IN RE: GUTIERREZ

5 SCRA 661

FACTS:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5,

1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted
of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-
conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of
conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed
to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted
"on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in
the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.

Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of
right and duty between man and man.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the
rule on disbarment.

RULING:

YES. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid
standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court
not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must
continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall,
107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues
recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFO RE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken
from the roll of lawyers.
 PEOPLE vs. TUANDA
181 SCRA 692

FACTS:

Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with a fine
and subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia
Marquez. Respondent appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court
and imposed upon Atty. Fe Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the practice of law until further
orders from the Supreme Court. The respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals noted respondent’s Notice of Appeal and advised her “to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum.” In the said motion, responded stated:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court’s penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant’s action on
the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely
by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause
damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

RULING:

NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense of which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a
person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which
deleteriously affects public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest
of the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand-
fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A
copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and spread on the record of respondent.
 SANCHEZ vs. SOMOSO
412 SCRA 569

FACTS:

In his complaint-affidavit filed Dr. Sanchez before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Dr. Raul C. Sanchez, a member of the medical staff of Sta. Lucia
General Hospital, stated that he was the attending physician of respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso
during the latter’s confinement at the hospital from 31 March to 09 April 1998. When respondent was
discharged on 09 April 1998, he urged complainant that, since it was a public holiday and banks were
closed that day for business, the latter be good enough to accept a check in payment of the hospital
bills due complainant totalling P44,347.00. Although apprehensive at first, complainant was later
persuaded, however, by respondent’s plea of his being a lawyer who can be trusted as such.

When deposited, the checks were dishonored. Complainant immediately met with and informed
respondent about it. Respondent promised to redeem the dishonored checks in cash; he never did.
Ultimately, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On 15 August 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution holding
that the necessary Informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) should be filed
against respondent. Pursuant to the resolution, two Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed
against respondent before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. A warrant for his arrest was
issued but, somehow, respondent was able to evade arrest.

Complainant in his administrative complaint submits that respondent is a disgrace to the law
profession and unfit to be a member of the bar, and that he should be disbarred and his name
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Samoso may be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

YES. The Court accepts the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Clearly, respondent’s action of
issuing his personal checks in payment for his medical bills, knowing fully well that his account with
the drawee bank has by then already been closed, constitutes a gross violation of the basic norm of
integrity required of all members of the legal profession. The Code of Professional Responsibility
specifically mandates that:

"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

"Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer not only in the
practice of the legal profession but also in his personal dealings as well. A lawyer must conduct
himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.
When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had already been
closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in refusing to settle his due
obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely low regard to his commitment to the
oath he has taken when he joined his peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the
profession he should, instead, hold in high esteem. His conduct deserved nothing less than a severe
disciplinary sanction.

The law profession is a noble calling, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent and fit to exercise it.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Salustino Somoso GUILTY of misconduct, and he is
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.
 DANTES vs. DANTES
438 SCRA 582

FACTS:

Mrs. Dantes alleged that his husband is a philanderer (womanizer). Atty. Dantes purportedly engaged
in illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them.
From the time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to his wife and their
children, thus, forcing her to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs.

Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with her and the birth of their children, but alleged that they
have mutually agreed to separate eighteen years before after his wife had abandoned him in their
residence. He further asserted that Mrs. Dantes filed the case just to force him to remit 70% of his
monthly salary to her.

Mrs. Dantes then presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin,
Darling, and Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of his husband and his paramour
to prove the fact that he sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with two different
women.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Crispin violated The Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers conduct must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as
to shock the common sense of decency.

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission of marital infidelity and immorality.

Atty. Crispin G. Dantes has been DISBARRED.

 IN RE: BASA 41 PHIL. 275

FACTS:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the
Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with
the crime of abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V.
del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years,
eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a
judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Basa should be suspended from his office as a lawyer.

RULING:

YES. The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude . . ." The sole question presented, therefore, is whether the crime of
abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.

"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision
can be found which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this
character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals
and the accepted rule of right conduct.

When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court,
we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the
respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. However, we are willing to strain (stretch beyond)
the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising a career may not be
completely ruined.

It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from
prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year.
 ARCIGA vs. MANIWANG
106 SCRA 591

FACTS:

In 1970, Arciga was a medical technology student and Maniwang was a law student. The two
acquainted and had a sexual relationship. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant. In 1975, Maniwang passed
the bar exams. After which, he stopped communicating with Arciga. Arciga then found out that
Maniwang married another woman. She confronted the wife and this irritated Maniwang to inflict
physical injuries upon Arciga. Arciga filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross
immoral conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to
marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Maniwang may be disbarred.

RULING:

NO. There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the
moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the
path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress
with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as "grossly
immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.

The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs Aspiras and
Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to
state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-
lace may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as
“that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”. The complaint for disbarment
against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
 ALFONSO vs. JUANSON
228 SCRA 239

FACTS:

The case involves a complaint filed by a doctor of medicine, Dr. Norbert L. Alfonso, charging Judge
Juanson with immorality and violation of the Code of Judicial ethics, alleging that Juanson and his
wife Sol were having an affair. The complainant has in his possession love letters written by Sol to
prove his claim, provided by Judge Juanson's wife. Sol, however, denied this claim several times.
Other evidence for the prosecution includes files of a private investigator hired by Dr. Alfonso's father
showing that Sol had met with Judge Juanson on 17 July 1992 in a condominium unit in
Mandaluyong and that they stayed there for approximately three hours. Dr. Alfonso confronted Sol
about the evidence that was gathered by his father. At first she denied the affair but later in the
evening she admitted having an illicit affair with Judge Juanson. Sol also admitted to the Complainant
that when she went to Hongkong on December 26, 1989 up to December 29, 1989 she was with
Respondent Judge, and records of the Commission on Immigration for said dates show that both Sol
Alfonso and Respondent Judge Modesto Juanson departed for Hongkong via Cathay Pacific plane on
December 26, 1989 and returned to Manila on December 29, 1989 The Alfonso spouses decided to
live in separate house.

In defense, Judge Juanson claims that he first knew Sol in 1987 when she engaged his professional
services in connection with the criminal cases filed by her office. In June 1992 (while the Alfonso
spouses were in the US) he received an overseas call from Sol asking him for advice concerning her
problem with her employer. They met up after the return of Sol in the Philippines to discuss her
problem. Judge Juanson added that it was impossible for him to have sexual intercourse with Sol
because he has been suffering from two debilitating diseases – diabetes mellitus and prostatitis
(which have seriously affected his sexual potency).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Juanson's alleged sexual impropriety is a ground for him to be dismissed from
the Judiciary

RULING:

NO. There is no doubt in our minds that a very special relationship existed between the respondent
and the complainant's wife as evidenced by cards or notes (love letters). It is clear that their affair
began before Sol and Dr. Alfonso were married on 10 December 1988 and might have blossomed
from the attorney-client relationship between respondent and Sol. However, the evidence presented
was insufficient to prove that he and Sol continued their extramarital affair after Judge Juanson was
appointed to the judiciary. Sol's admission to her husband that she had carnal knowledge with the
judge made no reference to specific dates and the side of Dr. Alfonso exerted no further effort to
obtain clarifications as to the dates. It cannot be safely presumed that Juanson committed any sexual
indiscretion after he became a judge. He is not charged for immorality committed before his
appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative
discipline in this case. Judge Juanson may have undergone moral reformation after his
appointment, or his appointment could have completely transformed him upon the solemn realization
that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. However, considering their prior special relationship, the
respondent and Sol's meetings could reasonably incite suspicion of either its continuance or revival
and the concomitant intimacies expressive of such relationship. Such indiscretions indubitably cast
upon his conduct an appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 and Canon 2 of Judicial
Ethics.

It has been said that a magistrate (administrator) of the law must comport (conduct accordingly)
himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. The ethical principles
and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the faith of the people in the
judiciary. It is settled that immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members
of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.
WHEREFORE, for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the
rule on official time, respondent JUDGE MODESTO C. JUANSON is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE
of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) and, further, sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
CORDON vs. BALICANTA
337 SCRA 662

FACTS:

Complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment against respondent
Balicanta. The court, referred the matter to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon, the
parties filed their respective position papers. Based on her complaint, she and her daughter inherited
21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The respondent helped her settle the estate of her late
husband. Respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation that would
develop the said real properties. Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the
corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer.
The respondent also made complainant sign a document which turned out to be a voting trust
agreement. Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of attorney
to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from her deceased husband. In time
the corporation became in debt and in the brink of foreclosure. Respondent refused to cooperate with
the complainant when it tried to take over the management of the corporation. Respondent blamed
the stockholders in the failure of the corporation and absolves himself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Balicanta may be disbarred.

RULING:

YES. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the
obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically,
he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. If the practice of law is
to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not
only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to
them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Lawyers are expected to abide by the
tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order
to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is
more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because "vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all."

Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer "to hold in trust all moneys and properties
of his client that may come into his possession." He is bound "to account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client." The relation between an attorney and his client is highly
fiduciary in nature. Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by
them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve
him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly
used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of
such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction.

The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set
aside the veil of corporate entity. For purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered in the
name of the corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant and her daughter.
The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old) and her
daughter. The properties conveyed fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority should be
deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or mortgaged at all. Respondent shall be liable, in
his personal capacity, to third parties who may have contracted with him in good faith.

Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondent’s offenses
cannot be adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended by the IBP. Instead, his
wrongdoings deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal and civil
liabilities for his dishonest acts.

BARRIENTOS vs. LIBIRAN-METEORO

487 SCRA 209

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro issued several bounced checks to complainants Isidra
Barrientos and Olivia Mercado for a pre-existing debt. The checks bounced due to insufficient funds,
thus, charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed. The lawyer asked for deferment of the criminal
charges and promised to pay her debt several times, but failed to pay the full amount, even after a
complaint for disbarment was filed against her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Meteoro is guilty of gross misconduct.

RULING:

YES. We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice
of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.
They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their
clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted
Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutor’s office in Cabanatuan City. Her only excuse
is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the payment of her debt,
which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against
a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows
a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.
The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent,
unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It also
manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her
peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem. Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were
issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures.

We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent’s misconduct. The IBP Board of

Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
In Lao vs. Medel, which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, the
Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate. Unlike in
the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts
amounting to P50,000.00. Thus, we deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and
the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision, and
is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to
the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.

ROYONG vs. OBLENA

7 SCRA 871

FACTS:

Josefina Royong, the niece it the common-law wife of Ariston Oblena, filed a rape case against
Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar. In her complaint, Royong alleged that in 1958
Oblena forced her to have intercourse with her and that she refrained to report the incident because
Oblena threatened to kill her family. As a result of the sexual intercourse, Royong gave birth to a
child. Oblena denied all the allegations and argued that he and Royong had a relationship and
Royong consented to have intercourse with him.

The Solicitor General recommended that Oblena be permanently removed from the roll of attorney
even though the acts of the Royong before and after the rape incident showed that she is more of a
sweetheart than a victim because of the circumstances behind the incident. The Solicitor General
also charged Oblena of falsifying and deliberately alleging in his application in the bar in1958 that he
is a person of good moral character while having an illicit and adulterous relationship with Angeles
who is not only the aunt of Royong but also has a legal husband in the province.

Oblena moved to dismiss the case because the offenses charged are different from those originally
charged in the complaint but the court overruled his petition. After the hearing, the investigators
concluded that A.) Oblena used his knowledge in law to commit immoral acts without incurring any
criminal liability; B.) he committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with Angeles, his
common-law wife, even after he became a lawyer and C.) Oblena falsified the truth as to his good
moral character in his application to take the bar.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illicit relationship with Royong and the open cohabitation with Angeles, a married
woman, are sufficient grounds to cause Oblena’s disbarment

RULING:

YES. Although Oblena is not yet convicted of the crime of rape, seduction or adultery and he is not
guilty of any of the grounds for disbarment enumerated in Sec 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, the
enumeration is not exclusive and the power of the court to exclude unworthy members of the bar is
inherent and is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice and can be exercised even
without any statutory authority, in all cases unless properly prohibited by statutes.

American jurisprudence provides that the continued possession of a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law. The loss requires suspension or
disbarment even though the statues do not explicitly specify that as a ground of disbarment.

Oblena’s argument that he believed himself to be a person with good moral character when he filed
his application to take the bar examination is wrong. One’s own approximation of himself is not a
gauge of his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what the person really is and not what the other people thinks he
is. His pretension to wait for the 18 th birthday of Royong before having carnal knowledge with her
shows the scheming mind of Oblena and his taking advantage of his knowledge of the law.

Also, Royong is the niece of his common-law wife and he enjoyed moral ascendancy over her.
Oblena took advantage of Royong’s trust on him. Oblena’s contention that the Solicitor General
exceeded his authority in filing the present complain which is entirely different from the original
complaint filed is untenable. There is nothing in the law requiring the Solicitor General to charge in
his complaint the same offense charged in the original complaint. What the law provides is that if the
Solicitor General finds sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation.

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession,
has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot consent to
his acts. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit
to remain a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of
herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

ADVINCULA vs. MACABATA

517 SCRA 609

FACTS:

Cynthia Advincula filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Ernesto Macabata, charging the latter
with grossly immoral conduct. Advincula sought legal advice from the latter about the possibility of
filing a complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours for not settling their accounts as demanded.
Atty. Macabata offered Advincula a ride on two occasions. On February 10, 2005, he sent Advincula
home and gave her a kiss on the cheek and embraced her very tightly. On March 2005, Atty.
Macabata allegedly kissed Advincula forcefully while his other hand was holding her breast. The two
texted each other after the said incident, which were used by Advincula as the evidence of guilt
against the latter. Atty. Macabata admitted that he kissed Advincula on two occasions because
Advincula offered her lips to him. He also argued that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt
Avenue in Quezon City, where he dropped her off was a busy street, makes it impossible to commit
the acts imputed to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Macabata committed grossly immoral acts that would warrant his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.

RULING:

NO. Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondent’s
actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be
defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree
of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a
continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.

HOWEVER, the acts of Atty. Macabata would not suffice to warrant a disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law. The term "grossly immoral" is referred to acts, (1) so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or; (2) so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or; (3) committed under
such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. Although
Atty. Macabata had admittedly kissed Advincula, it is not sufficient as to warrant a grossly immoral
act. Also, Advincula failed to present substantial evidence against Atty. Macabata, proving the latter
showed grossly immoral conduct.

However, the Court found Atty. Macabata guilty of an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Wherefore, the complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Macabata is hereby dismissed. However, he is hereby reprimanded to be
more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a stern warning that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

PARAS vs. PARAS

529 SCRA 893

FACTS:

On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel. Twenty-nine (29)
years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:

(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;
(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her;
(c) he did not give financial support to his children; and
(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father.

To substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras allegations that he is unfit as a husband constitute his unfitness as a
lawyer.

RULING:

NO. One’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice
versa. The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment
case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s charges
sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers
of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground
of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave,
incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly in cognitive of the basic marital
covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will
be seen in the following discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is
psychologically incapacitated, albeit (even though) such acts really fall short of what is expected from
a lawyer.

While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity,
falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless,
there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part.
In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.

In sum, this Court finds no cogent (logical) reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While
this Court commiserates (feel for) with Rosa’s plight (dilemma), however, it has no choice but to apply
the law. Dura lex sed lex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
 PAAS vs. ALMARVEZ
400 SCRA 554

FACTS:

Petitioner Judge Paas first filed an administrative case against Respondent Almarvez for various
grounds such as discourtesy, insubordination, soliciting money from detainees before giving their
Release Order, and divulging confidential information regarding cases before authorized release date
from monetorial consideration. Respondent Almarvez on the other hand filed an administrative case
against Judge Paas for allegedly abusing her administrative powers and harassing him. He further
alleged that Judge Paas lets her husband, Atty. Paas, use her court office as his own personal office
for his private practice.

For Judge Paas, Court held that she violated the SC Administrative Circular Nos. 3-92 and 0199
which prohibits the use of court offices other than for judicial tasks and performance. Although letting
her husband use her office to receive notices and orders seems innocuous, it could be interpreted as
a subtle way of sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of the judge in the same building
and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Paas may be suspended.

RULING:

YES. On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive address that
had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which his cases are lodged, or his
client, that he has close ties to a member of the judiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 3 A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS: Rule
3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT: Rule
10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM
ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS: Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply
that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.

It is unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to enhance a lawyer's
prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by such reprehensible and improper
conduct. A lawyer should not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges. A lawyer who resorts to such practice of seeking familiarity with
judges dishonors the profession, and the judge who consents to them is unworthy of his high office.

This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a desire to ensure receipt
of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge Paas to allow him to have his court
notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used
his office address but there is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address.
While a lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly informed of
any court action, these should not violate his lawyer's oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility,
nor provide an opportunity for a member of the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under
Supreme Court circulars and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

WHEREFOR, Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

RAU SHENG MAO vs. VELASCO

413 SCRA 113

FACTS:

Taiwanese national Rau Sheng Mao accuses Filipino Atty. Angeles A. Velasco of engaging in an
adulterous relationship and deceiving him in business dealings. Rau Sheng Mao hired Velasco as his
legal consultant and counsel for his company, the Foreign Investors Consultancy and Management
Inc. (FICMI).

Velasco persuaded Rau Sheng Mao to enter into a management agreement with Haru Gen Beach
Resort and Hotel Corporation for the operation and management of Twin Rock Beach Resort in Virac,
Catanduanes. Velasco sold Rau Sheng Mao ten thousand shares of stock with Haru Gen for
P1,000,000.00 but failed to deliver the certificates for the purchased shares. Velasco also persuaded
Rau Sheng Mao to buy three parcels of land from him for P3,660,800.00 but failed to deliver the
certificates of title for the purchased properties.

Rau Sheng Mao accuses Velasco of asking for money to be given to judges hearing his cases and of
representing him in a special proceeding involving the settlement of an estate but later moving for the
revocation of Rau Sheng Mao's appointment as administrator. Rau Sheng Mao charges Velasco with
immorality for having an adulterous relationship with Ludy Matienzo and fathering three children with
her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Velasco may be suspended from practice of law.

RULING:

YES. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral
delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral
conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community." Thus, in several cases,
the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores and
sense of morality of the community.

As keepers of the public faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility
and thus must handle their personal affairs with the greatest caution. They are expected at all times to
maintain due regard for public decency in the community where they live. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. Indeed, those who have
taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness
and the will to overcome the weakness of the flesh.

Indeed, no profession offers greater opportunity for public service than that of a lawyer. For the
privilege conferred upon him, a lawyer is tasked with the equally great responsibility of upholding the
ethics and ideals established by the learned lawyers of ancient times. Into his hands are entrusted the
life, liberty and property of a trusting man. The only guarantee that this trust will be carried with honor
is; the character of the lawyer. Such character, on the other hand, can only be observed through
one’s reputation and conduct. Thus, when a lawyer so deports himself that confidence can no longer
be rested in him without fear, his usefulness to the court and to the society ceases.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Angeles A. Velasco is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two
(2) years from notice, with warning that a repetition of the acts charged will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent is further ordered to notify this Court of his receipt of this Decision.

BERBANO vs. BARCELONA

410 SCRA 269

FACTS:

This case involves a complaint filed by complainant Felicitas Berbano against Atty. Wenceslao
Barcelona for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility in his representation of a detained
person, Porfirio Daen. Felicitas Berbano hired Barcelona to secure Daen's release from jail in
exchange for money person through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court, but
Barcelona failed to secure Daen's release and stopped communicating with Berbano and the others.
The Investigating Commissioner found Barcelona guilty as charged and recommended disbarment
and repayment of funds. The IBP Board of Governors reduced the penalty to a six-year suspension.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Barcelona may be disbarred.

RULING:

YES. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr.
Porfirio Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. Not only that, respondent even
had the audacity to tell complainant that the Justices of the Supreme Court do not accept checks. In
so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public contempt.

Respondent made a mockery of the Judiciary and further eroded public confidence in courts and
lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in the Aquino case and in the present case. More so, when
he misrepresented to complainant that he has connections with a Member of the Court to
accommodate his client and that Justices of the Court accept money. Indubitably, he does not
deserve to remain a member of the Bar any minute longer.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the
legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has
ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only a right
but a bounden duty as well, that is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.

WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C. Barcelona is DISBARRED from the
practice of law. His name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further directed to
return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the amount of Sixty-Four Thousand Pesos (P64,000.00)
within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
 BUMANLAG vs. BUMANLAG
74 SCRA 92

FACTS:

Lawyer Esteban T. Bumanglag was previously found guilty of gross immoral conduct and suspended
from the practice of law for two years.

Bumanglag filed several motions for reconsideration, all of which were denied.

In March 1975, Bumanglag sent a petition to the President of the Philippines, asking for a decree to
set aside the Court's suspension order and allow him to resume his legal practice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition of Atty. Bumanglag is allowed.

RULING:

NO. He must not ask the president to set aside the decree of the court’s decision which suspended
him for two years in the practice of law.

Under the fundamental principle of separation of powers enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, a decision of this Court may not be set aside by the President. But since respondent
has apologized for his "big mistake", the Court is disposed to view his misconduct and/or ignorance
with liberality and will administer a reprimand with warning of severe action on any future
transgressions, considering respondent's unenviable record.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross ignorance of the law and
of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's decision which
suspended him for two years from the practice of law, with warning that the commission of any
transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a member of the bar will be severely dealt with.
 MOBILE OIL PHILS, INC vs. CFI OF RIZAL, BRANCH VI
208 SCRA 523

FACTS:

On November 8, 1972, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the
partnership La Mallorca and its general partners, which included private respondents, for collection of
a sum of money arising from gasoline purchased on credit but not paid, for damages and attorney’s
fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring null and void its earlier decision.

RULING:

Yes, because Miguel Enriquez is a general partner of La Mallorca. He automatically became a

general partner of the partnership for being one of the heirs of the deceased general partner Mariano
Enriquez. Article IV of the Articles of Co-Partnership of La Mallorca provides that: “If during the
existence of this co-partnership, any of the herein partners should die, the co-partnership shall
continue to exist amongst the surviving partners and the heir or heirs of the deceased partner or
partners.”

Parties are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel in procedural matters. Mistakes of
counsel as to the relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence or mistakes in the proper defense, in
the introduction of certain evidence, or in argumentation are among others all mistakes of procedure,
and they bind the clients, as in the instant case. Having obtained what defendants bargained for and
having wrongly appreciated the sufficiency or insufficiency of petitioner’s evidence, private
respondents are now estopped from assailing the decision dated July 25, 1974.

The counsel for private respondents acted within the scope of his authority as agent and lawyer in
negotiating for favorable terms for his clients. It may be that in waiving the presentation of defendants’
evidence, counsel believed that petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove its cause of action or
knowing the futility of resisting the claim, defendants opted to waive their right to present evidence in
exchange for the condonation of past interest in the amount of around P150,000.00 and the award of
a nominal attorney’s fees instead of the 25% stipulated in the Sales Agreement and Invoices. In fact,
when counsel secured a waiver of the accumulated interest of P150,000.00, and the 25% stipulated
attorney’s fees, the defendant were certainly benefited.
 BELANDREZ vs. LOPEZ SUGAR CENTRAL MILL CO., INC
94 Phil 100

FACTS:

 Soledad Belandres, the mother of Querubin Villa, filed a complaint seeking damages for the death
of her son.
 Villa was a train conductor employed by the defendant, Lopez Sugar Central Mill Co., Inc.
 On May 5, 1952, Villa was riding as a train conductor on an empty car when some empty cars
were derailed due to the negligence of the defendant's employees.
 Villa fell from the car and was crushed by the wheels of the empty cars, resulting in his instant
death.
 Belandres sought damages amounting to P9,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the counsel’s admission that his client’s action was one for compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is within the scope of his authority as counsel.

RULING:

NO. One of the reasons stated by the Judge in dismissing the case is the supposed admission of
plaintiff’s counsel that the action is in the nature of a claim for compensation for a workman. The
judge must have misunderstood counsel, or the latter must have failed to make his meaning clear.
But admitting that he did admit his client’s action was one for compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, his admission or statement in that respect is certainly beyond the scope of his
authority as counsel, for the same does not refer to any matter of judicial procedure related to the
enforcement of the remedy, but to the subject matter or cause of action. As to this, client alone can
make the binding admission.

"The broad implied or apparent powers of an attorney with respect to the conduct or control of
litigation are, however, limited to matters which relate only to the procedure or remedy. The
employment of itself confers upon the attorney no implied or apparent power or authority over the
subject matter of the cause of action or defense; and, unless the attorney has expressly been granted
authority with respect thereto, the power to deal with or surrender these matters is regarded as
remaining exclusively in the client" (7 C. J. S. pp. 899-900.)

"The line of demarcation between the respective rights and powers of an attorney and his client is
clearly defined. The cause of action, the claim or demand sued upon, and the subject matter of the
litigation are all within the exclusive control of a client; and an attorney may not impair, compromise,
settle, surrender, or destroy them without his client’s consent. But all the proceedings in court to
enforce the remedy to bring the claim, demand, cause of action, or subject matter of the suit to
hearing, trial, determination, judgment, and execution, are within the exclusive control of the attorney."
(6 C. J. S., p. 643.)

The decision appealed from shall be reversed and the case remanded to the court a quo (lower court
whose decision is under review) for continuation of the trial and the proceedings in accordance
herewith. So ordered.
 COSMOS FOUNDRY SHOP WORKERS UNION vs. LO BU
63 SCRA 313

FACTS:

Petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union is the prevailing party in that labor dispute which
unfortunately had dragged on since 1961, all its efforts to obtain what was due it being rendered
illusory through the machinations of a certain Ong Ting, now deceased, and the private respondent
Lo Bu. The facts show that on January 16, 1973, petitioner Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union
was able to obtain from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the
satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. 1 Thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Mario Abiog of
Manila, who was especially deputized to serve the writ, did so on January 17 and 18, 1973 levying on
the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the
purpose of conducting the public auction sale.

It was set forth in the Petition, that respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion with the Court of
Industrial Relations to recall the writ of execution alleging as one of his grounds lack of jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the sale of the New Century Foundry Shop, followed by another motion
praying for the return of the levied properties this time asserting that petitioner labor union failed to
put up an indemnity bond and then a third, this time to allow the sheriff to keep the levied properties
at his factory, all of which were denied by the Court en banc in its order of March 23, 1973, assailed in
the certiorari proceeding, dismissed by this Court for lack of merit. Counsel Yolando F. Busmente in
his Answer to this petition, filed on February 20, 1975, had the temerity to deny such allegations. He
simply ignored the fact that as counsel for respondent Lo Bu, petitioner in L-36636, he did specifically
maintain: "On January 26, 1973, in order to vindicate his rights over the levied properties, in an
expeditious or less expensive manner, herein appellant voluntarily submitted himself, as a forced
intervenor, to the jurisdiction of respondent CIR, by filing an urgent 'Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution,' precisely questioning the jurisdiction of said Court to pass upon the validity and legality of
the sale of the 'New Century Foundry Shop' to him, without the latter being made a party to the case,
as well as the jurisdiction of said Court to enforce the Decision rendered against the respondents in
Case No. 3021-ULP, by means of an alias writ of execution against his properties found at the 'New
Century Foundry Shop.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conduct of Atty. Bustamante in denying the facts alleged in the petition to defend
the cause of his client is commendable.

RULING:

NO. Such conduct on the part of counsel is far from commendable. He could, of course, be casuistic
(dishonest) and take refuge in the fact that the paragraph of the petition, which he denied, was, in
addition to being rather poorly and awkwardly worded, also prolix, with unnecessary matter being
included therein without due regard to logic or coherence or even rules of grammar. He could add that
his denial was to be correlated with his special defenses, where he concentrated on points not
previously admitted. That is the most that can be said of his performance, and it is not enough. For
even if such be the case, Attorney Busmente had not exculpated himself. He was of course expected
to defend his client's cause with zeal, but not at the disregard of the truth and in defiance of the clear
purpose of labor statutes. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less
than the dignity of the profession, requires that he should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and
call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind,
then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar.

ROLDAN vs. PANGANIBAN

446 SCRA 32

FACTS:

 Complainant Jose A. Roldan filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against

respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito P. Noel.
 Roldan alleges that the respondent lawyers failed in their duties and obligations towards him
as their client, particularly in his right to appeal to a higher court after losing his case in the
lower courts.
 Roldan was the plaintiff in a civil case for recovery of possession with damages against Ramon
Montano and Robert Montano.
 The case was initially filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and was later appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43.
 Atty. Panganiban and Atty. Noel were the complainant's lawyers in the case.
 Roldan alleges that Atty. Noel failed to present a crucial receipt as evidence during the trial,
which would have proven that Roldan purchased the subject property ahead of the defendants.
 Roldan claims that Atty. Noel deliberately suppressed this evidence, leading to the dismissal of
his case.
 Roldan also argues that Atty. Noel refused to file a further appeal to the Court of Appeals
despite Roldan's desire to do so.
 Atty. Panganiban denies any involvement in the case, stating that he was on leave from the
practice of law since October 18, 1993, and was not actively representing Roldan.
 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) conducted an investigation and recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Atty. Panganiban and the imposition of censure on Atty.
Noel.
 The IBP's recommendation was adopted and approved by the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Noel may be disbarred.

RULING:

NO, only suspension. We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be
expected to file an appeal for the complainant because their lawyer-client relationship ended with the
RTC decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is
terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time,
the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client. Second, Atty. Noel admitted that
complainant instructed him to file an appeal with the higher court. Even assuming that their contract
does not include filing of an appeal with the higher courts, it is still the duty of Atty. Noel to protect the
interest of the complainant by informing and discussing with the complainant of the said decision and
his assessment of the same. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal (dedication) within the
bounds of the law. It is the obligation of counsel to comply with his client's lawful request. Counsel
should exert all effort to protect the interest of his client.

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer involves the exercise
of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. In cases of similar nature, the penalty
imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand, fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension of
three months, six months and even disbarment in aggravated case.

The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer pursuant to the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a suspension from the practice of law for one
month is just penalty under the circumstances.

Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noel is
SUSPENDED for one month with a warning that a repetition of the same would be meted a more
severe penalty.

YAP- PARAS vs. PARAS

523 SCRA 364

FACTS:

Rosa Yap-Paras (Petitioner) filed a case against Atty. Justo Paras (respondent) praying for the
disbarment of the latter, accusing that he committed acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct,
grossly immoral conduct, and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter. The respondent
was found guilty by the SC of falsehood and suspended him from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year, with a warning that a similar offense committed in the future will yield a harsher penalty.
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the court as per his suspension. During its
pendency, petitioner filed a Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment under the ground that Atty. Paras
did not heed the SC’s suspension order and was still practicing his legal profession.

Eventually, the MR was denied by the SC and asked respondent to comment on the current motion
filed against him by the petitioner within 10 days. The respondent filed a Manifestation with the court
after more than a year, stating that he has already complied with the 1-year suspension. In response,
the SC issued another resolution that compels respondent to explain why he should not be held in
contempt for failing to comply with the previous resolution. Respondent replied by denying the
previous allegations made by petitioner that he was engaged in the practice of law during his
suspension.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Justo Paras should be disbarred for violating the SC’s suspension order by
practicing his legal profession during his suspension period.

RULING:

NO. In a number of cases, we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of
disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather
intended to protect the courts and the public from members of the bar who have become unfit and
unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of
the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court
orders by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the
Court's suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the
lower courts of his one-year suspension from law practice.

An examination of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and
petitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them. It is well to
stress that mutual bickering and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity
of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court. Lawyers should treat each other
with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility.
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to
promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more
consistent with the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the
individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public
from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras
is hereby REPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly
complying with this Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed
upon him for a repetition of the same act.

BUGARING vs. ESPAÑOL

349 SCRA 459

FACTS:

The incident subject of the petition occurred during a hearing of Civil Case entitled "Royal Becthel
Builders, Inc. vs. Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et al.", for Annulment of Sale and
Certificates of Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order in the sala of respondent judge Dolores S. Español of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite, Branch 90, Imus, Cavite. Atty. Rexie Efren A. Bugaring was counsel for Royal
Bechtel Builders against Spouses Luis and Beatriz Alvaran on a case for annulment Certificates of
Title, Specific Performance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary
Restraining Order.

In one of the hearings, he was cited for contempt for allegedly bringing an assistant in court to
document the hearing on video tape and being disrespectful to the court. That while Atty. Concepcion,
a respondent called on his lawyer, Atty. Barzaga to proceed on behalf of his client, Atty. Bugaring
insisted that he be allowed to present his documentary evidence. He would then interrupt the court by
insisting that he be allowed to present his evidence. The Court told him a few times to listen and yet
he would speak up, often in a sarcastic manner anytime he feels like. He also mentioned about he is
more rather knowledgeable on the rules of Court. He also accused the Judge of being antagonistic
towards his client

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Bugaring should be cited for contempt.

RULING:

Yes. Atty. Bugaring was cited for contempt, sentenced to three days in jail with a fine of P 3,000.
However, appellate court ordered that P 1,000 be returned as it exceeds the P 2,000 limit. The Court
agrees with the appellate court. It contends that a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing
(supporting) his client’s cause. He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound to extend
every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
pursuant to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He should not therefore misuse the
rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice. Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is
to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or
obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty.

The Court of Appeals aptly stated:

But "a lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause" (Buenaseda v.
Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, 656). He should not forget that he is an officer of the court, bound
to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15, Ozamis City, 249 SCRA 432, 439).
He should not, therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice per
 Rule 10.03. Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, or unduly delay a
case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes, in accordance with
Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the same Canons (Ibid).

"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the
administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the
administration of justice contravenes such lawyer's duty."

MELENDREZ vs. DECENA

176 SCRA 662

FACTS:

There were two charges filed against Atty. Decena. First was about a 4k loan obtained by the spouse
s secured by a real estate mortgage. However, it appeared on the real estate mortgage document tha
t the amount loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of 4k. He said that the signing of the doc
uments was just for formality. so, they did. The spouses religiously paid 10% or 500 as interest for onl
y 3months because of financial reverses. Consequently, Atty. Decena made a second real estate mor
tgage document and the loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00. Again, on the a
ssurance that it was only for formality, the spouses signed the new REM document.

After 3 years, they learned that their lot was already sold to someone. So, they tried to raise the 10k a
nd went to Atty. Decena’s house but the latter did not accept the money and instead gave them a she
et of paper indicating that the total indebtedness had soared to 20,400.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done
at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused. It
was alleged that Atty. Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accus
ed without the consent and approval of the complainants and that he received the amount of P500.00
as an advance payment and he did not inform the spouses about this. And even after he was confron
ted, he still did not turn over the money.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Decena may be disbarred.

RULING:

YES. As to the first charge, the SC held that Atty. Decena indeed deceived the spouses. From the
facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate
Mortgage documents by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the
successive documents was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have
at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage,
particularly the provision appointing him as the complainants’ attorney-in-fact in the event of default in
payments on the part of complainants.

As to the second charge, Respondent is presumed to be aware of Section 23 Rule 138 that lawyers
cannot “without special authority, compromise their clients’ litigation or receive anything in discharge
of a client’s claim, but the full amount in cash.” Respondent’s failure to turn over to spouses the partial
payment underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal
or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes
so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court
must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Roll of Attorneys. The nature of the office of
an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar.
Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties
as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue
in the practice of law.

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the
complainants in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of
interest, considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent
attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is
indispensable for continued membership in the Bar. Respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby
DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys.

INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORP vs. ROXAS

256 SCRA 229

FACTS:

The administrative proceedings against Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas started way back in 1975 when a
petition for "disbarment or suspension" was filed, on 03 January of that year, by the Investment and
Management Services Corporation. The petition averred that the complainant managed three
corporations in the Philippines, to wit: Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc., Prime Trading Corporation and
Luzon Leather Industries, Inc.

Respondent lawyer, while he was still petitioner's Administrative and Legal Officer, allegedly
"misappropriated or appropriated for his own use and benefit certain sums of money or checks which
he received in trust, from the Prime Trading Corporation and Luzon Leather Industries, Inc.
amounting to P2,623.80, from the debtors of Luzon Leather Industries, Inc. amounting to P3,444.00,
and from a number of employees of the Worldwide Paper Mills, Inc. amounting to P1,749.50 or a
(grand) total of P7,817.30." In addition, according to petitioner, respondent issued bouncing checks to
pay for personal obligations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Roxas may be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

YES. Respondent clearly had no intention to squarely face the charges against him. By repeatedly
changing his address without informing the investigating officials or the Court he somehow managed
to evade the administrative investigation for, after years of delay, no longer could complainant
corporation be reached to substantiate its charges. The Court cannot take the matter lightly.

A lawyer must constantly conduct himself with great propriety. He is also an officer of the court, and
he owes to it, as well as to his peers, utmost respect and fidelity. His relationship with others should
no less be characterized than by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. When he
took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by those
pledges. In this covenant, respondent lawyer has miserably failed.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Leodegario V. Roxas is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon his receipt of this decision.
 VDA. DE ESPINO vs. PRESQUITO
432 SCRA 610

FACTS:

On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint 1 with the then Court Administrator
Alfredo Benipayo, charging respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for "having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest
means in refusing to honor and pay [her] late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive , the
sum of ₱763,060.00." According to complainant, respondent’s unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics
partly triggered the death of her husband, who died "disillusioned and embittered." The letter-
complaint and affidavit also alleged that notwithstanding the numerous oral demands by Mr. Espino
and complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused to pay the amount
represented by the eight checks which had all been dishonored. Complainant surmised that Atty.
Presquito’s refusal to pay may be due to his reliance on the influence of his father-in-law, a former
Executive Judge of the RTC (Cagayan de Oro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Presquito may be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

YES. It should be stressed that respondent issued eight (8) worthless checks, seemingly without
regard to its deleterious effects to public interest and public order. We have already declared, most
recently in Lao v. Medel, that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, and
puts the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt, though it is not related to his professional
duties as a member of the bar. He not only sets himself liable for a serious criminal offense under B.P.
Blg. 22, but also transgresses the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically the mandate of
Canon 1 to obey the laws of the land and promote the respect for law.

It behooves respondent to remember that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good
condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. A
lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, that renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who issued worthless checks
- Lao v. Medel, Co v. Bernardino, and Ducat v. Villalon, Jr., - we find respondent’s reprehensible
conduct warrants suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. PEPITO C. PRESQUITO is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
hereby suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered to immediately account with
complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land, which has been subdivided in the name of
respondent and his business partner.

TOLOSA vs. CARGO

171 SCRA 21

FACTS:

On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March
1982 seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in
his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal
home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila and that since then has been living with respondent at that address.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May
1982 denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had
been seeing him but that she had done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of
the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his
wife and mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the
beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Cargo may be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

NO. We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show
that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law may be properly imposed upon respondent.

At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with
the rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of
the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or
similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
 SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD vs. CLORIBEL
31 SCRA 1
FACTS:

First Contempt Case. The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International
Minerals Corp and in their third Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John Beltran
Sotto made use of language that are disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like "it seems many
of our judicial authorities believe they are chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face" and
insinuating favoritism and partisanship of the members of the Court, notable Chief Justice
Concepcion and Justice Castro due to alleged interest in the case (Castro's brother works for one of
the parties). Santiago and Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in the MR. The
Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt for
the said statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were inadvertently included in the
copy sent to the Court, and was just intended to be in the MR's rough draft.

Second Contempt Case. Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time
with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as counsel, and again contained language which the Court found
disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of town
when the decision was written and included seeming threats of elevating the issue to the World Court
and allegations of rise of graft and corruption in the judiciary. The Court demanded Caling to also
"show cause" and he said that it the motion was already prepared by Santiago when he

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lawyers should be cited in contempt.

RULING:

 For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago – YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

 For Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto – YES. Fine of P100.00.
 For Atty. Graciano C. Regala and Associates – NO. (Took no part)
 For Atty. Erlito R. Uy – NO. (Took no part)
 For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago – YES. Additional fine of P1,000.00
 For Atty. Juanito M. Caling – YES. Fine P200.00.
 For Mr. Morton F. Meads – YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

a) On the Third Motion for Reconsideration

The Supreme Court finds language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. Atty. Santiago
pictures petitioners as “vulturous executives” and speaks of this [Supreme] Court as a “civilized,
democratic tribunal”, but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and that he too has committed,
under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice. Atty. Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. Finally,
borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the
pleadings subject of the contempt citation.
b) On the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration

Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from
his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should
be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should
have reminded him that “a lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their
conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such
wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate their relation.”

Atty. Caling lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. He has not shown to the
satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was
plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous
in character.

As to Mr. Meads, having admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration, he cannot
beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer.
ZALDIVAR vs. GONZALES
166 SCRA 316

FACTS:

Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Atty. . Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the
case. Zaldivar then filed with the SuApreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against Atty. Gonzalez
directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing Informations against Zaldivar.

Atty. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal Informations against
Zaldivar. Atty. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly claims that he scored one
on the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court’s issuance of the TRO is a manifestation that the “rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, [while] it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.”

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered
Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that
he was only exercising his freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes,
that not less than six justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on
Zaldivar and to not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

RULING:

Yes. The statements made by respondent Atty. Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the
justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest
kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the
Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country.

Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of
is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who
owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and
the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez
to uphold the dignity and authority of the Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide
(genuine). In the case at bar, his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of
the Supreme Court approached him, are of no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzalez indefinitely from the practice of law.

TORRES vs. JAVIER

470 SCRA 408

FACTS:

Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for
malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyer's oath for
employing statements and remarks on his pleadings which are false, unsubstantiated, with malicious
imputation, abusive, offensive and improper with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial
officer.

Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing his pleadings considering that his
wife was included to the burglary exposed in the present case. Also, he invokes that those statements
he made are privileged communication, it forming part of a judicial proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Javier may be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

YES. Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions,
and motions, are absolutely privileged as long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject
inquiry, even if they are false or malicious. Privilege does not extend to matters that are palpably
irrelevant or improper. Respondent's statements regarding a burglary and the imputation of a motive
for the burglary were relevant to the audit case and therefore protected by absolute privilege.
Respondent's language in his pleadings was offensive and improper, in violation of legal ethics.
Lawyer's language must be dignified and arguments in pleadings should be gracious to both the court
and opposing counsel.

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 8 – A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESSS

AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Instructs that respondent’s arguments in his pleadings should be gracious to both the court and
opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to
another. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

As to the reference by respondent to the unfortunate and contemptible practice of notaries public –
basis of the last cause of action, while it may detract from the dignity that should characterize the
legal profession and the solemnity of a notarial document, respondent, who justifies the same as
legitimate defense of his client who was being accused by Atty. Torres of forgery, may, given the
relevance of the statement to the subject matter of the pleading, be given the benefit of the doubt.

Respecting the verified complaint – Annex "EJ-A" to the Comment of respondent filed by his wife,
Prof. Eleonor R. Javier, against complainant Atty. Torres, the same cannot be consolidated with the
present administrative case since the parties and causes of action of such complaint are completely
different from those of the present complaint.

WHEREFORE, for employing offensive and improper language in his pleadings, respondent Atty.
Jose C. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) Month, effective upon
receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that any future infraction of a similar nature shall
be dealt with more severely.

In re: LAURETA
148 SCRA 432

FACTS:

Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A.
Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous
language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust decision on the case GR 68635: Eva
Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when
Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the
defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history
of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the
case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa,
Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made
true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16 Decemeber 1986. Atty.
Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed
petitioner’s Complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Laureta may be suspended from the practice of law.

RULING:

YES. Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from
the practice of law until further Orders, and Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under
the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the
Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers
and checks and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal
branches of government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere.
Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the
setting aside of the order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the
lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall
pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for
ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.

In re: VELASQUEZ
April 29, 1965 LJ 548

FACTS:

This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals
Third Division, which canceled the assessment notices for deficiency income tax, value-added tax,
withholding tax on compensation, and expanded withholding tax issued by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue against Citysuper, Inc. (Citysuper). It also found that the Commissioner was
estopped from raising its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the case.

On April 1, 2013, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Letter of Authority No. 116-2013-
00000017 for Bureau of Internal Revenue officials to examine Citysuper's books of account and other
accounting records for an investigation for taxable year 2011.

On April 1, 2015, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice for
2011, informing Citysuper of its alleged deficiencies on income tax, value-added tax, withholding tax
on compensation, expanded withholding tax, and documentary stamp tax. The total assessed amount
was P2,083,016,072.43.5

On April 24, 2015, Citysuper received the Formal Letter of Demand and Assessment Notices for the
unpaid taxes. In response, on April 29, 2015, Citysuper filed a letter with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.6

On August 13, 2015, Citysuper filed before the Court of Tax Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, seeking to cancel the Formal Letter of Demand. To its pleading, it attached
the Details of Discrepancies and Audit Result/Assessment Notices for 2011. On February 29, 2016,
Citysuper submitted its Urgent Motion for Preferential Resolution of the Issue on Prescription. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a Comment/Opposition to the Urgent Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction.

RULING:
NO. When a taxpayer files a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals without validly
contesting the assessment with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the appeal is premature and
the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction.

Since in the instant case the taxpayer appealed the assessment of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue without previously contesting the same, the appeal was premature and the Court of Tax
Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain said appeal. For, as stated, the jurisdiction of the Tax Court is
to review by appeal decisions of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments. The Tax Court is a court
of special jurisdiction. As such, it can take cognizance only of such matters as are clearly within its
jurisdiction.

Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code requires that administrative protests against
assessments conform to the rules and regulations issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Respondent's April 29, 2015 letter did not comply with the requirements set down in Revenue
Regulations No. 18-2013. There was no administrative protest to speak of, and no decision on a
disputed assessment to assail. Thus, the Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction over the Petition for
Review assailing the July 13, 2015 letter.

Since the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction, there is no longer any need to resolve whether it
gravely abused its discretion in refusing to admit in evidence the authorization letter issued to Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The December 15, 2017 and March 20, 2018
Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 9117 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Petition for Review filed before the Court of Tax Appeals is DISMISSED.

CORNEJO vs. JUDGE TAN

85 Phil 772

FACTS:

 Cornejo was asked by the defendants to act as their counsel in a civil case.
 Cornejo requested Attorney Palacol to handle the case for his convenience.
 During the hearing, Cornejo was presented as a witness, but most of his testimony was objected
to by opposing counsel, and the judge sustained these objections.
 Cornejo attempted to appear as counsel for the defendants without proper substitution of counsel,
but the judge informed him that he could not do so according to the rules.

 A few days later, Cornejo submitted a memorandum accusing the judge of unduly favoring the
plaintiffs and criticizing his conduct as "unjust, hostile, vindictive, and dangerous."
 Copies of the memorandum were sent to the Secretary of Justice, the Supreme Court, and the
Office of the President of the Senate.

 The judge issued an order rejecting the accusation of partiality and requiring Cornejo to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
 The charges against Cornejo included appearing in court without being a party or attorney in the
case, using offensive language, misbehavior in the presence of the court, and publishing the
memorandum before it was submitted and decided by the court.

 Cornejo answered the order, expressing doubts about receiving impartial treatment and reiterating
his accusations against the judge.
 He also explained and rebutted the charges made against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Bienvenido A. Tan was correct in holding Attorney Miguel R. Cornejo in direct
contempt.

RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court examined the memorandum submitted by Cornejo and found it to contain
insulting and contemptuous language towards the judge. The court emphasized that attorneys have
the right to defend their clients fervently, but they should do so with respect and propriety towards the
courts.

As was said in Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil., 729:

"It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is
that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution."

And the last paragraph informing the judge that copies of the memorandum had been furnished
"the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, etc.", could rightly be interpreted as an attempt to
intimidate the court in the exercise of its judicial functions.

Omitting reference to the other points, enough has been stated to show that there was no clear abuse
of the respondent’s powers in declaring Attorney Cornejo to be in direct contempt.

RHEEM OF THE PHIL vs. FERRER

20 SCRA 441

FACTS:

The proceeding for certiorari and contempt is an offshoot of the Court of Industrial Relations’ (CIR)
denial of motion to dismiss the respondent’s complaint.

The following was filed by the counsel (Atty. Jose S. Armonio) for the petitioner:

One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to whether
or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is the
tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without due regard to the
statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often, it is overlooked that no
court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or contract through its decision the
scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This error is manifested by the decisions of
this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reference to and analysis of the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation
appears in this Honorable Court's decision in the instant case. As a result, the errors committed in
earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases
involving the same issue.

The Court ordered counsel to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Armonio’s statements violated the duty of respect to courts.

RULING:

YES. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that, “it is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.” Worth remembering is the
attorney’s duty to the courts “can only be maintained by rendering no service involving disrespect to
the judicial office which he is bound to uphold”.

In the case, the Court felt that Atty. Armonio’s language makes a sweeping charge that the decisions
of the SC blindly adhere to earlier rulings without making “any reference and analysis” of the pertinent
statutes of the CIR. The statements made by counsel detract much from the dignity and respect of
the SC.

Atty. Armonio was admonished (warned) by the SC.

FERNANDEZ vs. HON. BELLO

107 Phil 1140

FACTS:

Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for his client Florentino Perreyras however, Florentino died
without paying Fernandez. Fernandez then assisted the eldest child of Perreyras in a guardianship
proceeding so that the eldest may properly dispose of their property in order to pay their father’s
indebtedness. Eventually, Florentino’s nipa land was sold for P1,000.00. Thereafter, P200.00 was
paid to Atty. Fernandez for his legal services both for Florentino and his heirs. Judge Eloy Bello found
out about said payment and so directed Fernandez to explain (because under the
guardianship, proceeds of any sale must first be accounted for and no payment to creditors shall be
made without prior authorization from the court). In the course of the proceeding however, Judge
Bello stated that Fernandez does not deserve the P200.00 attorney’s fees because Fernandez is a
“below average standard of a lawyer.” Fernandez then responded with strong language (which were
not specified).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the strong language used by Atty. Fernandez against Judge Bello is forgivable.

RULING:

Yes. In this Court judge Bello desires that portions of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration be
stricken out for employing strong language. We believe the said strong language must have been
impelled by the same language used by the Judge Bello in characterizing the act of the petitioner as
“anomalous and unbecoming” and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee “through maneuvers of
documents from the guardian-petitioner.” If anyone is to blame for the language used by the
petitioner, it is the judge himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have
provoked petitioner, and the judge below has nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be
insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.
On the issue of attorney’s fees, the opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of
the right to a lawyer’s fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the
services rendered.