Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 13–17

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Research & Social Science

Short communication

The pace of governed energy transitions: Agency, international

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The recent debate on the temporal dynamics of energy transitions is crucial since one of the main reasons
Received 29 June 2016 for embarking on transitions away from fossil fuels is tackling climate change. Long-drawn out transitions,
Received in revised form 19 July 2016 taking decades or even centuries as we have seen historically, are unlikely to help achieve climate change
Accepted 22 August 2016
mitigation targets. Therefore, the pace of energy transitions and whether they can be sped up is a key
Available online 6 September 2016
academic and policy question. Our argument is that while history is important in order to understand the
dynamics of transitions, the pace of historic transitions is only partly a good guide to the future. We agree
Keywords:
with Sovacool’s [1] argument that quicker transitions have happened in the past and may therefore also
Energy transitions
Pace
be possible in the future globally. The key reason for our optimism is that historic energy transitions have
Governance not been consciously governed, whereas today a wide variety of actors is engaged in active attempts to
Political will govern the transition towards low carbon energy systems. In addition, international innovation dynamics
Creative destruction can work in favour of speeding up the global low-carbon transition. Finally, the 2015 Paris agreement
Policy mix demonstrates a global commitment to move towards a low carbon economy for the first time, thereby
UNFCCC Paris agreement signalling the required political will to foster quick transitions and to overcome resistance, such as from
incumbents with sunk infrastructure investments.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction was the case for historical transitions, and elaborate these in the
subsequent sections: First, historical transitions have not been gov-
A recent thought-provoking paper by Sovacool [1] challenges erned, but were emergent processes as a result of new fuel sources
a ‘conventional truth’ in the field of transition studies: that tran- being discovered, new services becoming available, or by technolo-
sitions take at least 30–50 years [2,3], if not centuries as some gies reducing their relative cost (Fouquet, this issue). However, in
historical examples show [4]. By arguing that transitions can occur the ongoing low carbon transition, there is a wide variety of actors
much faster, Sovacool’s paper is stimulating a very welcome debate, engaged in active attempts to govern the transition towards low
since the urgency of climate change requires swift energy transi- carbon energy systems, including policy makers but also a variety
tions. Not surprisingly, much thinking over the last ten years has of other actors. Second, in an increasingly interconnected world,
therefore been about whether it is possible to speed up transitions national developments can much more easily influence the global
through means of policy as well as wider societal mobilisation [5]. economy, thereby creating dynamic feedback mechanisms which
In this short communication – despite sharing some of the criti- can work in favour of speeding up the global low-carbon transition.
cisms voiced in Grubler et al. (this issue) – we agree with Sovacool’s Finally, we argue that the global climate agreement struck at the
[1] argument that quicker transitions in certain circumstances have international climate conference in Paris in December 2015 seals
happened in the past and may therefore also be possible in the a global paradigm shift in thinking about limiting climate change
future globally. We offer three main reasons for the possibility of which has the potential to set in motion a significant acceleration
low-carbon transitions of the energy system occurring faster than of current decarbonisation trends.

∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: f.kern@sussex.ac.uk (F. Kern).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.08.016
2214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
14 F. Kern, K.S. Rogge / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 13–17

2. Enter agency: from emergent to governed energy innovations which have started to revolutionize markets (such as
transitions the electric mobility boom caused by Tesla in the US). In addi-
tion, new business models for ‘prosuming’ low-carbon energy are
While history is important in order to understand the dynamics being developed around the world, including for off-grid access
and patterns of transitions, we argue that the pace of historic transi- to electricity from solar PV on rooftops in developing countries,
tions is only partly a good guide to the future (also see contributions thereby serving multiple objectives. Also the financial sector has
by Fouquet and Bromley in this issue). One key difference between started to adjust to the new realities posed by climate change, an
historic energy transitions and the ongoing low carbon transition example being pension funds divesting from their fossil-fuel invest-
is that historic transitions have not been planned or governed but ments (e.g. the Norwegian state pension fund). A final example of
were emergent processes. Typically economic historians argue that the increasing engagement of the business sector with low car-
transitions were driven by the development of new energy sources bon energy solutions is the applications for patents in renewable
(e.g. the discovery of natural gas in the North Sea), the availabil- energy technologies which have increased significantly after 1997
ity of better energy services (such as electric lighting compared due to innovators’ expectations of future climate policies resulting
to using candles), or the decrease of relative costs compared to from the Kyoto Protocol [11]. This is promising as Fouquet (this
alternatives (e.g. coal heating instead of wood) ([4]; this issue). issue) argues that ‘markets might take the lead in certain sectors
In contrast, in the ongoing low carbon transition, there is a wide and services in the transition to low carbon energy sources’.
variety of actors currently engaged in active attempts to govern Actors from civil society are also working towards low carbon
the transition towards low carbon energy systems. Sovacool [1] energy transitions, actively pushing for ambitious action on climate
points to the important role played by public policy in several of his change. For example, there are initiatives like the carbon tracker,
examples and Grubler et al. (this issue) acknowledge the benefits a think tank in London, which attempts to focus attention on the
of well-coordinated public policies and institutions. Also Fouquet financial risks of investing in ultimately ‘unburnable carbon’ [12].
(this issue) points out that governments in specific instances have Also, large foundations, such as the Gates Foundation, have pledged
created the institutional setting to stimulate energy transitions to to invest in the development of low carbon solutions, thereby
low-polluting energy sources. We argue that important actors in providing additional impetus to public R&D funds for low carbon
governing energy transitions do not only include policy makers, innovation. An example of a grassroots movements is the interna-
but also businesses, such as clean tech companies or finance sec- tional spread of transition towns in which citizens contribute to
tor actors, as well as actors from civil society, such as grassroots the low-carbon transformation of their city [13]. This movement
initiatives or environmental groups. started in Totnes in the UK but now encompasses 1258 registered
Policymakers at international, national, regional and local lev- groups across several continents. In addition, a growing number
els have been trying to promote change towards low carbon energy of citizens and community cooperatives have acted as investors
around the world for years: whether this is in the form of incen- in renewable energy, thereby actively supporting the low carbon
tivising new nuclear power stations (such as in the UK), equipping transition and shifting power structures in the electricity sector,
fossil fuel power stations with carbon capture and storage (such as such as in the case of Germany [14]. This distributed ownership of
in Canada) or focussing on the deployment of renewables (such as renewable power generation technologies in Germany – in 2012
in Germany or Denmark). Also policies to increase the efficiency of the renewable power generation capacity of 73 GW was mainly
consumer products are key for transitions (e.g. Japan’s top runner owned by citizen and cooperatives (47%) as well as institutional
policy) [6]. Having recognized their future global market poten- and strategic investors (41%) while only 12% was owned by energy
tial, many countries are attempting to be pioneers in low carbon suppliers [15] – may partly help explain the continuously high
technologies, and support the establishment of domestic lead mar- public acceptance rates for Germany’s transition towards renew-
kets, such as for solar PV or onshore wind [7]. Another striking able energy: in 2016, 93% of respondents saw the Energiewende
example of a country having recognized the market potential for as an important or very important topic, and 55% thought it pro-
low carbon technologies is China whose 13th five year plan heav- gressed too slowly, despite 69% expecting rising energy costs [16].
ily emphasises innovation in low carbon and clean technologies. The maintenance of such high acceptance levels has been argued
This may not come as a big surprise, as China has already for sev- to become the main currency of low carbon transitions [17]; also
eral years been the largest investor in the deployment of renewable see Bromley, this issue).
energy technologies, with its investment in renewables exceeding We argue that taken together this level of activity of a vari-
$102.9 billion in 2015 (or 36% of the world total). But China is not ety of types of actors across a range of different governance levels,
alone. Developing countries altogether invested a total of $156 bil- has led to significant momentum behind the low carbon transition
lion which exceeded for the first time the investment in developed which is likely to accelerate the process and which is unprece-
economies ($130 billion) in 2015 [8]. In addition, the establishment dented compared to historical transitions. However, to recognize
of new public institutions such as the International Renewable this momentum it may be important to specifically investigate the
Energy Agency (IRENA) as a sister organisation to the International latest trends in energy statistics (e.g. the past 3–5 years rather than
Energy Agency (IEA), or the independent Climate Change Com- the averages over the last 15–20 years) and to interpret them within
mittee in the UK responsible for recommending carbon budgets, the context of broader socio-technical changes.
further underlines the multiple activities originating from public
sector actors. Finally, there is also much activity at the local level
with a growing number of cities pledging to become 100% renew- 3. Add international dynamics: from national to global
able energy powered or to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions energy transitions
by 80% by 2050, as set out in the Paris City Hall Declaration which
was signed by nearly 1000 majors of cities from five continents in Sovacool [1] and Smil (this issue) both are in agreement that
2015 [9]. under certain circumstances national energy transitions can be
Also businesses are acting on carbon. For example businesses fairly rapid, but Smil argues that global energy transitions nec-
started to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. under the essarily are prolonged and multidecadal processes. Also Grubler
Carbon Disclosure Project), commit themselves to internal carbon et al. (this issue) claim that change of entire technology systems
reduction targets (e.g. German electric utilities inspired by the EU is inevitably a lengthy process. We agree that historically this
2020 targets) [10], and are bringing forward radical low carbon has often been the case but also believe there is some cause for
 F. Kern, K.S. Rogge / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 13–17 15

optimism. While we agree that ‘no new technology is adopted resource endowments and starting points vary significantly across
instantaneously across all markets’ (Grubler et al., this issue), we countries, but also their institutional contexts matter for the way
would like to challenge the logic of inevitably slow diffusion via in which transitions unfold, both in terms of their pace and direc-
leader-follower patterns. Compared to many historical transitions, tion [14,20]. This diversity of pathways makes the conventional 50%
the world today is much more globalised, and the changes unfold- global penetration indicator for determining the pace of energy
ing in some parts of the world have important knock-on effects transitions meaningless, and there may be more suitable metrics
in other parts of the world which leads to a more speedy global to measure progress of the low carbon transition, e.g. based on
roll-out of low carbon technologies (after a prolonged ‘formative reductions in carbon intensity.
phase’). Such international dynamics and the trend towards more diver-
A good example of this dynamic is the international inter- sified energy systems make us optimistic that a faster global energy
play between solar PV deployment subsidies (mainly in Germany transition can happen not only in the area of renewable electricity
but also other European countries such as Spain) which triggered generation, but also for areas such e-mobility, smart grids, heat or
mass investment in solar module manufacturing capacity in China storage.
which significantly brought down solar module costs, thereby
accelerating the further diffusion of solar PV globally [18,19]. This
co-evolution means that solar PV is now on the verge of achieving 4. Crown with political will: from Kyoto to Paris, and the
grid parity in many parts of the world, that new business models road thereafter
are being enabled for off-grid regions struggling with energy access,
and that global investments in solar PV have increased massively. While some frontrunner countries such as Germany or the UK
Likewise, while today’s lead market for the roll-out of offshore wind have already made some progress in decarbonising their energy
power is the UK [20], its progress benefited from parallel and inter- system, we agree with Smil (this issue) that there is still a long
connected developments in a number of countries [21], such as way to go in globally replacing (or decarbonising) the use of fossil
early experimentation in Denmark and now catching-up activities fuels, in reducing energy demand and increasing energy efficiency
in Germany, another major player in this field [22,23]. A similar which need to be an essential part of the transition strategy. Fou-
dynamic was at play in the development of onshore wind with quet reminds us that many historical transitions ‘led to dramatically
Denmark originally leading the way, and now joined by turbine greater levels of energy consumption’ (this issue) which needs to
manufacturers from China, the US, Germany and Spain delivering be avoided in the ongoing transition given the scale of the chal-
the large majority of the global market which in 2015 was domi- lenge. Much progress made so far can be traced back to the Kyoto
nated by capacity additions in China (30.8 GW), in the US (8.6 GW), Protocol which was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005.
and in Germany (5.7 GW) [9]. Originally, these pioneering coun- However, given its limited ambition and coverage it may not come
tries (Germany, UK, and Denmark) may have largely pursued these as a big surprise that its impact from a global perspective has been
national energy transitions for their own domestic reasons but the limited, as the numbers presented by Smil (this issue) demonstrate.
wider effects they produced have been of an international nature. In contrast, the Paris Agreement struck in December 2015 for the
A second argument is that future energy systems might be first time represents a truly global commitment to the decarbonisa-
more diverse than in the past, partly to offset risks from intermit- tion of the global economy which is unprecedented in ambition and
tent renewables. As Smil (this issue) rightly argues there will be scope. The agreement is based on a polycentric, multi-stakeholder
a multitude of primary sources which means no single source or approach which can be seen as being in line with Ostrom’s sugges-
technology has to have a quick global penetration to more than tions for the successful management of a common pool resource
50% market share which so far has been used as a metric for [25].
global energy transitions. Energy uses are very diverse and include However, while Paris shows the political will of global leaders
transport, heating and electricity and there is no silver bullet tech- to unite in the fight of climate change, only the implementation of
nology to decarbonise all of these sectors. For example, Germany these targets through concrete policies – as indicated in the INDCs
has largely focused its past efforts on the transition of its electric- – will render them credible and impactful and thus ultimately lead
ity system away from nuclear power towards renewable energy to an acceleration of the global energy transition which is visible
and on a number of counts has been very successful in achieving in global energy statistics. In this regard, there are already several
its targets (e.g. expansion targets have been reached faster than signs that underline the seriousness of policy makers in putting
expected, and the share of renewable energy in electricity gen- the Paris agreement into practice, such as the ongoing elabora-
eration has increased from 6.5% in 2000 to 32.5% in 2015, with tion of ambitious climate change plans for 2050 (e.g. in Germany),
renewables covering between 9.9% and up to 83.2% of generation the commitment of global leaders to double public spending on
[24]). In contrast and for various reasons (including vested inter- clean energy innovation (mission innovation, also see Bromley,
ests and political resistance of incumbent actors), Germany has so this issue), the intention of countries such as China to introduce
far seen only limited progress on phasing out coal for electricity a national emission trading scheme, or discussions in Europe to
generation. As rightly alluded to by Smil (this issue), progress in increase the carbon price of the EU emissions trading scheme. These
other areas of the energy system has been slow as well, including are important policy initiatives which will drive the energy transi-
the decarbonisation of transport, for which political support has tion, and if designed well, may enable national commitments to be
remained fairly weak. However, given global carbon constraints further increased – within the foreseen institutional architecture
and international competition on the e-mobility market, German for ‘ratcheting up’ future commitments – to bring them in line with
policymakers have recently started to strengthen policy support for the ambitious target to limit global temperature increases to well
the decarbonisation of the transport sector (e.g. with incentives for below 2 ◦ C or even as little as 1.5 ◦ C [26].
purchasing electric vehicles). In addition to these initiatives, we would like to highlight the
It is important to acknowledge that while we talk about a global growing policy debates about phasing out subsidies for fossil fuels
transition towards low carbon energy, this will be the result of very or even prematurely retiring fossil fuel infrastructure and technolo-
diverse pathways followed in different countries which through gies. These debates suggest the existence of a firm political will to
their interconnectedness (e.g. through grids in the case of elec- accelerate the low carbon transition. There now is a growing num-
tricity, global technology learning and diffusion of policy models ber of countries which have committed to or started to negotiate a
like feed in tariffs) influence each other. Still, not only do natural coal phase out, despite heavy resistance from incumbents, includ-
16 F. Kern, K.S. Rogge / Energy Research & Social Science 22 (2016) 13–17

ing the Netherlands, the UK, China, or Ontario in Canada as pointed varying roles a variety of actors will need to play to make rapid tran-
out by Sovacool [1]. Based on historical studies of transitions, Fou- sitions happen. Fouquet (this issue) is right to remind us that the
quet (this issue) usefully points out that ‘transitions are just as ‘complex interaction of the choices actors will make and the forces
much about the decline of incumbent industries, as about the rise of that continue to be applied on markets, along with a little serendip-
new ones’. Also Bromley (this issue) describes transitions as ‘phase ity, will influence the existence, speed and nature of transitions to
out/phase in’ processes. As a consequence we contend that from a low carbon economies’.
public policy perspective, instead of only focussing on the develop- In this short communication, we have highlighted three main
ment of new low carbon technologies or practices, rapid transitions aspects – agency, international dynamics and the Paris Agreement –
also require the withdrawal of support for existing technologies and which make us optimistic about an acceleration of the global energy
infrastructures or even to disadvantage them compared to low car- transition towards low carbon. Since research can only fully appre-
bon alternatives [27]. For example, in the Netherlands there is an ciate in hindsight how quickly or slowly the low carbon transition
ongoing political discussion about whether the sale of all internal took place and what its key dynamics were, the argument about
combustion engine cars should be banned by 2025, and Norway the pace of ongoing energy transitions is mainly about reasonable
just declared to phase out the sale of all non-electric cars by 2025. assumptions about the future based on lessons from the past and
Such phase-out policies and other control policies increase the interpreting current trends adequately. This is where we disagree
attractiveness of investing in low carbon alternatives which in turn with Smil’s scepticism (this issue) which is portrayed as a ‘realistic’
stimulates further innovation and cost reductions. For example, appraisal which he contrasts with ‘some unrealistic expectations’
a survey of German manufacturers of renewable power genera- concerning the pace of future energy transitions. Since the future
tion technologies showed that the nuclear phase out decision in by definition is unknowable, we argue that such scepticism only
Germany by now is seen as an even more important driver for helps to legitimize the status quo and is therefore as political as
renewables than the Renewable Energy Sources Act [28]. These hoping the low carbon transition can occur in time to avoid the
examples show the increased political appetite for and relevance worst consequences of climate change.
of speeding up the low carbon transition by using instruments in Clearly, accelerating the decarbonisation of the global energy
the policy makers’ toolkit aimed at ‘creative destruction’ [27]. system is by no means a straightforward exercise but requires hard
Based on the historic Paris Agreement and early signs of national political work [32] as well as strong political commitment to fight-
implementation, we argue that a new paradigm has been estab- ing climate change. We argue that the Paris Agreement has ushered
lished which may fundamentally rearrange investment patterns in a new era in which decarbonisation and a focus on energy
in the global energy system [29]. This can already be seen in demand reduction and increasing energy efficiency will become
2015 numbers where for the first time global capacity additions the ‘new normal’, thereby leading to a new paradigm in thinking
in renewable electricity (53.6%) have surpassed those in conven- about governing energy transitions. We content that the global sig-
tional technologies, and global investment in renewables was more nal sent out by Paris has the potential to significantly accelerate the
than double the amount allocated to new coal and gas generation decarbonisation of the global energy system.
($265.8 billion compared to $130 billion) [30]. These latest figures
provide a further rationale to expect an acceleration of the low car- Acknowledgements
bon transition driven by expectations and changes in policy mixes
motivated by the global commitment evidenced in Paris. This article was enabled through funding by Research Councils
UK through their support for the Centre on Innovation and Energy
Demand (Grant no. EP/KO11790/1). Our work in the Centre focusses
5. Conclusion on transitions towards low energy, low carbon energy systems. This
funding is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank the editor for
Given the urgency and magnitude of the challenge of decar- useful comments on an earlier version of this short communication.
bonising the global energy system to address climate change, we
welcome the debate on the pace of energy transitions stimulated
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