2024 Ageing Report (EU)

ISSN 2443-8014 (online)
2024
Ageing
Report
Underlying Assumptions
& Projection Methodologies
INSTITUTIONAL PAPER 257 | NOVEMBER 2023
EUROPEAN ECONOMY
Economic and
Financial Affairs
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CREDIT
Cover photography: © Reporters.be/CHROMORANGE
European Commission
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
2024 Ageing Report

Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies
EUROPEAN ECONOMY Institutional Paper 257

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was prepared as part of the mandate the Economic and Financial Affairs Council gave to the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) in 2021 to update and further deepen its triannual projections of age-
related expenditure based on new population projections by Eurostat. The work to fulfil this mandate is
performed within the EPC’s Ageing Working Group (AWG).
The forthcoming 2024 Ageing Report will provide long-term projections for public expenditure on
pensions, healthcare, long-term care and education in the European Union up to 2070. These budgetary
projections build on the macroeconomic assumptions and methodologies described in this report. The
2024 Ageing Report will be the eighth edition. Publication is scheduled for spring 2024.
This report is presented by the EPC and the European Commission (Directorate-General for Economic
and Financial Affairs - DG ECFIN) after discussion and agreement in the AWG. DG ECFIN provided the
analysis and calculations underpinning the report. Eurostat prepared the demographic projections.
The report was prepared under the supervision of Massimo Suardi (Director in DG ECFIN), Andrea
Oliveira (Chair of the EPC), Pieter de Jonge (Chair of the AWG) and Stéphanie Pamies (Head of Unit in
DG ECFIN). The main contributors were Santiago Calvo Ramos, Ben Deboeck, Miklos Erdei, Nicola
Gagliardi, Boriana Goranova, Frederic Opitz and Adja Awa Sissoko, in collaboration with the Members
of the AWG (see list below). Secretarial support was provided by Laura Crapanzano. The EPC and DG
ECFIN would like to thank all those concerned.
Comments can be sent to:
DG ECFIN - Unit C2: ecfin-secretariat-c2@ec.europa.eu
Secretariat of the Economic Policy Committee: epc-secretariat@ec.europa.eu
ii
MEMBERS OF THE AGEING WORKING GROUP
CHAIRMAN
Pieter de JONGE Ministry of the Interior, the Netherlands
BELGIUM
Nicole FASQUELLE Federal Planning Bureau
Vesna STAVREVSKA Federal Planning Bureau
BULGARIA
Kaloyan KOLEV Ministry of Finance
Penka TANEVA National Social Security Institute
CZECHIA
Zbynek STORK Ministry of Finance
Jindrich MARVAL Ministry of Finance
DENMARK
Sebastian HONORÉ Ministry of Finance
Thor Askov JENSEN Ministry of Finance
GERMANY
Philipp DYBOWSKI Federal Ministry of Finance
Daniel KEMPTNER Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
ESTONIA
Risto KAARNA Ministry of Finance
Tõnu LILLELAID Ministry of Finance
IRELAND
Patrick O’BRIEN Department of Finance
Colm ROCHE Department of Finance
iii
GREECE
Eirini ANDRIOPOULOU Ministry of Finance
Angeliki ZOULAKI National Actuarial Authority
SPAIN
Álvaro MEDINA GUTIÉRREZ Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation
Aurora GONZÁLEZ URIEL Ministry of Finance
FRANCE
Nicolas LEFEBVRE Ministry for the Economy and Finance
Vieu LIN Ministry for the Economy and Finance
CROATIA
Josipa MESTROVIĆ SPOLJAR Croatian Health Insurance Fund
Alen BUČIĆ Croatian Pension Insurance Institute
ITALY
Chiara RUBINO Ministry of Economy and Finance
Riccardo CONTI Sogei S.p.a.
CYPRUS
Maria MATSI Ministry of Finance
Maria NICOLAOU CHRISTOU Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance
LATVIA
Jūlija BURĢE Ministry of Finance
Sandra STABIŅA Ministry of Welfare
LITHUANIA
Mantas BUREIKA Ministry of Finance
Matas VINKUS Ministry of Social Security and Labour
LUXEMBOURG
Gabriel GOMES STATEC
Kevin EVERARD General Inspectorate of Social Security
iv
HUNGARY
Péter MÉSZÁROS Ministry of Finance
Renáta NÉMETH-SZŰCS Hungarian State Treasury
MALTA
Anna BONNICI Ministry for Finance and Employment
Wayne APAP Ministry for Finance and Employment
THE NETHERLANDS
Joris VAN TOOR CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Jessica DE VLIEGER Ministry of Finance
AUSTRIA
Susanna SANDRUSCHITZ-FLOH Ministry of Finance
Armin HEINRICH Ministry of Finance
POLAND
Joanna STACHURA Ministry of Finance
Pawel STRZELECKI National Bank of Poland
PORTUGAL
Conceicao NUNES Ministry of Finance
Rita FIGUEIRAS Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security
ROMANIA
Ioana GAVRIL Ministry of Finance
Tamara NAE Ministry of Finance
SLOVENIA
Ana MILANEZ Ministry of Finance
Lejla FAJIĆ Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development
SLOVAKIA
Marian ŠALING Ministry of Finance
Peter MARTIŠKA Ministry of Finance
v
FINLAND
Olli PALMEN Ministry of Finance
Seppo ORJASNIEMI Ministry of Finance
SWEDEN
Linnéa PRYTZ Ministry of Finance
Jonas NORLIN Ministry of Finance
OBSERVERS
NORWAY
Yngvar DYVI Ministry of Finance
SWITZERLAND
Carsten COLOMBIER Federal Department of Finance
ECB
Maximillian FREIER
EUROSTAT
Jarko PASANEN ESTAT F1
Hannah KIIVER ESTAT F1
EPC SECRETARIAT
Fabian LENGERT
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Stéphanie PAMIES ECFIN C2
Ben DEBOECK ECFIN C2
vi
CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
1. 2024 Ageing Report: mandate, general principles and process 1
2. Main results: the economic impact of population ageing 3
Part I: Underlying assumptions 11

1. Demographic projections 12
1.1. Introduction 12
1.2. Developments and assumptions for fertility rates 12
1.3. Developments and assumptions for life expectancy 14
1.4. Developments and assumptions for net migration 17
1.5. Overall results of the population projections 21
1.6. Demographic ageing in a global context 24
1.7. Comparison with the demographic projections in the 2021 Ageing Report 26
2. Labour force projections 32
2.2. Past trends and main drivers of labour market developments 32
2.3. The impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of older workers 35
2.4. Labour market participation and labour supply projections 38
2.5. Employment projections 44
2.6. Economic dependency ratios 47
2.7. Projection of total hours worked 48
2.8. Comparing the labour market projections with the 2021 Ageing Report 50
3. Labour productivity and potential GDP projections 63
3.2. Long-term potential GDP projections 64
3.3. Comparing the 2024 and 2021 GDP projections 69
4. Inflation and interest rate assumptions 73
4.1. Interest rate assumptions and use for pension fund projections 73
4.2. Inflation assumptions 75
5. Sensitivity tests and alternative scenarios 76
5.2. Projections under different sensitivity tests and alternative policy scenarios 76
Part II: Age-related expenditure items: coverage, projection

methodologies and data sources 85
1. Pensions 86
1.1. Main features of the pension projections 86
1.2. Coverage of the pension projections 86
1.3. Definition of the variables 87
2. Health care 96
2.2. Overview of the projection methodology 96
2.3. Different scenarios for projecting public health care expenditure 98
3. Long-term care 103
vii
3.2. Overview of the projection methodology 103
3.3. Different scenarios for projecting public long-term care expenditure 107
4. Education 110
4.2. Methodology to project total expenditure on public education 111
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 115
Annexes 116
A1. Projecting labour force developments using the Cohort Simulation Model 116
A2. Estimating the average exit age from the labour market 119
A3. Methodology underpinning potential GDP growth projections 120
A4. Overview of pension systems 123
A5. Coverage and specification of pension schemes 128
A6. Long-term care model structure 141
A7. Data sources for health care expenditure 142
A8. Data sources for long-term care expenditure 146
A9. Mathematical illustration of the health care scenarios 153
A10. Mathematical illustration of the long-term care scenarios 160
A11. Organisational structure of secondary education 167
A12. Data sources for education expenditure 168
A13. Estimating the education enrolment rate 169
Part III: Statistical Annex 171

1. Belgium 172
2. Bulgaria 173
3. Czechia 174
4. Denmark 175
5. Germany 176
6. Estonia 177
7. Ireland 178
8. Greece 179
9. Spain 180
10. France 181
11. Croatia 182
12. Italy 183
13. Cyprus 184
14. Latvia 185
15. Lithuania 186
16. Luxembourg 187
17. Hungary 188
18. Malta 189
19. The Netherlands 190
20. Austria 191
21. Poland 192
22. Portugal 193
23. Romania 194
24. Slovenia 195
25. Slovakia 196
viii
26. Finland 197
27. Sweden 198
28. Norway 199
29. European Union 200
30. Euro area 201
Part IV: Resources 203

References 204
LIST OF TABLES
1. Overview of the common sensitivity tests around the baseline 2
2. Population projections: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to
2021 Ageing Report 4
3. Population assumptions: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to
2021 Ageing Report 4
4. Labour force projections: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared
to 2021 Ageing Report 6
5. GDP projections: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to 2021
Ageing Report 8
I.1.1. Past trends in total fertility rates (TFR), 1960-2021 13
I.1.2. Projection of total fertility rates (TFR) in EUROPOP2023, 2022-2070 13
I.1.3. Past trends in life expectancy at birth, 1960-2021 15
I.1.4. Projection of life expectancy at birth and at 65, 2022-2070 17
I.1.5. Average annual net migration flows (including statistical adjustment),
1960-2021 19
I.1.6. Projection of net migration flows, 2022-2070 20
I.1.7. Projected total population, 2022-2070 21
I.1.8. Composition of the population by age group 22
I.1.9. Dependency ratios (%), 2022-2070 24
I.1.10. Geographical distribution of world population, % of total population,
1960-2070 25
I.1.11. Global demographic dependency ratios, % (1960-2070) 25
I.1.12. Population - difference between EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019 ('000) 27
I.1.13. Old-age dependency ratio – difference between EUROPOP2023 and
EUROPOP2019 (pps) 28
I.1.14. Life expectancy at birth – difference between EUROPOP2023 and
EUROPOP2019 (years) 28
I.1.15. Total fertility rates and net migration - difference between EUROPOP2023
and EUROPOP2019 29
I.2.1. Historical participation rates: total (%) 33
I.2.2. Historical participation rates: men (%) 34
I.2.3. Historical participation rates: women (%) 34
I.2.4. Automatic adjustment mechanisms 36
I.2.5. Participation rate projections by age group – total (%) 39
I.2.6. Participation rate projections – 65-74y, total (%) 40
I.2.7. Participation rate projections by age group – men (%) 41
ix
I.2.8. Participation rate projections by age group – women (%) 41
I.2.9. Breakdown of overall change in labour market participation (pps) 42
I.2.19. Labour force revisions: 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 Ageing Report (pps) 43
I.2.10. Labour supply projections - total 43
I.2.11. Employment rate projections by age group – total (%) 45
I.2.12. Employment rate projections by age group – men (%) 45
I.2.13. Employment rate projections by age group – women (%) 46
I.2.14. Share of older workers (55-64y) in total employment (20-64y) (%) 46
I.2.15. Economic old-age dependency ratio (%) 47
I.2.16. Total economic dependency ratio (%) 48
I.2.17. Projection of total weekly hours worked (million) and breakdown in full-
and part-time work 49
I.2.18. Labour force revisions: 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 Ageing Report
(thousands) 50
I.2.20. Breakdown of revisions in employment projection for 2070: 2024 Ageing
Report vs 2021 Ageing Report (20-64y; %) 52
I.2.21. Participation rate revisions for 2070: 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 Ageing
Report (pps) 52
I.3.1. Potential GDP growth rate - period average (%) 64
I.3.2. Total hours worked growth rate - period average (%) 65
I.3.3. Hourly labour productivity growth rate - period average (%) 65
I.3.4. TFP growth rate - period average (%) 66
I.3.5. Annual contribution of capital deepening - period average (%) 66
I.3.6. Breakdown of potential GDP growth (baseline), 2022-2070 67
I.3.7. Breakdown of potential GDP growth (higher TFP growth scenario), 2022-
2070 68
I.3.8. Breakdown of potential GDP growth (lower TFP growth scenario), 2022-
2070 69
I.3.9. 2024 and 2021 baseline projections compared (pps), 2022-2070 70
I.4.1. Long-term interest rate projections: baseline based on Commission 2023
spring forecast 73
I.4.2. Selected macroeconomic assumptions for the 2024 Ageing Report 74
I.4.3. Inflation projections: baseline based on Commission 2023 spring forecast 75
I.5.1. Overview of the common sensitivity tests and policy scenarios for
pensions 76
I.5.2. Sensitivity test: higher life expectancy 78
I.5.3. Sensitivity test: lower migration 79
I.5.4. Sensitivity test: higher migration 79
I.5.5. Sensitivity test: lower fertility 80
I.5.6. Sensitivity test: higher inflation 80
I.5.7. Sensitivity test: higher employment rate of older workers 81
I.5.8. Sensitivity test: lower productivity growth 81
I.5.9. Sensitivity test: higher productivity growth 82
I.5.10. Policy scenario: link to life expectancy 82
I.5.11. Policy scenario: constant retirement age 83
II.1.1. Typology of pension schemes in the Ageing Report 88
II.1.2. Earnings-related public pension schemes 92
II.2.1. Overview of health care scenarios 99
II.3.1. Overview of long-term care scenarios 107
x
II.4.1. Education expenditure, % of GDP 110
II.4.2. Expenditure per student on public education in PPS - 2019 113
II.A4.5. Contribution rates to the public pension system 123
II.A4.1. Pension schemes in EU Member States and projection coverage 123
II.A4.2. Statutory retirement ages, early retirement ages (in brackets) and
incentives to postpone retirement 124
II.A4.3. Main indexation and valorisation parameters for old-age pensions 125
II.A4.4. Automatic adjustment mechanisms 126
II.A5.1. Coverage and specification of pension schemes 128
II.A7.1. Data sources for the sector-specific indexation components 145
II.A8.1. Long-term care public expenditure base data requirements according
to availability 148
LIST OF GRAPHS
1. Overview of the Ageing Report projection exercise 2
2. EU – Population by age group and sex, 2022 and 2070 (thousands) 3
I.1.1. Change in life expectancy at birth (2019-2021) – impact of COVID-19
pandemic 16
I.1.2. Net migration flows (including statistical adjustment), 1960-2022 18
I.1.3. EU population change (natural change (births-deaths) + net migration),
1960-2022 18
I.1.4. EU population by age group and sex (‘000) 23
I.1.5. Median age in the EU, 2022-2070 23
I.2.1. Legislated change in statutory retirement ages 35
I.2.2. Impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of the age group 55-
64 in 2070 (%) 37
I.2.3. Impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of the age group 65-
74 in 2070 (%) 37
I.2.4. Projected change of the average labour market exit age by 2070 (years) 38
I.2.5. Age profile of participation rate by sex (EU) 39
I.2.6. Change in the labour force (20-64y; %) 43
I.2.7. Age profile of employment rate by sex (EU) 44
I.2.8. Population and employment projections: 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021
Ageing Report, 2070 (% change) 51
I.3.1. Average actual and potential GDP growth rates 2022-2032 68
I.3.2. GDP potential growth rates 2022-2070 - period average (%) 69
I.4.1. (r-g) based on long-term market interest rates - EU and euro area (%) 74
I.4.2. Evolution of market-based inflation projections (past inflation
expectations) vs outturn CPI inflation and ECB target, euro area 75
II.2.1. Schematic overview of the health care projection methodology 97
II.3.1. Schematic overview of the long-term care projection methodology 105
II.A3.1. Overview of the production function approach 121
II.A6.1. Long-term care model structure for the 2024 Ageing Report 141
xi
LIST OF BOXES
I.1.1. Methodology for the migration assumptions in the EUROPOP2023
projections – impact of displaced people from Ukraine 22
I.2.1. Cohort Simulation Model (CSM) 43
I.2.2. Legislated pension measures incorporated in the labour force projections 44
I.2.3. Assumptions on structural unemployment 45
I.3.1. Assumptions on the components of the production function used for
long-run potential growth projections 69
xii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. 2024 AGEING REPORT: MANDATE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS
To assess the long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU Member States, the ECOFIN Council
mandated the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) to update its comprehensive long-term budgetary
projections by the summer of 2024. The update of the Ageing Report, a joint report by the EPC and the
European Commission (DG ECFIN), should be based on new population projections by Eurostat. The
report is prepared by the EPC’s Ageing Working Group (AWG). The 2024 Ageing Report is the eighth
edition and will be published in spring 2024.
The Ageing Report’s long-term economic and budgetary projections are a unique exercise, covering the
EU Member States and Norway up to 2070. The report provides a vast set of comparable and internally
consistent information for all countries. These give insight in the timing of population ageing, its
economic implications and the associated budgetary challenges. Such pressures are already manifest in
many countries and are expected to accelerate as large cohorts of baby boomers retire, life expectancy
continues to rise and fertility rates remain low from a historical point of view.
Being a joint EPC-Commission product, the Ageing Report provides a shared assessment between the
Member States and the Commission on how ageing costs might develop in the future. The projections are
therefore a cornerstone of various surveillance processes at the EU level. They inform the coordination of
economic policies, in particular the European Semester, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, fiscal
surveillance, and the assessment of the sustainability of public finances.
Overview of the projection exercise

Graph 1 summarises the process for the triennial update of the report. In a first phase, the Commission
and the Member States in the AWG agree on the underlying assumptions and projection methodologies,
which are subsequently endorsed by the EPC. This first phase is the topic of the current report. In a
second phase, the age-related spending projections are prepared.
Part 1 of this report gives an overview of the demographic and macroeconomic assumptions. The
EUROPOP2023 population projections by Eurostat serve as a starting point. In addition, based on
common methodologies, macroeconomic projections are prepared for each country. These cover
economic growth and its drivers, namely changes in labour productivity (total factor productivity and
capital deepening) and in the labour force (participation, employment and unemployment rates), as well
as interest rates and inflation. A statistical annex at the end of the report gives a country-by-country
overview of the demographic and macroeconomic projections.
Part 2 details the methodologies used to project age-related expenditure in the second phase of the cycle.
The budgetary projections cover four items: public spending on pensions, health care, long-term care and
education. They will be published in the spring of 2024 in the 2024 Ageing Report. For pensions,
Member States prepare projections based on national models, which are the subject of an in-depth peer
review by the Commission and the AWG. This approach allows capturing the specificity of each
country’s public pension system, while ensuring cross-country consistency since the projections are based
on shared assumptions and methodologies. Based on common models, the Commission prepares the
health care, long-term care and education projections, which are discussed and agreed within the AWG.
1
European Commission
2024 Ageing Report: Underlying assumptions and projection methodologies
Graph 1: Overview of the Ageing Report projection exercise
Source: European Commission, EPC.
The Ageing Report’s long-term baseline projections are based on a general ‘no-policy-change’
assumption. Thus, they illustrate what the future might look like if current policies remain unchanged and
given a number of realistic assumptions. Nonetheless, projecting economic and budgetary developments
over the next fifty years is a challenging exercise and subject to considerable uncertainty. Therefore, a
series of sensitivity tests and alternative scenarios is conducted around the baseline to assess the
responsiveness of the projections to changes in the main underlying assumptions. In addition to the
common tests covering demographic and macroeconomic variables (see Table 1), specific scenarios apply
for each expenditure item.
Table 1: Overview of the common sensitivity tests around the baseline
Demography Inflation Labour force Productivity

Higher life Lower/higher Higher employment Lower/higher TFP
Lower fertility Higher inflation
expectancy migration rate older workers growth
Additional gain 33% less/more 20% lower Employment rate of

TFP growth
in life non-EU fertility rate Converge to 2% older workers (55-74y)
converges to
expectancy at immigration over over the entire by T+30 (T+5 in 10 pps higher than
0.6%/1.0%
birth of two the entire projection baseline). assumed in the baseline
(instead of 0.8%).
years by 2070. projection period. period. projection.
2
Executive Summary
2. MAIN RESULTS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POPULATION AGEING
The EU population is projected to start falling in the coming years while the number of older people
grows, especially relative to the number of people at working age
The total EU population is expected to rise Graph 2: EU – Population by age group and sex, 2022 and 2070
from 449 million people in 2022 to a peak of (thousands)
453 million people in 2026. After that, it Male Female
would fall to 432 million in 2070, a decline 90+

by 4% compared to 2022 (see Table 2). This 85-89
general trend at EU aggregate level 80-84

75-79
encompasses heterogeneous developments at 70-74
country level. For instance, in 13 Member 65-69

60-64
States, the population is projected to increase 55-59
between 2022 and 2070. Yet, an upward 50-54

45-49
shift in the age distribution is expected in all 40-44
Member States. As shown in Graph 2 for the 35-39
30-34
EU, the size of older age groups would 25-29
grow, while younger age brackets would 20-24
shrink. The few countries where the 15-19

10-14
2070
working-age population (people aged 20 to 5-9 2022
64) is projected to increase would see an 16000 12000 8000 4000 0

0-4
0 4000 8000 12000 16000
even greater increase in the population aged
65 or more.
Relating the old-age population to the working-age population provides the old-age dependency ratio.
This ratio gives an idea about the relative shift between potential retirees and potential workers and thus
of how an ageing population alters the beneficiary-contributor balance. As a result of the projected
dynamics in both groups, this ratio will rise sharply in all Member States over the coming decades (see
Table 3). From about 29% in 2010 in the EU, it rose to 36% in 2022 and would rise further to 59% in
2070, with most of the increase expected already by 2045. Put differently, the EU goes from having
nearly thirty people aged 20 to 64 for every ten people aged over 65 years in 2022, to having less than
twenty people by 2045.
Projected changes in the size and age profile of the population are determined by assumptions regarding
fertility rates, mortality rates and migration (see Table 3).
• The total fertility rate in the EU is projected to rise from 1.5 live births per woman in 2022 to 1.6 by
2070. This limited increase reflects the assumption that, in the very long run, fertility rises to the
highest rate currently observed across the EU Member States. Fertility rates would stay below the
natural replacement rate of 2.1 in all countries.
• Life expectancy at birth for males is expected to increase by 7.7 years in the EU, from 78.4 in 2022 to
86.1 in 2070. Female life expectancy at birth would rise by 6.4 years, from 84.0 in 2022 to 90.4 in
2070, thus leading to a further convergence between sexes. When looking at the remaining life
expectancy at the age of 65, the average increase is about 5 years for both. These projections are based
on the hypothesis of a partial upward convergence in longevity between Member States.
• Net migration is assumed to return to pre-2022 levels in the coming years, at around 1 million people
annually (0.2% of the EU population). This compares to an exceptionally high inflow of around 1% of
the EU population in 2022 because of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Countries’ long-
3
European Commission
term immigration and emigration rates are based on a partial convergence to past trends for the EU as
a whole. Net migration is projected to be positive in nearly all countries, at an average of 0.3% of the
EU population in 2022-2070.
Labour force participation is projected to rise, driven by older workers and women in general, but not
sufficiently to compensate for the decline in the working-age population
The macroeconomic implications of the demographic projections depend on how many people take part
in the labour market and for how long. The Ageing Report’s labour force projections follow a cohort
approach that captures the current situation in each country. It assumes no further policy changes beyond
already legislated pension reforms. The participation rate of the EU working-age population is projected
to increase by around 3 pps and by 10 pps for people aged 55-64 (see Table 4). The upward trend reflects
the combined effect of pension reforms on the exit behaviour of older age groups and the progressive
increase in the labour market attachment of female cohorts.
However, in most countries, higher participation is expected to be insufficient to offset the projected
decline in the working-age population. As a result, the number of people in the labour force is projected
to decrease by 12% (25 million people) between 2022 and 2070 in the EU or 0.3% annually. In several
Member States, the labour force would shrink by more than a quarter by 2070.
Employment rates are also projected to increase, though total hours worked would decline because of
population ageing
The employment assumptions are determined by the population, participation and unemployment
projections. The unemployment projections are based on estimates of structural unemployment rates. The
unemployment rate for the 20-64 age group would fall from 5.9% in 2022 to 5.1% in 2070 (see Table 4).
Employment in the EU is projected to increase from around 75% of the working-age population in 2022
to around 79% in 2070. This 4 pps increase includes a nearly 6 pps increase for women and about 2 pps
for men. The employment rate of people aged 55-64 is expected to rise by as much as 10 pps on average.
While a higher share of the population is expected to be employed, a shrinking working-age population
means that the total number of hours worked is nevertheless expected to fall by 9% in the EU between
2022 and 2070. As a result, the economic old-age dependency ratio (inactive people above the age of 65
relative to employed people aged 20-64) would rise from 46% in 2022 to 70% in 2070 (see Table 2). This
means that for every ten inactive people above 65, there will be 14 employed people in 2070, down from
22 in 2022 and 16 in 2045.
Given the expected decline in hours worked, labour productivity growth would become the sole driver
of GDP growth, projected at 1.3% in the EU
Annual real GDP growth of 1.3% on average is projected for the EU in the period 2022-2070 (see
Table 5). On the one hand, the contribution of labour to GDP growth is expected to turn negative as of the
late 2020s, decreasing by 0.2% on average over the projection period. This decline results from a lower
share of working-age people in an already shrinking total population, with a higher employment rate
somewhat offsetting the decline. On the other hand, labour productivity growth is assumed to grow by
1.4% on average over the projection period, of which 0.9 pps comes from total factor productivity (TFP)
and 0.5 pps from capital deepening.
4
Executive Summary
In the updated projections, TFP growth converges to 0.8% in the long term in all countries. Member
States with GDP per capita below the EU average are assumed to experience faster TFP growth in the
first part of the projection period, in line with past trends. A similar catching-up mechanism applies to the
capital deepening projections. The TFP convergence growth rate of 0.8% compares to 1% in the 2021
Ageing Report. Despite this downward revision, the assumptions still imply an acceleration in
productivity growth in the medium term for many Members States, considering that TFP growth has
fallen back to historically low levels in recent years.
The sensitivity tests (see Table 1) show the responsiveness of the economic growth projections to the
underlying assumptions, with stronger growth projected in case of higher migration, a higher employment
rate among older people or higher productivity growth. Similarly, lower migration, lower fertility, and
lower productivity would reduce economic growth. Some policy scenarios illustrate the role of pension
policies for future economic development, e.g. the scenario that models the impact of introducing a link
between legal retirement ages and gains in life expectancy.
Comparison with the economic projections underlying the 2021 Ageing Report
In 2022, the base year for the new projections, the EU counted 0.2 million more people than anticipated in
the previous demographic projections (see Table 2), but 0.9 million fewer people aged 65 or over. This
reflects a surge in mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic. The latter is visible in the life expectancy at
birth, which in 2021 had returned to the 2019 level only in a few countries. In 2022, life expectancy was
estimated to be still 0.6 years lower for men and 0.5 years for women than projected in the 2021 Ageing
Report (see Table 3). The 4.8 million higher net migration in 2022 is due to the strong inflow of displaced
Ukrainians.
The EU population is projected to shrink less by 2070, counting 7.9 million more people compared to the
demographic assumptions underpinning the 2021 Ageing Report, with a larger population in most
Member States. On average, dependency ratios are similar to those in the previous update, though the size
of the revision varies between countries. With few exceptions, the assumptions on future fertility are
unchanged from the previous update (see Table 3). The same holds for life expectancy, which is about
identical to the previous assumption for 2070. This implies a higher increase over the projection period,
as the COVID-19 impact gradually disappears from the statistics. Net migration is higher on average.
Participation rates being generally higher and unemployment rates lower in 2022 than projected in the
2021 Ageing Report, employment rates came out better than anticipated, being 1.6 pps higher on average
in the EU (see Table 4). Among the 55-64 age group, employment was 1.4 pps higher. When comparing
the projections for 2070 between the subsequent vintages, employment rates are 2.3 pps higher on
average. This follows from the better 2022 starting point, though also the overall increase in 2022-2070 is
0.7 pps higher in the new projections and 2.2 pps for people aged 55-64.
Average GDP growth in 2022-2070 is 0.1 pp lower for the EU than projected in the 2021 Ageing Report
(see Table 5). The annual contribution from hourly labour productivity is 0.2 pps lower, with weaker TFP
and capital deepening growth because of the downward revision in the long-term convergence
assumptions. The number of hours worked grows by 0.1 pp more on average, thus partially offsetting the
overall negative GDP impact of the new productivity assumptions.
5
6
Table 2: Population projections: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to 2021 Ageing Report
2024 Ageing Report 2024 Ageing Report - 2021 Ageing Report

European Commission
(1) (2)
Total population (million) Old-age dependency ratio (%) Economic dependency ratio (%) Total population (thousand) Old-age dependency ratio (pps) Economic dependency ratio (%)
difference difference difference

change change
2022 2070 % change 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 in % 2022 2070 in change 2022 2070 in change
(pps) (pps)
change(3) (pps) (pps)
BE 11.7 12.7 9% 33.7 53.0 19.2 45.4 66.9 21.5 78 857 7% -0.6 -0.3 0.2 -1.6 -5.0 -3.4 BE
BG 6.9 5.3 -23% 36.6 60.3 23.6 45.1 75.5 30.3 72 263 5% -1.7 -0.5 1.1 -2.5 -2.6 -0.1 BG
CZ 10.7 10.6 -2% 34.9 51.5 16.6 40.2 62.7 22.5 -28 359 4% -0.5 -2.2 -1.7 -1.9 -2.7 -0.7 CZ
DK 5.9 6.2 5% 35.4 56.5 21.1 40.3 56.6 16.3 58 31 1% -0.6 2.8 3.4 -2.2 0.6 2.8 DK
DE 83.9 84.2 0% 37.4 55.0 17.6 42.9 62.9 20.0 513 2526 3% -0.5 0.4 0.9 -1.0 0.1 1.1 DE
EE 1.4 1.3 -3% 34.9 57.3 22.4 35.9 58.5 22.6 24 117 10% -1.0 -2.0 -1.0 -3.8 -2.9 0.8 EE
IE 5.1 6.1 19% 25.7 55.6 29.8 30.4 63.8 33.3 -14 -426 -7% 0.0 2.6 2.6 -0.5 0.8 1.3 IE
EL 10.4 7.8 -25% 39.0 66.0 27.0 56.2 80.9 24.7 -175 -809 -9% -0.9 0.8 1.7 -4.1 3.7 7.8 EL
ES 47.7 47.7 0% 33.3 64.5 31.2 46.3 77.8 31.5 -258 642 1% -0.4 1.9 2.3 -1.9 2.2 4.1 ES
FR 68.0 69.7 2% 38.2 57.8 19.7 49.7 70.2 20.5 427 234 0% -0.5 0.9 1.5 -3.0 -1.9 1.2 FR
HR 3.9 3.0 -22% 38.9 62.2 23.3 53.9 78.5 24.6 -136 -16 -1% 1.2 -2.3 -3.5 -0.1 -11.3 -11.2 HR
IT 59.0 53.3 -10% 40.8 65.5 24.7 60.0 79.9 20.0 -1111 -614 -1% 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 -2.3 -2.7 IT
CY 0.9 1.0 9% 26.7 55.5 28.8 31.1 62.4 31.3 8 -102 -9% -1.2 4.8 6.0 -3.0 5.6 8.6 CY
LV 1.9 1.3 -33% 36.0 61.0 25.0 41.0 75.5 34.5 16 79 7% -1.0 -2.5 -1.6 -3.4 -2.9 0.4 LV
LT 2.8 2.0 -29% 33.1 72.4 39.3 37.2 86.6 49.4 68 190 10% -1.4 6.4 7.7 -4.4 7.7 12.1 LT
LU 0.7 1.0 49% 23.1 55.4 32.3 30.0 73.1 43.0 10 188 24% -0.7 -0.7 0.0 -2.0 -1.6 0.4 LU
HU 9.7 9.0 -7% 34.5 54.3 19.8 40.4 62.0 21.5 -47 103 1% -0.5 -3.1 -2.6 -3.8 -4.9 -1.1 HU
MT 0.5 0.8 54% 30.5 65.4 34.9 35.2 75.5 40.3 -9 104 15% -0.3 3.0 3.3 -2.6 2.3 4.9 MT
NL 17.7 18.7 6% 34.3 56.3 22.0 37.3 55.9 18.6 105 759 4% -0.6 1.1 1.7 -3.1 -4.6 -1.5 NL
AT 9.0 9.5 6% 32.0 57.0 25.0 39.5 67.4 27.9 66 298 3% -0.5 1.1 1.6 -1.2 -0.1 1.1 AT
PL 38.1 31.8 -16% 31.9 63.7 31.9 39.0 80.0 41.0 283 1040 3% -0.8 -4.1 -3.2 -2.8 -10.0 -7.1 PL
PT 10.4 9.0 -14% 40.7 67.8 27.0 48.6 75.8 27.2 99 493 6% 1.4 0.5 -0.9 1.0 -0.5 -1.5 PT
RO 19.0 15.0 -21% 33.5 55.8 22.3 47.9 78.8 30.9 130 1363 10% -0.7 -6.3 -5.6 3.8 -0.9 -4.7 RO
SI 2.1 2.0 -5% 36.1 57.5 21.5 44.1 69.7 25.6 0 64 3% 0.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.3 -2.8 -1.4 SI
SK 5.5 4.8 -12% 28.5 59.7 31.2 35.4 69.7 34.3 12 104 2% -0.6 -3.4 -2.8 -3.0 -17.0 -14.0 SK
FI 5.6 5.2 -6% 41.2 62.4 21.3 48.4 70.1 21.7 41 199 4% -0.4 0.0 0.4 -2.4 -0.8 1.6 FI
SE 10.5 12.9 23% 36.0 50.4 14.4 39.1 52.9 13.7 -38 -183 -1% -0.1 0.6 0.7 -1.4 -3.0 -1.7 SE
NO 5.4 6.5 20% 31.2 54.4 23.2 33.8 60.7 26.9 -19 -201 -3% 0.1 1.9 1.9 -1.4 -0.9 0.5 NO
EA 348.2 341.1 -2% 36.9 59.6 22.7 47.1 70.0 22.9 -238 4887 1% -0.3 0.6 0.9 -1.6 -1.0 0.5 EA
EU 449.1 431.9 -4% 36.1 59.1 23.0 45.7 69.9 24.2 193 7864 2% -0.4 -0.1 0.3 -1.6 -1.9 -0.3 EU
(1) (population 65+) / (population 20-64y).

(2) (inactive population 65+) / (employment 20-64y).
(3) 2070 difference as % of 2070 population according to EUROPO2019 (2021 Ageing Report).

Table 3: Population assumptions: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to 2021 Ageing Report
Fertility rate Life expectancy at birth (y) Fertility rate Life expectancy at birth (y)
Net migration ('000) Net migration ('000)
(live births/woman) Males Females (live births/woman) Males Females
change diff in diff in

avg change change avg 2022- avg 2022-
2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 in avg 2022 2070 change 2022 2070 change 2022 2070
2022-70 2022-70 2022-70 2070(1) 2070(1)
2022-70 2022-70 2022-70
BE 1.53 1.64 1.59 79.5 86.4 6.9 84.6 90.5 5.9 116 29 0.3% -0.03 -0.04 0.0 -0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 86 8 0.1% BE
BG 1.56 1.69 1.65 70.5 82.8 12.3 77.7 87.7 10.0 160 16 0.2% -0.04 -0.02 0.0 -1.8 -0.1 1.7 -1.6 0.0 1.6 164 6 0.1% BG
CZ 1.72 1.75 1.74 75.9 84.8 8.9 81.9 89.2 7.3 471 25 0.3% 0.00 -0.03 0.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 -0.7 0.0 0.7 442 7 0.1% CZ
DK 1.68 1.73 1.71 79.9 86.4 6.5 83.6 90.1 6.5 55 13 0.2% -0.04 -0.04 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 47 2 0.0% DK
DE 1.53 1.63 1.58 79.0 86.0 7.0 83.8 90.0 6.2 1631 236 0.4% 0.00 -0.04 0.0 -0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.3 1349 22 0.1% DE
EE 1.57 1.73 1.69 74.3 84.1 9.8 83.0 89.8 6.8 45 4 0.3% 0.08 0.03 0.0 -0.6 -0.2 0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.3 43 1 0.2% EE
IE 1.60 1.69 1.65 80.8 86.9 6.1 84.6 90.6 6.0 93 12 0.3% -0.20 -0.12 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3 60 1 0.0% IE
EL 1.41 1.55 1.48 78.8 86.5 7.7 84.2 90.4 6.2 22 20 0.1% 0.06 0.01 0.0 -0.7 0.1 0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.5 10 -6 -0.1% EL
ES 1.19 1.42 1.31 80.8 87.1 6.3 86.5 91.5 5.0 677 194 0.5% -0.10 -0.07 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.4 399 25 0.1% ES
FR 1.82 1.79 1.80 79.7 86.7 7.0 85.9 91.3 5.4 275 99 0.1% -0.02 -0.05 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.5 204 18 0.0% FR
HR 1.49 1.59 1.54 74.9 84.2 9.3 81.2 88.9 7.7 14 10 0.2% 0.04 0.00 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 0.1 0.8 19 4 0.1% HR
IT 1.24 1.45 1.35 81.1 87.1 6.0 85.5 91.0 5.5 348 240 0.4% -0.10 -0.07 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.5 154 34 0.1% IT
CY 1.37 1.51 1.44 80.5 86.8 6.3 84.6 90.3 5.7 18 2 0.2% 0.02 -0.02 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.7 -0.6 0.1 0.7 14 0 -0.1% CY
LV 1.53 1.70 1.64 70.3 82.5 12.2 79.8 88.4 8.6 33 2 -0.1% -0.07 -0.01 0.0 -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 -0.1 0.6 40 1 0.2% LV
LT 1.44 1.65 1.56 70.8 82.8 12.0 80.5 88.9 8.4 82 6 0.1% -0.17 -0.05 -0.1 -0.9 -0.1 0.8 -0.8 0.1 0.9 86 3 0.3% LT
LU 1.38 1.56 1.48 80.7 86.9 6.2 85.0 90.8 5.8 15 4 0.7% 0.02 0.01 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.2 10 1 0.3% LU
HU 1.62 1.72 1.69 72.5 83.6 11.1 79.3 88.5 9.2 48 26 0.3% 0.09 0.02 0.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 22 2 0.0% HU
MT 1.15 1.49 1.36 80.9 87.0 6.1 84.6 90.8 6.2 11 4 1.0% -0.02 0.02 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.4 2 0 0.2% MT
NL 1.53 1.63 1.59 80.3 86.7 6.4 83.6 90.0 6.4 235 42 0.3% -0.05 -0.05 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.4 182 9 0.1% NL
AT 1.44 1.57 1.51 79.5 86.3 6.8 84.2 90.2 6.0 104 35 0.4% -0.02 -0.03 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.4 76 9 0.1% AT
PL 1.39 1.61 1.53 73.2 84.1 10.9 81.3 89.5 8.2 1001 69 0.2% 0.04 0.05 0.1 -1.5 -0.2 1.3 -1.2 0.0 1.2 982 -3 0.0% PL
PT 1.41 1.55 1.48 79.6 86.9 7.3 85.0 90.4 5.4 82 39 0.3% -0.03 -0.04 0.0 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 64 20 0.1% PT
RO 1.81 1.77 1.79 70.9 83.3 12.4 78.6 88.5 9.9 79 28 0.0% 0.19 0.03 0.1 -1.7 -0.2 1.5 -1.3 0.0 1.3 143 7 0.1% RO
SI 1.59 1.69 1.65 78.5 86.0 7.5 84.4 90.5 6.1 15 6 0.3% 0.04 0.01 0.0 -0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.5 7 1 0.1% SI
SK 1.60 1.66 1.63 73.4 84.1 10.7 80.4 89.1 8.7 96 8 0.1% 0.02 -0.01 0.0 -1.3 0.0 1.3 -1.1 0.1 1.2 92 0 0.0% SK
FI 1.39 1.53 1.47 79.0 86.1 7.1 84.1 90.4 6.3 77 13 0.3% 0.05 0.00 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.6 -0.9 0.0 0.9 64 0 0.0% FI
SE 1.68 1.76 1.74 81.5 87.0 5.5 85.4 90.7 5.3 99 32 0.4% -0.03 -0.03 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0.1 36 2 0.0% SE
NO 1.47 1.60 1.54 82.1 87.3 5.2 85.1 90.7 5.6 36 26 0.4% -0.06 -0.05 -0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 8 3 0.0% NO
EA 1.48 1.60 1.54 79.6 86.5 6.9 84.8 90.7 5.8 3990 1002 0.3% -0.04 -0.05 0.0 -0.5 0.0 0.6 -0.4 0.0 0.4 2960 152 0.1% EA
EU 1.50 1.62 1.57 78.4 86.1 7.7 84.0 90.4 6.4 5902 1212 0.3% -0.02 -0.03 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.5 4796 175 0.1% EU
(1) Net migration as % of total population in the previous year.

Executive Summary
7
8
Table 4: Labour force projections: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to 2021 Ageing Report
European Commission
Employment rate (%) Participation rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) Employment rate (pps) Participation rate (pps) Unemployment rate (pps)
(20-64y) (55-64y) (20-64y) (55-64y) (20-64y) (20-64y) (55-64y) (20-64y) (55-64y) (20-64y)
pps pps pps pps pps
2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 pps diff 2022 2070 pps diff 2022 2070 pps diff 2022 2070 pps diff 2022 2070 pps diff
change change change change change
BE 72.1 75.8 3.7 56.9 67.8 10.9 76.1 80.3 4.1 59.1 70.6 11.5 5.3 5.6 0.3 0.8 4.8 4.0 -1.1 6.9 8.0 0.2 4.6 4.4 -1.9 6.6 8.4 -0.8 -0.6 0.2 BE
BG 75.8 76.6 0.8 68.5 70.5 2.0 79.1 80.5 1.3 71.0 73.5 2.5 4.2 4.9 0.6 1.5 3.1 1.6 6.8 6.1 -0.7 0.9 2.9 2.0 6.3 5.8 -0.5 -0.8 -0.4 0.4 BG
CZ 81.3 79.4 -1.9 73.2 73.2 0.0 83.1 81.5 -1.6 74.7 75.0 0.3 2.2 2.6 0.5 2.2 0.9 -1.3 8.6 4.9 -3.7 1.0 0.2 -0.8 7.7 4.3 -3.3 -1.4 -0.9 0.6 CZ
DK 80.2 84.8 4.6 73.3 84.3 11.0 83.6 88.0 4.4 75.5 86.6 11.1 4.1 3.6 -0.5 1.6 3.9 2.3 0.8 4.6 3.8 1.1 4.3 3.2 0.5 5.0 4.5 -0.7 0.3 1.0 DK
DE 80.7 81.9 1.2 73.3 75.2 2.0 83.3 85.2 1.9 75.3 77.9 2.6 3.1 3.8 0.8 0.5 1.2 0.7 1.5 1.9 0.4 0.3 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.8 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 DE
EE 81.8 86.1 4.3 73.4 85.0 11.6 86.5 91.7 5.1 77.1 89.7 12.6 5.4 6.0 0.6 2.5 3.6 1.1 3.7 2.3 -1.4 2.4 3.7 1.2 3.4 2.1 -1.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 EE
IE 78.2 81.3 3.1 66.7 71.6 4.9 81.6 85.8 4.3 69.0 74.8 5.8 4.2 5.3 1.2 4.0 5.4 1.4 5.2 4.7 -0.5 2.4 4.8 2.3 4.4 4.4 0.0 -2.1 -1.1 1.0 IE
EL 66.1 74.7 8.6 52.2 74.5 22.3 75.4 79.9 4.5 57.4 78.2 20.8 12.4 6.5 -5.8 2.6 -1.8 -4.4 4.8 -1.9 -6.7 0.5 -2.3 -2.8 3.6 -2.6 -6.2 -2.9 -0.4 2.5 EL
ES 69.6 76.4 6.8 57.6 72.9 15.2 79.6 81.6 2.0 65.4 77.5 12.1 12.6 6.4 -6.2 1.5 0.1 -1.4 3.8 -0.8 -4.6 -0.7 -0.9 -0.2 -0.5 -1.2 -0.7 -3.6 -1.2 2.4 ES
FR 74.0 79.0 5.0 56.9 71.9 14.9 79.6 84.3 4.7 60.4 75.9 15.5 7.0 6.3 -0.7 2.8 4.5 1.6 2.6 8.6 6.0 1.3 4.4 3.1 1.7 8.9 7.2 -2.1 -0.5 1.6 FR
HR 70.0 76.1 6.1 50.4 62.3 11.9 74.9 81.2 6.2 53.0 65.4 12.4 6.6 6.3 -0.3 2.3 6.4 4.2 5.1 9.8 4.7 2.3 6.6 4.3 6.0 10.9 4.9 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 HR
IT 64.8 71.3 6.5 55.1 73.3 18.2 70.4 76.3 5.8 57.9 76.3 18.4 8.0 6.4 -1.5 0.1 1.6 1.4 -4.7 0.1 4.8 -1.2 1.4 2.6 -5.3 0.4 5.7 -1.8 -0.3 1.4 IT
CY 77.5 80.8 3.3 64.6 72.5 7.9 83.2 86.1 3.0 68.0 76.1 8.1 6.8 6.2 -0.6 1.7 0.7 -1.0 5.0 -2.9 -7.9 1.2 0.3 -0.9 4.2 -4.0 -8.2 -0.7 -0.5 0.2 CY
LV 77.0 78.0 1.0 69.5 70.6 1.1 82.7 83.3 0.6 73.7 74.6 0.9 6.9 6.5 -0.5 1.3 0.6 -0.7 6.1 5.9 -0.3 0.4 0.3 0.0 4.7 5.1 0.4 -1.1 -0.4 0.8 LV
LT 79.1 79.8 0.8 70.1 70.3 0.1 84.2 85.4 1.2 75.3 75.7 0.4 6.1 6.5 0.4 2.1 -0.6 -2.8 8.2 1.2 -7.0 1.5 -1.0 -2.5 8.3 1.2 -7.1 -0.9 -0.4 0.5 LT
LU 74.5 74.5 0.0 46.3 50.2 4.0 77.6 78.4 0.8 48.4 53.3 4.9 4.0 5.0 1.0 1.2 0.4 -0.8 2.9 6.7 3.7 0.1 0.8 0.7 3.1 8.1 5.0 -1.4 0.5 2.0 LU
HU 80.3 83.6 3.3 65.9 75.5 9.6 83.2 86.6 3.4 68.0 77.8 9.8 3.5 3.5 -0.1 3.4 1.7 -1.7 0.1 -5.9 -6.1 1.8 1.4 -0.5 -0.3 -5.8 -5.5 -2.0 -0.5 1.5 HU
MT 81.0 83.5 2.5 54.3 70.0 15.7 83.3 87.0 3.8 55.3 71.8 16.5 2.7 4.0 1.3 2.2 0.8 -1.4 2.0 2.5 0.4 1.3 1.0 -0.2 1.8 2.6 0.8 -1.2 0.2 1.5 MT
NL 82.9 87.7 4.8 73.1 81.6 8.4 85.4 90.4 5.0 75.3 84.2 8.9 2.9 3.0 0.1 4.0 6.9 2.9 4.8 6.9 2.1 2.9 5.8 3.0 3.5 5.6 2.1 -1.5 -1.5 0.0 NL
AT 77.3 81.4 4.2 56.5 67.1 10.7 80.9 85.1 4.1 58.6 69.4 10.7 4.5 4.3 -0.2 0.7 1.9 1.2 1.8 5.1 3.3 0.7 2.2 1.5 2.0 5.5 3.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 AT
PL 76.9 76.9 0.1 56.8 60.7 3.9 79.1 79.3 0.2 57.8 61.9 4.1 2.9 3.0 0.1 3.4 4.9 1.4 5.6 7.6 2.0 2.3 3.5 1.2 5.0 6.7 1.8 -1.6 -2.0 -0.4 PL
PT 77.6 80.7 3.1 65.8 76.4 10.6 82.5 86.1 3.6 69.3 80.6 11.3 5.9 6.2 0.3 0.8 0.3 -0.5 4.0 2.6 -1.3 0.6 0.4 -0.3 3.5 2.2 -1.3 -0.3 0.0 0.3 PT
RO 68.3 68.3 0.0 46.8 56.3 9.4 72.1 72.5 0.4 48.6 58.5 9.9 5.2 5.8 0.6 -3.0 -4.4 -1.4 -4.0 0.6 4.6 -3.0 -3.5 -0.5 -3.9 1.3 5.2 0.2 1.4 1.3 RO
SI 78.3 80.6 2.3 55.1 72.4 17.3 81.4 85.4 4.0 57.3 76.6 19.4 3.9 5.7 1.8 0.8 2.3 1.4 1.4 11.7 10.3 -0.1 2.4 2.5 0.4 12.1 11.7 -1.2 0.0 1.2 SI
SK 76.8 79.7 2.9 64.0 79.2 15.2 81.7 84.8 3.1 67.1 82.8 15.7 6.0 6.0 0.1 3.8 8.4 4.6 8.0 22.9 14.9 3.5 8.4 4.9 7.6 23.1 15.5 -0.7 -0.6 0.1 SK
FI 78.3 80.3 2.0 71.5 77.2 5.8 83.7 85.6 1.9 77.0 83.1 6.0 6.4 6.2 -0.2 1.0 0.6 -0.4 4.8 1.3 -3.6 1.1 0.6 -0.5 5.6 1.7 -3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 FI
SE 82.3 84.2 1.9 77.8 82.4 4.6 87.8 89.1 1.3 82.2 86.5 4.3 6.3 5.5 -0.8 0.9 1.2 0.3 1.9 6.3 4.5 0.2 2.0 1.8 1.8 7.6 5.7 -0.7 0.8 1.6 SE
NO 80.8 82.0 1.3 74.5 72.1 -2.4 83.0 84.5 1.5 75.5 73.2 -2.3 2.7 3.0 0.3 1.7 3.3 1.6 2.2 2.9 0.6 0.8 3.3 2.5 1.9 2.9 1.0 -1.2 -0.1 1.1 NO
EA 74.1 78.6 4.6 62.5 73.5 11.0 79.3 83.1 3.8 65.9 76.9 11.0 6.6 5.4 -1.2 1.6 2.4 0.8 0.8 3.3 2.5 0.4 2.1 1.7 0.1 3.3 3.2 -1.5 -0.4 1.1 EA
EU 74.7 78.5 3.8 62.3 72.3 10.0 79.4 82.7 3.3 65.4 75.5 10.1 5.9 5.1 -0.9 1.6 2.3 0.7 1.4 3.6 2.2 0.5 2.0 1.5 0.8 3.6 2.8 -1.4 -0.4 1.0 EU

Table 5: GDP projections: 2024 Ageing Report and changes compared to 2021 Ageing Report
Average real GDP growth (2022-2070) Average real GDP growth (2022-2070; pps)
Labour productivity Labour input Real GDP Labour productivity Labour input Real GDP
(GDP per hour worked) (hours worked) per capita (GDP per hour worked) (hours worked) per capita
Working-age Average growth Working-age Average growth
Capital Employment Capital Employment
TFP change in: Population population hours TFP change in: Population population hours
deepening rate deepening rate
share worked share worked
5= 5=
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 6 7 8 9 10=1-6 1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
6+7+8+9 6+7+8+9
BE 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 BE
BG 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 2.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 BG
CZ 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 CZ
DK 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 DK
DE 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 DE
EE 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4 EE
IE 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 IE
EL 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 EL
ES 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 ES
FR 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 FR
HR 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 HR
IT 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.3 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 IT
CY 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 CY
LV 1.1 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.9 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 LV
LT 1.1 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 LT
LU 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5 LU
HU 1.7 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 HU
MT 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 MT
NL 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 NL
AT 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 AT
PL 1.5 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 PL
PT 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 PT
RO 1.7 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 RO
SI 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 SI
SK 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 SK
FI 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 FI
SE 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 SE
NO 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 NO
EA 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 EA
EU 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 EU
GDP growth is potential growth, which coincides with actual growth as of 2027 in the projections (see Part 1 – Chapter 3).

Executive Summary
9
Part I
Underlying assumptions
1. DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS
1.1. INTRODUCTION
EUROPOP2023, the 2022-based population projections, was released by Eurostat in March 2023. It
provides the demographic basis for the age-related expenditure projections in the 2024 Ageing Report for
the 27 EU Member States and Norway. The assumptions on fertility, mortality and net migration
underlying the projections for the period 2022-2100, as well as the underlying methodologies used can be
found on the Eurostat dedicated website. ( 1) National statistical institutes collaborated with Eurostat for
the data collection and had the opportunity to make methodological suggestions during the preparation of
these population projections. ( 2)
EUROPOP2023 applies a ‘partial convergence’ approach, meaning that the country-specific key
demographic determinants converge in the very long term towards common values. Setting the
convergence point far into the future – even beyond the endpoint of the projections – has the advantage of
taking due account of recent country-specific trends at the start, while at the same time assuming that
Member States’ demographic drivers will converge over time. These demographic determinants are the
fertility rate (impacting the number of births), the mortality rate (impacting the number of deaths) and net
migration (the population growth beyond the ‘natural’ growth due to births and deaths) derived from
converging emigration rates and per capita immigration levels.
The projection methodology assumes that fertility and mortality rates converge to those of the ‘best
performing’ Member States. As a result, fertility rates would rise in almost all Member States between
2022 and 2070, faster in the countries that currently have the lowest rates. Similarly, life expectancy
follows an upward convergence trajectory, with longevity increasing relatively faster in countries with
currently the lowest levels of life expectancy.
Net migration is estimated through separate emigration and immigration flows, based on past trends, the
latest empirical evidence, long-term partial convergence and intra-EU flows consistency. Moreover, when
the working-age population shrinks, additional ‘partially compensating’ immigration is assumed. For this
exercise, specific assumptions are made on the impact of displaced persons from Ukraine (see Box I.1.1).
1.2. DEVELOPMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR FERTILITY RATES
The total fertility rate is assumed to rise in almost all Member States between 2022 and 2070,
increasing from 1.50 to 1.62 on average in the EU.
1.2.1. Past trends
Total fertility rates (TFR ( 3)) declined sharply in the EU Member States following the post-war ‘baby
boom’. From an EU average of 2.59 in 1960, the number of live births per woman declined steadily in
nearly all countries, to less than two children on average in 1980, thus below the natural replacement rate
of 2.10 (see Table I.1.1). By 1980, fertility had fallen to 1.60 or less in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands.
(1) For the methodology, see Eurostat (2023).

(2) This does not preclude national statistical institutes having different population projections based on their own assumptions and
methodologies.
(3) Fertility rates reflect the average number of children a woman would have, should she, at each childbearing age, have the
fertility rates of the year under review. This number is obtained by summing the fertility rates by age and is called the Total
Fertility Rate or TFR.
12
Part I
By the mid-1990s, fertility rates had fallen below the natural replacement rate in all Member States. In
2000, fertility rates were below 1.40 in fifteen Member States, with women in Czechia, Spain and Latvia
giving birth to just 1.20 children on average.
The total fertility rate in the EU seemed to have reached its nadir by the turn of the century, hovering
around 1.50 since then. The average masks nonetheless diverse developments among Member States.
Fertility increased in all but five Member States in the 2000s. Since 2010, the trend has reversed again in
several cases, with decreases in 17 Member States. Since 2000, the largest declines were in Malta,
Luxembourg, Finland, and Cyprus, with a decline in the TFR of 0.30-0.60 live births per woman.
Conversely, Czechia, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Estonia saw increases
of 0.30-0.70 in their fertility rates during the same period.
In 2021, France, Czechia, Romania, and Ireland had the highest fertility rates, at around 1.80. At 1.13
children per woman, Malta had the lowest fertility rate in 2021, followed by 1.19 in Spain, 1.33 in Poland
and 1.25 in Italy.
Table I.1.1: Past trends in total fertility rates (TFR), Table I.1.2: Projection of total fertility rates (TFR) in
1960-2021 EUROPOP2023, 2022-2070
change avg
1960- 2000-
1960 1980 2000 2021 2022 2030 2050 2070 2022- 2022-
2021 2021
2070 2070
BE 2.54 1.68 1.67 1.60 -1.0 -0.1 BE 1.53 1.55 1.60 1.64 0.11 1.6
BG 2.31 2.05 1.26 1.58 -0.8 0.3 BG 1.56 1.60 1.66 1.69 0.13 1.6
CZ 2.09 2.08 1.15 1.83 -0.4 0.7 CZ 1.72 1.73 1.75 1.75 0.04 1.7
DK 2.57 1.55 1.77 1.72 -0.9 -0.1 DK 1.68 1.69 1.72 1.73 0.05 1.7
DE 2.37 1.56 1.38 1.58 -0.8 0.2 DE 1.53 1.55 1.59 1.63 0.09 1.6
EE 1.98 2.02 1.36 1.61 -0.4 0.3 EE 1.57 1.64 1.71 1.73 0.15 1.7
IE 3.78 3.21 1.89 1.78 -2.2 -0.1 IE 1.60 1.62 1.66 1.69 0.09 1.6
EL 2.23 2.23 1.25 1.43 -0.8 0.2 EL 1.41 1.44 1.50 1.55 0.14 1.5
ES 2.86 2.22 1.22 1.19 -1.7 0.0 ES 1.19 1.23 1.33 1.42 0.23 1.3
FR 2.73 1.95 1.89 1.84 -0.9 0.0 FR 1.82 1.81 1.80 1.79 -0.03 1.8
HR 2.38 1.90 1.46 1.58 -0.9 0.1 HR 1.49 1.51 1.55 1.59 0.11 1.5
IT 2.40 1.64 1.26 1.25 -1.2 0.0 IT 1.24 1.28 1.37 1.45 0.21 1.4
CY 3.51 2.48 1.64 1.39 -2.2 -0.3 CY 1.37 1.40 1.46 1.51 0.15 1.4
LV 1.95 1.88 1.25 1.57 -0.4 0.3 LV 1.53 1.59 1.66 1.70 0.16 1.6
LT 2.60 1.99 1.39 1.36 -1.1 0.0 LT 1.44 1.49 1.59 1.65 0.21 1.6
LU 2.29 1.50 1.76 1.38 -0.9 -0.4 LU 1.38 1.42 1.51 1.56 0.19 1.5
HU 2.02 1.91 1.32 1.61 -0.4 0.3 HU 1.62 1.67 1.71 1.72 0.10 1.7
MT 3.62 1.99 1.68 1.13 -2.5 -0.6 MT 1.15 1.25 1.40 1.49 0.33 1.4
NL 3.12 1.60 1.72 1.62 -1.6 -0.1 NL 1.53 1.55 1.60 1.63 0.10 1.6
AT 2.69 1.65 1.36 1.48 -1.3 0.1 AT 1.44 1.46 1.52 1.57 0.13 1.5
PL 2.98 2.28 1.37 1.33 -1.6 0.0 PL 1.39 1.45 1.56 1.61 0.22 1.5
PT 3.16 2.25 1.55 1.35 -1.8 -0.2 PT 1.41 1.44 1.50 1.55 0.14 1.5
RO 2.74 2.43 1.31 1.81 -0.9 0.5 RO 1.81 1.80 1.78 1.77 -0.03 1.8
SI 2.18 2.11 1.26 1.64 -0.6 0.4 SI 1.59 1.62 1.67 1.69 0.10 1.7
SK 3.04 2.32 1.30 1.63 -1.5 0.3 SK 1.60 1.61 1.63 1.66 0.06 1.6
FI 2.72 1.63 1.73 1.46 -1.4 -0.3 FI 1.39 1.42 1.48 1.53 0.14 1.5
SE 2.20 1.68 1.54 1.67 -0.5 0.1 SE 1.68 1.73 1.76 1.76 0.08 1.7
NO 2.90 1.72 1.85 1.55 -1.4 -0.3
NO 1.47 1.49 1.55 1.60 0.13 1.5
EA 2.59 1.83 1.47 1.51 -1.1 0.0
EA 1.48 1.50 1.55 1.60 0.12 1.5
EU 2.62 1.92 1.46 1.54 -1.1 0.1
EU 1.50 1.53 1.58 1.62 0.12 1.6
DE: time series does not include the former GDR until
Source: EUROPOP2023 (Eurostat).
1991. CY: 1980 value is from 1982; LV: 1960 based on UN
data; RO: 1960 based on UN data; HR: 2000 value is from
2001.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.
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European Commission
1.2.2. Latest Eurostat population projections
The assumptions on future values of total fertility rates (TFR) are based on two components: a country-
specific trend extrapolation and a convergence to an ultimate value. The trend extrapolation component is
the only driver up to 2024, when the convergence component starts gaining weight. For EUROPOP2023,
this ultimate convergence value equals 1.77 live births per woman, which is derived from projecting TFR
of the EU frontrunners in fertility development, notably Ireland, Sweden, France, Denmark, Finland,
Belgium, and the Netherlands. The year 2021 is excluded as base for projections due to the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic; the rate of 1.77 is thus derived from data for 2016 to 2020.
The fertility rate would rise from 1.50 in 2022 to 1.62 by 2070 for the EU (see Table I.1.2). It is projected
to increase in all Member States, except for marginally decreases in France and Romania (Member States
with the highest current and prospective TFR). Using a long-term anchor to which fertility rates converge
(beyond the projection period) of 1.77 live births per woman implies that fertility in all countries would
remain below the natural replacement rate over the entire projection period. The difference in fertility
between the countries with the highest and lowest rates shrinks from 0.7 live births per woman in 2022 to
0.4 in 2070, with a minimum of 1.42 in Spain versus a maximum of 1.79 in France in 2070. Spain, Italy,
Malta, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg, Austria, and Croatia would have fertility rates
below 1.60 in 2070.
1.3. DEVELOPMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR LIFE EXPECTANCY
The COVID-19 pandemic had a massive impact on mortality rates that led to drops or stagnation of life
expectancy in all countries, though with significant differences among Member States. Following that
impact, Eurostat demographic projections show increases in life expectancy both at birth and at the
age of 65 for both males and females over the period 2022-2070. For the EU, life expectancy at birth
would increase by 7.7 years for males and by 6.4 years for females, with the largest increases in
Member States that currently have the lowest life expectancy.
1.3.1. Past trends
Life expectancy has been increasing in most developed countries for very long periods. Since 1960, there
have been significant gains in life expectancy at birth in all EU Member States (see Table I.1.3). The
average life expectancy at birth increased by more than 15 years between 1960 and 2021 in the EU, from
63.2 years in 1960 to 78.6 in 2021 for males, and from 68.3 years to 84.2 for females.
The gap between the average female and the average male life expectancies at birth rose from 5.1 years in
1960 to close to 7 years in 1980 and remained at that level until 2000, with diverging developments
across Member States. Since 2000, the increase in life expectancy has been 2.7 years for females and 3.9
years for males, resulting in a narrowing of the longevity gap between the two sexes to 5.7 years in 2021.
The general trend of rising life expectancy and a smaller gap between the two sexes differs across
countries. Between 1960 and 2021, females gained 12 years or more in life expectancy in Ireland, Spain,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, and Finland. Gains amounted to less than 7 years in Bulgaria, Latvia
and Slovakia. Gains in male life expectancy over the same period exceeded 12 years in Belgium, Ireland,
Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal, and Finland. Male longevity rose by at most
7 years in Bulgaria, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. ( 4)
(4) Cyprus and Romania also gained less than 7 years (for both men and women), but over a shorter period (1980-2021), see Table
I.1.3.
14
Part I
Up to 2000, the gap between the two sexes widened compared to 1960 in almost all Member States, as
gains in female life expectancy exceeded that for males. Looking at developments since 2000, the gap
widened only in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania.
The COVID-19 pandemic has been having a massive impact on mortality since 2020. The pandemic led
to drops or stagnation of life expectancy in all Member States, though the timing and impact was not
uniform for all countries. In 2020, life expectancy decreased in all Member States but Denmark and
Cyprus. It increased again in 10 Member States in 2021, though without exceeding its 2019 level in any
Member State. While it was close to (not more than 0.2 years below) that level in Belgium, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Finland, and Sweden, it was more than 2 years below the 2019 level in Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Following the temporary shock, the increasing trend
of the past should resume.
Table I.1.3: Past trends in life expectancy at birth, 1960-2021
Males Females
1960- 2000- 1960- 2000-
1960 1980 2000 2021 1960 1980 2000 2021
2021 (1) 2021 2021 (1) 2021
BE 66.8 69.9 74.6 79.4 12.6 4.8 72.8 76.7 81.0 84.3 11.5 3.3 BE
BG 67.5 68.4 68.4 68.0 0.5 -0.4 71.1 73.9 75.0 75.1 4.0 0.1 BG
CZ 67.8 66.9 71.6 74.1 6.3 2.5 73.5 74.0 78.5 80.5 7.0 2.0 CZ
DK 70.4 71.2 74.5 79.6 9.2 5.1 74.4 77.3 79.2 83.3 8.9 4.1 DK
DE 66.5 69.6 75.1 78.4 11.9 3.3 71.7 76.2 81.2 83.3 11.6 2.1 DE
EE 64.7 64.2 65.6 72.7 8.0 7.1 73.1 74.3 76.4 81.4 8.3 5.0 EE
IE 68.1 70.1 74.0 80.5 12.4 6.5 71.9 75.6 79.2 84.3 12.4 5.1 IE
EL 67.3 73.0 75.9 77.4 10.1 1.5 72.4 77.5 81.3 82.9 10.5 1.6 EL
ES 67.4 72.3 75.8 80.4 13.0 4.6 72.2 78.4 82.8 86.2 14.0 3.4 ES
FR 66.9 70.2 75.3 79.3 12.4 4.0 73.6 78.4 83.0 85.5 11.9 2.5 FR
HR : : 70.9 73.6 : 2.7 : : 78.1 79.8 : 1.7 HR
IT 67.2 70.6 76.9 80.5 13.3 3.6 72.3 77.4 82.8 84.9 12.6 2.1 IT
CY : 72.3 75.4 79.2 6.9 3.8 : 77.0 80.1 83.4 6.4 3.3 CY
LV 65.2 63.6 65.0 68.2 3.0 3.2 72.4 74.2 76.1 78.0 5.6 1.9 LV
LT 64.9 65.4 66.7 69.5 4.6 2.8 71.4 75.4 77.4 78.8 7.4 1.4 LT
LU 66.5 70.0 74.6 80.5 14.0 5.9 72.2 75.6 81.3 84.8 12.6 3.5 LU
HU 65.9 65.5 67.5 70.7 4.8 3.2 70.2 72.8 76.2 77.8 7.6 1.6 HU
MT 66.5 68.0 76.3 80.8 14.3 4.5 70.5 72.8 80.5 84.3 13.8 3.8 MT
NL 71.5 72.7 75.6 79.7 8.2 4.1 75.5 79.3 80.7 83.0 7.5 2.3 NL
AT 66.2 69.0 75.2 78.8 12.6 3.6 72.7 76.1 81.2 83.7 11.0 2.5 AT
PL 64.9 66.9 69.6 71.6 6.7 2.0 70.6 75.4 78.0 79.6 9.0 1.6 PL
PT 61.1 67.9 73.3 78.5 17.4 5.2 66.7 74.9 80.4 84.4 17.7 4.0 PT
RO : 66.6 67.7 69.2 2.6 1.5 : 71.9 74.8 76.6 4.7 1.8 RO
SI 66.1 67.4 72.2 77.7 11.6 5.5 72.0 75.2 79.9 83.8 11.8 3.9 SI
SK 67.9 66.7 69.2 71.2 3.3 2.0 72.7 74.4 77.5 78.2 5.5 0.7 SK
FI 65.5 69.2 74.2 79.3 13.8 5.1 72.5 78.0 81.2 84.6 12.1 3.4 FI
SE 71.2 72.8 77.4 81.3 10.1 3.9 74.9 79.0 82.0 84.9 10.0 2.9 SE
NO 71.6 72.4 76.0 81.7 10.1 5.7 76.0 79.3 81.5 84.7 8.7 3.2 NO
EA 65.7 69.2 75.1 79.0 13.3 3.9 71.1 76.0 81.7 84.3 13.2 2.6 EA
EU 63.2 69.5 74.7 78.6 15.3 3.9 68.3 76.4 81.5 84.2 16.0 2.7 EU
(1) 1980-2021 for CY and RO.
HR: 2000 values are from 2001.
There is no consensus among demographers on very long-term trends, e.g. whether there is a natural
biological limit to longevity, the impact of future medical breakthroughs or the long-term effect of public
health programmes and societal behaviour such as the reduction of smoking rates or a higher prevalence
of obesity.
On the one hand, most demographic projections by international and national statistical institutes assume
that gains in life expectancy at birth will slow down compared with historical trends. This is because
15
European Commission
mortality rates at younger ages are already very low and future gains in life expectancy would require
improvements in mortality rates at older ages, which statistically have a smaller impact on life expectancy
at birth.
On the other hand, the current wide range of life expectancies across EU Member States, also compared
with developed non-EU countries, points to considerable scope for future gains. In 2021, life expectancy
at birth for females ranged from 75.1 years in Bulgaria to 86.2 in Spain and from 68.0 years in Bulgaria to
81.3 in Sweden for males, corresponding to gaps of 11.1 and 13.3 years between the highest and lowest
life expectancy in the EU.
Graph I.1.1: Change in life expectancy at birth (2019-2021) – impact of COVID-19 pandemic
84
2020 2021
82
2019
80
78
76
74
72
70
ES IT SE FR NO MT IE LU CY NL BE FI AT PT EL SI DK DE CZ EE HR PL SK LT HU LV RO BG
Source: Eurostat.
The projected changes in life expectancy at birth and at the age of 65 for males and females underlying
the 2022-based population projections are shown in Table I.1.4. The projections assume that increases in
life expectancy at birth are sustained during the projection period, albeit with considerable diversity
across Member States. ( 5)
In the EU, life expectancy at birth for males is expected to increase by 7.7 years over the projection
period, from 78.4 in 2022 to 86.1 in 2070. Female life expectancy at birth would rise by 6.4 years, from
84.0 in 2022 to 90.4 in 2070, leading to a further convergence between sexes. The largest increases in life
expectancies at birth, for both males and females, are projected to take place in the Member States that
currently have the lowest life expectancy.
In 2022, male life expectancy at birth was the lowest in Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, ranging between 70 and 75 years. In these countries, male life
expectancy would increase by 9-12 years by 2070. For females, gains in life expectancy of 8-10 years are
expected in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, from a life expectancy
of around 80 years in 2022. As a result of this catching-up, the difference between the countries with the
highest and the lowest life expectancy would narrow from 11.2 and 8.8 years in 2022 for men and
women, respectively, to 4.6 and 3.8 years in 2070.
(5) Mortality patterns are assumed to partially converge from the latest observed values towards a common (sex-specific) life table
(the ‘ultimate’ life table), which incorporates some information from previous mortality trends of selected countries. The initial
mortality patterns are derived from the period-cohort age- and sex-specific deaths reported by the country for the last years. In
light of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the assumptions formulated for mortality are based on the idea that in 2022 and
2023 the mortality rates have not completely aligned with levels observed before the pandemic but that they will fully return to
that level by 2024. This means that for 2022, age- and sex-specific mortality rates are derived from the averages of the years
2018 to 2021, while those of 2024 are based on age- and sex-specific mortality rates from 2018 and 2019. 2023 rates are
derived as their average. See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/proj_23n_esms.htm.
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Part I
When looking at the remaining life expectancy at the age of 65, average increases of 5.3 and 5.0 years are
expected respectively for males and females in the EU over the projection period, implying a more
modest narrowing of the gap between the two sexes than for life expectancy at birth.
By 2070, male life expectancy at 65 is expected to increase by 7 to 8 years in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. In these countries, remaining life expectancy at the age of 65
was 15 years or less in 2022, compared with an EU average of around 18 years. Gains of more than 6
years are projected for females aged 65 in the same countries. In 2022, female life expectancy at 65 was
less than 20 years in these countries, compared to 21.8 years on average in the EU.
Table I.1.4: Projection of life expectancy at birth and at 65, 2022-2070

Life expectancy at birth Life expectancy at 65
Males Females Males Females
change change change change
2022 2050 2070 2022- 2022 2050 2070 2022- 2022 2050 2070 2022- 2022 2050 2070 2022-
70 70 70 70
BE 79.5 83.8 86.4 6.9 84.6 88.2 90.5 5.9 18.7 21.7 23.6 4.9 22.3 25.1 26.9 4.6 BE
BG 70.5 78.5 82.8 12.3 77.7 84.2 87.7 10.0 13.5 18.5 21.3 7.8 17.5 22.0 24.6 7.1 BG
CZ 75.9 81.6 84.8 8.9 81.9 86.6 89.2 7.3 15.9 20.0 22.4 6.5 19.7 23.5 25.7 6.0 CZ
DK 79.9 83.8 86.4 6.5 83.6 87.7 90.1 6.5 18.7 21.5 23.4 4.7 21.3 24.5 26.5 5.2 DK
DE 79.0 83.3 86.0 7.0 83.8 87.6 90.0 6.2 18.3 21.3 23.3 5.0 21.5 24.4 26.4 4.9 DE
EE 74.3 80.4 84.1 9.8 83.0 87.2 89.8 6.8 15.8 19.7 22.2 6.4 20.9 24.2 26.3 5.4 EE
IE 80.8 84.5 86.9 6.1 84.6 88.3 90.6 6.0 19.4 22.1 23.9 4.5 22.1 25.0 27.0 4.9 IE
EL 78.8 83.7 86.5 7.7 84.2 88.1 90.4 6.2 18.7 22.0 23.9 5.2 21.7 24.8 26.7 5.0 EL
ES 80.8 84.8 87.1 6.3 86.5 89.7 91.5 5.0 19.5 22.4 24.1 4.6 23.6 26.2 27.7 4.1 ES
FR 79.7 84.1 86.7 7.0 85.9 89.3 91.3 5.4 19.7 22.4 24.1 4.4 23.8 26.2 27.7 3.9 FR
HR 74.9 80.8 84.2 9.3 81.2 86.1 88.9 7.7 15.6 19.5 22.0 6.4 19.3 23.0 25.3 6.0 HR
IT 81.1 85.0 87.1 6.0 85.5 89.0 91.0 5.5 19.5 22.3 24.0 4.5 22.7 25.5 27.2 4.5 IT
CY 80.5 84.4 86.8 6.3 84.6 88.1 90.3 5.7 19.1 21.9 23.7 4.6 21.8 24.6 26.4 4.6 CY
LV 70.3 78.0 82.5 12.2 79.8 85.2 88.4 8.6 14.1 18.6 21.5 7.4 19.0 23.0 25.4 6.4 LV
LT 70.8 78.5 82.8 12.0 80.5 85.9 88.9 8.4 14.4 18.9 21.7 7.3 19.5 23.4 25.7 6.2 LT
LU 80.7 84.5 86.9 6.2 85.0 88.6 90.8 5.8 19.4 22.1 23.9 4.5 22.5 25.3 27.1 4.6 LU
HU 72.5 79.5 83.6 11.1 79.3 85.2 88.5 9.2 14.5 19.0 21.8 7.3 18.4 22.7 25.4 7.0 HU
MT 80.9 84.7 87.0 6.1 84.6 88.5 90.8 6.2 19.5 22.2 24.0 4.5 22.5 25.3 27.1 4.6 MT
NL 80.3 84.3 86.7 6.4 83.6 87.6 90.0 6.4 18.8 21.7 23.6 4.8 21.3 24.4 26.4 5.1 NL
AT 79.5 83.8 86.3 6.8 84.2 88.0 90.2 6.0 18.6 21.6 23.5 4.9 21.8 24.7 26.6 4.8 AT
PL 73.2 80.3 84.1 10.9 81.3 86.6 89.5 8.2 15.4 19.9 22.4 7.0 19.8 23.9 26.1 6.3 PL
PT 79.6 84.6 86.9 7.3 85.0 88.3 90.4 5.4 18.9 22.4 24.0 5.1 22.3 24.9 26.7 4.4 PT
RO 70.9 79.0 83.3 12.4 78.6 85.0 88.5 9.9 14.2 19.2 22.0 7.8 18.1 22.7 25.4 7.3 RO
SI 78.5 83.2 86.0 7.5 84.4 88.2 90.5 6.1 17.8 21.2 23.3 5.5 21.7 24.9 26.7 5.0 SI
SK 73.4 80.3 84.1 10.7 80.4 86.0 89.1 8.7 15.1 19.6 22.2 7.1 19.0 23.4 25.8 6.8 SK
FI 79.0 83.5 86.1 7.1 84.1 88.2 90.4 6.3 18.3 21.6 23.4 5.1 21.6 25.0 26.8 5.2 FI
SE 81.5 84.8 87.0 5.5 85.4 88.6 90.7 5.3 19.7 22.2 23.9 4.2 22.5 25.2 26.9 4.4 SE
NO 82.1 85.2 87.3 5.2 85.1 88.5 90.7 5.6 20.2 22.5 24.2 4.0 22.3 25.1 26.9 4.6 NO
EA 79.6 84.0 86.5 6.9 84.8 88.5 90.7 5.8 18.9 21.9 23.7 4.8 22.4 25.2 27.0 4.6 EA
EU 78.4 83.3 86.1 7.7 84.0 88.0 90.4 6.4 18.2 21.5 23.5 5.3 21.8 24.9 26.8 5.0 EU
1.4. DEVELOPMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR NET MIGRATION
Because of high historical volatility over time and between countries, assumptions on migration are
methodologically the most difficult when preparing demographic projections. On the basis of the latest
projections, annual net migration inflows into the EU are expected to return to pre-2022 levels, that is
around 1 million people per year (0.2-0.3% of the population) during most of the projection period
after the exceptional level of around 1% of the population in 2022.
1.4.1. Past trends and driving forces
Graph I.1.2 shows the net migration flows to the EU, the euro area and Norway during the last six
decades. ( 6) From 1960 through the mid-1980s, net migration was mostly positive with annual net inflows
averaging around 130 000, though certain years saw large net outflows. Since 1985, annual net migration
(6) Data available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/DEMO_GIND.
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European Commission
has been consistently positive for the EU. Despite high volatility, it rose significantly: annual net entries
averaged 622 000 people in 1990-1999 and around 1.1 million in 2000-2008. Following a slowdown to
around 500 000 people in 2009-2011 in the wake of the global economic crisis, net migration started to
rise again, peaking at more than 1.5 million in 2013, mainly due to the increase in Italy following the
statistical adjustment linked to the post-2011 census corrections (+966 000). ( 7) In 2015, several Member
States saw large inflows because of instability in North Africa and the Middle East. Net inflows were 1 to
1.5 million people between 2017 and 2019 before decreasing again to below 1 million. In 2022, net
migration increased again, based on the latest estimates, to around 4 million ( 8) mainly due to the inflow
of displaced people fleeing Ukraine.
Graph I.1.2: Net migration flows (including statistical Graph I.1.3: EU population change (natural change
adjustment), 1960-2022 (births-deaths) + net migration), 1960-2022
2.000 4.000
≈ 4,000
1.500 3.000
Population change ('000)

Net migration flows ('000)
2.000
1.000
1.000
500
0
0
-1.000
-500
-2.000
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
-1.000
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
net migration
natural change of population
EU Euro area population change
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.
Net migration flows per country ( 9) between 1960 and 2021 are shown in Table I.1.5, in absolute terms
and relative to the population size. Over this period, Germany, Spain, France, and Italy recorded the
largest total net inflows in absolute terms. When relating migration flows to the 1960 population, the
largest overall inflows were in Luxembourg (+83%), Sweden (+25%), Cyprus (+25%), Norway (+22%),
Spain (+22%), Austria (+21%), Malta (+19%), Germany (+19%), the Netherlands (+16%) and Belgium
(+15%). At the opposite end are Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Portugal, Lithuania and Croatia, which saw
the largest outflows in absolute terms. Relative to population size, net outflows were the largest in
Romania (-18%), Lithuania (-16%), Bulgaria (-13%), Croatia (-11%) and Portugal (-8%). Between 2000
and 2021, net migration was negative on average in Lithuania (with annual outflows representing 0.6% of
the 2000 population), Latvia (-0.6%), Romania (-0.4%), Bulgaria (-0.2%), Croatia (-0.2%) and Estonia
(-0.1%), with very small outflows in Slovakia and Poland. In the latter two countries, as well as in
Estonia, net migration has been positive and rising for several years.
(7) This purely statistical correction may be revised following the conclusion of the 2021 census.
(8) Eurostat online table on decisions granting temporary protection by citizenship, age and sex – annual data (migr_asytpfa).
(9) Due to difficulties in producing good statistics on migration flows for all Member States, net migration is measured as the
difference between the total population stocks on 31 December and 1 January for a given calendar year, minus the natural
change (the difference between births and deaths). The population stocks that Member States transmit to Eurostat represents the
number of persons with usual residence in the country for at least 12 months (or legal or registered persons), including refugees
and, in some cases, asylum seekers who are resident in the country for at least 12 months. This method is different from the
approach of subtracting recorded emigration flows from immigration flows, which not only incorporates errors due to the
difficulty of registering migration flows, but also includes all possible errors and adjustments in other demographic variables.
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Part I
Following the 2008 crisis, net migration turned temporarily negative in several countries. This was the
case in, for example, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, and Portugal. For most Member States, net
migration was already the highest in the period 2018-2021 since 2009, increasing further to exceptionally
high levels in 2022.
Between 1960 and 2020, the total EU population rose consistently, though the size of the increase had
been trending lower. In 2020 and 2021, the population change turned negative but bounced back to highly
positive figures in 2022 (see Graph I.1.3). This is the result of counteracting developments. A volatile but
overall slightly increasing trend of net migration inflows (that then increased substantially in 2022), on
the one hand, and an overall more clearly decreasing trend of natural population change on the other
hand. The latter turned negative only in 2012 in light of the impact of decreasing mortality rates on deaths
partly offsetting the impact of decreasing fertility rates on births.
Table I.1.5: Average annual net migration flows (including statistical adjustment), 1960-2021
1960-1979 1980-1999 2000-2021 total 1960-2021 highest value in

(%1960 pop) (%1980 pop) (%2000 pop) (%1960 pop) 2009-2021 (year)
BE 11.857 (0.1) 7.705 (0.1) 46.281 (0.5) 1.409.408 (15.4) 86.413 (2010)
BG -7.717 (-0.1) -25.036 (-0.3) -17.423 (-0.2) -1.038.362 (-13.2) 30.715 (2020)
CZ -9.108 (-0.1) 42 (0) 23.476 (0.2) 335.143 (3.5) 49.969 (2021)
DK 2.567 (0.1) 8.433 (0.2) 17.334 (0.3) 601.333 (13.1) 41.886 (2015)
DE 127.417 (0.2) 342.158 (0.4) 276.963 (0.3) 13.526.185 (18.6) 1.165.772 (2015)
EE 7.603 (0.6) -3.965 (-0.3) -775 (-0.1) 55.692 (4.6) 7.071 (2018)
IE -3.821 (-0.1) -6.238 (-0.2) 23.024 (0.6) 305.328 (10.8) 43.966 (2018)
EL -11.493 (-0.1) 41.774 (0.4) -829 (0) 587.392 (7.1) 35.168 (2019)
ES -30.654 (-0.1) 55.646 (0.1) 283.552 (0.7) 6.737.988 (22.1) 452.909 (2019)
FR 136.844 (0.3) 36.617 (0.1) 94.295 (0.2) 5.543.709 (12.1) 134.420 (2021)
HR -1.140 (0) -9.615 (-0.2) -10.114 (-0.2) -437.617 (-10.6) 888 (2009)
IT -45.135 (-0.1) 8.372 (0) 210.997 (0.4) 3.906.680 (7.8) 1.183.877 (2013)
CY -3.844 (-0.7) 3.794 (0.7) 6.168 (0.9) 134.689 (23.5) 18.142 (2011)
LV 12.376 (0.6) -4.541 (-0.2) -13.141 (-0.6) -132.427 (-6.2) -286 (2021)
LT 4.847 (0.2) -5.446 (-0.2) -19.961 (-0.6) -451.129 (-16.2) 34.734 (2021)
LU 2.067 (0.7) 2.623 (0.7) 7.568 (1.7) 260.321 (82.9) 11.159 (2015)
HU -191 (0) -699 (0) 15.175 (0.1) 316.050 (3.2) 33.562 (2019)
MT -3.606 (-1.1) 1.014 (0.3) 5.206 (1.3) 62.672 (19.2) 20.343 (2019)
NL 18.990 (0.2) 28.458 (0.2) 39.608 (0.2) 1.820.321 (15.8) 107.627 (2019)
AT 6.745 (0.1) 18.383 (0.2) 43.187 (0.5) 1.452.680 (20.6) 114.237 (2015)
PL -35.689 (-0.1) -23.546 (-0.1) -7.217 (0) -1.343.487 (-4.5) 22.147 (2018)
PT -51.042 (-0.6) 1.734 (0) 12.202 (0.1) -717.711 (-8.1) 44.506 (2019)
RO -11.167 (-0.1) -40.519 (-0.2) -100.880 (-0.4) -3.253.073 (-17.7) -13.887 (2013)
SI 3.282 (0.2) 953 (0.1) 5.872 (0.3) 213.892 (13.5) 18.365 (2020)
SK 969 (0) -3.670 (-0.1) -232 (0) -59.123 (-1.5) 4.347 (2020)
FI -9.030 (-0.2) 4.922 (0.1) 12.804 (0.2) 199.524 (4.5) 22.513 (2021)
SE 14.869 (0.2) 17.848 (0.2) 55.514 (0.6) 1.875.655 (25.1) 117.693 (2016)
NO 1.767 (0) 7.689 (0.2) 26.800 (0.6) 778.714 (21.7) 47.142 (2012)
EA 109.521 (0) 486.462 (0.2) 1.025.591 (0.3) 34.482.673 (12.8) 1.468.940 (2013)
EU 152.556 (0) 390.317 (0.1) 1.008.652 (0.2) 33.047.804 (9.3) 1.518.409 (2013)
CY: 1961-1979 average.
Compared to fertility and mortality, migration is the most volatile component of population projections.
Immigration and emigration are generally determined by push and pull factors that are not explicitly
modelled in population projections. Past examples include the debt and financial crisis, the wars in
Afghanistan and Syria, and the impact of measures taken amid the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently,
there is the inflow of displaced persons fleeing Ukraine (see Box I.1.1.). In the future, climate change is
expected to become a prominent driver of demographic changes, specifically of global migration
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European Commission
flows. ( 10) Trends derived from past data are used to capture the overall development of immigration and
emigration flows in the EUROPOP projections. Table I.1.6 presents the net migration flows in the
EUROPOP2023 projections.
Table I.1.6: Projection of net migration flows, 2022-2070
Net migration ('000) Net migration (% of population)
2022-70
2022 2030 2050 2070 2022 2030 2050 2070
(%2022)(1)
BE 116 37 32 29 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 15.1
BG 160 -3 13 16 2.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 9.1
CZ 471 -2 26 25 4.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 13.6
DK 55 12 12 13 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 11.7
DE 1631 250 266 236 1.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 17.6
EE 45 1 4 4 3.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 15.5
IE 93 17 14 12 1.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 16.0
EL 22 -4 8 20 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 3.3
ES 677 221 196 194 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 23.6
FR 275 80 83 99 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 6.6
HR 14 2 7 10 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 7.0
IT 348 270 240 240 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 20.9
CY 18 0 2 2 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 9.7
LV 33 -7 0 2 1.7 -0.4 0.0 0.1 -3.3
LT 82 -8 3 6 2.9 -0.3 0.1 0.3 4.8
LU 15 8 5 4 2.3 1.0 0.6 0.4 45.2
HU 48 19 25 26 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 12.3
MT 11 9 6 4 2.2 1.6 0.8 0.5 64.6
NL 235 45 42 42 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 14.3
AT 104 36 37 35 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 20.2
PL 1001 -44 62 69 2.6 -0.1 0.2 0.2 7.0
PT 82 16 27 39 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 13.3
RO 79 -38 6 28 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.1
SI 15 6 6 6 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 14.8
SK 96 -1 9 8 1.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 6.7
FI 77 11 14 13 1.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 13.1
SE 99 50 42 32 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.3 20.7
NO 36 27 27 26 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 23.8
EA 3990 990 1001 1002 1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 15.6
EU 5902 985 1187 1212 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 14.0
(1) Cumulative net migration as % of 2022 population.
In 2022, which is the starting year of the projections, net migration was exceptionally high mainly due to
the inflow of displaced people fleeing Ukraine. The projection, published on 30 March 2023 ( 11),
calculates with an overall net migration figure of almost 6 million people (1.3% of the EU population).
Recent data suggest significantly less but still exceptionally high inflows in 2022 (see Section 1.4.1.).
For the EU, annual net inflows are assumed to return to pre-2022 levels as of the mid-2020s, to around
1 million people (0.2-0.3% of the EU population). Total net migration in the period up to 2070 would
amount to 63 million people in cumulated terms, equivalent to 14% of the 2022 population. Net migration
would converge to a level of about 0.3% of the EU population.
(10) While expected developments are still unclear and hard to predict, the potential impact of climate change on global migration
flows has been widely acknowledged. See, for example, International Organization for Migration (2008).
(11) The projections include official statistics for 2021 and are based on the population published for 1 January 2022, while
additional data covering 2022 could be taken into account until March 2023.
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Part I
The countries with the highest cumulative net migration as a share of population are expected to be Malta,
Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Austria, with cumulative inflows of at least 20% of the
2022 population over the projection period. While net migration is assumed to turn positive in all
countries during the projection period, cumulative net migration in 2022-2070 would nevertheless be
negative for Latvia and Romania, the only countries together with Lithuania with net migration outflows
after 2035.
1.5. OVERALL RESULTS OF THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS
Table I.1.7: Projected total population, 2022-2070 The EU population is projected to decline from 449
Total population
million people in 2022 to 432 million in 2070.
% change
(annual average - millions) During this period, Member States’ population will
2022 2045 2070
2022-
2045
2045-
2070
2022-
2070
age dramatically given the dynamics in fertility,
BE 11.7 12.5 12.7 7% 2% 9% mortality and migration. The median age would rise
BG 6.9 6.0 5.3 -13% -12% -23%
CZ 10.7 10.7 10.6 0% -2% -2%
by 4 years over the next decades.
DK 5.9 6.1 6.2 4% 1% 5%
DE 83.9 85.0 84.2 1% -1% 0% Table I.1.7 presents an overview of the population
EE 1.4 1.3 1.3 -1% -2% -3%
IE 5.1 5.9 6.1 15% 3% 19% projections for the period 2022-2070. ( 12) These
EL 10.4 9.2 7.8 -12% -16% -25% provide the basis for the age-related expenditure
ES 47.7 50.5 47.7 6% -6% 0%
FR 68.0 70.7 69.7 4% -1% 2%
projections in the 2024 Ageing Report.
HR 3.9 3.4 3.0 -12% -11% -22%
IT
CY
59.0
0.9
58.1
1.0
53.3
1.0
-2%
7%
-8%
2%
-10%
9%
According to the baseline demographic projections,
LV 1.9 1.5 1.3 -19% -17% -33% the EU population would reach a peak during this
LT 2.8 2.4 2.0 -15% -17% -29% decade. It is projected to rise from about 449 million
LU 0.7 0.9 1.0 33% 12% 49%
HU 9.7 9.3 9.0 -4% -3% -7% people in 2022 to 453 million people in 2026.
MT 0.5 0.7 0.8 37% 13% 54% Thereafter, the population would start to shrink,
NL 17.7 18.8 18.7 6% 0% 6%
AT 9.0 9.5 9.5 5% 1% 6%
falling below 432 million in 2070. This is a projected
PL 38.1 35.2 31.8 -8% -9% -16% decline by 4% compared to the base year level, most
PT 10.4 9.8 9.0 -5% -9% -14%
of which would take place in the last third of the
RO 19.0 16.8 15.0 -12% -11% -21%
SI 2.1 2.1 2.0 0% -5% -5% projection period. The overall downward trend
SK 5.5 5.2 4.8 -4% -8% -12% comprises rather heterogeneous developments at the
FI 5.6 5.5 5.2 -1% -5% -6%
SE 10.5 11.9 12.9 13% 8% 23% country level.
NO 5.4 6.1 6.5 12% 7% 20%
EA 348.2 354.1 341.1 2% -4% -2%
EU 449.1 450.1 431.9 0% -4%
For 13 Member States and Norway the total
-4%
Source: European Commission based on EUROPOP2023
population is projected to increase between 2022 and
(Eurostat). 2070, while 14 Member States would see the number
of inhabitants shrink. Compared to the base year, the
sharpest declines are projected in Latvia, Lithuania,
Greece, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, with a fall of between 21% and 33%. In these countries, the
population is expected to dwindle steadily throughout the projection period. Among the countries with a
rising population between 2022 and 2070, Malta, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Ireland would see their
inhabitants increase by 19% to 54%, mainly in the first part of the projection period.
In 2022, Germany was the Member State with the largest population (84 million people), followed by
France (68 million), Italy (59 million), Spain (48 million) and Poland (38 million). In 2070, this order
would remain the same with population declines projected in Italy and Poland, and limited population
growth in Germany, France and Spain.
(12) The population projections published by Eurostat refer to the population on 1 January. The projections in this table (and used
throughout this report) for year t are calculated as the average of the Eurostat projections on 1 January for year t and those for
year t+1, as done in previous projection exercises.
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European Commission
In all Member States, the share in the overall population of the age groups above 65 years is projected to
rise by 2070 (see Table I.1.8), from 21% in 2022 to 30% in 2070 for the EU. Increases range from 6 pps
in Sweden to 16 pps in Lithuania, where people aged 65 or more would represent 36% of the population
in 2070. Shares in Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Greece would be similar, with one in three persons
being at least 65 years old at the end of the projection period.
Table I.1.8: Composition of the population by age group
2022 2070 pps change 2022-2070
(0-19) (20-64) (65+) (80+) (0-19) (20-64) (65+) (80+) (0-19) (20-64) (65+) (80+)
BE 22% 58% 20% 6% 19% 53% 28% 11% -3.3 -5.1 8.5 5.8
BG 19% 59% 22% 5% 18% 51% 31% 14% -1.4 -7.8 9.2 9.0
CZ 21% 58% 20% 4% 19% 53% 27% 12% -1.7 -5.3 7.0 7.6
DK 22% 58% 20% 5% 20% 51% 29% 11% -2.3 -6.3 8.6 5.8
DE 19% 59% 22% 7% 19% 52% 29% 12% 0.1 -6.8 6.7 4.4
EE 22% 58% 20% 6% 18% 52% 30% 13% -3.3 -6.2 9.5 7.3
IE 26% 59% 15% 4% 18% 52% 29% 12% -7.8 -6.2 14.0 8.7
EL 19% 58% 23% 7% 17% 50% 33% 16% -1.8 -8.5 10.2 9.1
ES 19% 61% 20% 6% 16% 51% 33% 15% -3.7 -9.3 12.9 8.8
FR 24% 55% 21% 6% 20% 51% 29% 13% -3.7 -4.5 8.2 6.5
HR 19% 58% 23% 5% 16% 52% 32% 13% -3.4 -6.3 9.7 7.6
IT 17% 59% 24% 8% 15% 51% 34% 15% -2.6 -7.2 9.8 6.9
CY 21% 62% 17% 4% 18% 53% 29% 12% -3.2 -9.4 12.6 7.8
LV 21% 58% 21% 6% 18% 51% 31% 15% -3.5 -6.8 10.3 8.9
LT 20% 60% 20% 6% 15% 49% 36% 15% -4.5 -11.1 15.7 9.6
LU 21% 64% 15% 4% 18% 53% 29% 11% -3.0 -11.4 14.4 7.2
HU 20% 60% 21% 5% 19% 52% 28% 11% -0.4 -7.4 7.8 6.8
MT 18% 63% 19% 4% 15% 51% 34% 12% -2.6 -11.8 14.4 8.1
NL 21% 59% 20% 5% 19% 52% 29% 11% -2.4 -6.7 9.1 6.1
AT 19% 61% 20% 6% 18% 52% 30% 12% -1.6 -8.7 10.3 6.3
PL 21% 60% 19% 4% 17% 50% 32% 15% -3.2 -9.8 13.0 10.7
PT 18% 58% 24% 7% 17% 50% 34% 15% -1.0 -8.8 9.8 7.8
RO 22% 59% 20% 4% 19% 52% 29% 13% -2.9 -6.5 9.5 8.6
SI 20% 59% 21% 6% 17% 52% 30% 14% -2.2 -6.7 8.8 8.1
SK 21% 61% 18% 3% 19% 51% 30% 14% -1.8 -10.9 12.7 10.5
FI 21% 56% 23% 6% 16% 51% 32% 13% -4.4 -4.7 9.0 7.3
SE 23% 56% 20% 5% 20% 53% 27% 11% -3.1 -3.4 6.4 5.3
NO 23% 59% 18% 4% 18% 53% 29% 11% -4.8 -5.8 10.6 6.9
EA 20% 58% 22% 6% 18% 52% 31% 13% -2.3 -6.9 9.2 6.5
EU 20% 59% 21% 6% 18% 52% 30% 13% -2.3 -7.0 9.3 7.0
Source: European Commission based on EUROPOP2023 (Eurostat).
The share of people aged 80 years and above would more than double in all Member States between 2022
and 2070, with the exception of Germany and Italy. For the EU, this share would rise from 6% in 2022 to
13% in 2070. The projected increase is the highest in Poland and Slovakia.
The population share of the age group 0-19 would shrink in all Member States during the projection
period. The share in the EU population of this youngest group would decrease from 20% in 2022 to 18%
in 2070. The dwindling – also in absolute numbers for most countries – of the 0-19 age group is the
sharpest in Ireland, Norway, Lithuania, and Finland.
Finally, the population at working age (20-64 year-olds), would shrink in all Member States relative to
the overall population. Whereas in 2022, people at working age represented 59% of the EU population,
this share would fall to 52% in 2070. The decrease exceeds 10 pps in Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and
Slovakia.
The drivers of these trends are manifold. First, the increasing share of the population in the older age
groups is due to the combination of the large cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s and continued gains in
life expectancy. Second, the size of the groups aged 25-59 (the bulk of the working-age population, see
Graph I.1.4) shrinks significantly between 2022 and 2070 due to the low fertility rates and a shrinking
number of women in childbearing ages. Finally, net migration flows would not suffice to offset the trends
towards an ageing population.
22
Part I
The strong upward shift in the age distribution over Graph I.1.4: EU population by age group and sex (‘000)
the next decades is shown in Graph I.1.4. While in Male Female
2022 the largest age group for both males and 90+
females were people aged 50-54, in 2070 the 60-64 85-89
age group would be the largest in both cases. 80-84

75-79
Overall, the median age will rise from 44.4 years in 70-74
65-69
2022 to 48.8 years in 2070, with a relatively 60-64
steeper increase by around 2040. For men it 55-59

50-54
increases from 42.8 to 47.6 years, for women from 45-49

40-44
45.9 to 50.1 years (see Graph I.1.5). 35-39
30-34
25-29
Because of the demographic shift from younger to 20-24
15-19
older age groups, demographic dependency ratios 10-14
2070
are projected to increase significantly in all 5-9
0-4
2022
countries (see Table I.1.9). 16000 12000 8000 4000 0 0 4000 8000 12000 16000

The old-age dependency ratio (OADR), i.e. the (Eurostat).
number of people aged at least 65 divided by those
aged 20-64, gives an idea about the relative shift Graph I.1.5: Median age in the EU, 2022-2070
between potential retirees and potential workers 52
and thus of how an ageing population alters the
beneficiary-contributor balance. ( 13) The OADR is 50
projected to increase from 36% in 2022 to 59% in 48

2070 for the EU as a whole. This increase would
predominantly take place during the first half of the 46
projection period. The change in the OADR means
44
that the EU would move from having, for every
person aged over 65 years, nearly three (2.8) 42
people at working age to less than two (1.7).
40
total male female
The Member States with the highest projected 38
increase in the OADR are Lithuania, Malta,
2022
2025
2028
2031
2034
2037
2040
2043
2046
2049
2052
2055
2058
2061
2064
2067
2070
Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, and Slovakia, with

increases of at least 30 pps. In 2070, the OADR Source: EUROPOP2023 (Eurostat).
would surpass 65% in Greece, Italy, Lithuania,
Malta, and Portugal: for every two persons aged 65 or more, there would be only three individuals
between 20 and 64 years old. The OADR would stay below 55% in 2070 in Sweden, Norway, Czechia,
Belgium, Hungary, and Germany.
Similarly, the very old-age dependency ratio (people aged 80 or above relative to those aged 20-64) is
projected to rise considerably, from 10% to 25% on average in the EU. Broadly the same countries come
to the fore as for the standard old-age dependency ratio.
Finally, the total dependency ratio (the sum of people younger than 20 and older than 64 years relative to
the population aged 20-64) is projected to rise from 71% in 2022 to 94% in 2070 for the EU. This
measure relates the theoretical inactive population – people that have not yet entered or have already left
the labour market – to the theoretical contributory base. Again, broadly the same countries record the
largest changes for the total dependency ratio as for the narrower definitions. In 2070, it is expected that
the number of people outside the working-age population will have surpassed the working-age population
in Lithuania and Portugal, with a total dependency ratio of more than 100%. In contrast, the ratio would
(13) Economic dependency ratios are discussed in Chapter 2.
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European Commission
stay below 90% in Belgium, Czechia, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden. This compares to a maximum
value of 81% in France in 2022.
Table I.1.9: Dependency ratios (%), 2022-2070

Old-age dependency ratio Very old-age dependency ratio Total dependency ratio
(65+/20-64) (80+/20-64) ((0-19 & 65+)/20-64)
2022-2070 2022-2070 2022-2070
2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070
(pps change) (pps change) (pps change)
BE 33.7 44.9 53.0 19.2 9.5 16.4 21.3 11.8 72.0 81.1 88.7 16.6 BE
BG 36.6 53.6 60.3 23.6 8.0 15.1 26.8 18.8 69.6 87.1 95.5 25.9 BG
CZ 34.9 48.9 51.5 16.6 7.3 14.2 22.4 15.0 71.2 85.0 88.1 16.9 CZ
DK 35.4 46.8 56.5 21.1 8.8 16.4 21.2 12.4 73.4 85.3 94.7 21.2 DK
DE 37.4 49.2 55.0 17.6 12.3 18.7 22.4 10.1 69.0 83.4 90.8 21.9 DE
EE 34.9 46.2 57.3 22.4 10.3 15.6 25.6 15.4 72.0 79.8 92.5 20.5 EE
IE 25.7 42.4 55.6 29.8 6.2 13.0 23.4 17.2 70.2 79.1 90.5 20.3 IE
EL 39.0 68.7 66.0 27.0 12.2 23.7 32.4 20.2 70.9 102.2 99.8 28.9 EL
ES 33.3 60.1 64.5 31.2 10.0 20.2 29.0 19.0 64.9 90.1 94.6 29.8 ES
FR 38.2 51.6 57.8 19.7 10.9 19.9 24.8 13.9 81.0 92.8 97.2 16.2 FR
HR 38.9 53.1 62.2 23.3 9.4 18.2 25.2 15.8 72.0 83.6 92.8 20.9 HR
IT 40.8 64.9 65.5 24.7 13.0 23.2 28.2 15.2 70.6 93.9 94.4 23.8 IT
CY 26.7 38.8 55.5 28.8 6.4 13.3 22.4 16.0 61.1 71.9 90.0 28.8 CY
LV 36.0 53.2 61.0 25.0 10.4 18.1 29.2 18.8 72.3 86.1 95.4 23.0 LV
LT 33.1 53.7 72.4 39.3 9.3 18.6 31.0 21.6 65.7 82.4 103.1 37.5 LT
LU 23.1 36.3 55.4 32.3 6.1 11.3 21.0 14.9 56.0 69.2 89.6 33.6 LU
HU 34.5 47.7 54.3 19.8 7.8 13.2 21.9 14.1 67.4 83.1 91.1 23.6 HU
MT 30.5 32.8 65.4 34.9 6.8 11.1 24.1 17.4 58.2 57.9 94.3 36.1 MT
NL 34.3 46.3 56.3 22.0 8.3 16.9 21.1 12.8 70.3 82.9 92.4 22.0 NL
AT 32.0 48.4 57.0 25.0 9.6 17.2 23.2 13.6 63.7 80.9 90.9 27.3 AT
PL 31.9 47.9 63.7 31.9 7.1 16.1 29.8 22.6 65.9 79.4 98.1 32.2 PL
PT 40.7 65.9 67.8 27.0 11.9 23.6 29.8 17.9 71.3 99.0 101.8 30.5 PT
RO 33.5 52.2 55.8 22.3 7.6 14.5 25.1 17.5 70.5 89.3 91.9 21.3 RO
SI 36.1 54.5 57.5 21.5 9.5 19.2 26.3 16.7 69.3 87.2 90.9 21.6 SI
SK 28.5 48.4 59.7 31.2 5.5 14.7 27.5 21.9 62.7 83.0 97.7 35.0 SK
FI 41.2 47.8 62.4 21.3 10.5 18.7 25.6 15.1 78.2 79.9 94.3 16.1 FI
SE 36.0 41.2 50.4 14.4 9.6 14.4 20.2 10.6 77.2 79.6 88.4 11.2 SE
NO 31.2 43.1 54.4 23.2 7.6 14.8 21.3 13.7 69.7 77.4 88.0 18.4 NO
EA 36.9 54.1 59.6 22.7 11.1 19.7 25.3 14.2 71.1 88.3 93.9 22.9 EA
EU 36.1 52.8 59.1 23.0 10.3 18.7 25.3 14.9 70.7 87.1 93.8 23.1 EU
Source: European Commission based on EUROPOP2023 (Eurostat).
1.6. DEMOGRAPHIC AGEING IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
The EU's share of the world population is projected to shrink from 5.7% in 2020 to 3.8% by 2070. The
projected increase in dependency ratios is comparatively high for the EU, in particular given the
current demographic balance compared to ‘younger’ continents.
The UN population statistics and projections provide a global perspective of demographic trends. ( 14) The
combined share of EU Member States in the world population halved since 1960, when the EU
represented almost 12% of the world population (see Table I.1.10). While the EU population grew by
25% over the past six decades, demographic growth was faster in the rest of the world, with the global
population increasing by more than 150% over the same period. The shares of China, Japan, Russia and
the US in the global population also declined compared to 1960, in contrast with the rising shares of
India, Latin America and, particularly, Africa.
Given that fast population growth is expected to continue, the African continent’s share in the world
population would increase further, to about 31% in 2070. While staying the most populous continent,
Asia’s share would decline over the next five decades to around 50%. This fall is driven by China, India
(14) The United Nations Population Division updates its global population projections every two years. The latest projections are the
UN World Population Prospects 2022.
24
Part I
and Japan – in particular China, whose share would decrease by more than a third in 2020-2070 – with a
broadly stable share of about 40% for the other Asian countries.
Table I.1.10: Geographical distribution of world population, % of total population, 1960-2070

(pps change)
1960 1980 2000 2020 2045 2070
1960-2020 2020-2070
Africa 9.4% 10.8% 13.3% 17.4% 24.2% 31.1% 7.9 13.8
Asia 56.3% 59.3% 60.8% 59.5% 55.4% 50.5% 3.2 -8.9
China 21.7% 22.1% 20.6% 18.2% 14.3% 10.5% -3.5 -7.6
Japan 3.1% 2.6% 2.1% 1.6% 1.1% 0.9% -1.5 -0.7
India 14.8% 15.7% 17.2% 17.8% 17.4% 16.4% 3.0 -1.4
Europe 20.1% 15.6% 11.8% 9.5% 7.5% 6.3% -10.5 -3.2
EU 11.8% 9.1% 6.9% 5.7% 4.5% 3.8% -6.1 -1.9
EA 8.9% 6.9% 5.3% 4.4% 3.5% 2.9% -4.5 -1.5
Russian Federation 4.0% 3.1% 2.4% 1.9% 1.4% 1.2% -2.1 -0.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.3% 8.2% 8.5% 8.3% 7.8% 7.2% 1.0 -1.1
Northern America 6.4% 5.6% 5.1% 4.8% 4.4% 4.2% -1.7 -0.5
US 5.8% 5.0% 4.6% 4.3% 3.9% 3.8% -1.6 -0.5
Oceania 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.0 0.1
Source: UN World Population Prospects 2022.
By 2070, the EU’s share in the global population is expected to reach 3.8%, shrinking by 2 pps relative to
the current situation. ( 15) This is comparable to the projected share of the US, whose share would remain
broadly stable.
Looking at the age structure in the UN projections, the EU currently has already a comparatively high
OADR (see Table I.1.11). At 35%, it is below the Japanese ratio of 55% but considerably above that in
other large countries, with a higher increase in recent decades. Ratios and projected changes for the EU
are comparable to those based on the Eurostat projections, although the UN projects an even faster
population ageing for the EU (see Table I.1.11).
Table I.1.11: Global demographic dependency ratios, % (1960-2070)

Old-age dependency ratio Very old-age dependency ratio
(65+/20-64) (80+/20-64)
(pps change) (pps change)
1960 2000 2020 2070 1960 2000 2020 2070
1960-2020 2020-2070 1960-2020 2020-2070
World 10.2 12.9 16.5 36.5 6.3 19.9 1.3 2.2 3.4 12.3 2.1 8.9
Africa 7.2 7.5 7.6 14.5 0.4 6.9 0.7 0.9 1.0 2.7 0.3 1.7
Asia 7.9 10.8 15.4 44.8 7.5 29.4 0.8 1.6 2.9 15.5 2.1 12.7
China 8.4 11.5 19.7 74.2 11.4 54.4 0.7 1.6 3.5 32.9 2.8 29.3
Japan 10.6 28.7 54.8 83.2 44.2 28.4 1.3 6.5 18.3 41.6 17.0 23.4
India 7.0 8.9 11.5 41.7 4.5 30.2 0.7 1.2 1.8 12.0 1.2 10.2
Europe 15.2 24.3 31.9 60.2 16.7 28.3 2.2 4.8 8.9 26.5 6.6 17.6
EU 16.7 25.8 35.1 65.2 18.3 30.1 2.5 5.5 10.2 29.1 7.7 18.9
EA 17.7 26.7 36.0 67.3 18.3 31.3 2.7 5.9 11.0 30.4 8.3 19.4
Russian Federation 10.5 20.3 24.7 47.8 14.1 23.2 1.4 3.1 6.2 20.7 4.8 14.5
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.5 10.9 14.9 48.9 7.4 34.0 0.9 1.9 2.9 16.4 2.0 13.5
North America 17.3 20.8 27.8 52.3 10.5 24.5 2.7 5.1 6.4 20.7 3.7 14.2
US 17.5 20.8 27.6 51.9 10.1 24.3 2.7 5.2 6.3 20.5 3.6 14.1
Oceania 14.1 17.2 21.7 41.2 7.6 19.5 2.2 3.8 5.2 15.2 3.0 10.0
Source: UN World Population Prospects 2022.
Globally, the UN demographic projections expect the OADR to rise by 20 pps, from 16.5% in 2020 to
36.5% in 2070. The EU ratio would increase by 30 pps, reaching 65% in 2070. All continents are
expected to see an increase and in some cases, e.g. Asia and Latin America, the projected change in the
balance between potential retirees and potential contributors is similar to what is anticipated for the EU.
However, given that the current situation is generally more favourable in other regions, it can be
concluded that EU Member States will on average undergo a more radical ageing process than the rest of
(15) The UN projections and Eurostat’s EUROPOP2023 projections differ notably due to the different methodologies. The former
expects the EU population to peak in 2023 before falling to 388 million people in 2070, i.e. 44 million below the Eurostat
baseline (see Table I.1.8). The UN figures show a larger decline (or a smaller increase) for a majority of Member States.
25
European Commission
the world, notable exceptions such as Japan and China aside. Looking at developments for the very old-
age dependency ratio leads to broadly the same conclusion.
Global ageing shows in the projected changes of median ages. In 2020, the median age in the EU was 43
years, up from 30 years in 1960. This compares to 38 years in Northern America, 31 years in Asia and 30
years in Latin America. By 2070, half of the EU population would be above 49 years according to the UN
projections, compared to 45 years in Latin America, 46 years in Northern America and 44 years in
Asia. ( 16)
1.7. COMPARISON WITH THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS IN THE 2021 AGEING REPORT
In 2070, the EU would count 7.9 million people more than assumed in the 2021 Ageing Report. The
starting point is broadly similar because the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially on older age
groups, is offset, in particular for younger age groups, by the exceptional migration inflow in 2022. At
the same time, higher projections for age groups other than the youngest one and higher net migration
lead to a bigger increase and a larger population by 2070. As a result, the old-age dependency ratio
based on the new demographic projections is lower in the first half of the projection period but
increases faster thereafter, reaching a similar level in 2070 as in the previous edition.
This section compares the latest Eurostat demographic projections, EUROPOP2023, with those
underlying the 2021 Ageing Report, EUROPOP2019.
In the base year 2022, the EU population counted 193 000 more people than anticipated in the 2019-based
demographic projections (see Table I.1.12). This difference is the result of two counteracting effects. On
the one hand, there is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially on older age groups. On the
other hand, there is the exceptional migration inflow, in particular for the younger age groups, induced by
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Overall, the starting point is significantly lower than in the previous
projection in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Croatia, while it is significantly higher in Germany, France,
Poland, Romania, and the Netherlands.
In 2070, the total EU population would be some 7.9 million people larger (2%) than previously projected
in light of increasingly higher projections for the working-age and older age groups and lower projections
for the young age groups in parallel to higher net migration. The upward revision corresponds to at least
10% of the previous 2070 population projection for Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, and
Romania. Downward revisions concern only six Member States and Norway but were only significant in
Greece (-9%), Cyprus (-9%) and Ireland (-7%).
Developments for broad age groups (0-19, 20-64 and above 65), show that the higher population
projection is driven by differences for the 20-64 and 65+ age groups, which in 2070 would on average be
3% and 2% larger, respectively, than projected in EUROPOP2019.
− In 2070, the projected number of people younger than 20 years is more than 10% lower than the
previous number in the cases of Ireland and Cyprus. For this age group Luxembourg, Poland and
Romania have significantly higher figures in the EUROPOP2023 projection.
− For the working-age population (20-64 year-olds), only for Greece and Cyprus the figures are more
than 10% below the previous projection in 2070. They are higher by more than 10% for Estonia,
Luxembourg, Malta, and Romania.
(16) Data available at https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/MostUsed/.
26
Part I
− For the population above 65 years, only for Greece figures are lower by around 10% in 2070, while
they are more than 10% higher for Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta.
Table I.1.12: Population - difference between EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019 ('000)

Total population Population 0-19 Population 20-64 Population 65+
Difference in Difference in Difference in Difference in
2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070
2070 (%) (1) 2070 (%) (1) 2070 (%) (1) 2070 (%) (1)
BE 78 857 7% 26 87 4% 67 516 8% -15 254 8% BE
BG 72 263 5% 35 35 4% 75 151 6% -39 77 5% BG
CZ -28 359 4% 23 13 1% -14 304 6% -36 42 1% CZ
DK 58 31 1% 4 -64 -5% 55 4 0% -1 91 5% DK
DE 513 2.526 3% 159 -114 -1% 437 1.605 4% -83 1.035 4% DE
EE 24 117 10% 11 22 10% 16 69 11% -3 27 7% EE
IE -14 -426 -7% 1 -225 -17% -13 -185 -5% -3 -15 -1% IE
EL -175 -809 -9% -72 -132 -9% -33 -428 -10% -71 -249 -9% EL
ES -258 642 1% -95 -502 -6% -44 413 2% -119 731 5% ES
FR 427 234 0% 131 -541 -4% 355 282 1% -60 493 2% FR
HR -136 -16 -1% -15 -27 -5% -107 29 2% -14 -18 -2% HR
IT -1111 -614 -1% -117 -625 -7% -747 21 0% -248 -10 0% IT
CY 8 -102 -9% 2 -32 -15% 10 -63 -11% -4 -7 -2% CY
LV 16 79 7% 7 6 3% 15 55 9% -5 18 5% LV
LT 68 190 10% 10 -11 -4% 61 83 9% -2 118 20% LT
LU 10 188 24% 4 38 28% 7 98 24% -1 51 22% LU
HU -47 103 1% 1 68 4% -15 114 2% -33 -79 -3% HU
MT -9 104 15% -4 11 10% -3 50 14% -2 44 19% MT
NL 105 759 4% 19 -22 -1% 109 434 5% -24 347 7% NL
AT 66 298 3% 6 -7 0% 65 161 3% -5 145 5% AT
PL 283 1.040 3% 262 634 13% 161 633 4% -139 -227 -2% PL
PT 99 493 6% -45 8 1% 44 277 7% 101 209 7% PT
RO 130 1.363 10% 217 399 16% -9 899 13% -78 66 2% RO
SI 0 64 3% 0 5 1% 0 46 5% -1 14 2% SI
SK 12 104 2% 19 75 9% 12 69 3% -18 -40 -3% SK
FI 41 199 4% 15 25 3% 27 108 4% -2 66 4% FI
SE -38 -183 -1% -30 -131 -5% -1 -60 -1% -7 9 0% SE
NO -19 -201 -3% -11 -121 -9% -8 -96 -3% 0 16 1% NO
EA -238 4.887 1% 60 -1.962 -3% 279 3.638 2% -577 3.212 3% EA
EU 193 7.864 2% 572 -1.009 -1% 531 5.683 3% -910 3.191 2% EU
(1) Difference in 2070 as percentage of EUROPOP2019 projection for 2070.

Source: European Commission based on EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019 (Eurostat).
These changes result in a lower projected old-age dependency ratio throughout the projections for almost
all Member States, reaching significantly lower levels in the middle of the projection in numerous
countries before coming relatively closer to the previously projected figures in most of the cases.
However, notable differences persist even by the end of the projection period for Czechia, Estonia,
Croatia, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia (see Table I.1.13). The largest upward revisions
by the end of the projection period are for Denmark, Ireland, Cyprus, Lithuania, and Malta.
The broad differences in the population projections described above can be related to changes in the
assumptions regarding fertility, mortality and net migration with clearly greater roles of the latter two due
to the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, a
simplification of the derivation of net migration and new input data underlying the assumptions drive
differences in the long term (see Box I.1.1).
Fertility
Fertility rates are very similar to those assumed in the previous demographic projections with small
differences only in a handful of Member States (see Table I.1.15).
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European Commission
Table I.1.13: Old-age dependency ratio – difference Table I.1.14: Life expectancy at birth – difference between
between EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019 EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019 (years)
(pps)
Males Females
2022 2045 2070 2022-2070 change change
2022 2070 2022 2070
2022-2070 2022-2070
BE -0.6 -2.8 -0.3 0.2
BE -0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.2
BG -1.7 -2.2 -0.5 1.1 BG -1.8 -0.1 1.7 -1.6 0.0 1.6
CZ -0.5 -2.4 -2.2 -1.7 CZ -1.0 0.0 1.0 -0.7 0.0 0.7
DK -0.6 -1.4 2.8 3.4 DK 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3
DE -0.5 -3.0 0.4 0.9 DE -0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.2 0.1 0.3
EE -1.0 -3.2 -2.0 -1.0 EE -0.6 -0.2 0.4 -0.4 -0.1 0.3
IE -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.3
IE 0.0 0.2 2.6 2.6
EL -0.7 0.1 0.8 -0.4 0.1 0.5
EL -0.9 4.6 0.8 1.7 ES -0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.4
ES -0.4 -1.2 1.9 2.3 FR -0.6 0.0 0.6 -0.6 -0.1 0.5
FR -0.5 -1.6 0.9 1.5 HR -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 0.1 0.8
HR 1.2 -0.6 -2.3 -3.5 IT -0.4 0.1 0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.5
IT 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 CY -0.5 0.2 0.7 -0.6 0.1 0.7
LV -0.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 -0.1 0.6
CY -1.2 2.0 4.8 6.0
LT -0.9 -0.1 0.8 -0.8 0.1 0.9
LV -1.0 -4.2 -2.5 -1.6
LU 0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.2
LT -1.4 -5.2 6.4 7.7 HU -1.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0
LU -0.7 -5.4 -0.7 0.0 MT 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.4
HU -0.5 -1.9 -3.1 -2.6 NL -0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.4
MT -0.3 -6.5 3.0 3.3 AT -0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.4 0.0 0.4
NL -0.6 -3.0 1.1 1.7 PL -1.5 -0.2 1.3 -1.2 0.0 1.2
PT 0.7 1.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
AT -0.5 -1.0 1.1 1.6
RO -1.7 -0.2 1.5 -1.3 0.0 1.3
PL -0.8 -1.6 -4.1 -3.2
SI -0.5 0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.5
PT 1.4 0.0 0.5 -0.9 SK -1.3 0.0 1.3 -1.1 0.1 1.2
RO -0.7 -3.4 -6.3 -5.6 FI -0.6 0.0 0.6 -0.9 0.0 0.9
SI 0.0 -1.4 -1.2 -1.2 SE 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 -0.1
SK -0.6 -1.4 -3.4 -2.8 NO 0.6 0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2
FI -0.4 -2.0 0.0 0.4 EA -0.5 0.0 0.6 -0.4 0.0 0.4
EU -0.6 0.0 0.7 -0.5 0.0 0.5
SE -0.1 -0.6 0.6 0.7
NO 0.1 0.5 1.9 1.9 Source: European Commission based on EUROPOP2023 and
EA -0.3 -1.7 0.6 0.9 EUROPOP2019 (Eurostat).
EU -0.4 -1.7 -0.1 0.3
Old-age dependency ratio: persons aged 65 and over
in relation to persons aged 20-64.
and EUROPOP2019 (Eurostat).
Life expectancy
Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, life expectancy at birth in the EU was significantly lower
in 2022 for both males and females than expected in EUROPOP2019 (see Table I.1.14). The expected
average increase in male and female longevity from that lower starting point is then assumed to be faster,
reaching similar levels in 2070 as in the previous projections.
Better outcomes for males in 2022 only concern Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, and Norway.
Conversely, life expectancy was one year or more lower for Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovakia. For females, the extent of the revisions was slightly lower but the overall picture
is the same.
Net migration
Net migration flows in 2022 were exceptionally high due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
significantly higher for all Member States than the numbers projected in EUROPOP2019 (see Table
I.1.15). The higher net migration for the EU of around 4.8 million people in 2022 based on the
28
Part I
EUROPOP2023 projection ( 17) corresponded to more than 1% of the EU population. The difference was
significant throughout the EU and the highest as a percentage of the 2022 population in Czechia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Latvia, with higher net migration exceeding 2% of the total population.
Over the entire projection period 2022-2070, cumulative net migration is expected to count about 14
million more people as compared to the EUROPOP2019 projections. This corresponds to more than 3%
of the previous population projection for 2070. Looking at the period between 2025 (the year by which
figures are projected to return to pre-2022 levels) and 2070, thereby omitting the most exceptional years
from the comparison, net migration is projected to be much less but still visibly higher, by about 4.5
million people (1%). For almost all countries, the new migration projections entail an upward revision.
This revision exceeds 10% of the former 2070 population size in the cases of Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, and Malta. Net migration over the entire projection period was only revised downward for
Greece and Cyprus.
Table I.1.15: Total fertility rates and net migration - difference between EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019
Fertility rate Net migration ('000)
avg (1) sum sum sum sum

2022 2070 2022 2070 2022
2022-2070 2022-2070 2022-2070(2) 2025-2070 2025-2070 (2)
BE 0.0 0.0 0.0 86 8 0.7% 766 6.5% 627 5.3%
BG 0.0 0.0 0.0 164 6 2.4% 410 8.1% 220 4.4%
CZ 0.0 0.0 0.0 442 7 4.1% 606 5.9% 54 0.5%
DK 0.0 0.0 0.0 47 2 0.8% 123 2.0% 27 0.4%
DE 0.0 0.0 0.0 1349 22 1.6% 3.324 4.1% 547 0.7%
EE 0.1 0.0 0.0 43 1 3.2% 106 8.9% 47 4.0%
IE -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 60 1 1.2% 35 0.5% -105 -1.6%
EL 0.1 0.0 0.0 10 -6 0.1% -546 -6.4% -570 -6.6%
ES -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 399 25 0.8% 2.329 4.9% 789 1.7%
FR 0.0 0.0 0.0 204 18 0.3% 883 1.3% 334 0.5%
HR 0.0 0.0 0.0 19 4 0.5% 185 6.1% 172 5.7%
IT -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 154 34 0.3% 1.791 3.3% 984 1.8%
CY 0.0 0.0 0.0 14 0 1.5% -55 -5.0% -82 -7.5%
LV -0.1 0.0 0.0 40 1 2.1% 119 10.1% 90 7.7%
LT -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 86 3 3.1% 322 17.7% 218 11.9%
LU 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 1 1.5% 129 16.3% 94 11.9%
HU 0.1 0.0 0.0 22 2 0.2% 48 0.5% -43 -0.5%
MT 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 0.3% 89 12.5% 57 8.1%
NL 0.0 0.0 0.0 182 9 1.0% 860 4.8% 417 2.3%
AT 0.0 0.0 0.0 76 9 0.9% 427 4.6% 271 2.9%
PL 0.0 0.1 0.1 982 -3 2.6% 500 1.6% -613 -2.0%
PT 0.0 0.0 0.0 64 20 0.6% 709 8.4% 575 6.8%
RO 0.2 0.0 0.1 143 7 0.8% 640 4.7% 596 4.4%
SI 0.0 0.0 0.0 7 1 0.3% 72 3.7% 44 2.3%
SK 0.0 0.0 0.0 92 0 1.7% 98 2.1% -8 -0.2%
FI 0.0 0.0 0.0 64 0 1.1% 138 2.7% 6 0.1%
SE 0.0 0.0 0.0 36 2 0.3% 74 0.6% -132 -1.0%
NO -0.1 0.0 -0.1 8 3 0.2% 40 0.6% -17 -0.3%
EA 0.0 0.0 0.0 2960 152 0.8% 11.781 3.5% 4.505 1.3%
EU 0.0 0.0 0.0 4796 175 1.1% 14.182 3.3% 4.614 1.1%
(1) Difference in total net migration in 2022 as a percentage of EUROPOP2019 population projection for 2022.
(2) Difference in total net migration (2022-2070) as a percentage of EUROPOP2019 population projection for 2070.
Source: European Commission based on EUROPOP2023 and EUROPOP2019 (Eurostat).
(17) More recent estimates suggest somewhat lower but still exceptional figures.
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European Commission
Box I.1.1: Methodology for the migration assumptions in the EUROPOP2023 projections –
impact of displaced people from Ukraine
The models used by Eurostat to produce immigration and emigration projections, which combine into net
migration, take account of past migration trends, the most recent data, underlying demographic factors and
assumptions about future developments in migration flows. The models are built around a nowcast component,
a trend extrapolation and a long-term convergence module. In the case of the immigration model, also a
working-age population feedback mechanism is applied. The main elements of the methodology were
explained in detail in the previous edition of the Ageing Report. (1) In comparison, the EUROPOP2023
methodology was slightly simplified, modelling intra-EU migration flows no longer separately, as described
below. In addition, the expected in- and outflows of people fleeing Ukraine who currently benefit from
temporary protection were modelled explicitly.
Immigration assumptions
Total immigration in EUROPOP2023 consists of three components:
1. Immigration derived from past immigration trends. This is the largest component of immigration and
is modelled separately for (i) immigration from non-EU countries and (ii) immigration from EU countries.
The model is split into two periods: 2023-2027 and 2028-2100. For the years 2023 to 2027, the values are
derived from a linear interpolation between the nowcast level of 2022 and the average of past immigration
used to estimate expected immigration in 2027 (average of 2003-2022; 2013-2022 for Member States that
joined since 2004). As of 2027, immigration levels are estimated through linear interpolation between the
long-term average and the immigration per capita value for the EU in 2027.
2. A working-age feedback mechanism. In case of a decline in the working-age population (people aged
15-64), 10% of the decrease is assumed to be compensated by additional non-EU immigration.
3. In 2022 and 2023, inflows of displaced people from Ukraine under temporary protection. The large
influx of displaced people from Ukraine following the Russian war of aggression triggered the activation
of the Directive on Temporary Protection in March 2022. The rights of beneficiaries of temporary
protection include a residence permit for the entire duration of the protection (one to three years) and the
possibility to move to another Member State before the issuance of a residence permit. People fleeing
Ukraine under temporary protection are included in the base population for the purpose of population
projections. The stocks of beneficiaries of temporary protection at the end of December 2022 was used to
measure the total inflow of refugees in 2022. For 2023, the total inflow of people under temporary
protection is projected to be 15% of the inflows observed in 2022. There are no further inflows estimated
after 2023, nor further inflows due to family reunions.
Emigration assumptions
Total emigration in EUROPOP2023 results from two projection components:
1. Emigration derived from past emigration trends. It is modelled similarly to immigration (see above).
2027 emigration levels are converted into country-specific probabilities of emigration that are assumed to
linearly converge between 2027 and 2100 towards the EU average (2013-2022).
(1) See 2021 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies.
(Continued on the next page)
30
Part I
Box (continued)
2. Outflows in 2024-2033 of Ukrainian refugees who arrived under temporary protection in 2022-2023.
Surveys indicate that a relevant share of displaced people from Ukraine intends to stay in their current
host country. (2) The emigration projections assume that 33% of refugees will remain permanently in the
host country, with 67% returning. The return period is modelled over 10 years, such that the number of
returns per year decreases linearly, until 33% of the total inflows in 2022-2023 is left in 2033.
(2) In a UNHCR survey among Ukrainian refugees in 43 countries from August-September 2022, 81% of the respondents
indicated their wish to return to Ukraine eventually. A survey conducted in Germany between August and October
2022 indicated that 37% of the refugees from Ukraine would like to stay permanently, another 34% indicated their
intention to stay at least until the end of the war, 27% were undecided, and just 2% planned to leave within a year. In
Finland, a survey conducted in June and July 2022 showed that 27% of the refugees would not return to Ukraine in any
event, 33% stated that they would return once the war has ended, while 39% were uncertain.
31
2. LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIONS
Labour force participation among the population aged 20 to 64 years in the EU is projected to rise
from around 79% in 2022 to 83% in 2070. Higher participation of older workers and of women in
general is the main drivers behind the rising trend in the projections. The labour supply is, however,
projected to decline by 12% by 2070, as higher labour force participation can only partly offset the
expected fall in the working-age population. Over the same period, the employment rate is projected to
increase from 75% to 79% in the EU. Overall, the number of hours worked would fall by 9% on
average and economic dependency ratios would rise.
2.1. INTRODUCTION
The macroeconomic implications of the demographic trends described in the previous chapter will depend
in large part on labour force developments, namely how many people take part in the labour market and
for how long. More people working and doing so for a longer time broadens the contributory basis,
generating more resources to finance the rising pension and healthcare and long-term care costs
associated with population ageing, without crowding out other public spending priorities.
How long people will work in the future depends, among other factors, on the incentives created by
public and private pension programmes. It is therefore important to consider the likely impact of adopted
pension reforms on labour market exit behaviour. ( 18)
This chapter starts with a comparison of recent trends in labour force participation, followed by an
overview of the estimated effects of legislated pension reforms. Thereafter, the participation rate and
employment rate projections are discussed. ( 19) An analysis of the economic dependency ratio and a
comparison with the 2021 Ageing Report conclude the chapter. The boxes and annexes focus on the
underlying assumptions and methodology.
2.2. PAST TRENDS AND MAIN DRIVERS OF LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The composition of the labour force has changed fundamentally in recent decades. Younger cohorts have
tended to enter the labour market later, and women and older people have steadily increased labour
market participation. These dynamics have several drivers:
• Demographic factors, e.g. a delay in childbearing and decline in fertility rates.
• Sociocultural factors, e.g. longer schooling and the fading of the breadwinner model.
• Institutional factors, e.g. increases in legal retirement ages and stricter labour market regulation.
• Economic factors, e.g. more part-time employment and a shift to a service-based economy.
The labour market participation among people of working age (20-64) in the EU rose from 72% in 2000
to 75% in 2010 and to 78% in 2021 (see Table I.2.1). Compared to 2010, participation rose in all Member
States, with the largest increase recorded in Hungary and Malta, at about 15-20 pps. Fluctuations in the
upward trend in labour market participation coincide with the business cycle, e.g. in 2008-2011 (global
financial crisis) and 2020-2021 (COVID-19 pandemic).
(18) Other aspects that may affect labour supply are health and disability trends, and active labour market policies that may increase
demand for older workers and the flexibility of working in old age.
(19) To project participation rates by sex and single age, the Cohort Simulation Model (CSM) developed by the European
Commission (DG ECFIN) is used. The labour force projections are based on a ‘no-policy-change’ assumption (see Box I.2.1).
32
Part I
Rising female labour force participation has been the predominant driver of the trend increase. Male
labour participation in the EU was stable at around 82% in the 2000s but has been rising slowly since.
Given the fast rise in female participation, the difference between male and female participation has
narrowed (from 19 pps in 2000 to 11 pps in 2021). Yet, a clear gap remains and convergence slowed
down in recent years as also male participation picked up. Even though female participation has been
steadily increasing, it stays below male participation for all age groups in nearly all countries. In general:
• Prime-age male workers (aged 25-54) have the highest participation rates of all age groups, at over
90% in nearly all countries.
• The participation rates of men aged 55 to 64 years rose considerably since 2000, given higher
statutory retirement ages and reduced early exit possibilities. For women aged 55-64, the increase was
even stronger, though starting from a lower level, with a convergence in retirement conditions to those
for men in most countries.
• The participation rates of young people (aged 20-24) have declined in most countries as people tend to
study longer.
• Given these trends, a further increase in total labour market participation is expected, driven by prime-
age women and older workers in general.
Table I.2.1: Historical participation rates: total (%)

total (20-64y) young (20-24y) prime-age (25-54y) older (55-64y)
2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021
BE 70.8 73.5 75.1 60.7 55.2 47.4 82.8 86.3 85.4 25.9 39.2 57.1 BE
BG 67.1 71.9 77.2 48.5 51.3 35.8 81.6 82.9 84.7 25.1 49.3 67.9 BG
CZ 77.4 75.7 82.2 69.3 51.5 49.5 88.5 87.8 88.7 38.1 49.7 71.6 CZ
DK 81.4 80.6 82.9 79.1 75.2 73.1 87.9 88.4 87.1 56.9 58.9 75.3 DK
DE 74.6 80.6 82.3 71.1 69.9 71.5 85.4 87.3 87.2 42.9 62.6 74.1 DE
EE 77.6 80.2 84.5 64.7 60.8 68.8 88.0 88.3 88.8 47.3 64.3 76.6 EE
IE 73.0 76.2 79.5 73.6 78.1 71.4 78.4 80.7 84.3 46.3 55.1 66.4 IE
EL 69.6 73.0 73.4 63.1 51.4 42.1 78.3 83.2 83.1 40.9 45.2 54.4 EL
ES 69.8 77.8 79.2 60.9 64.6 53.2 78.0 85.7 87.1 40.8 50.7 64.4 ES
FR 74.9 75.8 79.2 59.3 61.6 64.6 86.4 88.7 88.0 31.7 42.2 59.7 FR
HR 67.6 69.9 73.5 63.1 56.5 51.9 80.2 80.8 85.3 24.5 41.8 50.7 HR
IT 63.6 66.3 69.3 55.8 46.8 43.1 74.2 76.9 77.3 28.6 37.9 56.5 IT
CY 75.6 80.0 82.0 72.6 69.4 69.1 81.6 86.9 87.7 51.2 59.1 66.9 CY
LV 73.7 79.6 81.6 64.8 65.0 61.3 85.5 88.6 87.1 39.0 56.9 72.2 LV
LT 78.6 78.2 83.5 64.6 52.3 60.7 89.3 88.4 90.1 45.6 56.5 74.1 LT
LU 69.0 73.8 77.9 56.3 40.8 52.0 79.8 85.7 89.2 27.6 40.6 48.8 LU
HU 65.0 67.4 82.0 57.6 44.7 55.4 77.3 80.9 90.1 22.6 36.5 64.7 HU
MT 60.5 64.0 81.7 79.5 73.8 74.4 64.2 72.9 89.5 29.5 33.3 53.9 MT
NL 76.0 79.7 84.6 80.6 77.1 83.6 83.6 87.8 88.7 38.6 55.3 73.8 NL
AT 74.1 77.5 80.4 71.7 73.4 73.8 85.3 87.1 89.0 31.4 42.2 58.4 AT
PL 72.9 71.1 78.0 63.7 57.9 55.5 82.7 84.1 87.4 32.1 36.7 56.0 PL
PT 76.4 79.1 81.2 63.7 59.1 51.5 84.6 88.7 90.4 53.2 54.3 66.9 PT
RO 75.9 69.7 70.8 60.9 47.2 46.7 84.4 81.9 80.6 52.5 42.1 45.6 RO
SI 73.4 75.8 79.8 59.4 57.7 52.8 87.7 90.0 92.2 23.7 36.5 54.9 SI
SK 76.5 75.2 80.0 70.1 52.7 46.4 88.3 86.9 88.8 24.6 45.1 64.1 SK
FI 79.6 79.0 82.7 77.7 69.7 68.1 88.1 87.5 87.9 45.5 60.2 73.8 FI
SE 80.7 84.5 87.5 61.3 72.0 72.8 86.8 89.8 91.1 68.4 74.8 82.5 SE
NO 82.9 82.1 83.0 74.6 72.3 73.0 87.7 87.3 86.6 66.2 69.6 75.9 NO
EA 72.0 75.8 78.4 64.1 62.2 60.8 82.2 85.2 85.7 37.2 49.2 64.7 EA
EU 72.4 75.0 78.4 63.6 60.5 59.6 82.6 85.0 85.9 37.9 48.1 64.0 EU
Croatia: 2002 instead of 2000.

Source: Eurostat, LFS.
33
European Commission
Table I.2.2: Historical participation rates: men (%)

2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021
BE 80.1 79.8 79.5 65.5 59.5 49.8 92.1 92.2 89.7 36.3 47.6 62.5 BE
BG 73.4 76.8 81.8 58.3 58.2 43.7 84.4 86.1 88.4 39.9 56.6 73.5 BG
CZ 86.2 84.9 89.5 77.3 60.0 58.8 95.0 95.5 95.8 54.5 62.5 78.1 CZ
DK 85.7 84.5 86.4 84.4 77.0 75.2 91.5 91.8 90.5 64.5 65.1 79.8 DK
DE 82.9 86.8 86.5 74.6 72.5 73.8 93.7 93.2 91.4 52.5 70.8 78.6 DE
EE 83.3 83.8 87.0 75.8 67.2 70.2 91.6 91.8 91.9 54.4 64.3 76.1 EE
IE 86.2 83.9 85.1 79.2 81.0 72.5 92.0 88.9 90.2 64.6 64.3 73.6 IE
EL 85.1 84.4 81.7 69.3 56.3 43.9 94.5 94.2 90.6 57.7 60.2 66.5 EL
ES 84.4 85.4 83.7 65.2 67.4 55.6 93.2 92.4 91.3 60.3 63.7 70.9 ES
FR 81.9 80.7 82.7 63.2 65.9 67.0 94.3 94.2 92.3 35.5 45.0 61.7 FR
HR 75.2 75.8 78.9 69.5 63.8 60.7 86.9 84.1 89.3 34.2 54.4 57.4 HR
IT 78.6 78.4 79.2 61.9 54.1 50.0 90.4 89.4 87.3 42.2 49.5 67.2 IT
CY 89.2 87.2 88.5 78.2 68.8 73.4 95.3 93.4 93.1 69.5 74.3 78.9 CY
LV 80.5 82.5 85.1 74.7 68.7 66.9 88.5 91.0 90.9 53.8 58.5 73.2 LV
LT 82.8 80.6 84.7 70.0 57.4 64.0 90.4 89.0 91.0 59.0 62.6 74.1 LT
LU 82.2 82.1 81.3 61.5 42.6 53.2 94.2 94.8 92.5 38.6 48.8 54.4 LU
HU 73.6 74.0 87.4 66.0 49.5 60.1 84.3 87.3 93.6 34.3 42.2 76.6 HU
MT 85.8 83.2 89.7 81.7 77.9 75.9 93.5 94.5 96.6 52.9 52.3 68.1 MT
NL 85.8 85.9 88.7 82.5 77.6 81.7 93.8 93.3 92.2 50.8 66.2 82.1 NL
AT 83.2 83.0 85.0 75.3 76.5 78.4 93.6 91.9 92.3 44.5 51.4 66.4 AT
PL 79.4 78.6 85.3 68.3 65.3 63.4 88.4 89.6 92.5 41.1 48.9 69.3 PL
PT 84.8 83.8 84.3 70.0 61.4 55.3 92.4 92.7 92.3 64.6 62.0 73.3 PT
RO 82.6 79.1 81.6 67.2 54.7 56.5 91.0 90.9 90.7 58.4 52.3 57.9 RO
SI 78.0 79.9 82.8 63.4 63.3 56.9 90.7 91.7 94.1 33.5 47.5 59.3 SI
SK 84.7 83.4 84.4 78.0 62.3 57.1 94.0 92.9 92.4 41.0 59.7 67.7 SK
FI 82.6 81.4 84.4 82.2 72.4 70.3 91.1 90.5 90.0 46.4 60.1 73.8 FI
SE 83.1 88.0 90.3 64.8 75.3 75.6 88.6 92.9 93.9 72.1 79.3 85.1 SE
NO 87.4 85.2 85.7 78.8 74.6 72.8 91.7 90.1 89.2 72.7 73.5 80.4 NO
EA 82.4 83.0 83.6 68.7 66.2 63.9 92.9 92.3 90.8 48.4 58.0 70.7 EA
EU 81.9 82.3 84.0 68.6 65.1 63.6 92.0 91.8 91.2 48.7 57.2 70.8 EU

Table I.2.3: Historical participation rates: women (%)

2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021 2000 2010 2021
BE 61.3 67.1 70.8 55.8 51.0 44.8 73.2 80.4 81.1 15.8 30.9 51.8 BE
BG 61.0 67.0 72.5 38.5 43.9 27.6 78.9 79.6 80.7 12.5 42.9 62.7 BG
CZ 68.8 66.4 74.7 61.5 42.5 39.7 81.9 79.8 81.1 23.3 38.0 65.2 CZ
DK 77.1 76.7 79.4 74.2 73.3 70.9 84.3 85.0 83.7 48.2 52.8 70.9 DK
DE 66.2 74.5 78.1 67.8 67.3 68.9 77.0 81.3 82.8 33.4 54.6 69.6 DE
EE 72.3 76.8 82.0 52.8 54.3 67.5 84.5 84.8 85.4 41.9 64.3 77.0 EE
IE 59.9 68.5 74.0 67.9 75.3 70.3 64.9 72.6 78.5 27.7 45.7 59.5 IE
EL 54.6 61.8 65.1 57.1 46.6 40.2 62.2 72.4 75.4 25.9 31.1 43.6 EL
ES 55.2 70.1 74.7 56.6 61.8 50.7 62.7 78.8 83.0 22.5 38.4 58.3 ES
FR 68.1 71.0 75.8 55.7 57.3 62.1 78.6 83.4 84.0 28.2 39.5 57.9 FR
HR 60.4 64.1 68.2 56.5 49.0 42.5 73.7 77.4 81.2 16.0 30.2 44.6 HR
IT 48.9 54.6 59.4 49.9 39.2 35.6 57.9 64.5 67.3 15.9 26.9 46.5 IT
CY 62.8 73.4 75.9 68.0 70.1 65.1 68.6 81.0 82.7 33.6 44.3 55.2 CY
LV 67.6 77.0 78.2 54.7 61.2 55.5 82.7 86.3 83.3 28.0 55.7 71.4 LV
LT 74.7 76.0 82.3 59.1 47.0 57.1 88.3 87.8 89.2 35.4 51.7 74.0 LT
LU 55.5 65.3 74.3 51.0 39.0 50.7 64.9 76.4 85.9 16.8 32.0 42.9 LU
HU 56.7 61.0 76.6 49.0 39.6 50.4 70.5 74.6 86.6 13.2 31.7 54.3 HU
MT 35.1 44.3 72.4 77.1 69.5 72.6 34.5 50.6 81.2 8.6 14.6 39.0 MT
NL 66.0 73.5 80.6 78.7 76.5 85.6 73.0 82.2 85.1 26.4 44.4 65.6 NL
AT 65.1 71.9 75.8 68.1 70.5 69.2 76.8 82.4 85.6 18.9 33.6 50.7 AT
PL 66.7 63.6 70.7 59.2 50.1 47.3 77.1 78.6 82.1 24.4 25.9 44.0 PL
PT 68.4 74.7 78.4 57.4 56.9 47.5 77.1 84.9 88.7 43.1 47.4 61.3 PT
RO 69.4 60.2 59.8 54.9 39.1 36.4 77.9 72.7 70.0 47.5 33.1 34.1 RO
SI 68.8 71.5 76.6 55.1 50.8 48.1 84.7 88.1 90.1 14.8 25.5 50.6 SI
SK 68.5 67.0 75.6 62.3 42.8 35.2 82.5 80.9 85.0 11.1 32.3 60.8 SK
FI 76.6 76.6 80.9 73.3 66.9 65.6 85.1 84.4 85.6 44.6 60.3 73.9 FI
SE 78.3 81.0 84.7 57.7 68.5 69.6 84.9 86.6 88.2 64.6 70.2 79.9 SE
NO 78.3 79.0 80.2 70.4 70.0 73.3 83.5 84.3 83.9 59.7 65.5 71.3 NO
EA 61.7 68.6 73.2 59.6 58.2 57.5 71.5 78.1 80.6 26.6 40.9 59.0 EA
EU 63.1 67.8 72.9 58.7 55.7 55.4 73.1 78.1 80.6 27.9 39.6 57.5 EU

34
Part I
2.3. THE IMPACT OF PENSION REFORMS ON THE PARTICIPATION RATE OF OLDER WORKERS
Tighter eligibility criteria and stronger retirement disincentives will induce older workers to stay longer
in the workforce and delay retirement. As a result, participation among older age groups is expected to
rise strongly in many countries and effective labour market exit ages are projected to increase by about
two years on average in the EU by 2070.
Pension reforms in EU Member States

Most Member States have legislated pension reforms in recent decades. Sometimes reforms are systemic
and revise the design of the public pension scheme, for example when moving from the traditional
defined benefit scheme to a point system or notional defined contribution scheme. Most changes are
parametric, though. Two broad types can be distinguished: tightening pension eligibility requirements
such as age and contributory period or making benefits less generous by adapting the pension formula and
indexation rules. Some countries also increased the contributions for current workers to strengthen the
internal financial balance of their pension systems or created pension reserve funds.
Among eligibility measures, the most frequent reform consists in raising the statutory and early retirement
ages. It is the measure with the largest direct impact on labour market exit behaviour as it forces people to
delay retirement. Nearly all Member States have already increased their early and statutory retirement
ages or are in the process of doing so in the coming years (see Annex 4 - Table II.A4.2). As a result, the
average statutory retirement age for men (women) is expected to rise from 65.2 years (64.5) in 2022 to
66.5 years (66.2) years in 2045, and to 67.3 years (67) in 2070 (see Graph I.2.1), with often similar
increases in the early retirement age.
Graph I.2.1: Legislated change in statutory retirement ages

men women
74 74
72.4 72.4
72 72
70 70.0 70 70.0
68 68
67.0 67.3
67.0 67.0
66.5
66 66 66.2
65.2 65.0 65.0
64.5
64 64
63.2
62.6 62.7
62 62
60.6
60 60
2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070
average of three highest member states average of three lowest member states EU
For a comprehensive overview, see Table II.A4.2 in Annex 4.

At the same time, adopted reforms have been reversed in several countries. This was for example the case
in Poland, Czechia, Croatia, and Slovakia. ( 20) In other cases, the impact of legislated reforms was
(20) In Poland, the 2016 reform lowered the statutory retirement age to 60 years for women and to 65 years for men, restoring the
situation from before the 2012 reform, which gradually raised the statutory retirement age to 67 years. In Czechia, the 2017
reform capped the statutory retirement age at 65 years, undoing the permanent increase in the retirement age, which was
roughly equivalent to changes in life expectancy, adopted in 2011. In Croatia, the 2019 reform capped the early/statutory
retirement age at 60/65 years as of 2030, lowered the penalty for early retirement and reversed the acceleration of the
equalisation of retirement ages between men and women. As a result, the 2018 and the earlier 2014 reforms, which would have
increased the early/statutory retirement age to 62/67 years by 2038, were partly reversed. In Slovakia, the 2019 reform capped
the statutory retirement age at 64 years, lower for mothers, thus abolishing the link to life expectancy adopted in 2012.
However, in 2023 the link to longevity was reintroduced (see Box I.2.2.
35
European Commission
delayed, e.g. the application of the index for pension revaluation and the sustainability factor in Spain ( 21)
and the temporary possibility to retire early in Italy in 2019 but extended since.
Some countries have introduced an automatic link Table I.2.4: Automatic adjustment mechanisms
between retirement ages and gains in life
Automatic Retirement age
expectancy to make their pension system more balancing
Sustainability
linked to life Legislated
factor(4)
robust to a continuous increase in longevity (see mechanism expectancy
Table I.2.4). The adoption of an automatic IT X X 1995 & 2010

LV X 1996
balancing mechanism within the pension system
SE(1) X X X 1998, 2001 & 2021
or a sustainability factor, which adjust the pension PL X 1999
benefit itself for changes in life expectancy, are FR(2) X 2003
other built-in mechanisms found in some Member DE X 2004
FI X X 2005 & 2015
States but they have at most an indirect impact on
PT(1) X X 2007 & 2013
labour market participation. EL X 2010
DK(3) X 2011
Box I.2.2 at the end of the chapter provides an CY X 2012
LU X 2012
overview of ongoing reforms with an expected
NL(1) X 2012
impact on effective retirement ages in the 27 LT X 2016
Member States and Norway. These reforms are EE X 2018
incorporated in the Cohort Simulation Model used SK X 2023
to project future participation rates (see Box (1) Only two thirds of the increase in life expectancy is
reflected in the retirement age.
I.2.1). (2) Pension benefits evolve in line with life expectancy through
the ‘proratisation’ coefficient; it has been legislated until 2028.
(3) Subject to Parliamentary decision.
(4) Benefit linked to life expectancy. In NDC systems, this is
done through the annuity factor.
Reform-induced changes in participation rates and exit ages

The age group 55-64 is the most affected by measures aimed at postponing retirement. Table I.2.1 showed
how the participation rates for this age bracket already increased from 38% in 2000 to 64% in 2021.
Graph I.2.2 shows the estimated impact of pension reforms by 2070. Adopted reforms should lift the
projected participation rate among both men and women aged 55-64 years by about 10 pps on average by
2070. Also for the age group 65-74 (see Graph I.2.3), legislated reforms push up projected participation
rates, with an average increase of 8 pps for men and 7 pps for women by 2070, though mainly in
countries that adjust their legal retirement ages to life expectancy.
Average exit ages from the labour market can be derived from the participation rates of the oldest age
brackets. Graph I.2.4 shows the change in the average exit age for men and women by 2070. It provides a
summary measure of the long-term impact of enacted pension reforms. The projections show an average
increase of around two years in the age at which people exit the labour market, which can be considered
an approximation for the effective retirement age.
(21) Both the IPR and the sustainability factor were eventually abolished in 2021.
36
Part I
Graph I.2.2: Impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of the age group 55-64 in 2070 (%)
men women
EU EU
EE EE
SE FI
DK DK
NL SE
EL SK
IT NL
PT PT
SK DE
HU LT
FI FR
CY ES
ES SI
SI HU
DE IE
CZ CZ
FR LV
LV NO
IE CY
LT BG
BG MT
NO EL
BE AT
MT BE
PL IT
AT HR
HR LU
RO PL
LU RO
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
without reforms impact reforms without reforms impact reforms
The reform impact is the difference between the participation rate projection in the baseline and that in the 'constant
retirement age scenario' (see Chapter 5).
Graph I.2.3: Impact of pension reforms on the participation rate of the age group 65-74 in 2070 (%)
men women
EU EU
DK DK
IT EE
EE IT
SE NL
NL SE
EL FI
PT PT
CY EL
FI CY
ES ES
NO NO
SK SK
IE IE
DE DE
PL LT
BG HU
LT LV
RO FR
HU HR
LV BE
BE BG
AT CZ
FR MT
HR AT
CZ RO
MT SI
SI PL
LU LU
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40
without reforms impact reforms without reforms impact reforms
For countries such as Austria, Czechia, Croatia, and Bulgaria the increase for women is higher than that
for men because of a progressive convergence of legal retirement ages for women to that of men.
Countries that introduced an automatic link between retirement ages and gains in life expectancy show
the highest increases (see Table I.2.4).
37
European Commission
Graph I.2.4: Projected change of the average labour market exit age by 2070 (years)
men women
6.0 6.0
5.0 5.0
4.0 4.0
3.0 3.0
2.0 2.0
1.0 1.0
0.0 0.0
MT
IE
IT
FR
FI
LU
NO
LV
LT
RO
HU
HR
DE
CZ
NL
CY
DK
PL
BE
BG
AT
PT
ES
SE
SI
EL
SK
EE
IE
MT
IT
FR
FI
HU
HR
RO
NO
LT
LV
LU
DE
CZ
CY
NL
DK
PL
AT
BG
BE
PT
ES
SE
SI
EL
SK
EE
Based on the age group 51-74.

2.4. LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION AND LABOUR SUPPLY PROJECTIONS
Social and institutional factors such as a higher attachment to the labour market of younger women
and adopted pension reforms are expected to push up participation rates. This increase would partly
offset the impact of a decrease in the working-age population on the labour supply.
2.4.1. Participation rate projections
The total participation rate in the EU is projected to increase by around 3 pps by 2070, with female
labour market participation anticipated to rise by 5 pps and the largest increases (by 10 pps) among the
older age groups.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the population at working age is projected to decline substantially in the
coming decades as large cohorts of retiring people are replaced by smaller cohorts of younger workers.
Other things being equal and given the age profile of participation rates, the increasing share of older
workers in the labour force puts downward pressure on the total participation rate.
The projections nevertheless reveal a rightward shift in the age profile of both male and female
participation rates, particularly at ages over 60 years (see Graph I.2.5). For female participation, there is
in addition a general upward shift. These broad trends reflect the combined effect of pension reforms and
the rising attachment of younger generations of women to the labour market.
Tables I.2.5, I.2.7 and I.2.8 provide an overview of the main projected developments for the participation
rates, broken down by broad age groups and sex. In the EU, the overall labour participation by the
population at working age (20-64y) would increase by 3.3 pps between 2022 and 2070: from 79.4% in
2022 to 82.7% in 2070. This increase is predominantly the result of rising female participation, with a
change of 5.2 pps compared to 1.3 pps for men. With 79% of the female working-age population
expected to be active in the labour market in 2070, female participation would nevertheless remain 7 pps
below male participation, compared with about 11 pps at present.
38
Part I
Graph I.2.5: Age profile of participation rate by sex (EU)
Males 2022 Males 2070 Females 2022 Females 2070

100% 100%
80% 80%
60% 60%
40% 40%
20% 20%
0% 0%
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Czechia is the only country for which overall participation is expected to decrease, though only slightly.
In addition to a decrease in the participation rate among prime-age Czech people, this results from a
higher share of population groups with a relatively lower participation. The largest increases are projected
for Croatia, Italy and Estonia, at over 5 pps. Estonia is also the country with the highest projected
participation rate among people aged 20 to 64 years in 2070, at nearly 92%. This compares with rates
below 80% for Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, and Romania in 2070.
When comparing projections for male and female participation for the 20-64 age group, aside from
Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, all Member States show a higher increase for women. Despite the
resulting convergence, overall female participation would remain lower than that of men throughout the
projection period in all Member States, except for Estonia and Luxembourg, which would see
participation reach 92% and 78%, respectively, for both sexes.
Participation among the youngest age bracket (20-24y) is expected to rise in all countries, by 2 pps on
Table I.2.5: Participation rate projections by age group – total (%)
total young prime-age older change 2022-2070 (pps)
20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64 total young prime-age older
2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64
BE 76.1 80.3 48.4 51.2 86.1 88.2 59.1 70.6 4.1 2.8 2.1 11.5 BE
BG 79.1 80.5 41.6 43.4 85.9 88.9 71.0 73.5 1.3 1.8 3.0 2.5 BG
CZ 83.1 81.5 50.7 52.7 89.1 88.3 74.7 75.0 -1.6 2.0 -0.8 0.3 CZ
DK 83.6 88.0 75.1 78.6 87.7 89.8 75.5 86.6 4.4 3.5 2.1 11.1 DK
DE 83.3 85.2 73.6 73.9 87.8 89.3 75.3 77.9 1.9 0.3 1.4 2.6 DE
EE 86.5 91.7 75.2 79.4 90.8 94.3 77.1 89.7 5.1 4.2 3.5 12.6 EE
IE 81.6 85.8 74.4 77.6 86.1 91.6 69.0 74.8 4.3 3.2 5.5 5.8 IE
EL 75.4 79.9 46.6 50.0 85.3 85.2 57.4 78.2 4.5 3.4 -0.1 20.8 EL
ES 79.6 81.6 55.3 56.5 87.4 86.9 65.4 77.5 2.0 1.2 -0.5 12.1 ES
FR 79.6 84.3 66.8 69.2 88.2 89.8 60.4 75.9 4.7 2.5 1.5 15.5 FR
HR 74.9 81.2 55.5 61.9 86.0 90.1 53.0 65.4 6.2 6.4 4.1 12.4 HR
IT 70.4 76.3 45.2 45.6 78.6 80.4 57.9 76.3 5.8 0.4 1.8 18.4 IT
CY 83.2 86.1 68.8 72.1 89.4 91.4 68.0 76.1 3.0 3.3 1.9 8.1 CY
LV 82.7 83.3 67.4 70.5 87.7 88.9 73.7 74.6 0.6 3.2 1.2 0.9 LV
LT 84.2 85.4 64.1 65.8 90.0 92.0 75.3 75.7 1.2 1.7 2.0 0.4 LT
LU 77.6 78.4 46.9 53.9 89.8 90.5 48.4 53.3 0.8 7.0 0.7 4.9 LU
HU 83.2 86.6 54.5 56.7 91.0 94.1 68.0 77.8 3.4 2.2 3.1 9.8 HU
MT 83.3 87.0 80.0 80.3 90.6 93.7 55.3 71.8 3.8 0.3 3.2 16.5 MT
NL 85.4 90.4 85.4 89.1 89.1 92.8 75.3 84.2 5.0 3.7 3.7 8.9 NL
AT 80.9 85.1 75.9 77.9 89.6 91.6 58.6 69.4 4.1 2.0 2.0 10.7 AT
PL 79.1 79.3 57.9 59.0 87.8 89.1 57.8 61.9 0.2 1.1 1.3 4.1 PL
PT 82.5 86.1 53.6 54.4 91.3 92.6 69.3 80.6 3.6 0.8 1.3 11.3 PT
RO 72.1 72.5 44.6 45.5 82.0 81.8 48.6 58.5 0.4 0.9 -0.2 9.9 RO
SI 81.4 85.4 56.6 59.2 92.9 92.8 57.3 76.6 4.0 2.7 -0.1 19.4 SI
SK 81.7 84.8 47.6 49.1 89.9 91.2 67.1 82.8 3.1 1.6 1.3 15.7 SK
FI 83.7 85.6 68.9 71.8 88.1 88.5 77.0 83.1 1.9 3.0 0.4 6.0 FI
SE 87.8 89.1 73.2 75.1 91.6 92.3 82.2 86.5 1.3 2.0 0.7 4.3 SE
NO 83.0 84.5 74.2 76.9 86.6 89.8 75.5 73.2 1.5 2.7 3.2 -2.3 NO
EA 79.3 83.1 63.0 65.1 86.4 88.1 65.9 77.0 3.8 2.0 1.6 11.0 EA
EU 79.4 82.7 61.6 63.7 86.7 88.2 65.4 75.5 3.3 2.1 1.5 10.1 EU
39
European Commission
average. Differences between countries and between sexes remain substantial for this age group
considering the cohort approach used to project participation (see Box I.2.1).
For the prime-age group (25-54y) an average increase of 1.5 pps is projected in the EU, with a maximum
rise of 5.5 pps in Ireland and a mild decrease of up to 0.8 pps in Czechia, Greece, Spain, Romania, and
Slovenia. By 2070, only Italy and Romania would have prime-age participation rates below 85% and
fourteen Member States would have a participation rate over 90% among people aged 25-54.
Table I.2.6: Participation rate projections The picture for males in the 25-54 age bracket is generally one of
– 65-74y, total (%) broad stabilisation, with the EU average participation rate
2022 2070 change unchanged at about 92% and projected changes limited to ±2 pps
BE 4.6 10.6 6.0 with more marked changes in Bulgaria (+3.6 pps), Ireland
BG 11.8 11.4 -0.4 (+2.6 pps), Croatia (+2.3 pps), Lithuania (+2.2 pps) and Greece
CZ 9.4 9.2 -0.3 (-2.4 pps). In contrast, female participation is projected to rise by
DK 14.8 35.9 21.1
DE 13.1 15.6 2.5
3 pps on average among the same age group, with an increase in
EE 25.5 33.3 7.8 all countries aside from Czechia, Romania and Slovenia. The
IE 14.2 16.5 2.4 average difference in male and female participation for prime-age
EL 9.9 24.3 14.4 people would still amount to 7 pps in 2070. Only in Finland,
ES 7.3 20.5 13.2 women aged 20 to 54 years are projected to be more active than
FR 6.3 10.4 4.1
men of the same age.
HR 5.5 10.0 4.4
IT 9.5 33.0 23.5
CY 15.2 23.4 8.2 Participation among the group of older workers (55-64y) is
LV 19.6 11.1 -8.5 expected to increase in all EU Member States, often substantially.
LT 18.7 12.5 -6.2 The EU average rises by 10 pps by 2070, to more than 75%. The
LU 5.0 4.3 -0.7 projected increase exceeds 15 pps in Greece, France, Italy, Malta,
HU 9.6 11.6 2.0
MT 8.7 8.6 -0.1
Slovenia, and Slovakia. In 2070, only Croatia, Luxembourg,
NL 16.2 30.0 13.9 Austria, Poland, and Romania would still have participation rates
AT 7.4 9.3 1.9 below 70% among people aged between 55 and 64 years. With
PL 8.9 10.0 1.1 higher increases for female (+13 pps) than for male older workers
PT 14.1 25.1 11.0 (+6 pps), the gender gap is projected to narrow substantially and
RO 3.7 9.6 5.8
even to be closed for several countries by 2070.
SI 6.7 6.6 -0.1
SK 6.4 19.9 13.4
FI 12.9 25.2 12.3As Graph I.2.5 showed, the increase in labour market
SE 18.2 29.7 11.5participation extends beyond the age of 65. Indeed, when
NO 21.1 20.2 -0.9considering the 65-74 age group, there is a similar upward trend
EA 10.0 19.3 9.4
in participation between 2023 and 2070 (see Table I.2.6). The
EU 9.8 18.4 8.6
average participation rate rises to 18% in 2070, though with large
differences between Member States. The largest increases occur
for countries with a link to life expectancy (led by Italy, Denmark
and Greece). Also for this age group, in most countries increases are substantially higher for women than
for men (see Statistical Annex in Part III).
40
Part I
Table I.2.7: Participation rate projections by age group – men (%)

2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64
BE 80.3 82.9 51.1 54.9 90.2 91.0 64.2 72.5 2.6 3.8 0.8 8.3 BE
BG 83.2 84.1 48.9 50.0 89.1 92.7 76.4 75.5 0.9 1.1 3.6 -0.9 BG
CZ 90.2 87.7 58.9 61.3 96.2 95.6 80.7 76.9 -2.5 2.4 -0.7 -3.9 CZ
DK 86.3 89.3 76.7 79.8 90.1 91.3 79.6 87.8 3.1 3.1 1.1 8.2 DK
DE 87.4 87.4 76.1 76.7 92.2 92.0 79.5 78.4 0.0 0.6 -0.2 -1.1 DE
EE 88.5 91.6 72.3 77.3 93.9 94.8 75.7 89.2 3.1 5.0 0.8 13.5 EE
IE 87.5 88.1 76.5 78.0 92.0 94.6 77.6 75.9 0.6 1.5 2.6 -1.8 IE
EL 84.3 85.6 49.8 53.1 93.2 90.8 71.1 85.1 1.3 3.3 -2.4 14.0 EL
ES 84.2 84.6 57.9 59.0 91.6 90.2 72.1 80.0 0.3 1.1 -1.4 7.9 ES
FR 82.9 86.0 69.1 71.8 92.3 91.7 62.1 76.4 3.0 2.7 -0.6 14.3 FR
HR 79.4 83.1 61.9 68.9 89.3 91.6 58.8 66.6 3.7 7.0 2.3 7.8 HR
IT 80.4 83.8 52.1 52.4 88.6 88.1 68.7 83.6 3.5 0.3 -0.4 14.9 IT
CY 89.0 90.2 72.3 77.4 94.3 95.1 79.6 80.3 1.1 5.2 0.8 0.7 CY
LV 85.6 86.3 73.4 77.6 90.9 91.8 73.4 76.0 0.7 4.3 0.9 2.6 LV
LT 85.0 86.3 64.0 66.4 91.1 93.3 75.0 75.7 1.2 2.4 2.2 0.7 LT
LU 80.9 78.3 44.8 52.3 92.7 90.6 56.2 53.2 -2.6 7.5 -2.0 -3.0 LU
HU 88.4 89.0 59.4 62.5 94.3 95.6 79.6 81.2 0.6 3.0 1.3 1.6 HU
MT 90.0 88.9 80.7 80.7 96.3 96.5 67.0 72.1 -1.1 0.0 0.2 5.1 MT
NL 89.3 92.2 84.8 89.9 92.6 94.6 82.1 85.9 2.9 5.1 2.0 3.8 NL
AT 85.3 86.3 78.8 78.7 92.6 93.4 67.1 68.7 1.0 -0.1 0.8 1.6 AT
PL 85.8 84.5 65.4 65.9 92.2 92.4 71.1 71.0 -1.3 0.4 0.2 -0.1 PL
PT 85.3 87.1 57.3 57.4 93.2 92.7 74.3 83.0 1.8 0.2 -0.5 8.8 PT
RO 82.3 82.6 54.6 55.4 91.3 92.7 60.8 66.6 0.3 0.8 1.4 5.8 RO
SI 84.6 87.9 61.3 64.2 95.0 95.1 61.7 78.4 3.3 2.9 0.1 16.8 SI
SK 85.8 86.0 58.8 60.2 93.3 91.5 69.9 82.0 0.2 1.4 -1.8 12.0 SK
FI 84.7 84.7 70.7 73.6 89.4 88.0 77.0 80.3 0.0 2.9 -1.3 3.3 FI
SE 90.5 91.2 76.8 79.1 94.1 94.2 84.9 88.2 0.8 2.3 0.1 3.3 SE
NO 86.0 85.5 75.3 78.5 89.2 90.9 80.7 73.5 -0.5 3.3 1.7 -7.3 NO
EA 85.1 87.8 64.2 70.1 93.6 92.4 70.6 82.3 2.7 5.9 -1.3 11.7 EA
EU 84.8 86.1 65.6 67.6 91.8 91.7 72.1 78.4 1.3 2.0 0.0 6.3 EU
Table I.2.8: Participation rate projections by age group – women (%)

2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64
BE 71.9 77.6 45.6 47.3 82.0 85.3 53.9 68.7 5.6 1.7 3.3 14.8 BE
BG 75.0 76.7 33.9 36.2 82.5 84.9 66.1 71.5 1.7 2.3 2.4 5.4 BG
CZ 75.8 74.8 42.3 43.6 81.6 80.3 68.8 73.0 -1.0 1.3 -1.3 4.2 CZ
DK 80.8 86.5 73.4 77.3 85.3 88.3 71.5 85.5 5.7 3.9 3.0 14.0 DK
DE 79.0 82.8 70.8 70.7 83.4 86.4 71.1 77.3 3.8 -0.1 3.0 6.2 DE
EE 84.5 91.7 78.2 81.6 87.4 93.8 78.2 90.3 7.1 3.3 6.3 12.0 EE
IE 75.8 83.6 72.3 77.3 80.4 88.6 60.8 73.8 7.8 5.0 8.2 13.1 IE
EL 66.6 73.9 43.3 46.6 77.4 79.1 44.8 71.2 7.3 3.3 1.7 26.4 EL
ES 75.0 78.7 52.6 54.0 83.3 83.7 59.0 75.1 3.7 1.4 0.4 16.2 ES
FR 76.3 82.6 64.3 66.6 84.3 87.8 58.8 75.5 6.3 2.2 3.5 16.7 FR
HR 70.5 78.9 48.6 54.1 82.6 88.3 47.7 63.9 8.4 5.5 5.7 16.2 HR
IT 60.5 68.0 37.5 38.0 68.6 71.8 47.6 68.5 7.4 0.5 3.2 20.9 IT
CY 77.7 82.0 65.4 66.6 85.0 87.5 56.8 72.1 4.3 1.2 2.5 15.3 CY
LV 79.9 80.0 61.1 62.9 84.4 85.7 73.9 73.0 0.1 1.8 1.3 -1.0 LV
LT 83.4 84.2 64.2 65.2 88.9 90.4 75.6 75.7 0.8 0.9 1.5 0.1 LT
LU 74.1 78.4 49.2 55.7 86.8 90.3 40.1 53.3 4.3 6.4 3.5 13.3 LU
HU 78.1 84.1 49.3 50.6 87.7 92.6 57.8 74.3 6.0 1.3 4.9 16.5 HU
MT 75.5 84.8 79.1 79.9 83.7 90.4 43.0 71.4 9.3 0.8 6.7 28.4 MT
NL 81.5 88.6 85.9 88.2 85.5 90.8 68.5 82.4 7.1 2.3 5.3 13.9 NL
AT 76.6 83.9 72.9 77.0 86.6 89.8 50.4 70.1 7.3 4.2 3.1 19.7 AT
PL 72.5 73.9 50.1 51.9 83.4 85.6 45.8 52.3 1.3 1.8 2.2 6.5 PL
PT 79.9 85.2 49.7 51.2 89.5 92.4 64.9 78.3 5.3 1.5 2.9 13.4 PT
RO 61.7 61.5 34.0 34.8 72.4 69.9 37.6 49.8 -0.3 0.8 -2.5 12.2 RO
SI 77.9 82.4 51.2 53.7 90.4 90.0 52.9 74.5 4.5 2.5 -0.4 21.7 SI
SK 77.5 83.6 35.9 37.7 86.3 90.9 64.4 83.6 6.0 1.8 4.6 19.2 SK
FI 82.6 86.5 66.9 69.9 86.8 89.0 77.1 86.0 3.9 2.9 2.3 8.9 FI
SE 85.0 86.8 69.0 70.8 88.9 90.1 79.4 84.6 1.9 1.8 1.3 5.2 SE
NO 79.8 83.5 73.1 75.2 83.8 88.6 70.0 72.8 3.6 2.1 4.8 2.8 NO
EA 75.1 81.8 57.9 63.3 83.8 85.9 59.4 77.6 6.6 5.4 2.2 18.2 EA
EU 74.0 79.1 57.4 59.4 81.5 84.5 59.1 72.6 5.2 2.1 3.0 13.5 EU
41
European Commission
2.4.2. Breakdown of changes in participation rates
Table I.2.9 applies a shift-share analysis to the change in the total participation rate by 2070 along age
and sex dimension. The overall participation rate is algebraically broken down in a pure participation rate
effect, a demographic effect and a residual interaction effect.
The participation rate effect captures changes in participation rates of specific age and gender groups and
is positive for all Member States. This reflects the trend rise in the participation rates of women and older
workers, with a small decrease in participation among prime-aged people in some countries.
The demographic effect, capturing changes in the structure of the working-age population, is negative in
most Member States because of shrinking cohorts of prime-aged people and women in general. Women
are thus associated with both positive participation and negative demographic effects. The former reflects
the upward transmission of younger cohorts’ higher participation rates, as captured by the CSM. The
latter reflects the ageing of the population, with a stronger impact on women, mostly because they leave
the labour force on average earlier than men.
Table I.2.9: Breakdown of overall change in labour market participation (pps)

Contribution of group-specific changes in participation rates Demographic effect
Total Men Women
Interaction effect
Total working-age (20-64)
Change in
participation
rate 2022-
Prime-age (25-54)
Prime-age (25-54)
Prime-age (25-54)
Prime-age (25-54)
2070 (pps)
Young (20-24)
Young (20-24)
Young (20-24)
Young (20-24)
Older (55-64)
Older (55-64)
Older (55-64)
Older (55-64)
Women
Men
BE 4.1 4.3 0.3 1.4 2.6 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.9 2.9 0.1 1.1 1.7 -0.3 0.0 -1.0 0.7 0.1 -0.1 0.1 BE
BG 1.3 2.8 0.1 2.1 0.6 1.2 0.0 1.3 -0.1 1.5 0.1 0.8 0.6 -1.4 0.9 -4.4 2.1 0.6 -0.6 0.0 BG
CZ -1.6 -0.3 0.2 -0.6 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.5 0.4 -1.3 1.1 -4.7 2.3 1.3 -1.1 0.1 CZ
DK 4.4 4.3 0.4 1.4 2.5 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.9 2.8 0.2 1.0 1.6 0.1 -0.9 0.9 0.1 1.1 -1.0 0.0 DK
DE 1.9 1.6 0.0 0.9 0.7 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 1.8 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.6 2.6 -2.9 0.9 -0.8 -0.1 DE
EE 5.1 5.5 0.3 2.5 2.8 1.9 0.2 0.3 1.4 3.7 0.1 2.2 1.4 -0.7 1.4 -4.7 2.6 1.6 -1.5 0.3 EE
IE 4.3 5.3 0.3 3.8 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.9 -0.2 4.5 0.3 2.9 1.3 -1.1 -0.5 -5.2 4.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 IE
EL 4.5 5.1 0.3 -0.1 4.9 0.9 0.1 -0.8 1.6 4.0 0.1 0.6 3.3 -0.9 0.7 -2.4 0.8 1.6 -1.3 0.3 EL
ES 2.0 2.6 0.1 -0.3 2.8 0.4 0.0 -0.5 0.9 2.1 0.1 0.1 1.9 -1.0 0.3 -3.6 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 ES
FR 4.7 4.8 0.3 1.0 3.6 1.5 0.1 -0.2 1.6 3.3 0.1 1.2 2.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 0.9 0.7 -0.6 0.2 FR
HR 6.2 6.4 0.6 2.7 3.1 2.0 0.3 0.8 0.9 4.2 0.2 1.9 2.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.6 3.6 -3.2 0.1 HR
IT 5.8 5.9 0.0 1.2 4.7 1.7 0.0 -0.1 1.9 3.8 0.0 1.0 2.8 -0.4 0.1 -1.2 0.8 1.9 -1.4 0.2 IT
CY 3.0 3.3 0.4 1.4 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 2.4 0.1 0.9 1.5 -0.5 -0.5 -1.9 1.9 2.1 -1.9 0.2 CY
LV 0.6 1.3 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 1.7 -3.6 1.2 3.1 -2.9 0.0 LV
LT 1.2 1.6 0.1 1.3 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.3 -2.0 1.4 5.7 -5.6 0.0 LT
LU 0.8 2.1 0.6 0.5 1.0 -0.7 0.4 -0.7 -0.3 2.8 0.3 1.2 1.3 -1.5 -0.1 -3.2 1.8 -0.1 0.1 0.1 LU
HU 3.4 4.3 0.2 2.2 2.0 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.2 3.5 0.1 1.7 1.7 -1.2 0.7 -4.0 2.2 1.2 -1.1 0.2 HU
MT 3.8 5.3 0.0 2.3 3.0 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 4.8 0.0 2.2 2.5 -2.6 -0.4 -6.4 4.2 0.9 -0.8 1.0 MT
NL 5.0 4.9 0.4 2.4 2.1 1.4 0.3 0.7 0.4 3.5 0.1 1.7 1.6 0.1 -1.1 1.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.4 0.0 NL
AT 4.1 4.1 0.2 1.3 2.6 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.2 3.6 0.2 1.0 2.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.4 0.0 AT
PL 0.2 1.9 0.1 0.9 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.6 0.1 0.8 0.7 -1.8 0.9 -5.2 2.5 1.5 -1.2 0.1 PL
PT 3.6 3.7 0.1 0.9 2.7 0.8 0.0 -0.2 1.0 2.8 0.1 1.0 1.7 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.2 1.5 -1.4 0.0 PT
RO 0.4 1.9 0.1 -0.2 2.0 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.0 -0.9 1.3 -2.0 0.6 -4.7 2.2 1.4 -1.0 0.5 RO
SI 4.0 4.8 0.2 -0.1 4.6 2.2 0.1 0.0 2.0 2.5 0.1 -0.1 2.6 -1.1 1.0 -2.9 0.8 1.4 -1.3 0.3 SI
SK 3.1 4.3 0.1 0.9 3.3 0.6 0.1 -0.7 1.2 3.7 0.1 1.6 2.1 -1.6 1.1 -4.4 1.7 0.9 -0.8 0.4 SK
FI 1.9 2.0 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.4 1.9 0.1 0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.5 -2.1 2.4 0.8 -0.8 0.2 FI
SE 1.3 1.6 0.2 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 -0.3 0.5 -2.4 1.6 0.7 -0.6 0.1 SE
NO 1.5 2.0 0.3 2.2 -0.5 0.0 0.2 0.6 -0.8 2.0 0.1 1.6 0.3 -0.3 -0.8 -2.4 2.9 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 NO
EA 3.8 3.9 0.2 1.1 2.7 0.9 0.1 -0.1 0.9 3.0 0.1 1.1 1.8 -0.1 0.2 -0.5 0.2 0.9 -0.8 0.0 EA
EU 3.3 3.6 0.2 1.0 2.4 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.7 2.7 0.1 1.0 1.6 -0.4 0.3 -1.4 0.7 1.0 -0.9 0.1 EU
42
Part I
2.4.3. Projection of labour supply
The total labour supply in the EU is expected to decrease by 12% over the projection period, with a
decrease of at least 25% in several Member States.
By multiplying the participation rates by single Table I.2.10: Labour supply projections - total
age and sex with the demographic projections Impact on
Total labour force Avg annual
provides the labour supply projections. The labour (20-64y, '000 persons) Change
growth rate
potential
(2070/2022) output
force in the EU is expected to decrease 2022 2070
(2022-2070)
growth(1)
substantially over the projection period. By 2070, BE 5.167 5.398 4% 0.1% 0.2%
the labour supply would shrink by almost 12% as BG 3.215 2.181 -32% -0.8% -0.4%
CZ 5.214 4.579 -12% -0.3% 0.0%
compared to 2022, with an average annual DK 2.843 2.796 -2% 0.0% 0.1%
decrease of 0.3% (see Table I.2.10). This entails a DE 41.343 37.601 -9% -0.2% 0.0%
fall in the number of workers of 24.5 million: 13.4 EE 680 623 -8% -0.2% 0.1%
IE 2.452 2.737 12% 0.2% 0.3%
million fewer male workers (-12%) and 11.2 EL 4.606 3.111 -32% -0.8% -0.4%
million fewer female workers (-11.5%). ES 23.032 20.005 -13% -0.3% 0.0%
FR 29.923 29.790 0% 0.0% 0.2%
HR 1.681 1.268 -25% -0.6% -0.2%
Graph I.2.6 highlights the substantial differences IT 24.377 20.890 -14% -0.3% 0.0%
in labour supply projections across Member CY 473 452 -4% -0.1% 0.1%
States, ranging from an increase of 31% in Malta LV 905 536 -41% -1.1% -0.5%
LT 1.442 845 -41% -1.1% -0.6%
to a decrease of 41% in Latvia and Lithuania in LU 325 403 24% 0.4% 0.5%
the period up to 2070. The labour force in 2070 HU 4.817 4.089 -15% -0.3% -0.1%
would exceed that in 2022 for only six countries. MT 277 363 31% 0.6% 0.5%
NL 8.881 8.812 -1% 0.0% 0.2%
In the cases of Croatia, Slovakia, Romania, AT 4.463 4.253 -5% -0.1% 0.1%
Poland, Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, and Lithuania, it PL 18.156 12.755 -30% -0.7% -0.3%
would shrink by a quarter or more. These steep PT 4.994 3.822 -23% -0.6% -0.2%
RO 8.044 5.670 -30% -0.7% -0.3%
declines in the labour force reverberate in the SI 1.015 895 -12% -0.3% 0.0%
potential growth estimates, discussed in Chapter SK 2.751 2.066 -25% -0.6% -0.2%
3. The decline by 4% on average in the first half FI 2.619 2.304 -12% -0.3% 0.0%
SE 5.205 6.103 17% 0.3% 0.4%
of the projection period is followed by another NO 2.663 2.929 10% 0.2% 0.3%
decline of 8% in the second half. The countries EA 161.408 146.173 -9% -0.2% 0.0%
with the sharpest fall in the labour supply in 2022- EU 208.903 184.347 -12% -0.3% 0.0%
2045 also show the steepest decline in 2045-2070. (1) Impact of labour force growth differential relative to the EU
average.
Graph I.2.6: Change in the labour force (20-64y; %)

50% 50.0%
40% 40.0%
30% 30.0%
20% 20.0%
10% 10.0%
0% 0.0%
-10% -10.0%
-20% -20.0%
-30% -30.0%
-40% -40.0%
-50% -50.0%
MT LU SE IE NO BE FR NL DK CY AT EE DE SI FI CZ ES IT HU PT HR SK RO PL BG EL LV LT EU
2022-2045 2045-2070 total: 2022-2070

43
European Commission
2.5. EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS
Employment in the EU is projected to increase from around 75% of the working-age population in
2022 to around 79% in 2070. This change mostly reflects higher employment rates among older people
and women in general, given higher participation among these groups and the assumption of declining
unemployment over time.
Employment is calculated as a residual variable, being determined by the population projections from
Eurostat (see Chapter 1), participation rates projected by the CSM (see Section 2.4) and the unemploy-
ment rate assumptions (see Box I.2.3).
Graph I.2.7: Age profile of employment rate by sex (EU)
Males 2022 Males 2070 Females 2022 Females 2070

100% 100%
80% 80%
60% 60%
40% 40%
20% 20%
0% 0%
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
The employment rate among people aged 20-64 is expected to rise from around 74.5% in 2022 to 78.5%
in 2070 in the EU (see Table I.2.11). This overall increase in the employment rate by 4 pps includes a
nearly 6 pps increase in the female employment rate and a smaller increase of about 2 pps in the male one
(see Tables I.2.12 and I.2.13). The age profile in Graph I.2.7 tracks that of participation, with a rightward
shift for both male and female employment and higher female employment at most ages by 2070. Despite
this strong increase in female employment, a higher share of the male population aged 20-64 would
nevertheless be employed in 2070: 82% compared to 75% for women.
Employment among older workers is expected to rise considerably over the projection period for both
sexes, with increases of 6 pps and 13 pps in the respective employment rates of men and women aged 55-
64. This reflects how recent pension and labour market reforms in many Member States incentivise older
workers to retire later. Only few Member States show a decrease in the employment rate for this age
bracket. By 2070, the employment rate for people aged 55-64 would be inferior to 65% in Croatia,
Luxembourg, Poland, and Romania, which under current legislation all cap the statutory retirement at 65
years – less in the case of Romanian and Polish women – with early retirement possible at 60 or younger
in most cases (see Table II.A4.2 in Annex 4).
As a result of these projections the share of older workers in total employment at EU level is expected to
rise from around 20% in 2022 to about 23% in 2070, with a minimum of 16% in Luxembourg and a
maximum of 28% in Italy (see Table I.2.14). The share of the older workers rises generally more for
women, due to cohort effects and reflecting the need for staying longer in employment to fulfil qualifying
conditions for retirement because of a later labour market entrance or interrupted working careers.
Exceptions are countries where older women are working currently more often than men, e.g. the Baltic
countries, or countries with more favourable retirement conditions for women, e.g. Poland and Slovakia.
44
Part I
Table I.2.11: Employment rate projections by age group – total (%)

2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64
BE 72.1 75.8 41.4 43.3 81.9 83.6 56.9 67.8 3.7 1.9 1.7 10.9 BE
BG 75.8 76.6 37.8 39.0 82.3 84.6 68.5 70.5 0.8 1.2 2.3 2.0 BG
CZ 81.3 79.4 48.3 49.7 87.3 86.1 73.2 73.2 -1.9 1.4 -1.2 0.0 CZ
DK 80.2 84.8 68.1 71.9 84.6 86.9 73.3 84.3 4.6 3.8 2.3 11.0 DK
DE 80.7 81.9 69.9 69.2 85.2 86.0 73.3 75.2 1.2 -0.7 0.7 2.0 DE
EE 81.8 86.1 63.9 66.7 86.5 89.5 73.4 85.0 4.3 2.8 3.0 11.6 EE
IE 78.2 81.3 68.3 69.5 82.8 87.0 66.7 71.6 3.1 1.2 4.2 4.9 IE
EL 66.1 74.7 33.0 42.6 75.1 79.8 52.2 74.5 8.6 9.6 4.7 22.3 EL
ES 69.6 76.4 40.9 49.3 77.2 81.7 57.6 72.9 6.8 8.3 4.5 15.2 ES
FR 74.0 79.0 56.5 59.7 82.7 84.7 56.9 71.9 5.0 3.2 1.9 14.9 FR
HR 70.0 76.1 47.2 52.9 80.6 84.7 50.4 62.3 6.1 5.7 4.1 11.9 HR
IT 64.8 71.3 35.6 37.8 72.4 75.1 55.1 73.3 6.5 2.1 2.7 18.2 IT
CY 77.5 80.8 57.4 60.7 84.0 86.4 64.6 72.5 3.3 3.3 2.4 7.9 CY
LV 77.0 78.0 58.3 62.2 81.8 83.4 69.5 70.6 1.0 3.9 1.7 1.1 LV
LT 79.1 79.8 57.2 58.4 85.1 86.7 70.1 70.3 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.1 LT
LU 74.5 74.5 40.9 45.7 86.7 86.8 46.3 50.2 0.0 4.8 0.1 4.0 LU
HU 80.3 83.6 49.7 51.9 88.1 91.2 65.9 75.5 3.3 2.2 3.1 9.6 HU
MT 81.0 83.5 74.9 71.6 88.3 90.2 54.3 70.0 2.5 -3.3 1.9 15.7 MT
NL 82.9 87.7 80.5 83.8 86.8 90.4 73.1 81.6 4.8 3.3 3.5 8.4 NL
AT 77.3 81.4 69.8 71.9 85.8 87.8 56.5 67.1 4.2 2.1 2.1 10.7 AT
PL 76.9 76.9 52.3 53.2 85.6 86.8 56.8 60.7 0.1 0.9 1.2 3.9 PL
PT 77.6 80.7 44.9 45.2 86.4 87.3 65.8 76.4 3.1 0.3 0.9 10.6 PT
RO 68.3 68.3 36.4 36.5 78.2 77.6 46.8 56.3 0.0 0.1 -0.7 9.4 RO
SI 78.3 80.6 51.5 51.9 89.6 88.1 55.1 72.4 2.3 0.4 -1.5 17.3 SI
SK 76.8 79.7 40.1 41.2 84.8 86.0 64.0 79.2 2.9 1.1 1.2 15.2 SK
FI 78.3 80.3 61.1 64.1 83.2 83.8 71.5 77.2 2.0 3.0 0.6 5.8 FI
SE 82.3 84.2 63.0 66.0 86.4 87.7 77.8 82.4 1.9 3.0 1.3 4.6 SE
NO 80.8 82.0 68.9 70.7 84.4 87.3 74.5 72.1 1.3 1.8 2.9 -2.4 NO
EA 74.1 78.6 54.7 57.9 81.0 83.6 62.5 73.5 4.6 3.3 2.6 11.0 EA
EU 74.7 78.5 53.7 56.7 81.8 84.0 62.3 72.3 3.8 3.0 2.2 10.0 EU
Table I.2.12: Employment rate projections by age group – men (%)

2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64
BE 75.9 78.0 42.9 45.5 85.6 86.1 61.7 69.5 2.2 2.6 0.4 7.8 BE
BG 79.6 79.8 44.4 44.9 85.3 88.1 73.4 72.2 0.2 0.5 2.8 -1.2 BG
CZ 88.6 85.8 56.3 58.1 94.8 93.8 79.3 75.3 -2.8 1.8 -1.0 -4.1 CZ
DK 82.8 86.2 70.0 73.5 86.9 88.3 77.1 85.3 3.3 3.4 1.4 8.2 DK
DE 84.6 83.8 71.9 71.4 89.3 88.4 77.2 75.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.9 -1.7 DE
EE 83.2 85.6 59.9 63.3 89.2 89.6 71.6 83.9 2.3 3.4 0.4 12.3 EE
IE 83.9 83.5 70.2 69.9 88.6 90.0 75.0 72.6 -0.5 -0.4 1.4 -2.4 IE
EL 76.6 81.4 38.2 46.9 85.1 86.5 66.1 82.0 4.8 8.6 1.4 15.9 EL
ES 75.0 79.8 43.5 51.7 82.5 85.5 64.6 75.9 4.8 8.2 3.0 11.2 ES
FR 77.0 80.4 57.5 61.0 86.6 86.5 58.5 72.2 3.4 3.5 0.0 13.7 FR
HR 74.8 78.5 54.2 60.4 84.4 86.8 56.2 63.6 3.7 6.3 2.4 7.4 HR
IT 74.7 79.0 41.7 43.9 82.7 83.2 65.3 80.3 4.3 2.2 0.5 14.9 IT
CY 83.6 85.2 60.7 65.6 89.5 90.9 75.5 76.3 1.5 4.9 1.3 0.8 CY
LV 78.7 79.9 61.7 66.9 84.0 85.4 68.3 71.2 1.2 5.2 1.4 2.9 LV
LT 79.5 80.3 56.2 57.9 85.8 87.5 69.6 70.0 0.8 1.8 1.7 0.4 LT
LU 77.7 74.4 39.0 44.2 89.5 87.0 53.8 50.1 -3.3 5.2 -2.5 -3.7 LU
HU 85.2 85.8 53.6 56.6 91.3 92.6 77.0 78.7 0.6 3.0 1.4 1.7 HU
MT 87.3 84.9 73.8 68.6 93.9 92.8 65.6 69.8 -2.4 -5.2 -1.0 4.2 MT
NL 86.9 89.6 79.7 84.3 90.5 92.4 80.1 83.6 2.7 4.6 1.9 3.6 NL
AT 81.2 82.2 71.6 71.8 88.5 89.5 64.2 65.8 1.1 0.2 1.0 1.6 AT
PL 83.4 82.0 59.3 59.5 90.0 90.1 69.7 69.5 -1.4 0.2 0.1 -0.2 PL
PT 80.6 82.0 48.3 48.1 88.6 87.8 71.1 79.3 1.4 -0.2 -0.8 8.2 PT
RO 77.7 77.5 45.3 45.3 86.7 87.5 58.3 63.7 -0.2 0.0 0.8 5.4 RO
SI 81.6 83.3 56.9 57.8 92.0 90.8 59.1 73.7 1.7 0.9 -1.2 14.6 SI
SK 80.9 81.0 49.9 50.9 88.3 86.6 67.0 78.6 0.1 1.1 -1.7 11.6 SK
FI 78.9 79.0 61.4 64.4 84.3 83.2 70.1 73.4 0.1 3.0 -1.1 3.3 FI
SE 85.1 86.4 67.3 70.6 89.2 89.9 80.2 83.8 1.4 3.2 0.7 3.6 SE
NO 83.5 82.8 69.1 71.2 86.9 88.3 79.7 72.3 -0.7 2.1 1.4 -7.3 NO
EA 79.0 82.4 56.6 60.0 85.3 86.1 67.5 75.0 3.5 3.4 0.7 7.5 EA
EU 80.0 81.9 57.1 60.0 87.0 87.6 68.7 75.1 1.8 3.0 0.5 6.4 EU
45
European Commission
Table I.2.13: Employment rate projections by age group – women (%)

2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64
BE 68.3 73.5 39.8 40.9 78.1 81.1 52.1 66.0 5.2 1.1 3.0 14.0 BE
BG 71.9 73.2 30.9 32.6 79.2 81.0 63.9 68.9 1.2 1.8 1.8 4.9 BG
CZ 73.7 72.3 39.9 40.7 79.4 77.7 67.3 71.1 -1.4 0.8 -1.7 3.8 CZ
DK 77.5 83.4 66.1 70.3 82.1 85.3 69.5 83.2 5.9 4.2 3.2 13.7 DK
DE 76.8 79.9 67.7 66.9 81.1 83.4 69.4 74.9 3.1 -0.8 2.3 5.5 DE
EE 80.4 86.7 68.1 70.3 83.6 89.4 75.0 86.3 6.3 2.2 5.8 11.3 EE
IE 72.6 79.1 66.4 69.2 77.3 84.1 58.7 70.6 6.5 2.8 6.8 11.9 IE
EL 55.7 67.6 27.4 37.9 65.0 72.4 39.4 66.9 11.9 10.5 7.4 27.5 EL
ES 64.1 73.0 38.3 46.7 71.8 77.9 51.0 70.1 8.9 8.4 6.1 19.1 ES
FR 71.1 77.6 55.5 58.4 79.0 82.8 55.5 71.6 6.5 2.9 3.8 16.1 FR
HR 65.2 73.2 39.7 44.6 76.7 82.1 45.2 60.7 8.0 4.8 5.4 15.5 HR
IT 55.0 62.9 28.9 30.9 62.1 66.0 45.3 65.8 8.0 2.0 4.0 20.5 IT
CY 71.7 76.3 54.2 55.5 78.9 81.7 54.1 68.8 4.5 1.3 2.8 14.8 CY
LV 75.3 75.8 54.6 57.0 79.5 81.2 70.4 69.9 0.5 2.4 1.7 -0.5 LV
LT 78.7 79.2 58.3 58.9 84.4 85.6 70.6 70.5 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.0 LT
LU 71.1 74.6 43.1 47.3 83.8 86.7 38.3 50.4 3.4 4.3 2.8 12.2 LU
HU 75.4 81.3 45.6 47.0 84.9 89.7 56.1 72.2 5.9 1.3 4.8 16.1 HU
MT 73.7 81.8 76.2 75.0 81.6 87.0 42.6 70.2 8.1 -1.2 5.4 27.6 MT
NL 79.0 85.7 81.2 83.2 83.2 88.3 66.3 79.5 6.8 2.0 5.1 13.2 NL
AT 73.3 80.6 67.9 72.0 83.0 86.1 48.9 68.5 7.3 4.1 3.2 19.6 AT
PL 70.4 71.6 45.1 46.6 81.2 83.3 45.0 51.4 1.2 1.5 2.1 6.4 PL
PT 74.8 79.5 41.3 42.1 84.4 86.8 61.2 73.6 4.6 0.9 2.4 12.4 PT
RO 58.8 58.3 27.0 27.1 69.5 66.8 36.4 48.2 -0.6 0.1 -2.7 11.8 RO
SI 74.7 77.4 45.5 45.5 86.9 84.9 51.1 70.9 2.7 -0.1 -2.0 19.7 SI
SK 72.7 78.3 29.9 31.1 81.1 85.4 61.3 79.9 5.6 1.3 4.3 18.6 SK
FI 77.8 81.7 60.8 63.8 82.1 84.5 72.8 81.3 3.9 3.0 2.4 8.6 FI
SE 79.3 81.7 58.0 60.9 83.4 85.3 75.3 80.8 2.5 2.9 1.9 5.5 SE
NO 77.8 81.2 68.7 70.1 81.8 86.2 69.1 71.8 3.3 1.4 4.4 2.7 NO
EA 69.9 77.2 52.0 55.2 75.8 80.2 57.1 71.3 7.4 3.2 4.4 14.3 EA
EU 69.3 75.0 50.1 53.1 76.6 80.3 56.1 69.5 5.7 3.0 3.7 13.3 EU
Table I.2.14: Share of older workers (55-64y) in total employment (20-64y) (%)
total men women
2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070
BE 18.1 18.7 21.5 18.5 18.5 21.2 17.6 18.9 21.9 BE
BG 20.4 25.6 23.5 19.9 24.4 22.7 21.0 26.9 24.4 BG
CZ 18.6 22.6 21.8 17.9 21.0 20.7 19.4 24.7 23.4 CZ
DK 20.7 19.7 22.6 20.9 19.7 22.3 20.6 19.8 23.0 DK
DE 23.7 21.4 20.5 23.4 20.6 19.9 24.1 22.2 21.1 DE
EE 19.6 24.1 24.9 17.3 24.4 24.9 22.0 23.8 24.8 EE
IE 16.4 19.0 22.8 17.2 18.4 22.1 15.6 19.7 23.6 IE
EL 18.7 24.6 24.9 19.7 24.0 24.6 17.4 25.3 25.4 EL
ES 19.1 22.5 25.4 19.5 21.5 24.8 18.7 23.6 26.1 ES
FR 17.7 20.4 22.2 17.1 19.8 21.5 18.2 21.0 22.9 FR
HR 18.1 20.3 21.4 18.0 19.5 21.4 18.1 21.4 21.4 HR
IT 21.8 22.5 27.8 21.9 21.4 27.1 21.7 23.9 28.7 IT
CY 15.8 19.4 19.6 17.5 18.7 19.2 14.1 20.3 20.1 CY
LV 21.8 26.3 23.3 19.2 25.2 22.8 24.4 27.6 23.9 LV
LT 22.4 24.8 23.8 20.5 23.9 24.3 24.2 25.9 23.2 LT
LU 12.3 14.6 15.9 13.8 14.5 15.8 10.6 14.8 16.0 LU
HU 16.3 21.6 20.8 16.9 21.5 21.0 15.7 21.7 20.7 HU
MT 12.1 20.0 21.4 12.9 19.9 21.6 11.0 20.1 21.2 MT
NL 20.7 18.6 21.6 21.5 18.8 21.3 19.8 18.4 21.9 NL
AT 17.6 19.3 19.4 18.8 18.4 18.6 16.3 20.2 20.2 AT
PL 15.3 22.1 19.8 16.6 23.3 21.2 13.8 20.7 18.1 PL
PT 20.5 22.5 23.1 20.5 22.5 23.2 20.4 22.5 22.9 PT
RO 13.9 22.0 20.4 14.4 21.4 20.3 13.3 22.8 20.6 RO
SI 16.8 22.6 22.7 16.6 21.8 22.4 17.1 23.7 23.1 SI
SK 17.4 24.6 23.2 16.5 24.2 22.6 18.4 25.0 23.8 SK
FI 21.1 21.3 25.2 19.9 20.7 24.1 22.2 22.0 26.3 FI
SE 19.9 20.7 22.5 19.5 20.4 22.2 20.3 21.0 22.9 SE
NO 19.1 18.5 21.6 19.6 18.3 21.3 18.5 18.7 21.9 NO
EA 20.5 21.3 23.0 20.5 20.6 22.5 20.5 22.0 23.5 EA
EU 19.6 21.4 22.6 19.7 20.9 22.2 19.5 22.0 23.0 EU
46
Part I
2.6. ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIOS
The economic old-age dependency ratio (inactive elderly to employed people) is projected to increase
significantly in all Member States, especially in the next decades. Similarly, the economic dependency
ratio (total inactive population to employed people) would rise strongly amid demographic ageing.
Variability across countries is large, though.
An important indicator to assess the impact of ageing on budgetary expenditure, particularly on its
pension component, is the economic old-age dependency ratio. This indicator expresses the inactive
elderly population (65+) as a share of total employment (aged 20-64 or 20-74). The economic old-age
dependency ratio would rise sharply according to the labour force projections: from 46% in 2022 to 64%
in 2045 and 70% in 2070 (from 45% to 61% and 66% in terms of employment in the 20-74 age group)
(see Table I.2.15). This means that for every 10 inactive persons above 65 in 2070, there will be 14
employed persons, down from 22 in 2022 and 16 in 2045.
Across EU Member States, the projected economic old-age dependency ratio for 2070 ranges from a
minimum of 53% in Sweden to a maximum of 87% in Lithuania. For most countries, the increase is
concentrated in the first half of the projection period, i.e. 2022-2045. The largest total rise in the old-age
dependency ratio is projected for Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Malta, Latvia, and Slovakia.
Table I.2.15: Economic old-age dependency ratio (%)

(inactive population 65+) / (employment 20-64y) (inactive population 65+) / (employment 20-74y)
2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070
2022-2045 2045-2070 2022-2045 2045-2070
BE 45 57 67 11 10 45 55 65 10 10 BE
BG 45 67 75 22 8 44 65 73 21 8 BG
CZ 40 59 63 19 4 39 57 61 18 4 CZ
DK 40 50 57 10 6 39 47 52 8 4 DK
DE 43 57 63 14 6 41 55 60 14 5 DE
EE 36 50 59 14 9 34 47 54 13 7 EE
IE 30 48 64 18 16 30 46 61 16 15 IE
EL 56 88 81 32 -7 55 83 76 28 -7 EL
ES 46 72 78 25 6 46 67 73 21 6 ES
FR 50 63 70 14 7 49 62 68 13 7 FR
HR 54 67 78 13 11 53 65 76 12 11 HR
IT 60 86 80 26 -6 58 79 72 21 -8 IT
CY 31 46 62 15 17 30 44 59 14 15 CY
LV 41 65 76 24 10 39 63 73 25 10 LV
LT 37 64 87 27 23 36 61 83 26 22 LT
LU 30 48 73 18 25 30 47 72 18 25 LU
HU 40 54 62 13 8 39 52 60 13 8 HU
MT 35 37 75 2 38 34 37 73 2 37 MT
NL 37 50 56 12 6 36 48 52 12 4 NL
AT 40 58 67 18 10 39 56 66 17 9 AT
PL 39 60 80 21 20 38 58 78 20 20 PL
PT 49 76 76 27 0 47 71 70 24 -1 PT
RO 48 73 79 25 6 47 71 77 23 6 RO
SI 44 66 70 22 4 43 65 69 21 4 SI
SK 35 59 70 24 10 35 57 66 22 9 SK
FI 48 57 70 8 13 47 55 65 8 11 FI
SE 39 44 53 5 9 38 42 50 5 7 SE
NO 34 49 61 15 12 32 47 58 14 11 NO
EA 47 65 70 18 5 46 62 66 16 4 EA
EU 46 64 70 18 6 45 61 66 16 5 EU
47
European Commission
Table I.2.16: Total economic dependency ratio (%)

(total inactive population) / (employment 20-64y) (total inactive population) / (employment 20-74y)
2022 2045 2070 2022 2045 2070
2022-2045 2045-2070 2022-2045 2045-2070
BE 130 130 138 0 9 128 126 134 -2 8 BE
BG 116 139 146 24 7 112 134 142 22 8 BG
CZ 105 127 131 22 4 102 124 128 21 5 CZ
DK 102 106 110 5 3 98 100 100 2 0 DK
DE 100 115 121 15 6 97 111 116 15 5 DE
EE 96 102 107 6 5 90 97 99 7 3 EE
IE 106 108 120 1 13 104 104 115 0 12 IE
EL 141 163 152 22 -11 137 153 142 16 -11 EL
ES 120 134 140 14 7 118 125 132 7 7 ES
FR 132 134 137 2 3 130 131 133 1 3 FR
HR 135 132 142 -4 11 133 128 138 -6 10 HR
IT 151 163 153 12 -10 147 151 137 5 -14 IT
CY 96 106 121 11 14 93 103 114 10 11 CY
LV 110 129 140 20 11 104 125 136 21 11 LV
LT 98 119 143 21 24 93 114 137 21 23 LT
LU 102 119 146 17 27 101 118 144 17 26 LU
HU 102 112 121 10 9 99 108 118 9 9 HU
MT 88 79 123 -9 44 86 78 120 -8 42 MT
NL 89 97 100 8 3 86 93 92 7 -1 NL
AT 101 112 123 11 11 100 110 120 11 10 AT
PL 110 129 151 19 21 107 125 147 18 21 PL
PT 110 136 134 26 -2 106 127 125 22 -3 PT
RO 142 168 171 26 3 141 162 166 21 4 RO
SI 109 124 128 15 4 107 122 126 15 4 SI
SK 103 128 136 25 8 102 123 129 22 6 SK
FI 111 113 123 1 11 107 109 115 1 6 FI
SE 99 99 106 0 7 95 94 99 -1 5 SE
NO 96 104 115 8 11 92 100 109 8 9 NO
EA 119 129 132 11 3 116 124 125 8 2 EA
EU 117 129 134 12 5 114 124 127 9 3 EU
The total economic dependency ratio, calculated as the ratio between the total inactive population and
those in employment, gives a measure of the average number of individuals that each employed person
‘supports’ economically. It is relevant for potential GDP per capita growth. This broadest definition of the
dependency ratio is expected to increase continuously over the projection period, from an average of
117% in 2022 to 134% in 2070 for the EU on average (see Table I.2.16).
The projected development of this indicator reflects the profound societal impact of changes in life
expectancy and fertility rates over the next decades. There are, however, large cross-country differences.
While the total economic dependency ratio would go up by more than 40 pps in Lithuania, Luxembourg
and Poland, the increase for several other countries is much more limited.
2.7. PROJECTION OF TOTAL HOURS WORKED
The number of hours worked is expected to fall by 9% on average in the EU over the projection period,
with a decrease projected in most countries. ( 22)
(22) The projection of weekly hours worked in Table I.2.17 is calculated using the CSM and differs from the projection of total
hours worked in Chapter 3. Specifically, for the potential GDP projections until 2032, the growth rates of hours worked are
estimated using the production function approach; thereafter the growth rates as estimated by the CSM are used (see Table I.3.2
48
Part I
Total hours worked are projected to decrease by 4% in 2022-2045 in the EU, followed by a similar
decrease in the second half of the projection period (see Table I.2.17). ( 23) As a result, the number of
hours falls by 9% on average in 2022-2070. The share of part-time work is assumed about stable at 11%
of all hours worked.
There are notable differences across Member States, which reflect a varying demographic outlook,
legislated pension reforms, unemployment rates and full- versus part-time practices. A fall in total hours
worked by more than 30% by 2070 is projected for Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. Eight countries are
expected to see an increase in the number of hours people work in total, with an increase of 20-30% in
Sweden, Luxembourg and Malta. The share of part-time work is assumed broadly unchanged so that the
current large differences between countries would remain. Part-time labour accounts for less than 3% of
total hours worked in Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, as compared to about 30% in
the Netherlands.
Table I.2.17: Projection of total weekly hours worked (million) and breakdown in full- and part-time work
2022 2045 2070 % change (total)
Total Full-time Part-time Total Full-time Part-time Total Full-time Part-time 2022-2045 2045-2070 2022-2070
BE 173.7 84.1% 15.9% 186.5 83.7% 16.3% 183.2 83.5% 16.5% 7.3 -1.7 5.5 BE
BG 124.6 99.2% 0.8% 98.0 99.1% 0.9% 84.1 99.1% 0.9% -21.3 -14.2 -32.5 BG
CZ 198.3 96.5% 3.5% 179.2 96.5% 3.5% 172.8 96.5% 3.5% -9.6 -3.6 -12.9 CZ
DK 99.7 86.6% 13.4% 103.0 86.6% 13.4% 103.5 86.9% 13.1% 3.4 0.5 3.9 DK
DE 1454.9 82.8% 17.2% 1372.1 82.7% 17.3% 1327.9 82.7% 17.3% -5.7 -3.2 -8.7 DE
EE 25.4 92.4% 7.6% 24.3 92.2% 7.8% 23.4 92.0% 8.0% -4.2 -3.6 -7.7 EE
IE 87.9 89.1% 10.9% 100.0 88.9% 11.1% 97.6 88.6% 11.4% 13.8 -2.5 11.0 IE
EL 164.7 95.8% 4.2% 139.7 95.6% 4.4% 123.8 95.7% 4.3% -15.2 -11.4 -24.8 EL
ES 750.2 92.9% 7.1% 791.8 92.8% 7.2% 731.0 92.7% 7.3% 5.6 -7.7 -2.6 ES
FR 1040.5 89.6% 10.4% 1078.7 89.4% 10.6% 1051.3 89.4% 10.6% 3.7 -2.5 1.0 FR
HR 61.1 97.4% 2.6% 55.1 97.3% 2.7% 46.9 97.3% 2.7% -9.8 -14.8 -23.1 HR
IT 837.5 89.2% 10.8% 811.8 89.2% 10.8% 791.6 89.3% 10.7% -3.1 -2.5 -5.5 IT
CY 17.3 95.5% 4.5% 17.6 95.4% 4.6% 17.1 95.5% 4.5% 2.0 -2.8 -0.9 CY
LV 34.6 96.3% 3.7% 25.4 96.2% 3.8% 20.1 96.3% 3.7% -26.6 -20.8 -41.9 LV
LT 54.6 96.9% 3.1% 42.1 97.0% 3.0% 31.8 97.0% 3.0% -22.8 -24.6 -41.8 LT
LU 11.2 88.6% 11.4% 13.7 88.0% 12.0% 13.8 87.8% 12.2% 22.2 0.4 22.7 LU
HU 184.4 97.6% 2.4% 169.2 97.5% 2.5% 157.6 97.5% 2.5% -8.3 -6.9 -14.6 HU
MT 10.4 93.5% 6.5% 14.7 93.3% 6.7% 13.4 93.0% 7.0% 41.1 -8.4 29.3 MT
NL 297.6 70.6% 29.4% 303.3 70.5% 29.5% 302.9 70.5% 29.5% 1.9 -0.1 1.8 NL
AT 150.2 81.3% 18.7% 150.0 80.8% 19.2% 144.4 80.9% 19.1% -0.1 -3.7 -3.8 AT
PL 714.8 97.0% 3.0% 608.6 96.8% 3.2% 504.3 96.9% 3.1% -14.9 -17.1 -29.5 PL
PT 185.2 96.8% 3.2% 158.9 96.8% 3.2% 146.9 96.8% 3.2% -14.2 -7.6 -20.7 PT
RO 307.6 97.8% 2.2% 249.4 97.6% 2.4% 219.5 97.6% 2.4% -18.9 -12.0 -28.6 RO
SI 38.4 95.2% 4.8% 35.5 95.0% 5.0% 33.2 94.9% 5.1% -7.5 -6.6 -13.6 SI
SK 99.6 97.7% 2.3% 86.2 97.7% 2.3% 77.3 97.7% 2.3% -13.5 -10.3 -22.4 SK
FI 90.6 90.3% 9.7% 88.9 90.5% 9.5% 82.1 90.4% 9.6% -1.9 -7.7 -9.4 FI
SE 185.3 86.6% 13.4% 211.8 86.4% 13.6% 224.2 86.3% 13.7% 14.3 5.9 21.0 SE
NO 94.1 86.0% 14.0% 100.9 86.3% 13.7% 103.1 86.2% 13.8% 7.2 2.1 9.5 NO
EA 5585.6 87.7% 12.3% 5496.3 87.3% 12.7% 5259.8 87.3% 12.7% -1.6 -4.3 -5.8 EA
EU 7400.3 89.5% 10.5% 7115.6 88.9% 11.1% 6725.8 88.9% 11.1% -3.8 -5.5 -9.1 EU
Hours worked by people aged 15-74.

in Chapter 3). Due to the different data sources and projection models, there may be some differences between the two
projections.
(23) The total number of hours worked is the product between employment and hours worked per person. Regarding hours worked,
the following assumptions are made: (i) total amount of hours worked per person (in the base year 2022) are kept constant by
sex and type of work (part-time versus full-time); and (ii) the part-time share of total work by sex and age group (20-24, 25-54
and 55-74) are kept constant over the entire projection period.
49
European Commission
2.8. COMPARING THE LABOUR MARKET PROJECTIONS WITH THE 2021 AGEING REPORT
Labour market indicators for base year 2022 were generally better than assumed in the 2021 Ageing
Report. The improved starting point for employment, participation and unemployment rates
reverberates in the labour market projections, which are, for most countries, more favourable than in
the previous exercise.
This section provides a comparison of the main Table I.2.18: Labour force revisions: 2024 Ageing Report vs
labour market assumptions discussed higher with 2021 Ageing Report (thousands)
those underlying the 2021 Ageing Report, as labour force (20-64) employment (20-64)
projected by the Cohort Simulation Model. In most 2022 2070 2022 2070
countries, the labour force and employment were BE 64 699 103 690
larger in 2022 than anticipated in the previous update BG 97 196 118 195
(see Table I.2.18). In the EU, 4.6 million more CZ 53 259 124 289
DK 84 141 98 127
people were employed in 2022 than projected, with DE 514 1801 587 1819
the labour force counting 1.8 million additional EE 32 85 32 81
people, meaning that 60% of the higher employment IE 64 2 111 31
in 2022 comes from people previously assumed EL 7 -441 140 -397
unemployed. It should be noted that the ES -238 124 618 354
macroeconomic assumptions for the 2021 Ageing FR 770 1766 1322 1792
HR -25 125 -21 121
Report were prepared amid the height of the COVID-
IT -965 400 -433 446
19 pandemic in spring 2020, when uncertainty about CY 15 -53 17 -47
the economic outlook was high. LV 16 47 25 46
LT 76 62 83 61
The employment rate – which also accounts for the LU 6 80 11 75
difference in population size – was 1.6 pps higher on HU 94 161 186 175
MT 2 47 5 44
average in 2022 than projected in the 2021 Ageing
NL 390 937 505 1028
Report (see Table I.2.19). Only in Romania it came AT 91 243 88 224
out lower. The biggest upward revisions for the base PL 653 1036 909 1239
year were for the Netherlands, Ireland, Slovakia, PT 74 254 84 238
Poland, and Hungary. Actual employment rates RO -346 406 -342 308
among people aged 55-64 were also higher in 2022 SI -2 63 11 59
SK 127 258 138 254
for most countries. As shown in Table I.2.19,
FI 57 108 52 102
participation rates were on average 0.5 pps higher in SE 13 88 51 32
2022 than previously projected. Unemployment came NO 17 36 48 38
in lower than anticipated, with a 1.4 pps lower EA 2878 7918 5069 8087
unemployment rate on average. EU 1820 9063 4623 9385
Table I.2.20 provides a breakdown of the change in
the employment projection for 2070 between the 2024 and 2021 Ageing Reports. For the EU, total
employment in 2070 was revised up by 5.5% (9.4 million, see Table I.2.18) given higher projections for
population (+2.6%) and the participation rate (+2.5%) and a slightly lower unemployment rate (-0.4%).
The exceptions to the general upward revision in employment concern Greece and Cyprus, with lower
working-age population projections resulting in lower employment by 2070. Conversely, the biggest
upward revisions are found in Luxembourg, Estonia, Belgium, Slovakia, and Malta. These revisions
primarily reflect the new demographic projections and to a lesser extent higher participation rate
projections because of the better starting point. In the case of Slovakia, the upward revision in the
participation projections is also due to newly enacted pension reforms. The breakdown of revisions in
employment levels underscores the close link between employment/labour force and population. Graph
I.2.8 visualises the high correlation between revisions in the employment and population projections.
50
Part I
Graph I.2.8: Population and employment projections:

2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 Ageing
Report, 2070 (% change)
25% LU
20%
SK
15% NL
HR
10%
5% RO
Employment
IE
0%
-5%
CY
-10%
EL
-15%
-15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Population
Table I.2.19: Labour force revisions: 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 Ageing Report (pps)
employment rate participation rate unemployment rate

(20-64) (55-64) (20-64) (55-64) (20-64)
2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070 2022 2070
BE 0.8 4.8 -1.1 6.9 0.2 4.6 -1.9 6.6 -0.8 -0.6 BE
BG 1.5 3.1 6.8 6.1 0.9 2.9 6.3 5.8 -0.8 -0.4 BG
CZ 2.2 0.9 8.6 4.9 1.0 0.2 7.7 4.3 -1.4 -0.9 CZ
DK 1.6 3.9 0.8 4.6 1.1 4.3 0.5 5.0 -0.7 0.3 DK
DE 0.5 1.2 1.5 1.9 0.3 1.0 1.4 1.8 -0.2 -0.2 DE
EE 2.5 3.6 3.7 2.3 2.4 3.7 3.4 2.1 -0.2 -0.2 EE
IE 4.0 5.4 5.2 4.7 2.4 4.8 4.4 4.4 -2.1 -1.1 IE
EL 2.6 -1.8 4.8 -1.9 0.5 -2.3 3.6 -2.6 -2.9 -0.4 EL
ES 1.5 0.1 3.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 -0.5 -1.2 -3.6 -1.2 ES
FR 2.8 4.5 2.6 8.6 1.3 4.4 1.7 8.9 -2.1 -0.5 FR
HR 2.3 6.4 5.1 9.8 2.3 6.6 6.0 10.9 -0.1 -0.4 HR
IT 0.1 1.6 -4.7 0.1 -1.2 1.4 -5.3 0.4 -1.8 -0.3 IT
CY 1.7 0.7 5.0 -2.9 1.2 0.3 4.2 -4.0 -0.7 -0.5 CY
LV 1.3 0.6 6.1 5.9 0.4 0.3 4.7 5.1 -1.1 -0.4 LV
LT 2.1 -0.6 8.2 1.2 1.5 -1.0 8.3 1.2 -0.9 -0.4 LT
LU 1.2 0.4 2.9 6.7 0.1 0.8 3.1 8.1 -1.4 0.5 LU
HU 3.4 1.7 0.1 -5.9 1.8 1.4 -0.3 -5.8 -2.0 -0.5 HU
MT 2.2 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.3 1.0 1.8 2.6 -1.2 0.2 MT
NL 4.0 6.9 4.8 6.9 2.9 5.8 3.5 5.6 -1.5 -1.5 NL
AT 0.7 1.9 1.8 5.1 0.7 2.2 2.0 5.5 0.0 0.2 AT
PL 3.4 4.9 5.6 7.6 2.3 3.5 5.0 6.7 -1.6 -2.0 PL
PT 0.8 0.3 4.0 2.6 0.6 0.4 3.5 2.2 -0.3 0.0 PT
RO -3.0 -4.4 -4.0 0.6 -3.0 -3.5 -3.9 1.3 0.2 1.4 RO
SI 0.8 2.3 1.4 11.7 -0.1 2.4 0.4 12.1 -1.2 0.0 SI
SK 3.8 8.4 8.0 22.9 3.5 8.4 7.6 23.1 -0.7 -0.6 SK
FI 1.0 0.6 4.8 1.3 1.1 0.6 5.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 FI
SE 0.9 1.2 1.9 6.3 0.2 2.0 1.8 7.6 -0.7 0.8 SE
NO 1.7 3.3 2.2 2.9 0.8 3.3 1.9 2.9 -1.2 -0.1 NO
EA 1.6 2.4 0.8 3.3 0.4 2.1 0.1 3.3 -1.5 -0.4 EA
EU 1.6 2.3 1.4 3.6 0.5 2.0 0.8 3.6 -1.4 -0.4 EU
51
European Commission
Table I.2.21 provides an overview of the revisions in the participation rates in 2070 by age group. The
2 pps higher participation rate for the working-age population in the EU is the result of upward revisions
for all broad age groups. Pension reforms legislated since the previous Ageing Report (see Box I.2.2)
come to the fore in the revisions for the oldest age group, for example for Slovakia, Sweden and France.
In other cases, upward revisions for the 55-64 age group result from higher participation at younger age,
which the CSM passes through to subsequent age brackets, or from a reassessment of earlier adopted
pension measures, for example for Croatia and Slovenia.
Table I.2.20: Breakdown of revisions in employment Table I.2.21: Participation rate revisions for 2070:
projection for 2070: 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 2024 Ageing Report vs 2021 Ageing
Ageing Report (20-64y; %) Report (pps)
E P PR UR 20-64 20-24 25-54 55-64

(1)-(2)- BE 4.6 -1.6 4.9 6.6 BE
(1)≈(2)+(3)-(4) (2) (3) (4) (3)+(4)
BG 2.9 -1.0 2.5 5.8 BG
BE 14.6% 8.0% 5.9% -0.6% 0.0% CZ 0.2 -0.7 -1.1 4.3 CZ
BG 9.9% 5.7% 3.7% -0.4% 0.0% DK 4.3 3.9 4.1 5.0 DK
CZ 6.7% 5.6% 0.3% -0.9% 0.0% DE 1.0 2.6 0.4 1.8 DE
DK 4.8% 0.1% 5.0% 0.3% 0.0% EE 3.7 5.1 4.1 2.1 EE
DE 5.2% 3.7% 1.2% -0.2% 0.0% IE 4.8 4.7 5.4 4.4 IE
EE 14.9% 10.6% 4.1% -0.2% 0.0% EL -2.3 4.2 -3.0 -2.6 EL
IE 1.2% -5.7% 5.7% -1.1% 0.1% ES -0.9 0.4 -0.9 -1.2 ES
EL -12.8% -10.4% -2.8% -0.4% 0.0% FR 4.4 5.6 2.6 8.9 FR
ES 1.9% 1.7% -1.1% -1.2% 0.1% HR 6.6 6.4 5.0 10.9 HR
FR 6.6% 0.8% 5.3% -0.5% 0.0% IT 1.4 0.2 1.9 0.4 IT
HR 10.7% 1.9% 8.5% -0.4% 0.0% CY 0.3 5.2 0.9 -4.0 CY
IT 2.3% 0.1% 1.9% -0.3% 0.0% LV 0.3 0.6 -1.3 5.1 LV
CY -10.5% -11.4% 0.3% -0.5% 0.0% LT -1.0 0.1 -1.8 1.2 LT
LV 9.6% 8.9% 0.4% -0.4% 0.0% LU 0.8 -0.6 -1.8 8.1 LU
LT 8.0% 8.8% -1.2% -0.4% 0.0% HU 1.4 -0.6 4.1 -5.8 HU
LU 21.7% 21.2% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0% MT 1.0 1.1 0.8 2.6 MT
HU 4.5% 2.4% 1.6% -0.5% 0.0% NL 5.8 10.6 5.2 5.6 NL
MT 13.6% 12.7% 1.2% 0.2% 0.0% AT 2.2 2.9 1.1 5.5 AT
NL 12.8% 4.6% 6.7% -1.5% 0.1% PL 3.5 -2.6 3.0 6.7 PL
AT 5.7% 3.3% 2.6% 0.2% 0.0% PT 0.4 -4.4 0.2 2.2 PT
PL 10.6% 4.0% 4.5% -2.0% 0.1% RO -3.5 -4.5 -5.0 1.3 RO
PT 6.9% 6.4% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% SI 2.4 -0.3 -0.8 12.1 SI
RO 5.9% 12.2% -4.8% 1.4% -0.1% SK 8.4 -3.1 5.0 23.1 SK
SI 7.3% 4.4% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% FI 0.6 -2.8 0.7 1.7 FI
SK 14.0% 2.9% 10.4% -0.6% 0.0% SE 2.0 -0.1 0.5 7.6 SE
FI 4.8% 4.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% NO 3.3 4.6 3.5 2.9 NO
SE 0.6% -0.9% 2.3% 0.8% 0.0%
EA 2.1 2.6 1.6 3.3 EA
EU 2.0 1.7 1.5 3.6 EU
NO 1.4% -2.7% 4.0% -0.1% 0.0%
EA 6.0% 3.0% 2.6% -0.4% 0.0% Source: European Commission, EPC.
EU 5.5% 2.6% 2.5% -0.4% 0.0%
The labour force identity L = E + U can be written as E = P x PR

x (1-UR) where L is the labour force, E is employment, U is
unemployment, P is the population, PR is the participation
rate, and UR is the unemployment rate. Taking the logarithm
of the above expression, revisions in employment level can
be approximated as follows:
𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
ln � 1�𝐸𝐸 � ≈ ln � 1�𝑃𝑃 � + ln � 1�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 � − (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈1 − 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈0 )
0 0 0
where indices 0 and 1 refer to two distinct projection
exercises
52
Part I
Box I.2.1: Cohort Simulation Model (CSM)
The cohort simulation model (CSM) as developed by the European Commission (DG ECFIN) (1)
has been used since the 2006 Ageing Report to project participation rates by gender and single age.
The rationale for using the CSM is to reflect the substantial changes in labour market behaviour in
recent decades across different cohorts and sexes. This methodology accounts, for instance, for the
significant rise in female labour force participation in recent decades, as younger women, with a
much stronger attachment to the labour force, gradually replace older women with relatively low
participation rates. Simultaneously, the cohort methodology also caters for a – generally small –
decline in the participation rate of men in recent generations in several countries, opposite to the
trend observed for women.
The central feature of the CSM is the estimation of labour market exit and entry rates for a ‘synthetic’
cohort. (2) Because no individual longitudinal data on labour market transitions is available,
participation data by single age is used to estimate labour market transitions, namely whether people
either entered or exited the labour market between two consecutive ages. These probabilities are
calculated on the basis of participation rates for the past ten years − 2013-2022 for the 2024 Ageing
Report. This reference period provides thus a ‘synthetic’ cohort for base year 2022. An unweighted
10-year average is used to avoid that the choice of a particular year unduly influences the calculation
of entry and exit rates through cyclical fluctuations or statistical errors.
Graph 1: The Cohort Simulation Model
The entry and exit rates are then used to project future participation rates as older generations are
progressively replaced by younger ones. For those Member States having legislated pension
reforms, average exit rates for the age group 51-74 are adjusted to account for the reform impact.
Otherwise, both average entry and exit rates are kept constant throughout the projection period,
reflecting a no-policy-change assumption. By keeping rates constant, the cohort effect is captured:
in the long term, we arrive at a population with the same individual characteristics as the cohorts
who enter the labour force now as measured through the 10-year average.
The 2024 Ageing Report projections build on the latest Eurostat demographic projections (see
Chapter 1), prepared independently by Eurostat with consultation of National Statistical Institutes.
Together with the participation rate projections, the population projections determine the labour
force assumptions.
(1) The methodology was initially developed at the OECD, see Burniaux et al. (2003).
(2) A more detailed description of the methodology can be found in Annexes 1 and 2.
53
European Commission
Box (continued)
The following assumptions are made:
• Base year for the labour market projections is 2022, the projection period covers 2023-2070.
• Average entry/exit rate are calculated, as a ten-year average (2013-2022), using participation
rates by sex and single age (15-74) from the harmonised EU Labour Force Survey of Member
States as compiled by Eurostat.
• A corrective mechanism for young cohorts (15-24) is applied, in order to avoid that any increase
in education enrolment rates (and the corresponding decline in participation rates) feeds into
future declines of participation rates for prime-age workers. This assumption means that
participation rates at each single year of age between 15 and 19 remain constant at the 10-year
average. Participation rates between ages 20 and 24 are allowed to increase if this is the outcome
of the model. Otherwise, the rates are kept constant at the 10-year average.
• Pension reforms are modelled through their estimated impact on the labour market exit rates of
older workers (aged 51-74). This is based on a best-reasoned judgment, using the probabilistic
nature of the CSM. Specifically, the historical average exit rates of older workers, calculated
separately for both sexes, are adjusted to account for the expected effects of enacted pension
reforms. The estimation of the adjustment takes into account country-specific information about
the relationship between retirement behaviour and the parameters of the pension system, as well
as cross-country evidence. This framework for analysis is able to incorporate a broad typology
of measures, inter alia, increases in the statutory or early retirement age, the convergence of
lower female statutory retirement ages to that of men, the linking of the statutory retirement age
to changes in life expectancy, and changes in financial incentives for early or delayed
retirement. Moreover, policy changes can be incorporated as one-off measures or be phased in
progressively within a specified period.
Additional assumptions on labour input
The production function methodology to project GDP growth (see Chapter 3), uses total hours
worked as labour input variable. The split between full-time and part-time work (for the age groups
15-24, 25-54, 55-64 and 65-74), as well as the corresponding weekly hours worked, is fixed at the
average values for the last available year (2022) for the entire projection period.
Although work rates and weekly hours worked are frozen per age group over the projection period,
total hours worked changes due to compositional effects that mostly reflect the projected increase
in female labour force participation, given the higher incidence of part-time work among women.
54
Part I
Box I.2.2: Legislated pension measures incorporated in the labour force projections
This box lists the most recent pension reforms Czechia

legislated by the Member States that are considered
to have a direct impact on the labour market exit Statutory retirement ages are determined in function
behaviour of the oldest workers and that are thus of a person’s birth year and, in the case of women,
relevant for the participation rates as projected the number of children raised. In 2017, a reform was
through the CSM model. For a more exhaustive adopted that caps the increase in the statutory
overview of Member States’ pension systems, see retirement age at 65, reversing the 2011 reform that
Annexes 4 and 5. This box describes the situation on increased retirement ages approximately in line with
30 September 2023. gains in life expectancy. In 2030, the retirement age
will be 65 years for men and women with maximum
The countries with the most significant new reforms 1 child. As of 2036, it will be 65 years for all.
since the 2021 Ageing Report are France, Slovakia
and Sweden. Early retirement is possible 3 year prior to the
statutory retirement age, with a minimum insurance
Belgium
period of 40 years (2023 reform, 35 years before).
The insurance period includes non-contributory
The 2015 reform raised the minimum early periods.
retirement age to 63 years and the minimum required
career length to 42 years. Exceptions apply to people Denmark
aged 60/61 with a career of at least 44/43 years. The
reform also raised the statutory retirement age in the The standard retirement age reached 67 years in
three main public old-age pension schemes (wage 2022. The statutory retirement age and the VERP
earners, self-employed and civil servants), from 65 age (voluntary early retirement pension with
years to 66 years in 2025 and to 67 years in 2030. A minimum 30 contributory years) increase on the
career of 45 years remains required for drawing a basis of life expectancy for a 60-year-old, with the
full pension. period on old-age pension targeted at 14.5 years
(17.5 years including VERP).
Bulgaria
Adjustments to life expectancy have to be confirmed
The statutory retirement age is rising to 65 years by Parliament 15 years before they take effect (12
following the 2015 reform: by 2029 for men and by years for changes in the VERP age). Increases to 68
2037 for women (63 years in 2029). After 2037, the years in 2030 and to 69 years in 2035 were
statutory retirement age is supposed to increase in confirmed in 2015 and 2020, with further updates
line with gains in life expectancy, though no clear every to be confirmed every 5 years. The maximum
rule has been legislated. Therefore, such mechanism increase in the retirement age is restricted to 1 year
is not included in the projections. The retirement age for every update.
for workers in the defence and security sector is
gradually increasing, to 55 years in 2029. In 2020, a new early retirement scheme was created
for people with long careers: people with 44 years of
The required career length for workers in normal labour market seniority (at the age of 61 years)
work conditions to qualify for retirement is rising by obtain the right to retire 3 years before the standard
two months annually, until it reaches 40 years for pension age. People with respectively 42 years and
men and 37 years for women in 2027. 43 years of labour market seniority can retire 1 and
2 years early.
People within 12 months of the statutory retirement
age can retire early, in which case the benefit is In 2019, a new right to disability pension was
reduced by 0.4% for each month of anticipation. created for people 6 years or less removed from the
Early retirement is also possible for people working statutory retirement age, on the conditions of at least
under hazardous and unhealthy working conditions 20-25 years of labour activity and a reduced work
or special groups such as teachers, military and ability. The scheme took effect in 2020 and replaced
police officers (55-60y). a similar senior disability pension.
55
European Commission
Box (continued)
Germany 60 to 62 (full pension with 40 years of contributions)

for the whole social security system. Since 2021,
As a result of the 2007 reform, the statutory retirement ages are linked to changes in life
retirement age is gradually increasing, reaching 67 expectancy at the age of 65, with updates every three
years in 2031. years.
Early retirement is possible (i) at the age of 63 for Spain

people with an insurance record of at least 35 years,
with a permanent reduction of 0.3% for each month The statutory retirement age is increasing to 67 years
below the statutory retirement age; (ii) 2 years ahead in 2027 and the contributory career for a full pension
of the statutory retirement age without a penalty, for to 37 years. Workers with a contributory period of at
people with a contribution history of 45 years. least 38.5 years can retire at the age of 65 with a full
pension.
Since 2023, it is possible to combine an early
pension with additional earnings without any loss of Early retirement for voluntary retirees requires a
pension entitlements. minimum age of 65 (as of 2027), a minimum
contributory period of 35 years and the resulting
Estonia benefit should be at least the minimum pension.
The retirement age for men and women was Early retirement for involuntary retirees (collective
equalised in 2016 at 63 years and is rising to 65 by dismissals) requires a minimum retirement age of 63
2026. The 2018 reform introduced a link to changes years (as of 2027) and a minimum contributory
in the 5-year average life expectancy at the age of period of 33 years.
65. This link is applied starting 2027, with a
maximum annual increase of three months. The
Early partial retirement is available for workers of
change in the retirement age will be known two
different ages depending on the number of years of
years in advance.
contributions: 63 years in 2027 with a contributory
period of at least 36.5 years, 65 years in case of 33-
The old bonus/malus system was replaced by an 36.5 contribution years. Below 33 contribution years
actuarially neutral system in 2021. The early early partial retirement is not possible.
retirement age (previously 3 years before the
statutory retirement age) is 1/2/3/4/5 year(s) lower,
Early retirement is penalised in function of the
for contribution periods of 20/25/30/35/40 years.
distance to the statutory retirement age and the
Drawing a pension benefit can be combined with
contribution period. People working beyond their
work.
earliest retirement age increase their benefits by 4%
per extra year of work, regardless of the contribution
Ireland
history. People can opt for a lump sum payment or a
The legislated increase in the state pension age to 67 mixed pay-out.
years in 2021 and to 68 in 2028 was repealed at the
end of 2020, fixing the state pension age at 66. To France
get a State Contributory Pension one needs to have
People can retire from the moment they reach the
started paying contributions before the age of 56,
earliest retirement age, with a penalty if they do not
with a minimum of 260 weekly contributions and a
meet the required contribution period. They can also
yearly average of at least 10 contributions.
delay their retirement to obtain a full-rate pension
A pathway to early retirement was opened in 2021, which is granted to people with the required
through the introduction of a new benefit for 65- contribution period or are 67 years old.
year-olds, equal to the unemployment benefit.
Following the 2023 reform, the earliest retirement
Greece age for all schemes will rise gradually from the
The 2012 and 2014 reforms increased the statutory standard 62 in 2022 to 64 years in 2032. In addition,
retirement age from 65 to 67 years (with at least 15 the required contribution period will rise to 43 years
contribution years) and the early retirement age from by 2027 instead of 2035 under the 2013 reform. In
56
Part I
Box (continued)
the public sector, for some special branches with increase. The next Directorial Decree with update
‘active service’ (e.g. policemen and nurses), the for 2027 will be enacted in 2025.
earliest retirement age is 57 years, rising to 59 years
following the 2023 reform. Early retirement is possible with 42 years and 10
months of contributions for men and 41 years and 10
Disabled people and working mothers of 3 children months for women, irrespective of their age. Starting
are granted a full pension at 65. People suffering from 2027, indexation to changes in life expectancy
from a professional disease or an accident that of the contributory requirement will be reinstated.
resulted in a permanent incapacity of at least 20% Once requirements for early retirement are met,
can retire at 60 with a full pension. Below 20% the workers need to wait an additional ‘window’ period
retirement age goes up to 62 following the 2023 of three months before they can receive their
reform. pension.
Early retirement for long careers (since September Workers may receive an early retirement allowance
2023): people who paid 5 quarters of contributions (‘APE Sociale’) before meeting the old-age pension
before the age of 18/20/21 and accumulated at least requirements when they are 63 years old and have
accrued (i) 30 years of contributions, subject to
169 quarters can retire at the age of 60/60-62/63.
additional requirements (i.e. being unemployed under
certain circumstances, being a caregiver, having a
Croatia disability degree equal to or more than 74%) or (ii)
The statutory retirement age is 65 years (63 for employees with 36 years of contributions of which at
least 7 of the last 10 or 6 of the last 7 in an arduous
women in 2022, rising to 65 in 2030), with 41
job. (1) This experimental measure has been
insurance years needed for a full pension. Early
introduced in 2017 and its expiry date has been
retirement is possible at the age of 60 (58 for women postponed several times. According to the Budget
in 2022, rising to 60 in 2030) with a minimum Law for 2023, it should expire at the end of 2023.
contributory period of 35 years (33 years for women
in 2022, rising to 35y in 2030). Penalisation of 0.2% Precocious workers may retire with 41 years of
per month of anticipation, i.e. maximum 12%. contributions until 2026 subject to additional
Bonus of 0.45% per month beyond the statutory requirements (partially similar to those requested for
retirement age since 2023 (0.34% before). Bonus in ‘APE Sociale’). (2) Starting from 2027, indexation to
case of long career (41 years): 0.15%. changes in life expectancy of the contributory
requirement will be reinstated. Once requirements
In 2016, war pensions (disability and survivor for early retirement are met, workers need to wait an
pensions) represented 5-6% of pensioners (71.000). additional ‘window’ period of three months before
By 2040 these are assumed to be fully disappeared they can receive their pension.
from the working-age population.
An additional early retirement scheme has been
Italy introduced for 2023, ‘Quota 103’: people can retire
Since the latest update to life expectancy in 2019, at 62 in case of a contributory period of 41 years.
the statutory retirement age is 67 years for men and This temporary scheme follows the experimental
women in all sectors, with a minimum of 20 temporary schemes ‘Quota 100’ (2019-2021: 62+38
contributory years. The indexation to changes in life years) and ‘Quota 102’ (2022: 64+38 years).
expectancy at 65 has been applied since 2013 and,
since 2019, is applied every two years, with a ‘Opzione donna’: in 2023, women who have reached
maximum increase of three months (in case of the age of 60 (59/58 with one/at least two children)
increases in life expectancy exceeding three months, with 35 years of contribution by 2022 may retire
the surplus is absorbed in subsequent updates). The earlier, under more stringent conditions than in the
updates for 2021, 2023 and 2025 did not result in an past (similar to those requested for ‘APE Sociale’).
Workers may receive their pensions 12 months (18
if self-employed) after requirements are met. Early
(1) 32 years in the construction sector. (2) Precocious workers are workers who have paid at least
one year of contribution before turning 19.
57
European Commission
Box (continued)
retirement is subject to benefits being entirely pension benefit is increased by 0.67% per month
computed according to the Notional Defined (8% per year).
Contribution (NDC) rules, instead of the mix of
Defined Benefit and NDC rules that would normally Luxembourg
apply to these workers. (3)
To be eligible for an old-age pension, an insured
Cyprus
person needs to be at least 65 years old and have
accumulated a total of 10 years of contributory
The 2012 pension reform introduced a link between periods. An insured person that is at least 60 years
the statutory retirement age and changes in life old and has accumulated a combined total of 40
expectancy. The mechanism applies since 2018, years of contributory periods (work) and credited
with updates every five years (first revision will non-contributory periods qualifies for early
cover the period 2018-2023). There is no early retirement, provided that contributions have been
retirement possibility, aside from miners. paid for at least 10 years. Individuals that are at least
57 years old gain access to early old-age benefits if
Latvia they accumulated a total of 40 years of contributory
periods (work).
As a result of the 2012 pension reform, the
retirement age increases by three months every year, Hungary
until reaching 65 years and a minimum contributory
period of 20 years as of 2025 (15 years until then). The statutory retirement age has been 65 years since
The early retirement age – with an insurance record 2022 for both men and women. There is no early
of at least 30 years – is two years lower than the retirement scheme, though women can retire with 40
statutory one, thus rising to 63 years by 2025. The contribution years (work+childcare years) regard-
early retirement benefit is 50% of the normal less of their age.
benefit. The full pension is restored upon reaching
the statutory retirement age. Malta
Lithuania
The 2006 reform entails a gradual increase in the
statutory retirement age to 65 years by 2027 (for
The 2011 reform raises the statutory retirement age people born as of 1962). In addition, the contributory
to 65 years by 2026, with annual increases of 4 period increases to 41 years by 2030.
months for women and 2 months for men. The 2016
pension reform increases the eligibility requirements Early retirement is possible as of the age of 61
for the full general pension component from 30 provided that the retiree will not remain in any
years (33 years in 2023) to 35 years by 2027. gainful employment and has the required
contribution history. People eligible for early
Early retirement is possible five years prior to the retirement are awarded a progressive bonus for each
statutory retirement age on the condition of meeting year that they continue working up to the age of 65.
the eligibility requirements for a full general Those who continue working beyond the retirement
pension. The pension benefit is reduced by 0.32% age can do so without forfeiting their pension while
for each month of anticipation – i.e. maximum 24% in employment.
– and the reduced pension is paid also after reaching
the statutory retirement age. The Netherlands
After reaching the retirement age, people can The 2019 reform modified the speed at which the
continue to work and combine a salary with the old- statutory retirement age rises to 67 years. The latter
age pension. In case of deferred retirement the will be reached in 2024, compared to 2023 under the
(3) This experimental measure was first introduced in

2004 and has been extended several times, most
recently in 2019 (DL n. 4/2019) until 2022. In the
latest Budget Law for 2023 the requirements for
‘Opzione Donna’ have been significantly tightened
with a new expiry date at the end of 2023.
58
Part I
Box (continued)
2012 reform. Thereafter, it will be linked to 2/3rd of In 2014, comprehensive new regulations for
the rise in the remaining life expectancy at 65, invalidity and occupational disability pensions came
instead of the full link envisaged under the 2012 into effect. The temporary invalidity pension was
reform. The duration of social security arrangements replaced by medical and job-related rehabilitation
for people below the retirement age (disability and was completely abolished for people born after
pensions, survivors' pensions, unemployment 1963. These people will receive special unemploy-
schemes and social assistance) will be extended in ment benefits (‘Rehabilitationsgeld’) instead. There-
line with the increase in the statutory retirement age. fore, the temporary invalidity pension is phased out.
Austria Poland
The statutory retirement age is 65 years for men and The retirement age is 65 years for men and 60 years
all civil servants and 60 years for women, with a for woman. No minimum contribution requirements
minimum contribution period of 15 years. As of apply. There is no early retirement possibility,
2024, the female retirement age will increase by six except for special schemes such as miners and
months every year, reaching 65 years in 2033. teachers, who can retire up to 5 years early. No
Several early retirement schemes exist: penalty or bonus applies.
− While the early retirement scheme Since 2022, there is an income taxation exemption
‘Korridorpension’ can still be accessed by men for labour income up to PLN 85 528 per year for wo-
at the age of 62 years, it requires 40 insurance men over 60 men over 65 who remain professionally
years since 2017, when the penalty for early active while not receiving a pension benefit.
retirement was increased from 4.2% to 5.1% per
year for people born as of 1955. For women only Portugal
relevant as of 2028.
Since 2015, the statutory retirement age changes in
− The early old-age pension scheme for long-term line with two thirds of the change in life expectancy
contributors ‘Hacklerregelung’ (45 years of at the age of 65. It was at 66 year and 7 months in
contributions) was tightened by increasing the 2022 but fell to 66 year and 4 months in 2023 and
minimum retirement age to 62 for men born as 2024 because of this adjustment. The statutory
of 1954 and for women born as of 1966. Penalty: retirement age is reduced by four months for each
4.2% per year. contributory year above 40 years, with a minimum
retirement age of 65 years.
− For the heavy worker ‘Schwerarbeitspension’,
the early retirement age is 60 (for women Early retirement is possible at the age of 60 with 40
relevant as of 2024), with a minimum of 45 contributory years. These conditions are not
insurance years (at least 10 years of hard labour adjusted for gains in life expectancy. A penalty of
in the last 20 years before retirement). Penalty: 0.5% per month of anticipated retirement applies.
1.8% per year.
Romania
− For the early old-age pension for long-term
Old-age retirement is possibly when reaching the
contributors in combination with heavy worker
standard retirement age (65 for men, rising to 63 for
regulation (‘Hackler-Schwerarbeit’), the mini-
women by 2030) with a minimum contribution
mum retirement age is 55 years for women (born
period of 15 years.
in 1959-1963) and 60 years for men (born in
1954-1958). Required insurance years are 40 for
For 'service pensions' (army, police, intelligence,
women and 45 for men. Penalty: 1.8% per year.
penitentiary staff), the eligibility criteria are an age
of 60 years, with at least 25 years of contribution, of
As of 2022, the early retirement possibilities without
which at least 15 years in service.
deductions in case of 540 contribution months that
existed in 2020 and 2021, have been abolished again
Since 2022, people who have lived for at least 30
for all pension types.
years in areas affected by residual pollution (due to
mining or various chemical activities) benefit from
59
European Commission
Box (continued)
a reduced standard retirement age of 2 years. The list with a requirement of 1.6 times the subsistence
of towns that benefit from this has been expanded to minimum. A penalty applies, amounting to 0.3% for
almost 100. every month below the statutory retirement age.
Early retirement is possible up to 5 years before the Finland

standard retirement age, with at least 35 contribution
years. Penalties apply in case of less than 43 The lowest old-age retirement age in the earnings-
contribution years. related scheme is rising by three months for each age
cohort, from 63 years in 2018 to 65 in 2027. The
Slovenia
upper age limit is currently 68 years and it will be
raised to 69 for those born in 1958–1961 and to 70
The right to an old-age pension depends on two for those born in 1962 or later.
parameters that both need to be met: the age of the
insured person (65 years for both men and women) The lowest old-age retirement age will be linked to
and the pension qualifying period (minimum 15 life expectancy as of 2030 so that the time spent
years). Early retirement is possible at the age of 60 working in relation to the time spent in retirement
in case of 40 contribution years. The penalty for will remain at the 2025 level. The annual increase of
early retirement is 0.3% for each month of the retirement age is limited to two months.
retirement before the age of 65, i.e. maximum 18%.
The earliest retirement age is reduced for childcare, Sweden
compulsory military service, employment between
the ages of 15 and 18, and arduous labour with a The retirement age is flexible and individuals can
detriment to health. claim benefits as of a minimum age without any
upper limit.
People that qualify for retirement (old-age or early) The 2022 reform increased the earliest age for an
but continue to work can earn a bonus of 3% per year old-age pension from 62 years to 63 years in 2023
for 3 years and receive part of the accrued pension and to 64 years in 2026. The earliest age for a
benefit (minimum 12.5%, 50% in case of half-time guarantee pension was raised from 65 years to 66
work, 75% in case of working 25%). years in 2023 and to 67 years in 2026. The upper age
for employment protection was increased to 69 years
Slovakia in 2023 and to 70 years in 2026.
The statutory retirement age for people born up to
1966 is defined by a fixed table based on age, cohort, As of 2026 an ‘indicative age’ will be introduced,
sex and number of raised children (for women with which will increase by one year every time the
children, the retirement age can be decreased by 6 expected remaining life expectancy at the age of 65
months for each of the first three children). It is set increases by 1.5 years (so that the indicative age
to increase by two months for each subsequent increases with 2/3rd of the remaining lifetime). When
cohort, reaching 64 years in 2030. the indicative age increases by a full year all age
limits will automatically be increased by one year.
The 2022 reform restored the link to average life
expectancy from 2030 onwards (for people born as Norway
of 1967), which was abandoned in the 2019 reform. The statutory retirement age is fixed at 67 years but
serves rather as a reference age since flexible
Pensioners are allowed to retire two years before retirement is possible from the age of 62. In order to
reaching the statutory retirement age if the benefit is receive a full guarantee pension, one must have been
at least 1.6 times the subsistence minimum. In that a member of the National Insurance Scheme for 40
case, their old-age pension is reduced by 0.5% per years, otherwise the benefit is reduced accordingly.
month. The pension benefit is increased by 0.5% for The guarantee part of the pension can be drawn only
every additional month of work beyond the from the age of 67.
retirement age.
In addition, early retirement is also possible with a

career of 40 years (not adjusted to life expectancy),
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Part I
Box I.2.3: Assumptions on structural unemployment
Structural unemployment is the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment to which, in the absence of shocks, the
economy is estimated to settle in the long run. Empirically, structural unemployment cannot be observed.
However, it is typically estimated via methods that pin down its statistical and theoretical properties. Its level
is usually determined by both institutional and fiscal factors (e.g. unemployment benefits or tax rates) which
influence the minimum wage needed for a worker to take up work (the ‘reservation wage’). To proxy for
structural unemployment, the Ageing Report uses estimates of the ‘non-accelerating wage rate of
unemployment’ (NAWRU): the unemployment rate that corresponds with stable wage growth, i.e. real wage
growth equals productivity growth. (1)
As a rule, actual unemployment rates are assumed to converge to NAWRU rates by 2027, in line with the
assumption of output gap closure in T+5 (see Chapter 3). Thereafter, actual unemployment rates coincide with
the NAWRU. In turn, NAWRU rates are assumed to gradually (2) converge to the minimum of
country-specific ‘anchors’ (3) or the median of national anchors, whichever is the lowest. (4)
Anchor values are country-specific values for the NAWRU that are calculated on the basis of the coefficients
of a panel estimation model in which the short-term NAWRU for EU Member States is regressed on a set of
structural variables (unemployment benefit net replacement rates, expenditure on active labour market
policies, the degree of union density, the labour tax wedge, and a demographic index), together with a set of
cyclical variables (total factor productivity, the long-term real interest rate, a measure of construction activity,
and a measure of industrial confidence). (5) To derive country-specific anchors, the non-structural variables
are set at their average values over the estimation sample.
Capping country-specific NAWRU values to the median is done to avoid extrapolating very high
unemployment rates into the far future. It should be noted that this cap on unemployment rates is a crucial
assumption for some countries that currently register high unemployment. Higher long-term unemployment
assumptions would, through weaker employment growth, lead to lower potential output growth. Capping
unemployment rates, as done in some cases, leads to higher employment and GDP growth, and essentially
assumes the implementation of future policy measures in the labour market. (6)
To account for changes in total/average unemployment rates because of the interaction between cohort-
specific structural unemployment rates and the structure of the labour force, age-specific unemployment rates
by gender are calculated as follows for each projection year:
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 2022
𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 = ∗ 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
∑𝑎𝑎 ,𝑔𝑔 �𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎2022 𝑡𝑡
,𝑔𝑔 ∗ 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 �
where
(1) For further details on the NAWRU methodology, developed by the Output Gap Working Group attached to the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC-OGWG), see Hristov et al. (2017) and Havik et al. (2014).
(2) In addition, if the estimated NAWRU ten years ahead (2032) is lower than the country-specific anchor, the former is
assumed to replace the anchor. For countries whose NAWRU is higher than the EU median, the gradual convergence
is assumed to be completed by 2050.
(3) Under the guidance of the EPC-OGWG and with the twin objectives of improving the medium-term framework for
fiscal surveillance up to T+10 (currently 2032), DG ECFIN carried out econometric work (see Hristov and Roeger
(2020); Hristov et al. (2017)) leading to the estimation of anchor values for the NAWRU.
(4) Anchors are country-specific values for the NAWRU that are calculated assuming that non structural variables are set
at their average values, thereby averaging out the impact of cyclical fluctuations, while structural variables are assumed
to remain unchanged at their last observed values (i.e. ‘no policy change’ principle).
( ) See Hristov and Roeger (2020) for detailed definitions of the explanatory variables included in the analysis.
5
(6) This assumption reflects the partial convergence assumption used in the projections and implies that some policy
measures are adopted to support such a decline in some countries.
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European Commission
Box (continued)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 =
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡 is the unemployment rate in age group a with gender g in period t; 𝑢𝑢 𝑡𝑡

where 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the total unemployment
𝑡𝑡
rate in period t; and 𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 is the share in the total labour force. This means that the unemployment rate structure
by age and gender observed in base year 2022 is kept unchanged throughout the projection period, with
age/gender values adjusted proportionally to satisfy a given total unemployment rate target.
Table 1 summarises the unemployment rate assumptions. In the EU, the unemployment rate is projected to
increase from 5.7% on average in 2022 to 6.7% in 2032 before declining again to 5.6% as of 2050. The decline
is expected to be particularly significant for countries such as Spain (-6.2%) and Greece (-5.8%).
Table 1: Unemployment rate projections (15-64y, %)
Table 1: 2022 2032 2050 2060 2070

BE 5.6 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
BG 4.3 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
CZ 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
DK 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
DE 3.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1
EE 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
IE 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
EL 12.5 10.2 6.8 6.6 6.6
ES 12.9 11.5 6.8 6.6 6.6
FR 7.3 7.5 6.7 6.6 6.6
HR 7.0 7.1 6.6 6.6 6.6
IT 8.1 9.6 6.7 6.6 6.6
CY 6.8 8.7 6.7 6.6 6.6
LV 6.9 7.4 6.7 6.6 6.6
LT 6.0 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.6
LU 4.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7
HU 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
MT 2.9 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5
NL 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
AT 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
PL 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
PT 6.0 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.5
RO 5.6 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
SI 4.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
SK 6.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
FI 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6
SE 7.5 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6
NO 3.3 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6
EA 6.3 6.7 6.0 5.9 5.9
EU 5.7 6.1 5.6 5.6 5.6
62
3. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY AND POTENTIAL GDP
PROJECTIONS
3.1. INTRODUCTION
To project potential GDP growth in the long term, a production function framework with the standard
specification of the Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale is used. In this
framework, potential GDP growth is driven by long-term developments in labour input and labour
productivity.
Projections of labour productivity are based on assumptions about long-run developments in its
underlying determinants, namely labour-augmenting total factor productivity (TFP) and the capital stock
per worker (also referred to as capital deepening). The long-run projection is based on the central
assumption of convergence of all Member States towards the same value of labour productivity by the
end of the projection horizon, while accounting for cross-country GDP per capita differences in the short
to medium term. Labour input projections are based on assumptions taken from Eurostat’s latest
population projections (see Chapter 1) and the labour market participation rate projected by the
Commission’s Cohort Simulation Model (see Chapter 2).
A detailed description of the production function framework and the key assumptions underpinning the
long-term GDP projections presented in this section are summarised in Annex 3. All assumptions have
been approved by the EPC, including the methodology developed by the EPC’s Output Gap Working
Group (OGWG) to calculate potential GDP over the first 10 years of the projection period. Indeed,
following the practice used for previous Ageing Reports, the OGWG T+10 methodology is used for
projecting potential growth and its components over the medium term – namely up to 2032 (Annex 3).
The long-term projections, and T+10 projections, in this report are based on the Commission 2023 spring
forecast.( 24) Thus, the EPC’s working groups, the OGWG and the AWG, are fully aligned. ( 25)
The rest of this section summarises (i) the long-term GDP projections in the baseline (Section 3.2.1), (ii)
the results of the higher and lower TFP growth scenarios (Section 3.2.2) ( 26) and (iii) the main differences
between these projections and those of the 2021 Ageing Report (Section 3.3).
(24) The Commission 2023 spring forecast was published on 15 May 2023 and took account of all available information at that time.
The revisions in the national accounts published in autumn 2023 are therefore not included in the assumptions presented in this
report. The 2022 nominal GDP in the EU was estimated to be 0.6% higher than in the spring 2023 update. For a number of
Member States the revision was downward.
(25) Since the 2024 Ageing Report, the T+10 methodology and the long-term projections adopted by the Ageing Working Group are
based on the same population projections, namely EUROPOP2023. Moreover, the T+10 projections used in this report reflect
the impact of the latest pension reforms on labour market participation rates.
(26) These alternative scenarios are also described in Chapter 5, together with other stress tests.
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European Commission
Table I.3.1: Potential GDP growth rate - period average 3.2. LONG-TERM POTENTIAL GDP PROJECTIONS
(%)
2022- 2031- 2041- 2051- 2061- 2022-

Relatively stable potential annual GDP growth of
2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2070 almost 1½% is projected over the long term in the
BE 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3
EU. This is much lower than in previous decades
BG 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 and involves downside risks should future TFP
CZ 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 growth develop less favourably than assumed,
DK 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.3 especially over the medium term.
DE 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.1
EE 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.6
IE 5.2 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.1 2.1 3.2.1. Baseline
EL 1.0 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
ES 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 Annual potential GDP growth is projected to average
FR 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.3% in the EU over the period 2022-2070. It would
HR 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.5
average 1.3% up to 2030, falling slightly to 1.2%
IT 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1
CY 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.6 during 2031-40 after which it rises again to 1.4% in
LV 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.1 the 2040s. It is then expected to fall in the 2050s to
LT 2.3 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.3% and in the 2060s to 1.1% (see Table I.3.1). The
LU 2.2 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.8 projections for the euro area follow a similar, though
HU 2.4 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.7
MT 4.2 3.1 1.8 0.9 0.8 2.1
slightly lower, trajectory at the beginning of the
NL 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.3 projection period, with annual growth of 1.2%
AT 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.3 through 2030, 1.1% in 2031-40, rising to 1.4%
PL 2.6 2.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.5 during the 2040s, and then falling to 1.2% in the
PT 1.4 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 2050s and to 1.1% in the final decade. Overall,
RO 2.6 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.7
SI 2.6 1.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.6
average growth in the euro area over the period 2022-
SK 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.4 2070 is projected at 1.2%.
FI 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.1
SE 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.4 The contribution of labour input – total hours
1.6
NO 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.5
worked – to potential growth in the EU and the euro
EA 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2
EU 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.1
area is projected to be negative as of the late 2020s.
1.3
The demographic assumptions result in a decline in
the working-age population and, by extension, a
negative contribution of labour input to potential
growth for most EU countries. The projected increase in participation and employment rates would not be
sufficient to counterbalance the decline in the working-age population (see Chapter 2). After a recovery in
the first years of the projection, total hours worked fall in the EU and the euro area, by 0.3% and 0.2%
respectively over the period 2030-2070 (see Table I.3.2). As a result, potential GDP growth in the EU and
the euro area become entirely driven by labour productivity.
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Part I
Table I.3.2: Total hours worked growth rate - period Table I.3.3: Hourly labour productivity growth rate -
average (%) period average (%)
2022- 2031- 2041- 2051- 2061- 2022- 2022- 2031- 2041- 2051- 2061- 2022-
2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2070 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2070
BE 0.9 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 BE 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1
BG -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.2 -0.7 BG 2.5 2.6 2.3 1.9 1.5 2.2
CZ 0.2 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 CZ 1.2 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.7
DK 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 DK 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
DE -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 DE 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
EE 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.0 EE 1.2 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.6
IE 1.3 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.3 IE 3.8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.8
EL -0.1 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6 -0.2 -0.6 EL 1.1 1.6 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.6
ES 0.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 ES 0.5 1.2 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.3
FR 0.6 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 FR 0.2 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.0
HR 0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.4 HR 1.9 2.0 2.2 1.9 1.4 1.9
IT 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 IT 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2
CY 0.8 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 CY 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.5
LV -0.9 -1.3 -1.3 -1.3 -0.3 -1.0 LV 2.5 2.7 2.1 1.8 1.4 2.1
LT -0.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.4 -0.8 -1.0 LT 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.4 2.1
LU 2.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.8 LU -0.3 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.9
HU 0.0 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3 HU 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.4 2.0
MT 2.1 1.3 0.4 -0.5 -0.5 0.5 MT 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.6
NL 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.2 NL 0.5 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1
AT 0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 AT 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
PL -0.2 -0.8 -1.1 -0.9 -0.4 -0.7 PL 2.9 2.8 2.1 1.8 1.4 2.2
PT -0.1 -0.9 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 PT 1.5 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.7
RO -0.7 -1.1 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.7 RO 3.4 3.0 2.3 1.9 1.5 2.4
SI 0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 SI 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.7
SK -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -0.5 SK 2.2 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.4 2.0
FI 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 FI 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
SE 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 SE 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
NO 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 NO 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
EA 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 EA 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3
EU 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 EU 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4
Source: European Commission, EPC. Source: European Commission, EPC.
Annual growth in labour productivity per hour worked is projected to increase in the period to the 2030s,
from 1.1% to 1.5%, while reaching 1.7% in the 2040s. Thereafter annual growth in labour productivity is
projected to fall to 1.5% in the 2050s and 1.3% in the 2060s. As a result, the average annual growth rate is
projected at 1.4% over 2022-2070. A similar trajectory is envisaged in the euro area, with labour
productivity rising from an average of 0.9% up to 2030 to about 1.6% in the 2040s, with an overall
average of 1.3% over the entire period (see Table I.3.3).
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth explains around two-thirds of labour productivity growth during
the projection period. Annual TFP growth converges to 0.8% by 2070 at the latest for all Member States.
For the EU, TFP growth averages 0.7% per year over 2022-30, rising to just above 1% in 2031-40 and
converging to 0.8% by the end of the projection horizon. The resulting average annual growth rate over
2022-70 is 0.9% (Table I.3.4). The annual TFP growth rate in the euro area follows a similar path, albeit
from a lower starting point over 2022-30 (0.6%) and rising more slowly in the coming decades, with an
average growth rate of 0.9% over 2022-70.
The contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity for the EU averages 0.5% per year during
2022-2070 (see Table I.3.5). The contribution rises from 0.4% in the 2020s to 0.6% in the 2040s and falls
afterwards to 0.5%. For the euro area, the contribution from capital deepening averages just 0.3% per year
during 2022-30 and rises to 0.6% before falling back to 0.5% in the 2050s and 2060s. The average is
65
European Commission
0.4% for the entire projection period. For countries whose GDP per capita is below the EU average, the
capital deepening contribution is projected to be considerably higher than the EU average in the first part
of the projection period, reflecting the assumed catching-up process.
Table I.3.4: TFP growth rate - period average (%) Table I.3.5: Annual contribution of capital deepening -
period average (%)
2022- 2031- 2041- 2051- 2061- 2022-
2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2070 2022- 2031- 2041- 2051- 2061- 2022-
BE 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2070
BG 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.4
BE 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
CZ 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.1
BG 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.8
DK 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
CZ 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6
DE 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
DK 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
EE 0.5 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.0
IE 3.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.4
DE 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
EL 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.1 EE 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6
ES 0.3 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 IE 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
FR 0.0 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 EL 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
HR 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.2 ES 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
IT 0.4 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 FR 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
CY 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 HR 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.7
LV 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 1.3 IT 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
LT 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.2 CY 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
LU -0.2 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6 LV 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8
HU 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.3
LT 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9
MT 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0
LU -0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
NL 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
HU 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8
AT 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
MT 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
PL 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.4
PT 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.1 NL 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
RO 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.4 AT 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
SI 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.2 PL 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8
SK 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.9 1.2 PT 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
FI 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 RO 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.5 1.0
SE 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 SI 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6
NO 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 SK 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7
EA 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 FI 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5
EU 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 SE 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Source: European Commission, EPC. NO 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
EA 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
EU 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
A summary of the relative contribution to potential GDP growth of labour productivity and labour
utilisation (and their determinants) in the baseline over the entire projection horizon 2022-70 is provided
by the standard growth accounting framework reported in Table I.3.6.
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Part I
Table I.3.6: Breakdown of potential GDP growth (baseline), 2022-2070
labour GDP per

share of change in
GDP growth prod. (GDP capital labour total employment capita
TFP working-age average
2022-2070 per hour deepening input population rate (1) growth
population hours worked
worked) 2022-2070
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1
BG 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 2.0
CZ 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.5
DK 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2
DE 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1
EE 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6
IE 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7
EL 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.7
ES 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2
FR 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.1
HR 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0
IT 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.3
CY 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4
LV 1.1 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.9
LT 1.1 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7
LU 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9
HU 1.7 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.9
MT 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.2
NL 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2
AT 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1
PL 1.5 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.8
PT 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5
RO 1.7 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.2
SI 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7
SK 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7
FI 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2
SE 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2
NO 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1
EA 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2
EU 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3
(1) Working-age population refers to people aged 15-74.

For the EU and for the euro area, the total population and the change in total hours worked over the entire
projection period are projected to remain quite stable, while an assumed increase in employment rates
makes a positive contribution to potential growth (0.1 pp). However, this is more than offset by a decline
in the share of the working-age population, which is a substantial negative drag on growth, with an annual
average of -0.2 pps. As a result, labour input contributes negatively to annual potential output growth on
average over the projection period (by 0.2 pps in the EU and by 0.1 pp in the euro area). Hence, growth in
labour productivity (production per hour worked) becomes the sole source of potential output growth in
both the EU and the euro area, averaging 1.4 pps and 1.3 pps, respectively. As a result, over the projection
horizon, annual potential GDP growth in the EU and euro area will average 1.3% and 1.2%, respectively.
While the majority EU Member States are projected to experience a slowdown in the contribution of
labour input (total hours worked) to potential growth rates due to the adverse impact of demographic
developments ( 27), overall potential growth rates differ substantially across countries over the projection
horizon. This is mainly explained by differences in productivity developments, especially in the first half
of the projection period, reflecting different productivity growth rates at the outset of the projection and
the assumed different future paths given the catching-up potential (see description in Box I.3.1).
In particular, for countries with GDP per capita below the EU average, growth rates are projected to be
higher. Indeed, TFP growth is above 1% for those countries with GDP per capita below the EU average,
which are thus assumed to have high catch-up potential. For these countries, annual TFP growth peaks
during the 2040s before gradually falling to 0.8% by 2070.
(27) However, under the baseline, average labour input growth is positive for some countries including Belgium, Denmark, Ireland,
France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway (see also Table I.3.6).
67
European Commission
By contrast, for countries with GDP per capita above the EU average, annual TFP growth is generally
below 1%, before converging to 1% by 2040, 0.9% by 2048, and to 0.8% by 2070.
Graph I.3.1: Average actual and potential GDP growth rates 2022-2032
5.0
4.5
4.0
Growth rates (%)
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
IT
MT
IE
FR
FI
DE
DK
NL
CZ
NO
LV
LT
LU
HR
CY
HU
RO
EA
EE
EU
BE
EL
AT
PT
SE
ES
SK
BG
SI
PL
Actual GDP growth Potential GDP growth
Finally, the GDP growth projections consider the position of the economies in the business cycle,
differentiating between potential and actual GDP growth. The commonly agreed rule is that the output
gap is closed at the latest three years after the end of the 2023 spring forecast, i.e in 2027 for the 2024
Ageing Report. As in most member states in 2021 potential GDP was higher than actual GDP, actual
GDP growth is projected to be higher than potential GDP growth until the output gap is closed in 2027
(see Graph I.3.1).
Table I.3.7: Breakdown of potential GDP growth (higher 3.2.2. Higher and lower TFP growth scenarios
TFP growth scenario), 2022-2070
GDP growth labour

TFP
capital
labour input
GDP growth Two scenarios with alternative TFP growth paths are
2022-2070 productivity deepening 2022-2070
evaluated: a higher TFP growth scenario with
assumptions closer to those of the 2021 Ageing
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5 Baseline
BE 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 1.3
BG
CZ
1.5
1.6
2.2
1.8
1.4
1.1
0.8
0.7
-0.7
-0.2
1.4
1.5
Report and a lower TFP growth scenario reflecting
DK 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.1 1.3 more conservative assumptions regarding TFP
DE 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 1.1
EE 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.7 0.0 1.6 growth rates based on the visible trend decline in
IE
EL
2.2
1.1
1.9
1.7
1.5
1.1
0.5
0.6
0.3
-0.6
2.1
1.1 TFP growth over the last decades (see Box I.3.1 for
ES
FR
1.3
1.2
1.4
1.1
0.9
0.7
0.5
0.4
-0.1
0.1
1.2
1.1
more details on these two scenarios).
HR 1.5 2.0 1.3 0.7 -0.4 1.5
IT 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.5 -0.1 1.1
CY 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.7 0.1 1.6 For the EU, GDP growth between 2022 and 2070 is
LV
LT
1.2
1.2
2.2
2.2
1.3
1.3
0.8
0.9
-1.0
-1.0
1.1
1.1
projected to be on average 1.4% in the higher TFP
LU
HU
1.9
1.8
1.1
2.1
0.7
1.3
0.4
0.8
0.8
-0.3
1.8
1.7
growth scenario while it is projected at 1.1% in the
MT 2.2 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.5 2.1 lower TFP growth scenario, compared to 1.3% in the
NL 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 1.3
AT 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.3 baseline (see Tables I.3.7 and I.3.8). For the euro
PL
PT
1.6
1.3
2.3
1.7
1.4
1.2
0.9
0.6
-0.7
-0.4
1.5
1.2
area the projected growth rates are slightly lower at
RO
SI
1.7
1.7
2.5
1.8
1.5
1.2
1.0
0.6
-0.7
-0.1
1.7
1.6
1.3% for the higher TFP growth scenario, while
SK 1.5 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.5 1.4 being 1% in the lower TFP growth scenario
compared to 1.2% in the baseline.
FI 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.2 1.1
SE 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.4 1.6
NO 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.3 1.5
EA 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 1.2
EU 1.4 1.5 1.0 0.5 -0.2 1.3 In the higher and lower TFP growth scenarios,
Source: European Commission, EPC. average GDP growth is impacted through two
68
Part I
channels compared to the baseline. Firstly, the contribution of TFP growth itself on GDP growth is higher
by assumption as TFP is one of the inputs of the production function (see Annex 3). Secondly, as TFP
growth feeds over the long-run assumption into capital growth (see Box I.3.1 for details), the contribution
of capital deepening to GDP growth also changes according to differing TFP growth.
Table I.3.8: Breakdown of potential GDP growth (lower For the higher TFP growth scenario that means that
TFP growth scenario), 2022-2070 the growth rate in labour productivity is 1.5% for the
GDP growth labour
TFP
capital
labour input
GDP growth EU and 1.4% for the euro area compared with 1.4%
2022-2070 productivity deepening 2022-2070
and 1.3% for the EU and the euro area respectively in
the baseline (see Table I.3.7). For the lower TFP
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5 Baseline
BE 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.3
BG
CZ
1.2
1.3
1.9
1.5
1.2
0.9
0.7
0.6
-0.7
-0.2
1.4
1.5
growth scenario the values are 1.2% for the EU and
DK 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 1.3 1.1% for the euro area (see Table I.3.8).
DE 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.1 1.1
EE 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.0 1.6
IE 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.3 2.1
EL 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.6 1.1
ES
FR
1.0
0.9
1.1
0.8
0.7
0.5
0.4
0.3
-0.1
0.1
1.2
1.1
3.3. COMPARING THE 2024 AND 2021 GDP
HR 1.3 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.4 1.5 PROJECTIONS
IT 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 -0.1 1.1
CY 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 1.6
LV
LT
0.9
0.9
1.9
1.8
1.1
1.1
0.7
0.8
-1.0
-1.0
1.1
1.1
Over the whole projection period, potential GDP
LU
HU
1.5
1.5
0.7
1.8
0.5
1.1
0.3
0.7
0.8
-0.3
1.8
1.7
growth is slightly lower in the 2024 exercise
MT 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.5 2.1 compared with the 2021 one, mainly due to the
NL 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 1.3
AT 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 lower TFP convergence paths. There are, however,
PL
PT
1.3
1.0
2.0
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.5
-0.7
-0.4
1.5
1.2
some differences for the sub-periods.
RO 1.5 2.2 1.3 0.9 -0.7 1.7
SI 1.4 1.5 1.0 0.5 -0.1 1.6
SK 1.2 1.8 1.1 0.7 -0.5 1.4 In particular, under the baseline of the 2024 Ageing
Report, the annual average potential GDP growth
FI 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.2 1.1
SE 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.6
NO
EA
1.3
1.0
1.0
1.1
0.6
0.7
0.3
0.4
0.3
-0.1
1.5
1.2
rate over the period 2022-2070 in the EU and in the
EU 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.2 1.3 euro area is projected to be 1.3% and 1.2%, 0.1 pp
Source: European Commission, EPC. lower than in the 2021 Ageing Report (Table I.3.9).
For the EU and the euro area, the annual contribution from labour productivity growth during 2022-70 is
0.2 pps lower than in the 2021 projection exercise. Labour input growth (hours worked) is projected to be
0.1 pp higher than in the 2021 Ageing Report for both the EU and the euro area.
However, there is some variation across countries in Graph I.3.2: GDP potential growth rates 2022-2070 -
the differences between the 2024 and 2021 potential period average (%)
GDP growth projections under the baseline. The EU euro area

2.0
largest downward revisions in average annual 2021 Ageing Report 2024 Ageing Report
potential GDP growth rates are for Cyprus, Denmark,
and Greece (-0.3 pps) due to the contributions of both
avg annual growth rate (%)
1.5
labour productivity (for Denmark) and labour input
(for Cyprus and Greece) being lower than in the 2021
exercise. The largest upward revisions concern
1.0
Croatia and Ireland (+0.4 pps). Ireland benefits from
stronger labour productivity projections, while
Croatia benefits from a higher projected labour input
than in the 2021 Ageing Report. The latter is driven 0.5
by higher projected participation rates in the 2024

Ageing Report for Croatia.
0.0
2022-45 2046-70 2022-45 2046-70
The differences between the 2024 and 2021 potential
GDP growth projections under the baseline Source: European Commission, EPC.
materialise primarily in the second part of the
projections (2045-2070), particularly for the euro
69
European Commission
area (Graph I.3.2). For the EU, annual potential GDP growth over the period 2022-45 is now projected to
average 1.3% (the same as in the 2021 projection). Over the period 2046-70, average GDP growth is
projected in the 2024 Ageing Report at 1.2%, while it was projected in 2021 to be 1.4%. For the euro
area, annual potential GDP growth over the period 2022-45 is projected in the 2024 Ageing Report to
average 1.2% (close to the 2021 Ageing Report average). Over the period 2046-70, it is projected to be
1.2% (versus 1.4% in the 2021 Ageing Report).
Table I.3.9: 2024 and 2021 baseline projections compared (pps), 2022-2070
GDP per
GDP growth labour share of change in
capital labour total employment capita
in 2022- prod. (GDP TFP working-age average
deepening input population rate growth in
2070 per hour population hours worked
2022-2070
worked)
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
BG 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
CZ -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
DK -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3
DE -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
EE -0.2 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.4
IE 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5
EL -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
ES -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3
FR -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
HR 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4
IT 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
LV -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
LT 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2
LU -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5
HU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0
MT 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3
NL 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1
AT -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
PL 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
PT 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RO 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
SI 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
SK 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
FI -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
SE -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2
NO -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1
EA -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
EU -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
(1) Working age populations refers to the total population aged 15-74.
70
Part I
Box I.3.1: Assumptions on the components of the production function used for long-run
potential growth projections
In 2022-2032 potential growth estimates are based on the T+10 methodology described in Annex 3. The long-
run projection is based on a similar production function, with a number of convergence rules for labour produc-
tivity growth. Using common methodologies for all Member States allows for cross-country comparability.
1. KEY ASSUMPTIONS ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (TFP) Table 1: GDP per capita (2032)
GDP per capita
Concerning total factor productivity growth, the AWG and EPC decided to Table 1 (% of EU27)
lower the long-run TFP growth rate in comparison to the 2021 Ageing IE 355.1
Report, namely from 1% to 0.8%. This decision was taken considering the LU 298.5
trend decline in TFP growth over the last decades, especially in recent DK 171.0
SE 160.2
times. (1) As done in the previous projection exercise, countries with below
NL 140.3
average GDP per capita in 2032 are assumed to have higher TFP growth, FI 137.3
thus acknowledging the catching-up potential. To avoid undue changes in AT 136.9
relative GDP per capita terms, the catching up potential is evaluated in BE 127.1
2040. The labour share is assumed to stay constant at 0.65 over the DE 122.1
EA 107.9
projection period (see Annex 3 for details). In the long term, labour
FR 107.7
productivity broadly coincides with TFP growth divided by the labour EU27 100.0
share, i.e. 1.2%. Scenarios consider higher and lower TFP growth rate MT 98.0
targets. IT 93.3
CY 88.2
SI 84.3
Baseline
ES 79.0
PT 66.2
The baseline assumption for TFP is that country-specific growth rates EE 65.8
converge to 0.8%. The speed and the year of convergence to the common EL 63.1
growth rate are determined by Member States’ income position relative to LT 62.9
the EU average (see Table 1). Hence, the lower the GDP per capita, the CZ 61.3
higher the real catching-up potential. SK 59.3
LV 58.8
PL 56.5
The specific assumptions agreed for the baseline by the AWG and EPC are HU 54.8
as follows (see Table 2): HR 53.8
RO 44.6
BG 30.0
• The ‘leader group’ includes countries that have a GDP per capita above
the EU average in 2032. For these countries, TFP growth is assumed to Source: European Commission,
EPC.
converge from the estimated value in 2032 to a 1% growth rate by 2040,
and to 0.9% in 2048.
• The ‘follower group’ comprises the countries with GDP per capita below the EU average in 2032. A
differentiation is made depending on the distance to the average, with 1.5% as an upper limit and 1% as a
lower limit in 2040 and 1.5% and 0.9% in 2048.
• For both groups TFP growth converges from the 2048 value to 0.8% in 2070 by linear interpolation.
Higher and lower TFP growth scenarios
In the higher TFP growth scenario, the ‘leader’ group is projected to converge to a TFP growth of 1% by 2040
from their 2032 values and to stay at this value until 2070. For the ‘follower’ group there is again a
(1) See European Commission (2023), ‘Prospects for long-term productivity growth’ in Quarterly Report on the Euro Area,
European Economy, Institutional Paper No 201.
71
European Commission
Box (continued)
differentiation made depending on their distance to the EU average with 1.5% and 1% as upper and lower
limits until 2048, with TFP growth converging to 1% in 2070.
In the lower TFP growth scenario, the ‘leader’ group of countries is projected to converge to a TFP growth of
0.8% by 2040 from their 2032 values, to 0.7% in 2048, and to 0.6% in 2070. For the ‘follower’ group there is
again a differentiation made depending on their distance to the EU average with upper and lower limits of
1.3% and 0.8% until 2040, 1.3% and 0.7% until 2048, with TFP growth converging to 0.7% in 2070.
In the long term, labour productivity broadly coincides with TFP growth divided by the labour share, namely
1.5% for the higher TFP growth scenario and 0.9% for the lower TFP growth scenario.
Table 2: TFP growth: baseline assumptions on the speed of convergence

2033-2040
GDP/cap > EU27 (2032) GDP/cap < EU27 (2032)

BE, DK, DE, IE, FR, LU, NL, AT, FI, SE, NO BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK
From value in 2032 to
From value in 2032 to 1%,

by linear interpolation
with a maximum of 1.5%, by linear interpolation
2041-2048
GDP/cap > EU27 (2040) GDP/cap < EU27 (2040)

BE, DK, DE, IE, FR, LU, MT, NL, AT, FI, SE, NO BG, CZ, EE, EL, ES, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, HU, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK
From value in 2040 to
From value in 2040 to 0.9%, by linear

interpolation
with a maximum of 1.5%, by linear interpolation
2049-2070
All Member States
From value in 2048 to 0.8%, by linear interpolation
2. KEY ASSUMPTIONS ON CAPITAL FORMATION
With regard to capital deepening, the assumption is unchanged from previous updates, namely a constant
capital-to-labour ratio in efficiency units in the long term. It is assumed therefore that in the long run, the
capital stock adjusts to the steady state path according to the ‘capital rule’: the growth rate of capital is equal
to the sum of labour and labour-augmenting technical progress. This fulfils the steady state property, as the
ratio of capital to labour expressed in efficiency unit remains constant over time. Consequently, labour
productivity growth coincides with that of labour-augmenting technical progress. As done in the 2021 Ageing
report a transition between the investment rule and the capital rule is applied to smooth the investment profile:
• First, the transition to the constant capital/labour (in efficiency units) ratio is introduced gradually in the
period 2032-2042 in a linear manner (‘transition rule’).
• Second, the capital/labour (in efficiency units) ratio is constant as of 2042 (‘capital rule’).
The transition rule was introduced in the 2021 Ageing Report to avoid too pessimistic productivity projections
for many of the catching-up countries, which have comparatively higher investment rates, while making little
difference for countries that are already close to their long-run TFP growth rate.
72
4. INFLATION AND INTEREST RATE ASSUMPTIONS
This chapter describes the interest rates and inflation assumptions used in the 2024 Ageing Report.
Interest rate assumptions, described in Section 4.1, are particularly relevant for the purpose of projecting
pension fund assets. Section 4.2 presents the baseline inflation assumptions. A higher alternative inflation
scenario is also included in the 2024 Ageing Report (see Chapter 5).
4.1. INTEREST RATE ASSUMPTIONS AND USE FOR PENSION FUND PROJECTIONS
4.1.1. Interest rate assumptions
Since the 2021 Ageing Report, interest rate assumptions Table I.4.1: Long-term interest rate projections:
are set in line with financial markets’ country-specific baseline based on Commission 2023
spring forecast
expectations for the medium term, while using common
convergence values for the long term. Long-term market T+2 T+10 T+30
2024 2032 2052
interest rates are assumed to converge linearly from the
BE 3.5 3.8 4.0
country-specific forecast values (T+2) to country-specific BG 2.6 2.5 4.0
market-based forward nominal rates by T+10. ( 28) Beyond CZ 3.0 4.7 4.0
T+10, they are assumed to converge to a common value of DK -0.2 2.7 4.0
DE 2.0 2.6 4.0
2% in real terms by T+30, corresponding to 4% in nominal EE 6.4 3.3 4.0
terms for most EU Member States. ( 29) This value is set to IE 1.8 3.7 4.0
stay constant thereafter (see Table I.4.1). EL 2.5 4.5 4.0
ES 1.9 4.5 4.0
FR 1.6 3.7 4.0
Such interest rate assumptions have a double rationale. On HR 2.4 4.7 4.0
the one hand, the linear convergence principle allows IT 3.9 4.6 4.0
accounting for country-specific situations in the short run, CY 2.5 4.7 4.0
LV 7.1 3.6 4.0
while still maintaining the assumption of a common real
LT 3.7 2.9 4.0
interest rate in the long run. On the other hand, market- LU 2.2 3.3 4.0
based methods represent an evidence-based, simple, tried- HU 8.6 7.0 5.0
and-tested approach to project nominal interest rates. They MT 5.3 4.4 4.0
NL 1.8 2.8 4.0
notably allow capturing evolving macroeconomic AT 3.2 3.2 4.0
conditions, that have changed substantially over the past PL 3.8 6.4 4.5
few decades, as acknowledged in a vast amount of PT 10.7 4.1 4.0
literature. RO 2.8 9.1 4.5
SI 2.9 4.2 4.0
SK 3.0 4.1 4.0
Overall, under these assumptions, the interest-growth rate FI 7.8 3.2 4.0
differential (r-g) in the EU/EA would converge from SE 2.3 2.4 4.0
EA 2.6 3.5 4.0
current negative values to a positive gap of about 1 pp in
2070 (see Graph I.4.1). ( 30)
(28) Short-term interest rates are assumed to converge linearly from country-specific forecast values (T+2) to country-specific
market-based forward nominal rates by T+10. This approach is similar to that used in the Commission forecast. For more
details, see Chapter 3 and Box 3.1 in the Debt Sustainability Monitor 2019 (European Commission, 2020).
(29) 4.5% nominal for Poland and Romania, and 5% nominal for Hungary, given these countries’ central banks have higher inflation
targets.
(30) See for example Abbas et al. (2020) and Blanchard (2019).
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European Commission
Graph I.4.1: (r-g) based on long-term market interest rates - EU and euro area (%)
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
-8.0
-10.0
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
2051
2054
2057
2060
2063
2066
2069
EU EA
(r-g) series are based on historical and projected long-term nominal market interest rates and the growth rate of nominal
GDP in national currency, between 2001 and 2070.
4.1.2. Pension fund projections
Assumptions regarding the development of long-term interest rates over the projection period influence
the projections of pension funds’ asset position and the related flows (e.g. property income or rate of
return). In the 2024 Ageing Report, the reporting on pension fund assets and returns has become
mandatory, when public funds exist and are sizeable. ( 31)
Considering the rising importance of pre-funded or partially funded public pension schemes across
Member States and the central role they already fulfil in a number of them, it is important to ensure
consistent and comparable projections (i.e. based on common assumptions) of the asset position of these
schemes and the related flows. These projections are central for the assessment of public pension schemes
and their sustainability, especially for Member States where these funds play a significant role. ( 32)
The pension funds’ rate of return assumption for the 2024 Ageing Report is unchanged compared with
previous reports. They are determined by the long-term interest rate assumptions as described in Section
4.1.1. Returns generated by the (public) pension assets are generally reinvested in the funds and need to
be considered in the projections.
Table I.4.2: Selected macroeconomic assumptions for the 2024 Ageing Report
C
o Long-term market interest rate Inflation target Potential GDP growth
l
Linear convergence to:

2% for all MS as of
- country-specific forward market rates in T+10 (2032) 1.1% (EU average real GDP
2027, except PL, RO
- 2% real by T+30 (2052); 4% nominal in all MS except PL, RO (4.5%) and HU (5%) growth in 2070)(1)
(2.5%) and HU (3%)
- maintained for the remainder of the projection period
(1) Growth rates are country-specific. See Chapter 3.

(31) The reporting for private pension funds remains voluntary.

(32) This is the case for Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden.
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Part I
4.2. INFLATION ASSUMPTIONS
The inflation assumptions for the 2024 Ageing Report are unchanged from previous updates. After the
end of the Commission 2023 spring forecast in T+2 (2024), inflation is assumed to converge linearly to
the inflation targets of the central banks by T+5 (2027). This target is 2% for euro area countries,
Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark and Sweden, 2.5% for Poland and Romania, and 3% for Hungary.
Despite a severe adverse supply shock, inflation expectations have only slightly increased above the
ECB’s monetary policy target of 2% in 2023. Moreover, some studies show that, when adjusted for the
risk premium, inflation expectations remain overall well-anchored to the ECB’s 2% target, as also shown
by survey-based measures. ( 33)
Table I.4.3: Inflation projections: baseline based Graph I.4.2: Evolution of market-based inflation
on Commission 2023 spring forecast projections (past inflation expectations) vs
outturn CPI inflation and ECB target, euro
T+2 T+5 area
2024 2027
9.0
BE 3.5 2.0
BG 4.2 2.0 8.0
CZ 3.4 2.0 7.0
DK 2.5 2.0
6.0
DE 2.7 2.0
5.0
EE 2.8 2.0
IE 2.6 2.0 4.0
EL 2.4 2.0 3.0
ES 2.7 2.0
2.0
FR 2.5 2.0
1.0
HR 2.2 2.0
IT 2.9 2.0 0.0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
CY 2.5 2.0
LV 1.7 2.0
EA inflation projections based on 10Y10Y swaps
LT 2.2 2.0 ECB inflation target
LU 2.6 2.0 Inflation
HU 4.0 3.0
The graph shows (i) (dark blue line) inflation projections
MT 2.8 2.0 given by market-based inflation expectations 10 years
NL 3.3 2.0 before (i.e. projections based on the average inflation
AT 3.8 2.0 markets expected at that point over the window between
PL 6.0 2.5 10 and 20 years ahead); (ii) (light blue line) outturn CPI
inflation and (iii) (yellow line) the ECB’s inflation target.
PT 2.7 2.0 Source: Bloomberg, Ameco spring 2023 and European
RO 4.6 2.5 Commission calculations.
SI 3.8 2.0
SK 5.7 2.0
FI 2.1 2.0
SE 1.9 2.0
EA 2.8 2.0
(33) See ECB (2023). At the same time, for some countries where inflation is currently well above the ECB target and given some
structural trends (e.g. population ageing, climate change, deglobalisation), a convergence to the target in three years’ time may
be relatively fast. The 2024 Ageing Report includes a (higher) inflation scenario to cater for uncertainties related to (long-term)
inflationary pressures and for cross-country differences (see Chapter 5).
75
5. SENSITIVITY TESTS AND ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
5.1. INTRODUCTION
The baseline projections attempt to measure how population ageing influences economic and
budgetary developments in the long term. However, given the inherent uncertainty surrounding long-
run projections, it is essential to conduct sensitivity tests to evaluate the responsiveness of the
projections to changes in the macroeconomic and demographic assumptions.
The sensitivity tests introduce a change to a specific variable. For each test, a uniform shock is applied to
all Member States. The assessment of the impact of population ageing on the different expenditure items
should be made with reference to all projections, meaning baseline plus sensitivity tests. This way the key
factors driving the projection results and potential risks to the baseline can be identified. The sensitivity
tests include both unfavourable and favourable changes in the underlying assumptions.
In addition, specific policy scenarios are considered for each expenditure item to reflect the impact of
potential future policy changes. These scenarios reflect the impact of deviating from the constant policy
assumption applied in the baseline. Rather than attaching probabilities that the assumed policy is
effectively implemented, the policy scenarios provide a ‘what-if’ view to enrich the analysis. The next
section provides the policy scenarios for the pension projections. The specific scenarios conducted for
health care, long-term care and education are presented in the respective chapters in Part II.
5.2. PROJECTIONS UNDER DIFFERENT SENSITIVITY TESTS AND ALTERNATIVE POLICY SCENARIOS
The macroeconomic projections for the different sensitivity tests are provided in Tables I.5.2 to I.5.11.
The assumptions are described in the following section and summarised in Table I.5.1.
Table I.5.1: Overview of the common sensitivity tests and policy scenarios for pensions
Demography Inflation Labour force Productivity Pension policy scenarios
Higher life Lower/higher Higher employment Lower/higher TFP Link retirement age to Constant Constant
Lower fertility Higher inflation
expectancy migration rate older workers growth life expectancy retirement age benefit ratio
When the benefit ratio

The early and
Additional gain 33% less/more 20% lower Employment rate of declines by 10%
TFP growth Effective retirement age statutory retirement
in life non-EU fertility rate Converge to 2% older workers (55-74y) relative to the base
converges to shifts in line with 3/4 th ages, as well as
expectancy at immigration over over the entire by T+30 (T+5 in 10 pps higher than year, measures are
0.6%/1.0% of the expected change career require-ments,
birth of two the entire projection baseline). assumed in the baseline taken to stabilise the
(instead of 0.8%). in life expectancy. are frozen at the
years by 2070. projection period. period. projection. benefit ratio from that
situation in 2023.
point onwards.
Following the procedure for the baseline assumptions, a bottom-up approach is followed: from population
through labour input to GDP growth projections. Each sensitivity test therefore involves recalculating all
assumptions and rerunning the labour force model and the production function.
The selection of sensitivity tests draws on the previous cycles. In general, the standard tests applied in the
2021 Ageing Report were appropriate for conducting a broad sensitivity analysis of the baseline
expenditure dynamics. Changes are therefore limited. They concern the design of the migration scenarios,
the introduction of a higher inflation scenario, and changes in the name of some of the tests and scenarios.
76
Part I
Sensitivity tests ( 34)

The following sensitivity tests are conducted for all Member States:
− Higher life expectancy: the age-specific mortality rates are reduced linearly to achieve an additional
increase in life expectancy at birth of two years by 2070 compared to the baseline.
− Lower/higher migration: immigration is, respectively, 33% lower and 33% higher than the baseline
over the entire projection period. Whereas in previous rounds the shocks were applied to overall net
migration, for the 2024 update the shocks are applied to the non-EU immigration flows. Since some
countries have negative net migration in the baseline because of intra-EU emigration, the modified
approach increases comparability of the scenario across countries.
− Lower fertility: the fertility rate is 20% lower than the baseline during the entire projection period.
− Higher inflation: inflation rates converge more slowly to central banks’ targets, given the high
increases in consumer prices of recent years. While in the baseline these targets are reached by 2027
for all Member States (see Chapter 4), the sensitivity test assumes inflation to converge linearly from
current country-specific values to market-based inflation rates by 2032. Thereafter, inflation rates
would converge by 2052 to the central bank targets: 2% for euro area countries, Bulgaria, Czechia,
Denmark and Sweden, 2.5% for Poland and Romania, and 3% for Hungary.
− Higher employment rate of older workers: through a reduction in the inactive population, the
employment rate of older workers (55 to 74) is increased by 10 pps over the period 2024-2036 and
remain at this higher level for the remainder of the projection period.
− Lower/higher productivity growth: total factor productivity growth (TFP) converges to a steady-state
growth rate of 0.6%/1.0%, compared to a baseline assumption of 0.8%. The convergence speed
follows the same principles and time points as under the baseline, with a period of fast convergence
for ‘followers’ (see Box I.3.1 in Chapter 3). The lower TFP test was called ‘TFP risk’ in the 2021
Ageing Report.
Policy scenarios
In addition to the above sensitivity tests, three policy scenarios are formulated for the pension projections:
− Linking retirement age to life expectancy: This scenario considers the adoption of a mechanism to
automatically update the statutory and early retirement ages in line with gains in life expectancy at the
age of 65 according to the EUROPOP2023 projections. As a result, effective retirement ages rise
gradually. To this end, the labour market exit ages as estimated by the Cohort Simulation Model are
adjusted. To account for the fact that people might have a higher risk of becoming (partially) disabled
at higher ages or would use alternative pathways to leave the labour force and retire, the applied
increase in retirement ages equals ¾th of the increase in life expectancy. For those countries where a
full link between the retirement age and the increase in life expectancy is already legislated — and
thus included in the baseline — this scenario is not run and the macroeconomic assumptions coincide
with the baseline. This is the case for Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Finland.
(34) The four demographic sensitivity tests are based on demographic projections prepared by Eurostat around the baseline
demographic projections (EUROPOP2023) discussed in Chapter 1.
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European Commission
− Constant retirement age: this scenario assumes that the main eligibility requirements (early and
statutory retirement age, career requirements) are unchanged over the projection period from current
conditions. It allows to isolate the expected impact of already legislated but not yet applicable
reforms, e.g. links to life expectancy. In this sense, the scenario also measures the budgetary impact of
reversing already planned reforms once their implementation date approaches.
− Constant benefit ratio: this scenario assumes policy measures are taken once the earnings-related
public pension benefit ratio decreases by more than 10% relative to the base year according to the
baseline projection. In this scenario the benefit ratio is kept constant at this 10% lower point for the
remainder of the projection period. For countries that report private schemes, the change in the total
benefit ratio provides the benchmark, though the adjustment to keep the latter at 90% of the base year
level is done through the public benefit ratio. This scenario was called ‘offset declining pension
benefit ratio’ in the 2021 Ageing Report. ( 35)
Table I.5.2: Sensitivity test: higher life expectancy

Average real GDP growth in 2022-2070
Labour productivity Real GDP
Labour input
(GDP per hour worked) per capita
change in growth in
share of
capital total employment average 2022-2070
TFP working-age
deepening population rate hours
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 BE
BG 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.9 BG
CZ 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CZ
DK 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DK
DE 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 DE
EE 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6 EE
IE 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.7 IE
EL 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 0.0 1.7 EL
ES 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.2 ES
FR 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 FR
HR 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 HR
IT 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.0 1.4 IT
CY 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.4 CY
LV 1.1 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.9 LV
LT 1.1 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 LT
LU 1.7 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 LU
HU 1.7 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.8 HU
MT 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.2 MT
NL 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 AT
PL 1.5 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.0 1.8 PL
PT 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 PT
RO 1.7 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 2.1 RO
SI 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SI
SK 1.5 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.4 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 FI
SE 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 SE
NO 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 NO
EA 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 EA
EU 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EU
(35) Since this scenario is activated in function of the baseline projections, no separate macroeconomic assumptions are prepared.
78
Part I
Table I.5.3: Sensitivity test: lower migration

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 BE
BG 1.3 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.9 -0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.0 2.0 BG
CZ 1.4 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CZ
DK 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DK
DE 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 DE
EE 1.5 1.7 1.0 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6 EE
IE 1.9 1.9 1.4 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7 IE
EL 0.8 1.6 1.1 0.6 -0.8 -0.8 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.6 EL
ES 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.2 ES
FR 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 FR
HR 1.3 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.6 -0.7 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 HR
IT 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.3 IT
CY 1.3 1.5 0.9 0.7 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.4 CY
LV 0.9 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.2 -1.0 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.9 LV
LT 0.9 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 LT
LU 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 LU
HU 1.6 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.9 HU
MT 1.8 1.6 1.0 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.2 MT
NL 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 AT
PL 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.8 PL
PT 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 PT
RO 1.6 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.9 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0 2.2 RO
SI 1.3 1.8 1.2 0.6 -0.4 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SI
SK 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 FI
SE 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 SE
NO 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 NO
EA 1.0 1.3 0.9 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 EA
EU 1.1 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EU
Table I.5.4: Sensitivity test: higher migration

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 BE
BG 1.5 2.1 1.4 0.8 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 -0.3 0.0 2.0 BG
CZ 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CZ
DK 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 DK
DE 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1 DE
EE 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6 EE
IE 2.3 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7 IE
EL 1.2 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 EL
ES 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 ES
FR 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.1 FR
HR 1.6 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 HR
IT 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.4 IT
CY 1.9 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 CY
LV 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.9 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.9 LV
LT 1.3 2.0 1.2 0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.8 LT
LU 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 LU
HU 1.9 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.2 0.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.9 HU
MT 2.4 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.9 1.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 1.2 MT
NL 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.1 AT
PL 1.6 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.8 PL
PT 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.5 PT
RO 1.8 2.4 1.4 0.9 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.2 RO
SI 1.8 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 SI
SK 1.5 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 FI
SE 1.8 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 SE
NO 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 NO
EA 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EA
EU 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EU
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European Commission
Table I.5.5: Sensitivity test: lower fertility

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 BE
BG 1.2 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.9 -0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.0 2.0 BG
CZ 1.3 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.6 CZ
DK 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.3 DK
DE 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1 DE
EE 1.4 1.6 1.0 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 EE
IE 1.9 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7 IE
EL 0.9 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.7 -0.8 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.7 EL
ES 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 ES
FR 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.1 FR
HR 1.3 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.6 -0.7 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 HR
IT 1.0 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.4 IT
CY 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 CY
LV 0.9 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.2 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.9 LV
LT 0.9 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.1 -0.8 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.8 LT
LU 1.6 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 LU
HU 1.6 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.9 HU
MT 2.0 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 1.2 MT
NL 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 AT
PL 1.3 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.8 PL
PT 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.5 PT
RO 1.5 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.9 -0.7 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.2 RO
SI 1.4 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 SI
SK 1.3 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 FI
SE 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 SE
NO 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 NO
EA 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EA
EU 1.1 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EU
Table I.5.6: Sensitivity test: higher inflation

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 BE
BG 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 2.0 BG
CZ 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CZ
DK 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DK
DE 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 DE
EE 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6 EE
IE 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7 IE
EL 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.7 EL
ES 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 ES
FR 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.1 FR
HR 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 HR
IT 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.3 IT
CY 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 CY
LV 1.1 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.9 LV
LT 1.1 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 LT
LU 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 LU
HU 1.7 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.9 HU
MT 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.2 MT
NL 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 AT
PL 1.5 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.8 PL
PT 1.2 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 PT
RO 1.7 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.2 RO
SI 1.6 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 SI
SK 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 FI
SE 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 SE
NO 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 NO
EA 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 EA
EU 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EU
80
Part I
Table I.5.7: Sensitivity test: higher employment rate of older workers

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.2 BE
BG 1.5 2.1 1.4 0.8 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.0 2.0 BG
CZ 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.6 CZ
DK 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 DK
DE 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DE
EE 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 EE
IE 2.2 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.8 IE
EL 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.4 -0.3 0.0 1.7 EL
ES 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 ES
FR 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.1 FR
HR 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.6 -0.3 -0.6 0.4 -0.2 0.0 2.1 HR
IT 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 0.0 1.4 IT
CY 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CY
LV 1.1 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.9 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 2.0 LV
LT 1.1 2.0 1.2 0.8 -0.9 -0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.8 LT
LU 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 LU
HU 1.8 2.0 1.3 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.1 1.9 HU
MT 2.2 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 MT
NL 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 AT
PL 1.6 2.1 1.4 0.8 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.9 PL
PT 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.3 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.6 PT
RO 1.7 2.4 1.4 0.9 -0.6 -0.5 0.1 -0.2 0.0 2.2 RO
SI 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 SI
SK 1.5 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.4 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 FI
SE 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.3 SE
NO 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.2 NO
EA 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EA
EU 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EU
Table I.5.8: Sensitivity test: lower productivity growth

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.9 BE
BG 1.2 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 BG
CZ 1.3 1.5 0.9 0.6 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.3 CZ
DK 1.1 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.0 DK
DE 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.9 DE
EE 1.4 1.4 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EE
IE 1.9 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.5 IE
EL 0.8 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.5 EL
ES 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.0 ES
FR 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.8 FR
HR 1.3 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 HR
IT 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.1 IT
CY 1.4 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 CY
LV 0.9 1.9 1.1 0.7 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.7 LV
LT 0.9 1.8 1.1 0.8 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 LT
LU 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.7 LU
HU 1.5 1.8 1.1 0.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.7 HU
MT 1.9 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.0 MT
NL 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 NL
AT 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 AT
PL 1.3 2.0 1.2 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.6 PL
PT 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.3 PT
RO 1.5 2.2 1.3 0.9 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.0 RO
SI 1.4 1.5 1.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.5 SI
SK 1.2 1.8 1.1 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 SK
FI 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.0 FI
SE 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.0 SE
NO 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.9 NO
EA 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.0 EA
EU 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 EU
81
European Commission
Table I.5.9: Sensitivity test: higher productivity growth

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 BE
BG 1.5 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.5 0.1 -0.3 0.0 2.0 BG
CZ 1.6 1.8 1.1 0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.6 CZ
DK 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 DK
DE 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DE
EE 1.7 1.7 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.7 EE
IE 2.2 1.9 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.8 IE
EL 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.6 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.8 EL
ES 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 ES
FR 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 FR
HR 1.5 2.0 1.3 0.7 -0.4 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.1 HR
IT 1.2 1.3 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.5 IT
CY 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CY
LV 1.2 2.2 1.3 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 2.0 LV
LT 1.2 2.2 1.3 0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.8 LT
LU 1.9 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.0 LU
HU 1.8 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 2.0 HU
MT 2.2 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 MT
NL 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 NL
AT 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.3 AT
PL 1.6 2.3 1.4 0.9 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.9 PL
PT 1.3 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.6 PT
RO 1.7 2.5 1.5 1.0 -0.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.2 RO
SI 1.7 1.8 1.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.8 SI
SK 1.5 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.8 SK
FI 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 FI
SE 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.3 SE
NO 1.6 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.3 NO
EA 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EA
EU 1.4 1.5 1.0 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EU
Table I.5.10: Policy scenario: link to life expectancy

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.2 BE
BG 1.6 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.6 -0.5 0.2 -0.3 0.0 2.1 BG
CZ 1.6 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.7 CZ
DK 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DK
DE 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 DE
EE 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.6 EE
IE 2.2 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.8 IE
EL 1.1 1.6 1.1 0.5 -0.6 -0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.0 1.7 EL
ES 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 ES
FR 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.1 FR
HR 1.6 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.3 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 0.0 2.2 HR
IT 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.3 IT
CY 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 CY
LV 1.2 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.9 -0.8 0.2 -0.2 0.0 2.1 LV
LT 1.3 2.0 1.2 0.8 -0.8 -0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.9 LT
LU 1.9 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.0 LU
HU 1.9 2.0 1.3 0.8 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 2.0 HU
MT 2.3 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 MT
NL 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.2 NL
AT 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.2 AT
PL 1.7 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.3 0.0 2.0 PL
PT 1.3 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.4 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.6 PT
RO 1.9 2.4 1.4 0.9 -0.5 -0.5 0.2 -0.2 0.0 2.4 RO
SI 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.8 SI
SK 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 SK
FI 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 FI
SE 1.7 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.2 SE
NO 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.2 NO
EA 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EA
EU 1.3 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EU
82
Part I
Table I.5.11: Policy scenario: constant retirement age

Labour input
change in growth in
share of
TFP working-age
population
worked
1=2+5 2=3+4 3 4 5=6+7+8+9 6 7 8 9 10=1-6
BE 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1 BE
BG 1.4 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.9 BG
CZ 1.5 1.7 1.1 0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.5 CZ
DK 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 DK
DE 1.1 1.3 0.8 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 DE
EE 1.4 1.7 1.0 0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.4 EE
IE 2.1 1.8 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.7 IE
EL 0.9 1.6 1.1 0.6 -0.7 -0.6 0.2 -0.3 0.0 1.5 EL
ES 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 ES
FR 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.0 FR
HR 1.4 1.9 1.2 0.7 -0.5 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 0.0 2.0 HR
IT 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 IT
CY 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.3 CY
LV 1.1 2.1 1.3 0.8 -1.0 -0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.9 LV
LT 1.0 2.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.7 LT
LU 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.9 LU
HU 1.7 2.1 1.3 0.8 -0.4 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1 1.8 HU
MT 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.9 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.2 MT
NL 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 NL
AT 1.2 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.1 AT
PL 1.5 2.2 1.4 0.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.8 PL
PT 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 1.4 PT
RO 1.6 2.4 1.4 1.0 -0.8 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 2.1 RO
SI 1.5 1.8 1.2 0.6 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.0 1.6 SI
SK 1.3 2.0 1.2 0.7 -0.7 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 1.5 SK
FI 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.5 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.1 FI
SE 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.1 SE
NO 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.1 NO
EA 1.1 1.3 0.9 0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.2 EA
EU 1.2 1.4 0.9 0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 1.3 EU
83
Part II
Age-related expenditure items: coverage,
projection methodologies and data sources
1. PENSIONS
1.1. MAIN FEATURES OF THE PENSION PROJECTIONS
Despite the varying set-up of national health care, long-term care and education systems across Member
States, the European Commission and the AWG have successfully developed common models to project
spending on these items. However, for pensions a different approach is taken since the diversity in public
pension systems is difficult to capture within a single framework. As a result, Member States use their
own national models to prepare pension expenditure projections, incorporating the demographic and
macroeconomic assumptions described in Part I of this report.
On the one hand, this decentralised approach enables the integration of the specific institutional features
and legal settings of each country’s pension system to the best extent possible. ( 36) On the other hand,
using distinct models may reduce the comparability of the results, despite relying on common
methodologies and assumptions.
To ensure both high quality and comparability of the projections across countries, an extensive peer
review is conducted by the AWG members and the Commission. This process intends to: (i) verify
whether the Member States apply the agreed methodologies and the underlying demographic and
macroeconomic assumptions; and (ii) examine how Member States interpret the existing pension
legislation. If deemed necessary, the AWG can ask the Member State to revise the projections.
1.2. COVERAGE OF THE PENSION PROJECTIONS
The focus of the pension projection exercise is government expenditure on public pension schemes, with
variables for private schemes (occupational, individual mandatory or individual non-mandatory) reported
on a voluntary basis. Annex 5 provides a comprehensive description of the pension schemes covered in
the projections.
Reporting is structured around the following items: gross pension expenditure by scheme and age; taxes
paid on pension benefits; benefit ratios and gross average replacement rates; the number of
pensions/pensioners by scheme, age and sex; contributions paid and the number of contributors;
indexation coefficients; the breakdown of new pension expenditure; and possible assets and reserves of
the public scheme.
Furthermore, Member States report administrative data for recent years on the number of new pensioners
by sex and public scheme. Additionally, Member States can provide, on a voluntary basis, details on
special pension schemes. These are preferential schemes that deviate from the standard regime in terms of
eligibility criteria, benefit amount, or state funding. Such schemes should be included in the overall
projections, which are exhaustive for public pension expenditure. The scope and nature of special
schemes are discussed in the country fiche accompanying the updated projections. Detailed descriptions
of special schemes are provided in the online PENSREF database.
(36) For a complete description of pension schemes in the EU Member States, please consult the PENSREF database.
86
Part II
Age-related expenditure items: coverage, projection methodologies and data sources
1.3. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES
1.3.1. Reporting norms and input data
Member States provide annual projections up to 2070, with base year 2022, and report historical data for
the period 2000-2021. All expenditure figures are measured in current prices.
The GDP projections for each country over the period 2022-2070 are produced by the Commission by
means of a production function and the agreed assumptions (see Part I, Chapter 3).
Average wages are calculated as the ratio of total gross wages from national account data and employed
people (employees and self-employed) aged 15-74. The change in the gross wage total is projected for
each country in accordance with labour productivity growth and changes in the number of hours
worked. ( 37)
Figures on the economy-wide average wage at retirement must be reported by the Member States. The
assumptions underlying the projections for this variable are peer reviewed and detailed in the country
fiche.
Member States should report historical data back to 2000 and discuss recent expenditure changes in the
country fiche. This should clarify the reasons behind: (i) notable changes in pension spending; (ii) overall
trends in pension spending in the recent past; and (iii) the possible implications of these changes and
trends for the projections.
The pension projections include the impact of the most recent pension reforms that will have entered
legislation by the cut-off date of the projections, i.e. 1 December 2023. To this end, in their country fiches
Member States provide detailed descriptions of the projections, including: (i) recently introduced reforms;
(ii) the implementation of these reforms; and (iii) how these reforms affect the projection results.
1.3.2. Variables: definitions and clarifications
Pension expenditure
Pension expenditure includes pensions and equivalent cash benefits granted for a long period (over 1
year) for old age, early retirement, disability, survivors (widows and orphans), and other specific purposes
that should be considered as equivalents or substitutes for the above-mentioned types of pensions, i.e.
pensions or pension-type benefits granted because of reduced work capacity or because of labour market
conditions.
Pension expenditure is projected according to the current legislation in force. Pensions are defined in a
broad sense: (i) earnings-related pensions; (ii) flat-rate pensions or basic pensions; (iii) means-tested
benefits that aim at providing a social minimum pension; and (iv) supplements that are a part of the
pension benefit and that are granted for an indefinite period on the basis of fulfilling certain criteria but
which are not directly linked to the remuneration of costs (e.g. supplements to support the purchase of
home or healthcare services are not included). Pensions and benefits can be paid out from specific
schemes or directly from government budgets. Social assistance is included if it is equivalent to a
minimum pension, thus representing a non-earnings-related minimum pension. Housing subsidies are
excluded and considered as other means-tested social transfers. To ensure the consistency of the
(37) In line with the assumption of a constant labour share. Gross wages include social security contributions paid by employers.
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projections with the underlying assumptions, the reporting of pension expenditure should include
pensions paid overseas.
Short-term disability benefits should be considered as sickness benefits, while prolonged unemployment
benefits to older workers should be considered as unemployment benefits.
Pensions do not include social security contributions paid by pension schemes on behalf of their
pensioners to other social protection schemes, notably to health schemes.
Pension expenditure by age

Many countries have introduced pension reforms that will increase the retirement age. To better
understand the impact of these reforms, Member States report public pension spending disaggregated by
age group: -54, 55-59, 60-64, 65-69, 70-74 and 75+. This breakdown increases transparency and
consistency between the projections for population, labour force and number of pensioners.
New pension expenditure

To monitor reforms and increase transparency, Member States provide annual projections for spending on
new pensions for each of the pension schemes: (i) old-age and early pensions (earnings-related, flat
component or basic pensions, and minimum pensions); (ii) disability pensions; (iii) survivor pensions;
and (iv) other pensions (see descriptions below).
Net pension expenditure

Net pension expenditure corresponds to gross pension expenditure minus taxes on pensions and
compulsory social security contributions paid by beneficiaries from gross public pension expenditure. In
countries where pensions are treated as non-taxable income, gross pensions equal net pensions. In
general, taxes are projected in a way that tax revenues as a share of pension expenditure, the implicit
average tax rate, stay constant over time.
Table II.1.1: Typology of pension schemes in the Ageing Report
PUBLIC PENSIONS PRIVATE PENSIONS
Old-age and early pensions Occupational schemes

- Basic and flat-rate pensions Individual mandatory schemes
- Earnings-related pensions
Individual voluntary schemes
- Minimum pensions (non-contributory)
Disability pensions
Survivor pensions
Other pension benefits
Public pensions
Public schemes and other public pensions are statutory schemes that are provided by the general
government sector to insure against old age and other age-related risks. Typically it concerns social
security schemes that cover the entire community, or large sections of the community, and are imposed,
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controlled and financed by government units. Government employee schemes sometimes exist outside of
the social security system. ( 38)
The projections aim at covering those pension schemes that affect public finances, in other words
schemes that are considered to belong to the general government sector in the national accounts system.
Usually, there is a specific or general social security contribution to the scheme, which is defined as part
of total taxes in the national accounting system. However, the scheme can also be financed, either
partially or fully, through general taxation. Thus, ultimately, the government bears the financial cost and
risk attached to the scheme. The pensions provided by the social security schemes can be either earnings-
related, flat rate or means-tested. In addition, public pensions include pension benefits that are paid
directly by the government budget or by another public sector entity. Cash benefits equivalent to
pensions, notably social assistance benefitting mainly older, retired people should be included as well.
On the boundaries between public and occupational pensions – and the identification of pension schemes
within these categories – see Annex 4.
Public pensions are split into four different categories: (i) old-age and early pensions; (ii) disability
pensions; (iii) survivor pensions; and (iv) other types of pensions.
Old-age and early pensions

Old-age and early pensions include both earnings-related and non-earnings-related pensions. Earnings-
related pensions reflect all those pensions for which entitlements depend on earnings or contributions to
the scheme. Non-earnings-related pensions are often social-assistance benefits financed by taxes that
nevertheless match the definition of pension expenditure.
Three sub-categories of old-age and early pensions are considered: basic pensions, earnings-related
pensions, and non-contributory minimum pensions.
− Basic pensions (flat component) are projected separately from other earnings-related public pensions
for the countries with a flat pension component. This concerns pensions benefits in flat amounts
allocated to beneficiaries meeting certain requirements, for instance a minimum number of
contributory years or residence.
− Earnings-related benefits other than basic pensions concern all pensions for which entitlements
depend on personal earnings or contributions to the old-age pension scheme. Old-age and early
pensions are considered as a single category given that in many countries no proper distinction
between the two can be made, either because the early retirement is built-in in the old-age pension
system, or because the standard retirement age varies in function of gender and will increase or
become more flexible with time. Early pensions include – in addition to genuine (actuarial) early
retirement schemes – other early retirement schemes that are not disability pensions and are granted,
primarily based on reduced work capacity or labour market reasons, to a specific (age or work) group
at an age below the statutory retirement age. This category also includes minimum pensions that are
contributory based.
− Non-contributory minimum pensions and minimum income guarantees are projected separately.
This category includes all pension expenditure for which entitlement does not depend on contribution
requirements, e.g. means-tested minimum pensions. In line with the general definition of pension
expenditure, through this variable the projections include social assistance equivalent to a minimum
pension and targeted to older or retired people. If a non-contributory benefit is granted because of
disability or other reasons, this benefit is projected under ‘Disability pensions’ or ‘Other pensions’.
(38) See Eurostat (2020), Technical compilation guide for pension data in national accounts – 2020 edition.
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Disability pensions
Expenditure related to disability does not distinguish between earnings- and non-earnings-related disabi-
lity pensions. Some countries consider disability benefits as part of their sickness insurance scheme while
in others they belong to the pension scheme. ( 39) While in some countries the pension classification
remains unchanged between the time it is first granted and the moment payments cease, early disability
pensions are generally transformed into old-age pension benefits upon reaching the statutory retirement
age.
Care allowances (benefits paid to disabled people who need frequent or constant assistance to help them
meet the extra costs of attendance) and integration support for people with disabilities (allowances paid
when having work adapted to their condition, e.g. a sheltered workshop, or when they follow a vocational
training) are not considered to be disability pensions.
The country fiche should provide a detailed description of the assumptions underlying the projection of
disability pension expenditure, e.g. assumed developments in disability rates.
Survivor pensions
Survivor pensions, without any age limit, are covered by the projections. Such benefits include both
earnings-related pensions and flat-rate or similar means-tested minimum pensions. The country fiche
should provide a detailed description of the assumptions behind the projection of survivor pension
expenditure, e.g. household composition, joint probability to survive.
Other pensions
All public earnings or non-earnings-related pensions not fitting in the three above categories should be
covered under ‘Other pensions’. Examples could be bonus pensions or pension-like benefits included in
the Ageing Report projection exercise.
Private pensions
Private pension schemes are covered on a voluntary basis in the projections. Distinction is made between
three types: (i) occupational private pensions; (ii) mandatory individual pensions; and (iii) voluntary
individual pensions. Annexes 4 and 5 provide an overview of the extent to which such schemes exist in
the Member States and whether the projections include them.
Occupational private pensions

Pensions provided by private occupational schemes are those that, rather than being statutory by law, are
linked to an employment relationship with the scheme provider. They are based on contractual
agreements between employers and employees, either at the company or sector/industry level. Private
pension funds, insurance companies or the sponsoring companies themselves run the schemes.
These schemes can be (quasi) mandatory in the sense that, based on a nation- or industry-wide bargaining
agreement, employers are obliged to provide their employees with an occupational pension scheme.
Participation of an individual can also remain voluntary. Private occupational schemes can be equivalent
to statutory earnings-related pension schemes or complementary to them. Of particular importance are the
occupational schemes that play a role equivalent to social security schemes in the overall pension
provision. The AWG agreed that the real rate of return on private funded pensions should reflect the real
long-term interest rate assumptions (see Part I, Chapter 4).
(39) In general, disability pensions as defined above should be covered by the pension projections, even though some countries
consider them as part of their sickness insurance scheme.
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Private individual pensions

In this case, access to the scheme does not require an employment relationship, even though in some
cases the contribution is based on the wage. Insured persons have the ownership of pension assets so that
they both enjoy the rewards and bear the risks associated to the assets’ valuation. The insurance contract
specifies a contribution schedule in exchange for which benefits will be paid when the member reaches a
specific age. The scheme provider administers the scheme by managing the pension assets through a
separate account on behalf of its members.
Private individual pension schemes are mostly non-mandatory, though some countries have also
mandatory schemes (see Annex 4).
Mandatory private individual pensions

Mandatory private pension schemes are similar to public schemes in that they are compulsory.
Transactions occur between the individual and the insurance provider. Transactions are not recorded as
government revenues or government expenditure and, therefore, do not have an impact on the
government balance. This category of private benefits mostly concerns pensions that were formerly part
of the social security scheme but that have been switched to funded private schemes.
In some cases, there are government guarantees to these pension schemes. Nevertheless, such a guarantee
is a contingent liability by nature, and these liabilities are not considered as economic transactions until
they materialise. Thus, a government guarantee is not an adequate condition to classify such schemes as
social security schemes.
Non-mandatory individual private pensions

Non-mandatory private pensions are based on individual insurance contracts between the individual and
the private pension scheme provider, usually an insurance company or a pension fund. They include
schemes for which membership is not required by law and is independent of any employment link (even
if members are mostly employed people). However, in some cases employers or the State may contribute
to the plan. Such schemes may also be joined through membership of an association.
The main difficulty in analysing individual saving provisions stems from the fact that it is difficult to
distinguish among different types of savings those that are clearly for retirement purposes. Part of the
savings that are not specifically labelled as pension savings may be used for retirement purposes, whereas
part of the savings in retirement schemes may in practice not be converted into a periodic retirement
income, e.g. one-off lump-sum benefits or early withdrawal possibilities. The extent to which these
schemes are effectively retirement savings depends on the attached conditions. For example, the
conditions could include: (i) tax incentives linked to the condition that savings must be converted into a
rent rather than paid out as a lump sum; or (ii) the minimum age at which people can access their savings.
In some cases, pension instruments are used as investment vehicles with noticeable tax advantages, for
instance when a number of years of participation in the plan are required to benefit from a lower tax rate.
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1.3.3. Benefit ratio and replacement rate at retirement
The benefit ratio and the replacement rate help interpret changes in average pension benefits.
Benefit ratio
The benefit ratio is the average pension benefit over the average wage. Changes in the ratio help
understand the projection results since they reflect the legal features of the pension framework. If private
pensions are reported, also a total benefit ratio is available.
The benefit ratio captures several dynamics. First, it reflects the increase in average pensions due to
indexation rules, the maturation of the pension system (especially in case of phasing-in/out of schemes)
and longer contribution periods, as well as changes in the pension formula. Second, it reflects the changes
in average wages that result from the labour productivity assumptions. Third, it captures the changes in
the structure of the respective population groups, namely the share of pensioners and workers in each year
of the projection exercise.
Gross average replacement rate at retirement

The gross average replacement rate at retirement is the ratio of the first average pension over the average
wage at retirement. The latter usually differs from the average wage unless a flat wage profile over the
entire working career is assumed in the projection exercise. For public pension schemes, the gross
average replacement rate reflects only earnings-related pensions, including the flat component.
The replacement rate provides insights in the decrease in income that results from moving from
employment into retirement. The size of this decline is influenced, for example, by the contribution
period, valorisation rules, bonuses/penalties in case of delayed/early retirement, and sustainability factors.
1.3.4. New public earnings-related pension
Changes in the flows of pensions and pension Table II.1.2: Earnings-related public pension schemes
expenditure over time should properly reflect the BE DB LT PS
impact of recently legislated reforms on the BG DB LU DB
functioning of pension systems. Therefore, a CZ flate rate + DB HU DB
disaggregation is made of the projected annual flow of DK flat rate + DB MT flat rate + DB
new earnings-related old-age and early pension DE PS NL flat rate + DB
EE flat rate + PS AT DB
entitlements in its main drivers.
IE flat rate + DB PL NDC
EL(1) flat rate + DB + NDC PT DB
Publicly provided earnings-related pension schemes ES DB RO PS
can be subdivided into the following three broad FR(2) DB + PS SI DB
types: defined benefit (DB), notional defined HR PS SK PS
contribution (NDC) and point system (PS). 16 IT NDC FI DB
countries have DB schemes, 6 have NDC systems and CY PS SE NDC
LV NDC NO NDC
8 are PS schemes (see Table II.1.2). ( 40)
(1) The NDC is an auxiliary mandatory pension scheme.
(2) PS refers to the complementary schemes AGIRC and
New pension expenditures for DB and NDC systems ARRCO.
can be disaggregated as follows: Source: European Commission, EPC.
(40) Counting twice France (once in the DB group and once in the PS group) and Greece (once in the DB group and once in the
NDC group).
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𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × ��

𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × ��
𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × ��
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (1.1)
where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the overall spending on new pensions, 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the number of new pensions, ��
𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the
average contributory period of new pensions, 𝐴𝐴 ��
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the average effective accrual rate of new pensions,
and ��
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 are the average pensionable earnings over the contributory period of new pensions. For some
countries, an additional sustainability factor or adjustment factor might apply. In the case of DB systems,
the accrual rate is predefined. For NDC systems, it is determined by the contribution rate to the notional
accounts and the annuity factor. ( 41)
For point systems, the breakdown of equation 1.1 is neither feasible, because pensionable earnings are not
explicitly considered but rather accounted for through the pension point accumulation, nor meaningful
given how a point system operates. Therefore, an alternative formula is used to breakdown new spending
in point systems:
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × ��

𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 × 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇 × ��
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 (1.2)
where the total new pension expenditure 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the product of the number of new pensioners 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 and
the average new pension benefit ��
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 . The latter equals the pension point value at retirement 𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇
multiplied by 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 which is the average number of accumulated pension points of new pensioners. For
��
some countries a sustainability factor or adjustment factor might apply.
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 can be further disaggregated:

The average number of pension points ��
�� 𝑇𝑇 × ��

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 = 𝐶𝐶 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 (1.3)
Where 𝐶𝐶��𝑇𝑇 is the average contributory period and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

��𝑡𝑡 the average number of points accrued annually. The
latter can be interpreted as the accrual rate in the case of point systems: the number of pension points at
retirement divided by the contributory period.
If the old-age pension includes a flat component, the relevant subcomponents are projected separately.
1.3.5. Number of pensions and pensioners, contributions, and contributors
Number of pensions
The number of pensions totals all pensions paid out to individuals, with one person possibly receiving
several pensions. Figures are reported by scheme and by age group and should be consistent with the
projections for population, labour force and number of pensioners. To ensure the consistency of the
exercise, the number of pensions should include pensions paid overseas.
Number of pensioners
The number of pensioners is reported for the overall public scheme as well as separately for each of the
pension schemes, allowing for the fact that a person may be a recipient of several types of pensions. The
number of pensioners should include pensions paid overseas. The projections should assume a constant
(41) Contributions are credited to individual accounts. These accounts are notional since contributions are used to pay the pension
benefits of current pensioners. At retirement, the accumulated notional balance is converted into an annuity by means of an
annuity factor that accounts for the estimated remaining life expectancy and an assumed rate of return on the contributions.
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ratio between pensions and pensioners in the absence of reforms affecting the pension take-up ratio or a
process of merging/closing of pension schemes.
A breakdown of public pensioners by age and sex is provided as well, allowing to assess the consistency
between demographic and labour market assumptions. The overall number of pensioners by age group
should be consistent with agreed labour force figures. The share of pensioners in each age group should
be below – but very close to – the number of inactive people in the same group.
The availability of data on pensioners (or pensions as a second best) is particularly relevant when
disaggregating the pension expenditure-to-GDP ratio. In particular, this data allows for the calculation of
the coverage ratio. The total coverage ratio is defined as the number of pensioners of all ages to the
number of people aged 65 or older. The analysis of the coverage ratio, which is also disaggregated by age
group, provides information about how the development of the effective exit age and the percentage of
population covered by a pension scheme affect pension spending.
Contributions to pension schemes

Contributions to pension schemes paid by both employers and employees as well any legislated
contribution by the state or other revenue sources (e.g. nuisance charges, people transferring rights and
savings from private schemes to the public scheme) provide information on potential future financing
gaps within the pension system, which is then to be covered by central government transfers. If the
pension contribution is part of a general social security contribution rate, an estimate should be provided,
if possible, for the share of the pension contribution, e.g. based on the most recent expenditure structure.
If general tax revenues finance pensions, no estimate should be provided.
Contribution projections should assume that the implicit contribution rates (contributions over gross wage
total) for the different components remain constant over the projection period or move in line with
legislation.
Number of contributors
As is the case with the number of pensioners, the number of contributors to each type of pension should
be considered separately, allowing for the fact that the same person may be a contributor to several
schemes. This is the case, for instance, for pension systems in which statutory contributions are divided
between a public scheme and a private pension scheme. However, the number of total contributors to the
public scheme should be close to the number of employed people or the projected labour force.
1.3.6. Valorisation rules
Unless the pension benefit is based on the final salary, a flat-rate pension or depends on years of
residence, pensionable earnings are to be adjusted for the change in living standards. This valorisation of
accrued pension rights is an important variable when estimating new pension benefits. Consumer prices,
wage growth, or a mixture of the two are the most common valorisation rules (see Annex 4).
1.3.7. Applied indexation
Member States report the indexation factors used to project the expenditure on earnings-related public
pensions, the flat component of old-age pensions, and minimum pensions. This information is particularly
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relevant for pension components for which the effectively assumed future indexation differs from the
legally stipulated mechanism.
Of particular concern is the indexation factor used to project minimum pensions and the interpretation of
the standard no-policy change assumption in this regard. When the legislated rule stipulates that lower-
than-wage indexation (e.g. pure price indexation or a mixed rule) applies to minimum pensions/minimum
income guarantees, expenditure on that specific item is projected to shrink rapidly over time. Past
experience on such non-generous indexation rules for minimum pensions shows that in practice ad hoc
interventions are regularly made to realign minimum pension benefits with changes in the standard of
living, which is, ultimately, the main objective of providing a minimum pension scheme.
Therefore, since the 2018 projection round, a common methodology for the indexation of non-
contributory minimum pensions has been applied in the projections. To ensure that the projections reflect
the 'safety net' role of minimum pensions, benefits are assumed to evolve in line with average wage
developments. In practice, all Member States should apply full wage indexation after a maximum of ten
years. This concerns all Member States with below wage indexation (pure price indexation, partial wage
indexation, indexation to GDP, no fixed rule, ...).
1.3.8. Assets and reserves of public schemes
Some countries accumulate surpluses of the public pension scheme in pension funds meant to finance
future scheme deficits. In such cases, pre-funded or partially funded pension systems alleviate future
sustainability concerns. Member States are expected to report assets accumulated in a social security fund
or a dedicated pension/reserve fund within the general government, for example in the case of partially
funded pension schemes, with the goal of providing the public pension scheme with a regular flow of
financing at some point in the future. Aside from the stock of assets, flows directed to the funds are also
to be reported.
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2. HEALTH CARE
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Spending on health care, one of the components of public age-related expenditure, represented 7.8% of
GDP in 2020 in the EU. ( 42) Standards of health care provision are overall high across the EU, with near
universal access to health care services. Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed certain deficiencies in the
resilience of EU health systems. To cope with long-term structural trends such as population ageing and
technological progress, while closing some of the resilience gaps identified, more public resources will be
necessary. All this makes public spending on health care an integral part of the debates on the long-term
sustainability of public finances. This chapter presents the methodology used to project public
expenditure on health care in the 27 EU Member States and Norway up to 2070, including the baseline
and alternative scenarios and stress tests.
2.2. OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECTION METHODOLOGY
General approach
The Commission (DG ECFIN) simulation model is used to project public health care expenditure. This
simulation model is a stylised macro model, capturing future developments of the population structure,
age-cost profiles, technological progress and standards of living. The model assumes that the entire
population is divided into groups with certain characteristics (e.g. age, gender, per capita expenditure,
health status). Changes in these groups lead to expenditure changes over time. This type of model is
widely used to prepare long-term expenditure projections, especially when the precise micro information
on the individuals and their transition rates from one health status to another is missing or unreliable.
The general methodology to project public health care expenditure involves four steps (see Graph II.2.1).
• Step 1: take the baseline population projection (i.e. number of people) by age and gender provided by
Eurostat for each year up to 2070.
• Step 2: take age/gender-specific public health care expenditure per capita (i.e. the age/gender-specific
expenditure profiles) provided by the Member States and Norway based on the latest available data.
• Step 3: project age/gender expenditure profiles for each year up to 2070 based on different
assumptions (i.e. the baseline and alternative scenarios).
• Step 4: for each projection year, multiply the projected number of people in each age/gender group by
the respective age/gender expenditure profile and sum all groups to obtain the total projected public
expenditure on health care.
Key data input and treatment of reforms

The common elements of all scenarios are the EUROPOP2023 projections by Eurostat (see Part 1,
Chapter 1) and the baseline assumptions on labour force and macroeconomic variables agreed by the EC
and the AWG-EPC (see Part 1, Chapters 2 and 3). The age/gender-specific profiles of public health care
expenditure per capita are provided by the Member States and Norway. Moreover, as for previous
projection exercises, the age profiles of per capita expenditure on health care are adjusted − in the
reference year − to match total public expenditure on health care as reported to international databases
(42) Total public expenditure on health care includes capital formation and excludes long-term care (health).
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Graph II.2.1: Schematic overview of the health care projection methodology
and confirmed by the Member States in the health care questionnaire. ( 43) This adjustment (shift of the
age-cost profile) is made by keeping the base year proportions between specific age cohorts constant.
Country-specific information on any relevant recent reform legislated and/or implemented that could have
an impact on public health care expenditure (e.g. binding spending ceilings) is as much as possible taken
into account in the projections. Information on legislated policy reforms and their quantification ( 44), both
increases and reductions, is provided by the Member States. The annual percentage reduction/increase is
deducted from/added to the level of spending, effectively changing the level of total health care spending.
Additional considerations
Three important aspects of the projection exercise need to be stressed. First, the baseline relies on a “no-
policy change assumption”: the analysis assumes that government health policy and behaviour of
individual participants in the health care market remain unchanged (with respect to the legislated reforms
considered). This means that health care provision is assumed to respond “automatically” to the needs
resulting from changes in population structure and health status, as well as to changes in income.
Second, many of the determinants of health care expenditure, notably supply-side determinants of
spending are either not quantifiable or depend on ad hoc policy decisions. Therefore, the methodology
used to project public health care expenditure mainly reflects demand-side factors such as demographic
structure, income and health status. However, in the risk scenario (see lower), the impact of non-
demographic factors such as technology and institutional settings is taken into account and calibrated
based on a regression analysis.
Third, given the important uncertainty surrounding long-term projections, a sensitivity analysis is
conducted, through several alternative scenarios and stress tests, attempting to identify the impact of each
quantifiable determinant separately based on different assumptions (an estimated guess or a “what if”
scenario).
(43) The total headline data on total expenditure may differ from the figures resulting from the combination of age cost profiles with
underlying population. Differences between the two measures of health care expenditure can result from differences in their
computation. While total expenditure is calculated from an aggregate budgetary perspective, costs per capita are in many
countries estimated based on health insurance or hospital inpatient data, which in most countries do not cover all public
expenses on health care.
(44) Including COVID-19 and measures in Recovery and Resilience Plans.
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2.3. DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR PROJECTING PUBLIC HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE
The purpose of health care systems is to “improve the health of the population they serve; respond to
people’s expectations and provide financial protection against the costs of ill-health” (WHO, 2000). In the
influential WHO report from 2000, health systems are attributed four vital functions: (1) service
provision, i.e. the delivery of personal and non-personal health services; (2) financing, i.e. the revenue
collection, the pooling of funds (insurance function) and purchase of services (the process by which
pooled funds are paid to providers in order to deliver the health interventions to care users); (3) resource
creation, i.e. investment in equipment, buildings and people (training); and (4) stewardship or oversight of
all the functions, i.e. the careful and responsible management of the health system.
In this context, public health care expenditure depends on factors that affect the demand and supply of
health services and goods. These include:
− The health status of the population.
− Economic growth and development.
− New technologies and medical progress.
− The organisation and financing of the health care system.
− Health care resource inputs, both human and capital.
The long-term projection scenarios for public health care expenditure, described below, capture demand
and supply-side factors, and include demographic and non-demographic variables. ( 45) The choice of
methodology and scenarios is constrained by the availability, accessibility, and quality of data. Therefore,
the model may not include all the relevant factors identified as affecting health care spending. To reflect
the effects of the different determinants on public expenditure on health care, changes are made to two
main inputs: (1) the age-related expenditure profiles (capturing unit costs) and (2) assumptions regarding
the development of unit costs over time driven by the macroeconomic variables or assumptions on health
status. As in the 2021 projection exercise, the list of determinants to be modelled is not exhaustive.
The scenarios to project public expenditure on health care in the 2024 Ageing Report are summarised in
Table II.2.1. Compared to the 2021 projection exercise, there are no changes in methodology for the
baseline (formerly called ‘AWG reference scenario’) and the risk scenario (formerly called ‘AWG risk
scenario’). To align the approach in health care with that for pensions and other spending items, the
starting point of the sensitivity analysis is now anchored to the baseline instead of to the formerly
‘Demographic scenario’. This approach improves the coherence of the health care chapter of the Ageing
Report by stress testing the baseline against alternative assumptions on both health care determinants, as
well as demographic and macroeconomic developments. This change also allowed reducing the number
of alternative scenarios. ( 46) A further streamlining led to the removal of two more scenarios used in
previous Ageing Reports, namely the ‘Death-related cost scenario’ and the ‘EU27 cost convergence
scenario.’
(45) See also Annex 9 for a mathematical illustration of the health care scenarios.
(46) The new anchor made some scenarios used in previous Ageing Reports redundant, such as the ‘High life expectancy scenario’,
the ‘Income elasticity scenario’ and the ‘Non-demographic determinants scenario’.
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Table II.2.1: Overview of health care scenarios
Sector-
No healthy Labour specific Additional
(1) Demographic Healthy ageing Risk
Baseline ageing intensity composite sensitivity
scenario scenario scenario(2)
scenario scenario indexation tests
scenario
I II III IV V VI VII
Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat

Population additional
population population population population population population population
projection sensitivity tests
projections projections projections projections projections projections projections
2022 profiles 2022 profiles 2022 profiles 2022 profiles 2022 profiles 2022 profiles 2022 profiles
2022 profiles
Age-related shift by half the shift by half the shift in line with shift by half the shift by half the shift by half the shift by half the
held constant
expenditure change in age- change in age- changes in age- change in age- change in age- change in age- change in age-
over the
profiles specific life specific life specific life specific life specific life specific life specific life
projection period
expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy expectancy
additional
Unit cost GDP per hour Input-specific
GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita sensitivity test
development worked indexation
scenarios
Cost sensitivity Cost sensitivity Cost sensitivity Cost sensitivity Cost sensitivity Cost sensitivity
Elasticity of of 1.1 in 2022 of 1.1 in 2022 of 1.1 in 2022 of 1.1 in 2022 of 1.5 in 2022 of 1.1 in 2022
1 1
demand converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1
by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070
Shaded cells indicate parameters that differ from the baseline assumptions.
(1) Baseline is the former AWG reference scenario.
(2) Risk scenario is the former AWG risk scenario.
2.3.1. Baseline
The baseline corresponds to the former ‘AWG reference scenario’. It provides the reference scenario used
in the context of EU fiscal surveillance. It shows the combined effect of a set of interrelated determinants
of public expenditure on health care. It reflects (i) the demographic impact of population ageing, based on
Eurostat projections, (ii) a “neutral” assumption on the evolution of health status, by assuming that half of
the extra years of life gained through higher life expectancy are spent in good health, (iii) unit costs
assumed to evolve in line with GDP per capita and (iv) the assumption of an income effect, which is
modelled through a cost sensitivity of 1.1 in the base year converging to unity by 2070.
2.3.2. Demographic scenario
The aim of the ‘Demographic scenario’ is to estimate the pure ageing effect on future public health care
expenditure. The age/gender expenditure groups evolve in line with the population projections up to
2070. Compared with the baseline, this scenario assumes that unit costs – i.e. the health care expenditure
per capita for each year of age – evolve only in line with real GDP per capita ( 47) without considering the
impact of any non-demographical determinants. Such a cost development, applied to the baseline age/
gender-specific per capita public expenditure profiles, can be considered neutral in macroeconomic terms
– if the age and mortality structure of the population did not change, public health expenditure as a share
of GDP would remain the same over the projection period. Other assumptions are unchanged compared
with the baseline.
2.3.3. No healthy ageing scenario
The ‘No healthy ageing scenario’ allows assessing the impact of the expansion of morbidity hypothesis
on public health spending projections. It assumes that age/gender-specific morbidity rates and the
structure of health care provision do not change over time. This, in turn, means that age/gender-specific
per capita public health care expenditure profiles, which can be considered as proxies for the morbidity
(47) Real GDP per capita at 2022 prices.
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rates ( 48), remain constant in real terms over the whole projection period. As in the baseline, the scenario
relies on the latest Eurostat population projections, assuming a gradual increase in life expectancy. This
increase in life expectancy together with no change in the health status, as compared to today’s health
status, mean that all the gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in poor health. The number of
years spent in good health remains constant. Other assumptions are unchanged compared with the
baseline.
2.3.4. Healthy ageing scenario
The ‘Healthy ageing scenario’ is based on the relative compression of morbidity hypothesis. It simulates
an improvement in health status in line with declining mortality rates and increasing life expectancy. It
assumes that the number of years spent in poor health during a lifetime remains constant over the
projection period. This means that all future gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in good
health. Consequently, the morbidity rate and therefore the age/gender-specific per capita public
expenditure profiles decline with the mortality rate. ( 49)
This ‘outward’ shift is proportional to the projected gains in life expectancy as given by the Eurostat
population projections. For each projection year the change in life expectancy in relation to the base year
is calculated. ( 50) Other assumptions are unchanged compared with the baseline.
2.3.5. Labour intensity scenario
The ‘Labour intensity scenario’ aims at estimating the evolution of public health care expenditure
considering that health care is and will remain a highly labour-intensive sector. Therefore, it is assumed
that unit costs (age/gender specific per capita public expenditure profiles used in the baseline scenario)
evolve in line with changes in labour productivity (modelled by real GDP per hours worked) ( 51), rather
than real GDP per capita growth (as assumed in the baseline). This assumption implies that wages in the
health sector grow in line with productivity in the overall economy and generally faster than GDP per
capita. ( 52) Other assumptions are unchanged compared with the baseline.
2.3.6. Sector-specific composite indexation scenario
The ‘Sector-specific composite indexation scenario’ explores the use of sector-specific rather than
economy-wide indexation of unit costs in the model, given the specific features of the health care sector
(high level of government regulation, investment in new technologies, high labour intensity, separate
financing instruments in inpatient and outpatient care). In practice, this scenario looks at the past cost
evolution of hospital care, outpatient care and outpatient pharmaceutical spending and indexes each of
them in a separate way, creating a country-specific composite indexation for unit cost development.
(48) Strictly speaking, age profiles of expenditure illustrate exclusively public health care spending per person of a given age cohort.
As such it is not a measure of health status or morbidity. However, given the lack of reliable and comparable data on the latter,
one can plausibly assume that the shape of the profile follows the evolution of health status over the lifespan, i.e. over time we
assume that the same segments of the curve (early childhood, old age and motherhood) follow the same pattern.
(49) In this scenario, the country-specific age/gender per capita expenditure profiles are progressively shifted outwards, in line with
increasing life expectancy. The method is applied to those age/gender groups where expenditure per capita is growing. For the
young and the oldest, the reference age/gender and therefore age/gender per capita public expenditure profile remains the same
over the whole projection period.
(50) The following example illustrates the approach: the life expectancy of a 50-year-old man in a given Member State is assumed to
increase by 4 years from 30 years in year t to 34 years in year t+20. Then, the scenario assumes that in t+20 a 50-year-old man
will have a per capita public expenditure profile of a (50-4) = 46-year-old man in year t (the latter adjusted as usual with the
GDP per capita growth rate over the last 20 years).
(51) Real GDP per hours worked at 2022 prices.
(52) In 2022, real GDP per hours worked in the EU was EUR 46 129 while real GDP per capita was EUR 35 202. The growth rate of
the real GDP per hours worked is projected to grow on average by 0.1 pp faster than the real GDP per capita in 2022-2070.
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To build this index, health care expenditure is disaggregated in its different components, broadly
reflecting the different sectors of the health system, including: (1) inpatient care; (2) outpatient care and
ancillary services; (3) pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances; (4) preventive care; (5) governance
and administration; and (6) capital investment. ( 53) For each of these components, the share in total public
health care expenditure is calculated and then applied to the age-specific per capita public expenditure. In
doing this, each age-specific per capita public expenditure is divided (mechanically) into six sub-items of
expenditure.
Next, the past change in public expenditure on each of those inputs is considered. The average annual
growth of the expenditure on the other components over the past 10 years is calculated. Then, the ratio of
each of these growth rates to GDP growth rate is calculated.
Due to the high volatility of the relative growth rates for the sub-components on prevention, governance
and administration, and capital formation, these items are excluded from the indexation. The other three
sub-items of the age-specific per capita expenditure (hospitals, outpatient care and medical goods) are
multiplied by their respective growth rate (capped at their respective 25th and 75th percentiles, as in
previous Ageing Reports). It is then assumed that the growth ratio multiplying each sub-item of
expenditure converges to 1 in a certain year in the future (i.e. grows at the same pace as productivity or
GDP). ( 54)
Other assumptions are unchanged compared with the baseline.
2.3.7. Risk scenario
The ‘Risk scenario’ (former ‘AWG risk scenario’) aims at fully accounting for technological changes and
institutional mechanisms, which have driven expenditure growth in recent decades. Econometric studies
show that demographic factors such as ageing have a positive but relatively small impact on spending
when compared with other drivers, such as income, technology, relative prices and institutional settings
(Maisonneuve and Martins, 2013). By only considering past income effects, the baseline implicitly
assumes a substantial progressive downward slope of past trends in health care spending, flattening out at
the end of the period. To address this critical aspect, the risk scenario considers a stronger impact of non-
demographic factors (e.g. technology or relative prices) on health care expenditure.
This scenario uses panel regression techniques to estimate the country-specific non-demographic cost of
health care. The non-demographic cost is defined as the excess of growth in real per capita health care
expenditure over the growth in real per capita GDP after controlling for demographic composition effects.
Alternatively, the results can also be expressed in terms of country-specific average income elasticities of
health care expenditure. A proxy for the non-demographic costs with an estimated EU average elasticity
of 1.5, based on Commission research ( 55) endorsed by the Ageing Working Group and recalculated for
the 2024 Ageing Report with the latest available data, is used in 2022 and then converges linearly to 1 by
the end of the projection period.
(53) In the 2021 and current projection exercise, they are largely based on the SHA 2011 classification of health care functions (see
Annex 7, Table II.A7.1).
(54) Assume that per capita public expenditure on health care for a 20-year-old man is EUR 2 000 in year t. Assume also that, in line
with total public expenditure on health care, this is made up of 40% inpatient care, 30% outpatient care and ancillary services,
17% pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances, 3% preventive care, 5% governance and administration, and 5% capital
investment. Therefore, the per capita public expenditure is divided into six sub-items: EUR 800 for inpatient care, EUR 600 for
outpatient care and ancillary services, EUR 340 for pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances, EUR 60 for preventive care,
EUR 100 for governance and administration, and EUR 100 for capital investment. Then, in year t+1, expenditure increases as
follows: EUR 800 x 1.2 + EUR 600 x 1.1 + EUR 340 x 1.3 + EUR 60 x 1.0 + EUR 100 x 1.0 + EUR 100 x 1.0, where 1.2, 1.1,
and 1.3 are the (illustrative) past growth ratios observed for the first three components, while the other items are not indexed by
their past observed growth rates. As far as the pattern of convergence is concerned, we can use past observations to determine
the convergence pattern of the growth ratios.
(55) Medeiros and Schwierz (2013).
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Other assumptions are unchanged compared with the baseline.
2.3.8. Other sensitivity scenarios
Alternative sensitivity tests are applied to the baseline to show the effect of key demographic and
macroeconomic assumptions on long-term public health expenditure projections. These alternative
sensitivity tests are applied to all age-related items and are therefore described in Part I, Chapter 5.
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3. LONG-TERM CARE
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Long-term care, together with pensions and health care, is an important component of age-related public
expenditure. Although it is currently the smallest of the three in terms of expenditure (representing an
estimated 1.7% of GDP on average in the EU in 2022), it is the one expected to experience the largest
increase according to past Ageing Reports. This chapter presents the methodology used to project long-
term care spending in the 27 EU Member States and Norway up to 2070, including the baseline and
several alternative scenarios and stress tests designed to assess the potential impact of each of the
determinants of long-term care expenditure on future public expenditure. These explore the same
dimensions as in the 2021 Ageing Report, although they have been restructured to be more transparent
and easily comparable.
3.2. OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECTION METHODOLOGY
3.2.1. Methodology
As in previous projection exercises – conducted jointly by the European Commission and the Ageing
Working Group (AWG) – the methodology to project long-term care expenditure is based on a stylised
macro-simulation model. This model allows capturing future developments of the population structure, of
age-cost profiles, of institutional set-up and of standards of living. It assumes that the whole population is
divided into groups according to certain characteristics (e.g. age, gender, per capita expenditure, health
status, need for care and type of care). If the (relative) size of these groups or their characteristics change
over time, long-term care expenditure changes in line with them. These types of models are often used in
long-term expenditure projections, in particular in cases where precise information at individual level and
on their transition from one status to the next is not available or is unreliable.
The choice of methodology and the various scenarios to be run are limited by the availability,
accessibility and quality of long-term care data. Expenditure data from the System of Health Accounts
(SHA) are used where available, complemented with proxies calculated based on categories from the
European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) and supplemented by national
data when necessary.
Dependency rates are based on EU-SILC data ( 56) and dependency is defined as difficulty in performing
at least one activity of daily living (ADL) (Katz et al., 1963) ( 57) or at least one instrumental activity of
daily living (IADL) (Lawton and Brody, 1969). ( 58) Long-term care is usually defined as a set of services
required by people with a reduced degree of functional capacity (whether physical or cognitive) and who
therefore depend on help to perform these activities for an extended period of time. The proportion of
EU-SILC respondents that report having a severe difficulty in carrying out their daily activities due to a
health problem lasting more than six months is used to obtain a proxy of ‘dependency’ rates. ( 59)
Data on the number of recipients and expenditure per recipient are however only available from national
sources.
(56) EU-SILC: The European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions; see the Eurostat website at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/ortal/page/portal/microdata/eu_silc.
(57) Activities of daily living (ADL) are the things people normally do in daily living, including any daily activity they perform for
self-care (such as feeding, bathing or dressing), work, homemaking and leisure (see Webster’s New World Medical Dictionary,
Wiley Publishing, 2008). If a person has difficulty in performing at least one of them, he or she is considered ADL-dependent.
(58) IADL includes shopping, laundry, vacuuming, cooking and performing housework, managing finances and using the telephone.
(59) Note that this is a conservative proxy as EU-SILC is used to identify ‘severe’ disability and the AWG definition of long-term
care is wider, encompassing people who have one IADL and whose level of disability is therefore relatively mild.
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The approach aims at examining the impact of the main factors affecting future long-term care
expenditure. Specifically, the methodology (described in Graph II.3.1 below) aims at analysing the impact
of changes in the assumptions on:
• The number of elderly people (through changes in the population projections).
• The number of dependent people (through changes in the prevalence rates of dependency). ( 60)
• The balance between formal and informal care provision (assuming changes in demand or exogenous
changes in the availability of informal carers).
• The balance between home care and institutional care within the formal care system.
• The unit costs of care per recipient (and how they evolve over time for different care settings).
The methodology consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Make a projection of the dependent and non-dependent population, broken down by age and
gender, using the baseline population projections from Eurostat. The dependent population is assumed to
need some form of long-term care, while the non-dependent population is assumed not to be in need of
long-term care. This projection is made by taking age- and gender-specific dependency rates ( 61) at the
value observed in the base year (estimated using existing indicators of disability from comparable
sources) and multiplying them by the baseline population projection ( 62) to obtain the number of
dependent people over the projection period.
Step 2: Divide the projected dependent population by age and gender into four groups depending on the
type of care they receive, namely (1) informal care, which is assumed to have no impact on public
spending, (2) in-kind care at home, (3) in-kind care in institutions and (4) cash benefits, with the latter
three all having an impact on public spending. The proportions of those in the dependent population that
belong to groups 2 to 4 can be derived by dividing the numbers of recipients for each care setting reported
by the Member States by the overall dependent population derived from EU-SILC data. ( 63) It is assumed
that the difference between the total number of dependent people and the total number of people receiving
formal care (at home, in institutions or as cash benefits) is the number of people who rely exclusively on
informal care. The proportion of the dependent population that receives informal care can therefore be
calculated as a residual by subtracting from the total the proportions of those that receive other types of
care.
Step 3: Calculate the age-gender profiles of expenditure per capita for the three types of formal long-term
care services based on Member States and Norway data, Eurostat SHA and ESSPROS data. For the base
year of the projection, the total public expenditure on home care, institutional care and cash benefits for
each age and sex group is divided by the number of people receiving in-kind care at home, in long-term
care institutions and receiving cash benefits in that group (provided by Member States). This gives us a
‘unit cost’ for each type of care, age and sex group.
(60) Based on the original proposal for the development of a long-term care expenditure projection model by Comas-Herrera et al.
(2005) that led to the model currently used in the Ageing Report.
(61) These dependency rates are averaged over the last five years, excluding data breaks.
(62) The model has been set up so that the projected number of dependent people (i.e. people with disability) will not decrease due
to increasing life expectancy, by ensuring that the number of dependent people in a five-year age class cannot be lower than in
the preceding one. The practical impact of this adjustment may be rather small.
(63) The model implicitly assumes that all those receiving home care, institutional care or cash benefits have difficulties with one or
more ADLs or IADLs, and that all people classified as dependent receive either informal care, home care, institutional care or
cash benefits.
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Step 4: The unit costs for the base year calculated in Step 3 are projected by applying indexation
assumptions. Cash benefits are generally indexed to GDP per capita, while in-kind benefits are generally
indexed to GDP per hours worked. In both cases this is done over the whole projection period. This
reflects the current imbalance of the care mix, with a relative deficit of formal care provision as well as
the labour-intensive nature of long-term care provision. Exceptions apply for Germany, France and
Slovenia, as discussed below in Section 3.2.3.
Step 5: Calculate public spending for the three care settings. For this purpose the number of people
receiving each type of care (at home, in institutions and receiving cash benefits) is multiplied by the age-
gender specific public expenditure per capita (respectively at home, in institutions and for cash benefits)
per year. The total public expenditure on long-term care services is obtained by adding up the expenditure
on each setting.
Graph II.3.1: Schematic overview of the long-term care projection methodology
3.2.2. Estimating dependency
Overall, as it is possible to identify those affected by disability, the projection methodology described
above is more precise than that used for health care expenditure for which there is no direct indicator of
health status and the age-related expenditure profile is used as a proxy. However, an important caveat is
that, while dependency rates are an indicator of the need for care, this need does not necessarily translate
into actual public expenditure, for at least two reasons.
First, the links between disability levels and demand/use of long-term care are not straightforward. There
is some uncertainty at each step involved. Many people with some form of disability can live completely
independent lives without the need for care services. Furthermore, dependency also depends on a person’s
perception of their ability to perform activities associated to daily living. On the one hand, survey data
can underestimate some forms of disability. People may not report certain socially stigmatised conditions,
such as alcohol and drug-related conditions, schizophrenia and mental degeneration. On the other hand,
disability data can be too inclusive and measure minor difficulties in functioning that do not require
community care. To minimise these potential issues, the focus is on those dependency levels reported as
‘severe’ ( 64) according to EU-SILC.
(64) This is because these people are most in need of income support and services, such as long-term care. This minimises the risk of
mistakenly capturing people who are not dependent, although some people with lower levels of dependency may be missed.
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Second, the coverage of long-term care systems is not universal in most EU Member States (eligibility
conditions may, for example, exclude those with dependency below a certain threshold or those with
financial means above a specific threshold) and a significant proportion of long-term care is still provided
by unpaid informal carers. As a result, expenditure profiles contain information about the propensity to
receive paid formal care, which depends on a number of factors other than dependency that affect the
demand for paid care such as household type, availability of informal carers, income or housing situation.
Most of these factors are also related to age.
3.2.3. Country-specific legislation on indexation rules of long-term care benefits
If countries can demonstrate that they apply price indexation by law, this is allowed for at least the first
10 years of the projection period. Such exceptions are described below.
Country-specific cases
There are three countries for which the general indexation rules described before are not strictly applied
for both cash and in-kind benefits, given specific legislation. In Germany, there is a legislation on the
ceiling of public long-term care expenditure. Moreover, under current German rules long-term care
benefits in-kind and cash are indexed to prices. The difference between the amounts financed by the
German government and the costs of long-term care is either covered by private insurance or paid by the
beneficiaries themselves. The German government is required by law to check every three years the need
and extent of adjusting long-term care benefits based on inflation. In France and Slovenia, cash benefits
are generally required by law to be indexed to prices.
Although the legislation described above can justify that these Member States apply specific indexation
rules, there are limits to the extent to which they can be taken into account in the projection. In an
extreme case, indexing all benefits to prices for the duration of the projection period could lead to a
significant reduction in long-term care expenditure as a share of GDP and in per capita terms compared to
the standard assumptions. This would in fact represent a departure from the ‘no policy change
assumption’ underpinning the baseline.
To account for this legislation; while preserving the realism of the projections, the following assumptions
are used for the baseline projections, as in the 2021 Ageing Report:
• For Germany, two thirds of the in-kind benefit expenditure are indexed in line with the Ageing
Report standard assumptions, and the remaining one third in line with prices over the whole projection
period. For cash benefits, two thirds of the expenditure are indexed in line with prices over the whole
projection period and the remaining one third in line with the standard assumptions.
• For France, price indexation is applied to cash benefit expenditure over the whole projection period,
with the rest being indexed according to the standard assumptions.
• For Slovenia, price indexation is applied to cash benefit expenditure over the first 10 years of the
projection, with the rest being indexed according to standard assumptions.
Therefore, this measure of dependency may underestimate the dependency rates for those EU Member States with
comprehensive long-term care systems that cover as well relatively low levels of dependency.
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3.3. DIFFERENT SCENARIOS FOR PROJECTING PUBLIC LONG-TERM CARE EXPENDITURE
Table II.3.1: Overview of long-term care scenarios
Coverage Cost
No healthy Healthy ageing Additional
Baseline* convergence convergence Risk scenario
ageing scenario scenario sensitivity tests
scenario scenario
I II III IV V VI
Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat

Population Additional
population population population population population population
projection sensitivity tests
projections projections projections projections projections projections
Half of 2019-2021
All projected Half of projected Half of projected Half of projected Half of projected
projected gains average
gains in life gains in life gains in life gains in life gains in life
Dependency in life dependency rates
expectancy are expectancy are expectancy are expectancy are expectancy are
status expectancy are held constant
spent without spent without spent without spent without spent without
spent without over projection
disability disability disability disability disability
disability period
Cost profiles per Cost profiles per

Member State Member State
Age-related
2022 cost converge converge
expenditure 2022 cost profiles 2022 cost profiles 2022 cost profiles 2022 cost profiles
profiles upwards to the upwards to the
profiles
EU average by EU average by
2070 2070
Probability of Probability of
Probability of Probability of Probability of Probability of Probability of
receiving in-kind receiving in-kind
receiving each receiving each receiving each receiving each receiving each
Policy setting / formal care formal care
type of care held type of care held type of care held type of care held type of care held
Care mix converging until converging until
constant at 2022 constant at 2022 constant at 2022 constant at 2022 constant at 2022
2070 upwards to 2070 upwards to
level level level level level
the EU average the EU average
In-kind: GDP
In-kind: GDP per In-kind: GDP per In-kind: GDP per In-kind: GDP per In-kind: GDP per
per hours
hours worked; hours worked; hours worked; hours worked; hours worked;
worked;
cash benefits: cash benefits: cash benefits: cash benefits: cash benefits:
Unit cost cash benefits: Additional
GDP per capita. GDP per capita. GDP per capita. GDP per capita. GDP per capita.
development GDP per capita. sensitivity tests
Country-specific Country-specific Country-specific Country-specific Country-specific
Country-specific
indexation indexation indexation indexation indexation
indexation
assumptions** assumptions** assumptions** assumptions** assumptions**
assumptions**
1 for top 1 for top 1 for top 1 for top 1 for top 1 for top 1 for top
expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
quartile MS in quartile MS in quartile MS in quartile MS in quartile MS in quartile MS in quartile MS in
Elasticity of
2022, for rest 1.1 2022, for rest 1.1 2022, for rest 1.1 2022, for rest 1.1 2022, for rest 1.1 2022, for rest 1.1 2022, for rest 1.1
demand
in 2022 in 2022 in 2022 in 2022 in 2022 in 2022 in 2022
converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1 converging to 1
by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070 by 2070
Shaded cells indicate parameters that differ from the baseline assumptions.
* AWG reference scenario in previous reports.
** Unit cost development also includes different country-specific assumptions for Member States with specific legislation on
the indexation of benefits. In the 2024 Ageing Report, these countries are France, Germany and Slovenia.
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3.3.1. The baseline
The baseline (previously named ‘AWG reference scenario’) is used by the European Commission in the
context of fiscal surveillance and the European Semester. The main assumptions are described below.
• Population projections rely on the baseline population projections by Eurostat.
• Dependency ratio: it is assumed that half of the projected longevity gains up to 2070 will be spent in
good health and free of disability/dependency. The age-gender specific dependency rates are shifted
by ½ of the change in life expectancy (e.g. if life expectancy increases by 2 years by year 2070, then
the dependency rate of 80-year-old men in 2070 is that of 79-year-old men in 2022).
• Age-related expenditure profiles: The age-related expenditure profiles from 2022 are used, uprated in
terms of the unit cost development.
• Public coverage: the shares of the older disabled population who receive either informal care, cash
benefits, formal care at home or institutional care that is provided or financed by the public sector are
kept constant over the projection period.
• Unit cost development: Unit costs are generally indexed according to GDP per hour worked in the
case of in-kind benefits and to GDP per capita in case of cash benefits. This reflects the current
imbalance of the care mix, with a relative deficit of formal care provision. Furthermore, the sector is
highly labour-intensive and productivity gains due to technology are difficult to achieve. Therefore,
public expenditure on long-term care is expected to be rather supply- than demand-driven. For that
reason, GDP per worker (which reflects the wage evolution in all sectors, including in the care sector),
rather than GDP per capita was chosen for in-kind benefits, the main driver of unit costs. Country-
specific indexation assumptions are used for Member States with specific legislation on long-term
care expenditure, i.e. Germany, France and Slovenia (see Section 3.2.3).
• Elasticity of demand: As countries become richer, they are likely to spend a larger proportion of their
GDP on long-term care. This is modelled in the baseline by including the assumption that the income
elasticity starts at 1.1 in base year 2022, falling to 1 by the end of the projection period for those
countries that are below the first quartile in terms of expenditure on long-term care as a proportion of
GDP. Based on current estimates this is expected for all countries except NL, SE, DK, BE, FI, DE, FR
and NO.
3.3.2. No healthy ageing scenario
The ‘no healthy ageing scenario’ is identical to the baseline apart from its assumption on the dependency
status. It assumes that the disability rates of the population of a given age will not improve despite
increases in life expectancy. This means, for example, that even if life expectancy increases by two years
by 2070, the proportion of 80-year-olds who are disabled in 2070 will be the same as it was in 2022.
Those constant proportions are then applied to the projected changes in the dependent population. Since
the prevalence of dependency is kept constant over the projection period, the dependent population
evolves precisely in line with the total elderly population. This implies that, in practice, none of the gains
in life expectancy translate into an improvement of health.
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Part II
3.3.3. Healthy ageing scenario
This scenario reflects an alternative assumption about the dependency ratio. Inspired by the so-called
‘dynamic equilibrium hypothesis’ ( 65), it is analogous to the healthy ageing scenario carried out in the
framework of the health care expenditure projections. The age-gender specific dependency rates are
shifted in line with changes in life expectancy (e.g. if life expectancy increases by 2 years by year 2070,
then the dependency rate of 80-year-old men in 2070 will be that of 78-year-old men today). This results
in a gradual decrease over time in the prevalence of disability for each age cohort that goes beyond the
gradual decrease in the baseline. Lower dependency rates translate in lower demand for and therefore
lower expenditure on long-term care services for each age group.
3.3.4. Coverage convergence scenario
This scenario makes a different assumption in terms of policy setting. The pressure for increased public
provision and financing of long-term care services may grow substantially in the coming decades,
especially in Member States where the bulk of long-term care is currently provided informally.
This scenario assumes that economic convergence across Member States, the exchange of best practices
and growing expectations of the populations will drive an expansion of publicly financed formal care
provision into the groups of the population that have not been covered by the public programmes so far
(i.e. widening of the coverage). This is modelled as convergence in the provision of in-kind formal care.
This scenario should be considered as a policy-change scenario, as it assumes a considerable shift in the
current long-term care provision mix from informal care to formal in-kind care, while aiming to take into
account the high diversity of the current country-specific care mix in terms of the balance between the
two types of in-kind care (home care and institutional care).
3.3.5. Cost convergence scenario
This scenario makes a different assumption on the age-related expenditure profiles. It considers the
impact of a convergence in the unit costs of care. Similar to the level of coverage, there is a great deal of
variation in the unit costs of care across Member States, which is a proxy for the variations in the quantity
and quality of care provided to recipients. Just like a convergence in coverage across EU Member States
could be expected, an increase in the costs of care (as percentage of GDP per capita) towards the EU
average is also a plausible hypothesis (i.e. an expansion in the depth of coverage). The ‘cost convergence
scenario’ is meant to capture the possible effect of a convergence in real living standards (resulting from
the macroeconomic assumptions) on long-term care spending.
3.3.6. Risk scenario
The risk scenario (previously named ‘AWG risk scenario’) differs from the baseline with regards to the
assumptions on age-related expenditure profiles and the policy settings. It is intended to capture the
impact of cost drivers additional to demography and health status, i.e. the likely effect of a convergence in
real living standards on long-term care spending.
3.3.7. Other sensitivity tests
Several sensitivity tests modify the baseline by making alternative assumptions on factors such as
migration, fertility, employment, productivity and life expectancy. The full list and description of the
assumptions can be found in Part I, Chapter 5 of this report.
(65) Rechel et al. (2020).
109
4. EDUCATION
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Government expenditure on education is Table II.4.1: Education expenditure, % of GDP

included in age-related spending as it is avg
2004 2007 2016 2018 2020 2021
largely affected by demographic develop- 2004-2021
BE 5.6 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.6 6.3 6.1
ments, due to the pronounced age profile of BG 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.3 3.8
enrolment rates. Education expenditure CZ
DK
4.8
6.6
4.3
5.9
3.9
6.8
4.6
6.4
5.1
6.4
5.1
6.0
4.6
6.6
represented around 5% of GDP on average DE 4.1 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.2
EE 6.2 5.7 5.7 6.2 6.4 5.9 6.1
in the EU in 2004-2021 (around 10% of total IE 4.1 4.3 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.0 4.1
general government spending), making it the EL
ES
4.1
4.1
3.6
4.0
4.0
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.5
4.7
4.1
4.6
4.1
4.2
third largest component of ageing costs. ( 66) FR 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.2 5.4
HR 5.6 5.0 4.9 4.8 5.6 5.2 5.1
Expenditure ratios vary considerably across IT 4.3 4.4 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.2
Member States, from a minimum of 3.5% of CY 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.0 5.8 5.5 5.7
LV 5.8 5.5 5.5 5.8 5.8 5.6 5.8
GDP in Romania to a maximum of 6.6% in LT 6.5 5.0 4.8 4.5 5.2 4.8 5.3
Denmark and Sweden (see Table 1). LU
HU
4.9
5.9
4.3
5.5
4.3
5.0
4.6
5.0
5.0
4.8
4.7
5.0
4.7
5.2
MT 5.5 5.2 5.1 5.0 5.7 5.5 5.3
NL 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.3
The projection exercise mainly aims at AT 4.9 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.1 4.9 4.9
assessing the impact of demographic chan- PL
PT
5.6
6.6
5.7
5.9
5.0
4.8
5.0
4.4
5.1
4.7
4.9
4.6
5.4
5.5
ges per se on general government education RO 3.6 3.9 3.4 3.1 3.7 3.2 3.5
SI 6.4 5.9 5.5 5.4 5.7 5.7 6.0
expenditure. ( 67) Therefore, baseline projec- SK 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 4.4 4.3 4.1
tions are conducted under the assumption of FI
SE
6.2
6.6
5.8
6.3
6.0
6.6
5.5
6.9
5.9
7.0
5.7
6.7
6.1
6.6
‘no policy change’. However, an alternative NO 5.6 4.8 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.0 5.2
EA 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.2 5.0 5.1
scenario – assuming policies favouring EU 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.8 5.2 5.0 5.1
higher enrolment rates – and additional
stress tests aimed at capturing macroecono- Only selected years over the period 2004-2021 are shown.
Source: European Commission, EPC – based on Eurostat,
mic uncertainty, are also considered. Classification of the functions of government (COFOG) data.
Long-term developments of public education

expenditure are affected by two opposite trends. On the one hand, the projected decline in the number of
young people is expected to reduce public spending (all else being equal). On the other hand, the
increasing enrolment rates, longer periods spent in education, and persistently rising (unitary) costs of
tertiary education are likely to put upward pressure on total education expenditure.
The methodology used in the Ageing Report is highly stylised and, as such, cannot fully reflect the
complexities of Member States’ education systems. It has been set out with a view to use harmonised
datasets, secure equal treatment across countries, and be consistent with wide labour market
developments, particularly on participation rates.
Projections of total expenditure on public education require consideration of a number of important

methodological issues, namely (i) the definition (or perimeter) of education activities; (ii) that studying
(66) Based on the classification of the functions of government (COFOG) data. In the same period, health expenditure represented
6.8% of GDP (and 14.2% of total general government expenditure), old-age (i.e. pension) expenditure represented 10% of GDP
(and 21% of total general government expenditure), while 'social protection' (also including the ‘old-age’ (pensions) function)
represented 19.1% of GDP (and 39.7% of total general government expenditure).
(67) Many other factors also have an important bearing on government education expenditure, for example the involvement of the
general government in the education system, the duration of mandatory education, progress in enrolment rates in upper
secondary and tertiary education, relative wages in the education sector, the average size of classes, and discretionary saving
measures to curb expenditure trends.
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Part II
can take place on a part-time basis after compulsory education; and (iii) that there are various outlays for
public spending on education. ( 68)
4.2. METHODOLOGY TO PROJECT TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON PUBLIC EDUCATION
The methodology used in the Ageing Report is based on a ‘quasi-demographic’ approach, since it relies
on both demographic and participation rate projections. The projections rely on the following elements:
− The use of the UOE ( 69) data collection, which covers enrolment rates, staff levels, the labour force
status of students (i.e. part time versus full time) ( 70), and detailed data on total public expenditure.
Data are disaggregated by single age and international standard classification of education (ISCED)
levels. ( 71) As in the 2021 Ageing Report, projections are run separately for four ISCED groupings,
representing primary education (ISCED 1), lower secondary education (ISCED 2), upper secondary
education (ISCED 3 and 4), and tertiary education (ISCED 5 to 8).
− Simplified assumptions on enrolment rates, with enrolment in primary and lower secondary education
levels assumed to be compulsory, while enrolment in upper secondary and tertiary education levels
depends on labour market outcomes, as changes in participation rates affect enrolment rates (in the
opposite direction).
− Projections of total expenditure on public education rely on two components: (1) the number of
students (see Section 4.2.1); and (2) expenditure per student on public education (see Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1. Number of students
Compulsory levels
For the compulsory levels considered (ISCED 1 and 2), enrolment rates per single age are assumed to
remain constant at the level observed in the base year of the projections. ( 72) The projected number of
students enrolled in ISCED levels 1 and 2 is obtained by multiplying for each specific age group, the
enrolment rate of the base year by the corresponding population projection.
Non-compulsory levels
Enrolment rates for ISCED groupings 3-4 and 5-8 consider labour market developments according to the
following formula (see Annex 13 for a derivation):
(68) Public spending on education includes direct expenditure on educational institutions as well as educational-related public
subsidies given to households and administered by educational institutions. Direct expenditure on educational institutions takes
two main forms: (i) direct purchases by the government of educational resources to be used by educational institutions (e.g.
direct payments of teachers’ wages by the education ministry); or (ii) payments by the government to educational institutions
that have the responsibility for purchasing educational resources themselves (e.g. a block grant to a university) (OECD, 2022).
(69) UNESCO-UIS/OECD/Eurostat Data Collection on Education Statistics. The current version of classification is ISCED 2011
which replaced ISCED 1997, used already in the 2021 Ageing Report. The correspondence table between the two
classifications is reported in the annex.
(70) Students are classified between full-time and part-time based on their intended study load within the reference school or
academic year. A full-time student is one who is enrolled in an education programme whose intended study load amounts to at
least 75% of the normal full-time annual study load. A part-time student is one who is enrolled in an education programme
whose intended study load is less than 75% of the normal full-time annual study lead (UNESCO-UIS/OECD/EUROSTAT
(UOE), 2019).
(71) However, data are not disaggregated by sex.
(72) In particular, the levels of enrolment rates for ISCED 1 and 2 observed in the base year of the projections are derived from
historical information (i.e. using the most recent available data). For details, see Annex 13.
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European Commission
∗
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (4.1)
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
where 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the total enrolment rate (both full and part-time students) for single age cohort i in period t;
∗
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the participation rate; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the fraction of part-time students in the total; and 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the fraction of
inactive individuals minus full-time students over the total population.
Equation (4.1) will be implemented in terms of differences to a base period (b):
𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 (4.2)
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 = − ∗ �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 �
1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
where
0 ≤ 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 , 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ≤ 1
where 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 is the ratio between full-time students and total inactive individuals; 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 is the fraction of
part-time students over the total number of students. These two ratios are assumed to remain constant
throughout the projection period.
According to Equation (4.2), an increase in the participation rate leads to a decrease in the enrolment
rate. ( 73) Enrolment rates per age are then broken down into ISCED levels (3-4 and 5-8) values, based on
student shares in the base year.
4.2.2. Expenditure per student and total expenditure on public education
Key data
Expenditure per student on public education, expressed in purchasing power standards (PPS), varies
significantly across educational level and country (see Table II.4.2). Higher levels of expenditure are
generally found for the ISCED 3-4 and 5-8 levels. However, in some countries, expenditure tends to be
higher for primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 1 and 2 levels). This variability reflects a
number of factors, such as wages of teachers and non-teaching staff, different class sizes, differences in
capital expenditure, as well as particular national circumstances. ( 74)
(73) To the extent that individuals entering the labour force are likely to have been previously involved in education activities. The
Labour Force Survey (LFS) variable MAINSTAT, which describes the main labour market status, was used to assess the
distribution of inactive individuals by age, distinguishing between schooling and other forms of inactivity, such as retirement
and domestic tasks.
(74) For example, smaller EU Member States tend to send a higher fraction of their tertiary students abroad. Other things being
equal, this tends to raise expenditure levels.
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Part II
Table II.4.2: Expenditure per student on public education in

PPS - 2019
ISCED 1 ISCED 2 ISCED 3-4 ISCED 5-8

BE 7.896 10.189 10.620 14.767
BG 3.889 5.027 3.659 4.972
CZ 5.021 8.590 7.473 9.351
DK 8.231 9.559 8.879 18.954
DE 7.211 8.885 9.523 13.608
EE 6.253 6.529 5.134 8.578
IE 5.976 6.847 8.324 12.169
EL 4.683 4.662 3.397 2.196
ES 5.124 6.289 7.216 7.250
FR 6.206 7.755 10.021 10.345
HR 9.049 : 4.830 5.181
IT 6.810 7.178 7.195 7.267
CY 8.205 9.851 10.813 4.783
LV 4.530 4.611 6.050 5.176
LT 4.752 4.719 5.336 5.680
LU 14.618 16.784 16.038 35.026
HU 4.937 4.309 5.055 7.002
MT 6.349 10.157 10.361 16.490
NL 7.013 9.567 9.031 14.019
AT 8.738 11.262 10.706 13.209
PL 5.628 5.621 4.815 7.856
PT 5.848 7.652 7.037 5.642
RO 2.070 4.540 4.092 6.788
SI 6.269 7.884 6.618 10.264
SK : : : :
FI 7.307 11.655 6.798 12.541
SE 9.181 9.331 10.755 20.741
EA 6.991 8.471 8.160 10.747
EU 6.607 7.978 7.684 10.764
Purchasing Power Standards. Based on full-time equivalents
(FTE) by educational level and programme orientation.
Source: European Commission, EPC - based on Eurostat (UOE
2019) data. Simple averages are shown for the EU and the euro
area.
Methodology
The expenditure (per student) on public education can be broken down into four main components: (i)
expenditure on staff compensation (i.e. gross wages and salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff); (ii)
other current expenditure; (iii) capital expenditure; and (iv) transfers (e.g. scholarships and public
subsidies to private education institutions).
On this basis, we can compute the total expenditure on public education (as percentage of GDP). This is
done across all ISCED levels: ISCED 1, ISCED 2, ISCED 3-4, and ISCED 5-8. ( 75)
∑𝑖𝑖 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑖𝑖�𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 �

= (4.3)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡
(75) It should be stressed that no attempt is made to project total expenditure on education, as ISCED 0 level expenditure (pre-
primary and not allocated by level) is not covered by the analysis.
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European Commission
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is expenditure on education in ISCED level i and year t, 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is expenditure on staff
compensation, 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is other current expenditure, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is capital expenditure, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is transfers; and i stands for
the ISCED groups: 1, 2, 3-4, and 5-8.
In line with past Ageing Reports, the average expenditure of the last two years of available data is used as
the starting point.
To project the expenditure-to-GDP ratio in the baseline, the main assumptions are the following:
− Expenditure per capita grows in line with labour productivity. Per capita values are defined either in
terms of education staff or students. Specifically, the average compensation is defined per member of
𝑊𝑊 𝑖𝑖 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
staff ( 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ), while the other three expenditure variables are defined in terms of student ratios ( 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , , ),
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖
where 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 and 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 are the number of workers in the education sector and students, respectively. ( 76)
− The education staff-to-student ratio will remain constant over the projection period, which implies that
staff adjusts instantaneously and fully to demographic changes.
Assuming that per capita variables grow in line with labour productivity is sufficient to derive the
following compact general formula for the projection of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio:
∑ EDU t
i
 ∑W0i [ ]
∑i O0i + K0i + R0i  IPt
i
=  i
* IT t + * IS t * + CEt (4.4)
GDPt  GDP0 GDP0  IGt
 
i i i i
where ITt , ISt , IPt , and IGt are indices (assuming the value of 1 in the base period) of respectively,
staff, students, labour productivity, and GDP. ( 77) A bar over an index represents one calculated over all
ISCED levels considered. ( 78) CEt is the composition effect, which is usually a small number compared
with the total expenditure-to-GDP ratio. ( 79)
Equation (4.4) expresses the expenditure-to-GDP ratio as a function of base period ratios, and indexes for
staff, students, labour productivity and GDP.
i i
In the baseline, which assumes a constant ratio of staff-to-students (i.e. ITt = ISt ), equation (4.4) can be
further simplified to:
(76) These modelling assumptions involve considerable simplifications of the determinants of the unit costs of education. A key
variable missing is class size. Research suggests that costs tend to change discontinuously with the creation/abolition of classes.
Given the difficulty in obtaining data on the relationship between class size and costs, a reasonable approximation may be using
student-to-staff ratios.
(77) An index
Xt measures the ratio between the values of variable X in the current period t and in the base period 0.
IX t =
X0
∑T t
i
∑S t
i
IT t = i
IS t = i
∑T 0
i
∑S i
0
( )
78 i and i .
(79) The composition effect is given by: {
 ∑W0i * ITt i − IT t } ∑ [O i
0 ] {
+ K 0i + R0i * ISti − IS t }
CEt =  i + i  * IPt
 GDP0 GDP0  IG
t

 

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Part II
∑ EDU t
i
∑ EDU i
0
IS t * IPt (4.5)
i
= i
* + CEt
GDPt GDP0 IGt
Equivalently, equation (4.5) can also be written as:
∑ EDU ∑ EDU t
i i
0
IS t ∑i EDU 0i IS t (4.6)
i
= i
* + CEt ≈ *
GDPt GDP0 IEt GDP0 IEt
where IEt is the employment index. ( 80)
In the baseline, equation (4.6) allows the following straightforward interpretation: projections for the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio are obtained by ‘inflating’ base period values by a students and labour
productivity index and by ‘deflating’ them by a GDP index. ( 81) There are two sources for the increase in
expenditure (ratios): the (average) number of students and per capita costs that are assumed to grow in
line with labour productivity, conversely GDP growth ‘deflates’ expenditure ratios.
4.3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In addition to the baseline described above, a set of sensitivity tests is run.
− High enrolment rates – as in the 2021 Ageing Report, a scenario is conducted, assuming a gradual
upward convergence of enrolment rates (to be completed by 2045). In particular, enrolment rates in
ISCED levels 3-4 and 5-8 are assumed to rise towards the average of the three best performers in the
EU. Such a scenario implicitly assumes a policy change supporting such convergence.
− Additional sensitivity tests: as in the 2021 Ageing Report and as done for the other expenditure items,
a range of uniform shocks to the baseline projection is applied across different scenarios (e.g.
higher/lower productivity, higher/lower migration, lower fertility). ( 82)
(80) The approximation assumes that CEt is a small number.

(81) The discrepancy being given by the composition effect (CEt).
(82) A nascent literature also points to potential impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on education, notably in terms of lower
educational achievement. In turn, the latter might affect future job prospects, lower earnings, and even long-term economic
growth (via lower productivity). However, the available studies are still quite heterogeneous and depend on the subject tested,
previous performance, age and social background. Overall, preliminary results point to higher learning deficits in countries with
lower income, at global level. The pandemic can be expected to have exacerbated the educational gap between children from
different socioeconomic backgrounds (with more adverse effects on students from lower socio-economic backgrounds), but also
between richer and poorer countries (Betthäuser et al., 2022; European Commission, 2022). Additional adverse impacts on
growth (via lower productivity) may even stem from the impact of long COVID on children’s educational outcomes (although
severe COVID-19 is less common for children than for adults, and research on the topic is still quite scarce – Chua et al., 2021).
115
ANNEX 1
Projecting labour force developments using the Cohort
Simulation Model
Overall approach
The Cohort Simulation Model (CSM) calculates entry rates to and exit rates from the labour market by
gender and cohort. The methodology was initially developed by the OECD ( 83), but its use by the
Commission for Ageing Report purposes is based on Carone (2005), with the particular feature of single
ages instead of the average of 5-years age groups.
The dynamic cohort approach is based on the estimates of labour market exit and entry rates of a
‘synthetic’ generation/cohort. The cohort is ‘synthetic’ because, due to a lack of individual longitudinal
data on labour market transitions, the same individual cannot be followed over time. Instead, it is assumed
that those individuals aged x+1 at year t+1 are representative of the same generation observed in the
previous year (aged x at time t). Due to the lack of specific information on each individual’s behaviour,
this assumption ignores inflows and outflows from the labour market that cancel out. ( 84)
Participation rate projections are produced by applying the weighted average entry and exit rates observed
over the period 2013-2022 by gender and single age to the period 2023-2070. Specifically, average entry
rates observed for the period 2013-2022 are kept constant over the entire projection period. For example,
average entry rates for persons aged x, calculated for the period 2013 to 2022 (with x varying between 15
and 74 years of age), are applied to persons aged x over the projection period of 2023 to 2070 to calculate
future participation rates. This way, the CSM captures ‘cohort effects’, namely the one resulting from the
stronger attachment of women of the youngest cohorts to the labour market.
The CSM is also able to incorporate a broad typology of pension reforms, such as increases in the
statutory retirement age, the convergence of lower statutory retirement ages for women to those for men,
the linking of the statutory retirement age to changes in life expectancy, the tightening of conditions for
early retirement, and changes in incentives affecting the retirement decision. The likely impact of pension
reforms is incorporated in the labour force projections by appropriately changing average labour market
exit probabilities for people aged 51-74.
The calculation of entry rates

Entry rates into the labour market from inactivity are calculated as follows. The calculation of the number
of people that enter the labour market (coming from inactivity) takes into account the size of each
gender/age group. It can be expressed as:
𝑡𝑡+1
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) − (𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥+1 )
𝑡𝑡+1
with 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥+1 ≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
where NLF is the number of people expected to become active between ages x and x+1; WAPmax is the
maximum working age population that can potentially enter the labour force, which is usually slightly
lower than the overall civilian population at working age, due for example to illness or inability; and LF is
the number of active people (thus in the labour force) aged x in year t and aged x+1 in year t+1.
By multiplying and dividing by the population aged x at time t, which is supposed to be the same as the
population aged x+1 at time t+1, the following equation is obtained:
(83) See Burniaux et al. (2003) and Scherer (2002), which developed a dynamic version of the methodology in Latulippe (1996).
(84) For example, this means that if in year t there are 100 persons aged x in the labour force and in the following year, thus aged
x+1, these same individuals leave the labour force (for whatever reason, e.g. discouragement, death or emigration), but they are
replaced by 100 other individuals aged x+1, previously not part of the labour force, no change in the size of our ‘synthetic’
cohort is observed. As a consequence, the calculated net rates of exit and entry are equal to zero, while the actual (gross) values
are 100%.
116
Part II
𝑡𝑡+1 )]
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = [(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) − (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥+1 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
where PRmax is the upper limit to the participation rate, assumed at 0.99 for both male and female. ( 85)
Thus, the rate of entry Ren can be calculated by dividing the number of people expected to become active
by the number of people outside the labour force at time t, that is:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 𝑡𝑡+1 )]
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑡𝑡
= [(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) − (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥+1 ×
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥

which, taking into account that 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = , can be reformulated as:
𝑥𝑥 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡+1 )]
1
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑥𝑥+1 = [(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 ) − (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥+1 ×
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡+1 �
�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥+1
or 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑥𝑥+1 = �1 − � ≥0
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡+1 −𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡 �
�𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥+1
or 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑥𝑥+1 = 𝑥𝑥
≥ 0 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1
�1−𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 �
After re-arranging, the analytical formulation used for projecting participation rates based on these entry
rates is obtained:
𝑡𝑡+1
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑥𝑥+1 × (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 )
Thus, projections of participation rates for each single-year cohort x+1 can be calculated by applying the
entry rates observed in a given year or period over the projection period (t = 2023-2070). In practice, the
entry rates for each age are calculated on the basis of the average participation rates observed over the
period 2013-2022.
The calculation of exit rates

In the same way, when participation rates for two adjacent single-year age groups are falling, an exit rate
from the labour market (the net reduction in the labour force relative to the number of people who were
initially in the labour force in the same cohort the year before) can be calculated as follows. The number
of persons that leave the labour market at time t+1 is equivalent to:
𝑡𝑡+1
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥+1
where OP is the number of people expected to be outside the labour force between age x and x+1, and LF
is the number of active people (thus in the labour force) aged x in year t and aged x+1 in year t+1.
By multiplying and dividing by the population aged x at time t, which is supposed to remain the same as
the population aged x+1 at time t+1, one gets:
𝑡𝑡+1 )
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 = (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥+1 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
where PR are the participation rates.
(85) Burniaux et al. (2003) use as maximum values for the male/female participation rates 0.99/0.95.
117
European Commission
Thus, the (conditional) rate of exit, Rex, can be calculated by dividing the number of people that leave the
labour force at time t+1 by the number of people active at time t. That is,
𝑡𝑡+1
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 𝑡𝑡+1 )
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥+1
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = 𝑡𝑡
= (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥+1 × 𝑡𝑡
=1−
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
As a consequence, Rex can also be used to project participation rates of older workers as:
𝑡𝑡+1
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥+1 = �1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥+1 � × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
or 𝑡𝑡+𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥+𝑛𝑛 = (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥+1 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥+2 )(1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥+3 ). . . �1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥+𝑛𝑛−1 � × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
Projecting the labour force

Participation rates by single age and gender are projected in accordance with the above approach.
Aggregate values for participation rates are a weighted average of participation rates by single age and
gender using population shares as weights. For example, the average participation rate PR for age group 𝑎𝑎
(lower age) to 𝑎𝑎 (upper age) in period t is calculated as:
𝑎𝑎
𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡� = � � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 × 𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎 𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓
where a is the age index, g is the gender index, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔

𝑡𝑡
is the participation rate for single age a and gender
g in period t, pop is the population; and p is the structure of the population:
𝑡𝑡
𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 =
∑𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎 ∑𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
𝑡𝑡
The labour force (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔

𝑡𝑡
) or labour supply (for each single age and gender combination) is then calculated
by multiplying the age/gender labour force participation rate with the corresponding population
projection:
𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
The total labour supply for age group 𝑎𝑎 (lower age) to 𝑎𝑎 (upper age) in period t is then calculated as
follows:
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎
𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡 𝑡𝑡
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝑎𝑎, 𝑎𝑎, 𝑡𝑡� = � � 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 = � � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎,𝑔𝑔
𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎 𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎 𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑓𝑓
118
ANNEX 2
Estimating the average exit age from the labour market
The CSM allows estimating the ‘average exit age’ from the labour force, which can be used as an
approximation for the effective retirement age. The methodology is based on the comparison of labour
force participation rates over time (see Annex 1).
The conditional probability for each person to stay in the labour force at age a in year t (conditional on
staying in the labour force in year t-1), can be calculated by using the observed activity rates PR as
follows:
𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡−1 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ≤1
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎−1
Thus, at time t, the conditional probability for each person to exit at age a (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
) is equal to:
𝑡𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 1− 𝑡𝑡−1 = 1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ≤1
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎−1
Assuming that nobody retires before minimum age m (e.g. m = 50), the (unconditional) probability that
any person will still be in the labour force (that is the probability of not retiring before a given age a) can
be calculated as the product of all the conditional probabilities to stay in the labour force from age m to
age a-1:
𝑎𝑎−1
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=𝑚𝑚
Thus, the probability of retiring at age a can be calculated as the product of the unconditional probability
of not retiring from age m to a and the (conditional) probability of exit:
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛
= 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
By assuming that everybody will be retired at a given age M (e.g. M = 74), the sum of the probabilities of
retiring between the minimum age m and the maximum age M is equal to 1:
𝑀𝑀
� 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = 1
𝑎𝑎=𝑚𝑚
The average exit age from the labour market is then calculated as the weighted sum of the retirement ages
(between the minimum and the maximum age of retirement, assumed 50 and 74 respectively), where the
weights are the probabilities of retiring at each age a:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = ∑𝑀𝑀 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

𝑎𝑎=𝑚𝑚 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 × 𝑎𝑎
119
ANNEX 3
Methodology underpinning potential GDP growth projections
Description of the production function framework

The production function framework used is based on the standard specification of the Cobb-Douglas
production with constant returns to scale, where GDP can be expressed formally as total output
represented by a combination of factor inputs multiplied by total factor productivity (TFP), which embeds
the technological level. ( 86)
𝑌𝑌 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝛽𝛽 ∙ 𝐾𝐾 1−𝛽𝛽
where:
• Y is total output (GDP).
• L is the supply of labour (total hours worked).
• K is the stock of capital.
• β is the labour share, i.e. the share of labour costs in total value-added. It is set at 0.65. ( 87)
As a result, labour productivity growth comes down to the following expression
𝑌𝑌̇ 𝐾𝐾̇
̇ + (1 − 𝛽𝛽) ∙ � �
� � = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿
Thus, the projection of TFP growth and the growth in capital per hour worked, so called capital
deepening, are the key drivers of projected labour productivity over the medium run.
In the long run, according to the standard neo-classical growth model ( 88), the economy should reach its
equilibrium, also called steady state or balanced growth path, where the ratio of capital stock to labour
1
expressed in efficiency unit, 𝐾𝐾/(𝐿𝐿 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽 ), remains constant over time. As a result, the capital stock per
1
hour worked grows at the same pace as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽 . Therefore, labour productivity growth (i.e. output per hour
worked growth) coincides with TFP growth divided by the labour share.
(86) See Havik et al. (2014).

(87) Although there is some debate about the recent and observed decline of the labour share, most economists assume that it will
remain broadly constant in a long run perspective, while allowing for a variation in the short-term. This rule is uniformly
applied in the projections to all Member States to allow for consistent cross-country comparisons of the results. The assumption
is also well-founded in economic theory. If the real wage is equal to the marginal productivity of labour, it follows that under
the standard features of the production function, real wage growth is equal to labour productivity growth and real unit labour
costs remain constant.
(88) Also known as the Solow growth model, see Solow (1956).
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Part II
Graph II.A3.1: Overview of the production function approach
Source: Havik et al. (2014).
It should also be noted that, in the steady state, the contribution of capital deepening to output growth is a
simple function of TFP ( 89), which becomes the single driver of labour productivity:
𝐾𝐾 𝐾𝐾̇ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 � � = (1 − 𝛽𝛽) ∙ � � = ̇
∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿 𝛽𝛽
As all these variables can be influenced by the business cycle in the short term, it is safer to project the
potential output, i.e. the output adjusted for cyclical movements in the economy, than the actual output.
This requires estimating the trend components for the individual production factors, except for the capital
stock, which can only adjust in the long run.
Estimating potential output therefore amounts to removing the cyclical component from both TFP and
labour. Trend TFP is obtained using a detrending technique. Potential labour input is the total labour
obtained when the unemployment rate equals the structural unemployment rate (NAWRU). It equals
LF⸱(1-NAWRU)⸱Hours, where LF stands for total labour force and Hours for average hours worked per
worker. The potential output denoted Yp can be expressed in logarithm as the sum (in logarithm) of trend
(89) With the assumption of a long-run TFP growth rate equivalent to 0.8% per annum in the baseline scenario (see Section 3.5), this
implies a long-run contribution of capital deepening to labour productivity growth equal to 0.4% and hence a labour
productivity growth rate of 1.2%.
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European Commission
TFP, potential labour input weighted by the labour share in total value-added and the total capital stock
multiplied by one minus the labour share. More formally, we get:
Log(Yp)=Log(trendTFP)+β⸱Log(LF⸱(1-Nawru)⸱Hours)+(1-β)⸱LogK
Graph II.A3.1 illustrates the building blocks of the production function used in the medium-term potential
growth projection and the T+10 methodology developed by the Commission and the EPC’s Output Gap
Working Group (OGWG).
Following the practice used for the 2021 Ageing Report, the AWG and EPC decided to use the OGWG
methodology for potential growth and its components until T+10 (2032).
Potential GDP projections for the first ten years ('T+10' projections)
The T+10 methodology was first used for the 2015 Ageing Report for projecting potential GDP growth
for the first ten years because it had several advantages compared to previous approaches:
More structural information: The T+10 approach marks an improvement with respect to the
incorporation of additional information regarding the structural determinants of growth. This is explicitly
the case with respect to the T+10 NAWRU anchor and is implicitly driving the rationale behind the
capital formation and participation rate forecasts over the period T+6 to T+10. There are clear advantages
from introducing more structural information into the T+10 methodology, including (i) it is easier to
explain country differences; and (ii) it allows for a quantitative evaluation of structural reforms.
T+10 NAWRU anchor versus reversion to a pre-crisis NAWRU level: The T+10 NAWRU anchor
represents a significant methodological improvement over the previous method by anchoring medium
term NAWRU developments to a long run unemployment rate which is estimated from the main
structural determinants of labour market trends. Alternative approaches that do not rely on economic
information were discussed and eventually abandoned. In particular, approaches relying on the concept of
a return to the pre-crisis level for the NAWRU appeared impractical.
‘Structural’ approach to investment: The debate in relation to the assumption to be used for the T+10
capital formation projections was initiated with a discussion on the relative merits of pursuing a structural
model of investment. This option was not pursued however since there would be only limited gains
relative to the ‘capital rule’ approach which was finally adopted. The latter approach effectively amounts
to a structural model of investment since it links investment to its fundamental long run drivers, namely
labour supply and TFP.
A more credible evolution for the path of participation rates: The approach adopted for projecting
participation rates up to T+10 constitutes a balanced mixture of the information emanating from time
series trends with the solid structural information derived from the cohort method. An important
improvement is the introduction of a technical transition rule for smoothing the breaks in participation
rates which occurred in the forecasts using the T+5 and the T+10 methodologies.
Internally consistent TFP projections up to T+10: The current T+6 to T+10 TFP projections are
arguably superior to those used until the 2015 Ageing Report since the T+5 and T+10 estimates are now
both produced with the same bivariate Kalman filter approach and are consequently internally consistent.
122
ANNEX 4
Overview of pension systems
Table II.A4.1: Pension schemes in EU Member States and projection coverage
Public pensions(3) Private pension scheme
Early Occupational Mandatory Voluntary

Minimum Old-age Disability Survivors'
Scheme type retirement pension private private
Pension(4) pensions pensions pensions
pensions scheme individual individual
ER priv M* priv(8)
BE DB MT - SA ER ER ER X yes*
FR self-emp V* self-emp
BG DB MT - SA ER ER ER ER V* quasi M* yes*
CZ flat rate + DB FR & ER ER ER ER ER X X yes*
FR & MT FR & MT
DK flat rate + DB V FR FR quasi M X yes
suppl. suppl.
DE PS MT - SA* ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
EE flat rate + PS MT - SA ER ER ER ER V* quasi M yes*
M pub
IE flat rate + DB MT - FR & SA FR X FR - MT FR - MT X yes*
V* priv
EL (1)
flat rate + DB + NDC MT - FR FR - ER FR - ER FR - ER FR - ER V* yes yes*
ES DB MT ER ER ER ER V X yes
FR(2) DB + PS MT - SA ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
HR PS ER ER ER ER ER X yes yes*
IT NDC MT - SA ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
M* pub
CY PS MT & ER ER ER ER ER X yes*
V* priv
LV NDC FR - SA ER ER ER ER X yes yes*
LT PS SA ER ER ER ER X quasi M yes*
LU DB FR(5) ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
HU DB MT - SA(6) ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
MT flat rate + DB MT - SA FR & ER FR & ER FR & ER FR & ER V* X yes*
NL flat rate + DB SA FR X ER FR M X yes*
AT DB MT - SA ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
PL NDC ER ER ER ER ER V* yes* yes*
quasi M
PT DB MT - SA(7) ER ER ER ER (9) X yes*
V
RO PS SA ER ER ER ER X yes yes
SI DB MT - SA* ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
SK PS MT - SA ER ER ER ER X quasi M yes*
FI DB MT ER ER ER ER V* X yes*
SE NDC MT ER ER ER ER quasi M yes yes
NO NDC FR ER X ER X M* X yes*
(1) The public supplementary pension fund is NDC since 2015. From 2022 onwards, the supplementary pensions of new labour
market entrants are covered by a funded DC scheme (treated as a mandatory private individual scheme in the projections).
(2) Point system refers to the complementary ARRCO and AGIRC schemes. (3) Public pension expenditure includes all public
expenditure on pensions and equivalent cash benefits granted for a long period, see Annex 5 for details on the coverage of
the public pension expenditure projections. (4) Minimum pensions correspond to minimum pensions and other social
allowances for older people not included elsewhere. (5) The minimum pension constitutes an integral part of the pension,
guaranteed for members that have contributed at least 20 years. It is included in the projections. Elder people who do not
qualify for a minimum pension can receive the means-tested social inclusion income, which is not included in the projections.
(6) Aside from the old-age allowance, which is not included in the pension system, there is an earnings-related minimum
pension under the state pension system. Both are included in the projections. (7) Includes all pensions of the non-earning-
related scheme such as old-age, disability and survivor pensions and the social supplement. (8) Participation in an
occupational scheme is mandatory for employees if their company is subject to a collective agreement that provides for a
second pillar. (9) Occupational pension schemes established under collective bargaining agreements are mandatory for
employers, with the possibility to opt-out for employees, others are voluntary.
DB defined benefit
PS point system
NDC notional defined contribution
MT Means-tested
FR Flat rate
ER Earnings-related
SA Social allowance/assistance
X Does not exist
V Voluntary participation in the scheme
M Mandatory participation in the scheme
* Not covered in the projections
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European Commission
Table II.A4.2: Statutory retirement ages, early retirement ages (in brackets) and incentives to postpone retirement
Statutory retirement age (early retirement age) Incentives**

MALE FEMALE
2022 2030 2050 2070 2022 2030 2050 2070 penalty bonus
BE 65 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 65 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) X
BG 64.4 (63.4) 65 (64) 65 (64) 65 (64) 61.8 (60.8) 63.3 (62.3) 65 (64) 65 (64) X X
CZ 63.9 (60) 65 (62) 65 (62) 65 (62) 62.2 (59.2) 64.7 (61.7) 65 (62) 65 (62) X X
DK* 67 (63.5) 68 (65) 71.5 (68.5) 74 (71) 67 (63.5) 68 (65) 71.5 (68.5) 74 (71)
DE 65.9 (63) 66.9 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) 65.9 (63) 66.9 (63) 67 (63) 67 (63) X X
EE* 64.2 (59.2) 65.5 (60.5) 67.7 (62.7) 69.8 (64.8) 64.2 (59.2) 65.5 (60.5) 67.7 (62.7) 69.8 (64.8) X X
IE 66 (66) 66 (66) 66 (66) 66 (66) 66 (66) 66 (66) 66 (66) 66 (66)
EL* 67 (62) 68.5 (63.5) 70.5 (65.5) 72.5 (67.5) 67 (62) 68.6 (63.6) 70.5 (65.5) 72.5 (67.5) X
ES 66.2 (64.2) 67 (65) 67 (65) 67 (65) 66.2 (64.2) 67 (65) 67 (65) 67 (65) X X
FR 67 (62) 67 (63.6) 67 (64) 67 (64) 67 (62) 67 (63.6) 67 (64) 67 (64) X X
HR 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 63 (58) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) X X
IT* 67 (64) 67.3 (64.3) 69.2 (66.2) 70.8 (67.8) 67 (64) 67.3 (64.3) 69.2 (66.2) 70.8 (67.8)
CY* 65 (65) 65.6 (65.6) 67.6 (67.6) 69.4 (69.4) 65.6 (65) 65.6 (65.6) 67.6 (67.6) 69.4 (69.4) X X
LV 64.3 (62.3) 65 (63) 65 (63) 65 (63) 64.3 (62.3) 65 (63) 65 (63) 65 (63)
LT 64.3 (59.3) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 63.7 (58.7) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) X X
LU 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57) 65 (57)
HU 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) X
MT 63 (61) 65 (61) 65 (61) 65 (61) 63 (61) 65 (61) 65 (61) 65 (61) X
NL* 66.6 (66.6) 67.3 (67.3) 68.5 (68.5) 69.8 (69.8) 66.6 (66.6) 67.3 (67.3) 68.5 (68.5) 69.8 (69.8)
AT 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 60 (55) 63.5 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) X X
PL 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 65 (65) 60 (60) 60 (60) 60 (60) 60 (60)
PT* 66.6 (60) 66.9 (60) 68.1 (60) 69.2 (60) 66.6 (60) 66.9 (60) 68.1 (60) 69.2 (60) X X
RO 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 61.8 (56.8) 63 (58) 63 (58) 63 (58) X
SI 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) 65 (60) X X
SK* 62.8 (60.8) 64 (62) 66.1 (64.1) 68.3 (66.3) 62 (60) 63.2 (61.2) 65.4 (63.4) 67.7 (65.7) X X
FI* 64.5 (61) 65.4 (62.4) 66.9 (63.9) 68.3 (65.3) 64.5 (61) 65.4 (62.4) 66.9 (63.9) 68.3 (65.3) X X
SE* 65 (62) 67 (64) 68 (65) 70 (67) 65 (62) 67 (64) 68 (65) 70 (67)
NO 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62) 67 (62)
BE – Bonus is expected to apply as of 2024.
BG – The latest pension reform included a provision to link retirement ages to life expectancy as from 2037. This provision has
not been implemented, though.
CZ – Statutory retirement age depends on the number of children. Values for women with two children are reported.
DK – Increase in the retirement age is subject to a Parliamentary decision.
ES – People with at least 38.5 contributory years have a statutory retirement age of 65 and an early retirement age of 63.
IT – Retirement is allowed with at least 20 years of contribution and a minimum pension amount of 1.5 times the old-age
allowance in 2012. In bracket the minimum age for early retirement under the NDC system is reported (a minimum pension
amount of 2.8 times the old-age allowance is required in addition to the minimum of 20 years of contribution). Early
retirement is also allowed regardless of age, with a contribution requirement of 42.8 years in 2022, indexed to changes in life
expectancy (43.3 in 2030, 45.3 in 2050 and 46.9 in 2070). Workers who reached the age of 62 with a minimum contribution
requirement of 38 years ('Quota 100') could have retired earlier in 2019-2021; workers who reached the age of 64 with a
minimum contribution requirement of 38 years ('Quota 102') could retire earlier in 2022; workers who reach the age of 62 with
a minimum contribution requirement of 41 years ('Quota 103') may retire earlier in 2023.
PT – Since 2015, early retirement is possible from the age of 60 with 40 contributory years. For each year the contributory
career exceeds 40 years, the statutory retirement age is reduced by 4 months.
SK – The statutory retirement age depends on the number of children. Weighted average for women is reported. Since 2023
early retirement is possible after 40 years of contribution. Figures report the standard early retirement which is possible 2 years
prior to the statutory retirement age.
SE – The retirement age is flexible as of 62 years without an upper limit and will increase in line with life expectancy at 65 years.
Under the Employment Protection Act, an employee is entitled to stay in employment until the age of 67.
NO – Retirement is flexible as of the age of 62.
*Countries where the statutory retirement age is legislated to increase in line with life expectancy. Reported retirement ages
are calculated based on life expectancy in the Eurostat population projections.
**Actuarial equivalence is not considered as a penalty/bonus.
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Part II
Table II.A4.3: Main indexation and valorisation parameters for old-age pensions
Pensionable earnings reference General valorisation variable(s) General indexation variable(s)
BE Full career Prices Prices and living standard

BG Full career Wages Prices and wages
CZ Full career Wages Prices and wages
DK Years of residence Not applicable Wages
DE Full career Wages Wages
EE Full career Prices and social taxes Prices and social taxes
IE Flat rate Not applicable No fixed rule
EL Full career Prices and wages Prices and GDP (max 100% prices)
ES 324 best months in last 348 Prices Prices
FR 25 best years (CNAVTS) Prices Prices
HR Full career Prices and wages Prices and wages
IT Full career GDP Prices
CY Full career Wages Prices and wages
LV Full career Contribution wage sum index Prices and wage sum
LT Full career Wage sum Wage sum
LU Full career Prices and wages Prices and wages
HU Full career Wages Prices
MT 10 best of last 41 years Cost of living Prices and wages
NL Years of residence Not applicable Wages
AT Full career Wages Prices
PL Full career NDC 1st: Wages, NDC 2nd: GDP Prices and wages
PT Full career up to a limit of 40 years Prices and wages Prices and GDP
RO Full career Prices and wages Prices and wages
SI Best consecutive 24 years Wages Prices and wages
SK Full career Wages Prices
FI Full career Prices and wages Prices and wages
SE Full career Wages Wages
NO Full career Prices and wages Prices and wages
BG – Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 2000.
CZ – Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1986.
IE – A price and wage indexation rule has been assumed in the projections.
EL – Pensionable earnings reference is full career, considering wages/income from 2002 onwards.
ES – Pensionable earnings reference is last 25 years as of 2022.
FR – The pensionable earnings reference is full career in AGIRC and ARRCO; CNAVTS: Caisse nationale de l'assurance
vieillesse des travailleurs salariés. Valorisation rule and indexation of 1% in both AGIRC and ARRCO.
LT – Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1994. Pensions are indexed to the seven-year average of the wage
sum growth over the current, previous three and next three years. The index is applied in case of a balanced budget of the
Pension Social Security System in two consecutive years and contingent on positive GDP or wage sum growth.
LU – Indexation rule is wages if sufficient financial resources are available, otherwise only cost of living indexation.
HU – Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1988.
MT – Pensionable earnings reference rule applies to people born as of 1969.
PT – Pensionable earnings reference is full career as of 2002. Price and wage valorisation applies to earnings recorded from
2002 onwards.
SK – Pensionable earnings reference is full career back to 1984.
SE – Indexation rule is wage growth minus 1.6 pps.
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European Commission
Table II.A4.4: Automatic adjustment mechanisms
Sustainability factor Retirement age

Automatic balancing
(benefit linked to life linked to life
mechanism
expectancy)(6) expectancy
CY X
DE X
DK(1) X
FR(2) X
FI X X
EL(3) X
EE X
IT X X
LV X
LT X
LU X
MT(4) X
NL(5) X
PL X
PT(5) X X
SK X
SE(5) X X X
(1) Subject to Parliamentary decision.
(2) Pension benefits evolve in line with life expectancy through the 'proratisation' coefficient; it has been legislated until 2028.
(3) An automatic balancing mechanism is applied in the auxiliary pension system.
(4) Subject to Parliamentary decision. The Government is obliged to provide Parliament, at least every five years, with
recommendations to keep a stable proportion between the contribution period and life expectancy at retirement.
(5) The legal retirement age is linked to two thirds of the increase in life expectancy.
(6) In NDC systems, the benefit is linked to changes in life expectancy through the annuity factor.
126
Table II.A4.5: Contribution rates to the public pension system
State contributions
Contribution rate: employer Contribution rate: employee Contribution rate: self-employed
Contribution rate Other provisions
Social security spending is also funded by State subisidies (around 19% of total
In 2023, 20.5% for revenues up to EUR 70.858 and 14.16%
BE 24.92% (for all Social Security schemes) 13.07% (for all Social Security schemes) - revenue) and alternative funding (around 16% of total revenue), mainly VAT
for revenues between EUR 70.858 and EUR 104.722.
revenues.
Born before 1960: 19.8% of declared covered earnings in the
8.22% when born after 1959; 11.02% when born 6.58% when born after 1959; 8.78% when born before
BG - State commitment to cover the deficit on an annual basis. preceding year; born after 1959: 14.8% of declared covered
before 1960 1960
earnings.
CZ 21.5% 6.5% - Balance of pension system is part of general governement budget 28%
DK - - - - -
State subsidies with annual indexation. 'Sustainability fund' fluctuates between
DE 9.3% 9.3% - 20% and 150% of monthly pension expenditures. The contribution rate is set so 18.6%
that this requirement is met.
20% (if not participating to 2nd pillar); 16% (if
EE - - - 20%
participating to 2nd pillar)
Social Insurance Fund and Social Assistance Fund (to finance other, non-pension
IE Varies Varies - 4% of covered income
social benefits). Shortfalls are met by the Exchequer.
Contributions are based on insurance classes. Corresponding
EL Main pensions 13.33%; auxiliary pensions 3% Main pensions 6.67%; auxiliary pensions 3% - National budget/other sources insurable base is derived taking into account contribution rate
of 20%.
Private sector: 23.6% + contribution to Private sector: 4.7% + contribution to Intergenerational
Pension Reserve Fund. If needed, annual funding gaps are covered through
ES Intergenerational Equity Mechanism (0.5% in 2023, Equity Mechanism (0.1% in 2023, rising to 0.2% in - 29.5% (including 1.2% to Intergenerational Equity Mechanism)
central government transfers.
rising to 1% in 2029) 2029)
Private sector (CNAV): 10.45% up to the Social Private sector (CNAV): 7.3% up to the social security Pensions Reserve Fund, Old-age solidarity fund, specific taxes and external
FR - 17.75% up to the SSC and 0.6% above.
Security Ceiling (SSC) and 1.9% above ceiling (SSC) and 0.4% above. transfers
20% (public PAYG scheme participants only); 15% 20% (public PAYG scheme participants only); 15%
4.86% to 17.58% for employees in arduous and
HR (participants in both public PAYG scheme and - Government is committed to cover deficits. (participants in both public PAYG scheme and mandatory fully-
hazardous occupations
mandatory fully-funded DC scheme) funded DC scheme)
IT 23.81% 9.19% - Residual funding by the State (pension expenditure exceeding contributions) 24%
CY 8.3% 8.3% 4.9% Reserve fund 15.6% of insurable income
Total contribution rate for old-age pension capital
Contribution rate for old-age pension capital: 20% (if no
(employer and employee): 20% (if no participant of
LV - - - participant of 2nd tier) or 16% (if participant of 2nd tier) with
2nd tier) or 16% (if participant of 2nd tier), with 4%
4% contribution to the 2nd tier.
contribution to the 2nd tier
State provides funds from the national budget to cover the general pension part of 8.72% - based on 50% of declared earnings (90% when
LT 0.0% 8.72% -
public pension scheme engaged in an individual activity).
LU 8% 8% 8% Buffer fund of at least 1.5 times the amount of annual pension expenditure 16%
11.8% in 2020, 11.1% in 2021, 9.3% in 2022 (part of
10% of declared monthly earnings and 9.3% of declared
HU social contribution tax payed into Pension Insurance 10% - -
monthly earnings in the form of a social contribution tax.
Fund)
15% of the annual income, subject to the same ceiling as for
MT 10% 10% 10% -
employees.
Government supplements shortfall between expenditure and funds raised by the
NL - 17.9% - 17.9%
17.9% tax levy
For farmers, self employed and liberal professions, the
17% for farmers, 18.5% for self-employed and 20% for liberal
AT 12.55% 10.25% difference with the standard contribution rate of 22.8% Federal budget covers the deficits in public pension schemes
professions.
is borne by federal transfers
PL 9.76% 9.76% - Demographic Reserve Fund 19.52%
Employee: 21.4% or 25.2%; employer: 10%, if economic
PT 23.75% 11% - Social Security Trust Fund dependence is higher than 80%, or 7% if economic
dependence is between 50% and 80%.
Between 0% and 8%: 0% (normal working conditions);
State provides funds from the national budget to cover the public pension system
RO 4% (difficult working conditions) and 8% (special 25% - 25%
deficit.
working conditions)
State provides funds from the national budget and other sources to cover
SI 8.85% 15.5% - 24.35%
shortfalls.
21.75% of gross wage (including disability insurance
Government makes contributions for people insured by the state (e.g. maternity 28.75% (including disability insurance contribution) if only
contribution) if one does not participate in the 2nd 7% of gross wage (including disability insurance
SK - leave) and covers special benefits (e.g. 13. pension, minimum pension). covered in the 1st pillar; otherwise 5.50% is sent to the
pillar; otherwise 5.50% is sent to the second pillar in contribution)
Otherwise, social security system deficits are covered by state transfers. second pillar in 2023 (rising to 6% by 2027).
2023 (rising to 6 % by 2027)
17.39% for private sector, including the 0.44% National and guarantee pensions are fully funded by the State. Part of farmers’,
FI repayment installment of the employer's contribution 7.15% (17-52y and +63y); 8.65% (53-62y) 17.11% for State pensions self-employed persons’ and seafarers’ pensions are funded by the State. 25% of 24.1% (17-52y and +63y); 25.6% (53-62y)
reduction; 16.84% for local government (in 2023). private sector pension is prefunded.
SE 10.21% (including Premium Pension) 7% (including Premium Pension) Employer contribution for social insurance Buffer funds 17.21%
14.1% in 2022 (temporary increase in 2023 by 5% for State Pension Fund contributes to financing government expenditures (pension
NO 7.9% - 11.1%
wages exceeding NOK 750.000) and other)
When several schemes exist, the information refers to the main (general regime) pension scheme.

Part II
127
ANNEX 5
Coverage and specification of pension schemes
Table II.A5.1: Coverage and specification of pension schemes
Schemes covered in the projections Schemes not covered

BE Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Public pension scheme
Means-tested minimum benefits: 65+; 66+ as of 2025; 67+ as of Unemployment with company
2030. allowance only includes the part paid
through unemployment benefits, not the
Wage earners: earnings-related old-age pensions (63+ and 41 career allowance paid by the employer.
years in 2018 and 63+ and 42 career years as of 2019(a)), widows.
Private occupational pensions scheme
Self-employed: earnings-related old-age pensions (63+ and 41
career years in 2018 and 63+ and 42 career years as of 2019(a)), Wage earners.
widows.
Self-employed.
Civil servants: earnings-related old-age pensions (63+ and 42
career years as of 2019(a)), widow(er)s, disability. Private individual voluntary pension
scheme
Unemployment with company allowance (wage earners): 62+ and
40 career years, until the age of 65 (66 as of 2025, 67 as of 2030).
Unemployment with company allowance (wage earners) for
companies undergoing restructuring or in difficulty: 60+ until the
age of 65 (66 as of 2025, 67 as of 2030).
Public pensions: disability
Wage earners, disability pensions: -64; -65 as of 2025; -66 as of
2030.
Self-employed, disability pensions: -64; -65 as of 2025; -66 as of
2030.
(a)
Some exceptions: 61 and 43 career years, 60 and 44 career years.
BG Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Supplementary mandatory pension
schemes
Earnings-related old-age pensions (including farmers and military
officials). Supplementary life-long old-age
pensions - Universal Pension Funds
Public pensions: other (UPF).
Earnings-related disability pensions due to general disease Early retirement pensions for a limited
(including farmers and military officials). period for people working in hazardous
Earnings-related disability pensions due to work injury and conditions - Professional Pension Funds
professional disease (including farmers and military officials). (PPF).
Earnings-related survivors’ pensions according to relationship with Supplementary voluntary pension

the deceased – widows, children, parents. schemes – individual private and
occupational pensions.
Pensions not related to employment – social pensions, special merits
pensions, pensions by Decree. Teachers’ Pension Fund.
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CZ Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Individual private schemes

Earnings-related old-age pensions (all sectors except armed forces, Voluntary fully funded scheme.
all ages).
Early pensions with permanent reductions (all sectors except armed
forces, all ages).
Public pensions: other
Disability pensions (all three types of disability, all sectors except
armed forces, all ages).
Widows and widower pensions (all ages).
Orphan pensions (all ages).
DK Public pensions: old-age and early pensions
Public flat-rate old-age pensions and means-tested supplements, all

citizens 67+ (68+ as of 2030, 69+ as of 2035).
Civil servants old-age pensions 67+, central and local government.
Voluntary early retirement schemes, all wage earners.
Disability pensions, -66.
Occupational pensions
Labour market pensions.
Individual, private pensions.
Labour market supplementary pensions, ATP.
Employees’ capital fund (LD).
DE Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Means-tested minimum benefits to
elderly (social assistance); 0.17% of
Earnings-related old-age, widows and disability schemes, all ages. GDP in 2022.
General scheme and civil servants. Farmers’ pensions; 0.07% of GDP in
Early pensions for long-time workers. 2022.
Early pensions for severely handicapped. Occupational pensions
Public pensions: other Annual contributions.

(covered above; not shown separately) Pension expenditure of 1.1% of GDP in
2022.
Individual funded and state subsidised
private pension (Riester-Rente),
schemes at a building stage, only
contributions to the schemes.
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European Commission
EE Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Occupational and voluntary private
individual pensions
Minimum flat-rate pensions, all citizens.
Earnings-related old-age pensions; 65+ for both sexes as of 2026, all
sectors (Pension Insurance Fund).
Early pensions (possible to retire 5 years before the statutory
retirement age), all sectors.
Disability pensions (work ability benefits) and survivors’ pensions,
all ages, all sectors (Pension Insurance Fund).
Private mandatory pensions
Funded schemes, mandatory for people born as of 1983, with
possibility to opt out since 2021.
IE Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Occupational pensions

Minimum flat-rate old-age non-contributory pensions, 66+ (also Private sector schemes and public
includes widow(er)s non-contributory pensions, deserted wives, sector commercial bodies.
66+), all sectors.
Carers, 66+, all sectors.
Flat-rate contributory 66+, private sector, self-employed and some
civil servants.
Widow(er)s contributory pensions, 66+, all sectors.
Carers and deserted wives (scheme winded down), 66+, private
sector, self-employed and some civil servants.
Public pensions: others
Widow(er)s non-contributory pensions, 65-, all sectors.
Blind people, carers, 65-, all sectors.
Disability pensions, 65-, and invalidity pensions 65-, private sector,
self-employed, some civil servants.
Carers, contributory, 65-, private sector, self-employed, some civil
servants.
Widow(er) contributory pension, 65-, all sectors.
Public sector occupational pensions
Pensions, lump sums and spouses, civil service, defence, police,
education, health and local authorities, non-commercial state
bodies.
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Part II
EL Public pensions Welfare benefits

Main pension: private sector (employees, self-employed and Occupational and voluntary private
farmers) and public sector. National pension (flat rate) and pension schemes.
(earnings-related) proportionate amount based on the total period
of insurance for all insured (statutory retirement age 67+)
(including transitional period for old system regarding age
thresholds and farmers).
Means-tested flat rate pensions of uninsured individuals 67+.
Disability pensions, 15-67y.
Survivors’ pensions, all ages.
Early pensions 62+, transition period.
Auxiliary pension (old-age, disability, survivor): NDC system
(including transitional period for old DB system).
Mandatory fully funded defined-contribution (DC) scheme

Auxiliary pension for new entrants to the labour market from 2022
onwards.
ES Public pensions: old-age and early pensions
Earnings-related old-age and early retirement pensions for private
sector employees, the self-employed, regional and local and central
government and the military.
Means-tested minimum pension supplements (contributory).
Means-tested minimum pension scheme (non-contributory).
War pensions.
Disability (-64) and survivors’ pensions (all ages) for private sector
employees, self-employed, regional, local and central government
and the military.
Means-tested minimum pension supplements (contributory).
Means-tested minimum pension scheme (non-contributory).
Private pensions
Private (supplementary and voluntary) pension schemes:
occupational and individual.
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European Commission
FR Public pensions - earnings-related Public pensions - earnings-related

Basic old-age pension schemes for all types of workers: private and Mandatory complementary pension
public sector employees, civil servants, self-employed, agricultural scheme for civil servants (RAFP,
sector, regulated private-practice professionals (e.g. architects, introduced in 2005): < 0.02% of GDP
lawyers, doctors) and other specific professions (e.g. railway in 2021.
workers).
Mandatory complementary pension schemes for the above
categories of workers except civil servants. Occupational and other private
pension schemes (PERP, PERCO,
Early pensions for long-time workers. PERE, PREFON): <0.3% of GDP in
2021.
Survivors’ pensions.
Non-contributory minimum pensions.
Disability (earnings-related and non-earnings-related) pension
benefits covered by the health insurance scheme.
HR Public pensions Voluntary private individual pension
schemes.
Old-age and early retirement pensions.
Disability pensions.
Minimum pensions (no means-tested).
Pensions of people who could be granted benefits from the PAYG
public pension scheme under more favourable conditions (e.g.
military officers, police officers and authorized officials, war
veterans from the Homeland War).
Mandatory fully funded defined-contribution (DC) scheme based
on individual savings accounts
Mandatory for all people born as of 1962 and for people born
between 1953 and 1962 who voluntarily joined the private second
pillar scheme.
IT Public pensions and social assistance benefits Occupational pensions
They are not included in the definition
Old-age and early retirement pensions. of the ‘Public pension system’ (used for
Disability pensions. the analysis of the sustainability of
public finances) insofar as:
Survivors’ pensions. (i) they are never mandatory and (ii)
Old-age allowances and social assistance additional lump sums they provide a pension supplement that
(State budget). corresponds to a minor fraction of the
pension guaranteed by the public
pension system and never replace it. No
risk is taken by the State on investment
returns.
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Part II
CY Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Occupational pensions
General Social Insurance Scheme (GSIS), covering the following DB pension schemes for semi-state and
benefits: early, statutory, invalidity and survivors’ pensions. private sector employees.
Government Employees Pension Scheme (GEPS) covering old-age, DC provident funds for private sector
widows’ and disability pensions. employees.
Social pension scheme and special allowances to pensioners.

LV Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Voluntary private funded pension
scheme
Old-age minimum pension, 65+ (as of 2025).
Specific public sector service pensions
Earnings-related old-age DB pensions, granted before 1996. schemes (paid from State budget).
Earnings-related old-age NDC pensions, 65+ (as of 2025), granted
as of 1996 (included early retirement).
Disability pensions, granted before 1996 and not transformed to old-
age pensions.
Disability pensions -65 (as of 2025).
Survivors’ pensions -24.
Individual funded old-age, mandatory for people born after 1971.
Social pension
public benefit, insurance record <15 years (<20 years from 2025),
paid from the state basic budget.
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LT Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Voluntary private pension schemes
Social assistance pensions, women 63.7+, men 64.3+ (65+ as of
2026); (State budget).
Earnings-related old-age pensions, women 63.7+, men 64.3+ (65+
as of 2026), all sectors (Social Insurance scheme).
Early retirement pensions (possible to retire 5 years before the
statutory retirement age), all sectors (Social Insurance scheme).
Public pensions: disability pensions
Social assistance disability pensions (State budget).
Earnings-related disability pensions, all sectors (Social Insurance
scheme).
Public pensions: survivors’ pensions
Social assistance survivors’ pensions (State budget).
Survivors’ pensions, all sectors (Social Insurance scheme).
Special public service (state) pensions for selected professions
(scientists, judges) (State budget); state pensions of the first and
second degree of the Republic of Lithuania (State budget); state
pensions of deprived persons (State budget) women 63.7+, men
64.3+ (65+ as of 2026).
Officials and military personnel pensions (for service, disability and
survivors), public sector (State budget); length of service pensions,
compensation for extraordinary working conditions (Social
Insurance scheme).
Pension supplement to small social insurance old-age and disability
pensions – top-up to the ceiling of the basket of minimum
consumption needs; depends on contribution period and the total
amount of pension benefits received by the pensioner.
Individual funded old-age pension, quasi mandatory, all sectors.
LU Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Voluntary private pension schemes
(occupational and individual), social
Earnings-related old-age, early retirement, disability pensions (65+), assistance (REVIS)
private sector and self-employed (general pension scheme).
Earnings-related old-age, early retirement, disability pensions (65+),
public sector (special pension scheme), state budget.
Disability (-64 years) and survivors’ pensions, all sectors.
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HU Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Support for disabled people, political
compensation allowances.
Social allowances close to minimum pensions to people above
retirement age. Voluntary private pension schemes
(occupational and individual)
Earnings-related old-age and anticipatory old-age pensions, all
sectors.
Survivors’ pensions, above retirement age, all sectors.
Disability pensions, above retirement age, all sectors.
Disability benefits, below retirement age, all sectors.
Survivors’ pensions, below retirement age, all sectors.
Pension-like regular social allowances, below retirement age.
Individual funded pensions. People who entered the labour market
before 2010 and chose to remain in the scheme, can have some
entitlements.
MT Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Private pension schemes (occupational
and individual)
Two-thirds pension scheme (incorporating two-thirds retirement
pension, national minimum pension, increased national minimum
pension, and decreased national minimum pension), 64y in 2023 and
65y as of 2027.
Pensions other than those listed above, notably disability and
survivors’ pensions and some pensions, including Treasury Pensions
(a DB pension scheme open to Public Officers who joined the
Public Service prior to 15/01/1979 and that is closed to new
members) and increased retirement pension, which will be phased
out over a transition period, to specific groups of pensioners.
Public pensions: disability: decreased national invalidity pension,
national minimum invalidity pension
Public pensions: survivors: early survivorship pension, national
minimum widows’ pension, survivors’ pension
Non-contributory old-age pension
NL Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Individual private pensions
Public flat-rate old-age pensions, 66.6y in 2022 (67y in 2024, linked
to life expectancy as of 2026), all citizens (AOW).
Widow pensions, women 55+, all sectors (ANW).
Disability benefits, all sectors (WAO; being phased out), WIA,
WaJong).
Occupational old-age pensions, legal retirement age, all sectors.
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AT Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Private occupational and individual
pensions
Earnings-related regular old-age pensions:
Private sector (including blue and white-collar workers, self-
employed and farmers): female 60y, male 65y (female retirement
age will rise gradually to 65 years in 2024-2033).
Public sector: female 65y, male 65y.
Earnings-related early retirement pensions (details concern private
sector):
Corridor pension scheme (‘Korridorpension’): female 62y, male
62y (for women this gets relevant only by 2028); required number
of insurance years is 40; 5.1% deduction per year before the regular
retirement age.
Early old-age pension for long-term contributors
(‘Hacklerregelung’): female 62y (born as of 1966), male 62y (born
as of 1954); required number of contribution years is 45; 4.2%
deduction for each year below the regular retirement age.
Heavy worker regulation (‘Schwerarbeitspension’): female 60y,
male 60y (for women this gets relevant only by 2024); required
number of insurance years is 45, at least 10 years of ‘hard labour’
within 20 years before retirement; 1.8% deduction per year before
the regular retirement age.
Early old-age pension for long-term contributors in
combination with heavy worker regulation (‘Hackler-
Schwerarbeit’): female 55y (born 1959-1963), male 60y (born
1954-1958); required number of insurance years is 40 for women,
45 for men; 1.8% deduction per year before the regular retirement
age.

Survivors’ pensions (widow, widower and orphans): all sectors.
Invalidity and occupational disability pensions: only in case of
permanent disability; the temporary invalidity pension was replaced
by medical and job-related rehabilitation and was completely
abolished for people born as of 1964 (therefore, the temporary
invalidity pension will fade out); all sectors.
Items not included in standard public pension expenditure but

covered in the projections
Minimum guarantee pensions: no legal minimum pension exists;
if individual pension claims are lower than legally defined
thresholds, the gap will be closed by federal budget contributions to
guarantee a minimum income for pensioners (equalising allowance
or ‘Ausgleichszulage’); the Ausgleichszulage is considered a social
benefit; all sectors.
Rehabilitationsgeld: only in case of temporary invalidity;
healthcare expenditure but paid out of the pension insurance pocket.
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Part II
PL Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Private pensions

Earnings-related DB old-age, women 60+, men 65+, disability, Private individual (non-mandatory)
widows, people born before 1949, private and public sector, self- pension schemes (including the
employed (ZUS, Social Insurance Institution). remaining part of the former
mandatory FDC pillar).
Earnings-related NDC old-age, women 60+, men 65+, private and
public sector, self-employed (ZUS). Private (non-mandatory) occupational
pension schemes.
Earnings-related NDC bridging pensions (employment in special
conditions or character) women 55+, men 60+.
Earnings-related DB old-age, disability and widows’ pensions, all
ages, farmers (KRUS, Farmers social insurance scheme).
Armed forces old-age pensions (State budget).
Disability and survivors’ pensions, private and public sector, self-
employed (ZUS).
Private quasi mandatory pensions
DC funded old-age pensions.
Includes supplements to ensure minimum pensions.
PT Public pensions Private individual pensions
Social Security System Individual (non-mandatory) private
- Contributory Welfare System (private sector employees and self- pension schemes.
employed, public employees since 2006 and special pensions): old-
age, disability and survivors’ pensions. Includes supplements to
ensure minimum pension value.
- Social Solidarity protection System (non-contributory and means-
tested): old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions.
- RESSAA (special social security scheme for agricultural
workers): old-age, disability and survivors’ pensions.
CGA (Pension scheme of civil servants hired until 2005): old-age
and early pensions, disability and survivors’ pensions. Includes
supplements to ensure minimum pensions values and special
pensions. Non-contributory CGA pensions are reported under
‘other pensions’ in the questionnaire.
Solidarity supplement for the elderly (non-contributory means-
tested scheme designed to help pensioners with low incomes).
Private occupational pensions

Occupational DB and DC pension schemes financed by pension
funds, all sectors.
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RO Public old-age pensions Private individual, voluntary pensions

Women 60+/63y, men 65y, standard contribution period women
30+/35y, men 35y.
No contribution period requirements for work accidents,
professional diseases, people with neoplasms, suffering from
schizophrenia or AIDS. For ordinary diseases and non-work-related
accidents, a minimum contribution period is required.
Early and partial early retirement
5 years before the statutory retirement age, provided the full
contribution period is exceeded by at least 8 years (for early
retirement) or by less than 8 (for partial early retirement, which is
penalised).
Survivors’ pensions: children and spouse.
Disability pension: people who lost at least half of their capacity to
work.
Military, farmers, special pensions, special indemnities.
Sine 2016, military pensions are paid by the State’s Budget, instead
of the State’s Social Insurance Budget.
Private mandatory pension
Compulsory for eligible people under the age of 35; voluntary for
age group 35-45.
SI Public pensions: old-age and early pensions National (state) pensions: excluded
from Pension and Disability Act in
Old-age pension (60+ with 40 years of service; 65+ with minimum 2012 (individuals can ask for social
insurance period of 15 year). assistance).
Early retirement (60+ with 40 year of insurance period, including
purchased years). Mandatory collective supplementary
pensions for public employees.
Special compulsory (occupational) pensions for workers in high-
risk occupations, private and public sector. Non-mandatory collective
Public pensions: other supplementary pensions (private
sector) - based on collective
Disability pensions agreements.
Survivors’ pensions
Private non-mandatory individual
Flat-rate pensions for farmers supplementary pensions (private and
public sector).
Pension supplements for the military personnel of the former
Yugoslav army and retirees from other republics of former SFRY.
Annual allowance for pensioners
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SK Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Voluntary individual pension: funded
DC scheme, introduced in 1996.
Earnings-related old-age pensions and early pensions, all ages.
Pension scheme of the municipal
police: small DB scheme, introduced in
Disability pensions, widow and widower pensions, orphan pensions, 2020. Quasi early retirement scheme
all ages. that provides ‘pensions’ to municipal
Minimum pensions, 13th pension, 14th pension (one-off police officers that leave the force until
disbursement in 2022), parental pension, means-tested minimum they reach the retirement age.
benefits to elderly (social assistance).
Private mandatory pensions – partly covered
Individual old-age pension: covers people that chose to take part in
the scheme and those that had been included in the scheme when it
was mandatory (prior to 2008) and did not exit during any of the
openings (in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2015). As of 2023, the scheme is
mandatory again for people entering the labour market for the first
time, though with the possibility to opt out.
The special pension system of the armed forces and police.
FI Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Occupational and voluntary individual
pensions: collective and voluntary
Earnings-related old-age pension. Minimum eligible age: 63 years supplementary schemes.
for individuals born before 1954. For those born in 1955 or later, the
minimum retirement age increases by 3 months for each birth cohort
until reaching 65 years (+65 years from 2027 and linked to life
expectancy from 2030). Applicable to private sector (TyEL), self-
employed (YEL), farmers (MYEL) and the public sector (JuEL,
covers central government, municipal sector and church employees).
Earnings-related partial early old-age pension (50% or 25%).
Minimum eligible age 61 years. Starting in 2026, minimum age
increases to 62 years, and from 2027 onwards it will be linked to
life-expectancy, set 3 years lower than old-age pension minimum
age).
National old-age pension (National pension insurance), +65 years.
Early national pension, +63 years for individuals born in 1957 or
before and +64 years for people born in 1958-1961.
Old-age pension for long-term unemployed, +62 years for
individuals born in 1957 or before and +64 years for individuals
born in 1958-1961.
Guarantee pension (guaranteed minimum amount) for individuals
over 65 years (16-64 years for disability pensioners).
Disability pension, 16-64 years, national pension scheme.
Disability pension, 17-62 years, earnings-related, all sectors.
Survivors’ pensions, no age limit for widow(er)s, 0-18y for orphans
(both earnings-related and national pension schemes).
Years-of-service pension, +63 years, earnings-related, all sectors.
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SE Public pensions: old-age and early pensions

Minimum pension, housing supplement for pensioners, maintenance
support for the elderly (State budget), 66+ (increasing in line with
life expectancy).
Earnings-related NDC old-age pensions, flexible from 62 years
(increasing in line with life expectancy), including old transitional
DB system, all sectors (Social insurance scheme).
Disability pensions, from age 19 until old-age retirement.
Survivor benefits, all ages (State budget).
Occupational (supplementary) DC and DB pensions, all sectors.
Individual mandatory fully funded old-age pension, flexible from 62
years (increasing in line with life expectancy), all sectors (Social
insurance scheme).
Private non-mandatory pensions
Tax-deductible pension savings (since 2016 only deductible for self-
employed).
NO Public pensions: old-age and early pensions Public pensions
Earnings-related benefits. Survivors’ pensions (abolished in 2023
and replaced by a transitory
Minimum income guarantee. arrangement).
Public pensions: other Central government occupational
Disability pensions. pension scheme: financed by employee
contributions and transfers from State
budget; supplement to public old-age
pension.
Local government occupational pension
schemes: funded schemes; supplement
to public old-age pension.
Private pensions
Mandatory private sector occupational
schemes: funded defined contribution
schemes; supplement to public old-age
pension.
Private non-mandatory defined benefits
and defined contribution schemes.
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ANNEX 6
Long-term care model structure
Graph II.A6.1: Long-term care model structure for the 2024 Ageing Report
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ANNEX 7
Data sources for health care expenditure
Data sources health care

The data required to run long-term public expenditure projections in the field of health care ( 90) includes:
• Population by age and gender.
• Total public expenditure on health care.
• Per capita public expenditure on health care by age and gender cohorts (age/gender specific
expenditure profiles). ( 91)
• Fiscal impact of legislated policy measures in the health care area.
• Health sector-specific expenditure shares and their relative growth rates in the past 10 years (for the
sector-specific indexation scenario).
The data collection procedure takes two steps. First, the Commission (DG ECFIN) pre-filles data based
on existing databases managed by international organisations (Eurostat, OECD, AMECO). The
questionnaire is then circulated to Member States and Norway, to endorse the pre-filled figures and
complement these with data from national sources if no data was available from international sources.
The completed data questionnaires are used for conducting the projections.
Note that age/gender-specific per capita public expenditure on health care are not available in any
common international databases. Therefore, they are provided exclusively by the Member States and are
based on national sources and methodologies.
Population by age and gender

Eurostat population projections (EUROPOP2023) by age and gender is used for the health care public
expenditure projections. Given the universal coverage of health care public provision in the EU and
Norway, the whole population is assumed to be covered over the projection horizon. The only exception
is Germany, where no legal obligation exists for public provision of health care to the share of the
population that is compulsory insured in private health insurance funds (approximately 10% of the
German population). Consequently, solely the German population compulsory insured in social insurance
funds is used in the health care projections. To that end, national data on projected participation rates by
age and gender in the social insurance funds is applied to the EUROPOP2023 projections for Germany.
Computing total public expenditure on health care

To calculate total public health care expenditure, the sum of the following two components is used:
1. Public current expenditure on health care – computed as the sum of all “core” health care System of
Health Accounts 2011 (SHA 2011) functions/expenditure categories HC.1 to HC.9, excluding HC.3
(defined as “Long-Term Care (health)” in SHA 2011). More specifically, for the current public
expenditure on health care the following SHA 2011 categories are used: Curative care (HC.1); and
Rehabilitative care (HC.2); Ancillary services (HC.4); Medical goods (HC.5); Preventive care
(HC.6); Governance, and health system and financing administration (HC.7); Other health care
services not elsewhere classified (HC.9).
(90) As explained below, this definition of health care excludes SHA expenditure category HC.3, which is included in the long-term
care expenditure category.
(91) The age-gender cost profiles are accepted for use based on a plausible description of the underlying national methodology and
data sources.
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Part II
2. Public expenditure on gross capital formation in health from the COFOG GF07 “Health” function
excluding the GF0705 “R&D Health” category. To smooth the volatility inherent to capital
formation, the average value for the last four years is used.
SHA data by function/expenditure category and respective sub-functions is available on Eurostat, OECD
Health Data, and WHO Data for All. At the time of compiling the questionnaire on health care, SHA data
on current public health expenditure is available up to year 2020. In past Ageing Reports, the latest
available SHA data point was used as a reference to the base year estimate. However, the COVID-19
pandemic increased the health care public current expenditure in all Member States, though to a varying
degree. Given the difficulties to collect complete data on COVID-19 related expenditure in order to
subtract the ones that can be considered as one-off or temporary spending, public current expenditure for
year 2019 is used instead as a reference point for the 2022 (base) year estimate. The data in million euros
have been extracted from Eurostat for all countries, except for Germany. For the purpose of the Ageing
Report, data on health care expenditure of the German compulsory private health insurances is not
considered. The public current health care expenditure for Germany is therefore comprised by the
government and social health insurances shares, which are reported on the OECD database only. The
figures in percentage of GDP for all countries are calculated on the basis of the GDP figures in million
euros from the AMECO database (spring forecast 2023).
On top of these components, COFOG data on capital formation from Eurostat is added. Most recent data
refer to year 2021. In past Ageing Reports, to smooth the volatility inherent to capital formation, the
average value for the last four years available was normally used. For the purposes of the 2024 Ageing
Report the years 2016 to 2019 are used for calculating the four-year average to align it with the 2019
values on current public expenditure on health care used from SHA and avoid over-estimating future
capital formation by excluding the temporary and extraordinary increases of the COVID-19 pandemic
years. COFOG data on capital formation in million euros has been extracted from Eurostat. The figures in
percentage of GDP for all countries are calculated on the basis of the GDP figures in million euros from
the AMECO database (spring forecast 2023). For Norway, GDP for mainland Norway is used as provided
by Statistics Norway.
Per capita public expenditure on health care by age and gender cohorts
The submission of gender and age specific cost-profiles for public health care expenditure is important to
track the impact of population ageing on future expenditure and essential for the health care projection
model used for the Ageing Report. To avoid possible data distortions in the pandemic years (excess
COVID-19 expenditure coupled with missing expenditure for postponed elective surgeries and other
diagnostics and chronic diseases treatments), countries are invited to base the calculations of the age-
gender cost profiles on the 2019 public expenditure data and health care consumption. Countries submit
age-gender cost profiles by single age or 5-year age groups. As age-cost profiles are computed following
national data sources and methodologies, they vary sometimes quite substantially, both over time and
across countries. This requires the submission of a documentation of the methodology and data sources
used to compute the age-gender cost profiles.
Fiscal impact of policy measures, including Resilience and Recovery Plans and COVID-19
measures
Fiscal and health care structural reforms may impact on the expenditure path, and the projections in the
Ageing Report need to take this into account. This is useful information for correctly determining the
situation in the base year and subsequent years of the projections.
Countries submit information and data on relevant or recently legislated or implemented policy measures
and reforms that have a potential impact on the health care expenditure path as part of the data collection
process. To this end, a description of the policy measures, the legal documents confirming the reforms
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European Commission
and the estimated fiscal impact on (if applicable) the components of expenditure is submitted to the
Commission.
A distinction is made between one-off (temporary) and permanent fiscal effects of health care policy
measures. One-off policy measures are typically capital investments or bonuses paid to health personnel
such as those paid during the COVID-19 crisis. Policy measures with permanent fiscal effects are such as
an increase/decrease of salaries in the health sector, change in the reimbursement volumes or basket of
health goods and services, operational costs of new hospitals or other health care institutions. One-off
(temporary) public expenditure only affects the projection results of the respective year(s), while policy
measures with permanent fiscal effect also affect the projection results of the subsequent years.
Furthermore, fiscal spending linked to the national Resilience and Recovery Plan’s (RRP) health care
reforms and investments can be indicated for the base year and the following years if implementation has
already started or reforms have been legislated. This includes both one-off national fiscal spending as
well as recurrent costs stemming from RRP health-related measures. National expenditure related to RRP
measures that have not yet been legislated or implemented is not included, as these are subject to
uncertainty and potential renegotiations.
Finally, countries submit data on expenditure related to the COVID-19 crisis that affect year 2022 (e.g.
permanent increase in salaries since year 2019 or long-lasting increase in prevention services such as
vaccines or testing). More specifically, all countries are requested to provide information for the base year
estimate on COVID-19 related public expenditure that were introduced from 2020 onwards and were not
discontinued in 2022.
Data used for calculating the sector-specific composite indexation

In the ‘sector-specific composite indexation scenario’ the importance and evolution of various
components to health care provision is captured. The components are: (1) inpatient care, (2) outpatient
care and ancillary services, (3) pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances, (4) preventive care, (5)
governance and administration, and (6) capital investment. They broadly reflect the different sectors of
the health system and correspond to the categories of the System of Health Accounts (SHA).
As shown in Table II.A7.1 the respective share in public expenditure on health care of each component is
calculated with SHA data for the latest year available, except for the capital formation component, for
which COFOG data on gross capital formation on health excluding R&D health is used. These shares are
then applied to the age-specific per capita expenditure and by so doing each age-specific per capita
expenditure is divided into six sub-items of expenditure.
Next, the past evolution of public expenditure on each of those components is calculated as average
annual growth rate for the past 10 years for each country. Due to current data limitations for building 10-
year time series from data based on the SHA 2011 classification, data from COFOG categories in
correspondence to the SHA 2011 health care functions are used for the calculation of the average annual
Table II.A7.1: Data sources for the sector-specific indexation components

Outpatient care
Medical goods
Inpatient care (curative and (curative and Governance and
(pharmaceuticals and Preventive care Capital formation
rehabilitative care) rehabilitative care) + administration
therapeutic appliances)
Ancillary services
(HC.1.3 + HC.1.4 + GF07 "Health"
HC.1.1 + HC.1.2 + HC.2.1
HC.2.3 + HC.2.4) + HC.5 HC.6 HC.7 + HC.9 function excluding
+ HC.2.2
HC.4 GF0705 "R&D Health"
SHA SHA SHA SHA SHA COFOG

Eurostat or OECD Eurostat or OECD Eurostat or OECD Eurostat or OECD Eurostat or OECD Eurostat
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expenditure growth rate for each component.
Lastly, the ratio of each of these 10-year average growth rates to the 10-year average growth rate of GDP
is built. Due to high volatility in the relative growth rates for prevention, capital formation and
governance and administration, these items are excluded from the indexation. Moreover, the relative
growth rates of the other three components (hospitals, outpatient care and medical goods) are capped at
their respective 25th and 75th percentiles.
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Data sources for long-term care expenditure
DATA SOURCES LONG-TERM CARE

As in past projection exercises, the 2024 Ageing Report will rely whenever possible on data following
common methodologies and definitions (i.e. the System of Health Accounts - SHA) agreed by
international institutions (Eurostat, OECD and WHO), gathered through the joint data collection exercise
(i.e. the joint OECD-Eurostat-WHO questionnaire) and reported in Eurostat (Cronos) and OECD (Health
Data) databases. ( 92)
SHA 2011 expenditure data are available for all EU Member States for variable HC.3, but only for a
limited number of Member States for the voluntary variable HC.R.1, which requires the use of the
European System of integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) database to construct a proxy for
this missing variable in several countries.
SHA and ESSPROS data on current long-term public expenditure are available up to the year 2020. In
past Ageing Reports, the latest available SHA data point was used as a reference to the base year
estimate. However, the COVID-19 pandemic increased the current public health care expenditure in all
Member States, though to a varying degree. Given the difficulties to collect complete data on COVID-19
related expenditure in order to subtract the ones that can be considered as one-off or temporary spending,
public current expenditure for the year 2019 is used instead as a reference point for the 2022 (base) year
estimate. Data in millions of euros have been extracted from Eurostat for all countries, except for
Germany. For the Ageing Report, data on health care expenditure of the German compulsory private
health insurances are not considered. Current public health care expenditure for Germany is therefore
comprised by the government and social health insurance shares, which are only reported on the OECD
database. The figures as a percentage of GDP for all countries are calculated based on the GDP figures in
million euros from the AMECO database (spring forecast 2023).
When data are not available in the international databases, they have to be provided by each Member
State individually. This is particularly the case for the number of recipients, age-cost profiles and the
breakdown of expenditure by care setting.
The data collection procedure covers the same steps as for health care (see Chapter 2 on health care), with
an equivalent questionnaire used to report the data required for the health and long-term care expenditure
projections.
The detailed analysis of available data and classifications carried out led to the following agreement. For
the Commission (DG ECFIN) to be able to calculate the proposed scenarios and run the relevant
sensitivity tests, the Member States provide the following information in the framework of the long-term
care expenditure projections:
• Total number of dependent people receiving long-term care a) in institutions b) at home and c) cash
benefits, by sex and five-year cohorts.
• Possible overlaps between the recipients of cash benefits and the recipients of long-term care in-kind
services (countries should provide information on whether this is legally possible in their long-term
care system and also on the numbers of those affected).
• Public expenditure per user (patient) on long-term care, by sex and single age or five-year cohorts (so-
called ‘age-related expenditure profiles’).
(92) See the SHA 2011 Manual (OECD, Eurostat, WHO, 2011). The manual contains guidelines for reporting health expenditure
according to an international standard. It proposes a common boundary of healthcare as well as a comprehensive and detailed
structure for classifying the components of total expenditure on health.
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• Public expenditure breakdown by care setting (institutional care, home care, cash benefits).
• Data on all policy measures implemented since 2019 that have a potential impact on the long-term
care expenditure path as part of the data collection process.
In addition, the Commission (DG ECFIN) pre-filled (according to data availability) the following items,
which the Member States had to verify/confirm:
• Total public spending on long-term care, disaggregated, into services of long-term nursing care
(classified as HC.3 in the System of Health Accounts) and social services of long-term care (classified
as HC.R.1).
• Breakdown of total public spending on long-term care into spending on institutional care, home care
and long-term care-related cash benefits derived from ESSPROS and/or SHA.
• Disability rates by sex and five-year cohorts (based on EU-SILC data).
Public expenditure on long-term care

The data sources on long-term care are described on Table II.A8.1.
According to the System of Health Accounts classification, public expenditure on long-term care is
defined as the sum of the following publicly financed items:
• Services of long-term nursing care (HC.3 in SHA 2011) (which is also called ‘long-term healthcare’
and includes both nursing care and medical care related to the cause of the dependency as well as
assistance with ADL tasks).
• ‘Social services’ of long-term care (HC.R. 1 in SHA 2011), which represent the ‘assistance services’
part, relating primarily to assistance with IADL tasks.
Taken together these should represent the total benefits allocated to dependent people, although, as
explained below, due to data availability issues, these data have to be supplemented to different degrees
with ESSPROS data to fulfil the projection needs.
Long-term care (health) public expenditure

The health component of long-term care (HC.3) includes a range of services required by persons with a
reduced degree of functional capacity, physical or cognitive, and who are consequently dependent on help
with basic activities of daily living (ADL), such as bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of bed or
chair, moving around and using the bathroom. The underlying physical or mental disability can be the
consequence of chronic illness, frailty in old age, mental retardation or other limitations of mental
functioning and/or cognitive capacity. It also includes any further medical treatment linked to the cause of
the disability as well as basic medical services including help with wound dressing, pain management,
medication, health monitoring, prevention, rehabilitation or services of palliative care.
Finally, HC.3 also includes any cash benefits spent on the services detailed above. However, these cash
benefits cannot be identified in the data, since they are assigned to the category that they are spent on by
the recipients.
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Table II.A8.1: Long-term care public expenditure base data requirements according to availability
I. Preferred solution: SHA, when data are available (all countries except those listed below)
LTC LTC LTC

LTC (health) LTC (social) (institutional care) (home care) (cash benefits)
SHA: HC.3 SHA: HCR.1 SHA: SHA: SHA:

(HC.3+HCR.1). (HC.3+HCR.1). (HC.3+HCR.1).
Institutional care Home care share Cash benefits share
share according to according to according to
ESSPROS, SHA, ESSPROS, SHA, ESSPROS, SHA,
ESSPROS+SHA or ESSPROS+SHA ESSPROS+SHA or
national data or national data national data
II. Alternative: When data on LTC (social) HCR.1 are not available from SHA for 2019, a proxy is
constructed based on ESSPROS data (BG, DE, IE, HR, IT, HU, MT, AT, PL and SK)
LTC LTC LTC

LTC (health) LTC (social) (institutional care) (home care) (cash benefits)
SHA: HC.3 ESSPROS: proxy SHA: SHA: SHA:

based on cash and in- (HC.3+HCR.1). (HC.3+HCR.1). (HC.3+HCR.1).
kind benefits Institutional care. Home care share Cash benefits share
according to Disability Share according to according to according to
and Old age functions, ESSPROS, SHA, ESSPROS, SHA, ESSPROS, SHA,
inclunding ESSPROS+SHA ESSPROS+SHA ESSPROS+SHA or
“Accommodation”, or national data or national data national data
“Home help”, “Periodic
care allowance”, and
in the Disability
function “Lump sum
care allowance”.
Adjusted to reduce
potential double-
counting with
expenditure already
included within HC.3
in SHA.
Long-term care (social) public expenditure

Long-term care recipients may also need help with instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) more
generally, such as help with activities of housework, meals, shopping, using the telephone and managing
one’s finances. The need for this type of services does not stem from social causes, but from by medical
conditions, old age or long-term disability that will often progress to more severe dependency. This type
of care is classified in SHA as a ‘social’ long-term care category HC.R.1 As in HC.3, this category also
includes cash benefit expenditure, although the data is not currently populated. A further shortcoming of
these data is that the SHA classification does not currently include expenditure on those long-term care
recipients that need help with IADL, but not with ADL.
As in the case of health care, the SHA figures on public expenditure on long-term care are available in
two separate databases: EUROSTAT database available at NewCronos website and a parallel OECD
database ‘OECD Health Data’. SHA data on HC.3 are available for all Member States. Data on HC.R.1 is
currently available for 15 Member States and Norway. For those not reporting HC.R.1, a proxy is
calculated on the basis of the following ESSPROS data categories, adjusted in order to reduce the
likelihood of double counting between HC.3 and the ESSPROS proxy:
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In-kind benefits in ESSPROS:
• ‘Disability’ function – ‘Accommodation’ (institutional care), and ‘Home help/assistance in carrying

out daily tasks’ (home care).
• ‘Old age’ function – ‘Accommodation’ (institutional care) and ‘Home help/assistance in carrying
daily tasks’ (home care).
Benefits in cash in ESSPROS:
• ‘Disability’ function – ‘Periodic care allowance’, ‘Lump sum care allowance’.
• ‘Old age’ function – ‘Periodic care allowance’.
These proxies are then validated on the basis of national expertise in order to eliminate any possible
double counting or under-counting in this area.
Public expenditure by care setting

The long-term care model projects public expenditure separately by care setting. The reason for this is
that each care setting covers a different population with different characteristics and its unit costs are
affected differently by the ageing of the population.
Institutional care refers to long-term care delivered in an institution in which the care recipient lives. It is
most appropriate for cases with relatively high degrees of dependency who need a lot of care. Institutional
care is provided to people with moderate to severe functional restrictions who live permanently or for an
extended period of time (usually for six months or longer) in specially designed institutions, or in a
hospital-like setting where the predominant service component is long-term care, although this may
frequently be combined with other services (basic medical services, help with getting meals, social
activities, etc.). In these cases, eligibility is often explicitly assessed and defined by the level (severity) of
dependency and level of care needs.
Home care refers to long-term care delivered in the private home of the care recipient. It is most
appropriate for cases with lower levels of dependency and can slow down the progression of dependency
as recipients age. Services at home include services provided by external home care providers, both
public and private, in a person’s private home on a long-lasting basis. This includes living arrangements
in specially designed or adapted flats for persons who require help on a regular basis, but where this
living arrangement still guarantees a high degree of autonomy and self-control over other aspects of a
person’s private life. Also included are services received on a day-case basis or in the form of short-term
stays in institutions, for example in the form of respite care. During these stays, persons are not
considered as ‘institutionalised,’ but are receiving temporary services to support their continued stay at
home. They also include tele-care where the care is provided in the home of the patient through IT.
In contrast to in-kind care like institutional care and home care, cash benefits are payments given to care
recipients or their families so that they can purchase care directly themselves. Public spending on cash
benefits includes social programmes offering care allowances. Care allowances were introduced in a
number of countries in order to allow households for more choice over care decisions, and to support care
provided at home or in institutions. They are mainly addressed to persons with long-term care needs who
live in their own homes but can also include people who receive care in an institution. However, the
design of these programmes varies widely across countries, which reduces the comparability between
them. Illustrating this variety of systems, it is noteworthy that in the System of Health Accounts cash
benefits can be included just as well in the HC.3 as well as in the HC.R.1 category.
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At least three types of cash-benefit programmes and/or consumer-choice programmes can be

distinguished: (1) personal budgets and consumer-directed employment of care assistants; (2) payments to
the person needing care who can spend it as (s)he likes but has to acquire sufficient care; and (3)
payments to informal caregivers.
This approach requires the identification of public expenditure on institutional care, home care, and cash
benefits.
Splitting long-term care expenditure by care setting according to SHA

In the SHA classification system, we can use the sub-functions of HC.3 to identify institutional and home
care, but with some limitations as explained below. For HC.R.1, although the classification allows for a
breakdown between in-kind care and cash benefits, these variables are not currently submitted to ESTAT
by any country.
The SHA function HC.3 (long-term care (health)) can be disaggregated into four sub-items as shown:
• Sub-function HC.3.1 comprises “long-term care (health) services provided in a health care facility
(hospital, nursing home) and requiring an overnight stay with medical supervision. The package of
services covers nursing and/or personal care, usually provided together, along with a range of other
components such as accommodation and support services”.
• Sub-function HC.3.2 comprises “planned long-term care (health) services in a health care facility but
without an overnight stay. The services may be provided in a hospital or nursing home or in a
dedicated or stand-alone day centre facility”.
• Sub-function HC.3.3 comprises “long-term care (health) services that have the purpose of managing
damaged health conditions and the associated clinical difficulties. Dependent patients with a chronic
condition may require periodic verification of medication doses and of the evolution of their
condition, and advice on how to handle symptoms that emerge as the disease evolves. These services
may refer to regular outpatient visits or to the increasing provision of remote monitoring services for
long-term care patients”.
• Sub-function HC.3.4 comprises ‘long-term care (health) services provided to persons within their own
home, or in residential settings such as adapted housing that can be considered as their home, rather
than in an ‘institution’. Such residential facilities include community-based settings, such as adapted
housing, which provide an individual housing environment in combination with certain services, such
as health protection and surveillance, often for elderly people who are becoming more dependent. It
can involve specialised health care at home and services to support informal (family or community)
care. Note that long-term care services of a lower-level social care nature (such as home help) may be
included as part of a package of home-based care. If such services cannot be separately accounted for
and are not the dominant component of the package, they should be included under HC.3.4; if,
however, they are the dominant feature, the complete package of care services should be included
under HC.R.1 ‘Long-term care (social)’.
According to the above definitions, HC.3.1 and HC.3.2 are types of care that are provided in institutions
or in community facilities (in any case not at beneficiary's home), while HC.3.4 is provided at home. This
delimitation is used as a distinction between the ‘medical’ components of long-term care being provided
in institutional and home care respectively. The case of HC.3.3 is different, as the SHA 2011 definition
has a degree of ambiguity. However, as the cases described relate mostly to home care, it is considered as
home care for the purposes of the Ageing Report.
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However, the SHA classification does not provide a cash benefits breakdown for HC.3. Cash benefits are
included in the different categories according to the services that they are used to purchase. A cash benefit
used to purchase institutional care should is therefore classified in SHA as expenditure on institutional
care.
The split by care setting of the ‘social’ component of long-term care of HC.R.1 in SHA 2011 across care
settings is problematic as well, since, although the breakdown between cash and in-kind benefits
theoretically exists but is not provided by any Member State.
As a result, SHA can be used to provide an estimated breakdown of expenditure by care settings in
Member States that do not have cash benefits.
Splitting long-term care expenditure by care setting according to ESSPROS

An alternative is to use the ESSPROS classification to identify long-term care expenditure by care setting,
deriving from the description of the ESSPROS functions - the share of spending that goes to cash
benefits, home care and institutional care, as explained above.
The accommodation variables in the ‘disability’ and ‘old age’ functions can approximate institutional care
expenditure.
The ‘home help/assistance in carrying out daily tasks’ variables in the ‘disability’ and ‘old age’ functions
can be used to estimate home care expenditure.
Finally, the ‘periodic care allowance’ variable in the ‘disability’ and ‘old age’ functions as well as the
‘lump sum care allowance’ in the ‘disability’ function can be used to estimate cash benefit expenditure.
With these three elements it is possible to use ESSPROS data to calculate the breakdown of long-term
care expenditure by care setting.
However, it should be noted that ESSPROS data also have limitations. Contrary to the SHA classification
system, ESSPROS expenditure classification system does not have specific long-term care functions.
Therefore, the definition of long-term care is not as clear-cut as in the case of SHA classification system.
Additionally, it includes both public and private expenditure. Finally, ESSPROS categories are unlikely
to contain all long-term care expenditure since they will not include the medical care component of HC.3.
2024 Ageing Report approach for splitting expenditure according to care setting
There is, therefore, no unambiguous solution to identifying the breakdown of long-term care expenditure
by care setting using the available data sets. Neither SHA nor ESSPROS provide a fully satisfactory
response.
The approach, as in the 2021 Ageing Report, uses ESSPROS proportions as a first approximation,
supplemented with SHA data whenever the ESSPROS data collection seems incomplete or the
breakdown seems to be of insufficient quality. In a second step, the long-term care expenditure
proportions by care setting and type of benefit will be validated against the breakdown derived from
national data provided by the Member States. Where available and of sufficient quality, national data will
be preferentially used to split total long-term care expenditure by care setting.
Disability rates
Similarly to past Ageing Reports, disability rates are derived from EU-SILC data and more specifically
data reported by the Global activity limitation indicator (GALI), on severe “limitations in activities
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because of health problems [for at least the last 6 months]”. ( 93) EU-SILC data, used to construct the
GALI indicator, are available for all EU Member States and Norway by age-sex group and have a
disability measure which allows us to identify severe (strongly limited) limitations.
This is considered an adequate measure of dependency with a high degree of data availability and
comparability. Indeed, it is available for 27 EU Member States and Norway, by age-sex group for people
aged 15+. ( 94) A moving average of the 5 most recent years of data available will be constructed and used
for the projections, albeit excluding any data breaks.
In addition, it is proposed that the ad-hoc 2017 EU-SILC survey focusing on children is used to
supplement this data for age-groups below 16 years. For those countries that were not covered by this
survey (the Netherlands, Denmark, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and Norway), the same methodology as in
the 2021 Ageing Report will be followed, and the four-year average dependency rate for the 16-19 age
group will be applied to this younger age group.
(93) The person’s self-assessment of whether they are hampered in their daily activity by any ongoing physical or mental health
problem, illness or disability. An activity is defined as ‘the performance of a task or action by an individual’ and thus activity
limitations are defined as ‘the difficulties the individual experience in performing an activity’. Limitations should be due to a
health condition. The activity limitations are assessed against a generally accepted population standard, relative to cultural and
social expectations by referring only to activities people usually do. This is a self-perceived health question and gives no
restrictions by culture, age, sex or the subject's own ambition. The purpose of the instrument is to measure the presence of long-
standing limitations, as the consequences of these limitations (e.g. care, dependency) are more serious. A 6-month period is
often used to define chronic or long-standing diseases in surveys.
(94) For those aged 0-14, either national data are used if available or the rate is assumed to equal those aged 15-19. The required age
breakdowns of the EU-SILC disability rates for the Ageing Report are calculated upon request of the AWG by Eurostat.
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Mathematical illustration of the health care scenarios
The formal illustration of the scenarios to project public expenditure on health care are presented in the
following sections. The scenarios are variations of the baseline.
I. Baseline
The baseline is the former ‘AWG reference scenario’ in the 2021 Ageing Report. It is based on the
Eurostat 2023 baseline projections for population and life expectancy. Further, it assumes that costs
profiles shift by half the change in age-specific life expectancy and that unit costs develop with GDP per
capita. It further assumes an elasticity of demand of 1.1 in base year 2022 which converges linearly to 1
over the projection horizon.
To calculate future public expenditure on health care, the age/sex-specific per capita public expenditure
profiles are multiplied by the respective age/sex population group in each projection year.
This scenario starts with calculating, for each projection year, the change in life expectancy in relation to
the base year. The change in life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in relation to the base year
(say, 2022) for each year of the projections, using the Eurostat population projections 2023 is given by:
∆𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡,0 = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0

II.A9.1
where:
ΔLEg,a,t,0 is the additional life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in year t compared to a person of
sex g and age a in the base year 2022;
LEg,a,t is the life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in year t; and
LEg,a,0 is the life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in the base year 2022.
The age/sex specific public expenditure profiles, showing the average public spending on health care per
capita for each year of age (from 0 to 100, according to data availability), are assumed to grow over time
in line with GDP per capita taking the income elasticity of demand into account, and considering the
changing life expectancy. Therefore, the per capita cost (expenditure) in a projected year t is:
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 t=0

II.A9.2
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 t>0
+ ∆𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎−0.5∗∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 )
where:
cg,a,t is the cost per capita of a person of a given sex g and age a in period t;
Δcg,0,a-0.5*ΔLEt is the growth rate in costs per capita due to the change in life expectancy between year 0 and
projection year t. Note that only half the change in life expectancy is considered for the shift.
(𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎−0.5∗∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡,0 − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎 )
∆𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎−0.5∗∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 = II.A9.3
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎
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where:
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎−∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡,0 is the cost per capita assigned to a person of sex g and of age a in the base year 2022 minus
half the years gained in life expectancy by a person of sex g and age a between year t and year 2022,
specified with a precision to a decimal part of a year in the base year 2022. ( 95) This is done only for those
sections of the age-profile where the cost per capita is growing. ( 96)
ΔYpct is GDP per capita growth rate in year t.
Y Y   Yt −1 
∆Ypct =  t − t −1    II.A9.4
 Pt Pt −1   Pt −1 
with Yt and Pt representing GDP and total population in projection year t;
εt is income elasticity of demand, assumed to converge from ε2022 to ε2070 in 2070 according to the
following equation:
𝜀𝜀2022 − 𝜀𝜀2070
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝜀𝜀2022 − (𝑡𝑡 − 2022) ∙ II.A9.5
2070 − 2022
In the baseline where the income elasticity of demand converges from 1.1 in 2022 to 1 in 2070, the values
will then be the following:
0.1
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 1.1 − (𝑡𝑡 − 2022) ∙
48 II.A9.6
Hence, this ‘adjusted’ per capita unit cost, cg,a,t, is the cost per capita of a person of sex g and age a in
year t of the projection period, following the adjustment to GDP per capita growth multiplied with the
income elasticity of demand at time t and shifted by half the change in age-specific life expectancy.
Next, in each year the respective unit cost is multiplied by the projected population of each age group
(using the baseline population projections) to obtain the total public spending for each age/sex group:
𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 II.A9.7
where:
Sg,a,t is public spending on health care for all persons of sex g and age a in year t.
Last, the resulting total public spending on health care is divided by the projected GDP to obtain the
public health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP:
∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 II.A9.8
𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 =
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡
(95) Changes in life expectancy and therefore shifts in the age profile from one year to another are sometimes very small (in a range
of a tenth part of a year). However, the data gathered by the Member States does not provide detailed information on costs per
capita by single year of age (the most detailed item available is a 5-year average), so an additional calculation needs to be
performed. To solve this problem, the intermediate values can be obtained by simple extrapolation/trend-smoothening method
from the existing average figures. In this way it is possible to assign a concrete value of cost per capita to each tenth part of a
year of age.
(96) For the young and the oldest old the reference age remains the same over the whole projection period.
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where:
Tt is the ratio of total public spending on health care to GDP in year t.
II. Demographic scenario

The aim of the ‘demographic scenario’ is to estimate the pure effect of an ageing population on future
public expenditure on health care. In other words, the income elasticity of demand is assumed to be 1
over the whole projection period. The formula for the ‘unit costs’ changes to:
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 t>0 II.A9.9

The other equations stay equal compared to the baseline.
III. No healthy ageing scenario

The ‘no healthy ageing scenario’ allows assessing the impact of the expansion of morbidity hypothesis on
public health spending projections. It assumes that age-/gender-specific morbidity rates and the structure
of health care provision do not change over time. This, in turn, means that age-/gender-specific per capita
public expenditure (on health care) profiles, which can be considered as proxies for the morbidity
rates ( 97), remain constant in real terms over the whole projection period. As in the baseline, the scenario
relies on Eurostat population projections, assuming a gradual increase in life expectancy. This increase in
life expectancy together with no change in health status, as compared to today's health status, mean that
all the gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in poor health. The number of years spent in good
health remains constant. Other assumptions are unchanged compared with the baseline.
The formula for the ‘unit costs’ changes to:

II.A9.10
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 ) t>0
IV. Healthy ageing scenario

The ‘healthy ageing scenario’ is based on the relative compression of morbidity hypothesis, meaning that
health status is improving in line with declines in mortality rates and increasing life expectancy. It
assumes that the number of years spent in bad health during a lifetime remains constant over the whole
(97) Strictly speaking, age profiles of expenditure illustrate exclusively public health care spending per person of a given age cohort.
As such it is not a measure of health status or morbidity. However, given the lack of a reliable and comparable data on the
latter, one can plausibly assume that the shape of the profile follows the evolution of health status over the lifespan, i.e. over
time, we assume that the same segments of the curve (early childhood, old age, and motherhood) follow the same pattern.
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projection period. Consequently, the morbidity rate and therefore the age/sex-specific per capita public
expenditure profiles are declining with the mortality rate.
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 t>0 II.A9.11

+ ∆𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,0,𝑎𝑎−∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 )
Therefore, the scenario mirrors the ‘no healthy ageing scenario’.
V. Labour intensity scenario

The ‘labour intensity scenario’ estimates the evolution of public expenditure on health care considering
that health care is and will remain a highly labour-intensive sector. In practical terms, that means that unit
costs are assumed to evolve in line with the evolution of GDP per hours worked. Therefore, the growth in
GDP per capita is replaced by the growth in GDP per hours worked, so that the equation for unit costs
becomes:
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 t>0 II.A9.12

where:
ΔYphwt is the rate of growth of GDP per hours worked in year t
 Y Y   Y 
∆Yphwt =  t − t −1   t −1 
HW HW HW
II.A9.13
 t t −1   t −1 
where HW stands for total hours worked.
Corresponding equations II.A9.7 and II.A9.8 are then used to calculate total age/sex group expenditure
and total public expenditure on health care in each projection year.
VI. Sector-specific composite indexation scenario

The ‘sector-specific composite indexation scenario’ presents the special character of the health care sector
(e.g. high level of government regulation, investment in new technologies, high labour intensity, a shift of
provision of some health care services from inpatient to outpatient care) and uses sector-specific elements
as unit costs determinants in the model.
This scenario considers that expenditure on health care can be disaggregated in its different components,
broadly reflecting the different sectors of the health system: 1) inpatient care, 2) outpatient care and
ancillary services, 3) pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances, 4) preventive care, 5) governance and
administration and 6) capital investment. The different components are treated separately and indexed in a
separate/different way, creating a sort of composite indexation for ‘unit cost development’.
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Due to the high volatility of the relative growth rates for the sub-components on prevention, governance
and administration, and capital formation, these items are excluded from the indexation. The other three
sub-items of the age-specific per capita expenditure (hospitals, outpatient care and medical goods) are
multiplied by their respective growth rate (capped at their respective 25th and 75th percentiles, as in
previous Ageing Reports). It is then assumed that the growth ratio multiplying each sub-item of
expenditure converges to 1 in a certain year in the future (i.e. grows at the same pace as productivity or
GDP). ( 98)
In mathematical terms, the different steps of this scenario are as follows: The share of each of the six
components in total public expenditure on health care in each year t of available data, up to the baseline
year of 2022 is calculated as follows:
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 6 II.A9.14
∑𝑖𝑖=1 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
where Si,t is the share of public expenditure on component or input i at each time t to total public
expenditure on health care,
PEi,t is total public expenditure on component i at each time t and
∑6𝑖𝑖=1 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is total public expenditure on health care expressed as the sum of the public expenditure on
each of the six components.
The average share of the ten past observations, up to the latest available data, si of each component is
calculated as:
∑−9
𝑡𝑡=0 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = II.A9.15
10
These average shares are combined with the age/sex-specific per capita expenditure in 2022 so that this is
the sum of the expenditure on the above six components:
6
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 = � 𝑠𝑠̅𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A9.16

𝑖𝑖=1
We can define the cost per capita in each subsector as
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,0 = 𝑠𝑠̅𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A9.17
To calculate the annual growth rate of public expenditure for each of the six components, the growth rate
of public expenditure for component i at time t of available data up to the baseline year of 2022 included
is:
(98) Assume that per capita public expenditure on health care for a 20-year-old man is EUR 2 000 in year t. Assume also that, in line
with total public expenditure on health care, this is made up of 40% inpatient care, 30% outpatient care and ancillary services,
17% pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances, 3% preventive care, 5% governance and administration, and 5% capital
investment. Therefore, the per capita public expenditure is divided into six sub-items: EUR 800 for inpatient care, EUR 600 for
outpatient care and ancillary services, EUR 340 for pharmaceuticals and therapeutic appliances, EUR 60 for preventive care,
EUR 100 for governance and administration, and EUR 100 for capital investment. Then, in year t+1, expenditure increases as
follows: EUR 800 x 1.2 + EUR 600 x 1.1 + EUR 340 x 1.3 + EUR 60 x 1.0 + EUR 100 x 1.0 + EUR 100 x 1.0, where 1.2, 1.1,
and 1.3 are the (illustrative) past growth ratios observed for the first three components, while the other items are not indexed by
their past observed growth rates. As far as the pattern of convergence is concerned, we can use past observations to determine
the convergence pattern of the growth ratios.
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𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = � � II.A9.18
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1
and the average annual growth rate of public expenditure for component i for the last past 10 years where
available, which is:
∑−9
𝑡𝑡=0 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 = II.A9.19
10
Note again that we assume no additional growth in three of the six categories, i.e. 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 1, for
prevention, governance and administration, and capital formation.
Next, we calculate the average annual growth rate of GDP (ΔY ) for the past ten years of available data as:
−9
1
��
∆𝑌𝑌 = ∙ � ∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 II.A9.20
10
𝑡𝑡=0
The ratio of average annual grow rate of expenditure on each component to the average annual growth
rate of GDP is calculated by dividing equation II.A9.19 by equation II.A9.20.
Following these calculations, the per capita cost is assumed to evolve in the following manner:
5
��𝚤𝚤
∆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = ∙ ��𝑠𝑠̅𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 � II.A9.21
��
∆𝑌𝑌𝚤𝚤
𝑖𝑖=1
where:
ΔYt is the GDP rate of growth in year t for each country.
Each of the six ratios of growth rates (the ratio of 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑖𝑖 to ΔY) converges linearly to 1 by a specified date,
2070.
Again, corresponding Equations II.A9.7 and II.A9.8 are then used to calculate total age/sex group
expenditure and total public expenditure on health care in each projection year.
VII. Risk scenario

The ‘risk scenario’ (former ‘AWG risk scenario’) aims at fully taking into account technological changes
and institutional mechanisms, which have driven expenditure growth in recent decades.
This scenario uses panel regression techniques to estimate the country-specific non-demographic cost of
health care. The non-demographic cost is defined as the excess of growth in real per-capita health care
expenditure over the growth in real per-capita GDP after controlling for the demographic composition
effects. Alternatively, the results can also be expressed in terms of country-specific average’ income
elasticities of health care expenditure. A proxy for the non-demographic costs with an estimated EU
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average elasticity of 1.5, based on this Commission research (endorsed by the Ageing Working Group)
and recalculated for the 2024 Ageing Report including latest data available, is used in 2022 and then
converges linearly to 1 by the end of the projection period. The formula for the elasticity of demand
changes to:
0.1
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 1.5 − (𝑡𝑡 − 2022) ∙ II.A9.22
48
The other equations are the same as in the baseline.
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ANNEX 10
Mathematical illustration of the long-term care scenarios
General definitions
Let us define Ng,a,t as the population of a given sex g and age a in year t. Following the main steps of the
general methodology process presented in Chapter 3 on long-term care, the following definitions are
derived.
STEP 1: dependent/non-dependent population

The ratio of dependent (resp. non-dependent) persons in the base year t=b (e.g. 2022) is derived from the
EU-SILC data, for each age – actually, 5-year age groups– and sex group: dg,a,b (resp. 1- dg,a,b). The
average dependency rates for the last 5 years are being used, based on data availability. Therefore, the
projected dependent population of a given sex g and age a in a projected year t is:
𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑏𝑏 ⋅ 𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 II.A10.1
STEP 2: split into types of care

To be able to differentiate the impact of different scenarios according to the respective behaviour of the
different types of care, one needs to split the projected dependent population into four groups: those
receiving formal in-kind care at home, those receiving formal in-kind care in institutions, those receiving
cash benefits (which is also defined as a type of formal care) and those receiving only informal care.
Therefore, one defines DFhg,a,t, DFig,a,t, DIg,a,t the projected dependent population of a given sex g and age
a in a projected year t receiving respectively in-kind formal care at home (DFh), in-kind formal care in
institutions (DFi), cash benefits and informal care (DI), as follows:
𝐹𝐹ℎ
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A10.2
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A10.3
𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ⋅ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 − 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 ) II.A10.4
Where pFhg,a,0 is the probability for a dependent person of sex g and age a to receive in-kind formal care at
home, in the base year 0 (e.g. 2022). Similarly, pFig,a,0 is the correspondent probability of being taken care
of formally in institutions, while pIg,a,0 – the probability of being take care of informally – is defined as
not receiving any formal care service.
STEP 3: age-sex profiles of expenditure

Average expenditure is calculated for a base year 0, to define the long-run unit costs of services. If the
data is available (through the SHA joint questionnaire and/or provided by Member States), unit costs for
in-kind formal care at home and in-kind formal care in institutions are calculated separately ( 99):
𝐹𝐹ℎ
𝐹𝐹ℎ
𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 = 𝐹𝐹ℎ II.A10.5
𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0
(99) Otherwise, an average of the age-cost profiles of other EU Member States is used.
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where: SFhg,a,0 is public spending on in-kind formal care at home in the base year (e.g. 2022);
and NFhg,a,0 is the number of recipients of a given sex g and age a of in-kind formal care at home, for the
same year.
Similarly, the unit cost per beneficiary of a given sex g and age a of in-kind formal care in institutions is:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 II.A10.6
𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0
Note that two adjustments are made to the derived unit costs. The first one applies when age profiles are
not provided separately for the two types of in-kind formal care. The age profiles provided by Member
States for public expenditure on in-kind formal care services are then used to ‘re-calibrate’ the unit costs.
In other words, the relative size of the amounts provided for each sex/age group is applied to respective
‘total’ public expenditure aggregates of in-kind formal care at home (SFh0) and in-kind formal care in
institutions (SFi0).
The unit costs evolve in time with the GDP growth, as will be explained in the next section of this annex.
STEP 4: total public expenditure on long-term care services

For a projected year t, public spending on both types of in-kind formal care is then computed as:
𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝐹𝐹ℎ
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 ⋅ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 II.A10.7
where: TSFhg,a,t (resp. TSFig,a,t) is public spending on formal in-kind care at home (resp. in institution) for
all persons of sex g and age a in year t.
Hence, for all age and sex groups:
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ = ∑ 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡
𝐹𝐹ℎ
II.A10.8
and
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = � 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
II.A10.9
STEP 5: total public expenditure on long-term care (services and cash)

Therefore, total public expenditure on both types of formal long-term care services is added to long-term
care related cash benefit expenditure, to obtain TSLTCt for a projected year t:
𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶 II.A10.10
Where TSCt is projected in a similar manner to expenditure on in-kind benefits ( 100).
(100) The projection of cash benefit expenditure is illustrated in less detail than that for in-kind benefits because the data on recipients
is less readily available and therefore the profile is in some cases assumed to be the same as that for in-kind care.
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These general definitions apply to the general, ‘basic’ model structure. To run more accurate scenarios,
general and scenario-specific assumptions are being applied. These assumptions are illustrated in the
following section.
Assumptions for the different scenarios
I. Baseline
The baseline of the 2024 Ageing Report is equivalent to the 2021 Ageing Report’s ‘AWG reference
scenario’. It builds onto the general model described above by assuming that for the time horizon of the
projection exercise, the age-sex specific public expenditure profiles (showing the average public spending
on long-term care per beneficiary for each year of age – or 5-year age group – from 0 to 85+ or more,
according to data availability) grow with either GDP per worker (for in-kind benefits) or GDP per capita
(for cash benefits) . For t > 0, the projections of the unit costs profiles develop according to the following
equations (subject to the relevant exceptions to reflect country-specific assumptions):
𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ⋅ (1 + 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 ) II. A10.11
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1 ⋅ (1 + 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 ) II. A10.12
where:
• cFg,a,t is the cost per beneficiary of a given sex g and age group a in period t. F can either be Fh for
formal in-kind care at home or Fi for formal in-kind care in institution.
• ΔYphwt is the rate of growth of GDP per hours worked in year t:
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1

• 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 = � − �� II.A10.13
𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−1 𝐻𝐻𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡−1
• cFcg,a,t is the cost per beneficiary of a given sex g and age group a in period t in for cash benefits (Fc).
• ΔYpct is GDP per capita growth rate in year t:
𝑌𝑌 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1
• 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = � 𝑡𝑡 − �� II.A10.14
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1
Further, the baseline takes the increase of life expectancy over the projection horizon into account.
It assumes that half of the projected longevity gains up to the end of the projection period will be spent in
good health and free of disability/dependency. Accordingly, age-specific disability rates shift along the
age profile by half of the projected increase in life expectancy.
In practice that means that one starts by calculating, for each projection year, the change in life
expectancy in relation to the base year. For example, life expectancy for a 50-year-old man is expected to
increase by, say, 4 years: from 30 years in year t to 34 years in year t+20 in a specific Member State.
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Then, the scenario assumes that in t+20, in that same Member State, a 50-year-old man will have a
disability prevalence of a (50 – (4 x 0.5)) = 48-year-old man in year t.
Hence, the change in life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in relation to the base year (2022) is
first calculated for each year of the projections, using the Eurostat population projections:
𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡,0 = 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A10.15
where:
• ΔLEg,a,t,0 is the additional life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in year t compared to a person
of sex g and age a in the base year.
• LEg,a,t is the life expectancy of a person of sex g and age a in year t.
• LEg,a,0 is life expectancy of an average person of sex g and age a in the base year.
Then the probability for being a dependent person is adjusted accordingly:
𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎−0.5Δ LE ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A10.16
where Δ LE = ΔLEg,a,t,0
Lastly, for Member States in the highest quartile of long-term care expenditure as a proportion of GDP in
the base year, income elasticity of long-term care expenditure is assumed to remain 1 over the projection
period. For the rest, income elasticity is assumed to start at 1.1 in the base year of 2022, falling to 1 by the
end of the projection period.
II. No healthy ageing scenario

The ‘no healthy ageing scenario’ is identical to the baseline except for its assumption on the dependency
status. It assumes that the disability rates of the population of a given age will not improve despite
increases in life expectancy. This means, for example, that even if life expectancy increases by two years
by 2070, the proportion of 80-year-olds who are disabled in 2022 will be the same as in 2070.
For the probability being a dependent person that meant that it would stay constant over the projection
horizon:
𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A10.17
For all t > 0.
Those constant proportions are then applied to the projected changes in the dependent population. Since
the prevalence of dependency is kept constant over the projection horizon, the dependent population
evolves precisely in line with the total elderly population. This implies that, in practice, none of the gains
in life expectancy translate into an improvement of health.
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European Commission
III. Healthy ageing scenario

This scenario reflects an alternative assumption about the dependency ratio. Inspired by the so-called
‘dynamic equilibrium hypothesis’ ( 101), it is analogous to the healthy ageing scenario carried out in the
framework of health care expenditure projections. The profile of age-specific disability rates shifts in line
with changes in life expectancy (disability rate in the future is equal to that of a younger - by the same
number of years as the change in age-specific life expectancy - age cohort today), resulting in a gradual
decrease over time in disability prevalence for each age cohort.
In practical terms, one starts by calculating, for each projection year, the change in life expectancy in
relation to the base year. For example, life expectancy for a 50-year-old man is expected to increase by,
say, 4 years: from 30 years in year t to 34 years in year t+20 in a specific Member State. Then, the
scenario assumes that in t+20, in that same Member State, a 50-year-old man will have a disability
prevalence of a (50 - 4) = 46-year-old man in year t. Equation II.A10.16 is adapted accordingly:
𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎−Δ LE ,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔,𝑎𝑎,0 II.A10.18
IV. Coverage convergence scenario

This policy-change scenario assumes an expansion of publicly financed formal care provision into the
groups of population that have not been covered by the public in-kind programmes so far. ‘Formal
coverage’ covers any of the three types of formal long-term care: in-kind institutional care, in-kind formal
home care, and cash benefits. This scenario assumes that coverage of in-kind formal care (institutional
and home care) will be extended to cover a proportion of those dependent people who do not receive any
type of care in the base year. The assumption is that all recipients of long-term care are dependent. It
means that the equations II.A10.2 to II.A10.4 become four equations, with probabilities now changing
over time, i.e. depending on t, but also country-specific (for a country i).
The scenario envisaged is a coverage convergence to the EU average for in-kind care. It is meant to
consider the high diversity of country-specific current in-kind care-mix between home care and
institutional care. The Member States where the in-kind formal coverage rate for a specific age-range is
below the EU average in the starting year are assumed to converge to this average by 2070. For age
ranges with coverage above the EU average, this scenario is the same as the base case scenario.
The baseline steps are used for the countries whose formal in-kind coverage for that age-group is the
same or greater than the EU average in the base year (2022). For those countries whose in-kind formal
coverage is below the EU average for that age-group, it is assumed to converge to the EU average. It
therefore implies that each type of in-kind formal care converges at a different pace, making up for the
respective relative gaps to the EU average. This scenario allows a country to grow faster the relatively
less-developed type of in-kind formal care. ( 102)
V. Cost convergence to EU average scenario

This policy-change scenario is run in parallel with the analogous scenario on healthcare expenditure
projections. The ‘cost convergence scenario’ is meant to capture the possible effect of a convergence in
real living standards on long-term care spending. It assumes an upward convergence of the relative age-
(101) Rechel et al. (2020).

(102) Note that the convergence to the EU average is done for each type of care and for each 5-year age group and sex separately.
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Part II
sex specific per beneficiary expenditure profiles (as percent of GDP per capita or per hours worked) of all
countries below the corresponding EU average to the EU average. This is done for each type of formal
care coverage (i.e. formal care in institutions, formal care at home, cash benefits).
To run this scenario, one builds on the methodology used for the baseline. For those countries whose per
beneficiary costs are equal to or above the EU average nothing changes.
For those countries below the EU average per beneficiary costs in the base year (2022) a further change in
the way cost per beneficiary evolves over the projection period is assumed to reach the EU average of per
beneficiary costs for each age-group. Building on the equations – for cash benefits – and – for in-kind
benefits – the real convergence to EU average is assumed to follow the adjusted equations (for t > 0):
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
= 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑖𝑖 ∙ �1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖 � II.A10.19
𝐹𝐹
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 𝐹𝐹
= 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑡𝑡−1,𝑖𝑖 ∙ �1 + ∆𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡,𝑖𝑖 + 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖 � II.A10.20
where:
cFa,t,i is the country i-specific cost of in-kind benefits per beneficiary of a given age a in period t. F is
either Fh for formal care at home or Fi for formal care in institution – adjusted to the GDP per hours
worked growth and a catch-up effect if country i is below the EU average;
cFca,t,i is the country i-specific cost of cash benefits per beneficiary of a given age a in period t –adjusted to
GDP per capita growth and a catch-up effect if country i is below the EU average;
ΔYpct,i is the GDP per capita rate growth rate in year t, for country i;
ΔYphwt,i is GDP per hours worked growth rate in year t, for country i, and
ma,i and na,i are hypothetical rates of growth of per beneficiary costs. They are higher than zero for
countries whose per beneficiary costs are below the EU average, and equal to zero for those countries
whose per beneficiary costs are equal or above the EU average. To close the gap, ma,i is assumed to be
constant in time and equal to ( 103):
1
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
� 𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2011 2070−2022
𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖 = �� −1
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,2022
II.A10.21
if 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
� 𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022 ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,2022
where:
� 𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022 is the weighted EU average relative cost per beneficiary of age a calculated in the base year of
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
2022 and
� 𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,2022 is the relative cost per beneficiary of age a for country i calculated in the base year of 2022
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
defined as:
(103) Assumptions for different convergence paths according to the initial country-specific situation - comparing to the EU average
age profile - could be explored further when data is made available.
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European Commission
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,2022
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,2022 = � � II.A10.22
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎,𝑖𝑖,2022
and
𝑐𝑐̅
𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022
� 𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022 = ��
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 � II.A10.23
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022
where:
𝑐𝑐̅𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022 is the weighted EU average cost per beneficiary of age a calculated in the base year (2022); and
��
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,2022 is the average GDP per hours worked in the EU calculated in the base year (2022).
The same type of reasoning can be run with the corresponding equations for cash benefits, adjusted to
GDP per capita growth instead of GDP per hours worked growth.
Then after country-specific per beneficiary cost has been calculated, subsequent corresponding equations
are used to obtain total age-sex group expenditure and then total public expenditure on long-term care in
each projection year.
VI. Risk scenario

The ‘Risk scenario’ keeps the assumption that half of the future gains in life expectancy are spent without
care-demanding disability, as in the baseline. In addition, it combines is a combination of the ‘cost
convergence scenario’ and the ‘coverage convergence’ scenario thereby being equal to the ‘cost and
coverage convergence scenario’ from the 2021 Ageing Report. The scenario assumes convergence
upwards of unit costs to the EU average as well as coverage convergence upwards to the EU average.
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ANNEX 11
Organisational structure of secondary education
Three different organisational models can be distinguished: (i) a single structure; (ii) a compulsory
integrated secondary education corresponding to a ‘common core’; and (iii) distinct types of education. In
some new Member States (Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia), combinations of these
three models coexist (European Commission, 2005).
In all countries where the single structure is the only type (Denmark, Estonia, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland,
Sweden, Iceland, Norway and Bulgaria), the end of secondary education coincides with the end of
compulsory education, except in Bulgaria where compulsory education ends one year later.
In almost half of all European countries, all pupils follow the same general curriculum ‘common core’
during lower secondary education. In seven of these countries, the end of lower secondary education
coincides with the end of full-time compulsory education.
In Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia and Bulgaria, the end of full-time
compulsory education does not coincide with the end of lower secondary education. Instead, one or more
final years of compulsory education are part of upper secondary education. Thus, pupils in these countries
- with the exception of Ireland - have to choose between general, technical or vocational education of one
or two years (or four in Hungary) before the end of full-time compulsory education.
In the French- and German-speaking Communities of Belgium, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria, pupils may select or be streamed into different types of
provision or school from the beginning or before the end of lower secondary education. Even though
pupils in Germany attend different schools, they follow entirely compatible curricula for the first two
years so that selection of an appropriate study branch can be deferred. In the Netherlands, pupils follow a
common core curriculum usually for the first two years at VMBO and three years at HAVO and VWO.
While its level varies depending on the type of school concerned, it specifies minimum skills that should
be acquired by all pupils.
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ANNEX 12
Data sources for education expenditure
Data sources and information

To project total expenditure on public education, Eurostat will be the main provider of data, mainly
through the UOE data collection. ( 104) Consistent with the 2021 Ageing Report, the average of the two
last available years (i.e. 2019 and 2020 – or more recent data if available) should be used as the starting
point of the projections. In addition, this average is then uprated until the base year of the 2024 Ageing
Report projections (i.e. 2022) using COFOG data. ( 105)
Specifically, by country, year, and ISCED groupings (1, 2, 3-4, 5-8), the following information from the
UOE dataset will be used:
• Total number of students by single age
• Number of working students by single age
• Numbers of teachers and non-teaching staff
• Total expenditure in staff compensation ( 106)
• Other current (excluding staff compensation) and capital expenditure
• Share of transfers over total public education expenditure
• Share of publicly funded education
Furthermore, and to secure full consistency of the long-term budgetary exercise, the common AWG
macroeconomic assumptions for the following variables are used:
• Total population per single age
• Labour force per single age
• GDP per worker
• GDP
(104) The objective of the UNESCO-UIS/OECD/EUROSTAT (UOE) data collection on education statistics is to provide
internationally comparable data on key aspects of education systems, specifically on the participation and completion of
education programmes, as well as the cost and type of resources dedicated to education.
(105) Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) data. Because of recurrent lags in the availability of recent UOE data,
uprating the starting point until the base year by using COFOG information has the advantage of taking into account the most
recent outturns.
(106) Current expenditure on staff compensation is obtained by deducting expenditure designated for capital, for ancillary services
and for R&D from direct expenditure on educational institutions (UOE, 2019).
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ANNEX 13
Estimating the education enrolment rate
Starting with the labour market identity:
E𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + U𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 II.A13.1
where Ei,t, Ui,t, Ii,t and Pi,t are, respectively, employment, unemployment, inactive and the population for
age cohort i in period t.
After adding and subtracting the number of full-time students (SFi,t ), and of part-time students (SPi,t ):
SF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + E𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + U𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − SF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 II.A13.2
Let us use the definitions of total students (ST𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ SF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ), labour force (LF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ E𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + U𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ), and
∗
inactive minus full-time students (I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − SF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ):
∗
ST𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + LF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 II.A13.3
SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
Dividing Equation II.A13.3 by the population (Pi,t ), and defining α𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ = as the fraction of
SF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ST𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
part-time students in the total number of students, the following identity is obtained:
∗
ST𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 SP𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ST𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 LF𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 II.A13.4
− ∗ + + =1
P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ST𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
Equation II.A13.4 can be rearranged as:
1 − p𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − i∗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
e𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =
1 − α𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 II.A13.5
∗
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
where 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡= is the enrolment rate for total students; 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡= is the participation rate; and𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
fraction of inactive minus full-time students over the population.
In Equation II.A13.5, enrolment rates are inversely related to the participation and the (adjusted)
inactivity rates.
In most EU Member States, the LFS MAINSTAT variable can be used to assess the distribution of
inactivity by age, distinguishing between schooling and other forms of inactivity. ( 107)
Assume that the ratio between full-time students and the total inactive (κi,b ) is constant over time at the
value observed in the base period (b):
(107) However, the MAINSTAT variable, which describes the main labour market status, is an optional one.
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European Commission
∗
SFi,t SFi,b Ii,t Ii,t ∗ ∗
= = κi,b ⇒ = �1 − κi,b � ∗ ⇒ ii,t −ii,b = �1 − κi,b � ∗ �ii,t − ii,b �
Ii,t Ii,b Pi,t Pi,t II.A13.6
I𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ∗ I∗𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
where κ𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ≤ 1; and, i𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ and i𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≡ are the inactivity and the adjusted inactivity rates,
P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 P𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
respectively.
A bar over a variable indicates that it is constant (i.e. time invariant).
How Equation II.A13.5 is used to project enrolment rates

Expressing Equation II.A13.5 in terms of differences to the base period, substituting Equation II.A13.6,
and using the identity �p𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − p𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 � + �i𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − i𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 � ≡ 0:
κ𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
e𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − e𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 = − ∗ �p𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − p𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 �
1 − α𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 II.A13.7
SF𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 SP𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 SP𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏

where κ𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 = ; α𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ≡ = , and 0 ≤ κ𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 , α𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ≤ 1.
I𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 SF𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 +SP𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 ST𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏
A value for κ𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏 lower than one means that changes in the labour force do not necessary reduce one by
one enrolment rates, because some people coming from inactivity were not involved in education
activities.
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Part III
Statistical Annex
The full dataset with annual data for 2022-2070 is published online.
1. BELGIUM
Main demographic and macroeconomic assumptions
Demographic projections - EUROPOP2023 (Eurostat) Ch 22-70 2022 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Fertility rate 0.1 1.53 1.55 1.58 1.60 1.62 1.64
Life expectancy at birth
males 6.9 79.5 80.8 82.4 83.8 85.2 86.4
females 5.9 84.6 85.5 86.9 88.2 89.4 90.5
Life expectancy at 65 (years)
males 4.9 18.7 19.7 20.7 21.7 22.7 23.6
females 4.6 22.3 23.0 24.1 25.1 26.0 26.9
Net migration (thousands) -86.8 115.7 37.2 36.2 32.5 30.1 28.9
Net migration as % of population in t-1 -0.8 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
Population (million) 1.0 11.7 12.0 12.4 12.6 12.6 12.7
share of prime-age population (25-54y) -4.0 39.0 38.1 38.2 37.1 36.2 35.0
share of working-age population (20-64y) -5.1 58.1 56.8 55.7 54.7 53.8 53.0
share of elderly population (+65y) 8.5 19.6 22.1 24.2 25.3 26.8 28.1
share of very elderly population (+80y) 5.8 5.5 6.4 8.1 9.7 10.3 11.3
share of very elderly population (+80y) in elderly population (+65y) 12.1 28.1 28.7 33.4 38.2 38.4 40.2
Macroeconomic assumptions AVG 22-70 2022 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Potential GDP (growth rate) 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.1
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.2 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.2 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Labour productivity per hour (growth rate) 1.1 0.2 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
TFP (growth rate) 0.7 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
capital deepening (contribution to labour productivity growth) 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Potential GDP per capita (growth rate) 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.0
Potential GDP per worker (growth rate) 1.1 0.3 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 10.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Nominal interest rate 3.8 1.7 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0
Labour force assumptions Ch 22-70 2022 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) -60 6,786 6,829 6,888 6,873 6,792 6,726
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.6 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) 231 5,167 5,323 5,489 5,506 5,452 5,398
Participation rate (20-64y) 4.1 76.1 77.9 79.7 80.1 80.3 80.3
young (20-24y) 2.8 48.4 50.9 51.3 51.1 51.0 51.2
prime-age (25-54y) 2.1 86.1 87.2 87.8 88.2 88.1 88.2
older (55-64y) 11.5 59.1 63.2 67.2 68.3 69.8 70.6
oldest (65-74y) 5.2 5.4 8.2 10.0 10.6 10.6 10.6
Participation rate (20-64y) - female 5.6 71.9 74.6 76.7 77.4 77.6 77.6
young (20-24y) 1.7 45.6 47.0 47.5 47.2 47.1 47.3
prime-age (25-54y) 3.3 82.0 83.8 84.8 85.3 85.3 85.3
older (55-64y) 14.8 53.9 59.8 64.8 66.3 68.0 68.7
oldest (65-74y) 7.1 3.2 7.8 9.5 10.2 10.2 10.2
Participation rate (20-64y) - male 2.6 80.3 81.2 82.6 82.8 82.9 82.9
young (20-24y) 3.8 51.1 54.6 55.1 54.8 54.7 54.9
prime-age (25-54y) 0.8 90.2 90.5 90.8 91.0 90.9 91.0
older (55-64y) 8.3 64.2 66.4 69.6 70.4 71.6 72.5
oldest (65-74y) 3.2 7.9 8.5 10.4 10.9 11.0 11.0
Average labour market exit age (1) 1.7 62.8 64.1 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.5
male 2.0 62.5 64.0 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.5
female 1.4 63.0 64.1 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.4
Employment rate (20-64y) 3.7 72.1 73.7 75.2 75.6 75.8 75.8
Unemployment rate (20-64y) 0.3 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
Employment (20-64y; millions) 0.2 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1
share of young (20-24y) -0.1 5.7 6.2 5.7 5.4 5.6 5.5
share of prime-age (25-54y) -4.5 75.2 73.9 73.9 73.0 72.3 70.7
share of older (55-64y) 3.1 17.8 17.7 17.9 19.0 19.3 20.9
share of oldest (65-74y) 1.6 1.3 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.9
Dependency ratios Ch 22-70 2022 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070
Share of older population in working-age population (2) 1.2 22.9 22.0 21.4 22.5 22.5 24.1
Old-age dependency ratio (3) 19.2 33.7 39.0 43.5 46.3 49.8 53.0
Total dependency ratio (4) 16.6 72.0 76.1 79.4 82.8 86.0 88.7
Total economic dependency ratio (5) 6.4 135.5 133.8 132.5 135.3 138.5 141.8
Economic old-age dependency ratio (20-64y) (6) 21.5 45.4 50.7 55.2 58.5 62.7 66.9
(1) Based on the average probabilities of labour force entry and exit. The table reports 2023 instead of 2022.
(2) Share of older population = Population aged 55 to 64 as a % of the population aged 20-64.
(3) Old-age dependency ratio = Population aged 65 and over as a % of the population aged 20-64.
(4) Total dependency ratio = Population under 20 and over 64 as a % of the population aged 20-64.
(5) Total economic dependency ratio = Total population less employed as a % of the employed population 20-74.
(6) Economic old-age dependency ratio (20-64) = Inactive population aged 65+ as a % of the employed population 20-64.
172
2. BULGARIA
Fertility rate 0.1 1.56 1.60 1.64 1.66 1.68 1.69
males 12.3 70.5 73.4 76.0 78.5 80.7 82.8
females 10.0 77.7 80.1 82.3 84.2 86.0 87.7
males 7.8 13.5 15.4 17.0 18.5 19.9 21.3
females 7.1 17.5 19.1 20.6 22.0 23.3 24.6
Net migration (thousands) -144.3 160.1 -2.9 11.5 12.9 12.4 15.8
Population (million) -1.6 6.9 6.5 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.3
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.7 0.0 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.4 -0.3
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.7 -0.2 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.4 -0.3
TFP (growth rate) 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.5 13.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) -1,353 4,063 3,781 3,411 3,015 2,749 2,710
Working-age population (growth rate) 0.0 -0.2 -0.8 -1.3 -1.2 -0.3 -0.3
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) -1,034 3,215 2,944 2,672 2,393 2,224 2,181
young (20-24y) 1.8 41.6 42.7 43.5 43.4 43.2 43.4
prime-age (25-54y) 3.0 85.9 87.3 88.1 88.9 89.1 88.9
older (55-64y) 2.5 71.0 66.3 68.5 69.4 72.8 73.5
oldest (65-74y) 0.2 11.2 10.0 10.5 10.4 10.1 11.4
young (20-24y) 2.3 33.9 35.6 36.3 36.2 36.0 36.2
prime-age (25-54y) 2.4 82.5 83.6 84.1 84.8 85.1 84.9
older (55-64y) 5.4 66.1 63.4 66.6 67.8 70.9 71.5
oldest (65-74y) 1.7 7.9 7.8 8.4 8.7 8.4 9.6
Participation rate (20-74y) - male -1.0 72.9 70.9 69.1 68.0 69.4 72.0
young (20-24y) 1.1 48.9 49.4 50.2 50.0 49.8 50.0
prime-age (25-54y) 3.6 89.1 90.8 91.9 92.7 92.8 92.7
older (55-64y) -0.9 76.4 69.4 70.3 71.1 74.8 75.5
oldest (65-74y) -2.4 15.7 12.9 12.8 12.3 11.9 13.4
male 1.0 63.5 64.0 64.1 64.2 64.3 64.4
female 1.7 62.5 63.2 63.9 64.0 64.1 64.2
Employment (20-64y; millions) -1.0 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1
share of young (20-24y) 1.1 3.7 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.8 4.8
share of older (55-64y) 3.0 19.8 21.2 23.8 23.3 19.5 22.8
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.1 3.0 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.1
173
3. CZECHIA
Fertility rate 0.0 1.72 1.73 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.75
males 8.9 75.9 77.9 79.8 81.6 83.3 84.8
females 7.3 81.9 83.5 85.1 86.6 87.9 89.2
males 6.5 15.9 17.4 18.8 20.0 21.3 22.4
females 6.0 19.7 21.0 22.3 23.5 24.6 25.7
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.2 1.5 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 0.0 0.0
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.2 1.6 -0.2 -0.7 -0.4 0.0 0.0
TFP (growth rate) 1.1 0.4 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.5 14.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.5 0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.1
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) -635 5,214 5,133 4,870 4,627 4,521 4,579
Participation rate (20-64y) -1.6 83.1 81.9 81.0 81.4 82.1 81.5
young (20-24y) 2.0 50.7 52.2 52.7 52.9 52.5 52.7
prime-age (25-54y) -0.8 89.1 88.9 88.1 88.0 88.5 88.3
older (55-64y) 0.3 74.7 74.5 74.2 74.5 75.2 75.0
oldest (65-74y) -1.5 10.7 7.2 9.9 8.5 8.7 9.2
Participation rate (20-64y) - female -1.0 75.8 75.4 74.3 74.3 75.3 74.8
young (20-24y) 1.3 42.3 43.2 43.6 43.7 43.4 43.6
prime-age (25-54y) -1.3 81.6 81.7 80.0 79.6 80.6 80.3
older (55-64y) 4.2 68.8 71.4 72.5 72.2 73.0 73.0
oldest (65-74y) 0.3 8.6 5.9 9.5 8.2 8.4 8.9
young (20-24y) 2.4 58.9 60.8 61.3 61.5 61.0 61.3
prime-age (25-54y) -0.7 96.2 95.7 95.6 95.7 95.6 95.6
older (55-64y) -3.9 80.7 77.5 75.9 76.7 77.1 76.9
oldest (65-74y) -3.7 13.2 8.6 10.3 8.8 9.1 9.4
male 1.3 62.6 63.9 63.9 63.9 63.9 63.9
female 2.2 61.7 63.7 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0
Employment rate (20-64y) -1.9 81.3 79.7 78.8 79.2 79.9 79.4
share of young (20-24y) 1.6 4.6 6.0 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.2
share of older (55-64y) 3.3 18.1 21.3 23.3 21.6 18.5 21.4
share of oldest (65-74y) -0.4 2.6 1.6 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.1
174
4. DENMARK
Fertility rate 0.1 1.68 1.69 1.71 1.72 1.72 1.73
males 6.5 79.9 80.9 82.4 83.8 85.1 86.4
females 6.5 83.6 84.9 86.3 87.7 88.9 90.1
males 4.7 18.7 19.5 20.5 21.5 22.5 23.4
females 5.2 21.3 22.3 23.4 24.5 25.5 26.5
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.1 1.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.2
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.1 1.2 -0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.2
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.9 0.6 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.2
young (20-24y) 3.5 75.1 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6 78.6
prime-age (25-54y) 2.1 87.7 88.3 89.1 89.7 89.8 89.8
older (55-64y) 11.1 75.5 76.7 79.1 81.8 84.9 86.6
oldest (65-74y) 19.6 16.3 16.1 22.2 27.0 34.5 35.9
young (20-24y) 3.9 73.4 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3 77.3
prime-age (25-54y) 3.0 85.3 86.1 87.3 88.2 88.2 88.3
older (55-64y) 14.0 71.5 74.2 75.8 79.2 83.9 85.5
oldest (65-74y) 26.2 9.2 14.2 21.8 25.2 32.8 35.4
young (20-24y) 3.1 76.7 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8 79.8
prime-age (25-54y) 1.1 90.1 90.5 90.8 91.0 91.2 91.3
older (55-64y) 8.2 79.6 79.2 82.4 84.3 85.9 87.8
oldest (65-74y) 12.5 24.0 18.0 22.7 28.9 36.1 36.4
male 3.7 65.3 65.8 66.9 67.8 68.6 69.0
female 4.4 64.5 65.4 66.6 67.5 68.4 69.0
Unemployment rate (20-64y) -0.5 4.1 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
share of young (20-24y) -1.4 9.0 8.9 8.3 8.6 7.8 7.6
share of older (55-64y) 0.6 20.0 20.2 18.1 21.1 21.6 20.6
share of oldest (65-74y) 5.4 3.5 3.6 5.3 5.6 8.2 8.9
175
5. GERMANY
Fertility rate 0.1 1.53 1.55 1.57 1.59 1.61 1.63
males 7.0 79.0 80.1 81.8 83.3 84.7 86.0
females 6.2 83.8 84.7 86.2 87.6 88.8 90.0
males 5.0 18.3 19.1 20.2 21.3 22.3 23.3
females 4.9 21.5 22.3 23.4 24.4 25.4 26.4
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Potential GDP per capita (growth rate) 1.1 -0.3 0.7 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.2
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 8.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.4 0.4 -0.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0
young (20-24y) 0.3 73.6 73.9 73.9 74.0 73.9 73.9
prime-age (25-54y) 1.4 87.8 88.3 88.8 89.1 89.3 89.3
older (55-64y) 2.6 75.3 72.9 76.3 76.0 77.0 77.9
oldest (65-74y) 1.2 14.5 13.0 12.7 15.0 14.9 15.6
young (20-24y) -0.1 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.7
prime-age (25-54y) 3.0 83.4 84.5 85.7 86.1 86.3 86.4
older (55-64y) 6.2 71.1 69.7 73.7 74.7 76.3 77.3
oldest (65-74y) 3.3 11.3 11.4 11.5 13.7 13.8 14.6
young (20-24y) 0.6 76.1 76.8 76.8 76.8 76.8 76.7
prime-age (25-54y) -0.2 92.2 91.9 91.6 91.9 92.1 92.0
older (55-64y) -1.1 79.5 76.2 79.0 77.3 77.7 78.4
oldest (65-74y) -1.4 18.0 14.7 14.0 16.5 16.1 16.6
male 1.1 64.4 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.4 65.5
female 1.4 64.0 64.8 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.5
share of young (20-24y) 0.5 7.6 7.7 8.5 8.2 7.9 8.1
share of prime-age (25-54y) 2.1 66.2 68.5 68.9 67.4 68.1 68.2
share of older (55-64y) -3.3 23.0 20.2 19.3 20.8 20.1 19.7
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.8 3.2 3.6 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.0
Share of older population in working-age population (2) -3.8 26.1 23.9 22.0 23.9 23.0 22.3
176
6. ESTONIA
Fertility rate 0.2 1.57 1.64 1.69 1.71 1.72 1.73
males 9.8 74.3 76.0 78.3 80.4 82.3 84.1
females 6.8 83.0 84.3 85.8 87.2 88.5 89.8
males 6.4 15.8 16.9 18.3 19.7 21.0 22.2
females 5.4 20.9 21.9 23.1 24.2 25.3 26.3
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.1 1.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.2
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.0 2.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 0.2
TFP (growth rate) 1.0 -0.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.5 19.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) -106 786 780 762 722 676 680
Working-age population (growth rate) -1.4 1.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.1
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) -56 680 675 668 644 616 623
young (20-24y) 4.2 75.2 79.0 79.5 79.5 79.2 79.4
prime-age (25-54y) 3.5 90.8 92.1 93.4 94.3 94.3 94.3
older (55-64y) 12.6 77.1 73.1 75.1 80.2 86.2 89.7
oldest (65-74y) 4.6 28.7 17.3 20.5 26.0 27.2 33.3
young (20-24y) 3.3 78.2 81.2 81.5 81.6 81.4 81.6
prime-age (25-54y) 6.3 87.4 90.1 92.5 93.8 93.8 93.8
older (55-64y) 12.0 78.2 72.1 72.1 79.3 86.5 90.3
oldest (65-74y) 4.7 27.7 18.3 20.4 25.0 26.4 32.5
young (20-24y) 5.0 72.3 76.9 77.5 77.5 77.0 77.3
prime-age (25-54y) 0.8 93.9 93.9 94.3 94.8 94.7 94.8
older (55-64y) 13.5 75.7 74.2 78.0 80.9 85.9 89.2
oldest (65-74y) 4.0 30.0 16.0 20.7 27.2 28.1 34.0
male 4.8 63.6 64.6 65.8 67.0 67.7 68.4
female 4.5 63.9 64.7 65.9 67.1 67.7 68.4
share of young (20-24y) 1.2 5.9 8.1 7.6 6.6 7.0 7.1
share of older (55-64y) 4.7 18.4 18.2 20.1 22.4 19.2 23.1
share of oldest (65-74y) 1.2 6.1 4.0 4.8 6.8 7.7 7.3
177
7. IRELAND
Fertility rate 0.1 1.60 1.62 1.64 1.66 1.67 1.69
males 6.1 80.8 81.7 83.2 84.5 85.7 86.9
females 6.0 84.6 85.6 87.0 88.3 89.5 90.6
males 4.5 19.4 20.1 21.1 22.1 23.0 23.9
females 4.9 22.1 22.9 24.0 25.0 26.0 27.0
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.3 3.1 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.3 2.7 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
TFP (growth rate) 1.4 5.0 1.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
capital deepening (contribution to labour productivity growth) 0.4 -0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) 183 3,006 3,224 3,348 3,235 3,232 3,189
Working-age population (growth rate) -1.9 1.6 0.8 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -0.3
young (20-24y) 3.2 74.4 77.3 77.7 77.5 77.4 77.6
prime-age (25-54y) 5.5 86.1 88.7 90.7 91.6 91.6 91.6
older (55-64y) 5.8 69.0 69.5 71.6 72.5 75.3 74.8
oldest (65-74y) 3.1 13.4 15.2 16.0 15.4 15.6 16.5
young (20-24y) 5.0 72.3 77.0 77.4 77.1 77.1 77.3
prime-age (25-54y) 8.2 80.4 84.4 87.2 88.5 88.6 88.6
older (55-64y) 13.1 60.8 65.1 69.1 70.5 74.3 73.8
oldest (65-74y) 9.0 6.3 13.1 14.2 13.9 14.1 15.3
young (20-24y) 1.5 76.5 77.6 78.1 77.8 77.8 78.0
prime-age (25-54y) 2.6 92.0 93.2 94.2 94.8 94.6 94.6
older (55-64y) -1.8 77.6 74.0 74.3 74.7 76.3 75.9
oldest (65-74y) -3.0 20.9 17.4 17.8 17.1 17.2 17.9
male 0.6 64.3 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8
female 0.8 64.1 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8 64.8
share of young (20-24y) -0.9 9.1 10.0 8.4 7.3 8.2 8.2
share of older (55-64y) 5.8 16.0 17.0 19.4 17.3 19.6 21.9
share of oldest (65-74y) 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.1 3.6 4.3
178
8. GREECE
Fertility rate 0.1 1.41 1.44 1.47 1.50 1.52 1.55
males 7.7 78.8 80.5 82.2 83.7 85.2 86.5
females 6.2 84.2 85.5 86.8 88.1 89.3 90.4
males 5.2 18.7 19.8 20.9 22.0 23.0 23.9
females 5.0 21.7 22.7 23.8 24.8 25.8 26.7
Net migration as % of population in t-1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.5 -0.3 -0.8 -0.9 -0.8 -0.3 -0.2
TFP (growth rate) 1.1 0.7 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 9.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 3.4 46.6 49.5 50.0 49.9 49.8 50.0
prime-age (25-54y) -0.1 85.3 85.1 85.0 85.2 85.2 85.2
older (55-64y) 20.8 57.4 65.5 70.9 74.0 76.5 78.2
oldest (65-74y) 15.0 9.3 9.9 13.9 16.8 19.9 24.3
young (20-24y) 3.3 43.3 46.0 46.5 46.5 46.3 46.6
prime-age (25-54y) 1.7 77.4 78.1 78.8 79.2 79.0 79.1
older (55-64y) 26.4 44.8 57.9 63.3 66.6 69.6 71.2
oldest (65-74y) 15.8 6.0 7.0 12.1 15.0 17.8 21.7
young (20-24y) 3.3 49.8 52.7 53.1 53.0 52.9 53.1
prime-age (25-54y) -2.4 93.2 92.0 91.0 90.9 90.8 90.8
older (55-64y) 14.0 71.1 73.7 79.1 82.0 83.7 85.1
oldest (65-74y) 13.9 13.2 13.2 16.0 18.9 22.2 27.1
male 3.7 63.8 64.6 65.6 66.4 66.9 67.5
female 3.8 63.7 64.6 65.5 66.3 66.9 67.5
share of young (20-24y) 1.2 4.2 5.4 5.1 5.3 5.5 5.3
share of older (55-64y) 5.0 18.3 23.1 25.5 20.9 20.9 23.3
share of oldest (65-74y) 4.2 2.4 3.0 5.1 6.4 5.8 6.6
Total economic dependency ratio (5) -2.6 152.2 149.2 157.0 165.4 162.1 149.7
179
9. SPAIN
Fertility rate 0.2 1.19 1.23 1.29 1.33 1.38 1.42
males 6.3 80.8 82.1 83.5 84.8 86.0 87.1
females 5.0 86.5 87.5 88.6 89.7 90.6 91.5
males 4.6 19.5 20.5 21.5 22.4 23.3 24.1
females 4.1 23.6 24.5 25.4 26.2 26.9 27.7
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.1 1.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.1 1.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 1.2 55.3 56.4 57.1 56.3 56.3 56.5
prime-age (25-54y) -0.5 87.4 87.4 86.9 87.0 86.9 86.9
older (55-64y) 12.1 65.4 72.9 77.8 77.4 77.9 77.5
oldest (65-74y) 14.1 6.4 13.8 18.9 18.8 19.6 20.5
young (20-24y) 1.4 52.6 53.8 54.5 53.8 53.7 54.0
prime-age (25-54y) 0.4 83.3 83.9 83.7 83.8 83.7 83.7
older (55-64y) 16.2 59.0 68.8 75.1 75.1 75.5 75.1
oldest (65-74y) 13.5 5.3 11.6 16.7 17.3 18.0 18.8
young (20-24y) 1.1 57.9 58.8 59.5 58.8 58.7 59.0
prime-age (25-54y) -1.4 91.6 91.0 90.1 90.3 90.1 90.2
older (55-64y) 7.9 72.1 77.3 80.7 79.9 80.5 80.0
oldest (65-74y) 14.8 7.6 16.3 21.3 20.4 21.5 22.3
male 2.5 64.0 65.6 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4
female 2.3 64.0 65.6 66.4 66.4 66.4 66.4
share of young (20-24y) 0.6 5.0 5.8 5.2 5.0 5.5 5.5
share of older (55-64y) 5.0 18.8 22.6 23.4 20.2 22.1 23.9
share of oldest (65-74y) 4.6 1.4 3.6 5.9 6.0 5.3 6.0
180
10. FRANCE
Fertility rate 0.0 1.82 1.81 1.80 1.80 1.79 1.79
males 7.0 79.7 81.1 82.7 84.1 85.5 86.7
females 5.4 85.9 86.9 88.2 89.3 90.4 91.3
males 4.4 19.7 20.6 21.5 22.4 23.3 24.1
females 3.9 23.8 24.5 25.4 26.2 27.0 27.7
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3
TFP (growth rate) 0.7 -0.1 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 5.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
young (20-24y) 2.5 66.8 69.1 69.3 69.1 69.1 69.2
prime-age (25-54y) 1.5 88.2 88.5 89.1 89.7 89.7 89.8
older (55-64y) 15.5 60.4 67.0 72.7 74.4 76.2 75.9
oldest (65-74y) 3.6 6.8 6.9 8.9 10.0 9.8 10.4
young (20-24y) 2.2 64.3 66.4 66.7 66.4 66.5 66.6
prime-age (25-54y) 3.5 84.3 85.4 86.8 87.7 87.8 87.8
older (55-64y) 16.7 58.8 64.8 70.5 73.3 75.6 75.5
oldest (65-74y) 4.9 5.4 7.0 8.5 9.7 9.6 10.3
young (20-24y) 2.7 69.1 71.6 71.9 71.6 71.7 71.8
prime-age (25-54y) -0.6 92.3 91.7 91.5 91.7 91.6 91.7
older (55-64y) 14.3 62.1 69.4 75.0 75.7 76.8 76.4
oldest (65-74y) 2.2 8.4 6.9 9.4 10.3 10.1 10.5
male 2.4 62.4 63.7 64.6 64.8 64.8 64.8
female 2.1 62.7 63.8 64.6 64.8 64.8 64.8
share of young (20-24y) -0.5 7.9 8.4 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.4
share of older (55-64y) 4.2 17.4 19.0 19.3 19.7 20.7 21.5
share of oldest (65-74y) 1.1 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.8
181
11. CROATIA
Fertility rate 0.1 1.49 1.51 1.53 1.55 1.57 1.59
males 9.3 74.9 76.7 78.8 80.8 82.6 84.2
females 7.7 81.2 82.9 84.5 86.1 87.5 88.9
males 6.4 15.6 16.9 18.2 19.5 20.8 22.0
females 6.0 19.3 20.5 21.8 23.0 24.2 25.3
Net migration as % of population in t-1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.4 1.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6
TFP (growth rate) 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 10.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 6.4 55.5 61.6 61.7 61.9 61.8 61.9
prime-age (25-54y) 4.1 86.0 88.7 89.8 90.2 90.1 90.1
older (55-64y) 12.4 53.0 57.2 63.5 64.3 65.0 65.4
oldest (65-74y) 5.0 5.0 7.4 9.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
young (20-24y) 5.5 48.6 53.9 54.1 54.1 54.1 54.1
prime-age (25-54y) 5.7 82.6 86.1 87.8 88.3 88.3 88.3
older (55-64y) 16.2 47.7 53.9 60.5 62.4 63.3 63.9
oldest (65-74y) 6.9 3.3 6.3 8.8 10.0 10.1 10.3
young (20-24y) 7.0 61.9 68.8 68.8 68.9 68.9 68.9
prime-age (25-54y) 2.3 89.3 91.1 91.5 91.7 91.6 91.6
older (55-64y) 7.8 58.8 60.6 66.5 66.1 66.5 66.6
oldest (65-74y) 2.8 6.9 8.7 9.2 10.0 9.8 9.7
male 0.4 63.3 63.6 63.7 63.7 63.7 63.7
female 1.1 62.5 63.2 63.7 63.7 63.7 63.7
share of young (20-24y) -0.1 6.0 6.7 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.9
share of older (55-64y) 2.9 17.8 17.4 20.2 19.1 19.9 20.7
share of oldest (65-74y) 1.6 1.5 2.3 2.6 3.2 3.0 3.1
182
12. ITALY
Fertility rate 0.2 1.24 1.28 1.33 1.37 1.41 1.45
males 6.0 81.1 82.4 83.7 85.0 86.1 87.1
females 5.5 85.5 86.8 87.9 89.0 90.1 91.0
males 4.5 19.5 20.5 21.4 22.3 23.2 24.0
females 4.5 22.7 23.7 24.7 25.5 26.4 27.2
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.3 0.4 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 8.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.3 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6
young (20-24y) 0.4 45.2 45.4 45.8 45.5 45.4 45.6
prime-age (25-54y) 1.8 78.6 79.1 79.8 80.6 80.5 80.4
older (55-64y) 18.4 57.9 64.5 67.5 70.3 74.2 76.3
oldest (65-74y) 23.7 9.4 14.7 18.5 21.5 27.0 33.0
young (20-24y) 0.5 37.5 37.9 38.2 37.9 37.9 38.0
prime-age (25-54y) 3.2 68.6 69.7 70.9 72.0 71.9 71.8
older (55-64y) 20.9 47.6 57.0 60.4 62.7 66.9 68.5
oldest (65-74y) 24.8 6.0 11.3 16.7 19.6 24.7 30.8
young (20-24y) 0.3 52.1 52.3 52.6 52.3 52.3 52.4
prime-age (25-54y) -0.4 88.6 88.0 88.0 88.4 88.3 88.1
older (55-64y) 14.9 68.7 72.4 75.0 78.0 81.1 83.6
oldest (65-74y) 22.1 13.1 18.5 20.5 23.6 29.3 35.2
male 4.6 64.0 65.2 66.0 66.7 67.6 68.6
female 4.5 64.5 65.6 66.3 67.1 68.0 69.0
share of young (20-24y) -0.4 4.5 4.7 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.1
share of older (55-64y) 3.7 21.2 25.0 21.9 21.1 23.5 24.9
share of oldest (65-74y) 7.7 2.7 4.9 7.1 7.0 8.1 10.4
Total economic dependency ratio (5) -12.0 156.0 155.3 158.0 158.4 150.9 144.0
183
13. CYPRUS
Fertility rate 0.1 1.37 1.40 1.43 1.46 1.49 1.51
males 6.3 80.5 81.8 83.2 84.4 85.6 86.8
females 5.7 84.6 85.8 87.0 88.1 89.2 90.3
males 4.6 19.1 19.9 20.9 21.9 22.8 23.7
females 4.6 21.8 22.6 23.6 24.6 25.5 26.4
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.1 1.9 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.1 2.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0
TFP (growth rate) 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) -43 568 572 569 563 535 525
Working-age population (growth rate) -1.5 1.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 0.0
young (20-24y) 3.3 68.8 71.8 72.1 72.3 72.3 72.1
prime-age (25-54y) 1.9 89.4 90.5 90.7 91.2 91.4 91.4
older (55-64y) 8.1 68.0 65.4 69.2 70.4 72.8 76.1
oldest (65-74y) 6.9 16.5 13.0 14.3 18.3 20.7 23.4
young (20-24y) 1.2 65.4 66.3 66.6 66.9 66.7 66.6
prime-age (25-54y) 2.5 85.0 86.4 86.7 87.3 87.5 87.5
older (55-64y) 15.3 56.8 59.3 64.2 65.6 68.5 72.1
oldest (65-74y) 11.5 9.5 9.5 12.1 16.0 18.2 21.0
young (20-24y) 5.2 72.3 77.3 77.5 77.6 77.5 77.4
prime-age (25-54y) 0.8 94.3 94.9 94.7 95.0 95.1 95.1
older (55-64y) 0.7 79.6 72.0 75.0 75.7 77.4 80.3
oldest (65-74y) 2.1 24.0 16.6 16.8 21.1 23.5 26.1
male 2.7 64.0 64.3 64.8 65.4 66.0 66.7
female 3.2 63.5 63.8 64.4 65.1 65.9 66.7
share of young (20-24y) -0.6 7.6 7.3 7.4 7.7 7.0 7.0
share of older (55-64y) 3.1 15.4 14.3 16.9 19.6 17.9 18.5
share of oldest (65-74y) 2.7 3.1 2.7 3.0 4.3 5.8 5.8
184
14. LATVIA
Fertility rate 0.2 1.53 1.59 1.63 1.66 1.68 1.70
males 12.2 70.3 72.6 75.4 78.0 80.4 82.5
females 8.6 79.8 81.5 83.4 85.2 86.9 88.4
males 7.4 14.1 15.5 17.1 18.6 20.1 21.5
females 6.4 19.0 20.3 21.7 23.0 24.2 25.4
Net migration (thousands) -31.0 32.9 -7.4 -2.4 -0.4 0.2 1.9
Net migration as % of population in t-1 -1.6 1.7 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
TFP (growth rate) 1.3 1.0 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.0 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.4 17.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) -451 1,094 975 867 753 652 643
young (20-24y) 3.2 67.4 70.1 71.3 70.7 70.0 70.5
prime-age (25-54y) 1.2 87.7 88.0 88.2 89.2 89.0 88.9
older (55-64y) 0.9 73.7 73.5 74.0 72.5 74.3 74.6
oldest (65-74y) -11.7 22.8 10.8 11.0 11.1 9.8 11.1
young (20-24y) 1.8 61.1 62.5 63.5 63.0 62.3 62.9
prime-age (25-54y) 1.3 84.4 84.4 84.9 85.9 85.8 85.7
older (55-64y) -1.0 73.9 73.6 71.5 70.5 72.9 73.0
oldest (65-74y) -9.7 20.5 10.7 10.8 10.6 9.4 10.8
young (20-24y) 4.3 73.4 77.4 78.4 77.8 77.1 77.6
prime-age (25-54y) 0.9 90.9 91.5 91.3 92.2 91.9 91.8
older (55-64y) 2.6 73.4 73.3 76.5 74.4 75.7 76.0
oldest (65-74y) -15.1 26.4 11.1 11.2 11.8 10.2 11.3
male 0.7 64.2 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9
female 0.7 64.2 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9
share of young (20-24y) 2.4 5.5 7.7 8.5 6.8 7.5 7.9
share of older (55-64y) 2.0 20.7 21.4 22.8 24.3 17.8 22.7
share of oldest (65-74y) -2.6 5.3 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.5 2.7
185
15. LITHUANIA
Fertility rate 0.2 1.44 1.49 1.55 1.59 1.62 1.65
males 12.0 70.8 73.3 76.0 78.5 80.8 82.8
females 8.4 80.5 82.4 84.2 85.9 87.5 88.9
males 7.3 14.4 15.9 17.5 18.9 20.3 21.7
females 6.2 19.5 20.9 22.2 23.4 24.6 25.7
Net migration (thousands) -76.2 81.8 -7.7 -0.5 2.8 4.3 5.5
Net migration as % of population in t-1 -2.6 2.9 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
TFP (growth rate) 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.5 18.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) -723 1,713 1,565 1,400 1,246 1,065 990
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) -598 1,442 1,321 1,187 1,054 910 845
young (20-24y) 1.7 64.1 64.6 66.5 66.1 65.5 65.8
prime-age (25-54y) 2.0 90.0 91.0 91.4 92.2 92.2 92.0
older (55-64y) 0.4 75.3 73.2 74.1 74.0 74.5 75.7
oldest (65-74y) -8.1 20.6 13.4 12.9 13.7 12.7 12.5
young (20-24y) 0.9 64.2 63.9 65.9 65.4 64.8 65.2
prime-age (25-54y) 1.5 88.9 89.0 89.5 90.5 90.5 90.4
older (55-64y) 0.1 75.6 75.3 73.7 73.2 74.2 75.7
oldest (65-74y) -6.8 18.9 13.1 12.9 13.2 12.2 12.2
young (20-24y) 2.4 64.0 65.2 67.1 66.7 66.1 66.4
prime-age (25-54y) 2.2 91.1 92.8 92.9 93.5 93.5 93.3
older (55-64y) 0.7 75.0 70.6 74.5 74.7 74.7 75.7
oldest (65-74y) -10.3 23.1 13.9 12.9 14.3 13.2 12.8
male 0.7 64.1 64.8 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9
female 0.8 64.1 64.8 64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9
share of young (20-24y) 0.4 5.6 5.9 6.4 5.7 5.5 6.0
share of older (55-64y) 1.5 21.4 20.4 21.1 25.1 21.5 22.9
share of oldest (65-74y) -0.5 4.4 3.8 3.7 4.2 4.9 3.9
186
16. LUXEMBOURG
Fertility rate 0.2 1.38 1.42 1.47 1.51 1.54 1.56
males 6.2 80.7 81.6 83.1 84.5 85.7 86.9
females 5.8 85.0 86.0 87.4 88.6 89.8 90.8
males 4.5 19.4 20.2 21.1 22.1 23.0 23.9
females 4.6 22.5 23.3 24.3 25.3 26.2 27.1
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.8 2.9 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.8 2.9 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.0
Labour productivity per hour (growth rate) 0.9 -0.7 0.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
TFP (growth rate) 0.6 -0.4 0.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Potential GDP per worker (growth rate) 1.0 -0.7 0.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) 95 419 465 501 523 522 514
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) 78 325 366 395 407 405 403
young (20-24y) 7.0 46.9 54.1 54.1 54.0 54.0 53.9
prime-age (25-54y) 0.7 89.8 90.3 90.3 90.3 90.4 90.5
older (55-64y) 4.9 48.4 48.5 50.5 51.7 51.4 53.3
oldest (65-74y) -1.3 5.6 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.3
young (20-24y) 6.4 49.2 55.8 55.8 55.7 55.8 55.7
prime-age (25-54y) 3.5 86.8 89.3 90.3 90.2 90.3 90.3
older (55-64y) 13.3 40.1 46.8 50.2 52.2 51.5 53.3
oldest (65-74y) 0.7 3.8 3.1 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.5
young (20-24y) 7.5 44.8 52.4 52.5 52.3 52.4 52.3
prime-age (25-54y) -2.0 92.7 91.3 90.4 90.3 90.5 90.6
older (55-64y) -3.0 56.2 50.2 50.8 51.3 51.3 53.2
oldest (65-74y) -3.3 7.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.2
male 1.0 60.6 60.7 61.0 61.2 61.3 61.5
female 0.6 60.9 61.0 61.0 61.1 61.3 61.5
share of young (20-24y) 0.5 5.0 5.3 5.2 5.6 5.5 5.5
share of older (55-64y) 3.5 12.2 12.2 13.2 15.6 15.7 15.7
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3
187
17. HUNGARY
Fertility rate 0.1 1.62 1.67 1.70 1.71 1.72 1.72
males 11.1 72.5 74.7 77.2 79.5 81.6 83.6
females 9.2 79.3 81.2 83.3 85.2 86.9 88.5
males 7.3 14.5 16.0 17.5 19.0 20.5 21.8
females 7.0 18.4 19.8 21.3 22.7 24.1 25.4
TFP (growth rate) 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 3.6 15.3 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
young (20-24y) 2.2 54.5 56.9 56.7 56.9 56.7 56.7
prime-age (25-54y) 3.1 91.0 93.1 94.1 94.1 94.1 94.1
older (55-64y) 9.8 68.0 72.8 74.0 78.2 77.9 77.8
oldest (65-74y) 1.9 9.7 9.3 11.3 10.8 11.7 11.6
young (20-24y) 1.3 49.3 50.8 50.7 50.8 50.7 50.6
prime-age (25-54y) 4.9 87.7 91.0 92.5 92.4 92.5 92.6
older (55-64y) 16.5 57.8 65.7 68.5 74.7 74.4 74.3
oldest (65-74y) 4.3 7.3 7.8 10.3 10.5 11.7 11.6
young (20-24y) 3.0 59.4 62.7 62.5 62.6 62.5 62.5
prime-age (25-54y) 1.3 94.3 95.1 95.5 95.6 95.6 95.6
older (55-64y) 1.6 79.6 80.5 79.7 81.5 81.2 81.2
oldest (65-74y) -1.4 12.9 11.3 12.4 11.1 11.8 11.6
male 0.2 64.4 64.6 64.6 64.6 64.6 64.6
female 1.1 62.9 63.3 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0
share of young (20-24y) 0.7 5.3 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1
share of older (55-64y) 4.3 15.9 20.1 21.9 21.7 19.9 20.2
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.5 2.3 1.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.8
188
18. MALTA
Fertility rate 0.3 1.15 1.25 1.33 1.40 1.45 1.49
males 6.1 80.9 81.9 83.4 84.7 85.9 87.0
females 6.2 84.6 85.6 87.1 88.5 89.7 90.8
males 4.5 19.5 20.3 21.3 22.2 23.1 24.0
females 4.6 22.5 23.4 24.4 25.3 26.3 27.1
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.6 4.4 1.9 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.5 3.3 1.9 0.9 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4
TFP (growth rate) 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 6.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (20-64y; thousands) 84 333 386 442 461 440 417
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) 86 277 338 390 402 381 363
young (20-24y) 0.3 80.0 80.5 80.7 80.4 80.4 80.3
prime-age (25-54y) 3.2 90.6 93.1 93.7 93.8 93.8 93.7
older (55-64y) 16.5 55.3 66.1 71.8 73.0 70.9 71.8
oldest (65-74y) -2.4 11.1 6.6 8.9 9.5 9.4 8.6
young (20-24y) 0.8 79.1 80.0 80.3 80.0 80.0 79.9
prime-age (25-54y) 6.7 83.7 88.4 90.2 90.4 90.4 90.4
older (55-64y) 28.4 43.0 59.4 69.3 72.2 70.5 71.4
oldest (65-74y) 2.9 5.4 5.0 7.9 8.9 9.0 8.4
young (20-24y) 0.0 80.7 81.0 81.1 80.8 80.8 80.7
prime-age (25-54y) 0.2 96.3 96.7 96.5 96.4 96.5 96.5
older (55-64y) 5.1 67.0 72.0 73.7 73.5 71.1 72.1
oldest (65-74y) -8.0 16.9 8.3 9.7 9.9 9.7 8.9
male 0.7 62.9 63.4 63.6 63.6 63.6 63.6
female 0.5 63.1 63.6 63.6 63.6 63.6 63.6
share of young (20-24y) -1.0 7.7 6.2 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.7
share of older (55-64y) 9.0 11.8 12.5 16.9 22.4 21.6 20.8
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.4 2.2 1.1 1.4 2.0 2.8 2.6
189
19. THE NETHERLANDS
Fertility rate 0.1 1.53 1.55 1.58 1.60 1.61 1.63
males 6.4 80.3 81.6 83.0 84.3 85.5 86.7
females 6.4 83.6 84.8 86.2 87.6 88.8 90.0
males 4.8 18.8 19.8 20.8 21.7 22.7 23.6
females 5.1 21.3 22.3 23.4 24.4 25.4 26.4
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.2 2.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.2 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2
TFP (growth rate) 0.7 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 11.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -1.3 0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.4
young (20-24y) 3.7 85.4 89.0 89.1 89.1 89.1 89.1
prime-age (25-54y) 3.7 89.1 90.5 91.6 92.4 92.7 92.8
older (55-64y) 8.9 75.3 72.5 75.6 78.4 82.0 84.2
oldest (65-74y) 13.0 17.0 16.8 17.3 22.2 26.4 30.0
young (20-24y) 2.3 85.9 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2 88.2
prime-age (25-54y) 5.3 85.5 87.6 89.2 90.5 90.8 90.8
older (55-64y) 13.9 68.5 67.2 71.8 75.5 80.3 82.4
oldest (65-74y) 18.3 11.6 17.0 17.6 21.9 25.6 29.9
young (20-24y) 5.1 84.8 89.9 89.9 89.9 89.9 89.9
prime-age (25-54y) 2.0 92.6 93.4 93.8 94.3 94.6 94.6
older (55-64y) 3.8 82.1 77.9 79.6 81.4 83.7 85.9
oldest (65-74y) 7.6 22.6 16.6 17.0 22.6 27.2 30.2
male 2.8 65.0 65.4 65.9 66.6 67.3 67.8
female 3.0 64.8 65.2 65.9 66.6 67.2 67.8
share of young (20-24y) -1.7 10.4 9.9 9.2 9.4 9.1 8.6
share of older (55-64y) 0.0 20.0 18.5 16.7 19.3 21.0 20.0
share of oldest (65-74y) 3.8 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.4 5.9 7.3
190
20. AUSTRIA
Fertility rate 0.1 1.44 1.46 1.49 1.52 1.55 1.57
males 6.8 79.5 80.8 82.4 83.8 85.1 86.3
females 6.0 84.2 85.3 86.7 88.0 89.1 90.2
males 4.9 18.6 19.5 20.6 21.6 22.6 23.5
females 4.8 21.8 22.6 23.7 24.7 25.6 26.6
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 8.6 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.4 0.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
young (20-24y) 2.0 75.9 77.9 78.0 78.0 77.9 77.9
prime-age (25-54y) 2.0 89.6 90.8 91.3 91.6 91.6 91.6
older (55-64y) 10.7 58.6 60.9 67.5 68.9 69.0 69.4
oldest (65-74y) 1.0 8.3 7.7 8.1 9.4 9.4 9.3
young (20-24y) 4.2 72.9 77.1 77.1 77.1 77.0 77.0
prime-age (25-54y) 3.1 86.6 88.4 89.3 89.7 89.8 89.8
older (55-64y) 19.7 50.4 58.1 66.9 69.2 69.8 70.1
oldest (65-74y) 1.9 6.0 4.8 6.5 7.8 7.9 7.9
young (20-24y) -0.1 78.8 78.8 78.8 78.8 78.8 78.7
prime-age (25-54y) 0.8 92.6 93.2 93.2 93.4 93.5 93.4
older (55-64y) 1.6 67.1 63.9 68.2 68.5 68.2 68.7
oldest (65-74y) -0.2 11.0 10.9 9.9 11.0 10.9 10.8
male 0.5 63.0 63.2 63.4 63.6 63.6 63.6
female 2.1 61.4 62.8 63.4 63.5 63.5 63.5
share of young (20-24y) 0.3 8.0 8.2 8.5 8.1 8.1 8.3
share of older (55-64y) 1.6 17.3 17.6 17.8 19.5 18.7 18.9
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.8 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.5
191
21. POLAND
Fertility rate 0.2 1.39 1.45 1.51 1.56 1.59 1.61
males 10.9 73.2 75.7 78.1 80.3 82.3 84.1
females 8.2 81.3 83.2 85.0 86.6 88.1 89.5
males 7.0 15.4 17.1 18.5 19.9 21.2 22.4
females 6.3 19.8 21.3 22.7 23.9 25.0 26.1
TFP (growth rate) 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 3.0 13.2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
young (20-24y) 1.1 57.9 58.2 59.0 59.2 58.8 59.0
prime-age (25-54y) 1.3 87.8 88.7 88.8 89.2 89.3 89.1
older (55-64y) 4.1 57.8 61.2 61.6 60.1 61.0 61.9
oldest (65-74y) 0.8 9.2 9.2 10.5 10.3 9.6 10.0
young (20-24y) 1.8 50.1 51.2 51.9 52.0 51.6 51.9
prime-age (25-54y) 2.2 83.4 85.0 85.3 85.6 85.8 85.6
older (55-64y) 6.5 45.8 51.8 52.0 50.4 51.2 52.3
oldest (65-74y) 0.4 6.0 5.6 6.7 6.6 6.2 6.4
young (20-24y) 0.4 65.4 65.1 65.9 66.1 65.6 65.9
prime-age (25-54y) 0.2 92.2 92.3 92.2 92.7 92.5 92.4
older (55-64y) -0.1 71.1 71.2 71.5 69.9 70.4 71.0
oldest (65-74y) 0.2 13.4 13.7 15.0 14.5 13.4 13.6
male 0.0 64.5 64.5 64.5 64.5 64.5 64.5
female 0.0 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6 61.6
share of young (20-24y) 1.1 5.5 6.3 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.6
share of older (55-64y) 4.3 15.0 15.8 21.2 20.3 16.7 19.3
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.4 2.3 2.3 2.6 3.6 3.3 2.7
192
22. PORTUGAL
Fertility rate 0.1 1.41 1.44 1.47 1.50 1.52 1.55
males 7.3 79.6 81.9 83.3 84.6 85.8 86.9
females 5.4 85.0 86.0 87.2 88.3 89.4 90.4
males 5.1 18.9 20.5 21.5 22.4 23.2 24.0
females 4.4 22.3 23.0 24.0 24.9 25.8 26.7
TFP (growth rate) 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 0.8 53.6 54.4 54.5 54.2 54.4 54.4
prime-age (25-54y) 1.3 91.3 92.1 92.3 92.5 92.5 92.6
older (55-64y) 11.3 69.3 71.1 74.1 76.5 79.0 80.6
oldest (65-74y) 10.8 14.3 16.1 18.4 19.3 22.5 25.1
young (20-24y) 1.5 49.7 51.3 51.4 51.1 51.2 51.2
prime-age (25-54y) 2.9 89.5 91.2 91.9 92.3 92.3 92.4
older (55-64y) 13.4 64.9 67.4 71.0 73.6 76.8 78.3
oldest (65-74y) 14.4 9.6 15.0 17.7 18.4 21.4 24.0
young (20-24y) 0.2 57.3 57.4 57.5 57.3 57.4 57.4
prime-age (25-54y) -0.5 93.2 93.1 92.8 92.7 92.7 92.7
older (55-64y) 8.8 74.3 75.3 77.5 79.5 81.4 83.0
oldest (65-74y) 6.3 20.0 17.5 19.3 20.3 23.7 26.3
male 2.3 64.6 64.9 65.4 65.8 66.4 66.9
female 2.3 64.2 64.7 65.1 65.5 66.0 66.4
share of young (20-24y) -0.3 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.9 5.0 4.8
share of older (55-64y) 1.7 19.7 21.5 22.8 20.6 22.4 21.4
share of oldest (65-74y) 3.7 3.6 4.5 5.9 6.3 6.3 7.4
193
23. ROMANIA
Fertility rate 0.0 1.81 1.80 1.79 1.78 1.78 1.77
males 12.4 70.9 73.7 76.4 79.0 81.3 83.3
females 9.9 78.6 80.9 83.0 85.0 86.8 88.5
males 7.8 14.2 16.0 17.6 19.2 20.6 22.0
females 7.3 18.1 19.7 21.3 22.7 24.1 25.4
Net migration (thousands) -50.6 78.7 -37.5 -4.8 5.7 13.1 28.2
TFP (growth rate) 1.4 1.3 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.9 12.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
young (20-24y) 0.9 44.6 45.0 45.4 45.4 45.3 45.5
prime-age (25-54y) -0.2 82.0 82.0 81.5 81.9 81.8 81.8
older (55-64y) 9.9 48.6 56.8 57.4 56.5 59.0 58.5
oldest (65-74y) 6.1 3.4 6.8 9.1 8.9 8.6 9.6
young (20-24y) 0.8 34.0 34.3 34.8 34.7 34.6 34.8
prime-age (25-54y) -2.5 72.4 71.4 69.8 70.0 70.0 69.9
older (55-64y) 12.2 37.6 50.0 50.0 47.7 50.2 49.8
oldest (65-74y) 4.4 2.3 4.4 6.8 6.4 6.0 6.7
young (20-24y) 0.8 54.6 54.9 55.4 55.3 55.2 55.4
prime-age (25-54y) 1.4 91.3 91.9 92.4 92.9 92.7 92.7
older (55-64y) 5.8 60.8 63.9 64.7 65.0 67.2 66.6
oldest (65-74y) 7.4 5.0 10.0 11.7 11.5 11.2 12.4
male 0.5 63.2 63.4 63.6 63.6 63.6 63.6
female 0.8 62.5 63.0 63.2 63.3 63.3 63.3
share of young (20-24y) 0.6 4.5 5.2 5.3 5.0 5.2 5.1
share of older (55-64y) 6.1 13.8 20.6 20.8 19.4 17.5 19.8
share of oldest (65-74y) 1.8 1.0 1.8 3.2 3.2 2.9 2.8
194
24. SLOVENIA
Fertility rate 0.1 1.59 1.62 1.65 1.67 1.68 1.69
males 7.5 78.5 80.0 81.7 83.2 84.6 86.0
females 6.1 84.4 85.7 87.0 88.2 89.4 90.5
males 5.5 17.8 18.9 20.1 21.2 22.3 23.3
females 5.0 21.7 22.8 23.9 24.9 25.8 26.7
TFP (growth rate) 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 9.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Labour force (20-64y; thousands) -121 1,015 993 981 927 899 895
young (20-24y) 2.7 56.6 58.5 59.4 59.2 58.9 59.2
prime-age (25-54y) -0.1 92.9 92.3 92.5 93.0 92.8 92.8
older (55-64y) 19.4 57.3 65.1 73.2 74.8 76.2 76.6
oldest (65-74y) -0.8 7.4 6.5 6.0 6.4 6.3 6.6
young (20-24y) 2.5 51.2 53.1 53.9 53.7 53.5 53.7
prime-age (25-54y) -0.4 90.4 90.0 89.7 90.2 90.1 90.0
older (55-64y) 21.7 52.9 61.9 71.4 72.6 74.1 74.5
oldest (65-74y) 1.4 5.1 6.0 5.6 6.2 6.0 6.4
young (20-24y) 2.9 61.3 63.4 64.4 64.2 63.9 64.2
prime-age (25-54y) 0.1 95.0 94.4 94.8 95.3 95.1 95.1
older (55-64y) 16.8 61.7 68.3 74.8 76.7 77.9 78.4
oldest (65-74y) -3.2 9.9 7.1 6.4 6.6 6.5 6.8
male 1.6 62.4 63.0 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0
female 1.8 62.2 62.9 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0
share of young (20-24y) 1.0 5.3 6.2 6.2 5.6 6.1 6.2
share of older (55-64y) 5.8 16.5 18.9 22.6 20.5 19.4 22.3
share of oldest (65-74y) -0.2 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.6
195
25. SLOVAKIA
Fertility rate 0.1 1.60 1.61 1.62 1.63 1.65 1.66
males 10.7 73.4 75.8 78.1 80.3 82.3 84.1
females 8.7 80.4 82.4 84.3 86.0 87.7 89.1
males 7.1 15.1 16.7 18.2 19.6 21.0 22.2
females 6.8 19.0 20.6 22.0 23.4 24.6 25.8
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.5 0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 0.1
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.5 0.3 -0.9 -0.7 -0.8 -0.4 0.1
TFP (growth rate) 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.5 12.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 1.6 47.6 48.9 49.2 49.4 49.0 49.1
prime-age (25-54y) 1.3 89.9 91.2 91.0 91.2 91.4 91.2
older (55-64y) 15.7 67.1 66.5 69.4 73.7 78.4 82.8
oldest (65-74y) 12.9 7.0 8.1 10.3 12.6 15.5 19.9
young (20-24y) 1.8 35.9 37.3 37.7 37.9 37.6 37.7
prime-age (25-54y) 4.6 86.3 89.4 90.4 90.7 91.2 90.9
older (55-64y) 19.2 64.4 64.2 66.2 73.1 78.7 83.6
oldest (65-74y) 12.0 5.9 6.9 8.9 10.7 13.8 18.0
young (20-24y) 1.4 58.8 59.9 60.2 60.4 60.1 60.2
prime-age (25-54y) -1.8 93.3 92.9 91.6 91.6 91.6 91.5
older (55-64y) 12.0 69.9 68.8 72.5 74.3 78.0 82.0
oldest (65-74y) 13.5 8.3 9.6 11.8 14.6 17.3 21.8
male 4.0 62.8 63.6 64.2 65.2 65.9 66.8
female 4.0 62.1 62.8 63.5 64.5 65.3 66.1
share of young (20-24y) 1.0 4.2 4.7 5.3 4.9 5.0 5.2
share of older (55-64y) 5.0 17.1 18.0 23.3 23.2 19.4 22.1
share of oldest (65-74y) 3.2 1.6 2.0 2.7 4.2 4.9 4.8
196
26. FINLAND
Fertility rate 0.1 1.39 1.42 1.45 1.48 1.51 1.53
males 7.1 79.0 80.5 82.0 83.5 84.9 86.1
females 6.3 84.1 85.7 87.0 88.2 89.4 90.4
males 5.1 18.3 19.5 20.5 21.6 22.5 23.4
females 5.2 21.6 23.0 24.0 25.0 25.9 26.8
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) -0.1 1.6 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) -0.2 1.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 7.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 3.0 68.9 71.7 71.9 71.8 71.8 71.8
prime-age (25-54y) 0.4 88.1 88.3 88.4 88.6 88.6 88.5
older (55-64y) 6.0 77.0 69.0 74.0 78.0 80.2 83.1
oldest (65-74y) 11.4 13.8 12.2 12.8 17.8 21.3 25.2
young (20-24y) 2.9 66.9 69.7 70.0 69.8 69.8 69.9
prime-age (25-54y) 2.3 86.8 87.8 88.8 89.2 89.3 89.0
older (55-64y) 8.9 77.1 70.2 74.5 80.1 82.8 86.0
oldest (65-74y) 14.6 11.0 8.9 10.3 15.3 20.2 25.6
young (20-24y) 2.9 70.7 73.5 73.8 73.6 73.6 73.6
prime-age (25-54y) -1.3 89.4 88.8 88.1 88.0 88.0 88.0
older (55-64y) 3.3 77.0 67.7 73.6 76.0 77.8 80.3
oldest (65-74y) 7.8 17.0 15.9 15.5 20.3 22.5 24.8
male 3.8 63.7 64.2 65.6 66.2 66.8 67.4
female 4.2 63.2 63.7 64.8 65.5 66.4 67.4
share of young (20-24y) -0.6 7.4 8.4 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.8
share of older (55-64y) 3.2 20.3 16.7 19.2 21.6 21.4 23.5
share of oldest (65-74y) 3.2 3.7 3.2 3.0 4.6 6.1 6.9
197
27. SWEDEN
Fertility rate 0.1 1.68 1.73 1.75 1.76 1.76 1.76
males 5.5 81.5 82.4 83.6 84.8 86.0 87.0
females 5.3 85.4 86.2 87.4 88.6 89.7 90.7
males 4.2 19.7 20.4 21.3 22.2 23.0 23.9
females 4.4 22.5 23.2 24.2 25.2 26.1 26.9
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1
young (20-24y) 2.0 73.2 75.1 75.2 75.1 75.1 75.1
prime-age (25-54y) 0.7 91.6 92.0 92.1 92.3 92.3 92.3
older (55-64y) 4.3 82.2 81.0 83.6 83.5 85.4 86.5
oldest (65-74y) 9.4 20.3 18.9 21.9 23.8 28.4 29.7
young (20-24y) 1.8 69.0 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8 70.8
prime-age (25-54y) 1.3 88.9 89.6 89.9 90.1 90.2 90.1
older (55-64y) 5.2 79.4 77.9 80.3 80.4 83.0 84.6
oldest (65-74y) 12.6 16.2 19.6 22.2 24.2 28.2 28.7
young (20-24y) 2.3 76.8 79.0 79.1 79.1 79.1 79.1
prime-age (25-54y) 0.1 94.1 94.4 94.2 94.3 94.3 94.2
older (55-64y) 3.3 84.9 84.1 86.8 86.6 87.6 88.2
oldest (65-74y) 6.0 24.5 18.1 21.5 23.4 28.5 30.6
male 2.9 65.0 65.8 66.4 66.4 67.2 67.9
female 2.9 65.0 65.7 66.4 66.4 67.1 67.9
share of young (20-24y) 0.5 7.2 8.4 8.1 7.6 7.6 7.7
share of older (55-64y) 2.0 19.1 19.1 18.3 21.1 19.0 21.1
share of oldest (65-74y) 2.2 4.1 3.8 4.6 4.8 6.7 6.3
198
28. NORWAY
Fertility rate 0.1 1.47 1.49 1.52 1.55 1.57 1.60
males 5.2 82.1 82.8 84.1 85.2 86.3 87.3
females 5.6 85.1 86.1 87.3 88.5 89.6 90.7
males 4.0 20.2 20.8 21.7 22.5 23.4 24.2
females 4.6 22.3 23.1 24.1 25.1 26.0 26.9
Employment (15-74y; growth rate) 0.3 3.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1
Labour input: hours worked (growth rate) 0.3 3.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1
Labour productivity per hour (growth rate) 1.2 -0.1 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
TFP (growth rate) 0.8 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Potential GDP per worker (growth rate) 1.2 -2.2 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 6.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Nominal interest rate : n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Working-age population (growth rate) -0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1
young (20-24y) 2.7 74.2 76.8 77.0 76.9 76.9 76.9
prime-age (25-54y) 3.2 86.6 88.1 89.1 89.8 89.7 89.8
older (55-64y) -2.3 75.5 70.2 70.2 71.3 72.9 73.2
oldest (65-74y) -2.0 22.2 17.5 16.8 17.9 19.1 20.2
young (20-24y) 2.1 73.1 75.1 75.3 75.2 75.2 75.2
prime-age (25-54y) 4.8 83.8 86.1 87.6 88.6 88.6 88.6
older (55-64y) 2.8 70.0 66.8 68.2 69.7 72.4 72.8
oldest (65-74y) 1.1 17.0 15.3 14.9 16.0 16.9 18.1
young (20-24y) 3.3 75.3 78.4 78.6 78.5 78.5 78.5
prime-age (25-54y) 1.7 89.2 90.0 90.6 90.9 90.8 90.9
older (55-64y) -7.3 80.7 73.6 72.2 72.8 73.4 73.5
oldest (65-74y) -5.3 27.6 19.8 18.8 19.7 21.2 22.3
male 0.6 65.0 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.5 65.6
female 0.7 65.0 65.1 65.2 65.3 65.5 65.6
share of young (20-24y) -0.8 8.5 8.9 7.9 7.5 7.7 7.6
share of older (55-64y) 2.2 18.3 18.3 16.8 18.8 19.4 20.4
share of oldest (65-74y) 0.8 4.4 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.8 5.2
199
29. EUROPEAN UNION
Fertility rate 0.1 1.50 1.53 1.56 1.58 1.60 1.62
males 7.7 78.4 80.0 81.7 83.3 84.8 86.1
females 6.4 84.0 85.3 86.7 88.0 89.3 90.4
males 5.3 18.2 19.3 20.4 21.5 22.5 23.5
females 5.0 21.8 22.8 23.9 24.9 25.9 26.8
TFP (growth rate) 0.9 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.3 9.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 2.1 61.6 62.5 63.4 63.8 63.5 63.7
prime-age (25-54y) 1.5 86.7 87.3 87.7 88.1 88.2 88.2
older (55-64y) 10.1 65.4 68.3 71.6 72.7 74.9 75.5
oldest (65-74y) 8.2 10.2 11.6 13.9 15.1 16.4 18.4
young (20-24y) 2.1 57.4 58.2 59.1 59.6 59.3 59.4
prime-age (25-54y) 3.0 81.5 82.9 83.7 84.3 84.5 84.5
older (55-64y) 13.5 59.1 63.7 67.5 69.3 72.0 72.6
oldest (65-74y) 9.6 7.5 9.8 12.4 13.6 15.0 17.1
young (20-24y) 2.0 65.6 66.6 67.5 67.8 67.5 67.6
prime-age (25-54y) 0.0 91.8 91.6 91.4 91.7 91.7 91.7
older (55-64y) 6.3 72.1 73.2 75.9 76.3 77.8 78.4
oldest (65-74y) 6.3 13.4 13.7 15.5 16.6 17.8 19.8
male 2.1 63.8 64.7 65.1 65.4 65.7 65.9
female 2.2 63.5 64.4 64.8 65.1 65.5 65.7
share of young (20-24y) 0.2 6.4 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.6
share of older (55-64y) 2.3 19.1 20.2 20.5 20.4 20.5 21.4
share of oldest (65-74y) 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.9 4.2 4.5 5.0
200
30. EURO AREA
Fertility rate 0.1 1.48 1.50 1.53 1.55 1.58 1.60
males 6.9 79.6 81.0 82.6 84.0 85.3 86.5
females 5.8 84.8 85.9 87.3 88.5 89.6 90.7
males 4.8 18.9 19.9 20.9 21.9 22.8 23.7
females 4.6 22.4 23.3 24.3 25.2 26.1 27.0
TFP (growth rate) 0.9 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
HICP (growth rate) 2.2 8.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
young (20-24y) 2.0 63.0 64.0 65.0 65.2 64.9 65.1
prime-age (25-54y) 1.6 86.4 87.0 87.5 87.9 88.0 88.1
older (55-64y) 11.0 65.9 68.9 73.1 74.3 76.2 77.0
oldest (65-74y) 9.0 10.4 12.1 14.3 16.0 17.2 19.3
young (20-24y) 5.4 57.9 62.4 64.7 61.9 62.0 63.3
prime-age (25-54y) 2.2 83.8 84.4 85.7 86.3 86.7 85.9
older (55-64y) 18.2 59.4 68.5 71.5 73.7 73.4 77.6
oldest (65-74y) 10.9 7.0 9.9 13.7 15.1 16.4 18.0
young (20-24y) 5.9 64.2 69.6 71.3 68.5 68.7 70.1
prime-age (25-54y) -1.3 93.6 92.0 92.3 93.1 93.4 92.4
older (55-64y) 11.7 70.6 77.8 78.1 77.3 77.3 82.3
oldest (65-74y) 8.0 12.1 13.1 16.5 17.4 18.4 20.1
male 2.4 63.8 64.8 65.3 65.6 65.9 66.1
female 2.4 63.7 64.8 65.3 65.6 65.9 66.1
share of young (20-24y) 0.0 6.7 7.0 6.8 6.6 6.7 6.7
share of older (55-64y) 1.8 19.9 20.7 20.4 20.4 21.0 21.7
share of oldest (65-74y) 2.8 2.5 3.3 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.3
201
Part IV
Resources
REFERENCES
• Abbas S.A., Pienkowski A. and K. Rogoff (2020), ‘Sovereign Debt: A Guide for Economists and
Practitioners’, Oxford University Press.
• Betthäuser B.A., Bach-Mortensen A. and P. Engzell (2022), ‘A systematic review and meta-analysis
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ISSN 2443-8014 (online)

INSTITUTIONAL PAPER 257 | NOVEMBER 2023

This paper exists in English only and can be downloaded from

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2023

PDF ISBN 978-92-68-04232-8 ISSN 2443-8014 doi:10.2765/960576 KC-BC-23-064-EN-N

© European Union, 2023

2024 Ageing Report

EUROPEAN ECONOMY Institutional Paper 257

Comments can be sent to:

DG ECFIN - Unit C2: ecfin-secretariat-c2@ec.europa.eu

Secretariat of the Economic Policy Committee: epc-secretariat@ec.europa.eu

Vesna STAVREVSKA Federal Planning Bureau

Penka TANEVA National Social Security Institute

Jindrich MARVAL Ministry of Finance

Thor Askov JENSEN Ministry of Finance

Daniel KEMPTNER Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

Tõnu LILLELAID Ministry of Finance

Colm ROCHE Department of Finance

Angeliki ZOULAKI National Actuarial Authority

Aurora GONZÁLEZ URIEL Ministry of Finance

Vieu LIN Ministry for the Economy and Finance

Alen BUČIĆ Croatian Pension Insurance Institute

Riccardo CONTI Sogei S.p.a.

Maria NICOLAOU CHRISTOU Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance

Sandra STABIŅA Ministry of Welfare

Matas VINKUS Ministry of Social Security and Labour

Kevin EVERARD General Inspectorate of Social Security

Renáta NÉMETH-SZŰCS Hungarian State Treasury

Wayne APAP Ministry for Finance and Employment

Jessica DE VLIEGER Ministry of Finance

Armin HEINRICH Ministry of Finance

Pawel STRZELECKI National Bank of Poland

Rita FIGUEIRAS Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security

Tamara NAE Ministry of Finance

Lejla FAJIĆ Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development

Peter MARTIŠKA Ministry of Finance

Seppo ORJASNIEMI Ministry of Finance

Jonas NORLIN Ministry of Finance

Hannah KIIVER ESTAT F1

Ben DEBOECK ECFIN C2

Part I: Underlying assumptions 11

Part II: Age-related expenditure items: coverage, projection

Part III: Statistical Annex 171

Part IV: Resources 203

1. 2024 AGEING REPORT: MANDATE, GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS

Overview of the projection exercise

Graph 1: Overview of the Ageing Report projection exercise

Source: European Commission, EPC.

Table 1: Overview of the common sensitivity tests around the baseline

Demography Inflation Labour force Productivity

Additional gain 33% less/more 20% lower Employment rate of

Source: European Commission, EPC.

2. MAIN RESULTS: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF POPULATION AGEING

453 million people in 2026. After that, it Male Female

would fall to 432 million in 2070, a decline 90+

general trend at EU aggregate level 80-84

country level. For instance, in 13 Member 65-69

between 2022 and 2070. Yet, an upward 50-54

shrink. The few countries where the 15-19