Modernising The Tort of Wilkinson V Downton

Modernising the tort of Wilkinson v Downton, J.P.I.
Law 2023, 1, 13-35
For educational use only

Modernising the tort of Wilkinson v Downton
Rachael Mulheron *
Journal Article
Journal of Personal Injury Law
J.P.I. Law 2023, 1, 13-35
Subject
Torts
Other related subjects

Personal injury
Keywords
Causation; Intentional torts; Personal injury; Psychiatric harm; Tortious liability
Cases cited
Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57; [1897] 5 WLUK 14 (QBD)
*J.P.I. Law 13 Abstract

A practical joke in the Albion pub in 1896 in East London spawned a cause of action, the rule in Wilkinson v Downton , which
persists to this day. However, the tort has suffered from limited utility since Wright J’s famous judgment. It is argued, in this
article, that the time has come to reform and to modernise the tort, so as to compensate the claimant who has been the subject of
a defendant’s statement, made intentionally to cause that claimant serious emotional distress. Reforming the tort will fill a gap
in Tort law by enabling the protection of C’s personal integrity, in circumstances of intentional wrongdoing, which other torts
do not currently facilitate. It would also re-fashion the tort for modern societal conditions in which one-off threats, suggestions,
requests and statements—written, image-based and pictorial, and directed towards C via social media platforms, electronic
communications, TikTok and other media—can do C substantial mental harm.
Introduction
The thesis of this article is that the time has come whereby the tort in Wilkinson v Downton, 1 promulgated by Wright J in 1897
and judicially tweaked since, should be reformed in English law—whether judicially or statutorily—to constitute the following
cause of action (Revised Wilkinson Tort):
"The intentional infliction upon C of physical (bodily) injury, or serious emotional distress, which is caused by D’s statements
directed to C."
Presently, the tort (Current Wilkinson Tort) stands for the following cause of action:
"The intentional infliction upon C of physical (bodily) injury, or emotional distress giving rise to a recognised psychiatric injury,
which is caused, or materially contributed to, by D’s statements and conduct."
If the reforms suggested in this article are implemented, the revised tort would provide a remedy for statements made on D’s part
which were made with the intention of causing C harm, and for which present Tort law does not adequately provide. Incredibly,
since its promulgation by Wright J more than 120 years ago, the Current Wilkinson Tort has succeeded in four subsequent cases
in England 2 —literally a handful! It is difficult to envisage a tortious cause of action which has been less useful in terms of
successful *J.P.I. Law 14 outcomes 3 —and particularly in a context whereby intent to cause C the requisite harm on D’s part
© 2023 Thomson Reuters. 1

Modernising the tort of Wilkinson v Downton, J.P.I. Law 2023, 1, 13-35
is alleged which ought, theoretically, to attract a greater willingness on the part of Tort law to provide redress for the injured
party. 4 Yet, if re-fashioned, the tort could become both relevant and important to modern societal conditions, especially where
D’s statements, invitations, suggestions and threats, disseminated via social media platforms and e-communications with the
intention of causing C serious emotional distress, can be both far-reaching and damaging. It is also notable that two of the
four successful cases have occurred in the last decade, both concerning sexual impropriety perpetrated by an educator against
a pupil, suggesting that the tort may have an important role to play in a sector of society in which vulnerability and inequality
of power can feature.
To set the context at the outset, it is helpful to revisit the origins of the Wilkinson Tort, and why the revised tort is needed as part
of the English Tort law landscape. The following sections then examine, element-by-element, the justifications and analysis
which support the proposed changes—dealing, in turn, with the requisite threshold harm; the "conduct element"; the "intent
element"; and the "consequence element", encompassing causation and remoteness of damage. Defences are also considered
and the final section concludes.
The Wilkinson Tort has travelled, as so much common law does, to the four corners of the common law world. 5 However,
for the purposes of the reform recommendations contained in this article, particular regard is given to English case law and
statutory enactments. The tort has been afflicted by uncertainty, 6 obscurity 7 and sparse usage in this jurisdiction—and has
been judicially ascribed unhappy adjectives such as that "peculiar tort" 8 —all of which has undermined its effectiveness and
raised the spectre of how it could usefully be refashioned. 9 In 2015, in Rhodes v OPO, 10 where the tort also failed, the Supreme
Court sought to recast the tort’s elements somewhat, and that decision and its reasoning provide an important reference point
(sometimes departed from) for the reforms which are suggested herein. Even from those many cases which have failed one or
more of the tort’s elements (see, for example, the recent example of BVC v EWF in 2019 11 ), lessons can be learnt.
The bottom line is that the Current Wilkinson Tort suffers from extremely limited utility in its current incarnation, but that there
is a "gap" in English law that could be filled if the tort was to be re-fashioned and modernised. *J.P.I. Law 15
Then … and now

To set the context of the era and circumstances in which the Current Wilkinson Tort arose: the incident occurred in 1896 in the
Albion Pub, located at 25 St Paul’s Road 12 in Bow Common, London.

Photo dated 2005 © David Kinchlea, and reproduced with the kind permission of Mr Kinchlea and The Lost Pubs Project.
Thomas Wilkinson became publican in 1895, 13 and Mr Downton, D, was a regular customer. On 9 April 1896, Mr Wilkinson
went to the races at Harlow, and left his wife, Lavinia Wilkinson, C, to manage the bar. D visited the pub that evening, and
falsely told C, as an unpleasant practical joke, that he had received a telegraphic message that her husband had been injured in
an accident involving a horse-drawn vehicle on his way back from the races, that he was lying "smashed up" in The Elms pub in
Leytonstone with two broken legs and with other serious injuries, and that C should fetch him. C sent others by train to reach her
husband, but they could not find him. In fact, C’s husband returned safely from the races by train later that evening. However,
the effects of the practical joke on C were dramatic. She became seriously ill. As well as vomiting, her hair turned white, and
she suffered "a violent shock to her nervous system", all of which required extensive medical treatment. C sued D for the harm
caused by this incident. She recovered the cost of the railway fares which had been incurred in the fruitless train journey to
Leytonstone under the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation (deceit). The more controversial head of damage (the "real question"
which was "without precedent", as Wright J put it 14 ) was the psychiatric injury which C had suffered. Wright J permitted
recovery of damages (£100) for this harm, inventing a new cause of action for which the case now stands. *J.P.I. Law 16 15
Lord Hoffmann remarked, in Wainwright v Home Office 16 that the Wilkinson Tort was really an accident of legal history
and timing. A decade earlier, in the 1888 case of Victorian Railway Commissioner v Coultas, 17 psychiatric injury was held
not to be compensable in negligence, because that type of harm was deemed as too remote at law. That decision was departed
from in 1901 in Dulieu v White, 18 ironically another incident-in-a-pub case, where negligently-inflicted psychiatric injury was
recovered. In the meantime, however, Wilkinson v Downton came before Wright J in 1897. Finding that Mr Downton did not
actually intend to cause Mrs Wilkinson’s psychiatric injury, but being unable to permit Mrs Wilkinson to recover in negligence,
Wright J devised a rule of inflicted psychiatric injury—not negligently-inflicted, but with an "imputed intention" to inflict,
because D’s practical joke was "calculated" to cause C psychiatric harm. Lord Hoffmann noted that Lord Wright’s concept of
"imputed intention" really "sailed as close to negligence" as was possible, given the bulwark of Coultas. 19
However, the fact remains that the Current Wilkinson Tort has survived the modern advent of negligently-inflicted psychiatric
injury for secondary victims 20 (that being the sort of scenario that Wilkinson v Downton most closely resembles, with the

immediate "victim" being Thomas Wilkinson, and with Lavinia, his wife, as claimant, being the secondary victim who shared
a close tie of love and affection with him 21 ). The Wilkinson Tort certainly has not (to quote Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright
22
) "disappeared beneath the surface of the law of negligence". It exists, and is still claimed in a variety of scenarios—but it
has been forlornly unsuccessful in most cases.
Law reform is only necessary if it fills a gap, and redresses existing inadequacies in the law. So, why is the Revised Wilkinson
Tort needed? It is suggested that there are three reasons (quite apart from its widespread lack of successful application in current
form).
First, other torts do not "cover the field", and potentially leave a gap in redress which the Revised Wilkinson Tort is designed to
fill. The statutory tort created by virtue of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PHA 1997) includes harassing incidents
arising from speech, and also allows for recovery of damages for emotional distress. However, purely by virtue of its statutory
drafting, it requires a course of conduct (two or more incidents), 23 and does not cover serious one-off events, 24 nor individual
acts by D that have no nexus with each other, 25 nor acts that occur out-of-jurisdiction. 26 Private nuisance is still hampered by
the Hunter rule of standing that requires C to have a proprietary or possessory interest in the land where D’s interference with
C’s peaceable enjoyment has occurred, and damages awardable under the tort reflect its property-based nature. 27 Defamation
will be inapplicable where D’s statement contains *J.P.I. Law 17 a threat but not a defamatory imputation, or where it is made
by D to C without publication to another. 28 Battery has "rescued" some parties who sued (alternatively) under the Current
Wilkinson Tort, but only because there was direct application of force by D upon C; 29 absent that, battery does not apply.
Assault entails no application of force, but requires the imminent threat of physical force and an overt ability to carry out the
threat, which is usually missing in scenarios in which D utters a verbal threat or statement intending to distress C. 30 The tort
of injurious falsehood is directed towards false statements which are calculated to harm the property, goods, or business or
economic interests of the claimant, entirely different types of interest than those which the Wilkinson v Downton tort focusses
upon. 31 Negligence giving rise to pure psychiatric injury, arising from carelessly-made statements or conduct, requires both
proof of a recognised psychiatric injury as a pre-requisite to any recovery, 32 and a duty of care owed by D to C which may
not arise as a matter of law. 33 Hence, these various torts do not cover the legal territory which the Revised Wilkinson Tort
proposes to cover.
Secondly, criminal law will not fill the void either. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund provides for compensation for
mental injury (falling short of a recognised psychiatric injury) that is consequential upon "a crime of violence", 34 but the types
of statements to which the Revised Wilkinson Tort is directed do not fall within this description, and hence, C would be ineligible
under that Fund. The enactment in 2015 of the criminal offence of disclosing private sexual photographs with intent to cause
distress 35 does not provide for compensatory redress either.
Thirdly, in the modern world of social media platforms, with the proliferation of text and email communications, and with the
increasing upload of humiliating TikTok posts, 36 D has a greater ability than ever to "reach" C with statements which can
cause C serious emotional distress. It is notable that one of the four successful cases under the Current Wilkinson Tort was
the first-ever "sexting case" in English law giving rise to damages, but its success depended upon C’s suffering a recognised
psychiatric injury (a pre-requisite which will not be necessary under the Revised Wilkinson Tort). 37 Hence, the modern world
is very different from when Mr Downton committed his practical joke in the Albion Pub in 1896, and the Wilkinson Tort should
be revised to reflect and to accommodate that reality. Although it has been academically suggested 38 that the Wilkinson Tort
is not particularly adept at dealing with victims who are threatened or coerced into sending correspondence and images of a
sexual nature, it is contended in this article that, with some finessing, the tort could place victims in a much stronger position.
Reforming the *J.P.I. Law 18 substantive cause of action, together with the ongoing development of the online court system
in England, 39 may provide a real opportunity for C to access redress for serious emotional distress caused by D’s intentional
statements and threats.
Hence, the purpose of the following sections is to examine how each element of the Current Wilkinson Tort would be amended
under this reform proposal, either to ringfence the element given the lesser pre-requisite damage of "serious emotional distress"
or to reflect the fact, more explicitly, that the Revised Wilkinson Tort is so much closer to trespass than it is to case.

Reforming the threshold harm

The Current Wilkinson Tort has long been legally described as an action on the case, and not a trespass to the person, 40 a
point to which attention will return when discussing the remoteness element. For present purposes, it is accepted that, as with
the Current Wilkinson Tort, the Revised Wilkinson Tort will not be actionable per se, but will require proof of damage. In
Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J stated that C had to show that D had "infringe[d] her legal right to personal safety, and has in
fact caused physical harm to her". 41 However, it was accepted in Wainwright (and evident from Wright J’s judgment itself)
that any reference to "physical harm" included psychiatric harm. 42
Physical (as in bodily, rather than mental) harm to C as a result of D’s intent to cause such harm is claimable under the Current
Wilkinson Tort, but has rarely featured in case law to date. Bodily injury under the Current Wilkinson Tort is doctrinally
"indirect" and typically "consequential". It is indirect (and that is why it has long been designated as an action on the case)
because it is to be contrasted with the trespassory torts where C’s injury arises either from the intentional and direct application
of force to C’s person without consent (battery) or the apprehension of the immediate application of force with the capacity to
carry that out with immediate effect (assault). Bodily injury under the Current Wilkinson Tort is (typically, but not necessarily)
consequential because mental harm is usually the primary harm being compensated for. This was the scenario in both Wilkinson
v Downton 43 itself, and subsequently. 44 It is doctrinally feasible that, had Mrs Wilkinson suffered only bodily injury as a result
of the telling of the practical joke, those would have been recoverable as indirectly-inflicted injury, but thus far, successful claims
for bodily injury have accompanied intentionally inflicted mental harm. Some claimants 45 have not managed to surmount the
de minimis threshold that necessarily applies to the recovery of damages for bodily injury (and, indeed, whether Mrs Wilkinson’s
own injuries would now qualify is doubtful 46 ). In other case law, the medical evidence has not been sufficient for the court to
conclude or to infer that physical injury to the claimant occurred by reason of the defendant’s conduct or statements. 47 Absent
any actionable bodily injury, the claim brought by C under the Wilkinson Tort is one for "pure" mental harm—and that is where
the focus of the tort, and of this article, lie. *J.P.I. Law 19
In common with negligence, the Current Wilkinson Tort stipulates that (except where injunctive relief is being urgently
sought 48 ) damages for distress, anxiety, misery, anger, fright, humiliation, indignation, etc, cannot be recovered, even if D
intended, by his conduct or statements, to cause C precisely that type of harm. 49 Proof that C suffered from a recognised
psychiatric injury is necessary ("an essential constituent element", as recently described in one case 50 ). This threshold for
actionable damage has been judicially described as "psychiatric injury in a technical sense, i.e. a condition to which a
recognised diagnostic label attaches", 51 and "a recognised medical condition (such as clinical depression or post-traumatic
stress disorder)", 52 and is typically (but not always 53 ) assessed in accordance with standard diagnostic classifications. 54 In
a substantial departure, however, it is proposed that, under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, "serious emotional distress" would be
the minimum threshold injury required, which harm could fall short of a recognised psychiatric injury. Under the revised tort,
proof of a psychiatric injury would go to quantum, but not to threshold liability.
This idea is not a novel one. As well as receiving academic 55 and law reform 56 support, some English appellate judges have
foreshadowed that a lesser form of mental harm ought to be actionable under the Current Wilkinson Tort. Exactly 100 years
after Wilkinson v Downton, Lord Hoffmann remarked, in the private nuisance case of Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd, that:
"I see no reason why a tort of intention should be subject to the rule which excludes compensation for mere distress,
inconvenience or discomfort in actions based on negligence. The policy considerations are quite different." 57
His Lordship also reserved opinion, in Wainwright, as to whether compensation should be recoverable where there was "a
genuine intention to cause distress" to C. 58 In Rhodes, the majority observed 59 that Lord Hoffmann had left this important
issue open, but that it was "common ground" there that a recognised psychiatric injury was required. In a separate judgment,
Lords Neuberger and Wilson stated that "there *J.P.I. Law 20 is plainly a powerful case for saying that, in relation to [the
Wilkinson Tort], … it should be enough for [C] to establish that he suffered significant distress as a result of D’s statement". 60
In the author’s view, the "powerful case" for reform of this sort must be considered through both a medical and a legal lens.
The law’s current insistence upon a recognised psychiatric injury under the Current Wilkinson Tort is arguably flawed under
both lenses.

The medical perspective

From a psychiatrist’s point of view, the distinction between emotional distress and anxiety on the one hand, and a recognised
psychiatric injury such as depression or post-traumatic-stress-disorder on the other, is not as clear-cut as the common law would
lead one to believe (as the author has discussed previously 61 ). In its submission to the England and Wales Law Commission’s
study on mental harm, the British Medical Association stated that "[t]here is no sudden cut-off point where grief and other
distresses suddenly become psychiatric illnesses". 62 Some courts have made the same point. In Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes
Ltd, the claimant had argued, "simply because anxiety and psychiatric injury were treated differently by the common law, it did
not mean to say that they were, in fact, different types of injury". 63 Having listened to the psychiatric evidence, the court agreed:
"anxiety and psychiatric harm are both, in my view, conditions with a similar aetiology, both sharing similar symptoms but
with one being more serious than the other … it seems quite artificial to attempt to draw a borderline between anxiety and
psychiatric illness caused by harassment … the victim of harassment is not entitled to damages for a label, but for what he
has actually suffered." 64
Moreover, some medical scholars point out that "[f]rom the beginning of psychiatric nosology in the late 19th century
until the 1970s, anxiety and depression were widely accepted in the non-psychoanalytic psychiatric community as different
manifestations of one affective spectrum disorder", but that it was actually pharmacological innovation which prompted the
view that anxiety disorders were somehow different from other, more serious, conditions:
"The rise of psychopharmacology that started in the 1950s led to the development of drugs that had a relatively specific
antidepressant (e.g. tricyclics) or anxiolytic effect (e.g. benzodiazepines), and supported a dichotomization between depression
and anxiety. During the development of the 3rd edition of DSM-III, the drafting of the sections on depressive and anxiety
disorders was assigned to two different advisory committees, which contributed to the fact that anxiety and depression were
included as completely different disorders in DSM-III [1980]." 65
Other medical scholars have remarked on the lack of realism which the categorisation approach of mental disorders in DSM-
III brought about, and which DSM-IV largely followed:
"[given] the high comorbidity of general anxiety and depressive disorders, the clinical difficulty of teasing these disorders apart,
and the meanings of symptoms to patients, I remain skeptical about the *J.P.I. Law 21 utility of keeping these problems
separate in a new classification. It seems likely that major depression and general anxiety disorders are manifestations of a
similar underlying disease process." 66
To the relief of other medical commentators, a significant feature of DSM-5 in 2013 67 was to move away from the strict
categorisation approach of mental disorders which the earlier editions had adhered to:
"the use of strict categorical boundaries has given the impression of psychiatric disorders as unitary, discrete phenomena
[whereas] [t]hroughout general medicine, conditions are frequently conceptualized on a continuum from ‘normal’ to
pathological, without relying on a singular threshold to distinguish the presence or absence of disease." 68
Hence, the English common law’s insistence upon a "bright-line" distinction between emotional distress and anxiety on the one
hand, and a recognised psychiatric injury on the other, has long been considered, medically, to be artificial and unrealistic.
It is suggested that some of the features of a "generalised anxiety disorder" 69 as was categorised in the first version of DSM-
V could indicate the type of "serious emotional distress" that could trigger the Revised Wilkinson Tort, i.e. distress that: (1) is
"excessive and typically interferes significantly with psychosocial functioning"; (2) is "pervasive, pronounced, and [with] longer
duration"; (3) causes "impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning"; and (4) is accompanied by
physical symptoms such as irritability, being easily fatigued, or disturbed sleep. 70 Hence, the types of factors to which regard
might be had, when assessing whether C has suffered the requisite mental harm, could include: how seriously C’s cognitive
functions and participation in daily activities were impaired as a result of D’s intentional acts; the length of time for which the

impairment was suffered; the extent of medical care which C required as a result of D’s acts; the extent to which C’s functioning
in social or employment settings was affected; and the extent of any accompanying physical symptoms. 71
The legal perspective

Moreover, four reasons justify, at law, a lower damage threshold under the Revised Wilkinson Tort.
First, it is an intentional tort which requires deliberate statements by D—there is nothing careless or accidental about it. Whatever
the arguments may be for permitting the recovery of something less than a recognised psychiatric injury in negligence, 72 the
argument in favour of a lower threshold of injury is much stronger where intent on D’s part is concerned. An appropriate quid
pro quo is that D should be held to greater account for intentionally-caused harm. This is the point made by Lord Hoffmann in
Hunter v Canary Wharf, i.e. "the policy considerations are quite different". 73 In Rhodes, the Supreme Court put it similarly:
"negligence and intent are very different fault elements and there are principled reasons for *J.P.I. Law 22 differentiating
between the … possible extent of liability for causing personal injury in either case". 74 The stricter the intent element is
construed, the stronger this argument.
Secondly, a lesser form of harm, i.e. emotional distress, is permitted for many common law torts which lie at the "intentional"
or "malicious" end of the spectrum, e.g. for the trespassory torts of battery, assault and false imprisonment; 75 and for malice-
based torts such as the malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings and (since 2016) civil proceedings. 76 Some judicial dicta
also suggests that for the tort of misfeasance in public office, C must have suffered from a "grievous non-physical reaction" that
may fall short of a recognised psychiatric illness. 77 In that regard, the Current Wilkinson Tort has always sat uncomfortably
with these common law cousins.
Thirdly, claims for anxiety or distress, unaccompanied by any physical injury, are sufficient for various statutory torts which
entail wrongful intentional conduct by D. For example, Parliament has decreed that the lower threshold of damage is appropriate
under the PHA 1997 ("[r]eferences to harassing a person include alarming the person or causing the person distress" 78 ). This
provision has arguably stultified any strong judicial willingness to recouch the Current Wilkinson Tort to permit recovery for
mere emotional distress 79 (albeit that it is contended in this article that the PHA does not "cover the field", hence the need for
the Revised Wilkinson Tort). In Mbasogo, it was pointed out that various additional statutory torts which proscribe intentional
discriminatory practices also provide compensation for "injury to feelings" amounting to distress. 80 It is also notable that, for
injury arising from a "crime of violence", the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme permits recovery for mental injury that
is disabling, but falls short of a "medically recognised illness or condition". 81
The final point draws upon Lord Neuberger’s judgment in Rhodes, i.e. that if the tort only requires that there be an intent on D’s
part to cause "significant distress as a result of D’s statement" as a minimum (as discussed later in the article 82 ), then it is "not
entirely easy" to reconcile that element of the tort with a threshold requirement that C must have suffered something more than
that, viz. a recognised psychiatric injury. 83 Consistency demands that the elements of threshold damage and intent coalesce.
Thus, the Revised Wilkinson Tort’s allowance for a lesser form of damage than a recognised psychiatric injury would be
consistent both with existing statutory regimes and with other intentional common law torts. It would also make doctrinal sense.
However, it is certainly not the author’s contention that every trivial or transient emotional distress caused to C by D’s intent
to cause severe emotional distress should be compensated. A de minimis threshold has long applied to claims for mental injury
in English Tort law, 84 and suggestions as to how the threshold of "serious emotional distress" could suitably be assessed have
been made above. *J.P.I. Law 23 85
Reforming the "conduct element"

In what was described in Rhodes as "the conduct element" of the Current Wilkinson Tort, 86 it is proposed that the Revised
Wilkinson Tort should be amended in four important respects.
Conduct versus statements

Over the decades, the Current Wilkinson Tort has expanded in English law, such that three types of conduct can trigger the tort:
(1) where D conveys false information to C, knowing that information to be untrue, but which C believes to be true, which
Wilkinson v Downton itself and other case law 87 demonstrate; or (2) where D verbally threatens C, which has the effect of
pestering and intimidating C, causing C to suffer harm, but without an overt act indicating an immediate intention to commit
battery (otherwise the threat would amount to assault); 88 or (3) where D commits an intentional act (lawful or unlawful) against
C which D intends to cause C harm. Under this last-mentioned category, various acts have been judicially noted as being at
least capable of triggering the tort—from deliberately letting a guard dog out of police control 89 to locking C out of her office
and setting off her car alarm; 90 from deleting the contents of a person’s Facebook profile that contained intimate poems and
photographs of C’s 91 to taking someone hostage to demand money from family member C for his safe release; 92 and from
conducting a strip search of C contrary to the protocols required by prison rules, 93 to videoing C whilst he was in the shower
naked. 94 The case law demonstrates that the Current Wilkinson Tort has expanded well beyond its original inception of a false
statement.
However, there has long been judicial disquiet about this expansion. In Rhodes, Lord Neuberger considered that the Current
Wilkinson Tort should be limited to "distressing statements"; 95 extra-curial commentary has favoured that restriction; 96 and
earlier authorities had sought to limit the tort in that way too. 97 The question hence arises as to whether intentional conduct,
in the absence of statements, should continue to be covered under the Revised Wilkinson Tort.
On balance, the author considers that it should not. Rather, the Revised Wilkinson Tort should focus upon D’s statements which
are intended to inflict emotional distress on C. For these purposes, the meaning of "statements" should be widely-construed,
to encompass the conveyance of false information, orally or in writing (similarly to the position under the Current Wilkinson
Tort, the conveyance of true information would not be caught up within its ambit); threats, express or implied; requests and
demands; warnings; and images, silent videos, and pictorials, as well as words. Hence, it is entirely within the scope of the
Revised Wilkinson Tort that a defendant’s sending sexual images of himself to the claimant and telling her that he loved her via
Facebook messaging, as part of grooming behaviour which ultimately led to *J.P.I. Law 24 sexual activity; 98 or a defendant’s
encouragement to the claimant to send to him indecent images of herself together with "sexual banter" in text and email messages
between them, 99 would constitute the sort of "statements" necessary to invoke the tort.
The main concern in so restricting the tort is: what about the one-off incidents of conduct by D which involve no statements
directed to C (recognising that a course of conduct would potentially be covered by the PHA 1997)? The reality is that, under the
Current Wilkinson Tort to date, most cases in which reliance has been placed on D’s conduct have involved statements too. 100
Hence, those sort of cases would be covered by the Revised Wilkinson Tort, precisely because of the statements involved.
For the rare case of D’s conduct, absent any statements, which causes C either physical harm or psychiatric injury, then in the
author’s view, C should be left to his compensatory remedies elsewhere—via assault, battery, or the statutory tort under the
PHA 1997, if D’s conduct was intentional; or via negligence, or to negligent assault (to the extent that that line of authority
is developed 101 ), if D’s conduct was reckless or careless; or via the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, if D’s conduct
constitutes a "crime of violence" against C. Actions for infringement of the ECHR may also be possible in the event that D is
a public authority (e.g. for the strip-search of the mother in Wainwright, in which no actionable statements were made towards
the mother during the search, a remedy for infringement of art.8 could arguably have been possible, had the case not preceded
the implementation of the ECHR into English domestic law 102 ).
In essence, there is no sufficient gap that requires that the Revised Wilkinson Tort should remain operative for one-off incidents
of conduct which occur absent any statements. Moreover, this reform would return the tort more closely to its roots, a position
which some judges have also preferred, rather than "lump[ing] together physical actions and statements". 103
Directed statements
The very point of Mr Downton’s practical joke was to upset the publican’s wife into thinking that her husband was lying seriously
injured elsewhere. The statement was directed to Mrs Wilkinson, and was conveyed to her directly too. However, two questions
immediately arise under the Revised Wilkinson Tort—does D’s statement need to be addressed to C directly and "in person";
and does it need to be directed to C as an individual, or can it be addressed to C as one of a group (or even more widely)?

As to the first question, can it sensibly be suggested that, had Mr Downton told his practical joke about Mr Wilkinson’s "accident"
to a barmaid at The Albion, who then relayed it to Mrs Wilkinson who was in her rooms upstairs, Mr Downton would not
have been found liable? This invokes the concept of the "distant victim", whereby D’s statement or threat is plainly directed
towards C, but it is said not in the presence of C but in the presence of third party (TP) who then passes it onto C causing C
emotional distress. It has been rarely litigated under the Current Wilkinson Tort—and when it has arisen, it was without the
benefit of any argument on the point. 104 Elsewhere in Commonwealth case law, 105 these types *J.P.I. Law 25 of cases have
been regarded as "exceptional". 106 However, in the author’s view, they should not be ruled out under the Revised Wilkinson
Tort. This would accord with modern societal conditions, whereby serious threats and false statements can be made about C on
social media platforms and via electronic communications, and which are then passed onto C. Chain-like communications are
more of a reality now. Of course, the role of the TP in such cases will be legally relevant, in that C’s emotional distress could
be exacerbated by how the information or threat was communicated to C by that intermediary. That issue goes to causation,
however, and not to the conduct element.
As to the second question, there is a marked judicial division of opinion as to whether or not D’s statement must be directed
to C as an individual, or as one of a group, under the Current Wilkinson Tort. The tort has certainly been judicially discussed
in scenarios where D’s statements were not directed towards C individually, but in which C was caught up—and the judicial
reactions have been quite different. In Breslin v McKenna, warnings about the planning, planting, and detonation of the bomb
at Omagh which killed 29 people were not directed particularly towards any of the 12 claimants who sued the Irish Republican
Army, 107 and whilst the Wilkinson Tort did not succeed there (battery did), there was no judicial discussion of the fact that
it may have been an inappropriate scenario for the tort altogether because the statements (and conduct) concerned the public-
at-large. In Rhodes, however, there was explicit consideration of the point. Where the concert pianist Mr Rhodes intended to
publish his autobiography Instrumental, dedicated to his son OPO, which outlined the violent sexual abuse perpetrated upon
Mr Rhodes from a young age, and which (it was alleged) would cause serious emotional distress to OPO, C, if published,
the Supreme Court members agreed that, despite the dedication, the book’s content was not directed towards OPO. It was
destined for "a wide audience", 108 hence non-actionable. The majority remarked that the Wilkinson Tort could be triggered
where D’s statements were directed to a group (even a large group such as a theatre audience where D falsely shouts out a
warning "fire" 109 ), but not to the public-at-large (as here). To add further confusion to the mix, Lord Neuberger preferred that
D’s statement should be aimed at C as a "particular individual (or [within a] relatively small group of individuals)". 110 Hence,
the point is unresolved and remains arguable under the Current Wilkinson Tort. 111
For the purposes of the Revised Tort, it is suggested that D’s statements should be directed to C, either as an individual or as a
member of a small and identifiable group (thereby excluding a large group of attendees at a theatre or the public-at-large). The
key reasons for that suggestion are that: (1) a narrowly-directed statement is an appropriate quid pro quo for permitting a lesser
form of damage under the Revised Wilkinson Tort and for permitting the "distant victim" scenario; and (2) it is appropriate
that, in an era when statements, threats, and information, can be published to the world-at-large, or to something very akin to
it, via social media platforms and via e-communications, it is unrealistic to cater for every claimant who may be caught up
in the threat, but which is not directed towards that C either individually or as one of a small group. This reform suggestion
provides an important ring-fence for liability.
False statements and intermediate acts

Under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, it is the statement itself which must cause the injury to C. This was the case where, say, Mr
Downton falsely informed Mrs Wilkinson that her husband was lying *J.P.I. Law 26 grievously-injured, or work colleagues
threatened Mrs Wong with physical retaliation if she reported colleagues’ absences.
However, making a false statement may not directly bring about serious emotional distress to C. Rather, by failing to tell the
truth, D’s statement may create an opportunity for an intermediate act to take place, and it is that act which causes C emotional
distress. This aligns more with an omission—in which D, via his statement, has created the opportunity for harm to occur to C
via a third party’s (TP’s) acts. In such a case, the Current Wilkinson Tort has not applied. For example, in W v Essex CC, 112
the foster parents of boy G were not injured by the misinformation by the Council’s officer (D) that G (TP) was not known or
suspected of sexual abuse. Rather, they were injured by the consequences of that false information, in that they allowed G to
come under their roof as a foster child, after which he sexually molested all four of their children. A claim under Wilkinson
v Downton was considered to be untenable in that case. 113 It is not being suggested that the Revised Wilkinson Tort should

apply to that scenario either. Omission scenarios, where it is TP who perpetrates the acts that bring about C’s emotional distress,
should not be actionable.
Excusing D’s conduct

Under the Current Wilkinson Tort, D’s statements or conduct must have no justification or reasonable excuse. The Supreme
Court declared, in Rhodes, that this was not a defence, with the burden of proof resting on D; but rather, the burden of proving
that D’s words or conduct were inexcusable or unjustifiable rested upon C. 114 This interpretation was surprising to this author.
It is suggested that the Rhodes view should be reversed under the Revised Wilkinson Tort for two key reasons. First, that
approach would render it consistent with the PHA 1997 ’s statutory tort which provides for statutory defences that are akin to
"justification or reasonable excuse", 115 and for which the burden rests on D. 116 Secondly, under the trespassory torts such as
assault and battery, D also bears the burden of proving defences such as consent, lawful justification, or necessity. 117 Hence,
the Revised Wilkinson Tort would be doctrinally clearer if D bore the burden of proving that his statements were made with
justification or reasonable excuse.
Reforming the intent element

The intent element underpinning the Current Wilkinson Tort has been a slippery eel—and clearly, any uncertainty on this point
should be categorically removed under the Revised Wilkinson Tort. Lord Hoffmann’s cautionary statement in Wainwright bears
noting—"you have to be very careful about what you mean by intend". 118
At the outset, what, precisely, does D have to intend? Under the Current Wilkinson Tort, the Supreme Court affirmed, in Rhodes,
that D must have intended either to cause C a recognised psychiatric injury, or to cause serious (or severe) emotional distress
which in fact resulted in psychiatric injury. 119 The latter option amounted to a recasting of the tort created in Wilkinson v
Downton (as it was the former option that Wright J had endorsed). 120 Academically, this recast was described as a "broader
standard [of intent]" *J.P.I. Law 27 121 and a "middle course", 122 and which reduced the evidential burden upon C. 123 The
importance of the point falls away under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, however, since it will be sufficient if D intended to cause
C emotional distress—and where no recognised psychiatric injury is necessary, either as what D intended, or as to the outcome
for C. It also follows that, if C suffers emotional distress from D’s statements but the evidence is that if D intended to improve
C’s well-being via those statements ("misguided as it may have been"), then D will not possess the requisite intent, and the
Wilkinson Tort will fail, under both Current 124 and Revised versions. D’s intent must be to do harm.
Intent on a spectrum: the possibilities

Under the Current Wilkinson Tort, there are no less than six types of intent which have been judicially identified, sometimes
with different terminology, and none of which has helped the clarity of the tort.
Wilful intent on D’s part to harm C has clearly sufficed. It means that D "actually wanted to produce such harm" 125 or had a
"genuine intent" to cause C such harm. 126 Subjectively, D desired that outcome. That sort of intent was made out in Janvier v
Sweeney, 127 where there was "an actual intention to terrify" C for the purposes of blackmail. 128
However, something lesser has sufficed too. In Wilkinson v Downton itself, Wright J said that Mr Downton had, by means of
his practical joke, committed "an act so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was produced, that an
intention to produce it ought to be imputed to [D]". 129 This concept of imputed intent was further defined in Wong to mean
that D did not actually intend the harm, but was taken to have meant to cause C the relevant harm, via a combination of two
matters, objectively assessed, viz. "the likelihood of such harm being suffered as the result of D’s intentional behaviour, and
D’s deliberately engaging in that behaviour". 130 In other words, D’s words or conduct were so likely to produce the harm C
suffered that an intention to cause that harm could be imputed to D. This type of imputed intention has also been judicially
ascribed the phrases of objective recklessness 131 or an imputed intention by operation of law. 132 It was applied by the Court
of Appeal (before the case proceeded the Supreme Court) in Rhodes, i.e. that Mr Rhodes, D, did not intend to cause emotional
distress to his son OPO, C, by publishing his autobiography, but the medical evidence was that the graphic accounts of sexual
abuse perpetrated upon his father meant that the son’s emotional distress was the likely consequence of that publication. 133

There has been a "twist" on the "imputed intent by operation of law" test under the Current Wilkinson Tort, in that some
appellate judges have analysed imputed intent as a subjective test, i.e. whether D knew that C’s harm was likely to result from
his statements or conduct. 134 This may be termed an imputed intent by operation of law, subjectively-assessed. As another
variation on the theme, it has muddied the waters. *J.P.I. Law 28 It has also meant that a thoughtless and rather stupid D could
escape liability; as he did not know the likely result of his words or conduct, and hence, had no requisite intent. 135
However, the death-knell of any form of imputed intent by operation of law under the Current Wilkinson Tort was sounded by
the Supreme Court in Rhodes, as having "no proper role in the modern law of tort" 136 (just as it had been abolished in Criminal
law five decades ago 137 ). The Supreme Court did not criticise the Court of Appeal below for having applied the doctrine of
imputed intent by operation of law to find in C’s favour, 138 given that Wong ’s Court of Appeal had earlier endorsed it; but
both the doctrine, and the result in C’s favour, were overturned in Rhodes.
Rather, the Supreme Court majority preferred the concept of imputed intention as a matter of fact 139 for the Current Wilkinson
Tort, 140 i.e. even where D may not have had the intention to cause harm to C and may well have given no thought to its
likelihood, the requisite intent could still be proven by inferring, as a matter of fact, that D intended to cause severe emotional
distress to C. In Mbasogo, the Court of Appeal was of the view that this form of intent was "at least capable of proof in
Wong", 141 given the unpleasant conduct of C’s work colleagues towards her (ultimately, the Court of Appeal did not need
to decide the issue in Wong, given that C did not suffer the requisite psychiatric injury). Since then, imputed intent to inflict
emotional distress on C could be inferred from the facts in the sexting case of C v WH, i.e. from D’s grooming activities, C’s
and D’s age disparity, and C’s known vulnerability as a pupil given her special educational needs. 142 It was also inferred as
a matter of fact in MXX v A Secondary School, again involving sexual activity against a pupil, this time perpetrated by a work
experience placement teacher, in circumstances where the claimant MXX had told the perpetrator, via Facebook messaging
which preceded the sexual activity, that she had been self-harming and had other emotional problems, and where it "must have
been obvious" to the perpetrator that his conduct would cause severe emotional distress to MXX. 143 By contrast, there was no
imputed intent on the part of Mr Rhodes to cause his son emotional distress that could be inferred from the facts. 144
Yet another form of intent was put forward by Lord Hoffmann in Wainwright, viz. where D "acted without caring whether he
caused harm [to C] or not". 145 This is a form of intent based upon recklessness. In C v D, 146 Field J noted that this type of intent
could be useful under the Current Wilkinson Tort where it was not likely that C’s mental harm would occur, and indeed, it was
useful there. The headmaster, D, did not intend pupil C to suffer psychiatric harm by his pulling down C’s trousers and staring at
his genitals, and nor was the incident likely to cause C harm so as to impute intention by operation of law. But D had been reckless
as to whether he caused such injury to C, and that was sufficient to prove intent. By contrast, this type of recklessness could
not be proven in Wainwright itself 147 or elsewhere. 148 However, in Rhodes, 149 the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
recklessness (oddly enough, not citing C v D at all), declaring it to be insufficient for the Current Wilkinson Tort. The term had
not been used by Wright J himself, and *J.P.I. Law 29 it was too slippery a concept to define easily. Post-Rhodes, it has been
accepted that recklessness is insufficient under the Current Wilkinson Tort. 150
An even lesser form of intent was raised, but discounted, in Wong, viz. that the Wilkinson Tort is committed if there is deliberate
conduct by D which will foreseeably lead to alarm or distress to the claimant. 151 Albeit that this is probably not a form of intent
strictly-speaking, it is just another form of the reasonable foreseeability test. Although applied under Canadian law, 152 it was
refuted by different English Courts of Appeal 153 as being insufficient under the Current Wilkinson Tort, and nor was it approved
by the Supreme Court in Rhodes. Quite the reverse; actual intent, or inferred intent as a matter of fact, were preferred there.
Hence, a very wide array of mental states has been discussed, or applied, in relation to the Current Wilkinson Tort, from "actual
intent" to what is "foreseeable".
The suggestion for the Revised Wilkinson Tort

If a lesser form of damage is to be permitted under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, then with an "air of realism", suitable ring-
fences must apply to preclude floodgates concerns. True to that aim, it is suggested that intent should take one of only two forms
under the revised tort—that D manifested either:

i. an actual intention to cause C serious emotional distress, subjectively-assessed; or

ii. an inferred intention to cause C serious emotional distress, objectively assessed, and by having regard to extrinsic
facts such as: C’s age; 154 any antecedent relationship between C and D; 155 the ease or difficulty with which C is
able to ascertain the veracity of D’s statements; 156 D’s demeanour when making the statements; 157 any economic,
physical, or social vulnerability on C’s part; 158 any direct knowledge by D of C’s characteristics or propensities that
rendered C more vulnerable to emotional distress; 159 the number of perpetrators making statements directed to C; 160
the consequences for those with a close tie of love and affection with C as a result of D’s statements; 161 and the
frequency of D’s statements. 162 These are the types of factors, derived from case law under the Current Wilkinson
Tort, from which an intent to cause emotional distress to C could suitably be inferred as a matter of fact.
The meanings of these two types of intent are clear, and both are capable of application on any given set of facts. Nothing else
should suffice under the Revised Wilkinson Tort. *J.P.I. Law 30
Reforming the "consequence element"
Reforming causation
Under the Current Wilkinson Tort, the causal link between D’s words or conduct and C’s harm can be proven if D caused, or
materially contributed to, that harm. Stricter "but-for" causation—which requires C to prove that, had D’s words or conduct
not occurred, then on the balance of probabilities, C’s harm would not have occurred 163 —has been duly applied under the
Wilkinson Tort in English law. 164
However, and more controversially, the weaker "material contribution" causal test was explicitly endorsed, and applied, in C v
D. 165 Actually, the approach that damages should be apportioned as between D’s tortious acts and the innocent causes of C’s
damage, because D materially contributed to C’s damage, was derived from negligence and breach of statutory duty giving rise
to physical injury, by virtue of the Bonnington principle. 166 That causal theorem specifically arose where D’s breach exposed
C to a harmful agent, where C was also exposed to that same agent innocently, and where D’s breach had a cumulative effect
upon the severity of C’s injury. In C v D, and having duly cited Bonnington, the court then noted that the theorem requires that
D’s intentional words or conduct were a material contribution towards, or "a more than trivial cause" of, C’s mental harm—
and, on that basis, the court should apportion the mental harm which was caused by D’s tortious conduct, and that which was
caused by other sources, "on a common sense basis". 167 The judge accepted that there were many causes that contributed to
C’s psychiatric injury, apart from the voyeuristic conduct of D, the headmaster of C’s school. These included: a strong lack of
trust of authoritarian figures; a lifelong condition of Anti-Social Personality Disorder; C’s dysfunctional family; the brutal way
that C was treated by senior boys at boarding school; his mother’s indifference when he told her of D’s conduct at the infirmary,
which led to the breakdown of his relationship with his parents because of a sense of betrayal; and his troubled relationship
with his father showing a rejection of paternal authority. 168 It was a long list of potential contributing causes. Nevertheless, C
recovered proportionate damages, on the basis that D’s conduct made a material contribution to his psychiatric condition. 169
This weaker causal theorem which permits proportionate damages and which was applied in C v D (and in some later cases too)
is perhaps a corollary both of the sympathy which these types of cases inevitably elicit, and of the undoubted medical dilemma
of allocating mental harm to one particular event on the balance of probabilities. 170 However, query whether that weaker causal
link should not suffice under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, and that a strict but-for test should be required. In other words, if C’s
serious emotional distress would probably have occurred anyway (on the basis of medical evidence), then no causal link should
be established. This position is potentially arguable for two reasons.
First, the quid pro quo (and ring-fence) for the lower threshold of damage (i.e. emotional distress) is that there ought to be a strict
causal connection of the sort that is usually applicable to actions on the case, *J.P.I. Law 31 of which negligence is the prime
category. A weaker causal theorem, coupled with a lesser type of damage, opens a potential floodgates of claims which must be
guarded against. Secondly, the Bonnington theorem has not, to date, been applied expansively under the tort of negligence (quite

the contrary 171 ), and it has required "one agent" in play. A similar viewpoint should arguably be applied under the Revised
Wilkinson Tort for doctrinal consistency (and there was no single agent operative in C v D). Otherwise, fractional damages
are being permitted, which has long been rejected in English Tort law. If Stephen Hotson was unable to recover 25% of the
damages awardable for his necrotic hip-joint on the basis that there was a 25% probability that medical negligence caused that
necrosis, 172 then it is arguably inconsistent that C should recover a proportion of damages for his mental harm in C v D on the
basis of the headmaster’s conduct when the other possible causes such as C’s innate personal characteristics and difficult family
circumstances induced psychiatric illness in an entirely different way. True it is that claimants with pre-existing psychological
vulnerabilities, or who are subject to other circumstances that impinge upon their mental health, may thus be precluded if the
material contribution test is done away with—but compromises are necessary, especially where the threshold of injury is reduced
to that of emotional distress falling short of a psychiatric injury. Ultimately, this question as to whether or not to permit the
material contribution to damage test in the context of the Revised Wilkinson Tort is very finely-balanced.
Reforming remoteness of damage

The remoteness element has two sub-parts, viz. reasonable foreseeability of the relevant damage, and the normal fortitude rule
—and both apply under the Current Wilkinson Tort. The Supreme Court did not refer to the particular requirements of the
"consequence element" in Rhodes (it did not have to), but, as mentioned previously, the tort has long been treated as an action on
the case 173 (and Wright J certainly considered it to be so, stating that "damage is a necessary part of the cause of action" 174 ),
for which causation and remoteness are relevant.
Accordingly, in Wilkinson v Downton, Wright J explicitly and necessarily considered two matters: (1) whether the effect on Mrs
Wilkinson of Mr Downton’s false tale "was, to use the ordinary phrase, too remote to be regarded in law as a consequence for
which the defendant is answerable" 175 (it was not, and the extent of C’s harm did not matter, as it never does in a remoteness
enquiry); and (2) whether Mrs Wilkinson’s nervous shock was reasonably foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude. Regard
had to be made to "the effect [that] was produced on a person proved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind", and Mr
Downton’s tale would foreseeably produce mental harm in anyone other than "an exceptionally indifferent person". 176 That
this passage endorsed the normal fortitude rule under the Current Wilkinson Tort was confirmed, dicta, in Page v Smith. 177
As always, it is not necessary for C to be a personal of normal mental fortitude herself. Mrs Wilkinson was 178 —but that is
legally beside the point. Once the damage is foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude as a result of D’s statements, then D
must take an emotionally fragile C as he finds him, "vulnerabilities and all". But it means that where the occurrence of mental
harm as a result of D’s words is unforeseeable and highly idiosyncratic in a person of normal fortitude, then that damage is not
compensable under the Current Wilkinson Tort. *J.P.I. Law 32 179
However, the question arises as to whether remoteness should have any role to play under the Revised Wilkinson Tort. In the
author’s view, it should not, for three doctrinal reasons.
First, the author has a lot of sympathy for the views of Lord Woolf CJ in Wainwright, wherein his Lordship said, of the Wilkinson
Tort, that, "I am not sure I would regard it as an action on the case"; that "[w]hile the tort is not conventional trespass, it is closer
to trespass than negligence"; and "[w]e are here concerned with an intentional tort and intended harm. In such a situation, unlike
negligence, problems as to forseeability do not arise". 180 Academically too, the Current Wilkinson Tort has been viewed as
"objectionable conduct closely analogous to trespass". 181 Lord Woolf suggested that whether or not the Wilkinson Tort was an
action on the case "is only of historic interest". 182 This author agrees. What should matter is the doctrinal clarity of Tort Law
—and weaving an intentional tort together with a test of foreseeability of damage is, and always was, an uncomfortable fit.
Secondly, doing away with reasonable foreseeability of damage would bring the Revised Wilkinson Tort into line with
trespassory torts such as battery and assault, where there is no such requirement. It is one of the advantages that the trespassory
torts enjoy over the Current Wilkinson Tort (and negligence), that C "is able to recover for unforeseeable damage". 183 Similarly,
under the statutory tort contained in the PHA 1997, the kind of damage suffered by C as a result of D’s harassment does not
have to be reasonably foreseeable either, where D engages in deliberate conduct of the kind which D knows will amount to
harassment. 184 For all intentional torts (of which the Revised Wilkinson Tort is one), D should not be able to escape the
consequences of his intent to cause serious emotional distress, no matter how unforeseeable those consequences may be. 185
Essentially, under the Revised Tort, if D intended (actually, or inferred as a matter of fact) to cause serious emotional distress

to C, then if D could not reasonably foresee all the consequences which actually occurred to C (say, the whitening of Mrs
Wilkinson’s hair as a result of the practical joke), that should not matter to the question of liability.
Thirdly, the ring-fence of strict but-for causation, tentatively suggested for the Revised Wilkinson Tort, allays fears of floodgates,
should the requirement of reasonable foreseeability of serious emotional distress in a person of normal fortitude be done away
with. Besides, it should not be supposed that the egg-shell condition of some claimants, i.e. those who have a pre-existing
vulnerability to serious emotional distress, will be irrelevant to the outcome of cases under the Revised Wilkinson Tort. It may
be that a court concludes (on the basis of medical evidence) that C’s mental harm is attributable, on the balance of probabilities,
to a naturally-recurring manifestation of a pre-existing psychiatric condition, rather than to any statement or threat on D’s part.
Causation would thus fail.
A new defence
Under the Current Wilkinson Tort, D can escape liability if his words or conduct were undertaken with justification or reasonable
excuse. In Rhodes, the publication of Mr Rhodes’ autobiography was justified, because having "struggled to cope with the
consequences of his suffering in the way that he has struggled, [he] has the right to tell the world about it", and there was an
overriding public interest "in others being *J.P.I. Law 33 able to listen to his life story in all its searing detail". 186 It has
already been suggested 187 that the burden of establishing this defence should be borne by D.
Apart from that, it is not in the public interest that all instances in which there was an intent on D’s part to inflict emotional
distress on C by means of statements should be "actionable". To apply a defence of implied consent to the infliction of emotional
distress (of the sort that applies in battery to excuse, say, everyday applications of force upon C’s person such as handshaking or
jostling on cramped public transport, 188 or incidents of horseplay and games 189 ) may seem unrealistic and artificial. However,
appellate judges have hinted at something approaching that in key statements to date, e.g. that the tort "must not interfere with
the give and take of ordinary human discourse (including unpleasant, heated arguments, whether in domestic, social, business
or other contexts, sometimes involving the trading of insults or threats)", 190 and that "it might not be in the public interest to
allow the law to be set in motion for [every] boorish incident". 191
It is contended herein that there ought to be a "not in the public interest to litigate" defence available under the Revised Wilkinson
Tort. Naturally, drawing the line between statements intended to inflict emotional distress on C which are actionable and non-
actionable may be challenging and finely-drawn, and will depend upon all the facts and circumstances. However, arriving at
such judgments is frequently part of a court’s task. Modern societal conditions in which hate-filled, threatening, or demeaning
statements can be directed at others via social media platforms and via e-communications will require close examination under
the Revised Wilkinson tort, to ascertain whether this defence is appropriate. However, it is already evident under the Current
Wilkinson Tort that some scenarios would seem to potentially fit within that defence.
For example, things are said in the workplace which may be emotionally distressing but not actionable. Managerial criticisms
would usually fall within the "justification and lawful excuse" defence noted above, 192 but other cases also show the
unpleasantness and resentment that colleagues can intentionally exhibit towards each other. Whilst a threat of retaliation against
C by a co-employee would have been actionable in Wong (but for the lack of the threshold harm of a psychiatric injury),
the remainder of the catalogue of co-employees’ words and conduct amounted to mere "rudeness and unfriendliness". 193 In
Wainwright too, Lord Hoffmann remarked that work colleagues "constantly do and say things with the intention of causing
distress and humiliation to others. This shows lack of consideration and appalling manners, but I am not sure the right way
to deal with it is by litigation". 194 Horseplay incidents are another potential scenario to which the defence could apply. The
practical joke by Mr Downton was on the actionable side of the line, but in Wainwright, Lord Scott remarked that some of life’s
trials and tribulations (citing initiation ceremonies at, say, schools, university colleges, or military regiments 195 ) could entail
humiliation but the law should not generally compensate for them. The ordinary hurly-burly of everyday life is another potential
scenario (again, Lord Scott cited retail scenarios in which, say, a shop assistant, bouncer, or barman may be publicly offensive
to a customer, causing personal humiliation and emotional distress, but which would be non-actionable 196 ). Domestic disputes
may also be deeply unpleasant to the participants, *J.P.I. Law 34 but as the dispute between former partners in BVC v EWF
197
demonstrates, that scenario will rarely be on the actionable side of the tort line either.
Finally, just as with Defamation and Privacy, a tort which is directed at C’s civil remedies arising from D’s making of statements
potentially attracts the ECHR art.10, which enshrines the human right to freedom of expression. While it was "in the public

interest" that Mr Rhodes’ autobiography be published in Rhodes, Lord Neuberger did not consider that the Current Wilkinson
Tort should be permitted to interfere with "normal, including trenchant, journalism and other writing". 198 His Lordship, the
only Law Lord to address art.10, noted that "the common law should be generally consistent with the Convention", and pointed
out that, under some Strasbourg jurisprudence, some "personally insulting" statements had infringed art.10, but that the need
for restriction upon D’s freedom of speech "must be established convincingly". 199 The same balancing exercise should apply
under the Revised Wilkinson Tort.
Of course, these defences and the balancing exercise are in addition to the existing procedural safeguards that preclude abusive,
vexatious, or improper litigation. 200 In the aftermath of the successful sexting case of C v WH, the NSPCC stated that "whilst
damages could help discourage potential abusers, there is a danger that young people could just use this as a way to get cash by
suing one another". 201 However, the prospect of "engineered" or "vexatious" claims is procedurally manageable, and should
never be a reason for negating substantive law reform that seeks to provide redress to genuine victims of D’s wrongdoing.
Conclusion
The five principal recommendations for reform of the Wilkinson Tort which have been made throughout this article are contained
in the Appendix. The Revised Wilkinson Tort would, it is suggested, provide far more utility for modern-day life than the
Current Wilkinson Tort can muster. Its allowance for serious emotional distress, rather than a recognised psychiatric injury, is
supportable both legally and medically. A century after Wilkinson v Downton was handed down, this step was foreshadowed in
Hunter v Canary Wharf, and it is time that the suggestion became a reality. However, if that step is taken, then the revised tort
should be suitably ring-fenced by amendments to the conduct, intent, and causation elements, and by removal of foreseeability
of damage altogether.
In the most recent judicial word on the Current Wilkinson Tort, Williams J remarked that Rhodes had set fairly tight strictures
around the cause of action, and which reflected a wider judicial policy that "the circumstances in which tortious liability will
result from words or conduct which cause psychiatric injury are limited, and that the parameters have been carefully identified to
ensure an appropriate balance with freedom of expression rights". 202 It is an undeniable objective of the reforms put forward in
this article that such a policy should be modified so that the importance afforded to freedom of expression should be tempered by
the recognition that statements can cause very serious damage to people—and, in today’s social media era, to young, vulnerable
and impressionable people. Indeed, words can harm to just the same extent that actions can. 203
The practical joke in the Albion pub on 9 April 1896 spawned a line of jurisprudence which persists to this day. However, by
reforming the Wilkinson Tort as suggested, it is hoped that it will fill a gap in Tort law by enabling the protection of C’s personal
integrity in circumstances of intentional wrongdoing which other torts, such as the PHA 1997, private nuisance, negligence, and
assault and battery, do not currently *J.P.I. Law 35 facilitate. It would serve to compensate those who have been the subject
of statements that D made, intentionally to cause C emotional distress, and which have no justification or lawful excuse.
But most importantly of all, Wright J’s legacy of seeking to provide a cause of action for those who are intentionally harmed
by another’s words would be preserved and enhanced, by re-fashioning the tort for modern societal conditions in which one-
off threats and statements—written, image-based and pictorial, and directed towards C via social media platforms, electronic
communications, TikTok and other media—can, undeniably, do C substantial mental harm.
Appendix
A summary of the proposed reforms under the Revised Wilkinson Tort
1. Pre-requisite damage: Proof of "serious emotional distress" is the minimum threshold injury required, where "pure
mental" harm is claimed under the Revised Wilkinson Tort. Unlike under the Current Wilkinson Tort, that harm
can fall short of a recognised psychiatric injury. Damages may also be recovered for consequential bodily injury,
psychiatric injury, or economic harm (if any). Diagnosis of a recognised psychiatric injury merely goes to quantum
of damages, but not to threshold liability.
2. Directed statements (not conduct): D’s statements which trigger the operation of the Revised Wilkinson Tort may
be written, oral, pictorial, or image-based, and contain information, threats, requests, or warnings. Unlike the

Current Wilkinson Tort, the Revised Wilkinson Tort does not cover scenarios in which D’s conduct (absent any
statement) causes C harm. Instead, where D intends to cause C physical harm or psychiatric injury by sole reason
of his conduct, then C is left to his compensatory remedies elsewhere. Under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, D’s
statements must be directed to C, but do not need to be made to C in person. Contrary to the position under the
Current Wilkinson Tort, it is sufficient if C learns of D’s statement via a third party (TP). The causal link between
D’s statement and C’s Harm may be severed by the time, manner, and circumstances in which TP conveys the
statement to C. Under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, D’s statement must be directed to C, either individually or as one
of a small and defined group; and liability for omissions is explicitly excluded. Any allegation that D’s statements
were made with justifiable excuse or reason should be treated as a defence, the burden of so establishing resting on
D.
3. The requisite intent: D’s intent to inflict harm on C as a consequence of his statements must be either actual or
inferred as a matter of fact. All other forms of intent which have been recognised and/or applied under the Current
Wilkinson Tort should be rejected under the Revised Wilkinson Tort.
4. Narrowing causation and removing remoteness: As a ring-fence upon potential liability, causation under the
Revised Wilkinson Tort may be recast to require a strict but-for causal link between D’s statement and C’s harm.
Establishing causation via proof that D’s statement materially contributed to that harm, which applies under the
Current Wilkinson Tort, may not suffice. Further, given that the Revised Wilkinson Tort is an intentional tort, it
is not necessary to establish that C’s harm was reasonably foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude (i.e. the
remoteness of damage enquiry which applies under the Current Wilkinson Tort does not apply). In the face of an
intention to cause C emotional distress, considerations of foreseeability of C’s harm are legally irrelevant.
5. A new defence: In addition to a defence that D’s statement was justified or made with reasonable excuse, a new
defence is available to D under the Revised Wilkinson Tort, to reflect the reality that not every unpleasantness,
even should it give rise to serious emotional distress, is worthy of litigation. This proposed defence is that the
incident is "non-actionable in the public interest". A necessary balancing act is also required under art.10 (freedom
of expression), given that English Tort law should be developed consistently with the ECHR.
Rachael Mulheron
Footnotes
1 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 QBD.

2 Apart from the source case, the tort has been proven in: Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316 CA; C v D
[2006] EWHC 166 (QB); C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB); [2016] E.L.R. 1; and MXX v A Secondary
School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB). In a few other cases, urgent injunctive relief has been awarded where
C has apprehended the intentional infliction of physical or psychiatric injury, but without all elements of
the tort being met, e.g. Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] Q.B. 727 CA at 736; [1993] 3 W.L.R. 476 (nuisance
calls caused C "an enormous weight of stress"); Burnett v George [1992] 1 F.L.R. 525 CA; [1993] 1 F.C.R.
1012 (following a relationship breakdown, C was molested and left with "a burning resentment"). Quia
timet injunctive relief was obtained in both.
3 It was pled, but unsuccessfully, in, e.g. In re Child C [2015] EWFC 79 at [63]; [2017] 1 F.L.R. 82;
Sabados v Facebook Ireland [2018] EWHC 2369 (QB) at [29]; [2019] W.T.L.R. 1361; Countess of
Caledon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2016] EWHC 2214 (QB) at [36]; BVC v EWF
[2019] EWHC 2506 (QB).
4 A point also made in: J. Murphy, "Tort’s Hierarchy of Protected Interests" (2022) 81 C.L.J. 356, 380.

5 To provide a sample of authorities: Canada: Barker v Barker 2020 ONSC 3746 at [1209] (Ont); Champ’s
Mushrooms v Guo 2018 BCSC 650 at [86] (BC). Ireland: Cully v Commissioner of An Garda Siochana
[2022] IECA 18 at [132]; Carey v Minister for Finance [2010] IEHC 247 at [3.5]. Australia: Grosse v
Purvis [2003] QDC 151 at [452] (Qld); Carter v Walker [2010] VSCA 340 at [170] (Vic); Magill v Magill
(2006) 226 C.L.R. 551 (HCA). Singapore: Nina Duwi Koriah v Noor Hayah binte Gulam [2019] SGDC
285 at [20]. New Zealand: Deliu v Hong [2013] NZHC 735 at [91]. Hong Kong: Wong Tai Wai v Hong
Kong SAR Govt [2004] HKCA 261 at [32]. Kenya: MKK v CWN [2016] EKLR 1 at [36]. Fiji: AG of Fiji v
Singh [2015] FJCA 161 at [81]. Samoa: Tutuila v Punitia [2012] WSSC 107 at [137]. Scotland: Robertson
(AP) v Scottish Ministers [2007] CSOH 186 at [15]; SLC, Defamation (Rep.248, 2017), [2.7]. United
States: Snyder v Phelps 131 S Ct 1207 at 1223 (2018); Bailey v Unocal Corp 700 F Supp 396, fn.5 (ND
Cal, 1997) ("the origin of the intentional infliction tort can be traced to English common law … things in
merry old England were getting out of hand").
6 per Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [75]; [2002] Q.B. 1334 (the tort "[has] puzzled
generations of lawyers"); Ruffley v Saint Anne’s School [2017] IESC 33 at [54] ("a difficult topic").
7 A v Hoare [2006] EWCA Civ 395 at [136]; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2320 (an "obscure tort, whose jurisprudential
basis remains unclear"); Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [51]; [2016] A.C. 219 ("seldom invoked
in practice"); Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [36]; [2004] 2 A.C. 406 ("far more often
discussed than applied").
8 W v Essex CC [1999] Fam. 90 CA at [56] (Stuart-Smith LJ); [1998] 3 W.L.R. 534.
9 Various academic commentators have also lamented the tort’s lack of utility, e.g. R. Bagshaw, "Deceit
Within Couples" (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 571, 574; J. Coad, "Privacy—Art 8. Who Needs It?" (2001) 12
Entertainment L. Rev. 226, 230–32; J. Adams, "Trespass in a Digital Environment" (2002) 1 Intellectual
Property Quarterly 1, 6–7; A. Johnstone, "Putting the Cart Before the Horse?" (2004) 63 Cambridge L.J.
15, 18; I. Goold and C. Kelly, "Who’s Afraid of Imaginary Claims? Common Misunderstandings of the
Origin of the Action for Pure Psychiatric Injury in Negligence 1888–1943" (2022) 138 L.Q.R. 58, 72.
For an interesting historical overview of the case, see too: M. Lunney, "Practical Joking and its Penalty:
Wilkinson v Downton in Context" (2002) 10 Tort L. Rev. 168.
10 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; [2015] E.M.L.R. 20.
11 BVC v EWF [2019] EWHC 2506 (QB). The claim was not actually pleaded in Piepenbrock v London
School of Economics and Political Science [2022] EWHC 2421 (KB), but the court considered that the
claim would not have reasonable prospects of success there either.
12 Now called St Paul’s Way, courtesy of a road name change in 1939. As a historical note, the Albion Pub
remained in the Wilkinson family until 1915 (per the Census entries reproduced at PubWiki, at https://
pubwiki.co.uk/LondonPubs/MileEnd/AlbionStPauls.shtml). This legal landmark in Bow closed as a
pub in 1990, and was demolished in 2005 (as noted at https://www.pubology.co.uk/pubs/2806.html and
www.whatpub.com/pubs/ELC/14391/albion-bow).
13 Post Office London Directory—Streets and Commercial (Kelly & Co. Limited: London, 1895) pp.648 and
1,525, accessed at the Tower Hamlets Local History Library and Archives.
14 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 at 58 and 61, respectively.
15 Wright J explicitly precluded recovery of that head of damage by virtue of the claim in deceit (at 58).
16 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; [2004] 2 A.C. 40.
17 Victorian Railway Commissioner v Coultas (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222 (PC, on appeal from the Vic SC) at
226.
18 Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669 CA.
19 Also the explanation for the tort’s origins in the Court of Appeal below: Wainwright v Home Office [2001]
EWCA Civ 2081 at [41]. However, the Supreme Court majority suggested that Wright J would have known
that he was not bound to follow Victorian Railway Commissioner v Coultas (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222 (as
a Privy Council decision whose authority had already been doubted by the Court of Appeal just prior to
Wilkinson, per Pugh v London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Co [1896] 2 Q.B. 248 CA), and, hence,
could have allowed recovery in negligence, but that Coultas did not involve a "wilful wrong", whereas
Wilkinson did. This uncertainty about what actually motivated Wright J’s decision aptly sums up the Tort!
20 per McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410 HL; [1982] R.T.R. 209.
21 Actually, the scenario of where the immediate victim is not harmed, but where the secondary victim
believes that the immediate victim has been injured (or killed) and suffers mental harm as a result, involves
the concept of the "elevated primary victim": see R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, 2nd edn (CUP,
2020), pp.239–41.

22 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [41].

23 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.7(3).
24 Noted in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [108]. See too: Ruffley v Saint Anne’s School [2017] IESC 33
at [17] (the Wilkinson Tort may cover "an isolated but sufficiently grave incident from which intention to
cause severe distress may suffice if psychiatric injury results"). Also claimed in Breslin v McKenna [2009]
NIQB 50, on the basis of the one-off fatal bombing at Omagh Town.
25 The nexus was lacking in, e.g. Andresen v Lovell [2009] EWHC 3397 (QB).
26 As in Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370; [2007] Q.B. 846 (conducts and statements as part of
a planned coup in Equatorial Guinea were committed out-of-jurisdiction, and were outside the reach of the
Act).
27 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] A.C. 655; [1997] 2 W.L.R. 684 HL. Both aspects are discussed further
in R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, 2nd edn (CUP, 2020), Ch.16, pp.835–42, 899–906.
28 Gross threatening images sent solely to C are not defamatory, cf. Charleston v News Group Newspapers
Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 65; [1995] 2 W.L.R. 450 HL.
29 e.g. the son’s in Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53; the victims’ in the Omagh Bombing case
[2009] NIQB 50. In MXX v A Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB), the court considered that both
assault/battery and the tort in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 could be proven in the alternative,
albeit that the nub of the case was that the defendant school was not vicariously liable for the perpetrator’s
commission of these torts.
30 As in Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370 (no overt capacity to carry out threats imminently).
31 Joyce v Sengupta [1993] 1 W.L.R. 337; (1992) 142 N.L.J. 1306 CA; Spring v Guardian Assurance [1995]
2 A.C. 296; [1994] 3 W.L.R. 354 HL, although the falsity of the statement in Wilkinson is "in the same
spirit" as the tort of injurious falsehood, noted by J. Murphy, "The Vitality of Injurious Falsehood" (2021)
137 L.Q.R. 658, 669.
32 McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 A.C. 410 HL.
33 Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) (dicta, as a duty of care was owed by soldiers to
civilians there).
34 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (as amended) [4], and Annex B.
35 By virtue of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.33(1).
36 See e.g. E. Dunkley and H. Shearing, ‘TikTok abuse ‘is pushing teachers over the edge’" BBC News, 13
November 2021; N. Bryan, "TikTok school abuse: Teachers quitting over paedophile slurs" BBC News,
21 November 2021. Given that many such videos are posted by children, two related questions arise:
(1) whether the children’s parents can be liable for their children’s intentional torts under ratification or
vicarious liability principles; and (2) whether TikTok can become liable for hosting the statement which
infringes the Revised Wilkinson Tort, similar to the principle in Defamation law whereby search engine
providers and webhosts may transmute from "facilitator" to "publisher" where offending material is not
removed within a reasonable time of notification (per Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 68; [2013]
1 W.L.R. 2151). Space limitations preclude further detailed consideration of these two issues, but both
arguably merit attention, should the Wilkinson Tort be reformed as suggested.
37 C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB). C was awarded £25,000 for that particular tort. For commentary, see J.
Wheeler, "Casenote" [2016] J.P.I.L. 28, 30.
38 e.g. C. McGlynn, "Image-based Sexual Abuse" (2017) 37 O.J.L.S. 534, 558; D. Bunting, "Sexting
Damages Case: The Legal Issues" (2016) 166 N.L.J. 6, 6.
39 As proposed by the MOJ, Transforming our Justice System (2016); and Briggs LJ, Civil Courts Structure
Review: Final Report (2016). For developments since then, see e.g. J. Rosenberg, The Online Court: Will
IT Work? (Legal Education Foundation, 2020). The present Pilot for Online Civil Money Claims for up to
£10,000, as set out in Practice Direction 51R, does not cover personal injury claims, but the Government’s
and Judiciary’s hopes for an online system for all lower-value civil claims are ambitious.
40 Trespasses are direct acts, whereas the acts under the Wilkinson Tort are treated as indirect interferences
with C’s person, such that the latter "has nothing to do with trespass to the person": Wainwright v Home
Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [47] (Lord Hoffmann), and in the court below: [2002] Q.B. 1334 CA at [67]–
[72].
41 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 at 58.
42 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [10], and accepted in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at
[73] as being common ground in that case.

43 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 at 58 ([t]he effect of D’s statement on C "was a violent shock to her
nervous system, producing vomiting and other more serious and permanent physical consequences at one
time threatening her reason, and entailing weeks of suffering and incapacity", emphasis added).
44 Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316 CA (as well as the mental illness of neurasthenia, C suffered from
"shingles and other physical ailments").
45 Sullivan v Boyle [2013] IEHC 104 at [35] (weight loss and disrupted sleep did not qualify as physical
harm).
46 Reilly v Merseyside RHA (1995) 6 Med. L.R. 246 CA (temporary physical manifestations of vomiting and
sweating not sufficient to constitute physical damage in negligence).
47 As was the case in: MXX v A Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB) at [159].
48 e.g. Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] Q.B. 727 at 736; [1993] 3 W.L.R. 476 CA (nuisance calls caused C "an
enormous weight of stress"); Burnett v George [1992] 1 F.L.R. 525; [1993] 1 F.C.R. 1012 CA (following
a relationship breakdown, C was molested and left with "a burning resentment"). Quia timet injunctive
relief was obtained in both. Some academic scholars argued that these cases should herald the wider
recognition of a lower threshold of injury under the Wilkinson Tort, e.g. R. Kidner, "Nuisance and Rights
of Property" [1998] Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 267, 269.
49 e.g. the mother’s claim in Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [47]; Wong v Parkside Health
NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [12]; (2002) 99(2) L.S.G. 28; C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) at
[87], [89], re the first incident of the two litigated; Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370 at [41] (C
suffered "serious anxiety, distress, and disruption to his personal life and work"); Powell v Boldaz [1998]
Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 116; (1997) 39 B.M.L.R. 35 CA at 46–48; A v Hoare [2006] EWCA Civ 395 at [135].
50 Piepenbrock v London School of Economics [2022] EWHC 2421 (KB) at [172].
51 Burns v Boots UK Ltd [2011] CSOH 182 at [10]; 2011 Rep. L.R. 124.
52 Alseran v Ministry of Defence [2017] EWHC 3289 (QB) at [878].
53 The principal case signifying a departure from a strict adherence to the diagnostic classifications being
Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 155; [1995] 2 W.L.R. 644 HL, as discussed in R. Mulheron, "Rewriting the
Requirement for a ‘Recognized Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence Claims" (2012) 32 O.J.L.S. 77, 91.
54 DSM-V (American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edn (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013) and ICD-11 (International Statistical Classification of Mental and Behavioural
Disorders, 11th edn (World Health Organisation, 2019).
55 See e.g. P. Handford, Mullany and Handford’s Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, 2nd edn (Thomson
LBC, 2006), p.712; N. Mullaney, "Civil Actions for Childhood Abuse in Australia" (1999) 115 L.Q.R.
565, 571; J. Bridgeman and M. Jones, "Harassing Conduct and Outrageous Acts: A Cause of Action
for Intentionally Inflicted Mental Distress?" (1994) 14 Legal Studies 180; P. Glazebrook, "Wilkinson v
Downton: A Centenary Postscript" (1997) 37 Irish Jurist 46; N. Moreham, "Privacy in the Common Law:
A Doctrinal and Theoretical Analysis" (2005) 121 L.Q.R. 628, 654; C. Hunt, "Wilkinson v Downton
Revisited" (2015) 74 Cambridge L.J. 392, 395; E. Descheemaeker, "Rationalising Recovery for Emotional
Harm in Tort Law" (2018) 134 L.Q.R. 602, 621; and I. Goold and C. Kelly, "Who’s Afraid of Imaginary
Claims? Common Misunderstandings of the Origin of the Action for Pure Psychiatric Injury in Negligence
1888–1943" (2022) 138 L.Q.R. 58, tracing through the recognition of mental harm as an injury in and of
itself, analogous "to a broken leg" (at 76), in cases such as Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
56 Particularly the Scottish Law Comm, Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Rep 196, 2004) [3.7] ("In the case of
intentional wrongdoing, we now think that the defender should normally be liable for the harm he intended
to cause: this should include distress, anxiety, grief, anger etc, whether or not this amounts to a medically
recognised mental disorder"). As the passage suggests, the Commission changed its view on this point,
between Consultation Paper (proposal 1(1)) and the Final Report.
57 Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] A.C. 655 HL at 707 (emphasis added).
58 His comments were seemingly more reserved, however: Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at
[46]–[47]; and Lord Scott rejected outright the notion of compensation for injured feelings arising from
intentional acts (at [62]).
59 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [64]–[67], quote at [73].
60 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [119], and also [116]. As others have noted, this point was a key
differential between Lord Neuberger and the majority, and hence, it was extraordinary that Lord Wilson
agreed with both judgments: A. Dickinson, "A Ruritanian Ordeal" (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 542, 545.
61 R. Mulheron, "Rewriting the Requirement for a ‘Recognized Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence
Claims" (2012) 32 O.J.L.S. 77, 100–2.

62 EWLC, Liability for Psychiatric Illness (Rep.249, 1998), p.51 fn.79. For similar sentiments, see Scottish
Law Comm, Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Rep.196, 2004), [2.3].
63 Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 G.W.D. 35-602 at [63] (re a claim arising under the PHA 1997
(Scotland)).
64 Dickie v Flexcon Glenrothes Ltd 2009 G.W.D. 35-602 at [165]. Ultimately, the claim for mental harm was
unsuccessful for other reasons.
65 H. Moller, "The Relevance of ‘Mixed Anxiety and Depression’ as a Diagnostic Category in Clinical
Practice" [2016] European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience 725 (footnotes omitted). See
too P. Swift, Living with Anxiety (Mental Health Foundation, 2014), p.12 ("the psychiatric profession first
codified diagnostic criteria for all the different disorders as recently as 1980, [per] DSM-III").
66 D. Stewart, "Commentary on ‘Psychosocial Origins of Depressive and Anxiety Disorders’, Part 2" in D.
Goldberg (ed), Diagnostic Issues in Depression and Generalised Anxiety Disorder (American Psychiatric
Assoc, 2010), p.352.
67 Available in full-text at https://cdn.website-editor.net/30f11123991548a0af708722d458e476/files/
uploaded/DSM%2520V.pdf.
68 D. Regier, "The DSM-5: Classification and Criteria Changes" (2013) 12 World Psychiatry 92, 95. The
most recent version of DSM-5 includes text revisions up to and including March 2022. However, the
points made in the accompanying text relate to the first version of DSM-5 published in 2013, as that is
sufficient to show the constant evolution of medical knowledge and analysis.
69 Coded as 300.02 in DSM-V (2013), 222–26.
70 Coded as 300.02 in DSM-V (2013), 222–23, under the heading, "Diagnostic features".
71 The author has previously argued that a "grievous non-physical reaction" should be permitted as the
threshold damage for negligence in English law (see R. Mulheron, "Rewriting the Requirement for a
‘Recognized Psychiatric Injury’ in Negligence Claims" (2012) 32 O.J.L.S. 77, 100–2), and proposed (at
109) various factors that should govern whether the threshold was met. These factors were developed with
the assistance of discussions with consultant psychiatrist Dr David Gill.
72 As argued by the author, (R. Mulheron, "Rewriting the Requirement for a ‘Recognized Psychiatric Injury’
in Negligence Claims" (2012) 32 O.J.L.S. 77, 100–2) and cited with approval, re the suggestion of a lower
threshold of damage for negligence, and the factors at 109, in: Saadati v Moorhead [2017] 1 S.C.R. 543
(SCC) at [21], [31], [38].
73 See Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] A.C. 655 HL at 707.
74 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [63].
75 Alseran v Ministry of Defence [2017] EWHC 3289 (QB) at [878]; [2019] Q.B. 1251.
76 Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43 at [43]; [2018] A.C. 779 (described as an "injury to health" under those
torts).
77 Hussain v CC of West Mercia [2008] EWCA Civ 1205 at [19] (Maurice Kay LJ), and referenced
subsequently (without the need to decide the point) in: N (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Dept
[2014] EWHC 3304 (QB) at [56]; Kimathi v Foreign and Commonwealth Office [2018] EWHC 1305 (QB)
at [29].
78 per PHA 1997 s.7(2); and see too, Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 251
at [7]; [2005] Q.B. 848 (the Act "goes further than the common law in providing for damages for anxiety
falling short of injury to health").
79 e.g. Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] A.C. 655 HL at 707; Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001]
EWCA Civ 1721 at [29]–[30]; Austen v University of Wolverhampton [2005] EWHC 1635 (QB) at [7].
80 Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370 at [97], citing: the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, the Race
Relations Act 1976, and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. See too P. Handford, Mullany and
Handford’s Tort Liability for Psychiatric Damage, 2nd edn (Thomson LBC, 2006), pp.714–15.
81 Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2012 (as amended), pp.46–47 (per the Tariff table).
82 See the section on Reforming the intent element below.
84 AD v Bury MBC [2006] EWCA Civ 1 at [78]; [2006] 1 W.L.R. 917.
85 See text accompanying fn.71 above.
86 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [73]. The other elements in this article, the "intent" and the
"consequence" elements, are also derived from the majority’s description in Rhodes.
87 Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316 CA (Private detective Sweeney knew that his statements that
Mademoiselle Janvier was assisting a German spy and was in danger of arrest were false). Conversely,

where D believes the statements to C to be true, the Wilkinson Tort cannot apply: Sullivan v Boylan [2013]
IEHC 104 (debt collector, D, believed the alleged debtor, C, to owe money to a builder).
88 As in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 (D threatened to have an ex-convict
retaliate against C).
89 Gloster v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2000] P.I.Q.R. P114 CA; [2000] Po. L.R. 61
(mentioned as an example)
90 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 (the tort failed, as there was no recognised
psychiatric injury suffered).
91 Sabados v Facebook Ireland [2018] EWHC 2369 (QB) at [29] (the tort being "conceivable").
92 A dicta example in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [85].
93 As in Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 A.C. 406 HL.
94 As in C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB).
96 M Arden, "Privacy and Third Parties to Criminal Proceedings" (2017) 76 Cambridge L.J. 469, 470.
cf. though, the abuse of dead bodies or non-consensual dealing with separated bodily parts whereby
"such claims usually involve acts rather than statements": R. Nwabueze, ‘Regulation of Bodily Parts:
Understanding Bodily Parts as a Duplex" (2019) 15 Intl. J. of the Law in Context 515, 523.
97 A v Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust [2004] EWHC 644 (QB); [2005] Q.B. 506 ("a deliberate and
wilful misstatement of fact"); Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] Q.B. 727 CA at 735 ("false words or verbal
threats"); Dulieu v White & Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669 at 683 ("the only physical action of the wrong-doer [in
Wilkinson] was that of speech").
98 As in MXX v A Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB). The difficulty for MXX in this case is
that, whilst the perpetrator may have committed the tort, the relevant statements did not occur during
the perpetrator’s work experience placement with the defendant school, and hence, the school was not
vicariously liable for the placement teacher’s tort.
99 As in C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) at [89]; [2016] E.L.R. 1.
100 e.g. in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721, C’s work colleagues threatened that
an ex-convict would harm her if she reported her work colleagues’ absences from work; in MXX v A
Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB) and in C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB), the respective
defendants’ grooming conduct was accompanied by text messages; and in the hostage-taking scenario
posed as a hypothetical scenario in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32, a threat conveyed to family members
was also envisaged.
101 Discussed in R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, 2nd edn (CUP, 2020), pp.692–94.
102 See Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [51] (Lord Hoffmann), noting that Buxton LJ, in the
court below (at [62]), thought that C would have a "strong case" under art.8.
103 As Lord Neuberger put it in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [102].
104 See Austen v University of Wolverhampton [2005] EWHC 1635 (QB) at [10] (it was assumed, by reference
to Canadian authority, that "it is no bar to recovery that the statement was not made by D directly to C’).
105 Noted in R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, 2nd edn (CUP, 2020), Ch.WD (online) pp.470–71, citing
several authorities from Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
106 Carter v Walker [2010] VSCA 340 at [264], [268].
107 Breslin v McKenna [2009] NIQB 50 at [266]; [2007] N.I. 201.
109 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [74] (in that scenario, "the relevant words or conduct were directed
… [to] a group. A person who shouts ‘fire’ in a cinema, when there is no fire, is addressing himself to the
audience").
111 Ironically, whether there may be a course of harassing conduct which is targeted at an individual X, but
where C, who is associated with X, can sue for harassment, has been controversial under the PHA 1997
too, as discussed in R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, 2nd edn (CUP, 2020), Ch.HA (online), pp.265–
66, by reference to e.g. Thomas v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1233 at [30]; [2002]
E.M.L.R. 4; and Levi v Bates [2015] EWCA Civ 206 at [26]; [2016] Q.B. 91.
112 W v Essex CC [1998] EWCA Civ 614 at [56] affirmed on appeal.
113 As noted in W v Essex CC [1999] Fam. 90 CA at [56]; [1998] 3 W.L.R. 534, and this particular claim was
not appealed further.

115 See PHA 1997 s.1(3)(c) ("in the particular circumstances, the pursuit of the course of conduct was
reasonable").
116 KD v Chief Constable of Hampshire [2005] EWHC 2550 (QB) at [146]; [2005] Po. L.R. 253; Levi v Bates
[2009] EWHC 1495 (QB) at [8].
117 R. (on the application of Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 12 at [65];
[2012] 1 A.C. 245.
118 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [44]–[45].
120 SLC, Defamation (Rep 248, 2017), [2.7].
121 C. Hunt, "Wilkinson v Downton Revisited" (2015) 74 Cambridge L.J. 392, 394.
122 A. Dickinson, "A Ruritanian Ordeal" (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 542, 544.
123 As earlier scholarly commentary foreshadowed, if that change to the tort was made: J. Coad, "Privacy—
Art 8. Who Needs It?" (2001) 12 Entertainment L. Rev. 226, 231.
124 Brayshaw v Partners of Apsley Surgery [2018] EWHC 3286 (QB) at [58]; (2019) 166 B.M.L.R. 76.
125 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [10] (Hale LJ).
126 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [46]–[47] (Lord Hoffmann).
127 Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316 CA.
128 Affirmed in Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [44] (Lord Woolf CJ).
129 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 at 58–59.
130 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [12]. This form of intent, whilst endorsed,
was not established in Wong.
131 Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [79] (Buxton LJ), and cited in: Rhodes v OPO
[2015] UKSC 32 at [60].
132 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [45], [81] (D "is to be taken as a matter of law to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his acts").
133 Noted in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [24].
134 Khoransandjian v Bush [1993] Q.B. 727 CA at 735; (1993) 25 H.L.R. 392, cited in Wong v Parkside
Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [12], and Bowler v Walker and Northampton HA [1996]
P.I.Q.R. P22 CA at P31. See too Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [78]–[79] (Buxton
LJ), citing the law report editor’s headnote in Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316 CA.
135 Also noted by N. Moreham, "Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law" (2014) 73 Cambridge
L.J. 350, 363.
137 per DPP v Smith [1961] A.C. 290 HL; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 546 overruled by the Criminal Justice Act 1967
s.8.
140 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [85] and [86].
141 Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370 at [95].
142 C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) at [89].
143 MXX v A Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB) at [157]–[158].
144 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [89]. Nor was any such intent capable of proof in: Piepenbrock v
London School of Economics [2022] EWHC 2421 (KB) at [170], describing the notion as "fanciful" on the
facts of that case.
146 C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) at [99]–[100], citing remarks in Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA
Civ 2081 (Lord Woolf CJ).
147 Rather, the two prison officers who conducted the strip search carried it out in a matter-of-fact way,
chatting to each other about unrelated matters, with no intention to humiliate C: Reese v Darlington
Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52 at [50]; [2004] 1 A.C. 309.
148 Bici v Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB).
149 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [87] (majority); [113] (Lord Neuberger, minority).
150 Brayshaw v Apsley Surgery [2018] EWHC 3286 (QB) at [56]; BVC v EWF [2019] EWHC 2506 (QB) at
[208].
151 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [11], citing J. Fleming, The Law of Torts,
9th edn (LBC, 1998), p.38.

152 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [70]–[71] citing Rahemtulla v Vanfed Credit Union [1984] 3 W.W.R.
296 (BCSC).
153 Powell v Boldaz [1998] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 116 CA; (1997) 39 B.M.L.R. 35; and Wong v Parkside Health
NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [11].
154 Re the young pupils in C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) and C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB).
155 Re the unpleasant nature of the debt-collector and debtor relationship in Sullivan v Boyle [2013] IEHC
104; the relationship of teacher-pupil in C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB); cf. the distant relationship
which the son had with his father in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32.
156 Re Mrs Wilkinson’s geographic distance from her husband and the physical difficulty of reaching him.
157 Re the matter-of-fact, rather than vindictive, strip search conducted by the prison officers in Wainwright v
Home Office [2003] UKHL 53.
158 Re the young pupil in C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB); the potential economic detriment to Mrs Wilkinson
should her husband be unable to continue to act as publican in Wilkinson; the wartime environment for
alleged spies in Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 K.B. 316.
159 Re the characteristics of the pupil in C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) who attended a special educational
needs school.
160 Re the three employees who acted in concert against C in Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001]
EWCA Civ 1721.
161 The hostage example in Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32; and the consequences for the President’s family
in Mbasogo v Logo Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1370.
162 However, to reiterate, a one-off incident is sufficient under the Revised (and Current) Wilkinson Tort.
163 per Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 Q.B. 428 QBD; [1968]
2 W.L.R. 422.
164 e.g. Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 (C conceded that the actionable threat
had not caused her emotional distress, but that it was attributable to earlier incidents of rudeness and
unfriendliness). cf. in MXX v A Secondary School [2022] EWHC 2207 (QB) at [163], the court was
prepared to accept, on the basis of the medical evidence, that the perpetrator’s grooming and sexual abuse
of the claimant caused the claimant to suffer psychiatric harm. Similarly: C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687
(QB) at [89].
165 C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB).
166 per Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] A.C. 613; [1956] 2 W.L.R. 707 HL (re silica dust to which
C was exposed, innocently and negligently). Also applied, in negligence, in Bailey v Ministry of Defence
[2008] EWCA Civ 883; [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1052 (re a weakened post-operative state, caused by negligence
and innocent pancreatitis).
167 C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) at [98], [102].
168 C v D [2006] EWHC 166 (QB) at [101], [104].
169 The quantum for each of the heads of damage was qualified by the statement, "the need to apportion
because the actionable abuse is but one of the causes of the psychiatric injury": C v D [2006] EWHC 166
(QB) at [105], [107], [110].
170 See e.g. L. Khoury, Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability (Hart Publishing, 2006), pp.46–55. For other
examples of the proportionate damages approach, see: C v WH [2015] EWHC 2687 (QB) at [86] (30% of
C’s psychiatric injury attributable to D’s abuse); and FGX v Gaunt [2023] EWHC 419 (KB), which was a
judgment on assessment of damages only, but where C v WH was cited with approval (at [38], [56]).
171 The Bonnington principle failed in both B v Ministry of Defence (the Atomic Veterans case) [2012] UKSC
9; [2013] 1 A.C. 78 and Petroleum Co of Trinidad and Tobago Ltd v Ryan [2017] UKPC 30, further
discussed in R. Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, 2nd edn (CUP, 2020), pp.439–43.
172 Hotson v East Berkshire HA [1987] A.C. 750 HL at 793; [1987] 3 W.L.R. 232, and discussed at 409–13.
173 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [47] (Lord Hoffmann), noted at n 40 above.
177 Page v Smith [1996] A.C. 155 HL at 177; [1995] R.T.R. 210 (where negligence was at issue, and not the
Wilkinson Tort).
178 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 at 58 (the consequences of the practical joke on Mrs Wilkinson
"were not in any way the result of previous ill-health or weakness of constitution; nor was there any
evidence of predisposition to nervous shock or any other idiosyncrasy").

179 As in Powell v Boldaz [1997] EWCA Civ 2002 ("[counsel] submits that psychiatric injury to the [parents]
was reasonably foreseeable … [but] I do not accept it"; the Wilkinson Tort failed).
180 Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081, quotes at [48], [49], and [50], respectively.
181 J. Coad, "Privacy—Art 8. Who Needs It?" (2001) 12 Entertainment L. Rev. 226, 16; J. Adams, "Trespass
in a Digital Environment" (2002) 1 Intellectual Property Quarterly 1, 7, citing J. Ziegler, Ringwood’s
Outline of the Law of Torts, 5th edn (Sweet and Maxwell, 1924), p.169; C. Brennan, "Wilkinson v
Downton as a Novel Basis for an Interim Injunction against Publication" (2015) 31 Professional
Negligence 33, 36.
182 Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [48].
183 Wainwright v Home Office [2001] EWCA Civ 2081 at [71] (Buxton LJ).
184 Laing Ltd v Essa [2004] EWCA Civ 2 at [31]; [2004] I.C.R. 746 (the 1997 Act "demonstrate[s] that it is
possible to create a statutory tort which does not incorporate the reasonable foreseeability test"); Jones v
Ruth [2011] EWCA Civ 804 at [25], [32]–[33]; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1495 (trial judge ruled out some of C’s
damage as being unforeseeable, but reinstated on appeal when the test of reasonable foreseeability was
rejected under PHA 1997).
185 Noted in, e.g. Breslin v McKenna [2009] NIQB 50 at [272] (re assault and battery); and Carey v Minister
for Finance [2010] IEHC 247 at [4.57] (re intentional torts generally).
187 See Reforming the "conduct element": Excusing D’s conduct above.
188 Wilson v Pringle [1987] Q.B. 237 CA at 243; [1986] 3 W.L.R. 1 (unless that consent is contrary to the
public interest: R. v Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534; R. v Donovan [1934] 2 K.B. 498; (1936) 25 Cr. App. R.
1).
189 Blake v Galloway [2004] EWCA Civ 814 at [21]; [2004] 1 W.L.R. 2844.
190 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [111] (Lord Neuberger).
191 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [46] (Lord Hoffmann).
192 As it is also defended under the PHA 1997 s.1(3)(c): Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust
[2005] EWCA Civ 251 at [82]; [2005] Q.B. 848, and affirmed in [2006] UKHL 34.
193 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721 at [17] (noting the "threat is different").
194 Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721.
196 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53.
197 BVC v EWF [2019] EWHC 2506 (QB) at [211].
199 Rhodes v OPO [2015] UKSC 32 at [120], citing several authorities. See too, European Court of Human
Rights Registry, Guide on Article 10 of the ECHR (30 April 2021), pp.96, 103.
200 Pursuant to the powers vested in the court under Civil Procedure Rules 3.1 and 3.4.
201 Quoted in N. Titheradge, "Damages Awarded in ‘Sexting Case’ for the First Time" BBC News, 30
November 2015.
202 Piepenbrock v London School of Economics [2022] EWHC 2421 (KB) at [156].
203 A point also made earlier in C. Stirling, "A Modern Take" (2015) 165 N.L.J. 7667, 13.

Modernising The Tort of Wilkinson V Downton

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Modernising the tort of Wilkinson v Downton, J.P.I.

Law 2023, 1, 13-35

For educational use only

Journal of Personal Injury Law

J.P.I. Law 2023, 1, 13-35

Other related subjects

*J.P.I. Law 13 Abstract

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. 1

Then … and now

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Reforming the threshold harm

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The medical perspective

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The legal perspective

Reforming the "conduct element"

Conduct versus statements

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False statements and intermediate acts

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Excusing D’s conduct

Reforming the intent element

Intent on a spectrum: the possibilities

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The suggestion for the Revised Wilkinson Tort

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i. an actual intention to cause C serious emotional distress, subjectively-assessed; or

Reforming the "consequence element"

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. 12

Reforming remoteness of damage

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A summary of the proposed reforms under the Revised Wilkinson Tort

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1 Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 QBD.

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. 16

© 2023 Thomson Reuters. 17

22 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53 at [41].

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