IP DNS Password
IP DNS Password
IP DNS Password
Chapter:
IP & DNS
32
What is an IP Address?
• An IP address:
- is a 32 bit long identifier
- encodes a network number (network prefix)
and a host number
33
Digitally signed by
Dr. Nirmalya Dr. Nirmalya Kar 1
Kar Date: 2024.04.01
10:39:26 +05'30'
4/1/24
zip codes.
• Two methods:
• Old: Classful addressing
• New: Classless addressing (also called
classless inter-domain routing, or CIDR)
34
1-617-373-1234
35 3278
Very General
West Village
West Village G
H
Room1234
Room 256
2
4/1/24
• Example:
128.143.137.144
36
3
4/1/24
• The network prefix identifies a network and the host number identifies a
specific host (actually, interface on the network).
38
Example
• Example: ellington.cs.virginia.edu
128.143 137.144
39
4
4/1/24
40
bit # 0 1 7 8 31
Class A 0
Network Prefix Host Number
8 bits 24 bits
bit # 0 1 2 15 16 31
bit # 0 1 2 3 23 24 31
41
5
4/1/24
bit # 0 1 2 3 4 31
bit # 0 1 2 3 4 5 31
42
43
6
4/1/24
45
46
7
4/1/24
47
Networ
Pfx Host
k
Subtree size
determined by …
network class
47
Class Sizes
48
Way too big
Class Prefix Network Number of Classes Hosts per Class
Bits Bits
A 1 7 27 – 2 = 126 224 – 2 = 16,777,214
(0 and 127 are (All 0 and all 1 are reserved)
reserved)
B 2 14 214 = 16,398 216 – 2 = 65,534
(All 0 and all 1 are reserved)
C 3 21 221 = 2,097,512 28 – 2 = 254
(All 0 and all 1 are reserved)
Total: 2,114,036
48
8
4/1/24
Class Sizes
49
49
50
9
4/1/24
51
52
10
4/1/24
53
Subnetting
54
11
4/1/24
extended network
prefix
• Then:
• Subnets can be freely assigned within the organization
• Internally, subnets are treated as separate networks
• Subnet structure is not visible outside the organization
55
Subnet Masks
• Routers and hosts use an extended network prefix (subnet mask) to identify
the start of the host numbers
* There are different ways of subnetting. Commonly used netmasks for university networks with /16 prefix
(Class B) are 255.255.255.0 and 255.255.0.0
56
12
4/1/24
57
Pfx Network Subnet Host
…
• Tree does not have a fixed depth
…
• Increasingly specific subnet masks
Subtree size
determined by length …
of subnet mask
57
58
13
4/1/24
Subnetting Revisited
59
60
14
4/1/24
CIDR Example
61
62
62
15
4/1/24
CIDR Rules
q First address of every block must be evenly divisible with size of block
63
64
16
4/1/24
• Traffic engineering
65 • Sometimes I want to announce different prefixes to different
neighbors (e.g., use multiple longer prefixes)
• Security
• E.g., announce two /9s in addition to a /8 to help prevent
dark-space hijacks
• New markets
• New networks in regions like Africa, Middle East, etc. with
their own prefixes
• Solutions
• Stop-gap: update router to reallocate IPv6 memory
• Route aggregation/prefix filtering
• Upgrade routers with more memory ($$$$)
65
Takeaways
66
17
4/1/24
67
68
68
18
4/1/24
69
DHCP offer
src: 223.1.2.5, 67
Broadcast: I’m a DHCP
dest: 255.255.255.255, 68
server!
yiaddrr:Here’s an IP
223.1.2.4
transaction ID: 654
address you can use
lifetime: 3600 secs
DHCP request
src: 0.0.0.0, 68
dest:: 255.255.255.255, 67
Broadcast: OK. I’ll take
yiaddrr: 223.1.2.4
that IP address!
transaction ID: 655
lifetime: 3600 secs
DHCP ACK
src: 223.1.2.5, 67
dest: 255.255.255.255,
Broadcast: 68
OK. You’ve
yiaddrr: 223.1.2.4
got that IP address!
transaction ID: 655
lifetime: 3600 secs
71
19
Transport Layer 3-71
4/1/24
DHCP
client-server
scenario
72
73
20
Network Layer 4-73
4/1/24
DHCP: example
DHCP DHCP v connecting laptop needs
DHCP UDP its IP address, addr of
DHCP IP
DHCP Eth
first-hop router, addr of
Phy DNS server: use DHCP
DHCP
v DHCP request encapsulated in
UDP, encapsulated in IP,
DHCP DHCP 168.1.1.1 encapsulated in 802.1 Ethernet
DHCP UDP
DHCP IP
Eth
v Ethernet frame broadcast
DHCP router with DHCP
Phy server built into (dest: FFFFFFFFFFFF) on LAN,
router received at router running
DHCP server
v Ethernet demuxed to IP
demuxed, UDP demuxed
to DHCP
74
DHCP DHCP
• DCP server formulates
DHCP UDP DHCP ACK containing
DHCP IP client’s IP address, IP
DHCP Eth address of first-hop router
Phy
for client, name & IP
address of DNS server
v encapsulation of DHCP
DHCP DHCP server, frame forwarded
DHCP UDP to client, demuxing up
DHCP IP to DHCP at client
DHCP Eth router with DHCP
DHCP
Phy server built into v client now knows its IP
router address, name and IP
address of DSN server,
IP address of its first-
hop router
75
21
Network Layer 4-75
4/1/24
76
77
22
4/1/24
78
79
23
Network Layer 4-79
4/1/24
IP Datagrams
q IP Datagrams are like a letter
81 o Totally self-contained
o Include all necessary addressing information
o No advanced setup of connections or circuits
0 4 8 12 16 19 24 31
Version HLen DSCP/ECN Datagram Length
Source IP Address
Destination IP Address
Data
81
0 4 8 12 16 19 24 31
Version HLen DSCP/ECN Datagram Length
TTL Protocol
Limits
Checksum
Source IP Address
packets to
Destination IP Address
65,535 bytes
Options (if any, usually not)
Data
82
24
4/1/24
0 4 8 12 16 19 24 31
Version HLen TOS Datagram Length
Source IP Address
Destination IP Address
Data
83
0 4 8 12 16 19 24 31
Version HLen DSCP/ECN Datagram Length
Source IP Address
25
4/1/24
0 4 8 12 16 19 24 31
Version HLen DSCP/ECN Datagram Length
Source IP Address
Destination IP Address
Data
85
Problem: Fragmentation
86
MTU = 4000 MTU = 2000 MTU = 1500
86
26
4/1/24
Fragmentation Example
87
MTU = 4000 MTU = 2000 MTU = 1500
Length = 2000, M = 1
Offset = 0
IP Data
Length = 3820, M = 0
20 1980
IP Hdr Data
20 3800 1980
Length = 1840, M = 0 + 1820
Offset = 1980 = 3800
IP Data
20 1820
87
Fragmentation Example
88
88
27
4/1/24
IP Fragment Reassembly
89
Fragmentation Concepts
90
28
4/1/24
Fragmentation in Reality
• Fragmentation is expensive
Regional Internet
Region Registry (RIR) Exhaustion Date
Asia/Pacific APNIC April 19, 2011
Europe/Middle East RIPE September 14, 2012
North America ARIN 13 Jan 2015
South America LACNIC 13 Jan 2015
Africa AFRINIC 17 Jan 2022
92
29
4/1/24
IPv6
IPv6 Trivia
94
30
4/1/24
IPv6 Header
0 4 8 12 16 19 24 31
Version DSCP/ECN Flow Label
Datagram Length Next Header Hop Limit
VersionSame
= 6 as IPv4 Groups
Same as IPv4 Same as into Same as TTL
packets
Source IP Address
Protocol
flows, in
used in IPv4
IPv4
for QoS
Destination IP Address
95
96
31
4/1/24
Performance Improvements
• No checksums to verify
97
• No need for routers to handle fragmentation
• Simplified routing table design
• Address space is huge
• No need for CIDR (but need for aggregation)
• Standard subnet size is 264 addresses
• Simplified auto-configuration
• Neighbor Discovery Protocol
• Used by hosts to determine network ID
• Host ID can be random!
97
• Source Routing
98
• Host specifies the route to wants packet to take
• Mobile IP
• Hosts can take their IP with them to other networks
• Use source routing to direct packets
• Privacy Extensions
• Randomly generate host identifiers
• Make it difficult to associate one IP to a host
• Jumbograms
• Support for 4Gb datagrams
98
32
4/1/24
Deployment Challenges
99
HTTP, FTP, SMTP, RTP, IMAP, …
TCP, UDP, ICMP
IPv4
Ethernet, 802.11x, DOCSIS, …
Fiber, Coax, Twisted Pair, Radio, …
99
Transitioning to IPv6
100
33
4/1/24
Transition Technologies
101
6to4 Basics
• Problem: you’ve been assigned an IPv4 address, but you want an IPv6
102 address
• Your ISP can’t or won’t give you an IPv6 address
• You can’t just arbitrarily choose an IPv6 address
• Solution: construct a 6to4 address
• 6to4 addresses always start with 2002::
• Embed the 32-bit IPv4 inside the 128-bit IPv6
address
207 192
IPv4: 46. 0
. .
34
4/1/24
103 • How does a host using 6to4 send a packet to another host
using 6to4?
Dest: 2002:104F:0800::
Dest: 16.79.8.0
IPv4
Internet
103
IPv4
Internet
IPv4 – 192.88.99.1
IPv6 – 2002:: /16
IPv4 – 207.46.192.0
IPv6 – 2002:CF2E:C000::
IPv6
Many ISPs Internet
provide 6to4
relay routers
IPv6 – 1893:92:13:99::
104
35
4/1/24
105
IPv4
Internet
IPv4 – 192.88.99.1
IPv6 – 2002:: /16
IPv4 – 207.46.192.0
IPv6 – 2002:CF2E:C000::
Dest: 207.46.192.0
IPv6
Dest: 2002:CF2E:C000::
Use normal IPv6 Internet
routing to reach
a 6to4 relay
router
IPv6 – 1893:92:13:99::
105
• Uniformity
106
• Not all ISPs have deployed 6to4 relays
• Quality of service
• Third-party 6to4 relays are available
• …but, they may be overloaded or unreliable
• Reachability
• 6to4 doesn’t work if you are behind a NAT
• Possible solutions
• IPv6 Rapid Deployment (6rd)
• Each ISP sets up relays for its customers
• Does not leverage the 2002:: address space
• Teredo
• Tunnels IPv6 packets through UDP/IPv4 tunnels
• Can tunnel through NATs, but requires special relays
106
36
4/1/24
10.0.0.4
10.0.0.2
138.76.29.7
10.0.0.3
107
108
37
Network Layer 4-108
4/1/24
109
110
38
Network Layer 4-110
4/1/24
111
112
39
Network Layer 4-112
4/1/24
113
114
40
4/1/24
115
2. connection to
relay initiated 1. connection to 10.0.0.1
by client relay initiated
by NATed host
3. relaying
client established
138.76.29.7 NAT
router
116
41
4/1/24
Chapter : outline
4.1 introduction 4.5 routing algorithms
• link state
4.2 virtual circuit and datagram
networks • distance vector
• hierarchical routing
4.3 what’s inside a router
4.6 routing in the Internet
4.4 IP: Internet Protocol • RIP
• datagram format • OSPF
• IPv4 addressing
• BGP
• ICMP
• IPv6
4.7 broadcast and multicast routing
117
118
42
Network Layer 4-118
4/1/24
Tunneling
A B IPv4 tunnel E F
connecting IPv6 routers
logical view:
IPv6 IPv6 IPv6 IPv6
A B C D E F
physical view:
IPv6 IPv6 IPv4 IPv4 IPv6 IPv6
120
A B IPv4 tunnel E F
connecting IPv6 routers
logical view:
IPv6 IPv6 IPv6 IPv6
A B C D E F
physical view:
IPv6 IPv6 IPv4 IPv4 IPv6 IPv6
data data
A-to-B: E-to-F:
B-to-C: B-to-C:
IPv6 IPv6
IPv6 inside IPv6 inside
IPv4 IPv4
121
43
Network Layer 4-121
4/1/24
123
1A-2F-BB-76-09-AD
LAN
(wired or adapter
wireless)
71-65-F7-2B-08-53
58-23-D7-FA-20-B0
0C-C4-11-6F-E3-98
124
44
Data Link Layer5-124
4/1/24
125
0C-C4-11-6F-E3-98
137.196.7.88
126
45
4/1/24
127
128
46
4/1/24
129
C
ARP table in A
IP addr MAC addr TTL
TTL
137.196. 58-23-D7-FA-20-B0 500
A B
7.14
71-65-F7-2B-08-53 58-23-D7-FA-20-B0
137.196.7.23 137.196.7.14
130
47
4/1/24
A B
R
111.111.111.111
222.222.222.222
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
131
IP
Eth
Phy
A B
R
111.111.111.111
222.222.222.222
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
132
48
Data Link Layer5-132
4/1/24
A B
R
111.111.111.111
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55 222.222.222.222
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
111.111.111.112 111.111.111.110
CC-49-DE-D0-AB-7D E6-E9-00-17-BB-4B 222.222.222.221
88-B2-2F-54-1A-0F
133
IP
Eth
Phy
A B
R
111.111.111.111
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55 222.222.222.222
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
111.111.111.112 111.111.111.110
CC-49-DE-D0-AB-7D E6-E9-00-17-BB-4B 222.222.222.221
88-B2-2F-54-1A-0F
134
49
4/1/24
IP IP
Eth Et
Phy h
Ph
A y
B
R
111.111.111.111
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55 222.222.222.222
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
111.111.111.112 111.111.111.110
CC-49-DE-D0-AB-7D E6-E9-00-17-BB-4B 222.222.222.221
88-B2-2F-54-1A-0F
135
IP
Et
h
Ph
A y
B
R
111.111.111.111
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55 222.222.222.222
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
111.111.111.112 111.111.111.110
CC-49-DE-D0-AB-7D E6-E9-00-17-BB-4B 222.222.222.221
88-B2-2F-54-1A-0F
136
50
4/1/24
137
IP src: 111.111.111.111
IP dest: 222.222.222.222
IP
IP Eth
Et Phy
h
Ph
A y
B
R
111.111.111.111
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55 222.222.222.222
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
111.111.111.112 111.111.111.110
CC-49-DE-D0-AB-7D E6-E9-00-17-BB-4B 222.222.222.221
88-B2-2F-54-1A-0F
138
51
4/1/24
IP IP
Eth Et
Phy h
Ph
A y B
R
111.111.111.111
222.222.222.222
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
139
140
52
Data Link Layer5-140
4/1/24
141
IP
Eth
Phy
A B
R
111.111.111.111
222.222.222.222
74-29-9C-E8-FF-55
49-BD-D2-C7-56-2A
222.222.222.220
1A-23-F9-CD-06-9B
142
53
Data Link Layer5-142
4/1/24
Chapter : outline
143
144
54
Application Layer 2-144
4/1/24
145
… …
146
55
4/1/24
147
148
56
Application Layer 2-148
4/1/24
149
resolution example
2
• host at cis.poly.edu 3
TLD DNS server
wants IP address for 4
gaia.cs.umass.edu
5
gaia.cs.umass.edu
150
57
Application Layer 2-150
4/1/24
gaia.cs.umass.edu
151
152
58
Application Layer 2-152
4/1/24
DNS records
DNS: distributed db storing resource records (RR)
RR format: (name, value, type, ttl)
type=A type=CNAME
§ name is hostname § name is alias name for some
§ value is IP address “canonical” (the real) name
§ www.ibm.com is really
type=NS
• name is domain (e.g., servereast.backup2.ibm.
foo.com) com
§ value is canonical name
• value is hostname of
authoritative name type=MX
server for this domain § value is name of mailserver
associated with name
153
154
59
Application Layer 2-154
4/1/24
2 bytes 2 bytes
identification flags
155
156
60
Application Layer 2-156
4/1/24
Attacking DNS
DDoS attacks Redirect attacks
• Bombard root servers with • Man-in-middle
traffic • Intercept queries
• Not successful to date
• DNS poisoning
• Traffic Filtering
• Send bogus relies to DNS
• Local DNS servers cache IPs of server, which caches
TLD servers, allowing root
server bypass Exploit DNS for DDoS
• Bombard TLD servers • Send queries with spoofed
• Potentially more dangerous source address: target IP
• Requires amplification
157
158
61
4/1/24
Password
Authentication
& Protection
159
Passwords
Why Are They Important?
• Passwords are cheap to deploy, but also act as the first
line of defense in a security arsenal.
• They are also often the weakest link.
160
62
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 160
4/1/24
Passwords
Authentication
• Passwords have been used for centuries, e.g. guards and
sentries
• Passwords = secret authentication code used for access.
αυθεντικός = real or genuine, from 'authentes' = author
• Answers the question: How do you prove to someone that
you are who you claim to be?
• Authentication methods:
• What you know (Passwords, Secret keys)
• Where you are (IP Addresses)
• What you are (Biometrics)
• What you have (Secure tokens)
161
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 161
AAA of Password Security
• Authentication (& Identification)
• Establishes that the user is who they say they are
(credentials).
• Authorization
• The process used to decide if the authenticated person is
allowed to access specific information or functions.
• Access Control
• Restriction of access (includes authentication &
authorization)
162
63
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 162
4/1/24
Passwords
How Can Passwords Be Stored?
Filing System
Clear text
Encrypted
Password + Encryption = bf4ee8HjaQkbw
Hashed
Password + Hash function =
aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee
Salted Hash
(Username + Salt + Password) + Hash function =
e3ed2cb1f5e0162199be16b12419c012
163
Passwords
How Are Passwords Stored? - Hashing
• Usually stored as hashes (not plain text)
• Plain-text is converted into a message
digest through use of a hashing
algorithm (i.e. MD5, SHA)
164
64
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 164
4/1/24
Passwords
How Are Passwords Stored? - Hashing
165
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 165
How Are Passwords Stored? – Early UNIX Systems
166
65
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 166
4/1/24
Passwords
How Are Passwords Stored? - Newer UNIX Systems
167
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 167
How Are Passwords Stored? – Windows NT/2k/XP/Vista
• Uses 2 functions for “hashing” passwords:
1. LAN Manager hash (LM hash)
– Password is padded with zeros until there are 14 characters.
– It is then converted to uppercase and split into two 7-character pieces
– Each half is encrypted using an 8-byte DES (data encryption standard) key
– Result is combined into a 16-byte, one way hash value
2. NT hash (NT hash)
– Converts password to Unicode and uses MD4 hash algorithm to obtain a 16-byte value
• SYSKEY
– Utility which moves the encryption key for the SAM database off of the computer
168
66
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 168
4/1/24
Passwords
Impact on Security
• Simple hacking tools are available to anyone who looks for them on the
Internet.
• Tools such as LOphtCrack allow admittance into almost anyone's account
if a simple eight-digit password is used.
People are frightened when they learn that using only an eight-digit password with
standard numbers and letters will allow anyone to figure out their passwords in less than
two minutes when one downloads a publicly available tool like LOphtCrack from the
Internet. This was the kind of tool which we found
(in Al Qaeda’s arsenal), nothing terribly sophisticated.
- Richard Clark, Presidents Advisor on Cyber Security (2001-2003)
169
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 169
Threats to Password Security, Part 1
• Disclosure
• Voluntary disclosure of information
• Inadequate guarding of system passwords
• Inference
• Known pattern to creation of passwords
• Use of generated passwords with predictable algorithm
• Exposure
• Accidental release of password
• Loss
• Forgetting to remember passwords
• Can lead to creation of easy passwords
170
67
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 170
4/1/24
Passwords
Threats to Password Security, Part 2
• Snooping/Eavesdropping
• Keyloggers
• Network sniffing (intercepting of network
communication where a password is submitted)
• Guessing
• Limited amount of choices which can be figured out
through process of elimination
• Use of blank/common passwords, passwords which
can be figured out by knowing name of relatives,
pets, etc.
• Cracking
• Automated “guessing”
171
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 171
Why Cracking is Possible
172
68
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 172
4/1/24
Passwords
Types of Password Cracking
• Dictionary Attack
– Quick technique that tries every word in a specific dictionary
• Hybrid Attack
– Adds numbers or symbols to the end of a word
173
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 173
Cracking Protection - Salting
• Salting requires adding a random piece of data and to the password
before hashing it.
• This means that the same string will hash to different values at different
times
• Users with same password have different entries in the password file
• Salt is stored with the other data as a complete hash
• Hacker has to get the salt add it to each possible word and then
rehash the data prior to comparing with the stored password.
174
69
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 174
4/1/24
175
Passwords
Cracking Protection - Salting Advantages
176
70
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 176
4/1/24
177
Passwords
Cracking Protection - Iteration Count
• The same password can be rehashed many times over to
make it more difficult for the hacker to crack the password.
• This means that the precompiled dictionary hashes are not
useful since the iteration count is different for different
systems
• Dictionary attack is still possible!
178
71
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 178
4/1/24
179
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 179
Challenge Response
180
72
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 180
4/1/24
Passwords
Personal Token Authentication
• Personal Tokens are hardware – Storage Token: A secret value
devices that generate unique that is stored on a token and
strings that are usually used in is available after the token has
conjunction with passwords for been unlocked using a PIN
authentication – Synchronous One-time
Password Generator:
• A variety of different physical
Generate a new password
forms of tokens exist
periodically (e.g. each minute)
• e.g. hand-held devices, Smart
based on time and a secret
Cards, PCMCIA cards, USB
tokens code stored in the token
– Challenge-response: Token
• Different types of tokens exist: computes a number based on
a challenge value sent by the
server
– Digital Signature Token:
Contains the digital signature
private key and computes a
computes a digital signature
on a supplied data value
181
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 181
Improving Security
• Password complexity • Single sign-on
– Case-sensitivity • User only has to remember
– Use of special characters, one password at a time and
numbers, and both upper yet can access all/most of their
and lower-case letters resources
– Minimum length • AKA Enterprise Reduced Sign-
requirements On (almost impossible to have
• Security questions one password used for
– Ask personal questions everything due to integration
which need to be verified issues)
– Some questions are very
easy to discover answers • Centralized password
• Virtual keyboard storage management
– Person clicks on-screen • Online sites accessible
keyboard to enter Single point through one password which
password (prevents of failure, but
contain all other passwords
easier to
keylogging)
remember
182
73
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 182
4/1/24
Passwords
Improving Security
• Graphical passwords • Other examples
• Goal: increase the size of – Click on a series of pictures in order
memorable password space – Drawing a picture
– Clicking four correct points on a
• Rely on the difficulty of picture
computer vision • Reading graphical text
• Face recognition is easy for – Requires user to input text based on
humans, harder for machines what is seen in the graphic. Attempts
to curb automated password crackers
• Present user with a sequence due to difficulty in distinguishing
of faces, he must pick the right letters/numbers
face several times in a row to – Scheme where users had to input text
log in based on graphics shown to “undress”
a picture
183
Passwords
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 183
Biometric/Behaviometric Authentication
184
74
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 184
4/1/24
Passwords
Biometric Considerations
185
Passwords
Protection/Detection
Protection:
• Disable storage of LAN Manager hashes.
• Configure both Local and Domain Account Policies
(Password & Account Lockout Policies).
• Audit access to important files.
• Implement SYSKEY security on all systems.
• Set BIOS to boot first from the hard drive.
• Password-protect the BIOS.
• Enforce strong passwords!
• Change your passwords frequently.
• Use two or three factor authentication.
• Use one time passwords.
186
75
Sanjay Goel & Damira Pon
University at Albany, School of Business/ NYS Center for Information Forensics and Assurance 186
4/1/24
Passwords
Ten Common Mistakes
187
188
76