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Marketization and privatization in mass

Article in International Journal of Educational Development · March 2000

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 International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijedudev

Marketization and privatization in mass education systems

Abstract

Recent education reform in many countries has sought to dismantle centralized educational bureaucracies to create
systems that emphasize parental choice and competition between schools, thereby creating quasi-markets in educational
services. In addition to this widespread marketization of public education systems, publicly financed and provided
education services have been privatized. In this paper, marketization and privatization policies are compared, and initial
research evidence on the impact of marketization and privatization in England, the USA, Australia and New Zealand
is examined in the light of the claims about diversity of provision, efficiency, effectiveness and equity. Also considered
in the significance of attempts currently underway in the UK and elsewhere to temper the emphasis on consumer rights
within policies of marketization and privatization with a renewed concern for the citizen rights traditionally associated
with social-democratic approaches to education policy.  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Educational policy; Comparative education; Educational administration; Marketization; Privatization

In many parts of the world, there have been Sections 2 and 3 look at the form and effects of
attempts to move away from the “one best system” these reforms within three countries—England and
of state funded and state provided education. Wales, New Zealand and the USA. In the light of
Recent reforms have sought to dismantle cen- these effects, the final part of the paper considers
tralized bureaucracies and create in their place whether and how we might move beyond marketiz-
devolved systems of schooling with increased ation and privatization to revitalize mass edu-
emphasis on parental choice and competition cation systems.
between increasingly diversified types of school.
These reforms are often seen to be leading to an
increasing “marketization” and “privatization” of 1. Marketization and privatization of welfare
education. The first part of this paper seeks to
locate these changes in broader developments in Although the terms marketization and privatiz-
welfare policy and considers whether marketiz- ation are frequently used, sometimes inter-
ation and privatization are part of the same policy changeably, to describe recent changes in welfare
constellation or represent distinctive tendencies. provision, they are often only loosely defined. In
connection with privatization, for instance, Donni-
son (1984, p. 45) argues that “its meaning is at best
* Tel.: +44-171-612-6813; fax: +44-171-612-6090. uncertain and often tendentious”. Indeed, he goes
E-mail address: g.whitty@ioe.ac.uk (G. Whitty) so far as to claim that it is little more than the

0738-0593/00/$ - see front matter  2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 7 3 8 - 0 5 9 3 ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 6 1 - 9
94 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107

invention of political journalists designed “not to Similarly, for Le Grand and Robinson (1984, p.
clarify analysis but as a symbol … to dramatise a 6), privatization is broadly defined and may
conflict and mobilise support”. However, while involve a decline in state provision, a reduction of
such terms are clearly politically embedded, explo- state subsidies and more deregulation, as well as
ration of their constituent elements and distinctive straightforward transfer of services from the public
features provides a useful framework to analyze to the private sectors. It is possible to see examples
the scale and nature of welfare restructuring. of all these processes within recent education
At its simplest level, the organization of welfare reforms. For example, Pring (1987) has suggested
can be represented in terms of the relationship that, under the Thatcher government in Britain,
between sources of funding and provision (Fig. 1). there was an increase in the purchasing at public
Klein (1984, p. 14) suggests that “the ‘pure’ model expense of educational services provided in private
of comprehensive state welfare” has been located schools, contracting out of services (such as school
in Cell 1. This is especially true of most (though meals and cleaning) to private providers, an
not all) mass education systems, where both fund- increasing requirement upon parents in public
ing and provision have traditionally been located schools to pay for services (such as music tuition in
firmly in the public sector. schools) that had hitherto sometimes been provided
However, this presents rather too static a picture free at the point of consumption and the introduc-
to capture the complex processes involved in tion of student loans into the higher education sys-
recent reforms in education and other aspects of tem. Pring argues that, when seen in conjunction
welfare (Whitty, 1984). Analyses by Heald (1983) with an ever-increasing impoverishing of the pub-
and Murphy et al. (1998) show that privatization lic sector, the latter is in danger of becoming
is a multi-faceted set of processes rather than a merely residual provision for those who cannot
straightforward movement out of Cell 1 into Cell afford to “go private”.
4. Their work suggests that it could thus entail one Nevertheless, if we look strictly at the issue of
or more of the following shifts away from the funding, or even at provision in most countries, it
“pure” welfare state model: is difficult to argue that education has been privat-
ized on any significant scale. In many cases, mar-
앫 charging for public services previously paid for ketization might be a better metaphor for what has
out of taxation (Klein’s Cell 2) been happening. In relation to welfare, marketiz-
앫 letting the private sector run a service that con- ation most often refers to the development of
tinues to be paid for out of taxation (Cell 3) “quasi-markets” in state funded and/or state pro-
앫 selling public services and transferring their vided services. Most commentators see quasi-mar-
functions to the private sector (Cell 4) kets in education as involving a combination of
앫 deregulating the private sector or liberalizing parental choice and school autonomy, together
arrangements that previously prevented the priv- with a greater or lesser degree of public account-
ate sector from competing with state-provided ability and government regulation. These kinds of
services (Cells 3/4 competing with Cells 1/2). reforms have been particularly evident in many

Fig. 1. Modes of welfare provision and funding (after Klein, 1984).

mass education systems, including those discussed vices (from 23% to 25%), although, as Butcher
later in this paper. Levaçic (1995) suggests that the (1995, p. 112) has pointed out, these probably
distinguishing characteristics of a quasi-market for involved “mainly technical and ancillary services”.
a public service are “the separation of purchaser There would also appear to have been a significant
from provider and an element of user choice increase in the purchase of privately provided ser-
between providers”. She adds that a quasi-market vices with state finance, but the amount involved
usually remains highly regulated, with the govern- is small (only from 3% to 5%). More significantly,
ment controlling “such matters as entry by new there has been some movement within state edu-
providers, investment, the quality of service (as cation “out from the ‘all public’ sector into the pri-
with the national curriculum) and price, which is vately-decided sector” (p. 27), yet Burchardt et al.
often zero to the user” (p. 167). The lack of a con- (1999) themselves claim that “practical con-
ventional cash nexus and the strength of govern- straints” on parental decision-making outweigh
ment intervention distinguish quasi-markets from their “theoretical freedom” and thus keep most
the idealized view of a “free” market, though few education within the “all public” sector of their
contemporary markets in any field are actually free model (p. 11). Thus, although their analysis does
from government regulation and many of them show clearly that education remains firmly within
involve some element of overt or covert subsidy. the public sector in most respects, our own view
Burchardt et al. (1999) have recently sought to is that they underestimate the extent to which edu-
build some of these considerations into a more cational decision-making has been “privatized” in
complicated map of welfare provision (which we the ideological sense.
have adapted in Fig. 2). Based on a “wheel of wel- In considering privatization and marketization in
fare”, it shows different combinations of public and Australia, Marginson (1993) usefully warns us
private provision, public and private finance and against seeing the two processes as inextricably
public and private decision-making. Onto this, they linked. For example, it is possible to have privatiz-
map various directions of movement out of the “all ation without marketization. Indeed, state subsidies
public” sector characterized by public provision, to the private sector may actually protect it from
public finance and public decision (similar to Kle- market forces. On the other hand, marketization of
in’s Cell 1). These movements include outright pri- the state sector may make resort to the private sec-
vatization, contracting out, the marketing of public tor less attractive to some parents. However,
services, the introduction of user charges and the although there may be tensions between privatiz-
use of vouchers. Oddly, in our view, they include ation and marketization, they are more likely to
quasi-markets as well as the conventional welfare complement rather than compete with each other.
state in their “all public” segment, when the advan- As Marginson (1993) himself points out, while
tage of their model over Klein’s is that it poten- “privatization does not in itself constitute market
tially allows one to distinguish between the two by relations, it creates a potentially favourable
including a segment that entails public funding and environment for market activity” (p. 178).
provision but private decision-making, as entailed Similarly, even where quasi-markets are con-
in many examples of marketization. fined to public sector providers, it is possible to
Burchardt et al. (1999) also show that, in relation argue that some aspects of marketization contribute
to educational expenditure in England, there was a to privatization in an ideological if not a strictly
reduction between 1979/80 and 1995/96 from 66% economic sense. These might include:
to 52% in the proportion of expenditure falling
within the public provision/public finance/public
decision-making sector. However, it seems likely 앫 fostering the belief that the private sector
that the bulk of the reduction (and certainly the approach is superior to that traditionally adopted
doubling of free-market services from 8% to 18%) in the public sector
fell outside the compulsory phase of education. 앫 requiring public sector institutions to operate
There was a small increase in contracted out ser- more like those in the private sector
96 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107

Fig. 2. Classification of public and private welfare activity (after Burchardt et al., 1999).

앫 encouraging private (individual/family) while Young (1986) even points to the greater
decision-making in place of bureaucratic fiat. involvement of the voluntary sector in publicly
funded welfare provision as an aspect of privatiz-
The growing influence of private sector organi- ation. The growth of quasi-autonomous institutions
zations as consultants in public provision can itself operating with devolved budgets and competing
contribute to a change in the ethos of the sector, for clients in the market place, with or without sig-
 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107 97

nificant private and voluntary sector involvement, funds to extend choice into the private sector.
certainly constitutes a change in the prevailing Often linked to such policies are moves to devolve
character of the welfare state in many countries. various aspects of decision-making from regional
Thus, even those reforms that merely foster and district offices to individual schools and permit
competition between public sector providers may those schools to market themselves in distinctive
move provision away from the tradition welfare ways.
state model, while technically remaining within In England and Wales, prior to the 1980s, the
Klein’s Cell 1 (Fig. 1) and Burchardt et al.’s “pub- vast majority of children were educated in state
lic” domain (top left-hand quadrant in Fig. 2). schools maintained by democratically elected local
However, while they might strictly be regarded as education authorities (LEAs) which exercised
elements of marketization, they could also be con- political and bureaucratic control over their schools
sidered a prelude to privatization. Many critics of but also often provided them with considerable
devices like devolved budgeting, internal markets professional support. There was, however, more
and cost-center accounting have seen them in these diversity than is often acknowledged, especially
terms. “Half-way houses” between state and priv- through the inclusion of voluntary schools (mainly
ate sectors, such as self-governing state schools, Anglican and Catholic) within the state sector.
have been seen as examples of what is sometimes There was also a significant and influential private
termed “creeping privatization”, as might a state sector catering for about 7% of children of compul-
sector education voucher scheme. sory school age. Nevertheless, after the Conserva-
Even though it is clear that, notwithstanding the tive victory at the 1979 election, the Thatcher and
rhetoric of the advocates and critics of recent Major governments set about trying to break what
reforms, all mass education systems we know of they saw as the LEA monopoly of public schooling
still fall within Archer’s (1984) definition of “state through the provisions of a series of Education
education systems”, this does not mean that the Acts passed in the 1980s and early 1990s.
growth of marketization, together with elements of Although the introduction of the National Cur-
privatization, has not had a significant impact on riculum and its associated system of testing can be
the nature of such systems. It is to this issue that seen as a centralizing control, most of the measures
we now turn, initially looking at recent policy have been designed to enhance parental choice and
changes in three countries and then exploring transfer responsibilities from LEAs to individual
their effects. schools. The earliest of these include the Assisted
Places Scheme, part of the 1980 Education Act,
2. Privatization and marketization in three which provided public funding to enable academi-
countries cally able children from poor homes to attend some
of the country’s elite private schools (see Edwards
This part of the paper will outline some of the et al., 1989; Fitz et al., 1989). Subsequently, the
policies of privatization and marketization that government sought to create new forms of state
have developed in recent years in England and school outside the influence of LEAs. City tech-
Wales, New Zealand and the USA. It will look at nology colleges (CTCs) were intended to be new
policies that directly involve the private sector and secondary schools for the inner city, with a curricu-
those that seek to create quasi-markets in public lum emphasis on science and technology and run
education. We shall thus be concerned with meas- by independent trusts with business sponsors
ures that claim to enhance opportunities for choice (Walford and Miller, 1991; Whitty et al., 1993).
among state schools1 and those that use public The grant-maintained schools policy, which was
included in the 1988 Education Reform Act,
1
enabled existing state schools to “opt out” of their
In the remainder of the paper, we use the term “state
schools” to describe publicly funded and publicly provided LEAs after a parental ballot and run themselves
schools in England and New Zealand and the term “public with direct funding from central government (Fitz
schools” to describe such schools in the USA. et al., 1993). More recent legislation has permitted
98 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107

schools to change their character by varying their Party government elected in 1990. The reforms led
enrolment schemes, encouraged new types of to a shift in the responsibility for budget allocation,
specialist schools and made it possible for some staff employment and educational outcomes from
private schools to “opt in” to the state system central government and regional educational
(Edwards and Whitty, 1997; Walford, 1995). boards to individual state schools. Schools were
Local Management of Schools (LMS) has given given boards of trustees that have effective control
those schools that have remained with their LEAs over their enrolment schemes, with even lighter
more control over their own budgets and day to regulation than in England. However, Wylie
day management, receiving funds determined by (1994) argues that some aspects of the New Zea-
the number and ages of their students. Open enrol- land reforms “offer a model of school self-manage-
ment allows state schools to attract as many stu- ment which is more balanced than the English
dents as possible, at least up to their physical experience”. This is because, at least initially, they
capacity, instead of being kept to lower limits or put “a great emphasis on equity … on community
strict catchment areas (or zones) in order that other involvement … on parental involvement [and on]
schools could remain open. When introduced in partnership: between parents and professionals” (p.
1988, this was seen as the necessary corollary of xv). Furthermore, neither the costs of teacher salar-
per capita funding in creating a quasi-market in ies nor of some central support services were
education. In some respects, it was a “virtual devolved to individual school budgets, though
voucher” system (Sexton, 1987), which was there have subsequently been moves in this direc-
expected to make all schools more responsive to tion. Only 3% of New Zealand schools were in a
their clients and either become more effective or pilot scheme for “bulk funding” (or devolution of
go to the wall. 100% of their funding including teachers’ salaries),
The range of policies introduced in England and but a “direct funding” option was opened up to all
Wales thus included some “privatizing” measures, schools in 1996. Alongside these reforms, national
such as the Assisted Places Scheme, but the major curriculum guidelines were introduced but these
changes are better regarded as examples of mar- were less detailed and prescriptive than the English
ketization. It is possible to argue that the sort of model and paid more attention to minority ethnic
privatization entailed within the Assisted Places interests. More recently, the extension of publicly-
Scheme suppressed marketization within the priv- funded choice into the private sector has begun
ate sector by protecting private schools from the with the introduction of Targeted Individual
full brunt of market forces. Indeed, some of the Entitlements, the New Zealand equivalent of the
schools that sought to join the Scheme were con- Assisted Places Scheme, which has led to claims
sidered economically vulnerable and one in Wales that “it marks the start of a move towards a
had to close before it could admit its first assisted voucher system in which schools compete for par-
place holders (Whitty et al., 1998). On the other ents’ education dollar” (Wellington Evening Post,
hand, the marketization of the public sector 28/9/95).
through schemes such as LMS and open enrolment, In the USA, the limited role of the federal
by making the public sector more like the private, government in relation to education makes it
may have reduced the distinctive nature of private harder to generalize about the nature and prov-
schools. Taken together, though, the reforms enance of policies designed to enhance parental
encourage a process of privatization in the ideo- choice and devolve decision-making to individual
logical sense if not the strictly economic one. public schools. The more significant decisions are
Similar reforms in New Zealand were intro- taken at state and district levels. While a few states,
duced by a Labour government, albeit one that had such as Minnesota, have statewide choice plans,
enthusiastically embraced monetarism and “new many initiatives have been more local. Wells
public management” techniques in the mid-1980s (1993) demonstrates the huge variety in origins and
(Wylie, 1995). They were subsequently given a likely effects of the various choice plans that have
more explicitly marketizing thrust by the National been mooted or implemented in the US over the
 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107 99

past few years. Similarly, American specialist or in its scheme. Edison, a for-profit private company,
“focus” schools have very different origins and contracts with districts to take over public schools
purposes (Raywid, 1994; Hill et al., 1990). They and is anticipated to see a growth in revenue from
include long-standing specialty schools, such as the the current $68 million to $126 million in 1999
Boston Latin School and New York’s highly aca- (Henry, 1998). In addition, individual charter
demic Stuyvesant High School, magnet schools schools appear to be using their quasi-autonomous
associated with desegregation plans, alternative status to enhance their funding basis. Many ask
schools, sometimes based on progressive peda- parents to invest substantial amounts of time and
gogic principles, and private Catholic schools. The money as a condition of their child’s attendance
nature of the quasi-autonomous charter schools (Diandra and Corwin, 1994).
that are currently being established in many states Thus, while the reforms have different aspects
and the extent of site-based management within in different countries, they all display common
school districts also varies considerably tendencies towards limited privatization alongside
(Wohlstetter et al., 1995). more extensive marketizing policies that promote
Devolution and choice in the US enlists signifi- institutional autonomy and devolve decision-mak-
cant support from progressive forces, particularly ing down to the institution and the individual, so
amongst those representing ethnic groups who that the boundary between what is public and what
have felt particularly shortchanged by public edu- is private becomes less clear. The blurring of this
cation (e.g. Wells et al., 1996). The mixed evidence boundary was supposed to revitalize mass edu-
about the efficacy and effects of desegregation and cation systems through making all schools more
magnet schools in the 1980s (Blank, 1990; Moore effective and more responsive. We now go on con-
and Davenport, 1990) has sometimes led to the sider the limited evidence that is available about
conclusion that enhanced parental voice and the actual effects of recent policies in our three
choice, rather than more concerted political inter- countries.
vention, will provide the best chance of educational
salvation for minority parents and their children.
Moe (1994) goes so far as to claim that the best 3. Initial research evidence
hope for the poor to gain the right “to leave bad
schools and seek out good ones” is through an This part of the paper will review some of the
“unorthodox alliance” with “Republicans and busi- evidence that is so far available concerning the
ness … who are the only powerful groups willing progress and effects of these marketization and pri-
to transform the system” (p. 33). For this reason, vatization policies in England and Wales, New
some aspects of the current reform agenda have Zealand and the USA. Advocates of these policies
developed a populist appeal well beyond the coter- argue that they will lead to increased diversity of
ies of conservative politicians or even the white provision and more efficient and effective schools.
populations to which they are usually expected to Some proponents, notably Moe (1994) in the USA
appeal. This is true, for example, of the state- and Pollard (1995) in the UK, have argued that
funded private school voucher scheme introduced such reforms will bring particular benefits for fam-
for students from poor families in Milwaukee, Wis- ilies from disadvantaged communities, who have
consin (Witte et al., 1994). been ill-served by more conventional arrange-
The delegitimation of bureaucratic and political ments. However, critics suggest that, even if they
control in of education in the USA (Chubb and enhance efficiency, responsiveness, choice and
Moe, 1990) also points to the complex ways in diversity (and even that, they say, is questionable),
which marketization and privatization may be con- such policies will almost certainly increase
nected. While the states and the districts have inequality between schools.
retained significant powers, the reforms have facili- In England and Wales, there seems to be little
tated an increase in privately-managed schools. evidence that choice policies are fostering horizon-
This fall, the Edison Project will have 48 schools tal diversity in schooling. Glatter et al. (1997)
100 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107

found no evidence of greater diversity of provision, learning, as claimed by the government (Levaçic,
except where there was specific government fund- 1995, p. xi).
ing for specialist schools, but rather a tendency In the final report of the Birmingham study
towards greater uniformity. However, although (Bullock and Thomas, 1994), relatively more head
some other commentators have suggested that the teachers claimed improvements in student learning,
reforms might even strengthen hierarchies but significantly these seem to be associated with
(Walford and Miller, 1991), Glatter and his col- increased funding rather than self-management per
leagues found no significant movement in the tra- se. While the Birmingham team concluded that
ditional hierarchy of types of school had yet self-management was broadly a successful reform,
taken place. they argued that more evidence was needed on the
With regard to claims that the reforms will lead relationship between resourcing levels and learning
to more effective use of resources, there is little outcomes. This seems particularly important in that
to suggest that any gains have been substantial. In the schools most affected by budgetary difficulties,
England, a national study conducted by and therefore least likely to report a positive impact
Birmingham University and funded by National on students’ learning, were often found to be those
Association of Head Teachers was generally posi- with students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
tive about the impact of LMS but conceded that The Birmingham study echoes some of the con-
direct evidence of the influence of self-manage- cerns expressed by Le Grand and Bartlett (1993)
ment on learning was “elusive”. The team’s initial in their study of quasi-markets in social policy.
survey (Arnott et al., 1992) showed that the vast Bartlett (1993) points out that, although parental
majority of head teachers agreed with the statement choice has been increased by open enrolment, “the
that “local management allows a school to make door is firmly closed once a school [is full]. And by
more effective use of its resources”. However, a encouraging an increasingly selective admissions
majority also felt that meetings were being taken policy in [over-subscribed] schools open enrolment
may have the effect of bringing about increased
up by administrative issues that lessened their
opportunities for cream-skimming and hence
attention to students’ learning. They were thor-
inequality”. Furthermore, he found that “those
oughly divided on the question of whether “chil-
schools which faced financial losses under the for-
dren’s learning is benefiting from local manage-
mula funding system tended to be schools which
ment”. Thus, it was rather unclear to what their
drew the greatest proportion of pupils from the
concept of greater effectiveness actually related. most disadvantaged section of the community”
The results cited here came mainly from head (Bartlett, 1993). Thus, whatever gains may have
teacher respondents, whose authority has been gre- emerged from the reforms in terms of efficiency
atly enhanced by the self-management reform. It and responsiveness to some clients, there are seri-
may be significant that the relatively few classroom ous concerns about their implications for equity.
teachers who were interviewed by the Birmingham The danger of “cream skimming” is clearly dem-
research team were far more cautious about the onstrated in an important series of studies from
benefits of LMS for student learning and overall King’s College, London on the operation of quasi-
standards. An independently funded study markets. In an early study, Bowe et al. (1992) sug-
(Levaçic, 1995) found head teachers generally wel- gested that schools were competing to attract
comed self-management even where their school greater cultural capital and thus hoping for higher
had lost resources as a result of it, while classroom yielding returns. Subsequently, Gewirtz et al.
teachers were skeptical about its benefits even in (1995) have shown schools seeking students who
schools which had gained in resources. LevaHic are “able”, “gifted”, “motivated and committed”,
concludes that, although local management and middle class, with girls and children with
enhances cost-efficiency, there is “a lack of strong South Asian backgrounds being seen as particular
theoretical argument and empirical evidence” to assets in terms of their potential to enhance test
show that it improves the quality of teaching and scores. The least desirable clientele include those
 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107 101

who are “less able”, have special educational reveals that the examination results of these
needs, especially emotional and behavioral diffi- schools rose as the proportion of socio-economi-
culties, as well as children from working class cally disadvantaged children within them declined.
backgrounds and boys, unless they also have some To that extent grant maintained schools can hardly
of the more desirable attributes. claim to have increased parental choice across the
There is certainly evidence that some schools board (see Power et al., 1994).
discriminate against children with special edu- Similar concerns have been voiced about the
cational needs and it is hard to see how this can Assisted Places Scheme (Edwards et al., 1989).
be avoided without public intervention. Bartlett This “contracting out” to the private sector of
(1993) argues that, only if the market price varies places for academically able but disadvantaged stu-
with the needs of the client will this not happen. dents has benefited only a small proportion of stu-
In other words, funding formulae need to be dents. Yet, the Scheme has endorsed the superior-
weighted to give schools an incentive to take more ity of the private sector and diminished the number
expensive children. The current premium paid for of academically able students in the public sector
children with special educational needs may not be (Fitz et al., 1989). And, because uptake of places
enough, if it makes the school less popular with is the dependent upon the awareness of individual
clients who, although bringing in less money, bring parents, relatively few of its beneficiaries come
in other desirable attributes. Bowe et al. (1992) and from the kinds of background featured in public
Vincent et al. (1995) give examples of schools justifications for the policy.
making just this sort of calculation. Walford (1992) argues that, while choice will
The academically able are the “cream” that most lead to better quality schooling for some children,
schools seek to attract. Such students stay in the the evidence so far suggests that it will “discrimi-
system longer and thus bring in more money, as nate in particular against working class children
well as making the school appear successful in and children of Afro-Caribbean descent” (p. 137).
terms of its test scores and hence attractive to other Smith and Noble (1995) also conclude from the
desirable clients. Glennerster (1991) suggests that, evidence that English choice policies are further
given the opportunity, most schools will want to disadvantaging already disadvantaged groups.
become more selective because taking children Although schools have always been socially and
who will bring scores down will affect their overall racially segregated to the extent that residential
market position. In this situation, those schools that segregation exists, Gewirtz et al. (1995) suggest
are in a position to choose often seek to identify that choice may well exacerbate this segregation
their success with an emphasis on traditional aca- by extending it into previously integrated schools
demic virtues and thus attract those students most serving mixed localities. Their research indicates
likely to display them. Many of the first schools to that working class children and particularly chil-
opt out and become grant maintained were selec- dren with special educational needs are likely to
tive, single sex and with traditional sixth forms and be increasingly “ghettoized” in poorly resourced
this gave the sector an aura of elite status (Fitz et schools.
al., 1993). Some grant maintained comprehensive Although, it could be argued that the English
schools have reverted to being overtly academi- education system is unusual in being dominated by
cally selective, and Bush et al. (1993) suggested an elite private sector and a tendency towards
that 30% of the grant maintained “comprehensive” selective education, these processes also appear to
schools they investigated were now using covert be occurring in the other countries. The Smithfield
selection. In addition, grant maintained schools Project, a major government-funded study of the
have been identified as amongst those with the impact of choice policies in New Zealand, suggests
highest rates of exclusion of existing students and that much the same sort of social polarization is
amongst the least willing to cater for students with taking place there (Lauder et al., 1994; Waslander
special educational needs (Feintuck, 1994). Recent and Thrupp, 1995). In another New Zealand study
research by Levaçic and Hardman (1999) also (Fowler, 1993), schools located in low socio-econ-
102 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107

omic areas were found to be judged negatively initial effect of marketization policies and that
because of factors over which they had no influ- social polarization has actually been reduced in
ence, such as type of intake, location and problems subsequent years. Educational polarization, how-
perceived by parents as linked to these. Wylie ever, has been confirmed in the case of England by
(1994) too has noted that schools in low-income Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools (HMCI,
areas there are more likely to be losing students to 1998) and, despite some outstanding exceptions,
other schools. If we could be sure that their poor schools located in contexts of multiple disadvan-
reputation was deserved, this might be taken as tage have overall levels of performance well below
evidence that the market was working well with the national average and tend to be relatively inef-
effective schools reaping their just rewards. But, fective at boosting students’ progress (Gray, 1998).
as in England, judgements of schools tend to be In the USA, despite the association of public
made on social grounds or narrow academic cri- school choice with racial desegregation, there are
teria and with little reference to their overall per- considerable concerns about the equity effects of
formance or even their academic effectiveness on recent attempts to enhance choice, especially as
value-added measures (Gewirtz et al., 1995). there is no clear evidence to date of a positive
Meanwhile, the current funding regime makes it impact on student achievement. What evidence
extremely difficult for schools in disadvantaged there is about the effects of choice policies on stud-
areas to break out of the cycle of decline. Wylie’s ent achievement and equity continues to be at best
study of the fifth year of self-managing schools in inconclusive (Plank et al., 1993), despite claims by
New Zealand (Wylie, 1994) identified schools in choice advocates that “the best available evidence”
low-income areas, and schools with high Maori shows that parental choice improves the education
enrolments, as experiencing greater resource prob- of all children, especially low income and minority
lems than others. students’ (Domanico, 1990).
Wylie (1994, 1995) reports that marketizing Even some of the more positive evidence from
measures have led to state schools paying more controlled choice districts, such as Cambridge
attention to the attractiveness of physical plant and (Rossell and Glenn, 1988) and Montclair (Clewell
public image than to changes to teaching and learn- and Joy, 1990), which seemed to show gradual
ing other than the spread of computers. They have overall achievement gains, is now regarded by
also led to increased attention to the information Henig (1994) as methodologically flawed making
about school programs and children’s progress that it difficult to attribute improvements to choice per
reaches parents, changes which “are clearly not se. Furthermore, although choice has not always
without value in themselves”. But she also notes led to resegregation, as its critics feared, improve-
that “they do not seem able to counter or outweigh ments in the racial balance of Montclair and Cam-
factors affecting school rolls which lie beyond bridge schools were most noticeable during periods
school power, such as local demographics affected of strong government intervention. Henig goes on
by employment, ethnicity, and class” (Wylie, 1995, to argue that the much vaunted East Harlem “mir-
citing Gordon, 1994; Waslander and Thrupp, acle” (Fliegel and Macguire, 1990) has “escaped
1995). Such research suggests that many of the dif- any serious effort at controlled analysis” even
ferences between schools result from factors larg- though it has had a special role “in countering
ely beyond the control of parents and schools, charges that the benefits of choice programs will
except the power of advantaged parents and advan- not accrue to minorities and the poor” (p. 142).
taged schools to further enhance their advantage Not only have the apparently impressive gains in
and thus increase educational inequalities and achievement now leveled off or even been
social polarization. These findings have very reversed, it is impossible to be sure that the earlier
recently been challenged by Gorard and Fitz figures were not merely the effect of schools being
(1998a,b) who have claimed that the tendency able to choose students from higher socio-econ-
towards increased polarization in both England and omic groups from outside the area or, alternatively,
Wales and New Zealand may have been merely an of the empowerment of teachers.
 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107 103

The American evidence with regard to private and Meier (1995) use existing data to test the
school choice is also contentious, but relevant to school choice hypothesis and conclude that “com-
our concerns in view of current demands for an petition between public and private schools appears
extension of the use of public funds to permit stu- to result in a cream skimming effect” and that there
dents to attend private schools. Much of the contro- is no reason to expect that the same will not happen
versy centers on the various interpretations of the with enhanced public school choice.
data from Coleman’s high school studies (Coleman
et al., 1982) and, in particular, the work of Chubb
and Moe (1990). Henig (1994) argues that small 4. Moving beyond privatization and
advantage attributed to private schools is a product marketization
of the methodology used. Lee and Bryk (1993) also
suggest the evidence as presented does not support In general, the system-wide effects of recent
Chubb and Moe’s conclusions. Nevertheless, Bryk reform measures do not seem yet to demonstrate
et al. (1993) claim on the basis of their own work the positive outcomes envisaged by their leading
that Catholic schools do impact positively on the proponents. In making this claim, we are, of
performance of low income families but they attri- course, generalizing from the evidence available.
bute this at least as much to an ethos of strong We would not wish to deny that there are instances
community values antithetical to the marketplace where reforms to public education systems have
as to the espousal of market forces. made a positive difference to the educational
Witte’s evaluation of the controversial Mil- experiences of students and teachers. The Kura
waukee privatizing experiment, which enables Kaupapa Maori in New Zealand and some of the
children from poor families to choose private “alternative” US charter schools provide examples
schools at public expense, concludes in its fourth where self-determination by communities and pro-
year report that “in terms of achievement scores fessionals has brought about innovative and poten-
… students perform approximately the same as tially empowering educational environments. How-
M[ilwaukee] P[ublic] S[chool] students”. How- ever, there are doubts as to the sustainability of
ever, attendance of choice children is slightly such programs and about the extent to which they
higher and parental satisfaction has been high. For can be attributed to marketizing and privatizing
the schools, “the program has generally been posi- measures rather than other changes in modes of
tive, has allowed several to survive, several to provision and governance. Moreover, these innov-
expand, and contributed to the building of a new ative instances need to be set alongside a prevailing
school” (Witte et al., 1994). Yet neither Witte’s pattern of educational conservatism and consoli-
own conclusions nor Greene and Peterson’s (1996) dated hierarchies both within and between schools.
rather more positive reworking of the data can be It could be argued that it is the contradictions
used to sustain some of the more extravagant and tensions between the policies that impede their
claims made both for and against this type of pro- effectiveness. Commentators from the radical right
gram. It is a small and narrowly targeted program see the answer as moving still further towards more
and certainly not, of itself, a sufficient basis upon genuinely marketized and even fully privatized
which to judge the likely effects of a more forms of education provision. Indeed, some advo-
thoroughgoing voucher initiative. cates of market forces have argued that the indif-
The Milwaukee program overall has not hitherto ferent performance of the reforms so far is merely
been oversubscribed and, although students are evidence that they have not gone far enough. For
self-selected, the schools involved have not been example, a government Minister responsible for
in a position to exercise choice. Elsewhere, the the introduction of the Assisted Places Scheme in
combination of oversubscription and self-selection England used our own research (Edwards et al.,
in explaining apparent performance gains through 1989) showing that it had failed to attract many
private school choice suggest that equity is a major working class students as a basis for arguing in
issue as it is in England and New Zealand. Smith favour of a fully-fledged voucher scheme (Boyson,
104 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107

1990). Similarly, Moe’s (1994) only major criti- vidual fund for education” which they would then
cism of the British reforms was that the govern- be able to spend when and where they saw fit.
ment had “created an open enrolment system in Tooley rightly reminds us of the equity failings
which there is very little to choose from, because of democratic systems. And, of course, empirical
the supply of schools is controlled by the LEAs”. research on current systems does not, indeed in
In order to free up the supply side, he suggested principle could not, show that total deregulation
that all schools should become autonomous. would not have beneficial effects. Yet, most of the
Tooley (1996) favours an even more deregulated available evidence does seem to suggest that going
system and the abandonment of a centrally pre- further in the direction of marketization and privat-
scribed curriculum. ization would be unlikely to yield overall improve-
Much of the support for moving further towards ments in the quality of education and might well
decentralizing education provision derives from the have damaging equity effects. Even Chubb and
alleged benefits of existing private provision. How- Moe (1990), who argue that equality is better “pro-
ever, as we discussed earlier, the evidence with tected” by markets than any political institutions,
regard to private school choice is contentious. concede that choice of school in a democracy can-
Even if we accept that some children who currently not be unlimited or entirely unregulated. So,
attend state schools might benefit from private edu- despite the rhetoric that suggests that devolution
cation, there is little to suggest that extending and choice takes educational decision-making out
opportunities to attend private schools more widely of politics, key decisions about goals and frame-
would benefit all groups equally. Witte et al. works will still need to be made in the broader
(1995) have undertaken an analysis of the current political arena.
social composition of private and public schools in The need to provide a better balance between
Wisconsin and conclude that “an open-ended consumer rights and citizen rights in education,
voucher scheme would clearly benefit households while recognizing the desirability of some facets
that are more affluent than the average household of choice and devolution, has led in England to
in Wisconsin”. They go on to say that, although proposals to put a greater degree of democratic
some might believe that making vouchers available control back in the picture. In particular, there has
to everyone would open up private schools to the been recent discussion around how to revive demo-
poor, the opposite argument seems equally plaus- cratic involvement and accountability at local level
ible. With more money available, private schools as a counter-balance to the market and the strong
that cannot currently afford to select, such as some central state. For example, Pryke (1996) remarks
of the inner city private schools in the Milwaukee that, “despite the experiments to let schools do
choice experiment, could become more selective. their own thing”—and he believes this has gone
The already highly selective schools could then further in England than anywhere else in the
maintain their advantage by demanding add-on world—“the great majority of them, and parents,
payments in addition to vouchers. have recognised the need for a body to act for them
Some on the right argue that these processes are as a community of schools” (p. 21). Similarly,
inevitable in a system that is only partly privatized. Brighouse (1996), Birmingham’s senior education
Tooley (1995) claims that the potential of markets officer, who argues that an atomized market will
in education cannot be properly assessed by look- create chaos and “put further distance between the
ing at the effects of quasi-markets, or what he pre- educational and social haves and the educational
fers to term “so-called” markets. In his own vision and social have-nots”, says that “there needs to be
of Education Without the State (Tooley, 1996) he a local agency aware of school differences, sensi-
argues that we need a “one tier private system” and tively working with each school, securing equity
that parents and students should be free to deter- and setting a climate for a drive towards ever
mine the kind of schooling they feel suits them higher standards” (p. 11). Responding to the ques-
best. He envisages lowering the school leaving age tion as to why such bodies should be demo-
and providing every student with a “lifelong indi- cratically accountable, he suggests that in matters
 G. Whitty, S. Power / International Journal of Educational Development 20 (2000) 93–107 105

of education provision “there is a need to balance apparently to be made entirely on the basis of
various and sometimes conflicting needs and pri- “what works”. It is therefore possible to find, for
orities (including) the needs of very different com- example, in its proposed Education Action Zones
munities within, for example, a modern city” and (DfEE, 1997), both a reassertion of collective
that difference and equity can best be seen to be responsibility for educational provision and a
held in balance in an openly democratic forum readiness to consider the active involvement of
(p. 14). private (even “for profit”) companies in its deliv-
Part of the challenge for those adopting this view ery. And, although the government has abandoned
must be to move away from atomized decision- the Assisted Places Scheme in order to uphold its
making to the reassertion of collective responsi- commitment to “benefit the many, not the few”, it
bility without recreating the very bureaucratic sys- has sought to bring private and state schools into
tems whose shortcomings have helped to legit- closer partnership. It is, of course, too early to say
imate the recent tendency to treat education as a what the effects of these policies will be—many
private good rather than a public responsibility. are still being formulated. However, while the
While choice policies are part of a social text that Third Way may offer an alternative to either
helps to create new subject positions which under- vehement advocacy or rejection of marketization
mine traditional forms of collectivism, those forms and privatization, there is already some concern
of collectivism themselves failed to empower about the coherence of New Labour’s reforms
many members of society, including women and (Whitty, 1998) and the extent to which marketiz-
minority ethnic groups. We need to ask how we ation and privatization will continue unabated
can use the positive aspects of choice and auto- under the new more fashionable discourse of mutu-
nomy to facilitate the development of new forms of ality and partnership.
community empowerment rather than exacerbating
social differentiation. As Henig (1994) says of the
USA, “the sad irony of the current education- Acknowledgements
reform movement is that, through over identifi-
cation with school-choice proposals rooted in mar- The ideas developed in this paper have emerged
ket-based ideas, the healthy impulse to consider from a variety of projects undertaken in collabor-
radical reforms to address social problems may be ation with colleagues. Part of Section 1 draws upon
channeled into initiatives that further erode the work carried out with Anne Chappell and Arthur
potential for collective deliberation and collective Keefe on a research project on “Privatisation of
response” (p. 222). Some reform proposals, such Education, Health and Welfare Services” funded
as Cookson’s (1994) “educational trust funds” and by Bristol Polytechnic Research Committee 1986–
Atkinson’s (1994) “educational enterprises”, seem 88. Parts of the remaining Sections have drawn
superficially to have similarities with neo-liberal upon the authors’ work on various ESRC-funded
policies of marketization and privatization. How- research projects (nos C00230036, C00232462,
ever, they are articulated with a rather different R000231899, R00023391501, R000235570) and
political agenda and could potentially make a posi- on their book with David Halpin on devolution and
tive contribution to the enhancement of social jus- choice in five countries (Whitty et al., 1998).
tice in education.
In seeking out ways of responding to this chal-
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practice: the changing nature of special educational pro- publications include The State and Private Education: A Study of
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tain. Educational Policy 6 (2), 123–138. ket.
Walford, G., 1995. Educational Politics: Pressure Groups and
Sally Power is a Senior Lecturer in the Policy Studies Group at
Faith-based Schools. Avebury, Aldershot.
the Institute of Education, University of London. She is the author
Walford, G., Miller, H., 1991. City Technology College. Open of The Pastoral and the Academic: Conflict and Contradiction in
University Press, Milton Keynes. the Curriculum and co-author of Grant Maintained Schools: Edu-
Waslander, S., Thrupp, M., 1995. Choice, competition and seg- caiton in the Market Place and Devolution and Coice in Education:
regation: an empirical analysis of a New Zealand secondary The School, the State and the Market.

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