Journal of School Choice

International Research and Reform

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Islamic Primary Schools in the Netherlands

Jaap Dronkers

To cite this article: Jaap Dronkers (2016) Islamic Primary Schools in the Netherlands, Journal of
School Choice, 10:1, 6-21, DOI: 10.1080/15582159.2015.1131508
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2015.1131508

© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &

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JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE
2016, VOL. 10, NO. 1, 6–21
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2015.1131508

INVITED ARTICLE

Islamic Primary Schools in the Netherlands

Jaap Dronkers
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market, Maastricht University, Maastricht, Netherlands

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
During the last 20 years of the 20th century, Islamic primary Islam; religious school;
school choice; Netherlands
schools were founded in the Netherlands thanks to its consti-
tutional “freedom of education” (which allows state-funded
religious schools), its voucher system (each school receives
the same amount of money per pupil), and school choice by
parents. This essay gives some background information about
the Dutch system of religious schools and the history of Dutch
Islamic schools.1 I address four aspects of Islamic schools: (a)
contradictions around the quality of education in Islamic
schools; (b) attitudes and values of pupils and parents in
Islamic schools, deviating from the broader Dutch society; (c)
serious administrative problems around establishing and run-
ning Islamic schools, due to the nonexistence of Islamic Dutch
elites and teachers; and (d) negative relations between the
current Islam religion and educational performance in modern
societies.

Introduction
Founding and maintaining religious schools in the Netherlands is rela-
tively quite simple, since the great political compromise of 1917 (the so-
called school pacification). Since that year, the equal funding for all
nonpublic schools but also equal quality standards and curricula for
public and nonpublic schools have been a part of the constitution. This
was a constitutional right not only for one dominant religion, but for all
religions in the Netherlands: Roman Catholic and several Orthodox-
Protestant churches (and even religiously neutral schools). This constitu-
tional right to found schools is, however, older: the liberal constitution of
1848 said that “teaching was free,” provided that the teachers had ability
and state supervision. It also stated that sufficient public education should
be provided by the national government. The Dutch constitutional “free-
dom of education” is thus foremost the right by religious and nonreligious
foundations and associations (not churches) to found schools within the
state parameters of educational quality and supervision. The parental right
to choose a school for their children is a consequence of this founder

CONTACT Jaap Dronkers j.dronkers@maastrichtuniversity.nl Research Centre for Education and the Labour
Market (ROA), Maastricht University, Kleverparkweg 58 zwart, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, Netherlands.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 7

“freedom of education,” but the right to refuse children of nonpublic

schools is limited by state regulations and jurisprudence (Dijkstra,
Dronkers, & Karsten, 2004).
“Freedom of teaching” dates back to the time of the French Revolution in which
freedom of teaching without interference by church or state was one of the
fundamental human rights. This “freedom of education” right became an issue
between more or less secular European states and the church (mostly but not only
the Catholic Church), during most of the 19th century until the mid-20th century.
This explains why many European states (including France) have reached a
political compromise of funding of religious schools by the state, and some (for
instance, Germany) have also a constitutional freedom of education (Dronkers,
2004). But in most European states only one dominant church was involved in this
political battle and thus only a restricted option for religious schools exists. The
Netherlands, however, have been a multireligious society since its establishment in
the 16th century and thus does not have a restricted list of religious schools. As a
consequence, Dutch state-funded primary schools can have different religions:
Catholic, Protestant-Christian, Reformed Orthodox, Reformed Liberated,
Anthroposophy, Combined Protestant and Catholic, Islamic, Interconfessional,
Evangelical, and Hindu (see Table 1). Nowhere in Europe will one find this large
variety of religious state-funded schools; nor these numbers of Islamic schools,
which are state funded and supervised. Therefore, the functioning of the Dutch
Islamic schools are interesting for a wider international audience, because there is
a demand for Islamic state-funded schools in some other European countries (for
instance, Belgium and United Kingdom).
After brief sketches of the Dutch systems of religious schools and the
history of Dutch Islamic schools, I address four aspects of Islamic schools:
quality, attitudes and values, administrative problems, and Islamic religion.

Table 1. Most important denominations of Dutch primary school in 2014.

Denomination primary N Absolute score final Socioeconomic status Added
school schools test pupils value
Public 2350 533,51 37,4 −0,36
Catholic 2064 534,72 34,5 0,29
Protestant-Christian 1785 534,39 37,0 0,00
Neutral nonpublic 340 535,88 34,9 0,45
Reformed Orthodox 165 535,33 29,1 0,75
Reformed Liberated 113 534,70 27,8 −0,59
Anthroposophy 68 535,86 24,8 −0,03
Protestant and Catholic 56 533,55 27,1 −0,31
Islamic 43 530,79 10,6 1,57
Interconfessional 10 534,23 27,8 −0,97
Evangelical 10 533,22 13,9 −0,78
Hindu 6 533,71 −9,1 1,69
Note. Only schools with pupils in the last grade of primary school (age 11/12).
8 J. DRONKERS

The Dutch system of religious schools

Because there is sufficient literature on the Dutch system of religious schools
(Dijkstra et al., 2004; Glenn & de Groof, 2004), I summarize here only its
most important characteristics, which are relevant for Islamic schools.
Although the Dutch system is an extreme case, many European countries
have some form of state-funded religious schools, combined with a kind of
voucher system and school choice by parents (Dronkers, 2004; Smyth, Lyons,
& Darmody, 2013). As a consequence, Islamic state-funded schools might
also be established in other European countries because all have substantial
Islamic minorities.
Religious schools have to be founded and owned by associations or
foundations, if they want to receive financial grants from the state. As a
consequence, religious schools are not owned nor run by churches or mos-
ques; they have independent legal identities. For instance, in the late 20th
century a very orthodox Catholic bishop could not remove the adjective
Catholic from more liberal Catholic schools in his diocese, because the courts
ruled they were owned and run by independent institutions. The legal
position of religious schools in the Netherlands resembles that of charter
schools in the United States, although the former have a much higher
stability than the later, and also less degree of freedom in their operation
(national curriculum, inspectorate, nation-wide tests and exams, salaries, ban
of fees). Accordingly, differences between public and religious schools in the
Netherlands are more cultural than material, more school-climate differences
than factual operation differences.
Religious state-funded schools have the same national curriculum as
public schools, but they can add religious teaching to the slate and have
a bit more freedom in applying the standards of that national curriculum
inside their schools. The quality criteria of the national educational inspec-
torate apply to all state-funded schools, public, religious, or not. National
curriculum is the basis for the nation-wide test at the end of primary
school and the national exams at the end of secondary school.
Participation in this test at the end of primary education is obligatory
and essential for obtaining access to the higher tracks in secondary educa-
tion (grammar school and higher secondary school). The same holds for
the national exam at the end of secondary education. Without a successful
exam, entrance into university or vocational college is virtually impossible.
Nationwide publications of quality of all primary and secondary schools by
the inspectorate and daily papers have become common since the early
21st century. These publications of school quality both of the Inspectorate
and daily papers use as their core the comparable school results of testing
at the end of primary school and the national exams at the end of
secondary schools.
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 9

There are national standards for teacher training and qualification.

Payment and application of these standards is mandatory for all public and
religious school in order to get state funding. If these standards are not met,
closure of the school will follow, as I discuss as follows in the case of Islamic
secondary schools.
One of the interesting unintended consequences of this Dutch version of
“freedom of education” is that elite private schools, operating without state
funding but with parental fees, disappeared in the mid-20th century. Given
the high standard of both public and religious schools and their low costs
(from parental perspectives), the demand for elite private schools dwindled
away. The few private schools, which still existed at the start of the 21st
century, are institutions to help school dropouts with well-to-do parents to
obtain a (higher) secondary school diploma, but do not have high prestige.
Mandatory schooling ends at the age of 18, although from 16 years
old onwards schooling can be combined with work (apprenticeship
schooling) and a minimum diploma is required before one can leave
the educational system. Grading is based on performance in class: social
promotion to higher grades hardly exists (only in the lowest vocational
track of vocational education). Stepping down to a lower track in
secondary education is an option after performance failure, although
higher educated parents will prefer repetition of the same grade within
the same track (avoiding downward mobility).
Although the Dutch do not use the term often, they have a voucher
system: Each nonpublic school gets the same grants per pupils as the public
schools get per pupil. As a consequence, if pupil numbers of a school drop,
the amount of state money for that school decreases as well (although with
some delay). Substantial sponsoring of schools by churches, firms, or other
agencies will be deducted from the state grant, although the strict rules were
somewhat relaxed in 2014. Parents using state-funded schools are not obliged
to pay a school fee and the nonobligatory parental school fee should not be
used for core activities of the school (teaching; building). Schools (both
public and nonpublic) get additional funding for pupils with less educated
parents in the same way. Because most parents at Islamic schools have very
low education, Islamic schools are an important beneficiary of this additional
money.
School choice by parents within municipalities is more or less free,
depending on whether schools want to increase their number of pupils.
Nonpublic schools cannot be obliged by the public authorities to increase
their number of pupils above a funding threshold. The housing for primary
schools is a task of the municipality and can be a reason for the delay of
opening new religious schools or their further expansion. Housing of the
growing and diminishing schools is often a hindrance for a quick adjustment
of school to the changing demand by parents and demographic population
10 J. DRONKERS

changes. But municipalities have never been successful in thwarting infinitely

school founders with enough involved parents, nor delaying enlargement of
the housing of popular schools. A common strategy of schools with increas-
ing numbers of pupils is to establish a new location of their school elsewhere
in the municipality under the same school board. Municipalities tried often
to restrict parental school choice, because it increases school segregation.
They try to form catchment areas of several schools, which parents can
choose. Most attempts have failed in the long run due to the constitutional
impossibility to force these schemes on all schools and parents.
In the early 20th century most nonpublic schools were Catholic,
Protestant-Christian, or neutral nonpublic. Their school boards were closely
related to the Protestant and Catholic political parties, which were members
of nearly all Dutch governments since 1919. The number of Catholic and
Protestant-Christian schools and their pupils increased until the 1960s and
became stable, despite the widespread secularization of Dutch society. By the
beginning of the 21st century more than 50% of the adult population
belonged to no church or religious association. Yet the variation of religious
schools increased, mainly by the foundation of smaller orthodox Protestant
schools like Reformed Orthodox, Reformed Liberated, and Evangelical. These
smaller orthodox Protestant schools lacked political backing by influential
national Christian-Democrat parties, but still grew during the second half of
the 20th century. Simultaneously, the number of anthroposophical schools
increased strongly, though anthroposophy is not a religion. This reflects the
increasing influence of nonreligious views on education.

The history of Dutch Islamic schools

During the last 20 years of 20th century, two types of non-Christian
religious schools were founded: Hindu and Islamic.2 Hinduism came to
the Netherlands via their former colony Suriname (North Latin-American)
where they were imported from British-India after the abolishment of
slavery in the 19th century (as in the British parts of the Caribbean).
Before or shortly after the independence of Suriname, substantial numbers
of Hindus migrated to the Netherlands, thanks to their Dutch passports.
Among the Surinamese migrants were Muslims, who also originated from
British-India (34,000).3 But the number of these Surinamese migrants was
dwarfed by the large numbers of Islamic migrants coming since the 1960s
as guest workers from Turkey (285,000) and Morocco (296,000), of which
the majority settled themselves with their families in Western Europe. Later
smaller groups of migrants came from Afghanistan (31,000), Iraq (27,000),
and Somalia (20,000).
The first attempts to found Islamic primary schools came in 1980, and in
1988 the first two Islamic schools opened their doors. In 2014 there are 46
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 11

Islamic primary schools, three of which do not yet have pupils in their last
grade. There were two Islamic secondary schools founded as well (in
Rotterdam and Amsterdam), but both were closed by the Dutch educational
authorities due to their insufficient quality and administrative problems.
After this failure the Christian School Foundation in Rotterdam decided in
2014 to establish an Islamic secondary school under its legal umbrella and
auspices.4 All Islamic primary schools have both male and female pupils, a bit
less of the latter. Co-education is standard in the Netherlands and only-boys
or only-girls schools do not exist. Also classes in Islamic school are mixed,
but some lessons (swimming, gymnastics) will not be mixed.
There is no easy explanation for the successful foundation of Islamic
primary schools and the failure of secondary schools. Perhaps founding a
secondary school is more difficult, because they must contain a number of
hierarchal tracks (from grammar school to vocational training) with more
specialized teaching, more administrative burdens, and more pupils. Another
explanation might be that the two secondary schools were founded with
primarily orthodox Islamic religious aims, while the primary schools had
more often also an emancipation aim. When the focus of the school founding
was on combating the educational disadvantage of Muslim children, the
Dutch local authorities were rather more accommodating than when the
focus was on the religious character of the school (Driessen & Merry, 2006).

Do Islamic schools meet minimum school quality?

The political compromise of 1917 was also an effort to create equal condi-
tions and equal quality of all schools, public and nonpublic. One element was
the creation of the same final examination of secondary education and equal
rules for the transition from the common primary school into one of the
tracks of secondary school (from vocational schooling to grammar school).
The score on a final test at the end of primary school and the teacher’s
recommendation about the most fitting track are the essentials for admission
to the higher tracks. The aggregates of these final scores (measures of
language and math) and the teacher recommendations per school are public
and published by national and local media. Table 1 shows these aggregated
scores for all schools in 2014 on a nationally used standardized test. This
national test has an average score of 535. Its minimum is 501 (equivalent for
lowest level of vocational schooling) and its maximum is 550 (equivalent for
grammar school). Islamic schools have on average the lowest score: 531, but
that is above the official minimum score. The Dutch inspectorate applies
527–529 as lower band for schools with more than 60% low educated
parents. Schools with lower scores and without a prospect of quick improve-
ment will be called publically a weak or very weak school by Dutch inspec-
torate. These schools will lose pupils (in most cases by fewer new pupils) and
12 J. DRONKERS

thus funding and run the risk of closure by Dutch authorities. Table 1 also
shows the parental socioeconomic status, based on the postal code of the
homes of the pupils. Pupils of Islamic schools have also a very low parental
socioeconomic status, although their average is not the lowest. I computed
the added value of all schools, based on their final test score average, the
average parental socioeconomic status and the percentage parents with very
low education. The estimation of parental socioeconomic status was based on
the zip code of the pupils of a school in combination with a population-
composition scale of all zip codes of the Netherlands, made by the Dutch
government. Fifty is the highest possible score of a zip code on this popula-
tion-composition scale (% more twice of average income, % minimum
income; % tertiary education, % unemployment, % nonwestern migrants),
and minus 50, the lowest possible score. The percentage of parents with low
education are provided by the schools: high percentages give them more
funding. This computation shows that Islamic schools have a higher final test
score then one might expect given the social background of the parents of the
pupils, around 1.6 points. Only Hindu schools have a higher added-value of
1.7 points. A difference of one point on this final test can give a better chance
to enter a higher track in secondary education (Korthals, 2015). A compar-
able positive added value of Islamic schools is also found by Merry and
Driessen (2014). So, there is a paradox: pupils at Islamic primary schools
have very low final test scores, but given their parental background these low
final scores are higher than expected.
According to the education inspectorate, 4% of all primary schools were
weak or very weak in September 2011 and 3% in September 2012
(Inspectie, 2013, p. 63). Twenty percent of the Islamic schools were
weak or very weak in 2011, against 7% in 2012. It is important to note
that the inspectorate takes the parental social-economic background into
account when they formulate their verdict, but given their very low
parental socioeconomic background, Islamic schools run a higher risk
that their average final test score and other quality indicators fall below
the lowest admitted by the inspectorate. The substantial change in the
percentage of weak and very weak primary schools illustrates clearly that
schools make a big effort to improve as soon as possible after a negative
inspectorate verdict (Koning & van der Wiel, 2013). Weak schools are
often helped by their national organizations such as the Islamic School
Board Organization (ISBO), or by special pedagogical teams.
What explains Islamic schools’ combination of low final test scores,
but positive added value and strong improvements? There is no sys-
tematic research, but several possible explanations. First, according to
the reports of the inspectorate, the didactical and pedagogical approach
of Islamic schools is conservative compared with other Dutch primary
schools: they use more often front-class teaching and homework. The
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 13

effectiveness of modern didactics is highly debatable, but most scholars

agree that pupils with few parental cultural resources are helped more by
structured teaching and clear curriculum requirements. Second, the same
inspectorate reports suggest that Islamic schools tend to invest more
teaching and learning time to the basic skills (Dutch language; math;
geography; history) and avoid spending much time on noncore activities
(music, discussion, swimming). In this way, they increase the amount of
time actually spent on learning the knowledge and skills measured in
final tests (Slavin, 2003), a point I will return to below. Third, Islamic
primary schools tend to have low ethnic diversity, typically serving only
two or three ethnic different groups (Turks, Moroccans, Indian-
Suriname); in strong contrast, urban public schools have considerable
ethnic diversity (Veerman, van de Werfhorst, & Dronkers, 2013).
Although there is no agreement whether ethnic diversity harms scholas-
tic achievements, there is agreement that high levels of ethnic diversity
challenge school operations and might hamper quality. Fourth, most
Islamic schools are situated in an urban context and have pupils from
poor neighborhoods. The Islamic religious activities of their schools and
the active Islamic community of their parents might act as an extra
protection against the temptations of that urban context and neighbor-
hoods (comparable to the Catholic school effect: Bryk, Lee, & Holland,
1993; Coleman & Hoffer, 1987; Coleman, Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982).

Attitudes and values of Islamic schools

The Netherlands has been a multireligious country since the 17th century
with a small Protestant majority and a large Catholic minority, which live
alongside each other. The Protestant majority broke in the 19th century into
different streams ranging from liberal to very orthodox. As a consequence, at
the end of the 19th century Dutch society was “pillarized,” with politico-
denominational segregation of Dutch society in Catholic, Protestant, Social-
Democrat, and Neutral segments or “pillars.” The Netherlands was “verti-
cally” divided by religions and ideologies. These pillars all had their own
social institutions: their own newspapers, broadcasting organizations, politi-
cal parties, trade unions and farmers’ associations, banks, schools, hospitals,
universities, scouting organizations, and sports clubs. Political compromises
were hammered out by the elites of these “pillars.” The great political
compromise of 1917 (the so-called school pacification), which allowed reli-
gious schools funded by the state and equal quality-standards and curricula
for public and nonpublic schools is an example of such a compromise
between the elites of these “pillars”(Lijphart, 1968). Only in the 1970s and
1980s did this “pillarization” erode. Now pillarization of Dutch society has
disappeared, but remnants can still be seen in the 21st century: religious
14 J. DRONKERS

schools funded by the state being one of these remnants. The breakdown of
pillarization did not decrease religious schools, although many of the
Catholic and Protestant schools are only religious in name, not in daily
practice or by the religion of the teachers and even of the school boards.
Yet there is no increasing preference among the growing numbers of non-
religious parents for public schools (see further about the resilience of
religious school in a nonreligious society Dijkstra et al., 2004).
Moreover, some orthodox Protestant communities continue to behave as
small “pillars.” Members of the Reformed Churches (Liberated) have their
own primary and secondary schools, their own national newspaper, and
some other organizations, such as a labor union. Members of several
Orthodox Reformed Churches have also founded their own schools, news-
paper, and political party. Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands are also
using the legal possibilities created for the pillarized structure of society, by
setting up their own schools.
As a consequence of these religious differences and the following pillariza-
tion, there was no national consensus or standards about the values and
norms, which should be taught in schools. These noncognitive educational
goals are left to the schools within the former “pillars.”
Merry and Driessen (2014, pp. 15–17) provide information about
citizenship of primary school pupils from a nationwide study. Their
four components of citizenship are measured knowledge, reflection,
skills, and attitudes; they also refer to four central societal tasks: acting
democratically, acting in a socially responsible manner, dealing with
conflicts, and dealing with differences (Ten Dam, Geijsel, &
Reumerman, 2011). The Knowledge scale (27 items) varies between 0
and 1. The scales Reflection (28 items), Skills (15 items), and Attitude
(24 items) vary between 1 and 4. Table 2 provides insight into the
citizenship competences of pupils of Islamic schools and compares
these with the scores of pupils of comparable schools (socio-economic
composition) and the average school.
With regards to three dimensions (reflection, skills, and attitudes) pupils at
Islamic schools score considerably higher than pupils at comparable schools,
and still higher than pupils at the average school. Only with regard to

Table 2. Comparison citizenship knowledge, reflection, skills, and attitudes in 2011 (Mean scores
of grade 8, final grade Dutch primary school).
Knowledge Reflection Skills Attitudes
Islamic schools 0.70 2.57 3.25 3.20
Comparable schools 0.71 2.38 3.10 3.05
Average schools 0.78 2.25 3.01 2.95
Mean/Standard deviation 0.77/0.18 2.96/0.43 3.04/0.39 2.27/0.56
Note. Adapted from “On the Right Track? Islamic Schools in the Netherlands After an Era of Turmoil” by M. S.
Merry and G. Driessen, 2014, Race, Ethnicity and Education, p. 17. doi:10.1080/13613324.2014.985586
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 15

knowledge competence do pupils at Islamic schools score nearly the same as

pupils at comparable schools, but significantly lower than pupils at the
average school. These findings directly challenge the assumption that pupils
at Islamic schools are less likely to cultivate the relevant civic virtues for
Dutch society at large. To be sure, some schools manage to cultivate civic
competences better than others, but this is not related with their religious or
private background (also Avram and Dronkers, 2011).
An older article (Driessen, 1997, p. 56) contains information about the
parental background of pupils of Islamic schools. The differences
between Islamic schools and non-Islamic schools are generally not very
large. The largest is that pupils at Islamic schools attend Koran classes
more often than pupils at comparable schools. Koran classes are part of
the regular curriculum at Islamic schools, in the same way that Bible
classes are a part of the regular curriculum at Protestant schools. Not all
pupils in Islamic school attend Koran classes because schools might have
trouble finding qualified Koran teachers or some pupils get exemption
from these classes. Another significant difference is that pupils at Islamic
schools are far more frequently given homework. This might be a part of
a specific strategy at these schools to make more of an “authoritarian”
effort to reduce the educational disadvantage of immigrant children than
“regular,” more liberal primary schools tend to make. A third difference
is the importance attached to religion as an important aspect of upbring-
ing. Parents of pupils at Islamic schools attach more importance to
religion than parents in other schools (remember that parents at most
Catholic and Protestant schools are far more secularized). Also parents
of pupils at Islamic have more often not the Dutch nationality, although
obtaining Dutch nationality by immigrants from less developed coun-
tries is far more common than by immigrants from within the European
Union (Dronkers & Vink, 2012).

Administration problems
Nonpublic schools are administrated by foundations or associations with
their own legal status, independently from churches, religious organiza-
tions, employers’ organizations, and so forth. The ground for this rule is
the separation between church and state, and thus the impossibility to
grant state money to religious schools. As a consequence, boards of
nonpublic schools need members who can run their schools, who can
negotiate with local and national authorities, and so forth. Catholic and
Orthodox-Protestant schools could find enough well-educated and well-
connected members for their school boards. The large Catholic minority
had enough upper class believers to recruit efficient school-board mem-
bers in the 19th century and the same held for the smaller Orthodox-
16 J. DRONKERS

Protestant groups in the 20th century. But what was true for these
indigenous religious groups is not necessary true for the Islamic and
Hindu groups. The later two religions were endogenous religions in the
Netherlands until 1960s (if we ignore the Dutch colonies) and given
their migration-history (unskilled labor migration into a society which
was not very open to non-European newcomers) lacked well-educated
and well-connected believers for their own organizations, like boards of
their religious schools. As a consequence of this lack of well-educated
and well-connected believers, there were many serious administrative
problems in Islamic schools due to mismanagement of the school
boards: misuse of educational money for other purposes, fraud, misman-
agement of nominating teachers, serious conflicts within boards, and so
forth. The quality of the (financial) administration is scrutinized by the
education inspectorate. If that quality is too low without prospects of
improvement the school will be closed down (formally they do not
receive the state grant anymore, and are thus insolvent). However, this
lack of well-educated and well-connected believers also means that
Islamic schools miss a common network with the Dutch authorities
and society at large. This weak network between Islamic school board
members and the Dutch political and administrative authorities means
that the Dutch usual way to solve administrative problems with schools
(strike a compromise between board and authorities) cannot be applied.
This lack of well-educated and well-connected members of Islamic
school boards and thus their failure to run their school properly accord-
ing to the national norms of the education inspectorate are important
explanations for the closing of the only two Islamic secondary schools in
the Netherlands.
Most teachers at Islamic schools are not Muslims, and the qualifica-
tion of these teachers is more or less equal to that of non-Islamic
schools. As stated previously, there are national standards for teacher
training and qualification and application is mandatory for state fund-
ing. There are too few qualified Islamic teachers available, so schools are
forced to nominate non-Islamic teachers acceptable to the education
inspectorate. This lack of believing teachers is not unique for Islamic
schools. Catholic and Protestant schools have the same problem attract-
ing believing teachers, due to the high level of secularization in the
Netherlands (more than 50% in no religion; more among the educated).
The secularized parents of pupils attending Catholic and Protestant
schools do not care much whether the teachers believe or do not believe
(Dijkstra et al., 2004), but the parents of Islamic schools value religion as
important in upbringing of their children (see Table 3). The need to use
non-Muslim teachers by Islamic schools adds additional tensions within
these schools, more than in other religious schools.
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 17

Table 3. Family and pupil characteristics of pupils on Islamic schools, comparable school (=SES
composition) and average school.
Islamic school Comparable school Average school
Foreign nationality mother % 82 62 5
Foreign nationality father % 78 58 5
Foreign language at home in % 84 73 5
Importance religion in upbringing 3.9 3.4 2.6
Importance parent language in upbringing 2.8 2.6 2.6
Length stay in Holland (years) 3.8 5.2 4.2
Pre-school care % yes 21 40 81
Koran classes % yes 83 42 3
Home work frequency 2.0 1.6 1.7
Source: Driessen, 1997: 56.

Islamic religion
Although individual socioeconomic differences between migrant pupils and
their families are the most important explanations of difference in their
educational performance, there remain—despite all controls for these back-
grounds—substantial differences between migrant children originating from
different origins. These origin differences (van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap,
2004), can be summarized as follows (Dronkers & de Heus, 2013):
“Migrants’ pupils from Islamic origin countries (Turkey, Morocco,
Pakistan) have lower scores than comparable migrants’ pupils from
Christian origin countries (Yugoslavia, Poland, Russia), who have lower
scores than comparable migrants’ pupils from non-Islamic Asia (India,
Vietnam, Korea, China).”
This is an outcome that is repeatedly found in research. Further analyses
show that this outcome is related with Islamic religion, not with an origin
from a country with a majority of Islamic believers. Dronkers and
Fleischmann (2010) show that individual religion is related to lower educa-
tional attainment of second-generation Islamic men in Europe, not their
origin from a dominantly Islamic country. Without any doubt Islamic
migrants perceive and face discrimination in Europe (André, Dronkers, &
Fleischmann, 2009), but they feel no more discriminated against than
migrants who adhere other non-Christian religions (Jews; Eastern religions).
Thus discrimination alone cannot be a valid explanation of the lower educa-
tional performance of Islamic migrants, because otherwise the migrant pupils
originating from Asian non-Islamic countries should also have low educa-
tional performance. Migration to Western Europe from Islamic countries like
Turkey and Morocco started in the 1960s with guest-workers, temporary
labor migrants recruited for unskilled work in dwindling industrial sectors
(textile, coal, shipbuilding; Icduygu, 2009). They followed earlier waves of
labor migration to Western Europe from Italy, Spain, and Yugoslavia in the
1950s, which also came for unskilled work. The possible negative selectivity
18 J. DRONKERS

of these guest-workers programs (firms and immigration organizations

sought young, uneducated workers) seems not to be unique for immigrants
from Turkey or Morocco; rather negative selectivity seems also true of guest
workers from Italy, Spain, and Yugoslavia (Dronkers & de Heus, 2010).
It is possible that some values and norms related with Islam explain the
low educational performance of pupils from Islamic countries. These coun-
tries score very low at the Gender Empowerment Measurement (GEM). The
GEM evaluates women’s participation and decision-making ability in politi-
cal and economic forums (Klasen, 2006). Ranging from 0 to 100, it combines
variables such as women’s share of parliamentary seats and ministerial
positions; as well as managerial, senior official, and legislative jobs; their
share of technical and professional jobs; and gender income differences. The
very low GEM of Islamic countries explains not only the low educational
performance of female migrant pupils from Islamic origin countries, but also
the low performance of male migrant pupils from Islamic origin countries
(Dronkers & Kornder, 2015).5 Thus the unequal gender norms in the Islamic
countries (masculine virility and feminine purity) may offer a valid explana-
tion for the low educational performance of both male and female migrant
pupils from countries with Islam as the dominant religion. Religion need not
be a “black box” of cultural phenomena, its various aspects can be analyzed
(gender equality, economic values, authority) and their importance in adher-
ents’ behaviour estimated. It can imply that values and norms, which are
related to a religion, can be adjusted to new circumstances and challenges.
An example of such an adjustment is Catholicism, which adjusted to capit-
alism without losing its critical stance toward gluttony.

Conclusion
Islamic primary schools have gained a foot in the Dutch educational
system and their numbers are increasing. A partial explanation of this
growth is their higher quality compared with public schools with the same
socioeconomic composition. Another reason for their growth is that
Islamic parents value a religious upbringing of their children and see
Islamic schools as an extra protection against the temptations of their
urban neighborhoods. A more conservative pedagogic approach, more
time-on-task for core subjects, lower ethnic school diversity and the active
Islamic community around the primary school could explain the relative
higher quality of Islamic primary schools.
However, the running of secondary Islamic schools has failed because of
low quality and serious administrative problems. An important reason for
this failure is the nonexistence of a well-educated and well-connected Islamic
elite for the foundations and associations that establish and run the religious
schools according the national norms of the education Inspectorate.
 JOURNAL OF SCHOOL CHOICE 19

A final challenge for Islamic schools are the gender values and norms
related with the Islamic religion in the Mediterranean region, where most
Islam migrants in continental Europe originate. These gender values and
norms hamper educational performance of both male and female children in
their migration societies because they reference a society which no longer
exists for them and thus blocks adjustment to modern society. In modern
society, high education performance by male and female students is of
tantamount importance, and very different and unequal gender roles (mascu-
line virility; feminine purity) seem not helpful for this performance. Islamic
schools in Europe might be instrumental for that adjustment of Islam to
modernity. An indication of their possible success as such an instrument is
the positive added value of Islamic primary schools in the Netherlands, for
boys and girls.
A next step in the study of Islamic schools in Europe is to see whether
these Dutch observations apply to other countries where Islamic schools are
now established (Belgium for instance) or where quasi-Islamic schools exist
(England).

Notes
1. This article is a rewritten and updated version of an older one about Islamic schools,
written in Dutch (Dronkers, 2011). I also use extensively the article of Merry and
Driessen (2014) on Islamic schools in the Netherlands. I presented this article at the 4th
International Conference on School Choice & Reform (ICSCR), January 16–19, 2015 in
Fort Lauderdale.
2. Before World War II there were also Jewish schools in the Netherlands. The massacre
of Dutch Jews during German occupation and the departure of the few survivors to
Israel and the United States, did not allow for Jewish primary schools any more.
3. Numbers refer to an estimation of the Islam population in the Netherlands in 2008
(Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012).
4. http://www.avicenna-college.com/
5. Male and female pupils from Hinduism countries would perform even better, if the
GEM of these origin countries would be higher.

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