G.R. No. 186403

Supreme Court E-Library
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 731

Mayor Corpus, et al. vs. Judge Pamular, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186403. September 5, 2018]
MAYOR “JONG” AMADO CORPUS, JR. and CARLITO

SAMONTE, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE RAMON D.
PAMULAR OF BRANCH 33, GUIMBA, NUEVA
ECIJA, MRS. PRISCILLA ESPINOSA, * and NUEVA
ECIJA PROVINCIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
FLORO FLORENDO, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;

CERTIORARI; A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
A “CONDITION SINE QUA NON” FOR THE FILING OF
RULE 65 PETITION; EXCEPTIONS, ENUMERATED.—
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition
sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.” This
enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error”
through a “re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case.” To dispense with this condition, there must be a
“concrete, compelling, and valid reason.” However, the following
exceptions apply: (a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent
necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in
a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
*
In some pleadings, Mrs. Espinosa is referred to as “Priscila.” For
consistency, this Decision will use “Priscilla” as per her signed Reply-
Affidavit. See rollo, p. 62.
732 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

process; (h) where the proceedings [were] ex parte or in which

the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the
issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A JURISDICTIONAL AND
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT.— Nothing in the records
shows that petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Regional Trial Court. Apart from bare conclusion, petitioners
failed to present any plausible reason why they failed to file a
motion for reconsideration before filing a petition before this
Court. While this issue was raised by respondent Priscilla in
her Comment, this was not sufficiently addressed by petitioners
either in their Reply or Memorandum. It must be stressed that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, as well as filing it
on time, is not a mere procedural technicality. These are
“jurisdictional and mandatory requirements which must be
strictly complied with.” Therefore, petitioners’ failure to file
a motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before
filing this Petition is fatal.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION; WHEN THE TRIAL COURT HAD
ALREADY DETERMINED THAT PROBABLE CAUSE
EXISTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF
ARREST, IT CAN PROCEED IN CONDUCTING
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ON THE AMENDED
INFORMATION DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A
PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE (DOJ).— [C]ourts do not meddle with the
prosecutor’s conduct of a preliminary investigation because it
is exclusively within the prosecutor’s discretion. However, once
the information is already filed in court, the court has acquired
jurisdiction of the case. Any motion to dismiss or determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused is within its discretion.
x x x Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined
that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
like in this case, jurisdiction is already with the Regional Trial
Court. Therefore, it can proceed in conducting further
proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance
of a warrant despite the pendency of a Petition for Review before
the Department of Justice.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 733

4. ID.; ID.; SECTION 11(c), RULE 116 OF THE REVISED

RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PERTAINS TO
SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGNMENT IN CASE OF
PENDING PETITION FOR REVIEW WITH THE DOJ;
IT DOES NOT SUSPEND THE EXECUTION OF A
WARRANT OF ARREST FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ACQUIRING JURISDICTION OVER THE ACCUSED.—
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case of a pending
petition for review before the Department of Justice. It does
not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for the purpose
of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO SUSPEND ARRAIGNMENT
BECAUSE OF THE PENDENCY OF THEIR PETITION
FOR REVIEW WITH THE DOJ; SUSPENSION OF
ARRAIGNMENT WILL LAST ONLY FOR A MAXIMUM
PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE FILING OF THE
PETITION AFTER WHICH THE COURT CAN
CONTINUE WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.— Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension
of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of
the prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9,
2009 before the Regional Trial Court, informing it about their
pending Petition for Review of the Prosecutor’s January 26,
2009 Resolution before the Department of Justice. Thus,
respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners’
motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department
of Justice. However, this Court’s rule merely requires a maximum
60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the
expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”
Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice on February 9, 2009. Thus, the 60-day
period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent

judge can now continue with the arraignment and further

proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.
6. ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION;
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT CANNOT BE MADE
AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND ONLY THE ACCUSED
WHO HAS BEEN ARRAIGNED CAN INVOKE THIS
RULE; REASONS.— Before an accused enters his or her plea,
either formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After an entry
of plea, only a formal amendment can be made provided it is
with leave of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. After arraignment, there can be no substantial
amendment except if it is beneficial to the accused. Since only
petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he can invoke this
rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because
he has not yet been arraigned. Once an accused is arraigned
and enters his or her plea, Section 14 prohibits any substantial
amendment especially those that may prejudice his or her rights.
One of these rights includes the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against
him or her, which is given life during arraignment. Arraignment
is necessary to bring an accused in court and in notifying him
or her of the cause and accusations against him or her. “Procedural
due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he
[or she] may be informed of the reason for his [or her] indictment,
the specific charges he [or she] is bound to face, and the
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him
[or her].” It is during arraignment that an accused is given the
chance to know the particular charge against him or her for the
first time. There can be no substantial amendment after plea
because it is expected that the accused will collate his or her
defenses based on the contents of the information. “The theory
in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his
[or her] defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals
in the information read to him [or her] during arraignment,
then the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the
same information.” Aside from violating the accused’s right
to due process, any substantial amendment in the information
will burden the accused in preparing for his or her defense. In
a criminal case, due process entails, among others, that the
accusation must be in due form and that the accused is given
the opportunity to answer the charges against him or her. There
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 735

is a need for the accused to be supplied with the necessary

information as to “why he [or she] is being proceeded against
and not be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he
[or she] is made the object of a prosecution, it being the fact
that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused
is at stake.” x x x Apart from violating the right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of his or her accusation,
substantial amendments to the information after plea is prohibited
to prevent having the accused put twice in jeopardy.
7. ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY;
REQUISITES TO VALIDLY INVOKE THE RIGHT;
DOUBLE JEOPARDY FORBIDS THE PROSECUTION OF
A PERSON FOR A CRIME OF WHICH HE/SHE HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY ACQUITTED OR CONVICTED.—
The constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy
is procedurally bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[.] x x x In substantiating
a claim for double jeopardy, the following requisites should
be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in
the first. With regard the first requisite, the first jeopardy only
attaches: (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. The test for the third requisite is “whether
one offense is identical with the other or is an attempt to commit
it or a frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information.” Also known as “res judicata in prison grey,”
the mandate against double jeopardy forbids the “prosecution
of a person for a crime of which he [or she] has been previously
acquitted or convicted.” This is to “set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he [or
she] shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety
of a second charge against him [or her] for the same offense.”
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE BEHIND THE RULE ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.— Double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional
concept which guarantees that an accused may not be harassed
with constant charges or revisions of the same charge arising
out of the same facts constituting a single offense. When an

accused traverses the allegations in the information by entering

a plea during the arraignment, he or she is already put in jeopardy
of conviction. Having understood the charges, the accused after
entering a plea prepares for his or her defense based on the
possible evidence that may be presented by the prosecution.
The protection given to the accused by the double jeopardy
rule does not attach only after an acquittal or a conviction. It
also attaches after the entry of plea and when there is a prior
dismissal for violation of speedy trial. An arraignment, held
under the manner required by the rules, grants the accused an
opportunity to know the precise charge against him or her for
the first time. It is called for so that he or she is “made fully
aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his [or her] life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him [or her].
At the very least then, he [or she] must be fully informed of
why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him
[or her].” Thereafter, the accused is no longer in the dark and
can enter his or her plea knowing its consequences. It is at this
stage that issues are joined, and without this, further proceedings
cannot be held without being void. Thus, the expanded concept
of double jeopardy presupposes that since an accused can be
in danger of conviction after his or her plea, the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy should already apply.
9. ID.; ID.; AMENDMENT OF INFORMATION; FORMAL AND
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT, DISTINGUISHED.— Any
amendment to an information which only states with precision
something which has already been included in the original
information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction
of the crime charged is only a formal amendment that can be
made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect
the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new accusation. x x x On the other
hand, “[a] substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court.”
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN AMENDMENT STATING THE ORIGINAL
INFORMATION EXCEPT TO THE INCLUSION OF
ANOTHER ACCUSED AND THE INSERTION OF THE
PHRASE “CONSPIRING AND CONFEDERATING
TOGETHER” IS MERELY FORMAL.— The facts alleged
in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 737

to that of the original information except as to the inclusion of

Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the insertion of the phrase
“conspiring and confederating together.” The allegation of
conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the prosecution
that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelito. Hence,
the amendment is merely formal.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY
IS MERELY FORMAL AMENDMENT, IT IS NOT
ALLOWED AFTER PLEA IF THE ACCUSED WILL BE
PREJUDICED.— Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that
in permitting formal amendments when the accused has already
entered his or her plea, it is important that the amendments
made should not prejudice the rights of the accused. x x x It
is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original
information, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-
defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment,
Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed
after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding
evidence will not be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy
in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment after
plea is not allowed.
12. ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION;
REQUIREMENT FOR THE JUDGE TO PERSONALLY
EVALUATE THE FINDING OF THE PROSECUTOR,
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR.— It is required for
the judge to “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence.” In case the evidence on record
fails to substantiate probable cause, the trial judge may instantly
dismiss the case. The records of this case reveal that the February
26, 2009 Order presented a discussion showing both the factual
and legal circumstances of the case from the filing of the original
information until the filing of the Motion to Amend Information.
Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the
incidents of this case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant.
Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant, a hearing
was conducted on February 13, 2009 regarding the motions
and manifestations filed in the case[.] x x x Apart from respondent
judge’s personal examination of the amended information and
supporting documents, the hearing conducted on February 13,
2009 enabled him to find probable cause prompting him to issue
the warrant of arrest.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Napoleon Uy Galit & Associates for petitioners.

Ricardo R. Atayde, Jr., for respondent Priscila Espinosa.
Office of the Solicitor General for public respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without

changing the prosecution’s theory that the accused willfully
shot the victim is merely a formal amendment.1 However, the
rule provides that only formal amendments not prejudicial to
the rights of the accused are allowed after plea.2 The test of
whether an accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to
determine whether a defense under the original information
will still be available even after the amendment is made and if
any evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable
even in the amended information. 3
This Petition for Certiorari4 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assails the February 26, 2009 Order 5 and Warrant of
Arrest 6 issued by Judge Ramon D. Pamular (Judge Pamular)
of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija in
Civil Case No. 2618-G. The assailed Order granted the
prosecution’s Motion to Amend the Original Information for
murder filed against Carlito Samonte (Samonte) to include Mayor
Amado “Jong” Corpus (Corpus) as his co-accused in the crime
1
People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) [Per J. Relova, First
Division].
2
Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third
Division].
3
People v. Casey, 190 Phil. 748-767 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, En Banc].
4
Rollo, pp. 3-50.
5
Id. at 51-54.
6
Id. at 55.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 739

charged.7 Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of

arrest against Corpus.8
Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte at Corpuz
Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecjia on June 4, 2008, causing his death.9
Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was
arrested.10 After the inquest proceedings, an Information11 for
murder dated June 5, 2008 was filed against him, thus:12
INFORMATION
Undersigned Inquest Prosecutor accuses CARLITO SAMONTE
y LAPITAN of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30 a.m.
at Corpuz St., Dist., in the Municipality/City of Cuyapo, Province
of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, with
malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to take the life of
ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
treacherously and taking advantage of superior strength attack the
latter and shot with an unlicensed firearm (1 Colt .45 cal. pistol with
SN 217815), thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wounds, which
directly caused the death of said Angelita Espinosa, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija June 5, 2008.13
Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded
self-defense. Trial on the merits ensued.14
7
Id. at 53.
8
Id. at 54.
9
Id. at 410.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 58.
12
Id. at 410.
13
Id. at 58.
14
Id. at 410.

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa

(Priscilla), filed a complaint-affidavit captioned as Reply-
Affidavit 15 dated September 8, 2008 after the prosecution
presented its second witness.16 She also filed an unsworn but
signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses17 before First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge Floro F. Florendo
(Florendo).18 Other affidavits of witnesses were also filed before
the prosecutor’s office, which included the following:
a.) Affidavit19 of Mr. John Diego, Vice Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija;
b.) Original Affidavit20 and a supplemental affidavit21 of witness
Alexander Lozano y Jacob; and
c.) Joint Affidavit22 of Victoria A. Miraflex, Ma. Floresmina
S. Sacayanan, Ma. Asuncion L. Silao and Corazon N.
Guerzon.23
Based on the affidavit 24 executed by Alexander Lozano
15
Id. at 59-62, in I.S. No. 08F-1445 entitled Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa
v. Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpus, Jr.
16
Id. at 410.
17
Id. at 63-67.
18
Id. at 410.
19
Id. at 68.
20
Id. at 69.
21
Id. at 70-72.
22
Id. at 73-74.
23
Id. at 411. Ma. Floresmina Sacayanan is named as “Floremina” in the
signed Joint Affidavit. See rollo, p. 74.
24
Id. at 310-311. The Department of Justice June 26, 2009 Resolution
stated, in part:
... ... ...
“Thereafter, the complainant’s witness, Alexander Lozano, executed a
supplemental affidavit stating, among others, that on the day of the shooting,
at past nine o’clock in the morning (9:00 A.M.), he went to the Sangguniang
Bayan Office to inquire from Vice Mayor John Diego about palay seeds
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 741

(Lozano) on June 30, 2008, Corpuz was the one who instructed
Samonte to kill Angelito.25
In response to Priscilla’s Reply-Affidavit, Corpuz filed a
Rejoinder Affidavit.26 He also filed a Counter-Affidavit27 against
witness Lozano’s affidavit.28
being distributed by the Municipality to the farmers. Lozano took the route
going to the gym at the back of the respondent mayor’s office. When he
was beside respondent’s office, he saw Samonte whispering something to
respondent outside the latter’s office. He noticed from the respondent’s
face that he got angry from what Samonte whispered to him. Lozano saw
respondent hand to Samonte a stainless gun, then heard respondent angrily
say, “PUTANG INANG LITO YAN, SIGE! BIRAHIN MO!” Lozano
immediately assumed that respondent referred to the victim, Espinosa, because
he knew respondent entertained a grudge against the victim, since the latter
led a campaign against the alleged abuses in the respondent mayor’s office,
and instigated the filing of criminal and administrative charges against him
before the Ombudsman. Thus, he immediately proceeded to the victim’s
office and told the latter what he witnessed and heard, and advised him to
take care.
Lozano did not include the foregoing matters in his first affidavit due to
fear of reprisal, since it will implicate the respondent mayor in the killing
of the victim.”
25
Id. at 514.
26
Id. at 84-88 and 411.
27
Id. at 75-83. See rollo, p. 311 where the Department of Justice June
26, 2009 Resolution stated, in part:
... ... ...
“Respondent, in his counter-affidavit, denied the accusation against him
and stated that he neither had any involvement nor participation in the quarrel
between Samonte and the victim. What happened between them was a personal
matter. Respondent further quoted the police witness’ statement that the
shooting incident was preceded by a heated altercation between Samonte
and the victim.
“Among others, respondent further stressed that Lozano’s statement is biased,
an afterthought, full of improbabilities and were highly opinionated surmises
and conjectures.”
28
Id. at 411.

In its October 7, 2008 Resolution,29 the Regional Trial Court

dismissed Priscilla’s complaint and the attached affidavits of
witnesses. 30
Priscilla filed a Motion for Reconsideration,31 which was
opposed by Corpus.32 Florendo reconsidered and set aside the
October 7, 2008 Resolution.33 He also instructed Assistant Public
Prosecutor Edwin S. Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct the
review.34
Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to
personally submit his resolution by January 22, 2009, prompting
Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the case as
the latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on
the evidence presented by the parties. This order was released
on January 23, 2009 and was received by Bonifacio on the
same date.35
In his January 26, 2009 Resolution,36 Florendo found probable
cause to indict Corpus for Angelita’s murder. He directed the
filing of an amended information before the Regional Trial
Court. 37 The amended information provided:
29
Id. at 89-95. The Resolution, docketed as I.S. No. 08F-1445, was
penned by Prosecutor II Edison V. Rafanan and approved by First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija, Cabanatuan City.
30
Id. at 411.
31
Id. at 96-107.
32
Id. at 411-412.
33
Id. at 108-109.
34
Id. at 412.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 122-125.
37
Id. at 412.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 743

INFORMATION
Undersigned Prosecutor accuses Carlito Samonte y Lapitan and
Amado Corpuz, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of Murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 2008 at around 10:30 a.m.
at Corpuz St., Dist., in the Municipality of Cuyapo, Province of Nueva
Ecija, Phillippines (sic), and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, with malice aforethought and with
deliberate intent to take [the] life of ANGELITO ESPINOSA, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, treacherously and taking advantage of
superior strength attack the latter and shot with an unlicensed firearm
(1 Colt .45 cal. Pistol with SN 217815), thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wounds, which directly caused the death of said Angelito
Espinosa, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Cabanatuan City for Guimba, Nueva Ecija, January 26, 2009.38
(Emphasis supplied)
Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued
a Review Resolution dated January 26, 2009, where he reinstated
the Regional Trial Court October 7, 2008 Resolution and affirmed
the dismissal of the murder complaint against Corpus.39 The
dispositive portion of his Resolution provided:
In view of the foregoing and probable cause, the Resolution of
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edison V. Rafanan, dated October
7, 2008, being in accord with the facts obtaining in this case and
with established rules, procedures and jurisprudence, is reinstated.
The criminal complaint for murder against respondent Mayor
Amado “Jong” Corpu[s] is DISMISSED.40 (Emphasis in the original)
Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend

Information, praying for the admission of the amended
38
Id. at 56.
39
Id. at 110-121.
40
Id. at 120-121.

information.41 Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by

filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition dated
February 2, 2009.42
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration.43 Samonte
and Corpus opposed this through a Vehement Opposition and
Omnibus Motion dated February 4, 2009. 44 They averred that
Judge Pamular’s action was premature considering that the
Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for
hearing.45 Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.46 Samonte
and Corpus also claimed that the issuance of a warrant of arrest
should be suspended because the latter intended to appeal through
a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. 47
Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review dated
February 9, 2009 before the Department of Justice.48 They also
filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 with
the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from acting further
on the Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review
filed with the Department of Justice.49
However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular of Branch
33, Regional Trial Court, Guimba, Nueva Ecija issued the assailed
February 26, 2009 Order, which granted the motion to amend
the information and to admit the attached amended information.
The assailed Order also directed, among others, the issuance
41
Id. at 230-231 and 413.
42
Id. at 232-240 and 413.
43
Id. at 413. No copy of this Motion for Reconsideration is attached in
the rollo.
44
Id. at 241-263.
45
Id. at 242-243.
46
Id. at 244-249.
47
Id. at 254-257.
48
Id. at 126-225.
49
Id. at 226-229.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 745

of a warrant of arrest against Corpus. 50 The dispositive portion

of the Order read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court after personally
examining the amended information and its supporting documents
finds probable cause and hereby orders to:
1. Grant the motion to amend the information;
2. Admit the attached amended information;
3. Issue the Warrant of Arrest for the immediate apprehension
of the respondent-movant Amado Corpu[s], Jr.; and
4. Deny the motion to defer/suspend arraignment and further
proceedings of this case.
SO ORDERED. 51
Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition

for Certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order, was filed by Corpus
and Samonte on March 3, 2009. 52 This Petition seeks to enjoin
Judge Pamular from enforcing the February 26, 2009 Order
and the warrant of arrest issued pursuant to the Order, and from
conducting further proceedings in the murder case.
Through its March 9, 2009 Resolution, this Court required
respondents to comment on the Petition. 53 It also granted
petitioners’ prayer for a temporary restraining order. Judge
Pamular, Florendo, Priscilla, and all other persons acting on
the assailed Regional Trial Court February 26, 2009 Order were
enjoined from implementing it and the warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to it.54
50
Id. at 53-54.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 3-50.
53
Id. at 254-255.
54
Id. at 256-258.

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009.55 She cites

Oaminal v. Castillo,56 which provided that in filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1 there should be “no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law” available.57 Considering that there is still a remedy
available for the accused apart from filing a petition, the petition
shall fail. She claims that petitioners should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before
resorting to a petition for certiorari before this Court. 58
She insists that the Regional Trial Court is correct in granting
the motion to admit the amended information because it has no
effect on Samonte’s case and reasoned that:
[F]irst, because there would only be an addition of another accused
with prior authority f[ro]m the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor,
second, the amendment will not cause any prejudice to the rights of
the accused and more importantly, that is what is provided for by
the Rules[.]59
She claims that the alleged lack of determination of probable
cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since
petitioners failed to present evidence or facts that would prove
their claim.60
Judge Pamular filed his Comment on April 8, 2009.61 He
asserts that he made a careful perusal of the case records in
issuing the assailed order. His independent judgment on the
existence of probable cause was derived from his reading and
evaluation of pertinent documents and evidence. He states that
55
Id. at 268-276.
56
459 Phil. 542 (2003) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
57
Rollo, p. 269.
58
Id. at 269-270.
59
Id. at 270.
60
Id. at 271.
61
Id. at 279-282.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 747

he had set the case for hearing on February 13, 2009, when
both parties were heard and given the opportunity to argue.62
He also added:
Yes, indeed, while the undersigned could rely on the findings of
the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor, I am nevertheless not bound
thereby. The termination by the latter of the existence of probable
cause is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the
herein respondent judge. I have no cogent reason to question the
validity of the findings of the Honorable Provincial Prosecutor. I
have much respect for the latter. Thus, after giving due course to the
arguments of parties and their respective counsels, I was fully
convinced in good faith that, indeed, there was a reasonable ground
to believe in the existence of probable cause for ... the immediate
apprehension and prosecution of Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpu[s],
Jr. Hence, the issuance of the assailed controversial Order.... 63
On July 22, 2009, Priscilla filed a Manifestation64 before
this Court. She asserts that this “present petition questioning
the alleged impropriety of the admission of the amended
information as well as the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr. has no more legal legs to stand
on.”65 She claims66 that Florendo’s January 26, 2009 Resolution
was upheld by the Department of Justice in its June 26, 2009
Resolution,67 the fallo of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the Officer-in-Charge Provincial
Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is directed to file the appropriate
Information against the respondent Mayor Amado Corpu[s], Jr.,
62
Id. at 281-282.
63
Id. at 282.
64
Id. at 307-309.
65
Id. at 308.
66
Id. at 307-308.
67
Id. at 310-313. The Resolution, docketed as I.S. No. 08F-1445, was
signed by Acting Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera of the Department of
Justice.

and to report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
SO ORDERED.68 (Emphasis supplied)
Priscilla asserts further that the issue regarding the suspension
of proceedings pending resolution by the Department of Justice
can now be considered moot and academic.69
On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed a Counter Manifestation.70
They claim that respondent Priscilla’s prayer for the lifting of
the temporary restraining order is premature, thus: 71
[Priscilla] should have been more candid. [She] should have informed
the Honorable Court that a motion for reconsideration with the
Department of Justice was filed by the herein petitioner, and is still
pending resolution. And in the event said motion for reconsideration
is denied, and as a part of petitioner/accused right to due process of
law, it being clearly provided by the rules, he would elevate said
resolution to the Court of Appeals on certiorari – and, certainly,
the aggrieved party would bring the matter before this Honorable
Court – during which interregnum, the appealed resolution of the
Provincial Prosecutor . . . would not have yet attained finality which
is what jurisprudence underscores before the respondent court should
have proceeded with the amended information.72 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
They further claim that lifting the temporary restraining order
would be a relief “too harsh and preposterous” since Corpus
would be immediately imprisoned and constrained to face trial
due to a flawed amended information.73 In case this Court resolves
to quash the amended information and nullify the warrant, Corpuz
will have already “suffered grave and irreparable injury—as
68
Id. at 313.
69
Id. at 308.
70
Id. at 315-328.
71
Id. at 316.
72
Id. at 316-317.
73
Id. at 326.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 749

he would not be able to discharge his constitutional mandate/

duty to his constituents as their duly elected mayor.”74 As to
Samonte, he will be allegedly “forced to face another set of
defense—against the theory of conspiracy in the amended
information which, as we have heretofore stated, after his
arraignment and trial half way, could no longer be proper.”75
On August 6, 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its Comment.76 It claims that petitioners should have made a
distinction on the propriety of respondent judge’s acts in granting
the admission of the amended information and in ordering the
issuance of a warrant. It posits that these acts are at par with
the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the person of the accused. These acts have nothing to do
with the suspension of arraignment provided for under Rule
116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which ordinarily happens after a trial court has acquired
jurisdiction.77
The Office of the Solicitor General also adds that the insertion
of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the
amended information will not affect Samonte’s substantial
rights.78 Thus, the original charge against Samonte of murder
and his deliberate manner of shooting Angelito remain
unaltered:79
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged
in the original information filed against petitioner Samonte is not
proven, the addition of conspiracy in the amended information, if
duly proven, would not in any way result in his conviction because
74
Id.
75
Id. at 327.
76
Id. at 409-430.
77
Id. at 416.
78
Id. at 418.
79
Id. at 419.

conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of

murder.80
The Office of the Solicitor General avers that respondent

judge was well acquainted with the legal and factual
circumstances behind the filing of the original information against
Samonte. The amended information merely added Corpus as a
co-conspirator. Thus, before respondent judge issued the assailed
order, a prior hearing was held on February 13, 2009, when all
the parties were heard.81
The Office of the Solicitor General also asserts that while
respondent judge committed error when he denied petitioners’
motion to suspend proceedings, what the law only requires under
Rule 116, Section 11 is a maximum of 60-day suspension of
the arraignment. In this case, the 60-day period had already
lapsed, rendering the issue raised by petitioners moot. Hence,
there is no longer any hindrance for respondent judge to continue
with Corpus’ arraignment. 82
Petitioners filed their reply on August 7, 2009. 83 They claim
that respondent judge should have suspended action on the
issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition
for Review before the Department of Justice.84 They cite Ledesma
v. Court of Appeals, 85 which stated:
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only
after an information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend
arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved.
Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the
trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of
justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite
80
Id.
81
Id. at 424-425.
82
Id. at 427-428.
83
Id. at 431-449.
84
Id. at 433.
85
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 751

a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information

or to dismiss the case.86
Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v.

Bonifacio,87 which directed the respondent judge in that case
to desist from proceeding with the trial until after the Department
of Justice would have finally resolved a pending petition for
review.88 Thus:
While [w]e have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has
utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, still she
is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not
be more anxious than the prosecution in expediting the disposition
of the case absent any indication of collusion between it and the
defense. The Ministry of Justice should not be deprived of its power
to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is
hereby ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-numbered
criminal case until after the Ministry of Justice has resolved the petition
for review filed by Mila P. Tolentino. No costs.89 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners claim that due to the theory of conspiracy in the
amended information, Samonte will have an additional burden
of setting up a new defense particularly on any acts of his co-
accused since “the act of one is the act of all.”90
Petitioners also claim that respondent judge failed to comply
with the mandate of making a prior determination of probable
cause before issuing the warrant. They insist that this mandate
“is never excused nor dispensed with by the respondent [judge]’s
self-serving narration of the law (not the required facts) stated
in [his] assailed order.”91
86
Id. at 232.
87
223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second Division].
88
Rollo, pp. 472-473.
89
Id. at 435.
90
Id. at 436-437.
91
Id. at 440.

On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed

despite the lapse of the 60-day maximum period of suspension
under Rule 116, Section 11(c), petitioners aver that “[w]hat
jurisprudence underscores is not the lapse of the 60-day period,
but the issue of finality of the decision on appeal.”92 The matter
should not only cover the suspension of arraignment but for
respondent judge to defer from further proceedings on the
amended information pending the final resolution of the
Department of Justice.93
This Court, through its August 26, 2009 Resolution, required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.94
Petitioners filed their memorandum on October 15, 2009.95
In their memorandum, they attached the Department of Justice
September 8, 2009 Resolution, 96 which granted their motion
for reconsideration, thus: 97
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Resolution promulgated on
June 26, 2009 (Resolution No. 473) is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija is hereby
directed to cause the withdrawal of the information for murder against
the respondent, if one has been filed in court, and to report the action
taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.98 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners assert that Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that upon motion by the
proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended:99
92
Id. at 446.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 450-451.
95
Id. at 456-495.
96
Id. at 496-499.
97
Id. at 457.
98
Id. at 498.
99
Id. at 473.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 753

Rule 116
Arraignment and Plea
Section 11. Suspension of Arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper
party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
... ... ...
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of
the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall
not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office.
Petitioners add that respondent judge should have refrained

from issuing the assailed warrant of arrest because he was aware
of the fact that the amended information was a result of the
flip-flopping stand of the public prosecutor from his original
stand.100 Thus, they claim that the motive behind the filing of
the amended information that included Corpus as an additional
accused is political.101
They aver that respondent judge failed to personally make
his independent findings of probable cause that will justify the
issuance of the warrant. They insist that the February 26, 2009
Order only consists of three (3) short sentences, which merely
pointed out a certain legal provision, instead of facts, that would
supposedly justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest, thus: 102
Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is
indispensable in the filing of the complaint or information and in
the issuance of warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has
defined probable cause to be concerned with probability, not absolute
or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this
stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations
of a judge after a full blown trial. No law or rule states that probable
100
Id. at 473-474.
101
Id. at 485.
102
Id. at 476-477.

cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the

light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.103
Petitioners also cite Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits substantial
amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of
the accused after his or her arraignment, thus:
Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information
may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at
any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of
the accused. 104 (Emphasis in the original)
They cite People v. Montenegro,105 which provided that an
allegation of conspiracy that was not previously included in
the original information constitutes a substantial amendment:106
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-
accused, which was not previously included in the original
information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the
respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a
different situation in the trial court. In People v. Zulueta, it was
held that:
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the
original charges will have to be radically modified to meet the
new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy
enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused
Zulueta all the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions
of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to
103
Id. at 477-478.
104
Id. at 490.
105
242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second Division].
106
Rollo, p. 491.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 755

allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons,

to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would
seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this stage
of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only
guaranteed two-days’ (sic) preparation for trial. Needless to
emphasize, as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of
the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper that he be
fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise
that may lead to injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities
to covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared adversaries.
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging
conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of the latter liable
not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also
for the acts of their co-conspirators.107 (Emphasis in the original)
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Memorandum
on October 16, 2009, which merely reiterated the arguments
and discussions in its Comment to the Petition. 108 Similarly,
respondent Priscilla’s Memorandum adopted the arguments
presented by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment
and memorandum. 109
On March 19, 2014, Priscilla filed a Manifestation,110 which
provides that on October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an
affidavit,111 stating that Corpuz ordered him to kill Angelito.112
Samonte’s affidavit provided:
SALAYSAY
Ako si Carlito Samonte kasalukuyang nakakulong sa Provincial
Jail ng Cabanatuan City sa kasong Murder kay Angelito Espinosa sa
107
Id. at 491-492.
108
Id. at 500-523.
109
Id. at 534-544.
110
Id. at 556-560.
111
Id. at 559, handwritten Affidavit of Samonte dated October 30, 2013,
executed before Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S. Gonzales of the Public Attorney’s
Office, Cabanatuan City.
112
Id. at 556.

utos po ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. ay matagal na pong plano

ang pagpatay kay Angelito Espinosa. Nagsimula po ito sa pagwasak
sa aircondition sa magiging opisina ni Angelito Espinosa at sa motor
niyang single, at iyon ay sa utos ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr.
hanggang umabot sa puntong sabihan ako na ang tagal-tagal mo
namang patayin si Angelito Espinosa pagalit na sinabi sa akin.
At noong June 4, 2008 sa pagitan ng 9:30 AM at 10 AM ng nasabing
oras sinabi sa akin muli na “Ayokong maupo yang si Angelito Espinosa
bilang secretaryo ng Sangguniang Bayan.” Sinabi ni Mayor Amado
R. Corpuz Jr. na gumawa ka ng senaryo para huwag makaupo yan
bilang B-SEC (Sangguniang Bayan Secretary) Bayan at kahit anong
klaseng senaryo patayin mo kung kaya mong patayin at ako na ang
bahala sa lahat. Kunin mo ang baril dito sa opisina ko, iyan po ang
utos sa akin ni Mayor Amado Corpuz Jr.
Kusa po akong gumawa ng sarili kong affidavit at salaysay na
walang nagbayad, pumilit at nanakot sa akin para gawin ang salaysay
at affidavit kong ito, at marami pa po akong isasalaysay pagharap
ko po sa korte.
Gumagalang,
Subscribed and sworn to before me: Carlito Samonte
(signed) (signed)
Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S. Gonzales113
On April 14, 2014, this Court received Priscilla’s letter dated
April 11, 2014 addressed to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, asking for assistance in the resumption of trial in view
of Samonte’s affidavit. 114
113
Id. at 559.
114
Id. at 564-565. The letter stated, in part:
April 11, 2014
Hon. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Padre Faura cor. Taft, Manila
Dear Ma’am,
... ... ...
Ma’am I do appreciate the court’s initiative to bring justice to its oppressed
people but it seems that efforts made we’re all be in vain if orders will not
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 757

The issues for this Court’s resolution are as follows:

First, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he conducted further proceedings on the
Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant of
arrest against petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr. despite the pendency
of his and petitioner Carlito Samonte’s Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice;
Second, whether or not the arraignment of petitioner Amado
Corpus, Jr. may proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-
day period suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11(c)
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Third, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the Amended
Information in clear defiance of law and jurisprudence, which
proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial
to the right of the accused; and
Finally, whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular
has personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor’s
report and supporting documents, the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner Amado
Corpus, Jr.
be implemented with sincerity and can be an avenue for the criminals to

escape their crime and left the victims in agony and pain.
Last October 30, 2013 an unexpected turn of event came where Carlito
“Kuratong” Samonte executed his extrajudicial confession freely and
voluntarily before Atty. Marcus Marcellinus S. Gonzales of the Public
Attorney’s office in Cabanatuan City where he admitted that it was Mayor
Amado Corpus Jr. who ordered him to kill my husband.
This vital event have given me an opportunity to file a manifestation before
the honorable Supreme court through my counsel on March 19, 2014 hoping
that the case will be brought back to court to resume trial as petitioner
Samonte has, in effect, parted ways with his co-petitioner Corpuz; and the
allegation that “the new theory of conspiracy in the Amended Information
would substancially prejudice accused Samonte’s right to due process” would
now be not applicable. (Grammatical errors in the original)

The Petition lacks merit.

I
Before this Court delves on the substantive issues in this
case, it first rules on the procedural matter involved.
Respondent Priscilla claims that petitioners should have first
filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court
before resorting to this Petition. Failure to do so renders it
dismissible. 115
This issue was not addressed by petitioners in their reply or
memorandum. However, petitioners justified their direct recourse
before this Court insisting that their case is anchored on pure
questions of law and impressed with public interest. Thus, they
claim that regardless of the rule on hierarchy of courts, their
filing of a petition is not a matter of choice but even mandatory.116
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require. (Emphasis supplied)
Rivera v. Espiritu 117 enumerated the essential requisites for
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65:
115
Id. at 270.
116
Id. at 3-4.
117
425 Phil. 169 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 759

(1) [T]he writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board,
or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.118 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The plain and adequate remedy pertained to by the rules is
a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or decision.119
Certiorari, therefore, “is not a shield from the adverse
consequences of an omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration.” 120
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration is a “condition
sine qua non for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari.”121 This
enables the court to correct “any actual or perceived error”
through a “re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case.”122 To dispense with this condition, there must be
a “concrete, compelling, and valid reason.”123 However, the
following exceptions apply:
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
118
Id. at 179-180.
119
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 743,
753 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
120
Id. at 752.
121
Republic v. Bayao, 710 Phil. 279, 287 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, Third
Division].
122
Id.
123
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 743,
753 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division).

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration

would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process;
(h) where the proceedings [were] ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest
is involved. 124
Nothing in the records shows that petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court. Apart from
bare conclusion, petitioners failed to present any plausible reason
why they failed to file a motion for reconsideration before filing
a petition before this Court. While this issue was raised by
respondent Priscilla in her Comment, this was not sufficiently
addressed by petitioners either in their Reply or Memorandum.
It must be stressed that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, as well as filing it on time, is not a mere
procedural technicality. 125 These are “jurisdictional and
mandatory requirements which must be strictly complied
with.” 126 Therefore, petitioners’ failure to file a motion for
reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court before filing
this Petition is fatal.
124
Id. at 751, citing Abraham v. NLRC, 406 Phil. 310 (2001) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
125
Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Resolution), 682 Phil.
186 (2012) [Per J. Villarama, Jr., First Division].
126
Id. at 195.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 761

II
Two (2) kinds of determination of probable cause exist:
executive and judicial.127 These two (2) kinds of determination
of probable cause were distinguished in People v. Castillo.128
Thus,
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive
and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one
made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly
pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must
be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made
a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case,
is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled
to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to
issue the arrest warrant.
[T]he public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and
that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the
information filed against the person charged is valid on its face,
and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
to the public prosecutor. 129 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
127
People v. Castillo, 607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second
Division].
128
607 Phil. 754 (2009) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
129
Id. at 764-765.

Thus, courts do not meddle with the prosecutor’s conduct

of a preliminary investigation because it is exclusively within
the prosecutor’s discretion.130
However, once the information is already filed in court, the
court has acquired jurisdiction of the case. Any motion to dismiss
or determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is
within its discretion.131
Crespo v. Mogul132 provided:
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal
action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which
is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing
of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused
is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted
himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose
of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing
of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the
accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to
Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in
the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the
Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not
130
De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 < http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/
january2016/209330.pdf > [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
131
Id., citing Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco,
En Banc].
132
235 Phil. 465 (1987) [Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 763

impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People
to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it
was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary
of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court,
the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or
deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper
determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion
to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon the directive of the Secretary of
Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state prosecutor
to handle the case cannot possibl[y be] designated by the Secretary
of Justice who does not believe that there is a basis for prosecution
nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the prosecution of the case
thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We
all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure
the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite
of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed
with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to
enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to
whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal
should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People
of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should
he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a
private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and
void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for
the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the
evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and
control.
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as [to] its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to

grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the records of the investigation.133 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined
that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,
like in this case, jurisdiction is already with the Regional Trial
Court. 134 Therefore, it can proceed in conducting further
proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance
of a warrant despite the pendency of a Petition for Review before
the Department of Justice.
III.A
Petitioners insist that respondent judge should have deferred
from conducting further proceedings on the amended information
and on the issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of
their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.135
They cite Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
RULE 116
Arraignment and Plea
... ... ...
Section 11. Suspension of arraignment — Upon motion by the proper
party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
... ... ...
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending
at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President;
provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60)
133
Id. at 474-476.
134
De Lima v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016 < http://
sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2016/
january2016/209330.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
135
Rollo, p. 469.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 765

days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case
of a pending petition for review before the Department of Justice.
It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for the
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.
In the assailed February 26, 2009 Order, Judge Pamular denied
Corpus’ motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further
proceedings.136 Petitioners claim that he should have suspended
action on the issuance of a warrant considering the pendency
of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice,
citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals 137 and Tolentino v.
Bonifacio 138 as their bases.139 Furthermore, they also assert that
the assailed Order defies Rule 116, Section 11 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.140
Procedure provides for the grounds for suspension of arraignment.
Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the
prosecutor’s resolution filed before the Department of Justice.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion141 dated February
9, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court, informing it about
their pending Petition for Review of the Prosecutor’s January
26, 2009 Resolution before the Department of Justice.142 Thus,
136
Id. at 54.
137
138
223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos, Second Division].
139
Rollo, pp. 472-473.
140
Id. at 473.
141
Id. at 226-229.
142
Id. at 227.
... ... ...

respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners’

motion to suspend the arraignment of Corpus because of the
pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department
of Justice.
However, this Court’s rule merely requires a maximum 60-
day period of suspension counted from the filing of a petition
with the reviewing office. 143 Consequently, therefore, after the
expiration of the 60-day period, “the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.”144
Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review145 before
the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009.146 Thus, the
60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence,
respondent judge can now continue with the arraignment and
further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.
III.B
A reading of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals147 reveals that the
provided ruling does not mainly tackle the issue presented in
this case.
In Ledesma, a complaint for libel was filed against Rhodora
Ledesma (Ledesma) before the City Prosecutor’s Office. Upon
3. As regards both accused, the said 26 January 2009 Florendo’s resolution

having been elevated to the DOJ Secretary, by way of appeal, and giving
due respect to the power of the DOJ Secretary under its power of control
and supervision over all prosecutors, notwithstanding the filing of the
information in court, any further proceedings thereto need be immediately
deferred/suspended.
... ... ...
143
RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, Sec. 11.
144
Samson v. Daway, 478 Phil. 793 (2004) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago,
First Division].
145
Rollo, pp. 126-225.
146
Id. at 413.
147
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 767

finding “sufficient legal and factual basis,” 148 the City

Prosecutor’s Office filed an information against Ledesma before
the Regional Trial Court. Ledesma then filed a petition for review
before the Department of Justice, which gave due course to the
petition directing the Prosecutor to move for the deferment of
further proceedings and to elevate the records of the case to it.
Conformably, the Prosecutor filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment
before the Regional Trial Court, which granted the motion and
deferred arraignment until termination of the Department of
Justice’s petition for review. Without the trial prosecutor’s
consent, the counsel for private complainant filed a motion to
lift the order and to set the case for trial or arraignment. The
Regional Trial Court granted the motion then consequently
scheduled Ledesma’s arraignment. However, the Secretary of
Justice reversed the prosecutor’s findings directing the trial
prosecutor to file before the Regional Trial Court a motion to
withdraw information, which was subsequently denied. Its denial
of the motion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The main issue in Ledesma was whether the respondent judge
in that case erred in denying the motion to withdraw information
and the consequent motion for reconsideration. This Court held
that the act of the judge was erroneous since he failed to give
his reasons for denying the motions, and to make any independent
assessment of the motion and of the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice. Thus:
In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and
considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary’s
resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner’s letter, the
information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to
dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for
reconsideration — all of which were submitted to the court — the
trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and
ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court’s order is inconsistent
with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment
148
Id. at 218.

of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge

was tasked to evaluate the secretary’s recommendation finding the
absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for
libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial
without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary’s
recommendation.
Had he complied with his judicial obligation, he would have
discovered that there was, in fact, sufficient ground to grant the motion
to withdraw the information. The documents before the trial court
judge clearly showed that there was no probable cause to warrant a
criminal prosecution for libel.149 (Emphasis supplied)
This was reiterated in the ratio of that case, which read:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on
the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the
secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired
jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution
but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial.
While the secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse
of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation
and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext
of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.150
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners in this case hinge their claim on Ledesma in arguing
that respondent Judge Pamular should have suspended action
on the issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their
Petition for Review before the Department of Justice, which
stated: 151
Where the secretary of justice exercises his power of review only
after an information has been filed, trial courts should defer or suspend
arraignment and further proceedings until the appeal is resolved.
149
Id. at 235-236.
150
Id. at 217.
151
Rollo, p. 433.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 769

Such deferment or suspension, however, does not signify that the

trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the secretary of
justice. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite
a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information
or to dismiss the case.152
While the quoted portion relates to the issue on suspending
arraignment pending the review of the Department of Justice,
there is nothing in Ledesma that speaks of suspending the issuance
of a warrant of arrest. Although there is an error on the part of
Judge Pamular in denying petitioners’ motion to suspend the
arraignment of Corpus, he can validly issue a warrant of arrest
upon finding probable cause to acquire jurisdiction over Corpus.
Hence, this was strengthened in the cited case of Ledesma, stating
that “[j]urisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost
despite a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the
information or to dismiss the case.”153
They also cited the dispositive portion of Tolentino, which
directed the respondent judge in that case to desist from
proceeding with the trial until after the Department of Justice
would have finally resolved the pending petition for review:154
While We have noted from the expediente that the petitioner has
utilized dilatory tactics to bring the case against her to trial, still she
is entitled to the remedy she seeks. The respondent judge should not
be more anxious than the prosecution in expediting the disposition
of the case absent any indication of collusion between it and the
defense. The Ministry of Justice should not be deprived of its power
to review the action of the City Fiscal by a precipitate trial of the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The respondent judge is
hereby ordered not to proceed with the trial of the above-numbered
criminal case until after the Ministry of Justice has resolved the petition
for review filed by Mila P. Tolentino. No costs.155
152
Id. at 434-435.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 472-473.
155
Id. at 435.

Tolentino involved a petition for certiorari that sought to

annul the order of the respondent judge in that case to proceed
with the trial of the case premised on grave abuse of discretion.156
In that case, petitioners Mila Tolentino (Mila) and Roberto
Tolentino were accused of falsification of public documents
before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay. Prior to Mila’s
arraignment, she asked for the suspension of the proceedings
due to the pendency of a petition for review before the Ministry
of Justice. The respondent judge in that case required the fiscal
to comment. In the comment, the fiscal interposed no objection
on the motion. However, respondent judge denied the motion
stating that the city fiscal had already reinvestigated the case
and speedy trial should also be afforded to the prosecution.
Hence, this Court ruled that respondent judge should not proceed
to trial pending the review before the Ministry of Justice.
However, the factual milieu of Tolentino is different from
the present case. It does not involve the issuance of a warrant
of arrest necessary for acquiring jurisdiction over the person
of the accused.
IV.A
Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion
of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together” in the
amended information. They contend that Rule 110, Section 14
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits substantial
amendment of information that is prejudicial to the rights of
the accused after his or her arraignment.157 To buttress their
point, they cited People v. Montenegro,158 which provided that
an allegation of conspiracy which was not previously included
in the original information, constitutes a substantial
amendment. 159
156
Tolentino v. Bonifacio, 223 Phil. 558 (1985) [Per J. Abad-Santos,
Second Division].
157
Rollo, p. 490.
158
159
Rollo, pp. 489-490.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 771


Procedure provides:
Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave
of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused. ... (Emphasis supplied)
Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or
substantial amendment of the complaint or information may
be made without leave of court. After an entry of plea, only a
formal amendment can be made provided it is with leave of
court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused.160 After
arraignment, there can be no substantial amendment except if
it is beneficial to the accused.161
Since only petitioner Samonte has been arraigned, only he
can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this
argument because he has not yet been arraigned.
Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section
14 prohibits any substantial amendment especially those that
may prejudice his or her rights. One of these rights includes
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him or her, which
is given life during arraignment.162
160
Matalam v. Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 664.
(2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].
161
Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 181 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]
stated: “Once the accused is arraigned and enters his plea, however, Section
14 prohibits the prosecution from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly
mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of the accused.”
162
Id.

Arraignment is necessary to bring an accused in court and

in notifying him or her of the cause and accusations against
him or her.163 “Procedural due process requires that the accused
be arraigned so that he [or she] may be informed of the reason
for his [or her] indictment, the specific charges he [or she] is
bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could be
possibly meted against him [or her].”164
It is during arraignment that an accused is given the chance
to know the particular charge against him or her for the first
time.165 There can be no substantial amendment after plea because
it is expected that the accused will collate his or her defenses
based on the contents of the information. “The theory in law
is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his [or
her] defense against the accusation on the basis of the recitals
in the information read to him [or her] during arraignment, then
the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same
information.”166 Aside from violating the accused’s right to due
process, any substantial amendment in the information will
burden the accused in preparing for his or her defense.
In a criminal case, due process entails, among others, that
the accusation must be in due form and that the accused is given
the opportunity to answer the charges against him or her.167
There is a need for the accused to be supplied with the necessary
information as to “why he [or she] is being proceeded against
and not be left in the unenviable state of speculating why he
[or she] is made the object of a prosecution, it being the fact
that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused
is at stake.”168
163
Kummer v. People, 717 Phil. 670 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
164
Id. at 687.
165
Id.
166
Mendez v. People, 736 Phil. 192 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
167
Buhat v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 562 (1996) [Per J. Hermosisima,
Jr., First Division].
168
Id. at 575.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 773

IV.B
Apart from violating the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of his or her accusation, substantial
amendments to the information after plea is prohibited to prevent
having the accused put twice in jeopardy.
Article III,169 Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
The Constitutional provision on double jeopardy guarantees
the invocation of the law not only against the danger of a second
punishment or a second trial for the same offense, “but also
against being prosecuted twice for the same act where that act
is punishable by . . . law and an ordinance.”170 When a person
is charged with an offense and the case against him or her is
terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other way
without his or her consent, he or she cannot be charged again
with a similar offense.171 Thus, “[t]his principle is founded upon
the law of reason, justice and conscience.” 172
The constitutionally mandated right against double jeopardy
is procedurally bolstered by Rule 117, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure,173 which reads:
169
Bill of Rights.
170
Ada v. Virola, 254 Phil. 341 (1989) [Per C.J. Fernan, Third Division].
171
Mallari v. People, 250 Phil. 421 (1988) [Per J. Fernan, Third Division].
172
Id. at 424.
173
Braza v. Sandiganbayan, 704 Phil. 476 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third
Division].

RULE 117
Motion to Quash
... ... ...
Section 7. Former Conviction or Acquittal; Double Jeopardy. —
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged,
or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
... ... ...
In substantiating a claim for double jeopardy, the following
requisites should be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the first. 174
With regard the first requisite, the first jeopardy only attaches:
(a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when
the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.175
The test for the third requisite is “whether one offense is

identical with the other or is an attempt to commit it or a
frustration thereof; or whether the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information.”176
174
Id. at 493.
175
Id. at 492.
176
Id.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 775

Also known as “res judicata in prison grey,” the mandate

against double jeopardy forbids the “prosecution of a person
for a crime of which he [or she] has been previously acquitted
or convicted.”177 This is to “set the effects of the first prosecution
forever at rest, assuring the accused that he [or she] shall not
thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second
charge against him [or her] for the same offense.”178
People v. Dela Torre179 underscored the protection given under
the prohibition against double jeopardy:
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against
a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3)
against multiple punishments for the same offense.
... ... ...
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence.
The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding
the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again
in the hope of securing a greater penalty.180 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional concept which

guarantees that an accused may not be harassed with constant
charges or revisions of the same charge arising out of the same
facts constituting a single offense. When an accused traverses
the allegations in the information by entering a plea during the
arraignment, he or she is already put in jeopardy of conviction.
177
Caes v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 258-A Phil. 620, 626 (1989)
[Per J. Cruz, First Division].
178
Id. at 626-627.
179
180
Id. at 430.

Having understood the charges, the accused after entering a

plea prepares for his or her defense based on the possible evidence
that may be presented by the prosecution. The protection given
to the accused by the double jeopardy rule does not attach only
after an acquittal or a conviction. It also attaches after the entry
of plea and when there is a prior dismissal for violation of speedy
trial.
An arraignment, held under the manner required by the rules,
grants the accused an opportunity to know the precise charge
against him or her for the first time.181 It is called for so that
he or she is “made fully aware of possible loss of freedom,
even of his [or her] life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him [or her]. At the very least then, he [or she]
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state
is mobilized against him [or her].” 182 Thereafter, the accused
is no longer in the dark and can enter his or her plea knowing
its consequences.183 It is at this stage that issues are joined,
and without this, further proceedings cannot be held without
being void.184 Thus, the expanded concept of double jeopardy
presupposes that since an accused can be in danger of conviction
after his or her plea, the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy should already apply.
IV.C
Any amendment to an information which only states with
precision something which has already been included in the
original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for
conviction of the crime charged is only a formal amendment
that can be made at anytime.185 It does not alter the nature of
181
Borja v. Mendoza, 168 Phil. 83 (1977) [Per J. Fernando, Second
Division].
182
Id. at 87.
183
Id.
184
People v. Estomaca y Garque, 326 Phil. 429 (1996) [Per J. Regalado,
En Banc].
185
People v. Montenegro, 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second
Division].
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 777

the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or divest

the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation.186
Thus, the following are mere formal amendments:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that
the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment
which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not
alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial
right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription. 187
(Citations omitted)
On the other hand, “[a] substantial amendment consists of
the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.”188
The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended
information are similar to that of the original information except
as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte’s co-accused and the
insertion of the phrase “conspiring and confederating together.”
The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of
the prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot
Angelito. Hence, the amendment is merely formal. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General:
Even if one or all of the elements of the crime of murder as alleged
in the original information filed against petitioner Samonte is not
proven, the addition of conspiracy in the amended information, if
duly proven, would not in any way result to his conviction because
conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of
murder. The addition of conspiracy would only affect petitioner Corpuz,
if together with the crime of murder leveled against petitioner Samonte,
186
Ricarze v. Court of Appeals, 544 Phil. 237 (2007) [Per J. Callejo,
Sr., Third Division].
187
Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 283 Phil. 956, 966 (1992) [Per J. Regalado,
En Banc].
188
Id.

both circumstances are duly proven by the prosecution.189 (Emphasis

supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 this Court

held that an allegation of conspiracy which does not change
the prosecution’s theory that the accused willfully shot the victim
is merely a formal amendment.
In that case, two (2) informations for frustrated homicide
were filed against accused Sixto Ruiz (Ruiz), who pleaded not
guilty to both charges. A reinvestigation of these two (2) cases
ensued in the Department of Justice, where the State Prosecutor
filed a motion for leave of court to amend the information on
the ground that the evidence revealed a prima facie case against
Luis Padilla (Padilla) and Magsikap Ongchenco (Ongchenco)
who acted in conspiracy with Ruiz. The trial judge denied the
motion and reasoned that the allegation of conspiracy constitutes
a substantial amendment. Consequently, the State Prosecutor
filed two (2) new informations for frustrated homicide against
Padilla and Ongchenco, which included the alleged conspiracy
with Ruiz. Padilla and Ongchenco moved to quash the two (2)
new informations, which was denied by the Court of First Instance
of Rizal. Ruiz also filed a motion to permit to quash and/or
strike out the allegation of conspiracy in the two (2) new
informations. The trial judge ordered that the motions be stricken
out from the records and explained that “the allegation of
conspiracy in those cases does not alter the theory of the case,
nor does it introduce innovation nor does it present alternative
imputation nor is it inconsistent with the original allegations.”191
This prompted Ruiz, Padilla, and Ongchenco to file before the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, which was subsequently granted. However, this Court
ruled:
189
Rollo, p. 419.
190
People v. Court of Appeals, 206 Phil. 637 (1983) [Per J. Relova,
First Division].
191
Id. at 640.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 779

There is merit in this special civil action. The trial Judge should
have allowed the amendment ... considering that the amendments
sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in
his memorandum, “[T]here was no change in the prosecution’s theory
that respondent Ruiz wilfully[,] unlawfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello ... The
amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because his
participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz
in the original informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed
amendments.”192 (Emphasis supplied)
In that case, the amended information was impelled by a
disclosure implicating Padilla and Ongchenco. Thus,
Otherwise stated, the amendments ... would not have prejudiced
Ruiz whose participation as principal in the crimes charged did not
change. When the incident was investigated by the fiscal’s office,
the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla and Ongchenco. The fiscal did
not include Padilla and Ongchenco in the two informations because
of “insufficiency of evidence.” It was only later when Francisco
Pagcalinawan testified at the reinvestigation that the participation
of Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a consequence, there
was the need for the amendment of the informations or the filing of
new ones against the two.193 (Emphasis supplied)
The records of this present case show that the original
information for murder against Samonte was dated June 5,
2008. 194 Based on Lozano’s affidavit dated on June 30, 2008, 195
Corpus was implicated as the one who instructed Samonte to
192
Id. at 641.
193
Id. at 642.
194
Rollo, p. 410.
195
Id. at 70-72. Lozano’s affidavit stated, in part:
KARAGDAGANG SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY.
Ako ay si Alexander Lozano y Jacob, ... ay malaya at kusang loob na
nagsasalaysay gaya ng mga sumusunod
... ... ...

kill Angelito.196 This prompted the prosecution to conduct a

reinvestigation, which resulted in the filing of the amended
information.197
IV.D
Petitioners quote the portion of People v. Montenegro198 that
cited the case of People v. Zulueta199 as their basis for asserting
that the allegation of conspiracy is a substantial amendment
because it warrants a new defense for the accused:200
Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original
charges will have to be radically modified to meet the new situation.
For undoubtedly the allegation of conspiracy enables the prosecution
to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all the acts, knowledge,
admissions and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes
3. Na bago ako pumunta sa tanggapan ni Atty. Geminiano ay nagtungo

muna ako sa Sangguniang Bayan lagpas alas-9 ng umagang iyon upang
itanong kay Vice Mayor John Diego ang tungkol sa binhi ng palay na
ipinamamahaging kasalukuyan ng munisipyo sa mga magsasaka.
4. Na papunta sa tanggapan ni Vice Mayor ay doon ako dumaan sa pasukan
papuntang gym sa may likod ng opisina ni Mayor Amado “Jong” Corpus,
Jr.
5. Na pagtapat ko sa tanggapan ni Mayor Corpus ay nakita ko si Carlito
Samonte na may ibinubulong kay Mayor habang sila ay nandoroon sa labas
sa may gilid ng tanggapan ni Mayor, at naging kapansin- pansin sa akin na
ang sinasabi ni Samonte kay Mayor ano man iyon dahil pabulong ang
pagsasalita niya ay ikinakagalit ni Mayor na bakas na bakas ko sa anyo ng
mukha ng nahuli.
6. Na kitang-kita ko rin ng abotan ni Mayor si Samonte ng puting baril na
eskwalado (stainless) at dinig na dinig ko ang sabay na pagalit na sinabi
nito kay Samonte na “Putang inang Lito yan! Sige! Birahin mo!”
... ... ...
196
Id. at 514.
197
Id.
198
199
89 Phil. 752 (1951) [Per J. Bengzon, Third Division].
200
Rollo, p. 491.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 781

in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens

the battlefront to allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered
weapons, to the evident discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it
would seem inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this
stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is only
guaranteed two-days’ preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize,
as in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at
stake, it is always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the
charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice.
The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage
of meeting unprepared adversaries.201
Zulueta is inapplicable. In that case, this Court declined the

admission of the amended information because it would change
the nature of the crime as well as the prosecution’s theory:
Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will perceive that
whereas in the first the accused is charged with misappropriation of
public property because: (1) he deceived Angel Llanes into approving
the bargain sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his
abandonment he permitted that woman to obtain the articles at very
cheap prices, in the amended information a third ground of
responsibility is inserted, namely, that he connived and conspired
with Angel Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.
Again it will be observed that the third ground of action in effect
contradicts the original theory of the information: if the accused
conspired with Llanes, he did not deceive the latter, and did not by
mere negligence permit the sale.202 (Emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Montenegro is also inapplicable in this case
because the amendment to the information in that case was
considered as substantial due to the effect of changing the original
crime charged from Robbery under Article 209 to Robbery in
an Uninhabited Place under Article 302 of the Revised Penal
Code. With this, the accused were exposed to a charge with a
201
Id. at 491-492.
202
People v. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752, 754 (1951) [Per J. Bengzon, Third
Division].

higher imposable penalty than that of the original charge to

which they pleaded “not guilty.” 203 Furthermore:
[T]he change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen
into entirely different articles from those originally complained of,
affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused
of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended
information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed
against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused
as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had
already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original
information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a
crime different from that committed by the principal, would be
manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court. 204 (Emphasis
supplied)
The case cited by petitioners in this case rendered the addition
of conspiracy in the amended information substantial because
it either alters the defense of the accused or alters the nature
of the crime to which the accused pleaded. However, the factual
incidents of the cited cases are different from this present case
because the allegation of conspiracy in the amended information
did not change the prosecution’s basic theory that Samonte
willfully and intentionally shot Angelito.
IV.E
Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting
formal amendments when the accused has already entered his
or her plea, it is important that the amendments made should
not prejudice the rights of the accused.205 In People v. Casey, 206
this Court laid down the test in determining whether an accused
is prejudiced by an amendment. Thus,
203
People v. Montenegro, 242 Phil. 655 (1988) [Per J. Padilla, Second
Division].
204
Id. at 662.
205
Pacoy v. Cajigal, 560 Phil. 598 (2007) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,
Third Division].
206
190 Phil. 748 (1981) [Per J. Guerrero, En Banc].
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 783

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment

of an information has been said to be whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might
have would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter
shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused
has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of
the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge
which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of
the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity
to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and
not of substance — not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not
prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.207
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original

information, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-
defense.208 While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment,
Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment will be allowed
after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding
evidence will not be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy
in the new information. Therefore, such formal amendment after
plea is not allowed.
V.A
Petitioners claim that the assailed warrant of arrest was made
in utter disregard of the constitutional mandate which directs
judges to personally conduct an independent examination, under
oath or affirmation, of the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce. 209 They further assert that the assailed
February 26, 2009 Order only consists of three (3) short
sentences that merely contain a certain legal provision, instead
207
Id. at 759.
208
Rollo, p. 410.
209
Id. at 476.

of facts that will supposedly substantiate the issuance of a warrant

of arrest.210
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution reads:
Article III
Bill of Rights
... ... ...
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
In Soliven v. Makasiar,211 the issue raised by the petitioner
in that case called for the interpretation of Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution. It is apparent that the inclusion of the word
“personally” after the word “determined” and the removal of
the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants
to “other responsible officers as may be authorized by law”
has persuaded the petitioner to believe that what the Constitution
now requires is for the “judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses”212 in determining probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant. However, this Court ruled that
this is not an accurate interpretation.
In that case, this Court underscored that the Constitution
gives emphasis on the “exclusive and personal responsibility
of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable
cause.”213 In convincing himself or herself on the presence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, the issuing judge
210
Id. at 477.
211
249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
212
Id. at 399.
213
Id.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 785

“is not required to personally examine the complainant and

his witnesses.”214 “Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise
judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.” 215
In the 1987 Constitution, the judge is required to “personally”
determine the existence of probable cause.216 This requirement,
however, does not appear in the corresponding provisions found
in our previous Constitutions. 217 This gives prominence to the
framers’ intent of placing “greater degree of responsibility upon
trial judges than that imposed under previous Constitutions.” 218
Probable cause cannot be merely established by showing that
a trial judge subjectively believes that he or she has good grounds
for his or her action.219 Thus, good faith does not suffice because
if “subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional
protection would be demeaned and the people would be ‘secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects’ only in the fallible
discretion of the judge.”220 Before issuing a warrant of arrest,
the judge must satisfy himself or herself that based on the
evidence presented, a crime has been committed and the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of it.221
In Lim v. Felix, 222 the ruling in Soliven was reiterated. The
main issue raised in Lim is whether a judge may issue a warrant
214
Id.
215
Id. at 399-400.
216
Abdula v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third
Division].
217
Id.
218
Id. at 773.
219
Allado v. Diokno, 302 Phil. 213 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
220
Id. at 235.
221
Ho v. People, 345 Phil. 597 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
222
272 Phil. 122 (1991) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc].

of arrest without bail “by simply relying on the prosecution’s

certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.”223
In that case, the preliminary investigation records conducted
by the Municipal Court of Masbate were still in Masbate.
However, the Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati still issued
a warrant of arrest against the petitioners. This Court ruled
that the respondent judge “committed a grave error when he
relied solely on the Prosecutor’s certification and issued the
questioned Order ... without having before him any other basis
for his personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause”224 and reasoned that:
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the
1987 Constitution which requires “... probable cause to be personally
determined by the judge ...” not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as
in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate,
he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse
of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal
were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants
of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent
Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence
of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated
by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired
in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the
respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the transmittal
of the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists
is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does
not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
223
Id. at 130.
224
Id. at 138.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 787

The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner

for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report
and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification.
All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and
its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot
determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s
examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion
for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by
the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances
of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor’s certification and investigation report whenever necessary.
He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer
the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case so
require.
... ... ...
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination,
a Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered
by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the
circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge’s sound
discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having
no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. 225 (Emphasis
supplied)
Soliven provided that as dictated by sound policy, an issuing
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses as long as he or she has satisfied himself or
herself of the existence of probable cause.226 To rule otherwise
would unduly burden judges with preliminary examination of
criminal complaints instead of attending to more important
matters. However, due to recent developments in the legal system
which include the judicial affidavit rule, the evil sought to be
prevented in Soliven does not exist anymore. To minimize the
time required for completing testimonies of witnesses in litigated
cases, this Court approved the use of judicial affidavits in lieu
225
Id. at 135-137.
226
Soliven v. Makasiar, 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

of witnesses’ direct testimonies.227 Thus, this is more in tune

with the Constitutional mandate by lessening the burden imposed
upon judges by expediting litigation of cases for them to attend
to their exclusive and personal responsibility of satisfying
themselves with the existence of probable cause when issuing
a warrant.
V.B
Rule 112, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
RULE 112
Preliminary Investigation
... ... ...
Section 6. When Warrant of Arrest May Issue. — (a) By the Regional
Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint
or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of
the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant
of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been
arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information
was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the provision, the issuing judge has the following
options upon the filing of an Information:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a warrant
of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable
cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within
227
Judicial Affidavit Rule, A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC (2012).
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 789

five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within
thirty days from the filing of the information.228 (Citation omitted)
It is required for the judge to “personally evaluate the

resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.”229 In
case the evidence on record fails to substantiate probable cause,
the trial judge may instantly dismiss the case.230
The records of this case reveal that the February 26, 2009
Order presented a discussion showing both the factual and legal
circumstances of the case from the filing of the original
information until the filing of the Motion to Amend Information.
Respondent Judge Pamular, therefore, is familiar with the
incidents of this case, which were his basis for issuing the warrant.
Thus, before he issued the assailed Order and warrant, a hearing
was conducted on February 13, 2009 regarding the motions
and manifestations filed in the case:231
On February 13, 2009, a hearing was held wherein the parties
presented their arguments. On the issue regarding the undated motion
to amend information without notice of hearing and the motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecution, the court ruled that the same
is moot and academic due to the conduct of the said hearing.232
Furthermore, respondent Judge Pamular has a working
knowledge of the circumstances regarding the amended
information that constrained him to find probable cause in issuing
the warrant. The pertinent portion of the Order provided:
Elementary is the rule that the existence of probable cause is
indispensable in the filing of complaint or information and in the
issuance of warrant of arrest. The legion of jurisprudence has defined
probable cause to be concerned with probability, not absolute or even
228
Ong v. Genio, 623 Phil. 835, 843 (2009) (Per J. Nachura, Third
Division].
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Rollo, p. 51.
232
Id. at 52.

moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man and not the exacting calibrations of a judge
after a full blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.233
In respondent Judge Pamular’s Comment, he claimed that:
Be that as it may, still, the undersigned respondent judge made a
careful perusal of the records of the case. Sufficient copies of
supporting documents and/or evidence were read and evaluated
upon which, independent judgment as to the existence of probable
cause was based. But, then again, still not satisfied, the undersigned
even went beyond the face of the resolution and evidences (sic)
presented before this Court. On 13 February 2009, Criminal Case
No. 2618-G was set for hearing. The prosecution and the defense
were given the chance to argue on the matter and ample opportunity
to be heard. 234 (Emphasis supplied)
Apart from respondent judge’s personal examination of the
amended information and supporting documents, the hearing
conducted on February 13, 2009 enabled him to find probable
cause prompting him to issue the warrant of arrest.235
VI
On March 19, 2014, Priscilla filed a Manifestation,236 which
provides that on October 30, 2013, Samonte executed an
affidavit 237 stating that Corpus ordered him to kill Angelito.238
233
Id. at 53.
234
Id. at 281-282.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 556-558.
237
Id. at 559-560.
238
Id. at 556.
VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 791

Settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts.239

These matters are left to the lower courts, which have “more
opportunity and facilities to examine these matters.”240 This
Court is not a trier of facts and cannot receive new evidence
that would aid in the speedy resolution of this case.241 It is not
this Court’s function to “analyze and weigh the evidence all
over again.”242
Therefore, based on the foregoing, this Court remands this
case to the Regional Trial Court for it to pass upon this factual
issue raised by petitioner Samonte based on his October 30,
2013 affidavit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The case is remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija for its
preliminary examination of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest and thereafter proceed to the arraignment
of petitioner Amado Corpus, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta (Chairperson), Reyes, A. Jr., Gesmundo, and Reyes,
J. Jr., JJ., concur.
239
Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 290 Phil. 649 (1992) [Per J. Campos,
Jr., Second Division].
240
Id. at 658.
241
Land Bank of the Phils. v. Livioco, 645 Phil. 337 (2010) [Per J. Del
Castillo, First Division].
242
Alicer v. Compas, 664 Phil. 730 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

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VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 731

[G.R. No. 186403. September 5, 2018]

MAYOR “JONG” AMADO CORPUS, JR. and CARLITO

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS;

732 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

process; (h) where the proceedings [were] ex parte or in which

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 733

4. ID.; ID.; SECTION 11(c), RULE 116 OF THE REVISED

734 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

judge can now continue with the arraignment and further

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 735

is a need for the accused to be supplied with the necessary

736 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

accused traverses the allegations in the information by entering

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 737

to that of the original information except as to the inclusion of

738 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Napoleon Uy Galit & Associates for petitioners.

An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 739

charged.7 Furthermore, it directed the issuance of a warrant of

740 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

The wife of the deceased, Mrs. Priscilla Alcantara-Espinosa

Based on the affidavit 24 executed by Alexander Lozano

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 741

742 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

In its October 7, 2008 Resolution,29 the Regional Trial Court

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 743

Meanwhile, Florendo filed an undated Motion to Amend

744 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

information.41 Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 745

of a warrant of arrest against Corpus. 50 The dispositive portion

Hence, a direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition

746 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Priscilla filed her comment on April 3, 2009.55 She cites

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 747

748 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 749

he would not be able to discharge his constitutional mandate/

750 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

conspiracy is not an essential or qualifying element of the crime of

The Office of the Solicitor General avers that respondent

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 751

a resolution by the secretary of justice to withdraw the information

Petitioners also cite the dispositive portion of Tolentino v.

752 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

On the issue of whether the arraignment of Corpus may proceed

Petitioners assert that Rule 116, Section 11(c) of the Revised

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 753

Petitioners add that respondent judge should have refrained

754 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

cause requires a specific kind of evidence. It is determined in the

Petitioners also cite Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 755

allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons,

756 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

utos po ni Mayor Amado R. Corpuz Jr. ay matagal na pong plano

VOL. 839, SEPTEMBER 5, 2018 757