Thiagarajan Kumararaja v. Capital Film Works Ltd.

(2017)

INTRODUCTION:
One of the first judgments in this direction was given by Division Bench of Hon’ble Madras
High Court in the case of Thiagarajan Kumararaja v. Capital Film Works (India) Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. which firstly held that “dubbing” is not translation as it is falling within the ambit of the
expression ‘communication to the public’ as defined under Section 2(ff) of the Copyright
Act, 1957 (“Act”) and so, dubbing right is an exclusive right for a film producer as per
Section 14(d) of the Act. Secondly in the facts of the present case since there was no
assignment of rights in the script of the cinematograph film in accordance with the
requirements under Section 19 of the Act, the rights in script continue to vest with
author(s)/script writer(s) and does not stand assigned to producer merely on strength of a
budget sheet which mentions amount paid by producer to author for directorial services
rendered towards cinematograph film as per its script. It was thus held that only original
author or script writer has got right either to remake cinema-graph movie again or make any
similar version thereof because such authority does not belong to a movie’s maker.
The Madras High Court ruled that, unless otherwise stated, a film producer has the right to
dub the film in any other language, which constitutes his freedom to interact with the
audience under the Copyright Act of 1957.

BENCH:
A Madras High Court Division Bench of The Honourable Mr.Justice RAJIV SHAKDHER
And The Honourable Mr.Justice ABDUL QUDDHOSE gave judgment in Mr. Thiagarajan
Kumararaja V. M/s Capital Film Works (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2018 (73) PTC 365 , on
20.11.2017.

HISTORY, FACTS, ARGUMENTS, & ISSUES OF THE CASE:

The writer/appellant filed a complaint in the Madras High Court against the
producers/respondents, alleging that the producers were planning to remake the film and dub
it in other languages, which would result in infringement of his copyright in the film's script.
Appellant's Arguments
The Appellant asserted that dubbing the picture amounted to a translation of the film's
underlying works, and thus constituted a remake. This would, in turn, violate his copyright in
the script because he never granted the producer adaptation rights.
The respondent's arguments
Responding to these claims, the respondents maintained that these would not constitute
infringement, but rather a message to the public, which was an exclusive right provided to the
film's producer under Section 14(d)(iii) of the Act.
Recently, it was reported that the Hindi dubbing rights for SS Rajamouli's Prabhas-starrer
'Saaho' were sold to T-Series for a whopping 150 million yen
Dubbing and subtitles make films accessible to audiences who may not speak or understand
the language of the original film.
 And of course, in a country like India with several large mainstream film industries, dubbed
films overcome language barriers and move seamlessly between India's largest film
industries.
There is a huge demand for domestic and international content in India, so not only is
dubbing a lucrative option for producers, but dubbed movies are also very popular and artists
can make an entire career out of dubbing.
As far as copyright is concerned, the unresolved issue of who has the right to dub a film was
recently discussed in the Madras High Court in the case of Thiagarajan Kumararaja v
Madras Madras M/s Capital Film Works Thiagarajan Kumararaja (TK), the appellant in
the case, is the writer and director of the Tamil film 'Aaranyakaandam', which was highly
acclaimed and also won a national award for TK The film's producer, director S P Charan
(through his production company Capital Film Works) has decided to dub the film into
Telugu almost three years after its production and is also planning to remake the film. It may
be Although this Tamil film did not perform well at the box office, it eventually gained a
huge cult following, which may have been the reason for the producers' renewed interest in
capitalizing on the film.

It has always been the case that TK has not transferred the rights to the script to the producer,
so the producer has no right to remake or dub the film without consent
After several rounds of litigation, both at intermediate and final stages, the Divisional Court
had to answer questions broadly similar to the following:
Even in the absence of a formal assignment agreement, whether TK Have you transferred
your rights to the producer?
Does the producer have the right to dub the movie?
Does the producer have the right to remake the movie?
The court found that TK did not transfer the script to the producer, but curiously he reached
two different conclusions regarding dubbing and remake rights
However, the court ruled that the producer had no right to remake the film because the script
was not attributable.
However, the court ruled that the producer's right to communicate a film to the
public extends to dubbing and showing the film in a different language
In fact, in its judgment, the court first decided the issue of dubbing and only then the issue
of film attribution and remake.

Put basically, this is the court’s thinking for why the producer’s copyright included the right
to name a film– Section 2(ff) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (the Act) characterizes
communication as making the work accessible to be seen, listened, or something else
delighted in. The utilize of the expression ‘otherwise enjoyed’ after the words ‘seen’ and
‘heard’ broadens the scope of how communication to the open has to be made and, as a
result, incorporates the right to name a film and communicate the named film to groups of
onlookers over the country.
While the interpretation of a scholarly work is carried out by utilizing a composing medium,
naming as it were includes the reconfiguration of the sound track which is as of now portion
of the cinematograph film of which the maker is the owner.
As the creator of the scholarly work i.e. the script, the essayist had, connect alia, a right to
make a cinematograph film.He cannot circumscribe that right, on the off chance that,
“authority qua that right is given to another person.”
This examination of the producer’s copyright is by distant one of the most sharp. It clarifies
the application of Sec. 14(d) to a expansive degree. Be that as it may, in unloading the
naming right and its different components, it is my see that the court missed a few better
focuses in arriving at the conclusion that it eventually reached.

First, the judgment draws an manufactured wedge between interpretation and naming in
arrange build up that naming is a reconfiguration of the soundtrack which as of now shapes
portion of the film and, as such, has nothing to do with the script. In spite of the fact that this
elucidation is not erroneous, the to begin with step of the naming prepare, undeniably,is the
interpretation of the script.Even in this case, TK contended that changing the sound track of a
film comes about in the creation of an completely modern film– a partitioned work for the
purposes of copyright law.Assuming arguendo that the communication right included the
right to name the film, such naming would customarily require the interpretation of the script
which has a place to a distinctive individual, the script-writer (TK in this case),and would too
require the last mentioned to independently authorize the interpretation of his script.

Second, the court recognizes the reality that the rights in the fundamental works are
partitioned from the rights in the film itself. This is indeed expressly specified in Sec. 13(4)
of the Act. In fact, at that point, the rights that the essayist has in her script (that she still
possesses) ought to not be influenced by the rights that a maker has in the film.

Third, the court unequivocally states that if a prohibitive condition was put by the script-
writer avoiding the maker from naming the film, at that point the maker has no such right. If
it is inside the specialist of the creator of a script to avoid the naming of a film, how can
naming, moreover, at the same time, be the producer’s right beneath Sec. 14(d). It ought to
either be that the maker continuously has the right to name a film or the script-writer (who
has not alloted the rights to the script) has to particularly authorize such naming. In other
words, if the maker as of now has the right to communicate a film in any way he satisfies
counting naming the film in distinctive dialects, how can a script-writer limit this fair by
ideals of owning the script itself?

Fourth, there might be reason to accept that the court’s dependence on Craftsmanship. 14 of
the Berne Tradition and the Sunder Pictures case was too somewhat lost. It appears that
Craftsmanship. 14 of the Tradition applies to contributing creators. In numerous purviews,
for occasion, the foremost chief of the film is considered a contributing creator. Be that as it
may, creators of melodic, scholarly and other basic works are creators in their claim right.
Whereas contributing creators cannot protest to the naming or the sub-titling of a motion
picture, I am not completely persuaded that the author of a script (who is still too the
proprietor of the script) can be subject to the same confinements as a vital executive or other
contributor.

The Tall Court depended on the Sunder Pictures case to back its perception that there is a
hone in the Indian cinema industry of naming movies into a number of dialects, and the
copyright in the motion picture is isolated from the copyright in the talkie, subsequently
permitting the rights proprietor to name the film in more than one dialect and relegate naming
rights in like manner. Be that as it may, the choice in Sunder Pictures was based on the
presumption that the maker (proprietor of the film in address) had the right to name the film.
The Offended party in Sunder Pictures, who was the assignee of the Tamil talkie film, looked
for to limit the rights of the litigants to display the talkie in Hindi, and it was in this setting
that the Court held that relegating the copyright to a film in one dialect does not deny the
proprietor the right to name the film in other dialects. This is on a very basic level diverse
from the truths of the display case wherein the copyright in the script is still possessed by TK,
and the rights in the script have not been alloted to the Maker (who as it were claims the
Tamil dialect film).

TK’s extraordinary take off request challenging the choice of the Division Seat relating to the
naming rights was as of late expelled by the Preeminent Court and the court did not give take
off as supplicated. In any case, it is common in the industry for the maker to purchase all
rights in the basic works and a circumstance like the show case does not ordinarily arise.But
the truth is that named movies interpret into great earnings. And in cases such as TK’s, it
remains to be seen whether the scholars will have their claim Javed Akhtar-moment and take
back what might be theirs to keep.
Thiagarajan Kumararaja v. M/s Capital Film Works & Anr.
In determining whether dubbing constituted a right to public communication, the Court faced
the following issues:
Accepting that there was no assignment of copyright in the film's script, did the producer
have the right to dub the film in another language?
Assuming the producer possesses such a right, may they still be barred from dubbing the film
by the creator of the original work?

LAWS INVOLVED:
Section 2 in conjunction with Sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Copyright Act, 1957 subclause
(d) of Section 14(1) of the Copyright Act
Section 19A of the Copyright Act 1957
Sections 13 and 14 of the Copyright Act of 1957
SECTION: 14 COPYRIGHT ACT 1957 Clause 2(f) of the Copy Right Act.

CONCLUSION:
Although the court interpreted the definition of public communication broadly, it concluded
that synchronization fell within the scope of public communication.
The court also referred to the producer's right of public communication and distinguished
between dubbing and translation
This did not in any way affect the author's rights to the underlying script of the film in
question.
Considering the Section 2(f) definition of a motion picture film, the court also held that the
synchronization is done with respect to the sound recording of the film and is, by definition,
an integral part of the film
The court also held that the dubbing of the film was not a remake or adaptation of the film
because no material changes were made to the underlying work, the film's script
Therefore, there was no violation of the author's rights.
Therefore, the movie's producer has no right to remake the movie without the author's
permission.
The current ruling of the Madras High Court's Division Bench gives much-needed
clarification of individuals' rights under the Copyright Act of 1957 in relation to a
cinematographic film. Specifically, the current decision comprehensively addresses the scope
of the terms "dubbing" and "remakes" in the context of cinematograph films and clearly
delineates the persons entitled to the right to dub and the right to undertake re-makes of films,
as well as the scope of the said rights under the Copyright Act of 1957. This verdict will go a
long way toward resolving numerous copyright problems in the film business, including the
current case.