China's Perceptions of U.S. Intentions toward Taiwan: How Hostile a Hegemon?

Author(s): Andrew Bingham Kennedy

Source: Asian Survey , Vol. 47, No. 2 (March/April 2007), pp. 268-287
Published by: University of California Press
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CHINA’S PERCEPTIONS OF U.S.
INTENTIONS TOWARD TAIWAN
How Hostile a Hegemon?

Andrew Bingham Kennedy

Abstract
While few Chinese observers currently suspect that Washington seeks formal
Taiwanese independence, a sizable majority believes the United States is
striving to preserve Taiwan’s de facto separation to check China’s rise. This
view is both unduly pessimistic and destabilizing. Accordingly, Washington
should work to correct it.

Keywords: Taiwan, China, cross-strait relations, U.S.-China relations, perceptions

How resilient is the current peace in the Taiwan Strait?

Since the end of the Cold War, American analysts have focused on China’s mil-
itary modernization as an ominous sign of instability to come. As the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) invests in advanced means of power projection—from
more-accurate missiles to stealthier submarines to anti-satellite capabilities—
it acquires new means of coercing Taiwan and complicating American inter-
vention in the event of a conflict. Taiwan is adapting to the mainland’s mod-
ernization, to be sure, but the island is struggling to keep up. Although China’s
emerging capabilities do not rival those of the United States, Chinese strate-
gists express confidence that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could still
pose a serious challenge for U.S. forces in a conflict over Taiwan, citing the

Andrew Bingham Kennedy is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of

Government at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he is also a Fellow at the
John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies. He wishes to thank Allen Carlson, Thomas Christensen,
Taylor Fravel, Michael Glosny, Michael Horowitz, Iain Johnston, Alex Liebman, and an anony-
mous reviewer for their assistance and constructive suggestions. The author also thanks the Chi-
nese and American officials and analysts who agreed to be interviewed for this article.
Asian Survey, Vol. 47, Issue 2, pp. 268–287, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2007
by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permis-
sion to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and
Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.2007.47.2.268.

268

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 269

political and logistical constraints such an intervention would face.1 Indeed, the
PLA has a proud history of fighting superior opponents that goes back to the Chi-
nese Revolution and, more poignantly for Americans, to the Korean War.
In response to China’s growing capabilities, the United States is reviving its
military contacts with Taiwan and offering it new kinds of weapon systems.
The United States has normalized consultations on arms sales, become involved
in Taiwanese defense reform, expanded educational and training exchanges,
and increased opportunities for strategic dialogue with high-level Taiwanese of-
ficials.2 The Pentagon also sends American officers to Taiwan to observe mili-
tary exercises and conduct capability assessments. More broadly, the U.S. is
deepening its strategic cooperation with Japan and augmenting its military pres-
ence in the Western Pacific.
Although U.S. officials hope these moves will help stabilize the situation,
the impact of such measures depends largely on how they are interpreted in Bei-
jing. The U.S. has disavowed support for Taiwanese independence, but China’s
leaders also worry about permanent informal separation—a much more realis-
tic goal for Taiwanese nationalists. As its 2000 Taiwan White Paper made clear,
China feels entitled to use force against Taiwan in response to the latter’s “in-
definitely” postponing unification talks.3 Although Chinese President Hu Jin-
tao has downplayed this precondition for using force since coming to power,
there is no guarantee that he (or his successors) will continue to do so in the
future. Indeed, the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People’s Con-
gress in March 2005 kept this precondition very much alive by justifying force if
the “possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”4
Accordingly, the perception that Washington and Taipei were conspiring to
maintain Taiwan’s de facto independence forever would be deeply disquieting
to Beijing.
To gain some insight into how China interprets U.S. Taiwan policy, this arti-
cle systematically explores the motives Chinese observers see behind American
support for Taiwan today. Although Beijing’s dissatisfaction with Washington’s
support for Taiwan is no secret, the way in which Chinese analysts explain
U.S. policy remains largely unexamined. The question here is not why U.S. sup-
port for Taiwan has recently increased but a deeper one: why does the United
States care about Taiwan’s security at all? This article documents the existence

1. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges
for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25:4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5–40.
2. For a summary of these developments, see Michael S. Chase, “U.S.-Taiwan Security Coop-
eration: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship,” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Dangerous Strait: The
U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 162–85.
3. “Taiwan White Paper,” Beijing Review 43:10 (March 6, 2000), p. 21.
4. “Anti-Secession Law Adopted by NPC (Full Text),” China Daily, March 14, 2005, http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-03/14/content_424643.htm.

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 270 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

of three different perspectives on this question within China. As elaborated be-

low, the mainstream view is that the U.S. supports Taiwan primarily as a
means of countering the mainland’s growing power, a perception I term the
“Nervous Hegemon” view. There are also more sanguine interpretations of
U.S. policy, however. In particular, an iconoclastic minority believes the U.S.
protects Taiwan mainly because the long history of the relationship makes it
difficult to abandon the island. Among other factors, these analysts stress
Washington’s interest in preserving its reputation as a reliable security partner,
a reputation at stake because of long-standing American support for Taiwan.
Given the emphasis here on the constraints imposed by the history of the rela-
tionship, I term this perception the “Entangled Ally” view. In addition, some
analysts believe that the U.S. is genuinely interested in preserving Taiwanese
democracy, perhaps with an eye toward using Taiwan’s example to inspire po-
litical liberalization on the mainland. I refer to this perception as the “Demo-
cratic Missionary” view.
These three views are not mutually exclusive. But it is important to under-
stand how much support each of them commands in China because they inform
divergent assessments of how the U.S. will behave in the future. The relatively
widespread Nervous Hegemon view, for example, implies U.S. antipathy to
the prospect of unification, if not necessarily support for Taiwanese indepen-
dence. Although the U.S. cannot dictate political outcomes on Taiwan, it does
have a number of means of influencing cross-strait relations. In this view,
Washington will use these levers to keep Taiwan and the mainland divided. To
the extent that the U.S. succeeds, China will be forced to choose between in-
definite separation and using coercive measures to promote unification.
The Entangled Ally and Democratic Missionary views have less unsettling
implications. To be sure, if the U.S. genuinely seeks to preserve Taiwanese de-
mocracy, then it is unlikely to be enthusiastic about unification as long as the
mainland remains autocratic. Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine scenarios
under which Washington could accept closer cross-strait political ties or even
unification, depending on the particular arrangements involved. Moreover,
should the mainland begin to democratize and do so in a relatively stable man-
ner, U.S. discomfort with the idea of unification should diminish.
If the U.S. is best seen as somehow “entangled” by its relationship with Tai-
wan, there would seem to be even less reason for Washington to fear the pros-
pect of unification. Of course, given its desire to maintain its reputation for
resolve, the U.S. would still seek to counter Chinese coercion of Taiwan through
continuing arms sales, military deployments, and official statements. In the
event of an attack on the island, such concerns could even motivate U.S. inter-
vention, particularly if the assault was seen as unprovoked. Nonetheless, it is
hard to see why an “entangled” U.S. would object to unification if the process
were peaceful and consensual. Even if U.S. allies in the region viewed the

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 271

matter in a different light, it seems unlikely that they would be able to dictate
American policy on the issue.
In addition to these implications, Chinese interpretations of U.S. Taiwan
policy matter because they inform more general perceptions of American inten-
tions toward China. As prominent Chinese analyst Chu Shulong has argued,
“The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of
American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status
of U.S.-China relations.”5 Accordingly, when Beijing is pessimistic about U.S.
policy toward Taiwan, it tends to take a darker view of Washington’s stance on
a range of issues, including regional efforts to combat terrorism, the alliance
with Japan, and the development of new military technologies.6 Grimmer views
of long-term U.S. intentions toward Taiwan can thus complicate Sino-American
relations across the board—not in the distant future, but today.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The next section surveys
Chinese explanations for U.S. support for Taiwan in the post-Cold War era.
This section draws upon interviews with Chinese officials and foreign policy
analysts conducted in 2005 and 2006, as well as recent articles and books on the
subject. Interviews are essential for gauging the real range of opinion on sensi-
tive subjects because Chinese analysts sometimes prefer not to make soft-line
views known in print.7 In this case, the interviewees included some of China’s
most influential America-watchers, Taiwan experts, and strategic analysts, both
inside and outside the government.8 Many of the non-official analysts con-
sulted are actively engaged as advisors to the government on policy toward
Taiwan or the United States. To protect the privacy of these individuals, they
are not identified by name.9
The second half of this article assesses the accuracy of these perceptions
insofar as possible. This assessment draws upon interviews with former U.S.

5. Chu Shulong, “Lengzhanhou Zhongmei Shuangbian he Diqu Zhanlue yu Anquan Guanxi”

[Post-cold war U.S.-China bilateral and regional strategies and security relations], Xiandai Guoji
Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 5 (2000), p. 12.
6. Thomas J. Christensen, “”Beijing’s Views of Taiwan and the United States in Early 2002:
The Renaissance of Pessimism,” China Leadership Monitor 3 (Summer 2002), p. 1.
7. See Philip C. Saunders, “China’s America Watchers,” China Quarterly 161 (March 2000),
p. 45.
8. To ensure a relatively representative sample, I interviewed 26 individuals from a range of
official and non-official institutions. These institutions included the State Council Taiwan Affairs
Office, the Academy of Military Science, the Central Party School, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, National Defense University, the China Institute of Contemporary International Rela-
tions (CICIR), Qinghua University, Beijing University, China Foreign Affairs University,
People’s University, Fudan University, and the Shanghai Institute for East Asian Studies.
9. The use of confidential interviews is of necessity a common practice in the study of Chinese
security policy. For examples, see Robert Ross, “The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coer-
cion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” International Security 25:2 (Fall 2000), pp. 87–123;
Christensen, “Posing Problems”; and Saunders, “China’s America Watchers.”

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 272 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

officials as well as my own analysis of U.S. behavior. It also weighs the spe-
cific arguments made by Chinese observers to justify particular interpretations
of U.S. policy. To the extent that Chinese analysts exaggerate the degree of con-
flict between Chinese and American goals, it is important to identify the spe-
cific misperceptions that exist and to correct them if possible. On the basis of
this analysis, I conclude that most Chinese observers attribute greater hostility
to Washington than is warranted at present. In the conclusion, I suggest how
the U.S. might make its goals on the Taiwan issue more clear in the future.

Explaining the U.S. Commitment

to Taiwan: Three Views
Although the Cold War context in which the U.S. commitment to Taiwan orig-
inated has disappeared, the U.S. continues to underwrite Taiwan’s security to-
day. What explains Washington’s continuing interest in the island? Given the
history of the American relationship with Taiwan and the current complexity
and ambiguity of U.S.-China relations, there are a number of ways to answer
this question. The research conducted for this article points to three different
views within Chinese policy circles. As described above, the U.S. is alternately
portrayed as a “Nervous Hegemon,” an “Entangled Ally,” or a “Democratic
Missionary.” In reality, of course, U.S. thinking about Taiwan is unlikely to be
as clear-cut as these stylized images suggest, and many Chinese observers rec-
ognize that the notion of a single “American interest” in Taiwan simplifies
matters dramatically. Even so, the observers interviewed for this article varied
widely in the emphasis they placed on different kinds of motivations for U.S.
policy, and they often singled out one factor in particular. Moreover, because
these three images have such contrasting implications for U.S.-China relations,
it is important to understand the relative plausibility that different Chinese ob-
servers attach to them. I consider each of these perspectives in turn below.

The Nervous Hegemon

Most Chinese observers attribute current U.S. support for Taiwan primarily to
a fear of China’s rising power in the post-Cold War era. This view prevailed
among both official and non-official interlocutors interviewed for this article. It
also dominates the printed discourse on the subject.10 Reinforcing this finding,

10. For examples, see Wang Fan, “Meiguo de Taihai Weichi Xianzhuang Zhengce de Tanxi”
[An analysis of the United States policy of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait], Tai-
pingyang Xuebao [Pacific Journal] 12 (2005), pp. 36–45; Liu Jianfei, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhanlue
de Zhuanbian Quxiang” [The changing direction of U.S. strategy toward China], Shijie Jingji yu
Zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics] 2 (2005), p. 34; Wu Xianbin, “Bushe Zhengfu dui Tai
Zhengce de Tedian ji qi Yuanyin” [The characteristics and causes of the Bush administration’s pol-
icy toward Taiwan], Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific] 3 (2004), pp. 16–23.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 273

Chinese scholars often describe this perspective as the mainstream view within
the Chinese government, military, and academic community.11 In fact, even
those who criticize this view as too pessimistic see it as the dominant perspec-
tive within China. In general, this motivation is attributed to both the Clinton
and current Bush administrations, although some suggest it has been particu-
larly pronounced in the latter case.12
Those who take this view vary as to what they think Washington is nervous
about. Nonetheless, there is a general perception that unification would en-
hance China’s overall power and remove a point of leverage for the United
States. This outcome is thus seen as highly undesirable from Washington’s per-
spective. In practice, therefore, U.S. policy is often said to consist of “four nos”:
“no unification, no independence, no war, and no harmony” (bu tong, bu du,
bu zhan, bu he).13 Although the U.S. might prefer formal independence for Tai-
wan, most Chinese observers believe that Washington sees this option as too
costly—and unnecessary, given Taiwan’s de facto independence of Beijing.
Similarly, the U.S. is seen as reluctant to fight a war with China over Taiwan,
although some suspect that Washington might prefer war if the only alterna-
tive were Taiwan’s unification with the mainland. Lastly, the U.S. is seen as
averse to increasing harmony between Taipei and Beijing, instead preferring
moderate levels of tension it can exploit.
These comparatively pessimistic observers cite many different kinds of evi-
dence to justify this view of U.S. policy. Some point to official U.S. publica-
tions, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, that call for maintaining U.S.
military primacy, and argue that this implies antipathy to cross-strait recon-
ciliation.14 One scholar cited as evidence the commentary on the Taiwan issue
from conservative think tanks in Washington. While noting that such organiza-
tions do not represent mainstream opinion, he argued that “the Bush adminis-
tration is pretty right wing, so people just think that [such organizations] are
telling the truth.”15 One military officer simply sees such a stance as rational:

11. One senior scholar estimated that roughly 90% of Chinese analysts believe that the United
States is unofficially opposed to unification in any form. Interview by author, Beijing, April 25,
2006.
12. For a prominent articulation of this view during the later years of Clinton administration,
see Su Ge, Meiguo Duihua Zhengce yu Taiwan Wenti [U.S. China policy and the Taiwan problem]
(Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1998), pp. 810–11. For additional examples from this time pe-
riod, see Yong Deng, “Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on United States Global
Strategy,” Political Science Quarterly 116:3 (Fall 2001), p. 354, fn. 42.
13. For example, see Xia Liping, “Meiguo dui Hua Zhanlue ji qi Neizai Maodun” [U.S. China
strategy and its inherent contradictions], Dangdai Yatai [Contemporary Asia-Pacific] 2 (2004), p. 8.
In some cases, the expression is abbreviated “no unification, no independence” (bu tong, bu du).
14. Wu Xinbo, “The Taiwan Issue and United States Asia/Pacific Security Strategy,” Ameri-
can Foreign Policy Interests 24:3 (June 2002), pp. 231–32.
15. Interview by author, Shanghai, June 3, 2005.

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 274 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

“If I were President of the United States, I would not want to see the mainland
and Taiwan unify.”16
Notably, there seem to be both soft- and hard-line versions of the Nervous
Hegemon view. Those espousing the softer view see the U.S. as opposed to
unification until it becomes more certain of China’s long-term intentions. These
individuals often describe the U.S. as using Taiwan to “guard against” ( fang-
fan ) China’s rise. As noted expert Xu Shiquan has put it, “Taiwan is a card the
U.S. uses to contain the development of Chinese power. If the U.S. is appre-
hensive about growing Chinese power and believes China will one day chal-
lenge its ‘leading position,’ it will not let the Taiwan card in its hand go.”17
Implicit in this view is the idea that U.S. support for Taiwan might be tem-
pered, if not eliminated, if Washington could be reassured about China’s future
ambitions. Hard-line analysts, in contrast, portray the U.S. as more certain and
deliberate. One official accused Washington of “using Taiwan to contain China”
( yi Tai zhi Hua ).18 In this view unification is simply not in the U.S. interest,
given the extent to which it would benefit a rival power.
Proponents of the Nervous Hegemon view often suggest the U.S. would try
to subvert cross-strait relations to stave off the possibility of unification, al-
though the U.S. capacity for such subversion remains a matter of dispute. In
any case, these observers agree that the U.S. would be extremely careful in tak-
ing such a step, given the sensitivity of the issue. Several individuals interviewed
for this article suggested that Washington might interfere through provocative
arms sales packages or by allowing Taiwanese officials to make high-profile
visits to the United States. One scholar added that the U.S. could prod Japan to
make pro-Taiwan gestures, which would sow discord between Taipei and Bei-
jing while directing the mainland’s ire against another country. Japan in turn
could defend such moves by explaining that it is under pressure from the United
States, thereby complicating matters for Beijing as it contemplates a re-
sponse.19 Whatever the American choice of means, there is real concern that
the U.S. will be “a big obstacle” (yi da zhang’ai) to unifying with Taiwan in
the future.20

16. Personal communication, August 18, 2005.

17. Xu Shiquan, “Shou Tai Wuqi: Dui Zhong Mei Guanxi Shashangli Bu Jian” [Selling weap-
ons to Taiwan: The injuriousness to U.S.-China relations is not decreasing], Guoji Xianqu Daobao
[International Herald Leader] (Beijing), November 5, 2004, p. 1.
18. Interview by author, Beijing, April 27, 2006.
19. On this point, see Hu Jiping, “Mei Ri ‘Gongtong Zhanlue Mubiao’ yu Riben She Tai Li-
chang Bianhua” [The U.S.-Japan ‘common strategic objective’ and Japan’s changing position on
interference in Taiwan], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary International Relations] 3 (2005),
p. 36.
20. Tao Wenzhao, “Meiguo dui Taiwan Zhengce de Yanbian” [The evolution of U.S. policy
toward Taiwan], Zhongguo Shehuikexueyuan Xueshu Zixun Weiyuanhui Jikan [Collected papers of
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Academic Consultative Committee] 2 (2005), p. 536.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 275

On the question of whether the U.S. ultimately seeks Taiwanese indepen-

dence, Chinese views seem to have evolved. The 1995 decision by Washington
to permit then-Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S. sparked partic-
ularly dark appraisals of U.S. intentions. According to one well-placed scholar,
at that time “the mainstream view was that the U.S. supported Taiwanese inde-
pendence” (zhuliu de kanfa shi Meiguo zhichi Taidu).21 The same individual
witnessed Jiang Zemin declare in a private meeting at the time that “there is
no Taiwan problem, only a U.S.-China problem” (meiyou Taiwan wenti, zhi you
Zhong-Mei guanxi wenti). This extremely pessimistic view was apparently
moderated following U.S. disavowals of support for Taiwanese independence.
Today, it is unclear what proportion of Chinese observers still suspects that
the U.S. hopes one day to achieve formal Taiwanese independence. One scholar
argued that “most” Chinese observers see this as the ultimate U.S. goal, not-
withstanding the disavowals of the Clinton and Bush administrations.22 None-
theless, I did not document much belief that the U.S. saw such an outcome as
realistic, even in the long term. Moreover, none of the other individuals con-
sulted for this study saw the mainstream view as quite so pessimistic. Perhaps
the most reasonable conclusion at this point is that there is no strong belief
that the U.S. ultimately favors Taiwanese independence, but such a view could
readily reemerge in the future.

The Entangled Ally

Most Chinese observers are skeptical that the U.S. is best understood as “en-
tangled” by its long-standing relationship with Taiwan. To be sure, many in-
dividuals acknowledge that the U.S. reputation as a reliable ally could suffer if
it reduced support for Taiwan, particularly in light of Washington’s historic
support for the island. Yet, this is typically seen as a secondary concern. One
scholar dismissed it as “a very small part” (hen xiao de yi bufen) of the U.S.
interest in Taiwan, while a military officer belittled it as “not a core interest”
(bushi hexin liyi).23
Nonetheless, there are several noteworthy exceptions to this general tendency.
One scholar argued that the history of the relationship with Taiwan made it diffi-
cult for the U.S. to disengage. Another was more specific, citing the Taiwan
Relations Act as a political commitment that the U.S. could not easily ignore.
A third maintained that the primary U.S. interest was in the stability of East
Asia as a region. Successful Chinese coercion of Taiwan would threaten this
stability by undermining the U.S. reputation as a security partner, but peaceful
unification would not.

21. Interview by author, Beijing, June 9, 2005.

22. Interview by author, Beijing, June 19, 2005.
23. Interviews by author, Beijing, June 13, 2005, and April 23, 2006.

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 276 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

While these more sanguine observers understand that their views diverge
from the mainstream, they remain unfazed by their minority status. In fact, these
individuals were often quick to dismiss more pessimistic assessments, at least
in private. Referring to the widespread view that U.S. Taiwan policy is part of
a larger containment policy, one scholar noted resignedly that “there are many
misperceptions in the U.S.-China relationship.”24 Another senior scholar was
more blunt, suggesting that the opinions of most Chinese analysts on this issue
“are without basis” (meiyou yiju).25 In this expert’s view, most Chinese analysts
see U.S. policy toward Asia as totally driven by its relationship with China and
fail to understand that the U.S. has other priorities as well.
To be sure, these more optimistic observers do not completely dismiss the
Nervous Hegemon view. Yet, they tend to attribute this highly realpolitik moti-
vation to individual China hawks in the Bush administration or the Congress,
rather than the U.S. government as a whole. Moreover, in some cases the in-
fluence of these more hawkish individuals is seen as having declined from an
apex when President Bush took office in 2001. Although this is partly a func-
tion of the administration’s discovery of China’s strategic utility after 9/11, it
is also a function of broader trends. One scholar suggested that certain Bush
administration officials took office with a “Cold War mind-set” inherited from
their last experience in government in the 1980s or early 1990s. In his view,
this mentality has faded as these officials have gained experience working with
China in a post-Cold War context.26
The Entangled Ally view can be found in print, though not as easily as the
Nervous Hegemon perspective. One prominent expert has noted that Ameri-
can interlocutors stress credibility concerns as driving U.S. interest in Taiwan,
without contradicting this explanation for U.S. policy.27 Other writers note
the reluctance of U.S. policymakers to “abandon” Taiwan in its hour of need,
presenting the issue more as a moral aversion to breaking a promise than a
concern over reputation.28 Nonetheless, this view seems to be limited to more-
academic publications; even there, reputational and moral concerns are gen-
erally not cited as the most important reasons for continuing U.S. support.
Instead, it appears that those who stress these kinds of motivations prefer not
to share their views in print.

24. Interview by author, Shanghai, June 1, 2005.

25. Interview by author, Beijing, June 19, 2005.
26. Interview by author, Beijing, April 18, 2006.
27. It was noted that the point was highly controversial, however. See Wang Jisi, “Zhong Mei
Weiji Xingwei Bijiao Fenxi” [A comparison of U.S. and Chinese crisis behavior], Meiguo Yanjiu
[American Studies Quarterly] 19:2 (Summer 2005), pp. 33–34.
28. Sun Zhe, “Meiguo zai Tai de ‘Teshu Liyi’ de Jian’gou” [The construction of the United
States’s ‘special interest’ in Taiwan], Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan [Taiwan Research Quarterly] (Xiamen,
PRC) 1 (2005), p. 25.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 277

The Democratic Missionary

Chinese observers generally do not see the U.S. as primarily concerned about
the protection of Taiwanese democracy or the promotion of democratic values
in Asia. They often note that Washington supported a repressive regime on
Taiwan for decades during the Cold War, which makes it difficult to see the
U.S. interest in Taiwanese democracy as a fundamental issue today. Nonethe-
less, several individuals interviewed for this study cited democracy promotion
as a supplemental concern for the United States. Some interlocutors saw this
concern as bolstering congressional support for Taiwan, especially in the lib-
eral wing of the Democratic Party. One official suggested that Taiwan was a
“democratic window” (minzhu chuanghu) through which the U.S. hoped to
promote political reform on the mainland. A prominent scholar went so far as
to suggest that “deep in the mind of the United States, Taiwan is a democracy,
and Taiwan is a friend.”29 Yet, even this individual hesitated to conclude that
this was Washington’s most important concern.
The Democratic Missionary view can sometimes be found in print. Typi-
cally, U.S. interest in Taiwan’s democracy is presented as a secondary concern
that supplements goals such as checking China’s rise.30 This accords with the
opinions expressed in the interviews for this study, as noted above. Yet, there
is also some evidence of self-censorship. One supporter of the Democratic
Missionary view confessed that he did not publish his ideas lest he be labeled
“pro-Washington.”31
Besides doubting that protecting Taiwanese democracy was Washington’s
top priority, most individuals consulted for this article discounted the notion
that democratization on the mainland would greatly improve Beijing’s rela-
tions with Washington and Taipei. In fact, some worried that democratization
in China would be destabilizing and that the resulting regime would be more
nationalistic and less predictable than before. Under such circumstances, a de-
mocratizing China might actually seem more threatening to Taiwan and the
United States, rather than less.
In sum, a majority of Chinese observers appear to subscribe to a relatively
gloomy interpretation of U.S. support for Taiwan. Although there is little be-
lief that the U.S. seeks Taiwanese independence, many observers believe that

29. Interview by author, Beijing, June 15, 2005.

30. For example, see Wang Jisi, “Sanshi Nian lai Zhong Mei Guanxi de Bian yu Bu Bian”
[Change and continuity in the past 30 years of U.S.-China Relations], Zhongguo Dangzheng
Ganbu Luntan [China Administrative Cadres’ Forum] 7 (2002), pp. 36–39. For an atypical analysis
that stresses U.S. interest in Taiwanese democracy, see Xin Qiang and Ni Shixiong, “Xingweiti
‘Shenfen’ yu Dui Wai Zhengce: Mei Tai Guanxi de Jian’gouzhuyi Fenxi” [Actor ‘identity’ and for-
eign policy: A constructivist analysis of U.S.-Taiwan relations], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 1 (2006),
pp. 22–28.
31. Personal communication, April 12, 2006.

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 278 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

Washington seeks to delay or prevent unification. For unification to occur,

China will thus have to overcome implicit American resistance. Despite this
widespread pessimism, a significant minority sees U.S. intentions as more
compatible with Chinese interests. These individuals typically attribute con-
tinuing U.S. protection of Taiwan to the history of the relationship and in par-
ticular, to Washington’s desire to maintain its reputation as a reliable ally.
In addition to the three main views highlighted above, Chinese observers
sometimes offer other perspectives on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Some note
the economic benefits that the U.S. derives from its arms sales to Taiwan,
highlighting the large package the Bush administration has offered.32 Yet, this
particular motivation seems most relevant to explaining Washington’s interest
in selling expensive weapons systems to Taiwan. It is less clear that this incen-
tive can explain Washington’s apparent willingness to risk a highly costly war
with China over the island. Other Chinese observers insist that American pol-
icy cannot be well understood if the U.S. is simply treated as a unitary actor;
one recent study of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan explores the role of bureaucratic
and inter-branch politics in Washington.33 Lastly, one analyst saw Washington
as unsure of what it had at stake, arguing that “the U.S. has a policy, but not a
strategy, toward Taiwan.”34 In his view, U.S. policy is best seen as reactive,
rather than goal-oriented.
Naturally, the views of Chinese observers are fluid. Some have become more
pessimistic over time, especially as the U.S. military relationship with Taiwan
has deepened in recent years. Others have become more optimistic after visit-
ing the United States. One military officer said he started to take American
interest in Taiwan’s democracy more seriously after talking with U.S.-based
sinologists. More generally, the view that the U.S. ultimately seeks formal Tai-
wanese independence has apparently abated in recent years despite its preva-
lence in the 1990s.

Perception or Misperception?
Assessing Chinese Views
If the pessimism that prevails among Chinese observers is correct, the U.S.
and China are doomed to struggle over Taiwan’s future, seeking to influence
Taiwanese politicians and voters in very different directions. Although mili-
tary conflict might not be inevitable, it would seem to be more likely—at least

32. Niu Jun, “Meiguo dui Tai Zhengce de Yanbian: Yige Lishi de Sikao” [The evolution of
U.S. Taiwan policy: A historical contemplation], Taipingyang Xuebao 2 (2005), p. 42.
33. See Zhang Qingmin, Meiguo dui Tai Junshou Zhengce Yanjiu: Juece de Shijiao [Research
on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan: Perspectives on policy-making] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press,
2006).
34. Interview by author, Beijing, June 23, 2005.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 279

if Beijing feared it was losing this political tug of war with Washington. Yet, if
this gloomy view is incorrect, Washington has a powerful interest in making
this clear to Beijing. Unwarranted pessimism on China’s part is dangerous and
should be extinguished whenever possible.
Of course, divining the “true” motivations behind U.S. Taiwan policy in the
post-Cold War era is no simple task. Ideally, one would seek evidence for and
against different types of strategic motivations in internal documents from the
Clinton and Bush administrations concerning the Taiwan issue. Unfortunately,
given the sensitivity and recency of the policies under discussion, such an ap-
proach is not feasible here. Even with unfettered access to classified material,
it might still be difficult to attribute an overall motivation to an organization as
large as the U.S. government. Although political scientists often assume that
governments make decisions as unitary actors, the reality is obviously much
more complicated.
The following analysis, therefore, adopts a more modest goal. Rather than
attempting to document definitively the most important motivations behind
U.S. policy, I assess the plausibility of particular Chinese perceptions. To do
so, I draw upon interviews with former U.S. officials as well as my own exam-
ination of U.S. behavior. I also consider several justifications given by Chinese
observers for their interpretations of U.S. policy. To ensure a relatively bal-
anced picture, the discussion relies on interviews with former officials from
both the Clinton and Bush administrations as well as from the Departments of
State (DOS) and Defense (DOD), and the National Security Council (NSC). In
aggregate, the analysis strongly suggests that most Chinese analysts hold ex-
cessively pessimistic views of U.S. policy. I examine the specific misperceptions
in turn below.

Taiwan’s Democratic Appeal

Whereas Chinese observers typically downplay U.S. interest in Taiwanese de-
mocracy, former officials from both the Clinton and Bush administrations cite
Taiwan’s democratic system as a powerful force behind U.S. interest in the is-
land today. One individual called Taiwan’s democracy “enormously important,”
and several cited it as the single most important factor overall behind U.S.
support.35 As pointed out above, Chinese pundits often justify their skepticism
on this score by noting that the U.S. supported Taiwan even when the latter’s
political system was highly autocratic. Nonetheless, the fact that democracy
did not motivate U.S. interest in Taiwan during the Cold War does not mean
that it could not do so today, under very different circumstances. One official
argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the U.S. more leeway to

35. Author’s interview with Daniel Blumenthal, former senior country director for China, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, and Mongolia, Office for International Security Affairs, DOD, August 3, 2005.

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 280 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

pursue its ideals in foreign policy—just as Taiwan’s political liberalization was

unfolding.36
Taiwan’s democratic appeal appears to work on a number of levels. First, it
shapes how some U.S. officials view Taiwan’s intentions and reliability as a
partner. One veteran of both the Clinton DOD and Bush DOS suggested that
Taiwan “is a like-minded democracy and friend, which puts them in a camp of
countries that would work with us on a range of issues.”37 Of course, this does
not mean that U.S. officials see American and Taiwanese interests as identical,
as bilateral frictions over Taiwanese gestures toward formal independence at-
test. “We have principled respect for Taiwanese democracy,” another official
put it, “but we don’t have the luxury of accepting everything that is done in the
name of Taiwanese democracy.”38
Second, the democracy issue “resonates” in the American political system
in ways that make it difficult for the U.S. to abandon the island.39 While Amer-
ican opinion polls concerning Taiwan’s security offer varying results depend-
ing on the questions asked, clear majorities consistently maintain that the U.S.
has a “vital interest” in Taiwan. There is little question that Taiwan’s democ-
racy boosts the island’s image among the American public.40 Indeed, even as
human rights abuses under martial law in the 1980s raised questions about U.S.
relations with Taiwan, “political liberalization on Taiwan has facilitated the
emergence of a broad consensus in Congress regarding U.S. policy.”41 In fact,
then-Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo launched political reforms in the mid-
1980s partly in response to urging from U.S. officials, who stressed democra-
tization as the best means of retaining American support in the future.42 This
strategy appears to have paid off, as the interviews for this study attest.
Third, some U.S. officials believe that Taiwan can serve as a model of de-
mocratization for other countries in Asia, particularly China. As one Clinton
DOD official put it, “Taiwan’s existence is a constant reminder to the PRC lead-
ership of the possibilities for reform and democratization. While it is currently

36. Author’s interview with Richard Bush, former chairman and managing director of the
American Institute in Taiwan, September 22, 2005.
37. Author’s interview with Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, DOS, September 13, 2005.
38. Author’s interview with Richard Bush.
39. Author’s interview with Robert Suettinger, former NSC director of Asian Affairs, August 7,
2005.
40. A 2002 Harris Interactive poll of U.S. citizens found that 65% of respondents viewed Tai-
wan as a “vital interest” of the United States. See Public Opinion Online, “Worldviews 2002 Sur-
vey,” October 2, 2002, accessible through “Polls and Surveys” in the Reference section of http://
www.lexis-nexis.com.
41. Richard Bush, “Domestic Political Considerations That Shape United States Policy toward
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan,” in David M. Lampton and Alfred D. Wilhelm (eds.), United States
and China Relations at a Crossroads (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995), p. 152.
42. Author’s interview with Richard Bush.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 281

not appreciated in Beijing, Taiwan is a laboratory for reform, and these exper-
iments have relevance and resonance for the mainland.”43
In fact, the Clinton administration’s NSC considered various potential means
of promoting the spread of democracy from Taiwan to the mainland, only to
conclude that political liberalization in China was realistic only in the long-
term. Even so, NSC officials made the case to Taiwanese interlocutors that the
island could serve as an example for the mainland, although they did not find
the Taiwanese overly receptive to the idea at that time.44 In the Bush adminis-
tration, officials with the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor have met with Taiwanese experts in an effort to gain more
insight into Taiwan’s democratization—and how exportable it may be.45
To be sure, Chinese skeptics counter that the U.S. has not traditionally em-
phasized the “Taiwan model” in its public diplomacy. This is not surprising.
First, there is no universal agreement among U.S. officials that the Taiwan
model is applicable to the mainland. Some see Taiwan as a useful template,
but others believe that political reform in China will unfold according to its
own logic. More important, even those officials who believe Taiwan can serve
as a model for the mainland worry that overt U.S. attention to this point will
be counterproductive. As a former NSC official noted, any American cam-
paign to promote the spread of Taiwan-style democracy to the PRC could be
denounced by Beijing as “peaceful evolution,” a reference to U.S. Cold War
efforts to undermine communism on the mainland.46
Despite these reservations, there are indications that the traditional U.S. re-
luctance to call attention to Taiwan’s example may be fading. In November
2005, while in Kyoto, Japan, President Bush made a point of lauding Taiwan
as a “Chinese” democracy: “Like South Korea, modern Taiwan is free and
democratic and prosperous. By embracing freedom at all levels, Taiwan has
delivered prosperity to its people and created a free and democratic Chinese
society.” After these remarks, Bush added a call for greater political openness
in China: “By meeting the legitimate demands of its citizens for freedom and
openness, China’s leaders can help their country grow into a modern, prosper-
ous, and confident nation.”47
These statements marked a clear departure from past U.S. practice, which
tended to encourage reform in China without mentioning Taiwan. It remains

43. Author’s interview with Kurt Campbell, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for
East Asia, October 11, 2005.
44. Author’s interview with Robert Suettinger.
45. Author’s interview with Randall Schriver.
46. Author’s interview with Robert Suettinger.
47. “George W. Bush’s Remarks in Kyoto, as Delivered,” Federal Document Clearing House
(FDCH) Political Transcripts, November 16, 2005, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp2.harvard.
edu/universe/document?_md8f026049bc8b612c0cd0621d4326b8e&_docnum2&wchp
dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5317806c500701dcb94de4055f9fc0e15.

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 282 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

to be seen how this new approach, if sustained, will be interpreted in Beijing.

The results of this study suggest it has yet to make a significant impression.
In keeping with the emphasis on democracy, some American officials sug-
gest that the U.S. would not have great difficulty accepting unification be-
tween Taiwan and a democratic regime on the mainland. Although there might
be some concerns about issues such as the security of shipping lanes and the
transfer of American defense technology from Taiwan to the mainland, these
would be countered by rising perceptions of the mainland as a more benevo-
lent actor. As one former DOD official argued, “There would be concerns, but
over time, it would [be] easier to work out an accommodation of these con-
cerns” with a democratic regime.48 In fact, other former U.S. officials believed
that the Bush administration would accept unification with a non-democratic
regime on the mainland as long as the particular arrangements did not under-
mine Taiwan’s system and were acceptable to Taiwanese voters.49

Credibility Concerns
Most Chinese analysts downplay, if not dismiss, the role of credibility con-
cerns in motivating U.S. interest in Taiwan. U.S. officials, however, often take
a different view. They note that the U.S. continues to rely heavily on East Asian
allies and suggest that credibility concerns surrounding these relationships play
a role in Taiwan policy. As two former Clinton DOD officials have argued:
Washington’s official relationship with Beijing on the one hand and its unofficial rela-
tionship with Taipei on the other represent perhaps the most complex foreign-policy
balancing act in the world today. At stake are a number of core U.S. foreign policy goals:
the promotion of democracy, the preservation of U.S. credibility [emphasis added],
loyalty to traditional allies and friends, the engagement and integration of an emerg-
ing power into the international system, and the maintenance of peace and stability
in Asia as a whole.50

Notably, Washington’s concerns are not limited to maintaining a reputation

for resolve in the face of pressure. American officials want the U.S. to be seen
not only as a reliable ally but also as a prudent and responsible actor. Accord-
ingly, in the event of rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. must assure
its allies that it has the situation “under control.”51 This may involve putting
pressure on Beijing, on Taipei, or on both.

48. Author’s interview with Daniel Blumenthal.

49. Author’s interview with Randall Schriver.
50. Kurt Campbell and Derek Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?” Foreign Affairs 80:4
(July-August 2001), p. 14.
51. Author’s interview with Richard Bush. More generally, see Michael McDevitt, “Taiwan:
The Tail That Wags Dogs,” National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Analysis 16:1 (October
2005), pp. 87–91.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 283

The extent to which U.S. policy toward Taiwan could influence its strategic
relationships in the region remains a matter of dispute within Washington,
however. On one side of the issue are those who tend to stress the unique na-
ture of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. In this view, U.S. allies in Asia are
unlikely to infer too much about Washington’s reliability based on its Taiwan
policy, recognizing that Taiwan is a special case. Others are much less certain
the Taiwan issue will be seen as unique, in part because the situation raises the
larger issue of American poise and resolve in the face of Chinese pressure.52
In short, although there are varying views within the U.S. government on
the credibility issue, Chinese observers who downplay this factor appear to be
missing genuine concern on the part of at least some U.S. officials. These offi-
cials include individuals who have been deeply involved in Taiwan policy in
the past, suggesting that this kind of concern is capable of influencing policy.

The Not So Nervous Hegemon

After downplaying Washington’s interest in Taiwanese democracy and Ameri-
can concerns over credibility, most Chinese analysts conclude that the U.S.
government is primarily interested in using Taiwan to counter China’s rising
power. As explained earlier, this perception naturally leads to the conclusion
that the U.S. opposes unification—peaceful or otherwise—because it would
merely lead to a stronger China. The accuracy of this perception is difficult to
assess, particularly since U.S. officials would presumably not admit to harbor-
ing such unfriendly intentions. For three reasons, however, fear of a rising
China seems unlikely to be the driving force behind U.S. Taiwan policy.
First, many of the justifications given to support the Nervous Hegemon
view are open to question. It is not safe to assume that right-wing think tanks
speak for the U.S. executive branch, even one led by a Republican president.
Nor should one assume that what appears “rational” in Beijing will seem equally
reasonable to policymakers in Washington. It was only a decade ago that many
PRC-based analysts believed the U.S. deliberately sought formal Taiwanese
independence, when in fact it did not. Lastly, while the Bush administration
does hope to preserve American primacy, it also seeks to avoid military con-
flict with China insofar as possible. Accordingly, because a resolution of the
Taiwan issue would remove the most potentially volatile irritant in Sino-U.S.
relations, it is far from clear that the present U.S. government would see peace-
ful steps toward unification as contradicting American interests.
Second, none of the U.S. officials consulted for this study believe that this
motivation has underpinned U.S. Taiwan policy in the past, though some thought
it could in the future. Although this may not be surprising, the vehemence and

52. Author’s interview with Randall Schriver.

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 284 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

consistency with which this perspective was rejected was telling; one former
Clinton NSC official denounced this view as “dead wrong.”53 Nor was there
any evidence of partisan difference on this issue. One veteran of the Bush Pen-
tagon argued that the Nervous Hegemon view was based on flawed notions of
how policy is made in the U.S. government. Whereas this view assumes far-
sighted realpolitik strategy, in reality “the U.S. does not think that far down
the chessboard.”54 This individual also noted that peaceful unification under
current conditions seemed to him so unlikely that it was simply not an issue
that the U.S. needed to worry about.
Of course, it is rare for a large national government to be completely of one
mind on a given issue. In this case, it is well-known that before joining the
Bush administration in 2001 as undersecretary of state, John Bolton, subse-
quently the U.N. ambassador until December 2006, openly advocated U.S.
recognition of Taiwan. There is thus at least one individual who has served in
the current administration who would likely oppose “peaceful unification” in
any form under current conditions. However, Bolton’s views while he was in of-
fice had little impact on the Bush administration’s Taiwan policy, as evidenced
by Bush’s direct criticism of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian in December
2003. In fact, in his initial confirmation hearing, Bolton made clear that Tai-
wan would not be part of his portfolio while in government.55
Perhaps more significantly, U.S. officials concerned about the alliance with
Japan could take a somewhat different stance on the Taiwan issue in the future
than those who are more involved in China policy. Specifically, Japan special-
ists might be more likely to take into account the concerns some Japanese pol-
iticians reportedly have about the geostrategic impact of unification, even if
consensual, on Japan’s position in the region. The individuals consulted for
this article, however, denied that such considerations had played any role in
U.S. policy to date, or even that such matters had been discussed.56
Third, U.S. behavior does not unambiguously support the Nervous Hegemon
view. To be sure, the U.S. refuses to sell weapons to China, maintains restrictions
on the trade of sensitive dual-use technologies, and lobbies other countries to
do the same. U.S. economic policy, however, belies the notion that Washing-
ton is committed to keeping China as weak as possible. Chinese exports to the
U.S. reached more than $243 billion in 2005, trailing only those from Canada,
while cumulative U.S. investment in the mainland surpassed $50 billion that

53. Author’s interview with Robert Suettinger.

54. Author’s interview with Daniel Blumenthal.
55. See “U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) Holds Hearing on the John Bolton Nomination,”
FDCH Political Transcripts, March 29, 2001, http://web.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/
document?_m5351e3ed567b95bbc3c01fb4f9f66fc4&_docnum4&wchpdGLbVlb-zSkVb&_
md5bc08c250af32439ad8efdb87b 506fa53.
56. Author’s interview with Randall Schriver.

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 285

year.57 Although difficult to calculate precisely, the massive impact of this trade
and investment on the overall financial and technical resources available to the
PRC undoubtedly dwarfs the effect of U.S. trade restrictions. Washington has
not merely acquiesced in this growing economic relationship but has actively
encouraged it, most notably by supporting China’s successful application for
membership in the World Trade Organization. This support reflects a desire to
promote U.S. economic interests rather than increase Chinese power, but it none-
theless contradicts the idea that Washington cannot tolerate a stronger China.
In addition, although the U.S. has not declared its support for peaceful uni-
fication, this need not imply that Washington opposes it. American officials
stress that it is for Taipei and Beijing to work out the specific nature of their
future relationship through dialogue; it is not for the U.S. to dictate the out-
come of such negotiations in advance. Indeed, if the U.S. publicly announced
support for peaceful unification, it would likely be interpreted in Beijing and
Taipei as something more: support for the PRC’s “one country, two systems”
formula.58 Because the U.S. has no interest in supporting that particular for-
mula over any other mutually acceptable solution, such a statement seems in-
advisable from Washington’s point of view.
In sum, although it is difficult to document the motivations behind U.S. Tai-
wan policy definitively, it seems clear that Chinese perceptions are on the whole
too pessimistic. Most observers are too quick to dismiss American interest in
Taiwanese democracy and credibility concerns, motivations that need not con-
flict with Beijing’s goal of unification. At the same time, the evidence that the
U.S. hopes to prevent unification to counter the mainland’s rising power is
equivocal at best. Because this view has more worrisome implications for the
future of Sino-American relations, its popularity in China is disquieting.
Skeptics might object that interviews with former U.S. officials are unreli-
able means of inferring the “real” intentions behind U.S. policy. In this view,
American officials say one thing for public consumption but something else in
private. Insofar as this hypothesis can be tested, it seems unfounded. Officials
interviewed for this study noted that references to Taiwanese democracy can
be found not merely in public pronouncements but in internal documents as
well. Moreover, consultants with long experience working with U.S. govern-
ment officials in intimate settings cannot recall a single instance in which an
official referred to a goal of keeping Taiwan and the mainland divided.59 If

57. For the export total, see U.S. Department of Commerce, TradeStats Express, http://tse.
export.gov, accessed July 27, 2006. For the investment figure, see Wayne Morrison, CRS Issue
Brief for Congress: China’s Economic Conditions, July 12, 2006, p. 6, http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/RL33534.pdf.
58. Personal communication from Richard Bush, May 8, 2006.
59. Michael Swaine, presentation, Institute of International Studies, Qinghua University, May
23, 2005.

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 286 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLVII, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2007

there is a secret American plan to keep Taiwan and the mainland apart, it is
so well-hidden that most U.S. officials involved in China policy do not know
about it.

Conclusion
The results of this study may be troubling, but they should not be surprising.
International politics is notoriously rife with misperceptions, and the U.S.-
China relationship is particularly prone to misunderstanding. In this case, China’s
pessimistic perceptions have a number of disturbing implications. First, Chi-
nese officials who believe the U.S. secretly opposes unification will be less
sanguine about the prospects for peaceful unification with Taiwan, other things
being equal. This expectation in turn makes it harder—if not impossible—to
persuade Taipei to come to the negotiating table, while making coercion ap-
pear more necessary. Such a conclusion naturally increases support for invest-
ments in military hardware and training while undermining arguments for
diplomatic initiatives and compromises. In addition, pessimism about the pos-
sibility of persuading Taiwan subverts arguments for democratization on the
mainland, insofar as these arguments cite the boost that such reforms would
give to cross-strait relations.
To be sure, the U.S. cannot dictate political outcomes on Taiwan. At the same
time, China’s influence over the island is rising as cross-strait economic ties con-
tinue to grow. It is thus possible that Chinese officials will see non-coercive
approaches to Taiwan as increasingly viable in the future, even in the face of
American resistance. Even so, Chinese perceptions of American opposition—
no matter how impotent—to closer cross-strait ties are likely to foster skepti-
cism about broader American intentions toward China, hindering cooperation
on a variety of issues. Should China ultimately succeed in unifying with Tai-
wan peacefully, the U.S. has no interest in Chinese analysts believing that
Beijing somehow “triumphed” over Washington’s implicit resistance.
Given the stakes involved, it would be imprudent to allow China’s overly
pessimistic perceptions to persist. The key here is not merely assuring Beijing
that the U.S. does not support Taiwanese independence, as both the Clinton
and Bush administrations have done. This is an essential part of the task, to be
sure, but it is not enough. Instead, American representatives must also stress
that the U.S. is prepared to accept unification if it is reached peacefully and
consensually.
Convincing Chinese interlocutors of U.S. sincerity on this score will not be
easy. Yet, if Washington approaches this problem in the right way, there is at
least some hope of progress. As other scholars have argued, diplomatic per-
suasion is most likely to succeed in settings that are relatively informal, par-
ticularly those that allow for small-group interaction and the development of

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 ANDREW BINGHAM KENNEDY 287

trust.60 The U.S. should thus communicate its assurances through casual ex-
changes that recur over time, rather than via formal pronouncements that will
likely be dismissed as diplomatic niceties. Indeed, the interviews for this study
suggest that such casual interactions are extremely important. All of the Chi-
nese observers with more sanguine views had either spent time in the U.S. or
had considerable experience interacting with American interlocutors in less
formal settings.61 In the future, the U.S. should work to expand such contacts,
particularly with the relatively isolated Chinese military.
Nonetheless, before undertaking a comprehensive effort to reduce Chinese
anxieties the U.S. government should develop a clearer view of its long-term
goals on the Taiwan issue. Despite the consistency of views among the Amer-
ican officials interviewed for this study, the U.S. executive branch does not seem
to have developed a coordinated position on this issue. In that sense, the Chi-
nese pundit who argued that “the U.S. has a policy, but not a strategy, toward
Taiwan” may well have been the most perceptive observer of all. A more in-
tensive discussion of Taiwan within the U.S. thus is needed before greater ef-
forts to reassure Beijing can be made. Although this is a long-term problem,
deferring the matter merely allows dangerous misperceptions to fester.

60. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 45:4 (December 2001), pp. 487–515.
61. Not all Chinese observers with experience in the U.S. held sanguine views, however. In-
stead, such experience seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the development
of such views.

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