December 27, 2023 HIR-23-11

Pickup Truck Centerline Crossover Collision

with Transit Van and Postcrash Fire
Andrews, Texas
March 15, 2022
About 8:17 p.m. central daylight time on March 15, 2022, a crash occurred between
a pickup truck and a van towing a trailer on Farm to Market (FM) Road 1788 in Andrews,
Andrews Country, Texas.1 A 2007 Dodge Ram 2500 pickup truck, traveling southbound,
crossed the centerline and collided nearly head-on with a northbound 2017 Ford Transit
350 van towing a 2019 Salvation trailer. The impact initiated a postcrash fire that consumed
the van and the pickup truck. Seven occupants of the van and two occupants of the pickup
truck died, and two van passengers were seriously injured.

Figure 1. The north view of FM 1788, showing the final rest positions of the involved
vehicles. (Source: Texas Department of Transportation, annotations added by NTSB)

1(a) In this report, all times are central daylight time. (b) Visit ntsb.gov to find additional information
in the public docket for this NTSB investigation (case no. HWY22MH006). Use the CAROL Query to
search safety recommendations and investigations.
Pickup Truck Centerline Crossover Collision with Transit Van and Postcrash Fire, Andrews, Texas HIR-23-11

Location Farm to Market Road 1788, near mile marker 10.547, Andrews,
Texas (see figure 2)
Date March 15, 2022
Time 8:17 p.m. central daylight time
Involved vehicles 2
Involved people 11
Injuries 9 fatal (pickup truck driver, pickup truck passenger, van driver, 6 van
passengers), 2 serious (2 van passengers)
Weather Dry, clear, and near nighttime (sunset was at 7:35 p.m.)
Roadway information Rural, two-lane undivided highway; 1 northbound and 1
southbound travel lane; straight, concrete pavement; no roadway
lighting at crash location

Figure 2. Map showing location of the crash.

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1. Factual Information

1.1 Background
On March 15, 2022, about 8:17 p.m., a 2007 Dodge Ram pickup truck crossed
the centerline of FM 1788 and struck nearly head-on a 2017 Ford Transit 350,
12-passenger van towing a 2019 Salvation trailer. The van was operated by the
University of the Southwest, located in Hobbs, New Mexico, and was occupied by a
26-year-old driver and 8 passengers. The van occupants were members of the
university’s golf team who had participated in a tournament in Midland, Texas,
earlier that day; the driver was the team’s coach. The pickup truck was occupied by
a 38-year-old driver and his son who was seated in the front passenger seat.
At the crash location, FM 1788 consists of a single travel lane in each direction,
separated by a dashed and a solid yellow line for southbound and northbound travel
lanes, respectively. The posted speed limit is 75 mph. At the time of the crash, the
roadway was dry and there were no environmental obstructions to the line of sight in
the area.

1.2 Event Sequence

NTSB investigators examined roadway documentation as well as vehicle
damage and interviewed witnesses to ascertain the crash sequence and the reason for
the pickup truck driver’s centerline crossover. The crash occurred in the northbound
travel lane. The roadway evidence at this location showed a large area of burnt asphalt
encompassing the northbound lane and its shoulder. The roadway evidence included
road gouge marks, metal scrapes, fluid stains, and dirt furrows.
Investigators identified the first precrash roadway evidence, the onset of a tire
friction mark determined to be from the left front tire of the pickup truck, about 73 feet
north of the location of impact. The friction mark started in the northbound lane about
1.8 feet from the white edge line (shoulder line) and continued in a shallow rightward
arc to the point of impact, 6.6 feet from the shoulder line. The friction mark indicates
that the pickup truck was traveling south in the northbound travel lane but was moving
back toward the southbound travel lane at the time of impact with the transit van.
The nearly head-on impact caused both vehicles to rotate counterclockwise. The
van came to rest in the northbound lane—at the impact location but rotated—while the
pickup truck came to rest off the roadway, southwest of the impact location. The trailer
separated from the van at impact and came to rest off the roadway, east of the location of
the van. Both the van and the pickup truck sustained catastrophic intrusion damage

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Pickup Truck Centerline Crossover Collision with Transit Van and Postcrash Fire, Andrews, Texas HIR-23-11

and were consumed by postcrash fire (see figure 3). The trailer sustained impact
damage to the left-front corner and limited thermal damage on the left side.

Figure 3. Left, damage to the pickup truck (right front view); right, damage to the van (left
rear view).

The Cummins engine control module and the airbag control module (ACM) from
the pickup truck were destroyed in the postcrash fire. The ACM from the van was
recovered, but the device was extensively fire-damaged. As a result, no usable data
could be retrieved from the recording modules on either of the vehicles. The limited
postcrash inspection identified no precrash mechanical deficiencies for either vehicle.2

The NTSB interviewed the driver of a vehicle that traveled immediately behind
the van for about 10 miles. The witness did not observe anything unusual about the
movement of the van and he also reported traveling at speeds of 70–75 mph. The
investigation did not identify any witnesses that had observed the pickup truck earlier in
the trip or leading up to its centerline crossover.
Considering the limited information obtained from the witness and that the
postcrash fire destroyed all recording modules, the NTSB conducted a simulation of the
crash to determine an approximate speed of the two vehicles. The simulation was
based on the available roadway evidence, including the tire friction mark that indicated
the preimpact path of the pickup truck, location of impact, weight of the vehicles
(including the trailer), measured friction of the roadway, contact damage on the
vehicles, and final rest positions of the pickup truck, the van, and the trailer.
Injuries, Occupant Protection, and Emergency Response. As a result of the
crash and the postcrash fire, both occupants of the pickup truck died. The van driver and

2 The extent of the postcrash inspection of the vehicles was limited due to the extensive fire
damage.

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six of the van passengers also died, while the remaining two van passengers
sustained serious injuries. According to autopsy reports for the two occupants of the
pickup truck and the van driver, all three died from blunt force and thermal injuries. 3

Two van passengers were ejected during the crash; one of them—seated in the
front passenger seat—died, while the other ejected passenger—originally seated in the
third row on the right—sustained serious injuries. The second seriously injured
passenger self-extricated.4
All seating positions in both vehicles were equipped with lap/shoulder belts. Based
on a buckled latch plate located next to the front passenger seat of the pickup truck, the
pickup truck passenger likely wore the available lap/shoulder belt at the time of the crash.
NTSB investigators found an unbuckled latch plate at the crash scene next to the at-rest
location of the pickup truck, suggesting that the pickup truck driver was likely unbelted.
Based on the interview with one of the surviving van passengers, the van driver wore the
available lap/shoulder belt, but none of the passengers were belted.

The Andrews County Sheriff's Department (ACSD) dispatcher was notified of the
crash at 8:18 p.m. through a 911 call and immediately dispatched ACSD patrol units,
the first of which arrived on scene at 8:25 p.m. The dispatcher notified the Texas
Department of Public Safety, Andrews County Volunteer Fire Department, Andrews
County Fire Marshall, and Andrews County Emergency Medical Services, whose first
units arrived on scene 2–3 minutes after the first ACSD patrol unit.5 The incident
commander requested the first medical evacuation (medevac) helicopter immediately
upon arrival at 8:27 p.m., and the second 10 minutes later; they arrived at a landing
zone by 9:24 p.m. The two medevac helicopters transported the two van occupants with
serious injuries to local hospitals, the last of which arrived at 11:16 p.m.

3 The autopsies were external examinations only; no internal autopsy examinations were
performed, limiting evaluation for natural disease. Furthermore, DNA tests were conducted on the
occupants of the pickup truck for the purpose of identification.

4 When interviewed by NTSB investigators, this passenger stated that he had to break a window to
evacuate from the van as the postcrash fire spread through the vehicle. He sustained thermal injuries.

5 Four other agencies responded to the crash: The Texas Department of Transportation, the
Andrews Police Department, the Andrews County Constable, and AeroCare Medevac.

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1.3 Additional Information

1.3.1 Roadway and Traffic Characteristics

The crash occurred on a straight section of FM 1788, with a crest vertical curve
approximately 1,369 feet north of the crash location.6 In that area, FM 1788 consists of
a single travel lane in each direction—the northbound lane is 11 feet 9 inches wide and
the southbound lane is 12 feet wide. The northbound and southbound travel lanes are
adjoined by 5- and 6-foot-wide paved shoulders, respectively. At the location of the
crash, the two directions of travel are separated by a dashed yellow line for the
southbound travel lane and a solid yellow line for the northbound lane. The crash
location was in a 1,680-foot-long passing zone for the southbound direction of travel;
the passing zone continued for another 680 feet past the crash location. The centerline
was additionally delineated by raised bi-directional retroreflective pavement markers
pointed to motorists in both directions of travel. The centerline had no rumble strips.
As measured in 2020, the average annual daily traffic on FM 1788 in the area of
the crash was 2,369 vehicles. At the request of NTSB investigators, the Texas
Department of Transportation conducted a speed and vehicle classification study about
a week after the crash; the top speed of 85% of all vehicles in the southbound lane was
76–80 mph, and of the observed southbound vehicles 15% were passenger vehicles
and 72% were single-unit vehicles.7 Examination of the 10-year crash history—from
2012 to 2022—within a 5-mile radius of the crash location revealed 31 crashes, 1 of
which was fatal.8 Nine of these crashes involved a vehicle crossing the centerline, one
of which involved unsafe speed in inclement weather conditions.

1.3.2 Driver Information

Pickup Truck Driver. The 38-year-old driver held a Texas class C driver’s license
with no endorsements or restrictions. According to his wife, the driver worked as a
mechanic and owned a trucking company. He obtained his first driver’s license in 2011.
His driving history shows numerous traffic violations, some of which occurred before he
obtained his driver’s license. In the 10-year period before the crash, the pickup truck driver
had 23 traffic violations, 10 of which related to driving without a license or with a
suspended license, and 9 of which were for speeding; one of the speeding violations

6 A crest vertical curve connects an ascending grade to a descending grade.

7 (a) 15% of the vehicles in the southbound lane were traveling at speeds above 80 mph. (b) The
Texas Department of Transportation classifies single-unit vehicles as being between 13 and 35 feet
long. These vehicles include both commercial and noncommercial vehicles.

8 The fatal crash involved a vehicle crossing the centerline and striking an oncoming vehicle in a
head-on collision. The police report did not attribute speeding as a factor in this crash.

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(from 2016) involved traveling 105 mph in a 75-mph zone. The pickup truck driver had
one driving-while-intoxicated violation that occurred in 2006. His most recent license
suspension occurred in May 2018; the license remained suspended until May 2019.
The driver was involved in one other crash, which occurred in 2012.
In the interview with NTSB investigators, the wife of the pickup truck driver
stated that, on the day of the crash, her husband woke up sometime in the afternoon
because he worked late the previous day. She also stated that he, along with their son,
had left their home in Seminole, Texas, about 20 minutes before the crash.
Examination of the pickup truck driver’s cell phone records showed that he was not
using his cell phone at the time of the crash.
Postmortem toxicology testing of the pickup truck driver’s femoral blood,
performed by NMS Labs, identified methamphetamine at a concentration of
1,900 nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL) and amphetamine, a methamphetamine
metabolite, at a concentration of 250 ng/mL. At the NTSB’s request, the Federal
Aviation Administration Forensic Sciences Laboratory also tested the pickup truck
driver’s femoral blood for methamphetamine and amphetamine, identifying them at
1,949 ng/mL and at 185 ng/mL, respectively.
Van Driver. The 26-year-old driver held a Texas class C driver’s license. His
driving history shows a single, unidentified traffic violation and no crashes. About
5:30 a.m. on the day of the crash, the van had left Hobbs for Midland, some 100 miles
away.9 According to a statement from one of the surviving van passengers, the van driver
was performing his coaching duties during the day. After finishing the golf tournament,
the team had dinner in Midland after which it departed for Hobbs around 7:30 p.m.,
about 45 minutes before the crash. The van driver had made the same trip a day earlier,
when the team traveled to Midland for a practice before the tournament; the driver and
the team returned to Hobbs by the end of the day.
Examination of the van driver’s cell phone records showed that he was not
using his cell phone at the time of the crash. The postmortem toxicological testing of
the van driver identified 193 ng/mL of cetirizine, an over-the-counter antihistamine.

1.3.3 University of the Southwest

University of the Southwest, located in Hobbs, New Mexico, is a private university

that obtained authorization from the US Department of Transportation (USDOT) in 2004

9 Because Hobbs is located in the mountain time zone, the team had departed Hobbs at 4:30 a.m.
local time. For clarity of discussion, all times in this report are referenced in central daylight time, as
stated previously.

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to transport passengers for non-business purposes.10 At the time of the crash, the
university owned four vehicles and employed three drivers with commercial driver’s
licenses (CDL). Two of the four vehicles required a CDL for operation, and two were
transit vans with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of less than 10,001 pounds,
the threshold for defining a commercial motor vehicle.11 However, the combined
GVWR of the van and the trailer involved in this crash was 12,500 pounds, which
classified it as a commercial motor vehicle. Although the van driver was not required
to have (and did not have) a CDL to operate the van with the trailer, he was required
to have a USDOT medical certification to operate a commercial motor vehicle; he did
not have this certification.12

The university’s Vehicle Use and Transportation Policy included minimum hiring
requirements for drivers and a prohibition for using cell phones while driving. However,
this policy did not contain any training requirements for coaches or other university
employees and did not include any requirements for pretrip safety briefings or
mandatory seat belt use for all occupants.
The postcrash compliance review of the university by the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration identified 12 safety violations, 3 of which were critical. 13 The
review resulted in a conditional safety rating for the university.14 The university had no
roadside inspections.

1.4 Postcrash Actions

After the crash, University of the Southwest informed NTSB investigators that it had
outsourced most of its student transportation and had signed a provider contract with a
bus company. The university also stated that any future transportation of students

10 Postcrash, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) determined that the
university should be characterized as a private motor carrier of passengers for business purposes.
11 Two of the vehicles were buses that exceeded a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of
26,001 pounds, which require a CDL for operation. See Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
383.5 for all the vehicle and cargo types as well as weight limits that require a CDL to operate, and 49
CFR 390.5 on how a motor vehicle is defined. Any vehicle above 10,001 pounds GVWR that operates
in interstate commerce (or is designed to transport eight or more passengers or to transport hazardous
material) is considered to be a commercial vehicle.
12 Title 49 CFR 391.41 and 391.43 specify the medical certification requirements for CDLs.
13 Critical and acute violations are defined in 49 CFR Part 385 Appendix B. The three critical violations
that the FMCSA identified were: (1) failing to maintain driver qualifications file on each driver employed,
(2) failing to preserve driver’s records of duty status supporting document for 6 months, and (3) using
a commercial motor vehicle not periodically inspected.

14 A conditional safety rating indicates that a carrier has failed some safety regulations but can
continue to operate. Safety ratings are defined in 49 CFR Part 385.5.

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that may be conducted by the university would be carried out in a passenger vehicle or
a van without a trailer, which would not require the university to adhere to regulations
pertaining to commercial motor vehicles. The university also reported that it no longer
owned the two buses that required a CDL to operate and that it had amended its
Vehicle Use and Transportation Policy to include a pretrip seat belt use statement.

2. Analysis

2.1 Exclusionary Factors and Pickup Truck Driver Actions

Weather and visibility were not factors in this crash. Additionally, because
the collision occurred on a long, straight section of the roadway, no environmental
obstructions reduced the sight distance.
Due to the postcrash fire, control modules capable of recording preimpact
vehicle information were destroyed on both the pickup truck and the van. The NTSB’s
simulation of the crash identified ranges of the preimpact speed of the two vehicles,
showing that the pickup truck was traveling between 85 mph and 110 mph, and that
the van was traveling 55–70 mph just before impact. The examination of the vehicles
did not identify any preexisting mechanical conditions that could have contributed to
the crash. Further, the severity of the nearly head-on impact at these speeds precluded
any reasonable expectation that the vehicles could have retained structural integrity.
Furthermore, the investigation determined that licensing, driving experience of
either driver, and distraction due to cell phone use were not factors in this crash.
Finally, the emergency response to the crash was timely and appropriate.
The postmortem toxicological test showed that the van driver had used
cetirizine, an antihistamine medication—detected at therapeutic levels—that has
potential to be sedating.15 However, the investigation found no evidence that the van
driver was experiencing sedating cetirizine effects or that such potential effects affected
his driving performance.
Postmortem analysis of the pickup truck driver’s blood showed that he had used
methamphetamine, identified at 1,900 ng/mL. In living people, methamphetamine blood
levels above 200 ng/mL generally represent abuse, whereas typical levels seen with
medicinal use are between 20 ng/mL and 50 ng/mL (NHTSA 2014). Levels in recreational
users typically do not exceed 2,500 ng/mL, above which severe toxicity is likely. The effects
of methamphetamine on driving-related aspects, such as attentiveness,

15 Cetirizine has substantially lower potential drowsiness effects compared to first-

generation antihistamines such as diphenhydramine (NHTSA 2004).

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awareness, perception and decision-making are substantial, and vary depending on the
stage of the effects progression, which follows a typical pattern. Early
methamphetamine effects include possibly feeling alert, euphoric, experiencing
hallucinations, and having poor impulse control with a tendency to make high-risk
decisions, while late effects (“coming down”) include possibly feeling restless,
uncoordinated, tired, and experiencing paranoia and anxiety.16

Although measuring the drug amount in blood does not help determine whether
the person is experiencing early versus late effects (NHTSA 2014), both sets of effects
have considerable detrimental impact on skills necessary for safe driving. Drivers
impaired by effects of methamphetamine have been observed leaving their lane of
travel, speeding, pulling into oncoming traffic, driving erratically, departing the roadway,
and crashing with other vehicles (NHTSA 2014, Logan 1996). Even accounting for
possible differences between methamphetamine blood levels before and after death,
the very high methamphetamine level in the pickup truck driver’s blood indicates
impairment.
The investigation shows that the pickup truck driver was driving in the
oncoming lane of travel and at an excessive speed at the time of impact. However,
other than the pickup truck driver’s impairment, the investigation could not obtain any
evidence that would indicate the reason for the pickup truck driver being in the
opposite lane of travel—such as loss of control or passing of a slower moving vehicle
—or for how long he was driving in the opposite travel lane.

2.2 Drug-Impaired Driving

The NTSB has a long history of issuing and advocating for safety recommendations
—nearly 150 to date—pertaining to impaired driving. Much of this advocacy has addressed
impaired driving of noncommercial drivers. One such example is the NTSB’s recent
investigation of a crash in Avenal, California, in which an alcohol-impaired driver, while
excessively speeding, crossed a centerline and struck another vehicle in a head-on
collision (NTSB 2022a). Last year, the NTSB also published a safety research report
examining the use of alcohol and other drugs among drivers (NTSB 2022b). In these two
reports, the NTSB examined crash-specific and broader causes of impaired driving and
explored potential countermeasures for their prevention. As a result, the NTSB issued a
series of recommendations, including those to federal and state agencies to improve
toxicological testing and tracking of drug use in crashes, and equip vehicles with
impairment detection technologies and driver monitoring systems.

16 See the National Institutes of Health National Library of Medicine for information
regarding methamphetamine and for amphetamine.

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In 2017, we investigated another crash in Texas that shares similarities with the
current crash. As a result of the investigation of the crash in Concan, Texas, in which an
impaired driver operating a pickup truck crossed a centerline and collided nearly head-on
with a medium-size bus, the NTSB issued a safety recommendation to the state of Texas
to conduct an executive-level review of the state’s impaired driving program (NTSB
2018).17 Unlike the impaired driver in the Concan crash who had an established history of
drug use while driving, the pickup truck driver in the Andrews crash did not have any
impaired-driving-related contacts with law enforcement in the previous
15 years. As such, law enforcement did not have an opportunity to identify the
pickup truck driver’s potential future risk of impaired driving.
In 2022, as part of addressing the increased number of impairment-related
crashes in the state, the Texas Impaired Driving Task Force, supported by the Texas
Department of Transportation, published an updated state Impaired Driving Plan, which
was submitted to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in
fulfilment of Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act obligations. 18

2.3 Excessive Speed

Speeding represents one of the most common factors associated with fatal crashes
in the United States (NCSA 2022), and one that the NTSB frequently encounters in our
investigations. The NTSB has recently investigated several other fatal crashes in which
speeding was the primary causal factor. The breadth of the safety recommendations that
we have issued as a result of these investigations highlights the broad approach required
to address the frequently fatal consequences of speeding.
In recent crash investigations—Fort Worth, Texas, and Mt. Pleasant Township,
Pennsylvania—involving vehicles traveling too fast for conditions, the NTSB issued several
safety recommendations to the states, NHTSA, and the Federal Highway Administration
regarding enforcement, setting of speed limits, and infrastructure- and vehicle-based
technologies, such as intelligent speed adaptation/assistance (ISA), that could reduce the
instances of speeding (NTSB 2023a; NTSB 2022c).19 In another recent crash investigation
—North Las Vegas, Nevada, which involved a passenger vehicle traveling at

17 See Safety Recommendation H-18-60.

18 (a) The Texas Impaired Driving Task Force reported a 12% increase in alcohol-impaired
driving fatalities in 2020 compared to the previous year. See Texas Strategic Highway Safety Plan.
(b) Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. 114–94.
19 See Safety Recommendations H-12-20 and -21 regarding implementing ISA in heavy
vehicles. In 2017, the NTSB published a safety study titled Reducing Speeding-Related Crashes
Involving Passenger Vehicles (NTSB/SS-17/01), in which Safety Recommendation H-17-24 was
issued to NHTSA to incentivize passenger vehicle manufacturers and consumers to adopt ISA
systems.

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extreme speeds—the NTSB issued safety recommendations to NHTSA and the states
regarding countermeasures to identify and track repeat speeding offenders and to
reduce speeding recidivism, as well as to increase awareness and implementation of
ISA systems (NTSB 2023b).
ISA can (a) alert a driver who is exceeding the speed limit, (b) implement an
overridable/easily counteracted deceleration mechanism, or (c) completely prevent a
driver from driving above the speed limit. Several passenger vehicle manufacturers in the
United States have started equipping some of their models with warning-only ISA
systems in recent years, while new model passenger vehicles in the European Union
have been mandated to be equipped with ISA since 2022.20 A warning-only ISA, which
relies on the driver to react appropriately- to vehicle alerts, may be ineffective when the driver’s perception
or decision making is impaired by drugs; however, an ISA system that can intervene independently of the
driver could more effectively slow the car and protect the vehicle occupants and other road users.

As a result of the North Las Vegas, Nevada, investigation, the NTSB has
recommended that NHTSA require ISA systems in all new vehicles and educate the
public about the benefits of ISA systems.21 The NTSB has further recommended that
passenger vehicle manufacturers install ISA systems as standard equipment in all
new vehicles.22

3. Conclusions

3.1 Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of
the Andrews, Texas, crash was the pickup truck driver’s excessive speed and his
crossing into the oncoming lane of travel, likely because of impairment from
methamphetamine use.

20 According to General Safety Regulation 661/2009/ED, the European Union has required since
July 2022 that all new models of light vehicles be equipped with ISA. This mandate extends to all new
light vehicles by 2024.
21 See Safety Recommendations H-23-14 and H-23-15.
22 See Safety Recommendation H-23-20.

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3.2 Lessons Learned: Impaired Driving and Excessive Speed

Driving above the speed limit or too fast for conditions is dangerous on its own,
but as this crash has exemplified, speeding is particularly dangerous when combined
with impairment. In 2021, about 60% of roadway fatalities in the United States were
attributed to speeding and/or alcohol impairment (NHTSA 2023). The NTSB has adopted
a multi-faceted approach in addressing these risks, including issuing safety
recommendations related to vehicle technologies—impairment detection systems,
advanced driver monitoring systems, and intelligent speed assistance—as well as
improving toxicological testing and enforcing speeding violations.

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References
Logan, B. 1996. “Methamphetamine and driving impairment.” Journal of
Forensic Sciences 41 (3), 457–464.
NCSA (National Center for Statistics and Analysis). 2022. “Speeding: 2020 data,” Traffic
Safety Facts. (Report No. DOT HS 813 320) Washington, DC: NHTSA.
NHTSA (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration). 2023. Stewart, T. Overview
of Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes in 2021. (Report No. DOT HS 813 435)
Washington, DC: NHTSA.
_____. 2014. Couper, F. and B. Logan. Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets.
(Report No. DOT HS 809 725) Washington, DC: NHTSA.
_____. 2004. Moskowitz, H. and C. Wilkinson. Antihistamines and Driving-Related
Behavior: A Review of the Evidence for Impairment. (Report No. DOT HS 809 714)
Washington, DC: NHTSA.
NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 2023a. Multivehicle Crash in Icy Conditions
on Interstate 35 West, Fort Worth, Texas, February 11, 2021. NTSB/HIR-23-01
(Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2023).

_____. 2023b. Multivehicle Crash at Signalized Intersection, North Las Vegas, Nevada,
January 29, 2022. NTSB/HIR-23-09 (Washington, DC: National
Transportation Safety Board, 2023).
_____. 2022a. Sport Utility Vehicle Centerline Crossover Collision with Pickup Truck on
State Route 33, Avenal, California, January 1, 2021. NTSB/HIR-22/05
(Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2022).
_____. 2022b. Alcohol, Other Drug, and Multiple Drug Use Among Drivers. NTSB/SRR-
22/02 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2022).
_____. 2022c. Multivehicle Crash Near Mt. Pleasant Township, Pennsylvania, January 5,
2020. NTSB/HIR-22/01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board,
2022).
_____. 2018. Pickup Truck Centerline Crossover Collision with Medium-Size Bus on US
Highway 83, Concan, Texas, March 29, 2017. NTSB/HAR-18/02 (Washington, DC:
National Transportation Safety Board, 2018).
_____. 2017. Reducing Speeding-Related Crashes Involving Passenger Vehicles.
NTSB/SS-17/01 (Washington, DC: National Transportation Safety Board, 2017).

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NTSB investigators worked with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the
Texas Department of Transportation, and the Texas Department of Public Safety
throughout this investigation.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United States and significant events in
other modes of transportation—railroad, transit, highway, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We
determine the probable cause of the accidents and events we investigate and issue safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. We also conduct safety research studies and
offer information and other assistance to family members and survivors for any accident investigated by
the agency. Additionally, we serve as the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation
and mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Coast Guard, and
we adjudicate appeals of civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.

The NTSB does not assign fault or blame for an accident or incident; rather, as specified by NTSB
regulation, “accident/incident investigations are fact-finding proceedings with no formal issues and no
adverse parties … and are not conducted for the purpose of determining the rights or liabilities of any person”
(Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations section 831.4). Assignment of fault or legal liability is not relevant to
the NTSB’s statutory mission to improve transportation safety by investigating accidents and incidents and
issuing safety recommendations. In addition, statutory language prohibits the admission into evidence or use
of any part of an NTSB report related to an accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter
mentioned in the report (Title 49 United States Code section 1154[b]).

For more detailed background information on this report, visit the NTSB investigations website
and search for NTSB accident ID HWY22MH006. Recent publications are available in their entirety on
the NTSB website. Other information about available publications also may be obtained from the
website or by contacting—
National Transportation Safety Board
Records Management Division, CIO-40
490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594
(800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551

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