ProDigiSign CPS
ProDigiSign CPS
ProDigiSign CPS
(CPS)
Version 4.0.0
29th June, 2022
OID: 2.16.356.100.1.
2.16.356.100.1.26.2
Professional DigiS
DigiSign Private Limited
Certifying Authority
Office No
No-238 2nd Floor, Patil Plaza, DEEPAK Digitally signed by
DEEPAK KUMAR
CERTIFICA
IFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT
Table of Contents
Definitions................................................................
................................................................................................
........................................................... 9
1. Introduction ................................
................................................................................................................................
................................... 12
1.1. Overview of CPS ................................................................................................................................
................................ .................................12
1.2. Identification ................................................................................................................................
................................ .......................................13
1.3. PKI Participants ................................................................................................................................
................................ .................................13
1.3.1. PKI Authorities ................................
................................................................................................................................
.......................................... 13
1.3.2. PKI Services................................
................................................................................................................................
............................................... 14
1.3.3. Registration Authority (RA) and Organizational Registration Authority (ORA) ...................................... ................................ 16
1.3.4. Subscribers ................................................................................................................................
................................ ................................................. 16
1.3.5. Relying Parties ................................
................................................................................................................................
........................................... 16
1.3.6. Applicability ................................................................................................................................
................................ .............................................. 16
1.4. Certificate Usage ................................................................................................................................
................................ .................................17
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Usees ................................................................................................
...................................................... 17
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses................................
................................................................................................
......................................................... 18
1.5. Policy Administration ................................................................................................
................................ .........................................................18
1.5.1. Organization administering stering the ddocument................................................................................................
.................................. 18
1.5.2. Contact Person ................................
................................................................................................................................
........................................... 18
1.5.3. Person Determining Certifica cation Practice Statement Suitability for the Policy .......................................
................................ 18
1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ................................
................................................................................................
.......................................................... 18
1.5.5. Waivers ................................................................................................................................
................................ ...................................................... 18
2. Publication & PKI Repository Responsibilities................................................................
.......................................... 19
2.1. PKI Repositories ................................................................................................................................
................................ .................................19
2.1.1. Repository Obligations ................................
..............................................................................................................................
.............................. 19
2.2. Publication of Certificatee Info
Information..............................................................................................
..............................19
2.2.1. Publication of CA Informati tion................................................................................................
................................................... 19
2.2.2. Interoperability ................................
................................................................................................................................
........................................... 19
2.3. Publication of Certificate Information
Info ..............................................................................................
..............................19
2.4. Access Controls on PKI Reposito
ositories ................................................................................................
................................19
3. Identification & Authentication
n ................................................................................................
................................... 20
3.1. Naming ................................................................
................................................................................................
.................................................20
3.1.1. Types of Names ................................................................................................................................
................................ ......................................... 20
3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meanin aningful ................................................................................................
............................................. 20
3.1.3. Anonymity of Subscribers................................
................................................................................................
.......................................................... 20
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various ous Name
N Forms ..............................................................................................
.............................. 20
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................................................................................................................
................................ ................................. 20
3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication
ication & Ro Role of Trademarks ................................................................
.................................................. 20
3.1.7. Name Claim Dispute Resoluution Procedure ...............................................................................................
............................... 21
3.2. Initial Identity Validation ................................
................................................................................................
..................................................21
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession
ssion of Private Key...............................................................................................
............................... 21
3.2.2. Authentication of Organizati tion user Identity ................................................................
............................................................. 21
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual
ual Identity ................................................................................................
......................................... 21
3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Info
nformation ................................................................................................
......................................... 22
3.2.5. Validation of Authority ................................
..............................................................................................................................
.............................. 22
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
Definitions
The following definitions are to be used while reading this CPS. Unless otherwise specified, the word
“CA” used throughout this document refers to FuturiQ Systems Pvt Ltd. CA, likewise CPS means
CPS of FuturiQ Systems Pvt Ltd. Words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in
the Information Technology Act, 2000 and subsequent amendments, hereafter referred to as the ACT
shall have the meaning respectively assigned to them in the Act.
The following terms shall bear the meanings assigned to them hereunder and such definitions shall be
applicable to both the singular and plural forms of such terms:
“Auditor"" means any accredited computer security professional or agency recognized and engaged by
CCA for conducting audit of operation of CA;
“CA Infrastructure” The architecture, organization, techniques, practices, and procedures that
collectively support the implementation and operation of the CA. It includes a set of policies,
processes, server platforms, software and workstations, used for the purpose of administering Digital
Signature Certificates and keys.
"CA Verification Officer"" means trusted person involved in identity and address verification of DSC
applicant and according approval for issuance of DSC.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL))—A periodically (or exigently) issued list, diggitally signed by a
Certifying Authority, of identified Digital
D Signature Certificates that have been
n suspended
suspend or revoked
prior to their expiration dates.
Crypto Token/Smart Card— A hhardware cryptographic device used for generrating and storing
user’s private key(s) and containing
ontaining a public key certificate, and, optionally, a cache of other
certificates, including all certificates
tes in tthe user's certification chain.
"Digital Signature" means authent ntication of any electronic record by a subscribeer by means of an
electronic method or procedure in acccordance with the provisions of section 3 of IT
T Act;
A
“Digital Signa ture Certificate Applicant” or “DSC Applicant” —A person rson that requests
the issuance of a Digital Signature Ceertificate by a Certifying Authority.
“Digital Signature Certificate App plication” or “DSC Application” —A requeest from a Digital
Signature Certificate applicant to a CA f o r the issuance of a Digital Signature Certifi
rtificate
Digital Signature Certificate—Meaans a Digital Signature Certificate issued under sub- section (4) of
section 35 of the Information Technolo
ology Act, 2000.
“ESP” or “eSign Service Provider”” is a Trusted Third Party as per definition in Sec
econd Schedule of
Information Technology Act to prov
ovide eSign service. ESP is operated within n CA Infrastructure &
empanelled by CCA to provide Online
ne Electronic Signature Service.
“Private Key" means the key of a keey pair used to create a digital signature;
"Public Key" means the key of a keey pair used to verify a digital signature and liisted in the Digital
Signature Certificate;
“Relying Party Agreement” Terrms and conditions published by CA for the acceptance
of certificate issued or facilitated
ted the digital signature creation.
"Subscriber Identity Verification method" means the method used for the he verification
v of the
information (submitted by subscribriber) that is required to be included in the Digital Signature
Certificate issued to the subscriber in accordance with CPS. CA follows the Ideentity Verification
Guidelines laid down by Controller.
Time Stamping Service: A servicee provided by CA to its subscribers to indica cate the correct date
and time of an action, and identity off the person or device that sent or received
ived the time
ti stamp.
Time Stamp—A notation that ind indicates (at least) the correct date and time of an action, and
identity of the person or device that ssent or received the time stamp.
ii. Duties directly involving the issuance, renewal, suspension, revocation of Digital Signature
Certificates (including the identification
identifi of any person requesting a Digital Sig
gnature Certificate
from a licensed Certifying Authority),
Autho creation of private keys or adminisnistration of CA’s
computing facilities.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
1. Introduction
India PKI is a hierarchical PKI with the trust chain starting from the Root Certifying Authority of
India (RCAI). RCAI is operated by the Office of Controller of Certifying Authorities,
Government of India. Below RCAI there are Certifying Authorities (CAs) licensed by CCA to
issue Digital Signature Certificates under the provisions of IT Act. These are also called Licensed
CAs. ProDigiSign CA is a Licensed CA under RCAI.
i. intended to be applica
cable to and is a legally binding document betw tween the CA, the
Subscribers, the applica
cants, the Relying Parties, employees and contrac
actors; and
ii. intended to serve ass notice to all parties within the context of the CA CPS
C
CPS refers to the various reequirements specified under the following guidelines
uidelines issued by
CCA
i. The identity Verificaation Guidelines [CCA-IVG]: For the identitty verification for
different types of certifi
rtificates like personal, organizational person, enncryption, system
certificate etc.
ii. Interoperability Guideelines for DSC [CCA-IOG]: For the certificate te profile, including
content and format of the certificates, key usage, extended key usage etc.
iii. X.509 Certificate Polic icy for India PKI [CCA-CP]: Assurance Class, Certificate policy
id, validity of certifica
cates, key size, algorithm, storage requirements,
nts, audit parameters
etc.
Certification Practice Statement
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v. Security Requirements
ments for Crypto Devices [CCA-CRYPTO]: The crypto device
management & securitty requirements for holding subscribers’ private
te key
k
1.2. Identification
The following are the levelss of assurance defined in the Certificate Poli licy. Each level of
assurance has an OID that cann be asserted in certificates issued by CA if the
he certificate
ce issuance
meets the requirements for that
hat assurance level. The OIDs are registered under the CCA are as
follows:
1.3.1.2. CA
ProDigiSign CA is also empanelled for providing eSign Services. The DSCs are issued
to applicants
nts for the purpose of document signing provided through eSign Services of
CA. The applicants are electronically authenticated to the eKYC services of CA or other
specified eKYC services by CCA. CA provides direct interface to applicant for
providing authentication
ntication information and also for accessing eKYC information retained
in the CA eKYC database. CA issues short validity Digital Signature Certificates of 30
minutes to eSign users directly. After generation of DSC and signature creation, ESP of
CA ensures that the private keys are destroyed immediately. The subscriber's private key
storage requirements are not applicable in this mode of DSC issuance.
CA does not suspend or revoke eKYC classes of Digital Signature Certificates. However
the CA maintains a null
ull Certificate Revocation List (CRL) in its repository to satisfy the
requirements of relying party applications. CRL is signed by issuing CA. Similarly re- re
key and renewal are not applicable to eKYC class of Digital Signature Certificates.
Once the verification of applicant is carried out and recorded in the CA eKY
eKYC database,
the issuance of eKYC classes of DSC are implemented in automated environment with a
requirement of authentication of applicant to eKYC database. Issuance of eKYC classes
and Class 1-3
3 of DSCs are carried out from separate certificate issuance ssystems.
The users of Application Service Provider (ASP) interface with ESP of CA for Signature
and DSC issuance through ASP gateway. ASPs are registered with ESP of CA after a
verification process. CA verifies the source of request and authenticates users directly
for each certificate request received from ASP before DSC issuance. Certificates are
electronically verified to ensure that all the fields and extensions are properly populated.
The certificates are of one time use and the issued certificates are archived. Private keys
Certification Practice Statement
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v. Time Stamping Servicee: CA Provides Time Stamping Service in accoordance with CCA-
TSP.
1.3.4. Subscribers
A Subscriber is the entity w whose name appears as the subject in a certifficate, who asserts
that it uses its key and cert
rtificate in accordance with the certificate policy
cy asserted in the
certificate, and who does not
ot itself issue certificates.
A Relying Party is the entityy that relies on the validity of the binding of the Subscriber's name
to a public key. The Relyingng Party is responsible for deciding whether or how to check the
validity of the certificate by
b checking the appropriate certificate status information. The
Relying Party can use the ce certificate to verify the integrity of a digitallyy signed message,
or to identify the creator of a message. A Relying Party may use information on in the certificate
(such as certificate policy identifiers) to determine the suitability of the he certificate for a
particular use.
1.3.6. Applicability
ProDigiSign CA issues the following classes of certificates. The Assurance level and
Applicability as defined under India PKI CP is given below
Assurance
Assurance Applicab
cability
Level
Class 1 Class 1 certifi
rtificates shall be issued for This provides a basicc level of assurance
both businesss personnel
pe and private relevant to environmen
ents where there are
individualss use.
us These certificates will risks and consequenequences of data
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
confirm that
hat the information in the compromise, but they
hey aare not considered
application prrovided by the subscriber to be of major significanc
cance.
does not connflict with the information
in well-recogn
ecognized consumer databases.
These certifica
cates will be issued for both This level is relevant
ant to environments
Class 2 business pe
personnel and private where risks and cons nsequences of data
individuals usse. These certificates will compromise are mode oderate. This may
confirm that the information in the include transactions
ons ha
having substantial
application prrovided by the subscriber monetary value or risk of fraud, or
does not confli
flict with the information in involving access to private information
well-recognized
zed con
consumer databases. where the likelihood
hood of malicious access
is substantial
Class 3 This certificacate will be issued to This level is relevant
ant to environments
individuals ass well as organizations. As where threats to datta are high or the
these are high gh aassurance certificates, consequences of the failure of security
primarily inttended for e-commerce services are high.
gh. This may include very
applications,
ons, they shall be issued to high value transactions
ons or high levels of
individualss ononly on their personal fraud risk.
(physical)) appea
appearance before the
Certifying Autthorities.
eKYC- eKYC - Single Factor class of This level is relevant to environments
Single certificates shall be issued based on where Single Factor authentication to
Factor Single Factor authentication of eKYC service is acceptable method for
subscriber to the applicable eKYC credential verification prior to issuance of
services. DSC. Certificate holder's
older's private keys are
These certificates will confirm that the created on hardware and destroyed
information in Digital Signature immediately after one time usage at this
certificate provided by the subscriber is assurance level.
samee as information retained in the
eKYC databases pertaining to the
subscriber.
eKYC- eKYC - Multi Factor class of certificates This level is relevant to environments
environ
Multi shall be issued based on Multi Factor where Multi Factor authentication to
Factor authentication of subscriber to the eKYC service is acceptable method for
applicable eKYC services. These credential verification prior to issuance of
certificates will confirm that the DSC. Certificate holder's private keys are
information in Digital Signature created on hardware and destroyed
certificate provided by the subscriber is immediately after one time usage at this
same as information retained in the assurance level.
eKYC databases pertaining to the
subscriber.
Phone: +91-(020)49105678
(020)49105678
Email: info@prodigisign.com
The CCA approve CPS of thhe CA and auditor’s assessment will also be taken
aken into account.
1.5.5. Waivers
1. Certificate Revocation
on List (CRL) issued by the Licensed CA
2. Digital Signature Certifi
rtificates issued by CA
https://prodigisign.com/repository/
2.2.1. Publication of CA In
nformation
2.2.2. Interoperability
See Section 2.1.
3.1. Naming
(iii) The common name rep epresents the subscriber in a way that is easily
y understandable
unde by
humans. For people, thiis will typically be a legal name. For equipmenent, this may be a
model name and serial nu
number, or an application process
Rules for interpreting name fforms shall be in accordance with applicable Standa
andards.
No stipulation.
The CA resolves any name co collisions (in association with serial number or unique identifier)
brought to its attention that m
may affect interoperability or trustworthiness.
In all cases where the DSC applicant named in a certificate generates its ow
wn keys that DSC
applicant is required to prove
ve possession of the private key, which corresponds
ponds to the public
key in the certificate request
st. This will be performed by the DSC applicant
cant using its private
key to sign a value and prooviding that value to the issuing CA. The CA then validates the
signature using the DSC applilicant public key.
7. Identity is established by
b in-person proofing before CA or equivalent
ent mechanism like
Aadhaar authenticationon or online Video Verification. To confirfirm identities; the
information provided
ded by whom is verified to ensure legitimacy.
3.2.3.1. Authentication
uthentication of Component Identities
1. Equipment identification
on (e.g., serial number)
CA does not include non-verrified Information provided by DSC applicant inn certificates.
ce
Certificates that contain expplicit or implicit organizational affiliation are issued only after
ascertaining the applicant
cant has the authorization to act on behalf of the organization
o in the
asserted capacity. The procedu edure followed by CA to establish the applicancant’s affiliation to
organization is as specified uunder CCA-IVG.
The subscribers havee to undergo fresh identity-proofing process for f the period for
which the certificatee has been issued. The maximum time for which ch initial identity-
proofing can be relied
ed upon for issuance of fresh certificate is as per the
he table below:
When current Signingg Key is used for identification and authentica cation purposes, the
life of the new certifi
rtificate will not exceed beyond the initial identitty-proofing period
specified in the tablee above.
abo
If a certificate has been revoked, CA issue fresh certificate to the he subscriber only
after the initial registraation process described in Section 3.2 to obtain
n a new certificate.
2. In case the possession on of the key is not with the subscriber, suspend/revoke
su the
certificate after verifying
ng the subscriber’s identity.
Communication among the CA A, RA, and subscriber are implemented withh requisite security
services (i.e., source authentication,
on, integrity, non-repudiation, or confidentiality
y) applied to them
commensurate with the assurance
ance level of the certificate being managed.
When cryptography is used, CA implemented the mechanism, at least as strong ong as the certificates
being managed, to secure web ssite using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certifica cate and set up with
appropriate algorithms and key ssizes satisfies the integrity and confidentiality
y requirements for
certificate management.
Based on the content of communiication, all, or none of the security services aree enforced.
en
The applicant intending to oobtain DSC from CA, need to submit DSC appli lication form filled
with identity details, addreess, photo , signature with duly attested supporti
rting documents to
CA. On receipt of the reque
equest and information in the prescribed format, CA carries out the
verification of documents and Video and Mobile number verification if i applicable. The
detailed requirements for
or each category of DSC applicants are specified undder CCA-IVG.
For certificates, all endd-user applicants undergo an enrollment processs consisting of:
• Completing
ng and sub
submitting a certificate application form and provviding the required
information,
• Generating a key pair.
pa
Certification Practice Statement
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Certificate Applications
ons submitted to the CA for processing coulld result in either
approval or denial.
After a certificate applicannt submits a certificate application, the CA veriifies or refutes the
information in the certifi ficate application. Upon successful verificatiion based on all
required authentication proc
ocedures for various classes of certificates, forw
ward the certificate
application for approval. The
T applicant’s request for certificate issuancee is reviewed by a
trusted person which may result
r in approval or denial of certificate.
The DSC applicant m must confirm acceptance of the certificate upon notification of
issuance by the CA. Notification and link are sent to subscriber for downloading
the certificate. The con
content of the certificate will be displayed to subscriber
sub along with
download option. Dow wnloading the certificate constitutes the subscribe
ber’s acceptance of
the certificate.
Not Applicable
Subscribers are liable to protect their private keys from access by anny other party. For
individual Signature certificates,
ce subscribers are required to generatee key pair in FIPS
140-2 level 2 cryptoo dev
devices.
Renewing a certificate mmeans creating a new certificate with the sam me name, for time
remaining in validity and other information as the old one, but a new, extended
validity period and a new serial number. Certificates are renewed by CA only if the public
Certification Practice Statement
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A certificate may be rrenewed if the public key has not reached the end of its validity
period, the associated
ed private key has not been revoked or comppromised, and the
Subscriber name and aattributes are unchanged. Request for renew wal of certificates
are not accepted by CA at present due to the constraint present in the
he CCA-IVG.
1. Initial registration
on pprocess as described in Section 3.2; or
1. Initial registration
on process
p as described in Section 3.2; or
Not applicable
A certificate is revoked
oked when the binding between the subject and thhe subject’s public
key defined within a certificate is no longer considered valiid. Some of the
circumstances that innvalidate the binding are:
1. Identifying informati
tion or affiliation components of any name(s)) in the certificate
become invalid;
4. The Subject or other authorized party (CPS) asks for the subscriber’
r’s certificate to be
revoked.
6. Subscriber is not inn a position to use certificate(Death – copy of Deatth certificate made
available to CA)
Whenever any of the he above circumstances occur, CA revokes the t certificate and
places it on the CRL L. Revoked certificates are included on all neew publications of
the certificate status
us information until the certificates expire.
e. CA ensures that the
revoked certificate w
will appear on at least one CRL.
A certificate subject, human supervisor of a human subject (for organ ganizational user),
Human Resources (HR)(H person for the human subject (for organiza zational user), PKI
Sponsor for componen
ponent, or CA, may request revocation of a certificate.
e.
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CA issues CRLs peri riodically, even if there are no changes to be made, to ensure
timeliness of inform mation. Certificate status information may be issued more
frequently than the isssuance frequency described below. CA ensures es that superseded
certificate status inforrmation is removed from the PKI Repository upon posting
pos of the
latest certificate status
us information.
Certification Practice Statement
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CA supports on-line ce
certificate status checking. Client software using
ng on-line certificate
status checking need not
n obtain or process CRLs.
ond Sec
No stipulation beyond Section 7.3.
Other than implementtation of CRLs and on-line revocation status, no other forms of
on-line revocation stattus will be provided by CA
No stipulation.
Suspension willl be pe
permitted in the event that a user’s token hold
ding private key is
temporarily unavailab
able to them.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
The reason code CRL entry extension will be populated with “certifica
cate Hold” by CA.
The Hold Instruction
on Code CRL entry extension will be absent.
No stipulation.
Relying Parties are bound to their obligations and the stipulati tions of this CPS
irrespective of the avaailability of the online certificate status service.
No stipulation.
No stipulation.
CA operation premises are a actively monitored with redundant power er and notification
methods. Sensitive areas within
wit the facility, such as power and network connection
connec are also
controlled within the protec
ected facility.
Tier 3 (Onwards):
• Media are stored securely. Backup media are also stored in a separate location
that is physically secure and protected from fire and water damages.
• Certificate issuance
uance and revocation is done in the high security zone housing the
Certificate Maanager server. The Key Ceremony also is carried out in the high
security core zone
zone. The HSM module is housed in the high security core zone.
5.1.2.1. CA Physical A
Access
1. No unautho
horized access to the hardware is permitted
3. All entry/ex
exits are monitored either manually or electronica
cally.
4. Access logs
ogs are maintained and inspected periodically.
6. Two personson physical access controls are required to bothh the cryptographic
modulee and co computer system for CAs issuing Class 1, Cllass 2 and Class 3
certificatess.
CAs secure facilities are equipped with primary and backup power systems to ensure
continuous, uninterrup
upted access to electric power and also these seecure facilities are
equipped with airr cond
conditioning systems to control temperature and relaative humidity.
PKI Repositories are provided with Uninterrupted Power sufficient for a minimum of
24 hours operation in
i the absence of commercial power, to o support
suppo continuity of
operations.
CA facility is equipped
pped to prevent and extinguish fires. Appropriatee procedures have
also been implementeded to minimize the damage due to smoke and fire exposure.
These measures also mmeet all applicable fire safety regulations.
All media containing ng production software and data, audit, arch chive, or backup
information are stored
ed within CA facilities and also in a securee off-site storage
facility with appropri
riate physical and logical access controls designed
gned to limit access
only authorized persoonnel and protect such media from accidental damage
da (e.g., water,
fire, and electromagne
agnetic exposure).
Sensitive documents and materials are shredded before disposal. Meddia used to collect
or transmit sensitivve information are rendered unreadablee bbefore disposal.
Cryptographic devices
ces aare physically destroyed or zeroed in accoccordance with the
manufacturer’s guidance
dance prior to disposal. Other waste is disposed
ed of in accordance
with the CA’s normal waste disposal requirements.
Full system backups of the CAs sufficient to recover from system failure,
f are created
on a periodic scheduule, and incrementally backup copies are stoored at an offsite
location. Backups aree performed and stored off-site not less than once
o every 7 days.
The data is properly seecured based on the classification of data, which
ch is defined by the
Certifying Authority inn the security policy.
CA ensures that
2. The functions are distributed among more than one person, so that
t any malicious
activity would requ
equire collusion.
5.2.1.1. CA Administrator
rator
1. Installation,
on, con
configuration, and maintenance of the CA;
2. Establishing
ng and maintaining CA system accounts;
3. Configuring
ng certificate profiles or templates and audit param
meters, and;
5.2.1.2. CA Officer
The CA officer
cer is responsible for issuing certificates, that is:
1. Registering
ng new subscribers and requesting the issuance of certificates;
ce
Certification Practice Statement
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3. Approving
ng aand executing the issuance of certificates, and;
4. Requesting,
ng, approving and executing the revocation of certifi
rtificates.
1. Reviewing,
ng, maintaining, and archiving audit logs;
2. Performing
ng or overseeing
o internal compliance audits to
o ensure that the CA is
operating inn acco
accordance with its CPS;
2. Entering applicants
app information, and verifying correctness;
1. CA key generation;
on;
In addition, sensitivee CA operations like operations of the cryptog ographic units and
certificate manager requ
equires the m-out-of-n control to handle the operations
ope of these
sensitive functions. A
Also split control is implemented to ensure seg gregations between
physical and logical acc
access to systems. Personnel having secret shares
sh do not have
physical access and vice-versa.
v All roles are assigned to multiplee pe
persons in order to
support continuity of ope
operations.
Role separation
on is enforced either by the CA equipment, or procedurally, or
by both means.. Individuals may assume more than one role, exc
xcept:
No individual will
wil be assigned more than one role.
1. Having successfull
lly completed an appropriate training program;
3. Being trustworthy;;
4. Having no other duties that would interfere or conflict with their duties for the
trusted role;
5. Having not been previously relieved of duties for reasons of negligence or non-
performance of duties;
6. Having not been denied a security clearance, or had a security clearance revoked
for cause;
1. Employment;
5. References
5. Subscriber verifica
cation requirements
No stipulation.
CA will take appropri riate administrative and disciplinary actions agaiinst personnel who
violate this policy. Acction taken and will be documented.
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Audit log files are generatted for all events relating to the security of the CAs. The security
audit logs either automaticcally collected or if not possible, a logbook, paper form, or other
physical mechanism are used.
us All security audits logs, both electronic and
a non-electronic,
are retained and made avaailable during compliance audits. The securityy audit
aud logs for each
auditable event defined in this
t section shall be maintained in accordance with w Section 5.5.2.
4. The identity of the entity and/or operator that caused the event. The following
events shall be audited:
Auditable Event CA
SECURITY AUDIT T
Any changes to the Audit
A parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type
of event audited
Any attempt to delete
elete or modify the Audit logs
IDENTITY-PROOF FING
Successful and unsucccessful attempts to assume a role
The value of maximximum number of authentication attempts is
changed
The number of unsucccessful authentication attempts exceeds the
maximum
authentication attemppts during user login
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
The processing of aud udit logs includes a review of the audit logs and recording of
significant events in an audit log summary. It includes a verification that
t the log has not
been tampered with, a brief inspection of all log entries, and a detaailed investigation
of any irregularities inn the logs. Actions taken based on audit log revieews are recorded.
See Section 2.
System configuration
on and procedures are implemented together to enssure that:
1. Only authorized
zed peop
people have read access to the logs;
2. Only authorized
zed peop
people may archive audit logs; and,
Automated audit datta is generated and recorded at the applicati tion, network and
operating system levell. Manually generated audit data is recorded by CA personnel.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
Audit processes are innvoked at system startup, and cease only at sysstem shutdown. In
the case of failure of audit collection system, CA operations are suspended
su until the
problem is remedied.
This CPS imposes no requirement to provide notice (that an event was w audited) to the
individual, organization,
on, device,
de or application that caused the event.
CA retains an archivee of information and actions that are material al to each certificate
application and to thehe ccreation, Issuance, revocation, expiration,
on, and renewal of each
certificate issued by the
he CCA. These records include all relevant evidence
dence regarding:
Data To Be Archived
Certification Practice
tice Statement
Contractual obligatiions
System and equipmeent configuration
Modifications and uupdates to system or configuration
Certificate requests
Revocation requests
ests
Subscriber identity authentication
a data as per Section 3.2.3
Documentation of reeceipt and acceptance of certificates
Documentation of reeceipt of Tokens
All certificates issued
ed or published
Record of Componeent CA Re-key
All CRLs and CRLss issued and/or published
All Audit Logs
All Audit Log Summ maries
Other data or applic
lications to verify archive contents
Compliance audit reeports
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
CA protects its arch chived records so that only authorized persons sons can access the
archived data. CA prrotects the archive against unauthorized viewi wing, modification,
deletion, or other tampe
pering, by storage within a trustworthy system. The media holding
the archive data and the
t systems required to process the archive dataa are maintained to
ensure that the archivee data can be accessed for the time period
CA keys are changed peri riodically as stipulated by the IT Act and thehe key changes are
a
processed as per key generation
gene specified in this CPS. If CA private keey is used to sign
CRLs, then the key shall be retained and protected.
issued digital certificate for a specified period of time. The subscriberss generates a new
private-public key pair and submit the public key along with the new app pplication to the CA
for generating a new Certifi
rtificate, preferably before the existing certificatee expires.
exp
The following table providdes the life times for certificates and associated private
p keys.
If a CA detects a potential
po hacking attempt or other form of co ompromise, it will
perform an investigatiion in order to determine the nature and the degree
d of damage.
If the CA key is susspected of compromise, the procedures outlined ned in Section 5.7.3
shall be followed. Othe
herwise, the scope of potential damage shall be assessed in order
to determine if the CCA needs to be rebuilt, only some certificates need to be revoked,
and/or the CA key needs to be declared compromised.
1. Suspected or detec
ected compromise of the CA system;
2. Physical or electron
onic attempts to penetrate the CA system;
3. Denial of service
ce aattacks on the CA system; or
4. Any incident prevventing CA from issuing a CRL within 24 hours hou of the time
specified in the next update field of its currently valid CRL. A CA will make all
efforts to restoree capability
capab to issue CRL as quickly as possible.
CA have a Disaster Recovery center as per the guidelines of IT Act. Act The disaster
recovery site will be made
m operational using the latest available backup
up data.
da
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
If CA equipment is damaged
d or rendered inoperative, but the signa
gnature keys are not
destroyed, CA makes all efforts to establish the operation as quickly
y as possible, giving
priority to the ability to generate CRL or make use of Disaster Reco ecovery facility for
CRL generation.
3. If the CA can obttain accurate information on the certificates it has issued and that
are still valid (i.e.,
.e., not expired or revoked), the CA may re-issue ue (i.e., renew) those
certificates with the
he not After date in the certificate as in original certificates;
ce and
5.8. CA Termination
CA will archive all audit loogs and other records prior to termination. CA will destroy all its
private keys upon termination.
on.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
CA creates a verifiab able audit trail for key pair generation as per the security
requirements Procedu
cedures which are followed and the same will be documented. The
process is validated byy an Auditor.
Subscriber private keyy is generated by the end subscriber and hence the
here is no delivery
to the end subscriberrs. In the case of hardware based tokens or smart cards, pre-
formatted tokens are sent
s to the subscribers and the associated PIN is sent by an out-
of-band process. The end user then uses the token and the client sofftware provided to
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
him to generate and sstore the private key and also initiates an online
ne session with the
CA server for certifica
cate generation.
End user subscribers generate a PKCS#10 requests containing their public key and send
it to the CA. This is accomplished using the client software which initiates an online
session with the CA server and deliver the signed certificates to the subscriber. The
online session is secured by SSL.
Cryptographic Function
Func Cryptographic Algorithm
Signature 2048-bit RSA or ECDSA with -p256p256
curve parameter
Hashing SHA-256
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposess (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The table in Section 6.1.1 summarizes the minimum requirements for cryptographic
modules; higher levelss may be used.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
CA creates backup of its signature keys. These are stored in encrypted form and under
the sole custody of CA.
The end entity private keys used solely for decryption are escrowed prior to the
generation of the corresponding certificates. The subscriber can keep the escrowed
keys.
CA private signa
gnature keys are backed up under the same multii-person control as
the original signa
gnature key. Numbers of backup copies are lim mited to three and
securely stored under the same multi-person control as the operrational key.
CA stores Private Keyys in hardware cryptographic module and keys are not accessible
without authentication
on mechanism that is in compliance with FIPS 140-2
14 rating of the
cryptographic module.e.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
Cryptographic modulee that has been activated is never left unattended ended or otherwise
available to unauthori rized access. After use, cryptographic modulees are deactivated.
After deactivation, the
he use of the cryptographic modules based CA key pair pa requires the
presence of the trusted
ed roles with the activation data in order to reacttivate said CA key
pair.
Private signature keyss will be destroyed when they are no longer needed,
ne or when the
certificates to which they correspond expire or are revoked. Destr stroying private key
inside cryptographic mmodules requires destroying the key(s) inside the he HSM using the
‘zeroization’ function of the cryptographic modules in a manner that hat any information
cannot be used to reco
ecover any part of the private key. All the privatee key
k back-ups are
destroyed in a manner
anner that any information cannot be used to recovver any part of the
private key. If the func
unctions of cryptographic modules are not acceessible in order to
destroy the key contaained inside, then the cryptographic modules will wil be physically
destroyed. The destruc
uction operation is realized in a physically securee environment
en
The activation data useed to unlock private keys is protected from discl
closure.
After a predetermined
ned nnumber of failed login attempts, a facility to
o lock the account
temporarily has been pprovided.
CA changes the acti tivation data whenever the HSM is re-keyed or returned from
maintenance. Before sending a cryptographic module for maintenanenance, all sensitive
information contained
ned in the cryptographic module is destroyed.
1. Require authentica
cated logins for trusted roles
2. Provide Discretiona
onary Access Control
6. Provide self-protec
ection for the operating system
Not applicable.
6.6. Life-Cycle
Cycle Technical Controls
CA employs appropriate seecurity measures to ensure that they are guardedded against denial of
service and intrusion attack
acks. Such measures include the use of hardware firewalls,
fir hardware
filtering routers, and intrus
usion detection systems. Unused network portss and services are
turned off. Protocols that provide
p network security attack vector(s) is not permitted through
the boundary control deviceces.
Any boundary control devvices used to protect the network on which PKI equipment is
hosted will deny all but the necessary services to the PKI equipment
ent even if those
services are enabled for other
her devices on the network.
All CA components are regularly synchronized with a time service ce such as Indian
Standard Time Service. Tim
me derived from the time service is used for est
stablishing the time
of:
1. CA Certificate Profile
Version Version 3
Serial number Positive number of maximum Length 20 bytes and unique to each
certificate issued by a issuer CA
Signature Algorithm SHA256 with RSA Encryption (null parameters)
or
ECDSA with SHA256 {1 2 840 10045 4 3 2}
Issuer DN Subject DN of the issuing CA
Validity Validity expressed in UTC Time for certificates valid through 2049
Subject DN The X.500 distinguished name of the entity associated with the
public key certified in the subject public key field of the certificate
( Common Name, Serial Number,State or Province Name, Postal
Code, Telephone number, PseudPseudonym,
onym, Organisation, Country)
Subject Public Key rsaEncryption {1 2 840 113549 1 1 1}, 2048 RSA Key modulus,
public exponent OR
ecPublicKey { 1.2.840.10045.2.1}, namedCurve, {
1.2.840.10045.3.1.7} (NIST curve P P-256)
Signature Issuer CA’s signature
EXTENSIONS
authorityKeyIdentifier Identifies the CA certificate that must be used to verify the
subscriber’s certificate. Issuing CA SubjectkeyIndetifier
subjectKeyIdentifier Octet String of unique value associated with the Public key
basicConstraints CA=False
keyUsage DigitalSignature, nonRepudiation(optional)
Extended Key Usage Document Signing: {1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12}
certificatePolicies The value must contain the OID representing the India PKI
certificate policy the certificate is valid for .( (Policy
Identifier=2.16.356.100.2.4.1 or 2.16.356.100.2.4.2 )
cRLDistributionPoints location of CRL information
A CA makes a full and complete CRL available to the OCSP Respon ponders as specified
below. This CRL is prrovided to the relying parties and published on the
he repository.
repos
Field Value
Version V2 (1)
Issuer Signature sha256WithRSAEncryption {1 2 840
Algorithm 113549 1 1 11}
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
Requests sent to Issueruer CA OCSP Responders are not required to t be signed. The
following table lists the
he fields that are expected by the OCSP Responde
nder.
Field Value
Version V1 (0)
Requester Name DN of the requestor (required)
Request List List of certificates as specified in RFC 2560
Request Extension Value
None None
Request Ent
ntry Value
Extension
None None
See RFC2560 for detaailed syntax. The following table lists which fieelds are populated
by the OCSP Responde
onder.
Field Value
Response Status As specified in RFC 2560
Response Type id-pkix-ocsp-basic {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 1}
Version V1 (0)
Responder ID Octet String (same as subject key iden
dentifier in
Responder certificate)
Produced At Generalized Time
List of Responses Each response will contain certificatee id; certificate
status1, this Update, next Update2,
Responder Signaturee sha256 With RSA Encryption {1 2 84 40 113549 1 1
11}
Certificates Applicable certificates issued to the OCSP
O Responder
Response Extension
on Value
Nonce c=no; Value in the nonce field of reque
equest (required, if
present in request)
Response Entry Value
Extension
None None
1
If the certificate is revoked, the OCSP Responder shalll provide revocation time and revocation reason from CRL entry and CRL entry extension.
2
The OCSP Responder shall use this Update and next Update
Up from CA CRL.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
CA has a compliance audiit mechanism in place to ensure that the requireements of this CPS
are enforced.
Office of CCA may determ mine that a CA is not complying with its obliga
gations set forth in
this CPS or the applicable CP. When such a determination is made, the office
o of CCA may
suspend operation of CA A, or may revoke the CA certificate, or may ay direct that other
corrective actions be taken
aken which allow operation to continue.
On completion of audit by ann empanelled auditor, Auditor submit an Auditt Report, including
identification of corrective m
measures taken or being taken by CA, to the office
o of CCA and
a copy to CA. The report idenntifies the version of the CPS used for the assessm
ment.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
9.1. Fees
The fees for variousous types of certificates are made available on CA website at
https://prodigisign.com and will be updated from time to time.
CA is not charging any fees to relying parties or other public for accessing the
certificate information
on from the repository. The certificate search facility
fac is provided
free of cost at its websit
site (https://prodigisign.com).
CA does not charge a fee for access to any revocation status infformation through
CRL. CA may charge
ge a fee for providing certificate status information
on via OCSP.
Not applicable
The refund policycy and other payments terms are governed as per the terms in the
subscriber agreement.. In case the application is rejected the full amount would be
refunded to the subscri
riber.
CA maintain reasonab
onable levels of insurance coverage to address all fooreseeable liability
obligations to PKI Parti
rticipants described in Section 1.3 of this CPS
CA offers no protection
on to end entities that extends beyond the protec
ections provided in
this CPS
CA will not knowingly vioolate any intellectual property rights held by othe
hers.
This CPS is based on the Performa CPS published by Office of CCA for Licensed CAs
and as amended from om time-to-time. All Intellectual Property Rights in this CPS
pertaining to CA aree oowned by the CA.
CA may claim all righ ghts, if any, in any trademark, service mark, or trade name of
its services under the llaw for the time being in force.
CA may claim properrty rights to the keys used (e.g., CA key pair, OCSP Responder
key pair, time stampp au
authority key pair, etc.) under the law for the timee being
be in force
Subject to any agreem ments between CA and its customers, ownershiip of and property
rights in key pairs corr
rresponding to Certificates of Subscribers is speccified in this CPS.
9.6.1. CA Representations
ons and Warranties
9.6.1.1. CA
3. Only verified
ed information appears in the certificate
9.6.2. Subscriber
In signing the
he docu
document described above, each Subscriberr should
shou agree to the
following:
3. The Subscriber sha hall protect its private key at all times, in accordance
acco with this
policy, as stipulated
ed in the certificate acceptance agreements, and local
l procedures
5. The Subscriber wilwill abide by all the terms, conditions, and restri
strictions levied on
the use of their pri
rivate keys and certificates.
Parties who rely upon the certificates issued under a policy defined
ned in this document
shall:
1. Use the certificatee for the purpose for which it was issued, as indicated in the
certificate informaation (e.g., the key usage extension);
Not applicable.
CA shall not be liable for f any indirect, exemplary, special, punitive, e, incidental, and
consequential losses, dam mages, claims, liabilities, charges, costs, expenses
expen or injuries
(including without limitation
on loss of use, data, revenue, profits, business and for any claims
of Subscribers or Users or other third parties including Relying parties).
All liability is limited to acctual and legally provable damages. CA's liabili
lity is as per the IT
Act,2000 other governing Indian laws and Agreement. If the liability is not dealtdea under the
provisions of ITACT 2000, 0, the following caps limit CA’s damages concern ning specific
certificates.
9.9. Indemnities
Indemnification by Subsc
ubscribers
• The subscriber’s use of a name (including without limitation within wit a common
name, domain nam me, or e-mail address) that infringes upon the Inntellectual Property
Rights of a thirdd party.
pa
ng parties
Indemnification by relying
To the extent permitted by applicable law, relying party agreement requires, relying
parties to indemnify CA foor:
• The relying party’s
pa failure to perform the representations and warranties as
outlined in the section
s 9.6.3 of this CPS.
• The relying
ng pa
party’s reliance on a certificate that is not reassonable under the
circumstances,, or
9.10.1. Term
The CPS becomes eff ffective upon approval by the Office of CCA. Am mendments to this
CPS become effectivee upon ratification by approval by CCA and publication
pub by CA
at https://prodigisign.com/cps. There is no specified term for this CP
PS.
9.10.2. Termination
While this CPS mayy be amended from time to time, it shall remmain in force until
replaced by a newer vversion or explicitly terminated by CCA.
Upon termination of this CPS, CA is nevertheless bound by its terms for all
Certificates issued for
or the remainder of the validity periods of such h Certificates.
Ce The
sections 5.5 and 9.00 of this CPS shall survive the termination or expiraation of this CPS.
9.12. Amendments
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
CA will review this C CPS at least once every year. Additional review
ws may be enacted
at any time at the discr
cretion of the CCA.
Unless the provision for dispute resolution under the IT Act is invvoked, any dispute
based on the contentss of this CPS, between CA and one of itss customers
cu who has
availed specific services
ces will be resolved according to provisions in the applicable
agreement between thehe pa
parties.
No stipulations.
No stipulation.
9.16.2. Assignment
Except where specified ed by other contracts, no party may assign or delegate this CPS
or any of its rights or duties under this CPS, without the prior written
en consent of CCA.
Further, the Office
ce of CCA in its discretion may assign and delegatte this CPS to any
party of its choice.
9.16.3. Severability
CA is not liable for any failure or delay in its performance under thiss CPS due to causes
that are beyond their reasonable control, including, but not limited to, an act of God,
act of civil or militaryy authority, fire, epidemic, flood, earthquake, riot,
ri war, failure of
equipment, failure of telecommunications lines, lack of Internet acce ccess, sabotage, and
governmental action.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
Not applicable.
Certification Practice Statement
Version 4.0.0
10. Bibliography
The following documents werre used in part to develop this CPS: