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ARTICLE 139A CODE: TPM2328
TEAM
R
ADV. T. P. ARAVINDAKSHAN MEMORIAL ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023
2023
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDOS
RAMLA
(PETITIONER)
V.
UNION OF INDOS
(RESPONDENT)
1|Page
Adv. T. P. Aravindakshan Memorial All India Moot Court Competition 2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS
S. No. CONTENTS Pg. No.
1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5
3. TABLE OF CASES 5
4. ARTICLES, JOURNALS, AND REPORTS 7
5. BOOKS REFERRED 8
6. LEXICONS 9
7. ONLINE RESOURCES 10
8. STATUTES, RULES, COMMENTARIES 10
9. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 12
10. STATEMENT OF FACTS 13
11. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 15
12. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 16
13. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 17
14. PRAYER 39
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT 2|Page

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1. & - And
3. AIHC – All India High Court Cases
4. AIR – All India Reporter
5. All – Allahabad
6. All ER – All England Reporter
7. Anr – Another
8. Art – Article
10. Bom.- Bombay
12. Ch – chapter
13. CHN – Calcutta High Court Notes
14. Cl - .clause
15. Doc.- Document
16. Edn - Edition
17. UP-uttar pradesh
18. Hon’ble- honourable
19. http - Hypertext Transfer Protocol
20. Mad- madras
21. Ltd - Limited
22. MANU - manupatra

23. Ori – orrisa
24. Ors – Others
25. P - Page
26. Para.- Paragraph
27. Refd -. Referred
28. S –Section
29. SC - Supreme Court of Indi
30. SCC – Supreme Court Cases
31. SCR – Supreme Court Reporter
32. SCW – Supreme Court Weekly
33. Ss – Sections
34. Sub-ss - Sub Sections
35. Supp – Supplementary
36. U.P – Uttar Pradesh
37. v. - Versus
38. Vol - Volume
39. www. - World Wide Web

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF CASES
S.No CASES REFERRED CITATION
1. ABC v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 10 SCC 1
2. Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) & (1997) 3 S.C.C. 573

Ors. v. Union of India
3. C. Masilamani Mudaliar v Idol of Sri (1996) 8 SCC 525

Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami
Thirukoil,
4. Chiranjeet Lal vs. Union of India A.I.R. 1951 SC 41
5. Dhairandra Kumar Mandal Vs. the 1955 1 S.C.R. 224

Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs to the Government of West Bengal &
Anr
6. Dwaraka Bai v Prof. Nainan AIR 1953 Mad 792
7. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555
8. Nazeer v. Shemeema 2017 1 K.L.T. 300
9. Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala (2018) 11 S.C.C. 1
10. Ishar Das v. State of Punjab 1973 S.C.C. (Cri) 708;
11. Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum 1981 1 Gau L.R. 358

12. John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003) 6 S.C.C. 611
13. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), And Anr v. (2017) 10 SCC 1

Union Of India And Ors..
14. K. Thimmappa v. Chairman Central Board of 2001 2 S.C.C. 259

Directors ,
15. Khursheed Ahmad Khan vs State of UP & Ors SLP (C) No.5097 of 2012
16. Lata Mittal vs. UOI JT 1987 (1) SC 339.
17. Mohammed Allahabad Khan vs Mohammed (1886) ILR 8 AII 234

Ismail Khan
18. Mohd Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945
19. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538
20. Ramji Missir v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1088;
21. Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 444;
22. Rukia Khatun v. Abdul Khalique Laskar . 1981 1 Gau :L.R. 375
23. Sarla Mudgal (Smt.), President, Kalyani and A.I.R. 1995 S.C 1531
others v. Union of India and others
24. Sathyaban Kishore v. State of Bihar 1972 3 S.C.C. 350 ;
25. Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K. M. & Ors A.I.R. 2018 S.C. 1933
26. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018) 7 S.C.C. 192
27. Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1
28. State of Madras v. Champakam A.I.R. 1951 S.C.C. 226
29. The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali A.I.R. 1952 Bom 84

30. Union of India v. MV Valliappan 1999 6 S.C.C. 259
31. Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply 1969 1 S.C.C. 87

Corporation Limited V. State of Uttar Pradesh
32. Maneka Gandhi V Union Of India A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597
33. Ramji Dayawala and sons Vs. Invest Import A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2005
34. Chandrakant Saha vs. Union of India 1979 1 S.C.C. 285
35. Jagmohan Singh V. State of UP 1973 2 S.C.R. 541
36. Gurubaksh Singh Sibbia V. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1978 S.C.1514
37. Mithu V. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 473
ARTICLES, JOURNALS AND REPORTS
1. United Nations, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of

Discrimination Against Women, Supp. No. 38, A/55/38, 22nd Session 17
Jan-4 Feb 2000 and 23rd Session 12-30 June 2000, General Assembly
Official Records, New York, 2000 at 8.
2. LOK SABHA DEBATES
3. RAJYA SABHA DEBATES
4. 22ND LAW COMMISSION REPORTS
BOOKS REFFERED

1. Aravind P Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 22 nd Edition,

2010; Lexis Nexis Butterworth’s.
2. Dr.Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional Law of India, 2 nd Edition, 2015,

Universal Law Publishing.
Durga Das Basu, Administrative Law, 5th Edition, 1998, Kamal Law
3.
House.
4. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Volume 1 & 3, 4 th Edition,

2002; Universal Book Traders
.
5. Indian Constituent Assembly, Constituent Assembly Debates Vol.1, 1999,

LokSabha Secretariat.
6. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 7th Edition, 2014, Lexis Nexis
Butterworth’s.
7.
MULLA Principles of Mahomedan Law Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, 20th
Edition, LexisNexis
8.
Dr. S. R. Myneni, Muslim law and other Personal Laws, 2nd
Edition, Asia Law House,

9.
B.M. Gandhi's Family Law Volume 1, Eastern Book Company
10.
G.C.V. Subba Rao's FAMILY LAW IN INDIA, 10th edition
LEXICONS
1. Black’s Law Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner, 8th Edition,2004; West,Thompson
2. Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, Daniel Jones, 3 rd Edition, 2009;

Cambridge University Press
3. Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, Mick Woodely, 11th Edition, 2009; Sweet
& Maxwell.
4. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, A.S. Hornby, 8 th Edition, 2007;

Oxford University Press.
5. The Law Lexicon, P. RamanathaIyer, 2nd Edition, 2002; Lexis Nexis.

ONLINE RESOURCES
1. www.jstor.org
2. www.manupatra.com
3. www.scconline.com
4. www.westlawindia.org
5. www.heinonline.org
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
1. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA ,1950
2. THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
3. SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954
4. INDIAN DIVORCE ACT, 1869

5. FOREIGN MARRIAGE ACT, 1969
6. HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955
7. HINDU MINORITY AND GUARDIANSHIP ACT,1956
8. HINDU SUCCESSION ACT,1956
MUSLIM WOMEN ( PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON MARRIAGE)
9.
ACT, 2019
MUSLIM WOMEN ( PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON DIVORCE)
10.
ACT,1986
11. PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT, 1958
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
12.
13. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT 10 | P a g e

FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
14.
RIGHTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONERS HEREBY SUBMIT THIS MEMORANDUM BEFORE THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT INVOKING THE JURISDICTION OF THIS

HON’BLE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 32 AND ARTICLE 139A OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDOS.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Ahmed and Ramla, domiciled under Erramanzil district, State of Deogarh, Indos,
got married in accordance with Mohammedan law on 15.06.2005, and they have two
daughters, Zia (2007) and Mehar (2010). Ahmed runs a dry fruit business outlet at
Erramanzil, and in due course, he met Ms. Zara, a widow, and the daughter of a
wealthy merchant in the UAE, Mr. Zain Abdullah. Ahmed and Zara soon fell in
love and got married in accordance with the Mohammedan law on 10.02.2016. They
were blessed with a daughter, Mehar (2018).
2. Mr. Zain Abdullah transferred a share worth an estimated value of seventy-five
crores in favour of Ms. Zara in February 2020. In the meantime, she expressed her
willingness to appoint Ahmed as the Managing Director of Mr. Zain’s company and
to transfer twenty-five percent of the equity to him, whereupon, Ms. Zara expressed
Mr. Zain’s concern regarding his assets being transferred to others than his children
and his grandchildren, and that Ahmed may be parting with more of Mr. Zain’s
assets if the concerns were addressed.
3. On 15.03.2020, Ahmed pronounced talaq to Ramla, sent them to the property he
purchased in her name and transferred a few properties worth ten crores in favour of
Ramla and his daughters. On 01.09.2020, Ahmed and Zara made an application
before the Marriage Officer to register their marriage under the Special Marriage
Act,1954, which was objected by Ramla on the grounds that the condition for
registration under the relevant provision of the Act was not satisfied, upon which the
Marriage Officer refused to register the marriage. Ahmed preferred an appeal to the
District Court of Erramanzil whereupon the District Court directed the Marriage
Officer to register their marriage. The arrest of Ahmed which occurred earlier in
light of the complaint filed by Ramla in accordance with the provisions of the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, was released on bail
by the Magistrate Court after the hearing .

4. The case arises when Ahmed approaches the High Court of Deogarh challenging the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 and the case made
against him, and Ramla, challenging the provisions of the Special Marriage
Act,1954, contending them to be arbitrary. The High Court decided to hear the cases
together. Meanwhile, the cases were transferred to the Supreme Court of Indos since
there was already a case relating to the constitutionality of Section 15 of the Special
Marriage Act,1954 filed by Sheikh Khan Sahab Trust. The case is posted for hearing
before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indos.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A. WHETHER SECTION 15 OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
B. WHETHER THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON

MARRIAGE) ACT, 2019 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMRNTS
1. THE SECTION 15 OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT, 1954 IS

CONSTITUTIONAL.
1.1. Personal Laws are in violation of Article 14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution
of Indos
1.2. Section 15 is not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Indos.
2. THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON MARRIAGE) ACT,

2019 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
2.1. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 does not
violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Indos.
2.2. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 does not
violate Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution of Indos
.
2.3. Section 4 and Section 6 of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Marriage) Act,2019 is not arbitrary and has legislative competency.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
(1) SECTION 15 OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
The Counsel for the Respondent respectfully submits that Section 15 of the Special
Marriage Act is constitutional on the grounds that certain provisions of the personal
laws are violative of Article 14 [2.1] and Section 15 of the Act is not in violation of
Article 14 under [2.2].
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K. M. &
Ors.1 while referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 2 and the
Puttaswamy3 case, the majority held
“21. The right to marry a person of one’s choice is integral to Article 21 of the
Constitution of Indos.”
It was propounded while referring to Shakti Vahini v. Union of India4 where the Court
opined that
“42.… It has to be sublimely borne in mind that when two adults consensually
choose each other as life partners, it is a manifestation of their choice which is
recognized under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Such a right has the
sanction of the constitutional law and once that is recognized, the said right
needs to be protected….”
It is evident from the judgments conferred under these two landmark cases, that the right
to marry is a fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of Indos.
The Special Marriage Act, 1954 was enacted to facilitate inter-caste and inter-religious
weddings, in which the couple is not needed to abandon their faith in order to marry.
Registration might even take place while they preserve their religious identity. The Act’s
1
A.I.R. 2018 S.C. 1933
2
Article 16
3
Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), And Anr v. Union Of India And Ors. (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1
4
(2018) 7 S.C.C. 192

Certificate of Registration has been regarded as universal evidence of marriage. As

stated in the Preamble, the Act allows for a special form of marriage in specific
circumstances, registration of such and other marriages, and divorce.
Indos being a secular State and secularism being a basic feature of the Constitution of
Indos, it is necessary that a singular permissive law, which is unbound by the shackles
of religion, is available as an alternative for those citizens who do not wish to follow the
rules and customs of their religion when it comes to matters relating to marriage and
divorce.
The chairman of the Joint Committee, Shri. C. C. Biswas stated that
“For the Government, the Special Marriage Bill was not just a bill of civil marriage but
had a certain symbolic significance. Article 44 of the Indian Constitution provides that
the State shall endeavor to make a uniform civil code. Naturally, the Government
expects the Special Marriage Bill to serve as ‘the first step in that direction’”. 5 Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru also said, ‘(i)t is a first step, or if you like a second step,
towards bringing about a certain uniformity in India. ... in the process of our building up
a nation in this country, it is essential that we should aim at a certain uniformity in
certain social observances’.6
The Special Marriage Act, 1954 is the first attempt in the sphere of marriage law toward
achieving the ideal of a Uniform Civil Code throughout the subcontinent.
In the recent case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India7, the dispute between Part III of the
Constitution and the Religious Personal Laws was raised again. There is no question of
interfering with Fundamental Rights. This is only a permissive measure. We are not
encouraging or compelling anybody to contravene the tenets of his religion. If any
person desires to have an inter-communal marriage, he is at liberty to do so. There is no
compulsion. There is no attempt here to provide that any person professing a particular
religion should be debarred from observing that faith.
5
LSD, 17 December 1953,col. 2423.
6
LSD, 14 September 1954, col. 1858.
7
(2017) 9 SCC 1

In the Shah Bano Begum case, a constitution bench headed by Y. V. Chandrachaud C. J.

held that
“A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing
disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies.”
(1.1) Personal Laws are in violation of Article 14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution
of Indos
In the recent judgment of Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala8, (also
known as Sabarimala judgment) the Supreme Court had finally exorcised the ghost of
Mali judgment9 and had held that customs and usages as well as personal laws are a part
of ‘laws in force’ under Article 13(1) and it will always be the right to equality which
will be given precedent upon the right to freedom of practice of religion. Hence it can be
tested for conformity with Part III of the Constitution. Whereas, the Special Marriage
Act was brought in under the head of Article 44, i.e., the directive principle of state
policy, namely the securing of a uniform civil code throughout the country”10.
Certain provisions under Personal laws may turn out to be discriminatory in nature. This
is purely because of the fact that these laws have originated from ancient times, and
certain provisions of these laws have still not yet adjusted to the ways in which Society
has evolved. Another loophole of personal laws is that they differ from religion to
religion and thus rights of every person differ according to their religion and this
inequality seriously violates Article 14.
(1.1.1) Disparities in Hindu Law

The goal of enacting Article 14 of the Constitution was to, among other things, erase
pre-existing disparities and limitations based on sex, like the Hindu women's right to
own property. As per the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court11,
8
(2018) 11 S.C.C. 1
9
The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, A.I.R. 1952 Bom 84
10
Mohd Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945
11
C. Masilamani Mudaliar v Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoil, (1996) 8 SCC
525

“The basic structure permeates equality of status and opportunity. The personal
laws conferring inferior status on women are anathema to equality. Personal
laws are derived not from the Constitution but from the religious scriptures. The
laws thus derived must be consistent with the Constitution, lest they became void
under Article 13 if they violated fundamental rights. The Right to equality is a
fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of Indos. The Parliament,
therefore, has enacted Section 14 to remove pre-existing disabilities fastened on
the Hindu female limiting her right to property without full ownership thereof.
The discrimination is sought to be remedied by Section 14(1) enlarging the
scope of acquisition of the property by a Hindu female appending an
explanation with it.”
Under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, the father was held as the
natural guardian of a Hindu child12. If a child was born out of wedlock, only then the
mother could be considered a natural guardian. But, in 2015, the Supreme Court held
that an unwed mother can legally become the sole guardian of a child 13. The apex court
held the consent of the biological father is not necessary for the mother to become the
legal guardian of the child. The Supreme Court observed that the father could not have
“a preferential right over the mother in the matter of guardianship.”
(1.1.2) Disparities in Christian Law
A married Christian woman is denied equal protection of the laws in two ways under
Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, as previously mentioned. First, she is
denied equal protection of the laws in relation to the grounds of divorce. First and
foremost, it deprives her of the other actual grounds for divorce that are accessible to
women who are married under other personal laws. Secondly, it distinguishes Christian
women as compared to Christian males only on the basis of sexual orientation. A
married woman is on an equal footing with other married women, regardless of the
religion to which she belongs or the legal framework under which she is wedded. A
12
S. 6 Indian Divorce Act, 1869
13
ABC v. State (NCT of Delhi)(2015) 10 SCC 1

Christian wife is denied of the basis for divorce -adultery, cruelty, desertion, and so on -
per se or simpliciter, which means that the above-mentioned three are not grounds for
divorce on their own; instead, she must prove incest 14 or bigamy, cruelty with adultery,
or desertion with adultery in order to obtain a divorce from her husband. As a result, the
burden of evidence15 is higher on a Christian wife claiming divorce than it is on any
other kind of wife. Also barred from claiming grounds for divorce are incurable insanity,
leprosy, venereal illnesses, the presumption of death, reciprocal consent, bigamy
simpliciter (simple marriage), impotency, seven-year incarceration, and other similar
circumstances.
In John Vallamattom v. Union of India16, Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act put
an embargo only on Christians on bequeathing property to charitable or religious uses.
The provision was challenged in the Supreme Court on the rationale of right to equality
and the court held that it violated Article 14 therefore the said provision was
declared ultra vires.
In accordance with Article 14, this leads to the denial of equality. This cannot be
rationalized as a legitimate categorization since it would amount to discrimination only
on the basis of religion, which is forbidden under Article 15 (1).
Section 10 has already been challenged in the case of Dwaraka Bai v Prof. Nainan17 in
this case; the Court confirmed the legality of the contract notwithstanding the obvious
disparity. In this particular case, Panchapakesa Ayyar J. made the following observation:
“I may also add that adultery by a wife is different from adultery by a husband.
A husband commits adultery somewhere but he does not bear a child as a result
of such adultery and make it a legitimate child of his wife's to be maintained by
the wife... But if the wife commits adultery she may bear a child as a result of
such adultery and the husband will have to treat it as his legitimate child... It is
obvious that this-very difference in the result of the adultery may form some
14
S. 3(6) Indian Divorce Act, 1869
15
S. 52 Indian Divorce Act, 1869
16
(2003) 6 S.C.C. 611
17
AIR 1953 Mad 792

grounds for requiring a wife, in a petition for divorce not only to prove adultery
by the husband but also desertion and cruelty, whereas the husband need only
prove adultery by the wife.” The act of adultery itself, rather than the outcome
of the conduct, is what the law recognises as a basis for divorce in most cases. If
this line of thinking is followed, then infidelity by husbands will never be a valid
basis for divorce. It is simply a reflection on the anti-women attitude of the
system that such double standards are allowed to continue. In the 1985 case
Jorden Diengdeh v S.S. Chopra28, the Supreme Court recommended a
comprehensive revision of the law of marriage and divorce, as well as the
establishment of a Uniform Civil Code, among other things.
(1.1.3) Disparities in Muslim Law
Under Muslim law, male heirs inherit double the property compared to female
counterparts since after getting married, females receive Mehr, and their husbands are
obliged to ‘maintain’ them. But on the other hand, male members have to maintain their
families, and the only source is their ancestral property. Also, if a husband dies of illness
before the consummation of marriage, then his widow has no right to her husband’s
ancestral property. But in Hindu law, everyone has the equal right in inheriting ancestral
property. Moreover, the deceased’s widow has an equal right as that of other heirs in
ancestral property.18 However, this was not the situation earlier under Mitakshra School.
Under the Mitakshra school, daughters had no right to inherit ancestral property. 19 Thus,
after the codification, Hindu personal law became more gender-neutral and adhered to
the right to equality.
In Mohammed Allahabad Khan vs Mohammed Ismail Khan,20 the court explicitly held
that Muslim law does not recognize adoption as Hindu law. Thus, the right of
inheritance of an adopted child under Muslims and Christians are severely restricted.
The same goes against the set international standards concerning adoption. To add onto
this, Polygamy has not been approved in any personal law except in Muslim Laws and
18
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956, (Act 30 of 1956), s.10.
19
Lata Mittal vs. UOI, JT 1987 (1) SC 339.
20
(1886) ILR 8 AII 234.

some tribal communities. This is because polygamy violates the right of the first wife
under Muslim law as her condition worsens after her husband’s subsequent marriages.
Usually, the husband’s income is not enough to maintain all his wives equally. In the
case of consummation, this affects the rearing of children. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Khursheed Ahmad Khan vs State of UP & Ors,21 decided that polygamy is not an
essential practice of Islam. Hence the state can bring reform under Art.25.
Also, according to Holy Quran: Muslim law recognises two types of divorces: judicial
and extra-judicial. Extra-judicial divorces consist of Ila, Zihar and Talaq-i-tafweez.
Under these divorces, a Muslim husband can unreasonably give irrevocable divorce to
his wife. Examples of irrevocable divorces are: when a husband compares his wife with
his mother or sister, when a husband takes an oath of not having sexual intercourse with
his wife for four months.22 All these cases result in the automatic pronouncement of
irrevocable divorce after the completion of the mandatory period. 23 Even the forms of
divorce where wives have rights like talaq-i-tafweez are required to be delegated by the
husband.24 But in Hindu law, there is no recognition of extra-judicial divorce. This
brings clarity and ensures justice under the judicial form of divorces through the court.
Thus, extra-judicial divorces under Muslim Personal law need to be abolished. In
Shayara Bano vs UOI & Ors,25 the SC abolished one form of extra-judicial divorce,
namely, talaq-i-biddat.
Likewise the uncodified personal laws are beyond the scrutiny of the Courts of Indos
making it arbitrary. Thus, in Conclusion, it can be ordained that the Personal Laws each
have its own sets of disparities, and even though some of the issues have been tackled, a
larger quantity of such orthodox disparities still exist.
(1.2) Section 15 is not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Indos.
21
SLP (C) No.5097 of 2012.
22
Lydia Suzanne Thomas, “Breaking: Muslim Woman Has the Right to invoke Extra-Judicial Divorce,
Rules Kerala High Court, Overrules About half-century Old Precedent” Live Law, Apr. 12, 2021.
23
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, “Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law”, Lexis Nexis, Ch. XVI, 22nd Ed.
24
Md. Khan vs. Shahamai, AIR 1972 J&K 8.
25
2017 9 S.C.C 1

The Special Marriage Act is one which has been formed, irrespective of caste and
religion. It does not create any form of classification between members of different
religions. It provides for a singular uniform law, for all those who choose to abide by the
rules of the same. The disparities prevailing in multiple personal laws have been evaded
through the provisions of the Special Marriage Act.
In Sarla Mudgal (Smt.), President, Kalyani and others v. Union of India and others 26,
Kuldip Singh, J., while delivering the judgment directed the government to implement
the directive of article 44 and to file an affidavit indicating the steps taken in the matter
and held that
" R.M. Shahai, J., while agreeing with Kuldip Singh, J., too agreed that "ours is
a Secular Democratic Republic. Freedom of religion is the core of our culture.
But religious practices, violative of human rights and dignity and sacerdotal
suffocation of essentiality civil and material freedoms, are not autonomy but
oppression."
In Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum27, popularly known as the Shah Bano's
case, the Supreme Court held that ,"It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our
Constitution has remained a dead letter." Despite section 127 of Cr PC, 1973 (which
provides that if a woman has received an amount under personal law, she would not be
entitled to maintenance under section 125 of Cr PC, 1973 after divorce) Muslim women
would be entitled to maintenance if amount received by her as "dower" under personal
law is not sufficient for her sustenance.
Though this decision was highly criticized by Muslim fundamentalists, yet it was
considered a liberal interpretation of law as required by gender justice. Later on, under
pressure from Muslim fundamentalists, the central government passed the Muslim
Women's (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which denied right of
maintenance to Muslim women under section 125 of Cr PC. The activists rightly
denounced that it "was doubtless a retrograde step. That also showed how women's
26
A.I.R. 1995 S.C 1531
27
A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 945

rights have a low priority even for the secular state of India. Autonomy of a religious
establishment was thus made to prevail over women's rights."
India has also signed the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 28 and
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women29. So, under these conventions, India has to make sure that everyone is treated
the same and stop any discrimination based on race, religion, sex 30, etc. But, on the other
hand, religious dogmas that show up in personal laws in India still keep women in their
place. And this is because the government and the courts follow the principle of "non-
interference" in religious matters. But this policy goes against the Constitution and basic
human rights. It also goes against international agreements. Also, India's policy of not
getting involved in the personal laws of another religion was backed up in a report from
the United Nations31. But it's important to know that this isn't always the best way to
protect religious freedom. For example, the CEDAW made comments on several reports
from India. One of these was: "India hasn't done anything to fix the fact that its personal
laws are unfair and discriminatory, which violates basic human rights." CEDAW allow
India to make a reservation32. This is what India did when it signed the treaty. India also
said that it would only follow the treaty's rules if it didn't go against its policy of not
getting involved in personal laws.
In the Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) & Ors. v. Union of India 33, the court
felt that a uniform law, though is might desirable, enactment thereof in one go perhaps
may be counter-productive to unity and integrity of the nation. In a democracy governed
by rule of law, gradual progressive change and order should be brought about.
Therefore, in order to abide by this, and to not cause any derogation to the pre-existing
personal laws, the Special Marriage Act has been implemented.
28
Hereinafter ICCPR
29
Hereinafter CEDAW
30
Article 26, ICCPR
31
. United Nations, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Supp.
No. 38, A/55/38, 22nd Session 17 Jan-4 Feb 2000 and 23rd Session 12-30 June 2000, General Assembly
Official Records, New York, 2000 at 8.
32
Articles 5(a) and 16(1)
33
(1997) 3 S.C.C. 573

In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 34 that the Court laid bare a new dimension of
Article 14 and pointed out that Article has highly activist magnitude and it embodies a
guarantee against arbitrariness. In the decision, Bhagwati, J. said that :
“The basic principle which therefore informs both Articles 14 and 16 is equality
and inhibition against discrimination. It is a founding faith, to use the words of
Bose, J., “a way of life”, and it must not be subjected to a narrow pedantic or
lexicographic approach. We cannot countenance any attempt to truncate its all-
embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist
magnitude.
Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot
be “cribbled, cabined and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire limits.
From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact,
equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a
republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where
an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political
logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and if it affects
any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art. 16. Articles
14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality
of treatment.”
It is to be noted here that the Special Marriage Act is merely a permissive one and not a
mandatory rule to be followed by all the citizens of Indos. Section 15 of the Special
Marriage Act, 1954 provides the citizens of Indos, with a choice to either opt for their
personal laws, and abide by them, or to register their pre-existing marriage under the
Special Marriage Act and to follow the secular rules provided by the legislature. By not
making these laws mandatory, Section 15 does not interfere with the fundamental right
of freedom of religion, conferred under Article 25 of Part III of the Constitution of
Indos, which in turn does not provide any arbitrary powers to the provisions of the
Special Marriage Act.
34
A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555

In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar35, the Supreme Court held that:
“It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does
not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. It condemns
discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.”
Since Section 15 does not make a condition that the citizens who are willing to register
their solemnized marriage under the Special marriage act should be of different
religions or of the same religion, it does not make for any form of classification between
any groups of people. It is an Act created irrespective of religion and caste.
Since, the section does not make any classification on the basis of religion and does not
provide any arbitrary powers to interfere with the provisions of the personal laws, it is
not in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of Indos.
Therefore, the counsel for the respondents humbly contends that Secion 15 of the
Special Marriage Act, 1954, is not in derogation of personal laws and not arbitrary.
Hence Section 15 is constitutionally valid.
35
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar

(2) THAT THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON

MARRIAGE) ACT,2019 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
It is humbly submitted before this Honorable Supreme Court that the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 is constitutionally valid.
Under the "Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill" triple talaq will be
viewed as a criminal movement and man can get up to three-year detainment. The
support for Muslim women will be left at the tact of justice. Talaq-ul-biddat has been a
source of severe oppression and injustice for Muslim women. The practice results in the
unilateral breakdown of a marriage at the whim of the husband. The talaq-ul-biddat or
instantaneous and irrevocable divorce (‘triple talaq’) is one of the modes under the
Muslim law through which a marriage is dissolved. It is pronounced by a declaration of
talaq repeated three times at short intervals or even in immediate succession 36.
In August 2017,this honorable court had pronounced the Islamic routine with regards to
moment separate through triple talaq as unlawful, illicit, and void and not ensured by
Article 25 (flexibility of religion) of the Constitution wherein it was held that triple
talaq is plainly discretionary and violative of the constitution and key directly under
Article 14 (equity under the steady gaze of law) so it must be struck down37.
A.1. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 does not
violate Article 25 of the Constitution of Indos.
Article 25(1) of the Constitution of Indos states,
“Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part,
all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practice and propagate religion38.”
36
M. HIDAYATULLAH ET. AL, MULLA PRINCIPLES OF MAHOMEDAN LAW 258 (19 ed. 1990)
37
Shayara Bano v. Union of India 2017 9 S.C.C 1
38
Article 25(1), Constitution of Indos,1950.

The terms ‘public order’,’ morality’ and ‘health’ has been given a broad spectrum of
definitions by the Apex Court in a plethora of cases. Where it is subject to public order,
morality and health, the state is entitled to curtail the rights enlisted under this provision.
Article 25 of the Constitution which confers the right to practice, preach and propagate
religion are "subject to the provisions of Part III", which means that it is subject to
Articles 14 and 15 which guarantee equality and non-discrimination. In other words,
under our secular Constitution, the right to the freedom of religion is subject to and in
that sense, subservient to other fundamental rights such as the right to equality, the right
to non-discrimination and the right to a life with dignity. Like all other Fundamental
Rights, it is subject to restrictions and does not protect religious practices that can
negatively affect the welfare of citizens. Hence, Article 25 is overridden by Article 14,
which guarantees the Right to Equality as triple talaq denies a Muslim woman equality
before the law. Article 25 is also subject to Article 15 (1) which states that “The State
shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex,
place of birth or any of them39”
The pronouncement of triple talaq is derogatory to the women of the Islam faith and
allows discrimination against women on the grounds of sex. Therefore, the counsel for
the Respondent humbly submits before this honorable court that the pronouncement of
talaq-ul-biddat violates Article 15 (1) of the Constitution.
However, Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937
recognises triple talaq as a statutory right, bringing it under the ambit of Article 13 of
the Constitution. Article 13 defines the term ‘law’ and states that all laws, framed before
or after the Constitution, shall not be violative of fundamental rights enshrined under
Part III of the Constitution of Indos.
The Supreme Court in the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India40 for the first time, set
aside triple talaq as a manifestly arbitrary practice. The Court held it not to be an
‘essential religious practice’ under Article 25 of the Constitution of India. Even prior to
this judgment, several High Courts had adopted a critical approach towards the practice.
39
State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan A.I.R. 1951 S.C.C. 226
40
Supra n.2

In Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum41, the Honorable Gauhati High Court analysed the
concept of talaq under Muslim law and concluded that it does not allow instantaneous
and irrevocable triple talaq42. The Court also stated that the correct law of talaq as
ordained by the Holy Quran is that it must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by
attempts at reconciliation. This position was reiterated by this Court in Rukia Khatun v.
Abdul Khalique Laskar43. In Nazeer v. Shemeema44, the Kerala High Court reached the
conclusion that triple talaq in one utterance is not valid according to Quranic
injunction45.
Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees religious freedom as Freedom of Practice and

Propagation of Religion. Like all other Fundamental Rights, it is subject to restrictions
and does not protect religious practices that can negatively affect the welfare of citizens.
 Hence, Article 25 is overridden by Article 14, which guarantees the Right to Equality
as triple talaq denies a Muslim woman, equality before the law. Article 25 is also
subject to Article 15 (1) which states that “the State shall not discriminate against any
citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex”46
It is therefore submitted before the Honorable Supreme Court “the triple talaq” does not
work in the favour of women, it clearly violates Article 15 (1) of the Constitution.
However, section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937
recognises triple talaq as a statutory right, bringing it under the ambit of Article 13 of
the Constitution. The Indian Constitution defines 'law' and says that all laws, framed
before or after the Constitution, shall not be in violation of fundamental rights.47
A.2. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 does not
violate Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution of Indos.
41
1981 1 Gau L.R. 358
42
Id.
43
1981 1 Gau :L.R. 375
44
2017 1 K.L.T. 300
45
Id.
46
Article 15(1) , Constitution of Indos,1950
47
Article 13 ,Constitution of Indos,1950.

Article 14 of the Constitution of Indos states that:
” The State shall not deny to any person equality before law or the equal protection of
laws within the territory of Indos.”
Though Article 14 mandates that State shall not discriminate between similarly situated
persons, that does not mean that all persons should be subjected to similar treatment.
Article 14 prescribes equality before law, but the fact remains that all the persons are not
equal in nature, attainment, or circumstances, and therefore, mechanical equality before
the law may result in injustice. Thus, the guarantee against the denial of equal protection
of the law does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made
applicable to the persons despite the differences in circumstances or conditions.
A Legislature is entitled to make reasonable classification for purposes of legislation

and treat all-in-one class on an equal footing. The Supreme Court has reiterated this
principle in the case of Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Corporation Limited V.
State of Uttar Pradesh 48:
“Article 14 of the constitution ensures equality among equals: its aim is to protect
persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not however operate
against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal
treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some
were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the law.”
When the validity of legislation is challenged on the ground of violation of Article 14,
each case must be examined independently in the context of Article 14, and not by
applying any general rule. Article 14 declares equality of rights to all persons within the
territory of India and enjoins equal protection to all persons in the enjoyment of their
rights and liberties without discrimination or favoritism.
Article 14 forbids class legislation and not reasonable classification of persons, objects,
and transactions by the Legislature for the purpose of achieving specific ends. When
48
1969 1 S.C.C. 87

there is no reasonable basis for classification, such classification may be declared

discriminatory49 .
Classification to be reasonable should fulfill the following 2 tests:
a. It should not be arbitrary, artificial, or evasive. It should be based on an

intelligible differentia, some real and substantial distinction, which distinguishes
persons or things grouped together in the class from others left out of it.
b. The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have a rational or

reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the statute in
question.
The Act of 2019 satisfies both the grounds of reasonable classification:
a. All the Muslims domiciled under the territory of Indos are subjected to the
provisions of the Act. A substantial distinction is made between the followers of
Islam and others.
b. The differentia adopted as the basis of classification has a rational and

reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act of 2019, i.e.,
to protect the rights of married Muslim women and to prohibit divorce by
pronouncing talaq by their husbands and to provide for matters connected
therewith or incidental thereto50.
The counsel for the respondent thus humbly submits before this honorable court that the
reasonable classification has been made between the believers of Islam and others and
therefore the Act of 2019 has passed the test for arbitrariness.
The Supreme Court has explained in Re Special Courts Bill:
49
S. Seshachalam v. Bar Council of Tamil Nadu 2014 16 S.C.C.72
50
Object, the Muslim Women(Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019.

“The differentia which is the basis of classification and the Act are distinct things and
what is necessary is that there must be nexus between them.”
The Supreme Court has also observed in K. Thimmappa v. Chairman Central Board of
Directors51,
“When a law is challenged to be discriminatory essentially on the ground that it denies

equal treatment or protection, the question for determination by the court is not whether
it has resulted in inequality but whether there is some difference which bears a just and
reasonable relation to the object of legislation. Mere differentiation does not per se
amount to discrimination within the inhibition of the equal protection clause. To attract
the operation of the clause it is necessary to show that the selection or differentiation is
unreasonable or arbitrary, that it does not rest on any rational basis having regard to
the object which the legislature has in view.”
Similarly, in Union of India v. MV Valliappan52, the Supreme Court observed that,
“It is settled law that differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a rational
nexus on the basis of which differentiation has been made with the object sought to be
achieved by particular provision, then such differentiation is not discriminatory and
does not violate the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution.”
Therefore, it is submitted before this honorable court that the classification made in the
enforcement of the Act of 2019 is reasonable, unarbitrary and in accordance with the
principles of reasonable classification. Hence, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights
on Marriage) Act,2019 does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Indos.
Article 21 of the Constitution of Indos states that:
“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law.53”
51
2001 2 S.C.C. 259
52
1999 6 S.C.C. 259
53
Article 21, Constitution of Indos,1950

It was laid down in Dhairandra Kumar Mandal Vs. the Superintendent &
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to the Government of West Bengal & Anr54 that,
"Where one procedure is prescribed for everybody but the parties are allowed to follow
another procedure if they voluntarily so elect the law cannot be said to be
discriminatory."
In the case of Chiranjeet Lal vs. Union of India55 this honorable court established that
"equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be
no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of
the legislation their position is substantially the same."
The believers of Islam in Indos are governed by their respective personal laws. Since
there is a substantive difference between the believers of different religions, they cannot
be classified as equals and they can be procedurally discriminated.
Therefore, it is the humble submission before this honorable court that the Act of 2019
does not violate Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Constitution of Indos.
A.3. Section 4 and Section 6 of The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on

Marriage) Act,2019 is not arbitrary and has legislative competency.
Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,2019 reads,
“Punishment for pronouncing talaq.: Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq
referred to in section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine”.
The object of the Act of 2019 is to protect the rights of Muslim Women on their
marriage. The punishment imposed under the Act is to be of deterrent effect since there
54
1955 1 S.C.R. 224
55
A.I.R. 1951 SC 41

are no alternative remedial measures available to the victims against the pronouncement
of triple talaq.
As regards arbitrariness, the meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily
visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is
arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be answered on the facts and circumstances of a given
case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle
emerging from impugned act and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness?56
In the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi V Union Of India57, the SC has

emphasized that "The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as
philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades
Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21
must answer the best of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14. It
must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it
would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied."
In the case of judicial discretion, as differentiated from administrative discretion, the

requirement of strict guidelines is not an indispensable requisite. In Ramji Dayawala
and sons Vs. Invest Import 58 Supreme Court while considering the question of judicial
Discretion observed,
"When applied to a court of justice, it means sound discretion guided by law. It must be
governed by rule, not by humor, it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal
and regular"
56
Shri Lekha Vidhyarth v. State of U.P. A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 537
57
A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597
58
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2005

Discretionary power given without providing adequate guidelines for the exercise of the
same becomes arbitrary and unreasonable. As regards the guidelines, it has been laid
down by the Supreme Court in Chandrakant Saha vs. Union of India59 of India that,
“As regards laying down principles of guiding norms, it has been held, for instance,
that it is not essential the very section in the statute which confers the power should
also lay down the rules of guidance, or the policy for the administrator to follow. If the
same can be gathered from the preamble or the long title of the statute and other
provisions therein, the discretion would not be regarded as uncontrolled or unguided
and the statute in question will not be invalid. At times, even vague policy statements to
guide administrative discretion have been held by the courts as complying with Article
14 of the Constitution"
Judicial Discretion is the very important part of sentencing of punishments because

every offence is provided with the wide range of punishment and the gravity of the
offence decides the sentencing of punishment and that gravity of the offence has to be
decided by the judge based on the fact and circumstances of the case and the judicial
mind is applied to it in order to give an appropriate sentence various case laws speaks
about the necessity and importance of Judicial Discretion.
In the case of Jagmohan Singh v. State of UP60 Supreme Court while considering the
question of judicial discretion held that "the impossibility of laying down standards in
the matter of sentencing is at the very core of criminal law as administered in India
which invests the judges with a very wide discretion in the matter of fixing degree of
punishments and that this discretion as a matter of sentence is liable to be corrected by
superior courts.....the Exercise of Judicial Discretion on well recognized principles is,
in the final analysis, the safest possible safeguard for accused.”
The standardization of sentencing process leaves little room for judicial discretion and
sacrifices justice at the altar of blind uniformity61. The apex court while examining the
59
1979 1 S.C.C. 285
60
1973 2 S.C.R. 541
61
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898

constitutionality of the discretionary power for giving anticipatory bails given to the
sessions and high court in the case of Gurubaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab62 held,
"...No two cases are alike on facts and therefore, courts have to be allowed to a little
free play in joints if the conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is
no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the court of Session and High court...
judicial. discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its
stride and to meet these challenges"
In Mithu V. State of Punjab63, the Supreme court while considering the question of
constitutionality of Section 303 of IPC struck it down and reckoned it is unconstitutional
as the impugned section did not provide any scope of discretion on the part of the
judiciary. Thus after analyzing all the above judgments pronounced by the apex court
one can easily say that Judicial Discretion is the infallible symptom of constitutional
assembly and reckoning the same as unconstitutional will adjacent to the interest of the
judiciary.
Additionally, the principle of judicial discretion under the separation of powers vested
with the adjudicating authorities. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act,1958
reads,
“Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.—(1) When

any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion
that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence
and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good
conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being
in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that
he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and
62
A.I.R. 1978 S.C.1514
63
A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 473

receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the
court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:
Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied
that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation
in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely
to live during the period for which he enters into the bond64.”
The same has been upheld in a plethora of cases65. When a Muslim man is convicted
under Section 4 of the Act of 2019 for the pronouncement of triple talaq, the convict can
be released on probation under surety in consideration to the facts and circumstances of
the case and under the unarbitrary discretion of the adjudicating authority.
Hence, it is humbly submitted before this honorable court that the Section 4 of the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019 is not arbitrary in nature
and therefore has legislative competency.
64
Section 4, Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
65
Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 444; see also -Ramji Missir v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1963
S.C. 1088; Ishar Das v. State of Punjab 1973 S.C.C. (Cri) 708; Sathyaban Kishore v. State of Bihar 1972 3
S.C.C. 350 ;

PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced, legal precedents,
authorities cited, and in light of the provisions of the Constitution applied; may this
Hon’ble Court be pleased to adjudge and declare that
A. THE SECTION 15 OF THE SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT IS

CONSTITUTIONAL.
B. THE MUSLIM WOMEN (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS ON MARRIAGE) ACT

IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
AND/OR
Pass any other Order, Direction, or Relief that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the
interests of justice, equity and good conscience.
For this act of Kindness, the Respondents, as in duty bound, shall humbly pray
Place: Sd/-
Date: (Counsel for the Respondents)

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DR. D.

ADV. T. P. ARAVINDAKSHAN MEMORIAL ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDOS

S. No. CONTENTS Pg. No.

4. ARTICLES, JOURNALS, AND REPORTS 7

8. STATUTES, RULES, COMMENTARIES 10

10. STATEMENT OF FACTS 13

11. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 15

12. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 16

13. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT 2|Page

3. AIHC – All India High Court Cases

4. AIR – All India Reporter

6. All ER – All England Reporter

10. Bom.- Bombay

13. CHN – Calcutta High Court Notes

15. Doc.- Document

16. Edn - Edition

17. UP-uttar pradesh

18. Hon’ble- honourable

19. http - Hypertext Transfer Protocol

20. Mad- madras

21. Ltd - Limited

22. MANU - manupatra

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT 3|Page

23. Ori – orrisa

24. Ors – Others

26. Para.- Paragraph

27. Refd -. Referred

29. SC - Supreme Court of Indi

30. SCC – Supreme Court Cases

31. SCR – Supreme Court Reporter

32. SCW – Supreme Court Weekly

34. Sub-ss - Sub Sections

35. Supp – Supplementary

36. U.P – Uttar Pradesh

38. Vol - Volume

39. www. - World Wide Web

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT 4|Page

S.No CASES REFERRED CITATION

1. ABC v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2015) 10 SCC 1

2. Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) & (1997) 3 S.C.C. 573

3. C. Masilamani Mudaliar v Idol of Sri (1996) 8 SCC 525

4. Chiranjeet Lal vs. Union of India A.I.R. 1951 SC 41

5. Dhairandra Kumar Mandal Vs. the 1955 1 S.C.R. 224

6. Dwaraka Bai v Prof. Nainan AIR 1953 Mad 792

7. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 555

8. Nazeer v. Shemeema 2017 1 K.L.T. 300

9. Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala (2018) 11 S.C.C. 1

10. Ishar Das v. State of Punjab 1973 S.C.C. (Cri) 708;

11. Jiauddin Ahmed v. Anwara Begum 1981 1 Gau L.R. 358

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RESPONDENT 5|Page

12. John Vallamattom v. Union of India (2003) 6 S.C.C. 611

13. Justice K S Puttaswamy (Retd.), And Anr v. (2017) 10 SCC 1

14. K. Thimmappa v. Chairman Central Board of 2001 2 S.C.C. 259

16. Lata Mittal vs. UOI JT 1987 (1) SC 339.

17. Mohammed Allahabad Khan vs Mohammed (1886) ILR 8 AII 234

20. Ramji Missir v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1088;

21. Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 444;

24. Sathyaban Kishore v. State of Bihar 1972 3 S.C.C. 350 ;

26. Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018) 7 S.C.C. 192

27. Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1