ARTICLE X

Local Government

General Provisions

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

SECTION 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

SECTION 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment
and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and
cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts
of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

SECTION 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources
of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments.

SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in
the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

SECTION 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds

of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their respective areas, in
the manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of
direct benefits.

SECTION 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 9. Legislative bodies of local governments shall have sectoral representation
as may be prescribed by law.

SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their
own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan
authority that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.

SECTION 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component
cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials,
shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province,
whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote
for elective provincial officials.

SECTION 13. Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate
their efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them in
accordance with law.

SECTION 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or other
similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments
and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental
organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to
strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region.

Autonomous Region

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.

SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous
regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

SECTION 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
SECTION 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region
with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed
of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided
that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall
be included in the autonomous region.

SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen
months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region.

SECTION 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of
the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160
SECTION 1. Title. – This Act shall be known and cited as the “Local Government Code
of 1991”.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources.
The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units.

(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units
through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum.

(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
nongovernmental and people’s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions.

SECTION 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. – The formulation and

implementation of policies and measures on local autonomy shall be guided by the
following operative principles:

(a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local government units of
their respective powers, functions, responsibilities, and resources;

(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an accountable, efficient,
and dynamic organizational structure and operating mechanism that will meet the
priority needs and service requirements of its communities;

(c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials and employees paid
wholly or mainly from local funds shall be appointed or removed, according to merit and
fitness, by the appropriate appointing authority;

(d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local government units shall
be accompanied with provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge their
powers and effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the power to
create and broaden their own sources of revenue and the right to a just share in
national taxes and an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development
of the national wealth within their respective areas;

(e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions;

(f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or coordinate their
efforts, services, and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them;

(g) The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and
barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate
actively in the implementation of national programs and projects;

(h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy not only by
legislative enabling acts but also by administrative and organizational reforms;

(i) Local government units shall share with the national government the responsibility in
the management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial
jurisdiction, subject to the provisions of this Code and national policies;

(j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local government units to
their respective constituents shall be strengthened in order to upgrade continually the
quality of local leadership;

(k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination
of national government policies and programs and extension of adequate technical and
material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units;

(l) The participation of the private sector in local governance, particularly in the delivery
of basic services, shall be encouraged to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an
alternative strategy for sustainable development; and

(m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization contributes to the
continuing improvement of the performance of local government units and the quality of
community life.

SECTION 4. Scope of Application. – This Code shall apply to all provinces, cities,
municipalities, barangays, and other political subdivisions as may be created by law,
and, to the extent herein provided, to officials, offices, or agencies of the national
government.

SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. – In the interpretation of the provisions of this

Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in
its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of
devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;

(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be construed strictly
against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any
tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local government unit pursuant to the
provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people in the community;

(d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising out
of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be
governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the
time such rights were vested; and

(e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision or
jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the place
where the controversies take place.

CHAPTER II

General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units

SECTION 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. – A local government unit

may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered
either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any
other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or
sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code.

SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. – As a general rule, the creation of a local

government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. – It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. – It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. – It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of

Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

SECTION 8. Division and Merger. – Division and merger of existing local government
units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation:
Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land
area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification
of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income
classification prior to such division.

The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6)
months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position
resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein.

SECTION 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. – A local government unit may be

abolished when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to
less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code,
as certified by the national agencies mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to
the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be.

The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished
will be incorporated or merged.

SECTION 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or

substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.

SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices and Facilities. –
(a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall specify the
seat of government from where governmental and corporate services shall be delivered.
In selecting said site, factors relating to geographical centrality, accessibility, availability
of transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development
and economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into account.
(b) When conditions and developments in the local government unit concerned have
significantly changed subsequent to the establishment of the seat of government, its
sanggunian may, after public hearing and by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its
members, transfer the same to a site better suited to its needs. Provided, however, That
no such transfer shall be made outside the territorial boundaries of the local government
unit concerned.

The old site, together with the improvements thereon, may be disposed of by sale or
lease or converted to such other use as the sanggunian concerned may deem
beneficial to the local government unit concerned and its inhabitants.

(c) Local government offices and facilities shall not be transferred, relocated, or
converted to other uses unless public hearings are first conducted for the purpose and
the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained.

SECTION 12. Government Centers. – Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall

endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the
National Government, local government units, or government-owned or -controlled
corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the
local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national
and local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as
contemplated under this Section. The National Government, local government unit or
government-owned or -controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the
construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.

SECTION 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places, Streets and
Structures. – (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine
Historical Commission (PHC), change the name of the following within its territorial
jurisdiction:

(1) Component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the sanggunian
concerned;

(2) Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges;

(3) Public vocational or technical schools and other post-secondary and tertiary schools;

(4) Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities; and

(5) Any other public place or building owned by the provincial government.

(b) The sanggunians of highly urbanized cities and of component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, hereinafter referred to in
this Code as independent component cities, may, in consultation with the Philippine
Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:
(1) City barangays, upon the recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned;

(2) City roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges;

(3) Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, community

colleges and non-chartered colleges;

(4) City hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and

(5) Any other public place or building owned by the city government.

(c) The sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may, in consultation with
the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its
territorial jurisdiction:

(1) City and municipal barangays, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay
concerned;

(2) City, municipal and barangay roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and
bridges;

(3) City and municipal public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical
schools, post-secondary and other tertiary schools;

(4) City and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and

(5) Any other public place or building owned by the municipal government.

(d) None of the foregoing local government units, institutions, places, or buildings shall
be named after a living person, nor may a change of name be made unless for a
justifiable reason and, in any case, not oftener than once every ten (10) years. The
name of a local government unit or a public place, street or structure with historical,
cultural, or ethnic significance shall not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the
sanggunian concerned and in consultation with the PHC.

(e) A change of name of a public school shall be made only upon the recommendation
of the local school board concerned.

(f) A change of name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities shall
be made only upon the recommendation of the local health board concerned.

(g) The change of name of any local government unit shall be effective only upon
ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected.

(h) In any change of name, the Office of the President, the representative of the
legislative district concerned, and the Bureau of Posts shall be notified.
SECTION 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence. – When a new local government unit
is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of
its chief executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other
time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it.

SECTION 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government Units. – Every local
government unit created or recognized under this Code is a body politic and corporate
endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall
exercise powers as a political subdivision of the national government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory.

SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. – (a) Local government units shall
endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the
duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the
functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers
and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities
enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) For a Barangay:

(i) Agricultural support services which include planting materials distribution system and
operation of farm produce collection and buying stations;

(ii) Health and social welfare services which include maintenance of barangay health
center and day-care center;

(iii) Services and facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and
solid waste collection;

(iv) Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay;

(v) Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and water supply systems;

(vi) Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall, multi-purpose pavement, plaza,

sports center, and other similar facilities;

(vii) Information and reading center; and

(viii) Satellite or public market, where viable;

(2) For a Municipality:

(i) Extension and on-site research services and facilities related to agriculture and
fishery activities which include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings, and other
seeding materials for aquaculture; palay, corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal
plant gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of seedling nurseries; demonstration
farms; quality control of copra and improvement and development of local distribution
channels, preferably through cooperatives; interbarangay irrigation systems; water and
soil resource utilization and conservation projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves;

(ii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the
DENR, implementation of community-based forestry projects which include integrated
social forestry programs and similar projects; management and control of communal
forests with an area not exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment of tree
parks, greenbelts, and similar forest development projects;

(iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which
include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal
and child care, and communicable and non-communicable disease control services;
access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical
supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated;

(iv) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on child and youth
welfare, family and community welfare, women’s welfare, welfare of the elderly and
disabled persons; community-based rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars,
street children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and victims of drug abuse; livelihood
and other pro-poor projects; nutrition services; and family planning services;

(v) Information services which include investments and job placement information
systems, tax and marketing information systems, and maintenance of a public library;

(vi) Solid waste disposal system or environmental management system and services or
facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation;

(vii) Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks including freedom parks,
playgrounds, and other sports facilities and equipment, and other similar facilities;
(viii) Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of the residents of
the municipality and which are funded out of municipal funds including, but not limited
to, municipal roads and bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public
elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health centers and other health facilities
necessary to carry out health services; communal irrigation, small water impounding
projects and other similar projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring development,
rainwater collectors and water supply systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage,
and flood control; traffic signals and road signs; and similar facilities;

(ix) Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal enterprises;

(x) Public cemetery;

(xi) Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions, including the acquisition of
equipment, regulation and supervision of business concessions, and security services
for such facilities; and

(xii) Sites for police and fire stations and substations and municipal jail;

(3) For a Province:

(i) Agricultural extension and on-site research services and facilities which include the
prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; dairy farms, livestock
markets, animal breeding stations, and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in
the organization of farmers’ and fishermen’s cooperatives and other collective
organizations, as well as the transfer of appropriate technology;

(ii) Industrial research and development services, as well as the transfer of appropriate
technology;

(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the
DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects,
pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the
environment; and mini-hydroelectric projects for local purposes;

(iv) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which
include hospitals and other tertiary health services;

(v) Social welfare services which include programs and projects on rebel returnees and
evacuees; relief operations; and population development services;

(vi) Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks and other public assembly areas,
and similar facilities;

(vii) Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs of the residents of the province
and which are funded out of provincial funds including, but not limited to, provincial
roads and bridges; inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood control,
and irrigation systems; reclamation projects; and similar facilities;

(viii) Programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings, except
those funded by the Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), and the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF); Provided, That
national funds for these programs and projects shall be equitably allocated among the
regions in proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the population;

(ix) Investment support services, including access to credit financing;

(x) Upgrading and modernization of tax information and collection services through the
use of computer hardware and software and other means;

(xi) Inter-municipal telecommunications services, subject to national policy guidelines;

and

(xii) Tourism development and promotion programs;

(4) For a City:

All the services and facilities of the municipality and province, and in addition thereto,
the following:

(i) Adequate communication and transportation facilities;

(ii) Support for education, police and fire services and facilities;

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs, and services.

(d) The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and the procurement of
equipment and materials from both foreign and local sources necessary for the
provision of the foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the local
government unit concerned, based on national policies, standards and guidelines.

(e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the
responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this section
within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code.
As used in this Code, the term “devolution” refers to the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to
perform specific functions and responsibilities.

(f) The National Government or the next higher level of local government unit may
provide or augment the basic services and facilities assigned to a lower level of local
government unit when such services or facilities are not made available or, if made
available, are inadequate to meet the requirements of its inhabitants.

(g) The basic services and facilities hereinabove enumerated shall be funded from the
share of local government units in the proceeds of national taxes and other local
revenues and funding support from the National Government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned or -controlled corporations which are tasked by law to establish and
maintain such services or facilities. Any fund or resource available for the use of local
government units shall be first allocated for the provision of basic services or facilities
enumerated in subsection (b) hereof before applying the same for other purposes,
unless otherwise provided in this Code.

(h) Regional offices of national agencies or offices whose functions are devolved to
local government units as provided herein shall be phased out within one (1) year from
the approval of this Code. Said national agencies and offices may establish such field
units as may be necessary for monitoring purposes and providing technical assistance
to local government units. The properties, equipment, and other assets of these regional
offices shall be distributed to the local government units in the region in accordance with
the rules and regulations issued by the Oversight Committee created under this Code.

(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local
government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national
agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions, and
responsibilities.

Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local

government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the
extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee:
Provided, That the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules
and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided, further, That regional directors who are
career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional
offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the
National Government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.

(j) To ensure the active participation of the private sector in local governance, local
government units may, by ordinance, sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of
public economic enterprises owned by them in their proprietary capacity.

Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic services or facilities enumerated in
this section.
SECTION 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. – Local government units shall
have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible for
the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program
objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and which
shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall be
automatically and directly released to them without need of any further action; to have
an equitable share in the proceeds from the utilization and development of the national
wealth and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions including sharing the
same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits; to acquire, develop, lease,
encumber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in
their proprietary capacity and to apply their resources and assets for productive,
developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their
governmental or proprietary powers and functions and thereby ensure their
development into self-reliant communities and active participants in the attainment of
national goals.

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain
for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. – (a) A city or municipality may, through an

ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the
Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the
following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:

(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%);

(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten percent (10%);
and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). otherwise known as “The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law”, shall not be affected by the said reclassification
and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65
of said Act.

(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendation of
the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.

(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue to
prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land
resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human settlements,
and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such
plans.

(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such approval
shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same shall be deemed as
approval thereof.

(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in

any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

SECTION 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. – (a) A local government unit may,
pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road,
alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of
permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all
the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the
public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed without
making provisions for the maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus
permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be
lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom park shall be closed
permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.

(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be temporarily closed during
an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs,
or an undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications, and waterworks
projects, the duration of which shall be specified by the local chief executive concerned
in a written order: Provided, however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or
square shall be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not officially
sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local government unit concerned.

(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly enacted ordinance, temporarily
close and regulate the use of any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public
place where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas may be
established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of
commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.

SECTION 22. Corporate Powers. – (a) Every local government unit, as a corporation,
shall have the following powers:

(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;

(2) To sue and be sued;

(3) To have and use a corporate seal;

(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;

(5) To enter into contracts; and

(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the
limitations provided in this Code and other laws.

(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing
corporate seals: Provided, That newly established local government units or those
without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered
with the Department of the Interior and Local Government: Provided, further, That any
change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided hereon.

(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.

(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary
functions and in the management of their economic enterprises, subject to the
limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.

SECTION 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants. – Local chief executives may,
upon authority of the sanggunian, negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in
kind, in support of the basic services or facilities enumerated under Section 17 hereof,
from local and foreign assistance agencies without necessity of securing clearance or
approval therefor from any department, agency, or office of the National Government or
from any higher local government unit: Provided, That projects financed by such grants
or assistance with national security implications shall be approved by the national
agency concerned: Provided, further, That when such national agency fails to act on the
request for approval within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be
deemed approved.

The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon signing of such grant
agreement or deed of donation, report the nature, amount, and terms of such
assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President.

SECTION 24. Liability for Damages. – Local government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.

CASES BATCH 1
SAN JUAN V CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
GR No. 92299, April 19 1991
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor
San Juan, peititioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed
position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as
PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently
approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the appointment of Almajose before the DBM and
the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his
contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of
PBO and that the appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112. It states that "upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state policy
of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25 and Art. X, Sec.
2 thereof.
He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly be defeated by a mere
administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to itself the right to fill-up any
existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as
embodied in public respondent DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.

Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated
by the provincial governor.
Held: We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two
interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local
autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution
The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local governments.
He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute.
Article II, S. 25, 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."
The 14 sections in Article X, on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in
greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
"Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
"Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units."
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
"""""" The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of
the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements."""""
IS ultra vires and MUST BE set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified
recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the list of
nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new
recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE, JR. GR NO. 132988, JULY 19, 2000

FACTS: The President (RAMOS) issued AO 372 (Adoption of Economy Measures in
Government for FY 1998). The AO provided that (a) 10% of the Internal Revenue allotment to
LGUs is withheld. Further it (b) "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent.
Subsequently, on, President Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing
to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the
LGUs. Petitioner contends that by issuing AO 372, the President exercised the power of control
over LGUs in contravention of law. Moreover, withholding 10% of the IRA is in contravention
of Sec 286 LGC and of Sec 6 Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release
to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. The Solicitor General, on the
other hand, argues that the aforesaid AO was purportedly in order to cope with the nation’s
economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation on that said period. Further, he
claims that AO 372 was issued merely as an exercise of the President’s power of supervision
over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local
governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal
services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA does
not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue
shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
ISSUE/S 1. Whether or not Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce
their expenditures by 25 percent is a valid exercise of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments? YES
2. Whether or not Section 4 of AO 372, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local
governments? NO
HELD:
1. YES. There are several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters:
(1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the
presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the
various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with the above requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, the respondents did not even try
to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit.
Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local
governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to
reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.  Although the Supreme Court agrees
with the Petitioner that the requisites were not complied with, it still holds that the President’s
directive in AO 372 is in conformity with law, and does constitute interference to local
autonomy. There is interference if Section 1 of AO 372 was couched in mandatory or binding
language. While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 3722 have a rather commanding tone, the
provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal
restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the
President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood,
however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not
follow such advice.
2. NO. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in
the national internal revenue as mandated by the Constitution. The Local Government Code.
specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.  The use of the term "shall" shows
that the provision is imperative. Therefore, Section 4 of AO 372, which orders the withholding of
10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments
to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x"

MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V BAZ, JR.

GR No. 105746, December 2, 1996
FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 by then Pres. Elpidio Quirino,
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. By virtue of Municipal Council
Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios
Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara, Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical dedcription in E.O.
No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the
Municipality of Jimenez. While conceding that the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, the
Municipality of Jimenez, in its answer, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an
agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement, which was approved by
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental in its Resolution No. 77 dated February 18, 1950,
fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. On October 11, 1989, the Provincial
Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution
approving the agreement between the parties was void since the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to
the Constitution and the LGC of 1983 (BP 337), Sec. 134. The Provincial Board denied the
motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 against
Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its Provincial Board, the Commission on
Audit, the Departments of Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive
Secretary.

Issues: 2. Whether R.A. 7160, Sec. 442 (d) is valid despite not conforming to the
constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of
new municipalities.
3. whether it is the boundary provided for in E.O. 258 or in Resolution No. 77 of the
Provincial board of Misamis Occidental which should be used as basis for adjudicating
Sinacaban’s territorial claim.
Held: 2. Sinacaban is not subject to the plebiscite requirement since it attained de facto status at
the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. The plebiscite requirement for the creation of
municipalities applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution
– it cannot be applied to municipalities created before.
3. E.O. No. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only the barrios (now barangays) therein
mentioned. What it says is that “Sinacaban contains” those barrios. The reason for this is that the
technical description, containing the metes and bounds of a municipality’s territory, is
controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a relocation survey as the only means of
determining the boundaries of the municipality & consequently to which municipality the
barangays in question belong. Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law
is not the carrying into effect of the law but its amendment – and a resolution of a provincial
Board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality that is contrary to the
technical description of the territory of the municipality is not binding. If Resolution No. 77 of
the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the
territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing Sinacaban’s claim. In
case no settlement of boundary disputes is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of
the province (Sec. 79, LGC of 1983). Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the
Decision and Resolution of the Provincial Board. This was in accordance with the LGC of 1983,
the governing law when the action was brought by Jimenez in 1989. The governing law now is
Secs. 118-119, LGC of 1991 (RA 7160). Jimenez’s contention that the RTC failed to decide the
case “within 1 yr from the start of the proceedings” as required by Sec. 79 of the LGC of 1983
and the 90-day period provided for in Art.VIII, Sec.15 of the Constitution does not affect the
validity of the decision rendered. Failure of a court to decide within the period prescribed by law
does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for
possible administrative sanction.

ALVAREZ, ET AL. V GUINGINA, JR., ET AL.

GR No. 118303, January 31, 1996
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of
Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted
a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled
out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243.
Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of
Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be
a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA
(Internal Revenue Allotment) was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further,
the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd
reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after
the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as
was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross
accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue
to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit.
They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the
same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own
as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

ORILLO, ET AL. V COMELEC

GR No. 93054, December 4, 1990
Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao,
Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.”
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the
creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province
and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-
mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that
the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast
only in the province of Ifugao.
the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act
for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said
Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issue: The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only
province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can,
alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held: The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords — provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This
is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for
administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To
become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional
requirements are not present in this case.

Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 6766 provide that the Cordillera Autonomous
Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional
Government and local government units. It further provides that:
“SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili
within the Autonomous Region . . .”
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials
exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

MIRANDA, ET AL. V AGUIRRE

GR No. 133064, Septmber 16, 1999
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an
independent component city to a component city. On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720
which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was
signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among
others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They alleged as ground the lack of
provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a
proper plebiscite. Respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also
contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. Sol
Gen: contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent
component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger,
abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite
of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
Issue: whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere
component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite.
Ruling: Yes, the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160),
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a
common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that
the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is
one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them —
direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. The
changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial.
They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they
cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its physical and political
configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people. On the other hand, our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the classification
involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a
need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ." In accord with the Constitution,
sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they involve
requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to
help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not
imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government
Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income,
population and land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code
provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite
shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date. Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of
1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory. The criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic
purpose. In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose — to use the
people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. The records
show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In
the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City
has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and
the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise
for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant
change in its socio-economic-political status. The challenged Act is manifestly void and
unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz., the plebiscite, the
proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are
equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new
province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining
areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental, grossly contravenes and disregards the
mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may
be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of
the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby
issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.

AGUSTIN VS EDU
GR No. L-49112, Feb. 2, 1979
FACTS: Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning
device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process
and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commisioner set forth the implementing
rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped
when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early
warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will
make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set
of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are unlawful and unconstitutional
and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part
of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the
specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles without
appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna Convention was ratified by the Philippine
Government under PD 207.

ISSUE:

WON the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.

HELD:

NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful delegation of
legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. In this case, the particular
exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification of the said Hague
and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .

The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreoever, at war with the
principle of international morality.

PETITION DISMISSED.

CITY GOV'T. OF QUEZON CITY, ET AL. V ERICTA

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for the charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and
have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death. As such, the Quezon
City engineer required the respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate
the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.

The then Court of First Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta, declared Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64 null and void.

Petitioners argued that the taking of the respondent’s property is a valid and reasonable exercise
of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground
of paupers. They further argued that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in
the exercise of local police power, ” to make such further ordinances and resolutions not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience
of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or confiscation
of property was obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property.

Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power.

Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law’ (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph
1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the
state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of
sovereignty.

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision
that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the
City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license
fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practised
in the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or confiscate. The
ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park
cemetery.

Police power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property’. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is
not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a
city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and
the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. A property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which
are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations, established
by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is possessed
with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and safety of
the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law and
providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.

However, in the case at hand, there is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least
six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased
paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by

Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides
in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such
place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from
said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious
and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

GR NO. 74457, MARCH 20, 1987

FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in
January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for
violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos
and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of E.O. No. 626
(except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if female).
The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright
confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries,
thus denying due process.

RULING:

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently
resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.” Flexibility must be the best virtue of
guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
safeguard against official arbitrariness.

It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is
missing. Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright
confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus
denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.
To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police
power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated
for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert
and protect his rights. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional,
and the superseceas bond is cancelled.

MACASIANO V DIOKNO
GR NO. 97764, AUGUST 10, 1992
Facts: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the
closure of some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a
flea market thereon. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized to enter into a
contract to any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea market and/or vending areas. Because of this purpose, respondent Palanyag
entered into an agreement with the municipality of Paranaque with the obligation to remit dues to
the treasury. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
 On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of Metropolitan
Traffic Command ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls. These stalls were later
returned to Palanyag. Petitioner then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days to
discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents
filed with the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for
preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction. The court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary
injunction.

Issue: Whether an ordinance issued by the municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and
use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market is valid?

Held: Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing
the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn
from public use, the property becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned. It is only then that respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might lawfully used or
conveyed.

Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for
vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private
persons. Hence the ordinance is null and void.

BINAY V DOMINGO
GR NO. 92389, SEPT. 11 1991
FACTS: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a bereaved
family whose gross income does not exceed P2000 a month. The resolution was referred to respondent
COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the resolution and disallowed in
audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. COA's objection is of the position that
there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under the
resolution and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati. COA's also
argued that. "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby
should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the
inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

ISSUES:

(1) WON the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the
general welfare clause.
(2) WON the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of the equal protection clause in the
constitution.

HELD:

(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of
the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare
(Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

(2) No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the
hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the
bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION,

FACTS:
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of
Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against private
respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of
Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at
Wakas, San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, alleging
in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code);
and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
It turned out that the plaintiff had earlier filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same
parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17939. Said case was ealier dismissed with
prejudice. The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became final.
The RTC then dismissed the second complaint, which the CA affirmed upon appeal.
Contentions of petitioner: (a) A resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law; (b) The
principle of res judicata is not applicable.
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance insofar as filing a complaint for expropriation is concerned;
(2) Whether or not the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is applicable
under the circumstances.
RULING:
(1)
No. A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Parañaque, cannot authorize an
expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local
Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A
resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not
suffice.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain
is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3.
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to
the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. In the
case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution of the municipal council.
Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and
“ordinance” are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary for an ordinance,
but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or
private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language — from
“resolution” under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 — demands a strict construction.
(2)
No. The principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature of
eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to exercise the
power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of
eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach every form of property which the
State might need for public use.” All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the
government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Thus, the State or its authorized
agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by reason alone of previous non-
compliance with any legal requirement. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate
the right of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a
previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit on the ground
that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue; it cannot, however,
bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by
law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the
same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain
through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said
legal requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with. To rule otherwise
will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social
justice.

DELA PAZ MASIKIP V. THE CITY OF PASIG, ET

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pag-
Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to
expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the “sports development
and recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to
Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.

Petitioner replied stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional,
invalid, and oppressive.
Respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is “to provide
sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents” and subsequently filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation,

ISSUE:

Was the City of Pasig able to establish “genuine necessity”?

RULING:

The Court holds that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. A scrutiny of the records shows that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council, the basis for the passage of Ordinance
No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City,
including those of Caniogan.

Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the
taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a
public character, must also be shown to exist.

ESTATE OR HEIRS OF THE LATE EX-JUSTICE JOSE B.L. REYES V. CITY OF

MANILA,

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Section 39. Qualifications. -

(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends
to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
 (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.

(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay
must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.

(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but
not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

Section 41. Manner of Election. -

(a) The governor, vice-governor, city mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal mayor, municipal
vice-mayor, and punong barangay shall be elected at large in their respective units by the
qualified voters therein. However, the sangguniang kabataan chairman for each barangay
shall be elected by the registered voters of the katipunan ng kabataan, as provided in this
Code.

(b) The regular members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and
sangguniang bayan shall be elected by district, as may be provided for by law. Sangguniang
barangay members shall be elected at large. The presidents of the leagues of sanggunian
members of component cities and municipalities shall serve as ex officio members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan concerned. The presidents of the "liga ng mga barangay and the
pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan" elected by their respective chapters, as
provided in this Code, shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan.
 (c) In addition thereto, there shall be one (1) sectoral representative from the women, one (1)
from the workers, and one (1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector as may be determined by the
sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior to the holding of the next local elections
as may be provided for by law. The COMELEC shall promulgate the rules and regulations to
effectively provide for the election of such sectoral representatives.

Section 42. Date of Election. - Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials shall
be held every three (3) years on the second Monday of May.

Section 43. Term of Office. -

(a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall
be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for
by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected
during the local elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall
be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May 1994.

CHAPTER II
Vacancies and Succession

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein.

(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.

(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
 voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.

For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.

Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. -

(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above do
not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities;

(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cities
and the sangguniang bayan;

(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.

(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which
the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position
next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the
manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political party as
that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term
of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of
membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are
conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination and certification shall
be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official
responsible therefore.

(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not belong
to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian
concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.

(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the
organization concerned.

Section 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. -

(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to,
leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or
municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall
automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief
executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which
can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.
 (b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate
sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has
reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the
local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents showing that said
legal causes no longer exist.

(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his
territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he may
designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall specify
the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the
local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.

(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue
such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right to assume the
powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence of the said
local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c) hereof.

(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any local
official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the vice-
governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member, as the case may be.

Section 47. Approval of Leaves of Absence. -

(a) Leaves of absence of local elective officials shall be approved as follows:

(1) Leaves of absence of the governor and the mayor of a highly urbanized city or an
independent component city shall be approved by the President or his duly
authorized representative;

(2) Leaves of absence of vice-governor or a city or municipal vice-mayor shall be

approved by the local chief executive concerned: Provided, That the leaves of
absence of the members of the sanggunian and its employees shall be approved by
the vice-governor or city or municipal vice-mayor concerned;

(3) Leaves of absence of the component city or municipal mayor shall be approved
by the governor; and

(4) Leaves of absence of a punong barangay shall be approved by the city or

municipal mayor: Provided, That leaves of absence of sangguniang barangay
members shall be approved by the punong barangay.

(b) Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove specified is not acted upon
within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence shall be
deemed approved.

CHAPTER III
Local Legislation
Section 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative power shall be exercised by the
sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang panlungsod for the city; the
sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the sangguniang barangay for the barangay.

Section 49. Presiding Officer. -

(a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the city
vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang
bayan; and the punong barangay, of the sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall
vote only to break a tie.

(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves
a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of
ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he
temporarily presided.

Section 50. Internal Rules of Procedure. -

(a) On the first regular session following the election of its members and within ninety (90)
days thereafter, the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of
procedure.

(b) The rules of procedure shall provided for the following:

(1) The organization of the sanggunian and the election of its officers as well as the
creation of standing committees which shall include, but shall not be limited to, the
committees on appropriations, women and family, human rights, youth and sports
development, environmental protection, and cooperatives; the general jurisdiction of
each committee; and the election of the chairman and members of each committee;

(2) The order and calendar of business for each session;

(3) The legislative process;

(4) The parliamentary procedures which include the conduct of members during
sessions;

(5) The discipline of members for disorderly behavior and absences without
justifiable cause for four (4) consecutive sessions, for which they may be censured,
reprimanded, or excluded from the session, suspended for not more than sixty (60)
days, or expelled: Provided, That the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall require
the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) vote of all the sanggunian members:
Provided, further, That a member convicted by final judgment to imprisonment of at
least one (1) year for any crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically
expelled from the sanggunian; and

(6) Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt. lawphil™

Section 51. Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests of Sanggunian Members. -
 (a) Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office, make a full disclosure of his
business and financial interests, or professional relationship or any relation by affinity or
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, which he may have with any person, firm, or
entity affected by any ordinance or resolution under consideration by the sanggunian of
which he is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of interest. Such relationship
shall include:

(1) Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the entity or firm to which the
ordinance or resolution may apply; and

(2) Contracts or agreements with any person or entity which the ordinance or
resolution under consideration may affect.

In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory provision applicable to this

situation, "conflict of interest" refers in general to one where it may be reasonably
deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to
some private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his
judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public.

(b) The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in writing and submitted to the
secretary of the sanggunian or the secretary of the committee of which he is a member. The
disclosure shall, in all cases, form part of the record of the proceedings and shall be made in
the following manner:

(1) Disclosure shall be made before the member participates in the deliberations on
the ordinance or resolution under consideration: Provided, That, if the member did
not participate during the deliberations, the disclosure shall be made before voting on
the ordinance or resolution on second and third readings; and

(2) Disclosure shall be made when a member takes a position or makes a privilege
speech on a matter that may affect the business interest, financial connection, or
professional relationship described herein.

Section 52. Sessions. -

(a) On the first day of the session immediately following the election of its members, the
sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its regular sessions. The
minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be once a week for the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, and twice a month for the
sangguniang barangay.

(b) When public interest so demands, special sessions may be called by the local chief
executive or by a majority of the members of the sanggunian.

(c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closed-door session is
ordered by an affirmative vote of a majority of the members present, there being a quorum,
in the public interest or for reasons of security, decency, or morality. No two (2) sessions,
regular or special, may be held in a single day.
 (d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to the members shall
be served personally at the member's usual place of residence at least twenty-four (24)
hours before the special session is held.

Unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds (2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present,
there being a quorum, no other matters may be considered at a special session except those
stated in the notice.

(e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings which may be
published upon resolution of the sanggunian concerned.

Section 53. Quorum. -

(a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified
shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum be
raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the
members and thereafter announce the results.

(b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time as a
quorum is constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without justifiable cause
by designating a member of the sanggunian to be assisted by a member or members of the
police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, to
arrest the absent member and present him at the session.

(c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the immediately preceding
subsection, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion duly
approved by the members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack of
quorum.

Section 54. Approval of Ordinances. -

(a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or

sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor,
as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix
his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The
sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3)
vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal
intents and purposes.

(b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the
sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case
of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had
signed it.

(c) Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of
all its members, be signed by the punong barangay.

Section 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. -

 (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sanggunian panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or
prejudicial to the public welfare, stating his reasons therefor in writing.

(b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a
local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the
payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or
items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the
sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in
the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall
be deemed reenacted.

(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian
may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its
members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief
executive concerned.

Section 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of
approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public
investment programs formulated by the local development councils.

(b) Within thirty (30) days after the receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt
of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its
decision.

(c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the
power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it
shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang
panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or
municipal authorities of the action it has taken.

(d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with
law and therefore valid.

Section 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang

Bayan. -

(a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies
of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned
for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal
ordinances.
 (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take
action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be
deemed approved.

(c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the
barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian
concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its
comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment,
amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is
suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.

Section 58. Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any
ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program,
after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official
or employee concerned.

Section 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. -

(a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local
development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10)
days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the
provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two
(2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.

(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or
resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city,
municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government
unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof.

The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or
English and in the language understood by the majority of the people in the local government
unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for
the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.

(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In
the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such
ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the
sanggunian of origin is situated.

(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of
the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be
published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in
the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of
general circulation.

CHAPTER IV
Disciplinary Actions

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. - An elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
 (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor;

(e) Abuse of authority;

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan,
and sangguniang barangay;

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of
the proper court.

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. - A verified complaint against any erring
local elective official shall be prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President;
and

(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.

Section 62. Notice of hearing. -

(a) Within seven (7) days after the administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the
President or the sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the respondent to
submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, and commence the
investigation of the case within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the respondent.

(b) When the respondent is an elective official of a province or highly urbanized city, such
hearing and investigation shall be conducted in the place where he renders or holds office.
For all other local elective officials, the venue shall be the place where the sanggunian
concerned is located.

(c) However, no investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days immediately prior to any
local election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If
 preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the 90-day period immediately preceding
local election, it shall be deemed automatically lifted upon the start of aforesaid period.

Section 63. Preventive Suspension. -

(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly

urbanized or an independent component city;

(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or

municipality; or

(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the
evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days:
Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.

(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be
deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was
formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case
is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such
delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.

(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as
abuse of authority.

Section 64. Salary of Respondent Pending Suspension. - The respondent official preventively
suspended from office shall receive no salary or compensation during such suspension; but upon
subsequent exoneration and reinstatement, he shall be paid full salary or compensation including
such emoluments accruing during such suspension.

Section 65. Rights of Respondent. - The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity to appear
and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him, and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. -

(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from the start
thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the investigation, the Office of the President or
the sanggunian concerned shall render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the
 facts and the reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be
furnished the respondent and all interested parties.

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a
period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to
the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications
required for the office.

(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be
considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position.

Section 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:

(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlungsod
of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and

(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan
and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities.

Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.

Section 68. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final
or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such appeal. In the event the
appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the
pendency of the appeal.

CHAPTER V
Recall

Section 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by
the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such
recall belongs.

Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. -

(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the
local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and
municipality which shall be composed of the following:

(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian members of the
municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay members in the city;

(3) Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are
elected by district, all elective municipal officials in the district; and in cases where
 sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay
officials in the district; and

(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in
the municipality.

(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a
public place and initiate a recall proceeding against any elective official in the local
government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly
initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory
recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly
initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered
voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.

(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his
representative, and in the presence of a representative of the petitioner and a
representative of the official sought to be recalled and, and in a public place in the
province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the
COMELEC through its office in the local government unit concerned. The COMELEC
or its duly authorized representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a
public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more
than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness
of the petition and the required percentage of voters.

(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorized
representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the position and
thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official
sought to be recalled.

Section 71. Election on Recall. - Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the
appropriate local office of the COMELEC, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall
set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the filing of
the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials. and forty-
five (45) days in the case of provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions
and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.

Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon
the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive
the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall continue in office.

Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not
be allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.

Section 74. Limitations on Recall. -

 (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term
of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Section 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. - All expenses incident to recall elections shall be
borne by the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act a contingency fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of recall
elections.

BATCH 2 CASES

FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE

BIANVENIDO VS COMELEC
Facts:
Bienvenido Marquez and Eduardo Rodriguez were candidates for Governor of the province of
Quezon in 1992. Rodriguez won, and this prompted Marquez to file a quo warranto proceedings
against Marquez for being disqualified as a candidate because he is a “fugitive from justice”
which is against Sec. 40 (e) of the Local Government Code.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad
Allegedly, at the time Rodriguez filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him
for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, USA. A warrant was issued for his arrest, but which remained
unserved because he already went to the Philippines then.
Marquez argued that Section 40(e) of RA 7160 is rather clear. "Fugitive from justice" includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged flee to avoid prosecution.
Rodriguez, on the other hand, cites the Congressional Oversight Committee who drafted the IRR
for the Local Government Code. In the deliberations, it could be seen that there was confusion as
to the implications of defining what a fugitive from justice really is. There was a pronouncement
from the Chairman that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, and this
was adapted verbatim in Art. 73 of the IRR.
Issue: What is the definition of “fugitive from justice” that should be followed?
Held: "Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition
truly finds support from jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and
ordinary connotation of the term.
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to
the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive)
"who has been convicted by final judgment" is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the
law.

Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of
its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however,
when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the
law but must remain congruent to it.
There was no clear ruling on the instance of Rodriguez because Comelec never made a
determination as to his status as a fugitive from justice. Case was remanded to Comelec. (G.R.
No. 112889, April 18, 1995)
RODRIGUEZ VS COMELEC (karugtong ni marquez)
FACTS: Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated
copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court and of the felony complaint.
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers proclaimed him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition
for certiorari.
Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?
Held: No. A fugitive from justice is defined as “not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.” This indicates that
the intent to evade is the compelling factor that makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction,
and there can only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the fleeing person knows
of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade
on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be
applied in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on June 25, 1985, five
months before the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12,
1985 and of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court. It was clearly
impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the
time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction
— to speak of yet at such time.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon
Province gubernatorial post.

RESIDENCE VS DOMICILE
=MARCOS VS COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position
of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First
District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that
the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of
votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
Issue: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the
one year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
Held: Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residencE.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run
for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District
of Leyte.
=FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Fact: Juan G. Frivaldo filed a petition to annul three Resolutions of Comelec, that disqualified
him from running for governor of Sorsogon. In 1995, Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any
public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the
petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on
said date.
Lee filed a petition (supplemental)2 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor
of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the proclamation of
Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under
P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had
been granted." As such, when "the said order was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation as
governor."
Lee filed a petition questioning the Frivaldo’s proclamation when his “judicially declared
disqualification is a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to
and to hold the Office of Governor.”
Issues: 1. Whether the the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure
his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
Held: 1. Yes. According to the law, citizenship may be reacquired by 1) direct act of the
Congress, 2) by naturalization, and 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. The law does not
specifically state that a particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (at least 1 year residency immediately preceding the day of election)
and age (at least 35 years of age on the election day.) Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office to ensure that no alien, or person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof. An official begins to govern or discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and
on the day law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on
the very day the term of his office began, he therefore, qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office
and to discharge the functions and responsibilities therof as of the said date. The law intended
citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a voter, even if a voter presumes being a
citizen first. The Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to vote actually. In other words, the law’s purpose in the second
requirement is to ensure prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern
and not anywhere else. In fact, petitioner voted in all previous elections. The prime issue of
citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election
or of filing the candidacy. The repatriation of the petitioner retroacted upon the date of filing of
his application.
=LABO VS COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. Private respondent Lardizabal, the
losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto questioning petitioner’s citizenship. The latter
claims that petitioner is a naturalized Australian citizen, having married an Australian citizen.
Records also showed petitioner’s oath and affirmation of allegiance to the Queen of Australia.
These were not denied; petitioner however claimed that his naturalization in Australia made him
at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian
citizen was bigamous.
Issue:
Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?
Ruling:
NO. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these
are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. All
of which are applicable to the petitioner. In connection with this, Article IV, Section 5, of the
present Constitution provides that, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.”

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled
after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian
citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country.
What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship
and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that
he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has
been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct
act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does
the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He
does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring
Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
… (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed
to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation
shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-
dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to
public office.

AGE QUALIFICATION
=GARVIDA VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of
a certain barangay. However the Board of election tellers denied her application on the ground
that she is already 21 years and 10 months old. She already exceeded the age limit for
membership as laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824.
The municipal circuit trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as member
and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but
the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.
However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is
disqualified to become a voter and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more
than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she was born on June 11, 1974 as can be
gleaned from her birth certificate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official
RULING:
In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she
registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and
nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old.
When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was
merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member
of the Katipunan ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK
officials set by Section 428 of the Local Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2824.
Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
RULE ON SUCCESSION
LABO VS. COMELEC
Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his
COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner
Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992
On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the
COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission
resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo,
Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule
18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor
of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is
elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of
Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.

On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others,
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct
respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested
elections.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory.
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as
regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of
candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view
that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should
be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy —
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as
Mayor of Baguio City.
Held:
No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of
respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already become final
and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by
petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no
restraining order was issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino
citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his
proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification
for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an
elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.

ORTEGA VS. COMELEC

Same facts
ISSUE: WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the
next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio
City.
RULING : No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner
Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of
Baguio City.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city
mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then
qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.
Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the
Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s)
candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo,
who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
note: Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and
Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. . .
BORJA VS COMELEC
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending
on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death
of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more
terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor
of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a
candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the ground that Capco would have
already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible
to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco
was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves
the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the
three-term limit.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as
well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the
office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A
consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the
freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that
the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the
first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to
falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to
govern them.