JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA

FACULTY OF LAW

COMPETITION LAW OF INDIA: POLICY, ISSUES AND DEVELOPMENT

TOPIC- THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION

LAW IN INDIA

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

ASST. PROF. MONA ARYA AASTHA

SRIVASTAVA

STUDENT ID- 202206936

LLM (SF)- SEM-I

BATCH: 2022 - 2024

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 DECLARATION

I, Aastha Srivastava, student of LLM (SF) 1 st semester studying at “Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia
Islamia” and the topic is ‘The Interplay between Consumer Protection and Competition Law in
India’ which was carried by me in my own research .This project was undertaken as a part of
academic curriculum according to the university rules and regulations and it has no commercial
interest and motive, it is my original work. It is not submitted to any other organization for any
other purpose.

Place: DELHI Aastha Srivastava

Date:__.12.2022 (Signature of student)

AASTHA SRIVASTAVA

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 CERTIFICATE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT AASTHA SRIVASTAVA HAS SUCESSFULLY

COMPLETED THE PROJECT WORK TITLED ‘THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN

CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA’ PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF MS.
MONA ARYA.

THIS PROJECT IS THE RECORD OF AUTHENTIC WORK CARRIED OUT

DURING THE ACADEMIC YEAR 2022-2023.

TEACHER’S SIGNATURE- ....................

DATE - __/12/2022

ASST. PROF. MS. MONA ARYA

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks to my teacher Asst. Prof. Ms. Mona Arya who gave me
the golden opportunity to do this wonderful project on the topic The Interplay between
Consumer Protection and Competition Law in India which also helped me in doing a lot of
Research and I came to know about so many new things. I am really thankful to her.

Secondly I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finalizing this
project within the limited time frame.

AASTHA SRIVASTAVA

SEM-I (SF)

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 TABLE OF CONTENT

1. ABSTRACT

2. INTRODUCTION
2.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
2.2. RESEARCH METHOD

3. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

4. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION IN

THE CONTEXT OF UTPS AND RTPS IN INDIA

 RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES

 INTERESTS OF CONSUMERS
 REGULATION OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES

5. THE NEED FOR CORRECT SEPARATION OF UTPS AND RTPS

6. CONCLUSION

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION

LAW IN INDIA

ABSTRACT

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The protection of the interests of consumers is a central aspect of all modern competition laws as
well as a direct aim of consumer protection laws. However, despite being complementary in
many ways, competition and consumer protection laws cover different issues and employ
different methods to achieve their goals. Whilst consumer protection rules are built upon the
premise that consumers are the weaker party to transactions and should be directly protected for
this reason in their dealings with traders through certain consumer rights, competition law only
indirectly protects the consumers’ economic well-being by ensuring that the markets are subject
to effective competition. This article explores the interplay between consumer protection and
competition law in the Indian context with some comparison with the EU position, where
relevant. After an examination of the relevant legislation and case law, the article finds that given
that the mandate of the Competition Commission of India is to prevent practices having an
adverse effect on competition, in cases of overlap between consumer protection and competition
laws, the Authority should act only on the basis of adverse effects on competition. The treatment
of ‘unfair trade practices’ is used to demonstrate the appropriateness of this approach.

INTRODUCTION

Around the world, many jurisdictions continue to explore the optimal relationship between
competition law and consumer protection law. To this end, policy choices are made in some
countries to unite the legal rules as well as the enforcement of these two areas of law whilst other
countries choose to separate the rules as well as the enforcement of these two closely related but
distinct areas of law. More often than not, choices made at a given point in time are reversed at a
later point as was observed, for example, in the case of the UK which first combined competition
and consumer powers at the Office of Fair Trading to later divest them when a new competition
authority (Competition and Markets Authority) was formed. India has similarly been exploring
the optimal relationship between its competition law and consumer protection law. After initially
combining competition and consumer protection rules in a singular Act (Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1970) with the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act in
1986 and the enactment of the Competition Act in 2002, there was a division both in the rules
and also in the enforcement functions. However, given that both areas of law are concerned with
the interests of consumers, albeit indirectly in competition law and directly in consumer law,
getting the relationship between these areas of law right is still pivotal for ensuring that there is

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no confusion between the application of the rules. Despite their close proximity, competition law
and consumer protection law are distinct areas of law with different underlying theories of harm
and objectives. Whereas consumer protection rules are built upon the premise that consumers are
the weaker party to transactions and should be directly protected for this reason in their dealings
with traders by the enforcing of certain consumer rights, competition law only indirectly protects
the consumers’ economic well-being through ensuring that the goods and services are produced
and priced competitively.

Competition enforcement world over is predicated on two identifiable theories of harm. It

considers harm to consumers and harm to competition as pivotal. However, this dual association
with consumer welfare and protection of competition often requires the competition regulator to
re-prioritize enforcement measures - at times in the interests of consumers and at times in the
interests of business. As we enter the seventh year of enforcement of Indian competition law,
two questions assume a high level of importance: Are these priorities well defined? Does
adopting one measure mean the absence of the other? This paper primarily considers the
differences and similarities between competition and consumer protection law and considers
what combination of these presents a mechanism to address these identifiable theories of harm.
This is done by exploring the state of the relationship between competition law and consumer
protection law in India while contrasting this with the same relationship under EU law to the
extent relevant. In pursuit of this aim, this article examines the relevant rules as well as the
enforcement regime. In this examination, the prohibition of ‘unfair trade practices’ is used as an
example that demonstrates the interplay between these different areas of law.

We proceed with a fundamental premise: both competition and consumer protection law embrace
the interests of the consumer, albeit in different ways. In the Indian context, the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 (“Consumer Act”) does so explicitly, while the Competition Act, 2002
(“Competition Act”) does so by necessary implication since any trade or business ultimately
results in the provision of goods or services to the consumer. The legislative history of these
enactments shed considerable light on the overlaps and differences between the statutes. In the
EU context, the question whether consumer welfare and more broadly, consumer interests should
guide the decisional practice in the application of competition law is a hotly debated one after
more than fifty years of enforcement. In fact, it reveals a potential area of tension between the
enforcement actions of the European Commission and the judgments of the Court of Justice of

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the European Union in this area of the law. It is also a question that reveals conflicting views on
what the goals of competition law are and should be.

The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the legislative background in India. Section
III assesses the interplay between consumer protection and competition in the context of ‘unfair
trade practices’ and ‘restrictive trade practices’ in India. Section IV demonstrates the importance
of correctly demarcating ‘unfair trade practices’ and ‘restrictive trade practices’ in a discussion
that is mainly focussed on India but that also draws on the experiences from the EU and to a
degree the United States. Section V concludes by finding that despite being a young competition
law jurisdiction, due to the specificities of the legislation and other factors, India is in fact in a
good position to correctly separate consumer protection issues from competition law issues. In
this respect, much depends on the Competition Commission of India’s making the right call in
specific enforcement decisions.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

 Are the priorities of dual association with consumer welfare and protection of
competition well defined?
 Does adopting one measure mean the absence of the other?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The methodology which has been adopted for the research is entirely doctrinal in nature. The
researcher will compile the paramount information from the primary, secondary and tertiary
sources. The reliance will be placed upon the statutes, legislations and judicial precedents which
shall be incorporated under the primary sources, the researcher shall also place reliance upon the
secondary sources which are inclusive of articles, journals, research papers, books, web sources,
and reports of Law Commission of India. The tertiary sources shall be the interviews, opinions,
open-ended questions from the focus groups i.e., advocates practicing criminal litigation. The
information acquired from the aforementioned sources would be compiled in the form of final
submission.
THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

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The approach of the Consumer Act was to create a new law to protect the interests of the
consumer and to fill the gap in the field of consumer protection. The Law Commission of India
explains this in its 199th Report that in spite of various provisions providing protection to the
consumer in different enactments like CPC 1908, Indian Contract Act 1872, Sale of Goods Act
1930, etc. very little could be achieved in the area of consumer protection. Though the MRTP
Act, 1969 has provided relief to the consumers, yet it became necessary to protect consumers
from exploitation and to save them from adulterated and substandard goods and deficient
services and unfair business practices. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (CPA) was thus
framed to protect consumers from unfair and undesirable practices of business community. The
Act came into force in 1987 and was further amended from time to time.

As the Law Commission explained, the gap was not the availability of a statutory framework as
much as the existence of a specialized body that dealt exclusively with practices harming the
interests of consumers. The then existing Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission (MRTP) established under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
1969 (MRTPA) with a dual mandate to deal with both anti-competitive and anti-consumer
practices was found to be too broad in its mandate. It dealt with unfair trade practices (UTP) that
concerned harm to consumers as well as monopolistic and restrictive practices (RTP) that
threatened competition and consumer welfare.

Generally, UTPs refer to any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice employed to promote
the use, sale or supply of any goods or provision of services.1 RTPs are understood to be trade
practices that have or may have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition.
The term monopolistic practice is often used interchangeably with restrictive practices. 2

UTPs were included within the scope of the MRTP only in the year 1984 pursuant to
recommendations of a Committee under the Chairmanship of Justice Rajinder Sachar (“Sachar
Committee”).3 This Committee recognized that curbing monopolistic and restrictive trade
practices (RTP) would only partially resolve consumer grievances by eliminating the effects of

1
Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
2
The Indian Monopolies Inquiry Commission, 1965.
3
Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Companies and MRTP Act, August 1978.

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such practices. The Sachar Committee’s report proposed a framework to deal with practices that
aimed at harming the consumer directly and equalise the consumer’s position vis-a-vis the
business. The Committee’s recommendations were incorporated into the MRTPA by an
amendment in the year 1984.4

UTPs were defined as “practices that were directed at misleading or deceiving a consumer by
making representations regarding the price, quality or use of goods or services or by misleading
advertisements or by any misleading offer of gifts”. Further, the Act proscribed the practice of
hoarding or destruction of goods or a refusal to sell intended at raising the price of the same or
similar goods.

Simultaneously, the MRTPA also disallowed RTPs that aimed at obstructing the flow of capital
or resources into the market or which brought about price manipulation or conditions of delivery
or practices that affected the flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or services in such
manner as to impose unjustified costs or restrictions on consumers.
In the year 1991, the Parliament had a relook at UTP provisions in the MRTPA and broadened
their scope.5 It did so by inserting the words “adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive
practice including any of the following practices” into the section header. This essentially made
the practice to deceive a consumer paramount (and not the form) and rendered the list of UTPs
provided under the MRTPA non-exhaustive. A telling effect of this amendment came with the
decision of the Supreme Court of India in Om Prakash vs. Assistant Engineer, Haryana Agro
Industries Corporation Limited and Anr. 6 The Court was hearing an appeal from the National
Commission established under the Consumer Act. In those years, the Consumer Act relied upon
the MRTPA to define an UTP. The appellant was aggrieved by a ‘pick and choose’ delivery
policy of the respondent that resulted in an increase in price of the tractor he purchased from the
respondent. The Supreme Court noted that prior to the 1991 amendment, the list of UTPs under
the MRTPA was exhaustive. Since the MRTPA (at the time of sale of the tractor) only
proscribed the practice of ‘hoarding or destruction or refusal to sell goods or services with the
object of raising their price’, the Court noted that mere delay in delivering the tractor,

4
MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984, w.e.f 01 August 1984.
5
MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991 w.e.f 27 September 1991.
6
1994 (2) SCALE 530, alt(1994) 3 SCC 504, 1994 3 SCR 463.

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notwithstanding that the delay was intentional, would not constitute a UTP. However, pursuant
to the 1991 amendment, all unfair methods or unfair or deceptive practices (including those
assailed in this case) would constitute UTPs.

Two years after the recommendations of the Sachar Committee which brought UTPs in the fold
of the MRTP, the Parliament enacted the Consumer Act. The Consumer Act was to become a
parallel legislation for regulating UTPs. Its principle object was the “better protection of the
interests of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the establishment of consumer
councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected
therewith”. It established district, state and national level forums to deal with consumer disputes.
The Consumer Act and MRTPA prohibited similar UTPs and defined them identically. As
originally enacted, the Consumer Act did not cover RTPs. 7 By an amendment in the year 1993, 8
the Consumer Act was amended to include RTPs in the nature of ‘tie-in’ sales. By another
amendment in the year 2002,9 delays in the supply of goods or services intended to inflate the
price were covered as RTPs under the Consumer Act. The scope of the Consumer Act in
regulating RTPs was much narrower than the MRTPA, which regarded RTPs as practices which
had the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting competition. In particular, the MRTPA
proscribed practices which tend to obstruct the flow of capital or resources into the stream of
production as an RTP. Likewise, manipulation of prices, conditions of delivery or flow of supply
in the market which may have the effect of imposing on the consumer unjustified costs or
restrictions were regarded as RTPs.10

A significant similarity between the MRTPA and the Consumer Act on the issue of UTPs was
the status of consumers. The Consumer Act did not protect buyers who purchased goods or
services for a ‘commercial purpose’ from petitioning the Consumer Forums. Consequently,
commercial purchasers who purchased to resell were not included within the ambit of a
consumer. While the MRTPA did not define a consumer, given the similarity of UTP provisions
with the Consumer Act, Indian courts relied on the definition of consumers in the latter statute.

7
Consumer (Protection) Bill, 1986.
8
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993.
9
Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002.
10
Section 2(o) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

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11
Thus, neither statute protected consumers against UTPs practiced by commercial purchasers/
buyers.

With the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the year 1991 and trade liberalisation in the
domestic market and trade protectionism under the World Trade Organisation, the scope of the
existing market regulation law – the MRTPA – was found to be insufficient to deal with the
needs of the domestic industry and competition from a globalised trade. The Government of
India set up a Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. S.V.S. Raghavan in the year 1999 to
suggest measures to adopt a more robust competition policy (“Raghavan Committee”). 12 This
Committee suggested the repeal of the MRTPA by a comprehensive competition statute
modelled in line with the Committee’s suggestions. Significantly, the Committee proposed that
the Competition Commission of India (CCI), to be established under the new statute, would deal
with monopolistic and RTPs while UTPs were to be transferred to the adjudication machinery
under the Consumer Act. The Committee set the agenda for a new competition policy in the
following terms:

The ultimate raison d’être of competition is the interest of the consumer. The consumer’s right to
free and fair competition cannot be denied by any other consideration. There is also a need for
supportive institutions to strengthen a competitive society notably, adequate spread of
information throughout the market, free and easy communication and ready accessibility of
goods...Competition policy should thus have the positive objective of promoting consumer
welfare.13

THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONSUMER PROTECTION AND COMPETITION IN THE CONTEXT OF

UTPS AND RTPS IN INDIA

11
AIR 1989 Delhi 329, 1988 64 CompCas 884 Delhi.
12
SVS Raghavan Committee on Competition Policy and Law
13
ibid

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The treatment of RTPs and UTPs in India in the enforcement of the Consumer Act and the
Competition Act presents an interesting overlap in terms of functions.

a) Restrictive trade practices

The treatment of RTPs displays the intersection between the substance and enforcement of the
two Acts as well as the potential issues that can follow from this intersection. The Consumer Act
proscribes RTPs which tend to bring about manipulation of price or conditions of delivery or to
affect flow of supplies in the market relating to goods or services in such a manner as to impose
on consumers unjustified costs or restrictions and include ‘tie-in’ sales and ‘delayed supplies’ –
with a view to raising the price of goods or services. While the Raghavan Committee identified
the minor overlap between the two Acts in terms of ‘tie-in’ sales, the definition of RTPs under
the Consumer Act is undeniably broad and would include within its scope any trade practice that
tends to bring about manipulation of price or conditions of delivery or to affect flow of supplies
in the market relating to goods or services in such a manner as to impose on the consumers
unjustified costs or restrictions. Another amendment to the Consumer Act in the year 2002, 14
expressly prohibited any “delay beyond the period agreed to by a trader in supply of such goods
or in providing the services which has led or is likely to lead to rise in the price”. It is likely that
because this amendment came in a year after the Raghavan Committee Report and at the same
time as the notification of the Competition Act, its effect was not examined by the Raghavan
Committee. As such, there does exist a significant an overlap in terms of regulation of RTPs
between the Competition and Consumer Act.

But how does this overlap play out in terms of regulation of RTPs? The Competition Act
requires, as a condition precedent, the existence of an agreement between traders.

It applies a per se standard in relation to horizontal agreements 15 and a rule of reason standard for
vertical agreements.16 This is somewhat similar to the enforcement history under the MRTPA. In
its initial years the MRTPA distinguished the RTPs within its scope to be actionable only where

14
See Section 2(5) of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002.
15
Agreements between players engaged in an identical trade.
16
Agreements between players at different levels of the production chain.

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they eliminated or restricted competition.17 By an amendment in the year 1984, the Parliament
included a per se standard for RTP contravention in the MRTPA. 18 However, even after this
amendment, some RTPs remained subject to a rule of reason analysis.19

b) Interests of consumers

Another important difference between the two Acts is the treatment of the consumer. Under the
Competition Act, consumers include persons who buy goods or services irrespective of whether
they use it for a ‘commercial purpose’, resale or for personal use. This is in line with the
preamble to the Act which requires the CCI to

...prevent practices having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition in
markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by other
participants in markets, in India.20

Unlike the MRTPA, there is also no requirement that the adjudication machinery under the
Competition Act should be triggered by a consumer. 21 Under the Consumer Act, a consumer is a
person who purchases goods or services, but not for a commercial purpose. This demonstrates
that the purpose of the Consumer Act is to protect the interests of final consumers and not other
traders engaged in a different trade. This distinction is clear from the grievance redress functions
under both statutes and the addressability of their orders. The Consumer Act addresses consumer
disputes against traders directly, while the Competition Act addresses consumer welfare
indirectly by ensuring that efficiencies are promoted and more choices are available to
consumers. In practice we see that this distinction is often very blurred. A significant example of
direct regulation in favour of the consumer is the DLF case. 22 It involved a complaint by an

17
Rajasthan Housing Board v. Parvati Devi (Smt.) and others; Appeal (civil) 14994 of 1996 judgment dated 03 May
2000
18
ibid
19
M/s. Voltas Limited Bombay vs. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 1881.
20
Preamble to the Competition Act, 2002.
21
‘Information’ can be filed by any person under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. However, the Competition
Appellate Tribunal has stressed on the need to evaluate the locus standi of informants; L.H. Hiranandani Hospital
Vs. Competition Commission of India and Ors. Order of the Competition Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 19 of
2014 dated 18 December 2015.
22
Belaire Owner’s Association vs. DLF Limited, CCI Order dated 12 August 2011 in Case No. 19 of 2010.

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association of apartment owners assailing certain terms and conditions in DLF’s standard form
Apartment Buyer’s Agreement and alleging abuse of dominance by DLF.

c) Regulation of unfair trade practices

The deletion of UTPs from the scope of the Competition Act is also significant. The Sachar
Committee had originally recommended the retention of UTPs in the MRTPA since these
“practices were likely to cause grave loss or damage to many consumers”. However, there is no
concept of UTPs as understood in the MRTPA sense, in the Competition Act. While the term
“unfair” has been employed in the Competition Act, it is used in the context of restrictive trade
practices by a dominant entity under Section 4. The Competition Act defines a ‘dominant entity’
as one who enjoys a position of strength in a relevant market which enables it to (i) operate
independently of competition forces and (ii) affect its competitors, consumers or the relevant
market in its favour. Under Section 4, the Competition Act prohibits the imposition of an unfair
price or condition in the purchase or sale of goods or services. The Consumer Act also does not
define the term ‘unfair,’ but it follows an ‘effects’ over ‘form’ approach in regulating UTPs.

THE NEED FOR CORRECT SEPARATION OF UTPS AND RTPS

This section aims to demonstrate why it is important to correctly distinguish between UTPs and
RTPs in practice to achieve the optimal separation between consumer protection and competition
laws. Let us assume for a moment the existence of an UTP practised by a dominant entity. What

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should be the degree of antitrust enforcement in such situations? For example, courts in the
United States have preferred an effect based approach to this question. In Official Airline Guides
(OAG),23 the FTC challenged the refusal by a monopolist/publisher of airline schedules to
include in its compendium schedules of commuter airlines, before a U.S. Court of Appeals. This
refusal to deal was discriminatory, unjustified, and injurious to commuter airlines in their
competition with certificated airlines. The monopolist, however, did not act coercively, did not
compete in the commuter airlines’ market, where the antitrust injury occurred, and did not seek
or have any prospect of gaining power in that market. Although the court acknowledged that
FTC determinations as to what practices constitute an “unfair method of competition” deserve
great weight, it declined to uphold the Commission’s order. In explaining its decision, the court
expressed concern that declaring such conduct unlawful would give the Commission too much
latitude to substitute its own judgement for a respondent’s independent business decisions that
were taken without any anticompetitive purpose or prospect. In essence, although the challenged
conduct was discriminatory and harmful, it did not violate the policies underlying the antitrust
laws.24

With the existing invasive proliferation of e-commerce and digital media in the Indian market,
the conduct of firms, as they adapt to business and competition, need not necessarily take a form
based approach. As such, where practices do not fall within the rigid descriptions of unilateral
conduct under Section 4, the CCI must consider an effects based approach to enforcement.
Naturally, this may also call for amendments to the existing statute since UTPs remain explicitly
excluded from the purview of the Competition Act unlike, for example, Article 102 TFEU which
explicitly covers unfair prices and unfair trading conditions.

CONCLUSION

While the jurisdictions and mandate of consumer fora and the CCI under Indian law are vastly
different, with a total of 3.7 million consumer cases pending in consumer forums until 2014, 25 it
would be advisable that a certain level of market regulation in favour of the consumer is

23
Official Airline Guides, 630 F.3d at 927
24
Extract from the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz in the Matter Of Rambus, Inc. Docket No.
9302, FTC
25
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com

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introduced into the existing system by either generating a best practices code or by enabling suo-
moto regulation by the consumer fora. Some of these changes have already been conceptualised
in the form of the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2015 which proposes the
establishment of a Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) to promote, protect and
enforce the rights of consumers. The CCPA will carry out the following functions, among others:
(i) inquiring into violations of consumer rights, investigating and launching prosecution at the
appropriate forum; (ii) passing orders for recall of goods, or withdrawal of services and
reimbursement of the price paid, and pass directions for discontinuation of unfair trade practices;
(iii) issuing safety notices and order withdrawal of advertisements; and (iv) declaring contracts
that are unfair to a consumer as void. 26 The starting point in setting policy should be the
recognition that competition law and consumer protection law have separate functions,
mechanisms and to a degree separate objectives even if one of the common goals might be the
enhancement and protection of the interests of consumers. The two areas of law protect
consumer interests in different ways. The objectives of competition law are much narrower than
the wider consumer protection law goals. 27 Competition law should be enforced to prohibit
practices that distort competition and thus are detrimental to consumer or total welfare (or any
other ultimate goal) as determined by policy. 28 The scrutiny of practices that are merely
exploitative of the customers of a dominant undertaking through unfair practices and the like
without also being exclusionary through distortive effects on competition may require
competition authorities to act as regulators for which they are unlikely to be the appropriate
bodies.29

The Indian legislator, by removing UTPs from the scope of the Competition Act, has already
demonstrated its preference for the demarcation of consumer protection law and competition law
in the context of UTPs. This demonstrates a more modern approach to competition law than both
that of the US and the EU neither of which has achieved such separation in the legislation. The
proposal to set up an apex body (the CCPA) with powers akin to the CCI to look specifically at
consumer issues is a welcome step to ensure that consumer interest is preserved both in terms of
consumer protection from unfair and restrictive practices by the CCPA; and consumer welfare by
26
Consumer (Protection) Amendment Bill, 2015
27
R O’Donoghue and J Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU (2nded, Hart Publishing, 2013) 848.
28
P Akman, ‘The Role of Exploitation in Abuse under Article 82 EC’ (2009) 11 Cambridge Yearbook of European
Legal Studies 165, 184.
29
Akman (n 69) 185.

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ensuring effective competition through the CCI. Although in the US, through the case law and
FTC policy, UTPs have been made subject to a demonstration of harm to competition before
they will be acted against, the EU still lags behind in finding a workable separation concerning
the competition law treatment of practices that may harm the interests of consumers without
necessarily also distorting competition. In fact, the EU has also not found a solution to the issue
of the treatment of practices that may harm competitors without necessarily also causing harm to
consumers. All in all, it is clear that there is a lot the jurisdictions under examination can learn
from one another on the interplay between consumer protection law and competition law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:

 K Cseres Competition Law and Consumer Protection (Kluwer Law International 2005)
152.

Codified Statutes

18
  Consumer Protection Act, 1986

 MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1984.

 MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991.

 Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993.

 Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002.

 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

Reports

 The Indian Monopolies Inquiry Commission, 1965.

 Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on Companies and MRTP Act, August
1978
 SVS Raghavan Committee on Competition Policy and Law.

Internet Sources:

 https://scroll.in/.
 https://www.bbc.com/news.
 https://www.thehindu.com.
 https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis.
 https://www.ilo.org/
 https://scholarworks.uark.edu
 https://www.thehindu.com
 https://www.thehindubusinessline.com

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