russian leadership.

Avenging the defeat of 1871, or revanchism, and recovering the provinces

of Alsace-Lorraine became an obsession of French policy and public opinion for the following few
years,[10] yet since the 1880s this concern was eclipsed by the conquest of a vast colonial empire,
and had disappeared from the programs of all French political parties as utterly unrealistic. [11]

World empires and colonies around 1914

To isolate France and avoid a war on two fronts, Bismarck negotiated the League of the Three
Emperors between Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany. After Russian victory in the 1877–
1878 Russo-Turkish War, the League was dissolved due to Austrian concerns over Russian
influence in the Balkans, an area they considered to be of vital strategic interest. Germany and
Austria-Hungary then formed the 1879 Dual Alliance, which became the Triple Alliance when Italy
joined in 1882.[12] For Bismarck, the purpose of these agreements was to isolate France by ensuring
the three Empires resolved any disputes between themselves; when this was threatened in 1880 by
British and French attempts to negotiate directly with Russia, he reformed the League in 1881, which
was renewed in 1883 and 1885. After the agreement lapsed in 1887, he replaced it with
the Reinsurance Treaty, a secret agreement between Germany and Russia to remain neutral if
either were attacked by France or Austria-Hungary.[13]
Bismarck viewed peace with Russia as the foundation of German foreign policy but after
becoming Kaiser in 1890, Wilhelm II forced him to retire and was persuaded not to renew the
Reinsurance Treaty by his new Chancellor, Leo von Caprivi.[14] This provided France an opportunity
to counteract the Triple Alliance by signing the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1894, followed by the
1904 Entente Cordiale with Britain. The Triple Entente was completed by the 1907 Anglo-Russian
Convention. While these were not formal alliances, by settling long-standing colonial disputes in
Asia and Africa, the notion of British entry into any future conflict involving France or Russia became
a possibility.[15] British and Russian support for France against Germany during the Agadir Crisis in
1911 reinforced their relationship, increasing Anglo-German estrangement.[16]
Arms race

SMS Rheinland, a Nassau-class battleship, Germany's first

response to the British Dreadnought
German industrial strength and production had significantly increased after 1871, driven by the
creation of a unified Reich, French indemnity payments, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.
Backed by Wilhelm II, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz sought to use this growth in economic power to
build a Kaiserliche Marine, or Imperial German Navy, which could compete with the British Royal
Navy for naval supremacy.[17] His thinking was influenced by US naval strategist Alfred Thayer
Mahan, who had argued that possession of a blue-water navy was vital for global power projection;
Tirpitz had his books translated into German, while Wilhelm made them required reading for his
advisors and senior military personnel.[18]
However, it was also an emotional decision, driven by Wilhelm's simultaneous admiration for the
Royal Navy and desire to surpass it. Bismarck thought that the British would not interfere in Europe,
as long as its maritime supremacy remained secure, but his dismissal in 1890 led to a change in
policy and an Anglo-German naval arms race began.[19] Despite the vast sums spent by Tirpitz, the
launch of HMS Dreadnought in 1906 gave the British a technological advantage over their German
rivals.[17] Ultimately, the race diverted huge resources into creating a German navy large enough to
antagonise Britain, but not defeat it; in 1911, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann
Hollweg acknowledged defeat, leading to the Rüstungswende or 'armaments turning point', when he
switched expenditure from the navy to the army.[20]
This decision was not driven by a reduction in political tensions, but German concern over Russia's
quick recovery from its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and subsequent 1905 Russian
Revolution that same year. Economic reforms, backed by French funding, led to a significant post-
1908 expansion of railways and transportation infrastructure, particularly in its western border
regions.[21] Since Germany and Austria-Hungary relied on faster mobilisation to compensate for their
numerical inferiority compared to Russia, the threat posed by the closing of this gap was more
important than competing with the Royal Navy. After Germany expanded its standing army by
170,000 troops in 1913, France extended compulsory military service from two to three years; similar
measures were taken by the Balkan powers and Italy, which led to increased expenditure by
the Ottomans and Austria-Hungary. Absolute figures are difficult to calculate due to differences in
categorising expenditure, since they often omit civilian infrastructure projects like railways which also
had logistical importance and military use. It is known, however, that from 1908 to 1913, military
spending by the six major European powers increased by over 50% in real terms.[22]
Conflicts in the Balkans

Sarajevo citizens reading a poster with the proclamation of

the Austrian annexation in 1908
The years before 1914 were marked by a series of crises in the Balkans, as other powers sought to
benefit from Ottoman decline. While Pan-Slavic and Orthodox Russia considered itself the protector
of Serbia and other Slav states, they preferred the strategically vital Bosporus straits to be controlled
by a weak Ottoman government, rather than an ambitious Slav power like Bulgaria. Since Russia
had its own ambitions in northeastern Anatolia, while their clients had overlapping claims in the
Balkans, balancing these divided Russian policy-makers and added to regional instability. [23]
Austrian statesmen viewed the Balkans as essential for the continued existence of their Empire, and
saw Serbian expansion as a direct threat. The 1908–1909 Bosnian Crisis began when Austria
annexed the former Ottoman territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which it had occupied since 1878.
Timed to coincide with the Bulgarian Declaration of Independence from the Ottoman Empire, this
unilateral action was denounced by the European powers, but accepted as there was no consensus
on how to resolve the situation. Some historians see this as a significant escalation, ending any
chance of Austria co-operating with Russia in the Balkans, while also damaging diplomatic relations
between Serbia and Italy, both of whom had their own expansionist ambitions in the region. [24]
Tensions increased after the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War demonstrated Ottoman weakness and
led to the formation of the Balkan League, an alliance of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece.
[25]
The League quickly overran most of the Ottomans' territory in the Balkans during the 1912–
1913 First Balkan War, much to the surprise of outside observers.[26] The Serbian capture of ports on
the Adriatic resulted in partial Austrian mobilisation, starting on 21 November 1912, including units
along the Russian border in Galicia. In a meeting the next day, the Russian government decided not
to mobilise in response, unwilling to precipitate a war for which they were not as of yet prepared to
handle.[27]
The Great Powers sought to re-assert control through the 1913 Treaty of London, which had created
an independent Albania, while enlarging the territories of Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece.
However, disputes between the victors sparked the 33-day Second Balkan War, when Bulgaria
attacked Serbia and Greece on 16 June 1913; it was defeated, losing most of Macedonia to Serbia
and Greece, and Southern Dobruja to Romania.[28] The result was that even countries which
benefited from the Balkan Wars, such as Serbia and Greece, felt cheated of their "rightful gains",
while for Austria it demonstrated the apparent indifference with which other powers viewed their
concerns, including Germany.[29] This complex mix of resentment, nationalism and insecurity helps
explain why the pre-1914 Balkans became known as the "powder keg of Europe".[30]

Prelude
For a chronological guide, see Timeline of World War I.

Sarajevo assassination
Main article: Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

Traditionally thought to show the arrest of Gavrilo

Princip (right), this photo is now believed by historians to depict an innocent bystander,
Ferdinand Behr [31][32]

In the summer of 1914, the sovereigns of Europe were woven together by treaties, alliances, as well
as secret agreements. The Triple Alliance (1882) encompassed the German Empire, Austria, and
Italy.[33]
On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir presumptive to Emperor Franz Joseph
I of Austria, visited Sarajevo, capital of the recently annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cvjetko
Popović, Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, Trifko Grabež, and Vaso Čubrilović (Bosnian Serbs)
and Muhamed Mehmedbašić (from the Bosniaks community),[34] from the movement known
as Young Bosnia, took up positions along the route taken by the Archduke's motorcade, with the
intention of assassinating him. Supplied with arms by extremists within the Serbian Black
Hand intelligence organisation, they hoped his death would free Bosnia from Austrian rule, although
there was little agreement on what would replace it.[35]
Nedeljko Čabrinović threw a grenade at the Archduke's car and injured two of his aides, who were
taken to hospital while the convoy carried on. The other assassins were also unsuccessful but, an
hour later, as Ferdinand was returning from visiting the injured officers, his car took a wrong turn into
a street where Gavrilo Princip was standing. He fired two pistol shots, fatally wounding Ferdinand
and his wife Sophie.[36] Although Emperor Franz Joseph was shocked by the incident, political and
personal differences meant the two men were not close; allegedly, his first reported comment was "A
higher power has re-established the order which I, alas, could not preserve". [37]
According to historian Zbyněk Zeman, in Vienna "the event almost failed to make any impression
whatsoever. On 28 and 29 June, the crowds listened to music and drank wine, as if nothing had
happened."[38] Nevertheless, the impact of the murder of the heir to the throne was significant, and
has been described by historian Christopher Clark as a "9/11 effect, a terrorist event charged with
historic meaning, transforming the political chemistry in Vienna".[39]