134. Heirs of G. Bofill v. CA, G.R. No. 107930, October 7, 1994, Bellosillo, J.

Doctrine: Possession is not a definitive proof of ownership nor is non-possession inconsistent

Facts: An action for declaration of ownership over Lot No. 2954-A of the Panay Cadastre in
Panay, Capiz, was filed by petitioners against the Sps. Enrique and Flordeliza Begalan and Sps.
Jose and Bernardita Catalan. The heirs of Manuel Barredo claimed also to be the owners of the
lot in litigation. They filed a complaint in intervention against the petitioners heirs of Manuel Bofill.
On 12 August 1988, the trial court rendered a decision declaring petitioner the owners of the lot
in question and entitled to the possession thereof, ordering respondents as defendants therein to
vacate the premises, and to pay petitioners. The Trial Court ruled that the claim of the plaintiff-
intervenors and defendants over this land was a mere exchange of collateral(s) from Lot 526 to
Lot 2954-A for a loan of P450.00 obtained by Manuel Bofill. The said loan having been paid one
year thereafter, said deed of exchange as collateral for said loan was rendered without legal force
and effect, hence no entry in the title covering the lot was made regarding said loan, nor was the
title in the name of Manuel Bofill transferred to anybody else up to the present time. Respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Is there a transfer of ownership from petitioner to respondent when they exchange of
lots?

Ruling: No. The exchange of lots as used in the Casugot can refer to exchange of ownership, of
possession, of collaterals, or of any other attribute of ownership. Exchange of lands does not
necessarily refer to exchange of ownership. Besides, possession is not a definitive proof of
ownership, nor is non-possession inconsistent therewith. Hence, the claim that Barriatos was the
possessor of Lot 2954-A is not incompatible with Bofill's claim of ownership.

143. Republic v. Diaz, G.R. No. L- 36486, August 6, 1979, Melencio-Herrera, J.

Doctrine: A lessee who continues to stay on the premises after the expiration of the lease contract
is deemed a usurper, as such he become possessor in bad faith.

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines owns a parcel of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija.
The land was donated by Crisostomo to the Republic as it was stated in his last will. The then
Attorney General represented the Government was the administrator of the properties consisting
of commercial and residential lots as well as agricultural lands, however, the Auditor General ruled
that the properties should properly be administered by the Bureau of Lands. The administration
of Crisostomo Estate was then transferred to the Bureau of Lands.
On March 31, 1955, the then Director of Lands, Zoilo Castrillo, entered into a contract of
lease with defendant Heraclio D. Diaz over Lot No. 1467 of the Santa Rosa Cadastre. Portions of
Lot No. 1467 were cultivated by thirteen "helpers-tenants" of defendant. The tenants of Lot No.
1467, other landless farmers in the area and the Barrio Council of San Gregorio, Santa Rosa,
Nueva Ecija, had filed various petitions to allow them and other farmers of the barrio to lease Lot
No. 1467 directly from the Government. Before the expiration of his lease contract, defendant
gave notice that he was exercising his option to renew the lease contract for another period of ten
(10) years, and at the same time requested that he be given written permission to assign his
leasehold rights over said lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines as an additional guaranty
for payment of a loan intended for the purchase of farm implements.
The Governor of the Land Authority, Hon. Benjamin M. Gozon, sent a reply-letter to
defendant informing the latter that the Office could not agree to the latter's exercise of his alleged
option to renew the contract of lease over Lot No. 1467. The Governor of the Land Authority, Hon.
Conrado F. Estrella, requested defendant to vacate the premises. On February 21, 1969, the
Governor of the Land Authority entered into agricultural lease contracts with the actual occupants
of Lot No. 1467. On January 20, 1970, the Office of the Solicitor General lodged a Complaint for
recovery of possession against defendant in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The trial
court dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner. On July 31, 1970, plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that the case involves only a pure question of law that is,
the interpretation of the pertinent laws relative to the contract of lease executed by the Director of
Lands in favor of defendant.

Issue: Did the defendant become a usurper?

Ruling: Yes. It is obvious that the period of the lease contract, even as renewed, has hardly
expired on March 31, 1975. Since defendant is still occupying the subject premises it will have to
be held that defendant's occupancy thereof no longer finds any legal basis. He is a usurper and
he has no right to legitimately continue in the use and enjoyment of the premises. He has become
a possessor in bad faith. If the lessee continues enjoying the thing after the expiration of the
contract, over the lessor's objection, the former shall be subject to the responsibilities of a
possessor in bad faith.

152. Santiago v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-31919, March 24, 1930, J. Ostrand

Doctrine: In these circumstances, the defendant must suffer the consequences of her
lawlessness whether she is a part owner of the property or not.

Facts: After the death of Juan Dizon, a petition for the appointment of a special administrator was
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petition was opposed by Marta Dizon but her
opposition was overruled and Vicente Santiago, was appointed special administrator. Santiago
took possession of the property left by the deceased, including the house. Marta Dizon entered
the house and made it her abode, against the will of the plaintiff. Three days later, Cristina Cruz,
the herein defendant, also made the house her home on the invitation of Marta Dizon and
remained there notwithstanding the objections of the plaintiff. Santiago and other persons living
in the house were insulted and to prevent such action he placed padlocks on most of the doors
in the house. Santiago was authorized by the Court to employ deputy sheriffs at his own expense.
Marta Dizon died, but Cristina Cruz still insisted on living in the house. The plaintiff brought the
present action against her for forcible entry and detainer. The justice of the peace rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant and absolved her from the complaint. Upon appeal to the Court
of First Instance, that court rendered a judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the premises.

Issue: Does Marta have the right over the property.

Ruling: No. Santiago held possession of the house before Marta Dizon and the defendant took
possession. They acquired such possession by force and against the will of the plaintiff, taking
the law in their own hands. In these circumstances, the defendant must suffer the consequences
of her lawlessness whether she is a part owner of the property or not. The fact that she was invited
by Marta Dizon is immaterial; Marta had no greater right than the defendant.

161. Moralidad v. Pernes, G.R. No. 152809, August 3, 2006, J. Garcia

Doctrine: The owner of the property imposed as condition for the continuation of the usufruct
over the property by his kins that they should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in
harmony, and avoid bickering. There was a continuing animosity among the kins, hence, is a
ground for termination of the usufruct. The deterioration of the relations of the kins to an almost
irretrievable level is a good reason for the termination of the usufruct.

Facts: A parcel of land located in Davao City and registered in the name of petitioner Mercedes
Moralidad was the subject property in this case. Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the
purpose of letting Arlene move from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the
property to be also available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner
made known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986. Following her retirement
in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the respondents’ on the house they
build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations turned sour because members
of the Pernes family were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to change certain practices
concerning matters of health and sanitation within their compound. Due to the worsening relation
between petitioner and respondent, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful
detainer suit against the respondent spouses. In their defense, the respondents alleged having
entered the property in question, building their house thereon and maintaining the same as their
residence with petitioner’s full knowledge and express consent. The MTCC declared that the
respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis-à-vis the house they built on her property,
cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse for not complying with the demand to vacate.
Dissatisfied, the respondent spouses appealed to the RTC of Davao City. The RTC reversed that
of the MTCC, holding that respondents’ possession of the property in question was not, as ruled
by the latter court, by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her express consent. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Issue: Is the usufruct estinguished?

Ruling: Yes.
Under Article 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of
any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating,
and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. In the document it states "[T]hat anyone of my kins
may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the
same is not inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). In fine, the occurrence of any
of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of
harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express
wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
 From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts
and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by
the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely,
the document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents’ own evidence
before the MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost an
irretrievable level." There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints before
the local barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint
for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and harmoniously with
the Pernes family and vice versa. Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the
petitioner and the Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure,
despite her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct
as having been terminated.