004 - Peicl
004 - Peicl
004 - Peicl
Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law
(PEICL)
2nd Expanded Edition
Edited by
Jürgen Basedow • John Birds • Malcolm Clarke
Herman Cousy • Helmut Heiss • Leander Loacker
This volume contains an expanded and partly updated version of the “Principles of Euro-
pean Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)” produced by the Project Group “Restatement of
European Insurance Contract Law”. While the first edition published in 2009 essentially
dealt with rules applicable to all classes of insurance, this edition also includes provisions
on liability insurance, life insurance and group insurance. The overall draft of the PEICL is
now ready for political consideration by the institutions of the European Union in view of
eventual legislation.
We owe thanks to the publisher, sellier european law publishers Munich, for high quality
service in the production of the present book. We also want to express our gratitude to Ms.
Mandeep Lakhan and Mr. Sascha Drobnjak for their valuable support. Finally, we want to
thank the translators of the PEICL for their very helpful contribution to the further dis-
semination of our draft.
v
Preface to the First Edition
This volume contains the “Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)” pro-
duced by the Project Group “Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law”. The Project
Group started its work in September 1999. It joined the European Network of Excellence on
European Contract Law (CoPECL), which was set up by the European Commission in 2005,
and drafted its Principles as a contribution to the Common Frame of Reference of European
Contract Law. However, the PEICL go beyond a Frame of Reference and are intended to
provide a Draft Optional Instrument of European Insurance Contract Law.
The founding father and first chairman of the Project Group, the late Professor Fritz Re-
ichert-Facilides, University of Innsbruck, died in 2003. His academic life was strongly de-
voted to comparative and especially European insurance contract law. It is a source of great
satisfaction to the Members of the Project Group to be able to present the completed Prin-
ciples of European Insurance Contract Law as Fritz Reichert-Facilides would have wanted
them to be. We owe thanks to the publisher, sellier.elp Munich, for high quality service in the
production of the present book. The Project Group’s assistants have prepared the layout of
the book. In this respect, we want to express our gratitude especially to Dr. Marlene Danzl,
Ms. Mandeep Lakhan, Mr. Manuel Sacchetto and Mr. Golo Wiemer.
June 2009
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Table of Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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Notes
Application to Private Insurance Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Mutual Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Marine Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Reinsurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Other Specific Branches of Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Mandatory Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Single Mandatory Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Minimum Protection Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
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Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Notes
The Pros and Cons of Defining the Insurance Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Standard Elements of Definitions of the Insurance Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
The Insurer’s Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Uncertain Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Definitions of Other Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
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Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Notes
Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
In dubio contra stipulatorem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Notes
General Law of Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Specific Rules of Insurance Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Notes
Community Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
The Kind and Context of the Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
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General Law of Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Specific Provisions for Insurance Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Knowledge of the Policyholder’s Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
When Policyholder and Insured are Not Identical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Note
Background in Community Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
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Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Duty of Spontaneous Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Duty to Answer the Insurer’s Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Notes
The All-or-Nothing Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
The Proportional Reduction of the Insurance Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Approximation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Innocent Breach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Notes
Obvious Defects of the Policyholder’s Answer, Article 2:103(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Immaterial Information, Article 2:103(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
The Insurer’s Knowledge and Behaviour, Article 2:103(c) and (d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
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Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Notes
European Directives and their Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
The Kind of Information to Be Given . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Stricter Requirements under National Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Information Duty Drafted in General Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Application Form Provided by the Insurer, Article 2:201 para. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Notes
Community Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
National Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
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Community Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
The Sanction of Immediate Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Incomplete and Unclear Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Notes
A Matter of General Contract Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Consensual Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Notes
The Roles of Offeror and Offeree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
The Binding Nature of an Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Notes
Community Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Implementation for Life Assurance and Similar Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
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Implementation of EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Additional and Broader Provisions on the Fairness of Insurance Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Non-Negotiated Contracts, Article 2:304 paras. 1 and 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Exceptions from Judicial Review, Article 2:304 para. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Consequences of Invalidity of a Clause, Article 2:304 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Notes
General Permission for Retroactive Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Sector-Specific Permission for Retroactive Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Notes
Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Form and Information Requirements: Germany, Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
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Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Notes
Issue of a Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Information to Be Provided – Detailed Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Mixture: General Provision with Some Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Means of Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Constitutive Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Issue of General Contract Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Cover Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Written Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
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Maximum Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Personal Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Notes
Statutory and Contractual Prolongation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Period of Prolongation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Prolongation and Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Notes
Article 2:603 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Article 2:603 para. 1(a) – Commencement of Alteration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Article 2:603 para. 1(b) – Notice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Article 2:603 para. 1(c) – Right of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Notes
Article 2:604 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Article 2:604 para. 2 – Reasonableness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Article 2:604 para. 3 – Expiration of the Right of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Article 2:604 para. 4 – End of Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
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Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Life Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Legal Expenses Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Further Post-contractual Information Duties under National Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Notes
First Sentence of Article 3:101 para. 1 – Statutory Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Second and Third Sentences of Article 3:101 para. 1 – Contractual Limitations . . . . . 184
Article 3:101 para. 2 – Minimum Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Article 3:101 para. 3 – Imputation of the Agent’s Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
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General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
Finland and Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Austria, Germany, Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Notes
Ipso iure Avoidance or Declaration of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Termination ex tunc or ex nunc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Causation: France and United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Causation in Other Member State Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Fault: France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Fault: Other European Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
Written Notice and Time Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
End of Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
National Peculiarities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
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Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Belgium and Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Austria and Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Further Objective Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Fault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Finland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Belgium and Luxembourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Notes
Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
Material Aggravation of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Aggravation Specified in the Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Notes
Notice in Reasonable Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Insurer’s Duty to Pay Insurance Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Notes
Expiry of Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Discharge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
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Reduction of the Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Termination of Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Exceptions for Personal Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Notes
Postponement of Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Protection of the Applicant’s Expectations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
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Notes
Article 5:103 para. 1: The Right to Terminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Form of Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Article 5:103 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Notes
Article 6:101 para. 1: Duty to Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Who Owes The Duty to Notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Article 6:101 para. 2: Time Allowed for Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Contractual Derogations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Article 6:101 para. 3: Sanction – Reduction of Insurance Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Contractual Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Notes
Article 6:102 para. 1: Duty to Cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Article 6:102 paras. 2 and 3: Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
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Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Notes
Article 6:104 paras. 1 and 3: Rules on the Time of Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
Article 6:104 para. 2: Partial Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Notes
General Rules on Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Specific Interest Rules for Insurance Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Punitive Interest Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Notes
Community Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
General Rules for All Claims Arising from Insurance Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Specific Rules on Prescription of Premiums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
General Rules of the Law of Prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
Comparison of Prescription Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
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Notes
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
A Single Rule without Any Requirement of Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
A Double Standard: Knowledge plus Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
The Insurer’s Decision on the Claim as Starting Point of Prescription . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
The Duration of the Prescription Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Exception for Life Assurance Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
Notes
General Remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Contractual Derogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Suspension in Case of Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Suspension when Notice or Claim is Lodged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Additional Reason for Suspension or Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Notes
The Indemnity Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Value Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Effect of Value Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Fraud or Misrepresentation on the Part of the Insured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Notes
The Principle of Proportionate Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
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General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
The Claim for Reduction, Article 8:103 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Termination, Article 8:103 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Notes
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Indemnity Principle, Article 8:104 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Full Liability of Each Insurer, Article 8:104 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Recourse against Other Insurer(s), Article 8:104 para. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
Notes
Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
Intention and Gross Negligence, Article 9:101 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Intention and Recklessness of Third Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Contractual Derogations in Case of Negligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
Failure to Avert and Mitigate Loss, Article 9:101 para. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
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Notes
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Reasonable Mitigation Costs, Article 9:102 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
The Sum Insured as Limit, Article 9:102 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
Notes
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Basic Principle, Article 10:101 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Protection of Subrogation Rights, Article 10:101 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
Protection of the Insured’s Entourage, Article 10:101 para. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
No Subrogation Rights against the Insured, Article 10:101 para. 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Notes
Article 11:101 para. 1: General Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Artikcle 11:101 para. 2: Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
Insurance for Whom It May Concern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
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Notes
Imputation to the Policyholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Direct Notification Duties of the Insured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Notes
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Initial Absence of Risk, Article 12:101 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
Subsequent Cessation of Risk, Article 12:101 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Notes
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
The Termination Approach, Article 12:102 para. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
The Substitution Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Transferable Insurance Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Passing of Insurance Cover, Article 12:102 para. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Exceptions, Article 12:102 para. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
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General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Relationship to Personal Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
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Serbian version:
Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717
Slovak version:
Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 745
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Annexes
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 863
Table of National Statutes (including draft legislation and like sources) . . . . . . 866
Table of EU Legislation (including draft legislation and like sources) . . . . . . . . . . 873
Table of International Conventions and Model Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 878
Table of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 879
Bibliography of Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883
xxxviii
Our Sponsors
The Project Group is very grateful for many years of essential financial support by the
following institutions:
Being part of the CoPECL Network established by the European Commission the Group
also acknowledges financial assistance granted by the Commission in the years 2005-
2009.
In addition, the Group is indebted to the many institutions whose support made possible
36 workshops across Europe.
xxxix
Members of the Project Group
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Jürgen Basedow, LL.M. Adv. Dr. Jorge Pegado Liz
Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches und Lisboa/Bruxelles
internationales Privatrecht, Hamburg
Prof. Dr. Jaana Norio-Timonen
Prof. Dr. Juan Bataller Grau Helsingin yliopisto
Universidad Politécnica de Valencia
Prof. Dr. Ioannis Rokas
Prof. John Birds Οικονομικό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Universities of Manchester and Sheffield
Prof. Dr. Martin Schauer
Prof. Dr. Diana Cerini Universität Wien
Università degli Studi di Milano Bicocca
Prof. Dr. Anton K. Schnyder, LL.M.
Prof. Dr. Malcolm A. Clarke Universität Zürich
University of Cambridge, St. John’s College
tit. Prof. Dr. Péter Takáts
Prof. Dr. Herman Cousy Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Budapest
xl
Former Members of the Project Group
Prof. Dr. Zdzisław Brodecki A. Prof. Dr. Bernhard Rudisch, LL.M.
Uniwersytet Gdańsk Universität Innsbruck
[Member from April 2001– March 2007] [Member from September 1999 –
April 2009]
Prof. Dr. Fritz Reichert-Facilides, LL.M. (†)
Universität Innsbruck
[Founder and Chairman from
September 1999 – October 2003]
xli
List of Rapporteurs
xlii
List of Rapporteurs
xliii
List of Rapporteurs
xliv
List of Translators
Marilena Sotirchou
Dutch version I.K. Rokas & Partners Law Firm, Athens
Luca Semeraro
German version Università degli Studi di Milano Bicocca
xlv
List of Translators
xlvi
Publications on the PEICL
A. General Publications
1. Editions of books and/or monographs
Jürgen Basedow and Till Fock (eds.), Europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht, vols. I & II
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2002); vol. III (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2003)
Petr Dobiáš, Zákon o mezinárodním právu soukromém (komentář) (Leges, Prague 2013)
Petr Dobiáš, Mezinárodní pojistné právo se zřetelem křešení pojistných sporů v rozhodčím řízení (Vybrané
kapitoly) (Nakladatelství Leges, s.r.o., Prague 2011)
Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008
(ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008)
Helmut Heiss, Insurance Contract Law between Business Law and Consumer Protection (Reports presented
at the 18th International Congress on Comparative Law of the Académie internationale de droit comparé/
International Academy of Comparative Law – Washington 2010) (Dike, Zurich 2012)
Helmut Heiss, ‘Stand und Perspektiven der Harmonisierung des Versicherungsvertragsrechts in der EG’
in Petra Pohlmann (ed.), Veröffentlichungen der Münsterischen Forschungsstelle für Versicherungswesen
an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (“Münsteraner Reihe”), Issue 99 (VVW, Karlsruhe
2005)
Helmut Heiss (ed.), An Internal Insurance Market in an Enlarged European Union (VVW, Karlsruhe 2002)
Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A
Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011)
Helmut Heiss and Anton K. Schnyder, ‘Versicherungsverträge’ in Herbert Kronke,
Werner Melis and Anton K. Schnyder (eds.), Handbuch des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts (Schmidt,
Cologne 2005)
Leander D. Loacker, Informed Insurance Choice? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2015)
Fritz Reichert-Facilides (eds.), Aspekte des internationalen Versicherungsvertragsrechts im
Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1994)
Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder (eds.), Versicherungsrecht in Europa –
Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000)
Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira (eds.), International Insurance Contract Law
in the EC (Kluwer, Deventer 1993)
Ioannis Rokas (ed.), Commentary on Insurance Contract Act (Nomiki Bibliothiki, Athens 2014)
Ioannis Rokas, Insurance Law, An Introduction (3rd edn Nomiki Bibliothiki, Athens 2014)
Ioannis Rokas, Idiotiki Asfalisi (11th edn Ant. N. Sakkoulas, Athens 2006) 105
Anton K. Schnyder, Europäisches Banken- und Versicherungsrecht (Müller, Heidelberg 2005)
Pedro Pais de Vasconcelos, D&O INSURANCE: O Seguro de Responsabilidade Civil dos Administradores e
outros Dirigentes da Sociedade Anónima (Almedina 2007)
Nina Adelmann, ‘Unfair Terms in Insurance Contracts’ in Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law –
ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008) 133
Christian Armbrüster, ‘Das Versicherungsrecht im Common Frame of Reference’, Zeitschrift für Europäis-
ches Privatrecht (2008) 775
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Versicherungsvertragsrecht als Markthindernis?’, Europäische Zeitschrift für
Wirtschaftsrecht (2014) 1
Jürgen Basedow, ‘An optional instrument and the disincentives to opt in’, Contratto e impresa/Europa,
Numero speciale – Trenta giuristi europei sull’idea di codice europeo del contratto (2012) 37
xlvii
Publications on the PEICL
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Internal Market (Insurance)’ in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt, Reinhard Zimmermann,
with Andreas Stier (eds.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law, vol. I (Oxford Universi-
ty Press, Oxford 2012) 955
Jürgen Basedow, ‘An Optional European Contract Law and Insurance’ in Caroline Van Schoubroeck,
Wouter Devroe, Koen Geens and Jules Stuyck (eds.), Over Grenzen – Liber amicorum Herman Cousy
(Intersentia, Antwerp/Cambridge 2011) 19
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Closing remarks: Summary and outlook’ in Helmut Heiss, on behalf of the Project Group
Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law (eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract Law:
A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 95
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Das fakultative Unionsprivatrecht und das internationale Privatrecht’ in Herbert
Kronke and Karsten Thorn (eds.), Grenzen überwinden – Prinzipien bewahren. Festschrift für Bernd von
Hoffmann (Gieseking, Bielefeld 2011) 50
Jürgen Basedow, ‘European Contract Law – The case for a growing optional instrument’ in Reiner Schulze
and Jules Stuyck (eds.), Towards a European Contract Law (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 169
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Fakultatives Unionsprivatrecht oder: Grundlagen des 28. Modells’ in Detlev Joost,
Hartmut Oetker and Marian Paschke (eds), Festschrift für Franz Jürgen Säcker zum 70. Geburtstag (Beck,
Munich 2011) 29
Jürgen Basedow, ‘The case for a European Insurance Contract Act’ in Arthur Hartkamp, Martijn W.
Hesselink, Ewoud Hondius, C. Mak and Edgar Du Perron (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code (4th
edn, Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn 2011) 735
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Entwicklungslinien des Versicherungsvertragsrechts – Die schweizerische Gesamt-
revision im Lichte der Rechtsvergleichung’ in Anton K. Schnyder (ed.), Internationales Forum zum
Privatversicherungsrecht 2008 (Schulthess Juristische Medien, Zurich/Basle/Genf 2009) 11
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Versicherungsbinnenmarkt’ in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt and Reinhard Zimmer-
mann (eds.), Handwörterbuch des Europäischen Privatrechts, vol. II (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009) 1654
Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Optional Application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law’ in
Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA Forum scripta iuris
europaei), vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008) 111
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Die Laufzeit von Versicherungsverträgen als rechtsökonomisches Problem in Theodor
Siegel, Andreas Klein, Dieter Schneider, and Hans-Peter Schwintowski (eds.), Unternehmungen,
Versicherungen und Rechnungswesen. Festschrift zur Vollendung des 65. Lebensjahres von Dieter Rückle
(Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2006) 143
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Verso una disciplina europea dei contratti di assicurazione: ragioni, struttura e metodo’,
Danno e Responsabilità (2006) 5; also published in Onofrio Troiano (ed.), Verso una disciplina europea
dei contratti di assicurazione? (Giuffrè, Milan 2006) 11
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Versicherungsbinnenmarkt und ein optionales europäisches Vertragsgesetz’ in
Manfred Wandt (ed.), Kontinuität und Wandel des Versicherungsrechts. Festschrift für Egon Lorenz zum
70. Geburtstag (VVW, Karlsruhe 2004) 93
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Insurance Contract Law as Part of an Optional European Contract Act’ [2003] Lloyd’s
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 498, abridged version in ERA Forum 2003 (ERA Forum
scripta iuris europaei), vol. 4, issue 2 (Springer, Heidelberg 2003) 56
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Why insurance contract law in Europe should be harmonised’, Nordisk Försäkringstid-
skrift (2002) 31
Jürgen Basedow, ‘The European Insurance Market, Harmonisation of Insurance Contract Law, and
Consumer Policy’, (2000-2001) 7 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 495
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Die Gesetzgebung zum Versicherungsvertrag zwischen europäischer Integration und
Verbraucherpolitik’ in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder (eds.), Versicherungsrecht in
Europa – Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000) 13
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Transparenz als Prinzip des (Versicherungs-)Vertragsrechts’, Versicherungsrecht (1999)
1045
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Versicherungsvertragsrecht’ in European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research,
Untersuchung der Privatrechtsordnungen der EU im Hinblick auf Diskriminierungen und die Schaff ung
eines europäischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Luxembourg 1999) 29, 99, 159
xlviii
Publications on the PEICL
xlix
Publications on the PEICL
Petr Dobiáš, ‘Právní úprava pojištění v novém občanském zákoníku ve srovnání se Zásadami evropského
smluvního pojišťovacího práva’ (The Legal Regulation of Insurance in New Civil Code in Comparison
with Principles of European Insurance Contract Law) in Naděžda Rozehnalová and Tereza Kyselovská
(eds.), K některým vývojovým otázkám mezinárodního práva soukromého (Brno, Masarykova Univerzita
2013) 215
Petr Dobiáš, ‘Mezinárodně právní aspekty pojištění (International Legal Aspects of Insurance)’, Pojistné
rozpravy, (2010) No. 26, 39
Petr Dobiáš, ‘Principles of European Insurance Contract Law in Comparison with Czech Law on
Insurance Contracts’ in Alexander J. Belohlávek and Nadežda Rozehnalová (eds.), Czech Yearbook of
International Law (Juris Publishing Inc., New York 2010) 111
Petr Dobiáš, ‘Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law)’ in Monika Pauknerová and Michal Tomášek (eds.), Nové jevy na počátku 21. století, Part
IV (Proměny soukromého práva, Karolinum, Prague 2009) 210
Tjalling Dorhout Mees, ‘Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Insurers pre-contractual
duties, the conclusions of the contract and the insurance policy (art. 2:201 t /m 2:203, 2:301 t /m 2:304,
2:501 en 2:502)’, Aansprakelijkheid, Verzekering & Schade (2008) 229
Tjalling Dorhout Mees, ‘Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Retroactive and
Preliminary Cover, Duration of the Insurance Contract and Post-Contractual Information Duties of the
Insurer (articles 2:401 t /m 2:403, 2:601 t /m 2:604 en 2:701 en 2:702)’, Aansprakelijkheid, Verzekering &
Schade (2009) 3
Bill Dufwa, ‘Försäkringsavtalsrätten i den europeiska smältdegeln’ in Svensk Försäkrings Framtid (Stock-
holm 2000) 129
Bill Dufwa, ‘Integration genom fristående akademiska grupper’, Europarättslig Tidskrift (2006) 307
Bill Dufwa, ‘Principer för europeisk försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)’, 2 Juridisk Tidskrift (2010-11) 351
Erich Erlenbach, ‘Auf dem Weg zum europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrecht’, Versicherungswirtschaft
(2008) 2120
Imrich Fekete, ‘Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy’ (Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law), Poistné rozhľady (2010) (XVI), No. 3, 3.
Marcel Fontaine, ‘An Academic View’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 29
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Dopuszczalność umowy ubezpieczenia wstecznego w prawie polskim i wspólnotowym’ in
W Sułkowska (ed.) Szanse i zagrożenia dla rynków ubezpieczeń w krajach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej
(Kraków 2009) 177
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Insurance Restatement’, Rozprawy Ubezpieczeniowe nr 9 (2/2010) 134
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Insurance Restatement jako europejski instrument opcjonalny służący regulacji umowy
ubezpieczenia’, Rozprawy Ubezpieczeniowe nr 9 (2/2010) 126
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Insurance Restatement jako przykład jednolitego prawa wspólnotowego o umowie
ubezpieczenia’, Studia ubezpieczeniowe nr 127 (2009) 307
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Nowelizacja Kodeksu Cywilnego w zakresie wybranych przepisów ogólnych o umowie
ubezpieczenia w s´wietle prac Project Group on a Restatement of European Insurance Contract law’,
Wiadomos´ci Ubezpieczeniowe No. 7/8 (2007) 32
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Pojęcie ryzyka w unijnym prawie ubezpieczeń gospodarczych na przykładzie Polski a treść
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law’ in M. Serwach (ed.), Ryzyko ubezpieczeniowe. Wybrane
zagadnienia teorii i praktyki (Łódź 2013) 227
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law a koncepcja polskiego kodeksu ubez-
pieczeń’ in E. Kowalewski (ed.) O potrzebie polskiego kodeksu ubezpieczeń (Toruń 2009) 125
Dariusz Fuchs, ‘The European Restatement Contract Law a grupowe ubezpieczenia na życie’ in E.
Kowalewski (ed.), Ubezpieczenia grupowe na życie a prawo zamówień publicznych, wydawnictwo TNOiK
(Toruń 2010), 185
Yong Q Han, ‘The Comparative-law Relevance of PEICL to the Making of Judicial Interpretation II to the
Chinese Insurance Act 2009’ (2012) 1 Insurance Law Review 94 (Law Press, Beijing)
David Harari, ‘The Role of the Intermediary’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 75
l
Publications on the PEICL
Helmut Heiss, ‘Anlegerschutz bei Versicherungsprodukten’ in Egon Lorenz (ed.), Karlsruher Forum 2014
(Verlag Versicherungswirtschaft, Karlsruhe 2015) 41
Helmut Heiss, ‘Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht – Ein Instrument auch des EU-Außenhandels? ’ in
Normann Witzleb, Reinhard Ellger, Peter Mankowski, Hanno Merkt and Oliver Remine (eds.), Festschrift
D. Martiny (Mohr, Tübingen 2014) 917
Helmut Heiss, ‘Das Gemeinsame Europäische Kaufrecht – Ein optionales Instrument’ in Stefan Perner,
Daniel Rubin, Martin Spitzer and Andreas Vonkilch (eds.), Festschrift A. Fenyves (Verlag Österreich,
Vienna 2013) 873
Helmut Heiss, ‘Angleichung als Legitimationsproblem – Stellt die Schaffung von „Parallelrecht“ einen
geeigneten Ausweg dar?’ in Leander Loacker and Corinne Zellweger-Gutknecht (eds.), Differenzierung
als Legitimationsproblem – APARIUZ (Heft 14 Dike, Zurich 2012) 4
Helmut Heiss, ‘General Report’ in Helmut Heiss (ed.), Insurance Contract Law between Commercial Law
and Consumer Protection (Reports presented at the 18th International Congress on Comparative Law of
the Académie internationale de droit comparé/International Academy of Comparative Law – Washing-
ton 2010) (Dike, Zurich 2012) 7
Helmut Heiss, ‘Optionales europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht’, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches
und internationales Privatrecht 76 (2012) 316
Helmut Heiss, ‘Pre-contractual information duties of insurers in EU insurance contract law’ (2012) 23
Insurance Law Journal (Australia) 86
Helmut Heiss, ‘Introduction’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European Insur-
ance Contract Law: A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 7
Helmut Heiss, ‘Optionales europäisches Vertragsrecht als “2. Regime”’ in Holger Altmeppen and Hanns
Fitz, Heinrich Honsell (eds.), Festschrift G. H. Roth (Beck, Munich 2011) 237
Helmut Heiss, ‘Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PDECA)’, Responsabilitá
Civile e Previdenza 1 (2011) 5 (= Italian translation of the ‘Introduction’ in Jürgen Basedow, John Birds,
Malcolm Clarke, Herman Cousy and Helmut Heiss (eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract
(Sellier elp, Munich 2009))
Helmut Heiss, ‘Europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht: Vom Gemeinsamen Referenzrahmen zum
optionalen Instrument?’ in Michael Ganner (ed.), Die soziale Funktion des Privatrechts. Festschrift Heinz
Barta (Linde, Vienna 2009) 311
Helmut Heiss, ‘The Common Frame of Reference (CFR) of European Insurance Contract Law’, (2009) 1
European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 2
Helmut Heiss, ‘Insurance Contracts in Rome I: Another recent failure of the European legislature’ in Petar
Sarcevic, Andrea Bonomi and Paul Volken (eds.), Yearbook of Private International Law, vol. X (Sellier
elp, Munich 2008) 261
Helmut Heiss, ‘Insurance Premium’ in Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law – ERA Forum Special
Issue 2008 (ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008) 141
Helmut Heiss, ‘The Common Frame of Reference (CFR) of European Insurance Contract Law’ in Angelika
Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei),
vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008) 95
Helmut Heiss, ‘The Common Frame of Reference (CFR) of European Insurance Contract Law’ in Reiner
Schulze (ed.), Common Frame of Reference and Existing EC Contract Law (Sellier elp, Munich 2008) 229
Helmut Heiss, ‘Der Vorentwurf einer “Gesamtrevision des BG über den Versicherungsvertrag (VVG)” im
Lichte der europäischen Entwicklungen’, Haftung und Versicherung (2007) 235
Helmut Heiss, ‘Die Direktklage vor dem EuGH’, Versicherungsrecht (2007) 327
Helmut Heiss, ‘Európai biztosítási jog felé: szabályrendszer – közös referenciakeret – választható eszköz?’
Bistosítási Szemle (2007) No. 2, 3
Helmut Heiss, ‘Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)’ in Marc Hendrikse and Jac
Rinkes (eds.), Insurance and Europe (Uitgeverij Paris, Zutphen 2007) 41
Helmut Heiss, ‘Reform des internationalen Versicherungsvertragsrechts’, Zeitschrift für die gesamte
Versicherungswissenschaft (2007) 503
Helmut Heiss, ‘Das Kollisionsrecht der Versicherungsverträge nach Rom I und II’, Versicherungsrecht
(2006) 185
Helmut Heiss, ‘Mobilität und Versicherung’, Versicherungsrecht (2006) 448
li
Publications on the PEICL
Helmut Heiss, ‘Towards a European Insurance Contract Law: Restatement – Common Frame of Refer-
ence – Optional Instrument?’ Internationale Juristenvereinigung Osnabrück 13 (2006) 1
Helmut Heiss, ‘Europäischer Versicherungsvertrag – Initiativstellungnahme des Europäischen Wirtschafts-
und Sozialausschusses verabschiedet’, Versicherungsrecht (2005) 1
Helmut Heiss, Malcolm Clarke and Mandeep Lakhan, ‘Europe: towards a harmonised European insurance
contract law – the PEICL’ in Julian Burling and Kevin Lazarus (eds.), Research Handbook on Internation-
al Insurance Law and Regulation (Elgar, Cheltenham 2011) 603
Helmut Heiss and Marlene Danzl, ‘Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen des europäischen Versicherungsver-
tragsrechts’, Versicherungsrundschau (2008) 20
Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes, ‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law:
Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law 693
Helmut Heiss and Ariane Ernst, ‚Finanzinnovationen im Versicherungsrecht – ein Überblick‘ in Florian
Möslein (ed.), Finanzinnovationen und Rechtsordnung (Schulthess, Zurich 2014) 336
Helmut Heiss and Olympia Kosma, ‘Die Direktklage des Geschädigten im europäischen Versicherungs-
recht’ in Mop van Tiggele-van der Velde, Gerard Kamphuisen, and B. K. M. Lauwerier (eds.), De
Wansink-bundel: van draden en daden (Liber amicorum Han Wansink) (Kluwer, Deventer 2006) 279
Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan, ‘An Optional Instrument for European Insurance Contract Law’,
Merkourios 2010, Volume 27/Issue 71, 1
Helmut Heiss and Leander D. Loacker, ‘Neue Impulse für die Schaffung eines Europäischen Ver-
sicherungsvertragsrechts – Europäischer Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss präsentiert Initiativstellung-
nahme’, Versicherungsrundschau (2005) Issue 9, 245
Helmut Heiss and Ulrike Mönnich, ‘Versicherungsanlageprodukte im PRIPS-Vorschlag – Basisinforma-
tionsblatt statt information overload?’, Versicherungsrundschau 2013, 32
Helmut Heiss and Marielle van Popering, ‘Richting Europees Verzekeringsovereen- komstenrecht: Restate-
ment – Common Frame of Reference – Optioneel instrument?’ Nederlands tijdschrift voor handelsrecht
(2007) 189
Peter Hinchliffe, ‘Review of Principles of European Insurance Law’ in Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European
Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer,
Heidelberg 2008) 167
Gerard Kamphuisen, ‘PEICL en de tussenpersoon’, Aansprakelijkheid, Verzekering & Schade (2008) 291
Georg Kathrein, ‘Welcome Address’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 3
Leander D. Loacker, ‘Europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht’ in Dirk Looschelders and Petra Pohlmann
(eds.), Versicherungsvertragsgesetz – Kommentar (2nd edn Heymanns, Cologne 2011) 63
Leander D. Loacker, ‘Gleich und Gleich gesellt sich gern?’, Haftpflicht und Versicherung (2011) 351
Leander D. Loacker, ‘Insurance soft law? Die Idee eines europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrechts
zwischen akademischer Pionierleistung, Gemeinsamem Referenzrahmen und optionalem Instrument’,
Versicherungsrecht (2009) 289
Ulrike Mönnich, ‘Europäisierung des Privatversicherungsrechts’ in Roland Michael Beckmann and Anne-
marie Matusche-Beckmann (eds.), Versicherungsrechts-Handbuch (Beck, Munich 2009) 70 (§ 2)
Andreas Müller, ‘Vers un droit européen du contrat d’assurance. Le “Project Group Restatement of
European Insurance Contract Law”’, (2007) 1 European Review of Private Law 59
Jaana Norio-Timonen, ‘Harmonisaatio ja eurooppalaiset kuluttajavakuutusmarkkinat’ in Olli Mäenpää,
Dan Frände and Päivi Korpisaari (eds.), Oikeuden historiasta tulevaisuuden Eurooppaan – Pia Letto-Van-
amo 60 vuotta (Suomalainen Lakimiesyhdistys, Helsinki 2014) 261
Jaana Norio-Timonen, ‘Legal Coherence as a Prerequisite for a Single European Insurance Market’ in Pia
Letto-Vanamo and Jan Smits (eds.), Coherence and Fragmentation in European Private Law (Sellier elp,
Munich 2012) 43
Jaana Norio-Timonen, ‘Vakuutussopimuslainsäädännön harmonisoinnilla kohti eurooppalaisia kulutta-
javakuutusmarkkinoita’ in Lena Sisula-Tulokas, Irene Luukkonen, and Marja Saario (eds.), Kuluttajien
vakuutustoimisto ja Vakuutuslautakunta 35 vuotta (Kuluttajien vakuutustoimisto & Vakuutuslautakunta,
Helsinki 2006) 69
Jorge Pegado Liz, ‘Developments at EESC Level’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp, Munich 2011) 25
lii
Publications on the PEICL
liii
Publications on the PEICL
Han Wansink, ‘The Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law: doelstellingen en verhouding tot
Nederlands verzekeringsrecht’ in F.J.M. De Ly, K.F. Haak and W.H. van Boom, Eenvormig bedrijfsrecht:
realiteit of utopie? (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, The Hague 2006) 24
Han Wansink, ‘The Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law: doelstellingen en verhouding tot
Nederlands verzekeringsrecht’, Verzekeringsarchief (2006) 81
Felix Wieser, ‘The Perspective of the Insurance Industry’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.),
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp,
Munich 2011) 51
liv
Introduction
Helmut Heiss
Contents
I. The Principles of European Insurance a. Optional Instrument as an EU Regulation
Contract Law as an Academic Endeavour b. The “Option”
1. The Idea c. Optional Instrument and Mandatory
2. Work Progress Insurance Contract Law
3. The Approach d. Comprehensive instead of Minimum
a. Scope of Application Standard Regulation
b. Matters Not Regulated in the Principles of e. Option also Available for Purely Domestic
European Insurance Contract Law Contracts
c. Mandatory Rules f. Option and Third Parties to the Insurance
d. Adherence to the Existing Acquis Commu- Contract
nautaire g. Comparison with the Proposed Common
e. Language and Terminology European Sales Law (CESL)
f. Uniform Interpretation and Application III. Political Developments
g. Enforcement 1. Opinions of the European Economic and
II. The Principles of European Insurance Social Committee (EESC)
Contract Law as a Model Optional Common 2. Resolutions of the European Parliament
European Insurance Contract Law (CEICL) 3. European Commission
1. The Need for a Common European a. Establishment of a Common Frame of
Insurance Contract Law (CEICL) Reference of European Contract Law
2. Optional instead of a Non-optional CEICL b. Commission Expert Group on European
3. Main Features of the Proposed Optional Insurance Contract Law
Instrument IV. Final Remarks
1. The Idea
I1. The Project Group aiming at a “Restatement of European Insurance Contract Law”1
started its work in 1999. By then, Community legislation in the field of insurance supervi-
sory law had established a system of single licensing and the conflict of laws issues had been
partly unified and partly harmonised through the Brussels Convention2 , the Rome Conven-
1
This Group has been called by various names such as “Project Group”, “Innsbruck Group”, “Insurance
Group” or “Restatement Group”; for the purposes of this article the Group shall be called “Project
Group”.
2
The Brussels Convention was initially transformed into the Brussels I Regulation (44/2001), which has
now been replaced by Brussels Ibis Regulation (1215/2012).
1
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
tion (80/934/EEC)3 and the Directives on insurance law4 . However, in contrast with these
achievements in supervisory and private international law, an earlier attempt to harmonise
substantive insurance contract law had failed.5 In view of this shortcoming of Community
legislation in the field of insurance law, the Project Group decided to undertake to elabo-
rate “Principles of European Insurance Contract Law” (PEICL) in order to reactivate the
unification process.
I2. The reasons for this undertaking have been extensively chronicled in the research
works of the late Professor Fritz Reichert-Facilides and of Professor Jürgen Basedow which
were first presented at an international conference hosted by Professor Anton K. Schnyder
in Basle in 1998.6 In the course of this conference both argued that the attempts to complete
the internal insurance market within the EU had failed so far. Reichert-Facilides pointed out
that the harmonisation of private international law had failed to bring about the expected
or at least aspired effects for the internal market.7 The analysis provided by Jürgen Basedow
showed that the private international law of insurance contracts was in fact an inadequate
means for the creation of an internal insurance market.8 For the sake of policyholder protec-
tion, which is considered a “general good” by the European Court of Justice,9 the applicable
rules of private international law are to a large extent mandatory. Pursuant to art. 11 para.
1(b) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (1215/2012), a policyholder, insured or beneficiary may
bring an action against an insurer at the court where the plaintiff is domiciled. Under the
relevant rules of private international law as laid down in art. 7 of the Rome I Regulation
3
As to the application of the Rome Convention (80/934/EEC) to certain insurance contracts, see art. 1
paras. 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention (80/934/EEC); the Rome Convention (80/934/EEC) has mean-
while been replaced by the Rome I Regulation (593/2008).
4
See – for non-life insurance – the Second Non-Life Insurance Directive (88/357/EEC); Third Non-
Life Insurance Directive (92/49/EEC); for life assurance the Life Assurance Consolidation Directive
(2002/83/EC); the Directives’ rules on the conflict of laws have meanwhile been replaced by the Rome
I Regulation (593/2008), in particular its art. 7; as far as insurance contracts are concerned, the Rome I
Regulation applies also in EEA Contracting States, see art. 187 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/
EC).
5
The Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law [1979] OJ C190/2 (as
amended by [1980] OJ C355/30) was withdrawn by the Commission on 4 August 2003. With regard
to earlier attempts of harmonisation of insurance contract law, see Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Optional
Application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law’ in Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European
Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer,
Heidelberg 2008) 111.
6
See the conference volume edited by Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder, Versicherungs-
recht in Europa – Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel
2000).
7
Fritz Reichert-Facilides, ‘Gesetzgebung in Versicherungsvertragsrechtssachen: Stand und Ausblick’
in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder, Versicherungsrecht in Europa – Kernperspektiven
am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000) 1, 10; id., ‘Europäisches Ver-
sicherungsvertragsrecht?’ in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt and Hein Kötz (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich
Drobnig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1998) 119.
8
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Die Gesetzgebung zum Versicherungsvertrag zwischen europäischer Integration
und Verbraucherpolitik’ in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder, Versicherungsrecht in
Europa – Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000) 13.
9
Case 205/84 Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [1986] ECR 3755.
2
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
(593/2008), the law applicable to the insurance contract will regularly be the law of the
Member State in which the policyholder has his habitual residence. It follows that litigation
in matters relating to insurance will usually take place in the home country of the policy-
holder and be subjected to the law of this country as well.10 As a consequence, insurers must
be and actually are aware of the fact that any product they sell cross-border will be subjected
to a law different to the law in their home country.
I3. The impact of a new legal environment on an insurance product can be very great.11 If,
for example, an insurance product which is lawfully marketed in England is sold cross-bor-
der to a German customer, a particular exception contained in the contract terms which is,
in principle, not subject to the English Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations
199912 may be subject to regulation under German law and could be held to be void under
s. 307 German CC. If so, the scope of cover provided by one and the same particular in-
surance product will turn out to be broader in Germany than in England due to the differ-
ences in the law applicable. It follows that insurers will be reluctant to provide cross-border
services.13
I4. In fact, statistics show that cross-border provision of insurance services plays a minor
role in the internal European market.14 The European Commission has repeatedly acknowl-
edged this fact.15 Insurers carry on their international business predominantly through sub-
sidiaries or branch offices. Despite the fact that such international activities are widespread
in the European market they are insufficient to establish an internal market for insurance
products. The products sold by foreign subsidiaries or branch offices are not the same as
the products sold by the insurer in the country where it is domiciled. Products offered in
the country of the subsidiary or branch office are either developed independently of the
products sold in the home market of the insurer or at least adapted to the legal regime of
the state where the insurance product is sold.
10
See, for example, Helmut Heiss, ‘Stand und Perspektiven der Harmonisierung des Versicherungsver-
tragsrechts in der EG’ in Petra Pohlmann (ed.), Veröffentlichungen der Münsterischen Forschungsstelle
für Versicherungswesen an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (“Münsteraner Reihe”),
Issue 99 (VVW, Karlsruhe 2005) 8 f.
11
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Insurance Contract Law as Part of an Optional European Contract Act’ [2003]
Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 498, 500 (abridged version in ERA Forum 2003
(ERA Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 4, issue 2 (Springer, Heidelberg 2003) 56); as to examples of
obstacles, see the CEA Policy Report as well as the Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on
European Insurance Contract Law.
12
For details see Malcolm Clarke, The Law of Insurance Contracts (5th edn Informa, London 2006) 19-5.
13
For further examples Helmut Heiss, ‘Mobilität und Versicherung’, Versicherungsrecht (2006) 448.
14
See Jürgen Basedow, ‘Die Gesetzgebung zum Versicherungsvertrag zwischen europäischer Integration
und Verbraucherpolitik’ in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder, Versicherungsrecht in
Europa – Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000) 17
referring to data provided by EUROSTAT; Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on Europe-
an Insurance Contract Law, nos. 4 ff. (in particular no. 6).
15
See para. I61 below.
3
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I5. To give a relatively simple example, in Germany foreign insurance companies primarily
sell insurance products through subsidiaries or branch offices.16 There are, however, no for-
eign (mass) insurance products sold in Germany in the same way they are sold at the place
of origin. As a result, competition between insurance products throughout Europe remains
rather restricted. Insurance enterprises are not in a position to compete across Europe with
any innovative products they introduce, nor are customers in a position to gain full access
to various national insurance products. The internal market for insurance products has not
been completed.
I6. It may be argued that the shortcomings of the internal insurance market in its current
condition could be overcome by a shift in European international insurance contract law
allowing parties to choose the law of the insurer’s domicile as the law applicable to the in-
surance contract. However, the argument turns out to be mistaken. First of all, the approach
would deprive the policyholder of protection by private international law, which does not
appear to be acceptable as a matter of legal policy. Secondly, the shift in the rules of private
international law would be followed by a switch in behaviour on the part of insurers and
policyholders. Whereas under the current private international law regime, it is chiefly the
insurer who hesitates to provide cross-border services, it would be the policyholder who
would be reluctant to acquire foreign insurance products in the absence of protection under
private international law. The internal market would remain incomplete.17
I7. In the light of this analysis, the Project Group adopted the view that “the law of insur-
ance [in Europe] must be one”.18 However, the Project Group thought that the European
Commission could hardly be expected to resume its efforts to harmonise insurance con-
tract law unless the circumstances which had led to the failure of the earlier proposal for
a directive had changed or would change in the future. In fact, several factors had indeed
changed by 1999. The European Court of Justice had opened the door to a system of single
licensing in its decision of 4 December 1986,19 and the system was finally introduced by the
Third Generation of Insurance Directives20 some years later. Some members of the Project
Group reported talks with representatives of insurance companies and their impression
16
See, for example, Leander D. Loacker, ‘Insurance soft law?’ Versicherungsrecht (2009) 289; for Europe
in general Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on European Insurance Contract Law,
no. 4 ff.
17
See in more detail Jürgen Basedow, ‘Die Gesetzgebung zum Versicherungsvertrag zwischen eu-
ropäischer Integration und Verbraucherpolitik’ in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schny-
der, Versicherungsrecht in Europa – Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und
Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000) 20 f.; Helmut Heiss, ‘Stand und Perspektiven der Harmonisierung des
Versicherungsvertragsrechts in der EG’ in Petra Pohlmann (ed.), Veröffentlichungen der Münster-
ischen Forschungsstelle für Versicherungswesen an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster
(“Münsteraner Reihe”), Issue 99 (VVW, Karlsruhe 2005) 13 f.
18
Hans Möller as quoted by Fritz Reichert-Facilides, ‘Rechtsvereinheitlichung oder Rechtsvielfalt? Über-
legungen vor dem Modell des Versicherungsvertragsrechts’ in Fritz Schwind (ed.), Europarecht, IPR,
Rechtsvergleichung (Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 1988) 155.
19
Case 205/84 Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [1986] ECR 3755.
20
See (what is today) art. 15 para. 1 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC); Ulrike Mönnich, ‘Europäis-
ierung des Privatversicherungsrechts’ in Roland Michael Beckmann and Annemarie Matusche-Beck-
mann (eds.), Versicherungsrechts-Handbuch (3rd edn Beck, Munich 2015) § 2 paras. 49 ff.; Helmut Heiss
4
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
that the insurance industry was actually rather keen to provide its services cross-border
but could not do so for the reasons given. Last but not least, an ever increasing number of
European citizens, “euro-mobile citizens”, were moving and living in Member States other
than their home country.21 Without any doubt, these “euro-mobile citizens” had created a
strong demand for Europe-wide insurance solutions, namely the availability of insurance
policies which they could bring along without facing legal barriers whenever they moved
from one Member State to another.22 What was still missing was a comparative analysis of
the various insurance contract laws in Europe and a text stating the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law which could be considered a set of rules amounting to a common
understanding of insurance contract law throughout Europe.
I8. The requisite comparative analysis of insurance contract law in Europe was presented
shortly afterwards by Jürgen Basedow, a founding member of the Project Group, and his re-
search team at the Hamburg Max Planck Institute. The work was published as “Europäisches
Versicherungsvertragsrecht”23 in three volumes in 2002 and 2003.24 The Hamburg team
did not, however, elaborate a model law for Europe, leaving this task to the Project Group
which was established by Fritz Reichert-Facilides25 and chaired by him until his death on
23 October 2003. Following his death, Helmut Heiss, who was then vice-chairman of the
Project Group, took over as interim chairman and was appointed as the new chairman by
the Project Group on 15 April 2004. The overall purpose of the work done by the Project
Group is to provide the European legislature with a model law designed to overcome the
existing barriers to an integrated European insurance market.
and Anton K. Schnyder, ‘Versicherungsverträge’ in Herbert Kronke, Werner Melis and Anton K. Schny-
der (eds.), Handbuch des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts (Schmidt, Cologne 2005) 142.
21
The image of a “euro-mobile citizen” was first created by Jürgen Basedow, ‘Das österreichische Bun-
desgesetz über internationales Versicherungsvertragsrecht – Eine rechtspolitische Würdigung’ in
Reichert-Facilides (ed.), Aspekte des internationalen Versicherungsvertragsrechts im Europäischen
Wirtschaftsraum (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1994) 89.
22
See, inter alia, the exemplifications in Helmut Heiss, ‘Mobilität und Versicherung’, Versicherungsrecht
(2006) 448.
23
European Insurance Contract Law.
24
Jürgen Basedow and Till Fock (eds.), Europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht, vols. I & II (Mohr Sie-
beck, Tübingen 2002); vol. III (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2003).
25
As to the basic concepts of the project see Fritz Reichert-Facilides, ‘Gesetzgebung in Versicherungsver-
tragsrechtssachen: Stand und Ausblick’ in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder, Versicherungs-
recht in Europa – Kernperspektiven am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000);
id., ‘Europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht?’ in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J. Hopt and Hein Kötz (eds.),
Festschrift für Ulrich Drobnig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1998) 119; id., ‘Ver-
braucherschutz – Versicherungsnehmerschutz: Überlegungen im Blick auf das Projekt: “Restatement
des Europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrechts”’ in Bernhard Eccher, Kristin Nemeth and Astrid Tangl
(eds.), Verbraucherschutz in Europa. Festgabe für em. o. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Heinrich Mayrhofer (Verl. Öster-
reich, Vienna 2002) 179, 180; as to his role as the founding father of the Project Group see Helmut Heiss,
‘Introduction’, in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier, Munich 2011) 7, 8 ff.
5
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
2. Work Progress
I9. Since its establishment in 1999, the Project Group has drafted Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law modelled on American Restatements of the Law,26 in a manner
which had previously been adopted by the so-called Lando Commission on European Con-
tract Law in the course of drafting its Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).27 Ac-
cordingly, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are drafted as Rules, followed
by Comments presenting the reasons for the rule and illustrating how it should be applied
by giving examples, and Notes28 reproducing the status quo of insurance contract law in each
Member State and the acquis communautaire on the point in question. The entire text was
linguistically revised by the Drafting Committee of the Project Group, headed by Professor
Malcolm A. Clarke.
I10. The first part of the Project Group’s work, comprising the general part of insurance
contract law including general rules for all types of indemnity insurance and for all types
of insurance of fixed sums, was completed and published as the first edition to the present
volume in 2009. The first edition of the PEICL consisted of three Parts comprising a total
of 13 Chapters.29
I11. The Project Group’s work of course did not stop at this point. In 2008, the Group
started drafting special rules for individual branches of insurance, namely liability insur-
ance, life insurance and group insurance. The Project Group chose these branches because
it thought them to be at the forefront of transborder provision of services in the insurance
sector. The Commission Expert Group on European Insurance Contract Law30 evidently
26
With regard to the American Restatement of the Law, see www.ali.org (The American Law Institute’s
website).
27
See Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law
International, The Hague 2000) and Ole Lando, Eric Clive, André Prüm and Reinhard Zimmermann
(eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
28
The method of presenting these “Notes” has, however, changed in the new parts of the 2nd expanded
edition; as to this change para. I12 below.
29
As to the 1st edition of the PEICL, see the contributions of experts representing a political and aca-
demic view as well as the stakeholders’ views of insurers, intermediaries and consumers, in Helmut
Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model
Optional Instrument (Sellier, Munich 2011); for further reviews of the PEICL see Alessandra Zanobet-
ti, Uniform Law Review (2010) 611; Mario Pérez Garrigues (2010) Revista de Derecho Mercantil 797;
Gerhard Köbler, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Germanistische Abteilung
(2011) No. 128; Andrea Uber and Inga Krebs, ‘Neuerscheinungen versicherungswissenschaftlicher
Bücher’ Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 99 (2010) 237; Martin Ebers, European
Review of Private Law (2010) 1037 ff.; Jacquetta Castle, ‘Book Review’ (March 2012) British Insurance
Law Association No. 124, 84 ff.; Christian Armbrüster, ‘PEICL – The Project of a European Insurance
Contract Law’ (2013-2014) 20(1) Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 119 ff.
30
This Expert Group was set up by Commission Decision of 17 January 2013 on setting up the Commis-
sion Expert Group on a European Insurance Contract Law [2013] OJ C16/6; as to the Expert Group
and its work section III.3.b. below.
6
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
shared this view since it chose in its Final Report of January 2014 for liability insurance
(including motor insurance) and life insurance as branches specifically to be dealt with.31
I12. As a consequence, the present volume as compared with the first edition is enlarged
by Parts Four (Liability Insurance), Five (Life Insurance) and Six (Group Insurance). The
way the new Rules are presented is basically in line with the presentation of the Rules
on general issues (Parts One, Two and Three). However, the Project Group decided not
to produce separate Notes on special branch insurance rules, but instead to annotate the
Comments to such rules by way of footnotes, giving references to the status quo of insur-
ance contract law on the specific branches in national law. One of the main reasons for this
change in style was that there are substantially less statutory rules on branches in national
laws than on the general issues of insurance contract law.
3. The Approach
a. Scope of Application
I13. Despite the fact that the 2nd expanded edition of the PEICL provides for both gen-
eral rules of insurance contract law and rules on specific branches, it does not mean that
its scope of application is restricted to those branches regulated. Rather, the substantive
scope of application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law encompasses
all types of insurance32 except reinsurance.33 Insurance of special risks (for example marine
and aviation insurance) and large risk insurance are covered by the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law, notwithstanding the fact that the second sentence of Article 1:103
para. 2 grants parties unfettered freedom of contract in those cases.34
I14. In spite of their broad scope of application, the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law do not govern every aspect which may become relevant in matters concerning
insurance contracts. Quite the contrary, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
abstain, in principle, from regulating issues of general contract law. The resulting gap must
be filled in a way which allows as little recourse to national law as possible. Consequently, the
first sentence of Article 1:105 para. 1 prohibits any recourse to national law when applying
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. Instead, Article 1:105 para. 2 provides
for the application of the Principles of European Contract Law in their most recent edition
31
As to this Report para. I63 below.
32
As to the application of national rules to specific branches which are not regulated by the PEICL,
paras. I17 f. below.
33
See Article 1:101 PEICL.
34
See Monika Stahl, ‘The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) and Their Applica-
tion to Insurance Contracts for Large Risks’, Veröffentlichungen aus dem LL.M.-Studiengang Interna-
tionales Wirtschaftsrecht der Universität Zürich und des Europa Instituts an der Universität Zürich,
vol. 71 (Schulthess, Zurich 2013).
7
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
drafted by the Lando Commission.35 By virtue of this reference, the Principles of European
Contract Law become the lex generalis of the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law. Furthermore, the Project Group consistently drafted the Principles of European In-
surance Contract Law with the Principles of European Contract Law in mind, not only as
far as terminology is concerned but also in order to avoid any duplication in the provisions.
Whenever a rule of the Principles of European Contract Law also appeared to be appro-
priate in the context of insurance, the Project Group abstained from regulating the matter
in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. Nevertheless, some provisions were
more or less “copied” from the Principles of European Contract Law to the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law, and for a simple reason: The provisions of the Principles
of European Contract Law are, in principle, non-mandatory. However, the Project Group
thought that some of these non-mandatory provisions should be mandatory in the context
of insurance. This goal was achieved by copying these provisions into the Principles of Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract Law and thereby making them mandatory in accordance with
Article 1:103 para. 2 PEICL.36
I15. The choice in favour of referring to the Principles of European Contract Law had
already been made by the Project Group for its first edition of the PEICL. This is mainly
because the General Part of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)37 had not been
finished at the time the Project Group was drafting its Rules, and the CESL Regulation Pro-
posal,38 which also provides for general rules, did not exist at that stage. Considering that
the DCFR has never been adopted as an “official” CFR by the European Commission and
that the fate of the proposal on a CESL appears to be unclear39, the Project Group decided to
retain a reference to the PECL as the lex generalis to its PEICL. The future developments on
a CFR (if any) and a CESL will show whether it will be advisable to change from the PECL
to another instrument in the future. This will, of course, not be possible without making
adaptations to the PEICL.
I16. Whenever an issue is neither regulated in the Principles of European Insurance Con-
tract Law nor in the Principles of European Contract Law, Article 1:105 para. 2 PEICL refers
to the principles common to the laws of the Member States. Article 1:105 para. 2 PEICL
clearly prescribes methods of comparative law to fill gaps.
I17. As has been mentioned, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law only
regulate some, but not all individual branches of insurance. However, there are mandatory
35
Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law
International, The Hague 2000) and Ole Lando, Eric Clive, André Prüm and Reinhard Zimmermann
(eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
36
See, for example, Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Optional Application of the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law’ in Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA
Forum scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008) 111, 114 f.
37
The Draft Common Frame of Reference in its “Full Edition”, including Comments and Notes, only
became available at the end of 2009.
38
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European
Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, as amended.
39
The proposal for a CESL has recently been withdrawn and a modified proposal has been announced;
see para. I45 below.
8
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
provisions in national laws on the other branches not governed by the PEICL. It therefore
seems inconceivable to apply the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law to such
branches without recourse to the (otherwise applicable) national rules of law as the protec-
tion of the policyholder would be undermined. Hence, the second sentence of Article 1:105
para. 1 provides for the application of the mandatory rules of the national law applicable to
the special types of insurance contracts. Such application of national law is, however, limited
to “branches of insurance which are not covered by special rules contained in the PEICL”.40
Since the 2nd edition now regulates liability, life and group insurance, the second sentence
of Article 1:105 para. 1 no longer plays a role for these branches.
I18. Special mention has to be made of compulsory liability insurance. While the PEICL
apply to compulsory liability insurances (see Article 16:101), they do not unify rules on
specific types of compulsory liability insurance. The reason is obvious: A large number of
compulsory insurance contracts is regulated by national laws, EU law or other sources.41
This is why Article 16:101 para. 2 in line with art. 7 para. 4(a) of the Rome I Regulation
(593/2008/EC) provides that such insurance contracts must comply with the “specific pro-
visions imposing the obligation” even if the PEICL have been chosen as the law governing a
liability insurance contract. Thus, any rules making liability insurance compulsory, whether
at the level of national law or EU law, will ultimately take priority over the PEICL.
c. Mandatory Rules
I19. As indicated earlier, it is the mandatory rules of national insurance contract law which
form a barrier to the proper functioning of the internal insurance market. For this reason,
the Project Group restricted its work to drafting European principles which are mandatory
and therefore capable of substituting national mandatory law.
I20. The mandatory character of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law can
be seen in two manners. On the one hand, there are rules which must not be derogated from
by parties’ agreement at all. Such “absolutely” mandatory rules are mentioned in Article
1:103 para. 1, where the relevant rules are listed in the first sentence. Moreover, the second
sentence of the same provision provides in a general manner that “sanctions for fraudulent
behaviour” must not be derogated from by agreement. A good example of a rule containing
a sanction for fraudulent behaviour is Article 2:104, for instance.
I21. The mandatory character of most provisions of the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law, however, is of a different kind and may be described as “semi-mandatory”.
The first sentence of Article 1:103 para. 2 PEICL states: “The contract may derogate from
all other provisions of the PEICL as long as such derogation is not to the detriment of the
policyholder, the insured or beneficiary.”
40
See the second sentence of Article 1:105 para. 1 PEICL.
41
As to this point the Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on European Insurance Contract
Law (see para. I63 below) states at no. 31: “The number and type of compulsory insurance require-
ments differ substantially from country to country. In Spain there are around 400 cases of compulsory
insurance, for example liability for bullfighting and for owners of dangerous dogs, while in France
there are around 100, in Poland 40 and in Germany, at the federal level, only around 30.”
9
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I22. The semi-mandatory character of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
is limited to mass risk insurance. Since semi-mandatory rules of insurance law purport to
ensure the protection of the policyholder, insured and beneficiary as the weaker parties,
their mandatory character must be removed when there is no need for protection, as is the
case with insurance covering large risks. Mass risks are distinguished from large risks by
a statutory definition42 in line with the existing acquis communautaire, which defines the
term in art. 13 no. 27 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) in line with its predecessor,
art. 5 of the First Non-Life Insurance Directive (73/239/EEC). Art. 16 no. 5 of the Brussels
Ibis Regulation (1215/2012) and art. 7 para. 2 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) also refer
to the same definition. The protection granted to the policyholder, insured and beneficiary
under the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law is consequently not restricted
to consumer contracts, applying instead to all mass risks, including insurance contracts
concluded by small or medium-size enterprises.
I23. As has been mentioned, the definition of large risks in the second sentence of Article
1:103 para. 2 follows the one found in the existing insurance acquis. This shows that the
Group endeavoured to adhere to the existing acquis communautaire as closely as possible
unless shortcomings in it indicated a deviation from it. In addition to the insurance ac-
quis,43 several directives on consumer contract law44 outlining the information duties of
the entrepreneur and withdrawal rights of the consumer,45 the judicial control of unfair
contract terms46 as well as injunctions47 have been employed by the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law.
I24. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law also include an adapted reference
to the Gender Directive (2004/113/EC), which contains a special provision for insurance
contracts.48 While Article 1:207 in the first edition of the PEICL allowed differences in pre-
miums and conditions in line with art. 5 para. 2 of the Gender Directive (2004/113/EC),
42
See the definition given by the second sentence of Article 1:103 para. 2 PEICL.
43
An overview on the existing insurance acquis is presented by Robert Purves, ‘Europe: the architec-
ture and content of EU insurance regulation’ in Julian Burling and Kevin Lazarus (eds.), Research
Handbook on International Insurance Regulation (Elgar, Cheltenham 2011) 621; Ulrike Mönnich,
‘Europäisierung des Privatversicherungsrechts’ in Roland Michael Beckmann and Annemarie Ma-
tusche-Beckmann (eds.), Versicherungsrechts-Handbuch (3rd edn Beck, Munich 2015) § 2 paras. 23 ff.,
Dirk Looschelders and Lothar Michael, ‘§ 11 Europäisches Versicherungsrecht’ in Armin Hatje
and Peter-ChristianMüller-Graff (eds.), Enzyklopädie Europarecht, vol. V, Europäisches Sektorales
Wirtschaftsrecht (ed. by Ruffert) (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013) paras. 144 ff.; and Leander D. Loack-
er, ‘Vorbemerkung C.’ in Dirk Looschelders and Petra Pohlmann (eds.), VVG-Kommentar (2nd edn
Wolters Kluwer Deutschland, Cologne 2011) paras. 14 ff.
44
As to the relevance of the consumer acquis in the field of insurance see Helmut Heiss and Anton K.
Schnyder, ‘Versicherungsverträge’ in Herbert Kronke, Werner Melis and Anton K. Schnyder (eds.),
Handbuch des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts (Schmidt, Cologne 2005) 195.
45
See in particular the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) as amended.
46
See the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC).
47
See the Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC).
48
See art. 5 of the Gender Directive (2004/113/EC).
10
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
the article had to be redrafted in light of the findings of the ECJ in its judgment of 1 March
2011, C-236/09 (‘Test-Achats’).49 Article 1:207 as amended prohibits the use of gender as a
factor “resulting in differences in individuals’ premiums and benefits”.
I25. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not transpose the Insurance
Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC)50 as the PEICL do not deal with the professional duties
of intermediaries at all.51 However, the Directive was considered by the Group and was a
source of inspiration for regulating the pre-contractual information and advice duties of
the insurer.52
I26. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, the European legislature has endeav-
oured to intensify regulation of financial markets including insurance. Art. 91 of the MiFID2
(2014/65/EU) has already brought about substantial changes to the Insurance Mediation
Directive (2002/92/EC) and a new Proposal for an IDD, which is intended to replace the
Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC), has been published.53 Moreover, the PRIIP
Regulation (1286/2014)54 has been adopted. While these new/forthcoming regulations in-
fluence insurance law, they have not been adopted by the 2nd expanded edition of the PEICL.
As far as the changes to the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) are concerned,
the reasons for not transposing the new provisions are the same as set above in view of the
original version of the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC).55 As far as the Pro-
posal for an IDD and the PRIIP Regulation (1286/2014) are concerned, the main reason
for not considering them is that when the Project Group held its last plenary workshop
at the end of January 2014, it was very much unclear as to whether the proposed rules
would ever be enacted and, more so, what would be their contents. In any event, as far as
the PRIIP Regulation (1286/2014) is concerned, it will produce EU and thus uniform law
throughout the Member States. Thus, at least in principle, the regulation could be applied
in addition to the PEICL without impacting their purpose to provide a European insurance
market with uniform rules of insurance contract law. Exceptions must, however, be noted:
Art. 11 paras. 2, 3 and 4 of the PRIIP Regulation (1286/2014) all refer to the national law
applicable for determining details of the investors claim for damages in case of any breach
49
Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des
ministres [2011] ECR I-773; Ulrike Mönnich, ‘Unisex: Die EuGH-Entscheidung vom 1.3.2011 und
die möglichen Folgen’ Versicherungsrecht 2011, 1092 ff.; Leander D. Loacker, ‘Gleich und Gleich ge-
sellt sich gern? Überlegungen zur Einführung verpflichtender Einheitstarife im europäisierten Ver-
sicherungsvertragsrecht’ Haftung & Versicherung 2011, 351 ff.
50
As amended by MiFID2 (2014/65/EU), see art. 91.
51
As to the reason for not regulating the professional duties of the intermediaries, see para. I44 below.
52
For a comparative analysis, see, for example, Leander D. Loacker, Informed Insurance Choice? (Elgar,
Cheltenham 2015).
53
On 16 July 2015, the Presidency / General Secretariat of the Council confirmed the ‘final compromise
text with a view to agreement’ concerning the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on insurance mediation (recast) (IMD), Doc. No. 10747 / 15 of 16 July 2015, Inter-
institutional File: 2012 / 0175 (COD); the Directive has, however, not yet been adopted.
54
Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014
on key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIP)
[2014] OJ L352/1.
55
See para. I25 above
11
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
of the insurer’s duty to draft and publish a key information document. As far as a future
IDD is concerned, the proposal as it stands covers areas regulated within the PEICL mainly
because the proposed IDD is also intended to apply to insurers in case of direct sales. Thus,
adaptations of the PEICL may be necessary in the future in order to keep them in line with
the other insurance acquis communautaire.
I27. Notwithstanding the availability of translations into several other languages,56 the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law were drafted in English as the working lan-
guage of the Project Group. Accordingly, English terminology was used in the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Project
Group used national English legal terminology. Quite the contrary, in order to avoid giving
the impression that a particular provision merely codifies a concept of English common
law, the Project Group departed from English legal terminology on many occasions. For
example, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not refer to “promissory
warranties” but to “precautionary measures”57 in order to avoid giving the mistaken im-
pression that the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law have implemented the
English concept of “warranties” At the same time, the Project Group attempted to use as
much international legal terminology as was available. First of all, the Group adhered as
far as possible to the terminology of the Principles of European Contract Law as well as
the existing acquis communautaire. Secondly, it had recourse to terminology found in in-
ternational transport conventions, for example to the phrase “with intent to cause the loss
or recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would probably result”, which is taken from
the Montreal Convention 1999 and used on several occasions throughout the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law to identify an especially serious form of fault.
I28. The effectiveness of a European insurance contract law cannot be guaranteed by the
uniform text of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law alone, but instead de-
pends to a large degree on uniform application of the law by national courts. Article 1:104,
therefore, states general considerations according to which the Principles of European In-
surance Contract Law should be interpreted. Among these, “uniformity of application” plays
a significant role.58 In spite of the existence of Article 1:104, it would clearly be desirable,
for the sake of uniform application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law,
for the European Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. Under art. 267 TFEU, however, this would
require the European legislature to enact the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law as (secondary) EU law.
56
See the private translations in this book below.
57
See the heading of Section One of Chapter Four of the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law.
58
A similar rule can be found in art. 7 CISG.
12
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
g. Enforcement
I29. In principle, the policyholder, insured and beneficiary have to enforce their rights by
bringing an action in court. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law themselves
do not provide for an out-of-court complaint and redress mechanism. They do not, however,
interfere with existing mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution, such as ombudsmen.59
In fact, the insurer is under a duty to inform the policyholder about such mechanisms in
accordance with Articles 2:201 para. 1(k) and 2:501(k).
I30. Moreover, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law allow “qualified enti-
ties”, such as consumer associations, to seize a competent national court or authority and
seek an order prohibiting or requiring the cessation of infringements of the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law.60 The term “qualified entity” is defined by reference to
the list drawn up by the European Commission in pursuance of art. 4 para. 3 of the Injunc-
tions Directive (2009/22/EC).61
I31. The PEICL have been characterised in section I of this Introduction as an academic
endeavour with a practical aim, namely to provide the European insurance market with a
set of uniform rules allowing parties to conclude “European” insurance contracts, which can
be sold cross-border by insurers and carried along by euro-mobile citizens without a need
to adapt them to any national insurance contract law. However, the PEICL cannot achieve
this goal as long as they remain a non-binding set of rules (“soft law”). Non-binding rules
obviously do not replace national law and they are commonly not considered eligible for the
parties through a choice of law within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008).62
While Recital 13 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) empowers the parties to “incorporate
by reference into their contract a non-State body of law”, such incorporation would trans-
59
EU law is regulating out-of-court redress mechanisms in its Directive 2013/11/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer dis-
putes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22 [2013] OJ L165/63; see also
Regulation (EU) 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/
EC (Regulation on Consumer ODR), as well as Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters.
60
Article 1:301 para. 1 PEICL.
61
See Article 1:301 para. 2 PEICL referring to the Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC); the list was pub-
lished on 15 April 2014 by the Commission, ‘Communication concerning Article 4(3) of Directive
2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of con-
sumers’ interests, which codifies Directive 98/27/EC, concerning the entities qualified to bring an
action under Article 2 of this Directive’ [2014] OJ C115/1.
62
This would be different if parties would submit their contract to arbitration; however, arbitration is
usually not considered an adequate form of dispute resolution for mass risk insurances.
13
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
form the PEICL into contract terms subject to the law applicable and all its mandatory rules.
Thus, a choice by contracting parties in favour of the PEICL would not provide parties with
uniform rules.
I32. In order to give parties a set of uniform rules, the European legislature would have to
enact the PEICL as EU law. The proper legislative instrument would be an EU Regulation.
Regulations are directly applicable in every Member State and enjoy priority over national
law under art. 288 para. 2 TFEU. Thus, the PEICL serve as a model EU Regulation.
I33. Providing a uniform set of rules is not the only advantage of using an EU Regulation.
Procedural advantages would follow as well, because an EU regulation would, technically
speaking, be secondary EU law. Thus, the European Court of Justice, using the preliminary
ruling procedure, would be accorded the authority to interpret the instrument in order to
guarantee legal uniformity in Europe.63 In contrast, as long as non-binding rules, such as
the PEICL, are not enacted as an EU Regulation, they will not give access to the European
Court of Justice, even if they were available as the lex contractus by a choice of the parties.
Furthermore, again from a procedural point of view, an EU Regulation would, in several
respects, be applied like domestic law by courts of Member States and by national supervi-
sory authorities. In contrast, the determination and application of general principles of law
would, in various Member States, be subject to special rules, for instance the parties would
be obliged to assert and prove non-domestic law. As non-domestic law, its application by
courts of first or second instance would only be subject to limited review by supreme courts
in some Member States. Finally, the various establishments for insurance ombudsmen pro-
vide that they may not, or at times even must not accept cases, which are subject to foreign
law.64 Therefore, on choosing general principles of contract law, customers’ access to these
alternative mechanisms for dispute settlement could remain barred. In comparison, the
application of an EU Regulation would be put on a par with the application of domestic
law so as to guarantee its application ex officio, its revision by national supreme courts and
its application by national ombudsmen bureaus.
63
See art. 267 TFEU.
64
See, for example, s. 8 para. 3 of the German Code of Procedure for the Insurance Ombudsman, ac-
cording to which the ombudsman can reject dealing with complaints at every level of the procedure
if the claim is to be determined decisively according to foreign law.
14
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
native to national law.65 In this way, it may be compared to the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), under art. 6 of which parties may
opt out, namely agree that the Convention will not apply to their contract.66
I35. Both approaches, optional as well as non-optional legislation, would serve the need of
the internal insurance market for uniform rules. Both would offer advantages particularly
to “multiple players”, such as insurers doing business in the European internal market, who
would not have to be concerned with the impact of different national contract law regimes
on their insurance products. The costs of legal research and adaptation of contracts as well
as its administration to each national system of contract law would disappear. Moreover,
a uniform European insurance contract law would allow for efficient cross-border use of
the Internet in order to sell standard policies. For euro-mobile policyholders a uniform
European insurance contract law would provide a stable contractual framework which is
not subject to the changing national law of their domiciles. Cross-border commuters could
benefit from the continuous access they have to two different insurance markets. However,
non-mobile policyholders would profit as well because a uniform insurance contract law
would give them better access to foreign products.
I36. There are compelling reasons for why an optional instrument would be preferable.
First of all, an optional instrument has far better chances of finding political approval than
a non-optional instrument. National legislatures, encouraged by national representatives of
the legal profession, would be more inclined to resist an instrument which replaced national
contract law. This is true in particular for those Member States which have enacted compre-
hensive legislation on insurance contracts more recently, very often after lengthy debates at
national level. They would, however, have no reason to refuse an optional instrument which
left national law untouched.67 Secondly, an optional instrument appears to be economically
more efficient because it does not force parties to alter their traditional ways of doing busi-
ness; it merely provides them with an additional option. Insurers acting internationally will
be more inclined to take advantage of the opportunity than others acting only locally; they
can continue to use their traditional contract forms and procedures inspired by national
law, and, therefore, would not be burdened with costs of adapting their contracts to a new
legal environment.
65
Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes, ‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law:
Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private
Law 693, 695; see Dirk Staudenmayer, ‘Ein optionelles Instrument im Europäischen Vertragsrecht?’
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2003) 828, 832.
66
Peter Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2005) 15 f.
67
Helmut Heiss, ‘Stand und Perspektiven der Harmonisierung des Versicherungsvertragsrechts in der
EG’ in Petra Pohlmann (ed.), Veröffentlichungen der Münsterischen Forschungsstelle für Versicherung-
swesen an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (“Münsteraner Reihe”), Issue 99 (VVW,
Karlsruhe 2005) 36; as to the aspect of competition between legal orders see Helmut Heiss and Noemi
Downes, ‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law: Reflections from a Private
International Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law 696 and n 11.
15
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I37. Due to these considerations, the PEICL were drafted as a model optional instru-
ment.68 Thus, they are only to be applied if they are chosen by the parties to the contract.
The pertinent provision, Article 1:102 PEICL, reads as follows:
b. The “Option”
I39. The option of the parties is modelled on the assumption that the PEICL will become
an EU Regulation, thereby opening the choice to the parties. Thus, the choice is not a choice
of law under the Rome I Regulation (593/2008). Indeed, a choice of law under the Rome I
Regulation (593/2008) would not be sufficient to provide parties with a set of uniform rules
on insurance contract law because such choice would always be restricted by protective pro-
visions such as art. 7 (Insurance contracts)70 and art. 9 (Overriding mandatory provisions)
of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008).
I40. Article 1:102 grants parties the option of choosing the PEICL “notwithstanding any
limitations of choice of law rules under private international law”. Indeed, submission of
the contract to the PEICL does not require protection of either party by means of private
international law for a simple reason: an EU Regulation would have direct effect in every
Member State. Choice of a (supranational) law which is applicable in the Member State
68
See Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL):
A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier, Munich 2011).
69
SE Regulation (2157/2001) and EEIG Regulation (2137/85).
70
In particular, art. 7 para. 3 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) limits the scope of party autonomy
for mass risk insurance covering risks in the Member States.
16
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
where both parties have their habitual residence is not to be considered a choice of a foreign
law and, thus, will not justify any restrictions imposed by art. 7 of the Rome I Regulation
(593/2008).71
I41. Irrespective of the fact that there is no reason for protecting parties, in particular
the policyholder, against a choice of the PEICL by means of private international law, such
choice must not have a detrimental effect on the policyholder. This is why an optional Com-
mon European Insurance Contract Law must provide a high level of consumer protection.72
I42. The situation is different where parties from third states are involved. Since an EU
Regulation does not apply in third states, a choice in favour of the PEICL amounts to a
choice of a foreign law. It follows that parties from third states must be protected against a
choice in favour of the PEICL in the same way they are protected against the choice of any
other law which is foreign to them.73
I43. A solution for both situations is offered by the so-called “2nd regime” model.74 Un-
der this model, an optional European (insurance) contract law is considered to be a “2nd
regime” of contract law within each Member State. Due to the enactment of an optional
EU Regulation on insurance contract law, there would be two parallel regimes, the national
and the supranational, in every Member State. Thus the choice between the two of them
is, first, a substantive choice between two sets of contract law applicable in the same Mem-
ber State and, second, such choice will be available to the extent that the law of a Member
State applies to the contract in accordance with the conflict rules as set out in the Rome I
Regulation (593/2008).
I44. It follows from the “2nd regime” model that a choice in favour of the PEICL will always
be available in cases which are exclusively connected with one or more Member State(s).75
The choice will not be limited by rules of private international law in such case because
Article 1:102 allows an unrestricted choice in each and every member States concerned.
I45. If, however, a contract has relevant connections with a third state, no choice will be
available where the law of a third country is applicable. If, for instance, a consumer insur-
ance contract is concluded with a consumer resident in a third country concerning a risk
71
In more detail, Helmut Heiss, ‘Optionales europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht’, Rabels Zeit
schrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 76 (2012) 316, 330 f.
72
In more detail, Helmut Heiss, ‘Optionales europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht’, Rabels
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 76 (2012) 331 f.; as to the consumer’s
view in general, see Peter Hinchliffe, ‘The Consumer‘s View’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan
(eds.), Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier
elp, Munich 2011) 59.
73
In more detail, Helmut Heiss, ‘Optionales europäisches Versicherungsvertragsrecht’, Rabels
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 76 (2012) 334 f.
74
As proposed by Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes, ‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European
Contract Law: Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review
of Private Law 707 ff.; this model is followed, in principle, by the CESL Regulation Proposal.
75
Unless, of course, the parties validly opt out of it by a choice of law under private international law,
which they will not do if they intend to choose the CEICL (PEICL).
17
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
also located in a third state (which is regularly the case when the policyholder resides in a
third state), the law of the consumer will govern the insurance contract in accordance with
art. 6 para. 1 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008)76 and, thus, no choice in favour of the
PEICL will be available to the parties under that law. Of course, parties may choose the law
of a Member State, which grants them the option in favour of the PEICL, in accordance
with the first sentence of art. 6 para. 2 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008). However, such
choice and the option exercised in favour of an application of the PEICL will be restricted
by the application of more favourable mandatory rules of the consumer law in accordance
with the second sentence of art. 6 para. 2 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008). This is in
line with the legal policy underlying art. 6 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008).
I46. In order to achieve its aims, the optional instrument allows parties to opt out not
only of non-mandatory but also of mandatory rules of national insurance contract law. The
choice is free of any restrictions imposed by current private international law. It follows
that the optional instrument must provide appropriate mandatory rules of insurance con-
tract law, effectively replacing the protection of the policyholder offered under national law,
thereby applying a high level of protection in the optional instrument, just as other Union
acts must do under art. 114 para. 3 TFEU.77
I47. It may appear contradictory to propose an optional instrument which would only be
applicable if parties opt into it, and at the same time present a comprehensive regulation
of mandatory rules on insurance contract law in the optional instrument.78 However, the
contradiction disappears when looking at the fact that the option of the parties is restricted
to choosing the instrument as a whole or not at all.79 A national system with a high degree
of protection for the policyholder will therefore be replaced by a European system offering
a different kind of protection, yet protection at an equivalent level.80 Since a partial choice is
excluded, the insurers are not allowed to pick and choose parts of each system for their own
benefit. This approach tends to ensure that the insurer’s reason for opting into the European
contract law regime is not to avail itself of a more relaxed standard of policyholder protec-
tion, but to be able to base its business on one and the same set of rules throughout Europe.
76
Art. 7 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) is not applicable in such situations due to the limitation of
its scope of application in para. 1.
77
See the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European Insurance Con-
tract Law’ [2005] OJ C157/1, no. 6.2.
78
As to mandatory rules in optional contract law in general, see Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes,
‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law: Reflections from a Private Interna-
tional Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law 697 and 699.
79
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Versicherungsbinnenmarkt und ein optionales europäisches Vertragsgesetz’ in
Manfred Wandt (ed.), Kontinuität und Wandel des Versicherungsrechts. Festschrift für Egon Lorenz
zum 70. Geburtstag (VVW, Karlsruhe 2004) 93, 105; Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes, ‘Non-optional
Elements in an Optional European Contract Law: Reflections from a Private International Law Per-
spective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law 709 f.
80
Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes, ‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law:
Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law
699.
18
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I48. Mandatory insurance contract law is similar to consumer law in that it protects the
weaker party.81 Several EU directives have been enacted in the field of consumer contract
law and many of them contain so-called minimum standard clauses allowing national leg-
islatures to provide consumers with a higher standard of protection than required, as long
as such national rules do not violate the fundamental economic freedoms of the TFEU.82 It
is to be noted, however, that more recent directives no longer contain minimum standard
clauses83 or at least restrict the rights of the Member States to provide for more protective
rules on certain issues such as, for instance, the information to be provided to consumers.84
The latter is also the approach taken in art. 4 of the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/
EU) stating: “Member States shall not maintain or introduce, in their national law, provi-
sions diverging from those laid down in this Directive, including more or less stringent
provisions to ensure a different level of consumer protection, unless otherwise provided
for in this Directive”.
I49. In the case of an optional instrument in the insurance sector, a general or even a
restricted minimum standard clause would seriously jeopardise its fundamental purpose,
namely to allow the insurer to sell and the policyholder to buy insurance anywhere in
Europe, based solely on one legal regime. This objective would be frustrated if national leg-
islatures could impose higher levels of policyholder protection.85 The optional instrument
must govern the insurance contract comprehensively.86 This is not to say that a partial or
minimum standard regulation would not help at all. It simply would not be sufficient to
achieve the completion of the internal insurance market, which is, after all, the ultimate
objective of the exercise. This is why the PEICL form a comprehensive regulation and, under
the first sentence of Article 1:105 para. 1, do not permit references to national law.
81
Fritz Reichert-Facilides, ‘Gesetzgebung in Versicherungsvertragsrechtssachen: Stand und Ausblick’
in Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Anton K. Schnyder, Versicherungsrecht in Europa – Kernperspektiven
am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts (Helbing und Lichtenhahn, Basel 2000) 6 f.
82
See art. 8 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC); art. 8 para. 2 of the Directive on Sale
of Consumer Goods and Guarantees (1999/44/EC).
83
Consumer Credit Directive (2008/48/EC), as amended, and Timeshare Directive (2008/122/EC)
84
Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC), as amended.
85
See Helmut Heiss, ‘Stand und Perspektiven der Harmonisierung des Versicherungsvertragsrechts
in der EG’ in Petra Pohlmann (ed.), Veröffentlichungen der Münsterischen Forschungsstelle für Ver-
sicherungswesen an der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster (“Münsteraner Reihe”), Issue
99 (VVW, Karlsruhe 2005) 32 f; Daniela Weber-Rey, ‘Harmonisation of European Insurance Contract
Law’ in Stefan Vogenauer and Stephen Weatherill (eds.), The harmonisation of European contract law:
implications for European private laws, business and legal practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006) 207,
220; Leander D. Loacker, ‘Insurance soft law?’ Versicherungsrecht (2009) 295; European Commission,
Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010), COM (2005) 177 final; Opinion of the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European Insurance Contract Law’ [2005] OJ C157/1,
no. 6.3.1.
86
Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Versicherungsbinnenmarkt und ein optionales europäisches Vertragsgesetz’ in
Manfred Wandt (ed.), Kontinuität und Wandel des Versicherungsrechts. Festschrift für Egon Lorenz
zum 70. Geburtstag (VVW, Karlsruhe 2004) 104.
19
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I50. The facilitation of insurance transactions in the single European market will only
take full effect if all the contracts of a particular insurer can be submitted to the optional
instrument. Parties must, therefore, also be given that option for purely domestic contracts,
namely insurance contracts between policyholders and insurers from the same Member
State and concerning a risk also situated in this Member State.87 Otherwise, domestic insur-
ance contracts, which usually represent the biggest share of an insurer’s business, would have
to be drawn up in accordance with national law and only cross-border insurance products
could be subject to the optional instrument. As a consequence, the pooling of risks would
be more burdensome and many insurers would probably still not enter into cross-border
transactions. Equally, a policyholder may want to provide for a future change of place of
residence by buying a policy in his/her home market based on the European optional in-
strument of insurance contract law. For these reasons, as far as insurance is concerned, any
restriction on the scope of application of an optional instrument on European contract law
to cross-border transactions should be rejected.88
I51. The optional character of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law also has
an impact on their content. Since the option is given to the parties to the insurance contract,
namely the insurer and the policyholder, its effects are restricted to the parties themselves
but nonetheless include the beneficiary and the insured, because their rights depend on the
parties’ agreement.
I52. Third parties must not, however, be adversely affected by the parties’ choice. This
applies, inter alia, to intermediaries, who are not parties to the insurance contract. The legal
position of intermediaries will not be affected by the parties’ choice in favour of the Prin-
ciples of European Insurance Contract Law. As a consequence, the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law do not govern the duties of the insurance intermediaries, but only
the liability of the insurer for its agents, including agents purporting to be independent.89
87
Helmut Heiss and Noemi Downes, ‘Non-optional Elements in an Optional European Contract Law:
Reflections from a Private International Law Perspective’ (2005) 13 European Review of Private Law
702 f; Jürgen Basedow, ‘The Optional Application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law’ in Angelika Fuchs (ed.), European Contract Law – ERA Forum Special Issue 2008 (ERA Forum
scripta iuris europaei), vol. 9 (Springer, Heidelberg 2008) 116.
88
See Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Versicherungsbinnenmarkt und ein optionales europäisches Vertragsgesetz’
in Manfred Wandt (ed.), Kontinuität und Wandel des Versicherungsrechts. Festschrift für Egon Lorenz
zum 70. Geburtstag (VVW, Karlsruhe 2004) 108 f; likewise Leander D. Loacker, ‘Insurance soft law?’
Versicherungsrecht (2009) 296.
89
See Articles 3:101 and 3:102 PEICL; as to the factual significance of the PEICL to insurance interme-
diaries see David Harari, ‘The Role of the Intermediary’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.),
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp,
Munich 2011) 75.
20
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I53. Having previously announced the possibility of creating optional instruments for
European contract law in recital 14 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008), the European leg-
islature now appears to be aiming at creating its first optional instrument covering sales law.
On 11 October 2011, the Commission proposed a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law (CESL).90 Amendments were made
to this proposal by the European Parliament in its first reading on 26 February 2014.91 While
the current proposal has most recently been withdrawn by the European Commission, a
modified proposal “in order to fully unleash the potential of ecommerce in the Digital Sin-
gle Market” is announced.92 The following statements still relate to the original proposal as
amended by the European Parliament.
I54. The CESL Regulation Proposal in principle adopts the “2nd regime” model of optional
European contract law. It clearly points out that the choice available to the parties is of a
substantive and not of private international law nature. Thus, the conflict rules set out in
the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) must be applied first and the choice will be available to
the extent that the law of a Member State, but not to the extent that the law of a third state,
is applicable.
I55. There are, however, a number of additional restrictions to the scope of application of
the CESL Regulation Proposal. It is proposed that it should apply to distance contracts93 and
cross-border contracts94 only. As far as the latter are concerned, Member States may stretch
the scope of application to contracts with no foreign element.95 Such restrictions are not in
line with the optional instrument proposed here.
III. Political Developments
I56. The EESC has decided on and published two own-initiative opinions relevant for
an optional Common European Insurance Contract Law. The first Opinion on “The Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract” which was delivered on 15 December 2004,96 considered the
90
COM (2011) 635 final.
91
European Parliament legislative resolution of 26 February 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law (COM(2011)0635 –
C7-0329/2011-2011/0284(COD)) (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading), doc. no. P7_TA-
PROV(2014)0159.
92
Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work
Programme 2015, A New Start, COM (2014) 910 final, no. 60.
93
Art. 4 para. 1 and art. 5 of the CESL Regulation Proposal (no. 87) as amended by the EP (no. 88).
94
Art. 1 para. 1, art. 3 and art. 4 of the CESL Regulation Proposal (no. 87) as amended by the EP (no. 88).
95
Art. 13(a) of the CESL Regulation Proposal (no. 87) as amended by the EP (no. 88).
96
[2005] OJ C157/1 (Rapporteuer: Jorge Pegado Liz; Experts: Fritz Reichert-Facilides and Helmut Heiss);
with regard to this Opinion, Helmut Heiss, ‘Europäischer Versicherungsvertrag – Initiativstellung-
21
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
shortcomings of the existing internal insurance market. It confirmed the view that some
kind of European insurance contract law must be available in order to allow a cross-border
provision of insurance services. Therefore, the EESC encouraged the Commission to take
steps towards unifying insurance contract law in the EU.
I57. The second Opinion of 27 May 2010 on the “28th Regime”97 does not specifically deal
with insurance contract law, but it is mentioned. This Opinion favours the creation of uni-
form European private law using optional instruments and adopts the “2nd regime” model.
In its no. 1.8 it lists requirements to be met by such optional instrument:
I58. In its Resolution of 3 September 2008,98 the European Parliament pointed to the
possibility of creating optional instruments in the future. This is stressed again in a second
Resolution of the European Parliament of 8 June 2011.99 In its second resolution, the Euro-
pean Parliament also
(…) reiterate[d] its earlier call to include insurance contracts within the scope of the
OI,100 believing that such an instrument could be particularly useful for small-scale in-
surance contracts; stresses that, in the field of insurance contract law, preliminary work
has already been performed with the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
(PEICL), which should be integrated into a body of European contract law and should
be revised and pursued further; (…)
22
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
3. European Commission
I59. In its 2003 Action Plan on European Contract Law101 of 12 February 2003 and its
2004 Communication on European Contract Law, the European Commission announced
the establishment of a Common Frame of Reference of European Contract Law. According
to the Commission’s 2003 Action Plan on European Contract Law, the Common Frame
of Reference should comprise Definitions and Rules and both should be accompanied by
Comments and Notes. The Comments would contain explanations and illustrations of the
proposed Rules. The Notes would give reference to the status quo of contract law in the
Member States and the existing acquis communautaire.
I60. The Commission wanted the Common Frame of Reference to be drafted in order to
establish a set of rules which provided the definitions, structure and contents of Europe-
an contract law developed through comparative legal analysis of national contract laws.102
Strictly speaking, these definitions and principles would not be of a binding nature since
they would not be enacted as a regulation or directive.103 The Commission announced,
however, that it was determined to adhere to the terminology and system of the Com-
mon Frame of Reference in any later legislation concerning contracts.104 Furthermore, the
Common Frame of Reference was expected to become an important aid for the European
Court of Justice in preliminary rulings procedures105 on the meaning of legal provisions,
101
In more detail Reiner Schulze, ‘Gemeinsamer Referenzrahmen und acquis communautaire’,
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2007) 130.
102
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘European Con-
tract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward’, COM (2004) 651 final, 11 October 2004,
no. 2.2.1 and 3.1.; see also Reiner Schulze, ‘Gemeinsamer Referenzrahmen und acquis communau-
taire’, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2007) 135.
103
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘European Con-
tract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward’, COM (2004) 651 final, 11 October 2004,
no. 2.1.3.
104
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘European Con-
tract Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward’, COM (2004) 651 final, 11 October 2004,
no. 2.1.2.
105
Verica Trstenjak, ‘Die Auslegung privatrechtlicher Richtlinien durch den EuGH: Ein Rechtspre-
chungsbericht unter Berücksichtigung des Common Frame of Reference’, Zeitschrift für Europäis-
ches Privatrecht (2007) 145; following their publication, the Principles of European Contract Law
and the Draft Common Frame of Reference have been cited by Advocate-Generals in their opin-
ions either in support of their interpretation of Community law (M. Poiares Maduro, opinion of
21 November 2007 on Case C-412/06 Annelore Hamilton v Volksbank Filder eG [2008] ECR I-2383;
Trstenjak, opinion of 11 September 2008 on Case C-180/06 Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers [2009]
ECR I-3961; Trstenjak, opinion of 6 March 2007 on Case C-1/06 Bonn Fleisch Ex- und Import GmbH
v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2007] ECR I-5609; etc.) or to provide an overview of other pro-
posals for arrangements which are different to some extent (Trstenjak, opinion of 18 February 2009
on Case C-489/07 Pia Messner v Firma Steffen Krüger [2009] ECR I-7315; Trstenjak, opinion of 11
June 2008 on Case C-275/07 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [2009] ECR
I-2005; Trstenjak, opinion of 4 September 2008 on Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v Bundesrepublik
Deutschland [2009] ECR I-2119, Trstenjak, opinion of 15 November 2007 on Case C-404/06 Quelle
23
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
and also for national courts with regard to their own interpretation of the existing acquis
communautaire. Not least, international academic discussion in Europe could be based on
the common rules provided by the Common Frame of Reference. This instrument would,
to some extent, provide Europe with a common legal language, as was the case with Latin
until national codifications replaced the ius commune. It would allow law faculties to teach
contract law with a European and comparative perspective. National legislatures might also
contribute to harmonisation by adopting the rules of the Common Frame of Reference in
future reforms of national contract law. Ultimately, one might regard the Common Frame of
Reference as a European lex mercatoria106 and as such it may find application in arbitration
proceedings.107
I61. Insurance contract law played an important role in the 2003 Action Plan on European
Contract Law. The plan repeatedly referred to the necessity of harmonising the law on insur-
ance contracts. The Commission argued that “firms are unable to offer, or are deterred from
offering, financial services across borders, because products are designed in accordance with
local legal requirements”108 and pointed out that “the same problems occur particularly with
insurance contracts”.109 In view of this relevance of insurance contract law, the European
Commission in its 2004 Communication on European Contract Law stated with regard to
the structure of a Common Frame of Reference: “[…] two types of contracts which were
mentioned specifically were consumer and insurance contracts. The Commission expects
the preparation of the Common Frame of Reference to pay specific attention to these two
areas.”110
I62. The task of drafting the CFR was assigned to a “CoPECL Network of Excellence”
which was founded in May 2005 upon an initiative by the European Commission.111 The
CoPECL Network comprised universities, institutions and other organisations with more
than 150 researchers operating in all of the EU Member States. The following groups par-
24
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
ticipated in the Network: The Study Group on a European Civil Code; The Research Group
on the Existing EC Private Law, or “Acquis Group”; The Project Group on a Restatement of
European Insurance Contract Law, known as the “Insurance Group” within the CoPECL
Network; The Association Henri Capitant together with the Société de Législation Com-
parée and the Conseil Supérieur du Notariat; The Common Core Group; The Research
Group on the Economic Assessment of Contract Law Rules, or “Economic Impact Group”
(TILEC – Tilburg Law and Economics Center); The “Database Group”; and The Academy
of European Law (ERA). The first draft of the Common Frame of Reference was presented
to the European Commission at the end of 2007.112 The final draft was submitted at the end
of 2008.
I63. As part of the CoPECL Network, the Project Group on a “Restatement of European
Insurance Contract Law” (the “Project Group”) was in charge of drafting the Common
Frame of Reference of Insurance Contract Law. It delivered its share of the Draft Common
Frame of Reference to the Commission at the end of 2008 and published it as “Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law”, the first edition to the present volume, in 2009.
I64. Drafting a Common Frame of Reference was an ambitious project which had the
potential to considerably boost the development of European contract law in general and
insurance contract law in particular. However the Common Frame of Reference by itself
would never have been sufficient to complete the internal insurance market.113 Since it
would only provide non-binding rules, the Common Frame of Reference would not be
available to the parties as the choice of the applicable insurance law and insurance contracts
would still be submitted to mandatory rules of national law. The obstacles to the functioning
of the internal insurance market presented by the diversity of national mandatory insurance
contract law would not be removed and cross-border sales would remain an exception. For
this reason, it has been argued that a functioning internal insurance market will require
more, namely an optional instrument of European insurance contract law.114
I65. While the Draft Common Frame of Reference was published by the CoPECL Net-
work,115 the European Commission never adopted a “political” CFR. Rather, the Commis-
sion went on to draft optional instruments, beginning with a Common European Sales
Law (CESL).
112
See www.copecl.org; the draft on insurance contracts is available at www.restatement.info.
113
See Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen und das Versicherungsvertragsrecht’,
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2007) 280, 283; likewise Leander D. Loacker, ‘Insurance soft
law?’ Versicherungsrecht (2009) 292.
114
See Jürgen Basedow, ‘Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen und das Versicherungsvertragsrecht’,
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (2007) 285; concerning the relationship of the Common
Frame of Reference to a possible future optional instrument, see Alex Flessner, ‘Der Gemeinsame
Referenzrahmen im Verhältnis zu anderen Regelwerken’, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht
(2007) 112 and Leander D. Loacker, ‘Insurance soft law?’ Versicherungsrecht (2009) 293.
115
Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis
Group) (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame
of Reference (DCFR) (Full edition Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich 2009).
25
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I66. On 17 January 2013, the Commission decided to set up an “Expert Group on Euro-
pean Insurance Contract Law”.116 Art. 2 para. 1 of this decision describes the Expert Group’s
purpose as follows: “The Expert Group’s task shall be to carry out an analysis in order to
assist the Commission in examining whether differences in contract laws pose an obstacle
to cross-border trade in insurance products.” Pursuant to para. 3 of the same provision,
the Expert Group was to deliver a report on its findings by the end of 2013. This report
was published in English at the beginning of 2014 and is now available to the public on the
Commission’s website.117
I67. The setting up of the Expert Group must be viewed against the background of
broad-ranging efforts towards the creation of a European contract law in general (especial-
ly the Common European Sales Law) and European insurance contract law in particular.
In respect of contract law in general, the European Commission presented a Green Paper
on Options for a European Contract Law in 2010, in which it presented various avenues
for action. The ensuing consultation received responses in particular from the insurance
industry, according to which the differences in the Member States’ contract laws presented
an obstacle to the cross-border provision of insurance services.118 For example, CEA (Com-
ité Européen des Assurances) – Insurance Europe’s predecessor – represented the following
position during the consultation:
(…) it is currently not possible for insurance companies to offer uniform insurance
products across Europe, based on a European uniform legal framework. Today’s differ-
ences in national laws mean that insurers willing to provide services across borders still
need to tailor the wordings of their policies to meet local requirements, and this entails
significant costs and legal uncertainty.119
Such statements confirmed an analysis conducted by the European Economic and Social
Committee for the purposes of its own-initiative Opinion on “The European Insurance
Contract” in 2004,120 and lend insurance contract law a particular urgency.
116
European Commission, ‘Commission decision of 17 January 2013 on setting up the Commission
Expert Group on a European Insurance Contract Law’ [2013] OJ C16/6.
117
Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on European Insurance Contract Law (General Rap-
porteur: Jürgen Basedow): http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/expert_groups/insurance/final_
report.pdf.
118
See also Jürgen Basedow, ‘Versicherungsvertragsrecht als Markthindernis?’, Europäische Zeitschrift
für Wirtschaftsrecht 2014, 1.
119
See CEA, ‘Position Paper: CEA views on the European Commission’s Green Paper on policy options
for progress towards an EU contract law for consumers and businesses’ (2011): http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/news/consulting_public/0052/contributions/56_en.pdf; for a more detailed analysis see Felix
Wieser, ‘The Perspective of the Insurance Industry’ in Helmut Heiss and Mandeep Lakhan (eds.),
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): A Model Optional Instrument (Sellier elp,
Munich 2011) 51.
120
[2005] OJ C157/1; see para. I48 above.
26
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
I68. The fact that the decision on setting up an Expert Group was ultimately aimed at
creating a legislative instrument is expressly stated in at least one place: Recital 2 of the
Commission decision expressly refers to the European Parliament’s call for an optional
instrument to include insurance contract law.
I69. The Commission decision also suggests a substantive focus for the report. It namely
refers to the White Paper “An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions” of 16
February 2012,121 in which there is a call for an examination of the extent to which con-
tract-law related obstacles prevent the design and distribution of life assurance products as
pension products. In addition to liability insurance (including motor liability insurance), life
assurance is therefore given particular importance for good reasons in the Expert Group’s
report.
I70. The establishment and work of the Expert Group must therefore be regarded as an
intermediate step towards the creation of a Common European Insurance Contract Law.
Much depends on it. The European Commission may initiate legislation only if the dif-
ferences between insurance contract laws represent an obstacle to the internal insurance
market. It is not important whether the appropriate basis for competence for the creation of
an optional instrument can be found in art. 114 TFEU (competence for the approximation
of laws), art. 352 (contingency competence) or in another provision governing competence.
The task of the Expert Group was restricted to analysing the question as to whether the
difference in the insurance contract laws of the Member States could be deemed obstacles.
The experts were not required to formulate a proposal for a future Common European
Insurance Contract Law.
I71. It is not possible to deal with substantive details in this Introduction. In lieu of a sub-
stantive discussion, the executive summary of the Final Report is presented below:
Executive Summary
1. This report examines the impact of differences between national contract laws on
cross-border insurance business under the freedom to provide services and the freedom
of establishment. The mandate of the Expert Group is to carry out an analysis in order
to assist the Commission in examining whether differences in contract laws pose an
obstacle to cross-border trade in insurance products. It does not relate to other differ-
ences which may influence cross-border insurance business. Nevertheless, the report
recognises the significance of such other differences; some of them are of a factual,
economic and social nature, others relate to areas of the law different from contract law,
in particular to prudential regulation and taxation. These differences include: ‘know-
ing your customer’, understanding the true risk proposed for cover, language, culture,
including expectations of the local policyholder, the need for local claims handling, the
form and prevalence of frauds, the tax and labour law environment, the legal, regula-
tory and supervisory environment, and cross-border redress options. The members of
the Group were drawing on their professional knowledge and expertise and were not
considering statistical evidence except where explicitly mentioned.
121
COM (2012) 55 final.
27
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
2. Two approaches to handle this task have been adopted: The first starting from the
differences in insurance contract law in general, i.e. without specifying any classes of
insurance; the second focusing on particular classes: life insurance, liability insurance,
and motor insurance.
3. With regard to large risks, the cross-border provision of insurance cover is already
now a common occurrence; it rarely encounters obstacles arising from differences in
insurance contract law since the parties are free to choose the applicable law.
4. By contrast, the law applicable to mass risk insurance can be chosen only in limited
situations. Rome I calls for the application of the law of the Member State in which the
risk is situated which in most cases of mass risk insurance is the Member State in which
the policyholder is habitually resident. The legislator has adopted this system in order
to protect the weaker party.
5. Where the law applicable to the contract differs from that of the insurer’s country of
origin which has served as the basis for the design of the contract and is mandatory,
the contract, its marketing, and/or its administration by IT, call centres and legal de-
partments will need adaptation. Differences in national mandatory rules may restrict
the freedom of the insurer to provide its services cross border (and may thus form
obstacles); such rules are important to protect European citizens as consumers or for
example as victims of road accidents. These differences raise the costs of cross-border
trade in insurance. These effects have been highlighted with regard to a number of rules
governing several aspects of cross-border insurance contracts, for example pre-contrac-
tual duties, formalities of contracting, precautionary measures, the unfairness control
of standard contract terms, and duration and renewal of policies.
6. Life insurance displays a great variety of types and functions. For some of them, es-
pecially pensions, tax law and social security regulations supersede insurance contract
law as the principal source of regulation. Other life insurances are similar to financial in-
struments. In this context, divergent rules on pre-contractual information duties (which
are particularly important for consumers’ confidence in cross-border trade) and on the
calculation of surrender values were identified as highly relevant for cross-border life
insurance. Differences in other rules relate to the withdrawal period, the consequences
of cancellation, the drafting of questionnaires, the payment of premium and the insur-
ance money, and to termination. They have the effect of increasing legal uncertainty
and complexity, and of raising costs of cross-border activities. How insurers manage
these requirements is a business decision driven by their commercial approach and
attitude to risk.
7. The legal framework of liability insurance is particularly complex due to the involve-
ment of third parties, the interrelation with liability law, and the variety of duties to
insure imposed by national legislation or regulation. While it is not easy to isolate issues
of pure insurance contract law, a number of legal divergences have been identified as
causing costs and uncertainty. This notably applies to the various differences concerning
compulsory insurances, to rules on the mitigation of loss, in particular on the cover of
legal expenses incurred for the defence and on the time-span of the insurer’s liability.
The applicable rules on insurance contract law are only one element in the decision to
offer cross-border liability cover alongside others; they do not appear to be the main
element.
8. Motor liability insurance is compulsory under Dir. 2009/103/EC and one of the most
widely spread insurances in Europe. Various specific features such as driving habits or
28
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Introduction
liability regimes exist. Despite a basic harmonisation, differences between the relevant
national contract laws subsist and raise the costs of entering a foreign market. These dif-
ferences concern in particular specific punitive interest rates in the case of non-payment
by the insurer, the reimbursement of legal expenses, the compulsory nature of Bonus/
Malus systems in a few Member States, certain requirements as to the form and proof
of motor liability insurance, the duty to accept risks and to submit offers to applicants,
and the review of premium adjustment clauses under standards of unfairness.
IV. Final Remarks
I72. The presentation of this volume marks the end of a research project conducted by
scholars from all over Europe for more than 15 years. Its result is unique in that it provides
for the first time Common Principles of European Insurance Contract Law including rules
on the most significant branches of insurance. Thereby, the PEICL give the European legis-
lature the opportunity to enact an optional Common European Insurance Contract Law as
well as to national legislatures in Member and non-Member States to consider the principles
in the course of national law reforms. Equally, academics will have the opportunity to use a
common European understanding of insurance contract law as a basis for farther reaching,
not the least inter-continental comparative research work. As such, the finalisation of the
project marks a new starting point.
29
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL):
Rules
Part One: Provisions Common to All Contracts Chapter Ten: Rights of Subrogation
Included in the Principles of European Chapter Eleven: Insured Persons Other than the
Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) Policyholder
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions Chapter Twelve: Insured Risk
Section One: Application of the PEICL
Section Two: General Rules Part Three: Provisions Common to Insurance
Section Three: Enforcement of Fixed Sums
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Chapter Thirteen: Admissibility
Insurance Contract
Section One: Applicant’s Pre-contractual Information Part Four: Liability Insurance
Duty Chapter Fourteen: General Liability Insurance
Section Two: Insurer’s Pre-contractual Duties
Chapter Fifteen: Direct Claims and Direct
Section Three: Conclusion of the Contract
Actions
Section Four: Retroactive and Preliminary Cover
Section Five: Insurance Policy Chapter Sixteen: Compulsory Insurance
Section Six: Duration of the Insurance Contract
Section Seven: Post-contractual Information Duties Part Five: Life Insurance
of the Insurer Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life
Chapter Three: Insurance Intermediaries Insurance
Section One: Third Parties
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured Section Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the
Section One: Precautionary Measures Contract
Section Two: Aggravation of Risk Section Three: Changes during the Contract Period
Section Three: Reduction of Risk Section Four: Relation to National Laws
Chapter Five: Insurance Premium Section Five: Insured Event
Chapter Six: Insured Event Section Six: Conversion and Surrender
Chapter Seven: Prescription Part Six: Group Insurance
Part Two: Provisions Common to Indemnity Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group
Insurance Insurance
Section One: Group Insurance in General
Chapter Eight: Sum Insured and Insured Value
Section Two: Accessory Group Insurance
Chapter Nine: Entitlement to Indemnity Section Three: Elective Group Insurance
31
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
1
Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
32
Article 1:202 Further Definitions
33
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
2
Article 1:203 para. 2 is modelled on art. 5 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC).
3
This Article is modelled on the Gender Directive (2004/113/EC) and on Case C-236/09 Association
Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres [2011] ECR I-773.
34
Article 2:102 Breach
4
This Article is modelled on the Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC).
35
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
cluded the contract had it known the information concerned. If, however, the insurer would
have concluded the contract at a higher premium or on different terms, the insurance money
shall be payable proportionately or in accordance with such terms.
5
This provision is modelled on arts. 183 to 189 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
36
Article 2:303 Cooling-off Period
(i) the right to revoke the application or avoid the contract in accordance with Article 2:303
in the case of non-life insurance and with Article 17:203 in the case of life insurance;
(j) that the contract is subject to the PEICL;
(k) the existence of an out-of-court complaint and redress mechanism for the applicant and
the methods of having access to it;
(l) the existence of guarantee funds or other compensation arrangements.
(2) If possible, this information shall be provided in sufficient time to enable the applicant to
consider whether or not to conclude the contract.
(3) When the applicant applies for insurance cover on the basis of an application form and/or a
questionnaire provided by the insurer, the insurer shall supply the applicant with a copy of the
completed documents.
6
This Article is modelled on the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC).
37
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
(2) The policyholder shall not be entitled to avoid the contract when
(a) the duration of the contract is less than one month;
(b) the contract is prolonged under Article 2:602;
(c) it is a case of preliminary insurance, liability insurance or group insurance.
7
This Article is modelled on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC).
38
Article 2:502 Effects of the Policy
39
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
40
Article 4:102 Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Contract
41
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
42
Article 5:103 Termination of the Contract
43
Chapter Six: Insured Event
44
Article 7:103 Other Issues Relating to Prescription
(2) Even if the total value of a claim cannot yet be quantified but the claimant is entitled to at least
a part of it, this part shall be paid or provided without undue delay.
(3) Payment of insurance money, whether under para. 1 or para. 2, shall be made no later than
one week after the acceptance and quantification of the claim or part of it, as the case may be.
8
This Article is modelled on art. 3 para. 1(d) of the Late Payment Directive (2000/35/EC).
9
Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
45
Chapter Eight: Sum Insured and Insured Value
46
Article 11:103 Breach of Duty by One Insured
(3) For the purposes of paras. 1 and 2 causation of loss includes failure to avert or to mitigate loss.
47
Chapter Twelve: Insured Risk
48
Article 14:108 Claims Exceeding the Sum Insured
(2) For the purposes of para. 1 causation of loss includes failure to avert or to mitigate loss.
(3) Subject to a clear clause in the policy providing for reduction of the insurance money accord-
ing to the degree of fault on his part, the policyholder or insured, as the case may be, shall be
entitled to indemnity in respect of any loss caused by negligent non-compliance with specific
instructions of the insurer after the occur-rence of the loss.
49
Chapter Fifteen: Direct Claims and Direct Actions
50
Article 17:102 Beneficiary of the Insurance Money
51
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
er shall have no rights concerning the insurance money, the conversion value or the surrender
value as long as the money has not been paid to the policyholder.
(6) An insurer paying the insurance money to a person designated in accordance with para. 1 shall
be discharged from its obligation to pay, unless it knew that the person in question was not
entitled to the insurance money.
52
Article 17:205 Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Contract
(a) as regards the insurer: a specific reference to the compulsory publication of the annual
report on its solvency and financial condition;
(b) as regards the contractual commitments of the insurer:
(i) an explanation of each benefit and each option,
(ii) information about the proportion of the premium attributable to each benefit, both
main benefits and supplementary benefits, where appropriate;
(iii) the methods of calculation and distribution of bonuses including a specification of the
applicable supervisory law;
(iv) an indication of surrender and paid-up values and the extent to which they are guar-
anteed;
(v) for unit-linked policies: an explanation of the units to which the benefits are linked, and
an indication of the nature of the underlying assets;
(vi) general information on the tax arrangements applicable to the type of policy.
(3) In addition, specific information shall be supplied in order to facilitate a proper understanding
of risks underlying the contract which are assumed by the policyholder.
(4) If the insurer quotes in figures the amount of the possible benefits over and above the con-
tractually guaranteed payments it shall provide the applicant with a model calculation which
states the possible maturity benefit based on the actuarial principles for premium calculation
with three different rates of interest. This shall not apply to insurance contracts covering risks
for which the insurer is uncertain to be liable nor to unit-linked policies. The insurer shall clearly
and comprehensibly indicate to the policyholder that the model calculation only represents
a model based on fictitious assumptions and that the contract does not guarantee possible
payments.
10
Article 17:203 para. 1 is modelled on art. 35 of the Life Assurance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/
EC) and art. 6 of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC).
53
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
54
Article 17:501 Insurer’s Investigation and Information Duty
(7) The rights set forth in this Article may be exercised not earlier than five years after the conclu-
sion of the contract.
55
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
56
Article 18:202 Information Duties
(5) Sums due under this Article shall be paid no later than two months after the receipt of the
policyholder’s request by the insurer.
57
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
58
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL):
Rules, Comments and Notes
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Comments
Substantive Scope: Substantive Private Insurance Contract Law
C1. Notwithstanding the focus on mandatory law, the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law are of private law character. The Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law contain rules of insurance contract law.
Mutual Insurance
C2. Article 1:101 para. 1 explicitly mentions the applicability of the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law to mutual insurance. This reflects the fact that within mutual insur-
ance the contractual relationship of the insurer and the policyholder can be distinguished
from the membership of the policyholder of the mutual insurer. Clearly, the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law only apply to the contractual relationship and leave the
membership issues to national corporate law.
C3. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not apply to social insurance.
For the delimitation of private and social insurance law, a formal approach is suggested. To
avoid rather strenuous endeavours in determining the “social” character of a legal provision,
emphasis is put on the decision of legislators as to which branch specific packages of norms
are attributed.
C4. Insurance contract law which forms the substance of the Principles of European In-
surance Contract Law must be distinguished from the law of insurance supervision. In
principle, the two areas of law are to be distinguished by using a formal approach asking
whether legislators have created a rule of public rather than of contract law. However, for
the purposes of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law this formal approach
is not entirely sufficient. Recourse to national supervisory law is excluded by virtue of Arti-
cle 1:105 if the relevant rules regulate issues covered by the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law (see Article 1:105 Comment 3).
60
Article 1:101 Substantive Scope of Application
C5. This matter is uniformly regulated across Europe by the Rome I Regulation (593/2008)
and the Rome II Regulation (864/2007). While the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) entered
into force on 17 December 2009, the Rome II Regulation (864/2007) has been in force since
11 January 2009. The Regulations replace the former European regime of international
insurance contract law as embodied in the Rome Convention (80/934/EEC), the Life As-
surance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC), the Second Non-Life Insurance Directive
(88/357/EEC) and the Third Non-Life Insurance Directive (92/49/EEC) without essential
changes. The Regulations contain conflict rules for insurance contracts but no substantive
rule of insurance contract law. The aim of these rules of private international law to create
a feasible basis of a European internal insurance market has failed. The Principles of Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract Law focus on substantive insurance contract law which will be
applicable if the parties opt in their favour. On the relation between private international
law and the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law see below Article 1:102 Com-
ments 2 and 3.
C6. The law of insurance intermediaries is subject to its own regulation (see in particular
Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) as amended by MiFID2 (2014/65/EU)) and is
not dealt with in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. Of course, as far as the
professional duties of the intermediaries as against the customer, such as duties to advise, are
concerned, one might argue that the close functional connection of these subjects with the
insurance contract would justify their regulation within a codification on insurance contract
law. The Project Group has indeed considered such an approach but could not follow it for
the obvious reason that the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law represent an
optional insurance contract law which applies whenever the policyholder and the insurer,
being the parties to the insurance contract, agree on their application. Clearly such choice
taken by the policyholder and insurer could not affect the personal obligations of the in-
termediaries as against the policyholder. This is why the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law restrict themselves to regulating the scope of liability of the insurer for acts
committed by intermediaries in their Articles 3:101 and 3:102.
Marine Insurance
C7. Marine insurance has, in many countries, been the object of separate codifications
and/or has been excluded from codifications of general insurance contract law. The Prin-
ciples of European Insurance Contract Law do not follow this tradition. In line with more
recent tendencies to consider marine insurance law part of general insurance contract law
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law apply, in principle, also to marine insur-
ance. This is particularly because of their optional application: Parties to a marine insurance
contract may opt in favour of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law but are
not forced to have them applied to their contract. Moreover, even if the parties to a marine
insurance contract opt for the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law they enjoy
freedom of contract according to Article 1:103 para. 2(a).
61
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Reinsurance
C8. The fields of law described above in Comments 3 to 6, although dealing with insur-
ance, a priori do not lie within the scope of the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law because they are not private insurance contract law. Reinsurance is part of insurance
contract law. Nevertheless, Article 1:101 para. 2 excludes reinsurance from the Principles
of European Insurance Contract Law. In most countries, reinsurance therefore follows its
own rules (see the Notes). One might even speak of an internationally broadly established
lex mercatoria. There is no need for legislative endeavours in this field.
Notes
Application to Private Insurance Contracts
N1. In some Member States, the national insurance contract acts explicitly state that they are
applicable to private insurance contracts in general or to land insurance as opposed to marine
insurance (see art. 54 para. 1(1) Belgian IA 2014, art. 111-1 para. 1 French ICA, art. 1 para. 1
Greek ICA and art. 257 of the Code on Private Maritime Law, arts. 1884 to 1886 Italian CC, art. 4
para. 1 Luxembourg ICA, art. 820 Polish CC, and art. 2 Spanish ICA), thus providing for a very
wide scope of application which is narrowed by exceptions and/or supplemented by rules giving
priority to special provisions for specific sectors of insurance. The Swedish statute makes a clear
difference between individual (Chapters 2 to 16) and collective (Chapters 17 to 20) insurance.
Individual insurance is divided into indemnity insurance (Chapters 2 to 9) and personal insur-
ance (Chapters 10 to 16). Indemnity insurance is divided into consumer insurance (Chapters 2
to 7) and business insurance (Chapter 8). For most national legislators, a special rule stating the
scope of application appears to be redundant in an insurance contract act or in the pertinent part
of the civil code.
Mutual Insurance
N2. Insurance provided in the form of mutual insurance is sometimes explicitly mentioned
as being subject to the national insurance contract act too (see art. 4 para. 7 Belgian IA 2014,
art. 111-1 para. 2 French ICA, and art. 1884 Italian CC according to which the rules of insurance
contracts apply to mutual insurance only where compatible); in most countries the rules on
insurance contracts will be applied to mutual insurance by analogy.
Marine Insurance
N3. Marine insurance is generally considered as a purely commercial business that requires
either special rules or full freedom of contract. The exclusion of marine insurance from the
scope of the national insurance contract act is therefore a common occurrence. In Belgium and
France, it follows from the limitiation of the respective statutes to land insurance (assurance
terrestre, see art. 54 Belgian IA 2014 and art. 111-1 para. 1 French ICA). In Austria and Germany,
marine inurance is explicity excluded from the application of the insurance contract act (s. 186
Austrian ICA and s. 209 German ICA); the German reform of 2007 has derogated from the
special provisions on marine insurance that had previously been part of the Commercial Code,
62
Article 1:102 Optional Application
without however extending the scope of the insurance contract act to marine insurance. In Italy,
art. 1885 CC provides that the rules of general insurance contracts are default rules to be applied
for what is not provided by the Code of Navigation. In Poland, marine insurance is governed
by the Maritime Code mainly in the sense of marine non-life insurance (also a consequence of
art. 820 CC)
N4. The approach laid down in Articles 1:101 and 1:103 PEICL is in line with a second group
of national laws that provide for a qualified application of the insurance contract act to marine
insurance; these statutes either declare that mandatory provisions of the insurance contract act
are dispositive only when the insurance is taken out by businesses (s. 3 para. 3 Finnish ICA) or
when concerning insurance that is not consumer insurance (s. 7 para. 1 of Ch. 1 Swedish ICA), or
they give priority to a specific regulation of marine insurance contained in other laws (art. 1885
Italian CC, art. 2 Portuguese ICA and art. 406 of the Spanish Law of Maritime Navigation), or
they are not mandatory in accordance with civil code provisions (art. 807 Polish CC).
N5. In the United Kingdom there is no general statute on insurance contract law that would
require an exception for marine insurance. Rather marine insurance is the only branch of insur-
ance that is subject to regulation by a general statute, namely the Marine Insurance Act 1906. Its
provisions have also inspired many court decisions relating to non-marine insurance contract
law over the course of time.
Reinsurance
N6. Only very few national regulations of insurance contract law apply to reinsurance. Such
application can however be inferred from some special provisions relating to reinsurance in
arts. 1928 f. Italian CC, arts. 72 f. Portuguese ICA and arts. 77 f. Spanish ICA. The total exclusion
of reinsurance from the application of the insurance contract legislation is the more common
rule (s. 186 Austrian ICA, art. 54 Belgian IA 2014, art. 7:927 Dutch CC, s. 1 para. 3 Finnish ICA,
art. 111-1 para. 1 French ICA, s. 209 German ICA, art. 4 para. 4 Luxembourg ICA, art. 820 Polish
CC, s. 3 para. 2 of Ch. 1 Swedish ICA, and art. 101 para. 1 Swiss ICA.
N7. Some national insurance contract acts further reduce their own scope of application by ex-
cluding other branches of insurance. Such exclusions can be found in the laws of Belgium for the
insurance of transport of goods (art. 2 para. 1(2) ICA 2014), of France for the insurance of risks
in inland navigation (art. 111-1 para. 1 ICA), of France (art. 111-1 para. 1 ICA) and Luxembourg
(art. 4 para. 5 ICA) for credit insurance. A partial exclusion of motor vehicle liability insurance
and patient insurance is laid down in s. 3 para. 1 Swedish ICA, and in Finland also including
environmental insurance (s. 1 para. 2 ICA). These rules appear, however, to be isolated from a
comparative perspective and are not based on a general principle.
63
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Comments
Basic Principle
C1. In accordance with the recommendations made by the European Economic and So-
cial Council (Opinion on “The European Insurance Contract”, no. 8.6 at p. 26) a European
initiative in the field of insurance contracts should aim initially at the possible adoption of
an optional model insurance contract. To achieve this aim the parties must be free to agree
on the application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law irrespective of any
existing limitations of their contractual freedom on other grounds.
C2. The legal nature of the parties’ agreement on the application of the Principles of Euro-
pean Insurance Contract Law is unclear. On the one hand, their choice is meant to replace
the relevant provisions of the national law of any Member State that would be applicable
under private international law; thus, the choice of the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law would exclude the operation of the choice of law rules relating to risks situated
within the Community and contained in art. 7 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008). These
provisions refer only to the law of Member States which might be interpreted as excluding
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law which will be part of Community law.
Moreover, they limit the free choice of the applicable law by the parties in various respects.
These limitations should not hamper the parties’ agreement on the application of the Prin-
ciples of European Insurance Contract Law.
On the other hand, it would be unwise to allow parties to choose the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law if the law applicable to the contract under private international law
does not permit such a choice. This may be the case if the law applicable to the contract is
the law of a non-Member State, for instance if a policyholder habitually resident within the
Community takes out insurance with an insurer established outside the Community for a
risk located in a third country; see arts. 4 para. 2 and 7 para. 1 of the Rome I Regulation
(593/2008). If the foreign law applicable to the contract does not allow a contractual dero-
gation from its own mandatory provisions, Community law should not permit the choice
of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law either, lest that result in divergent
solutions in Community courts and in the courts of third countries.
C3. The solution implemented by Article 1:102 is a hybrid one. This provision is a substan-
tive rule, namely it presupposes that the law of the European Union or of one of its Member
States is applicable under the conflict of laws; thus, choice of law rules must determine at a
first stage whether Community law (or the law of one of its Member States) or the law of a
third state applies. In the latter case it would be up to the third state’s law to determine the
effect of the parties’ choice of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. If Com-
munity law or the law of a Member State is applicable, Article 1:102 has an additional signif-
icance for private international law. It supersedes art. 7 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008),
and in particular the limitations imposed on the free choice of law laid down therein.
64
Article 1:102 Optional Application
C4. The parties’ right to subject their contract to the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law is not limited to cross-border contracting situations. Thus, parties may want
to agree on the application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law in view of
a future change of residence to another Member State which would turn a domestic contract
into an international one. If the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law could be
chosen only by parties residing in different Member States it would be out of reach of those
citizens of the Community who, at the time of contracting, live in the same country where
the insurer is established but who are planning to go abroad. Moreover, Article 1:102, by
allowing the choice of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law also in same
country situations, may trigger a competition between different contracting models, namely
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law and the national law. In the long run
this may bring about an assimilation of national laws.
No Partial Choice
C5. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are conceived as an instrument
that provides comprehensive protection to the policyholder and replaces national law that
would govern the contract in the absence of a contractual choice of the Principles of Euro-
pean Insurance Contract Law. Thus, the parties are given the choice between national law
and the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law as a whole. It would be incompatible
with this approach to allow the parties to exclude particular provisions. Selective exclusion
of this kind would allow insurers to undermine the basic protection that should be granted
to customers in order to make the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law accept-
able as an alternative to national law. It is for similar considerations that some international
instruments only allow the parties to exclude their rules as a whole; see, for example, the
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring.
C6. Article 1:102 does not concern the issue whether single provisions of the Principles
of European Insurance Contract Law may be derogated from altogether or to the benefit of
the policyholder alone. This issue is dealt with in Article 1:103.
Effect on Intermediaries
C7. The parties referred to in Article 1:102 are the parties to the insurance contract, namely
the insurer and the applicant or policyholder. An intermediary may be bound by contract
to the insurer or the policyholder, as the case may be, but it is a third party to the insurance
contract. The parties’ agreement on the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law as
the law applicable to the insurance contract therefore has no effect on the rights and obli-
gations of an intermediary.
Note
There are no antecedents in national law.
65
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Comments
Focus on Mandatory Law
C1. The “living law” of the insurance contract is not statutory in character, but is embodied
in general contract terms. It would not be feasible for any European legislator to produce the
entirety of norms necessary to facilitate a modern insurance business. The former German
ICA for example, attempted this by regulating in detail not only the general aspects but also
the main single branches of insurance law. However, the development of insurance practice
left these endeavours behind. In addition, modern important fields of business, for example
health insurance and legal protection insurance, had not at that time been fully developed.
Moreover, wherever freedom of contract prevailed, the insurance industry made use of it
by its general contract terms, thus setting aside the statutory regulations.
C2. The essential function for legislation regarding insurance contracts is therefore to
take effective measures to limit freedom of contract. This has to be done, on the one hand,
for reasons of public policy. For example, taking out insurance without a legitimate interest
to be protected must be prevented as well as any inducement to receive insurance benefits
by fraudulent means. On the other hand the policyholder needs protection against unfair
contract terms. Particular attention has to be paid to clauses which lead to a loss of cover,
for example, due to breach of a duty to observe precautionary measures (Article 4:103). In
all this, it is not only the policyholder who deserves attention, but also other persons with an
interest in the cover: the insured, the beneficiary, the victim and so on. It is a typical feature
of modern insurance contract legislation, beginning in the first decade of the 20th century,
to impose a large number of mandatory provisions. This contrasts sharply with contract
law in general which strongly adhered to freedom of contract. Only later did other fields of
contract law begin to follow a similar model. Mention may be made of labour law, the law
of landlord and tenant, and the numerous protective devices regarding the consumer which
have developed since World War II.
C3. The focus on mandatory rules follows not least from the internal market orientation of
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. Mandatory rules of national insurance
law form a barrier to the functioning of the internal market which can be overcome by re-
placing them by new uniform provisions. As a result, the Principles of European Insurance
66
Article 1:103 Mandatory Character
Contract Law give a comprehensive set of mandatory rules. If chosen by the parties, they
replace all national mandatory law.
Technique
C4. Two methods are apparent in pertinent legislative acts. Under the first one, the man-
datory provisions are enumerated or designated individually. Under the other, the entirety
of the statute is declared mandatory, subject to specific exceptions. The Principles of Euro-
pean Insurance Contract Law follow a double tracked approach in respect of mandatory
and semi-mandatory provisions. Some provisions, which are enumerated in the exhaustive
list of Article 1:103 para. 1, are absolutely mandatory, which means that no derogation is
allowed. The list includes the Articles that deal with fraudulent behaviour on the part of the
policyholder, insured or beneficiary. The second sentence of Article 1:103 para. 1 does not
specify these Articles because most of them cover fraudulent, intentional and/or negligent
behaviour without distinction; see, for example, Articles 4:203, 6:102 para. 3 and 9:101 para.
1. Basic considerations of morality dictate that the parties should not be allowed to agree on
insurance cover in the case of fraud.
C5. Article 1:103 para. 2 declares all other provisions of the Principles of European In-
surance Contract Law to be mandatory in the sense that they must not be derogated from
to the detriment of the policyholder, insured or beneficiary (semi-mandatory rules; there
are a few specific exceptions within individual Articles, for example Article 9:101 para. 2).
Derogations to the benefit of policyholder, insured or beneficiary are permissible as are
derogations which are to the benefit of the insurer but do not disadvantage the policyholder,
insured or beneficiary.
C6. The application of semi-mandatory law to all contracts covered by the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law would be inappropriate, especially as far as commercial
risks are concerned. A further distinction is needed. There are different approaches by which
the scope of the mandatory character of insurance contract law can be defined: frequently,
insurance contract acts specify certain branches of insurance in which their rules will be
applied but not be mandatory. This concerns mainly branches which are mercantile in char-
acter also on the policyholder’s side, for example, transport insurance. Another approach
is to restrict the mandatory character of the rules to consumer insurance contracts. Within
European law the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) as well as the Unfair Con-
tract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC), both applicable to insurance contracts, are restricted to
consumer transactions. Yet another approach is taken by the Rome I Regulation (593/2008)
concerning the mandatory character of its conflict of law rules in insurance, in particular,
the admissibility of agreements on the applicable law. Art. 7 para. 2 of the Rome I Regulation
(593/2008) grants free choice of law in cases of large risks as defined under art. 5(d) of the
First Non-Life Insurance Directive (73/239/EEC) which is to be replaced by art. 13 point
27 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC). An almost identical approach is taken by
the Brussels Ibis Regulation (1215/2012) concerning jurisdiction clauses (see art. 15 para. 5
together with art. 16 para. 5 of the Regulation).
C7. The exclusive application of mandatory rules to consumer insurance contracts would
create unsatisfactory results for professionals and small businesses. While an extension of
67
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
the scope appears desirable, it is very difficult to find a convincing definition. The third
approach, namely an exemption of large risks as defined by art. 13 point 27 of the Solvency
II Directive (2009/138/EC), provides a solution. Since it is part of the acquis communautaire
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law adopt this approach of European private
international law. In addition, the scope of freedom of contract will coincide with the scope
of free choice of law as well as free choice of jurisdiction. This is a desirable outcome because
mandatory rules of substantive law may be avoided to a certain degree by choosing a foreign
legal order according to party autonomy in the choice of law anyhow. The PEICL regulate
these related issues in the same way and thereby set up a coherent system of freedom of
contract. This solution, as applied to group insurances, explains the second sentence of
para. 3. The persons who merit protection in group insurance are the individual insureds,
not the policyholder.
Notes
N1. The full range of mandatory provisions, minimum protection rules favouring the policy-
holder, and default or dispositive insurance contract law that is reflected by Article 1:103 PEICL
can be found in most national legal systems in Europe. Yet, the mix of the three elements differs
from country to country.
Mandatory Acts
N2. The smallest latitude for freedom of contract is allowed by Belgian law. According to art. 56
IA 2014, the full statute of 149 articles is mandatory unless a contractual derogation is explicitly
permitted in single provisions. In the absence of such exceptions, the provisions of the statute
are absolutely binding for the policyholder and the insurer (Fontaine, para. 61; Cousy/Schoorens
65). For a similar approach, see art. 807 para. 1 Polish CC. Given the impact of Belgian law on
the Insurance Contract Act of Luxembourg, art. 3 of that country’s Insurance Contract Act will
likely be interpreted in the same way.
N3. In France, the wording of art. 111-2 points into the same direction. The Cour de cassation
has in fact invalidated a contractual prolongation of a prescription period for the benefit of the
policyholder as being incompatible with the predecessor provision of art. 111-2 (Cass. civ. 1re,
2.6.1964, RGAT 1965, 46 f.). But there are authors in legal literature who take the view that
art. 111-2 only excludes contractual derogations to the detriment of the policyholder (see the
discussion by Basedow/Fock-Völker 465). The provision in question also contains a long list of
articles exempt from the mandatory character.
N4. In other European countries, the bulk of insurance contract law will either be dispositive or
guarantee a minimum protection to the policyholder, while single provisions may be designated
or considered as absolutely mandatory. Thus, the indemnity principle which excludes an indem-
nity exceeding the loss suffered by the insured is basically considered as being non-derogable in
Austria, until recently in Germany (Prölss/Martin-Kollhosser, § 55 VVG para. 1 (old version);
s. 55 German ICA has, however, been abrogated by the 2008 reform. Thus, German law no longer
68
Article 1:103 Mandatory Character
prohibits the indemnity from exceeding the loss if the parties so agree (cf. Wandt, para. 727)),
and the Netherlands (art. 7:963 para. 1 CC). In the new Dutch Civil Code, the limitation of a
liability insurer’s right to offset premium claims against a claim for insurance money (art. 7:935
para. 2 CC) is designated as being mandatory, see art. 7:943 para. 1 CC. In a similar way, art. 97
Swiss ICA and the new Portuguese ICA enumerate the provisions of the act which are absolutely
mandatory, see art. 12. The new Dutch Civil Code also enumerates the provisions of the act which
are absolutely mandatory (see arts. 7:943 para. 1, 7:963 para. 1 and 7:986 para. 1 CC).
N5. In general, provisions that protect the interests of third parties will be immune from con-
tractual derogation agreed between the policyholder and the insurer, see the explicit rule in s. 3
para. 1 Finnish ICA, and in s. 6 para. 2 Swedish ICA. See also arts. 7:963 para. 3 and 7:947 Dutch
CC. Another example is given by life assurance which can be taken out on the life of a third party
only with that person’s approval (see for example in Italy art. 1919 para. 2 CC; in Germany s. 150
para. 2 ICA); that requirement is characterised as being part of the “ordine pubblico” (Donati/
Volpe Putzolu 187; Wandt, Anwendbares Recht 347) which excludes any possibility of contractual
derogation.
N6. A second group of national insurance statutes that has served as a model for the Principles
of European Insurance Contract Law permits contractual alterations of its provisions, but only to
the benefit of the policyholder or insured. Since these statutes invalidate agreements that deviate
from any provision of the respective act, they may be characterised as minimum protection acts.
This is the basic approach taken in Finland (s. 3 ICA), Greece (art. 33 para. 1 ICA; alterations of
its provision can, however, be stipulated without restrictions, where it is specifically provided for
in the ICA and in case of insurance of carriage of goods, credit and guarantee insurance and ma-
rine or aviation insurance), Sweden (s. 6 para. 1 ICA), and Spain (art. 2 ICA). See also arts. 7:943
paras. 2 and 3, 7:963 paras. 2 and 4 to 6 and 7:986 paras. 2 to 4 Dutch CC. In Poland, there is no
statutory restriction in place, however it is a common view held in legal commentary.
N7. A third model of European insurance contract acts departs from the principle of freedom of
contract; the single provisions contained in these acts are default rules unless they are specifically
designated as establishing a minimum protection for the policyholder. The lists of binding min-
imum provisions differ in length from country to country. Thus, the list contained in art. 1932
Italian CC is fairly short, while those laid down in art. 13 Portuguese ICA, art. 98 Swiss ICA and
in several provisions of the Austrian (ss. 15a, 34a, 68a, 72, 108, 115a, 158p, 178, and 178n) and
German ICA (ss. 18, 32, 42, 87, 112, 129, 171, 191, and 208) are much longer. In substance, this
technique may amount to the same degree of policyholder protection as the one outlined in Note
6. But all of the statutes mentioned in this Note contain dispositive provisions of law in addition
to the binding rules conferring a minimum protection to the policyholder.
N8. British insurance contract law is characterised by an almost unrestricted freedom of con-
tract. Except where the EC Directives mentioned in para. 9 apply, the major interference with
that principle was to be found in the rules of the Financial Conduct Authority dealing with
the conduct of insurance business (ICOBS 8). These restrict the use of legal defences based on
69
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
N9. The consumer directives of the European Union should also be mentioned in this context.
Of particular relevance to insurance contracts are the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/
EEC) and the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC). The consumer directives provide for
minimum protection in a double sense: they allow for the consumer’s rights to be extended both
by the private transactions with a professional and by appropriate provisions of national law.
The latter way is barred by Article 1:105 PEICL which does not permit recourse to national law
where the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law apply. But the possibility of private
transactions providing for a higher level of consumer protection is in line with Article 1:103 para.
2 PEICL.
N10. Most national laws define the scope of application of their mandatory or minimum pro-
tection rules. For this purpose, they either refer to particular branches of insurance and/or to
the personal status of the policyholder. The impact of the acquis communautaire is more and
more perceptible.
N11. Certain branches of insurance that are covered by Article 1:103 para. 3 have traditionally
been governed by freedom of contract; many Member States have excluded them from the scope
of mandatory minimum protection rules. This relates to marine and aircraft insurance which
are not assurances terrestres covered by national insurance contract acts (see Article 1:101 PEICL
Notes 3 ff.), but it is also true for countries like Greece (art. 33 para. 1 ICA) and Sweden (s. 7 para.
1 of Ch. 1 ICA with a counter-exception for consumer insurance) where the insurance contract
act basically applies to marine and aircraft insurance. Further branches left to freedom of contract
are transport insurance (see for example s. 187 Austrian ICA and art. 33 para. 1 Greek ICA),
credit insurance (art. 33 para. 1 Greek ICA and s. 7 para. 2 of Ch. 1 Swedish ICA), and different
types of collective insurance (s. 7 paras. 3 to 5 of Ch. 1 Swedish ICA).
N12. As to the personal criteria used for the demarcation of the mandatory or minimum pro-
tection rules, two models can be ascertained. Just like many EU consumer protection directives,
the Netherlands restrict the application of some provisions – for example on the breach of the
policyholder’s duties of disclosure or on the maximum duration of the insurance contract – to
consumers as policyholders (see arts. 7:943 para. 3, 7:963 para. 6 and 7:986 para. 3 CC), namely
to individuals acting for non-business purposes. S. 3 para. 2 Finnish ICA takes a similar ap-
proach, but extends the application of the minimum protection rules of its insurance contract
act to any “natural person or legal person that in terms of the nature and scope of its business or
other activities or other circumstances can be compared to a consumer as a party to the contract
signed with the insurer.”
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Article 1:104 Interpretation
N13 More recent insurance contract regulations draw the borderline between “large risks” and
all other risks. The term is defined in art. 13 point 27 of the Solvency II Direcitve (2009/138/
EC). For its subsequent use in EC private law, in particular for choice of court agreements and
choice of law agreements, see Comment 5 and Fuchs 49 f. In Poland such a distinction is also
being discussed in the preparatory project for the new Civil Code on insurance contract law.
N14. This distinction has been adapted in recent national insurance contract laws to define the
scope of mandatory or minimum protection provisions, see in particular s. 210 German ICA,
art. 3 para. 3 Luxembourg ICA as well as art. 12 para. 2 and art. 13 para. 2 Portuguese ICA. The
enumeration technique employed in these countries pursues the same objective as the formula
of the Finnish statute, see Note 12 above, namely to extend the non-derogable protection of the
act to small and medium-sized businesses and non-profit organisations taking out insurance,
without however subjecting all policyholders to that mandatory protection. Article 1:103 para.
3 follows this model.
Comments
The Objective
C1. The objective of the Article is to lay down guidelines for the interpretation of the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. It sets forth recognised methods of stat-
utory interpretation, in particular the reference to the wording of a provision, its context
and its purpose. Since the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law essentially flow
from a comparison of various national insurance contract laws regard should be had to
the comparative background. The Article draws from interpretation provisions contained
in international instruments, in particular art. 31 para. 1 VCLT, art. 7 para. 1 CISG and
Article 1:106 PECL.
C2. Interpretation has both a static and a dynamic aspect. The first relates to situations
which can occur at present, but have not been envisaged specifically in the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law, while the second concerns situations which could not
occur at the time of drafting, but which, when they do occur, have to be dealt with by the
existing rules. An example would be the application of the requirement of a written form,
established in the 1950s, to the exchange of e-mails in later years.
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Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Textual Interpretation
C3. The wording of the provisions is of primary importance. While the Principles of Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract Law are drafted in English, the concepts used in the Principles
of European Insurance Contract Law do not reflect English law but have their own autono-
mous meaning. As soon as versions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
have been adopted in official Community languages other than English they will have the
same authority as the English version. In case of divergence between different language
versions the meaning has to be clarified in the light of the purpose of a provision, taking
account of all official languages; see Case 55/87 Moksel v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaft-
liche Marktordnung [1988] ECR 3845 para. 15; Case 26/69 Stauder v Ulm [1969] ECR 419.
Context
C4. In interpreting the provisions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law,
consideration must be given to their context. In accordance with the long-standing practice
of the European Court of Justice this refers to the micro-system of the single Community
Act, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law in this case; see for example Case
C-125/79 Denilauler v Couchet Frères [1980] ECR 1553 para. 13. But a contextual interpre-
tation will increasingly often have to look beyond the single Community Act to the place
of a given provision in the growing macro-system of Community law as a whole; see, for
example, Case 172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963 para. 24. Thus, the Principles
of European Insurance Contract Law take account of numerous Community acts. Therefore,
its rules should be interpreted in the light of the general context of Community law; and in
particular regard should be had to the Principles of European Contract Law.
C5. The requirement of good faith is a basic principle of European contract law. Under
art. 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC) a standard term shall be regarded
as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the
parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer. The good faith principle can
also be traced in the case law of the European Court of Justice. Thus, for example, the Court
has repeatedly referred to this principle when interpreting jurisdiction clauses under art. 17
of the Brussels Convention11; see Case 25/76 Segura v Bonakdarian [1976] ECR 1851 para.
11; Case 71/83 The Tilly Russ [1984] ECR 2417 para. 18. A duty of good faith is also imposed
upon each party by the mandatory provision of Article 1:201 PECL which, moreover, in
Article 1:106 list good faith as a guiding principle for interpretation.
C6. The principle of legal certainty is one of the basic principles of Community law. The
Community courts often have recourse to this principle in various fields. Inter alia, the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice has relied on “the principle of legal certainty in contractual matters”
11
The Brussels Convention was initially transformed into the Brussels I Regulation (44/2001), which has
now been replaced by Brussels Ibis Regulation (1215/2012).
72
Article 1:105 National Law and General Principles
as a basis for its views on the provisional validity of anti-competitive agreements; see Case
99/79 Lancôme v Etos & Albert Heyn [1980] ECR 2511 para. 16.
Uniform Application
C7. The need for a uniform application flows from the very existence of uniform law. It
has been affirmed by several international conventions, inter alia by art. 7 para. 1 CISG and
also by Article 1:106 PECL. It has equally been recognised by the European Court of Justice
in many instances, such as Case 55/87 Moksel v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Mark-
tordnung [1988] ECR 3845 para. 15; Case C-271/00 Gemeente Steenbergen v Baten [2002]
ECR I-10489 para. 28.
Protection of Policyholders
C8. The protection of policyholders in insurance contracts has been a guideline of Com-
munity policy for many years. Thus, the choice of law provisions of the Second Generation
of Insurance Directives basically referred to the law of the country of the policyholder as the
law applicable to an insurance contract; see art. 7 of the Second Non-Life Insurance Direc-
tive (88/357/EEC); art. 32 of the Life Assurance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC). This
model is still followed by the new conflict rules as contained in art. 7 para. 3 of the Rome
I Regulation (593/2008). Further evidence is provided by the special rules on jurisdiction
contained in arts. 10 ff. of the Brussels Ibis Regulation (1215/2012) which grant the policy-
holder the privilege of a competent court at his domicile in most cases and which restrict
the possibility of clauses choosing any other jurisdiction. The acquis communautaire is thus
inspired by the basic objective to ensure adequate protection to policyholders which should
also be observed in the interpretation of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law.
Note
While some national laws contain provisions dealing with the interpretation of contracts, few
antecedents appear to exist in national laws relating to the interpretation of statutes, but see for
example s. 6 Austrian CC laying down similar principles as those set forth in the first sentence
of Article 1:104 and additional examples in Polish law: art. 56 and art. 65 paras. 1 and 2 CC.
12
Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
73
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
the absence of relevant rules in that instrument, in accordance with the general principles
common to the laws of the Member States.
Comments
Basic Principle
C1. In many countries, insurance contract law is characterised by a great number of very
detailed mandatory provisions which differ from country to country. The divergence be-
tween them is one of the reasons for the lack of implementation of the European insurance
market. In particular that is why insurers are unable to use the same policy for selling
insurance cover to consumers resident in different European countries. If the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law are to overcome these difficulties they must of necessity
supersede mandatory national provisions.
C2. It follows that recourse to national law, for whatever reason, must be prohibited. In the
first place the rules of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law cannot be con-
sidered as minimum standards which would nonetheless allow Member States to enforce
the stricter provisions of their national law granting greater protection to policyholders.
While minimum harmonization has been a standard practice of European legislation in the
area of consumer law, a similar approach would undermine the uniform application of the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law from the outset. The consequence would
be that insurers would still have to face the present uncertainty about the legal framework
of their policies sold in the various Member States.
Supervisory Law
C3. The exclusionary effect of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law is limit-
ed to national provisions of contract law, it does not relate to national supervisory law which
remains applicable when the parties have chosen the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law as the applicable contract law. But the borderline between contract law and
supervisory law is not the same in all Member States. For example, information duties may
be laid down in the law of contract in some Member States and in the supervisory law in
others. Such differences must not affect the scope of the exclusionary effect of Article 1:105
para. 1 lest the uniform application of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
be endangered. The demarcation of contract law and supervisory law must therefore be de-
termined by autonomous interpretation: the subjects treated in the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law are contractual; their regulation by the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law bars the implementation of national provisions dealing with the
respective issues regardless of whether the national provisions form part of contract law or
supervisory law.
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Article 1:105 National Law and General Principles
C4. For the same reasons, Member States cannot be permitted to enforce particular provi-
sions of their national law as internationally mandatory provisions. While art. 9 para. 2 of the
Rome I Regulation (593/2008) allows Member States to apply those rules of their own law
which are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract, a similar
exemption from the rules of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law would not
be acceptable. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law ensure comprehensive
protection of the policyholder, the insured and the beneficiary; while this protection may
fall short of corresponding rules in single Member States this does not entitle the judges of
those Member States to disregard the rules of the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law and apply provisions of their national law as internationally mandatory rules instead.
C5. By way of exception, recourse to national law is allowed where a Member State has
enacted mandatory provisions for a special branch of insurance such as health care insur-
ance which is not yet covered by specific provisions of the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law. This exception is required since the Principles of European Insurance Con-
tract Law do not deal with all special branches of insurance. The exception does, however,
not apply as far as the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law deal with liability
insurance, life insurance and group insurance.
Filling Gaps
C6. A further distortion of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law may result
if national provisions are applied in order to fill gaps. Like other instruments of uniform law
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law cannot be comprehensive. In view of
their purpose to overcome the divergences between mandatory national provisions, their
scope is limited to mandatory law leaving many issues unsettled. It is up to the insurance
contract in the first place and to general contract law in the second to fill these gaps. In the
absence of general Community contract law the traditional way of filling those gaps would
be to apply the provisions of the national law which is applicable under private international
law. Under the relevant conflict rules of art. 7 para. 3 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008),
the applicable law will generally be the law of the Member State where the policyholder re-
sides. Consequently, an insurer selling insurance cover under the same policy to applicants
from various Member States would have to adjust to as many different national laws. The
main obstacle to the cross-border sale of insurance cover would not be removed, but main-
tained. Therefore, recourse to national law must be prohibited in these situations as well.
C7. Gaps in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law should be filled by prin-
ciples which are common to the Member States. Having this goal in mind, the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law have been drafted in the light of the Principles of Euro-
pean Contract Law as a core component of the Common Frame of Reference of European
Contract Law. In many instances references contained in the Comments on the Rules of the
75
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law testify to this close link. Where neither the
insurance contract nor the Common Frame of Reference help to fill a gap in the Principles
of European Insurance Contract Law, which will not occur very often, it would be up to
the national courts and ultimately to the European Court of Justice to identify principles
which are common to the laws of the Member States. The case-law of the European Court
of Justice on the liability of the Community for damage caused by its institutions or by its
servants in the performance of their duties (art. 340 para. 2 TFEU) provides guidance in
this respect. It shows in particular that among the various solutions offered by the national
laws of the Member States it is the one that best serves the purpose of Community law
which should be chosen.
Note
There are no antecedents in national law.
Comments
Insurance Contract (para. 1)
C1. The term “insurance contract” is not always defined in insurance contract law because
the scope of the concept in national contexts is well-known and sufficiently clear or because
76
Article 1:201 Insurance Contract
a definition may be considered as dangerous because of its exclusionary effect. Despite this,
para. 1 of the Article includes a general definition of the term as a guide to the reader of the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law rather than a comprehensive definition of
an insurance contract.
C2. In accordance with the definition, “insurance contract” means a contract under which
one party, the insurer, promises another party, the policyholder, cover against a specified
risk in exchange for a premium. The key elements of an insurance contract are thus the
transfer (of the economic consequences) of a risk to the insurer and the policyholder’s obli-
gation to pay for this transfer. The risk is often an unwanted incident such as death, accident,
fire or burglary, in the non-occurrence of which the person benefiting from the insurance
contract has an interest. However, the risk may also be a desired event like being alive at a
certain date, getting married or the birth of a child. Such desired events may raise similar
economic concerns which the policyholder wants to deal with.
C3. Risk includes the element of uncertainty. It is sufficient for the element of risk that at
the time the contract is formed there is no certainty whether, when or up to what amount
any payment will have to be made or even how long the agreed payment of premium will
last. As uncertainty has to be assessed from the perspective of the parties and at the time the
contract is made, even a retroactive insurance – an insurance for a risk which already has
materialised – is possible as long as the contracting parties are unaware of the fact that the
insured event (see Comment 5 below) has already occurred (see Article 2:401).
C4. The uncertainty relates to an element outside the insurance contract and not to the
performance of the contract itself. This latter type of uncertainty exists in many contracts,
for example in sales or loan agreements. Parties try to cope with it by different types of
securities and guarantees which are however not covered by the definition of insurance
in para. 1. Notwithstanding restrictions under supervisory law, para. 1 does not preclude
the contract from imposing obligations other than the transfer of risk, it may still be an
insurance contract.
C5. In accordance with para. 2, “insured event” does not mean the risk against which
the insurance has been taken, but the materialisation of the risk specified in the insurance
contract. A risk materialises when the uncertain event defined in the insurance contract
occurs. Economic and other consequences of the insured event may occur substantially
later. Thus, for example, in an accident insurance, the insured event will usually be defined
in the contract as the occurrence of an accident. This is different from the appearance of a
physical defect years later, from a necessary operation due to this defect or from the receipt
of the invoice concerning the operation.
C6. In the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law insurance contracts are divided
into indemnity insurances (see Part Two) and insurances of fixed sums (see Part Three).
The distinction basically depends on the manner in which insurance money is calculated.
77
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
In accordance with para. 3, “indemnity insurance” is an insurance under which the insurer
is obliged to indemnify against loss suffered on the occurrence of an insured event. Thus, in
indemnity insurance the consequences of the insured event must be measurable in money.
C7. The amount of the insurance money can be based directly on the costs incurred as a
result of the insured event, like medical expenses following an illness. Sometimes the indem-
nity must be calculated according to a rule that may be different from one policy to another
and be based, for example, on market value, cost of repair or replacement of the property to
be indemnified taking account of the depreciation where appropriate. Parties may also fix
the value of the insured property by agreement in the contract. This would not change the
character of the contract as an indemnity insurance (see also Article 8:101 and Comments).
C9. The main idea and purpose of insurance is to cover losses. If the loss and the insur-
ance money were not linked together, insurance would come close to gambling. Therefore,
insurances of fixed sums cannot be allowed for all types of insurance. In Article 13:101 this
possibility is limited to only accident, health, life, marriage, birth or other personal insur-
ance. However, an indemnity insurance may provide for the payment of a flat sum (which
for practical purposes comes close to an insurance of fixed sums) provided that the limits
drawn by Article 8:101 are respected.
C10. “Liability insurance” is defined in para. 5 very broadly (‘exposure of the insured to
legal liability’) in order to cover various types of liability policies which are found in the
European Single Market. Thus, the definition applies to policies under which the insurer’s
liability is triggered by commission of the wrongful act, the occurrence of loss, or claims
made. For the various types of liability insurance covered by the PEICL, see Annex I classes
10-13 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
C11. “Life insurance” is defined in para. 6 essentially by the element of a biometric risk
to be covered by the insurer. This is made clear by referring to the “death or survival” of
the person at risk. Apart from that, the definition is very broad in order to cover all types
of life insurance which are found in the European Single Market. This includes insurances
where the payment of the insured sum by the insurer is guaranteed for a certain point in
the future but the period during which the premium is paid by the policyholder depends
on the survival or death of the person at risk (frequently called “term-fix Versicherung” in
78
Article 1:201 Insurance Contract
Germany). In such case, the biometric risk which the insurer bears relates to the amount
of premium it will get for providing cover. If, for instance, the person at risk dies two years
after the conclusion of the contract, the policyholder will only have to pay premium for the
two-year period. Afterwards, the insurer has to take over.
C12. For the various types of life insurance, see Annex II of the Solvency II Directive
(2009/138/EC). The PEICL are primarily intended to serve for the life insurance mentioned
in art. 2 para. 3(i) and (ii) of Solvency II, although it is possible for the parties to agree on
the application of the PEICL also outside these life insurances. Art. 2 para. 3(i) and (ii)
mentions: “(i) life insurance which comprises assurance on survival to a stipulated age
only, assurance on death only, assurance on survival to a stipulated age or on earlier death,
life assurance with return of premiums, marriage assurance, birth assurance; (ii) annuities”.
C13. For Comments on the definition of group insurances, and in particular of accessory
and elective group insurance, see Article 18:101 Comments 2 to 4.
C14. Paras. 8 and 9 provide that the group members are “insured” or “automatically in-
sured”. This wording does not restrict the application of the definition to indemnity insur-
ances. For instance, a person at risk under a life insurance contract would also be “insured”
within the meaning of the definitions under paras. 8 and 9.
Notes
The Pros and Cons of Defining the Insurance Contract
N1. The term insurance contract is usually employed for the description of the scope of applica-
tion of an insurance contract act, see the notes on Article 1:101. Given the numerous mandatory
or minimum protection rules contained in such acts, a precise definition is even more significant
since it determines the implications for freedom of contract. On the other hand, commercial
practice has brought about a large number of new contractual arrangements which are sometimes
difficult to reconcile with a clear definition of an insurance contract. Therefore, the countries
which have actually endeavoured to define the insurance contract are not very numerous. In
particular, the more recent laws of Finland, Germany, Sweden and Portugal lack such definition.
In the legal literature of Poland, the definition of insurance contract is interpreted in differing
ways (art. 805 para. 1 CC); Fuchs, Rozprawy 915 f.; Fuchs/Nowak/Nowak-Kowalewski and Fuchs
27 ff.
N2. An alternative to a single definition for all kinds of insurance contracts may consist in the
drafting of separate definitions for indemnity or non-life insurance on the one hand and life
insurance or personal insurance on the other. A similar approach is taken by the laws of Finland
(s. 2 ICA) and Italy (art. 1882 CC; additional definitions are contained in the Code of Private
Insurance with reference to legal expenses insurance, see Cerini 107). See the new Dutch Civil
Code for a system of a general definition combined with sub-definitions for indemnity, life and
79
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
personal insurance. In the Swedish Act (s. 4 of Ch. 1 ICA) separate definitions are provided for
consumer insurance, enterprise insurance and collective insurance. Like the former Belgian ICA,
the IA 2014 combines a general definition (art. 5 para. 14 IA) with subdefinitions of indemnity
insurance (art. 55, 3° IA), insurance of fixed sums (art. 55, 4° IA), property insurance (art. 5, 15°
IA) and personal insurance (art. 5, 16° IA).
N3. There are three elements which can be found in different forms in all statutes that do provide
for a definition of the insurance contract in general: the policyholder’s duty to pay a premium;
the uncertainty about the insured event; and the insurer’s duty to pay insurance money if the
insured event occurs. The second and third of these elements are, however, far from clear and
need additional explanations to avoid an excessively narrow wording.
N4. Art. 7:925 of the Dutch Civil Code defines the insurance contract inter alia by the insurer’s
obligation to make one or more payments (uitkeringen) to the other party. It thereby follows
the model of the UK Marine Insurance Act 1906 which also refers to the insurer’s obligation to
indemnify the assured, see s. 1. What is appropriate for marine insurance may lead to difficulties
for other branches of insurance. Thus, a liability insurance policy stating the insurer’s obligation
to defend the policyholder’s interest by granting legal advice might not be covered by the Dutch
definition if taken literally. Similar problems may arise if a health insurer promises to provide,
not a reimbursement of health care costs incurred by the policyholder, but medical services
by doctors or hospitals operating under a franchising arrangement with the insurer. Art. 7:926
para. 1 CC therefore brings about a helpful clarification stating that a performance other than in
money shall be deemed to be “payment” for the purpose of the application of the Dutch insurance
contract law.
N5. The formula used by Article 1:201 para. 1 PEICL according to which the insurer promises
“cover” appears to avoid such difficulties. It is inspired by the Belgian and Luxembourg statutes
which identify the insurer’s duty as performing an obligation laid down in the contract (à fournir
une prestation stipulée dans le contrat, art. 5(14) Belgian IA 2014 and art. 1(A) Luxembourg ICA).
This leaves it to the parties to agree whether that obligation sounds in money or in kind, which
is made explicit in Greek law (art. 1 para. 1 ICA). In Poland, the above approach is consequence
of art. 3 para. 1 of the Act on Insurance Activity (see Fuchs, Ochrona 40 ff.)
Uncertain Event
N6. Similar problems may arise from the requirement of uncertainty relating to the insured
event. It is especially in some insurance contracts with a marked investment element that it
may be questioned whether the occurrence of the insured event is uncertain, as required by the
statutes of Belgium (art. 5(14) IA 2014) or Luxembourg (art. 1(A) ICA). These problems may be
avoided by an explicit reference to such investment contracts which are considered as insurance
contracts (art. 1(A) Luxembourg ICA). A more general approach is taken by the Dutch Civil
Code which specifically points out that the uncertainty of the event may be the occurence itself,
the time of the occurrence or the duration of the payment of premium (art. 7:925 CC). “Insured
80
Article 1:202 Further Definitions
event” has its own definition in art. 2 para. 18 of the Polish Act on Insurance Activity (see Fuchs,
Rozprawy 915 ff.)
N7. Definitions are a matter of convention. They become significant for the application of the
rules that make use of the terms defined. Apart from the term insurance contract itself (see Note
1), comparing definitions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law with those of
national insurance contract laws therefore does not appear to provide relevant insights. This
applies to the other definitions in Article 1:201 and to those in Article 1:202.
Comments
Introduction
C1. An insurance contract is concluded between the insurer and the policyholder as the
parties to the contract. In addition, the insurance contract may affect a number of other
persons with rights and obligations based on the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law and/or the insurance contract. Although it is possible and often even common for one
person to have several of these roles at the same time, it must be kept in mind that every
right and duty is connected to a role, not to the person behind the role. Therefore, it would
be incorrect to state, for example, that the insured is responsible for the insurance premium
even if the insured in a certain case happens also to be the policyholder.
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Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
C2. In Article 1:202 certain roles related to the insurance contract are defined for the
purposes of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. It should be noted that
these definitions do not necessarily correspond to the ones used in insurance contract law
in different countries.
Insured (para. 1)
C3. As far as the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are concerned, “insured”
means the person whose interest is protected against loss under indemnity insurance (Ar-
ticle 1:202 para. 1). Unlike in some national insurance contract laws, the definition does
not include the person on whose life, health, integrity or status the insurance is taken (the
“person at risk”, see Article 1:202 para. 3). The policyholder is not necessarily identical to
the insured (see in particular Articles 11:101 to 11:103). The insured could be, for example,
an owner of a property where the policy is taken out by the tenant; a holder of a right of
lien where goods are insured by their owner; or a potential tortfeasor where a liability
insurance is taken out by a parent as a family insurance. The insured is the one entitled to
the insurance money.
Beneficiary (para. 2)
C4. In Article 1:202 para. 2 “beneficiary” is defined as the person in whose favour the
insurance money is payable under insurance of fixed sums. Thus, it is not a general term
for the person receiving the insurance money. The beneficiary may be compared to the
insured, but his entitlement to the insurance money is not dependent on suffering loss. A
policyholder is not necessarily a beneficiary. Neither is the “person at risk” (see Article 1:202
para. 3) necessarily the beneficiary.
C5. It is important for the purposes of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
to distinguish “person at risk” from “insured” (see Article 1:202 para. 1). Person at risk is the
person on whose life, health, integrity or status the insurance is taken (Article 1:202 para.
3). Status in this context means such a change in a person’s life as, for example, marriage,
adoption of a child, or starting an education. The policyholder is not necessarily the person
at risk. Neither is the person at risk necessarily the beneficiary (insurance of fixed sums) or
the insured (indemnity insurance).
Victim (para. 4)
C6. Although liability insurance is also in the interest of the person suffering loss or dam-
age, the insured in such insurance is the tortfeasor. It is his or her interest in not having to
bear the economic consequences of the liability which forms the object of the insurance
contract. The person suffering loss or damage benefits from the insurance and may in some
cases even be entitled to a direct right of action against the insurer. This person has been
defined in the PEICL as “victim”, the person for whose death, injury or loss the insured is
liable (Article 1:202 para. 4). While the word “victim” is used in everyday language also in
82
Article 1:202 Further Definitions
Premium (para. 6)
C8. The primary obligation of a policyholder is to pay the insurance premium. In accord-
ance with Article 1:202 para. 6, “premium” means the payment due to the insurer on the part
of the policyholder in return for cover. In addition to the actual premium, the policyholder
may, for example, in unit-linked insurances be obliged to pay also certain handling fees in
addition to the premium. When applying the articles concerning premium (Articles 5:101
to 5:105) these kinds of fees are not considered as premium.
C9. In an insurance contract there are several periods of time which must be distinguished:
One of them, “contract period”, is defined in Article 1:202 para. 7 as the period of contractual
commitment starting at the conclusion of the contract and ending when the agreed term of
duration elapses. As an insurance contract can be prolonged after the contract period has
expired, a single insurance contract may consist of several contract periods. As a general
rule, the contract cannot be altered during a contract period but only from the beginning
of a new contract period (see Article 2:603).
C10. “Insurance period” means the period for which the premium is due in accordance
with the parties’ agreement (Article 1:202 para. 8). Thus, a contract period may consist of
83
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
one or more insurance periods. Also, the insurance period does not necessarily fall within
the contract period. For example, in retroactive insurance, the policyholder has to pay
premium for an insurance period preceding the contract period. Moreover, the insurance
period is not identical to the liability period. For example, the policyholder is under an
obligation to pay a premium for the period of time in which the insurer is relieved of its
obligation to cover the risk in accordance with Article 5:102 para. 2 (non-payment of a
subsequent premium).
C11. The third period of time defined is the “liability period”. In accordance with Arti-
cle 1:202 para. 9 it means the period of cover. This period may begin at the same time as
the contract period or later. In case of retroactive cover, the liability period may even start
before the contract period. As far as liability insurance is concerned, the liability period
may differ substantially from the contract period depending on the fact that triggers the
insurance cover (manifestation, occurrence, claims made).
Note
See Article 1:201 Note 7.
13
Article 1:203 para. 2 is modelled on art. 5 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC).
84
Article 1:203 Language and Interpretation of Documents
Comments
Relationship to the Principles of European Contract Law
C1. As compared with Article 1:104 dealing with the interpretation of the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law, Article 1:203 lays down requirements relating to the
drafting and interpretation of insurance contracts. Generally, insurance contracts are in-
terpreted like other contracts in particular in accordance with text, context and purpose.
Therefore, in principle, the rules contained in Chapter Five of the Principles of European
Contract Law apply to insurance contracts. Article 1:203 contains some special rules for
written documents provided by the insurer, including notices and other communications
from the insurer, as well as policies even if they have been individually negotiated.
Transparency
C2. Article 1:203 is intended to promote the transparency of documents. The words of the
Article are based on the first and second sentences of art. 5 of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive (93/13/EEC). That the contents should be expressed fully and clearly is an aspect of
the requirement of good faith to enable policyholders to assess their rights and obligations.
C3. Plain and intelligible means plain and intelligible to the reasonable policyholder. All
documents provided by the insurer must put the policyholder in a position to assess, by
applying general rules of interpretation (see Comment 1), all the legal consequences of the
policy, in particular his rights and obligations. If not, the contra proferentem rule of con-
struction (see Article 5:103 PECL) applies, and the interpretation most favourable to the
policyholder will prevail. If, however, a term is meaningless to a reasonable policyholder, the
contra proferentem rule cannot be applied. In such case, the court may disregard the term
and enforce the remainder of the document.
Language of Documents
C4. Documents will only be transparent if they are issued in a language the policyholder
understands. Therefore, Article 1:203 para. 1 provides a language rule which gives the pol-
icyholder a right to receive all documents provided by the insurer in the language in which
the contract is negotiated. In many cases this will be the mother tongue of the policyholder
because insurers will market products and communicate with customers in their native
language. However, if the policyholder approaches a foreign insurer, for example through
an insurance broker, and uses a different language it can be inferred that the policyholder
submits to communication with the insurer in that language. Therefore, it is sufficient that
documents are drafted in the language in which the contract was negotiated.
C5. Article 1:203 para. 1 departs from language rules in existing European contract law.
According to art. 185 para. 6 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), information con-
cerning life insurances must be provided by the insurer in an official language of the Mem-
ber State of the place of commitment which is, in most cases, the Member State in which the
policyholder has his habitual residence. The policyholder may, however, choose an official
language of another Member State. Similarly a timeshare provider must issue all documents
85
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
in an official language of the Member State in which the purchaser is resident or – upon
the request of the purchaser – of which he is a national according to art. 4 para. 3 and art. 5
para. 1 of the Timeshare Directive (2008/122/EC). However, some Member States specified
in that Directive may require a certified translation of the contract in other languages; cf.
art. 5 para. 1(2) and (3).
C6. Such rules are not sufficient to achieve the purpose of the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law particularly because they would tend to inhibit certain insurance
transactions. An insurer, who does not do business in the country in which the policyholder
has his habitual residence but is approached by a prospective customer in the language in
which the insurer is doing business, may decide to refuse cover because all relevant docu-
ments would have to be translated. In such cases an excessively strict language rule may have
the effect of denying the policyholder access to foreign insurance markets.
Sanctions
C7. Article 1:203 does not provide for specific sanctions for violations of the language re-
quirements. A judge, therefore, will have to apply appropriate sanctions which are available
under general contract law. For that purpose the judge may refer to the Principles of Euro-
pean Contract Law in accordance with Article 1:105 para. 2 but not to any sources of na-
tional contract law (see Article 1:105 para. 1). In general, a judge may hold that a document
edited in a language other than the one required by Article 1:203 para. 1 has not reached
the policyholder. Similarly the judge may decide that an information provided in another
language than required has not been given at all. On the other hand the policyholder will
be estopped from invoking a breach of Article 1:203 in particular situations. This will be
the case for example when the documents have been provided in the mother language of
the policyholder which was not the language of negotiations.
C8. In addition, the policyholder may claim damages for losses that may occur if informa-
tion to be provided in a particular language remains unknown to him because it was given
in a language he does not understand. Moreover, measures of collective enforcement of the
language requirement may be taken. A non complying insurer may face a class action for
injunctions as referred to in Article 1:301 or sanctions imposed by the competent supervi-
sory authority in accordance with national supervisory law.
Notes
Transparency
N1. Several EC directives give evidence of a general quest for more transparency in consumer
transactions. A possible way to achieve this goal is by making his commitment more intelligible
for the policyholder. Therefore, special provisions have been established requiring insurance
documents to be drafted in a clear and comprehensible manner, see in particular art. 185 para. 6
of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) and art. 3 para. 3 of the Distance Marketing Directive
(2002/65/EC).
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Article 1:203 Language and Interpretation of Documents
N2. Various antecedents can be found in the national legal systems of the Member States: some
of them are directly focused on insurance contracts, see for example art. 14 and art. 15 para. 3
of the Belgian Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision; art. L. 112-3 French
ICA (furthermore: stipulations regarding nullity, forfeiture or exclusions are valid only if they
are drafted in an easily perceptible manner; see also arts. L. 113-12 and L. 113-15 French ICA);
s. 7 German ICA and s. 2 para. 1 of Ch. 2 Swedish ICA (concerning pre-contractual consumer
information); art. 2 para. 8 Greek ICA; art. 166 and arts. 182 to185 of the Italian Code of Private
Insurance (referring to pre-contractual information documents); art. 16 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA
(any limitations and exclusions regarding cover must be highlighted); art. 12 paras. 3 and 4 of the
Polish Act on Insurance Activity); art. 21 Portuguese ICA; and art. 3 Spanish ICA (concerning
general and special contract terms).
Language
N3. In the Single European Market with its many languages, the understanding of insurance
documents depends on the use of language that is comprehensible for the policyholder. Language
regulations therefore are not uncommon in Community instruments. In art. 185 para. 6 of the
Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), it is laid down that the written information concerning life
insurances provided for in this regulation shall be drafted in one of the official languages of the
Member State of the commitment, which is the Member State where the policyholder has his
habitual residence. However, subpara. 2 stipulates that the said documents may be drafted in a
different language if the policyholder so requests and if permitted by the law of the Member State
or if the policyholder is free to choose the applicable law.
N4. Accordingly, the regulations of most European insurance laws are aligned with this rule, see
for example s. 9a para. 6 Austrian ISA (the pre-contractual information must be in German, un-
less the policyholder expressly accepts another language or has chosen a different law); art. 112-3
French ICA (insisting on French wording); Italy (pre-contractual information must be in Italian
when the policyholder does not opt for another language); art. 16 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA
(the contract has to be drafted in one of the official languages of Luxembourg or in a language
understood by the policyholder); art. 8 para. 1 Spanish ICA (the policyholder can choose one of
the official languages of the place where the contract is made. In addition, the policyholder can
request a different language according to art. 185 para. 6 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/
EC)); United Kingdom (the information must be in an official language of the State of the com-
mitment or in another language agreed by the parties – ICOBS 6.3.1).
N5. Article 1:203 para. 2 draws on a provision of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/
EC). According to the second sentence of art. 5 of that Directive, the interpretation of a stand-
ard term that is most favourable to the consumer will prevail where doubts remain because of
an unclear drafting of a contract term. This provision has been implemented in the laws of all
Member States.
87
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Comments
C1. Article 1:204 places the burden of proof of the receipt of the documents required
by Article 2:201 (Provision of Pre-contractual Documents) and Article 2:501 (Contents)
by the policyholder on the insurer because it is its duty to provide the policyholder with
these documents. This is in line with general rules on the burden of proof but repeated in
Article 1:204 in order to avoid doubt and make the rule mandatory.
C2. In contrast, Article 1:204 does not interfere with general rules on the standard of
proof. In particular means of easing proof such as “res ipsa loquitur”, “prima facie evidence”
and so on may be applied in favour of the insurer.
Notes
General Law of Evidence
N1. As part of the general provisions, Article 1:204 articulates a rule which in most countries
is left to the general law of evidence. When the insurer is under an obligation to convey certain
information or documents to the policyholder, it would generally be incumbent upon the insurer
to prove that it has performed that duty. However, rules on the burden of proof may be suscep-
tible of being derogated from by agreement under national law. A binding rule, see Article 1:103
para. 2, avoids such derogations and ensures a uniform application of the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law in this respect throughout the European Union.
N2. Several countries have explicitly put the burden of proof for the issue of certain documents
and information upon the insurer, see Austria: s. 5b para. 3 ICA; and Germany: s. 8 para. 2 ICA;
see also art. 2 para. 6 Greek ICA. As far as applicable to the conclusion of the specific insur-
ance contract, the Member States’ rules may follow art. 15 of the Distance Marketing Directive
(2002/65/EC), according to which the Member States “may stipulate that the burden of proof in
respect of the supplier’s obligation to inform” can be placed upon the supplier. The Member States
have apparently made little use of this option (for an implementing provision, see art. VI, 62 of
the Belgian Code of Economic Law; see also the Spanish Royal Decree on Insurance Supervision:
under art. 107 the insurer has to make sure that the policyholder receives all necessary informa-
tion and acknowledges its receipt by means of a note at the end of the policy or in an additional
document). See also the notes on Articles 2:201 to 2:203 and Articles 2:501 to 2:502.
88
Article 1:205 Form of Notice
Comments
Consensual and Formal Contracts
C1. The validity of an insurance contract subject to the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law does not depend on any particular form; see Article 2:301. In particular the
issue of an insurance policy is not a condition precedent to its conclusion; rather, the obli-
gation to issue such a policy follows from the conclusion of the contract. This basic rule is in
line with the general development of contract law. While the observation of particular forms
has been a general feature of ancient contract law, modern law has enlarged the significance
of consent as the sole source of contractual obligations.
C2. The trend towards consensual contracts, also reflected by Article 2:101 para. 2 PECL, is
supplemented by provisions that point out the validity of notices irrespective of a particular
form such as Article 1:205. This provision is in line with Article 1:303 para. 1 PECL; while
that article deals with notices given by any party to a contract, Article 1:205 only applies to
notices given by the applicant, policyholder, insured or beneficiary, but not by the insurer.
C3. Under Article 1:103 para. 2 PEICL, the principle laid down in Article 1:303 para. 1
PECL and reaffirmed, with slight amendments, in Article 1:205 PEICL cannot be derogated
from as far as notices given by the persons listed in the latter provision are concerned. With
regard to notices of the insurer, no general principle is established in the Principles of Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract Law, although various provisions provide for the written form
in specific situations (see below in Comment 11). Where those provisions do not apply, the
matter is left to the dispositive principle of Article 1:303 para. 1 PECL which may serve to
fill the gap under Article 1:105 para. 2 PEICL.
Proof
C4. While a notice covered by Article 1:205 may be valid irrespective of any particular
form, it has to be proven if contested by the insurer. The means of proof and the degree of
probability required are left to the national law of the court seized. Article 1:205 interferes
with that national law only to the extent that national provisions require the written or any
other specific form as a mandatory precondition of proof.
Notice
C5. In accordance with Article 1:303 para. 6 PECL, the term “notice” is understood in a
broad way and comprises not only the conveyance of information, but also announcements
containing an element of intention: promises, statements, offers, an acceptance, demand,
request or other declaration. Thus, the applicant may comply with his duty of disclosure
under Article 2:101 by oral answers to the questions put to him by the insurer. Similarly,
89
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
the revocation of an application under Article 2:302, the cancellation of preliminary cover
under the second sentence of Article 2:403 para. 2, or the request for a reduction of premi-
um in the case of a reduction of risk, Article 4:301, may be communicated by any means,
notwithstanding any contract clauses that may require a notice in writing.
C6. Article 1:205 applies not only to notices specifically mentioned in other provisions of
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law, but to all “notices […] in relation to
the insurance contract”. It follows that notices which are prescribed, not in the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law, but in the insurance contract, are equally subject to Arti-
cle 1: 205 provided that they are given by the applicant, policyholder, insured or beneficiary.
Therefore, such notices may be given by any means irrespective of any writing requirement
laid down in the same insurance contract.
Persons Favoured
C7. Article 1:205 concerns only notices by the applicant, policyholder, insured or bene-
ficiary. The policyholder is defined in Article 1:201 as the person to whom the contractual
promise of the insurer is addressed; before he receives that promise, his status is that of an
applicant. For the definition of the insured and beneficiary, see Article 1:202 paras. 1 and 2.
For notices by the insurer or other persons, see above in Comments 2 and 3.
C8. Under a widespread practice of insurance companies, contract terms require policy-
holders and other persons who want to derive benefits from an insurance contract to make
certain declarations in writing, perhaps even supplemented by further formal requirements
such as the registration of a letter. It follows from Article 1:205, which may not be derogated
from under Article 1:103 para. 2, that such clauses are invalid and shall be disregarded.
C9. Some provisions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law seem to sug-
gest by the use of other terms that a written notice is required. Thus, Article 6:101 para. 2
declares the notice of the insured event to be effective “on dispatch”. It would be erroneous,
however, to infer that such notice must be in writing. That provision is rather meant to
make clear that, in the case of a written notice, dispatch and not receipt by the addressee is
the relevant point in time for assessing whether the notice has been given without undue
delay. While a certain period of time may elapse between dispatch and receipt in the case
of a written notice, this is not the case if the notice is given orally or by telephone. In those
cases, the second sentence of Article 6:101 para. 2 is irrelevant.
C10. The freedom of form is subject to “specific rules contained in the PEICL”. Such formal
requirements are laid down in various provisions, for example for declarations of termina-
tion or avoidance in Article 2:202 para. 2(b), Article 2:303 para. 1, Article 2:602 para. 1(b),
Article 2:604 para. 3, or Article 4:301 para. 2. A written declaration is also required for the
revocation of the designation of an insured by the policyholder under Article 11:101 para. 3.
90
Article 1:205 Form of Notice
C11. While the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not establish a general
principle for the form of notices by the insurer, see above in Comments 2 and 3, a large
number of specific provisions require the insurer to give written notice in order to make
the policyholder aware of a serious situation; see, for example, notices of avoidance and
termination under Article 2:104, Article 2:602 para. 1(a), Article 4:203 para. 1, or Arti-
cle 5:103 para. 1. Serious consequences for the policyholder may also result from the effects
of Article 5:101(a) (non-payment of the first or single premium) and Article 6:103 para. 2
(rejection of a claim by the insurer); in both cases the insurer’s notices have to be in writing.
Notes
Community Law
N1. The European directives do not specifically address the formal requirements for notice by
the applicant, policyholder, insured or beneficiary. The obligation in art. 185 para. 6 of the Solven-
cy II Directive (2009/138/EC) to communicate certain information to the policyholder in writing
in a clear and accurate manner before the contract is concluded only relates to information to
be provided by a life insurer, not by the applicant, insured, policyholder or beneficiary. Art. 8
para. 1 of the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law refers to
the provisions in the insurance policy for the form of notice of an insured event.
N2. At national level, the picture seems to be slightly more complex. Again, it appears to be
necessary to distinguish in general between formal requirements affecting the insurer and formal
requirements affecting the applicant, insured, policyholder or beneficiary. Article 1:205 only
deals with formal requirements affecting the applicant, policyholder, insured or beneficiary. For
formal requirements affecting the insurer, see, for example, Articles 2:102, 2:104, 2:201, 2:402,
2:502, 2:602, 2:603, 2:604, 2:701, 5:101, 5:102, 5:103, and 6:103 para. 2 PEICL and the correspond-
ing notes. In addition, Article 1:205 is subject to the specific rules in the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law establishing particular requirements as to form. This relates in particular
to the formal requirements for the conclusion of an insurance contract, the proof of its existence
(Article 2:301) and its revocation during a cooling-off period (Article 2:303 para. 1). The formal
requirements at the stage of concluding the contract are addressed in Articles 2:301 and 2:303
para. 1 PEICL and the corresponding notes. Other specific formal requirements affecting the
applicant, policyholder, insured or beneficiary are addressed in Articles 2:602 para. 1(b), 2:604
para. 3 and 2:702 para. 2 PEICL and the corresponding notes.
N3. The relevance of Article 1:205 is therefore limited to all other notices made by the applicant,
policyholder, insured or beneficiary. These notices can be of a different nature, they may relate
to an aggravation of risk during the contract (Article 4:202), the occurrence of an insured event
(Article 6:101) or any other situation where a duty to give notice is established by law (for exam-
ple in the case of double insurance) or such notice is made voluntarily. It is thus difficult to give
a general and all-embracing comparative law answer to the question of whether all notices of
91
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
the applicant, policyholder, insured or beneficiary which fall under Article 1:205 are subject to
formal requirements in national insurance laws. A precise answer would rather depend on the
relevant kind of notice and a comparison of the provisions which govern in national law (namely
the provisions on aggravation of risk, occurrence of an insured event, and so on; for a detailed
analysis of the form of notice in specific situations in German and English law, see Rühl 51, 71,
96, 152, 157, 162, 166, 221, 288, 297, 306, 311s and 346).
N4. If an attempt at providing a general answer is nevertheless made, it would probably be that
European insurance laws are in general supportive of giving notice in an informal manner (for
England, see Clarke 23-3B, for Germany, see Hofmann 118, Schimikowski, para. 193; Bruck/
Möller-Rolfs, § 19 VVG para. 80; for both see Rühl above). However, at the same time many Eu-
ropean insurance laws seem to allow the parties to stipulate in the insurance contract that notice
made in relation to the insurance contract after conclusion of the contract must be in writing or
by eletronic communication (for Austria, see the second sentence of s. 34a ICA; for the United
Kingdom, see Clarke 26-2B, MacGillivray 19-041; for Germany, see s. 32 ICA regarding notice
given to the insurer (not to his agent), BGH 10.2.1999, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1999,
1633, 1634-1636, Bruck/Möller-Brömmelmeyer, § 32 VVG paras 23 ff., Schwintowski/Bröm-
melmeyer-Schwintowski, § 32 VVG para. 4 ff., Wandt, paras. 398 und 398a; for England and
Germany, see Rühl above).
N5. This can be illustrated by the example of the form of notice in case of occurrence of an
insured event. All European laws start from the basis of a liberal approach, requiring no specific
form for such notice (for Austria, see Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1077; for Belgium, see Fontaine,
para. 318; for Denmark, see Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974; for the United Kingdom, see Clarke 26-
2B; for France, see Cass. civ. 20.10.1992, RGAT 1993, 99, Bonnard, Droit et pratique, para. 543; for
Germany, see Prölss/Martin-Armbrüster, § 30 VVG para. 9; for Greece, see Chatzinikolaou-Ag-
gelidou 182, Kiantos 129, Rokas, para. 429 ff. and Skouloudis 267; for Italy, see Cendon-Franzoni,
art. 1913, 1681, Rescigno-Gallone, Codice Civile, art. 1913, 2131; for Luxembourg, see Basedow/
Fock-Völker 798; for the Netherlands Asser/Clausing/Wansink 230 ff.; for Poland, see art. 818
para. 1 CC; for Portugal, see Vasques 300; for Spain, see Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria (art. 16) 201,
Sánchez Calero, (art. 16) 264: a requirement of written form is stipulated for a notice according
to art. 38 ICA; and for Switzerland, see the second sentence of art. 38 para. 1 ICA).
N6. However, while most jurisdictions permit the insurer to require written notice or the use
of specific forms by including a corresponding clause in the insurance contract (for example
Belgium: Fontaine, para. 318; the United Kingdom: Clarke 26-2B; Germany: Prölss/Martin-Arm-
brüster, § 30 VVG para. 9, Schimikowski, para. 220, Wandt, para. 939; Greece: Basedow/Fock-Pa-
pathoma-Baetge 624; Italy: Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 714; Luxembourg: Basedow/
Fock-Völker 798; Denmark: Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974; Switzerland: the second sentence of
art. 38 para. 1 ICA, Maurer 340), others object to such contractual stipulations (France: Lamy
Assurances, para. 613).
92
Article 1:206 Imputed Knowledge
Comments
The Issues
C1. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law contain a number of information
duties, in particular Article 2:101 requiring an applicant for insurance to inform the insurer
of material circumstances of which the applicant “is or ought to be aware”. The circumstanc-
es that are material are those identified, in the case of Article 2:101, by the requirement that
they be “the subject of clear and precise questions put to him by the insurer”. However,
there remain issues about what exactly an applicant “is or ought to be aware” of within the
range of material circumstances, in other words, about what kinds of knowledge might be
imputed to applicants whether they actually have that knowledge or not. These issues are
discussed in the Comments on Articles 2:101 ff. Such issues also arise when persons other
than the policyholder are involved in the formation and/or performance of the contract.
These are the concern of Article 1:206.
C2. The very notion of imputing knowledge presumes that applicants in good faith may
be treated in law as being in breach of an information duty, with significantly adverse con-
sequences in some cases, when they do not actually possess that knowledge but their agents
do. Such issues might be resolved by reference to the general law of agency. However, people
with knowledge to be imputed may not be agents within the general law of agency. In view
of the particularity and importance of insurance information duties, it is therefore com-
monplace to regulate the issue of imputation in the context of insurance contracts. This is
the function of Article 1:206, which does not deal with the imputation of acts committed by
such persons to the policyholder or to the insurer, as the case may be. The extent to which
such acts can be imputed is a matter of general law of agency.
C3. Persons whose knowledge may be imputed to the policyholder or the insured, as the
case may be, are characterised by two elements: as indicated by the word “entrusted” in
Article 1:206 there must be a special relationship between these persons and the policyhold-
er which has come into existence for other reasons. The object of their being “entrusted”
must be to confer responsibility essential to the conclusion or performance of the insurance
contract.
C4. Such relationships may result from employment, marriage or other domestic relations,
business organisations and so on. In all of these contexts it is very difficult to draw the line
93
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
between persons whose knowledge can be imputed to the policyholder and other persons
who may have actual knowledge but cannot be expected to communicate that information
to the policyholder. The concept of “entrustment” with responsibilities is sufficiently flexible
to allow for the identification of the relevant persons.
C5. A simple example is that of two or more individuals who seek joint insurance cover
on the house that they share. Under Article 1:206 non-disclosure of material facts known
only to one of the joint policyholders affects the other. Thus, one who actually arranges the
insurance is deemed to know material facts known only to the other and vice versa. In the
event of non-disclosure the insurer is usually entitled to avoid the contract of insurance as
regards both of them. Another example is that of the professional caretaker entrusted with
the care of the property in the absence of the owner and policyholder. The latter are deemed
to know what is known to the caretaker. A person employed to clean the property would
not be such an example.
Notes
General Law of Agency
N1. The rule on the imputation of knowledge, set forth in the introductory part of the Princi-
ples of European Insurance Contract Law, addresses an issue that remains in the domain of the
general law (of agency) in most countries. Accordingly, it was also taken up by the drafters of the
Principles of European Contract Law, see their Article 1:305 which however contains a dispos-
itive rule as opposed to the mandatory character of Article 1:206 PEICL. It follows that the fair
and full understanding and analysis of Article 1:206 implies the reference to the accompanying
comments and notes of Article 1:305(a) PECL. Very similar to the provision in the Principles
of European Contract Law is the draft Art. II–1:105 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference.
While both general provisions cited above do not only deal with the imputation of knowledge,
but also that of intention, gross negligence and other states of the mind, the wording of Article
1:206 is limited to the imputation of knowledge. This imputation enables the judge, however, to
draw consequences as to the negligence of the policyholder, insured or beneficiary.
N2. Article 1:206 PEICL addresses situations where the policyholder, the insured or the bene-
ficiary entrusts a person with certain responsibilities regarding the conclusion or performance
of the contract. This person may be referred to as an agent, although he may not be an agent in
a technical sense. Just like Article 1:206, some national insurance laws point out that the knowl-
edge of both the policyholder and his agent is relevant, see Note 3 below. Article 1:206 further
extends to cases where the insured also acts as an agent of the policyholder. Take the example of
a liability insurance taken out by the policyholder in favour of his family; while family members
are co-insured, their knowledge about an insured event will be imputed to the policyholder under
Article 1:206. Some national laws specifically deal with similar situations, see Note 4 below.
94
Article 1:206 Imputed Knowledge
N3. National provisions specifically drafted for insurance contracts mainly relate to the pre-con-
tractual duty of disclosure of the party which takes out insurance. The purpose of Article 1:206
to hold the policyholder responsible for his agent’s knowledge can be achieved in two ways: the
law may either impose upon the agent a duty to disclose his knowledge and hold the principal
responsible for any breach of that duty, or the agent’s knowledge may be treated as the knowledge
of the policyholder. A detailed rule of the first type can be found in ss. 18 and 19 of the UK Marine
Insurance Act 1906. S. 19 extends the assured’s duty of disclosure to all agents effecting insurance.
Rules of the latter type are contained in the insurance contract acts of German influence. Under
s. 19 Austrian ICA, s. 20 German ICA, and art. 5 Swiss ICA, the knowledge of the agent and
the knowledge of the policyholder are treated alike. For a similar approach, see also the second
sentence of art. 815 para. 1 Polish CC. As a consequence, the knowledge of both the policyholder
and his agent has to be taken into account under s. 20 German ICA when compliance with the
duty of disclosure has to be assessed.
N4. Rather than addressing the knowledge of agent and principal, several jurisdictions have
particular rules for those contracts where the policyholder and the insured are not identical.
Under Finnish law (s. 22 ICA) and under Swedish law (s. 1 of Ch. 12 ICA in cases of “individual
personal insurance”), the policyholder as well as the insured is required to give “true and com-
plete answers” to the insurer’s questions. Similarly, the law of Luxembourg “en cas d’assurance de
personnes” requires the insured, in addition to the policyholder, to disclose all the information
which he should reasonably expect to be important to the insurer (art. 11 para. 1(2) ICA). Cf. for
the similar solution under Greek law: Rokas, para. 422a ff., Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge
616, for Italy art. 1894 CC provides that, only if the insured has knowledge of the lack of disclo-
sure or wrong declaration made by the contracting party, this knowledge can be raised by the
insurer as a defence (see Cerini 95) and for Spain, see art. 11 ICA. Similarly and following the
concept of a contract for the account of a third-party (“für fremde Rechnung”), the knowledge of
the policyholder and the knowledge of the insured are both declared relevant under German law
(s. 47 ICA), Austrian law (s. 78 ICA) and Polish law (art. 815 para. 2(1) CC). If made known to
the insurer, however, the insured’s knowledge remains irrelevant when the insured is not aware
of the conclusion of the contract (s. 47 para. 2 German, s. 79 para. 2 Austrian ICA and art. 815
para. 2(1) Polish CC).
N5. This solution appears to differ from the French rule in art. L. 113-2 ICA, which the courts –
following older legislation – construe in such a way that the relevant knowledge is the knowledge
of the policyholder only (“connues de lui”), see Cass. civ. 1er, 1.2.2000, no. 97-11, 539; Lamy As-
surances, para. 266). The former and traditional rule was also observed in the Netherlands, where
it was generally accepted under the former law that only the applicant’s knowledge was relevant
(Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman-Kamphuisen 28). Under the new law, however, all information
must be disclosed by the applicant including the information of all third parties having an in-
terest in the insurance. Consequently, knowledge of any such third-party will be imputed to the
policyholder (art. 7:928 para. 2 CC). This development demonstrates the evolution of the law,
which is also contained in the imputation rule of Article 1:206 PEICL and allows the insured to
be considered as a person entrusted with certain aspects of the performance of the contract.
95
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Comments
Insurance and Differentiation
C2. However, the basic orientation of the European Union under art. 19 TFEU is to “take
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”. While art. 19 does not state a legal rule which
would be directly applicable as between private parties, it confers upon the Union the power
to adopt legislation in pursuance of the goal of non-discrimination. But the impact of art. 21
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which was transformed into
binding primary law by the Treaty of Lisbon, may reach even further. According to para. 1
of that provision “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion,
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall
be prohibited.” Art. 23 stresses that “equality between women and men must be ensured in
all areas, including employment, work and pay.” Art. 21 para. 2 repeats the prohibition of
any discrimination on grounds of nationality that had already formed part of the Treaty of
Rome and its successors. The enumeration of the prohibitions is not exhaustive as can be
inferred from art. 21 para. 1 (“any discrimination based on any ground such as …”). Where
14
This Article is modelled on the Gender Directive (2004/113/EC) and on Case C-236/09 Association
Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres [2011] ECR I-773.
96
Article 1:207 Non-Discrimination
C3. The prohibitions established protection against the discriminatory exercise of power
by the European Union and by the Member States when they are implementing the law of
the Union, see art. 51 of the Charter. For the time being it is still unclear whether and to
what extent they are directly applicable in relations between private parties, in particular
between insurers and policyholders. With regard to labour relations the Court of Justice
has pointed out that “the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age must […] be
regarded as a general principle of Community law” which supersedes both national and
secondary Community legislation; see the judgment of 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04
Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981 para. 75. Given the particular circumstances of that
decision it is unlikely that the very broad statement by the European Court of Justice applies
equally to other areas of law such as insurance. First, non-discrimination has always been an
objective of particular significance in labour law; see art. 141 EC. Secondly, the Court had
to deal with a situation where a directive implementing the general principle had already
been adopted, but not yet transformed into national law. Thirdly, and unlike insurance,
labour relations are not by necessity dependant upon a selection of personal criteria used
to differentiate between people.
C4. In respect of insurance the Court of Justice has more recently pointed out that because
of “the principle of equal treatment for men and women, enshrined in arts. 21 and 23 of the
Charter, the respective situations of men and women with regard to insurance premiums
and benefits contracted by them are comparable” and that a derogation from the principle
of equal treatment between men and women cannot be permitted to persist indefinitely, see
1 March 2011, Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats v Conseil
des ministres [2011] ECR I-773, paras. 30 and 31-32. However, the procedural setting of this
case was not a dispute between private parties, but the challenge to the validity of an EU
directive. The Court quashed a decision of the Council, not that of an insurer. The judg-
ment therefore still leaves some doubt as to the impact of art. 21 of the Charter on private
relations. Moreover, the Court’s repeated invocation of art. 23 (which only deals with the
equality of men and women, not with other differentiations) in combination with art. 21
suggests that the discrimination on other grounds such as age which is only mentioned in
art. 21 may be treated with more tolerance than the discrimination on grounds of sex. The
European Commission Guidelines ([2012] OJ C11/1) published after Test-Achats explicitly
point out that the judgment “does not affect the use of other risk-rating factors, such as age
or disability, which is currently not regulated at EU level” (para. 18).
C5. Because of these remaining uncertainties Article 1:207 does not establish a broad
principle of non-discrimination banning the differentiation on the basis of any of the fac-
tors listed in art. 21 of the Charter; such a broad principle might be the end of risk-based
premium calculation which has been the traditional basis of private insurance. The more
risk factors are prohibited, the more insurance will become a social compensation scheme.
For the time being, the PEICL preserve the traditional model of private insurance as far
as possible. Thus, Article 1:207 is limited to the implementation of what at present can be
said to be the law of the Union. At present, the acquis communautaire contains essentially
97
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
C6. Para. 1 adapts the provision contained in art. 5 of the Gender Directive (2004/113/EC)
to the particular circumstances of an optional instrument on European insurance contract
law. Art. 5 takes account of the need for a specification of the principle of equal treatment
laid down in art. 4 of that Directive for insurance contracts. Art. 5 reads:
1. Member States shall ensure that in all new contracts concluded after 21 December
2007 at the latest, the use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums and benefits
for the purposes of insurance and related financial services shall not result in differences
in individuals’ premiums and benefits.
98
Article 1:208 Genetic Tests
or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin. As laid down in art. 3 para. 1 this
prohibition applies to the private sector and in particular to the supply of services which are
available to the public. Thus, insurance is most likely included in the prohibition. It relates to
the discrimination against all individuals involved whether they are policyholders, insured
persons, persons at risk or beneficiaries.
Sanctions
C8. Violation of the principle of non-discrimination should not lead by itself to the avoid-
ance of the whole contract which would deprive the policyholder or insured of the cover
needed. The insurance contract should remain binding on both parties, but the discrimina-
tory terms and premium obligations should not be binding on the policyholder or insured,
as the case may be. This solution is in line with art. 6 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive
(93/13/EEC). Thus, while the insurer will remain fully bound by the contract the policy-
holder and insured may invoke the prohibition of discrimination that has been violated, and
claim the substitution of the premiums or terms concerned by premiums or terms which
would have been agreed upon had the prohibition of discrimination been complied with.
In addition, the policyholder is entitled to terminate the contract for the future.
Burden of Proof
Note
Article 1:207 implements non-discrimination directives of the European Union, see the Com-
ments. There do not appear to be any antecedents relating to the field of insurance in national law.
99
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Comments
Background
C1. Article 2:101 obliges the applicant to “inform the insurer of circumstances of which
he is or ought to be aware, and which are subject of clear and precise questions put to him
by the insurer”. This may comprehend questions about results of a genetic test or even a
request by the insurer to undergo such test. While an insurer may well have an interest in
obtaining genetic information as regards personal insurances, this obviously conflicts with
the applicant’s right to privacy as genetic information is one of the most personal items of
data. Disclosure duties in this area may be incompatible with the right to data protection
provided by Union Law15 and by the laws of Member States.
C2. The conflict of interest is reflected in a strong political sentiment against the use of
genetic tests as a means of risk assessment in the field of insurance. This has led to restric-
tions or prohibitions on the use of genetic data in several Member States.16 The PEICL take
up these concerns and try to balance the interests involved.
Scope of Application
C3. Even though it may be of particular practical importance only in the field of life and
health insurances, Article 1:208 applies to all types of insurance contracts. This is because
there may be other insurances such as accident insurance or insurance covering the risk of
inability to work where it may be of relevance.
C4. According to Article 1:208, the insurer is barred from any use of individual genetic
data. Thus, it is not allowed to accept an application on condition that the applicant, the
policyholder or the person at risk, as the case may be, undergoes a genetic test; nor can
the latter be obliged to disclose the results of an earlier genetic test. In this way, pressure to
undergo a genetic test and to disclose the results in order to improve the chance of being
accepted or to benefit from lower premiums is excluded. The insurer is not even allowed to
use data which is voluntarily disclosed.
Exceptions (para. 2)
C5. Para. 2 provides an exception to the strict rule of para 1. It is applicable to all types of
personal insurance (for the meaning of “personal insurance”, see Article 2:601 Comment 7).
15
See, for example, art. 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Data
Protection Directive (95/46/EC).
16
See, for example, art. 58 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014; s. 18 of the German Genetic Diagnostics Act; s. 67
of the Austrian Law on Genetic Engineering; arts. 26 ff. of the Swiss Law on Genetic Screening of
Humans); s. 2 of Ch. 2 of the Swedish Law on Genetic Integrity; the Concordat and Moratorium on
Genetics and Insurance (agreement between the UK government and the Association of British In-
surers).
100
Article 1:301 Injunctions
This exception presumes that the insurer’s demand for information including genetic data is
more justified, if the sum insured or the money payable under the policy reaches a certain
level. Similar ideas can be found in several national laws.17 As a consequence of the excep-
tion under para. 2, the insurer may ask the applicant, policyholder or the person at risk, as
the case may be, to undergo a genetic test and the latter will have to disclose the results of
an earlier test, in accordance with Article 2:101 ff.
C6. However, in accordance with Swedish law,18 the exception under para. 2 only applies
if the person at risk is 18 years of age or more. Minors merit more protection. Thus, an insur-
er must not request a parent or guardian to consent to a genetic test of a minor, or to disclose
the results of an earlier test. In these cases all the restrictions under para. 1 will apply.
Comments
Enforcement of Mandatory Rules by Injunction
C1. Article 1:301 restates the rules contained in arts. 4 and 7 of the Injunctions Directive
(2009/22/EC).
17
See s. 18 para. 1 of the German Genetic Diagnostics Act; art. 27 para. 1(d) and (e) of the Swiss Law on
Genetic Screening of Humans).
18
See s. 2 of Ch. 2 of the Swedish Law on Genetic Integrity.
19
This Article is modelled on the Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC).
101
Chapter One: Introductory Provisions
Article 1:301 adapts these provisions to the insurance context. It is intended to ensure that
adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in insurance
contracts.
C2. Standing is granted to entities qualified according to art. 4 para. 3 of the Injunctions
Directive (2009/22/EC) to take measures to stop or prohibit the actual or imminent viola-
tion of any mandatory rules in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. How-
ever, the regulations contained in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are
to protect consumer and non-consumer policyholders, while the list in art. 4 para. 3 of the
Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC) refers to organisations which essentially protect con-
sumers’ interests. In practice the application of Article 1:301 will be restricted to consumer
cases. This is not an optimal situation; however, standing under art. 4 of the Injunctions
Directive (2009/22/EC) is the only route currently available to organisations for bringing
collective actions of this kind.
Note
Background in Community Law
N1. As laid out in the comments, Article 1:301 is to be construed against the background of the
Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC) and art. 7 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/
EEC). Included in the former is an annex listing all the other directives whose infringements
shall give rise to the special remedy provided by the Directive.
102
Article 1:302 Out-of-court Complaint and Redress Mechanisms
Comments
Out-of-court Complaint and Redress Mechanisms under National Law
C1. Much national legislation or self-regulation by the insurance industry has introduced
mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution for the settlement of insurance disputes. The
most prominent example is the Insurance Ombudsman, an institution which exists in Mem-
ber States such as Belgium (Ombudsman van de Verzekeringen / Belgian Insurance Om-
budsman), Finland (Vakuutus- ja rahoitusneuvonta, Vakuutuslautakunta / Finnish Financial
Ombudsman Service, Finnish Insurance Complaints Board), Germany (Ombudsmann für
Versicherungen / German Insurance Ombudsman), the Netherlands (Ombudsman Verze-
keringen / Dutch Insurance Ombudsman), Poland (Rzecznik Ubezpieczonych / Insurance
Ombudsman), Switzerland (Ombudsman der Privatversicherung und der Suva / Ombuds-
man for Private Insurance and SUVA) and the United Kingdom (Financial Ombudsman
Service, which includes an insurance section). Some other Member States have introduced
similar out-of-court complaint and redress mechanisms. Mention may be made for example
of Greece (Synigoros tou Katanaloti / Hellenic Consumers’ Ombudsman) and Sweden (All-
männa reklamationsnämnden, Ansvarsförsäkringens Personskadenämnd, Trafiksadenämn-
den / National Board for Consumer Complaints, Board on liability insurance covering per-
sonal injuries, Traffic Accident Board).
C2. The main characteristics of such mechanisms are informal access to justice, a free or
low cost service and wide discretion to find a fair and just solution which is binding on the
insurer but does not preclude access to the courts for the complainant. Clearly such institu-
tions are of great support to the policyholder, insured or beneficiary when enforcing their
claims under an insurance policy.
C3. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not deal with out-of-court
complaint and redress. However, it is not intended that they should interfere with the var-
ious mechanisms established in the Member States. This is why Article 1:302 makes clear
explicitly that opting for the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law as the law
governing the insurance contract will not rule out in any way the access of the policyholder,
insured or beneficiary to the appropriate national mechanism.
C4. Some rules of procedure provide that the national ombudsman services do not decide
cases governed by foreign law (see for example in Germany art. 8 para. 3 of the Code of
Procedure for the Insurance Ombudsman allowing the Insurance Ombudsman to refuse
taking a case which has to be decided on foreign law; or art. 4(a) of the Financial Services
Ombudsman Regulations in the Netherlands limiting the authority of the ombudsman to
cases which are submitted to Dutch law). Article 1:302 is intended to make it clear that a case
governed by the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law is not meant to be regarded
as being governed by foreign law for the purpose of such provisions. National ombudsman
services should not refuse to accept such cases; since the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law are drafted as a European optional instrument which is to be put in force in
103
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
the whole Community, namely every Member State, their application cannot be considered
a case of application of foreign law.
Note
The national mechanisms display a wide variety of forms even within a single Member State.
Some of these mechnanisms have already been mentioned in the comments.
Comments
Information Imbalance
C1. Insurers require information about the circumstances surrounding the risk in order to
decide whether or not to accept an application for insurance. Since these circumstances lie
mostly in the knowledge of the applicant rather than the insurer, full and honest disclosure
of these facts is of fundamental importance to the insurer’s decision. A distinction between
incomplete (undisclosed) information and inaccurate (misrepresented) information may be
difficult to draw. For example, when an applicant for motor insurance with five convictions
for motoring offences in the last five years states that he has had four, is that a misrepresenta-
tion of the number of offences or non-disclosure of the fifth? Hence there is a tendency in
current law to deal with misrepresentation and non-disclosure in the same way, and this
approach has been adopted in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law.
C2. Since insurers require information about the circumstances surrounding the risk in
order to decide whether or not to accept an application for insurance, the relevant cir-
cumstances are those prevailing at the time that the insurer reaches the decision which, if
favourable to the application, is taken to be the time that the contract of insurance is con-
cluded. When the circumstances change in a material way between the time the application
is submitted and the time when the contract is concluded, the applicant is obliged to give the
insurer notice of any such change, of which the applicant is or should be aware.
104
Article 2:101 Duty of Disclosure
Questionnaires
C3. An applicant may be obliged either to disclose the information on his or her own ini-
tiative or to disclose it in response to questions put by the insurer, thus leaving the initiative
with the insurer. The question method is the one required by Article 2:101 para. 1, mainly for
the reason that it is usually more difficult for applicants than for insurers to appreciate what
information is material to the risk. Such a rule is more likely to cut unnecessary transaction
costs and eliminate subsequent disputes. That is why, although the “own initiative” rule is
that found as the basic rule of law in most European countries, insurance practice today has
mostly adopted the question method. This is true in particular of contracts on “mass risks”.
Relative Knowledge
C4. Article 2:101 requires applicants to inform the insurer of circumstances of which they
were or should have been aware. In one country the corresponding rule applies only to
persons seeking insurance in the course of business. In most countries in Europe, however,
the law makes no such distinction, although, as regards the consequences of breach of duty,
in practice some account is taken of the knowledge and experience that can be expected of
an applicant of the kind in question. Today the distinction between applicants in business
and applicants that are not is difficult to draw and, in the opinion of some commentators,
outdated. There is a marginal area of business activity that affects business people in their
private life too; an example is the insurance of computers and cell phones, which may be
used both at home and at work. Hence Article 2:101 makes no such distinction. Nonetheless,
courts or tribunals applying Article 2:101 should recognise the reality that some kinds of
applicant can be expected to know more than others. More knowledge might be expected,
for example, of a physician applying for health insurance and of a fireman applying for house
insurance than would be expected of other kinds of applicant in such cases.
C5. Firms that are incorporated usually have one or more individuals, for example a CEO
or a managing director, who are regarded by the law of the country of incorporation as
the “alter ego” of the company and whose knowledge is regarded as that of the company.
Frequently, however, certain functions are delegated to individuals lower in the corporate
hierarchy. When that function can be exercised without further reference back to persons
higher in the hierarchy or chain of command, that person’s knowledge may be regarded
as that of the company. These are the persons whose knowledge counts for the purpose of
Article 2:101. For example, in the case of a medium-sized property company, the relevant
person might be the managing agent of the particular block of shops or offices to be insured.
In a large company of any kind that person is usually the company’s risk manager, if any.
Mutatis mutandis the same is true of unincorporated associations.
C6. Whether or not applicants for insurance have actual knowledge of material facts, in
many countries they are deemed to know what is known or should be known to certain
of their agents – in the case of companies or associations agents outside the organisation.
105
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Among such agents distinguish those with a mandate limited to contract specified insurance
cover from those wider functions. These are persons whose role or mandate goes beyond
contracting insurance but is such that they are likely to receive information relevant to in-
surance cover that might be sought by their principal. In appropriate circumstances they are
expected to communicate that information to their principal; this too is information, in the
language of Article 2:101 para. l, of circumstances which an applicant ought to know. Most
applicants with whom the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are concerned
are consumers and small businesses, and it is the first category of agent that will be impor-
tant. They include the agents sometimes referred to as “insurance brokers” and “insurance
intermediaries”. In this connection see also Article 1:206.
Enquiry or Investigation
C7. Article 2:101 is an objective rule in the sense that it presumes that applicants for in-
surance have certain kinds of knowledge. Underlying this is an expectation that statements
made to insurers be made honestly. Applicants should not be allowed to “turn a blind eye” to
the possibility of information which is adverse to their application but which can be readily
unearthed. Thus, applicants are expected to check statements they make in applications
against any relevant records, including computer records, in their possession, whether at
home or in the office. Applicants are expected to make reasonable enquiries. To expect a
professional opinion, however, goes too far. When an insurer wants a professional assess-
ment of a risk, such as a valuation of property to be insured, usually the insurer must ask its
applicants expressly to get a valuation, or arrange for one to be made itself.
C8. When applicants seek cover for one or more other persons, the circumstances which
applicants know or ought to know, include those which were or should have been known
to the other persons concerned. Here too therefore applicants have a duty to check relevant
matters not within their own actual knowledge or of which they are uncertain but which
may be within the actual or deemed knowledge of the other persons. For example, in the
case of motor cover, applicants must disclose not only their own convictions for motoring
offence, if any, but also those of other persons to be insured. This is the effect of Article 2:101
para. 2.
Notes
Survey
N1. All European insurance laws recognise a duty of the insured to disclose information before
the insurance contract is concluded (see also art. 3 of the Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive on Insurance Contract Law). However, at first sight they seem to be fundamentally
divided on the question whether the insured is obliged to disclose any material information for
the insurance contract without a specific request by the insurer or whether the scope of the duty
to disclose depends on the questions of the insurer.
106
Article 2:101 Duty of Disclosure
N2. The duty to disclose any material information on the insured’s own initiative is the posi-
tion in the insurance laws of Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and, in part, the
United Kingdom (for Austria, see Schauer 108; for Belgium, see Cousy/Schoorens 76; for Italy,
see arts. 1892 to 1894 CC and Cerini 77; for Luxembourg, see art. 11 ICA and Commentaire des
Articles, in Chambre des deputes, session ordinaire 1996-1997, no. 4252, note on art. 11, 34; for
Portugal art. 24 ICA, Vasques 220; for the United Kingdom, see s. 18 of the Marine Insurance
Act 1906, Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501 and Mac-
Donald Eggers 41-029, Rühl 47, for qualification, see Clarke 23-12A, but note that the Consumer
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 abolished a pure duty of disclosure on
consumers and that the Insurance Act 2015 proposes to rewrite the duty in commercial insur-
ances and replace s. 18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906). The Dutch CC makes an exception
on the duty of spontaneous disclosure where the insurance was concluded on the basis of a
questionnaire drafted by the insurer (art. 7:928 para. 6), and in respect of facts concerning an
person’s criminal past (art. 7:928 para. 5), in both cases apart from the intent of misleading the
insurer (see Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman-Wansink 9). German law also provides a restricted
duty of spontaneous disclosure – developed from the principle of utmost good faith – in cases of
obviously extraordinary and material information which particularly affect the insurer’s interests
(see BGH 19.5.2011, Versicherungsrecht 2011, 1549).
N3. The scope of the duty to disclose is however limited: the insured need not disclose facts
which are either known to the insurer or presumed to be known to him as matters of common
knowledge or facts which an insurer should know in the ordinary course of business (for Bel-
gium, see the second sentence of art. 58 IA 2014; for England and Wales, Marine Insurance Act
1906, s. 18(3)(b), MacDonald Eggers 41-030; for Luxembourg, see the second sentence of art. 11
para. 1 ICA) or facts which diminish the risk of the insurer (for England and Wales, Marine
Insurance Act 1906, s. 18(3)(a), see Clarke 23-10C; for the Netherlands, art. 7:928 para. 5 CC).
In the Swedish Act (s. 8 para. 1 of Ch. 8) the duty of spontaneous disclosure, existing only in
business insurance, is limited to information of evident importance for assessment of the risk.
N4. A further important limitation on the duty to disclose comes into play if an insurer does not
enquire into a particular matter which most insurers (and thus the prudent insurer) would regard
as material and therefore ask about. Such behaviour may be regarded exceptionally by English
law as a waiver of the applicant’s duty of disclosure in particular if it forms part of the market
policy of the insurer or if the insurer has conducted his own investigations (for example Clarke
23-12A). A similar position is found in Dutch law (Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman-Wansink
9-10).
N5. On the other hand, in the insurance laws of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Poland,
Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom as regards consumer insurance, the scope of the
duty of disclosure depends on the range of the insurer’s questionnaire. In France, the insured is
not obliged to any disclosure beyond his answers to the questions of the insurer, the rule of art.
L. 113-2 para. 2 ICA is regarded as conclusive (Lamy Assurances, para. 278). A similar conclusive
rule is found in s. 22 Finnish ICA, s. 19 para. 1 German ICA (see Wandt, paras. 789 ff.), art. 3 para.
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
1(b) Greek ICA, art. 815 para. 1 Polish CC, art. 10 Spanish ICA (Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 194,
for further references, see Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1315), art. 4 para. 1 Swiss ICA (see OG des
Kantons Zürich, 11.4.1969, SVA XIII No. 16 and Maurer 251) and the UK Consumer Insurance
(Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, ss. 2 and 3.
Approximation
N6. Whereas the starting points of both positions at first sight seem to be quite distinct, a certain
approximation is brought about by the doctrine of waiver of disclosure in those cases where
the insurer does not ask questions on points which a prudent insurer would regard as material.
Therefore, the rule of Article 2:101 favours the second approach, also taking into consideration
that the broad concept of spontaneous disclosure has been subject to considerable criticism in
recent years (for the United Kingdom, see Clarke 23-12A and the reflection of this approach in
the recasting of the duty of disclosure in commercial insurances in the Insurance Act 2015; for
Germany, see Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 71). In fact, the new German ICA obliges the appli-
cant only to answer questions put to him by the insurer (cf. s. 19; Wandt, para. 785).
108
Article 2:102 Breach
Comments
Remedies Available to Insurers
C1. The information about the circumstances surrounding the risk to be insured forms the
basis of the insurers’ judgement and calculations when concluding the contract of insurance.
If insurers discover later that that information was inaccurate or incomplete, they should
be entitled to reconsider whether or on what terms they wish to continue to cover the risk.
Accordingly, Article 2:102 para. 1 entitles insurers to terminate the contract or to propose
a reasonable variation of the contract of insurance in question.
C2. Insurers are entitled to terminate the contract and the cover altogether in two cases.
The first is when the inaccurate or undisclosed information was so significant, namely so
material to the risk that, if they had been fully and accurately informed, they would not have
concluded the contract of insurance at all. In other cases, in particular when the information
is less significant, insurers should not be in a position to threaten termination just in order to
get a better bargain. The second case for termination is when, after the prescribed period of
time, the parties to the insurance contract have been unable to agree a reasonable variation.
In each case termination of the contract takes effect one month after notification. Moreover,
like the corresponding provision of the Principles of European Contract Law, Article 9:305,
termination under the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law, Article 2:102, takes
effect not retroactively but for the future.
C3. When insurers elect to propose a variation of the insurance contract, that variation
must be reasonable and, in any event, the variation proposed is without effect unless it has
been accepted by the policyholder concerned. Policyholders should be in a position to
seek better terms elsewhere, when possible. Variation of the contract, when accepted by a
policyholder, takes effect on acceptance or, when the proposed variation is neither accepted
nor rejected by the policyholder, one month after receipt of the variation proposal. When
policyholders fail to respond, it is better that there should be cover along the lines of the
variation proposed than no cover at all. Variations, like termination (see Comment 2), do
not have retroactive effect.
C4. Article 2:102 para. 2 requires the insurers to elect between the remedies available
within a reasonable time, which is one month, once they are aware of the breach. On the one
hand, policyholders must not be kept in a position of undue doubt and uncertainty. On the
other hand, insurers cannot be expected to make an instant election even with knowledge of
the breach. In that regard insurers should not be obliged to check in detail the accuracy or
completeness of every application. However, they should not be able to turn a blind eye to
errors or omissions which are obvious from the application form itself, from what they know
109
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
about the particular risk or in the light of information about risks of the kind in question
which they know or should know.
C5. Once aware of an error or non-disclosure, insurers are not obliged to immediately
notify the policyholder concerned, and that the question of sanction is under review. Usu-
ally the fact will indeed have come to the attention of the policyholder. However, when the
insurer’s decision is to terminate the contract, the policyholder must be given clear notice
of the decision and enough time to obtain alternative insurance cover, when available.
C6. The procedures provided for by Article 2:102 take time and, moreover, an error of
non-disclosure may be discovered only after an insured event has occurred. Be that as it
may, when the error or non-disclosure is innocent, policyholders should not be unduly
prejudiced. Thus, Article 2:102 para. 5 provides that in such an eventuality the insurance
money shall remain payable to a policyholder in full. The same is true when the error or
non-disclosure is the product of negligence by the policyholder, as long as there is no causal
connection with the loss. However, when there is negligence and a causal connection, the
insurance money payable is qualified in the way set out in Article 2:102 para. 5. In case of
intentional breach, Article 2:104 applies which gives the insurer the choice between the
sanctions provided in Article 2:102 and avoidance of the contract under Article 2:104.
Notes
The All-or-Nothing Principle
N1. The consequences of a breach of the applicant’s pre-contractual duty of disclosure differ in
European insurance contract laws. The most severe sanction is foreseen in the insurance laws
of England and Wales, Ireland and Scotland. In the laws of these countries, the insured loses all
insurance cover for the insured event even if the non-disclosure was innocent or the non-dis-
closure had no relation to the insured event (all-or-nothing approach; s. 18(1) of the UK Marine
Insurance Act 1906 for England and Wales, see Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905 and Park
78; for Scotland, see Wilson/Forte-Forte, para. 858; for Ireland, see Schütte 34-35. In England,
however, the severity has been tempered by clauses referred to as “non-avoidance clauses”: see
Toomey v Eagle Star Ins Co Ltd (No 2) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 88; or “non-validation clauses”: Sea-
shell of Lisson Grove v Aviva [2011] EWHC 1761 (Comm) [2012] Lloyd’s Rep IR 356: See further
Clarke 23-18G. Further the all-or-nothing principle has been modified for consumer insurances
by the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 and should be modified
for commercial insurances when the Insurance Act 2015 comes into force in 2016.
N2. The insurance laws in Austria and Germany also follow the all-or-nothing approach, but
limit its scope by requiring negligence or even gross negligence (Germany) of the breach and a
causal link between the non-disclosure and the insured event (ss. 16 para. 3 and 21 Austrian ICA
and s. 19 paras. 2 and 3 German ICA). For a similar approach, see art. 815 para. 3 Polish CC.
The all-or-nothing principle is furthermore precluded if the insurer would, nevertheless, have
concluded the contract, albeit under different conditions, even if it had known the non-disclosed
110
Article 2:102 Breach
circumstances, s. 19 para. 4 German ICA (see Wandt, paras. 801 ff.). Except in the case of fraud,
the Dutch Civil Code applies the all-or-nothing approach only if the insurer, had it been aware
of the true state of affairs, would not have concluded the insurance contract at all (art. 7:30 para.
4). In Sweden, concerning business insurance, the all-or-nothing approach is applied not only
in cases of fraud and acts in contravention of good faith (as with consumer insurance), but also
where the policyholder has intentionally or negligently disregarded the information duty and
the insurer can prove that it would not have concluded the contract at all if the disclosure duty
had been performed, s. 9 paras. 1 and 2 of Ch. 8 ICA.
N3. For the legal systems which adhere to the all-or-nothing approach, it is not necessary to
distinguish between the effect of non-disclosure on the insurance contract before an insured
event occurred and the effect of non-disclosure after an insured event occurred as it is done in
Article 2:102 para. 5: In both situations, the insurer is entitled to rescission of the contract.
N4. Other European countries and in particular the more recent insurance laws have taken a
different approach. Depending on the nature of the breach, they have opted for a proportional
reduction of insurance money. These systems need to distinguish between the situations before
and after the insured event occurred in order to make it possible for the insurer to terminate or
adjust the contract based on wrong disclosure to the correct assessment of the risk.
N5. They also differentiate between the innocent, negligent and fraudulent applicant, denying
the protection of the reduction model in particular to the fraudulent applicant who does not
deserve any form of protection (see Article 2:104 and corresponding notes) but granting its
benefits to the negligent applicant who retains at least a proportionally reduced insurance cover.
This reduction model can be found in art. 3 para. 3(c) of the Amended Proposal for a Council
Directive on Insurance Contract Law and in the laws of Belgium (art. 60 IA 2014), Denmark
(s. 6 ICA), France (art. L. 113-9 ICA), Finland (s. 24 para. 2 ICA), Greece (art. 3 para. 5 ICA),
Italy (art. 1893 CC), Luxembourg (art. 13 ICA), the Netherlands (art. 7:930 paras. 2 and 3 CC),
Portugal (art. 26 para. 4 ICA), Spain (art. 10 para. 3 ICA) and the United Kingdom (Consumer
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 as regards consumer insurance; a similar
regime for commercial insurance is contained in the Insurance Act 2015). The Dutch Civil Code
limits the scope of the reduction model in so far as the insurer has to pay in full if the facts, not
or not correctly disclosed, are not material to the assessment of the risk as it has materialised
(Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman-Kamphuisen 31).
N6. A more flexible form of the reduction model exists in the new insurance law of Sweden
where the consumer insurance cover is not reduced on a strictly proportional basis but in ac-
cordance with what is reasonable in the light of the significance which the fact would have had
for the insurer’s risk assessment, whether such disregard was intentional or negligent, and other
circumstances (s. 2 para. 2 of Ch. 4 ICA). A somewhat similar model also applies to non-life
insurance in Finland (s. 23 para. 2 ICA, according to which if the policyholder or the insured
has, either wilfully or through negligence which cannot be considered slight, failed to fulfil his
duty of disclosure, compensation may be reduced or refused).
111
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
N7. Many of the aforementioned statutes also contain provisions for contract variation and/or
termination which are similar to Article 2:102 paras. 1 and 2, see for example art. 60 Belgian
IA 2014, art. L. 113-9 French ICA, s. 20 para. 1 Finnish ICA, s. 19 para. 4 German ICA, art. 3
paras. 3 and 4 Greek ICA and art. 13 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA. In the Dutch CC, the contract as
such remains in force in the event of non-disclosure, albeit with “gaps” in the cover and it is up
to the policyholder to decide to terminate it or not. The insurer may terminate the contract only
in case of fraud or if it would not have concluded the contract at all, being aware of the true state
of affairs (art. 7:929 CC, Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman-Kamphuisen 29-30.).
Approximation
N8. It should be added that the sharp differences between the positions of the insurance laws
as described above do not result in equally far-reaching differences in insurance practice. This is
particularly true for the United Kingdom and Ireland where the harsh position of the common
law (Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA); Graham v Western Australian Ins Co Ltd (1931)
40 Ll. L. R. 64, 66, per Roche J) was, at least with regard to consumer contracts, considerably
softened by the Statements of Insurance Practice issued by the Association of British Insurers and
the Codes of Practice of the Irish Insurance Federation (Rühl 98-99, Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1459).
In the United Kingdom it is now the focus of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), see ICOBS
8. The Financial Services Act 2012 abolished the previous Financial Services Authority with
effect from 1 April 2013. Its responsibilities were split between two new agencies (the Prudential
Regulation Authority, a division of the Bank of England, and the Financial Conduct Authority).
Insurance issues as regards the conduct of business as opposed to financial regulation are now
handled by the Financial Conduct Authority. Moreover, as far as doctrinal law is concerned,
the position of insurance consumers was softened by the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and
Representations) Act 2012 and will be softened for business insureds under the provisions of the
Insurance Act 2015 when it comes into force in 2016.
Innocent Breach
N9. Finally, Article 2:102 para. 5 provides for an exception from the proportionality model in
favour of an innocent applicant. The rules on contract variation and termination apply both to
innocent and negligent misrepresentations – both negligent and innocent misrepresentations
lead to a miscalculation of the insured risk and therefore require adjustment of the insurance
contract for the future. But the rule of Article 2:102 para. 5 applies only to negligent misrep-
resentations and thus abandons the proportional reduction of insurance cover in favour of the
innocent insured. A similar privilege for the innocent insured can be found in the insurance laws
of Belgium (art. 60 para. 2 IA 2014), Finland (ss. 23 para. 2 and 24 para. 2 ICA), Luxembourg
(art. 13 para. 2 ICA) and, so far as consumers are concerned, the United Kingdom (Consumer
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, ss. 4 and 5).
112
Article 2:103 Exceptions
(b) information which should have been disclosed or information inaccurately supplied, which
was not material to a reasonable insurer’s decision to enter into the contract at all, or to do so
on the agreed terms;
(c) information which the insurer led the policyholder to believe did not have to be disclosed; or
(d) information of which the insurer was or should have been aware.
Comments
Unanswered Questions
C1. To reduce transaction costs insurers commonly require applicants to complete stand-
ard forms containing questions drafted with no particular applicant in mind. Such forms
exhibit a tendency to contain more questions than are strictly necessary for insurers to
reach a decision on a particular application. Thus it is not uncommon that an application
is submitted with an incomplete or blank answer because, for example, the applicant is
unable or unwilling to supply the information required, but that the insurer concludes the
contract nonetheless. In such a case, the inference is that the answer was not material to the
decision or that it was so marginal to the decision that the insurer was willing to assume
that, if supplied, the information would not have been material. This is the kind of scenario
envisaged by Article 2:103(a).
Immaterial Information
C2. Article 2:103(b) makes an exception for information that is not material to a reason-
able insurer’s decision to enter the contract at all, or to do so on the terms agreed. Insurers
are not entitled to the remedies provided for in Article 2:102 by reference to information
which, they maintain, is material to them, even though it is not material to most other
insurers of that kind of risk. The exception is the corollary of the rule, that is found in the
law of many countries, that applicants are obliged to disclose (only) information that is
(objectively) material to the risk in question. Moreover, in most countries, to be material
the information in question must be sufficiently significant to be causative – in the sense
that, if it had been disclosed, it would have had a certain effect on the conduct of the insur-
er: that the insurer would have refused to conclude the contract at all or would have done
so only on different terms. The relevant effect is confirmed by Article 2:103(b). However,
there is a reputable presumption underlying Article 2:101 that the information requested
by the insurer’s question form is material in this sense. Note also Article 4:201, concerning
aggravation of risk, in which the insurer’s rights are triggered by changes in the risk insured
that are material in this same sense.
C3. The “reasonable insurer”, like the “reasonable man”, is a mythical figure popular with
legislators. However, whereas most people claim to have a notion of the “reasonable man”,
there is less confidence about what is meant by a “reasonable insurer” and about what
such an insurer is likely to regard as material. In some cases it will be obvious nonetheless.
Elements of “moral hazard”, such as past convictions for criminal offences, are a clear ex-
113
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
ample. In other less obvious cases, the expectation is that information will be sought about
the practice of the insurance market in question and thus about the notion of “reasonable
insurer” there. In any event, the applicant’s duty is limited by Article 2:101 to answering the
insurer’s questions, with the corollary that these are matters that the particular insurer re-
gards as material and with the presumption that the relevant insurance market would agree.
Waiver
C4. Article 2:103(c) envisages an applicant who answers an insurer’s questions with the
assistance of an employee or representative of the insurer. Not uncommonly such persons’
representative advise applicants about the kind of information to be supplied in response to
one or more of the questions. When applicants are advised erroneously that a certain fact
does not have to be mentioned, and it is nonetheless reasonable for them to rely on that
advice, the particular insurer is estopped from pleading non-disclosure on the part of the
applicant. In other words, through their designated employees or representatives, insurers
may be deemed to have waived the disclosure of the information in question and are not
entitled to the remedies provided for in Article 2:102.
C5. When material information is already known to insurers, there is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that they conclude a related contract of insurance in reliance on their own knowl-
edge rather than on what is said or not said about the matter by applicants. Good faith,
mutuality and fair dealing require that such a rule apply not only to what insurers actually
know but also to information that they ought to know. Moreover, such considerations also
dictate that in principle the knowledge thus imputed to insurers be no less extensive than
that imputed to applicants: see Article 2:101 Comments 4 to 7. For insurers, the imputation
should not extend to purely paper based records, which are likely to be extensive and too
costly to search. However, subject to the operation of data protection legislation, the imputa-
tion extends to information which is readily accessible and thus to in house computer data,
notably records, and also to collective data compiled in cooperation with other insurers.
C6. If one of the exceptions in Article 2:103 applies, an insurance contract which has
been properly concluded and is not invalid on other grounds will remain in force as agreed.
Notes
Obvious Defects of the Policyholder’s Answer, Article 2:103(a)
N1. The rule of Article 2:103(a) reflects a kind of waiver of disclosure different from the one
discussed in the notes on Article 2:101. Article 2:103(a) does not concern a waiver of disclosure
in relation to facts which the insurer did not ask for (although a prudent insurer would have
asked for). It rather concerns a waiver of disclosure of information the insurer asked for but did
not receive or which it received with obvious gaps or errors.
114
Article 2:104 Fraudulent Breach
N2. This situation is dealt with both in national laws which require spontaneous disclosure and
in laws which do not. Both systems seem to arrive at the same result: if the insurer concludes a
contract of insurance although it is aware of incomplete or incorrect disclosure by the insured,
it is deemed to have waived its right of information and consequently loses the remedies for the
breach of the duty to inform (which are spelt out in Articles 2:102 and 2:104). This is true for the
laws of Belgium (art. 58 para. 2 IA 2014), Finland (s. 35 para. 1 ICA), Germany (BGH 11.5.2011,
Versicherungsrecht 2011, 909; BGH 25.3.1992, BGHZ 117, 385 and s. 19 para. 5(2) ICA), Greece
(the third sentence of art. 3 para. 1 ICA), Luxembourg (art. 11 para. 2 ICA), the Netherlands
(art. 7:928 para. 4 CC and Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman-Kamphuisen 28-29), Poland (the
third sentence of art. 815 para. 1 CC), Spain (Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 195, Sánchez Calero,
(art. 10) 203, for further references, see Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1319), Sweden (s. 4 of Ch. 4
ICA), Switzerland (art. 8 no. 6 ICA) and England and Wales (Clarke 23-12B1 and 23-13). An
exceptio doli is made in the case of a fraudulent applicant: he shall not benefit from the possible
negligence of the insurer who does not conduct further inquiries (art. 58 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014;
s. 35 para. 1 Finnish ICA; art. 3 para. 1(c) Greek ICA; art. 11 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA).
N3. As the purpose of the duty of disclosure is to enable the insurer to assess and calculate the
risk insured, circumstances which are not material to the risk (namely which would not influ-
ence a reasonable insurer’s decision to conclude the contract or to calculate the premium) are,
in all legal systems, outside the duty of disclosure. This rule can be found in art. 3 para. 1 of the
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law, s. 16 para. 1 Austrian
ICA, art. 7:928 para. 4 Dutch CC, s. 35 para. 2 Finnish ICA, art. 113-2 para. 2 French ICA, s. 19
para. 1 German ICA, the first sentence of art. 3 para. 1 Greek ICA, art. 1892 para. 1 Italian CC,
art. 11 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA, art. 24 para. 1 Portuguese ICA, art. 10 para. 1 Spanish ICA and
art. 4 para. 2 Swiss ICA.
N4. The exceptions of Article 2:103(c) and (d) are discussed by implication in the notes on Ar-
ticle 2:101. A provision similar to Article 2:103(c) can be found in art. 8 no. 2 Swiss ICA, a rule
similar to Article 2:103(d) in art. 3 para. 1 of the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on
Insurance Contract Law, s. 16 para. 3 Austrian ICA, art. 58 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014, s. 19 para. 4
German ICA, s. 35 para. 1 Finnish ICA, art. 11 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA and art. 8 nos. 3 and 4
Swiss ICA.
115
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Comments
The Range of Remedies
C1. According to Article 2:102 para. 1 and Article 2:102 para. 3, in cases of innocent
non-disclosure or inaccuracy, insurers are entitled to terminate the contract in two cases.
One is when the parties have been unable to reach timely agreement on a reasonable vari-
ation. The other is when a fully and accurately informed insurer would not have concluded
the contract of insurance at all. In the case of fraudulent non-disclosure or inaccuracy, as
in the case of negligence, such conditions do not apply so that termination is entirely at the
discretion of the insurer. The very fact that a policyholder was fraudulent in the presentation
of the risk raises adverse implications about the moral hazard involved, and insurers are
entitled to avoid the contract at their will.
C2. Fraud is not defined in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law, however,
under Article 4:107 para. 2 PECL a party’s “representation or non-disclosure is fraudulent
if it was intended to deceive”. While in most countries fraud is not only a breach of mo-
rality but also a breach of the criminal law the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law consider any deliberate deception as being fraudulent. The consequences in law for
contracts induced by fraud are often severe: fraus omnia corrumpit. However, the impact
of fraud on the decision of insurers to contract varies widely in insurance cases, and severe
consequences may not be appropriate. The applicant who states his age to be 49 rather than
50, in an application for fire insurance, may well be more foolish than fraudulent.
Avoidance
C3. In the circumstances described the effect of fraud under Article 2:104 is that the con-
tract is not void but may be avoided at the discretion of the insurer concerned. This too is
the rule for contracts in general in Article 4:107 para. 1 PECL, under which the remedy for
fraud is also avoidance. Article 2:104 does not oblige insurers to avoid the contract. Insurers
have the alternative remedy provided by Article 2:102 either to terminate the contract for
the future or to propose a variation of the existing contract. This follows from the fact that
intentional breach is more serious than innocent or negligent breach (a maiore ad minus).
This is why the first sentence of Article 2:104 refers to Article 2:102.
C4. Article 2:104 allows insurers to avoid the contract only when they have been led to
conclude the contract by the fraud of the policyholder. A similar rule is found in Arti-
cle 4:107 para. 1 PECL. Fraud which has no effect on an insurer’s decision to conclude the
contract, whether because the false information was inherently immaterial or because the
insurer was aware that the information was false, does not carry consequences adverse to
the policyholder. The requirement of causation reflects the widespread view that it is not the
primary role of insurance contract law to uphold social morality with rules that are punitive.
116
Article 2:105 Additional Information
C5. In the case of innocent breach of Article 2:101 when insurers exercise the right to ter-
minate the contract, the effect is not retroactive but prospective. The policyholder in ques-
tion is not required to repay the amount of honest claims previously paid under the policy.
When breach is negligent insurers may demand repayment subject to the proportionality
rule: Article 2:102 para. 5. In cases of fraud, however, insurers are entitled to avoid the con-
tract of insurance with unqualified retroactive effect. In this respect Article 2:104 is once
again in line with the Principles of European Contract Law, in which Article 4:107 para. 1
provides that a “party may avoid a contract when it has been led to conclude it” by the other
party’s fraudulent non-disclosure; and in which Article 4:115 provides that on avoidance
“either party may claim restitution of whatever it has supplied under the contract”, except
that under Article 2:104 PEICL insurers are entitled to retain premium paid. Retention of
premium in cases of fraud may be authorised by a term of insurance policies, a common
term that has been upheld and enforced by the courts. Although in this and other respects
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law contain elements of retribution, it is
mainly inspired by the goal of deterrence. A fraudulent applicant must not be allowed to
think: if the fraud is successful, then I will gain; if it is unsuccessful, unless there has been
an intervening loss, I will not lose.
Notes
N1. The countries which follow the model of proportionate reduction of insurance cover in case
of non-disclosure make an exception in the case of a fraudulent applicant. In such cases no need
for protection is felt. Similar exceptions can be found in art. 3 para. 4 of the Amended Proposal
for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law and in the laws of Belgium (art. 59 IA 2014),
Denmark (s. 4 ICA), Finland (ss. 23 para. 1 and 24 para. 1 ICA), France (art. L 113-8 ICA), Greece
(art. 3 para. 6 ICA), Italy (art. 1892 CC), Luxembourg (art. 12 ICA), the Netherlands (art. 7:930
para. 5 CC), Spain (art. 10 para. 3 ICA) and Sweden (s. 4 of Ch. 4 ICA).
N2. For those countries which adhere to the all-or-nothing model and deny cover to a negligent
or innocent applicant who breaches the duty of pre-contractual disclosure, it goes without saying
that a fraudulent applicant will not be entitled to claim insurance cover.
117
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Comment
Article 2:105 is aimed at occasions in which an applicant supplies material information even
though it has not, in accordance with Article 2:101 para. 1, been the subject of clear and
precise question put to him by the insurer. Policyholders are not obliged to supply additional
information but, when they do so and it is material to an insurer’s decision, it must be as
accurate and complete as that which is the subject of such questions.
Note
The application of Articles 2:102 to 2:104 to voluntarily supplied information is a necessary
implication for those insurance laws which start from the premise of a duty to disclose any ma-
terial information spontaneously (Austria, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United
Kingdom; for references see the notes on Article 2:101). But also those jurisdictions which limit
the scope of the duty of disclosure to the questions asked by the insurer seem to apply the sanc-
tions if information was voluntarily supplied, as the questions only limit the duty of disclosure,
but do not discharge the applicant from the duty to give true information, for example art. 5
Belgian IA 2014.
Comments
C1. Article 2:106 makes it clear that the provision in Article 1:208 para. 1 is lex specialis as
regards the applicant’s pre-contractual information duties provided for by this section; see
also the comments to Article 1:208.
20
This provision is modelled on arts. 183 to 189 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
118
Article 2:201 Provision of Pre-contractual Documents
(f) the amount of the premium and the method of calculating it;
(g) when the premium falls due as well as the place and mode of payment;
(h) the contract period, including the method of terminating the contract, and the liability
period;
(i) the right to revoke the application or avoid the contract in accordance with Article 2:303
in the case of non-life insurance and with Article 17:203 in the case of life insurance;
(j) that the contract is subject to the PEICL;
(k) the existence of an out-of-court complaint and redress mechanism for the applicant and
the methods of having access to it;
(l) the existence of guarantee funds or other compensation arrangements.
(2) If possible, this information shall be provided in sufficient time to enable the applicant to
consider whether or not to conclude the contract.
(3) When the applicant applies for insurance cover on the basis of an application form and/or a
questionnaire provided by the insurer, the insurer shall supply the applicant with a copy of the
completed documents.
Comments
Pre-contractual Documents in General
C1. Pre-contractual documents have become an ever more frequent means of conferring
protection on consumers in general (see for example arts. 3 and 4 of the Package Travel
Directive (90/314/EEC); arts. 5 and 6 of the Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EU); art. 3
of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC); arts. 3 para. 1, 4 para. 1 and 5 para.
2 of the Timeshare Directive (2008/122/EC) as well as arts. 5 ff. of the Consumer Credit
Directive (2008/48/EC) and applicants for insurance cover in particular (arts. 183-185 of
the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC)); as to national legislation, see the Notes below).
Pre-contractual documents help to ensure transparency for the prospective policyholder.
They put such persons in a position to check the prospective contract and reach an informed
decision. Above all, the scope of insurers’ information duties is further extended by current
EU legislation, such as the PRIIP Regulation (1286/2014) and the proposed IDD (Insurance
Distribution Directive21).
C2. In view of the policy considerations referred to in Comment 1, Article 2:201 para. 1
requires the insurer to provide the applicant with a pre-contractual document containing
relevant information concerning the insurance contract under negotiation, as well as the
proposed contract terms. This duty is independent of the obligation of the insurer to issue
an insurance policy after conclusion of the contract (Article 2:501).
21
See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on insurance media-
tion (recast) – Confirmation of the final compromise text with a view to agreement, Doc. No. 10747 / 15
of 16 July 2015, Interinstitutional File: 2012 / 0175 (COD); the Directive has, however, not yet been
adopted.
119
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
C3. The contents of the pre-contractual document are described by Article 2:201 para. 1 in
a way that is referable to all branches of insurance. In some branches additional information
is required (see for example the list of information to be given by a life insurer under art. 185
of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC)). Such requirements are dealt with at a later stage
within the rules specific to single branches of insurance.
C4. Applicants often complete forms provided by the insurer. Examples are the application
form and the questionnaire (see Article 2:101 para. 1). Both documents are of decisive evi-
dential value for ex-post determination of the contents of the concluded insurance contract
or a possible breach of the applicant’s pre-contractual information duty (Articles 2:101 to
2:105). Therefore, the insurer is obliged to hand out copies of such completed forms to the
applicant (Article 2:201 para. 3).
Form of Documents
C5. The document must be in writing. This includes means of communication that pro-
vide a record readable by both sides, as defined by Article 1:301 para. 6 PECL. In particular,
messages sent by telegram, telex, telefax and e-mail are equivalent to written statements
under that rule.
Notes
European Directives and their Implementation
N1. The Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), which recasts the so-called Third Generation
Insurance Directives, explicitly requires that the insurer provides the prospective policyholder
with certain information before entering into the contractual relationship. Similar information
duties have been laid down in further EC directives that may also become relevant for insurance.
This relates, in particular, to art. 5 of the Electronic Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) and to
art. 3 of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC). The information requirements under
the latter directives are not always in line with those of the insurance directives.
N2. For the implementation of the information requirements of the Third Generation Insurance
Directives, see for instance s. 9a paras. 1 and 3 and s. 18b para. 1 Austrian ISA; art. 30 Belgian
IA 2014 in conjunction with art. 15 para. 1 of the Belgian Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on
Insurance Supervision; art. 20 para. 1-2 Dutch ISA in conjunction with the Dutch Decree on the
Supervision of the Conduct of Financial Enterprises (which enables the insurer to furnish the
required information later after the conclusion of the contract together with the delivery of the
policy on the condition that the policyholder is granted a cooling-off period of 30 days); s. 5 para.
1 Finnish ICA (according to s. 5 para. 2, this information does not need to be provided if the
policyholder does not want it or if giving the information “would pose excessive inconvenience”)
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Article 2:201 Provision of Pre-contractual Documents
and the Ministry of Justice Decree on Information to be provided on Life Insurance (177/2011);
art. L. 112-2 French ICA; s. 7 German ICA together with the Regulation on Duties of Information
Relating to Insurance Contracts of 18 December 2007; arts. 166 and 182 to 187 of the Italian Code
of Private Insurance plus the rules provided in the ISVAP Regulation No. 5/2006; art. 13a of the
Polish Act on Insurance Activity; art. 18 Portuguese ICA; art. 60 Spanish ISA in conjunction
with arts. 104 to 107 of the Spanish Royal Decree on Insurance Supervision; and in the United
Kingdom ICOBS 6.
N3. Art. 3 para. 1 Swiss ICA also states that the insurer has to give the applicant specific infor-
mation either by including them in the proposal form or by giving a separate document before
the prospective policyholder submits his proposal. The Swedish ICA (see ss. 2 and 3 of Ch. 2 for
indemnity insurance and ss. 2 and 3 of Ch. 10 for personal insurance) is similar, but it restricts
this duty of information to cases where the applicant has not renounced his right to information
and where the information is not impracticable to be given. Cf. also the Finnish ICA under Note
2 above.
N4. Article 2:201 para. 1 closely adheres to the policyholder information requirements of the
Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC). According to art. 183 para. 2 of the Solvency II Directive
(2009/138/EC), the information duties in non-life insurance only apply if the applicant is a nat-
ural person.
N5. Some Member States set even more demanding standards than the directives. This relates
for example to Austria: s. 18b para. 1 ISA requires additional information about the insurer’s
performance and the choice of the policyholder in this matter; under s. 5b para. 2(2) ICA the
general insurance conditions must be provided to the policyholder. In France, the insurer must
hand out either a copy of a draft contract with all its annexes or a note containing detailed
information on the insurance cover, including exclusions and the duties of the policyholder,
see art. 112-2 ICA. In Germany (the information must include among other items the general
policy conditions, the name and address of the contracting parties, the total costs to be borne
by the policyholder, including the premium and any taxes and additional fees, s. 7 ICA and the
Regulation on Duties of Information Relating to Insurance Contracts of 18 December 2007). For
Italy, see art. 185 of the Code of Private Insurance. In Spain, the insurer shall include the text of
the general contract terms in the proposal if such a proposal exists (art. 3 para. 1 ICA); see also
arts. 53, 60 and 81 ISA. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services (Distance Marketing) Reg-
ulations 2004 implement the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC). The Regulations set
minimum standards for the information that must be provided to consumers before they enter
certain financial services contracts, among them contracts of insurance. Distance marketing is
when there is no personal contact with the consumer, but the transaction is conducted through
the Internet or by post or by telephone. See, for example, http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/
ICOBS/3/Annex2. Switzerland puts the insurer under an obligation to state the general policy
conditions (the second sentence of art. 3 para. 2 ICA).
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
N6. Contrary to the enumeration technique chosen by the respective directives and several
national legislators, some legal systems merely stipulate a duty of pre-contractual information
in general terms, sometimes accompanied by one or more examples, see s. 5 para. 1 Finnish ICA
and s. 2 para. 1 of Ch. 2 Swedish ICA: any information needed by the applicant to assess his in-
surance requirements and to select the insurance shall be provided; details specifically mentioned
concern the premium, insurance terms and conditions and all major exclusions from cover.
N7. Article 2:201 para. 3 is drafted on the model of s. 5b para. 1 Austrian ICA which requires
the insurer to immediately issue a copy of the policyholder’s written application. The same rule
has been adopted in Belgium (art. 64 para. 3 IA 2014), Luxembourg (art. 16 para. 3 ICA) and
Greece (art. 2 paras. 2 and 4): no later than at the time of conclusion of the contract shall the
insurer furnish, to the policyholder, a copy of the information previously given to the insurer
by the policyholder concerning the risk to be covered. In Switzerland, too, the policyholder can
demand that the insurer has to deliver a copy of the policyholder’s declarations – included in
the proposal of insurance or otherwise made – on the basis of which the contract was finally
concluded (art. 11 para. 2 ICA).
Comments
General Remarks
122
Article 2:202 Duty to Warn about Inconsistencies in the Cover
C2. The duty of assistance concerns areas where the insurer can usually be considered an
expert. In general, insurers are experts as to the evaluation of risks as well as to the contents
of their insurance policy. This is why Article 2:202 para. 1 obliges the insurer to warn the
applicant about aspects of the proposed risk not covered by the policy.
C3. The duty of assistance is limited to situations where the insurer had reason to know
about gaps in cover referred to in Comment 2, because the actual risk situation of the
applicant was apparent to the insurer or where such a gap should reasonably have been
anticipated by the insurer.
C4. The scope of the duty of assistance is to be determined in the light of all circumstances
of the particular case. This is why Article 2:202 para. 1 refers to the circumstances and mode
of contracting. Several aspects may be relevant:
a. The information duties of the insurer will be more extensive if there are face to face nego-
tiations between an applicant and an agent representing the insurer. In this context reference
should be made to art. 12 para. 3 of the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) as
amended by art. 91 of MiFID2 (2014/65/EU), according to which insurance intermediaries
(including agents) “shall at least specify, in particular on the basis of information provided
by the customer, the demands and needs of that customer as well as the underlying reasons
for any advice given to the customer on a given insurance product. These details shall be
modulated according to the complexity of the insurance contract being proposed”.
c. The duties to warn will be less extensive if there are no face to face negotiations between
the applicant and the insurer or an agent representing the insurer. Under such circumstances
the insurer will only be able to give fairly routine assistance. A similar position is taken in
the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC). In particular, according to art. 3 para. 1(2)
(a), the insurer has to provide the consumer with “a description of the main characteristics
of the financial services”.
d. Furthermore, the pre-contractual duties of the insurer may be limited if the mode of
contracting does not entitle the applicant to expect assistance. This may be the case when
insurance products are sold in a supermarket and it is clear that the retailer of such products
is not primarily involved in the marketing of insurance. However, consideration should also
be given to whether such a way of marketing insurance policies is appropriate in the light of
the complexity of the insurance product at stake. In particular, if fund linked life assurance
policies (with the possibility of losing the investment) are sold, a warning about the nature
of such insurance and the extent of the risks involved needs to be provided, irrespective of
123
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
the way of such policies are marketed. Reference should be made, however, to art. 1 para. 2 of
the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) as amended by art. 91 of MiFID2 (2014/65/
EU). According to that provision professional standards should not be applied to persons
whose principal professional activity is other than advising on and selling insurance, if the
insurance policies sold are not complex and marketing them does not require any general
or specific knowledge.
C5. Lack of the requisite information may ultimately lead to insufficient insurance cover
for the policyholder (in some cases it may also lead to over-insurance or undesired cov-
erage). In such cases, under general contract law the party that has a right to be informed
appropriately may rescind the contract (see, for example, Article 4:107 PECL: “avoidance”)
or sue for damages. In some countries insurance laws provide for modification of the insur-
ance contract in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the policyholder.
Damages
C6. Article 2:202 para. 2(a) establishes a right of the policyholder to damages. The insurer
will have to pay the policyholder the amount of money that will put him in the position he
would have been in, had he been duly warned by the insurer. The insurer will be relieved of
the obligation to pay damages only if it proves that there was no fault on its part.
C7. Damages might become payable in various circumstances. In some cases the policy-
holder would have bought alternative insurance cover had he known that a particular risk
was not covered under the policy in question. In other cases, for example if a risk is not
insurable in the market, the policyholder might have refrained from engaging in activities
involving the risk; of course this would have to be proved. Article 2:202 para. 2(a) does not
specifically deal with the burden and standard of proof. However, it is an established prac-
tice of the courts throughout the Member States of Europe to ease the burden of proof on
the policyholder by presuming or at least accepting a prima facie case that the policyholder
would have reacted in a reasonable manner had he been warned by the insurer. Therefore,
it may be assumed that the policyholder would have been ready to buy additional cover if
it was available at a reasonable price in the market.
C8. If an insurer finds out about a breach of its duty to warn after the making of the con-
tract, it may perform its duty at that time. If then the policyholder does not respond (for
example by buying additional cover), there will be no further liability for damages on the
part of the insurer.
Termination
C9. Article 2:202 para. 2(b) gives the policyholder a right to terminate the contract. Ter-
mination will have no retroactive effects.
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Article 2:202 Duty to Warn about Inconsistencies in the Cover
Notes
Community Law
N1. The pre-contractual information duties of the insurer can basically be divided into two
subcategories: the duty to inform about the insurance policy in general and the duty to advise the
insured in respect of his individual requirements of insurance in particular. Whereas the former
is dealt with in the section on the insurance policy (Articles 2:501 and 2:502), the latter is subject
to Articles 2:201 to 2:203. The insurance directives of the European Community so far only deal
with the information duty concerning the insurance policy in general and do not regulate the
duty to advise the insured about his particular needs. An exception can be seen in the Insurance
Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) (as amended), but this Directive only applies to the duties of
insurance intermediaries and does not stipulate a duty to advise for the insurer (see art. 12 of the
Directive). In the neighbouring field of investment services, art. 25 para. 2 of MiFID2 (2014/65/
EU) requires investment firms providing advise to the investor on investment services and fi-
nancial instruments to test any investment recommended for its suitability to the investor. While
MiFID2 (2014/65/EU) has amended the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC), it does
not apply to insurance undertakings (art. 2 para. 1(a) of that Directive). However, the situation
may change with an enactment of the proposed Insurance Distribution Directive. This Directive
is proposed to apply to insurers in cases of direct marketing and provides for duties of advice in
particular for so called insurance based investment products (see art. 25 IDD as proposed by the
Presidency / General Secretariat of the Council on 16 July 2015).
National Law
N2. The laws of the Member States differ as to the duty of the insurer – as opposed to the in-
surance intermediary – to provide advice on the suitability of the insurance for the needs of the
insured. Three legislative model solutions can be discerned. The laws of Germany (s. 6 para. 1
ICA), Sweden (s. 2 of Ch. 2 and s. 2 of Ch. 10 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 926 and Bengtsson
206-208) and the rules in the FCA Handbook in the United Kingdom. Detailed guidance on the
question of suitability is set out, for example, in ICOBS, which imposed more general duties to
provide “product information”. See ICOBS 6.1. ff.
N3. In other countries the courts require the presence of particular circumstances. This is the
case in Austria (OGH 28.3.2012, 7 Ob 100/11y; OGH 30.11.1989, Versicherungsrecht 1991, 87,
OGH 10.5.1984, Versicherungsrecht 1985, 1099 (1100)) and France (Cass. civ. 2.10.1984, Bull.
Civ. I n° 241; Cass. civ. 1.12.1989, RGDA 1999, 335 (336); for further references, see Basedow/
Fock-Völker 476 ff.) where such a duty is imposed if the insured had expressly stated a special
need for insurance or if it is apparent that his perception of the insurance cover is misconceived.
In Italy, a similar duty is imposed on both intermediaries and insurers (art. 183 of the Code of
Private Insurance).
N4. In a third group of legal systems no such duty seems to exist at all, at least not in a binding
form. This relates to Greece, but only as regards the specific provisions of the Insurance Contract
Law, (see Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 583 ff.), to Spain (see Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1291)
and to Switzerland (see Honsell/Vogt/Schnyder-Fuhrer art. 34 VVG paras. 46, 137). See also the
interesting approach in art. 811 para. 1 Polish CC. In other jurisdictions, it has at least not been
125
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
considered at large in legal debate (for example in Belgium, see Basedow/Fock-Fock 241 and in
the Netherlands, see Wansink, Het Verzekeringsarchief 2009 3-28).
N5. The solution which is proposed in Article 2:202 reflects a compromise solution between the
extremes. The duty to give advice is limited to circumstances in which the insurer can foresee
or reasonably could have foreseen that the cover provided will not be adequate for the needs of
the insured. In this appreciation of all relevant circumstances, the mode of contracting and in
particular the involvement of an independent intermediary who is obliged to advise the insured
under art. 12 of the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC), as amended, are taken into
account.
Sanctions
N6. Those statutes which impose a duty to advise the insured about inconsistencies between
the cover offered and his individual requirements of insurance generally provide for some form
of sanction in case of breach of that duty. Under the new German law, an insurer who breaches
its obligation to give advice has to compensate the policyholder for any loss resulting from that
breach, unless the insurer acted without fault (s. 6 para. 5 ICA). Under the Swedish Act, the in-
surer cannot rely on particularly important information that should have been but has not been
provided to the consumer according to s. 4 of Ch. 2 ICA (s. 8 of Ch. 2 ICA).
N7. Austrian law sanctions a breach of the duty to inform on the basis of its general civil law
concept of culpa in contrahendo. As a consequence, the insured can claim compensation for the
lack of insurance cover resulting from the breach of the duty to inform. The liability arising from
culpa in contrahendo requires fault on the side of the insurer who is responsible for any auxiliary
personnel (s. 1313a CC). French law, on the other hand, invokes tort law in order to sanction a
breach of a duty to inform or to warn the insured (art. 1382 CC, Fil 109-117). The liability under
art. 1382 CC requires fault, but the insurer is held responsible for his intermediaries and agents
as préposés (art. 1384 para. 5 CC, art. 511-1 ICA).
N8. In Austrian, German and French law the indemnification for lack of insurance cover is
regarded as (either quasi-contractual or delictual) compensation.
N9. The law of the United Kingdom enforces the duty to inform and consult with the instru-
ments of public law (for example financial penalties or limitation/withdrawal of the permission
to carry on regulated activities, see the enforcement section of the FCA Handbook) and the
procedures of the Financial Ombudsman Bureau which may lead to the Ombudsman ordering
fair compensation for the insured (Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1406, 1408, 1412 f., s. 229 of the UK
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000).
126
Article 2:203 Duty to Warn about Commencement of Cover
applicable, the first premium is paid, unless preliminary cover is granted. If the insurer is in breach
of the duty to warn it shall be liable in accordance with Article 2:202 para. 2(a).
Comments
Problems of Commencement of Cover in Practice
C1. Application forms contain questions as to when the cover sought is to begin. The ap-
plicant commonly enters the day of making the application as the desired commencement
date, because the risk usually exists at the time when the application is made. Applicants
often believe themselves to be automatically insured once they have signed the application
form. Such belief is supported by the fact that insurers often grant preliminary cover but
it may turn out to be a seriously mistaken belief if the insurer does not grant preliminary
cover in the specific case. Moreover, agents often assist applicants in filling out the appli-
cation form. As long as the agent does not respond negatively to an applicant’s request for
immediate cover, the applicant will consider the silence of the agent as confirmation of his
belief that he enjoys cover as of the time of signing the application.
Duty to Warn
C2. A request for immediate cover implies a tacit request for preliminary cover and re-
quires immediate response by the insurer. This is why the first sentence of Article 2:203
obliges the insurer either to grant such cover or to warn the applicant about the lack of cover
as long as the insurance contract is not concluded and, if applicable, the first premium is
not paid (see Article 5:101). Article 2:203 is a special case of the general duty of the insurer
to warn the applicant about gaps in the insurance cover and, therefore, leads to the same
sanctions (see Article 2:203 referring to Article 2:202 para. 2).
Notes
Community Law
N1. Under European law, the most detailed list of information duties so far is in art. 185 of the
Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) concerning life insurance. In its para. 3 b), the information
on the commencement of cover is only referred to indirectly by the obligation incumbent upon
the insurer to inform about the “term of the contract” (see also Article 2:201 and the notes).
N2. The duty established by Article 2:203 resembles s. 1a para. 2 Austrian ICA. This requires
that the applicant who, in order to apply for insurance cover, uses a standard form issued by the
insurer, shall be indemnified by the insurer for losses occurring before the contract is concluded
if the insurer cannot prove that it had warned about the (later) commencement of cover.
127
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
N3. Under Swedish law, the situation for the applicant differs insofar as the law, if not agreed
upon otherwise by the parties, prescribes the commencement of the insurer’s obligation to in-
demnify the applicant to start the day after the applicant has either sent off the application or has
received an offer by the insurer (s. 2 para. 2 of Ch. 3 ICA). As a consequence, a gap in cover is
unlikely. However, the rule is modified when the commencement of the cover is made contingent
upon the policyholder’s payment of the premium. Then, the cover only commences the day after
the premium has been paid.
N4. Under the new German law, the insurer is required to inform the applicant about the com-
mencement of cover (s. 7 ICA and s. 1 para. 1(12) of the Regulation on Duties of Information
Relating to Insurance Contracts of 18 December 2007). In case of breach of the duties listed in
that regulation, the period allowed for avoidance in s. 8 does not commence. While no indem-
nification of the applicant is prescribed by the ICA, a right to damages may follow from general
principles of contract law (Wandt, para. 287).
N5. In other countries, the provisions requiring the insurer to provide information on the terms
of the contract do not explicitly refer to the situation underlying Article 2:203; see for example for
Finland, s. 5 ICA; for France, art. 112-2 ICA; for Greece, art. 2 para. 6 ICA and art. 4 para. 2(h)
and para. 3(d) of the Legislative Decree on Insurance Undertakings; for Belgium, art. 15 of the
Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision; and for Luxembourg, art. 10 para.
1 ICA. The sanctions for breach of those duties are not explicitly set forth in the respective laws
but would result from principles of general contract law.
Comments
The Principles of European Contract Law
C1. The rules of insurance contract law are not the same as those of general contract law,
although in most countries the latter to a certain extent are used and applied in insurance
contract law. This is particularly the case regarding the formation of contract. Many of the
provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law concerning this part of European
contract law (Articles 2:101 to 2:302) can be applied to insurance contract law. In this way
a desirable simplification is attained.
C2. Attention has to be paid, however, to the possibility that there are provisions of the
Principles of European Contract Law on the formation of contract that are not always ap-
128
Article 2:301 Manner of Conclusion
propriate for insurance contracts. After all, the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law do not generally have the same goals or constituency as the Principles of European
Contract Law.
C3. Articles 2:301 and 2:302 illustrate the point. Article 2:301 adopts Article 2:201 para.
2 PECL because a mandatory provision is needed in insurance contract law. Article 2:302,
however, deviates from the Principles of European Contract Law, aiming to increase the
protection of the applicant in a way that would not have been the case if the corresponding
rule of the Principles of European Contract Law were applied.
Agreement
C4. The main rule of general contract law in Europe is that it is enough for contract
formation that the parties reach agreement. With the exception of some specific types of
contract, there are no rules requiring a contract to be concluded in or evidenced by writing
or in any other way. To write a contract might be quite natural, but the conclusion of the
contract normally takes place before the parties record it in writing.
C5. The same ought to apply to insurance contracts. In a few European countries some
kind of form is required for the insurance contract to be valid, but there is no reason to
implement a rule of this kind at the European level. Moreover, it is important and socially
desirable that insurance cover can be put in place as quickly as possible after the decision
of the applicant to apply for insurance and the agreement of the parties. Observance of
formalities will cause delay.
C6. Since there is no requirement of form for an insurance contract, agreement can be
oral or in writing. The latter can be effected by post, fax or electronically. Nothing prevents
the insurer and the applicant choosing different ways. So, for instance, the applicant might
propose insurance by telephone, while the acceptance by the insurer might be given in a
letter sent by post.
C7. Normally the conclusion of an insurance contract presupposes activity by both parties.
But there are also situations where the inactivity of one of them could lead to such conclu-
sion. A situation of this kind could arise where, although no insurance contract is in fact
concluded, the applicant believes the opposite and the insurer has reason to suspect this
mistake without doing anything to correct it. Such an infringement of good faith towards a
negotiating party, who, because of his mistake never considers taking alternative insurance,
might result in the conclusion of an insurance contract.
Insurance Contract
C8. An insurance contract is concluded if the parties intend to be legally bound, and they
reach a sufficient agreement: this is the rule in Article 2:101 PECL, which applies equally to
insurance contracts. The decision whether there has been an intention to be legally bound
must be taken from an objective point of view. If the insurer or the applicant afterwards
129
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
asserts that they never had that intention, the starting point lies with the other party’s ex-
pectations. What could reasonably had been understood by the statements and conduct
of the party denying intention will, together with the demand for a sufficient agreement,
determine whether a contract has been concluded or not: see Article 2:102 PECL.
C9. It is not possible to give a satisfactory formulation covering all the cases where suf-
ficient agreement has been reached by the parties. The existence of such agreement has to
be sought from case to case. For the conclusion of a contract according to Article 2:301,
however, the parties cannot be expected to know all the details of the cover and its price. In
principle it is enough that the parties know what kind of insurance is intended. The social
importance of insurance implies that the degree of agreement required cannot be as high
as in general contract law.
Mandatory Character
C10. Article 2:301 closely follows Article 2:101 para. 2 PECL. However, contrary to the
Principles of European Contract Law, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
do not leave the parties free to agree the form in which the contract is to be concluded. An
agreement between the insurer and the applicant that a special form has to be observed by
them for an insurance contract to be concluded is meaningless from the point of view of
the conclusion of the contract. The very agreement on form proves that the parties intended
to be legally bound.
C11. For example, an applicant, who wants to take fire insurance, agrees on 1 September
with the insurer that a certain form of agreement has to be observed before there is an in-
surance contract. This is to be recorded on a form agreed on 10 September. The applicant’s
house is burnt down on 9 September. The conclusion of the contract, however, took place
on 1 September, and the applicant is probably (see Comment 7 above) protected by the fire
insurance, although the particular form agreed to was not completed in time.
Proof
C12. In the Principles of European Contract Law the main rule is immediately followed
by the rule that the contract may be proved by any means, including witnesses: the second
sentence of Article 2:101 para. 2. There is a need to repeat this rule in the Principles of
European Insurance Contract Law, since one cannot rule out the possibility of agreement
between the insurer and the applicant that proof of the contract by some means should not
be valid unless witnessed. Such an agreement is not valid.
Notes
A Matter of General Contract Law
N1. References to general contract law are common in national laws with regard to the formation
of the insurance contract. This is true for Austria (Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1014), for Belgium
(Basedow/Fock-Fock 233), for Denmark (Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 290), for France (Basedow/Fo-
130
Article 2:302 Revocation of an Application for Insurance
ck-Völker 465-466), for Germany (Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 321: the reference to the Civil Code
and Commercial Code for issues not regulated in the ICA is also valid for the new ICA), for
Greece (Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 577, Chatzinikolaou-Aggelidou, Simvasi 195 ff., Ro-
kas, paras. 238 ff. and Rokas, Eisigiseis paras. 62 ff.), for Ireland (Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1393), for
Italy (Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 666), for the Netherlands (Basedow/Fock-Fock 828),
for Poland (Kowalewski 239), for Portugal (see art. 4 ICA referring to the subsidiary application
of the general rules of civil and commercial law), for Sweden (Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 920, also
valid for the new ICA) and for the United Kingdom (Birds 5.1 ff., Clarke 11-1).
Consensual Contract
N2. The insurance contract is generally considered as a consensual contract which is formed by
the consent of the parties, no special form being required (see for Austria, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel
1018; for Denmark, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 923-924; for Finland, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 923-
924 and Hoppu/Hemmo 90-96; for France, Lamy Assurances, para. 443 and Basedow/Fock-Völker
469; for Germany, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 326; for Greece, Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge
580, Chatzinikolaou-Aggelidou, Simvasi 196 ff. and Rokas, paras. 237 ff.; for Ireland, Basedow/
Fock-Rühl 1399; for Italy, Cerini 65; for the Netherlands, Basedow/Fock-Fock 830; for Poland,
Kowalewski 242; for Spain, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 179, Bataller/Veiga 523 and Basedow/Fo-
ck-Schlenker 1288; for Switzerland, Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1212; for Sweden, Basedow/Fock-Scher-
pe 923-924; for the United Kingdom, Birds 5.1 ff. and Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1399; see however for
Scotland, Article 2:501 Note 9. Moreover for marine insurance a policy is required: s. 22 of the
UK Marine Insurance Act 1906; and when insurance is contracted electronically an accessible
form is required: regulation 6 of the UK Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.
N3. Even where special rules require written form or consider the policy as an equivalent to
the insurance contract, these rules are not meant to establish written form as a condition for a
valid insurance contract (see for Austria, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1018; for Belgium, Basedow/
Fock-Fock 238 and Cousy/Schoorens 95; for Italy, Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 671). Such
provisions would in general rather be part of the law of evidence.
N4. The consensual character of the insurance contract does not withstand the imposition of the
duty on the insurer to provide certain pre-contractual information to the policyholder/applicant
nor is the consensual nature of the contract impaired by the insurer’s obligation to issue a policy.
The breach of those obligations does not invalidate the contract, but is rather considered as a
breach of contractual or pre-contractual obligations arising in view of the conclusion of, or from,
the insurance contract. For such obligations flowing from national law, see the notes on Articles
2:201 and 2:501. It is however true that the imposition of pre-contractual information duties
makes the conclusion of the insurance contract without the observation of any form whatsoever
de facto difficult (see Basedow/Fock-Lenzing 156 with regard to the EC directives).
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Comments
An Application for Insurance
C2. Before the application for insurance reaches the insurer it may be withdrawn by the
applicant. However, even after it has reached the insurer the applicant may be able to revoke
his application. Article 2:302 prescribes that this must be done at the latest before he receives
the acceptance of the insurer.
C3. Article 2:202 para. 1 PECL is not as generous to the applicant as is Article 2:302.
According to the former the crucial moment before which a revocation must be effected is
dispatch of the acceptance. Applied to insurance law this rule would imply that the applicant
would be unable to revoke his application after that. This would normally not be a problem if
acceptance was given orally or sent by e-mail, since the arrival of the acceptance here comes
close to the moment of dispatch. But the situation is different when the insurer’s acceptance
is sent by post and the rule in Article 2:302 is different too.
C4. A revocation sent electronically arrives when it reaches the insurer’s server. Corre-
spondingly, an acceptance arrives when it reaches the applicant’s server. This rule is justified;
because of the previous application both parties can be expected to check their e-mails. The
same rule may not be appropriate for all other kinds of notices.
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Article 2:302 Revocation of an Application for Insurance
(3) Paragraph (2) applies notwithstanding that the place where the information system is
located may be different from the place where the data message is deemed to be received
under paragraph (4).
(4) Unless otherwise agreed between the originator and the addressee, a data message
is deemed to be dispatched at the place where the originator has its place of business,
and is deemed to be received at the place where the addressee has its place of business.
For the purposes of this paragraph:
(a) if the originator or the addressee has more than one place of business, the place
of business is that which has the closest relationship to the underlying transaction or,
where there is no underlying transaction, the principal place of business;
(b) if the originator or the addressee does not have a place of business, reference is to
be made to its habitual residence.
(5) The provisions of this article do not apply to the following […].
Effectiveness of Revocation
C5. According to Article 2:202 para. 3 PECL a revocation of an offer is ineffective in some
cases, for instance if the offer states a fixed time for its acceptance. This rule is not suitable
for the revocation of an application for insurance. It follows from Article 2:303 PEICL that
restrictions on the freedom to revoke an application for insurance are not valid as long as
there is no acceptance on the part of the insurer. The applicant might have an interest in
contracting alternative insurance cover. Although directly or indirectly the applicant might
have promised not to revoke the application before acceptance by the insurer, he is free
to do it. This means that the only way of avoiding revocation is for the insurer to effect its
acceptance as quickly as possible.
Notes
The Roles of Offeror and Offeree
N1. Legislative rules about how the roles of offeror and offeree are settled are normally not
given. However, practice and jurisprudence give some answers as to the normal model. Most
countries regard the applicant as the offeror, while the insurer is the offeree. This is the situation
in Austria (see Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1014), France (see Basedow/Fock-Völker 466), Germany
(see Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 321), Greece (see Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 577 and Rokas,
Eisigiseis paras. 62 ff.), Ireland (see Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1393), Italy (see Basedow/Fock-Brunetta
d’Usseaux 667), the Netherlands (Basedow/Fock-Fock 828), Poland (see Kowalewski 239-240)
and the United Kingdom (see Rust v Abbey Life Assurance Co [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 386; The
Zephyr [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 58, 72, per Hobhouse J.; Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1393). But this is just a
mode reflecting the typical way of contracting; it is subject to exceptions. The model appears to be
more open, allowing both parties to adopt the role of the offeror or offeree, in Denmark, Finland
and Sweden (cf. Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 920-921 and for Sweden Bengtsson 23), the Netherlands
(see Basedow/Fock-Fock 828) and Switzerland (see Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1209), although at the
end of the day in all these countries the applicant is considered to be the offeror in the normal
case. The type of insurance involved as well as the particulars of the process of acceptance by the
insurer may vary the normal model.
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
N2. A clear exception can be found in Belgium, where the insurer is considered to be the offeror
who sends the policy contract to the applicant. By signing the policy, the applicant concludes the
contract (see Fontaine, para. 112; Basedow/Fock-Fock 233). In order to accelarate the contracting
process, insurance practice appears to make use of policies which the insurer has signed before
even knowing the identity of the applicant and his particular risk; such pre-signed policies be-
come binding when the applicant signs them, see art. 4 para. 2 IA 2014. While the rules of the
insurance contract act reflect these practices they apparently do not exclude different ways of
formation of the insurance contract (Basedow/Fock-Fock 238).
N3. National contract laws differ as to whether and at what point in time an offeror is bound by
the offer made. While the laws of German and Nordic tradition generally consider the offer as
binding, those of romanic and common law tradition mainly decline such legal effect, unless it is
explicitly stipulated. As a consequence, admitting a revocation has very different significance in
these two groups of countries: where an offer is binding, a revocation tends to be considered as
a disturbance. Where the offeror remains free as a matter of law, he simply makes use of a right
he has anyway.
N4. An offer to take or to give insurance is not binding in Ireland (see Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1394)
and in the United Kingdom (see Canning v Farquhar (1886) 16 QBD 727; Basedow/Fock-Rühl
1394). France has taken the same stance, although under general French contract law the offer-
or is bound for a reasonable time to maintain his offer (see Basedow/Fock-Völker 467). In the
Netherlands, the offer of the applicant is not binding unless it includes a term for acceptance, or
irrevocability results otherwise from the offer (see Basedow/Fock-Fock 829). In these countries
the latest point in time for the revocation is generally considered to be the acceptance of the offer
(see for France Basedow/Fock-Völker 467). In Portugal, the proposal is irrevocable after having
been received by or known to the insurer (this is a general rule of contract law, art. 230 CC).
N5. The opposite rule, namely the binding character of the insurance offer, can be found in
Austria (see Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1014), Denmark (see Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 921; Lando/
Beale 167), Finland (see Hoppu/Hemmo 91-92 and Lando/Beale 167), Germany (s. 145 CC, see
Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 321-322), Greece (see Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 578 and Rokas,
Eisigiseis paras. 62 ff.), Poland (see art. 66 CC), Sweden (cf. Lando/Beale 167), Switzerland (art. 1
paras. 1 and 2 ICA: the applicant is bound to his offer for a period of 14 days, or four weeks if a
medical check is requested, see Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1210). In Italy, where the principal rule of
general contract law declines a binding nature of an offer (art. 1328 CC), there is an exception
for offers given by applicants of insurance. Here the applicant is bound to his offer for a period
of 15-30 days; due to counter-exceptions for life assurance, the practical application of this rule
is essentially for indemnity insurance (see art. 176 of the Code of Private Insurance for life as-
surance and Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 668-669).
N6. Belgium represents a mixed system: while the applicant’s proposal for insurance is explicitly
declared to be non-binding (art. 4 para. 1 IA 2014), the insurer’s offer incorporated in the policy
sent to the applicant is said to be irrevocable for a reasonable time (see Fontaine, para. 113). A
system according to which the insurer is bound by his offer for 15 days, while the applicant is
not, also exists in Spain (see Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 178 and Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1285).
134
Article 2:303 Cooling-off Period
Comments
Introduction
C1. The Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) and the Distance Marketing Directive
(2002/65/EC) provide a model for a cooling-off period. In principle, Article 2:303 follows
this model.
C2. The object of granting the policyholder a cooling-off period is to give him a period
of time after receipt of all material information, including the standard terms, in order to
appraise the contract of insurance offered to him and hence make a well-informed decision
whether it meets his needs.
C3. Article 2:303 para. 1 entitles the policyholder to avoid the contract by giving notice in
writing within a cooling-off period of two weeks. However there are circumstances where
the granting of a cooling-off period is not appropriate for the type of insurance in question
or because in certain important situations third parties would be harmed by the exercise
of a right to withdraw. The relevant types of insurance are listed in Article 2:303 para. 2.
Avoidance
C4. In accordance with the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) a choice is made
in favour of retroactive avoidance of the contract: the policyholder is entitled to avoid the
contract ab initio. The consequences of avoidance are governed by Article 4:115 PECL: either
party may claim restitution of whatever it has supplied under the contract, provided it makes
concurrent restitution of whatever it has received. In relation to insurance it means the
insurer is entitled to restitution of any payment of insurance money while the policyholder
is entitled to restitution of any payment of premium. The insurer is not entitled to claim
reimbursement of any expenses in relation to the conclusion of the contract.
22
This Article is modelled on the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC).
135
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
C5. Inherent in having a cooling-off period is that it should not begin before the policy-
holder has received the information necessary to properly appraise the contract of insurance
and hence make a well-informed decision whether it meets his needs. As to the information
required reference is made to the documents mentioned in Articles 2:201 and 2:501.
C6. In line with the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) it is enough that the
notification is sent before the deadline expires.
C7. As already mentioned above, there are circumstances where the granting of a cool-
ing-off period is inappropriate given the character of the cover agreed. There are two par-
ticular groups where this is the case: The first group includes cases where cover has been
granted for very short periods, see below Comments 8 to 10. In a second group of cases
avoidance of the contract by the policyholder may do harm to third parties who may rely
on the existence of cover, see below Comments 11 to 13. These considerations underlie the
enumeration of exceptions to the policyholder’s right of avoidance contained in para. 2. In-
surance services are financial services for the purposes of the Distance Marketing Directive
(2002/65/EC). In so far as insurance contracts are agreed upon as distance contracts within
the meaning of that Directive, the policyholder has a right to withdraw from the contract
within 14 calendar days, see art. 6. While the Directive provides for some exceptions from
this basic rule of withdrawal, the list laid down in Article 2:303 para. 2 does not simply copy
the exceptions of the Directive. As will be explained below, the Directive insufficiently takes
account of some particular features of certain insurance contracts which require further
exceptions.
C8. The exception laid down in para. 2(a) is justified by the short duration of the contract.
In short term insurance contracts a right of avoidance would create a disproportionate un-
certainty about the validity of the contract. Moreover, the policyholder is not substantially
prejudiced due to the low premiums for such short term contracts. Art. 6 para. 2(b) of the
Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) contains a similar exception.
C9. Preliminary cover is equally of a short duration. In some Member States it will be
agreed for a fixed term of two weeks, four weeks or two months, in others it is of unlimited
duration, but agreed with the understanding that it will end as soon as the main insurance
contract takes effect after a short lapse of time. The taking out of preliminary cover may be
a precondition for the policyholder obtaining certain public licences. Thus, cars will only
be admitted to public use if there is motor liability insurance which will usually be taken
out on a preliminary basis. If the policyholder were allowed to avoid the contract within a
period of two weeks, the purpose of this requirement, for example the protection of third
party victims of potential traffic accidents, would be undermined, because such victims
would be unprotected. While the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) does not
contain an explicit exception from the right of withdrawal for preliminary cover, the gen-
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Article 2:303 Cooling-off Period
eral principle underlying art. 6 para. 2(b) would apply to preliminary insurance as well; the
time limitation of the Directive’s exception to insurance policies of less than one month’s
duration is inappropriate here.
C10. The exception laid down in Article 2:303 para. 2(b) for contracts prolonged under
Article 2:602 flows from the consideration that the policyholder could already make use of
a cooling-off period when he concluded the initial contract. There is no legitimate interest
in having another period of reconsideration at the beginning of the prolonged contract.
This is reflected by art. 1 para. 2 of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) which
excludes successive operations from the scope of the Directive altogether.
C11. The two remaining exceptions laid down in Article 2:303 para. 2(c) concern liability
insurance and group insurance. Liability insurance is taken out, in many cases, for the pro-
tection of third parties. The protection of third parties is the main or even exclusive purpose
of the many laws and regulations, adopted at the level of both the Community and of the
Member States, which prescribe compulsory liability insurance. But even where liability
insurance is voluntary, it often serves the interest of third parties. For instance, landlords will
often ask their tenants to take out liability insurance; they may even make the conclusion of
the rental agreement dependant upon the proof of such cover. As pointed out in the context
of preliminary cover above in Comment 9, the avoidance, by the policyholder, of a liability
insurance contract would essentially impair the interest of third parties who would not even
be informed of such avoidance.
C12. The situation is similar in the case of group insurance. Here, the policyholder takes
out the insurance on behalf of the members of a group. Avoidance of the contract by the
policyholder would interfere with the rights and interests of those group members who are
not party to the insurance contract. It follows that the exception does not apply where the
group members have concluded individual insurance contracts under a general framework
agreement.
C13. The Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) does not take account of the rights
and interests of third parties who may rely on the validity of contracts of financial services
concluded between a consumer/policyholder and an insurer. Frictions with the Directive
will be rare in the case of group insurance which is unlikely to be agreed upon in a distance
contract. This is different in respect of various types of liability insurance, however. For the
reasons set forth above, the solution of the Directive cannot be applied here.
Notes
Community Law
N1. Under art. 186 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), which replaces art. 35 Life As-
surance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC), the policyholder of an individual life assurance
contract has a right to cancel the contract which can be exercised in a period of 14 to 30 days
from the time he is informed of the conclusion of the contract. This right is limited to life assur-
ance. The right to cancellation in life assurance is supplemented by a right of withdrawal under
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
art. 6 of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) which includes insurance (art. 2(b)),
but which is limited to the distance marketing of financial services to consumers (art. 1 of the
Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC)). This Directive was to be implemented by national
legislators by 9 October 2004 (art. 21 para. 1 of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC)).
N2. In implementing the Life Assurance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC) (and its prede-
cessor), most Member States such as Austria (s. 165a ICA), Belgium (art. 9 para. 1 of the Royal
Decree of 14 November 2003 on Life Assurance), France (the third sentence of art. L. 132-5-1
para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 495), Italy (art. 117 of the Code of Private Insurance), Lux-
embourg (art. 100 ICA) and Spain (art. 83a ICA) have limited the right of cancellation to life
assurance contracts, closely adhering to the Directive. Sweden is a country where there is no
need at all for a particular cooling-off period in life assurance. The policyholder has been given
a right to terminate all kinds of personal insurances at any time with immediate effect (s. 5 of
Ch. 11 ICA).
N3. Other countries have extended the right beyond life assurance to personal accident or health
insurance or to long-term insurance contracts in general (Poland: art. 812 para. 4 CC; Portugal:
art. 118 para. 1a ICA; United Kingdom: ICOBS 7.1.1. At common law, see Sun Fire Office v Hart
(1889) 14 App Cas 98; Clarke 18-3E; Beatson/Burrows/Cartwright 52 f.; Ireland: for the common
law, see Carna Foods v Eagle Star [1997] 2 IR 193) or for consumers (Austria: s. 5c ICA).
N4. Even where statutory insurance law grants a right of cancellation only in life assurance,
insurance industry associations sometimes recommend that the insurers accord a general right
of cancellation for all sorts of long-term insurance contracts. Finland provides for a general right
of termination for insurance contracts (s. 12 ICA), while Denmark opts for a general right of
cancellation in consumer insurance (Chapter 4a of the Act No. 451 of 9 June 2004 on Certain
Consumer Contracts, for all life-insurance contracts: art. 97a ICA). A similar stance is taken
in Germany, Greece and the Netherlands where the right of policyholders to avoid insurance
contracts extends to other branches of insurance and all modes of conclusion of an insurance
contract (s. 8 German ICA; art. 8 para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 4:20 para. 2 Dutch ISA in conjunction
with art. 60 para. 2 and 61 para. 2 of the Dutch Decree on the Supervision of the Conduct of
Financial Enterprises).
N5. If a right of avoidance is established, it is normally excluded for (certain) short-term insur-
ance contracts. Art. 6 para. 2(b) of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) exempts travel
and baggage insurance policies or similar short-term insurance policies of less than one month’s
duration from the scope of the right of withdrawal granted by art. 6 para. 1 of that Directive.
Art. 186 para. 2(a) of the Solvency II Direcitve (2009/138/EC) states that the Member States need
not apply the right of cancellation granted by art. 186 para. 1 of that Directive for individual life
assurance to contracts of six months’ duration or less. Similar provisions restricting the right of
avoidance to long-term insurance contracts can be found in s. 8 para. 3 German ICA, the first
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Article 2:304 Abusive Clauses
and second sentences of art. 8 para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 117 para. 4 of the Italian Code of Private
Insurance, art. 812 para. 4 Polish CC, art. 118 para. 1 Portuguese ICA, ICOBS 7.1.3 (United
Kingdom) and the recommendations of Dutch insurance associations (Basedow/Fock-Fock 838).
N6. An exception for the prolongation of a pre-existing insurance contract is a case where, be-
cause of the status of the policyholder or the circumstances in which the contract is concluded,
the policyholder does not need the special protection of the right of cancellation in accordance
with art. 186 para. 2(b) of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) because he should already be
aware of the contents of the insurance contract which he has decided to prolong.
N7. An exception for preliminary cover can be found in s. 8 para. 3 German ICA. Furthermore,
preliminary or provisional insurance contracts come quite close to contracts whose performance
has been fully completed by both parties at the consumer’s express request before the consumer
exercises his right of withdrawal, thus justifying an exclusion of the right of avoidance by analogy
to art. 6 para. 2(c) of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC). Similarly, cases of prelim-
inary or provisional insurance, liability insurance or group insurance do not fall under the right
of cancellation of art. 186 of the Solvency II Direcitve (2009/138/EC) because they either do not
concern life assurance (for example liability insurance), individual insurance (group insurance)
or the circumstances in which the contract is concluded suggest that the policyholder does
not need the special protection of a right of cancellation, art. 186 para. 2(b) of the Solvency II
Direcitve (2009/138/EC). An exception for group insurance contracts, namely a restriction of
the right of cancellation to individual insurance contracts is provided for not only in art. 186
para. 1 of the Solvency II Direcitve (2009/138/EC), but also mirrored in the respective national
provisions implementing that Directive (for example s. 165a para. 3 Austrian ICA, art. 100 Lux-
embourg ICA, art. 83a Spanish ICA).
23
This Article is modelled on the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC).
139
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
(4) A term shall always be regarded as not individually negotiated when it has been drafted in
advance and the policyholder has therefore not been able to influence the substance of the
term, particularly in the context of a pre-formulated standard contract. The fact that certain
aspects of a term or one specific term have been individually negotiated shall not exclude
the application of this Article to the rest of a contract if an overall assessment of the contract
indicates that it is nevertheless a pre-formulated standard contract. When an insurer claims
that a standard term has been individually negotiated, the burden of proof in this respect shall
be incumbent on the insurer.
Comments
Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC)
C1. Article 2:304 restates the rules contained in arts. 3, 4 and 6 of Unfair Contract Terms
Directive (93/13/EEC) as well as Article 4:110 PECL and adapts them to the context of the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. It has been formulated to take into account
the particularities of insurance contracts, which deal with insurance as an intangible service.
In accordance with art. 7 para. 1 of the Directive, this provision is intended to ensure that
adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in insurance
contracts.
C2. Going beyond the scope of the Directive, Article 2:304, like Article 4:110 PECL, ap-
plies the judicial review to commercial contracts (compare art. 3 of the Directive). The
restriction to consumer contracts is not appropriate in insurance law because policyholders
need protection against insurers, no matter whether they are consumers or not. Insurers
commonly draft the terms of the insurance contracts in advance, so that policyholders have
no opportunity to negotiate the terms.
Core terms
C3. Recital 19 of the Directive explicitly says that in insurance contracts, the terms which
clearly define or circumscribe the insured risk and the insurer’s liability shall not be subject
to review since those terms are taken into account in calculating the premium paid by the
consumer. However, this does not mean that every term that deals with the insured risk
and the insurer’s liability is exempted from the fairness test. While the English text of the
Directive gives the impression that every term that defines the insured risk or the insurer’s
liability is taken into account in calculating the premium and thus has to be exempted from
the fairness test, the German version of the Directive (“soweit”) shows that an exemption
should be made only if the term actually has been considered in the calculation of the pre-
mium. To provide an effective protection of the policyholder’s rights, the number of terms
exempted from the fairness test must be restricted. The Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law are based on the assumption that the Directive is applicable to insurance
contracts and they provide for a more comprehensive review than the minimum standards
of the Directive.
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Article 2:304 Abusive Clauses
C4. Thus for the purpose of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law, only core
terms are exempted from the fairness test. Such terms are protected from court interven-
tion. In a competitive insurance market the essential elements of any insurance contract,
namely the scope of insurance cover and the premium paid, are matters for market forces
and the agreement of the parties. These core terms are described in Article 2:304 as terms
that state the essential description of the cover granted or the premium agreed. This de-
scription appears more appropriate to the insurance contract than the vaguer terms used in
the Directive (“main subject matter of the contract”). In this context, the relevant terms are
those that give a crucial definition or circumscription of the type and subject of insurance,
the insured risk, the insurer’s liability, the insurance benefit, the sum insured, the insured
interest or the insurable value. Terms restricting, changing, elaborating or modifying the
insurer’s obligation to perform are, however, not core terms and therefore subject to review
under Article 2:304. If, for example, a policyholder takes out professional indemnity insur-
ance, this would imply the exclusion of general liability as part of the crucial definition of
the “type and subject of insurance”. This implicit exclusion would therefore not be subject
to review. However, if a term of the policy excludes liability for pure economic loss, such a
term would be subject to review.
C5. However, core terms are only exempted from the fairness test if they are drafted in
plain and intelligible language to a reasonable holder of a policy of that type (Article 2:304
para. 3; this reinforces the general requirement for documents to be plain and intelligible
under Article 1:203 para. 1). Freedom of contract can only be effective, if the policyholder
has the opportunity to understand the terms that are crucial for his decision to take out the
particular insurance contract.
C6. Terms that have been individually negotiated are also excluded from the fairness test
(Article 2:304 para. 1). If both parties, the insurer and the policyholder, have agreed on an
individually negotiated term, their freedom of contract has to be respected and the term
may not be submitted to review under Article 2:304.
C7. A term will only be considered as individually negotiated if the policyholder had
a real opportunity to influence the formulation and the content of the term. This is why
Article 2:304 para. 4 states that terms which were drafted by the insurer in advance are to
be considered as not individually negotiated. Furthermore, if parts of a term or a single
term are negotiated individually, the rest of the term or the contract, as appropriate, may
still be considered as not individually negotiated. In addition, Article 2:304 para. 4 places
the burden of proving that a standard term has been individually negotiated in a particular
case on the insurer.
Fairness Test
C8. The unfairness of a term is assessed by an overall evaluation of the interests involved.
For that purpose Article 2:304 uses the criteria of “good faith” and “fair dealing” as general
guidelines. Furthermore, it makes explicit that a violation of good faith and fair dealing
must lead to a “significant imbalance” of the protected parties’ “rights and obligations”
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
to their detriment. These criteria stem from the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/
EEC), art. 3 paras. 1 and 3. It is not always easy to draw a sharp line between them. They
frequently overlap, meaning that a term violating “good faith” and “fair dealing” at the
same time causes a “significant imbalance” in the protected parties’ rights and obligations.
Nevertheless, the fairness test under Article 2:304 para. 1 must always take account of all
the criteria mentioned.
Grey List
C9. The Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC) is supplemented by an annex con-
taining an indicative list of terms that can be considered to be unfair (a “grey” list). The list
is not exhaustive. Conversely a term in the list may not always be unfair but such a term
would certainly need further scrutiny. The list of terms in the annex of the Directive may be
relevant to insurance contracts and may be considered when applying Article 2:304 just as
it is considered to be an appropriate guideline for the interpretation of Article 4:110 PECL.
For that purpose the list is reprinted below.
Sanctions
C10. Under Article 2:304 para. 1 an unfair term does not bind the policyholder, the in-
sured or the beneficiary. This provision, which is based on art. 6 para. 1 of the Directive,
ensures that an unfair term cannot be enforced against any of them, but would allow any of
them to rely on such a term if it would be to their advantage in an appropriate case.
C11. If a term is unfair, the remainder of the contract remains in force if this is possible and
appropriate (first sentence of Article 2:304 para. 2). Otherwise the term has to be replaced
by a term that reasonable parties would have chosen instead of the unfair term (second
sentence of Article 2:304 para. 2). For that purpose it depends on what a reasonable insurer
and a reasonable holder of a policy of the type in question would have agreed upon at the
time of conclusion of the contract had they known about the unfairness of the term.
C12. The assessment of unfairness is a matter of value judgments which are based on cer-
tain facts taken into account by the judge. The burden of proof for these facts establishing a
case of significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations lies with the policyholder,
insured or beneficiary subject to alleviations under the national laws of civil procedure.
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Article 2:304 Abusive Clauses
including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim
which the consumer may have against him;
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by
the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on his own
will alone;
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter
decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer
to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the
latter is the party cancelling the contract;
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately
high sum in compensation;
(f) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis
where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or sup-
plier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the seller or
supplier himself who dissolves the contract;
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so;
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not
indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not
to extend the contract is unreasonably early;
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity
of becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;
(j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without
a valid reason which is specified in the contract;
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any char-
acteristics of the product or service to be provided;
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or allowing a
seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both cases giving
the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final price is too high
in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded;
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services
supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to inter-
pret any term of the contract;
(n) limiting the seller’s or supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by
his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular formal-
ity;
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfil all his obligations where the seller or supplier does
not perform his;
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations
under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer,
without the latter’s agreement;
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively
to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available
to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law,
should lie with another party to the contract.
2. Scope of subparagraphs (g), (j) and (l)
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
C14. For the matter of insurance contracts, only a few of the terms in the list above become
relevant. These are namely24
(a) Terms that mislead the insured consumer about the contract:
(i) “Hidden terms”: This is, for example, a term irrevocably binding the insured to terms
with which the insured had no real opportunity of becoming acquainted before the con-
clusion of the contract (para. 1(i) on the grey list). In this context “acquaintance” first of
all requires intelligibility of the terms. The more complex they are, the less intelligible they
become and the harder it will be for the insurer to prove that the insured had a real opportu-
nity of understanding them. The praxis of some insurance outlets like travel agencies selling
travel insurance to offer scant summaries of cover will not be sufficient.
A “hidden term” can also be one that remits to a legal provision which is not quoted in the
contractual terms.
Another example is important terms hidden in long documents, perhaps with small print
(“unfair surprises”).
(ii) “Entire agreement” clauses, some of which fall within the grey list category of terms
“limiting the […] supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by his agents”
(para. 1 on the grey list). For example: “All terms of the contract of insurance are contained
in this policy. No representations are made or given by the Company save as appear herein.”
Otherwise the insured could not rely on what the selling agent had said about the policy
terms. Besides that this category also includes terms saying that when completing the pro-
24
The list of terms that concern insurance context as well as the examples given have been taken over
with a few adaptions from Clarke 19-5A4.
144
Article 2:304 Abusive Clauses
posal, the insurer’s agent is acting not on behalf of the insurer, as most proposers would
(reasonably) expect, but on behalf of the applicant.
(b) Terms that excuse improper performance of contractual obligations:
(i) Terms excluding liability for delay in handling and paying claims are terms “inappropri-
ately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the […] supplier […]
in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate performance by […] the
supplier of any of the contractual obligations” (para. 1(b) on the grey list).
(ii) Terms “obliging the insured to fulfil all his obligations where the insurer does not per-
form his” (para. 1 on the grey list).
(c) Terms erecting barriers to redress: These are terms “excluding or hindering the con-
sumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy” (para. 1(q) on the grey
list), including:
(i) A term enabling the insurer to mount a technical defence. Such might be a term requiring
notice of loss in an unduly short period of time.
(ii) A term requiring “proof satisfactory to the insurer”, if it allows the insurer to make unfair
demands on the claimant consumer.
(iii) A “reverse burden clause”, whereby the insurer has merely to allege that the loss claimed
is excepted rather than covered to put upon the claimant the burden of proving otherwise.
(iv) Arbitration clauses: the insured is required to take disputes exclusively to arbitration
not covered by legal provisions. Such clauses are considered to be potentially unfair as the
insured is likely to be no match for the insurer in the arbitral process – any more than in a
foreign court.
(v) Any other term the effect of which is to enable the insurer to be slow in paying a claim.
(d) Terms that allow the insurance supplier to cancel the contract, at least when the insured
has no equivalent right (para. 1(g) on the grey list).
(i) Terms that have the effect of allowing the insurer to cancel the contract without rea-
sonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so. Thus terms with a
cancellation period that does not give the insured enough time to seek alternative cover.
(ii) Terms whereby insurers are entitled to cancel cover but to retain premium.
(e) Terms that allow the insurer to vary an insurance contract unilaterally without a valid
reason specified in the contract (para. 1(j) on the grey list). This includes terms that entitle
the insurer to vary the premium unilaterally during the insurance period or to assign the
contract to another insurer.
(f) Terms that allow disproportionate penalties for breach by the consumer (para. 1(d) and
(e) on the grey list).
Notes
Implementation of EU Law
N1. Article 2:304 para. 1 is modelled on art. 3 para. 1 and art. 4 para. 1 of the Unfair Con-
tract Terms Directive (93/13/EC). Accordingly, all Member States have meanwhile implemented
equivalent rules, which also apply to insurance contracts as far as they qualify as consumer
contracts as defined in the Directive.
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
N2. In comparison, the methods of implementation of the Directive vary greatly corresponding
to the concepts of civil legislation and consumer protection as generally advocated in the Mem-
ber States. In some countries, the provisions serving to implement the Directive can be found
as parts of the civil code (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland), in others as part
of consumer statutes (Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Spain), in the statutes on market practices
(Belgium), as part of statutes on pre-formulated contracts (Portugal), in a statute on consumer
contracts (Sweden) or on general contract law (Denmark), or in specific statutory instruments
as in the United Kingdom and in Ireland (cf. Münchener Kommentar-Basedow, vor § 305 BGB
para. 23).
N3. The implementing provisions of the national laws are as follows: s. 6 of the Consumer Pro-
tection Act (Austria); art. 73 of the Act of 6 April 2010 on Market Practices and Consumer
Information and Protection, presently incorporated into the Code of Economic Law, art. VI, 82
(Belgium); s. 36 of the Contract Act (Denmark); s. 1 of Ch. 3 of the Consumer Protection Act
(38/1978) (Finland); art. L. 132-1 of the Consumer Code (France); s. 307 CC (Germany); Law
on Consumer Protection (Greece); European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Con-
tracts) Regulations 1995 (Ireland); arts. 33 to 38 of the Consumer Code (Italy); art. 6:233 CC (the
Netherlands); art. 385(1) CC (Poland); Royal Legislative Decree on Consumer and User Interests
(Spain); Act on Contractual Conditions in Consumer Relationships (Sweden); and the Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (United Kingdom). For surveys of the imple-
mentation processes, see: Report on the Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive;
and Münchener Kommentar-Basedow, vor § 305 BGB paras. 22 f. (including the implementing
provisions and acts of the new Member States); for national reports on the implementation: see
Alexandridou 173 ff.; Alpa 181 ff.; Balate 143 ff.; Bernitz 13 ff.; Davo 157 ff.; El Vinger 185 ff.; Hon-
dius 193 ff.; Lete 205 ff.; Monteiro 197 ff.; Posch 135 ff.; Reich 165 ff.; Wilhelmson 151 ff.; and Willett
223 ff.
N4. However, the aforementioned list of implementing provisions and acts does not give a pre-
cise account of the extent to which the fairness of insurance contracts may be reviewed. In
nearly all countries, contingent upon their approach to consumer protection and their way of
implementing the Directive, additional or broader rules are applicable when abusive clauses are
scrutinised. In order to reach a higher level of protection, some countries have either established
general rules on pre-formulated standard contracts, or they have extended the review of the
fairness of the contract as a matter of general contract law or insurance contract law.
N5. As an example of the latter approach, the Scandinavian countries traditionally allow for
more extensive judicial review of contract terms as a matter of general contract law (cf. for a
comparison with the Swedish law preceding the implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive (93/13/EC): Bernitz 13-27). The respective provisions are s. 36 of the Swedish and the
Danish Contract Acts. It shall be noted, however, that even though these rules apply to contracts
in general, the review of the fairness is stricter if a consumer or a “weaker” party is involved, see
s. 36 para. 2 of the Swedish Contract Act.
N6. In a similar vein, the civil codes of several Member States contain provisions enabling the
courts to review abusive clauses as part of pre-formulated standard contracts irrespective of their
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Article 2:304 Abusive Clauses
incorporation into commercial or consumer contracts. Frequently, such provisions also apply to
insurance contracts, see for example for Italy: art. 1341 para. 2 CC; for Germany: s. 307 CC; for
Austria: s. 879 para. 3 CC.
N7. Even before the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EC), Belgium had enacted legis-
lation designed to ensure the fairness of the contract specifically in respect of insurance con-
tracts, art. 14 of the Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision (see Fontaine,
paras. 63 ff.).
N8. Article 2:304 para. 1 only applies if the contract has not been individually negotiated as
defined in para. 4. Para. 4 is virtually identical to art. 3 para. 2 of the Unfair Contract Terms
Directive (93/13/EC) and, accordingly, already implemented in the Member States as far as con-
sumer insurance contracts are involved, see the references in Note 3.
N9. The Scandinavian countries traditionally assess the fairness of the contract regardless of the
circumstances of its conclusion. In other words, case-related negotiations do not foreclose the
application of a rule such as Article 2:304 (cf. for Finland: Wilhelmsson 155). This goes without
saying where the review of the insurance term is based on a provision of the (general) Contract
Act, as is the case in Denmark and Sweden (respective art. 36 of the Contract Acts, see above Note
5). In a similar vein, the Belgian Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision,
above at Note 7, provided for an application irrespective of the negotiated or non-negotiated
character of a clause. The Dutch Civil Code applies the test of fairness to clauses which have
been drafted to be included into a number of contracts, regardless of the aspect of negotiating
(art. 6:231(a)).
N10. Under French law, too, the aforementioned provision art. 132-1 of the Consumer Code on
abusive clauses applies regardless of whether the contract has been negotiated or not. As to the
scope, it should be recalled, however, that art. 132-1 of the Consumer Code, as the name of the
code suggests, is not applicable to all contracts, but only to those made by consumers. The Cour
de cassation has held that it shall not be applied when the insurance contract was taken out in
pursuance of the insured’s business (Cass. civ. 1er, 23.2.1999, RGDA 1999, 325). In Belgium, the
aforementioned provision of art. 73 of the Act of 6 April 2010 on Market Practices and Consumer
Information and Protection is applicable to contracts concluded with consumers regardless of
whether the contract has been negotiated or not.
N11. In accordance with Article 2:304 para. 3, many national laws provide for exemptions from
review for those terms of the contract which are identified to be essential for the conclusion of
the contract itself (“essentialia negotii”). Such rules have been introduced in France (art. L. 132-1
para. 6 of the Consumer Code), the Netherlands (art. 6:231 CC), and Poland (the second sentence
of art. 385(1) para. 1 CC). In other countries, the limits of the scope of review have been estab-
lished by the courts, for Germany: BGH, 13.7.2005, Versicherungsrecht 2005, 1417; Münchener
Kommentar-Wurmnest, § 307 BGB paras. 12 f.; for Italy: Volpe Putzolu 514. It remains disputed
147
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
and unclear in some other countries whether exceptions to the scope of review are made by the
courts: cf. Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1030 f. for Austria.
N12. The continuation of the contract, as provided for under para. 2, is modelled on art. 6 para.
1 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EC) and has been implemented accordingly in
all Member States. This rule follows from the consideration that the judicial review of a contract
term is meant to protect the policyholder. This purpose would be defeated if the invalidity of the
term led to the invalidity of the whole contract.
N13. For the same reason, it is added in the second sentence that if the contract is not capable
of being continued without the unfair term, it “shall the substituted by a term which reasonable
parties would have agreed upon had they known the unfairness of the term”. While this rule
exceptionally burdens the court with the task of rewriting the contract in respect of the invalid
term, it is an inescapable consequence of the judicial review of contract terms which are essential
to the agreement of the parties.
Comments
Issues of Risk
C1. Insurance contracts must cover a risk by definition (see Article 1:201 para. 1). From an
objective point of view a risk is lacking in contracts granting retroactive insurance, because
at that point in time the insured event has either materialised or not.
Nevertheless, Article 2:401 allows retroactive cover as long as, at the time of contracting,
there is subjective uncertainty in that the parties are unaware whether the insured event
has materialised or not.
C2. Retroactive cover does not concern cases where the insurance relates to uncertainty
about future developments while both parties are aware of the occurrence, in the past, of
events which give rise to those future developments. Thus, parties may conclude an insur-
ance contract covering the future depreciation of goods leased in the past. Or they may, after
the occurrence of a fire, take out insurance relating to the amount of loss which has been
148
Article 2:401 Retroactive Cover
caused by that fire but which is uncertain and difficult to asses. In a claims-made liability
policy the uncertainty of future claims made by third parties against the policyholder may
be insured even for those cases where the event giving rise to those claims has occurred
before the conclusion of the insurance contract. In such cases, the insured event is a future
occurrence. Therefore, Article 2:401 is not applicable. Nonetheless, the events that occurred
in the past have to be notified to the insurer in accordance with Article 2:101.
C3. If an insurer grants cover to a policyholder knowing that an insured event has not
occurred at the time the contract is formed, it should not be entitled to collect the premium
for the retroactive cover knowing that it would never have to pay. However, such a contract
will not be void because it may at the same time provide the policyholder with cover for
the future. In such cases the policyholder must be protected by retaining that cover and the
insurer should be entitled to collect the premium for the period after contract formation.
C4. In contrast, the contract is void if the policyholder, at the time of contract formation,
knows, by actual knowledge or knowledge imputed in accordance with Article 1:206, that
the insured event has already occurred. Moreover, in such cases the transaction is fraudulent
and the insurer should not be bound.
C5. If, at the time of contracting, both parties are aware that the insured event has already
occurred, the contract is not a contract of insurance as defined in Article 1:201. However, the
contract may be upheld as another type of contract, such as a contract of settlement, under
general contract law. Payments are sometimes agreed by the parties when the scope of a
policy is unclear or inadequate but the insurer wishes to pay to secure or retain the customer.
C6. If the policyholder does not know but has reason to know that the insured event has
materialised, Article 2:401 para. 2 will not apply. However, in such cases the policyholder
may have violated his pre-contractual information duties under Article 2:101. As a conse-
quence, the insurer may invoke the sanctions imposed by Articles 2:102 to 2:105.
Notes
General Permission for Retroactive Cover
N1. Policies providing for retroactive cover are permitted under most European laws. In Austria
and Germany, s. 2 para. 1 and s. 2 para. 2 Austrian and German ICA are explicit and correspond
to Article 2:401 para. 1 and Article 2:401 para. 2 PEICL, respectively. Under the Greek ICA, any
interest may form the object of an insurance contract. This includes past risks provided that the
policyholder, insured or beneficiary is not aware when concluding the contract that the insured
event has already occurred, see Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 599, Chatzinikolaou-Aggelidou
282 ff., and Rokas, paras. 414 ff. In the Netherlands, art. 7:925 CC leaves open the possibility of
retroactive cover, see Wansink/Kamphuisen/Kalkman 27. Spanish insurance law allows for ret-
149
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
roactive cover if there is uncertainty as to whether the risk has materialised, art. 6.2 ICA and in
marine insurance, see art. 422 of the Spanish Law of Maritime Navigation.
N2. In France, however, art. 121-15 para. 1 ICA stipulates a special rule for indemnity insurance:
If, at the moment the contract is made, the damage has already occurred (for example the in-
sured object has already perished), the retroactive clause is void. This would imply that policies
covering putative risks are not admissible in indemnity insurance. However, art. 121-15 ICA can
be interpreted as implicitly referring to the knowledge of the parties. The insurability of puta-
tive risks is accordingly recognised by the Cour de Cassation, cf. Lamy Assurances, para. 110(e).
Clauses providing for retroactive cover are referred to as clauses de reprise du passé; for a similar
approach see also art. 806 para. 2 Polish CC. In general, such clauses limit cover to past risks
not known by either party, or are at least construed in such way, cf. Lamy Assurances, para. 1287.
Finally, the Cour de Cassation has recognised in a number of judgements that insurance of past
risks is only invalid when the policyholder knew, at the time of the conclusion of the contract,
that the insured risk had already materialised, cf. Lamy Assurances, para. 110(d).
N3. When a policy is void under aforementioned conditions, the policyholder may recover his
premiums, art. 12115 para. 2 French ICA. Art. 121-15 para. 3 ICA provides for a special punitive
provision: when a party to the contract acted in bad faith, it must pay the other party a sum
equivalent to double the annual insurance premium.
N4. Other countries permit retroactive policies for specific branches of insurance. The most
common sectoral retroactive insurance policies are to be found in marine insurance, see for Spain
already above Note 1.
N5. In Belgium, art. 79 IA 2014 prohibits retroactive cover as a general rule. Belgian marine
insurance law makes an exception, however: According to art. 219 ComC, Book II, any insurance
contract concluded after the arrival or the loss of goods insured is void if the policyholder knew
of the loss, or the insurer knew of the arrival. This, in turn, means that retroactive insurance is
valid if both parties contracted in good faith. When land insurance contracts for putative risks
are void under art. 79 IA 2014, payments have to be refunded in general, see Fontaine, para. 234.
If the policyholder contracted in bad faith, no refund is due. When the policyholder acted in
gross negligence, the insurer may keep the proportion of the premium that corresponds to the
time elapsed until he knows of the realisation of the risk, art. 79 para. 3 IA 2014.
N6. In Italy, the statutory provisions provide for similar results. Land insurance contracts grant-
ing retroactive cover are void, see Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 690. Only in marine insur-
ance may the parties agree to cover a putative risk, cf. art. 514 of the Code of Navigation. Art. 514
para. 1 of the Code of Navigation provides that the insurance is void if the risk never existed or
ceased to exist, and the parties knew of this fact beforehand. It is presumed, until the contrary is
proved, that the news of cessation of the risk arrived without delay either at the location of the
conclusion of the contract, or the location where the policyholder agreed to the contract, see
art. 514 para. 2 of the Code of Navigation. Pursuant to art. 514 para. 3 of the Code of Navigation.
the insurer who contracted unknowingly is entitled to the premium only if he can deliver proof
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Article 2:402 Preliminary Cover
that the policyholder knew of the above-mentioned circumstances. When proof is not delivered,
the insurer in good faith may recover only his costs.
N7. For the United Kingdom and Ireland, see Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1440 ff. In the United King-
dom, s. 6(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 sanctions cover “lost or not lost” although the
insured “may not have acquired his interest until after the loss” and thus in effect retroactive
cover; however, this does not apply if at the time of contracting the insured was aware of the
loss and the insurer was not. Otherwise, to recover, he must have an interest at the time of loss:
Anderson v Morice (1876) 1 App Cas 713 embodied in s. 6(2). The same is true of the Republic of
Ireland, where the Marine Insurance Act is also law. Thus, retroactive marine insurance policies
would be admissible under the same conditions. Beyond this special clause, retroactive cover is
discussed neither in the United Kingdom nor in Ireland, cf. Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1441. However,
it seems permissible in both countries.
N8. In Switzerland, the general rule is laid down in art. 9 ICA. Under the said rule, retroactive
cover is prohibited in principle. Retroactive fire and transit insurance contracts are exempted
by art. 10 ICA. Such policies are void only if both parties knew, at the time of the conclusion of
the contract, that the risk insured has or has not occurred, as the case may be, art. 10 ICA. If the
insurer knew that no insured risk has occurred, the policyholder is not bound by the contract;
the insurer may claim or recover neither premium nor costs, see art. 10 para. 2 ICA. Conversely,
when the policyholder knew the insured event had occurred, the insurer is not bound by the
contract and may recover its costs, art. 10 para. 3 ICA.
N9. The insurability of putative risks seems uncertain under the laws of Luxembourg. Pursuant
to art. 32 ICA, a policy is void, when the risk, at the time the contract is concluded, has already
occurred or has never existed, see also Bisenius 57. However, art. 37 para. 1 ICA stipulates that
the commencement of cover is determined by the will of the parties. Reading arts. 32 and 37 ICA
together, one might construe the law as allowing for retroactive policies when the parties are in
uncertainty as to the realisation of the risk. The legislative motives, however, do not comment
on this question, cf. Basedow/Fock-Völker 783.
Comments
Preliminary Cover
C1. An applicant usually requests immediate cover of the risk. However, an insurer will
usually not accept the risk without a risk evaluation which can take time. This is why the
institution of preliminary cover has been developed in insurance practice. It allows the
insurer to evaluate the risk carefully without a final assumption of the risk. In turn, the ap-
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
plicant enjoys preliminary cover that allows him to wait for the final decision of the insurer
without anxiety.
C2. In practice, preliminary cover granted orally by insurance agents has turned out to
be hard to prove. In order to provide the policyholder with a reliable piece of evidence the
insurer is obliged to put the preliminary cover in writing. Under the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law writing includes electronic documents (see Article 2:301 Com-
ment 6). However, in the case of preliminary cover, the writing is not required to contain
more than a minimum of information. This minimum includes the name and address of
the contracting parties, the insured and the beneficiary (see Article 2:501(a) and (b)), the
subject matter of the insurance and the risks covered (Article 2:501(d)), the sum insured
and any deductibles (Article 2:501(e)) as well as the contract period and the liability period
(Article 2:501(h)). Such a requirement does not excessively burden the insurer. At the same
time the information is sufficient to prove the existence and extent of the cover.
C3. Articles 2:201 to 2:203 (insurer’s pre-contractual duties) do not apply to contracts
granting preliminary cover because duties of this kind could be a disincentive to the grant-
ing of preliminary cover. It is in the own interest of the policyholder that the granting of
preliminary cover will not be excessively burdened.
Notes
Survey
N1. Only few national statutes deal with preliminary cover. The subject appears to be left to the
parties’ contractual arrangements, and most legislators seem to trust that the problems arising in
the context of preliminary cover will not lead to serious disputes in view of the main insurance
contract to be concluded between the same parties. But the main insurance contract may not
be concluded at all or not between the same parties, cf. for Sweden Hellner, part 5.2.1. In the
absence of legal rules on preliminary cover, the outcome of a dispute arising from such a prelim-
inary agreement may therefore be very difficult to predict. In particular mandatory requirements
concerning pre-contractual information duties for insurance contracts, if applied to preliminary
cover, may put in question the validity of the latter which is often agreed by oral or other speedy
means of communication. In some Member States, national statutes deal with this issue. The
other problems addressed relate to the standard terms governing the preliminary cover and to
its relation to the main contract.
N2. In Germany, s. 7 ICA and further regulations place the insurer under an obligation to pro-
vide certain information to the applicant before the latter agrees to the (main) insurance contract;
the parties are not permitted to derogate from this rule to the detriment of the applicant. While
152
Article 2:402 Preliminary Cover
the insurer must basically provide the same information for a cover note, as can be inferred from
the first sentence of s. 49 para. 1 ICA, this provision allows the parties to agree on the transfer
at a later stage, namely either at the time when the applicant makes a request to that effect, or
together with the policy. Where no contract terms are communicated to the applicant at the time
of conclusion of the preliminary cover agreement that cover is subject to the terms habitually
employed by the insurer, see s. 49 para. 2 ICA. Under Greek law as well the policyholder can
waive the right to be supplied with the information according to art. 2 para. 7 ICA. Furthermore,
the insurer is under an obligation to provide the policyholder with a preliminary cover note in
writing.
France
N3. In France, preliminary cover agreements are exempted from the formal and information
requirements for insurance contracts, see art. 112-3 para. 4 ICA and Lamy Assurances, para. 431.
However, proof of the existence of the preliminary cover is hardly conceivable if the parties do not
observe at least written form, cf. Lamy Assurances, para. 432. Only when cover notes are issued
under the cross-border provision of insurance services as defined in art. 351-1 ICA does statute
provide for a minimum content. In such rare cases, the cover note must contain the name and
address of the agency or branch which offers cover, and, in the case of motor liability insurance,
additionally the head office and national representative, see art. 112-7 para. 3 ICA.
N4. The jurisprudence of the Cour de Cassation has further established minimum contents for
cover notes, albeit indirectly. As a starting point, the Cour de Cassation established, as a general
rule, that preliminary cover must be granted by the general policy terms and conditions of the
insurer. This rule, however, is complemented by the general principle that only clauses brought
to the attention of the policyholder may be opposed to him, Cass. civ. 1re, 7.3.1989, n° 87-10.266,
RGAT 1989, 546-548. If lower court judges find that certain terms and conditions were not
brought to the attention of the policyholder, and if the insurer is unable to prove otherwise, it
is held that such terms and conditions may not be invoked against the policyholder, see Lamy
Assurances, para. 433.
Belgium
N5. Belgian law distinguishes three types of preliminary cover, subject to different rules, namely
preliminary cover during, before and after formation of the main insurance contract. Art. 55, 5°
IA 2014 defines the term demande d’assurance, which refers to preliminary cover during contract
formation. Such demande d’assurance is “a form emanating from the insurer by which the insurer
offers to take in charge the risk preliminarily, at the request of the policyholder”. Preliminary cov-
er in this sense is thus embedded in the formation of the main policy. As the terms and conditions
of such demande d’assurance and the main policy may vary considerably, the demande d’assurance
and the main policy demand/offer must be signed separately, see the seventh sentence of art. 57
para. 2 IA.
N6. When preliminary cover is granted before or after contract formation, the term of demande
d’assurance does not apply. Rather, Belgian law speaks of couverture provisoire in general. This
term encompasses preliminary cover granted before a future main policy and is also used to de-
note a definitive main insurance contract between the parties, but issued in a preliminary docu-
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
ment, so as to give the insurer time to draft the main policy in further detail. As such preliminary
cover is not linked directly to contract formation, it is not subject to the requirements of art. 57
para. 2 IA 2014, cf. Fontaine, para. 188. This is not to say that a couverture provisoire, namely
preliminary cover before or after contract formation, is not subject to any formal requirements.
Art. 64 para. 1 IA 2014 establishes an indirect requirement, in that proof of any form of insurance
contract is admissible only in writing, save for avowal or oath.
Luxembourg
N7. According to the second sentence of art. 9 para. 3 ICA, the cover note and the insurance
offer must be issued as separate documents. The third sentence of art. 9 para. 3 ICA provides for
the same information as Article 2:402 para. 1 PEICL. Additionally, the insurer must disclose the
basis of the pricing system, see the sixth indent of the third sentence of art. 9 para. 3 ICA and
Bisenius 41.
United Kingdom
N8. In the United Kingdom, preliminary cover may be granted by way of a cover note. A written
note, however, is not essential as preliminary or “interim” cover ranges from an oral agreement
to formal documentation, see Birds 5.6, Clarke 12-3, Colinvaux 1-47. When temporary cover is
granted neither in the form of a document specifying the terms and obligations nor a document
incorporating the future terms and obligations of the main policy, the terms of the latter policy
would still be decisive, given a general proposition that the application for insurance is construed
to refer to the standard terms contained in the insurer’s usual form of policy, see Birds 5.6.3 ff.,
Clarke 12-4, Colinvaux 1-52. In such cases, though, the policyholder may not be aware of the
terms which govern his claim, for example a notice duty. Accordingly, it has been held by the
Court of Appeal that the beneficiary of preliminary cover, if not informed beforehand, is not
bound by the terms of the policy itself, in particular the notice duty: Re Coleman’s Depositories
Ltd [1907] 2 KB 798. Special rules apply to cover notes issued by brokers, see Birds 5.6, Clarke
12-2, Colinvaux 1-31.
N9. Since the parties may conclude a valid preliminary insurance contract without any reference
to contract terms, it may be difficult to establish the terms applicable to the cover note. As pointed
out above, several national statutes provide for the application of the terms habitually employed
by the insurer in such cases or limit their application to what could reasonably be foreseen by
the applicant, see Notes 2, 3 and 8 above. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
do not contain such a rule since they are meant to apply only if the parties so agree, see Article
1:102 PEICL. Moreover, it would simply reflect general contract law as laid down in the Princi-
ples of European Contract Law which would fill gaps of the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law anyway, see Article 1:105 para. 2 PEICL. Under the interpretation rule of Article
5:102 PECL, the usages, previous dealings and good faith have to be considered when filling the
gap of a contract; this would not lead to results which differ from those achieved by the national
laws mentioned above.
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Article 2:403 Duration of Preliminary Cover
Comments
Duration of the Preliminary Cover
C1. The purpose of preliminary cover is to enhance the pre-contractual relationship be-
tween the applicant and the insurer. This purpose is only fulfilled if the cover does not end
before the contractual negotiations. If negotiations fail because the insurer is unwilling to
accept the risk, the reason for the preliminary cover vanishes and Article 2:403 para. 1 sec-
ond alt. provides for the preliminary cover to end at that time, though parties may agree on
a longer duration. If, however, the application is accepted by the insurer and the insurance
contract is concluded, it may still be necessary for the applicant to enjoy preliminary cover.
This is the case whenever the commencement of the cover under the ultimate insurance
contract is delayed by clauses requiring the policyholder to pay the first premium in order
to obtain cover (see Article 5:101). In order to avoid gaps in the cover period in such cases,
the preliminary cover should remain in force for the period of payment of the first premi-
um (which is at least two weeks according to Article 5:101(b)). It should, however, lapse if
payment is not made upon expiry of the period. This is why Article 2:403 para. 1 first alt.
mentions the time, when cover under the ultimate insurance contract should begin, as the
end of the preliminary cover unless parties have agreed on a longer duration.
C2. Article 2:403 para. 1 only applies to cases in which a preliminary cover is granted
because the applicant has filed an application. If in particular circumstances this is not the
case, preliminary cover should end at the time agreed. Furthermore, such preliminary cover
may be cancelled by either party giving two weeks notice. This right of cancellation allows
the insurer to break-off dealings with a customer who has no serious intention of going
through with the whole transaction.
Notes
Germany
N1. The German ICA regulates the duration of preliminary cover using a special and very de-
tailed provision: The preliminary insurance contract ceases no later than at the time when cover
under a further preliminary contract or the main insurance contract commences, see the first
sentence of s. 52 para. 1 ICA. The same rule applies when the holder of the cover note subsequent-
ly concludes the main insurance contract with a different insurer, see the first sentence of s. 52
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
para. 2 ICA. The preliminary insurer has to be notified of the subsequent contract, see the second
sentence of s. 52 para. 2 ICA. If the main insurance contract made with the insurer issuing the
cover note fails to operate because of a revocation or an objection by the holder of the cover note,
the preliminary insurance contract ceases at the latest when the revocation or objection reaches
the insurer, see s. 52 para. 3. Where the preliminary insurance contract was entered into for an
indefinite period, either party may terminate the contract without notice, see the first sentence
of s. 5 para. 4 ICA. However, the insurer’s termination only becomes effective two weeks after
receipt, see the second sentence of s. 52 para. 4 ICA.
France
N2. In France, the decisions of the Cour de Cassation have continually stressed the temporary
nature of preliminary cover, see Lamy Assurances, para. 430(b), citing judgments rendered in
1994, 1999 and 2001. Where a term is specified in the cover note, cover ends at the deadline
agreed upon; the compensation of losses arising from risks materialised subsequently may not be
claimed by the policyholder, see Lamy Assurances, para. 430(b). French insurance law thus lacks
a mandatory provision of the nature of Article 2:403 para. 1 PEICL. Under French insurance law,
the duration of preliminary cover is determined independently from the state of negotiations
on the main policy, Cass. civ. 1er, 9.11.1999, n° 9714.252, RCA 2000, Commentaires, n° 105.
Thus, preliminary cover may end before a subsequent main policy is established between the
parties. This leads to uncertainties over damages occurring subsequently in cases when no clear
preliminary term was fixed, and a later contract has not been concluded. The Cour de Cassation
has decided that the burden of proof that the risk materialised after expiry of the preliminary
contract lies with the insurer, Cass. civ. 1er, 25.10.1994, n° 92-18.447, RGAT 1994, 1098-1100.
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Article 2:501 Contents
(k) the existence of an out-of-court complaint and redress mechanism for the applicant and the
methods of having access to it;
(l) the existence of guarantee funds or other compensation arrangements.
Comments
Insurance Policy
C1. Like most national legal systems, the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law provide the policyholder with a right to an insurance policy issued by the insurer
(Article 2:501). However, the validity of the contract does not depend on the issue of the
policy. The insurance policy must contain at the very least the information specified in
Article 2:501(a) to (l).
Evidence
C2. In some countries the law requires the insurance contract to be evidenced in writing
in order to be enforceable. However, rules of this kind are not found in most countries,
whether for insurance contracts or other kinds of contract. Accordingly, the Principles of
European Contract Law do not contain such a rule and the Rome I Regulation (593/2008)
(art. 18 para. 2) is to similar effect. Therefore, the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law do not require evidence in writing either (see also Article 2:301).
C3. National laws sometimes provide for further legal consequences from the mere fact
that a written document has been issued. A prominent example is the parol evidence rule
in the UK. This rule and similar rules of national law should not be applied in the context
of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law without taking into account the
particular weight given to oral communication under the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law (see Article 1:205). Note, however, that Article 2:502 has similar effect to the
parol evidence rule.
C4. In order to ensure complete protection of the policyholder, Article 2:402 para. 1 deals
with preliminary insurance contracts. The document required is similar to an insurance
policy. The information to be provided is, however, restricted to information relevant in
the pre-contractual phase. In this way, transparency interests of the applicant are balanced
with the general interest to ease or at least to avoid unreasonable burdens for insurance
transactions.
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Notes
Issue of a Document
N1. The insurer’s duty to issue an insurance policy is a common principle in European insur-
ance acts, for example in s. 3 para. 1 Austrian and German ICA; art. 64 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014;
art. 7:932 Dutch CC; s. 6 para. 1 Finnish ICA; art. 112-3 French ICA; art. 2 paras. 2 and 3 Greek
ICA; art. 1888 para. 2 Italian CC; art. 809 para. 1 Polish CC; arts. 32 ff. Portuguese ICA; art. 5
Spanish ICA; art. 11 para. 1 Swiss ICA.
N2. In England and Wales, there is no general rule of common law requiring an insurance
document in non-marine insurance (Roberts v Security Co [1897] I QB 111, CA; Murfitt v Royal
Insurance Co [1922] 38 TLR 334; Birds 88 ff., Clarke 11-2A1 and 14-1). But most insurance con-
tracts are recorded in a policy.
N3. Very similar to the list of information presented in Article 2:501 – with only a few exceptions
and some additional requirements –, are the pertinent regulations in Belgium (art. 64 para. 2
IA 2014; additionally required: the date of conclusion of the contract); France (art. 112-4 ICA;
the policy must also state the name and the address of the Insurance Supervisory Authority and
the terms of rescission, art. 113-12 ICA; even more specific requirements in life assurance, see
art. R. 132-4 ICA); Greece (art. 1 paras. 2 and 3 and art. 2 paras. 3 and 4 ICA: the policy must
contain among other things the exceptions to cover, the place and date of issue and a note that
the contract is governed by general and special insurance terms and conditions, if applicable);
Luxembourg (art. 16 para. 2 ICA: instead of the law applicable, the policy has to name the compe-
tent venue; additionally to be stated: the conditions and the way of rescission and that automatic
renewal of the contract is only possible for one year at a time, art. 38 ICA); Poland (art. 12a of
the Act on Insurance Activity, regarding the contents of general contract terms); Portugal (art. 37
ICA, providing that particular pieces of information – for example in relation to the scope of the
cover as well as the right to avoid or rescind the contract – must be prominent) and Spain (art. 8
ICA: information on the insurance concept chosen, and the amount of administrative costs and
taxation must be included).
N4. Since the main function of the policy is to record the insurance contract and to give evidence
of its particulars, it shall describe its content (s. 3 para. 1 Austrian and German ICA, see Bruck/
Möller-Knops, § 3 VVG para. 3; art. 7:932 Dutch CC; art. 1888 Italian CC; see Donati/Volpe
Putzolu 177; La Torre-Benini art. 1888 no. 3; art. 37 para. 2 Portuguese ICA; art. 11 para. 1 Swiss
ICA). Likewise the practice in England (Halsbury 226).
N5. Some national laws have chosen a more general approach requiring only a document that
contains “written confirmation of the contract” or a document “that sets out the main content
of the contract”; such formulae may be supplemented with more detailed requirements, see
s. 6 Finnish ICA: detailed requirements in personal insurance; see art. 809 para. 1 Polish CC as
compared with art. 12a of the Polish Act on Insurance Activity regarding general contract terms;
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Article 2:501 Contents
see also ss. 2 and 4 of Ch. 2 (consumer insurance) and ss. 2 and 4 of Ch. 10 (personal insurance)
Swedish ICA.
Means of Proof
N6. Depending on the national law of civil procedure the policy may acquire a particular rel-
evance as a means of proof. It may be an indispensable tool for proving the insurance contract,
while in other countries it will provide conclusive evidence of the contract without, however,
being necessary for its proof.
N7. In some Member States, proof of the insurance contract and its content is limited to evidence
in writing, which would at least require the party bearing the burden of proof to furnish some
documentary evidence to start with, a so-called commencement de preuve par écrit. In respect
of insurance contracts in particular, such a requirement of written evidence of the insurance
contract is established for example in Belgium (art. 64 para. 1 IA 2014), in Greece (art. 2 paras. 1
and 2 ICA), in Italy (art. 1888 para. 1 CC) and in Luxembourg (art. 16 para. 1 ICA).
N8. In common law jurisdictions, the insurance contract may be proven by any means. But the
policy has a particular significance: under the parol evidence rule “a document which looks like
the whole of the contract, namely a document that contains all the terms of the kind one would
expect in that kind of contract and which has a degree of formality that suggests the document
is significant to those who made it […] a presumption that that is the whole of their contract
and evidence will not be admitted to add to, vary or contradict that document” (Birds 5.4, Clarke
11-2A1 and 14-1; see also MacGillivray 11-037). There can be no doubt that a policy is such a
document.
Constitutive Effect
N9. Unlike in all other European laws, insurance contracts in Scotland are considered as obliga-
tiones litteris and must therefore be constituted in writing (Colinvaux (1990) 1-22). In contrast
to that, some legal orders explicitly define the policy to have no constitutive effect, see the notes
on Article 2:301 and for example for France art. 112-3 para. 4 ICA.
N10. Terms and conditions applicable to the insurance contract are also part of the agreement.
Consequently, the insurer must furnish the policyholder with this specific information as well.
This shall be done either by means of a document (see for example for Austria s. 5b para. 2(2)
and para. 4 ICA, for Germany s. 305 CC and s. 7 para. 1 ICA, for Greece art. 2 paras. 4 and 6
ICA, for Poland art. 12a Act on Insurance Activity, for Spain art. 3 para. 1 ICA) or by including
them in the policy or by making them available in another manner (Greece: art. 2 para. 6 ICA;
Luxembourg: art. 17 ICA).
N11. The rule prevailing in England provides that when the insurer comes to issue the policy,
he has to issue it with the terms and conditions usually attached to his policy, insofar as these are
not inconsistent with the express terms of the parties’ preliminary contract (S E Lancs Insurance
Co v Croisdale (1931) 40 Ll. L. R. 22, 24; furthermore MacGillivray 2-010; Clarke 11-1A3).
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Cover Notes
N12. Several legal systems explicitly consider the foregoing provisions as equally applicable
to preliminary cover notes, for example: Greece (art. 2 paras. 2 and 3 ICA). Some other coun-
tries, however, require less information to be included in a cover note, for example art. 9 para. 3
Luxembourg ICA. Occasionally, it is merely laid down that a cover note has to be issued, see for
example for Spain art. 5 ICA. See also the notes on Article 2:402.
Written Form
N13.By requiring a written policy, Article 2:501 is again in line with many European insurance
statutes, for example Austria and Germany (s. 3 para. 1 ICA); France (art. L. 112-3 para. 1 ICA);
Greece (art. 2 paras. 1 and 2 ICA); Italy (art. 1888 para. 2 CC; see also arts. 166 to 185 of the Code
of Private Insurance); Luxembourg (art. 16 para. 2 ICA); the Netherlands (art. 7:932 CC); Poland
(art. 809 para. 1 CC); Portugal (art. 32 para. 2 ICA); Spain (art. 5 ICA) and Switzerland (art. 11
para. 1 ICA). See further the Electronic Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) (art. 10 para. 3).
N14. In England and Wales, no insurance policy is required by law except in marine insur-
ance (s. 22 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906). However, the effect of the parol evidence rule is
that, in practice, insurance contracts have to be in writing: see Clarke 11-2A1; 14-1.
Comments
C1. The policy is a document evidencing the contract. Often it is also used as a tool for
concluding the contract: Some jurisdictions hold that the insurer tacitly accepts the appli-
cation by sending the policy to the policyholder. In other jurisdictions the policy is an offer
by the insurer to the prospective customer who accepts the proposal by signing the policy.
In both cases there is a risk that the terms of the policy depart from what was requested by
the applicant or from prior agreement. Often the insurer will intentionally issue the policy
with new or modified terms as a consequence of its risk evaluation. It is in the interest of
lowering transaction costs in the insurance sector to allow an insurer to issue the policy on
different terms. At the same time the policyholder must be protected against unsuspected
changes of terms in the policy.
Under general contract law such changes could even lead to an absence of agreement that
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Article 2:502 Effects of the Policy
might affect the whole contract and leave the policyholder unprotected. Article 2:502 serves
to prevent such situations.
C2. Article 2:502 serves the interests of both the insurer and the policyholder in an
even-handed way. It does so by giving constitutive effects to the policy if certain conditions
are met: The policy will be deemed to be agreed upon by the parties if (i) the insurer has
highlighted every variation of the policy from the application or prior agreement, (ii) the
policyholder does not object to the variation within one month of receipt of the policy and
(iii) the insurer has informed the policyholder in writing and in bold print about his right to
object to the variations. From the rationale outlined in Comment 1 it follows that the term
“policy” as used in Article 2:502 includes all documents attached or incorporated thereto
such as the general contract terms as mentioned in Article 2:501.
C3. In some jurisdictions the policy is required to be signed or is normally signed by the
policyholder. By signing the policyholder accepts the contents of the policy as the final
agreement even if its terms depart from those of a previous application or agreement. Arti-
cle 2:502 does not prohibit such practice. However, Article 2:502 grants special protection
to the policyholder also in those cases.
C4. By providing special protection, Article 2:502 replaces national rules with similar
effects such as the parol evidence rule.
Notes
Legal Presumption of Approval
N1. The presumption introduced in Article 2:502 para. 1 is already the state of the law in Austria
and Germany (s. 5 para. 1 ICA), Greece (art. 2 para. 5 ICA); Poland (art. 811 para. 1 CC, with
small differences); Portugal (art. 35 ICA); Spain (art. 8 para. 3 ICA) and Switzerland (art. 12 para.
1 ICA).
N2. In the United Kingdom, the regulation is slightly different although achieving the same
results: A policy inconsistent with the policyholder’s application is regarded as a counter-offer
(Canning v Farquhar (1886) 16 QBD 727; Harrington v Pearl Life Co (1914) 30 TLR 613; Al-
lis-Chalmers Co v Fidelity & Deposit Co (1916) 114 LT 433 (HL)). Accordingly, the policyholder
can reject it or ask for renegotiations. If he does not, the content of the policy is deemed to be
accepted. Only in exceptional cases can the policyholder who kept the policy without noticing
the alterations claim that the insurer is estopped from relying on these alterations since the in-
surer’s conduct made the policyholder reasonably believe that his application was fully accepted
(Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Exch 654, 663; Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597, 607). These
circumstances are not easily proved by the policyholder.
N3. However, the fiction that the policy has been approved takes effect only in case a proposal
has been made, not in cases in which a contract has been concluded informally or in which a
“common intention” has already existed before the delivery of the policy. In the latter cases, the
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
policy is merely of probative value and the contents can be disproved. The policyholder is then
entitled to sue on the earlier agreement or to seek a rectification of the policy (MacGillivray
2-025). More or less the same applies in the Netherlands: a policy, expressing an acceptance which
deviates from the offer, is considered to be a new offer and a rejection of the original offer, unless
the deviation refers to points of minor importance. In that case the policy is considered to reflect
the agreed coverage unless the offeror objects to the differences without delay (art. 6:225 CC)
N4. The statutes mentioned in Note 1 all require that if the policyholder is to object that must be
done within one month after receipt of the divergent policy (s. 5 para. 1 Austrian and German
ICA; art. 2 para. 5 Greek ICA demands the objection to be in writing; art. 811 para. 1 Polish CC:
minimum 7 days; art. 35 Portuguese ICA; art. 8 para. 3 Spanish ICA; art. 12 para. 1 Swiss ICA:
four weeks).
N5. In the United Kingdom, rectification can be sought after a loss has occurred (Henkle v Royal
Exchange Assurance Co (1749) 1 Ves Snr 317; Eagle Star and British Dominions Ins Co v Reiner
(1927) 27 Ll. L. R. 173; Bates (Thomas) & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 All ER
1077 (CA); for a recent and helpful statement of the law see T & N Ltd v Royal & Sun Alliance
plc [2003] 2 All ER (Comm) 939 at [133] ff, per Lawrence Collins J). In any case, the insured
must not have sued on the uncorrected policy before because this would be deemed an approval
(Foster v Mentor Life Assurance Co [1854] 3 E & B 48, 65; Xenos v Wickham (1866) LR 2 HL 296,
324, per Lord Cranworth; Baker v Yorkshire Fire Assurance Co [1892] 1 QB 144; Dawsons Ltd v
Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413, 431-432, per Viscount Cave).
N6. In order to make this provision more protective to the policyholder, the presumption only
takes effect under certain conditions, for example if the insurer has informed the policyholder
about this specific consequence at the time of delivering the document by means of an additional
note or an especially highlighted perceptible endorsement in the policy itself (s. 5 paras. 1 and 2
Austrian and German ICA; moreover, the particular variations must be pointed out separately,
s. 5 para. 2 Austrian and German ICA) or if the insurer has duly informed the policyholder about
the variations and about the right of the latter to object (art. 2 para. 5 Greek ICA; in addition, the
insurer has to issue a separate printed specimen of the notice of objection).
N7. Some statutes stipulate that the insurer only has to insert this very rule into the policy (the
second sentence of art. 8 para. 3 Spanish ICA; art. 12 para. 2 Swiss ICA: the exact wording of this
provision has to be included).
N8. Italian law contains a rule saying that if the content of the policy is not identical to the policy-
holder’s proposal, the policy is deemed expressly accepted if the policyholder signs the document
(see Donati/Volpe Putzolu 180). If, however, the insurer has already accepted the policyholder’s
proposal and then issues a diverging policy, the principal proposal prevails.
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Article 2:601 Duration of the Insurance Contract
N9. If the insurer’s performance fails to meet the requirements established as preconditions
for the fictitious approval of the – altered – policy, the insurance contract is regarded as having
been agreed upon in accordance with the application. This rule is already known in Austria and
Germany (s. 5 para. 3 ICA), as well as in Greece (art. 2 para. 5 ICA) and Poland (art. 811 para. 1
CC).
Comments
Comparative Survey
In other European countries insurers have traditionally tried to extend the duration of con-
tractual commitments as much as possible. By tying their customers for many years they
improved the bases of their calculations without losing the ability to adjust the premiums
which is often specifically allowed by contract clauses.
C2. More recent developments in Europe are characterised by the adoption of maximum
terms of insurance contracts. Various states have taken the view that the policyholder has
to be protected against long-term contracts which tie the customers for a period of time
going beyond the foreseeable future.
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
C3. Article 2:601 para. 1 is conceived as a mandatory provision which purports, as a gen-
eral rule, to forbid the conclusion of insurance contracts for a period of less or more than
one year. Admittedly, a specific provision on a minimum term is not required to cope with
practical needs existing in Europe at present.
But the rapid development of capital markets and the experience of the United States suggest
that a rule against ultra-short insurance terms should be adopted in time. By way of excep-
tion insurance terms of less than one year (or more than one year) may be agreed upon if the
insured risk is of such a nature that a shorter insurance period is appropriate, for example
travel insurance or the insurance of exhibition equipment. The provision does not deal with
the term of insurance contracts that are covered by that exception.
C4. Limitation of the insurance term can be achieved in different ways. The parties may
either be allowed to make contracts for a longer or even unlimited period of time if they are
given an inalienable right to terminate the contract by unilateral declaration when the max-
imum time-span expires. Alternatively it is possible to invalidate a contract clause which
provides for a longer term; in that case the need for an extension of the insurance cover can
be served by a rule on the renewal of the policy. While the former model has been followed
in some States such as France, Germany and Austria, other countries including Belgium
and Sweden have preferred the establishment of a maximum contract term. While both
solutions have their merits, the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law prefer the
latter for its clarity and because it reduces problems connected with the adjustment of the
policy; see below Article 2:602 Comments 2 and 3.
C5. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law establish a maximum contract
term of one year in Article 2:601 and a provision for automatic prolongation in Article 2:602.
The term of one year is in line with more recent legislation in the field, in particular with the
laws of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Sweden. Under Finnish law the policyholder is
even entitled to terminate an insurance contract at any time during the insurance period.
The Proposal for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law provided for a maximum
term of three years, and Austria has adopted this rule for a termination by a consumer. In
Germany a one-year term is fixed for motor liability insurance, but the general rule was five
years and is now three years under the new ICA of 2007. The one-year term thus reflects the
general legislative trend towards shorter contract terms in several Member States and the
prevailing practice in others. It also avoids a number of inconveniences that longer terms
may give rise to such as the need for an adjustment of conditions and premium, premature
termination and so on.
Effects of Violation
C6. The limitation of contractual freedom by Article 2:601 para. 1 raises the question as to
the legal consequences of a contract that provides for a longer or a shorter insurance term
not covered by this provision. In the national legal systems the issue is not dealt with by
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Article 2:601 Duration of the Insurance Contract
insurance contract laws, but by general principles of private law. This method can equally
be applied in the context of Article 2:601. Under Article 4:116 PECL the effect of avoidance
is limited to the terms affected by the ground of avoidance unless it would appear unrea-
sonable to uphold the remaining contract. Consequently, an insurance contract providing
for an invalid term of five years would be regarded as a contract without a defined period.
The establishment of the period of insurance would be a matter of interpretation under
Article 5:101 PECL; under Article 2:601 the term would be one year.
Personal Insurance
C7. In health and life insurance the demand for insurance cover is different. Since health
inevitably gets worse in the long run, short-term insurance entails the risk of a steady rise
in the level of premiums over the years and of an eventual loss of insurance cover altogether
in old age. Therefore, personal insurance is characterised by contracts of indefinite dura-
tion or – in some sectors of life assurance – by long-term policies, and legislation in many
countries even restricts the insurer’s right to terminate such contracts. The model of the
short-term policy adopted by the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law cannot
be applied to personal insurance which is used in Article 2:601 as a synonymous expression
covering health and life insurance (see also Article 13:101).
Notes
Maximum Period
N1. Much European legislation provides for protection against excessively long contract periods.
Some statutes allow for termination after the expiry of a given period, others limit the duration of
the contract period itself. Thus, the rule in the first sentence of Article 2:601 para. 1 corresponds
to the laws of Belgium, Portugal and Sweden (the first sentence of art. 85 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014;
art. 40 Portuguese ICA; s. 3 of Ch. 3, s. 4 of Ch. 8 Swedish ICA). The rule in the second sentence
of Article 2:601 para. 1 is to be found only in the law of Sweden (the second sentence of s. 3 of
Ch. 3 ICA).
N2. In all other legal systems in Europe, subject to unilateral rights of termination, the duration
of the insurance contract is a matter for the policy itself to provide. However, the period that is
commonly fixed is different. In Denmark, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom insurance
contracts usually expire after one year (see for Denmark Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 991, Sørensen 98;
for Ireland Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1508; for Spain Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1367, Bataller/Latorre/
Olavarria 186; for Portugal Vasques 233; for the United Kingdom Birds 5.7.1, Clarke 18-3A),
whereas they may run for an indefinite period in Austria, Germany, Greece, France, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland (see Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 123 f.). For
Italy, even if in principle there is no maximum period, when the period of a non-life insurance
contract is longer than five years the policyholder can always terminate it (see art. 1899 CC, as
modified by Law of 23 July 2009, no. 99). Specific rights of termination are provided in the event
of premium variations.
N3. In practice, however, the difference between the former and the latter countries is minor: To
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
avoid undue hardship that might result from an indefinite insurance period, the laws of Austria,
Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands allow either party to terminate
the contract after a certain period of time has elapsed (see Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 123 f.).
In France and Luxembourg termination of the contract is possible every year on the anniversary
of the policy (art. L. 113-12 para. 2 French ICA; art. 38 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA). The same is
basically true for Austria, Germany and Greece: A contract made for an indefinite period may
be cancelled at the end of every premium term which is one year unless the parties provide for a
shorter term (ss. 8 para. 2, 9 Austrian ICA; ss. 11 para. 2 and 12 German ICA; art. 8 paras. 2 and
6 Greek ICA). In the Netherlands, insurance contracts running for more than five years may be
terminated every five years (art. 7:940 para. 2 CC). In Austria, cancellation of contracts made for a
definite period of more than three years is allowed after three years and every following year (s. 8
para. 3 ICA, which only applies to consumers within the meaning of the second sentence of s. 1
para. 1 of the Consumer Protection Act), in Germany, too, after three years and every following
year (s. 11 para. 4 ICA). In Italy, both parties are allowed to terminate at the end of each year
insurance contracts that run for an indefinite period, except where specific economic advantages
have been given to the policyholder for a pluriennal contract: in this case, the policyholder can
terminate the contract after five years, otherwise he will lose the economic benefits; in any case,
the rule does not apply to life insurance (see new art. 1899 as modified by Law of 23 July 2009,
no. 99). In Finland, the contract may be cancelled by the policyholder at any time (s. 12 ICA,
unless the agreed duration of the insurance contract is shorter than 30 days). A look at the more
recent enactments reveals a general trend to shorter maximum periods.
Personal Insurance
N4. The rule in Article 2:601 para. 2 is in accordance with the law of Belgium (art. 85 para.
1(4) IA 2014) and the Netherlands (art. 7:940 para. 2 CC). A similar rule applies in Spain for
life assurance (art. 22 para. 3 ICA). In Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, where most
insurance contracts expire after one year even though there is no corresponding rule of law,
personal insurances, in particular life and health insurances, run for a longer period of time (see
Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 124 f.; see for Ireland Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1508; Vasques 233; for
the United Kingdom Birds 5.7, Clarke 11-4B; Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1508). In Portugal and Sweden,
on the other hand, the duration of personal insurance is also limited to one year unless the parties
agree otherwise (for Portugal, this follows from the fact that the rule on duration is contained in
the general part of the ICA (título I) which applies equally to indemnity insurance and personal
insurance; for Sweden, see s. 2 of Ch. 11 ICA).
166
Article 2:602 Prolongation
Comments
The Need for Prolongation
C1. The time limitation for insurance contracts established in Article 2:601 has to be ac-
commodated with the need felt by the vast majority of insurers and their customers to
maintain business relations over longer periods of time. A complete renegotiation of all
insurance contracts every year which would follow from the general rules on contract law
appears inappropriate.
Policyholders who, for reasons of absence, sickness and so on, cannot be contacted by the in-
surer would remain without insurance cover. Moreover, the general renegotiation of all pol-
icies would be excessively costly given the small number of policies which are not renewed
in practice. The national legal systems of Member States therefore facilitate prolongation
by two types of solution: they either mandate a prolongation of the policies by operation of
law, or they allow for contract clauses which provide for such prolongation. The practical
difference between the solutions is not great. Article 2:602 adopts the former model which
takes precedence over the time limitation laid down in Article 2:601.
C2. The prolongation is to be distinguished from renewal in the sense of a new agree-
ment for the purposes of the applicant’s or the insurer’s information duties, of the duty to
issue certain documents in relation to the conclusion of the contract, of the consequences
attached to the non-payment of the first premium and of other obligations in relation to the
formation phase of the contract. If, however, one of the parties gives notice in accordance
with Article 2:602 and a new contract is made between the same parties afterwards, it will
depend upon the particular circumstances of the case whether the rules of law relating to
the formation stage of the contract apply.
Adjustment of Contract
Form of Notice
C4. As regards the notice referred to in subparas. (a) and (b) it must be made in writing
for reasons of clarity. This includes means of communication that provide a record read-
able by both sides, as defined by Article 1:301 para. 6 PECL. In particular, messages sent
by telegram, telex, telefax and e-mail are equivalent to written statements under that rule.
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Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
In order to be valid the insurer’s notice has to set forth the reasons for the insurer’s deci-
sion not to prolong the contract. This information is meant to equip the policyholder with
knowledge that might be useful for him when applying for coverage with another insurer.
The reasons given are not subject to judicial review unless they are against good faith or
public policy. Thus, reference to the policyholder’s ethnic origin may invalidate the notice
under general principles.
Term of Notice
C5. The term laid down for the notice of termination given by the insurer differs from
that fixed for the policyholder. This difference is based on the consideration that continuous
insurance cover is of vital importance to the vast majority of policyholders in many sectors
of insurance. Therefore, the term established for the insurer’s notice of termination must
allow the policyholder to compare competing offers while he is still protected by the old
contract and to negotiate for a smooth transition into the new one. Under Article 2:602
para. 1(a) the insurer’s notice must therefore be given one month before the expiration of
the contractual term at the latest. On the other hand, there is no need to protect the insurer
against a notice of termination given shortly before the end of the contractual term. It would
even appear that a policyholder, who is reminded of the end of the contractual term only
by the insurer’s invoice for the subsequent year which is sent just before the end of the term
or even afterwards, should be allowed to compare competing offers for the usual period of
one month which in practice would extend the original term of the contract. This particular
favour takes account of the typical consumer who does not think of his insurance cover
until he is reminded by the insurer’s notice for the following year. The notice period of one
month does not start to run unless it has been clearly stated on the invoice. If the invoice
does not contain this information, the policyholder may terminate the prolonged contract
at any time during the subsequent annual period.
C6. The time limits established for the notice of termination should be computed along
the lines laid down in Article 1:304 PECL, insofar as Article 2:602 does not provide for dif-
ferent solutions. Contrary to Article 1:303 PECL but in line with various Community acts
in the field of consumer protection (see, for example, art. 11 para. 2 of the Consumer Rights
Directive (2011/83/EU), art. 7 of the Timeshare Directive (2008/122/EC)) the deadline laid
down for a policyholder’s notice shall be deemed to have been observed if the notice has
been dispatched in time. In accordance with Article 1:303 PECL the insurer’s notice of
termination becomes effective when it reaches the addressee, namely when it is delivered
to the addressee or to his place of business or mailing address, or, if the addressee does not
have a place of business or mailing address, to his habitual residence.
Notes
Statutory and Contractual Prolongation
N1. The rule in Article 2:602 corresponds to the laws of Belgium, Portugal and Sweden (the sec-
ond sentence of art. 85 para. 1(1) Belgian IA 2014; art. 41 para. 1 Portuguese ICA: the contract is
prolonged after the lapse of one year unless the parties have agreed otherwise; s. 4 of Ch. 3, s. 4 of
168
Article 2:602 Prolongation
Ch. 11 Swedish ICA). In Denmark, Finland (for non-life insurance), Ireland and Portugal, similar
rules may be and usually are contractually stipulated (see Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 125 f.;
see for Denmark Lyngsø 158, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 992, Sørensen 98; for Finland, see s. 16 ICA
(non-life insurance); for Portugal Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1193). The same is true for Austria,
France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland as regards those insurance
contracts that do not run for an indefinite period, but for a limited period of time only (see for
Austria s. 8 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1112, Schauer 301; for France Bonnard, Droit et
pratique, para. 594, Lambert-Faivre, para. 240, Basedow/Fock-Völker 555-556; for Greece art. 8
para. 1 ICA ; for Italy art. 1899 CC, Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 741, Steidl 150; for Luxem-
bourg art. 83 para. 3 ICA, Bisenius 63, Basedow/Fock-Völker 813; for the Netherlands Clausing/
Wansink 136, Basedow/Fock-Fock 896; for Switzerland art. 47 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1263).
In Poland, similar rules apply for compulsory insurance (see the Act on Compulsory Insurance);
the Polish Civil Code does not cover issue of prolongation at all.
Period of Prolongation
N2. In most countries, the prolongation of the contract will be for a limited period of time only.
In Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Sweden and Spain, the contract will be prolonged for one year
(art. 85 para. 1(1) Belgian IA; art. 8 para. 1(b) Greek ICA; art. 41 para. 1 Portuguese ICA; s. 4
of Ch. 3 Swedish ICA; the second sentence of art. 22 para. 1 Spanish ICA). The same effect is
achieved in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland where the insurer may not invoke
a contractual clause insofar as it provides for prolongation of more than one year (s. 8 para. 1
Austrian ICA; s. 11 para. 1 German ICA; art. 83 para. 3 Luxembourg ICA; art. 47 Swiss ICA).
In Italy, the prolongation of the contract will be for two years (art. 1899 para. II CC). In the
Netherlands the same rule as for the initial period of contract applies to the prolongation of the
contract (art. 7:932 para. 2 CC).
N3. In Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, the prolongation
is classified as a continuation of the original contract (see for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock 293-
294; see for Denmark Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 992; for Germany Bruck/Möller-Johannsen, § 11
VVG para. 10, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 436, and Prölss/Martin-Armbrüster, § 11 VVG para. 2; for
Portugal Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1193 [still valid for the new ICA], Vasques 233; for Sweden
Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 992 [still valid for the new ICA]). In Ireland and the United Kingdom, it
is seen as the making of a new contract (see for Ireland Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1508; for the United
Kingdom Stokell v Heyward [1897] 1 Ch 459; Birds 5.7, Clarke 11-4B, Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1508).
Therefore, both the insurer and the policyholder have to fulfil the duties that are imposed before
conclusion of any insurance contract, such as the duty to disclose material circumstances (Lam-
bert v Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 485, see Basedow/Fock-Basedow/
Fock 125 f.). The law in Belgium, France, and Greece regarding this point is unsettled (see for
Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock 295, Fontaine, para. 407; for France Lamy Assurances, para. 511;
Lambert-Faivre, para. 242, Picard/Besson, para. 166, Basedow/Fock-Völker 556; and for Greece
Rokas, paras. 272 ff.).
169
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Comments
The Need for a Rule for Alteration
C1. Article 2:602 provides for a prolongation of one-year contracts by operation of law.
Other contracts may include a clause to automatically prolong (or renew). In these cir-
cumstances, there may be a need for adjustments and for some mechanism that allows a
modification of the premium or the conditions of the contract.
C2. Before deregulation within the European Community, following from the implemen-
tation of the Third Generation of Insurance Directives (92/49/EEC and 92/96/EEC), mod-
ification of contracts was mostly the function of alteration clauses. In most countries, such
clauses and the way they were used by the insurers had to be approved by the supervisory
authority.
C3. Since deregulation prior approval of alteration clauses is no longer allowed. Further-
more, the consent of the supervisory authority is no longer required for the use of contrac-
tual rights of alteration. Today alteration clauses can only be vetted ex post under the rules
on unfair contract terms. However, these rules offer no particular guidance on the validity
of alteration clauses.
Therefore, to take into account the specific features of insurance contracts, several national
legislators have passed statutory provisions setting minimum standards for the validity of
alteration clauses.
C4. There are at least two ways to deal with the problem by legislation: One is to specify the
requirements for a valid alteration clause (for example Sweden), the other is to set minimum
standards for such a clause (for example Finland).
C5. Article 2:603 adopts the second solution. This is in line with the traditional solutions
in the national legal systems of several Member States.
170
Article 2:603 Alteration of Terms and Conditions
Furthermore, it is very difficult to specify requirements for the validity of alteration clauses
in all types of insurance contracts, as they may be different.
Thus, the scope of alteration allowed (premium adjustments only or also amendment of
other terms and conditions) or the conditions of the market may require an “independent
expert” to review and approve each alteration.
Notes
Article 2:603 para. 1
N1. In most European countries, the insurer may reserve the right to alter the insurance con-
tract in the manner referred to in Article 2:603 para. 1 (art. 42 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA; s. 19
Finnish ICA. See for Austria Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1075 f.; for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock
270; for Denmark Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974; for Italy Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 713;
for Ireland Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1467; for Switzerland Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1241). Only the law of
Sweden provides for a statutory right to alter the terms and conditions of the insurance contract,
in conjunction with prolongation, irrespective of any alteration clause contained in the contract
(s. 5 of Ch. 3 ICA). In Germany, such a statutory right to alter the terms and conditions exists
only for life occupational disability insurance and health insurance (ss. 163, 164, 176 and 203
paras. 2 and 3 ICA), for all other contracts the insurer may contractually reserve the right (Wandt,
para. 210). In the Netherlands, the insurer may as a condition precedent to the prolongation of
an individual contract of insurance propose to alter the premium and/or the conditions of the
contract. In case the policyholder refuses to accept this proposal, the insurer may terminate the
contract. Art. 7:940 para. 4 CC limits a contractual right for the insurer to alter the terms and
conditions of all policies belonging to the same category during the period of contract where the
alteration is detrimental to the policyholder (en-bloc clauses). In Poland there is no statutory
regulation of alterations of contract of this kind. In the UK, for example in respect of PHI or LTC
insurance, insurers may reserve a right to vary the premium. There the understanding would be
that the insurer is entitled to take account of changes, namely in practice, increases in the cost of
171
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
matters for which there is no published (price) index. Analogy with cases in which lenders have
retained a right to vary interest rates suggest that the insurer must exercise this right in good
faith; in that regard see Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] UKHL 52,
[2002] 1 AC 481, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 489.
N2. In all European legal systems, such clauses are regulated by the general rules of contract
law or of the law on general contract terms (s. 6 para. 1(5) of the Austrian Consumer Protection
Act; ss. 307 and 308 para. 4 German CC; arts. 371 and 372 Greek CC. See for Germany Wandt,
paras. 215 ff.; for Denmark Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974; for Finland Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974).
In addition, some legal systems have minimum requirements for such clauses (s. 19 Finnish ICA;
s. 5 of Ch. 3 in conjunction with s. 6 of Ch. 2 Swedish ICA; art. 42 Luxembourg ICA). Those rules
usually state formal requirements for the validity of such clauses that are similar to the ones men-
tioned in Article 2:603 para. 1. Only very few countries have established further requirements
(ss. 172 and 178f Austrian ICA for health and life insurance; s. 19 Finnish ICA). In Belgium,
France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, there are no spe-
cial rules stating minimum requirements for such clauses (see for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock
270; for Ireland Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1467; for the United Kingdom Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1467,
where, generally, unilateral alteration of terms agreed post contract is not permitted by law).
N3. Only the laws of Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden provide a rule relating to the time the
clause takes effect that is similar to the rule of Article 2:603 para. 1(a). According to s. 19 para. 2
Finnish ICA, an alteration takes effect at the commencement of the insurance period which next
follows after a month has elapsed from the date on which the insurer dispatched the notification
of the changed conditions to the policyholder. The same rule applies in Sweden under s. 5 of Ch.
3 ICA. Art. 42 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA provides that any alteration of the premium shall not
take effect before the next annual premium is due.
N4. Most legal systems in Europe require an insurer who wishes to alter the premium or the
conditions to give written notice to the policyholder before the expiration of the current con-
tract period. However, the national laws differ with regard to the period of time the notice has
to be given in advance. The law of Finland requires a period of one month as does Article 2:603
para. 1(b), see the third sentence of s. 19 para. 2 ICA. In some countries the period is longer: in
Luxembourg, the notice has to be given three months in advance (the first sentence of art. 42
para. 3 ICA). In Belgium, motor policies usually provide that the insurer has to give notice to the
policyholder 90 days before the next premium is due (see Basedow/Fock-Fock 270). In Sweden,
the rule is flexible: the insurer has to give notice no later than concurrently with the invoice for
the prolonged insurance policy; the prolonged policy runs for the period and on the conditions
specified by the insurer (s. 5 of Ch. 3 ICA).
N5. In most legal systems in Europe and sometimes subject to further requirements, the policy-
holder has a right to terminate the contract either by law (s. 12 Finnish ICA, s. 40 German ICA;
172
Article 2:604 Termination after the Occurrence of an Insured Event
the second sentence of art. 42 para. 3 Luxembourg ICA) or by the terms of the policy itself (see
for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock 270 and for the United Kingdom Sun Fire Office v Hart (1889)
14 App Cas 98; Clarke 18-3E2. According to the second sentence of s. 19 para. 2 Finnish ICA,
the insurer must remind the policyholder of this right). However, only in Luxembourg is the
insurer required to inform the policyholder about his right to terminate the insurance contract
as provided in Article 2:603 para. 1(c) (the second sentence of art. 42 para. 3 ICA).
Comments
The Need for Termination
C1. The insurance contract is characterised by deficits of information on both sides: while
the insurer is often ignorant about the particulars of the risk, the policyholder has little
knowledge of the insurer’s practices concerning the handling of claims. The occurrence of
an insured event is the moment of truth and either party may wish to terminate the contract.
C2. Although that wish to terminate is less urgent under a regime of short-term policies
it is still not necessarily absent. Some countries such as France and Germany grant the right
to terminate a contract in their statutes. The matter can be left to the contract, however,
given the strong incentive for insurers to cut short their commitment once they know the
true extent of the risk. Contrary to many older national laws there must be a safeguard,
however, against one-sided clauses. In accordance with more recent statutes such as the law
of Belgium the option of termination must be granted to both parties.
For the reasons indicated in Article 2:601 Comment 7 personal insurance cannot be subject
to this type of optional termination.
Time Limits
C3. Certainty in contractual relations requires that the option of termination be granted
only for a short time. The period of two months allows for a preliminary assessment of the
damage and its causes, and of the insurer’s practice with regard to the handling of claims.
173
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
C4. National insurance contract laws grant the right of termination in a number of other
cases such as non-payment of premium, misinformation about the risk, aggravation of risk
and non-notification of such alteration, transfer of the insured goods or property, death or
insolvency of the policyholder and so on. The Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law deal with some of these types of termination in the event of non-compliance with
contractual duties in the context of the duty in question; other types of termination have
little importance under a regime of short-term policies. It should also be borne in mind
that a party is entitled to terminate a contract under general principles, if the other party’s
non-performance is fundamental; see Article 9:301 PECL.
C5. For the meaning of Article 2:604 in the context of group insurances, see Article 18:203
para. 1.
Notes
Article 2:604 para. 1
N1. The insurer’s right to terminate the insurance contract after the occurrence of an insured
event provided for in Article 2:604 para. 1 is to be found in most European legal systems, except,
for example, in Finland, and in Spain where a clause providing termination of the contract after
the occurrence of an insured event is considered abusive (see Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 186).
It is usually of a contractual nature (see for Austria Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1116; for Denmark
Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 994; for France art. 113-12 ICA; for Germany Basedow/Fock-Lemmel
439; for Greece the second sentence of art. 8 para. 5 ICA; for Italy such a clause is allowed only
if specifically agreed in non-consumer contracts, see art. 1341 CC and Basedow/Fock-Brunetta
d’Usseaux 744, de Gregorio/Fanelli 106; in consumer contracts, such a clause, even if agreed, is
considered to be unfair under the rules on unfair contract terms in the Consumer Code, see
Cerini 74 and more recent case law; for Luxembourg Basedow/Fock-Völker 814; for the Nether-
lands art. 7:940 para. 3 CC; for Portugal see art. 117 ICA; for the United Kingdom Tyrie v Fletcher
(1777) 2 Cowp 666; Birds 5.7.1, Clarke 18-3C, Rose 10.38 ff., Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1510). Only in
Austria and Germany and only for some sorts of insurance contracts is the right to terminate
based on the law (ss. 96, 113 and 158 Austrian ICA; ss. 92 and 111 German ICA).
N2. Few countries impose restrictions on the validity of the insurer’s right to terminate the
insurance contract similar to the ones provided for in Article 2:604 para. 1. The restriction laid
down in Article 2:604 para. 1(a) comes close to the laws of Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands
and Portugal. Under these legal systems, clauses like the ones referred to in Article 2:604 para.
1(a) are valid. However, by operation of law the right to terminate the contract is also granted
to the policyholder (the first sentence of art. 86 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014; the second sentence of
art. 8 para. 5 Greek ICA; art. 7:940 para. 3 Dutch CC; art. 117 Portuguese ICA: subject to party
agreement).
174
Article 2:604 Termination after the Occurrence of an Insured Event
N3. The restriction of Article 2:604 para. 1(b) is to be found in the laws of Belgium, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands (art. 86 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014; art. 41 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA; art. 7:940
para. 5 Dutch CC). In Belgium, the right of the motor vehicle liability insurer to terminate the
insurance contract is limited to those cases where the insurer is under the obligation to cover
the damage suffered by the victim. In Austria and Germany, the right to terminate the insurance
contract after the occurrence of an insured event does not apply to health insurance (s. 178i para.
2 Austrian ICA; s. 206 German ICA). In Portugal, clauses giving the insurer a right to terminate
are excluded in life, health and indemnity insurance (art. 117 para. 3 ICA).
N4. No country apart from the Netherlands has a specific rule that termination must be reasona-
ble as required by Article 2:604 para. 2 (see Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 128-129). According to
art. 7:940 para. 3 CC, the insurer may only terminate on the grounds stated in the contract, which
are of such a nature that it can no longer be required to be bound by the contract. However, the
exercise of the right of termination may be barred in particular cases under general principles
like abuse of rights, estoppels, and so on.
N5. In all European countries, the right to terminate the insurance contract upon the occurrence
of an insured event is lost if it is not exercised within a certain period of time. However, the time
limits imposed are usually different from the ones fixed by Article 2:604 para. 3. In Denmark,
the right to cancel the insurance contract expires 14 days after the policyholder has given notice
of the occurrence of an insured event or – in the absence of such notice – 14 days after the in-
surer received knowledge of the insured event (see Lyngsø 149, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 994). In
Belgium and Portugal, the right to terminate the insurance contract must be exercised within
one month after payment of the claim or the insurer’s refusal to pay (the second sentence of
art. 86 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014, art. 117 para. Portuguese ICA). In France, the insurer will not be
allowed to cancel the contract if it has known about the occurrence of the insured event for more
than one month and still accepts the insurance premium (the second sentence of art. R. 113-10
para. 1 ICA). In Austria and Germany, insurer and policyholder lose the right to terminate the
contract one month after they have – with or without success – terminated negotiations about
the payment of the claim (s. 96 para. 2 and the first sentence of s. 158 para. 2 Austrian ICA; the
first sentence of s. 92 para. 2 and the first sentence of s. 111 para. 2 German ICA). In the United
Kingdom the point is governed, if at all, by the terms of the policy.
N6. In most Member States the insurance cover ends some time after the policy has been ter-
minated upon occurrence of the insured event. However, most of the countries provide for a
longer period of time than Article 2:604 para. 4. In France and the Netherlands, the insurance
cover ends one month from the date on which notice of termination was given to the other party
(the first sentence of art. R. 113-10 para. 1 French ICA; art. 7:940 para. 3 Dutch CC). In Austria
and Germany, the same rule applies where the insurer terminates the contract (s. 96 para. 2 and
s. 158 para. 2 Austrian ICA; s. 92 para. 2 and s. 111 para. 2 German ICA). On the other hand, if
the policyholder terminates the contract he may choose that the termination takes effect either
175
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
immediately or at any other moment within the stipulated insurance period (the third sentence
of s. 96 para. 2 and s. 158 para. 2 Austrian ICA; the third sentence of s. 92 para. 2 and s. 111 para.
2 German ICA). In Belgium, cover ends after three months (art. 84 para. 2 together with art. 86
para. 1(2) IA 2014). However, termination becomes effective one month after notification where
there is a suspicion of fraud, but only if the insurer has secured a criminal prosecution of the
suspect (art. 86 para. 1(3) IA). In Greece, the termination, if initiated by the insurer, shall not
take effect until the lapse of thirty days from the date on which such notice of termination was
communicated to the policyholder; or fifteen days, if the insurer can point to a breach by the
policyholder of his disclosure duties (see the third sentence of art. 8 para. 5 and the first sentence
of art. 3 para. 7 ICA). A period shorter than that laid down in Article 2:604 para. 4 is to be found
only in the laws of Greece and the Netherlands and only for the special case of fraud; according
to art. 7:940 para. 3 Dutch CC, if the policyholder makes a fraudulent claim, insurance cover will
terminate immediately, on the date of notification, while, according to the second sentence of
art. 3 para. 7 Greek ICA, in case of intentional breach by the policyholder of its disclosure duties,
the termination should take immediate effect.
Comments
The Need for Information During the Period of Insurance Cover
C1. Article 2:701, like Article 2:702, deals with the duty of the insurer to keep the policy-
holder informed during the contract period (for similar duties concerning the initial stage
of the contract see Articles 2:201 and 2:501). It is important for the policyholder to be in-
formed accurately in order that he can assert his contractual rights properly. Insurers should
at least provide policyholders at all times with clear and accurate information as to the
essential features of the insurance product held. The two provisions of Section 7 distinguish
information duties imposed by law from those which are triggered by the policyholder’s
request. The former concern only basic data needed by the policyholder for the purposes
of communication. The latter deal with the insurance product as such.
C2. Article 2:701 is in line with art. 185 para. 5 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
The duty to inform should, however, not be limited to life assurance but applies to all types
of insurance contracts. Nevertheless, post-contractual information duties are extended in
case of life insurance in accordance with Article 17:301.
176
Article 2:701 General Information Duty
C3. Compared with a duty to inform when requested (see Article 2:702), a duty to inform
spontaneously should be more restricted in view of the burden it puts on the insurer. Under
such a duty, the insurer must contact all its policyholders. Therefore, a duty to inform spon-
taneously should be limited to changes considered to be so important that all policyholders
need to be aware of them.
C4. Policyholders must therefore be informed of any change in the registered name of the
insurer or in its corporate structure; in the address of its head office and, where appropriate,
of the agency or branch which concluded the contract. This will enable them to contact the
insurer if they deem it necessary.
C5. Contrary to the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), art. 185 para. 5, Article 2:701
does not require information about a change in the general contract terms (see, however,
Article 17:301 para. 2 concerning life insurance). This is covered by Article 2:603 para. 1(b)
and (c) (“Alteration of Terms and Conditions”). For the same reason Article 2:701 does not
include a duty to send information about any other essential changes in the contract.
Updating Information
C6. Article 2:701 does not oblige the insurer to update information previously given. Such
a duty would either follow from the operation of Article 2:603 para. 1(b) and (c), which
requires information about changes in the contract, or from the application of the principle
of good faith.
Manner of Communication
C7. The information required under Article 2:701 must be given in writing and without
undue delay. This is flexible enough to allow the insurer to produce the information in the
normal course of business.
Notes
Survey
N1. Post-contractual information duties of the insurer are subject to detailed provisions in the
Member States. Information duties may be contained in supervisory law as well as in insurance
contract law. In Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, post-contractual
information duties of the insurer are a matter of insurance supervision. In other countries, such
as France, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden, they are regulated in the complex of
insurance contract law.
177
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Life Insurance
N2. Art. 185 para. 5(b) of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), which replaces art. 36 of the
Life Assurance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC), provides that, during the period of the
contract, the policyholder shall be informed of any changes concerning the insurer’s name and
address, its legal form, the address of its head office and of the agency or branch which concluded
the contract. This mirrors Article 2:701 PEICL. In case of an additional contract between the
parties, or when changes occur in the legal framework, the insurer, pursuant to Art. 185 para. 5(c)
of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), must provide the policyholder with information on
all central aspects of the contract as set out in art. 185 para. 3(d) – (j) of the Solvency II Directive
(2009/138/EC). Finally, the insurer must annually inform the policyholders on the state of their
bonuses, Art. 185 para. 5(d) of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
N3. As these requirements are contained in a directive, they were enacted by national legisla-
tures or are mirrored in pre-existing law of Member States. In Austria, specific post-contractual
information duties in life assurance contracts are imposed by s. 18b para. 2 ISA. For Belgium, see
art. 15 para. 2(b) of the Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision and arts. 19
and 20 of the Royal Decree of 14 November 2003 on Life Assurance. In Italy, post-contractual
information duties in life assurance are contained in arts. 182 ff. and regulations by council au-
thorities, see Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 674. For Luxembourg, see the third and fourth
indents of art. 17 para. 1 ICA. For Poland, see art. 13 of the Act on Insurance Activity and Kow-
alewski 201.
N4. For France, see art. L. 132-22 ICA. The provision distinguishes between life assurances for
less than €2000 and life assurance at or above €2000, see Bonnard, para. 788. Under the rules
for the latter, the insurer must inform the policyholder annually about: the repurchase value,
guaranteed capital, the premium, as well as average investment yields and bonuses, the latter
information being subject to further definition by way of executive decree. Under the rules for
cover below €2000, the above-mentioned annual information is required on demand by the
policyholder.
N5. In the Netherlands, post-contractual information duties for life and non-life insurance con-
tracts are set out in art. 4:20 para. 3 ISA in conjunction with arts. 73 and 75 of the Decree on the
Supervision of the Conduct of Financial Enterprises.
N6. Art. 204 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), which replaces art. 7 of the Legal
Expenses Insurance Directive (87/344/EC), calls for special post-contractual information duties
in legal expenses insurance. Whenever a conflict of interest arises or a disagreement over the
settlement of dispute occurs, the insurer, or, when appropriate, the claims settlement office shall
inform the policyholder of the right to choose a lawyer, and the possibility of having recourse to
alternative dispute resolution services.
N7. In France, the requirements of the Legal Expenses Insurance Directive (87/344/EC) were
transposed in arts. L. 127-5 and R. 127-1 ICA. For Belgium, see art. 156, 2° and art. 157 para. 1 IA
2014 together with art. 8 of the Royal Decree of 12 October 1990 on Legal Expenses Insurance.
178
Article 2:701 General Information Duty
For the Netherlands, see art. 4:69 ISA. For the United Kingdom, see regulation 9 of the Insurance
Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990. For Austria, see s. 158k para. 3 and
s. 158l para. 2 ICA. For Ireland, see regulation 10 of the European Communities (Non-Life In-
surance) (Legal Expenses) Regulations 1991. For Germany, see the second sentence of s. 128 ICA.
For Luxembourg, see art. 23 of the Grand Ducal Regulation of 20 December 1991 on Insurance,
now integrated into art. 96 ICA.
N8. Some Member State laws establish information duties more or less similar to Article 2:701
PEICL. For Austria, see s. 9a para. 5 ISA. For Belgium, see art. 15 para. 2(a) of the Royal Decree
of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision. In Germany, s. 6 para. 1(1) of the Regulation on
Duties of Information Relating to Insurance Contracts of 18 December 2007, which is based on
s. 7 paras. 2 and 3 ICA, corresponds to Article 2:701 PEICL. According to s. 6 para. 1(2) of the
Regulation, the insurer shall also inform about changes of fundamental contractual provisions,
related costs, methods of payment, and, finally, changes in the duration of the contract, when
these are caused by changes in the law. In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the first indent of
art. 17 para. 1 ICA corresponds to Article 2:701 PEICL. As in German law, the second indent
of art. 17 para. 1 ICA further obliges the insurer to inform about changes of fundamental con-
tractual provisions, rights of termination, costs, methods of payment, and finally, changes in the
duration of the contract, when these arise from changes in the law.
N9. For Finland, see s. 7 para. 1 ICA. The insurer shall dispatch to the policyholder an annual
statement detailing the sum insured and any such circumstances concerning the insurance as are
of manifest importance to the policyholder. For Sweden, see s. 5 para. 1 of Ch. 2 ICA: During the
entire period of insurance and in conjunction with renewal of the insurance policy, the insurer
shall, to a reasonable extent, inform the policyholder of circumstances relating to the insurance
which are of importance to the policyholder.
N10. In the United Kingdom, post-contractual information duties are covered in the In-
surance Conduct of Business Sourcebook in the Financial Services Authority’s Handbook. The
general rule is set out in ICOBS 6.1.6: information duties may apply pre-contract conclusion and
post-contract conclusion, so as to enable customers to make an informed decision; the duties may
include matters such as mid-term changes and renewals. ICOBS 6.3.3(1) corresponds to Article
2:701 PEICL. Furthermore, under ICOBS 6.3.3(2), the insurer must inform about changes in
benefits, contract term, means of terminating the contract, methods and duration of payment
and changes in the premium for each benefit, when such changes arise from change in policy
conditions or an amendment of the applicable law. Specific post-contractual information duties
for protection policies are provided for by ICOBS 6.4.11.
N11. For France, where general post-contractual information duties have been developed by the
courts, see Lamy Assurances, para. 47. General post-contractual information duties are unknown
to the law of Switzerland. Information duties pursuant to arts. 3 and 3a Swiss ICA are limited to
the pre-contractual phase.
179
Chapter Two: Initial Stage and Duration of the Insurance Contract
Comments
Purpose
C1. The duty to inform also serves to promote competition in the insurance sector. If
insurers were not obliged to keep policyholders informed about any essential change con-
cerning their contract, policyholders would not be able to compare the product they are
holding with other products on the market in order to evaluate if a change of product could
be advantageous to them. Article 2:702 therefore grants the right to the policyholder to
request information about several aspects of the insurance product itself, for example, the
beginning or the end of the term, the substance of the contract or the question whether
certain conduct is covered by the insurance.
Limits
C2. Such a duty should, however, not enable policyholders to overburden insurers with
requests for information. To this end Article 2:702 para. 1(a) limits the duty to matters
relevant to the performance of the contract and only to the extent that can reasonably be
expected of insurers. Therefore, policyholders can only request information concerning
essential elements of the contract which are of manifest importance to them such as the
general contract terms or steps to be taken after the occurrence of an insured event. In such
cases no fee can be charged by insurers. This does not rule out the possibility of charging
for other kinds of information.
C3. Article 2:702 para. 1(b) has to be distinguished from 2:603. While the latter provision
deals with alteration of the terms of the policyholder’s own contract, the former addresses
changes in standard terms offered by the insurer on the market. The possibility of long-term
insurance contracts (see Article 2:601) and of the automatic prolongation of insurance con-
tracts as provided for by Article 2:602 have to be reconciled with policyholders’ legitimate
interest in obtaining the best product for their needs. The duty under Article 2:702 para.
1(b) is intended to enable policyholders to compare their current product with the one the
insurer is offering to new customers and with other products on the market. The insurer
may fulfil this duty by informing policyholders of the changes that were made and in addi-
tion sending the new standard terms of insurance in question. In view of the considerable
costs incurred by providing such information, insurers will have to furnish it only upon the
180
Article 3:101 Powers of Insurance Agents
request of interested policyholders. Sending it out to all others would generate cost without
promoting competition.
Manner of Communication
C4. As to the manner of communication see Article 2:701 Comment 7. In the context
of Article 2:702 “without undue delay” requires insurers to answer very promptly where
necessary and possible.
Remedies
C5. While the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not explicitly provide
any remedy if the insurer does not comply with the request, several possibilities exist: for
example, policyholders may claim damages if they suffer loss from the breach of the infor-
mation duty; they may also complain to a supervisory authority or insurance ombudsman.
Note
Article 2:702 PEICL requires further information only on request by the policyholder. Such a
rule is not unknown to national law. For Sweden, see s. 5 para. 2 of Ch. 2 ICA: The insurer shall,
at the policyholder’s request, provide information regarding the premium and other terms and
conditions of the insurance policy. For Germany, see s. 7 para. 4 ICA: on the policyholder’s
request, the insurer must transmit a copy of the contract and applicable standard terms. For the
Netherlands, see art. 4:20 para. 5 ISA, which entitles the legislator to restrict post-contractual in-
formation duties in explicitly mentioned cases to information requested for by the policyholder.
181
Chapter Three: Insurance Intermediaries
Comments
Legal and Contractual Authority of the Insurance Agent
C1. The legal authority vested in the insurance agent by the first sentence of para. 1 is
designed to reflect the standard scope of employment of insurance agents which justifies
expectations by policyholders of corresponding powers of the agent. The purpose of the
rule is to establish conformity between the insurance agents’ role and their authority. The
insurance agents’ role is directed at the promotion of the sale of insurance contracts by
giving advice to policyholders about all matters relevant for their decision to buy insurance.
The role usually includes support services to policyholders during the term of the insurance
contract, such as proposing updates to the policy, gathering of information and providing
assistance concerning claims. By contrast, the role usually does not include the granting of
insurance cover on behalf of the insurer.
C2. The first sentence of para. 1 is not mandatory in the sense that it could never be
derogated from by the insurer to the detriment of the policyholder. Any derogation would,
however, need to be notified to the policyholder in a separate document. In this sense it is
a formally cogent rule that allows an opting out but only by using a prescribed form and
procedure.
C3. The insurer may grant additional powers to the agent, for example a power to conclude
the insurance contract. A power of attorney of this kind is subject to the general provisions
of the law of agency including the rules on implied and apparent authority; see Chapter 3
PECL. Authority according to Article 3:101 may therefore arise from the “apparent employ-
ment” of a person as an insurance agent.
C4. The role played by insurance agents may change in the course of time. The task of
collecting premiums is a good example: whereas insurers formerly employed their agents
to collect premiums, this business practice was given up because money transfers through
banks, including e-banking, became a more convenient and secure mode of paying.
Minimum Authority
C5. The minimum extent of the authority which any insurance agent possesses is the
actual scope of his employment. This scope of authority is mandatory and must not be
restricted by the insurer even by obeying the formal requirements of the second sentence
of Article 3:101 para. 1. The actual scope of the agent’s employment is a question of fact
which requires proof by the policyholder. The insurer must, however, cooperate with the
policyholder in providing the evidence of the terms of the agent’s employment.
C6. Insurance agents are expected to have wide powers in respect of the exchange of
information. Therefore, para. 2 assigns to them as a minimum the power to render infor-
mation and advice on behalf of the insurer and the authority to receive all notices from the
policyholder. Since the provisions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are
mandatory in favour of the policyholder, the (minimum) powers set out in para. 2 cannot
be limited or excluded by agreement of the parties.
182
Article 3:101 Powers of Insurance Agents
C7. Para. 3 imputes relevant knowledge which the insurance agent has or ought to have
acquired during the course of his employment with the insurer. Such a rule is an inevitable
consequence of the insurance agent’s agency on behalf of the insurer and the insurer’s deci-
sion to delegate to the agent. Para. 3 corresponds to the imputation of knowledge of persons
close to the policyholder, insured or beneficiary prescribed by Article 1:206. For para. 3 to
be applicable a contractual assignment of the insurance agent’s authority to receive knowl-
edge from the policyholder and transfer it to the insurer is not required. That is because the
authority of the insurance agent arises by operation of law. Other than the employment as
such, no special vesting of powers is needed.
C8. The rule does not deal with the question of personal liability of insurance agents to
the policyholder. Such questions are not within the scope of insurance contract law but are
a matter of the professional liability of intermediaries.
Notes
First Sentence of Article 3:101 para. 1 – Statutory Powers
N1. The rule established in the first sentence of Article 3:101 para. 1 is the same as that in Swit-
zerland (see art. 34 ICA). According to Greek law, the insurance intermediary has the powers
and duties stated by statutory law but the insurer is bound by any other acts of the agent which
are in accordance with normal insurance practice provided that the policyholder acted in good
faith (Kiantos, Praktoras 161 and Rokas, paras. 1301 ff.). The laws of Austria, Germany, Poland,
and Spain provide a list of certain activities which, in principle, are covered by the agent’s au-
thority; thus the agent is deemed to be empowered to receive all applications, notifications and
declarations concerning the insurance contract (see for Austria s. 43 para. 2 ICA, and Basedow/
Fock-Lemmel 1035; for Germany s. 69 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 350; for Poland art. 4 of the
Act on Insurance Mediation; for Spain art. 12 para. 2 of the Law on Mediation of Private Insur-
ance and Reinsurance, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 142). The agent may have additional powers
flowing from a contractual authorisation.
N2. In Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and the United Kingdom
there is no statutory rule that determines the authority of the agent. Thus, its origin and scope
are purely contractual in nature (see for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock 245; for France arts. 1984 ff.
CC, Basedow/Fock-Völker 492; for Luxembourg arts. 1984 ff. CC, Basedow/Fock-Völker 778; for
Portugal arts. 258 ff. CC, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1155; for the United Kingdom Birds 197 ff.,
Clarke 7-2 ff., Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1426). The Dutch Civil Code determines in Chapter 7:10.10
the legal position of the agent as defined in Article 1:202 para. 5 PEICL (see Asser/Clausung/
Wansink 47 ff.).
183
Chapter Three: Insurance Intermediaries
N3. Rules dealing with contractual limitations of the agent’s authority such as those in the second
and third sentences of Article 3:101 para. 1 only make sense in legal systems that provide for a
statutory basis of the agent’s authority. In Germany, standard terms providing for a limitation of
the agent’s power to receive declarations addressed to the insurer are ineffective (s. 72 ICA). The
same is basically true for Spain (see art. 12 para. 2 of the Law on Mediation of Private Insurance
and Reinsurance, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 142). In other European countries, restrictions of
the agent’s authority are either unusual (Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 46) or do not raise legal
problems because the power of the agent results from contract and not from statute.
N4. As a result of the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC), as amended, European legal
systems will require the insurance agent to provide the policyholder with information and advice
(art. 12 of the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC)). By implication the Directive confers
also the power upon the agent to provide information and to give advice.
N5. To date, the Directive has been implemented in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Finland, France,
Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Ireland where the
insurance agent is under an obligation to inform and advise the policyholder. (For Belgium see
art. 273 IA 2014; for Germany see s. 61 ICA; for Greece see Rokas, para. 1277; for Finland see
s. 5 ICA and ss. 19 to 22 of the Insurance Mediation Act (570/2005); for France Bonnard para.
184, Groutel 12, Basedow/Fock-Völker 481; for Luxembourg Bisenius 95, Rod 626, Basedow/
Fock-Völker 772; for Poland see for example art. 13 of the Act on Insurance Mediation; for Por-
tugal see art. 29 ICA; for Spain art. 6 para. 1 of the Law on Mediation of Private Insurance and
Reinsurance, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 133; for Switzerland Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1215; for the
United Kingdom see, for example, ICOBS 5.1.20, Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1413 ff.; for Ireland s. 49(1)
(b) and (4)(a) of the Insurance Act 1989, Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1413 f.). For the Netherlands, see
arts. 4:23, 4:72 and 4:73 ISA which refer to the so-called independent insurance intermediary or
broker and do not apply to the agent as defined in Article 1:202 PEICL.
N6. The principle established in Article 3:101 para. 3 is well known in most European countries.
In Germany, it has always been common legal practice that facts communicated to the insurance
agent during the course of its employment are deemed to be communicated to the insurer; the
agent is regarded as the insurer’s “eyes and ears” (see BGH 18.12.1991, BGHZ 116, 387 (390),
BGH 23.5.1989, BGHZ 107, 322 (323), BGH 11.11.1987, BGHZ 102, 194 (197), Basedow/Fock-
Lemmel 350). Today, the rule has been codified in s. 70 ICA.
N7. Corresponding rules are also to be found in the laws of Austria, France, Greece, the Nordic
Countries, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Ireland (see for Austria the second
sentence of s. 44 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1036; for France Lambert-Faivre, para. 186, Des-
champs, para. 117, Basedow/Fock-Völker 492; for Greece art. 214 CC, Basedow/Fock-Papatho-
ma-Baetge 594, Kiantos, Praktoras 161; for the Nordic Countries Dohr 54, Basedow/Fock-Scher-
pe 935; for Switzerland Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1221, Maurer 209, Roelli/Keller 162; for the United
184
Article 3:102 Agents of Insurers Purporting to Be Independent
Kingdom Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA); British
Bank of the Middle East v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 9 (HL);
Birds 12.3.3, CMS 1-35 ff., Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1430; for Ireland Buckley 25, Basedow/Fock-Rühl
1430). In Spain special rules concerning the so-called “passive representation” apply but lead to
the same results in practice (see art. 12 para. 2 of the Law on Mediation of Private Insurance and
Reinsurance, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 142).
Comments
Rationale
C1. Policyholders trust agents purporting to be independent as though they really were
independent. Article 3:102 protects the reasonable expectations of the policyholder that the
independent intermediary acts in compliance with the duties imposed on such an inter-
mediary by law. At the same time imposing liability deters insurers from taking advantage
of “pseudo-brokers”.
C2. Intermediaries have to register either as being dependent or independent under the
Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) as amended. Insurers can be expected to mon-
itor their own distribution network by inspecting the register. If they raise no objection to
the agent’s registration as independent (“pseudo-brokers”) they should not be allowed to
benefit from such a discrepancy between fact and appearance for which the agent is respon-
sible. For the rule to apply, however, the insurer’s actual knowledge of the agent’s conduct or
behaviour is not a requirement. The insurer is a guarantor that its agent shall comply with
the obligations of independent intermediaries when purporting to be such.
Scope
C3. The rule only applies to persons who are employed by the insurers as agents. Thus,
the existence of such an agency relationship has to be proven. Other persons who hold
themselves out to be agents of the insurer may trigger the insurer’s liability under general
rules of agency but are not covered by this Article. This applies, for example, to the former
agent of an insurer who continues to conduct his business as if he were still an agent of the
same insurer.
C4. Since “pseudo-brokers” are employed by the insurer they hold the minimum authority
granted by Article 3:101.
185
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
Note
An extension of the duties of insurance brokers to those insurance agents who act vis-à-vis the
applicant as if they were insurance brokers can be found in particular in Austrian and German
insurance law. Both laws subject such “pseudo-brokers” to the same duties as insurance brokers
in order to protect the applicant who relies on their role as insurance brokers (for Austrian and
German law, see Prölss/Martin-Dörner, § 59 VVG para. 147, OLG Oldenburg 13.1.1999, Ver-
sicherungsrecht 1999, 757, for similar views on Swiss law, see Honsell/Vogt/Schnyder-Fuhrer
art. 34 VVG para. 43).
Comments
General Remarks
C1. Section 1 of Chapter 4 PEICL on “The Risk Insured” deals with “Precautionary Meas-
ures” required by the insurance contract, a concept similar but not identical to that of
“promissory warranties” in English law or contractual “Obliegenheiten” in German law.
In order to avoid the consequences which have arisen in those countries over time the
wording of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law is inspired by art. 31 of the
Finnish ICA. The section contains three articles dealing with the definition of the concept
and sanctions for non-compliance, in particular termination of the contract and discharge
of the insurer’s liability.
C2. Insurers use terms like “warranties” as a tool to limit the risk, to protect themselves
against a temporary aggravation of risk and sometimes to avoid their obligations to the
detriment of policyholders. As the Joint Consultation Paper on Insurance Contract Law
(UK) indicates, the impact of these terms may defeat the insured’s reasonable expectation
of cover, particularly in cases where there is a discharge from liability even in the absence
of a causal connection between the breach and the loss. The Paper (p. 15 para. 73) gives the
following illustration: “A policyholder who warrants to maintain a sprinkler system might
expect that the insurer will not pay for fire damage while the sprinkler was not working.
They would not expect the insurer to refuse a storm damage claim or a fire claim that arises
after the sprinkler has been repaired”. In addition, policyholders are often not aware of the
warranties imposed upon them in the terms of the policy or of the harsh consequences of a
breach of warranty, as it is a matter of common knowledge that the “average” consumer or
small businessman is not inclined to read the terms of the policy carefully. Therefore, the
186
Article 4:101 Precautionary Measures: Meaning
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law have established a new regime that seeks
to be in accord with both insurers’ and policyholders’ reasonable expectations and to avoid
the harsh consequences set forth above.
C3. According to Article 4:101 a precautionary measure means a clause in the insurance
contract, whether or not described as a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer,
requiring the policyholder or the insured, before the insured event occurs, to perform or
not to perform certain acts.
C4. One of the major problems in identifiying a precautionary measure is that it is not
always easy to draw the line between precautionary measures and other types of contractual
terms which seek to limit the scope of cover. A certain conduct on the part of the policy-
holder can be required by a term phrased as a precautionary measure (“the policyholder
must keep the vehicle in a roadworthy condition”), a condition precedent to the liability
of the insurer (“cover is conditional on the vehicle being roadworthy”) or as an exception
to the risk (no cover where “the vehicle is not in a roadworthy condition”). Article 4:101 is
intended to cover all these situations.
C5. This does not rule out the possibility of incorporating terms which establish con-
ditions precedent or exceptions to the insurer’s liability. However, to the extent that such
clauses refer to specific conduct on the part of the policyholder or the insured intended to
limit the risk they are to be treated as precautionary measures. For example, a term of the
insurance contract excluding liability for fire caused by negligent handling of gas bottles
in breach of specific regulations would be treated as a precautionary measure, whereas the
exclusion of liability for fire caused by handling of gas bottles as such would be treated as
an exclusion clause not covered by Article 4:101.
Notes
General Remarks
N1. It is worth noting that Community law does not regulate precautionary measures. Precau-
tionary measures established contractually can be found in all European countries. In addition,
insurance contract laws impose similar obligations on the insured, these obligations however
binding the insured by statute. Such obligations are not discussed in the following notes. In light
of the consequences of a breach, which range from automatic discharge to a right to termination
(see notes on Articles 4:102 and 4:103), and the different requirements, such as causation, fault,
and so on, precautionary measures must be distinguished from clauses specifying or delimiting
the insured risk. Thus, most national insurance contract laws either provide for statutory defini-
tions such as Article 4:101, or have established specific terminologies with regard to precaution-
ary measures.
187
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
N2. The Finnish ICA which has inspired Article 4:101 uses the notion of precautionary guide-
lines. These are defined in s. 31 para. 1 Finnish ICA, which is only applicable to indemnity insur-
ance, as “provisions on devices, apparatuses, procedures or other arrangements introduced with
an aim to prevent or restrict the occurrence of damage or loss” or “guidelines to the effect that
the person using or managing the property insured shall have certain competence”. S. 31 para.
2 Finnish ICA sets forth that “the insured shall comply with the precautionary guidelines”. The
Swedish ICA provides for a similar definition: s. 6 para. 2 of Ch. 4 ICA defines security provisions
as “provisions set forth in the policy terms regarding pre-determined courses of action or facili-
ties which are intended to prevent or limit loss or regarding certain pre-determined qualifications
of the insured or its employees or other cooperating parties”.
N3. Austrian, German and Swiss insurance contract law denote clauses aimed at by Article 4:101
PEICL as vertragliche Obliegenheiten, see for instance art. 29 Swiss ICA. The national provision
most comparable to Article 4:101 PEICL is s. 28 para. 1 German ICA, specifying precautionary
measures as vertragliche Obliegenheiten, which have to be performed before the occurrence of the
insured event (“die von dem Versicherten vor Eintritt des Versicherungsfalles zu erfüllen sind”).
United Kingdom
N4. Insurance law in the United Kingdom does not speak of precautionary measures as such.
Contract terms which require performance of certain acts before the insured event occurs, may
come in the form of warranties, more specifically promissory warranties, or conditions. The mean-
ing of (promissory) warranties and conditions in insurance contract law differs from the meaning
of these terms in the general law of obligations. In general, warranties and conditions in insur-
ance contract law have the inverse meaning as in general contract law; warranties in insurance
contract law denoting clauses of particular importance, see Birds 9.1 ff.; Basedow/Fock-Rühl 197.
S. 32 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 defines promissory warranties as promises by which “the
insured undertakes that some particular thing will or will not be done or that some condition
will be fulfilled”; see Birds 9.3 ff.; Clarke 20-5. This provision has been held to represent the state
of law in all classes of insurance, see Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association
(Bermuda) Ltd, The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233. Also conditions in insurance contract are quite
different from conditions in general contract law; see Clarke 20-1 ff.
France
N5. French Insurance contract law does not contain a statutory provision comparable to Article
4:101 PEICL. In general terms, the clauses covered by Article 4:101 PEICL may be referred to
as obligations de l’assuré avant sinistre. More specifically, they appear in the form of mesures de
prévention (du risque), see Lamy Assurances, paras. 236 ff. Precautionary measures may be em-
bedded in clauses providing for a discharge of the insurer. Such clauses are referred to as clauses
de déchéance, see the second alternative in the fourth sentence of art. 112-4 ICA. There appears
to be much uncertainty in French courts over the classification of contractually established pre-
188
Article 4:102 Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Contract
cautionary measures as clauses de déchéance or clauses on the delimitation of the insured risk,
see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(b).
N6. Similar to French law, Belgian insurance contract law does not contain a statutory defini-
tion of precautionary measures. The terminology in (French-speaking) Belgium is similar to
the French terminology. Precautionary measures aimed at preventing the materialisation of the
insured risk are referred to as mesures de prévention, see Fontaine, para. 305. Art. 75 IA, although
related, does not cover precautionary measures in the sense of Article 4:101 PEICL. The obliga-
tions covered by art. 75 IA only ensue after occurrence of the risk. Finally, art. 106 IA does cover
precautionary measures, but only such precautionary measures to be taken under imminent
danger that the risk will occur, and is limited in scope to indemnity insurance policies. Art. 27
Luxembourg ICA exactly corresponds to art. 75 Belgian IA 2014, with the sole difference of not
being limited in scope to indemnity insurance. As with Belgian and Luxembourg law, the Dutch
Civil Code does not refer to the subject of precautionary measures as defined in Article 4:101
PEICL. Art. 7:957 Dutch CC corresponds to art. 52 Belgian IA 2014 and is linked to measures to
mitigate insured loss in the sense of Article 9:102 PEICL.
Spain
N7. In Spain, obligations of the policyholder or the insured to perform certain acts, are referred
to as cargas. Art. 17 ICA does not cover precautionary measures in the sense of Article 4:101
PEICL, as the obligations under this provision ensue only after the insured risk has materialised.
Poland
N8. In Poland, the Civil Code does not contain a statutory definition of precautionary measures.
The obligations of the policyholder or the insured covered by art. 826 CC take effect only after
the insured risk has materialised. See Fuchs, Funkcja 35 ff. and Fuchs, Zakres 37 ff.
Greece
N9. According to general law, the breach of a contractual precautionary measure cannot lead
to loss of cover unless the insured is liable for the breach and there is a causal relation with the
damage suffered, see Rokas, Eisigiseis paras. 155 ff.
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Comments
Termination and Non-Prolongation
C1. Article 4:102 allows the insurer to terminate while the contract period is still running
compared to a non-prolongation according to Article 2:602. The right to terminate is limited
to cases where the policyholder or the insured has breached his obligation with intent to
cause the loss or recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would probably result. For the
latter formula see Article 9:101 Comments 2 and 3. This limitation of the insurer’s right to
terminate the contract is of limited relevance because according to Article 2:601 the contract
period is one year only and the insurer may refuse prolongation according to Article 2:602
para. 1(a) where the policyholder or insured was in breach of precautionary measures.
C2. If the insurer exercises its right of termination under Article 4:102 after the occurrence
of an insured event this right may overlap with the right of termination under Article 2:604.
There may also be an overlap with a right of termination under Article 4:203: If the breach of
the precautionary measure occurs in the case of an aggravation of risk the insurer is entitled
to terminate notwithstanding non-compliance with the strict requirements of Article 4:102
para. 1.
Manner of Termination
C3. The right to terminate must be exercised by written notice to the policyholder. “Writ-
ten” statements are defined in Article 1:301 para. 6 PECL as including “communications
made by telegram, telex, telefax and electronic mail and other means of communication
capable of providing a readable record of the statement on both sides”. The right to terminate
must be exercised within one month of the time when non-compliance with a precautionary
measure becomes known or apparent to the insurer. The receipt of the notice of termination
is relevant for determining the time limit (see Article 1:303 para. 2 PECL). Cover comes to
an end at and from the time of termination.
C4. The application of Article 4:102 is modified as far as group insurances are concerned,
see Article 18:203 para. 2.
Notes
Ipso iure Avoidance or Declaration of Termination
N1. Breach of a precautionary measure may give rise to a variety of consequences. Article 4:102
PEICL limits the effects of clauses which grant the insurer a right to terminate the contract.
Under some insurance contract laws, however, compliance with a precautionary obligation is a
190
Article 4:102 Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Contract
condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. When such an obligation is breached, the risk
has never been covered, the insurance contract has never commenced and a declaration of ter-
mination is obsolete. This may be the case in French law, see Lamy Assurances, paras. 236 ff. The
same effect is known in the United Kingdom. The House of Lords held in Bank of Nova Scotia v
Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd, The Good Luck [1992] 1 AC 233 (see also
Basedow/Fock-Rühl 191), that breach of a warranty constitutes failure of a condition precedent
to cover, and terminates the contract. Although the judgment concerned the Marine Insurance
Act, it is widely acknowledged that its findings apply to all types of insurance contracts, see Birds
152 ff., Clarke 20-6C1 and Basedow/Fock-Rühl 194. This may be the case also in Polish law, see
art. 826 para. 3 CC.
N2. With regard to the clauses covered by Article 4:102 PEICL, a further distinction must be
drawn. Article 4:102 limits the effects of clauses providing for termination of the contract ex nunc.
This must be distinguished from avoidance taking effect ex tunc. The Austrian and German ICA
emphasise this distinction by explicitly banning clauses providing for a right to avoid, see s. 6
para. 4 Austrian ICA and s. 28 para. 5 German ICA respectively. The state of the law in the United
Kingdom is comparable, equating in substance to an ex nunc effect. Although breach of a (prom-
issory) warranty constitutes failure of a condition precedent (see above), duties which had fallen
due before breach remain due; and procedural conditions for the settlement of earlier claims must
still be performed, see Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp 785, De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 TR 343,
Clarke 20-6C2. According to Dutch insurance contract law, the only consequence of breach of a
precautionary measure is loss of coverage during the period of breach.
N4. In the United Kingdom, special rules apply for consumer and small business insurance.
ICOBS 8.1.1(3) provides that insurers must not “unreasonably reject a claim (including by ter-
minating or avoiding a policy)”; and ICOBS 8.1.1 provides that “rejection of a consumer policy-
holder’s claim is unreasonable, except where there is evidence of fraud, if it is for […] (3) breach
of warranty or condition unless the circumstances of the claim are connected to the breach and
unless certain other conditions are required in the case of a pure protection contract.” Note
also the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012, s 6(2); Clarke 23-19A.
Furthermore, insurance policies in the United Kingdom may contain clauses requiring a causal
link between breach and loss.
191
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
N5. Given the various exceptions in France and the United Kingdom, and in light of the other
continental jurisdictions, the solution adopted by Article 4:102 PEICL reflects a growing Eu-
ropean consensus. The various codifications subject a right of termination to: failure to comply
with precautionary measures, see s. 6 para. 1 Austrian ICA, s. 15 para. 1(3) Finnish ICA and s. 28
para. 1 German ICA; material breach or other due cause, see s. 7 para. 1 of Ch. 3 Swedish ICA;
failure to comply with a precautionary obligation aimed at reducing the risk or preventing the ma-
terialisation of the risk, see art. 29 Swiss ICA. Art. 29 para. 2 Swiss ICA clarifies that the insurer
may not invoke such a termination clause when a nexus between the loss and the breach cannot
be established. This requirement of causation is recognised by the other laws as well. Whether
or not the respective countries provide for a separate provision on causality in their insurance
codes as opposed to the criteria of the general law of obligations appears above all to be a matter
of the onus of proof.
N6. In France, when precautionary obligations are classified as conditions precedent to cover,
fault of the insured in failing to comply is not a necessary condition, see Lamy Assurances, para.
239. For the same view in the Netherlands, see Asser/Clausing/Wansink 418 ff., and in the United
Kingdom, see Basedow/Fock-Rühl 186 f. The results are mitigated in practice either by subjecting
a breach of precautionary obligations to a different set of rules, such as the exclusion de garantie
in France, see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(b), or through construction, leading to the conclusion
that the precautionary obligation was not violated, see Clarke 20-6B for the United Kingdom.
N7. Under Article 4:102 para. 1, the policyholder or the insured must have acted with intent
or recklessly and with knowledge that the loss would probably result. This formula is to be found
in international transport conventions; see, for example, the Article 22 para. 5 of the Montreal
Convention 1999. The formula is also mirrored in national insurance laws. Under the pertinent
provisions, the insured/policyholder must have acted: at least negligently in Austria, see the sec-
ond sentence of s. 6 para. 1 ICA; however, if breach of the precautionary obligation was merely
negligent, and not grossly negligent, reckless or intentional, the insurer may only terminate the
contract when the insured was initially advised against this consequence by way of a formal
document, s. 6 para. 5 ICA. In Germany, the insured/policyholder must have acted intentionally,
knowingly or through gross negligence, see s. 28 para. 1 ICA. Finnish law requires non-compliance
to have occurred wilfully or through gross negligence, s. 15 para. 1(3) ICA. For United Kingdom
law, see Clarke 19-2E.
N8. In line with Article 4:102 para. 2 PEICL, the Austrian and German laws set a time limit, for
the exercise of the right of termination, of one month from the time when non-compliance with
a precautionary measure becomes known to the insurer, see the second sentence of s. 6 para.
1 Austrian ICA and s. 28 para. 1 German ICA respectively. The Nordic codifications are more
flexible. Finnish law mandates exercise of the right of termination without undue delay, s. 15 para.
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Article 4:103 Discharge of the Insurer’s Liability
2 ICA. Under Swedish law, the right to termination expires after unreasonable delay, s. 7 para. 2 of
Ch. 3 ICA. According to s. 7 of Ch. 3 ICA, there is no time limit on the insurer’s right to terminate
the contract when the insured or the policyholder acted fraudulently or in contravention to good
faith.
N9. Like the first sentence of Article 4:102 para. 2 PEICL, s. 15 para. 2 Finnish ICA and s. 7 para.
2 of Ch. 3 Swedish ICA mandate a written notice of termination.
End of Cover
N10. The second sentence of Article 4:102 para. 2 PEICL seems to reflect an international
consensus. With the exception of Finland, European insurance contract laws either provide for
immediate end of cover or submit the question to the general law of obligations. S. 15 para. 2
Finnish ICA differs from the PEICL rule in that the policy remains valid one month after dispatch
of the notice of termination.
National Peculiarities
N11. Under the German ICA, when breach of a precautionary obligation relates to a severable
part of the contract, the insurer may only terminate the contract in its entirety if proof is deliv-
ered by the insurer that it would not have concluded the remaining contract as it stands, s. 29
para. 1 ICA. Furthermore, if a severable breach, under s. 29 para. 1 ICA, gives rise to a partial
termination by the insurer, the policyholder may terminate the remaining part of the contract. In
the other European countries, the issue of severability would be a question of the general law of
obligations. But it seems German law stands out in providing a subsequent right of termination
for the policyholder.
Comments
General Remarks
C1. Article 4:103 deals with contract clauses which discharge the insurer from liability if
the policyholder or insured is in breach of a precautionary measure. If there is no such clause
the provision remains irrelevant because the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law do not discharge the insurer automatically. Article 4:103 seeks to limit the consequences
193
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
of such clauses (see Article 4:101 Comment 2) for the policyholder or insured by requiring
both causation and fault.
Causation
C2. Article 4:103 para. 1 is clear: non-compliance with a precautionary measure shall only
have effect to the extent that the loss was caused by the non-compliance by the policyholder
or insured. Non-compliance with a requirement of a sprinkler in full operation in a fire
policy therefore may have the effect of excluding the insurer’s liability for loss caused by fire
if the loss would have been avoided by a fully operating sprinkler. In addition, the insurer’s
liability may be reduced if the loss caused by fire could not have been fully avoided by an
operating sprinkler (for example in case of lightning) but has increased due to the absence
of such a sprinkler. In that case the insurer’s liability would only be reduced as far as the
non-compliance contributed to the extent of the loss. The onus of proving the prerequisites
for a discharge of the insurer’s liability, including a causal link between non-compliance
and loss, is on the insurer.
Fault
C3. As mentioned above, Article 4:103 introduces a second requirement for the discharge
of the insurer’s liability: the loss must be caused with intent to cause the loss or recklessly
and with knowledge that the loss would probably result, on the part of the policyholder or
insured. For intent and recklessness see Article 9:101 Comments 2 and 3.
C4. Under Article 4:103 para. 2 the policyholder or the insured will be entitled to insur-
ance money in respect of any loss caused by negligent but non-reckless breach of a precau-
tionary measure. The basic philosophy is that insurance is taken out not just for accidental
risks but also for cases of negligent behaviour. The parties may however deviate from the
basic rule by an appropriate contract clause. Such a clause must satisfy the requirements
of Article 1:203. The additional requirement that it has to be clear indicates that it must be
in a very specific language in order to discharge the insurer in cases of negligence. If such
a clause is applied in a specific case the discharge of the insurer from liability is limited by
the degree of causation (Article 4:103 para. 1) and additionally by the degree of fault. If the
fault is very slight there is no discharge, if the degree of fault comes close to recklessness the
discharge may be almost complete.
Notes
General Remarks
N1. As Community law does not cover precautionary measures, comparisons can only be drawn
to national provisions. An important distinction must be made between clauses providing for a
discharge of the insurer (discharge clauses) and clauses excluding certain risks (exclusion clauses),
as the two types of clauses are subject to different rules. Whereas discharge clauses generally
require fault on the part of the policyholder/insured, exclusion clauses generally require neither
causation nor fault to be established. In substance, however, both techniques often lead to the
194
Article 4:103 Discharge of the Insurer’s Liability
same result: the policyholder and/or the insured obtain only part of the insurance money or no
insurance money at all.
Causation
N2. Article 4:103 para. 1 PEICL stipulates that the loss must have been “caused by the non-com-
pliance”. The same requirement applies under Article 4:103 para. 2 PEICL, as can be inferred as
a matter of systematic interpretation.
France
N3. In France, precautionary measures may either be classified as conditions precedent to cov-
er (conditions de garantie) or as exclusionary clauses (clauses d’exclusion). The terminology in
French insurance law can be misleading. Even though courts may hold precautionary measures
to fall under the regime of the clauses d’exclusion, this regime, as it is applied, follows the rules
of discharge clauses, see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(b): «On se place de la sorte dans le droit
fil du mécanisme de la déchéance.» When precautionary measures are regarded as conditions
precedent to the insurer’s liability, non-compliance as such bars any claim by the policyholder,
see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(a). When precautionary measures, however, are submitted to the
rules applying to discharge clauses, discharge of the insurer takes effect only when a causal link
between breach and loss can be established, see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(b). Given the harsh
consequences in the absence of a nexus requirement, it appears that there is a recent tendency
in French jurisprudence to submit clauses providing for a discharge to the regime of discharge
clauses, see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(b).
United Kingdom
N4. If the policy stipulates for precautionary measures in the form of warranties, breach of such
warranties automatically terminates the contract and discharges the insurer from its liability un-
der the contract (see above, notes on Article 4:102, in particular the Good Luck case). Causation
is not required. However, special rules apply for consumer and small business insurance. ICOBS
8.1.2 provides that an insurer may invoke non-compliance with a warranty only when there is
evidence of fraud, or when the circumstances of the claim are sufficiently connected with the
breach. Moreover, automatic termination being considered harsh, the effect of breach of warranty
is to be moderated by the Insurance Act 2015, when it comes into force in 2016. Furthermore, to
mitigate the harsh results of the absence of a nexus requirement, insurance policies in the Unit-
ed Kingdom may contain clauses requiring a causal link between breach and loss. For a recent
example with respect to breach of warranty, see Bennett v Axa Insurance Plc [2003] EWHC 86
(Comm), [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 615.
Italy
N5. In Italy, precautionary measures fall under the topic of perfection of cover. It is a condition
precedent to the liability of the insurer that precautionary measures be complied with, see Base-
dow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 707.
195
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
N6. Art. 65 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014 stipulates that the insurer may only invoke a contractual
discharge clause provided that a causal link be established between the occurrence of the insured
event and the breach of a precautionary obligation, which must be one which is imposed by the
contract (“une obligation determine impose par le contrat”). Art. 65 para. 2 IA 2014 authorises the
government to further regulate questions of discharge. However, up to now no such regulation
(arrêté royal) relating to art. 65 IA has been enacted. The provisions in the Luxembourg ICA are
almost identical; see art. 18 Luxembourg ICA.
N7. In Austrian law, discharge clauses may not be invoked if the breach of the precautionary
measure had no impact on the occurrence of the insured event, see s. 6 para. 2 ICA. In Germany,
causation is required by s. 28 para. 3 ICA. However, when the insured acted fraudulently, the
insurer is discharged even without causal relationship, see the second sentence of s. 28 para. 3
ICA.
The Netherlands
N8. According to the jurisprudence of the Dutch Supreme Court, the breach of a precautionary
measure leads de iure to a loss of coverage during the period of breach, However the insured may
prove a lack of causal relationship between the breach and a materialisation of the risk insured, in
which case the respective claim has to be paid by the insurer (see Asser/Clausing/Wansink 418 ff.).
N9. Further objective elements necessary for a discharge of the insurer are imposed by the laws
of Austria and Germany. For Austria, see s. 6 para. 5 ICA: if non-compliance with a precautionary
measure was merely negligent, discharge only takes effect if the insured was previously informed
of this consequence by way of a formal document.
Fault
N10. Most European insurance laws require some degree of fault for a discharge of the insurer
to take place. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the exceptions. Breach of precau-
tionary obligations construed as warranties discharges the insurer regardless of the policyholder’s
fault (see for the United Kingdom Basedow/Fock-Rühl 199 and for the Netherlands Asser/Claus-
ing/Wansink 418 ff.), unless the wording of a warranty requires or implies it. In France, fault is not
necessary for a discharge of the insurer, when precautionary obligations are held to constitute a
condition precedent to cover (condition de garantie), see Lamy Assurances, para. 239(a). When
precautionary measures are held to constitute an exclusion de garantie, and thus, in fact, a form
of discharge clause, the party in breach must have acted with fault (faute), see Lamy Assurances,
para. 239(b). It appears this encompasses all degrees of fault.
N11. Article 4:103 PEICL establishes a two-fold regime: intention or recklessness with “knowl-
edge that the loss would probably result” has the consequence in law of total discharge of the
196
Article 4:103 Discharge of the Insurer’s Liability
insurer from liability under the contract, and according to Article 4:103 para. 1, degrees of fault
below this level permit a proportionate reduction of insurance money, to the extent that they
remain above the level of simple negligence, Article 4:103 para. 2.
Germany
N12. This regime corresponds to s. 28 para. 2 German ICA: When non-compliance with a pre-
cautionary measure is wilful, the insurer is discharged of his liability entirely, the first sentence of
s. 28 para. 2 ICA. When non-compliance is grossly negligent, the insurer may reduce payment
according to the degree of fault, the onus of proof for exculpation lying with the insured, the
second sentence of s. 28 para. 2 ICA.
Finland
N13.Similar results are provided by Finnish law, which combines a two-fold regime in a single
provision. According to s. 31 para. 3 ICA, any compensation may be refused or reduced if the
insured has wilfully or through negligence which cannot be considered slight failed to comply with
a precautionary guideline as defined in s. 31 para. 1 ICA. S. 31 para. 4 ICA supplements special
rules for general liability insurance policies: negligence must either be gross, or, where so pro-
vided in the policy, be caused by the use of alcohol or narcotics.
Austria
N14. For the necessity of fault in Austria, see the first sentence of s. 6 para. 1 ICA: a contrac-
tual provision exempting the insurer from liability when a precautionary obligation is breached
shall be without effect when non-compliance can be excused. As a consequence the insurer is
discharged entirely when non-compliance results from simple negligence. S. 6 para. 1a ICA pro-
vides for a proportionate reduction of insurance money; but it does not relate to precautionary
measures in the sense of Article 4:101 PEICL.
N15. The first sentence of art. 65 Belgian IA 2014 leaves open the possibility for a partial dis-
charge, but does not state a threshold degree of fault necessary for total discharge. For the degree
of fault admissible, see the third sentence of art. 62 Belgian IA 2014. Pursuant to this provision,
the insurer is not liable when the policyholder, the insured or the beneficiary acted either inten-
tionally or with grave fault. For grave fault to result in a discharge, the relevant behaviour must be
expressly and exhaustively mentioned in the contract. Although art. 62 IA 2014 is to be found in
the section on the delimitation of the risk, the third sentence of art. 8 applies to discharge clauses
as well, see Fontaine, para. 378. The law is construed as allowing for the exclusion of damages
caused with a lesser degree of fault, see Fontaine, para. 379. Thus, any degree of fault on the part
of the policyholder may lead to a (partial) discharge, as long as the obligations in question are
clearly and exhaustively mentioned in the policy.
N16. The Luxembourg ICA contains an almost identical provision. Art. 18 ICA leaves open the
possibility for partial discharge, but, like its Belgian counterpart, does not elaborate further on the
fault – discharge ratio. Under art. 14 ICA, intentional causation of damage discharges the insurer
197
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
entirely. Pursuant to the third sentence of art. 14 ICA, grave fault may also lead to a discharge,
when the behaviour in question is expressly and exhaustively listed in the policy. Like its Belgian
counterpart, art. 14 Luxembourg ICA is to be found in the section on the delimitation of the risk.
However, the analogy to Belgian insurance law suggests that it is equally applicable to discharge
clauses. Furthermore, the resemblance to Belgian law suggests that, as under the Belgian ICA,
degrees of fault below grave fault may lead to (partial) discharge.
Comments
Allocation of Risk
C1. Insurers contract on the basis of their assessment of the risk at the time that the con-
tract of insurance is concluded. Once a policy has been issued, they hope that the risk un-
dergoes no significant aggravation or increase during the insurance period. Policyholders,
however, do not want their activity during the period to be unduly restricted. Moreover,
society, which has an interest in an effective and solvent insurance sector, also has an interest
in fostering useful entrepreneurial activity. Insurance contract law seeks to balance these
sometimes conflicting interests.
C2. In countries where the insurance period is usually one year or less, the law tends to
favour policyholders: it does not provide any legal mechanism to enable insurers to change
policy terms in the light of any significant aggravation of the risk during the period. On the
one hand, the law in these countries does not countenance wilful or reckless conduct by
policyholders resulting in loss but, on the other hand, it does not relieve insurers of poor
underwriting. For the rest it is insurers who, for a limited period of time, bear the risk of the
unexpected. In these countries attempts by insurers to establish an escape route in the policy
by means terms such as promissory warranties or notification clauses have met with hostile
and restrictive interpretation by the courts. In most countries in Europe, however, insurance
periods are commonly longer than one year and the law does make some provision for
policy change in the event of a significant aggravation of risk during the insurance period.
C3. Under Article 2:601, except in the case of personal insurance, “the duration of the
insurance contract” is one year but the “parties may agree a different period”, when appro-
priate to the particular risk. Moreover, Article 2:602 provides that in any event, unless one
of the parties to the contract gives notice to the contrary, the one-year period provided for
in Article 2:601 shall be “prolonged”. This being so, the issue of aggravation of risk cannot
198
Article 4:201 Clauses Concerning Aggravation of Risk
be ignored because even in the countries with law to provide for aggravation of risk, the
rules tend to differ; and because, the nature of the issue is such that it is not covered by
the Principles of European Contract Law, rules are needed. In the Principles of European
Insurance Contract Law the response to this need is not to prescribe rules for all cases of
aggravation of risk but for cases in which, as is likely, policies contain terms on the issue,
and to establish minimum safeguards for policyholders. Note that the relevant rules of the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not apply to personal insurance, such
as life and health insurance, for which different and more appropriate rules are to be pre-
scribed in due course.
Aggravation of Risk
C4. Aggravation of risk is defined in Article 4:201, in which the reference to what is “ma-
terial” envisages the corresponding delimitation of the duty of disclosure stated in Arti-
cle 2:103(b). An aggravation which is due to natural wear and tear of property insured in
indemnity insurance or to the increasing age of the person insured in life assurance is not
material. The further requirement, that the aggravation of risk be “of a kind specified in the
contract of insurance”, is to meet the need to alert and inform policyholders about what is
a material aggravation of risk, and assumes that reasonable policyholders read their policy.
Reference might have been made, as does the law in some countries, to elements of risk
which are the subject of questions in the application. However, reference to the policy was
preferred as being an intuitive and convenient reference point for policyholders.
Clauses
C5. When the aggravation of risk is such that insurers wish to reconsider the risk and
decide whether to continue cover and, if so, on what terms, they usually seek to achieve that
wish by means of policy clauses. One possibility in the past has been the inclusion of prom-
issory warranties. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law neuter such clauses
in Articles 4:101 ff., insofar as failure to take precautionary measures required by the policy
does not entitle insurers to terminate the cover, except when failure occurs with intent to
cause the loss or recklessly and with knowledge that loss or damage would probably result.
Another possibility hitherto has been a policy term that simply entitles insurers to terminate
cover in the event of aggravation of risk. Such clauses are not prohibited altogether by the
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law but are regulated by Article 4:203.
Notes
Information Requirements
N1. In many countries a duty to inform the insurer of an aggravation of risk is imposed on the
policyholder by law, for example, in Germany (s. 23 para. 2 ICA), in Italy (art. 1898 para. 1 CC),
in Poland (art. 815 CC) and in Switzerland (arts. 28 ff. ICA); some reservations concerning life
assurance, see Kowalewski 197. In other countries, notably common law countries such as the
United Kingdom as well as the Netherlands, there is no such requirement. Indeed the basic posi-
tion is to the contrary (Pim v Reid (1843) 6 M & G 1; Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997]
199
Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
CLC 129). Although a similar duty may be imposed by the contract of insurance (Birds 7.17), the
courts are inclined to construe against such a duty: Clarke 20-5A4. See for the Netherlands Asser/
Clausing/Wansink 410 ff.
N2. A rule limiting the effect of contract clauses to cases of material aggravation, such as that in
Article 4:201, is found, for example, in art. 113-4 para. 1 French ICA, s. 27 German ICA, art. 4
para. 1 Greek ICA, art. 1898 para. 1 Italian CC (as interpreted by commentaries) and art. 11
Spanish ICA.
N3. A further limitation of contract clauses on the aggravation of risk laid down in Article 4:201
is the requirement that the aggravation shall be specified in the contract of insurance. A similar
rule can be found in Denmark (s. 45 para. 1 ICA). A rule of this kind designed to assist the
policyholder who is ignorant of matters that might influence insurers, is not common in other
national laws of insurance in Europe, however, experience in various countries indicates that
such a rule is desirable in the interest of the private policyholder.
Comments
The Need for Notification
200
Article 4:202 Duty to Give Notice of an Aggravation of Risk
C2. When a policy duty of notification is triggered, Article 4:202 provides some means
of ensuring that policyholders are given a reasonable time in which to respond, and are
allowed to do so in a reasonable manner. In particular, the duty does not have to be per-
formed personally but can be delegated. Moreover, given that in law notice or notification
may be effective either on receipt or on dispatch, Article 4:202 para. 2 favours policyholders,
like other provisions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law such as Arti-
cles 2:602 and 6:101, by stating that dispatch of the notice is sufficient for this purpose. They
know when a notice has been dispatched but in many cases can be less sure when it has been
received. Moreover, in the event of dispute, dispatch is easier for policyholders to prove than
receipt by the insurer. Provided that a reasonable mode of transmission is employed, risks
associated with the medium are for insurers to bear rather than policyholders.
C3. What is a reasonable time in which to notify aggravations of risk, as with notice of loss
clauses, depends on the particular circumstances. Insurers want notice as soon as possible
in order to reach a decision before loss occurs. However, policyholders must be given time
to appreciate that the notice clause has been triggered. When the aggravation of risk is one
intentionally brought about by a policyholder, the time may be relatively short. When the
aggravation of risk has not been brought about by the policyholder but by forces of nature
or by a third party, which may be the case of increased risk of flooding or subsidence for
example, the time may well be longer, even though these are changes of which policyhold-
ers are likely to be aware. Awareness is central to this provision, and in that regard the rule
reflects the current rule found in many countries in Europe, in which the law provides for
aggravation of risk.
Breach
C4. Breach of the duty of notification on the part of policyholders does not necessarily
have serious consequences for insurers. Thus, Article 4:202 para. 3 seeks to nullify policy
clauses whereby, in the event of breach, cover is automatically terminated. Concerning the
possibility of termination see Article 4:203. In that regard the intention behind Article 4:202
is that the legal consequences of breach should be related and proportionate to the breach.
In particular, as provided by Article 4:202 para. 3, insurers are not on that ground entitled
to refuse to pay any subsequent loss resulting from an event within the scope of the cover
but not a consequence of the lack of notification. Other losses resulting from events within
the scope of the cover may be a consequence of the aggravation of risk but not of the lack
of notification; Article 4:203 para. 3 applies to such losses.
Notes
Notice in Reasonable Time
N1. A rule such as that in Article 4:202 para. 1 requiring the policyholder to notify the insurer
is found in Germany (s. 23 paras. 2 and 3 ICA: notification “without delay”, as interpreted by
courts and commentators) and Switzerland (art. 30 para. 1 ICA “without delay”). In Greece and
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Portugal, the policyholder ought to give notice within 14 days from the moment when he learns
about the aggravation (see art. 4 para. 1 Greek ICA and art. 93 para. 1 Portuguese ICA). In Swe-
den s. 3 of Ch. 4 ICA (covering consumer insurance) explicitly allows the insurer to include in the
contract a clause to the effect that the policyholder shall inform the insurer about an important
change in circumstances of a type specified in the contract.
N2. A rule such as that in Article 4:202 para. 3 requiring the insurer to pay insured losses
unconnected with the aggravation of risk, is found, for example, in Denmark (s. 55 para. 2 and
s. 45 para. 3 ICA) and in Germany (s. 26 para. 3(1) ICA). The same is true of Portugal. Under
the Portuguese ICA, the insurer may refuse payment only in respect of losses resulting from
the aggravation of risk (see art. 94 para. 1 ICA). Swedish law enables the insurer to reduce the
insurance money in accordance with what is reasonable in light of the significance which the
fact would have had for the insurer’s risk assessment, whether such disregard was intentional or
negligent, and other circumstances. For business insurance the all-or-nothing principle applies,
see s. 10 of Ch. 8 ICA.
Comments
Reconsideration of the Risk by Insurers
C1. When a material aggravation of risk, as defined in Article 4:201, occurs during the
insurance period, insurers may, subject to Article 4:203, rely on any policy term that en-
titles them to terminate the contract. Generally speaking the decision to terminate or not
is a decision that the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law leave to the market,
provided that the aggravation is indeed material and that policyholders are not unduly
prejudiced. In particular, policyholders must not be left in undue uncertainty about what
their insurer will decide.
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Article 4:203 Termination and Discharge
C2. In the event of termination policyholders must have time in which to find alternative
cover. Thus, Article 4:203 para. 1 states that insurers must exercise their right to terminate
by notice to the policyholder within one month of the time when they were or should have
been aware of the aggravation. In the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law there
is a presumption in favour of policyholders, sometimes expressed, for example in Arti-
cle 2:102 para. 2, that notice from insurers is not effective until receipt of notice.
C3. Exception is made for cases in which policyholders are “in intentional breach of the
duty of notification at the time of termination”, for example when they may well have sought
to deceive the insurer concerned about the level of risk in order to avoid an increase in
premium. In such circumstances, policyholders should have contemplated the possibility
of having to seek alternative cover, if available, and do not merit a further month’s cover
while they do so.
Discharge
C4. Article 4:203 para. 3 contains a rule parallel to Article 2:102 para. 5 (breach of the
applicant’s pre-contractual information duty). When the policyholder neither knows nor
ought to know about the aggravation of the risk, he should not be unduly prejudiced. Thus,
Article 4:203 para. 3 provides that in such an eventuality the insurance money shall remain
payable to a policyholder in full. The same is true when the policyholder knows or ought
to know about the aggravation of the risk, as long as there is no causal connection with the
loss. However, when the policyholder knows or ought to know and there is also a causal
connection, the insurance money payable is qualified in the way set out in Article 4:203
para. 3 and in the same way as in Article 2:102 para. 5.
C5. The application of Article 4:203 para. 1 is modified as far as group insurances are
concerned, see Article 18:203 para. 2.
Notes
Expiry of Cover
N1. A rule permitting the insurer to terminate cover in the event of aggravation of risk is found
in many countries, although the period after which termination takes effect and insurance cover
ends, varies: 7 days in Denmark (s. 47 ICA), 10 days in France (art. 113-4 para. 2 ICA), 15 days in
Greece (art. 4 para. 2 and the first sentence of art. 3 para. 7 ICA), one month in Belgium (art. 81
para. 1(2) IA 2014) and Luxembourg (art. 34 para. 1(3) ICA). In Italy termination takes effect
immediately or after 15 days depending on the degree of aggravation (art. 1898 para. 3 CC). The
United Kingdom is the exception: no termination at all on that ground.
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Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
Discharge
N2. As with other cases of breach of a duty of the policyholder, national laws exhibit a gradual
change from the all-or-nothing principle to a proportionate reduction of the insurance money,
when the insured event occurs before the termination of the insurance contract. In the case of a
fraudulent increase of risk the insurer will generally be entitled to withhold payment completely,
see for Germany s. 26 para. 1 ICA; for Greece art. 4 para. 2 in conjunction with art. 3 para. 6
ICA; for Portugal art. 94 para. 1(c) ICA; for Spain the second sentence of art. 12 para. 2 ICA;
in Sweden (consumer insurance), where the policyholder fails to notify the insurer about the
increase in risk, insurance money may be reduced in accordance with what is reasonable, taking
into account, among other factors whether the failure is intentional.
N3. The rule emerging from national laws in respect of a breach of the notification duty is in
line with Article 4:203 para. 3: it is the proportionate reduction of the insurance money. The first
step will be the hypothetical ascertainment of the premium that would have been due had the
policyholder complied with his duty of notification. The insurance money will then be reduced
in the proportion established between that hypothetical premium and the actual premium. Rules
of this kind can be found in Belgium (art. 81 para. 3(b) IA 2014); France (art. 113-9 para. 3 ICA);
Greece (art. 4 para. 2 in conjunction with art. 3 para. 5 ICA); Luxembourg (art. 34 para. 3(b)
ICA); Portugal (art. 94 para. 1(b) ICA); Spain (the third sentence of art. 12 para. 2 ICA). Some of
these provisions entirely exclude payment if the insurer, being aware of the increased risk, would
not have insured it at all.
N4. Yet another group of national laws provides for a reduction of the insurance money in
accordance with the degree of fault of the policyholder. This relates to Finland (with regard to
indemnity insurance only, s. 26 para. 3 ICA), Germany (the second sentence of s. 26 para. 1 ICA)
and Sweden (the second sentence of s. 3 para. 1 of Ch. 4 and s. 2 of Ch. 4 ICA).
Comments
Purpose and Scope
C1. Article 4:301 deals with situations in which there is a material reduction of the risk
under the insurance contract, but one that does not arise from compliance with any pre-
cautionary measures required by the policy in accordance with Article 4:101 ff. A material
reduction of the risk subject to Article 4:301 could occur as a result not only of action by
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Article 4:301 Consequences of the Reduction of Risk
policyholders (or other persons insured) but also as a result of action by third parties or
other causes.
C2. Examples of such action include the installation of security measures that are not
required by the terms of a household insurance policy, such as burglar alarms, special locks
or smoke detectors. Policyholders should be encouraged to take voluntary steps to reduce
risks, and the prospect of a lower premium held out by Article 4:301 provides a degree of
encouragement. Examples of third party action include the construction of flood defences
by government where insured property is situated in an area prone to flooding.
C3. Article 4:301 para. 1 is not meant to encourage good risk management but consider-
ations of fairness suggest that policyholders should have the possibility of paying less for
the cover on request. Any overpayment of premium for the past is a loss which lies where it
falls – on the policyholder in question. Article 4:301 para. 1 is concerned only with material
reductions of risk that occur after conclusion of the contract.
C4. By extension, this provision should also apply to the situation where a policyholder
over-estimated the risk when completing the application for insurance; for example the ap-
plication for a property about to be purchased states that there is no alarm system, but when
the purchase is completed the policyholder discovers that in fact there is such a system. If
the property is over-valued, Article 8:103 will apply.
Materiality
C5. To benefit from Article 4:301, policyholders must be able to establish, if required,
that the reduction in risk is material. “Material” is to be understood in the same sense as in
other provisions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law; see Article 2:103(b)
Comment 2.
Policyholder’s Initiative
C6. To benefit from Article 4:103, policyholders must also take the initiative by requesting
a reduction of the premium; and any reduction, if agreed, takes effect only from the date of
the request under Article 4:103. Thus, policyholders cannot require a retrospective reduc-
tion, although that does not rule out the possibility of party agreement to such a reduction.
If, on the contrary, the parties do not reach any agreement on reduction within four weeks,
policyholders are entitled to terminate the contract and seek cover elsewhere. Termination
would take effect immediately and policyholders would be entitled to a return of premium
for the remaining insurance period in accordance with Article 5:104.
Notes
Reduction of the Premium
N1. A right to request a proportionate reduction of the premium, as set forth in Article 4:301,
can be found in the laws of Belgium (art. 80 IA 2014), France (art. 113-4 para. 4 ICA), Greece
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Chapter Four: The Risk Insured
(art. 5 para. 1 ICA), Italy (art. 1897 CC), Luxembourg (art. 33 ICA), Portugal (art. 92 para. 1 ICA),
and Spain (art. 13 ICA). Only the wordings chosen by the national legislators seem to indicate
slight differences regarding the substance of the reduced risk. What is called “material reduction
of risk” in Article 4:301 meets similar qualifications under the laws of Belgium and Luxembourg
(“sensible et durable”), Portugal (“unambiguous and durable”) or Greece (“substantially dimin-
ished”). Other laws do not characterise the reduction of the risk any further, see for example the
French law where “en cas de diminution de risque” the policyholder is simply entitled to pay a
lower premium.
N2. A narrower approach is taken in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Under the laws of these
countries a reduction of the premium may only be applied for in respect of risks which, when the
contract was concluded, had been assessed as special, aggravating risks justifying an additional
premium. See for Austria s. 41a ICA, for Germany s. 41 ICA and for Switzerland art. 23 ICA.
N3. The effect of a reduction of the premium also depends on when it takes effect. Under art. 80
Belgian IA 2014 and s. 41 German ICA, the relevant point in time is the receipt of the policy-
holder’s application by the insurer, namely when the insurer became aware of the reduction of the
risk; this is in line with Article 4:301 as can be inferred from the words stating that the request is
justified “for the remaining contract period.” The solution is the same in art. 23 Swiss ICA. But
according to s. 41 of the Austrian ICA, and under art. 13 of the Spanish ICA, the reduction of the
premium does not become effective before the beginning of the subsequent insurance period.
N4. In the countries not mentioned above the written laws do not contain provisions on the
reduction of risk. This includes countries with rather recently introduced insurance codes, such
as the Netherlands and Sweden. United Kingdom and Irish case law deals only with the aggra-
vation and its consequences for the obligations of the insurer, but not with the reduction of risk.
Accordingly, no reduction of the premium can be requested by the policyholder if not explicitly
provided for in the contract. Given the short contract periods that prevail in these countries this
is not considered as a matter of concern.
Termination of Contract
N5. Several countries have provisions virtually identical to Article 4:301 para. 2, including the
one-month period preceding the right to terminate the contract. These are the laws of Belgium
(art. 80 IA 2014), Greece (art. 5 para. 1 ICA) and Luxembourg (art. 33 ICA). In Portugal, the
law grants the policyholder a right to terminate in case the parties fail to reach an agreement on
the new premium (see art. 92 para. 2 ICA). There is no express requirement, however, as to how
much time needs to elapse before the right of termination arises. Under French law (art. L. 113-4
para. 4 ICA) and under Spanish law (art. 13 para. 2 ICA), the policyholder’s right to terminate
the contract is triggered by the insurer’s refusal to lower the premium in the case of reduction of
risk. The termination, then, becomes effective after 30 days under French law and with the clos-
ing of the insurance period under Spanish law. For the period of time between the termination
of the contract and its effect, the insurer must reimburse the policyholder for the proportionate
“over”-premium.
N6. Contrary to these provisions, the Italian Code allows for the termination of the contract by
the insurer only. It is entitled to terminate the contract within two months after it has received
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Article 5:101 First or Single Premium
notice of the reduced risk which leads to a reduction of the premium (see above Note 1 and
art. 1897 CC). Going a step further, the laws of Austria, Germany and Switzerland which grant
the right to a proportionate reduction of the premium only in rare cases (see above Note 2) do
not allow either party to terminate the contract by unilateral declaration.
N7. It is a common occurrence that countries which have provisions on the reduction of risk at
the same time limit the scope of those provisions. They usually exclude contracts dealing with
either health or life insurance, see: Belgium (art. 80 IA 2014), France (art. L. 113-4 para. 6 ICA),
Greece (the third sentence of art. 5 para. 1 ICA), Austria (s. 164a ICA for life assurance), and
Luxembourg (art. 33 ICA). Under the new German law, the provision governing the reduction
of risk shall only apply to life assurance contracts when the risk which is said to be reduced had
been specified by the parties when the contract was concluded (s. 158 para. 3 ICA).
Comments
Scope of Regulation
C1. The scope of regulation of Article 5:101 is limited in several ways. First of all, it only
deals with certain aspects of non-payment of premium leaving questions of performance
such as the place, time and mode of payment of the premium to the general rules as con-
tained in the Principles of European Contract Law (see Articles 7:101, 7:102, 7:107 and
7:108). Secondly, Article 5:101 only deals with first premiums or single premiums (as to the
meaning of these terms below Comments 5 to 7) whereas subsequent premiums are dealt
with in Article 5:102. Thirdly, Article 5:101 only deals with the impact of non-payment
of a first or single premium on the formation of the contract and the commencement of
cover under the policy, whereas the right of the insurer to terminate the contract following
non-payment of premium is dealt with in Article 5:103.
Regulatory Approach
C2. Article 5:101 restricts itself to limiting the effect of any condition imposed by the in-
surer by which the formation of the contract or the commencement of the cover under the
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Chapter Five: Insurance Premium
policy depends on prior payment of the first or single premium. Article 5:101 itself neither
requires pre-payment of the premium nor does it revoke cover in case of non-payment.
Thus, in the absence of a condition imposed by the insurer, non-payment of the first or
single premium will have no impact on the conclusion of the contract and the provision of
cover by the insurer. In such cases the insurer will be restricted to enforcing its claim for
premium in accordance with Article 9:101 para. 1 PECL and for interest in accordance with
Article 9:508 PECL or terminating the contract in accordance with Article 5:103 PEICL.
C3. On the other hand, Article 5:101 does not prohibit a condition requiring payment
of premium prior to the formation of the contract or the beginning of the cover. Such a
condition is looked upon as a means to deter fraudulent contracting by policyholders. In
particular, it makes it impossible for them to enjoy cover, at least for a certain amount of
time, under a contract which was concluded knowing that they were not going to pay the
premium – whether they were unable or simply unwilling to do so. Of course, policyholders
could nevertheless obtain cover without advance payment of premium by means of prelim-
inary cover if the insurer is willing to grant it (see, however, Article 2:403 and especially its
para. 2 addressing the problem of preliminary cover obtained fraudulently).
C4. Article 5:101 applies no matter what kind of condition the insurer chooses to impose.
In practice, mainly two patterns are followed by insurers. In some countries the offer of
the insurer or the insurer’s acceptance of the application for insurance, as the case may
be, is conditional on the advanced payment of premium. As a consequence, subject to
Article 5:101, a contract of insurance will only be formed and cover will only start to run
upon payment of the premium. In other countries insurers insert specific clauses into their
general contract terms which become part of the contract by parties’ agreement and make
the commencement of the cover but not the conclusion of the contract depend on payment
of the first or single premium.
C5. In view of Article 5:102 the distinction between first premiums and subsequent premi-
ums becomes vital. In principle, “first premium” is the premium which falls due immediately
after the conclusion of the contract. Since contracts concluded under the Principles of Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract Law normally last for one year (see Article 2:601) the premium
due for the year after the initial conclusion of the contract is a first premium. In contrast,
all premiums due after a prolongation of the contract according to Article 2:602 will be
subsequent premiums and not governed by Article 5:101 but by Article 5:102.
C6. The issue described above in Comment 5 does not arise when a single premium is due.
A single premium is the only premium which will ever be paid by the policyholder under the
policy. Therefore, there will be no subsequent premiums within the meaning of Article 5:102
and Article 5:101 will apply to the single premium. In order to avoid any argument to the
contrary the wording of Article 5:101 makes its application to single premiums explicit.
C7. Insurers frequently agree that policyholders may pay the premiums by instalments.
A premium which is calculated, for example, on a yearly basis may be paid by the policy-
holder by monthly instalments. In such cases “the premium” will only be fully paid about
208
Article 5:101 First or Single Premium
one month before the regular one year period of the insurance contract comes to an end
in accordance with Article 2:601. In such cases it would be contrary to the purpose of Ar-
ticles 5:101 and 5:102, as well as the parties’ intention which is expressed in the agreement
allowing payment of the first premium by instalments, to apply Article 5:101 to the full
amount of the first premium. This is because the conclusion of the contract and/or the
commencement of cover would be delayed by about 11 months. It follows that only the
first instalment can be considered a first premium whereas all following instalments are
subsequent premiums and subject to Article 5:102.
C8. A condition subject to Article 5:101 and imposed by the insurer will only take effect
if specific criteria are met. First of all, the policyholder must be warned about the condition
and its consequences (Article 5:101(a)). For that purpose the insurer must give written no-
tice of the condition to the policyholder; for the meaning of written notice see Article 2:602
Comment 4. Like all documents issued by the insurer the notice must use plain and intelli-
gible language and must be issued in the language in which the contract was negotiated, as
required by Article 1:203 para. 1. The notice must set out the condition imposed by the in-
surer as well as the consequence of non-payment of the premium, namely the lack of cover.
C9. The warning to be given under Article 5:101(a) may partly overlap with the general
duty of the insurer to warn the applicant about the commencement of cover in accordance
with Article 2:203, where applicable. In such cases the insurer must comply with both duties
in a manner which is mutually consistent.
C10. The second requirement for a condition subject to Article 5:101 is the receipt of an
invoice (Article 5:101(b)). The invoice must not only state the amount of the (first or single)
premium but must also comply with the duty to warn which is required of the insurer by
Article 5:101(a).
C11. Finally, Article 5:101(b) allows the policyholder a period of two weeks after receipt
of an invoice for payment of premium. As long as this period has not expired the policy
condition is without effect (for more details, see below Comment 12).
C12. If the policyholder pays premium within the two week period, the condition im-
posed by the insurer “shall be without effect” and, therefore, the policyholder, insured or
beneficiary, as the case may be, will enjoy cover irrespective of whether an insured event
has occurred before or after payment of the first premium. If, in turn, the policyholder does
not pay premium within the two week period, cover only commences with actual payment
and only for the future. During the period until payment is made, including the period of
two weeks referred to in Article 5:101(b), the risk will not be covered. However, if the poli-
cyholder is prevented from paying, Article 8:108 PECL may apply.
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Chapter Five: Insurance Premium
Notes
Postponement of Cover
N1. In most European countries the beginning of insurance cover is linked to the payment of the
first or single premium (“Einlöseprinzip”). This rule can be found as a non-mandatory provision
in the laws of Austria (s. 38 para. 2 ICA), Denmark (s. 14 ICA); Germany (s. 37 para. 2 ICA),
Greece (art. 6 para. 1 ICA), Italy (art. 1901 para. 1 CC), Poland (art. 814 para. 1 CC), and Portugal
(art. 59 ICA: not applicable to life assurance and certain other types of insurance).
N2. In other countries, even though no similar rule can be found in the insurance laws, a con-
tractual clause having the same effect is permitted by the law (see for Belgium art. 69 para. 2
IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 267-268; for England and Wales Clarke 13-9, Basedow/Fock-Rühl
1464; for France Picard/Besson, Contrat para. 100, Basedow/Fock-Völker 520; for Ireland Doolan
361; for Luxembourg art. 37 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 796; for Scotland Forte, para. 834;
for Sweden the second sentence of s. 1 of Ch. 5 ICA; for the Netherlands Basedow/Fock-Fock
869; and for Switzerland art. 19 para. 2 and art. 20 para. 3 ICA). Consequently, in many of these
countries the same rule exists as a result of contractual practice (see for Belgium Cousy/Schoorens
119, Basedow/Fock-Fock 267-268; for the Netherlands Basedow/Fock-Fock 869; for England and
Wales Clarke 13-9, Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1464; for Scotland Forte, para. 834; for Ireland Doolan
361). Only Finnish law (s. 11 para. 3 ICA) requires an additional justification by the nature of
insurance or another particular reason for a contractual clause in the abovementioned manner
to be effective.
N3. Even though almost all European legal systems make it possible to require payment of the
first or single premium for the insurance cover to begin, many laws establish some form of pro-
tection for the policyholder before the putative insurance cover is lost. One form of protection
which can be found is a requirement of warning of the consequences of non-payment before
they materialise. This requirement (similar to Article 5:101 para. 1(a)) can be found in the laws of
Austria (s. 38 para. 3 ICA), Germany (the second sentence of s. 37 para. 2 ICA), Portugal (art. 60
para. 1 ICA) and Switzerland (art. 20 para. 1 ICA). In those countries where the Einlöseprinzip
is established as a result of contractual practice, at least some form of warning is achieved by the
fact that the consequences of non-payment are expressly spelled out in the insurance contract
or shall be set forth in pre-contractual information (for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock 268; for
Sweden the fourth sentence of s. 2 para. 1 of Ch. 2 ICA).
N4. Another form of protection is the allowance of a “period of grace” (similar to Article 5:101
para. 1(b)) between receipt of an invoice (possibly containing a warning of the consequences of
non-payment) and the actual payment by the policyholder. If the policyholder pays the first or
single premium within this period of usually seven to fourteen days, insurance cover is granted
even for the time before the payment was effected. Forms of such “periods of grace” can be found
in the laws of Austria (s. 38 para. 2 ICA: two weeks), Denmark (s. 14 ICA: one week; usually
longer in contractual practice, see Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 971), Portugal (art. 60 ICA), Sweden
(s. 1 of Ch. 5 ICA: 14 days – applies to consumer insurance only), and Switzerland (art. 20 para.
1 ICA in accordance with art. 107 of the Code of Obligations (a reasonable period for execution
210
Article 5:102 Subsequent Premium
has to be fixed by the creditor) foresees a “period of grace”). No “period of grace” exists in the
laws of Germany (Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 390), Greece (Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 620),
and Italy (Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 710). However, some of the countries which do
not have a “period of grace” require fault of the policyholder regarding non-payment for the
commencement of cover to be delayed (for example s. 37 para. 2 German ICA and s. 2 of Ch. 5
Swedish ICA).
Comments
Scope of Regulation
C1. The scope of regulation in Article 5:102 is subject to the same limitations as Arti-
cle 5:101; see above Comment 1 on Article 5:101. However, in contrast with Article 5:101,
Article 5:102 deals with non-payment of subsequent premiums; as to the meaning of this
term see below Comment 3. As a consequence it only deals with contract clauses, provid-
ing for the insurer to be relieved of its obligation to provide cover, but not with conditions
unilaterally imposed by the insurer in its initial offer or acceptance; see, in contrast, Arti-
cle 5:101 Comment 4.
Regulatory Approach
C2. Article 5:102 applies the same regulatory approach as Article 5:101. Therefore, it is
restricted to limiting the effect of any contract clause by which the provision of cover under
the policy depends on prior payment of a subsequent premium. Article 5:102 itself neither
requires pre-payment of the premium nor does it revoke cover in case of non-payment.
Thus, subject to a clause in the contract providing otherwise, non-payment of a subsequent
premium will have no impact on the provision of cover by the insurer. In such cases the
insurer will be restricted to enforcing its claim for premium in accordance with Article 9:101
para. 1 PECL and for interest in accordance with Article 9:508 PECL or, alternatively, ter-
minating the contract in accordance with Article 5:103 PEICL.
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Chapter Five: Insurance Premium
Subsequent Premium
C3. In the context of Article 5:101 the terms “first premium” and “single premium” have
been defined; see Comments 5 to 7. It follows from these definitions that the term “sub-
sequent premium” must be understood as any premium or instalment of a premium due
following payment of a first premium within the meaning of Article 5:101.
C4. The criteria to be met under Article 5:102 in order to relieve the insurer of its obliga-
tion to cover the risk go beyond what Article 5:101 requires in the case of non-payment of a
first or single premium. This is justified because at that stage sanctions do not have to deter
fraudulent contracting on the part of the policyholder.
C5. First of all, Article 5:102 para. 1(a) requires the insurer to send an invoice to the
policyholder in order to make him aware of the premium due. The invoice must at least
provide the policyholder with the two most important pieces of information concerning the
subsequent premium, namely its precise amount and the date of payment.
C6. If payment is not made in accordance with the invoice, the insurer must send a re-
minder to the policyholder; see Article 5:102 para. 1(b). The reminder must state the precise
amount of the premium due. In addition, it must grant the policyholder a period of grace
of at least two weeks. Finally, the reminder must state the consequences of non-payment
of the premium within the period of grace, namely the suspension of cover provided for
by the contract.
C7. If the policyholder pays premium within the period of grace, any insured event will be
covered irrespective of whether it occurred before or after payment of premium.
C8. If the policyholder does not pay premium within the period of grace, cover will be
suspended with effect from the end of the period of grace; see the first sentence of Arti-
cle 5:102 para. 2. As a consequence, insured events which occurred before the period of
grace has ended will be covered.
C9. If the period of grace has ended and cover has been suspended, the policyholder still
has the option to resume cover by paying the premium; see the second sentence of Arti-
cle 5:102 para. 2. Cover will, however, be resumed only for the future. As a consequence,
insured events occurring between the end of the period of grace and the payment of pre-
mium remain uncovered under the policy.
C10. The option to resume cover by paying premium as provided for in the second sen-
tence of Article 5:102 para. 2 is lost as soon as the contract is terminated. Termination for
non-payment of a subsequent premium is regulated in Article 5:103.
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Article 5:102 Subsequent Premium
Notes
N1. Almost all European insurance laws provide for insurance cover to be suspended on default
of payment of subsequent insurance premiums. This is true for the law of Austria (s. 39 para. 2
ICA), Belgium (standard contractual clause permitted by art. 69 para. 1 IA 2014, see Vandeputte
84 and Basedow/Fock-Fock 268), Denmark (s. 14 ICA), France (art. L. 113-3 ICA), Italy (art. 1901
para. 2 CC), Luxembourg (art. 21 ICA), the Netherlands (art. 7:934 CC), Poland (art. 814 para. 3
CC), Portugal (art. 61 para. 2 ICA), Spain (art. 15 para. 2 ICA), Switzerland (art. 20 para. 3 ICA),
England and Wales (Clarke 13-9 and 18-3), Scotland and Ireland (Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1465).
N2. Exceptions seem to be Greece and Sweden. In Greece, the insurer has the choice between
termination and continuation of the insurance contract. If the contract is not terminated, the in-
surance cover is preserved even in default of premium payment (art. 6 para. 2 ICA and Basedow/
Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 621). In Sweden, likewise, insurance cover is not lost by operation of
law where the policyholder defaults on the subsequent premium. Rather, the insurer has a right
to terminate the contract pursuant to s. 2 of Ch. 5 ICA (see also the notes on Article 5:103).
N3. At the same time most European legal systems stipulate additional requirements for the
insurance cover to be lost in the case of non-payment of subsequent insurance premiums. Usually
insurance cover is not lost unless an additional period of payment set by the insurer has run out
and the policyholder has been warned of the forfeiture of cover. The requirement of an additional
payment period exists in the laws of Austria (s. 39 para. 1 ICA: two weeks), Belgium (art. 70(2)
IA 2014: 15 days, see Cousy/Schoorens 120), Denmark (s. 14 ICA: one week), France (art. L. 113-3
ICA: 30 days), Germany (s. 38 para. 1 ICA: two weeks as a minimum), Luxembourg (art. 21 ICA:
30 days), the Netherlands (art. 7:934 CC: 14 days), Poland (art. 814 para. 3 CC: 7 days from receipt
of a notice posted by the insurer), Spain (art. 15 para. 2 ICA: one month; Basedow/Fock-Schlenker
1329-1330), Sweden (the first sentence of s. 2 para. 2 of Ch. 5 ICA: within two weeks from receipt
of a notice posted by the insurer), Switzerland (art. 20 para. 1 ICA: 14 days), and in art. 6 para.
1 of the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law (two weeks). A
rule to the effect that the additional payment period may not be set before the premium fell due
exists in the Netherlands (art. 7:934 CC).
N4. The requirement of a warning of the forfeiture of coverage can be found in the laws of
Austria (s. 39 para. 1 ICA), Belgium (art. 70 para. 3 IA 2014), France (Basedow/Fock-Völker
521), Germany (s. 38 para. 1 ICA), Luxembourg (art. 22 ICA), the Netherlands (art. 7:934 CC),
Poland (art. 814 para. 3 CC), Sweden the second sentence of s. 2 para. 2 of Ch. 5 ICA), Switzer-
land (art. 20 para. 1 ICA), and in art. 6 para. 1 of the Amended Proposal for a Council Directive
on Insurance Contract Law. No requirement of warning exists in Italy where insurance cover is
lost automatically 15 days after the subsequent premium fell due (art. 1901 para. 2 CC). It may
be added that special rules exist for life assurance contracts in many countries, for example
Austria (ss. 173 and 175 ICA), France (art. L. 132-20 para. 1 ICA), Germany (s. 166 para. 2 ICA),
Luxembourg (art. 24 ICA) or the Netherlands (art. 7:980 CC). The same is true of the law in the
United Kingdom, although there is a long established insurance practice of issuing life assurance
policies with a “period of grace” for payment of subsequent premiums: Birds 5.7.3, Clarke 13-8A.
213
Chapter Five: Insurance Premium
Comments
Scope of Regulation
C1. Article 5:103 regulates the insurer’s right to terminate the contract in case of non-pay-
ment of premium. It covers non-payment of both a first or single premium and a subsequent
premium. However, termination only applies to cases in which a contract has actually been
formed. This is not the case if the insurer makes payment of a first or single premium a
condition of formation of the contract in accordance with the first of the alternatives stated
in Article 5:101. Thus, non-payment of the first or single premium prevents the formation
of the contract and, therefore, there is no question of termination.
C2. Article 5:103 states a special, mandatory and comprehensive rule. Thus, it overrides
the provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law on delay in payment as well as
non-payment of money otherwise applicable, namely Articles 8:106 para. 3 and 9:301 to
9:304 PECL.
Regulatory Approach
C3. Article 5:103 grants the insurer a right to terminate the contract in case of non-pay-
ment of the premium by the policyholder. The rule serves, first of all, the interest of the
insurer to be able to terminate its contractual relationship with a policyholder, who has
proved to be unreliable in paying the premium. Indeed, relief from the obligation to pro-
vide cover in accordance with conditions of the kind referred to in Articles 5:101 and 5:102
does not fully satisfy the interest of the insurer in termination because it would remain in a
relationship which involves some obligations to the policyholder.
C4. On the other hand, Article 5:103 was not needed solely for the purpose of giving a
right of termination to the insurer, because Articles 8:106 para. 3, 9:301 and 9:304 PECL,
which would apply as the lex generalis by virtue of Article 1:105 PEICL give a right to ter-
mination anyway. Article 5:103 also lays down mandatory limits on the insurer’s right of
termination.
214
Article 5:103 Termination of the Contract
C5. The insurer will only be entitled to terminate the contract if, first of all, the period
of two weeks for payment of premium under Article 5:101(b) has ended. Since this period
will only start to run if the further conditions set out in Article 5:101 are fulfilled, these
conditions must also be met. However, in the unlikely case that an insurer does not use the
option granted by Article 5:101 it may nevertheless send an invoice to the policyholder and
trigger the two week period for payment of premium.
C6. Furthermore, Article 5:103 para. 1 requires information about the right of termination
to be given to the policyholder. This information must be included in the invoice mentioned
in Article 5:101(b); see Article 5:103 para. 1.
Notice of Termination
C8. If the insurer wishes to exercise its right to terminate, it must do so by giving the pol-
icyholder written notice of termination; for the meaning of written notice see Article 2:602
Comment 4.
Effects of Termination
C9. The contract will come to an end upon receipt of notice of termination by the poli-
cyholder.
C10. Termination under Article 5:103 has no retroactive effects. Therefore, the insurer
is entitled to the premium due for the period in which the contract remains in force; con-
cerning divisibility of the premium see Article 5:104. This period is, however, restricted by
Article 5:103 para. 2; see below Comment 11.
Automatic Termination
C11. According to Article 5:103 para. 2 the insurer must either terminate the contract or
bring an action for payment of premium within a period of two months following the pay-
ment periods mentioned in Article 5:103 para. 1. The contract is deemed to be terminated
and end automatically, if the insurer fails to act in either way within such period. Thus, the
insurer cannot let the contract go on indefinitely and collect the premium while cover is
withheld in accordance with Article 5:101 or suspended in accordance with Article 5:102.
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Chapter Five: Insurance Premium
C12. Article 5:103 para. 2 must not be applied in the unlikely case that the insurer does
not use the options granted by Articles 5:101 and 5:102. In such case, if the insurer has a
right to terminate under Article 5:103 para. 1 but decides not to use it, no harm is done to
the policyholder. Because cover must be provided by the insurer it is only reasonable that
the policyholder owes any premium due as long as the insurer does not terminate.
Notes
Article 5:103 para. 1: The Right to Terminate
N1. The right of an aggrieved party to terminate a contract after giving the other party a reason-
able time in which to perform is accepted by the Principles of European Contract Law (Article
8:106 para. 3), the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) (arts. 47, 49 para. 1(b), 63, and 64 para. 1(b)) and the laws of many European countries
(Lando/Beale 376-377). The first sentence of Article 5:103 para. 1 establishes this principle for
insurance law and refers back to the time periods of Article 5:101(b) and Article 5:102 para. 1(b)
as reasonable time periods for performance.
N2. The right to terminate the insurance contract if the policyholder has delayed performance
and a reasonable time to perform has lapsed can be found in the insurance laws of Austria (s. 39
paras. 1 and 3 ICA: two weeks), Belgium (art. 71 paras. 1 and 3, art. 70 para. 2 IA 2014: not less
than 15 days), Denmark (s. 13 ICA: one week and three days after termination notice), Finland
(s. 39 para. 1 ICA: 14 days from the dispatch date of the termination notice; this does not apply
to automatically renewed non-life insurance policies), France (art. L 113-3 para. 3 ICA: 30 + 10
days), Germany (s. 38 paras. 1 and 3 ICA: two weeks), Greece (the second sentence of art. 6 para.
2 ICA: one month), Luxembourg (art. 22 para. 2 and art. 21 ICA: 30 + 10 days), the Netherlands
(art. 7:934 CC: 14 days), Spain (Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 193, Sánchez Calero, (art. 15) 255-256,
Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1329-1330), Sweden (s. 2 of Ch. 5 ICA), and Switzerland (arts. 20 para.
1 and 21 para. 1 ICA: 14 days; Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1240). In England and Wales, Scotland and Ire-
land, except in the case of life assurance, delayed payment leads to termination of the insurance
contract even if the insurer does not set an additional payment period (Clarke 13-9; Basedow/
Fock-Rühl 1465). The contract remains valid, however, if the insurer accepts late payment of
the premium (Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1465). In Poland: art. 814 paras. 2 and 3 CC. In Portugal the
insurance contract ends automatically subject to the conditions laid down in art. 61 ICA.
Form of Termination
N3. Explicit formal requirements (“by notice in writing”) for the termination of the insurance
contract (at least for some forms of termination) can be found in Austria (see Basedow/Fo-
ck-Lemmel 1118), Belgium (art. 71 para. 4 and art. 70 para. 1 IA 2014, see Basedow/Fock-Fock
299), Finland (s. 39 ICA), France (arts. L. 113-14 and R. 113-6 ICA), Greece (the second sentence
of art. 6 para. 2 ICA), Italy (Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 746), Luxembourg (art. 39 para.
1 ICA) and Sweden (s. 2 of Ch. 5 ICA: notice of termination must contain information on the
date from which the termination takes effect; where such information is omitted, the termination
is without effect). The possibility to combine the notice of termination with the invoice or the
216
Article 5:104 Divisibility of Premium
reminder is explicitly permitted by the insurance laws of Austria (s. 39 para. 3 ICA), Belgium
(art. 71 para. 3 IA 2014) and Germany (s. 38 para. 3 ICA).
N4. The second half of Article 5:103 para. 1 makes it possible to combine the invoice or the
reminder with the sanction of automatic termination of the insurance contract if payment is not
effected in the period fixed. Similar rules can be found in the insurance laws of Austria (s. 39
para. 3 ICA), Belgium (art. 71 para. 3 IA 2014) and Germany (s. 38 para. 3 ICA).
N5. In order to avoid the insurer taking advantage of a forfeiture of cover while keeping the
right to the premium, some European insurance codifications have developed a presumption of
termination similar to Article 5:103 para. 2. Such a presumption exists in Spain (art. 15 para. 2
ICA: six months after the additional payment period has expired) and Switzerland (art. 21 para.
1 ICA: two months after the additional payment period has expired). As already mentioned, Por-
tuguese law regards the insurance contract as terminated by operation of law if the policyholder
defaults on the premium (art. 61 paras. 2 and 3 ICA).
Comments
The Principle
C1. Article 5:104 establishes the principle of divisibility of premium. Therefore, if a con-
tract is terminated early, the insurer will only be entitled to claim an amount of premium
which relates to the period of time before termination took effect. If premium is pre-paid,
the insurer must pay back a pro rata share of the premium to the policyholder. For example,
a contract concluded for one year but terminated after 10 months will give rise to a claim for
repayment of one sixth of the yearly premium which was paid in advance.
C2. Article 5:104 excludes the principle of indivisibility of premium found in some coun-
tries because it is not justifiable in this context. Indivisibility is, first of all, no longer required
for reasons of practicability. Modern information technology allows virtually costless cal-
culation of pro rata premium. Secondly, the argument, that the insurer needs the premi-
um to fund the relevant risk pool as originally conceived, is unfounded. Following early
termination of the contract, the overall exposure of the insurer to risk decreases and the
unearned premium is no longer needed to maintain the solvency of the insurer. Thirdly, the
risk covered is not indivisible itself. Insurance practice shows that premium for a risk can
be calculated on a daily, monthly or yearly basis. Clearly, premiums for cover of a shorter
217
Chapter Five: Insurance Premium
period are lower in absolute terms than premiums for cover of a longer period. Therefore,
at least from an economic point of view, risks are divisible in time. There is, of course, an
argument, that the risk is not even throughout a given period, such as one year. For exam-
ple in the case of flood insurance, the risk is higher at some seasons than others. However,
insurers can tackle this problem, for example, by calculating and charging premiums on
a monthly basis instead of a yearly basis. The principle of divisibility of premium neither
prevents nor interferes with such calculation and charging of premium. Fourthly, the right
of the insurer to keep unearned premium cannot be justified as a provision for liquidated
damages. In fact, many cases of early termination are not based on a breach of contract on
the side of the policyholder. Moreover, the amount of unearned premium depends on the
time of termination and, therefore, the amount of liquidated damages will be high if termi-
nation comes early but low if it comes relatively late. Finally, indivisibility may be looked
upon as a “penalty” against the policyholder. However, as has been mentioned, many cases
of early termination do not involve any breach of contract on the side of the policyholder
and, therefore, there is no ground for a penalty. Again, the amount of the penalty depends
on the time of termination which is merely fortuitous. For all these reasons, any such pe-
nalisation of the policyholder must be restricted to extreme cases; see below Comment 3.
Notes
N1. Many insurance laws regard the insurance premium as divisible and limit the premiums
which the insurer may collect to those owed pro rata temporis at the time of termination of the
insurance contract. This is true for the laws of Austria (s. 40 ICA), Belgium (art. 73 IA 2014),
Denmark (s. 16 ICA), Germany (s. 39 ICA), Finland (s. 45 ICA), Poland (art. 813 para. 1 CC),
Portugal (art. 61 para. 3 ICA), Sweden (s. 3 of Ch. 5 ICA), and Switzerland (art. 24 ICA with
an exception made, in case of partial damage, by art. 42 para. 2 ICA where the policyholder
terminates the contract in the year following its conclusion). The Dutch Civil Code applies the
principle of divisibility according to what is fair (see art. 7:939 CC). In Greece, the principle of
divisibility is derived from the second sentence of art. 7 para. 6 ICA which provides that the
parties can agree that the premium shall be indivisible in the event of termination of the contract
after the occurrence of the insurance event.
N2. On the other hand, the traditional contrast to the principle of divisibility, the principle of
indivisibility of premium which has traditionally been the position in particular of German-in-
fluenced legal systems, seems to be in decline. Law reform in Austria and Germany shifted the
respective laws towards the principle of divisibility (for Austria see Fenyves/Kronsteiner/Schau-
er-Fenyves, § 2 VersVG para. 1 and § 40 VersVG para. 1, Heiss/Lorenz-Heiss, § 40 VersVG para.
1, and Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1113-1114; for Germany compare s. 39 ICA with s. 40 former ICA,
see Wandt, para. 500), and even in those countries where the principle of indivisibility is still in
force, it is either limited to insurance of business risks or at least the scope of application of the
principle of indivisibility is limited and its extension by way of analogy rejected (for criticism in
218
Article 5:105 Right to Pay Premium
Comments
Obligation of the Insurer to Accept Payment
C1. The policyholder is the person who owes the premium. He is obliged to pay and the
insurer must accept his payment. In contrast, third parties – including the insured and ben-
eficiary – do not owe the premium and, therefore, do not have to make payment. However,
sometimes third parties want to pay so that the insurer is not relieved of its obligation to
cover the risk. Usually this is the case when the third party benefits from cover, for example,
either directly as an insured, or indirectly as a pledgee. In other cases payment by a third par-
ty is intended as a gift to the policyholder, for example, when a mother keeps paying health
insurance premiums for her bankrupt son. Both cases raise the question, whether an insurer
must accept payment from a third party as the payment of the policyholder, even though it
seeks to be relieved of its obligation to provide cover in accordance with Article 5:101, 5:102
and to obtain early termination of the contract in accordance with Article 5:103.
C2. Article 5:105 establishes the right of certain third parties to pay the premium on behalf
of the policyholder. The wording of the provision is flexible and modelled on the parallel
rule contained in Article 7:106 PECL. The wording of Article 7:106 PECL has been adapted
to the context of insurance premiums and its contents are made mandatory by virtue of
Article 1:103 para. 2.
C3. Payment by a third party must be accepted by the insurer if it is made with the consent
of the policyholder (Article 5:105(a)). This will usually be the case when the third party
wishes to benefit the policyholder.
C4. Payment by a third party, even if made without the consent of the policyholder, must
be accepted by the insurer, if the third party has a legitimate interest in maintaining the
cover (Article 5:105(b)). However, this option is restricted to cases where the policyholder
has already failed to pay on time or where it is clear that he is not going to make payment.
219
Chapter Six: Insured Event
This restriction is appropriate because, without it, there appears to be no good reason for
giving a third party, even one with a legitimate interest a right to pay premium.
C5. A third party has a legitimate interest in maintaining the cover whenever he benefits
from it either directly or indirectly. The insured and the beneficiary under the policy both
benefit directly from cover and are thus entitled to pay premium in accordance with Arti-
cle 5:105(b). Third parties who have an interest in the subject matter of insurance or who
would otherwise have to cover losses resulting from an insured event benefit indirectly from
cover and are also entitled to effect payment. This is the case, for example, with a relative
who would otherwise have to cover losses resulting from an insured event because he may
be obliged to provide maintenance for the policyholder. It applies also to pledgees who
would lose their security if the property pledged was destroyed after the insurer was released
from its obligation to provide cover on account of non-payment of premium. Moreover, a
tenant may also have a legitimate interest in effecting payment of premium for insurance
taken on the tenanted property, if he has reason to fear that it could not be rebuilt for lack
of funds if it were destroyed by fire. The cases mentioned are only examples and, thus, do
not represent an exhaustive list.
Notes
N1. The dispositive rule of Article 7:106 para. 1 PECL admits performance by a third person
either if the debtor assents or if the third person has a legitimate interest in performance and the
debtor has failed to perform or it is clear that the debtor will not perform at the date due. Similarly
the law of obligations on the European continent generally allows third parties to perform the
contract, albeit on varying conditions, while English law is much more restrictive and only in
specific situations favourable to third parties’ performance (for the general law see Lando/Beale
340; for the law of insurance contracts, see Clarke 13-5)).
N2. The mandatory provision of Article 5:105 slightly varies the rule of Article 7:106 para. 2
PECL for the field of insurance law (where a large number of contracts affect the interests of third
parties) and allows payment by third parties without the further requirement of default of the
policyholder being a precondition of payment. Similar rules can be found in Austria (s. 35a ICA),
France (Picard/Besson, Contrat para. 270; Basedow/Fock-Völker 536), Germany (s. 34 ICA),
Luxembourg (art. 70 para. 3 ICA), Portugal (art. 55 ICA which permits the payment by a third
party with or without a legitimate interest in the fulfilment of the obligation) and Spain (art. 7
para. 3 ICA).
220
Article 6:101 Notice of Insured Event
(2) Such notice shall be given without undue delay. It shall be effective on dispatch. If the contract
requires notice to be given within a stated period of time, such time shall be reasonable and
in any event no shorter than five days.
(3) The insurance money payable shall be reduced to the extent that the insurer proves that it has
been prejudiced by undue delay.
Comments
Channels of Communication
C1. The obligation to give notice of an insured event to the insurer on risk without undue
delay applies (as a default rule) in all cases. No single person subject to the obligation is
identified in Article 6:101. In practice, the person with an obvious interest in giving notice of
an event is one or more of those referred to in Article 6:101 para. 1, who may do so person-
ally or through an agent. As the rule is framed as an obligation, breach of which may have
adverse consequences to those concerned, the provision concerning awareness is included
to safeguard their position.
C2. Notice by another person is effective, it being understood that insurers are not obliged
to act on information that does not appear to be reliable. The rule envisages, for example,
catastrophic events reliably reported in mass media or notified by friends and neighbours
where the event is such that policyholders with potential claims may have been incapac-
itated from carrying out day to day functions. In such instances potential claimants are
not compelled to claim but, if they do so, insurers cannot reduce the amount payable by
reference to Article 6:101 para. 3.
Balancing Interests
C3. Due performance of the notice obligation is beneficial to insurers because it affords
them an opportunity for investigation and the prevention of fraud, before the trail becomes
cold and information about the occurrence becomes more difficult and unduly expensive to
obtain. Moreover, it assists insurers to form an intelligent estimate of their liabilities, their
financial exposure, in general. Still, some delay is inevitable. However, there is undue delay
when the time taken to notify insurers is longer than is reasonable in the circumstances.
Circumstances vary. On the one hand, in life assurance it may be some time before inter-
ested persons even discover the existence of the policy. In house insurance, on the other
hand, unless the policyholder occupant has been away on holiday or on business, the time
required to notify a burglary is likely to be short. Indeed, lengthy periods are unlikely to
be reasonable in the case of indemnity insurance unless, for example, a person with fire
insurance perishes in the fire together with the policy. In all cases, however, the five day
period referred to in Article 6:101 para. 2 indicates the minimum period that people can
expect to be allowed.
221
Chapter Six: Insured Event
Notice Periods
C4. Policies sometimes state a certain number of days for notice to be given of the loss. In
some countries courts have applied such conditions to the letter whether, in the particular
case, it was reasonable to expect notice in the stipulated time or not. The Principles of Eu-
ropean Insurance Contract Law protect policyholders by providing that the policy period, if
any, shall not be shorter than five days, as well as requiring that it must be reasonable in the
particular case which, of course, may extend the number of days allowed in that case. More-
over, as with other notice rules in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law, notice
is effective on dispatch, and this must be stated in the policy. See Article 4:202 Comment 2.
C5. The contents of a notice of loss must be sufficient to achieve the purpose of such
notice; see Comment 2. They include the time, place, and circumstances of the insured
event, and any other available information which might assist insurers to decide whether
and, if so, how to undertake an investigation of the loss. Notice does not have to amount to
a precisely formulated claim with full details, such as an estimate of the value of what has
been damaged or lost. Distinguish notice of an insured loss from proof of its occurrence.
Statements in the notice are no more than assertions of fact. Sooner or later claimants must
be in a position to prove the facts on which their claim is based but that is not required of
them for the purpose of notice.
C6. In practice, once insurers have received due notice, it is then for them to indicate, if the
policy does not do so, what further particulars are reasonably required. See Article 6:102.
Commonly insurers do this simply by sending claimants a form to complete. The wording of
both policy notice terms and claim forms are likely to be construed in favour of claimants.
Words such as “full particulars of loss” are not taken literally but mean “the best particulars
the insured can reasonably give”. A requirement of “true” particulars is taken to mean true
to the best of the claimant’s belief.
Breach of Duty
C7. The effect of breach of notice requirements varies in the law of European countries. In
particular, there is no universal agreement about whether it is a condition of any sanction
against claimants that insurers have been prejudiced by any undue delay. Article 6:101 para.
3 resolves this issue in favour of claimants. Moreover, first, as insurers usually raise breach
of the notice duty as a ground for refusing to pay a claim, it is for insurers to prove prejudice
which, in many if not most cases, insurers will find it either difficult or inexpedient to do.
Second, it can be inferred that a reduction in the amount of insurance money payable, the
remedy stated in Article 6:101 para. 3, is the only sanction. Thus, insurers will not be allowed
to plead policy terms whereby performance of a notice duty is a “condition precedent” of
payment of any insurance money at all. In that regard note also the rules on precautionary
measures: Articles 4:101 ff.
222
Article 6:101 Notice of Insured Event
Notes
Article 6:101 para. 1: Duty to Notify
N1. Obligations of the policyholder to give notice to the insurer that an insured event has oc-
curred are common to most European insurance statutes (see for Austria s. 33 para. 1 ICA,
Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1077; for Belgium art. 74 para. 1(1) IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 271; for
Denmark s. 21 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974; Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 974; for France
art. 113-2 para. 4 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 523; for Germany s. 30 para. 1 ICA; for Greece art. 7
para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 623 and Rokas, paras. 429 ff.; for Italy art. 1913 pa-
ra. 1 CC, Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 714; for Luxembourg art. 26 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/
Fock-Völker 798; for the Netherlands art. 7:941 para. 1 CC, Asser/Clausing/Wansink 230 ff.; for
Poland art. 818 para. 1 CC (not mandatory); more detailed: Kowalewski 299; for Portugal art. 100
para. 1 ICA; for Spain art. 16 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1330 ff.; for Sweden s. 2 of Ch. 7 ICA;
the same rules apply to business insurance with one exception, see s. 19 para. 2 of Ch. 8 ICA; and
for Switzerland the first sentence of art. 38 para. 1 ICA and Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1241).
N2. Even the insurance contract laws of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland provide
for a duty by law to give notice, although the basis of the rule in law is not clear: Birds 14.5; Clarke
26-2A. Although this duty is normally regulated in the insurance contract, the duty of utmost
good faith comprises, according to the prevailing opinion, an obligation of the policyholder to
give notice that the insured event has occurred (cf. Haydenfare v British National Ins Soc Ltd
[1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 393 (402); Clarke 26-2A; Rühl 285 ff.).
N3. In some European jurisdictions the duty to give notice of the insured event is not limited to
the policyholder; under certain circumstances, it may be incumbent upon third parties (see for
Austria ss. 158d and 158e ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1078; for Germany the second sentence
of s. 30 para. 1 ICA; for Poland art. 818 para. 4 CC) or upon the insured or even the beneficiary
(for the Netherlands art. 7:941 para. 1 CC; for Switzerland the first sentence of art. 38 para. 1 ICA
and Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1241).
N4. Apparently European insurance laws do not contain explicit provisions comparable to the
second sentence of Article 6:101 para. 1. Although the notice is not a declaration of intent but
rather a declaration of knowledge (Wissenserklärung) (cf. for example for Germany Münchener
Kommentar-Wandt, § 30 VVG para. 2), it appears that the general rules on representation and
agency apply at least by analogy (see, for example, for Germany Palandt-Ellenberger, Einf. v.
§ 164 BGB para. 3). This is also true in the United Kingdom, provided that the source of the
information is reliable: Clarke 26-2C.
N5. However, European insurance laws differ as to the time period allowed for notice. In some
countries the policyholder has to notify the insurer as soon as possible (see for Belgium art. 74
para. 1(1) IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 271; for Denmark s. 21 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scher-
pe 974; for France the general rule in art. 113-2 para. 4 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 523; for
223
Chapter Six: Insured Event
Luxembourg art. 26 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 798; for the Netherlands art. 7:941 para.
1 CC). According to other European insurance laws, notice shall be given without undue delay
(see for Austria the general rule in s. 33 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1077; for Germany
the general rule in s. 30 para. 1 ICA; for Greece the special rule in art. 278 of the Code on Pri-
vate Maritime Law; Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 625; for Switzerland the first sentence of
art. 38 para. 1 ICA; Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1241; however it is also possible to agree on or within an
appropriate and reasonable time period (for the Netherlands the second sentence of art. 7:941
para. 1 CC, Basedow/Fock-Fock 873; or as soon as reasonably possible (for the United Kingdom
Birds 14.6, Clarke 26-2E).
N6. Some jurisdictions clearly establish that the event shall be notified within a fixed period
of time which may vary between 24 hours and 8 days after the occurrence (see for Austria the
special rules in the first sentence of s. 92 para. 1, s. 110 para. 1, the first sentence of s. 153 para.
1, and s. 153 para. 2 ICA; Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1077; for France the special rule in art. 123-1
ICA; Basedow/Fock-Völker 523; for Greece art. 7 para. 1 ICA and art. 9 para. 1 of the Code on
Motor Liability Insurance providing for notice as soon as possible but not later than eight days;
for Italy art. 1913 para. 1 CC, Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 714; for Portugal art. 100 para.
1 ICA; for Spain art. 16 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1330 f.). In Poland, the period of time can
be settled by parties in the insurance contract.
Contractual Derogations
N7. Commonly the duty to give notice of the insured event is and can be regulated by special
contractual stipulations and contracts of insurance determine the requirements for a valid notice
in detail. In order to keep those requirements reasonable and fair, most European insurance laws
put some limit on the contractual freedom of the parties (Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 92 f.).
N8. Similarly to what is laid down in Article 6:101 para. 2, a time period fixed in the insurance
contract is declared ineffective if the policyholder gives notice within a reasonable time period
(see for Belgium art. 19 para. 1(2) IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 271; for Luxembourg art. 26 para.
1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 798) or within a fixed statutory time period (for France art. 113-2
para. 4 ICA: 5 working days; Basedow/Fock-Völker 523), or if the stipulated time period is so
short that the rights of the policyholder may be impaired (for Italy art. 2965 CC, Basedow/Fo-
ck-Brunetta d’Usseaux 714). Other insurance laws do not allow insurance contracts to derogate
from statutory notice periods to the detriment of the policyholder (see, for example, for Portugal
art. 13 ICA and the Netherlands art. 7:943 para. 2 CC).
N9. Like Article 6:101 para. 2, many European insurance laws regard the dispatch of the notice
by the policyholder within the time period as sufficient (see for France Cass. civ. 21.2.1989, RGAT
1989, 421 (422), Basedow/Fock-Völker 523; for Germany as a general rule of law OLG Hamm
18.5.1988, Recht und Schaden 1988, 302 and OLG Köln 16.8.1994, Versicherungsrecht 1995, 567).
N10. According to most European insurance laws, the insurer is entitled to damages if the pol-
icyholder breaks the duty to give notice and the insurer can prove that, as a consequence, it has
suffered loss (see for Belgium art. 76 para. 1 IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 271 ff.; for France
224
Article 6:101 Notice of Insured Event
art. 113-11 para. 4 ICA; for Greece art. 7 para. 2 ICA and art. 9 para. 3 of the Code on Motor Lia-
bility Insurance, see Chatzinikolaou-Aggelidou 182 ff.; for Italy art. 1915 CC, Basedow/Fock-Bru-
netta d’Usseaux 715; for Luxembourg art. 28 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 798; for the
Netherlands art. 7:941 para. 3 CC, Asser/Clausing/Wansink 233 ff.; for Switzerland art. 38 para.
2 ICA and Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1241). Some jurisdictions grant the insurer the right to withhold
the insurance money only in the case of fraud or dolus directus (see for Belgium art. 76 para. 2
IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 272; Italy art. 1915 CC, Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 715;
for Luxembourg art. 28 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 798; for the Netherlands art. 7:941
para. 5 CC, Asser/Clausing/Wansink 238 ff.; for Switzerland art. 38 para. 3 ICA and Basedow/
Fock-Bälz 1241 f.).
Contractual Arrangements
N11. However, insurance contracts often stipulate that the insurer is discharged from its duty
to perform if the policyholder does not comply with its duty to give notice of the insured event
(Basedow/Fock-Basedow/Fock 94; see also art. 101 para. 1 Portuguese ICA which expressly allows
such clauses). In response to such stipulations, many European insurance laws limit contractual
arrangements which allow the insurer to cut insurance money in general (for France art. 113-
11 ICA; for Greece Areopag 1805/1986, NoB 1987, 1609 and Rokas, para. 432; for Luxembourg
art. 26 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 798; for Poland art. 818 para. 3 CC; for Portugal art. 101
para. 3 ICA). Others release the insurer only of its duties in case of fraudulent, intentional or
grossly negligent breaches of the duty to notify the insurer of the occurrence of the insured event
(see for Austria the first sentence of s. 6 para. 3 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1077; for Belgium
art. 76 para. 2 IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 271; for Germany s. 28 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fo-
ck-Lemmel 396; Italy art. 1915 CC, Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 715; for Switzerland art. 45
ICA, BG 9.1.1989, BGE 115 II 88 (90), Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1241).
225
Chapter Six: Insured Event
Comments
Information about the Occurrence of the Insured Event
C1. As noted in Article 6:101 Comment 5, once insurers have received notice of the oc-
currence of an insured event and thus of a pending claim, they commonly respond by
sending claimants a form to complete or by seeking further particulars of the occurrence
or its consequences in some other way. Such information may be necessary if insurers are to
investigate the claim or seek to mitigate the extent of the insured loss. Accordingly, a duty to
cooperate in this and other respects is sometimes implied in the law of European countries
as an aspect of the mutual duty of good faith. Such a duty is confirmed by Article 6:102.
The duty must be performed by the policyholder, insured or beneficiary, as the case may
be: the person or persons to whom the request for information is made. In practice this will
be the one most likely to possess the information and, usually, the one that makes a claim
under the policy.
Reasonable Requests
C2. In contrast with the law of certain countries, in Article 6:102 the duty of cooperation
is limited to a duty to respond to reasonable requests from the insurer for information about
the causes and effects of the insured event. The duty does not extend to more intrusive
matters, such as giving insurers access to financial information, or to more stressful matters
such as submission to examination under oath. Nor does it extend to a duty, sometimes
found in liability policies, to attend the proceedings of a court or tribunal. The duty does ex-
tend, however, to reasonable requests for information that might assist a defence to actions
brought against liability policyholders. It is implicit that the response must be made within
a reasonable time and that it is limited to information that is reasonably available then.
Breach of Duty
C3. As in the case of breach of the duty in Article 6:101 para. 1, according to Article 6:102
para. 2 it is for insurers to prove that a breach of the duty to respond to reasonable requests
for information has occurred, and that they have suffered prejudice as a result; see Arti-
cle 6:101 Comment 6. Moreover, it can be inferred from Article 6:102 para. 2 that, subject
226
Article 6:102 Claims Cooperation
to para. 3, a reduction in the amount of insurance money payable is the only sanction for
breach of the duty of cooperation. As to the circumstances that justify non payment under
para. 3, namely intent to cause loss or damage or recklessly and with knowledge that loss or
damage would probably result, see Article 9:101 Comments 2 and 3.
Notes
Article 6:102 para. 1: Duty to Cooperate
N1. Many European insurance laws require the policyholder and/or the insured to cooperate and
especially to provide the insurer with all relevant information and documents (see for Austria
s. 34 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1079; for Belgium art. 74 para. 2 IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock
271; for Denmark s. 22 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 975; for Finland s. 69 ICA, Basedow/Fo-
ck-Scherpe 975; for Germany s. 31 para. 1 ICA, for Greece the second sentence of art. 7 para. 1
ICA, Rokas, Eisigiseis para. 152, for Luxembourg art. 28 paras. 1 and 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völk-
er 798; for the Netherlands art. 7:941 para. 2 CC, Asser/Clausing/Wansink 232 ff.; for Portugal
art. 100 para. 2 ICA; for Spain art. 16 para. 3, art. 38 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1331; for
Sweden s. 2 of Ch. 7 ICA; the same rules apply to business insurance with one exception, see
s. 19 para. 2 of Ch. 8 ICA; for Switzerland art. 39 para. 1 and Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1243, 1245;
in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, this will be the consequence of standard
terms: Birds 14.5; Colinvaux 9-09; Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1470 f.), although it could also be seen as
an aspect of a general and continuing duty of utmost good faith: Clarke 27-1A and for consumers
as being based on the FCA Rules: Lowry/Rawlings 251.
N2. In addition, in some countries the notice of the insured event given by the policyholder
(the point dealt with by Article 6:101) must contain enough information to enable the insurer
to investigate the damage (see for example for Germany BGH 23.11. 1967, Versicherungsrecht
1968, 58, 59 and OLG Köln 21.4.1998, Recht und Schaden 1998, 458). Under certain circumstanc-
es, some European insurance laws even require the policyholder to deliver evidence by expert
opinion (see for France art. 122-2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 525 ff.). The duty to cooperate may
be incumbent, not only on the policyholder, but in some jurisdictions also on a victim (see for
Austria ss. 158d and 158e ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1077; for Germany s. 31 para. 2 and s. 100
para. 3 ICA)
N3. The sanctions for a violation of the duty to cooperate are in some countries a matter of
contract (see for Germany Wandt, paras. 568 ff. and 939; in Portugal, the same remedies apply as
in the event of the policyholder’s breach of the duty to cooperate, see art. 101 ICA); however, if a
release of the insurer’s duty to perform is stipulated, freedom of contract is restricted in a similar
way as it is in relation to the breach of the policyholder’s duty to give notice of the insured event
(see Notes 10 ff. under Article 6:101 (see for the Netherlands art. 7:941 paras. 3 and 4 CC, Asser/
Clausing/Wansink 233 ff.; for Portugal art. 101 para. 3 ICA).
N4. If the contract does not provide for any sanctions, the consequences of a breach of the duty to
cooperate are like those provided for a breach of the duty to give notice of the insured event (see
227
Chapter Six: Insured Event
the notes on Article 6:101 para. 3); see for Denmark ss. 21 and 23 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe
975; for Greece art. 7 para. 2 ICA, for Luxembourg art. 28 paras. 1 and 2 ICA, Basedow/Fo-
ck-Völker 798; for the Netherlands art. 7:941 paras. 4 and 5 CC. According to Swiss law in cases
of non-cooperation by the policyholder the court has to appoint an expert to give evidence of
the damage (art. 67 para. 2 ICA; Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1243).
Comments
Settlement
C1. In the language of insurance practice, there is an important difference between settling
a claim and settling a dispute. The settlement of a claim is the normal process, whereby
insurers assess the claim presented in the light of the evidence and of the terms of the
policy concerned and, all being well, “clear the file” by payment of insurance money to
the claimant. In Article 6:103 para. 1, however, acceptance of a claim has the more limited
meaning of assessing the validity of a claim as being one covered by the policy in question.
Only after a positive assessment of the claim does an insurer proceed to settlement of the
claim in the broader sense that includes payment. Duties relating to payment are regulated
by Article 6:104.
C2. Distinguish also from settlement of claims, even in the broader sense that includes
payment, the settlement of disputes over the validity or scope of insurance claims. That kind
of settlement is a contract of compromise, a contract distinct from the contract of insurance
to which the compromise relates, whereby, claimant and insurer, having disagreed on some
aspect of the claim such as the amount of insurance money due, settle their disagreement
with the compromise.
C3. Article 6:103 para. 1 obliges insurers to take reasonable steps to settle undisputed
claims promptly. The insurers’ obligation should be read in conjunction with the obligation
to assist in the matter by responding to reasonable requests from insurers for information:
Article 6:102 para. 1. Requests for information usually come to persons who have every
interest in responding to such requests in order to expedite payment of the claim. Indeed
that is also in the interest of society at large. Those who have suffered insured losses should
be indemnified as soon as reasonably possible. In these circumstances Article 6:103 para. 2
establishes a presumption that claims have been accepted in the relatively short period of
one month. When that is too short, as might be true of large or complex claims, Article 6:103
228
Article 6:104 Time of Performance
para. 2 allows insurers to give reasoned notice of deferral. Mere suspicion of fraud would
not normally be a valid reason.
Notes
N1. The duty of the insurer to settle a claim promptly is, in effect, inherent to most European
insurance laws although apart from Sweden (see s. 1 para. 1 of Ch. 7 ICA) apparently none of
them enunciates the principle contained in Article 6:103 para. 1 expressly. However, several
European countries provide mechanisms to facilitate swift claims settlement by requiring the
insurer to accept or reject a claim in due time.
N2. For example, similar in its effects to Article 6:103 para. 2, the insurance money becomes due
under Austrian law if the insurer does not react within one month to an inquiry by the policy-
holder about the reasons of non-payment, if that inquiry was submitted within two months of
the claim by the policyholder (see the second sentence of s. 11 para. 1 ICA; Basedow/Fock-Lem-
mel 1082). German and Swiss insurance law contain a special rule on the time of performance
which is applicable if the insurer does not investigate properly and delays the acceptance of the
claim. In that case, the insurance money is deemed to fall due at the time the claim would have
been settled in the case of a proper investigation (see for Germany OLG München 13.11.1964,
Versicherungsrecht 1965, 173, OLG Hamburg 19.8.1966, Versicherungsrecht 1967, 392 (393),
OLG Hamburg 6.8.1981, Versicherungsrecht 1982, 543, OLG Köln 21.1.1982, Versicherungsrecht
1983, 922 (923), OLG Saarbrücken, 20.9.1995, Versicherungsrecht 1996, 1494 (1495), Basedow/
Fock-Lemmel 404 f., Wandt, para. 943; for Switzerland Roelli/Keller 567, Basedow/Fock-Bälz
1245). According to French law, fraudulent delay on the part of the insurer in settling the claim
can interrupt the prescription of the duty of performance (see art. 114-1 ICA, Cass. civ. 10.5.2000,
RGDA 2000, 514 (515), Basedow/Fock-Völker 529 f.). For further examples, see the notes on
Article 6:104 para. 2 and Article 6:105.
Comments
The Importance of Performance
C1. Prompt payment of claims, which have been accepted as valid in accordance with Ar-
ticle 6:103, is self-evidently important to claimants who have suffered financial loss of such
significance to them that they have bought indemnity insurance to cover it. The insurance
money due to them may be urgently needed to repair a roof or to enable them to carry on
229
Chapter Six: Insured Event
business. The same is likely to be true of services promised by insurers, such as the services
of a driver to a policyholder unable to drive a motor vehicle.
Undue Delay
C2. Under Article 6:104 para. 1 insurers are obliged to pay without “undue delay”. To avoid
possible unjustifiable delay by reference to what that means in a particular case, para. 3 also
requires payment of insurance money not later than one week after acceptance of the claim
in accordance with Article 6:103. Moreover, it is no excuse for non-payment that total value
of a claim cannot yet be quantified: Article 6:104 para. 2: insurers must pay part of the claim.
C3. What is required by Article 6:104 is not necessarily payment of all of the insurance
money that may finally be payable in respect of the claim but such insurance money as
has been determined to be due under the policy by that time, as provided by Article 6:104
para. 2. In some instances, for example, ongoing damage to property caused by storms
or by subsidence, more time will be needed to adjust loss and determine the full amount
due. Note that what is required to be paid is not an arbitrary amount but the part to which
claimants are “entitled”, which means the full amount of insured loss which has been already
determined to be due.
C4. The legal consequences of any breach by insurers of the payment duty under Arti-
cle 6:104 are regulated by Article 6:105.
Notes
Article 6:104 paras. 1 and 3: Rules on the Time of Payment
N1. Most European insurance laws contain provisions on the time of performance. Time periods
vary. In some jurisdictions performance is due immediately after the acceptance of the claim (see
for Austria the first sentence of s. 11 para. 1 and the first sentence of s. 154 para. 1 ICA, which
contains a time limit within which payment must be made of two weeks, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel
1082 f.; in Belgium, as to some types of insurances, 30 days after acceptance of the claim (see
the special rule in art. 121 para. 2 IA 2014, Basedow/Fock-Fock 274); in Denmark 14 days after
the insurer has obtained all facts to assess the claim (see the first sentence of s. 24 para. 1 ICA,
Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 976 ff.); and in Finland one month after the insurer has obtained all facts
to assess the claim (see s. 70 para. 1 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 977)). In France payment is
due, in general, immediately after the occurrence of the insured event, but, as to some types of
insurances, 60 or 90 days after the notice of the insured event (see arts. 113-5, 242-1, 211-9 ICA,
Basedow/Fock-Völker 528); in Germany immediately after the acceptance of the claim (see ss. 14
para. 1 and 106 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 404); in Italy, provisions for the time of payment
exist only in respect of motor insurance (see the special rules in the Code of Private Insurance)
and the terms vary according to the types of damage (Cerini 279 ff.); in Luxembourg immediately
after the insurer has obtained all information necessary to assess the claim but, at the latest, 30
days after the acceptance of the claim (see art. 29 paras. 1 and 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 801);
230
Article 6:104 Time of Performance
and in Switzerland four weeks after the insurer has obtained all information necessary to assess
the claim (art. 41 ICA). In the Netherlands performance is due in accordance with the general
rules of debtor’s default (arts. 6:81 ff. CC), in Poland, as a rule: in 30 days after the notice of the
insured event (art. 817 para. 1 CC, Kowalewski 307 ff.); in Portugal in 30 days after the insurer
has obtained all information necessary to assess the loss (art. 104 ICA), and in Spain immedi-
ately after the investigations have been concluded – insurer has maximum 40 days in order to
investigate – (see art. 18 ICA, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 205, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1334).
Spanish law contains a special rule, if an expert is involved in the assessment of the damage; in
that case, the insurance money has to be paid within 5 days after the time period in which the
insurer can challenge the expert opinion has elapsed (see art. 38 ICA, Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria
228, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1334, 1340 ff.). In Sweden performance is due one month after the
notice of the insured event (see s. 1 para. 2 of Ch. 7 ICA). Greek general insurance contract law
does not set any exact time periods, but merely requires the insurer to pay without undue delay
(art. 7 para. 7 ICA and Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 631; for non-life insurance the law
obliges the insurer to pay without undue delay the insurance money upon acceptance on behalf
of the insurer of the results of the adjusters’ report, see art. 29 para. 1 of the Legislative Decree
on Insurance Undertakings and Rokas, paras. 364 ff.). Some countries have not enacted specific
rules on the time of performance for insurance contracts (see for Belgium Basedow/Fock-Fock
274, for Italy Basedow/Fock-Brunetta d’Usseaux 717). The general rules on obligations apply. For
the uncertain state of the law in the United Kingdom, see Birds 14.13 ff.; Clarke 30-2, and Sempra
Metals v IRC [2007] UKHL 34; note Clarke, Compensation 291.
N2. Some European insurance laws provide for partial payment as a step in the direction of
prompt payment of full indemnity. Time periods vary. In Austria partial payment is due one
month after the notice of the insured event (see s. 11 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1083);
in Belgium, as to some types of insurances, 30 days after agreement on the expert decision
concerning the amount of the loss (see the special rule in art. 121 para. 2 IA 2014, Basedow/
Fock-Fock 273); in Denmark 14 days after the insurer has obtained all facts to assess the claim
(see s. 24 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 977); in Finland one month after the insurer has
obtained all the facts to assess the undisputed part of the compensation (see s. 70 para. 4 ICA,
Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 977); in Germany one month after the notice of the insured event (see
s. 14 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 405); in Greece without undue delay to pay the undis-
puted amount of insurance money if a longer period is required for the assessment of the loss
(see the second sentence of art. 7 para. 7 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 630); in Poland
payment of the unquestionable part of the insurance money is due in 30 days after the notice of
the insured event (art. 818 para. 2 CC); in Spain 40 days after the notice of the insured event (see
art. 18 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1334); in Sweden immediately upon notice of the insured
event (see s. 1 para. 3 of Ch. 7 ICA).
231
Chapter Six: Insured Event
Comments
Compensation
C1. Payment is late or delayed when it has not been made by the time that it is due in
accordance with Article 6:104. As to the consequences, Article 6:105 para. 1 provides for
interest and is inspired by the Motor Insurance Directive (2009/103/EC). In cases in which
liability is not contested and the damages have been quantified, art. 22 of the Directive oblig-
es Member States to require insurers “to make a reasoned offer of compensation in cases
where liability has not been contested and the damages have been quantified” within three
months of the date when the injured party presented his claim for compensation. If such an
offer is not made within three months, insurers must pay the claimant interest. Interest is
the least amount of which, in practice, unsatisfied claimants are likely to have been deprived
by not having received the money due. The “rate applied by the European Central Bank” is
modelled on the “reference rate” defined by art. 2 para. 7(a) of the Late Payment Directive
(2011/7/EU). Reference is made to this rate in Article 6:105 solely as a mode of calculation
in case of late payment of insurance money, and for no other purpose.
Damages
C2. In practice “statutory” interest alone may not be sufficient to indemnify claimants
against the consequences of late payment of insurance money due. When motor insurers
or fire insurers delay payment, and a claimant urgently needs the money to buy another van
for the business to replace the one stolen or to repair the fire damage to the factory, subject
to the normal legal limits, the insurer in question should be liable for the consequences.
The same is true when an insurer has exercised a policy option not to pay insurance money
as such but to have property, which the subject of the insurance, reinstated or otherwise to
provide services. If insurers fail to do what they have promised to do without undue delay,
commercially and legally their liability is the same as that of any other contract breakers:
dealers that have failed to supply a van or contractors who have failed to repair a factory
roof. For that reason the liability envisaged in Article 6:105 para. 2 is not a liability particular
to insurance contract law but is liability in accordance with the general rule established by
Article 9:508 PECL.
25
This Article is modelled on art. 3 para. 1(d) of the Late Payment Directive (2000/35/EC).
232
Article 6:105 Late Performance
C3. Under Article 9:508 para. 2 PECL damages are recoverable for any “further loss”,
namely loss not indemnified by an award of interest, so far as it is “recoverable under this
Section”. The Section, headed “Damages and Interest”, includes Article 9:502 PECL where-
by “the general measure of damages” is the sum that puts claimants into the position that
they would have been “if the contract had been duly performed”, namely if the insurance
money had been paid on time. Thus, both the Principles of European Contract Law and
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law adopt the widely accepted expectation
interest as the conceptual basis for damages. However, under Article 9:503 PECL the limit
of liability of parties in breach in respect of loss that they “foresaw or could reasonably have
foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract as a likely result of its performance”,
namely the expectation interest, is qualified when “the non-performance was intentional
or grossly negligent”. The qualification contemplates what in some countries is referred to
as breach of contract in bad faith. Although such cases may not occur at all often in the
context of insurance, when they do insurers are liable in full for all loss consequential on
their failure to pay on time.
Assessment of Loss
C4. Generally, according to the rule in the Article 9:503 PECL, contract breakers, includ-
ing insurers, are liable only for loss which they “foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen
at the time of the contract” as a likely result of non-performance (emphasis added). This
limit on liability applies to heads or categories of loss in a particular case rather than to
the precise amount. So, although the precise amount of insurance indemnity is normally
calculated on values later at the time of loss, their liability for late payment in principle is
nonetheless limited to what they could or should have foreseen at the time that the insurance
contact was concluded.
Instances of Loss
C5. It is the business of insurers to provide protection for their policyholders. They are
deemed to know, for example, why people, consumers or businesses, buy fire insurance,
and hence the likelihood that an undue delay in payment is likely to result in at least some
of the very kinds of loss for which the policyholders sought protection in the first place.
C6. For policyholders in business those kinds of loss might include profits lost when
business premises are destroyed by fire or when a commercial vehicle is stolen, or the cost of
borrowing from a bank to keep a business going until the insurer pays, or even loss of credit
or injury to credit reputation, when that was a foreseeable consequence of late payment.
233
Chapter Seven: Prescription
Notes
General Rules on Interest
N1. Some European insurance laws have no special rules on interest or damage claims for de-
layed payment of the insurance money as such (for France Groutel 124, Favre Rochex/Courtieu,
paras. 1-285 f., Basedow/Fock-Völker 529; for Germany Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 404 f., Wandt,
para. 942, but see s. 91 which provides for a special interest rate in property insurance; for Greece
Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge 630 f.; for the Netherlands Scheltema/Mijnssen 256; for Poland
Kowalewski 226; for Portugal Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1180; for Switzerland BG 22.11.1990, SVA
XVIII No. 7, 35 f., Basedow/Fock-Bälz 1246; for the United Kingdom, see Article 6:104 Note 1,
above). In those countries the general laws on delayed performance of obligations apply.
N2. However, in some countries the general rules are mandatory at least as far the duties of
the insurer are concerned (see for Austria s. 11 para. 4 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1082; for
Germany s. 14 para. 3 ICA). In most jurisdictions interest according to the general statutory
interest rates has to be paid (see for Denmark s. 24 para. 3 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 977; for
Finland s. 70 para. 3 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 977; for Luxembourg the second sentence of
art. 29 para. 2 ICA, Basedow/Fock-Völker 801; for the United Kingdom, see s. 35A para. 1 of the
Supreme Court Act 1981). These laws may be mandatory or provide for minimum standards that
cannot be derogated from.
N3. If payment of the insurance money is delayed, some jurisdictions provide for higher in-
terest rates (see for France art. 211-13 ICA: twice the legal interest rate in motor liability insur-
ance, art. 242-1 para. 5 ICA; twice the legal interest rate in compulsory construction insurance;
see also Basedow/Fock-Völker 528). According to Spanish law the insurer has to pay penalty
interest (statutory interest rate plus 50 percent; 20 percent from the second year) if insurance
money is not paid within 3 months after the occurrence of the insured event (see art. 20 para. 3
ICA; for details on this contentious rule, see Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 207, Sánchez Calero, Mora
del asegurador 336 f. and 344 f., Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1335-1140). In the United Kingdom
unpaid premium due is a “simple” contractual debt and may be claimed as such by the insurer,
until the limitation period of “six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”
expires: s. 5 of the Limitation Act 1980, applicable in England and Wales.
234
Article 7:101 Action for Payment of Premium
Comments
C1. The rules on prescription relate to contractual claims in general and not to specific
types of contracts. That is why the Principles of European Contract Law contain a full
set of rules on prescription. However, there are certain specific problems which attach to
insurance contracts in particular. They are dealt with in Articles 7:101 and 7:102. For the
remaining issues Article 7:103 refers to the Principles of European Contract Law.
C2. According to Article 7:101, the general period of prescription for claims to insurance
premiums is one year. In that respect Article 7:101 deviates from Article 14:201 PECL which
provides for a prescription period of three years. The shorter period is justified by the fact
that premiums are usually paid periodically, quite frequently even in monthly instalments.
Moreover, insurers usually set up claim enforcement processes which will ensure that they
do not need a longer period of prescription than one year.
C3. The prescription period starts running from the moment the payment is due. The
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not define this moment but reference
may be made to Article 7:102 PECL. In the case of the insurance premium, the insurance
contract will usually provide for a fixed time for payment, for instance at the beginning of
the insurance period (see Article 1:202 para. 8) or at the beginning of every month.
Notes
Community Law
N1. The pertinent body of Community law does not contain any provision governing the law of
prescription in insurance matters.
N2. Most jurisdictions do not provide for a specific rule governing the prescription of actions
for payment of the premium. Instead, general rules apply to all or most claims that flow from
insurance contracts irrespective of the cause of action. If exceptions from the general rule exist,
they mostly do not pertain to the insurer’s claim for the premium. According to these general
rules, actions for payment of the premium are prescribed after two years in France (art. 114-1
para. 1 ICA: «toutes actions dérivant d’un contrat d’assurance»; cf. also Lamy Assurances, para.
974), and in Switzerland (art. 46 para. 1 ICA), after three years in Austria (s. 12 para. 1 ICA), in
Belgium (art. 88 para. 1 IA 2014), in Luxembourg (art. 44 para. 1 ICA), and in Poland (art. 818
para. 1 CC), after four years for non-life and five for life insurance in Greece (art. 10 ICA). Various
exceptions apply in cases of personal or life insurance contracts and thereby affect the action for
payment of the premium.
N3. Some codes, however, contain an explicit rule governing the action for payment of the pre-
mium. In Italy, for example, actions for payment of the premium are prescribed after a period of
235
Chapter Seven: Prescription
one year after the payment has fallen due (art. 2952 para. I CC; cf. also Cerini 253). In Portugal,
the period of prescription is two years (see art. 121 para. 2 ICA. In accordance with art. 121 para.
2 ICA, the period of prescription for all other claims arising from the insurance contract is 5
years from the time when the claimant had knowledge of his right, notwithstanding the general
prescription period stated in the Civil Code). Under Spanish law, an action for payment of the
premium has to be brought within 6 months after the premium, which is not the first premi-
um, has fallen due (art. 15 ICA, see Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 193 and Basedow/Fock-Schlenker
1372). The same short prescription period of 6 months applies in Danish law (s. 40 ICA, see
Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 997). Swedish law determines in s. 7 of Ch. 5 ICA (as well as in s. 7 of Ch.
13 ICA for individual personal insurance cases) that the insurer forfeits “the right to an unpaid
premium when 6 months have elapsed since the premium should have been paid”, provided that
the insurance policy has not been terminated or ceased to apply before then.
N4. Neither the United Kingdom nor Ireland provide for specific rules on prescription of in-
surance claims. The statutory limitations of the Limitation Act 1980, applicable in England and
Wales, and of the Irish Statute of Limitations 1957 – albeit subject to contractual stipulations
(see Article 7:101 Note 2 and Article 7:103 Note 2) – as well as equitable limitations apply. Thus,
if the parties do not shorten the period of prescription by contract, actions derived from simple
contracts are barred after six years, and those arising from contracts under seal after 12 years
(Clarke 26-5, Colinvaux 9-32). The Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 provides for
a prescription period of 5 years applying to all contractual claims in Scottish law (see Basedow/
Fock-Rühl 1516).
N5. This comparative survey provides evidence of a very wide range of prescription periods re-
lating to claims and actions for premium. Such actions are prescribed after 6 months in Denmark
(s. 40 ICA, see Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 997), Spain (art. 15 ICA, see Basedow/Fock-Schlenker
1372), and Sweden (s. 7 of Ch. 5 ICA, as well as in s. 7 of Ch. 13 ICA for individual personal insur-
ance cases), after two years in France (art. 114-1 para. 1 ICA), in Italy (art. 2952 CC as modified
by art. 3 of the Decree of 28 August 2008), in Portugal (art. 121 para. 1 ICA), and in Switzerland
(art. 46 para. 1 ICA), after three years in Austria (s. 12 para. 1 ICA), in Belgium (art. 88 para. 1
IA 2014), in Luxembourg (art. 44 para. 1 ICA), in the Netherlands (art. 7:942 para. 1 CC) and
in Poland (art. 818 para. 1 CC), after four or five years in Greece (art. 10 ICA), after five years in
Scotland (s. 6 para. 1 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973), and after 6 years
(12 years if under seal) in Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, however,
contractual stipulations commonly and significantly shorten the prescription periods to one year
in commercial cases (Clarke 26-5C).
236
Article 7:102 Action for Payment of Insurance Benefits
after a period of ten years from the occurrence of the insured event, except in the case of life
insurance for which the relevant period shall be 30 years.
(2) Action for payment of the surrender value of life insurance shall be prescribed after a period
of three years from the time when the policyholder receives the final account from the insurer.
In any event, however, action shall be prescribed at the latest after a period of 30 years from
the termination of the life insurance contract.
Comments
General Period of Prescription and its Commencement
C1. According to Article 7:102, the general period of prescription for claims to insurance
benefits is three years. In that respect Article 7:102 is in line with Article 14:201 PECL.
C2. According to the Principles of European Contract Law, the period of prescription
begins to run from the time “when the debtor has to effect performance” (Article 14:203
para. 1 PECL). This rule requires some clarification if applied to insurance cases because the
general rule on time of performance under Article 7:102 PECL does not fit such cases. This
is why Article 7:102 PEICL (sic) takes a different approach by referring to the time when
the insurer has or is deemed to have made a final decision on the claim in accordance with
Article 6:103. On the other hand the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do
not contain a comprehensive rule on the time of performance by the insurer either. Three
cases have to be distinguished: acceptance (Article 6:103), rejection (Article 6:103 para. 2)
and constructive acceptance in the case of an insurer’s inertia (Article 6:103 para. 2). The
time of performance is regulated only for the first and third case but not for the case where
the insurer wrongfully rejects the claim (see Article 6:104). However, since rejection is a
final decision of the insurer, insurance money will fall due at the time of this final (though
negative) decision and prescription will start to run. This is why Article 7:102 connects the
commencement of the prescription period to the final decision of the insurer and thereby
covers all cases.
C3. The decision of the insurer depends on the statement of claim by the policyholder.
Nevertheless, the policyholder is not in a position to postpone the commencement of the
prescription period arbitrarily because he is under a duty to notify the insurer about an
insured event in accordance with Article 6:101. After notification the insurer can ask the
policyholder to state his claim, if necessary. A policyholder, who does not respond to the
insurer’s request, may violate the duty of good faith (Article 1:201 PECL) if he delays his
claim unduly.
C4. If in exceptional circumstances the policyholder does not know about the occurrence
of the insured event, he will not be able to notify the insurer and the insurer will not be able
to deliver a final decision in accordance with Article 6:103. In such a case the absolute pre-
scription period stated in Article 7:102 will apply, namely ten years, except in life assurance
where the period is thirty years. In contrast to the general prescription period the absolute
237
Chapter Seven: Prescription
prescription period commences with the occurrence of the insured event. Therefore, the
time of its commencement is objectively determined and will not depend on the knowledge
and/or acts of either one of the parties.
Notes
Introduction
N1. Whereas Article 7:101 deals with the prescription of actions for payment of the premium,
Article 7:102 governs the prescription of actions brought against insurers for the benefit of the
insurance. As its characteristic feature the provision combines a subjective and an objective ele-
ment. According to the subjective element, which is laid down as the primary factor in the first
sentence of Article 7:102 para. 1, the prescription period only starts to run after the insurer has
made or was deemed to have made a final decision on the claim. The second sentence of Article
7:102 para. 1, which is referred to as the secondary, objective element, determines prescription
after 10 years (30 years in life assurance cases) from the occurrence of the insured event in any
case, irrespective of what the insurer may or may not have decided.
N2. The subsequent notes will illustrate the diversity of the national laws with respect to the
prescription of claims for the insurance money or benefit. As will be shown in Note 5, the laws
of some countries regard the objective element (the occurrence of the insured event) as the sole
trigger for the running of the prescription period. Except for cases of fraud the claimant’s igno-
rance of his claim, in other words, is not taken into account. In Note 6, other laws are reported
where such an objective rule (event) is supplemented by an additional requirement of knowledge.
Reliance on the insurer’s decision as another key factor to determine prescription, however, is
not without antecedents as will be illustrated in Note 11. An account of all the different statutory
periods of limitation is finally provided in Notes 8 to 10. The final Note refers to exceptions for
life assurance contracts.
N3. In accordance with this distinction two groups of national laws can be identified. The first
group, namely those adopting the objective element of the occurrence of the insured event as
the sole factor triggering the running of the prescription period, consists of Greece, Ireland, Italy
and the United Kingdom (cf. the subsequent Note 5). The jurisdictions of Belgium, Germany,
France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg form the second group
(cf. Note 6). The prescription period in these countries does not run unless the claimant is aware
of his case.
N4. Where the prescription period does not start to run without the insured’s knowledge of
his case, the insurer’s position may become excessively insecure over time. In order to protect
the insurer’s legitimate claim to know where he stands, some national laws establish additional
maximum periods of prescription that start to run on the occurrence of the insured event (see
Notes 6 and 9). A second time barrier is available for the insurer who knows about the insured
event and has already been confronted with a claim for insurance money: in the laws of Austria
and the Netherlands, it can speed up prescription by rejecting the claim (see Notes 7 and 9).
238
Article 7:102 Action for Payment of Insurance Benefits
N5. Several countries take the occurrence of the insured event as the sole factor for the running
of the prescription period. The claimant’s ignorance of his case, therefore, is not taken into ac-
count, but the prescription period is rather long in these countries. Most prominently, English
law provides such an example where the statutory period runs even though the claimant may be
unaware of his cause of action. According to s. 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980, applicable in
England and Wales, exceptions to this rule only apply in cases of fraud or concealment (Clarke
26-5A, Colinvaux 9-32, and for Greece Rokas, Eisigiseis paras. 112-116 ff.).
N6. The laws of the second group share the view that the running of the prescription period is
principally hindered by the claimant’s ignorance of his case. They also have in common that this
requirement is not strict, meaning that the provision has to be complemented by a rule that finally
precludes claims at some point in time irrespective of the claimant’s ignorance. An additional
rule therefore sets an absolute time limit after which any claim is prescribed, and thus secures
the insurer’s interests. This time limit starts to run on the occurrence of the insured event. This
model can be found in Belgium (art. 88 para. 1(2) IA 2014), Denmark (s. 29 ICA, Basedow/Fo-
ck-Scherpe 996), Luxembourg (art. 44 para. 1 ICA), France (art. 114-1 ICA), Portugal (art. 121
para. 2 ICA), and in Sweden (s. 4 of Ch. 7 ICA). German law takes the same approach: in the
absence of a special regime under the ICA, prescription is subject to the general rules of the Civil
Code (s. 195 CC) which also provide for a double-standard analogous to the aforementioned
legal systems (see Wandt, para. 945).
N7. Making the insurer’s decision an important element for determining prescription, as Article
7:102 para. 1 does, is not without antecedents in particular under Austrian (s. 12 para. 3 ICA),
Dutch (art. 7:942 para. 3 CC) and Finnish law (s. 74 ICA). In the first two countries mentioned,
the rule requiring the claimant to bring the action within a certain time period from the insurer’s
refusal to settle the claim is to be viewed as a lex specialis supplementing the general rules on
prescription of claims against the insurer. In other words: in the absence of the insurer’s rejection
of the claim, the ordinary rules apply. Once the insurer has rejected a claim, however, the claims
are subject to prescription in accordance with the aforementioned special rules.
N8. Under Dutch law, an action is time-barred if it is not brought within three years after the
claimant has become aware of his claim (art. 7:942 para. 1 CC). In Austria, the claimant has to
bring the action within one year from the insurer’s refusal to settle the claim. The general limita-
tion period, however, is also three years (see s. 12 paras. 1 and 3 ICA). In Finland, the claimant is
still granted three years from the date of receipt of the insurer’s decision to bring suit before the
claim is prescribed (s. 74 ICA).
239
Chapter Seven: Prescription
N9. In France, the prescription period of two years begins to run with the occurrence of the
insured event; the claimant, however, can prove ignorance with the effect that prescription only
starts to run afterwards (art. 114-1 ICA). In Belgium, the period of prescription is three years
beginning with the occurrence of the insured event and, in case of the claimant’s ignorance, with
the day of knowledge. An action is always prescribed if it is brought later than 5 years after the
occurrence of the insured event (art. 88 para. 1(2) IA 2014). In Luxembourg, the prescription
period is three years starting with the occurrence of the insured event only if the claimant cannot
prove ignorance. Again, an action is prescribed five years after the occurrence of the insured
event in any case (art. 44 para. 1 ICA). Under Danish law, an action is prescribed two years after
the claimant receives knowledge of his claim. No action, however, can be brought later than 5
years after the claim fell due (Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 996). The prescription period in Sweden is
three years after the claimant knows that the claim could be made, with a maximum of 10 years
from the earliest time at which the claim could have been made (s. 4 of Ch. 7 ICA). The German
law is similar: the Civil Code provides for a limitation period of three years from the moment
the claimant has notice of the occurrence of the insured event (s. 195 CC). Irrespective of the
claimant’s ignorance, however, the claim shall be prescribed not later than after ten years from
the insured event (see s. 199 CC). In Italy, the prescription period for insurance contracts other
than life insurance is two years, following the amendment introduced by Law of 17 December
2012, no. 294 (see Cerini 245).
N10. In England and Wales, as stated in the notes on Article 7:101, actions derived from simple
contracts are barred after six years, and those arising from contracts under seal after 12 years.
In commercial cases, however, they may be subject to contractual stipulations shortening the
prescription period to one year (Clarke 26-5A, Colinvaux 9-32 and 9-35).
N11. Various national laws provide for exemptions from the general prescription period in case
of life assurance contracts. These exemptions extend the prescription period to 5 years in Greece
(art. 10 ICA) and the Netherlands – allowing a further extension of the prescription period by
contract – (art. 7:985 CC), to 10 years in France (art. 114-1 para. 4 ICA) and Italy (art. 2952 para.
II, as amended by Law of 17 December 2012, no. 294) and even to 30 years in Belgium (art. 88
para. 1(2) IA 2014).
26
Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
240
Article 7:103 Other Issues Relating to Prescription
Comments
Prescription of Claims Not Covered by Articles 7:101 and 7:102
C1. Chapter 7 deals with prescription of certain claims arising from the contract of insur-
ance. Typically, it covers the claim of the insurer for payment of a premium (Article 7:101)
as well as the claim of the insured or beneficiary for payment of insurance benefits (Arti-
cle 7:102). The contract of insurance may, however, give rise to other claims, for example for
damages if a business interruption insurer fails to provide the promised computer support.
Such claims based on remedies for a breach of contract in general are not covered by Chap-
ter 7 and are subjected by virtue of Article 7:103 to the general rules on prescription of the
Principles of European Contract Law.
C2. Articles 7:101 and 7:102 do not rule on all issues of prescription. Unregulated issues are
subjected by virtue of Article 7:103 to the rules on prescription of the Principles of European
Contract Law. In fact, most of the latter remain applicable also in matters of insurance.
Only some provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law are replaced by the Prin-
ciples of European Insurance Contract Law: Article 14:201 PECL by Article 7:101, Arti-
cle 14:203 para. 1 PECL by Article 7:102 and Article 14:601 PECL by the second sentence
of Article 7:103.
Contractual Derogations
C3. Articles 7:101 and 7:102 may be derogated from by the contract of insurance, only to
the benefit of the policyholder (see first sentence of Article 1:103 para. 2), unless the contract
covers a large risk as defined in the second sentence of Article 1:103 para. 2. In contrast, the
provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law are to a large extent non-mandatory
(see Article 14:601 PECL). The second sentence of Article 7:103 ensures that the general
limitations on freedom of contract (Article 1:103 para. 2) will also apply the provisions of
the Principles of European Contract Law as referred to in the first sentence of Article 7:103.
Notes
General Remark
N1. The reference to the various provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law under
the heading of “Other Issues of Prescription” indicates the variety of topics possibly covered by
this single provision. However, the reference does not include Article 14:601 PECL dealing with
parties’ agreements on an extension or reduction of the prescription period. Rather, the provision
itself expressly allows for the derogation in accordance with Article 1:103 para. 2. Therefore, the
invoked principles mainly apply with respect to questions of suspensions and renewals (as the
Principles of European Contract Law refer to what is more traditionally called interruption). The
following notes focus on the specifics related to insurance matters and, hence, cannot be fully
241
Chapter Seven: Prescription
understood without reference to the notes covering the incorporated articles of the Principles of
European Contract Law.
Contractual Derogation
N2. The national laws vary with respect to the possibility of contractual derogation. Whereas
some jurisdictions have generally acknowledged the parties’ powers to extend or shorten the
period of prescription, a number of national laws provide for mandatory rules prohibiting de-
rogatory agreements on prescription. Derogation is excluded in the Netherlands (art. 7:943 para.
2 combined with art. 7:942 CC) and in Greece (art. 275 CC); in Italy, the prescription period
cannot be modified by agreement between the parties; any agreement intended to modify the
prescription or to modify the rules of suspension and/or interruption of the prescription peri-
od is void – art. 2936 CC – Cerini 100), in Luxembourg (art. 44 ICA), in Poland (art. 119 CC),
and in Switzerland (art. 46 ICA – concerning the shortening of the prescription period). In the
United Kingdom and in Ireland, however, courts have endorsed agreements on prescription in
commercial cases to one year (Clarke 26-5A f. Colinvaux 9-32 f.). Portuguese law, too, allows for
agreements on prescription under art. 330.1 CC; the special rules on prescription of art. 121 ICA
are not part of the list of minimum standards laid down in art. 13 ICA. In Denmark, the insurer is
only allowed to rely upon derogatory stipulations detrimental to the insured after the insured has
been notified and given the right to declare his claim within a time period of 6 months (Basedow/
Fock-Scherpe 997).
N3. By reference to Article 14:304 PECL, negotiations postpone the period of prescription.
Thus, an action is not prescribed “before one year has passed since the last communication
made in the negotiations”. Negotiations suspend the running of prescription in Denmark (Base-
dow/Fock-Scherpe 998), Germany (s. 203 CC), Austria (Basedow/Fock-Lemmel 1120). In other
countries, however, limitation sometimes runs notwithstanding negotiations (see for the United
Kingdom: Clarke 26-5C). If negotiations happen to be close to expiry of the prescription peri-
od, it is common in the United Kingdom, in order to prevent expiry, to enter into a “standstill”
agreement, if the policy itself does not already provide for the matter (Colinvaux 9-37).
N4. Many national laws face the intricacies of prescription following the negotiation on the
validity of the claim by accepting the notice of the insured as a proper reason to suspend pre-
scription. Provisions according to which prescription is suspended when the insured has lodged
a notice or claim with the insurer can be found in: Austria (s. 12 para. 2 ICA), Germany (s. 15
ICA), Belgium (art. 88 para. 3 IA 2014), Luxembourg (art. 45 para. 3 ICA), the Netherlands
(art. 7:942 para. 2 CC), and Poland (art. 819 para. 4 CC). Swedish insurance law explicitly refers
to the lodging of a claim with the insurer in such a way as to guarantee, without exception, a
time period of 6 months after the insurer’s final decision to bring suit (s. 4 of Ch. 7 and s. 5 of
Ch.16 ICA). Additionally, it should be mentioned that it suffices in some legal regimes to suspend
expiry by issuing a notice with some kind of agency. Such provisions are contained in the laws of
Luxembourg (art. 45 para. 4 ICA), Denmark, Sweden and Finland (Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 998).
242
Article 8:101 Maximum Sums Payable
N5. Most circumstances covered by the incorporated articles of the Principles of European Con-
tract Law are to be found in the general rules of the Member State jurisdictions. Some countries,
however, provide for additional rules in the Insurance Contract Act. This includes provisions
acknowledging vis major as, to put it in the language of the Principles of European Contract Law,
an impediment beyond the creditor’s control: in Belgium (art. 89 para. 2 IA 2014), in Luxembourg
(art. 45 para. 2 ICA), France (Cass. civ. 1re, 13.2.1979, RGAT 1980, 62). See as well the notes on
Article 14:303 PECL.
Comments
The Indemnity Principle and the Sum Insured
C1. In the case of indemnity insurance, the insurance money paid by the insurer, if the
insured event occurs, must in principle not exceed the amount of claimants’ actual loss at the
relevant time. This is the indemnity principle, which has a central role in all legal systems:
to compensate the insured for loss sustained without undue enrichment. The principle is
reaffirmed by Article 8:101. It applies whether the loss is total or partial.
C2. The principle is not a mandatory rule of the kind referred to in Article 1:103 para. 1.
The parties may derogate from the indemnity principle in accordance with Article 1:103
para. 2. An important example is found where they specify the mode of calculating “loss”.
Their policy may refer to market value at a specified time and place, or the cost of repairing
or replacing lost or damaged property (“repair or replacement cost cover”). An important
instance of the latter is a provision “new for old”. In this case, it is not the actual value of prop-
erty at the time of the insured event, allowing for depreciation, that determines the amount
of insurance money payable but the cost of replacement by new or equivalent property. The
clause is valid because, in line with the indemnity principle, it places persons insured in
the same position they were in before the event occurred even though, in strictly monetary
terms, they are better off.
243
Chapter Eight: Sum Insured and Insured Value
Mitigation Costs
C3. Derogation from a narrow construction of the indemnity principle may occur where,
in accordance with Article 9:102 para. 2, the cost of justifiable measures taken to mitigate
loss is payable by insurers, even if together with the compensation for the loss of property
insured the amount payable exceeds the sum insured.
C4. The sum insured under the policy is the maximum sum the insurer has agreed to pay.
It is determined by party agreement taking into consideration the purpose of the contract,
except for example in cases of compulsory insurance in which the amount may be deter-
mined by law.
Valued Policies
C5. The parties may derogate from the indemnity principle by means of valued policies,
as is stated in Article 8:101 para. 2. Parties may agree at the time of the contract on the value
of property to be insured for the purpose of indemnity, even if the value agreed exceeds the
actual value of the subject-matter.
C7. Being based on party intention, value clauses in valued policies are not applied where
party consent is flawed: (a) where the value stated is based on a significant mistake; (b)
where the value of the property is material to the risk, and the amount stated is based on
misrepresentation or non-disclosure and, in particular, (c) where it is based on fraud: seri-
ous over-valuation usually indicates that it may be a case of fraud. The impact of fraud and
misrepresentation is underlined by Article 8:101 para. 2.
Notes
The Indemnity Principle
244
Article 8:101 Maximum Sums Payable
ICA), and the United Kingdom (Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QB 380 (386)). The Swedish leg-
islator has abandoned the indemnity principle. It was first done in the Consumer Insurance Act
in 1980, mainly because insurers themselves had created a new kind of insurance, covering the
damage of buildings being burnt down and compensating the policyholder with a new house
(which might have a higher value than the old one had). Later the same approach was taken in the
ICA, covering all kinds of insurance. It should be noted that the German ICA does not contain
a provision similar to s. 55 former German ICA which was initially understood as reflecting the
principle of indemnity. The legislator’s decision to strike out such a provision is in line with the
more recent jurisprudence of the Bundesgerichtshof according to which also the former German
ICA did not embrace a general and mandatory principle of indemnity (see BGH 4.4.2001, BGHZ
147, 212 (216); Wandt, paras. 725 ff.).
Value Agreements
N2. Contract clauses fixing the value of the insured property are explicitly allowed in most Mem-
ber States. Pertinent provisions can be found in the laws of Austria (s. 57 ICA), Belgium (art. 109
para. 1 IA 2014), France (Basedow/Fock-Völker 502), Germany (s. 76 ICA), Greece (art. 16 para.
3 ICA), Italy (art. 1908 para. 2 CC, see for the prevailing view: Donati 247), Luxembourg (art. 67
ICA), Portugal (art. 131 ICA), Spain (art. 28 ICA), Sweden (s. 2 of Ch. 6 ICA), Switzerland (art. 65
ICA), as well as England and Scotland (Birds 292-293, Colinvaux 10-06, Wilson/Forte-Forte,
para. 888).
N3. Even though all the laws mentioned in Note 2 permit value agreements of the insured prop-
erty, they differ with respect to the effect they attribute to such agreements. In some of them,
the agreements conclusively fix the value of the insured property. Without prejudice to rules of
general contract law, the agreed values, in other words, cannot be challenged by any party to the
contract (Belgium: Basedow/Fock-Fock 253; United Kingdom: Colinvaux 10-06; Clarke 28-7;
Scotland: Wilson/Forte-Forte, para. 888; Ireland: O’Regan Cazabon 20; Italy: Donati 247; Greece:
art. 16 para. 3 ICA; Luxembourg: art. 67 para. 1 ICA).
N4. Other jurisdictions show less respect for value agreements. Rather, those laws grant the
insurer the possibility to prove that the real value is lower than the agreed one. The value agree-
ment, then, has the effect of shifting the burden of proof of the value of the insured property to
the insurer (France: Basedow/Fock-Völker 502; Denmark: s. 39 para. 2 ICA, see also Basedow/
Fock-Scherpe 945; Switzerland: art. 65 ICA).
N5. Under the laws of Austria (the second sentence of s. 57 ICA), Germany (the second sen-
tence of s. 76 ICA), Greece (Areopag 6/1990, NoB 1990, 1321) and Spain (art. 28 para. 3 ICA),
the insurer can only challenge the value agreements when it proves that the difference between
the agreed value and the real value is significant. Even though, as a rule of thumb, it has been
assumed that a difference of 10 % shall be considered significant, the Bundesgerichtshof held
that the assumption of a significant difference cannot be made regardless of the facts of the case
(BGH 4.4.2001, BGHZ 147, 212 (216)). This rule remained untouched by the new German ICA.
Similarly, a value agreement produces no effects under Portuguese law if it is evident that the
agreement misstates the real value of the insured interest (art. 131 para. 1 ICA).
245
Chapter Eight: Sum Insured and Insured Value
N6. The new Dutch law seems to deviate from the previously presented provisions through the
possibility of introducing an expert opinion. According to the second sentence of art. 7:960 CC,
an exception to the principle of indemnity is only granted for those cases in which the value
agreement concluded by the parties is based upon an expert’s assessment made beforehand.
N7. In several of the Member States’ laws the validity of the value agreement is explicitly subject-
ed to the absence of fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the insured, as Article 8:101 para.
2 prescribes. Under Greek (the third sentence of art. 16 para. 3 ICA) and Spanish (art. 28 para. 3
ICA) law, any assessment based on the parties’ agreement can only be challenged on grounds of
“error, fraud, threat, or a fictitious simulation”. Similarly, the laws of Luxembourg (art. 67 para.
1 ICA) and Belgium (art. 109 para. 1 IA 2014) have explicitly introduced exceptions in case of
fraud. In practice this is true also in countries without specific legislation on the matter such as
the United Kingdom (Birds 15.8, Clarke 28-7A). However, the consequences of fraudulent claims
are dealt with in some detail by the Insurance Act 2015.
Comments
Basic Principle: First Loss Cover
C1. If the sum insured under a policy is less than the true value of the insured property or
of the insured’s interest in the property, there is underinsurance to which Article 8:102 ap-
plies. In spite of the “imbalance” inherent in underinsurance, Article 8:102 para. 1 provides
for full recovery on the basis of the stated value, as if the cover were provided on a first loss
(premier risque) basis. Thus, contract administration will be simpler as the persons insured
(especially consumers) do not have to check property values regularly to adjust the sums
insured and, in particular, there is no danger of their receiving less than full compensation
in case of loss.
C2. The Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do allow parties to contract out
of the basic rule in Article 8:102 para. 1, however, in only one direction, that of calculation
based on less than the stated sum. According to Article 8:102 para. 2 the parties may agree
that compensation paid by the insurer be reduced in the same proportion to the loss as the
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Article 8:102 Underinsurance
sum insured relates to the value of the property (pro rata), which is the solution typical
in the law of most Member States. Insurers may well provide for such a rule in the case
of higher value property (or property rights). Note that this is the only derogation that is
less favourable to policyholders which is permitted in view of the mandatory character of
the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law. It is only a proportional reduction of
compensation that may be validly agreed. However, the rule about recovery of the costs of
mitigation (Article 9:102) referred to above (see Article 8:101 Comment 3) applies also to
cases of underinsurance.
Alternative Remedies
Notes
The Principle of Proportionate Reduction
N1. Most continental jurisdictions permit contract clauses giving effect to the principle of pro-
portionate reduction set forth in Article 8:102 para. 2 or have even conveyed the force of law
to this principle: Belgium: art. 98 para. 1 IA 2014; Germany: s. 75 ICA; France: art. 121-5 ICA;
Greece: art. 17 para. 1 ICA; Italy: art. 1907 CC; Luxembourg: art. 56 para. 1 ICA; the Netherlands:
art. 7:958 para. 5 CC; Denmark: s. 40 ICA; Austria: s. 56 ICA; Portugal: art. 134 ICA.; Switzer-
land: art. 69 ICA; Spain: art. 30 ICA; and Sweden: s. 3 of Ch. 6 ICA. In the United Kingdom, the
principle of proportionate reduction is only applicable under the regime of the Marine Insurance
Act of 1906. If this statute does not apply, the parties must agree so, conventionally by making
payment “subject to average”, or, at least in consumer policies, the insurer is required to pay up
to the insured sum (Sillem v Thornton (1854) 3 E & B 868).
Exceptions
N2. Several countries have however established conditions under which the insurer is not al-
lowed to hold back any payment on the basis of the principle of proportionate reduction. In Fin-
land (s. 58 para. 2 ICA) and in Luxembourg (art. 56 para. 2 ICA), the principle of proportionate
reduction does not apply where the calculation of the insured sum was made by the insurer or
its representative. It is noteworthy in this context that s. 58 para. 2 Finnish ICA applies the same
principle to underinsurance as it does to overinsurance (s. 57 para. 2): Whenever the insured
sum in substance is based on an assessment made by the insurer itself, the insurer can be held
on to its assessment (see also Article 8:101 Note 2).
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N3. This idea of policyholder protection is echoed in Belgium, where a special decree prescribes
that the insurer is not entitled to rely on the principle of proportionate reduction if the calcu-
lation of the insured sum was based on information provided by the insurer itself. The decree
additionally requires that the insurer must provide the relevant factors for the calculation to the
insured (Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 on Fire Insurance of Normal Risks; Fontaine (1996),
para. 798). Under Finnish law, the application of the principle of proportionate reduction is ad-
ditionally limited to cases where the difference between the insured sum and the insured value
is significant (s. 58 para. 1 ICA).
Contractual Derogations
N4. It is assumed in most jurisdictions that the provision prescribing the principle of proportion-
ate reduction is not mandatory. Rather, the parties can derogate from the application of the princi-
ple: Austria: Bruck/Möller-Möller, § 56 VVG para. 55; Belgium: Fontaine (1996), para. 508; Den-
mark: Basedow/Fock-Scherpe 946; France: Basedow/Fock-Völker 503; Germany: Schwintowski/
Brömmelmeyer-Kloth/Neuhaus, § 75 VVG para. 40; Greece: Basedow/Fock-Papathoma-Baetge
604 and Rokas, Greece, paras. 124-125; Italy: art. 1907 CC; Luxembourg: art. 3 para. 3 ICA; the
Netherlands: Asser/Clausing/Wansink 327; Poland: Kowalewski 216; for Portugal the non-manda-
tory character results from the fact that the rules on underinsurance are not included in the list of
mandatory and semi-mandatory terms pursuant to arts. 12 and 13 ICA; Spain: Bataller/Latorre/
Olavarria 216 and Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1310; Sweden (in case of business insurances): s. 18
of Ch. 8 ICA; and Switzerland: Koenig 331. With the exception of the Marine Insurance Act 1906
(above Note 1), the principle of proportionate reduction applies in England only if the parties have
agreed on it (Birds 15.9, Clarke 28-8A). Otherwise, the rule as laid down in Article 8:102 para. 1
PEICL applies. However, when the Insurance Act 2015 comes into force in 2016 the principle of
proportionate reduction will apply in certain cases listed in Schedule 1 of the Act.
Comments
Basic Principle: Adjustment of Terms
C1. If the sum insured under a policy exceeds the true value of the insured property or of
the insured’s interest, there is overinsurance to which Article 8:103 applies. The situation is
treated simply as one of parties mutually mistaken about the true value of the subject-matter
of insurance. They are given, first, an opportunity to correct their mistake. If they are unable
to agree the corrected value, then they are given the opportunity to terminate the contract.
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Article 8:103 Adjustment of Terms in Case of Overinsurance
C2. Overinsurance may result from multiple insurance taken out by the same policy-
holder. In such cases, Article 8:103 should be applied in a way that gives the parties to the
insurance contract which caused the overinsurance a right to adjustment of its terms.
C3. If an insured event occurs the insurance money payable will be determined in accord-
ance with the indemnity principle under Article 8:101. In so far as overinsurance is caused
by multiple insurance, Article 8:104 must also be taken into consideration.
Alternative Remedies
C4. Overinsurance, like underinsurance (see Article 8:102 Comment 3), is subject to wider
considerations, including the circumstances in which overinsurance came about. It should
not be overlooked that, if the true value was not disclosed when the contract was concluded,
as required by Article 2:101, the contract of insurance may be varied or terminated (Ar-
ticle 2:102 para. 1). Moreover, if the property value was misrepresented negligently by the
applicant, the amount of money payable may be affected by Article 2:102 para. 5.
Notes
General
N1. Most European legislations dealing with the issue of oversinsurance differentiate between
two different scenarios. If the policyholder causes the overinsurance with fraudulent intent, the
insurance contract is void (see s. 51 para. 4 Austrian ICA, the second sentence of art. 97 Belgian
IA 2014, art. 121-3 para. 1 French ICA, s. 74 para. 2 German ICA, art. 17 para. 3 Greek ICA,
art. 1909 Italian CC, art. 54 Luxembourg ICA, art. 31 para. 2 Spanish ICA, and art. 51 Swiss ICA.
In the absence of any fraudulent behaviour, the contract is valid. However, the law will generally
provide for a reduction of the premium to compensate for the fact that the insurer is not obliged
to pay in excess of the actual loss. As will be shown below, the technicalities of the reduction of
the premium may differ in the various legislations.
N2. On the other hand, the laws of Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
differ from the aforementioned ones. Although acknowledging the principle of indemnity, ac-
cording to which the actual value of the insured interest is generally a ceiling on the recoverable
sum (see s. 57 Finnish ICA, art. 7:960 Dutch CC, for Ireland see Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1446, for
the United Kingdom see Clarke 28-1A), the law does not provide for adjustment of contractual
terms in the event of overinsurance.
N3. Among the countries providing for an adjustment of the contract in the event of overinsur-
ance, two different approaches can be found. Thus, in Austria, Germany, Poland and Spain the
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Chapter Eight: Sum Insured and Insured Value
adjustment is available only if the sum insured exceeds the actual value of the subject-matter by
a substantial amount (see s. 51 para. 1 Austrian ICA and s. 74 para. 1 German ICA: “erheblich”,
art. 816 Polish CC: “istotna zmiana”, art. 31 para. 1 Spanish ICA). In Belgium, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and Portugal, on the other hand, the statutory language does not provide for a similar
threshold (see art. 96 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014, art. 121-3 para. 2 French ICA, art. 1909 Italian CC,
art. 53 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA, art. 132 Portuguese ICA).
N4. Another difference concerns the modalities of adjustment. The bulk of legal systems grant
the parties the right to request the adjustment of the contractual terms. In France, on the other
hand, the adjustment is carried out by operation of law regardless of whether a party makes a
request (see art. 121-3 para. 2 ICA). In the latter case, however, the adjustment has no immediate
effect: the premium is reduced starting from the subsequent year.
N5. The legal systems granting the parties the right to request the adjustment of the contract in
the event of overinsurance contain no provision as to the consequences in case the parties fail
to reach an agreement on the new terms. Rather, the provisions in question provide for a reduc-
tion of the premium in proportion to the extent of overinsurance (see, for example, s. 51 para. 1
Austrian ICA and art. 1909 Italian CC), thus suggesting that the adjustment process is a merely
“mechanical” act and the parties have no scope of bargaining.
Comments
Background
C1. There may be a number of situations where, following the occurrence of an insured
event, an insured is entitled to claim on more than one policy; see the examples given in
Comment 2. This may be because a risk has been deliberately insured with more than
one insurer or this may have arisen inadvertently. The Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law, though, do not differ depending on whether the insured acted deliberately
or not in being covered by more than one policy. On the other hand, the insured cannot be
permitted to recover in total more than he is entitled to in accordance with the principle
of indemnity set out in Article 8:101. Further, to require any one of the insurers to bear
the whole burden of a loss when others have received premiums to cover the same interest
250
Article 8:104 Multiple Insurance
would be unacceptable. Article 8:104 regulates these matters, which is necessary not least
because the rules of the Principles of European Contract Law are insufficient in the context
of insurance contract law.
C2. The essence of multiple insurance is that the same interest is covered in respect of
the same risk by more than one insurer. For the purposes of Article 8:104, the relevant
time for judging whether multiple insurance exists is not the time of the conclusion of the
contract but the time of the occurrence of the loss. There is no multiple insurance where
two or more people have different interests in the same property and each insures his own
interest, for example, where the interests of the owner, the tenant and the mortgagee of the
same building are all insured.
C3. On the other hand, the same interest can be covered under separate policies taken out
by different policyholders or separate policies taken out by the same policyholder. A simple
example of the latter is where a policyholder insures his house with more than one insurer.
Another example is where belongings are insured when a policyholder is on holiday both
under the terms of his household insurance policy and under his travel insurance policy.
An example of multiple insurance arising when there are different policyholders is the case
of goods stored in a warehouse and insured by both the owner and the warehouseman.
A second is the case of a car that is at a garage for repair being insured under the owner’s
motor policy and the policy taken out by the garage covering all vehicles while they are in
its possession. Another is the situation where someone who is insured against third party
liability when driving a vehicle other than his own under his own insurance policy is also
covered by the policy taken out by the vehicle’s owner.
C4. Situations where property is insured by different policyholders will not, though, nec-
essarily amount to multiple insurance within the terms of Article 8:104. The same interest
must be insured under both or all policies. If, for example, the warehouseman’s policy covers
him only against his legal liability in respect of the stored goods, and the loss is not caused in
such a way as to render him liable, there is no multiple insurance. The same would be true if
a policy effected by a garage on vehicles in its possession was similarly restricted in its cover.
C5. On the other hand, whether or not the same interest is separately insured is not affect-
ed by a clause contained in one or more of the policies stating that cover does not attach to
an event covered by another policy. It is important for the protection of policyholders that
they are not put into a situation where they may be passed between one insurer and another
without getting a satisfactory response from any of them. Clauses that had this effect, often
known as double insurance clauses or escape clauses, used to be common in some systems,
but should now be regarded as abusive clauses and ineffective under Article 2:304.
C6. It is not uncommon for the laws of the Member States to confer free choice on the
insured to seek recovery of his entire loss from one or more of the insurers up to the limits
of the obligations of each of them, but only overall up to the amount of the indemnity to
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Chapter Eight: Sum Insured and Insured Value
which he is entitled. This system is more favourable to the insured than the alternative sys-
tem, which is based upon the application of the so-called chronological principle; according
to this, insurers are liable successively depending on the times at which their policies were
issued. Article 8:104 is drafted on the basis that the insured has this free choice.
C7. Article 8:104 para. 2 addresses the situation where there is under-insurance under
each of the policies. This is necessary because some systems would limit the insured’s re-
covery to the amount of the sum insured under each of the policies, even if the total amount
of the different sums insured would provide sufficient cover to compensate the insured for
his loss. Thus, the insured may claim against all insurers of the same interest to the extent
necessary to indemnify all losses actually suffered by him. The principle laid down in Ar-
ticle 8:101 applies as regards the maximum sum payable by all the involved insurers taken
together, to ensure that the insured does not profit from his loss.
C8. Article 8:104 also deals with the question of the contributions by the insurers to the
amount paid or payable to the insured. The basic principle that the insurer who has paid the
insured is entitled to a contribution from the other insurers is confirmed by Article 8:104 pa-
ra. 1, but the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law do not deal with this question
any further, not least because it is quite possible that, in some cases of multiple insurance,
not all the insurers involved are covered by the Principles of European Insurance Contract
Law. In such conflict of law situations, art. 16 of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008) can be
applied by analogy.
C9. Article 8:104 para. 3 obliges each insurer involved to contribute in proportion to the
amount for which it would be liable if its policy stood alone (independent liability basis).
This permits any agreed deductible to be taken into account. The amount to be shared
should include all expenses reasonably incurred by the insurer in indemnifying the insured.
Notes
General
N1. At the national law level, the issue of multiple insurance is generally dealt with in connection
with overinsurance. However, it must be noted that the cover of the same interest by more than
one insurance contract does not necessarily result in overinsurance. It may be the case that, on
aggregate, the sums insured under the various contracts remain below the actual value of the
insured interest. Accordingly, two different legislative approaches can be found. Some statutes
are only concerned with multiple insurance that actually causes overinsurance. Other laws also
contain provisions applicable to multiple insurance in general, no matter whether overinsurance
is actually involved.
N2. Examples for the latter are the duties of notification some countries prescribe in the event of
multiple insurance. If the insured takes out more than one insurance covering the same interest in
Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, he or she must give immediate notice to
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Article 8:104 Multiple Insurance
each insurer (see s. 58 Austrian ICA, art. 7:961 para. 1 Dutch CC, art. 121-4 para. 1 French ICA,
s. 77 para. 1 German ICA, art. 15 para. 1 Greek ICA, art. 1910 para. 1 Italian CC, art. 133 para. 1
Portuguese ICA, and art. 32 para. 1 Spanish ICA). In some countries, the insured is under a duty
to inform each insurer of the existence of any other insurer once the insured event has occurred
(see art. 1910 para. 3 Italian CC, art. 133 para. 1 Portuguese ICA, and art. 32 para. 2 Spanish
ICA; note that in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, this duty exists in addition to the duty of notification
at the time of the formation of the contract). If the insured fails to provide the information, the
insurer can deny payment (Cerini 87-90). There is no such notification obligation in the Polish
Civil Code.
N3. If the multiple insurance results in overinsurance, namely the sums insured under the var-
ious contracts exceed in the aggregate the actual value of the insured interest, it is generally
agreed that the insured is not entitled to recover in excess of the loss actually suffered (indemnity
principle).
N4. As in other cases of overinsurance, many countries differentiate between fraudulent and
non-fraudulent behaviour on the part of the policyholder. Thus, if the policyholder concludes
multiple insurance contracts with a view to recover more than the actual loss, each contract
based on such fraudulent intent is void (see s. 59 para. 3 Austrian ICA, art. 97 Belgian IA 2014,
art. 121-4 para. 3 and art. 121-3 para. 1 French ICA, s. 78 para. 3 German ICA, art. 17 para. 3 in
conjunction with the second sentence of art. 15 para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 54 Luxembourg ICA, and
art. 53 para. 2 Swiss ICA).
N5. Where the policyholder acted in good faith, the contracts are valid, but the insured may
only recover to the extent of the actual loss (see s. 59 para. 1 Austrian ICA, art. 121-4 para. 4 and
art. 121-1 French ICA, s. 78 para. 1 German ICA, art. 15 para. 2 Greek ICA, art. 1910 para. 3
Italian CC, and the fourth sentence of art. 32 Spanish ICA). The same rule applies in jurisdictions
lacking the distinction between fraudulent and non-fraudulent behaviour (see s. 59 Finnish ICA,
s. 4 of Ch. 6 Swedish ICA, art. 7:961 para. 1 and art. 7:961 Dutch CC, and for the United Kingdom
see Clarke 28-9, but note that this aspect of the law is affected by the Insurance Act 2015).
N6. Finally, it is noteworthy that the Austrian and the German Insurance Contract Acts contain
special provisions concerning the rights of the policyholder in the event of overinsurance caused
by multiple insurance contracts. Unless the overinsurance results from fraudulent behaviour, the
policyholder may terminate or ask for an adjustment of the insurance contract concluded later
in time in order to eliminate the overinsurance (see s. 60 para. 1 Austrian ICA and s. 79 para. 1
German ICA).
N7. Most national laws allow the insured to claim from any one or more insurers the full amount
insured under the respective contract (as long as the payments do not exceed the actual loss)
(see s. 59 para. 1 Austrian ICA, art. 99 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014, art. 7:961 para. 1 Dutch CC, s. 59
Finnish ICA, art. 121-4 para. 4 French ICA, s. 78 para. 1 German ICA, art. 15 para. 3 Greek ICA,
art. 1910 para. 3 Italian CC, art. 55 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA, art. 824(1) para 2 Polish CC, s. 4
253
Chapter Nine: Entitlement to Indemnity
of Ch. 6 Swedish ICA, and for English law see Clarke 28-9). In other words, the insurer from
whom indemnity is sought may not refuse or reduce payment on the ground that there are other
insurers liable for the same loss. Essentially, this means that, vis-à-vis the insured, each insurer is
treated as though there were no other insurers alongside, covering the same interest.
N8. Portugal and Switzerland, on the other hand, adopt a different approach. Here, the insured
is only entitled to recover on a pro rata basis from each insurer, namely in proportion to the
amounts insured under the various contracts (see art. 133 para. 4 Portuguese ICA and art. 71
para. 1 Swiss ICA).
N9. As far as the first group of countries is concerned, however, it must be noted that the rule
allowing the insured to recover the whole loss from any insurer is mostly non-mandatory (see
s. 68a Austrian ICA, art. 7:961 Dutch CC, s. 87 German ICA, art. 15 para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 1932
Italian CC, art. 824(1) para. 2 Polish CC; see Fuchs, Podwójne 24 ff., and for English law see
Clarke 28-9A). This marks an important difference to Article 8:104 para. 2 PEICL. Thus, in the
aforementioned countries the parties may agree for example on a pro rata liability of the insurer
where multiple insurance is involved (in the United Kingdom, such an agreement is referred
to as “rateable proportion clause”, see Clarke 28-9A). Likewise, the parties may stipulate in the
contract that the insurer is under a duty to pay compensation only subject to the condition that
no indemnity can be obtained from other insurances covering the same interest (such clauses
are known as “Subsidiaritätsklauseln” under German law, see Wandt, para. 769).
N10. Where the insurer’s liability is not limited to a pro rata share and the insured has re-
covered the entire loss from one insurer, it is generally accepted that the insurer in question is
entitled to contribution from the other insurers (see s. 59 para. 2 Austrian ICA, art. 7:961 para.
3 Dutch CC, s. 60 Finnish ICA, s. 78 para. 2 German ICA, art. 15 para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 1910
para. 4 Italian CC, art. 824(1) para. 2 Polish CC, and for the United Kingdom see Birds 335, Col-
invaux 11-46). Each insurer is liable in proportion to the amounts stated in the various insurance
policies, or – see the Dutch Civil Code – in proportion to the amounts recoverable under each
policy involved.
254
Article 9:101 Causation of Loss
Comments
Limits on Recovery of Indemnity
C1. As stated in Article 9:101 para. 2, in principle policyholders (or other persons insured)
are entitled to indemnity in respect of loss or damage within the scope of the cover, even
though the loss or damage was caused by their own negligent act or omission. This provision
stresses the central purpose of insurance to cover not only what Shakespeare called “the
slings and arrows of outrageous fortune” but also the foolishness and carelessness of men
and women. On this premise the main purpose of Article 9:101, however, is to establish
limits on the kinds of human conduct that may be covered by insurance and, in particular,
to delimit kinds of conduct that are so unacceptable that they are not normally covered.
Intention
C2. Insured events brought about intentionally by third parties are usually covered but not
events caused intentionally by policyholders. The juristic basis of this position is sometimes
said to be the presumed intention of insurers, in which policyholders have concurred by
concluding the contract. Cover for loss or damage intentionally caused by policyholders
would be difficult to rate on account of the inherent element of moral hazard and, in any
event, insurance would be so costly that it would not find a market. In some national laws,
however, enforcement of such cover is prohibited by legislation or refused as a matter of
public policy by the courts. For the avoidance of doubt entitlement to the enforcement of
such cover is prohibited by Article 9:101 para. 1.
Recklessness
C3. Article 9:101 para. 1 establishes a similar prohibition in respect of recklessness. This
too is widely regarded as culpable. The provision amplifies the concept of recklessness by
means of an objective test: to be culpable policyholders must act “with knowledge that the
loss or damage would probably result”. The test has been taken from the law of internation-
al carriage, notably the Montreal Convention 1999. This formulation is well understood,
having been refined by courts across the world over many years. It envisages conduct less
serious than that actually intended to bring about loss but more serious than gross negli-
gence. However, the prohibition in Article 9:101 is a restriction on cover which is not to go
any further than required by public policy, and thus does not preclude the possibility that
in such cases insurance might be enforced by a third party victim under special rules appli-
cable to liability insurance. This possibility will be dealt with by the PEICL at a later stage
in the provisions specific to liability insurance. For the time being, the second sentence of
Article 1:105 para. 1, providing for the application of mandatory national rules on liability
insurance, will apply.
C4. Article 9:101 para. 3 provides that the foregoing rules about culpability apply not
only to the initial cause of loss but also to the response of policyholders to the occurrence
of insured events for which they were not initially responsible – response to events which
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Chapter Nine: Entitlement to Indemnity
are imminent as well as events that have already occurred. The provision envisages cases
in which policyholders, perhaps attracted by the prospect of insurance money, deliberately
make little or no serious attempt to avert or mitigate loss, when such an attempt was viable,
with the result that the extent of loss or damage is greater than it would have been, if poli-
cyholders’ response had been less culpable.
C5. The law in many countries contains what has been described as a “duty” to avert loss
that is imminent, and a “duty” to mitigate loss that has occurred. However, these so-called
duties are not duties in the usual sense of private law obligations actionable in damages,
when unfulfilled. The impact of breach of these “duties” is in the domain of causation: a
breach of duty by a policyholder breaks the “chain” of causation between the insured event
and some or all of the resulting loss or damage, and to that extent insurers are not liable.
C6. Only a serious breach of such “duties” is regarded as breaking the chain of causation.
Otherwise the insurance would not cover policyholders’ negligence; see Comment 1. Con-
sequently the breach must be culpable in the sense of Article 9:101 paras. 1 and 2 – whether
the breach be in failure to avert or failure to mitigate, the rule is the same. The reason is
that it may be difficult, for example during a storm or fire, to draw a line between aversion
and mitigation. Pouring water on one pile of wood may avert the outbreak of fire there and
at the same time mitigate the extent of the fire that has already started in the pile of wood
that is next to it.
C7. Note that the prohibition in Article 9:101 applies to both the policyholder and the
insured, when they are different persons, and that, when loss is caused by one, in general
the other will be entitled to indemnity nonetheless. Further, whether or not the policyholder
and the insured are different persons, the prohibition is subject to the possibility of contrac-
tual derogation of the kind permitted by Article 1:103 para. 2. In cases in which policyholder
and insured are different persons, reference in these Comments to the policyholder are to
be read as reference to the insured, where appropriate.
Notes
Survey
N1. In European legal systems, it is a well-established principle that the insurer may be exempted
from the duty to pay compensation if the insured event was deliberately caused by the policyhold-
er or the insured himself. Nonetheless, the various national rules on the exclusion of the insurer’s
liability differ considerably. While it is uncontested that the insurance does not cover the loss if it
was caused by an intentional act on the part of the policyholder, it is a highly controversial issue
which sorts of careless conduct, if any, may affect a claim. Moreover, the legal consequences of
such careless behaviour differ among the laws: some statutes provide for the total forfeiture of
the claims against the insurer, while others provide for a reduction only, see Notes 3 and 4 and,
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Article 9:101 Causation of Loss
with regard to the admissibility of contractual derogations, Notes 7 and 8. Moreover, there are
controversies as to whose behaviour matters: the insured’s, the policyholder’s, and maybe also
that of servants and family (see Notes 5 and 6). Yet another question is whether the causation of
the insured event and the failure to mitigate the loss (in the aftermath of the occurrence) are to
be treated alike, see Notes 9 and 10.
N2. Not only do the rules on causation of loss differ from country to country, inconsistencies can
even be found in respect of different branches of insurance within the same legal system (see, for
example, for Germany ss. 81, 82, 137, 161 and 162 ICA, for Spain arts. 19, 48 and 92 ICA). Fire
insurance, cargo insurance, and other forms of indemnity insurances are often subject to distinct
rules. Thus, the references to the national rules in the following paragraphs are only indicative of
the general rules adopted by the respective country.
N3. As stated above, it is a universally accepted rule that the insurer owes no compensation if the
policyholder caused the loss through intentional behaviour. With respect to negligent behaviour,
the various statutory rules are far less consistent. Speaking generally, most statutes draw a dis-
tinction between gross negligence (sometimes also referred to as recklessness, for example in the
Netherlands and Sweden) and other degrees of negligence. While the former tends to exclude or
to reduce the claims against the insurer, the latter has usually no bearing on the policyholder’s
rights.
N4. Austria, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Poland, equate gross negligence with intentional
behaviour and allow the insurer to refuse any payment (s. 61 Austrian ICA, art. 7 para. 5 Greek
ICA (for indemnity insurance), art. 1900 para. 1 Italian CC, art. 7:952 Dutch CC: opzet of roeke-
loosheid, and art. 827 para. 1 Polish CC). In Finland, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, on
the other hand, gross negligence on the part of the insured only gives the insurer the right to
reduce compensation (see ss. 28 to 30 Finnish ICA, s. 81 para. 2 German ICA, s. 5 para. 2 of Ch.
4 Swedish ICA, and art. 14 para. 2 Swiss ICA). In other legislations, the policyholder is entitled
to full indemnity even if he caused the loss through grossly negligent conduct (see art. 62 Belgian
IA 2014, see Cousy/Schoorens 91, art. 113-1 French ICA, art. 14 Luxembourg ICA, art. 46 para.
1 Portuguese ICA, and art. 19 Spanish ICA). For the United Kingdom see Birds 13.2.1, Clarke
19-2A, and Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1468: if a policy contains a term requiring the insured to take
reasonable care, indemnity will be denied in the event of recklessness: Fraser v Furman (Produc-
tions) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 898 (CA); Sofi v Prudential Assurance [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 559 (CA).
However, it must be stressed that, in practice, the gaps between the various rules will be narrower
than the differences in the rules may suggest. The reason is that, in most cases, the provisions
concerning gross negligence are non-mandatory and, hence, the parties are free to make their
own arrangements (see also below).
N5. Most legal systems expressly provide that the rules on causation of loss equally apply if it
was the insured who caused the insured event (see s. 78 Austrian ICA, art. 62(2) Belgian IA 2014,
art. 7:952 Dutch CC, ss. 28 and 30 Finnish ICA, s. 47 German ICA, art. 7 para. 5 Greek ICA,
257
Chapter Nine: Entitlement to Indemnity
art. 1900 para. 1 Italian CC, art. 14 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA, art. 827 para. 4 Polish CC, art. 46
Portuguese ICA, art. 19 Spanish ICA, and art. 14 Swiss ICA).
N6. Moreover, under some national laws, the insurer is also exempted from the duty to pay com-
pensation in cases where certain third parties other than the insured or the policyholder caused
the loss. As far as the imputation of knowledge is concerned this issue is covered by Article 1:206
PEICL, see the notes on that provision. In most countries this is a matter left to general private
law. However, the details vary considerably on this point. In Finland and Poland, the insured is
also responsible for third parties such as co-owners and individuals living in the same household
(see s. 33 Finnish ICA and art. 827 para. 3 Polish CC). In Germany, the rules of causation of loss
also apply to individuals who qualify as “representatives” of the insured under the doctrine of
Repräsentantenhaftung (see Wandt, paras. 633 ff. and 910). In Greece the rules on causation of loss
also apply to third parties entrusted professionally to safeguard the insured interest (see the first
sentence of art. 7 para. 5 ICA). Similar rules can be found in Switzerland and the United King-
dom (see for Switzerland art. 14 para. 3 ICA, for the United Kingdom see Basedow/Fock-Rühl
1480), at least, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, if the actions of a third party can be
attributed to the insured or policyholder under normal agency principles; the deliberate acts of
the insured’s spouse or employee do not prevent an innocent insured from recovering (Midland
Insurance Co v Smith (1881) 6 QBD 561, Shaw v Robberds (1837) 6 Ad & El 75). In some laws, on
the other hand, the law explicitly provides that third party conduct does not affect the insured’s
claim against the insurer (see art. 1900 para. 2 Italian CC). Once again, however, since the rules
on third party causation are non-mandatory in most countries, the statutory provisions will only
play a marginal role. Instead, the terms and conditions of the insurance contract will prevail.
N7. As shown above, in almost all legislations the insured is entitled to full indemnity even if he
or she caused the loss through negligent behaviour falling short of gross negligence. In many legal
systems, however, the parties are allowed to derogate from that rule and to exclude the insurer’s
liability in the event of simple negligence on the part of the policyholder (or that of the insured).
In particular, this holds true for Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Unit-
ed Kingdom (see s. 68a Austrian ICA, s. 87 German ICA, art. 1932 Italian CC, arts. 7:952 and
7:963 Dutch CC; note that in France such agreement must be “formelle et limitée contenue dans
la police”, art. L 113-1 French ICA; in the United Kingdom, the agreement must be explicit, for
example by restricting cover to “accidental” losses; a clause merely requiring the insured to act
with reasonable care will not have this effect: Fraser v Furman [1967] 1 WLR 898, Sofi v Pruden-
tial Assurance [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 559, see Birds 13.2.2, Clarke 19-2A. Covering policyholder
negligence has been regarded as a central purpose of insurance, from at least the time of Shaw v
Robberds (1837) 6 Ad & El 75).
N8. In other countries, the scope of contractual freedom is restricted. In Greece, for instance,
the parties may enter an agreement excluding compensation for simple negligence only with
respect to professional risks (art. 7 para. 6 Greek ICA; see also s. 5 para. 2 of Ch. 4 Swedish ICA
allowing a party agreement only “where special reasons exist”). Luxembourg, Poland, and Spain
do not permit the exclusion of indemnity for any degree of fault below gross negligence (for
Luxembourg, see art. 14 para. 2 ICA e contrario; for Poland, art. 827 para. 1 CC; for Spain, the
rule results from the mandatory character of art. 19 ICA, see art. 2 ICA).
258
Article 9:102 The Costs of Mitigation
N9. The duty to mitigate loss once the insured event has occurred (sometimes also referred to as
“duty of salvage”) is recognised in most legal systems (the United Kingdom forms an exception
in that it lacks a statutory duty to mitigate loss; however, such a duty may be stipulated by the
parties in the insurance contract, see Clarke 27-5A). However, a duty to mitigate loss or damage
may be regarded as an issue for the general law of obligations and failure to perform that duty as
a kind of negligence; it is clearly possible to insure against loss caused by negligence on the part
of the insured; see Note 7 above).
N10. The legal consequences arising from the failure to observe that duty, however, differ to
some extent. In Austria, Germany, and Poland, the failure to mitigate loss is is treated in a similar
manner as the causation of the insured event: the insurer may deny (or reduce) compensation
if the insured or the policyholder acted deliberately or through gross negligence (see s. 62 para.
2 Austrian ICA, s. 82 para. 3 German ICA, and art. 826 para. 3 Polish CC). Other legislations
establish special rules for the failure to mitigate loss. Generally, the insurer has the right to reduce
compensation to the extent the insured failed to contain the damage. Simple negligence on the
part of the insured is sufficient (see art. 76 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014, s. 32 Finnish ICA (only slight
negligence excluded), art. 1915 para. 2 Italian CC, art. 28 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA, art. 7:957
para. 3 Dutch CC, art. 17 para. 1 Spanish ICA, and art. 61 para. 2 Swiss ICA). If the insured
acted intentionally, the insurer may be entitled to refuse any payment (see art. 21 para. 2 Belgian
IA 2014, art. 28 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA, art. 101 para. 2 and art. 126 para. 3 Portuguese ICA
(subject to agreement in the insurance contract), and art. 17 para. 2 Spanish ICA). For the United
Kingdom, see Note 9 above.
Comments
Establishment of a Right to Recover Certain Costs
C1. A successful attempt to mitigate loss and damage is in the interest of all concerned,
and it is a clear implication of Article 9:101 para. 3 that, if there is to be recovery under the
policy, under certain circumstances measures of mitigation must be attempted by the appro-
priate person. Article 9:102 addresses the question of meeting the cost of mitigation. This is
necessary because, although policyholders are usually required to mitigate by national law,
in some countries insurers are automatically obliged to reimburse the cost of mitigation but
in some they are not. Moreover, when they are so obliged rules tend to differ in the detail.
259
Chapter Nine: Entitlement to Indemnity
C2. Under Article 9:102 para. 1 the right to recover the cost of mitigation extends not only
to payments made to salvage operators or for other service providers but also to an indem-
nity in respect of “the amount of damage suffered by the policyholder” in cases in which
physical damage has been deliberately inflicted to reduce the extent of ultimate damage.
One example is the creation of a fire break to stop the spread of fire. Another might be the
abandonment of some goods to save others.
C3. The right of recovery provided for by Article 9:102 para. 1 is a qualified right. Special
circumstances apart, insurers cannot be expected to assume responsibility for a cost that,
being beyond their control, might be grossly out of proportion. Potentially extravagant
measures, which have been commissioned by a distraught policyholder anxious to save
cherished possessions, would be a hazard difficult to rate and result in cover at a price
difficult to sell. On the one hand, therefore, Article 9:102 states that policyholders must be
justified in regarding the measures taken as “reasonable under the circumstances”.
C4. On the other hand, policyholders should not be unduly inhibited from taking rea-
sonable measures of mitigation by fears that they might have to retain some of the cost.
Thus, as long as measures taken are reasonable in accordance with Article 9:102 para. 1,
policyholders are entitled to recover the full cost, even for measures that are not successful,
and “even if together with the compensation of the loss insured the amount payable exceeds
the insured sum”. This risk is one that may not have entered into an insurer’s calculations
when setting the premium, but allocation of this risk to insurers rather than policyholders
appears to be the more equitable outcome. Moreover, it is the more practicable outcome, if
policyholders are to take effective measures of mitigation. Otherwise they might well find it
difficult to be certain that their measures will succeed or to assess the point at which the cost
incurred has reached the amount of the insured sum, and thus hesitate to take the measures
that should be taken for effective mitigation.
C5. In cases in which policyholder and insured are different persons, reference in these
Comments to the policyholder are to be read as reference to the insured, where appropriate.
Underinsurance
C6. In case of underinsurance, the pro-rata-rule of Article 8:102 para. 2 also applies to the
reimbursement of mitigation costs; see the last sentence of Article 8:102 para. 2.
Notes
General
N1. Most national laws provide for a duty to avert or mitigate the loss insured (often also referred
to as “duty of salvage”). Moreover, in some legal systems the policyholder and the insured are
bound to comply with any instruction given by the insurer in order to contain the damage (see
s. 62 para. 1 Austrian ICA, s. 82 para. 2 German ICA, art. 7 para. 3 Greek ICA and art. 61 para.
260
Article 9:102 The Costs of Mitigation
1 Swiss ICA). The United Kingdom forms an exception in that its insurance law lacks a duty to
mitigate; consequently, mitigation costs are only recoverable if stipulated in the contract (see
Yorkshire Water Services v Sun Alliance & London Insurance [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 221, Clarke
27-5A and 28-8G3 and Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1475). The parties do not usually include such an
obligation in the insurance contract. However, it is generally accepted among the other legal sys-
tems that, subject to certain exceptions, the costs of mitigation are recoverable from the insurer.
Nonetheless, as will be shown below, national laws differ on some points.
N2. Under most national laws, the insurer covers the costs of mitigation provided that the mit-
igating measures were reasonable regardless of whether the measures were actually successful
in containing the damage. It must be noted, however, that the test adopted to determine the
reasonableness of the measure differs slightly among European countries.
N3. The language of some statutes suggests that a purely objective standard is applied: the ques-
tion is whether or not the measure was “objectively” reasonable (see art. 7:957 paras. 1 and 2
Dutch CC, s. 61 Finnish ICA, the first sentence of art. 7 para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 826 para. 4 Polish
CC, art. 127 para. 1 Portuguese ICA, the fourth sentence of art. 17 Spanish ICA, and art. 70 para.
1 Swiss ICA). Other countries adopt a more subjective approach and ask whether the insured or
the policyholder was justified in taking the measure in question (see s. 63 para. 1 Austrian ICA,
s. 83 para. 1 German ICA). According to art. 106 Belgian IA 2014, art. 64 Luxembourg ICA, and
art. 1914 Italian CC, the decisive test is whether the insured acted with due diligence under the
“bonus pater familias” standard.
N4. Another difference concerns the burden of proof: while in most systems it is up to the
claimant to prove the reasonableness of the mitigation efforts (see, for example, for Austria and
Germany Schwintowski/Brömmelmeyer-Kloth/Neuhaus, § 83 VVG para. 18), the insurer bears
the onus of proving the unreasonableness of the measures under the Italian CC (see art. 1914
paras. 2 and 3 CC).
N5. France, on the other hand, differs considerably from the aforementioned countries. Unless
the insurance contract provides otherwise, the insurer does not cover mitigation costs. The rules
on fire insurance provide that the damage arising from salvage measures is recoverable (see art.
L. 122-3 ICA). However, the expenses of the salvage do not fall within that rule. In some cases,
however, mitigation costs may be recovered under the general doctrines of “gestion d’affaires”
or “enrichissement sans cause” provided the insurer benefited from the mitigation efforts (see
Basedow/Fock-Völker 530).
N6. In general, where mitigation costs are covered by the insurer, the sum insured under the
contract is not a ceiling on the payment owed by the insurer. Thus, the expenses for the mitigation
efforts are recoverable even if this sum, together with the compensation for the loss, exceeds the
sum insured (see art. 106 Belgian IA 2014, s. 61 Finnish ICA, the second sentence of art. 7 para.
3 Greek ICA, art. 1914 para. 2 Italian CC, art. 64 Luxembourg ICA, art. 7:959 para. 1 Dutch
CC, s. 5 of Ch. 6 Swedish ICA, and art. 70 para. 1 Swiss ICA). In Austria, Germany, Poland, and
261
Chapter Ten: Rights of Subrogation
Portugal, this only applies to mitigation costs arising from compliance with instructions given
by the insurer (see the second sentence of s. 63 para. 1 Austrian ICA, s. 83 para. 3 German ICA,
art. 826 para. 4 Polish CC, and art. 127 para. 3 Portuguese ICA).
N7. However, it must be noted that, at least in practice, the extent to which mitigation costs are
recoverable will vary less significantly from country to country than it might appear at first sight.
Firstly, in those jurisdictions where the sum insured is no absolute cap on the recoverability of
mitigation costs similar limitations will arise nonetheless on the basis of the reasonableness test:
mitigation costs that exceed the insured sum will rather likely be deemed unreasonable.
N8. Secondly, some of the national laws allowing for the reimbursement of mitigation costs in
excess of the sum insured are non-mandatory (see art. 7 para. 3 Greek ICA (except for consum-
er contracts), art. 7:963 para. 6 Dutch CC (except for consumer contracts and mitigation costs
exceeding the sum insured), and art. 90 para. 1 Swiss ICA). In these cases, the parties to the
insurance contract are free to limit the insurer’s liability through contractual stipulation. In Bel-
gium, the amount of reasonable costs can be limited in most insurance branches by royal decree
(art. 106 para. 2 IA and the Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 implementing the IA 2014).
Comments
Introduction
C1. It is a common feature of all legal systems that the insurer who indemnifies a poli-
cyholder or insured against an insured loss succeeds to any rights of action against a third
party that the policyholder or insured may have in respect of the loss. Its major purpose is
to prevent the unjust enrichment of the policyholder or insured so that he does not benefit
from both the insurance money and from any damages that he obtains from the third par-
ty and thus receives more than is sufficient to compensate him for his loss. This provides
justification for a mandatory rule in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law.
262
Article 10:101 Subrogation
In some legal systems, this principle gives the insurer the right to sue the third party in
the name of the insured; in other systems the insurer is assigned the right to sue in its own
name by operation of law (cessio legis). This Article covers both types of right and refers to
the insurer’s right as the right of subrogation. For the purposes of the application of this
principle, it will not matter whether the action by the insurer is in its own name or that of
the insured that it has indemnified.
C3. The thrust of Article 10:101 is, while ensuring that the policyholder or insured is not
unjustly enriched, to give him priority over the insurer when it comes to the recovery of
compensation from a third party responsible for the loss. This seems an appropriate posi-
tion in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law which are intended to provide
adequate protection for the weaker party.
C4. Nothing in Article 10:101 precludes the parties from agreeing that the insurer will
not exercise subrogation rights or from insurers agreeing among themselves that they
will not exercise such rights in certain situations. They may go beyond the restrictions in
para. 3, explained below.
C5. However, as well as conferring the right of subrogation, Article 10:101 para. 1 imposes
the first important limitation on the right, namely that it applies only in so far as and to
the extent that the insurer has indemnified the insured. The rule comprises two linked but
distinct elements. The insurer cannot have the right to claim from the third party until it
has actually paid the insured according to the entitlement of the latter under the policy, as
until then it cannot be said that the insured would be unjustly enriched. Further, the insurer
can itself recover from the third party only such amount as it has paid to the insured. This is
necessary in order to safeguard the position of the insured who may himself be able to take
action against the third party to recover for any loss that was uninsured.
C6. For example, it is common that the policy contains a deductible and thus the insured
has to bear the first part of any loss. Such provision is often found, for example, in motor
insurance and household insurance. The insurer will indemnify the insured less the amount
of the deductible and the insurer’s right against the third party should be limited to reclaim-
ing the amount actually paid out. The same principle should apply where the insured fails
to recover a full indemnity because the maximum he can recover under the policy is less
than the actual amount of his loss.
C7. However, in order to provide a fair balance of the rights of the parties, it is necessary to
ensure that the insured does not act in a way that prejudices the insurer’s right of subroga-
tion where the cause of a loss is the actions or omissions of a third party who is legally liable.
263
Chapter Ten: Rights of Subrogation
This is the intention behind para. 2. It operates when the insured waives a right against the
third party that he would otherwise have, which means that the insured must act in such
a way that the third party would have a defence to a claim by the insured or by the insurer
exercising subrogation rights. This might take the form of a binding agreement under which,
for example, the insured forfeits all or some of a potential claim against the third party. In
such circumstances the insured forfeits his claim to indemnity under the policy, although
only in respect of the particular loss. There is no reason to penalise the insured in respect
of a claim for a different loss.
Third Party
C8. Article 10:101 grants the insurer a subrogated right against third parties. This does
not include the policyholder and the insured. This is important in a situation, for example,
where in an insurance of property that is leased and insured by the landlord for the benefit
of both himself and his tenant, the insurer indemnifies the landlord following an insured
loss and seeks to claim against the tenant on the basis that the latter was legally responsible.
C9. Article 10:101 para. 3 contains clear exclusions of subrogation rights against family
members, employees and so on. National legal systems deal with the issue covered by this
paragraph in different ways, but at least some of them provide for similar restrictions on
insurer’s subrogation rights and there are equivalent voluntary ones elsewhere. The purpose
of these restrictions is to prevent the social harm that could result from a person appearing
to bring a legal action against someone with whom he or she might be in an extremely close
relationship, even if in reality the action is brought by the insurers. There are sound policy
reasons for providing for such exclusions. To take a simple example, it does not seem sound
to allow an insurer who has indemnified the owner of, say, a vase whom it has indemnified,
to claim against the owner’s partner who was simply careless in causing the vase to fall to
the floor and break.
C10. It is clear that such restrictions do not apply when the insurer can prove that the
defendant caused the loss deliberately or recklessly and with knowledge that loss or damage
would probably result. This is, deliberately, the same wording as that in Article 9:101 para. 1
and is to be construed in the same way, so that knowledge for these purposes can be inferred
objectively from the facts. There is no good policy reason to exempt from liability someone
who has caused loss in such circumstances. On the other hand, the paragraph does protect
the defendant who has been negligent.
C11. Three categories of persons are protected by Article 10:101 para. 3. The restrictions ex-
tend to persons connected with the policyholder and not just with the insured. “Member of
the household” should be understood to mean someone living in the same household as the
policyholder or insured. The second category – those in an equivalent social relationship –
should be construed to cover members of the family of the policyholder or insured who
do not live with the latter and such persons as close friends or neighbours because action
against such persons could lead to a breakdown in relationships. As to the third category, it
should always be clear whether or not a person is an employee of the policyholder or insured.
264
Article 10:101 Subrogation
C12. Article 10:101 para. 4 protects the insured against detrimental exercise of the sub-
rogation rights of the insurer. For example, if the insured is not fully indemnified by the
insurer, but the means of the third party are insufficient to cover his tort claim as well as
the subrogated claim of the insurer, the insured’s claim will enjoy priority. In effect, Arti-
cle 10:101 para. 4 shifts the risk of third party insolvency to the insurer.
Notes
General
N1. The notion of subrogation can be found, in one form or another, in all European legal
systems. Generally speaking, if a third party caused the insured event and the insurer compen-
sated the loss, it is recognised that the insurer has an interest in the claims of the insured or the
policyholder against that third party. However, the technicalities of subrogation differ among
the various legislations. Thus, in most countries the insurer is automatically subrogated to the
claims against the third party by operation of law. In Spain, on the other hand, subrogation is
at the option of the insurer (“facultad de la subrogación”, see Basedow/Fock-Schlenker 1355):
the subrogation does not take effect unless the insurer exercises the option. Moreover, in most
legislations the subrogation is considered as an assignment effected by law (cessio legis) and the
insurer/subrogee consequently exercises the subrogation rights in its own name, whereas, for
example, in the United Kingdom and Ireland, the insurer/subrogee acts on behalf of the creditor
and may only bring a claim in the name of the policyholder/subrogor, unless there is an express
assignment of the right of action (see Birds 17.2 ff., Clarke 31-2, Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1497, for
England, in particular, see Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QB 380 and Napier v Hunter [1993] AC
713).
N2. It is important to note from the outset that the insured is not a “third party” for the purpose
of subrogation (see Birds 17.14, Clarke 31-5D, Basedow/Fock-Völker 583, Wandt, para. 998).
The explanation is that the insurance contract might be (partially) frustrated if the insurer was
allowed to exercise subrogation rights against a person insured under the same contract.
N3. It is a universally accepted principle in the national laws of the Member States that the insur-
er is subrogated to the claims against third parties only to the extent it has actually indemnified
the insured for the loss suffered (see s. 67 para. 1 Austrian ICA, art. 95 paras. 1 and 3 Belgian
IA 2014, the first sentence of art. 7:962 para. 1 Dutch CC, s. 75 Finnish ICA, art. 121-12 para. 1
French ICA, s. 86 para. 1 German ICA, art. 14 para. 1 Greek ICA, art. 1916 Italian CC, art. 52
Luxembourg ICA, art. 828 para. 1 Polish CC, art. 136 para. 1 Portuguese ICA, art. 43 para. 1
Spanish ICA, s. 9 of Ch. 7 Swedish ICA, art. 72 Swiss ICA and for the United Kingdom Page v
Scottish Insurance Corporation (1929) 98 LJKB 308, Birds 17.6, and Clarke 31-3B). This common
feature reveals that in all European countries the doctrine of subrogation is based on the same
rationale, namely to avoid the insured’s over-compensation (see, for example, Clarke 31-7, Wandt,
para. 952 and Rokas, para. 538).
265
Chapter Ten: Rights of Subrogation
N4. Various European regimes contain rules designed to protect the insurer’s subrogation rights.
In particular, the insured and the policyholder ought to refrain from acts that prejudice the in-
surer’s subrogation rights. However, the scope of that duty as well as the legal effects of its breach
may take different forms.
N5. Some national laws confine themselves to providing that the insured forfeits the claim
against the insurer to the extent he or she has vitiated the exercise of the subrogation rights,
for example by waiving the rights or a security interest against the third party (see s. 67 para. 1
Austrian ICA, art. 95 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014, art. 121-12 para. 2 French ICA, and art. 52 para. 2
Luxembourg ICA). Other countries take a broader approach: they impose a duty on the insured
and the policyholder to safeguard the subrogation rights in the insurer’s interest (see the second
sentence of art. 7:962 para. 1 Dutch CC). Sometimes, as in the case of Germany or England,
this duty is coupled with an obligation to actively assist the insurer in enforcing the subrogation
rights (see s. 86 para. 2 German ICA, for English law, where the point is often normally covered
by express contract provision, see Birds 17.8 and Clarke 31-6C).
N6. If that duty is breached, the insurer is entitled to damages (see the second sentence of art. 14
para. 3 Greek ICA, art. 1916 para. 3 Italian CC, art. 43 para. 2 Spanish ICA, and art. 72 para. 2
Swiss ICA). As a matter of fact, this remedy will generally result in the reduction of the com-
pensation paid by the insurer. Under certain circumstances, the insured might even completely
forfeit the claim against the insurer (see also s. 86 para. 2 German ICA, which provides for the
reduction or the forfeiture of the compensation claim if the insured has prejudiced the insurer’s
subrogation rights; see also art. 136 para. 2 Portuguese ICA, which states that the policyholder
or the insured is liable up to the sum insured under the contract).
N7. The bulk of national laws bar the insurer from exercising the subrogation rights against cer-
tain third parties who are in a close relationship with the insured. The rationale of the rule is that
the insurer may not recover from parties against whom the insured himself would have brought
no claim and who might take de facto or de iure recourse against the policyholder or the insured.
Another argument is that the insurance is often taken out also in the interest of those individuals
(see Kamphuisen 47 and Wandt, paras. 987 ff.). The United Kingdom differs from other countries
in that it lacks such a rule, although there is an industry agreement that the liability insurer of an
employer will not take action against an employee who has negligently injured a fellow employee;
this has been relied upon in denying subrogation rights to the insurer of one employer against
an employee of another employer working in the same place (Morris v Ford Motor Co [1973] QB
792), but the status of this decision as a matter of strict law has been doubted: see Birds 331-333.
N8. The group of protected persons varies from country to country. It is generally agreed that
close family members such as the insured’s spouse, children, and parents as well as persons living
with the insured in the same household are protected under the exemption clause (see s. 67 para.
2 Austrian ICA, s. 86 para. 3 German ICA, art. 14 para. 2 Greek ICA, art. 828 para. 2 Polish CC,
art. 136 para. 4(b) Portuguese ICA, art. 43 para. 3 Spanish ICA, and art. 72 para. 3 Swiss ICA).
In addition, some statutes also include persons employed in the household of the insured (see
266
Article 11:101 Entitlement of the Insured
art. 95 Belgian IA 2014, art. 121-12 para. 3 French ICA, art. 1916 para. 2 Italian CC, and art. 52
Luxembourg ICA). The Netherlands adopts the broadest approach extending the protection also
to the employer or employee of the policyholder or insured, or to persons employed with the
same employer (see art. 7:962 para. 3 CC).
N9. As a general rule, the exception to subrogation does not apply where the third party caused
the insured event intentionally, see for example the second sentence of art. 7:962 para. 3 Dutch
CC, art. 14 para. 2 Greek ICA, and art. 828 para. 3 Polish CC. In Switzerland, on the other hand,
the exemption clause is only applicable if the third party in question acted with slight negligence
or with no fault at all (see art. 72 para. 3 ICA).
N10. The rule that the insurer is not allowed to exercise the subrogation rights to the prejudice of
the insured is expressly recognised in a number of legal systems (see s. 67 para. 1 Austrian ICA,
art. 7:962 para. 2 Dutch CC, s. 86 para. 1 German ICA, the second sentence of art. 828 para. 1
Polish CC, and art. 43 para. 2 Spanish ICA). However, even in the absence of such an express pro-
vision, the designation of the insured as a person whose risk is covered by the policy to the same
extent as that of policyholder would bar the exercise of any subrogated rights against the insured.
Comments
Concept
C1. Frequently, the person whose interest is protected against loss under indemnity in-
surance is someone other than the policyholder. Such insurance is commonly referred to
as a contract in favour or on account of a third party. This kind of contract is sometimes
characterised as a stipulation in favour of a third party; see Article 6:110 para. 1 PECL. The
policyholder makes the contract, however the third party is insured and also entitled to
enforce the contract.
267
Chapter Eleven: Insured Persons other than the Policyholder
C2. Effective protection of the third party (insured) requires mandatory rules which are
set out in Chapter 11 of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law which forms
part of Part 2 of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law and is therefore only
applicable to indemnity insurance. Third party rights arising in respect of the insurance of
fixed sums have to be dealt with separately.
Basic Rule
C3. From the perspective of general contract law, the mere fact that a contract has been
taken out for a third party does not necessarily mean that the third party gets a claim of his
own against the debtor. However, unless the policyholder revokes the cover in accordance
with Article 11:101 para. 2, Article 11:101 gives the insured an express right to claim the
insurance money.
C4. The insured may but does not have to be named in the policy but must be identifia-
ble in the manner laid down in it. Subject to this, insurance may be taken out in favour of
whomever it may concern.
C5. The entitlement of the insured does not depend on his acceptance of the right. How-
ever, the insured can at any time decline entitlement; see also Article 6:110 para. 2 PECL.
C6. The rule covers cases where the person entitled to the insurance money is an insured.
A person not qualifying as an insured may also be entitled to the insurance money, for
example by a provision in the policy or by an assignment, but these are not within Arti-
cle 11:101.
Revocation of Cover
C7. Under para. 2 the policyholder is free to revoke cover except in two cases: either the
policy provides otherwise or the insured event has already occurred. This rule differs from
Article 6:110 para. 3(b) PECL which allows the third party beneficiary to accept his right and
thereby prevent it from being revoked. Given the mandatory character of Article 11:101, the
policyholder should have greater rights of revocation. The practical effect of Article 6:110
para. 3(b) PECL can be achieved by the exclusion of the right of revocation in the insurance
policy in accordance with Article 11:101 para. 2(a). In this context, it should be noted that
the exclusion of revocation in the insurance policy is effective even without notification to
the insured; see the opposite approach taken by Article 6:110 para. 3(a) PECL for general
contract law. Again, the practical effect of the latter rule can be achieved by appropriate
drafting of the policy which is common in the insurance industry.
C8. Article 11:101 para. 2(a) does not protect the insured against a termination of the
contract as a whole, in particular for non-payment of the premium by the policyholder; see
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Article 11:101 Entitlement of the Insured
Article 5:103. That is why in this case the insured will have the right to step in to preserve
his interests by paying the premium himself; see Article 5:105.
C9. Article 11:101 para. 2(b) protects the insured against a loss of a claim for insurance
money that has already accrued by the occurrence of the insured event. In contrast to a
revocation prior to the insured event, the insured is already entitled to a direct claim against
the insurer. Moreover, the insured is no longer able to obtain insurance cover for that event
himself. It is obvious that even in this case the insured is entitled to renounce the benefit.
Form of Notice
C10. Contrary to the general rule in Article 1:205, notice of revocation has to be given in
writing; see Article 11:101 para. 3. The rule aims to avoid uncertainty as to whether a revo-
cation has been exercised and thus as to whether the third party has in fact lost insurance
cover.
Effects of Revocation
C11. In accordance with Article 1:303 PECL, notice of revocation takes effect on receipt
by the insurer. It does not have retroactive effect. In the case of a revocation, Article 11:101
does not impose an obligation to give notice to the insured but such a duty may flow from
contract or general principles in appropriate cases.
Notes
Article 11:101 para. 1: General Principle
N1. The possibility for the policyholder to stipulate an insurance for the account of another
person and the relevant rights of that person is widely accepted and regulated (see for example
ss. 74 to 80 Austrian ICA, art. 77 of the Belgian IA 2014, s. 2768 Czech CC, arts. 7:946 ff. Dutch
CC, art. 112-1 French ICA, ss. 43 to 48 German ICA, art. 9 Greek ICA, s. 547 Hungarian CC,
art. 1891 Italian CC, art. 49 Luxembourg ICA, art. 808 Polish CC, art. 48 Portuguese ICA, arts. 16
to 18 Swiss ICA, art. 7 Spanish ICA, Chapter 9 Swedish ICA; for English law likewise in spite of
the rule of “privity of contract”, but depending especially on the construction of the insurance
policy see, for example, Hepburn v Tomlinson [1966] AC 451; see Birds Chapter 4, Clarke, Chapter
5, see Basedow/Fock-Rühl 1482 ff.).
N2. The entitlement of the insured to directly claim insurance money from the insurer is also
widely accepted (see for example s. 44 German ICA which is identical to the previous law ac-
cording to which the insured can claim the insurance money without the policyholder’s approval
if he is in possession of the policy; see Römer/Langheid-Römer, § 75-76 VVG para. 17, art. 7:945
Dutch CC, art. 808 para. 3 Polish CC according to which if it is not agreed otherwise the insured
can directly claim payment from the insurer, art. 48 para. 3 Portuguese ICA, and art. 7 para. 3
Spanish ICA). On the contrary under s. 2767 para. 1 Czech CC insurance benefits may only be
claimed by the policyholder.
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N3. Where there are no specific provisions regulating the right of the insured to directly claim
payment from the insurer, that right might be attributed to him in accordance to the provisions
of the general law on the stipulation in favour of a third party (see for France: Lamy Assurances,
para. 166 note 1, for Greece Rokas, para. 308).
N4. Revocation and/or alteration of the cover to the detriment of the insured and the conditions
under which such right can be exercised by the policyholder are regulated in detail for personal
and especially for life assurance in the laws of several countries, while in indemnity insurances
this is not the case. Under the first sentence of art. 7:947 Dutch CC, the policyholder may revoke
the designation of the insured only in agreement with the insurer or the insured. The German
law basically acknowledges the policyholder’s right to revoke, but excludes the acceptance of
payment or assignment if the insured is in possession of the policy (Wandt, paras. 693 ff.; see also
for Austria s. 76 para. 2 ICA). On the other hand, art. 1891 para. 2 Italian CC and art. 48 para. 3
Portuguese ICA do not permit the policyholder to invoke any rights arising from the insurance
contract without the consent of the insured, even if the policyholder himself is in possession of
the policy.
N5. The conditions under which the policy can be altered are not always the same as the condi-
tions under which coverage can be revoked: Even if the insurance has been concluded with the
consent of the insured the policyholder can proceed to the alteration of its terms to the detriment
of the insured as long as the latter has not yet become a party to the contract according to the
provisions of the general civil law (see for Austria: Berliner Kommentar-Hübsch, § 75 VVG para.
4). According to art. 808 para. 3 Polish CC the parties to the insurance contract cannot agree that
the insured not be entitled to the performance if the insured event has already occurred.
N6. As to the possibility to name a person as irrevocably entitled to the insurance money, this is
commonly allowed in general private law only with the consent of the person in question (see,
for example, art. 1121 French CC, art. 411 in conjunction with art. 413 Greek CC, art. 1411 Italian
CC).
N7. The rule in Article 11:101 para. 2(b) is found exceptionally in insurance contract acts (see
the second sentence of art. 7:947 Dutch CC).
Acceptance
N8. Acceptance of the designation by the insured does not constitute a prerequisite for its valid-
ity; this corresponds to rules laid down in many laws (see for Austria OGH 19.4.1979 SZ 52/65,
Heiss/Lorenz-Heiss, § 74 VVG para. 4; for Germany BGH 25.11.1963, BGHZ 40, 297 (301), see
Schwintowski/Brömmelmeyer-Hübsch, § 44 VVG para. 2; arts. 22 f. Belgian IA 2014, art. 9 Greek
ICA, art. 1891(b) Italian CC, art. 808 Polish CC, and art. 7 Spanish ICA).
N9. A different view is generally laid down in insurance contract legislation with regard to the
designation of a third party as insured in life assurance. If the policyholder and the insurer were
allowed to make an insurance contract on the life of a third party insured, this might convey in-
centives to kill the insured, and the insured would bear the consequences of the moral risk while
270
Article 11:102 Knowledge of the Insured
not being able to receive the benefit of the contract. That is why national laws require the third
party’s acceptance as a condition for such contracts (see for example the first sentence of s. 159
para. 2 Austrian ICA, s. 2826 para. 1 Czech CC, art. 132-2 para. 1 French ICA, the first sentence
of s. 150 para. 2 German ICA, the first sentence of art. 28 para. 2 Greek ICA, art. 1919(b) Italian
CC, art. 83 para. 4 Spanish ICA, art. 74 para. 1 Swiss ICA).
N10. Several insurance contract laws refer to an insurance taken out for an insured who may be
named or unnamed. No additional or different rules are provided for the latter case; in some laws
it is mentioned by means of an explanatory provision that the regulations applying on the named
insured are equally applied to the unnamed (see for example s. 80 para. 2 Austrian ICA, art. 77
Belgian IA 2014, the second sentence of art. 112-1 French ICA, s. 48 German ICA, the first and
second sentences of art. 9 para. 1 Greek ICA, the second sentence of art. 808 para. 1 Polish CC,
and art. 7 para. 1 Spanish ICA). Article 11:101 does not require the insured to be named and is
therefore in line with these national laws.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Where an insured has knowledge of material facts unknown to the policyholder which
he would have to disclose to the insurer if he took out the insurance himself, this would
result in an undesirable situation under general rules: the policyholder would not have to
disclose such facts since he is unaware of them, and the insured would not be under any
obligation arising out of the contract since he is not a party to it. Thus, the designation of
a third party as insured, a person who is more familiar with the risk than the policyholder,
would be detrimental to the insurer. This would reduce the willingness of insurers to offer
cover for third parties and might also increase the risk of collusion between policyholders
and such third parties.
C2. In order to deal with this situation, insurers might introduce contract clauses equating
the insured’s knowledge with that of the policyholder, thus triggering the policyholder’s ob-
ligation to disclose facts unknown to him but known to the insured. However, such clauses
will lead to inappropriate results in some cases: where an insured does not know about the
rights he is granted under an insurance contract there is no reason for him to disclose mate-
rial facts. For example, why should a worker who does not know about the liability insurance
taken out by the employer in favour of his employees disclose a criminal conviction, which
employment law would not require him to disclose? Article 11:102 strikes a balance between
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Chapter Eleven: Insured Persons other than the Policyholder
the interests of the insurer on the one side and the policyholder and insured on the other,
taking into account the latter’s knowledge of his position under the contract of insurance.
C3. An insured may at the same time be a person entrusted with responsibilities essential
to the conclusion or performance of the contract as referred to in Article 1:206. In such a
case that provision allows for the imputation of knowledge of such a person to the poli-
cyholder. While that person would be aware of those responsibilities, for example in the
maintenance of fire alarm installations, he might not know that the employer’s fire policy
does not only cover the risk of loss caused by fire, but also the liability of the policyholder’s
personnel entrusted with the supervision of the fire alarm installations. Thus, an imputation
of that person’s knowledge of the bad condition of the fire alarm installations to the policy-
holder would not be justified under Article 11:102, but his knowledge would be imputed to
the policyholder under Article 1:206 which is grounded on a different rationale.
C4. Under Article 11:102 knowledge of the insured is not equivalent to the policyholder’s
knowledge as a matter of law. The provision is limited to giving effect to a clause in the policy
which leads to an imputation of the insured’s knowledge to the policyholder, provided that
the insured was aware of his status as an insured at the relevant time.
C5. The relevant time is to be determined in accordance with the provision of the Princi-
ples of European Insurance Contract Law or the clause of the contract that imposes certain
duties of disclosure of information on the policyholder. Thus, when the applicant’s knowl-
edge has to be ascertained at the time he answers the questions put by the insurer (see
Article 2:101), the insured’s state of knowledge may become relevant under Article 11:102
if the insured knew about his status as insured at that time. If he becomes aware of being
insured only later Article 11:102 does not allow for an imputation of his knowledge, and
his later becoming aware will not lead to imputation of his knowledge retroactively to the
policyholder.
C6. Article 11:102 also applies where an imputation clause refers to what the insured ought
to have known and not only what he actually knew. Constructive knowledge of this kind on
the part of the insured can only be attributed to the policyholder if the insured was aware
of his status as insured at the relevant time.
C7. Article 11:102 is restricted to cases where the insured has actual knowledge of his
status as insured, namely of the existence of cover in his favour. Constructive knowledge of
that status is not sufficient.
Legal Consequences
C8. Article 11:102 provides for the imputation of the insured’s knowledge, but does not
impose a duty of notification on him. Such a duty is explicitly laid down, however, in other
provisions of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law such as Articles 4:202
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Article 11:103 Breach of Duty by One Insured
and 6:101. In respect of these provisions, imputation of the insured’s knowledge to the
policyholder will usually be redundant. Article 11:102 is mainly relevant where the Princi-
ples of European Insurance Contract Law or contract clauses or other applicable principles
refer to the knowledge of, or information to be provided or actually provided by, the sole
policyholder; see for example Articles 2:101 and 2:105. In the situations covered by those
provisions the policyholder will be treated as if he had the knowledge of the insured.
Notes
Imputation to the Policyholder
N1. The imputation, in the context of notification duties, of the insured person’s knowledge to
the policyholder flows from the principle that the promisor (namely the insurer) of a perfor-
mance in favour of a third party (the insured) should not have less contractual rights than if
he had promised the performance only for the benefit of his counterparty (the policyholder).
A usual expression of that principle is that the promisor may assert against the beneficiary all
defences which the promisor could assert against the promisee (see for example art. 5.2.4 of the
UNIDROIT Principles, s. 882 Austrian CC, s. 334 German CC, art. 414 Greek CC, arts. 1413 and
1891 para. 3 Italian CC, the third sentence of art. 49 Luxembourg ICA, and the second sentence
of art. 808 para. 2 Polish CC). As a consequence the insurer is also able to invoke, as against
the insured, the breach of the notification duties related to the risk of the policyholder; see the
Comments.
N2. As between the promisor (insurer) and the promisee (policyholder) the latter’s obligations of
disclosure and notification will generally not be reduced by the fact that the relevant knowledge
is not vested in him, but in the insured designated by him. It is up to the policyholder to organ-
ise the flow of information from the insured to himself or to the insurer in an appropriate way.
Therefore, rules and contract clauses providing for an imputation of the insured’s knowledge to
the policyholder are common. But the rationale for that imputation is lacking when the insured
does not even know about the existence of the insurance contract or about his status as insured
under that contract. Therefore, some national insurance contract laws make an exception from
the imputation principle in such cases, see s. 79 para. 1 Austrian ICA, the first sentence of s. 47
para. 2 German ICA, and art. 5 para. 2 Swiss ICA.
N3. The effect of an imputation is achieved, in other countries, by legal provisions which direct-
ly impose duties upon the insured, see for example s. 2788 para. 1 Czech CC, art. 7:941 para.
1 Dutch CC, s. 22 Finnish ICA, the second sentence of art. 9 para. 2 Greek ICA, s. 547 para. 2
Hungarian CC, art. 808 para. 2 Polish CC, and art. 7 Spanish ICA.
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Comments
Rationale and Purpose
C1. Where one insurance contract protects the interests of several persons, one of them
may breach his duties while the others comply with theirs. The question arises whether the
breach affects the rights of all persons insured under the policy. For example, one of several
apartment owners insured under a single fire insurance policy taken out for the whole
building may breach his contractual obligation to ensure the regular maintenance of a gas
heating system in his apartment while the other owners subscribe to a maintenance service.
The question arises whether in the event of a fire caused by defects of the gas heating of the
owner in breach the insurer should be entitled to refuse payment of the insurance money to
that insured only or to the other co-insured owners as well. One may also think of an acci-
dent insurance taken out by an association in favour of its members; suppose the cover for
new members is subject to their answering certain questions put by the insurer, and that one
new member does not disclose information as he should. Then the question arises whether
where several members are involved in an accident, the insurer should be entitled to decline
cover to all of them on the ground that one has not given correct answers to the questions.
C2. The answer given by Article 11:103 is in the negative: the insurance relationship be-
tween the insurer and each insured is considered to be separate, so that a breach of obliga-
tions on the part of one of them does not affect the others. In other words, an “innocent”
insured will not be affected by the breach of a co-insured’s duty under the same insurance
contract.
C3. Article 11:103 applies if there is more than one insured under a single insurance con-
tract. One of the insured persons may be the policyholder if his interest is protected under
the insurance contract, see the definition in Article 1:202 para. 1. Where such a policyholder
breaches an obligation under the contract the effect of that breach on other persons insured
under the same contract depends upon the nature of the obligation breached.
C4. Where the obligation is incumbent upon the policyholder as the contracting party,
the breach will affect the whole contract and consequently also the rights of other persons
insured under it provided that the obligation in question is not intrinsically separable. This
may relate, for example, to the incorrect disclosure of some material facts at the pre-con-
tractual stage, see Article 2:101, or to the non-payment of the premium, see Article 5:103;
in the latter case, the insured will, however, be entitled to avoid the consequences of the
policyholder’s non-payment by paying himself, see Article 5:105.
C5. As distinct from these obligations there are others which have to be performed by
the policyholder and any insured or other person who wants to derive rights from the
contract likewise; see, for example, the notification duties in the case of aggravation of risk,
Article 4:202, or after the occurrence of an insured event, Article 6:101. The rationale of
such cooperation duties is not the position of the obligor as the contracting partner of the
insurer, but his designation as a person entitled to the benefit of the insurance; this rationale
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Article 11:103 Breach of Duty by One Insured
also applies to the imposition of those duties to the policyholder. Consequently, where he
breaches such an obligation in respect of his interest insured under the contract, but another
insured does not with regard to his interest insured under the same contract, the policyhold-
er’s breach will not affect the rights of the other insured in accordance with Article 11:103.
C6. Where the policyholder’s own interest is not protected by the insurance contract,
he is not an insured, and Article 11:103 will consequently not apply. An illustration would
be the accident insurance taken out by an association in favour of its members, see above
Comment 1. Breaches of such a policyholder’s duties will invariably affect the whole contract
and all insured persons in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Principles of Euro-
pean Insurance Contract Law. Article 11:103 will, however, apply to breaches of contractual
obligations by a single insured irrespective of whether the policyholder is co-insured or not.
C7. A significant field of application of Article 11:103 is group insurance taken out by
one policyholder in favour of a group of persons who may be designated by their names
or by general criteria identifying the insured persons, such as “employees of the policy-
holder” or “members of the policyholder” where the policyholder is an association. Here,
Article 11:103 applies to the breach of an insured’s duties. Breaches of the policyholder’s
obligations will be assessed in accordance with Comments 3 to 6.
C8. Where, however, group insurance is contracted by an agent of the various protected
persons the resulting insurance contracts will come into existence between the separate
policyholders and the insurer. Even where that occurs under a framework contract made by
the agent with the policyholder the single persons protected are not “insured under the same
insurance contract” as required by Article 11:103. But in such cases the single policyholders
do not need to be protected by Article 11:103 either since their relation with the insurer is
governed by individual contracts.
C9. The protection of the insured by Article 11:103 in the case of a breach of duty by an-
other insured does not preclude imputation on other grounds. The insured who is in breach
of duty may be entrusted with responsibilities essential to the conclusion or performance of
the contract as referred to in Article 1:206. In such a case that provision would allow for the
imputation of the insured’s knowledge to the policyholder who may be co-insured under
the contract and would thus be affected also in that capacity. However, the knowledge of the
person in breach could not be attributed to other insureds under that provision.
Legal Consequences
C10. The legal consequences of a breach of duty by one insured will not affect other per-
sons insured under the same contract. For example, the discharge of the insurer’s obligation
to cover the risk under Article 2:102 para. 5, Article 4:103 or Article 4:203, or the reduction
of the insurance money in the case of refusal of claims cooperation, Article 6:102 para. 2, will
be limited to the insured in breach and without effect as against other persons insured. In a
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similar vein, the termination of the insurance contract declared by the insurer will remain
ineffective as against all insured persons except the one who was in breach.
C11. Illustration: A condominium located in a summer resort is insured against fire under
a single policy; the apartments are owned by different persons insured under that policy.
In winter when the apartments are not inhabited a fire occurs due to a short circuit and
causes damage to several apartments. While the absent owners are not aware of the event,
one of them is informed but fails to notify the insurer. While this owner will be subject to
the consequences flowing from Article 6:101 para. 3, the other owners are not adversely
affected. Suppose, however, that the owner who is informed is the caretaker who is entrusted
by the condominium operator with the responsibilities under the insurance contract: in that
case the consequences drawn by the insurer from the caretaker’s breach of notification duty
would affect all owners because his knowledge would be attributed to the condominium
operator, which is the policyholder, under Article 1:206. If the caretaker is entrusted, not
by the operator, but by some owners only, his breach will affect the rights of these owners
and not the other owners.
Joint Insurance
C12. Article 11:103 provides for an exception if the interest insured is a joint interest. This
is the case where it is vested in more than one insured person, for example where it belongs
to a community of heirs or to a partnership forming a “Gesamthand” under the laws of
some Member States or to husband and wife living in the matrimonial property regime of
“communauté de biens”. In such situations the limitation of the effects of a breach by one
insured to this person cannot be put into effect because the legal rules applicable to the legal
relation between that insured and the other insureds do not admit any separate affectation.
If construed correctly, these regimes would not even allow for the single persons involved
to be considered as insured; it would rather be the community of heirs, the “Gesamthand”
or the “communauté de biens”, which would be insured.
C13. Illustration: A building is insured against fire; upon the owner’s death the property
passes to his heirs, for example his widow who continues to live in the house, and two sons
living in other cities. Under the applicable law of succession the heirs form a community
of heirs which takes over the position of the policyholder and owns the estate until it is
dissolved and the single assets are attributed to the individual heirs by agreement. Before
such an agreement is made, a fire breaks out in the house destroying parts of it. The wid-
ow fails to comply with her duties of claims cooperation under Article 6:102 para. 1. The
consequences of this behaviour, in particular the reduction of the amount of the insurance
money payable (Article 6:102 para. 2), will by necessity affect the community of heirs as a
whole, including the two sons.
Note
According to art. 7 Swiss ICA, the breach of the pre-contractual information duties by one in-
sured of a collective insurance does not, under certain circumstances, harm the interests of the
other insureds. The wording of the article partially covers the case described by Article 11:103
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Article 12:101 Lack of Insured Risk
PEICL. In some other countries, the protection of the insured under a group policy usually is
determined by contract terms and their interpretation rather than by statutory provisions (for
France see Basedow/Fock-Völker 550). Sweden has however introduced statutory provisions for
the protection of the insured in group insurances; see Ch. 17 to 19 ICA; a rule limiting the legal
effect of the breach, by one insured, of his obligations to this insured can be found in s. 17 para.
2 of Ch. 17 ICA. The principle provided by Article 11:103 can also be found in Germany in s. 123
para. 1 ICA (applicable to mandatory motor liability insurance) and is accepted as a general rule
of law applicable to all cases where several insured are grouped together under one contract for
the benefit of a third-party (see Wandt, paras. 629 and 707).
Comments
Structure and Position of the Rule
C1. Article 12:101 deals with situations where there is no risk for the insurer to bear, even
if it wished to, because the insured event cannot possibly occur. This could be the case either
throughout the whole insurance period (para. 1) or only over a certain part of it (para. 2).
The difference between these two situations is obvious: whereas the insurer never bore any
risk in the first case, it did bear the risk – although not for as long as expected at the time
of formation of the contract – at least for a certain time in the second case. Hence, the legal
consequences, notably the claims of the insurer are different.
C2. Article 12:101 belongs to the chapter on indemnity insurances and is therefore not
applicable to insurances of fixed sums, not even by analogy. In the latter cases a solution
may be found sometimes in the Principles of European Contract Law, particularly in Arti-
cle 6:111 (“Change of Circumstances”).
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Chapter Twelve: Insured Risk
C4. If, for example, pictures are insured against theft during an exhibition which in the
end never takes place, the insurer never ran the risk of paying insurance money. In such
cases the insurer has no justifiable claim to the premium. However, a claim for expenses
which arose in connection with the processing of the application is fair and reasonable.
What “reasonable sum” means in this context has to be assessed by the court from case to
case, for example by reference to industry average costs.
C5. Para. 2 deals, for example, with the case where an architect is insured on an occurrence
basis against risks arising from his professional activities and dies during the insurance
period. Here, the insurer bore the insured risk only until the time the architect died, thus it
should only be entitled to premium corresponding to the time prior to the cessation of the
insured risk. This means that Article 5:104 (“Divisibility of Premium”) applies accordingly.
C6. The legal consequence of para. 2, namely termination of the insurance contract, could
in theory take effect at two different points in time: either at the time when the insured risk
actually ceases (in the example under Comment 5 that would be the death of the architect)
or at the time when the insurer gets notice of the cessation of the risk. Article 12:101 para. 2
adopts the second alternative. The reason for that is the practical consideration that it may
be extremely difficult for the insurer to verify the cessation of risk. In order to get a premium
refund, the policyholder might be tempted to allege cessation of the risk at a point in time
prior to the actual cessation. Article 12:101 reduces the risk of false allegations by obliging
the policyholder to notify the cessation. In any event, reliable information of this kind is
important to insurers for an accurate assessment of their costs.
C7. Para. 2 also applies if a cessation of the insured risk is the result of an occurrence
of the insured event, for example when an insured house burns down. In such cases, the
insurer shall only be entitled to premium in respect of the period prior to the notification
of the insured event.
C8. The cessation of risk referred to in the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
must be permanent. It would therefore not be sufficient, if, for example, the insured under
annual travel insurance cancels one trip but could go on other journeys which would be
covered. The same applies in motor vehicle liability insurance if the insured vehicle is just
temporarily taken off the road.
Transfer of Title
C9. Transfer of title to property is not a cessation of the insured risk within the meaning
of Article 12:101 but is subject to the special provisions contained in Article 12:102.
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Article 12:101 Lack of Insured Risk
Notes
General
N1. Most European legislation contains provisions dealing with the non-existence of the insured
risk. The scope of the various rules differs from country to country. Some statutes are only con-
cerned with the absence of the insured risk at the time of the formation of the insurance contract.
Other legal systems take a broader approach, addressing also the problem of cessation of the risk
subsequent to the conclusion of the contract.
N2. Where the specific insurance contract law lacks an express provision (such as in Finland,
France or in Sweden), recourse is sometimes had to rules of general contract law. In France, for
example, it is argued that the non-existence of the insured risk falls under art. 1108 CC. Accord-
ing to this rule, any contract lacking an “objet du contract” is void (see Basedow/Fock-Völker 500).
N3. Under several national laws, the insurance contract is generally void if no risk exists at the
time the contract is concluded (see art. 79 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014, art. 1895 Italian CC, art. 32 pa-
ra. 1 Luxembourg ICA, art. 806 Polish CC, art. 44 para. 1 Portuguese ICA, art. 4 Spanish ICA, and
art. 9 Swiss ICA; in the United Kingdom see with respect to marine insurance s. 4 of the Marine
Insurance Act 1906); in the absence of a valid contract no premium is due. In other countries,
the statutory language does not provide for the nullity of the insurance contract; instead, the rules
directly address the premium issue and state that the policyholder owes no premium (see s. 68
para. 1 Austrian ICA, art. 7:938 para. 1 Dutch CC, and s. 80 para. 1 German ICA). Generally, the
same rules apply if the contract has been entered to cover a future risk and that risk never comes
into being (see the express provisions in s. 68 para. 1 Austrian ICA, art. 79 para. 2 Belgian IA
2014, s. 80 para. 1 German ICA, art. 1896 para. 2 Italian CC, art. 32 para. 1 Luxembourg ICA,
and art. 44 para. 3 Portuguese ICA).
N4. Under certain circumstances, the forfeiture of the premium may be unfair to the insurer.
Consequently, the majority of jurisdictions afford some degree of protection. In a couple of legal
systems, the insurer is entitled to a fair sum to cover the expenses incurred (see s. 68 para. 1 Aus-
trian ICA, the third sentence of art. 7:938 para. 1 Dutch CC, s. 80 para. 1 German ICA, the second
sentence of art. 5 para. 2 Greek ICA, art. 1896 para. 2 Italian CC, art. 32 para. 2 Luxembourg
ICA, and art. 44 para. 4 Portuguese ICA). In some countries, on the other hand, the insurer may
claim the full premium where the policyholder was “at fault” when the contract was concluded,
namely where the policyholder acted in bad faith or was under an inexcusable mistake (see art. 79
para. 3 Belgian IA 2014, the first sentence of art. 7:938 para. 1 Dutch CC, s. 80 para. 3 German
ICA (only if the policyholder intended to obtain an unlawful pecuniary advantage), art. 32 para.
3 Luxembourg ICA, and art. 44 para. 5 Portuguese ICA). However, the insurer forfeits the enti-
tlement as soon as he has notice of the non-existence of the risk. Switzerland follows a distinct
rule, allowing the insurer to recoup the expenses incurred subject to the condition only that the
policyholder acted in bad faith and the insurer itself was not aware of that fact (see art. 10 para.
3 ICA).
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N5. Only a minority of legal systems specifically addresses the issue of cessation of the insured
risk during the insurance period. Austria, Germany and Italy adopt similar rules on this point.
Essentially, the insurer is entitled to the premium up to the moment when he is given notice of
the cessation of the risk (see s. 68 para. 2 Austrian ICA, s. 80 para. 2 German ICA, and art. 1896
para. 1 Italian CC). The Netherlands, on the other hand, take an approach more favourable to the
policyholder. If no risk existed for a full insurance year, no premium is due for that year and the
insurer may only claim reimbursement for the expenses incurred (the second and third sentences
of art. 7:938 para. 1 Dutch CC). After the end of the insurance year either party may terminate
the insurance contract within one month. Finally, in Spain it is debated whether the cessation of
risk allows the policyholder to recover a proportional part of the premium or the insurer receives
the whole premium amount (Bataller/Latorre/Olavarria 175).
Comments
The Need for a Rule concerning Transfer of Property
C1. If the policyholder transfers title to insured property, the transferee will in many cas-
es have a legitimate interest in the maintenance of cover. For example, the purchaser of a
house which is insured against fire should not lose cover just because the seller of the house
(policyholder) is not interested any more in maintaining the cover, knowing that he cannot
suffer an economic loss after the passing of the risk to the purchaser. It would therefore
be inappropriate to simply apply the provision of Article 12:101 (“Lack of Insured Risk”)
to such cases. The transferee must be protected against loss of cover, since there may not
be time to conclude a new insurance contract or he may be unaware of his need for cover.
C2. For all this, it is clear that the automatic transfer of a person to an existing insurance
contract does not solve the problem sufficiently: On the one hand, the insurer cannot be
forced to accept a policyholder it does not want to insure. On the other hand, the transfer-
ee may have good reasons not to enter into the existing contract which possibly does not
conveniently protect his (economic) interests. Thus, the Principles of European Insurance
Contract Law opt for a flexible provision which meets the principle of freedom of contract
as well as the need of the transferee for maintenance of insurance cover for a limited period.
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Article 12:102 Transfer of Property
C3. Transferees who have an economic interest in property shall in principle be protect-
ed during a transit time of one month whereas policyholders who – due the transfer of
property – cannot suffer financial loss shall not be bound to an existing insurance contract
which does not make legal and/or economical sense anymore for too long time. After the
one month period the contract shall be terminated automatically. As a consequence the
transferee is deemed to be insured under the policy held by the seller from the passing of
the risk until one month after the transfer of title.
C4. Article 12:102 para. 2 stipulates that the transferee of the transferred property shall
be deemed to be an insured under the existing insurance contract. That means that (unless
otherwise agreed) the interests of, for example, a buyer of a house which was insured by
the purchaser against fire is at least insured during the one-month-period after the time of
transfer. By the end of that period, the transferee can be expected to recognise his need for
insurance cover.
C5. The need for flexibility as described in Comment 3 may most suitably be met by
establishing a non-mandatory provision. Article 12:102 para. 3(a) therefore provides that
agreements between all three persons involved, namely insurer, policyholder and transferee,
will override the provisions contained in paras. 1 and 2.
C6. Moreover, policyholder and transferee may agree between the two of them on an
earlier time for termination. There is no need to protect the transferee if he agrees to such
early termination of cover.
C7. A special case is addressed in the second sentence of para. 1. It refers to cases in which
the insurance contract was specifically taken out for the benefit of a future transferee. This
is often the case, for example, in transport insurance where the distance purchaser of goods
(who is not yet their owner) agrees with the seller on a cif clause, under which the seller
is obliged to insure the goods for the benefit of the purchaser. Here there is no automatic
termination as provided for in the first sentence of para. 1.
Scope of Application
C8. Article 12:102 is only applicable to property insurance. The explicit reference to “prop-
erty” makes clear that the scope of application of Article 12:102 cannot be extended to other
kinds of indemnity insurance.
C9. According to para. 3(b), the provisions of Article 12:102 paras. 1 and 2 shall not apply
to transfer of title by inheritance. The reason for this exclusion is that Article 12:102 is only
in line with cases where the transfer of property is based on a legal transaction. In contrast
to that, solutions to cases of universal succession have to be found under general private law.
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C10. The statutory fiction of an insurance contract for the benefit of a third party (Arti-
cle 12:102 para. 2) clarifies three matters: first of all, the transferee is entitled to claim the
insurance money; secondly, a policyholder who is paid insurance money in case of occur-
rence of the insured risk, is obliged to account for that money to the transferee. Thirdly,
the policyholder and not the transferee of property has the duty to pay the premium to the
insurer. In view of the short span of one month and the possibility to agree, for example,
on a proportionate reimbursement of the premium by the transferee, there are no serious
concerns against such a payment duty.
C11. The application of Article 12:102 is modified as far as group insurances are con-
cerned, see Article 18:203 para. 3.
Notes
General
N1. The effects on the insurance contract resulting from the transfer of the insured good vary
among the European legal systems. In essence, two distinct legislative approaches can be found.
Some countries provide for the automatic termination of the insurance contract (usually after
the lapse of a brief transition period) once the subject-matter of the contract is transferred to a
new owner. In other countries, the insurance contract continues to be in force and the transferee
of the insured property is substituted for the transferor by operation of law. However, it must be
noted that the difference between the two rules is attenuated by two important aspects. First, in
the legal systems following the “termination approach” the parties are generally allowed to agree
on the continuation of the insurance contract. In a similar vein, the national laws adopting the
“substitution approach” grant the insurer and the transferee the right to terminate the insurance
contract. Thus, the parties may actually achieve the same outcomes under either rule.
N2. The national rules dealing with insurance contracts in the case of transfer of property differ
considerably in their scope of application. While in most jurisdictions the provisions are con-
fined to inter vivos transfers, in other legal systems they may also encompass transfers by way
of inheritance (see art. 121-10 French ICA and art. 37 Spanish ICA). In a minority of countries,
the rules also apply to foreclosure sales (see s. 73 Austrian ICA, s. 99 German ICA, and art. 37
Spanish ICA). Not only do some legal systems differentiate on the mode of transfer, they may also
provide special rules dependent on the insured good. Thus, for instance, chattel and real estate
may be subject to distinct rules (see art. 57 paras. 1 and 2 Belgian IA 2014 and art. 69 paras. 1 and
2 Luxembourg ICA). Likewise, special rules may apply to the transfer of cars and other vehicles
(see art. 121-11 French ICA, and for Italy see Cass. 25.9.1972, no. 2781, Foro it. 1973).
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Article 12:102 Transfer of Property
N3. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands adopt the “termination approach” mentioned
above: the insurance contract comes automatically to an end when the title to the insured prop-
erty passes to a new owner (see art. 111 Belgian IA 2014, art. 7:948 para. 2 Dutch CC and art. 69
Luxembourg ICA). The United Kingdom also follows this rule: absent an assignment agreement,
the conveyance of the insured property does not result in the passage of any rights under the
insurance contract to the transferee: Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1.
N4. In some of the aforementioned countries, however, the transferee may still be covered by
the insurance contract for a brief transition period. Thus, in Belgium and Luxembourg, an in-
surance contract covering real estate remains in force for the benefit of the new owner for three
more months following the conveyance (see art. 111 para. 1 Belgian IA 2014 and art. 69 para.
1 Luxembourg ICA). The same applies to any kind of insured good for a period of one month
under Dutch law (see art. 7:948 paras. 1 and 2 CC). Similar rules can be found in Finland and
Sweden. Here, the law is silent as to the consequences for the insurance contract in the event of
the transfer of the insured good. Rather, it is left to the parties of the contract to decide wheth-
er or not the contract is to be continued. However, the law provides that, no matter what the
policyholder and the insurer agree upon, the insurance cover will not end before the lapse of a
mandatory transition period for the benefit of the transferee (see s. 63 Finnish ICA: 14 days if
the new owner does not have insurance himself; and s. 2 of Ch. 9 Swedish ICA: 7 days).
N5. In other countries, the rights and duties under the insurance contract automatically pass
to the transferee of the insured property. However, the transferee and the insurer may both
terminate the contract (see s. 70 Austrian ICA, art. 121-10 para. 2 French ICA (not applicable to
cars), s. 96 German ICA, art. 12 para. 2 Greek ICA, art. 1918 Italian CC (not applicable to cars),
art. 95 para. 2 Portuguese ICA, art. 35 Spanish ICA and art. 54 paras. 2 and 3 Swiss ICA). Also,
the insurer is not liable to the transferee unless he was notified of the conveyance in due course.
However, an exception may apply to losses occurring within a brief transition period from the
transfer of ownership: the transferee may recover these losses even if he failed to inform the
insurer about the conveyance (see s. 71 para. 1 Austrian ICA and s. 97 German ICA).
N6. Furthermore, it must be noted that a couple of legal systems contain special rules concerning
insurance contracts taken out for the benefit of certain third parties. Italy and Spain provide that
where the insurance policy is issued to order or to bearer the contract passes automatically to the
transferee; no notification is required and no right of termination is available (see art. 1918 para.
5 Italian CC and art. 36 Spanish ICA). In the Netherlands, the rules on the termination of the
insurance do not apply if the policy designates the transferee as the beneficiary of the insurance
(see art. 7:948 para. 5 CC).
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Chapter Thirteen: Admissibility
N7. Where the law provides that the rights and obligations under the insurance contract pass
to the transferee of the insured property, the language of the statutory provisions in question
generally suggests that those rights and duties vest in the transferee the very moment the title to
property is passed (see for example for Germany Wandt, para. 715; for Switzerland art. 54 para.
1 Swiss ICA). Only art. 7:948 para. 1 Dutch CC marks an exception: here, it is expressly provided
that the rights and duties under the contract are passed to the acquirer “with the risk, even if the
risk was passed on before transfer.”
N8. As already indicated at the outset, the rules on transfer of insured property generally leave
a wide margin for party autonomy. Since the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law are
generally conceived as mandatory this margin has to be specifically pointed out in this context
which is not necessary in many national laws. Where default rules provide for the continuation
of the contract with the transferee, the parties can exercise termination rights to end the insur-
ance. On the other hand, the rules providing for the automatic termination of the insurance
contract are generally not mandatory either (see art. 111 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014 and art. 69 para.
2 Luxembourg ICA (both with respect to chattel only) and art. 7:948 Dutch CC). In the United
Kingdom, in particular, the transferee can succeed to the insurance contract on the basis of an
assignment. The requirements for the assignment agreement differ to some extent, dependent on
whether the assignment is based on statute (for example s. 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925,
applicable in England and Wales), on common law rules, or on equity. In any case, the insurer
must be notified and give its consent to the assignment of the insurance contract (see Clarke,
Chapter 6).
N9. As pointed out above in Note 2 there are provisions in some Member States which extend
the application of the insurance-specific transfer of property regime also to inheritance which is
however outside the scope of the Principles of European Insurance Contract Law.
Comments
C1. The main characteristic of an insurance of fixed sums is that the sum agreed will be
paid to the beneficiary upon the occurrence of the insured event, since, in contrast to in-
demnity insurance including valued policies (see Article 8:101 Comments 5 to 7), it does not
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Article 13:101 Insurance of Fixed Sums
matter whether the beneficiary has suffered any financial loss; see Article 1:201 para. 4. Thus,
a “net profit” to the beneficiary when taking out insurance is possible and often intended
which may give rise to undesirable incentives. For that reason, Article 13:101 restricts the
taking out of an insurance of fixed sums to branches of insurance where no serious moral
hazard is to be expected. It follows from the rationale of the rule that it cannot be derogated
from either for the benefit of the insurer or for that of the policyholder; see Article 1:103
para. 1.
C2. The branches of insurance in question are listed in Article 13:101. All such branches
are personal insurance where a monetary incentive will, at least under normal circum-
stances, not be strong enough to induce deliberate causation of the insured event by the
beneficiary. The remaining cases can be left to the insurer’s discretion in agreeing the insured
sum, and to criminal law. In branches not listed in Article 13:101, an insurance contract may
be concluded as indemnity insurance only; consequently, the insurer shall not be obliged in
those other branches to pay more than what is needed to indemnify losses actually suffered
by the insured; see Articles 1:201 para. 3 and 8:101.
C3. Article 13:101 allows the insurance of fixed sums in the listed branches. It does not,
however, prohibit the conclusion of indemnity insurance in those branches. In fact it is
very common to conclude, for example, health insurance as indemnity insurance covering
medical expenses.
Notes
General
N1. Insurance of fixed sums is a concept familiar to all European legal systems. The terminology
varies among the different countries: Greece refers to it as insurance of fixed sums, while the
Netherlands refer to it as “benefit insurance” (see the definitions in art. 27 para. 1 Greek ICA
and art. 7:964 Dutch CC), Belgium and Luxembourg as “assurance à caractère forfaitaire” (see
art. 55, 4° Belgian IA 2014 and art. 1(L) Luxembourg ICA). Some statutes lack a specific term
and describe the insurance of fixed sums by contrasting it to indemnity insurance (see s. 1 para.
1 Austrian ICA and art. 1882 Italian CC): whereas indemnity insurance is designed to redress
the losses arising from a particular event, the insurance of fixed sums involves the payment of
an agreed-upon amount on the occurrence of a particular event.
N2. Some countries adopt yet a different approach and refer to the insurance of fixed sums under
the label of “personal insurance” given that insurances of fixed sums are generally only admissible
for personal insurance (see art. 131-1 French ICA, art. 805 para. 2 p. (a) Polish CC, and part. III
Swiss ICA). The same language could be found in Germany prior to 2008 (see the second sentence
of s. 1 para. 1 former German ICA). In the meantime, the German legislator has abandoned this
approach pointing to the fact that a personal insurance is not necessarily an insurance of fixed
sums since it may also be taken out as indemnity insurance (see Wandt, para. 36).
N3. In the United Kingdom, finally, the notion of insurance of fixed sums emerged from case law
(see Clarke 3-6D; Colinvaux 18-04). Originally, in cases of life assurance the law was prepared to
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enforce contracts where the insured had no interest in the life insured, but that was halted by the
passage of the Life Assurance Act 1774. Although s. 3 of that Act allows recovery from the insurer
only to the extent the insured actually has an interest in the life in question, this provision was
held not to apply to insurance on the life of a spouse. In practice, in many situations a beneficiary
will recover in excess of their actual interest.
Content
N4. Regardless of the terminological differences, the characteristic features of the insurance of
fixed sums are common to almost all European legal systems. Unlike in the case of indemnity
insurance, the amounts paid under an insurance of fixed sums bear no direct relationship to
the extent of the loss suffered by the insured. Under some national statutes, this principle is
expressly recognised (see art. 55, 4° Belgian IA 2014, art. 7:964 Dutch CC, art. 27 para. 5 Greek
ICA, and art. 1(L) Luxembourg ICA). In the absence of an express provision, the principle can
be derived from the fact that insurances of fixed sums are generally not subject to the indemnity
principle, namely the rule limiting the recoverable compensation to the loss actually incurred
by the insured. This conclusion can be drawn by way of a systematic comparison of the statutory
provisions on indemnity insurance on the one hand and those on insurances of fixed sums on the
other. A consistent pattern can be found: the statutes in Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Spain,
Sweden, and Switzerland all implement the indemnity principle solely in provisions pertaining
to the various forms of indemnity insurance; this indicates that the principle is inapplicable to
insurances of fixed sums.
N5. Insurance of fixed sums is limited to personal insurance, the most common types being life
and accident insurance. Generally, the insurance payments can take the form of a lump sum or
an annuity (see, for example, s. 1 para. 1 Austrian ICA, art. 27 para. 1 Greek ICA, art. 1882 Italian
CC, and art. 1 Spanish ICA).
N6. While it is generally true that an insurance of fixed sums is a personal insurance, the inverse
statement, namely that a personal insurance is always an insurance of fixed sums, does not hold
true. A personal insurance, for example accident insurance, may be also taken out as indemnity
insurance. In this case, instead of paying an agreed sum, the insurer covers all losses arising from
the accident. This option is expressly recognised under the Greek and the Portuguese statutes
(see art. 27 para. 1 Greek ICA and art. 175 para. 2 Portuguese ICA) and it is also accepted in
legal systems lacking a similar provision (see for Austria and Germany Bruck/Möller-Baumann,
§ 1 VVG para. 56).
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Article 14:101 Defence Costs
Comments
Underlying Principle
C1. The right of an insured faced with a claim by a victim should in principle include the
right to the costs of his defence as well as any compensation payable. Indeed, the liability in-
surer must pay for these costs irrespective of whether or not the insured is actually adjudged
liable to the victim. Article 14:101 makes defence costs subject to Article 9:102 as defending
a claim is to be regarded as a special form of mitigation of loss. Under the PEICL, liability
policies excluding the reimbursement of defence costs will not be possible.
C2. Defence costs include the costs of litigation but are not confined to these. For example,
a claim by a victim may be so clearly established in law that the case does not proceed to
litigation and the insurer simply accepts liability on behalf of the insured. Nonetheless costs
will be incurred by the insured and/or the insurer, even if these amount only to relatively
minimal costs of investigating the victim’s claim.
C3. Article 9:102 requires the reimbursement of costs of mitigation to the extent that the
policyholder or insured was justified as regarding the measures as reasonable. This principle
of reasonableness has very important consequences in the context of defence costs. First,
the test of reasonableness is to be judged from the point of view of the insured. If he rea-
sonably thinks that the claim by the victim is ill-founded or that the compensation claimed
is excessive, the insurer must respect his wishes even if the insurer would wish to settle the
claim without incurring further costs. However, this must be subject to the insured’s view
being one that a reasonable insured could hold. There can be no justification for holding
an insurer liable for costs where the insured’s case would be regarded as baseless by a rea-
sonable insured.
C4. Secondly, the principle of reasonableness applies to any term in the policy that gives
the insurer control of the proceedings brought by the victim against the insured. Such
terms are commonplace in liability insurance policies and may well give rise to conflicts
of interest between the insured and the insurer. Situations may arise where the amount of
compensation claimed by the insured and the defence costs will exceed the sum insured by
the policy. For obvious reasons the insured may want to settle the claim for an amount (in-
cluding defence costs) that is within that sum insured or hardly in excess of it. The insurer,
on the other hand, may wish to continue to fight the claim, knowing that it is likely to have
to pay out the maximum under the policy in any case. If the victim is willing to compromise,
then the insurer that insisted on continuing to resist the claim would be in breach of the
requirement of reasonableness. For the same reason, the insurer must not settle a claim by
the victim if the insured reasonably protests that he is not in fact legally liable to the victim
and that such a settlement would be adverse to his interests.
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C5. The terms of the policy normally specify whether or not the costs of defence are
included within the overall sum insured or whether they are separately insured up to a
specified limit. However, such clauses are subject to Article 9:102 para. 2 which provides for
a minimum standard. Where the compensation and defence costs exceed the sum laid down
in the policy, the insured who has acted reasonably will be entitled to recover in excess.
C6. The principle of reasonableness also provides the test for clauses of the liability in-
surance policy that restrict the policyholder’s choice of defence lawyer. While such clauses
reflect the insurer’s legitimate interest in lowering the cost of defence, they may violate the
requirements of good faith and fair dealing and therefore be invalid under Article 2:304, for
example where the lawyer proposed by the insurer is unacceptable to the policyholder for
personal reasons or where that lawyer is involved in a conflict of interest between the policy-
holder and the victim. In such cases, the employment by the policyholder of an independent
lawyer may meet the standard of reasonableness under Article 9:102 even if that lawyer
charges higher fees than the lawyer proposed by the insurer. The standard of reasonableness
as applied here reflects the principle of free choice of the lawyer that is explicitly laid down
for legal expenses insurance in arts. 201 and 202 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
Multiple Insurance
C8. Defence costs to be reimbursed under Article 14:101 may at the same time be covered
under a legal expenses policy. In such case, Article 8:104 applies appropriately. The same
would apply if there is more than one liability policy.
Comments
Underlying Principle
C1. It is of paramount importance that the victim is not affected by actions of the policy-
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Article 14:103 Causation of Loss
holder or insured and the insurer that prejudice his claim. Article 14:102 makes it clear that
these actions include any steps taken by the policyholder or insured and/or the insurer and
not simply a formal binding agreement between them. To any such action the victim must
give his consent in writing.
C2. It is common that the insurer pays the victim directly even in the absence of a direct
claim. However, Article 14:102 covers a situation where the insurer makes payment to the
policyholder or insured rather than directly to the victim, and this includes even the case
where such payment is of the full amount of the victim’s claim. Payment by the liability
insurer to the policyholder does not necessarily discharge the insurer.
Scope
C3. The provision is relevant only in cases where the victim does not hold a direct claim
against the insurer in accordance with Article 15:101. By definition, an agreement or act of
the parties to the insurance contract is without effect on an existing direct claim. However,
the direct claim against the insurer is subject to a reduction in accordance with Article
15:104 if it is one out of several direct claims which in total exceed the insured sum.
C4. However, Article 14:102 does not apply to an agreement or equivalent regarding de-
fence costs, since an arrangement between the policyholder or insured and the insurer in
this respect is of no concern to the victim.
Comments
Underlying Principle
C1. Para. 1 of Article 14:103 reiterates the rule of public policy that, whereas loss caused
by negligence is coverable by insurance, loss caused intentionally or recklessly is not: see
Article 9:101 Comments 1 to 3. For example, a roof repairer covered for negligent work
is not covered where he damages a customer’s roof intentionally, motivated by malice or
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prompted by a cousin who is a competitor of the customer. On the other hand, the rule is not
infringed by an act which is committed knowingly and willingly but without any intention
to cause damaging consequences. Such act would be considered, for the purpose of para.
1, as negligent and hence insurable when viewed in the context of the work as a whole. For
example, a roof repairer intended to install a certain kind of tile and did so, however, the
tile was unsuitable for the work in question.
C2. Whereas, in accordance with the principle of freedom of contract, the policy may
impose specific precautionary measures in accordance with Article 4:101 or exclude specific
activities from cover, exclusion of the rule in Article 14:103 para. 1 shall be without effect.
C3. Para. 2 of Article 14:103 reflects the fact that often a clear line cannot be drawn be-
tween external events and the response to such events by policyholders or persons insured.
Envisaged are cases where such persons deliberately make little or no serious attempt to
avert or mitigate loss even though an attempt was perfectly viable, with the result that the
extent of the loss is greater than it would have been if their response had been more effec-
tive. Such a case might arise where tiles on a building owned by the insured fall off and the
insured knows that this is likely to happen again and cause damage, and nevertheless does
not take any measures to avoid that.
Specific Instructions
C4. The reference in para. 3 to compliance with the specific instructions of the insurer rests
on the presumption that liability insurers usually know how best to “salvage the situation”.
Moreover, if the instructions are given by public authorities, such as the police, fire brigade,
or army, a court seized of the issue may consider that such instructions have been accepted
and adopted by the insurer concerned, and that the instructions should be complied with
in accordance with para. 3. In principle, negligent non-compliance with such instructions
does not affect the policyholder’s claim to full indemnity. However, the parties are entitled
to derogate from this principle, if a term of the contract in question provides for a reduction
of the indemnity in accordance with the degree of the policyholder’s fault. Thus, a total
exclusion of indemnity in the case of negligence is without effect.
C5. While the specific instructions addressed in Article 14:103 para. 1 are intended to
contain the consequences of the insured event and to prevent further loss, the request for
information under Article 6:102 para. 1 is aimed at the retrospective investigation of the
insured event.
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Article 14:105 Assignment
Comments
Acceptance of the Victim’s Claim
C1. Some national laws require policyholders or insureds to observe “a duty of coopera-
tion”.27 A specific instance of the duty might be that, although they may admit facts about
what occurred, they must not accept or settle a victim’s claim without the consent of the
insurer. Under such laws the policy may provide that, if the policyholder or the insured is
in breach of duty in this respect, the insurer shall be released from all further obligations
under the insurance. Such clauses, being unduly onerous for the policyholder or the insured,
are without effect under para. 1 of Article 14:104. As a result, an insurer is not released from
its duty under the policy.
Insurer’s Consent
C2. Article 14:104 para. 1 does not have the effect that the insurer is bound by the pol-
icyholder’s settlement with the victim. Para. 2 of Article 14:104 makes this clear. In order
to bind the insurer, the settlement must be made with its consent. Such consent does not
require any specific form.
Comments
Interests Involved
C1. Whereas a person with liability insurance cannot assign the insurance, it may be in
the interests of that person (and that person’s associates) that particular claims under the
insurance be assigned. In particular, the insured may be interested in assigning a claim for
27
See, for example, art. 6:474 para. 1 Hungarian CC (note, however, that under para. 2 of the same
article, the insurer shall not be released from its liability in case the claim, acknowledged or satisfied,
is manifestly well founded) and art. 74 Spanish ICA. A provision similar to Article 14:104 can be
found in s. 154 para. 2 of the Austrian ICA (however, this provision in general permits a contractual
clause releasing the insurer from its obligation when the policyholder accepts the victim’s claim). Such
clauses are invalid in Germany due to s. 105 ICA. For Belgian law concerning insurance contracts
in general, see for example art. 74 IA 2014 (duty of the insured to inform the insurer immediately of
any claim and to transmit any relevant information), art. 75 IA 2014 (concerning the insured’s duty
to prevent and mitigate the loss); and concerning liability insurance, art. 144 IA 2014 (the duty of the
insured to transfer documents about the claim immediately), art. 145 IA 2014 (the duty of the insured
to show up in court when asked to do so). In the UK, in the case of liability insurance, the contract
commonly contains a co-operation clause, in which the insured promises not to admit liability or to
settle a claim without the consent of the insurer; see Terry v Trafalgar Ins Co Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep
524; and Rambharose v Bovell [2009] UKPC 6.
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Chapter Fourteen: General Liability Insurance
indemnity to the victim who would thereby get a direct claim against the liability insurer.
In the circumstances of the case, this might even be of vital importance for the relationship
between the insured and the victim.
C2 Insurers try to avoid procedural confrontation with a victim’s claim. They are afraid of
collusion between the victim and the insured. For instance, under national procedural law,
the insured may be able to testify in the (more effective) role of a witness instead of in the
role of a party following the assignment of the claim. That is why some standard conditions
of liability insurance declare the assignment of claims to be inadmissible.
Rationale
C3. Since, however, a claim for indemnity against an insurer is a part of the insured’s
assets he should be free to dispose of that claim as he is in respect of other assets. There is
in general no serious disadvantage to the insurer, assuming that the assignee acquires no
better rights against the insurer than the assignor. Therefore clauses prohibiting assignment
are nullified by Article 14:105.
C4. Insurers are moreover able to pursue their interests by other means. Apprehension
about being confronted with unjustified claims can for example be reduced by no-claims-bo-
nuses which provide an incentive to the insured not to assign and thereby lose control over
claims against the insurer. Where the claims record is made accessible to other insurers
(see Article 14:106), the insured will have to pay higher premiums over a number of years
irrespective of a change of the insurer.
Comments
Background
C1. It is commonplace in a number of different types of insurance for the insurer to re-
ward the policyholder who has not made a claim with a discount on future premiums (a
no-claims bonus). If no claim is made for a number of years, the discount over the amount
of premium that would otherwise be charged can be quite substantial.
Transfer of Bonuses
C2. Furthermore, in this situation, such discounts may be transferable to a policy taken
out with a new insurer and Article 14:106 para. 2 is to this effect (see below). Therefore,
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Article 14:107 Insured Event
when a policyholder is considering changing his insurer, it is vital that he is able to obtain
a statement of his claims record from his existing insurer so that he can produce this to a
new insurer and Article 14:106 para. 1 confers such a right on him, which is exercisable at
any time. This rule corresponds to art. 16 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/103/EC) and
fulfils the principle that policyholders should receive equal treatment from insurers. The
five year period is chosen because it achieves a fair balance and does not require an insurer
to keep records for an unduly long period.
Claims Record
C3. Article 14:106 para. 2 requires a new insurer to give due consideration to the policy-
holder’s claims record with other insurers for the past five years when assessing the premium
chargeable or imposing other terms. The latter might include any deductible payable by the
policyholder in the event of a claim against him. However, as para. 2 makes clear, this is
applicable only when the new insurer takes a claims record into account.
C4. For these purposes, claims include all claims which have actually been paid and re-
corded on the policyholder’s file by the insurer, irrespective of whether they were made by
the policyholder, an insured or a victim by way of a direct claim.
Comments
Background: Triggers for the Insurer’s Liability
C1. A distinctive particularity of liability insurance is that the insured event (the mate-
rialisation of the risk) may not be a single event but a gradual process that is spread out in
time, during which the insured incurs liability to a victim. In this process different succes-
sive steps can be distinguished: (i) when the initial act of the insured causing damage (or
another fact for which the insured is legally liable) occurs, (ii) when the latter leads to the
actual occurrence of loss or damage to a third person (or, in slightly different versions, the
phase in which such loss is “first sustained” or “first appears” or “becomes manifest”) and
(iii) when the victim makes a claim for damages against the insured or (where the law allows
it) directly against the liability insurer.
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C2. The question which of the steps mentioned determines whether an insured event
has occurred within the liability period of a given insurance contract (and is therefore the
trigger) will either be decided by law or a clause in the insurance contract. As long as there
is no mandatory rule of law, parties are free to choose the decisive step in their contract,
including choice of a mixture or combination of steps or an intermediate step.
C3. For instance, the contract may be made on an act committed basis. In that case, the
insurer will remain liable after the end of the liability period (posterior liability). Where,
however, the contract is made on a loss occurrence basis, the insurer will be liable for losses
occurring within the liability period even if the fact giving rise to liability took place before
the liability period (anterior liability) and, in addition, for losses occurring within the liabili-
ty period but giving rise to claims made only after it ends (posterior liability). The traditional
solution in many countries28 was that contracts were concluded on an act committed basis.
C4. In the 1980s, the asbestos cases made the insurance and reinsurance world aware of
the problems caused by the unlimited cover of long lasting, and sometimes even unforesee-
able, “long tail risks” which might materialise decades after the end of the liability period.
To cope with these problems, insurers have developed new formulas of coverage, like cover
“on loss occurence basis”, but also by linking cover to the sole requirement that the claim
for damages (against the insured or against the insurer) is made during the liability period
(cover on “claims made basis”).
C5. Claims made policies in particular gave rise to debate. It was pointed out that they
entail particular dangers for the insured. The main problem is that under a claims-made
policy the question whether the insured will actually enjoy cover depends on what is for
him a purely fortuitous condition, namely, whether the victim happens to make the claim
inside or outside the liability period. If the liability period of the insurance contract happens
to have expired at the moment when the victim lodges the claim, the insured will not get
cover (unless special arrangements were made by the parties). What makes this problem
even worse for the insured is that he will possibly not be able to benefit from a subsequent
insurance contract with another insurer. Even if the insured is successful in finding a sub-
sequent insurer, chances are that this insurer will exclude from the cover the consequences
of all acts or of losses that occurred under the previous contract, especially if they were
known to the insured when applying for cover with the subsequent insurer. Gaps in cover
will emerge between the contracts.
28
See, for instance, Austrian practice in the field of pure economic loss liability insurance. In the UK,
the act committed is the norm as a result of contract provisions in most types of liability insurance.
Professional indemnity insurance is the notable exception to that. This seems to have been the tradi-
tional point of departure of the Swedish law. When the ICA was adopted in 2005, the legislature was
well aware of the problems concerning the triggers for the insurer’s liability. However no step in favour
of one or another solution was taken.
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Article 14:107 Insured Event
C6. In some countries the introduction of claims made policies by insurers has given
rise to highly critical reactions from the courts29, or from legislation30 which have either
prohibited claims made policies or have submitted them to strict conditions. At present, the
situation in the Member States is very different: Whereas in some countries the parties enjoy
a high degree of freedom,31 in others the matter is dealt with by industry-wide standard
terms and in some there are statutory rules.
C7. For example, in the Netherlands, the “General Policy Clauses” apply a loss occur-
rence system for private insurance, and a claims-made system for business insurance. The
Dutch CC does not interfere with the core terms that state the essential description of the
cover granted; the limitation of the cover in time, including the claims made principle, is
considered to be such a core term. It is the practice in claims made insurance that the cover
basically grants an extended claims reporting period of one year if the insurer exercises its
right to terminate the contract. However, it is five years if termination is due to cessation of
the professional activity of the particular insured.
C8. In Austria, the insured event is defined32 as the fact giving rise to liability. Standard
contract terms may derogate from this definition. They often distinguish between various
kinds of liability insurance: As for liability insurance covering the death of a person, per-
sonal injury and damage to property, the insured event is defined as the occurrence of the
damage. If liability insurance covers pure economic loss only, the insured event is defined
as the negligent act causing the damage. Claims made policies are used mostly in the case
of D&O insurances.
C9. In Germany, the legislator refrains from giving a definition33 of what constitutes an
“insured event” leaving a more precise definition to the standard terms of liability insurance,
in which different “triggers” are used for different kinds of risks. For a number of categories
of professionals, tailor-made solutions have been drafted.
29
In France the clause de réclamation (claims made clause) was considered to be illicit by the French
Cour de Cassation (Cass. fr. 19.12.1990 (7 decisions), RGAT 1991, 155). In Spain, Tribunal Supremo
(Supreme Court) in decisions of 20 March 1991, 23 April 1992, 14 July 2003, 1 December 2006, 28
May 2007 and 3 July 2009 voided claims made clauses. Also in Italy, courts were initially divided over
the validity of claims made clauses. More recent case law (see, for example, Cass. 13.1.2005, no. 562
(Court of Cassation)) decided that such clauses are valid, but their validity is subject to the formal
requirements that are imposed on some restrictive contract terms under art. 1341 para. 2 CC. In
Greece, concerns regarding the validity of claims-made clauses have also been raised in legal insur-
ance doctrine (see Rokas para. 268 ff.); there has been case law which has accepted the validility of a
claims-made clause in the context of professional insurance contracts (see Athens Court of Appeal
110/2011, EEmpD 2011, 119).
30
In its original version, The Belgian ICA of 1992 imposed compulsory coverage on “act committed
basis”, with unlimited posteriority coverage.
31
For example, in Finland, Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom and Ireland. For Germany, BGH
26.3.2014, Versicherungsrecht 2014, 625.
32
S. 149 Austrian ICA.
33
See s. 100 German ICA.
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Chapter Fourteen: General Liability Insurance
C11. In Spain, in response to the Supreme Court judgment37 the legislator intervened
in 199538 and allowed a claims-made system but only if the policy provides for (i) cover
for claims made within one year after the end of the contract for loss occurring during the
contract period, or (ii) cover for acts committed within one year before the commencement
of the cover.
C12. Under art. 142 Belgian IA (corresponding to art. 78 of the former ICA) in contracts
for common risks such as motor vehicle liability insurance, or consumer liability insurance
contracts it is compulsory for cover to be on a “loss occurrence” basis with unlimited pos-
terior cover. In other contracts, parties may agree that cover will be limited to claims made
during the contract period for losses that occurred during that period. However, if the
parties so agree, cover will extend to claims made within thirty-six months after the end of
the contract, if (i) these claims relate to loss occurring during the contract period and not
covered by another insurance; or (ii) if acts or facts that may give rise to liability during the
contract period were notified to the insurer before the end of the contract period.
C13. In Luxembourg,39 the insurance contract covers loss occurring during the contract
period even if the claim is made after the termination of the contract. However, for all
branches other than motor vehicle insurance, the parties may agree that cover will be limited
to claims that are made within three years after the occurrence of the loss.
C14. The PEICL set out a general definition of the insured event which refers to the fact
which gives rise to the liability of the insured. If this fact occurred during the liability period
of an insurance contract, cover will be due on the basis of this contract. The general defini-
tion applies in principle to all liability risks. However, here the PEICL make – contrary to
their general approach – a distinction between consumer contracts and liability insurance
34
See above, note 29.
35
Art. L. 124-5.
36
Art. L. 124-5.
37
See above, note 29.
38
Art. 73 para. 2 Spanish ICA.
39
Art. 81 Luxembourg ICA.
296
Article 14:107 Insured Event
contracts covering business risks. This is due to the nature of liability risks. In consumer
liability insurance such risks have a standard character usually known to the insurer. By
contrast, commercial and professionals risks, even those below the threshold of large risks,
may be highly individual, involve large sums and materialise only after years. Often the
policyholder has a better awareness of this risk than the insurer. The distinction made by
the PEICL when it comes to liability insurance concerns the mandatory or non-mandatory
character of the general definition.
C16. This rule implies that cover is effective if the fact giving rise to liability took place
during the liability period, even if the loss to the victim occurred only later after the end of
that period, and even if the claim against the insured (or where the law allows it, directly
against the liability insurer) was lodged after the liability period.
C17. “Fact” is used in Article 14:107 to mean acts, omissions and other circumstances
which give rise to liability.
C18. In commercial and professional liability insurance, the insured also expects the in-
surance contract to cover facts occurring during the liability period. In accordance with the
law of some Member States and policy practice, the rule in para. 1 applies to insurance con-
tracts for commercial or professional purposes as well. However, for the reasons explained
in Comment 19, the parties must be allowed to derogate from the general rule, so when it
comes to professional and commercial risks, Article 14:107 para. 1 is only a default rule.
C19. As regards insurance contracts for commercial or professional purposes long tail
risks are more frequent, and also more problematic than they are for consumer liability con-
tracts. Bearing in mind the diversity of the situations, the varying needs of the parties, and
the particularities of specific risks and branches of insurance, it does not seem appropriate
to impose the basic rule nor any other specific formula concerning the duration of cover. It
would be unwise to utterly restrict the freedom of the parties in their search for adequate
solutions. In addition, legal limitations that are too strict might impede new developments.
The parties must have the freedom to derogate from the basic rule and to opt for one of
the manifold solutions and formulae or a combination thereof. It is consequently up to the
parties and to the insurance intermediary to be attentive to these problems. However, there
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Chapter Fourteen: General Liability Insurance
are good reasons for making an explicit legal rule for those contracts where the parties have
chosen a claims-made solution.
C20. Claims made clauses deserve particular attention because they are very common,
they are often unclear and they entail serious dangers for the insured (see Comment 5,
above).
C21. To deal with these problems, para. 2 contains a specific rule as regards the duration
of cover in claims made policies. If the parties to a contract covering professional or com-
mercial risks opt for a formula of cover on a claims-made basis, the contract is deemed to
provide cover not only for claims made during the liability period but also for claims made
during a subsequent period. It is up to the parties to determine the duration of this period
but it can never be shorter than five years starting from the end of the liability period.
C22. The posterior cover applies where the fact on which the claim is based occurred
before the end of the liability period and even if it occurred before the commencement of
the liability period. The logic of a claims-made formula implies that there is anterior cover,
namely for facts and even losses that preceded the insurance contract.
C23. The second sentence of Article 14:107 para. 2 allows the insurer to exclude the ante-
rior cover. The insurance contract may exclude cover for all claims that are based on facts
and losses that occurred before the liability period, if the applicant at the time of the con-
clusion of the contract was aware or ought to have been aware of them and he should have
expected them to give rise to claims. The logic of a claims-made policy does not go so far as
to oblige the insurer to extend the anterior cover to facts of which the applicant had actual
or constructive knowledge at the time of concluding the contract. Whereas the insurer who
contracts on a claims-made basis is obliged to give posterior cover of no less than five years,
it can limit the anterior cover to only those facts which were unknown to the applicant.
Other Clauses
C24. The fact that Article 14:107 deals explicitly with the conditions and limits of a claims-
made policy does not imply that the parties have entire freedom with respect to the effects
of other clauses which derogate from the general rule that prescribes cover on an act com-
mitted basis. Examples are clauses based on loss occurrence or clauses using other triggers
or combinations of triggers.
C25. Whatever choice the parties make, they must take into account all the concerns
which underlie the solution applied to claims made policies in Article 14:107 para. 2. In
some Member States such clauses are submitted to an unfairness test as are other standard
clauses. This is also the standard under the PEICL, see Article 2:304. Article 14:107 should
serve as a guideline for the assessment of other clauses under Article 2:304.
298
Article 14:108 Claims Exceeding the Sum Insured
Comments
Rationale
C1. Unless an insurer offers liability insurance with unlimited coverage, its liability will be
limited by the insured sum. Any claim exceeding the insured sum will not be fully covered
and, thus, the victim(s) will have to recover the amount of the excess from the person liable
under the law of torts. This applies in all cases irrespective whether it is the claim of a single
victim or the aggregate of claims of several victims which exceed the insured sum. In the
latter case the question arises which claim(s) will be covered in total or in part by the insured
sum and which others must be recovered from the person liable. The law of obligations
usually follows the “first come, first served” model. Following this principle, an insurer that
pays out the insured sum to victim A would perform its obligation under the liability in-
surance contract and would not be liable for any further claims brought by victims B and C.
C2. This result appears to be unfair: There is no reason why a victim who is in a position
to bring his claim relatively quickly against the person liable, for instance because he has
only suffered damage to property, should enjoy the privilege of recovering under the liability
insurance contract, whereas a person who is hindered from bringing a claim, for instance
because he is severely injured and hospitalised, should have to claim in tort not covered by
the insurance contract because the insured sum is exhausted. The law should not provide
such incentives to rush to the courts. Equally, there is no convincing reason why a tortfea-
sor and/or his insurer should have the power to determine freely which of several claims
brought at the same time will be covered under the insurance contract. This is why Article
14:108 distributes the insured sum proportionally among the victims in a way that is similar
to the distribution of the assets of a bankrupt debtor to his creditors.
C3. Strict application of the proportionality rule under para. 1 would create the risk for the
insurer of being held liable for more than the insured sum. This would be the case if further
victims unknown to the insurer when the insurance money is distributed bring claims later.
Such an outcome would be unfair. Thus, an insurer which acts in good faith and complies
with the duty of equal treatment of all victims and pays out the insured sum will be protected
against further claims brought later. Having obliged the insurer to distribute the insured
sum proportionally, this protection is simply the other side of the coin.
Proportionality
C4. The only precondition for the application of the proportionality rule is the mere fact
that the claims exceed the insured sum. Such being the case, Article 14:108 para. 1 provides
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Chapter Fourteen: General Liability Insurance
for a proportionate reduction of each and every claim made. For example: Victim A suffered
a loss of 1 million, B a loss of 2 million and C a loss of 3 million. This means a total loss of
6 million. The sum insured is 4 million which is the ultimate limit for all payments by the
insurer. Thus, all payments must be reduced to 4/6 = 2/3 of their losses: A will receive 1/6
of 4 million, B 2/6 = 1/3 of 4 million and C 3/6 = 1/2 of 4 million.
C5. In cases where the insured has cover under more than one liability insurance contract,
the insured sums must be added and Article 14:108 applied as though the aggregate insured
sum were under one insurance contract only.
Multiple Events
C6. Article 14:108 typically applies where several victims of a single event, for instance
an explosion, bring claims exceeding the insured sum. To what extent the same rule may
be applied to cases where several victims of two or more events bring claims exceeding the
insured sum (potentially also the aggregate sum for the current insurance period) has to
be determined by the judge in the light of the circumstances of the case. A series of events
may be considered as a single insured event or as several insured events (depending on the
terms of the insurance contract, the length of the time between the events, questions of
causation and so on).
C7. In general, an insurer will be required to treat victims equally also in such situations
where several victims of two or more events bring claims exceeding the insured sum. On
the other hand, it cannot be asked more than to act in good faith. For instance, if a series
of acts committed by the insured is considered to be several insured events, Article 14:108
may be applied mutatis mutandis. Whereas, if a single event has taken place and the liability
issue has been assessed, an insurer will neither be allowed nor obliged to withhold payment
because of the mere possibility of another insured event occurring within the same insur-
ance period.
C8. Protection of the insurer which pays for claims of victims known to it will depend on
its acting in good faith. An insurer acts in good faith when it pays to known victims without
negligently overlooking other victims. The application of the relevant standard of care will
depend on the circumstances of the case.
C9. An insurer acting in good faith will be protected in cases where indemnification of
known victims exhausts the insured sum as well as where a part of the insured sum has not
been exhausted but is at the same time insufficient to cover the share the unknown victim
would have received had the insured sum been distributed among all victims. For instance,
where two victims known to the insurer bring claims for 1 million each and the insured
sum is 1 million, each of them will be paid 500,000 and nothing will be paid to a third
victim bringing his claim for yet another 1 million later. He will thus not be able to recover
333,333.33 he would have recovered had the insured sum been paid out proportionately
in accordance with Article 14:108 para. 1. If, however, the insured sum is 2.5 million, the
two victims known to the insurer will be fully covered and the third victim who brought
300
Article 15:101 Direct Claims and Defences
his claim later will be covered for the remaining 500,000. He will, however, not be able to
recover the 833,333.33 he would have recovered had the insured sum been paid out propor-
tionally in accordance with Article 14:108 para. 1.
Comments
Rationale
C1. A direct claim against the insurer is provided by para. 1 in order to streamline com-
pensation procedures and to protect the victim. Such protection appears justified on the
assumption that private liability insurance does not exclusively serve the interests of the
policyholder and/or insured but at the same time also serves the interests of the victim
representing a social dimension of liability insurance. This assumption is supported by the
law of the Member States all of which provide for direct claims at least to a certain extent.
While some grant victims a direct claim in any case40, others restrict it to motor vehicle
liability insurance41 where a direct claim is provided following art. 18 of the Motor Vehicle
Liability Insurance Directive (2009/103/EC) whereas other Member States apply interme-
40
The general principle of direct claims was developed by the courts in France (Cass. civ., 14.6.1926, DP
1927.J.57), and since 2007, art. L. 124-3 French ICA. See also art. 76 Spanish ICA and art. 150 Belgian
IA 2014 (first introduced in 1992; which gives the injured party a “ius proprium” against the insurer
in every type of liability insurance). Art. 151 Belgian IA 2014, however, makes a distinction between
compulsory and non-compulsory liability insurance, but only as regards the contention of the defenc-
es of the insurer against the injured party.
41
See, for instance, s. 25 of the Austrian Motor Insurance Act; art. 10 para. 1 of the Greek Code on
Motor Liability Insurance, see also n. 42; art. 6:473 para. 1 Hungarian CC and art. 28 para. 1 of the
Hungarian Law on Motor Liability Insurance.
301
Chapter Fifteen: Direct Claims and Direct Actions
diate solutions granting a direct claim only in a list of situations.42 In accordance with
the social dimension of liability insurance, while at the same time seeking a compromise
between the different solutions in the Member States, Article 15:101 lists the cases where a
direct claim is granted.
C2. According to the concept underlying the PEICL, the direct claim does not provide the
victim with more than what the insured is entitled to under the insurance cover. Thus, an
insurer being sued directly by the victim will be able to rely on defences available under the
insurance contract. Exceptions to this principle are left to specific provisions on compulso-
ry liability insurance such as, for instance, art. 13 of the Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance
Directive (2009/103/EC) deeming certain exclusion clauses to be void in respect of claims
brought by victims. The only general exception in the second sentence of Article 15:101
para. 2 of the PEICL is intended to avoid moral hazard on the part of the policyholder and
insured once the direct claim has come into existence.
Compulsory Insurance
C3. The victim enjoys a direct claim if the liability insurance has been taken out in com-
pliance with a rule making it compulsory (para. 1(a); see also Article 16:101). In compulsory
insurance the social dimension of protecting the victim is particularly important and usually
justifies the imposition of an insurance requirement on the policyholder as well as granting
the right of direct action for the victim.
Insolvency
C4. If the policyholder or the insured becomes insolvent the claim against the liability
insurer following from an insured event would normally form part of the bankrupt estate of
the policyholder or insured and would therefore be distributed among all creditors, the vic-
tim being only one of them and receiving only a share of it. Para. 1(b) prevents this result by
giving the victim a direct claim which is not part of the bankrupt estate of the policyholder
or insured and, thus, will allow the victim to recover damages up to the sum insured. This
case of a direct claim appears to be justified because the victim deserves to be in a stronger
position as regards the insured sum than other creditors of the policyholder or the insured.
Moreover, several of those Member States which do not grant a direct claim in this case pro-
42
See art. 7:954 Dutch CC limiting a direct claim to loss as a result of death or bodily injury; s. 67 of
the Finnish ICA providing a direct claim if 1) the insurance is statutory, 2) the insured has been de-
clared bankrupt or is otherwise insolvent, or 3) the general liability insurance has been mentioned in
marketing efforts launched to promote the insured‘s business; s. 115 of the German ICA providing a
direct claim in all compulsory insurances if certain criteria are met. A similar position is encountered
in Greece. Art. 26 of the Greek ICA (which does not apply to motor third party liability insurance
governed by the Code on Motor Liability Insurance) provides for a direct claim of third parties in all
compulsory insurances if certain criteria are met. Yet the stipulations of this provision have not been
applied in practice so far due to non-issuance of the secondary legislation which is necessary for the
implementation of such provision. See for Sweden, ss. 7 and 8 of Ch. 9 ICA. See also van der Sluijs,
Direktkrav; Johansson/van der Sluijs, Direktkrav vid ansvarsförsäkring enligt den nya försäkring-
savtalslagen (2006); and van der Sluijs, Studier i försäkringsrätt, 15-29. For further references, see also
Bengtsson 389-393.
302
Article 15:101 Direct Claims and Defences
vide that the victim has a priority interest in the rights of the policyholder or insured against
the liability insurer.43 In these Member States the law is close to providing a direct claim.
Liquidation or Winding up
C5. Granting a direct claim in cases where the policyholder or insured has been liquidat-
ed or wound up (para. 1(c)) is based on considerations similar to the direct claim in cases
of insolvency because the assets of the liquidated policyholder or insured are distributed
among the creditors. Moreover, it will not be necessary for the victim to sue a legal entity
which might have ceased to exist. Ultimately, para. 1(c) gives victims privileged access to
the insurance claims held by the policyholder or insured.
Personal Injury
C6. Para. 1(d) grants a direct claim in all cases where personal injury has been suffered by
the victim. This case is based on equitable considerations and provides for a strong social
dimension in liability insurance. The victim suffering personal injury should not be com-
pelled to first bring a claim against the tortfeasor who might be unable to satisfy the victim.
This aspect is of particular importance in the case of personal injuries.
C7. Finally, para. 1(e) grants a direct claim in cases where such a claim is provided for
under the law governing liability. This provision may be of a declaratory nature only. Article
15:101 para. 1(e) PEICL follows art. 18 of the Rome II Regulation (864/2007): “[t]he person
having suffered damage may bring his claim directly against the insurer of the person liable
to provide compensation if the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation or the law
applicable to the insurance contract so provides”. Among these two alternatives, the PEICL
will cover only alternative 2 (the law applicable to the insurance contract) if chosen by the
parties. Choice of the PEICL does not, however, have any impact on alternative 1 (the law
governing the liability). Thus, the Rome II Regulation (864/2007) predicates that such a
direct claim must be provided for and para. 1(e) avoids any conflict between the PEICL and
art. 18 of the Rome II Regulation (864/2007).
C8. There are at least two “inherent” limits to a direct claim under the PEICL. The first
concerns liability. The claim of the victim against the insurer should not go beyond the
claim in liability against the insured (insurance follows liability). Thus, no direct claim
is provided by Article 15:101 para. 1 where there is no liability on the part of the insured
(above Comment 2). The second limit concerns cover. Subject to what is said in Comment 9,
the direct claim will not provide the victim with more than what the insured is entitled to
under the insurance contract. Consequently, as a matter of procedure, in a direct action
43
See s. 157 Austrian ICA; art. 3:287 Dutch CC granting the victim a priority interest in the rights of
the policyholder or insured against the liability insurer in case of other types of loss than death and
bodily injury.
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Chapter Fifteen: Direct Claims and Direct Actions
brought by the victim the court will have to ascertain both the existence of liability as well
as corresponding insurance cover.
Defences
C9. It is debatable to what extent the insurer should be allowed to raise defences under the
insurance contract as, for instance, discharge due to non-payment of premium or breach
of precautionary measures by the policyholder, against the victim making a direct claim.
Bearing in mind the “inherent limits” to a direct claim under the PEICL and as described
in Comment 8, a victim should not benefit from insurance which does not cover liability
of the insured.
C10. The only general exception refers to defences “based upon the conduct of the poli-
cyholder and/or the insured after the loss” (second sentence of Article 15:101 para. 2). The
direct claim arises when the loss occurs and cannot be obstructed by the subsequent behav-
iour of the policyholder or the insured. Otherwise a moral hazard problem could emerge
allowing the policyholder to get rid of the claim of the victim, for instance, by misconduct.
Therefore, second sentence of Article 15:101 para. 2 prevents the insurer from invoking
such defences against the victim. This will, however, not prevent it from relying on the
misconduct of the policyholder or insured and thus having recourse against either of them.
C11. The picture changes fundamentally when it comes to compulsory insurance. Com-
pulsory insurance primarily protects the victim against the inability of the policyholder or
insured to pay damages. Thus, many national laws preclude the insurer from relying on
defences under the insurance contract. The extent to which this is the case varies within
the Member States and branches of liability insurance. Such rules will still apply even if the
PEICL are chosen as the applicable law (see also Article 16:101 para. 2).
Comments
Rationale
C1. Article 15:102 responds to situations of imbalance of information as between the three
304
Article 15:102 Information Duties
parties involved – the insurer, the policyholder or insured, as the case may be, and the vic-
tim. Para. 1 ensures that the victim obtains all information necessary from the policyholder
and the insured to enforce a direct claim. Para. 2 ensures that a policyholder is informed
by the insurer about any direct claim made by the victim so that the policyholder gets a
chance to contribute to the settlement negotiations or even pay the claim personally. Para.
3 ensures that the insurer will obtain any information about the insured event known to the
policyholder and relevant for the settlement of the direct claim.
C2. Unless there is a duty to insure, a victim cannot know whether the person liable has
cover under a liability insurance contract and on which conditions exactly. Thus, victims
will not know whether they have a direct claim, who is the insurer, what are the insured
sums available, whether the insurer has been discharged and so on. A duty to inform the
victim may result from the liability regime applicable as between the person liable and
the victim which is not subject to the PEICL. Independently thereof, Article 15:102 para.
1 imposes a corresponding information duty on the policyholder and the insured. Thus,
if the policyholder and the insurer agree on the PEICL in accordance with Article 1:102,
they benefit the victim as a third party to the contract by making Article 15:102 applicable.
C3. What is “needed” must be decided in the light of the circumstances of the individual
case. Usually, the existence of a liability insurance contract, the insured sums available and
the scope of cover will be sufficient. Reasons for assuming that the insurer may be dis-
charged may also be relevant. In general, a policyholder will have fulfilled the obligation
under para. 1 by submission of copies of the contractual documents to the victim.
C4. A policyholder may not know that the victim has made a claim against the insurer
directly. In this context, it must be noted that a claim is not only made when an action is
brought against the insurer but also when it is notified to the insurer or if mechanisms of
alternative dispute resolution are initiated, for example, when a complaint is filed with the
insurance ombudsman. There is a clear interest of policyholders in learning about a claim
made. First of all, they will want to contribute to the settlement negotiations. Secondly, they
may wish to pay damages themselves if they fear that otherwise the premium will be raised
or that they might even be without cover at all. Thus, para. 2 obliges the insurer to notify
the policyholder of a claim made against it directly. Notice must be given without undue
delay but no later than two weeks after the claim is made.
Sanctions
C5. If an insurer is in breach of its information duty, any settlement between it and the
victim will not be binding on the policyholder. The latter may rely on the settlement but does
not have to. Claims for compensation in accordance with Article 1:105 may also be available.
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Chapter Fifteen: Direct Claims and Direct Actions
C6. A policyholder who has been informed about a direct claim made against the insurer
in accordance with para. 2 will be obliged to provide the insurer with information about the
insured event. In principle, this follows from the general duty of the policyholder to coop-
erate with the insurer in the investigation of the insured event in accordance with Article
6:102. The first sentence of para. 3 goes even further and prescribes that a policyholder in
breach of the information duty will be deemed to have agreed to the settlement. Thus, a
policyholder will not be able to maintain against the insurer that a victim’s claim was un-
founded, whether as a whole or in part.
C7. A corresponding duty to inform is imposed on the insured in the second sentence of
para. 3. This duty arises when the insured has actually received a notice of the claim made
by the victim in time. The term “in time” does not refer to the two-week period provided
for in para. 2. It only requires sufficient notice to give the insured the chance to provide
relevant information.
C8. Where the insured is in breach of this duty, he will be deemed to have agreed to a
direct settlement of the claim by the insurer. This may lead to economic consequences such
as an increase in premium for the policyholder.
C9. An insurer relying on para. 3 will have to grant the policyholder or insured, as the
case may be, a reasonable period of time for fulfilling the information duty. One month is
deemed to be a reasonable time.
C10. The first and second sentences of para. 3 only refer to the standard case where the
policyholder or insured finds out about the direct claim being made by notification from the
insurer. However, it applies equally whenever the policyholder or insured finds out about
the direct claim being made by other means. An example would be where the insurer has
notified the policyholder about the direct claim and the latter has forwarded such infor-
mation to the insured.
306
Article 15:104 Prescription
Comments
Rationale
C1. It has been mentioned that a primary purpose of the direct claim is to protect the
victim upon an insolvency of the policyholder or insured, as the case may be (see Article
15:101 Comment 4). Such purpose would be undermined if the insurer could discharge itself
as against the victim by paying insurance money to the policyholder or insured, as the case
may be. Insurance money received by the policyholder or insured would form part of the
assets of the payee and, thus, would be distributed among all of the creditors participating in
the insolvency proceeding. The intention underlying Article 15:103 is to avoid such results.
Principle
C2. In principle, any payment made by the insurer to the policyholder or insured will not
discharge the insurer as against the victim. The insurer will only be discharged if and to the
extent that the insurance money is actually received by the victim.
Exceptions
C3. Article 15:103 sets out two exceptions where the insurer will be discharged. Both
exceptions are based on the idea that a victim, who does not even intend to enforce the
claim directly, should not be able to prevent an insurer from paying insurance money to
the policyholder or insured.
C4. The first exception (in (a)) refers to the case where the victim has straightforwardly
waived the right to claim compensation directly with the insurer. Once the right is waived,
that is that.
C5. The second exception (in (b)) is similar. Where a victim does not show any interest
in bringing a claim directly, even though requested to do so in writing by the insurer, the
victim no longer needs protection against payments to the policyholder or insured. Under
(b), the victim is granted a period of four weeks after the request of the insurer to bring the
direct claim.
307
Chapter Fifteen: Direct Claims and Direct Actions
Comments
Rationale
C1. Article 15:104 adds specific provisions to the general rules on prescription, as set out
in Articles 7:101 ff. It deals with specific aspects which most of all relate to the hybrid nature
of a direct claim combining elements of insurance contract and liability law. Para. 1 seeks
to bring in line the prescription period for a direct claim with the period for the underlying
liability claim. Para. 2 gives parties (the victim and the insurer) time to negotiate and settle
or reject the claim without having to be concerned about the prescription of the victim’s
claim against the insured.
Prescription Period
C2. Para. 1 establishes a special prescription period for a direct claim against the insurer
and subjects such a claim to the period of prescription applicable to the victim’s claim. This
follows from the fact that the direct claim makes the insurer jointly and severally liable with
the insured. It should not be possible for the victim to sue the insurer and collect insurance
money at a time when his rights to claim damages against the insured are prescribed.
C3. The same applies to the claim of the insured under the insurance contract. Thus, an
insurer will be able to raise prescription as a defence against both the insured and the victim.
C4. The prescription period for the liability claim against the insured will be determined
by the law applicable to the liability. This law is to be determined in accordance with the
conflict rules of Rome I Regulation (593/2008), where liability is contractual, or Rome II
Regulation (864/2007), where liability is non-contractual.
C5. Even if the victim’s claim against the insured is prescribed, the prescription itself may
be the object of litigation between them which gives rise to costs. Defence costs incurred
by the insured are mitigation costs as defined in Article 14:101. The insurer is obliged to
cover those costs and will not be able to rely on prescription of the insured’s claim under
Article 15:104 para. 1. Any other interpretation of the rule would contradict its purpose
and that of Article 14:101. Moreover, it would deprive the insured of any incentive to invoke
prescription which would also be against the insurer’s interests.
Suspension
C6. A victim with a direct claim will usually start negotiating his claim with the insurer.
These negotiations should not be put under time pressure by the fact that the prescription
period of the claim against the insured under liability law will keep running during the
victim’s negotiations with the insurer. This is why para. 2 suspends prescription of this
(the liability) claim from the time the insured acquires knowledge of the claim being made
against the insurer until the settlement or final rejection of the claim.
308
Article 16:101 Scope of Application
C7. It must, however, be borne in mind that prescription of the claim of the victim against
the insured is not subject to the PEICL but the law governing liability. Under that law, the
insured will be entitled to raise the defence of prescription or not. By the agreement on the
applicability of the PEICL, the insured agrees not to invoke prescription as against the victim
as long as prescription is suspended under para. 2. This agreement is intended to benefit
the victim who will be entitled to invoke suspension. Where the law which governs liability
goes even further, the victim may rely on it.
C8. An important and intended effect of para. 2 is to preclude an insurer from negotiating
the direct claim and ultimately relying on it being prescribed due to the prescription of the
underlying liability claim in accordance with para. 1.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Liability insurance has evolved as a voluntary transaction designed to avert the ruin-
ous consequences civil liability vis-à-vis third parties may have for the policyholder. Over
time, scientific and technological progress have considerably increased the risks inherent
in certain activities and have given rise to new, formerly unknown and particularly risky
types of action. Those engaging in such activities have often no sufficient means to meet
the consequences of those risks or have tried to reduce their risk exposure, for example, by
means of corporate veils. The consequence of these developments has been a shift of risks to
third parties uninvolved in, but affected by, the policyholder’s activities. At the same time,
this shift of risks could not be avoided by strengthening the liability regime by introducing
strict liability of persons engaging in hazardous activities.
C2. Legislatures in many countries have tried to protect the third parties thus affected by
subjecting the exercise of certain activities to the compulsory conclusion of liability insur-
ance contracts. The activities thus affected, the scope of the liability insurance required, and
the defences permitted differ from country to country; differences may even exist within
a country in respect of the same activity as between various regions. But there are certain
309
Chapter Sixteen: Compulsory Insurance
common features. In any event, compulsory liability insurance is meant to protect the third
party suffering loss from the policyholder’s activity, and not primarily the policyholder.
C3. It is not the purpose and beyond the scope of the PEICL to harmonise or unify the
numerous and divergent duties to insure liability that exist in the European Union. These
duties often form an integral part of the economic regulation of a trade or profession from
which they can hardly be separated. However, the respect for specific regulatory require-
ments concerning for example the extent of cover or the exclusion of certain defences does
not necessarily exclude the use of a common contractual framework such as the PEICL.
C4. In substance, art. 7 para. 4(a) of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008/EC) makes clear
that a conflict between the applicable contract law and the law of the state imposing the
obligation to insure has to be resolved in favour of the latter. This rule has inspired Article
16:101 para. 2; it is sufficient to safeguard the regulatory purpose of the duty to insure.
C5. The additional reservation for a Member State, permitted by art. 7 para. 4(b) of the
Rome I Regulation (593/2008/EC), to prescribe that its own contract law governs an in-
surance made compulsory under its law, will not exclude the PEICL once it is accepted as
an optional instrument through a European regulation. Such regulation will be “directly
applicable in all Member States” in accordance with art. 288 para. 2 TFEU and will therefore
form part of the law of each Member State. Consequently the requirement established by a
Member State under art. 7 para. 4(b) of the Rome I Regulation (593/2008/EC) will encom-
pass both the autonomous national contract law and the PEICL.
C6. Compulsory insurance may result from duties originating in the law of the European
Union, in the law of Member States, in the law of third States, or in private instruments
such as a contract or the articles of an association. Article 16:101 does not aim at insurance
obligations of the latter kind; they are of private origin and are therefore classified as volun-
tary for the purposes of the PEICL which can be used for such insurance contracts anyway.
C7. EU law itself has established obligations to insure for a number of activities including
those of air carriers,44 users of motor vehicles,45 ship-owners46 or insurance intermediaries.47
Where a duty to insure arises from the law of the Union, insurance taken out to satisfy that
duty may be based either on national contract law or on the PEICL. In other cases, EU law
explicitly allows Member States to establish an insurance obligation as a condition precedent
44
Concerning the liability in respect of passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties see Aircraft Insur-
ance Regulation (785/2004); for the carriage of mail see art. 11 of the Air Services Operation Regula-
tion (1008/2008).
45
Art. 3 of the Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Directive (2009/103/EC).
46
Art. 4 of the Maritime Insurance Directive (2009/20/EC); on the application of the PEICL to marine
insurance see Article 1:101 Comment 7 and Notes 3 to 5.
47
Art. 4 para. 3 of the Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC), as amended.
310
Article 16:101 Scope of Application
to the provision of services offered by foreign suppliers on their respective markets; this is
for example the case for lawyers.48 Where host Member States make use of that permission
the PEICL are equally available for the insurance contracts in question.
C8. Most duties to insure are laid down at the level of Member States, either in national law
or at a lower level in instruments adopted by official entities invested with regulatory powers
such as autonomous regions in federal Member States, municipalities or professional bodies.
These obligations exist in great variety within the EU. In some Member States their number
exceeds one hundred, in others there are not more than a few. Sometimes the instruments
simply enunciate the duty to insure as such, in other instances the duty is specified in respect
of the amount of the insurance sum, the persons to be covered, the defences permitted or
excluded, and so on, by rules which affect the contractual relationship between the insurer
and the insured. Article 16:101 para. 1(b) permits the parties to opt for the PEICL as the
contract law governing their contract. This gives rise to problems of coordination, see below
Comment 11.
C9. An applicant and an insurer, whether located inside or outside the European Union,
may conclude the contract in view of a risk located outside the Union which is the object
of a duty to insure established by the law of a third state. There is nothing in the PEICL to
preclude the parties from using the PEICL for that purpose. However, the Union is not able
to give an authoritative answer to the question whether a contract subject to the PEICL will
satisfy the insurance obligation laid down in the third country. This is a matter to be decided
by the law of that third State, as made clear by Article 16:101 para. 1(c).
C10. Just as national contract law can be made compatible with the divergent rules on
duties to insure adopted in a Member State (see above Comment 8), the PEICL can be rec-
onciled with them. That is the purpose of Article 16:101 para. 2 which – contrary to Article
1:105 – gives priority to national law in the case of a conflict with the PEICL. This priority
rule is necessary to make the PEICL applicable to insurance contracts satisfying duties to
insure imposed by national law. In respect of the victim’s direct claim against the insurer the
same principle is expressed in Article 15:101 para. 2 which excludes defences of the victim
where specific rules of the law making the insurance compulsory so provide.
C11. However, para. 2 has the inconvenient effect of imposing additional costs in the
drafting of insurance policies designed to satisfy duties to insure in different Member States.
Take for example the case of an insurer who wants to offer cover for motor vehicle liability
in respect of vehicles “normally based” in different Member States. The law of the “territory
in which the vehicle is normally based” is relevant for determining the details of the duty to
insure under art. 3 of the Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Directive (2009/103/EC). Thus,
that insurer will have to check the law of targeted Member States to find out, for instance,
whether non-payment of the premium discharges the insurer from the duty to pay com-
pensation to a victim suffering loss for which the policyholder is liable, whether there is an
insurance sum exceeding the minimum amount established by the Directive and so on. It
48
Art. 6 para. 3 of the Lawyers’ Establishment Directive (98/5/EC).
311
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
is up to the Union’s further harmonization efforts in this field to overcome the difficulties
involved.
Comments
Rationale
C1. It is common practice in all Member States that a life insurance contract may be taken
out on the life of either the policyholder or a third person. Article 17:101 is based on this
principle. Even though the provision refrains from stating in a positive manner49 that taking
out a life insurance contract on the life of a third party is permitted, it only restricts but does
not rule out such a possibility and, thus, accepts it implicitly. Indeed, there are many situa-
tions where insurances on the life of a third party serve important functions. For instance,
an employer may take out life insurance on the life of employees in order to finance private
pension schemes in favour of employees and/or financial support for their families in case
of death. Such conduct should therefore be accommodated.
C2. If insurance is taken on the life of a third party, the policyholders conclude the in-
surance contract in their own names whereas the third person, upon whose life the policy
is taken, is the “person at risk” as defined in Article 1:202 para. 3. Here the position of
the person at risk poses two problems: Firstly, any insurance on the life of the third party
creates an economic interest of the beneficiary in the death of the person at risk. Secondly,
insurances taken out on the life of a given third party may be used as a kind of gambling
or wagering. For instance, policyholders may pay premiums for gambling on the lives of
famous persons such as the king or queen of a particular country. Article 17:101 seeks to
solve both problems.
49
This is the case, however, in art. L. 132-1 French ICA and in s. 150 para. 1 German ICA. Art. 83
Spanish ICA allows the policyholder to conclude a contract on the life of a person other than the pol-
icyholder if informed consent of the person at risk is obtained in writing or if it is possible to presume
such consent.
312
Article 17:101 Life Insurance on the Life of a Third Party
C3. National laws have mainly applied two approaches to solving these problems. Eng-
lish50 and Dutch51 law only allow a policyholder to take insurance on the lives of persons in
which they have an insurable interest. This should prevent parties from using life insurance
as an instrument of gambling but also reduces any economic incentive of the beneficiary
to kill the person at risk. Other legislators, for instance in France52 and Germany53, have
established a statutory requirement that persons at risk give consent to the insurance taken
on their lives. Article 17:101 follows the latter approach. While it requires an informed con-
sent of the person at risk in writing, it does not require any insurable interest on the part
of the policyholder or beneficiary in the life of the person at risk. Preference is given to the
consent requirement because it is relatively easy to determine the existence of consent in
writing and because the persons at risk should know best, who is acceptable as a beneficiary
with an economic interest in their death. At the same time, pure gambling will usually not
be possible if the consent in writing of the person at risk is required. In contrast, the English
insurable interest doctrine as imposed by the Life Assurance Act 1774 has turned out to be
a source of endless discussion and extensive litigation.
Consent in Writing
C4. Contrary to the general rule laid down in Article 1:301 para. 6 PECL, applicable to
insurance contracts which are subject to the PEICL in accordance with Article 1:105 para.
2 PEICL, writing requires the autograph signature of the person at risk. Therefore, signature
on behalf of the person at risk is excluded. Equally, this will rule out the use of electronic
documents. This restriction is needed in order to make sure the contract is based on the
genuine and undistorted consent of the person at risk, and forgeries are excluded as far
as possible. However, the autograph signature may be replaced by an electronic signature
within the meaning of the Electronic Signatures Directive (1999/93/EC).
50
S. 1 Life Assurance Act 1774 enacted to prevent a “mischievous kind of gaming”: “From and after the
passing of this Act no insurance shall be made by any person or persons, bodies politick or corporate,
on the life or lives of any person, or persons, or on any other event or events whatsoever, wherein the
person or persons for whose use, benefit, or on whose account such policy or policies shall be made,
shall have no interest, or by way of gaming or wagering; and every assurance made contrary to the
true intent and meaning hereof shall be null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever.”
51
Art. 302 former Dutch Civil Code relating to insurance required a material or ideal interest of the
beneficiary to the life of the insured person. This requirement is supposed to still be valid under the
new current CC. See Asser/Clausing/Wansink 479 ff.
52
Art. L- 132-2 French ICA.
53
S. 150 para. 2 German ICA. See also art. 74 para. 1 of the Swiss ICA. Consent is also the rule in some
parts of the United States: Watson v Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins Co, 140 F 2d 673, 676 (DC, 1943—
life), cert den 322 US 746. See however the special position of Belgian law: art. 102 IA 2014 states
with respect to all insurance for a fixed sum (including life insurance) that the beneficiary must have
a personal and legitimate interest in the non-occurrence of the insured event, while this interest is
sufficiently demonstrated when the person at risk has given his consent.
313
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Informed Consent
C5. The first sentence of Article 17:101 requires the “informed” consent of the person
at risk. This requirement is satisfied once the persons at risk know of the most important
features of the policy taken on their lives so that they can properly evaluate the risk attached
to the conclusion of such a contract. The first sentence of Article 17:101 does not list the
information to be provided to the person at risk which will permit that person to make an
informed choice. In general, informed choice will at least require that the person at risk is
aware of the sum insured, the beneficiary, any security on the contract and the duration of
the contract (see also the second sentence of Article 17:101).
Time of Consent
C6. Article 17:101 does not specify the point in time, when the informed consent has to
be given by the person at risk. Thus, consent given before the conclusion of the contract
will ensure the validity of the contract from the beginning. However, if parties enter into
the contract without the consent of the person at risk, the contract is invalid as long as the
consent is not obtained. Subsequent consent validates the contract retroactively.
C7. The requirement of obtaining informed consent will have a certain impact on the time
when the consent is actually given. As stated (see Comment 5), informed consent requires
that the person at risk is aware of the sum insured, the beneficiary, a security on the contract,
if any, and the duration of the contract. It follows that the informed consent can only be
given once these elements of the insurance contract are determined.
C8. A consent requirement would probably not achieve its purpose if it was restricted to
the original contract but was not applicable when the contract is changed thereafter. The
parties could enter into a contract to which the person at risk happily consents but change
the contract to the detriment of the person at risk by severely increasing the insured sum,
exchanging the beneficiary for another, less trustworthy person, prolonging the insurance
contract and so on. This is why the second sentence of Article 17:101 extends the consent
requirement to any substantial change of the contract.
C9. Next to substantial changes of the contract itself, the third sentence of Article 17:101
also requires the written consent of the person at risk for any assignment or encumbrance be
it on the insurance contract as a whole or the payment of the insurance money. This appears
to be necessary in order to prevent parties from strategies circumventing Article 17:101.
Sanctions
C10. A contract which is concluded without the consent of the person at risk is invalid
(the first sentence of Article 17:101). As stated (see Comment 6), an invalid contract can be
validated if the consent requirement is fulfilled later. If consent is denied, the contract will
remain invalid and the insurer will have to return any premium paid. At the same time, it
will not have to pay out any insurance money should the insured event occur.
314
Article 17:102 Beneficiary of the Insurance Money
C11. In the case of subsequent amendments of the contract, the change or any assignment
or encumbrance executed without the consent of the person at risk will be without effect
(the second and third sentence of Article 17:101). Thus, the contract will continue to be in
force as it was before the change, assignment or encumbrance.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Life insurance contracts are often concluded in favour of a third person, the bene-
ficiary (Article 1:202 para. 2). The designation of a beneficiary may serve, for example, as
a means of ensuring the financial well-being of family members or to make the insurance
contract a security for a loan.
C2. Article 17:102 provides for situations where conflicts or practical difficulties may arise
in the process of designation of the beneficiary and the allocation of the sums insured. Prac-
tical difficulties usually arise when the designation is either not clear (for example, “wife”,
315
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Scope
C3. A designation of a beneficiary under Article 17:102 para. 1 only relates to the insurance
money paid upon the occurrence of an insured event. It does not cover the case where a sur-
render value is paid on termination of the contract. Such cases are covered by Article 17:103,
according to which the policyholder may designate a beneficiary of the surrender value.
C4. Article 17:102 para. 1 grants the policyholder a right to designate, unilaterally, one
or more beneficiaries. This does not require consent of the insurer. Such designation is
usually made at the time of concluding the contract but may also be made or altered later,
even by will.
C5. Designation may be changed or revoked as long as the policyholder is alive. The right
to revoke or change the designation exists irrespective of the fact that the initial beneficiary
must be mentioned in the pre-contractual document (Article 2:201(b)) and in the insurance
policy (Article 2:501(b)). If, however, the insured event occurs before the policyholder’s
death, the right to designate will end immediately, para. 2. This may be the case if the insured
event is the survival of the policyholder to a fixed point in time or where it is the death of a
third party who is the person at risk.
C6. Some national laws exclude the possibility of revocation of the designation where
it has been declared irrevocable but they also require that the beneficiary has accepted
the nomination.54 Other national laws only require that the policyholder has declared the
designation irrevocable without requiring acceptance by the beneficiary.55 For the purposes
of the PEICL it is sufficient, bearing in mind the principle of individual autonomy, that the
policyholder has declared the designation of the beneficiary irrevocable.
C7. In general, the designation of a beneficiary must be made in writing and communi-
cated to the insurer. This safeguards legal certainty and makes it relatively easy and cost-ef-
ficient to handle and administer insurance claims. By way of exception, the policyholder
may designate the beneficiary in a will (see Comment 5). The form of the will is governed
by the applicable inheritance law. Under the PEICL, a designation by will does not have
to be communicated to the insurer to be effective. An insurer who – being unaware of the
will – pays insurance money in good faith will be protected by para. 6.
54
See, for example, art. 1921 para. 2 Italian CC and (in a similiar sense) art. L 132-9 French ICA. See,
however, art. 186 Belgian IA 2014 stating that revocation is possible as long as the beneficiary has not
accepted the designation (there is no requirement of any declaration of (ir)revocability in the con-
tract).
55
See, for example, s. 159 para. 3 German ICA, art. 6:478 para. 3 Hungarian CC and art. 87 Spanish ICA.
316
Article 17:102 Beneficiary of the Insurance Money
C8. Where policyholders have not made an effective designation, the beneficiaries are to
be determined in accordance with para. 3. This provision is intended to fulfil the probable
intention of policyholders, in line with the solution provided by many national laws. Thus,
the PEICL do not stipulate the automatic transfer of the right of the beneficiaries to their
heirs but instead return it to the policyholders or their heirs for further disposition.
C9. Para. 3 also applies where a purported designation is invalid, for example, for failing
formal requirements or because of the mental incapacity of the policyholder.
C10. As an exception to the principle underlying para. 2(b) and (c), para. 4 regulates the
case of the death or revocation of one or more beneficiaries. In this case, namely the auto-
matic increase in the sums to be paid to other beneficiaries, the solution seeks to respect
what would have been the will of the policyholder, when identifying more than one benefi-
ciary. In any event, the policyholder may provide otherwise in the designation.
C11. Where the policyholder becomes insolvent and a third person has been designated
as beneficiary, the entitlement to the insurance money, the surrender value or conversion
value, as the case may be, will not become part of the insolvent estate. The beneficiary will re-
tain the rights acquired no matter whether the designation was revocable or irrevocable. The
administrator of the insolvent estate has neither the right under Article 17:601 para. 1 nor
any other rights under the policy (for example, alteration or cancellation of the contract).
C12. Where the policyholder becomes insolvent and is a beneficiary of the insurance
money or the surrender or conversion value, as the case may be, and insurance money or
the surrender value is effectively paid to the policyholder, this money will form part of the
insolvent estate. As long as no such payment has been effected, the administrator of the
insolvent estate neither has the right under Article 17:601 para. 1 nor any other rights under
the policy (for example, alteration or cancellation of the contract). Likewise, rights to future
insurance money, conversion or surrender value do not form part of the insolvent estate,
unless otherwise provided by applicable national insolvency law.
C13. Para. 5 provides for asset protection intended to maintain the wellbeing of the family
of the policyholder. Potential abuses of the asset protection are subject first to the reserva-
tions of national insolvency laws and second to the general principle of fraus omnia cor-
rumpit. The rules of national insolvency laws on the nullity, voidability or unenforceability
of legal acts, which are detrimental to all creditors, have not yet been harmonised and are left
to national laws by the European Insolvency Regulation (art. 4 para. 2(m) of the Insolvency
Regulation (1346/2000/EC); lex fori concursus).
C14. Where a creditor takes steps to enforce payment outside insolvency proceedings,
para. 5 is irrelevant. Debtors (policyholders) retain access to all of their assets and may be
317
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
required in such situations to satisfy the creditors from assets other than the rights under the
policy. If policyholders decide not to make available other assets in order to satisfy creditors
and use rights under the policy instead, this would amount in substance to a revocation of
a designation that has not been made irrevocable. If, in contrast, beneficiaries have been
designated irrevocably, rights under the policy are vested in them and no longer form part
of the assets of policyholders. Thus, creditors of policyholders will not be able to seize such
rights.
Discharge (para. 6)
C15. Where a beneficiary has been designated in accordance with para. 1, the insurer will
usually know the identity of that person, since it has received written notice of the designa-
tion. When paying the insurance money to the designated person, the insurer’s belief in the
right of that person to receive the money will be justified. However, the designation may
be null, for example, where it was revoked in a subsequent and undisclosed will or because
the policyholder made the designation in a state of mental incapacity. In such situations,
the insurer’s belief in the right of the designated beneficiary deserves protection. Thus the
insurer will be discharged by para. 6, unless it knew that the recipient of the payment was
not entitled to it.
C16. The insurer is only precluded from relying on para. 6 where it had actual knowledge
that it paid the insurance money to the wrong person. It is not sufficient that the insurer
merely ought to have known it. The insurer’s knowledge of the truth or the facts allowing
the inference of this knowledge has to be proved by the person who claims that the insurer
is not discharged, which will usually be a person claiming to be the true beneficiary.
C17. Article 17:102 para. 6 discharges the insurer but does not govern the question wheth-
er the true beneficiary may claim the insurance money from the recipient. This question is
governed by the applicable national law of unjust enrichment.
318
Article 17:103 Beneficiary of the Surrender Value
Comments
Rationale
C1. The policyholder may wish to keep, even in the case of designation of a third person
as beneficiary of the insurance money, control of the insurance contract and of a potential
claim to the surrender value. Where the life insurance is, for example, meant to provide
financial support to the policyholder’s family in the case of the policyholder’s own death,
he may nevertheless prefer to reserve the surrender value for himself (or someone else), if
he, being the person at risk, decides during his lifetime to terminate the contract and to
claim the surrender value. Article 17:103 therefore allows the policyholder to designate two
different beneficiaries, one for the insurance money that falls due in the case of the insured
event under Article 17:102, the other for the surrender value that may be claimed until
occurrence of the insured event under Article 17:103. Thus, the policyholder remains in
control of the investment until the occurrence of the insured event.
C2. The designation of a beneficiary of the surrender value is independent of the desig-
nation of a beneficiary of the insurance money. Even where the latter designation is irrevo-
cable, the policyholder may still designate another beneficiary with regard to the surrender
value. This possibility reduces the value of an irrevocable designation of a beneficiary of the
insurance money. Where a beneficiary of the insurance money wants additional security,
he has to solicit a further irrevocable designation of himself as beneficiary of the surrender
value.
C3. Unless declared irrevocable, the designation of the beneficiary may be revoked and
changed at any time by the policyholder. Revocation is sent to the insurer by written decla-
ration. Writing includes electronic documents such as emails, see Article 2:301 Comment
6 of the Principles of European Contract Law. Other forms of writing, e.g. wills, are not
sufficient.
C4. While the policyholder may revoke the designation at any time, revocation cannot be
effected by heirs where the insured life is that of a third person and the policyholder dies
before the person at risk, see the cross-reference in para. 3 to Article 17:102 para. 2. The
policyholder’s designation may be part of overall estate planning which heirs should not
distort by posthumously changing the beneficiary, and claiming the surrender value for
themselves or for any other person. Thus, the heirs, while inheriting the right to claim the
surrender value, may only do so in favour of the beneficiary designated by the deceased.
C5. The policyholder is not compelled to designate a beneficiary of the surrender value.
He may simply have abstained from doing so, he may have revoked a previous designation,
or the beneficiary previously designated may have passed away – in all of these situations
the question arises of who will be entitled to the surrender value. In all these cases the
319
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
policyholder is the person entitled – and not the beneficiary of the insurance money even
where such designation has been made.
Cross-references (para. 3)
C6. Para. 3 refers to certain provisions laid down in Article 17:102 in respect of the desig-
nation of a beneficiary of the insurance money, stating that they shall apply to the designa-
tion of a beneficiary of the surrender value mutatis mutandis. In particular this concerns
the entitlement of the policyholder’s heirs to change a designation made by the policyholder
(Article 17:102 para. 2, see above Comment 4). While the heirs lack the right to designate
another beneficiary, they are entitled to the surrender value in their capacity as heirs, pro-
vided that the policyholder was the beneficiary of the surrender value and has failed to
designate another beneficiary in case of his death. The cross-reference also concerns the
problems arising from the designation of more than one beneficiary (Article 17:102 para. 4),
the role of the surrender value in the insolvency of the policyholder’s estate (Article 17:102
para. 5) and the discharge of the insurer which pays a person who had been designated in
accordance with Article 17:103 para. 1 (Article 17:102 para. 6).
Comments
Rationale
C1. Where a beneficiary has been designated, both the policyholder and the beneficiary
are entitled to rights flowing from the contract. Each of them therefore has to be protected
against certain dealings, such as assignments and encumbrances by the other, that may
affect their rights. Article 17:104 provides that protection by requiring the other’s consent
to such dealings.
C2. An irrevocable designation confers a vested right on the beneficiary. This is why para.
1 of Article 17:104 requires written consent by such a beneficiary to an assignment or en-
cumbrance by the policyholder.56 In contrast, a revocable designation is subject to amend-
56
PEICL’s position in this respect (namely the requirement for consent of the irrevocably designated
beneficiary) and others reflects a general principle of contract law which has received special statutory
enactment in some countries; see, for example: art. 117 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014 (regarding encum-
brance) and art. 119 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014 (regarding assignment), s. 51 Finnish ICA (regarding
320
Article 17:105 Renunciation of Estate
ment by the policyholder and therefore the beneficiary is not entitled to this protection. In
such case, an assignment or encumbrance would amount to a revocation of the beneficiary’s
designation. An assignment or encumbrance by way of security revokes the designation of
the beneficiary only for the period of the security.
C3. Para. 2 mirrors the provision of para. 1 by protecting the policyholder against actions
of the beneficiary. The provision gives the policyholder control of the ultimate allocation of
the insurance money even in cases where the beneficiary has been designated irrevocably.
This is particularly important in the common case where the policyholder is also the person
at risk. If the life insurance contract is taken on the life of a third party, there is an additional
requirement of the consent by the person at risk under the third sentence of Article 17:101.
Consent
C4. Consent may be given at any time. Usually this consent will be given when the bene-
ficiary or policyholder, as the case may be, wants to effect an assignment or encumbrance.
However, it may also be given, for example, at the time of the designation of the beneficiary,
at the time of the conclusion of the life insurance contract or even after an assignment or
encumbrance by subsequent approval. An assignment or encumbrance in violation of the
consent requirement under para. 1 or 2 shall be without effect.
C5. An assignment of or encumbrance on the insurance contract or the right to the insur-
ance money effects, in principle, a transfer of the claim for insurance money. If the transferee
dies before the insurance money becomes due, subject to any provision to the contrary in the
assignment, the encumbrance or the consent, the rights arising from the insurance contract
shall form part of the transferee’s estate in accordance with the applicable law of succession.
Comments
Background
C1. Where the estate of a deceased person at risk is insolvent, an heir is likely to renounce
the estate in order to avoid liability. With this background in mind, such a renunciation can-
not be interpreted as including a rejection of the claim as a beneficiary under the life insur-
assignment and encumbrance) and art. 116 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA (regarding encumbrance) and
art. 118 para. 2 Luxembourg ICA (regarding assignment).
321
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
ance contract. After all, accepting the insurance money will not raise any liability for debts
of the deceased person at risk. Article 17:105 applies this rule of construction by providing
that renunciation of the estate in itself does not affect that person’s status as beneficiary.
C2. This is not a consequence of the law of succession but of the insurance contract con-
cluded as a contract inter vivos in favour of a third party. This difference subsists even where
the policyholder has designated “my heirs” as beneficiaries and in cases where the heirs are
deemed to be beneficiaries under Article 17:102 para. 3.
Rule of Construction
C3. Article 17:105 only establishes a rule of construction which will not apply if the bene-
ficiary makes it clear that he not only refuses the inheritance but the claim to the insurance
money as well. This may be the case where an heir rejects any ties to the deceased person
at risk.
C4. The extent to which the insurance money can be allocated to the insolvent estate is a
matter of insolvency law, see para. 4. For instance, the conclusion of the insurance contract
and/or the payment of premiums may be subject to the rules on nullity, voidability or un-
enforcability of legal acts detrimental to all the creditors.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Whereas Articles 2:101 to 2:106 concerning the applicant’s pre-contractual informa-
tion duties are, in principle, applicable to all insurance contracts, Article 17:201 contains two
rules which take account of special features of the life insurance contract.
C2. The disclosure requirement in Article 17:201 para. 1 is due to the nature of a life insur-
ance contract in which it is possible to insure the life of a person other than the policyholder
322
Article 17:201 Applicant’s Pre-contractual Information Duties
(the “person at risk”). In such a contract, the insurer must be able to evaluate the risk relating
to that person and obtain the relevant information.
C3. Article 17:201 para. 1 prescribes that the information which must be provided by the
applicant by virtue of Article 2:101 para. 1 includes those circumstances of which the person
at risk was or should have been aware. Technically, this is similar to the solution applied in
Article 2:101 para. 2 where an insurance contract is made for the benefit of a third person.
Relevant information which is known or ought to be known by the person at risk is deemed
to be known by the policyholder himself. This will encourage the policyholder to seek with
the person at risk the information required to answer the insurer’s questions. Misrepresenta-
tions by the person at risk will be imputed to the policyholder.
Indisputability (para. 2)
C4. Para. 2 introduces a time limit for the invocation of sanctions provided in Articles
2:102, 2:103 and 2:105 for the breach of pre-contractual information duties. Several national
laws57 limit the right of the insurer to terminate a life insurance contract, where the applicant
has violated the duty of disclosure, to a fixed time limit, except in case of fraud. In other
countries58 where such a rule does not exist, an exclusion clause to the same effect is usually
contained in the contract (the so called clause d’incontestabilité). Article 17:201 para. 2 is a
mandatory rule, of a kind found in several national laws.
C5. There are a number of justifications for such a rule. Life insurance contracts typi-
cally run for a long time and it would be incompatible with the social function of these
contracts that after a sufficient length of time an insurer, except in case of fraud, could still
invoke sanctions for a breach of disclosure duties at the time of the contract’s conclusion.
This applies with particular force to life insurance contracts taken out to construct pension
and retirement arrangements, and such measures should not be disturbed by disputes over
shortcomings of the policyholder and of the person at risk many years earlier. Furthermore,
in such cases it would be very difficult to apply the sanction provided for in Article 2:102.
C6. National laws provide for different periods of indisputability, ranging from one to five
years.59 To ensure legal certainty, Article 17:201 para. 2 provides a compulsory period of
five years in all cases of non-fraudulent breach. It should be noted that the period may be
shortened by contract, in accordance with Article 1:103 para. 2.
57
S. 163 Austrian ICA; s. 35 para. 3 Finnish ICA (for life insurance, the insurer may invoke failure to
fulfil the duty of disclosure only if the insured dies before five years have elapsed from the commence-
ment of cover or if the insurer has dispatched a notice of termination or amendment of terms and
conditions within the mentioned period of time); art. 89 Spanish ICA, s. 4 para. 2 Swedish ICA.
58
See, however, art. 162 Belgian IA 2014 which denies the insurer the right to invoke a non-intentional
breach of the information duties as from the time that the life insurance contract enters into force.
59
In Austria, three years; in Finland, five years, see n. 57; in Spain, one year under art. 89 Spanish ICA;
in Sweden, five years, see s. 4 para 2 ICA. For Belgium, the rule is that of immediate indisputability
(see n. 58). However, art. 162 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014 allows the government to derogate from this rule
and provide for a certain period of indisputability (so far unused possibility).
323
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C7. Here as in other matters, the principle of fraus omnia corrumpit must apply. Therefore
indisputability does not apply in the case of a fraudulent breach under Article 2:104.
Comments
Rationale
C1. In general, the insurer’s precontractual duties to provide information which should
enable the applicant to consider whether or not to conclude the contract are prescribed in
Article 2:201. This article implements the provisions of arts. 183 and 184 of the Solvency II
Directive (2009/138/EC), extends them to life insurance contracts, and transposes certain
requirements of the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC). It requires the documents
to contain the following: (i) information that should allow identification of the persons
involved, including specific information about the name and location of the insurer’s head
office; (ii) information on the risk insured and on the main insurance conditions; (iii) in-
324
Article 17:202 Insurer’s Pre-contractual Information Duties
formation on general issues such as the application of the PEICL, the right to revoke the
application or to avoid the contract, the existence of out-of-court complaint mechanisms
and the existence of guarantee funds. It is the purpose of Article 17:202 to specify these
requirements when necessary and to add further requirements as required by art. 185 of
the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC).
C2. The imposition of additional information duties under Article 17:202 is justified by
the complexity and special nature of a life insurance contract. It may be a sophisticated
instrument of estate management for private households and enterprises or public bodies.
As a consequence, there may be a need for additional pre-contractual information. Solvency
II has laid down such requirements which have to be implemented in national law. For the
purpose of a future optional instrument of the EU, the PEICL implement the requirements
of art. 185 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) without following them word for
word.
C3. Article 17:202 para. 2 contains information which must be included in the pre-con-
tractual document provided by the insurer in accordance with Article 2:201. One concerns
the insurer itself and requires it to make a concrete reference to the annual report on its
solvency and financial condition. The annual report is the one that is referred at in art. 51
of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) which obliges the Member States to impose the
publication of such annual report. In accordance with the terms of the Directive, the oblig-
atory reference must be such as to allow the policyholder easy access to this information.
C4. The other requirements concern the commitments of the insurer. These contain the
specific aspects of a life insurance operation: separate information about the different ben-
efits and the options, duly explained; information about calculation and distribution of
bonuses; information about surrender and paid-up values; information about the units
in a unit-linked policy and about the underlying assets, and general information on tax
arrangements.
C6. In accordance with art. 185 para. 4 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), Article
17:202 para. 3 obliges the insurer to contribute to the proper understanding of the risks
underlying the contract which are assumed by the policyholder. Para. 4 of art. 185 does
so by putting upon the insurer an additional information duty in this respect. As to what
must be understood by the concept “risks underlying the contract” very little has been
325
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C7. Again in accordance with the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC), Article 17:202
para. 4 specifies details about how the insurer must quote figures and amounts of possible
future benefits over and above the contractually guaranteed payments.
Comments
Rationale and Object of para. 1
C1. Generalising a concept that figures in art. 186 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/
EC),61 which replaces art. 35 of the Life Assurance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC),62
and the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC),63 Article 2:303 provides for a cool-
ing-off period in all insurance contracts. More specifically this Article entitles the policy-
holder to avoid the contract within a period of two weeks. Enforcing the prescription of
Article 2:303 in the context of life insurance, Article 17:203 para. 1 affirms the rule laid down
in Article 2:303, but makes an exception with respect to the duration of the cooling-off peri-
od, which is extended to one month. The period starts with receipt of all information, both
the general information in accordance with Article 2:501 and pre-contractual information
for life insurance in accordance with Article 17:202.
C2. Whereas art. 186 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) requires a cooling-off
period of 14 to 30 days, and the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC) requires a pe-
riod of 30 calendar days in distance contracts relating to life insurance, Article 17:203 para.
1 provides for a one month period for all life insurance contracts, irrespective of the fact
whether the insurance contract is a distance contract or not. The longer cooling-off period
60
Article 17:203 para. 1 is modelled on art. 186 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) and art. 6 of
the Distance Marketing Directive (2002/65/EC).
61
Art. 186 of this Directive provides for a “cancellation period” of between 14 and 30 days.
62
Art. 35 of this Directive provides for a “cancellation period” of between 14 and 30 days.
63
Art. 6 of the Directive provides for a right of withdrawal within 14 days (30 days in the case of life
insurance and personal pension operations).
326
Article 17:204 Policyholder’s Right to Terminate the Contract
for all life insurance contracts is in accordance with some national laws64 and appears indeed
to be justified because life insurance is a sophisticated product, deals with high sums of
money, and the policyholder is in a difficult position to understand all the contract details.
C3. As regards the commencement of the cooling-off period, Article 2:303 para. 1, to
which para. 2 of the present Article refers, prescribes that this period starts from the “receipt
of acceptance of delivery of the documents referred to in Article 2:501”. A problem arises if
the insurer fails to provide the policyholder with the documents mentioned in Article 2:501,
in which case the right to avoid the contract is subject to no limit. In non-life insurance
contracts such extension of the time will rarely occur, since most insurance contracts are
subject to prolongation pursuant to Article 2:602, and since such prolongation puts an end
to the policyholder’s right to avoid the contract.
C4. However life insurance contracts do not fall under the prolongation rule of Article
2:602 as they are usually concluded for more than a one year period. A special rule restrict-
ing the time limit of the right to avoid the contract is therefore required. Article 17:203 para.
2 therefore imposes a one year limit upon the right of the policyholder in a life insurance
contract. This limit will apply regardless of whether the insurer has complied with its duty
to provide the policyholder with the documents mentioned in Article 2:501.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Contracts for life insurance are often intended to serve strategic purposes such as
safeguarding the financial well-being of the family and the support of loans as collateral.
In pursuance of such aims life insurance contracts are often concluded for periods of many
years, which usually exceed the periods that are foreseeable by an average policyholder.
64
See, for example, s. 165a Austrian ICA; art. 9 of the Belgian Royal Decree of 14 November 2003 on Life
Assurance; art. 4:28 para.2 of the Dutch ISA; s. 13 a Finnish ICA; the second sentence of art. 8 para. 3
Greek ICA; see also art. 4 para. 3 of the Greek Legislative Decree on Insurance Undertakings.
327
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C2. Such contracts may well be pure risk contracts, which do not attract any conversion
or surrender value, so that Articles 17:601 and 17:602 are not applicable. It is to such pure
risk contracts that Article 17:204 para. 1 applies. However, where a conversion or surrender
value is attracted, Articles 17:601 and 17:602 apply, see para. 2.
C3. Article 17:204 is confined to the policyholder’s right of termination; the insurer’s right
to terminate a life insurance contract is regulated by Article 17:205. The underlying prin-
ciples of these two provisions differ profoundly: While the policyholder, except for the
specified situations, is basically entitled to terminate the contract at will, the insurer’s right
of termination is only permitted for specific reasons. The difference is due to the purpose
and business model of life insurance which transfers long-term risks from the individual
policyholder to the collective organised by the insurer.
C4. The policyholders’ ability to foresee future changes relevant to their decision to take
out life insurance decreases as the relevant time horizon is extended; as to the imminent
future they will often be in a better position to predict such changes than anybody else. Since
the conclusion of life insurance contracts generates costs which become futile in the event of
termination – in particular of a medical examination of the person at risk and of the agent’s
commission – it is fair that policyholders should bear such costs where they terminate the
contract shortly after conclusion. The exclusion of the right to terminate within the first
year has the practical effect of allowing the insurer to use the first year’s premium to cover
such costs. The one-year period is in line with that in Article 17:602 para. 1 in respect of the
policyholder’s right to claim the surrender value. It is imposed by the first sentence of Article
17:204 para. 1 irrespective of whether the insurer applies such a period in its contract terms.
C5. The premium for life insurance may be due, depending on the parties’ agreement, at
regular intervals or as a single premium which will usually be paid at the beginning of the
contract period. In the latter case the life insurance contract is very similar to investment
contracts: policyholders want to benefit from the insurer’s better access to the capital mar-
kets. Since this better access is usually dependent on a long-term commitment, the policy-
holder’s termination before the end of the contract period would deprive the insurer of the
basis on which it calculated its own long-term commitment in the capital market. Moreover,
once the single premium is paid, the policyholder cannot claim a need to terminate the
contract because he can no longer pay the premium.
C6. The second sentence of Article 17:204 para. 1, therefore, permits contract clauses
excluding the right of termination in single premium life insurance. The exception is, how-
ever, limited to cases in which the single premium has already been paid; when the insurer
328
Article 17:205 Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Contract
agrees to a postponed payment of the single premium, it accepts the risk of non-payment
and, thereby, the imbalance between a long-term commitment in the capital market and
the possible absence of refinancing.
C7. Premature termination of the life insurance contract may also be excluded where
national tax law or national social security law make the conferral of benefits conditional
upon a certain minimum duration of the life insurance contract. Such requirements of
national public law should not impede the use of the PEICL as the governing contract law.
The second sentence of Article 17:402, therefore, allows the parties to derogate from the
PEICL to avoid a conflict with the national provisions in question. In the present context,
this means that contract clauses excluding termination for the period laid down in the na-
tional provision would be allowed, but not provisions which exclude the right to terminate
in breach of the national requirements.
C8. There may be other grounds preventing the policyholder from terminating the con-
tract. For example, premature termination of a long-term life insurance contract may con-
stitute a breach of a loan agreement the policyholder has concluded with a bank. The in-
terdependence of the loan and the life insurance can be sufficiently regulated by the terms
of the loan agreement; it does not require exclusion of the policyholder’s right to terminate
the life insurance contract under Article 17:204.
C9. While the policyholder’s notices in general do not require a particular form to be
valid (Article 1:205), specific provisions of the PEICL require important declarations to be
in writing. This applies, for example, to the avoidance of the contract during the cooling-off
period (Article 2:303), the rejection of a contract prolongation (Article 2:602), or termi-
nation after the occurrence of an insured event (Article 2:604). The termination of a life
insurance contract is of similar importance and must be in writing. As in other provisions
of the PEICL this means communication that provides a record readable by both sides; see
Comment 5 to Article 2:201.
C10. The third sentence of para. 1 makes it clear that termination becomes effective two
weeks after receipt of the notice. Contract clauses postponing the effective date to the end of
the month or the end of the year are incompatible with this provision. As a consequence of
termination, the insurer loses the right to the premium; see Article 5:104. Where premium
has already been paid for a longer period, claims for restitution may lie under national law.
329
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Comments
Rationale
C1. Life insurance contracts usually are long-term contracts; see Article 17:204 Com-
ment 1. As such both parties will often feel a need for termination when unforeseen cir-
cumstances occur. Where performance of a contract becomes “excessively onerous” general
contract law may grant a right, and impose a duty on the other party, to “enter into nego-
tiations with a view to adapting or terminating the contract”, provided that some further
conditions are fulfilled.65 In respect of contracts of indeterminate duration general contract
law usually allows for unilateral termination by notice without requiring specific grounds.66
C2. These rules do not provide satisfactory solutions for life insurance contracts. They
are too narrow for the policyholder’s wish to terminate, see Article 17:204 Comment 1, and
too wide for termination by the insurer. The very purpose of a life insurance contract is to
provide long-term protection of the beneficiary against the financial hazard arising from the
death of the person at risk. The contract would miss this purpose if the insurer were entitled
to withdraw from its obligations on the grounds set forth above.
C3. Assume for example, that the terms of the life insurance contract become “excessively
onerous” due to a dramatic decrease of the rate of return the insurer can achieve at the cap-
ital market. Allowing termination in such a situation would frustrate the agreement. In a
similar vein, a contract clause permitting the insurer to terminate the contract in the case of
an aggravation of risk, see Article 4:203, would defeat the object of the contract, since ageing
and the deterioration of health inevitably will aggravate the risk constituted by the person at
risk, and thereby allow for termination in general. The solution espoused by Article 17:205
is to invalidate termination as a general principle subject to specific exceptions.
C4. Termination of the life insurance contract by the insurer is lawful “only to the extent
permitted in this Chapter”, namely in Chapter 17 of the PEICL. An indirect reference to
the insurer’s right to terminate the contract is laid down in Article 17:201 in respect of the
applicant’s pre-contractual information duties under Article 2:101. Where the applicant has
breached the pre-contractual duty of disclosure, the insurer may in fact terminate the life
insurance contract within a period of five years after conclusion of the contract, provided
that the additional conditions laid down in Articles 2:102 and 2:103 are fulfilled, see Article
17:201 para. 2.
C5. The five-year limitation does not apply where the breach of the disclosure duty has
occurred fraudulently, see Article 17:201 para. 2 in conjunction with Article 2:104. Although
Article 17:205 refers to “termination” while Article 2:104 allows the insurer to “avoid” the
contract, Article 17:205 indirectly refers to avoidance under Article 2:104 as well. This fol-
65
See art. 89 of Annex I to the CESL Regulation Proposal of 11 October 2011, copying almost literally
Article 6:111 PECL.
66
See art. 77 of the CESL Regulation Proposal, previous footnote.
330
Article 17:205 Insurer’s Right to Terminate the Contract
lows from the exception established in Article 17:201 para. 2 for fraudulent breach, and
from the general principle that sanctions have to be proportionate to the seriousness of
the breach.
C6. The insurer’s right to terminate the life insurance contract for breach of pre-contrac-
tual disclosure duties is subject, irrespective of the degree of the policyholder’s fault, to
Article 17:602 para. 2. The insurer’s obligation to pay out a surrender value, if any, is thus
ensured for all cases of termination, rescission and avoidance of the life insurance contract
by the insurer.
C7. A further indirect reference to the insurer’s right to terminate the contract is con-
tained in Article 17:302. The cross-reference of that provision to Article 4:201 indicates
that clauses of a life insurance contract may deal with the aggravation of risk. In particular
such clauses may also enable the insurer to terminate the life insurance contract in the
event of an aggravation of risk; the rules laid down in Articles 4:201 to 4:203 also apply to
life insurance contracts. In accordance with Article 17:302, however, clauses specifying age
and deterioration in health as an aggravation of risk shall be invalid and cannot entitle the
insurer to terminate.
C8. This is different with regard to other changes aggravating the risk, for example the
employment of the person at risk, subsequent to the conclusion of the life insurance con-
tract, by a private security service in a country stricken by civil unrest and commotions.
Article 17:302 does not refer to an eventual surrender value accrued under the policy prior
to termination. But even without such reference it follows from Article 17:602 para. 2 that
the insurer is obliged to pay out such surrender value.
C9. Finally, the insurer may also be entitled to terminate a life insurance contract in the
case of non-payment of the premium. This follows from the cross-reference to Article 5:103
in Article 17:601. By excluding the right of termination for certain life insurance contracts,
Article 17:601 makes clear that that right is basically acknowledged for life insurance con-
tracts in general. While the rule on termination does not apply to life insurance contracts
which have attracted a conversion value or a surrender value, it is applicable in respect of
other life insurance contracts, in particular to pure risk life insurance.
C10. The form, modalities and effects of termination by the insurer are not regulated by
Article 17:205, but by the provisions dealing with the single cases referred to above. How-
ever, in respect of a surrender value that may have accrued under the policy, Article 17:602
para. 2 provides, in general, for the insurer’s obligation to pay out such surrender value to
the policyholder.
331
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Comments
Rationale
C1. Since Article 17:301 forms part of Section Three of Chapter Seventeen of Part Five
(“Life Insurance”), it provides for regular and ad hoc post-contractual information duties on
the part of the insurer, which apply in the specific context of life insurance. These specific
information duties are imposed on the insurer in addition to its general post-contractual
information duties under Articles 2:701 and 2:702. The enhanced post-contractual duties
result from the complexity and the long-term nature of life insurance contracts which gen-
erate an increased need for protection.
Scope
C2. In addition to pure risk insurance there are life insurance contracts with profits. Such
contracts provide for bonuses for the policyholder. Under para. 1 the insurer must provide
the policyholder, throughout the insurance contract, with annual information relating to
such bonuses attached to with-profit policies. Under para. 2 which is applicable to all life
insurance contracts, further ad hoc information must be provided as listed.
Context
C3. In part Article 17:301 reflects the content of art. 185 para. 5 of the Solvency II Directive
(2009/138/EC), but there are differences regarding the extent of the insurer’s post-contrac-
tual information duty.
332
Article 17:303 Adjustment of Premium and Benefits Payable
Comments
Rationale
C1. In some countries the possibility that the risk insured will be aggravated during the
insurance period has led to clauses entitling insurers to “second thoughts”: to reconsider
whether to continue to provide the cover and, if so, on what terms. Lest such clauses offer
an escape route for those responsible for poor underwriting, Article 4:201 establishes min-
imum safeguards for the policyholder, in particular, such clauses are without effect unless
the aggravation in question is material and of a kind specified in the insurance contract.
C2. In the case of life insurance, the subject of Chapter 17, increase in age is inevitable
and deterioration in health likely; these are changes that will occur during the contract
period, the subject of Chapter 17 Section 3. Moreover they are changes for the worse and
thus aggravations of the risk. It is inappropriate that the provisions for aggravation of risk
in the case of non-life insurance, found in Chapter 4, should apply equally to life insurance.
For life insurance the issue is dealt with in Articles 17:302 and 17:303.
Scope
C3. Increase in age and deterioration in health, the changes mentioned in Article 17:302,
are the obvious but not necessarily the only instances of aggravation of the risk that may
arise. For example, it may become established by medical science that certain features of
human lifestyle, which had been regarded hitherto as harmless, are indeed damaging to
health. Article 17:302 being confined to the instances specified, it is envisaged that any
other instances would be considered under Article 2:304, which deals with abusive clauses.
Sanction
C4. In accordance with Article 2:304 a clause in breach of Article 17:302 will not bind
the policyholder. The consequences of an aggravation of risk under Articles 4:201 ff. are
not triggered.
333
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
supervisory authority. The policyholder shall be entitled to offset the increase in premium with
an appropriate reduction of the insurance benefits.
(3) In the case of a paid-up policy, the insurer shall be entitled to reduce the insurance benefits
under the conditions set out in para. 2.
(4) An adjustment in accordance with para. 2 or 3 shall not be permitted
(a) in so far as an error has been committed in the calculation of the premium and/or benefits
of which a competent and diligent actuary ought to have been aware, or
(b) where the underlying calculation is not applied to all contracts including those concluded
after the adjustment.
(5) An increase of premium or a reduction of benefits shall become effective three months after
the insurer has provided the policyholder with written notice about the increase of premium
or reduction of benefits, the reasons for this and about the policyholder’s own right to demand
a reduction of benefits.
(6) In a life insurance contract covering risks for which the insurer is certain to be liable, the pol-
icyholder shall be entitled to a decrease of premium where, due to an unforeseeable and
permanent change in respect of the biometric risks used as the basis for calculating the pre-
mium, the original amount of premium is not appropriate and necessary in order to guarantee
the insurer’s continued ability to pay insurance benefit. The decrease has to be agreed by an
independent trustee or the supervisory authority.
(7) The rights set forth in this Article may be exercised not earlier than five years after the conclu-
sion of the contract.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Article 17:303 paras. 1 to 5 grant the insurer a statutory power to adjust the premium
or the insurance benefits.The rationale lies in the fact that life insurance contracts are gen-
erally long term contracts and the insurer has no general right to terminate the contract. For
reasons of policyholder protection, termination is only allowed on the grounds specified in
Chapter 17 (see Article 17:205). This absence of a general power to terminate together with
the fact that the calculation basis (namely certain biometric assumptions) of the premium
may change throughout the contract period, without the insurer having any influence over
it, may result in the agreed premium becoming insufficient. Without prejudice to supervi-
sory emergency measures, it seems appropriate that the insurer is given a statutory power
to alter the premium or the insurance benefits in order to safeguard its continuous ability
to pay insurance benefits. Article 17:303 paras. 2 and 3 therefore entitle the insurer to raise
the premium or to reduce the insurance benefit according to the change of circumstances.
C2. In the interest of equal treatment, Article 17:303 para. 6 provides for a corresponding
right of the policyholder to claim a decrease of premium when the change in the biometric
assumptions reveals the premium as excessive.
334
Article 17:303 Adjustment of Premium and Benefits Payable
C3. Some national laws provide a statutory power to adjust the premium for health insur-
ance contracts. In light of the continuous increase of costs in the health care sector, a need
for premium adjustment seems especially obvious concerning health insurance contracts
(see art. 206 para. 2(d) of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC)). Such a power of pre-
mium adjustment is less common in the field of life insurance. In comparative law there
are mainly two models for such powers: one grants the insurer statutory power to adjust
the premium;67 the other allows the insurer to include contract clauses to the same effect.68
C4. The salient question was, thus, which of the two models should be chosen. The in-
trinsic need for such a power, the uncertainties inherent in a contractual solution and the
severe consequences of the possible ineffectiveness of an adjustment clause are reasons for
a statutory power. The approach taken by Article 17:303 serves the purpose of transparen-
cy, clarity and legal certainty, in a way that a power to provide for contractual adjustment
clauses could not.
C5. The power of adjustment is limited to contracts where the insured event is certain to
occur. As such, the provision only applies to life insurance containing a savings element
which is at least in part guaranteed by the insurer. As a result, unit-linked contracts where
the policyholder bears the investment risk are not covered by Article 17:303. Term life in-
surance contracts are not covered either, because pure-risk life insurance contracts often last
for a relatively short term and the premium only covers the risk of the death of the insured
person and is not intended to build up capital for the policyholder or the beneficiaries. For
such contracts the insurer can counter the risk of a change in the assumptions concerning
the probability of death by providing for a safety margin when calculating the premium.
C6. According to its para. 3, Article 17:303 also applies to a paid-up policy (Article 17:601)
although the policyholder has already completely fulfilled his obligation to pay the premi-
um. Such a contract is subject to the same alterations of risk, as described above (cf. Com-
ment 1). However, the policyholder is not required to pay a supplementary premium. The
adjustment is effected rather by reducing the insurance benefits appropriately.
Requirements (para. 2)
C7. An adjustment by the insurer is only permissible in accordance with strict require-
ments. These requirements are provided by the first sentence of para. 2 regarding an increase
67
See s. 163 German ICA which regards the situation in life insurance contracts to be comparable with
health insurance and thus grants a right of premium adjustment.
68
For example Austria, Finland and Greece. While most countries do not specifically provide further
criteria for the adjustment, some have enacted such provisions (for example art. 42 Luxembourg ICA;
s. 20 a Finnish ICA). Under all jurisdictions, however, in consumer contracts the premium adjustment
clauses are controlled by the unfair contract terms regime (for example s. 6 para. 1(5) of the Austrian
Consumer Protection Act).
335
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C8. Para. 2 establishes three requirements for an alteration of premium relating first to the
biometric risks, second to the insurer’s solvency and third to the procedure of alteration.
First, it only allows adjustment on the basis of changes in biometric risks, not as a response
to the alteration of other factors underlying the premium calculation – such as, for example,
assumptions concerning the interest rate available on the capital markets, or costs. Second,
an adjustment is only permissible where it is necessary to guarantee the continued ability to
pay insurance benefits and therefore an insurer may not impose an adjustment in order to
increase its profits. Third, para. 2 requires the approval of either an independent trustee69
or the supervisory authority because the average policyholder is not in a position to evaluate
whether the conditions for premium adjustment are met. The insurer has no option and
will have to employ an independent trustee if national supervisory law does not provide
for approval by the supervisory authority. Such approval does not exclude a review by a
court in a claim brought by the individual policyholder or by a consumer organisation in
accordance with Article 1:301.
Exceptions (para. 4)
C9. An adjustment is not permitted if an error has been committed in the calculation of
the premium or the insurance benefits, which a competent and diligent actuary would not
have committed. The insurer is the person responsible for the correct calculation of the
premium at the time of contracting and where a premium has been miscalculated because
of such an error, the insurer bears the cost.
C10. For reasons of equal treatment, an adjustment is not permitted if it is selective. Thus,
the insurer will have to adjust all contracts subject to Article 17:303, whether they were
concluded before or after the adjustment was proposed.
C11. An adjustment becomes effective three months after the insurer has informed the
policyholder by a written notice that describes the nature of the adjustment, explains the
reasons for it and informs the policyholder of his right to demand a reduction of benefits
instead of an increase of premium. This period is necessary since the adjustment of the pre-
mium or the benefits constitutes an alteration of one of the main contractual obligations and
the policyholder needs time to evaluate, perhaps with professional guidance, whether, given
his personal circumstances, he should demand a reduction in insurance benefits instead of
an increase in premium.
69
Cf., for example, s. 142 German ISA 2016.
336
Article 17:304 Alteration of Terms and Conditions
Premium Reduction
C12. Para. 6 grants the policyholder a claim against the insurer for the reduction of the
premium. This right gives a fair balance between policyholder and insurer. If the latter is
able to alter the contract in its favour in the event of an adverse alteration of the biometric
basis for the premium, the former should also be able to request an adjustment to his advan-
tage where the biometric risks have changed in his favour. As in the case of an adjustment
instigated by the insurer (see Comment 8), reduction of the premium is contingent on
approval by an independent trustee or the relevant supervisory authority. This ensures that
the adjustment is actuarially sound.
C13. Para. 7 prescribes that an adjustment of the premium and benefits payable due to the
alteration of biometric risks is not possible until five years after the conclusion of the con-
tract. This rule is intended to prevent an insurer seeking a competitive advantage by basing
its calculations on low (and inadequate) actuarial assumptions and adjusting the calculation
in its favour shortly after the conclusion of the contract. The required long-term calculation
is in line with art. 209 para. 1 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) which states that
premiums for new business should be sufficient, on reasonable actuarial assumptions, to
enable life insurance undertakings to meet all their commitments and, in particular, to
establish adequate technical provisions.
Adjustment Clauses
C14. Article 17:303 does not preclude the parties from agreeing on a premium adjustment
clause in the contract, as long as this is not to the detriment of the policyholder (Article
1:103 para. 2). A premium adjustment clause providing that the premium may be adjusted in
accordance with generally acknowledged mortality tables, if any, may arguably be regarded
as valid as long as the requirements of Article 17:303 are met.
337
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Comments
Rationale
C1. Article 17:304 complements the preceding Article on the adjustment of the premium
and benefits payable by providing a mechanism for the alteration of other terms and condi-
tions. The rationale of this rule is the fact that life insurance contracts are typically conclud-
ed for a long period of time during which the insurer has no ordinary power of cancellation
and during which the alteration of extra-contractual circumstances may require adjustment
of the contract. In view of this, many life insurance contracts contain a clause empowering
the insurer to alter unilaterally the terms and conditions other than the premium and bene-
fits payable. While Article 17:304 permits such clauses, it imposes requirements which must
be met to justify alterations (paras. 1 and 2).
Scope
C2. Article 17:304 applies to the alteration of all parts of the insurance contract other
than the premium and benefits payable and unlike Article 17:303 it applies to all types of
life insurance contracts.
C3. Article 17:304 starts from the principle that general terms and conditions of a life
insurance should not be changed. It sets out requirements for clauses permitting such a
change by way of exception in a number of clearly defined cases. This is in line with few
national laws,70 while most laws leave the matter to contractual agreement. In the absence
of more specific rules, the limits of such adjustment clauses are commonly derived from
the law on unfair contract terms.71
C4. In contrast with Article 17:303, Article 17:304 does not provide for a statutory power
to adjust the contract but rather sets out the requirements that a contractual adjustment
clause must meet in order to be lawful. Since the absence of an adjustment clause in the
contract regarding terms and conditions would generally be less detrimental than the ab-
sence of a premium adjustment clause, the matter can be left to contractual arrangements.
C5. Article 17:304 lists the limited range of circumstances in which a contractual clause
may be justified to alter terms and conditions. An alteration is only permissible, where the
alteration is required to comply with the amendment of certain legal provisions (para. 1
70
See s. 164 German ICA providing for a statutory right of alteration; for a special provision concerning
amendments of terms and conditions of life insurance and other insurance of the person, see s. 20 a
Finnish ICA.
71
See also para. 1(j) of Annex of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive (93/13/EEC); s. 6 para. 1(5) and
s. 6 para. 2(3) of the Austrian Consumer Protection Act.
338
Article 17:304 Alteration of Terms and Conditions
(a)–(c)) or, when a clause of the contract is null and void (para. 1(d)), where the substitution
of the clause is necessary to continue the contract in accordance with Article 2:304 para. 2.
C6. Para. 1(a)-(c) generally implies an alteration of existing national law or administrative
practice. For the purposes of this provision, an alteration of existing national law may also
result from a decision of a superior court by which the legal provision in question is given
a meaning different from the one which was hitherto generally presumed.
C7. An adjustment of the contract may become necessary due to alteration of insurance
supervisory law or a binding decision by the supervisory authority directed against the
insurance undertaking in question (para. 1(a)). Especially in the realm of life assurance,
insurance supervisory law and insurance contract law are closely intertwined. This is for
example the case of life insurance contracts with a savings element.72
Pension Schemes
C8. Often occupational pension schemes are effected by means of life insurance. The
amendment of mandatory rules of the applicable national law on pension schemes could
thus make it necessary to adjust insurance contracts in order to conform with the altered
legal requirements (para. 1(b)).
Tax Privileges
C9. Because of its importance in providing financial provision for older people, life in-
surance may well attract tax privileges or subsidies. In order to ensure that the parties
concerned (especially the policyholders, insured persons or beneficiaries) will not lose their
tax privileges or right to subsidies, the insurance contract will in some circumstances need
to be adjusted to meet the altered legal requirements that apply to such tax privileges or
subsidies (para. 1(c)).
C10. Where a clause in the general terms and conditions is invalid, it appears appropri-
ate to grant the insurer a limited power to substitute the invalid clause with a new (valid)
clause binding all members of the collective. In view of the collective nature of insurance
this seems preferable to a substitution effected for the single contract, in particular in life
insurance contracts with a savings element, where insurance benefits have to be calculated
in accordance with uniform standards for all policyholders.
72
For example s. 169 para. 3 German ICA concerning the calculation of the surrender value; similarly,
s. 176 Austrian ICA; see also art. 91 Swiss ICA.
339
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C11. The alteration becomes effective three months after the insurer has informed the
policyholder in writing about the alteration. The written notice must indicate the content of
the alteration and the reasons for it. The notice must be in clear terms and in the language
in which the contract was negotiated (in accordance with Article 1:203 para 1; see also
Article 2:502 para. 2).
C12. The policyholder is granted a period of three months to prepare for the alteration.
In comparison with some national laws73 this is a rather extensive period. It corresponds
to the period for an adjustment of the premium, in accordance with Article 17:303 para. 5.
Retroactive Effect
C13. Notwithstanding that the alteration of the terms or conditions will only become
effective after three months, the new (altered) clauses may have a retroactive effect if this
is necessary for the functioning of the contract. This could for example be the case where a
new clause provides that the policyholder has to bear costs which are spread over the whole
contract period.
Comments
Rationale
C1. In most European countries, retirement annuities used to be organised and provided
by social security institutions. During employment, employers and employees made fi-
73
S. 20 a Finnish ICA: changes shall take effect at the commencement of either the premium period or,
if the premium period is shorter than one year or if no premium period has been agreed upon, the cal-
endar year which next follows after a month has elapsed from the date at which the insurer dispatched
the notice of the changed conditions.
340
Article 17:401 Pension Plans
nancial contributions, so that, after having reached the retirement age the employee would
receive an old-age pension for life, and even after his death a surviving spouse or under age
children, would receive payments. Since social security systems were on a pay-as-you-go
basis they were affected by demographic changes. Moreover, since life expectancy has been
on the rise since the time when social security systems were established it is becoming
increasingly difficult to provide adequate pensions for the retired by means of the contri-
butions of current employees.
C2. Pension schemes provided by social security systems have typically been supplement-
ed by alternative systems, one of which is an old-age pension provided by means of life
insurance. In many cases, such pension schemes are organised by employers. There are
different ways in which this can be done. The employer might, for instance, contract life
insurance to cover the pension payment to the retired employees. In most cases, such an
insurance contract will constitute group insurance in favour of the former employees and
their relatives, as the case may be. In many countries, there is special legislation dealing
with this kind of pension scheme. This legislation may provide for regulations which are
not compatible with the PEICL.
C3. The solution provided for such cases is not to completely exclude the application of
the PEICL to the corresponding life insurance contracts. Rather, in accordance with Article
17:401, national legislation takes precedence. Subject to this, the PEICL should also be avail-
able for life insurance contracts relating to pension plans; otherwise, it would not be possible
to opt in to PEICL when life insurance has this important function. Thus, Articles 17:401
and 17:402 constitute a special section which deals with the relation between the PEICL on
life insurance, as far as chosen by the parties, and national law on pension schemes. Contra-
ry to the general rule that no recourse to national law is permitted when the PEICL apply,
Articles 17:401 and 17.402 give preference to national law on pension schemes, so that a
choice of the PEICL would not eliminate the possibility of taking advantage of such schemes.
Illustration
C4. According to Article 18:204 on group insurance a group member leaving the group
has a right to equivalent cover under a new individual contract with the insurer concerned
without a new assessment of the risk. In some national legal systems, there is no such right
with regard to insurance contracts relating to employer’s pension plans. Instead national law
might provide, for instance, that an employee whose occupation had continued for a certain
period of time may claim the capital which already has been saved up to be transferred to
the pension scheme of his new employer.74 These provisions would apply to a life insurance
contract governed by the PEICL as well. On the other hand, Article 18:204 might not apply
to such a life insurance if the right of the employed to continue the contract is not provided
for in the same way by national law.
74
See s. 4 para. 2 of the German Company Pension Act; s. 13 para. 1 No. 2 of the Austrian Occupational
Pensions Act.
341
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Scope
C5. Article 17:401 applies to life insurances relating to pension plans. Life insurance is to
be understood in accordance with Article 1:201 para. 6. Since Article 17:401 refers to such
kind of life insurance which provides for payments after retirement, the provision will not
apply to an insurance contract which covers only the death of the person at risk (pure life
insurance). Article 17:401 will not apply to pension schemes which are organised by means
of instruments other than life insurance based on a contractual agreement by the parties.
C6. The contract must be related to a pension plan. Pension plans may be organised by
employers or other institutions. An employer’s pension plan may be understood as a con-
tractual promise of the employer to provide an old-age pension or a disability benefit75 after
retirement in favour of an employee and/or his family members. Such contractual promise
may be performed in various ways, among them, by concluding a life insurance contract
upon the life and to the benefit of the employee. Article 17:401 will only be applicable where
the employer uses a life insurance contract in such a way.
C7. The result of the application of Article 17:401 is that national law providing manda-
tory rules for such kinds of life insurance will prevail over the PEICL. This means that (a)
those special rules will apply to the insurance contract which is generally governed by the
PEICL whereas other provisions of national law, for instance those dealing with insurance
contract law in general, will not apply, and (b) the PEICL will not apply insofar as they are
not compatible with those special rules of national law.
C8. Article 17:401 refers to the rules of the applicable national law. Whether or not those
special rules of a national law are applicable is not governed by the PEICL but conflict of laws
rules. The conflict of laws rules might call for the application of the law which governs the
employment contract, or the law at the place where the professional activity takes place, or
the law which governs the social security of the insured (cf. art. 8 of the Rome I Regulation
(593/2008)).
75
See Article 17:102.
342
Article 17:402 Tax Treatment and State Subsidies
Comments
Rationale
C1. In many European countries, life insurance provided by private insurers is an im-
portant instrument to supplement or perhaps even to replace old-age provision organised
by social security. Whereas social security is based on a pay-as-you-go basis, private life
insurance operates by using a capital cover system which makes it less vulnerable to demo-
graphic changes. To make private life insurance as an instrument for private pension plans
more attractive, Member States are encouraging them by granting some privileges. Premi-
ums paid by the policyholder may be deducted from tax, or in some cases even subsidies
may be granted by the state. Generally, these privileges are tied to special conditions which
the life insurance has to comply with.76 So for instance, the claims of the insured might be
non-transferrable77 or the policyholder might be obliged to renounce the right to terminate
the contract for ten years.78 Based on these considerations, Article 17:402 has the purpose
to allow the use of the PEICL even in cases when they may conflict to a national regime
providing for a special tax treatment or for state subsidies.
Scope
C2. Article 17:402 applies to all kinds of life insurance, whether taken out individually or
as group insurance. Whereas tax systems mainly focus on insurance contracts supplement-
ing or replacing social security in the field of pension plans, Article 17:402 is not restricted
to such contracts. It may be applied to any kind of tax privileges or state subsidies. Whether
or not the latter will apply is not the subject of PEICL but regulated by national conflict of
laws rules.
Legal consequences
C3. The first sentence of Article 17:402 provides that the PEICL will not affect national
rules imposing specific requirements on life insurance contracts in order to qualify for
special tax treatment or for state subsidies. This is mainly a clarification that the PEICL do
not deal with tax law or state subsidies and therefore would not affect those requirements
which are imposed by national law for tax privileges or state subsidies.
76
See, for instance, the German “Riester-Rente” and “Rürup-Rente” as regulated in s. 10a and ss. 79 ff.
of the German Income Tax Act and the German Act on the Certification of Retirement and Basic
Pension Plans; and “prämienbegünstigte Zukunftsvorsorge” as regulated in ss. 108g ff of the Austrian
Income Tax Act.
77
S. 97 of the German Income Tax Act. According to art. 15 of Greek Law on Income Tax, special tax
privileges are granted to the policyholder in long term life insurance. If, however, the policyholder
requests the surrender value, the applicable tax rate is increased by 50 %, unless the policyholder has
reached the age of 60.
78
See s. 108g para. 1 and s. 108i para. 1 of the Austrian Income Tax Act. The Austrian Supreme Court
held that these provisions in the Income Tax Act even have to be considered as leges speciales vis-à-vis
the right of the policyholder to a premature termination of the contract as provided in s. 165 Austrian
ICA (OGH 7.9.2011, 7 Ob 138/11m, SZ 2011/113 and 9.5.2012, 7 Ob 40/12a).
343
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C4. The essential consequence of Article 17:402 is laid down in the second sentence. As
far as it is required to meet the conditions for a special tax treatment or state subsidies the
parties to the insurance contract may deviate from any provision of the PEICL. This rule
especially applies to those provisions which are mandatory. Deviation from the PEICL is
also permitted if it is not in favour of the policyholder or the insured. Any other provision
of the PEICL which is not in conflict with the national regime of tax law or state subsidies
will apply.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Cases arise where a beneficiary will not claim payment from the insurer because he
lacks information about relevant facts. Relevant facts are the occurrence of the insured
event, usually the death of the person at risk, the existence of the insurance contract and/
or his status as a beneficiary. Although it is not the primary task of the insurer to secure
the rights of the beneficiaries, the principle of good faith requires it to investigate the oc-
currence of an insured event, to ascertain the identity of the beneficiary and to inform the
beneficiary about his status under the life insurance contract under certain circumstances.
Article 17:501 defines the circumstances giving rise to the duties of the insurer and provides
sanctions for breach. One purpose of these duties is to reduce the number of “sleeping con-
tracts”, another is to ensure that beneficiaries actually get what they are entitled to.
C2. Cases arise where the insurer without knowing about the insured event has good
reason to assume that it has taken place. Examples of this are the life insurance contracts of
Jewish policyholders murdered in concentration camps. Reasons to assume that the insured
event has occurred can also be found in other situations, for example, in the case of a policy-
holder who stops paying premiums and does not respond to invoices over a long period of
time. In such situations, the insurer should be under an obligation to take reasonable steps to
investigate whether the insured event has occurred. It will not be allowed to remain idle and
wait until either the beneficiary finds out about the insured event or the claim is prescribed.
344
Article 17:501 Insurer’s Investigation and Information Duty
C3. What appears to be “reasonable” must ultimately be ascertained in the light of all
the circumstances of the individual case. In general, the insurer will have to consider the
likelihood of an insured event having occurred, the costs of investigation, the ability of the
beneficiaries themselves to investigate, and so on. For the meaning of the term “best efforts”
employed in para. 2, see Comment 6, below.
C4. Once an insurer knows that the insured event has occurred, it has to investigate the
identity and address of the beneficiary. This duty arises in both cases, namely where the
insurer has investigated the occurrence of the insured event and where it gained knowledge
thereof by other means.
C5. In cases where the beneficiary has been designated by name and address, reference to
the files of the insurer will usually be sufficient to obtain all relevant information. However,
the beneficiary may have changed address or have been designated in a certain capacity,
such as the “wife” of the policyholder, his “children” or “heirs”. Equally, the policyholder
may also have designated a beneficiary in his will, of which the insurer may not be aware.
In such cases, the insurer will have to take best efforts to ascertain the identity and address
of the beneficiary.
C6. What amounts to the insurer’s “best efforts” must ultimately be ascertained in the light
of all the circumstances of the individual case. In any event, the term “best efforts” clearly
requires more than the term “reasonable steps” under para. 1. The insurer would obviously
be obliged to incur costs in investigations, as long as they are not unreasonable in the light
of the amount at stake.
C7. Once an insurer knows that the insured event has occurred and the identity and ad-
dress of the beneficiary, it has to inform the beneficiary “accordingly” (second part of the
first sentence of para. 2). This duty arises in both cases, namely where the insurer has in-
vestigated the identity and address of the beneficiary and where it has gained knowledge
thereof by other means.
C8. The term “accordingly” refers first of all to the status of the beneficiary. However, it
also refers to the occurrence of the insured event. Thus, an insurer must inform the bene-
ficiary about (i) that person’s status as a beneficiary and (ii) the occurrence of the insured
event. A person may not be aware of the status as a beneficiary if the contract was concluded
by another person. For instance, a parent may have concluded a life insurance contract
for the benefit of a child without telling the child about it. Similarly, a beneficiary may not
be aware of the occurrence of the insured event, namely the death of the person at risk.
For instance, if the policyholder and the beneficiary have stopped living together and lost
contact, information about the death of the person at risk may not reach the beneficiary.
While this will not be the case very often, it cannot be ruled out altogether and should be
covered by Article 17:501.
345
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C9. Once an insurer knows that the insured event has occurred and the identity and ad-
dress of the beneficiary, it has 30 days to comply with the information duty required by the
second sentence of para. 2. If such information does not reach the beneficiary within this
time, the insurer is in breach of its duty.
Sanctions (para. 3)
C10. Under the principle of estoppel (venire contra factum proprium nulli conceditur), an
insurer which breaches its duties under para. 1 or 2 and therefore does not receive a justi-
fied claim by the beneficiary in time will later be precluded from raising prescription as a
defence. Technically, this result is reached by way of suspension of the prescription period.
C11. Suspension will last until the beneficiary obtains knowledge of “actual entitlement”,
namely, of both status as a beneficiary and occurrence of the insured event.
C12. Irrespective of the sanctions provided in para. 3, the beneficiary may claim damages
in accordance with Article 1:105 para. 2. Furthermore, sanctions may be imposed under
the applicable supervisory law.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Several national laws provide that the insurer is relieved of the obligation to pay the
insurance money in the case of suicide of the person at risk.79 There are two major ex-
ceptions: In some jurisdictions, the insurer may refuse payment only if the person at risk
commits suicide within a certain period of time after the conclusion of the contract;80 even
79
S. 169 Austrian ICA; art. 239 Bulgarian ICA; art. L 132-7 French ICA; s. 161 German ICA; Art 1927
Italian CC; art. 833 Polish CC; art 191 Portugese ICA, art. 93 Spanish ICA. In the UK that is the effect
of case law; see Beresford v Royal Exchange Assurance Company [1938] AC 586.
80
Art. 164 para. 2 Belgian IA 2014: one year; art. 239 Bulgarian ICA: one year; art. L 132-7 French ICA:
one year; s. 161 German ICA: 3 years; art. 1927 Italian CC: two years; art. 191 Portuguese ICA: one
year; art. 833 Polish CC: two years (at the same time parties can provide in the insurance contract that
the shortest period may be six months); art. 93 Spanish ICA: one year.
346
Article 17:502 Suicide
where there is no time limit provided by law, there seems to be a general practice in some
jurisdictions to introduce a time limit by standard contract terms.81 The second exception
applies in jurisdictions where suicide is covered regardless of the time which has elapsed
since the conclusion of the contract if the person at risk acts in such a state of mental inca-
pacity as to lack free will.82
C2. Two alternative rationales might explain these national rules. On the one hand it is
possible to interpret them as a qualification of the general principle that intentional causa-
tion of the insured event discharges the insurer from liability (see, for example, Article 9:101
which applies in indemnity insurance only). This explanation is not adequate in the case
of life insurance since suicide in many cases is caused by supervening mental distress and
can hardly ever be attributed to a long-term deliberate course of action. Suicide is often the
materialisation of the risk of fatal mental illness or depression.
C3. An alternative rationale comes from the principle that an applicant would be obliged
to disclose his intention to cause the insured event, an intention that deprives the insured
event of its accidental and insurable character. However, questions posed by insurers con-
cerning the applicant’s intention to commit suicide are futile and absurd. A rule establishing
a clear time-limit avoids the need for such questions and related evidential difficulties which
would otherwise result.
Scope
C4. The provision applies to all kinds of life insurance where the death of a person is an
insured event. It does not matter whether the life insurance is a pure risk policy or a mixed
life/investment policy.
Time Period
C5. Article 17:502 para. 1 provides for a period of one year. Arguably, the period could
be five years and, thus, be brought in line with Article 17:201 para. 2 (stating the period
throughout which the sanctions for pre-contractual information are available to the in-
surer). However, following the model of various national laws, the one year period was
considered to be more appropriate in the given context. After all, it is difficult to think of
a person who at the time of the formation of the contract is considering suicide but would
wait for more than one year before carrying out that intention.
Mental Incapacity
C6. Even when the person at risk commits suicide during the first year after the formation
of the contract the insurer is liable to pay in two cases: The first is that the mental state of
the person at risk is such that it cannot be regarded as knowing the consequences of his
actions (Article 17:502 para. 2(a)). The second covers situations where the person at risk
did not anticipate the possibility of committing suicide at the time when he entered into the
81
As this is, for example, the case in Austria and the UK.
82
See, for example: s. 169 Austrian ICA; s. 161 German ICA and art. 93 Spanish ICA.
347
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
contract. If this is clearly and convincingly evidenced (proved beyond reasonable doubt),
as for instance in cases where the person at risk commits suicide following an accident he
suffers after the formation of the contract and which results in severe injuries with long-term
effects, it seems fair to allow a beneficiary to claim the insurance money.
Discharge
C7. Where the insurer is discharged from having to pay the insurance money, a surrender
value, if any, will still be paid to the beneficiary. It is the equivalent of having saved mon-
ey. This applies even in cases where the insurer has terminated, rescinded or avoided the
contract, for instance, because of a breach of the pre-contractual disclosure duties (Article
17:602 para. 2). This being so, a similar rule should apply in cases of suicide because there
is no reason why the beneficiary should be treated in a different way. This is the effect of the
reference in Article 17:502 para. 1.
C8. Article 17:502 is semi-mandatory in favour of the beneficiary (Article 1:103 para.
2) which allows derogation to his benefit. For example, when life insurance is used as an
instrument to secure a loan, the insurer might grant unconditional cover even for suicide
committed within the first year of the contract period.
Comments
Rationale
C1. It is an acknowledged principle of insurance contract law that someone who inten-
tionally kills a person at risk will not receive the insurance money.83 By distinguishing two
different situations, German and Austrian laws are even more detailed: If a beneficiary is
killed by the policyholder, the insurer is relieved of any obligation to pay either the insur-
ance money or the surrender value. If the beneficiary kills the person at risk, the beneficiary
is deemed not to have been designated. In such a case the insurance money is paid to the
83
See, for example, s. 170 Austrian ICA; art. 164 para. 2(2) Belgian IA 2014; art. 234 of the Bulgarian
ICA; art. 7:973 Dutch CC; s. 29 Finnish ICA; s. 162 German ICA; art. 30 Greek ICA; art. 6:484 para. 2
Hungarian CC; art. 1922 Italian CC; art. 92 Spanish ICA. For the UK, see Beresford v Royal Exchange
Assurance Company [1938] AC 586.
348
Article 17:503 Intentional Killing of the Person at Risk
other beneficiaries, if any, or to the policyholder or, if the policyholder is the person at risk,
to his legal successors.
Scope
C2. In order to apply Article 17:503, the death of the person at risk as defined in Article
1:202 para. 3 must be an insured event. This is true for most life insurance contracts, in
some Member States even by way of definition, either for pure risk contracts or mixed life
insurances.
Details
C3. The basic principle underlying Article 17:503 is that the person who intentionally kills
the person at risk will not be entitled to collect the insurance money. Depending on the
circumstances of the case, there will either be no payment or payment to a person other than
the killer. Where the killer is the policyholder and the beneficiary, the insurer will not have
to pay out at all (para. 3). If, however, the killer is a beneficiary and not the policyholder,
his designation will be deemed to be revoked (para. 1) and the policyholder or his heirs,
as the case may be, will become beneficiaries, in accordance with Article 17:102 para. 3. If
two or more beneficiaries have been designated, the insurance money will be distributed
proportionately among those who were not involved in the killing (Article 17:102 para. 4).
If the claim under the insurance contract has been assigned to a third party who kills the
person at risk, the assignment is without effect (para. 2) and the beneficiary will collect the
insurance money.
Intention
C4. All cases mentioned in Comment 3 have in common that the person who kills the
person at risk does so intentionally. The provision does not apply if the person at risk is
killed by an act of negligence, even gross negligence.
Self-Defence
C5. Para. 4 makes it clear that Article 17:503 paras. 1 to 3 do not apply when the benefi-
ciary or the policyholder acts justifiably, in particular legitimate self-defence. If so, they will
be entitled to the insurance money.
Mandatory Character
C6. Article 17:503 is an absolutely mandatory provision, in accordance with Article 1:103
para. 1. This means that the insurer cannot contract to pay the insurance money to the
beneficiary or the policyholder who has intentionally killed the person at risk. The reason
is obvious: There should be no incentive to commit a crime.
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Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
Comments
Rationale
C1. Para. 1 is intended to protect the policyholder of a life insurance contract when oth-
erwise the contract would be terminated because of his non-payment of the premium.
Therefore the general rule of Article 5:103, providing for the right of the insurer to terminate
the contract by written notice, does not apply to contracts which have attracted a conversion
value or a surrender value. Whether such a value has been attracted depends on the kind
of the life insurance contract and the duration of the contract as well as the requirements
of the applicable supervisory law. The calculation of the conversion and/or the surrender
value is dealt with in Article 17:603.
Policyholder’s Options
C2. In general, life insurance contracts under the first sentence of para. 1 are to be convert-
ed into paid-up policies. This means that there will be no further duty on the policyholder
to pay premium. Other terms and conditions of the contract, in particular those regarding
the death of the person at risk, remain applicable. The amount of the insurer’s obligation to
pay becomes fixed at the time of conversion.
C3. Instead of requesting conversion, the policyholder may decide to terminate the con-
tract and request the payment of its surrender value. In this case, the insurer is obliged to
“buy back” the policy. Surrender of the contract is dealt with in Articles 17:602 and 17:603. If
there is no request for the surrender value, the policy will be converted by operation of law.
Information Duty
C4. According to para. 2 the insurer must inform the policyholder about the conver-
sion and/or surrender values. The provision refers to the periods under Articles 5:101(b)
and 5:102 para. 1(b). The policyholder must be asked to choose between conversion and
payment of the surrender value. If the insurer does not comply with its information duty,
350
Article 17:602 Surrender of the Contract
sanctions may result, such as damages, other remedies of general contract law or sanctions
under supervisory law.
Form of Request
C5. Para. 3 requires the request of the policyholder for conversion to be in writing. Writing
within the meaning of para. 3 includes electronic documents. The formal requirement under
para. 3 serves evidentiary needs.
Comments
Right of Surrender (para. 1)
C1. Article 17:602 provides an alternative to Article 17:601. Instead of not paying the pre-
mium and opting for conversion of a life insurance contract the policyholder may, at any
time after one year from the conclusion of the contract, terminate the contract and claim
its surrender value. This mirrors a common solution which can be found in several Mem-
ber States.84 The calculation of the surrender value is dealt with in Article 17:603. Payment
must be made by the insurer to the beneficiary of the surrender value in accordance with
Article 17:103.
84
Cf. for instance ss. 165, 176 Austrian ICA; art. 7:978 Dutch CC; s. 13 Finnish ICA; art. 6:481 para. 2
Hungarian CC; art. 89 Spanish ICA. In Greece, art. 29 para. 3 Greek ICA provides that, in case of
individual life insurance contract, the policyholder is entitled to request the surrender of his policy
after the lapse of a period which is stipulated in the policy and which may not be longer than three
years, whereas different arrangements may be made in case of group life insurance contract.
351
Chapter Seventeen: Special Provisions for Life Insurance
C2. The request by the policyholder to terminate the contract and have the surrender value
paid to him must be in writing in accordance with para. 1. For the requirement of writing,
see Article 17:601 para. 3 and Article 17:601 Comment 5.
C3. Para. 2 grants the policyholder a right to the surrender value also in cases where the
contract is terminated, rescinded or avoided not by the policyholder but by the insurer. This
applies even if the contract has been avoided because of a fraudulent breach of the applicant’s
pre-contractual disclosure duty, Article 2:104.
C4. In accordance with para. 3, at least every year, the insurer is obliged to inform the
policyholder about the amount of the surrender value and the extent to which it is guar-
anteed either by contract or by the applicable supervisory law. In addition there is such an
information duty whenever the policyholder requests the information. Thus, a policyholder
who wants to make use of the right under para. 1 will usually request information on the
current surrender value under para. 3.
C5. With-profits life insurances entitle policyholders to participate in the insurer’s profits
as defined in the contract and by the applicable supervisory law. Where the policyholder
claims the surrender value, the insurer must pay out the appropriate share of profits. The
only exception to this rule is the case where profits have already been taken account of in
calculating the surrender value.
C6. Para. 5 states the due date for the payment of the sums provided for in Article 17:602.
Two months seem to be a reasonable period of time to allow the insurer to make a payment
even if it might be forced to realise assets or investments.
352
Article 17:603 Conversion Value; Surrender Value
Comments
Home Country Principle (first sentence of para. 1)
C1. Article 17:603 does not prescribe the way the conversion and the surrender value have
to be calculated. Instead, para. 1 refers to “the law of the home Member State of the insur-
er” for the purpose of the calculation of the surrender or conversion value. In most cases,
insurance supervisory law regulates the matter. Alternatively, national law may regulate the
calculation partly by supervisory law and partly by contract law.85
C2. Article 17:603 does not interfere with the way national law regulates these issues.
Reference to the home country is in line with the home country control principle as applied
by Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC; see in particular art. 30 para. 1). These also define
the home Member State (see art. 13 para. 8 of the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC)).
C3. Para. 1 obliges the insurer to “state the way the conversion value and/or the surrender
value is calculated” in the insurance contract. Also, additional national rules of the law of
the insurer’s home country might apply to this information duty. These may include infor-
mation on the cost of investments and other costs the insurer is confronted with; see also
the insurer’s pre-contractual information duties in this respect in Article 17:202 para. 2(iv).
C4. The way of calculating the surrender and/or conversion value in accordance with the
law of the insurer’s home country must “comply with established actuarial principles” as well
as with para. 2. This is explicitly required to ensure a mandatory standard irrespective of
whether and to what extent they are provided for in the law of the insurer’s home country.
In order to comply with the actuarial principles, the calculation must at least be intelligible
to an independent actuary.
C5. When calculating the surrender and/or conversion value, insurers may deduct costs
of contract conclusion such as commissions to be paid to the intermediary. The applicable
supervisory law may restrict such deduction. In any event, para. 2 requires the insurer to
spread the deduction of costs in equal amounts over a period of at least five years. As a
result, if the policyholder requests payment of the surrender value by the end of the first
year, the insurer will be allowed to deduct 20 per cent of the costs of contract conclusion
as a maximum only. Thus, para. 2 ensures that a contract will attract a positive surrender
value at an early stage.
85
See, for example, s. 176 paras. 3 to 5 Austrian ICA; s. 169 para. 3 German ICA; art. 91 of the Swiss ICA.
For Greece, see for example art. 29 para. 4 Greek ICA, pursuant to which, in case of a surrender or in
case of any termination of an insurance contract, the insurer grants the policyholder the surrender
value; the insurer’s expenses which “burden” the specific insurance contract as well as the premium
with a saving element constitute the basis for calculation of the surrender value. Further provisions
on surrender value are laid down in the Greek Legislative Decree on Insurance Undertakings.
353
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
C6. Payment of the surrender value may be connected to particular costs for the insurer
where, for example, a disinvestment is required. Insurers are allowed to deduct “an ap-
propriate amount” from the surrender value in order to cover these costs if they have not
already been accounted for when calculating the surrender value. The deducted amount
must be appropriate and not exceed the insurer’s costs of payment; it must not be a penalty.
Established actuarial principles have to be followed.
Comments
Background
C1. Group insurance contracts are widely used products because they can be tailored to
the specific needs of certain groups, thus achieving benefits of economies of scale not avail-
able to individual policyholders. In such cases, typically the underwriting process works
differently, as insurers tend to assess and underwrite the risk with respect to the group as a
whole, and not to its individual members.
Definition
C2. Group insurance contracts are structured as contracts between an insurer and a group
organiser for the benefit of group members with a common link to the group organiser, see
the first sentence of Article 1:201 para. 7 PEICL. In practice, the common link in question
may often be membership of an organisation or a legal relationship with the group organiser
(for example, employment contracts, membership of a trade union and so on). However,
any kind of social contact might suffice (for example, visitors to a sports event, to school
fairs and so on).
Classification
C3. The PEICL aim to regulate group insurance systematically. In contrast, the subject is
not dealt with comprehensively by most national laws. Many national laws do not contain
354
Article 18:102 General Duty of Care of the Group Organiser
any rules on group insurance whereas others deal with the subject extensively.86 Under
the PEICL, group insurance may be either accessory or elective. Both terms are defined in
Article 1:201 paras. 8 and 9.
C4. Under an accessory group insurance contract group members are automatically in-
sured by belonging to the group and without being able to refuse insurance. In contrast,
in elective group insurance the inception of cover is the result of personal application or
non-refusal of an offer of cover. Given the particular nature and widespread use of acces-
sory group insurances, the application of the PEICL to such contracts may require special
attention by the judge – see Article 18:201.
C5. Contracts for group insurance will be subject to the PEICL if the group organiser and
the insurer agree in accordance with Article 1:102. In such cases, the legal position of the
group members will be determined by the PEICL and consent by the group members is not
required. This applies even to elective group insurance where group members choose to join
the insurance scheme which, however, is pre-existing and based on the PEICL according
to the agreement between the insurer and the group organiser. The only choice they have is
to join the insurance scheme and accept the application of the PEICL whereas they cannot
join the scheme and opt out of the PEICL.
Comments
Rationale
C1. The group organiser (whether for instance an employer, a bank or an insurance bro-
ker) plays a key role in both establishing and operating group insurance. As a rule, members
of the group have very little, if any, influence on the terms and conditions negotiated by the
group organiser with the insurer. Also, the group organiser is typically the link between the
86
In Spain, art. 81 ICA regulates group insurance in the area of personal insurances only, similarly to
art. L141-1 to 7 of the French ICA, inserted into the text in 2005. Finland and Sweden are exceptions
with their detailed regulation on the subject: s. 2 Finnish ICA provides the legal definition of group
insurance, with s. 4 listing the rules applicable to group insurance and ss. 76 to 80 containing specific
rules. The Swedish ICA contains four chapters with more than 80 articles on the subject (cf. Chapters
17-20 of the Swedish ICA). In Austria (although the term “group insurance” is used in s. 178m ICA),
Germany, Poland and in the UK group insurance is not specifically regulated by contract law.
355
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
insurer and the group members, transmitting information, documents, premiums, even
insurance money. In this way, the role of group organisers may look very similar to that of
an agent. This position may be abused in order to avoid rules relating to insurance inter-
mediaries. However, this is primarily a matter for the relevant regulation of the profession
whereas the PEICL only deal with aspects of insurance contract law.
Duty of Care
C2. Because the group organiser’s role is similar to that of an agent, the PEICL impose
a general duty of care on the group organiser both when concluding and administering
the contract. The wording follows the Commercial Agency Directive (86/653/EEC).87 The
group organiser is therefore obliged to look after the legitimate interests of group members
and act dutifully and in good faith.88 The duty of care is a consequence of the insurer’s and
the group organiser’s agreement on the application of the PEICL. It benefits the individual
group member as a third party.
C3. Article 18:101 ensures that the group organiser does not put his own interests above
those of the group member (the future insured), for example, in earning commission. It
requires the group organiser to seek terms and conditions of the group insurance which
reflect the actual risk and the discernable needs of group members. It may also require the
group organiser to make sure that the information provided under Article 18:202 will be
in a language which the group member is able to understand. Should the group organiser
breach his general duty of care, there will be an appropriate remedy which may well provide
for damages, see also Article 1:105 Comment 7.
C4. The relationship between the group organiser and the group member may provide
for further obligations on the group organiser. For example, the terms of a credit agreement
between a bank and a borrower may specify the terms of the group insurance to protect
the loan; a contract of employment may specify those of a life or health or accident insur-
ance for the benefit of the employee. Where the group organiser is a regulated insurance
intermediary, the additional information duties under the Insurance Mediation Directive
(2002/92/EC), as amended, apply.89
Information (para. 2)
C5. The special position of the group organiser, as negotiator of the group insurance and
as link between the insurer and the group members, makes the organiser the arterial av-
enue for transmitting contractual information to the group members. Para. 2 specifies a
particular aspect of the general duty of care under para. 1. The organiser must forward any
relevant notices issued by the insurer to the group members and inform them about any
amendments to the contract. This information must be in the language in which the contract
87
See art. 3 para. 1.
88
For Germany BGH 8.5.2013 Versicherungsrecht 2013, 853; Wandt, Zulässigkeit, 856.
89
See especially art. 12 (to be amended under the Proposal for an IDD).
356
Article 18:201 Application of the PEICL
is negotiated (Article 1:203 para. 1); translation might be required under the general duty
of care under para. 1 where the group organiser knows or should know that the particular
group member does not understand the language of the contract.
C6. Para. 2 will apply to elective group insurance only occasionally, as in this area the
general information duty of the insurer to the insured applies. However, there will be a duty,
for instance, to inform group members about the termination of the framework contract.
This information is important because group members are not parties to the framework
contract and would otherwise not obtain information on its termination.
Comments
Group Insurance and Protection of Group Members
C1. In accordance with Article 18:101, contracts for group insurance are subject to the
PEICL provided that the group organiser and the insurer have made an agreement in ac-
cordance with Article 1:102. The question then arises whether it is possible for the group
insurance contract to derogate from the PEICL. The basic rule of Article 1:103 para. 3 is that
derogation shall be allowed for the benefit of any party in contracts covering large risks. In
the context of group insurance this would mean that it would be the characteristics of the
group organiser which are decisive. This would have the effect of leaving the group mem-
bers, even consumers, unprotected in most cases.
C2. Therefore, to protect group members in accessory group insurance, derogation from
the PEICL will only be allowed against those members who satisfy the criteria of a large risk
(Article 1:103 para. 3). In addition, the rules mentioned in Article 1:103 para. 1 are absolutely
mandatory and thus will always apply even in respect of large risk insurance.
C3. Accessory group insurance is concluded between an insurer and a group organiser,
making the group organiser the policyholder under such a contract. Thus, when applying
the PEICL to accessory group insurance, provisions concerning the policyholder are ap-
plicable to the group organiser only. For instance, the duty to warn the policyholder about
inconsistencies in the cover under Article 2:202 is clearly a duty to warn the group organ-
iser. The policyholder’s right to terminate the contract under Article 17:204 is also a right
vested in the group organiser. On the other hand, group members may have the position of
an insured, beneficiary or a person at risk, as the case may be, and thus be affected by the
relevant provisions of the PEICL.
357
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
C4. However, the straightforward application of the PEICL to accessory group insurance
does not always lead to satisfactory or even sensible outcomes. Therefore it is necessary for
adjustment to provide for appropriate discretionary power; thus, the PEICL are applicable
to accessory group insurance with “the necessary changes having been made”.
C5. For example, a literal application of Article 17:102 would give the group organiser
a right to designate beneficiaries. Sometimes this may be the case (for example in loan
insurance) but more often it is the group member who has the right to designate the ben-
eficiaries. The same applies to Articles 17:103 and 17:104. Regarding the duty to warn the
policyholder about inconsistencies in the cover under Article 2:202 the inconsistencies have
to be determined in light of the need for cover of the group member, while the warning has
to be addressed to the group organiser (see Comment 3).
C6. It will primarily be up to the parties to provide for a sensible application of the PEICL
to their accessory group insurance contract. The common way to do this is by way of ap-
propriate contract terms. In the event of dispute, Article 18:201 confers the responsibility
for review of such terms upon the competent court.
C7. In some cases neither the straightforward application of the PEICL nor the mutatis
mutandis rule will lead to satisfactory results. Special provisions for such cases is made in
Articles 18:202 ff.
Comments
Rationale
C1. The insurer’s pre-contractual information duties are regulated in Articles 2:201 ff.
and include a duty to provide a pre-contractual document (Article 2:201), a duty to warn
358
Article 18:202 Information Duties
about inconsistencies in the cover (Article 2:202) and a duty to warn about when the cover
does or does not commence (Article 2:203). The insurer’s post-contractual information
are a general information duty (Article 2:701) and a duty to give further information upon
the policyholder’s request (Article 2:702). All these duties are duties of the insurer to the
insurance applicant or policyholder, as the case may be. In accessory group insurance, the
insurer owes these duties to the group organiser.
C2. The group members also need information about the insurance. However, applying
the provisions referred to in Comment 1 mutatis mutandis to the group members would
either not be possible at all (for example, where group members are unidentifiable) or be
excessively costly. Therefore, special provisions on information duties are necessary.
C3. When applying the duty under Article 2:201 to accessory group insurance, it is the
group organiser who needs to have the information therein in order to make an informed
choice. Since individual group members are automatically insured under the group in-
surance, they do not have to make such a decision and thus information would partly be
dysfunctional.
C4. What the group member does need, however, is information about the key aspects of
the insurance contract as stated in para. 1. This includes information on (a) the existence
of the insurance contract, (b) the extent of cover, (c) any precautionary measures and any
other requirements for preserving cover, and (d) the claims procedure.
C5. For the same reason as mentioned in Comment 3, information does not need to be
given in advance of joining the group. Instead it suffices that information is given without
undue delay after that in accordance with para. 1. For instance, when an employer informs
its employees (including new ones) about the group insurance by way of periodical circulars,
this may be sufficient compliance with the duty.
C6. The responsibility for giving the relevant information lies on the group organiser, not
the insurer, as it is the group organiser who is aware of new members joining the group (see
the example of new employees hired by the group organiser). The duty to provide informa-
tion is a consequence of the insurer’s and the group organiser’s agreement on the application
of the PEICL. It benefits the individual group member as a third party.
Sanctions
C7. The PEICL do not contain any specific sanction for a breach of para. 1. This question
is left to the law governing the relation between the group organiser and a group member.
This could result in the group member claiming damages.
359
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
Burden of Proof
C8. As far as individual insurance policies are concerned, the burden of proving that the
policyholder has received documents to be provided by the insurer lies with the insurer
(Article 1:204). By analogy with this provision, according to para. 2 the group organiser
bears the burden of proving that the group member has received information required
under para. 1.
C9. It is worth noting that the rule in para. 1 only provides for information about the
insurance available when a person joins the group. The possibility of later amendments of
the group insurance is covered by Article 18:102 para. 2. According to this provision the
group organiser must forward any relevant notices issued by the insurer to group members
and inform them about any amendments.
Comments
Rationale
C1. The PEICL permit, under specified conditions, contract clauses allowing the insurer
to terminate the contract after the occurrence of an insured event (Article 2:604), where the
policyholder breaches his duty to take precautionary measures (Article 4:102) and where he
has aggravated the risk insured (Article 4:203). Straightforward application of these rules
to group insurance could entail the termination of the entire group insurance contract as a
result of the acts of a single group member. This would be against the purpose and spirit of
group insurances. It would provide a welcome pretext to insurers which want to get rid of
group insurances that have turned out to be commercially adverse. Article 18:203 therefore
limits the effect of termination in such cases to the exclusion of the group member whose
acts have given the reason for termination.
360
Article 18:204 Right to Continue Cover – Group Life Insurance
C2. Para. 1 confines the insurer’s right to terminate the group insurance contract under
Article 2:604 to the exclusion of the group member involved in the occurrence of an insured
event. The provision does not deal with the corresponding right of the policyholder, namely
the group organiser. This right follows from a straightforward application of Article 2:604.
Accordingly its exercise must be reasonable. Where, for example, the group organiser is
in financial troubles and wants to mitigate them by terminating the group insurance, the
exercise of the right to terminate would not appear to be reasonable.
C3. In group insurance the risk is not usually individually assessed but assessed in respect
of the whole group (see also Article 18:101 Comment 1). In a similar vein, precautionary
measures which are designed to maintain the level of risk in accordance with that at the
time of contracting are usually imposed, not on the single group member but on the group
organiser. In the case of an aggravation of the collective risk or the non-compliance of the
group organiser with precautionary measures, the sanctions follow from a straightforward
application of Articles 4:102 and 4:203.
C4. However, there are exceptions where the conduct of the single group member is sig-
nificant under the contract. Where that is the case the conduct of the individual group
member and the aggravation of the individual risk should not lead to the termination of the
whole group insurance contract. Para. 2 excludes such a disproportionate sanction, limiting
termination to the exclusion of the individual group member in question. This exclusion will
be possible regardless of whether the non-compliance with precautionary measures or the
aggravation of risk can be ascribed to the individual group member directly or to a person
for whose conduct the group member is accountable.
C5. Para. 3 deals with the problem where, in accordance with Article 12:102, the insurance
contract is terminated by the transfer of insured property. In the case of accessory group
insurance the rule must be that insurance cover of the transferred property ends but that the
group insurance contract remains in force. Therefore, para. 3 states that for the purpose of
Article 12:102 termination of the insurance contract shall only have the effect of excluding
the group members who have transferred insured property.
361
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
(2) The group organiser shall inform the group member in writing without undue delay about
(a) the imminent termination of his cover under the contract for group life insurance,
(b) his rights under para. 1 and
(c) how to exercise those rights.
(3) If the group member has indicated his intention to exercise his right under 18:204 para. 1, the
contract between the insurer and the group member shall continue as an individual insurance
contract at a premium calculated on the basis of an individual policy at that time without
taking into account the current state of health or age of the group member.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Accessory group insurance operates on the assumption that an individual joining a
group such as a sports club or the workforce of a company is automatically insured if the
group has group insurance. Correspondingly that person would lose insurance cover when
leaving the group. In personal insurance, this loss of cover may create serious problems
where the person in question has a serious illness and consequently can obtain individual
cover only with extensive exclusions or not at all. Therefore, following the laws of some
Member States,90 Article 18:204 grants the person the right to continue the insurance con-
tract on an individual basis when leaving the group or when the group insurance contract
ends. The rule is limited to accessory group life insurance since the PEICL do not generally
address other kinds of personal insurance.
C2. In accordance with Article 18:204, if an accessory group life insurance contract is
terminated or if the member leaves the group, the cover does not end immediately but
three months later. However, this does not apply where the group insurance ends earlier. In
such case, prolongation is neither necessary nor justified as the group member should be
aware of the duration of the group cover from the information received in accordance with
Articles 18:102 and 18:202.
C3. During the three month prolongation the (former) group member has time to secure
the continuation of his insurance cover in the form of individual insurance. Three months
appear to be sufficient for communicating with the insurer, the group organiser and alter-
native insurers.
90
See, for example, s. 178 Austrian ICA (relating to health insurance), s. 80 Finnish ICA (relating to
life insurance), s. 206 German ICA (relating to health insurance) and art. 138bis-8 Belgian ICA 2014
(relating to health insurance). According to s. 15 of Ch. 19 Swedish ICA there is a right to continuous
cover in personal insurance with some limitations (see s. 16 of Ch. 19 ICA).
362
Article 18:204 Right to Continue Cover – Group Life Insurance
C4. When accessory group life insurance cover terminates, a group member has a right
to equivalent cover under a new individual contract with the insurer concerned without a
new assessment of the risk. It should be noted that the member has this right regardless of
whether the insurer offered such a product in its portfolio beforehand.
C5. Para. 1 protects the individual group member by ensuring the same benefits, namely
the same insured sum and the same exclusion clauses, as provided by the group insurance.
In particular, cover may not be refused and terms may not be altered on the basis of a new
risk assessment.
C6. The insurer may recalculate the premium for the individual insurance contract. How-
ever, such recalculation must be done in accordance with para. 3. The insurer is not per-
mitted to require a medical examination or answers to a questionnaire. Thus, the premium
for the individual insurance must be based on the health of the member when joining the
group life insurance and the insurer is not permitted to take into account any deterioration
in the group member’s health in the meantime. If no risk assessment took place when the
member joined the group, none is permissible at this stage either. If there was an individual
risk assessment when the member joined the group, the individual insurance must be based
on that. This means, for example, that the insurer may take into account diabetes which
the member had when joining the group and which was taken into account in the group
insurance, whereas cancer discovered later may not be taken into account.
C7. Therefore, in the case of continuation of cover the insurer is entitled to charge the
current premium for an individual contract concluded at the time when the member joined
the group. This may be a fictitious figure especially in cases where the insurer only offers the
cover in question as group insurance.
C8. Technically the continuation of cover requires the conclusion of a new contract be-
tween the insurer and the former group member. However, as far as possible under national
law, the individual insurance should be considered as the continuation of the previous group
contract for the purpose of applying tax laws, rules of civil procedure and so on.
C9. Para. 2 requires the group organiser to inform the member promptly and in writing
about the imminent termination of the group cover, the rights under para. 1 and how to
exercise those rights. Such information is needed by the group member in order to exercise
the rights under para. 1. The obligation is assigned not to the insurer but to the group or-
ganiser because the latter knows the members of the group.
363
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
C10. The PEICL do not contain any specific sanction for a breach of para. 2. This question
is left to the law governing the relation between the group organiser and a group member.
This could result in the group member claiming damages.
Comments
Elective Group Insurances as Framework Contracts
C1. Elective group insurance is defined as group insurance under which group members
are insured as a result of personal application or because they have not refused insurance
offered, Article 1:201 para. 9. Article 18:301 para. 1 provides that (unlike accessory group
insurance contracts) elective group insurance is based on a framework contract between the
insurer and the group organiser which is not an insurance contract but which sets out scope
and structure of the scheme which members of the group may join. Such a framework con-
tract and the related individual insurance contracts with group members are to be regarded
as separate legal instruments. This applies irrespective of whether the group organiser or the
individual member pays the premium; however, the latter is common practice.
C2. As the framework contract and the subsequent insurance contracts with the group
members are separate legal instruments, the scope of application of the PEICL to both kinds
of contracts must be determined.
C3. With regard to the individual insurance contracts Article 18:301 para. 2 prescribes
that the PEICL shall apply where the insurer and the group organiser have agreed upon
this in the framework contract. This applies even if the individual member does not opt for
the application of the PEICL when joining the group. This follows from the fact that the
member opts for a pre-existing insurance scheme subject to the PEICL. The only choice he
has is to join it and accept the application of the PEICL or not to join.
C4. A framework contract is not an insurance contract under the definition in Article
1:201 para. 1. Consequently, the PEICL do not apply. However, where the framework con-
364
Article 18:302 Alteration of Terms and Conditions
tract provides for the application of the PEICL to the individual insurance contracts, the
position of the group organiser must be governed by Article 18:101 (Applicability of the
PEICL to Group Insurance) and Article 18:102 (General Duty of Care of the Group Organ-
iser). This is why para. 2 declares the framework contract to be governed by these provisions.
Comments
Rationale
C1. Article 18:301 treats the group insurance contract as a framework contract and in-
dividual insurance contracts. Thus, an alteration of the framework contract should not
have effect on the individual insurance contracts. In order to alter the individual insurance
contracts the insurer would have to follow the rules laid down in Articles 2:603, 17:303
and 17:304, where applicable. Article 18:203 makes this clear and applies even if the group
insurance contract states otherwise.
C2. The term “alteration” in Article 18:302 should be understood in a broad sense to apply
irrespective of the method by which the changes to the terms and conditions are effected.
Alteration includes what in the framework contract is renegotiated by the insurer and the
group organiser as well as a unilateral alteration of the framework contract by the insurer,
if the framework contract gives the insurer such a power.
C3. The reference to Article 2:603 means that any alteration of terms and conditions in
the framework contract will alter the rights and duties of individual policyholders only (i)
starting from the date when the next prolongation takes effect, (ii) if the insurer sends writ-
ten notice of the alteration to the policyholder no later than one month before the expiry of
the current contract period, and (iii) the notice informs the policyholder about his right to
terminate the insurance contract and about the consequences if the right is not exercised. If
these requirements are not all met, the alteration of the framework contract may be effective
in relation to the group organiser but not to the policyholder in question. In order to bind
the policyholder, the additional requirements under Article 2:603 must be observed.
C4. What has been said in Comment 3 about the requirements of Article 2:603 will apply
mutatis mutandis to the requirements of Articles 17:303 and 17:304.
365
Chapter Eighteen: Special Provisions for Group Insurance
Comments
Contents
C1. The termination of the framework contract or the cessation of membership of a group
member will not have any effect on the insurance contract since the framework contract and
the insurance contract with the group members are separate instruments. The insurance
contract, previously within the elective group insurance scheme, will continue to exist as an
individual insurance contract between the insurer and the policyholder on the same terms
and conditions as originally agreed.
C2. Nevertheless there may be consequences following from the termination of the frame-
work contract on the administration of the individual insurance contract. For instance,
termination of the framework contract by the insurer may terminate a previously granted
authority of the group organiser to collect premiums on behalf of the insurer. In such a case
premiums will have to be paid directly to the insurer. Another example would be termina-
tion of a framework contract due to a group organiser’s liquidation.
C3. While Article 18:303 for elective group insurance and Article 18:204 for accessory
group insurance address the same situation, both rules differ considerably. These differences
are due to the different nature of both kinds of insurance. Whereas in the case of accessory
group insurance termination of the group life insurance contract does have a direct effect
on the insurance cover, the termination of the framework contract of an elective group
insurance does not affect the existence of the individual insurance contracts.
366
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL):
Translations (non-authentic)
Chinese version
by Yong Qiang Han
⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜа㕆䘲⭘ҾᵜljࡉNJѝᡰᴹਸ਼Ⲵ਼ޡ
䘲⭘ҾᵜljࡉNJѝᡰᴹਸ਼Ⲵ਼ޡ ㅜॱㄐԓս≲گᵳ
㿴ᇊ ㅜॱаㄐ؍অᤱᴹӪѻཆⲴަԆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ
ㅜаㄐࡽ㖞㿴ᇊ ㅜॱҼㄐᡰ؍仾䲙
ㅜа㢲ᵜljࡉNJѻ䘲⭘
ㅜҼ㢲а㡜㿴ࡉ ㅜй㕆䘲⭘Ҿᇊ仍؍䲙Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
䘲⭘Ҿᇊ仍؍䲙Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
ㅜй㢲ᢗ㹼
ㅜॱйㄐ䘲⭘㤳ത
ㅜҼㄐ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵࡍ䱦⇥৺ަᵏ䰤
ㅜа㢲ᣅ؍ӪⲴݸਸ਼ؑѹ࣑ ㅜഋ㕆䍓ԫ؍䲙
䍓ԫ؍䲙
ㅜҼ㢲؍䲙ӪⲴݸਸ਼ؑѹ࣑ ㅜॱഋㄐᲞ䙊䍓ԫ؍䲙
ㅜй㢲؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵ䇒・
ㅜॱӄㄐⴤ᧕≲گᵳоⴤ᧕䇹䇬
ㅜഋ㢲䘭ⓟ؍оᲲ؍
ㅜӄ㢲؍অ ㅜॱޝㄐᕪࡦ؍䲙
ㅜޝ㢲؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵᵏ䰤
ㅜг㢲ਸ਼ᡀ・ਾ؍䲙ӪⲴؑѹ࣑ ㅜӄ㕆Ӫሯ؍䲙
Ӫሯ؍䲙
ㅜйㄐ؍䲙ѝӻ ㅜॱгㄐӪሯ؍䲙⢩↺㿴ᇊ
Ӫሯ؍䲙⢩↺㿴ᇊ
ㅜа㢲ㅜйӪ
ㅜഋㄐᡰ؍仾䲙
ㅜҼ㢲ࡍ䱦⇥оਸ਼Ⲵᵏ䰤
ㅜа㢲亴䱢᧚ᯭ
ㅜй㢲ਸ਼ᵏ䰤Ⲵਈॆ
ㅜҼ㢲仾䲙໎࣐
ㅜഋ㢲оഭ⌅ѻޣ㌫
ㅜй㢲仾䲙߿ቁ
ㅜӄ㢲؍䲙һ᭵
ㅜӄㄐ؍䲙䍩 ㅜޝ㢲䖜ᦒоਈ⧠
ㅜޝㄐ؍䲙һ᭵
ㅜޝ㕆ഒփ؍䲙
ഒփ؍䲙
ㅜгㄐ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ᵏ䰤
ㅜॱޛㄐഒփ؍䲙⢩↺㿴ᇊ
ㅜҼ㕆䘲⭘Ҿ㺕گර؍䲙Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
䘲⭘Ҿ㺕گර؍䲙Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ ㅜа㢲ഒփ؍䲙ѻа㡜㿴ᇊ
ㅜҼ㢲䱴රഒփ؍䲙
ㅜޛㄐ؍䲙ԧ٬઼؍䲙䠁仍
ㅜй㢲䘹ᤙරഒփ؍
ㅜҍㄐਇ㺕گѻᵳ࡙
369
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜа㕆䘲⭘ҾᵜljࡉNJѝᡰᴹਸ਼Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
䘲⭘ҾᵜljࡉNJѝᡰᴹਸ਼Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
ㅜаㄐࡽ㖞㿴ᇊ
ࡽ㖞㿴ᇊ
ㅜа㢲ᵜljࡉNJѻ䘲⭘
ᵜljࡉNJѻ䘲⭘
ㅜᶑ䘲⭘㤳ത
ᵜljࡉNJа㡜䘲⭘Ҿवᤜӂࣙ؍䲙൘Ⲵ䈨୶ъ؍䲙DŽ
ᵜljࡉNJн䘲⭘Ҿ؍䲙DŽ
ㅜᶑԫ䘹䘲⭘
ྲ᷌ᖃһӪᐢ㓿а㠤㓖ᇊ؍䲙ਸ਼ਇᵜljࡉNJ㓖ᶏˈࡉᵜljࡉNJᗇԕ䘲⭘ǃфнਇ
สҾഭ䱵⿱⌅Ⲵ⌅ᖻ䘹ᤙ䲀ࡦѻᖡ૽DŽ↔ཆˈ䲔ᵜljࡉNJㅜᶑ㿴ᇊѻཆˈᵜlj
ࡉNJᓄ䈕Ѫᮤփаᒦ䘲⭘ˈнᗇᧂ䲔ԫօ⢩ᇊᶑⅮDŽ
ㅜᶑᕪࡦ㿴ᇊ
ᵜljࡉNJㅜᶑㅜҼਕǃㅜᶑǃㅜᶑǃㅜᶑǃㅜᶑǃㅜ
ᶑѪᕪࡦ㿴ᇊDŽަԆᶑⅮ⎹ޣሩⅪ䇸㹼Ѫѻ㖊ᰦҏѪᕪࡦ㿴ᇊDŽ
ԕнᦏᇣ؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫѻᵳ⳺Ѫ䲀ˈ؍䲙ਸ਼ਟԕሩᵜljࡉNJ
ަԆᡰᴹ㿴ᇊҸԕਈ䙊DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵ؍ᱟ⅗ⴏ(&ᤷԔㅜᶑㅜⅮᡰࡇⲴབྷර仾䲙ˈࡉਟԕ
ѪҶԫօаᯩᖃһӪⲴ࡙⳺㘼Ѫк䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴਈ䙊DŽ൘ഒփ؍䲙ѝˈਈ䙊ᓄ䈕
ӵӵ䪸ሩњփ㻛؍䲙Ӫˈަ↔њփ㻛؍䲙Ӫ享ㅖਸ⅗ⴏ(&ᤷԔㅜᶑㅜ
ⅮE亩ᡆF亩㿴ᇊⲴӪ䓛⢩ᖱDŽ
ㅜᶑ䀓䟺
ሩᵜljࡉNJѻ䀓䟺ˈ享ަᦞ᮷ᵜǃ䈝ຳǃⴞⲴ઼∄䖳⌅㛼Ჟ㘼䘋㹼ˈфቔަ享㘳㲁
׳䘋؍䲙ъⲴ䈊ᇎؑ⭘о↓ޜӔ᱃ǃਸ਼ޣ㌫ѝⲴ⺞ᇊᙗǃ⌅ᖻ䘲⭘Ⲵа㠤ᙗˈԕ৺ሩ
؍অᤱᴹӪѻ؍࠶ݵᣔDŽ
ㅜᶑഭ⌅оа㡜ࡉ
нᗇԕഭ⌅ѻ㿴ᇊሩᵜljࡉNJҸԕ䲀ࡦᡆ㺕ݵDŽնᱟˈሩҾᵜljࡉNJѝ⢩࡛
㿴ࡉᵚ⎹৺Ⲵ؍䲙亶ฏˈഭ⌅㤕ᴹᕪࡦ㿴ᇊ䘲⭘ѻˈࡉ䈕ᕪࡦ㿴ᇊਟԕሩᵜlj
ࡉNJҸԕ䲀ࡦᡆ㺕ݵDŽ
ቡ؍䲙ਸ਼ѝᆈ൘ǃնᵜljࡉNJᵚҸ᰾⽪㿴ᇊⲴһ亩ˈ享䚥ᗚlj⅗⍢ਸ਼⌅
ࡉNJҸԕ䀓ߣ˗ྲlj⅗⍢ਸ਼⌅ࡉNJҏᰐ㿴ᇊˈࡉ享䚥ᗚ䈨ᡀઈഭ⌅ᖻѻ਼ޡ
а㡜ࡉ䀓ߣѻDŽ
ㅜҼ㢲а㡜㿴ࡉ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ਸ਼
Ā؍䲙ਸ਼āᱟᤷаᯩᖃһӪণ؍䲙ӪᦞԕੁਖаᯩᖃһӪণ؍অᤱᴹӪ䈪ԕ؍
䲙䍩Ѫሩԧ؍⢩ᇊ仾䲙Ⲵਸ਼DŽ
4 ৲㿱 Lando / Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law Internation-
al, The Hague 2000);Lando / Clive / Prüm / Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law,
Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
370
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
Ā؍䲙һ᭵āᱟᤷ؍䲙ਸ਼㓖ᇊⲴ仾䲙ѻ⧠ᇎॆDŽǃ
Ā㺕گර؍䲙āᱟᤷ؍䲙Ӫ享ቡ؍䲙һ᭵䙐ᡀⲴᦏཡҸԕ䎄؍Ⲵگ䲙DŽ
Āᇊ仍؍䲙āᱟᤷ؍䲙Ӫ享൘؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ਾ᭟Ԉപᇊ䠁仍Ⲵ؍䲙DŽ
Ā䍓ԫ؍䲙āᱟᤷԕ㻛؍䲙Ӫሩਇᇣ㘵Ⲵ⌅ᖻ䍓ԫѪ仾䲙Ⲵ؍䲙DŽ
ĀӪሯ؍䲙āᱟᤷ؍䲙ӪⲴѹ࣑ᡆ؍䲙䍩ѻ᭟ԈਆߣҾӵ㜭ԕ仾䲙Ӫѻ↫ӑᡆ⭏ᆈ
Ѫ؍䲙һ᭵Ⲵ؍䲙DŽ
Āഒփ؍䲙ਸ਼āᱟᤷ؍䲙Ӫоഒփ㓴㓷㘵ѪҶഒփᡀઈѻ࡙⳺Ⲵਸ਼˗ഒփᡀઈ
оഒփ㓴㓷㘵ާᴹⲴ਼ޡ㚄㌫DŽഒփ؍䲙ਸ਼ਟԕ؍ഒփᡀઈѻᇦᓝᡀઈDŽ
Ā䱴රഒփ؍䲙āᱟᤷഒփᡀઈ⭡ҾҾ⢩ᇊഒփ㘼㠚ࣘ㻛؍фᡀઈн㜭ᤂ㔍
㻛Ⲵ؍ഒփ㜭؍䲙DŽ
Ā䘹ᤙරഒփ؍䲙āᱟᤷഒփᡀઈสҾњӪᣅ؍ᡆ⭡Ҿ⋑ᴹᤂ㔍؍䲙㘼㻛Ⲵ؍ഒ
փ؍䲙DŽ
ㅜᶑᴤཊᇊѹ
Ā㻛؍䲙Ӫāᱟᤷަ࡙⳺ṩᦞ㺕گර؍䲙ਇࡠ؍ᣔԕݽ䚝ਇᦏཡⲴӪDŽ
Āਇ⳺Ӫāᱟᤷṩᦞᇊ仍؍䲙ਇ亶؍䲙䠁ⲴӪDŽ
Ā仾䲙Ӫāᱟᤷަ⭏ભǃڕᓧǃ䈊ᇎᡆ䓛ԭ㻛ᣅⲴ؍ӪDŽ
Āਇᇣ㘵ā൘䍓ԫ؍䲙ѝᱟᤷ㻛؍䲙ӪѪަ↫ӑǃՔᇣᡆᦏཡᣵ䍓ԫⲴӪDŽ
Ā؍䲙ԓ⨶Ӫāᱟᤷ؍䲙ӪѪ䬰ᡆ㇑⨶؍䲙ਸ਼㘼䳷֓Ⲵ؍䲙ѝӻDŽ
Ā؍䲙䍩āᱟᤷ؍অᤱᴹӪѪҶᗇࡠ؍㘼享ੁ؍䲙Ӫ᭟ԈⲴ䍩⭘DŽ
Āਸ਼ᵏ䰤āᱟᤷਸ਼ѹ࣑ᵏ䰤DŽަҾਸ਼䇒・ǃ㓸Ҿ㓖ᇊⲴᆈ㔝ᵏ䰤ቺ┑ѻ
ᰦDŽ
Ā؍䲙ᵏ䰤āᱟᤷᖃһӪ㓖ᇊⲴ؍䲙䍩ࡠᵏᵏ䰤DŽ
Ā 䍓ԫᵏ䰤āᱟᤷ؍ᵏ䰤DŽ
Āᕪࡦ؍䲙āᱟᤷṩᦞ⌅ᖻᡆⴁ㇑㿴ᇊⲴᣅ؍ѹ࣑㘼ᣅ؍Ⲵ؍䲙DŽ
ㅜᶑ䈝䀰о᮷Ԧ䀓䟺
؍䲙ӪᨀⲴа࠷Җ䶒ᶀᯉ䜭享֯⭘୶⍭䇒・ਸ਼ᡰ⭘Ⲵ䈝ˈф⭘䈝ᗵ享ᒣᇎ᱃
៲DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙ӪᨀⲴҖ䶒ᶀᯉѝ⭘䇽ѻѹᡆަᨀؑⲴᴹ⯁ѹˈࡉᓄԕᴰᴹ࡙Ҿ
؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺ӪⲴ䘲ᖃ䀓䟺Ѫ߶DŽ
ㅜᶑҖ䶒ᶀᯉ᭦ᦞ˖䇱ᦞ㿴ࡉ
䇱᰾؍অᤱᴹӪᐢ㓿᭦ࡠ؍䲙ӪᨀⲴҖ䶒ᶀᯉѻ䍏ᣵˈ⭡؍䲙ӪᣵDŽ
ㅜᶑ䙊⸕
ṩᦞlj⅗⍢ਸ਼⌅ࡉNJѝⲴާփ㿴ࡉˈᣅ؍Ӫǃ؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫࠪڊ
Ⲵо؍䲙ਸ਼ᴹⲴޣ䙊⸕нᗵ䟷ਆԫօ⢩ᇊᖒᔿDŽ
ㅜᶑ᧘ᇊ⸕䚃
ྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫሶ䇒・ਸ਼ᡆን㹼ਸ਼ᡰᗵ䴰Ⲵһ亩ငᢈҾԆӪˈ
ࡉᓄ䈕᧘ᇊ䈕ԆӪᇎ䱵⸕䚃ᡆᓄ䈕⸕䚃ⲴؑޣӖѪާփᇎᯭࡽ䘠ငᢈⲴ؍অᤱᴹ
Ӫǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫ⸕䚃DŽ
5 ᵜᶑㅜ˄2˅ⅮԕDirective 93 / 13 / EECㅜ5ᶑѪ㬍ᵜDŽ
371
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜᶑ৽↗㿶
ᙗ࡛ǃᘰᆅǃྷӗᵏǃഭ㉽ԕ৺᯿ᡆ≁᯿ᡀ࠶нᗇѪሬ㠤њӪѻ㿱؍䲙䍩઼؍䲙
䠁ᐞᔲⲴഐ㍐DŽ
䘍৽к䘠ㅜ ⅮⲴਸ਼ᶑⅮ वᤜо؍䲙䍩ᴹⲴޣᶑⅮ ሩ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ
ᰐ㓖ᶏ࣋DŽṩᦞл䘠ㅜ Ⅾˈਸ਼ᓄ䈕สҾ䶎↗㿶ᶑⅮ㘼ሩৼᯩᖃһӪ㔗㔝ᴹ㓖
ᶏ࣋DŽ
൘к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㻛䘍৽ѻᛵᖒˈ؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ਼DŽ㓸→ਸ਼Ⲵ䙊⸕ᓄ൘؍অ
ᤱᴹӪ⸕䚃к䘠㿴ᇊ㻛䘍৽ѻᰕ䎧єњᴸԕҖ䶒ᖒᔿਁࠪDŽ
ㅜᶑสഐ⍻䈅
؍䲙Ӫнᗇ㾱≲ᣅ؍Ӫǃ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ仾䲙Ӫ䘋㹼สഐ⍻䈅ᡆ㾱≲ަᣛ䵢สഐ⍻䈅
ѻ㔃᷌DŽ؍䲙Ӫҏнᗇ֯⭘↔ؑ䘋㹼仾䲙䇴ՠDŽ
к䘠ㅜаⅮ㿴ᇊн䘲⭘ҾྲлᛵᖒⲴӪ䓛؍䲙˖ྲ᷌仾䲙Ӫᒤ┑ॱޛǃфሩަᣅ
؍Ⲵ؍䲙䠁仍䎵䗷йॱз⅗ݳᡆ؍অ亩л㔉Ԉ仍⇿ᒤ䎵䗷йз⅗ݳDŽ
ㅜй㢲ᢗ㹼
ㅜᶑ⾱Ԕ
ྲ᷌ᵜljࡉNJㅜᶑᗇԕ䘲⭘ˈࡉㅖਸл䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴ䘲Ṭѫփᴹᵳੁ
ᴹ㇑䗆ᵳⲴഭ⌅䲒ᡆᵪᶴ⭣䈧⾱Ԕˈԕ⾱→ᡆ㾱≲→ڌ䘍৽ᵜljࡉNJⲴ㹼ѪDŽ
䘲Ṭѫփˈᱟᤷ⅗ⴏငઈՊṩᦞ⅗⍢䇞Պ઼⅗⍢⨶һՊᒤᴸᰕ亱ᐳⲴޣҾѪ
Ҷ؍ᣔ⎸䍩㘵࡙⳺㘼؞䇒Ⲵ(&ਧᤷԔㅜᶑ㘼ࡇࠪⲴঅѝⲴѫփᡆ㓴㓷DŽ
ㅜᶑ⌅䲒ཆᣅ䇹оᮁ⍾ᵪࡦ
ᵜljࡉNJѻ䘲⭘нᧂ䲔؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫራ≲ަਟԕ㧧ᗇⲴ⌅䲒ཆᣅ䇹
઼ᮁ⍾ᵪࡦDŽ
ㅜҼㄐ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵࡍ䱦⇥৺ަᵏ䰤
ㅜа㢲ᣅ؍ӪⲴݸਸ਼ؑѹ࣑
ㅜᶑᣛ䵢ѹ࣑
ᣅ؍Ӫ䇒・ਸ਼ˈᓄሶ㠚ᐡ⧠൘⸕䚃ᡆ⧠൘ᓄ䈕⸕䚃Ⲵǃф؍䲙Ӫᾊ߶⺞䰞ࡠⲴ
ᛵᖒ䇹؍䲙ӪDŽ
ࡽⅮᨀ৺Ⲵᛵᖒˈवᤜ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䗷৫ᴮ㓿⸕䚃ᡆ䗷৫ᵜᓄ䈕⸕䚃ⲴᛵᖒDŽ
ㅜᶑ䘍৽ᣛ䵢ѹ࣑
ྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪ䘍৽ㅜᶑˈࡉྲлㅜ Ⅾ㠣ㅜ Ⅾˈ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳᨀࠪሩਸ
਼Ҹԕਸ⨶ਈᴤᡆ㓸→ਸ਼DŽѪ↔ˈ؍䲙Ӫ享൘ަ⸕䚃؍অᤱᴹӪ䘍৽ѹ࣑ѻһᇎ
ᰦ䎧ањᴸቡަਈᴤᡆ㓸→ਸ਼ѻᙍੁ؍অᤱᴹӪ䘋㹼Җ䶒䙊⸕ˈᒦ䈤᰾ަ
ᙍѻ⌅ᖻਾ᷌DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫᨀࠪሩਸ਼Ҹԕਸ⨶ਈᴤˈࡉਸ਼สҾ؍䲙ӪᨀࠪⲴਸ⨶ਈᴤ㘼㔗㔝ᴹ
᭸ˈն؍অᤱᴹӪ൘᭦ࡠࡽⅮ㿴ᇊⲴ䙊⸕ᰦ䎧ањᴸᤂ㔍؍䲙ӪᨀࠪⲴਸ਼ਈᴤ
372
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ᯩṸᰦ䲔ཆDŽ൘؍অᤱᴹӪᤂ㔍ਈᴤѻᛵᖒˈ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳ൘᭦ࡠᤂ㔍䙊⸕ᰦ䎧ањ
ᴸ㓸→ਸ਼DŽ
ྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪ䘍৽ㅜᶑᒦᰐ䗷䭉ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫнᗇ㓸→ਸ਼ˈն؍䲙Ӫ㜭䇱᰾
ؑޣ֯ٷ㻛ᣛ䵢ࡉަṩᵜнՊ䇒・ਸ਼ᰦ䲔ཆDŽ
ਸ਼㓸→Ӿ؍অᤱᴹӪ᭦ࡠᵜᶑㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴҖ䶒䙊⸕ѻᰕањᴸਾਁ⭏᭸࣋DŽਸ
਼ਈᴤⲴ⭏᭸ᰦ䰤⭡ᖃһӪ㓖ᇊDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙һ᭵ᱟᣅ؍仾䲙ѝⲴḀഐ㍐ሬ㠤ǃф؍অᤱᴹӪᵚᣛ䵢䈕ഐ㍐ᡆቡ↔ᴹ
㲊ٷ䘠ㆄˈф䈕؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏൘؍䲙ਸ਼㓸→ᡆਈᴤਁ⭏᭸࣋ѻࡽˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳ
н᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁ˈնԕަ⸕֯ٷ䚃ࡽޣ䘠ؑׯнՊ䇒・ਸ਼Ѫ䲀DŽྲ᷌؍֯ٷ䲙
Ӫ⸕䚃ࡽ䘠ؑޣਾӽՊԕ䖳儈؍䲙䍩ᡆԕн਼ᶑⅮަࡉˈ؍ᓄ䈕᤹➗ᇎ䱵؍
䲙䍩઼䖳儈؍䲙䍩Ⲵ∄ֻ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁ǃᡆ᤹➗䈕н਼ᶑⅮ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁DŽ
ㅜᶑֻཆ
ㅜᶑⲴ㖊ᙗ㿴ᇊн䘲⭘Ҿྲлᛵᖒ˖
D ؍অᤱᴹӪṩᵜᵚഎㆄⲴᨀ䰞ˈᡆަᨀؑⲴ᰾ᱮнᆼᮤᡆн↓⺞˗
E ؍অᤱᴹӪᵜᓄ䈕ᣛ䵢Ⲵؑᡆަн߶⺞ᨀؑⲴˈሩҾањ⨶ᙗ؍䲙ӪⲴᱟ
䇒・ਸ਼ѻߣᇊᡆԕօᶑⅮ䇒・ਸ਼ѻߣᇊᒦн䟽㾱˗
F ؑᵚ㻛ᣛ䵢Ⲵഐᱟ؍䲙Ӫ֯؍অᤱᴹӪԕѪ↔ؑнᗵᣛ䵢˗
G ؑ㲭ᵚ㻛ᣛ䵢ˈն؍䲙Ӫᐢ㓿⸕䚃ᡆᵜᓄ䈕⸕䚃↔ؑDŽ
ㅜᶑสҾⅪ䇸㘼䘍৽ᣛ䵢ѹ࣑
ྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪⲴⅪ䇸ሬ㠤؍䲙Ӫоަ䇒・؍䲙ਸ਼ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳ䬰ਸ਼ᒦᴹᵳ᭦
ਆԫօࡠᵏ؍䲙䍩˗؍䲙ӪⲴ䘉Ӌᵳ࡙нᖡ૽ㅜᶑѻ䘲⭘DŽ䬰ਸ਼Ⲵ䙊⸕ˈᓄ൘
؍䲙Ӫ⸕䚃Ⅺ䇸㹼Ѫᰦ䎧єњᴸԕҖ䶒ᖒᔿੁ؍অᤱᴹӪਁࠪDŽ
ㅜᶑ䱴࣐ؑ
ㅜᶑǃㅜᶑǃㅜᶑҏ䘲⭘Ҿ؍অᤱᴹӪ൘䇒・ਸ਼ᰦ䱴࣐ᨀⲴㅜ
ᶑ㿴ᇊѻཆⲴަԆԫօؑDŽ
ㅜᶑสഐؑ
ᵜ䜘࠶нᗇ䘲⭘ҾㅜᶑㅜаⅮ㿴ᇊⲴสഐ⍻䈅ѻ㔃᷌DŽ
ㅜҼ㢲؍䲙ӪⲴݸਸ਼ѹ࣑
ㅜᶑ䇒・ਸ਼ࡽޣ᮷ᵜⲴᨀ
؍䲙Ӫ享ੁᣅ؍Ӫᨀᤏ䇒・Ⲵਸ਼ѻ༽ᵜˈԕ৺वਜ਼лࡇؑޣⲴ᮷ᵜ˖
D 䇒・ਸ਼ⲴᖃһӪѻ〠઼ൠ൰ˈቔަᱟ؍䲙ӪⲴ⌅ᖻᖒᔿ৺ަ㩕ъᙫ䜘ൠ൰ԕ
৺䘲ᖃᛵᖒлᨀ䇒・ਸ਼ᡆṨ؍Ⲵ؍䲙Ӫ࠶᭟ᵪᶴⲴ〠઼ൠ൰˗
E 㻛؍䲙Ӫǃਇ⳺Ӫԕ৺仾䲙Ӫѻ〠઼ൠ൰˗
F ؍䲙ԓ⨶Ӫѻ〠઼ൠ൰˗
G ؍䲙ḷⲴ⢙઼ᡰ؍仾䲙˗
H ؍䲙䠁仍઼ݽ䎄仍˗
I ؍䲙䍩䠁仍઼ަ䇑㇇ᯩᔿ˗
373
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
J ؍䲙䍩ࡠᵏᰦ䰤ԕ৺؍䲙䍩᭟Ԉᯩᔿ઼᭟Ԉൠ⛩˗
K ਸ਼ᵏ䰤ˈवᤜ㓸→ਸ਼Ⲵᯩᔿˈԕ৺䍓ԫᵏ䰤˗
L 䬰ᣅ؍ᡆᦞㅜᶑ䬰䶎Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ǃᦞㅜᶑ䬰Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ
਼ѻᵳ࡙˗
M 䖭᰾䈕؍䲙ਸ਼ਇlj⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉNJѻ㓖ᶏ˗
N ᣅ؍ӪⲴ⌅䲒ཆᣅ䇹઼ᮁ⍾ᵪࡦԕ৺䘀⭘䘉ӋᵪࡦⲴᯩᔿ˗
O ؍䇱ส䠁ᡆަԆ䎄گᆹᧂDŽ
ྲਟ㜭ˈк䘠ؑ享൘ݵ䏣ᰦ䰤ᨀˈԕׯᣅ؍Ӫ㜭㘳㲁ᱟ䇒・ਸ਼DŽ
ྲ᷌ᣅ؍Ӫ൘ᣅ؍ᰦ֯⭘Ⲵᱟ؍䲙ӪᨀⲴᣅ؍অ઼ᡆ䈒䰞㺘ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫ享ੁᣅ؍
Ӫᨀປ߉ᆼ∅Ⲵ㺘অѻ༽ᵜDŽ
ㅜᶑቡ؍㤳തна㠤ѻ䆖⽪ѹ࣑
൘䇒・ਸ਼ᰦˈ؍䲙Ӫ享ቡަ⸕䚃ᡆᓄ䈕⸕䚃Ⲵᣅ؍Ӫ㾱≲Ⲵ؍㤳തоަᇎ䱵ᨀ
Ⲵ؍㤳തѻ䰤ᆈ൘Ⲵԫօна㠤ੁᣅ؍ӪҸԕ䆖⽪DŽ↔䆖⽪ѹ࣑Ⲵን㹼ˈ享
㘳㲁ਸ਼䇒・Ⲵᛵᖒ઼ᯩᔿˈቔަ享㘳㲁ᣅ؍Ӫᱟᗇࡠ⤜・ⲴѝӻӪઈѻᑞࣙDŽ
؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽к䘠ѹ࣑ᰦ
D ަ享ੁ؍অᤱᴹӪቡ⭡↔ਁ⭏Ⲵޘ䜘ᦏཡҸԕ㺕ˈگնަ䘍৽ѹ࣑ᰐ䗷䭉ᰦ䲔
ཆ˗
E ؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ㠚ަ⸕䚃؍䲙Ӫ䘍㓖ѻᰕ䎧єњᴸԕҖ䶒䙊⸕㓸→ਸ਼DŽ
ㅜᶑቡ؍ᵏ䰤ᔰѻ䆖⽪ѹ࣑
ྲ᷌ᣅ؍Ӫਸ⨶Ⲵ䈟䇔Ѫ؍ҾަᨀӔᣅ؍᮷Ԧѻᰦǃф؍䲙Ӫ⸕䚃ᡆᓄ䈕⸕䚃ᣅ؍
ӪⲴ↔䭉䈟䇔䇶ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕・ণੁᣅ؍Ӫྲл䆖⽪˖؍Ҿ؍䲙ਸ਼䇒・ǃ
ф俆ᵏ؍䲙䍩ӔԈ ྲ؍䲙䍩Ѫ࠶ᵏӔԈ ѻਾˈնᆈ൘Ჲ؍ᰦ䲔ཆDŽྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽↔
䆖⽪ѹ࣑ˈࡉަᓄ䈕ṩᦞк䘠ㅜㅜᶑㅜ D 亩ᣵ䍓ԫDŽ
ㅜй㢲ਸ਼Ⲵ䇒・
ㅜᶑ䇒・ᯩᔿ
؍䲙ਸ਼ᒦ䶎ᗵ享ԕҖ䶒ᖒᔿ䇒・ᡆ䇱᰾ˈҏн享䟷ਆަԆԫօ⢩ᇊᖒᔿDŽ؍䲙ਸ਼ᆈ
൘ѻ䇱ᦞਟԕ䟷ਆवᤜਓཤ䇱䀰൘ⲴԫօᖒᔿDŽ
ㅜᶑ䬰ᣅ؍
ᣅ؍Ӫਟԕ䬰ᣅˈ؍նԕ䬰䙊⸕൘ަ᭦ࡠ؍䲙ӪⲴ؍䈪ѻࡽࡠ䗮؍䲙ӪѪ䲀DŽ
ㅜᶑߧ䶉ᵏ
؍অᤱᴹӪ൘᭦ࡠ؍䲙ӪⲴ؍䈪ᡆ᭦ࡠㅜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴ᮷Ԧ ԕҼ㘵ѝ䖳㘵
Ѫ߶ ѻਾєઘˈᴹᵳԕҖ䶒䙊⸕䬰؍䲙ਸ਼DŽ
лࡇᛵᖒлˈ؍অᤱᴹӪнᗇ䬰ਸ਼˖
D ਸ਼ᴹ᭸ᵏн䏣ањᴸ˗
E ਸ਼ᦞㅜᶑᔦᵏ˗
F ਸ਼ѪᲲ؍ǃ䍓ԫ؍䲙ᡆഒփ؍䲙DŽ
374
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜᶑнޜᒣᶑⅮ
䶎㓿њ࡛୶⍭⺞ᇊⲴᶑⅮˈྲ᷌ަᴹᛆ䈊ᇎؑ⭘઼ޜᒣӔ᱃ࡉǃфަᦞᡰ
؍䲙ਸ਼ѻ⢩ᖱǃ䈕ਸ਼ѝަԆᶑⅮԕ৺䈕ਸ਼䇒・ᰦⲴᛵᖒ㘼䇔ᇊަሩ؍অᤱᴹ
Ӫǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺ӪⲴਸ਼ᵳ࡙ѹ࣑䙐ᡀᱮ㪇ཡ㺑ˈࡉ↔ᶑⅮሩ؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛
؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫнާᴹ㓖ᶏ࣋DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙ਸ਼䲔৫нޜᒣᶑⅮѻਾӽ㜭㔗㔝ᆈ൘ˈࡉަ㔗㔝ሩਸ਼ᖃһӪާᴹ㓖ᶏ
࣋DŽࡉˈᓄԕ⨶ᙗⲴᖃһӪྲ᷌⸕䚃нޜᒣᛵᖒѻਾਟ㜭Պ㓖ᇊⲴਖཆᶑⅮᴯԓ
нޜᒣᶑⅮDŽ
ᵜ
ᶑ䘲⭘Ҿ䲀ࡦᡆ؞᭩؍㤳തⲴᶑⅮˈնн䘲⭘Ҿ˖
D ޣҾ؍઼؍䲙䍩Ⲵԧ٬䏣仍ᙗѻᶑⅮ˗
E ሩᨀⲴ؍㤳തᡆ㓖ᇊⲴ؍䲙䍩䘋㹼ᗵ㾱᧿䘠ⲴᶑⅮˈնԕᒣᇎ᱃䈫Ⲵ䈝䀰᧿
䘠ᰦ䲔ཆDŽ
а࠷һݸᤏᇊǃӾ㘼֯؍অᤱᴹӪн㜭ᖡ૽ަᇩⲴᶑⅮ䜭㻛㿶Ѫ䶎㓿њ࡛୶⍭⺞
ᇊⲴᶑⅮ˗һ⺞ݸᇊⲴḷ߶ਸ਼ѝⲴᶑⅮቔѪྲ↔DŽྲ᷌ሩਸ਼Ⲵᙫփՠ䟿ਟԕ⺞
ᇊަѪһ⺞ݸᇊⲴḷ߶ਸ਼ˈࡉণ֯䈕ਸ਼ḀᶑⅮⲴḀӋᯩ䶒ᡆḀާփᶑⅮᱟ㓿њ
࡛୶⍭⺞ᇊˈᵜᶑӽ❦䘲⭘Ҿ䈕ਸ਼ަԆᶑⅮDŽྲ᷌؍䲙ӪѫᕐḀḷ߶ᶑⅮᱟ㓿њ
࡛୶⍭㘼⺞ᇊˈࡉަ享ቡ↔ᣵѮ䇱䍓ԫDŽ
ㅜഋ㢲䘭ⓟ؍оᲲ؍
ㅜᶑ䘭ⓟ؍
ྲ᷌؍ᵏ䰤वᤜ؍䲙ਸ਼䇒・ѻࡽⲴа⇥ᵏ䰤ˈф؍䲙Ӫ൘ਸ਼䇒・ᰦ⸕䚃ᡰ؍
仾䲙нՊਁ⭏ˈࡉ؍অᤱᴹӪӵ享᭟Ԉਸ਼䇒・ਾ䛓а⇥ᵏ䰤Ⲵ؍䲙䍩DŽ
൘䘭ⓟ؍ѻᛵᖒˈྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪ൘ਸ਼䇒・ᰦ⸕䚃ᡰ؍仾䲙ᐢ㓿ਁ⭏ˈࡉ؍䲙
Ӫ享ӵѪਸ਼䇒・ਾⲴ䛓а⇥ᵏ䰤ˈ؍ф↔ᛵᖒнᖡ૽ㅜᶑѻ䘲⭘DŽ
ㅜᶑᲲ؍
䇒・Ჲ؍ਸ਼ᰦˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ㆮਁ؍অ˗䈕؍অ享वਜ਼ㅜᶑㅜ D ǃ E
ǃ G ǃ H 亩㿴ᇊⲴؑˈфᗵ㾱ᡆޣᰦ享वਜ਼䈕ᶑㅜ K 亩㿴ᇊⲴؑDŽ
ㅜᶑ㠣ㅜᶑǃԕ৺ㅜᶑ ӽਇкⅮ㿴ᇊ㓖ᶏ н䘲⭘ҾᲲ؍DŽ
ㅜᶑᲲ؍ᵏ䰤
ྲ᷌ᣅ؍ӪᗇࡠᲲࡉˈ؍Ჲ؍ᵏ䰤㓸→Ҿ؍䲙ਸ਼⺞ᇊⲴ؍ᵏ䰤ᔰѻᰦᡆᣅ؍
Ӫ᭦ࡠ؍䲙Ӫ᰾⺞ᤂ㔍Ⲵ؍䙊⸕ᰦDŽ
ྲ᷌ᣅ؍Ӫੁཊњ؍䲙Ӫᣅ؍㘼ᗇࡠҶᲲࡉˈ؍Ჲ؍ᵏ䰤ਟԕ⸝Ҿㅜᶑㅜ Ⅾ
㿴ᇊⲴᵏ䰤DŽ↔Ჲ؍ҏਟ⭡ԫօаᯩᨀࡽєઘ䙊⸕㘼ਆ⎸DŽ
ㅜӄ㢲؍অ
ㅜᶑ؍অⲴᇩ
䇒・؍䲙ਸ਼ᰦˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ㆮਁ؍অ઼нवਜ਼൘؍অѝⲴа㡜ਸ਼ᶑⅮDŽ؍অᓄ䈕व
ᤜྲлؑޣ˖
10 ᵜᶑԕDirective 93 / 13 / EECѪ㬍ᵜDŽ
375
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
D ਸ਼ᖃһӪ〠઼ൠ൰ˈቔަᱟ؍䲙ӪⲴ⌅ᖻᖒᔿ৺ަ㩕ъᙫ䜘ൠ൰ԕ৺䘲ᖃᛵᖒ
лᨀ䇒・ਸ਼ᡆṨ؍Ⲵ؍䲙Ӫ࠶᭟ᵪᶴⲴ〠઼ൠ൰˗
E 㻛؍䲙Ӫǃԕ৺Ӫሯ؍䲙ѝⲴਇ⳺Ӫ઼仾䲙ӪⲴ〠઼ൠ൰˗
F ؍䲙ѝӻӪⲴ〠઼ൠ൰˗
G ؍䲙ḷⲴ⢙઼ᡰ؍仾䲙˗
H ؍䲙䠁仍ԕ৺ݽ䎄仍˗
I ؍䲙䍩䠁仍ᡆ؍䲙䍩䇑㇇ᯩᔿ˗
J ؍䲙䍩ࡠᵏᰦ䰤ԕ৺᭟Ԉᯩᔿ઼᭟Ԉൠ⛩˗
K ਸ਼ᵏ䰤ˈवᤜਸ਼㓸→Ⲵᯩᔿˈԕ৺䍓ԫᵏ䰤˗
L 䬰ᣅ؍ᡆᦞㅜᶑ䬰䶎Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ǃᦞㅜᶑ䬰Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼
ѻᵳ࡙˗
M 䖭᰾䈕؍䲙ਸ਼ਇlj⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉNJѻ㓖ᶏ˗
N ⌅䲒ཆᣅ䇹ԕ৺ᣅ؍Ӫᮁ⍾ᵪࡦ઼ަ㧧ᗇᮁ⍾Ⲵᯩᔿ˗
O ؍䇱ส䠁ᡆަԆ䎄گᆹᧂDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍অⲴ᭸࣋
ྲ᷌؍অᶑⅮоᣅ؍অᡆᖃһӪࡽݸ䗮ᡀⲴԫօॿ䇞ᆈ൘ᐞᔲˈф䘉Ӌᐞᔲ൘؍অ
ѝ㻛ケࠪḷ⽪ˈࡉ䘉Ӌᐞᔲᓄ䈕㻛㿶Ѫᐢᗇࡠ؍অᤱᴹӪ਼ˈն؍অᤱᴹӪ൘᭦
ࡠ؍অѻᰕ䎧ањᴸሩ䘉Ӌᐞᔲ㺘⽪৽ሩⲴ䲔ཆDŽ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ԕ㋇փᆇҖ䶒䙊⸕
؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳቡ؍অѝケࠪḷ᰾Ⲵᐞᔲ㺘⽪৽ሩDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽кⅮ㿴ᇊˈࡉ؍䲙ਸ਼ᶑⅮ㻛㿶Ѫԕᣅ؍অᡆᖃһӪһॿⲴݸ䇞Ѫ
߶DŽ
ㅜޝ㢲؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵᵏ䰤
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵᵏ䰤
؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵᵏ䰤ѪаᒤDŽᖃһӪਟԕสҾ仾䲙⢩ᖱⲴ㾱≲㘼㓖ᇊн਼Ⲵᵏ䰤DŽ
кⅮ㿴ᇊн䘲⭘ҾӪ䓛؍䲙DŽ
ㅜᶑᔦᵏ
ㅜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴаᒤᵏቺ┑ѻਾˈ؍䲙ਸ਼ᓄ䈕㻛ᔦᵏˈնлࡇᛵᖒ䲔ཆ˖
D ؍䲙Ӫ൘ਸ਼ᵏ┑㠣ቁањᴸࡽҖ䶒䙊⸕нҸᔦᵏᒦ䈤᰾ަ⨶⭡˗ᡆ
E ؍অᤱᴹӪᴰ䘏൘ਸ਼ᵏ┑ᰕǃᡆ൘ަ᭦ࡠ؍䲙䍩ԈⅮ䙊⸕ѻᰕ䎧ањᴸ ԕ
䖳㘵Ѫ߶ Җ䶒䙊⸕нҸᔦᵏDŽ൘ਾаᛵᖒˈ䈕ањᴸᵏ䰤ӵӾ؍䲙䍩ԈⅮ
䙊⸕ԕ㋇փᆇ䖭᰾Ⲵᰕᵏᔰ䇑㇇DŽ
к䘠ㅜаⅮ E 亩ѝⲴ䙊⸕ˈ൘ਁࠪᰦণ㿶ѪᐢࠪDŽ
ㅜᶑᶑⅮⲴਈᴤ
ᦞㅜ˖ᶑᔦᵏⲴਸ਼ˈަѝ㤕ᴹᶑⅮݱ䇨؍䲙Ӫਈᴤ؍䲙䍩ᡆਈᴤަԆᶑ
Ⅾˈࡉ䈕ᶑⅮᰐ᭸ˈնᇩྲлⲴ㿴ᇊᴹ᭸˖
D 㿴ᇊԫօਈᴤ൘л⅑ᔦᵏࡽнਁ⭏᭸࣋˗
E 㿴ᇊ؍䲙Ӫᓄ൘ᖃࡽਸ਼ᵏ䰤ቺ┑㠣ቁањᴸࡽቡਈᴤᙍҖ䶒䙊⸕؍অᤱᴹ
Ӫˈф
F к䘠䙊⸕享⸕؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ਼ԕ৺ަн㹼֯ਸ਼㓸→ᵳⲴਾ᷌DŽ
кⅮ㿴ᇊнᖡ૽ޣҾਈᴤᶑⅮѻ᭸࣋ⲴަԆ㾱≲DŽ
376
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜᶑᡰ؍仾䲙ਁ⭏ਾⲴਸ਼㓸→
㿴ᇊ؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ਾਸ਼㓸→ⲴᶑⅮᰐ᭸ˈնлࡇᛵᖒ䲔ཆ˖
D 䈕ᶑⅮ᰾⺞㿴ᇊৼᯩᖃһӪ䜭ᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ਼ˈф
E 䈕ਸ਼ᒦ䶎Ӫ䓛؍䲙DŽ
㿴ᇊਸ਼㓸→ᵳⲴᶑⅮԕ৺↔ᵳ࡙ѻ㹼֯൷享ਸ⨶DŽ
ྲ᷌аᯩᖃһӪ൘⸕䚃؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ਾєњᴸᵚሶަ㓸→ਸ਼ⲴᙍҖ䶒䙊⸕ਖ
аᯩˈࡉަਸ਼㓸→ᵳ㿶Ѫᵏ┑㘼нᗇ㹼֯DŽ
؍䲙ਸ਼൘к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ䘋㹼Ⲵ䙊⸕ࠪєઘѻਾ㓸→DŽ
ㅜг㢲ਸ਼ᡀ・ਾ؍䲙ӪⲴؑѹ࣑
ㅜᶑа㡜ؑѹ࣑
ᮤњਸ਼ᵏ䰤ˈ؍䲙Ӫ䜭ᓄ䈕ԕҖ䶒ᖒᔿੁ؍অᤱᴹӪᨀަ〠ǃൠ൰ǃ⌅ᖻᖒ
ᔿǃᙫ䜘ൠ൰ǃ䇒・ਸ਼Ⲵԓ⨶Ӫᡆ࠶᭟㔃ᶴⲴൠ൰ԕ৺䘉ӋؑⲴਈॆ˗↔ؑ
ᨀѹ࣑нᗇᴹнᖃ䘏ᔦDŽ
ㅜᶑ㓿䈧≲Ⲵ䘋а↕ؑѹ࣑
㓿؍অᤱᴹӪ䈧≲ˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ੁަᨀྲлᴹؑޣˈфнᗇᴹнᖃ䘏ᔦ˖
D ሩ؍䲙Ӫਸ⨶ᵏᖵⲴǃޣѾਸ਼ን㹼Ⲵޘ䜘һ亩˗
E ؍䲙Ӫቡ਼㊫؍䲙ਸ਼ᨀⲴᯠ⡸ḷ߶ᶑⅮDŽ
؍অᤱᴹӪⲴ䈧≲ԕ৺؍䲙ӪⲴㆄ༽൷享ԕҖ䶒ѪѻDŽ
ㅜйㄐ؍䲙ѝӻ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ԓ⨶ӪⲴᵳ࡙
؍䲙ԓ⨶Ӫ㓿ᦸᵳ㘼ԓ㺘؍䲙Ӫᇎᯭᦞᖃᰦ؍䲙㹼ъᇎ䐥Ҿަ㙼ъ⍫ࣘ㤳ത
Ⲵ㹼ѪDŽሩ؍䲙Ӫԓ⨶Ӫѻԓ⨶ᵳⲴԫօ䲀ࡦ享ԕঅ⤜᮷Ԧ᰾⺞䙊⸕؍অᤱᴹӪDŽ
նᱟˈ؍䲙ԓ⨶ӪⲴԓ⨶ᵳ䲀ᓄ䈕㠣ቁ⏥ⴆަᇎ䱵㙼ъ⍫ࣘ㤳തDŽ
൘ԫօᛵߥлˈ؍䲙ԓ⨶ӪⲴᵳ࡙वᤜ˖
D Ѫ؍অᤱᴹӪᨀ઼ؑᔪ䇞˗
E ᭦ਇ؍অᤱᴹӪਁࠪⲴ䙊⸕DŽ
؍ 䲙ԓ⨶Ӫ൘ަ㙼ъ⍫ࣘѝ⸕䚃ᡆᓄ䈕⸕䚃Ⲵؑޣ㿶ѪӖѪ؍䲙Ӫᡰ⸕DŽ
ㅜᶑ㠚〠⤜・Ⲵ؍䲙ԓ⨶Ӫ
ྲ᷌؍䲙ӪⲴԓ⨶Ӫ㠚〠ᱟ⤜・ѝӻˈնަ䘍৽Ҷ⌅ᖻሩ⤜・ѝӻ䈮࣐Ⲵѹ࣑ˈࡉ؍䲙
Ӫ享ቡ↔䘍৽ѹ࣑Ⲵ㹼Ѫᣵ䍓ԫDŽ
ㅜഋㄐᡰ؍仾䲙
ㅜа㢲亴䱢᧚ᯭ
ㅜᶑ亴䱢᧚ᯭⲴѹ
亴䱢᧚ᯭᱟᤷ؍䲙ਸ਼ѝ㾱≲؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ൘؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ࡽᇎᯭᡆнᇎᯭḀ
㹼ѪⲴᶑⅮ˗㓿ᖃһӪ㓖ᇊˈ䈕ᶑⅮਟԕᱟ؍䲙Ӫᣵ䎄Ԉ䍓ԫⲴᶑԦˈҏਟԕнᱟDŽ
377
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ӪⲴਸ਼㓸→ᵳ
؍䲙ਸ਼ਟԕ㿴ᇊྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫн䚥ᆸ亴䱢᧚ᯭࡉ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ
਼DŽնᱟˈ䲔䶎؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫԕ䙐ᡀᦏཡѻ᭵ᡆ᰾⸕ਟ㜭Պ䙐ᡀᦏཡত
㖞ѻн亮㘼䘍৽ަѹ࣑ˈࡉࡽ䘠ਸ਼㿴ᇊᒦᰐ᭸࣋DŽ
؍䲙Ӫ㹼֯ਸ਼㓸→ᵳˈ享㠚ަ⸕䚃к䘠䘍৽ѹ࣑Ⲵ㹼Ѫѻᰕ䎧ањᴸԕҖ䶒䙊
⸕؍অᤱᴹӪDŽਸ਼㓸→ᰦ؍ণ㹼㔃ᶏDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙Ӫ䎄Ԉ䍓ԫⲴ䀓䲔
؍䲙ਸ਼ਟԕ㿴ᇊሩ亴䱢᧚ᯭѻ䘍৽ਟԕ֯؍䲙Ӫ䜘࠶ᡆޘ䜘ݽ䍓ˈն↔㿴ᇊӵ൘
؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫԕ䙐ᡀᦏཡѻ᭵ᡆ᰾⸕ਟ㜭Պ䙐ᡀᦏཡত㖞ѻн亮㘼䘍৽
ަѹ࣑ѻᛵᖒާᴹ᭸࣋DŽ
؍䲙ਸ਼ਟԕ᰾⺞㿴ᇊ؍䲙䠁᤹➗؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴ䗷䭉㘼߿ቁˈն؍অᤱ
ᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳቡ䗷ཡ䘍৽亴䱢᧚ᯭ㘼ሬ㠤Ⲵᦏཡ㧧ᗇ؍䲙䠁DŽ
ㅜҼ㢲仾䲙໎࣐
ㅜᶑ仾䲙໎࣐
ྲ᷌؍䲙ਸ਼वਜ਼ᡰ؍仾䲙໎࣐ᶑⅮˈࡉ↔ᶑⅮӵ൘仾䲙ᇎ䍘໎࣐ǃф仾䲙Ҿਸ਼ާ
փᤷ᰾Ⲵ仾䲙ᰦާᴹ᭸࣋DŽ
ㅜᶑ仾䲙໎࣐䙊⸕ѹ࣑
ྲ᷌ᡰ؍仾䲙໎࣐ᶑⅮ㾱≲ቡ仾䲙ѻ໎࣐䘋㹼䙊⸕ˈࡉ↔䙊⸕享䘲ᖃᛵᖒ⭡؍অ
ᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫࠪˈնԕ䙊⸕ѹ࣑Ӫ⸕䚃ᡆᵜᓄ䈕⸕䚃؍㤳തԕ৺
䈕仾䲙ѻ໎࣐Ѫ䲀DŽԆӪⲴ䙊⸕ӖѪᴹ᭸DŽ
ྲ᷌к䘠ᶑⅮ㾱≲䙊⸕享൘⺞ᇊᵏ䰤ࠪˈࡉ↔ᵏ䰤享Ѫਸ⨶DŽ䙊⸕㠚ਁࠪᰦ⭏
᭸DŽ
൘к䘠䙊⸕ѹ࣑㻛䘍৽ѻᛵᖒˈ؍䲙Ӫнᗇԕ↔Ѫ⨶⭡㘼ቡ↔ਾᰦ䰤ਁ⭏Ⲵᦏཡᤂ
㔍Ҹԕ䎄Ԉˈն䈕ᦏཡᵜ䓛ᱟᵚѪ仾䲙໎࣐ѻ䙊⸕Ⲵ㔃᷌ᰦ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜᶑ㓸→о䀓䲔
ྲ᷌ਸ਼㿴ᇊ仾䲙໎࣐ᰦ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ਼ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫ㹼֯ᵳ࡙享㠚ަ⸕䚃仾䲙
໎࣐ਾањᴸԕҖ䶒ᖒᔿሶަ㓸→ਸ਼ѻᙍ䙊⸕؍অᤱᴹӪDŽ
؍ᵏ┑㔃ᶏҾਸ਼㓸→ਾањᴸᰦDŽྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪ᭵䘍৽ㅜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴѹ
࣑ˈࡉ൘ਸ਼㓸→ᰦ؍ণ㹼ᵏ┑㔃ᶏDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙һ᭵ᱟഐ仾䲙໎࣐㘼൘؍㔃ᶏѻࡽਁ⭏ˈф؍অᤱᴹӪ⸕䚃ᡆᓄ䈕⸕
䚃↔仾䲙ѻ໎࣐ˈ㘼؍䲙ӪᵜᶕнՊ↔؍໎࣐Ⲵ仾䲙ˈࡉ؍অᤱᴹӪᰐᵳ㧧ᗇ䎄
ԈDŽնᱟˈྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫᝯԕ䖳儈Ⲵ؍䲙䍩ᡆн਼ⲴᶑⅮҸԕ؍໎࣐Ⲵ仾䲙ˈࡉ
؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ᤹➗؍䲙䍩໎࣐ѻ∄ֻ㧧ᗇ䎄Ԉᡆࡽᦞ䘠н਼ᶑⅮ㧧ᗇ䎄ԈDŽ
ㅜй㢲仾䲙߿ቁ
ㅜᶑ仾䲙߿ቁⲴਾ᷌
ྲ᷌仾䲙ᇎ䍘ᙗ߿ቁˈࡉ؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ䈧≲؍䲙Ӫ䱽վ࢙։ਸ਼ᵏ䰤Ⲵ؍䲙䍩DŽ
378
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ྲ᷌㠚к䘠䈧≲ᨀࠪਾањᴸᖃһӪᵚ㜭ቡ᤹∄ֻ䱽վ؍䲙䍩䗮ᡀа㠤ˈࡉ؍অ
ᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ൘к䘠䈧≲ਁࠪѻਾєњᴸԕҖ䶒䙊⸕㓸→ਸ਼DŽ
ㅜӄㄐ؍䲙䍩
ㅜᶑ俆ᵏ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩ᡆа⅑ᙗ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫԕᣅ؍Ӫ᭟Ԉ俆ᵏ؍䲙䍩ᡆа⅑ᙗ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩Ѫਸ਼ᡀ・ᡆ؍ᔰⲴᶑ
Ԧˈࡉ䈕ᶑԦӵ൘л䘠ᛵᖒлᴹ᭸˖
D ؍䲙ӪԕҖ䶒ᖒᔿ֯⭘᰾⺞Ⲵ䈝䀰ሶ↔ᶑԦ䙊⸕ᣅ؍Ӫˈᒦੁަ䆖⽪н᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩
ׯнҸˈ؍ф
E ᣅ؍Ӫ᭦ࡠㅖਸк䘠 D 亩㾱≲ⲴԈⅮ䙊⸕єઘਾӽᵚ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩DŽ
ㅜᶑ࠶ᵏ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩
؍অᤱᴹӪྲᵚ᤹➗㓖ᇊ࠶ᵏ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫ؍仾䲙ѻѹ࣑㻛䀓䲔ˈնӵ
ԕлࡇᛵᖒѪ䲀˖
D ؍অᤱᴹӪᐢ᭦ࡠ䖭᰾ᓄԈ䠁仍઼ԈⅮᵏ䲀ⲴԈⅮ䙊⸕˗
E ؍䲙䍩᭟Ԉᰕࡠᵏѻਾˈ؍䲙Ӫੁ؍অᤱᴹӪਁ䘱ԈⅮᨀ⽪ˈф䈕ᨀ⽪㔉Ҹ㠣ቁ
єઘⲴᔦ䮯ᵏˈᒦ䆖⽪㤕н᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩ࡉ・ণ㓸→˗؍ф
F к䘠 E 亩㿴ᇊⲴᔦ䮯ᵏቺ┑ѻਾˈ؍অᤱᴹӪӽᵚ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩DŽ
൘кⅮ E 亩㿴ᇊⲴᔦ䮯ᵏቺ┑ѻਾ؍䲙ӪⲴ䍓ԫ㠚ࣘ䀓䲔DŽ؍ਟԕ൘ሶᶕ؍অᤱ
ᴹӪ᭟Ԉ⅐㕤Ⲵ؍䲙䍩ᰦণ㹼ᚒ༽ˈն؍䲙ਸ਼ㅜᶑ㓸→ਾ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜᶑਸ਼㓸→
ྲ᷌ㅜᶑ E 亩ᡆㅜᶑㅜ Ⅾ E 亩ᡰᤷᵏ䰤ቺ┑ਾ؍䲙䍩ӽᵚ᭟Ԉˈф
ㅜᶑ E 亩㿴ᇊⲴԈⅮ䙊⸕ᡆㅜᶑㅜ Ⅾ E 亩㿴ᇊⲴԈⅮᨀ⽪᰾⽪؍䲙
Ӫᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ਼ˈࡉ؍䲙ӪᴹᵳԕҖ䶒䙊⸕㓸→؍䲙ਸ਼DŽ
൘лࡇᛵᖒˈ㿶Ѫ؍䲙ਸ਼㓸→˖
D ൘ㅜᶑ E 亩㿴ᇊⲴԈⅮᵏ䰤ቺ┑ਾєњᴸˈ؍䲙Ӫнԕ䇹䇬䈧≲؍অᤱ
ᴹӪ᭟Ԉ俆ᵏ؍䲙䍩˗
E ൘ㅜᶑㅜ Ⅾ E亩㿴ᇊⲴԈⅮᵏ䰤ቺ┑ਾєњᴸˈ؍䲙Ӫнԕ䇹䇬䈧≲
؍অᤱᴹӪ᭟Ԉ俆ᵏ؍䲙䍩DŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙䍩Ⲵ࠶ࢢ
ྲ᷌؍䲙ਸ਼൘ਸ਼ᵏ䰤ቺ┑ѻࡽ㓸→ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫӵᴹᵳ㧧ᗇਸ਼㓸→ѻࡽⲴ䛓䜘࠶؍
䲙䍩DŽ
ㅜᶑ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩Ⲵᵳ࡙
؍䲙Ӫнᗇᤂ㔍ㅜйᯩ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩ˈնㅜйᯩ᭟ԈӵԕлࡇᛵᖒѪ䲀˖
D ㅜйᯩ᭟Ԉ㧧ᗇ؍অᤱᴹӪ਼˗ᡆ
E ㅜйᯩሩ؍ѻ㔤ᤱᆈ㔝ާᴹਸ⨶࡙⳺ǃф؍অᤱᴹӪᒦᵚ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩ᡆަᱮ❦н
Պ᤹ᵏ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䍩DŽ
379
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜޝㄐ؍䲙һ᭵
ㅜᶑ؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏䙊⸕
䘲ᖃᛵᖒˈ؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫᓄ䈕ቡ؍䲙һ᭵ѻਁ⭏䙊⸕؍䲙Ӫˈ
նԕ䙊⸕ѹ࣑Ӫ⸕䚃ᡆᵜᓄ䈕⸕䚃؍㤳ത઼һ᭵ѻਁ⭏Ѫ䲀DŽԆӪⲴ䙊⸕ӖѪᴹ
᭸DŽ
к䘠䙊⸕нᗇᴹнᖃ䘏ᔦDŽ䙊⸕㠚ਁࠪᰦ⭏᭸DŽྲ᷌ਸ਼㾱≲䙊⸕享൘ᰒᇊᵏ䰤
䘋㹼ˈࡉ↔ᵏ䰤享Ѫਸ⨶ˈնнᗇቁҾһ᭵ਁ⭏ਾӄᰕDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ㜭䇱᰾к䘠䙊⸕ᴹнᖃ䘏ᔦф↔䘏ᔦሩަ䙐ᡀᦏཡˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳ䱽վ
؍䲙䠁᭟Ԉ仍DŽ
ㅜᶑ㍒䎄䗷〻ѝⲴਸѹ࣑
ᦞ䘲ᖃᛵᖒˈ؍অᤱᴹӪǃ㻛؍䲙Ӫᡆਇ⳺Ӫᓄᖃ൘؍䲙һ᭵䈳ḕ䗷〻ѝо؍䲙
Ӫਸˈᓄᖃഎㆄ؍䲙ӪⲴਸ⨶䈒䰞ˈቔަᱟޣҾྲлؑⲴ䈒䰞˖
üü؍䲙һ᭵Ⲵഐоਾ᷌˗
üü؍䲙һ᭵Ⲵ㓚ᖅᡆަԆ䇱ᦞ˗
üü䘋ޣޕൠ⛩DŽ
кⅮ㿴ᇊⲴਸѹ࣑㻛䘍৽ᰦˈਇл䘠ㅜ Ⅾѻᤈᶏˈ؍䲙Ӫ㤕㜭䇱᰾ަഐ↔䚝ਇ
ᦏཡˈࡉަᴹᵳ䱽վ؍䲙䠁䎄Ԉ仍DŽ
ྲ᷌к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴѹ࣑ѻ䘍৽ᱟࠪҾ䙐ᡀᦏཡѻ᭵ᡆѹ࣑Ӫ᰾⸕ਟ㜭䙐ᡀᦏ
ཡত㖞ѻн亮ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᓄᰐѹ࣑䎄Ԉ؍䲙䠁DŽ
ㅜᶑ㍒䎄ѻਇ⨶
؍䲙Ӫ享䟷ਆа࠷ਸ⨶↕僔ቭᘛᆼ㔃䎄ԈһᇌDŽ
䲔䶎؍䲙Ӫሩ㍒䎄䈧≲Ҹԕᤂ㔍ˈᡆ൘᭦ࡠޣ㍒䎄᮷Ԧ઼ަԆؑѻਾањᴸ
ԕҖ䶒䙊⸕䘏ᔦਇ⨶㍒䎄ѻߣᇊᒦ䈤᰾䘏ᔦ⨶⭡ˈࡉ᧘ᇊ؍䲙Ӫᐢਇ⨶㍒䎄䈧≲DŽ
ㅜᶑን㹼ѹ࣑Ⲵᰦ䰤
؍䲙Ӫਇ⨶㍒䎄䈧≲ѻਾˈᓄ䈕᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁ᡆᨀަ䈪Ⲵᴽ࣑DŽ↔ѹ࣑ѻን㹼н
ᗇᴹнᖃ䘏ᔦDŽ
ণ֯ޘ䜘䎄Ԉ䠁仍ቊᵚ⺞ᇊˈնਚ㾱㍒䎄Ӫᴹᵳ㧧ᗇ䜘࠶䎄Ԉˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ᨀ
↔䜘࠶䎄گᡆᴽ࣑ˈфнᗇᴹнᖃ䘏ᔦDŽ
к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ઼ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴ؍䲙䠁ˈᓄ൘н䘏Ҿਇ⨶㍒䎄઼⺞ᇊޘ䜘ᡆ䜘࠶䎄Ԉ
䠁仍ਾєઘҸԕ᭟ԈDŽ
ㅜᶑ䘏ᔦን㹼ѹ࣑
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫᵚㅜᶑ䎄Ԉ؍䲙䠁ˈࡉ㍒䎄Ӫᴹᵳ䈧≲䈕؍䲙䠁㠚䎄Ԉࡠᵏѻᰕ
䎧Ⲵ࡙DŽ࡙⦷Ѫ؍䲙ҹ䇞ᡰॺᒤⲴㅜаᰕѻࡽ⅗⍢ѝཞ䬦㹼ᇎᯭⲴᴰ䘁ѫ㾱
㶽䍴亩ⴞ䘲⭘Ⲵަ⺞ᇊⲴ࡙⦷ѻк䱴࣐ޛњⲮ࠶⛩DŽ
㍒䎄Ӫᴹᵳቡ؍䲙Ӫ䘏ᔦ䎄Ԉ؍䲙䠁䙐ᡀⲴަԆᦏཡ㧧ᗇ䎄گ䠁DŽ
380
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜгㄐ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ᵏ䰤
ㅜᶑ؍䲙䍩䈧≲ᵳ
؍䲙䍩䈧≲ᵳⲴ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ᵏ䰤൘㠚Ӿ㕤䍩ࡠᵏѻᰕ䎧㓿䗷аᒤ㘼ቺ┑DŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙䠁䈧≲ᵳ
а㡜㘼䀰ˈ؍䲙䠁䈧≲ᵳ㠚؍䲙Ӫᦞㅜᶑቡ⨶䎄ᇎ䱵ࠪᴰ㓸ߣᇊᡆ᧘ᇊަ
ࠪᴰ㓸ߣᇊѻᰕ䎧㓿䗷йᒤ㘼ቺ┑DŽնᱟˈ൘ԫօᛵᖒлˈ؍䲙䠁䈧≲ᵳⲴ䇹䇬
ᰦ᭸ᵏ䰤ᴰ䮯㠚؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ѻᰕ䎧㓿䗷ॱᒤ㘼ቺ┑ˈն൘Ӫ䓛؍䲙䈕䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ᵏ
䰤ᴰ䮯ѪйॱᒤDŽ
൘Ӫ䓛؍䲙ˈ؍অ⧠䠁ԧ٬䈧≲ᵳⲴ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸൘؍অᤱᴹӪӾ؍䲙Ӫ᭦ࡠᴰ㓸䍖অ
ѻᰕ䎧㓿䗷йᒤ㘼ቺ┑DŽնᱟˈ൘ԫօᛵᖒлˈ䈕ᵏ䰤ᴰ䮯ѪӪ䓛؍䲙ਸ਼㓸→ਾ
йॱᒤDŽ
ㅜᶑޣҾ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ᵏ䰤ⲴަԆ䰞仈
lj⅗⍢ਸ਼⌅ࡉNJㅜᶑ㠣ㅜᶑҏ䘲⭘ҾสҾ؍䲙ਸ਼㘼ӗ⭏Ⲵ䈧≲ᵳ˗
↔㊫䈧≲ᵳ਼ᰦҏਇᵜljࡉNJㅜᶑ઼ㅜᶑѻ㓖ᶏDŽᦞᵜljࡉNJㅜ
ᶑㅜ Ⅾˈ؍䲙ਸ਼ਟԕਈ䙊䘲⭘lj⅗⍢ਸ਼⌅ࡉNJⲴࡽ䘠ᶑⅮDŽ
ㅜҼ㕆䘲⭘Ҿ㺕گර؍䲙Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
ㅜޛㄐ؍䲙䠁仍઼؍䲙ԧ٬
ㅜᶑᴰབྷ䎄Ԉ仍
؍䲙Ӫᓄᰐѹ࣑֯ަ䎄Ԉ仍䎵䗷㺕گ㻛؍䲙Ӫᇎ䱵䚝ਇᦏཡᡰᗵ䴰ѻ仍ᓖDŽ
൘ᇊ٬؍䲙ˈণ֯؍䲙䠁仍䎵䗷؍䲙ḷⲴ⢙ѻᇎ䱵ԧ٬ˈ䈕؍䲙ӖѪᴹ᭸ˈնԕᖃ
һӪ㓖ᇊ؍䲙ԧ٬ᰦ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪᵚᇎᯭⅪ䇸ᡆᵚ䘋㹼нᇎ䱸䘠Ѫ䲀DŽ
ㅜᶑн䏣仍؍䲙
ণ֯؍䲙䠁仍ቁҾ؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ᰦ؍䲙䍒ӗⲴԧ٬ˈ؍䲙Ӫҏᓄ䎄گн䎵䗷؍䲙䠁
仍Ⲵԫօ؍㤳തᦏཡDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫṩᦞк䘠ㅜ Ⅾᨀн䏣仍؍䲙ˈࡉަᴹᵳ䘹ᤙ᤹➗ྲлᶑԦ䘋㹼∄ֻ
䎄ˈگণ᤹➗؍䲙䠁仍оо؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ᰦ؍䲙䍒ӗⲴᇎ䱵ԧ٬ѻ䰤Ⲵ∄ֻሩᦏཡ
䘋㹼䎄گDŽ㘼фˈ൘䘉ᛵᖒлˈㅜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴ߿ᦏᡀᵜҏᓄ᤹➗਼ṧ∄ֻᗇࡠ
㺕گDŽ
ㅜᶑ䎵仍؍䲙ⲴᶑⅮ䈳ᮤ
ྲ᷌؍䲙䠁仍䎵䗷Ⲵ؍ᴰབྷਟ㜭ᦏཡˈࡉԫօаᯩᖃһӪ൷ᴹᵳ䈧≲䱽վ؍䲙䠁
仍ˈᒦᓄ߿ቁ࢙։ਸ਼ᵏ䰤Ⲵ؍䲙䍩DŽ
ྲ᷌ᖃһӪ൘ᨀࠪк䘠䈧≲ਾањᴸᵚቡк䘠߿䱽һᇌ䗮ᡀа㠤ˈࡉԫօаᯩᖃ
һӪ൷ᴹᵳ㓸→ਸ਼DŽ
12 ৲㿱 Lando / Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law Internation-
al, The Hague 2000); Lando / Clive / Prüm / Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law,
Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
381
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜᶑ༽ᮠ؍䲙
ྲ਼᷌а࡙⳺⭡ཊњ؍䲙Ӫ࠶࡛ࡉˈ؍㻛؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳੁަѝԫօањᡆཊњ؍䲙
Ӫ㍒䎄ˈնԕ㺕ަگᇎ䱵ᦏཡᡰ䴰ѻᗵ㾱仍ᓖѪ䲀DŽ
к䘠؍䲙Ӫ䚝䙷㍒䎄ѻਾᓄԕަ؍অѝ⺞ᇊⲴ؍䲙䠁仍Ѫ䲀ሩᦏཡ઼߿ᦏᡀᵜҸԕ
䎄ˈگնަᴹᵳቡ↔䎄گ仍䈧≲ަԆ؍䲙ӪҸԕ࠶ᣵDŽ
к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴ؍䲙Ӫѻ䰤Ⲵ䎄࠶گᣵᡰ⎹ᵳ࡙оѹ࣑ᓄоަ࠶࡛ሩ㻛؍䲙Ӫ
ᣵⲴ䍓ԫᡀ∄ֻDŽ
ㅜҍㄐਇ㺕گѻᵳ࡙
ㅜᶑᦏཡഐ
ྲ᷌ᦏཡᱟ⭡Ҿ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫԕ䙐ᡀᦏཡѻ᭵ᡆ᰾⸕ਟ㜭䙐ᡀᦏཡত㖞
ѻн亮㘼ਁ⭏ˈࡉަᰐᵳቡ↔ᦏཡ㧧ᗇ㺕گDŽ
؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䗷ཡ䙐ᡀᦏཡⲴˈަᓄ䈕㧧ᗇ᤹➗ަ䗷䭉〻ᓖ㘼䱽վ䠁仍Ⲵ
؍䲙䠁㺕ˈگն䘉㺕گԕ؍অᐢᴹྲ↔᰾⺞㓖ᇊⲴᶑⅮѪ䲀DŽ
ㅜ Ⅾ઼ㅜ ⅮѝⲴᦏཡഐवᤜᵚ㜭䚯ᦏݽཡᡆᵚ㜭߿ቁᦏཡDŽ
ㅜᶑ߿ᦏᡀᵜ
؍䲙Ӫᓄቡ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪѪ߿ቁᡰᦏ؍ཡ䟷ਆ᧚ᯭ㘼ਁ⭏Ⲵᡀᵜᡆ⭡↔䚝
ਇⲴᦏᇣҸԕ㺕ˈگնԕ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ㜭↓ᖃ䇔Ѫަ䟷ਆⲴ᧚ᯭ൘ᖃᰦᛵ
ᖒлᇎਸ⨶ ণ֯䘉Ӌ᧚ᯭᵚ㜭ᡀ࣏߿ቁᦏཡ Ѫ䲀DŽ
؍䲙Ӫᓄ᤹➗к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊሩ߿ᦏᡀᵜ䘋㹼㺕ˈگণ֯↔㺕گ䠁仍о؍䲙䠁ѻ઼
䎵䗷؍䲙䠁仍ᰦӖ❦DŽ
ㅜॱㄐԓս≲گᵳ
ㅜᶑԓս≲گᵳ
؍䲙Ӫੁ㻛؍䲙Ӫ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁ѻਾᴹᵳੁሩᦏཡ䍏ᴹ䍓ԫⲴㅜйᯩ㹼֯ԓս≲گ
ᵳDŽ䈕ᵳ࡙ѻ㹼֯ਇл䘠ㅜ Ⅾѻ㓖ᶏDŽ
ྲ᷌㻛؍䲙Ӫ᭮ᔳሩㅜйᯩⲴ≲گᵳǃф⭡↔ᦏ৺؍䲙ӪⲴԓս≲گᵳˈࡉ㻛؍䲙
ӪԕަᔳᵳⲴ〻ᓖѪ䲀ቡ䇹ҹᦏཡཡ৫㧧ᗇ؍䲙䠁Ⲵᵳ࡙DŽ
؍䲙Ӫнᗇሩ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ⲵᇦᓝᡀઈᡆоަާᴹ㊫լ⽮Պޣ㌫ⲴӪǃᡆަ
䳷ઈ㹼֯ԓս≲گᵳˈնަ㜭䇱᰾ᦏཡᱟ⭡Ҿ↔㊫Ӫઈ᭵ᡆ᰾⸕ਟ㜭ਁ⭏ᦏཡত
㖞ѻн亮㘼ሬ㠤Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
؍䲙Ӫ㹼֯ԓս≲گᵳнᗇᴹᦏҾ㻛؍䲙Ӫѻᵳ⳺DŽ
ㅜॱаㄐ؍অᤱᴹӪѻཆⲴަԆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ
ㅜᶑ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴᵳ࡙
൘؍䲙ਸ਼ᱟѪ؍অᤱᴹӪѻཆⲴԆӪѻ࡙⳺㘼䇒・ѻᛵᖒˈྲ᷌؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ˈ
ࡉ䈕ԆӪᴹᵳ㧧ᗇ؍䲙䠁DŽ
؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ䬰к䘠؍䲙ˈնлࡇᛵᖒᰦ䲔ཆ˖
D ؍অᐢ㓿㿴ᇊнᗇ䬰˗ᡆ
382
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
E ؍䲙һ᭵ᐢ㓿ਁ⭏DŽ
к
Ⅾᡰ䘠䬰ˈ㠚䬰ѻҖ䶒䙊⸕ੁ؍䲙Ӫਁࠪᰦ⭏᭸DŽ
ㅜᶑ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴ⸕䚃
൘؍অᤱᴹӪᴹѹ࣑ੁ؍䲙ӪᨀؑޣѻᛵᖒˈㅜᶑѝԆӪⲴ⸕䚃нᗇᖂ㔃
Ѫ؍অᤱᴹӪѻ⸕䚃ˈն䈕ԆӪ⸕䚃㠚ᐡⲴ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䓛ԭᰦ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜᶑঅњ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽ѹ࣑
অњ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽ަѹ࣑ᒦнᖡ૽਼а؍অлަԆ㻛؍䲙Ӫѻᵳ࡙ˈն仾䲙㻛䘎ᑖ؍
ᰦ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜॱҼㄐᡰ؍仾䲙
ㅜᶑᡰ؍仾䲙нᆈ൘
ྲ᷌ᡰ؍仾䲙൘ਸ਼䇒・ᰦ઼ਸ਼ᵏ䰤൷нᆈ൘ˈࡉ؍অᤱᴹӪн享᭟Ԉ؍䲙
䍩DŽնᱟˈ؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳቡ⭡↔ਁ⭏Ⲵ䍩⭘㧧ᗇਸ⨶仍ᓖⲴ㺕گDŽ
ྲ᷌ᡰ؍仾䲙൘ਸ਼ᵏ䰤нᆈ൘ˈࡉਸ਼൘؍䲙Ӫቡ↔᭦ਇ䙊⸕ᰦণ㹼㓸→DŽ
ㅜᶑ䍒ӗ䖜䇙
ྲ᷌؍䲙䍒ӗ㻛䖜䇙ˈࡉ؍䲙ਸ਼൘䖜䇙ਁ⭏ањᴸਾ㓸→ˈն؍অᤱᴹӪҏਟо
ਇ䇙Ӫ㓖ᇊᴤᰙⲴਸ਼㓸→ᰦ䰤DŽྲ᷌؍䲙ਸ਼ᱟѪሶᶕⲴਇ䇙Ӫѻ࡙⳺㘼䇒・ˈ
ࡉᵜ㿴ࡉн䘲⭘ѻDŽ
㠚ᡰ؍䍒ӗѻ仾䲙㻛䖜〫ѻᰦ䎧ˈ䈕䍒ӗⲴਇ䇙Ӫ㻛㿶Ѫ㻛؍䲙ӪDŽ
൘ л䘠ᛵᖒˈк䘠ㅜ Ⅾ઼ㅜ Ⅾн䘲⭘˖
D ؍䲙Ӫǃ؍অᤱᴹӪ઼䍒ӗਇ䇙Ӫѻ䰤ᴹ৽㓖ᇊ˗ᡆ
E 䍒ӗ䖜䇙ᱟഐ㔗㘼ਁ⭏DŽ
ㅜй㕆䘲⭘Ҿᇊ仍؍䲙Ⲵ਼ޡ㿴ᇊ
ㅜॱйㄐ䘲⭘㤳ത
ㅜᶑᇊ仍㔉Ԉර؍䲙
ӵཆՔᇣ؍䲙ǃڕᓧ؍䲙ǃӪሯ؍䲙ǃႊါ؍䲙ǃ⭏㛢؍䲙ᡆަԆӪ䓛؍䲙Ѫᇊ仍؍
䲙DŽ
ㅜഋ㕆䍓ԫ؍䲙
ㅜॱഋㄐᲞ䙊䍓ԫ؍䲙
ㅜᶑᣇ䗙ᡀᵜ
ቡᦞㅜᶑ㘼ਁ⭏Ⲵᣇ䗙ᡀᵜˈ؍䲙ӪᓄҸԕ㺕گDŽ
383
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜᶑ؍ᣔਇᇣӪ
؍䲙Ӫо؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫቡ؍䲙অ亩лⲴ؍䲙䠁䈧≲ᵳԕॿ䇞ǃᔳᵳǃ᭟Ԉᡆ਼
ㅹ㹼ѪࠪⲴԫօ઼䀓൷нᖡ૽ਇᇣӪⲴൠսˈնਇᇣӪԕҖ䶒㺘⽪਼Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜᶑᦏཡⲴഐ
؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫᰐᵳቡަ᭵ⲴѪᡆнѪሬ㠤Ⲵᦏཡ㧧ᗇ㺕˗گ䘉वᤜ
ᦏཡਁ⭏ਾ㖄亮ф᰾⸕н䚥ᗚ؍䲙ӪⲴᤷ⽪ਟ㜭Պ࣐䟽ᦏཡতӽн䚥ᗚ؍䲙ӪⲴᤷ
⽪DŽ
ࡽⅮᡰ〠Ⲵሬ㠤ਇᦏཡवᤜᵚ䟷ਆ᧚ᯭ䚯ᦏݽཡᡆ߿ቁᦏཡDŽ
؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫᴹᵳቡަഐ䗷ཡ㘼ᵚ䚥ᗚ؍䲙Ӫ൘ᦏཡਁ⭏ѻਾⲴᤷ⽪㘼ሬ
㠤Ⲵԫօᦏཡ㧧ᗇ㺕ˈگն؍䲙অᶑⅮ᰾⺞㓖ᇊਟ؍ᦞঅᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴ䗷
䭉〻ᓖ㘼߿仍᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜᶑ䇔䍓ԫ
؍䲙ਸ਼ᶑⅮ㤕㓖ᇊ؍䲙Ӫਟ൘؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䇔ਟᡆگਇᇣӪⲴ䎄گ䈧
≲ᵳᰦণਟ䀓䲔؍䲙ӪⲴ䍓ԫˈࡉ䈕ᶑⅮᰐ᭸DŽ
䲔䶎؍䲙Ӫ਼ˈަнਇ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪоਇᇣӪѻ䰤Ⲵॿ䇞ѻ㓖ᶏDŽ
ㅜᶑ䖜䇙
؍䲙ਸ਼ᶑⅮ㤕ཪ㻛؍䲙Ӫ䖜䇙ަ؍অ亩л؍䲙䠁䈧≲ᵳѻᵳ࡙ˈࡉ䈕ᶑⅮᰐ᭸DŽ
ㅜᶑᰐ㍒䎄ѻ྆࣡
؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ൘ԫօᰦى㾱≲㧧ᗇޣҾަ䗷৫ӄᒤⲴ≲گ㓚ᖅDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ֯؍䲙䍩ቡᡆަԆᶑԦ䎆Ҿ؍অ亩лⲴ≲⅑گᮠᡆ䠁仍ˈࡉަ享䘲ᖃ
㘳㲁؍অᤱᴹӪ൘䗷৫ӄᒤⲴ≲گ㓚ᖅDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙һ᭵
؍䲙һ᭵ᓄᤷਁ⭏൘؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵ䍓ԫᵏ䰤ሬ㠤㻛؍䲙Ӫ享ᣵ䍓ԫⲴһᇎˈն؍
䲙ਸ਼สҾ୶ъᡆ㙼ъⲴ㘳㲁㘼ԕަԆḷ߶üü∄ྲਇᇣӪⲴ≲گüü⭼ᇊ؍䲙һ
᭵Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙ਸ਼ᖃһӪԕਇᇣӪⲴ≲⭼گᇊ؍䲙һ᭵ˈࡉቡ䍓ԫ؍䲙ᵏ䰤ⲴਇᇣӪ
≲گᡆ䍓ԫ؍䲙ᵏ䰤ਾӄᒤԕкǃфһ᭵һᇎਁ⭏൘䍓ԫᵏ䰤㓸→ѻࡽˈަᓄ䈕
Ҿ؍㤳തDŽ؍䲙ਸ਼ҏਟสҾਸ਼䇒・ᰦᣅ؍Ӫ⸕䚃ᡆᵜᓄ⸕䚃ަᵜᓄ亴䇑ࡠሬ
㠤≲Ⲵگᛵᖒ㘼ሶ↔≲ᧂگ䲔൘؍㤳തѻཆDŽ
ㅜᶑ㍒䎄仍䎵ࠪ؍䲙䠁仍
ྲ᷌⭡Ҿᆈ൘ཊњਇᇣӪ㘼㠤֯؍䲙䠁گԈᙫ仍䎵ࠪ؍䲙䠁仍ˈࡉᓄ᤹➗∄ֻ߿䱽
گԈ仍DŽ
؍䲙Ӫྲ᷌н⸕䚃ᆈ൘ަԆਇᇣӪ㘼ழሶޘ䜘؍䲙䠁᭟Ԉ㔉ަ⸕䚃ᆈ൘Ⲵਇᇣ
Ӫˈࡉ䈕؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕൘ަᇎ䱵᭟ԈⲴ؍䲙䠁о؍䲙䠁仍Ⲵᐞ仍䲀ᓖሩަԆਇᇣӪ
᭟Ԉ䎄گ䠁DŽ
384
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜॱӄㄐⴤ᧕≲گᵳоⴤ᧕䇹䇬
ㅜᶑⴤ᧕≲گоᣇ䗙
൘лࡇᛵᖒˈԕ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪሩਇᇣӪⲴ䍓ԫѪ䲀ˈਇᇣӪᴹᵳੁ؍䲙ਸ
਼ѝⲴ؍䲙Ӫⴤ᧕䈧≲㧧ᗇ䎄˖گ
D ؍䲙ާᴹᕪࡦᙗ˗ᡆ
E ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫӗ˗ᡆ
F ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫᐢ㓿㻛㇇˗ᡆ
G ਇᇣӪᐢ㓿䚝ਇӪ䓛ᦏᇣ˗ᡆ
H ޣҾ䍓ԫⲴ⌅ᖻ㿴ᇊҶⴤ᧕≲گᵳDŽ
؍䲙Ӫਟԕቡަ؍ᦞ䲙ਸ਼ӛᴹⲴᣇ䗙ሩᣇਇᇣӪˈնᴹ᰾⺞㿴ᇊ㠤֯؍䲙ާᴹ
ᕪࡦᙗᰦ䲔ཆDŽ❦㘼ˈ؍䲙ӪᰐᵳสҾ؍অᤱᴹӪ઼ᡆ㻛؍䲙Ӫ൘ᦏཡਁ⭏ਾⲴ㹼
Ѫ㘼ᨀࠪԫօᣇ䗙DŽ
ㅜᶑؑѹ࣑
㓿ਇᇣӪ䈧≲ˈ؍অᤱᴹӪ઼㻛؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ণ㹼ᨀگ≲᧕ⴤަᡰ䴰㾱ⲴؑDŽ
؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ቡަ䚝ਇⲴԫօⴤ᧕≲گԕҖ䶒䙊⸕؍অᤱᴹӪ˗↔䙊⸕нᗇᴹнᖃ
䘏ᔦˈфᴰ䘏ᓄᖃ൘ަ᭦ࡠ≲گѻਾєઘ䘋㹼DŽྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽↔䙊⸕ѹ࣑ˈࡉ
ަሩਇᇣӪⲴ᭟Ԉᡆ٪࣑䇔нᓄ䈕ᖡ૽؍অᤱᴹӪⲴᵳ࡙DŽ
ྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪ൘ަ᭦ࡠ؍䲙ӪࡽᦞⅮ㿴ᇊࠪⲴ䙊⸕ѻਾањᴸᵚੁ؍䲙Ӫ
ᨀо؍䲙һ᭵ؑⲴޣˈࡉ᧘ᇊ؍অᤱᴹӪ਼؍䲙Ӫቡަ䚝䙷Ⲵ≲گҸԕⴤ
᧕઼䀓DŽ䈕㿴ࡉҏ䘲⭘Ҿᇎ䱵৺ᰦ᭦ࡠ↔䙊⸕Ⲵ㻛؍䲙ӪDŽ
ㅜᶑ䀓䲔
лࡇᛵᖒлˈሩ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴ᭟Ԉӵӵ䀓䲔؍䲙ӪሩਇᇣӪѻѹ࣑˖
D ਇᇣӪᐢ㓿᭮ᔳަⴤ᧕≲گᵳ˗ᡆ
E ਇᇣӪ൘᭦ࡠ؍䲙ӪⲴҖ䶒䈧≲ѻਾഋᰕ⋑ᴹቡަⴤ᧕≲گѻᝯ䙊⸕؍䲙ӪDŽ
ㅜᶑ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸
ਇᇣӪሩ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ᓄ䈕䘲⭘Ҿ㻛؍䲙ӪᡆਇᇣӪሩ؍䲙Ӫᨀ䎧Ⲵ䇹䇬DŽ
ਇᇣӪሩ㻛؍䲙ӪⲴ䎄گ䈧≲ᵳⲴ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸Ӿ㻛؍䲙Ӫ⸕䚃ਇᇣӪᐢ㓿ੁ؍䲙Ӫ
㹼֯ⴤ᧕≲گᵳ㘼ѝ→˗↔ѝ→൘䈕ⴤ᧕≲گᵳ㓿؍䲙Ӫ઼䀓ᡆ⭡؍䲙Ӫᤂ㔍㘼㔃
ᶏDŽ
ㅜॱޝㄐᕪࡦ؍䲙
ㅜᶑ䘲⭘㤳ത
ቡን㹼л䘠⌅ᖻ㿴ᇊⲴ؍䲙ѹ࣑㘼䇒・Ⲵ؍䲙ਸ਼ˈᖃһӪਟԕ䘹ᤙ䘲⭘ᵜlj
ࡉNJ˖
D ⅗ⴏ⌅㿴ᇊⲴ˗
E ⅗ⴏᡀઈഭഭ⌅㿴ᇊⲴ˗ᡆ
F 䶎⅗ⴏᡀઈഭഭ⌅൘䈕ഭ⌅ᖻݱ䇨Ⲵ㤳ത㿴ᇊⲴDŽ
䲔䶎؍䲙ਸ਼ㅖਸ䈮࣐ᣅ؍ѹ࣑Ⲵާփ⌅ᖻ㿴ᇊˈ؍䲙ਸ਼ᵜ䓛Ⲵᆈ൘ᒦн┑䏣ᕪ
ࡦᣅ؍ѹ࣑DŽ
385
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ㅜӄ㕆Ӫሯ؍䲙
ㅜॱгㄐӪሯ؍䲙⢩↺㿴ᇊ
ㅜа㢲ㅜйӪ
ㅜᶑᣅ؍ㅜйӪѻ⭏ભ
䲔䶎㧧ᗇ仾䲙ӪҖ䶒ㆮ㖢Ⲵ⸕ᛵ਼ˈԕㅜйӪⲴ⭏ભѪ؍䲙ḷⲴѻ؍䲙ਸ਼ᰐ᭸DŽሩ
䈕ਸ਼Ⲵԫօᱮ㪇ਈᴤˈवᤜਇ⳺Ӫѻਈᴤǃ؍䲙䠁仍ѻਈᴤԕ৺ਸ਼ᵏ䰤Ⲵਈᴤˈ㤕
ᰐ↔਼ࡉᰐ᭸DŽ↔㿴ࡉҏ䘲⭘Ҿ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵ䖜䇙ᡆቡ؍䲙䠁ᵳ࡙䇮ᇊⲴ䍏ᣵDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙䠁ਇ⳺Ӫ
؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳᤷᇊаսᡆཊս؍䲙䠁ਇ⳺Ӫˈᒦᴹᵳਈᴤᡆ䬰ަᤷᇊˈնᐢ㓿
ᇓ⽪ަᤷᇊнਟ䬰Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ↔ᤷᇊˈ䲔䶎ᱟ൘䚇ౡѝࠪˈᓄ䈕ԕҖ䶒䘋㹼ф
ᗵ享䘱䗮㔉؍䲙ӪDŽ
ࡽⅮᤷᇊᵳԕ৺ਈᴤᡆ䬰ᤷᇊⲴᵳ࡙൘؍অᤱᴹӪⲴ↫ӑᰦ䰤ᡆ؍䲙һ᭵Ⲵਁ⭏
ᰦ䰤ѻ䖳ᰙᰦ䰤㓸→DŽ
൘лࡇᛵᖒˈ؍অᤱᴹӪᡆަ㔗Ӫᓄ䈕㻛㿶Ѫ؍䲙䠁ਇ⳺Ӫ˖
D ؍অᤱᴹӪᒦᵚᤷᇊਇ⳺Ӫ˗ᡆ
E ቡਇ⳺Ӫѻᤷᇊᐢ㓿㻛䬰ˈфᰐަԆਇ⳺Ӫ㻛ᤷᇊ˗ᡆ
F ਇ⳺Ӫ൘؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ࡽᐢ㓿↫ӑˈфᰐަԆਇ⳺Ӫ㻛ᤷᇊDŽ
ྲ᷌؍অᤱᴹӪᤷᇊҶєսᡆєսԕкਇ⳺ӪˈфቡަѝḀսਇ⳺ӪⲴᤷᇊᐢ㓿㻛
䬰ᡆḀսਇ⳺Ӫ൘؍䲙һ᭵ਁ⭏ࡽ↫ӑˈࡉަᵜᶕਟԕ㧧ᗇⲴ؍䲙䠁ᓄ䈕᤹➗∄
ֻ࠶䝽㔉ަԆਇ⳺Ӫˈն؍অᤱᴹӪṩᦞㅜ Ⅾਖ㹼㓖ᇊⲴ䲔ཆDŽ
ԕӗ⌅ѝޣҾডᇣ٪ᵳӪ࡙⳺Ⲵ⌅ᖻ㹼Ѫѻᰐ᭸ǃ䬰ᡆнਟᢗ㹼ѻ㿴ᇊѪ䲀ˈ
ਚ㾱؍䲙䠁ቊᵚ㻛᭟Ԉ㔉؍অᤱᴹӪˈࡉ؍অᤱᴹӪⲴӗ䍒ӗнᓄӛᴹ؍⎹ޣ䲙
䠁ǃ؍অⲴ䖜ॆԧ٬ᡆ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵᵳ࡙DŽ
؍䲙Ӫੁࡽᦞ䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊᤷᇊⲴӪ᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁ѻਾˈަ᭟Ԉѹ࣑ׯᗇԕ䀓䲔ˈ
նަ᰾⸕ਇ亶Ӫᰐᵳ㧧ᗇ؍䲙䠁ᰦ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜᶑ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵਇ⳺Ӫ
؍অᤱᴹӪᦞㅜᶑᤷᇊਇ⳺ӪⲴˈަӽ❦ਟԕᤷᇊ؍অ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵਇ⳺Ӫˈ
ᒦᴹᵳਈᴤᡆ䬰↔ᤷᇊDŽ↔ᤷᇊǃਈᴤᡆ䬰ᓄ䈕ԕҖ䶒Ѫѻˈަᓄ䈕䘱䗮
㔉؍䲙ӪDŽ
൘лࡇᛵᖒˈ؍অᤱᴹӪ㻛㿶Ѫ؍অ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵਇ⳺Ӫ˖
D ⋑ᴹ⧠䠁ԧ٬ਇ⳺Ӫ˗ᡆ
E ⧠䠁ԧ٬ਇ⳺Ӫѻᤷᇊᐢ㓿㻛䬰фᒦᵚᤷᇊަԆਇ⳺Ӫ˗ᡆ
F ᤷᇊⲴ⧠䠁ԧ٬ਇ⳺Ӫᐢ㓿↫ӑфᒦᵚᤷᇊަԆਇ⳺ӪDŽ
ㅜᶑㅜ ǃ ǃ Ⅾᓄ㓿ᗵ㾱Ⲵ䶎ᇎ䍘ਈॆ㘼߶⭘DŽ
ㅜᶑ؍অѻ䖜䇙ᡆ䇮ᇊ䍏ᣵ
ྲ᷌ਇ⳺Ӫᐢ㓿㻛ᤷᇊфнਟ㻛䬰ˈࡉ؍䲙ਸ਼ᡆ؍䲙䠁ᵳ࡙ѻ䖜䇙ᡆ䇮ᇊ䍏ᣵ
享㓿ਇ⳺ӪҖ䶒਼ᯩѪᴹ᭸DŽ
ਇ⳺Ӫሩ؍䲙䠁ᵳ࡙Ⲵ䖜䇙ᡆ䇮ᇊ䍏ᣵ享㓿؍অᤱᴹӪ਼ᯩѪᴹ᭸DŽ
386
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜᶑ᭮ᔳ䚇ӗ
ྲ᷌ਇ⳺Ӫᱟᐢ᭵仾䲙ӪⲴ㔗Ӫфަᐢ㓿᭮ᔳҶ䚇ӗˈࡉ᭮ᔳ䚇ӗ䘉аঅ⤜һᇎᒦн
ᖡ૽ަ؍ᦞ䲙ਸ਼ާᴹⲴൠսDŽ
ㅜҼ㢲ࡍ䱦⇥оਸ਼Ⲵᵏ䰤
ㅜᶑᣅ؍ӪⲴݸਸ਼ؑѹ࣑
ᣅ؍Ӫᦞㅜᶑㅜ ⅮᨀؑⲴᓄ䈕वᤜ仾䲙Ӫ䗷৫⸕䚃ᡆ䗷৫ᵜᶕᓄ䈕⸕
䚃ⲴᛵᖒDŽ
ഐ䘍৽ㅜᶑǃㅜᶑ઼ㅜᶑǃնнवᤜㅜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴݸਸ਼ؑѹ
࣑㘼ਁ⭏Ⲵࡦ㻱൘ਸ਼䇒・ቺ┑ӄᒤѻਾᓄ䈕н䘲⭘DŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ӪⲴݸਸ਼ѹ࣑
؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕⸕ᣅ؍Ӫަᱟᴹᵳ৲о᭦⳺࠶䝽DŽᣅ؍Ӫ享൘оᣅ؍অⲴ࠶Ⲵ᮷
Җѝ᰾⽪䱸䘠䇔ަᐢ㓿᭦ਇ↔ؑDŽ
؍䲙ӪᦞㅜᶑᨀⲴ᮷Җᓄ䈕वਜ਼ྲлؑ˖
D ާփᨀ৺ޣҾ؍䲙ӪⲴگԈ㜭઼࣋䍒࣑⣦ߥⲴᒤᓖᣕѻᕪࡦࠪ⡸˗
E ؍䲙ӪⲴਸ਼䈪
L ቡ⇿а᭦⳺઼ᵏᵳⲴ䀓䟺˗
LL ⇿аѫ㾱᭦⳺઼䱴ᑖ᭦⳺ሩᓄⲴ؍䲙䍩ѻ∄ֻ˗
LLL 㓒࡙Ⲵ䇑㇇о࠶䝽ᯩᔿˈवᤜᤷ᰾ਟ䘲⭘Ⲵⴁ㇑⌅ᖻ˗
LY ሩ⧠䠁ԧ٬઼䖜ᦒԧ٬Ⲵ䈤᰾ԕ৺↔ԧ٬ѻ᭟ԈⲴ⺞؍〻ᓖ˗
Y ቡঅս䘎᧕ර؍অˈ享ሩо᭦⳺䘎᧕ⲴঅսҸԕ䀓䟺ˈᒦ䈤᰾ަሩᓄ䍴
ӗѻᙗ˗
YL 䘲⭘Ҿ؍অⲴ〾࣑ㆩࡂѻа㡜ؑ˗
䲔↔ѻཆˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ᨀާփؑˈԕׯᣅ؍Ӫ㜭ᚠᖃ⨶䀓ਸ਼亩лަᣵⲴ仾
䲙DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫԕᮠᆇ䈤᰾䎵䗷ਸ਼؍䇱Ⲵ䠁仍Ⲵਟ㜭Ⲵ᭦⳺ˈࡉަᓄ䈕Ѫᣅ؍Ӫᨀ
ањ䇑㇇⁑රˈф↔⁑ර享䈤᰾؍অࡠᵏᰦਟ㜭ާᴹⲴ᭦⳺˗↔᭦⳺ԕ؍䍩䇑㇇
Ⲵ㋮㇇ࡉѪสˈާᴹйн਼Ⲵ࡙⦷DŽն↔㿴ࡉн䘲⭘Ҿ؍䲙ӪቡަⲴ؍仾
䲙ѻ䍓ԫн⺞ᇊⲴ؍䲙ਸ਼ˈҏн䘲⭘Ҿঅս䘎᧕ර؍অDŽ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ԕᾊǃਟ
⨶䀓Ⲵᯩᔿੁᣅ؍Ӫ䈤᰾ަ䇑㇇⁑රӵӵԓ㺘аสҾٷᇊⲴ⁑රǃфਸ਼ᵜ䓛н
؍䇱ਟ㜭Ⲵ᭟Ԉ仍DŽ
ㅜᶑߧ䶉ᵏ
ቡӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ˈㅜᶑㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴߧ䶉ᵏѪањᴸˈ㠚ᣅ؍Ӫ᭦ࡠᡆ؍䲙
ӪӔԈㅜᶑ઼ㅜᶑᡰᤷⲴ᮷ҖਾǃӾҼ㘵ѝ䶐ਾⲴᰦ䰤ᔰ䎧㇇DŽ
؍䲙Ӫᦞㅜᶑㅜ Ⅾ㘼䬰ਸ਼ѻᵳ࡙൘ਸ਼䇒・аᒤѻਾ⎸⚝DŽ
ㅜᶑ؍অᤱᴹӪ㓸→ਸ਼Ⲵᵳ࡙
؍অᤱᴹӪᓄ䈕ᴹᵳ㓸→нާᴹ䖜ᦒԧ٬ᡆ⧠䠁ԧ٬ⲴӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ˈն↔㓸→
нᗇ൘؍䲙ਸ਼䇒・ਾн䏣аᒤᰦ⭏᭸DŽྲ᷌ᐢ㓿᭟ԈҶঅㅄ؍䍩ˈࡉਸ਼ᵏ䰤ቺ
┑ࡽⲴਸ਼㓸→ᵳਟ㻛ᧂ䲔DŽਸ਼Ⲵ㓸→ᓄ䈕ԕҖ䶒䘋㹼ˈф൘؍অᤱᴹӪ᭦ࡠ؍
䲙ӪⲴ㓸→䙊⸕єઘѻਾ⭏᭸DŽ
387
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ྲ᷌Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ᐢ㓿ާᴹ䖜ᦒԧ٬ᡆ⧠䠁ԧ٬ˈࡉᓄ䘲⭘ㅜᶑࡠㅜ
ᶑDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙Ӫਸ਼㓸→ᵳ
؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ӵ൘ᵜㄐ㿴ᇊⲴ㤳തᯩᴹᵳ㓸→Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼DŽ
ㅜй㢲ਸ਼ᵏ䰤Ⲵਈॆ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ӪⲴਾਸ਼ѹ࣑
➗㿴ᇊᡆ㓖ᇊˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄᖃ⇿ᒤੁ؍অᤱᴹӪᨀҖ䶒䍴ᯉ䈤᰾؍অ䱴ᴹⲴ᭦⳺
Ⲵ⧠ᰦԧ٬DŽ
؍䲙Ӫ䲔Ҷ享䚥ᗚㅜᶑⲴ㿴ᇊѻཆˈ䘈ᓄ䈕৺ᰦੁ؍অᤱᴹӪ⸕лࡇһ亩˖
D ؍অⲴа㡜ᶑԦ઼⢩↺ᶑԦ
E ൘؍অᶑԦਈᴤᡆᵜljࡉNJ؞䇒ѻᛵᖒˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕৺ᰦੁ؍অᤱᴹӪ⸕ㅜ
ᶑI亩઼J亩ԕ৺ㅜᶑㅜ ⅮE亩ㅜа㠣ӄ⛩ࡇѮⲴؑDŽ
ྲ᷌ޣҾਟ㜭Ⲵ᭦⳺ѻՠ㇇ᮠ仍൘ਸ਼ᵏ䰤㻛䲿ᰦᨀࡉˈㅜᶑㅜഋⅮҏ
ᓄ䘲⭘DŽྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ൘ਸ਼䇒・ࡽᡆ䇒・ਾᨀҶޣҾ᭦⳺৲оѻ▌൘Ⲵሶᶕਁኅ
ᮠ仍ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ቡࡍᮠᦞоᇎ䱵ᮠ仍ѻ䰤Ⲵᐞᔲ⸕؍অᤱᴹӪDŽ
ㅜᶑ仾䲙࣐䟽
൘Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ѝˈྲ᷌ਸ਼ᶑⅮሶᒤ喴ᡆڕᓧѻᚦॆᤷᇊѪㅜᶑѹкⲴ仾䲙໎
࣐ˈࡉ↔ᶑⅮ㻛㿶Ѫㅜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴнޜᒣᶑⅮDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䍩оᓄԈ᭦⳺ѻ䈳ᮤ
ྲ᷌Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵ؍仾䲙ᗵ❦Ѫ؍䲙Ӫᡰᣵˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫӵӵᴹᵳᦞᵜᶑㅜ
Ⅾ઼ㅜ Ⅾ䈳ᮤ؍䍩ᡆ᭦⳺DŽ
ྲ᷌Ѫ䇑㇇؍䍩ѻสⲴӪփ⭏⢙ᤷḷѻ仾䲙ਁ⭏Ҷнਟ亴㿱Ⲵǃ≨ѵᙗⲴਈ
ॆˈф؍䍩ѻ໎࣐Ѫ⺞؍؍䲙Ӫᤱ㔝᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁Ⲵ㜭࣋ᡰᗵ㾱ˈ㘼ф؍䍩ѻ໎࣐Ѫ
⤜・ⲴਇᢈӪᡆⴁ㇑ᵪᶴᡰ਼ˈࡉਟԕ໎࣐؍䍩DŽ؍অᤱᴹӪᓄ䈕ᴹᵳԕ؍䲙䠁
ѻᢓ߿ᣥ⎸؍䍩ѻ໎࣐DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䍩ᐢ㓿ޘ䜘㕤ˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ᴹᵳᦞк䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊⲴᶑԦ䱽վ؍䲙䠁DŽ
൘л䘠ᛵᖒнᗇᦞк䘠ㅜ Ⅾᡆㅜ Ⅾ䈳ᮤ؍䍩ᡆ؍䲙䠁˖
D ؍䍩઼ᡆ؍䲙䠁ѻ䇑㇇ᆈ൘䇑㇇䭉䈟ˈфањ㜌ԫऔࣹⲴ㋮㇇ᐸᵜᓄ䈕䇶ࡠ
䈕䭉䈟˗
E 䇑㇇ᒦн䘲⭘Ҿޘ䜘ਸ਼ वᤜ൘䈳ᮤਾ䇒・Ⲵਸ਼ DŽ
؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ቡ໎࣐؍䍩ᡆ䱽վ؍䲙䠁ੁ؍অᤱᴹӪҖ䶒䈤᰾ˈᒦ䈤᰾↔ㅹ໎࣐ᡆ
䱽վѻഐˈ䘈㾱⸕؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ㾱≲䱽վ؍䲙䠁DŽ؍䍩ѻ໎࣐ᡆ؍䲙䠁ѻ䱽
վ൘؍䲙Ӫ䘋㹼ࡽ䘠䙊⸕йњᴸਾਁ⭏᭸࣋DŽ
ྲ᷌Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵ؍仾䲙ᗵ❦Ѫ؍䲙ӪᡰᣵˈфѪ䇑㇇؍䍩ѻสⲴӪ
փ⭏⢙ᤷḷѻ仾䲙ਁ⭏Ҷнਟ亴㿱Ⲵǃ≨ѵᙗⲴਈॆˈӾ㘼֯ᗇᶕⲴ؍䍩䠁仍ሩ
Ҿ⺞؍ᤱ㔝᭟Ԉ؍䲙䠁Ⲵ㜭࣋нާᴹ䘲ᖃᙗ઼ᗵ㾱ᙗˈࡉ؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ䱽վ؍
䍩DŽն↔䱽վᗵ享Ѫ⤜・ⲴਇᢈӪᡆⴁ㇑ᵪᶴᡰ਼DŽ
ᵜᶑ㿴ᇊⲴᵳ࡙ਟԕ൘ਸ਼䇒・ቺ┑ӄᒤѻਾ㹼֯DŽ
388
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜᶑਸ਼ᶑⅮоᶑԦѻਈᴤ
ྲ᷌ਸ਼ᶑⅮݱ䇨؍䲙ӪਈᴤޣҾ؍䍩઼ᓄԈ؍䲙䠁ѻཆⲴަԆᶑⅮᡆᶑԦˈࡉ䈕
ᶑⅮᰐ᭸ˈն൘лࡇᛵᖒ䲔ཆ˖
D ↔ਈᴤᱟѪҶ䚥ᗚवᤜⴁ㇑ᵪᶴ䟷ਆⲴᤈᶏ᧚ᯭ൘Ⲵⴁ㇑⌅ѻ؞䇒˗ᡆ
E ↔ਈᴤᱟѪҶ䚥ᗚޣҾ䳷ѫޫ㘱䠁䇑ࡂⲴਟ䘲⭘Ⲵഭ⌅Ⲵᕪࡦ㿴ᇊѻ؞䇒˗ᡆ
F ↔ਈᴤᱟѪҶ䚥ᗚഭ⌅ѪҶㅖਸ⢩↺Ⲵ〾࣑༴⨶ᡆ᭯ᓌ㺕䍤㘼ᕪࡦ䈮࣐ⲴޣҾ
Ӫሯ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵާփ㿴ᇊ˗ᡆ
G ↔ਈᴤṩᦞㅜᶑㅜ ⅮㅜҼਕ㘼ᴯԓਸ਼ѝⲴᶑⅮDŽ
ਈᴤ൘؍অᤱᴹӪ᭦ࡠޣҾ↔ਈᴤ৺ަഐⲴҖ䶒䙊⸕ਾㅜйњᴸᔰᰦਁ⭏᭸
࣋DŽ
ᵜ
ᶑㅜ Ⅾѻ䘲⭘ᰐ⺽ҾޣҾਈᴤᶑⅮѻ᭸࣋ⲴަԆ㾱≲DŽ
ㅜഋ㢲оഭ⌅ѻޣ㌫
ㅜᶑޫ㘱䠁䇑ࡂ
оޫ㘱䠁䇑ࡂޣ㚄ⲴӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ᓄਇਟ䘲⭘ⲴޣҾޫ㘱䠁䇑ࡂⲴഭ⌅ѻᕪࡦ㿴ᇊ
ⲴᤈᶏDŽᵜljࡉNJӵ൘о↔㊫ᕪࡦ㿴ᇊᇩⲴᛵߥл䘲⭘DŽ
ㅜᶑ〾࣑༴⨶о᭯ᓌ㺕䍤
ᵜljࡉNJнᖡ૽ഭ⌅ѪҶㅖਸ⢩↺Ⲵ〾࣑༴⨶ᡆ᭯ᓌ㺕䍤㘼ᕪࡦ䈮࣐Ⲵާփ㿴ᇊDŽ
ྲ᷌ਟ䘲⭘Ⲵഭ⌅ѻ↔㊫ާփᕪࡦ㿴ᇊоᵜljࡉNJна㠤ˈࡉਟሩᵜljࡉNJҸԕ
ਈ䙊߶⭘DŽ
ㅜӄ㢲؍䲙һ᭵
ㅜᶑ؍䲙ӪⲴ䈳ḕоؑѹ࣑
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫᴹ⨶⭡ؑ؍䲙һ᭵ਟ㜭ᐢ㓿ਁ⭏ˈࡉަᓄ䈕䟷ਆਸ⨶᧚ᯭሩ↔Ҹԕ⺞
䇔DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ⸕䚃؍䲙һ᭵ᐢ㓿ਁ⭏ˈࡉަᓄ䈕ቭᴰབྷࣚ࣋ḕራਇ⳺ӪⲴ䓛ԭ઼ൠ
൰ˈᒦᓄ䙊⸕䈕ਇ⳺ӪDŽ↔䙊⸕ᓄ䈕൘؍䲙Ӫ⸕䚃ਇ⳺ӪⲴ䓛ԭ઼ൠ൰ਾйॱᰕ
䘋㹼DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙Ӫ䘍৽к䘠ㅜ Ⅾᡆㅜ Ⅾˈࡉਇ⳺Ӫ䈧≲ᵳⲴ䇹䇬ᰦ᭸ѝ→ࡠަ㧧ᗇ
ޣҾަᇎ䱵ᵳ࡙ⲴؑᰦѪ→DŽ
ㅜᶑ㠚ᵰ
ྲ᷌仾䲙Ӫ൘؍䲙ਸ਼䇒・ਾаᒤ㠚ᵰˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫ㔉Ԉ؍䲙䠁ѻѹ࣑㻛䀓䲔DŽ൘
↔ᛵᖒлˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕ᦞㅜᶑ᭟Ԉ⧠䠁ԧ٬઼ަԆԫօ᭦⳺DŽ
к䘠ㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊ൘лࡇᛵᖒн䘲⭘˖
D 仾䲙Ӫ൘ᇎᯭ㠚ᵰ㹼Ѫᰦަᘇ⣦ᘱ㠤֯ަ⋑ᴹ㜭࣋㠚⭡ߣᇊަമ˗
E ਟԕ∛ᰐԫօਸ⨶ᘰ⯁ൠ䇱᰾仾䲙Ӫ൘䇒・ਸ਼ᰦᒦᰐ㠚ᵰമDŽ
ㅜᶑ᭵ᵰᇣ仾䲙Ӫ
ྲ᷌ਇ⳺Ӫ᭵ᵰᇣ仾䲙Ӫˈࡉሩ䈕ਇ⳺Ӫѻᤷᇊ㿶Ѫ㻛䬰DŽ
ྲ᷌؍䲙䠁䈧≲ᵳⲴਇ䇙Ӫ᭵ᵰᇣ仾䲙Ӫˈࡉ䈕䖜䇙нާᴹ᭸࣋DŽ
389
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
؍অᤱᴹӪоਇ⳺Ӫ਼аᰦˈྲ᷌ަ᭵ᵰᇣ仾䲙Ӫˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫнᗵ㔉Ԉ؍䲙䠁DŽ
ྲ᷌ਇ⳺Ӫᡆ؍অᤱᴹӪሩ仾䲙Ӫѻᵰᇣާᴹ↓ᖃᙗˈ∄ྲ↓ᖃ䱢ছˈࡉᵜᶑн䘲
⭘DŽ
ㅜޝ㢲䖜ᦒоਈ⧠
ㅜᶑਸ਼Ⲵ䖜ᦒ
ㅜᶑн䘲⭘Ҿᐢ㓿ާᴹ䖜ᦒԧ٬ᡆ⧠䠁ԧ٬ⲴӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼DŽ↔ਸ਼ᓄ䈕㻛
䖜ᦒѪ؍䍩ᐢ㓿ޘ䜘㕤Ⲵ؍অ SDLGXSSROLF\ ˈն؍অᤱᴹӪ൘᭦ࡠྲлㅜ
Ⅾᨀ৺Ⲵؑਾഋઘ㾱≲᭟Ԉ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
൘ㅜᶑE亩ᡆㅜᶑㅜ ⅮE亩ᡰᤷⲴᵏ䰤ቺ┑ਾഋઘˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕⸕
؍অᤱᴹӪަਸ਼Ⲵ䖜ᦒԧ٬઼⧠䠁ԧ٬ˈᒦ㾱≲؍অᤱᴹӪ൘䖜ᦒԧ٬઼⧠䠁ԧ
٬ⴤ᧕ᤙа䈧≲㔉ԈDŽ
㔉Ԉ䖜ᦒԧ٬ᡆ᭟Ԉ⧠䠁ԧ٬ѻ䈧≲ᓄ䈕ԕҖ䶒ѪѻDŽ
ㅜᶑਸ਼Ⲵਈ⧠
൘؍䲙ਸ਼䇒・ቺ┑аᒤѻਾˈ؍অᤱᴹӪਟԕ൘ԫօᰦىԕҖ䶒㾱≲؍䲙Ӫޘ䜘
ᡆ䜘࠶᭟Ԉ؍䲙অᐢ㓿ާᴹⲴ⧠䠁ԧ٬DŽਸ਼ᓄᓄ㻛䈳ᮤᡆ㻛㓸→DŽ
ਇㅜᶑѻᤈᶏˈྲ᷌ާᴹ⧠䠁ԧ٬ⲴӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ᐢ㓿㻛㓸→ǃ㻛䀓䲔ᡆ㻛؍
䲙Ӫ䬰ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫᴹѹ࣑᭟Ԉ⧠䠁ԧ٬ˈণ֯൘ㅜᶑѻᛵᖒҏྲ↔DŽ
؍অᤱᴹӪ䈧≲㧧ᗇޣҾ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵ⧠ᰦᮠ仍৺ަ⺞؍᭟ԈⲴ〻ᓖⲴؑˈ؍䲙Ӫ
ᓄ䈕ণ⸕DŽণ֯؍অᤱᴹӪᵚ䈧≲↔ؑˈ؍䲙Ӫҏᓄ䈕⇿ᒤቡ↔⸕؍অ
ᤱᴹӪDŽ
؍অᤱᴹӪᴹᵳ㧧ᗇⲴԫօ᭦⳺ѻԭ仍ᓄ䈕൘⧠䠁ԧ٬ѻཆਖ㹼᭟Ԉˈն൘䇑㇇⧠
䠁ԧ٬ᰦᐢ㓿䇑ྲ↔ㅹԭ仍Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
ቡᦞᵜᶑⲴᓄԈ䠁仍ˈ؍䲙Ӫᓄ䈕൘ަ᭦ࡠ؍অᤱᴹӪⲴ䈧≲ਾєњᴸҸԕ᭟
ԈDŽ
ㅜᶑ䖜ᦒԧ٬઼⧠䠁ԧ٬
؍䲙ਸ਼ᓄ䈕䈤᰾ྲօṩᦞ؍䲙ӪᡰⲴ⅗ⴏᡀઈഭⲴ⌅ᖻ䇑㇇䖜ᦒԧ٬઼ᡆ⧠䠁
ԧ٬DŽަ䈤᰾Ⲵ䇑㇇ᯩᔿᓄ䈕䚥ᗚᰒᇊޜ䇔Ⲵ㋮㇇ࡉ઼ᵜᶑㅜ ⅮDŽ
؍䲙Ӫ൘ᢓ䲔䇒・ਸ਼Ⲵᡀᵜᰦˈᓄ䈕ㅹ仍䘋㹼ˈфᢓ߿ᵏнᗇ䎵䗷ӄᒤDŽ
؍䲙ӪᴹᵳѪҶ⏥ⴆ⧠䠁ԧ٬Ⲵ᭟Ԉᡀᵜ㘼ᢓ䲔䘲ᖃⲴǃᦞᰒᇊޜ䇔Ⲵ㋮㇇ࡉ
䇑㇇ࠪᶕⲴ䠁仍ˈն↔䠁仍ᐢ㓿㓣ޕ䇑㇇Ⲵ䲔ཆDŽ
ㅜޝ㕆ഒփ؍䲙
ㅜॱޛㄐഒփ؍䲙⢩↺㿴ᇊ
ㅜа㢲ഒփ؍䲙ѻ䙊⭘ᶑⅮ
ㅜᶑ䘲⭘
൘ഒփ؍䲙ˈྲ᷌ഒփ㓴㓷㘵о؍䲙Ӫᐢ㓿ᦞㅜᶑ䗮ᡀॿ䇞ˈࡉަഒփ؍䲙ਸ਼
ਇᵜljࡉNJѻᤈᶏDŽഒփ؍䲙㾱Ѹᱟ䱴රˈӾ㘼䘲⭘ᵜㄐㅜҼ㢲ˈ㾱Ѹᱟ䘹ᤙර㘼
䘲⭘ᵜㄐㅜй㢲DŽ
390
Chinese: ⅗⍢؍䲙ਸ਼⌅ࡉ
ㅜᶑഒփ㓴㓷㘵Ⲵа㡜⌘ѹ࣑
൘ഒփ؍䲙Ⲵ୶⍭оን㹼䗷〻ѝˈഒփ㓴㓷㘵ᓄ䈕ቭ㙼ழൠ㘳㲁ഒփᡀઈⲴਸ⨶
࡙⳺DŽ
ഒփ㓴㓷㘵ᓄ䈕ሶ؍䲙ӪㆮਁⲴԫօޣ䙊⸕䖜ਁ㔉ഒփᡀઈˈᒦੁަ⸕ሩҾਸ
਼Ⲵԫօ؞䇒DŽ
ㅜҼ㢲䱴රഒփ؍䲙
ㅜᶑᵜljࡉNJѻ䘲⭘
൘ᗵ㾱ᰦˈਟሩᵜljࡉNJ䶎ᇎ䍘ਈ䙊㘼䘲⭘Ҿ䱴රഒփ؍䲙DŽ
ㅜᶑؑѹ࣑
ഒփᡀઈ൘࣐ޕഒփᰦˈഒփ㓴㓷㘵ᓄ䈕৺ᰦੁަ⸕ྲлһ亩˖
D ؍䲙ਸ਼Ⲵᆈ൘˗
E ؍㤳ത˗
F 亴䱢᧚ᯭ઼㔤ᤱަⲴ؍Ԇ㾱≲˗ԕ৺
G ㍒䎄〻ᒿDŽ
䇱᰾ഒփᡀઈᐢ㓿᭦ᚹㅜ Ⅾ㿴ᇊؑѻѮ䇱䍓ԫ⭡ഒփ㓴㓷㘵ᣵDŽ
ㅜᶑ؍䲙Ӫ㓸→ਸ਼
สҾㅜᶑѻⴞⲴˈྲ᷌؍䲙ӪⲴਸ਼㓸→ᵳ䲀Ҿሶᐢ㓿䚝䙷؍䲙һ᭵Ⲵഒփᡀ
ઈᧂ䲔൘؍㤳തѻཆˈࡉ↔ᵳ࡙ѻ㹼֯㻛㿶Ѫਸ⨶DŽ
สҾㅜᶑѻⴞⲴˈ؍䲙Ӫ㹼֯ਸ਼㓸→ᵳѻ᭸᷌ӵӵᱟሶᵚ䟷ਆ亴䱢᧚ᯭⲴഒ
փᡀઈᡆ仾䲙࣐䟽Ⲵഒփᡀઈᧂ䲔൘؍㤳തѻཆDŽ
สҾㅜᶑѻⴞⲴˈ؍䲙ਸ਼㓸→Ⲵ᭸᷌ӵӵᱟ֯ሶᡰ؍䍒ӗѻᡰᴹᵳ䖜〫㔉
ԆӪⲴഒփᡀઈ㻛ᧂ䲔൘؍㤳തѻཆDŽ
ㅜᶑഒփӪሯ؍䲙ѝⲴ㔝؍ᵳ
ྲ᷌䱴රഒփӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼㓸→ˈᡆഒփᡀઈ䘰ࠪ䈕ഒփˈࡉަ؍䲙൘↔йњᴸ
ਾᡆ൘ഒփӪሯ؍䲙ਸ਼ᵏቺ┑ᰦҼ㘵Ⲵ䖳ᰙᰦ䰤㓸→DŽ൘↔ᛵᖒлˈഒփᡀઈᴹ
ᵳо਼а؍䲙ӪԕᯠⲴњփਸ਼㧧ᗇ਼ṧⲴ؍䲙ˈфнᗵ䟽ᯠ䘋㹼仾䲙䇴ՠDŽ
ഒփ㓴㓷㘵ᓄ䈕ቡлࡇһ亩৺ᰦ䙊⸕ഒփᡀઈ˖
D ަᦞഒփ؍䲙ਸ਼ӛᴹⲴ؍䲙ণ㓸→˗
E ަᦞㅜ ⅮӛᴹⲴᵳ࡙˗ԕ৺
F ަਟྲօ㹼֯䘉Ӌᵳ࡙DŽ
ྲ᷌ഒփᡀઈᐢ㓿᰾⽪ަᴹ㹼֯ㅜᶑㅜ ⅮлⲴᵳ࡙ˈࡉ؍䲙Ӫоഒփ
ᡀઈѻ䰤Ⲵਸ਼ᓄ䈕㔗㔝Ѫњփਸ਼㘼ᆈ൘ˈфަ؍䍩ᓄสᖃᰦⲴњփ؍অ㘼䇑
㇇ˈᒦнᗵ㘳㲁䈕ᡀઈᖃᰦⲴڕᓧ⣦ߥᡆᒤ喴DŽ
ㅜй㢲䘹ᤙරഒփ؍䲙
ㅜᶑ䘹ᤙරഒփ؍䲙ѻа㡜㿴ᇊ
䘹ᤙරഒփ؍䲙ᱟᤷ؍䲙Ӫоഒփ㓴㓷㘵ѻ䰤䇒・ⲴṶᷦਸ਼઼؍䲙Ӫоഒփᡀઈ
ѻ䰤൘䈕Ṷᷦл䇒・Ⲵњփਸ਼ѻ㔃ਸDŽ
391
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ഒփ㓴㓷㘵о؍䲙Ӫਟԕа㠤㓖ᇊᵜljࡉNJ䘲⭘Ҿњփ؍䲙ਸ਼DŽնᱟ䲔Ҷㅜ
ᶑ઼ㅜᶑѻཆˈᵜljࡉNJн䘲⭘ҾṶᷦਸ਼DŽ
ㅜᶑᶑⅮоᶑԦѻਈᴤ
Ṷᷦਸ਼ⲴᶑⅮ઼ᶑԦѻਈᴤӵᖡ૽ᦞㅜᶑǃㅜᶑ઼ㅜᶑ㘼䇒・Ⲵ
њփਸ਼DŽ
ㅜᶑ؍ѻᤱ㔝
Ṷᷦਸ਼Ⲵ㓸→ᡆњ࡛ഒփᡀઈ䍴ṬⲴ㝡ሩ؍䲙Ӫо䈕ഒփᡀઈѻ䰤Ⲵ؍䲙ਸ਼нᓄ
ާᴹԫօᖡ૽DŽ
392
Czech version
by Petr Dobiáš
První část: Ustanovení společná všem smlou- Kapitola devátá: Nárok na odškodnění
vám zahrnutým v zásadách evropského Kapitola desátá: Postižní práva
pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
Kapitola jedenáctá: Pojištěné osoby jiné než
Kapitola první: Úvodní ustanovení pojistník
Oddíl první: Použití ZEPSP
Oddíl druhý: Obecná pravidla
Kapitola dvanáctá: Pojištěné riziko
Oddíl třetí: Vymáhání
Část třetí: Ustanovení společná pro obnosové
Kapitola druhá: Počáteční fáze a trvání pojistné pojištění
smlouvy Kapitola třináctá: Přípustnost
Oddíl první: Předsmluvní informační povinnost
zájemce Část čtvrtá: Pojištění odpovědnosti
Oddíl druhý: Předsmluvní povinnosti pojistitele
Oddíl třetí: Uzavření smlouvy
Kapitola čtrnáctá: Všeobecné pojištění
odpovědnosti
Oddíl čtvrtý: Retroaktivní a předběžné krytí
Oddíl pátý: Pojistka Kapitola patnáctá: Přímé nároky a přímé žaloby
Oddíl šestý: Doba trvání pojistné smlouvy Kapitola šestnáctá: Povinné pojištění
Oddíl sedmý: Informační povinnosti pojistitele po
uzavření smlouvy Část pátá: Životní pojištění
Kapitola třetí: Pojišťovací agenti Kapitola sedmnáctá: Zvláštní ustanovení pro
Kapitola čtvrtá: Pojistné riziko životní pojištění
Oddíl první: Preventivní opatření Oddíl první: Třetí strany
Oddíl druhý: Zvýšení rizika Oddíl druhý: Počáteční fáze a trvání smlouvy
Oddíl třetí: Snížení rizika Oddíl třetí: Změny během doby trvání smlouvy
Oddíl čtvrtý: Vztah ke vnitrostátním právním řádům
Kapitola pátá: Pojistné Oddíl pátý: Pojistná událost
Kapitola šestá: Pojistná událost Oddíl šestý: Změna a odkupné
Kapitola sedmá: Promlčení
Část šestá: Skupinové pojištění
Část druhá: Ustanovení společná pro škodové Kapitola osmnáctá: Zvláštní ustanovení pro
pojištění skupinové pojištění
Kapitola osmá: Pojistná částka a pojistná Oddíl první: Skupinové pojištění obecně
hodnota Oddíl druhý: Akcesorické skupinové pojištění
Oddíl třetí: Volitelné skupinové pojištění
393
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
1 Srov. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law Internatio-
nal, The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law,
Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
394
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
395
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
3 Tento článek je vytvořen po vzoru směrnice 2004/113/ES a rozsudku SD EU ve věci C-236/09 Test
Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des ministres [2011] SbSD I-773.
4 Tento článek je vytvořen po vzoru směrnice 2009/22/ES.
396
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
397
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
5 Tento článek je vytvořen po vzoru článků 183 až 189 směrnice 2009/138/ES (Solventnost II).
398
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
(a) pojistitel odškodní pojistníka za veškeré ztráty vzniklé porušením této povinnosti upozornit
jej, pokud pojistitel nejednal bez zavinění, a
(b) pojistník je oprávněn smlouvu ukončit písemnou výpovědí podanou do dvou měsíců poté,
co se o porušení dozví.
399
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(b) podmínky podávající nutný popis poskytnutého krytí nebo dohodnutého pojistného, pokud
jsou tyto podmínky psané jasným a srozumitelným jazykem.
(4) Podmínka se vždy považuje za podmínku, jež nebyla individuálně sjednána, pokud byla vypra-
cována předem a pojistník tudíž nebyl schopen ovlivnit podstatu této podmínky, zejména v sou-
vislosti s předem formulovanou standardní smlouvou. Skutečnost, že určité aspekty podmínky
nebo jedna určitá podmínka byly individuálně sjednány, nevylučuje použití tohoto článku na
zbývající část smlouvy, pokud celkové hodnocení smlouvy ukazuje, že se i přesto jedná o předem
formulovanou standardní smlouvu. Pokud pojistitel tvrdí, že standardní podmínka byla individu-
álně sjednána, nese důkazní břemeno v tomto ohledu pojistitel.
400
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
401
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
402
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
403
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
404
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
405
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
8 Tento článek je vytvořen po vzoru čl. 3 odst. 1 písm. (d) směrnice 2000/35/ES.
406
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
9 Srov. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law Internatio-
nal, The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law,
Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
407
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
408
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
409
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
410
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
411
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Promlčecí doba pro nárok uplatněný poškozeným proti pojištěnému se staví od okamžiku, pokud
je takový okamžik, od kterého si byl pojištěný vědom, že byl uplatněn přímý nárok proti pojistiteli,
až do chvíle, kdy byl přímý nárok uspokojen nebo jednoznačně zamítnut pojistitelem.
412
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
413
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
10 Článek 17:203 odst. 1 je vytvořen podle článku 35 směrnice 2002/83/ES o životním pojištění a článku
6 směrnice 2002/65/ES.
414
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
415
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
416
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
417
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
418
Czech: Zásady evropského pojišťovacího smluvního práva (ZEPSP)
(2) Pro účely článku 4:102 a článku 4:203 odst. 1, výkon práva na výpověď ze strany pojistitele bude
mít účinek pro vyloučení těch členů skupiny z pojistného krytí, kteří nepřijali požadovaná pre-
ventivní opatření nebo jejichž riziko se zvýšilo, podle toho o jaký případ se jedná.
(3) Pro účely článku 12:102 bude mít výpověď pojistné smlouvy účinek v podobě vyloučení z pojist-
ného krytí jen pro ty členy skupiny, kteří převedli svůj titul k pojištěnému majetku.
419
Dutch version
by Han Wansink and Mariëlle van Popering
Deel Een: Algemene bepalingen voor alle Hoofdstuk Negen: Omvang van dekking
overeenkomsten waarop de “Principles of Hoofdstuk Tien: Subrogatie
European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)”
van toepassing zijn Hoofdstuk Elf: Verzekering ten behoeve van
een derde
Hoofdstuk Een: Inleidende bepalingen
Afdeling Een: Toepassing van de PEICL
Hoofdstuk Twaalf: Verzekerd Risico
Afdeling Twee: Algemene bepalingen
Deel Drie: Algemene bepalingen voor de
Afdeling Drie: Handhaving
sommenverzekering
Hoofdstuk Twee: Het sluiten en de duur van de Hoofdstuk Dertien: Toelaatbaarheid
overeenkomst
Afdeling Een: De mededelingsplicht bij het aangaan Deel Vier: De Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering
van de verzekeringsovereenkomst
Afdeling Twee: Precontractuele verplichtingen van
Hoofdstuk Veertien: De Algemene Aansprake-
de verzekeraar
lijkheidsverzekering
Afdeling Drie: Sluiting van de overeenkomst Hoofdstuk Vijftien: Directe aanspraak
Afdeling Vier: Verzekering met terugwerkende kracht Hoofdstuk Zestien: Verplichte verzekering
en voorlopige dekking
Afdeling Vijf: Verzekeringspolis Deel Vijf: Levensverzekering
Afdeling Zes: Duur van de verzekeringsovereenkomst Hoofdstuk Zeventien: Bijzondere bepalingen
Afdeling Zeven: Postcontractuele informatieplicht voor levensverzekering
van de verzekeraar Afdeling Een: Derden
Hoofdstuk Drie: Verzekeringsagenten Afdeling Twee: De eerste fase en de duur van de
Hoofdstuk Vier: Het verzekerde risico overeenkomst
Afdeling Een: Preventieve garanties Afdeling Drie: Veranderingen tijdens de contracts-
Afdeling Twee: Risicoverzwaring duur
Afdeling Drie: Risicovermindering Afdeling Vier: Verhouding tot Nationaal Recht
Afdeling Vijf: Verzekerd voorval
Hoofdstuk Vijf: Verzekeringspremie Afdeling Zes: Conversie en Afkoop
Hoofdstuk Zes: Verzekerd voorval
Hoofdstuk Zeven: Verjaring Deel Zes: Collectieve verzekering
Hoofdstuk Achttien: Bijzondere bepalingen
Deel Twee: Algemene bepalingen voor de voor Collectieve Verzekering
schadeverzekering Afdeling Een: Collectieve Verzekering Algemeen
Hoofdstuk Acht: Verzekerde som en verzekerde Afdeling Twee: Accessoire Collectieve Verzekering
waarde Afdeling drie: Vrijwillige Collectieve Verzekering
420
Dutch: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)
421
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
1 Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
422
Dutch: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)
(7) “Contractsduur” is het tijdsbestek dat aanvangt met het sluiten van de overeenkomst en eindigt
wanneer de overeengekomen duur is verstreken;
(8) “Verzekeringsperiode” is het tijdsbestek waarvoor premie is verschuldigd overeenkomstig de
afspraak tussen partijen;
(9) “Dekkingsperiode” is het tijdsbestek waarvoor dekking bestaat.
(10) “Verplichte verzekering” is een verzekering tot het sluiten waarvan de wet of enige publiekrech-
telijke verordening verplicht.
2 Artikel 1:203 lid 2 is opgesteld naar het model van Artikel 5 van Richtlijn 93/13/EEG.
3 Dit artikel is opgesteld naar het model van Richtlijn 2004/113/EG.
423
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
het overleggen van de resultaten van een dergelijk onderzoek, noch mag hij daaruit verkregen
informatie gebruiken bij de waardering van te verzekeren risico’s.
(2) Het bepaalde in lid 1 is niet van toepassing op persoonsverzekering waarbij de verzekerde op
wiens leven of gezondheid de verzekering wordt afgesloten, de leeftijd van achttien jaar heeft
bereikt en de verzekerde som voor deze verzekerde meer dan 300.000 euro bedraagt, dan wel
het jaarlijks uit te keren bedrag meer dan 30.000 euro bedraagt.
Artikel 2:102 Rechtsgevolgen bij niet-nakoming voor inhoud en bestaan van de overeen-
komst en recht op uitkering
(1) Ingeval de verzekeringnemer artikel 2:101 schendt, is de verzekeraar, behoudens het in de leden
2 tot 5 bepaalde, gerechtigd een redelijke wijziging van de overeenkomst voor te stellen of de
overeenkomst op te zeggen. Te dien einde deelt de verzekeraar zijn voornemen binnen een
maand nadat de schending van artikel 2:101 hem bekend of kenbaar is geworden, schriftelijk
mede, vergezeld van informatie omtrent de juridische gevolgen van zijn beslissing.
(2) Indien de verzekeraar een redelijke wijziging voorstelt, bestaat de overeenkomst op basis van
de voorgestelde wijziging voort, tenzij de verzekeringnemer het voorstel binnen een maand na
424
Dutch: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL)
ontvangst van de in lid 1 bedoelde mededeling afwijst. In dat geval is de verzekeraar gerechtigd
de overeenkomst op te zeggen binnen een maand na ontvangst van de schriftelijke mededeling
inhoudende de afwijzing door de verzekeringnemer.
(3) De verzekeraar is niet gerechtigd de overeenkomst op te zeggen indien de verzekeringnemer
artikel 2:101 buiten zijn schuld schendt, tenzij de verzekeraar bewijst dat hij de overeenkomst
niet zou hebben gesloten wanneer hij de ware stand van zaken had gekend.
(4) De opzegging van de overeenkomst wordt een maand nadat de verzekeringnemer de in lid 1
bedoelde schriftelijke mededeling heeft ontvangen, van kracht. Een wijziging van de overeen-
komst wordt van kracht overeenkomstig hetgeen partijen zijn overeengekomen.
(5) Indien een verzekerd voorval wordt veroorzaakt door een omstandigheid welke het voorwerp
is van een verwijtbare schending van de mededelingsplicht door de verzekeringnemer en in-
treedt voordat de opzegging of een wijziging van kracht wordt, is geen verzekeringsuitkering
verschuldigd indien de verzekeraar de overeenkomst niet zou hebben gesloten wanneer hij de
betreffende omstandigheid had gekend. Indien echter de verzekeraar de overeenkomst tegen
een hogere premie of onder andere voorwaarden zou hebben gesloten, is de verzekeringsuit-
kering verschuldigd naar evenredigheid of in overeenstemming met die andere voorwaarden.
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5 Dit artikel is opgesteld naar het model van de artikelen 183-189 van Richtlijn 2009/138/EG (Solven-
cy II).
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427
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(b) bedingen die een primaire beschrijving geven van de geboden dekking of de bedongen
premie, mits het beding duidelijk en begrijpelijk is geformuleerd.
(4) Een beding wordt steeds geacht niet het voorwerp van afzonderlijke onderhandeling te zijn
geweest wanneer het, met name in het kader van een toetredingsovereenkomst van tevoren is
opgesteld en de verzekeringnemer dientengevolge geen invloed op de inhoud daarvan heeft
kunnen uitoefenen. Het gegeven dat sommige onderdelen van een beding of een afzonderlijk
beding het voorwerp zijn geweest van een afzonderlijke onderhandeling sluit de toepassing van
dit artikel op het overige van een overeenkomst niet uit, indien een globale beoordeling leidt
tot de conclusie dat het niettemin een toetredingsovereenkomst betreft. Indien een verzekeraar
stelt dat een standaardbeding voorwerp van afzonderlijke onderhandeling is geweest, dan rust
de bewijslast daarvan op de verzekeraar.
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429
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(a) de verzekeraar uiterlijk een maand vóór het verstrijken van de verzekeringsduur het tegen-
deel schriftelijk heeft meegedeeld en daarbij de redenen voor zijn beslissing heeft vermeld;
of
(b) de verzekeringnemer uiterlijk op de dag waarop de duur van de overeenkomst verstrijkt of
binnen een maand na ontvangst van de premienota, al naar gelang hetgeen later intreedt,
het tegendeel heeft meegedeeld. In het laatste geval begint de termijn van een maand
slechts te lopen, ingeval deze op de nota duidelijk in vetgedrukte letters was vermeld.
(2) In het kader van het in lid 1 (b) bepaalde wordt de mededeling geacht te zijn gedaan zodra zij is
verzonden.
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(a) alle aangelegenheden die van belang zijn voor de nakoming van de overeenkomst, voorzo-
ver dit redelijkerwijze van de verzekeraar kan worden verwacht;
(b) nieuwe standaardbepalingen die de verzekeraar aanbiedt in verzekeringsovereenkomsten
van hetzelfde type als degene die hij met de verzekeringnemer heeft gesloten.
(2) Zowel het verzoek van de verzekeringnemer als het antwoord van de verzekeraar geschiedt
schriftelijk.
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432
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(b) van een vervolgpremie binnen twee maanden na afloop van de in artikel 5:102 lid 1 (b)
genoemde periode.
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(2) Een vordering uit uitkering wordt geacht te zijn geaccepteerd, tenzij de verzekeraar deze binnen
een maand na ontvangst van de relevante gegevens en andere inlichtingen afwijst of de aan-
vaarding daarvan uitstelt bij schriftelijke mededeling onder vermelding van de redenen voor zijn
besluit.
8 Dit artikel is opgesteld naar het model van artikel 3 lid 1 (d) Richtlijn 2000/35/EG.
435
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9 Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
436
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(2) De verzekeraar tegen wie een vordering is ingesteld, is tot uitkering gehouden tot het beloop
van de verzekerde som onder de polis, alsmede tot vergoeding van de bereddingskosten, on-
verminderd het recht elke andere verzekeraar aan te spreken.
(3) Tussen verzekeraars onderling staan de verplichtingen en rechten als bedoeld in lid 1 in verhou-
ding tot de bedragen waarvoor zij afzonderlijk jegens de verzekerde aansprakelijk zijn.
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persoon werd veroorzaakt met opzet of door roekeloosheid en in de wetenschap dat schade
waarschijnlijk zou intreden.
(4) De verzekeraar oefent de vordering waarin hij is gesubrogeerd, niet ten nadele van de verzekerde
uit.
Artikel 11:101 Aanspraak van derde en herroeping van aanwijzing van derde
(1) Ingeval de verzekering ten behoeve van een ander dan de verzekeringnemer wordt afgesloten,
komt die ander (de verzekerde) de verzekeringsuitkering toe indien het verzekerde voorval in-
treedt.
(2) De verzekeringnemer is gerechtigd de dekking ten behoeve van een derde te herroepen, tenzij
(a) de polis anders bepaalt; of
(b) het verzekerde risico is ingetreden.
(3) De herroeping wordt van kracht zodra zij de verzekeraar schriftelijk is meegedeeld.
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(b) een begunstiging tot de afkoopwaarde is herroepen en geen andere begunstigden zijn aan-
gewezen of
(c) een begunstigde tot de afkoopwaarde is en geen andere begunstigden zijn aangewezen.
(3) Artikel 17:102 paras. 2, en 4 to 6 zijn mutatis mutandis van toepassing.
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(vi) algemene informatiover de belastingregels die op het betrokken polismodel van toe-
passing zijn.
(3) Ten slotte wordt specifieke informative verschaft met het oog op het verkrijgen van een helder
beeld van de risico’s die de verzekeringnemer loopt met het sluiten van de polis.
(4) Indien de verzekeraar het bedrag van mogelijke uitkeringen boven de in de overeenkomst gega-
randeerde betalingen in cijfers aangeeft, verschaft hij de aanvrager een voorbeeldberekening die
weergeeft het mogelijke looptijdvoordeel, gebaseerd op de actuariele beginselen voor premie-
vaststelling met drie verschillende rentepercentages.Dit geldt niet voor verzekeringen, waarbij
niet zeker is dat de verzekeraar tot uitkering is gehouden en voor unit-linked-verzekeringen. De
verzekeraar wijst de verzekeringnemer er helder en begrijpelijk op dat de voorbeeldberekening
slechts gebaseerd is op gefingeerde aannames en dat de overeenkomst mogelijke betalingen
niet garandeert.
Artikel 17:204 Het recht van opzegging van de overeenkomst door de verzekeringnemer
(1) De verzekeringnemer heeft het recht een overeenkomst van levensverzekering op te zeggen
die geen conversie – of afkoopwaarde kent, zij het dat de opzegging niet eerder effectief wordt
dan een jaar na het afsluiten van de overeenkomst. Het recht van tussentijds opzeggen kan
worden uitgesloten in geval een eenmalige premie is betaald. De opzegging dient schriftelijk te
geschieden en wordt effectief twee weken na ontvangst van een opzeggingsbevestiging door
de verzekeraar.
(2) Voor het geval de overeenkomst van levensverzekering wel een conversie – of afkoopwaarde
kent, zijn de artikelen 17:601-17:603 van toepassing.
10 Artikel 17:203 lid 1 is gebaseerd op artikel 35 van de Directive 2002/83/EC on Life Insurance en artikel
6 Directive 2002/65/EC.
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(b) in geval van een wijziging van de polisvoorwaarden of een aanpassing van de PEICL: de infor-
matie, opgenomen in artikel 2:201 sub f en g als ook in artikel 17:202 lid 2 sub b, onderdelen
i tot v.
(3) Artikel 17:202 lid 4 geldt ook indien de cijfers met betrekking tot het geschatte bedrag van moge-
lijke uitkeringen op enig moment tijdens de looptijd van de verzekering worden verschaft. Indien
de verzekeraar cijfers heeft verschaft, hetzij voor, hetzij na het sluiten van de overeenkomst,
met betrekking tot de mogelijke toekomstige ontwikkeling van de winstdeling, informeert de
verzekeraar de verzekeringnemer over elke verandering tussen de actuele ontwikkeling en de
oorspronkelijke gegevens.
445
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446
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447
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(4) Het winstaandeel waarop de verzekeringnemer aanspraak kan maken, wordt in aanvulling op
de afkoopwaarde uitgekeerd, tenzij dat reeds is verdisconteerd in de berekening van de afkoop-
waarde.
(5) De bedragen verschuldigd op basis van dit artikel, wordt niet later dan twee maanden na ont-
vangst het verzoek tot uitbetaling door de verzekeringnemer door de verzekeraar betaald.
448
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Artikel 18:204 Het recht op voortzetting van de dekking op een Collectieve Levensverze-
kering
(1) Zodra een overeenkomst van accessoire collectieve verzekering wordt opgezegd of een lid van
de collectiviteit uittreedt, eindigt de dekking na drie maanden of – indien eerder – met de afloop
van de overeenkomst. In dat geval kan het lid van de collectiviteit aanspraak maken op een ge-
lijkwaardige dekking op een nieuwe individuele overeenkomst met dezelfde verzekeaar zonder
een nieuwe risicobeoordeling.
(2) De organisator van de collectiviteit informeert het lid van de collectiviteit onverwijld over:
(a) de dreigende beeindiging van zijn dekking onder de overeenkomst van collectieve levens-
verzekering,
(b) diens rechten onder lid 1 en
(c) de wijze waarop die rechten uit te oefenen.
(3) Indien het lid van de collectiviteit heeft aangegeven zijn recht als bedoeld in artikel 18:204 lid
1, uit te oefenen, wordt de overeenkomst tussen de verzekeraar en het lid van de collectiviteit
voortgezet op basis van een individuele overeenkomst van verzekering met een premie bere-
kend op basis van een zelfstandige polis zonder rekening te houden met de actuele gezondheid
en leeftijd van het lid van de collectiviteit
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450
French version
by Jérôme Kullmann and Emese Kaufmann-Mohi
Partie une: Règles générales concernant tous Chapitre neuf: Droit aux indemnités
les contrats réglementés par les principes Chapitre dix: Droits découlant de la subroga-
du droit Européen du contrat d’assurance tion
(PDECA)
Chapitre onze: Assurance au bénéfice d’autrui
Chapitre un: Règles préliminaires
Section une: Applicabilité des PDECA
Chapitre douze: Risque assuré
Section deux: Dispositions générales
Partie trois: Règles générales concernant les
Section trois: Exécution
assurances de sommes
Chapitre deux: Phase initiale et durée du Chapitre treize: Admissibilité
contrat d’assurance
Section une: Obligation de déclaration précontrac- Partie quatre: Assurance responsabilité
tuelle du demandeur d’assurance
Section deux: Obligations précontractuelles de
Chapitre quatorze: Assurance responsabilité
l’assureur
générale
Section trois: Conclusion du contrat Chapitre quinze: Demandes d’indemnisation
Section quatre: Couverture rétroactive et couverture directes et actions directes
provisoire Chapitre seize: Assurance obligatoire
Section cinq: Police d’assurance
Section six: Durée du contrat d’assurance Partie cinq: Assurance vie
Section sept: Obligation d’information post-contrac- Chapitre dix-sept: Dispositions spéciales pour
tuelle de l’assureur assurance vie
Chapitre trois: Intermédiaires d’assurance Section une: Parties tiers
Chapitre quatre: Le risqué assuré Section deux: Phase initiale et durée du contrat
Section une: Mesures de précaution Section trois: Modifications pendant la durée du
Section deux: Aggravation du risque contrat
Section trois: Diminution du risque Section quatre: Rapport aux droits nationaux
Section cinq: Evènement assuré
Chapitre cinq: Primes d’assurance Section six: Conversion et rachat
Chapitre six: Sinistre
Chapitre sept: Prescription Partie six: Assurance de groupe
Chapitre dix-huit: Dispositions spéciales pour
Partie deux: Règles générales concernant assurance de groupe
l’assurance contre les dommages Section une: Assurance de groupe en général
Chapitre huit: Somme assurée et valeur assurée Section deux: Assurance de groupe complémentaire
Section trois: Assurance de groupe facultative
451
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
1 Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003). Pour la version française voir: Rouhette/Lamberte-
rie, Principes du droit européen du contrat (Soc. de Législation Comparée, Paris 2003).
452
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453
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454
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455
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(5) Lorsqu’un évènement assuré est causé par un élément du risque que le preneur d’assurance n’a
pas déclaré par négligence ou qu’il déclaré de manière inexacte et que l’évènement se réalise
avant que la résiliation ou la modification ait pris effet, il n’y a pas lieu au paiement de la pres-
tation d’assurance lorsque l’assureur n’aurait pas conclu le contrat s’il avait connu l’information
en cause. Toutefois, lorsque l’assureur aurait conclu le contrat à un prime plus élevé ou à des
conditions différentes, la prestation d’assurance doit être payée proportionnellement ou selon
ces conditions.
4 Cette disposition prend pour modèle les articles 183 à 189 Directive 2009/138/CE (Solvabilité II).
456
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457
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458
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(2) Lorsque, dans le cas d’une couverture rétroactive, le preneur d’assurance sait, au moment de la
conclusion du contrat, que le risque assuré s’est réalisé, sous réserve de l’art. 2:104, l’assureur ne
doit fournir de couverture que pour la période postérieure à la conclusion du contrat.
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460
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(2) Les clauses qui prévoient le droit de résilier le contrat et la mise en œuvre de la résiliation doivent
être raisonnables.
(3) Le droit de résilier le contrat s’éteint lorsque la partie en cause n’a pas donné un avis écrit de la
résiliation à l’autre partie, dans un délai de deux mois à compter du jour où il a eu connaissance
du sinistre.
(4) La couverture d’assurance s’éteint deux semaines après l’avis adressé conformément à l’alinéa 3
de la présente disposition.
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462
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(3) En cas de violation de l’obligation de notification, l’assureur n’est pas en droit de refuser d’indem-
niser un dommage subséquent causé par un évènement couvert par l’assurance, sauf lorsque le
dommage résulte du défaut de notification de l’aggravation du risque.
463
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(b) que, après échéance de la prime due, l’assureur envoie au preneur d’assurance un rappel
du montant exacte de la prime due, accordant un délai de paiement supplémentaire d’au
moins deux semaines et avertissant le preneur d’assurance de la suspension immédiate de
la couverture si le paiement n’est pas fait et
(c) que le délai supplémentaire prévu à l’alinéa (b) expire, sans qu’il y ait eu paiement.
(2) L’assureur est libéré de son engagement dès l’expiration du délai supplémentaire prévu à l’alinéa
1 (b). La couverture reprend son cours, dès que le preneur d’assurance a payé le montant dû, à
moins que le contrat ait été résilié en vertu de l’art. 5:103.
464
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7 Cette disposition prend pour modèle l’art. 3 alinéa 1 (d) de la Directive 2000/35/CE.
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8 Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003). Pour la version française voir: Rouhette/Lamberterie,
Principes du droit européen du contrat (Soc. de Législation Comparée, Paris 2003).
466
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467
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468
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469
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470
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471
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472
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(b) la désignation d’un bénéficiaire de la valeur de rachat a été révoqué et aucun autre bénéfi-
ciaire n’a été désigné ou
(c) le bénéficiaire de la valeur de rachat est décédé et aucun autre bénéficiaire n’a été désigné.
(3) L’article 17:102 alinéas 2 et 4 à 6 s’appliquent mutatis mutandis.
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(3) En outre, des informations spécifiques sont fournies afin de permettre de bien percevoir les
risques sous-jacents au contrat assumés par le preneur d’assurance.
(4) Dans le cas où l’assureur indique des chiffres relatifs au montant de possibles garanties en sus
et au-delà des versements convenus par contrat, l’assureur fournit au preneur un exemple de
calcul dans lequel le possible versement à échéance est exposé, en appliquant la base de calcul
des primes, sur la base de trois taux d’intérêt différents. Ceci ne s’applique pas aux assurances
et aux contrats à terme. L’assureur informe le preneur, de manière claire et compréhensible, que
cet exemple de calcul n’est que l’application d’un modèle fondé sur de pures hypothèses et que
le contrat ne garantit pas les éventuelles prestations.
9 L’article 17:203 alinéa 1 prend pour modèle l’article 35 Directive 2002/83/CE concernant l’assurance
directe sur la vie et l’article 6 Directive 2002/65/CE.
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a indiqué des chiffres, avant ou après la conclusion du contrat, sur la possible évolution future
de la participation aux bénéfices, l’assureur doit informer le preneur de toute différence entre
l’évolution constatée et la donnée initiale.
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(b) se conformer à une modification d’une règle impérative de la loi nationale applicable concer-
nant le régime de retraite des employeurs, ou
(c) se conformer à une modification des règles nationales imposant des exigences spécifiques
aux contrats d’assurance vie pour pouvoir bénéficier d’un traitement fiscal spécial ou de
subsides étatiques, ou
(d) remplacer une clause du contrat conformément à l’article 2:304 alinéa 2 phrase 2.
(2) La modification prend effet au début du troisième mois après que le preneur d’assurance ait été
informé par un avis écrit de la modification ainsi que des raisons de cette dernière.
(3) L’alinéa 1 s’applique sans préjudice d’autres exigences concernant la validité des clauses de mo-
dification.
476
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(b) il est prouvé, hors de toute doute raisonnable, qu’au moment de la conclusion du contrat, la
personne exposée au risque n’avait pas l’intention de se suicider.
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478
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479
German version
by Nina Adelmann†, Leander D. Loacker and Andrea Stäubli
Erster Teil: Allgemeine Vorschriften für alle 9. Kapitel: Anspruch auf Schadensersatz
Verträge, die den Grundregeln des Europäi- 10. Kapitel: Rechte aus dem Forderungsüber-
schen Versicherungsvertragsrechts (GEVVR) gang
unterfallen
11. Kapitel: Vom Versicherungsnehmer
1. Kapitel: Einführungsbestimmungen verschiedene Versicherte
Erster Abschnitt: Anwendbarkeit der GEVVR
Zweiter Abschnitt: Allgemeine Regelungen
12. Kapitel: Versichertes Risiko
Dritter Abschnitt: Durchsetzung
Dritter Teil: Allgemeine Bestimmungen für die
2. Kapitel: Zustandekommen und Laufzeit des Summenversicherung
Versicherungsvertrages 13. Kapitel: Zulässigkeit
Erster Abschnitt: Vorvertragliche Anzeigepflicht des
Antragstellers Vierter Teil: Haftpflichtversicherung
Zweiter Abschnitt: Vorvertragliche Pflichten des
Versicherers
14. Kapitel: Allgemeine Haftpflichtversicherung
Dritter Abschnitt: Vertragsschluss 15. Kapitel: Direktansprüche und Direktklagen
Vierter Abschnitt: Rückwärtsversicherung und 16. Kapitel: Pflichtversicherung
vorläufige Deckung
Fünfter Abschnitt: Versicherungspolice Fünfter Teil: Lebensversicherung
Sechster Abschnitt: Laufzeit des Versicherungsver- 17. Kapitel: Besondere Bestimmungen für die
trages Lebensversicherung
Siebter Abschnitt: Informationspflichten des Erster Abschnitt: Dritte
Versicherers nach Vertragsschluss Zweiter Abschnitt: Zustandekommen und Laufzeit
3. Kapitel: Versicherungsvermittler des Vertrages
4. Kapitel: Versichertes Risiko Dritter Abschnitt: Änderungen während der
Erster Abschnitt: Sicherheitsmaßnahme Vertragslaufzeit
Zweiter Abschnitt: Risikoerhöhung Vierter Abschnitt: Verhältnis zum nationalen Recht
Dritter Abschnitt: Risikoverringerung Fünfter Abschnitt: Versicherungsfall
Sechster Abschnitt: Umwandlung und Rückkauf
5. Kapitel: Versicherungsprämie
6. Kapitel: Versicherungsfall Sechster Teil: Gruppenversicherung
7. Kapitel: Verjährung 18. Kapitel: Besondere Bestimmungen für die
Gruppenversicherung
Zweiter Teil: Allgemeine Vorschriften für die Erster Abschnitt: Gruppenversicherung im
Schadensversicherung Allgemeinen
8. Kapitel: Versicherungssumme und Versiche- Zweiter Abschnitt: Akzessorische Gruppenversiche-
rungswert rung
Dritter Abschnitt: Freiwillige Gruppenversicherung
480
German: Grundregeln des Europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrecht (GEVVR)
1. Kapitel: Einführungsbestimmungen
Erster Abschnitt: Anwendbarkeit der GEVVR
481
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(GEVR)1 und, falls einschlägige Regelungen dort nicht getroffen wurden, in Übereinstimmung
mit den allgemeinen Grundsätzen, die den Rechtsordnungen der Mitgliedsstaaten gemeinsam
sind, zu entscheiden.
1 Vgl. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law Internatio-
nal, The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law,
Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
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(6) „Prämie“ ist jene Zahlung, die der Versicherungsnehmer dem Versicherer als Gegenleistung für
die gewährte Deckung schuldet;
(7) „Vertragslaufzeit“ ist die Zeitspanne vertraglicher Bindung, die mit dem Vertragsschluss beginnt
und mit Ablauf der vereinbarten Laufzeit endet;
(8) „Versicherungsperiode“ ist die Zeitspanne, für die die Prämie laut Vereinbarung der Parteien
geschuldet wird;
(9) „Haftungszeitraum“ ist die Zeitspanne, während der ein Anspruch auf Deckung besteht;
(10) „Pflichtversicherung“ ist eine Versicherung, welche aufgrund einer Versicherungspflicht abge-
schlossen wurde, welche auf Gesetz oder Verordnung beruht.
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(3) Im Falle des Verstoßes gegen Absatz 1 ist der Versicherungsnehmer berechtigt, den Vertrag zu
kündigen. Die Kündigung muss dem Versicherer schriftlich innerhalb von zwei Monaten, nach-
dem der Versicherungsnehmer von dem Verstoß Kenntnis erlangt, zugehen.
484
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485
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
5 Diese Vorschrift ist den Artikeln 183-189 der Richtlinie 2009/138/EG (Solvency II) nachgebildet.
486
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verursacht, das dem Gebot von Treu und Glauben und den Grundsätzen redlichen Verhaltens
widerspricht.
(2) Soweit der Versicherungsvertrag auch ohne die unwirksame Bestimmung fortbestehen kann,
bleibt er im Übrigen wirksam. Anderenfalls kann die unwirksame Klausel durch eine Vertragsbestim-
mung ersetzt werden, die redliche Vertragsparteien in Kenntnis der Missbräuchlichkeit der betroffe-
nen Klausel vereinbart hätten.
(3) Dieser Artikel findet auf Vertragsklauseln, die die Deckung beschränken oder verändern, Anwen-
dung, er ist hingegen weder anwendbar auf
(a) die Angemessenheit des Verhältnisses von Deckungsschutz und Prämie noch auf
(b) Vertragsklauseln, die die grundlegende Beschreibung der gewährten Deckung oder der ver-
einbarten Prämie enthalten, sofern sie klar und verständlich abgefasst sind.
(4) Eine Vertragsklausel ist immer dann als nicht im Einzelnen ausgehandelt anzusehen, wenn sie
im Voraus abgefasst wurde und der Versicherungsnehmer deshalb, insbesondere im Rahmen
eines vorformulierten Standardvertrages, keinen Einfluss auf ihren Inhalt nehmen konnte. Die
Tatsache, dass bestimmte Elemente einer Vertragsklausel oder eine einzelne Klausel im Einzelnen
ausgehandelt worden sind, schließt die Anwendung dieses Artikels auf den übrigen Vertrag nicht
aus, sofern es sich nach der Gesamtwertung dennoch um einen vorformulierten Standardvertrag
handelt. Behauptet ein Versicherer, dass eine Standardvertragsklausel im Einzelnen ausgehan-
delt wurde, so obliegt ihm dafür die Beweislast.
488
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(2) Sofern einer Person vorläufige Deckung gewährt wird, die nicht bei demselben Versicherer einen
Antrag auf Abschluss eines Versicherungsvertrages gestellt hat, so kann der vorläufige Deckungs-
schutz für einen kürzeren als den in Artikel 2:601 Absatz 1 genannten Zeitraum gewährt werden.
Eine solche Deckung kann von jeder Partei unter Einhaltung einer Frist von zwei Wochen gekün-
digt werden.
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490
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3. Kapitel: Versicherungsvermittler
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492
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(2) Sofern die Vertragsbestimmung vorsieht, dass die Anzeige innerhalb eines bestimmten Zeit-
raums zu erfolgen hat, muss dieser Zeitraum angemessen sein. Die Anzeige wird mit ihrer Ab-
sendung wirksam.
(3) Der Versicherer ist wegen der Verletzung der Anzeigepflicht nicht berechtigt, die Zahlung für
nachfolgende Schäden zu verweigern, die durch ein von der Deckung erfasstes Ereignis verur-
sacht wurden, es sei denn, der Schaden war eine Folge der unterbliebenden Anzeige des erhöh-
ten Risikos.
5. Kapitel: Versicherungsprämie
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6. Kapitel: Versicherungsfall
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(2) Eine solche Anzeige hat ohne unangemessene Verzögerung zu erfolgen. Sie wird mit ihrer Ab-
sendung wirksam. Sofern der Vertrag vorsieht, dass die Anzeige innerhalb eines bestimmten
Zeitraums zu erfolgen hat, so muss dieser Zeitraum angemessen und darf jedenfalls nicht kürzer
als fünf Tage sein.
(3) Die Versicherungsleistung verringert sich in dem Umfang, in dem der Versicherer nachweist,
durch unangemessene Verzögerung beeinträchtigt worden zu sein.
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7. Kapitel: Verjährung
9 Vgl. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law Internatio-
nal, The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law,
Part III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
496
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498
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499
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500
German: Grundregeln des Europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrecht (GEVVR)
501
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
den die Rechte des Versicherungsnehmers durch eine Zahlung an das Opfer oder eine Schuldan-
erkennung gegenüber dem Opfer nicht berührt.
(3) Stellt der Versicherungsnehmer dem Versicherer nicht innert einem Monat seit Erhalt der Anzei-
ge gemäß Absatz 2 die Informationen über das versicherte Ereignis zur Verfügung, gilt dies als
Zustimmung des Versicherungsnehmers zur direkten Regulierung des Anspruches durch den
Versicherer. Diese Regelung ist auch auf Versicherte anwendbar, welche eine solche Anzeige
tatsächlich und rechtzeitig erhalten haben.
502
German: Grundregeln des Europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrecht (GEVVR)
nachgewiesen durch Unterschrift eingeholt wird. Jede spätere erhebliche Änderung des Vertrages,
einschließlich einem Wechsel des Begünstigten, einer Erhöhung der Versicherungssumme und einer
Änderung der Vertragsdauer, ist ohne eine solche Zustimmung unwirksam. Das Gleiche gilt für eine
Abtretung oder eine Verpfändung des Versicherungsvertrages oder des Rechts an der Versicherungs-
leistung.
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(c) ein Begünstigter hinsichtlich des Rückkaufswertes verstorben ist und keine anderen Begüns-
tigten bezeichnet wurden.
(3) Artikel 17:102 Absatz 2 sowie Absatz 4-6 gelangen mutatis mutandis zur Anwendung.
504
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10 Artikel 17:203 Absatz 1 ist Artikel 35 der Richtlinie 2002/83/EG und Artikel 6 der Richtlinie 2002/65/EG
nachgebildet.
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(7) Die in diesem Artikel festgelegten Rechte können frühestens fünf Jahre nach Vertragsschluss
ausgeübt werden.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(3) Wenn der Versicherer Absatz 1 oder 2 verletzt, steht die Verjährung des Anspruches des Begüns-
tigten still, bis der Begünstigte von seiner tatsächlichen Berechtigung Kenntnis erlangt.
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(3) Der Versicherer hat den Versicherungsnehmer auf dessen Aufforderung hin, aber in jedem Fall
jährlich, über den aktuellen Betrag des Rückkaufswertes zu informieren sowie über das Ausmaß,
in dem dieser garantiert ist.
(4) Die Überschussbeteilung, die dem Versicherungsnehmer zusteht, ist zusätzlich zum Rückkaufs-
wert zu bezahlen, sofern die Überschussbeteiligung nicht bereits bei der Berechnung des Rück-
kaufswertes berücksichtigt wurde.
(5) Die nach diesem Artikel geschuldeten Geldbeträge sind spätestens zwei Monate nach Zugang
der Aufforderung des Versicherungsnehmers beim Versicherer zu bezahlen.
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510
German: Grundregeln des Europäischen Versicherungsvertragsrecht (GEVVR)
511
Greek version
by Ioannis Rokas, Eirini Sarri and Marilena Sotirchou
Μέρος πρώτο: Διατάξεις Κοινές σε όλες τις Κεφάλαιο ένατο: Καταβολή του ασφαλίσματος
συμβάσεις που περιλαμβάνονται στις Αρχές Κεφάλαιο δέκατο: Δικαίωμα υποκατάστασης
Ευρωπαϊκού Δικαίου της Ασφαλιστικής
Σύμβασης (ΑΕΔΑΣ) Κεφάλαιο ενδέκατο: Ασφαλισμένος που δεν
είναι λήπτης της ασφάλισης
Κεφάλαιο πρώτο: Εισαγωγικές διατάξεις
Τμήμα πρώτο: Εφαρμογή των ΑΕΔΑΣ
Κεφάλαιο δωδέκατο: Ασφαλιστικός Κίνδυνος
Τμήμα δεύτερο: Γενικές διατάξεις
Μέρος τρίτο: Διατάξεις κοινές για όλες τις
Τμήμα τρίτο: Εκτέλεση
ασφαλίσεις ποσού
Κεφάλαιο δεύτερο: Ρυθμίσεις κατά τη Κεφάλαιο δέκατο τρίτο: Παραδεκτό
σύναψη και κατά τη διάρκεια της ασφαλιστικής
σύμβασης Μέρος τέταρτο: Ασφάλιση αστικής ευθύνης
Τμήμα πρώτο: Προσυμβατικές υποχρεώσεις
ανακοινώσεων του αιτούντος ασφάλιση
Κεφάλαιο δέκατο τέταρτο: Γενική ασφάλιση
Τμήμα δεύτερο: Προσυμβατικές υποχρεώσεις του
αστικής ευθύνης
ασφαλιστή Κεφάλαιο δέκατο πέμπτο: Ευθεία αγωγή κατά
Τμήμα τρίτο: Σύναψη της Σύμβασης του ασφαλιστή
Τμήμα τέταρτο: Αναδρομική και προσωρινή κάλυψη Κεφάλαιο δέκατο έκτο: Υποχρεωτική ασφάλιση
Τμήμα πέμπτο: Ασφαλιστήριο
Τμήμα έκτο: Διάρκεια της ασφαλιστικής σύμβασης Μέρος πέμπτο: Ασφάλιση ζωής
Τμήμα έβδομο: Υποχρεώσειςενημέρωσης του Κεφάλαιο δέκατο έβδομο: Ειδικές διατάξεις για
ασφαλιστή μετά τη σύναψη της σύμβασης ασφάλιση ζωής
Κεφάλαιο τρίτο: Διαμεσολαβούντες στην Τμήμα πρώτο: Τρίτα πρόσωπα
ασφάλιση Τμήμα δεύτερο: Αρχικό στάδιο και διάρκεια της
Κεφάλαιο τέταρτο: Ασφαλιστικός κίνδυνος σύμβασης
Τμήμα πρώτο: Προληπτικά μέτρα Τμήμα τρίτο: Αλλαγές κατά τη διάρκεια της περιόδου
Τμήμα δεύτερο: Επίταση του κινδύνου της σύμβασης
Τμήμα τρίτο: Μείωση του κινδύνου Τμήμα τέταρτο: Σχέσεις με την εθνική νομοθεσία
Τμήμα πέμπτο: Ασφαλιστική περίπτωση
Κεφάλαιο πέμπτο: Ασφάλιστρο Τμήμα έκτο: Μετατροπή και ποσό επαναγοράς
Κεφάλαιο έκτο: Ασφαλιστική περίπτωση
Κεφάλαιο έβδομο: Παραγραφή Μέρος έκτο: Ομαδική ασφάλιση
Κεφάλαιο δέκατο όγδοο: Ειδικές διατάξεις για
Μέρος δεύτερο: Διατάξεις κοινές για όλες τις τις ομαδικές ασφαλίσεις
ασφαλίσεις ζημιών Τμήμα πρώτο: Ομαδικές ασφαλίσεις γενικά
Κεφάλαιο όγδοο: Ασφαλιστικό ποσό και Τμήμα δεύτερο: Συμπληρωματική ομαδική ασφάλιση
ασφαλιστική αξία Τμήμα τρίτο: Επιλεκτική ομαδική ασφάλιση
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
PECL)1, και, εφόσον δεν υπάρχουν σχετικές διατάξεις, με προσφυγή στις κοινές γενικές αρχές των
εθνικών δικαίων των Κρατών μελών.
1 Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
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(6) «Ασφάλιστρο» είναι το ποσό που οφείλεται στον ασφαλιστή από τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης έναντι
της παρεχόμενης κάλυψης.
(7) «Διάρκεια της σύμβασης» είναι η περίοδος της συμβατικής δέσμευσης που αρχίζει από τη σύναψη
της σύμβασης και λήγει με την πάροδο της συμφωνημένης διάρκειας.
(8) «Ασφαλιστική περίοδος» είναι η περίοδος για την οποία οφείλεται το ασφάλιστρο κατά τη συμ-
φωνία των μερών.
(9) «Περίοδος ευθύνης» είναι η χρονική περίοδος της ασφαλιστικής κάλυψης.
(10) «Υποχρεωτική ασφάλιση» είναι η ασφάλιση, που έχει συναφθεί κατ’ εφαρμογή υποχρέωσης προς
ασφάλιση, που πηγάζει από νομοθέτημα.
2 Η παράγραφος 2 του άρθρου 1:203 βασίζεται στο άρθρο 5 της Οδηγίας 93/13/ΕΟΚ.
3 Το άρθρο αυτό βασίζεται στην Οδηγία 2009/22/ΕΚ.
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Κεφάλαιο δεύτερο: Ρυθμίσεις κατά τη σύναψη και κατά την διάρκεια της
ασφαλιστικής σύμβασης
Τμήμα πρώτο: Προσυμβατικές υποχρεώσεις ανακοινώσεων του αιτούντα
ασφάλιση
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δικαιώματός του. Η δήλωση πρέπει να είναι γραπτή και να δίδεται εντός ενός μηνός από τότε
που ο ασφαλιστής έλαβε γνώση της παράβασης του άρθρου 2:101 ή όφειλε να είχε λάβει γνώση
αυτής.
(2) Αν ο ασφαλιστής προτείνει μια εύλογη τροποποίηση, η σύμβαση ισχύει εφεξής με βάση την τρο-
ποποίηση, εκτός εάν ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης απορρίψει την πρόταση εντός ενός μηνός από την
λήψη της δήλωσης της ως άνω παρ. 1. Στην περίπτωση αυτή, ο ασφαλιστής έχει το δικαίωμα να
καταγγείλει την ασφαλιστική σύμβαση εντός ενός μηνός από την λήψη της δήλωσης απόρριψης
της πρότασης από τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης.
(3) Ο ασφαλιστής δε δικαιούται να καταγγείλει τη σύμβαση σε περίπτωση που η παράβαση του
άρθρου 2:101 δεν οφείλεται σε υπαιτιότητα του λήπτη της ασφάλισης, εκτός εάν αποδείξει ότι
δε θα είχε συνάψει την ασφαλιστική σύμβαση εάν γνώριζε τις σχετικές πληροφορίες.
(4) Η καταγγελία της σύμβασης επιφέρει αποτελέσματα μετά την πάροδο ενός μηνός από τη λήψη
της γραπτής δήλωσης της παρ. 1 του παρόντος άρθρου από τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης. Η έναρξη
των αποτελεσμάτων της τροποποίησης ρυθμίζεται με συμφωνία των μερών.
(5) Αν την ασφαλιστική περίπτωση προκάλεσε ένα στοιχείο του κινδύνου, που δεν είχε ανακοινωθεί
ή είχε περιγραφεί αναληθώς από αμέλεια του λήπτη και η επέλευσή της συντελέστηκε προτού η
καταγγελία ή η τροποποίηση επιφέρουν αποτελέσματα, ο ασφαλιστής δεν υποχρεούται σε κατα-
βολή του ασφαλίσματος, εφόσον δεν θα είχε συνάψει τη σύμβαση, εάν γνώριζε τις σχετικές με το
στοιχείο αυτό πληροφορίες. Εάν όμως ο ασφαλιστής θα είχε συνάψει τη σύμβαση με υψηλότερο
ασφάλιστρο ή με διαφορετικούς όρους, θα καταβάλλεται ασφάλισμα που θα καθορίζεται σε ανα-
λογία με το ασφάλιστρο που εισπράχθηκε ή σύμφωνα με τους όρους που θα είχαν συμφωνηθεί.
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5 Η διάταξη αυτή βασίζεται στα άρθρα 183-189 της οδηγίας 2009/138/ΕΚ (Φερεγγυότητα II).
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(α) ο ασφαλιστής θα αποζημιώνει τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης για κάθε ζημία που προκαλείται από
την παράβαση του ως άνω καθήκοντος, εκτός αν ενήργησε χωρίς υπαιτιότητα, και
(β) ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης δικαιούται να καταγγείλει τη σύμβαση. Το δικαίωμα καταγγελίας
ασκείται με γραπτή δήλωση που κοινοποιείται στον ασφαλιστή εντός δύο μηνών από τότε
που ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης έλαβε γνώση της παράβασης.
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αντικαθίσταται από τον όρο που θα είχε συμφωνηθεί από το μέσο συνετό συμβαλλόμενο, εάν
είχε επίγνωση της καταχρηστικότητας.
(3) Οι ρυθμίσεις του άρθρου αυτού εφαρμόζονται σε όρους που περιορίζουν ή τροποποιούν την
κάλυψη, αλλά δεν εφαρμόζονται:
(α) σε θέματα που αφορούν στην αναλογία του ασφαλίστρου προς τις καλυπτόμενες αξίες, κα-
θώς και,
(β) στους όρους που περιέχουν την ουσιώδη περιγραφή της κάλυψης ή του ασφαλίστρου, με την
προϋπόθεση ότι έχουν συνταχθεί με σαφήνεια και σε κατανοητή γλώσσα.
(4) Ένας όρος κρίνεται ότι δεν αποτέλεσε αντικείμενο ατομικής διαπραγμάτευσης, όταν έχει συ-
νταχθεί εκ των προτέρων και όταν ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης, εκ των πραγμάτων, δε μπόρεσε να
επηρεάσει το περιεχόμενό του, ιδίως όταν περιέχεται σε μία προπαρασκευασμένη και τυποποιη-
μένη σύμβαση. Το γεγονός ότι ορισμένα μέρη κάποιου όρου ή ένας μεμονωμένος όρος υπήρξε
αντικείμενο ατομικής διαπραγμάτευση, δεν αποκλείει την εφαρμογή του παρόντος άρθρου στο
υπόλοιπο της ασφαλιστικής σύμβασης, εάν από την εν γένει αξιολόγησή της προκύπτει ότι εντού-
τοις είναι μια προπαρασκευασμένη και τυποποιημένη σύμβαση. Το βάρος απόδειξης ότι ένας
τυποποιημένος όρος υπήρξε αντικείμενο ατομικής διαπραγμάτευσης, το φέρει ο ασφαλιστής
που το επικαλείται.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Η παρ. 1 του παρόντος άρθρου δεν εφαρμόζεται στην ασφάλιση προσώπων.
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εντός ενός μηνός από τότε που η επίταση του κινδύνου περιήλθε σε γνώση του ασφαλιστή ή έγινε
προφανής.
(2) Η κάλυψη λήγει ένα μήνα μετά την καταγγελία ή, κατά τον χρόνο της καταγγελίας, αν ο ασφαλι-
σμένος παραβίασε με δόλο την υποχρέωση που προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 4:202.
(3) Εάν η επέλευση της ασφαλιστικής περίπτωσης οφείλεται στην επίταση του κινδύνου, την οποία
ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης γνώριζε ή όφειλε να γνωρίζει, πριν τη λήξη της κάλυψης, ο ασφαλιστής
δεν υποχρεούται να καταβάλει το ασφάλισμα εφόσον δεν θα είχε ασφαλίσει τον κίνδυνο όπως
είχε επιταθεί. Στην περίπτωση ωστόσο που ο ασφαλιστής θα είχε ασφαλίσει τον κίνδυνο όπως
έχει επιταθεί με υψηλότερο ασφάλιστρο ή με διαφορετικούς όρους, θα καταβάλλεται ασφάλισμα
που θα καθορίζεται σε αναλογία με το ασφάλιστρο που εισπράχθηκε ή σύμφωνα με τους όρους
που θα είχαν συμφωνηθεί.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Ο ασφαλιστής απαλλάσσεται της ευθύνης του όταν παρέλθει η επιπρόσθετη προθεσμία της ως
άνω παρ. 1 (β). Η κάλυψη θα αρχίσει εκ νέου για το μέλλον μόλις ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης κατα-
βάλει το οφειλόμενο ποσό εκτός αν η σύμβαση έληξε σύμφωνα με τις προβλέψεις του άρθρου
5:103.
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8 Αυτό το άρθρο βασίζεται στο άρθρο 3 παράγραφος 1(δ) της Οδηγίας 2000/35/ΕΕ.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
9 Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
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υποβλήθηκε ο ασφαλισμένος για το περιορισμό της ζημίας, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 9:102, αποκα-
θίστανται με την ίδια αναλογία.
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(3) Με την επιφύλαξη ύπαρξης σαφούς όρου στην ασφαλιστική σύμβαση που προβλέπει την μεί-
ωση του ασφαλίσματος ανάλογα με το βαθμό της υπαιτιότητάς του, ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης
ή ο ασφαλισμένος, ανάλογα με την περίπτωση, θα έχει δικαίωμα είσπραξης ασφαλίσματος για
οποιαδήποτε ζημία προκλήθηκε από αμέλειά του ως προς τη συμμόρφωση με τις κατά τα ως άνω
ειδικές οδηγίες του ασφαλιστή.
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αποζημιώσει τους τυχόν άλλους ζημιωθέντες, αλλά μέχρι τη συμπλήρωση του ασφαλιστικού
ποσού.
Άρθρο 15:101 Ευθεία αγωγή κατά του ασφαλιστή και αντίκρουση αυτής
(1) Στο βαθμό που ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης ή ο ασφαλισμένος, ανάλογα με την περίπτωση, ευθύ-
νεται, ο ζημιωθείς δικαιούται να προβάλει απαίτηση αποζημίωσης ευθέως κατά του ασφαλιστή,
στο μέτρο που ο τελευταίος ευθύνεται από την ασφαλιστική σύμβαση, με την προϋπόθεση ότι
(α) η ασφάλιση είναι υποχρεωτική, ή
(β) ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης ή ασφαλισμένος είναι αφερέγγυος, ή
(γ) ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης ή ασφαλισμένος έχει εκκαθαριστεί ή έχει τεθεί υπό εκκαθάριση, ή
(δ) ο ζημιωθείς έχει υποστεί σωματική βλάβη, ή
(ε) η νομοθεσία που διέπει την ευθύνη του ασφαλιστή προβλέπει για ευθεία αγωγή κατά του
ασφαλιστή.
(2) Ο ασφαλιστής μπορεί να προβάλει ενστάσεις από την ασφαλιστική σύμβαση κατά του ζημιωθέ-
ντος, εκτός αν οι ειδικές διατάξεις που καθιστούν την ασφάλιση υποχρεωτική το αποκλείουν. Ο
ασφαλιστής δεν μπορεί να προβάλει ενστάσεις κατά του ζημιωθέντος οι οποίες απορρέουν από
(αντισυμβατική) συμπεριφορά που επέδειξε ο λήπτη της ασφάλισης ή/και ο ασφαλισμένος μετά
την επέλευση της ζημιάς.
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(β) δεν έχει ενημερώσει τον ασφαλιστή σχετικά με την πρόθεσή του να προβεί σε άσκηση ευθεί-
ας απαίτησης εντός τεσσάρων εβδομάδων από λήψη σχετικής γραπτής αίτησης του ασφαλι-
στή.
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Άρθρο 17:204 Καταγγελία της σύμβασης από τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης
(1) Ο λήπτης της ασφάλισης δικαιούται να καταγγείλει την ασφάλιση ζωής, εφόσον δεν προκύπτει
τιμή μετατροπής ή ποσό επαναγοράς, με την προϋπόθεση τα αποτελέσματα της καταγγελίας να
μην αρχίζουν πριν την πάροδο ενός έτους από τη σύναψη της σύμβασης. Το δικαίωμα πρόωρης
καταγγελίας της σύμβασης μπορεί να αποκλειστεί όταν έχει καταβληθεί εφάπαξ το ασφάλιστρο.
Η καταγγελία της σύμβασης γίνεται γραπτά και τα αποτελέσματά της επέρχονται δύο εβδομάδες
μετά την παραλαβή της από τον ασφαλιστή.
(2) Αν στην ασφάλιση ζωής έχει προκύψει τιμή μετατροπής ή ποσό εξαγοράς, εφαρμόζονται τα άρ-
θρα 17:601 έως 17:603.
Άρθρο 17:301 Πληροφορίες που πρέπει να παρέχει ο ασφαλιστής στον λήπτη της ασφάλι-
σης μετά τη σύναψη της σύμβασης
(1) Ο ασφαλιστής υποχρεούται να παρέχει στον λήπτη της ασφάλισης ετησίως γραπτή βεβαίωση της
τρέχουσας αξίας των επιπλέον παροχών που επισυνάπτονται στο ασφαλιστήριο, στο βαθμό που
τούτο είναι εφαρμόσιμο.
(2) Πλέον των απαιτήσεων που προβλέπονται στο άρθρο 2:701, ο ασφαλιστής πρέπει να ενημερώνει
τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης, χωρίς αδικαιολόγητη καθυστέρηση, για οποιαδήποτε αλλαγή σχετικά
με:
(α) τόσο τους γενικούς όσο και τους ειδικούς όρους του ασφαλιστηρίου,
(β) σε περίπτωση μεταβολής των όρων του ασφαλιστηρίου ή τροποποίηση των ΑΕΔΑΣ: τις πλη-
ροφορίες που απαριθμούνται στο άρθρο 2:201 εδάφιο στ’ και ζ’, καθώς και στο άρθρο 17:202
παράγραφος 2 εδάφιο β’ περίπτωση i έως v.
(3) H παράγραφος 4 του άρθρου 17:202 εφαρμόζεται και στην περίπτωση όπου τα αριθμητικά στοι-
χεία που αφορούν το εκτιμώμενο ποσό των πιθανών παροχών παρέχονται οποιαδήποτε στιγμή
κατά τη διάρκεια της σύμβασης. Σε περίπτωση που ο ασφαλιστής έχει παρουσιάσει αριθμητικά
στοιχεία είτε πριν είτε μετά τη σύναψη της σύμβασης σχετικά με την ενδεχόμενη μελλοντική
εξέλιξη της συμμετοχής στα κέρδη, ο ασφαλιστής ενημερώνει τον λήπτη της ασφάλισης για τυχόν
διαφορές μεταξύ της πραγματικής εξέλιξης και των αρχικών στοιχείων που είχαν δοθεί.
10 Το άρθρο 17:203 παράγραφος 1 βασίζεται στο άρθρο 35 της Οδηγίας 2002/83/ΕΚ για την ασφάλιση
ζωής και στο άρθρο 6 της Οδηγίας 2002/65/ΕΚ για την από απόσταση εμπορία χρηματοοικονομικών
υπηρεσιών.
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(δ) για να αντικατασταθεί μία ρήτρα της σύμβασης με άλλη, σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 2:304 παρά-
γραφο 2 πρόταση 2.
(2) Η τροποποίηση τίθεται σε ισχύ κατά την έναρξη του τρίτου μήνα από την εκ μέρους του λήπτη
της ασφάλισης παραλαβή γραπτής ειδοποίησης που του αποστέλλει ο ασφαλιστής και που πλη-
ροφορεί τον λήπτη σχετικά με την τροποποίηση και τους λόγους αυτής.
(3) Η παράγραφος 1 δεν εμποδίζει την εφαρμογή άλλων ρυθμίσεων που προβλέπονται σχετικά με
την εγκυρότητα του όρου που τροποποιεί τη σύμβαση ασφάλισης.
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Ο αναγραφόμενος τρόπος υπολογισμού του ποσού επαναγοράς ή/και της τιμής μετατροπής θα
συμμορφώνεται με τις καθιερωμένες αναλογιστικές αρχές και με τις διατάξεις της παραγράφου
2.
(2) Όταν ο ασφαλιστής αφαιρεί τα έξοδα σύναψης της ασφαλιστικής σύμβασης, το πράττει σε ίσα
ποσά και εντός χρονικού διαστήματος που δεν μπορεί να υπολείπεται των πέντε ετών από την
σύναψή της.
(3) Ο ασφαλιστής δικαιούται να αφαιρέσει το ποσό που προκύπτει από την κάλυψη των δαπανών
που συνδέονται με την καταβολή του ποσού επαναγοράς. Το ποσό αυτό υπολογίζεται σύμφωνα
με τις καθιερωμένες αναλογιστικές αρχές, εκτός εάν περιλαμβάνεται στο ποσό σχετική μείωση.
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543
Hungarian version
by Péter Takáts and Emese Kaufmann-Mohi
Első rész: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog Tizedik fejezet: Visszakövetelési jog
alapelvei (EBSZJA) által szabályozott összes Tizenegyedik fejezet: Biztosítási szerződés
szerződésre vonatkozó közös szabályok harmadik személy javára
Első fejezet: Bevezető rendelkezések Tizenkettedik fejezet: A biztosított kockázat
Első szakasz: A EBSZJA hatálya
Második szakasz: Általános szabályok Harmadik rész: Az összegbiztosításra vonat-
Harmadik szakasz: Igényérvényesítés kozó közös szabályok
Második fejezet: A biztosítási szerződés kezdeti Tizenharmadik fejezet: Alkalmazási kör
szakasza és időtartama
Első szakasz: Az ajánlattevő szerződést megelőző Negyedik rész: Felelősségbiztosítás
közlési kötelezettsége Tizennegyedik fejezet: A felelősségbiztosítás
Második szakasz: A biztosító szerződést megelőző általános szabályai
kötelezettségei
Harmadik szakasz: A szerződés megkötése
Tizenötödik fejezet: Közvetlen igényérvényesí-
Negyedik szakasz: Visszamenőleges és előzetes
tés és közvetlen kereset
fedezet Tizenhatodik fejezet: Kötelező biztosítás
Ötödik szakasz: A biztosítási kötvény
Hatodik szakasz: A biztosítási szerződés időtartama Ötödik rész: Életbiztosítás
Hetedik szakasz: A biztosító tájékoztatási kötelezett- Tizenhetedik fejezet: Az életbiztosításra
ségei a szerződéskötés után vonatkozó különös szabályok
Harmadik fejezet: Biztosításközvetítők Első szakasz: Harmadik személyek
Második szakasz: A szerződés kezdeti szakasza és
Negyedik fejezet: A biztosított kockázat időtartama
Első szakasz: Kármegelőzési teendők
Harmadik szakasz: Változások a szerződési időszak
Második szakasz: Kockázatnövekedés
alatt
Harmadik szakasz: A kockázat csökkenése
Negyedik szakasz: Kapcsolat a nemzeti jogokkal
Ötödik fejezet: Biztosítási díj Ötödik szakasz: A biztosítási esemény
Hatodik fejezet: A biztosítási esemény Hatodik szakasz: Díjmentesítés és visszavásárlás
Hetedik fejezet: Elévülés Hatodik rész: Csoportos biztosítás
Második rész: A kárbiztosításra vonatkozó Tizennyolcadik fejezet: A csoportos biztosításra
közös szabályok vonatkozó különös szabályok
Első szakasz: A csoportos biztosítás általános
Nyolcadik fejezet: A biztosítási összeg és a
szabályai
biztosított érték
Második szakasz: Az automatikus csoportos
Kilencedik fejezet: A kártérítésre való biztosítási szerződés
jogosultság Harmadik szakasz: A fakultatív csoportos biztosítási
szerződés
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Hungarian: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog alapelvei
1 Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
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546
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548
Hungarian: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog alapelvei
ban a biztosító a szerződést magasabb díj ellenében vagy más feltételek mellett megkötötte
volna, a biztosítási összeg arányosan vagy e feltételeknek megfelelően kifizethető.
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(h) a biztosítási időszak, ide értve a szerződés megszűnésének eseteit, és a felelősségi időszak;
(i) az ajánlat visszavonásának a joga vagy a szerződéstől való elàllás joga nem-életbiztosításnál
a 2:303 cikknek, életbiztosításnál a 17:203 cikknek megfelelően;
(j) hogy a szerződésre az EBSZJA irányadó jog;
(k) az ajánlattevő bíróságon kívüli panasz és jogorvoslati lehetőségei és azok hozzáférhetősége;
(l) kártalanítási (garancia) alap, vagy más kompenzációs megoldás fennállása.
(2) Ha lehetséges, ezt a tájékoztatást az ajánlattevő részére úgy kell teljesíteni, hogy annak elegendő
ideje legyen mérlegelni, hogy a szerződést megköti-e vagy sem.
(3) Ha az ajánlattevő a biztosításra a biztosító által rendelkezésre bocsátott ajánlati lap és/vagy adat-
közlő útján tesz ajánlatot, a biztosító köteles az ajánlattevőnek a teljes kitöltött dokumentációt
átadni.
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(2) Ha a biztosító nem a jelen Cikk 1. bekezdése szerint jár el, a szerződést, az adott esettől függően,
a szerződő ajánlatában vagy a felek korábbi megállapodásában szereplő feltételek szerint meg-
kötöttnek kell tekinteni.
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(4) A biztosítási fedezet a 3. bekezdés szerinti írásbeli felmondó nyilatkozatot követő két hét eltelté-
vel szűnik meg.
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sított részére előírják, hogy a biztosítási esemény bekövetkezte előtt meghatározott magatartást
tanúsítson vagy ne tanúsítson.
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gyakorolhatja, attól az időponttól számított egy hónapon belül, hogy a kockázat növekedéséről
tudomást szerzett, vagy az nyilvánvalóvá vált.
(2) A biztosító kockázatviselése a felmondás közlését követő egy hónap elteltével, vagy azonnali
hatállyal szűnik meg, amennyiben a szerződő a 4:202 cikkben meghatározott kötelezettségét
szándékosan szegte meg.
(3) Ha a biztosítási eseményt még a kockázatviselés megszűnése előtt olyan megnövekedett kocká-
zat okozta, amelyről a szerződő tudott, vagy tudnia kellett volna, a biztosító mentesül a helytállási
kötelezettség alól, ha a megnövekedett kockázatot egyébként nem vállalta volna. Mindazonáltal,
ha a biztosító a megnövekedett kockázatot magasabb díj ellenében vagy más feltételekkel vál-
lalta volna, a biztosítási összeg arányos mértékben, vagy e más feltételek szerint kifizetendő.
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9 Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
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(3) A visszavonás akkor hatályosul, amikor az erről szóló írásbeli nyilatkozatot a biztosító kézhezveszi.
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(2) Abban az esetben, ha a felek a biztosítási eseményt a károsult által előterjesztett kárigényre
hivatkozással határozzák meg, a biztosításnak fedeznie kell a felelősségvállalási időszak, vagy az
azt követő legalább öt év alatt bejelentett kárigényeket, amennyiben azok a felelősségvállalási
időszak lejáratát megelőzően történt jogi tényen alapulnak. A biztosítási szerződés kizárhatja a
fedezetet azon körülmények vonatkozásában, amelyekről a szerződéskötéskor az ajánlattevő
tudott, vagy tudnia kellett volna, ha azok várhatóan kárigényt alapozhattak meg.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(b) a biztosító írásbeli kérdésére – annak kézhezvételétől számított négy héten belül – nem nyilat-
kozott a közvetlen igényérvényrsítésre irányuló szándékáról.
564
Hungarian: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog alapelvei
(3) A szerződő felet, illetve örököseit kell a biztosítási összeg kedvezményezettjeinek tekinteni, ha
(a) a szerződő fél nem jelölt kedvezményezettet, vagy
(b) a kedvezményezett-jelölést visszavonták és nem jelöltek más kedvezményezettet, vagy
(c) a kedvezményezett a biztosítási esemény bekövetkezése előtt meghalt és más kedvezmé-
nyezettet nem jelöltek.
(4) Ha kettő, vagy több kedvezményezettet jelöltek és bármelyikük jelölését visszavonták vagy bár-
melyikük meghalt a biztosítási esemény bekövetkezése előtt, a biztosítási összeg azon részét,
amely az érintett kedvezményezettet illette volna, a megmaradó kedvezményezettek között
arányosan kell felosztani, ha csak a szerződő fél az 1. bekezdésben írt módon másként nem ren-
delkezett.
(5) Az alkalmazandó jog fizetésképtelenségre vonatkozó szabályaiban a hitelezőket hátrányosan
érintő jogcselekmények semmisségét, megtámadhatóságát vagy hatálytalanságát kimondó ren-
delkezésektől függően a szerződő fél csődvagyona nem tarthat igényt a biztosítási összegre, a
díjmentesített értékre vagy a visszavásárlási összegre mindaddig, ameddig azt a szerződő félnek
ki nem fizették.
(6) A biztosító, ha az 1. bekezdésben írtak szerint kijelölt személy részére a biztosítási összeget kifi-
zeti, mentesül a további fizetési kötelezettség alól, ha csak nem bírt tudomással arról, hogy az
érintett személy a biztosítási összegre nem volt jogosult.
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566
Hungarian: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog alapelvei
(2) A szerződő fél joga a szerződéstől való, a 2:303 cikk 1. bekezdésében szabályozott elállásra a
szerződéskötéstől számított egy év alatt évül el.
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568
Hungarian: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog alapelvei
569
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(4) Nem alkalmazhatók a jelen Cikk rendelkezései arra az esetre, ha a kedvezményezett, vagy a szer-
ződő fél a veszélyeztetett személy életét jogszerűen – például jogos védelmi helyzetben – oltja
ki.
570
Hungarian: Az Európai biztosítási szerződési jog alapelvei
571
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
szűnik meg, az ezek közül korábban bekövetkező időpontban. Ezzel egyidejűleg a csoport-tag
jogot szerez – egy új egyéni biztosítási szerződés alapján – egyenértékű biztosítási fedezetre
ugyanannál a biztosítónál, új kockázatelbírálás nélkül.
(2) A csoport-szervező a csoport-tagot késedelem nélkül írásban köteles tájékoztatni
(a) a csoportos életbiztosítási szerződés alapján fennálló fedezet várható megszűnéséről,
(b) az őt az 1. bekezdés alapján megillető jogokról és
(c) ezen jogok gyakorlásának módjáról.
(3) Ha a csoport-tag jelezte szándékát az őt a 18:204 cikk 1. bekezdése alapján megillető jog gyakor-
lására, a biztosító és a csoport-tag között fennálló jogviszony egyéni biztosítási szerződésként
él tovább, annak díját pedig egy, az adott időpontban köthető egyéni biztosítási szerződésre
vonatkozó kalkuláció szerint kell kiszámítani, figyelmen kívül hagyva a csoport-tag életkorát,
vagy aktuális egészségi állapotát.
572
Italian version
by Diana Cerini and Luca Semeraro
Parte Prima: Principi comuni a tutti i contratti Capitolo Nove: Diritto all’Indennizzo
inclusi nei Principi Comuni del contratto di Capitolo Dieci: Diritto di Surroga
assicurazione (PEICL)
Capitolo Undici: Persone Assicurate Diverse Dal
Capitolo Uno: Principi Introduttivi Contraente
Sezione Uno: Applicazione dei PEICL
Sezione Due: Norme generali
Capitolo Dodici: Rischio Assicurato
Sezione Tre: Esecuzione
Parte Terza: Principi Comuni alle Assicurazioni
Capitolo Due: Fase pre-contrattuale e durata a Somma Fissa
del contratto di assicurazione Capitolo Tredici: Ammissibilità
Sezione Uno: Doveri di informazione precontrattuale
del contraente e/o dell’assicurando Parte Quarta: Assicurazione sulla responsabi-
Sezione Due: Doveri di informazione precontrattuale lità civile
dell’assicuratore
Sezione Tre: Conclusione del contratto
Capitolo Quattordici: Assicurazione sulla
Sezione Quattro: Coperture retroattive e coperture
responsabilità generale
provvisorie Capitolo Quindici: Richieste e azioni dirette
Sezione Cinque: Polizza d’assicurazione Capitolo Sedici: Assicurazione obbligatoria
Sezione Sei: Durata del contratto di assicurazione
Sezione Sette: Dovere di informazione Parte Quinta: Assicurazione sulla vita
dell’assicuratore in corso di contratto Capitolo Diciassette: Disposizioni speciali
Capitolo Tre: Intermediari di Assicurazione dell’assicurazione sulla vita
Capitolo Quattro: Il Rischio Assicurato Sezione Uno: Parti terze
Sezione Uno: Misure preventive Sezione Due: Fase iniziale e durata del contratto
Sezione Due: Aggravamento del rischio Sezione Tre: Modifiche durante il periodo contrat-
Sezione Tre: Riduzione del rischio tuale
Sezione Quattro: Rapporto con il diritto nazionale
Capitolo Cinque: Premio di Assicurazione Sezione Cinque: Evento Assicurato
Capitolo Sei: Evento Assicurato Sezione Sei: Riduzione e cessione
Capitolo Sette: Prescrizione
Parte Sesta: Assicurazioni di gruppo
Parte Seconda: Norme Comuni alle assicurazi- Capitolo Diciotto: Norme particolari per le
oni indennitarie assicurazioni di gruppo
Capitolo Otto: Somma Assicurata e Valore Sezione Uno: Le Assicurazioni di gruppo in generale
Assicurato Sezione Due: Assicurazione di gruppo accessoria
Sezione Tre: Assicurazione di gruppo volontaria
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
1 Cfr. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
574
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
575
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(7) Per “Periodo contrattuale” si intende il periodo dell’impegno contrattuale che inizia alla conclu-
sione del contratto e termina con la scadenza del contratto;
(8) Per “Periodo assicurativo” si intende il periodo durante il quale il premio è dovuto in base
all’accordo tra le parti;
(9) Per “Periodo di responsabilità” si intende il periodo di durata della copertura.
(10) Per “assicurazione obbligatoria” si intende un’assicurazione che viene stipulata in base ad un
obbligo di assicurare imposto da leggi o regolamenti.
(11) Per “veicolo a motore” si intende ogni veicolo destinato a circolare sul suolo, ma non su rotaie, e
azionato da una forza meccanica, nonché i rimorchi, anche non agganciati.
5 L’articolo 1:203 para. 2 è redatto sulla base dell’articolo 5 della Direttiva 93/13/EEC.
6 Questo articolo è redatto sulla base della Direttiva 2004/113/EC e sulla decisione Corte di Giustizia
“Test Achats” (2011).
576
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
577
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
di cui al par. 1. In tale caso, l’assicuratore ha il diritto di risolvere il contratto entro un mese dalla
ricezione della notifica scritta del rifiuto del contraente.
(3) L’assicuratore non ha il diritto di risolvere il contratto se il contraente ha violato l’Articolo 2:101
senza colpa, a meno che l’assicuratore provi che non avrebbe concluso il contratto se avesse
conosciuto la circostanza non comunicata.
(4) La risoluzione del contratto ha effetto decorso un mese dalla ricezione da parte del contraente
della notifica scritta di cui al par. 1. La variazione ha effetto sulla base degli accordi fra le parti.
(5) Se un evento assicurato è causato da un elemento del rischio, che è oggetto di negligente reticen-
za o dolo del contraente, e si verifica prima che la risoluzione o variazione abbiano effetto, nessun
indennizzo dovrà essere corrisposto. Tuttavia, se l’assicuratore avrebbe concluso il contratto ad
un premio più elevato o a condizioni diverse, l’indennizzo sarà corrisposto in proporzione o in
accordo a tali diverse condizioni.
8 Questo articolo è redatto sulla base degli artt. 183-189 della Direttiva 2009/138/CE (Solvency II)
578
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
(a) Il nome e indirizzo delle parti contrattuali, in particolare, della sede e la forma giuridica
dell’assicuratore e, se del caso, della succursale stipulante il contratto o concedente la coper-
tura;
(b) Il nome e l’indirizzo dell’assicurato, del beneficiario e della persona a rischio;
(c) Il nome e l’indirizzo dell’intermediario di assicurazione;
(d) L’oggetto dell’assicurazione ed il rischio coperto;
(e) La somma assicurata e le somme deducibili;
(f) L’ammontare del premio o il metodo di calcolo dello stesso;
(g) Quando il premio è dovuto così come il luogo e modalità di pagamento;
(h) Il periodo contrattuale, incluse le modalità di recesso dal contratto, ed il periodo di respon-
sabilità;
(i) Il diritto di revocare la proposta o annullare ilcontratto in base all’Articolo 2:303 in caso di
assicurazione contro i danni e in base all’articolo 17:203 in caso di assicurazione sulla vita;
(j) La previsione che il contratto è soggetto ai PEICL
(k) L’esistenza di un procedimento arbitrale ed i meccanismi di regresso del contraente e i metodi
per accedere agli stessi;
(l) L’esistenza di fondi di garanzia o altri accordi di compensazione.
(2) Se possibile, l’informazione deve essere fornita in un tempo sufficiente a consentire al contraente
di valutare se concludere o meno il contratto.
(3) Quando il contraente richiede una copertura sulla base di una proposta e/o questionario predis-
posto dall’assicuratore, l’assicuratore dovrà fornire al contraente copia completa dei documenti.
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580
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582
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
11 [Ndt] Il testo inglese è precautionary measure. Il commento spiega che si tratta tanto di c.d. condizioni
di assicurabilità, quanto di condizioni di operatività della garanzia o di salvaguarda.
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Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
(3) Nell’ipotesi di violazione del dovere di notifica, l’assicuratore non può rifiutare di pagare i danni
conseguenti da un evento rientrante nell’oggetto della copertura a meno che il danno sia con-
seguenza dell’evento di aggravemnto del rischio non comunicato.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
586
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
12 Questo articolo è redatto sulla base dell’articolo 3 par. 1 (d) della Direttiva 2000/35/EC.
587
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Articolo 7:102 Azione per il pagamento dei diritti derivanti dal contratto di assicurazione
(1) In generale, l’azione per l’esercizio dei diritti derivanti dal contratto di assicurazione si prescrive
decorsi tre anni dal momento in cui l’assicuratore ha assunto o avrebbe dovuto assumere una decisi-
one finale sul[la accettazione del] sinistro in base all’Articolo 6:103. In ogni caso l’azione si prescrive al
più tardi decorso il periodo di 10 anni dall’accadimento del sinistro, eccetto nel caso di assicurazione
sulla vita per cui il periodo è di 30 anni.
(2) L’azione per il pagamento del riscatto nell’assicurazione vita si prescrive decorso un periodo di
tre anni dal momento in cui il contraente riceve il resoconto finale dall’assicuratore. In ogni caso,
tuttavia, l’azione si prescrive al più tardi decorsi 30 anni dalla scadenza del contratto di assicura-
zione sulla vita.
13 Cfr. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
III (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
588
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
589
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Articolo 11:103 Violazione dei dovere da parte di uno solo degli assicurati
La violazione del dovere di informazione da parte di uno solo degli assicurati non pregiudica ne-
gativamente i diritti delle altre persone assicurate in base al medesimo contratto, a meno che il
[medesimo] rischio non fosse assicurato congiuntamente.
590
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591
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592
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
593
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
594
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
595
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(v) per le polizze unit-linked: una spiegazione delle quote alle quali le prestazioni sono
collegate, e una indicazione della natura delle attività sottostanti;
(vi) le informazioni generali relative al regime fiscale applicabile al tipo di polizza.
(3) Inoltre, specifiche informazioni devono essere fornite al fine di facilitare una corretta compren-
sione dei rischi sottostanti il contratto assunti dal contraente.
(4) Se le quotazioni dell’assicuratore in cifre vanno oltre i pagamenti contrattualmente garantiti
esso fornisce l’ammontare dei possibili vantaggi al richiedente con un modello di calcolo in cui si
afferma il possibile beneficio di maturità sulla base dei principi attuariali per il calcolo del premio
con tre diversi tassi di interesse. Ciò non si applica ai contratti di assicurazione che coprono rischi
a fronte dei quali l’erogazione della prestazione è non è garantita né alle polizze unit-linked.
L’assicuratore deve indicare in modo chiaro e comprensibile per l’assicurato che il modello di
calcolo rappresenta solo un modello basato su presupposti fittizi e che il contratto non garantisce
eventuali pagamenti.
15 L’ Articolo 17:203 par. 1 è redatto sulla base dell’ Articolo 35 della Direttiva 2002/83/CE sull’ Assicu-
razione sulla vita e sull’articolo 6 della Direttiva 2002/65/CE.
16 [Ndt] Si intende il diritto di porre termine, con disdetta o recesso, al contratto, quale diritto diverso
dal ripensamento.
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Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
(2) In aggiunta ai requisiti di cui all’articolo 2:701, l’assicuratore informa il contraente senza indugio
su qualsiasi modifica relativa:
(a) alle condizioni di polizza, generali e speciali;
(b) in caso di modifica delle condizioni di polizza o una modifica dei PEICL: le informazioni di cui
all’articolo 2:201 lett. f, g, nonché all’articolo 17:202 par. 2 lett. b punti da I a V.
(3) L’articolo 17:202 par. 4 si applica anche quando vengono forniti i dati relativi alla stima dei pos-
sibili benefici, in qualsiasi momento durante il periodo contrattuale. Qualora l’assicuratore ha
fornito dati, prima o dopo la conclusione del contratto, circa il potenziale di sviluppo futuro della
partecipazione agli utili, l’assicuratore informa il contraente in merito a eventuali differenze tra
lo sviluppo attuale e dati iniziali.
597
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
598
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
599
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600
Italian: Principi di Diritto Europeo del Contratto di Assicurazione (PEICL)
Articolo 18:204 Diritto di prosecuzione della copertura – Assicurazioni di gruppo sulla vita
(1) Se un contratto di assicurazione sulla vita di gruppo accessorio viene terminato o se un membro
lascia il gruppo, la copertura termina dopo tre mesi o con la scadenza del contratto per il gruppo
di assicurazione sulla vita, se anteriore. Quando ciò si verifica, il membro del gruppo ha diritto d
avere una copertura equivalente in virtù di un nuovo contratto individuale con l’assicuratore in
questione senza una nuova analisi e valutazione del rischio.
(2) L’organizzatore del gruppo informa il membro del gruppo iscritto, senza indugio su
(a) la cessazione imminente della sua copertura nell’ambito del contratto di assicurazione sulla
vita di gruppo,
(b) i suoi diritti ai sensi del par. 1 e
(c) modalità di esercizio di tali diritti.
(3) Se il membro del gruppo ha indicato la sua intenzione di esercitare il proprio diritto ai sensi
dell’articoli 18:204 par. 1, il contratto tra l’assicuratore e il membro del gruppo prosegue come un
contratto di assicurazione individuale ad un premio calcolato sulla base di una polizza individuale
in quel momento senza prendere in considerazione l’attuale stato di salute o l’età del membro
del gruppo.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
602
Japanese version
by Kyoko Kaneoka, Souichirou Kozuka and Satoshi Nakaide
䶻䵯ⓜ㙟䤓尞⸩ 䶻䵯≬椉⯠侓劔ቋ嬺≬椉劔ሯ䟿ቍቮ⫃⚗
䶻乏3(,&/ቑ拸䞷 䶻䵯嬺≬椉Ⓒ䥙
䶻乏偞ⓖ
䶻乏㇆嫛尞⸩ቑ⸮䚍 䶻捷⸩櫜≬椉␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻䵯≬椉⯠侓ቑ⒬㦮㹄椝♙ቖ㦮栢 䶻䵯拸㽤㊶
䶻乏䟂手ⅉቑ⯠侓ⓜቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
䶻乏≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓偯俟ⓜቑ券╨ 䶻捷弻↊≬椉
䶻乏⯠侓ቑ偯俟 䶻䵯㣽抩弻↊≬椉
䶻乏拰♙䤓♙ቖ㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮
䶻䵯䦃㘴嵚㻑㲸♙ቖ䦃㘴峃岮
䶻乏≬椉峋Ⓡ
䶻乏≬椉⯠侓ቑ㦮栢 䶻䵯㇆Ⓟ≬椉
䶻乏⯠侓㈛ቑ≬椉劔ቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
䶻捷䞮✌≬椉
䶻䵯≬椉ⴡ⅚劔
䶻䵯䞮✌≬椉ቇሧቑ䔈ⓖ
䶻䵯≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቮ☀椉 䶻乏䶻ₘ劔
䶻乏℗棁㘹函 䶻乏⯠侓ቑ⒬㦮㹄椝♙ቖ㦮栢
䶻乏☀椉ቑ⬦┯ 䶻乏⯠侓㦮栢₼ቑ⮘㦃
䶻乏☀椉ቑ䂪⺠ 䶻乏⦌␔㽤ቋቑ栱≑
䶻䵯≬椉㠨 䶻乏≬椉ℚ㟔
䶻䵯≬椉ℚ㟔 䶻乏慱㙪♙ቖ屲侓
䶻䵯䀗䅔㣑╈ 䶻捷⥲⇢≬椉
䶻捷㚜⹂≬椉␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩ 䶻䵯⥲⇢≬椉ቑ䔈ⓖ
䶻乏⥲⇢≬椉抩ⓖ
䶻䵯≬椉摠櫜♙ቖ≬椉∰櫜
䶻乏⏷❰┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉
䶻䵯≬椉摠嵚㻑㲸 䶻乏↊㎞┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉
䶻䵯ⅲ⇜㲸
603
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻䵯ⓜ㙟䤓尞⸩
䶻乏3(,&/ቑ拸䞷
䶻㧰⸮役㽤䤓拸䞷乓⦁
3(,&/ቒᇬ䦇℡≬椉ት⚺ባ䱐≬椉⏷咻拸䞷ሸቯቮᇭ
3(,&/ቒᇬ␜≬椉ቒ拸䞷ሸቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰指㔭䤓拸䞷
3(,&/ቒᇬ⦌椪䱐㽤ብቋቈሲ䄥㕯㽤指㔭ቑⓅ侓ሮሮቲቬሽᇬ㇢ℚ劔ሯቀቑ⯠侓
ቇሧ拸䞷ሸቯቮቜሰሶቋት⚗㎞ሺቂቋሰ拸䞷ሸቯቮᇭ䶻㧰㈢ሩሶቋት㧰
ↅቋሺᇬ3(,&/ቒ⏷⇢ቋሺ拸䞷ሸቯᇬ䔈⸩ቑ尞⸩ት棳⮥ሼቮሶቋቒ峀ሸቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰㇆嫛尞⸩㊶
䶻 㧰䶻㠖ᇬ䶻㧰ᇬ䶻㧰ᇬ䶻㧰ᇬ䶻㧰♙ቖ䶻
㧰ቒᇬ㇆嫛尞⸩ቋሼቮᇭቀቑⅥቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ峟㷉䤓ቍ嫛䍉ቛቑⓅ子栱ሼቮ棟ㄵቊ
㇆嫛尞⸩ቋሼቮᇭ
ቀቑⅥቑሧሮቍቮ尞⸩ብᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቑₜⒸ䥙ቍ
ቬቍሧ棟ቭᇬ⯠侓ቫቭሶቯቋ䟿ቍቮ⸩ቤትሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
㖖ⅳ(&䶻㧰䶻檔⸩ቤቮ⮶尞㲰☀椉ት≬椫 孫⎮ ሼቮ⯠侓ርሧ
ቒᇬ䶻檔ሧሩ䟿ቍቮ⸩ቤትሧሽቯቑ㇢ℚ劔ቑⒸ䥙ብሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ⥲
⇢≬椉ርሧቒᇬ䟿ቍቮ⸩ቤቒᇬ㖖ⅳ(&䶻㧰䶻檔 E ♙ቖ F ⸩
ቤቬቯቂ⇢䤓尐ↅት䄏ቂሼ⊚ᇰቑ嬺≬椉劔⺍ሺቑቢሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰屲摗
3(,&/ቒᇬቀቑ㠖岏ᇬ㠖厗ᇬ䥽䤓♙ቖ㹣憒㽤䤓卛㣾䏶ቬሺ屲摗ሸቯቮᇭቋቭቲ
ሴᇬ≬椉⒕摝ርሴቮ≰券崯⸮ᇬ⯠侓栱≑ቑ⸘⸩㊶ᇬ拸䞷ቑ倀㊶♙ቖ≬椉⯠侓劔
ቑ拸⒖ቍ≬帆ት≒拁ሼቮ㉔尐㊶ሯ揜㏽ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰⦌␔㽤♙ቖ咻☮ⓖ
⦌ ␔㽤ቒᇬ3(,&/ት棟⸩ሼቮቂቤብ孫⏔ሼቮቂቤብ♑䏶ሼቮሶቋቒ峀ሸቯቍ
ሧᇭ3(,&/⦉㦘ቑ尞⸩ሯ⚺ቡቯሧቍሧ≬椉ቑ⒕摝ቑቢት⺍廰ቋሺⓅ⸩ሸቯ
ቂ㇆嫛䤓ቍ⦌␔㽤ቇሧቒᇬሶቑ棟ቭቊቒቍሧᇭ
≬椉⯠侓栱ሼቮ⟞櫛ቊሥቆ3(,&/ርሧ㢝䯉䤓屲㼉ሸቯሧቍሧብቑ
ቒᇬዅዙዊአኮ⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ 3(&/ 1㈢ቆ屲㼉ሸቯᇬቀቑ₼ብ拸㇢ቍ尞⸩ሯቍ
ሧ⫃⚗ቒᇬᨁᨑ┯䥮⦌ቑ㽤␀抩ቑ咻☮ⓖ⪉ቈሧ屲㼉ሸቯቮብቑቋሼቮᇭ
䶻乏偞ⓖ
䶻㧰≬椉⯠侓
ᇷ≬椉⯠侓ᇸቋቒᇬ㇢ℚ劔ቑ㡈ᇬሼቍቲቄ≬椉劔ሯᇬ䦇㓚㡈ᇬሼቍቲቄ≬椉⯠
侓劔⺍ሺᇬ≬椉㠨ት⺍∰ቋሺ䔈⸩ቑ☀椉⺍ሼቮ≬椫 孫⎮ ት侓ሼቮ⯠侓ት
ሧሩᇭ
1 Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003)♑䏶ᇭ
604
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
ᇷ≬椉ℚ㟔ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ርሧ䔈⸩ሸቯቂ☀椉ሯ⸮䚍ሼቮሶቋትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ㚜⹂≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ቫቭ䞮ሻቂ㚜⯀ት⫺孫ሼቮ券╨ት
弯ሩ≬椉ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ ⸩櫜≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮⺍ሺ⸩櫜ቑ摠攼ት㞾㓤ሩ券╨ት
弯ሩ≬椉ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ弻↊≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔ሯ嬺⹂劔⺍ሺ㽤䤓ቍ弻↊ት弯ሩሶቋት☀椉ቋሼ
ቮ≬椉ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ䞮✌≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椉劔ቑ券╨♗ቒ≬椉㠨ቑ㞾㓤ሧሯᇬ≬椉⺍廰劔ቑ㸊ℰ♗ቒ
䞮ⷧቑቢቫቆ⸩券ሸቯቮ≬椉ℚ㟔ሮሮቮ≬椉ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ⥲⇢≬椉⯠侓ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椉劔ቋ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቑ栢ርሴቮᇬ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቋ␀抩ቑ
栱≑ት㦘ሼቮ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ቑⒸ䥙ቑቂቤቑ⯠侓ትሧሩᇭ⥲⇢≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ⥲⇢㱚㒟
❰ቑ⹅㡞ብቡቂ≬椫 孫⎮ ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
ᇷ㇆Ⓟ┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ሯ⥲⇢㓏⻭ሼቮቋ呹╤䤓≬椉ትⅧሸ
ቯᇬ≬椉ት㕡倅ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቍሧ⥲⇢≬椉ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ↊㎞┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ሯ⊚ⅉቋሺ䟂手ቢᇬ♗ቒቀቑ≬椉ት㕡
倅ሺቍሮቆቂ俟㨫ቋሺᇬቀቑ≬椉ትⅧሸቯቮሶቋቋቍቮ⥲⇢≬椉ትሧሩᇭ
䶻㧰抌┯䤓⸩券
ᇷ嬺≬椉劔ᇸቋቒᇬ㚜⹂≬椉ርሧ㚜⯀⺍ሺቀቑⒸ䥙ሯ≬帆ሸቯቮ劔ትሧ
ሩᇭ
ᇷ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉᇸቋቒᇬ⸩櫜≬椉ርሧ≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧት♦ሴቮቜሰ劔ትሧ
ሩᇭ
ᇷ≬椉⺍廰劔ᇸቋቒᇬቀቑ劔ቑ䞮✌ᇬ⋴ㅆᇬ愺⇢ቑ㳮厌♗ቒ愺⇢ቑ䕅㏚ሯ≬椉
Ⅷሸቯቮ劔ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ 嬺⹂劔ᇸቋቒᇬ彯⎮弻↊≬椉ርሧᇬቀቑ劔ቑ㸊ℰᇬ⍆⹂♗ቒ㚜⯀ቇሰ嬺
≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ት弯ሩ劔ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉᇸቋቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ≬椉⯠侓ቑ弸⮁♗ቒ丰䚕ቑቂቤ怆䞷ሺቂ≬椉ⴡ
⅚劔ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ≬椉㠨ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ㙟∪⺍ሼቮ⺍∰ቋሺ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ≬椉劔⺍ሺ
㞾㓤ሩቜሰ摠攼ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ⯠侓㦮栢ᇸቋቒᇬ⯠侓ቑ偯俟㣑栚ⱚሺᇬ⚗㎞ሸቯቂ㦮栢ሯ俛拝ሺቂ㣑俑ℕ
ሼቮ⯠侓ₙቑ券╨ሯⷧ倩ሼቮ㦮栢ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ≬椉㦮栢ᇸቋቒᇬ₰㇢ℚ劔ቑ⚗㎞㈢ቆ≬椉㠨ሯ㞾㓤ቲቯቮ⺍廰ቑ㦮栢ትሧ
ሩᇭ
ᇷ弻↊㦮栢ᇸቋቒᇬ≬椫 孫⎮ ት㙟∪ሼቮ㦮栢ትሧሩᇭ
ᇷ㇆Ⓟ≬椉ᇸቋቒᇬ㽤ⅳቫቆ嵁ሸቯቮ券╨㈢ቆ偯俟ሸቯቮ≬椉ትሧ
ሩᇭ
䶻㧰㠖㦇ቑ岏崭♙ቖ屲摗2
≬椉劔ሯ㙟∪ሼቮ⏷ቑ㠖㦇ቒᇬ㢢ሮቇ㢝䨼ቊሥቆᇬ⯠侓ሯℳ䂘ሸቯቂ岏崭
ቫቆ岧承ሸቯሧቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ሯ㙟∪ሼቮ㠖㦇♗ቒ㍔⫀ቑ㠖岏ቑ㎞✂䠠券ሯሥቮቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ
嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቑሧሽቯሮቋቆ㦏ብ㦘Ⓒቍ屲摗ት㘰䞷ሼቮᇭ
2 䶻᧭᧮᧬᧯㧰᧮檔ቒᇬₜ⏻㷲⯠侓㧰檔㖖ⅳ 93/13/EEC)䶻5㧰ትኤወቋሺሧቮᇭ
605
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻㧰㠖㦇♦檧ቑ峋㕯
≬椉劔ሯ㙟∪ሼቜሰ㠖㦇ት≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ♦檧ሺቂሶቋቑ峋㢝弻↊ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ弯ሩᇭ
䶻㧰抩䩴ቑ㱧㆞
3(,&/⒴㹄ቑ⸩ቤሯሥቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሧᇬ䟂手ⅉᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠
♦♥ⅉሯ≬椉⯠侓栱ሺ嫛ሩ抩䩴ቒᇬ䔈⸩ቑ㱧㆞ቫቮቜሰሶቋት尐㻑ሸቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰ℕ䩴ቋቢቍሼ⫃⚗
≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ≬椉⯠侓ቑ偯俟♗ቒ嫛ₜ♾㶯ቍ弻╨ት
䶻ₘ劔岦ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ㇢崁䶻ₘ劔ሯ㇢崁弻╨ቑ嫛椪ሺ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊ
ሥቆቂሶቋቒᇬ㇢崁≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ䩴ቆሧቂብቑቋቢቍ
ሼᇭ
䶻㧰ぽ⒴䰐㷱3
㊶⒴ᇬⰙⲯᇬ⒉䞲ᇬ⦌仜♙ቖⅉ䲽♗ቒ㺠㡞䤓⒉呹ቒᇬ⊚ᇰቑ≬椉㠨♙ቖ≬椉俵Ⅷ
ぽ䟿ት岼ሴቮቂቤቑ尐侯ቋሺቒቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉㠨栱ሼቮ㧰ↅት⚺ቤᇬ㦻㧰檔拤♜ሼቮ⯠侓㧰ↅቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬
椉劔ቋቑ栱≑ርሧ䎰╈ቋሼቮᇭ䶻檔㦜ሼቮሶቋትⓜ㙟ቋሺᇬ⯠侓ቒ槭ぽ
⒴䤓㧰ↅ⪉ቈሧ㇢ℚ劔ት㕧㧮ሼቮᇭ
䶻檔拤♜ሼቮቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒቀቑ⯠侓ት屲侓ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ≬椉⯠
侓劔ቒᇬ㇢崁拤♜ት䩴ቆቂ㣑ሮቬℛዓ㦗ⅴ␔≬椉劔⺍ሺ㦇槱ትብቆ屲侓
抩䩴ት嫛ቲቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰按↬㮫㪊
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䟂手ⅉᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ≬椉⺍廰劔⺍ሺᇬ按↬㮫㪊ት♦ሴ啴ሺ
ሲቒቀቑ㮫㪊俟㨫ት栚䯉ሼቮሶቋት㻑ቤᇬ♗ቒቀቑ㍔⫀ት☀椉ቑ䂻⸩ቑቂቤ∎
䞷ሺቒቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻檔ቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ≬椉⺍廰劔ሯ㸂ⅴₙቊሥቮⅉ≬椉ቊሥቆᇬሶቑ劔⺍ሼቮ≬
椉摠櫜ሯₖዃዙዊት怔ራᇬ♗ቒ≬椉峋Ⓡ⪉ቈሧ㞾㓤ቲቯቮሥቂቭቑ摠櫜
ሯₖዃዙዊት怔ራቮብቑቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻乏㇆嫛尞⸩ቑ⸮䚍
䶻㧰ぽ㷱嵚㻑4
䶻檔尞⸩ሼቮ拸㫋⥲⇢ቒᇬ3(,&/ሯ䶻㧰ቫቭ拸䞷ሸቯቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ丰
懓㲸ት㦘ሼቮ⦌␔子⒳㓏ቀቑⅥቑ㳮栱⺍ሺᇬ3(,&/ቑ拤♜ት䰐㷱ሺ♗ቒቀቑ
ぽ㷱ት✌ሽቮ✌ⅳት㻑ቤቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
拸㫋⥲⇢ቋቒᇬ䀗彊劔Ⓒ䥙ቑ≬帆ቑቂቤቑぽ㷱嵚㻑㲸栱ሼቮ㦗㡴ቑ
㶶ね巿↩ዘ㶶ね䚕ℚ↩(&䶻㧰㈢ቆ㶶ねⱣ❰↩ሯ䷥⸩ሺቂኖእ
岧憘ሸቯሧቮ⥲⇢♗ቒ俓僣ት㎞✂ሼቮᇭ
606
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻㧰子⒳⮥ቑ啵㍔♙ቖ㟠䂗㓚倩
3(,&/ሯ拸䞷ሸቯቮ⫃⚗ቊሥቆብᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯᇬ
3(,&/ሯ拸䞷ሸቯቍሮቆቂቋሺቂቬⒸ䞷ሼቮሶቋቑቊሰቮ子⒳⮥ቑ啵㍔♙ቖ㟠䂗㓚
倩ቑ栚ⱚቒⰷስቬቯቍሧᇭ
䶻䵯≬椉⯠侓ቑ⒬㦮㹄椝♙ቖ㦮栢
䶻乏䟂手ⅉቑ⯠侓ⓜቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
䶻㧰⛙䩴券╨
⯠侓ቑ偯俟椪ሺᇬ䟂手ⅉቒᇬ≬椉劔⺍ሺᇬ呹むሯ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰℚ檔
ቊሥቆᇬሮቇ≬椉劔ሯ㢝䨼ሮቇ㷲䭉ቍ役⟞ቑ⺍廰ቋሺቂብቑት⛙䩴ሼቮ券╨ት
弯ሩᇭ
䶻檔⸩ቤቮℚ檔ቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔ቋቍቮ劔ሯ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊሥቆቂℚ檔ት
⚺ባᇭ
䶻㧰拤♜
≬ 椉⯠侓劔ሯ䶻㧰拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ䶻檔ቍሧሺ䶻檔㈢ሩሶቋት㧰
ↅቋሺᇬ≬椉劔ቒ⯠侓ቑ⚗䚕䤓ቍ⮘㦃ት㙟㫗ሺ♗ቒ⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮሶቋሯቊሰ
ቮᇭሶቑቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻㧰ቑ拤♜ት䩴ቆቂ㣑♗ቒቀቯሯ㢝ቬሮቍቆ
ቂ㣑ሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇬቀቑ㼉⸩ቑ㽤䤓ቍ╈㨫栱ሼቮ㍔⫀ቋቋብᇬ㦇槱ቫቭ
ቀቑ㎞⦂ት抩䩴ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ሯ⚗䚕䤓ቍ⮘㦃ት㙟㫗ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䶻檔㓏⸩ቑ抩䩴ት♦檧ሺ
ቂ㣑ሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔ቀቑ㙟㫗ት㕡倅ሺቍሧ棟ቭᇬ⯠侓ቒቀቑ㙟㫗ሸቯቂ⮘㦃⪉
ቈሧⷧ倩ሼቮᇭ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ㕡倅ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቫቮ㕡
倅ሯ㦇槱ቫቭ抩䩴ሸቯሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇬ⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
≬椉⯠侓劔ሯタ弻ℚ䟀ቍሲሺ䶻㧰拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬቀቑ㍔
⫀ት䩴ቆሧቯቓ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺቍሮቆቂሶቋት峋㢝ሺቂቋሰት棳ሰᇬ⯠侓ት俑ℕ
ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቍሧᇭ
⯠ 侓ቑ俑ℕቒᇬ䶻檔㓏⸩ቑ㦇槱ቫቮ抩䩴ት≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ♦檧ሺሮቬዓ㦗㈛
╈┪ት䞮ሽቮᇭ⮘㦃ቒᇬ㇢ℚ劔ቑ⚗㎞ብቋቈሧ╈┪ት䞮ሽቮᇭ
≬椉ℚ㟔ሯᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ拝⯀ቫቮₜ⛙䩴♗ቒₜ⸮⛙䩴ቑ⺍廰ቋቍቆቂ☀椉ቑ
尐侯ቫቆᇬ俑ℕ♗ቒ⮘㦃ሯ╈┪ት䞮ሽቮⓜ䤉䞮ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯቀቑ
㍔⫀ት䩴ቆሧቯቓ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺቍሮቆቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉摠ቒ㞾㓤ቲቯቍሧᇭቂ
ቃሺᇬ≬椉劔ሯቫቭ浧櫜ቑ≬椉㠨♗ቒ䟿ቍቮ㧰ↅቊሥቯቓ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺሧቂ⫃
⚗ቒᇬ≬椉摠ቒᇬቀቑ━⚗㉫ሻ♗ቒ崁㇢ሼቮ㧰ↅት拸䞷ሺ㞾㓤ቲቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰√⮥
䶻㧰⸩ቤቮⓅ子ቒᇬⅴₚቑ⫃⚗ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
D ⥭䷣ሯቍሸቯቍሮቆቂ役⟞♗ቒ㢝ቬሮₜ⸛⏷啴ሺሲቒₜ㷲䭉ቍ㍔⫀ᇭ
E ⛙䩴ሸቯቮቜሰቊሥቆቂ㍔⫀♗ቒₜ㷲䭉⛙䩴ሸቯቂ㍔⫀ቊሥቆᇬ⚗䚕䤓ቍ≬
椉劔ሯ⯠侓偯俟ቑ♾⚵♗ቒ⚗㎞ሸቯቂ㧰ↅቫቮ⯠侓ቑ偯俟ት⒳㠼ሼቮₙቊ摜尐
ቊቒቍሮቆቂብቑᇭ
F ≬椉劔ሯᇬ⛙䩴ቑ㉔尐ሯቍሧቋ≬椉⯠侓劔崳≰ሸሾቂ㍔⫀ᇭ
G ≬椉劔ሯ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊሥቆቂ㍔⫀ᇭ
607
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻㧰峟㷉ቫቮ拤♜
䶻㧰⸩ቤቮⓅ子ሮሮቲቬሽᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ峟㷉ቫቮ䶻㧰
ቑ拤♜ቫቆ⯠侓ት偯俟ሼቮሶቋቋቍቆቂቋሰቒᇬ⯠侓ት♥䀗ሺᇬሮቇ≬椉㠨ት扣
挓ሺቍሧሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ♥䀗ቑ抩䩴ቒᇬ峟㷉ት≬椉劔ሯ䩴ቆቂቋሰሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔
≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺ㦇槱ቊቍሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰抌┯䤓ቍ㍔⫀
䶻㧰ቍሧሺ䶻㧰ቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ⯠侓偯俟椪ሺᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䶻㧰ቫ
ቭ券╨ቈሴቬቯቂ㍔⫀┯ራ㙟∪ሺቂ㍔⫀ቇሧብ拸䞷ሸቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰按↬㮫㪊
ሶቑ乏ቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ䶻㧰䶻檔⸩ቤቮ按↬㮫㪊ቑ俟㨫ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻乏≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓偯俟ⓜቑ券╨
䶻㧰⯠侓偯俟ⓜቑ㦇槱ቑ㙟∪5
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䟂手ⅉ⺍ሺᇬ∎䞷ሺቫሩቋሼቮ⯠侓㧰檔ቑሺ♙ቖⅴₚቑ㍔⫀ቑሩ
ቄ崁㇢ሼቮብቑት岧憘ሺቂ㦇槱ት㙟∪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
D ⯠侓㇢ℚ劔ቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞㓏ᇬ䔈≬椉劔ቑ㦻ㄦ♙ቖ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺ♗ቒ≬椫 孫
⎮ ት㙟∪ሼቮ㞾ㄦሯሥቮ⫃⚗ቒቀቑ㞾ㄦቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞㓏ᇬ₵ቖ≬椉劔ቑ
㽤䤓ㇱ㏚
E 嬺≬椉劔ᇬ₵ቖ䞮✌≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ♙ቖ≬椉⺍廰劔ቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ
⇞㓏
F ≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞㓏
G ≬椉ቑ䥽䤓䓸♙ቖ≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቮ☀椉
H ≬椉摠櫜♙ቖ㘶棳ሯሥቮቋሰቒቀቑ櫜
I ≬椉㠨ቑ櫜♙ቖቀቑ並⸩㡈㽤
J ≬椉㠨ቑ㞾㓤㣑㦮₵ቖ㞾㓤ሧቑ⫃㓏♙ቖ㡈㽤
K ⯠侓㦮栢 ⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮ㡈㽤ት⚺ባᇭ ♙ቖ弻↊㦮栢
L 㚜 ⹂≬椉ርሧቒ䶻㧰ᇬ䞮✌≬椉ርሧቒ䶻㧰㈢ቆ䟂手
ት㜳⥭ሺ♗ቒ⯠侓ት♥䀗ሼ㲸Ⓒ
M ⯠侓ሯ3(,&/ቑ拸䞷ት♦ሴቮሶቋ
N 䟂手ⅉቑቂቤቑ子⒳⮥ቑ啵㍔⑵䚕♙ቖ㟠䂗Ⓟㄵቑⷧ⦷₵ቖⒸ䞷㡈㽤
O ≬峋⪉摠ቀቑⅥቑ孫⎮㘹函ቑⷧ⦷
ሶቑ㍔⫀ቒᇬ♾厌ቍ棟ቭᇬ䟂手ⅉሯ⯠侓ት偯俟ሼቮሮ⚵ሮት㮫岝ሼቮₙቊ◐⒕ቍ
㣑栢ት函ሧ㙟∪ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䟂手ⅉሯᇬ≬椉劔ሯ㙟∪ሼቮ䟂手㦇啴ሺሲቒ役⟞䯷♗ቒቀቑ♛㡈ብቋቈሧ≬
椉≬椫 孫⎮ ት䟂ሺ手ባ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ岧⏴㈛ቑ㦇槱ቑሺት䟂手ⅉℳⅧ
ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰≬椫 孫⎮ ቑₜ⚗咃ት㖖㛧ሼቮ券╨
⯠侓ቑ偯俟ሥቂቭᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䟂手ⅉሯ䕻䵚ቑⴡ⅚劔ቑ孫⇟ት♦ሴሧቮሮ⚵
ሮት⚺ባ⯠侓偯俟ቑℚ㍔♙ቖ㡈㽤ት劒㏽ሺᇬㆤሰ♦ሴቫሩቋሼቮ≬椫 孫⎮ ቋ
608
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
≬椉劔ሯ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊሥቆቂ䟂手ⅉቑ尐㦪ቋቑ栢⚗咃ሺቍሧ䍈ሯሥቯ
ቓᇬቀቯት䟂手ⅉ㖖㛧ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻檔ቑ拤♜ሯሥቆቂቋሰቒᇬ㶰ቑ♛㡈ቑ尞⸩ት拸䞷ሼቮᇭ
D ≬椉劔ቒᇬ拝⯀ቍሲ嫛╤ሺቂ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬቀቑ㖖㛧券╨
拤♜ሮቬ䞮ሻቂሼቜቑ㚜⹂ት彯⎮ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ拤♜ት䩴ቆቂቋሰሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔㦇槱ቫቭ抩䩴ሼቮሶቋ
ቫቆᇬ⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮ㲸Ⓒት㦘ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰ᇫ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ栚ⱚ㣑㦮ት㖖㛧ሼቮ券╨
䟂手ⅉሯᇬ䟂手ቑ㙟⒉㣑≬椫 孫⎮ ሯ栚ⱚሼቮቋ崳≰ሺርቭᇬቀቯሯ⚗䚕䤓ቊሥ
ቆቂ⫃⚗ርሧᇬ≬椉劔ሯሶቑ崳≰ት䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊሥቆቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉
劔ቒᇬ㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮ ትㆤሰ♦ሴቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ⯠侓ሯ偯俟ሸቯቮ㣑 ⯠侓ቑ偯
俟┯ራᇬ䶻⥭≬椉㠨ሯ㞾㓤ቲቯቮሶቋቡቊ尐ሼቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ㣑 ቡቊ≬椫
孫⎮ ሯ栚ⱚሺቍሧሶቋትᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺ䦃ቄ㖖㛧ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ≬
椉劔ቒᇬሶቑ㖖㛧券╨拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ䶻㧰䶻檔 D ㈢ቆ弻↊ት弯ሩᇭ
䶻乏⯠侓ቑ偯俟
䶻㧰ᇫ偯俟ቑ㡈㽤
≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቆ偯俟ሺ♗ቒ峋㢝ሼቮሶቋት尐ሺቍሧብቑቋሺᇬ㱧㆞ቇሧ
Ⅵቑሧሮቍቮ尐ↅብ㦜ሸቍሧᇭ⯠侓ቒᇬ♲檼ቑ峋岏ት⚺ባሧሮቍቮ㓚㹄ቫቆ
ብ峋㢝ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰ᇫ≬椉䟂手ቑ㜳⥭
≬椉ቑ䟂手ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሮቬቑ㔎嶍ት䟂手ⅉሯ♦檧ሼቮⓜ㜳⥭ሯ≬椉劔Ⓙ拣ሼቮ棟
ቭᇬ䟂手ⅉሯ㜳⥭ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰ᇫኌዙዐኍዘኇኲ㦮栢6
≬
椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ㔎嶍ቑ♦檧♗ቒ䶻㧰⸩ቤቮ㦇櫭ቑⒿ拣ቑሧሽቯሮ拔ሧ㡈ሮ
ቬ拀栢ⅴ␔㦇槱ቫቮ抩䩴ት䤉ሼቮሶቋቫቭᇬ⯠侓ት♥䀗ሼሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬⅴₚቑ⫃⚗ቒ⯠侓ት♥䀗ሼሶቋሯቊሰቍሧᇭ
D ⯠侓㦮栢ሯዓ㦗㦹䄏ቑ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ⯠侓ሯ䶻㧰ቫቭㆅ栆ሸቯቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
F 㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椉ᇬ弻↊≬椉♗ቒ⥲⇢≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ᇭ
䶻㧰ₜ㇢㧰檔7
⊚⒴䤓ℳ䂘ሸቯቍሮቆቂ㧰ↅቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ቑ㊶役ᇬⅥቑሼቜቑ⯠侓㧰ↅ♙ቖ
⯠侓ሯ偯俟ሸቯቂ㣑ቑ䕅㽐ት╧㫗ሼቮቋᇬ≰券崯⸮ቑ尐嵚♜ሺᇬ⯠侓ቑₚቊ
䞮ሽቮ≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቑ㲸Ⓒ♙ቖ券╨栱ሼቮ摜⮶ቍₜ
⧖嫰ቫቭₜⒸ䥙ትብቂቬሼ⫃⚗ቒᇬሶቯቬቑ劔ቋቑ栱≑ርሧ╈┪ት䞮ሻ
ቍሧᇭ
6 㦻㧰ቒᇬ抩≰弸⮁㖖ⅳ(2002 / 65 / EC)ትኤወቋሺሧቮᇭ
7 㦻㧰ቒᇬₜ⏻㷲⯠侓㧰檔㖖ⅳ(93 / 13 / EEC)ትኤወቋሺሧቮᇭ
609
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
⯠侓ቒᇬₜ⏻㷲ቍ㧰ↅት棳ሧብⷧ倩ሼቮሶቋሯ♾厌ቍ⫃⚗ቒᇬ₰㇢ℚ劔ት㕧㧮
ሼቮᇭሶቯⅴ⮥ቑ⫃⚗ᇬₜ⏻㷲ቍ㧰ↅቒᇬ㇢崁㧰ↅሯₜ⏻㷲ቊሥቮሶቋት䩴ቆ
ሧቯቓ⚗䚕䤓ቍ㇢ℚ劔ሯ⚗㎞ሺሧቂቊሥተሩ㧰ↅቫቆ函ሰ㙪ራቬቯቮᇭ
㦻㧰ቒᇬ≬椫 孫⎮ ት棟⸩♗ቒ⮘㦃ሼቮ㧰ↅብ拸䞷ሼቮሯᇬⅴₚቑብቑቒ拸䞷
ሺቍሧᇭ
D ≬椫 孫⎮ ♙ቖ≬椉㠨ቑ櫜ቑ䦇㇢㊶ᇭ
E ㆤሰ♦ሴቬቯቂ≬椫 孫⎮ ♗ቒ⚗㎞ሸቯቂ≬椉㠨栱ሼቮ㦻役䤓ℚ檔ት尞⸩ሼ
ቮ㧰ↅᇭቂቃሺᇬ㇢崁㧰ↅሯ㢢ሮቇቲሮቭቧሼሧ岏囘ቊ㦇ሮቯሧቮ⫃⚗
棟ቮᇭ
⯠ 侓㧰ↅቒᇬሥቬሮሻቤ⇫㒟ሸቯርቭᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯቀቑ⸮役ቇሧ㈀檎┪
ት㖐ቇሶቋሯቊሰሧቍሧ⫃⚗ᇬ䔈ℚⓜ㱧㆞▥ሸቯቂ㲨䄥⯠侓侓㷍ቊሥቮ⫃
⚗ቒᇬ⊚⒴䤓ቍℳ䂘ት俛ሧቍሧብቑቋデቢቍሸቯቮᇭሥቮ㧰ↅቑ䔈⸩ቑ⟞
櫛䍈♗ቒ㧰ↅሯ⊚⒴䤓ℳ䂘ሸቯሧቂቋሰብᇬ⯠侓ት⏷⇢ቋሺ尚ቯቓ㲨䄥
⯠侓侓㷍ቊሥቮቋ岏ራቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ⯠侓ቑⅥቑ捷⒕㦻㧰ት拸䞷ሼቮሶቋትⰷስ
ቍሧᇭ㲨䄥㧰ↅሯ⊚⒴䤓ℳ䂘ሸቯሧቮሶቋት≬椉劔ሯ㇄ሼቮቋሰቒᇬቀቑ
ሶቋቑ峋㢝弻↊ቒ≬椉劔ሯ弯ሩᇭ
䶻乏拰♙䤓♙ቖ㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮
䶻㧰拰♙䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮
⯠侓ሯ偯俟ሸቯቮⅴⓜቑ㦮栢ቇሧ㙟∪ሸቯቮ≬椫 孫⎮ 拰♙䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮
ቑ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉劔ሯᇬ⯠侓偯俟㣑≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቮ☀椉ሯ䤉䞮ሺሧቍሧሶቋ
ት䩴ቆሧቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ⯠侓偯俟㈛ቑ㦮栢ቑቢ⺍㉫ሺቂ≬椉㠨ት
弯㕔ሼቮብቑቋሼቮᇭ
拰♙䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯᇬ⯠侓偯俟㣑≬椉ℚ㟔ሯ䤉䞮ሺሧ
ቮሶቋት䩴ቆሧቂቋሰቒᇬ䶻㧰ቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቮሶቋቍሲᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ⯠侓
偯俟㈛ቑ㦮栢ቑቢቇሧ≬椫 孫⎮ ት㙟∪ሼቮብቑቋሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮
㤺 ⸩䤓ቍ≬椉⯠侓ት偯俟ሼቮቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻㧰 D ⚆ᇬ E ⚆ᇬ G
⚆ᇬ H ⚆♙ቖ K ⚆ቑሩቄ崁㇢ሼቮብቑ⸩ቤቮ㍔⫀ት岧憘ሺቂኈክዙካዙእት
䤉嫛ሼቮብቑቋሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰ቍሧሺ䶻㧰♙ቖᇬ㦻㧰䶻檔ቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቮሶቋቍሲᇬ䶻㧰
ቒᇬ㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮ ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ㦮栢
≬椉⯠侓ቑ䟂手ⅉ⺍ሺ㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮ ሯ㙟∪ሸቯቮ⫃⚗ᇬቀቑ≬椫 孫⎮
ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ₙቑ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ栚ⱚቇሰ⚗㎞ሸቯቂ㣑♗ቒ䟂手ት㦏俑䤓㕡倅ሼ
ቮ㡷ቑ抩䩴ት䟂手ⅉሯ≬椉劔ሮቬ♦檧ሺቂ㣑ቡቊⷧ倩ሼቮᇭ
⚛ቑ≬椉劔⺍ሺ≬椉⯠侓ት䟂ሺ手ቶቊሧቍሧ劔⺍ሺ㤺⸩䤓ቍ≬椫 孫⎮
ሯ㙟∪ሸቯቮ⫃⚗ᇬቀቑ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ㙟∪ቒᇬ䶻㧰䶻檔⸩ቤቮ㦮栢ቫቭብ
䩼ሧ㦮栢ቇሧ嫛ሩሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭቀቑ⫃⚗ቑ≬椫 孫⎮ ቒᇬሧሽቯሮቑ㇢ℚ劔
ሮቬᇬ拀栢ⓜ抩䩴ሼቮሶቋቫቭ♥ቭ䀗ሼሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
610
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻乏≬椉峋Ⓡ
䶻㧰␔⹈
≬椉⯠侓ት偯俟ሺቂ㣑ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬⅴₚቑ㍔⫀ቑሩቄ崁㇢ሼቮብቑት岧憘ሺቂ≬椉
峋Ⓡትᇬ≬椉峋Ⓡ岧憘ሯቍሧ⫃⚗ቒ咻䤓ቍ⯠侓㧰ↅቋ␀ᇬℳⅧሺቍሴቯቓቍ
ቬቍሧᇭ
D ⯠侓㇢ℚ劔ቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞㓏ᇬ䔈≬椉劔ቑ㦻ㄦ♙ቖ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺ♗ቒ≬椫 孫⎮ ት
㙟∪ሼቮ㞾ㄦሯሥቮ⫃⚗ቒቀቑ㞾ㄦቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞㓏ᇬ₵ቖ≬椉劔ቑ㽤䤓ㇱ㏚
E 嬺≬椉劔ᇬ₵ቖ䞮✌≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ♙ቖ≬椉⺍廰劔ቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞
㓏
F ⴡ⅚劔ቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ⇞㓏
G ≬椉ቑ䥽䤓䓸♙ቖ≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቮ☀椉
H ≬椉摠櫜♙ቖ㘶棳ሯሥቮ⫃⚗ቒቀቑ櫜
I ≬椉㠨ቑ櫜♙ቖቀቑ岗並㡈㽤
J ≬椉㠨ቑ㞾㓤㦮棟₵ቖ㞾㓤ሧቑ⫃㓏♙ቖ㡈㽤
K ⯠侓㦮栢 ⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮ㡈㽤ት⚺ባᇭ ♙ቖ弻↊㦮栢
L 㚜 ⹂≬椉ርሧቒ䶻㧰ᇬ䞮✌≬椉ርሧቒ䶻㧰⪉ቈሧᇬ䟂手
ቢት㜳⥭ሺ♗ቒ⯠侓ት♥䀗ሼ㲸Ⓒ
M ⯠ 侓ሯ3(,&/ቑ拸䞷ት♦ሴቮሶቋ
N 䟂手ⅉቑቂቤቑ子⒳⮥ቑ啵㍔⑵䚕♙ቖ㟠䂗Ⓟㄵቑⷧ⦷₵ቖቀቑⒸ䞷㡈㽤
O 孫 ⎮⪉摠ቀቑⅥቑ≬帆㘹函ቑⷧ⦷
䶻㧰峋Ⓡቑ╈┪
≬椉峋Ⓡቑ㧰檔ሯ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ䟂手ቢᇬቀቑⅥ㇢ℚ劔栢ቑℚⓜቑ⚗㎞ቋ䟿ቍቆ
ሧቮ⫃⚗ᇬ峋Ⓡቑቍሮቊ㇆嵎ሸቯሧቮ䦇拤ቒᇬ峋Ⓡቑ♦檧ሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔≬椉
⯠侓劔ሯ䟿巿ት䟂ሺ䵚ቍሧ棟ቭᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቫቆ⚛㎞ሸቯቂብቑቋቢቍሸ
ቯቮᇭ≬椉劔ቒᇬ峋Ⓡቑ₼ቊ㇆嵎ሸቯሧቮ䦇拤⺍ሺ䟿巿ት䟂ሺ䵚ቮ㲸Ⓒ
ትᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺ⮹ⷦቑ岧憘ቫቭ⛙䩴ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ሯ䶻檔㈢ቲቍሮቆቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䟂手ቶቃ㧰ↅ♗ቒ
㇢ℚ劔栢ቑℚⓜቑ⚗㎞㈢ቆ⚗㎞ሸቯቂብቑቋቢቍሼᇭ
䶻乏≬椉⯠侓ቑ㦮栢
䶻㧰≬椉⯠侓ቑ㦮栢
≬ 椉⯠侓ቑ㦮栢ቒቋሼቮᇭ㇢ℚ劔ቒᇬ☀椉ቑ㊶役ቫቭ㉔尐ቋሸቯቮቋሰቒᇬ
䟿ቍቮ㦮栢ት⚗㎞ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻檔ቒⅉ≬椉ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰⯠侓ㆅ栆
䶻㧰⸩ቤቮቑ㦮栢ሯ䄏ℕሺቂ㈛ቒᇬ⯠侓ቒᇬⅴₚቑ⫃⚗ት棳ሰㆅ栆ሸ
ቯቮᇭ
D ≬椉劔ሯᇬ⯠侓㦮栢䄏ℕቑዓ㦗ⅴₙⓜᇬ㦇槱ቫቭᇬ䚕䟀ትⅧሺ♜⺍ቑ
怲㡷ቑ抩䩴ትሺቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯᇬ⯠侓㦮栢䄏ℕቑ㡴♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ቑ≬椉㠨嵚㻑㦇ት♦檧ሺሮቬ
ዓ㦗㈛ቑሧሽቯሮ拔ሧ㡈ቡቊᇬ㦇槱ቫቭ♜⺍ቑ怲㡷ቑ抩䩴ትሺቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
611
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
㈛劔ቑ⫃⚗ቒᇬዓ㦗ቑ㦮栢ቒ嵚㻑㦇₼⮹ⷦቫቆ㢝䨼岧憘ሸቯሧ
ቮቋሰቑቢ栚ⱚሼቮᇭ
䶻檔 E ቑ拸䞷ₙᇬ抩䩴ቑ╈┪ቒ䤉≰㣑䤉䞮ሺቂብቑቋቢቍሼᇭ
䶻㧰⯠侓㧰ↅቑ⮘㦃
䶻 㧰⪉ቈሲㆅ栆ቑ⺍廰ቋቍቮ≬椉⯠侓ርሧ≬椉㠨♙ቖቀቑⅥ⯠侓ቑ㧰
ↅት⮘㦃ሼቮ㲸棟ት≬椉劔ራቮ㧰檔ቒᇬⅴₚቑ⪉䄥ሯሼቜ䄏ቂሸቯሧቮ
⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ╈┪ት㦘ሸቍሧᇭ
D ⮘㦃ቒᇬ㶰⥭ቑㆅ栆㣑ቡቊቑ栢ቒ╈┪ት㦘ሺቍሧብቑቋሸቯቮሶቋᇭ
E ≬椉劔ሯᇬ䚍⦷ቑ⯠侓㦮栢ቑ䄏ℕቫቭብዓ㦗ⅴₙⓜ㦇槱ቫቭ⮘㦃ት抩䩴
ሼቮሶቋᇭ
F 抩䩴ቑ₼ቊᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬ⯠侓俑ℕቑ㲸Ⓒሯሥቮሶቋ♙ቖቀቑ㲸Ⓒሯ嫛
∎ሸቯቍሮቆቂ⫃⚗ቑ╈㨫ሯ崻㢝ሸቯሧቮሶቋᇭ
䶻檔ቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ⮘㦃㧰檔ቑ╈┪栱ሼቮⅥቑⓅ侓ቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቮብቑቊቒቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉ℚ㟔䤉䞮㈛ቑ⯠侓ቑ俑ℕ
≬椉ℚ㟔䤉䞮㈛ቑ⯠侓俑ℕት⸩ቤቮ㧰檔ቒᇬⅴₚቑ♛㡈ሯ䄏ቂሸቯቮቋሰት棳ሰ
╈┪ት㦘ሺቍሧᇭ
D ⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮ㲸Ⓒሯ₰㇢ℚ劔ራቬቯሧቮሶቋᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓ሯⅉ≬椉栱ሼቮብቑቊቒቍሧሶቋᇭ
俑ℕ㧰檔♙ቖ俑ℕ㲸ቑ嫛∎ቒᇬሧሽቯብ⚗䚕䤓ቊቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉ℚ㟔ት䩴ቆሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇬ䦇㓚㡈⺍ሺ㦇槱ቫቮ俑ℕቑ抩䩴ት䤉ሺ
ቍሧቋሰቒᇬ㇢ℚ劔ቑ⯠侓俑ℕ㲸ቒ䀗䅔ሼቮᇭ
≬椫 孫⎮ ቒᇬ䶻檔㈢ቆቂ抩䩴ቑ拀栢㈛俑ℕሼቮᇭ
䶻乏⯠侓㈛ቑ≬椉劔ቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
䶻㧰咻䤓ቍ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
⯠侓㦮栢₼ᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬቀቑ⚜䱿♙ቖ㓏⦷⦿ᇬ㽤䤓ㇱ㏚ᇬ㦻ㄦ♙ቖ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺቂⅲ
䚕ㄦ♗ቒ㞾ㄦቑ㓏⦷⦿栱ሼቮ⮘㦃ቑ㍔⫀ትᇬ拔䅭ቍሲᇬ㦇槱ቫቭ≬椉⯠侓劔㙟
∪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰嵚㻑ቫቮ抌┯䤓㍔⫀
≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ嵚㻑ሼቮ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬⅴₚቑℚ檔栱ሼቮ㍔⫀ት拔䅭ቍሲᇬ
≬椉⯠侓劔㙟∪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
D ≬椉劔⺍ሺᇬ⚗䚕䤓尐㻑ቊሰቮ乓⦁␔ርሧᇬ⯠侓ቑ嫛栱ቲቮ
⒖ቑℚ檔ᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓劔ቋ偯俟ሺቂ⯠侓ቋ⚛䲽ቑ≬椉⯠侓ቇሧᇬ≬椉劔ሯ∎䞷ሼቮ㠿ሺ
ሧ㲨䄥⯠侓㧰ↅᇭ
≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ嵚㻑♙ቖ≬椉劔ቑ⥭䷣ቒᇬሧሽቯብ㦇槱ቫቬቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
612
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻䵯≬椉ⴡ⅚劔
䶻㧰≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉቑ㲸棟
≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉቒᇬ䚍⦷ቑ≬椉㯼䟛ቑ㏲嫛ርሧ呹愺ቑ㯼╨乓⦁⻭ሼቮ嫛䍉ቑ⏷
ትᇬ≬椉劔ቑቂቤ⸮嫛ሼቮ㲸棟ት㦘ሼቮᇭ≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉቑ㲸棟嵁ሸቯቂሧሮ
ቍቮⓅ棟ብᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬ䕻䵚ቑ㦇槱ቫቭ㢝䨼抩䩴ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬ
ቍሧᇭቂቃሺᇬ≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉቑ㲸棟ቒᇬ⺠ቍሲቋብ⸮椪ቑ㯼╨Ᵽ岦乓⦁ት⚺ባብቑ
ቊቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉቑ㲸棟ቒᇬሧሮቍቮ⫃⚗ብᇬⅴₚቑብቑት⚺ባብቑቋሼቮᇭ
D ≬椉⯠侓劔㍔⫀ት㙟∪ሺሮቇ┸岏ሼቮሶቋᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓劔ሮቬቑ抩䩴ት♦檧ሼቮሶቋᇭ
≬椉ⅲ䚕ⅉሯቀቑ㯼╨ቑ拝䲚ቊ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊሥቆቂሶቋቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ䩴
ቆሧቂቋቢቍሼᇭ
䶻㧰䕻䵚ቋ䱿ሼቮ≬椉劔ቑⅲ䚕ⅉ
≬椉劔ቑⅲ䚕ⅉሯ䕻䵚ቑⴡ⅚劔ቋ䱿ሺሧቮ⫃⚗ᇬ䕻䵚ቑⴡ⅚劔嵁ሸቯቮ㽤㈚ₙ
ቑ券╨拤♜ሺ嫛╤ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬቀቑ拤♜ቇሧ弻↊ት弯ሩᇭ
䶻䵯≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቮ☀椉
䶻乏℗棁㘹函
䶻㧰℗棁㘹函㎞券
℗棁㘹函ቋቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ቑ㧰檔ቊሥቆᇬ≬椉劔ቑ弻↊ቑⓜ㙟㧰ↅቋሸቯሧቮሮ⚵
ሮት⟞ቲሽᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔⺍ሺᇬ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ⓜ⇤ቬሮቑ嫛䍉ት
嫛ሩሶቋ♗ቒ嫛ቲቍሧሶቋት券╨Ⅷሴቮብቑትሧሩᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓屲侓㲸
℗棁㘹函拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗≬椉劔ሯ⯠侓ት俑ℕሸሾቮ㲸棟ት㦘ሼቮሶቋት⸩ቤቮ
㧰檔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯᇬ㚜⯀ት䤉䞮ሸሾቮ㎞⦂ትብቆ♗ቒ㚜⯀ቑ
䤉䞮ቑርቀቯሯሥቮሶቋት崜巧ቍሯቬ䎰嶏券╨拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ╈┪ት
㦘ሺቍሧᇭ
屲侓㲸ቒᇬ℗棁㘹函ቑ拤♜ሯ≬椉劔ቑ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ≬椉劔㢝ቬሮቍቆቂ㣑ሮቬ
ዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሼቮ㦇槱ቫቆ嫛∎ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ≬椫
孫⎮ ቒᇬ屲侓㣑俑ℕሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቑ⏜弻
℗棁㘹函ቑ拤♜ቫቆ≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ቑ⏷捷♗ቒ捷ት⏜ቯቮሶቋት⸩ቤቮ㧰檔
ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯ㚜⯀ት䤉䞮ሸሾቮ㎞⦂ትብቆ♗ቒ㚜⯀ቑ䤉䞮ቑ
ርቀቯሯሥቮሶቋት崜巧ቍሯቬ䎰嶏券╨拤♜ሺቂሶቋቫቆ㚜⯀ሯ䤉䞮ሺ
ቂ棟ㄵርሧቑቢ╈┪ት㦘ሼቮᇭ
拝⯀ቑ䲚ㄵ㈢ቆ≬椉摠ት䂪櫜ሼቮ㢝䨼ቍ尞⸩ሯሥቯቓቀቯ㈢ሩሶቋት㧰ↅ
ቋሺᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ拝⯀ቫቮ℗棁㘹函ቑ拤♜ቫቆ䤉䞮ሺ
ቂ㚜⯀⺍ሺ≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧት♦ሴቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
613
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻乏☀椉ቑ⬦┯
䶻㧰☀椉ቑ⬦┯栱ሼቮ㧰檔
≬椉⯠侓₼ᇬ≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቂ☀椉ቑ⬦┯栱ሼቮ㧰檔ሯ⚺ቡቯሧቮ⫃⚗ᇬቀቑ
㧰檔ቒᇬ㇢崁☀椉ቑ⬦┯ሯ摜⮶ቍብቑቊሥቭᇬሮቇ≬椉⯠侓ርሧ䔈⸩ሸቯቂ䲽櫭
ቑብቑቊሥቮቋሰት棳ሰᇬ╈┪ት㦘ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰☀椉ቑ⬦┯ት抩䩴ሼቮ券╨
☀椉ቑ⬦┯栱ሼቮ㧰檔ሯቀቑ抩䩴ት券╨ቈሴሧቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺
≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቒᇬ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑⷧ⦷♙ቖ☀椉ቑ⬦┯ት䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮ
ቜሰቊሥቆቂሶቋት㧰ↅቋሺᇬቀቑ抩䩴ትሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ抩䩴券╨ት弯
ሩ劔ⅴ⮥ቑ劔ቫቮ抩䩴ብ╈┪ት㦘ሼቮᇭ
抩䩴ት㓏⸩ቑ㦮栢␔嫛ሩቫሩ㧰檔₼ቊ券╨ቈሴቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ㦮栢ቒ⚗䚕䤓
ቍብቑቊቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ抩䩴ቒ䤉≰ቑ㣑╈┪ት㦘ሼቮᇭ
抩䩴券╨ቑ拤♜ሯሥቆቂቋሰᇬ≬椉劔ሯᇬቀቑሶቋት䚕䟀ቋሺ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ乓
⦁␔⚺ቡቯቮℚ㟔ሮቬቀቯⅴ棜䤉䞮ሺቂ㚜⯀ቇሧቑ㞾㓤ት㕡ባሶቋቒᇬ
ቀቑ㚜⯀ሯ☀椉ቑ⬦┯ት抩䩴ሺቍሮቆቂሶቋቑ俟㨫ቊቍሧ棟ቭᇬ峀ሸቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰⯠侓ቑ俑ℕ♙ቖ⏜弻
⯠侓ርሧᇬ≬椫 孫⎮ ሸቯቂ☀椉ሯ⬦┯ሺቂቋሰቒ≬椉劔ሯ⯠侓ት屲侓ሼቮሶ
ቋሯቊሰቮቋ⸩ቤሧቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ㲸Ⓒቒᇬ☀椉ቑ⬦┯ሯ≬椉劔ቑ䩴ቭᇬ♗
ቒ≬椉劔㢝ቬሮቍቆቂ㣑ሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሼቮ㦇槱ቫቆ
嫛∎ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
☀椉ቑ≬椫 孫⎮ ቒᇬ俑ℕሮቬዓ㦗㈛ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䶻㧰ቑ券╨㎞⦂䤓
拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗ቒ屲侓㣑ᇬ俑ℕሼቮᇭ
≬椉ℚ㟔ሯᇬ☀椉ቑ≬椫 孫⎮ ሯ俑ℕሼቮⓜᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰ
ቊሥቆቂ☀椉ቑ⬦┯ሮቬ䤉䞮ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ⬦┯㈛ቑ☀椉ቊሥቯቓ≬椉劔ቒㆤሰ♦
ሴቍሮቆቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉摠ቒ㞾㓤ቲቯቍሧᇭ≬椉劔ሯᇬ⬦┯㈛ቑ☀椉ትቫቭ浧
ሧ≬椉㠨♗ቒ䟿ቍቮ㧰ↅቑₚቊㆤሰ♦ሴሧቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉摠ቒᇬቀቑ━⚗
㉫ሻ♗ቒ崁㇢ሼቮ㧰ↅት拸䞷ሺ㞾㓤ቲቯቮᇭ
䶻乏☀椉ቑ䂪⺠
䶻㧰☀椉ቑ䂪⺠ቑ╈㨫
☀ 椉ቑ摜⮶ቍ䂪⺠ሯሥቆቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ㸚ⷧሼቮ⯠侓㦮栢ቇሧ
ᇬቀቑ━⚗㉫ሻቂ≬椉㠨ቑ䂪櫜ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
₰㇢ℚ劔ሯᇬ━⚗㉫ሻቂ䂪櫜ቇሧ嵚㻑ሮቬዓ㦗ቑ栢⚗㎞ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰ
ቍሧቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ嵚㻑ሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔㦇槱ቫቮ抩䩴ቫቆ⯠侓ት
屲侓ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
614
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻䵯≬椉㠨
䶻㧰䶻⥭♗ቒ㣑㓤ሧ≬椉㠨
≬椉劔ሯᇬ䶻⥭♗ቒ㣑㓤ሧ≬椉㠨ቑ㞾㓤ሧት⯠侓ቑ㒟䵚♗ቒ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ栚ⱚቑ㧰
ↅቋሺሧቮቋሰቒᇬቀቑ㧰ↅቒᇬ㶰ቑ⏷ት䄏ቂሼ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ╈┪ት䞮ሻቍሧብ
ቑቋሼቮᇭ
D ቀቑ㧰ↅሯᇬ㢝䨼ቍ嫷䚍ቫቭᇬሮቇ≬椉㠨ሯ㞾㓤ቲቯቮቡቊቒ≬椫 孫⎮ ሯ栚ⱚ
ሸቯቍሧ㡷ት䟂手ⅉ⺍ሺ巵⛙ሼቮሶቋቫቭᇬ㦇槱ቊ䟂手ⅉ⺍ሺ↬拣ሸ
ቯሧቮሶቋᇭ
E D ቑ尐ↅት䄏ቂሼ嵚㻑㦇ቑ♦檧㈛ᇬ㞾㓤ሧሯቍሸቯቮሶቋቍሲ拀栢ቑ㦮栢ሯ俛
拝ሺሧቮሶቋᇭ
䶻㧰⥭䥽ⅴ棜ቑ≬椉㠨
⥭䥽ⅴ棜ቑ≬椉㠨ሯ㞾㓤ቲቯቍሧ⫃⚗≬椉劔ሯ☀椉ት≬椫 孫⎮ ሼቮ券╨ሮቬ
⏜ቯቮሶቋት⸩ቤቮ㧰檔ቒᇬ㶰ቑሼቜት䄏ቂሼ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ╈┪ት䞮ሻቍሧብ
ቑቋሼቮᇭ
D ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯᇬ㞾㓤ሩቜሰ≬椉㠨ቑ㷲䭉ቍ摠櫜♙ቖ㞾㓤ሧቑ㦮㡴ት岧憘ሺቂ嵚
㻑㦇ት♦檧ሺቂሶቋᇭ
E ≬椉㠨ቑ㞾㓤㦮㡴ት拝ሱቂ㈛ᇬ≬椉劔ሯᇬ㞾㓤ሩቜሰ≬椉㠨ቑ㷲䭉ቍ摠櫜
ቇሧቑ⌻⛙㦇ት≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺ抐Ⅷሺᇬ⺠ቍሲቋብ拀栢ቑ抌┯䤓ቍ㞾
㓤㦮栢ትራᇬሮቇ㞾㓤ሧሯቍሸቯቍሴቯቓ䦃ቄ≬椫 孫⎮ ሯ⋫㷱ሼቮሶቋ
ት≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺ巵⛙ሺቂሶቋᇭ
F 㞾 㓤ሧሯቍሸቯቮሶቋቍሲᇬ E ⚆ቑ尐ↅ⸩ቤቮ抌┯䤓ቍ㦮栢ሯ俛拝ሺቂሶ
ቋᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻檔 E ⚆⸩ቤቮ抌┯䤓ቍ㦮栢ሯ俛拝ሺቂ㈛ቒᇬ弻↊ሮቬ⏜ቯቮᇭ
≬椫 孫⎮ ቒᇬ⯠侓ሯ䶻㧰ሺቂሯቆ屲侓ሸቯቂ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔
ሯ㞾㓤ሩቜሰ摠櫜ት㞾㓤ቆቂቋሰቒ䦃ቄ⺕㧴⚠ሮቆ㈸㿊ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰⯠侓ቑ屲侓
≬ 椉㠨ሯ㞾㓤ቲቯቍሧቡቡ䶻㧰 E ⚆♗ቒ䶻㧰䶻檔 E ⚆⸩ቤቮ㦮栢
ሯ俛拝ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቮ抩䩴ትብቆ⯠侓ት屲侓ሼቮሶቋሯቊ
ሰቮᇭቂቃሺᇬ䶻㧰 E ⚆㓏⸩ቑ嵚㻑㦇♗ቒ䶻㧰䶻檔 E ⚆㓏⸩ቑ⌻⛙
㦇≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓屲侓㲸ሯ岧憘ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗棟ቮᇭ
≬椉劔ሯⅴₚቑ㦮栢␔㞾㓤ሧት㻑ቤቮ峃ራት㙟怆ሺቍሧ⫃⚗ቒᇬ⯠侓ቒ屲侓
ሸቯቂብቑቋቢቍሼᇭ
D 䶻⥭ቑ≬椉㠨ቇሧቒᇬ䶻㧰 E ⚆⸩ቤቮ㦮栢ቑ俛拝㈛ዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇭ
E ⥭䥽ⅴ棜ቑ≬椉㠨ቇሧቒᇬ䶻㧰䶻檔 E ⚆⸩ቤቮ㦮栢ቑ俛拝㈛
ዓ㦗ⅴ␔ᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉㠨ቑ♾⒕㊶
≬椉⯠侓ሯ⯠侓㦮栢ቑ䄏ℕⓜ屲侓ሸቯቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ屲侓ቫቭⓜቑ㦮栢ሮ
ሮቮ≬椉㠨ቑቢት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉㠨ት㞾㓤ሩ㲸Ⓒ
ⅴₚቑሧሽቯሮቑ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻ₘ劔ቫቮ㞾㓤ሧት㕡ቶቊቒቍቬቍሧᇭ
D 䶻ₘ劔ሯ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ⚛㎞ት㈦嫛䍉ሼቮቋሰᇭ
615
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
E 䶻ₘ劔ሯ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ倨倩ቇሧ㷲㇢ቍⒸ䥙ት㦘ሺሧቮ⫃⚗ቊሥቆᇬ≬椉⯠
侓劔ሯ㞾㓤㦮棟㞾㓤ሧት嫛ቲቍሧቋሰ♗ቒ㞾㓤ሧት嫛ቲቍሧቊሥተሩሶቋሯ㢝
ቬሮቊሥቮቋሰᇭ
䶻䵯≬椉ℚ㟔
䶻㧰≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ抩䩴
≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ቒᇬ≬椉≬椫 孫⎮ ቑⷧ⦷♙ቖ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ት䩴ቭᇬ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜ
ሰቊሥቆቂሶቋት㧰ↅቋሺᇬ抩䩴券╨ት弯ቆሧቮ劔ᇬሼቍቲቄ⫃⚗㉫ሻ
≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቫቭᇬ≬椉劔抩䩴ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬ
ቍሧᇭ䶻ₘ劔ቫቮ抩䩴ብ╈┪ት㦘ሼቮᇭ
㇢崁抩䩴ቒ拔䅭ቍሲሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ抩䩴ቒ䤉≰ቫቭ╈┪ት㦘ሼቮᇭ⯠
侓ₙቊ㓏⸩㦮栢␔ቑ抩䩴ት券╨ቈሴሧቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ㦮栢ቒᇬ㡴ⅴₙቊሥቆ
ሮቇ⚗䚕䤓ቍ㦮栢ቊቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
㞾㓤≬椉摠ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ抩䩴ቑ拔䅭ቫቭ㚜⹂ት嬺ቆቂሶቋት峋㢝ሺቂ棟ㄵቊ䂪
櫜ሸቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰嵚㻑㣑ቑ◣┪
≬椉⯠侓劔ᇬ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቒᇬ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ嵎㪊ᇬቋቭቲሴⅴₚቑℚ
檔ቇሧᇬ⚗䚕䤓ቍ尐㻑ሯሥቯቓ≬椉劔◣┪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
ದ ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ☮⥯♙ቖ俟㨫ቇሧቑ㍔⫀
ದ ≬椉ℚ㟔栱ሼቮ㦇峋ቀቑⅥቑ峋㕯
ದ 栱≑ሼቮ⫃㓏ቛቑ䵚ቄ⏴ቭ
䶻檔拤♜ሺቂ⫃⚗ᇬ䶻檔ቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቮሶቋቍሲᇬ≬椉摠ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ拤♜
ቫቭ㚜⹂ት嬺ቆቂሶቋት峋㢝ሺቂ棟ㄵቊ䂪櫜ሸቯቮᇭ
䶻檔ቑ拤♜ሯᇬ㚜⹂ት䤉䞮ሸሾቮ㎞⦂ትብቆ♗ቒ㚜⹂ቑ䤉䞮ቑርቀቯሯሥቮሶ
ቋት崜巧ሺቍሯቬ䎰嶏ቍሸቯቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒ≬椉摠ት㞾㓤ሩ券╨ት弯ቲቍ
ሧᇭ
䶻㧰嵚㻑ቑ㔎嶍
≬椉劔ቒᇬ嵚㻑抮ቧሮ㉫ሽቮቫሩሥቬቩቮ⚗䚕䤓ቍ㓚㹄ትቋቬቍሴቯቓቍቬ
ቍሧᇭ
嵚㻑ቒᇬ栱≑ሼቮ㦇櫭ቀቑⅥ㍔⫀ት♦檧ሺሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔䚕䟀ትⅧሺቂ㦇槱
ቫቮ抩䩴ትብቆ嵚㻑ት㕡倅ሺ♗ቒ㔎嶍ትㆅ㦮ሺቍሧ棟ቭᇬ㔎嶍ሸቯቂብቑቋቢ
ቍሸቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰嫛㦮
嵚㻑ት㔎嶍ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ拔ㆅቍሲᇬ㞾㓤ሧት嫛ሧᇬ♗ቒ侓⸩ሸቯቂ㈈
╨ት㙟∪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
嵚㻑摠櫜ቑ⏷櫜ሯ䭉⸩ሸቯቮⅴⓜቊሥቆብᇬ⺠ቍሲቋብቀቑ捷⒕ቇሧ嵚
㻑劔ቑ㲸Ⓒሯ崜ቤቬቯቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ捷⒕ቒ拔ㆅቍሲ㞾㓤ቲቯ♗ቒ俵Ⅷሸቯቍ
ሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧቒᇬ䶻檔ቑ⫃⚗ብ䶻檔ቑ⫃⚗ብᇬቀቑ嵚㻑摠櫜ት㔎嶍ሺቂቋ
ሰᇬ♗ቒ≬椉摠櫜ቑ⏷捷啴ሺሲቒ捷ሯ䭉⸩ሺቂቋሰሮቬᇬ拀栢ⅴ␔ሸቯቍ
ሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
616
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻㧰㞾㓤ሧቑ拔ㆅ8
≬ 椉摠ሯ䶻㧰㈢ቆ㞾㓤ቲቯቍሮቆቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ嵚㻑㲸劔ቒᇬቀቑ摠櫜
ቇሰᇬ㞾㓤ሧሯቍሸቯቮቜሰ㡴ሮቬ㞾㓤ሧ㡴ቡቊᇬ㶶ね₼⮽攏嫛ሯ㇢崁◙㦮ቑ㦏
⒬ቑ㤵㡴䦃ⓜ⸮㡌ሺሧቂ尐ኲቾኁኧዐኔዐኍዘኇዉዙኔዄዐ拸䞷ሺ
ቂⒸ䘖ኮዙኘዐእት┯ራቂⒸ㋾ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
嵚㻑㲸劔ቒᇬሶቑሮ≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧቑ拔ㆅቫቆ嬺ቆቂ㚜⹂ሯሥቮቋሰ
ቒᇬቀቑ彯⎮ት㻑ቤቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻䵯䀗䅔㣑╈
䶻㧰≬椉㠨㞾㓤嵚㻑㲸
≬椉㠨㞾㓤嵚㻑㲸ቒᇬ㞾㓤㦮㡴ሮቬ栢嫛ቲቯቍሧቋሰቒᇬ㣑╈ቫቆ䀗䅔ሼ
ቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉俵Ⅷ嵚㻑㲸
≬椉俵Ⅷ嵚㻑㲸ቒᇬ☮ⓖቋሺᇬ≬椉劔ሯ嵚㻑栱ሼቮ㦏俑ቑ㼉⸩ት嫛ሧ♗ቒ䶻
㧰ቫቭ嫛ቆቂቋቢቍሸቯቂ㣑ሮቬ栢嫛ቲቯቍሧቋሰቒᇬ㣑╈ቫቆ
䀗䅔ሼቮᇭቂቃሺᇬሧሮቍቮ⫃⚗ብᇬ嵚㻑㲸ቒ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮㣑ሮቬ俛拝
ሺቂቋሰᇬ㣑╈ቫቆ䀗䅔ሼቮሯᇬ䞮✌≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ቒሶቑ㦮栢ቒ栢ቋሼ
ቮᇭ
䞮✌≬椉ቑ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ㞾㓤嵚㻑㲸ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ≬椉劔ሮቬ䭉⸩䤓ቍ岗並㦇
ት♦檧ሺቂ㣑ሮቬ栢嫛ቲቯቍሧቋሰቒᇬ㣑╈ቫቆ䀗䅔ሼቮᇭቂቃሺᇬሧ
ሮቍቮ⫃⚗ብᇬ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ቑ俑ℕሮቬት俛拝ሺቂ㣑ሮቬᇬ嵚㻑㲸ቒᇬ㣑
╈ቫቆ䀗䅔ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰㣑╈栱ሼቮቀቑⅥቑℚ檔
3(,&/䶻㧰ርቫቖ䶻㧰ቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቮሶቋቍሲᇬ≬椉⯠侓ሮቬ䞮ሽቮ嵚
㻑㲸ቒᇬዅዙዊአኮ⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ 3(&/ 9䶻㧰ሮቬ䶻㧰ቑ尞⸩ት拸䞷ሼ
ቮᇭ≬椉⯠侓ርሧቒᇬ3(,&/䶻㧰䶻檔㈢ቆᇬሶቯቋ䟿ቍቮ⚗㎞ትሼቮ
ሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻捷㚜⹂≬椉␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻䵯≬椉摠櫜♙ቖ≬椉∰櫜
䶻㧰㞾㓤ሧ櫜ቑₙ棟
≬椉劔ቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔ሯ䚍⸮嬺ቆቂ㚜⯀ትቶ孫ሼቮቂቤ㉔尐ቍ摠櫜ት怔ራቮ
㞾㓤ሧትሼቮ券╨ት弯ቲቍሧᇭ
≬椉ቑ䥽䤓䓸ቑ∰櫜ቇሧ⚗㎞ሼቮ㧰檔ቒᇬ⚗㎞ሸቯቂ∰櫜ሯ䥽䤓䓸ቑ䚍⸮ቑ
∰櫜ት怔ራሧቮቋሰቊብᇬ∰櫜ቇሧቑ⚗㎞ሯቍሸቯቂ㣑≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ
8 㦻㧰ቒᇬ㞾㓤拔ㆅ㖖ⅳ(2000 / 35 / EC)䶻3㧰1檔(d)ትኤወቋሺሧቮᇭ
9 Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2000), Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer International, The Hague 2003)♑䏶ᇭ
617
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
嬺≬椉劔ቑ⌃⚗㎞㒟䵚⺍ሺ㈀檎ትራቂ峟㷉♗ቒₜ⸮⛙䩴ሯቍሧ棟ቭ╈┪
ት㦘ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰捷≬椉
≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉摠櫜ሯᇬ≬椉ትⅧሸቯቂ弰䞲ቑ≬椉ℚ㟔䤉䞮㣑ቑ∰櫜䄏ቂቍሧ
⫃⚗ብᇬ≬椉摠櫜ቑ棟ㄵቊ㚜⯀ትቶ孫ሼቮ弻↊ት弯ሩᇭ
ሶቑ尞⸩ሮሮቲቬሽᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻檔㈢ሧ孫⎮ት㙟∪ሼቮ⫃⚗ርሧᇬ㞾
㓤ቲቯቮ≬椉摠ሯ㚜⯀䤉䞮㣑ቑ弰䞲ቑ䚍⸮ቑ∰⊳⺍ሺ≬椉摠櫜ሯ㦘ሼቮ━⚗
棟⸩ሸቯቮቋሧሩ␔⹈ቑ≬椉ት㙟∪ሼቮሶቋብቊሰቮᇭሶቑ⫃⚗ቒᇬ䶻
㧰⸩ቤቮ㚜⹂憌䂪ቑቂቤቑ㘹函尐ሼቮ彊䞷ብᇬ⚛ሻ━⚗ቊቶ孫ሸቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰怔拝≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ቑ㧰ↅ⮘㦃
≬椉摠櫜ሯ≬椉⯠侓ቑₚቊ䞮ሻ㈦ቮ㦏⮶ቑ㚜⯀櫜ት怔ራቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬሧሽቯቑ㇢
ℚ劔ብᇬ㸚ⷧሼቮ⯠侓㦮栢ቇሧᇬ≬椉摠櫜ቑ䂪櫜♙ቖሶቯ⺍㉫ሺቂ≬椉㠨
ቑ䂪櫜ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
嵚㻑ሯቍሸቯሮቬዓ㦗ⅴ␔䂪櫜ቇሧ⚗㎞拣ሺቍሧቋሰቒᇬሧሽቯቑ㇢
ℚ劔ብ⯠侓ት屲侓ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰摜宖≬椉
⚛ ቑⒸ䥙ሯⅴₙቑ≬椉劔ቫቭ䕻䵚孫⎮ሸቯሧቮቋሰቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬሧ
ሽቯሮⅴₙቑ≬椉劔⺍ሺᇬ嬺≬椉劔ሯ䚍⸮嬺ቆቂ㚜⯀ትቶ孫ሼቮቂቤ
㉔尐ቍ棟ㄵቡቊ嵚㻑ትሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
嵚㻑ት♦ሴቂ≬椉劔ቒᇬⅥቑ≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ㻑⎮㲸ቑ嫛∎ትⰷስቮሶቋቍሲᇬ呹
むቑ≬椉峋Ⓡₙቑ≬椉摠櫜拣ሼቮቡቊቑ摠櫜ትᇬ㚜⹂棁㷱彊䞷ሯ㞾⒉ሸቯሧ
ቮቋሰቒቀቯቋቋብ㞾㓤ቲቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔栢ርሧቒᇬ䶻檔⸩ቤቮ㲸Ⓒ♙ቖ券╨ቒᇬቀቯቁቯሯ嬺≬椉劔⺍ሺ
䕻䵚弻↊ት弯ሩ摠櫜㹣√ሼቮብቑቋሼቮᇭ
䶻䵯≬椉摠嵚㻑㲸
䶻㧰㚜⯀ቋቑ⥯㨫栱≑
≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ㚜⯀ት䤉䞮ሸሾቮ㎞⦂ትብቆ♗ቒ㚜⯀ቑ䤉䞮ቑር
ቀቯሯሥቮሶቋት崜巧ቍሯቬ䎰嶏ሺቂ呹むቑ⌃ቑ嫛䍉♗ቒₜ⇫䍉ቫቭ㚜⯀ሯ
䤉䞮ሺቂ棟ㄵርሧቒᇬ㚜⹂ቑቶ孫ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቍሧᇭ
拝⯀ቑ䲚ㄵ㈢ቆ≬椉摠ት䂪櫜ሼቮ㢝䨼ቍ≬椉峋Ⓡₙቑ尞⸩ሯሥቯቓቀቯ㈢
ሩሶቋት㧰ↅቋሺᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ拝⯀ቑሥቮ嫛䍉♗ቒₜ⇫䍉
ቫቭ䤉䞮ሺቂ㚜⯀⺍ሺᇬቶ孫ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻檔♙ቖ䶻檔ርሧᇬ㚜⯀ቑ⥭挎♗ቒ憌䂪ት㊯ቆቂሶቋቒ㚜⯀ቋቑ⥯㨫栱≑
⚺ቡቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰㚜⹂憌䂪彊䞷
≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯ孫⎮ሸቯቮ㚜⯀ት憌䂪ሼቮቂቤቑ㘹函ት♥
ቆቂሶቋቫቭ弯㕔ሺቂ彊䞷♗ቒ嬺ቆቂ㚜⹂ቑ櫜ቇሧᇬ㚜⯀ት憌䂪ሼቮ╈㨫
ሯቍሮቆቂ⫃⚗ቊሥቆብᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯቀቑ㘹函ት㇢崁ℚ㍔ቑₚ
ቊ⚗䚕䤓ቋ≰ሻቂሶቋሯ䦇㇢ቊሥቮ棟ㄵርሧᇬቶ孫ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
618
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻檔㈢ቆ♥ቬቯቂ㘹函ቇሧቒᇬ孫⎮ሸቯቮ㚜⯀ቑቶ孫ቋ⚗
岗ሼቯቓ㞾㓤摠櫜ሯ≬椉摠櫜ት怔ራቮቋሰቊሥቆብᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔
⺍ሺᇬቶ孫ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻䵯ⅲ⇜㲸
䶻㧰ⅲ⇜
䶻 檔ቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቮሶቋቍሲᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔⺍ሺቶ孫ትሺቂ乓⦁␔
ቊᇬ㚜⯀ቇሰ弻↊ሥቮ䶻ₘ劔⺍ሺⅲ⇜㲸ት嫛∎ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻ₘ劔⺍ሼቮ㲸Ⓒት㟍㭓ሺቂሶቋቫቭ≬椉劔ቑⅲ⇜㲸ት⹂ሺቂ
ቋሰቒᇬቀቑ棟ㄵቊ㇢崁㚜⯀⺍ሼቮቶ孫ት♦ሴቮ㲸Ⓒት⯀ሩᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔啴ሺሲቒ嬺≬椉劔ቑ₥ゾቑ㱚㒟❰ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔啴ሺሲቒ嬺
≬椉劔⺍ሺሶቯቋ⚛䷘ቑ䯍↩䤓栱≑ሥቮ劔♗ቒ≬椉⯠侓劔啴ሺሲቒ嬺≬椉
劔ቑ嬺䞷劔⺍ሺቒᇬቀቯቬቑ劔ሯ㚜⯀ት䤉䞮ሸሾቮ㎞⦂ትብቆ♗ቒ㚜⯀ቑ
䤉䞮ቑርቀቯሯሥቮሶቋት崜巧ቍሯቬ䎰嶏㚜⯀ት䤉䞮ሸሾቂሶቋት峋㢝ሺቂ⫃
⚗ት棳ሰᇬⅲ⇜㲸ት嫛∎ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቍሧᇭ
≬ 椉劔ቒᇬⅲ⇜㲸ቑ嫛∎ቫቆ嬺≬椉劔ቑⒸ䥙ት⹂ሼቮሶቋቒቊሰቍሧᇭ
䶻䵯≬椉⯠侓劔ቋ嬺≬椉劔ሯ䟿ቍቮ⫃⚗
䶻㧰嬺≬椉劔ቑ㲸Ⓒ
≬ 椉⯠侓劔ⅴ⮥ቑ劔ቑቂቤሼቮ≬椉⯠侓ርሧቒᇬ≬椉ℚ㟔ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ㣑
ቒᇬቀቑ≬椉⯠侓劔ⅴ⮥ቑ劔ሯ≬椉摠ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬⅴₚቑሧሽቯሮቑ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ⅴ⮥ቑ劔ቑቂቤሼቮ
孫⎮ት㜳⥭ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
D ≬椉峋Ⓡ⒴㹄ቑ⸩ቤሯሥቮ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ≬椉ℚ㟔ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
㜳⥭ቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቮ㜳⥭ቑ抩䩴ሯ≬椉劔⺍ሺቍሸቯቂ㣑╈┪ት䞮ሽቮᇭ
䶻㧰嬺≬椉劔ቑ䩴♗ቒₜ䩴
䶻㧰⸩ቤቮ嬺≬椉劔ቑ䩴♗ቒₜ䩴ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ≬椉劔⺍ሺቀቑ㍔⫀
ት㙟∪ሼቮ券╨ት弯ቆሧቮ⫃⚗ᇬ呹むሯ嬺≬椉劔ቊሥቮሶቋትቀቑ劔ሯ䩴ቆሧቂ
ቋሰት棳ሰᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ䩴♗ቒₜ䩴ቋሺ㔀ቲቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰ⅉቑ嬺≬椉劔ቫቮ券╨ቑ拤♜
ⅉቑ嬺≬椉劔ቫቮ券╨ቑ拤♜ቒᇬ☀椉ሯ⇢ቋሺ孫⎮ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ
⚛ቑ≬椉⯠侓ₙቑⅥቑ嬺≬椉劔ቑ㲸Ⓒ㈀檎ት♙ሸቍሧᇭ
619
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻䵯嬺≬椉Ⓒ䥙
䶻㧰嬺≬椉Ⓒ䥙ቑ㶯Ⱁ
嬺≬椉Ⓒ䥙ሯᇬ⯠侓ቑ偯俟㣑ብ≬椉㦮栢␔ቑሧሮቍቮ㣑䍈ብⷧ⦷ሺቍሧቋሰ
ቒᇬ≬椉㠨ቑ㞾㓤ሧ券╨ቒ䤉䞮ሺቍሧᇭቂቃሺᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ弯㕔ሺቂ彊䞷ቇሧ
⚗䚕䤓ቍ摠櫜ት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
嬺≬椉Ⓒ䥙ሯ≬椉㦮栢₼ⷧ⦷ሺቍሲቍቆቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯቀቑሶ
ቋት䩴ቬሸቯቂ㣑俑ℕሺቂብቑቋቢቍሼᇭ
䶻㧰弰䞲ቑ䲊慱
≬椉ትⅧሸቯቂ弰䞲⺍ሼቮ㲸Ⓒሯ币䂰ሸቯቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬቫቭ㡸ሧ㣑
䍈ቑ⯠侓俑ℕት≬椉⯠侓劔ቋ币♦ⅉሯ⚗㎞ሺቍሧ棟ቭᇬ币䂰ሮቬዓ㦗㈛俑ℕሼ
ቮᇭሶቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ሯ⺕㧴ቑ币♦ⅉቑⒸ䥙ቑቂቤ偯俟ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗
ቒᇬ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
≬椉ትⅧሸቯቂ弰䞲ቑ币♦ⅉቒᇬⅧ≬ሸቯቂ弰䞲ቑ☀椉ሯ䲊慱ሺቂ㣑ሮቬ嬺≬椉
劔ቋቢቍሸቯቮᇭ
䶻檔♙ቖ䶻檔ቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ㶰ቑሧሽቯሮቑ⫃⚗ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
D ≬椉劔ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♙ቖ币♦ⅉሯ⒴㹄ቑ⚗㎞ትሼቮቋሰᇭ
E 䦇倩ቫቆ㲸Ⓒሯ䲊慱ሼቮቋሰᇭ
䶻捷⸩櫜≬椉␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻䵯拸㽤㊶
䶻㧰⸩櫜≬椉
⸩櫜≬椉ቒᇬ⍆⹂ᇬ䡍䡔ᇬ䞮✌ᇬ⳩Ⲋᇬ⒉䞮ቀቑⅥቑⅉ≬椉棟ቆ⯠侓ሼቮሶቋሯ
ቊሰቮᇭ
䶻捷弻↊≬椉
䶻䵯㣽抩弻↊≬椉
䶻㧰棁㈰彊䞷
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻㧰㈢ቆ弯㕔ሺቂ棁㈰彊䞷ትቶ孫ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰嬺⹂劔ቑ≬帆
嬺⹂劔ቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቭ⚛㎞ሺቂቋሰት棳ሰᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቡቂቒ嬺≬椉劔ቋ≬椉劔ቑ栢
ርሧᇬ⚗㎞ᇬ㲸Ⓒቑ㟍㭓ᇬ㆐䂗ቀቑⅥሶቯ䄥ሽቮ嫛䍉ቫቭ≬椉峋Ⓡ⪉ቈሲ
≬椉摠嵚㻑ሯ㼉䂗ሸቯቂሶቋቫቆᇬቀቑ⦿⇜ትふ⚂ሸቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰㚜⹂ቑ㕪咃
≬椉⯠侓劔♙ቖ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ㚜⹂ት䤉䞮ሸሾቮ㎞⦂ትብቆሺቂ呹むቑ⇫䍉♗ቒ
ₜ⇫䍉ቫቆ㚜⹂ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ棟ㄵርሧᇬ≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧት♦ሴቮ㲸Ⓒት⯀
ሩᇭ≬椉⯠侓劔♙ቖ嬺≬椉劔ሯᇬ㚜⹂䤉䞮㈛ᇬ≬椉劔ሯሺቂ䔈⸩ቑ㖖䯉㈢ቲ
620
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
ቍሴቯቓ㚜⹂ሯ㕰⮶ሼቮሶቋት䩴ቭቍሯቬ䎰嶏ᇬ≬椉劔ሯሺቂ䔈⸩ቑ㖖䯉㈢
ቲቍሮቆቂቋሰብᇬⓜ㹄ቑ尞⸩ሯ拸䞷ሸቯቮᇭ
䶻檔ቑ拸䞷ₙᇬ㚜⹂ቑ㕪咃ቒ㚜⹂ት⥭挎♗ቒ憌䂪ሺቍሮቆቂሶቋት⚺ባᇭ
拝⯀ቑ䲚ㄵ㉫ሻ≬椉摠ት䂪櫜ሼቮሶቋት⸩ቤቂ≬椉峋Ⓡₙቑ㢝䨼ቍ㧰檔ሯሥ
ቯቓቀቯ㈢ሩሶቋት㧰ↅቋሺᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ㚜⹂ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ
㈛≬椉劔ሯሺቂ䔈⸩ቑ㖖䯉拝⯀ቫቆ㈢ቲቍሮቆቂቂቤ䤉䞮ሺቂ㚜⹂
ቇሧቒᇬ≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧት嵚㻑ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰弻↊ቑ呹崜
≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯ嬺⹂劔ቑ嵚㻑ት㔎嶍ሺᇬ♗ቒቀቯ⺍ሺ㆐䂗ሺቂ⫃
⚗ቒ≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ት⏜ቯቮብቑቋሼቮ≬椉⯠侓ቑ㧰檔ቒᇬ䎰╈ቋሼቮᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ⚛㎞ሺቂ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ嬺⹂劔ቋ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ቑ栢ቑ⚗㎞
ቫቆ㕧㧮ሸቯቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰币䂰
嬺≬椉劔ሯ≬椉峋Ⓡ⪉ቈሲ嵚㻑㲸ት币䂰ሼቮ㲸Ⓒት㖐ቂቍሧሶቋት⸩ቤቮ≬椉⯠侓
ቑ㧰檔ቒᇬ䎰╈ቋሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰䎰嵚㻑━ㆤ᧫ኾአእዘኤኾአእⓅ
≬ 椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ㦏扠栢ቑ呹むቑ≬椉摠嵚㻑㸃栱ሼቮ岧旁ትሧቇቊብ嵚㻑ሼ
ቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
≬椉劔ሯᇬ≬椉峋Ⓡ⪉ቈሲ㞾㓤ሧቑↅ㟿♗ቒ摠櫜ቫቆᇬ≬椉㠨ቀቑⅥቑ㧰
ↅት㼉⸩ሼቮቋሰቒᇬⅥቑ≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ㦏扠栢ቑ≬椉摠嵚㻑
㸃ት◐⒕劒㏽ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉ℚ㟔
≬椉ℚ㟔ቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ት弯ሩሶቋቋቍቮℚ⸮ቊሥቆ≬椉⯠侓ቑ弻↊㦮栢
␔䤉䞮ሺቂብቑቋሼቮᇭቂቃሺᇬ⟕㯼ₙ♗ቒ匆㯼ₙቑ弻↊ት䥽䤓ቋሼቮ≬椉⯠
侓ርሧᇬ㇢ℚ劔ሯ嬺⹂劔ቫቮ嵚㻑ቀቑⅥቑ⪉䄥ቫቭ≬椉ℚ㟔ት⸩券ሼቮ
⫃⚗ቒሶቑ棟ቭቊቒቍሧᇭ
⯠侓㇢ℚ劔ሯ嬺⹂劔ቫቮ嵚㻑ት⪉䄥ቋሺ≬椉ℚ㟔ት⸩券ሼቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ弻↊㦮
栢␔ሸቯቂ嵚㻑♙ቖቀቯ倩ሲⅴₙቑ㦮栢␔ሸቯቂ嵚㻑ቊሥቆ弻↊㦮
栢ቑ俑ℕⓜ䤉䞮ሺቂℚ⸮⪉ቈሲብቑ⺍ሼቮ孫⎮ሯㆤሰ♦ሴቬቯቮብቑቋሼ
ቮᇭ≬椉⯠侓ርሧቒᇬ䟂手ⅉሯ嵚㻑㲸ቑ䤉䞮ት℗尚ቊሰቂℚ㍔ት⯠侓偯俟㣑
䩴ቆሧቂሮ♗ቒ䩴ቮቜሰቊሥቆቂ⫃⚗ቇሧ孫⎮ትㆤሰ♦ሴቍሧብቑቋሼ
ቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻㧰嵚㻑櫜ሯ≬椉摠櫜ት怔ራቮ⫃⚗
宖㟿ቑ嬺⹂劔⺍ሺ㞾㓤ሩቜሰ偞櫜ሯ≬椉摠櫜ት怔ራቮቋሰቒᇬ━⚗㉫ሻ
䂪櫜ሺ㞾㓤ሩብቑቋሼቮᇭ
Ⅵቑ嬺⹂劔ቑⷧ⦷ት䩴ቬቍሧቡቡ崯⸮ᇬ䩴ቯሧቮ嬺⹂劔⺍ሺ≬椉摠ት㞾
㓤ቆቂ≬椉劔ቒᇬⅥቑ嬺⹂劔⺍ሺ≬椉摠櫜ቑ㸚櫜拣ሼቮቡቊ㞾㓤ሩ券╨ት
弯ሩᇭ
621
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻䵯䦃㘴嵚㻑㲸♙ቖ䦃㘴峃岮
䶻㧰䦃㘴嵚㻑㲸♙ቖ㔦㆐
㶰㙁ስቮሧሽቯሮቑ⫃⚗ቒᇬ嬺⹂劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ት弯
ሩ棟ㄵቊ≬椉劔⺍ሺ㞾㓤ሧት㻑ቤቮ䦃㘴ቑ嵚㻑㲸ት≬椉⯠侓ₙ㦘ሼቮᇭ
D ≬椉ሯ㇆Ⓟሸቯሧቮቋሰᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯ䎰彖┪ቊሥቮቋሰᇭ
F ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔ሯ䂔並ሸቯ♗ቒ屲㟲ሺቂቋሰᇭ
G 嬺⹂劔ሯⅉ愺㚜⹂ት♦ሴቂቋሰᇭ
H 弻↊ት尞⸩ሼቮ㽤ሯ䦃㘴嵚㻑㲸ት⸩ቤሧቮቋሰᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ嬺⹂劔⺍ሺᇬ≬椉ት㇆Ⓟሼቮ尞⸩ርሧ䰐ሻቬቯሧቮ⫃⚗ት
棳ሰᇬ≬椉⯠侓⪉ቈሲ㔦㆐ት㇄ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭቂቃሺᇬ㚜⹂ቑ䤉䞮㈛
ርሴቮ≬椉⯠侓劔啴ሺሲቒ嬺≬椉劔♗ቒቀቑ♛㡈ቑ嫛╤ት䚕䟀ቋሼቮ㔦㆐ት㇄
ሼቮሶቋቒቊሰቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
≬椉⯠侓劔♙ቖ嬺≬椉劔ቒᇬ嬺⹂劔ሯ㻑ቤቮቋሰቒᇬ䦃㘴嵚㻑ትሼቮቂቤ㉔尐
ቍ㍔⫀ት㙟∪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䦃㘴嵚㻑ት♦ሴሮቬ拀栢ⅴ␔拔䅭ቍሲᇬ㦇槱ቫቆᇬ嵚㻑ቇ
ሧ≬椉⯠侓劔抩䩴ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ≬椉劔ሯሶቑ券╨ት㊯ቆቂቋሰቒᇬ
嬺⹂劔⺍ሼቮ㞾㓤ሧ♗ቒ券╨ቑ㔎崜ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ㲸Ⓒ㈀檎ትራቍሧᇭ
≬椉⯠侓劔ሯᇬ䶻檔⪉ቈሲ抩䩴ት♦檧ሺሮቬሮ㦗ⅴ␔≬椉ℚ㟔栱ሼቮ
㍔⫀ት≬椉劔㙟∪ሺቍሧቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ嬺⹂劔ቋ䦃㘴㼉䂗ሼ
ቮሶቋ⚛㎞ሺቂብቑቋቢቍሼᇭቀቑ抩䩴ት㓏⸩ቑ㣑㦮䚍⸮♦檧ሺቂ嬺≬椉
劔ቇሧብᇬሶቑ尞⸩ት拸䞷ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰弻↊ቑ䀗䅔
≬椉劔ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮ⫃⚗棟ቭᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ嬺≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ≬椉摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧ
ቫቆ嬺⹂劔⺍ሼቮ券╨ት⏜ቯቮᇭ
D 嬺⹂劔ሯ䦃㘴嵚㻑㲸ት㟍㭓ሺቂቋሰᇭ
E 嬺⹂劔ሯ≬椉劔ቑ㦇槱ቫቮ䏶↩ሮቬ拀栢ⅴ␔䦃㘴嵚㻑㲸ት嫛∎ሼቮ㎞㊬ት≬
椉劔抩䩴ሺቍሮቆቂቋሰᇭ
䶻㧰㣑╈
≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ嵚㻑㲸ቒᇬ嬺≬椉劔ቫቮሮ嬺⹂劔ቫቮሮት⟞ቲሽᇬ嬺⹂劔ቑ
嬺≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ嵚㻑㲸ሯ㣑╈ቫቭ䀗䅔ሼቮ㣑ᇬ㣑╈ቫቆ䀗䅔ሼቮᇭ
嬺⹂劔ቑ嬺≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ嵚㻑㲸ቑ䀗䅔㣑╈㦮栢ቒᇬ≬椉劔⺍ሼቮ䦃㘴嵚㻑ሯ
ሸቯቂሶቋት嬺≬椉劔ሯ䩴ቆቂ㣑ሮቬᇬ䦃㘴嵚㻑ሯ㼉䂗ሸቯᇬ♗ቒ≬椉劔ቫቆ
㢝䭉㕡倅ሸቯቂ㣑ቡቊቑ栢ቒᇬ䀗䅔㣑╈ቒ拁嫛ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻䵯㇆Ⓟ≬椉
䶻㧰拸䞷乓⦁
㇢
ℚ劔ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮ⫃⚗ቑ券╨ት嫛ሼቮቂቤ偯俟ሸቯቮ≬椉⯠侓ቇሧ
ᇬ3(,&/ት指㔭ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
622
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
D 㶶ね␀⚛⇢ቑ㽤ቫቆ券╨ቈሴቬቯሧቮ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ┯䥮⦌ቫቆ券╨ቈሴቬቯሧቮ⫃⚗ᇭ
F ┯䥮⦌ⅴ⮥ቑ⦌ቫቆ券╨ቈሴቬቯሧቮ⫃⚗ᇭ ቀቑ⦌ቑ㽤ቫቭ崜ቤቬ
ቯሧቮ棟ㄵርሧᇭ
≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ት偯俟ሼቮ券╨ት⸩ቤቂ尞⸩⚗咃ሺሧቍሴቯቓᇬቀቑ
券╨ት嫛ሺቂብቑቋቒ崜ቤቬቯቍሧᇭ
䶻捷䞮✌≬椉
䶻䵯䞮✌≬椉ቇሧቑ䔈ⓖ
䶻乏䶻ₘ劔
䶻㧰䶻ₘ劔ቑ䞮✌⺍ሼቮ䞮✌≬椉
≬椉⯠侓劔ⅴ⮥ቑ劔ቑ䞮✌⺍ሼቮ≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉⺍廰劔ሯ崻㢝ት♦ሴቂₙቊᇬ㦇
槱ቫቭሮቇ刁⚜ቊ䭉崜ሸቯቂ⚛㎞ትራቂ⫃⚗ት棳ሧᇬ䎰╈ቋሼቮᇭ≬椉摠♦♥
ⅉቑ⮘㦃ᇬ≬椉摠櫜ቑ⬦櫜♙ቖ⯠侓㦮栢ቑ⮘㦃ት⚺ባ⯠侓ቑℚ㈛䤓ቍ⮘㦃ቒᇬሶቯቋ
⚛ሻ⚛㎞ሯቍሴቯቓ╈┪ት㖐ቂቍሧᇭ≬椉⯠侓♗ቒ≬椉摠嵚㻑㲸ቑ币䂰♙ቖ㕔≬㲸ቑ
岼⸩ቇሧብᇬ⚛㱧ቋሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ
≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬⅉ♗ቒℛⅉⅴₙቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉት㖖⸩ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰᇬቡቂᇬ
㖖⸩ሯ㜳⥭ₜ厌ቋ嫷䯉ሸቯሧቍሧ棟ቭᇬቀቑ㖖⸩ት⮘㦃♗ቒ㜳⥭ሼቮሶቋሯቊ
ሰቮᇭ㖖⸩ᇬ⮘㦃♙ቖ㜳⥭ቒᇬ按岏ቫቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ㦇槱ቫቆ嫛ሧᇬ≬椉
劔抐Ⅷሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
㖖⸩ᇬ⮘㦃♗ቒ㜳⥭ትሼቮ㲸Ⓒቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ㸊ℰ♗ቒ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ቑሧሽ
ቯሮቑℚ䟀ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ㣑ᇬ䀗䅔ሼቮᇭ
㶰㙁ስቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔♗ቒ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ䦇倩ⅉት≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቋቢቍ
ሼᇭ
D ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉት㖖⸩ሺሧቍሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቑ㖖⸩ሯ㜳⥭ሸቯᇬⅥቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ㖖⸩ሸቯሧቍሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
F ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ⓜ㸊ℰሺᇬⅥቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ㖖⸩ሸቯሧ
ቍሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
ℛ ⅉⅴₙቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ㖖⸩ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ⓜቀቑሩቄ
ቑሥቮ劔ቑ㖖⸩ሯ㜳⥭ሸቯᇬ♗ቒሥቮ劔ሯ㸊ℰሺቂቋሰቒᇬቀቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ
㞾㓤ቲቯቮሶቋቋሸቯሧቂ≬椉摠ቒᇬ䶻檔⪉ቈሧ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ⒴㹄ቑ㖖⸩
ትሺቍሧ棟ቭᇬ㸚⇨ቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቑ栢ቊ━⚗㉫ሻ⒕揜ሸቯቮᇭ
䄥㕯⊡䞲㽤ርሧ尞⸩ሸቯቂ⍄㲸劔ት⹂ሼቮ嫛䍉ቑ䎰╈ᇬ♥䀗ሺ♗ቒ嫛♾厌
㊶栱ሼቮ尞⸩㈢ሩሶቋት㧰ↅቋሺᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ⊡䞲弰⥲ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓
劔⺍ሺ㞾㓤ቲቯቮⓜቑ≬椉摠ᇬ慱㙪∰櫜♗ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠⺍ሼቮ㲸Ⓒሯቍሧ
ብቑቋሼቮᇭ
䶻檔⪉ቈሧ㖖⸩ሸቯቂ劔⺍ሺ≬椉摠ት㞾㓤ቆቂ≬椉劔ቒᇬቀቑ劔ሯ≬
椉摠ት♦ሴ♥ቮ㲸Ⓒት㦘ሺቍሧሶቋት䩴ቆሧቂ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ㞾㓤ሧ券╨ት⏜ቯ
ቮᇭ
623
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
䶻㧰屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ♦♥ⅉ
䶻
㧰⪉ቈሲ㖖⸩ሮሮቲቬሽᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ♦♥ⅉት㖖
⸩ሺᇬ♗ቒቀቑ㖖⸩ት⮘㦃啴ሺሲቒ㜳⥭ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ㖖⸩ᇬ⮘㦃♙ቖ㜳⥭
ቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቆ嫛ሧᇬ≬椉劔抐Ⅷሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
㶰㙁ስቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ት屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ♦♥ⅉቋቢቍሼᇭ
D 屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ♦♥ⅉሯ㖖⸩ሸቯሧቍሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
E 屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ♦♥ⅉቑ㖖⸩ሯ㜳⥭ሸቯᇬⅥቑ♦♥ⅉሯ㖖⸩ሸቯሧቍሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
F 屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ♦♥ⅉሯ㸊ℰሺᇬⅥቑ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ㖖⸩ሸቯሧቍሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
䶻㧰䶻檔♙ቖ䶻檔ቍሧሺ䶻檔ቑ尞⸩ት䄥䞷ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰币䂰♗ቒ㕔≬㲸岼⸩
≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ㜳⥭ₜ厌ቍብቑቋሺ㖖⸩ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯሺቂ
≬椉⯠侓♗ቒ≬椉摠嵚㻑㲸ቑ币䂰♗ቒቀቯ⺍ሼቮ㕔≬㲸ቑ岼⸩ቒᇬ≬椉摠♦♥
ⅉሯ㦇槱ቫቭ⚛㎞ሺቍሧ棟ቭᇬ╈┪ት㖐ቂቍሧᇭ
≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯሺቂ≬椉摠嵚㻑㲸ቑ币䂰♗ቒቀቯ⺍ሼቮ㕔≬㲸ቑ岼⸩ቒᇬ≬椉
⯠侓劔ሯ㦇槱ቫቭ⚛㎞ሺቍሧ棟ቭᇬ╈┪ት㖐ቂቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰䦇倩㟍㭓
≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ㸊ℰሺቂ≬椉⺍廰劔ቑ䦇倩ⅉቊሥቆ䦇倩ት㟍㭓ሺቂ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉⯠侓
⪉ቈሲ⦿⇜ቒᇬ䦇倩㟍㭓ቑℚ⸮ቑቢቫቆቒ㈀檎ት♦ሴቍሧᇭ
䶻乏⯠侓ቑ⒬㦮㹄椝♙ቖ㦮栢
䶻㧰䟂手ⅉቑ⯠侓ⓜቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
䶻 㧰䶻檔⪉ቈሧ䟂手ⅉሯ⛙䩴ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧ㍔⫀ቒᇬ≬椉⺍廰
劔ሯ䩴ቆሧቂሮ♗ቒ䩴ቆሧቮቜሰቊሥቆቂℚ㍔ት⚺ባᇭ
䶻㧰ᇬ䶻㧰♙ቖ䶻㧰⪉ቈሲ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨ቑ拤♜⺍ሼቮⓅ子
ቒᇬ⯠侓ቑ偯俟ሮቬ栢棟ቭᇬ拸䞷ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ䶻㧰⪉ቈሲⓅ
子ቒሶቑ棟ቭቊቒቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓ⓜቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䟂手ⅉ⺍ሺᇬ⯠侓劔揜㇢嵚㻑㲸ቑ㦘䎰ቇሧ⛙ስቍሴቯቓቍቬ
ቍሧᇭሶቑ㍔⫀ት♦檧ሺቂሶቋቒᇬ䟂手㦇ቋቒ⒴ቑ㦇槱岧憘ሸቯቂ㢝䯉䤓ቍ㠖
岏ቫቭ䭉崜ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰⪉ቈሧ≬椉劔ሯ㙟∪ሼቮ㦇槱ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮℚ檔ት岧憘ሺቍሴቯ
ቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
D ≬椉劔ቇሧᇫᇫኚወዐኔዙ♙ቖ弰╨ቑ䕅㽐栱ሼቮ㶰⫀⛙ቑ䤉嫛ሯ券
╨ቈሴቬቯሧቮሶቋቑ㢝䯉䤓ቍ㖖㛧
E ≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓ₙቑ券╨ቇሧ
L ⚓䲽ቑ俵Ⅷ♙ቖኇኴኔዄዐቑ崻㢝
LL ⚓俵Ⅷ⺍㉫ሼቮ≬椉㠨ቑ━⚗ቇሧቑ㍔⫀ᇭቂቮ俵Ⅷቋ䔈侓ቫቮ
俵Ⅷሯሥቮ⫃⚗ቒቀቑ♛㡈ት⚺ባᇭ
LLL ⯠侓劔揜㇢ቑ岗並♙ቖቀቑ⒕揜ቑ㡈㽤ᇭ拸䞷ሸቯቮ䥲䧲㽤ቑ崂便ት⚺ባᇭ
LY 屲侓扣㓊摠櫜♙ቖ㓤䂗≬椉摠櫜ቑ嫷䯉♙ቖቀቯቬሯ≬峋ሸቯሧቮ棟ㄵ
624
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
Y ዃ ከአእዐኌ≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ᇫᇫ俵Ⅷሯ抲╤ሼቮ㔤彖◧⇜ቑ崻㢝♙ቖ☮彖䞲
ቑ㊶役ቑ嫷䯉
YL ≬椉⯠侓ቑ䲽櫭㉫ሻ拸䞷ሸቯቮ䲝㽤ₙቑ♥ቭ㔀ሧቇሧቑ咻䤓ቍ
㍔⫀
ቀቑⅥᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ弯㕔ሼቮሶቋቋቍቮ⯠侓ₙቑኖኌቇሧ拸⒖ቍ䚕屲ት
≒ሼቂቤቑ䔈㹄ቑ㍔⫀ሯ㙟∪ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬ 椉劔ቒᇬ⯠侓ቫቭ≬峋ሸቯቂ㞾㓤ሧት怔ራ䤉䞮ሼቮ♾厌㊶ሯሥቮⒸ䥙ቑ櫜
ቇሧ㟿⊳ት㛧䯉ሼቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ䟂手ⅉ⺍ሺᇬₘ抩ቭቑ䟿ቍቮⒸ⥭ቭ⺍
㉫ሺቂ≬椉㠨岗並ቑ☮ⓖ⪉ቈሲ䄏㦮俵Ⅷ摠ቑ櫜ት⚺ባኤወ岗並ት㙟䯉ሺቍሴ
ቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭሶቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ት弯ሩሮ⚵ሮሯ䭉⸩ሺሧቍሧ☀椉ት
≬椫ሼቮ≬椉⯠侓♙ቖዃከአእዐኌ≬椉⯠侓⺍ሺቒᇬ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ≬椉劔
ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬኤወ岗並ቒⅽ崻䤓ቍⓜ㙟⪉ቈሲኤወት䯉ሼብቑ
ሼሱቍሧሶቋ♙ቖ⯠侓ₙቒ㞾㓤ሧቑ♾厌㊶ሯ≬峋ሸቯሧቍሧሶቋትᇬ㢝䭉
ሮቇ䚕屲ሺቧሼሲ崻㢝ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰ኌዙዐኍዘኇኲ㦮栢10
䞮 ✌≬椉⯠侓ቇሧቒᇬ䶻㧰䶻檔⸩ቤቮኌዙዐኍዘኇኲ㦮栢ቒᇬ㔎
嶍ቑ♦檧♗ቒ䶻㧰♙ቖ䶻㧰⸩ቤቮ㦇櫭ቑⒿ拣ቑሧሽቯሮ拔ሧ㣑䍈ሮ
ቬሮ㦗ቋሼቮᇭ
≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䶻㧰䶻檔⪉ቈሧ⯠侓ት♥䀗ሼ㲸Ⓒቒᇬ⯠侓ቑ偯俟ሮቬ
ት俛拝ሺቂቋሰᇬ䀗䅔ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ⯠侓俑ℕ㲸
≬ 椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ⯠侓偯俟ሮቬቫቭብ㡸ሧ㣑㦮俑ℕቑ╈┪ሯ䤉䞮ሼቮ⫃⚗ት棳
ሰᇬ慱㙪∰櫜♗ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠ት⇃ቲቍሧ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
㣑㓤ሧ≬椉㠨ሯ㞾㓤ቲቯሧቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ⯠侓㦮栢ቑ䄏ℕⓜቒ俑ℕ㲸ሯቍሧ
ብቑቋሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ俑ℕቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቆሺቍሴቯቓቍቬሽᇬ≬椉劔ሯ俑
ℕቑ抩䩴ት♦檧ሺሮቬ拀栢㈛╈┪ት䤉䞮ሼቮᇭ
䞮 ✌≬椉⯠侓ሯ慱㙪∰櫜♗ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠ት⇃ሩቋሰቒᇬ䶻㧰ቍሧሺ䶻
㧰ት拸䞷ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓俑ℕ㲸
≬椉劔ቒᇬሶቑ䵯ቊ崜ቤቬቯቮ乓⦁ርሧቑቢ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ት俑ℕሼቮሶቋሯቊሰ
ቮᇭ
䶻乏⯠侓㦮栢₼ቑ⮘㦃
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቑ⯠侓㈛ቑ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓⯠侓劔揜㇢ሯቇሲ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ䚍⦷∰櫜ት㹝㦇槱岧
憘ሺ≬椉⯠侓劔㙟䯉ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰ቑ券╨┯ራᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮℚ檔栱ሼቮ⮘㦃ትᇬ拔䅭ቍሲ
≬椉⯠侓劔䩴ቬሾቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
D ⯠侓♙ቖ䔈侓ት⚺ባ≬椉⯠侓㧰ↅ
10 䶻᧭᧳᧮᧬᧯㧰䶻᧭檔ቒᇬ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓栱ሼቮ㖖ⅳ(2002/83/EC)䶻㧰♙ቖ抩≰弸⮁㖖ⅳ
(2002/65/EC)䶻6㧰ትኤወቋሺሧቮᇭ
625
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
E ≬椉⯠侓㧰ↅቑ⮘㦃♗ቒ3(,&/ቑ㟈㷲ቑ⫃⚗ᇫᇫ䶻㧰 I ♙ቖ J ₵ቖ䶻
㧰䶻檔 E L ቍሧሺ Y ⸩ቤቮ㍔⫀
䶻㧰䶻檔ቑ尞⸩ቒᇬ⯠侓㦮栢₼ቑሧሽቯሮቑ㣑䍈ርሧᇬ♾厌㊶ሯሥቮ
俵Ⅷ摠ቑ櫜ቑ℗䂻ቇሧ㟿⊳ሯ㙟䯉ሸቯቮ⫃⚗ብ拸䞷ሼቮᇭ≬椉劔ሯᇬ⯠侓
ቑ偯俟ቑⓜቊሥቮቋ㈛ቊሥቮቋት⟞ቲሽᇬ⺕㧴ቑⒸ䥙揜㇢ቑ♾厌㊶ቇሧ㟿⊳
ት㙟䯉ሺቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬ⸮働ቋ㇢⒬ቑ㟿⊳ቑ䦇拤
ቇሧ䩴ቬሾቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰☀椉ቑ⬦┯
䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ርሧᇬ燱♗ቒ⋴ㅆቑ㌹▥ት䶻㧰⸩ቤቮ☀椉ቑ⬦┯ቋሺ
尞⸩ሼቮ㧰檔ቒᇬ䶻㧰⪉ቈሰₜ㇢㧰檔ቋቢቍሼᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉㠨♙ቖ≬椉俵Ⅷቑ嵎㠃
≬ 椉劔ሯ弻↊ት弯ሩሶቋሯ䭉⸩ሺሧቮ☀椉ት≬椫ሼቮ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ርሧ
ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻檔♙ቖ䶻檔㈢ቆቑቢ嵎㠃ትሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
≬椉㠨ቑ⬦櫜ቒᇬ≬椉㠨ቑ並⸩ቑ⪉䮝䞷ሧቬቯቮ⇨✌ኖኌቇሧ℗尚ₜ厌
ሮቇ㋡⃔䤓ቍ⮘▥ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ⫃⚗ቊሥቆᇬ≬椉㠨ቑ⬦櫜ሯ≬椉劔ቑ≬椉俵Ⅷት
嫛ሩ㖐倩䤓ቍ厌┪ት≬峋ሼቮቂቤ㉔尐ቊሥቭᇬሮቇቀቑ⬦櫜⺍ሺ䕻䵚䥲㪊
ⅉ♗ቒ䥲䧲㇢⻏ሯ⚛㎞ሺቂቋሰᇬ崜ቤቬቯ㈦ቮᇭ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ≬椉㠨ቑ⬦櫜
ትᇬ≬椉俵Ⅷት䦇㉫䂪櫜ሼቮሶቋቫቆ屲䀗ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
㓤ሧ䂗ቢ≬椉ቑ⫃⚗ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻檔⸩ቤቮ㧰ↅቑₚቊ≬椉俵Ⅷት䂪櫜ሼ
ቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
䶻檔♙ቖ䶻檔⸩ቤቮ嵎㠃ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ崜ቤቬቯቍሧᇭ
D ≬椉㠨啴ሺሲቒ≬椉俵Ⅷ♗ቒቀቑ♛㡈ቑ岗並ርሧᇬ㦘厌ቊሮቇ㽷㎞䂀ሧ≬
椉岗䚕ⅉቊሥቯቓ㺦Ⅷሧቂቒሽቑ崳ቭሯሥቆቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ⓜ㙟ቋቍቮ岗並ሯᇬ嵎㠃㈛偯俟ሸቯቂሼቜቑ⯠侓⺍ሺ拸䞷ሸቯሧቍ
ሧ⫃⚗ᇭ
≬椉㠨ቑ⬦櫜♗ቒ俵Ⅷቑ䂪櫜ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯᇬ≬椉㠨ቑ⬦櫜♗ቒ≬椉俵Ⅷቑ䂪櫜ᇬ
ቀቑ䚕䟀♙ቖ≬椉⯠侓劔ሮቬ≬椉俵Ⅷቑ䂪櫜ት嵚㻑ሼቮ㲸Ⓒቇሧᇬ㦇槱ቫ
ቆ≬椉⯠侓劔抩䩴ሺሮቬሮ㦗㈛╈┪ት䞮ሽቮᇭ
≬椉劔ሯ弻↊ት弯ሩሶቋሯ䭉⸩ሺሧቮ☀椉ት≬椫ሼቮ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ርሧᇬ
≬椉㠨ቑ並⸩ቑ⪉䮝䞷ሧቬቯቮ⇨✌ኖኌቇሧ℗尚ₜ厌ሮቇ㋡⃔䤓ቍ⮘▥
ቫቭᇬ≬椉劔ሯ≬椉俵Ⅷት嫛ሩ㖐倩䤓ቍ㞾㓤厌┪ት䭉≬ሼቮቂቤᇬ㇢⒬ቑ≬
椉㠨ሯብቒቧ拸⒖ቊቒቍሲᇬሮቇ㉔尐ቊቒቍሲቍቆቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቒ≬椉
㠨ቑ䂪櫜ት㻑ቤቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ䂪櫜ቒᇬ䕻䵚䥲㪊ⅉ♗ቒ䥲䧲㇢⻏ቫቆ⚛㎞
ሸቯቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
ሶቑ㧰⸩ቤቮ㲸Ⓒቒᇬ⯠侓ቑ偯俟㈛ት俛拝ሼቮቡቊቒ嫛∎ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቍ
ሧᇭ
䶻㧰⯠侓㧰ↅቑ⮘㦃
≬椉劔ሯ≬椉㠨♙ቖ≬椉俵Ⅷⅴ⮥ቑ⯠侓㧰ↅት⮘㦃ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮብቑቋሼቮ
㧰檔ቒᇬቀቑ⮘㦃ሯ㶰㙁ስቮ䥽䤓ቑቂቤ㉔尐ቊሥቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ䎰╈ቋሼቮᇭ
D 䥲䧲㇢⻏ቫቮ㇆Ⓟ䤓ቍ⑵⒕ቀቑⅥ䥲䧲㽤ቑ㟈㷲㈢ሩቂቤ
E ╃⍜劔ቑ摠Ⓟㄵሮሮቮ䄥㕯⦌␔㽤ቑ㇆嫛尞⸩ቑ㟈㷲㈢ሩቂቤ
F 䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ሯ䲝㽤ₙቑ䔈⒴ቑ♥ቭ㔀ሧ♗ቒ⦌ቑ孫┸摠ቑ尐ↅት䄏ቂሼቂቤቑ
㧰ↅት⸩ቤቮ⦌␔㽤ⅳቑ尞⸩ቑ㟈㷲㈢ሩቂቤ
626
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
G 䶻㧰䶻檔䶻㠖㈢ቆ⯠侓㧰檔ት函ሰ㙪ራቮቂቤ
⮘㦃ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺ⮘㦃♙ቖቀቑ䚕䟀ት抩䩴ሼቮ㦇槱ት嬺≬椉劔ሯ♦檧
ሺቂ㡴ቑ㈛ሮ㦗ቑ㦮栢ሯ䄏ℕሼቮ㡴ቑ⻭ሼቮ㦗ቑ⒬㡴╈┪ት䞮ሻቮᇭ
䶻檔ቑ拸䞷ቒᇬ⮘㦃㲸㧰檔ቑ㦘╈㊶栱ሼቮⅥቑ尐ↅቑ拸䞷ትⰷስቍሧᇭ
䶻乏⦌␔㽤ቋቑ栱≑
䶻㧰摠Ⓟㄵ
摠Ⓟㄵ栱ሼቮ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ摠Ⓟㄵሮሮቮ䄥㕯⦌␔㽤ቑ㇆嫛尞⸩ቑ拸䞷ት
♦ሴቮᇭ3(,&/ቒᇬቀቯቬቑ尞⸩♜ሺቍሧ棟ㄵቊቑቢ拸䞷ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰䲝㽤ₙቑ♥ቭ㔀ሧርቫቖ⦌ቑ孫┸摠
3(,&/ቒᇬ䲝㽤ₙቑ䔈⒴ቑ♥ቭ㔀ሧ♗ቒ⦌ቑ孫┸摠ቑ尐ↅት䄏ቂሼቂቤ䞮✌≬椉⯠
侓⺍ሺ嵁ሸቯቮ䔈⒴ቑ㧰ↅት⸩ቤቮ⦌␔㽤ⅳት⮘㦃ሼቮብቑቊቒቍሧᇭ䄥㕯⦌␔
㽤ቑቀቯቬቑ㧰ↅቋ3(,&/ሯ㕄屵ሼቮ㣑ቒᇬ3(,&/ቒ拸䞷㘡棳ሸቯቮᇭ
䶻乏≬椉ℚ㟔
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቑ嵎㪊♙ቖ㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
≬椉ℚ㟔ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ♾厌㊶ሯሥቮቋ≰ሽቮ䚕䟀ት㦘ሼቮ≬椉劔ቒᇬሶቯት䭉崜ሼ
ቮቂቤቑ⚗䚕䤓ቍ㓚㹄ትቋቬቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉ℚ㟔ቑ䤉䞮ት䩴ቆቂ≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ♙ቖቀቑ⇞㓏ት䩴ቮቂቤ㇢崁
䕅㽐ቑₚቊ㦏⠓ቑ┹┪ት⻌ሲሺᇬቀቑ劔⺍ሺ䦇㉫ቑ㍔⫀㙟∪ትሺቍሴቯቓ
ቍቬቍሧᇭቀቑ㍔⫀㙟∪ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ♙ቖቀቑ⇞㓏ት䩴ቆቂ㣑ሮ
ቬᇬ㡴ⅴ␔ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ሯ䶻檔拤♜ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቑ嵚㻑㲸ቑ䀗䅔㣑╈ቒᇬ≬椉摠♦
♥ⅉሯ呹むቑ㲸Ⓒት䚍⸮䩴ቮ㣑ቡቊቑ栢ቒᇬ拁嫛ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰呹㹉
≬ 椉⯠侓ቑ偯俟㈛ⅴ␔≬椉⺍廰劔ሯ呹㹉ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉摠ት㞾
㓤ሩ券╨ት⏜ቯቮᇭሶቑ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉劔ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠♙ቖ䶻㧰⪉ቈሲ⓿⇨
摠揜㇢ት㞾㓤ቲቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻檔ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮ⫃⚗ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
D ≬椉⺍廰劔ሯᇬ呹㹉ሺቂ㣑呹むቑ㎞㊬ት呹䟀㼉⸩ሼቮ厌┪ት㖐ቂቍሧ位䯭
䕅㏚ቊ嫛╤ሺሧቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
E ≬椉⯠侓ት偯俟ሺቂ椪ᇬ≬椉⺍廰劔ሯ呹㹉ት㎞⦂ሺሧቍሮቆቂሶቋሯ⚗䚕
䤓ቍ䠠ሧት怔ራቮ䲚ㄵ峋㢝ሸቯቂ⫃⚗ᇭ
䶻㧰㟔㎞ቫቮ≬椉⺍廰劔ቑ㹉⹂
≬椉摠♦♥ⅉሯ≬椉⺍廰劔ት㟔㎞㸊ℰሸሾቂቋሰቒᇬቀቑ劔⺍ሼቮ≬椉摠♦
♥ⅉቑ㖖⸩ቒ㜳⥭ሸቯቂብቑቋቢቍሼᇭ
≬椉摠嵚㻑㲸ቑ币䂰ቒᇬ币♦ⅉሯ≬椉⺍廰劔ት㟔㎞㸊ℰሸሾቂቋሰቒᇬ䎰╈ቋ
ሼቮᇭ
627
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉቊብሥቮ⫃⚗ᇬ≬椉⺍廰劔ት㟔㎞㸊ℰሸሾቂቋሰ
ቒᇬ≬椉摠ቒ⒖㞾㓤ቲቯቍሧᇭ
㷲 ㇢棁嫪ቀቑⅥቑ㷲㇢ቍ䚕䟀ቫቭᇬ≬椉摠♦♥ⅉ♗ቒ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯᇬ≬椉⺍廰
劔ት㸊ℰሸሾቂ⫃⚗ቒᇬሶቑ㧰ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻乏慱㙪♙ቖ屲侓
䶻㧰⯠侓ቑ慱㙪
䶻㧰ቒᇬ慱㙪∰櫜♗ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠ት⇃ሩ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ቒ拸䞷ሺቍሧᇭ慱㙪
∰櫜♗ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠ት⇃ሩ⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ሯ䶻檔⸩ቤቮ㍔⫀ት♦檧ሺቂቋ
ሰሮቬ拀栢ⅴ␔屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧት㻑ቤቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ㓤ሧ䂗ቢ≬椉慱㙪
ሸቯቮᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻㧰 E ♗ቒ䶻㧰䶻檔 E ⸩ቤቮ㦮栢ቑ䄏ℕ㈛拀栢ⅴ␔
ᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬ慱㙪∰櫜ርቫቖ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ櫜ት䩴ቬሾᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔
慱㙪ቋ屲侓扣㓊摠㞾㓤ሧቑሧሽቯሮት指㔭ሸሾቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
慱㙪嵚㻑♗ቒ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧቑ嵚㻑ቒᇬ㦇槱ቫቆሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰屲侓
≬ 椉⯠侓劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓ቑ偯俟㈛ት俛拝ሼቮⓜ╈┪ት䤉䞮ሼቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ
ሧቇቊብᇬ㦇槱ቫቭᇬ≬椉劔⺍ሺ≬椉⯠侓⇃ሩ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ捷♗ቒ⏷
捷ቑ㞾㓤ሧት㻑ቤቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭሶቑ⫃⚗ቒᇬቀቑ⯠侓ቒ⮘㦃ሸቯᇬ♗ቒ俑
ℕሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰ቑ尞⸩㈢ሩሶቋት㧰ↅቋሺᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ት⇃ሩ䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ሯ≬
椉劔ቫቆ俑ℕሸቯᇬ㜳⥭ሸቯᇬ♗ቒ♥䀗ሸቯቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椉劔ቒᇬ䶻㧰
ቑ⫃⚗ቊሥቆብᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ት㞾㓤ቲቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔⺍ሺᇬ嵚㻑ሯሥቆቂ㣑ᇬቡቂ嵚㻑ሯቍሧ⫃⚗ብ
⥭ቒᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ䚍⦷∰櫜♙ቖቀቯሯ≬峋ሸቯሧቮ棟ㄵቇሧᇬ㍔⫀㙟
∪ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬ 椉⯠侓劔ሯ嵚㻑ቊሰቮ⓿⇨摠ቑ揜㇢ቒᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ岗並ርሧ揜㇢摠ሯ┯
並ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠┯ራ㞾㓤ቲቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
ሶቑ㧰⸩ቤቮ摠櫜ቒᇬ≬椉劔ሯ≬椉⯠侓劔ቑ嵚㻑ት♦檧ሺቂቋሰሮቬሮ㦗ⅴ␔
㞾㓤ቲቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰慱㙪∰櫜ዘ屲侓扣㓊摠
≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቑ㓏⦷ሼቮᨁᨑ┯䥮⦌ቑ㽤㈢ቆ岗並ሸቯቮᇬ慱㙪∰櫜
啴ሺሲቒ屲侓扣㓊摠♗ቒቀቑ♛㡈ቑ岗並㡈㽤ት岧憘ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ慱㙪∰
櫜啴ሺሲቒ屲侓扣㓊摠♗ቒቀቑ♛㡈ት岗並ሼቮ㡈㽤ቋሺ岧憘ሸቯቂ㡈㽤ቒᇬ䭉
䵚ሸቯቂ≬椉岗䚕ቑ☮ⓖ♙ቖ䶻檔ቑ尞⸩㈢ቆቂብቑቊቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ሯ⯠侓偯俟ቑ彊䞷ት㘶棳ሼቮ⫃⚗ቒᇬ⧖䷘櫜ቫቭᇬሮቇⅴₙቑ㦮栢
ቲቂቆሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
≬椉劔ቒᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ㞾㓤ሧሮሮቲቮ彊䞷ት孫ቶሼቮቂቤᇬ䭉䵚ሸቯቂ
≬椉岗䚕ቑ☮ⓖ㈢ቆ岗並ሸቯቂ拸⒖ቍ摠櫜ትᇬ屲侓扣㓊摠ቑ岗並ርሧ㡱
䂪櫜ሸቯሧቮ⫃⚗ት棳ሰᇬ㘶棳ሼቮሶቋሯቊሰቮᇭ
628
Japanese: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL) 䶻᧭捷: ዅዙዊአኮ≬椉⯠侓㽤☮ⓖ(PEICL)⚺ቡቯቮሼቜቑ⯠侓␀抩ሼቮ尞⸩
䶻捷⥲⇢≬椉
䶻䵯⥲⇢≬椉ቑ䔈ⓖ
䶻乏⥲⇢≬椉抩ⓖ
䶻㧰拸䞷乓⦁
⥲⇢≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔♙ቖ≬椉劔ሯ䶻㧰㈢ቆ⯠侓ት偯俟ሺቂ⫃⚗
ᇬ3(,&/ቑ拸䞷ት♦ሴቮᇭ⥲⇢≬椉ቒᇬ⏷❰┯⏴ቊሥቆሶቑ䵯ቑ䶻乏ቑ拸䞷ት
♦ሴቮብቑᇬ♗ቒ↊㎞┯⏴ቊሥቆሶቑ䵯ቑ䶻乏ቑ拸䞷ት♦ሴቮብቑቑሧሽቯሮቋ
ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቑ咻䤓ቍ㽷㎞券╨
⥲⇢≬椉⯠侓ቑℳ䂘♙ቖ嫛椪ሺᇬ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቒᇬ㽷㎞ት⻌ሲሺᇬሮቇ崯⸮
⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ቑ㷲㇢ቍⒸ䥙ት劒㏽ሺ嫛╤ሺቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቒᇬ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰⺍ሺᇬ≬椉劔ሯ䤉ሺቂ抩䩴ትሼቜ↬拣ሺᇬቡቂ
⯠侓ቑ≽㷲ትሼቜ䩴ቬሾቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
䶻乏⏷❰┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉
䶻㧰3(,&/ቑ拸䞷
3(,&/ቒᇬ㉔尐㉫ሻ⏷❰┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉䄥䞷ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰㍔⫀㙟∪券╨
⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ሯ⥲⇢┯⏴ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቒᇬ㶰㙁ስቮℚ檔⏷ትᇬ拔
䅭ቍሲ㱚㒟❰䩴ቬሾቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
D ≬椉⯠侓ቑⷧ⦷
E ≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ乓⦁
F ℗棁㘹函♙ቖ≬椫 孫⎮ ት值㖐ሼቮቂቤቑቀቑⅥቑ㧰ↅ
G 嵚㻑ቑ㓚倩
䶻檔ቫቭ券╨ቈሴቬቯቮ㍔⫀ት⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ሯ♦檧ሺቂሶቋቑ峋㢝弻↊ቒᇬ⥲⇢
ⅲ嫷劔ሯ弯ሩᇭ
䶻㧰≬椉劔ቫቮ俑ℕ
䶻 㧰ቑ拸䞷ₙᇬ≬椉⯠侓劔ቫቮ⯠侓俑ℕ㲸ቑ嫛∎ቒᇬ≬椉ℚ㟔ሯ䤉䞮ሺቂ
㱚㒟❰ት≬椫 孫⎮ ሮቬ棳⮥ሼቮሶቋ棟⸩ሸቯሧቮቋሰ棟ቆ⚗䚕䤓ቊሥቮ
ብቑቋሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰♙ቖ䶻㧰䶻檔ቑ拸䞷ₙᇬ≬椉劔ቫቮ⯠侓俑ℕ㲸ቑ嫛∎ቑ╈㨫
ቒᇬ券╨ቈሴቬቯቂ℗棁㘹函ትቋቬቍሮቆቂ㱚㒟❰♗ቒ☀椉ቑ⬦┯ሯ䞮ሻቂ㱚㒟
❰ት≬椫 孫⎮ ሮቬ棳⮥ሼቮሶቋ棟ቬቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰ቑ拸䞷ₙᇬ≬椉⯠侓ቑ俑ℕቑ╈㨫ቒᇬ≬椉ሯⅧሸቯቂ弰䞲ት币䂰ሺቂ
㱚㒟❰ት孫⎮ሮቬ棳⮥ሼቮሶቋ棟ቬቯቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椫ት倨倩ሼቮ㲸Ⓒನನ⥲⇢䞮✌≬椉
⏷
❰┯⏴⥲⇢䞮✌≬椉ሯ俑ℕሸቯᇬ♗ቒ㱚㒟❰ሯ⥲⇢ት楱叀ሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬椫
ቒᇬሮ㦗㈛♗ቒ⥲⇢䞮✌≬椉⯠侓ቑ俑ℕ㣑ቑሧሽቯሮ㡸ሧ㣑䍈俑ℕሼቮᇭሶ
629
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ቑ⫃⚗ᇬ㱚㒟❰ቒᇬ㇢崁≬椉劔ቋቑ栢ቊᇬ㠿ቂቍ☀椉指㔭ት♦ሴቮሶቋቍሲᇬ㠿
ቂቍ⊚ⅉ⯠侓⪉ቈሧ⚛䷘ቑ≬椫ት♦ሴቮ㲸Ⓒት㦘ሼቮᇭ
⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቒᇬ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰⺍ሺᇬ㶰㙁ስቮℚ檔ት拔䅭ቍሲᇬ㦇槱ቫቭ䩴
ቬሾቍሴቯቓቍቬቍሧᇭ
D ⥲⇢䞮✌≬椉⯠侓⪉ቈሲ≬椫ቑ俑ℕሯ扺ቆሧቮሶቋ
E 䶻檔⸩ቤቮ㲸Ⓒ
F ቀቑ㲸Ⓒት嫛∎ሼቮ㡈㽤
⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ሯ䶻㧰䶻檔⸩ቤቮ㲸Ⓒት嫛∎ሼቮ㎞㊬嫷䯉ትሺቂቋሰቒᇬ≬
椉劔ቋ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ቋቑ栢ቑ⯠侓ቒᇬ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ቑ䚍⦷ቑ⋴ㅆ䕅㏚♙ቖ燱ት╧㫗
ሼቮሶቋቍሲᇬቀቑ㣑䍈ቑ⊚ⅉ≬椉⯠侓ት⪉䮝ቋሺ岗並ሸቯቂ≬椉㠨ቫቭᇬ
⊚ⅉ≬椉⯠侓ቋሺ倨倩ሼቮᇭ
䶻乏↊㎞┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉
䶻㧰↊㎞┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉抩ⓖ
↊㎞┯⏴⥲⇢≬椉⯠侓ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቋ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቋቑ栢ቑ⪉㦻⯠侓ቋሶቑ⪉㦻⯠侓
⪉ቈሰ≬椉劔ቋ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ቋቑ栢ቊ偯俟ሸቯቮ⊚ⅉ≬椉⯠侓ቋሯ宖⚗ሺቂብቑ
ቋቢቍሼᇭ
3(,&/ቒᇬ⥲⇢ⅲ嫷劔ቋ≬椉劔ሯቀቑ拸䞷⚛㎞ሺቂ⫃⚗ᇬ⊚ⅉ≬椉⯠侓拸
䞷ሼቮᇭቂቃሺᇬ⪉㦻⯠侓ቒᇬ䶻㧰♙ቖ䶻㧰ት棳ሰ3(,&/ት拸䞷
ሺቍሧᇭ
䶻㧰⯠侓㧰ↅቑ⮘㦃
⪉㦻⯠侓ቑ⯠侓㧰ↅቑ⮘㦃ቒᇬ䶻㧰ᇬ䶻㧰♙ቖ䶻㧰ቑ尐ↅ㈢ቆ
ᇬ拸⒖ቍሸቯቂ⫃⚗棟ቭᇬ⊚ⅉ≬椉⯠侓⺍ሺ╈┪ት㦘ሼቮᇭ
䶻㧰≬椫 孫⎮ ቑ倨倩
⪉㦻⯠侓ቑ俑ℕ♗ቒ⊚ᇰቑ⥲⇢㱚㒟❰ቑ㱚㒟❰彖㫋ቑ⠹⯀ቒᇬ≬椉劔ቋ㱚㒟❰ቑ栢ቑ
≬椉⯠侓⺍ሺ㈀檎ት♙ሸቍሧᇭ
630
Korean version
by Eun-Kyung Kim and Che-Oug Rim
2TKPEKRNGUQH'WTQRGCP+PUWTCPEG%QPVTCEV.CY 2'+%.
ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢿٕࡧԞؼଳˀߜࡒأૣଞѶָҕ ࢿࢠл˽
ˀߜࡳଛࢇࢺ̊ ࢿࢠؼଲˀߜɹ߂Сؼଲ
ࢿࢠۭ߬̊ࢺ ࢿࢠؼଲଲ
ࢿࢸࡧԞؼଲˀߜࡒأࡿࢳࡅ
ࢿࢸࢇࡿࢺ ࢿٕࢺߓؼଲ̊ࢺࢇ
ࢿࢸओପ ࢿࢠଭࡅۺ
ࢿࢠؼଲˀߜࡿজ̘Ьˀࠧࡧऌ
ࢿࢸߜࡿˀߜࢴࢺࢼؼːࡿב ࢿٕॷࢋؼଲ
ࢿࢸؼଲࡿˀߜʹࢴࡿב ࢿࢠॷࢋؼଲࢇ
ࢿࢸˀߜࡿʹ ࢿࢠऍࢸˮ˽˒ऍࢸܛܒ
ࢿࢸەؼࢺ࢙̔ܒ
ࢿࢸؼଲऋ˽ ࢿࢠࡿؼבଲ
ࢿࢸؼଲˀߜࡿ̘ɻ
ࢿֵٕ۟ؼଲ
ࢿࢸؼଲࡿˀߜ୬ࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ࢿࢠֵ۟ؼଲࡿછࢺ̊ش
ࢿࢠؼଲࣵʋ
ࢿࢸࢼ
ࢿࢠْؼଲ ࢿࢸˀߜজ̘Ьˀࠧࡧऌ
ࢿࢸࠓ،࣌ ࢿࢸˀߜ̘ɻࣵࡿسʾ
ࢿࢸଲࡿऋɹ ࢿࢸ˯έ˔ࡿ˒أˀ
ࢿࢸଲࡿʀܒ ࢿࢸؼଲ˅ۉ
ࢿࢠؼଲՋ ࢿࢸࢴୗ˒ଢߜ
ࢿࢠؼଲ˅ۉ
ࢿٕЬؼଲ
ࢿࢠݡ୧
ࢿࢠЬؼଲࡿછࢺ̊ش
ࢿٕܕଢؼଲ̊ࢺࢇ ࢿࢸЬؼଲࢇ
ࢿࢸْࣔࢳЬؼଲ
ࢿࢠؼଲ̓ߓ˒ؼଲɹߓ ࢿࢸࢋࡿЬؼଲ
ࢿࢠەؼлଛ˽ն
631
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢿٕࡧԞؼଳˀߜࡒأૣଞѶָҕˀߜࡳଛࢇ
̊ࢺ
ࢿࢠۭ߬̊ࢺ
ࢿࢸࡧԞؼଲˀߜࡒأࡿࢳࡅ
ࢼ࣌ݥऐࢳࢳࡅآ
3(,&/ࡵࢊ؆ࢶࢉؿیଵ߾ࢶࡈଜֲۘؿଵࡶ૦ଡଞЬ
3(,&/ࡵࢢؿଵ߾Еࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
ࢼ࣌۱ੑࢳࢳࡅ
˲ࢿࢂئۘئی۴߾˗ଞࢿଞ߾˗˃߷ࢇߦкیɼ˃ߟ߾3(,&/ࡶࢶࡈଜѦ
Լଢࢂձଞˁࡉ3(,&/ࢇࢶࡈѹЬࢿ࣏߾ҬԂઞࢽ̍ࢽࡶؑࢿଜए߉ˈ
3(,&/ࢇࢊ˘ࢶࡈѹЬ
ࢼ࣌ʅପۺ
ࢿ࣏࣏ࢿ࣏ࢿ࣏ࢿ࣏ࢿ࣏ࢿחЕʈ
ଭ̍ࢽࢇЬ̐࠹̍ࢽࡵ̛یଭࡢࠪ˗ѹࢿࢢࢉˁࡉ߾ଞଜࠆʈଭࢇ۽
Ь
ؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈߾ʯٙࢇ࢈ࢇѸए߉Еଞؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰
Ьհ̍ࢽࢂࢶࡈࡶؑࢿଟܹЬ
(&एࢿ࣏ࢿତࢇࢂଜЕоࡢଵࡶжؿଜЕ˃ߟ߾۰ߦк
߾یʯࢇ࢈ࢇѸЕˁࡉ߾ଞଜࠆࢿତࡶؑࢿଜЕʨࡵରࡈѹЬ
(&एࢿ࣏ࢿତEӖЕFɼָݤଞʎࡁطʢࡶ࣐ଜЕଥкଔؿଵ
߾ଞଜࠆЯؿଵ߾۰ࢂٕٗࢶؑࢿԻоତଟܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ଢۮ
3(,&/ࡵࢷחق୯˗˃̐ࢶּئչˈؑࢶئˬٸˁࢂ˗ࢺ߾۰ଥ۱ଥߞଞЬ
ઞؿଵࠒࠇ߾۰ࢂࡕࢂݨ۽ࢂݦ˃ߟ˗˃߾۰ࢂૡؿ۽˗ࢊࢂࡈࢶ۽
ଵ˃ߟ߾্ִࢂؿ۰ଥ۱ଥߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌˯έࡒࢇ˒أ
˲ΰࢂ߾ئଞ3(,&/ࢂࢿଞӖЕࡵؿରࡈѸए߉ЕЬ3(,&/߾૦ଡѹઞط
̍ࢽ߾ࢂଥ۰ЕжؿѸए߉Еؿଵࢂࣗզձ˱۽ଜˈЕ˲ΰࢂئʈଭ̍ئ
ࠪ˗ଜࠆ۰ЕࡈࢶࢇחѸए߅ТଞЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰؈ۢଞࢿחɼ3(,&/߾۰ָ̍ࢽѸए߉Еˁࡉࡪԡ˃ߟࡕئ
߾Ҭծˈࡪԡ˃ߟࡕئ߾Ѧࢶࢸଞ̍ࢽࢇٕࢢଞˁࡉ߾Еୣࡕ˲˲ΰئ
ࢂࢊ؆ࡕ߾ҬհЬ
632
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢿࢸࢇࡿࢺ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲˀߜ
ؿଵ˃ߟࡵࢊ؏кؿ یଵ ɼۘо؏ ؿଵ˃ߟ ߾ʯؿଵՎձоɼԻઞࢽ
ଞࡢଵ߾оଥࢷؿଜЕ˃ߟࡶࢂଞЬ
ؿଵˈیЕؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ઞࢽଞࡢଵࢂ؈ۢࡶࢂଞЬ
ܘଥؿଵࡵؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢࡳԻࡵ߾ݨܘоଥؿଵ߾ʯהࢂۘؿձٕࠆ
ଞؿଵࡶࢂଞЬ
ࢽߖؿଵࡵؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢ߾оଥˈࢽ̖ߖࢂए̗ࢂהձؿଵ߾ʯٕࠆଞ
ؿଵࡶࢂଞЬ
ॺࢎؿଵࡵଔؿଵɼଔଥ߾оଥ߾ࢎॺࢶئऐִଞࡢଵ߾оଞؿଵࡶࢂ
ଞЬ
ָۢؿଵࡵؿଵࢂࢂהӖЕؿଵՎࢂए̗ࢇଔؿଵࢂیӖЕ࣑ۢࡳԻ
ଜЕؿଵࡉࣛ߾ˈیѸЕؿଵࢇЬ
Яؿଵ˃ߟࡵЯࢂ˱ࡢࡶ࢈ࢇࢂࡕ۽ଜࠆؿଵࠪЯࢂоɾ߾
ʼଞ˃ߟࢇЬЯؿଵ˃ߟࡵ˱ࢂࡕ۽ɼ࣐ࡶоۘࡳԻଟܹЬ
ٕࣗࢶЯؿଵࡵ˱ࢇࡕ۽ଥкЯ߾ܖଜʯѻࡳԻނʠࢸଟܹ߷ࢇѰࡳ
ԻଔؿଵɼѸЕЯؿଵࢇЬ
ࢎࢂЯؿଵࡵ˱ؿࢇࡕ۽ଵɼࡶʠࢸଜए߉ࡸࡳԻނଔؿଵɼѸʠΟ
ऐࢻࢶࢉݦঐࡳԻނଔؿଵɼѸЕЯؿଵࡶֆଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ࡿࢺࢳْۼ
ଔؿଵЕܘଥؿଵࢂ߾ݨܘоଥଔؿଵࢇ࢈ࡶɼएЕࢇЬ
ؿଵܹ࢈Ԅࢽߖؿଵ߾۰ؿଵ̖ࡶए̗؇ࡶܹЕࢇЬ
ࢉؿଵࢂଔؿଵԄ̐ࢂָۢʢʈࠟࢷଡࢇΟ̐ۘ߾ؿଵࢇ٠ࠆऑձ
ֆଞЬ
ॺࢎؿଵ߾۰ଔଥԄ̐ࢂۘیଥӖЕ߾ݨܘоଥଔؿଵ߾ʯॺࢎࡶט
ЕձֆଞЬ
ؿଵֻखоչࢉࢇԄؿଵ߾ࢂଥୖؿશईؿଵ˃ߟࢂ˗չձּࢶࡳԻˈ
ࡈѹؿଵࣸʎձֆଞЬ
ؿଵՎԄؿଵۘࢂ̗ٕձоɼԻؿଵ˃ߟɼؿଵ߾ʯए̗ଜЕ̖ߖࢇЬ
ؿଵ̛ɾࢇԄ˃ߟࢂʼ˕Իݤଜࠆ˃ߟ̛ۘɾࢂˁ˕ԻΖΟЕ˃ߟۘࢂה
̛ɾࡶࢂଞЬ
ؿଵՎ̛ɾࢇԄкࢂیଢࢂ߾ҬԂؿଵՎΨࢂהɼЕ̛ɾࡶֆଞЬ
ॺࢎ̛ɾࢇԄ̛ࢠؿɾࡶࢂଞЬ
ࢂ ؿהଵࢇԂଡࡵئӖЕ̍ࢽ߾ࢂଥؿଵɼࢇʈࢿѸЕؿଵࢇЬ
ࢼ࣌ࠧߪ߬ࡿۭהଢۮ
ؿଵ߾ࢂଥ۽ѹֻҘח۰ЕЯָܻՎଜࠆߞଜˈ˃ߟࢇۘѺҶࢇࡈ
ଞ߯߭ԻߞࣇࠆޱଞЬ
ؿଵ߾ࢂଥࢿ˓ѹࢽؿӖЕֻҘח۰ࢂࢂɼָٙଞˁࡉ߾Еؿଵ˃
ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈߾ʯফоଞࡪչଜʯଥ۱ଜࠆߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ܶࡿۭהԳऋֵ
ؿଵ߾ࢂଥ۽ѹח۰ձؿଵ˃ߟɼܹԶବЕएࠆٕࢂऎָॺࢎࡵؿଵ߾
ʯЬ
633
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢼ࣌ऌࡿݢ
3(,&/ࢂઞࢽଞࡕ߾ҬԂঐߟؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈ɼؿଵ˃
ߟ˕˗ѹएձଜЕˁࡉ߭ҿଞઞطଞݥѦࡁ˱Ѹए߅ТଞЬ
ࢼ࣌лնࢆࢄ߄ʥ
˃ߟࢂࢇଭӖЕʼ߾ଗࡁଞ̀ଞࡶؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈߾ʯ
ࡢࢎ؇ࡵɼ̐ࢂ̀ଞࡶࢇଭଜЕ˕ࢽ߾۰оչࢉࢇߊߑʠΟߊ߅ߞବыࣸࡁ
ଞیତࡵؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈ɼ߇ʨࡳԻقЬ
ࢼ࣌५̓شऌ
ݦࢎط۽ষࣗࢉࢶ˲ۏӖЕࡪࢇࡶ࣐ԻʎࢉࢂؿଵՎࠪؿଵ̖ࢂ८ࢇ
ձѿ߭۰Е߅ТѹЬ
ؿଵՎ߾˗ଞ࣏ତࡶ૦ଡଜࠆࢿତ߾؆ଜЕ࣏ତࡵؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵ
ձ˱ܖଜए߅ТଞЬࢿତ߾ҬԂ۰ଥк˃ߟࡵ८̖طए̍ࢽࡶ̒ʠԻଜࠆ
кیձ˱ܖଞЬ
ࢿତࢂˁࡉ߾ؿଵ˃ߟЕ˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟ̀ଞࡶɼऑЬࣗՎࢂएЕؿଵ
˃ߟɼؿଵ߾ʯ̐ࡢ؆߇ࡶݨیΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾۰ִࡳԻଜࠆߞଞ
Ь
ࢼ࣌ࡧࢴʣۉ
ؿଵЕঐߟؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵ߾ʯࡪࢷʦیձࡁ˱ଜʠΟ̐Ԝ
ଞʦیʼ˕ձˈएଜѦԼࡁ˱ଟܹ߷ˈӖଞؿଵɼ̐ʨࡶࡢଵթࢂࢽۏ
ּࢶࡳԻࢇࡈଟܹ߷Ь
ࢿତࡵࢉؿଵࢂଔؿଵɼؿˈࢇۘࢇۿଵ̖ߖࢇփࡪԻձট˕ଜʠΟ
ࠉɾؿଵ̖ߖࢇփࡪԻձট˕ଜЕࢉؿଵ߾Еࢶࡈଜए߉ЕЬ
ࢿࢸखଭ
ࢼ࣌ ֵ ࡒأԳ
ࢿ࣏ɼࢶࡈɼМଞˁࡉࢿତ߾ࢽࢂ߾ҬԂ̀ଞЕЕ˗ଟ˲ΰئ
ࡕࢇΟк˲ࡶएࢽଟܹˈ3(,&/ࢂࡢ؆߾оଥ۰̖एָԶࡶ˱ଟܹЬ
̀ଞЕЕࢂࡪԡࢂୣࠪࡢࡕୣࢂ˗߾ؿ࢈ࢇٸܕଞए
(&'LUHFWLYHࢿ࣏ ʎࢽ ߾ҬԂࡪԡखଭࡢࡕୣɼ۽ଞּԼ߾̛ট
ଜࠆ˱۽ѹЯӖЕ࣏ऐࡶࢂଞЬ
ࢼ̘࣌ࢼࡿࢄࡿ࠶ࢺأˮࢼܶЬ
3(,&/ࢂࢶࡈࢇؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈ɼࢇࡈଟܹЕࢂ࠹ࢽئ
ࢇࢂࢿ̛ࠪ˱ࢿܹЯ߾ࢂࢻ̒ࡶւЕʨࡵ߅ТЬ
634
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢿࢠؼଲˀߜࡿজ̘Ьˀࠧࡧऌ
ࢿࢸߜࡿˀߜࢴࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ࢼ࣌˅ऌࡿב
˃ߟʼ߾ݤঐߟЕؿଵ߾ʯؿଵࢂָଜˈࢽଞओ߾חоଥݦ
ࢇߊߑʠΟߊ߅ߞଜЕیତࡶؿଵ߾ʯߊԮߞଞЬ
ࢿତࢂیତࡵଔؿଵɼߊߑʠΟߊ߅ߞବыʨࡶ૦ଡଞЬ
ࢼ࣌
ؿଵ˃ߟɼࢿ࣏ձࡢ؆ଞˁࡉࢿ࣏قତٕਫ਼ࢿତ߾ҬԂؿଵЕ
˃ߟࡶଢչࢶࡳԻضˁଟʨࡶࢿ߇ଜʠΟࣗՎܹݤЬ˃ߟࢂࣗՎձࡢଥ
ؿଵЕࢇԜଞʼࢽࢇɼएЕئթ୪˕߾оଞࢽؿձ૦ଡଜЕࢂیձ۰ִࡳ
ԻएଥߞଜֲࢇЕࢿ࣏ࢂࡢ؆یତࡶߊߑʠΟࡢ؆ࢇָؒଥऑҶԻ
ٕਫ਼ʎࡖࢇΰ߾ଥߞଞЬ
ؿଵɼ˃ߟࡶଢչࢶࡳԻضˁଟʨࡶࢿ߇ଞˁࡉ˃ߟɼ̐ࢿ߇ࡶʠࢸ
ଜए߉ЕଞࢿତࢂएձܹԶଞΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾˃ߟࡵ̐ضˁѹࢿ߇
߾ҬԂएܖѹЬ˃ߟɼʠࢸଜЕˁࡉؿଵЕ̐ʠࢸࢂ۰ִएձܹԶ
ଞΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟܹЬ
˃ߟɼࢿ࣏ࢂࡢ؆߾оଥॺࢎࢇ߷ЕˁࡉؿଵЕ̐Ԝଞࢽؿձߊ
ߑшԂִ˃ߟࡶʼଜए߉ߑࡶʨࡶऎָଜए߉Еଞ˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟܹ߷Ь
˃ߟࢂࣗՎЕؿଵ˃ߟɼࢿତ߾Ҭհ۰ִएձܹԶଞΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖ୯
߾୪ԯࢇ؈ۢଞЬ˃ߟࢂضˁࡵкࢂیଢࢂ߾ҬԂ୪ԯࢇ؈ۢଞЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟࢂ˕ݨԻࢉଞٙˈएӖЕٕˈݨए߾Ҭհжࡢؿଵࢂࡁܕɼؿଵ
ࢇࢉࡕࢂˈیѸˈ˃ߟࢂࣗՎΟضˁࢂ୪ԯࢇ؈ۢଜ̛ࢷ߾ؿଵˈیɼࢊ߭
Οˈؿଵɼ̐Ԝଞࡢ؆ߑߊࡶݨیшԂִ˃ߟࡶʼଜए߉ߑࡶˁࡉԂִ
ؿଵ̖ࡵए̗Ѹए߅ТଞЬ̐ԜΟփࢊؿଵɼؿଵՎձऎߖଜʠΟЬհ࣏
ʢࡳԻ˃ߟࡶʼଟܹ߹ࡶˁࡉؿଵ̖ࡵ̐߾ٸԷଜʠΟЬհ࣏ʢ߾Ҭ
Ԃए̗ѺܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ࠓ࠶
ࢿ࣏߾̍ࢽѹࢿࢢЕЬࡸࢂˁࡉ߾Еࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
D ओ߾חоଥ۰зࢇضѸए߉ߑʠΟࢿ˓ѹࢽؿɼָؒଜʯ۽ࠬӖЕٕࢽ
ଞˁࡉ
E ˈएѸ߹߭ߞଜЕࢽؿӖЕٕࢽଜʯࢿ˓ѹࢽؿԻЕଢչࢶࢉؿଵɼ˃
ߟࢂʼࢇΟ࣏ʢࢂѰࢂձʼࢽଟࢇࡪɼѸए׃ଞˁࡉ
F ؿଵɼؿଵ˃ߟԻଜࠆ̖ˈएଟଗࡁɼ߷ЬˈѦԼࡪѦଜࠆࢽؿɼࢿ
˓ѹˁࡉӖЕ
G ؿଵɼߊߑʠΟߊߑ߭ߞବыࢽࢉؿˁࡉ
ࢼ࣌ࢳ̘ۉ
ؿଵ˃ߟɼࢿ࣏ձࡳࢶ̛یԻࡢ؆ଜࠆ˃ߟʼࡶࡪѦଞˁࡉࢿ࣏
߾̍ࢽѹࢿࢢࢂΰࡈࡶଥଜए߅ТଜˈؿଵЕ̐˃ߟࡶীܕଜˈΨѹؿ
ଵՎձীҗଟܹЬীࢂܕएЕؿଵɼ̛یձ߇ΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾ؿଵ
˃ߟ߾ʯ۰ִࡳԻଜࠆߞଞЬ
635
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢼ࣌ɹࢺؼ
ࢿ࣏߾ࢂଥࡁ˱ѹʨ߾ɼଜࠆ˃ߟʼؿݤଵ˃ߟɼࢿ˓ଜЕֻҘࢽ
࣏ࢿ࣏ࢿ߾ؿɼࢶࡈѹЬ
ࢼ࣌
ࡪࢷࢽؿ
ࢇࢠࡵࢿ࣏ࢂࢿତࢂࡪࢷʦیʼ˕߾ࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
ࢿࢸؼଲࡿˀߜʹࢴࡿב
ࢼ࣌ˀߜʹࢴۭգࡿࢼː
ؿଵЕঐߟ߾ʯ˃ߟߟ˗ڸփ߅ТԂࣸࡁଞˁࡉЬࡸࢂࢽؿձ૦ଡଜЕ
۰զձࢿ˓ଥߞଞЬ
D ˃ߟкܕ࣯˕ָ۽ࢂیઞؿଵࢂ߶ییقҟԼऎଗࡁଞˁࡉ
˃ߟࡶʼଜʠΟࢉݣࡶٕٗࢠؿଞएࢺ
E ଔؿଵࢂؿָۢܕ࣯˕ָ۽ଵࢂˁࡉ߾Еؿଵܹ࢈ࠪଔؿଵ
F ؿ ଵֻखоչࢉࢂܕ࣯˕ָ۽
G ؿଵּࢶ˕жࡢؿଵ
H ؿଵ̖ߖ˕̛ٕж̖
I ؿଵՎࢂߖ˕ئ؏ࢽۏ
J ؿଵՎࢂए̗ܕࢠ̛ࠪݤए̗؏ئ
K ˃ߟࣗʼ؏ࡶئ૦ଡଞ˃ߟ̛ɾ̛ࢎॺɾ
L ܘଥؿଵࢂˁࡉࢿ࣏̐չˈָۢؿଵࢂˁࡉࢿ࣏߾ҬԂঐߟঋ
ୣ̀ӖЕ˃ߟী̀ܕ
M ˃ߟࡵ3(,&/ࢂоۘࢇԂЕݨی
N ঐߟձࡢଞࢸࢿ˱˕̛̀ࢿࢂࢇ࠹ࢽئ८ࢂ࣑ࢢ̐ʨ߾ࢻ̒ଜЕ؏
ئ
Oؿ ࢠ̛̖ࢇΟ̛ࢢ࣑ࢂࢽߟۘؿ
ɼМଜЬִࢇԜଞࢽؿЕঐߟɼ˃ߟʼࠆٕձˈԮଟܹЕٗଞݤ
ɾࢶࠆࡪձɼएˈࢿ˓Ѹ߭ߞଞЬ
ঐߟЕঐߟ۰Οؿଵɼࢿ˓ଞओ̛߾חটଜࠆؿଵжؿձঐߟଟҶؿ
ଵЕঐߟ߾ʯࠬࢷଞ۰զࢂ˓ࢿࡶقیଜࠆߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌࢝ؼέࡅࡿٖࢇ˔ଙࠃ߇չࡿב
˃ߟʼۘࢂߟ˃߾ݤଢ଼ئ؏ઞঐߟɼѧվѹࣸʎࢉࢂ࣏ԯࡶ؇ߑ
ЕएࢂࠆٕҟࡶˈԮଜࠆࢿ˓ѹжؿࠪؿଵɼߊߑʠΟߊܹ߹ыঐߟ
ࢂࡁ˱ࢂࢇیٙࢊձঐߟ߾ʯߊԮߞଞЬ
ࢿତࡶࡢ؆ଜЕˁࡉ
D ؿଵ߾ʯ˕߷ࢇݨЕˁࡉձࢿ࠹ଜˈؿଵЕߊռࢂࡢࢂה؆ࡳԻ؈
ۢଞֻҘܘଥ߾оଜࠆؑۘଜࠆߞଞЬ
E ؿଵ˃ߟЕࡢ؆ࡶ߇ΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾۰ִࡳԻ˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟܹЬ
ࢼ࣌࢝ؼʋ˔ݡଙࠃ߇չࡿב
ঐߟɼ९ࠝଟփଞࡪیԻঐߟ۰ɼࢿষѹкࢇࢠؿ߾ݤʎݤѺʨࡳԻˈ߹
ؿଵɼ ࢇձ ߊʠΟ ߊ߅ߞ ବࡶ ˁࡉ ؿଵЕ ࢜ࢽࢶ ࢇۘؿରࡈѸЕ ˁࡉɼ
636
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
߅Фଞ˃ߟࢇʼѸˈটୣؿଵՎɼΨѸ߭ߞࢇࢠؿʎݤѹЬЕʨࡶए߷
ࢇߊԮߞଞЬؿଵɼߊռࢂהձࡢ؆ଞˁࡉࢿ࣏ࢂࢿ D ତ߾Ҭհॺ
ࢎࡶऑЬ
ࢿࢸˀߜࡿʹ
ࢼ࣌ʹࡿ،أ
ؿଵ˃ߟࡵ۰ִࡳԻʼӖЕָݤѸʠΟ̛߭ҿଞࡶݥଗࡁԻଜए߅Тଞ
Ь˃ߟࡵ˱ѿۘࢂऎ߯ࡶ૦ଡଞ߭ҿଞܹЯࡳԻѦऎָѺܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿߜঈୠ
ঐߟɼؿଵࢂݣΠࡶܹԶଜ̛ࢷ߾ঐߟࢂঋୣɼؿଵ߾ʯѦбଞˁࡉ
ؿଵࢂঐߟࡵঋୣଟܹЬ
ࢼܷ࣌ԫ̘ɻ
ؿଵ˃ߟЕࢿ࣏߾۰ָݤଞݣΠࢂܹԶࡵ۰զࢂˬٕࣸшНࡵݤ
ࢺࡳԻٕਫ਼࣯ࢇΰ߾۰ִएࢂ؏ࡳݥԻ˃ߟࡶঋୣଟܹЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟࢂঋୣ̀ࡵЬࡸࢂˁࡉ߾ЕؑࢿѹЬ
D ˃ߟ̛ɾࢇʎࡖփࢉˁࡉ
E ˃ߟࢇࢿ࣏߾ҬԂࠉࢠѹˁࡉ
F ࢜ ࢽؿࢎॺۘؿଵӖЕЯؿଵࢂˁࡉ
ࢼ࣌Τࡅࢳ࣌ଡ
ࡕࢂݨ۽ࢂݦ˕˓ࢽଞʠԎ࣏ʢ߾؆ଜࠆ˃ߟۘؿଵ˃ߟࠪଔؿଵ
ؿଵܹ࢈߾ʯܘଥձ؈ۢݤࢇҚࢂ̀չࠪࢂࣸ߾הоଞٙ̎ࡶߞ̛ଟ
Ҷؿଵࢂقओ˕˃ߟֻۘҘ࣏ʢࢇߟ˃ʼѹкۘࢂݤଢ଼ࡶˈԮଜࠆʎ
ࡳࢶطԻࢂѸए߉ࡵߟ˗࣏ତࡵؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵؿଵܹ࢈ձ˱ܖ
ଜए߉ЕЬ
ٙ˓ࢽߟ˗࣏ତࡶࢿ࠹ଜˈ˃ߟࡶࡪएଟܹЬִ˃ߟࡵ˃ܖଥ۰кیձ
˱ܖଞЬփߟ̐ԥए߉Ьִٙ˓ࢽଞ࣏ତࡵଢչࢶࢉкیҚࢇ࣏ʢࢂٙ˓
ࢽ߾۽оଥߊߑшԂִѰࢂଜࠑࡶ࣏ତࡳԻоѹЬ
࣏قЕࢿࡶࢠؿଞӖЕܹࢽଜЕߟ˗߾ࢶࡈѸΟЬࡸࢂˁࡉЕ̐Ԝଜए߅
ТଜЬ
D жࢂؿɼߖ˕ؿଵՎࢂк˗߾۽ଞߟ˗
E ݣࢂࢠؿΠӖЕؿଵՎࢂଢࢂ߾ଗܹࢶࢉ۶ָࢇ̛ܽѹߟ˗
ߟ˗ࢇ۽߾ࢷیѸ߭˃ߟЕ̐ʼ˕ߟ˗ࢂΰࡈઞ۽߾ࢷیѹࣱ
˃ߟ˕˗ଥ۰ࢷୁࠒଯࡶࣲܹ߷߹ыˁࡉߟ˗ࡵʎࡳࢶطԻۘѸए߉
ЕʨࡳԻقЬߟ˗ࢂଥ۱ӖЕଜΟࢂઞࢽଞ࣏ࢇחʎࡳࢶطԻۘѸ߹Ь
Еࢂߟ˃ࡵݨیΟ֞एٕٗ߾۰ࢇ࣏ࢿؑࡶࡈࢶࢂחଜए߉ЕЬؿଵɼ
ࣱߟ˗ࢇʎࡳࢶطԻࢂѹʨࢇԂЕʨࡶ࣯ࢠࡶଜЕˁࡉࢇ߾оଞऎָ
ॺࢎࡵؿଵ߾ʯЬ
637
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢿࢸەؼࢺ࢙̔ܒ
ࢼ࣌ەؼ̔ܒ
˃ߟࢇʼѸ̛ࢷ̛ɾ߾оଞؿଵۘࢇࢠؿରࡈѹˁࡉ ؿ ۘؿ̗ܕଵɼ
˃ߟࢂʼؿ߾ࢺݤଵˈیɼ؈ۢଜए߉ߑࡸࡶߊˈЬִؿଵ˃ߟЕ
ʼࢇࢺݤ୯ࢂ̛ɾ߾оଥ۰փؿଵՎΨࢂהɼЬ
ࢂۘؿ̗ܕˁࡉ߾˃ߟɼ˃ߟࢂʼؿ߾ݤଵࢂˈی؈ۢࡶߊߑЬִؿଵ
Еࢿ࣏߾ҬԂ˃ߟʼࢇ୯ࢂ̛ɾ߾оଥ۰փࢠؿଞЬ
ࢼ࢙࣌ࢺەؼ
࢜ࢽࡶߟ˃ۘؿʼଟҶଗࡁଞˁࡉؿଵЕࢿ࣏DEGH
K߾ָݤѹࢽؿձ૦ଡଜЕؿଵ˃ߟݣΠ۰ձ؈ଭଜࠆߞଞЬ
ࡢࢿତ߾ҬԂࢿ࣏ٕਫ਼ࢿ࣏ࠪࢿ࣏Е࢜ࢽࡈࢶ߾ۘؿଜए߅
ТଞЬ
ࢼ࢙࣌ࢺ̘ࡿەؼɻ
ঐߟɼ࢜ࢽݣࡶۘؿΠ؇ࡵˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟۘࢠؿʎݤɼଢࢂѹࢺݤӖЕঐ
ߟ߾оଞؿଵࢂݨଞʠࢸࢂएձঐߟɼܹԶଞࡵۘؿࢽ࢜߾ࢺݤ
ԻࣗՎଞЬ
Ѱࢊଞؿଵࠪؿଵ˃ߟࡶʼଜए߉ࡵ߾ʯ࢜ࢽࢉݣࢇۘؿѹˁࡉࢿ
࣏ࢿତ߾ָݤѹ̛ɾؿЬडࡵ̛ɾࢂ࢜ࢽࢠؿࢇۘؿѺܹЬࢇԜଞ
ߦࡵۘؿкࢂ߾یଜࠆ࣯ࢇΰࢂएԻଥएѺܹЬ
ࢿࢸؼଲऋ˽
ࢼ࣌ऋ˽ࡿέࡅ
ؿଵ˃ߟࢂʼ߾ݤऎ̀߾૦ଡѸए߉Е࣏˗ߟߟ˃ؿତ˕ଡ͉ࣸࡁଞˁࡉ
Ьࡸࢂࢽؿձ૦ଡଜЕؿଵऎ̀ࡶ؈ଭଞЬ
D ˃ߟкܕ࣯˕ָ۽ࢂیઞؿଵࢂ߶ییقҟԼऎଗࡁଞˁࡉ
˃ߟࡶʼଜʠΟࢉݣࡶٕٗࢠؿଞएࢺ
E ଔؿଵࢂؿָۢܕ࣯˕ָ۽ଵࢂˁࡉЕؿଵܹ࢈ࠪଔؿଵࢂ˕ָ۽
࣯ܕ
F ࣸ ʎࢂܕ࣯˕ָ۽
G ؿଵࢂּࢶ˕жࡢؿଵ
H ؿଵ̖ߖ˕̛ٕж̖
I ؿଵՎࢂߖ˕ئ؏ࢽۏ
J ؿଵՎࢂए̗ܕࢠ̛ࠪݤए̗؏ئ
K ˃ߟࣗʼ؏ࡶئ૦ଡଞ˃ߟ̛ɾ̛ࢎॺɾ
L ܘଥؿଵࢂˁࡉࢿ࣏̐չˈָۢؿଵࢂˁࡉࢿ࣏߾ҬԂঐߟঋ
ୣ̀ӖЕ˃ߟী̀ܕ
M ˃ߟࡵ3(,&/ࢂоۘࢇԂЕݨی
N ঐߟձࡢଞࢸࢿ˱˕̛̀ࢿࢂࢇ࠹ࢽئ८ࢂ࣑ࢢ̐ʨ߾ࢻ̒ଜЕ؏
ئ
Oؿ ࢠ̛̖ࢇΟ̛ࢢ࣑ࢂࢽߟۘؿ
638
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢼ࣌ऋ˽ࡿ୧Ԭ
ؿଵऎ̀ࢂ࣏ତࢇؿଵ˃ߟࢂঐߟӖЕкیࢽߟࢂࢷࢇࢂࢇییତ˕Ь
հˁࡉؿଵऎ̀߾Ο८ࢇЕؿଵ˃ߟɼؿଵऎ̀ࢂܹԶ୯ʎࡖΰ߾
ࢇࢂձࢿ̛ଜए߅ТଜЕˁࡉ߾ЕࢇձѰࢂଞʨࡳԻقЬؿଵЕؿଵऎ̀
ࢇ˃ߟۘଢࢂଞʨ˕८ࢇɼЕˁࡉ߾Еࢇࢂձࢿ̛ଟ̀չɼࡸࡶ˶ࡵ
ԻएଜࠆߞଞЬ
ؿଵɼࢿତࡶࣱܹଜए߉ࡵˁࡉ˃ߟࡵؿଵ˃ߟࢂঐߟۘࢂ࣏ʢӖЕ
кیࢽߟࢂࢷࢇࢂیତ߾̛ଜࠆଢࢂଞʨࡳԻقЬ
ࢿࢸؼଲˀߜࡿ̘ɻ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲˀߜࡿ̘ɻ
ؿଵ˃ߟࢂ̛ɾࡵϗࢇЬࡢଵࢂقओ߾ҬԂкیЕЬհ̛ɾࡶଢࢂଟܹ
Ь
ࢿତࡵࢉؿଵ߾Еࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ࠆ࢝
ࢿ࣏߾̍ࢽѹϗࢂ̛ɾࢇएˁࡉ߾˃ߟࡵЬࡸˁࡉձࢿ࠹ଜˈЕࠉ
ࢠѹЬ
D ؿଵɼࢶ߭Ѧ˃ߟࢂփՎʎࡖࢇࢷ߾ۘо؏߾ʯʼࢽࢂࢇࡪձָݤଜ
ࠆ۰ִࡳԻएଞˁࡉ
E ؿଵ˃ߟɼࢶ߭Ѧ˃ߟ̛ɾࢂࣗՎࢊӖЕؿଵࢂؿଵՎঐ˱۰ࢂܹԶ
୯ʎࡖࣸΟࣸࢂʨࡳԻۘо؏߾ʯ۰ִࢂएձଞˁࡉЬփ୯ࢂˁ
ࡉ̐ʎࡖࢂ̛ɾࡵ˶ࡵԻঐ˱۰߾ָ̛ܽଞˁࡉ߾ଞଜࠆ̛
ۏѹЬ
ࢿତEࢂীए߾ҬԂएЕ؈ܞईࡪݤ୪ଞʨࡳԻقЬ
ࢼ࣌ߜ˔࣌ଡ˒࣌ʟࡿسʾ
ࢿ࣏߾ҬԂࠉࢠѹؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ؿଵՎӖЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂЬհߟ˗࣏ତӖ
Е࣏ʢࡶضˁଜѦԼؿଵ߾ʯରࡈଜЕߟ˗ࡵЬࡸࡶ̍ࢽଜए߉ࡳִה୪
ࢇЬ
D ضˁࡵЬࡸ߾ࢷࢇࢠࠉࢂءЕ୪ԯࢇ߷ࡶʨ
E ؿଵɼୃࢢࢂ˃ߟ̛ɾࢇփՎѸ̛ࢷН߭Ѧʎࡖΰ߾ؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ
۰ִࡳԻضˁࡶएଟʨ
F एЕؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯࣗՎଟ̀չɼЬЕʨ˕ࣗՎଟ̀չձଭیଜए߉
Еˁࡉࢂʼ˕ձΰࡈࡳԻଟʨ
ࢿତࡵضˁߟ˗ࢂ୪ԯ߾оଞЬհ࣏ʢ߾ࠒଯࡶए߅ТଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲ˅ۉ۟୬ࡿˀߜࣔՋ
ؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢ୯˃ߟࢂࣗՎձ̍ࢽଜЕ࣏ତࡵЬࡸˁࡉɼ߅Тִה୪ࢇЬ
D ߦк߾یʯࣗՎࢂ̀ଞࡶٕࠆଜˈ
E ࢉؿଵ˃ߟࢇ߅Хʨ
ࣗՎࢂ̍ࢽ˕̀ଞࢂଭیЕଢкଥߞփଞЬ
ࢿחѹкیɼؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢࡶࢉݥଞ୯ʎࡖΰ߾Ьհк߾یʯ۰ִ
ࡳԻࣗՎࢂएձଜए߅ТଞˁࡉࣗՎࢂ̀չЕֵܕଞЬ
ࢿତ߾Ҭհए࣯୯߾ؿଵۘࣗࡵࢠؿՎଞЬ
639
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢿࢸؼଲࡿˀߜ୬ࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ࢼ࣌ࢇࢼؼࢺːࡿב
˃ߟ̛ɾѰ߇ؿଵЕؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯए߷ࢇ࣯ۘࠪ߶یܕҟԼࢂࢺق
࣯ࡶߟ˃ࠪܕʼଞоչࢺࢇΟएࢺࢂ࣯˗߾ܕଜࠆضˁѹࢽؿձ۰ִࡳԻࢿ
˓ଜࠆߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌࠾ҩխؼࢺْۼ
ؿଵ˃ߟɼࡁঐଜЕˁࡉؿଵЕؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯए߷ࢇ˗ࢽؿձࢿ
˓ଜࠆߞଞЬ
D ɼМଞଞؿଵ߾ʯଢչࢶࡳԻ̛оଟܹЕ˃ߟࢂࢇଭ߾˗ଞֻҘی
ତ
E ؿଵ˃ߟࠪʼଞʨ˕ʋࡵࡪࢂؿଵ˃ߟ߾оଜࠆؿଵɼࢿ˓ଞۚ
Իࡋࣱߟ˗
ؿଵ˃ߟࢂࡁঐ˕ؿଵࢂࡻзࡵ۰ִࡳԻଭଜࠆࣇߞଞЬ
ࢿࢠؼଲࣵʋ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲָओлնࢆࡿ˽ଛ
ؿଵֻखоչࢉࡵୃଭؿଵ߾הݨ߶ۏҬԂؿଵձоչଜࠆֻҘଭࡢձˈ
ࡈࡢإΰ߾۰ଟܹЬؿଵֻखоչࢉࢂ̀ଞ߾оଞࢿଞࡵطʎࢂ۰զԻ
ؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯָएѸ߭ߞଞЬ̐ԜΟؿଵֻखоչࢉࢂ̀ଞࡵࢶ߭
Ѧࡢإࡈˈࢿݨձ૦ଡଜࠆߞଞЬ
߭Гˁࡉ߾Ѧֻखࢉࢂ̀ଞࡵЬࡸࢂ̀ଞࡶ૦ଡଜࠆߞଞЬ
D ؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯࢽؿձࢿ˓ଜˈߊռܹЀଞ
E ؿଵ˃ߟԻٕਫ਼एձܹԶଟ̀ଞ
ؿଵֻखоչࢉࢇ̐ࢂˈࡈ˕ࢽ߾۰ߊߑʠΟߊ߅ߞବыࣸࡁଞࢽؿЕؿଵ
ɼ߇ʨࡳԻقЬ
ࢼ࣌
ࢠ࣯ࡶࢎܖࢷٸଜЕؿଵࢂֻखоչࢉ
ؿଵࢂֻखоչࢉࢇࣸܖࢷٸʎࢎࡶ࣯ࢠଜִ۰ࢂ߾ئଥࣸʎ߾ʯٕ˕ѹ
ࢂהձࡢ؆ଜЕଭࡢձଞˁࡉؿଵЕ̐Ԝଞࡢ؆߾ॺࢎࢇЬ
ࢿࢠْؼଲ
ࢿࢸࠓ،࣌
ࢼ࣌ࠓ،࣌ࡿײ
ࠖ؏࣏Ԅؿଵ˃ߟۘؿଵࢂॺࢎࢂࢽए࣏ʢࡳԻٕࠪࠆࢢ̛ނЕ˗˃߷ࢇؿ
ଵˈی؈ۢࢷ߾ઞࢽଭࡢࢂࡢӖЕٕࡢձ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵ߾ʯࡁ˱ଜ
Е࣏ତࡶࢂଞЬ
640
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿˀߜଢऌ˽
ࠖ؏࣏ձҬծए߅Тଞˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵɼܘଥձࢊࡳࢂѦ
ԻӖЕֻהଜʯ̐չˈܘଥɼ؈ۢଟܹѦЬЕʨࡶߊˈࢂהձࡢ؆ଞʨ
ࢇ߅Фଞؿଵ߾ʯ˃ߟࡶࣗՎ̀ݤଞࢇѦԼ̍ࢽѹ࣏ତࡵ୪ԯࢇ߷
Ь
ࠖ؏࣏ձҬծए߅Тଞʨࢇؿଵ߾ʯߊԮएʠΟָؒଥऑҶԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖ
ΰ߾ؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯଥए̀ࢇ۰ִࡳԻएѸ߭ݨଭѸ߭ߞଞЬؿଵۘࢠؿ
ࡵଥएࢂҶ߾ࣗՎଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿֱॷࡧۉ
ࠖ؏࣏ձҬծए߅ТଞˁࡉؿଵɼࢷٕӖЕࢊִٕॺࢇԂЕ࣏ତࡵܘଥ
ձࢊࡳࢂѦԻӖЕֻהଜʯ̐չˈܘଥɼ؈ۢଟܹѦЬЕʨࡶߊˈؿ
ଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵɼࠖ؏࣏ձࣱܹଜए߅Тଜࠆܘଥɼ؈ۢଞࡢإΰ
߾۰փࡪ୪ଜЬ
ࠖ؏࣏ձٕ࣯ࢂଜʯҬծए߅Тଡ߾ҬԂߞ̛ѹܘଥ߾оଥ۰Е˕ࢽࢂݨ
Ѧ߾ҬԂؿଵ̖ࢂʃߖࢇ̍ࢽѹָଞ࣏ତ߾̒ʠଜࠆؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿ
ଵЕؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࡶɼऑЬ
ࢿࢸଲࡿऋɹ
ࢼ࣌ଲࡿऋɹ˔ଛ࣌ଡ
ؿଵ˃ߟࢇٕࡢؿଵࢂऎɼ߾˗ଞ࣏ତࡶ૦ଡଜˈЕˁࡉ࣏̐ତࡵࢿחѹࡢ
ଵࢂऎɼɼࣸࡁଜˈؿଵ˃ߟָۘݤѹࡪࢇ߅Фˁࡉ୪ԯࢇ߷Ь
ࢼ࣌ଲऋɹࡿऌࡿב
ߟ˗࣏ତࢇٕؿѹࡢଵࢂऎɼࢂएձࡁ˱ଜЕˁࡉएЕएࢂࢂהɼ
ЕʨࡳԻ̍ࢽѹؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈ӖЕؿଵࢂࡢ˕ࢠؿଵ
ऎɼࢂ࣑ࢢձߊ߅ߞବы߾ࢂଥࢇଭѸ߭ߞଞЬࢉ߾ࢂଞएѦࡪ୪
ଜЬ
ઞࢽଞ̛ɾΰ߾एѸ߭ߞଞЬˈࢽଥऑߟ˗ࢂˁࡉ̛̐ɾࡵۘкଜࠆߞ
ଞЬएЕ؈˕ܞѰ߾ݤ୪ԯࢇЬ
एࢂࡢה؆ࢂˁࡉܘଥࠪࡢଵऎɼࢂएࡢ؆˃˗˕ࢉ߾ࢇیɼ߷Еଞ
ࡢإࢂࢠؿΰࢂؿଵࢂˈیʼ˕Իࢇ߭ऑܘଥ߾оଥ۰ЕؿଵЕؿଵ̖ए
̗ࡶʠࢸଟ̀ଞࢇ߷Ь
ࢼ࣌ࣔՋֱࠧॷ
ٕࡢؿଵࢇऎɼѹҶ߾ؿଵɼ˃ߟࡶࣗՎܹݤЬˈ˃ߟ߾۰ࢽଞˁ
ࡉ̐ऎɼɼؿଵ߾ʯߊԮ࣌ʠΟָؒଥऑҶԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾̐Ԝଞ̀չ
Еؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ۰ִۘएԻݨଭѸ߭ߞଞЬ
ؿଵۘࢂࣗࢂߟ˃ࡵࢠؿՎ୯ʎࡖ߾փՎѸʠΟؿଵ˃ߟɼࢿ࣏ࢂ
ࢂהձˈࢂԻࡢ؆ଞˁࡉࣗՎ߾ࢺݤփՎѹЬ
ࡢଵࢂऎɼԻࢉଥؿଵˈیɼߞ̛Ѹ߹ˈ̐Ԝଞࡢଵࢂऎɼձؿଵ˃ߟɼ
ߊߑʠΟߊ߅ߞବˈؿଵۘࢂࣗࢇࢠؿՎଜ̛ࢷؿଵɼऎɼѹࡢଵࡶࢷ
ୁࢉܹଜए߉ߑЬִؿଵ̖ࡵए̗Ѻܹ߷ЬЬփؿଵɼऎɼѹࡢଵ߾ш
641
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ଜࠆؿଵՎձऎߖଜʠΟЬհ࣏ʢࡳԻࢉܹଞˁࡉؿଵ̖ࡵٸԷࢶࡳԻӖЕ
̐Ԝଞ࣏ʢ߾ҬԂए̗ѺܹЬ
ࢿࢸଲࡿʀܒ
ࢼ࣌ଲʀ˒ʹࡿܒ
ࡢଵࢇୃࢵଜʯʃܕଞˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟЕ࣑ؿଵ˃ߟ̛ɾ߾оଞؿଵՎࢂ
ʃߖࡶঐ˱ଟܹЬ
кیɼঐ˱୯ʎࡖΰ߾ٸԷࢶʃߖ߾ଢࢂձࢇՔए׃ଞˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟ
Еঐ˱୯ʎࡖΰ߾۰ִ߾ࢂଞएԻ˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟܹЬ
ࢿࢠؼଲՋ
ࢼ࣌জୠؼଲՋӓВࢇؼٖݡଲՋ
ؿଵɼটୣؿଵՎӖЕࢊݤٙؿଵՎࢂए̗ࡶؿଵ˃ߟࢂʼ۽վӖЕࢠؿ
ʎݤձ࣏ʢࡳԻଜЕˁࡉ࣏̐ʢࡵЬࡸ˕ʋए߅Тଜִ୪ԯࢇ߷Ь
D ঐߟɼؿଵՎձए̗ଟҶ̧एؿଵࢇࢠؿʎݤѸए߅ТଞЬЕʨࡶָଞ
߯߭ձࡈیଜࠆˁˈଜЕΰࡈࡳԻ࣏̐ʢࢇ۰ִࡳԻঐߟ߾ʯएѸˈ
E Dࢂࡁʢࡶ࣐ଜЕঐ˱۰ࢂܹԶ୯ؿଵՎձए̗ଜए߅Тଞॹ࣯ɼˁ
˕ଜЕˁࡉ
ࢼ࣌ˀؼܓଲՋ
˃ؿܖଵՎձए̗ଜए߅ТଜЕˁࡉؿଵɼࡢଵࡶжؿଟॺࢎࡶִଞЬЕ
ʨࡶ̍ࢽଜЕ࣏ତࡵЬࡸ˕ʋए߅Тଜִ୪ԯࢇ߷Ь
D ؿଵ˃ߟɼࢽଞؿଵՎࢂߖ˕ए̗ࢊձ̛ࢢଜЕঐ˱۰ձܹԶଜࠑ
ࡶʨ
E ؿଵՎए̛̗ࢊ୯ए̗ଟࢽଞؿଵՎࢂߖࡶؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ̛ۘˈੁݤ
ࢶ߭Ѧ࣯ࢂɼ̛ɾࡶٕࠆଜˈѦए̗Ѹए߅Тଟˁࡉईؿݤଵۘࢠؿ
ࢇࣸЯѻࡶؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯߊռʨ
F ؿ ଵՎձए̗ଜए߅ТଞॹEࢂɼ̛ɾࢇփՎଜࠑࡶʨ
ࢿ࣏قତEࢂɼ̛ɾࢇփՎଞ୯߾ЕؿଵЕִॺѹЬ˃ߟࢇࢿ
࣏߾ҬԂࣗՎѸए߅ТଜЕଞؿଵ˃ߟɼए̗ଜࠆߞଟ̖ߖࡶए̗ଜЕई
ؿݤଵۘࢂࢠࡵࢠؿԎձଯଜࠆࢢʎѹЬ
ࢼ࣌ˀߜࡿࣔՋ
ࢿ࣏EӖЕࢿ࣏ࢿତE߾۰ࢽଞ̛ɾࢇփՎଞҶ߾ؿଵՎձ
ए̗ଜए߉ࡳִࢿ࣏E߾Ҭհফˈ߾ؿଵɼ˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟ̀ଞࢇ
ЕʨࡳԻ̛ࢢѹˁࡉؿଵЕ۰ִࢂएԻ˃ߟࡶࣗՎଟ̀ଞࢇЬ
ؿଵɼЬࡸࢂ̛ࢿࡶܞܕଜए߉ЕЬִ˃ߟࢇࣗՎѹʨࡳԻɾ࣯ଞЬ
D ࢿ࣏E߾̍ࢽѹ̛ɾࢂփՎ୯ʎࡖΰ߾টୣؿଵՎए̗ӖЕ
E ࢿ࣏ࢿତE߾̍ࢽѹ̛ɾࢂփՎ୯ʎࡖΰ߾˃ؿܖଵՎࢂए̗
642
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲՋࡿɹٔۺ
˃ߟ̛ɾࢇփՎଜ̛ࢷ߾ؿଵ˃ߟࢇࣗՎѹˁࡉؿଵЕࣗՎѸ̛ࢷࢂ̛ɾ߾
оଥ۰փؿଵՎձঐ˱ଟܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲՋࡿऌ̔ˮ˽
ؿଵЕЬࡸࢂˁࡉࢿࢂए̗ࡶʠࢸଟܹ߷Ь
D ࢿɼؿଵ˃ߟࢂѰࢂଜ߾ए̗ଞˁࡉӖЕ
E ࢿɼؿଵۘࡪࡶࢠؿएଜЕіࢶئଞࢇ࢈ࡶɼएˈؿଵ˃ߟɼए̗ଜए
߉ߑʠΟؿଵ˃ߟɼए̛̗ࢊ߾ए̗ଜए߅Тଟʨࢇָؒଞˁࡉ
ࢿࢠؼଲ˅ۉ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿ˅ۉऌ
ؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢࡵएࢂהɼЕӖЕؿଵۘࢂࢢ࣑ࢇࢠؿଞЬЕݨی
ؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢࡶߊ߅ߞବыԻ̍ࢽѹؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈
߾ࢂଥؿଵ߾ʯएѸ߭ߞଞЬࢉ߾ࢂଞएѦ୪ԯࢇЬ
̐ԜଞएЕए߷ࢇࢇՔ߭ࣇߞଞЬएЕ؈˕ܞѰ߾ݤ୪ԯࢇЬ
एɼઞࢽ̛ɾΰ߾ࢇՔ߭एѦԼࢽଞ˃ߟࢂˁࡉ̐Ԝଞ̛ɾࡵۘкଞ̛ɾ
ࢇ߭ߞଜֲ߭ҿଞˁࡉ߾Ѧࢊփࢇ߭۰Е߅ТѹЬ
ए̗Ѹ߭ߞଟؿଵ̖ࡵؿଵࢂˈیएɼٕкଜʯएࠉѻࡳԻؿނଵɼܘ
ଥձ߹ࡸࡶऎָଜЕ߾ࡢإ۰ʃߖѹЬ
ࢼ࣌ˮ࣌ୃݡ
ؿଵ˃ߟଔؿଵӖЕؿଵܹ࢈Еଢչࢶࢉࡁ˱߾ࡻଡࡳԻؿނଵࢂˈی
࣏߾ی۰ઞЬࡸࢂʨ߾ؿଵ߾ʯ࣏ଥߞଞЬ
ė ؿଵ˕ࢉࡕࢂˈیʼ˕߾˗ଞࢽؿ
ė ؿଵࢂˈی۰զ̛ࠪऎʠ
ė ˗ѹࢠ̒ࢻࢂ߾ܕ
ࢿତ߾۰ࢽଞیତࡶࡢ؆ଜˈࢿତ߾ଥкѸЕˁࡉए̗Ѻؿଵ̖ࡵ̐ࡢ
؆ࡳԻࢉଜࠆܘଥձ߹ࡸࡶؿଵɼऎָଜЕ߾ࡢإ۰ʃߖѹЬ
ܘଥձߞ̛ଟࢂѦԻӖЕֻהଜʯ̐չˈ̐ܘଥɼ؈ۢଟएѦֻհЬЕʨࡶ
ߊˈࢿତࡶࡢ؆ଞˁࡉؿଵЕؿଵ̖ࡶए̗ଟॺࢎࢇ߷Ь
ࢼ࣌ˮࡿݠΝ
ؿଵЕؿଵ̖ঐ˱ձࢽଜ̛ࡢଥֻҘଢչࢶЯ˃ձईࢇݤଭଥߞଞЬ
ؿଵɼ˗ѹ۰զ̛ࠪࢽؿձܹԶଞ୯ʎࡖΰ߾ؿଵ̖ঐ˱ձʠࢸଜ
ʠΟ̐ࢇࡪձ̛ࢢଞ۰ִࢂएԻؿଵ̖ঐ˱ࢂݣΠࡶࠉ̛ଜए߅ТଜЕଞ
ؿଵ̖ঐ˱ЕݣΠѹʨࡳԻقЬ
ࢼ࣌ࢄପ̘
ঐ˱ɼ؇߅ҚࠆएִؿଵЕए߷ࢇؿଵ̖ࡶए̗ଜʠΟ˃ߟۘߟࢽѹ̗
ٕձଥߞଞЬ
ঐ˱ࢂফࣗɼߖࢇࢽۏѸए׃ଜЕˁࡉ߾Ѧঐ˱̀Еࢶ߭ѦࢊٕԂѦঐ˱
ଟ̀ଞࢇˈࢇࢊٕЕए߷ࢇए̗ѸʠΟࢿ˓Ѹ߭ߞଞЬ
643
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢿତӖЕࢿତ߾˗˃߷ࢇؿଵ̖ए̗ࡵؿଵ̖ࢷӖЕ̐ࢊٕࢂঐ˱߾
оଞݣΠࢽۏ୯࣯ࢊࢇΰ߾ଭଜࠆࣇߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ࢄପऌ
ࢿ࣏߾ҬԂؿଵ̖ࢇए̗Ѹए߉ࡵˁࡉঐ˱̀Еଥкؿଵ̖ࢇए̗
Ѹ߭ߞଟ߾̛ݤ؈ۢଜЕࢇձঐ˱ଟ̀չɼˈࢷ؆̛Τࢇࢷফ̒ࢂ
ࡪԡࣸߒࡵଭ߾ࢂଥݤଭѹоষࢿѦ߾ࢇࡶࢶࡈଡ߾߭۰Еձɼ
ଥߞଞЬ
ঐ˱̀Еؿଵ̖ࢂए̗एԻߞ̛ѹɼܘଥ߾оଞؑۘࡶঐ˱ଟ̀ଞࢇ
Ь
ࢿࢠݡ୧
ࢼ࣌ؼଲՋऌ̔ࡿˮ
ؿଵՎए̗ࢂঐ˱Еए̗ࢊԻٕਫ਼ϗࢇˁ˕ଜִݤֵܕ୪ɼࠬ۽ѹЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲْ̔ࡿˮ
ࢊ؆ࢶࡳԻؿଵ̗ٕࢂঐ˱Еࢿ࣏߾ҬԂؿଵɼঐ˱߾оଜࠆফࣗʼ
ࢽࡶଜʠΟଞʨࡳԻࢇؿЕΤԻٕਫ਼ϗࢇˁ˕ଜִݤֵܕ୪ɼࠬ۽ଞЬ̐
ԜΟ߭ҿଞˁࡉԂѦঐ˱Еؿଵˈی؈ۢ୯Н߭Ѧϗΰ߾Еࢿ̛Ѹ߭ߞ
ଜएփ̐ۘк̛ɾࢇϗࢉָۢؿଵࢂˁࡉЕࠖ࠹ԻଞЬ
ָۢؿଵࢂଥए̗̖ࢂए̗ঐ˱Еؿଵ˃ߟɼؿଵԻٕਫ਼ফࣗ˃ۏ۰ձ
ܹԶଞΤԻٕਫ਼ϗࢇΰ߾ଥߞଞЬ̐ԜΟН߭Ѧঐ˱Еָۢؿଵ˃ߟࢂࣗ
ՎࢊԻٕਫ਼ϗΰ߾ЕଥߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ݡֲܒ୧˔ଛ̘ࢼה
ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئࢿ࣏ࠪࢿ࣏߾ҬԂࡪԡ˃ߟࡕئࢿ࣏߾۰
ࢿ̧࣏एЕؿଵ˃ߟࡳԻࢉଜࠆ̛ۢЕؿଵ̖ঐ˱߾ࢶࡈѹЬؿଵ˃ߟࡵࡪ
ԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئࢿ࣏ࢿତ߾ҬԂࢇ̍ࢽҚࡶؑࢿଟܹЬ
ࢿٕܕଢؼଲ̊ࢺࢇ
ࢿࢠؼଲ̓ߓ˒ؼଲɹߓ
ࢼ࣌নлऌ̔ɹЙ̓ߓ
ؿଵЕଔؿଵɼܘࢿݨଥࢂࡢࡶۘؿଥଗࡁଞ̖ߖࢇۘࡳԻए̗ଟࢂה
Е߷Ь
ؿଵּࢶࢂיɼߖࢂଢࢂձ̍ࢽଞߟ˗ۘࢂ࣏ତࡵɼߖࢇଢࢂѹؿ߾ࢺݤଵ
˃ߟࡵଔؿଵࢂݤࢂ̛یѦӖЕˈएࢂࡢה؆߾ࢂଞʨࢇ߅Фଞؿ
ଵּࢶࢿݨࢂיɼߖࡶφ߭۰Е̖ߖࡳԻଢࢂѸ߹ЬଟएԂѦࡪ୪ଜЬ
ࢼ࣌ࢇْؼଲ
ؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢؿ߾ݤଵ̖ߖࢇٕؿѹࢢࢂۏɼߖؿЬࢶࡶएԂѦؿଵЕ
ٕؿѹܘࢿݨଥ߾оଥؿଵ̖ߖ̧एփॺࢎࢇЬ
644
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ؿଵɼࢿତ߾ҬԂؿଵۘ˓ࢿࡶࢠؿଜЕˁࡉˈی؈ۢݨࢂۏࢢࢂࢺݤ
ࢿɼߖࡶଞѦԻଜࠆٸԷԻۘؿଟ̖ߖࢂ̛টԻଜЕؿଵࡶо߇ࡳԻࢿ߇ଟ
ܹЬࢇˁࡉ߾ࢿ࣏߾ࢂଞܘଥ؏एࡵࡈٸѰࢊଞٸԻۘؿѹЬ
ࢼ࣌জ˒ؼଲࡿʾࡆ࣌ʟࡿ࣌ࢺ
ؿଵ̖ߖࢇ˃ߟٕۘؿɼМଞফоܘଥߖࡶφ߭۰ЕˁࡉߦкیЕؿଵ̖
ߖࢂʃߖ˕ࠆؿଵ̛ɾ߾ۘࡻଜЕؿଵՎࢂʃߖࡶࡁ˱ଟܹЬ
ߦкیɼʃߖঐ˱ձʎࡖΰ߾ଢࢂଜए߉ЕˁࡉߦкیЕ˃ߟࡶࣗՎ
ଟܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ࣵؼؽଲ
Ѱࢊଞଔؿଵࢇ࢈ࢇָࢇۘࢂؿଵ߾ࢂଜࠆΟЈ߭۰ٕؿѹˁࡉଔؿଵ
Е̐ɼࢿݨԻࡵܘଥձۘؿ؇Еіଗࡁଞ߾߇ࡢإ۰ࢉӖЕЬܹࢂؿ
ଵ߾оଜࠆࡶۘؿঐ˱ଟܹЬ
ঐ˱ձ؇ࡵؿଵЕЬհؿଵɼٕжଟٕٗࡶଥଜए߉ˈܘଥ؏एࡈٸ
˕ଡ͉ؿଵ˃ߟۘࢂؿଵ̖ߖ̧एۘؿଜࠆߞଞЬ
ࢿତ߾۰̍ࢽଜˈЕؿଵɾࢂ̀չࠪࢂהЕؿଵɼଔؿଵ߾ʯۘؿ
ॺࢎࢇЕ̖ߖࢂٸԻٗଟଜࠆॺࢎࢇЬ
ࢿࢠەؼлଛ˽ն
ࢼ࣌ܕଢࡿࢆ˒˔ˀ
ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵɼܘଥձࢊࡳࢂѦԻӖЕֻהଜʯ̐չˈܘଥɼ
؈ۢଟܹѦЬЕʨࡶߊˈࡢӖЕٕࡢԻ؈ۢଞܘଥ߾оଥ۰Еۘؿ
؇ࡶ̀չɼ߷Ь
ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵࢂ˕ࢽࢂݨѦ߾ҬԂؿଵ̖ࡶʃߖଞЬˈ̍ࢽଞؿ
ଵ˃ߟۘࢂָؒଞ࣏ତ߾̒ʠଜࠆؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵЕ˕߾ݨҬհ
ࡢӖЕٕࡢԻࢉଞܘଥ߾оଜࠆۘؿ؇ࡶ̀չɼЬ
ࢿତ˕ࢿତࢂীए߾ҬԂܘଥࢂࢉ˕˗˃Еܘଥձ؏एଜʠΟˁʃଜए߅
Тଞʨࡶ૦ଡଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ܕଢ،ऌࡅٵ
ٕؿѹܘଥձˁʃଜ̛ࡢଜࠆؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵ߾ࢂଜࠆীଜࠆऑ࣏
ɼ˓۽ଜए׃ଜшԂѦ࣏ࠪ˗ଜࠆؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵɼࢇԜଞ
ۘଢ଼߾۰ۘкଜЬˈશЯଞ̧ࡢإएটԎѹࡈٸӖЕ̐Իࢉଞܘଥձؿଵ
ЕۘؿଜࠆߞଞЬ
ٕؿѹܘଥࢂࢿ˕ߖۘؿତ߾ҬԂীଞ࣏Իࢉଜࠆए̗ଟؿࢇࡈٸଵ̖
ߖࡶট˕ଜЕˁࡉ߾ѦؿଵЕؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵ߾ʯۘؿଜࠆߞଞ
Ь
645
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢿࢠл˽
ࢼ࣌л
ࢿ࣏قତ߾ҬԂؿଵЕଔؿଵ߾ʯۘؿଞࡢإΰ߾۰ࢂܘଥ߾оଜࠆ
ॺࢎࢇЕࢿ߾оଜࠆоࡢ̀ࡶଭیଟ̀չձɼऑЬ
ଔؿଵɼࢿ߾оଞ̀չձ૦̛ଜЕʨࢇؿଵࢂоࡢ̀ࡶଥଜЕˁࡉ
ଔؿଵЕࢿחѹܘଥ߾оଞۘؿঐ˱̀ࡶۘݨଞЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵӖЕଔؿଵࢂɼ࣐ࢂ˱ؿࡕ۽ଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿ
ଵ߾оଜࠆѰҟଞیୣࢶ˗˃߾ЕӖЕؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵࢂ
ଔࡈࢉࢂࢂѦࢶࢇʠΟֻהଜʯ̐չˈܘଥɼ؈ۢଟܹЬЕʨࡶߊˈܘଥ
ձߞ̛ଜࠑࡸࡶऎָଞˁࡉձࢿ࠹ଜˈؿଵЕࢇҚ߾оଜࠆоࡢ̀ࡶଭی
ଟܹ߷Ь
ؿଵЕଔؿଵ߾ʯܘଥɼѺоࡢ̀ࢂଭیձଟܹ߷Ь
ࢿࢠؼଲˀߜɹ߂Сؼଲ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿ˽ն
ؿଵ˃ߟࢇ࠹ࢂձࡢଜࠆࢉܹѹؿଵࢂˁࡉؿଵˈیɼ؈ۢଜִ̐
ࢉࢇؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࡶɼऑЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟЕЬࡸࢂˁࡉࣸଜΟɼ߅ТִؿଵۘࡶࢠؿঋୣଟܹЬ
D ؿଵऎ̀ࢇбչ̍ࢽଜЕˁࡉ
E ؿଵˈیɼ؈ۢଞˁࡉ
ঋୣ߾оଞ۰ִࢂएɼؿଵ߾ʯ؈ܞѹҶঋୣࢂ୪˕ɼ؈ۢଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿࢆऌ
ؿଵ˃ߟɼؿଵ߾ʯࣸࡁଞࢽؿձࢿ˓ଟࢂהɼЕˁࡉࢿ࣏߾Ҭհ
ɼଔؿଵԻ۰ࢂࢂݦएࡢձߊˈए߉ЕଞଔؿଵɼߊˈЕʨࡶ
ؿଵ˃ߟɼ߇ʨࡳԻ߷ܹكЬ
ࢼ࣌ࢆࡿؼଲࡿଛࡿב
ࢉࢂଔؿଵ߾ࢂଞࢂࡢה؆ࡵ̐ࡢଵࢇ˓ѰࡳԻٕؿѸए߅ТଜЕଞѰࢊଞ
ؿଵ˃ߟۘࢂЬհଔؿଵࢂ̀չ߾ٙչଜʯࠒଯࡶए߉ЕЬ
ࢿࢠؼଲଲ
ࢼ࣌
ଔؿଵࡢଵࢂʼࠆ
ଔؿଵࡢଵࢇ˃ߟʼڸݤփ߅ТԂؿଵ̛ɾѰ߇߭Г߾ࢺݤѦ࣑ࢢଜए߅
ТଜЕˁࡉؿଵՎձए̗ଟଗࡁɼ߷ЬЬփؿଵЕएষѹ߾ࡈٸоଜࠆ
ۘкଞ̖ߖࡶঐ˱ଟܹЬ
ଔؿଵࡢଵࢇؿଵ̛ɾѰ߇шࢇ࣑ۘࢢଜए߅ТଜЕˁࡉ˃ߟࡵؿଵ߾ʯ
̐ʨ߾ˈ˗ଥएѹٕࢺݤਫ਼ࣗՎѹʨࡳԻقЬ
646
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢼ࣌
ؿଵּࢶߦࢂיѦ
ଔؿଵࢢߦࢇ̀ࡪܕࢂۏѦѹˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟࠪߦܹࢉࢇؿଵ˃ߟࡶшࢇհ
ࣗ߾ࢺݤՎଜЕіଢࢂଜए߅ТଜЕଞߦѦٕࢺݤਫ਼ʎࡖ୯߾ؿଵ˃ߟࡵࣗ
ՎଞЬࢇࡕࡵؿଵ˃ߟࢇࢠԎࢂߦܹࢉࡶࡢଜࠆࢉܹѹˁࡉ߾Еࢶࡈଜए
߅ТଞЬ
ࢢࡵࢉܹߦࢂۏଔؿଵࢢࢷࢇࢇۏѹҶԻٕਫ਼ଔؿଵԻقЬ
ࢿତ˕ࢿତࡵЬࡸࣸଜΟࢂˁࡉ߾ЕࢶࡈѸए߅ТଞЬ
D ؿଵؿଵ˃ߟ̐չˈߦܹࢉࢇбչߟࢽଜЕˁࡉ
E ۘࢂ߾ܖଥࢷࢇࢇ̀ࡪܕଜЕˁࡉ
ࢿٕࢺߓؼଲ̊ࢺࢇ
ࢿࢠଭࡅۺ
ࢼ࣌ࢺߓؼଲ
ۘଥʢʈָۢࢉষۢӖЕ̛ࢉؿଵփࢇࢽߖؿଵࡳԻࢉܹѺܹЬ
ࢿٕॷࢋؼଲ
ࢿࢠॷࢋؼଲࢇ
ࢼ࣌،ߪࡅٵ
ؿଵЕࢿ࣏߾ҬԂٕжଞ؏߭ۘؿࡶࡈٸଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ଢࡿؼୋ
ଔଥɼ۰ִࡳԻѰࢂଜए߉Еଞ̐ࢂएࡢЕଢࢂ૦̛ए̗ӖЕ̐ࠪѰҟଞ
ଭࡢҟࡶٙחଜˈؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵؿଵ߾ࢂଞ˃ߟۘؿଵ̖ए̗
ঐ˱߾˗ଞ߭ҿଞʼࢽ߾Ѧࠒଯࡶ؇ए߉ЕЬ
ࢼ࣌ܕଢࡿߛ̘
ܘଥձߞ̛ଟࢂѦԻࡢӖЕٕࡢ߾̛ࢉଞܘଥ߾оଜࠆЕؿଵ˃ߟӖ
ЕଔؿଵЕۘؿ؇ࡶܹ߷Ьֻהଜʯܘଥɼ߆Ѻܹࡸࡶߊִ۰Ѧؿ
ଵࢂˈی؈ۢ୯߾ؿଵࢂઞطଞएݤձҬծए߉ߑыˁࡉѦ૦ଡଞЬ
ࢿତࢂীए߾ҬԂܘଥࢂࡕࢉ߾Еܘଥ؏एӖЕˁʃଜए߅Тଞˁࡉձ૦
ଡଞЬ
˕߾ٸࢂࢎॺݨҬԂؿଵ̖ࢂʃߖࡶࢽଞָؒଞߟ˗߾̒ʠଜࠆؿଵ˃
ߟࠪଔؿଵЕؿଵࢂˈی؈ۢ୯߾ؿଵࢂઞطଞएݤձփଜʯٙࢇ
ଭଡࡳԻނ؈ۢଞܘଥ߾оଥ۰Ѧࡶۘؿঐ˱ଟܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ॷࢋࡿࢆࢺ
ؿଵ˃ߟΟଔؿଵɼଔଥࢂঐ˱ձݣΠଜʠΟࢇଭଜЕˁࡉ߾ؿଵձ
ִॺଜЕؿଵ˃ߟ࣏ତࡵה୪ࢇЬ
647
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ଔଥࠪؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵɾࢂଢࢂ߾ؿଵɼѰࢂଜए߉Еଞؿ
ଵЕ̐Қࢂࢇیଢࢂ߾˱ܖѸए߉ЕЬ
ࢼ࣌ߣѣ
˃ߟۘଔؿଵࢂঐ˱̀ࡶߦѦଟ̀չձੌଜЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂ࣏ତࡵה୪ࢇЬ
ࢼ࣌˅ۉבଜࢆʾԬ࠾ࡪ
ؿଵ˃ߟЕۘݤएϗɾ̐ࢂঐ˱ࠪ˗ѹ̛Լࡶࡁ˱ଟ̀չɼЬ
ؿଵɼ˃ߟۘए̗ѹঐ˱̖ߖࢇΟঐ˱୨ܹ߾ҬԂؿଵՎӖЕЬհ࣏ʢࡶ
ࢽଞЬִएϗɾЬհؿଵձ૦ଡଜЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂঐ˱ࢇԯࡶࢶࢸ
ˈԮଜࠆߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲ˅ۉ
ۘ߶ࢶӖЕࢷؿࢂࢶּࢶחଵ˃ߟ߾˗ѹߦкیɼؿଵˈیձଔଥࢂ
ঐ˱ҟ˕ʋࢇЬհࣱ̛ࡳԻࢽࢂଜЕˁࡉɼ߅ФଞؿଵˈیЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂ
ॺࢎ̛ɾࣸ߾؈ۢଜࠆଔؿଵ߾ʯॺࢎࡶ؈ۢੁݤЕࢇ˃˗ݨیЬ
˃ߟкیɼؿଵˈیձଔଥࢂঐ˱ԻࢽࢂଜЕˁࡉॺࢎ̛ɾΰӖЕϗ
ΰঐ˱ѹʨ˕ॺࢎ̛ɾࢂࣗՎࢷ߾؈ۢଞ̛߾ݨیটଜЕঐ˱߾оଜࠆؿ
ଵۘࢽࢉࢇࢠؿѹЬؿଵ˃ߟࢂʼ߾ݤঐߟɼঐ˱̀ࢇ؈ۢଟܹѦ
ЬЕߑߊࡶݨیʠΟߊ߅ߞଜЕʨࡶ̛টԻଞؿࡶࢠؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰Еࢿ࠹ଟ
ܹЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲ̓ߓࡳজ˒ଙВˮ
Ьܹࢂଔଥ߾ʯए̗ଟদߖࢇؿଵ̖ߖࡶট˕ଜЕˁࡉ̐ए̗ࡵٸԷࢶࡳ
ԻʃߖѹЬ
Ьհଔଥࢂ࣑ࢢձߊए׃ଜˈߊԮऑଔଥ߾ʯ۴ࢂԻؿଵ̖ࡶए̗ଞؿ
ଵЕࠆؿଵ̖ߖࡶଞѦԻЬհଔଥ߾оଞॺࢎࢇЬ
ࢿࢠऍࢸˮ˽˒ऍࢸܛܒ
ࢼ࣌ऍࢸˮ˽˒ଡس
ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵࢂॺࢎЕ߾ࡢإоଜࠆЬࡸࢂˁࡉɼ̍ࢽѹؿଵ
˃ߟ߾۰ଔଥЕؿଵ߾оଜࠆࡶۘؿऐࢻঐ˱ଟܹЬ
D ࢂؿהଵࢉˁࡉӖЕ
E ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵɼળۏଞˁࡉӖЕ
F ؿ ଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵࢂॹהɼࢽչѸʠΟঐۏѹˁࡉӖЕ
G ଔଥɼۘଥձࡵˁࡉӖЕ
H ॺࢎࡶ̍ࢽଜЕࢇئऐࢻঐ˱̀ࡶ̍ࢽଜˈЕˁࡉ
ࢂؿהଵࡶ̍ࢽଜЕઞࢂ߾ࢽ̍طଥ̖एѸए߉ЕଞؿଵЕؿଵ˃ߟۘଔ
ଥ߾оଜࠆ؏߭ଟܹЬЬփؿଵЕܘଥ؈ۢ୯߾ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔ
ؿଵࢂए̒߾ݤʠଜࠆ۰Е߭ҿଞ؏߭Ѧଟܹ߷Ь
ࢼ࣌ࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ଔଥࢂࡁ˱߾ҬԂؿଵ˃ߟࠪଔؿଵЕऐࢻঐ˱߾ଗࡁଞࢽؿձࢿ˓
ଥߞଞЬ
648
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ؿଵЕऐࢻঐ˱ࢂܹԶ୯࣯ࢇΰ߾ए߷ࢇؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ۰ִࡳԻ
एଥߞଞЬؿଵɼࢇࢂהձࡢ؆ଟˁࡉଔଥ߾оଞॹࢂהए̗ӖЕݣ
ࢉࡵؿଵ˃ߟࢂ̀չ߾ࠒଯࡶए߉ЕЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟɼࢿତ߾ҬհएࢂܹԶࡳԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖΰ߾ؿଵ˗߾ˈیଞࢽ
ؿձؿଵ߾ʯࢿ˓ଜए׃ଟˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟЕঐ˱߾оଜࠆؿଵɼऐࢻ
ଥʼଜЕʨ߾ѰࢂଞʨࡳԻقЬࢇ̍ࢽࡵۘݨیʋࡵ߾ࢺݤएձܹԶଞ
ଔؿଵ߾ʯѦࢶࡈଞЬ
ࢼֱ࣌ॷ
ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕଔؿଵ߾оଞؿଵ̖ࢂए̗ࡵЬࡸ˕ʋࡵˁࡉփଔଥ߾о
ଞࢂהԻٕਫ਼ؿଵձִॺଞЬ
D ଔଥɼऐࢻঐ˱̀ࡶ૦̛ଜЕˁࡉӖЕ
E ଔଥɼؿଵࢂ۰ִۘࡁ˱ձܹԶଞ୯࣯ࢇΰ߾ऐࢻঐ˱̀ଭیࢂࢂی
ݤձؿଵ߾ʯएଜए߉ࡵˁࡉ
ࢼ࣌ݡ୧
ଔؿଵӖЕଔଥ߾ࢂଥࢿ̛ѹʨ߾ۘ˗߷ࢇଔؿଵ߾оଞଔଥࢂܕ
ݤࢂܞ୪ɼֵܕѹҶ߾ؿଵ߾оଞݤࢂܞܕ୪ɼֵܕଞЬ
ଔؿଵ߾оଞଔଥࢂঐ˱̀ࢂݤ୪̛ɾࡵؿଵ߾ʯऐࢻঐ˱̀ࢂଭیɼ
߹ࡸࡶ߇ҶԻٕਫ਼̐ऐࢻঐ˱ɼؿଵ߾ࢂଜࠆࢽѸʠΟָؒଜʯʠࢸ
ѺҶ̧एࢽएѹЬ
ࢿࢠࡿؼבଲ
ࢼ࣌ࢳࡅآ
3(,&/ࡵЬࡸ˕ʋࡵˁࡉࢂࢇࢂהଭࡶݨଜ̛ࡢଥؿଵ˃ߟࡶʼଞߦ
кࢂ߾یଥ۴ѺܹЬ
D ˓Ѱࢂ߾ئଥ̍ࢽѹˁࡉ
E ୣࡕ˲߾̍ࢽѹˁࡉӖЕ
F ୣ ࡕ˲ࢂࢂ߾ئଥରࡈѹ߾ࡢإ۰ٸୣࡕ˲ࢂࢽ̍߾ئѹˁࡉ
ؿଵ˃ߟʼࢂהձٕ˕ଜЕઞࡶࢽ̍طҬծЕʨࢇ߅Фଞؿଵ˃ߟࢇؿଵ
ɼଟࢂהձ࣐ଜЕʨࡵ߅ТЬ
ࢿֵٕ۟ؼଲ
ࢿࢠֵ۟ؼଲࡿછࢺ̊ش
ࢿࢸࢼ
ࢼ࣌ࢆࡿֵ۟ؼଲ
ؿଵ˃ߟɼ߅Фࢂָۢ߾оଞؿଵ˃ߟࡵ۶ָ߾ɽଜࠆଔؿଵࢂ۰ִ
ۘѰࢂࠪଗ۰ָ߾ࢂଜࠆ߉ࡳִה୪ࢇЬܹ࢈ࢂضˁؿଵ̖ߖࢂऎߖ˃
ߟ̛ɾࢂضˁҟࡶ૦ଡଜЕଯ୯߾ࡶ˃ߟࢂضࢉࢶࢿݨˁѦ̐ԜଞѰࢂɼ
߷Ьִה୪ࢇЬࢇʨࡵؿଵ˃ߟࢇΟؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࢂߦѦӖЕࢵк߾ѦѰࢊଜ
ʯࢶࡈѹЬ
649
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢼ࣌ؼଲ̓ܶࢅ
ؿଵ˃ߟЕࢉӖЕЬܹࢂؿଵ̖ܹ࢈ձएࢽଟܹˈ̐एࢽࢇঋୣଟ
ܹ߷ЕʨࡳԻࢽѹˁࡉɼ߅ФଞࢇձضˁଜʠΟঋୣଟܹЬएࢽض
ˁӖЕঋୣЕࡪ߯߾ࢂଞʨࡶࢿ࠹ଜˈ؆Җݤ۰ִࡳԻ۽ଜࠆؿଵ߾ʯ
ؿΰࣇߞଞЬ
ؿଵ̖ܹ࢈߾оଞ एࢽضˁঋୣࢂ̀չЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂیӖЕؿଵی
ˈࢂ؈ۢࣸ֠ࢵࢊ߭ΟЕʨࡶࡕࢉࡳԻଜࠆࣗՎଞЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟӖЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂۘࡵࢉܖЬࡸࢂˁࡉؿଵ̖ܹ࢈ԻقЬ
D ؿଵ˃ߟɼܹ࢈ձएࢽଜए߅ТଞˁࡉӖЕ
E ܹ࢈ࢂएࢽࢇঋୣѸˈЬհܹ࢈ձएࢽଜए߉ࡵˁࡉӖЕ
F ؿ ଵˈی؈ۢࢷ߾ܹ࢈ɼیଜˈЬհܹ࢈ձएࢽଜए߉ࡵˁࡉ
ࢉӖЕ̐ࢇۘࢂܹ࢈ɼएࢽѸˈؿଵˈی؈ۢࢷ߾̐ࣸϼ˳ɼɼঋୣ
ѸʠΟیଜЕˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟɼࢿତ߾Ҭհ୯ܖएࢽࡶଜए߉ߑЬִח
ࢿɼѹؿଵܹ࢈߾ʯ̆ܖѸ߹ࡶؿଵ̖ߖࡵࠆؿଵܹ࢈߾ʯٸԷࢶࡳԻ
ٗؑѹЬ
Ѧ߾ئۏ۰ࢶࡈɼМଞ̍ࢽҚࣸ߾۰ॹ̀߾ʯٙչଞה୪ה୪ɼМ۽ӖЕ
खଭٙɼМ˗߾۽ଞ̍ࢽҚ߾˗ଜࠆؿଵ˃ߟࢂળؿࡵۏࢢۏଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ
ए̗Ѹए߅Тଞؿଵ̖ؿଵՎࢂࢷӖЕଥए̗̖ҟ߾оଜࠆ߭ҿଞ̀
չѦ߷Ь
ࢿତ߾ҬԂएࢽѹ߾ʯؿଵ̖ࡶए̗ଜЕؿଵЕ̐ɼؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࢇ
߷Еࢎࡶߊˈ߹ыʨࢇ߅Фଞए̗ࢂהձִଜʯѹЬ
ࢼ࣌ଢऌୗ̔̓ࡿܶࢅ
ࢿ࣏ࢂएࢽ߾˗˃߷ࢇؿଵ˃ߟЕଥए̗̖ࢂܹ࢈ձएࢽଟܹ
ˈ̐एࢽࡶضˁଜʠΟঋୣଟܹЬएࢽضˁӖЕঋୣЕ۰ִࡳԻ
۽ଜࠆؿଵ߾ʯؿΰࣇߞଞЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟЕЬࡸ˕ʋࡵˁࡉଥए̗̖ࢂܹ࢈ԻقЬ
D ଥए̗̖߾оଞЬհܹ࢈एࢽࢇ߷߹ыˁࡉӖЕ
E एࢽѹଥए̗̖ࢂܹ࢈ɼঋୣѸˈЬհܹ࢈एࢽࢇ߷߹ыˁࡉӖЕ
F ଥ ߟ̗̖ࢂܹ࢈ɼیଜˈЬհܹ࢈ࢂएࢽࢇ߷߹ыˁࡉ
ࢿ࣏ࢿତࢿତٕਫ਼ࢿତ̧एࣱࡈଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ߣѣӓВгؼ
ؿଵܹ࢈ɼঋୣଟܹ߷ѦԼएࢽࢇࢽѹˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟࢂؿଵ˃ߟࢇΟ
ؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࢂߦѦӖЕжؿЕܹ࢈ࢂ۰ִۘࢂѰࢂ߷ࢇЕה୪ࢇЬ
ؿଵ̖ܹ࢈߾ࢂଞؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࢂߦѦࠪжؿЕؿଵ˃ߟࢂ۰ִۘѰࢂ
߷ࢇЕה୪ࢇЬ
ࢼ̘࣌ૣܓە۱߬
ؿଵܹ࢈ɼیଞଔؿଵࢂۘܖۘˈࢇࢉܖ૦̛۴߯ࡶଞˁࡉۘܖ૦̛۴߯
ࢇԂЕЯѧࢶؿࡵݨیଵ˃ߟۘ̐ࢂएࡢ߾ࠒଯࡶए߉ЕЬ
650
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢿࢸˀߜজ̘Ьˀࠧࡧऌ
ࢼ࣌ߜࡿˀߜࢴࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ࢿ࣏ࢿତ߾ҬԂঐߟɼࢿ˓ଜЕࢽؿЕଔؿଵɼߊߑʠΟߊˈ
߭ߞବыۘଢ଼߾оଞࢽؿձ૦ଡଥߞଞЬ
ࢿ࣏ձࢿ࠹ଞࢿ࣏ࢿ࣏߾࣏ࢿҬհ˃ߟࢷࢽ˓ࢿؿ
ࢂࡢה؆߾оଞࢿࢢЕ˃ߟʼ୯ϗɾࡪ୪ଜЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿˀߜࢴࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ؿଵЕঐߟ߾ʯࢇ࢈߾ॳࠆଟ̀չɼЕएߊԮߞଞЬࢇࢽܹࢂؿԶ
ࡵ؆Җݤঐߟ۰࠹طѦԻָ۶ָѹח۰߾ࢂଥࢉݥѸ߭ߞଞЬ
ࢿ࣏߾ҬԂؿଵɼࢿ˓ଜЕח۰ЕЬࡸࢂࢽؿձ૦ଡଥߞଞЬ
D ؿଵࠪ˗ଜࠆؿଵࢂए̗ࠆԯ˕ࢢࢽۘ߾оଞࠉɾˈؿ۰ࢂࢂה
˓ࠪݤઞࢽՎ
E ؿଵࢂ˃ߟۘॺࢎ߾˗ଜࠆ
L ɽ ̗ٕࠪ۴یତ߾оଞ۶ָ
LL ࣯̗ٕࠪɼ̗ٕࣸɽ̗ٕ߾̛ࢉଜЕؿଵࡁ߾оଞࢽؿ
LLL ࢶࡈɼМଞʃѧࢂ̍ئ۶ָࡶ૦ଡଜЕؑкࢂئ؏ࢂؑٗࢽۏ
LY ଥߟ̗̖ࢂ̖ߖ˕ࠬΨࢠؿ˕ߖ̖ࢂݤѸЕࢂࡢإए
Y ࠉۏѰؿଵ˃ߟࢂˁࡉ̛টࢂ۽˱ࢂۏएܹࠪ࢈ࢇࠉѰѹઆ
߾ۏоଞ۶ָ
YL ˃ߟࢂࡪ߾ҬԂࢶࡈɼМଞ˕ࢊࢂࣱ̛ۿ؆ࢶࢽؿ
ɼࢶࡳԻࢉܹѹ˃ߟۘࡢଵࢂࢶࢸଞࢇଥձݒʯଜ̛ࡢଥ˱ࢶࢽؿɼ
ؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯࢿ˓Ѹ߭ߞଞЬ
ؿଵɼ˃ߟۘए̗ࢇࢠؿѹ̗ٕձট˕ଜЕ̖ࠖۘߖ߾оଜࠆܹձࢿݤ
ଜЕˁࡉۿɼएࢂЬհࢇԻؿଵՎձࢽۏଜЕؿଵܹչࡕ߾̒ʠଜࠆࠖ
ۘփ̛ए̗̖ࡶ૦ଡଞֻљʺࢶ۰ձঐߟ߾ʯࢿ˓ଥߞଞЬࢇЕؿଵɼ
ॺࢎࡶٕжଜʯѺएٙݨଞࡢଵࡶжؿଜЕؿଵ˃ߟࢇΟؿߖضଵ߾Еࢶ
ࡈଜए߅ТଞЬؿଵЕؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯֻљʺࢶ۰ɼɼࢽࢶࢉࢷࢿ߾̛ট
ଞʨࢊࢠؿࡶ࢈ܹۘࠖࢇߟ˃ˈࢇڸଜए߉ЕЬЕʨࡶָؒଜˈ૦˘ࢶࡳԻ
ָݤଥߞଞЬ
ࢼܷ࣌ԫ̘ɻ
ָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ࢿ࣏ࢿତ߾̍ࢽѹܺԮ̛ɾࡵݣΠࢂࢂݤیɼѦб
୯ʎࡖӖЕࢿ࣏ࠪࢿ࣏߾۰ࢽଞ۰զձˬٕଞ୯ʎࡖࣸ߾۰
шΟࣸࢂʨࡳԻଞЬ
ࢿ࣏ࢿତ߾Ҭհؿଵ˃ߟࢂ˃ߟঋୣ̀ࡵ˃ߟʼ୯ϗࢇˁ˕ଜִ
ֵܕଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲˀߜࡿଢऌ˽
˃ߟʼ୯ϗࢇΰࢂࣗՎЕ୪ԯࢇ߷Ьˈࢽଞָۢؿଵ˃ߟࢇԂѦ̐ʨࢇ
ؿଵՎࢂࢷӖЕଥए̗̖ࡶ؈ۢੁݤए߉Еˁࡉؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯָۢؿ
ଵ˃ߟࡶଥएଟ̀ଞࢇЬ˃ߟ̛ɾࢇࣗՎଜ̛ࢷ߾ଥएଟ̀ଞࡵࢊݤٙؿ
ଵՎԻए̗ѸЕˁࡉ߾Еࢿ࠹ѺܹЬଥएЕ۰ִࡳԻଥߞଜֲؿଵ߾
ʯଥएएɼѦбଞҶԻٕਫ਼࣯୯߾୪˕ɼ؈ۢଞЬ
651
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ָۢؿଵ˃ߟࢇࢷɼߖӖЕଥए̗̖ࡶ؈ۢੁݤЕˁࡉࢿ࣏ٕਫ਼ࢿ
࣏ձࢶࡈଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿଢऌ˽
ؿଵЕָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾оଜࠆࢂ߾ࢠقଥରࡈѹ߾ࡢإଞଜࠆଥएଟ̀չɼ
Ь
ࢿࢸˀߜ̘ɻࣵࡿسʾ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿˀߜ୬ࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ؿଵЕؿଵ˃ߟ߾૦ଡѹؑк̖ࢂୃࢢɼ߾оଞʨࡶϗ۰ִࡳԻ̛ࢢ
ଜࠆؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯࢿ˓ଥߞଞЬ
ࢿ࣏߾Ҭհࢂ߾࠹הѦؿଵЕЬࡸ˕˗ѹֻҘضˁیତࡶए߷
ࢇؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯߊԮߞଞЬ
D ˃ߟ࣏ʢࢊ؆࣏ʢઞ࣏طʢ
E ˃ߟ࣏ʢࢂضˁӖЕ3(,&/ࢂʎࢽࢂˁࡉࢿ࣏ࢿତIࠪJڸփ
߅ТԂࢿ࣏ࢿତELּٕਫ਼Yּ߾۰ΟࠊଜЕࢽؿ
ࢿ࣏ࢿତࡵ˃ߟ̛ɾࣸ߭ГҶԂѦ̗ٕࠖۘࢂࢽߖ߾оଞܹձ
ࢿݤଜЕˁࡉ߾ࢶࡈଞЬؿଵ˃ߟࢂʼࢷ୯ձٙחଜˈؿଵɼࢠԎࢂ࢜
ࢢࢶܹ࢈߾˗ଞܹձࢿݤଜЕˁࡉؿଵЕ˕ࢶݨট̛ࢿݤѹܹࢂ८
ࢇձؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ۶ָଥߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ଲࡿऋɹ
ָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ϠӖЕʢʈࢂ߆ձࢿ࣏߾ҬհࡢଵࢂऎɼԻࢽଜЕ
࣏ତࡵࢿ࣏߾ҬհΧࡈࢶ࣏ତࡳԻقЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲՋࠧؼଲ̓ߓࡿ࣌ࢺ
ؿଵɼॺࢎࡶٕжଟʨࢇݨଞࡢଵࡶжؿଜЕָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ؿଵ
Еࢿତ˕ࢿତ߾ҬԂ۰࣏ࢽଟܹЬ
ؿଵՎऎߖࡵؿଵՎࢂۏষ߾̛টɼѸЕۢיଝࢶࡢଵ߾˗ଜࠆ্ࠖٙɼМ
ଜˈएضࢉࢶܖɼЕˁࡉؿଵՎऎߖࢇؿଵࢂؿଵ̖ए̗ࠆࢠؿԯࡶ
ؿଟଗࡁɼЕˁࡉѧվ˗ݦչࢉӖЕؿଵʃѧ̛˱ɼѰࢂଜЕˁࡉ
߾ରࡈѺܹЬؿଵ˃ߟЕؿଵ̖ߖࢂʃߖ߾оଜࠆؿଵՎࢂऎߖࡳԻؿ
ࠬଟܹЬ
ؿଵՎɼࠬΨѹ˃ߟࢂˁࡉؿଵЕࢿତ߾۰ࢽଞ࣏ʢ߾ࢂଥؿଵ̖ߖࡶ
ʃߖଟܹЬ
ࢿତӖЕࢿତ߾ࢂଞ࣏ࢽࡵЬࡸࢂˁࡉ߾ЕରࡈѸए߅ТଞЬ
D ʸࡶʉশࡪМଞ˃չࢉࢇߊ߅ߞବыؿଵՎӖЕ̐չˈؿଵ̖ߖࢂۏ
ࢽ˕ࢽ߾۰ࠝզɼЕˁࡉ
E ̛ট˃ࢽ࣏ࢇۏ୯߾ʼѹ˃ߟࡶ૦ଡଞЬհֻҘ˃ߟ߾ࢶࡈѸए߉Е
ˁࡉ
ؿଵՎࢂऎߖӖЕؿଵ̖ߖࢂʃߖࡵؿଵɼؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯؿଵՎࢂऎߖ
ӖЕؿଵ̖ߖࢂʃߖࢇ߾оଞ̒ʠؿଵ̖ߖࢂʃߖࡳԻࢉଞؿଵ˃ߟࢂ
ˈࡪଞ̀չ߾оଞ۰ִۘࢂएձଞҶԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖ୯߾୪ԯࢇЬ
652
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ؿଵɼॺࢎࡶٕжଟʨࢇݨଞࡢଵࡶжؿଜЕָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ؿଵ˃
ߟЕؿଵՎࢂ̛߾ࢽۏটɼѸЕۢיଝࢶࡢଵ߾˗ଞ্ࠖٙɼМଜˈएܖ
ࢶࢉضԻࢉଜࠆقԎࢂؿଵՎɼшࢇۘࢶࢸଜए߉ˈؿଵࢂؿଵ̖ए
̗ࠆࢠؿԯࡶؿଟଗࡁɼЕˁࡉؿଵՎձʃߖଟܹЬʃߖࡵѧվݦ
˗չࢉӖЕؿଵʃѧ̛˗ࢂѰࢂɼ߭ߞଞЬ
߾࣏ق۰ࢿݤଜЀչЕ˃ߟࢂʼ୯ϗࢇΰ߾Еଭیଟܹ߷Ь
ࢼ࣌ߜ˔˒࣌ʟࡿسʾ
ؿଵՎࠪؿଵ̖ߖ࠹߾ؿଵɼضˁଟܹЕߟ˗˕࣏ʢࡵ̐ضˁࢇЬࡸ
ࢂˁࡉɼ߅ТԂִה୪ࢇЬ
D ؿଵʃѧ̛˱߾ࢂଞ˱ܖԯࢇЕ࣏ձ૦ଡଞʃѧࢂئʎࢽࢇҬծЕˁ
ࡉӖЕ
E ˈࡈ࣯ࢂࠉ̖ؿଵ߾ࢶࡈѸЕ˲ΰࢂئʈଭ̍ࢽࢂʎࢽ߾ҬծЕˁࡉӖЕ
F ָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ઞࢽ˕ࢇॺࢽۿΟ˲ɼࢂ̖࣏ؿ؆ࠒࡶࡢଞઞࢽଞ࣏ʢ
ࡶٕ˕ଜЕ˲ΰئʎࢽ߾ҬծЕˁࡉӖЕ
G ࢿ࣏ࢿତࢂ߾חҬհ˃ߟ࣏ତࡶоଜЕˁࡉ
ضˁࡵؿଵɼࢇԜଞضˁ˕̐̒ʠ߾оଞࢽؿձ۰ִࡳԻएଜˈؿଵ˃
ߟ߾ʯࢇएɼѦбଞ୯ʎࡖٕਫ਼୪ԯࢇЬ
ࢿତࡵضˁ࣏ତࢂࡪ୪߾۽оଞЬհࡁʢ߾ࠒଯࡶए߅ТଞЬ
ࢿࢸ˲ΰ˃˗ࢂ˕ئ
ࢼ࣌ࠆ̓ؼଲ
ࠉ̖ؿଵ˕˗ѹָۢؿଵ˃ߟࡵࠉ̖ؿଵ߾ࢶࡈѸЕ˲ΰࢂئʈଭ̍ࢽ߾Ҭհ
Ь3(,&/ࡵ̐Ԝଞ̍ࢽ߾؆ଜए߉Е߾ࡢإ۰փࢶࡈଞЬ
ࢼ࣌˒˯˒ॷࢺۼɹ̓࣌ؼ
ָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ઞॺࢽۿ˕طӖЕ˲ɼ˗˕̖࣏ؿଜࠆઞطଞ࣏ʢࡶٕ˕ଜ
Е˲ΰ߾ئЕ3(,&/ࢇࢶࡈѸए߉ЕЬ̐Ԝଞ˲ΰ˕ئ3(,&/ࢂ̍ࢽɾ߾Ѫࢇ
ۢʷΟЕˁࡉ୯Еࢿ࠹ѺܹЬ
ࢿࢸؼଲ˅ۉ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿ࣌ࢼؼࢺࠧۉːࡿב
ؿଵˈیɼ؈ۢବࡶܹѦЬˈࡶփଞ̒ʠɼЕؿଵЕࢇʨࡶࢉଜ
̛ࡢଞଢչࢶࢉࢸ८ձऑଭଜࠆߞଞЬ
ؿଵˈیɼ؈ۢବࡸࡶ߅ЕؿଵЕؿଵܹ࢈ࢂܕ࣯˕ࡕݦձߊ߅ΰˈ̐
߾ʯߊչ̛ࡢଥফ۴ࢂϠԯࡶЬଜࠆߞଞЬࢇࢽؿЕؿଵɼؿଵܹ࢈
ࢂܕ࣯˕ࡕݦձ߇ΤԻٕਫ਼ࢊࢇΰ߾ࢿ˓Ѹ߭ߞଞЬ
ؿଵɼࢿତ˕ࢿତࡶࡢ؆ଜЕˁࡉؿଵܹ࢈ࢂؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ଭݤࢂی
୪Еؿଵܹ࢈ɼ̀ࢂݦչձߊʯѹҶԻٕਫ਼ʎݤѹЬ
653
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
ࢼ࣌ێ
˃ߟʼ୯ϗࢇΰ߾ଔؿଵɼࡶۑଜЕˁࡉؿଵЕؿଵ̖ए̗ࢂה
ɼִࢿѹЬࢇˁࡉؿଵЕࢿ࣏߾ҬԂଥए̗̖˕̛̗ٕձए̗
ଥߞଞЬ
ࢿତࡵЬࡸࢂˁࡉ߾Еࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
D ଔؿଵࢂݤۑѦɼࡪԻࡋࢂیʼࢽࡶଟܹ߷Еۘ߾۰ଭଜࠆऑ
ˁࡉӖЕ
E ଔؿଵɼ˃ߟʼࢂࢂۑ߾ݤѦɼ߷߹ыʨࡳԻࢂࠆࢂݪए߷ࢇऎ
ָѹˁࡉ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲлଛ˅ࡿࢆێ
ؿଵܹ࢈ɼଔؿଵձˈࢂԻۑଥଞˁࡉ̐ࢂܹ࢈एࢽࡵঋୣѹʨࡳԻ
قЬ
ؿଵ̖ঐ˱̀ࢂߦѦЕߦܹࢉࢇଔؿଵձˈࢂԻۑଥଞˁࡉ߾Е୪˕ɼ߷
Ь
ؿଵܹ࢈ࢉѰؿ߾ݤଵ˃ߟࢉɼˈࢂԻଔؿଵձۑଥଞˁࡉؿଵ̖
ࡵए̗Ѹए߅ТଞЬ
ଔؿଵձۑଥଞؿଵܹ࢈ӖЕؿଵ˃ߟɼࢽк؏ࡢҟࢂࡪیԻ̐ଭࡢ
ɼࢽкѸЕˁࡉ࣏قЕࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
ࢿࢸࢴୗ˒ଢߜ
ࢼ࣌ˀߜࡿࢴୗ
ࢿ࣏ЕؿଵՎࢂࢷࢇΟଥए̗̖ࢇЕָۢؿଵ˃ߟ߾Еࢶࡈଜए߅
ТଞЬ̐Ԝଞؿଵ˃ߟࡵࢿତ߾ҬհࢽؿɼѦбଞ୯࣯ࢇΰ߾ؿଵ˃ߟ
ɼࢷɼߖࢂए̗ࡶࡁ˱ଜए߉ЕଞؿଵՎɼࠬΨѹؿଵ˃ߟࡳԻࢷѹ
Ь
ؿଵЕࢿ࣏EӖЕࢿ࣏ࢿତE߾Ҭհ̛ɾࢂփՎ୯࣯ࢇ
ΰ߾ؿଵՎࢂࢷ˕ଥए̗̖߾оଥߊԮ࣯߭ߞଜˈؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯؿଵ
Վࢂࢷ˕ଥए̗̖ࣸ۴ଜѦԼଥߞଞЬ
ؿଵՎࢂࢷӖЕଥए̗̖ࢂए̗ࡁঐࡵ۰ִࡳԻଥߞଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ˀߜࡿଢߜ
ؿଵ˃ߟЕؿଵ߾ʯଥए̗̖ࢂࢷٕӖЕࢊٕࢂए̗ࡶ߭ГҶԂѦࡁ
˱ଟܹࡳΟ˃ߟʼ୯ϗࢇΰ߾Еଟܹ߷Ь̐߾ҬԂ˃ߟࡵ࣏ࢽѸ
ʠΟࣗՎѺܹЬ
ࢿ࣏߾ҬԂଥए̗̖ࢇЕָۢؿଵ˃ߟࢇଥएঋୣӖЕؿଵ߾
ࢂଥীܕѸִࢿ࣏ࢂˁࡉԂଟएԂѦଥए̗̖ࡶए̗ଥߞଞЬ
ؿଵЕϗࢽԷࢶࢉˁࡉڸփ߅ТԂؿଵ˃ߟࢂࡁঐࢇЕҶցЬϗ
ଥए̗̖ࢂୃࢢߖܹࠪए̗ࢇࢠؿѸЕ߾ࡢإоଜࠆߊԮ࣯߭ߞଞЬ
ؿଵ˃ߟ߾ʯ̀ଞࢇЕࢇ࢈ࢂؑкࡵଥए̗̖ࡶшଜࠆए̗ѸΟଥए
̗̖ࢇࢽۏѹ˃ࣛ߾ࢇؑкٕٗࢇ؆ࠒѹˁࡉЕࢿ࠹ଞЬ
ؿଵЕࢂ߾࣏قଞ̖ߖࡶؿଵ˃ߟࢂঐ˱ձ؇ࡵΤԻٕਫ਼ʎࡖࢇΰ߾
ए̗ଥߞଞЬ
654
Korean: Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL) ࡪԡؿଵ˃ߟࡕئ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲՋࡿࢴୗଢऌୗ̔̓
ؿଵ˃ߟ߾۰ؿଵࢂࢢܕࢺقए߾ئҬԂࢽۏѹؿଵՎࢂࢷӖЕ̐չˈ
ଥए̗̖ࢂ؏ࡶݥ۶ָଥߞଞЬଥए̗̖˕ؿଵՎࢂࢷࢂࡵݥ؏ࢽۏ
˓ࢉѹؿଵܹչࡕ˕ࢿତࡶࣱܹଥߞଞЬ
ؿଵɼ˃ߟࢂʼࢿ˓ࡶࡈٸଜЕˁࡉϗࢇۘࢂ̛ɾ߾̎ҟଞٸԻࢇ
Ք߭ࣇߞଞЬ
ؿଵЕଥए̗̖ࡶए̗ଜЕіࢶࢽଞࢉ˓ࡶࡈٸѹؿଵܹչࡕ߾ҬԂ
ࢽۏଜˈ̐ࢇ߾ࢽۏʃߖٗࢇ૦ଡѹˁࡉɼ߅Фଞۘкଞࢿ˓ࡶࡈٸଟ
ܹЬ
ࢿٕЬؼଲ
ࢿࢠЬؼଲࡿછࢺ̊ش
ࢿࢸЬؼଲࢇ
ࢼ࣌2'+%.ࡿࢳࡅ
Яࢂоࠪؿଵɼࢿ࣏߾ҬԂ˃ߟࡶʼଞˁࡉЯؿଵ˃ߟࡵ3(,&/
ࢂоۘࢇѹЬЯؿଵ˃ߟࡵ߾ࢸࢿࢂࢠقҬհٕࣗࢶЯؿଵࢇʠΟࢠق
ࢂࢿࢸ߾ҬհࢎࢂЯؿଵࢇЬ
ࢼ࣌Ьл૯ࡿࢇבࡿࡿ࣬ࢳ
Яؿଵ˃ߟࢂۘ˕ࢇଭ߾۰ЯоЕ˱ࢽࢂࡕ۽кଞࢇ࢈˱ձࡢ
ଜࠆ۴ԛଞ˗չࢂ࣯ࢂࢂהԻଭѰଥߞଞЬ
ЯࢂоЕؿଵࢂֻҘࣸࡁଞएձ˱߾ࡕ۽ʯࢷбଥߞଜֲ˃ߟࢂ
ֻҘضˁیତ߾оଜࠆߊԮߞଞЬ
ࢿࢸْࣔࢳЬؼଲ
ࢼ࣌2'+%.ࡿࢳࡅ
ଗࡁଞˁࡉٕࣗࢶЯؿଵ߾۰3(,&/ࡶࣱࡈଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ࢺࢼؼːࡿב
ࢉࢇЯ߾ɼଜЕˁࡉоЕ̐ɼ߾ʯЬࡸࢂیତࡶए߷ࢇߊ
ԮߞଞЬ
D ؿଵ˃ߟࢂ࣑ࢢ
E ࡢإࢂࢠؿ
F ࠖ ؏࣏ࠪؿଵۘࢂؿձࡪएଜЕіଗࡁଞ̛࣏ʢ
G ঐ˱ࢸ८
˱ࢿࢇࡕ۽ତ߾ҬԂଗࡁଞࢽؿձܹԶଜࠑЬЕऎָॺࢎࡵЯо߾ʯ
Ь
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡿˀߜଢऌ
ࢿ࣏ࢂীए߾ҬԂؿଵࢂ˃ߟଥए̀ଭیЕؿଵˈیձࢊࡳ˱ࡕ۽
ࡶؿଵۘࢂࡳࢠؿԻٕਫ਼ࢿ࠹ଜЕʨࢇࢿଞѹˁࡉ߾փࢶࢽଞʨࡳԻقЬ
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ࢿ࣏ࠪࢿ࣏ࢂࢿତࢂীए߾ҬԂؿଵࢂ˃ߟଥए̀ଭیЕଗࡁ
ଞࠖ؏࣏ձҬծए߉ʠΟࡢࢂݦଵࡶऎɼؿࡶࡕ۽˱ݤଵۘࢂ߾ࢠؿ
۰ؑࢿੁݤЕˁࡉ߾փ୪ԯࢇЬ
ࢿ࣏ࢂীए߾ҬԂؿଵ˃ߟࢂࣗՎЀࢂݦչձؿଵּࢶࡶߦѦଞ
˱ؿࡶࡕ۽ଵۘࢂ߾ࢠؿ۰ؑࢿੁݤЕˁࡉ߾փ୪ԯࢇЬ
ࢼ࣌ؼଲࡳ࢝ؼەऌܓଜ˽նЬֵ۟ؼଲ
ٕࣗࢶЯָۢؿଵ˃ߟࢇࣗՎѸʠΟӖЕ˱ࢇࡕ۽ЯձੌઁଜЕˁࡉؿ
ଵۘࡵࢠؿʎࡖӖЕЯָۢؿଵ˃ߟࢇࣗՎ୯ڃհʨࡶࣱ̛ࡳԻࣗՎଞ
ЬࢇԜଞˁࡉΟ֞ए˱ࡵࡕ۽ଥкؿଵ߾ʯࡢଵ߾оଞۚԻࡋૡɼ߷ࢇ
ѰࢊଞࡳࢠؿԻʎۚࡶߟ˃طՀʯʼଟ̀չɼЬ
ЯоЕ˱߾ࡕ۽ʯЬࡸࢂیତࡶए߷ࢇߊԮߞଞЬ
D Яָۢؿଵ˃ߟۘؿଵۘࣗࢠؿՎࢂࢎ
E ࢿତ߾Ҭհ̀չ
F ̐ ̀չࢂଭئ؏ی
˱ࢿ࣏ࢿࢇࡕ۽ତ߾ҬԂ̀ࢂݦչձଭیଜˈଞЬִؿଵࠪ
˱ࡕ۽ɾࢂ˃ߟࡵ˱ࢂࢢୃࢂࡕ۽ʢʈۘӖЕࠉԶࡶˈԮଜए߅Тଜˈʎ
̛߾ߟ˃طটଜࠆࢽۏѹؿଵՎԻʎؿطଵ˃ߟࡳԻएܖଟܹЬ
ࢿࢸࢋࡿЬؼଲ
ࢼ࣌ࢋࡿЬؼଲ
ࢎࢂЯؿଵ˃ߟࡵؿଵࠪ˱ࢂ߾ࡕ۽ଥࢊࣗࢂ̛ߟ˃قΰ߾۰ʼଞʎ
ؿࢉࢶطଵ˃ߟ˕ؿଵࠪЯо࣏ࢂߟ˃ق̛ࢂࢇیଢࡳԻقЬ
3(,&/ࡵЯоࠪؿଵɼ̐߾оଞࢶࡈ߾ଢࢂଞʎؿطଵ˃ߟ߾Еࢶࡈ
ѸΟࢿ࣏ࠪࢿ࣏ձࠖ࠹Իଜࠆ̛߾ߟ˃قЕࢶࡈଜए߅ТଞЬ
ࢼ࣌ߜ˔˒࣌ʟࡿسʾ
ࢿ࣏ࢿ࣏࣏ࢂ࣏ࢿʢࢂࢇଭ߾ଗࡁଞˁࡉ̛˗ߟࢂߟ˃ق
˕࣏ʢضˁࡵʎؿطଵ˃ߟ߾ଞଜࠆࠒଯࢇЬ
ࢼ࣌ऌ࢝ؼࢆࢳܓ
̛ࣗࢂߟ˃قՎӖЕЯ˱ઁੌࢂٕࢊࣸࡕ۽ЕؿଵࠪΟ֞ए˱ࡕ۽ɾࢂؿ
ଵ˃ߟ߾Еࠒଯࡶए߅ТଞЬ
656
Polish version
by Dariusz Fuchs, Łukasz Szymański and Magdalena Boguska
657
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
1 Cf. Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International,
The Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part
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(7) „Okres trwania umowy ubezpieczenia” – oznacza okres trwania zobowiązania umownego, po-
cząwszy od zawarcia umowy aż do wygaśnięcia umowy wraz z upływem oznaczonego i uzgod-
nionego w umowie terminu;
(8) „Okres trwania ubezpieczenia” – oznacza okres w którym ubezpieczający zobowiązany jest do
opłacania składki ubezpieczeniowej zgodnie z umową;
(9) „Okres trwania odpowiedzialności” oznacza okres udzielanej ochrony ubezpieczeniowej.
(10) „Ubezpieczenie obowiązkowe” oznacza umowę ubezpieczenia zawartą w wykonaniu obowiązku
ubezpieczenia wynikającego z przepisów prawa.
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Postanowień niniejszej Sekcji nie stosuje się do wyników testów genetycznych, które są przedmiotem
regulacji Artykułu 1:208 par. 1.
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(2) Umowa w pozostałej część obowiązuje strony, jeżeli jest to możliwe po wyłączeniu z niej okre-
ślonych warunków. Jeśli nie, nieuczciwe warunki powinny być zastąpione warunkami, na które
zdecydowałyby się strony, gdyby wiedziały o ich nieuczciwości.
(3) Niniejszy artykuł stosuje się do warunków, które ograniczają lub zmieniają zakres ochrony ubez-
pieczeniowej, jednakże ocena nieuczciwego charakteru warunków nie dotyczy:
(a) relacji wartości ochrony ubezpieczeniowej do składki ubezpieczeniowej, ani
(b) określenia głównego przedmiotu udzielanej ochrony ubezpieczeniowej i uzgodnionej skład-
ki ubezpieczeniowej, o ile warunki te zostały wyrażone prostym i zrozumiałym językiem.
(4) Warunki umowy zawsze zostaną uznane za nie wynegocjowane indywidualnie, jeżeli zostały
sporządzone wcześniej i ubezpieczający nie miał w związku z tym wpływu na ich treść, zwłaszcza
jeżeli zostały przedstawione konsumentowi w formie uprzednio sformułowanej umowy standar-
dowej. Fakt, że niektóre aspekty warunku lub jeden szczegółowy warunek były negocjowane
indywidualnie, nie wyłącza stosowania niniejszego artykułu do pozostałej części umowy, jeżeli
ogólna ocena umowy wskazuje na to, że została ona sporządzona w formie uprzednio sformu-
łowanej umowy standardowej. Jeżeli ubezpieczyciel twierdzi, że standardowe warunki umowne
zostały wynegocjowane indywidualnie, ciężar dowodu w tym zakresie spoczywa na nim.
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ubezpieczeniowa może zakończyć się wcześniej niż w terminie wskazanym w par. 1, może być
także wypowiedziana przez każdą ze stron z dwutygodniowym okresem wypowiedzenia.
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piśmie umowy w ciągu dwóch miesięcy od dnia w którym dowiedziała się o zajściu wypadku
ubezpieczeniowego.
(3) Ochrona ubezpieczeniowa ustaje w terminie dwóch tygodni od dnia wypowiedzenia umowy
ubezpieczenia, o którym mowa w par. 3.
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(b) minął termin dwóch tygodni od dnia otrzymania przez ubezpieczającego informacji o których
mowa w lit. (a), a składka ubezpieczeniowa do tego czasu nie została zapłacona.
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Rozdział 7: Przedawnienie
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(2) Postanowienie umowy, które określa wartość przedmiotu ubezpieczenia jest ważne nawet jeśli
określona wartość przekracza rzeczywistą wartość przedmiotu ubezpieczenia, o ile ubezpiecza-
jący lub ubezpieczony nie działali na szkodę drugiej strony lub nie wprowadzali ubezpieczyciela
w błąd, w chwili gdy wartość była ustalana.
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nien być uprawniony do odszkodowania jeśli jakakolwiek szkoda została wyrządzona przez dzia-
łanie lub zaniechanie wynikające z niedbalstwa.
(3) Przyczynienie się do powstania szkody o którym mowa w par. 1 i 2 oznacza także bezskuteczność
zapobiegnięcia lub zmniejszenia szkody.
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(3) Jeżeli ubezpieczający w ciągu jednego miesiąca od otrzymania notyfikacji wskazanej w par. 2, nie
przekaże ubezpieczycielowi informacji, dotyczących wypadku ubezpieczeniowego, uznaje się że
ubezpieczający wyraził zgodę na rozstrzygnięcie o roszczeniu przez ubezpieczyciela. Reguła ta
ma zastosowanie także do ubezpieczonych, którzy otrzymali notyfikację w prawidłowym czasie.
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nież do przelewu z umowy ubezpieczenia lub obciążenia umowy ubezpieczenia lub wierzytelności
o zapłatę świadczenia pieniężnego
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(4) Jeżeli ubezpieczyciel odwołuje się do kwot możliwych świadczeń ponad te, które są gwaranto-
wane, powinien udostępnić ubezpieczającemu model kalkulacji, uwzględniający możliwy okres
zakończenia i wypłaty świadczeń, oparty o aktuarialne zasady kalkulacji składek ubezpieczenio-
wych oraz uwzględniający trzy różne stopy procentowe odsetek. Powyższe nie ma zastosowania
do umów ubezpieczenia, w których ubezpieczyciel może nie ponosić odpowiedzialności oraz do
umów z ubezpieczeniowymi funduszami kapitałowymi. Ubezpieczyciel powinien jednoznacznie
i w sposób zrozumiały wskazać ubezpieczającemu, że udostępniony model kalkulacji oparty jest
jedynie na założeniach najlepszej wiedzy a umowa nie gwarantuje możliwych świadczeń.
10 Artykuł 17:203 par. 1 oparty jest na treści Artykułu 35 Dyrektywy 2002/83/WE dotyczącej ubezpie-
czeń na życie oraz Artykułu 6 Dyrektywy 2002/65/WE.
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(3) W przypadku gdy wartości mające związek z szacowaną wysokością możliwych świadczeń, są
ujawniane w w dowolnym terminie wciągu trwania okresu ubezpieczenia Artykuł 17:202 par. 4
ma zastosowanie. W przypadku gdy ubezpieczyciel ujawnił – przed lub po zawarciu umowy-
wartości dotyczące rozwoju przyszłych potencjalnych korzyści z zawarcia umowy, ubezpieczyciel
informuje ubezpieczającego o każdej różnicy pomiędzy obecnym stanem a wstępnymi danymi.
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(b) udowodniono bez żadnych wątpliwości, że w momencie zawarcia umowy, osoba wobec
której może ziścić się ryzyko zajścia wypadku nie zamierzała popełnić samobójstwa.
Artykuł 17:503 Zabójstwo z zamiarem bezpośrednim osoby wobec której może ziścić się
ryzyko zajścia wypadku ubezpieczeniowego
(1) Uposażony traci swój status uposażonego, jeżeli zabija z zamiarem bezpośrednim osobę, wobec
której może ziścić się ryzyko zajścia wypadku.
(2) Przeniesienie roszczenia owypłatęy świadczenia pieniężnego jest nieskuteczne, jeżeli osoba, na
którą przeniesiono roszczenia, zabija z zamiarem bezpośrednim osobę wobec której może ziścić
się ryzyko zajścia wypadku.
(3) Świadczenie pieniężne nie jest należne, jeżeliubezpieczający, będący także uposażonym, zabija
z zamiarem bezpośrednim osobę wobec której może ziścić się ryzyko zajścia,.
(4) Niniejszy Artykuł nie ma zastosowania w przypadku, gdy uposażony lub ubezpieczający zabija z
usprawiedliwionych powodów, na przykład w akcie obrony koniecznej, osobę wobec której może
ziścić się ryzyko zajścia wypadku.
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688
Portuguese version
by Pedro Pais de Vasconcelos
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Portuguese: Princípios do Direito Europeu do Contrato de Seguro (PEICL)
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Em caso de dúvida sobre o significado do texto de qualquer documento ou informação facultada
pela seguradora, deverá prevalecer a interpretação mais favorável para o tomador do seguro,
para o segurado ou para o beneficiário.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(b) informações que deviam ter sido prestadas ou que foram incorretamente prestadas, mas que
não tenham sido relevantes para uma decisão razoável, por parte do segurador, de celebrar o
contrato ou de o celebrar com aquele conteúdo;
(c) informações que o segurador tenha induzido o tomador a crer que não teriam de ser prestadas;
(d) informações que o segurador conhecesse ou devesse conhecer.
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(3) Quando o contraente solicitar uma cobertura de seguro com base numa proposta de contrato
e/ou questionário fornecido pela seguradora, a seguradora deverá facultar ao contraente uma
cópia de todos os documentos depois de completados.
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(a) seja comunicada ao contraente por escrito usando linguagem facilmente compreensível e
alertando o contraente de que não se encontra seguro até o pagamento do prémio, e
(b) passe um período de duas semanas após a receção do aviso para pagamento do prémio nos
moldes previstos em (a) sem que o pagamento tenha sido feito.
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(2) O credor terá ainda direito a ser indemnizado por danos adicionais pela mora no pagamento do
capital seguro.
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(2) O segurado que renunciar a algum direito contra esse terceiro e com isso prejudicar o direito de
sub-rogação do segurador, perde o direito a ser indemnizado pelo segurador no montante do
dano que assim lhe causar.
(3) Não existe direito de sub-rogação do segurador contra membros do agregado familiar do to-
mador ou do segurado, nem contra pessoas numa posição análoga à de membro do agregado
familiar do tomador do seguro ou do segurado, nem contra empregados do tomador do seguro
ou do segurado, exceto se o segurador provar que o sinistro foi causado por essas pessoas com
intenção de o causar ou com imprudência ou negligência consciente da probabilidade da sua
ocorrência.
(4) O segurador não exercerá os seus direitos de sub-rogação em detrimento do segurado.
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(2) O adquirente do bem assume a posição de segurado desde o tempo de transferência do risco
sobre o bem seguro.
(3) Os parágrafos 1 e 2 não se aplicam
(a) se o segurador, o tomador e o adquirente acordarem diversamente; ou
(b) em caso de transmissão por sucessão por morte.
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(2) Salvo mediante o seu consentimento, o segurador não fica vinculado por acordo entre a vítima
e o tomador ou o segurado, conforme o caso.
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Portuguese: Princípios do Direito Europeu do Contrato de Seguro (PEICL)
709
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710
Portuguese: Princípios do Direito Europeu do Contrato de Seguro (PEICL)
O segurador deve informar com clareza o tomador que o modelo de cálculo só representa um
modelo baseado em pressupostos fictícios e que o contrato não garante possíveis pagamentos.
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712
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Secção V: O sinistro
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714
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716
Serbian version
by Mira Todorovic-Symeonides
Prvi Deo: Zajedničke odredbe za sve ugovore Deveto Poglavlje: Pravo Na Obeštećenje
regulisane Principima Evropskog Ugovornog Deseto Poglavlje: Pravo Subrogacije
Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
Jedanaesto Poglavlje: Osiguranici Koji Nisu
Prvo Poglavlje: Uvodne Odredbe Ugovarači Osiguranja
Odeljak jedan: Primena PEUPO-a
Odeljak dva: Opšta pravila
Dvanaesto Poglavlje: Osigurani Rizik
Odeljak tri: Primena
Treči Deo: Opšte Odredbe O Osiguranju Na
Drugo Poglavlje: Početna Faza I Trajanje Utvrđene Iznose
Ugovora O Osiguranju Trinaesto Poglavlje: Dopustivost
Odeljak jedan: Predugovorne obaveze podnosioca
predloga da pruži informaciju Četvrti Deo: Osiguranje Od Odgovornosti
Odeljak dva: Predugovorne obaveze osiguravača
Odeljak tri: Zaključenje ugovora
Četrnaesto Poglavlje: Opšte Osiguranje Od
Odgovornosti
Odeljak četiri: Retroaktivno i privremeno pokriće
Odeljak pet: Polisa osiguranja Petnaesto Poglavlje: Direktni Zahtevi I Tužbe
Odeljak šest: Trajanje ugovora o osiguranju Šesnaesto Poglavlje: Obavezno Osiguranje
Odeljak sedam: Obaveze osiguravača da pruži
informacije nakon zaključenja ugovora Peti Deo: Životno Osiguranje
Treće Poglavlje: Posrednici U Osiguranja Sedamnaesto Poglavlje: Posebne Odredbe O
Četvrto Poglavlje: Osigurani Rizik Životnom Osiguranju
Odeljak jedan: Mere predostrožnosti Odeljak jedan: Treća lica
Odeljak dva: Povećanje rizika Odeljak dva: Predugovorna faza i trajanje ugovora
Odeljak tri: Smanjenje rizika Odeljak tri: Promene za vreme trajanja ugovora
Odeljak četiri: Odnos prema nacionalnim pravima
Peto Poglavlje: Premija Osiguranja Odeljak pet: Osigurani slučaj
Šesto Poglavlje: Osigurani Slučaj Odeljak šest: Konverzija i otkup
Sedmo Poglavlje: Zastarelost
Šesti Deo: Kolektivno Osiguranje
Drugi Deo: Opšte Odredbe O Osiguranju Od Osamnaesto Poglavlje: Posebne Odredbe Za
Štete Kolektivno Tivno Osiguranje
Osmo Poglavlje: Osigurana Svota I Osigurana Odeljak jedan: Uopšteno o kolektivnom osiguranju
Vrednost Odeljak dva: Dopunska kolektivna osiguranja
Odeljak tri: Izborna kolektivna osiguranja
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718
Serbian: Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
719
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) U slučaju sumnje u pogledu jezičkog značenja bilo kog dokumenta ili informacije koju daje
osiguravač, prevagu će imati tumačenje koje je najpovoljnije za osiguranika, osigurano lice, ili
ugovarača osiguranja.
Član 1:301 Zahtevi da se zabrani nastanak ili naloži prestanak povrede prava
(1) Kvalifikovano lice, definisano u stavu 2, je ovlašćeno da se obrati nadležnom nacionalnom sudu
ili organu i traži odluku kojom se zabranjuje ili nalaže prestanak povreda PEUPO-a, ukoliko se
primenjuju u skladu sa članom 1:102.
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Serbian: Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
(2) Kvalifikovano lice je svako telo ili organizacija sa liste koju je sačinila Evropska komisija u skladu
sa članom 4 Direktive 2009/22/EC Evropskog parlamenta i Saveta od 23. aprila 2009. godine o
povredama zaštite interesa potrošača, sa izmenama.
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(a) pitanje na koje nije pružen odgovor, ili kada pružena informacija očigledno nije tačna ili je ne-
potpuna;
(b) informaciju koja je trebalo da bude pružena, ili informaciju koja je bila data ali je neprecizna, a
koja nije bila suštinski značajna za razumnu odluku osiguravača da uopšte zaključi ugovor, ili da
to učini pod ugovorenim uslovima;
(c) informaciju u pogledu koje je osiguravač naveo ugovarača da zaključi da je takve prirode da ne
mora biti prijavljena;
(d) informaciju koja je osiguravaču bila ili morala biti poznata.
722
Serbian: Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
723
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724
Serbian: Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
725
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(b) ako ugovarač osiguranja dostavi drugoj strani pisano obaveštenje najkasnije do dana isteka
ugovora ili u roku od mesec dana od dana kada ugovarač osiguranja primi fakturu za premiju,
u zavisnosti od toga koji je datum kasniji. U drugom slučaju, jednomesečni rok će početi da
teče samo ako je jasno istaknut na fakturi tamnijim slovima.
(2) U svrhu stava 1 (b) smatraće se da je obaveštenje dato dana kada je otpremljeno.
726
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728
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729
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
730
Serbian: Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
731
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
nja štete. U tom slučaju, i troškovi umanjenja štete, definisani u članu 9:102, biće nadoknađeni u
istoj srazmeri.
732
Serbian: Principi Evropskog Ugovornog Prava Osiguranja (PEUPO)
733
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734
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(2) Osim ukoliko se sa tim složi, osiguravača neće obavezivati ugovor između oštećenog i ugovarača
osiguranja ili osiguranika, u zavisnosti od slučaja.
735
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) U odnosu na oštećenog, osiguravač može istaći one prigovore na koje ima pravo po ugovoru o
osiguranju, osim ukoliko je osiguranje po posebnim odredbama obavezno. Međutim, osigravač
nema pravo na isticanje bilo kakvog prigovora po osnovu ponašanja ugovarača osiguranja i/ili
osiguranika nakon nastanka štete.
736
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737
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738
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739
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740
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741
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742
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743
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
744
Slovak version
by Imrich Fekete and Hana Hlavatovičová
Prvá časť: Spoločné ustanovenia pre všetky Desiata kapitola: Právo na postih
poistné zmluvy zahrnuté v princípoch európ- Jedenásta kapitola: Poistenie v prospech tretej
skeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ) osoby
Prvá kapitola: Úvodné ustanovenia Dvanásta kapitola: Poistné riziko
Prvý oddiel: Použitie PEPPZ
Druhý oddiel: Všeobecné pravidlá Tretia časť: Spoločné ustanovenia pre
Tretí oddiel: Ochrana práva poistenia na pevnú sumu
Druhá kapitola: Vznik a doba trvania poistnej Trinásta kapitola: Prípustnosť
zmluvy
Prvý oddiel: Predzmluvná informačná povinnosť Štvrtá časť: Poistenie zodpovednosti
záujemcu o poistenie Štrnásta kapitola: Všeobecné poistenie
Druhý oddiel: Povinnosti poisťovateľa pred uzavretím zodpovednosti
poistnej zmluvy
Tretí oddiel: Uzavretie poistnej zmluvy
Pätnásta kapitola: Priame nároky a priame
žaloby
Štvrtý oddiel: Spätné a predbežné poistné krytie
Piaty oddiel: Poistka Šesťnásta kapitola: Povinné poistenie
Šiesty oddiel: Doba trvania poistnej zmluvy
Siedmy oddiel: Informačná povinnosť poisťovateľa Piata časť: Životné poistenie
po uzavretí poistnej zmluvy Sedemnásta kapitola: Osobitné ustanovenia
Tretia kapitola: Poisťovací sprostredkovatelia pre životné poistenie
Prvý oddiel: Tretie osoby
Štvrtá kapitola: Poistné riziko Druhý oddiel: Vznik a doba trvania poistnej zmluvy
Prvý oddiel: Preventívne opatrenia
Tretí oddiel: Zmeny počas doby trvania poistnej
Druhý oddiel: Zvýšenie poistného rizika
zmluvy
Tretí oddiel: Zníženie poistného rizika
Štvrtý oddiel: Vzťah k národnému právu
Piata kapitola: Poistné Piaty oddiel: Poistná udalosť
Šiesta kapitola: Poistná udalosť Šiesty oddiel: Zmena a odkup
Siedma kapitola: Premlčanie Šiesta časť: Skupinové poistenie
Druhá časť: Spoločné ustanovenia pre Osemnásta kapitola: Osobitné ustanovenia pre
škodové poistenie skupinové poistenie
Prvý oddiel: Skupinové poistenie všeobecne
Ôsma kapitola: Poistná suma a poistná
Druhý oddiel: Doplnkové skupinové poistenie
hodnota
Tretí oddiel: Voliteľné skupinové poistenie
Deviata kapitola: Právo na náhradu škody
745
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746
Slovak: Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ)
747
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
748
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749
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
sa zbavuje svojej povinnosti plniť, ak by v prípade vedomosti o takej informácii poistnú zmluvu
vôbec neuzavrel. Ak by však poisťovateľ poistnú zmluvu napriek tomu uzavrel, ale s vyšším
poistným alebo za iných podmienok, plnenie z poistnej zmluvy sa poskytne v pomernej výške alebo
v súlade s takými podmienkami.
750
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751
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752
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753
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
754
Slovak: Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ)
755
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
756
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(3) Ak poistnú udalosť spôsobilo pred zánikom poistnej ochrany také zvýšenie poistného rizika, o
ktorom poistník vie alebo mal by vedieť, poisťovateľ sa zbavuje povinnosti plniť, ak by na seba
takéto zvýšenie poistného rizika inak neprevzal. Ak by však poisťovateľ napriek tomu zvýšené
poistné riziko na seba prevzal, ale za vyššie poistné alebo za iných podmienok, plnenie z poistnej
zmluvy poskytne v pomernej výške alebo vo výške zodpovedajúcej týmto podmienkam.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
v článku 5:101 písm. b) alebo upomienka uvedená v článku 5:102 ods. 1 písm. b) obsahuje právo
poisťovateľa poistnú zmluvu vypovedať.
(2) Poistná zmluva sa považuje za zrušenú v prípade, ak, podľa okolností konkrétneho prípadu, po-
isťovateľ nepodá žalobu na úhradu
(a) prvého poistného do dvoch mesiacov po uplynutí lehoty uvedenej v článku 5:101 písm. b);
alebo
(b) následného poistného do dvoch mesiacov po uplynutí lehoty uvedenej v článku 5:102 ods. 1
písm. b).
758
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759
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
760
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761
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(3) Zrušenie poistenia je účinné od okamihu doručenia písomného oznámenia o zrušení poisťova-
teľovi.
762
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763
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764
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meho nároku poisťovateľom. Toto pravidlo sa vzťahuje taktiež na poistených, ktorým bolo také
oznámenie skutočne doručené včas.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
zmenu alebo odvolanie treba zaslať poisťovateľovi v písomnej forme, okrem prípadu, ak sú tieto
zahrnuté do závetu.
(2) Právo určiť, zmeniť alebo odvolať určenie sa skončí smrťou poistníka alebo vznikom poistnej
udalosti, podľa toho, čo nastane skôr.
(3) Poistník alebo, podľa okolností konkrétneho prípadu, jeho dedičia, sa považujú za osoby opráv-
nené na poistné plnenie, ak
(a) poistník neurčil oprávneného alebo
(b) určenie oprávneného bolo odvolané a ďalší oprávnení neboli určení alebo
(c) oprávnený zomrel ešte pred vznikom poistnej udalosti a ďalší oprávnení neboli určení.
(4) V prípade, ak boli určení dvaja alebo viac oprávnených a určenie ktoréhokoľvek z nich bolo odvo-
lané, alebo ak ktorýkoľvek z nich zomrie ešte pred vznikom poistnej udalosti, sa výška poistného
plnenia, ktorá by bola vyplatená oprávnenému alebo oprávneným, rozdelí medzi pozostalých
oprávnených v pomernej výške, pokiaľ poistník v súlade s odsekom 1 neurčil inak.
(5) Bez ohľadu na neplatnosť, zrušiteľnosť alebo nežalovateľnosť právnych úkonov spôsobujúcich
veriteľom ujmu, ktoré sú stanovené príslušnými predpismi o konkurznom konaní, nemá konkurz-
ná podstata poistníka žiadne práva vo vzťahu k poistnému plneniu, redukovanej alebo odkupnej
hodnote, ak plnenie nebolo vyplatené poistníkovi.
(6) Poisťovateľ, ktorý vyplatil poistné plnenie osobe určenej v súlade s odsekom 1, je zbavený povin-
nosti plniť, okrem prípadu, ak vedel, že dotknutá osoba nie je oprávnená na poistné plnenie.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
768
Slovak: Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ)
(3) V prípade poistky oslobodenej od povinnosti platiť poistné je poisťovateľ oprávnený znížiť po-
istné plnenie v súlade s podmienkami stanovenými v odseku 2.
(4) Úprava podľa odsekov 2 alebo 3 nie je prípustná,
(a) pokiaľ sa vo výpočte poistného a/alebo poistného plnenia stala chyba, o ktorej mal poverený
a zodpovedný poistný matematik vedieť, alebo
(b) ak sa základný výpočet nepoužije na všetky poistné zmluvy vrátane tých, ktoré boli uzavreté
po úprave.
(5) Zvýšenie poistného alebo zníženie poistného plnenia nadobudne účinnosť tri mesiace po tom,
čo poisťovateľ zaslal poistníkovi písomné oznámenie o zvýšení poistného alebo znížení poist-
ného plnenia, o dôvode daného zvýšenia alebo zníženia a o práve poistníka požiadať o zníženie
poistného plnenia.
(6) Poistník je v prípade poistnej zmluvy pre životné poistenie, pokrývajúcej poistné riziká, pri kto-
rých je isté, že poisťovateľ je povinný plniť, oprávnený na zníženie poistného, čo má z hľadiska
nepredvídateľnej a trvalej zmeny vo vzťahu k biometrickým rizikám použitým ako základ pre
výpočet poistného za následok, že pôvodná výška poistného nie je dostatočná a vhodná pre záru-
ku dlhodobej schopnosti poisťovateľa vyplatiť poistné plnenie. Toto zníženie musí byť schválené
nezávislým aktuárom alebo dozorným orgánom.
(7) Práva uvedené v tomto článku možno uplatniť až po piatich rokoch po uzavretí poistnej zmluvy.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
oprávnenia na poberanie štátnej (sociálnej) podpory. V prípade rozporu takých požiadaviek prísluš-
ného národného práva s ustanoveniami PEPPZ sa možno od PEPPZ odchýliť.
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Slovak: Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ)
(2) Poisťovateľ informuje poistníka o redukovanej a odkupnej hodnote do štyroch týždňov od uply-
nutia lehoty uvedenej v článku 5:101 písm. b) alebo v článku 5:102 ods. 1 písm. b) a požiada
poistníka, aby si vybral medzi zmenou poistnej zmluvy a výplatou odkupnej hodnoty.
(3) Žiadosť poisťovateľa o zmenu poistnej zmluvy alebo výplatu odkupnej hodnoty treba zaslať v
písomnej forme.
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Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Organizátor skupiny zašle členom skupiny akékoľvek dôležité informácie vydané poisťovateľom
a informuje ich o akýchkoľvek dodatkoch k poistnej zmluve.
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Slovak: Princípy európskeho práva poistnej zmluvy (PEPPZ)
773
Spanish version
by Juan Bataller, Paola Rodas Paredes and Nuria Pastor Martorell
774
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
1 N. de la T.: La versión inglesa se refiere a “ fair dealing”. Este concepto hace referencia al deber de
lealtad de partes implicadas en una negociación. Entendemos que este concepto en nuestro Derecho
se encuentra subsumido en el de la buena fe, por lo que no hemos incluido ninguna mención adicional
a la de buena fe, a fi n de evitar una redacción que podría prestarse a confusión.
775
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Las cuestiones derivadas del contrato de seguro que no estén expresamente resueltas en los
PDECS, deberán resolverse de conformidad con los Principios de Derecho Contractual Europeo
(PDCE) y, en ausencia de normas relevantes en los mismos, de acuerdo con los principios gene-
rales comunes al Derecho de los Estados Miembros.
776
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
(8) “Período asegurado” significa el período durante el cual se debe la prima de acuerdo con lo
dispuesto por las partes
(9) “Período de responsabilidad” significa el período de cobertura.
(10) “Seguro obligatorio” significa el seguro contratado como consecuencia de una obligación impu-
esta por ley u otra norma jurídica.
777
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) El párrafo 1 no será de aplicación a contratos de seguro personales en los que la persona en
riesgo tenga 18 años de edad o más y en los que la suma asegurada de dicha persona exceda los
300,000 euros o la cantidad a pagar en virtud de la póliza exceda los 30,000 euros por año.
4 N. de la T.: “Enforcement”, en la versión inglesa. Este término hace referencia a los mecanismos exis-
tentes para conseguir el cumplimento de una norma, contrato, etc. (en este caso del contrato de se-
guro). Es un término de difícil traducción en castellano, pues no encuentra un equivalente exacto
en nuestra lengua. Por ello, nos hemos decido por procurar una expresión que contenga la esencia
del concepto, para lo que ha servido de inspiración la traducción: Benlloch/Irujo/Sanz, Principios de
Derecho Europeo de los Contratos (Madrid, Colegios Notariales de España, 2003).
5 Este artículo está basado en la Directiva 2009/22/CE.
6 N. de la T.: Hemos utilizado el término “solicitante” como equivalente a “applicant”, para hacer refe-
rencia a la persona que manifiesta al asegurador su interés en contratar un seguro. Sin embargo debe
tenerse en cuenta que dicho término no coincide necesariamente con el concepto establecido por la
Ley del Contrato de Seguro.
778
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
finalización del mismo. A tal fin, el asegurador comunicará por escrito su intención, acompañan-
do a la misma la información acerca de las consecuencias legales de su decisión, dentro del mes
siguiente a que el incumplimiento del artículo 2:101 sea conocido o resulte patente.
(2) Si el asegurador propone una variación razonable, el contrato continuará sobre la base de la
variación propuesta, a menos que el tomador del seguro rechace la propuesta dentro de un mes
desde que reciba la comunicación a que hace referencia el párrafo 1. En ese caso, el asegurador
podrá finalizar7 el contrato dentro del período de un mes desde que reciba la comunicación
escrita del rechazo del tomador del seguro.
(3) El asegurador no podrá finalizar el contrato si el tomador del seguro incumple, sin que le sea
imputable, el artículo 2:101, a menos que el asegurador pruebe que no habría formalizado el
contrato si hubiera conocido la información correspondiente.
(4) La finalización del contrato tendrá efecto un mes después de que el tomador del seguro hubiera
recibido la comunicación por escrito referida en el párrafo 1. La modificación del contrato tendrá
efecto de acuerdo con lo establecido por las partes.
(5) Si un siniestro es causado por un elemento del riesgo que es objeto de omisión o descripción
negligente por parte del tomador del seguro, y ocurre antes de que la finalización o modifica-
ción del contrato tenga lugar, ninguna prestación asegurada será abonada si el asegurador no
hubiera formalizado el contrato de haber conocido la información en cuestión. Sin embargo, si
el asegurador hubiera formalizado el contrato con una prima mayor o en términos diferentes, la
indemnización será abonada proporcionalmente o de acuerdo con dichos términos.
7 N. de la T.: El texto original se refiere a “right to terminate the contract” en un esfuerzo deliberado
por eludir la terminología legal empleada en las distintas legislaciones nacionales para referirse a la
extinción del contrato. Por esta razón hemos decidido buscar un término que refleje dicho esfuerzo.
La nota vale para todos aquellos artículos donde se hace referencia a la fi nalización del contrato.
779
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
8 Este artículo está basado en los Artículos 183 a 189 de la Directiva 2009/138/EC (Solvencia II).
780
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
(a) el asegurador indemnizará al tomador del seguro de cualquier pérdida resultante del incumpli-
miento del deber de advertencia, a menos que el asegurador hubiera actuado sin culpa; y
(b) el tomador del seguro podrá terminar el contrato mediante comunicación escrita dentro de los
dos meses siguientes a que el incumplimiento sea conocido por el tomador del seguro.
781
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
782
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
783
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784
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
785
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
786
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
rador hubiera asegurado el riesgo agravado por una prima mayor o bajo condiciones diferentes,
la prestación asegurada se abonará proporcionalmente o de acuerdo con dichas condiciones.
Capítulo 5: La prima
787
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) El contrato se tendrá por finalizado si, según sea el caso, el asegurador no inicia la reclamación
del pago
(a) En el caso de la primera prima, dentro de los dos meses desde que expire el período estab-
lecido en el artículo 5:101 (b); o
(b) En el caso de primas posteriores, dentro de los dos meses desde que expire el período esta-
blecido en el párrafo 1 (b) del artículo 5:102.
Capítulo 6: El siniestro
10 N. de la T.: El texto original utiliza la palabra “claims”. Debido a que en nuestra legislación el período
que sigue al acaecimiento del siniestro se conoce como liquidación, hemos decido emplear dicho
término.
788
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
(3) En caso de que el incumplimiento de cualquiera de los puntos señalados en el párrafo 1 haya
sido cometido con intención de causar perjuicio o con negligencia y conocimiento de que dicho
perjuicio sería probable, el asegurador quedará liberado de su prestación.
Capítulo 7: Prescripción
789
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) La acción para reclamar el valor debido del seguro de vida prescribirá tres años después de que
el tomador del seguro reciba el cálculo definitivo del asegurador. En todo caso, sin embargo, la
acción prescribirá una vez transcurridos 30 años desde el momento de la finalización del contrato
de seguro de vida.
12 Lando/Beale (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (Kluwer Law International, The
Hague 2000); Lando/Clive/Prüm/Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003).
790
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
791
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
cuando pruebe que la pérdida fue causada por dicha persona de forma intencionada o con
negligencia y conocimiento de que probablemente se produciría el daño.
(4) El asegurador no podrá ejercer su derecho a la subrogación en perjuicio del asegurado.
792
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793
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
794
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
(2) El asegurador notificará por escrito al tomador del seguro sobre cualquier reclamación efectuada
contra él sin demora injustificada y, como muy tarde, dentro de las dos semanas siguientes a la
recepción de la reclamación. Si el asegurador incumple dicha obligación, el pago o conocimiento
de la deuda hacia la víctima no afectará los derechos del tomador del seguro.
(3) Si el tomador del seguro no facilita al asegurador sobre la información relativa al siniestro ase-
gurado dentro del plazo de un mes desde la recepción de la notificación mencionada en el
párrafo 2, se considerará que el tomador del seguro se allana con la reclamación realizada por
el asegurador. Esta norma también será de aplicación para los asegurados que hayan recibido
dicha notificación en tiempo.
795
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
796
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
(b) La designación de un beneficiario del valor de rescate ha sido revocada y no se han designa-
do otros beneficiarios o
(c) El beneficiario del valor de rescate fallece y no se han nombrado otros beneficiarios.
(3) El artículo 17:102, en sus párrafos 2 y 4 a 6 se aplicará mutatis mutandis.
797
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(3) Además, deberá proporcionarse información específica para facilitar la comprensión de los ries-
gos subyacentes al contrato asumidos por el tomador del seguro.
(4) Si el asegurador cita como dato la cantidad de los posibles beneficios y exceden las sumas con-
tractualmente garantizadas, deberá proporcionar al solicitante un modelo de cálculo que con-
tenga los posibles beneficios al momento del vencimiento de la póliza basado en los principios
actuariales para el cálculo de la prima con tres distintos tipos de interés. Esto no será de aplicación
a aquellos contratos de seguro en los que el asegurador no tenga certeza de su responsabilidad
ni a las pólizas vinculadas a fondos de inversión. El asegurador deberá indicar a los tomadores
de seguro de forma clara y comprensible que el modelo de cálculo únicamente representa un
modelo basado en conjeturas y que el contrato no garantiza los posibles pagos.
798
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
799
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(b) Cumplir con una reforma de normas imperativas de la legislación nacional aplicable sobre
los planes de pensiones de empleados, o
(c) Cumplir con una reforma de normas imperativas de la legislación nacional que impongan
requisitos específicos sobre contratos de seguro sobre la vida para cumplir con los requisitos
en materia de régimen fiscal o subvenciones públicas, o
(d) Sustituir una cláusula del contrato de acuerdo con el Artículo 2:304, párrafo 2 en su segunda
frase.
(2) La alteración será efectiva al comienzo del tercer mes tras la recepción por parte del tomador del
seguro de la comunicación escrita que le informe sobre la alteración y las razones de su adopción.
(3) El párrafo 1 será de aplicación sin perjuicio de los otros requisitos necesarios para la validez de
las cláusulas modificadas.
Sección 5: Siniestro
800
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
(a) La persona en riesgo, en el momento de suicidarse, actúa en un estado mental que le impide
tomar libremente la decisión;
(b) Queda probada cualquier duda razonable acerca de la intención de suicidio de la persona en
riesgo en el momento de concluir el contrato.
801
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
802
Spanish: Principios de Derecho Europeo del Contrato de Seguro (PDECS)
803
Swedish version
by Bill W. Dufwa
804
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
1 Jfr. Lando/Beale (eds), Principles of European Contract Law, Parts I and II (1999), Lando/Clive/Prüm/
Zimmermann (eds.), Principles of European Contract Law, Part III (2002).
805
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
806
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
807
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Sektion 3: Verkställighet
808
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
informationen i fråga. Skulle försäkringsgivaren däremot ha ingått kontraktet men med en högre
premie eller på andra villkor skall försäkringsersättningen betalas proportionellt eller enligt så-
dana villkor.
6 Denna artikel har som förebilder artiklarna 183-189 i direktiv 2009/138/EG (Solvens II). direktiv
73/239/EG, direktiv 2002/83/EG och direktiv 2002/65/EG.
809
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(f)premiens storlek och den metod med vars hjälp premien kalkyleras;
(g)förfallodagen för premien samt plats och sätt för betalning;
(h)kontraktsperioden, inklusive metoden för att avsluta kontraktet och ansvarsperioden;
(i)rätten att återkalla ansökan eller undvika kontraktet enligt artikel 2:303 vid skadeförsäkring
och enligt artikel 17:203 vid livförsäkring;
(j) att försäkringsavtalet omfattas av PEICL;
(k) existensen av ett alternativt tvistelösningsförfarande utanför domstol och återkravsmekanis-
merna till förmån för sökanden samt vad som krävs för att kunna utnyttja dessa möjligheter;
(l) existensen av garantifonder och andra ersättningsanordningar.
(2) Om möjligt skall denna information lämnas i så god tid att den sökande hinner överväga om
försäkringsavtalet skall ingås eller inte.
(3) När sökanden ber om försäkringsskydd på grundval av ett formulär och/eller en questionnaire
tillhandahållna av försäkringsbolaget, skall detta förse sökanden med en kopia av de ifyllda do-
kumenten.
810
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
811
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Sektion 4: Försäkringsbrev10
812
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
813
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Både villkor om avslut och villkor om utövandet av varje rätt att avsluta måste vara skäliga
(3) Varje rätt att avsluta upphör om parten i fråga inte skriftligen har lämnat ett skriftligt meddelande
om avslut till den andra parten inom två månader efter att ha blivit medveten om försäkringsfal-
let
(4) Försäkringsskyddet avslutas två veckor efter anmälan enligt stycket 3.
Kapitel 3: Försäkringsförmedlare
Artikel 3:102 Försäkringsagenter som ger sig ut för att vara oberoende
Om en försäkringsagent ger sig ut för att vara en oberoende försäkringsförmedlare och handlar i
strid med de skyldigheter en sådan förmedlare har enligt lag, blir försäkringsbolaget ansvarigt för
detta handlande.
814
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
Sektion 2: Riskökning
815
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Sektion 3: Riskminskning
Kapitel 5: Försäkringspremie
816
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
Kapitel 6: Försäkringsfallet
817
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(3) I händelse av varje sådan kränkning av stycket 1 som skett med uppsåt att orsaka skada eller som
varit hänsynslöst och i medvetande om att sådan skada sannolikt skulle inträda, är försäkrings-
bolaget befriat från skyldigheten att betala försäkringsersättning.
Kapitel 7: Preskription
12 Denna artikel har som förebild artikel 3 para.1 (d) direktiv 2000/35/EEG.
818
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
819
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
820
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
(3) återkallelsen blir giltig när ett skriftligt meddelande om återkallelsen har mottagits av försäk-
ringsbolaget.
821
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Avdelning 4: Ansvarsförsäkring
Kapitel 14: Allmän ansvarsförsäkring
822
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
kommersiella eller professionella ändamål definierar försäkrad händelse med hänvisning till an-
dra kriterier såsom den skadelidandes anspråkskrav.
(2) När kontraktsparterna definierar försäkrad händelse med hänvisning till den skadelidandes an-
språkskrav, skall täckning garanteras med hänsyn till krav framställda inom ansvarsperioden eller
inom en följande period, inte mindre än fem år, och som är grundad på ett faktum som inträffat
före slutet av ansvarsperioden. Försäkringskontraktet kan exkludera täckning på den grunden
att vid tidpunkten för kontraktets ingående, den sökande var eller borde ha varit medveten om
omständigheter som han borde ha väntat skulle ge upphov till ersättningskrav.
823
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Avdelning 5: Livförsäkring
Kapitel 17: Särskilda föreskrifter för livförsäkring
Sektion 1: Tredjeman
13 Den mening som här skrivits återfi nns inte i den engelska texten utan återfi nns i denna blott i orden
„informed consent“, ett begrepp som för att bli begripligt har måst uppgå i en separat mening.
824
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
utseendet, ändringen eller återkallelsen skett genom testamente, måste åtgärden ske skriftligen
och sändas till försäkringsbolaget.
(2) Rätten att utvälja, ändra eller återkalla förordnandet upphör vid försäkringstagarens död eller
vid försäkringsfallet, allt beroende på vad som kommer först.
(3) Försäkringstagaren eller dennes arvingar skall betraktas som förmånstagare till försäkringser-
sättningen om:
(a) försäkringstagaren inte har förordnat någon förmånstagare eller
(b) förordnandet av en förmånstagare har återkallats och inga andra förmånstagare har blivit
förordnade eller
(c) en förmånstagare har avlidit före försäkringsfallet och ingen annan förmånstagare har blivit
förordnad.
(4) Om två eller flera förmånstagare har blivit förordnade och valet av förordnandet av dem åter-
kallats eller någon av dem avlider före försäkringsfallet, skall hela försäkringsbeloppet delas ut
proportionellt om inte annat är specificerat av försäkringstagaren enligt stycket 1.
(5) Med förbehåll för regler om nullitet, ogiltighet eller ogenomförbarhet av rättsliga åtgärder till
förfång för borgenärer som kan återfinnas i tillämpliga regler i insolvensrätten skall försäkrings-
tagarens konkursbo inte ha någon rätt till försäkringsersättningen, det konverterade värdet eller
återköpsvärdet så länge ersättningen inte har blivit betald till försäkringstagaren.
(6) Ett försäkringsbolag som betalar försäkringsersättning till en person som är förordnad enligt
stycket 1 är befriad från sin skyldighet att betala, såvida det inte visste om att personen i fråga
inte var berättigad till försäkringsersättningen.
825
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
826
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
(2) Försäkringstagarens rätt att undgå kontraktet enligt artikel 2:303 stycket 1 går ut ett år efter
ingåendet av kontraktet.
14 I den engelska texten har här tillfogats orden „within the meaning of Article 4:201“. Denna hänvisning
är både onödig och obegriplig, varför den här har fått utgå.
827
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
och där en oberoende förtroendeman eller övervakningsmyndighet har samtyckt till ökningen.
Försäkringstagaren har rätt att utjämna premieökningen genom en tillbörlig minskning av för-
säkringsförmånerna.
(3) Vid ett betalt försäkringsvillkor har försäkringsbolaget en rätt till minskning av försäkringsförmå-
nerna enligt de villkor som fastställs i stycket 2.
(4) En justering enligt stycket 2 eller 3 är inte tillåten.
(a) såvitt ett misstag har begåtts vid kalkyleringen av premien och/eller förmånerna om vilket
en kompetent och noggrann aktuarie borde ha blivit medveten, eller
(b) där den underliggande kalkyleringen inte tillämpats på alla försäkringkontrakt inklusive de
som ingåtts efter justeringen.
(5) En ökning av premien eller en minskning av förmåner blir gällande tre månader sedan försäk-
ringsbolaget har tillhandahållit försäkringstagaren ett skriftligt meddelande om ökningen av
premien eller minskning av förmånerna, skälen för detta samt om försäkringstagarens egen rätt
att begära en minskning av förmånerna.
(6) I ett livförsäkringsavtal som täcker risker för vilka försäkringsbolaget är säkert på att bli ansvarig
har försäkringstagaren rätt att erhålla en minskning av premien vilken, på grund av en oförut-
sebar och permanent förändring av biometriska risker använda som grund för premiekalkylen,
gör den ursprungliga storleken av premien gångbar och nödvändig för att garantera försäkrings-
bolagets fortsatta förmåga att betala försäkringsförmån. Minskningen måste godkännas av en
oberoende förtroendeman eller av övervakningsmyndigheten.
(7) De rättigheter som utvecklats i denna artikel kan ej utövas tidigare än fem år efter ingåendet av
försäkringskonraktet.
828
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
Sektion 5: Försäkringsfallet
829
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
säkringstagaren kräver betalning av återköpsvärdet inom fyra veckor efter att ha mottagit den
information till vilken hänvisas i stycket 2.
(2) Försäkringsbolaget skall informera försäkringstagaren om konverterings- och återköpsvärdet
inom fyra veckor sedan den period till vilken hänvisas i artikel 5:101(b) eller artikel 5:102 stycket
1(b) samt be försäkringstagaren att välja mellan konvertering eller betalning av återköpsvärdet.
(3) Begäran om konvertering eller betalning av återköpsvärdet skall ske skriftligen.
Avdelning 6: Gruppförsäkring
Kapitel 8: Särskilda föreskrifter för gruppförsäkring
Sektion 1: Gruppförsäkring i allmänhet
830
Swedish: Principer för en Europeisk Försäkringsavtalsrätt (PEICL)
antingen automatisk15 och då täckt av sektion 2 av detta kapitel eller också frivilligt vald16 och då
omfattad av sektion 3.
15 I den engelska texten har valts ordet „accessory“, på svenska accessorisk. Detta ord har emellertid på
svenska (med sin medicinska anknytning till ett bihang) också en betydelse av något mindre väsent-
ligt, knappast lämpligt när det gäller den försäkring här i fråga. En mera träffande term i samman-
hanget är automatisk, varför det använts i denna översättning.
16 I den engelska texten står ”elective”, ett ord som skulle kunna heta ”elektiv” på svenska men som inte
finns i det svenska språket. Därför har det ord som bäst svarar mot det engelska ”elective” föredragits:
”frivilligt vald”.
831
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
säkringskontraktet. När detta inträffar har gruppmedlemmen en rätt till samma skydd enligt ett
nytt individuellt kontrakt med berört försäkringsbolag utan en ny riskvärdering.
(2) Gruppföreträdaren skall utan oskäligt uppehåll skriftligen informera gruppmedlemmen om
(a) det nära förestående upphörandet av grupplivförsäkringen,
(b) dennes rättigheter enligt stycket 1 och
(c) hur dessa rättigheter skall utövas.
(3) Om gruppmedlemmen har antytt sin avsikt att utöva sina rättigheter enligt artikel 18:204 stycket
1 skall kontraktet mellan försäkringsbolaget och gruppmedlemmen fortsätta som ett individuellt
försäkringskontrakt med en premie kalkylerad på grundval av en individuell försäkring vid denna
tid utan hänsyn tagen till det aktuella hälsotillståndet eller gruppmedlemmens ålder.
832
Turkish version
by Samim Ünan and Serap Amasya
Birinci Kısım: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Dokuzuncu Bölüm: Tazminat Alma Hakkı
Hukuku İlkelerine (ASSHİ) Tâbi Bütün Sözleş- Onuncu Bölüm: Halefiyet Hakkı
melere Uygulanacak Ortak Hükümler
On Birinci Bölüm: Sigorta Ettirenden Farklı
Birinci Bölüm: Başlangıç Hükümleri Sigortalılar
Birinci Ayrım: ASSHİ’nin Uygulanabilirliği
İkinci Ayrım: Genel Hükümler
On İkinci Bölüm: Sigortalanmış Riziko
Üçüncü Ayrım: Kurallara Uyulmasının Sağlanması
Üçüncü Kısım: Tutar Sigortalarına İlişkin Ortak
İkinci Bölüm: Sigorta Sözleşmesinin Başlangıç Hükümler
Aşaması ve Süresi On Üçüncü Bölüm: İzin Verilen Tutar Sigortaları
Birinci Ayrım: Sigorta Yaptırmak İçin Başvuruda
Bulunan Kişinin Sözleşme Öncesi Bilgi Verme Dördüncü Kısım: Sorumluluk Sigortası
Yükümlülüğü
İkinci Ayrım: Sigortacının Sözleşme Öncesindeki
On Dördüncü Bölüm: Genel Sorumluluk
Yükümlülükleri
Sigortası
Üçüncü Ayrım: Sözleşmenin Kurulması On Beşinci Bölüm: Doğrudan İstem ve
Dördüncü Ayrım: Geriye Etkili Teminat ve Geçici Doğrudan Dava
Teminat On Altıncı Bölüm: Zorunlu Sigorta
Beşinci Ayrım: Sigorta Poliçesi
Altıncı Ayrım: Sigorta Sözleşmesinin Süresi Beşinci Kısım: Hayat Sigortası
Yedinci Ayrım: Sigortacının Sözleşme Kurulduktan On Yedinci Bölüm: Hayat Sigortasına İlişkin
Sonraki Bilgilendirme Yükümlülüğü Özel Hükümler
Üçüncü Bölüm: Sigorta Aracıları Birinci Ayrım: Üçüncü Kişiler
Dördüncü Bölüm: Sigortalanmış Riziko İkinci Ayrım: Sözleşmenin Başlangıç Safhası ve Süresi
Birinci Ayrım: Koruyucu Önlemler Üçüncü Ayrım: Sözleşme Süresi İçindeki Değişiklikler
İkinci Ayrım: Rizikonun Ağırlaşması Dördüncü Ayrım: Ulusal Hukuklarla İlişki
Üçüncü Ayrım: Rizikonun Hafiflemesi Beşinci Ayrım: Sigortalanmış Olay
Altıncı Ayrım: Dönüştürme ve Ayrılma
Beşinci Bölüm: Sigorta Primi
Altıncı Bölüm: Sigortalanmış Olay Altıncı Kısım: Grup Sigortası
Yedinci Bölüm: Zamanaşımı On Sekizinci Bölüm: Grup Sigortası Hakkında
Özel Hükümler
İkinci Kısım: Zarar Sigortalarına İlişkin Ortak Birinci Ayrım: Genel Olarak Grup Sigortası
Hükümler İkinci Ayrım: Otomatik Grup Sigortası
Sekizinci Bölüm: Sigorta Bedeli ve Sigorta Üçüncü Ayrım: Seçime Bağlı Grup Sigortası
Değeri
833
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
834
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
835
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
836
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
837
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
838
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
(b) sigorta ettiren, ihlali öğrendiği andan başlayarak iki ay içinde yazılı bildirim yoluyla sözleş-
meyi feshedebilir.
839
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
hazırlanmış bir katılım sözleşmesi sayılması gerekiyorsa, bir hükmün bazı unsurlarının veya belli
bir hükmün özel olarak görüşülmüş bulunması, bu maddenin o sözleşmenin geri kalan kısmına
uygulanmasını engellemez. Katılım sözleşmesindeki bir hükmün özel olarak görüşüldüğünü ileri
süren sigortacı, bu hususu kanıtlamakla yükümlüdür.
840
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
841
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Fıkra 1, değişiklik yapma hakkı öngören sözleşme hükümlerinin diğer geçerlilik koşullarını etki-
lemez.
842
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
843
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Sözleşmedeki hüküm, bildirimin belirli bir süre içinde yapılmasını öngörmekte ise, bu sürenin
makul olması gereklidir. Bildirim, gönderme anından başlayarak hüküm doğurur.
(3) Bildirim yükümlülüğüne aykırılık hâlinde, sigortacı, sigorta teminatı kapsamındaki bir olayın yol
açtığı sonraki bir zararı ödemekten kaçınma hakkına ancak bu zarar ağırlaşmış rizikonun bildiril-
memesinden ileri gelmiş bulunduğu takdirde sahip olur.
844
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
(b) primin muaccel olmasından sonra, sigortacı, sigorta ettirene ödemesi gereken primin tam
tutarını içeren, ona en az iki haftalık ek bir ödeme süresi veren ve onu ödeme yapılmazsa
sigorta teminatının derhal duracağı konusunda uyaran bir ihtar yollamış; ve
(c) bent (b)’de öngörülen ek süre ödeme yapılmaksızın geçmiş olmadıkça
geçersizdir.
(2) Sigortacı, Fıkra 1 bent (b)’de öngörülen ek sürenin sonunda sorumluluktan kurtulur. Sözleşme,
Madde 5:103 uyarınca feshedilmiş olmadıkça, sigorta teminatı, sigorta ettirenin ödemesi gereken
tutarı ödediği anda tekrar başlar.
845
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
846
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
Ancak başvuru hakkı her hâlde, sigortalanmış olayın gerçekleşmesinden itibaren en geç on yılda,
hayat sigortalarında ise otuz yılda zamanaşımına uğrar.
(2) Hayat sigortalarında ayrılma değerinin ödenmesi için yargı yoluna başvuru hakkı, sigortacının
gönderdiği kesin hesabın sigorta ettirene ulaştığı andan başlayarak üç yılda zamanaşımına uğrar.
Ancak başvuru hakkı her hâlde, hayat sigortası sözleşmesinin sona ermesinden başlayarak en geç
otuz yılda zamanaşımına uğrar.
847
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
(2) Kendisinden istemde bulunulan sigortacı, diğer sigortacılara rücu hakkı saklı kalmak kaydıyla,
düzenlediği poliçede yazılı sigorta bedeline kadar, varsa zararı azaltma giderleriyle birlikte, öde-
me yapar.
(3) Fıkra 2’de belirtilen hak ve borçlar, sigortacılar arasında, bunların sigortalıya karşı ayrı ayrı sorumlu
oldukları tutarlarla orantılıdır.
848
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
849
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
850
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
(2) Sigortacı, primi veya başka sözleşme koşullarını, poliçe kapsamında ödenmiş olan tazminat is-
temlerinin sayısına veya tutarına bağlamış ise, sigorta ettirenin başka sigortacılarla mevcut olan
son beş yıla ilişkin tazminat kayıtları da gereken ölçüde dikkate alınır.
851
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
aykırı davranırsa, sigorta ettirenin hakları zarar görene ödeme yapması veya ona karşı borç ikra-
rında bulunması yüzünden etkilenmez.
(3) Sigorta ettiren, Fıkra 2’ye uygun olarak bildirimin kendisine ulaşmasını izleyen bir ay içinde
sigortacıya sigortalanmış olaya ilişkin bilgi aktarmazsa, istemin doğrudan sigortacı tarafından
sonuçlandırılmasına onay vermiş sayılır. Bu kural söz konusu bildirimin zamanında kendilerine
fiilen ulaşmış olduğu sigortalılar hakkında da uygulanır.
852
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
hüküm doğurmaz. Bu hüküm, sigorta sözleşmesinin veya sigorta parası üzerindeki hakkın başkasına
devri veya başkası lehine sınırlanması hâlinde de uygulanır.
853
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
Madde 17:201 Sigorta Yaptırmak İçin Başvuruda Bulunan Kişinin Sözleşme Öncesi Bilgi
Verme Yükümlülüğü
(1) Sigorta yaptırmak için başvuruda bulunan kişi tarafından Madde 2:101 Fıkra 1 uyarınca yapılması
gereken bildirim, riziko kişisinin bildiği veya bilmesi gereken hususları da kapsar.
(2) Madde 2:104 hariç olmak koşuluyla, Madde 2:102, 2:103 ve 2:105’te öngörülen sözleşme öncesi
bilgilendirme yükümlülüğüne aykırılık hâline ilişkin yaptırımlar, ancak sözleşmenin yapılmasının
üzerinden beş sene geçtikten sonra uygulanabilir.
854
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
855
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
sigorta ile temin edilen getirileri ödeme yeteneğinin sürekliliğini sağlama bakımından gerekli
olması ve primin artırılmasının bağımsız bir malvarlığı yöneticisi veya kamu makamı tarafından
kabul edilmesi hâllerinde yapılabilir. Sigorta ettiren, primin artırılan kısmının sigorta ile temin
edilen getirilerden yapılacak uygun bir indirime mahsup edilmesini isteyebilir.
(3) Sigortacı, prim ödemeden bağışık poliçelerde sigorta ile temin edilen getirileri Fıkra 2’de belirti-
len koşullar çerçevesinde indirebilir.
(4) Fıkra 2 veya Fıkra 3 uyarınca ayarlama
(a) prim ve/veya sigorta ile temin edilen getirilerin hesaplanmasında uzman ve özenli bir aktü-
erin farkına varmış olması gereken bir hata yapıldığı, veya
(b) ayarlamaya dayanak oluşturan hesaplamanın ayarlamadan sonra kurulanlar dahil bütün
sözleşmelere uygulanmadığı
hâllerde mümkün değildir.
(5) Prim artışı veya sigorta ile temin edilen getirilerden yapılacak indirim, sigortacının sigorta etti-
rene sebepleriyle birlikte prim artırımını veya getirilerden yapılacak indirimi ve sigorta ettirenin
kendisinin de bu getirilerin indirilmesini isteme hakkı bulunduğunu yazılı olarak bildirdiği andan
üç ay sonra hüküm doğurmaya başlar.
(6) Sigortacının kesin olarak sorumlu olacağı rizikoları temin eden bir hayat sigortası sözleşmesinde;
başlangıçtaki prim tutarının, primin hesaplanmasında esas alınan biometrik rizikolarda önceden
görülemeyen ve sürekli nitelik taşıyan bir değişme sebebiyle, sigortacının sigorta ile temin edilen
getirileri ödeme yeteneğinin sürekliliğini sağlama bakımından artık uygun ve gerekli olmadığı
hâllerde, sigorta ettiren primin indirilmesini isteyebilir. İndirimin kamu makamı veya bağımsız
bir malvarlığı yöneticisi tarafından kabul edilmiş olması lazımdır.
(7) Bu maddede hükme bağlanan haklar, sözleşmenin kurulması üzerinden beş sene geçmiş olma-
dıkça kullanılamaz.
856
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
857
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
858
Turkish: Avrupa Sigorta Sözleşmesi Hukuku İlkeleri (ASSHİ)
859
Principles of European Insurance Contract Law (PEICL): Translations (non-authentic)
860
Annexes
Abbreviations
863
Annexes
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EWCA Civ Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
EWHC number (Comm) High Court, Commercial Court
Exch Exchequer Reports
FCA Financial Conduct Authority
Foro it. Il Foro Italiano
HL House of Lords
IA Insurance Act
ICA Insurance Contract Act
ICOBS Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook
IDD Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on insurance mediation (recast) – Confirmation of the final compromise
text with a view to agreement, Doc. No. 10747 / 15 of 16 July 2015,
Interinstitutional File: 2012 / 0175 (COD)
Ins Insurance
IR Irish Reports
ISA Insurance Supervisory Act
ISVAP Instituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni private e di interesse
colletivo
KB Law Reports, King’s Bench
LJKB Law Journal Reports, King’s Bench New Series
Lloyd’s Rep Lloyd’s Law Reports
Lloyd’s Rep IR Lloyd’s Law Reports Insurance & Reinsurance
Lloyd’s Rep, Ll. L. R. Lloyd’s List Law Reports
LR Law Reports (1st series)
LT Law Times Reports
LTC Long-term care
M&G Manning & Granger’s Common Pleas Reports
MiFID2 Directive 2014 / 65 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending
Directive 2002 / 92 / EC and Directive 2011 / 61 / EU (Text with EEA
relevance) [2014] OJ L173 / 349
No., no. number
NoB Nomiko Bima (Greece)
OG Obergericht (Switzerland)
OGH Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria)
OI Optional Instrument
OJ Official Journal of the European Communities
OLG Oberlandesgericht (Austria, Germany)
OR Obligationsrecht
PECL Principles of European Contract Law
PEICL Principles of European Insurance Contract Law
PHI permanent health insurance
PRIIP Regulation (EU) No. 1286 / 2014 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 November 2014 on key information documents for
packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIP) [2014]
OJ L352 / 1
864
Abbreviations
865
Table of National Statutes (including draft legislation
and like sources)
Austria
CC – Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, JGS Nr. 946/1811, as amended
Consumer Protection Act – Bundesgesetz vom 8. März 1979, mit dem Bestimmungen zum Schutz
der Verbraucher getroffen werden (Konsumentenschutzgesetz – KSchG), BGBl. Nr. 140/1979, as
amended
ICA – Bundesgesetz vom 2. Dezember 1958 über den Versicherungsvertrag (Versicherungsvertrags-
gesetz 1958), BGBl. Nr. 2/1959, as amended
Income Tax Act – Bundesgesetz vom 7. Juli 1988 über die Besteuerung des Einkommens natürlicher
Personen (Einkommensteuergesetz 1988 – EStG 1988), BGBl. Nr. 400/1988
ISA – Bundesgesetz vom 18. Oktober 1978 über den Betrieb und die Beaufsichtigung der Ver-
tragsversicherung (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz – VAG), BGBl. Nr. 569/1978, as amended
Law on Genetic Engineering – Bundesgesetz, mit dem Arbeiten mit gentechnisch veränderten
Organismen, das Freisetzen und Inverkehrbringen von gentechnisch veränderten Organismen
und die Anwendung von Genanalyse und Gentherapie am Menschen geregelt werden (Gentech-
nikgesetz – GTG), BGBl. Nr. 510/1994, as amended
Motor Insurance Act – Kraftfahrzeug-Haftpflichtversicherungsgesetz 1994 (KHVG 1994), BGBl.
Nr. 651/1994, as amended
Occupational Pensions Act – Bundesgesetz vom 17. Mai 1990, mit dem betriebliche Leistungszusa-
gen gesichert werden (Betriebspensionsgesetz – BPG), BGBl. Nr. 282/1990, as amended
Belgium
Act of 6 April 2010 on Market Practices and Consumer Information and Protection – Wet van 6
april 2010 betreffende marktpraktijken en consumentenbescherming (Loi du 6 avril 2010 relative
aux pratiques du marché et à la protection du consommateur)
Code of Economic Law – Wetboek van economisch recht (Code de droit économique)
ComC, Book II – Wet van 21 augustus 1879 houdende Boek II Zee- en Binnenvaart van het
Wetboek van Koophandel (Loi du 21 août 1879 contenant le Livre II du Code de Commerce. De la
navigation maritime et de la navigation intérieure)
IA 2014 – Wet van 4 april 2014 betreffende de verzekeringen (Loi du 4 avril 2014 relative aux
assurances)
ICA – Wet van 25 juni 1992 op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst (Loi du 25 juin 1992 sur le contrat
d’assurance terrestre)
ISA – Wet van 9 juli 1975 betreffende de controle der verzekeringsondernemingen (Loi du 9 juillet
1975 relative au contrôle des entreprises d´assurances)
Law of 26 May 2002 on Intra-Community Injunctions for the Protection of Consumers’ Interests –
Wet van 26 mei 2002 betreffende de intracommunautaire vorderingen tot staking op het gebied
van de bescherming van de consumentenbelangen. (Loi du 26 mai 2002 relative aux actions en
cessation intracommunautaires en matière de protection des intérêts des consommateurs)
Royal Decree of 12 October 1990 on Legal Expenses Insurance – Koninklijk besluit van 12 oktober
1990 betreffende de rechtsbijstandverzekering (Arrêté royal du 12 octobre 1990 relatif à l´assur-
ance protection juridique)
866
Table of National Statutes
Royal Decree of 14 November 2003 on Life Assurance – Koninklijk besluit van 14 november 2003
betreffende de levensverzekeringsactiviteit (Arreté royal du 14 novembre 2003 relatif à l´activité
d´assurance sur la vie)
Royal Decree of 22 February 1991 on Insurance Supervision – Koninklijk besluit van 22 februari
1991 houdende het algemeen reglement betreffende de controle der verzekeringsondernemingen
(Arrêté royal du 22 février 1991 portant règlement général relative au contrôle des entreprises
d´assurances)
Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 implementing the ICA – Koninklijk besluit van 24 december
1992 tot uitvoering van de wet van 25 juni 1992 op de landverzekeringsovereenkomst (Arrêté
royal du 24 décembre 1992 portant exécution de la loi du 25 juin 1992 sur le contrat d´assurance
terrestre)
Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 on Fire Insurance of Normal Risks – Koninklijk besluit van
24 december 1992 betreffende de verzekering tegen brand en andere gevaren wat de eenvoudige
risico´s betreft (Arrêté royal du 24 décembre 1992 réglementant l´assurance contre l´incendie et
d´autres périls, en ce qui concerne les risques simples)
Royal Decree of 21 February 2014 – Koninklijk besluit van 21 februari 2014 inzake de krachtens
de wet vastgestelde gedragsregels en regels over het beheer van belangenconflicten, wat de verze-
keringssector betreft (Arrêté royal du 21 février 2014 relatif aux règles de conduite et aux règles
relatives à la gestion des conflits d’intérêts, fixées en vertu de la loi, en ce qui concerne le secteur
des assurances)
Royal Decree of 21 February 2014 – Koninklijk besluit van 21 februari 2014 over de regels voor
detoepassing van de artikelen 27 tot 28bisvan de wet van 2 augustus 2002 betreffende het toezicht
op definanciële sector en definanciële diensten op de verzekeringssector (Arrêté royal du 21 février
2014 relatif aux modalités d’application au secteur des assurances des articles 27 à 28bis de la loi du
2 août 2002 relative à la surveillance du secteur financier et aux services financiers)
Law of 2 August 2002 on the supervision of the financial sector and on financial services – Wet van
2 augustus 2002 betreffende het toezicht op de financiële sector en de financiële diensten (Loi du
2aout 2002 relative à la surveillance du secteur financier et aux services financiers)
Czech Republic
Zákon č. 89 / 2012 Sb., občanský zákoník (Act No. 89 / 2012 Coll., Civil Code)
ICA – Zákon č. 37/2004 Sb., o pojistné smlouvě a o změně souvisejících zákonů (zákon o pojistné
smlouvě) (Act No. 37/2004 Coll. on Insurance Contract and on Amendments to Related Acts)
Repealed by the Civil Code to the extent of Part One and Part Two of the ICA. Insurance contracts
concluded before 1 / 1 / 2014 are governed by the ICA.
Denmark
Contract Act – Aftaleloven, Bekendtgørelse af lov om aftaler og andre retshandler på formuerettens
område, as amended
ICA – Lov (LBK) nr. 999 af 5. oktober 2006 (Forsikringsaftaleloven)
Act No. 1257 of 20 December 2000 on the Protection of the Consumers’ Interests – Lov nr. 1257 af
20. december 2000 om forbud til beskyttelse af forbrugernes interesser
Act No. 451 of 9 June 2004 on Certain Consumer Contracts – Lov nr. 451 af 09. juni 2004 om visse
forbrugeraftaler
Finland
Act regulating the procedure for cross-border injunctions (1189/2000) – Laki rajat ylittävästä
kieltomenettelystä (1189/2000)
Consumer Protection Act (38/1978) – Kuluttajansuojalaki (38/1978), as amended
ICA – Vakuutussopimuslaki (543/1994), as amended
867
Annexes
France
CC – Code civil, as amended
Consumer Code – Code de la consommation, as amended
ICA – Codes des assurances: le contrat, as amended
Germany
CC – Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGBl. I S. 42, 2909; 2003 I S. 738), as amended
Former German ICA – Gesetz über den Versicherungsvertrag vom 30. Mai 1908 (RGBl. S. 263),
as amended, now repealed
Code of Procedure for the Insurance Ombudsman – Verfahrensordnung für den Versicherungsom-
budsmann (VomVO), beschlossen am 28.9. 2001 vom Vorstand des Versicherungsombudsmann
e.V.
ICA – Versicherungsvertragsgesetz vom 23. November 2007 (BGBl. I S. 2631), as amended
Injunctions Act – Unterlassungsklagengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 27. August
2002 (BGBl. I S. 3422, S. 4346), as amended
Income Tax Act – Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG) neugefasst durch B. v. 08.10.2009 BGBl. I S. 3366,
3862; zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 3 G. v. 25.07.2014 BGBl. I S. 1266; Geltung ab 30.06.1979
ISA 2016 – Gesetz über die Beaufsichtigung der Versicherungsunternehmen (Versicherungsauf-
sichtsgesetz – VAG) vom 1. April 2015 (BGBl. I S. 434)
Genetic Diagnostics Act – Gesetz über genetische Untersuchungen bei Menschen (Gendiagnostik-
gesetz – GenDG) G. v. 31.07.2009 BGBl. I S. 2529 (Nr. 50), 3672; zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 4
G. v. 07.08.2013 BGBl. I S. 3154; Geltung ab 01.02.2010
Company Pension Act – Betriebsrentengesetz (BetrAVG) – Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrie-
blichen Altersversorgung G. v. 19.12.1974 BGBl. I S. 3610; zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 3 G. v.
23.06.2014 BGBl. I S. 787; Geltung ab 22.12.1974
Act on the Certification of Retirement and Basic Pension Plans – Gesetz über die Zertifizierung
von Altersvorsorge- und Basisrentenverträgen (Altersvorsorgeverträge-Zertifizierungsgesetz –
AltZertG) Artikel 7 G. v. 26.06.2001 BGBl. I S. 1310, 1322; zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 15 G. v.
25.07.2014 BGBl. I S. 1266; Geltung ab 01.08.2001
Regulation on Duties of Information Relating to Insurance Contracts of 18 December 2007 –
VVG-Informationspflichtenverordnung vom 18. Dezember 2007 (BGBl. I S. 3004)
Greece
CC – Αστικός Κώδικας, Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 456/1984, ΦΕΚ Α’ 164/1984 (Greek Civil Code,
Presidential Decree No. 456/1984, Official Government Gazette, A’ 164/1984)
Code on Motor Liability Insurance – Κωδικοποιημένος Νόμος 489/1976 «Περί υποχρεωτικής
ασφαλίσεως εξ ατυχημάτων αυτοκινήτων αστικής ευθύνης», ΦΕΚ Α 331/1976: Code on Motor
Liability Insurance, Law No. 489/1976 “On Motor Liability Insurance”, Official Government
Gazette, Α΄ 331/1976
Code on Private Maritime Law – Κώδικας ιδιωτικού Ναυτικού Δικαίου, Νόμος 3816/1958 «Περί
κυρώσεως του κώδικος ιδιωτικού ναυτικού δικαίου» ΦΕΚ A’ 32/28.02.1958 (Greek Code on
Private Maritime Law, Law No 3816/1958 “On Certifying the Private Code on Maritime Law”,
Official Government Gazette, A’ 32/28.02.1958)
868
Table of National Statutes
ICA – Νόμος 2496/1997 «Νόμος για την Ασφαλιστική Σύμβαση», ΦΕΚ A’ 87/16.05.1997 (Greek
Law No. 2496/1997 “on Insurance Contract Law”, Official Government Gazette, A’ 87/16.05.1997)
Law on Consumer Protection – Νόμος 2251/1994 «Προστασία των καταναλωτών» (Greek Law
No. 2251/94, “On Consumer Protection”, Official Government Gazette, A’ 191/16.11.1994)
Law on Income Tax – Νόμος 4172/2013 «Κώδικας Φορολογίας Εισοδήματος» (Greek Law
No. 4172/2013, «On Income Tax», Official Government Gazette, A› 167/23.7.2013)
Law on Agency in Private Insurance Contracts – Νόμος 1569/1985 «Διαμεσολάβηση στις συμβάσεις
ιδιωτικής ασφάλισης, σύσταστη σώματος ειδικών πραγματογνωμόνων τροχαίων ατυχημάτων,
λειτουργία γραφείου διεθνούς ασφάλισης και άλλες διατάξεις» ΦΕΚ A’ 183/25.10.1985 (Greek
Law No. 1569/1985, “on Agency in Private Insurance Contracts”, Official Government Gazette, A’
183/25.10.1985)
Legislative Decree on Insurance Undertakings – Νομοθετικό Διάταγμα 400/1970 «Περί ιδιωτικής
επιχειρήσεως ασφαλίσεως» ΦΕΚ Α’ 10/17.01.1970 (Greek Legislative Decree No. 400/1970 “On
private insurance undertakings”, as amended, Official Government Gazette, A’ 10/17.01.1970)
Presidential Decree No. 190/2006 – Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 190/2006 «Προσαρμογή της ελληνικής
νομοθεσίας στην Οδηγία 2002/92/ΕΚ σχετικά με την ασφαλιστική διαμεσολάβηση», ΦΕΚ Α’
196/14.09.2006: Greek Presidential Decree No. 190/2006 “On Insurance Intermediaries” imple-
menting Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December
2002 on insurance mediation, Official Government Gazette, A’ 196/14.09.2006
Presidential Decree No. 301/2002 – Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 301/2002 «Προσαρμογή της ελληνικής
νομοθεσίας προς τις διατάξεις της οδηγίας 98/27/ΕΚ του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου και του
Συμβουλίου της 19ης Μαίου 1998 «περί των αγωγών παραλείψεως στον τομέα της προστασίας
των συμφερόντων των καταναλωτών» (ΕΕ αριθ. L 166 της 11/06/1998, σ. 51-55) και τροποποίηση
του Νόμου 2251/1994 για την “Προστασία των καταναλωτών”» ΦΕΚ, A 301/04.11.2002 (Greek
Presidential Decree No. 301/2002 “On implementing Directive 98/27 of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests
and amending law 3351/1994 “On Consumer Protection”, Official Government Gazette, A’
301/04.11.2002)
Hungary
CC – 2013 évi V. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről (Law no. V of 2013 on the Civil Code)
Law on Motor Liability Insurance– 2009 évi LXII. törvény a kötelező gépjármű-felelősségbiztosítás-
ról (Law no. LXII of 2009 on the Compulsory Motor Third-Party Liability Insurance)
Ireland
Codes of Practice of the Irish Insurance Federation
European Communities (Non-Life Insurance) (Legal Expenses) Regulations 1991 – European
Communities (Non-Life Insurance) (Legal Expenses) Regulations, 1991 (S.I. No. 197/1991)
European Communities (Protection of Consumers’ Collective Interests) Regulations 2001 – Euro-
pean Communities (Protection of Consumers’ Collective Interests) Regulations, 2001 (S.I. No. 449
of 2001)
European Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations 1995 – European
Communities (Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts) Regulations, 1995 (S.I. No. 27/1995)
Insurance Act 1989 – Insurance Act, 1989
Statute of Limitations 1957 – Statute of Limitations, 1957
869
Annexes
Italy
CC – Codice Civile Italiano
Code of Navigation – Codice della navigazione
Code of Private Insurance – Decreto legislativo 7 settembre 2005, n. 209 – Codice delle assicurazio-
ni private
Consumer Code – Codice del consumo
Decree of 28 August 2008 – Decreto legge 28 agosto 2008 n. 134
ISVAP Regulation No. 5/2006 – Regolamento ISVAP n. 5/2006
Law of 23 July 2009, no. 99 – Legge 23 Luglio 2009, n. 99
Law of 17 December 2012, no. 294 – Legge 17 Dicembre 2012, n. 294
Luxembourg
Act on Injunctions of 19 December 2003 – Loi du 19 décembre 2003 fixant les conditions d´agré-
ment des organisations habilitées à intenter des actions en cessation
CC – Code civil en vigueur dans le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
Grand Ducal Regulation of 20 December 1991 on Insurance – Règlement grand-ducal du 20 décem-
bre 1991 pris en exécution de la loi du décembre 1991 sur le secteur des assurances et précisant les
modalités d´agrément d´exercice des entreprises d´assurance établies à Luxembourg
ICA – Loi du 27 juillet 1997 sur le contrat d´assurance
Netherlands
CC – Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 7 titel 7 Verzekering (New Civil Code Book 7 Part 17
Insurance)
Decree on the Supervision of the Conduct of Financial Enterprises – Besluit gedragstoezicht
financiële ondernemingen (Bgfo)
Financial Services Ombudsman Regulations – Reglement Ombudsman Financiële Dienstverlening
Former Dutch Civil Code relating to insurance – Wetboek van koophandel 1846
Former ISA – Wet toezicht verzekeringsbedrijf 1993
ISA – Wet op het financieel toezicht 2006 (Act on Financial Supervision 2006)
Poland
Act on Compulsory Insurance – Ustawa z dnia 22 maja 2003 r. o ubezpieczeniach obowiązkowych,
Ubezpieczeniowym Funduszu Gwarancyjnym i Polskim Biurze Ubezpieczycieli Komunikacyjnych,
Dziennik Ustaw z 2003 r. nr 124 poz. 1152 ze zm. (Act of 22 May 2003 on compulsory insurance,
Insurance Guarantee Fund and Polish Motor Insurer’ Bureau, Official Gazette 2003 no 124 item, as
amended)
Act on Insurance Activity – Ustawa z dnia 22 maja 2003 r. o działalności ubezpieczeniowej, Dzi-
ennik Ustaw z 2003 r. nr 124 poz. 1151 ze zm. (Act of 22 May 2003 on insurance activity, Official
Gazette 2003 no. 124 item 1151, as amended)
Act on Insurance Mediation – Ustawa z 22 maja 2003 r. o pośrednictwie ubezpieczeniowym,
Dziennik Ustaw z 2003 r. nr 124 poz. 1154 ze zm. (Act of 22 May 2003 on insurance mediation,
Official Gazette 2003 no. 124 item 1154, as amended)
CC – Ustawa z dnia 23 kwietnia 1964 r. Kodeks Cywilny, Dziennik Ustaw z 1964 r. nr 16 poz. 93 ze
zm. (Act of 23 April 1964 Civil Code, Official Gazette 1964 no. 16 item 93, as amended)
Portugal
CC – Código Civil Português Decreto-Lei nº 47 344, de 25 de Novembro de 1966, as amended
ICA – Lei do Contrato de Seguro Decreto-Lei nº 72/2008, de 16 de Abril, as amended
870
Table of National Statutes
Spain
ICA – Ley 50/1980, de 8 de octubre, de Contrato de Seguro
ISA – Real Decreto Legislativo 6/2004, de 29 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el Texto refundido de
la Ley de ordenación y supervisión de los seguros privados
Law of Maritime Navigation – Ley 14/2014, de 24 de julio, de Navegación Marítima
Law on Mediation of Private Insurance and Reinsurance – Ley 26/2006, de 17 de Julio de mediación
en seguros y reaseguros privados
Law 39/2002 of 28 October 2002 – Ley 39/2002, de 28 de octubre, de transposición al ordenamiento
jurídico español de diversas directivas comunitarias en materia de protección de los intereses de
los consumidores y usuarios
Royal Decree on Insurance Supervision – Real Decreto 2486/1998, de 20 noviembre, por el que se
aprueba el Reglamento de Ordenación y Supervisión de los Seguros Privados
Royal Legislative Decree on Consumer and User Interests – Real Decreto legislativo 1/2007, de
16 noviembre 2007 por el que se aprueba el Texto refundido de la Ley General para la defensa de
los consumidores y usuarios y otras leyes complementarias
Sweden
Act 2000:1175 of 15 June 2001 – Lag (2000:1175) om talerätt för vissa utländska konsumentmyn-
digheter och konsumentorganisationer (Act (2000:1175) on the right to take legal action against
certain consumer authorities and consumer organisations)
Act on Contractual Conditions in Consumer Relationships – Lag (1994:1512) om avtalsvillkor i
konsumentförhållanden (Act (1994:1512) on contractual conditions in consumer relationships)
Consumer Insurance Act – Konsumentförsäkringslag (1980:38)
Contract Act – Lag (1915:218) om avtal och andra rättshandlingar på förmögenhetsrättens område
(General Contract Law Act (1915:218))
ICA – Försäkringsavtalslag (2005:104) (Insurance Contract Act 2005 (2005:104))
Law on Genetic Integrity – Lag (2006:351) om genetisk integritet m.m.
Switzerland
Code of Obligations – Bundesgesetz vom 30. März 1911 betreffend die Ergänzung des Schweizer-
ischen Zivilgesetzbuches (Fünfter Teil: Obligationenrecht) SR 220
Draft Swiss ICA – Bundesgesetz über den Versicherungsvertrag (VVG), Entwurf vom 21. Januar 2009
Explanatory Report on the Draft Swiss ICA – Revision des Bundesgesetzes über den Ver-
sicherungsvertrag (VVG), Erläuternder Bericht zur Vernehmlassungsvorlage vom 21. Januar 2009
ICA – Bundesgesetz vom 2. April 1908 über den Versicherungsvertrag (Versicherungsvertrags-
gesetz, VVG) (SR 221.229.1)
Law on Genetic Screening of Humans – Bundesgesetz über genetische Untersuchungen beim
Menschen (GUMG) vom 8. Oktober 2004 (SR 810.12)
Unfair Competition Act – Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) vom 19.
Dezember 1986 (SR 241), as amended
United Kingdom
Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance – Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics
and Insurance 2011
Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 – Consumer Insurance (Disclosure
and Representations) Act 2012
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 – Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002 No. 2013 to implement Directive 2000/31/EC)
871
Annexes
Financial Services (Distance Marketing) Regulations 2004 – Financial Services (Distance Market-
ing) Regulations 2004, (S.I. 2004 No. 2095)
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 – Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
FSA Handbook – Financial Services Authority Handbook
ICOBS – Financial Services Authority Handbook of Rules and Guidance. Insurance: Conduct of
Business Sourcebook
Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990 – Insurance Companies (Legal
Expenses Insurance) Regulations 1990 (S.I. 1990 No. 1159)
Joint Consultation Paper on Insurance Contract Law – The Law Commission Consultation Paper
No 182 and The Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 134 INSURANCE CONTRACT
LAW: Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured A Joint Consul-
tation Paper, 2007
Life Assurance Act 1774 – Life Assurance Act 1774
Marine Insurance Act 1906 – Marine Insurance Act 1906
Statements of Insurance Practice issued by the Association of British Insurers
Stop Now Orders (EC Directive) Regulations 2001 – Stop Now Orders (E.C. Directive) Regulations
2001 (S.I. 2001 No. 1422)
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 – Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
Regulations 1999 (S.I. 1999 No. 2083)
Scotland (only)
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973
872
Table of EU Legislation (including draft legislation
and like sources)
873
Annexes
874
Table of EC Legislation
European Council Press Release (8397/08) – Press Release of the Council of the European Union,
Justice and Home Affairs of 18 April 2008, Press: 96, No: 8397/08
European Parliament legislative resolution of 26 February 2014 on the proposal for a regu-
lation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law
(COM(2011)0635 – C7-0329/2011-2011/0284(COD)) (Ordinary legislative procedure: first
reading), doc. no. P7_TA-PROV(2014)0159
European Parliament resolution of 3 September 2008 on the common frame of reference for
European contract law, P6_TA(2008)0397
European Parliament resolution of 8 June 2011 on policy options for progress towards a European
Contract Law for consumers and businesses (2011/2013(INI)), P7_TA-PROV(2011)0262
Final Report of the Commission Expert Group on European Insurance Contract Law (2014)
First Non-Life Insurance Directive (73/239/EEC) – First Council Directive 73/239/EEC of 24 July
1973 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the tak-
ing-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance [1973] OJ L228/3
Fourth Motor Insurance Directive (2000/26/EC) – Directive 2000/26/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 May 2000 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to insurance against civil liability in respect of the use of motor vehicles and amending Council
Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC (Fourth motor insurance Directive) [2000] OJ L181/65
Gender Directive (2004/113/EC) – Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 imple-
menting the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of
goods and services [2004] OJ L373/37
Green Paper on Financial Services Policy – European Commission, Green Paper on Financial
Services Policy (2005-2010), COM (2005) 177 final
Green Paper on Options for a European Contract Law – European Commission, Green Paper on
policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for consumers and businesses, COM
(2010) 348 final
Injunctions Directive (2009/22/EC) – Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests (Codified
version) (Text with EEA relevance) [2009] OJ L 110/30
Insolvency Regulation (1346/2000/EC) – Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000/EC of 29 May
2000 on insolvency proceedings
Insurance Mediation Directive (2002/92/EC) – Directive 2002/92/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation [2003] OJ L9/3, as amended by
art. 91 of MiFID2 (2014/65/EU)
Late Payment Directive (2011/7/EU) – Directive 2011/7/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 February 2011 on combating late payment in commercial transactions (Text with
EEA relevance) [2011] OJ L 48/1
Lawyers’ Establishment Directive (98/5/EC) – Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 February 1998 to facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent
basis in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained, OJ 1998 L77/36
Legal Expenses Insurance Directive (87/344/EEC) – Council Directive 87/344/EEC of 22 June 1987
on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses
insurance [1987] OJ L185/77
Life Assurance Consolidation Directive (2002/83/EC) – Directive 2002/83/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 5 November 2002 concerning life assurance [2002] OJ L345/1
Maritime Insurance Directive (2009/20/EC) – Directive 2009/20/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the insurance of shipowners for maritime claims [2009] OJ
L131/128
875
Annexes
MiFID2 (2014/65/EU) – Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive
2011/61/EU (Text with EEA relevance) [2014] OJ L173/349
Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Directive (2009/103/EC) – Directive 2009/103/EC of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 relating to insurance against civil liability
in respect of the use of motor vehicles, and the enforcement of the obligation to insure against
such liability, OJ 2009 L263/1
Package Travel Directive (90/314/EEC) – Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package
travel, package holidays and package tours [1990] OJ L158/59
PRIIP Regulation (1286/2014) – Regulation (EU) No. 1286/2014 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 26 November 2014 on key information documents for packaged retail and
insurance-based investment products (PRIIP) [2014] OJ L352/1
Proposal for a Council Directive on Insurance Contract Law – Proposal for a Council Directive on
the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to insurance contract
[1979] OJ C190/2
Proposal for an IDD – Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on insurance mediation (recast) – Confirmation of the final compromise text with a view to
agreement, Doc. No. 10747 / 15 of 16 July 2015, Interinstitutional File: 2012 / 0175 (COD)
Race Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) – Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implement-
ing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000]
OJ L180/22
Regulation (EU) 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on online
dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation 2006/2004 and Directive
2009/22/EC (Regulation on Consumer ODR)
Reinsurance Directive (2005/68/EC) – Directive 2005/68/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 16 November 2005 on reinsurance and amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC,
92/49/EEC as well as Directives 98/78/EC and 2002/83/EC (Text with EEA relevance) [2005] OJ
L323/1
Report on the Implementation of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive – Report from the Commis-
sion on the implementation of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts, COM (2000) 248 final
Resolution on the Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law – European Parliament
resolution of 3 September 2008 on the common frame of reference for European contract law,
P6_TA-PROV(2008)0397
Rome Convention (80/934/EEC) – 80/934/EEC: Convention on the law applicable to contractual
obligations opened for signature in Rome on 19 June 1980 (consolidated version) [1998] OJ
C27/34
Rome I Regulation (593/2008) – Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) [2008] OJ
L177/6
Rome II Regulation (864/2007) – Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007]
OJ L199/40
SE Regulation (2157/2001) – Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the
Statute for a European company (SE) [2001] OJ L294/1
Second Non-Life Insurance Directive (88/357/EEC) – Second Council Directive 88/357/EEC
of 22 June 1988 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating
to direct insurance other than life assurance and laying down provisions to facilitate the effective
exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 73/239/EEC [1988] OJ L172/1
876
Table of EC Legislation
877
Table of International Conventions and Model Laws
CISG – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG),
signed on 11 April 1980 at Vienna, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3
Montreal Convention 1999 – Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air, done at Montreal on 28 May 1999
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce – UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce (1996)
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring – UNIDROIT Convention on International
Factoring (Ottawa, 28 May 1988)
UNIDROIT Principles – UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004
VCLT – Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, done at Vienna on 23 May 1969
878
Table of Cases
European
Case 26/69 Stauder v Ulm [1969] ECR 419
Case 25/76 Segura v Bonakdarian [1976] ECR 1851
Case 99/79 Lancôme v Etos & Albert Heyn [1980] ECR 2511
Case 125/79 Denilauler v Couchet Frères [1980] ECR 1553
Case 71/83 The Tilly Russ [1984] ECR 2417
Case 205/84 Commission v Federal Republic of Germany [1986] ECR 3755
Case 55/87 Moksel v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung [1988] ECR 3845
Case C-172/91 Sonntag v Waidmann [1993] ECR I-1963
Case C-85/96 Martínez Zala v Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691
Case C-281/98 Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano [2000] ECR I-4139
Case C-271/00 Gemeente Steenbergen v Baten [2002] ECR I-10489
Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981
Case C-1/06 Bonn Fleisch Ex- und Import GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2007] ECR
I-05609
Case C-180/06 Renate Ilsinger v Martin Dreschers [2009] ECR I-3961
Case C-404/06 Quelle AG v Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände
[2008] ECR I-2685
Case C-412/06 Annelore Hamilton v Volksbank Filder eG [2008] ECR I-2383
Case C-445/06 Danske Slagterier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2009] ECR I-2119
Case C-275/07 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [2009] ECR I-2005
Case C-489/07 Pia Messner v Firma Steffen Krüger [2009] ECR I-7315
Case C-236/09 Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v Conseil des
ministres [2011] ECR I-773
Cases T-8/95 and T-9/95 Wilhelm Pelle and Ernst-Reinhard Konrad v Council of the European Union
and Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-4117
Austria
OGH 19.4.1979, SZ 52/65
OGH 10.5.1984, Versicherungsrecht 1985, 1099
OGH 30.11.1989, Versicherungsrecht 1991, 87
OGH 7.9.2011, 7 Ob 138/11m, SZ 2011/113
OGH 28.3.2012, 7 Ob 100/11y
OGH 9.5.2012, 7 Ob 40/12a
France
Cass. civ. 14.6.1926, DP 1927. J. 57
Cass. civ. 2.10.1984, Bull. Civ. I n° 241
Cass. civ. 21.2.1989, RGAT 1989, 421
Cass. civ. 1.12.1989, RGDA 1999, 335
Cass. civ. 20.10.1992, RGAT 1993, 99
Cass. civ. 10.5.2000, RGDA 2000, 514
Cass. civ. 1re, 2.6.1964, RGAT 1965, 46
Cass. civ. 1re, 13.2.1979, RGAT 1980, 62
Cass. civ. 1re, 7.3.1989, n° 87-10.266, RGAT 1989, 546
Cass. civ. 1re, 25.10.1994, n° 92-18.447, RGAT 1994, 1098
Cass. civ. 1re, 23.2.1999, RGDA 1999, 325
Cass. civ. 1re, 9.11.1999, n° 97-14.252, RCA 2000, Commentaires, n° 105
879
Annexes
Germany
BGH 25.11.1963, BGHZ 40, 297
BGH 23.11.1967, Versicherungsrecht 1968, 58
BGH 11.11.1987, BGHZ 102, 194
BGH 23.5.1989, BGHZ 107, 322
BGH 18.12.1991, BGHZ 116, 387
BGH 25.3.1992, BGHZ 117, 385
BGH 10.2.1999, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1999, 1633
BGH 4.4.2001, BGHZ 147, 212
BGH 13.7.2005, Versicherungsrecht 2005, 1417
BGH 11.5.2011, Versicherungsrecht 2011, 909
BGH 19.5.2011, Versicherungsrecht 2011, 1549
BGH 22.6.2011, BGHZ 190, 120
BGH 8.5.2013 Versicherungsrecht 2013, 853
BGH 26.3.2014, Versicherungsrecht 2014, 625
OLG München 13.11.1964, Versicherungsrecht 1965, 173
OLG Hamburg 19.8.1966, Versicherungsrecht 1967, 392
OLG Hamburg 6.8.1981, Versicherungsrecht 1982, 543
OLG Köln 21.1.1982, Versicherungsrecht 1983, 922
OLG Hamm 18.5.1988, Recht und Schaden 1988, 302
OLG Köln 16.8.1994, Versicherungsrecht 1995, 567
OLG Saarbrücken 20.9.1995,Versicherungsrecht 1996, 1494
OLG Köln 21.4.1998, Recht und Schaden 1998, 458
OLG Oldenburg 13.1.1999, Versicherungsrecht 1999, 757
Greece
Areopag 1805/1986, NoB 1987, 1609 – Αρείου Πάγου (ΑΠ) 1805/1986
Αreopag 6/1990, NoB 1990, 1321 – Ολομέλεια Αρείου Πάγου (ΟλΑΠ) 6/1990
Athens Court of Appeal 110/2011, EEmpD 2011, 119 – Εφετείο Αθηνών (ΕφΑθ) 110/2011
Ireland
Carna Foods v Eagle Star [1997] 2 IR 193
Italy
Cass. 25.9.1972, no. 2781, Foro it. 1973
Cass. 13.1.2005, no. 562 (Court of Cassation)
Spain
Tribunal Supremo, 20 de marzo de 1991
Tribunal Supremo, 23 de abril de 1992
Tribunal Supremo, 14 de julio de 2003
Tribunal Supremo, 1 de diciembre de 2006
Tribunal Supremo, 28 de mayo de 2007
Tribunal Supremo, 3 de julio de 2009
Switzerland
BG 9.12.1966, BGE 92 II 342
BG 23.3.1981, SVA XIV Nr. 15
BG 9.1.1989, BGE 115 II 88
880
Table of Cases
United Kingdom
Alfred McAlpine v BAI [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 694; [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 437 (CA)
Allis-Chalmers Co v Fidelity & Deposit Co (1916) 114 LT 433 (HL)
Anderson v Morice (1876) 1 App Cas 713
Baker v Yorkshire Fire Assurance Co [1892] 1 QB 144
Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd, The Good Luck [1992]
1 AC 233
Bates (Thomas) & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 All ER 1077 (CA)
Bennett v Axa Insurance Plc [2003] EWHC 86 (Comm), [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 615
Beresford v Royal Exchange Assurance Company [1938] AC 586
British Bank of the Middle East v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (UK) Ltd [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 9
(HL)
Canning v Farquhar (1886) 16 QBD 727
Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905
Castellain v Preston (1883) 11 QB 380
Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413
De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 TR 343
Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank [2001] UKHL 52, [2002] 1 AC 481, [2002] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 489
Eagle Star and British Dominions Ins Co v Reiner (1927) 27 Ll. L. R. 173
Foster v Mentor Life Assurance Co [1854] 3 E & B 48, 65
Fraser v Furman (Productions) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 898
Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480 (CA)
Freeman v Cooke (1848) 2 Exch 654
Friends Provident Life & Pensions Ltd v Sirius International Insurance [2006] Lloyd’s Rep IR 45
Graham v Western Australian Ins Co Ltd (1931) 40 Ll. L. R. 64
Harrington v Pearl Life Co (1914) 30 TLR 613
Haydenfare v British National Ins Soc Ltd [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 393
Henkle v Royal Exchange Assurance Co (1749) 1 Ves Snr 317
Hepburn v Tomlinson [1966] AC 451
Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1997] CLC 129
Lambert v Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 485
Midland Insurance Co v Smith (1881) 6 QBD 561
Morris v Ford Motor Co [1973] QB 792
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Napier v Hunter [1993] AC 713
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Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp 785
Pim v Reid (1843) 6 M & G 1
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Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1
Re Coleman’s Depositories Ltd [1907] 2 KB 798
Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1 (CA)
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Sempra Metals v IRC [2007] UKHL 34
Shaw v Robberds (1837) 6 Ad & El 75
881
Annexes
United States
Watson v Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins Co, 140 F 2d 673, 676 (DC, 1943—life), cert den 322 US 746
882
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cited in the text followed by full references; otherwise
cited in full)
883
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887
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889
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890
Index
Abuse of rights Art. 2:304 N4; Art. 2:304 N6; Premium reduction Art. 1:205 C5;
Art. 2:304 N11; Art. 2:604 N1; Art. 2:604 N4; Art. 4:301; Art. 4:301 C6; Art. 4:301 N1;
Art. 8:104 C5 Art. 4:301 N2; Art. 4:301 N3; Art. 4:301 N4;
Acceptance Art. 2:302 C1; Art. 2:302 C4; Art. 4:301 N6; Art. 8:103; Art. 8:103 N1;
Art. 2:302 N1; Art. 2:302 N4; Art. 11:101 N8 Art. 8:103 N5; Art. 17:303; Art. 17:303 C2;
Acceptance of the designation by the insured Art. 17:303 C12
Art. 11:101 N8 Premium stability Art. 17:303 C13
Advanced payment of premium Art. 5:101 Procedure of alteration Art. 17:303 C8
C4 Recalculation Art. 18:204 C6
Policy Art. 2:502 C1; Art. 2:502 C3; Reduction of benefits Art. 17:303 C6;
Art. 2:502 N2; Art. 2:502 N3; Art. 2:502 N8 Art. 17:303 C7; Art. 17:303 C11
See also Claims Right to terminate Art. 17:303 C1
Accessory Group Insurance Arts. 18:201- Risks for which the insurer is certain to be liable
18:204 Art. 17:303
See also Group insurance Savings element Art. 17:303 C5
Acknowledgement of Liability Art. 14:104; Selective adjustment Art. 17:303 C10
Art. 15:102 Supervisory emergency measures Art. 17:303
Acceptance of the victim’s claim Art. 14:104 C1
C1 Technical provisions Art. 17:303 C13
Duty of cooperation Art. 14:104 C1 Term life insurance Art. 17:303 C5
Acquis communautaire see Community law Time of effectiveness Art. 17:303 C11
Adjustment see Alteration Time of reduction of premium Art. 17:303
Adjustment of premium Art. 2:601 C1; C11
Art. 2:602 C3; Art. 2:603; Art. 17:303; Unit-linked contracts Art. 17:303 C5
Art. 17:304 C1; Art. 17:304 C12 Written notice Art. 17:303 C11
Actuarial principles Art. 17:202; Art. 17:303 See also Agent
C12; Art. 17:303 C13; Art. 17:603 See also Clauses
Actuary Art. 17:303 C9; Art. 17:603 C4 See also Group insurance
Adjustment clauses Art. 17:303 C14 See also Risk
Alteration of risk Art. 17:303 C6 See also Supervisory law
Biometric risks Art. 17:303 C8; Art. 17:303 Agency Art. 6:101 N4; Art. 9:101 N6
C12; Art. 17:303 C13 Authority to give notice Art. 6:101
Calculation of the benefits Art. 17:303 C9; Imputation of knowledge Art. 1:206 C2;
Art. 17:303 C10 Art. 1:206 N1; Art. 1:206 N2
Certainty of insured event Art. 17:303 C5 Power of attorney Art. 3:101 C3; Art. 3:101
Form Art. 17:303 C11 C7
Health insurance Art. 17:303 C3 See also Agent
Independent supervisory authority See also Commercial Agency Directive
Art. 17:303; Art. 17:303 C8; Art. 17:303 C12 Agent Art. 1:202; Art. 1:202 C7; Art. 2:202
Independent trustee Art. 17:303; Art. 17:303 C4; Art. 2:202 N7; Art. 3:101; Art. 3:101 C1;
C8; Art. 17:303 C12 Art. 3:102; Art. 3:102 C3; Art. 11:103 C8
Insurance benefits Art. 17:303; Art. 17:303 Additional powers to the agent Art. 3:101 C3
C1; Art. 17:303 C6; Art. 17:303 C7; Art. 17:303 Commission Art. 17:204 C4
C8 Knowledge of the agent Art. 1:206 N3;
Insurer’s solvency Art. 17:303 C8 Art. 2:101 C6; Art. 3:101 C7; Art. 3:101 N6
Investment risk Art. 17:303 C5 Knowledge of the agent’s conduct Art. 3:102
Mortality tables Art. 17:303 C14 C2
Offset Art. 17:303 Liability of the agent I52; Art. 3:101 C8
Paid-up policy Art. 17:303 C6 Powers of the agent Art. 3:101
Premium increase Art. 4:203 C3; Art. 15:102 C8; Purported independence I52; Art. 3:102;
Art. 17:303; Art. 17:303 C7; Art. 17:303 C11 Art. 3:102 C1; Art. 3:102 C2
891
Aggravation of risk Index
892
Index Beneficiary
Consent by group members Art. 18:101 C4; Written consent of beneficiary Art. 17:104
Art. 18:101 C5 C1; Art. 17:104 C2
Construction Art. 1:203 C3 Written consent of person at risk Art. 17:101
Derogation Art. 1:103; Art. 1:103 C4; C8; Art. 17:101 C9; Art. 17:101 C11; Art. 17:104
Art. 1:103 C5 C3
Domestic insurance contracts Art. 1:102 C4 Written consent of policyholder Art. 17:104
Enforcement see Enforcement C1; Art. 17:104 C3
Group insurance Art. 1:103; Art. 1:103 C7; See also Cessio legis
Art. 18:101; Art. 18:101 C5; Art. 18:102 C2; See also Subrogation
Art. 18:201 C3-C5; Art. 18:301 C2-C4 Association Art. 11:103 C1
Intermediaries Art. 1:101 C6; Art. 1:102 C7 Association of British Insurers Art. 2:102 N8
Language I27 Assurance see Insurance
Lex mercatoria Art. 1:101 C8 Austrian Consumer Protection Act
Life insurance Art. 1:201 C12; Art. 17:401 Art. 17:303 C3; Art. 17:304 C3; Art. 2:603 N2
Mutatis mutandis Art. 14:108 C7; Art. 17:103 Average adjuster Art. 6:104 N1
C6; Art. 18:201; Art. 18:201 C4-C7; Art. 18:202 Avoidance
C2; ; Art. 18:303 C4 Cooling-off period Art. 2:303; Art. 2:303 C3;
Recourse to national law I14; Art. 17:401 C3 Art. 2:303 C4
Partial choice Art. 1:102 C5 Exception for short duration Art. 2:303 C8
Principles common to the laws of the Member Fraud Art. 2:104; Art. 2:104 C3
States I16; Art. 1:105 Non-disclosure Art. 2:104 C5
Private insurance Art. 1:101; Art. 1:101 N1 Right to cancellation Art. 2:303 N1;
Professionals Art. 1:103 C7 Art. 2:303 N4
Reinsurance I13; Art. 1:101; Art. 1:101 C8; Bad faith Art. 2:401 N3; Art. 2:401 N5;
Art. 1:101 N6 Art. 6:105 C3; Art. 12:101 N4
Semi-mandatory I21; I22; Art. 1:103 C4; Exceptio doli Art. 2:103 N2
Art. 1:103 C5; Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 12:101 C3; Beneficiary I2; I21; I22; I29; I43; Art. 2:201;
Art. 17:502 C8 Art. 2:501; Art. 4:103 N15; Art. 7:103 C1;
Small businesses Art. 1:103 C7; Art. 4:103 N4 Art. 11:101 C7; Art. 12:102 N6; Art. 17:101;
Substantive scope Art. 1:101 C1 Art. 17:102; Art. 17:104; Art. 17:105; Art. 17:501;
Supervisory law Art. 1:105 C3 Art. 17:503
Terminology I14; I27 Cover Art. 2:401 N1; Art. 2:402 C2;
Translations I27 Art. 2:402 N8; Art. 5:101 C12
Transport insurance Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:103 Economic incentive Art. 17:101 C3
N6; Art. 1:103 N11; Art. 12:102 C7 Economic interest Art. 17:101 C2; Art. 17:101
Uniform application I28; Art. 1:104 C7; C3
Art. 1:105 C2; Art. 1:105 C3; Art. 1:204 N1 Enforcement of rights I29; Art. 1:302;
Uniform interpretation I28 Art. 1:302 C2; Art. 1:302 C3
Uniform law Art. 1:105 C6 Imputation Art. 1:206; Art. 1:206 N1;
Arbitration I60; Art. 2:304 C13; Art. 2:304 Art. 1:206 N2; Art. 3:101 C7; Art. 11:101 N1
C14 Information Art. 17:501 C1; Art. 17:501 C2;
Arbitration clause Art. 2:304 C14 Art. 17:501 C3; Art. 17:501 C7-C9
See also Alternative dispute resolution Information duty Art. 6:102 C1
Assignment Art. 11:101 C6; Art. 11:101 Insurance money Art. 17:102 C1; Art. 17:102
N4; Art. 12:102 N8; Art. 14:105; Art. 17:101; C2; Art. 17:102 C3; Art. 17:102 C4; Art. 17:102
Art. 17:104; Art. 17:503 C5; Art. 17:102 C6; Art. 17:502 C6
Assignment of the claim Art. 10:101 N1; Insurance of fixed sums Art. 13:101;
Art. 14:105 C1; Art. 14:105 C2; Art. 14:105 C3; Art. 13:101 C1; Art. 13:101 C2; Art. 13:101 N3
Art. 17:503 C3 Notice Art. 1:205; Art. 1:205 C2; Art. 1:205
Collusion Art. 14:105 C2 C6; Art. 1:205 C7; Art. 1:205 N1; Art. 1:205
Consent Art. 17:104 C4 N2; Art. 1:205 N3; Art. 4:202; Art. 6:101;
Consent of person at risk Art. 17:101 C8 Art. 6:101 N3
Direct claim Art. 14:105 C1 Protection I51; Art. 1:103; Art. 1:103 C2;
Effect Art. 17:104 C5 Art. 1:103 C7; Art. 1:105 C4; Art. 1:203;
No-claims bonuses Art. 14:105 C4 Art. 2:304; Art. 2:304 C10; Art. 2:304 C12;
Art. 17:205 C2
893
Benefit Index
Rights Art. 17:104 C1; Art. 17:104 C2; See also Duty of disclosure
Art. 17:105 C1; See also Fraud
Surrender value Art. 17:102 C1; Art. 17:102 See also Notice
C2; Art. 17:102 C3; Art. 17:102 C4; Art. 17:602 See also Payment
C1 Brussels Convention I1; Art. 1:104 C5
See also Definitions Brussels Ibis Regulation I2; I22; Art. 1:103
See also Designation C6; Art. 1:104 C8; Art. 14:101 C7
See also Enforcement Burden of proof Art. 1:207 C9; Art. 2:202
See also Killing of the person at risk C7; Art. 2:304; Art. 2:304 C7; Art. 2:304 C12;
See also Third party Art. 2:304 C14; Art. 2:403 N2; Art. 2:501 N7;
Benefit Art. 4:102 N5; Art. 4:103 C2; Art. 6:102 C3;
Benefit insurance Art. 13:101 N1 Art. 9:102 N4
Benefits payable Art. 17:303 Group insurance Art. 18:202 C8
Calculation of benefits Art. 13:101 N1 Shifting the burden of proof Art. 8:101 N4
Changes in benefits Art. 2:701 N10 Unfairness Art. 2:304 C12-C13
Insurance contract for the benefit of a third See also Conclusion of the contract
party Art. 12:102 C10 See also Receipt of documents
Insurance for the benefit of a future transferee Cancellation Art. 2:304 C14
Art. 12:102; Art. 12:102 C7 Carelessness Art. 9:101 N1
Paid-up policy Art. 17:303 C6; Art. 17:303 C7 Causal connection Art. 2:102 C6; Art. 2:102
Reduction of benefits Art. 17:303 C7; N2; Art. 4:101 C2; Art. 4:103 N6; Art. 4:103 N8;
Art. 17:303 C11 Art. 4:203 C4
Right to reduce the insurance benefit See also Cessation of insured risk
Art. 17:303 C1 Causal link see Causal connection
Bonus-Malus systems see No-claims bonuses Causation Art. 4:101 N1; Art. 4:102 N3;
Branches of insurance I11; I17; I71; Art. 1:103 Art. 4:102 N5; Art. 4:103 C1; Art. 4:103 C2;
C1; Art. 2:603 C5 Art. 4:103 N2; Art. 4:103 N4; Art. 4:202;
Causation of loss Art. 9:101 N2 Art. 4:203
Cooling-off period Art. 2:303 C3; Art. 2:303 Repräsentantenhaftung Art. 9:101 N6
N4 See also Causal connection
Exclusion Art. 1:101 N7 See also Insured event
Insurance of fixed sums Art. 13:101 C1-C2 See also Intent
Mandatory national law Art. 1:105; See also Loss
Art. 1:105 C5 See also Policyholder
Mandatory regulation Art. 1:103 C1; See also Pre-contractual information duties
Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:103 N10; Art. 1:103 N11 Causation of loss Art. 9:101; Art. 9:101 N2;
Pre-contractual documents Art. 2:201 C3 Art. 14:103
Retroactive cover Art. 2:401 N4 Degree of fault Art. 9:101 C4; Art. 14:103 C4
Variations in insurance contracts Art. 1:201 Intentional Art. 14:103 C1
N4 Precautionary measures Art. 14:103 C2
See also Insurance Reduction of insurance money Art. 14:103
Breach Specific instructions Art. 14:103 C2
Breach of a co-insured’s duty Art. 11:103 C2; See also Mitigation of loss
Art. 11:103 C10 CEICL see Common European Insurance
Breach of duty by the insured Art. 11:103 Contract Law
Group insurance Art. 11:103 C7-C8 CESL see Common European Sales Law
Innocent breach Art. 2:102; Art. 2:102 N9 CESL Regulation Proposal I15; I53-I55
Intentional breach Art. 2:102 C6; Art. 2:102 See also Common European Sales Law
N2; Art. 2:102 N6; Art. 2:604 N6; Art. 4:103 Cessation of insured risk Art. 2:401 N6;
N15; Art. 4:203; Art. 6:101 N11 Art. 12:101 C5; Art. 12:101 N1; Art. 12:101 N5
Pre-contractual disclosure duties Art. 17:205 Notice of the cessation of the risk Art. 12:101
C4-C6 C6
Proportionality rule Art. 2:104 C5 Permanent cessation of risk Art. 12:101 C8
Remedies for breach of disclosure duty Cessio legis Art. 10:101 C1; Art. 10:101 N1
Art. 2:102 C1; Art. 2:102 C4 See also Assignment
See also Disclosure
894
Index Common Frame of Reference
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Europe- Posterior cover Art. 14:107 C3; Art. 14:107
an Union Art. 1:207 C2 C12; Art. 14:107 C22; Art. 14:107 C23
Choice of jurisdiction Art. 1:103 C7; Subsequent period Art. 14:107 C10;
Art. 1:103 N13 Art. 14:107 C21
Choice of law I31; I37; I39; I40; Art. 1:102 Claims made policies Art. 14:107 C4
C2; Art. 1:102 C3; Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:103 C7; Anterior cover Art. 14:107 C3
Art. 1:103 N13; Art. 1:104 C8 Austria Art. 14:107 C8
Choice of foreign law I40 Belgium Art. 14:107 C12
Overriding mandatory provision I39 Germany Art. 14:107 C9
Substantive choice I43 France Art. 14:107 C10
See also Application of the PEICL Luxembourg Art. 14:107 C13
Chronological principle Art. 8:104 C6 Netherlands Art. 14:107 C7
CISG see United Nations Convention on Prohibition Art. 14:107 C6
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods Restriction Art. 14:107 C6
(CISG) Spain Art. 14:107 C11
Claims Art. 3:101 C1; Art. 6:103 Clauses
Acceptance of claims Art. 6:103; Art. 6:104; Abusive clauses Art. 2:304; Art. 8:104 C5;
Art. 7:102 C2 Art. 17:303 C3; Art. 17:304 C14
Beneficiary Art. 7:103 C1 Adjustment clauses I71; Art. 17:303 C4;
Claim for reduction Art. 8:103 N2 Art. 17:303 C14; Art. 17:304 C3; Art. 17:304 C4
Claim form Art. 6:101 C6 Alteration clauses see Adjustment clauses
Claims cooperation Art. 6:102 Clear clauses Art. 4:103 C4; Art. 9:101
Claims settlement office Art. 2:701 N6 Discharge clauses Art. 4:101 C2; Art. 4:103
Constructive acceptance Art. 7:102 C2 C1; Art. 4:103 N1
Final decision on the claim Art. 7:102 C2 En-bloc clauses Art. 2:603 N1
Insured’s claim Art. 10:101 C12 Escape clauses Art. 8:104 C5
Rejection Art. 7:102 C2; Art. 7:102 N8 Exclusion clauses Art. 4:103 N1
Right to claim the insurance money Invalidity of a clause Art. 2:304 N13
Art. 11:101 C3 One-sided clause Art. 2:604 C2
Settlement Art. 6:103; Art. 6:103 C3 Rateable proportion clause Art. 8:104 N9
Statement of claim by the policyholder Requirement for a valid alteration clauses
Art. 7:102 C2 Art. 2:603 C2; Art. 2:603 C4; Art. 17:304 C3;
Validity of insurance claims Art. 6:103 C2 Art. 17:304 C4
Wrongful rejection Art. 7:102 C2 Unfairness Art. 2:304; Art. 14:107 C25
See also Direct claims See also Adjustment of premium
See also Enforcement See also Arbitration clause
See also Prescription See also Notice
Claims exceeding the sum insured See also Partial invalidity
Art. 14:108 Collusion Art. 11:102 C1
Aggregate of claims Art. 14:108 C1 Commercial Agency Directive Art. 18:102
Distribution among victims Art. 14:108 C2 C2
Duty of equal treatment of victims Commercial contracts Art. 2:304 C2;
Art. 14:108 C3; Art. 14:108 C7 Art. 2:304 N6
Good faith Art. 14:108 C3; Art. 14:108 C7; Common European Insurance Contract Law
Art. 14:108 C8; Art. 14:108 C9 I31-I55; I56; I70; I72
Multiple events Art. 14:108 C6-C7 Non-State body of law I31
Proportionality (rule) Art. 14:108 C2; Common European Sales Law I15; I53-I55;
Art. 14:108 C4-C5 I65; I67
Protection of the insurer Art. 14:108 C8 Common Frame of Reference I59-I65
Unlimited coverage Art. 14:108 C1 Common Frame of Reference of European
See also Sum insured Contract Law I59-I62; I64; I65; Art. 1:105
Claims made clauses Art. 14:107 C20-23 C7
Anterior cover Art. 14:107 C3 Common Frame of Reference of Insurance
Duration of cover Art. 14:107 C18 Contract Law I61; I63; I64
Liability period Art. 14:107 C15 See also Draft Common Frame of Reference
895
Common Principles of European Insurance Contract Law Index
Common Principles of European Insurance Municipalities Art. 1:202 C12; Art. 16:101 C8
Contract Law I72 Non-Member State I72; Art. 16:101
Community law I1; I9; I22; I23; I26; I27; I59; Professional bodies Art. 1:202 C12;
I60; Art. 1:102 C2; Art. 1:102 C3; Art. 1:103 Art. 16:101 C8
C7; Art. 1:103 N10; Art. 1:104 C4; Art. 1:104 Scientific and technological progress
C6; Art. 1:104 C8; Art. 1:105 C7; Art. 1:205 N1; Art. 16:101 C1
Art. 1:207 C3; Art. 1:301 N1; Art. 2:202 N1; Ship-owners Art. 16:101 C7
Art. 2:203 N1; Art. 2:303 N1; Art. 4:101 N1; Strict liability Art. 16:101 C1
Art. 4:103 N1; Art. 7:101 N1; Art. 16:101 Voluntary insurance Art. 1:202 C12
EC Directives Art. 2:202 N1 Conclusion of the contract Art. 1:205 C1;
See also European insurance contract law Art. 1:205 N2; Art. 2:301-Art. 2:304; Art. 2:301
Community Trademark Regulation I38 C6; Art. 2:302 C1; Art. 12:101
Compensation Art. 2:201; Art. 2:304 C13; Agreement Art. 2:301 C4: Art. 2:301 C6
Art. 2:403 N2; Art. 4:103 N13; Art. 6:104 N2; Binding nature of an offer Art. 2:302 N3;
Art. 6:105 C1; 10:101 C1; 10:101 C3; 10:101 N1; Art. 2:302 N5
10:101 N3; 10:101 N6; 13:101 N4 Conclusion in writing Art. 2:301; Art. 2:301
Deductible Art. 8:104 C9; Art. 10:101 C6 C4
Exemption Art. 9:101 N1; Art. 9:101 N3; Consensual contract Art. 2:301 N2;
Art. 9:101 N6; Art. 9:101 N8; Art. 9:101 N10 Art. 2:301 N4
Indemnity principle Art. 8:101 C1; Art. 8:101 Cooling-off period Art. 2:303; Art. 2:303 C5
C3 Essentialia negotii Art. 2:304 N12
Quasi-contractual compensation Art. 2:202 Exceptions from judicial review Art. 2:304
N8 N12
Reduction Art. 9:101 N4; Art. 9:101 N10 Fax Art. 2:301 C6
Sanctions Art. 2:202 N6; Art. 2:202 N7; Formalities I71; Art. 2:301 C5; Art. 2:301
Art. 2:202 N8; Art. 2:202 N9 C10; Art. 2:301 C11
Tortious compensation Art. 2:202 N8 General contract law Art. 2:301 N1
Underinsurance Art. 8:102 C1; Art. 8:102 C2; Grey list Art. 2:304 C9
Art. 8:102 C7; Art. 8:102 N9 Offer Art. 2:302 N3; Art. 2:302 N5; Art. 2:302
See also Mitigation costs N1; Art. 2:302 N2
Competition I5; Art. 1:102 C4; Art. 1:202 Plain and intelligible language Art. 2:304;
C7; Art. 2:304 C4; Art. 2:601 C2; Art. 2:702 C1; Art. 2:304 C5
Art. 2:702 C3 Post Art. 2:301 C6; Art. 2:302 C1
Compulsory insurance I18; I71; Art. 1:202; Review of the fairness Art. 2:304 N4
Art. 1:202 C12; Art. 2:601 N1; Art. 8:101 C4; Rewriting the contract Art. 2:304 N14
Art. 15:101; Art. 15:101 C2; Art. 15:101 C3; Small print Art. 2:304 C14
Art. 15:101 C11; Art. 16:101; Art. 16:101 C5; Third parties Art. 2:303 C3; Art. 2:303 C7;
Art. 16:101 C6 Art. 2:303 C9
Air carriers Art. 16:101 C7 Variation of contract Art. 2:304 C14
Liability insurance I18; Art. 2:303 C11; See also Clauses
Art. 14:107 C12; Art. 16:101 C2 See also Notice
Community law Art. 16:101; Art. 16:101 C7 Condition precedent Art. 4:101; Art. 4:101
Corporate veils Art. 16:101 C1 C3; Art. 4:101 C4; Art. 4:101 C5; Art. 4:102 N1;
Duty to insure Art. 16:101 C3-C5; Art. 16:101 Art. 4:102 N2; Art. 4:102 N6; Art. 4:103 N5;
C6-C9; Art. 16:101 C11 Art. 4:103 N10; Art. 6:101 C7
Hazardous activities Art. 16:101 C1 Consumer Art. 2:601 N3; Art. 2:602 C5;
Insurance intermediaries Art. 16:101 C7 Art. 6:102 N1; Art. 6:105 C7; Art. 8:102 C1;
Law of the European Union Art. 1:202 C12; Art. 14:107
Art. 16:101 C6 Consumer associations as qualified entity
Law of the Member States Art. 1:202 C12; I30
Art. 16:101 C6; Art. 16:101 C8 Consumer contracts I3; I22; Art. 2:102 N8;
Law of third States Art. 1:202 C12; Art. 2:303 N4; Art. 2:304 C2; Art. 2:304 N1;
Art. 16:101 C6; Art. 16:101 C9 Art. 2:304 N2; Art. 2:304 N3; Art. 2:304 N6;
Lawyers Art. 16:101 C7 Art. 2:604 N1; Art. 9:102 N8; Art. 14:107 C13;
Member State Art. 16:101 Art. 14:107 C14
Motor vehicles Art. 16:101 C7
896
Index Cover
Consumer insurance I45; Art. 1:101 N1; General contract law Art. 17:601 C4
Art. 1:101 N4; Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:103 C7; Paid-up policies Art. 17:601 C2
Art. 1:103 N9; Art. 1:201 N2; Art. 2:102 N6; Form of request Art. 17:601 C5
Art. 2:303 N1; Art. 2:303 N4; Art. 2:304 N6; Information duty Art. 17:601 C4
Art. 4:103 N4; Art. 4:202 N1; Art. 4:203 N2; Electronic documents Art. 17:601 C5
Art. 5:101 N4 Supervisory law Art. 17:601 C1
Consumer liability insurance Art. 14:107 C14 Written request Art. 17:601 C5
Consumer policies Art. 8:102 N1 Conversion value Art. 17:601 C1
Consumer protection I41; I48; Art. 1:103 N9; Calculation of conversion value Art. 17:603;
Art. 2:304 N2; Art. 2:602 C6; Art. 2:603 N2 Art. 17:603 C1; Art. 17:603 C3; Art. 17:603 C4;
Pre-contractual consumer information Art. 17:603 C5; Art. 17:603 C6
Art. 1:203 N2 See also Surrender value
Withdrawal rights I23 Co-owner Art. 9:101 N6
See also Enforcement Cooling-off period Art. 2:201 N2; Art. 2:303
See also Out-of-court complaint and redress Group insurance Art. 2:303; Art. 2:303 C11-
mechanisms 13; Art. 2:304 N7
See also Transparency Life insurance Art. 17:203
Consumer Credit Directive Article 2:201 C1 Right to cancellation Art. 2:303 N1;
Consumer rights I48; Art. 2:201 C1; Art. 2:303 N4
Art. 2:602 C6 Time limit on notice Art. 2:303 C6
Contract CoPECL Network I62; I63; I65
Consensual contracts Art. 1:205 C1; Costs Art. 1:201 C7; Art. 2:701 N8; Art. 12:101
Art. 1:205 C2; Art. 2:301 N2; Art. 2:301 N4 C6
Contract in favour of a third party Cost of borrowing Art. 6:105 C6
Art. 11:101 C1 Cost of repair Art. 1:201 C7; Art. 8:101 C2
Contract of compromise Art. 6:103 C2 Mitigation costs Art. 8:101 C3; Art. 8:102;
Contract on account of a third party Art. 8:102 C2; Art. 8:104; Art. 9:102; Art. 9:102
Art. 11:101 C1 C2; Art. 9:102 C6; Art. 9:102 N1-N8;
Contract period Art. 2:701; Art. 5:104 Art. 15:104 C5; Art. 14:101 C1; Art. 14:101 C3;
Contract term Art. 2:701 N10 Art. 15:104 C5
Cross-border I55; Art. 1:102 C4 New for old Art. 8:101 C2
Distance contracts I55; Art. 2:303 C7; Replacement costs Art. 1:201 C7; Art. 8:101
Art. 17:203 C2 C2
Investment contract Art. 17:204 C5 Transaction costs Art. 2:502 C1
See also Adjustment See also Defence costs
See also Aggravation of risk Cover Art. 1:201 C2; Art. 1:201 N5; Art. 2:604;
See also Benefit Art. 4:203
See also Compensation Commencement of cover Art. 2:203;
See also Consumer Art. 2:203 C1; Art. 5:101; Art. 5:101 C9
See also Definitions Cover “lost or not lost” Art. 2:401 N7
See also Duration Cover notes Art. 2:501 N12; Art. 2:402;
See also Insurance Art. 2:402 N2; Art. 2:402 N8
See also Insurance intermediaries Einlöseprinzip Art. 5:101 N1
See also Insurance policy End of cover Art. 4:102 N10
See also Life assurance Essential description of the cover Art. 2:304
See also Negotiation Exception Art. 4:101 C4
Contractual derogation Art. 7:103 N2; Formation of cover Art. 5:101
Art. 8:102 N4; Art. 9:101 C7 Granting of insurance cover Art. 3:101 C1
Contractual derogations of Articles 7:101, 7:103 Immediate cover Art. 2:203 C1
Art. 7:103 C3 Interim cover Art. 2:402 N8
Contractual stipulations Art. 6:101 N12 Minimum content of cover notes Art. 2:402
Release of the insurer’s duty to perform N3; Art. 2:402 N4
Art. 6:101 N12 Passing of insurance cover Art. 12:102 N7
Conversion Art. 17:601 Perception Art. 2:202 N3
Non-payment of premium Art. 17:601 C1 Provisional cover Art. 2:402 N6
Request in writing Art. 17:601 Resumption of cover Art. 5:102 C9
897
Credit Index
898
Index Distance Marketing Directive
Undue delay Art. 2:701; Art. 2:702 C4; Duty to inform Art. 15:102 C2
Art. 4:102 N8; Art. 6:101; Art. 6:104; Art. 6:104 Imbalance of information Art. 15:102 C1
C2; Art. 6:105 C2; Art. 6:105 C5 Insurance ombudsman Art. 15:102 C4
Unreasonable delay Art. 4:102 N8 Insured’s information duty Art. 15:102 C7
Designation Art. 17:102 Insurer’s information duty Art. 15:102 C4
Absence of effective designation Art. 17:102 Liability regime applicable Art. 15:102 C2
C8-C9 Policyholder’s information duty Art. 15:102
Accepted by beneficiary Art. 17:102 C6 C6
Beneficiary Art. 17:102 C1; Art. 17:102 C3; Directive on Insurance Contract Law
Art. 18:201 C5 Amended proposal Art. 1:205 N1; Art. 2:101
By will Art. 17:102 C4; Art. 17:102 C7 N1; Art. 2:102 N5; Art. 2:103 N3; Art. 2:103
Death of policyholder Art. 17:102 C10 N4; Art. 2:104 N1; Art. 5:102 N3; Art. 2:601 C5
Form of designation Art. 17:102 C7 Directives on insurance law I1
Heirs Art. 17:102 C8; Art. 17:103 C6 Discharge Art. 2:102 C6; Art. 4:101 N1;
In writing Art. 17:102 C7; Art. 17:103 C3 Art. 4:101 N5; Art. 4:103; Art. 4:103 C1;
Irrevocable Art. 17:102 C6 Art. 4:103 C2; Art. 4:103 N2; Art. 4:203;
Mental capacity Art. 17:102 C15 Art. 4:203 C4; Art. 4:203 N2; Art. 6:101 N11;
Revocation Art. 17:102 C6; Art. 17:102 C10; Art. 6:101 N12; Art. 11:103 C10; Art. 14:103 C2;
Art. 17:102 C14; Art. 17:103 C3-C4; Art. 17:104 Art. 15:103; Art. 15:103 C2; Art. 16:101 C11;
C2 Art. 17:102 C15-C17; Art. 17:103 C6; Art. 17:502
Right to designate Art. 17:102 C4 C7-C8
Vested rights Art. 17:104 C2 Avoidance Art. 17:502 C7
See also Discharge Breach of precautionary measures Art. 4:101
Digital Single Market I53 C2; Art. 4:103 C1-C4
Direct actions see Direct claims Exceptions Art. 15:103 C3
Direct claims Art. 15:101; Art. 15:101 C1-C11 Knowledge of wrong payment Art. 17:102
Breach of precautionary measures C17
Art. 15:101 C9 Payment of insurance money Art. 15:103 C1;
Compulsory insurance Art. 15:101 C2; Art. 15:103 C2; Art. 17:102 C15; Art. 17:502
Art. 15:101 C3; Art. 15:101 C11 C7-C8
Creditors Art. 15:101 C5 Rescission Art. 17:502 C7
Defences Art. 15:101 C2; Art. 15:101 C9-C11 True beneficiary Art. 17:102 C16
Duty to inform Art. 15:102; Art. 15:102 C2 Unjust enrichment Art. 17:102 C17
Information duties See Direct claim informa- Waiver Art. 15:103 C4
tion duties See also Aggravation of risk
Insolvency Art. 15:101 C4; Art. 15:103 C1 See also Suicide
Insured event Art. 15:102 C1; Art. 15:102 C6 See also Termination
Law governing liability Art. 15:101 C7 Disclosure
Limits Art. 15:101 C8 Incorrect disclosure Art. 2:103 N2
Liquidation Art. 15:101 C5 Innocent non-disclosure Art. 2:104 C6
Moral hazard Art. 15:101 C10 Non-disclosure Art. 2:101 C1; Art. 8:101 C7;
Non-payment of premium Art. 15:101 C9 Art. 8:102 C2; Art. 8:103 C4
Payment to or acknowledgement of debt 303 Spontaneous Disclosure Art. 2:101 N2
Personal injury Art. 15:101 C6 Waiver of disclosure duty Art. 2:101 N6;
Settlement of the claim Art. 15:102 C1; Art. 2:103 C4; Art. 2:103 N1
Art. 15:102 C4-C6; Art. 15:102 C8; Art. 15:104 See also Breach
C6 See also Duty of disclosure
Waiver Art. 15:103 C4 See also Negligence
Winding up Art. 15:101 C5 Dispatch Art. 1:205 C9; Art. 2:701 N9
See also Claims Acceptance Art. 2:302 C3; Art. 2:302 C4
See also Moral hazard Notice Art. 2:604; Art. 2:604 C6; Art. 4:102
See also Discharge N10; Art. 6:101; Art. 6:101 C4; Art. 6:101 N9
Direct claim information duties Art. 15:102 Distance Marketing Directive Art. 1:103 C6;
Alternative dispute resolution Art. 15:102 C4 Art. 1:103 N9; Art. 1:203 N1; Art. 1:204 N2;
Breach Art. 15:102 C5; Art. 15:102 C6 Art. 2:201 C1; Art. 2:201 N1; Art. 2:201 N5;
Contractual documents Art. 15:102 C3 Art. 2:202 C4; Art. 2:303 C1; Art. 2:303 C4;
899
Distance Marketing Directive Index
Art. 2:303 C6-C10; Art. 2:303 C13; Art. 2:303 Duty to mitigate Art. 9:101 C5; Art. 9:101
N1; Art. 2:303 N5; Art. 2:303 N7; Art. 17:202 C1; N9; Art. 9:102 N1
Art. 17:203 C2 Duty to salvage Art. 9:101 N9; Art. 9:102 N1
Distress Art. 6:105 C7 See also Breach
Damages for distress Art. 6:105 C7 See also Contractual stipulations
Doctrine of subrogation see Subrogation See also Duty of disclosure
Documentary evidence Art. 2:501 C2; See also Information
Art. 2:501 C3; Art. 2:501 N7; Art. 2:501 N8; See also Insurance money
Art. 2:502 C1; Art. 6:102 See also Payment
Ex post determination Art. 2:201 C4 See also Post-contractual information duties of
See also Policy the insurer
Documents Art. 2:501 N2; Art. 2:501 N2; See also Pre-contractual duties of the insurer
Art. 2:501 N5; Art. 2:501 N10; Art. 2:502 C2; See also Pre-contractual information duties
Art. 2:502 N6; Art. 2:502 N8; Art. 6:102 N1; See also Sanctions
Art. 6:103 Duty of disclosure Art. 1:205 C5; Art. 2:101;
Electronic documents Art. 2:402 C2 Art. 2:101 N1; Art. 11:102 N2
Separate documents Art. 2:402 N6; Breach Art. 2:102; Art. 4:202 C4
Art. 2:402 N7; Art. 2:402 N8; Art. 3:101; Facts Art. 2:101 N3
Art. 3:101 C2 Prudent insurer Art. 2:101 N4
See also Information See also Disclosure
See also Interpretation of documents EEIG see European Economic Interest Grouping
See also Language of documents EESC see European Economic and Social
See also Notice Committee
See also Pre-contractual documents EIOPA Art. 17:202 C6
See also Receipt of documents Elective Group Insurance Art. 18:301-18:303
See also Transparency See also Group insurance
Dolus directus Art. 6:101 N10 Electronic Commerce Directive Art. 2:201
Domestic insurance contracts Art. 1:102 C4 N1; Art. 2:301 C6; Art. 2:301 N2; Art. 2:302 C1;
Doorstep Selling Directive Art. 2:602 C6 Art. 2:302 C4; Art. 2:501 N13
Draft Common Frame of Reference I15; I63; Electronic Signatures Directive Art. 17:101
I65; Art. 1:206 N1 C4
See also Common Frame of Reference E-mail Art. 1:104 C2; Art. 2:201 C5; Art. 2:301
Drafting Committee I9 C6; Art. 2:302 C1; Art. 2:302 C3; Art. 2:302 C4;
Due date see Payment Art. 2:302 C3; Art. 2:402 C2; Art. 4:102 C3
Duration Art. 2:101; Art. 2:601 Employee of the policyholder see Policyholder
End of cover Art. 2:604 N6 Encumbrance Art. 17:104
Expiry of maximum time-span Art. 2:601 C4 Consent Art. 17:104 C4
Indefinite period Art. 2:601 N3 Effect Art. 17:104 C5
Long-term contracts Art. 2:601 C2; Written consent of beneficiary Art. 17:104
Art. 2:602 C3; Art. 2:601 C7 C1; Art. 17:104 C2
Maximum contract term Art. 2:601 C5 Written consent of person at risk Art. 17:101
Maximum period Art. 2:601 N1; Art. 2:601 C8; Art. 17:101 C9; Art. 17:101 C11; Art. 17:104
N2 C3
Minimum duration Art. 2:601 C1 Written consent of policyholder Art. 17:104
One-year term Art. 2:601 C5 C1; Art. 17:104 C3
Period of prolongation Art. 2:602 N2 Enforcement I29; I30; Art. 1:301; Art. 1:203
Short-term contracts Art. 2:601 C1; C3; Art. 1:203 C8; Art. 2:304 C10; Art. 2:501 C2
Art. 2:604 C2 Alternative dispute resolution I29; I33;
Duty Art. 1:302 C1; Art. 2:701 N6; Art. 15:102 C4
Duty of notification Art. 8:104 N2 By consumer associations I30
Duty to avert Art. 9:101 C5; Art. 9:102 N1 Enforcing claims Art. 1:302 C2; Art. 5:102
Duty to cooperate Art. 6:102 C1; Art. 15:102 C2; Art. 7:101 C2; Art. 9:101 C2; Art. 9:101 C3
C6 European Commission Art. 1:301
Duty to give notice Art. 6:101 N2; Art. 6:101 Injunctions Art. 1:301
N3; Art. 6:101 N1 Injunctions Directive Art. 1:301; Art. 1:301
C1; Art. 1:301 C2; Art. 1:301 N1; Art. 1:301 N2
900
Index First loss
Life assurance Art. 13:101 N3 Evidence Art. 1:204 N1; Art. 2:301 N3;
PEICL I29; I30 Art. 2:402 C2; Art. 2:502 C1; Art. 3:101 C5;
Out-of-court complaint and redress mecha- Art. 6:101; Art. 6:103 C1
nisms I29; Art. 1:302 Commencement de prevue par écrit
Qualified entity I30; Art. 1:301; Art. 1:301 Art. 2:501 N7
C2; Art. 1:301 N2 Evidence by expert opinion Art. 6:102 N2;
Third party Art. 9:101 C3; Art. 11:101 C1 Art. 6:102 N4
Subrogation Art. 10:101 N5 Evidence in writing Art. 2:301; Art. 2:301 C4;
See also Direct action Art. 2:501 C2; Art. 2:501 N7
Enquiries Art. 2:101 C7 Parol evidence rule Art. 2:501 N8; Art. 2:501
Estoppel Art. 2:604 N4 N14; Art. 2:502 C4
Euro-mobile citizens I7; I31; I35 Prima facie evidence Art. 1:204 C2;
European Central Bank Art. 6:105; Art. 6:105 Art. 1:207 C9
C1 See also Documentary evidence
European Commission I4; I7; I15; I30; I53; See also Fraud
I59-71; Art. 1:207 C4; Art. 1:301 Exclusions Art. 2:201 N5; Art. 2:201 N6;
Action Plan on European Contract Law I59; Art. 4:103 N1
I61 Expenses Art. 2:303 C4; Art. 12:101 C3;
Commission Decision of 17 January 2013 Art. 12:101 C4; Art. 12:101 N5
I68; I69 Expense of settling the amount of actual loss
Communication on European Contract Law Art. 8:101 C6
I59; I61 Medical expenses Art. 13:101 C3
Green Paper on Options for a European Expert Art. 2:603 C5
Contract Law I67 Expert opinion Art. 6:102 N4; Art. 6:104 N1;
Guidelines on insurance Art. 1:207 C4 Art. 6:104 N2; Art. 8:101 N6
White Paper ‘An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and See also Evidence
Sustainable Pensions’ I69 Expert Group on European Insurance
See also Common Frame of Reference of Europe- Contract Law I66-I71
an Contract Law Executive summary I71
European Company I38 Final Report I11; I71
European contract law I47; I50; I53; I54; I58 Failure to avert Art. 9:101; Art. 9:101 C4;
See also Common Frame of Reference Art. 9:101 N9
European Economic and Social Committee Failure to mitigate Art. 9:101; Art. 9:101 C4;
I56-I57; I67 Art. 9:101 N9; Art. 9:101 N10
Opinion on ‘The European Insurance Contract’ Fairness Art. 4:301 C3; Art. 6:101 N7
I56; I67; Art. 1:102 C1 Fair dealing Art. 1:104 C5; Art. 2:103 C5;
Opinion on the ‘28th Regime’ I57 Art. 2:304; Art. 2:304 C8
European Economic Interest Grouping I38 Fairness test Art. 2:304 C8
European insurance contract law I28; I35; Review of the fairness Art. 2:304 N4
I38; I56; I64; I67; Art. 1:105 C7; Art. 1:207 C6 See also Conclusion of the contract
See also Restatement of European Insurance See also Unfair contract terms
Contract Law Fault Art. 2:202; Art. 2:202 C6; Art. 2:202
See also Common European Insurance Contract N6; Art. 2:202 N7; Art. 4:101 N1; Art. 4:102
Law N6; Art. 4:102 N7; Art. 4:103; Art. 4:103 C3;
European Parliament Art. 4:103 C4; Art. 4:103 N10; Art. 4:103 N15;
Second resolution of 8 June 2011 I58 Art. 5:101 N4; Art. 12:101 N4
European Union I2; Art. 1:104 N1; Art. 1:105 Degree of fault Art. 4:103 C4; Art. 4:203 N4
C7; Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C3; Art. 1:207 C7; Grave Art. 4:103 N16
Art. 16:101 C3; Art. 16:101 C6; Art. 16:101 C9 Financial Services Authority See FSA
Competence for approximation of laws I70 Financial Services (Distance Marketing)
Contingency competence I70 Regulations 2004 Art. 2:201 N5
Law I18; I26; I28; I32; I33; Art. 1:102 C3; Financial Services Handbook See FSA
Art. 1:103 N9; Art. 1:202 C12; Art. 1:207 C3; Handbook
Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:207 Note; Art. 1:301 C1; First loss Art. 8:102 C1
Art. 2:304 N1-N3; Art. 16:101 C7 Cover see Loss
Premier risque Art. 8:102 C1
901
First Non-Life Insurance Directive Index
First Non-Life Insurance Directive I22; General contract law Art. 2:301 N1
Art. 1:103 C6 General contract terms Art. 1:103 C1;
Forfeiture Art. 9:101 N1; Art. 10:101; Art. 2:501 N10; Art. 2:502 C2; Art. 2:702 C2
Art. 10:101 N5 Living law of the insurance contract
Forfeiture of the premium Art. 12:101 N4 Art. 1:103 C1
Form Art. 2:402 N2 See also Terms of contract
Documents Art. 2:201 C5 General principles common to the laws of the
E-mail Art. 1:104 C2; Art. 2:302 C3; Member States Art. 9:101 C3
Art. 2:302 C4; Art. 2:602 C4; Art. 4:102 C3 General principles of contract law Art. 1:105
Internet Art. 2:201 N5 C7; Art. 2:203 N5
Post Art. 2:201 N5; Art. 2:301 C6; Art. 2:302 General principles of European contract law
C1 I43
Telefax Art. 2:301 C6; Art. 2:602 C4; See also Community law
Art. 4:102 C3 Good faith Art. 1:104 C5; Art. 1:203 C2;
Telegram Art. 2:602 C4; Art. 4:102 C3 Art. 2:102 N2; Art. 2:103 C5; Art. 2:301 C7;
Telephone Art. 2:201 N5 Art. 2:304; Art. 2:304 C8; Art. 2:401 N5;
Telex Art. 2:602 C4; Art. 4:102 C3 Art. 2:401 N6; Art. 2:402 N9; Art. 2:602 C4;
Formal requirements Art. 2:301; Art. 2:603 Art. 2:701 C6: Art. 3:101 N1; Art. 4:102 N8;
N2 Art. 6:102 C1; Art. 7:102 C3; Art. 8:104 N5
Registration of a letter Art. 1:205 C8 Utmost good faith Art. 6:101 N2; Art. 6:102
See also Language of documents N1
Fraud Art. 1:103 C2; Art. 1:103 C4; Art. 2:103 See also Claims exceeding the sum insured
N2; Art. 2:104; Art. 2:104 C2; Art. 2:104 C3; Gross negligence Art. 1:206 N1; Art. 2:102
Art. 2:104 C5; Art. 2:104 N1; Art. 2:401 C4; N2; Art. 6:101 N11; Art. 6:105 C3; Art. 9:101 C3;
Art. 2:604 N6; Art. 4:102 N4; Art. 4:102 N8; Art. 9:101 N3; Art. 9:101 N4; Art. 9:101 N10
Art. 4:103 N4; Art. 4:103 N7; Art. 4:203 N2; Group insurance I11; I12; I17; Art. 18:101-
Art. 5:101 C3; Art. 5:102 C4; Art. 5:104 C3; 18:303
Art. 6:101 C3; Art. 6:101 N10; Art. 6:101 Accessory group insurance Art. 1:201;
N11; Art. 6:103 C3; Art. 6:103 N2; Art. 7:102 Art. 1:201 C13-14; Art. 18:101; Art. 18:101
N2; Art. 7:102 N5; Art. 8:101; Art. 8:101 C7; C3-C4; Arts. 18:201-18:204; Art. 18:201
Art. 8:101 N7; Art. 8:103 N1; Art. 8:104 N4; C1-C7; Art. 18:202 C1-C9; Art. 18:203 C1-C5;
Art. 8:104 N6; Art. 17:201 C4; Art. 17:201 C5 Art. 18:204 C1-C10
Evidence Art. 4:102 N4; Art. 4:103 N4 Accident insurance Art. 18:102 C4
Fraudulent applicant Art. 2:102 N2; Amendments Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 C5;
Art. 2:102 N5; Art. 2:102 N7; Art. 2:104 N1-N2 Art. 18:202 C9
Fraudulent breach Art. 2:104; Art. 2:104 Assessment of risk Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204
C1-C6; ; Art. 17:201 C6-C7; Art. 17:205 C5; C4-C6
Art. 17:602 C3 Automatically insured Art. 1:201 C14
fraus omnia corrumpit Art. 2:104; Art. 17:102 Cessation of membership Art. 18:303;
C13; Art. 17:202 C7 Art. 18:303 C1
Morality Art. 2:104 C2 Classification Art. 18:101 C3-C4
Remedies Art. 2:104 C1; Art. 2:104 C3 Company workforce Art. 18:204 C1
Freedom of contract I13; Art. 1:101 C7; Continuation of cover Art. 18:204;
Art. 1:101 N3; Art. 1:103 C1; Art. 1:103 C2; Art. 18:204 C1-C8
Art. 1:103 C7; Art. 1:103 N2; Art. 1:103 N7; Contracts for group insurance Art. 18:101;
Art. 1:103 N8; Art. 1:103 N11; Art. 1:201 N1; Art. 18:101 C1-C5; Art. 18:102; Art. 18:201;
Art. 2:304 C5; Art. 2:304 C6; Art. 6:102 N3; Art. 18:201 C1-C7; Art. 18:301; Art. 18:301
Art. 7:103 C3; Art. 12:102 C2; Art. 14:103 C2 C1-C4
Limits Art. 1:103 C2 Cover in transitional period Art. 18:204
Public policy Art. 1:103 C2 C2-C3
FCA Art. 2:102 N8 Duty to warn the policyholder Art. 18:201
FCA Handbook Art. 2:201 N5; Art. 2:202 C3; Art. 18:201 C5; Art. 18:202 C1
N2; Art. 2:202 N9 Economies of scale Art. 18:101 C1
FCA Rules Art. 6:102 N1 Elective group insurance Art. 1:201;
Gender Directive I24; Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:201 C13-14; Art. 18:301-18:303;
Art. 1:207 C6
902
Index Imputation of knowledge
Art. 18:101 C3-C5; Art. 18:102 C6; Art. 18:301 Authority to collect premiums Art. 18:303
C1-C4; Art. 18:302 C1-C4; Art. 18:303 C1-C3 C2
Employment Art. 18:101 C2; Art. 18:102 C4 Bank Art. 18:102 C1; Art. 18:102 C4
Framework contract Art. 11:103 C8; Commission Art. 18:102 C3
Art. 18:102 C6; Art. 18:301; Art. 18:301 C1-C4; Damages Art. 18:102 C3
Art. 18:302; Art. 18:302 C1-C4; Art. 18:303; Duty of care Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 C2-C3;
Art. 18:303 C1-C3 Art. 18:102 C5; Art. 18:301 C4
Health deterioration Art. 18:204 C6 Duty under contract Art. 18:102 C4
Health Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204 C6 Employer Art. 18:102 C1; Art. 18:202 C5
Indemnity insurance Art. 1:201 C14 Good faith Art. 18:102 C2
Individual insurance Art. 18:202 C8; Insurance broker Art. 18:102 C1
Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204 C3; Art. 18:204 C5-C8; Insurance intermediaries Art. 18:102 C1
Art. 18:301; Art. 18:301 C1-C4; Art. 18:302; Information duty Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 C3
Art. 18:302 C1; Art. 18:303 C1-C3 -C6; Art. 18:202; Art. 18:202 C1; Art. 18:202
Information Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 C5-C6; C3-C9; Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204 C9-C10
Art. 18:202 C1-C6; Art. 18:202 C9; Art. 18:204 Liquidation Art. 18:303 C2
C2; Art. 18:204 C9 Precautionary measures Art. 18:203 C3
Insured Art. 1:201 C14; Art. 18:201 C3 See also Burden of proof
Language Art. 18:102 C3; Art. 18:102 C5 See also Group organiser’s information duties
Life insurance Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204 Group organiser’s information duties
C1-C7; Art. 18:303 C3 Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 C3 -C6; Art. 18:202;
Loan Art. 18:102 C4; Art. 18:201 C5 18:202 C1-C6; Art. 18:202 C3-C9; Art. 18:204;
Medical examination Art. 18:204 C6 Art. 18:204 C2; Art. 18:204 C9-C10
New contract Art. 18:204 C8 Amendments to the contract Art. 18:102 C5;
Notices Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 C5; Art. 18:202 C9
Art. 18:202 C9; Art. 18:302 C3 Breach Art. 18:202 C7; Art. 18:204 C10
Premium Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204 C6; Burden of proof Art. 18:202 C8
Art. 18:204 C7; Art. 18:301 C1; Art. 18:303 C2 Claims procedure Art. 18:202 C4
Prolongation Art. 18:204 C2 Damages for breach Art. 18:102 C3
Protection of group members Art. 18:201 C1-C2 Existence of the insurance contract
Right to continue cover Art. 18:204; Art. 18:202; Art. 18:202 C4
Art. 18:204 C1-C8 Extent of cover Art. 18:202; Art. 18:202 C4
Right to individual cover Art. 18:204 C1; Information after joining Art. 18:202 C9
Art. 18:204 C4 Language Art. 18:102 C3
Sports club Art. 18:204 C1 Notices Art. 18:102 C5
Termination see Termination of contract Periodical circulars Art. 18:202 C5
Trade union Art. 18:101 C2 Precautionary measures Art. 18:202 C4
Visitors to a sports event Art. 18:101 C2 Requirements for preserving cover
See also Application of the PEICL Art. 18:202 C4
See also Branches of insurance Sanctions Art. 18:202 C4
See also Breach Termination of the framework contract
See also Definitions Art. 18:102 C6
See also Designation Time when information has to be provided
See also Group organiser Art. 18:202 C5
See also Group organiser’s information duties Health Art. 2:601 C7
See also Pension plans See also Group insurance
See also Person at risk ICOBS Art. 1:103 N8; Art. 1:203 N4; Art. 2:102
See also Termination N8; Art. 2:201 N2; Art. 2:201 N5; Art. 2:202 N2;
See also Transfer Art. 2:303 N5; Art. 2:701 N10; Art. 3:101 N5;
Group organiser Art. 18:101; Art. 18:101 Art. 4:102 N4; Art. 4:103 N4
C2; Art. 18:101 C5; Art. 18:102; Art. 18:102 IDD (Proposal for an) I26; Art. 2:201 C1;
C1; Art. 18:201 C1; Art. 18:201 C3; Art. 18:201 Art. 2:202 N1
C5; Art. 18:202; Art. 18:202 C1; Art. 18:301; Imputation of knowledge Art. 1:206;
Art. 18:301 C1; Art. 18:301 C3; Art. 18:301 C4; Art. 9:101 N6; Art. 11:102 C6; Art. 11:102 C8
Art. 18:302 C2; Art. 18:302 C3 Business organisations Art. 1:206 C4
Agent Art. 18:102 C1 Domestic relations Art. 1:206 C4
903
Indemnity Index
904
Index Insurance industry practice
Insurance period Art. 4:201 C2; Art. 12:101; See also Definitions
Art. 12:101 N5 See also Duration
Insurer’s behaviour Art. 2:103 N4 See also Enforcement
Joint insurance Art. 1:206 C5; Art. 11:103 See also European insurance contract law
C12 See also Group insurance
Land insurance Art. 1:101 N1; Art. 1:101 N3; See also Indemnity
Art. 2:401 N5; Art. 2:401 N6 See also Indemnity insurance
Large risk insurance I13 See also Insurance contracts
Legal expenses insurance Art. 1:103 C1; See also Insurance intermediaries
Art. 1:201 N2; Art. 2:701 N6; Art. 2:701 N7; See also Insurance money
Art. 14:101 C6 See also Insurance of fixed sums
Long-term insurance Art. 2:303 N3; See also Insurance policy
Art. 2:303 N5; Art. 2:602 C3; Art. 2:702 C3 See also Insured
Marine insurance I13; Art. 1:101 C7; See also Insured event
Art. 1:101 N1; Art. 1:101 N3; Art. 1:101 N4; See also Insurer
Art. 1:101 N5; Art. 1:103 N6; Art. 1:103 N11; See also International insurance contract law
Art. 1:201 N4; Art. 2:401 N1; Art. 2:401 N5; See also Knowledge
Art. 2:401 N6; Art. 2:401 N7; Art. 2:501 N14; See also Liability
Art. 12:101 N3 See also Liability insurance
Marriage insurance Art. 1:201 C9; See also Life insurance
Art. 13:101 See also Multiple insurance
Mass risk insurance I22; I71; Art. 2:101 C3 See also Mutual insurance
Motor liability insurance I11; I69; I71; See also Out-of-court complaint and redress
Art. 2:303 C9; Art. 10:101 C6 mechanisms
Non-marine insurance Art. 2:501 N2 See also Payment
Normal insurance practice Art. 3:101 N1 See also Premium
Personal accident insurance Art. 2:303 N3 See also Retroactive cover
Personal insurance Art. 1:101 N1; Art. 1:201 See also Social insurance law
C9; Art. 2:601; Art. 2:601 C7; Art. 2:601 N4; Insurance acquis I23; I26
Art. 2:604; Art. 2:604 C2; Art. 4:201 C3; Insurance broker Art. 2:101 C6; Art. 2:202
Art. 4:301 N7; Art. 7:101 N2; Art. 7:101 N3; C4b; Art. 2:402 N8; Art. 2:601 C1; Art. 3:101 N5
Art. 11:101 N4; Art. 13:101; Art. 13:101 N2; Intermediaries Art. 1:202 C7; Art. 2:202 N3;
Art. 13:101 N5; Art. 13:101 N6 Art. 2:202 N7
Preliminary insurance Art. 2:402 See also Insurance intermediaries
Private insurance Art. 1:101; Art. 1:101 N1 Insurance Companies (Legal Expenses Insur-
Property insurance Art. 12:102 C8 ance) Regulations 1990 Art. 2:701 N7
Pure risk insurance Art. 17:204 C2; Insurance contract law Art. 2:701 C1
Art. 17:205 C9; Art. 17:301 C3; Art. 17:303 C5; Comparative analysis I8
Art. 17:304 C14 Insurance contracts Art. 1:201; Art. 1:201 C1;
Reinsurance I13; Art. 1:101; Art. 1:101 C8; Art. 1:201 N1
Art. 1:101 N6 Cover Art. 1:201 C2; Art. 1:201 N5
Retroactive insurance Art. 1:201 C3; Depreciation Art. 1:201 C7
Art. 2:401 N5 Gambling Art. 1:201 C9
Small businesses insurance Art. 1:103 C7; Interpretation of insurance contracts
Art. 4:103 N4 Art. 1:203 C1
Transit insurance Art. 2:401 N8 Investment contracts Art. 1:201 N6;
Transport insurance Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:103 Art. 17:205 C5
N11; Art. 12:102 C7 Minimum protection rule Art. 1:201 N1
Travel insurance Art. 2:303 N5; Art. 2:601 C3 Sum Art. 1:201 C8
See also Branches of insurance Uncertainty Art. 1:201 C4; Art. 1:201 N6
See also Claims See also Consumer
See also Compulsory insurance See also Insurance
See also Conclusion of the contract See also Life assurance
See also Consumer See also Transparency
See also Consumer insurance Insurance industry practice Art. 3:101
See also Credit insurance
905
Insurance Mediation Directive Index
906
Index Joint Insurance
Insured event Art. 1:201; Art. 1:201 C5; See also Performance
Art. 1:205 N3; Art. 2:102; Art. 2:102 C6; Interest Art. 6:105; Art. 6:105 C1; Art. 6:105
Art. 2:102 N2; Art. 2:604; Art. 2:702 C2; C3; Art. 6:105 N1; Art. 6:105 N2
Art. 6:101; Art. 6:102; Art. 8:101 C1; Art. 8:102; Expectation interest Art. 6:105 C3
Art. 8:104 N2; Art. 9:101 N5; Art. 11:101; Joint interest Art. 11:103 C12
Art. 11:101 C7; Art. 11:101 N5; Art. 12:101 C7; Intermediaries see Insurance intermediaries
Art. 13:101 C1; Art. 14:107; Art. 14:107 C13; Internal market I2; I4; I5; I6; I35; Art. 1:101
17:501 C5; Art. 1:103 C3; Art. 2:601 C2
Act committed Art. 14:107 C3; Art. 14:107 Obstacle I64; I66; I67; I69; I70; I71;
C24 Art. 1:105 C6
Act of the insured Art. 14:107 C1 Pension products I69
Asbestos cases Art. 14:107 C4 Life assurance products I69
Business risks Art. 14:107 C13 International insurance contract law I6;
Causation of the insured event Art. 13:101 Art. 1:101 C5
C2 Interpretation of documents Art. 1:203
Claims made Art. 14:107 C1; Art. 14:107 C3; Contra proferentem rule Art. 1:203 C3
Art. 14:107 C4 Plain and intelligible Art. 1:203 C3
Commercial risks Art. 14:107 C17-C18 Transparency Art. 1:203 C2; Art. 1:203 N1
Consumer contracts Art. 14:107 C13 Interpretation of the PEICL I28; Art. 1:104
Consumer liability insurance Art. 14:107 C14 C1
Duty to inform beneficiary Art. 17:501 Context Art. 1:104 C4
C7-C9 Context of Community law Art. 1:104 C4
Long tail risks Art. 14:107 C4; Art. 14:107 Languages Art. 1:104 C3
C14; Art. 14:107 C18 Textual interpretation Art. 1:104 C1
Notice of the insured event Art. 1:205 N5; Investigation Art. 2:101 C7; Art. 6:101 C3;
Art. 6:101; Art. 15:102 C6 Art. 17:501
Occurrence of loss Art. 14:107 C1; Address of the beneficiary Art. 17:501 C4
Art. 14:107 C3 Best efforts Art. 17:501 C3; Art. 17:501 C6
Occurrence of the insured event Art. 7:102 Children Art. 17:501 C5
C4; Art. 7:102 N2; Art. 7:102 N3; Art. 7:102 Costs of investigation Art. 17:501 C3;
N5; Art. 7:102 N9; Art. 8:104 C1; Art. 17:501 Art. 17:501 C6
C2-C3 Duty to investigate Art. 17:501 C2-C3;
Professional risks Art. 14:107 C17-C18 Art. 17:501 C4-C5
Sleeping contracts Art. 17:501 C1 Good faith Art. 17:501 C1
Status of the beneficiary Art. 17:501 C8 Heirs Art. 17:501 C5
Triggers for liability Art. 14:107 C1 Identity of the beneficiary Art. 17:501 C1;
See also Claims made clauses Art. 17:501 C4
See also Claims made policies Investigation of the insured event Art. 6:102;
See also Definitions Art. 17:501
See also Investigation Invoices Art. 17:501 C2
See also Suicide Occurrence of insured event Art. 17:501
Insured good Art. 12:102 N1 C2-C3
Insured risk see Risk; Risk insured Reasonable steps Art. 17:501 C6
Insured sum see Sum insured Sleeping contracts Art. 17:501 C1
Insurer Wife Art. 17:501 C5
Insurer’s decision Art. 7:102 N7 Will Art. 17:501 C5
Insurer’s rejection Art. 7:102 N8 Investment services Art. 2:202 N1
Protection Art. 10:101 C7 Invoice Art. 2:602 C5; Art. 5:101 C10;
Intent Art. 1:206 N1; Art. 4:203 C3; Art. 6:102; Art. 5:102; Art. 5:102 C5; Art. 5:103; Art. 5:103
Art. 6:102 C3; Art. 9:101; Art. 9:101 C2; C5; Art. 5:103 C6
Art. 9:101 C1; Art. 9:101 N3; Art. 9:101 N4; Joint Consultation Paper on Insurance
Art. 9:101 N5; Art. 9:101 N10; Art. 10:101; Contract Law Art. 4:101 C2
Art. 10:101 N9 Joint Network on European Private Law see
Causation of damage Art. 4:103 N16 CoPECL Network
See also Breach Joint Insurance Art. 1:206 C5; Art. 11:103 C12
See also Loss Communauté de biens Art. 11:103 C12
907
Judicial review Index
908
Index Mandatory provisions
Art. 2:303 N6; Art. 2:303 N7; Art. 2:701 C2; With-profit policies Art. 17:301 C2
Art. 2:701 C5; Art. 2:701 N2 See also Assignment
Life insurance I11; I12; I71; Art. 1:201 See also Branches of insurance
C9; Art. 1:201 N2; Art. 1:205 N1; Art. 2:303 See also Conversion
N2; Art. 2:601 C7; Art. 2:603 N1; Art. 2:603 See also Definitions
N2; Art. 2:604 N3; Art. 4:201 C3; Art. 4:301 See also Designation
N7; Art. 7:101 N2; Art. 7:102; Art. 7:102 C4; See also Encumbrance
Art. 7:102 N1; Art. 7:102 N11; Art. 11:101 N4; See also Group insurance
Art. 11:101 N9; Art. 13:101; Art. 13:101 N5; See also Killing of the person at risk
Art. 17:101-17:603; Art. 18:204; Art. 18:204 See also Life Assurance Consolidation Directive
C1-C7; Art. 18:303 C3 See also National laws
Amendments of the contract Art. 17:101 C11 See also Pension plans
Death of beneficiary Art. 17:102 C10 See also Person at risk
Death of person at risk Art. 17:101 C2; See also Post-contractual information duties of
Art. 17:102 C5; Art. 17:205 C2; Art. 17:401 C5 the insurer
Biometric risk Art. 1:201 C11 See also Premium
Bonuses Art. 17:301 C2 See also Pre-contractual information duties
Cancellation of contract Art. 17:102 C11; See also Pre-contractual information duties of
Art. 17:102 C12; Art. 17:304 C1 the insurer
Consent requirements Art. 17:101 C3-C7 See also Suicide
Economic incentive of the beneficiary See also Surrender
Art. 17:101 C3 See also Termination
Economic interest of the beneficiary Limitation see Prescription
Art. 17:101 C2; Art. 17:101 C3 Limits in recovery of indemnity see
Employer Art. 17:101 C1 Indemnity
Fund linked life assurance policies Art. 2:202 Liquidated damages Art. 8:101 C6
C4d Loss Art. 1:201 C6; Art. 1:201 C8; Art. 2:102
Gambling Art. 17:101 C2; Art. 17:101 C3 C6; Art. 2:202; Art. 8:101 C1; Art. 8:101 C2;
In favour of third party Art. 17:102 C1 Art. 13:101 N3
Instrument to secure a loan Art. 17:502 C8 Actual loss Art. 8:104 N5; Art. 8:104 N7
Insurable interest Art. 17:101 C3 Assessment of loss Art. 6:105 C4
Life insurance contract Art. 7:102 Causation see Causation of loss
Life of third party Art. 1:103 N5; Art. 11:101 Financial loss Art. 13:101 C1
N9; Art. 17:101; Art. 17:101 C1-C4; Art. 17:104 First loss cover Art. 8:102 C1
C3 Intent to cause the loss Art. 4:102; Art. 4:102
Loan agreement Art. 17:204 C8 C1; Art. 4:103; Art. 4:103 C3; Art. 4:201 C5
Medical examination Art. 17:204 C4; Loss actually suffered Art. 8:104
Art. 18:204 C6 Loss insured Art. 9:102
Non-life insurance Art. 1:201 N2; Art. 2:601 Loss of credit Art. 6:105 C6
N2; Art. 7:101 N2 Maximum possible loss Art. 8:103
Private pension schemes Art. 17:101 C1 Partial loss Art. 8:101 C1
Prolongation Art. 17:203 C4 Precautionary measures Art. 4:101 N6
Pure risk Art. 17:204 C2; Art. 17:205 C9; Profits lost Art. 6:105 C6
Art. 17:301 C3; Art. 17:303 C5; Art. 17:304 Total loss Art. 8:101 C1
C14; Art. 17:502 C4; Art. 17:503 C2 See also Definitions
Rate of return Art. 17:205 C3 See also Notice
Renunciation of estate Art. 17:105; Main insurance contract Art. 2:402 N1;
Art. 17:105 C1 Art. 2:403 N1
Revocation of beneficiary Art. 17:102 C10 Mandatory provisions I2; I14; I17; I19; I45;
Sanctions for no consent Art. 17:101 I46; I47; I48; I57; Art. 1:103 C2; Art. 1:103 C3;
C10-C11 Art. 1:103 C4; Art. 1:103 C7; Art. 1:103 N2;
Security Art. 17:101 C5; Art. 17:101 C7 Art. 1:103 N3; Art. 1:103 N4; Art. 1:103 N10;
Term-fix Versicherung Art. 1:201 C11 Art. 1:103 N12; Art. 1:105 C1; Art. 1:105 C2;
Unit-linked life insurance Art. 17:204 C6; Art. 1:105 C5; Art. 3:101 C5
Art. 17:303 C5 Absolutely mandatory provisions I20;
Wagering Art. 17:101 C2 Art. 1:103 C4; Art. 1:103 N4
909
Maritime Insurance Directive Index
Derogation Art. 1:103 C4; Art. 1:103 C5 Montreal Convention I27; Art. 4:102 N7;
Consumers Art. 1:103 C2 Art. 9:101 C3
Internationally mandatory provisions Moral hazard Art. 2:103 C3; Art. 2:104 C1;
Art. 1:105 C4 Art. 9:101 C2; Art. 13:101 C1; Art. 15:101 C2;
Labour law I71; Art. 1:103 C2 Art. 15:101 C10
Law of landlord and tenant Art. 1:103 C2 Net profit Art. 13:101 C1
Mandatory character Art. 1:103 C6; Motor Insurance Directive Art. 6:105 C1;
Art. 2:301 C3; Art. 2:301 C10; Art. 17:503 C6 Art. 15:101 C2
Mandatory protection rule Art. 1:201 N1 Multiple insurance Art. 8:103 C2; Art. 8:104;
Non-mandatory rule Art. 12:102 C5 Art. 8:104 C2; Art. 8:104 N1
Public policy Art. 1:103 C2 Contribution Art. 8:104; Art. 8:104 C8
Semi-mandatory provisions I21; I22; Independent liability basis Art. 8:104 C9
Art. 1:103 C4; Art. 1:103 C5; Art. 12:101 C3 Subsidiaritätsklausel Art. 8:104 N9
Statutory regulations Art. 1:103 C1 Mutual insurance Art. 1:101; Art. 1:101 C2;
Unfair contract terms Art. 1:103 C2 Art. 1:101 N2
See also Application of the PEICL Mutuality Art. 2:103 C5
See also Freedom of contract National laws Art. 2:201 N5; Art. 17:401;
See also Internal market Art. 17:402
Maritime Insurance Directive Art. 16:101 C7 State subsidies Art. 17:402 C1; Art. 17:402 C3
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive See also Pension plans
Art. 2:202 N1 See also Tax treatment
Materiality Art. 4:301 C5; Art. 8:101 C7 Nature of the PEICL see Application of the
MiFID2 I26; Art. 1:101 C6; Art. 1:202 C7; PEICL
Art. 2:202 C4; Art. 2:202 N1 Negligence Art. 1:103 C4; Art. 2:102 N2;
Minimum protection Art. 1:103 N1; Art. 1:103 Art. 2:102 N4; Art. 2:102 N6; Art. 2:104 C6;
N6; Art. 1:103 N7; Art. 1:103 N10; Art. 1:103 Art. 4:103 C4 Art. 4:103 N13; Art. 4:103
N12; Art. 1:105 C2 N14; Art. 9:101; Art. 9:101 N7; Art. 9:101 N9;
Minimum standards Art. 2:603 C4; Art. 2:603 Art. 9:101 N10; Art. 10:101 C10; Art. 10:101 N9;
C6 Art. 14:103 C1; Art. 14:103 C4; Art. 17:503 C4
Minimum standard regulation I48-I49 Negligent non-disclosure Art. 2:102;
Minimum term Art. 2:601 C3 Art. 2:102 C6
Misrepresentation Art. 2:101 C1; Art. 8:101; Negotiation Art. 7:103 N3
Art. 8:101 C7; Art. 8:101 N7; Art. 8:102 C3; Individually negotiated term Art. 2:304;
Art. 8:103 C4 Art. 2:304 C6; Art. 2:304 N9; Art. 2:304 N10;
Misrepresented information Art. 2:101 C1 Art. 2:304 N11
Mistake Art. 8:101 N7 Negotiations fail Art. 2:403 C1
Inexcusable mistake Art. 12:101 N4 Non-negotiated contracts Art. 2:304 N9
See also Value Renegotiation Art. 2:602 C1
Mitigation of loss I71; Art. 9:102 C1; New for old see Costs
Art. 14:101 C1 No-claims bonuses I71; Art. 14:105 C4;
Bonus pater familias Art. 9:102 N3 Art. 14:106; Art. 14:106 C1
Mitigation costs Art. 8:101 C3; Art. 8:102; Bonus-Malus systems I71; Art. 14:106
Art. 8:102 C2; Art. 8:104; Art. 9:102; Art. 9:102 Claims record Art. 14:105 C4; Art. 14:106 C2;
C2; Art. 9:102 C6; Art. 9:102 N1-N8; Art. 14:106 C3-C4
Art. 15:104 C5; Art. 14:101 C1; Art. 14:101 C3; Transfer of bonuses Art. 14:106 C2
Art. 15:104 C5 Non-discrimination Art. 1:207
Objective reasonableness Art. 9:102 N3 Acquis communautaire Art. 1:207 C5
Reasonable measures Art. 9:102; Art. 9:102 Actuarial data Art. 1:207 C1
C3; Art. 9:102 N2; Art. 9:102 N3-N4 Age Art. 1:207 C1; Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207
Salvage operators Art. 9:102 C2 C3; Art. 1:207 C4
Subjective reasonableness Art. 9:102 N3 Avoidance Art. 1:207 C8
Unsuccessful measures Art. 9:102; Art. 9:102 Belief Art. 1:207 C2
C4f Benefits Art. 1:207 C4; Art. 1:207 C5;
See also Causation of loss Art. 1:207 C6; Art. 1:207 C9
See also Costs Burden of proof Art. 1:207 C9
Modification see Alteration of terms Classes of risk Art. 1:207 C1
910
Index Notice
Differentiation Art. 1:207 C1; Art. 1:207 C2; Consequences of non-payment Art. 5:102 C6
Art. 1:207 C4; Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:207 C6 Reminder Art. 5:102; Art. 5:102 C6;
Direct discrimination Art. 1:207 C6 Art. 5:103; Art. 5:103 C7
Disability Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C4 See also Period of grace
Discrimination Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C4; Notice Art. 1:205 C2; Art. 1:205 C5; Art. 2:602;
Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:207 C7; Art. 1:207 C6; Art. 2:603 N5; Art. 2:102 C5; Art. 3:101 N1
Art. 1:207 C8; Art. 1:207 C9 Breach of notice requirements Art. 6:101 C7
Discriminatory terms Art. 1:207 C8 Change of circumstances Art. 2:101 C2
Equal treatment Art. 1:207 C4; Art. 1:207 C5; Contents of the notice Art. 6:101 C5
Art. 1:207 C6 Dispatch Art. 6:101 N9
Equality Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C4; Form of notice Art. 1:205; Art. 1:205 C1;
Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:207 C7 Art. 1:205 C3; Art. 1:205 C5; Art. 1:205 C7;
Ethnic origin Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:205 C8; Art. 1:205 C10; Art. 1:205 C11;
Art. 1:207 C7; Art. 1:207 C9 Art. 1:205 N1; Art. 2:602 C4; Art. 11:101 C10
Gender Art. 1:207 C1; Art. 1:207 C5; In writing see Written notice
Art. 1:207 C6; Art. 1:207 C9 Insurance period Art. 12:101
General principle of Community law Insured Art. 1:205 C7
Art. 1:207 C3 Interest in giving notice Art. 6:101 C1
General principle of law Art. 1:207 C3; Manner of notification Art. 4:202 C2
Art. 1:207 C9 Notice by another person Art. 6:101 C1
Genetic features Art. 1:207 C2 Notice of an insured loss Art. 6:101 C5
Indirect discrimination Art. 1:207 C6; Notice of deferral Art. 6:103 C3
Art. 1:207 C7 Notice of prolongation Art. 2:602 C3
Labour law Art. 1:207 C3 Notice of termination Art. 2:602 C3;
Labour relations Art. 1:207 C3 Art. 2:602 C6; Art. 2:604 N6; Art. 5:103 C8;
Language Art. 1:207 C2 Art. 12:101
Maternity Art. 1:207 C6; Art. 1:207 C9 Notification clauses Art. 4:201 C2
National minority Art. 1:207 C2 Obligation to give notice Art. 11:101 C11
Nationality Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C5; Periods Art. 6:101 C4
Art. 1:207 C7; Art. 1:207 C9 Proof Art. 6:101 C5
Other experience Art. 1:207 C1 Reasonable time Art. 4:202 C2; Art. 4:202
Personal characteristics Art. 1:207 C1; C3; Art. 4:202 N1; Art. 6:101; Art. 6:101 C4;
Art. 1:207 C2 Art. 6:101 N7
Political opinion Art. 1:207 C2 Receipt of notice Art. 4:203 C2; Art. 5:103 C9
Pregnancy Art. 1:207 C6; Art. 1:207 C9 Term of notice Art. 2:602 C5
Premiums Art. 1:207 C1; Art. 1:207 C2; Time for notification Art. 6:101 N5
Art. 1:207 C4; Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:207 C6; Time period Art. 6:101 N8
Art. 1:207 C8; Art. 1:207 C9 Written notice Art. 1:205 C8; Art. 1:205
Principle of equal treatment Art. 1:207 C4; C9; Art. 1:205 C11; Art. 2:102; Art. 2:202;
Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 1:207 C6 Art. 2:301 N3; Art. 2:303; Art. 2:303 C3;
Race Equality Directive Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 2:602; Art. 2:602 C4; Art. 2:603 C6;
Art. 1:207 C7 Art. 2:603 N4; Art. 2:604; Art. 3:101;
Racial origin Art. 1:207 C2; Art. 1:207 C5; Art. 4:301; Art. 5:101 C8; Art. 5:103; Art. 5:103
Art. 1:207 C7; Art. 1:207 C9 C8; Art. 5:103 N3; Art. 4:102; Art. 4:102
Refusal to offer cover Art. 1:207 C5 C2; Art. 4:102 N2; Art. 4:102 N8; Art. 4:102
Religion Art. 1:207 C2 N9; Art. 6:103; Art. 11:101; Art. 11:101 C10;
Risk factors Art. 1:207 C1; Art. 1:207 C5 Art. 15:102; Art. 15:103; Art. 15:103 C5;
Risk-based premium Art. 1:207 C5 Art. 17:204; Art. 17:204 C9; Art. 18:204;
Sanctions for discrimination Art. 1:207 C8 Art. 18:204 C9
Sex see Gender See also Agent
Sexual orientation Art. 1:207 C2 See also Aggravation of risk
Social origin Art. 1:207 C2 See also Cessation of insured risk
Statistical experience Art. 1:207 C1 See also Conclusion of the contract
Test-Achats I24; Art. 1:207 C4; Art. 1:207 C6 See also Conveyance
See also Unfair Contract Terms Directive See also Duty
Non-payment Art. 5:101 C12; Art. 5:102 C8 See also Insurance intermediaries
911
Notification Index
912
Index Post-contractual information duties of the insurer
913
Pre-contractual documents Index
914
Index Presumption
915
PRIIP Regulation Index
PRIIP Regulation I26; Art. 2:201 C1 Reasons for the insurer’s decision not to prolong
Key information document I26 Art. 2:602 C4
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) Statutory prolongation Art. 2:602 N1
I9; I14; I15; I27; Art. 1:104 C1; Art. 1:104 Promissory warranties I27; Art. 4:101 C1;
C4; Art. 1:104 C5; Art. 1:104 C7; Art. 1:105 Art. 4:101 N4; Art. 4:102 N2; Art. 4:201 C2;
C7; Art. 1:203 C1; Art. 1:203 C3; Art. 1:203 Art. 4:201 C5
C7; Art. 1:205 C2; Art. 1:205 C3; Art. 1:205 Promissory conditions Art. 4:101 N4
C5; Art. 1:206 N1; Art. 2:102 C2; Art. 2:104 See also Precautionary measures
C2; Art. 2:104 C5; Art. 2:202 C1; Art. 2:202 Proof Art. 1:205 C4; Art. 2:301
C5; Art. 2:301 C1; Art. 2:301 C2; Art. 2:301 Standard of proof Art. 2:202 C7
C3; Art. 2:301 C8; Art. 2:301 C10; Art. 2:301 See also Burden of proof
C12; Art. 2:302 C3; Art. 2:302 C5; Art. 2:303 See also Evidence
C4; Art. 2:304 C1; Art. 2:304 C2; Art. 2:304
C9; Art. 2:402 N9; Art. 2:501 C2; Art. 2:601 Property
C6; Art. 2:602 C6; Art. 3:101 C3; Art. 4:102 Conveyance Art. 12:102 N4
C3; Art. 4:201 C3; Art. 5:101 C1; Art. 5:101 Notification of the conveyance Art. 12:102
C2; Art. 5:101 C12; Art. 5:102 C2; Art. 5:103 N5
C2; Art. 5:103 C4; Art. 5:103 N1; Art. 5:105 Purchase of a house Art. 12:102 C1
C2; Art. 5:105 N1; Art. 5:105 N2; Art. 6:105 See also Transfer
C2; Art. 6:105 C4; Art. 7:101 C1; Art. 7:101 See also Value
C3; Art. 7:102 C1; Art. 7:102 C2; Art. 7:102 Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights
C3; Art. 7:103; Art. 7:103 C1; Art. 7:103 C2; Art. 2:201 C1
Art. 7:103 C3; Art. 7:103 N1; Art. 7:103 N5; Provisions common to indemnity insurance
Art. 8:104 C1; Art. 11:101 C1; Art. 11:101 C2; see Indemnity insurance
Art. 11:101 C5; Art. 11:101 C7; Art. 11:101 C11; Public law Art. 1:101 C4; Art. 2:202 N9
Art. 12:101 C2; Art. 17:101 C4; Art. 17:103 C3 Public policy see Ordre public
Gap filling Art. 1:105 C6 Questions Art. 2:105 Comment; Art. 2:105
Law of the Member States Art. 1:105 C6 Note
Lex generalis I14; I15; Art. 5:103 C4 Precise and clear questions Art. 2:101 N5;
Uniform law Art. 1:105 C6 Art. 2:401 N8
Principles of general contract law see General Questionnaire I71; Art. 2:101 C3; Art. 2:101
principles of contract law N5; Art. 2:201
Private international law I1; I2; I6; I37; I40; Unanswered questions Art. 2:103; Art. 2:103
I41; I44; I46; I54; Art. 1:101 C5; Art. 1:102 C2; C1
Art. 1:102 C3; Art. 1:103 C7; Art. 1:105 C6 Race Equality Directive see Non-discrimina-
Conflict of laws I1; I2; I37; I40; I41; I42; I46; tion
I54; Art. 1:101 C5; Art. 1:102 C2; Art. 1:102 Reasonableness Art. 2:604 N4
C3; Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:105 C6; Art. 8:104 C8 Mitigation costs Art. 9:102 N3-N4
Harmonisation I2 Reasonable parties Art. 2:304; Art. 2:304
International insurance contract law I6 C11; Art. 2:304 N14
Pro rata Reasonable request Art. 6:102 C2
Basis Art. 8:104 N9 Reasonable time Art. 6:102 C2
Compensation Art. 8:102 C2 Subjective approach to mitigation Art. 9:102
Recovery Art. 8:104 N8 N3
Rule Art. 9:102 C6 Receipt of documents Art. 1:204
Procedures Burden of proof Art. 1:204 C1; Art. 1:204 N1;
Preliminary ruling I28; I33; I47; I60 Art. 1:204 N2; Art. 18:202 C8
See also Ombudsman Contents Art. 1:204 C1
Professional opinion Art. 2:101 C7 Pre-contractual documents Art. 1:204 C1
Prolongation of contracts Art. 2:303 C10; Proof Art. 1:204
Art. 2:303 N6; Art. 2:602; Art. 2:602 N1; Receipt of the documents Art. 1:204 C1
Art. 2:603; Art. 17:203 C4 Res ipsa loquitur Art. 1:204 C2
Automatic prolongation Art. 2:601 C5; Standard of proof Art. 1:204 C2
Art. 4:201 C3 Reckless conduct Art. 4:102; Art. 4:102
Need for prolongation Art. 2:602 C1 C1; Art. 4:103; Art. 4:103 C3; Art. 4:201
C2; Art. 4:201 C5; Art. 6:102; Art. 6:102
916
Index Sanctions
C3; Art. 9:101; Art. 9:101 C3; Art. 9:101 N3; Commercial Risks Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 14:107
Art. 9:101 N5; Art. 10:101; Art. 10:101 C10 C17; Art. 14:107 C20
Recourse against other insurer Art. 8:104 Evaluation of risks Art. 2:202 C2
N10 Exception to the risk Art. 4:101 C4
Redress I29; I71; Art. 2:304 C14; Art. 2:501 Future risk Art. 12:101 N3
See also Out-of-court complaint and redress Human risk factors Art. 1:207 C1
mechanisms Initial absence of risk Art. 12:101 N3
Reduction Art. 9:101 N1 Large risks I13; I22; I23; I71; Art. 1:103 C6;
Proportional reduction see Insurance money Art. 1:103 C7; Art. 1:103 N13; Art. 7:103 C3;
Reduction by operation of law Art. 8:103 N4 Art. 14:107 C13; Art. 18:201 C1; Art. 18:201 C2
Reduction of the sum insured Art. 8:103 Mass risks I22; I71; Art. 2:101 C3;
See also Claims Materialisation of the risk Art. 1:201 C5
See also Insurance money Moral risk Art. 11:101 N9
See also Premium Nature of the risk Art. 2:601; Art. 2:601 C3
See also Risk Over-estimated risk Art. 4:301 C4
Renewals Art. 2:601 C1; Art. 2:601 C4; Passing of the risk Art. 12:102 C3
Art. 2:602 C2; Art. 2:602 N3; Art. 2:701 N10; Professional risk Art. 9:101 N8
Art. 7:103 N1; Art. 7:103 N5 Reduction of risk Art. 1:205 C5; Art. 4:301
Rescission Art. 2:102 N3; Art. 2:202 C5; Risk management Art. 4:301 C3
Art. 2:501 N3 Risk never existed Art. 2:401 N6; Art. 2:401
Restatement of European Insurance Contract N9
Law I1; I62; I63 Risk never occurred Art. 2:401 N9
Branches of insurance I11 See also Definitions
General part I10 See also Materiality
See also Optional instrument See also Person at risk
Restatements of the law I9 See also Risk insured
See also Restatement of European Insurance Risk insured Art. 4:101; Art. 8:104 C2;
Contract Law Art. 11:103; Art. 12:101
Restitution Art. 2:104 C5; Art. 2:303 C4; Calculation Art. 2:102 C1; Art. 2:102 N9;
Art. 17:205 C10 Art. 2:103 N3
Retroactive cover Art. 2:401; Art. 2:401 C2; Lack of insured risk Art. 12:102 C1
Art. 2:401 C3; Art. 2:401 N1 Non-existence of insured risk Art. 12:101 C4;
Retroactive Art. 2:303 C4 Art. 12:101 N1
Retroactive effect Art. 2:102 C2; Art. 2:102 Reasonable sum Art. 12:101 C4
C3; Art. 2:104 C5; Art. 2:202 C9; Art. 5:103 See also Cessation of insured risk
C10 Rome I Regulation I2; I18; I22; I31; I39; I40;
Retroactive insurance Art. 1:201 C3; I43; I45; I53; I54; Art. 1:101 C5; Art. 1:102 C2;
Art. 2:401 N5 Art. 1:102 C3; Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:104 C8;
Retroactive policies Art. 2:401 N4 Art. 1:105 C4; Art. 1:105 C6; Art. 2:501 C2;
See also Definitions Art. 8:104 C8; Art. 15:104 C4; Art. 16:101 C4;
See also Knowledge Art. 16:101 C5; Art. 17:401 C8
Revocation Art. 1:205 N2; Art. 2:403 N1; Rome II Regulation Art. 1:101 C5; Art. 15:101
Art. 11:101; Art. 11:101 N4 C7; Art. 15:104 C4
Arrival of revocation Art. 2:302 C4 Rome Convention I1; Art. 1:101 C5
Effectiveness Art. 2:302 C5; Art. 11:101 C11 Sanctions Art. 2:202 N6; Art. 2:203 N2;
Revocation of an application Art. 2:302; Art. 2:304 C10
Art. 2:302 C2 Damages Art. 17:501 C12
See also Cover Estoppel Art. 17:501 C10
Risk Art. 1:201 C2; Art. 1:201 C4; Art. 2:401 For a violation of the duty to cooperate
C1; Art. 2:601 C3 Art. 6:102 N3
Biometric risks Art. 1:201 C11; Art. 17:303; Incomplete Sanctions Art. 2:203 N4
Art. 17:303 C1; Art. 17:303 C2; Art. 17:303 C8; Prescription suspension Art. 17:501 C10-C11
Art. 17:303 C12; Art. 17:303 C13 Punitive interest rates Art. 6:105 N3
Change of risk Art. 2:602 C3; Art. 17:303 C6 Supervisory law Art. 17:501 C12
Classes of risk Art. 1:207 C1 Unclear sanctions Art. 2:203 N4
917
Scope of application of the PEICL Index
918
Index Terms of contract
919
Third Generation Insurance Directives Index
See also General contract terms Insured event Art. 1:201 N3; Art. 1:201 N6
See also Insurance policy Legal framework Art. 1:105 C2
See also Non-discrimination Performance Art. 1:201 C4
See also Performance Remedy Art. 2:102 C4
See also Standard terms Revocation Art. 11:101 C10
See also Unfair contract terms Risk Art. 1:201 C3; Art. 2:401 N1; Art. 2:401
Third Generation Insurance Directives N9
I7; Art. 2:201 N1; Art. 2:201 N2; Art. 2:201 N4; Subjective uncertainty Art. 2:401 C1
Art. 2:603 C2 Validity of the contract Art. 2:303 C8
Third Non-Life Insurance Directive I1; UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-
Art. 1:101 C5; Art. 1:205 N1; Art. 2:201 C1; merce Art. 2:302 C4
Art. 2:201 N4 Underinsurance Art. 8:102; Art. 8:102 C1;
Third party Art. 2:303 C3; Art. 2:303 C7; Art. 9:102 C6
Art. 2:303 C9; Art. 6:101 N3; Art. 10:101; Underwriting Art. 4:201 C2; Art. 17:302 C1;
Art. 10:101 C1; Art. 10:101 C8 Art. 18:101 C1
Direct claim against the insurer Art. 11:101 Unfair contract terms Art. 1:301 C1;
C9; Art. 11:101 N3 Art. 1:103 C2; Art. 1:103 N9; Art. 2:603 C3;
Interest in maintaining the cover Art. 5:105 Art. 2:603 C5; Art. 2:604 N1
C4; Art. 12:102 C1 Remainder of the contract Art. 2:304 C11
Legitimate interest Art. 5:105 C4 Significant imbalance Art. 2:304 C8
Repräsentantenhaftung Art. 9:101 N6 Standard contract Art. 2:304
Spouse Art. 10:101 N8; Art. 13:101 N3 Uncommon content Art. 2:304 N8
Threat Art. 8:101 N7 Unfair Contract Terms Directive I3;
Time limit Art. 1:103 C6; Art. 1:104 C5; Art. 1:203 C2;
Exercise of right to terminate Art. 2:602 C6; Art. 1:203 N5; Art. 1:207 C8; Art. 1:301 N1;
Art. 2:604 C3; Art. 2:604 C5; Art. 4:102 C3; Art. 2:304 C1; Art. 2:304 C8; Art. 2:304 C9;
Art. 4:102 N8 Art. 2:304 C13; Art. 2:304 N1; Art. 2:304 N5;
See also Cooling-off period Art. 2:304 N7; Art. 2:304 N8; Art. 2:304 N12
See also Payment Unfair surprises Art. 2:304 C14
See also Prescription Unfairness Art. 2:304; Art. 14:107 C25
Timeshare Directive I48; Art. 1:203 C5; See also Fairness
Art. 2:201 C1; Art. 2:602 C6 See also Terms of contract
Transfer Art. 12:102 UNIDROIT Principles Art. 11:102 N1
Group insurance Art. 12:102 C11; Art. 18:203 Uniform law Art. 1:105 C6
Inter vivos transfers Art. 12:102 N2 United Nations Convention on Contracts
Substitution approach Art. 12:102 N5 for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
Termination approach Art. 12:102 N3 I34; Art. 1:104 C1; Art. 1:104 C7; Art. 5:103 N1
Transfer of the insured goods Art. 2:604 C4 Usage Art. 2:402 N9
Transfer of the insured property Art. 2:604 Value
C4; Art. 12:102; Art. 18:203 C5 Adequacy in value of the cover and the premi-
Transfer of title Art. 12:101 C9; Art. 12:102 um Art. 2:304
Transferee Art. 12:102 C5; Art. 12:102 C6; Agreed value Art. 8:101; Art. 8:101 N2
Art. 12:102 N1 Difference between the agreed value and the
Transition period Art. 12:102 N1; Art. 12:102 real value Art. 8:101 N5
N4; Art. 12:102 N5 Effect of value agreements Art. 8:101 N3
Transparency Insured value Art. 8:101
Alteration of terms Art. 2:603 C6 Market value Art. 1:201 C7; Art. 8:101 C2
Consumer transactions Art. 1:203 N11 Mistake Art. 8:101 C7
Documents Art. 1:203 C2; Art. 1:203 C4 Over-valuation Art. 8:101 C7
Insurance contract Art. 2:501 C4 Probative value Art. 2:502 N3
Pre-contractual documents Art. 2:201 C1 Property over-valued Art. 4:301 C4
Transport conventions I27; Art. 4:102 N7 Repurchase value Art. 2:701 N4
Treaty of Lisbon Art. 1:207 C2 Significant value Art. 8:101 N5
Treaty of Rome Art. 1:207 C2 Surrender value Art. 7:102
Uncertainty Value of the property Art. 8:102
Future claims Art. 2:401 C2
920
Index Writing
Valued policies Art. 8:101 C3; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Art. 13:101 C1 Art. 1:104 C1
Variation of contract see Alteration of terms Vis major Art. 7:103 N5
VCLT see Vienna Convention on the Law of Void contract Art. 2:104 C3; Art. 2:401 C3;
Treaties Art. 2:401 C4; Art. 2:401 N2; Art. 2:401 N3;
Victims Art. 2:303 C9 Art. 2:401 N6; Art. 2:401 N8; Art. 8:103 N1;
Agreement on defence costs Art. 14:102 C4 Art. 8:104 N4; Art. 12:101 N3; Art. 12:101 N5
Claim Art. 14:101 C2; Art. 14:104 C1 Warning Art. 5:101; Art. 5:101 C8; Art. 5:102
Duty to cooperate Art. 6:102 N2 N3
Enforcement of rights Art. 9:101 C3 Requirement of warning Art. 5:101 N3;
Payment to the policyholder Art. 14:102 C2 Art. 5:102 N4
Protection Art. 1:103 C2; Art. 2:303 C9; Warranties Art. 4:101 C2; Art. 4:101 N4;
Art. 14:102 Art. 4:103 N4
Settlement of claim Art. 14:102; Art. 14:104 See also Precautionary measures
C1; Art. 14:104 C2 See also Promissory warranties
Termination Art. 2:604 N3 Wilful misconduct Art. 4:103 N13; Art. 4:201
Written consent Art. 14:102 C1 C2
See also Acknowledgement of liability Writing Art. 5:101
See also Definitions See also Documentary evidence
See also Direct claim See also Documents
921