ULE OF Ischief
ULE OF Ischief
ULE OF Ischief
RULE OF MISCHIEF
When there is a conflict between two or more provisions of the law they should be
followed in such way that maximum benefit can be obtained and no rule need to be
violated in the process of following other one.
It is a sound rule of interpretation that Courts must try to avoid a conflict between the
provisions of Statute.
A statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with
reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the
whole statute.
It is the duty of the Courts to avoid conflict between two provisions, and whenever it is
possible to do so to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonize.
Where in an enactment, there are two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each
other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect may be given to both. This is
what is known as the “rule of harmonious construction”. Such a construction has the
merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a
section and other parts of the statute.
Case Laws:
1. The principle of harmony building has its origins in the landmark judgment of Shri
Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, 1951. The disagreement between Part III
(Fundamental Rights) and Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy) of the
Constitution was the subject of the India case. It was evident that there existed a conflict
between Article 13 and Article 368 of the Indian constitution. On one hand Article 368
gave legislature the power to amend the constitution at the same time Article 13 (2)
restricted the same. The Supreme Court in this case used the doctrine of harmonious
construction in an attempt to resolve the conflicting provisions. It was concluded that the
word 'law' in Article 13 (2) is for ordinary laws and not constitutional laws. Thereby
limiting the extent of 'law' under Article 13 (2).
2. Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1975) 1 SCC 735:
Background: This case involved the interpretation of provisions related to the refund of
excess sales tax paid by Dhampur Sugar Mills under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act,
1948.
Facts: Dhampur Sugar Mills had paid excess sales tax under protest. Subsequently, the
Act was amended, and the amendment provided for a new mode of calculating refunds.
Dhampur Sugar Mills applied for a refund based on the amended provision, but the State
of Uttar Pradesh rejected the application and calculated the refund amount using the old
provision.
Issue: The main issue was whether the amended provision could be applied
retrospectively for calculating the refund, or whether the old provision should be used.
Court's Decision: The Supreme Court of India held that the amended provision could be
applied retrospectively for calculating the refund. The Court applied the rule of
harmonious construction to interpret the provisions in a manner that was beneficial to the
taxpayer and did not render any provision redundant.
3. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [AIR 1951 SC 318]
Facts of the Case: The State of Bombay had enacted the Bombay Prohibition Act, of
1949, which aimed to prohibit the production, manufacture, possession, and consumption
of alcohol. This Act contained provisions that allowed the state government to grant
licenses for the sale and possession of alcohol for medicinal and other specified purposes.
The question arose whether these provisions conflicted with Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the
Constitution, which guarantee the right to hold property and practice any profession,
trade, or business.
Issue: The main issue before the court was whether the provisions of the Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949, that granted licenses for the sale and possession of alcohol for
specific purposes were violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)
(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
Court's Ruling and Analysis: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the provisions of
the Bombay Prohibition Act that allowed the state government to grant licenses for
specific purposes. The court emphasized the principle of harmonious construction in
statutory interpretation. It held that when there are seemingly conflicting provisions in a
statute, the court should endeavor to reconcile them in a way that allows both provisions
to operate effectively and harmoniously.
Order: The Supreme Court of India upheld the validity of the provisions of the Bombay
Prohibition Act, 1949, which allowed the state government to grant licenses for the sale
and possession of alcohol for medicinal and other specified purposes.
4. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978):
Background: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India is a landmark Indian constitutional case
that dealt with the right to travel abroad and the scope of the fundamental right to
personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
Issue: The central issue in this case was whether the government could impose restrictions
on an individual's right to travel abroad and whether such restrictions would be subject to
judicial review under Article 21.
Key Arguments:
Maneka Gandhi, a journalist and activist, challenged the government's decision to
impound her passport and restrict her right to travel abroad. She argued that this violated
her fundamental right to personal liberty and that the restrictions were arbitrary and not
based on valid reasons.
The Union of India contended that the government had the authority to impound
passports and restrict travel abroad under the Passport Act, 1967, and that such decisions
were not justiciable.
Decision and Rationale: The Supreme Court of India, in its landmark judgment, ruled in
favor of Maneka Gandhi and held that the right to travel abroad fell within the ambit of
the right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court
recognized that personal liberty encompassed a wide range of freedoms, including the
freedom to travel abroad.
The court also held that any law that could potentially deprive a person of their personal
liberty must satisfy the tests of reasonableness and fairness. It declared that the Passport
Act, 1967, had to be read in harmony with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
The court ruled that the government's decision to impound Maneka Gandhi's passport
should be based on valid reasons, should be procedurally fair, and should be subject to
judicial review. It emphasized that the right to personal liberty could not be curtailed
arbitrarily.
5. M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (1986)
Background: M. C. Mehta v. Union of India is a significant Indian environmental case
that dealt with the interpretation of various environmental laws and the principle of
harmonious construction to protect the environment.
Issue: The central issue in this case was whether industries in the Taj Trapezium Zone
(TTZ), which includes the Taj Mahal in Agra, should be regulated and relocated to
prevent environmental pollution and damage to the monument.
Key Arguments:
M. C. Mehta, the petitioner, argued that the industries in the TTZ were causing pollution
and damage to the Taj Mahal, a UNESCO World Heritage Site. He contended that the
environmental laws should be strictly enforced to protect the monument and the
environment.
Decision and Rationale: The Supreme Court of India, in its judgment, applied the
principle of harmonious construction to reconcile the conflicting interests of industrial
development and environmental protection. The court held that both objectives could be
pursued simultaneously.
The court ordered the relocation of polluting industries from the TTZ and imposed strict
environmental regulations. It emphasized that environmental laws and industrial
development could coexist, provided that industries adhered to pollution control measures
and operated in an environmentally sustainable manner
Beneficent construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes.
When there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word, the
meaning which gives relief and protects the benefits which are purported to be given by
the legislation should be chosen. A beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct
perspective so as to fructify the legislative intent.
People are entitled to receive certain benefits, but only if they meet certain
conditions and within a specific time frame. If these conditions are not met, the benefit
will be nullified or no longer applicable. There should be due stress and emphasis to
Directive Principles of State Policy and any international convention on the subject.
The liberal construction can only flow from the language of the act and there cannot
be placing of unnatural interpretation on the words contained in the enactment.
Also, beneficial construction does not permit the rising of any presumption that
protection of widest amplitude must be deemed to have been conferred on those for
whose benefit the legislation may have been enacted.
Case laws:
The literal rule of interpretation has been termed as the primary rule of interpretation.
As the name suggests, the literal rule of interpretation means that the judge literally
interprets the statute. It can also be called the plain-meaning rule or the grammatical
rule.
In the literal rule of interpretation, the courts are required to observe the ordinary and
natural meaning of words, interpret the phrase or words as it is. Judges are not
required to add words or modify meaning and they must observe the actual intent of
the legislature. It is the safest rule of interpretation
Statutes are constructed using the ordinary meaning of language given to the term and
the judges are not required to interpret the terms in any other way.
Judges are bound by the literal meaning of the words and cannot use their judicial minds
to deviate from it.
Criticism:
Literal Rule rests on the assumption that there is only one meaning for a particular word.
This restricts the scope of deriving meaning from the context of the Statute and depending
solely upon the plain wordings. This is the reason the Judges prefer to apply the golden
rule instead of the Literal rule so as to consider the intent of the Statute and not the plain
words.
According to Salmond, “The essence of law lies in the spirit, not in its letter, for the letter
is significant only as being the external manifestation of the intention that underlies it”.
Lord Reid in DPP v Ottewell affirmed that “the imprecision of the English language… is
such that it is extremely difficult to draft any provision which is not ambiguous in that
sense”
Advantages of Literal Rule of Interpretation:
Literal rule enables layman to understand the issue in hand.
It enables to understand the intent of legislature simply and clearly.
This rule respects parliamentary supremacy.
Separation of Power is accomplished in an applicable manner
The disadvantage of the Literal Rule of Interpretation
Creates loopholes in Law
Another criticism of this rule is that it restricts and bounds the court making it unable to
use its judicial mind to deviate from the literal meaning of the terms
Sometimes, a court might ascertain an absolutely absurd meaning which the legislature
never intended.
Case laws:
1. Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 325 : In this case Maqbool, an
Indian citizen, upon returning from an international trip brought some gold with him.
According to the Sea Customs Act, no Indian citizen was allowed to bring any valuables
such as gold and hence, his gold was confiscated. He was then prosecuted under the
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Maqbool contended that since the gold had
already been confiscated, and that was a trial in itself. He cannot be prosecuted under
FERA, 1947 as it would amount to double jeopardy. However, the Supreme Court held
that confiscation of gold cannot be termed as prosecution and hence it was not a case of
double jeopardy according to the strict and literal interpretation of Article 20(2)
2. State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese and others, 1987 AIR 33 SCR(1) 317,
in this case a person was caught along with the counterfeit currency “dollars” and he was
charged under section 120B, 498A, 489C and 420 read with section 34 of Indian Penal
Code for possessing counterfeit currency. The accused contended before the court that a
charge under section 489 A of Indian Penal Code can only be levied in the case of
counterfeiting of Indian currency notes and not in the case of counterfeiting of foreign
currency notes. The court held that the word currency notes or bank note cannot be
prefixed. The person was held liable to be charge-sheeted.
3. In the case of R vs. Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446
The defendant bit off victim's nose. According to the statute it is an offence 'to stab cut or
wound'. The court interpreted the Statute in such a manner that it gave a pre-requisite for
the act of the defendant to be an offence and that is the usage of an instrument. Therefore,
the defendant was held not liable for biting.
4. Deepak Aggrawal v Keshav Kausik (2013)
Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India provides that a person shall only be eligible to
be appointed as a District Judge if he has been, for not less than seven years, an advocate
or pleader, and is recommended by the high court for appointment. A three-Judge Bench
of the Supreme Court held that it is clear from the expression "has been" that the present
perfect continuous tense is used for a position that began sometime in the past and is still
continuing, and that therefore such person must, with the requisite period, still be
continuing as an advocate on the date of his application.
5. Municipal Board v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan
the location of bus stand by changed by the local transport authority. Application against
the order must be moved within 30 days from the date of the order. The issue raised be
applicant is that the order can be moved 30 days from the knowledge of the order passed
by Regional Transport authority. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the since the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous equitable consideration are out of place
and clear grammatical meaning of the statute stand out.
According to this Rule, the words of a statute must be construed 'ut res magis valeat quam
pereat' meaning thereby that words of statute must be construed so as to lead to a sensible
meaning. Generally, the words or phrases of a statute are to be given their ordinary
meaning. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it effective and
operative on the principle of ut res magis valeat quam pereat So while interpreting a law,
two meanings are possible, one making the statute absolutely vague and meaningless and
other leading to certainty and a meaningful interpretation, in such case the later
interpretation should be followed
Avoiding Absurdity: Courts presume that the legislature did not intend to create absurd,
irrational, or unreasonable results through its legislation. Therefore, the interpretation that
leads to such outcomes is generally avoided in favor of a more sensible interpretation.
Practical Effect: Courts consider the practical consequences of different interpretations.
The interpretation that leads to a more practical or workable outcome is often preferred.
Legislative Intent: The rule aims to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Courts
consider the purpose and objectives behind the legislation to arrive at an interpretation
that aligns with the broader legislative goals.
Context and Contextual Interpretation: The context in which the statute is enacted,
including other related provisions and the legislative history, is taken into account to
arrive at a reasonable interpretation.
Literal Interpretation with Reasonableness: While the rule focuses on reasonable
interpretations, it doesn't disregard the actual wording of the statute. Courts still consider
the literal meaning of the words but ensure that the interpretation is reasonable in light of
the context and purpose.
Case Laws:
This rule is the modification of the literal rule. The golden rule modifies the language of
the words in a statute to successfully interpret the actual meaning of the legislation. It
takes into account the context in which the words are used so that justice can be done to
the intention of the legislation. It is to be noted that the rule can be used only when the
language of the statute is ambiguous or grammatically incorrect. Thus the judges need to
be extremely careful with their interpretation and only exercise this power when it is
absolutely necessary.
The golden rules departs from its strictly literal rules, it is elaboration or extension of
literal rule. Golden rule of interpretation allows judges to depart from a word normal
meaning in order to avoid an absurd result.
The rule was defined by Lord Wensleydale in the Grey v Pearson case (1857) as: “The
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to
some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to
avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.”
Approach Of The Golden Rule
The golden rule can be applied in two ways:
Narrow Approach– This approach is applied when the word or phrases capable of more
than one literal meaning. This allows the judge to apply the meaning which avoids the
absurdity.
Broad Approach– This approach is applied when there is only one literal meaning. But
applying that one literal meaning would cause an absu/rdity. Under this approach the
court will modify the meaning to avoid the absurdity. The modification shall be keeping
in mind the intention of the Parliament making the law in question.
Case laws:
1. In the leading case of R v Allen from 1872, the defendant was charged
with bigamy under section 57 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 which made it
an offence to marry while one's spouse is still alive and not divorced. The court held that
the word 'marry' could not in that context mean 'become legally married' since that could
never apply to someone who is already married to someone else. To make sense of the
provision, the word should be interpreted as meaning to 'go through a second ceremony of
marriage
2. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Azad Bharat Financial Company (1967)
a transport vehicle belonging to the defendant was found to be carrying a parcel of opium
during a routine check by authorities. The defendant presented an invoice indicating that
the parcel contained crates of apples as the sole item. As per Section 11 of the Opium Act
of 1878, all vehicles transporting contraband articles were to be impounded and the
articles confiscated.
The transport company argued that they did not know the opium present in their vehicle.
The main issue was whether the magistrate was obligated to confiscate the vehicle based
on the wording of Section 11 of the Opium Act of 1878.
The High Court ruled that it would be unjust to confiscate the vehicle of an individual
who did not know of the presence of opium. Considering that the statute in question was
penal, it should be interpreted in a manner that does not penalise someone who has not
committed an offence. The word “shall” in “shall be confiscated” was interpreted to mean
“may” in the context of such cases
3. Lee v. Knapp (1967)
In this case, interpretation of the world 'stop' was involved. Under section 77(1) of the
road traffic Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall stop after the accident. In this
case, the driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then moved away.
Applying the golden rule the Court held that requirement of the section had not been
followed by the driver as he had not stopped for a reasonable time of period Requiring
interested persons to make necessary inquiries for him about the accident.
4. Raghunathrao v. Union of India (1993) 1 SCC 659.
In this case, the Supreme Court of India was tasked with interpreting the word "State" as
used in Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. Article 12 defines "State" for the purposes of
Part III of the Constitution, which deals with Fundamental Rights. The question arose
whether the term "State" in Article 12 only includes governmental entities or extends to
other bodies performing governmental functions.
Issue: The main issue was whether entities other than governmental bodies could be
considered "State" under Article 12, thereby making them subject to the Fundamental
Rights provisions of the Indian Constitution.
Decision: The Supreme Court applied the Golden Rule of interpretation to broaden the
scope of the term "State" in Article 12. The Court held that the term should include not
only governmental entities but also non-governmental entities that are engaged in public
or governmental functions. This interpretation aligned with the spirit of the Constitution
and ensured that the Fundamental Rights of citizens would be protected even when
violations occurred by entities beyond the traditional definition of the government.
5. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar [(1962) 1 SCR 396]:
Facts of the Case: The case involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section
124A of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with the offense of sedition. The petitioner,
Kedar Nath Singh, was charged with making speeches that allegedly promoted feelings of
disaffection towards the government.
Issue: The primary issue before the court was whether Section 124A of the Indian Penal
Code was consistent with the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Court's Ruling and Analysis: The Supreme Court applied the golden rule of interpretation
to reconcile the potentially conflicting provisions of Section 124A and Article 19(1)(a).
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code defined the offense of sedition as any act or
speech that attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards the government. The petitioner argued that this provision was
unconstitutional as it restricted the fundamental right to freedom of speech.
The court held that while the language of Section 124A was broad, it should be
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution. The court applied the
golden rule to ensure that the provision would not be used to stifle legitimate dissent or
criticism of the government.
The court ruled that only acts or speeches that incite violence or public disorder would
fall within the purview of the offense of sedition. It interpreted Section 124A in a manner
that harmonized it with the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression,
avoiding an interpretation that would infringe upon the constitutional rights.