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Quezon City Government Vs Dacara - Compress

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020 QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR AUTHOR:

J. TIAMZON, Petitioners, vs. FULGENCIO DACARA*, NOTES: (if applicable)


Respondent.
G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
TOPIC: Liability of Municipal Corporation – Article 2189
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:
1. Dacara Jr.’s car turned turtle upon hitting a rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City,
which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra Jr., his son who was likewise on board the
car, sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth..
2. Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor children filed a complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon
before RTC. He prayed for damages.
3. The LGU contended that the fault is with the driver, since the LGU have out up warning signs. The trial court ruled that the LGU
is liable.
4. The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not the Quezon City Government is liable for damages due to the injuries suffered by Dacara Jr.?

HELD: YES. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the
maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
RATIO:
Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a
roadside construction. They argue that the driver, Fulgencio Dacara Jr., of respondent's car was overspeeding, and that his own
negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident.

The Court found petitioner, Quezon City, negligent.

"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be
blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were
placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the
policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.

Negligence of QC is the proximate cause

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.16

Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that
the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.

The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance
of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory
provision found in the subject­article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of
the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and
neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.

Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident.
This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated
'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that
Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code.

These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up
for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It
is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well­settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the
original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.

Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to
petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to
overturn this factual conclusion.

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