Laurel VS Misa
Laurel VS Misa
Laurel VS Misa
Laurel Vs Misa
77 Phil 856 (1847)
Ponente: ?
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1945, Anastacio Laurel, herein petitioner, a Filipino citizen, was arrested by the
US Army and was interned, under a commitment order ―for his active collaboration with the
Japanese during the Japanese occupation.
He was charged with treason as defined and penalized by Art. 114 of the Penal Code.
However, in September 1945, he was turned over to the Commonwealth government and since
then he has been under the custody of the Director of Prisons. Petitioner then filed a petition for
habeas corpus mainly asserting that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the
reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently,
the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUES:
WON the petitioner can be prosecuted for the crime of treason by giving aid and support to the
enemy during the Japanese occupation.
HELD:
YES. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government because the inhabitants of the occupied territory
were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during the enemy‘s occupation.
Just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of
treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way a inhabitant of a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate or sovereign if he
adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort.
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy‘s occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government; that the sovereignty vested in the titular government must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed
and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty
cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least
during the so-called period of suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights
of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant; and that as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is
not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their
legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance.