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GISB101 International Negotiaiton

Week 6 Strategic Moves

Commitments
The two aspects of commitments and credibility: “what” and “how”
● The “what” part is seizing the first-mover advantage.
● The “how” part is thinking up devices for making strategic moves credible in a specific
situation.

A commitment is an unconditional strategic move.

Threats and Promises

Threats威脅 Promises承諾

They are more complex conditional moves.

Threats and promises induce the others to take actions different than they would otherwise.

a response rule that punishes others who fail to an offer to reward other players who act as you
act as you would like them to would like them to

● The response rule prescribes your action as a response to the others’ moves.
● Although you act as a follower in the actual game, the response rule must put be in place
before others make their moves.

Deterrence威懾 Compellence壓制

When you want to stop the others from doing When you compel the others to do something
something they would otherwise do they would not otherwise do

Both sides will bear an extra cost if the threat has to be carried out.

Difference between them

does not necessarily have a deadline must have a deadline

can be achieved by a promise that earlier

can be achieved more simply and better by a
performance gets a better reward/giving the
threat
other player the incentive not to procrastinate

Promises can also be compellent or deterrent.

A compellent promise is designed to induce A deterrent promise is designed to prevent

someone to take a favorable action. c.f., carrot someone from taking an action that is against
strategy your interests. c.f., stick strategy

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There is an informational role for stating what will happen, even without any rule:
Warnings警告 Assurance保證

When it is in your interest to carry out a threat When it is in your interest to carry out a promise

They do not change your response rule in order to influence another party.

​Brinkmanship邊緣政策
● Start small and gradually raise the size of the threat. 從小處著手，逐漸提高威脅的規模。
● You want to keep the size of a threat down to the smallest level that will have the desired
effect, but you may not know in advance the smallest effective size of a threat.
您希望將威脅的規模保持在能夠達到預期效果的最小水平，但您可能無法提前知道威
脅的最小有效規模。
● Strategy of brinkmanship means taking an adversary to the brink of disaster in order to get
him or her to blink first.
邊緣政策策略意味著將對手帶到災難的邊緣，以便讓他或她先眨眼。
● The key to understanding brinkmanship is to realize that the brink is not a sharp precipice but
a slippery slope, getting gradually steeper.
理解邊緣政策的關鍵是要認識到邊緣不是陡峭的懸崖，而是逐漸陡峭的斜坡。
● The essence of brinkmanship is the deliberate creation of risk. The risk should be sufficiently
intolerable to your opponent to induce him to eliminate the risk by following your wishes.
邊緣政策的本質是故意製造風險。這個風險應該足以讓你的對手無法忍受，促使他按
照你的意願來消除風險。
● Understanding the potentialities and risks of brinkmanship is crucial in your life. Use it
carefully, and understand that even with the best care it may fail.
了解邊緣政策的潛力和風險對您的生活至關重要。小心使用它，並了解即使採取最好
的做法，它也可能會失敗。
● If your assessment is that in this confrontation you will blink first, then you may be better
advised not to embark on the path of brinkmanship in the first place.
如果你認為在這次對抗中你會先眨眼，那麼最好建議你一開始就不要走上邊緣政策的
道路。
● In any exercise of brinkmanship, the risk of falling off the brink can turn into a reality.
在任何邊緣政策的實施中，跌落懸崖的風險都可能變成現實。

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GISB101 International Negotiaiton
Week 7 Making Strategies Credible

The Eightfold Path to Credibility

Principle 1: Change the payoffs of the game. 改變遊戲的收益。

● Make it in your interest to follow through on your commitment.
履行您的承諾符合您的利益。
● Turn a threat into a warning, a promise into an assurance.
將威脅變為警告，將承諾變為保證。
● It can be done through two classes of tactics:
1. Write contracts to back up our resolve.
2. Establish and use a reputation.
● Both tactics make it more costly to break the commitment than to keep it.
這使違背承諾比遵守承諾的成本更高。

Principle 2: Change the game by limiting our ability to back out of a commitment.
● Three possibilities are considered.
3. Cut off communication.
4. Burn bridges behind us.
5. Leave the outcome beyond our control, or even to change.
● The available actions and their payoff both can be changed. Combined principles.
● If a large commitment (in P1) is broken down into many smaller ones, then the gain from
breaking a little one (in P2) may be more than offset by the loss of the remaining contract.
6. Move in small steps.

Principle 3: Use others to help us maintain commitment.

7. Develop credibility through teamwork.
- A team may achieve credibility more easily than an individual.
8. Employ mandated negotiating agents.
- Hire others to act in our behalf.

Contracts 合約
● Make the commitment credible by agreeing to pay a penalty if contracting parties fail to
follow through.
如果締約方未能履行承諾，則同意支付罰款，從而使承諾具有可信度。
● For the contracting approach to be successful, the party that enforces the action or collects the
penalty must have some independent incentive to do so.
為了使契約方法成功，執行行動或收取罰款的一方必須有一些獨立的動機來這樣做。
● A broken contract typically produces damages, so that the injured party is not willing to give
up on the contract for nothing.
違約通常會產生損害，因此受害方不願意白白放棄合約。
● Most contacts specify that some third party will be in charge of enforcing it.
大多數合約都規定由第三方負責執行。

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 - A third party does not have any personal interest in whether the contract is upheld.
第三方對於合約是否得到履行不存在任何個人利益。
- Its incentive to enforce the contact comes from other sources.
它強制執行聯繫的動機來自其他來源。
● In the court system, judges don’t stand to gain anything directly whether one side or the other
wins a civil case arising from a contract dispute.
在司法系統中，合約糾紛民事案件無論一方勝訴，法官都無法直接獲得任何利益。
- The judges are motivated to weigh the facts of the case in light of the laws and render
an impartial verdict.
法官們有動機根據法律衡量案件事實並做出公正的判決。
- They have their professional pride and ethic that motivates them to be careful and
deliver correct verdicts.
他們的職業自豪感和職業道德促使他們謹慎行事並做出正確的判斷。
- They also have stronger career reasons as well; if they make too many errors and
repeatedly overruled on appeal by higher courts, they will not be promoted.
他們也有更強烈的職業理由； 如果他們犯了太多錯誤，並在上訴中多次被上級
法院駁回，他們將不會得到晉升。
● Many industries have arbitration panels to adjudicate disputes among their members and
between their members and customers.
許多行業都有仲裁小組來裁決其成員之間以及成員與客戶之間的爭議。
● But institutions and mechanisms for enforcing contracts are not completely against
renegotiation. 重新談判並不是完全沒有可能。
- The matter comes to the attention and under the adjudication of a third party only
when one of the two parties to the contract decides to bring it there.
只有當合約兩方之一決定將其提交給第三方時，該問題才會引起第三方的注意
並進行裁決。
- If the two main parties to the contract have the temptation to renegotiate, they can do
so at their joint will and the original contract will not be enforced.
如果雙方願意重新談判的話，他們可以按照共同意願重新談判，原始合約將不
予執行。
● Thus, contracts alone cannot overcome the credibility problem.
只有合約的話是不能解決誠信問題的。
- Success can be enhanced by using some additional tools for credibility, such as
employing parties with independent interests in enforcement or having a sufficiently
strong reputation at stake.
透過使用一些額外的可信度工具可以提高成功率，例如僱用具有獨立利益的執
法方或擁有足夠強大聲譽的各方。
- If the reputation effect is strong enough, it may be unnecessary to formalize a
contract.
如果聲譽效應夠強，可能就沒有必要簽訂正式的合約。

Reputation 信譽
● If you try a strategic move in a game and then back off, you may lose your reputation for
credibility. 如果您在遊戲中嘗試採取戰略行動然後退出，您可能會失去可信度。

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 - In a once-in-a-lifetime situation, reputation may be unimportant, but people play
several games with different rivals at the same time, or the same rivals at different
times.
在千載難逢的情況下，聲譽可能並不重要，但人們會同時與不同的對手進行幾
場比賽，或在不同的時間與相同的對手進行比賽。
- Future rivals will remember the past actions and may hear about them.
未來的競爭對手會記住過去的行為並可能知道它們。
- Then people have an incentive to establish a reputation.
這樣人們就有動力去建立聲譽。
- This serves as a commitment that makes people’s strategic moves credible.
這是一種承諾，使人們的策略性舉措變得可信。
● Sometimes a public declaration of our resolve can work by putting our reputation on the line
in a public way.
有時，透過以公開的方式將​​我們的聲譽置於危險之中，公開聲明我們的決心可以發揮
作用。
● However, If a public official makes such a declaration and then acts contrary to it, his
reputation can suffer irreparable damage.
然而，如果公職人員做出這樣的聲明，然後採取相反的行動，他的聲譽可能會受到無
法彌補的損害。
- George H. W. Bush declared no taxes during his campaign for the presidency in 1988,
but economic circumstance compelled him to raise taxes a year later. He was defeated
in 1992 reelection.

Cutting Off Communication 切斷溝通

● Cutting off communication succeeds as a credible commitment device because it can make an
action truly irreversible.
切斷溝通作為一種可靠的承諾手段是成功的，因為它可以使行動真正不可逆轉。
- An extreme form of this tactic arises in the terms of a last will and testament. Once
the party has died, renegotiation is virtually impossible.
這種策略的一種極端形式出現在遺囑中。 一旦一方死亡，重新談判幾乎是不可
能的。
● There is a serious difficulty with the use of cutting off communication as a device to maintain
commitment. 一直使用切斷溝通來維持承諾的話是很困難的。
- If we are incommunicado, it may be difficult to make sure that the rival has acceded
to our wishes.
如果我們不願與別人接觸的話，這樣很難確定對手是否同意我們的意願。
- We must hire others to ensure that our stipulation is being honored.
我們必須僱用其他人來確保我們的規定得到遵守。
- e.g., wills are carried by trustees, not the deceased.
例如，遺囑由受託人而非死者持有。

Burning Bridges behind You 自斷退路（做事不留退路或後路）

● Armies often achieve commitment by denying themselves an opportunity to retreat.
軍隊常常透過拒絕撤退的機會來實現承諾。

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Leaving the Outcome beyond Your Control or to Change 讓結果超出你的控製或改變
● In reality, this kind of system is such a good deterrent because it makes aggression tantamount
to suicide. 事實上，這種制度具有很好的威懾作用，因為它使侵略行為等同於自殺。
● However, this strategic advantage comes with a huge cost.
然而，這種策略優勢也伴隨著龐大的成本。
● This is where brinkmanship 邊緣政策 comes in.
- Like Russian Roulette, it is only a probability, not a certainty that the automatic
explosion happens. 就像俄羅斯輪盤賭一樣，這只是一種可能性，而不是一種確
定性自動爆炸發生。
- The shooter no longer controls whether the firing chamber contains the bullet but the
size of the risk beforehand.
- Brinkmanship is a controlled lost of control: the threatener controls the size of the risk
but not the outcome.
邊緣政策是一種受控制的失控：威脅者控制風險的大小而不是結果。
- All the time we just hope that the opponent has a lower tolerance for risk and will
give in, and that the mutually undesirable outcome will not occur before either
concedes.
一直以來，我們只是希望對手的風險承受能力較低，能夠讓步，在雙方都認輸
之前，不要出現雙方都不願意看到的結果。
- Brinkmanship is a delicate strategy, fraught with danger. Practice it at our own peril.
邊緣政策是一種微妙的策略，充滿危險。 實踐它的風險由我們自己承擔。

Moving in Step 小步前進

● Although two parties may not trust each other when the stakes are large, if the problem of
commitment can be reduced to a small enough scale, then the issue of credibility will resolve
itself. 雖然當利害關係很大時，雙方可能不信任對方，但如果承諾問題能夠減少到足夠
小的規模，那麼可信度問題就會自行解決。
● The threat or promise is broken up into many pieces, and each one is solved separately.
威脅或承諾被分解為許多部分，並且每一部分都單獨解決。
● As with brinkmanship, moving in small steps reduces the size of the threat or promise and
correspondingly the scale of commitment.
與邊緣政策一樣，小步前進可以減少威脅或承諾的規模，並相應地減少承諾的規模。
● But what if the other party tries backward reasoning? 但如果對方嘗試逆向推理怎麼辦？
- If we expect to be cheated on the last round, we should break off the relationship one
round earlier。如果我們預期最後一輪會被欺騙，我們應該提前一輪斷絕關係。
- But then the penultimate round will become the final round, and so we will not have
escaped the problem.
但隨後倒數第二輪將成為最後一輪，因此我們將無法逃脫這個問題。
● To avoid the unraveling of trust, there should be no clear final step. As long as there remains a
chance of continued business, it will never be worthwhile to cheat.
為了避免信任瓦解，不應有明確的最終步驟。只要還有繼續做生意的機會，欺騙就永
遠不值得。

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Teamwork 團隊合作
● Often others can help us achieve credible commitment.
通常其他人可以幫助我們實現可信的承諾。
- Although people may be weak on their own, they can build resolve by forming a
group.
儘管人們單獨行動可能很弱，但他們可以透過組成一個團體來增強決心。
● In Princeton and some other universities, exams are not monitored, and cheating is an offense
that leads to expulsion.
在普林斯頓大學和其他一些大學，考試不受監控，作弊屬於違法行為，會導致開除。
● Failure to report observed cheating is also a violation of the honor code, and leads to
expulsion as well. 未能報告所觀察到的作弊行為也違反了榮譽準則，並會導致開除。
● When the honor code is violated, students report crimes because they do not want to become
guilty accomplices by their silence.
當榮譽準則遭到違反時，學生會舉報犯罪行為，因為他們不想因為自己的沉默而成為
犯罪共犯。

Mandated Negotiating Agents 授權談判代理人

● When money on the table like in a wage negotiation, people are induced to try negotiating one
more time.
當金錢擺在桌面上（就像薪資談判一樣）時，人們會被誘導嘗試再進行一次談判。
● The worker’s situation can be improved if he has someone else negotiate for him.
如果有其他人替他進行談判，工人的處境就會得到改善。
● When the union leader is the negotiator, his position may be less flexible.
當工會領導人擔任談判者時，他的立場可能不太靈活。
● The union leader becomes a mandated negotiating agent. His authority to act as a negotiator is
based on his position.
工會領導人成為授權談判代理人。 他作為談判者的權力是基於他的立場。
● Using mandated negotiating agents becomes especially useful if we are negotiating with our
friends, family, or someone with whom we share social links that we are reluctant to break.
如果我們正在與我們的朋友、家人或我們不願意打破的社交聯繫的人進行談判，那麼
使用授權談判代理人就變得特別有用。
- An impersonal agent is better able to avoid falling into trap of relationship and can
get us a better deal.
一個客觀的代理人能夠更好地避免陷入關係陷阱，並能為我們帶來更好的交
易。
- Many professional sports players or artists employ agents partly for this reason.
許多職業運動員或藝術家聘請經紀人的部分原因就是這個原因。
● In practice we are concerned with the means as well as the ends of achieving commitment.
Ethics issue
● Another type of mandated negotiating agent is a machine.
- Many store clerks and government bureaucrats are required to follow rules
mechanically to make prices or policies more credible.
- Employees also benefit by being able to say that negotiating or bending the rule is
“above their grade.”

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Undermining Opponent’s Credibility
● If we stand to gain by making our strategic moves credibly, can we benefit by preventing
other players from making their strategic moves credible?
我們能否透過阻止其他參與者可可信地實施其策略措施而受益？
● There are many situations where the other player’s strategic move can hurt us.
在許多情況下，其他玩家的策略行動可能會傷害我們。
● We can use ways to prevent the other from making that move credible, but they are tricky and
even risky, and we should not expect perfect success.
我們可以採取一些方法來阻止對方使這一舉動變得可信，但它們很棘手，甚至有風險
，我們不應該期望完美的成功。

Contracts
● If all the distinct parties to the original contract are still present, then to get around a contract
we have to propose a new deal that will be in the interests of everyone at that point.
如果原始合約的所有持份者仍然存在，那麼為了繞過合同，我們必須提出一項符合當
時所有人利益的新協議。
- Suppose we are playing a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game.
假設我們正在重複進行囚徒困境遊戲。
- An explicit or implicit contract says that everyone should cooperate until some one
cheats; after that, cooperation will break down and everyone will choose the selfish
action.
明示或隱含的合約規定，每個人都應該合作，直到有人作弊； 之後，合作就會
破裂，每個人都會選擇自私的行為。
- We can try to get away with cheating once by pleading that it was just an innocent
error and that all the available gains from future cooperation should not be wasted just
because the contract says so.
我們可以試圖透過辯稱這只是一個無心錯誤，並且未來合作中的所有可用收益
不應該僅僅因為合約如此規定而被浪費，從而試圖逃脫一次作弊行為。

Reputation
● A reputation is valuable only to the extent that it gets publicized.
聲譽只有在得到宣傳的情況下才有價值。
● We can make it ineffective by maintaining secrecy.
我們可以透過保密來使其無效。

Communication
● Cutting off communication could make the other player is unavailable to receive the
information about the opponent’s commitment or threat in the first place, the strategic move is
pointless.
切斷溝通可能會使其他玩家無法首先接收有關對手的承諾或威脅的訊息，戰略行動毫
無意義。

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Burning Bridges
● Recall the advice of Sun Tzu: 回想一下孫子的建議：
- “When you surround an enemy, leave an outlet free.”
“當你包圍敵人時，要留出出口。”
- One leaves an outlet free not so that they enemy may actually escape but so that the
enemy may believe there is a road to safety.
留出一個出口，不是為了讓敵人真正逃脫，而是為了讓敵人相信有一條通往安
全的道路
- It denies the enemy an opportunity to make his own very credible commitment of
fighting to the death.
它剝奪了敵人做出自己非常可信的戰鬥至死承諾的機會。

Moving in Steps
● Salami tactics 薩拉米香腸戰術: We can try to destroy the credibility of an opponent’s threat
by going against his or her wishes in small steps.
是一種以結盟、威脅來分化、征服的政治和軍事手段。 成功運用此戰術，進攻方會以分
化敵方、逐漸佔領少數領地的方法，達成統治一大片地區的目的。
● Each step should be so small in relation to the threatened costly action that it is not in the
interests of the other to invoke it. It is too small to invoke serious retaliation.
相對於所威脅的代價高昂的行動而言，每一步都應該很小，以至於調用它不符合對方
的利益。 它太小了，不足以引發嚴重報復。

Mandated Agents
● We might simply refuse to deal with the agent and demand to speak directly to the principal.
我們可能會拒絕與代理人打交道並要求直接與委託人交談。
● Whether the principal agrees to deal directly with us then depends on his or her reputation or
other aspects of his or her resolve.
委託人是否同意直接與我們打交道取決於他或她的聲譽或其決心的其他方面。

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GISB101 International Negotiaiton
Week 9 Interpreting and Manipulating Information

Intro: Asymmetric Information, Screening, and Signaling

Introduction: Used Car Market reference

● The information that sellers have is different from the information that buyers know in the
used car market. (Information asymmetry 資訊不對稱)
在二手車市場上，賣家掌握的資訊與買家了解的資訊不同。
● Asymmetric information leads to market failure because the transaction price does not reflect
either the marginal benefit to the buyer or the marginal cost of the seller.
資訊不對稱會導致市場失靈，因為交易價格既不能反映買方的邊際收益，也不能反映
賣方的邊際成本。

Information Asymmetry
● Why can’t we just rely on others to tell the truth? 為什麼我們不能依賴別人說實話呢？
- Recall the football penalty game between the kicker and the goalie. Suppose that the
kicker says “I am going right.” Should the goalie believe him?
● Sometimes telling the truth might be against people’s interests.
有時說真話可能會違背人們的利益。
● The greater the conflict, the less the message can be trusted.
衝突越大，消息的可信度越低。
● The only rational reaction to an assertion made by another player whose interests are totally
opposed to yours is to ignore it completely.
完全忽略與你利益完全相反的一方所做出的斷言。
- Thus, the goalie should ignore what the kicker say: Don’t assume it to be true, but
don’t assume its opposite to be true either.
● Some players know more than others about something that affects the payoffs for them all,
like dealers in used car markets. 有些人會比其他人知得更多。
- Some who possess extra information are keen to conceal it; others are equally keen to
reveal the truth. 一些擁有額外資訊的人熱衷於隱瞞/揭露真相。
- Players with less information typically want to elicit it truthfully from those who
know. 資訊較少的一方通常希望從了解情況的人那裡如實獲取資訊。
● Actions speak louder than words.
- Players should watch what another player does, not what he or she says.
留意行動，而不是言語
- Knowing that the others will interpret actions in this way, each player should in turn
try to manipulate actions for their information content.
當知道對方的行動時，我們應該嘗試操縱他們的行為以獲得資訊。
- e.g., Poker players

10
Signaling and Screening
● Actions leak information. 行動會透露資訊
- Signaling 訊號傳遞: People will choose actions that promote favorable leakage.
指透過可觀察的行為傳遞商品價值或品質的確切訊息（資訊優勢方先行動）
- Signal jamming: People will act in ways that reduce or eliminate unfavorable
leakage.
- To be an effective signal, an action should be incapable of being mimicked by a
rational liar; it must be unprofitable when the truth differs from what you want to
convey.
為了成為有效的訊號，該動作應該不能被理性的說謊者模仿； 當事實與你想要
傳達的不同時，它一定是無利可圖的。
● Screening 訊號甄別: If we want to elicit information from someone else, we should set up a
situation where that person would find it optimal to take one action if the information was of
one kind, and another action if it was of another kind; action (or inaction) then reveals the
information. 指透過不同的合約甄別真實訊息（資訊劣勢方先行動）
● Higher education 高等教育 also works as signaling.
- What employers cannot easily observe but really need to know is a prospective
employee’s general ability to think and learn.
僱主無法輕易觀察到，但真正需要了解的是，未來員工的一般思考和學習能
力。
- A good degree from a good college acts as a signal of such ability.
一所好大學的好學位就是這種能力的標誌。
● But such signaling can turn into a rat race (wasteful competition)
- If the more able get only a little more education, the less able might find it profitable
to do likewise.
- Especially when true abilities remain unchanged.
- In this case, a public policy solution is needed.

Example: Used Car Market

● Two types of used cars: lemons (bad quality) vs. peaches (good quality)
● 假設二手車市場上有兩種質素的車求售，一類是保養良好的好車，二是內部引擎零件
都有嚴重耗損的次貨（英文會稱之為Lemon），並每種各佔一半；再假設二手車買家不
能單靠外觀分辨二手車的質素，只有賣家知道手上舊車的質素。
● Akerlof的推論是二手車市場將會失效。試想一下，如果買家無法分辨市場上的二手車
是好是壞，並只有「一半車是次貨」的資訊；又假設買家認為好車值10萬，次貨只值5萬；
一個極理性的推論，是他會利用50%買到壞車的預期，推算出任何一輛二手車合理均
價為7.5萬（= 50% x 10萬 + 50% x 5萬）。
● 但若10萬是好車的合理價格，賣方是不會願意以7.5萬賣出手上的舊車；這樣下來，市
場上再不會有好車的供應，只有值5萬的二手車扮作好車以7.5萬求售。但理性的買家
會推算出市場上再無好車，結果將是市場上只有壞車以5萬的價格交易。換言之，市場
只會充斥Lemon，變成Market of Lemon。
● 理論的總結，就是信息不對稱（即是賣方比買方更了解產品的質素），會令質素較好的
產品難以在市場生存，被次貨趕絕 — 這個情況稱為Adverse Selection/逆向選擇。

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Solutions to the Lemon Problem 檸檬問題 reference
● Warranty 保用:
- If sellers know that the car is in good condition and not likely to need costly repairs,
offering the warranty is relatively costless to the sellers.
如果賣家知道汽車狀況良好，並且不太可能需要昂貴的維修，那麼提供保用對
賣家來說相對成本較低。
- However, if sellers know that the car is in poor condition, sellers expect to have to
incur a lot of cost to fulfill the warranty.
然而，如果賣家知道汽車狀況不佳，賣家預計將需要承擔大量費用來履行保
固。
- Thus, even after taking into account the higher price that a car under a warranty may
fetch, the worse the quality of the car, the more likely the warranty is to be a losing
proposition to the sellers.
因此，即使考慮到保用期內的汽車可能賣得更高的價格，汽車的品質越差，保
固對賣家來說就越有可能是虧本的。
- The action of offering a warranty serves to “separate out” sellers who merely “talk the
talk” from those who can “walk the walk.”
提供保用的行為可以將那些只會「說說而已」的賣家與那些「言行一致」的賣家
「區分開來」。

● Signals: actions that are intended to convey a player’s private information to other players
- For a signal to be a credible carrier of a specific item of information,
為了令這個訊號變得可靠
➔ it must be the case that the action is optimal for the player to take if, but only
if, he has that specific information. 對該玩家來說，它一定是最佳的行動。
- For instance, if the expected cost of fixing cars is smaller than the price difference
with and without a warranty, then we can infer that a seller offering such a warranty
knows his car to be of good quality.
- This warranty is against the interests of an owner who know his car to be of low
quality. That’s why the warranty works as a credible signal.
- The warranty itself has to be credible in the sense that we can enforce its terms when
the need arises. 保用本身必須是可信賴的，因為我們可以在需要時執行其條款。
- Enforcement of a warranty given by a private seller is likely to be much harder.
- Revelation of the quality of a car through warrantees or other methods is likely to be
far more problematic for private transactions than for sales by established dealers.
- The differences in payoffs from taking an action for players who have different
information make signals credible. 擁有不同資訊的玩家採取行動所帶來的回報
差異使訊號變得可信。

Example: Insurance Market 保險市場

● Who buys insurance? 誰會買保險？
- People have better information about their own risks than do the companies from who
they seek insurance. 人們比他們尋求保險的公司更了解自己的風險。
- Thus, insurance firms ask actions to choose from among different plans with different
provisions of deductibles and coinsurance. 因此，保險公司要求人們從具有不同免
賠額和共同保險規定的不同計劃中進行選擇。

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 - The less risky types will prefer a plan that has a smaller premium but requires them to
bear a larger fraction of the risk. 風險較小的人會喜歡保費較小的計劃，但這代表
他們要承擔較大風險。
- This is less attractive to those who know themselves to have higher risk. 對於那些知
道自己風險較高的人來說，這不太有吸引力。
- Thus, the choice reveals the insurance applicant’s risk type. 投保人的選擇便透露了
他們的風險程度。
- Like this, screening comes into play when the less-informed player requires the
more-informed player to take such an information-revealing action. 像這樣，當資訊
較少的玩家要求資訊較多的玩家採取這種透露資訊的行動時，篩選就會發揮作
用。
● Insurers have long known that their policies selectively attract the worst risks.
保險公司早就知道他們的保單會選擇性地吸引最嚴重的風險。
● Those at greater risk will be overrepresented and will buy bigger policies.
那些風險較大的人將購買更大的保單。
● Raising the price excludes the good risks leaves behind just the worse cases.
提升價錢只會減少低風險的個案，而剩下高風險的。
● Like lemons in the used car market, the relatively “bad” types are selectively attracted to the
transaction, which is called “adverse selection.”

Example: Credit Card Firm 信用卡公司

● Capital One, one of credit card firms in the U.S. created “positive selection.”
● Three consumer types:
- Maxpayers
- Revolvers
- Deadbeats
● Capital One offered transfer of balance at a lower interest rate, which screens out the
unprofitable types.

Example: Getting a MBA

● Since getting a MBA requires a long time (two years) and expensive tuitions (about
$140,000), the degree serves to discriminate between types.
- People face different costs of getting a MBA including their opportunity costs.
- Students who have better managerial skills face lower costs.
- It works because the cost of getting a MBA is less for those firms want to attract than
for those firms want to avoid.
● Firms can also hire people for an in-house training or probationary period like internship.
● Firms can offer contracts with suitably designed backloaded or performance-related
compensation.
● Firms can observe the performance of managers in other firms and then try to lure away the
proven good ones.
● When all firms are doing this, it alters all their calculations of the costs of hiring apprentices,
their salary and performance pay structure and so on.
● If all firms compete so the salaries of the talented above the minimum increases, those lacking
managerial talent will also find it pays to go for the MBA. Then, the pool of MBA’s will be
contaminated by untalented who are lucky enough to pass.

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Who Needs Signaling?
● In the case where someone does not send a signal, that, too, conveys information. Usually it is
bad news, but not always. 如果有人沒有傳達訊號的話 ，這也是一個資訊。通常會是一個
壞消息，雖然不總是如此。
● If the other player knows that you have an opportunity to take an action that will signal
something good about yourself, and you fail to take this action, then the other will interpret
that as meaning that you do not have that good attribute. 如果對方給了機會讓你展現好的
特質，但你沒有做到的話，那麼對方便會認為你並沒有好的特質。

Countersignaling
● Some of the people most able to signal refrain from doing so. Why?
● In this case, the best way to signal your ability or type is by not signaling at all, by refusing to
play the signaling game. 在這種情況下，表明你的能力或類型的最佳方法是根本不發出
信號，拒絕玩信號遊戲。
● People who are signaling try to differentiate themselves from some other type that can’t afford
to make the same signal. 發出訊號的人試圖將自己與其他無法發出相同訊號的人區分開
來。
● In some circumstances, the most powerful signal you can send is that you don’t need to
signal. 在某些情況下，你可以發出的最強的訊號就是你不需要發出訊號。

Example: Voicemail Messages of Professors of Economics

● Harbaugh and To (2020) investigated voicemail greetings and course syllabi across 26
economics departments in the UC and CSU systems.
- They found that only 4.7 percent of economists at schools with a Ph.D. program used
a title on their voicemail message.
- As compared to 27.3 percent of their colleagues at universities without a doctoral
program.
- Only one professor among 124 includes the title in course syllabi at schools with a
Ph.D. program, while 41.4 percent of professors of economics at universities without
a doctoral program use titles in their course syllabi.
● The caller of the degree or title suggests that professors feel the need of a credential in order
to distinguish themselves.
● The truly impressive faculty show they were so famous that they didn’t need to signal.

Signal Jamming 訊號干擾（減少露出對自己不利的資訊）reference

​明明拿了一手爛牌卻打得起勁，好像牌很好，這就是一個訊號干擾的例子，讓跟你一起打麻將
的朋友們搞不清楚其實你拿了一手其爛無比的牌。
● Can we consider the current condition of used cars as a signal?
- Careless owners can mimic like washing and polishing the car when they offer the car
for sale.
- Too small cost difference makes the signal ineffective.
● When can small cost differences between the types suffice for the signal to be effective?
- The answer depends on the proportions of the two types in the population.
- Suppose the proportion of careless owners in the population is quite small.
假設粗心的車主只佔很少部份。

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 - The buyer will think that the probability of the owner being careful is quite high.
買家便會認為有更大機會遇到細心的車主。
- The careless owners will also clean their cars prior to selling to mimic the other type.
粗心的車主會在出售車前先清潔一下，以模仿其他細心的車主。
- All types take the same action, and therefore the action is completely uninformative,
is called a “pooling equilibrium 混同均衡” of the signaling game—the different
types end up in the same pool of signals.
所有人都採取同樣的行為（發送相同的訊號），因此完全沒有任何資訊。

- By contrast, the kind of equilibrium where one type signals and the other does not, so
that the action accurately identifies or separates the types, is a “separating
equilibrium 分離均衡”
相反，當他們發送了不同的訊號時，訊號便可以準確地顯示出不同類型。

● Suppose the proportion of careless owners in the population is very large.

假設粗心的車主只佔了很大部份。
- Careless car owners do not find cleaning worth his while to incur the cost of cleaning
the car. 粗心的車主認為清潔不值得花費清潔汽車的費用。
- The careful owners always have clean cars. Thus, no pooling equilibrium.
細心的車主總是擁有乾淨的汽車。 因此，不存在匯集均衡。
- But if a one careless car owner is cleaning the car so get mistaken for a careful owner,
and will find it worth his while to incur the small cost. Thus, no separating
equilibrium. 但如果一個粗心的車主在清洗汽車，那麼就會被誤認為是一個細心
的車主，並且會發現花點小錢是值得的。因此，不存在分離均衡。
● What happens is somewhere in between: each careless owner follows a mixed strategy.
● Because the action now conveys only partial information to distinguish the two types, the
outcome is called semi-separating 準分離均衡.

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Price Discrimination 價格分歧 reference
● The application of the concept of screening that most impinges on your life is price
discrimination.
● Some people are willing to pay more than others—either, but the sellers do not know exactly
how much each individual customer is willing to pay. 有些人願意比其他人支付更多的費
用，但賣家並不確切知道每個客戶願意支付多少費用。
● Sellers can create different versions of the same good and price the versions differently.
賣家可以建立同一商品的不同版本，並對不同版本進行不同的定價。
● These actions implicitly reveal the customers’ private information, namely their willingness to
pay. The sellers are screening the buyers. 這些行為隱含地洩露了客戶的私人訊息，即他
們的支付意願。 賣家正在篩選買家。
- hardcover vs. paperback
- professional vs. lite version of software
- economy class vs. first class for business travelers
● Equilibrium condition for a signaling (price discrimination) game
- Incentive compatibility constraint: One type (e.g., business travelers) has incentive
to join while the other does not.
- Participation constraint: Such pricing allows a type (e.g., tourists) still participate in
the game.
- The equilibrium pricing strategy that separates one type from among two requires to
satisfy the both constraints.

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 ✅
GISB101 International Negotiaiton
Week 10 Cooperation and Coordination

Cooperation 合㑅（偏契約精神，相互配合）
Ivy League Colleges Football: How Cooperation Makes Everyone Happier
● In the 1950s the Ivy League colleges were faced with a problem.
1950 年代，常春藤盟校面臨一個問題。
● Each school wanted to produce a winning football team
每所學校都希望培養一支獲勝的足球隊。
● The colleges found themselves overemphasizing athletics and compromising their academic
standards in order to build a championship team.
大學發現自己過度強調運動，並為了建立一支冠軍球隊而犧牲了學術標準。
● But no matter what they did, at the end of the season the standings were much as they had
been before. The average win-loss record was still 50:50.
但無論他們做什麼，賽季結束時的積分榜都與之前一樣。 平均勝負戰績仍是50:50。
● The inescapable mathematical fact is that for every winner there had to be a loser. All the
extra work canceled itself out.
不可避免的數學事實是，每個勝利者必然有一個失敗者。 所有額外的工作都被抵消
了。
● The excitement of college sports depends as much on the closeness and intensity of the
competition as on the level of skill.
大學運動的精彩程度不僅取決於技術水平，還取決於比賽的激烈程度和強度。
- Many college football fans prefer it to the professional versions because while the
level of skill is lower, there is often more excitement and intensity to the competition.
與專業版本相比，許多大學橄欖球迷更喜歡它，因為雖然技術水平較低，但比
賽往往更加刺激和激烈。
● So Ivy League colleges joined together and agreed to limit spring training to one day
因此，常春藤盟校聯合起來，同意將春訓限制在一天內。
● Although there were more fumbles (errors), the games were no less exciting.
雖然失誤較多，但比賽的精彩程度絲毫不減。
● Everyone was better off. 每個人的境況都變得更好。
- Colleges saved money and efforts. 大學節省了金錢和精力。
- Athletes had more time to concentrate on their studies.
運動員有更多時間專注於學習。
- Some alumni who wanted their alma maters to excel at football and forget about
academic work may lose but they are minority.
一些希望母校在足球方面表現出色而忘記學術工作的校友可能會失敗，但他們
是少數

Student Competition: How Cooperation Changes Students Study Habit

● The trick is to form a cartel 同業聯盟 to limit competition.
- The problem for students is that the cartel cannot easily detect cheating.
● To arrange a self-enforcing cartel is difficult. It is all the better if an outsider enforces the
collective agreement limiting competition. 安排一個自我執行的卡特爾是很困難的。 如果
由外部人執行限制競爭的集體協議，那就更好了。

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How Unintentional Cooperation Makes Cigarette Companies Better Off
● In the past, cigarette companies used to spend money to convince consumers to “walk a mile”
for their product or to “fight rather than switch.” 過去，香煙公司常常花錢說服消費者「多
走一英里」購買他們的產品，或「戰鬥而不是更換」。
● The different campaigns made advertising agencies rich, but their main purpose was defensive
不同的活動使廣告公司致富，但其主要目的是防禦性的
- Each company advertised because the others did, too.
每家公司都做廣告，因為其他公司也都做了廣告。
● In 1968, cigarette advertisements were banned from TV by law in the U.S.
1968 年，美國法律禁止在電視上播放香菸廣告。
● The companies thought this restriction would hurt them and fought against it.
那些公司認為這項限制會傷害他們並與之抗爭。
● But it turned out that the ban helped cigarette companies all avoid costly advertising
campaigns and thus improved all their profits.
但事實證明，該禁令幫助所有香煙公司避免了昂貴的廣告活動，從而提高了他們的利
潤。

Coordination 協調（偏交談商量）

Commuting Problem: How Coordination Solves the Problem

Discussion: How can the best pattern be achieved?
● License: Issue 2,000 licenses to use the bridge every week or month
● A market-based solution: charge people for the harm they cause to others (increase a toll)
- Suppose each person values an hour of time at $12, that is each would be willing to
pay $12 to save an hour, or $1 to save five minutes.
- Then charge a toll for driving on the Bay Bridge; set the toll $2 above the BART fare.
People regard an extra $2 cost as equivalent to 10 minutes of time.
- Now all commuters face the same effective costs including the value of time. No one
wants to switch to the other route.
- In the process, the City of San Francisco have collected additional $4,000 of toll
revenue ($2 × 2, 000 cars), which can go into the city’s budget, benefiting everyone
because taxes can be lower than they would otherwise be.
- It works like that those commuters who ride BART are selling time to those who use
the bridge.
- Possibly the cost of collecting the toll sometimes exceeds the resulting benefit of
saving people’s time.

Keyboard Layout: The Vicious Circle without Coordination

● Engineers developed new keyboard layouts, such as DSK (Dvorak’s Simplified Keyboard),
which reduced the distance typists’ fingers traveled by over 50 percent.
- The same material can be typed in 5 to 10 percent less time using DSK than
QWERTY.
● But QWERTY is the established system. Almost all keyboards use it, so we all learn it and are
reluctant to learn a second layout.
● No individual user can change the social convention. 任何人都無法改變社會習俗。

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 ● The uncoordinated decisions of individuals keep us tied to QWERTY.
● The problem is called a bandwagon effect 從眾效應 reference
個體受到群體的影響而懷疑、改變自己的觀點、判斷和行為等，以和他人保持一致。
● How can we achieve the socially better equilibrium?
- The historical accident that led to QWERTY capturing nearly 100 percent of typists
ends up being self-perpetuating, even though the original motivation for QWERTY is
long since obsolete.
- It requires coordinated action. 它需要協調一致的行動。
- If the major computer manufacturers coordinate on a new keyboard layout or a major
employer, such as the federal government, trains its employees on a new keyboard,
this could switch the equilibrium all the way from one extreme to the other.
如果主要電腦製造商就新的鍵盤佈局進行協調，或者聯邦政府等主要雇主對其
員工進行新鍵盤的培訓，這可能會將平衡從一個極端轉變為另一個極端。
- The essential point is that it is not necessary to convert everyone, just a critical mass.
- Given enough of a toehold, the better technology can take it from there.
● The important insight from game theory is to recognize early on the potential for future
lock-in–once one option has enough of a head start, superior technological alternatives may
never get the chance to develop.
博弈論的重要見解是儘早認識到未來鎖定的潛力 —— 一旦一種選擇具有足夠的領先
優勢，更先進的技術替代方案可能永遠沒有機會發展。
● Thus there is a potentially great payoff in the early stages from spending more time figuring
out not only what technology meets today’s constraints but also what options will be the best
for the future.
因此，在早期階段，花更多時間不僅弄清楚哪些技術能夠滿足當今的限制，而且弄清
楚哪些選擇最適合未來，可能會帶來巨大的回報。

The Game of Speeding

● If nobody is abiding by the law, then you have two reasons to break it too.
如果沒有人遵守法律，那麼你也有兩個違反法律的理由。
- It is safer to drive at the same speed as the flow of traffic.
以與車流相同的速度行駛更安全。
- When you tag along with the other speeders, your chances of getting caught are
almost zero. 當您跟隨其他超速者時，被抓住的機會幾乎為零。
- As long as you go with the flow of traffic, there is safety in numbers.
只要沿著車流行駛，人多就有安全。
● As more people become law-abiding, both reasons to speed vanish.
隨著越來越多的人守法，這兩個加快速度的理由都消失了。
- It becomes more dangerous to speed, since this requires weaving in and out of traffic.
超速行駛會變得更加危險，因為這需要在車流中穿梭。
- Your chances of getting caught increase dramatically. 你被抓住的機會大大增加。
● Here the tendency is toward one of the extremes.

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 ● The difference arises because of the way interactions work.
- With commuting, either choice becomes less attractive when more of the others
follow you, whereas with speeding, additional company makes it more attractive.
在通勤時，當更多的人跟隨你時，任何一種選擇都會變得不那麼有吸引力，而
在超速行駛時，更多的陪伴會讓它更有吸引力。
- If one driver speeds up, he makes it a little safer for the others to speed.
如果一名駕駛加速，他會讓其他駕駛加速更安全一些。
- If no one is speeding, no one is willing to be the first to do so and provide this
“benefit” to the others without being “rewarded” for doing so (positive externality).
如果沒有人超速，就沒有人願意成為第一個超速的人，並為其他人提供這種
“好處”，而不因此而獲得“獎勵”（正外部性）。
- But there is a new twist: if everyone is speeding, then no one wants to be the only one
to slow down.
但有一個新的轉折：如果每個人都超速，那麼沒有人願意成為唯一減速的人。
● What can lawmakers learn from this? 立法者可以從中學到什麼？
- It is not necessary to set the speed limit so high that everyone is happy to obey it.
沒有必要將速度限制設定得太高，以至於每個人都樂意遵守。
- The key is to get a critical mass of drivers obeying the speed limit.
關鍵是要讓足夠數量的駕駛遵守限速。
- Thus a short phase of extremely strict enforcement and harsh penalties can change the
behavior of enough drivers to generate the momentum toward full compliance.
因此，短期內極其嚴格的執法和嚴厲的處罰可以改變足夠多司機的行為，從而
產生完全合規的動機。
- The equilibrium moves from one extreme (where everyone speeds) to the other
(where everyone complies).
平衡從一個極端（每個人都加速）轉移到另一個極端（每個人都服從）。
- With the new equilibrium, the police can cut back on enforcement,and the compliance
behavior is self-sustaining.
有了新的均衡，警察就可以減少執法力度，合規行為可以自我維持。
- Short but intense enforcement can be significantly more effective than the same total
effort applied at a more moderate level for a longer time.
短期但強烈的執法可能比在較長時間內以較溫和的水平採取相同的整體努力
要有效得多。

⭐️ Today’s Take-Away
● We described many cases in which the games people play have more losers than winners.
● Uncoordinated choices interact to produce a poor outcome for society.
不協調的選擇相互作用，會為社會帶來不良結果。
- Multiperson prisoners’ dilemma: everyone made the same choice, and it was the
wrong one. 多人囚犯困境：每個人都做出相同的選擇，但都是錯的。
- Examples in which some people made one choice while their colleagues made
another, but the proportions were not optimal from the standpoint of the group as a
whole.
例如，有些人做出了一種選擇，而他們的同事則做出了另一種選擇，但從整個
群體的角度來看，比例並不是最佳的。

20
 - This happened because one of the choices involved spillovers—that is, effects on
others—which the choosers failed to take into account.
發生這種情況是因為其中一個選擇涉及外溢效應，即對他人的影響，而選擇者
沒有考慮到這一點。
● Other extreme example: everyone choosing one thing or everyone choosing the other.
其他極端的例子：每個人都選擇一件事，或者每個人都選擇另一件事。
- To choose one, or make sure the right one was chosen, required social conventions,
penalties, or restraints on people’s behavior. 要選擇一種，或確保選擇正確的一種
，需要社會慣例、懲罰或對人們行為的限制。
● Some historical forces might keep the society locked into the wrong equilibrium.
- Group could voluntarily slide down a slippery path to an outcome it would
collectively regret. 團體可能會自願滑向一條讓所有人都後悔的結果。
- Sometimes there might be an equilibrium held together by people’s mutually
reinforcing expectations about what others think. 有時，人們對他人想法的相互增
強的期望可能會形成一種平衡。
- In other cases, equilibrium might fail to exist altogether, and another way to reach a
stable outcome would have to be found. 在其他情況下，均衡可能無法完全存在，
必須找到另一種達到穩定結果的方法。
● The point of these stories is that the free market doesn’t always get it right.
這些故事的重點是，自由市場並不總是正確的。
● There are two fundamental problems.
- History matters:
➔ When one looks forward to recognize that lock-in will be a potential problem,
this provides a reason for government policy to encourage more diversity
before the standard is set.
當人們期待認識到鎖定將成為潛在問題時，這就為政府在製定標準之
前鼓勵更多多樣性的政策提供了理由。
➔ Or if we seem stuck with an inferior standard, public policy can guide a
coordinated change from one standard to another.
或者，如果我們似乎堅持較低的標準，公共政策可以引導從一種標準到
另一種標準的協調變化。
➔ Inferior standards may be behavioral rather than technological.
較低的標準可能是行為方面的，而不是技術方面的。
➔ The move from one equilibrium to a better one can be most effectively
accomplished via a short and intense campaign.
從一種平衡到更好的平衡的轉變，可以透過短期而激烈的運動最有效
地實現。
➔ The trick is to get a critical mass of people to switch, and then the bandwagon
effect makes the new equilibrium self-sustaining.
訣竅在於讓足夠多的人進行轉變，然後潮流效應使新的平衡能夠自我
維持。
● The other general problem with laissez-faire is that so much of what matters in life takes place
outside the economic marketplace.
自由放任的另一個普遍問題是，生活中許多重要的事情都發生在經濟市場之外。
- Goods ranging from common courtesy to clean air are frequently unpriced, so there is
no invisible hand to guide selfish behavior. 從普通禮貌到清潔空氣等商品往往都
是無價的，因此不存在看不見的手來引導自私行為。
- Sometimes creating a price can solve the problem. 有時制定價格可以解決問題。

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- Pricing the good changes its nature. 商品的定價改變了它的性質。
- The coordination failures suggests the role for public policy.
協調失敗顯示了公共政策的作用。

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 ✅
GISB101 International Negotiaiton
Week 11 Bargaining

Measuring the Pie

● The first step in any negotiation is to measure the pie correctly. 準確量度
● More generally, the size of the pie is measured by how much value is created when the two
sides reach an agreement compared to when they don’t.
派的大小是透過雙方達成協議時與未達成協議時創造的價值來衡量的。
- Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 談判協議最佳替代方案
- Since everyone can get their BATNA without having to negotiate, the whole point of
the negotiation is how much value can be created above and beyond the sum of their
BATNAs. 一個人對BATNA的估計決定這個人的談判底線或者臨界點在哪一點
，在這一點之上，任何談判條件都超越他的期望，都是他可以接受的。
● The best way to think about the pie is how much more value can be created beyond giving
everyone his or her BATNA.
除了為每個人提供他或她的 BATNA 之外，還能創造多少更多的價值。
● The BATNAs were fixed in the negotiations so far.

● What if the BATNAs are not fixed? 如果不是固定的話呢？

- We need the strategy of influencing the BATNAs.
- In general, we want to raise our BATNA and lower the BATNA of the other side.
提高自己的，降低別人的
- Sometimes these two objectives will be in conflict. 有時兩個目標會有衝突

Strategic Moves Increasing BATNA

This Will Hurt You More Than It Hurts Me
● When a strategic bargainer observes that a better outside opportunity translates into a better
share in a bargain, he will look for strategic moves that improve his outside opportunities.
當策略談判者發現更好的外部機會可以轉化為更好的談判份額時，他會尋找能夠改善
外部機會的策略舉措。
● Moreover, he will notice that what matters is his outside opportunity relative to that of his
rival.
相對於對手，重要的是自己的外在機會。
● He will do better in the bargaining even if he makes a commitment or a threat that lowers both
parties’ outside opportunities, so long as that of the rival is damaged more severely.
即使他所做的承諾或威脅降低了雙方的外部機會，只要對手的外部機會受到更嚴重的
損害，他就會在討價還價中做得更好。

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Strikes
Brinkmanship and Strikes 邊綠政策和罷工
● Consider a labor contract renewal between the union and the firm.
如果工會和公司將會地勞工合約更新，
● Before an old contract expires, the union and the firm begin the negotiations for a new labor
contract, but there is no sense of urgency during this period.
在舊合約到期之前，工會和公司開始就新的勞工合約談判，但在這期間之前完全沒有
危機感。
● It would seem that each party should wait until the last moment and state its demand just as
the old contract is about to expire and a strike looms.
很有可能雙方都會等到最後才提出自己的訴求，但這時侯合約快要到期，而罷工也快
要開始。

● In fact, delaying agreement can be costly even during the tranquil phase when the old contract
still operates because the process of negotiation has its own risk.
事實上，即使在舊合約仍然有效的平靜階段，推遲達成協議的成本也可能很高，因為
談判過程本身就有風險。
- misperception of the other side’s impatience or outside opportunities
對對方不耐煩或外在機會的誤解
- tension, personality clashes, 緊張關係、性格衝突、
- suspicion that the other side is not bargaining in good faith
懷疑對方沒有誠意討價還價
● The two parties do not always look forward and see the same end.
雙方並不總是期待並看到相同的結局。
● They may not have the same information or share the same perspective, so they see things
differently. 他們可能沒有相同的資訊或共享相同的觀點，因此他們對事物的看法不同。
- Each side must make a guess about the other’s cost of waiting.
雙方必須猜測對方的等待成本。
- Since a side with a low waiting cost does better, it is to each side’s advantage to claim
its cost is low.
由於等待成本低的一方做得更好，因此聲稱其成本低對雙方都有利。
- But these statements have to be proven. 但這些說法必須得到證實。

● The way to prove one’s waiting costs are low is to begin incurring the costs and then show
you can hold out longer, or to take a greater risk of incurring the costs–lower costs make
higher risks acceptable. 證明等待成本較低的方法是開始產生成本，然後表明您可以堅
持更長時間，或者承擔更大的產生成本的風險——較低的成本使較高的風險可以接
受。
● It is the lack of a common view about where the negotiations will end that leads to the
beginning of a strike. 正是因為談判將在何處結束缺乏共識，才導致了罷工的開始。

● Think of a strike as an example of signaling. 將罷工視為訊號的一個例子。

- As always, actions speak louder than words. 一如既往，行動勝於雄辯。
➔ While anyone can say that he or she has a low cost of going on strike or
taking on a strike, to actually do so is the best proof possible.

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 雖然任何人都可以說他或她罷工或參加罷工的成本很低，但實際這樣
做就是最好的證明。
- Conveying information by a signal entails a cost, or sacrifice of efficiency.
透過訊號傳遞訊息需要成本或效率的犧牲。
➔ Both the firm and the workers would like to be able to prove their low costs
without having to create all the losses associated with a work disruption.
公司和工人都希望能夠證明他們的低成本，而不必造成與工作中斷相
關的所有損失。
➔ The situation is tailor-made for the exercise of brinkmanship.
這種情況是為實行邊緣政策而量身訂做的。
- The union could threaten an immediate breakdown of talks followed by a strike, but
strikes are costly to union members as well. 工會可能威脅立即破裂談判，然後舉
行罷工，但罷工對工會成員來說代價也很高。
➔ While time for continued negotiation remains, such a dire threat lacks
credibility. 雖然繼續談判的時間還有，但這種可怕的威脅缺乏可信度。
- But a smaller threat can remain credible: tempers and tensions are gradually rising,
and a breakdown may occur even though the union doesn’t really want it to.
但較小的威脅仍然是可信的：脾氣和緊張局勢正在逐漸加劇，即使工會並不真
正希望如此，也可能會崩潰。
➔ If this bothers the management more than it bothers the union, it is a good
strategy from the union’s perspective. 如果這對管理階層的困擾大於對工
會的困擾，那麼從工會的角度來看，這是一個很好的策略。

● Recall that the strategy of brinkmanship is a weapon for the one that fears a breakdown less.
邊緣政策策略對於那些不那麼擔心崩潰的人來說是一種武器。
- Usually the union is seeking a revision of the terms of the contract in its favor, and for
it the arrangement is singularly disadvantageous.
通常，工會會尋求對合約條款進行有利於自己的修改，而這種安排對工會來說
是極為不利的。
➔ The management does not have a reason to concede. It can let the
negotiations spin on forever while the old contract remains in force de facto.
管理層沒有理由讓步。 它可以讓談判永遠進行下去，而舊合約實際上
仍然有效。
- The threat in the situation is the probability that the process may break down and a
strike may ensue. 這種情況的威脅是流程可能崩潰並可能發生罷工。
➔ The union practices brinkmanship, but now it does so after the old contract
has expired. 工會實行邊緣政策，但現在是在舊合約到期後才這樣做的。
➔ The time for routine negotiations is past. Continued work under an expired
contract while negotiations go on is widely regarded as a sign of union
weakness. 例行談判的時間已經過去了。 在談判仍在進行的情況下繼續
在過期合約下工作被廣泛認為是工會軟弱的表現。
➔ There must be some chance of a strike to motivate the firm to meet the
union’s demands. 必須有一些罷工的機會來激勵公司滿足工會的要求。

● When the strike does happen, what keeps it going?

當罷工真的發生時，是什麼讓罷工繼續下去？
- The key to commitment is to reduce the threat in order to make it credible.
承諾的關鍵是減少威脅，使其可信。

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 - Brinkmanship carries the strike along on a day-by-day basis.
邊緣政策每天都在推動罷工。
➔ The threat never to return to work would not be credible, especially if the
management comes close to meeting the union’s demands. 永遠不重返工作
崗位的威脅是不可信的，特別是如果管理層接近滿足工會的要求的話。
➔ But waiting one more day or week is a credible threat. The losses to the
workers are smaller than their potential gains. 但再等一天或一週是一種可
信的威脅。 工人的損失小於他們的潛在收益。
- Provided they believe they will win, it is worth their while to wait.
只要他們相信自己會贏，那麼等待就是值得的。
➔ If the workers are correct in their beliefs, management will find it cheaper to
give in and in fact should do so immediately. 如果工人們的信念是正確的，
管理階層就會發現屈服的成本更低，事實上應該立即屈服。
➔ Hence the workers’ threat would cost them nothing.
因此，工人的威脅不會給他們帶來任何損失。
- The problem is that the firm may not perceive the situation the same way.
問題是公司可能不會以同樣的方式看待這種情況。
➔ If it believes the workers are about to concede, then losing just one more
day’s or week’s profits is worth getting a more favorable contract.
如果它認為工人們即將讓步，那麼僅僅損失一天或一周的利潤就值得
獲得一份更優惠的合約。
- In this way, both sides continue to hold out, and the strike continues.
就這樣，雙方繼續堅持，罷工仍在繼續。

● As the conflict continues, both sides risk a large loss with a small but increasing probability.
隨著衝突的持續，雙方都面臨著巨大損失的風險，這種損失的可能性雖小但不斷增
加。
● Brinkmanship in the form of a strike imposes costs differently, but the effect is the same.
罷工形式的邊緣政策會帶來不同的成本，但效果是相同的。
● Instead of a small chance of a large loss, there is a large chance, even certainty, of a small loss
when a strike begins. 當罷工開始時，出現小損失的可能性很大，甚至是肯定的，而不是
小機率造成大損失。
- As the strike continues unresolved, the small loss grows, just as the chance of falling
off the brink increases. 隨著罷工持續無法解決，小小的損失就會增加，同時跌落
懸崖邊緣的可能性也會增加。
● The way to prove determination is to accept more risk or watch strike losses escalate.
證明決心的方法是接受更多風險或眼睜睜看著罷工損失不斷升級。
- Only when one side discovers that the other is truly the stronger does it decide to back
down. 只有當一方發現對方確實更強大時，才會決定退縮。
- One side may suffer less from waiting, perhaps because it has valuable alternatives.
一方可能因等待而遭受的損失較小，也許是因為它有有價值的替代方案。
- Winning may be very important, perhaps because of negotiations with other unions
獲勝可能非常重要，也許是因為與其他工會的談判
- Losing may be very costly, so that the strike losses look smaller.
失敗的代價可能非常大，因此罷工損失看起來更小。

● Brinkmanship applies to the bargaining between nations as well as that between firms.
邊緣政策也適用於國家之間以及企業之間的討價還價。

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Bargaining Over Many Issues
● Each side may value the items differently in the negotiation over multiple issues.
在多個問題的談判中，各方可能對不同的項目有不同的重視。
● Such differences open up new possibilities for mutually acceptable bargains.
這種差異為雙方都能接受的討價還價開啟了新的可能性。
- Broad negotiations toward trade liberalization in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), have had better success
than ones narrowly focused on particular sectors or commodities.
關貿總協定（GATT）和世界貿易組織（WTO）中針對貿易自由化的廣泛談判比狹
隘地針對特定部門或商品的談判取得了更大的成功。

● But joining issues together opens up the possibility of using one bargaining game to generate
threats in another. 但將問題結合在一起就有可能利用一種討價還價遊戲在另一種討價
還價遊戲中產生威脅。
- For example, the U.S. may have more success in extracting concessions in
negotiations to open up the South Korean market to its exports if it threatened a
breakdown of the military relationship, thereby exposing South Korea to a risk of
North Korean aggression. 例如，如果美國威脅要破壞軍事關係，從而使韓國面臨
朝鮮侵略的風險，那麼美國可能會在談判中更成功地爭取韓國讓步，以向其出
口產品開放韓國市場。
- The U.S. has no interest in actually having this happen; it would be merely a threat
that would induce Japan to make the economic concession.
美國無意讓這種情況真正發生； 這只是一個誘使日本做出經濟讓步的威脅。
- Therefore, South Korea would insist that the economic and military issues be
negotiated separately. 因此，韓國將堅持經濟問題和軍事問題分開談判。

Virtual Strikes
● A strike hurts more than the two parties negotiating. 罷工對雙方談判的傷害更大。
● But the parties negotiating have to be willing to walk away in order to demonstrate the
strength of their BATNA or to hurt the other side more. 但談判雙方必須願意離開，才能展
現自己 BATNA 的實力，或為對方帶來更多傷害。
● Even for an ordinary strike, the collateral damage can easily eclipse the size of the dispute.
即使是普通的罷工，附帶損害也很容易掩蓋爭端的規模。
● Is there some way that the two parties can resolve their differences without imposing such
large costs on the rest of us?
有沒有辦法讓雙方解決分歧，但又不給我們其他人帶來如此大的成本？
- Instead of a traditional strike, the idea is to have a virtual strike (or virtual lockout),
in which the workers keep working as normal and the firm keeps producing as
normal. 這個想法不是傳統的罷工，而是進行虛擬罷工（或虛擬停工），工人繼續
正常工作，公司繼續正常生產。
- The trick is that during the virtual strike neither side gets paid.
訣竅在於，在虛擬罷工期間，雙方都不會得到報酬。

● In a regular strike, workers lose their wages and an employer loses its profits.
在定期罷工中，工人失去工資，雇主失去利潤。

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● So during a virtual strike, the workers would work for nothing and the employer would give
up all of its profits. 因此，在虛擬罷工期間，工人將無償工作，雇主將放棄所有利潤。
● Profits might be too hard to measure and short-term profits might also understate the true cost
to the firm. 利潤可能很難衡量，短期利潤也可能低估了公司的真實成本。
● Instead, we have the firm give up all of its revenue. 相反，我們讓公司放棄所有收入。
- As to where the money would go, the revenue could go to a charity.
至於錢的去向，收入可以捐給慈善機構。
- Or, the product could be free so that the revenues would be given to customers.
或者，該產品可以是免費的，這樣收入就可以回饋給客戶。
● During a virtual strike, there is no disruption to the rest of economy.
在虛擬罷工期間，其他經濟領域不會受到干擾。
- The consumer is not left stranded without service.
消費者不會因為得不到服務而陷入困境。
- Management and labor feel the pain and thus have an incentive to settle, but the
government, charities, or customers get a windfall.
管理階層和勞工感受到了痛苦，因此有動力解決問題，但政府、慈善機構或客
戶卻得到了意外之財。

● In 1999, Meridiana Airline’s pilots and flight attendants staged Italy’s first virtual strike.
1999 年，Meridiana 航空公司的飛行員和空服員發動了義大利首次虛擬罷工。
- The employees worked as usual but without being paid, while Meridiana donated the
receipts from its flights to charities. 員工照常工作，但沒有工資，而 Meridiana 將
其航班收據捐贈給慈善機構。
- The flights that were virtually struck were not disrupted.
幾乎受到攻擊的航班並未受到干擾。
- Other Italian transport strikes have followed the Meridiana lead.
義大利其他交通運輸業的罷工也緊跟著 Meridiana 的腳步。
- In 2000, Italy’s Transport Union forfeited 100 million lire from a virtual strike carried
out by 300 of its pilots. 2000 年，義大利運輸聯盟因 300 名飛行員進行虛擬罷工
而被沒收 1 億里拉。
- The virtual pilots’ strike provided a public relations opportunity, as the strike
payments were used to buy a fancy medical device for a children’s hospital.
虛擬飛行員罷工提供了公共關係機會，因為罷工付款被用來為兒童醫院購買高
檔醫療設備。
- Instead of destroying consumer demand, the virtual strike windfall provides an
opportunity to increase the brand’s reputation. 虛擬罷工帶來的意外之財並沒有
破壞消費者的需求，反而提供了提高品牌聲譽的機會。

● Somewhat perversely, the public relations benefit of virtual strikes may make them harder to
implement. 有點反常的是，虛擬罷工的公共關係優勢可能會使它們更難實施。
- Indeed, a strike is often designed to inconvenience consumers so that they put
pressure on management to settle. 事實上，罷工往往是為了給消費者帶來不便，
以便他們可以向管理階層施加壓力，要求他們解決問題。
● Thus asking an employer to forfeit its profits may not replicate the true costs of a traditional
strike. 因此，要求雇主放棄利潤可能無法複製傳統罷工的真實成本。
- In a historical example, management agreed to forfeit more than its profits—and
instead forfeited its entire gross revenue on all sales during the duration of the strike.

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 在歷史上的例子中，管理層同意放棄的不僅是利潤，而是放棄了罷工期間所有
銷售的全部總收入。

● Why would workers ever agree to work for nothing? 為什麼工人們會同意無償工作？

- To impose pain on management and to prove that they have a low cost of waiting.
給管理階層帶來痛苦，並證明他們的等待成本很低。
➔ Indeed,during a virtual strike, we might expect to see labor work harder
because every additional sale represents additional pain to the manufacturer,
who has to forfeit the entire revenue on the sale. 事實上，在虛擬罷工期間，
我們可能會看到勞動力工作更加努力，因為每增加一次銷售都會給製
造商帶來額外的痛苦，製造商必須放棄全部銷售收入。
● Our point is to replicate the costs and benefits of the negotiation to the parties involved while
at the same time leaving everyone else unharmed.
我們的觀點是將談判的成本和利益複製給相關各方，同時不讓其他人受到傷害。
- So long as the two sides have the same BATNAs in the virtual strike as they do in the
real one, they have no advantage in employing the real strike over a virtual one.
只要雙方在虛擬罷工中擁有與真實罷工中相同的BATNA，那麼他們在使用真
實罷工時就沒有比虛擬罷工更具優勢。
● The right time to go virtual is when the two sides are still talking.
虛擬化的最佳時機是雙方仍在交談的時候。
- Rather than wait until the strike is real, labor and management might agree in advance
to employ a virtual strike in the event their next contract negotiations fail.
勞工和管理層可能會提前同意在下一次合約談判失敗時採取虛擬罷工，而不是
等到罷工真正發生。
● The potential gains from eliminating the entire inefficiency of traditional strikes and lockouts
justify efforts to experiment with this new vision for managing labor conflict.
消除傳統罷工和停工的全部低效率的潛在收益證明了嘗試這種管理勞資衝突的新願
景的努力是正確的。

⭐️ Today’s Take-Away
● One important element that determines how the pie will be split is each side’s cost of waiting.
決定如何分配派的一個重要因素是雙方的等待成本。
● The general idea is that the better a party can do by itself in the absence of an agreement, the
larger its share of the bargaining pie will be.
一方在沒有達成協議的情況下自己做得越好，在談判中獲得的份額就越大。
● The first step in any negotiation is to measure the pie correctly. 第一步要正確量度派的大小
● More generally, the size of the pie is measured by how much value is created when the two
sides reach an agreement compared to when they don’t.
派的大小是透過雙方達成協議時與未達成協議時創造的價值來衡量的。

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● The best way to think about the pie is how much more value can be created beyond giving
everyone his or her BATNA.
除了為每個人提供他或她的 BATNA 之外，還能創造多少更多的價值。

● When BATNAs are moving, we need the strategy of influencing the BATNAs.
當BATNA移動時，我們需要影響BATNA的策略。
● He will do better in the bargaining even if he makes a commitment or a threat that lowers both
parties’ outside opportunities, so long as that of the rival is damaged more severely.
即使他所做的承諾或威脅降低了雙方的外部機會，只要對手的外部機會受到更嚴重的
損害，他就會在討價還價中做得更好。
● Each side may value the items differently in the negotiation over multiple issues.
在多個問題的談判中，各方可能對不同的項目有不同的重視。
● Such differences open up new possibilities for mutually acceptable bargains.
這種差異為雙方都能接受的討價還價開啟了新的可能性。

● There are many reasons to make strikes happen and continue.

導致罷工發生和持續的原因有很多。
● Virtual strike is suggested.
- In a regular strike, workers lose their wages and an employer loses its profits.
在正常罷工中，工人失去工資，僱主失去利潤。
- So during a virtual strike, the workers would work for nothing and the employer
would give up all of its profits.
因此，在虛擬罷工期間，工人將無償工作，僱主將放棄所有利潤。
- Our point is to replicate the costs and benefits of the negotiation to the parties
involved while at the same time leaving everyone else unharmed.
我們的觀點是將談判的成本和利益複製給相關各方，同時不讓其他人受到傷
害。
- So long as the two sides have the same BATNAs in the virtual strike as they do in the
real one, they have no advantage in employing the real strike over a virtual one.
只要雙方在虛擬打擊中擁有與真實打擊中相同的BATNA，那麼他們在使用真
實打擊時就沒有比虛擬打擊更具優勢。
- The potential gains from eliminating the entire inefficiency of traditional strikes and
lockouts justify efforts to experiment with this new vision for managing labor
conflict.
消除傳統罷工和停工的全部低效率的潛在收益證明了嘗試這種管理勞資衝突
的新願景的努力是正確的。

30
 ✅
GISB101 International Negotiaiton
Week 12 International Organizations and Multilateral Negotiations

What Makes International Negotiations Different?

● Different “board”
- Political and legal pluralism 法律多元主義 (weak laws, standards, practices,
enforcement and punishment mechanisms)
- International economics
- Foreign governments and bureaucracies 官僚機構
- Instability
- Ideology 思想
- Culture

● Different “players”
- Countries/states/non-states/governments (diplomats 外交官)
- Multinational corporations (int’l business men)
- Non-traditional actors (international NGOs and individuals)

● Different “stakes”
- War and peace
- Environment/resources
- Country’s interest
- International business

● Different “moves” (strategic and counter-moves)

- Threat (invasions, sanctions 制裁, isolations, etc.)
- Enticement 誘惑 (alliances, aids, etc.)
- Complexities: Interventions and Interference 干涉
- Long-term relationships and reputations
- Track-two diplomacy
- Mediation 調解/arbitration 仲裁 by third parties
- Historical independent outcomes

Structuring Negotiation

1. The Board
● Definition: international system setting and the specific negotiation characteristics
● The (international) system setting in which all negotiations take place

● Macro-perspective: The international system

- Polarity 極性: the distribution of power among states (balance/ bipolarity/
polycentrism/ unipolarity)

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 - Crisis 危機: International negotiations are affected by the existing structure of the
international system, but also characterized by the climate in which they are
conducted. The impact of crisis is particularly important for negotiators. The three
key elements of crisis are threat 威脅, time pressure 時間壓力, and the
accompanying stress 伴隨的壓力 that these engender.
- third-party intervention 第三方介入: The introduction of an external party into a
negotiation when it is apparent that progress cannot be achieved without some form
of outside involvement. (mediation 調解 by global or regional organizations, states or
groups of states, private citizens, religious organizations, special interest groups) c.f.,
arbitration 仲裁 (a judicial process 司法程序 bound to abide by that ruling)
● Micro-perspective: characteristics of individual negotiations (actors, issues, and processes)
- Number of actors/ coalitions 聯盟 (a collection of actor who band together to try to
achieve common goals, at either the domestic or transnational level)
- Team cohesion 凝聚: monolithic 整體式的 model/ heterogeneous 異質的 model

- Actor capabilities 能力 (military 軍事, economic 經濟, political 政治, territorial 領

土, demographic 人口統計) / limits to power
- Actor norms/ styles (cultural background 文化背景)
➔ e.g., U.S. negotiators’ Laissez-faire 自由放任 attitude toward planning,
cowboy shoot-out techniques, demands for rapid action, excessive legalism
reflecting independence, desire for individual achievement
vs.
East Asians’ attitude reflecting dependence, trust, reticence 沉默寡言,
hierarchy 等級制度, obligation, loyalty 忠誠, and harmony 和平.
- Low-context, or individualistic and high-context, vs. relationship-oriented negotiating
styles
- Actor commitment 承諾
- Number of issues 問題數量/ bargaining dimensions: zero-sum or positive-sum
(win-win)
- Issue linkage 問題關連: the inclusion of additional issues not directly related to the
issue under negotiation; nations transform difficult and even deadlocked 陷入僵局
negotiations into ones with the possibility of mutually beneficial outcomes for all.
- Time frame:
➔ so-called iceberg theory of negotiation (Colosi 1986): It is critical for
negotiators to gain an accurate understanding of the different ways in which
time impacts the parties to the negotiation.

- Public 公開的 or private 非公開的 forum

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 - Outcome 結果: whether or not agreements are mandatory 強制的, the option of
walking away
- Ratification 核准 issues: different levels of negotiations (internal/external); different
level of how binding particular agreements
- Legacy 遺產: a repetition 重複 in negotiations; a carryover 結轉 from one
negotiation episode to the next

2. The Players
● States
- The diplomatic corps
- Political leaders
- Groups of states/international orgarnizations
● Transnational 跨國 Actors
- Substates (cross-regional actors)
- State rivals and “substitute state”
- NGOs (in environmental and human right area)
● Actor dynamics
- The rules of the game: international regime (informal international institutions
organized around sets of mutual expectations; Ruggie 1975). It is still premature to
claim universal standards when talking about behavior in the international system.
- Power and identity (culture)
- Competing identities
● Othering: the politicization 政治化 of cultural differences between negotiation parties
- The cold war: deterrence 威懾 and dangerous trust
- The US-Japan case: moving beyond cultural difference
- The Northern Ireland Case: mirror imaging in societal-level constraint.

COP28
Discussion: Try to analyze the Dubai COP28 by the game approach with your group
● Game board
Macro perspective:
- Polarity: balance power among states
- Crisis: climate change impacts (Temperature records are being repeatedly broken and
climate impacts felt in unprecedented wildfires, floods, storms and droughts
worldwide.)
- Third-party intervention: The United Nations (UN)
Micro perspective:
- Public forum (media can join)
- Outcome: the most notable legally binding agreement that emerged from the COP
process is the Paris Agreement, which was adopted at COP21 in 2015.
- Legacy: a carryover from one negotiation episode to the next (Other critical tasks
facing negotiators in Dubai include getting the loss and damage fund (established at
COP27) up)

● Players

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 - The negotiating parties include governments that have signed the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and/or the Paris
Agreement.
- World leaders, ministers, negotiators, thousands of representatives from civil society,
the private sector, international organizations, and the media.

Discussion: How does COP28 differ from trade negotiations in the WTO or military and
diplomatic negotiations in the United Nations Security Council?
● Game board
- Scope and focus:
COP: climate change and related environmental issues
WTO: liberalization and regulation international trade
UNSC: matters of international peace and security
- Power:
COP: negotiating power may differ but still balance in general
WTO: not really balance as it also recognizes the concept of "special voting
majorities" in certain cases
UNSC: power is centred among the five permanent members
- Decision making:
COP: consensus; outcomes are non-binding agreements
WTO: consensus; outcomes are binding agreements that require ratification and
implementation by member states
UNSC: has a clear voting system
● Players
- COP: nongovernmental actors is pivotal
- WTO: participation of WTO member countries, which currently number over 160;
nongovernmental actors do not have formal membership or voting rights
- UNSC: the permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and the
rotating non-permanent members of the Council; nongovernmental actors do not
participate directly

Discussion: How does COP28 differ from US-China trade dispute negotiations during
2019-2023?
● Game board
- Scope and focus:
COP: climate change and related environmental issues
US-China: resolving trade tensions and addressing specific trade-related issues
between the two countries
- Power:
COP: balance
US-China: bipolar
- Decision making:
COP: agrees with consensus (like a coordination game)
US-China: direct negotiations between the two countries' representatives (not much
coordination but competition)
● Players
- COP: includes scientists (for providing evidence) -> major difference
- US-China: two countries only (bilateral)

34
 ✅
GISB101 International Negotiaiton
Week 13 Free Trade Agreements and Bilateral Negotiations

Introduction: How do bilateral negotiations differ from multilateral negotiations?

Bilateral Negotiations 雙邊 Multilateral Negotiations 多邊

1. The primary difference lies in the number of participants of negotiations 參與人數不同

Separate negotiations must be done with Multilateral negotiations can be done with many
different partners on one to one basis. partners together.

2. The effectiveness of negotiations depends on the issue of negotiations

The most effective way of liberalizing trade in

an interdependent global economy, because
They are quicker and easier to negotiate than concessions in one bilateral or regional deal
multilateral agreements, because only two may undermine concessions made to another
parties are included in bilateral negotiations. trading partner in an earlier deal. trade
只有兩個國家就比較有效率 agreements are a significant driver for trade
liberalization, although multilateral agreements
are more extensive.

Structuring Negotiation

3. The Stakes
● The stakes of negotiations: the issues on the negotiation table 談判桌上的問題
- Issue salience 問題顯著性: the importance a particular actor or set of actors gives to
an issue (the perceived stakes)
- It is not the issue itself that generates stakes for the actors involved, but rather the
interests that underlie the issues for each and every actor involved (Sebenius, 2002).
背後的利益才是重點
- Understanding variations in issue salience for the actors involved in international
negotiations is an important step in the effect to build a more complex understanding
of the ways issues affect negotiations.
要了解不同持份者所著重的問題
● The issue salience may change over time. 問題的重要性可能會隨著時間的推移而改變

35
 - The same issue might at one point in time be very important but at other times of
seemingly little consequence for the various stakeholders.

● Sometimes, issues are highly salient for one group but less so for others.
有時，問題對於一個群體來說非常突出，但對於其他群體來說則不那麼突出
- Nation-states are not monolithic 整體式的 entities.
- The reality of policy making is that many actors within countries vie for control of
and influence over the outcomes of international negotiations.
當制定政策時，現實是各國內部的許多持份者都在爭取控制權和影響力，而不
是國際談判結果的。
- Even if an issue is highly salient for domestic groups in one participant in a
negotiation, it is not necessarily very salient for those on the other side.
即使某個問題對於談判一方的國內團體來說非常突出，但對另一方來說卻不一
定非常突出。
- The flexibility and strategies of the negotiations from opposing sides will be different
even though they are discussing the exact same issue.
即使討論的是同一個問題，雙方談判的彈性和策略也會有所不同。

● Four factors that influence issue salience:

1. The distribution of costs and benefits among domestic (substate) actors
(controversy over the domestic stakes) 成本和收益分配 (國內利益的爭議)
- Perceptions about the fairness of negotiated international agreements affect
who gets involved in the negotiation process at the domestic level as well as
the salience of the issue for those actors.
對談判達成的國際協議公平性的看法影響著誰參與國內談判進程以及
問題對這些參與者的重要性。
- Consideration of the perceived distribution of costs and benefits is also
affected by short-term vs. long-term calculations.
對成本和收益的感知分配的考慮也受到短期與長期計算的影響。
- Perceptions of stakes create incentives for interested parties to sway public
opinion on an issue.
對利害關係的看法會激勵相關方在某個議題上影響公眾輿論。
2. The commitment of key individuals and groups to the negotiation issue
重要持份者對談判問題的承諾
- High commitment can result from national pride, ethnic ties, deeply held
political ideologies, perceived offenses, the personal interests and
temperaments of the negotiators, and other causes.
高度承諾可能源自於民族自豪感、種族連結、根深蒂固的政治意識形
態、感知到的冒犯、談判者的個人利益和氣質以及其他原因。
- The impact of commitment on how issues are perceived in international
negotiations can be both positive and negative.
承諾的影響可能是正面或負面的。

36
 - The potential for misunderstanding is rife when relationships are rooted in
emotional perceptions of the “other.”
當關係植根於對「他人」的情感認知時，誤解的可能性就很普遍。
- When issue involvement becomes emotionally charged at the domestic level,
it will complicate the international dimension of the negotiations.
當國內層面的問題涉及情緒化時，國際層面的談判就會變得複雜。
3. The urgency that the presence of a crisis situation adds
危機局勢的存在增加了緊迫性
- Crisis situations tend to focus decision-making attention on a country’s chief
executive and a narrow circle of advisers.
危機局勢往往會將決策注意力集中在一個國家的執行長和一小群顧問
身上。
4. The level of media attention focused on the negotiations 媒體對談判的關注程度
- Issue salience can also be affected by the level of domestic and international
attention afforded a negotiation issue.
問題的顯著性也可能受到國內和國際對談判問題的關注程度的影響。
- Research shows that when visibility increases, negotiators become less
flexible, leading often to impasses (Druckman and Druckman, 1996)
研究表明，當可見性增加時，談判者就會變得不那麼靈活，常常導致僵
局

● Two-level game 雙層賽局: a term used to characterize the double set of negotiations that
must be carried out both at the domestic level and at the international level. reference
這個譬喻作為了解國內政治與外交如何相互影響的架構。
Putnam認為，許多國際政治交涉通常可被視為是「雙層賽局」。

- Internal negotiation (Level 1) + External negotiation (Level 2) (Putnam)

➢ International: bargaining between negotiators leading to a tentative agreement
談判者之間進行討價還價，最後達成臨時協議
➢ Domestic: separate discussions within each group of constituents about
whether to ratify the agreement 每組成員分別討論是否批准該協議
- External negotiation (Level 1) + Internal negotiation (Level 2)
- Win-set 共識圈: the existence of overlap between perceptions of acceptable
outcomes at both levels of a two-level negotiation. 雙層談判的兩個層面上對可接
受結果的看法之間存在重疊。
- The open pursuit of international negotiation may constrain the ability of negotiations
to derive agreement.
公開尋求國際談判可能會限制談判達成協議的能力。
- The domestic-input factor can be a help or a hindrance to negotiators. It complicates
the process by adding another layer of complexity, but it can also provide leverage
with the international parties.
國內投入因素對談判者可能是一種幫助，也可能是一種阻礙。 它增加了另一層
複雜性，使整個過程變得更加複雜，但它也可以為國際各方提供影響力。
- If a proposal is not acceptable back home, a negotiator can use the threat of domestic
objections to try to squeeze more concessions out of a negotiation partner.

37
 如果某項提案在國內不被接受，談判者可以利用國內反對的威脅來試圖迫使談
判夥伴做出更多讓步。

4. The Moves
● Strategic choices in
- simultaneous games (prisoners’ dilemma, chicken)
- sequential games

● Implementing strategy
- Zone of agreement 談判協議區: the overlapping area of acceptable outcomes for
both or all negotiating parties. 談判時的協議空間
- 在區域之外，無論進行多少談判都不會達成協議。

● Competitive negotiation 競賽談判

- Positional bargaining : negotiating stance where an actor identifies only one
desirable outcome and refuses to move away from it or consider any other options
持份者只得出一個結論，而拒絕考慮其他選項

- Adversarial diplomacy: negotiating stance when the interests of two or more

countries clash, but there is little or no chance of armed conflict
雖然兩個或上以的國家的利益衝突時，他們卻很少可能或不會發生武裝衝突。
- Coercive diplomacy 強制外交/拼死一搏: negotiating stance involving the threat of
force or limited use of force as a tool at the negotiation table
一國試圖通過威脅使用武力或實際使用有限的武力以及其他方式來使另一國
改變其自身行為。reference

● Collaborative negotiation 協作談判

- Interest-based bargaining: negotiating stance that focuses on trying to understand
the needs of the other party and finding areas of common interest.
著重於嘗試了解對方的需求並尋找共同利益領域。
- To move beyond the problems of positional bargaining, four specific moves are
suggested (Fisher and Ury, 1999)
➔ Separate The People From The Problem.
➔ Focus On Interests, not positions.
➔ Invent Options For Mutual Gain.
➔ Insist on Using Objective Criteria to Judge the merits of possible solutions.

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 - These measures can be used to build trust among negotiation adversaries and boost
their confidence in the negotiation process.
這些措施可以用來在談判對手之間建立信任，增強他們對談判進程的信心。

● Track-two diplomacy 二軌外交: negotiations involving nontraditional diplomats and

nontraditional settings. Informal negotiations allow the parties to come together more easily
to explore mutual fears, grievances and demands (Rasmussen 1997)
二軌外交是非官方或半官方人士（包括學者、退休官員、公共人物和社會積極分子等）
參與外交對話，目的在於尋找衝突解決和信任創建的機會。在二軌外交中，智庫開始
接受外交使命，參與官方外交對話，或者得到官方授意以公開的、非官方論壇的形式
探索實現外交目的的途徑。reference

● Mediation 調解: an outside perspective brought in to help find ways to resolve a deadlocked
conflict when parties desire progress but cannot resolve issues themselves
當各方希望取得進展但無法自行解決問題時，引入外部視角來幫助找到解決僵局衝突
的方法
- Mediation tactics in three categories: communication, formulation, and manipulation
1. Communication 溝通: All parties to the negotiation are able to speak freely
and be heard by the other parties.
談判各方都可以自由發言並被其他各方聽到。
2. Formulation 制定/規劃: A mediator can shape the process and substance or
the formulation of the negotiation.
調解員可以塑造談判的過程和內容或表達。
3. Manipulation 影響/操縱: a mediator’s ability to use his or her position to
obtain an agreeable outcome to the problem
調解員利用其職位為問題取得滿意結果的能力

Bilateral Trade Negotiations

Trade Negotiations
Trade negotiations’ characteristics：
● national power 國家勢力 vs. bargaining power 談判勢力
● long-term and repeated negotiations 長期和重覆的談判
● multi-issues negotiations 多重問題的談判
● conflicts within the government 政府內的衝突
● domestic conflicts with losing industries/groups 國內衝突（受影響的行業或團體）

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Nature of US Trade Policy
● Mock-markup 模擬審議程序: Congress has reviewed trade agreements prior to the
introduction of an implementing bill. The committees of jurisdiction typically hold hearings
on the proposed trade agreement. They often hold informal “mock” markups on a draft
implementing bill. Mock markups provide for public review of the proposed agreement and
allow the President to receive feedback and concerns from Congress, which are, nonetheless,
nonbinding on the Administration. Congress has only option for up or down voting within 60
days.
● USTR Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report: The annual report of the President
prepared by USTR should be submitted to the Congress pursuant to Section 163 of the Trade
Act of 1974.

Discussion: Try to analyze the US-Singapore FTA by the game approach with your group
● Game
● Players
Two countries: US and Singapore
- Singapore: The Singapore government, led by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong;
Tommy Koh as Singapore's chief negotiator; George Yeo as Trade Ministers
- US: The United States Trade Representative (USTR); Special Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky and Ambassador Steven Green
● Stake
- The USSFTA aims to promote trade and investment between the two countries by
reducing barriers to trade, improving market access, and establishing rules for fair
competition.
● Move
- Collaborative negotiation

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