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440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 101749. July 10, 1992.

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

Remedial Law; Appeal; Evidence; Findings of fact of the Court of

Appeals are as a rule conclusive upon the Supreme Court.—The issue raised
primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once
again constrained to stress the well-entrenched statutory and jurisprudential
mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule,
conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited
to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower
court.—Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its
findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that
it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been
committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion,
such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to
examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties.
Civil Law; Damages; Generally, a breach of promise to marry per se is
not actionable except, where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for
the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.—It is true that in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.

_________________

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*SECOND DIVISION.

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Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in

or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.—
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article
2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for moral damages.
Criminal Procedure; Penalty; Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.—Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime
is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give
rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
Same; Same; Same; The dismissal did not in any way affect the right of
herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action.—In the instant case, the dismissal of the
complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the
fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.
Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein
private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because
such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
Same; Evidence; There are different rules as to the competency of
witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.—
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules
as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal

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and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt

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442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is

sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence
only.
Same; Same; Same; It is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution
for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil
action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.—Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs.
Rillon, we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution
for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil
action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Nocon, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Conrado G. Bunag for petitioner.
Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo Law Office for respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
1
Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No.
07054, entitled “Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and
Conrado Bunag, Jr.,” which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at Bacoor, Cavite, and, 2implicitly,
respondent court’s resolution of September 3, 1991 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient
antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court
below, the evidence of record and the contentions of the parties, it is
appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be
extensively reproduced hereunder:

_______________

1Penned by Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon, with Associate Justices Antonio

M. Martinez and Asaali S. Isnani, concurring; Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 14.

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2Rollo, 24-26.

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Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

“Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered

indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had
sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought
plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband
and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-
appellant, defen-dant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his
application for a marriage license.
“Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in
Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. The court a
quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we
paraphrased as follows:

‘Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had
finished a college course in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on
September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, while she was walking
along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios Canteen to
take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male
companion. Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks
before September 8, 1973, they had a quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters
over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda at the Aristocrat
Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff
obliged, as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).’
‘Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr.
seated himself by her right side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat
Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the
right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead threatened
her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against
the post if she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru
F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and
dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and pleas. In spite of her
struggle she was

444

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444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

no match to the joint strength of the two male combatantsbecause of her

natural weakness being a woman and her smallstature. Eventually, she was
brought inside the hotel where thedefendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her
against her will and consent. She could not fight back and repel the attack
because afterBunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her,
hiscompanion held her two feet, removed her panty, after which heleft.
Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his companionto come back and
hold her feet if she did not surrender herwomanhood to him, thus he
succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt
and how blood came outof her private parts after her vagina was penetrated
by the penisof the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov. 5, 1974).
‘After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more
to allow her to go home but the latter would not consent and stated that he
would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry her, so
much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him.
Thereafter, they took a taxi together after the car that they used had already
gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.’s
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at
9:30 o’clock in the evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10)
o’clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of Bunag,
Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday,
she and Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license,
which they did. They filed their applications for marriage license (Exhibits
‘A’ and ‘C’) and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from
September 8, 1973 to September 29,
1973. ‘On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never
returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her parents
on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could
not sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-
appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5, 1974).
‘The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle,
Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on September 8, 1973 when plaintiff
failed to arrive home at 9:00 o’clock in the evening, his sister who is the
mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile,
and he told his sister that plaintiff might have married (baka nag-asawa,
t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next day

445

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Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

(Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio
captain Jacinto Manalili of Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff
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and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera’s house, so that her sister requested him to
go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de
Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado
Bunag, Sr., who told him, ‘Pare, the children are here already. Let us settle
the matter and have them married.’

‘He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she
would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr. and his father promised they would be
married.’

“Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant

Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant on September 8,
1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
eloped on that date because of the opposition of the latter’s father to their
relationship.
“Defendants-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get married, and this
fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez.
The couple made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of September 8,
1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend
Guillermo Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named
Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome then
proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital’s canteen where they had some snacks.
Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to Quirino Avenue where she could
get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after
Guillermo Ramos, Jr., and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a taxi
to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but
these were full. They finally got a room at the Holiday Hotel, where
defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate
number. Three hours later, the couple checked out of the hotel and
proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where
they stayed until September 19, 1973. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter
disagreements with plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats made to
his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.
“During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone
to the house of Juana de Leon and telling plaintiff-appellant that she would
be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado
Adreneda, member of the board of directors of Mandala Corporation,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.’s

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Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

employer, three times between the evening of September 8, 1973 and

September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to
know about his son’s whereabouts when he was told of the couple’s
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elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida

Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of
3
plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son.

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry

was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against
petitioner Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as
Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at
Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that
petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the
4
trial court rendered a decision ordering petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay
private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000,00 for and as attorney’s fees, as well as the costs of suit.
Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all
liability.
Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court’s
decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this
case. On the other hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appel-lants,
assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by the
trial court, which were summarized by respondent court as follows:
(1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly
abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding that
defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be
wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding
plaintiff-appellant damages
5
for the breach of defendants-appellants’
promise of marriage.
As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of
Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in
toto the decision of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is

_________________

3Ibid., 15-19.
4Ibid., 27-57; Annex C, Petition; per Executive Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza.
5Ibid., 15.

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Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

before us on a petition for review, contending that (1) respondent

court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for
petitioner’s defense, resulting in the misapprehension of facts and
violative of the law on preparation of judgments; and (2) it erred in
the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that

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there was forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement
6
and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages.
Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and
appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that
he and private respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no
case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement
and agreement to marry. It is averred that the agreement to marry has
been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both
parties and the exhibits presented in court.
This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of
the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and the weight
accorded thereto in the factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to
do is to evaluate and analyze anew the evidence, both testimonial
and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court,
and as further meticulously reviewed and discussed by respondent
court.
The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of
fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-
entrenched statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court.
Only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject
to clearly settled exceptions in case law.
Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the
latter, its findings of fact being conclusive. This Court has
emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh
such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction

________________

6Ibid., 7.

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Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been

committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of
discretion, such findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or
required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence
7
submitted by the parties. Neither does the instant case reveal any
feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our
decisional rules may warrant a review of the factual findings of the
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Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of

the records, we sustain the holding of respondent court in favor of
private respondent.
Petitioner likewise asserts that since the action involves a breach
of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored
rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
8
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable,
except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases
specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
9
damages. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in
the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of

_________________

7Morales vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 197 SCRA 391 (1991).

8De Jesus, et al. vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866 (1933).
9Ford vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 186 SCRA 21 (1990).

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VOL. 211,JULY10,1992 449

Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to

10
specifically provide for in the statutes.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of
petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal
knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to
marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter
renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one
days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the
award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and
2234 of the Civil Code.
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Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages

were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is
guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of
the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay
City Fiscal’s Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability
will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious
act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
11
direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
12
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might

_________________

10Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 176
SCRA 778 (1989).
11Calalang, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 194 SCRA 514 (1991).
12Sec. 2(b), Rule 111, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure; Faraon, et al. vs. Prieta,
24 SCRA 582 (1968).

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450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bunag, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way
affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two
proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore,
it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that
there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the
quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal
action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action
it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance
13 14
of evidence only. Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, we stressed that
it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first
instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action

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based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise

be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman) and Padilla, J., concur.

Nocon, J., No part.

Petition denied.

Note.—Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the

defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for injuries he may have
suffered (Simex International [Manila] Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
183 SCRA 360).

——o0o——

_________________

13Ocampo, et al. vs. Jenkins, et al., 14 Phil. 681 (1909).

14107 Phil. 783 (1960).

451

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