Motivating Sustainable Consumption

Motivating Sustainable Consumption
a review of evidence on consumer

behaviour and behavioural change
a report to the Sustainable Development Research Network
January 2005
Professor Tim Jackson

Centre for Environmental Strategy
University of Surrey
GUILDFORD Surrey
GU2 7XH
t.jackson@surrey.ac.uk
www.surrey.ac.uk/CES
Acknowledgements
I am profoundly grateful to all those who have contributed inputs of various kinds to
this work. Particular thanks should go to Malcolm Eames at PSI for his invaluable
guidance and support throughout, to Kristina Dahlström for her careful note-taking
thoughtful inputs, and to the project advisory committee for their help in framing the
project and reviewing its progress. Previous drafts of the work were presented at
various workshops and informal seminars, and I would like to thank all those who
took the time to attend those seminars and comment on progress.
Numerous individuals have provided advice, comment, criticism and suggestions for
improving the work and improving its clarity and scope. I owe particular debts of
gratitude to Katie Begg, Andrew Darnton, Andy Davey, Andy Dobson, Paul Ekins,
Tara Garnett, Birgitta Gatersleben, Alan Hallsworth, Maxine Holdsworth, Michael
Jacobs, Wander Jager, Bronwen Jones, Andrew Lee, Henry Leveson-Gower, Roger
Levett, Karen Lucas, John Manoochehri, Michael Massey, Laurie Michaelis, Ronan
Palmer, Miriam Pepper, Chris Pomfret, Trewin Restorick, Jill Rutter, Bob Ryder,
Louise Shaxson, Sigrid Stagl and David Uzzell for invaluable inputs and insights at
various stages of development.
This work represents a substantial output from a research fellowship on the ‘social
psychology of sustainable consumption’ funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council’s Sustainable Technologies Programme (STP). I am grateful both for the
financial support offered by the ESRC and the guidance of the (former) STP
programme manager, Frans Berkhout.
Contents
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... iii
Executive Summary....................................................................................................... v
Part 1 Framing the Debate ................................................................................ v
Part 2 Models of Consumer Behaviour ........................................................... vi
Part 3 Towards Behavioural Change ............................................................... xi
PART 1: FRAMING THE DEBATE........................................................................ 1
1 Towards Sustainable Consumption Policy ............................................................ 3

1.1 The Challenge of Behavioural Change ...................................................... 3
1.2 The Challenge of Sustainable Consumption.............................................. 4
1.3 Terms of Reference for this Review .......................................................... 5
1.4 The Question of Evidence.......................................................................... 5
1.5 The Limitations of Systematic Review ...................................................... 6
1.6 Overview of the Structure .......................................................................... 7
2 Consumption: the vanguard of history? ................................................................. 9

2.1 Consumption and Well- Being.................................................................... 9
2.2 Consumption and Needs .......................................................................... 10
2.3 Consumption and Desire .......................................................................... 11
2.4 Ordinary and Inconspicuous Consumption.............................................. 13
2.5 Consumption and Identity........................................................................ 13
2.6 The Symbolic Role of Consumer Goods ................................................. 14
2.7 Consumption as Social Conversation ...................................................... 15
2.8 Consumption and the Pursuit of Meaning ............................................... 16
2.9 Conclusions .............................................................................................. 17
PART 2: MODELS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR ........................................... 19
3 The Role of Models .............................................................................................. 21
4 Rational Choice.................................................................................................... 29
4.1 Consumer Preference Theory................................................................... 30
4.2 The Attribute (Lancaster) Model ............................................................. 31
4.3 Rational Choice in Non-Purchasing Behaviour ....................................... 32
5 Against Rational Choice ...................................................................................... 35

5.1 Bounded Rationality, Habit and Emotion................................................ 35
5.2 The Argument against Individualism....................................................... 37
5.3 The Moral Critique ................................................................................... 39
6 Adjusted Expectancy-Value Theory.................................................................... 43

6.1 Simple Expectancy-Value Attitude Theory............................................. 43
6.2 Means-End Chain Theory........................................................................ 44
i
6.3 The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) .................................................. 46

6.4 The Theory of Planned Behaviour ........................................................... 48
7 Moral and Normative Conduct ............................................................................ 51

7.1 Ecological Value Theory ......................................................................... 52
7.2 Norm Activation Theory.......................................................................... 54
7.3 Stern’s Value Belief Norm Theory.......................................................... 56
7.4 The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct ............................................... 58
8 The Matter of Habit .............................................................................................. 63

8.1 Cognitive effort – control, automaticity and heuristics ........................... 64
8.2 The Role of Habit and Routine ................................................................ 65
8.3 Framing, Priming and Bias ...................................................................... 66
9 Sociality and Self ................................................................................................. 69

9.1 The Social-Symbolic Self ........................................................................ 70
9.2 The Project of Symbolic Self-Completion............................................... 73
9.3 Self-Concept, Cognitive Dissonance and Spillover ................................. 76
9.4 Self- Discrepancy Theory ......................................................................... 77
9.5 Social Identity Theory.............................................................................. 79
9.6 Cultural Theory........................................................................................ 84
10 Integrative Theories of Consumer Behaviour .................................................. 89

10.1 Structuration and Social Practices............................................................ 89
10.2 Stern’s Attitude-Behaviour-Context Model............................................. 92
10.3 Triandis’ Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour .......................................... 93
10.4 The Motivation-Opportunity-Abilities model.......................................... 95
10.5 Bagozzi’s Model of Consumer Action .................................................... 97
10.6 Summary Discussion ........................................................................... 99
PART 3: TOWARDS BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE ............................................ 103
11 Change, Persuasion and Learning.................................................................. 105

11.1 Persuasion Theory.................................................................................. 106
11.2 The Elaboration Likelihood Model........................................................ 107
11.3 Social Learning Theory.......................................................................... 109
11.4 Control, Helplessness and Participatory Problem Solving .................... 112
11.5 Breaking ‘Bad’ Habits ........................................................................... 114
11.6 Community-Based Social Marketing..................................................... 118
11.7 Summary Discussion ............................................................................. 119
12 Policy Options and Opportunities .................................................................. 121

12.1 Policy Options in Historical and Cultural Context ............................ 122
12.2 Policy Opportunities in Social and Institutional Context .................. 127
12. 3 Concluding Remarks.......................................................................... 132
References .................................................................................................................. 135
ii
Abstract
Consumer behaviour is key to the impact that society has on the environment. The
actions that people take and choices they make – to consume certain products and
services or to live in certain ways rather than others – all have direct and indirect
impacts on the environment, as well as on personal (and collective) well-being. This is
why the topic of ‘sustainable consumption’ has become a central focus for national
and international policy.
Why do we consume in the ways that we do? What factors shape and constrain our
choices and actions? Why (and when) do people behave in pro-environmental or pro-
social ways? And how can we encourage, motivate and facilitate more sustainable
attitudes, behaviours and lifestyles?
Motivating Sustainable Consumption sets out to address these questions. It reviews

the literature on consumer behaviour and behavioural change. It discusses the
evidence base for different models of change. It also highlights the dilemmas and
opportunities that policy- makers face in addressing unsustainable consumption
patterns and encouraging more sustainable lifestyles.
Changing behaviours – and in particular motivating more sustainable behaviours – is

far from straightforward. Individual behaviours are deeply embedded in social and
institutional contexts. We are guided as much by what others around us say and do,
and by the ‘rules of the game’ as we are by personal choice. We often find ourselves
‘locked in’ to unsustainable behaviours in spite of our own best intentions.
In these circumstances, the rhetoric of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and ‘hands-off’

governance is inaccurate and unhelpful. Policy-makers are not innocent bystanders in
the negotiation of consumer choice. Policy intervenes continually in consumer
behaviour both directly (through regulation and taxes eg) and more importantly
through its extensive influence over the social context within which people act.
This insight offers a far more creative vista for policy innovation than has hitherto
been recognised. A concerted strategy is needed to make it easy to behave more
sustainably: ensuring that incentive structures and institutional rules favour
sustainable behaviour, enabling access to pro-environmental choice, engaging
people in initiatives to help themselves, and exemplifying the desired changes
within Government’s own policies and practices.
iii
iv
Executive Summary
Part 1 Framing the Debate
1. Towards Evidence Based Policy
Consumer behaviour is key to the impact that society has on the environment. The
actions that people take and the choices they make – to consume certain products and
services rather than others or to live in certain ways - all have direct and indirect
impacts on the environment, as well as on personal (and collective) well-being. This is
why the topic of ‘sustainable consumption’ has become a central focus for national
and international policy.
This report was commissioned by the Sustainable Development Research Network as

a preliminary review of the research on consumer behaviour and behavioural change.
These issues are becoming increasingly important in the context of emerging debates
about consumption, consumer behaviour and sustainable development.
Policy development in the context of behavioural change is notoriously difficult. One

of the reasons for this is the enormous variety of factors that influence behaviour.
Another is the ‘value laden- ness’ of behavioural and lifestyle issues. At the same
time, there is a widespread recognition of the need to engage in this difficult terrain
and to develop ‘evidence-based policies’ to support behavioural change. Nowhere is
this more relevant than in the domain of sustainable consumption.
2. Consumption: the vanguard of history?
Consumption, in the words of one author (Miller 1995) represents the ‘vanguard of
history’. The historical and contemporary literature suggests a huge variety of
different roles for consumption in modern society. These include its functional role in
satisfying needs for food, housing, transport, recreation, leisure, and so on. But
consumption is also implicated in processes of identity formation, social distinction
and identification, meaning creation and hedonic ‘dreaming’. Some authors argue
that these processes are driven by evolutionary imperatives of status and sexual
selection. Two key lessons flow from this literature.
The first is that material goods are important to us, not just for their functional uses,
but because they play vital symbolic roles in our lives. This symbolic role of
consumer goods facilitates a range of complex, deeply engrained ‘social
conversations’ about status, identity, social cohesion, group norms and the pursuit of
personal and cultural meaning. In the words of Mary Douglas (1976) ‘An
individual’s main objective in consumption is to help create the social world and to
find a credible place in it.’
v
The second key lesson is that, far from being able to exercise deliberative choice
about what to consume and what not to consume, for much of the time people find
themselves ‘locked in’ to unsustainable consumption patterns. Consumer 'lock- in'
occurs in part through the architecture of incentive structures, institutional barriers,
inequalities in access, and restricted choice. But it also flows from habits, routines,
social norms and expectations and dominant cultural values.
These lessons emphasise the difficulty and complexity associated with negotiating
pro-environmental behavioural change. They also highlight the need for policy to
come to grips with (and to influence) the social and institutional context of consumer
action, as well as attempting to affect individual behaviours (and behavioural
antecedents) directly.
Part 2 Models of Consumer Behaviour
3. The Role of Models
A key aim of this report is to provide an overview of different models of consumer

behaviour and of behavioural change. Conceptual models play two important roles in
understanding what motivates consumer behaviour and drives behavioural change.
In the first place, they provide heuristic frameworks for exploring and conceptualising
consumer behaviour. In particular, they can help us understand the social and
psychological influences on both mainstream and pro-environmental (or pro-social)
consumer behaviour. For example, some models offer conceptual insights into the
psychological antecedents of behaviour; others illustrate the way in which social
norms are contextualised; others again highlight the impact of different value
orientations on behaviour, and so on. These heuristic understandings also help us to
identify points of policy intervention.
Secondly, these models can be (and have been) used as frameworks to test empirically
the strength of different kinds of relationships (between values and behaviours for
example) in different circumstances. This is important for several reasons, not the
least of which is that it enables us to develop an empirical evidence base for particular
assertions about consumer behaviour and consumer motivation. It also allows us to
interrogate the strength of these relationships under specific conditions, and to explore
the possibilities for behavioural change.
Models that are good for heuristic understanding are not necessarily good for
empirical testing, and vice versa. A good conceptual model requires a balance
between parsimony and explanatory completeness.
4. Rational Choice
The starting point for the discussion of models of consumer behaviour is the familiar
‘rational choice model’ that guides much of existing policy. This model contends that
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consumers make decisions by calculating the individual costs and benefits of different
courses of action and choosing the option that maximises their expected net benefits.
Several key assumptions underlie the model. These are that:
• individual self- interest is the appropriate framework for understanding human

behaviour;
• ‘rational’ behaviour is the result of processes of cognitive deliberation; and
that
• consumer preferences are exogenous to the model – that is to say they are
taken as given without further elaboration as to their origins or antecedents.
The policy interventions that flow from this perspective are relatively straightforward.
In the first place, it is argued, policy should seek to ensure that consumers have access
to sufficient information to make informed choices about the available options.
Secondly, it is recognised that private decisions do not always take account of social
costs. Policy is therefore required to ‘internalise’ these external costs and make them
‘visible’ to private choice.
5. Against Rational Choice
Though familiar, and clearly parsimonious, the rational choice model has been
extensively criticised. One central criticism is that there are cognitive limitations on
our ability to take deliberative action. In fact, we use a variety of mental ‘short-cuts’
– habits, routines, cues, heuristics – which reduce the amount of cognitive processing
needed to act and often bypass cognitive deliberation entirely. A degree of
automaticity enters our behaviour, making it much more difficult to change, and
undermining a key assumption of the model.
Another problem is that affective (emotional) responses confound cognitive

deliberation. It is well-known in marketing theory, for example, that consumers build
affective relationships with products and respond at an emotional level to decisions
about what to buy and how to behave. Some evolutionary neuro-physiology even
suggests that emotion ‘precedes’ cognition in decision contexts. Our behaviours are
based more on emotional response than on conscious deliberation.
The self- interest assumption of the rational choice model has also been attacked. In
fact, human behaviour consists of social, moral and altruistic behaviours as well as
simply self- interested ones. To make matters worse, the assumption of individuality
is also suspect. Individual deliberations clearly do play some part on our behaviour.
But behaviours are usually embedded in social contexts. Social and interpersonal
factors continually shape and constrain individual preference.
6. Adjusted Expectancy Value Theories
Some social psychological models attempt to conceptualise human behaviour in a

more nuanced way. Rational choice theory is a form of ‘expectancy value’ theory. In
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this kind of theory, choices are supposed to be made on the basis of the expected
outcomes from a choice and the value attached to those outcomes. A range of
‘adjusted’ social psychological models of consumer behaviour seek to use this basic
idea to go beyond assumptions of rational choice and unravel the psychological
antecedents of consumer preferences.
Some theories also respond to critics by expanding on the expectancy value structure
of the rational choice model in various ways. In particular, they attempt to account
for the influence of other people’s attitudes on individual behaviour. The most famous
example of this kind of theory is Ajzen and Fishbein’s ‘Theory of Reasoned Action’.
Ajzen’s ‘Theory of Pla nned Behaviour’ extends the same model to incorporate the
influence of people’s perceptions about their own control over the situation.
These conceptual models are useful in understanding the structure of some intentional
behaviours. But they also leave out some key aspects of consumer behaviour. In
particular, they do not offer clear insights into normative (moral), affective
(emotional) and cognitive (e.g. habitual) dimensions of people’s behaviour.
Furthermore, the social psychological evidence suggests that some behaviours are not
mediated by either attitude or intention at all. In fact the reverse correlation, in which
attitudes are inferred from behaviours, is sometimes observed. This has important
implications for motivating sustainable consumption, because it suggests that
behaviours can be changed without necessarily changing attitudes first.
Moreover, these behaviour changes could be valuable in changing people’s

environmental attitudes more generally. People may recycle simply as a result of
changes in municipal waste collection services, without ever having decided that
‘recycling is a good thing’. But once they start recycling, some people will infer from
this that they are (to some extent) ‘green’. The possibility that this new attitude will
‘spill over’ into other behaviours is an intriguing one.
7. Moral and Normative Conduct
Moral and normative considerations are inherent in any discussion of

environmentally-significant consumer behaviour. Rational choice models eschew
discussion of moral behaviour and assume that it reflects an aspect of self- interest.
But incorporating moral beliefs into adjusted expectancy value models appears to
improve their predictive power.
Moreover, some authors have made explicit attempts to understand the dimensions
and the antecedents of moral or pro-social behaviours. For example, Schwartz’s
‘Norm-Activation Theory’ suggests that moral behaviours are the result of a personal
norm to act in a particular way. These norms arise, according to Schwartz, from an
awareness of the consequences of one’s actions and the ability and willingness to
assume responsibility for those consequences.
viii
The most well-known work on the moral dimensions of pro-environmental behaviours

is that of Paul Stern and his colleagues. Their Value-Belief-Norm theory attempts to
elucidate a chain of influence from people’s value sets and beliefs to the emergence of
a personal norm to act in a given way. The importance of this work is its insight into
the value basis of different behaviours and behavioural intentions.
Cialdini’s Focus Theory of Normative Behaviour also has important ramifications for
understanding consumer behaviour. Cialdini suggests that people are continually
influenced in their behaviours by social norms which prescribe or proscribe certain
behavioural options. The existence of such social norms can be a powerful force both
in inhibiting and in encouraging pro-environmental behaviour. At one level, pro-
environmental behavioural change can be thought of as a transition in social norms.
8. The Matter of Habit
Expectancy value models still assume that behaviour is the result of deliberative,
cognitive processes. But in practice, many of our ordinary, everyday behaviours are
carried out with very little conscious deliberation at all. Cognitive psychology
suggests that habits, routines and automaticity play a vital role in the cognitive effort
required to function effectively. This ability for efficient cognitive processing
becomes increasingly important in a message-dense environment, such as the modern
society in which we live.
At the same time, the process of ‘routinization’ of everyday behaviours makes them
less visible to rational deliberation, less obvious to understand, and less accessible to
policy intervention. Habitual behaviours often undermine our best intentions to
change and are an important structural feature of behavioural ‘lock- in’. Habit is one
of the key challenges for behavioural change policy since many environmentally-
significant behaviours have this routine character.
9. Sociality and Self
Many social-psychological models assume an individual approach to human

behaviour. But experience tells us that we are often constrained by what others think,
say and do. Some social theories go even further than this and suggest that our
behaviours, our attitudes, and even our concepts of self are (at best) socially
constructed and (at worst) helplessly mired in a complex ‘social logic’. Social
identity theory, for example, regards key aspects of our behaviour as being motivated
by a tendency towards intra-group solidarity and inter-group competition.
These kinds of theories provide a rich evidence base for the social embeddedness of
environmentally significant behaviour. They also suggest that behavioural change
must occur at the collective, social level. Individual change is neither feasible nor
sufficient.
ix
The relationship between self and society is mediated by the particular form that
social organisation takes within a given society. Cultural theory suggests that
historically there have been only four main types of social organisation: fatalist,
hierarchical, individualist/entrepreneurial and egalitarian. Each of these cultural
forms has a different view of nature and a different view of how social and
environmental goals should be achieved.
The dominant cultural model in 21st Century society is individualist. But this is only
one form of social organisation and there is evidence to suggest that it may not be
sufficient to address the complexity of pro-environmental behavioural change.
10. Integrative Theories of Consumer Behaviour
Some models of consumer behaviour focus on internal antecedents of behaviour such

as values, attitudes and intentions. Others focus more on external factors like
incentives, norms and institutional constraints. Some models are good at describing
internal (cognitive) aspects of individual decisions but fail to reflect the importance of
contextual or situational variables and vice versa.
Making sense of behaviour inevitably requires a multi-dimensional view which

incorporates both internal and external elements. In particular, as Stern has noted, a
useful model has to account for:
• motivations, attitudes and values;

• contextual or situational factors;
• social influences;
• personal capabilities; and
• habits.
The report reviews a number of models that attempt this task. These include the
attempt by Stern (2000) and his colleagues to construct an integrated attitude-
behaviour-context (ABC) model capable of describing and predicting pro-
environmental consumer behaviour, Triandis’ (1977) early theory of interpersonal
behaviour, and the recent work of Bagozzi and his colleagues (2002) to build a
comprehensive model of consumer action.
The question of whether consumers are free to make choices about their own actions
or whether they are bound by forces outside their control has provoked a long debate
in the social sciences. This debate - about the relative influence of human agency and
social structure – culminated in the development of Giddens' (1984) ‘structuration
theory’ which attempts to show how agency and structure relate to each other.
Giddens work has provided the basis for a view of consumption as a set of social
practices, influenced on the one hand by social norms and lifestyle choices and on the
other by the institutions and structures of society. Giddens' model proposes a key
distinction between 'practical' and 'discursive' consciousness. Most everyday, routine
action is performed in practical consciousness. But there is evidence to suggest that
x
intentional or goal-oriented behaviours require elaboration in discursive

consciousness. This insight is important in devising strategies to change habitual
behaviour.
Part 3 Towards Behavioural Change
11. Change, Persuasion and Learning
Behavioural change is fast becoming the ‘holy grail’ of sustainable development

policy. But understanding how, why and where behaviours change is an important
pre-requisite for making progress here. Information campaigns have been widely
used for achieving public interest goals. But they are known to be less effective than
other forms of learning. Research suggests that learning by trial and error, observing
how others behave and modelling our behaviour on what we see around us provide
more effective and more promising avenues for changing behaviours than information
and awareness campaigns.
Persuasion is particularly difficult in a message-dense environment. In one extreme

case, a California utility spent more money on advertising the benefits of home
insulation than it would have cost to install the insulation itself in the targeted homes.
Effective persuasion relies on observing a number of basic principles. These include:
• understanding the target audience;

• using emotional and imaginative appeal
• immediacy and directness;
• commitments/loyalty schemes;
• use of ‘retrieval cues’ to catalyse the new behaviour.
The ‘elaboration likelihood model’ of Petty and Cacioppo (1981) suggests that lasting
behavioural change relies on people consciously engaging with and elaborating on the
subject matter of the persuasive message.
As the evidence from Section 9 underlines: human beings are social creatures. In
spite of our best efforts at independence and individuality, we learn by example, and
model our behaviours on those we see around us. ‘Coping with the demands of
everyday life,’ argued Bandura (1977), ‘would be exceedingly trying if one could
arrive at solutions to problems only be actually performing possible options and
suffering the consequences.’ According to social learning theory, we learn most
effectively from models who are attractive to us or influential for us, or from people
are simply ‘like us’. Sometimes we learn by counter-example. And we learn not to
trust people who tell us one thing and do another.
Since many environmentally significant behaviours are routine in nature, it is vital for
sustainable consumption policy to find ways of addressing and re- negotiating habitual
behaviour. Like many psychological processes, habit formation has its own rules and
dynamics. A vital ingredient for changing habits is to ‘unfreeze’ existing behaviour –
xi
to raise the behaviour from the level of practical to discursive consciousness. This
process is known to be more effective in a supportive, social environment.
12. Policy Options and Opportunities
Looking through the lens of consumer behaviour reveals a complex and outwardly
intractable policy terrain. People are attached to material consumption in a wide
variety of ways, some of them functional, some symbolic. They are often locked in to
unsustainable patterns through a complex mixture of factors some of them
institutional, some of them social or psychological.
The rhetoric of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and does not help much here because it
regards choice as individualistic and fails to unravel the social, psychological and
institutional influences on private behaviours. Some behaviours are motivated by
rational, self- interested, and individualistic concerns. But conventional responses
neither do justice to the complexity of consumer behaviour nor exhaust the
possibilities for policy intervention in pursuit of behavioural change.
It is clear that achieving pro-environmental behaviour change demands a more

sophisticated policy approach. A concerted strategy is needed to make behaviour
change easy: ensuring that incentive structures and institutional rules favour pro-
environmental behaviour, enabling access to pro-environmental choice, engaging
people in initiatives to help themselves, and exemplifying the desired changes
within Government’s own policies and practices.
A creative approach to behavioural change policy has a number of different avenues

to consider. These include the influence of Government on:
• incentive structures (taxes, subsidies, penalties)

• facilitating conditions and situational factors (access to recycling, public
transport etc)
• institutional context (rules, regulations, market structures)
• social and cultural context (strength of community, family stability etc)
• business practices and their impact on both consumers and employees
• helping communities to help themselves
• its own environmental and social performance.
In summary, the apparent intractability of consumer behaviour is in part a function of

the policy model which has dominated conventional thinking on pro-environmental
and pro-social change. But the evidence suggests that this model is inaccurate.
Despite the rhetoric of modern ‘hands-off’ governance, policy intervenes continually
in the behaviour of individuals both directly (through taxes, regulations and
incentives) and (more importantly) through its extensive influence over the social and
institutional context.
Governments are not just innocent bystanders in the negotiation of consumer choice.
They influence and co-create the culture of consumption in a variety of ways. In
xii
some cases, this influence proceeds through specific interventions – such as the
imposition of regulatory and fiscal structures. In other cases it proceeds through the
absence of regulations and incentives. Most often it proceeds through a combination
of the ways in which Government intervenes and the ways in which it chooses not to.
As this review attempts to demonstrate, a genuine understanding of the social and

institutional context of consumer action opens out a much more creative vista for
policy innovation than has hitherto been recognised. Expanding on these opportunities
is the new challenge for sustainable consumption policy.
xiii
xiv
PART 1: FRAMING THE DEBATE
‘An individual’s main objective in consumption is to help

create the social world and to find a credible place in it.’
(Douglas 1976)
1
2
1 Towards Sustainable Consumption Policy
The broad aim of this report is support the development of policies that will
encourage and promote pro-environmental1 consumer behaviours. Examples of such
behaviours include: the recycling of household wastes, purchase of ‘sustainable’
products, using energy efficient appliances, choosing gr een electricity tariffs,
composting garden and kitchen waste, investing in ‘ethical’ funds, conserving water
or energy, buying organic food, returning electrical goods for re- use or recycling,
switching transport mode, changing travel behaviour, buying remanufactured or re-
used goods, reducing material consumption, pursuing ‘voluntary simplicity’ and so
on.
Clearly not all of these are consumer behaviours in the strict sense of purchasing
behaviours. Some of them – such as energy conservation and travel – can be
construed as ‘consumer’ behaviours in the sense of behaviours that affect resource
consumption. Others, however, are more to do with household management
(recycling, composting) or lifestyle choice (voluntary simplicity). Although even
these latter behaviours have direct or indirect implications for resource consumption,
it may ultimately be as appropriate to classify them as ‘citizen’ behaviours as it is to
call them consumer behaviours. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this report, we shall
generally use the term consumer behaviour and assume that it refers to ‘the
acquisition, use and disposal’ of products, services, and practices (Bagozzi et al
2002).
1.1 The Challenge of Behavioural Change

Policy development in the area of behaviour and behavioural change is notoriously
difficult. A part of the reason for this is that changing people’s behaviour is itself
difficult. Changing our own behaviour is difficult; certainly more difficult than we
sometimes wish it was. A simple – and relevant – experiment will illustrate the point.
Try changing the position of the waste bin in your kitchen. Better still, get someone
else to change it for you. And then count how many days it is before you stop going to
the wrong place to deposit your waste; and how many times you curse whoever it was
suggested the experiment.
One reason for the notorious difficulty of policy in this area is the wide variety of
different factors that influence behaviours and choices. Some of these factors affect
behaviour and choice directly. Others affect behaviour indirectly by shaping and
constraining the social and institutional context within which choice is negotiated.
Some factors are more clearly amenable to policy intervention. Others appear more
1
It should be noted that such behaviours do not always result in net environmental gains for a
variety of well-known reasons, including rebound effects, takeback effects, and the
counterveiling environmental costs of certain pro-environmental actions (such as the energy cost
of recycling). Assessing the environmental impacts of specific behaviours or intentions is
beyond the scope of this document. It will concentrate instead on people’s pro-environmental
attitudes and intentions and the relation between these and their behaviours.
3
elusive and are less obviously open to Government influence. Others again, it is
argued, may not even be appropriate domains for external persuasion.
The assumed ‘sovereignty’ of consumer choice is one reason policy- makers tend to
fight shy of attempting to influence personal ‘lifestyle’ decisions. Another is the sheer
complexity involved in understanding the conflicting influences involved. The sphere
of social action is almost invariably characterised by value tradeoffs and personal or
interpersonal dilemmas. Negotiating these is difficult enough. Predicting the impact of
specific policy interventions on them is even more problematic. The recent calls for
‘evidence-based’ policy (Cabinet Office 1999, 2001) must struggle here with an
evidence base that has an impressively long pedigree but is vast, complex, inherently
uncertain, and potentially confusing.
At the same time, there is widespread acknowledgement of the need to engage in this
difficult terrain. From systemic health and educational priorities, such as obesity and
truancy, to specific anti-social behaviours like car-dumping, drink-driving and fly-
tipping, there is an increasing recognition of the need to identify underlying influences
on such behaviours. In particular, it is now acknowledged that factors such as
personal motivation, collective practice, peer pressure, habit, subjective norm, and
social context play a key role, both in influencing behaviour and in determining the
success or failure of policy interventions to change it. There is an emerging realisation
amongst policy- makers of the need to find innovative ways for policy to support
behaviour change in all of these areas (Shipworth 2000, Halpern et al 2003, Darnton
2004a&b, NCC 2003 & 2005).
1.2 The Challenge of Sustainable Consumption

Nowhere are these insights more relevant than in the domain of ‘sustainable
consumption’. The key role of consumer behaviour (and household consumer
behaviour in particular) in driving environmental impact has long been recognised. It
may have proved impossib le so far to agree on a precise definition of the term
sustainable consumption. But the realisation that people’s choices, behaviours and
lifestyles will play a vital role in achieving sustainable development is one of the
(relatively few) points of agreement to have emerged from international
environmental policy debates over the last decade or so (Jackson and Michaelis 2003).
The UK Government has explicitly recognised this. In July 2003, DEFRA and DTI
jointly published a UK Framework for Sustainable Consumption and Production
entitled Changing Patterns (DEFRA 2003). The document was a response to the 10-
year framework of programmes launched at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in 2002 in support of ‘national and regional initiatives to accelerate the
shift towards sustainable consumption and production’.
One of the most important roles of the Framework document was to identify the next
steps for UK policy, amongst which the Government highlighted the need to stimulate
a debate on sustainable consumption. In pursuance of this goal, the Government
invited the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC) and the National Consumer
Council (NCC) to submit proposals for a national ‘roundtable’ on sustainable
4
consumption. The UK Round Table on Sustainable Consumption held its first

meeting in June 2004 and will, it is hoped, play a key role in advancing understanding
of sustainable consumption, identifying plausible visions of a sustainable lifestyle and
engaging business in the sustainable cons umption debate.
The present study aims to contribute to these aims. It is intended, in particular, to

inform policy-makers grappling with the need to encourage pro-environmental
behaviour change. The report was commissioned by the Sustainable Development
Research Network as a preliminary review of different social-psychological models of
consumer behaviour and behavioural change. It has been carried out at the Centre for
Environmental Strategy in the University of Surrey, and draws extensively from the
author’s fellowship work ‘Towards a social psychology of sustainable consumption’,
which is supported by the ESRC Sustainable Technologies Programme.
1.3 Terms of Reference for this Review

Consultations with key stakeholders, including DEFRA, DTI, SDC and NCC, led to
the agreement of specific ‘terms of reference’ for the study. These terms of reference
focused on three linked research questions, namely:
1. What does research tell us about the factors that motivate, shape and constrain
the behaviour of ‘mainstream’ household consumers?
2. What does research tell us about the factors that motivate, shape or constrain
pro-environmental household consumer behaviours?
3. What does research tell us about achieving pro-environmental change in
mainstream household consumer behaviours?
A key aim of the review is to assess the scope, nature and robustness of the evidence
base within each of these areas and to identify gaps within that evidence base.
1.4 The Question of Evidence

The question of what exactly constit utes a robust evidence base is clearly an important
one and worth commenting on briefly at the start. 2 This issue is problematic even for
research questions involving quantitative assessments of physical changes relating to
environmental impacts. Political and scientific debates over the extent of an
anthropogenic greenhouse effect bear witness to this. For social and behavioural
issues, the problem is compounded by the subjective nature of the evidence base, the
diversity of behavioural influences, the complexity of underlying motivations, and the
embeddedness of both attitudes and behaviours in specific social contexts and
practices.
On the plus side, there is a huge literature base on human behaviour to draw from with
an impressively long historical pedigree. Some of this literature is in the form of
useful conceptual syntheses which draw in their turn from wider anthropological,
sociological or psychological evidence bases. There is also an enormous and rapidly
2
See Shaxson (2004) for a useful overview of the challenge of evidence-based policy-making.
5
expanding body of empirical research (both quantitative and qualitative) related to

consumer behaviour and the environment.
But the overall field of consumer behaviour, as Gabriel and Lang (1995) have
remarked, borders on being ‘unmanageable’. Disparate parts of the evidence are often
difficult to reconcile. Methodologies differ widely – even within disciplines. Results
are often expressed in vastly different forms. Some studies report ethnographic
qualitative research. Others derive quantitative correlations on the basis of statistical
sample s.
The representativeness of both quantitative and qualitative evidence is a perennial

issue. Most qualitative studies and many quantitative studies must be regarded as
limited by the context of the study. Likewise, the direction of causal influence is
sometimes problematic. The existence of a correlation between, for example, altruistic
values and recycling behaviours cannot necessarily be taken to imply a causal effect
from altruism to recycling. As discussed in more depth below, reverse causalities, in
which behaviours influence values, have also been detected in the research. Moreover,
the establishment of even quite strong correlations between particular variables rarely
precludes the possibility that other ‘intervening’ variables, excluded from the study
(the existence of kerbside facilities, for example) might be playing important causal
roles.
In this context, a coherent and widely supported conceptual insight can often provide
as much value as a very detailed piece of empirical work involving quantitative
evidence of topical behaviours. For example, the insight – built up over several
decades of detailed qualitative research – that human beings interact with material
artefacts partly on the basis of the symbolic values those artefacts hold for them (see
section 2.6 below) could potentially be as useful to policy development as knowing
that out of 1009 households surveyed in Greater London during 2002, 14% of the 485
households in the sample with kerbside recycling did little or no recycling (RRF 2002,
2004).
Human motivations are so multi- faceted that about the only thing one can say with
absolute certainty is that it is virtually impossible to derive universal causal models
with which to construct behaviour change policies in different domains. Searching for
robust and useful things to say about consumer motivations and behaviours is often,
therefore, a case of weighing up the ‘balance of evidence’ from a wide variety of
studies from different kinds of perspective and establishing broad understandings
from which to inform more detailed and more specific policy development. 3
1.5 The Limitations of Systematic Review

A further important caveat follows here. The movement towards evidence-based
policy has built its case for influencing policy on the extensive use of systematic
reviews of the evidence base (Cooper and Hedges 1994, Davies 2003). The principles
3
One of the immediate lessons from this complexity is the need for an incremental approach to
policy development involving preparatory work to select and design taylored policy mechanisms,
appropriate piloting, and careful evaluation . This point is returned to later in the study.
6
inherent in systematic review – namely a critical appraisal of the literature and

rigorous analysis of the strength of evidence according to explicit and transparent
criteria – are clearly laudable. In the context of social and behavioural issues,
however, the challenges of the systematic review concept are quite considerable.
A systematic review of all the literature relevant to the three guiding questions set out
above is, in all probability, an impossible task. Furthermore, its value in guiding
policy development would almost inevitably be obscured by the sheer size of the task
and weight of the output. Once again, the virtue of synthetic insights drawing from
large bodies of evidence may be higher for policy- making than exhaustive accounts of
every position in the knowledge base.
At any rate, the resources available for this study certainly do not stretch to systematic
review. This study is not therefore a systematic review in the formal sense. Rather it
is a broad synthesis of a wide literature base relevant to the guiding questions. As
such, it may of course inform later systematic reviews of particular elements within
the evidence base. Hopefully, it will also be relevant to the incremental development
of policy initiatives in its own right.
1.6 Overview of the Structure

In pursuit of these aims, the review is divided into three substantive parts. The first
part – Framing the Debate – sets out the context for the study and includes a broad
summary of modern understandings of consumption and consumer behaviour. This
synthesis is qualitative in nature and relies heavily on earlier reviews. In particular, it
summarises some of the findings from Jackson and Michaelis’s (2003) study for the
Sustainable Development Commission. It highlights some of the main elements of
contemporary understandings of consumer behaviour and points to their relevance for
understanding behavioural change.
The second part – Models of Consumer Behaviour – explores a variety of different

conceptual models of both mainstream and pro-environmental consumer behaviour.
and discusses their relevance for the task of motivating sustainable consumption.
Starting from the dominant rational choice models, the study examines the main
limitations of the rational choice paradigm. It describes a variety of other behavioural
models drawn from various disciplines and teases out the implications of these models
for understanding and motivating pro-environmental behaviour.
The third part – Towards Behavioural Change – attempts to move the debate
towards a robust understanding of what is possible in relation to encouraging and
promoting pro-environmental behavioural change. It first summarises some of the
key understandings about change and learning processes. Finally, it explores the
options and opportunities available to policy- makers wishing to think creatively about
motivating sustainable consumption.
7
8
2 Consumption: the vanguard of history?
Understanding (mainstream) consumer behaviour is a pre-requisite for understanding

how to motivate or encourage pro-environmental consumer behaviour. But it is also a
daunting task. The terminology and the context of sustainable consumption are
relatively recent. But the debates about consumption, consumer behaviour and
consumerism are much older and much deeper.
Consumption, in the words of one social scientist, has become the ‘vanguard of
history’ (Miller 1995). To question consumption is, at one level, to question history
itself. To engage in attempts to change consumption patterns and consumer
behaviours is, in one sense, to tinker with fundamental aspects of our social world.
And to proceed without acknowledging this degree of complexity and sophistication
is to invite an inevitable failure.
The wider debates on consumption have an extraordinary pedigree. They can be

traced back (at least) to classical philosophy. They encompass the critical social
theory of the 19th and early 20th century, the consumer psychology and ‘motivation
research’ of the early post-war years, the ‘ecological humanism’ of the 1960s and
1970s, the anthropology and social philosophy of the 1970s and 1980s, and the
sociology of modernity, popularised in the 1990s.
Each of these different avenues of exploration asks slightly different questions about
consumption and about consumer behaviour. The motivation researchers wanted to
find out the best way to design and market products that people would buy; the critical
social theorists and the humanists were alarmed at the ecological and social impacts of
rampant materialism; the anthropologists and the sociologists were out to understand
modernity, and reflect on the kind of society we had become. In spite of these
differences, they all have something to say about consumption and about
consumerism, and as such what they say is relevant to the aims of this report.
The purpose of this section is to offer a very brief overview of these extensive debates
and to draw out some of the important implications for understanding and for
influencing pro-environmental consumer behaviour. This summary draws from an
earlier paper published by the Sustainable Development Commission (Jackson and
Michaelis 2003). Supporting accounts of the underlying literatures can also be found
in Bocock (1993), Edwards (2000), Gabriel and Lang (1995), Jackson (2003),
Michaelis (2000), Miller (1995), Røpke (1999) and Sanne (2002) amongst many
others.
2.1 Consumption and Well-Being

In some simple sense, it is argued, consumption can be viewed as a functional attempt
to improve individual and collective well-being by providing the goods and services
necessary to meet people’s wants and desires. This linear view of consumption
(Figure 1) is, by and large, the one encoded in conventional economics (Mas-Colell et
al 1995, Begg et al 2003). Stressing the ‘insatiability’ of consumer desire and the
9
‘sovereignty’ of consumer choice, economics takes a broadly utilitarian approach to

evaluating consumer goods and services.
I buy a particular commodity because it offers certain functionalities which are useful
to me. My new car gets me from A to B more efficiently, cheaply and pleasantly than
my old car did. My new fridge freezer has more room for ready-made frozen meals.
My wide-screen plasma TV is easier to see and hear. I am willing to spend more
money on these purchases because I value these additional services. Moreover, my
wants as a consumer can never be taken to be entirely satiated, because there will
always be new and better products offering me more and different ways of satisfying
my appetites and tastes.
Figure 1: A Supply Chain View of Well-being
Raw materials Capital Labour
Production
Waste,
Goods and services environmental
damage
Consumption
Satisfaction
Well-being
Though it is based on the assumption that consumers have a certain set of preferences
or tastes, the economic view of consumption is virtually silent on the underlying
motivations for these preferences. The most that economics attempts to say about
these motivations is what is ‘revealed’ about preferences from the ways in which
consumers spend their money in the market. As we shall see in more detail in the
following section, economics makes key assumptions about the rationality of
consumers in being able to choose products that do indeed offer them utility and
thereby contribute to their well-being.
2.2 Consumption and Needs

The conventional economic position has been openly attacked by numerous critics
over the years. One of the most telling critiques draws heavily on the concept of
human needs. Needs theorists suggest that, in contrast to the ‘insatiability’ of desire,
‘true’ human needs are finite, few and universal (Max Neef 1992, Maslow 1954,
1968).
Classifications and typologies of human need tend to distinguish between material

needs (such as subsistence and protection) and social or psychological needs (such as
self-esteem, autonomy, belongingness). They also distinguish between needs
10
themselves and satisfiers, and suggest crucially that not all satisfiers are equally
successful at meeting the underlying needs. Food for example is a satisfier of the
need for subsistence. But not all foods have equal nutritional value and some are
positively bad for us in anything more than very small quantities.
The possibility that some of what we consume does not satisfy our needs provides the
basis for a long-standing critique of consumer society (Springborg 1981). Far from
meeting our needs, social critics maintain that commercial interests in modern society
have created whole sets of ‘false’ or ‘unnatural’ needs that now serve only to alienate
consumers from their own well-being and in the process threaten the environment
(Fromm 1976, Illich 1977, Marcuse 1964, Scitovsky 1976).
According to this critique, the consumer way of life is ‘deeply flawed, both
ecologically and psychologically’ (Wachtel 1983). It serves neither our own best
interests nor the protection of the environment. Proponents of this argument call on
the so-called ‘life-satisfaction paradox’ in their defence. Real consumer expenditure
has more than doub led in the last thirty years, but reported life-satisfaction has barely
changed at all (Donovan et al 2002). Recent evidence that materialistic values hinder
vital aspects of personal well-being also tends to support this critique (Kasser 2002).
The debate about human needs has generated protracted and sometime fierce
disagreements between protagonists (Douglas et al 1998, Jackson et al 2004). Cultural
theorists and sociologists in particular tend to be fiercely sceptical of the whole
discourse of needs, arguing that it is naïve, rhetorical and moralistic. Nonetheless, the
language of needs retains a popular appeal and an obvious resonance with the
discourse of sustainable development.
Moreover, the needs-based critique of consumer society appears to hold out

considerable hope for sustainable consumption. If social and psychological needs
really are ill-served by modern commodities, then it should be possible to live better
by consuming less, and in the process reduce our impacts on the environment.
On the other hand, this begs the question: why, if consumerism fails to satisfy, do we
continue to consume? The social critique of consumer society tends to point here to
the power of commercial marketers – the ‘hidden persuaders’ in Packard’s (1956)
terminology – to ‘dupe’ consumers into buying things that do not serve their needs at
all. But there are a number of other equally powerful and sometimes more
sophisticated responses to the same question.
2.3 Consumption and Desire

One rather persuasive response to the question posed above is that the emphasis on
needs has been overstated. Consumers are driven not so much by coherent attempts to
satisfy well-defined sets of needs and wants at all, according to this view. Many of
our tastes and preferences are informed by desire. And desire, it is argued has a very
different character than needs. Far from being associated with ‘rational’ efforts to
match the functional character of goods with our specific personal or social
11
requirements, desire is to be associated with powerful emotional or sexual drives and

motivations. 4
The idea that consumption has something to do with sexual desire is borne out by
ethnographic research (Belk et al 2003) and clearly resonates with the common
wisdom of advertising executives that ‘sex sells’. From cigarettes to chocolate, and
from underwear to cars, sexual connotation has been widely employed in advertising,
both directly and indirectly, to render goods and services attractive to prospective
consumers. But this association of objects with sexual desire is not by any means an
arbitrary or artificial device dreamed up by marketers out of nowhere. If it were, it
would be highly unlikely to succeed. What advertising attempts to exploit is a very
real and rather widespread association of material commodities with sexual and social
status.
Not surprisingly, therefore, display and status aspects of consumption have been the
focus of sociological and psychological discourses on consumption for well over a
century. Veblen’s (1898) notion of conspicuous consumption and Hirsch’s (1977)
concept of positional goods both point to the importance of material goods in social
positioning. Hirsch also points to the dynamic nature of this kind of consumption. We
must run faster and faster to stay in the same place, like the Red Queen in Lewis
Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass, precisely because our sexual and social
competitors are also engaged in the same race.
This is where accounts of consumer desire sometimes call on evolutionary biology in

their attempt to explain and understand status and display-oriented consumption
(Wright 1994, Ridley 1994). The theory of evolution suggests that animal behaviours
are the result of evolutionary adaptation under pressure from the forces of natural
selection (inter- and intra-species competition for scarce resources) and sexual
selection (intra-species competition for sexual partners). Recent work on evolutionary
psychology suggests that these forces have also shaped psychological traits such as
our desires, attitudes, and natures. In other words, this avenue of thought suggests
that consumer behaviour is conditioned, in part at least, by social and sexual
competition. In doing so, it suggests a biological basis for consumption that portrays
the task of changing behaviour in an even more daunting light.
However, evolutionary psychology does not offer a unique role to competitive or self-
interested behaviours. It also provides an account of cooperative and moral
behaviours (Hamilton 1964, Ridley 1996). Importantly, these aspects of the theory
suggest that individual choices between competitive and cooperative behaviour
depend crucially on the social climate. And as we shall discuss in more detail in
Section 12, Government has a vital role in shaping this climate.
4
A related and rather interesting hypothesis is Campbell’s (1987, 2003) idea that modern consumers
are engaged in form of hedonistic dreaming – the pursuit of pleasure through the evocative power
of material goods to conjure up imagined desires.
12
2.4 Ordinary and Inconspicuous Consumption

Some recent work in sociology suggests that the conspicuous and status-seeking
aspects of consumer behaviour have been overemphasised. According to this view, a
great deal of consumption in fact takes place inconspicuously as a part of the ordinary,
everyday decision- making of millions of individual consumers.
‘Ordinary’ consumption, argue these authors, is not oriented particularly towards

individual display. Rather it is about convenience, habit, practice, and individual
responses to social norms and institutional contexts (Gronow and Warde 2001, Shove
2003, Shove and Warde 1997). And far from being willing partners in the process of
consumerism, consumers are seen as being ‘locked- in’ to a process of unsustainable
consumption over which they have very little individual control (Sanne 2002).
The concept of ‘inconspicuous consumption’ is important to an understanding of

consumer behaviour for several reasons. In particular, it has a clear resonance with
our day-to-day experience of consuming. High-street shopping for fashion goods may
explicitly engage our display motivations on selected occasions. Apart from
compulsive or addictive shoppers however, we do not as a rule spend our day-to-day
life engaged consciously in this kind of consumption. Much everyday consumption is
almost invisible, even to ourselves.
In particular, the regular payments that leave our bank accounts to cover our
mortgages, insurance payments, utility bills and local taxes appear to have very little
in the way of display or status associated with them at all. Even when we change
electricity or gas suppliers, for example, very few people tend to be motivated in their
choice of new supplier by any attempt to improve their social standing. Indeed there
would be little point in engaging in such a strategy. As well as being inconspicuous to
ourselves, such choices are virtually invisible to our social peers, our sexual
competitors, or the world at large.
One of the messages that flows from this analysis is that consumers are a long way
from being willing actors in the consumption process, capable of exercising either
rational or irrational choice in the satisfaction of their own needs and desires. More
often they find themselves ‘locked in’ to unsustainable patterns of consumption, either
by social norms which lie beyond individual control, or else by the constraints of the
institutional context within which individual choice is negotiated.
2.5 Consumption and Identity

Irrespective of the tension between conspicuous and inconspicuous consumption,
there is a broad agreement that, in modern society, consumption is in some sense
inextricably linked to personal and collective identity. Identity, according to Gabriel
and Lang (1995, 81) is the ‘Rome to which all discussions of modern Western
consumption lead, whether undertaken by Marxist critics or advertising executives,
deconstructionists or liberal reformers, advocates of multi-culturalism or radical
feminists’.
13
The idea that material goods play some role in defining and delimiting the concept of
the self has a long pedigree (Belk 1988). It can be traced, for example, to William
James’s assertion that:
‘a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic
powers, but his clothes, his friends, his wife and children, his ancestors, his reputation and
works, his lands and yacht and bank account…’ (James 1890, 291-292)
In the hands of certain sociologists and social philosophers, the insight that consumer
goods are important to processes of identity creation has become the basis for a quite
specific view of consumer society. According to this view, the individual consumer is
engaged in a continual process of constructing and reconstructing personal identity in
the context of a continually renegotiated universe of social and cultural symbols.
Giddens (1991) points to the ‘dilemmas of the self’ faced by the individual in modern
society, through the continually enlarging choice of consumer goods. Baumann
(1998) points to the convenient resonances between the process of perpetual
reconstruction of identity, and the impermanent, transient nature of modern consumer
goods. ‘Aggregate identities, loosely arranged of the purchasable, not-too- lasting,
easily detachable and utterly replaceable tokens currently available in the shops,’ he
writes, ‘Seem to be exactly what one needs to meet the challenges of contemporary
living.’
Authors take different positions on the extent to which this relationship between
identity and consumerism is a good or a bad thing. Campbell (1997) argues that an
open choice of consumer goods is vital to enable consumers to function as
autonomous individuals in modern society. Cushman (1992) argues that the ‘empty
self’ of the modern consumer, which is constantly in need of ‘filling up’, is a cultural
artefact generated quite explicitly by and for the commercialism of modern society.
Baudrillard (1970) condemns the ‘social logic’ of consumption as a ‘luxurious and
spectacular penury’.
Despite these differences, the link between the consumption of material goods and the
construction and maintenance of personal identity is one of the most prominent and
perhaps most important elements in modern understandings of consumer behaviour.
Whereas in earlier times we were what we did (or sometimes who we knew), in
modern society we are what we consume.
2.6 The Symbolic Role of Consumer Goods

Embedded within the idea that consumption and identity are linked, lies an even more
important insight into our relationship to consumer goods. This is the claim that
consumer goods play vital symbolic roles in our lives (Barthes 1973,
Czikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton 1981, Dittmar 1992, McCracken 1990). We
value goods not just for what they can do, but for what they represent to us and to
others. Without this almost magical potential, it is doubtful that plain ‘stuff’ could
play such a key role in our lives.
14
The insight that consumer goods attain symbolic properties clearly has some
resonance with popular psychology about our relationship with material possessions.
A child’s favourite teddy bear, a woman’s wedding dress, a stamp collector’s prized
first day cover, the souped- up, low-sprung sports car of the ‘boy racer’: all these
examples suggest that there is much more at stake in the possession of material
artefacts than simple functional value.
Over the second half of the twentieth century, this popular wisdom was given much
more robust and sophisticated footing. The symbolic importance of consumer goods
has been underlined by a wide range of intellectual sources including the semiotics of
Charles Morris (1946) and the social philosophy of Jean Baudrillard (1970). The
evidence from anthropolo gy is perhaps the most convincing (Appadurai 1986,
Douglas 1976, McCracken 1989, Sahlins 1976). Societies throughout the ages have
used material commodities as symbolic resources to denote a wide variety of different
kinds of meanings in an even wider variety of situations and contexts.
It would be impossible to do justice to the enormous literature supporting this insight

here. Nonetheless, the lesson from this huge body of work is rather clear: material
commodities are important to us, not just for what they do, but for what they signify
(about us and about our lives, loves, desires, relationships, successes and failings)
both to others and to ourselves. Material commodities are not just artefacts. Nor do
they offer purely functional benefits. They derive their importance, in part at least,
from their symbolic role in mediating and communicating personal, social, and
cultural meaning.
Moreover, it is vital to point out that the fundamental basis for this process – the
symbolic role of material artefacts – is not unique to modernity. In the light of the
anthropological evidence, we must see the symbolic role of consumer goods as an
essential feature of human societies with long roots in antiquity. Any understanding
of consumer behaviour not built on this insight is likely to underestimate the social
and psychological importance of consumer goods and services.
2.7 Consumption as Social Conversation

This symbolic role for material goods opens is not confined to creating and
maintaining personal identity. The individual psychology of material possessions is
important, of course. But the task of constructing and maintaining symbolic meaning
is itself a social one. Symbols are by their nature socially constructed. The value
attached to symbols is constantly negotiated and re-negotiated through social
interactions within a specific cultural context.
In other words, the symbolic function of consumer goods fits them perfectly to play a
key role in ‘social conversations’ – the continuing social and cultural dialogues and
narratives that keep societies together and help them function. ‘Forget that
commodities are good for eating, clothing and shelter,’ argue Douglas and Isherwood
(1979). ‘Forget their usefulness and try instead the idea that commodities are good for
thinking; treat them as a non-verbal medium for the human creative faculty.’
15
Douglas and Isherwood draw attention, in particular, to the importance of material

goods in providing ‘marking services’. These are social rituals - dinner parties, work
functions, or festive celebrations, for example – which serve to embed people in their
social group, cement social relations and play a vital role in maintaining information
flows within the social group. These information flows, claim Douglas and
Isherwood, go far beyond the invidious ‘display consumption’ offered by
Veblenesque critiques of consumerism. They serve a vital purpose in helping the
individual to maintain and improve social resilience in the face of cultural shifts and
social shocks, and in helping the group to maintain its social identity and to negotiate
intergroup relationships.
In other words, the symbolic role of consumer goods facilitates a set of vital social
conversations about individual and social identity, group cohesiveness and cultural
meaning. These conversations appear to play a decisive role in strengthening the
resilience and ensuring the survival of human social groups. 5
2.8 Consumption and the Pursuit of Meaning

The ability of consumer goods to operate discursively, as a form of social
conversation, means that they become embedded in a wide variety of different
personal, social and cultural narratives. There is, for example, persuasive
ethnographic evidence to suggest that people use material artefacts in negotiating the
boundaries between the sacred and the profane, in defending against the ever-present
threat of demoralisation and anomie, and in constructing social and cultural meaning
structures that give both our personal lives and our society a sense of significance and
purpose (Belk et al 1989, Berger 1967, Campbell 2003, Douglas 1976, Jackson 2004,
Solomon et al 2003).
This view is typified by McCracken’s (1988) discussion of the role of consumer

goods in the pursuit of ‘displaced meaning’. McCracken argues that one of the most
pressing problems a culture must deal with is the ‘gap between the “real” and the
“ideal” in social life’, the distance between our aspirations (for ourselves, for our
society, for human nature) and the reality with which we are daily confronted. He
suggests that consumer goods play a key role in helping to overcome this problem.
Material artefacts, he says, are ‘bridges’ to displaced meaning.
Designer sunglasses, the new car, the wedding outfit, the seaside vacation, the rose-
covered cottage are far more than satisfiers of functional needs. They are bigger, in
some sense, either than the objects themselves or even than their use value. They are
material representations of our expectations for the future, of the status to which we
aspire, of the comforts that we deserve, of the rewards that we fervent ly hope will be
showered upon us. They are bridges to our displaced ideals.
These insights are clearly vital where our understanding of consumption is concerned.
It is already clear that no purely functional account of material goods is going to
5
Research from an entirely different quarter appears to reinforce these ideas. The importance of gift-
giving in exchange relations has been widely explored in consumer psychology and motivation
research (Belk and Coon 1993).
16
deliver a robust model for understanding consumer behaviour: because functionality

is not the point (or at least not exclusively the point). We consume not just to nourish
ourselves or protect ourselves from the elements or maintain a living. We consume in
order to identify ourselves with a social group, to position ourselves within that group,
to distinguish ourselves with respect to other social groups, to communicate
allegiance to certain ideals. To differentiate ourselves from certain other ideals. We
consume in order to communicate. Through consumption we communicate not only
with each other but with our past, with our ideals, with our fears and with our
aspirations. We consume, in part at least, in pursuit of meaning.
2.9 Conclusions
The psychological, sociological and anthropological literature on consumption is
enormously rich. Its richness has long been recognised in marketing, consumer
studies and motivation research. Business and commercial interests have drawn
widely on this depth in order to design products and devise strategies for persuading
people to buy them. Importantly, the same literature represents an enormous resource
for policy-makers attempting to get to grips with the problem of unsustainable
consumption.
At the same time, it is clearly not an easy or malleable literature. It is dogged with
disagreements and intellectual tensions. Its sheer size militates against easy
assimilation. And its understandings straddle some well-entrenched and rather
intractable debates with very long histories. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw out
two or three important themes in relation to understanding unsustainable
consumption.
The first of these is that we are living in a consumer society. To say this, is not just to
make obvious points about the massive expansion in the availability of consumer
goods in developed economies over the last fifty years. It is not just to point to the
structural reliance of those economies on consumption growth, or even to highlight
the extensive commercialisation of previously public goods and services. All these
things are important. But almost certainly there is more going on.
Fundamental aspects of our cultural identity are different now from what they were a
hundred and fifty or two hundred years ago. Modern consumer society has its own
logic, its own dynamics, its own epistemologies and ethics, its own myths and
cosmologies. And all of these are identifiably different from those of other times and
places. This perspective on the centrality of consumption in modern society is
obviously daunting. But it will not help policy- making to evade the issue: large-scale
shifts in consumption patterns will inevitably involve engaging with the ‘vanguard of
history’.
At the same time, there are certain respects in which the consumer society is much
like any other society before it. The second key insight to be drawn from the
consumption literature is that material artefacts play important symbolic roles and as a
result of this are able to negotiate vital psychological and social functions in our lives.
17
The main objective of the individual in consumption is no less, in Mary Douglas’

words than ‘to help create the social world and to find in it a credible place’.
The symbolic role of material artefacts is something that we appear to share with
every society for which there is anthropological evidence. But the extent to which
this symbolic role is appropriated in modern society for key social and psychological
purposes does appear to be a distinguishing feature of modernity. At any rate, the
social-psychological and cultural complexity associated with this relationship is one
of the main reasons for the apparent intractability of consumer behaviour and
consumption patterns.
Equally importantly, however, the evidence indicates that consumer motivations are
often embedded in a variety of ordinary, routine and habitualised behaviours which
are themselves heavily influenced by social norms and practices and constrained by
institutional contexts. These factors emphasise that far from being able to exercise
free choice in the selection of goods and services, consumers often find themselves
‘locked in’ to specific consumption patterns by a variety of social, institutional and
cognitive constraints.
These understandings highlight the difficulty and complexity associated with

negotiating pro-environmental behavioural change. But they also point to the
importance of understanding and influencing the social context within which
consumer choice is negotiated. Policies that seek to promote pro-environmental
behavioural change will need to engage as much with the social context that shapes
and constrains social action as it will with mechanisms of individual choice. We
return to this issue in Section 12.
18
PART 2: MODELS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR
‘The heart has reasons, reason does not know at all’

(Pascal 1670)
19
20
3 The Role of Models

Understandings of consumer behaviour and of policies to influence consumer
behaviour rest, either explicitly or implicitly, on certain kinds of ‘models’ of what
behaviour is, what its antecedents are, how it is influenced, shaped and constrained.
These models are generally built from a set of conceptual premises, and some form of
causal relationship between dependent and independent variables.
A simple example relevant to pro-environmental behaviour serves to illustrate how

this relationship works. Schwartz’s (1977) Norm Activation Theory (see Section 7.2
below) suggests that personal norms (intentions to behave in pro-social ways) are
activated by two antecedent variables: an awareness of the consequences of one’s
actions and the assumption of personal responsibility for those actions. For example,
if I am aware of the consequences of fuel consumption for the problem of climate
change and prepared to accept that I have some responsibility for my own fuel-
consuming behaviour, then I am more likely – according to the theory – to develop a
personal norm to reduce my fuel consumption.
A much more complicated model of consumer behaviour is illustrated in Figure 2.

Howard and Sheth’s (1969) ‘theory of buyer behaviour’ was one of the earliest and
most influential schematic representations of consumer choice widely recognised by
marketers.
Inputs Perceptual Constructs Learning Constructs Outputs
Intention Purchase
Stimulus Display
Significative
a . Quality
b . Price Intention
Overt Confidence
c. Distinctiveness Search
d . Service
e . Availability
Attitude
Symbolic
a . Quality
b . Price Stimulus Attitude
c. Distinctiveness ambiguity
d . Service
Brand
e . Availability
Comprehension
Social
a . Family
b . Reference
Groups Choice Brand
Motives Attention
c. Social Class Criteria Comprehension
Perceptual
Attention Satisfaction
bias
Figure 2: Howard and Sheth’s (1969) theory of buyer behaviour
21
At first sight a model such as this looks rather intractable, particular from a policy
perspective. What exactly is to be made of the complexity illustrated here? How and
where in such a model should policy- makers seek to interact? And to what extent
does the model allow for or predict consumer responses to policy interventions? All of
these questions are difficult to answer, and partly for this reason, the Howard and
Sheth model is rarely used today, even in advertising research.
In fact, models such as this have been widely criticised, mainly for being untestable,
and for ‘lacking specificity’ in their variables. ‘Theories that incorporate virtually
every known social-psychological construct and process,’ argue Ajzen and Fishbein
(1980, 15), ‘Not only lack parsimony but, more important, they are likely to generate
confusion rather than real understanding’. Nonetheless, Figure 2 serves to illustrate
several important points about the use and usefulness of behavioural models.
In the first place, it clearly illustrates the diverse range of influences considered by
mainstream consumer research as relevant to purchasing behaviours. This is a typical
feature of a great deal of consumer research and marketing literature. These
professions have adopted an eclectic approach to research drawing widely on a range
of theoretical traditions and frameworks in order to construct pragmatic
understandings of consumer behaviour.
At one level, the eclecticism inherent in seven or eight decades of ‘motivation

research’ represents a real resource for those seeking to understand consumer
behaviour, and identify strategies through which to influence it. At the same time,
consumer research is not an easy literature to grapple with. This is in part because of
the scale, complexity, and historical depth of the field. But it is partly because the
interests of consumer researchers and marketers – how to find ways of identifying
consumer needs and desires and designing products and services to satisfy these – are
structurally different from the interests of those seeking to influence consumer
behaviour in the public interest.
Figure 2, for example, is mainly structured around trying to inform marketing

strategies with an understanding of the relationship between external stimuli and
brands in consumer choice. It may provide some insights that could later inform
policies for sustainable consumption. But it was not designed for that purpose.
Perhaps more importantly, a model such as the one illustrated in Figure 2 is not
particularly useful for undertaking quantitative empirical work aimed at investigating
the strength or weakness of particular relationships between specific attitudes,
intentions and behaviours. It is, quite simply, too structurally complex for that task.
This illustrates another crucial point about models. To the extent that such theories are
validated (or at least, not falsified) by empirical evidence, they offer two kinds of
benefits in terms of understanding consumer behaviour and attempting to influence it.
Firstly, they can provide heuristic devices for exploring the nature of specific
behaviours and for identifying the factors that might be important to policymakers
who are attempting to influence those behaviours. So, for example, Schwartz’s theory
22
suggests that the ascription of personal responsibility for the consequences of one’s
actions plays a key role in activating personal norms to behave in pro-environmental
ways. As such it suggests that the negotiation of consumer and citizen responsibilities
is an important area for consideration, if we wish to influence consumers to act in
ways that will reduce fuel-related greenhouse gas emissions. Likewise, the theory of
buyer behaviour highlights the importance of the relationship consumers have to
brands and the impact of this on their purchase decisions.
But a second potential function for models such as these is to provide a conceptual
and theoretical framework for carrying out detailed empirical research on the structure
of specific behaviours, and the role of interventions in influencing those behaviours.
Norm-activation theory, for example, has been employed to explore a variety of pro-
environmental behaviours such as recycling (Bratt 1999), car use (Bamberg and
Schmidt 2003) and water conservation (Harland et al 1999).
To be usable (and therefore useful) however, models in this latter category must focus
quite closely on a (relatively) limited number of specific relationships between key
variables. Beyond a certain degree of complexity, it becomes virtually impossible to
establish meaningful correlations between variables or to identify causal influences on
choice. Conversely, these simpler models run the risk of missing out key causal
influences on a decision, by virtue of their simplicity – as illustrated by our discussion
of Schwartz’s norm activation theory.
Typically, of course, this means that there will always be something of tension
between simplicity and complexity in modelling consumer behaviour. More complex
models may aid conceptual understanding but be poorly structured for empirical
quantification of attitudes or intentions (for example). Less complex models may aid
in empirical quantification but hinder conceptual understanding by omitting key
variables or relationships between key variables.
A further tension inherent in modelling consumer behaviour arises in relation to the

kinds of variables different models attempt to measure. Firstly, one can distinguish a
set of approaches that study and model behaviour mainly as a function of processes
and characteristics which are conceived as being internal to the individual: attitudes,
values, habits and personal norms. Another set of approaches studies behaviour as a
function of processes and characteristics external to the individual: fiscal and
regulatory incentives, institutional constraints and social norms.
The ‘internalist’ approach has mainly been pursued in disciplines such as social and
cognitive psychology; the ‘externalist’ approach has mainly been the domain of
disciplines such as applied behavioural analysis and institutional or evolutionary
economics. But disciplinary distinctions are not always hard and fast. For example,
some early sociology of consumption characterised modern consumers in terms of
‘invidious’ behaviours conceived of (largely) as responses to internal cognitive
processes. Later approaches to the sociology of consumption have placed a great deal
more emphasis on external constraints, consumption ‘practices’ and the ‘social logic’
of consumer behaviour. Marketing studies typically adopt a more eclectic approach
23
drawing loosely from both perspectives, but tending to emphasise the importance of
‘revealed’ economic or ethnographic accounts of consumer tastes and preferences.
The distinction between internalist and externalist approaches is important to the

debates about sustainable consumption precisely because each approach suggests very
different conceptualisations of individual and societal change. Whereas the former
approach envisages that changes in consumption patterns will flow from changes in
individual beliefs, attitudes and norms, the latter sees change in external conditions as
exercising a vital influence on individual behaviours.
In the first perspective, enlightened consumers are free to choose pro-environmental

behaviours – assuming that they possess appropriate beliefs or attitudes; in the second,
consumers are ‘locked in’ to consumption choices by a variety external conditions
ranging from genetic conditioning to economic necessity, social expectation,
accessibility constraints and the ‘creeping evolution of social norms’.
It would probably be fair to say that these kinds of tensions are far from being
resolved. There have certainly been some ambitious attempts – for example by
Bagozzi and his colleagues (Bagozzi et al 2002) and by Stern and his colleagues
(Stern et al 1999, Stern 2000, Guagnano et al 1995) – to construct coherent models of
consumer behaviour capable of capturing both internalist and externalist dimensions
of pro-environmental consumer choice. We review some of these models in Section
10 below.
But there have been relatively few attempts to apply these more complex schematic
models empirically as a way of obtaining quantitative evidence about real attitudes
and behaviours. Nor is it easy to see how this could easily be remedied. Some of
these models remain, in some sense, too complex. Their main virtue, therefore, has to
be seen as heuristic – that is, as fulfilling the conceptual role identified above, rather
than the empirical one.
Nonetheless, there is also an enormous variety of more applicable models, some of

them quantitative, others qualitative that can and have been used to explore consumer
behaviour in general and pro-environmental behaviour in particular.
As any student of behaviour will know, a comprehensive discussion of even a

representative sample of these models is a daunting task. Table 1 (below) summarises
a selection of common models that bear particularly on the question of pro-
environmental consumer behaviour. But it by no means exhausts the possibilities.
Nor is it particularly easy to offer a systematic review even of the literature within this
selection, for reasons that have already been discussed. The rest of Part 1, therefore,
presents a synthetic overview of some of the most important of these models,
structured in a particular way.
Specifically, the starting point for the overview will be the rational choice model that
underlies conventional economic understandings of consumer behaviour and a
number of other behavioural models. Next, we discuss some of the limitations of and
objections to conventional rational choice theory. Following on from this, we outline
24
two specific kinds of responses to these limitations. One response has been to
construct what might be called adapted expectancy- value models that attempt to
correct for some of the deficiencies of the rational choice model. In addition,
however, there have been some attempts to start from different places in their attempts
to understand social action. Some of these models (for instance those developed by
Paul Stern and his colleagues) have been developed more specifically in the context of
understanding pro-environmental behaviour.
25
Table 1: Social-Psychological Theories of Behaviour and Change

(bold type in the description refers to another entry in the table)
Social Psychological Key Description

Theory References
Attitude-Behaviour- Stern and A kind of field theory for environmentally
Context (ABC) Oskamp 1987, significant behaviour. Behaviour (B) is an
Theory Stern 2000 interactive product of ‘internal’ attitudinal
variables (A) and ‘external’ contextual
factors (C)
Cognitive Dissonance Festinger 1957 Argues that people are motivated to avoid
Theory internally inconsistent (dissonant) beliefs,
attitudes and values.
Cultural Theory Thompson et Hypothesises a four- fold typology of

al 1990 cultural ‘types’ with different conceptions
of governance and the good life:
hierarchists, egalitarians, individualists,
and fatalists.
Elaboration- Petty 1977, A persuasion model which predicts that

Likelihood Model Petty and the long-term success of a persuasive
Cacioppo 1981 message depends on how much mental
processing or ‘elaboration’ of the message
is undertaken by the subject (target).
Expectancy-Value Fishbein 1973, A broad class of theories (of which

Theory Ajzen and rational choice theory is one) based on the
Fishbein 1980 idea that behaviour is motivated by the
eg expectations we have about the
consequences of our behaviour and the
values we attach to those outcomes.
Field Theory Lewin 1951 Influential early social-psychological

theory positing behaviour as a function of a
dynamic ‘field’ of internal and external
influences. Behavioural change relies on
unfreezing (existing behaviours), shifting
to a new level, and then refreezing.
Interpersonal Triandis 1977 Like the Theory of Reasoned Action the

Behaviour (TIB) Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour (TIB)
includes both expectancy-value and
normative belief constructs. However, TIB
also includes the influence of habitual,
social and affective factors on behaviour.
26
Motivation-Ability- Ölander and An integrated behavioural model that

Opportunity model Thøgersen combines both internal motivational
1995 variables – usually based on the Theory of
Reasoned Action - with external
contextual variables of ability (including
habit and task knowledge) and opportunity.
Means End Chain Gutman 1982, A qualitative form of expectancy-value

Theory Reynolds and theory which posits that preferences are
Olson 2001 based on a ‘laddered’ relationship between
attributes, consequences and values.
Norm Activation Schwartz One of the better known attempts to model

Theory 1977, 1992 pro-social or altruistic behaviours: a
personal norm (PN) to behaviour in a pro-
social way is activated by awareness of the
consequences (AC) of one’s actions and
the ascription of personal responsibility
(AR) for them.
Normative Conduct Cialdini, Cialdini’s Focus Theory of Normative

Kallgren and Conduct proposes that behaviour is guided
Reno 1991 by social norms which are either
descriptive (what is done) or injunctive
(what should be done) in nature. The
strength or ‘salience’ of these different
kinds of norm in a given context depends
on a variety of dispositional and situational
factors.
Persuasion Theory Hovland et al A set of theoretical approaches to the ‘art

1953, Petty et of persuasion’ that identifies (1) the
al 2002. credibility of the source, (2) the message
and (3) the thoughts/ feelings of the
receiver as the three critical structural
elements in the success of persuasion
strategies.
Rational Choice Elster 1986, The underlying basis of most economic

Theory Homans 1961 theories of consumer preference and
etc several other social-psychological theories
of behaviour. Suggests that behaviour is the
outcome of rational deliberations in which
individuals seek to maximise their own
expected ‘utility’.
27
Self- Discrepancy Higgins 1987 Suggests that people are motivated to act
Theory according to feelings aroused by the
perceived gap between their actual and
‘ideal’ selves.
Self-Perception Bem 1972 Proposes that people infer their attitudes by

Theory observing their own behaviour.
Subjective Expected Ajzen and A form of expectancy value theory closely

Utility (SEU) Fishbein 1980, related to the rational choice model, SEU
Eagly and theory suggests that behaviour is a function
Chaiken 1993 of the expected outcomes of the behaviour
and the value assigned to those outcomes.
Structuration Theory Giddens 1984 Attempts to provide a model of the

relationship between agency (how people
act) and structure (the social and
institutional context). Giddens structuration
theory relies on a distinction between
‘practical’ and ‘discursive’ consciousness.
Symbolic Blumer 1969, Argues that people interact with things

Interactionism Mead 1934 (artefacts, institutions, others) on the basis
of the symbolic meanings those things have
for them.
Symbolic Self- Wicklund and A symbolic interactionist theory which

Completion Theory Gollwitzer suggests that people create their sense of
1982 identity through the appropriation of
symbolic resources to complete the ‘self-
image’.
Theory of Planned Ajzen 1991 Adjusts the Theory of Reasoned Action to

Behaviour (TPA) incorporate the actor’s perceived control
over the outcomes of his or her behaviour.
Theory of Reasoned Ajzen and Perhaps the best-known social-

Action (TRA) Fishbein 1980 psychological attitude-behaviour model,
the Theory of Reasoned Action adjusts
expectancy value theory to incorporate
normative social influences on behavioural
intention.
Value-Belief-Norm Stern et al An attempt to adjust Schwartz’s Norm
Theory 1999, Stern Activation theory to incorporate a more
2000 sophisticated relationship between values,
beliefs, attitudes and norms.
28
4 Rational Choice
The rational choice model is so widespread and so deeply entrenched in the

institutions and structures of modern (Western) society, that it tends to have an
immediate familiarity to us. The basic tenet of the model is that we behave in such a
way as to maximise the expected benefits to ourselves (as individuals) from our
actions.
A premise of the rational choice model is that human behaviour is a continual process
of making deliberative choices between distinct courses of action. Faced with such
choices, according to rational choice theory, we weigh up the expected benefits and
costs of the different actions, and choose the one that offers the highest expected net
benefit or lowest expected net cost to us. 6
In travelling between home and work, for example, I am faced with a choice whether
to go by car or to take public transport. I choose to go by car, because the journey is
(generally) shorter, the marginal cost is (usually) lower and I like listening to the
radio. Or alternatively, perhaps, I choose public transport because it is (generally)
more environmentally friendly, (often) less stressful, and I enjoy the company of
strangers.
The process of establishing the net costs and benefits of different alternatives is
supposed to have two distinct components. One is a set of expectations about the
outcomes of each choice. The other is an evaluation of those outcomes. In the
example above, for instance, my choice to travel by car depends both on my
expectations (that the journey will be cheaper and shorter eg) and my (positive)
evaluation of those outcomes. This feature of the model often leads to rational choice
models being referred to in the literature as expectancy-value models (Fishbein 1973).
One of the key features of the rational choice model (especially in its application to
consumer behaviour 7 ) is an emphasis on the individual as the unit of analysis. It is
individuals who make choices in the model, on the basis of rational deliberations that
consist of individual evaluations of subjectively expected outcomes.
The value attached to an outcome is often called the ‘utility’ of that outcome for the
given individual, and the rational choice model is therefore one of a more general
class of models sometimes referred to as subjective expected utility (SEU) models.
The individual-centred approach of these models is referred to as methodological
individualism. Social behaviour, in this view, is an emergent property of a collection
of individual behaviours, each of which results from deliberative choices based on the
subjective expected utility of the individual.
6
The literature on rational choice models and critic isms of them is huge. A useful overview of the
theory and common critiques can be found in Scot (2000). Key rational choice texts include Becker
(1976), Elster (1986), Friedman and Hechter (1990), Homans (1961).
7
The rational choice model has also been applied to the behaviour of entities other than human
individuals, for example, firms. But even in this case, the basic assumption is that the organisation
operates as an individual entity in the deliberative framework.
29
One of the reasons why rational choice theory may seem familiar is that it closely
resembles and indeed draws heavily on the intellectual underpinnings of classical
economics. Cost-benefit analysis, for example, is nothing more than a highly
quantitative form of rational choice model. As we shall see in the following sections,
economics certainly does not have the monopoly on rational choice. But the rational
choice model is so-deeply embedded in the economic theory of consumer preference
that it is instructive to make that the starting point of our overview.
4.1 Consumer Preference Theory

The common economic theory of consumer preferences (Begg et al 2003, eg) has four
basic elements to it: the consumer’s available income, the price of goods on the
market, the consumer’s tastes or preferences and the behavioural assumption of
‘utility maximisation’. Give n a limited income, a specific range of goods to choose
from, and a potentially infinite set of (exogenous) tastes or preferences, the consumer
chooses goods from those available in such a way as to maximise his or her subjective
expected utility within the constraints of his or her available income.
Several elements of this model are worth commenting on in more detail. The first is
the assumed ‘rationality’ of consumer choice. Rational consumers are those who
make reasoned choices that maximise their expected utility over the set of possible
purchases. This is the same concept of rationality, clearly, that is embedded in the
rational choice model. In order to achieve this utility maximisation, however,
consumers need to be in possession of a certain set of information. In particular, and
this is the second point, they will need to know the range of possible goods they could
choose from, and the prices of each of these goods. Thus, information plays a key role
in the actual behaviour of consumers in real- life situations. ‘Rational’ choices are only
possible in the context of ‘perfect’ market information.
Next, it is important to note that the preferences or tastes that underlie consumer
choice lie outside the model itself. They are assumed exogenous to it. The consumer
preference model has little or nothing to say about the nature, structure or origin of
consumer preferences. Since Samuelson’s (1938) work, the most that economics
attempts to say about the structure of individual or collective preference is what is
‘revealed’ about these preferences through the actual decisions that rational
consumers make in the market place.
Finally, it is instructive to note that economic theory has an important assumption of

‘non-satiety’. In other words, economics assumes that there is no limit to the desires
that consumers have for goods and services. The underlying wants and needs are
assumed to be potentially infinite. This requirement is structurally important not just
to the operation of the consumer preference model – without it the concept of
constraint in relation to utility maximisation would not work – but at one level to the
entire project of economics as the science of the allocation of scarce resources.
When it comes to the question of influencing cons umer behaviour, the consumer
preference model has, at least, the virtue of simplicity. The key influences in any
given situation are the range of private costs and benefits and individual taste or
30
preference (Figure 3). In addition, of course, the model envisages a key role for
information, in allowing consumers to make ‘rational’ choices. But there still only
appear to be two rather limited points of intervention in the model, for policy- makers
seeking to achieve social goals. One is to ensure that cons umers are provided with the
requisite information to make rational choices. The other is to adjust private costs and
benefits to reflect the existence of social costs and benefits that may lie outside the
realm of individual choice.
Social costs and

benefits
Taxes and
incentives
Information Tastes and
preferences
Private costs
and benefits
Consumer Behaviour
Figure 3: Simple Economic Model of Consumer Preference
4.2 The Attribute (Lancaster) Model

There is a variation on the consumer preference model that is worth mentioning
briefly. This variation was originally proposed in 1966 by Kelvin Lancaster and is
hence often referred to as the Lancaster model or sometimes the Attribute model of
consumer preference.
Lancaster’s suggestion was that consumer preferences for goods are not formed on the
basis of the products themselves, but on the attributes that those products possess and
the values of those attributes for individual consumers. The economic theory of choice
constructed from this suggestion has proved considerably more complex than
conventional preference theory. Nonetheless, it has been widely employed and
developed to explore consumer preferences for product attributes in sectors as diverse
as food (Crawford 2003, Philippidis and Hubbard 2003 eg), luxury cars (Anurit et al
1999), health care (Ryan and Bate 2001), and renewable energy investments
(Bergmann et al 2004).
31
4.3 Rational Choice in Non-Purchasing Behaviour

Consumer preference theory – and its extension to ‘attributes’ – were developed to
apply specifically to economic transactions: that is, basically, to consumer’s
purchasing behaviours. But the rational choice model has also been applied to
people’s non-purchasing behaviours. Perhaps the best-known application of rational
choice to non-purchasing behaviours is the work of Gary Becker, whose (1976)
Economic Approach to Human Behaviour and (1981) Treatise on the Family won him
the Nobel Prize. Becker used the concept of human capital to understand apparently
non-economic household behaviours such as divorce, the increase in women’s
participation in the labour force and the distributio n of child-rearing and household
labour between men and women.
Consistent with its roots in anthropological theories of social exchange (Homans

1961), rational choice models see exchange as a fundamental determinant of human
behaviour. The trade in econo mic goods and services is only one aspect of social
exchange. At a broader level, according to this extended rational choice model, we
exchange a variety of different goods (time, gifts, labour, critical appreciation, sexual
services and so on) in the expectation that (at least over the long-term) these
exchanges will benefit our own self- interest.
In principle, therefore, and to the extent that it is a valid model of behaviour, rational
choice theory ought to be useful in describing a wide variety of environmentally-
relevant behaviours. Establishing the individual costs and benefits of non-purchasing
behaviours (recycling, for example) is as important as understanding people’s
purchasing behaviours (buying recycled goods, eg).
Moreover, the distinction between purchasing and non-purchasing behaviours very

often breaks down under a careful analysis. More often than not, as the travel
behaviour example above illustrates nicely, any such choice will involve both
financial and ‘non- financial’ costs and benefits. Pro-environmental behaviour like
many other kinds of behaviour involves both purchasing behaviour and non-
purchasing behaviour. The focus on economic exchange inherent in consumer
preference theory is to some extent an arbitrary limitation on understanding pro-
environmental behaviour. But for the rational choice model, more generally, this is
not necessarily a problem. There is a well-established tradition of extending rational
choice beyond purchase decisions.
Where we might expect rational choice theory to confront some problems, however, is
in relation to moral and social behaviours. The evidence (discussed in more detail in
Section 7.1 below) suggests that only a limited proportion of pro-environmental
behaviour can be regarded as flowing from a fundamentally self- interested value-
orientations. Altruistic, pro-social and biospheric value orientations also appear to be
influential in motivating pro-environmental behaviours, and this is particularly likely
to be the case where pro-environmental behaviours incur net private costs to those
who engage in them.
There are some ways round this problem for rational choice theory, in particular
through the concept of extended self- interest. But since the problem of values is part
32
of a wider critique of the rational choice model, we defer discussion of this to the next
section.
33
34
5 Against Rational Choice
At the heart of rational choice theory lies the image of the self- interested economic
person, an image whose roots can be traced back to the writings of Adam Smith and
John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham (Russell 2000, Sen 1984). Though powerful as
an image, and firmly imbedded in many modern institutions, this conception of
human action has never been without its critics, and in the last half century the
rational choice model has been subject to an increasingly ferocious assault for a
variety of reasons.
The rational choice model is built on a number of key assumptions about social action
(Scott 2000, Zey 1992). These can be categorised under three main headings: 1) that
choice is rational; 2) that the individual is the appropriate unit of analysis in social
action; and 3) that choices are made in the pursuit of individual self- interest. Most of
the criticisms of rational choice theory can be categorised as responses to one or more
of these assumptions. The rationality assumption has been attacked mainly on
cognitive grounds; the individuality assumption mainly on sociological grounds and
the assumption of self- interest mainly on moral and epistemological grounds. We
address each of these criticisms in turn.
5.1 Bounded Rationality, Habit and Emotion

One of the most famous critiques of the rational choice model lies in the Nobel Prize
winning work of Herbert Simon. Simon (1957) argued that in decision- making
situations actors face both uncertainties about the future and costs in acquiring
information about the present. These two factors, he claimed, limit the extent to which
rational decision- making (in the sense of a comprehensive calculation of net costs and
benefits) is possible. Not only do I simply not have the time to amass all the
information necessary to make a thorough comparison between choices; some of that
information is simply not available to me, because it concerns events that lie in the
(uncertain) future.
Environmental issues in particular raise new kinds of uncertainties for consumers

because in many cases the impacts of our actions are distanced from us, either in
space or in time. In acting sustainably, consumers are required to take account of
agricultural, manufacturing, economic or social processes that take place on the other
side of the world – or only become relevant at some point in the future. Moreover, it is
often the cumulative effect of many people’s actions over time that is problematic
rather than my own actions per se.
The problem here is structurally similar to the problem (alluded to in Section 1.5) of
carrying out a systematic review. In the face of limited resources, a systematic review
of the evidence required for ‘rational’ decision-making (policy- making) is not always
possible, indeed in Simon’s view is frequently impossible. The image of choice as a
process of rational deliberation over a complete range of alternatives is unrealistic.
Decision- making in practice is not like that. It occurs under time constraints and
operates under cognitive limitations.
35
Ordinary people in ordinary situations are simply not capable of processing all the
cognitive information required for so-called ‘rational’ choices. Drawing on evidence
of the actual behaviour of firms, Simon argued instead for a model of ‘bounded
rationality’ in which actors make decisions not by ‘optimising’ across all possible
choices but by ‘satisficing’ – that is by setting a minimum level, with which if they
achieve they will be ‘happy enough’.
One of the ways in which people cope with the cognitive demands of choice,
particularly where it occurs on a routine basis, is through a variety of cognitive and
emotional heuristics and biases – rules of thumb – against which they tend to make
immediate and sometimes not even conscious decisions (Tversky and Kahnemann
1974). The existence of such heuristics and biases again potentially confounds the
deliberative model of decision- making inherent in rational choice theory.
This kind of low-cognitive-effort decision- making is most obvious in the case of what
we commonly call routine or habitual behaviours. We saw in Section 2.4 how routine
and habit are increasingly regarded by sociologists and social psychologists as an
important aspect of ordinary consumer behaviour. The same notion is inherent in the
opening experiment in Section 1. My inability to locate the kitchen waste bin, seven
or eight days after it has been moved, is the result of a deeply- ingrained habit that now
appears to be interfering with my ability to make rational choices.
The existence of habit, its role in decisions, and its apparent departure from the model
of rational cognitive deliberation has exercised critics of rational choice for well over
a century. From the early writings of Durkheim (1893) to the more recent
sociological work of Bourdieu (1990) and cognitive psychology of Bargh (1994),
Aarts and Verplanken (1999) and others, the role of habit has assumed an important
place in the critique of rational choice theory and in the development of robust social-
psychological models.
In fact, some attempts can be made to recover the concept of rationality in the face of
habit. From one perspective habits can be regarded as cognitive scripts whose role is
to reduce the cognitive effort required to make routine decisions whose rationality (ie
optimality from the perspective of self- interest) has already been determined. For as
long as these cognitive scripts serve the interests of rational decisions, they can in fact
be regarded as rational habits. 8 In particular, of course, one of their benefits is to
reduce the transaction costs associated with rational deliberation.
Quite often however, as in the case of the disappearing waste bin, the existence of
counter- intentional habits (Verplanken and Faes 1999) interferes substantially with
the ability of the individual to make decisions in his or her own best interests. In
particular, in any circumstances in which one is attempting to change one’s own
behaviour (or indeed the behaviour of others) the transaction costs of rational
deliberation appear to be reversed by the existence of habitualised behaviour. A
distinct cognitive effort is now required to overcome habitual behaviour, even where
8
Simon 1957 coined the term procedural rationality to refer to the rationality inherent in this context,
as opposed to the ‘substantive rationality’ embodied in the rational choice model.
36
the new behaviour carries substantial benefits to the individual concerned. In a later
section, we shall return to the importance of this issue for policy-making.
Quite apart from the role of habit in ordinary behaviour, critics of rational cho ice
theory have also pointed to the emotional or affective dimensions of decision- making.
I choose to buy this, that or the other shirt, not on the basis of rational calculation of
the costs and benefits of a range of options, but because I have an affective response
to the colour blue (say). Or to take another example, I decide to keep, rather than give
away or have put down, an elderly cat who has suddenly begun to urinate in my study
and cause me untold frustration and extra housework, not because I have totted up the
costs and benefits of keeping it, but because I have an overriding affection for another
creature who has shared a part of my life with me.
Of course, rational choice theory can attempt to recover rationality in these cases by
capturing my affective responses to cats and the colour blue within the concept of
individual utility, and perhaps even attempt to impute an economic value to these
affective responses on the basis of the time and money foregone in cleaning up cat’s
mess. But from the perspective of those critics of rational choice theory who
highlight the role of emotion (Zey 1992, Etzioni 1988), this is an almost futile and
potentially tautological attempt to protect a crumbling theory from its own limitations.
In fact, in some constructions, the recognition of emotion as an important influence on

human choice threatens to dethrone cognitive deliberation from behaviour altogether.
Some attempts have been made to construct a theory of rationality in which reason
itself – far from being a deliberative process – is viewed as a set of conditioned
responses to patterns of learning laid down as ‘emotional markers’ in the body
(Damasio 1994, 1999). Reason itself, in this model, is a construct of our emotional
responses to situations. We make decisions on the basis of our cognitive responses to
affective (emotional) states which are themselves the result of physiological triggers
in the body, that are built up from both innate responses and learned behaviours
reinforced over the history of the individual life.
Though clearly a long way from rational choice theory, this kind of model does
suggest some explanation for the much- lamented (by economists) irrationality of
ordinary behaviour. It is also a part of the common wisdom of marketers. The
relationship that marketers attempt to establish between brands and consumers is a
fundamentally affective one. 9
5.2 The Argument against Individualism

A second strand of the argument against rational choice theory concerns the
assumption of individuality. The unit of analysis in rational choice theory is the
decision- making process of the individual. Individuals themselves are defined as
rational self- interested maximisers of subjective utility. Social behaviour is explained,
in rational choice theory, as an emergent property of the individual behaviours and
actions of which it is composed. ‘The elementary unit of social life is the individual
9
Personal Communication, Chris Pomfret, Unilever, 2nd March 2004.
37
human action,’ claims Elster (1986, 13). ‘To explain social institutions and social
change is to show how these arise as the result of the action and interaction of
individuals.’
Again, this kind of ‘methodological individualism’ is familiar to us because it is

deeply imbedded in the institutions of the modern economy. The concept of individual
choice, the rights of the individual, and the supremacy of individual preference
occupy a central role both in the structure of market economies and in the culture of
Western society. That there might be any alternative to this conception is, in itself,
something that we sometimes have a hard time grasping.
Nonetheless, there is a very long-standing critique of methodological individualism

which argues that it is an ‘undersocialised’ account of human agency and overlooks
both our understanding of the relationship between self and other and the nature of
decision- making and choice in real life (Granovetter 1985, Zey 1992). Although it
would be impossible to do justice to the complexity of this critique, it is worth
highlighting three dimensions of it here.
Firstly, the notion of individual choice as a coherent entity is itself challenged by the
social psychology of identity. From the early work of George Herbert Mead, social
psychology has proposed a notion of self which is socially constructed. For Mead
(1934), the self is the result of ‘social conversations’. In some senses, social
interaction is formally antecedent to identity. We learn to construct a sense of self, an
identity, but we do so only through our interactions with others (Burr 2002). At the
very least, according to social psychology, the relationship between self and other
must be regarded as dualistic. Though the concept of an individual ‘self’ capable of
engaging with others and thereby influencing the nature and structure of social
conversations is at one level coherent, it depends for its existence and its development
on social interaction, on the social conversations that it also plays a part in
perpetuating.
This conception of self makes the assumption of individual rationality hard to defend,
however. As Zey (1992, 14) contends: ‘habits of mind and behaviour develop in a
social and cultural context’. Our ‘individual’ decisions are influenced by our relation
to others at a level that is beyond our conscious control. Individual choice in this
framing of identity is helplessly mired in the fabric of social norms, expectations and
interactions.
A second avenue of criticism against methodological individualism flows from

organisational studies of decision- making. This avenue points to the fact that in
practice a good many decisions are made in a collective, organizational setting.
Individual rationality is compromised in this context by the need to account for the
wishes and desires of others. But more importantly, organizational psychology
suggests that in group situations – where many decisions are made – individuals adopt
social roles that are defined by the particular context and situation in which they find
themselves. Moreover, the identity of the group itself becomes a key determinant of
group behaviour and of the social processes that exist within the group (Tajfel 1982).
38
These intra and inter-group processes undermine the very possibility of individual
rationality in such a context.
The final element of the critique against individualism flows from the long-standing
concern of sociology with problems of social action and social structure. The question
of understanding how social structures arise, how they change and how they influence
human behaviour has been central to sociology for at least a century (Giddens 1984).
If every social structure could be reduced to the actions of particular individuals, then
it might be possible for methodological individualism to account for it. Sociologists
argue that this is not the case. In particular, they point to the existence of social
structures which do not appear to benefit any particular individual, the longevity of
social structures over time (sometimes exceeding many individual lifetimes), the
behaviour of individuals in associating themselves with groups that do not appear to
support their own self- interest, and the apparent deference of individual behaviour to
the wishes of the group in numerous different kinds of situation.
In place of individualist theories of social action, sociologists and social

anthropologists have attempted to build structuralist accounts of social action (Polanyi
1944) or else to devise theories of practice (Bourdieu 1990, Reckwitz 2002), where
the units of analysis are the components of structure and practice themselves rather
than the individual behaviours subsumed within it.
Critics of the sociological approach have accused it of ‘over-socialising’ human

action, just as critics of rational choice theory accuse it of ‘under-socialising’
individua l choice (Campbell 1996 eg). What we are faced with here is a very long-
standing debate between two different units of analysis, commonly referred to as
agency on the one hand and structure on the other. Or to be more precise, we are
caught between proponents of the view that individual agency is the important unit of
analysis in understanding social action and proponents of the view that social
structure should play that role. As we shall see below, this long-standing debate is
mirrored by a very similar and more recent debate between ‘internalist’ and
‘externalist’ conceptions of pro-environmental behaviour.
In any such situation, where a modern debate finds itself piggybacking on the
structure of a much more long-standing historical debate, we clearly need to take care
in adopting hard and fast methodological positions. On the other hand, the extent to
which rational choice theory, and many of the familiar institutions that are built on it,
has undersocialised human action is strongly supported from a number of different
theoretical frameworks and with quite a considerable body of evidence. This
undersocialisation of rational choice theory – and many modern institutions that are
founded on it – is one of the key lessons for sustainable consumption policy that may
be drawn from the critique of rational choice theory.
5.3 The Moral Critique

The final major critique of rational choice theory takes exception to the idea that
humans act only out of self- interest. Once again this debate is as old (at least) as the
history of classical economics. Critics of the concept of the self- interested economic
39
person point both to moral dimensions of individual behaviour and to the acceptance
by individuals of the moral dimensions of social structures (Scott 2000). Both of these
kinds of influences limit the extent to which self- interest actually operates in society,
according to critics of rational choice.
The latter issue is clearly related to the problem of accounting for social structure
within methodological individualism. Why is it that as individuals we accept social
structures at all? One reason might be, as some opponents of individualism suggest,
that these structures are formally antecedent to individual behaviour, and that we, as
individuals are socialised automatons, helpless in the face of institutional structure.
Another possibility is that – as individuals – we recognise that behaviours dominated
by self- interest fail to protect the long-term best interests of society at large. But in
accepting either of these explanations we are essentially rejecting fundamental aspects
of rational choice theory.
The moral dimensions of behaviour are also visible from within the perspective of
individual action. Frank (1988) for example points to the place of moral sentiments in
human decisions. We routinely forego narrowly conceived self- interest for the sake of
broadly altruistic motives. We invest a great deal of time and energy in looking after
our children, our relatives, our close friends and occasiona lly even, total strangers.
Even more puzzling perhaps, from the perspective of rational choice, is the existence
of self-destructive motives such as vengeance and spite, in which we are prepared to
wreak havoc on others even at the cost of harm to ourselves.
Some kind of ‘rational’ explanation for these types of behaviour is offered by

evolutionary psychology (Wright 1994), which supposes a series of genetically-based
mechanisms (kin selection, reciprocal altruism and so on) for both altruistic and
spiteful behaviours (Hamilton 1970). But the rationality inherent in these explanations
is very different from that inherent in the idea of individual self- interest. The genetic
explanation for parental love (and other forms of kin selection) lies in the success of
such strategies in securing the survival of genes from one generation to the next. But
this ‘genetically rational’ behaviour is prosecuted through individual behaviours
which have little or nothing to do with subjective self- interest. Whether these
evolutionary mechanisms can offer any comfort to those seeking pro-environmental
behaviour is another matter entirely. 10
Some attempts can be made to rescue the ‘rationality’ of non-self-serving decisions,

even within the structure of a subjective expected utility model. In particular, by
assigning individual utilities of various kinds to pro-social behaviours, rational choice
theory can, to some extent claim to incorporate them within a subjective expected
utility model. I behave in an altruistic way, in this view, because there is a value to
me (feeling good about myself perhaps, or the expectation that others will reciprocate)
that can be incorporated into the cost-benefit equation of rational deliberation. Once
again, however, these attempts to extend the boundaries of subjective expected utility
into a moral terrain have been roundly condemned by critics of rational choice theory.
10
For a fuller discussion of this issue see (eg) Jackson 2002a.
40
At the very least, the existence in practice of clearly defined and measurable pro-
social and pro-environmental values that appear to transcend individual self- interest
(Schwartz 1977, Stern and Dietz 1994, Schultz 2001) suggests that not all moral
behaviour can easily be subsumed under the rational choice model.
41
42
6 Adjusted Expectancy-Value Theory
Not surprisingly, the extensive critique of rational choice theory has prompted a
number of efforts to come up with alternative conceptual models of consumer
behaviour that attempt to accommodate these critiques. Interestingly, and in spite of
sometimes vociferous opposition to the economic theory of consumer preference,
many of these alternatives retain some at least of the expectancy-value structure of
rational choice theory. Generally however, they differ from conventional consumer
preference theory in at least one of three separate ways.
In the first place, they generally do not assume the commensurability of different
underlying utilities or values. In other words consumer preferences are not cashed out
purely in terms of the financial values of market transactions. Secondly, they
generally attempt to unpack preference and offer some kind of revelation of the
underlying expectancy- value structure of consumer attitudes. Finally, they often
adapt the basic expectancy value structure to incorporate elements such as social
influence, moral concern or habit.
In this section, we describe some of these adjusted expectancy value theories, starting
with a very simple expectancy value model of consumer attitudes and then proceeding
to a variety of more or less qualitative and more or less complex models that have
been used in the literature to describe and predict consumer behaviours.
6.1 Simple Expectancy-Value Attitude Theory

The most straightforward application of expectancy-value theory to consumer
preference is a social psychological model which posits that a consumer’s attitude
towards (preference for) an object (eg product, service, place, person or idea) can be
resolved explicitly in terms of two (measurable) antecedents. These are, on the one
hand, the consumer’s beliefs (bi ) about the characteristics of the purchase
(expectations); and on the other hand, the consumer’s evaluation (ei ) of those
characteristics (values). Expectancy-value theory suggests that consumer’s overall
attitude (Aobj) towards the object is expressed in the following equation:
n
Aobj = ∑ bi ei
i =1
My attitude towards an object is the sum of my beliefs about its characteristics,

weighted by my evaluations of those characteristics.
This construction is used, empirically, both to test and to predict consumer attitudes.
Typically, empirical studies might design questionnaires in which respondents
quantify both their beliefs about specific characteristics of a product (or range of
products) and their evaluations of those characteristics on a point scale. So, in testing
consumer attitudes towards re-usable milk-bottles (for example) one might design a
questionnaire in which consumers were asked to express their beliefs about
43
characteristics such as convenience (on a scale ranging from not at all convenient to
very convenient), cleanliness, environmental impact and so on; together with their
evaluation of these characteristics (on a scale ranging from ‘not at all important’ to
‘very important’, eg).
The assumption of rationality inherent in this theory is much the same as that inherent
in other rational choice models. The rational consumer is one who makes choices that
maximise Aobj subject to their available resources. In spite of this similarity, this
social psychological model goes further than conventional economic preference
theory in its attempt to unpack consumer’s attitudes. Whereas economics suggests
that the best we can discover about preferences is what is revealed through the choices
that consumers make in the market, the social-psychological approach suggests that it
is possible to distinguish between and to measure the two antecedent variables, beliefs
and values. In doing so, it suggests a clear distinction between policy initiatives
aimed at changing beliefs (eg through advertising campaigns, labelling, information
schemes and so on) and those aimed at changing values. We shall return to this
distinction in the final Chapter.
6.2 Means-End Chain Theory

A far more qualitative variation on the same theme is employed in Means-End Chain
Theory (Gutman 1982, Reynolds and Gutman 1988). This model has been used
widely in marketing since the early 1980s. It takes as its starting point the idea that
consumer behaviour is (either consciously or unconsciously) goal-directed.
Consumers buy goods in order to achieve certain goals. The goals themselves often
reside in the realm of over-arching personal, social or moral values: the desire to be
happy, to feel useful, to belong, to protect one’s family and so on. These values are
regarded as the ‘ends’ that consumers seek in purchasing goods.
The means for achieving these ends, according to Means-End Chain theory, are the
attributes of the products that consumers purchase. In this respect, at least, the model
closely resembles both the rational choice theory inherent in the Lancaster model, and
the simple expectancy- value theory described above. Developed for marketing and
advertising research, Means End Chain theory asserts that people’s preferences can be
construed in terms of a ‘laddered’ relationship (Figure 4) between a product’s
attributes, the consequences accruing from these attributes, and the relevance of those
consequences for achieving important personal values.
A very simple example serves to illustrate how this works. In purchasing a new
fridge freezer for my kitchen, for example, I am drawn to selecting my purchase on
the basis of a number of specific attributes of the products I see before me. I end up
choosing a given model for a number of different reasons. But in particular (it
transpires during an interview), I choose a white fridge freezer because whiteness is
both a symbol of cleanliness and a means of telling me whether or not the fridge
freezer is actually clean. This is important to me because I believe that a clean kitchen
will protect the health and vitality of my family, and this is an end that I value highly.
44
Value Protect family … Value

.
Healthy kitchen
Consequence
Consequence
‘A clean look’
Consequence ‘can see dirt
easily’
Attribute ‘Whiteness’ … Attribute

.
Figure 4: Hypothetical Means-End Map for Fridge Freezer Purchase
Though Means End Chain theory draws on Lancaster’s attribute model, it differs from
conventional consumer preference models in two important respects. Firstly, it
provides for a much more qualitative exploration of consumer preferences than does
conventional consumer preference theory. Consequently, the model has been widely
applied in ethnographic market research both to inform product development and to
develop advertising and marketing campaigns (Reynolds and Olson 2001).
Secondly – and like the social-psychological model described above – it does not
regard preferences as exogenous to the model. On the contrary, Means-End Chain
theory attempts quite specifically to identify both the values that underlie consumer
choices, and the chains of reasoning that lead from those values to specific choices,
via the attributes of products.
It is clear from this description, however, that Means End Chain theory remains a
variation on rational choice that lies firmly in the realm of expectancy-value theory.
Though it relaxes the assumption that values are self- interested, and makes no attempt
to define rationality in terms of optimisation procedures, Means-End Chain theory
does assume, sometimes explicitly (Gutman 1997), that consumer decisions are
rational in sense of being a) goal-directed and b) driven by identifiable underlying
values.
It is worth noting that in addition to its uses in conventional marketing and advertising
research, Means-End Chain theory provides a potentially valuable tool for
understanding pro-social or pro-environmental consumer decisions in terms of
45
underlying values, and has occasionally been applied in this way (Palmer-Barnes et al
1999 eg). 11
6.3 The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)

One of the most widely-applied theories of social behaviour flows from the ground-
breaking work of Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen in the late 1970s. Drawing from a
long tradition of social psychological work on the attitude-behaviour relationship, the
two authors developed what they claimed to be a quite general theory of social
behaviour called the Theory of Reasoned Action (Figure 5).
Beliefs about
outcomes
Attitude
towards the
behaviour
Evaluation of
outcomes
Relative importance
of attitude and
Intention Behaviour
norm
Beliefs about Subjective

what others
norm
think
Figure 5: The Theory of Reasoned Action
The starting point for this theoretical development is the expectancy-value

construction described at the beginning of this section: people behave according to
their beliefs about the outcomes of their behaviour and the values they attach to those
outcomes. Beliefs about and evaluations of outcome lead to an attitude towards the
given behaviour, according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), and this attitude towards
the behaviour is one of two main influences on people’s intention to act in the given
way. Intention to act, in the Fishbein- Ajzen model, is the immediate antecedent and
key determinant of behaviour.
However, the Theory of Reasoned Action departs from simple expectancy-value

theory in one important respect. A second major influence on intention in the Theory
of Reasoned Action is what Fishbein and Ajzen called a person’s subjective norm,
that is ‘his [sic] perception that most people who are important to him think he should
11
An ESRC project led by the University of Leeds is currently using a variation on this model to
explore the difference between the purchase behaviours of ‘ordinary’ consumers and ‘voluntary
simplifiers’.
46
or should not perform the behaviour in question’ (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980, 57). As
this prescription makes clear, the subjective norm is to be construed as an individual
belief about what other people who are important to me think of the specific
behaviour, rather than my own personal belief about the morality of the given
behaviour. This latter construction has been called a personal norm in the literature.
The distinction between subjective norms and personal norms has been the subject of
some discussion (Kashima and Kashima 1988 eg). Fishbein and Ajzen (1980)
maintained that personal norms are essentially subjective behavioural beliefs and did
not therefore need a separate elaboration. However, several other models including
Triandis’ (1977) Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour and Schwartz’s (1970) Norm
Activation model treat personal norms rather differently (see below).
More recently, a number of attempts have been made to adjust the Ajzen/Fishbein
model to incorporate moral norms explicitly (Sparks and Shepherd 2002). Given the
importance of moral and normative issues in the critique of rational choice theory, and
their relevance for sustainable consumption, these subtleties may eventually turn out
to be cruc ial to the success or failure of Theory of Reasoned Action in treating pro-
environmental behaviours.
As a response to the critique of rational choice theory, Theory of Reasoned Action

certainly has the virtue of making explicit the antecedents of preference or attitude.
More importantly, it acknowledges the social influence on personal behaviour, which
is incorporated into the model in the form of a subjective norm. The limitations of
cognitive deliberation, the role of habit, the influence of affective or moral factors are,
however, not specifically addressed by the model.
Nonetheless, the claim of its architects is that Theory of Reasoned Action represents a
quite general theory of social action. Fishbein, Ajzen and others have applied the
theory in a wide variety of different contexts to understand behaviours as different as
dieting, women’s occupational orientations, family planning, voting, giving up
alcohol, choice of transport mode, and so on (Ajzen 1991). It has also been used
explicitly to understand and to predict consumer’s purchase behaviours (Ajzen and
Fishbein 1980, Chapter 13). In contrast to some of the earlier models of consumer
behaviour (such as the Howard and Sheth model), the Theory of Reasoned Action has
the virtue of being able to explore specific aspects of consumer action and preference
in some detail.
Ajzen and Fishbein distinguish between four different elements involved in consumer
behaviour: the target (brand or product), the action (buying, using, borrowing,
disposing etc), the context (own use, gift etc), and the time horizon (now, next week,
next year etc). ‘Variations in each of these elements of consumer behaviour will
similarly affect the consumer’s normative belief,.’ claim the authors (op cit, p 172).
An advantage of Theory of Reasoned Action is its ability to address the attitudinal
antecedents of these different elements.
An important limitation of much of the empirical work based on the Theory of

Reasoned Action is that, in many cases, studies are limited by what they can discover
47
through questionnaire surveys and/or interviews. At the end of the day, these
questionnaire surveys entail asking people about their attitudes (beliefs about and
evaluations of consequences), their subjective norms, and their intentions. The success
of the theory is generally taken to be its ability to correlate intentions with its
antecedents (attitudes and subjective norms). Studies have rarely gone on to measure
actual behaviours as well as intentions. Rather, intentions have generally been taken
as being good predictors of behaviours. However, this is only true in particular
circumstances, namely where there is a reasonable degree of volitional control over
the behaviour in question.
6.4 The Theory of Planned Behaviour

Its authors claim that the Theory of Reasoned Action is able to explain a considerable
degree of the variance between attitudes, subjective norms and intentions, in
situations where people have volitional control over their actions. My intention to act
in a certain way is, in these circumstance, likely to be a reliable indicator of my actual
behaviour.
However, the existence of cases where actors have incomplete volitional control
scarcely needs pointing out. It may even be argued that these cases outnumber those
in which volitional control is achieved or even achievable. The road to hell, as they
say, is paved with good intentions.
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen and Madden 1986, Ajzen 1988, Ajzen
1991) is an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action specifically to those
situations in which actions are not under volitional control. The specific modification
(illustrated in Figure 6) is to include a new variable known as perceived behavioural
control (PBC) as an additional indicator of both intention and action.
PBC is defined as ‘the person’s belief as to how easy or difficult performance of the
behaviour is likely to be’ (Ajzen and Madden 1986). According to the architects of
the Theory of Planned Behaviour, the inclusion of PBC, together with behavioural
intention can be used directly to predict actual behavioural achievement. Ajzen
(1991) offers two rationales for this hypothesis.
Firstly, he argues that, holding intention constant, the degree of success in actually
carrying out that intention depends on the strength of our belief in our ability to carry
out that behaviour. Someone who is confident that they can master a particular
activity – engaging in garden composting for example – is more likely to succeed than
someone who doubts their ability to carry it through. Secondly, argues Ajzen,
perceived behavioural control can be taken as an indicator of actual behaviour control.
Provided that the individual’s perceptions of control are not misguided, PBC is likely
to indicate actual behaviour control, and if the individual truly does have volitional
control over their actions then intention is likely to correlate closely with behaviour.
48
Beliefs about
outcomes
Attitude
towards the
behaviour
Evaluation of
outcomes
Relative importance
of attitude and
Intention Behaviour
norm
Beliefs about Subjective

what others
norm
think
Perceived
Behavioural Control
Figure 6: The Theory of Planned Behaviour
The construct of PBC has some similarities with – and indeed draws some historical
pedigree from – the concept of self-efficacy. Bandura (1977, 1982) proposed that
self-efficacy is concerned with ‘judgements of how well one can execute courses of
action required to deal with prospective situations’. The self-efficacy belief is learned
in various ways, according to Bandura, including personal experiences (good or bad)
and the example provided by others (modelling). Perceived self-efficacy can
determine whether an individual attempts a given task, the degree of persistence when
the individual encounters difficulties, and ultimate success.
A systematic programme of investigation by Bandura and his colleagues has

supported the idea that people’s actual behaviour is strongly correlated wit h their
confidence in their ability to perform the action in question. Ajzen (1991) uses this
evidence to claim support for the concept of PBC. But this equivalence is not
universally accepted. Armitage and Conner (1999) found, in a study of intentions to
eat a low-fat diet, that self- efficacy and PBC had distinct and independent effects on
intentions.
The Theory of Planned Behaviour has been applied widely to the task of
understanding behaviour in a vast range of different contexts. A recent meta-survey of
the application (and efficacy) of the theory (Armitage and Conner 2001) identified
applications in 154 different contexts. These included smoking behaviours, alcohol
consumption, health screening attendance, breast/testicular examination, food choice,
sexual behaviours, blood donation, internet use, gift-buying, accident avoidance,
investment, engaging in collective action and making consumer complaints (East
1997, Conner and Sparks 1996).
49
Planned behaviour is also one of the models most frequently used in the literature to
explore pro-environmental behaviour. Applications of the model to what is often
called ‘environmentally significant behaviour’ (Stern 2000) include attempts to use it
to understand or predict recycling behaviours, travel mode choice, energy
consumption, water conservation, food choice, and ethical investment (Staats 2003,
Wall et al 2003).
Again many of these studies fail to measure actual behaviour, and concentrate mainly
on measuring the relationship between attitudes, intentions and PBC. However, there
are certainly some studies that support a strong correlation between pro-
environmental intention and pro-environmental behaviour in the context of a high
degree of volitional control (Boldero 1995).
In the final analysis, the Theory of Planned Behaviour remains an adjusted expectancy
value model. It is capable of incorporating affective or moral antecedents of
behaviour only in so far as these are modelled as attitudinal beliefs about or
evaluations of the outcomes of specific actions. In the following subsection we
explore another set of models that attempt a much more explicit modelling of moral
influences on consumer behaviour.
50
7 Moral and Normative Conduct
A common assumption in explorations of pro-environmental behaviour is that those

who undertake such behaviours tend to have at least some altruistic or moral reasons
for doing so. It turns out that this is not always the case. Some pro-environmental
behaviours can be motivated entirely by self-serving interests. All the same, a part of
the case for pro-environmental behaviour is a moral case. Problematic environmental
impacts of my individual actions here today are as likely (or perhaps more likely) to
fall on other people at some other time and place, as they are to fall directly on me.
Even if I am not myself motivated to care about these impacts on others, I may care
about the expectations of others on me not to act in anti-social ways.
There is therefore an inescapably normative dimension to the understanding of pro-

environmental behaviour. Expectancy-value theories struggle to accommodate this
component because of underlying assumptions about individual self- interest as the
basis for human motivation.
Adjusted expectancy-value theories such as the Theory of Reasoned Action and the
Theory of Planned Behaviour can at least incorporate normative influences on
individual consumers via the concept of the subjective norm: my beliefs about how
important others think I should behave. However, it has been argued, with some
degree of cogence, that this concept of normative influence exhausts neither the range
of normative influences nor the importance of altruistic or moral values in individual
behaviour.
Some attempts have been made to adjust the Theories of Reasoned Action and
Planned Behaviour to incorporate moral beliefs explicitly. Manstead (2000) reviews
some of these studies and concludes that the specific inclusion of moral beliefs
improves the predictive power of the theory in a variety of applications in which pro-
or anti-social dimensions of behaviour are relevant. These include committing
driving violations (Parker et al 1995), organic milk consumption (Raats et al 1995),
and GM food consumption (Sparks et al 1995). A more recent study by Sparks and
Shepherd (2002) on consumer’s attitudes towards meat consumption and food
produced by genetic engineering confirms this conclusion.
These kinds of results suggest that there may be a key role for theories that focus
explicitly on the moral and normative dimensions of human behaviour. In this
subsection we briefly describe four such models. The first is the ‘value theory’
developed in the wake of Dunlap and van Liere’s (1978) work on the New
Environmental Paradigm. The second is the Norm-Activation theory introduced
briefly in Section 3 above. A third model is an attempt by Paul Stern and his
colleagues to link ecological value theory to the Norm Activation model. Finally, we
briefly explore Cialdini’s Focus Theory of Normative Conduct.
51
7.1 Ecological Value Theory

The earliest and simplest normative model of pro-environmental behaviour suggests
that pro-environmental behaviour arises from quite specific value orientations in the
individual. In its simplest form, the suggestion here is that pro-environmental
behaviours flow directly from pro-social or moral values. Thus, if I hold certain kinds
of moral or altruistic values I am more likely, according to the model, to engage in
pro-environmental behaviours.
Much of this work draws on empirical evidence of the existence of two or three main
value orientations in society. Early work (Schwartz 1973, 1977 eg) distinguished
mainly between a ‘self-enhancement’ (ie self-regarding) value orientation and a ‘self-
transcendent’ (ie other-regarding) value orientation. The former corresponds closely
with the assumption of self- interest at the heart of the rational choice model. The
second orientation is supposed to offer a distinct alternative to the self- interest model.
The value model hypothesises that those who hold primarily self- interested values are
less likely to engage in pro-environmental behaviours than those who hold primarily
self-transcendent values. A variation on this thesis suggests the existence of a third
distinct value orientation focused on valuing the environment (as distinct from other
people). This ‘biospheric’ value orientation – which is regarded as distinct from a pro-
social or altruistic value orientation – is supposed to have emerged quite recently in
human history.
The earliest and most well-kno wn study of the biospheric value orientation is the
work carried out in the context of Dunlap and van Liere’s (1978) New Environmental
Paradigm. The starting point for Dunlap and van Liere was the suggestion of
numerous earlier writers that environmental problems stem in part at least from the
values, attitudes and beliefs that prevail in society. These earlier writers had pointed in
particular to ‘our belief in abundance, our faith in science and technology, and our
commitment to a laissez- faire economy, limited government planning and private
property rights’ (Dunlap and van Liere 1978, 10) as contributory factors in the
‘environmental crisis’.
Dunlap and van Liere believed that this set of values – referred to by some (Caldwell
1970, Campbell and Wade 1972) as the ‘Dominant Social Paradigm’ – was being
moderated or eroded to some extent in modern society by the emergence of a ‘New
Environmental Paradigm’. The New Environmental Paradigm, they argued,
contained a set of core values which, as distinct from the Dominant Social Paradigm,
pay increased respect to natural limits and the importance of preserving the balance
and integrity of nature. 12
Since Dunlap and van Liere’s original study a huge number of studies have been
carried out attempting to confirm the existence of three distinct value orientations:
biospheric, social and egoistic. A number of studies have also attempted to explore
12
There are resonances here between the new environmental paradigm and Inglehart’s (1990)
argument about the emergence in modern society of ‘post-materialist’ values.
52
the relationships between these different value orientations and pro-environmental

behaviour.
As we have already indicated, there is no general one-to-one correspondence between

biospheric values and pro-environmental behaviours. Some pro-environmental
behaviours are motivated by self- interest, some by altruism, and others by biospheric
values.
There is interesting evidence to suggest that those with primarily egoistic value
orientations or less likely to engage in certain kinds of pro-environmental behaviour
than those with pro-social or biospheric value orientations (Stern et al 1995) and that
those who adhere strongly to the Dominant Social Paradigm are less likely to hold
pro-environmental attitudes (Kilbourne et al 2001). Perhaps most interesting is work
that explores the contextual nuances between different kinds of behaviour and these
value orientations.
Zavestoski (2002), for example, finds that concern for the environment correlates
positively with both self-enhancement (egoistic) and self-transcendent (altruistic)
value orientations. Concern for over-consumption, by contrast, correlated positively
with the self- transcendent value orientation, but negatively with the self-enhancement
value orientation. If am egoistic I may indeed still be likely to express concern for the
my environment. I am less likely to eschew the benefits offered by consumption
goods. This finding appears to suggest that while motivating environmental concern
may be able to proceed without value change, persuading people to consume less
probably cannot.
Taken as a whole however, ecological value theory must contend with three key
difficulties. The first of these is the attitude-behaviour gap. 13 Having pro-social or
pro-environmental values or attitudes is not the same thing as engaging in pro-social
or pro-environmental behaviour. This point is most deliciously illustrated by
Bickman’s (1972) study on littering. In a survey of 500 people’s attitudes to littering,
94% of those interviewed acknowledged responsibility. However, only 2% of those
interviewed picked up litter that had been strategically planted by the researchers on
their way out!
The same issue has been highlighted in recent studies of domestic energy-
consumption. Gatersleben et al (2002) and Jensen (2002) both demonstrate that pro-
environmental intentions and behaviours do not necessarily correlate with reduced
energy consumption in the household. In fact, there is evidence of a reverse
correlation. Environmental attitudes are often reported as being higher in households
in the higher socio-demographic classes. But household energy consumption
correlates positively with household size – a key indicator of socio-economic class.
A second, related problem faced by ecological value theory lies in the difficulty of
distinguishing dispositional influences on behaviour (such as value or attitude) from
13
The existence of an attitude-behaviour gap (sometimes also called a value-action gap) has plagued
attitude behaviour theory since at least 1957, when Festinger published his work on cognitive
dissonance (see section 9.3 below).
53
contextual or situational variables. Studies of recycling, for example, have pointed to

higher levels of reported recycling or willingness to recycle amongst higher-income
white households, than amongst lower- income black or Asian families (RRF 2002,
2004). Sometimes such studies have pointed uncritically to the need for information
campaigns targeted specifically at lower income families, without pausing to consider
contextual factors – such as the convenience of recycling – in the two cases. But this
response betrays a worrying disregard for situational demographics. More black and
Asian families live in areas of high density housing with poor recycling facilities –
and often no kerbside service. Paraskevopoulous et al (2003) have argued that
contextual factors (such as social exclusion) are themselves an important antecedent
of environmental attitudes.
The tendency to attribute variances in behaviour to dispositional factors (attitudes,

beliefs or higher level psychological constructs such as values) and to overlook the
influence of situational variables is known in psychology as the ‘fundamental
attribution error’. The Perceived Behavioural Control element of the Theory of
Planned Behaviour is one attempt to overcome this constraint of simple attitude-
behaviour models. Another attempt is the attitude-behaviour-context (ABC) model
developed by Paul Stern and his colleagues (see Section 10.2 below).
A final problem for value models lies in the instability of individual values across
different contexts and situations. There is quite a lot of (not entirely conclusive)
evidence on longitudinal or cohort shifts – for example changes in the strength of
environmental values over time or at different ages.
There is also some fairly convincing evidence to suggest that the values and beliefs
that are salient at any one time – ie important to the decision-making process – vary
according to the context or situation in which people find themselves. Biel and
Nilsson, for example, have recently found that the strength of a person’s
environmental values in a professional context can vary significantly from their
environmental values in a personal situation (Biel 2004). We return to this issue of
salience in later Sections.
None of these problems can be taken to dismiss the link between values and pro-
environmental behaviour entirely. However, they do point to the need for
considerable care in imputing behaviour from values and in understanding the
contextual variables that moderate the attitude-behaviour relationship.
7.2 Norm Activation Theory

Shalom Schwartz’s (1977) Norm Activation theory remains one of the most widely
applied models of moral behaviour. The original motivation of the theory was to
provide a framework for understanding pro-social, altruistic behaviours, and Schwartz
restricted the domain of application quite specifically to these kinds of behaviours.
The basic premise of the theory is that personal norms are the only direct determinants
of pro-social behaviours. Schwartz conceived of personal norms as feelings of strong
54
moral obligation that people experienced for themselves to engage in pro-social

behaviour. He rejected the idea that intentions mediate this relationship.
It is clear that the concept of personal norm in Schwartz’s theory is markedly different
from the concept of subjective norm embodied in the Theory of Reasoned Action.
Schwartz argued that some behaviours are intended quite specifically ‘to benefit
another as an expression of internal values, without regard for.. social and material
reinforcements’ (op cit, 77)
Norm-Activation theory regards internalised personal norms as having two direct

psychological antecedents, namely an awareness of the consequences of one’s actions
and an acceptance of the personal responsibility that one holds for these consequences
(Figure 7).
Awareness of
Consequences
Personal
Behaviour
Norm
Ascription of
responsibility
Figure 7 Schwartz’s Norm Activation Theory
Importantly, awareness of consequences and ascription of responsibility are not just

causal antecedents of the personal norm, their strength is also supposed to moderate
the link between the personal norm and the behaviour. In other words, the
relationship between personal norm and behaviour is stronger in the case where one is
aware of the negative consequences of not engaging in the pro-social behaviour and
where one accepts responsibility for these consequences, and weaker where one is
unaware of negative consequences and denies responsibility.
In practice, however, as with the Theory of Planned Behaviour, studies often restrict
their focus to the correlations between personal norm and its psychological
antecedents, and assume that the existence of the personal norm is sufficient for the
behaviour to occur. Where the relationship between personal norm and behaviour is
modelled, it is often mo derated by the strength or weakness of external contextual or
situational constraints (see below).
Because of its goal of explaining specifically pro-social behaviours, Schwartz’s theory

has been widely applied in attempts to understand and to predict pro-environmental
55
behaviours. Stern et al (1986) used the theory to investigate support for environmental
protection, Hopper and Nielsen (1991) and Vining and Ebreo (1990 & 1992) used it to
examine recycling behaviours, Black et al (1995) to explain househo ld energy
adaptations and Bamberg and Schmidt (2003) to explore alternatives to car use.
The degree of explanation of variance in behaviour predictable by these models

differs from case to case. The single biggest factor which appears to interfere with
personal norms in the success of pro-environmental behaviours is the existence of
external social or institutional constraints. This finding is extremely important to an
understanding of pro-environmental behaviour. In a later section, we shall look at
some attempts to construct integrated models of behaviour that incorporate both
social-psychological and contextual variables. Before doing so, however, we briefly
examine an adaptation of Schwartz’s theory, proposed by Paul Stern and his
colleagues.
7.3 Stern’s Value Belief Norm Theory

Paul Stern is undoubtedly one of the most experienced and prolific of those who have
attempted to construct social-psychological models of pro-environmental consumer
behaviour. Drawing extensively on studies of energy behaviours dating back to the
late 1970s, Stern has engaged in an increasingly sophisticated attempt to understand
‘environmentally significant behaviours’ and to develop a coherent theory about them
(Gardner and Stern 2002, Stern 2000).
A premise of much of this work has been that pro-social attitudes and personal moral
norms are significant predictors of proenvironmental behaviour. Thus, Stern and his
colleagues have drawn extensively on previous work on altruism, helping, and pro-
social behaviour to construct models of pro-environmental behaviour. One such
attempt (Figure 8) is the Value-Belief-Norm theory (Stern et al 1999) of pro-
environmental behaviour which explicitly links Scwartz’s Norm Activation model to
ecological value theory (see above).
The theory postulates that acceptance of the new environmental paradigm (NEP) is
formally antecedent to awareness of consequences in the norm-activation model. 14
The degree of acceptance of the NEP is itself correlated (positively) with biospheric
and altruistic values and (negatively) with egoistic values. That is, if I hold strong
altruistic or biospheric values I am more likely to accept the NEP. The stronger my
egoistic value orientation, the less likely I am to accept it. 15 Acceptance of the NEP
correlates positively with awareness of the (environmental) consequences of my
actions, and this in its turn leads me to become aware of my responsibility to reduce
14
There are some formal differences between the structure of Stern’s norm-activation model and the
one originally proposed by Schwartz. For example, in the original theory AC and AR are
independent variables, whereas in this model AC is antecedent to AR. In addition, the mediating
influences of AC and AR on the PN-behaviour relationship are excluded from the Stern model.
These formal differences need not concern us here. For a fuller discussion, however, see Wall et al
2004.
15
Given that the NEP consists in statements in supportive of social and environmental attitudes, this
is of course not particularly surprising, except perhaps as evidence that these value orientations
really are distinct.
56
those consequences. On the basis of this, I develop a personal norm (in Stern’s
model) to engage in pro-environmental action.
Values Beliefs Norm Behaviour
Environmental
Citizenship
Biospheric
Acceptance Policy
Altruistic AC AR PN
of NEP support
(-ve)
Egoistic
Private sphere
behaviours
AC = awareness of consequences
AR = ascription of responsibility
PN = personal norm
Figure 8: Stern’s Value-Belief-Norm Model
Stern argues that the Value-Belief-Norm model provides ‘the best explanatory
account to date of a variety of behavioural indicators of non-activist
environmentalism’ (Stern 2000, 412). In defence of this assertion he cites evidence
from several prior studies (Black et al 1985, Gardner and Stern 1996, Stern et al
1995a, Stern et al 1995b and Stern and Oskamp 1987).
Stern et al (1999) compared the Value Belief Norm model against three ecological
value models in relation to three different indicators of pro-environmental behaviour:
reported private sphere behaviour (recycling etc), support for environmental policies,
and environmental citizenship (membership of NGOs eg). The study found that this
model consistently explained more of the variance in such behaviours than the
competing value theories.
Data from this study and two others (Karp 1996 and Stern et al 1995b) all suggest that
altruistic values are most strongly implicated in the activation of a personal pro-
environmental norm. Self-enhancement (egoistic) values tend to be negatively
correlated with pro-environmental norms and actions (Stern 2000). The precise role
of biospheric values – as distinct from altruistic values – is still unresolved
empirically. Stern et al (1993) find support for the existence of distinct biospheric
values in a study of 348 college students. So too does a more recent and broader set
of studies (Schultz 2001).
But Stern et al (1993) also argue that different value orientations co-exist in the same
individual and may all influence behaviour. Stern hypothesises that ‘individual action
may depend on the belief or value set that receives attention in a given context’ (op cit
57
336). This hypothesis mirrors something we have already remarked upon and draws
some support from Cialdini’s Focus Theory (see below).
The implications of this hypothesis for understanding the link between values and
norms or actions are quite profound. It suggests, in particular, that respondents to
questionnaire surveys are particularly sensitive to the way in which questions are
framed. In particular, Stern et al suggest that egoistic values become more salient
when questions are framed in terms of willingness to pay taxes to protect the
environment – ‘questions that draw attention to the monetary and thus egoistic aspects
of environmental problems’ (op cit, p339). Perhaps even more importantly, it
suggests that behaviours depend critically on the salience of specific beliefs and
values in specific contexts.
A further problematic area for value models of environmental action is the relatively
weak correlation between personal norms and indicators of pro-environmental
behaviour. For example, even though Stern et al’s (1999) study performed better than
the competing value models, it still explained less than 35% of the variance in such
behaviours. For private sphere behaviours the explained variance was less than 20%.
These kinds of results certainly do not rule out the importance of values as a basis for
motivating (or predicting) environmental action. But they do suggest that such results
must be treated with some caution. Once again, the role of situational or contextual
factors is an obvious candidate for improving the explanation of behavioural variance.
Stern’s attempts to incorporate such factors into integrated attitude-behaviour-context
model are described in Section 10.2.
7.4 The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct

As Stern et al’s (1993) hypothesis indicates, theories relating personal norms to
personal values have somehow to cope with the fact that the salience of specific
values depends, amongst other things, on the social context in which we find
ourselves.
In a group of deep green, tree-hugging, sandal-wearing environmentalists, I am

tempted to forego the rack of lamb on the restaurant menu, even though I love the
sound of it and have no personal moral objection to the slaughter of lambs for human
delectation. Conversely, I may be tempted to abandon my strict vegetarian beliefs
when I am taken to dinner by a group of sharp-suited, blue-chip, stock-holding asset
managers whom I am trying to persuade to fund my research work (on consumer
behaviour of course). The influence of the social context on personal conduct is the
subject of the final model in this Section.
The concept of social norms has generated fierce debate in social science, in part
because of a linguistic confusion in the term itself. In one reading, the word norm
simply means what is normally done (or to our perceptions about what those in our
social group would normally do) in a particular situation. In quite another, the word
58
norm appears to refer to what ought to be done (ie to our perceptions as to what most
people would approve or disapprove of). 16
The confusion in the literature was largely laid to rest by rather simple definitional
adjustment made to the theory of norms by the social psychologist Cialdini and his
colleagues in the early 1990s. Cialdini’s Focus Theory of Normative Conduct
(Cialdini et al 1990, 1991) argues that the two kinds of norms exist, but are formally
and functionally distinct.
The first kind of norm (what most people do) Cialdini refers to as a descriptive norm.
It carries little in the way of mo ral weight and simply refers to the perception we hold
about what is normal in a given situation. A simple example of the power of a
descriptive social norm is provided by a social experiment in which a huge crowd of
people was persuaded to gather on a street corner and stare at an empty spot in the
sky, simply by seeding the idea in people’s mind with a sample group (Milgram et al
1969).
Less trivially, we tend to negotiate and inform much of our individual behaviour on
the basis of what others around us do. If everyone around me regularly puts out their
rubbish bins for collection on a given day, I feel confident not only that this is a
socially appropriate action but also that it would be expedient for me to do the same.
Likewise, if everyone around me drives at just a few miles above the clearly defined
speed limit, I am tempted to regard this as a social norm and to follow suite. Indeed, I
may even penalise myself by not following suit, if the goal is to get safely from A to
B in the least amount of time.
This example illustrates that descriptive social norms play an adaptive role in our
behaviour. Cialdini and his colleagues argued that by simply copying the way that
others around me behave, I am able to bypass the mental effort involved in thinking it
out for myself, and to free up cognitive resources for more important tasks (see also
Section 8.1 below). Thus a reliance on descriptive social norms is an example of what
Simon (1976) called ‘procedural’ rationality. Its outcomes may in fact turn out to be
less than optimal for me, but its short term advantages can be rather high.
In contrast to descriptive norms, which simply reflect what is done, Cialdini referred
to the second kind of norm, what ought to be done, as an injunctive social norm. This
second kind of norm explicitly reflects the moral rules and guidelines of the social
group. Injunctive norms tend to motivate and constrain our actions by promising
social rewards and sanctions for acting or not acting in certain kinds of ways.
Thus, social norms operate in two distinct ways. On the one hand, they provide
behavioural examples that may be helpful in selecting the behaviour appropriate to
any given situation. In this capacity, they function as a kind of heuristic for guiding or
moderating our behaviour without spending too much cognitive effort. On the other
16
This latter meaning is closer to the sense of the word norm in both Schwartz’s theory and Ajzen and
Fishbein’s work; although, as we have already mentioned, there is a subtle difference between what
I believe ought to be done (personal norm), and what I think people others believe ought to be done
(subjective norm).
59
hand, social norms relate to the social outcomes associated with the performance of a
given behaviour.
In both cases, there may be a lot at stake for us. Our ability to adhere to social norms
(and in particular to injunctive social norms) may have a critical influence on how we
are perceived in our peer group, and hence of our social and personal success. Our
ability to fit in, find a mate, develop a peer community, get our children into a good
school and so on, are all mediated (to some extent) by our success in following social
norms.
A critical aspect of Cialdini’s Focus Theory is that the two kinds of norms may easily
apply to the same situation. For example, there is clearly an injunctive norm
(expressed through speeding restrictions, fines, penalties, and public disapproval)
against driving too fast. This injunctive norm operates in such a way as to motivate
people to stay within the speed limit, even as the descriptive norm often operates in
such a way to encourage people to exceed it.
Given that contradictory injunctive and descriptive norms may apply to the same
situation, how do we decide what to do? Cialdini argues that we respond to normative
influences in a rather flexible way, depending on the context in which we find
ourselves, the social group around us, the importance of the action, the state of our
environment, and the circumstances which accompany the situation. Whether and
how we respond to a descriptive norm or an injunctive norm depends on which kind
of norm is salient (or in focus) for us.
For example, in the absence of police cameras, patrol cars and accidents, I tend to
follow the descriptive norm and find myself driving at much the same speed as
everyone else on the motorway. On becoming aware that there is a patrol car just
ahead, that there may be cameras on the road and that someone on the opposite
carriageway has just had a crash, I tend to slow down, even if those around me have
not yet done so. Moreover, I am generally swift to express moral disapproval when
someone else’s speeding has led them to knock down an innocent pedestrian.
Of course this is not to deny that some people buck descriptive norms on a regular
basis. On the whole, however, the evidence from a considerable body of social
psychological work suggests that our actions are influenced in no small part by the
existence and salience of social norms. Personality, situation and personal norms
(belief about what I should do irrespective of what others are doing or think I should
do) all play some part in determining my response to these norms.
There is a good deal of evidence from Cialdini’s work and elsewhere that people ‘who
are dispositionally or temporarily focused on normative considerations are decidedly
more likely to act in norm-consistent ways’ (Cialdini et al 1991, 204). 17 For example,
in Cialdini’s original study, people’s littering behaviours were vastly different
depending on whether descriptive or injunctive norms were salient in any given
situation.
17
See also Berkowitz 1972, Berkowitz and Daniels 1964, Gruder et al 1978, Miller and Grush 1986,
Ruskowski et al 1983, Schwartz and Fleischman 1978.
60
Clearly, the same kind of framework is useful to an understanding of other kinds of

behaviour, including many environmentally- significant behaviours. Whether I engage
in kerbside recycling, drive to work, buy Fair Trade goods, take a two week holiday in
the Caribbean every year, sign up for a green electricity tariff, install energy efficient
light bulbs, or compost all my kitchen waste, will all be heavily influenced by the
existence and salience of descriptive and injunctive social norms.
At one level, the complexity inherent here may re-enforce the idea that engaging in
behavioural change is a lost cause. On the other hand, there are clear policy lessons
that can be drawn from the importance of social norms in guiding individual
behaviour. Cialdini himself was keen to point out how insights into the effects of
focus and salience could be used to the advantage of public interest policy. We shall
return to these issues in Part 3 of this review.
61
62
8 The Matter of Habit
Rational choice theory suggests that consumer behaviour is the product of cognitive
deliberation. In deciding on a course of action, we are supposed to tot up the costs and
benefits of alternative options and plump for the one that maximises our individual
utility. A similar model of cognition lies at the heart of some of the other adjusted
expectancy-value models that we have examined in this report. In Ajzen and
Fishbein’s models, for instance, behaviour is mediated by intention, which in itself
presupposes some kind of cognitive deliberation.
It may be true to suggest that human behaviour, in the abstract, is goal-directed, in

some rather general sense. However, it is certainly not the case that individual actions
are invariably the result of conscious cognitive deliberation. The existence of
instinctive or automatic responses has been well-established not just in social
psychology but in biology and medical science for over a century (McDougall 1908).
We know, as individuals, that we often seem to act instinctively, automatically, out of
routine or habit, or driven by emotional responses that appear beyond control in
certain situations. We also know – and have made the point above – that this
sometimes occurs in spite of our best intentions to act otherwise.
This situation is clearly problematic for models that regard behaviour as being
mediated by intention. It is also problematic for attempts to motivate pro-social or
pro-environmental behaviour. Even if we can persuade people to change their
attitudes and beliefs in favour of pro-environmental action, even if we can convince
them of the need to behave in pro-social ways through injunctive or descriptive social
norms, even if we are successful in getting people to internalise pro-environmental
personal norms, there is still no guarantee that they will actually behave in pro-
environmental ways.
This realisation has led some people to dismiss intention-based and value-based
models of individual behaviour entirely. Some sociological responses would even
have us abandon any model of individual agency as irredeemably flawed and
reconstruct social action in terms of ‘practices’ located at the collective rather than the
individual level. Behavioural change in this view would simply be seen as the
evolution of ‘social practices’. One of the advantages of such a position would be to
highlight the existence and the importance of social norms in human behaviour.
On the other hand, our understanding of the dynamics of social practice, of the ways
in which social practices evolve, and of the interaction between policy and social
practice is as yet so limited that it would be difficult to see how policy could make use
of this position – beyond taking social norms a bit more seriously as influences on
behaviour. Since policy-makers are themselves a group of individuals immersed in
social practice, the idea of using policy to influence social practice has about it
something of the impossibility of lifting ourselves up by our own bootstraps.
Before renouncing behavioural models entirely therefore, it would certainly be worth

asking if there is anything at all that can be said about how, where and when
63
individuals may be said to act from their intentions; how, where and when they appear
to act in automatic or routine ways; and how if at all, this knowledge might help us
understand and further pro-environmental behavioural change. In fact, there is a long-
established and by now rather sophisticated body of work in social psychology that
explores exactly these questions. In the following three subsections we examine some
of this work and its relevance for environmentally-significant behaviour.
8.1 Cognitive effort – control, automaticity and heuristics

Early social and cognitive psychologists basically agreed that mental processes were
either ‘automatic’ or ‘controlled’ (Johnson and Hasher 1987). Controlled processes
involve intention, control, the efficient consumption of attentional resources
(cognitive effort) and awareness – what has Bargh (1994) called the ‘four horsemen of
automaticity’. Automatic processes were assumed not to possess these characteristics.
More recently, it has been concluded that there is no clear division between automatic
and controlled cognitive processes. Controlled processes often become automatic ones
once they are learned and engrained in us. I have to think hard about the act of
shifting gears when I am learning to drive the car. Now that I have been driving to
work everyday for fifteen years, I sometimes don’t even notice stopping at traffic
lights.
More fundamentally, it has become clear fairly recently that a mental process
generally involves both controlled and automatic attributes simultaneously
(Kahneman and Treisman 1984, Logan and Cowan 1984, Bargh 1996). For example,
having recently established separate containers for domestic recyclables, I may have
to exert cognitive effort in distinguishing whether or not the item in my hand is
recyclable. But once that is done my learned automatic waste disposal skills take over
– provided of course that someone has not moved the bin.
Somewhere on the spectrum between control and automaticity lies the use of
‘heuristics’ – simple cues or cognitive signs that allow us to dispense with full
cognitive deliberation. The concept of heuristics is familiar in consumer research. It
is well-known (as illustrated in Figure 2) that consumers often make choices on the
basis of simple signals like brand or price. This is particularly the case when we are
making routine or habitual purchases.
The upshot is that the process of selecting an action or behaviour has both controlled
and automatic components in different measure – depending on the action and the
context for it. Three basic factors are believed to play a role in determining this
balance between cognitive effort and automaticity.
In the first place, the degree of control increases with the degree of ‘involvement’ of
the decision- maker in the process. This in its turn is influenced by the degree of
importance of the decision. Tversky (1969, 1972) demonstrated that we are more
likely to use simple heuristics when the consequences of the decision are less
important. Conversely, the attention of the actor is higher when the consequences are
more significant. Interestingly, attention to a decision may sometimes be voluntary –
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where we are engaged in pursuing a new opportunity, for example the purchase of a
new car. Equally however, it may also be involuntary in situations where the
satisfaction of an important need is jeopardised (Kahneman 1973).
A second precondition for increased cognitive effort is the perceived complexity of

the decision task. This complexity can be related to the range of opportunities with
which we are faced, the number of attributes these opportunities possess, the difficulty
in predicting consequences from attributes, or the degree to which trade-offs between
different personal goals are involved.
A final, important influence on the investment of cognitive effort is the degree of

constraint imposed by the decision itself. Time, cognitive capacity, and access to
knowledge all constitute constraints on our ability to exercise complete cognitive
control over a decision. Time is one of the most important if these constraints. This is
one of the reasons why people tend to use simpler decision heuristics when they are
under a time pressure (Ben Zur and Breznitz 1981, Maule and Svenson 1993).
Of course, the implications of this finding for sustainable consumption policy are
quite profound, partic ularly in a society in which consumers feel increasingly hurried
and harried (Southerton and Tomlinson 2003). The pace of life, the demands on
cognitive attention from an increasingly wide range of sources, and the tendency to
respond to time pressure by reducing cognitive effort all appear to militate against
behavioural change and in favour of automaticity, routine, heuristics and habit.
8.2 The Role of Habit and Routine

The literature on ‘ordinary consumption’ (Section 2.4) has highlighted the routine,
habitualised nature of a great deal of ‘environmentally significant’ behaviour. Our
everyday lives are full of repetitive actions. Following a specific route to work,
buying a given brand of coffee, turning the light on, turning the television off,
disposing of waste paper, paying for electricity, running the bath or shower: decisions
about all these routine activities are generally taken with very little conscious thought.
Even though, sometimes we may be conscious of the fact that we are acting from
habit, the actual performance of the task still requires very little cognitive effort. This
is because routine behaviour is highly automated. On the spectrum from control to
automaticity, habits lie close to the automatic end (Jager 2003).
There has been a tendency – particularly amongst rational choice theorists – to

denigrate habitual behaviour as irrational. But it is important to understand that habits
offer quite considerable benefits to human functioning. Instead of exerting cognitive
effort on routine decisions that we have taken many times before and that have,
initially at least, served us well, we relegate these decisions to the realm of low
cognitive effort where simple heuristic cues or automatic responses can guide us. In
the process we free up cognitive resources for more important decisions (Posner and
Snyder 1975, Schneider and Shiffrin 1977, Baumeister et al 1998). Habitual
behaviour therefore falls quite clearly into Simon’s category of procedural rationality.
65
Habitual behaviour is particularly successful as a strategy when decision contexts

barely change. In such circumstances, we are clearly justified in believing that
deliberation would always come up with the same answer. This is one of the reasons
why habit is so prevalent in situations of ordinary everyday decision- making, as has
been demonstrated, for instance, by a number of recent studies on modality choice in
transportation (Aarts and Dijksterhuis 2000, Aarts et al 1998, Bamberg and Schmidt
2003, Gärling et al 2001). People’s past behaviours and habitual travel patterns turn
out to be more successful in explaining the variance in behaviour than either expected
value or morality.
At the same time, of course, habitual behaviour – the relegation of decision- making to
the realm of low-cognitive effort – becomes problematic when the context or
conditions of the decision change. My habitual motion towards the wrong corner of
the kitchen to deposit my rubbish is positively infuriating after a week or so. The
availability of a low-cost, sustainable and equally tasty Fair Trade alternative to my
usual choice of coffee will completely pass my by, if the realm of grocery shopping is
dominated by habitual response. And my dawning awareness of a clear link between
standby electricity consumption and climate change may fail entirely to stem the
motion of my semi-automatic finger on the remote control button.
This latter example highlights a further aspect of habitual behaviour. In addition to

the savings in cognitive effort, habits are often reinforced by short-run rewards and
incentives. As anyone who has tried to give up eating fatty foods or smoking will
know, these short-run incentives can outweigh the long-term benefits of making a
behavioural change, and derail our best intentions to quit. Counter-intentional habits
(Verplanken and Faess 1999) therefore represent a kind of ‘cognitive trap’ that locks
us into routine behaviours, even where these behaviours conflict with rational
deliberations, are at odds with social norms and confound our best intentions to
change.
The discussion in this section points, on the one hand, to the immense difficulty of
achieving pro-environmental behaviour change. At the same time it highlights the
importance of understanding the process of habit formation and change, if policy is to
influence people towards pro-environmental behaviour. Not surprisingly, there is
some literature on both these processes, and some models that offer useful insights
into how behavioural change can be negotiated. We review some of this literature in
Section 11.
8.3 Framing, Priming and Bias

Cialdini’s Focus Theory (Section 7.4) points to the importance of situational factors in
determining the degree of ‘salience’ of particular social norms. The concept of
salience has broader connotations in cognitive theory. We have also noted the
evidence supporting the hypothesis that people’s reported values may depend on the
situational factors that make specific value orientations salient for us at any one point
in time. As a less-than-fully-committed vegetarian, I may well forego my moral
concerns about eating meat in certain circumstances.
66
There is also some fascinating evidence of the impact of ‘mortality salience’ on

consumer values and behaviours. People exposed to images of violence and death
appear to report more highly on a scale of materialist values than do control groups
(Arndt et al 2003, Solomon et al 2003). This evidence has been used to support the
idea (Section 2) that a part, at least, of our relationship to material commodities is
concerned with quite basic psychological and sociological processes concerning the
creation and maintenance of personal and social meaning (Jackson 2002b & 2004,
McCracken 1990).
Common to all this evidence is the suggestion that our cognitive responses depend on
a variety of different aspects of the way in which a situation is framed. These framing
factors constitute a set of sometimes unconscious ‘cues’ which function in such a way
as to bias our cognitive respons es towards or away from particular choices. Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) demonstrated that, even in very clear and transparent choice
problems, the way in which the decision is framed has a large influence over people’s
responses to it.
Once again, this phenomenon is believed to fulfil an adaptive function in pursuit of

procedural rationality. It aims to minimise cognitive effort in decision- making
contexts. Some of our framing responses or biases appear to be learned and are often
culturally and contextually specific. In a certain context, the white (doctor’s) coat
signifies that a person should be trusted, in another that he or she should be feared.
But some biases appear to be hard-wired in us, and common across different contexts.
For example, Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that framing a decision task in
terms of ‘winning’ had a considerably different impact than framing the same
decision task in turns of ‘losing’.
The importance of cognitive framing effects has been widely acknowledged in

advertising and marketing. In one sense, the art of advertising could be thought of as
the successful selection of culturally resonant cues that persuade consumers in favour
of a particular product or brand. At any rate, the idea that it is possible to ‘prime’ a
specific response to a given situation or choice by strategically framing the context is
a powerful and well-established technique of persuasion.
This insight has some quite specific applications to pro-environmental choice (Niva
and Timonen 2002). The impact of mortality salience on consumer attitudes is one
example of this. Some recent work on priming environmental values shows that the
same cognitive processes can also be used in favour of pro-environmental behaviour.
Biel (2004) reports how unconscious ‘priming’ of respondents with images of nature
had a significant impact on their value orientations and intentions to recycle.
The difficulties associated with priming individual choice are well-known to

advertisers. In spite of some ‘hard-wired’ responses, most people respond differently
to different situational cues. Nonetheless, an understanding of these effects can only
serve to improve the design of attempts to promote pro-environmental behaviour. In
Section 11, we shall examine some of the implications of these cognitive processes
for social marketing techniques.
67
68
9 Sociality and Self
Most of the models that we have looked at in preceding section presuppose that there
is a workable concept of individual agency. It makes sense to talk about my
individual attitudes and beliefs, the values that I hold personally about the
environment, and the way in which those values and beliefs influence my individual
deliberations to act in certain ways. It is also defensible to assume that where my
personal intentions are strong enough, they will trigger specific individual actions.
I am a committed environmentalist, with a profound belief in the holistic integrity of

the earth, and as a result I renounce materialism, invest only in ethical companies and
recycle everything. Or, alternatively, I belief that humans hold dominion over the
earth and that science and technology hold the key to humanity’s continued progress.
As a result I resist what I perceive as Luddite attempts to control technology and go
out of my way to trade in my performance car for a newer faster model every eighteen
months. In both cases, the antecedents to my action are generally assumed to be the
values, beliefs or preferences that I hold – as an individual.
This individualistic approach to deliberative action is, as we have seen, most strongly
imbedded in the rational choice model. In the case of conventional consumer
preference theory, individual preferences are the single key determinant of both
individual and aggregate consumption patterns. The adapted expectancy value models
make some attempt to incorporate social influences on individual behaviour through
the concept of subjective norms – my personal beliefs about what important others
might think of my actions.
Normative theories move further than this towards the importance of sociality for
individual deliberation. In certain social situations – for example where my reputation
is at stake – my behaviour is constrained within quite narrow margins by the social
norms and conventions I find around me. Even in daily life, I respond almost
instinctively to the descriptive norms of other people’s behaviour. I am locked into
the social fabric in ways which almost suggest that individual deliberation is a mirage.
If every bin on the street is overflowing, I feel far less compulsion to reduce and
recycle. If everyone recycles, I avoid my neighbours gaze as I drag out the heaving
wheelie bin on rubbish day.
Rational choice theory attempts to recover individuality in such situa tions by

suggesting that social constraints can be cashed out in terms of the overwhelming
individual costs associated with defying norms and conventions. Critics suggest that
this response is potentially circular and unenlightening as a way of understanding and
predictive social behaviour. Irrespective of who is right in this debate, it is clearly
worth investigating some alternatives conceptions of sociality and understanding how
these relate to the concept of self and individual action.
In this section, therefore, we examine the complex relationship between self and
other, between the individual and society, from several, slightly different perspectives.
69
We also discuss the relevance of these views for understanding and influencing pro-
environmental behaviour.
9.1 The Social-Symbolic Self

The idea that identity and self-concept have a social dimension has a long pedigree in
social science. One of the earliest and most influential writers to point to the socially-
constructed nature of the self was George Herbert Mead. Mead (1934, 1956) drew on
empirical evidence both from developmental psychology – how our attitudes,
behaviours and concepts of self evolve during childhood and adolescence – and also
from ethology: the scientific study of animal behaviour.
He argued that both the mind and the concept of self arise out of a fundamentally
social process: communication. Mead identified two distinct kinds of social
conversation. The first is what he called ‘the conversation of gestures’ – the series of
gesture and counter- gesture that characterises inter- individual situations. Mead’s
now-famous example of a dog-fight illustrates this idea:
‘Dogs approaching each other in hostile attitude carry on such a language of gestures. They
walk around each other, growling and snapping, and waiting for the opportunity to attack…
The act of each dog becomes the stimulus to the other dog for his response. There is then a
relationship between these two; and as an act is responded to by the other dog, it, in turn,
undergoes change.’ (Mead 1934, 151)
In this example, as in many others, there is no such thing as individual behaviour in

the abstract. Each action is a response to a social situation. The combination of
actions constitutes a process of communication: a social conversation.
This more or less unconscious process is to be distinguished from what Mead called
the ‘conversation of significant gestures’ in which participants in the conversation
remain not only fully aware that they are participating in a conversation but must also
gain familiarity with the ‘significant symbols’ through which communication occurs.
In humans for example, our ability to communicate through language offers a whole
new realm of social conversation and a whole new complexity to inter-personal
behaviour.
The most important aspect of Mead’s ideas about communication is their implication
for the concept of self and for identity. For Mead, the self only exists as a result of
conversations of significant gestures.
‘The self is something which has a development; it is not there at birth, but arises in the
process of social experience and activity, that is, it develops in the given individual as a result
of his [sic] relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals in that process’.
(Mead 1934, 135)
‘A self can arise only where there is a social process within which this self has its initiation. It
arises within that process’ (Mead 1956, 42).
More recent authors have stressed the same point. Stringer (1982, 58) suggests that
‘man [sic] is the sum of his social interactions. Through constant interaction with
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others, the self is constantly changing.’ In summary, according to this viewpoint, the
individual self can only be said to exist in relation to social conversation. Personal
identity, in other words, is an emergent property of inherently social relations.
In Mead’s view this emergent self plays an essentially evolutionary role. It is there to
support the cohesion of the group. And it is able to achieve this precisely because it is
the result of social conversations. These social conversations provide the mechanism
both for negotiating and for internalising (in personal identity) the values, attitudes
and beliefs of the social group. In this way, the concept of the self also plays a key
role in negotiating and perpetuating culture. Cultural norms are negotiated by and
internalised within individuals by way of social conversations.
It is clear from his writing that Mead is thinking of the term ‘significant symbols’
mainly in terms of language itself. For Mead, therefore, the ‘conversation of
significant gestures’ is a ‘conversation’ more or less in the usual sense. But later
developments served to broaden the conception of ‘significant symbols’ beyond
spoken and written language, to incorporate the symbolic meanings associated with
and carried by objects, people, processes and situations.
Section 2 noted the importance of the (mainly anthropological) evidence suggesting

that people respond to material artefacts on the basis of the symbolic meanings that
these artefacts carry. The school of ‘symbolic interactionism’ formalises this insight
through three key premises about human action (Blumer 1969):
• that human beings act towards things on the basis of the symbolic meanings
those things have for them;
• that the meaning of such things is negotiated through social interaction; and
• that in any given situation these meanings are handled in and modified by an
‘interpretative process’ specific to the situation and the individuals involved.
The first of these premises is a straightforward expression of the insight that things
carry symbolic significance as well as functional utility (cf Douglas and Isherwood
1978). The second flows directly from the insights of Mead and others about the
ways in which social conversation mediates our attitudes and behaviours.
The third premise is worth commenting on briefly. For it is this premise that prevents
individual human agency being construed as meaningless. Action is mediated in the
symbolic interactionist view by a process of interpretation which takes place within a
given context or situation. And interpretation is not to be seen as a purely automatic
application of established or ‘given’ meanings. On the contrary, the actor ‘selects,
checks, suspends, regroups and transforms the meanings in the light of the situation’
in which she is placed and the direction of her action (Blumer 1969, 5).
Section 2.7 highlighted the social importance of what Douglas (1976) called ‘marking
services’ – the use of symbolic goods in exchange rituals that serve to negotiate and
define social structure. In a sense the exchange of goods (and values) achieved in
marking services is quite precisely a conversation of gestures. The symbolic role
71
attributed by human beings to material artefacts creates a whole new realm of symbols
which become the subject and the object of whole new social conversations.
Whether these conversations are ‘significant’ – in Mead’s sense of being aware – is a

very interesting question. Given that material goods operate as symbols, and that the
formation of symbols appears to require creative faculties that belong within the realm
of awareness, then presumably Mead would have answered this question in the
affirmative. However, there is also plenty of evidence to suggest that our everyday
responses to symbolic signals occur at a sub- or semi-conscious level. We may be
fully aware, at some level, that – as one group of respondents in Belk et al’s (2003)
study on consumer desire pointed out – ‘no one’s gonna spot you across a crowded
room and say, “wow! nice personality!”’ But that doesn’t mean that we literally and
consciously ‘clock’ every visual signal carried by material objects at every moment of
our waking lives.
Sometimes our sense of whether we do or do not belong in a certain group is nothing

more than an uncomfortable feeling of displacement. In all probability, it swept over
us almost instantaneously upon entering the room, conveyed by a myriad subtle but
undeniable visual signals: the clothes we were wearing, the clothes others were
wearing, their demeanour, hairstyle, the way they tied their shoes, the shade of
wallpaper on the walls, the photographs hanging there, the fabric of the upholstery on
the chairs.
Thus the conversation of gestures opened up to us through the symbolic role of

material goods is one that is neither fully aware, nor fully unconscious. As such it
protects itself with a peculiarly powerful veil of ‘collective misrecognition’ (to use
Bourdieu’s phrase). We ‘know’ intellectually that the symbolic nature of goods plays
an important role in social conversations. But we do not carry this awareness into
every such conversation with us. And we seldom articulate it in a fully conscious
conversation of ideas. As such, the symbolic conversation of gestures embodied in
the use, exchange and trade of material goods presents us with an incredibly difficult
domain for policy intervention. We return to this difficulty in Section 12 of this
review.
The key point here is this: that in facilitating an entire ‘new’ realm of social
conversation (ie separate from the realm of animal gestures and separate from the
‘significance’ of the linguistic realm), the symbolic meanings of material artefacts fits
them perfectly for an absolutely vital role in social and psychological functioning.
Moreover, this is not – as some observers have suggested – a defining feature of
modernity. The symbolic role of commodities was always employed in this way.
In summary, this perspective highlights several key points about social behaviour: that
we respond to situations as social beings on the basis of symbolic meanings; that
those meanings are socially negotiated and constructed; and that these socially-
constructed meanings are adapted and transformed on a continual basis in the context
of specific situations. As we shall see, these lessons have a wide applicability for
understanding both consumer behaviour in general and pro-environmental behaviour
in particular.
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9.2 The Project of Symbolic Self-Completion

The social-symbolic role of consumer goods occupies an important role in modern
conceptualisations of identity and the negotiation of the ‘self-concept’. As we noted
in Section 2, the insight that material goods play an important role in the process of
identity construction is one of the key elements in the sociology and psychology of
consumption. The idea that material goods are also a part of the ‘extended self’ (Belk
1988) ties our consumption patterns closely to individual and collective processes of
identity construction.
Symbolic Social Norms

Resources and Values
internal-external dialectic of identity formation

me
dia
Self-symbolism Social-symbolism
ted
ex
pe
rie
nc
e
viscous meaning
Life history Discursive
and situation elaboration

behavioural
signification
e
nc
rie
xpe
e
ed
liv
concretised meaning
Material Resources
Figure 9: The Symbolic Project of the Self ( after Elliott and Wattanasuwan 1998)
In particular, there is a view of identity in which the construction of the self- concept
requires access to both material and symbolic resources. Like Mead’s view of self,
this view insists that identity construction is a social process and proceeds through
social conversation. Elliott and Wattanasuwan (1998, Figure 9) offer a model in
which two kinds of resources (material and symbolic) and two kinds of processes
(individual and social) each play dual roles in the construction of identity. The basis
for my self-concept at any one point in time includes my broad life history and
situation. For example, I am a white forty-something British male, married and with
three children, living in Farnham. But that broad history is also coloured by a myriad
of details about the precise nature of my life, and that detailed picture is constantly
changing. As it changes, my self-concept changes with it.
I am encouraged (socially and culturally) to think of myself as successful if I have

access to certain kinds of material resources: a nice house, a smart car, decent clothes
and so on. My lived experience of these material resources becomes a part of my self-
concept. If they are ripped suddenly from my life, through tragedy or unemployment
or disaster, I am disabled not just functionally but psychologically as well. These
73
material resources are a part of the ‘lived experience’ that creates and maintains my
self-concept.
But my relationship to these material resources is in part a ‘mediated experience’. I

know how to think about my car, my house, my clothes, my wife and my children, in
part at least, because of the social symbolism which these elements of my life convey
(to me and to others). These symbolic resources are as important to the negotiation of
my self-concept as the material resources on which I rely functionally (Thompson
1990, 1995).
Even more importantly, my lived and mediated experience of these material and
symbolic resources is part of a social process. At best I am able to attribute what
Elliott and Wattanasuwan (1998) call ‘viscous’ meaning to my individual experiences
at the personal level. I must then test out this unsolidified meaning through a process
of ‘discursive elaboration’ in which I describe, discuss, argue about, laugh at the
mediated symbolic meanings I glean from the symbolic resources around me
(Thompson 1990). And it is only in the social realm, that these symbolic meanings
become solidified and allow me to ‘complete’ the symbolic project of the self.
I am proud of my new 3 litre sports car. One of my motivations for buying it was an
advertisement I saw sugge sting the symbolic association of this particular car with
social and sexual status. In practice, I enjoy both its functional ability to get me away
from the traffic lights faster than other cars, and the status I imagine this confers on
me. I am a man in a hurry. I have places to go, and I am not going to let others stand
in my way. Imagine my distress when my colleagues turn up their noses at my prize
possession. This car is aggressive, they say. It speaks of someone obsessed with
power. Or perhaps trying to disguise impotence. What is more, this car consumes the
earth’s resources at an unsustainable rate and is contributing to anthropogenic climate
change. No one who cares about other people and the future of the planet could
possibly drive such a car.
The example may be trivial. The outcome uncertain. I may eventually renegotiate a
self-concept that accommodates these competing influences on identity. Maybe I will
ride the ridicule for the sake of perceived social status. Perhaps I will even sell the
car. But, according to symbolic self-completion theory, the process of discursive
elaboration of symbolic meanings illustrated by this example is typical of the way in
which we negotiate self and maintain our identity.
At any rate, this view of the social-symbolic negotiation of identity has a good deal of
purchase in consumer research and marketing. Advertising has been recognised as one
of the most potent sources of symbolic meaning in modern society (Grunert 1986,
Sherry 1987). Ritson and Elliott (1995) have pointed out how advertised meanings
are ‘co-created’ through discursive elaboration. Elliott and Wattanasuwan (1998)
show how brands and advertised meanings operate as symbolic resources in the social
construction of identity. And a cursory overview of advertisements in the public
domain provides a fair sprinkling of evidence that these ideas inform common
marketing practice. As we shall see in the next section, this view also has some clear
applicability to pro-environmental consumer behaviour.
74
One of the interesting questions arising from this model of identity construction is the
extent to which different kinds of societies rely on different kinds of symbolic
resources in the process of self-completion. As we have pointed out already, the
association of symbolic meanings with material artefacts appears to be universal
across all societies. Likewise, the use of symbolic resources in the process of self-
completion is supposed to be a common feature. Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982)
argued that it is part of the human condition to be born, in some sense, incomplete,
without a fully- formed concept of self. A similar view is proposed by narrative
identity theory. Ricoeur (1984, 1992) argues that we are engaged in a continual
process of building personal and social identities, employing complex narratives about
ourselves, our relation to others, our relation to the material world about us. Jenkins
(1996) emphasises how this task must be continually validated through social
interaction.
Clearly however, the precise nature of the symbolic resources employed in this
process may differ from one society to another. In one society, symbolic self-
completion may primarily occur through the social-symbolic importance attached to
particular trades and capabilities. In another, it might be pursued mainly through the
exchange of mythical social roles and narratives (Campbell 1959). What characterises
modern Western society, in the eyes of Baumann (1998), Dittmar (1994),
Featherstone (1991), Giddens (1991), McCracken (1990) and a good many others is
that the symbolic project of the self is mainly pursued through the consumption of
material goods imbued with symbolic meaning. But the project itself is common
across all societies.
In summary, this view of identity construction supposes that we pursue, negotiate and
affirm our self-concept through the social-symbolic conversation associated with the
acquisition, disposition and exchange of both material artefacts and symbolic
resources. It is precisely the power of material goods to embody symbolic meanings
that fits them for this task in identity construction. And the process of negotiating
symbolic meaning is inherently social. I know who I am not simply through self-
reflection, but through social conversations about symbolic meanings with others. A
critical part of these social interactions is itself mediated through the language of
goods (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, Campbell 2003) .
From this perspective the project of sustainable consumption can perhaps be seen as
the goal of shifting the symbolic basis of social conversation from material ‘stuff’ to
some other kind of non- material resources. 18 How this to be achieved is less obvious.
But clearly other societies and other cultures have at other times found other sources
of symbolic meaning with which to negotiate social conversation. The ‘materiality’ of
modern society should be seen therefore as a contingent rather than a necessary
feature of social organisation.
18
See Jackson 2005 for a fuller discussion of this point.
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9.3 Self-Concept, Cognitive Dissonance and Spillover

The notion of self-concept plays an important role in people’s motivations to behave
in certain kinds of ways – and not to behave in other kinds of ways. The question of
how I think of myself can turn out to be critical in influencing how I intend to behave
– and how I actually behave. In particular, of course, the self-concept can be linked
explicitly to the motivation for pro-environmental behaviours. If I think of myself as
environmentally concerned, it would seem intuitively plausible that I would be more
likely to recycle, buy organic food, and resist the lure of fast gas-guzzling cars.
Sparks and Shepherd (1992) tested this idea for the specific case of organic food. In
particular, they wanted to know whether the ‘self- identity’ of people as green
consumers constituted a significant influence on their consumption of organically-
produced vegetables. In addition they wanted to find out whether this effect was
independent of people’s attitudes. They found that self- identity appears to exert a
significant influence on intentions to consume organically, over and above the
contribution of the attitude constructs included in Ajzen’s Theory of Planned
Behaviour.
They also found that this effect persisted even when past behaviour was included in
the model. People who think of themselves as green consumers are more likely to be
motivated to consume organic food than those who do not, irrespective of past food
consumption practices. This is just one example of how the way we think of
ourselves can have an important influence on pro-environmental motivations and
intentions.
In fact, the idea that self-concept plays an important role in human motivations is
another of those ideas that has a long pedigree. Festinger’s (1957) cognitive
dissonance theory, for example, postulated that internal feelings of discomfort
motivate people to reduce inconsistencies in the cognitive information they hold about
themselves, their behaviour or their environment. These feelings of discomfort might
arise from conflicting attitudes or values, but equally they might be invoked by
discrepancies between an attitude (about the self, for example) and a behaviour.
One of the ways in which this general idea has been incorporated into social-
psychological theories of pro-environmental behaviour is through an exploration of
so-called ‘spillover effects’ between one kind of environmental behaviour and
another. Thøgersen (1999) has been one of the principal proponents of the view that
the presence of one kind of pro-environmental attitude or behaviour in a given
individual ought to be a reliable predictor of general environmental attitudes, and
perhaps of other pro-environmental behaviours. If for example, I am a keen recycler
then – according to this cognitive dissonance interpretation, I ought to be more likely
than someone who doesn’t recycle – to hold positive attitudes towards buying organic
food, say.
Thøgersen envisages a number of different possible mechanisms for this kind of

spillover effect. Firstly, my positive attitudes towards recycling may be inconsistent
with my negative attitudes towards organic food. This inconsistency causes me
cognitive or emotional discomfort, and I therefore change my attitude towards organic
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food and view it more favo urably. This effect in which my positive attitude to one
pro-environmental behaviour leads to a positive attitude towards another pro-
environmental behaviour is called positive spillover. An alternative, clearly, is that I
reduce the dissonance associated with conflicting attitudes by shifting my attitude
towards recycling and viewing it less favourably. This effect is called negative
spillover.
There is also interesting evidence that behaviours themselves have a direct influence
on attitude. For example, Thøgersen and Ölander (2002) found evidence supporting
the hypothesis that people who engaged in recycling were more likely to hold positive
attitudes towards other environmental behaviours, and that this effect was independent
of their attitudes towards recycling. In other words, the very act of recycling appears
to improve my attitudes towards pro-environmental behaviour in general.
Again, the idea that behaviours can influence attitudes has considerable purchase in
social psychology. In fact, Bem (1972) suggested that we infer our own attitudes on
the basis of observations about our own behaviour, in much the same way that we
infer the attitudes of others on the basis of their behaviours. I know what my attitudes
about recycling or organic food are by observing whether I recycle or whether I buy
organic food, according to this view. Though this assumption that behaviours are
prior to attitudes is certainly not always valid, Bem’s self-perception theory provides a
useful compliment to Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory (Fazio 1977) and
highlights the importance of behaviour as an antecedent of attitude, in certain
situations.
From an environmental perspective, this insight may turn out to be critically important
in policy terms. The jury is still out on the existence and strength of spillover effects
(Thøgersen and Ölander 2002, 2003). But the possibility that engagement in a specific
pro-environmental behaviour can influence positively our attitudes towards other pro-
environmental behavio ur suggests the intriguing possibility of an additional dividend
for policy that seeks to improve facilitating conditions. Investment in recycling
infrastructure, for example, might be justifiable not just from the improvement in
recycling rates that it is likely to bring about, but also from the knock-on effect that
recycling behaviour has on people’s environmental attitudes in general (and thence on
other pro-environmental behaviours).
9.4 Self-Discrepancy Theory

Not all of the implications of cognitive discrepancy are so fortunate for sustainable
consumption. One of the most sophisticated attempts to construct a generalised
theory of how internal discrepancies affect people’s motivations is Higgins’ (1987)
self-discrepancy theory. The starting point for Higgins theory is the articulation of a
variety of different kinds of self-concepts. In the first place there is my actual self-
concept – my own individual conception about who I am right now. But it also makes
sense to talk of (my perceptions about) how others conceive of me. In other words, at
any one time I have a self-concept which is derived partly from own perspective on
myself and partly from my perceptions of others’ perspective on me.
77
In addition, Higgins points out, there is a meaningful distinction between my actual

self and my potential self – conceptions of how I am right now and how I might be or
could potentially be in the future. And this potential self in its turn can be conceived
either as an ideal self (what I as an individual or others around me wish me to be) and
an ought self (what I or others around me think I ought to be). In total therefore,
Higgins identifies six distinct types of self-concept: actual-own, actual-other, ideal-
own, ideal-other and ought-own, ought-other.
Critically, according to self-discrepancy theory, discrepancies can arise between any

two different kinds of self-concept, and each kind of discrepancy will give rise to
different types of emotional response – different ‘qualities’ of cognitive discomfort.
So, for example, Higgins marshals evidence to indicate that the discrepancy between
my (own) actual self-concept and my (own) ideal self- concept is likely to give rise to
dejection-related emotions such as disappointment and dissatisfaction. Discrepancies
between my (own) actual self-concept and the ideal concept others have of me, on the
other hand, is most likely to give rise to feelings of shame or embarrassment. And
discrepancies between my (own) actual self-concept and my (own) ought self-concept
is likely to give rise to feelings of guilt.
It is easy to see how each of these kinds of discrepancies might be relevant, in

different ways, for understanding sustainable (and unsustainable) consumption. For
example, the discrepancy between actual-own and ought-own underlies Sparks and
Shepherd’s work on self-concept as a green consumer. Dittmar (1999, 2003) has
shown how a particular kind of self-discrepancy – the distance between actual and
ideal self-concepts – can be used to predict compulsive or excessive buying
behaviours. This same discrepancy is the one explored in McCracken’s (1990)
exploration of consumer behaviour as the pursuit of ‘displaced meaning’ (Section
2.8). The actual-own and ideal-other discrepancy clearly informs consumer
motivations that are prompted by status anxiety and group identification.
Thus, to the extent that self-discrepancy theory is supported by the evidence, 19 it

offers a particularly powerful way of understanding both individual and social
motivations for consumer action. We experience a variety of uncomfortable emotions
when there are large discrepancies between the way we see ourselves and the way we
would like to be, or between the way we see ourselves and how we believe others
think we ought to be. These emo tions motivate action to reduce the discrepancy.
Some of those discrepancy-reducing intentions are mediated by material goods.
This is a message that is clearly not lost on the advertising industry. ‘What does your
pen (car, house, pair of spectacles, holiday destination, toilet roll holder etc) say about
you?’ is a constant theme in marketing strategies, and appeals to a set of powerful
self-discrepancy dynamics. Some would go further than this and suggest that one of
the roles of advertising has been to stimulate this kind of self-discrepancy dynamic,
specifically because it fosters (fundamentally insatiable) consumer appetites (Packard
1956, Hamilton 2003 eg).
19
Higgins himself (1987) cites a good many studies in support of the thesis, and subsequent studies
bear out the main conclusions.
78
Be that as it may, self-discrepancy theory provides some important insights into the
socia l influences on consumer action, and offers supportive evidence in favour of a
number of the understandings of consumer behaviour discussed in Section 2.
9.5 Social Identity Theory

Social theories of the self and social-symbolic theories of identity allow us to capture
some of the social dimensions that are missed from purely individualistic approaches
to motivation and behaviour. Where individualistic approaches assume that consumer
choice is a matter for individual cognitive rationality, the social and social-symbolic
approaches attempt to account for the influence of others in the very process of
identity construction and choice.
Often however, the principal unit of analysis remains individual: individual identity,
individual perceptions of what others think or individual behaviours generally form
the focus of attention. When cashed out in operational terms, for example, models
such as self-discrepancy theory generally measure differences between an individual’s
perceptions of self and his or her perceptions about the social expectations of others.
The social-symbolic model of self-completion (Figure 9) does incorporate a
fundamentally social process – discursive elaboration. But this process is again
viewed largely from the standpoint of the symbolic project of the (individual) self.
There are some social-psychological approaches which attempt to go beyond using
the individual as a unit of analysis. One of these is social identity theory.
Social identity theory arose out of a quite convincing body of evidence suggesting that
competitive inter-group behaviour is common to almost every society that we know
of. In fact, there is wide-spread cross-cultural evidence that society organises itself
into distinct groups which favour the ‘ingroup’ – ie those within the given reference
group – and discriminate against the ‘outgroup’ – those outside the group (Wetherell
1982).
Moreover, this tendency appears to operate even when there are no obvious goal or
scarcity conflicts to trigger intergroup competition (Rabbie and Horowitz 1969,
Ferguson and Kelley 1964, Rabbie and Wilkens 1971). A famous experiment by
Billig and Tajfel (1973) showed how ingroup and out-group biases seem to emerge,
even under quite arbitrary categorisations of people into different social groups. The
‘minimal group hypothesis’ suggests that, rather than being based on clear and
identifiable discrepancies between social groups, it is the very act of forming social
groups that leads to ingroup identification and intergroup conflict.
In an attempt to explain these observations Tajfel and Turner (1979) and their
colleagues (Hogg and Abrams 1988, Tajfel 1978, Turner and Giles 1981) developed a
theory of intergroup behaviour which is based on the premise that social identification
with a ‘reference group’ is a key component of identity. This ‘social identity’ is
defined in terms of ‘the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social
groups together with some emotional and value significance to him of the group
membership’ (Tajfel 1972, 31).
79
More recent work by Ellemers et al (1999) appears to confirm this social component
of the self-concept. They furnish evidence to suggest that social identity is based on a
cognitive awareness of one’s membership of a group, a positive or negative evaluation
of this group membership – a sense of ‘group esteem’ – and an emotional or affective
involvement with a particular reference group or set of reference groups. 20
Social identity theory then attempts to explain the minimal group hypothesis (and by
extension intergroup behaviour generally) by suggesting that there is a widespread if
not universal human desire for positive social identity. We are motivated as human
beings to feel good about the group we perceive ourselves as belonging to. 21 There is
certainly some cross-cultural evidence to support this hypothesis (Wetherell 1996).
Positive social identity is in some sense the glue that keeps social groups together,
regulating individual behaviour, preventing the fragmentation of social norms and
strengthening the advantage of the group as a whole (Ellemers et al 1999, Bergami
and Bagozzi 2000.
To achieve positive social identity, however, ingroup members are motivated to
discriminate against the outgroup, because the discriminatory strategy itself
establishes a distinction between the two groups, enhances the positive value of the
ingroup, and provides for a positive social identity. Though this effect appears to be
stronger where there are either objectively definable differences or external grounds
for competition (conflicts over scarce resources eg) between the groups, social
identity theory asserts that it is the process of social categorisation itself that is the
primary driver of ingroup/outgroup bias. We appear to have an in-built tendency
both to form discrete social groups and to favour our fellow group members over
outsiders.
Social identity theory also has some important things to say about how social change
occurs. As we have seen, the theory attributes the general form of intergroup
behaviour to social categorisation and self-esteem processes. But it attributes the
specific manifestation of those behaviours (eg conflict, harmony, emulation etc) to
people’s beliefs about the nature of intergroup divisions and relationships.
Different societies not only have different social structures, 22 they have different
belief systems about the degree of social mobility that is permissible or achievable
within that structure. Modern Western societies are characterised by a high social
mobility belief system in which people are supposed to be able to move freely
between social groups, and in particular to have easy access to ‘higher’ social groups.
This belief system means that the most obvious strategy for social improvement is an
individual mobility strategy, in which the individual exercises his or her perceived
right (and ability) to pass from a lower to a higher status group (Figure 10).
20
Social identity theory supposes that as individuals we may belong simultaneously to a number of
different reference groups. The importance or salience of our membership to each such reference
group will differ according to circumstantial and dispositional factors.
21
A corollary of social identity theory – the self-esteem hypothesis – is that individual self-esteem
improves with positive perceptions of the ingroup and is negatively correlated with positive
perceptions of the outgroup. However, the evidence for the self-esteem hypothesis is inconsistent
at best (Hogg and Vaughan 2002, Houston and Andreopoulou 2003).
22
See also Section 9.6 below.
80
Belief Strategy Tactic

System s
Social mobility Individual Assimilation to

belief system mobility higher status group
New dimensions of
comparison
No cognitive Social Redefine value of

alternatives creativity existing dimensions
Comparison with
Social change different outgroups
belief system
Activism, social
Cognitive Social
movement,
alternatives competition
revolution, war
Figure 10: A Social Identity Perspective on Social Change23
The main alternative to a social mobility belief system is one in which people believe
that social improvement can only occur through a change in the social order itself. 24
In some cases, however, even this kind of change appears impossible and the social
order is perceived to be not only legitimate but more or less immutable. Examples of
such belief systems include the caste system in traditional Hindu society and feudal
society in the middle ages.
In these circumstances, people simply do not believe they have cognitive alternatives
to the existing social order. Consequently, they engage in a variety of creative
strategies for promoting the self-esteem of the group they happen to find themselves
in. These might include, for example, identifying new value dimensions – on which
the in-group scores well – as the basis for intergroup comparison. Perhaps we are
working class, and have no money and very few prospects. But at least we are more
honest, fun- loving, authentic, sociable, morally good (eg) than those who consider
themselves better off than us. Another social creativity strategy (Figure 10) is to shift
the basis of social comparison onto different out groups.
Sometimes, however, the existing social order is perceived as neither legitimate nor
immutable. In these circumstance a change in the social order is a real cognitive
alternative and social improvement may then proceed through a variety of different
23
Adapted from Hogg and Vaughan 2002.
24
It is important to note that the determinant of strategic action here is not actual social mobility but
perceived social mobility. It may in fact be less possible to improve one’s social standing in
modern Western society than is currently believed. But this does not – at least over the short term –
diminish the strength of social mobility as a belief structure or the perceived legitimacy and
efficacy of individual mobility as a social psychological strategy.
81
kinds of collective social action: including activism, social protest, terrorism,

revolution and war.
The implications of social identity theory for the project of understanding and
influencing consumer behaviours are many and diverse. In the first place, of course,
the theory offers an explanatory account of the importance of social norms (both
descriptive and injunctive) on consumer action. Certain kinds of actions and
behaviours are more or less ruled in or ruled out for me, simply because I perceive
myself as belonging to a certain social group. Moreover, the roots of these ‘normal
behaviours’ have very little to do with individual rational deliberation. Rather they
are heavily influenced both by intergroup and by intra-group dynamics. And in both
cases, my personal influence over prescribed or proscribed action is severely
limited. 25
Equally important is the support that social identity theory lends to the changing
salience of specific social norms. The fact that typically I will belong to more than
one reference group suggests that I am likely to be subject to different – and
sometimes competing – social influences. Sometimes, the strength of these influences
may be skewed heavily by the situation in which I find myself – as in the ‘weak
vegetarian’ example of Section 7.4. At other times I may be subject to some quite
difficult va lue conflicts, when the social identity component associated with one
reference group (my professional affiliation with the green lobby, for example) comes
up against the social identity component of another reference group (my old school
friends who are all now working in investment banking, say).
Social identity theory has been applied to a variety of different circumstances and
social behaviours. It has been useful in understanding behaviours as varied as
delinquency, ‘anti-social’ behaviour, frustration-aggression, ethnocentrism, social
protest, self-sacrifice and stereo-typing (Hogg and Vaughan 2002).
There are also useful lessons for and applications to consumer behaviour. It is well-
known that consumer goods are implicated in the construction and maintenance of
identity (Dittmar 1992, Baumann 1998, Featherstone 1991). Amongst the important
processes of identification that consumer goods facilitate is identification with the in-
group – or conversely distinction from the out-group. Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of
social distinction offers one representation of the way in which consumer goods offer
distinctive social identities.
Mary Douglas (1997) has articulated a view of shopping as a form of protest that
owes much to social identity theory. Far from being motivated by clearly definable,
coherent versions of individual identity, Douglas argues that what holds consumer
decisions together and offers them coherence is the notion of protest. ‘Protest is a
fundamental cultural stance’, she maintains (op cit 17). People may not know what
they want; but they are very clear about what they do not want. And these hostilities
are directed continually at perceived out groups. ‘One culture accuses others, at all
25
Here is a situation in which, rather than social behaviour being an emergent property of individual
behaviour, personal behaviour is an emergent property of group behaviour (and social context).
82
times’ (ibid). Consumption decisions, in this view, are expressions of protest against
other cultures and cultural types.
What is true of shopping behaviours may be equally true of other kinds of behaviour.
It has long been recognised, for instance, that some forms of environmental activism
are motivated as much by protest against incumbent or dominant ideologies as by
concern for the environment per se (Stern et al 1999). That environmentalism is a
form of social protest is scarcely news. But the converse is also true, and equally
important: resistance to pro-environmental messages and behaviours has to be
understood, at least partly, in the context of social identities.
Just as environmentalists construe themselves in opposition to certain social groups,

so too do those who resist pro-environmental behaviour. For example, surveys of
attitudes towards recycling have consistently identified a certain hard-core of
respondents who persistently fail to recycle, express clear opposition to recycling, and
declare that they would never recycle, however easy it was for them to do so (RRF
2002, 2004). From a social identity perspective, we must expect that the emergence
of a clear social identity relating to recycling behaviour will give rise to social
opposition. I simply won’t recycle no matter how easy it is or how often I am asked,
not because I perceive the individual costs and benefits to be too high or too low, but
because recycling for me is associated with a certain kind of person belonging to a
certain kind of social group and this group is not the one I belong to.
This situation is clearly more uncomfortable for policy than one in which every
individual agent is open to ‘rational’ persuasion concerning the social benefit of pro-
environmental action. Government attempts to influence behaviour must somehow
confront the dynamics of social identity if they are to be successful. Clearly there are
some options open in the pursuit of this. For example, the use of role models –
belonging to successful in- groups – to promote pro-environmental and sus tainable
behaviours has been suggested as one route towards influencing public behaviour
(Halpern et al 2003) and this suggestion draws some support from social identity
theory.
On the other hand, the complex dynamics of social identification – and in particular
the inherent tendency towards social differentiation and intergroup conflict – suggests
that achieving pro-environmental change through ‘uniformity’ or ‘copying’ will not
be particularly easy. The stronger the signal that a certain behaviour associates people
with a particular group, the greater the likelihood that some people will resist that
behaviour, and choose a different behaviour simply for the purposes of social
differentiation.
Moreover this tendency towards cultural protest may be exacerbated in highly

stratified societies such as the one in which we now live. In more ‘uniform’ societies,
with low levels of social stratification and strong group norms of social identity, the
chances of achieving particular kinds of behaviour may be more realistic than in
highly disaggregated societies characterised by large income inequalities, which
celebrate individual choice, and place a high premium on social mobility and cultural
83
pluralism. The implications of this understanding for pro-environmental behaviour

change will be addressed more fully in Section 12.
9.6 Cultural Theory

In the previous section, we highlighted the importance of social differentiation as a
source of motivation for cultural differences in behaviour. Douglas (1997) promo tes
the idea of social protest to the position of a central organising feature of consumer
behaviour. Social identity theory sees this kind of intergroup hostility as arising from
the process of social identification itself. By contrast, Douglas perceives it as being
rooted in cultural dialogues about the proper functioning of society. ‘The basic choice
that a rational individual has to make is the choice about what kind of society to live
in’, she argues ‘Commodities are chosen because they are not neutral; they are chosen
because they would not be tolerated in the rejected forms of society and are therefore
permissible in the preferred form. Hostility is implicit in their selection’ (ibid).
This insight can be formalised, according to Douglas, in terms of a particular theory
concerning different kinds of social organisation. Cultural theory assumes that there
are four fundamentally different cultural forms of social organisation. Drawing on
Max Weber’s (1958) early exploration of different types of society, Douglas (1966,
1970) and her colleagues (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, Douglas and Wildavsky
1982, Thompson et al 1990) argue that there are only a limited number of different
forms of social organisation and that these are defined along two separate axes: group
and grid (Figure 11).
The position of a given society along the ‘group’ axis denotes the relative importance
of the group as opposed to the individual in that society. In a ‘high- group’ society,
group values prevail over individual values, ind ividual action is constrained and
curtailed by group norms, and society is organised extensively around group
relationships. Individual identity by contrast is relatively weak and individual
competition is subordinated to the best interests of the group. In a ‘low-group’ society,
the opposite is true: the individual dominates over the group, leading to unfettered
competition in the pursuit of individual interest, and the subordination of group values
and norms.
The ‘grid’ dimension of the cultural theory diagram denotes the extent to which the
relationships between individuals in a given society are free and unconstrained. In a
‘high- grid’ society, there are a variety of ‘insulations’ between individuals that
prevent free transactions. These insulations can be either physical in nature (such as
physical separation between specific individuals or groups of individuals) or the result
of self- made rules – such as the caste system in India. The result of such insulations
in a high-grid society is that certain kinds of transactions are barred, leading to
asymmetries in relationships between people. In a low-grid society, by contrast, there
are no such insulations, transactions between people are free and unconstrained,
leading to symmetric relationships between individuals.
84
high grid
(asymmetric
transactions)
Fatalist Hierarchist
(isolationist style) (traditionalist style)
low group high group

(unfettered (fettered
competition) competition)
Individualist Egalitarian
(entrepreneurial) (naturalist style)
low grid
(symmetrical
transactions)
Figure 11: Cultural Theory’s Typology of Social Organisation and Cultural Type
Cultural theory’s ‘impossibility theorem’ argues that there are four and only four
types of social organisation. 26 Each of these forms of social organisation ‘induces’ a
distinctive form of rationality. In individualist societies for example, rationality is
largely associated with the pursuit of the best interests of the individual, in the
absence of coercive norms. In egalitarian society, rationality consists in the collective
management of resources to the mutual benefit of the group, and so on.
It is clear from this description that modern economies are to be characterised

essentially as low-group, low-grid societies, correspond ing to an individualistic model
of rationality. This insight offers some explanation for the dominance of the rational
choice model within existing institutions and policy frameworks. Much of the
preceding discussion in this paper has been concerned with highlighting the
limitations of that model. Cultural theory offers the insight that the rational choice
model is associated with a particular way of conceiving of social organisation. But
that this is only one of four different possible forms of social orga nisation.
Some later work in cultural theory suggests that in addition to being associated with
specific models of rationality, different cultural models are also associated with
different types of individuals. The suggestion here is that there are different kinds of
26
In fact, some later versions of cultural theory identify a fifth cultural types, the hermit, based on a
model of ‘conviviality without coercion’ (Dake and Thompson 1993 eg) that sits outside the grid-
group categorisation.
85
individuals (cultural types) who each ‘prefer’ different kinds of social organisation.
The four cultural types identified by cultural theory (Figure 11) are:
• Hierarchist: this cultural type adheres to established traditions and

institutions, maintains social relations through a defined network of family and
old friends, and is resistant to social change.
• Individualist (or entrepreneurial): this cultural type prefers wide-flung, open
networks, and celebrates competition, innovation, ind ividual choice and
personal freedom;
• Egalitarian: this cultural type is against formality, rejects authoritarian
institutions, and ‘prefers simplicity, frankness, intimate friendship and spiritual
values’ (Douglas 1997);
• Fatalist (or isolate): this cultural type withdraws from social organisation,
eschews friendship, competition, gift-giving and commerce, preferring to
make do with their own resources.
There is a subtle but important difference between cultural theory as a theory of social
organisation, and cultural theory as a theory of individual cultural type. In the former
case, support for the theory is to be sought in historical evidence of the existence of
each kind of social organisation. In the latter case, the evidence base would be
provided by identification of distinct psychological types in society. Interestingly,
there is evidence in favour of both interpretations. The social organisational evidence
is perhaps the most convincing and draws on both sociological and cultural
anthropological evidence of different kinds of society (Douglas 1966 & 1970, Ophuls
1973, Sahlins 1976, Weber 1958).
But there is also more recent evidence to support the idea that these four (or five)
forms of social organisation correspond to specific ‘worldviews’ or belief systems
which in their turn are associated with different individuals belonging to specific
psychological types. A number of authors have found evidence for the existence of
these individual types, and established that each type appears to favour distinct
cultural myths about nature (Schwartz and Thompson 1990) has different
consumption tastes and preferences (Dake and Thompson 1993) and responds
differently to environmental and social risk (Thompson and Rayner 1998). Some
recent work has also established correlations between cultural types and underlying
(egoistic, altruistic, biospheric) value sets (Meader et al 2004).
Schwartz and Thompson (1990) found that entrepreneurs regard nature as robust,
isolates regard it as unpredictable, hierarchists regard it as robust within certain
prescribed limits, and egalitarians see nature as fragile. In response to these different
conceptions of nature, each cultural type favours particular forms of environmental
management. Largely, these are the ones associated with the form of organisation
preferred by that cultural type. Thus egalitarians tend to prefer community-based
management policies; hierarchists favour rule-based responses, and individualists
favour market solutions.
These insights are potentially useful both in understanding consumer motivations and
in identifying and delimiting the policy options available for pro-environmental
86
behaviour change. At the same time, the two interpretations of cultural theory pose
interesting, non-trivial, questions about the relationship between cultural types and
forms of social organisation. Is the preponderance of cultural types the result of the
domination of particular forms of social organisation? Or are cultural types formally
prior to (or independent of) types of social organisation?
It is clear, for instance, that most of our social organisation in modern society lies in
the lower left- hand quadrant – the individualist type. Conventional policy- making has
favoured free- market solutions to common resource problems and most of our
institutions and concepts of rationality reflect this. Presumably then, it would not be
at all surprising to find a preponderance of people with value sets that are widely
influenced by the dominant social norm or paradigm of individualism.
Questions such as this are important because the answer to them has clear
implications for the design of policy. If cultural types are prior to social organisation,
then policies designed to influence behavioural change should probably be
differentiated according to cultural type. If the preponderance of cultural types – or
the salience of certain values and norms in individuals – depends on the dominant
form of social organisation, then shifting individual behaviours is going to be difficult
without shifts in the form of social organisation.
These questions tend not to have been addressed explicitly within cultural theory and
must remain beyond the scope of this paper. But they clearly have some similarities to
the difficult questions about the relationship between individual beliefs, social values
and cultural worldviews that haunt the social psychological models. Further research
into these relationships and their importance for pro-environmental behavioural
change may be needed.
87
88
10 Integrative Theories of Consumer Behaviour

As we noted in an earlier section, there are – broadly speaking – two identifiably
different kinds of approaches to understanding consumer behaviours. Firstly, we can
distinguish a set of approaches that stud y and model behaviour mainly as a function of
processes and characteristics which are conceived as being internal to the individual:
attitudes, values, habits and personal norms.
Quite another set of approaches studies behaviour as a function of processes and

characteristics external to the individual: fiscal and regulatory incentives, institutional
constraints and social practices. The first (‘internalist’) perspective carries an implicit
assumption of consumers as atomistic agents autonomous of social structure, while
the second (‘externalist’) perspective sees consumers as constrained operators
programmed (or at least heavily influenced) by external forces beyond their
comprehension or control.
The literature on recycling is typical of this ‘divergence’ in perspectives. In particular,

the early literature on recycling shows clear evidence of the division. Internalist
perspectives, such as those of Arbuthnot (1974), de Young (1986 & 1990) and Pardini
and Katzev (1983/4), focused exclusively on attitudes, beliefs and intrinsic
motivations as critical determinants of recycling actions. Externalist approaches such
as those of Ingram and Geller (1975), Jacobs and Bailey (1982/3) and Witmer and
Geller (1976) concentrated solely on the role of external constraints, prompts, and
incentives in promoting recycling behaviour.
Not surprisingly, the two perspectives tend to differ widely in their policy
prescriptions. On the understanding that public attitudes are the most important
determinants of successful pro-environmental behaviour, the internalist approach calls
mainly for awareness raising, information provision and advertising campaigns to
motivate pro-environmental attitudes. By contrast, the externalist approach tends to
call for a combination of incentives and changes in the regulatory structure to create
the right conditions for pro-environmental behaviour.
More recent literature on recycling (for example) tends to adopt more freely from both
perspectives (Hopper and Nielsen 1991, Oskamp et al 1991, Tucker et al 1998, Perrin
and Barton 2001, Oates and McDonald 2004). But it doesn’t always do so in a
particularly structured way. In particular, this literature often does not explore the
relationships between internal factors and external constraints in any depth. In this
section we briefly examine a number of different frameworks for social action which
attempt to combine both internalist and externalist perspectives.
10.1 Structuration and Social Practices

The internalist-externalist dichotomy in theories of consumer behaviour mirrors a
more long-standing, and more deeply entrenched debate in social science concerning
the relationship between agency (or human action) and structure (the social
institutions that constitute the framework for human action). The basic dilemma in
the agency-structure debate can be expressed in the question: are humans capable of
89
autonomous, directed social action; or are they rather locked into historical and social
processes over which there is no possibility of individual or collective control?
The dimensions of this problem are complex and involve sociological, biological,
historical, and philosophical elements. The debate has been explored most thoroughly
by sociologists, for whom the attempt to formulate coherent understandings of social
action is paramount. This concern with social action, its origins and driving forces, is
one of the factors that has led sociology to condemn the one-dimensional rationality
inherent in the conventional rational choice model. It has also led some sociologists
to attempt to devise more sophisticated forms of ‘structuration theory’ which attempt
to bridge the agency-structure dichotomy and offer more sophisticated, integrative
models of social action (Parker 2000).
Perhaps the most well-known form of structuration theory is that of Giddens (1976,
1984) who coined the term ‘structuration’. Giddens starting point in trying to build an
integrated model of human agency and social structure draws something from the
interactionism of Mead and others (Section 9.1). Individual subjectivity is mediated
through social interaction. Social interaction is what gives individuals access to
language, intersubjective interpretation, meaning and knowledge. Only by being
embroiled in the social world of others, with whom they can reliably interact, can
people achieve ‘ontological security’ (Giddens 1984, 375). This ontological security
provides for a continuing sense of the ‘well- foundedness of reality’ (Parker 2000, 56).
Giddens’ structuration theory rests on three fundamental understandings about the

nature of social interaction:
• reflexivity: the continuous ‘monitored character of the ongoing flow of social

life’ (Giddens 1984, 3);
• recursiveness: the continual production and reproduction of the social
practices in which social actors are engaged (Johnston et al 2000, 798); and
• regionalisation: the temporal, spatial or time-space differentiation of the social
processes that channel social life (Giddens 1984, 376).
These propositions about social life allowed Giddens to construct a model of the
interconnection between ordinary everyday routine action and the long-term, large-
scale evolution of social institutions. Specifically, individual and collective agency
provides for the production, regularisation, extension and reproduction of complex
patterns of social interaction – or in other words for the ‘constitution of society’. But
this concept of agency is only possible because actors have access to the
‘transformative capacity’ of historical social structures, such as language, rules,
norms, meanings and power (op cit, 28-9). These ‘rules and resources’ are not
endowed with agency in and of themselves. But they come to have effect through
being known and applied by social actors. Thus, Giddens model portrays social
structure as both the medium and the outcome of people’s ordinary social practices.
From the perspective of understanding consumption behaviours, one of the most

important elements in structuration theory is a distinction between ‘practical’ and
‘discursive’ consciousness. Practical consciousness is the everyday knowledge that
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people have about how to do things. It depends on a huge wealth of commonly

accepted knowledge concerning how to go about things. In fact, Giddens suggests that
the bulk of human agency rests in using this kind of practical consciousness in the
context of familiar, routine (routinized) situations and behavioural contexts.
In one sense, it is this practical consciousness which allows me to identify the

whereabouts of the rubbish bin faultlessly (until it is moved), drive to work without
noticing that I have stopped at the lights, and respond effortlessly to many of the
trivial tasks that fill my everyday life. Most of this kind of action appears to take
place without any recourse to premeditation or conscious, deliberative reasoning.
At the same time, human agency is also characterised by the ability to engage in such
reasoning, for example, when asked to expand upon the underlying reasons for (even
routine) action. This ‘discursive consciousness’ consists in everything that actors are
able to say about the social conditions of their action. It presupposes both that social
actors have an awareness of action and that this awareness has a discursive form – it is
prosecuted through social discourse. However, this kind of consciousness does not
necessarily describe a process of continual rational deliberation over individual
actions. On the contrary, according to Giddens, accounts of intention are generally
produced during or after action, rather than before it. Agency is, for the most part, the
process of being enmeshed in the repetitive, routine practices of everyday life.
Actors Human Action Social Practices Structures
Cooking
Lighting
Systems of Provision
Lifestyles
Discursive and
Rules and
practical Showering
resources
consciousness
Socialising
etc..
Figure 12: Consumption as Social Practices (after Spaargaren and van Vliet 2000)
The distinction between practical and discursive consciousness clearly has some
resonances with the social psychological understandings of routines and habits. It
also has some important implications in terms of motivating pro-environmental
behaviour. Spaargaren and van Vliet (2000) have suggested a model of consumption
as a set of social practices (Figure 12) influenced on the one hand by social norms and
lifestyle choices and on the other by the institutions and structures of society. They
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suggest that shifting consumption patterns requires us to ‘raise’ routine behaviours

from the level of practical consciousness to discursive consciousness. Most everyday,
routine action is performed in practical consciousness. But there is evidence to
suggest that intentional or goal-oriented behaviours require elaboration in discursive
consciousness. This insight is important in devising strategies to change habitual
behaviour (Section 11.5).
10.2 Stern’s Attitude-Behaviour-Context Model

One of the most significant efforts to overcome the internalist-externalist dichotomy
in the social psychological literature is the attempt by Stern (2000) and his colleagues
(Guagnano et al 1995, Stern et al 1999) to develop integrated ‘attitude-behaviour-
constraint’ (ABC) models of environmentally-significant behaviour (Figure 13).
positive
External conditions (C)
Re
cy
No cli
negative Re ng positive
cy
cli
ng
negative
Attitudes (A)
Figure 13: The Attitude-Behaviour-Context Model applied to recycling
The fundamental starting point for Stern’s approach (drawing on Lewin’s field theory)
is the understanding that behaviour is a function of the organism and its environment.
Or in the language of ABC, behaviour (B) is ‘an interactive product of personal
sphere attitudinal variables (A) and contextual factors (C)’ (Stern 2000, 415).
Attitudinal variables considered in such theories might include a variety of specific

personal beliefs, norms and values as well as general ‘pre-dispositions’ to act in
certain ways. Contextual factors can potentially include a wide variety of influences
such as: monetary incentives and costs, physical capabilities and constraints,
institutional and legal factors, public policy support, interpersonal influences (social
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norms eg) and in some cases (Olli et al 1999) broader dimensions of the social
context, such as allegiance to or influence by environmental groups.
The structural dynamics between the influence of attitudes (ie internal factors) and
contextual (ie external) factors is a key dimension of the ABC model. In particular,
its proponents claim that the attitude-behaviour link is strongest whe n contextual
factors are weak or non-existent; and that, conversely, there is virtually no link
between attitudes and behaviours when contextual factors are either strongly negative
or strongly positive.
So, for example, in the case of recycling, when access to recycling facilities is either
very hard or very easy, it scarcely matters whether or not people hold pro-recycling
attitudes. In the first case, virtually no-one recycles; and in the second case most
people recycle. In a situation, however, in which it is possible but not necessarily easy
to recycle, the correlation between pro-environmental attitude and recycling
behaviour is strongest. Guagnano et al (1995) found empirical support for this
hypothesis in a study of kerbside recycling.
10.3 Triandis’ Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour

If there is one key element in the social psychology of behaviour that is still missing
from Stern’s ABC model it is the role of habit. Stern (2000) acknowledges this and
proposes that an integrated model of environmentally significant behaviour would
consist of four factors:
• attitudes
• contextual factors
• personal capabilities and
• habits.
As yet, Stern and his colleagues have not yet developed this suggestion into an
empirical modelling framework. Interestingly, however, the general thrust of Stern’s
suggestion is very similar to an attempt made almost thirty years ago by social
psychologist Harry Triandis to develop an integrated model of ‘interpersonal’
behaviour.
Triandis recognised the key role played both by social factors and by emotions in
forming intentions. He also highlighted the importance of past behaviour on the
present. On the basis of these observations, Triandis proposed a Theory of
Interpersonal Behaviour (Figure 14) in which intentions – as in many of the other
models we have examined – are immediate antecedents of behaviour. But crucially
habits also mediate behaviour. And both of these influences are moderated by
‘facilitating conditions’ (a similar concept to Stern’s notion of external contextual
factors).
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Beliefs about
outcomes
Attitude
Evaluation of
Facilitating
outcomes
Conditions
Norms
Roles Social factors Intention
Self-concept
Emotions Affect Behaviour
Frequency of
Habits
past behaviour
Figure 14: Triandis’ Theory of Interpersonal Behaviour
Equally importantly, intentions are in themselves seen as having three distinct kinds
of antecedents. Attitudes – or to be more specific the perceived value of the expected
consequences – play a role in mediating intentions, just as they do in Ajzen-Fishbein’s
expectancy-value theory. But Triandis is also particularly concerned to include both
social and affective factors in the model.
Social factors include norms, roles and self-concept. Norms, for Triandis, appear to be
conceptualised in much the same way as Cialdini conceptualised injunctive social
norms – that is, as social rules about what should and should not be done. Roles are
‘sets of behaviours that are considered appropriate for persons holding particular
positions in a group’ (Triandis 1977, 8). Self-concept refers here to the idea that I
have of myself, the goals that it is appropriate for this kind of person to pursue or to
eschew, and the behaviours that this kind of person does or does not engage in. These
elements of the theory of interpersonal behaviour certainly draw some legitimacy
from social psychological theories of self and identity (Mead 1934) and are supported
by the insights of social identity theory (Tajfel 1973) and self-discrepancy theory
(Higgins 1987) in particular.
Triandis is one of the few theorists to offer an explicit role for affective factors on
behavioural intentions. Emotional responses to a decision or to a decision situation
are assumed distinct from rational- instrumental evaluations of consequences, and may
include both positive and negative emotional responses of varying strengths. There is
certainly some indication in Triandis’ writing that affect is a more or less unconscious
input to decision-making, and is governed by instinctive behavioural responses to
particular situations. This sometimes leads to a rather one dimensional
characterisation of affect along a pain-pleasure axis (see Triandis 1977, 35).
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Nonetheless, the attempt to incorporate emotional antecedents into a model of action

has a lot of support in more recent writings (Bagozzi et al 2002, Steg et al 2001) as
well as a (rather contentious) pedigree in behaviourism (Skinner 1971).
In summary, my behaviour in any particular situation is, according to Triandis, a

function partly of what I intend, partly of my habitual responses, and partly of the
situational constraints and conditions under which I operate. My intentions in their
turn are influenced by social, normative and affective factors as well as by rational
deliberations. I am neither fully deliberative, in Triandis’ model, nor fully automatic.
I am neither fully autonomous nor entirely social. My behaviours are influenced by
my moral beliefs, but the impact of these is moderated both by my emotional drives
and my cognitive limitations.
Triandis theory of interpersonal behaviour captures many of the criticisms levelled at

rational choice theory in way that is not done by some of the other models that we
have looked at. It offers a clear heuristic value in the conceptual sense discussed at
the beginning of this section, as a model. It also can be, and has been, used as the
framework for empirical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the component
factors in different kinds of situations.
Ironically, far less use has been made of Triandis work than was made of the Ajzen-
Fishbein work or even of Schwartz’s Norm-Activation model. And this is particularly
true in relation to pro-environmental behaviour. This is probably partly because of the
greater complexity – or as Ajzen and Fishbein (1975) would have it, the lack of
parsimony of the model. However, it is telling that, where it has been used, it appears
to have additional explanatory value over Ajzen’s model.
Bamberg and Schmidt (2003) compared the predictive power of Triandis’ theory
against the Theory of Planned Behaviour and Schwartz’s Norm-Activation model in
the context of car use. They found that one of Triandis’ variables – role beliefs –
significantly increased the explanatory power offered by Ajzen’s model in predicting
intentions to use a car. They also discovered that another of Triandis’ variables – habit
– significantly increased explanatory power in predicting self-reported car use. 27
10.4 The Motivation-Opportunity-Abilities model

Another well-known attempt to construct an integrative model for consumer action is
the motivation-opportunity-abilities (MOA) model proposed by Ölander and
Thøgersen (1995). These authors acknowledge that consistency between attitudes and
behaviours can only be expected under conditions of volitional control. They point to
the improvements in predictive power achievable by incorporating an ‘ability’
concept and a concept of facilitating conditions or ‘opportunity’ to perform the
behaviour into the model (Figure 15).
27
Interestingly, this study found no significant effect from the incorporation of the concept of
personal norm on either intention or self-reported behaviour.
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Ability
Beliefs
Habit, task
Evaluations
knowledge
Attitude
towards
behaviour
Intention Behaviour
Social
Norm Opportunity
situational
conditions
Motivation
Figure 15: The Motivation-Opportunity-Ability Model
The Motivation component of the MOA model is recognisable in Figure 15 as a

simplified version of the Theory of Reasoned Action (Section 6.3). However,
Ölander and Thøgersen (1995) also suggest several other possibilities here, including
the use of the motivational part of Triandis’ model or the insertion of Schwartz’s
Norm-Activation model.
The ‘ability’ concept is supposed to incorporate both a habit and a task knowledge
element. Its inclusion in the model draws support from a variety of places, including
previous research on waste separation and recycling behaviours (Kok and Siero 1985,
Pieters 1989, 1991, Thøgersen 1994a). The importance of habit both as an
independent determinant of behaviour and as a moderator of intention has already
been discussed. Task knowledge is also clearly an important consideration,
particularly in relation to new procedures relevant to pro-environmental behaviour,
such as the appropriate separation and sorting of recycling materials (Verhallen and
Pieters 1985, Thøgersen 1994b).
The influence of situational factors on consumer behaviours has been raised a number
of times in this review. The opportunity component of the MOA model is clearly
related to Triandis’ concept of facilitating conditions and Stern’s notion of external
conditions. Though Ölander and Thøgersen prefer to see opportunity as ‘objective
preconditions for behaviour’, this aspect of the model also has some similarities with
96
Ajzen’s concept of perceived behaviour control – at least in so far as the latter concept
is regarded as being a proxy for actual behaviour control.
Evidence for the importance of situational factors as a precondition for pro-

environmental behaviour is plentiful. Ölander and Thøgersen point to a study of
source separation carried out at the Aarhus Business School (Johansson 1993,
Thøgersen 1990) which showed that improving the opportunities for recycling had a
significant impact on actual recycling behaviours that was independent of either
attitudes towards recycling or the perceived difficulties of recycling. Similar evidence
is cited by Guagnano et al (1995).
The important structural feature of the MOA model is its attempt to integrate
motivation, habitual and contextual factors into a single model of pro-environmental
behaviour. Applications of the MOA framework include its use to describe attempts
by households to reduce energy consumption (Gatersleben and Vlek 1997, 2000).
10.5 Bagozzi’s Model of Consumer Action

One final integrative model of consumer behaviour worth mentioning here has arisen
from a long-standing programme of research on consumer behaviour pursued by
Robert Bagozzi and his colleagues (Bagozzi et al 2002). Bagozzi’s early attempts to
understand consumer action focused on the act of trying (Figure 16).
Attitude towards
success Frequency of past Recency of past
trying and/or past trying and/or past
behaviour behaviour
Attitude towards
failure
Intention to try Trying
Attitude towards
process or means
Subjective
norms
Figure 16: Bagozzi and Warshaw’s Theory of Trying
97
Bagozzi and Warshaw (1990) proposed that many consumer behaviours could be
studied from the perspective of trying to act. ‘To fulfil one’s consumption goals, a
consumer must see their own action as a purposive endeavour where foresight and
effort are needed’, argue Bagozzi et al (2002). They discuss, for example, the
situation in which a consumer is trying to buy an appropriate gift for a friend. To
succeed in this action, the consumer must construe their action explicitly as being
composed of a variety of different tasks: deciding to embark on a shopping trip,
identifying which stores to browse, deciding how much to spend, and so on. This set
of tasks comprises the actions required in ‘trying’ to buy a present for the friend.
Importantly, the Theory of Trying regards the act of trying as being mediated by the
intention to try and moderated by both the frequency and the recency of past trying or
past behaviour. The inclusion of aspects of past behaviour in the model is akin to the
inclusion of habit in the Triandis model and draws strong support from empirical
evidence. In a meta-analysis of 64 studies, Ouellette and Wood (1998) found robust
evidence of the impact of frequency of past behaviours on future behaviour.
The immediate antecedents of the intention to try, in Bagozzi and Warshaw’s model
look rather similar to the Ajzen-Fishbein models, except that Bagozzi distinguishes
attitudes about success explicitly from attitudes about failure and attitudes about the
process of trying itself.
More recently, Bagozzi and his colleagues have extended and elaborated the theory of
trying into a comprehensive model of goal-directed consumer action (Figure 17). 28
The extended model incorporates many of the kinds of variables introduced in earlier
sections of this review including affective, normative, habitual and social components.
This model of consumer action is very modern in the sense that it attempts to show
how unconscious cerebral factors (shown in red in Figure 17) influence both
emotional and deliberative decision- making processes.
As we remarked in Section 5, Damasio (1994, 1999) has offered a radical account of

rationality in which decision-making processes are affected by non-conscious
emotions, signalled through somatic marker effects in the body. Damasio (1994, 173-
4) argues that prior to cognitive deliberation, these marker effects induce pleasant or
unpleasant feelings which highlight different options and induce positive or negative
biases. These biases serve either to favour or to eliminate certain options, prior to
cognitive deliberation.
A slightly different model has been elaborated by Libet (1993) who discovered that
people’s conscious decisions to initiate bodily movements are preceded by a
‘readiness potential’ which is involved in sending signals to the muscles to move. In
other words, Libet’s work supports the hypothesis that unconscious processes initiate
choices before cognitive deliberation occurs. Libet argued that decision- making is the
act of choosing to allow or disallow an action to continue, after the action itself has
been unconsciously initiated.
28
This comprehensive model is a combination (and extension) of the Theory of Trying and Perugini
and Bagozzi’s (2001) Model of Goal-directed Behaviour.
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Social and
self -conscious
emotions
Second-order
moral values and
Goal
standards
feasibility
Social
identity
Anticipated
positive emotions
Goal Goal Behavioural Implementation

desire intention desire intention
Anticipated
negative emotions
Trying
Perceived
Outcome Subjective behavioural
Attitudes
expectancies norms control and self -
efficacy
Unconscious
cerebral initiatives Goal-directed
and somatic behaviour
Normative
marker effects Behavioural
beliefs and
beliefs and
motivation to
evaluations
comply
Goal attain-
Feedback
ment/failure
Situational
forces
Figure 17: Bagozzi’s Comprehensive Model of Consumer Action
The Bagozzi model is perhaps the most elaborate attempt in recent years to
incorporate the range of influences on consumer behaviour into a single composite
theory of consumer action. What it achieves in terms of heuristic inclusion, however,
it lacks in parsimony. Not surprisingly, no attempt has yet been made to apply this
theory empirically. Nonetheless, there are a number of studies that test and support
many of the individual relations proposed between different variables. Moreover, the
model clearly offers a more sophisticated understanding of consumer behaviour than
simple expectancy-value theories.
10.6 Summary Discussion

In summary, it should be clear that recent understandings of consumer behaviour, and
of pro-environmental consumer behaviour in particular, have come a long way from
the simple expectancy- value models embedded in the Theory of Reasoned Action.
These more recent models also go some way towards answering critiques of the
rational choice model.
In particular, social psychological models attempt to account, systematically, for

moral, social, symbolic and affective (as well as reasoned) components of consumer
behaviour. They describe the role of descriptive and injunctive social norms on
individual action. They show how cognitive processes and unconscious biases impact
on goal-directed behaviour. They highlight the importance of habit, both in reducing
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the cognitive effort associated with goal-directed behaviour, but also in moderating
behavioural intentions.
The issue of habit illustrates very clearly the existence of trade-offs between different
components of consumer decision- making. Cognitive efficiency – sometimes
reinforced by short-run rewards – means that we are often locked into counter-
intentional habits, in spite of our best intentions. Affective motivations (emotions)
often conflict with moral concerns. Social norms interfere with individual preference.
Situational conditions interfere with intent ion. The broad social and cultural context
is a powerful influence on attitudes and motivations.
Choice, in these circumstance, is never a straightforward process of individual rational

deliberation. Intentions and desires are moderated by social, cognitive, situational and
cultural factors.
When it comes to the models used to describe this complex terrain, there is clearly a
tension between parsimony and explanatory power. The simpler models are more
readily applicable, and generally speaking have been more frequently applied (and
tested) in empirical studies. On the other hand, the ability of these simpler models to
offer robust explanations for, or predictions of, different kinds of behaviour is limited.
For example, the explained variance associated with Stern’s Value Belief Norm
theory was less than 35% (Stern et al 1999) in empirical studies.
As the conceptual complexity of the models rise, however, their empirical

applicability diminishes. Designing, testing and corroborating a sophisticated multi-
variable social-psychological model (with feedback) of the type illustrated in Figure
17 is a daunting empirical task. To date, it has not been carried out.
Does this matter, in terms of developing a policy-relevant understanding of consumer

behaviour? Perhaps not. In the first place, there is a fairly robust evidence base in
support of each of the individual links proposed in (for example) Bagozzi’s
Comprehensive Model of Consumer Action. We know that the frequency and
recency of past behaviours moderates intentions. We know that affective factors
mediate rational choice. We know that normative factors moderate desire. The
quantitative and qualitative empirical support for such links is relatively well-
established.
As conceptual models of cons umer action, therefore, these more sophisticated models
offer policy- makers a fairly robust picture of the factors that shape and constrain
consumer choice. They also point to some key areas for further examination in
promoting pro-environmental behavioural change. In particular, of course, the
importance of habit in consumer action, draws attention to need to understand and to
influence the processes of habit formation and change. The moderating effect of
external situational factors on consumer intentions highlights the need to improve
facilitating conditions in a wide range of environmentally-significant situations. And,
perhaps most telling of all, the embeddedness of the individual in a social group
points to the vital influence of social and cultural context on consumer behaviour.
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On the other hand, of course, deciding on the exact balance of affective, moral,
habitual and social motivations and situational conditions in any given situation is no
easy task. We cannot necessarily assume that the importance of habit (for example) is
as high in one situation (energy conservation eg) as it is in another (travel mode
choice, say). Nonetheless, the broad understanding that consumer action is framed by
these different components, together with some detailed empirical studies of the
strength of specific relationships, can provide useful lessons for policy-makers
seeking to encourage pro-environmental behaviour.
Admittedly, not all of these lessons are particularly easy ones. For a start, the sheer
complexity inherent in consumer action is frightening from a policy perspective.
Figure 17 is a far cry from the simple consumer preference model illustrated in Figure
3. In the latter case, there were basically only two possible points of policy
intervention: the provision of adequate information to enable informed choice; and the
adjustment of private costs and benefits to reflect social externalities.
By contrast, the terrain of Figure 17 is much more complex. It suggests a model of

consumer choice in which there is a multiplicity of different points of intervention, for
example, through influencing the social and institutional conditions that affect moral
choice and social identity as well as through addressing the situational conditions
associated with specific actions. It also suggests that some attention needs to be paid
to the cognitive processes of behavioural change.
Of course, these more complex kinds of intervention also pose some considerable
problems and make some considerable demands on policy- makers. But fortunately,
there are at least some insights into how these problems can be overcome and these
demands can be met. It is to these insights that we now turn.
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102
PART 3: TOWARDS BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE
‘If wishes were horses, beggars would ride.’

(Anon)
103
104
11 Change, Persuasion and Learning
Behavioural change is fast becoming a kind of ‘holy grail’ for sustainable

development policy – and in particular for sustainable consumption policies. How
can we persuade people to behave in more environmentally and socially responsible
ways? How can we shift people’s transport modes, appliance choices, eating habits,
leisure practices, lifestyle expectations (and so on) in such a way as to reduce the
damaging impact on the environment and on other people? How can we encourage
sustainable consumption and discourage unsustainable consumption?
As the exploration in preceding sections has made abundantly clear, these tasks are
enormously complex for a variety of reasons. Consumer choices are influenced by
moral, normative, emotional, social factors, facilitating conditions and the sheer force
of habit, as well as by so-called rational deliberations and intentions. In many cases,
as we have highlighted throughout, people appear to be locked in to behaviours and
behavioural patterns that seem to be resistant to change.
And yet behaviours do change. In fact, they change continually and sometimes
radically over quite short periods of time. The uptake of mobile phones, 4x4s, wide-
screen plasma TVs, power showers, standby modes in electronic appliances and air
conditioning in cars, patterns of holiday travel and school transport: these are all
examples of technological and behavioural change which have occurred in the space
of only a decade or so in recent Western development. Much further reaching changes
have occurred over only slightly longer timescales.
What is significant about these sorts of changes is that they represent a kind of
‘creeping evolution’ of social and technological norms. Individuals do change their
behaviours, that much is clear. Sometimes individual behaviour initiates new social
trends. More often individuals find themselves responding to societal and
technological changes that are initiated elsewhere, at some higher or deeper level. It
is clear, therefore, that we must think of individual behaviour as being ‘locked- in’ not
just in a static but also in a dynamic sense. We are locked into behavioural trends as
much as and possibly more than we are locked into specific fixed behaviours. Some
of this perspective is implicit, for example, in the agency-structure debates discussed
in Section 10.1.
It is beyond the scope of this review to discuss this phenomenon of ‘dynamic lock- in’
in detail, although this is clearly an important topic worthy of future consideration.
Nonetheless, it is also clear that developing policies to encourage pro-environmental
and pro-social consumer behaviours has to be informed by some kind of
understanding of the dimensions of and possibilities for behavioural change. So how
do behaviours change? What understandings exist for the processes of change? And
given that behaviours do change, sometimes quite radically, over time, how can these
understandings be used to inform behaviour change policies?
At one level this task is as complex as trying to understand consumer behaviours. It

also involves the same kind of entrenched and often intractable debates that dog the
105
debates about consumer behaviour. For example, some approaches focus on

voluntaristic, goal-directed change processes. Others assume a more or less
‘behaviourist’ approach in which sometimes arbitrary behavioural variations are
reinforced (either positively or negatively) by external stimuli. This dichotomy clearly
mirrors the dichotomy between internalist and externalist conceptions of behaviour.
In spite of these complexities, there are only a relatively limited number of quite
specific avenues for behaviour change. Specifically, the literature suggests that
humans learn new behaviours through trial and error, through persuasion, or through
various forms of modelling (social learning). Each of these routes is important to pro-
social or pro-environmental behaviour change and we explore them in various ways in
this section. Specifically, we discuss the literatures on persuasion, modelling, and
social learning. We address the key role of habit formation and change. Finally, we
look at the role of participatory problem-solving and community based social
marketing.
11.1 Persuasion Theory

If the aim of government policy is to change either attitudes or behaviours in a pro-
environmental direction, then one of the places to look for inspiration is the rather
extensive literature on persuasion. Like much of the work reviewed in this report –
persuasion theory has a rather long pedigree. It can be traced, for example, to
Aristotle’s ‘three pillars of rhetoric’: ethos, logos and pathos.
A more recent casting of the Aristotelian model emerged from an extended

programme of research on persuasion that spanned the 1940s and the 1950s. The
work of the Hovland-Yale Communication and Persuasion (HYCP) group framed
successful persuasion in terms of three key elements (Hovland et al 1953, Hovland
1957):
• the credibility of the speaker (the source);

• the persuasiveness of the arguments (the message); and
• the responsiveness of the audience (the recipient).
It is now recognised that this rather linear model of persuasion has some significant
limitations (Petty et al 2002). Most importantly, the HYCP model assumes that
attitude change occurs through the assimilation and comprehension of the persuasive
information. In other words, the chain of events looks something like this: I am
exposed to a particular persuasive message – such as an argument to the effect that
there is a need to reduce energy consumption in order to halt climate change; and as a
result of hearing and understanding this message, I change my attitude towards energy
consumption and (ultimately) my energy consuming behaviour.
Though it sounds reasonable enough, it turns out that empirical evidence fails to
support this hypothesis. On the contrary, empirical evidence indicates both that
learning can occur without any change in attitudes, and that attitude (and behaviour)
change can occur without any assimilation of the persuasion message (Greenwald
1968, Petty and Cacciope 1981).
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Several attempts were made to overcome the deficiencies of the HYCP model. One
of these was the balance theory of persuasion (Abelson et al 1968 eg). This model
draws inspiration from Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory (Section 9.3).
People appear to prefer consistency not just in their own attitudes, motivations and
behaviours, but also in their interpersonal relationships. Balance theory suggests that
it is possible to exploit this preference – for instance by suggesting or highlighting
inconsistency – in order to change people’s attitudes.
Another important attempt to overcome the linearity of the HYCP model emerged in
cognitive response theory, which placed a greater emphasis on individuals as active
participants in the persuasion process. This model suggests that attitude change is
extensively mediated by people’s cognitive response to the persuasion message
(which depends in its tur n on the specific involvement, history and context of the
individual) rather than by routine message learning. Some evidence emerged to
corroborate this (Greenwald 1968).
11.2 The Elaboration Likelihood Model

One of the most influential recent persuasion theories is the elaboration likelihood
model (ELM) of Petty and Cacioppo (Petty 1977, Petty and Cacioppo 1981, 1986). In
contrast to previous theories, the ELM suggests that there are two distinct types of
psychological processes involved in attitude change, one involving central processing
and one involving peripheral processing (Figure 18).
The central processing route is one in which attitude change occurs as the result of
mindful attention to the content of a persuasive message, elaboration of its
implications and integration into one’s own attitude set. This route relies, according
to the ELM, on a high level of motivation and ability in the target audience to engage
with the message. This is most likely to occur when the issue at hand is personally
relevant to the target audience.
The peripheral processing route, by contrast occurs when the target’s motivation
and/or ability to engage with the issue is low. In this case, peripheral ‘persuasion
cues’ may be used to suggest ‘source attractiveness’. As an example, consider the
association of a celebrity with a particular pro-environmental behaviour (public
transportation or energy efficiency eg). In this case, rather than attending to the
message content, an audience with low motivation or ability to engage in the issue
itself responds to the peripheral suggestion that there are potential rewards (‘I too can
be like this celebrity’) associated with the target behaviour.
According to the theory, the central processing route is most likely to lead to enduring
attitude change. However, there are also ways in which peripheral processing can be
successful in long-term attitude and behaviour change. According to the peripheral
route, source attractiveness or the suggestion of potential rewards can sometimes lead
directly to behavioural change (the right hand route in Figure 18).
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Central Processing
(high motivation/ability)
Peripheral processing Peripheral processing
(low motivation/ability) (low motivation/ability)
Attention
Comprehension
Peripheral cues Peripheral cues
Elaboration
Reward Reward
association association
Integration
Attitude Change
Behaviour Change
Figure 18: Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model
For example, a target responding to the celebrity involvement (eg) may find
themselves taking public transport without ever having deliberated over the choice.
Once the behaviour in question has changed, the target begins to consider the
advantages of public transport and adjust their attitudes accordingly. This possibility
is consistent with Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory (Section 9.4) which suggests
that we sometimes infer what our attitudes are by observing our own behaviour.
Clearly however, this strategy relies on something more than peripheral persuasion
cues. These may provide the initial stimulus for behaviour change. But the change is
unlikely to be enduring if the target, having taken public transport, finds that the buses
are dirty, the trains are late, and he or she is severely disadvantaged by making that
choice. Positive reinforcement of behavioural choices is essential if uptake is to be
enduring and to lead in its turn to attitudinal change. Moreover, the empirical
evidence suggests that the peripheral route is less successful in changing attitudes
when the target is highly motivated and engaged in the issue in question.
Irrespective of these different routes, persuasion theory suggests a very careful

attention to the target audience in any kind of persuasion strategy. Petty and
Cacioppo’s model predicts that enduring attitude change is most likely via the central
processing route. But it also suggests that personally involving messages are most
likely to facilitate the more successful central processing route.
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Of course, the difficulty of ensuring people’s involvement in persuasion messages is

not inconsiderable. Knowing the target audience is a necessary but not sufficient step.
In addition, increasingly, any kind of persuasive appeal has to compete in a very
message-dense environment. Pratkanis and Greenwald (1993) argue that in order to
have the best chance of success, persuasive appeals must employ highly credible
sources and be structured around a single, well-placed, very positive message.
Bator and Cialdini (2000) identify several other characteristics of successful

persuasion. These include:
• the emotional, imaginative appeal of the persuasive message;

• the immediacy, directness and relevance of the message;
• the use of commitments – such as bumper stickers, badges or loyalty schemes
– to signal involvement; and
• the importance of identifying ‘retrieval cues’ that might help people bring the
persuasive message to mind;
Bator and Cialdini also emphasise the importance of careful design, target
identification and pre-testing of public interest information campaigns.
11.3 Social Learning Theory

Policy- makers have traditionally placed a high emphasis and expectation on the
ability of persuasion to achieve goals that are in the public interest. This is perhaps
understandable. For a start, this strategy is supported by the dominant understandings
about rational choice. And besides, the concern with sovereignty of consumer choice
appears to delimit the options available to the public sector to influence ‘private’
actions.
Nonetheless, the limitations of this kind of persua sion have long been recognised.
Exhortation and information remain two of the most widely used ways of trying to
influence attitudes or behaviours. But they are also, according to Donald Campbell
(1963), amongst the least effective. Far more effective ways of achieving behavioural
change, according to Campbell, are trial and error, observing what others do, and
observing how others respond to one’s own behaviour.
The behaviourist school in psychology placed the highest emphasis on trial and error,
arguing that we learn what to do (and what not to do) by experiencing positive (and
negative) reinforcements (rewards or penalties) for our behaviours. Pavlov’s famous
experiment with dogs illustrates this form of learning. If I am punished for buying
incandescent light-bulbs and rewarded for buying fluorescent ones, I will end up
avoiding incandescents and buying fluorescents, according to the behaviourists. And
this strategy of punishment and reward will be far more effective than providing me
with informatio n about the relative greenhouse impacts of each type of bulb or
exhorting me to save energy.
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Albert Bandura (1973, 1977b) agreed that conversation (information and exhortation)
is not a particularly effective way of learning. But he also took issue with the
behaviourists’ assumption that learning proceeds solely through trial and error.
‘Coping with the demands of everyday life,’ he argued (Bandura 1977b, 27), ‘would
be exceedingly trying if one could arrive at solutions to problems only by actually
performing possible options and suffering the consequences.’
Instead, Bandura proposed that in real life, the process of trial and error is continually
complemented by various forms of social learning. The main premise of Bandura’s
highly influential social learning theory is that, in addition to our own direct
experience, we learn by observing others around us, including our parents, our peers
and those portrayed through the media, and modelling our behaviour on what they do.
We learn from these social models in several distinct ways. In the first place, there
appears to be a natural tendency – we remarked on it in Section 7.4 – to imitate
behaviours that we see in others. This tendency is variously explained by invoking the
procedural efficiency of descriptive social norms or aspects of social identity theory.
But social learning theory predicts that in addition to modelling our behaviour on the
behaviour of others, we also learn by observing the response of these models to given
behaviours. For example, if we observe someone experiencing pleasure from a
particular behaviour we will also tend to imitate that behaviour. These ‘vicarious’
experiences of other people’s behaviours and behavioural responses have as much
impact on our behavioural choices, according to social learning theory, as our own
direct experience.
Bandura evolved his theory of social learning through a famous series of experiments
on aggressive behaviours in children. Nursery-age school children witnessed an adult
in an adjacent room repeatedly hitting and knocking down a Bobo doll 29 with varying
degrees of aggression. The researchers compared the subsequent behaviour of these
children towards a similar doll with a control group who had not been exposed to the
models. They found that the children who had witnessed the aggression performed
similar aggressive acts, while the control group did not.
A variety of further experiments involving variations on the same format – using

different subject sets, different kinds of models and some of them using media images
rather than live models – have confirmed the social learning effect (Murray 2004).
Bandura’s work has proved most influential in debates about whether or not children
exposed to images of violence and aggression on the television exhibit violence
themselves. This learning effect is not always constant. It is not the only way that we
learn, and it depends in particular on the characteristics of the model and the
modelling situation. We learn most effectively from models who are attractive to or
influential for us, such as our parents (at certain ages), celebrities, people who are
successful or powerful, or people who are simply like we are. We do not learn purely
by imitation. Sometimes we learn by counter-example. We learn how not to behave
by observing the behaviours of ‘anti-role models’ – those from whom we would like
29
This is a type of doll with a wide semi-spherical base that rights itself when knocked over.
110
to dissociate ourselves – or by observing the negative consequences from other

people’s behaviours.
Modelling appears to be a particularly successful strategy for learning physical

behaviours – involving routine practical actions 30 – and for assimilating social
behaviours. It is therefore, particularly relevant to many kinds of behaviours that are
encoded in ordinary everyday social practices. But social learning theory has also
been highly influential – and arguably effective – as the basis for new forms of
marketing and advertising.
The constraints faced by conventional advertising – in particular in relation to the

‘message density’ of the modern world – have led advertisers to attempt to develop
new kinds of communication strategies that attempt to ‘fly beneath the consumer’s
radar’ and influence their buying behaviours without the consumer being aware that
they are subject to persuasion. So-called stealth marketing – involving a variety of
creative strategies such as viral marketing, brand-pushing, and celebrity marketing –
(Kaikati and Kaikati 2004 eg) is often based heavily on the ideas of social learning
theory. Stealth marketing offers a whole new interpretation of Vance Packard’s
(1956) ‘hidden persuaders’ argument and raises equally difficult moral and ethical
issues. But its power is ample evidence for the effectiveness of social learning.
The potential applications of social learning theory for pro-environmental behaviours

are legion. We have already remarked on some of them in the course of earlier
discussions. Modelling plays a key role in the establishment and maintenance of
social norms for example (Sections 7 and 9). I learn and remember how, where and
when to put out the recycling as much from observations of those around me as by
information from the council. My identity-related buying behaviours (clothes, cars,
appliances eg) are influenced by those on whom my identity is modelled and by those
from whom I am hoping to distinguish myself.
The use of influential role models in encouraging and promoting sustainable

behaviours may be one of the applications of this kind of insight. Some have argued
explicitly that public section communication programmes should avail themselves
quite explicitly of the new social learning based techniques of stealth marketing, viral
marketing and so on (DEMOS 2003). The effectiveness of stealth techniques in the
service of pro-social messages is not yet proven. And there are also perhaps difficult
ethical issues about the use of such techniques in any situations. But it is clear that
sustainable consumption policies can at least learn something significant from these
kinds of approaches.
Perhaps most importantly of all, social learning theory highlights the critical role that
Government can play in providing leadership on sustainable consumption. While
Government departments may not be the most obviously influential ‘role models’ for
consumers there are a number of reasons why the starting point for effective
behavioural change policy should be the example of government.
30
Modeling is widely used as a practical learning technique in sports science, for example.
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In the first place, a failure to exemplify the behavioural changes that policy wishes to
see will significantly undermine any information and persuasion campaigns in which
the government attempts to engage. In the second place, the example of successful
internal procurement and environmental management programmes sends a strong
signal to both businesses and consumers both about what is possible, and that
government is serious about achieving what is possible. Finally, of course, such
initiatives provide invaluable ‘learning grounds’, in which the difficulties of achieving
sustainable procurement or other forms of pro-environmental change can be
rigorously explored and overcome.
In summary, the key lesson from theory and the related empirical evidence base is that
social learning is a powerful avenue of behavioural change. And this has been
demonstrated empirically for a wide range of different behaviours in a wide range of
different circumstances.
11.4 Control, Helplessness and Participatory Problem Solving

One of the many paradoxes that haunt the debates on behavioural change is that more
information is not always better. Just because I supply you with more and more
reasons why you should reduce the use of your car and change to public transport
instead, does not in itself make it any easier or indeed more likely that you will make
such a change. In fact there are several reasons why my misguided attempt at
persuasion may make it even harder for you. Amongst these is the fact that by and
large people like to feel in control of their lives and resist feelings of helplessness.
My attempts to impose more information on your already crowded life may simply
reinforce your sense of helplessness about the situation.
Kaplan and Kaplan (1989) identified three evolutionary insights into the information
processing and problem-solving propensities of human beings. They concluded that
people are motivated:
• to know and understand what is going on: they hate being disoriented or
confused;
• to learn, discover and explore: they prefer acquiring information at their own
pace and answering their own questions;
• to participate and play a role in what is going on around them: they hate
feeling incompetent or helpless.
Kaplan (2000) uses this ‘reasonable person’ model of human motivation to suggest
that helplessness is a ‘pivotal issue’ in understanding consumer behaviour and
responding to it. Perhaps perversely, the provision of information does not necessarily
either increase control or reduce helplessness. Sometimes it has precisely the opposite
effect. For example, a study by Research International (Levin 1993) investigated the
reaction to increasing levels of information about environmental problems. It
concluded that more information led to greater concern, but paradoxically also to
greater helplessness.
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A later study by the NGO Public Agenda (Donn 1999) attributed a recent decline in
concern about environmental issues, not to apathy but to an increasing sense of
helplessness and futility on the part of individual citizens. These conclusions draw
clear conceptual support from the importance of the ‘perceived behaviour control’
construct in the theory of planned behaviour (Section 6.3). They are also supported
by a recent study showing that people who feel that their behaviour would not make
any difference are less likely to participate in environmentally responsible behaviours
(Allen and Ferrand 1999).
Kaplan (2000) proposes that the general solution to this kind of problem is to develop
a participatory problem solving to encouraging sustainable behaviours. ‘Rather than
telling people what they must do or do without,’ he argues, ‘the proposed approach
provides people with an opportunity to figure out for themselves how various broadly
defined goals can be met.’ Kaplan makes a distinction between three different
understandings of behavioural change: 1) telling people what to do, 2) asking them
what they want to do and 3) helping people understand the issues and inviting them to
explore possible solutions. Although the first is often used and the second has been
regarded as one way of increasing participation in government decision, it is the third
understanding that lies behind the participatory problem-solving approach that Kaplan
proposes.
A somewhat similar suggestion was made in the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit’s recent
report on personal responsibility and behavioural change (Halpern et al 2003). The
authors of that report drew attention to the strategy of ‘co-production’, involving
partnerships between individuals, experts and the state in achieving health-related and
other public interest goals.
There is however a subtle but important distinction in emphasis between the Strategy
Unit approach and the participatory approach proposed by Kaplan. The former draws
attention to the role of personal responsibility for behavioural change. It is embedded
largely in the liberal paradigm of individual choice, and its prescriptions are (either
intentionally or unintentionally) complicit with the general assumption of reducing the
role of the state in matters assumed to be about personal choice. The danger inherent
in the co-production model is, therefore, that the state is seen as ‘opting out’ of its
own responsibility for key public interest objectives. At the same time, there is an
implicit assumption that this will ‘save’ money for the state, giving the impression
that economic efficiency is the main driver for the co-production model, rather than
effectiveness of change, and leaving people exposed to the impression that
government wishes to do less rather than more to reach public goals.
Kaplan’s approach by contrast recognises the need for the state to support and guide
the process of participatory problem-solving. Citing evidence that people in groups
prefer to work with experts than on their own (Wandersman 1979) he argues that this
approach relies explicitly on expertise from governments, corporate and non-profit
organisations, and must be supported by appropriate infrastructures and institutions.
Participatory problem-solving is not a recipe for hands-off or ‘hollowed out’
government.
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As we shall see in the next section however, the participatory flavour of these
approaches draws support from a wide variety of other perspectives on behavioural
change.
11.5 Breaking ‘Bad’ Habits

We have been drawn at various stages of this review to the critical role of habit and
routine behaviours. Habits can be thought of as procedural strategies designed to
reduce the cognitive effort associated with making choices, particularly in situations
that are relatively stable. They allow us to perform routine actions with a minimum of
deliberation and often only limited awareness. Moreover, the evidence suggests that
habit is a crucial component in a wide variety of environmentally-significant
activities: travel behaviour, shopping patterns, household chores, waste disposal,
leisure activities, and even personal hygiene.
Habits are formed through repetition and reinforcement. Andersen (1982) identifies
three stages in the formation of a new habit. The first stage, or declarative stage,
involves information processing relating to a particular choice or action. For
example, I may be exposed to information regarding a particular brand of ethically
traded coffee. At this stage my attitudinal and affective responses to this information
are both important. The information challenges my existing choice, but at this stage
does not actually change my coffee-buying behaviour. In the second knowledge
compilation stage, however, I convert this information into a new routine by
exercising a different choice in practice.
In keeping with social learning theory, the successful performance of a particular

action or behaviour reinforces subsequent performances of the same action. I am
happy with the taste of the new coffee and its ethical sourcing offers an additional
satisfaction. When the action itself is associated with a clear positive reinforcement,
and repeated over time, a ‘cognitive script’ is developed which enables me to repeat
the same action in similar circumstances with very little cognitive effort. This final
procedural stage locks me into a new coffee-buying habit and virtually without
thinking now I toss the ethically traded coffee into my supermarket trolley week after
week. At this stage, my behaviour is more or less automatised and bypasses rational
deliberation almost completely.
The strength of the habit is generally taken to be determined by two factors (Jager
2003). Firstly, it is stronger the more often the action is repeated (Jager 2003). Thus,
it is harder to break my coffee buying habit (which is repeated on a weekly basis) than
it is to break my habit of going to the Isle of Wight on holiday, which only happens
once every year (if I am lucky). The second factor involved in the force of habit is the
strength and frequency of the (positive) reinforcement that I receive and its proximity
to the behaviour in question.
But here there is an additional complication. As we have already noted, habitual

actions work for as long as the situation remains stable. But in certain cases, it
becomes clear that particular habits are not in our long-term best interests. Or else
conflict directly with social norms or expectations. In this case, short-term
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reinforcements are traded off against long- (and short-) term disadvantages, and it is
not clear in any given situation which will prevail. If the new information (an
awareness of long-term disadvantage say) is sufficiently disconcerting, cognitive
dissonance may encourage me to change my behaviour. On the other hand, if the
reinforcement from the behaviour is particularly strong, I may choose another strategy
for avoiding cognitive dissonance – for instance readjusting my long-term goals –
rather than change the habit of a lifetime.
What is clear – both from the literature and from most people’s personal experience –
is that counter-intentional habits are exceedingly hard to break (Verplanken and Faes
1999). Routine behaviour is, in many case, extremely hard to change. And since
many environmentally significant behaviours are embedded in social practices
(Section 10.1), this makes the prospect of encouraging pro-environmental behaviour
change particularly daunting for policy- makers.
Nonetheless, there is a remarkably consistent set of theoretical and empirical

understandings about behavioural change which does provide some insights into
changing ‘bad’ environmental habits and offer some hope to policy- makers
attempting to support this.
The basic consensus arising from these different perspectives (Figure 19) is that
behavioural change involves the ‘unfreezing’ of existing behavioural patterns and the
discursive elaboration of new and preferable alternatives, before these become the
basis of new behavioural patterns. The roots of this view are to be found in Kurt
Lewin’s influential change theory.
Practical Discursive Practical

consciousness consciousness consciousness
Spaargaren and van Vliet 2000
Freezing Unfreezing Refreezing
Lewin’s Change Theory
Awareness of Consideration of Evaluating of

Old habit New habit
need to change alternatives new behaviour
Dahlstrand and Biel 1997
Figure 19: Breaking Bad Habits: some conceptual perspectives
An influential figure in social psychology, 31 Lewin suggested that behavioural change

involves examining and challenging accepted beliefs and belief systems before
different behaviours can be identified and incorporated into new patterns and routines.
Crucially, since many behaviours and practices evolve from social norms and as a
31
Many of the existing integrative theories of human action owe something to Kurt Lewin’s ‘field
theory’ – see Table 1.
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result of social expectations, Lewin argued that this process of ‘unfreezing’ existing
behaviour patterns needs to take place in a group environment and to involve open
and supportive communication amongst those involved in negotiating the change.
A not-dissimilar model of behaviour change has been proposed within sociology,

where, as we have seen (Sections 2 and 9), recent work highlights the fact that people
often find themselves locked into particular behavioural patterns over which they
appear to have little or no individual control. Individual behaviours are constrained
by social practices and rest largely in what Giddens called practical consciousness.
Spaargaren and van Vliet (2000) have used this framing of social practices to suggest
that pro-environmental behavioural change needs to occur by raising specific
behaviours from the level of ‘practical consciousness’ to ‘discursive consciousness’.
Once again, this discursive process is seen as involving a social exploration of new
alternatives at the group or community level. The psychological process of habit
formation and change developed by Dahlstrand and Biel (1997) echoes a similar
sequence of processes.
This model of discursive social change not only offers the advantage of tackling
entrenched routine and habitual behaviours; it also presents a way of overcoming the
‘lock- in’ associated with descriptive social norms and it draws support from other
conceptual viewpoints such as social learning theory (11.3). It also clearly resonates
with the model of ‘discursive elaboration’ that lies at the heart of key social symbolic
processes such as meaning negotiation and identity construction (Section 9.2).
Perhaps more importantly, it appears to be well-supported by empirical evidence. For

instance, the conceptual model of discursive social change forms the intellectual basis
for Global Action Plan’s ‘Action at Home’ programme (Burgess 2003) which has
been amongst the most successful of the attempts to encourage and support pro-
environmental behaviour changes at the household level. In fact, community-based
approaches to social change are becoming an increasingly important part of the
landscape of sustainable development, as Table 2 illustrates for the energy sector.
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Table 2: Community-Based Initiatives Promoting Sustainable Energy

Consumption
Name Description Location

Awel Aman Tawe Community energy project which supports and promotes Wales
community renewable energy projects and offers advice on
energy efficiency to local residents.
http://www.awelamantawe.org.uk
Bedzed The UK’s largest ‘carbon neutral’ eco-village. Initiated by Beddington,
BioRegional, Bedzed provides 100 sustainable, low-energy UK
living for around residents.
http://www.bioregional.com/
The BioEnergy Village Pioneering project to convert the entire heat and electricity Göttingen,
supply of a village of 800 people in Lower Saxony to Germany
biomass.
http://www.bioenergiedorf.de/index_e.html
Community Energy A fund administered by the Energy Saving Trust offering UK
grants to develop community-based district heating or CHP
schemes – see below.
http://www.est.co.uk/communityenergy/
Environmental Action A scheme funded by the UK Department for the UK
Fund Environment Food and Rural Affairs; priorities for 2005-
2008 include community-based initiatives on sustainable
consumption.
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/eaf/
GAP EcoTeams Groups of households (usually 6-8) who, for 4 months, Nottingham
commit to monitoring their consumption habits with regard and SE
to waste, gas, electricity, water, transport and shopping and England
aim to make them more sustainable.
http://www.globalactionplan.org.uk
Harlock Hill Wind The UK’s first co-operatively owned wind energy project, Cumbria, UK
Farm constructed in 1997 and consisting of 5 500kW Wind World
turbines.
http://www.baywind.co.uk/pages/HHL.htm
Slateford Green A car-free, low-energy sustainable housing development Edinburgh
consisting of 120 mixed tenure units.
http://www.canmore-housing.org.uk/
Small Change A community project scheme run by Global Action Plan and East London,
aimed at helping primary school children and their families South West
to use energy more efficiently, eat more healthily and reduce England
waste & pollution.
http://www.globalactionplan.org.uk
Travel Smart A community-based programme that encourages people to Perth, Western
use alternatives to travelling in their private car. Australia
http://www.dpi.wa.gov.au/travelsmart/index.html
Way to Go Fosters safer, healthier travel alternatives for elementary and Vancouver,
middle school students. BC
http://www.waytogo.icbc.bc.ca/
Woking Borough A progressive local council strategy aiming to serve the local Woking, UK
Council community with community heating, combined heat and
power and renewable energy.
http://www.woking.gov.uk/html/climate/
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11.6 Community-Based Social Marketing

One recent attempt to use these kinds of insights to encourage pro-environmental
behavioural change is the emergence of community-based social marketing. 32 Social
marketing is an approach to policy design which begins with understanding the
barriers that people perceive when attempting to engage in a given activity.
Community-based social marketing merges this approach with a psychological
insights into the importance of social norms and community engagement in changing
behaviours. It is based around four consecutive steps:
• selecting behaviours and ident ifying barriers;

• designing a programme to overcome barriers to the selected behaviour;
• piloting the programme;
• evaluation.
The first step involves identifying a set of behaviours relevant to a particular

environmental goal. For example, in attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from the home we might identify a number of behaviours including: switching to low-
flow showerhead, turning out lights, installing additional insulation and so on. Rather
than attempting to promote all of these behaviours, the aim of the first step is to
identify the barriers that each such behaviour faces and then selecting a specific
behaviour to promote, based on three different criteria:
• what is the potential impact of the proposed behavioural change?

• what are the barriers specific to this behavioural change?
• what resources are required to overcome the barrier?
The idea of the first step is to identify behaviours where a change could have a
significant pro-environmental benefit, but where the barriers to change would not
demand under resource investments. One of the key issues here is whether the
behavioural change in question is a one-off behaviour (purchase of an energy efficient
appliance, for example) or involves shifting routine behaviours (such as turning off
lights. Generally speaking, as we have already remarked, effecting a lasting change in
habitual or routine behaviours is much more difficult than influencing one-off
behaviours.
The design stage must aim to construct a strategy which removes as many of the
barriers to the selected behaviour as possible within a limited allocation of resources.
It is in this stage, that the importance of social-psychological insights comes into play.
For example, community-based social marketing might draw on the use of a variety of
social-psychological devices in order to motivate change. For example, the use of
‘commitments’ to reinforce people’s intentions to engage in pro-environmental
behaviour, ‘prompts’ designed to increase the salience of behavioural norms and
remind people to behave in certain ways, and ‘signals’ to reinforce descriptive and
injunctive social norms, have all proved useful in reinforcing pro-environmental
32
See for example Kassirer & McKenzie-Mohr 1998, McKenzie -Mohr 1996 & 2000, McKenzie-
Mohr and Smith 1999, Peattie 1999, Peattie and Peattie 2004.
118
behaviours. The important aspect of the design stage is to target interventions very
specifically towards the identified barriers, drawing on social-psychological insights
into the nature of those barriers and the way in which people’s behaviours are
motivated and constrained in order to devise ways of overcoming the barriers and
promoting the desired behaviours.
A key element in successful social marketing strategies is an adequate piloting and

testing stage. In Section 1 we remarked on the peculiar difficulty associated with
establishing a robust evidence base for policy interventions aimed at behavioural
change. The sheer complexity of human behaviours and motivations makes it very
hard to predict with certainty what the impacts of policy interventions on people’s
behaviours are going to be. In this context, the ‘consumer-proofing’ of policy
mechanisms and social marketing strategies achieves an over-riding importance.
Typically, a small- scale pilot of community-based social marketing strategy is
rigorously tested and evaluated before proceeding to a wider implementation
programme.
Examples of successful community-based social marketing include a strategy to

promote household composting in Nova Scotia. This programme used a combination
of public commitments and visible signals to establish a strong community
composting norm. The evaluation stage revealed that around 80% of those originally
approached were found to be composting several months after the programme began.
In another experiment a community-based social marketing strategy was tested
against an information-only strategy in the context of lawn-watering. The social
marketing strategy was found to have reduced the watering of lawns by 54%, whereas
it increased by 15% over the same period in the information-only control group
(McKenzie-Mohr 2000).
The lesson from such examples is that the careful design of community-based social
marketing strategies can have a significant impact even on relatively intractable,
routine behaviours.
11.7 Summary Discussion

Shifting consumption patterns towards more sustainable behaviours relies on a robust
understanding not just of what motivates consumers, but also on how behavioural
change occurs, and how (if at all) it can be influenced by public sector interventions.
This section has illustrated that, in spite of the complexity of the issue, there are a
number of useful avenues for thinking about and facilitating change.
For example, the long pedigree of persuasion theory has some salutary lessons for
conventional public sector information campaigns. But it also provides useful
pointers to the design of effective social marketing and behaviour change
programmes. In addition, the section has highlighted once again the social-
embeddedness of consumer behaviours and behaviour change processes. Far from
suggesting that these processes are intractable to policy intervention however, the
evidence suggests that there clear and identifiable dynamics to these processes, and
that ways of influencing those dynamics do exist. The opportunities for community-
119
based social marketing, social learning, participatory problem-solving and the

discursive unfreezing of embedded, routine behaviours are all key areas for those
thinking about behavioural change.
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12 Policy Options and Opportunities
Policies to encourage pro-environmental behaviour have tended in the past to favour

two main avenues of intervention. The first avenue is information intensive. It
assumes that providing people with appropriate information about (eg) climate change
or air pollution will change their attitudes – and hence their behaviours in pro-
environmental or pro-social ways. The second perspective attempts to influence the
private economic costs and benefits associated with individual behaviours. In this
perspective, the aim of policies has been to propose a variety of taxes and incentive
schemes to encourage pro-environmental change.
Sadly, the evidence does not support optimism in relation to either of these
perspectives – at least by themselves. The history of information and advertising
campaigns to promote sustainable behavioural change is littered with failures (Geller
1981, Geller et al 1983, McKenzie-Mohr 2000). In one extreme case, a California
utility spent more money on advertising the benefits of home insulation than it would
have cost to install the insulation itself in the targeted homes (McKenzie-Mohr 2000).
The fiscal approach has also faced limited success in encouraging long-term pro-
environmental behaviour changes. Although there is evidence to suggest that price
differentials (for example) are sometimes successful in persuading people to shift
between different fuels, there is much less convincing evidence of the success of
economic strategies in improving energy efficiency overall or in shifting behaviours
more generally. Examples of pro-environmental interventions which offer both
private benefits to individual consumers are legion. Yet it is well known that people
still tend not to take up these options. A variety of different obstacles and barriers are
blamed for this (Jackson 1992, Sorrell et al 2000).
McKenzie-Mohr (2000) argues that the failure of such campaigns to foster sustainable
behaviours is partly the result of a failure to understand the sheer difficulty associated
with changing behaviours. As a review of the Residential Conservation Service – an
early energy conservation initiative in the US – once concluded, most such efforts
tend to overlook ‘the rich mixture of cultural practices, social interactions, and human
feelings that influence the behaviour of individuals, social groups and institutions’
(Stern and Aronson 1984).
The evidence reviewed in this report tends to support this view. The two conventional
avenues of intervention both flow from the rational choice model of human behaviour.
The limitations of this perspective were explored extensively in Part 2 of the report.
The failure of the rational choice model to account adequately for matters of habit,
moral behaviours, emotional and affective responses, cognitive limitations, the
importance of social norms and expectations and the social embeddedness of
individual behaviour has been extensively documented.
Attempts to account for these elements of consumer behaviour in social-psychological

and sociological models go some way towards understanding where, when and how
such factors become important in the context of sustainable consumption. But these
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theories paint a much more complex and in some ways intractable picture of
consumer behaviours. Evidence from learning and persuasion theories also underline
the complexity associated with pro-environmental behavioural change.
At one level, the lessons from all this are salutary. Looking at consumer behaviour
through a social and psychological lens reveals a complex and outwardly hostile
landscape that appears to defy conventional policy intervention. Consumer behaviours
and motivations are complex and deeply entrenched in conventions and institutions.
Social norms and expectations appear to follow their own evolutionary logics,
immune to individual control. Social learning is powerful but not particularly
malleable. Persuasion is confounded by the information density of modern society.
The rhetoric of consumer sovereignty is inaccurate and unhelpful here because it

regards choice as entirely individualistic and because it fails to unravel the social and
psychological influences on people’s behaviour. But short of mandating particular
behaviours and prohibiting others – an avenue that Government has been reluctant to
pursue – it is difficult at first sight to see what progress can be made in this intractable
terrain.
At the same time the urgency of addressing the task remains undiminished. In
particular, as the evidence in this review has illustrated, delving into this complex
terrain is essential if behaviour change initiatives are to address key ‘problem areas’ in
consumer behaviour. In particular sustainable consumption policies must find ways to
tackle the question of habit and routinisation on the one hand and the social
embeddedness of individual behaviours on the other.
So how should policy- makers go forward from this point? What options are
available to them for addressing these key issues? And what kind of framework
should we use to think about policy interventions, beyond the limited perspective of
rational choice?
These are all critical questions, and a full response to them is beyond the scope of this
review. However, in the following sections we set out, first, a broad historical
overview of the policy terrain and, second, a view of policy intervention which opens
out a range of new possibilities for thinking about the role of government in
promoting pro-environmental behaviour change and sustainable consumption.
12.1 Policy Options in Historical and Cultural Context

At its broadest level, the problem of motivating sustainable consumption – or of
encouraging pro-environmental changes – is a particular manifestation of an eternal
social issue. As Gardner and Stern (1996), Ophuls (1973, 1977), Daly and Cobb
(1989) and others have pointed out, it is essentially the problem of ensuring that
behaviours which threaten the well-being of the social group are discouraged and that
those which promote long-term well-being are encouraged. In one sense, it is quite
precisely the problem of societal governance, of coordinating individual behaviour for
the common good.
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Pointing to Plato’s Republic and other historical writings, Ophuls (1973) highlighted
the perennial nature of this issue. He also suggested that, from time immemorial, there
have only ever been a few basic methods – written about by philosophers and
employed by societies - for achieving this. Specifically, the four ‘solution types’ are
(Gardner and Stern 1996, 27):
1. government laws, regulations and incentives;

2. programmes of education to change people’s attitudes;
3. small group/community management; and
4. moral, religious and/or ethical appeals.
Different societies and different writers at different times have tended to favour
specific options or combinations of options. Hobbes, for example, championed the
first approach, while Rousseau favoured the third. As we have already noted,
conventional policy prescriptions in our society tend to favour the first two options.
Or, to be more precise, we tend to favour a specific configuration of the first two
solutions, one in which the balance of government intervention is focused on fiscal
incentives designed to internalise social and environmental externalities and
information is provided to ensure that people make informed or ‘rational’ individual
choices.
What is interesting is the existence of clearly defined and well-recognised solution

types which are not particularly evident in the current policy mix – namely options 3
and 4. Quite why this should be the case is slightly puzzling at first. Some insights
into the ascendancy or otherwise of specific solution types can, however, be gained
from the understandings of cultural theory (Section 9.6).
Cultural theory suggests four distinct forms of social organisation, with associated
‘cultural types’ and related assumptions about the appropriate form of governance.
Modern societies can best be categorised within this framework as low group, low-
grid societies, ie lying in the lower left hand quadrant of Figure 11. The guiding
principles for social organisation in such societies favour the rights of the individual
over the rights of the group and place a premium on social mobility. Governance is
‘light’ in this cultural worldview. Competition, open access to markets, and equality
of opportunity are all prized. Regulation, hierarchy and social insulations are
eschewed. This is the entrepreneurial, individualistic society. And its models of
governance are precisely those that conform to the particular combination of the first
two solution types.
Though cultural theory does not exactly explain how we came to be such a society, it
does do two things. Firstly, it highlights that this form of social organisation is only
one of a number of possible different forms. Secondly, it suggests that since the
world is inhabited by a variety of cultural types, a single over-riding form of social
organisation is never likely to be entirely successful.
From the perspective of this review, we might also offer here another cultural
theoretic hypothesis. Namely, that the forms of governance familiar to the
individualistic/entrepreneurial society are never, by themselves, going to be sufficient
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to achieve the kind of behavioural change demanded by sustainable development.

The complexity of human behaviour and the enormity of the challenge of achieving
pro-environmental behavioural change mean that we can no longer afford to restrict
policy options to the particular combination of solution types conventionally
attributed to low-group, low-grid societies. Thinking outside the familiar policy
options is going to be vital.
So how much could be learned from the relatively unused or underused options for
managing the common good? This must remain a slightly open question for the
moment. And yet, there are clear opportunities for exploring these possibilities
further.
The decline of religious authority and the rise of moral relativism in the modern age
appear, at one level, to rule out the possibility that the fourth solution type can offer
anything productive to sustainable consumption policy. At the same time, of course,
every society retains moral and ethical codes of some kind, and our society is no
different. We accept the right to life and health. We condemn those who infringe the
rights of others in these respects. Typ ically, therefore, and in spite of the rhetoric of
consumer sovereignty, there remains an ethical basis for restraining individual
freedoms where these are seen to undermine or compromise the common good or the
well-being of others.
What determines the viability of policy interventions on moral or ethical grounds is

often the strength or resonance of an appropriate ‘moral conversation’ associated with
particular freedoms or choices. Is there a public debate over a specific moral issue?
Does it resonate at all in the public consciousness? Are people concerned about
environmental damage, resource scarcity, the exploitation of others, infringements of
the rights of the less fortunate? Evidence suggests that in general terms they do
express such concerns. It also suggests that they express these concerns in varying
degrees in relation to a wide variety of different issues.
In the last two decades, for example, issues as varied as smoking in public places,
drink-driving, the rights of animals, labour rights in developing countries, the side-
effects of immunisation, the rights of the embryo, the behaviour of multi- nationals,
and the risks associated with genetically modified organisms have all become the
subject of very heated ‘moral conversations’. Understanding and responding to these
conversations is clearly a part of the challenge of Government. But the potential also
exists, and is occasionally exploited, for Government to take a more active role in
stimulating, facilitating or initiating such conversations.
The option that stands out perhaps most obviously as lying outside the conventional
policy menu is the third: small group or community management. Gardner and Stern
(1996, 150) call this solution type the ‘forgotten strategy’. They illustrate the form of
communal management by citing two examples, one relating to grazing rights in the
Swiss alpine village of Törbel and the other amongst crab fishermen in Maine. In both
examples, common resources are managed effectively over long periods of time (five
centuries in the case of Törbel) by the emergence and adoption of strong group rules
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and norms. Elinor Ostrom (1990) illustrated a range of similar strategies for
governing the commons.
Successful community management initiatives have several characteristics, according

to Gardner and Stern (Table 3). Firstly, local control of the resource in question has
to be achievable – there must be definable boundaries of control, changes in the
resource must be locally monitorable and the rights of local control must be
recognised by higher- level authorities. Secondly, the local community must be
sufficiently dependent on the local resource that there is an incentive for self-
regulation. The existence and strength of the local community is a key issue in
successful community management. Finally, group management depends on
‘appropriate’ rules and procedures. In particular, the selection and modification of
such rules must be a participatory process.
Table 3: Conditions Conducive to Successful Community Resource Management

(adapted from Table 6.1, p130 in Gardner and Stern 1996)
1. Resource is controllable locally
a. definable boundaries
b. resources stay within their boundaries
c. local management rules are recognised
d. changes in the resource base can be monitored
2. Local Resource Dependence
a. perceptible threat of resource depletion or degradation
b. difficulty of finding substitutes for local resources
c. difficulty or expense attached to leaving the area
3. Presence of community
a. stable, usually small population
b. ‘thick’ network of social interactions (weak grid)
c. strong shared norms, especially in upholding agreements
d. sufficient local knowledge to devise fair and effective rules
4. Appropriate rules and procedures
a. participatory selection and modification of rules
b. group control of monitoring and enforcement processes
c. rules emphasis exclusion of outsiders, restraint of insiders
d. congruence of rules and resources
e. in-built incentives for compliance
f. graduated, easy-to-administer sanctions and penalties for non-
compliance.
In organisational terms, according to Gardner and Stern (1996, 135) what makes
community management systems work is a combination of participatory decision-
making, monitoring, social norms and community sanctions. The psychological basis
of group management draws heavily on some of the social psychological theories
reviewed in this report. In particular, the importance of social norms and expectations
as an influence on individual behaviour is clearly visible here. In addition, the
internalisation of those norms through social learning and the emergence of a social
identity are key to the success of such systems.
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Even though community schemes do include sanctions and penalties for non-
compliance, these are not, according to Gardner and Stern, the most important
element in ensuring compliance. Rather, the effectiveness of group management
comes from the internalisation of the group’s interest by individuals in the group. The
authors suggest that there are several reasons why people internalise group norms. In
the first place, they have participated in creating them. In the second place, they can
see the value of these norms for themselves in preserving and protecting the interests
of the local community and themselves as members of that community.
In addition, these group norms become a part of the shared meaning of the
community, and contribute to the social well-being of the group, not just through the
protection of resources, but through the development of trust, collaboration and social
cohesion. Sanctions may be necessary to protect the group from those tempted to
violate the collective good for individual interests, but the main reason people accept
and act on social norms is that doing so cements social relations, signals membership
of the group, and contributes to a sense of shared meaning in their lives.
Clearly, the conditions for successful group or community management identified in

Table 3 do not always hold. There are two principal difficulties that we could point
to. The first is that many of the environmental issues that we would wish to tackle do
not have the characteristic of local resource scarcity issues typical of successful
community management strategies. Problems such as climate change and ozone
depletion are inherently global. Moreover, the distancing of environmental impacts
from behaviours through trade specialisation and economic inequality substantially
reduce the incentive for engaging in community management.
It might, in principle, be possible to mitigate the severity of this limitation in various

ways. For example, encouraging energy sufficiency or renewable energy targets at
the regional or local level increases the incentive for community engagement in local
resource management. The negotiation of carbon quota systems at the local or
community level may also contribute to the development of this kind of group norm.
At the very least, an understanding of the power of group norms and processes could
be employed in developing community change initiatives such as those exemplified
by Global Action Plan’s ‘Action at Home’ initiative, the Quakers’ ‘Living Witness’
project, the Church of England’s ‘eco-congregations’ and others (Burgess 2003,
Church and Elster 2002, Jackson and Michaelis 2003, Michaelis 2002).
The second major obstacle is that social trends appear to be undermining the social
conditions for community management. At one level, community management is a
form of social organisation. Gardner and Stern suggest that it represented the norm in
social organisation throughout much of human history, exemplified in nomadic tribes,
agricultural villages, fishing communities and small rural towns. For this reason, they
claim, it retains an intuitive appeal for most people, even today.
Others have suggested that that this is an over-romanticised view of a particular form
of social organisation, and that earlier societies were more usually highly stratified,
hierarchical and feudal in nature (Douglas and Isherwood 1979, eg). Small
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community life can sometimes, as Gardner and Stern also recognise, be bourgeois,
backward, intellectually sterile and socially repressive.
Whatever the pros and cons of small communities, it is clear that as a form of social
organisation they are far less common today than a hundred, fifty, or even twenty- five
years ago. Powerful social and economic forces have intensified trade, eroded
community boundaries, distanced cause from effect, and undermined some of the
basis for local governance. These trends have been supported by ideological
transitions that prioritise social mobility, the globalisation of commerce and culture,
and uniformity of political form. From a cultural theory perspective, community
management belongs in a completely different quadrant (specifically the lower right –
and to some extent the upper right side of Figure 11) from the entrepreneurial,
individualistic cultural form that characterises modern society.
In the final analysis, Gardner and Stern (1996, 31) argue, no single solution type, on
its own, is likely to be effective in delivering pro-environmental behaviour change.
Effective policies for motivating sustainable consumption are going to need to draw
creatively on all four perspectives. They will need to explore the untapped potential
for governance within each perspective. Given the critical importance of social
processes in consumer behaviour, alluded to over and again in the evidence base
reviewed in this paper, the scope for exploring the ‘forgotten strategy’ from amongst
Gardner and Stern’s solution types – namely community management – should be
given serious consideration.
12.2 Policy Opportunities in Social and Institutional Context

The literature reviewed in Part 2 of this report was structured around a critique of the
rational choice model of human behaviour. In the previous subsection, we saw how
this model of behaviour both supports and is supported by a particular model of
governance. If humans behave according to the rational choice model, then the
appropriate forms of government are those which ensure that people have adequate
information on which to base their decisions and that private costs reflect social
externalities.
The limitations of the rational choice model, by the same token, point to limitations of
the entrepreneurial- individualist form of governance. But the failings of the
conventional model cannot be taken as evidence that human beings are unconcerned
by economic costs and benefits, that they are unmotivated by selfish concerns, or that
they do not engage in rational deliberations.
On the contrary, the evidence on pro-environmental behaviour suggests that cost (and
its time equivalent personal effort) is a primary issue for respondents in surveys on
recycling, organic food, public transportation and a number of other key areas of
environmental concern. Likewise low awareness, inadequacy of information and lack
of knowledge are cited over and again as obstacles to the uptake of recycling schemes,
composting, ethical purchasing and so on (NCC 2003, WCC 2004 & 2003, RRF 2004
& 2002).
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Thus, the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence in this report is not that fiscal
incentives and information campaigns are irrelevant or inappropriate as policy options
to facilitate pro-environmental behaviour change. People are sometimes self-
interested. They do make economic decisions. Their choices are swayed by cost.
Adjusting prices to incorporate negative or positive externalities is therefore a
legitimate avenue through which to promote pro-environmental or pro-social
behaviour and to discourage anti-social or environmentally damaging behaviour.
Providing accessible and appropriate information to facilitate pro-environmental
choice is also a key avenue for policy.
But the evidence reviewed here does suggest very strongly that these measures are
insufficient on their own to facilitate pro-environmental behaviour change of the kind
and scale required to meet existing environmental challenges. And as such, this
evidence base provides a critique of the model of governance in which the role of
policy is confined mainly to providing information and internalising externalities. In
the language of cultural theory, the individualistic/entrepreneurial cultural form is
insufficient to deliver sustainable consumption. It simply fails to reflect the
complexity and social nature of human behaviours.
There is also evidence that this model of governance is nothing more than an ‘ideal
form’, supported by a set of rather unrealistic assumptions about human behaviour
and the role of the state. In a sense, the ‘hands off’ rhetoric of modern governance is
nothing more than an ideological discourse. The reality is that policy intervenes
continually in people’s behaviour. Specifically, it intervenes directly – through taxes,
incentives and the regulatory framework. More importantly, it intervenes indirectly
through its extensive influence over the social and institutional context within which
individual behaviours are negotiated.
This view of the state – as a continual mediator and ‘co-creator’ of the social and
institutional context – opens out a range of vital avenues for policy intervention in
pursuit of behavioural change. The complex terrain of human behaviour, as viewed in
a social, psychological and cultural context, is not a place devoid of possibilities for
state influence. Rather it is one in which there are numerous possibilities at multiple
levels for motivating pro-environmental behaviours and encouraging sustainable
consumption. In the following paragraphs, we outline some of these possibilities very
briefly:
Facilitating Conditions
Time and again, the evidence suggests that external situational factors (also referred to
in Section 10 as facilitating conditions, situational conditions or contextual factors)
are a key influence on the uptake of pro-environmental behaviours. Such conditions
include the provision of recycling facilities, access to energy efficient lights and
appliances, the availability of public transport services and so on. The adequacy of
such facilities and services, equality of access to them, and consistency in their
standards of operation are all vital ingredients in encouraging pro-environmental
choice. Inadequate or unequal access, insufficient information, incompatibilities
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between different services: all these factors are known to reduce the effectiveness and
uptake of pro-environmental behaviours.
Institutional Context
At a broader level, the set of rules, regulations and operating conditions – defining the
context within which choice is negotiated – is another key intermediary between
policy and public behaviour. For example, the market conditions – established by
Government – under which energy supplies are generated, distributed and supplied
has a profound impact on the kinds of energy generatio n that are preferred and the
extent to which energy efficiency is or is not cost-effective for consumers. These
conditions could either foster or sabotage the viability of renewable energy, energy
efficiency, energy service companies and so on.
Government also has a vital role in negotiating the institutional context in which
business and consumers operate through the setting of legislation, regulations and
standards. In particular, it is clear that:
• product standards could make vital differences between durability and

obsolescence, between efficiency and waste, between recyclability and landfill;
• building standards could further improve or simply hinder the efficiency of the
UK building stock;
• trading standards might either foster or prevent excessive or addictive
consumption and play a key role in the success or failure of sustainable
consumption patterns;
• media standards play a vital role in influencing the wider social and cultural
context of consumer attitudes, motivations and desires (see below).
• marketing standards could either encourage or inhibit unscrupulous or
inappropriate selling, advertising and marketing practices;
This last area is worth commenting on in more detail. At one level, it is clear that
Government can, does and should intervene in the marketing of products or services
that are harmful, either to the individual or to others, or which impose costs on the
state. Cigarette advertising, for example, has long been subject to certain restrictions
in this respect. But there are much further reaching conclusions to be drawn from the
evidence in this review.
In Section 9 we pointed to the key role played by symbolic resources, both in the
social construction of identity and in the negotiation of shared meanings. As Figure 9
illustrates, these symbolic resources provide a vital link in social identification
processes. But a crucial question arises here for sustainable consumption policy. Who
or what controls these symbolic resources? Do they lie within the control of the social
actors who make use of them? Do they lie within the remit of public policy
intervention? Are they subject to control by agents who seek to profit from their
influence on others?
To some extent, all three of these relations hold. The one that is potentially the most
problematic however, is the third. Control over the symbolic resources available for
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discursive elaboration of meanings lies mainly in the realm of the marketing strategies
of corporate actors. These actors have a vested interest in controlling such resources.
They also have a long and rather sophisticated experience in effecting this control to
their own best advantage.
The commercial nature of this relationship is particularly problematic where children

are concerned. From about the age of five onwards, social and developmental
psychology suggests that the social community within which discursive elaboration of
symbolic meanings occurs shifts gradually away from parental influence and towards
the peer group. And yet it is clear that – at least until the early teens – this peer group
lacks the critical faculties needed to resist, select or accommodate the complexities of
these messages. It is precisely for this reason that some Nordic countries have banned
advertising for those under 12, and why the UK National Family and Parenting
Institute has called for similar measures. 33
Moreover concern over the social control of symbolic resources is by no means

restricted to advertising targeted at children. Asymmetries of power and resources in
the relationship between advertisers and their target audience suggest the need for
much stronger public control of commercial media – extending at least as far as
exerting strong advertising standards, and possibly including restrictions on specific
marketing practices such as certain forms of stealth marketing (Section 11.3).
Social and Cultural Context

It should by now be clear that Government plays a significant role in the social and
cultural context within which consumers act. Nor is state influence simply confined to
regulation, information and tax setting. These activities are obviously important both
as direct and as indirect influences on consumer behaviour. But there is more at stake
here. A part of the indirect influence of State policy is symbolic. The evidence from
social anthropological theories (discussed in Section 9) suggests that people respond
quite explicitly to the symbolic meanings of things. Responses to Government
interventions and public policy messages are no different in this respect.
Government policies send important signals to consumers about institutional goals

and national priorities. They indicate in sometimes subtle but very powerful ways the
kinds of behaviours that are rewarded in society, the kinds of attitudes that are valued,
the goals and aspirations that are regarded as appropriate, what success means and the
worldview under which consumers are expected to act. Policy signals have a major
influence on social norms, ethical codes and cultural expectations.
33
A recent Ofcom report on the role of advertising in relation to childhood obesity accepts some of
these points. But it comes out against an outright ban on children’s TV advertising of food
products on the grounds that advertising is only one of the impacts on obesity, that it would hit both
‘good’ and ‘bad’ food advertising, and that it would reduce investment in commercial children’s
television and hence restrict viewing choice. The evidence reviewed in this report suggests that this
should not be regarded as the final word on advertising to children.
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In particular, the consistency or inconsistency of government actions can have a

profound effect on the success or viability of pro-environmental messages and
interventions. A good deal of ethnographic evidence on consumer behaviour suggests
that people mistrust and ignore pro-environmental exhortation if it appears
inconsistent with policy messages coming from elsewhere in Government, or is seen
to be at odds with the behaviour of central government, local authorities, private
companies and the behaviours of other key social actors (WCC 2004, NCC 2003 eg).
In short, it is not enough to expect that individuals can be exhorted to behave in
certain ways. Consumers are social beings, enmeshed in a complex institutional and
cultural logic. The architecture of this social logic plays a vital role in facilitating or
inhibiting what is socially possible. Government policy must be aware of its own role
in this context, and seek to act accordingly.
Business Practices
Consumers are also employees. As employees, people are immersed daily in a certain
set of behaviours, values and logics. In particular, they are exposed to a variety of
environmentally significant practices. Does the company behave in an
environmentally responsible manner? Do they recycle? Are their procurement
practices sustainable? Do they operate a sustainable transport policy? The answers to
these questions can have a significant influence on consumers – both as employees
and as householders.
In the first place, there is evidence to suggest that behaving in certain ways in one
context can have a knock-on effect in another context (Section 9). If I am encouraged
to recycle at work, it is more likely that I will attempt to recycle at home. This
spillover is thought to occur in two distinct ways. On the one hand, I gain a
familiarisation with the actual practice of recycling. I learn, for example, that wastes
can be separated, that quality grading of wastes is important and that appropriate
siting receptacles can facilitate sorting. On the other hand, I am encouraged to think of
myself in a particular way (Section 9.3) and this changed self-concept has an
influence on my domestic behaviour.
Sadly, the evidence appears to suggest that recycling at work is significantly less
common than recycling at home (KPMG 2004). This means not only that business
practices are less sustainable than they ought to be, but also that a unique opportunity
for influencing and supporting domestic behaviours is lost. There is even a danger
that failure to encourage pro-environmental behaviours at work can significantly
reduce the incentive for consumers to act responsibly at home. Through its influence
on business, Government policy can seek to redress this balance.
Community-Based Social Change

Throughout this review, we have highlighted the strength of the evidence base
concerning the social dimensions of consumer behaviour. Time and again, the
evidence points to the influence of social norms, expectations and identification
process on human behavio ur. These social processes can present significant
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impediments to pro-environmental consumer behaviour. But they can also be

powerful forces for pro-environmental and pro-social change.
In Section 9, we highlighted the discursive nature of social-symbolic processes.

Section 11 illustrated how a particular kind of elaborative social process is vital in
‘unfreezing’ habitual behaviours, and re- negotiating new social norms. In Section
12.1 we drew attention to the community management of social resources and role of
internalised group norms in promoting the common good. The evidence is
unequivocal that consumer behaviours are socially negotiated. Changing behaviour
cannot be conceived as the processes of encouraging change at the individual level;
pro-environmental behavioural change has to be a social process.
Government can play a key role in these processes: by recognising the importance of
social norms in behaviour change policies; by initiating, promoting and supporting
community- led initiatives for social change; by supporting the community
management of social resources; and by designing effective community-based social
marketing strategies.
Leading by Example
Finally, evidence suggests a clear role for Government in leading by example. Clear
environmental management initiatives and strong sustainable procurement
programmes in both the public sector and within public private partnerships can have
a robust influence on sustainable consumption in a variety of ways.
Firstly, of course, public sector expenditure contributes almost 40% of the national
income. Encouraging pro-environmental behaviour in the public sector is therefore a
far from trivial contribution to the UK’s environmental and social impact. Equally
importantly, however, the evidence surveyed in Section 11.3 suggests that
Government behaviour plays a strong functional and symbolic role in social learning
processes. Unsustainable public sector behaviour can undermine pro-environmental
information and awareness campaigns. But conversely. robust and successful
environmental management and procurement programmes send a strong signal to
businesses and consumers and demonstrate that the Government is serious about pro-
environmental change.
Finally, strong public sector leadership in sustainable consumption provides

invaluable learning grounds for policy about what is and is not possible, what is and is
not necessary, what is and is not achievable in terms of successful behavioural
change.
12. 3 Concluding Remarks

Changing behaviour is difficult. The evidence in this review is unequivocal in that
respect. Overcoming problems of consumer lock- in, unfreezing old habits and
forming new ones, understanding the complexity of the social logic in which
individual behaviours are embedded: all these are pre-requisites for successful
behaviour change initiatives.
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But in spite of all appearances this complex terrain is not intractable to policy
intervention. Policy already intervenes in human behaviour both directly and
indirectly in numerous ways. And as we have attempted to demonstrate in this final
chapter, a genuine understanding of the social and institutional context of consumer
action opens out a much more creative vista for policy innovation than has hitherto
been recognised. Expanding on these opportunities is the new challenge for
sustainable consumption policy.
In following up on these possibilities, Government can draw some clear guidance

from the evidence base. In the first place, leading by example is paramount.
Secondly, we have drawn attention to the limitations of the rational choice model.
Based on individual cognitive deliberation, this model is inadequate as a basis for
understanding and intervening in human behaviours for a number of reasons. In
particular it pays insufficient attention to the social norms and expectations that
govern human choice and to the habitual and routine nature of much human
behaviour. It also fails to recognise how consumers are locked into specific behaviour
patterns through institutional factors outside their control. By contrast, the evidence
suggests that discursive, elaborative processes are a vital element in behaviour change
– in particular in negotiating new social norms and ‘unfreezing’ habitual behaviours.
This shift from ‘deliberation’ to ‘elaboration’ as a working model of behavioural
change can be seen as a key message of this study.
Throughout this review we have attempted to relate understandings of behaviour and

behaviour change to the strength of the available evidence base. It is clear that this
evidence base is unequivocal in certain areas. In particular, the relevance of
facilitating conditions, the role of lock- in and the critical importance of the social and
cultural context emerge as key features of the debate. The role of community in
mediating and moderating individual behaviours is also clear. There are some strong
suggestions that participatory community-based processes could offer effective
avenues for exploring pro-environmental and pro-social behavioural cha nge. There
are even some examples of such initiatives which appear to have some success.
What is missing from this evidence base, at present, is unequivocal proof that
community-based initiatives can achieve the level of behavioural change necessary to
meet environmental and social objectives. There is simply not enough experience
across enough areas and covering all the relevant parameters to determine precisely
what form such initiatives should take, how they should be supported, what the best
relationship between community-based social change and Government is, how
relations between communities should be mediated, or what kinds of resources such
initiatives require for success.
In these circumstances, there is an evident need to proceed with care, to develop and
design pilot community-based schemes in a participatory fashion, to monitor the
impact of these schemes and to ‘consumer proof’ policy initiatives carefully over
time.
133
In the final analysis, the complexity of consumer behaviours should warn us against
simplistic prescriptions for change. Material goods and services are deeply embedded
in the cultural fabric of our lives. Through them we not only satisfy our needs and
desires, we also communicate with each other, and negotiate important social
relationships. Consumer goods are implicated in vital ‘social conversations’ about
identity, social cohesion and cultural meaning.
It is clear from this that behaviour change initiatives are going to encounter
considerable resistance unless and until it is possible to substitute for these important
functions of society in some other ways. In this context, motivating sustainable
consumption has to be as much about building supportive communities, promoting
inclusive societies, providing meaningful work, and encouraging purposeful lives as it
is about awareness raising, fiscal policy and persuasion.
This is not to suggest that Government should be faint- hearted in encouraging and
supporting pro-environmental behaviour. On the contrary, a robust effort is clearly
needed; and the evidence reviewed in this study offers a far more creative vista for
policy innovation than has hitherto been recognised.
134
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What topics are discussed in the document?

Motivating Sustainable Consumption

a review of evidence on consumer

a report to the Sustainable Development Research Network

Professor Tim Jackson

Abstract ......................................................................................................................... iii

PART 1: FRAMING THE DEBATE........................................................................ 1

1 Towards Sustainable Consumption Policy ............................................................ 3

2 Consumption: the vanguard of history? ................................................................. 9

PART 2: MODELS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR ........................................... 19

3 The Role of Models .............................................................................................. 21

5 Against Rational Choice ...................................................................................... 35

6 Adjusted Expectancy-Value Theory.................................................................... 43

6.3 The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) .................................................. 46

7 Moral and Normative Conduct ............................................................................ 51

8 The Matter of Habit .............................................................................................. 63

9 Sociality and Self ................................................................................................. 69

10 Integrative Theories of Consumer Behaviour .................................................. 89

PART 3: TOWARDS BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE ............................................ 103

11 Change, Persuasion and Learning.................................................................. 105

12 Policy Options and Opportunities .................................................................. 121

References .................................................................................................................. 135

Motivating Sustainable Consumption sets out to address these questions. It reviews

Changing behaviours – and in particular motivating more sustainable behaviours – is

In these circumstances, the rhetoric of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and ‘hands-off’

Part 1 Framing the Debate

1. Towards Evidence Based Policy

This report was commissioned by the Sustainable Development Research Network as

Policy development in the context of behavioural change is notoriously difficult. One

2. Consumption: the vanguard of history?

Part 2 Models of Consumer Behaviour

3. The Role of Models

A key aim of this report is to provide an overview of different models of consumer

• individual self- interest is the appropriate framework for understanding human

5. Against Rational Choice

Another problem is that affective (emotional) responses confound cognitive

6. Adjusted Expectancy Value Theories

Some social psychological models attempt to conceptualise human behaviour in a

Moreover, these behaviour changes could be valuable in changing people’s

7. Moral and Normative Conduct

Moral and normative considerations are inherent in any discussion of

The most well-known work on the moral dimensions of pro-environmental behaviours

8. The Matter of Habit

9. Sociality and Self

Many social-psychological models assume an individual approach to human

10. Integrative Theories of Consumer Behaviour

Some models of consumer behaviour focus on internal antecedents of behaviour such

Making sense of behaviour inevitably requires a multi-dimensional view which

• motivations, attitudes and values;

intentional or goal-oriented behaviours require elaboration in discursive

Part 3 Towards Behavioural Change

11. Change, Persuasion and Learning

Behavioural change is fast becoming the ‘holy grail’ of sustainable development

Persuasion is particularly difficult in a message-dense environment. In one extreme

• understanding the target audience;

12. Policy Options and Opportunities

It is clear that achieving pro-environmental behaviour change demands a more