The Territory of Japan: Kentaro Serita

Kentaro Serita
The Territory
of Japan
Its History and Legal Basis
Second Edition
The Territory of Japan
Kentaro Serita
The Territory of Japan

Its History and Legal Basis
Second Edition
Kentaro Serita
Kobe University
Kobe, Japan
ISBN 978-981-99-3012-8 ISBN 978-981-99-3013-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3013-5
Translation from Japanese language edition: Nihon no Ryōdo, published by CHUOKORON-

SHINSHA.INC. in 2010 [2002]. © Kentaro Serita. All Rights Reserved.
© Kreab K.K. 2023. This book is an open access publication.

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Preface to the English Edition
Japan first became widely known among Europeans through The Travels of Marco
Polo, in which thirteenth century Venetian merchant Marco Polo referred to Japan as
“Zipangu, the Land of Gold.” Though Polo himself never travelled to Japan, he is
thought to have been expressing the views held by the residents of southern China,
after he had spent time in Hangzhou, which at the time was a trade hub between
Japan and China.
Meanwhile, modern Japan makes an appearance in American author Herman
Melville’s Moby-Dick, as a country closed to the outside world and a refueling
station for the American whaling crew that ventures out into the North Pacific, as far
as the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands. This depiction demonstrates how, as the newly
modernized Japan was being pressed by the nations of Western Europe to open its
doors to trade, many wanted the attribution of the islands around Japan to be
clarified—not only China, but also Russia to Japan’s north, various countries that
had been looking East since the Age of Sail, and America to the east. Thus, efforts
were made to define Japan’s territories from the end of the Edo period through to the
Meiji period, resulting in their present definition. This work describes the changes
and current state of Japan’s territories while also touching upon developments in the
international community relating to maritime resources from the latter half of the
twentieth century onwards.
It is well known how Japan emerged as a modern nation and vied alongside other
countries to expand its territory at a time when the world was ruled by the law of
survival of the fittest, before finally signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952.
Consequently, a series of unresolved territorial issues continue to burden Japan. In
this work, I attempted to examine the claims of the relevant countries with an open
mind and strived to lay the foundation for calmly addressing the issues involved, so
as to find a peaceful solution.
As was mentioned in the Epilogue of the original Japanese edition, this text was
primarily an analysis of the situation up to 2002. Therefore, I would like to write a
summary of the facts regarding the situation since that time as they relate to Russia,
China, and the Republic of Korea (ROK).
v
vi Preface to the English Edition
The Northern Territories: Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island,

the Habomai Islands, and Shikotan Island
As touched on in Chapter 1, the entry into force of the Soviet-Japanese Joint

Declaration put an end to the state of war with the former Soviet Union, which
had not signed the Peace Treaty with Japan after World War II. However, Russia (the
successor State to the former Soviet Union) continues to occupy the Northern
Territories even now, as the two parties have not reached an agreement on the
peace treaty negotiations referred to in the said Declaration.
In November 2010, then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev set foot on
Kunashiri Island despite protests from the Japanese government, the first time for
a sitting Russian or Soviet leader to visit one of the four islands of the Northern
Territories. He paid another visit again as prime minister in July 2012.
After Russia launched its “special military operation” against Ukraine on
February 24, 2022, the United Nations General Assembly held an emergency special
session and adopted a Resolution declaring Russia’s action an “Aggression against
Ukraine.” Japan joined with other Western countries to impose sanctions on Russia.
On September 5, 2022, with still no end in sight to the war in Ukraine, Russia
announced the suspension of force of the visa-free travel agreement for former
residents of the disputed islands, “as a response to the illegal sanction pressure
exerted by the Japanese government and its joining the West’s Russophobic pol-
icy.”1 Peace treaty negotiations remain suspended.
The Senkaku Islands
In April 2012, the then-governor of Tokyo announced his idea for the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government to purchase three privately owned Senkaku Islands
(Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island). Instead, the central
government acquired ownership of the islands in question on September 11 of that
year for more than 2 billion yen ($26 million) and ownership was transferred from
the private citizens to the government. Since the acquisition of the islands, there have
been incidents in China where anti-Japanese demonstrations turned violent, and the
buildings of Japanese companies were set on fire.
Prior to this development, China sent two government vessels into Japanese
territorial waters for the first time on December 8, 2008. (This intrusion did not
result from an arbitrary decision made by the ships, according to an article in which
the person in charge of the government vessels at the time was interviewed; it was
planned from 2006 for the purpose of undermining Japan’s valid control over the
1
According to Leonid Slutsky, chairman of the international committee of the Russian State Duma.
“Russia’s withdrawal from agreement on Kurils seen as response to sanctions—lawmaker,”
September 5, 16:24 https://tass.com/politics/1503027. Accessed December 11, 2022.
Preface to the English Edition vii
islands and was carried out with the consent of the authorities.) Then, a Chinese
fishing boat operating in Japanese territorial waters caused a collision on September
7, 2010 when it crashed into Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels that had called for it to
leave the territorial waters. As soon as the captain of the fishing vessel was arrested
for obstructing the execution of official duties, China immediately demanded an
apology and compensation from Japan. Since the 2012 transfer of ownership to the
Japanese government, China has reportedly sent government vessels into Japan’s
contiguous zone, except in rough weather, to this day.
September 11, 2022 marked 10 years since the transfer of ownership over the
Senkaku Islands. During this time, it has become normal for China Coast Guard
ships to stalk Japanese fishing vessels operating in Japan’s territorial waters. Also,
there have been 332 cases of intrusion into territorial waters over this decade,
according to the Japan Coast Guard. Under these circumstances, the Japan Coast
Guard remains on high alert, continuing to deploy a succession of new patrol vessels.
With the confrontation between the USA and China over Taiwan intensifying, it
appears that tensions in the East China Sea will be further prolonged.
Takeshima
In August 2012, ROK President Lee Myung-bak set foot on Takeshima for the first
time as an incumbent president. The Japanese side protested, but ROK government
officials and parliamentarians have been landing on Takeshima ever since then.
ROK security personnel have been permanently stationed on the island since 1954,
and the country continues its illegal occupation.
Over the years, Japan has patrolled the island (Japan Maritime Safety Agency2
vessels on patrol were fired upon several times), sent official protests, and presently
announces Japan’s response in its Diplomatic Bluebook. Japan may be required to
take additional measures to support its territorial claim, however, so that its oppo-
sition will not be deemed a “paper protest” (as one judge found France’s to be in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case, contested between the United Kingdom and France at
the International Court of Justice; see Chapter 4).
Moreover, Japan has proposed three times3 since 1954 to refer the matter to the
International Court of Justice for a peaceful settlement, but there has been no
movement in the situation.
Yokohama, Japan Kentaro Serita

September 2022
2
The English name for Japan’s Coast Guard until it was changed in 2000.
3
September 1954, March 1962, and August 2012.
Preface
Earth, the Water Planet, is home to over six billion people. It also hosts animals,
plants, and a variety of resources such as minerals. Human beings, land dwellers, are
split up among around 200 countries. There they live their lives, using Earth’s
resources to do so. Although there are around 200 countries now, 50 years ago
there were only around 100. Given that territory forms the foundation of the political
entity that is a State, the past 50 years have seen significant territorial changes.
Setting aside the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the twentieth
century has been characterized by the independence of former colonies and loss of
colonial territory for the former colonizers. Starting in the sixteenth century, for
500 years the countries of Europe had sought to expand their homeland, doing so by
seizing colonies. During the last 100 of those 500 years, the recently modernized
Japan also took part in the scramble to seize colonies. While the colonizers lost these
lands, the former colonies gained their independence, and almost all human beings
came to have their own homeland.
Each country is structured in its own way. The countries that had colonies,
including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Neth-
erlands, Belgium, and Japan, all vary, both in when they had colonies and when they
lost them. Even among those countries that have flourished since ancient times, those
that were colonized, such as India, Indonesia, or Mexico, and those that were not,
such as China, Turkey, or Thailand, are all different.
But what does “homeland” even mean?
The United Nations (UN) advanced the emancipation of non-self-governing
territories, i.e., colonies. During that process, Spain and Portugal argued that they
had overseas provinces, not colonies, which could not be separated from the Spanish
or Portuguese mainland. The UN responded in 1960 by adopting the standard
whereby a non-self-governing territory is “a territory which is geographically sep-
arate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.”
Since ancient times, many countries have gradually expanded their spheres of
influence, eventually clashing with other powers, resulting in war. When one power
comes into contact with a rival power, its expansion ceases. This process was
ix
x Preface
repeated for a period of time, eventually forming proto-countries. Today that is

thought to be what is meant by “homeland,” and it is said to be ethnically and/or
culturally unified.
In Japan’s case, the feudal lords of the Sengoku (“Warring States”) period
established small States across the Japanese archipelago. Each had its own laws
and administration. They often clashed with one another. Starting in the middle of
the sixteenth century, there was a notable emergence of forces seeking to unify the
Japanese archipelago. As is commonly known, Oda Nobunaga took a large step
toward that goal. In order to unify the country, Japan broke off trade relations with
the outside world until the sixteenth century. Toyotomi Hideyoshi turned his atten-
tion to the Asian mainland and sent troops to the Korean Peninsula, whereas
Tokugawa Ieyasu sought to restore friendly diplomatic relations with the Joseon.
Friendly diplomatic relations were restored in 1607 for the first time since the
Muromachi period. Envoys travelled between Japan and the Joseon, and although
there were ups and downs, friendly relations were maintained until the Meiji
Restoration (1868). Relations with Europe, meanwhile, were limited to Dejima in
Nagasaki, but despite this, Japan flourished culturally and economically in the Edo
period. The beginnings of a modern market-based economy also emerged.
Examining territorial changes reveals the nature of countries. One cannot speak of
a country’s territory without taking into account its relations with its neighbors. This
work examines the path Japan has taken as a modern State from the Meiji period
onward. I intend to squarely examine the nature of Japan and thereby understand its
standing in East Asia and the world.
Kobe, Japan Kentaro Serita

May 2002
Introduction
A nation’s existence is founded on a fixed area. This space is its territory. There is no
nation that has no territory. The only place in which a nation can exclusively exercise
its authority is within its own territory. Territory consists of territorial land, which is
the land portion; territorial sea in the case of nations that face the sea, whereby a
nation’s sovereignty extends to a belt of sea of a fixed distance adjacent to its coast;
and territorial air space, which is the air space above a nation’s territorial land and
sea. A nation’s territory is the spatial scope within which its legal order applies. That
scope is determined by international law. Depending on the nation, stipulations
regarding its territory may be included in its constitution. The Constitution of
Japan does not include such stipulations. Japan’s domestic laws only include a law
on its territorial sea. In principle, Japan’s current territory is stipulated by the
Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 and the Treaty of Peace with Japan of
September 1951.
In addition to territorial land, sea, and air space, this work also touches upon
exclusive economic zones (EEZs), continental shelves, and air defense identification
zones (ADIZs), given that they are also often discussed in the context of territory.
Therefore, in addition to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, this work also refers to
international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), and related domestic laws, as necessary.
Furthermore, as a result of Japan’s surrender in 1945 and in accordance with the
Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration, Japan’s current territory was limited
to Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku, and various small islands that were decided
by the Allied powers. In other words, Japan was giving up the territory that it had
added over the previous approximately 50 years through the exercise of military
power, similar to Europe and the USA. Japan’s quest for expansion sometimes
extended to warfare, such as the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese
War, and World War I, and was in principle reverting to the state of possessing
only the territory that was firmly established at the end of the Edo period
(1603–1867) and the beginning of the Meiji period (1868–1912), when Japan first
embarked on becoming a modern nation; in other words Japan’s inherent territory.
xi
xii Introduction
Though the current state of Japan’s territory has already been established for
approximately 60 years, it reminds one of the end of the Edo period, when Japan
completed its unification and enjoyed peace; it even makes one feel that it is possible
to live without digging in one’s heels and to feel at ease with oneself.
The stipulations of Article 2 and 3 of Chapter II, titled “Territory,” of the Treaty
of Peace with Japan are as follows. (Incidentally, the significance of Article 3 has
been lost following the conclusion of the Amami Reversion Treaty of 1953, the
Ogasawara Reversion Treaty of 1968, and the Okinawa Reversion Treaty of 1972.)
Article 2
(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title,4 and claim to
Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of
Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a
consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.
(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations
Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April
2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate
to Japan.
(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part
of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or
otherwise.
(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel
Islands.
Article 3
Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place
under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority,
Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito
Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and
the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a
proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all
and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and
inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.
The Treaty of Peace with Japan, though initially intended to be a peace treaty
between all the Allied powers and Japan, was eventually concluded only between the
nations of the free world from among the Allied powers and Japan, in light of the
dramatic change in the international setting arising from the formation of the
Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the outbreak of
the Korean War in 1950. Unlike the peace treaties concluded in 1947 with Italy,
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Romania, which involved all the Allied powers and
as such established overall peace, the Treaty of Peace with Japan merely achieved
plural (i.e., fragmented) peace. Japan therefore concluded subsequent bilateral peace
4
“Title” refers to facts that are recognized as generating rights under law. The title to territory
includes appendages, such as protrusions from the sea floor within territorial seas, accumulation of
sediment, and reclaimed coastlines, as well as occupation of terra nullius, and cessions, and
annexations.
Introduction xiii
treaties or treaties to reestablish diplomatic relations with those countries that did not
participate in the Treaty of Peace with Japan,5 which was signed in San Francisco
(thus also known as the San Francisco Peace Treaty).
Although China managed to survive the war against Japan through a united
national front, following the conclusion of World War II, the Government of the
PRC controlled mainland China, while the Government of the Republic of China
(ROC) was based in Taiwan and some other areas. Neither party was invited to
participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference. Japan concluded the Treaty of
Peace between Japan and the Republic of China (Japan-ROC Peace Treaty) with the
ROC government in Taiwan in April 1952. Article 2 of the treaty referred to the
Treaty of Peace with Japan, stating, “It is recognized that under Article 2 of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of
America on September 8, 1951 . . ., Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to
Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the
Paracel Islands.” The Government of Japan recognized the PRC government in
September 1972 and, upon issuing the Joint Communique of the Government of
Japan and the Government of the PRC (Japan-China Joint Communique), declared
the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty null and void. Paragraph 3 of the Japan-China Joint
Communique states, “The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates
that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.
The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under
Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”
In October 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union, which did not sign the Treaty of
Peace with Japan, signed the Joint Declaration by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and Japan, which restored normal diplomatic relations between the two
sides. Article 9 of the declaration stipulates:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue, after the restoration of
normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan,
negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.
In this connexion, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of
Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to
Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to
Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and Japan.
In general, the transfer of wartime territories is ultimately decided by a peace

treaty. However, according to Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which was
accepted by Japan and which concluded the war, Japan was also limited by the terms
of the Cairo Declaration of November 1943.6 The Cairo Declaration made no
mention of the Kurile Islands; their transfer to the Soviet Union was merely a
5
Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai. 1988. Kokkō saikai, seifu shōnin (Restoration of Diplomatic Relations
and Recognition of Governments). Tokyo: Keio University Press.
6
See the section on the Cairo Declaration in Chapter 1.
xiv Introduction
promise shared among the leaders of the USA, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
under the secret agreements of the Yalta Conference of February 1945, of which
Japan was not aware. Therefore, Japan and Russia, the successor of the Soviet
Union, have yet to conclude a peace treaty, which would ultimately resolve the
territorial issue between the two sides.
Thus, upon analyzing the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the current status of Japan’s
territories is clear. Chapter 1 of this book traces the development of Japan’s territory
from the past to the present, centered on the Treaty of Peace with Japan and with a
focus on the international context. The chapter will clarify the process leading from
the firm establishment of Japan’s territories at the end of the Edo period and during
the Meiji period, to their subsequent expansion and then their reduction following
the end of the war, as well as the key issues. In addition, Chapter 1 in particular will
discuss Antarctica, regarding which Japan has never asserted any territorial claims,
taking into account the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, and the fact
that Japan is one of the parties to the Antarctic Treaty. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 examine
the specific territorial topics, looking in some detail at the diplomatic challenges
related to Japan’s territory, namely the Northern Territories, the Senkaku Islands,
and Takeshima, while also clarifying the arguments. Chapter 5 takes a comprehen-
sive look at the issue of Japan’s sovereignty and national jurisdiction in relation to
the seas. Chapter 6 addresses the diplomatic factors to consider pertaining to the seas
that lie between Japan and China, and between Japan and the Republic of Korea
(ROK), namely the current situation in which the delimitation of EEZs between
Japan and China, and Japan and the ROK is extremely difficult, as well as the points
of contention and points of agreement for reaching a temporary solution. Finally,
based on the points covered in the preceding chapters, Chapter 7 gives thought to
what is best for future generations in terms of stability and coexistence in East Asia.
It proposes designating the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima, over which the asser-
tion of sovereignty by the relevant countries is deadlocked, as nature preserves in
line with the model in Antarctica, which is only open for natural or scientific studies.
Furthermore, Chapter 7 treats the difficulty of delimiting EEZs as a golden oppor-
tunity, in a sense, and proposes establishing a cooperative international structure in
the area stretching from the Sea of Japan to the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
Chapter 8 examines territorial air space, providing an overview of the current
situation and discussing ADIZs, too, given that they also pertain to territorial
matters.
Translation Note
Japanese terms, including the names of persons and places, are in principle roman-
ized according to the Hepburn system, with a macron (a bar over the letters) to
indicate long vowels. An exception is made for commonly known place names, such
as Tokyo, Kyoto, etc. Chinese words are romanized using the Pinyin system;
exceptions include familiar historical personages, such as Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang
Jieshi in Pinyin). Japanese names are written in the traditional word order, placing
the family name first, e.g., Hashimoto Ryūtarō. This custom has been followed for
the names of persons from other Asian countries, too. Any direct citation from a
source document in English, however, retains the original wording.
xv
Contents
1 Development of Japan’s Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Delimitation and Expansion of Peripheral Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Delimitation of Peripheral Territories in the Late Edo and Meiji
Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Northern Territories, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin . . . . . . . 1
The Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands and Okinawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
The Senkaku Islands and Takeshima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Territorial Expansion During the First Sino-Japanese War, the
Russo-Japanese War, and World War I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Cession of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Cession of Sakhalin and the Annexation of the Korean
Peninsula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Leases, Settlements, and Special Interests in China, Acquisition of the
South Pacific Mandate, and the Creation of Manchukuo . . . . . . . . 10
The End of World War II and Territorial Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Drafting the Treaty of Peace with Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Current State of Japan’s Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Renunciation of Japan’s Expanded Territory: Korea, Taiwan, the
Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, and the South Pacific Mandate . . . . . . . . 22
Renunciation of the Kurile Islands and the Issue of the Northern
Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Reversion of the Administrative Rights from the US: Amami,
Ogasawara (Bonin), and Okinawa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Clashes with Other Countries’ Sovereignty: Takeshima and the
Senkaku Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Antarctic and Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
xvii
xviii Contents
2 The Northern Territories (Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island, the

Habomai Islands, and Shikotan Island) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Background of the Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Speech by the USSR Representative to the Peace Conference . . . . 42
Khrushchev’s Peaceful Coexistence Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
The Era of the New Japan-US Security Treaty and the USSR’s Claim
That “Territorial Issues Have Already Been Settled” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Khrushchev Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Tanaka-Brezhnev Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Improvements in Soviet-Japanese and Russia-Japan Relations . . . . . . 49
New Thinking Diplomacy Under Gorbachev: Japan’s Expanding
Equilibrium Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Collapse of the Soviet Union, and President Yeltsin’s Law and
Justice: Japan’s Multilayered Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
New Developments in Japan-Russia Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Tokyo Declaration and Krasnoyarsk Agreement/Kawana Proposal . 52
President Putin and the Irkutsk Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Background of Japan-Russia Negotiations and Measures for Achieving
a Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Developments in Japan-Russia Negotiations and Their Significance
in the Contemporary Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Steps to be Taken for a Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3 The Senkaku Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
China’s Claim Prompted by Potential Oil Reserves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Examination of China’s Argument and Its Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Analysis of the Arguments that the Senkaku Islands Appertain to
Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Detailed Examinations of Each of China’s Arguments . . . . . . . . . . 71
Examination of Japan’s Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Approaches to a Final Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4 Takeshima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
The Republic of Korea’s Declaration Concerning Maritime Sovereignty:
The Origin of the Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Examining the ROK Side’s Arguments and Their Basis . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Examining the Argument that Takeshima Has Been Korean Territory
since Long Ago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Examining the Argument that Japan’s 1905 Territorial Incorporation
of Takeshima Is Invalid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Examining the Argument that in Addition to the Cairo Declaration,
a Series of Postwar Measures Confirm Takeshima to be Korean
Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Examining the Japanese Side’s Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Approaches to the Takeshima Issue until a Final Decision is Reached . . 105
Contents xix
5 Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Classification of the Sea: Territorial Sea, High Seas, and Exclusive
Economic Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Territorial Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
High Seas: International Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Expansion of the Territorial Sea Breadth from 3 to 12 Nautical Miles . . 113
The 200 Nautical Mile Fishery Zone and 1977 Fishery Zone Temporary
Measures Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
The International Nature of the Delimitation of Maritime Areas . . . 116
Trends in the Law of the Sea Leading Up to the Emergence of
a 200 Nautical Mile Fishery Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
1977 Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters . . . . 121
Need for Review from the Perspective of Securing and Distributing
Protein Resources of the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
EEZ Enclosing Marine Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
EEZ as a System Derived from Fishery Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Japan-ROK Agreement on the Continental Shelf and EEZ . . . . . . . . . 129
Military Use and Scientific Research in EEZs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Military Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Scientific Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
1996 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act . . . . . . . . 139
Enactment, Revision, and Abolition of Domestic Legislation
Pursuant to Japan’s Ratification of UNCLOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Adoption of the Straight Baseline Method for the Territorial Sea . . 141
Incidents Involving Foreign Fishing Vessels Operating in New
Territorial Seas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Treatment of the Seabed Zone in the Act on the Exclusive Economic
Zone and Continental Shelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Principle of Delimitation in the Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone
and Continental Shelf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Changing Relevance of the “Median Line” Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6 Exclusive Economic Zones Between Japan and the Republic
of Korea, and Japan and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Main Causes of Difficulties with Demarcation of Boundaries . . . . . . . 153
Gap Between the Claims of Japan and the ROK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Gap Between the Claims of Japan and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
New Fisheries Agreements Between Japan and China, and Japan and
the ROK, and the Establishment of PMZs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Regulations Leading up to the New Fisheries Agreements . . . . . . . 158
Provisional Measures Under the New Fisheries Agreements . . . . . . 159
xx Contents
7 A Proposal for Stability and Coexistence in East Asia . . . . . . . . . . 165

Acknowledging the Issues: Looking Squarely at the Causes
of Instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Establishing the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima Nature Reserves . . 167
Establishing an International Regime for Preserving the Resources
and the Environment in the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, and
East China Sea: Establishing a Joint Fishing Zone by Japan, China,
the ROK, and Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8 Territorial Air Space and Air Defense Identification Zones . . . . . . 173
Territorial Air Space and Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Freedom of Flight for Civil Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
Air Defense Identification Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
About the Author
Kentaro Serita was born in 1941 in the former Manchuria. He graduated from the
Faculty of Law at Kyoto University. He has served as Professor of International Law
in the Faculty of Law at Kobe University from 1981; Dean of the Graduate School of
International Cooperation Studies at Kobe University from 1994; and Professor
Emeritus at Kobe University from 2004. He was also formerly the Dean of the
Law School at Aichi Gakuin University and President of Kyoto Notre Dame
University.
An expert in international law and international human rights law, he has
authored many works, including Kenpō to kokusai kankyō (Japan’s Constitution in
the International Environment (revised edition)); Kokusai jinken jōyaku shiryōshū
(The International Bill of Human Rights (document collection)); Eijūsha no kenri
(The Rights of Permanent Residents); Fuhenteki kokusai shakai no seiritsu to
kokusaihō (Building on the Global Community and International Law); Shima no
ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei (Sovereignty over Islands and the Delimita-
tion of Economic Zones); and various international treaties. In 2017, he received the
Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold Rays with Neck Ribbon for his academic
achievements.
xxi
Chapter 1
Development of Japan’s Territory
Delimitation and Expansion of Peripheral Territories
Delimitation of Peripheral Territories in the Late Edo and Meiji

Periods
It is well known that Japan, as an independent country, has been in contact with
China and the Korean Peninsula since ancient times, and it has deepened exchanges
with these neighbors. However, when Western nations pressed Japan to open its
doors to trade as a modern State, there was a need to clarify the sovereignty over the
surrounding islands. Thus began the process of defining Japan’s peripheral territory,
which spanned from the late-Edo to the Meiji periods. Japan had to delineate the
territories between itself and Russia, which was expanding southward from Siberia;
the United States and the United Kingdom, which were approaching across the
Pacific from the east and west; and also nearby China and the Korean Peninsula.
The Northern Territories, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin
Looking first to the north, Russia occupied the Kamchatka Peninsula at the close of
the seventeenth century, then began expanding southward toward the Kurile Islands.
When the Russians had come to the Northern Territories by the mid-eighteenth
century, the influence of Japan’s Matsumae Domain had only extended to Kunashiri
Island. However, Russia’s administration did not reach Etorofu Island; although it
had established a colony on Uruppu Island, Russia abandoned it and withdrew in
1805. Meanwhile, the Japanese shogunate conducted a survey of Sakhalin,
Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island and Uruppu Island beginning in 1785; hardened
defenses in eastern Ezo to bring the area, including the Northern Territories, under its
direct control in 1799; and established a settlement on Etorofu Island the following
© Kreab K.K. 2023 1

K. Serita, The Territory of Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3013-5_1
2 1 Development of Japan’s Territory
year. Japan thus had established its sovereignty over the Northern Territories by the
beginning of the nineteenth century. The 1811 Golovnin Incident further demon-
strated that Japanese rule had been cemented there.1
The Matsumae Domain had also conducted surveys of Sakhalin in the seven-
teenth century. At the beginning of that century, the Qing dynasty initiated its
administration of Sakhalin, already known in China in the earlier Tang and Yuan
dynasties. Qing influence brushed up against Russia’s in the Heilongjiang (Amur)
River area. The Treaty of Nerchinsk of 1689 established the relationship between the
Qing dynasty and Russia in this area, and the latter withdrew. The desolate land of
Sakhalin was not of particular interest to the Qing, however, and neither Japan nor
Russia was able to determine much about the region despite sending survey expe-
ditions during this time.
As Russia sought to expand into the northern Pacific in search of trade, Adam
Laxman and Nikolai Rezanov made voyages to Nemuro in 1792 and to Nagasaki in
1804. After the shogunate refused to trade with Russia, Rezanov burned down a
guard station and committed other acts of violence on his return journey toward
Sakhalin. In May 1805, Mamiya Rinzō, whom the shogunate had ordered to conduct
a survey of Sakhalin, discovered what came to be known as the Mamiya Strait
between Russia and Sakhalin, thus proving that the latter is an island. Mamiya’s
findings appeared in a book of maps, Kita Ezo Zusetsu, and this evidence was
presented in Europe in a book by Philipp Franz von Siebold entitled Nippon
(1832). However, the ownership of Sakhalin was not determined until the late Edo
period. In 1727, Russia signed the Treaty of Kyakhta with the Qing dynasty. This
document delimited the border between Siberia and Outer Mongolia and, together
with the Treaty of Nerchinsk, kept Russia’s southern expansion in check until the
mid-nineteenth century.
Following the First Opium War of 1840, the Qing dynasty signed the Treaty of
Nanjing in 1842. The Qing was forced to cede Hong Kong to the UK and to open the
ports of Shanghai and Canton (Guangzhou). As a result, Russia’s overland trade
through the town of Kyakhta was suddenly threatened and Russia was forced to
reconsider a policy of expanding into Qing lands. In 1843, a naval expedition under
the command of Yevfimy Putyatin was planned to survey the Sea of Okhotsk and the
mouth of the Amur River, ensure access to Chinese seaports, and visit Japan. The
expedition was postponed due to various circumstances, but a survey of the Amur’s
mouth was conducted. The port of Nikolayevsk-on-Amur was built at the river’s
mouth in 1850, thus sparking a border dispute with the Qing about sovereignty over
the Amur coastline. According to the record of a British ambassador to Russia,
Russia surveyed Sakhalin (Karafuto) for coal in 1852. When word reached Russia
1
Russians had conducted raids in southern Sakhalin, on Etorofu Island, and elsewhere during
1806–07. The shogunate hardened its defenses against the violence, and when Russian naval
captain Vasily Golovnin sailed to Kunashiri Island under orders from the Russian Navy to survey
the area, he and his subordinates were captured on Kunashiri Island by Matsumae magistrate
officials and transported to Hakodate. This incident was peacefully resolved 2 years later thanks
to mediation by Takadaya Kahei.
Delimitation and Expansion of Peripheral Territories 3
the following year of a mission to Japan undertaken by Commodore Matthew

C. Perry of the US Navy, there was concern that the US would seize Sakhalin.
Russia then issued a decree to occupy the island.
It was under these circumstances that Putyatin, Russia’s plenipotentiary, came to
Nagasaki in July 1853, where he commenced negotiations with the shogunate on
delineating national borders and opening Japanese ports for trade. This mission
resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation
between Japan and Russia on February 7, 1855. This treaty, which was based upon
the Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity, dealt with national borders in Article 2. It
defined the border as lying between Etorofu Island and Uruppu Island, and it stated
that Etorofu Island in its entirety belongs to Japan, that all of Uruppu Island and the
“Kurile” Islands to its north belong to Russia, and with regard to Sakhalin that “the
division of the land shall be performed at a later date.”
In May 1858, as the Qing dynasty was in the midst of the Taiping Rebellion and
fighting the Second Opium War against the British and French armies in a conflict
that was sparked by the October 1856 Arrow Incident, Russia, pressing south from
Siberia, signed the Treaty of Aigun with the Qing, by which Russia gained all land
north of the Heilongjiang (Amur) River. Furthermore, under the Convention of
Peking (Beijing) agreed between Russia and the Qing in November 1860, the
Qing ceded to Russia the Primorsky Krai area east of the Ussuri River as compen-
sation for mediating a peace with the UK and France. Due to the Qing signing the
Convention of Tianjin with Russia, the US, the UK, and France in June 1858, as well
as the Convention of Peking in October 1860, external powers began stationing
ministers resident in Beijing, and in January 1861 the Qing established the Zongli
Yamen, an institution to handle diplomatic affairs in the manner of Western States.
In the meantime, Russia was gradually pushing farther into Sakhalin and antag-
onizing Japan by asserting control over the entire island. After the Meiji Restoration
of 1868 overthrew the Japanese shogunate, Harry Parkes, envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary of the UK, displayed an interest in Russian activity in this
region and advised Japan to abandon Sakhalin.
Sakhalin was shared by Japan and Russia, but there were clashes between the two
countries’ officials and negotiations had come to a standstill. Japanese Foreign
Minister Soejima Taneomi suggested purchasing Sakhalin from Russia, participated
in the Seikanron debate over whether to immediately send a punitive expedition to
Korea, and also suggested ceding Sakhalin to Russia providing that Russia agreed to
a Japanese conquest of Korea. However, Japanese figures such as Kuroda Kiyotaka,
then vice director-general of the Hokkaidō Development Commission, argued in
favor of abandoning Sakhalin to instead focus on administering Hokkaidō and
strengthening defenses against the Russians out of concern for Japan’s foreign
relations and national strength at the time.
Eventually, Soejima met with the Qing dynasty in March 1873 to negotiate issues
concerning the Ryūkyū Islands. He resigned that October due to the political
upheaval that had resulted from the Seikanron debate. After the pro-invasion faction
stepped down from their posts, those in favor of focusing on domestic affairs gained
control of the Japanese government. The policies supported by figures like Kuroda
gained widespread support. Vice Admiral Enomoto Takeaki became Minister to

Russia in 1874, where he commenced negotiations that resulted in the conclusion of
the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands on May 7, 1875.
Under the terms of the treaty, Japan recognized that the entirety of Sakhalin was
Russian territory, while Russia ceded to Japan the Kurile Islands, thus giving Japan
dominion over the 18 islands stretching from Shumshu Island to Uruppu Island.
Thus, in a peaceful manner, the Kurile Islands became Japanese territory and a
border between Japan and Russia was finally delimited.2
The Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands and Okinawa
Next as we look to the south, no discussion of the Pacific Ocean during the
nineteenth century can omit the role of the Chinese market. The US, the first country
to pry open Japan’s doors to the outside world, had conducted its trade with the Far
East primarily along a route running from the Atlantic Ocean around the Cape of
Good Hope and onward to the Indian Ocean. After the Mexican-American War and
the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on March 10, 1848, the US received
land concessions that include present-day California and Texas. It enacted a plan to
open sea routes accessing the Pacific Ocean when gold was discovered in California.
Like many European countries, America’s capitalist mindset was one reason for
seeking to open Japan’s markets. Furthermore, from the 1840s to the 1850s, whaling
was a thriving industry and there was a concentration of whales in the North Pacific.
Some whaling vessels ended up shipwrecked on the Japanese coast, thus providing
further impetus to open up Japan.
It was in this setting that Commodore Perry, in command of the East India
Squadron, turned his eyes on his first voyage toward the Port of Naha as well as
Port Lloyd (Port of Futami) on Chichijima Island, the chief port of the Ogasawara
(Bonin) Islands. Perry had been raised in Rhode Island, the heart of the American
whaling industry, and he came from a military family, with both a father and elder
brother who had served in the Navy. On May 26, 1853, he arrived in Naha from
Shanghai, and after paying a visit to Ryūkyū King Shō Tai at Shuri Castle he entered
the Port of Futami on June 14. British and Russian warships had also visited the
Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands prior to Perry’s arrival, and already there were foreigners
living there as immigrants. The shogunate had dispatched magistrates of foreign
affairs to the islands in 1861, but the door to immigrants was mostly closed until the
Meiji Restoration.
Even after the beginning of the Meiji period, the Japanese government was unable
to work out a clear position on immigration, the Seikanron debate being a contrib-
uting factor. However, it did spell out a development and settlement policy in 1874,
2
Taijudō, Kanae. 1998. Kaikokki no ryōdo kōshō: Ryōdo kizoku no kokusaihō (Territorial Negoti-
ations upon the Opening of Japan: International Law on Territory). Tokyo: Tōshindō.
Delimitation and Expansion of Peripheral Territories 5
and in 1876 the government placed the Ogasawara Islands under the control of the
Home Ministry and sent notifications to ministers resident of other nations. No other
country lodged an objection to this incorporation.
Perry had also eyed the Ryūkyū Kingdom, but it had long-standing ties with the
Qing dynasty and the archipelago was in a special position in the nineteenth century.
That is to say, Shimazu Iehisa, the lord of the Satsuma Domain (also known then as
the Kagoshima Domain), had received permission from Shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu,
who had unified Japan under one ruler, to send troops to the main island of Okinawa
in 1609 to apprehend King Shō Nei of the Ryūkyū Kingdom and subject his land to
Japanese rule. However, Shō Nei’s clan continued to maintain control over the
Ryūkyū Kingdom as its kings. Their reign was regulated by the Fifteen Laws
stipulated by the Shimazu clan, and for over 200 years the Satsuma Domain
collected tax from the Ryūkyū Kingdom and enforced the laws of the domain. The
Ryūkyū Kingdom had maintained ties with the Qing, sending tribute and engaging
in a tributary relationship. However, there was no objection from the Qing over the
Shimazu clan’s rule, and Qing law was not enforced on the Ryūkyū Islands. In other
words, the Qing dynasty did not have material control over Ryūkyū, and the islands
were in practical terms a vassal State of the Satsuma Domain. However, the Satsuma
Domain did permit the Ryūkyū Kingdom considerable political and religious free-
dom, and the kingdom maintained contact with the Qing as well as Western powers
in the late Edo period.
It was in this situation that in 1854 the Ryūkyū Kingdom signed the Ryūkyū-US
Treaty of Amity with Commodore Perry, along with largely similar treaties with
France in 1855 and the Netherlands in 1859. Thus, despite being within the shogun-
ate’s system of domains, the Ryūkyū Kingdom was granted a degree of autonomy.
After the Meiji Restoration, however, this was a source of controversy concerning
the Ryūkyū Disposition.3 In any case, Japanese control over the Ryūkyū Islands
caused no problems for Japan’s relations with the Qing dynasty or any other powers
from 1880 onward.4
3
A Meiji government plan to integrate the Ryūkyū Kingdom into the Empire of Japan. It comprised
a series of policies implemented from the islands’ incorporation under the jurisdiction of Kago-
shima Prefecture in 1871 until the establishment of Okinawa Prefecture in 1879.
4
Japan had been embroiled in a dispute with the Qing dynasty over control of the Ryūkyū Kingdom.
During negotiations, Japan submitted a proposal to China it termed Buntō Kaiyaku. “Buntō,”
literally “island separation,” meant conceding to China islands near Taiwan: Miyako Island and
the Yaeyama Islands (also known as the Sakishima Islands). “Kaiyaku,” meaning “revised terms,”
would redefine the relationship between Japan and the Qing dynasty by permitting the Japanese to
conduct trade in China just as Western nations were allowed to. The negotiations reached a
compromise that fulfilled Japanese wishes on October 21, 1880, but met with objections from Li
Hongzhang, an influential Chinese politician and diplomat, and the Qing dynasty postponed signing
an agreement. Thereafter, the Japanese did not respond to calls for renewed talks, and the issue
faded away after the First Sino-Japanese War.
The Senkaku Islands and Takeshima
The existence of the Senkaku Islands was known since ancient times to the people of
the Ryūkyū and the Chinese, as they lay along a trade route between those two
kingdoms. After the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government, while giving
consideration to the overall relationship with the Qing dynasty, from 1885 on
conducted thorough surveys of the Senkaku Islands through the authorities of
Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods. It was carefully confirmed
through these surveys that the Senkaku Islands had been uninhabited and showed
no trace of having been under Qing control. Based on this confirmation, the Japanese
government took the step of formally incorporating the Senkaku Islands into the
territory of Japan in January 1895. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, the peace treaty that
ended the First Sino-Japanese War, was concluded in April of that year, by which
Taiwan was ceded to Japan. However, the Senkaku Islands were not among the
islands ceded to Japan as a part of the territory of Taiwan.5
Takeshima, the uninhabited islands that lie along the line running from the Oki
Islands of Shimane Prefecture to Ulleungdo of Korea, are historically associated
with the Japanese economic activities on Ulleungdo. The Kingdom of Joseon in
Korea adopted an “empty-island” policy with Ulleungdo from the fifteenth century
to the end of the nineteenth century. During this time, Japanese people did admin-
ister Ulleungdo for around 80 years from the beginning of the seventeenth century
after receiving a license from the shogunate. Disagreements arose with the Joseon,
however, and in 1696 the shogunate forbade Japanese from traveling to the island.
After the shogunate renounced Ulleungdo (called Takeshima at the time), it no
longer prohibited travel to present-day Takeshima (called Matsushima at the time),
regardless of a policy of national seclusion that had been adopted by then. After the
Meiji Restoration, the Japanese government decided to place Takeshima under the
jurisdiction of Shimane Prefecture in 1905, and it gave public notice thereof. Even
so, no protests were lodged.6
Territorial Expansion During the First Sino-Japanese War,

the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I
The Cession of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula
Japan and the Qing dynasty settled the matter of Taiwan in October 1874: at the end
of that year Japan withdrew its troops from the so-called Taiwan Expedition. The
Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands was signed in May of the
5
See Chapter 3.
6
See Chapter 4.
Territorial Expansion During the First Sino-Japanese War,. . . 7
following year. These events marked the clear delimitation of Japan’s peripheral
territory and the beginning of Japanese expansion into the continent. Japan, seeking
to open up the Korean Peninsula, dispatched a warship in September 1875 to support
its negotiations with the Joseon. This sparked the Ganghwa Island Incident,7 which
was followed by the February 1876 signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty of Amity.
Japan thus won the race with the Western powers to open up the Korean Peninsula. It
was through this treaty that Japanese political and economic influence rapidly
penetrated into the area.
However, the Joseon Kingdom was a tributary of the Qing dynasty and also part
of its market, so the Korean Peninsula became a flashpoint for conflict and disputes
between Japan and the Qing. The Japanese and Qing militaries became involved in
the political struggle within the Joseon Kingdom between the pro-Japanese Inde-
pendence Party and the pro-Qing Conservative Party. This eventually resulted in the
signing of the Convention of Tianjin between Japan and the Qing in April 1885,
which stipulated that both sides remove their troops from the area. Yet in 1894, the
internal political turmoil within the Joseon Kingdom led to the Donghak Rebellion
that spread throughout the Korean Peninsula.8 The Joseon government requested the
dispatch of Qing troops. Japan also sent in forces, and the confrontation between the
two finally resulted in exchanges of fire between their armies in July. Then, on
August 1, Japan declared war on the Qing.
Japan’s victory that resulted in the 1895 peace treaty to end the First Sino-
Japanese War not only turned the Korean Peninsula into a neutral zone, but also
forced the Qing dynasty to pay a huge sum in reparations and cede Taiwan, the
Pescadores Islands, and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. The cession of the
Liaodong Peninsula, however, was not overlooked by Russia, which adopted an
increasingly aggressive stance in administering the Far East after deciding to con-
struct the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1891. Hence, Russia, Germany, and France
intervened to have Japan sign a treaty in November 1895 to return the Liaodong
Peninsula.
The great powers demanded numerous concessions from the Qing once the
dynasty’s weakness was exposed. On the pretense of the Qing bestowing gratitude
for the tripartite intervention, Russia and the Qing concluded the Sino-Russian
Secret Treaty in May 1896, the treaty concerning the construction and management
of the Chinese Eastern Railway in August, the so-called Cassini Treaty in
7
In September 1875, the Japanese government dispatched a warship on “a cruise for the purpose of
studying sea routes to the Kingdom of Joseon.” As surveys of the Tsushima Strait were largely
complete at this time, the gunboat Un’yō, on patrol along the western coast of Korea, approached
Ganghwa Island, where it was met with Korean cannon fire. The Un’yō then responded with a
disproportionate retaliatory assault.
8
Donghak was an anti-Christian, anti-Confucian peasant religion that arose in the mid-nineteenth
century. It advocated establishing Eastern (Korean) Learning (as opposed to Western Learning) and
promoted the establishment of worldly benefit and an equal society. It spread widely among farmers
in southern Korea, which led to a peasant rebellion involving Donghak followers and ordinary
farmers.
September, as well as a treaty for the lease of Lüshun (Port Arthur) and Dalian Bay
signed in March 1898, which yielded great benefits from Manchuria to Guandong
(Kwantung). They also established so-called railway-affiliated land where Russia
had police authority as well as the right to station troops. After the Russo-Japanese
War, Japan acquired the “railway-affiliated land” along the South Manchuria Rail-
way and the Anfeng Railway connecting Andong with Fengtian (Mukden) (present
day Dandong to Shenyang). Germany used the killing of missionaries in Shandong
as an excuse to occupy Jiaozhou Bay in 1897, then concluded a treaty in March the
next year to lease the area. In June 1897, France obtained rights to the Yunnan
extension of the Annan Railway as well as mining rights in Yunnan, Guangxi, and
Guangdong. France then signed a treaty with the Qing the following November to
lease Guangzhou Bay. Matching France’s accomplishments, the UK signed an
agreement to lease the Kowloon Peninsula in June 1898, and then, in rivalry with
Russia, concluded another lease agreement for the town of Weihai in July.9 The great
powers also forced the Qing to make “non-concession declarations” so that they
could monopolize the interests and lands they had acquired.
With the exchange of notes in April 1898, Japan forced the Qing dynasty to
permit non-concession in Fujian, while the UK received non-concessions on the
coast at the mouth of the Yangtze River and other locations, and France received
them on Hainan Island and in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Taking advantage
of this momentum, foreign powers gradually expanded and added to the number of
settlements they administered, such as the Shanghai International Settlement. Japan
established its first exclusive settlement in the Hangzhou concession in September
1896. Its largest was the Tianjin concession, established via a memorandum between
Japan and the Qing in August 1898. Other Japanese settlements were in Suzhou,
Hankou, Shashi, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Chongqing.
The Cession of Sakhalin and the Annexation of the Korean

Peninsula
Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, and its incursions into the Korean
Peninsula and Manchuria, posed a threat to Russian plans for expanding into its Far
East. The hostility between Japan and Russia intensified on the Korean Peninsula
where the Qing dynasty had withdrawn. In March 1898, Nishi Tokujirō, foreign
minister in the third Itō Hirobumi Cabinet, notified Russian Foreign Minister Baron
Roman Romanovich Rosen that if Russia would leave Korea to Japan, then Japan
would consider Manchuria outside the scope of its interests. Rosen’s reply was that
Russia would not accept the complete exclusion of its influence from Korea. The
dispute ended in April with the conclusion of the Nishi-Rosen Agreement, which
9
Department of Transportation, Ministry of Railways of Japan. Shina tetsudō kankei jōyaku isan
(Collection of Treaties related to Chinese Railways). September 1926.
stipulated that Russia would allow Japanese dominance in terms of the size of
commerce and industry, and the number of settlements, while Japan would give
tacit approval to Russian occupation of Lüshun and Dalian.
In March 1899, however, the anti-foreigner Boxers (a faction of the ancient White
Lotus religion) staged a rebellion in Shandong, China in response to Germany’s
leasing of Jiaozhou Bay and their movement spread across northern China. In May
1900, the legations of 11 powers in Beijing demanded that the Qing dynasty
immediately quell the Boxers’ revolt. Instead, in June the Qing emperor joined
sides with the Boxers who had surrounded the national legations in Beijing. He
then declared war on all foreign powers that had troops in Beijing. With the support
of the UK and the US, Japan dispatched a large force that was joined in an alliance
with other nations’ troops, and this army marched into Beijing in August. The Boxer
Rebellion (also known as the Boxer Uprising or the Yihequan Movement) came to
an end in September 1901 with the signing of the Boxer Protocol. This document
forced the complete surrender of the Qing and granted the foreign powers the right to
station police and military forces in the Legation Quarter. The majority of troops
supplied in the joint deployment were from the Japanese and Russian armies.
Russian forces were diverted to strengthen their grip on Manchuria. Russia’s indif-
ference to objections from Japan, the UK, and the US led to greater hostility between
Japan and Russia.
In January 1901, Russia proposed turning Korea into a neutral zone, to which
Japan demanded that Russia first withdraw its troops from Manchuria. After con-
cluding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty in 1902, Japan called for the recognition
of the independence of the Qing dynasty and Korea and underscored the importance
of preserving their territorial integrity. Japan further demanded that it be given
dominant status in all areas, including politics, the economy, and military matters
and be allowed to possess a foothold for entry into Manchuria. Russia only gave
support to respecting the independence and territorial integrity of Korea and pushed
for turning lands north of the 39th parallel into neutral territory and for Japan’s full
exclusion from Manchuria. At the end of 1903, Japan formulated a policy towards
the Qing dynasty and Korea to be taken if negotiations were to break down. Japan
made its final proposal to Russia in January the following year. An Imperial
Conference was convened on February 4, which concluded that “if we waste this
opportunity, we fear that we, the Empire of Japan, will fall into a disadvantageous
situation both diplomatically and militarily, from which we shall not recover.” The
Japanese government decided to break off the talks with Russia and on February
10 issued a declaration of war against Russia. The Russians signed an agreement to
surrender Lüshun to Japan on January 2, 1905. Japan emerged victorious in the
Battle of Mukden on March 10, and on May 27 Japan secured a complete naval
victory in the Sea of Japan. After the Battle of Mukden, however, Japan’s
war-fighting capabilities had reached their limit. On June 1, Japan requested that
US President Theodore Roosevelt amicably mediate a Russo-Japanese peace. With
Roosevelt’s good offices, a conference was convened in Portsmouth, New
Hampshire.
The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on September 5, 1905, forced Russia to

recognize Japan’s special rights in Korea, stipulated that both countries would
withdraw their forces from Manchuria, and guaranteed that Russia would respect
Manchurian sovereignty. Furthermore, the lease on the Port of Lüshun and Dalian,
as well as the railway running between Changchun and the Port of Lüshun along
with its affiliated land, would be ceded to Japan. In addition, Russian territory on
Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel was ceded to Japan. However, by taking over
control of special interests in Manchuria from Russia, Japan continued its expansion
into the Asian mainland while sowing discord over the issues of maintaining
territorial integrity, the Open Door Policy, and equal opportunity as advocated by
the US.
After the Russo-Japanese War, in October 1905, Japan finalized a policy of
turning Korea into a protectorate. The Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 (Japan–Korea
Protectorate Treaty) was signed in November, thus establishing the Office of the
Resident-General and making Korea a protectorate of Japan. Japan later annexed
Korea on August 22, 1910, through the conclusion of the Japan-Korea Annexation
Treaty.
Leases, Settlements, and Special Interests in China, Acquisition

of the South Pacific Mandate, and the Creation of Manchukuo
The Xinhai Revolution began on October 10, 1911, in Wuchang, China. The
following January, Sun Yat-sen became provisional president and established the
Provisional Government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Nanjing. Qing dynasty
Emperor Puyi abdicated in February and Yuan Shikai was appointed provisional
president in Beijing the next month, thus marking the end of Qing rule. The US
recognized the ROC in May 1913, followed by 13 other powers including Japan, the
UK, Russia, Germany, and France that October. On October 10, Yuan was officially
inaugurated as president of China.
On August 1, 1914, just after the outbreak of World War I, Germany declared war
on Russia. The UK wished for Japan to join the fight against the German-armed
merchant fleet; Japan declared war on Germany on August 23. Japan occupied
German-controlled territory in Jiaozhou Bay and on South Pacific islands. Since
the great powers were too distracted to pay any attention to East Asia, Japan took
advantage by issuing the Twenty-One Demands to the Yuan Shikai administration in
January 1915, followed by an ultimatum. China was forced to accept the demands on
May 9. Japan had insisted on special interests in Shandong Province as well as
various interests in Manchuria and Mongolia. Also among the demands were that the
Chinese government should engage Japanese as political, financial, and military
advisers. Thus, on May 25, the two sides concluded a Sino-Japanese treaty and
exchanged notes concerning Shandong Province, notes concerning Fujian Province,
and notes concerning leased land in Jiaozhou Bay; they also signed a Sino-Japanese
treaty concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and exchanged
notes on the Han-Ye-Ping Company (a company formed to manage Hanyang’s
iron manufacturing, Daye’s gold mining and Pingxiang’s coal mining). In addition
to sparking anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, these moves to expand Japan’s
influence there met with strong opposition from the US. The signing of the Lansing-
Ishii Agreement in November 1917 was an American attempt to prevent the expan-
sion of Japan’s special interests. That same month, the Soviet government was
established in Russia following the October Revolution.
World War I came to an end when the Allied Powers signed an armistice with
Germany on November 11, 1918. A peace conference was held in Paris in January
1919. At a meeting of five powers on January 27, Japanese plenipotentiary Makino
Nobuaki demanded the unconditional cession of Jiaozhou Bay and all German
territory on Pacific islands north of the equator. On May 4 in Paris he proclaimed
that Shandong would be retroceded to Japan; the peace conference participants
decided on May 7 to make Pacific islands north of the equator a Japanese mandate.
The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
(Treaty of Versailles) was signed on June 28. China did not sign the treaty in light
of the dissatisfaction over the treatment of Shandong as well as the rise of the May
Fourth Movement back home, which called for China’s refusal to sign the peace
treaty (as it did not nullify the Twenty-One Demands), the nullification of said
demands, and a boycott of Japanese goods.
In July 1921, the US unofficially proposed holding a conference in Washington,
DC to Japan, the UK, France, and Italy to discuss arms limitations and issues
concerning the Far East. This American initiative resulted in the convening of the
Washington Naval Conference that November. In December Japan, the US, the UK,
and France signed a document entitled the “Four-Power Treaty on Insular Posses-
sions and Dominions in the Pacific.” The signatories pledged to respect rights
pertaining to these islands and to cooperate in order to resolve any disputes among
them. It was also stipulated that with the entry into force of the treaty, the third
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was signed on July 13, 1911, would be terminated.
In February 1922, these four countries at the Washington Naval Conference were
joined by Belgium, China, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal in signing the Nine-
Power Treaty concerning China, which stipulated respect for China’s sovereignty,
maintaining its territorial integrity, support for the Open Door Policy, and equal
opportunity. This treaty essentially limited the scope of the Twenty-One Demands.
The return of the lease on Jiaozhou Bay was also promised at this conference. This
Washington system was assembled through Japan’s cooperative diplomacy with the
US. Under this regime, however, conflicts over Japan’s special status in East Asia
with the UK and the US (the latter in particular) gradually rose to the surface.
Disagreement over the issue of Manchuria became especially heated.
On the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese army staged a bombing on the
South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu. This led to the commencement of military
operations in an event that came to be known as the Mukden Incident. It also
destroyed the framework of cooperation with the US under the Washington system.
On September 19, the Japanese government received reports about clashes between
Japanese and Chinese forces and decided to prevent the situation from escalating as
it did not have a clear understanding of what had really happened. However, the staff
of the Kwangtung Army, the Japanese force stationed in the area and led by officers
that included Lieutenant Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishirō,
decided to resolve the Manchuria-Inner Mongolian question on their own. US
Secretary of State Henry Stimson, citing the Kellogg-Briand Pact on the renunciation
of war and the Nine-Power Treaty, issued a warning to Japan on September 22 that it
should take responsibility for the events in Manchuria. The Japanese Cabinet of the
time was being led by Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijūrō. The Japanese government
released its first announcement concerning the Mukden Incident on September 24.
The Council of the League of Nations passed a resolution on October 24 calling for
the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria. In response, the Japanese
government issued a second announcement on the matter on October 26, citing the
preconditions for the return of Japanese troops to within the South Manchuria
Railway zone, or in other words the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Nevertheless,
the Kwangtung Army continued to carry out military operations for up to 5 months,
occupying major cities in the three provinces of Fengtian (Liaoning), Jilin, and
Heilongjiang. On March 1, 1932, the Kwangtung Army declared that it was creating
the State of Manchukuo. Eventually, the Japanese Ministry of War and the Army
General Staff Office granted approval of the Kwangtung Army’s actions. After the
May 15 Incident, the Japanese government recognized the State of Manchukuo,
which its military had created, on September 15 and signed the Japan-Manchukuo
Protocol. In the meantime, the US Secretary of State had announced the Stimson
Doctrine, a policy that withheld recognition of the new situation in Manchuria, on
January 7, 1932. The League of Nations formed the Lytton Commission, a group
with British, American, French, German, and Italian members who conducted an on-
the-ground investigation in Japan, China, and Manchuria in February. The resulting
Lytton Report was communicated to Japan, China, and other League member States
on October 1, after Japan had accorded recognition to the State of Manchukuo.
Based on this report, the League of Nations deliberated on a draft recommendation,
and on February 24 of the following year the Assembly voted 42 to 1 in favor of
approving the document. Japan announced its withdrawal from the League of
Nations on March 27, and, isolated, pursued its rule over Manchuria and expansion
into the Asian mainland.10
The Second Sino-Japanese War began on July 7, 1937, when Japanese and
Chinese forces clashed on the Marco Polo Bridge outside of Beijing. The Japanese
army occupied the capital of Nanjing on December 13. The Chinese government that
had formed the First United Front between the Kuomintang and the Communist
Party relocated to Chongqing in November and called on US, British, and Soviet
support in an all-out war of resistance. The front extended all across China. Japan
10
For more on Japan’s recognition of Manchukuo and the US refusal to recognize the State, see
Serita, Kentarō. 1996. Fuhenteki kokusai shakai no seiritsu to kokusaihō (Building on the Global
Community and International Law). Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
The End of World War II and Territorial Issues 13
occupied the island of Hainan in February 1939. Then, in July 1940, it adopted a
policy of southward expansion, which would include the use of force, in order to
acquire strategic resources for conducting war. Japan’s reach consequently extended
to the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. Japan signed the Japanese-Soviet
Neutrality Pact in Moscow on April 13, 1941. Having reduced the risk of a two-front
conflict, Japan started the Pacific War by declaring hostilities against the Chongqing
government’s supporters, the US and the UK on December 8 (December 7 in
the US).
It is useful at this juncture, before we review Japan’s territory prior to the outbreak
of World War II, to refer to the Four-Power Treaty on Insular Possessions and
Dominions in the Pacific concluded among Japan, the US, France, and Italy, as the
central part of the Washington System, which accounted for 10 years of peace
between World War I and World War II. A Protocol was added to the treaty in
February 1922, the year after it was signed. It states: “The term ‘insular possessions
and insular dominions’ used in the aforesaid Treaty shall, in its application to Japan,
include only Karafuto (or the Southern portion of the island of Sakhalin), Formosa
and the Pescadores, and the islands under the mandate of Japan.”
Other than the territories prescribed by the Four-Power Treaty, Japan also held the
Korean Peninsula, and its colonial interests in China included leased land and
settlements, and the Beijing Legation Quarter, as well as railway-affiliated land. In
fact, Japan signed a pact on January 9, 1943, with the Chinese government in
Japanese-occupied Nanjing led by Wang Jingwei concerning the retrocession of
settlements and the abolition of extraterritoriality. All settlements and the Legation
Quarter had reverted to China by August 1. However, the government in Chongqing
led by Chiang Kai-shek refused to recognize the treaty and considered it inherently
null and void. Meanwhile, the Spratly Islands, where mining operations were
underway to retrieve phosphoric ore that the Japanese had discovered in 1915,
were incorporated into the jurisdiction of the Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung in
1939. Although the Japanese had been mining phosphoric ore in the Paracels since
1920, Japan had never asserted its sovereignty over the islands before World War II.
The End of World War II and Territorial Issues
Territories won and lost through war are finally decided by a peace treaty. As had
been the case with the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, and the
Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which was signed in San
Francisco in September 1951, determined the extent of Japan’s territory after
World War II. In the case of World War II, however, the armistice and surrender
documents prior to the official peace contained clauses concerning territory and
broadly outlined the political conditions for peace and reparation principles. Fur-
thermore, the occupation of Japan lasted a lengthy period of 6 years from the end of
war to the official peace. Of course, there are many instances in history when a
preliminary peace was arranged, during which conditions for the official peace to
come were worked out, but the timeframes ranged from a few months to at most a
year, and thus 6 years was unusually long. Therefore, there is value in conducting a
detailed analysis of the peace that was arranged after World War II.
Three important documents touched on the matter of Japan’s territory prior to the
end of the war: the Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943, the secret Yalta
Agreement of February 11, 1945, and the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945.
The Cairo Declaration was incorporated into the Potsdam Declaration, and the
surrender document Japan signed on September 2, 1945, contained a pledge to
carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith. In contrast, the
Yalta Agreement remained only as an agreement of the leaders of the US, the UK,
and the Soviet Union, which was made public on February 11, 1946, after Japan’s
surrender. The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration are decisively differ-
ent in legal nature from the Yalta Agreement in terms of whether or not Japan
accepted them prior to the peace treaty.
There are two other documents that stated the general goals of the Allies in the
war. These were the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, and the Declaration by
United Nations of January 1, 1942. In both documents, the Allies advocated the
principles of no territorial aggrandizement and the self-determination of peoples.
This is what most definitively distinguishes World War II from the imperialistic wars
fought previously.
The Allies involved used these declarations and agreements to unilaterally incor-
porate Japanese territory as their own and to take other measures prior to the
conclusion of a peace treaty. Not only are these measures of questionable legitimacy
in terms of the end to territorial aggrandizement and the self-determination the Allies
had themselves advocated, but they also created a problem concerning the peace
treaty’s final legal validity. The following is an examination of these actions taken by
the Allies, the relationship between those actions and principles, and the problems
they created.
Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration
The US, China, and the UK issued the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945. The
Declaration begins with the following statement: “We—the President of the United
States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the
Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our
countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to
end this war.” On July 28, however, then Prime Minister of Japan Suzuki Kantarō
ignored the Potsdam Declaration and announced that the war would go on. The first
atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. The Soviet Union joined the
war on August 9: the Red Army commenced an invasion of Manchuria, northern
Korea, and Sakhalin. That same day, the second atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki.
Japan finally accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14. On
August 16, Emperor Hirohito ordered all Japanese forces to cease fighting
immediately. Thereafter, the Soviet Union began landing forces on Shumshu Island
on August 18; they had completed their occupation of Shikotan Island, Kunashiri
Island, and the Habomai Islands by September 3. In Manchuria, Soviet forces took
Fengtian, Changchun, Harbin, and Jilin on August 20, and Lüshun and Dalian on
August 22. In Korea they seized Pyongyang on August 24. On September 2, Foreign
Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General
Staff Umezu Yoshijirō signed the surrender documents aboard the USS Missouri in
Tokyo Bay. Also that day, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),
General Douglas MacArthur, issued his first general order to the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy.
The Potsdam Declaration was written by the US, the UK, and China, then later
agreed to by the Soviet Union. It contains 13 paragraphs. Number 8, which concerns
territory, reads as follows: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out
and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”
To briefly sum up how World War II started, a great war was declared in Europe
on September 3, 1939. The next day, the Japanese government declared that it would
not be involved in the hostilities in Europe and that it would move forward in settling
the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japan, Germany, and Italy signed the Tripartite Pact
in September 1940. In a speech on December 29, US President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, elected to an unprecedented third term in office in November, denounced
the Tripartite Pact and declared that the US would supply arms to democratic
nations. The US enacted the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941 to support the countries
fighting against Germany. The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact was signed on April
22. Hostilities broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union on June 22 when
German forces launched an invasion of the USSR. It was at this juncture that
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in Newfoundland,
where they announced the Atlantic Charter, a document that advocated the building
of a new world to ensure the freedom, equality, and peace of people. The Atlantic
Charter confirmed eight points of common national policy principles, which begin as
follows: “First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second,
they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed
wishes of the peoples concerned...”
Meanwhile, Japan declared war on the US and the UK on December 8, 1941. On
January 1, 1942, the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, China, and others declared the
formation of an alliance whose goals would be those espoused in the Atlantic
Charter. Each of the Allies vowed that they would not independently seek a ceasefire
or peace settlement with the Axis powers. As they fought the war, the main Allies,
including the US, the UK, China, and the Soviet Union, met to discuss the conditions
for peace with Japan. Deliberations with the Soviet Union had a particular focus on
the conditions under which it would join the fight against Japan, but these discus-
sions did not go into considerable detail until 1943. The British foreign minister met
with President Roosevelt in Washington, D.C. in March of that year. Roosevelt then
met with Churchill in Quebec in August. In October, the foreign ministers of the US,
the UK, and the Soviet Union held a meeting in Moscow. It was here that Soviet
leader Joseph Stalin and the Soviet foreign minister informed US Secretary of State
Cordell Hull that the USSR would go to war against Japan. Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by their military and diplomatic
advisors, met in Cairo from November 22 to 25 to discuss the war against Japan.
The results of their deliberations were announced on the final day of this conference.
They are presented in the Cairo Declaration. It reads as follows:
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan.
They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their
purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or
occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall
be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories
which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become
free and independent.
With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at
war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations
necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
The Cairo Declaration laid down two principles concerning issues related to Japan’s
territory. The first is opposition to territorial aggrandizement, a principle also shared
with the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by United Nations. The second
principle established is that those territories of Japan that were “seized,” “stolen,”
and “taken” (terms that are not necessarily accurate from a legal perspective) shall be
stripped from Japan. These territories were those which were absorbed in Japan’s
expansion in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and in World
War I.
The day after the Cairo Conference concluded, Roosevelt and Churchill held
meetings with the Soviet leader in Tehran until December 1. Stalin again stated that
the USSR would go to war against Japan, and he made the return of territories and
special rights taken by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War an issue. However, the
Soviet Union’s reward for fighting Japan was not definitively finalized until the
Yalta Conference in February 1945. A pact concerning Japan was made in secret at
these Yalta meetings. Fearful that details of the agreement may leak out, the US, UK,
and USSR did not invite Chinese officials to these deliberations, even though the
topic at hand concerned their country. China was not promptly informed of the pact.
The Yalta Agreement on Soviet involvement in the war against Japan states the
following:
The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and
Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and
the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on
the side of the Allies on condition that:
1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be
preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be
restored, viz:
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all islands adjacent to it shall be returned to
the Soviet Union,
(b) the commercial port of Dalian shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of
the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur
[Lüshun] as a naval base of the USSR restored,
(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides
an outlet to Dalian shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-
Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet
Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in
Manchuria;
3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads
referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President
will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union
shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National
Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in
order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China
from the Japanese yoke.
This secret pact contained rewards inserted by Roosevelt and demanded by Stalin in
exchange for joining the fight against Japan. The USSR was promised to receive
(1) the Japanese territories of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, and
(2) Japan’s interests in Manchuria.
President Harry S. Truman, who assumed office following the sudden death of
Roosevelt, abided by the Yalta Agreement. As Japan’s interests in Manchuria were a
matter involving China, Truman informed then Minister of Foreign Affairs Soong
Tzu-wen of the ROC of the agreement in Washington, D.C. on June 14, 1945, and
Soong commenced negotiations with Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov in Moscow on June 30. During this time Stalin temporarily halted the
negotiations to attend the conference in Potsdam on July 14. The Potsdam Declara-
tion was issued on July 26 and negotiations between China and the Soviet Union
resumed on August 5. On August 8, the USSR declared war on Japan. The Soviets
invaded Manchuria on the following day and commenced military operations inside
Chinese territory.
The negotiations finally wrapped up on August 14. The two sides signed the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (the instrument of ratification was not
exchanged until later in Chongqing, on December 3). This was also the date on
which Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Under the terms of the
Japan-Soviet Treaty, the Soviet Union gained the advantageous position and inter-
ests in the Three Northeastern Provinces—roughly equivalent to Manchuria—that
Russia had enjoyed during its Imperial era. This unfair treaty for China was the price
for Soviet aid in the fight against Japan. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
was founded in 1949, it formed a new agreement, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded on February
14, 1950, to replace the treaties and agreements of the Republican era. Nevertheless,
Japan’s leases and its interests in Manchuria were recognized by international

treaties such as the Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905, the treaties between Japan
and the Qing dynasty, and the January 20, 1925, treaty on basic rules governing
relations between Japan and the Soviet Union that reaffirmed the continuing com-
plete validity of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty that Japan had signed with Russia.
Thus, the parties involved were required to take legal steps to make any changes to
these treaties (hence the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Sino-
Japanese Peace Treaty).
Japan was completely unaware of the secret Yalta Agreement on southern
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Thus, Japan was not bound by the agreement itself.
With regard to southern Sakhalin, the Cairo Declaration, which is incorporated into
the Potsdam Declaration, stated that “Japan will also be expelled from all other
territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” Southern Sakhalin became
Japanese territory in the peace treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War. Therefore,
this sentence from the Cairo Declaration can be interpreted as also referring to
southern Sakhalin. However, since the Kurile Islands changed hands peacefully,
this sentence from the Cairo Declaration does not apply. Instead, the islands’ transfer
to the Soviet Union is only in agreement with the clause in the Yalta Agreement
which states: “The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of
the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.”
Even so, the transfer of this territory should have been postponed until a peace treaty
had been signed. In any case, Japan was kept uninformed of the Yalta Agreement
when it agreed to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.
Drafting the Treaty of Peace with Japan
At the February 1947 Paris Peace Conference, the Allies signed peace treaties with
Italy and other Axis States Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, as well as with Finland.
The peace with Japan and Germany was finally put on the agenda. On March
17, SCAP Douglas MacArthur put forth a proposal in Tokyo for a prompt peace
with Japan that would mark a shift from implementing a harsh peace to a magnan-
imous peace.
Earlier, on March 12, Truman had declared to the world the start of the “Cold
War” between the US and the Soviet Union. On June 5, the US worked out the final
details of the Marshall Plan, a massive aid program for Europe. In the meantime,
China’s civil war had intensified.
Even with these fast-paced developments occurring, the US government
suggested on July 11 to national representatives on the Far Eastern Commission
(FEC) in Washington, DC that preliminary meetings on the peace with Japan be held
in August. However, the proposal to hold a meeting of the 11 FEC member States
was at odds with the proposal for a four-way meeting of the foreign ministers of the
US, the UK, the Soviet Union, and China, where the Soviets would hold veto power.
Furthermore, although members of the British Commonwealth agreed on swiftly
implementing a peace with Japan, the timing conflicted with the British Common-
wealth Conference in Canberra in August, so the FEC meeting was, in fact, post-
poned. During this year and the next, the debate over peace with Japan grew
international in scope as the focus turned toward the American proposal. However,
the global situation was rapidly changing, as the Cold War became ever more
serious. The Berlin Blockade was launched in September 1948. In August, the
Republic of Korea (ROK) was founded south of the 38th parallel on the Korean
Peninsula and recognized by the US; in September, the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of Korea (DPRK) was established north of the line and recognized by the Soviet
Union. The US then signed an aid agreement with the ROK in December. The North
Atlantic Treaty forming NATO was signed in April 1949. The Federal Republic of
Germany (West Germany) was created as a provisional government in May. The
PRC was founded in Beijing on October 1 and the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany) was established on October 7. Then, the ROC relocated its capital to
Taipei, Taiwan in December. In 1950, Mao Zedong and Stalin met in February in
Moscow, where they signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and
Mutual Assistance. The structural framework of opposing sides known as the Cold
War eventually led to actual fighting when North Korean troops crossed the 38th
parallel and pushed southward on June 25.
Little progress was made on settling the peace with Japan, but John Foster Dulles,
who had been assigned as a consultant to the US State Department in April, was
charged with working on the peace agreement in May. He then began exploring a
multilateral (separate) peace agreement. The Americans prepared for the negotia-
tions by drafting seven principles that outlined their thinking. These principles were
based on a vast trove of past documents and draft treaties the State Department had
collected over the years. The FEC member States commenced their negotiations in
September.
Details of the American memorandum on the Seven Principles for Peace with
Japan came out in bits and pieces in the press in October. The State Department
released the document on November 24, with seven principles covering: Parties,
United Nations, Territory, Security, Political and Commercial Arrangements,
Claims, and Disputes. The document clearly sets forth a basic path toward a
magnanimous peace that would generally rule out claims for reparations, place no
limits on Japan’s militarization or on industrial productive capacity, and would not
consider establishing administrative organs in Japan following the peace. It states the
following regarding territory11:
Japan would
(a) recognize the independence of Korea;
(b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and
Bonin Islands and
11
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume VI, East Asia and the Pacific, eds. Neal
H. Petersen, et al. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), Document 757. https://history.
state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d757. Accessed on December 13, 2022.
(c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R., China and U.S. with reference to the
status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of no
decision within a year after the Treaty came into effect, the U.N. General Assembly
would decide. Special rights and interests in China would be renounced.
Preliminary negotiations between FEC members and the US on the seven principles
wound down in late October. The Soviet Union was against the proposal for a peace
based on the seven principles. It particularly voiced objections over the clause on
territory. The Soviets argued that the ownership of Taiwan and the Kurile Islands
had already been agreed between the Allies during the war, and they were also
opposed to a trusteeship arrangement for the Ryūkyū Islands. Such a position had
been anticipated, and the US expected the negotiations to proceed to another round.
However, when the UN Forces seemed to be approaching the Chinese border on the
Korean Peninsula in late November, Chinese volunteer troops crossed into Korea
and by early 1951 had pushed the UN Forces back to a position south of the 38th
parallel. This change in the military situation and escalating clashes between US and
Chinese forces led to the reemergence of the view that a peace treaty was premature
and the idea of allowing Chinese representatives from both Beijing and Taiwan to
attend the talks was written off. Nevertheless, the US began to push even harder for a
quick peace settlement with Japan.
In March 1951, after discussions with other interested parties, American officials
delivered an American proposal for the Treaty of Peace with Japan to the FEC
member States. The Japanese government received the same document on March 27.
The 22-article draft’s Preamble and Chapter III, which dealt with territory, were
written as follows:
3. Japan renounces all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores;
and also all rights, titles and claims in connection with the mandate system or deriving
from the activities of Japanese nationals in the Antarctic area. Japan accepts the action
of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, in relation to extending the
trusteeship system to Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.
4. The United States may propose to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship
system, with the United States as the administering authority, the Ryukyu Islands south
of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands,
Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Japan will concur in any such proposal. Pending the
making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have
the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction
over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.
5. Japan will return to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the southern part of
Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it and will hand over to the Soviet
Union the Kurile Islands.
Furthermore, Article 11 of this document stipulates that “Japan renounces all special
rights and interests in China,” while Article 19, the final article of Chapter VIII,
states that “Except for the provisions of Article 11, the present Treaty shall not
confer any rights, title or benefits to or upon any State unless and until it signs and
ratifies, or adheres to, this Treaty; nor, with that exception, shall any right, title and
interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision hereof
in favor of a State which does not sign and ratify, or adhere to, this Treaty.” Through
these provisions, the US was clearly showing that although southern Sakhalin and
the Kurile Islands had been promised to the Soviet Union in Yalta and that they had
come under Soviet occupation, the confirmation of Soviet title under a peace treaty
would hinge upon whether the Soviet Union participated in said peace treaty.
The British government then completed a draft treaty in April. With this docu-
ment, it made clear that it recognized the PRC as the government of China.
Assuming this government would be the signatory to the treaty, the document
went beyond having Japan renounce sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores
Islands by also clearly stipulating that China was the owner of these territories. The
British draft was stricter than the American one regarding territorial issues, as it
stipulated that Japan’s residual sovereignty of the Ryūkyū Islands and the
Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands shall not be recognized, that Japan shall renounce
sovereignty over them, and that Japan shall also renounce all future claims to the
Antarctic region. In order to move the peace negotiations forward, the Americans
and British devoted their combined energies to writing a joint US-UK draft that
would meet each other halfway. From late April to early May, working level
meetings were held in Washington, D.C., where a provisional joint draft was written.
That draft was the basis for negotiations in London in June, where the two sides
largely reached a consensus. Thereafter, this draft was shown to the Japanese. After
they had met to clear up issues, the final joint US-UK draft was released on July 12.
Japan had received the US-UK draft treaty on July 7. On July 20, this joint draft was
officially sent along with an invitation to peace talks.
When the two sides were negotiating the provisions on territory in London, the
British compromised because the US flatly denied it had any intention of exerting
sovereignty over the Ryūkyū Islands. With regard to Taiwan, the UK had recognized
the PRC as the government of China and argued for returning the island to China, but
the US disagreed because it had recognized the ROC and wanted only for Japan to
renounce sovereignty over Taiwan. As for the Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin,
the provisional draft written in May stated that these islands would be transferred to
the Soviet Union as desired by the UK (although the British understanding was that
the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island were not a part of the Kurile Islands).
However, the US did not want to provide any direct benefits to the Soviet Union and
was concerned about becoming involved in disputes between Japan and the Soviets,
who were in de facto control, over the method of transfer, should the Soviets not join
the Treaty. Therefore, the US proposed that Korea, Taiwan, southern Sakhalin, the
Kurile Islands and other territories be grouped together under one article only
stipulating that Japan renounce sovereignty over them. This proposal was eventually
adopted in the final treaty. Thus, Article 2 of the US-UK draft for the Treaty of Peace
with Japan was completed and the draft was released on July 12.
Until the Treaty of Peace with Japan went into effect on April 28, 1952, Japan
was under Allied occupation, during which it was under indirect rule.
However, SCAP, in a January 1946 memorandum entitled “Governmental and
Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan,” defined Japan as
follows:
3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to include the four main islands of
Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu) and the approximately 1000 smaller
adjacent islands, including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands north
of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and excluding (a) Utsuryo
(Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks (Take Island) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island,
(b) the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude (including Kuchinoshima
Island), the Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano (Kazan or Iwo) Island
Groups, and all the other outlying Pacific Islands [including the Daito (Ohigashi or
Oagari) Island Group, and Parece Vela (Okino-tori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Gan-
ges (Nakano-tori) Islands], and (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai
(Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Akiyuri, Shibotsu and Taraku
Islands) and Shikotan Island.
4. Further areas specifically excluded from the governmental and administrative jurisdic-
tion of the Imperial Japanese Government are the following: (a) all Pacific Islands
seized or occupied under mandate or otherwise by Japan since the beginning of the
World War in 1914, (b) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, (c) Korea, and
(d) Karafuto.
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all memorandums and orders issued by General
Headquarters thereafter were considered to apply to the above definition of Japan.
However, the sixth item of the memorandum stated, “Nothing in this directive shall
be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination
of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.”12
The Current State of Japan’s Territory
Renunciation of Japan’s Expanded Territory: Korea, Taiwan,

the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, and the South Pacific Mandate
In accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japan renounced
Korea, Taiwan, the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, and the South Pacific Mandate. Apart
from the Kurile Islands, these were all territories that Japan added during the Sino-
Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, and World War I.
Korea was placed under military administration, with the area to the south of the
38th parallel occupied by the US military and the area to the north occupied by the
Soviet military. Ultimately, in 1948, the Government of the ROK was established in
the south and the Government of the DPRK in the north. In accordance with the
Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japan “recogniz[ed] the independence of Korea” and on
the day of entry into force of the Treaty, Japan accorded implied recognition to the
ROK.13 Following lengthy negotiations between Japan and the ROK, the two sides
12
For more details on these international documents, see Serita, Kentarō (ed). 2010. Konpakuto
gakushū jōyakushū (Basic Documents in International Law). Tokyo: Shinzansha.
13
Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai. 1983. Kokka shōnin (Recognition of States). Tokyo: Japan Institute
of International Affairs.
The Current State of Japan’s Territory 23
concluded the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in
June 1965. Japan is still engaged in negotiations with the DPRK, but no diplomatic
relations exist between the two sides as of now.
As for Taiwan, authority over the country was given to Chiang Kai-shek during
the reallocation of Japan’s occupied territories that was stipulated in SCAP General
Order No. 1 of September 2, perhaps in part because the US, which had seized
control of the Philippines in February 1945 towards the end of World War II, passed
through Taiwan and landed in Okinawa in April of the same year. On October 25 a
retrocession ceremony was held and China accepted the “surrender of the Imperial
Japanese Army and Navy and supporting forces in Taiwan and Penghu,” “took
administrative control over the territory and people of Taiwan and Penghu, and
seized the military and other assets of Taiwan and Penghu,” and proclaimed that
from that day “Taiwan and Penghu were again incorporated formally into the
territory of the ROC and that the territory, people and administration were placed
under the sovereignty of the Nationalist Government of the ROC.” The ROC thus
completed the reintegration of Taiwan under its own control through measures under
its domestic law, thereby making Taiwan a province of the ROC. Taiwan, which was
known under Japanese rule as a shū (Japanese for state or province), was now known
as a xian (Chinese for county), and the Spratly Islands, which were part of Taiwan,
were made part of Guangdong Province. Under the Treaty of Peace with Japan,
Japan simply “renounce[d] all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores”
and “to the Spratly Islands,” without specifying to whom it was doing
so. Subsequently, this renunciation was “recognized” in the Japan-ROC Peace
Treaty of 1952. Japanese court precedent interpreted this to mean that Taiwan was
transferred to the Republic of China.14 However, in the 1972 Japan-China Joint
Communique with the Government of the PRC, which considered Taiwan to be an
inalienable part of its own territory, Japan merely stated that “the Government of
Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s
Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam
Proclamation.”
The Soviet Union, which entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945,
launched an attack on South Sakhalin on August 11, and controlled all of Sakhalin
by August 25. Meanwhile, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on August
14 and the Emperor of Japan ordered the immediate ceasefire of all troops. However,
fighting was initiated by the Soviet landing on August 16 on Shumshu Island, the
island closest to the Kamchatka Peninsula, and all Japanese forces on the island
surrendered on August 23. Though the Soviet literature on the matter contains
different interpretations and there is no unified view, it is believed that the Soviet
forces then headed south as far as Uruppu Island, which was formerly a territory of
Russia and which had been transferred to Japan under the Treaty for the Exchange of
Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands, occupying all 18 islands by August 28. It is said that
14
See the Supreme Court Ruling on December 5, 1962, in Supreme Court of Japan, Saikōsai keiji
hanrei shū (Collection of Supreme Court Rulings) 16, 1661.
the Soviets initially believed that Etorofu Island and other islands to the south of it
were under US control and the troops that were advancing southward retreated.
However, learning that US forces were not occupying the islands, the Soviet forces
occupied Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, Shikotan Island, and the Habomai Islands
by September 3, using a detached force (Fig. 1.1).
According to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, under a military occupation the occupant bears a number of obliga-
tions, including respecting the laws in force in the occupied territory, respecting
private rights, and protecting the property of the hostile State. However, on February
2, 1946, the Soviet Union nationalized the land and banks on South Sakhalin and the
“Kurile Islands,” and subsequently, on February 3, it took measures to incorporate
the occupied areas as part of the territory of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic, one of its member States. The Council of People’s Commissars affirmed
the measures and ordered that the effects thereof be applied retroactively from
September 20, 1945. In February 1947, the Soviet Constitution was revised to
include provisions stipulating this change in territory, and in March of the following
year, the Russian Constitution was also similarly revised. According to the 1951
Treaty of Peace with Japan, “Japan renounce[d] all right, title and claim to the Kurile
Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which
Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of
September 5, 1905.” However, as the Soviet Union was not a party to the treaty, no
rights, titles, or benefits were conferred to it, in accordance with Article 25 of said
treaty (special provisions under Article 21 apply to China and Korea, which, like
Russia, were not parties to the treaty).
Meanwhile, the Pacific Islands that were formerly under mandate to Japan came
under the occupation of the US and on April 2, 1947, they became a UN trust
territory. The end of the Japanese mandate was not necessarily legally defined, but in
any case, Japan “accept[ed] the action of the United Nations Security Council,” in
accordance with the Treaty of Peace with Japan.
Renunciation of the Kurile Islands and the Issue

of the Northern Territories
Citing the agreements of the Yalta Conference, the Soviet Union occupied the Kurile
Islands, as described above. At the same time, however, following various develop-
ments, Japan eventually accepted its renunciation of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands
under the Treaty of Peace with Japan. At the San Francisco Peace Conference, the
Soviet Union had opposed the joint proposal by the UK and the US that only a
renunciation be stipulated in the treaty, and had proposed a revision, which was not
accepted, whereby Japan would recognize the complete sovereignty of the Soviet
Union over these territories and renounce all right, title, and claim to them. As such,
the question of to whom Japan would renounce these territories was not decided.
1) National boundaries based on Kamchatka 2) National boundaries based on Kamchatka

the 1855 Treaty of Commerce, Peninsula the 1875 Treaty for the Peninsula
Navigation and Delimitation Exchange of Sakhalin for
between Japan and Russia the Kurile Islands
Sea of Okhotsk Sea of Okhotsk
Sakhalin Sakhalin
s
nd
nd
sla
sla
eI
eI
ril
ril
Etorofu Etorofu
Ku
Ku
Island Island
Kunashiri Kunashiri
Island North Pacific Island North Pacific
Hokkaido Shikotan Island Hokkaido Shikotan Island
Habomai Islands Habomai Islands
3) National boundaries based on Kamchatka 4) National boundaries based on Kamchatka

the 1905 Portsmouth Peace Peninsula the 1951 San Francisco Peace Peninsula
Treaty Treaty
Sea of Okhotsk Sea of Okhotsk

Sakhalin Sakhalin
s
s
nd
nd
sla
sla
eI
eI
ril
ril
Etorofu Etorofu
Ku
Ku
Island Island
Kunashiri
Island North Pacific Kunashiri Island North Pacific
Hokkaido Shikotan Island Hokkaido Shikotan Island
Habomai Islands Habomai Islands
Upon reviewing the major

treaties concluded between Japan
and Russia, it is clear that the Taraku Island 9/2 Shumshu
Northern Territories are not part
Shibotsu Island 9/2 Island 8/18
of the Kurile Islands, that were
renounced by Japan under the Yuri Island 9/3
San Francisco Peace Treaty. Suishō Island 9/3
Matsuwa Island 8/29
8/25
On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union Sea of Okhotsk
broke the Japanese-Soviet
Neutrality Pact, which it had signed Uruppu Island 8/27
in 1941 and which was in effect at
the time, and entered the war Etorofu Island 8/28
against Japan. At the beginning of Kunashiri Island 9/2
September, Soviet forces occupied Hokkaido Shikotan
not only the Kurile Islands, but also North Pacific
Island 9/1
the Northern Territories.
Fig. 1.1 National Boundaries with Russia

However, it is well known that the Soviet Union has in fact controlled these
territories until the present day.
In light of the fact that the Soviet Union did not ratify the Treaty of Peace with
Japan, in accordance with its Article 20 Japan and the Soviet Union needed to
conclude a bilateral peace treaty. So, in June 1955, for the first time, the two
countries commenced negotiations to conclude a peace treaty. However, it seemed
unlikely that they would be able to come to an agreement on matters other than the
Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island in these talks. Therefore, on September 29 of
the following year, as stated in the Matsumoto-Gromyko letters, Japan and the
Soviet Union agreed to resume negotiations on the conclusion of a bilateral peace
treaty that included the territorial issues following the resumption of normalized
diplomatic relations, and in accordance with the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declara-
tion, the state of war between the two sides was brought to an end and diplomatic
relations were resumed.
The disagreement between Japan and the Soviet Union centered on the geograph-
ical scope of “the Kurile Islands” that Japan had renounced. At the San Francisco
Peace Conference, the Japanese plenipotentiary Yoshida Shigeru had already stated
that, “At the time of the opening of Japan, her ownership of two islands of [Etorofu]
and Kunashiri of the South Kuriles was not questioned at all by the Czarist
government. But the North Kuriles north of [Uruppu] and the southern half of
Sakhalin were areas open to both Japanese and Russian settlers.”15 Furthermore,
Yoshida drew the attention of the countries in attendance in referring to “the islands
of Habomai and Shikotan, constituting part of Hokkaido, one of Japan’s four main
islands.” Although the Treaty of Peace with Japan itself did not define the geograph-
ical scope of the Kurile Islands, Japan’s interpretation was that “the Kurile Islands”
referenced in the treaty did not include the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, nor
did it include Etorofu Island and Kunashiri Island. However, it can be pointed out
that a certain degree of uncertainty was evident during the interpellation sessions of
the Diet around the time of the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. In
October 1951, Nishimura Kumao, director-general of the Treaties Bureau of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in reference to the difference between the South and
North Kuriles, stated that, “I consider the North Kuriles and the two islands of the
South Kuriles to be part of the scope of the Kurile Islands as stated in the treaty.”16 In
May of the following year, Minister for Foreign Affairs Okazaki Katsuo stated in
response to a question that, “According to the peace treaty, Japan has renounced the
Kurile Islands and Sakhalin. It follows therefore, that since Japan has renounced
them, we should not think about trying to recover them. That being said, the ideal
outcome would be for the Allied countries to reconsider and revise the treaty.
15
English from “The Delegate of Japan-Shigeru Yoshida (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs)” September 7, 1951, Annex 33, pp. 313–314. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/
shiryo/archives/pdfs/heiwajouyaku4_07.pdf. Accessed on December 13, 2022.
16
House of Representatives Special Committee on the Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security
Treaty.
Furthermore, the islands to the south of the Kuriles, such as Habomai and Shikotan,
are obviously not part of the Kuriles. Therefore, regardless of Japan’s renunciation of
rights in Article 2 of the treaty, we of course intend to maintain to the very end the
assertion that these are Japan’s territories... I believe there are differing views on the
definition of the Kuriles. We intend to clearly resolve these points as soon as possible
in the future.”17 Subsequently, in December 1955, Nakagawa Tōru, director-general
of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in response to a
question that, “We consider the South Kuriles to not be part of the Kurile Islands. As
you are aware, we are continuing to engage in the negotiations with the Soviet Union
based on this stance.”18 On February 11 of the following year, at the House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for
Foreign Affairs Morishita Kunio proclaimed the unified view of the government
that the four Northern Islands of Japan’s Northern Territories were not part of the
Kurile Islands that Japan had renounced.
With regard to the negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union, under the
1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, the two sides agreed to resume negotiations to
conclude a bilateral peace treaty following the resumption of normalized diplomatic
relations and to transfer the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island to Japan, in line
with the wishes of Japan and out of consideration for its national interests. The
negotiations lost momentum, however, partly owing to Soviet opposition to the
subsequent conclusion of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960. In October 1973,
Tanaka Kakuei, the serving Japanese prime minister, visited the Soviet Union, the
first such visit since Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama’s in 1956. As a result of the
summit meeting between Tanaka and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the
Soviet Union softened its previous stance that “the territorial question has been
settled by virtue of various international agreements” and the Japanese side
announced the two sides had affirmed that the issue of the four Northern Islands
remained unresolved. Thereafter, however, time passed without significant devel-
opments. More recently, working groups on the peace treaty were established at the
8th Japan-Soviet Foreign Ministers meeting held in December 1988, in order to
promote greater progress on peace treaty negotiations between the two foreign
ministers. Although the Soviet Union’s stance remained firm, the two sides were
nonetheless able to hold substantive discussions on the territorial issues. Following
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as the
successor of the former Soviet Union, and negotiations between Japan and Russia
have continued until the present day.19
17
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.
18
Ibid.
19
See Chapter 2.
Reversion of the Administrative Rights from the US: Amami,

Ogasawara (Bonin), and Okinawa
While the dates on which these islands came under US military occupation differ, the
date on which the US military landed on the main island of Okinawa was April 1945.
The major US policy of establishing military bases in Japan, in order to administrate
the Ryūkyū Islands under the UN Trusteeship system and under US military
occupation, was first officially announced by US Secretary of State Henry Stimson
in January 1950. In September of the same year, the secretaries of state and defense
addressed a joint memorandum to the president, recommending the start of prelim-
inary negotiations for the Peace Treaty with Japan and stating the need to secure
exclusive and strategic US control of the Ryūkyū Islands south of 29 degrees north
latitude. The Seven Principles of Peace with Japan issued in October stated that,
“Japan would ... agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority,
of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands” and negotiations with the Allied powers were
subsequently begun.
In an aide-mémoire dated November 20, 1950, the Soviet Union pointed out that
neither in the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Declaration was there any mention
of removing Japan’s sovereignty over the Ryūkyū and Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands,
as well as the fact that the governments issuing the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations
had stated the policy of not expanding territories, and therefore sought an explana-
tion from the US regarding its rationale for placing these islands under UN trustee-
ship with the US as the administering authority. In response, the US issued a reply on
December 28, citing Article 77 of the UN Charter and the Potsdam Declaration,
explaining that trusteeship did not amount to territorial expansion, and that, in strict
adherence to the Potsdam Declaration, it would determine in the peace treaty the
future status of the “minor islands” referred to in the declaration. This contention
between the US and the Soviet Union remained until the San Francisco Peace
Conference, at which point the US plenipotentiary, John Foster Dulles, and the
British plenipotentiary, Kenneth Younger, clarified that sovereignty over the Amami
Islands and the Ryūkyū Islands would remain with Japan (i.e., residual sovereignty),
while the Soviet plenipotentiary, Andrei Gromyko, proposed the recognition of
Japan’s complete sovereignty. In any case, the administrative rights over the
Amami Islands, the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands, and the Okinawa Islands, which
were transferred to the US under the Treaty of Peace with Japan, were returned to
Japan through the respective reversion agreements concluded in 1953, 1968, and
1972, without it ever being proposed that they be placed under UN trusteeship. Japan
currently has complete sovereignty over these islands.
Nevertheless, it was not entirely inconceivable that the conclusion of an agree-
ment only between Japan and the US regarding the reversion of the administrative
rights over these islands, which can be considered as changing the provisions of the
Treaty of Peace with Japan, would give rise to legal issues in relations with other
parties to the treaty. However, Article 3 of the treaty states that “Japan will concur in
any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place [the islands] under
Fig. 1.2 The Ogasawara

(Bonin) Islands and Russia
Okinawa
(Reversion requested)
DPRK Etorofu Island
Sea of Kunashiri Island
Japan
ROK Japan Pacific Ocean
PRC Tokyo
Ogasawara Islands
reversion in June 1968)

Okinawa
ROC reversion in May 1972)
its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority.” As
such, Japan must concur with any such “proposal,” but if no such proposal is made,
then Japan will not be made to bear any obligations. Furthermore, the US would not
be obligated to make such a proposal, nor would there be any issue with the US
making a direct reversion to Japan, the original sovereignty holder. Moreover, as
evidenced in the interpellation sessions of the Japanese Diet, from the very begin-
ning, the possibility was discussed of the reversion of the islands to Japan, if and
when their strategic necessity was lost (Fig. 1.2).
Treaties Bureau Director-General Nishimura Kumao stated that “The United
States has expressed, as its rationale for placing the Nansei Shotō Islands under
the trusteeship system, the need for the United States to administrate the islands for
the present time for the sake of maintaining peace and security, and has never once
expressed the need to improve the political, economic, and cultural standards of our
brethren living on these islands, and make them autonomous or independent.”20 In
addition, 2 days after, in response to a question, Nishimura stated that, “As the
U.S. Government has officially explained, the purpose of Article 3 is not permanent,
and is solely intended for the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East.
Therefore... we believe it is necessary to make continual efforts to ensure the stability
of the Far East as soon as possible, to bring about the day where measures such as
those of Article 3 are no longer necessary, and to enable the region to revert to its
original state.”21
It can therefore be said that the legal status of the Nansei Shotō Islands and the
Nanpō Shotō Islands, as defined in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, is
unique, in terms of the question of its consistency with the basic purpose of the UN
trusteeship system, and the fact that it was the result of the political situation in the
Far East.
20
House of Councillors Special Committee on the Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty,
November 5, 1951.
21
Ibid., November 7, 1951.
Clashes with Other Countries’ Sovereignty: Takeshima

and the Senkaku Islands
For the sake of the administration of the occupation of Japan by the Allied powers,
Takeshima was included among the regions separated from Japan politically and in
terms of administration where the exercise of the rights of the Japanese government
was suspended, in accordance with an instruction note issued by SCAP on January
29, 1946.
Once the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951, and the
restoration of Japanese sovereignty became certain, the ROK took steps to
strengthen its regulations of activities by foreign fishing vessels, and on January
18, 1952, ROK President Syngman Rhee issued the Proclamation of Sovereignty
over Adjacent Seas (also known as the proclamation of the Syngman Rhee Line), a
unilateral declaration of sovereignty over waters that included Takeshima. Japan
immediately lodged a protest with the ROK side on January 28, stating that, while
the ROK declaration appeared to assume territorial rights over Takeshima, “the
Japanese government does not recognize any such assumption or claim by the
ROK concerning these islets which are without question Japanese territory.” In
response to Japan’s protest, the ROK stated by the note verbale on February
12 that the ROK “merely wished to remind the Japanese Government that SCAP,
by SCAPIN No. 677 dated January 29, 1946, explicitly excluded the islets from the
territorial possessions of Japan and that again the same islets have been left on the
Korean side of the MacArthur Line, facts that endorse and confirm the Korean claim
to them, which is beyond any dispute.” On April 25 of the same year, the Japanese
government refuted the ROK response, stating that the SCAP instruction note was
irrelevant to the sovereignty of Takeshima.22
Thereafter, from 1954 onwards, ROK authorities have been stationed on
Takeshima, and armed incidents have even occurred. As the ROK’s “illegal occu-
pation” of Takeshima continues, the Japanese government has taken a variety of
measures to date, including lodging protests each year.23
The Senkaku Islands, meanwhile, did not appear to have any particular natural
resources, nor were subject to much interest by the world. However, in the autumn of
1968, the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (now the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific)
conducted a geophysical survey led primarily by Japanese, ROK, and Taiwanese
scientists. The survey indicated the possibility of the existence of abundant petro-
leum resources in an area approximately 200,000 km2 in size, mostly due northeast
from Taiwan, attracting much attention from other countries. Precisely at this time,
the negotiations between Japan and the US for the reversion of Okinawa were
22
See the section on the SCAP instruction note in Chapter 1.
23
See Chapter 4.
ongoing, and in June 1971 an agreement was reached on the Okinawa Reversion
Treaty, and administrative control of Okinawa reverted to Japan in 1972.
Following the conclusion of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty in June 1971, on
December 30 of the same year the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a
statement asserting that, “Not long ago, the U.S. Congress and the Japanese Diet one
after the other approved the agreement on the ‘reversion’ of Okinawa. In this
agreement, the Governments of the United States and Japan flagrantly included the
Diaoyu and other islands in the ‘area of reversion.’ This is a gross encroachment
upon China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese people absolutely
will not tolerate this!” and furthermore, that, “After World War II, the Japanese
Government illicitly handed over to the United States the Diaoyu and other islands
appertaining to Taiwan, and the United States Government unilaterally declared that
it enjoyed the so-called ‘administrative rights’ over these islands. This in itself was
illegal.”24
In response, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1972 issued a
statement entitled “Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,” in
which it stated that, since their incorporation into Japan’s territory in 1895, “Histor-
ically, the Senkaku Islands have continuously been an integral part of the Nansei
Shotō Islands, which are the territory of Japan. These islands were neither part of
Taiwan nor part of the Pescadores Islands, which were ceded to Japan from the Qing
dynasty in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which came into
effect in May of 1895;” that, “Accordingly, the Senkaku Islands are not included in
the territory which Japan renounced under Article II of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty. They were placed under the administration of the United States of America
as part of the Nansei Shotō Islands, in accordance with Article III of the said treaty”
and that, “The fact that China expressed no objection to the status of the Islands
being under the administration of the United States under Article III of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty clearly indicates that China did not consider the Senkaku
Islands as part of Taiwan.”
While Japan has continued to control the Senkaku Islands, Japan and China did
hold various exchanges on the matter around the time of the conclusion of the Treaty
of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. On
October 25, 1978, then Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, who was visiting Japan for the
exchange of the instruments of ratification for the treaty, stated that “Even if... the
issue is temporarily shelved, I don’t think I mind.” In the first place, the idea that
during the negotiations on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and
China, Japan arrived at the tacit understanding that the issue of the Senkaku Islands
would not be mentioned in the treaty and would instead be shelved, is, as Minister of
Foreign Affairs Miyazawa Kiichi stated in 1975, in response to a question on the
matter, “a mistaken recognition, and it is not in fact the case that the negotiations on
24
“Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” December
30, 1971. English translation in Peking Review, January 7, 1972, p. 12. http://www.massline.org/
PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972-01.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2022.
the treaty were held amid the issue being shelved.”25 In addition, more recently,
Treaties Bureau Director-General Saitō Kunihiko stated, in response to a question on
the matter, that, “Since the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control of Japan and a
part of Japan’s territory, the idea of shelving the issue is completely unthinkable.
Thus, there was absolutely no agreement between Japan and China to shelve the
issue.”26
The Antarctic and Japan
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, all continents on Earth, apart from the
Arctic and the Antarctic, have been divided up by different countries. Since 1908,
the UK and six other countries have set up sectors in parts of the Antarctic, over
which they have asserted their sovereignty, citing discoveries of coastlines or past
expeditions as evidence. Sectors are fan-shaped areas determined by two lines drawn
poleward from both extremes of the coastline or other geographic features on which
the country in question bases its claim and a latitudinal line. “Sectorism” asserts that
the laws of occupation,27 which were established as a means by which human beings
could acquire land for regular living, are inapplicable or inappropriate for the polar
regions (Fig. 1.3).
However, the effectiveness of sectorism has not yet been commonly recognized
and jurisdiction over the polar regions remains uncertain. Thus, in order to avoid
clashes over sovereignty among the countries concerned and to prevent territorial
disputes, in the spirit of international cooperation realized by the International
Geophysical Year, the Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 and entered into force
in 1961. Under the treaty, all countries’ claims to territorial rights or territories south
of 60 degrees south latitude were frozen and the whole region was opened up for
peaceful use, resulting in the establishment of a completely unprecedented interna-
tional regime. As for the Arctic, Canada and the Soviet Union established sectors
therein, and have at present established their territorial rights over the land areas
inside these sectors.
Japan, meanwhile, had at one point asserted its territorial rights over the Antarctic
prior to World War II based on the exploration led by Lieutenant Shirase Nobu but
had not taken measures to incorporate the area into its territory. However, in
accordance with Article 2, paragraph (e) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Japan
25
House of Representatives Committee on Budget, October 22, 1975.
26
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 8, 1985.
27
Occupation: A mode of title to the acquisition of land, alongside, for example, cession or
annexation. Occupation is the exercise of authority over and acquisition of a land with no sovereign
title by a country. In order to ensure that the occupation is effective, the country must effectively
control the terra nullius with the intention of making it part of its sovereign territory, but it need not
necessarily notify other countries thereof.
30˚ 20˚ 0˚
40°
Sou South Africa
th L
atit
ud
˚E
e
45
Bouvet I (Nor)
Prince Edward Is (SA)
South Sandwich Is (Br) 60°
Sou
South Georgia (Br) th L
atit
No ud Crozet Is (Fr)
rw e
ay
Falkland Is
.
.K
U
(Br) SA R
G
Argentina In
Syowa Kerguelen Is (Fr)
A.B.C.R.U B J
Halley R Aus )
Heard I ((Aus)
AUS
Chile Mawson
A Amsterdam I (Fr)
C R
AUS
Davis
Australia
90˚W South Pole
U Mirnyy R
R Vostok
It AUS
Ice Shelf
NZ McMurdo (U) Casey
Scott
Ross Sea NZ F
e
nc
60
ge
°S
er
ou
nv
th
a
ali
Co
ce
str
La
an
u
ic
tit
Fr
A
ct
ud
New Zealand
ar
e
nt
A
Macquarie I (Aus)
40 Campbell I (NZ)
°S
ou
th
La
tit
ud
e
˚W
New Zealand Australia

150
180˚
Claimed sectors Antarctic research stations
Sector claimed by Argentina A Argentine It Italian

AUS Australian J Japanese
Sector claimed by Chile B British NZ New Zealand
(The sectors claimed by Argentina and C Chinese R Russian
Chile overlap with that of the U.K.) F French SA South African
G German U United States
In Indian
Fig. 1.3 Antarctica

had renounced all claim to any part of the Antarctic area, and the Japanese stated the
following in response to a question posed during Diet deliberations over the treaty.
Regarding ‘any part of the Antarctic’ as stated in paragraph (e), in January 1912,
Lieutenant Shirase Nobu carried out an exploration to the Antarctic, marking the location
at 156 degrees west longitude and 80 degrees south latitude, after which the Japanese
government addressed a demarche to the U.S. Department of State in 1938 requesting the
preservation of the title to decide the jurisdiction of these areas. In light of these circum-
stances, Japan has a strong right to express its views on these areas of the Antarctic. Under
the aforementioned paragraph, Japan will renounce these claims.28
The paragraph was not actually in the Seven Principles of Peace with Japan issued by
the US Department of State in November 1950 and was originally included in the
Treaty of Peace with Japan upon the strong urging of Australia, New Zealand, and
the UK. The UK government had pushed for making Japan renounce current and
future claims in the Antarctic but was unable to gain the agreement of the US, and so
the parties settled on the current wording. As such, what Japan renounced was claims
based on activities leading up to the conclusion of the peace treaty, in other words
those before World War II, and this does not involve any benefits accruing to Japan
from its subsequent activities. In fact, in the latter half of the 1970s, amid growing
international interest in the harvesting of mineral resources in the Antarctic, the
Japanese government stated the following in response to a question on the matter.
What Japan has renounced under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan is any right,
title to or interest in the Antarctic area at the time of the entry into force of said treaty. We do
not consider that these provisions mean that Japan has renounced all claim to any right, title
to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area whether deriving from the
activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise, following the entry into force of the treaty, in
other words that Japan has renounced its position from the time of the treaty and into the
future.29
In practice as well, Japan is one of the original parties to the Antarctic Treaty, and it
has continued to the present to exercise its right to comment on a variety of related
issues, including territorial sovereignty. Japan’s basic stance on the issue of territo-
rial rights is that, as a party to the Antarctic Treaty, it is possible for Japan to make
territorial claims on an equal footing with the other parties to the treaty, but,
outwardly, Japan has declared itself to be a non-claimant, in contrast to the claimants
in the Antarctic. This policy is likely to remain unchanged.
The Antarctic Treaty includes provisions pertaining to the preservation and
conservation of living resources in connection with research activities. However, if
issues over the commercial use of resources were to arise, the territorial issues would
become highly sensitive. Setting aside the issue of whaling that has taken place since
before World War II, the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals was
concluded in London in 1972. Additionally, in the latter half of the 1970s, Japan, the
28
House of Councillors Special Committee on the Peace Treaty and the Japan-US Security Treaty,
November 6, 1951.
29
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 5, 1978.
former Soviet Union, Poland, and the ROK operated a large-scale trial operation for
the production of krill over an area spanning 200,000 km2, and it was decided that
regulations similar to those in conventional fisheries conventions would be
established for the conservation of such zooplankton. At the time, the issue of
200 nautical miles became a major point of contention. Ultimately, the Convention
on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was concluded in 1980,
which extended the applicable area to the Antarctic Convergence and included
regulations based on the flag State doctrine.
However, matters become more complicated when issues of petroleum and
natural gas deposits or mineral resources on the continental shelf are involved.
Discussions on the subject are ongoing among the members countries of the
Antarctic Treaty, while even the UN has tried to address such issues since 1983,
giving rise to the argument that the Antarctic should be managed internationally as
the “common heritage of mankind,” as described in the principles governing the
deep ocean floor stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Eventually, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activ-
ities was adopted in June 1988 and was released for signing in November. Addi-
tionally, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was
adopted in October 1991.30
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
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30
For more comprehensive research on the various issues related to the Antarctic Treaty, see
Ikeshima, Taisaku. 2000. Nankyoku jōyaku taisei to kokusaihō (The Antarctic Treaty Regime and
International Law). Tokyo: Keio University Press.
Chapter 2
The Northern Territories (Kunashiri Island,
Etorofu Island, the Habomai Islands,
and Shikotan Island)
As discussed in Chapter 1, Japan delineated its peripheral territories between itself

and Russia, China, and the Korean Peninsula in a process from the mid-1800s to
early 1900s. In the chapters that follow, I would like to examine each situation in
greater detail. Japan has demanded the return of the Northern Territories, comprising
the Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Etorofu Island, and Kunashiri Island, which
are occupied by Russia, while China has claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands (also known as the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese), which are validly controlled
by Japan, and Japan has claimed sovereignty over Takeshima (also known as Dokdo
in Korean), which is occupied by the Republic of Korea (ROK).
The Northern Territories are inhabited, unlike the Senkaku Islands and
Takeshima; there are related treaties and international documents, including the
Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia in
1855, the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands in 1875, the
Portsmouth Peace Treaty in 1905, and the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951,
among others, making the nature of the issue as well as the diplomatic approach
quite different from the other territorial issues. Changes in Japan’s territories through
the establishment of Japan’s peripheral regions at the end of the Edo period and
beginning of the Meiji period as well as Japan’s later expansion have already been
covered in the previous chapter.
Background of the Issue
The Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of the Territorial Issue was
completed in September 1992 with the cooperation of the ministries of foreign
affairs of Japan and Russia. The ministries jointly created this compendium in
order to aid in the correct understanding between the peoples of both countries
with regard to the territorial issue between Japan and Russia. It includes basic
documents issued by Japan, the Soviet Union, and Russia concerning the
© Kreab K.K. 2023 37

38 2 The Northern Territories (Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island, the. . .
demarcation of territories between the two countries as well as a series of documents

and materials about the territorial issue. The preface is written as follows and the
background and current status of negotiations with regard to this dispute appear as
agreed upon by both foreign ministries (Fig. 2.1).
As a result of the Japanese advance from the South onto the Kurile Islands and the Russian
advance from the North by the middle of the 19th century, a Japanese-Russian border
emerged between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu. This border was legally established by
the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia of
February 7, 1855. The treaty peacefully established that the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan and Habomai were Japanese territory, and that the islands to the north or Uruppu
were Russian territory.
According to the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands of May
7, 1875, the islands from Uruppu to [Shumshu] were peacefully ceded by Russia to Japan in
exchange for the concession of Japanese rights to the island of Sakhalin.
With the signing of the Treaty on Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Russia
on June 8, 1895, the Treaty of 1855 became invalid, but at the same time, the validity of the
Treaty of 1875 was reaffirmed.
According to the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Japan and Russia of September
5, 1905, Russia ceded that part of the island of Sakhalin south of the 50th parallel North to
Japan. In light of Japanese and Russian documents from this period, it is obvious that from
the time that Japanese-Russian diplomatic relations were established in 1855, the title to the
islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai was never held in doubt by Russia.
In the Convention on Fundamental Principles for Relations between Japan and the
USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] of January 20, 1925, that announced the
establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Soviet
Union agreed that the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905 would remain in force.
The Joint Declaration of the US [United States] and the UK [United Kingdom] of August
14, 1941 (the Atlantic Charter), which the Soviet Union acceded to on September 24, 1941,
stated that the US and Great Britain “seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other” and that
“they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned.”
The Cairo Declaration of the US, UK and China of November 27, 1943, which the Soviet
Union acceded to on August 8, 1945, stated that the “Allies covet no gains for themselves
and have no thought of territorial expansion.” At the same time the Declaration stated that
the Allies’ goal was particularly to drive Japan from “the territories which she has taken by
violence and greed.”
The Yalta Agreement of the Three Great Powers (the USSR, the US and the UK) of
February 11, 1945, stipulated as one of the conditions for the USSR’s entry into the war
against Japan: “the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.” The Soviet
Union maintained that the Yalta Agreement provided legal confirmation of the transfer of
the Kurile Islands to the USSR, including the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and
Habomai. Japan’s position is that the Yalta Agreement is not the final determination on the
territorial issue and that Japan, which is not party to this Agreement, is nei[t]her legally nor
politically bound by its provisions.
The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, which the Soviet Union acceded to on August
8, 1945, stated that “the terms of the Cairo Declaration be carried out” and that “Japanese
sovereignty be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor
islands as the Allies would determine.” On August 15, 1945, Japan accepted the terms of the
Potsdam Declaration and surrendered.
In the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the USSR of April 13, 1941, the parties had an
obligation to mutually respect each other’s territorial integrity and inviolability. The Pact
also stated that it would remain in force for five years and that if neither of the contracting
Background of the Issue 39
154˚ 50˚
Kamchatka Peninsula
150˚ Kurile Strait
Atlasov Island Shumshu Island
Paramushir Island
Shirinki Island
Onekotan Island
Makanrushi Island
Kharimkotan Island
Ekarma Island Shiashkotan Island
Chirinkotan Island
Lovushki Rocks
Raikoke Island
Matua Island
146˚ 46˚
Rasshua Island
Sea of Okhotsk Ushishir Island
Ketoy Island
Simushir Island North Pacific
Broutona Island
Chirpoy Island
Sakhalin Uruppu Island

Tokotan
Etorofu Strait
Shikuka
Shibetoro
142˚
Shana
Rubetsu Etorofu Island
Toyohara 42˚
Maoka Ruyobetsu Shikotan Island
Odomari
Kunashiri Island Shikotan
Mamiya Strait
Habomai Islands
Tomari
Nemuro
Wakkanai Abashiri
Rebun Island
Kushiro
Rishiri Island Asahikawa
(The names of each of the Kurile

Sapporo Islands are those used in the
Treaty for the Exchange of
Otaru Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands)
Data from Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Warera no hoppo ryodo
Fig. 2.1 The Northern Territories and the Kurile Islands

parties denounced it a year before its date of expiration, it be considered to be automatically

extended for the next five years.
After the Soviet Union announced its intention to denounce the Japanese-Soviet Neu-
trality Pact on April 5, 1945, the Pact was to have become invalid on April 25, 1946. The
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 9, 1945.
From late August to early September 1945, the Soviet Union occupied the islands of
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai. After that, by the Decree of the Presidium of the
USSR Supreme Soviet of February 2, 1946, these islands were incorporated into the then
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan of September 8, 1951 provides for Japan’s
renunciation of rights, titles and claims to the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin. However,
the Treaty did not determine to which state these territories belong. The Soviet Union did not
sign this treaty.
The question of the limits of the Kurile Islands that were renounced by Japan in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty was mentioned, for example, in a statement by K[umao] Nishimura,
Director of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, in the Japanese
Parliament on October 19, 1951, and in a statement by Mr. K[unio] Morishita, Parliamen-
tary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in the Japanese Parliament on February
11, 1956, as well as in an Aide-Mémoire from the Department of State of the US, which was
one of the drafters of the Treaty, to the Government of Japan dated September 7, 1956.
As the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, separate negotiations
on the conclusion of a peace treaty were conducted between Japan and the Soviet Union.
However, because of differences in the positions of the two sides over the territorial clause of
the treaty, an agreement was not reached.
An exchange of letters between Mr. S[hunichi] Matsumoto, Plenipotentiary Represen-
tative of the Government of Japan, and Mr. A[ndrei] A. Gromyko, USSR First Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, on September 29, 1956, showed that the two sides agreed to
continue negotiations on the conclusion of a peace treaty, which would also include the
territorial issue, after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
This exchange of letters also paved the way for the reestablishment of Japanese-Soviet
diplomatic relations and the signing of the Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR.
The Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR of October 19, 1956 ended the state of war
and reestablished diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries. In the Joint
Declaration, Japan and the USSR agreed to continue negotiations on the conclusion of a
peace treaty after the reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations, and the USSR also
agreed to hand over the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan after the signing of a
peace treaty. The Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR was ratified by the Japanese
Parliament on December 5, 1956, and by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
on December 8, 1956. Instruments of ratification were exchanged in Tokyo on December
12, 1956.
In 1960, in connection with the conclusion of the new Japanese-US Security Treaty, the
Soviet Union stated that the return of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan would
be conditional upon the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Japanese territory. In
response, the Government of Japan raised the objection that the terms of the Joint Decla-
ration between Japan and the USSR could not be changed unilaterally, because it was an
international agreement that had been ratified by the Parliaments of both countries.
The Soviet side later asserted that the territorial issue in Japanese-Soviet relations had
been resolved as a result of World War II and such an issue did not exist.
The Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué of October 10, 1973, issued at the conclusion of
the summit in Moscow, noted that “the settlement of unresolved problems left over since
World War II and the conclusion of a peace treaty will contribute to the establishment of
truly good-neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries.”
The Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué of April 18, 1991, issued at the conclusion of the
summit in Tokyo, stated that both sides had conducted negotiations “on a whole range of
issues pertaining to the preparation and the signing of a peace treaty between Japan and the
USSR, including the problem of territorial demarcation, taking into consideration the
positions of both sides on the issue as to where the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri
and Etorofu belong.” The Communiqué also stressed the importance of accelerating the
work on the conclusion of a peace treaty.
After the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991 and
Japan’s recognition of the Russian Federation as the State with the continuity from the
USSR, the negotiations on a peace treaty which were conducted between Japan and the
USSR have been continuing between Japan and the Russian Federation.
Both sides are firmly committed to a common understanding of the need to resolve the
territorial issue on the basis of “law and justice.”
In November 1991 Mr. B[oris] N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, in his
letter to the Russian people, indicated the need to reach a final postwar settlement in
relations with Japan and noted that attention would be paid to the interests of the inhab-
itants of the said islands. The Government of Japan has also declared its intention to respect
fully the human rights, interests and wishes of the Russians who now live on the islands, in
the course of the resolution of the territorial issue.1
The above represents the preface to the Joint Compendium of Documents on the
History of the Territorial Issue. This indicates there is a need to address the
unresolved issues that have persisted since World War II. The issue for Japan is
the return of these islands. “From the time that Japanese-Russian diplomatic rela-
tions were established in 1855, the title to the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan
and Habomai was never held in doubt by Russia,” and yet “From late August to early
September 1945, the Soviet Union (after Japan agreed to the Potsdam Declaration
and surrendered on August 15, 1945) occupied the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan and Habomai. After that, by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet of February 2, 1946, these islands were incorporated into the then
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic.”
Documents issued since 1993, including the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia
Relations of October 1993, were published in January 2001 as an expanded and
revised version of the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of the
Territorial Issue, and transcribed therein. This chapter will touch upon recent trends
below.
Japan-USSR Peace Treaty Negotiations, Restoration of Japan-USSR Diplomatic
Relations, and the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration.
1
“Preface,” Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and
Russia. 1992. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/preface.html.
Accessed on December 6, 2022.
Speech by the USSR Representative to the Peace Conference
Andrei Gromyko, representative of the USSR side, gave a speech on September

5, 1951, at the San Francisco Peace Conference (refer to the Joint Compendium of
Documents on the History of the Territorial Issue).2
. . . The peace treaty with Japan should, naturally, resolve a number of territorial questions
connected with the peace settlement with Japan. It is known that in this respect as well the
United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union undertook specific obligations.
These obligations are outlined in the Cairo Declaration, in the Potsdam Declaration, and in
the Yalta Agreement.
These agreements recognize the absolutely indisputable rights of China, now the Chi-
nese People’s Republic, to territories severed from it. It is an indisputable fact that original
Chinese territories which were severed from it, such as Taiwan (Formosa), the Pescadores,
the Paracel Islands and other Chinese territories, should be returned to the Chinese
People’s Republic.
The rights of the Soviet Union to the southern part of the Sakhalin Island and all the
islands adjacent to it, as well as to the Kurile Islands, which are at present under the
sovereignty of the Soviet Union, are equally indisputable.
Thus, while resolving the territorial questions in connection with the preparation of a
peace treaty with Japan, there should not be any lack of clarity if we are to proceed from the
indisputable rights of States to territories which Japan got hold of by the force of arms.
(abridged)
Similarly, by attempting to violate grossly the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union
regarding Southern Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it, as well as the Kurile Islands
already under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union, the draft also confines itself to a mere
mention of the renunciation by Japan of rights, title and claims to these territories and
makes no mention of the historic appurtenance of these territories and the indisputable
obligation on the part of Japan to recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union over these
parts of the territory of the USSR.
(abridged)
. . .To sum up, the following conclusions regarding the American-British draft peace
treaty can be drawn:
(abridged)
The draft treaty is in contradiction to the obligations undertaken by the United States and
Great Britain under the Yalta Agreement regarding the return of Sakhalin and the transfer
of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union. ...
In other words, the USSR was not satisfied with the territorial conditions of the San
Francisco Treaty. It did not sign the treaty because “it was not a treaty of peace, but
rather a treaty for preparing for a new war in the Far East.” Accordingly, it became
essential to conclude a peace treaty between Japan and the USSR.
2
“Statement of the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko, at the
Conference in San Francisco (1951),” Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territo-
rial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1992. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/
edition92/period4.html. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
Khrushchev’s Peaceful Coexistence Policy
A variety of politicians have come and gone during more than 40 years of history
involving Russo-Japanese negotiations. On the Russian side, this includes Stalin
who concluded the Yalta Agreement, followed by First Secretaries Khrushchev and
Brezhnev, then Presidents Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin.
Khrushchev changed the direction of diplomacy from the Stalin-led Cold War to
peaceful coexistence, and he commenced measures in 1955 to approach Japan in an
effort to normalize diplomatic relations. The move for USSR-Japan negotiations that
began with the Domnitsky document of January 1955 took concrete form in June
with the London negotiations involving Matsumoto Shun’ichi, plenipotentiary rep-
resentative of the Japanese government, and Yakov Malik, Soviet ambassador to the
United Kingdom, which involved lengthy discussions about the repatriation of
Japanese nationals detained in Siberia and the territorial issue. Negotiations, how-
ever, reached an impasse; while they restarted in London in January of the following
year, negotiations were eventually cancelled in March. The Japanese side’s demands
included the return of Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island as well as the Habomai
Islands and Shikotan Island to Japan, and referral of Southern Sakhalin Island and
other matters to an international conference. The USSR side asserted that all
territorial issues were resolved within the Yalta Agreement, Potsdam Declaration,
and the territorial clause of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This resulted in an
impasse between both sides. However, Khrushchev is said to have implied during
the second half of the London negotiations that the Habomai Islands and Shikotan
Island could be returned conditionally.
The day after the London negotiations were cancelled, the USSR unilaterally
announced restrictive measures on salmon fishing in the North Pacific against the
Japanese. As a result, Japan was forced to negotiate fishing rights, and while
negotiations in Moscow between Kōno Ichirō, minister of agriculture, and Alek-
sandr Ishkov, minister of fisheries, wrapped up in May 1955, the condition was the
conclusion of a peace treaty or the restoration of diplomatic relations. In July,
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov held
negotiations in Moscow, and an agreement was nearly reached with the exception of
the territorial issue, but no breakthrough was made with regard to this issue, and in
September the following exchange of notes was agreed between Matsumoto
Shun’ichi, plenipotentiary representative of the Japanese government, and Andrei
Gromyko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs.3
3
“1. Letter from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Japanese Government, S. Matsumoto, to
the USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.A. Gromyko (1956),” and “2. Letter from the
USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. A. Gromyko, to the Plenipotentiary Represen-
tative of the Government of Japan, S. Matsumoto (1956),” Joint Compendium of Documents on the
History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1992. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/
europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
. . . At the same time the Japanese Government thinks that after the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations as a result of these negotiations, it is quite desirable that Japanese-
Soviet relations develop even further on the basis of a formal peace treaty, which would also
include the territorial issue. (Matsumoto letter)
I have further the honor to inform you on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics that the Soviet Government accepts the view of the Japanese Govern-
ment referred to above and announces its agreement to continue negotiations on the
conclusion of a peace treaty, which would also include the territorial issue, after the
reestablishment of normal diplomatic relations. (Gromyko letter)
In October, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō traveled to Moscow despite health

problems and on October 19 signed the Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR.
According to this declaration, the state of war would end and diplomatic relations be
restored, but the territorial issue was not resolved and the conclusion of a peace
treaty was postponed. Paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration stated the following4:
9. Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree to continue, after the restoration
of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan,
negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking
into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to hand over to Japan the
Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan. However, the actual handing over of these
islands to Japan shall take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
During the drafting of the declaration, the Japanese side strongly demanded the
insertion of the words “including the territorial issue” in the part of the declaration
concerning the peace treaty instead of simply stating that they agreed to continue
negotiations for a peace treaty. However, this was not included in the finalized
declaration.
The Era of the New Japan-US Security Treaty

and the USSR’s Claim That “Territorial Issues Have Already
Been Settled”
Khrushchev Document
The Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration represents the most important fundamental

document defining the relations between Japan and USSR following World War
II. The following were agreed in accordance with this declaration5:
4
“3. Paragraph 9 of the Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR (1956),” Joint Compendium of
Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1992. https://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
5
For the original texts, please see, “No. 3768. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan: Joint
Declaration. Signed at Moscow, on 19 October 1956,” 263 UNTS 99, pp. 112–116. https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20263/v263.pdf. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
The Era of the New Japan-US Security Treaty and the USSR’s Claim. . . 45
1. The state of war would cease, and peace, friendship and good-neighborly rela-
tions would be restored.
2. Diplomatic and consular relations would be restored, and each side would
establish its embassy in the territory of the other.
3. Japanese nationals detained in the Soviet Union would be repatriated to Japan.
4. The bilateral agreements including the fisheries convention signed in May 1956
would come into effect.
5. The Soviet Union would support Japan’s application for membership in the
United Nations.6
They also affirmed that in their mutual relations they would be guided by the
principles under the United Nations Charter, in particular those set forth in Article
2. It was also promised that a trade, navigation, and other commercial agreements
would be concluded on a firm and friendly basis.
The USSR renounced all war reparations, and both countries agreed to forgo their
claims against each other arising from the result of the war.
“Since diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR were restored through
the Joint Declaration, bilateral relations showed steady developments in various
fields including business, trade and culture, among others.”7 However, Prime
Minister Kishi Nobusuke signed the new Japan-US Security Treaty on January
19, 1960 and on January 27, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko handed the
following memorandum to Kadowaki Suemitsu, Japanese ambassador to the
USSR, unilaterally adding the new condition that all foreign military forces had
to withdraw from Japanese territories as a requirement for the return of the
Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island agreed upon in the Joint Declaration by
Japan and the USSR.8
But the Soviet Union certainly cannot ignore such a step as Japan’s conclusion of a new
military treaty which undermines the basis for peace in the Far East and creates obstacles to
the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. A new situation has formed in relation to the
fact that this treaty actually deprives Japan of independence and that foreign troops
stationed in Japan as a result of Japan’s surrender remain on Japanese territory. This
6
The original members of the United Nations (UN) signed the Declaration by United Nations in
January 1942 and included countries that had declared war against the Axis countries of Japan and
Germany. Members included Axis countries and neutral countries in World War II, as well as newly
independent former colonies. Of the defeated countries, the Allies promised to support UN
membership for Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania per the 1947 peace treaty, but
they could not obtain the necessary votes of approval in the UN Security Council regarding
communist countries, so the USSR vetoed Italy and Finland’s memberships. Japan obtained the
approval for membership from signatory countries under the peace treaty, but the USSR stood in the
way of its membership with its veto power, giving as its reason the absence of a peace treaty and
Japan’s hostile attitude.
7
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2001. Warera no hoppō ryōdo (Our Northern Territories).
8
“4. Memorandum from the Soviet Government to the Government of Japan (1960),” Joint
Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1992.
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html. Accessed on
December 6, 2022.
situation makes it impossible for the Soviet Government to fulfill its promises to return the
islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan.
(abridged)
But since the new military treaty signed by the Japanese Government is directed against
the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Government cannot
contribute to extending the territory available to foreign troops by handing over such
islands to Japan.
Thus, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to declare that the islands of Habomai
and Shikotan will be handed over to Japan, as was stated in the Joint Declaration by Japan
and the USSR of October 19, 1956, only if all foreign troops are withdrawn from Japan and
a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty is signed.
The above memorandum from the Government of the USSR made new assertions by
invoking the principle of clausula rebus sic stantibus in international law. The
Japanese side responded as follows on February 5.9
. . . It is extremely incomprehensible that in its latest memorandum, the Soviet Government is
connecting the issue of the revised Japan-US Security Treaty with the issue of handing over
the islands of Habomai and Shikotan. . . .
(abridged)
This Joint Declaration is an international agreement regulating the foundations of the
relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union. It is an official international document
which has been ratified by the highest organs of both countries. It is needless to say that the
contents of this solemn international undertaking cannot be changed unilaterally. Moreover,
since the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty10 which is valid indefinitely already existed and
foreign troops were present in Japan when the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was signed, it
must be said that the Declaration was signed on the basis of these facts. Consequently, there
is no reason that the agreements in the Joint Declaration should be affected in any way.
The Government of Japan cannot approve of the Soviet attempt to attach new conditions
for the provisions of the Joint Declaration on the territorial issue and thereby to change the
contents of the Declaration. Our country will keep insisting on the reversion not only of the
islands of Habomai and Shikotan, but also of the other islands which are inherent parts of
Japanese territory. ...
The USSR was persistent in sending similar memoranda, but finally Premier Khru-
shchev conveyed in writing to Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato in September 1961 that
“territorial issues have already been solved in the series of international agreements
concluded some time ago.” As a result, the Soviet Union’s stance toward the
Northern Territories issue took a further step backward. The Government of Japan,
however, maintained its consistent point of view in February 1956 that “Kunashiri
and Etorofu islands were not included as part of the Kurile Islands in the Treaty of
Peace with Japan.” During the Budget Committee meeting of the House of Repre-
sentatives of October 1961, in response to questions on the testimony of Treaties
9
“5. Memorandum from the Japanese Government to the Soviet Government (1960).” Ibid.
10
Current version of Japan-US Security Treaty (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
Between Japan and the United States of America) was later concluded in 1960.
The Era of the New Japan-US Security Treaty and the USSR’s Claim. . . 47
Bureau Director-General Nishimura Kumao about discussions of a peace treaty,

Ikeda replied, “I believe the words of the government committee member11 are
incorrect.”
Following this, the USSR continued to assert its belief that “territorial issues have
already been settled” until the Tanaka-Brezhnev meetings in October 1973.
Tanaka-Brezhnev Meetings
The Hatoyama Cabinet was followed by: the Ishibashi Cabinet, which was in power
only for a short while; the Kishi Cabinet, which focused on revisions to the Japan-US
Security Treaty; the Ikeda Cabinet, which planned the path to economic growth; and
the Satō Cabinet, which engaged in negotiations for the return of Okinawa. The
Okinawa Reversion Treaty entered into force on May 15, 1972, and Prime Minister
Satō Eisaku resigned in June. On July 5, Tanaka Kakuei won a fierce four-way battle
against rival party leaders (Miki Takeo, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Fukuda Takeo)12 to
be elected head of the Liberal Democratic Party as Satō’s successor, and Tanaka was
subsequently elected prime minister. He announced on July 7 that he would urgently
move forward with the normalization of diplomatic relations with the People’s
Republic of China. On September 25, Tanaka visited China with Ōhira, minister
for foreign affairs, and the Japan-China Joint Communiqué was announced on
September 29, officially normalizing relations. Following this, Ōhira visited the
Soviet Union in October and began the first negotiations on a peace treaty with
Russia with his counterpart, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.
Tanaka sent a letter to Brezhnev in March 1973, and in his response Brezhnev
invited the prime minister to visit Moscow. From October 7 to 10, 1973, Tanaka paid
an official visit to the Soviet Union, the first by a Japanese prime minister in 17 years.
Based on discussions between both leaders, the Japanese-Soviet Joint Communiqué
was issued on October 10. This Communiqué stipulated the following about the
territorial issue.
1. Recognizing that the settlement of unresolved problems left over from WWII and conclu-
sion of a peace treaty would contribute to the establishment of truly good-neighborly and
friendly relations between the two countries, both sides held negotiations on issues
pertaining to the contents of a peace treaty. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations on
the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries at an appropriate time in 1974.13
In response to Tanaka stating that he wished to confirm that the four islands were
included in “unresolved issues,” it is said that Brezhnev confirmed that that was
11
The director-general of the Treaties Bureau.
12
Known in Japanese as the “San-Kaku-Dai-Fuku” battle.
13
“6. Japanese-Soviet Joint Communique (1973),” Joint Compendium of Documents on the History
of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1992. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/
territory/edition92/period5.html. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
precisely the case.14 At any rate, 17 years after normalizing relations with the Soviet
Union, which had stated repeatedly that “territorial issues were already settled,” an
agreement was reached to continue negotiations on territorial issues at the highest
level involving both countries’ leaders.
However, time passed without clear progress being made. Although former
residents had been allowed visits to their relatives’ graves on the four islands on
and off with only identification cards and without a passport or visa for humanitarian
purposes since 1964, in September 1976 the Soviet Union announced its definitive
decision to require a Japanese passport and Soviet visa for such visits. As a result,
these visits had to be suspended (and remained suspended until August 1986). This
was because, for Japan, such measures appeared to be the Soviet Union’s attempt to
legitimatize that these four islands belonged to the Soviet Union, and such a view
could not possibly be accepted.
The Soviet Union established fishing grounds 200 nautical miles off its coast on
December 10, 1976 by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and
announced rules for its implementation, including the sea area applicable based on
a decision by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in February 1977. The seas
around the Four Northern Islands were included. Japan stated emphatically that such
a unilateral measure by the Soviet Union was regrettable and could not be accepted,
protesting immediately through diplomatic channels. The USSR-Japanese provi-
sional fisheries agreement signed in May 1977 after USSR-Japanese fisheries nego-
tiations began in March the same year contained the clause, “Nothing in this
Agreement shall be deemed to prejudice the positions or views of the two Govern-
ments ... with regard to matters concerning the relations between them” (Article 8).
As a result, Japan’s stance toward the territorial issue was clearly reserved. During
these negotiations, it is said that the USSR strongly pursued the clear demarcation of
the international border determined in the Nemuro Strait between Hokkaidō and
Kunashiri Island by the Council of Ministers of the USSR in February and in the
Goyōmai Channel between Hokkaidō and the Habomai Islands within the provi-
sional fisheries agreement. This effectively stalled negotiations. Japan established
the Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters in July the same year
and established a 200 nautical mile zone of its own that also included the seas
surrounding the Four Northern Islands (see Chapter 6).
Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao visited the Soviet Union in January 1978 and
held discussions with his counterpart Gromyko, without any progress made. Gro-
myko did not reciprocate with a visit to Japan, and so the talks were suspended until
January 1986.
14
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warera no hoppō ryōdo.
Improvements in Soviet-Japanese and Russia-Japan Relations 49
Improvements in Soviet-Japanese and Russia-Japan

Relations
New Thinking Diplomacy Under Gorbachev: Japan’s

Expanding Equilibrium Policy
Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed the General Secretary of the Soviet Union in
March 1985. He embarked on the path of democratization, glasnost (openness) and
perestroika (reform). Diplomatically, he advanced the concept of New Thinking
diplomacy. Specifically, Gorbachev was concerned whether the Soviet Union could
withstand the economic pressure of competing with US President Ronald Reagan’s
military expansion, so he strived to restore relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union by proposing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF),
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, and a unilateral reduction in conventional weapons. As for Soviet-
Japanese relations, he highly praised Japan’s economic growth and attempted to
improve relations through changes in awareness. Subsequently, Foreign Minister
Gromyko was dismissed after 30 years in office, with Eduard Shevardnadze
appointed in his place. Regular Soviet-Japan foreign ministers’ meetings were
restored and resumed in January 1986, when Shevardnadze visited Japan; Foreign
Minister Abe Shintarō visited Russia that May. A Soviet-Japanese cultural agree-
ment was signed; talks were held about grave visits to the Northern Territories, as
well, and a note verbale was exchanged that July, with visits resuming in August.
Thus, although its stance toward the territorial dispute remained rigid, there is no
denying that the Soviet Union did come to the table to talk. As a result, dialogue
between Japan and the Soviet Union gradually expanded. Gorbachev’s thinking was
highlighted during his speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 and his speech in
Krasnoyarsk in September 1987.
Thereafter, the occurrence of the Toshiba Machine matter and Soviet Union spy
incident signaled a cooling of Soviet-Japanese relations. However, Shevardnadze
visited Japan once again in 1988 and a vice foreign ministerial working group on a
peace treaty was formed (meetings were held eight times with the Soviet Union and
seven times with Russia; and the Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of
the Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia was published in 1992 with the
cooperation of both foreign ministries).
Foreign Minister Uno Sōsuke visited the Soviet Union in 1989, where he
presented Japan’s “expanding equilibrium policy” whereby overall Soviet-Japanese
relations would expand while giving priority to the conclusion of a peace treaty and
resolution of territorial issues. The policy gained the basic understanding of the
Soviet side. This expanding equilibrium policy marked a change in the principle of
inseparability between political and economic matters. The Soviet Union’s stance
remained rigid, however. At the time of Shevardnadze’s visit to Japan in 1990,
Gorbachev’s intention to visit Japan in April 1991 was announced. That visit
proceeded as planned, marking the first ever visit by a Soviet head of state to
Japan, and the first Soviet-Japanese summit meeting held in 18 years. While there
was no breakthrough on the territorial issue at this meeting, the following Japanese-
Soviet Joint Communiqué was signed on April 18.15
4. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan and President M[ikhail] S. Gorbachev of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics held in-depth and thorough negotiations on a whole
range of issues relating to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, including the issue of territorial demarcation,
taking into consideration the positions of both sides on the attribution of the islands of
Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu.
The joint work done previously–particularly the negotiations at the highest level–has
made it possible to confirm a series of conceptual understandings: that the peace treaty
should be the document marking the final resolution of war-related issues, including the
territorial issue, that it should pave the way for long-term Japan-USSR relations on the basis
of friendship, and that it should not infringe upon either side’s security.
The Soviet side proposed that measures be taken in the near future to expand exchanges
between residents of Japan and residents of the aforementioned islands, to establish a
simplified visa-free framework for visits by the Japanese to these islands, to initiate joint,
mutually beneficial economic activities in that region, and to reduce the Soviet military
forces stationed on these islands. The Japanese side stated its intention to consult on these
questions in the future.
As well as emphasizing the primary importance of accelerating work to conclude the
preparation for a peace treaty, the Prime Minister and the President expressed their firm
resolve to make constructive and vigorous efforts to this end taking advantage of all positive
elements that have been built up in bilateral negotiations in the year since Japan and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic jointly proclaimed an end to the state of war and the
restoration of diplomatic relations in 1956.
According to the Japanese side, this Communiqué “...clearly marked the first time in
writing without doubt that the four islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and
Etorofu were included in the territorial issue to be resolved in a peace treaty.”16
This communiqué resulted in the beginning of new efforts. But the domestic
situation in the Soviet Union changed rapidly that summer, with a failed coup
attempt in August and the end of Communist Party rule. This was followed by the
collapse of the Soviet Union in December.17
Gorbachev contributed greatly to improved relations with Japan in areas other
than the territorial dispute. Perestroika was welcomed by developed countries and
Gorbachev’s personal style of traveling with his wife helped to ease distrust of the
Soviet Union among the Japanese people and could be credited with changing the
way it was viewed by the Japanese people.
15
“1. Japanese-Soviet Joint Communique (1991),” Joint Compendium of Documents on the History
of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia. 1992. https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/
territory/edition92/period6.html. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
16
17
See “Sobieto renpō no kaitai (The Break-up of the Soviet Union)” in Serita, Kentarō. 1996.
Fuhenteki kokusai shakai no seiritsu to kokusaihō (Building on the Global Community and
International Law). Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
Improvements in Soviet-Japanese and Russia-Japan Relations 51
Collapse of the Soviet Union, and President Yeltsin’s Law

and Justice: Japan’s Multilayered Approach
The Russian Republic, which was part of the Soviet Union, declared its sovereignty
in June 1990, followed by Ukraine and Belarus in July. Amidst confrontation with
Soviet President Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Russian Supreme
Soviet Boris Yeltsin signed a basic treaty between Russia and Ukraine in November
1990, and he launched a policy that prioritized equal relations without the assump-
tion of the existence of the Soviet Union as a point of departure for both countries’
declaration of sovereignty. In the chaos caused by the attempted coup by the
conservative faction of the Soviet Union on August 19, 1991, Yeltsin won a decisive
victory. Ukraine and Belarus declared their independence immediately after the
failed coup attempt. On December 8 of that year, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus
signed the agreement to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in
Minsk, the capital of Belarus, declaring the end of the Soviet Union. The leaders of
these three countries and other republics excluding the Baltic States met on
December 21 in the Kazakh capital of Alma Ata where they adopted a protocol on
the agreement in Minsk, officially declaring the creation of the CIS. The Alma Ata
Declaration proclaimed: “With the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the USSR ceases to exist.”18
Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi sent a letter to Yeltsin on December
27, in which he conveyed that the Russian Federation is the state retaining continu-
ing identity with the Soviet Union and that all treaties and other international
agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union would continue to be applied
between Japan and the Russian Federation.
In other words, Japan recognized the Government of Russia. Japan also explicitly
recognized the 10 countries of the CIS, including Ukraine and Belarus, on December
28, when its minister for foreign affairs sent letters to the foreign ministers of each of
these countries.19 The European Community clearly stated on December 23 prior to
Japan that it deemed Russia as the successor State of the Soviet Union.
Acting Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov
visited Japan in September 1991 and delivered a letter from President Yeltsin to
Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki that expressed that he would eliminate the distinction
between victor and defeated country of World War II, that the territorial dispute
would be resolved based on law and justice, and the resolution of the territorial issue
would not be further delayed.
18
“Agreements establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States [Done at Minsk, December
8, 1991, and done at Alma Ata, December 21,1991],” Council of Europe, CDL 94(54), 1994,
p. 149. https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(1994)054-e Accessed
1 March 2023.
19
Official Telegram No. 815, January 8, 1992, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bulletin No. 9. For more
details about the independence of the three Baltic countries and the independence of the 11 countries
including Ukraine, see Serita, 1996 op. cit.
Prime Minister Miyazawa met with Yeltsin in New York in January 1992. During
the meeting, Yeltsin stated that he would visit Japan later that year in September.
Preparations were made energetically for this visit by both Japan and Russia. During
this process, Japan stated that, based on Russia’s new approach indicated since
September 1991, it would fully respect the human rights, interests, and hopes of
the Russian people living on the four Northern Territories after their return to Japan,
and that it would respond flexibly with regard to the timing, format, and conditions
for the return if Japan’s sovereignty over the four islands were confirmed. Yeltsin’s
visit to Japan was postponed shortly before his departure, however, owing to the
domestic situation in Russia. Nevertheless, in September, the Joint Compendium of
Documents on the History of the Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia was
completed with the cooperation of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan and
Russia as noted above.
Yeltsin did eventually visit Japan in October 1993, and the meeting between both
leaders resulted in the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia relations, signed on
October 13. The preface of the New Edition of the Joint Compendium of Documents
on the History of the Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia from January
16, 2001, states: “This was the first comprehensive document signed between
Japan and the Russian Federation establishing the principal direction of progress
for bilateral relations. The Tokyo Declaration stipulates the necessity for the early
conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of the issue of where the afore-
mentioned islands20 belong, on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on
the documents produced subject to the consent between both countries as well as on
the principles of law and justice. Consequently, the Tokyo Declaration is especially
important.”
New Developments in Japan-Russia Relations
Tokyo Declaration and Krasnoyarsk Agreement/Kawana

Proposal
The Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations, the first of its kind with Russia
after the fall of the Soviet Union, stated the following21:
Based upon the recognition that, with the end of the Cold War, the world is moving away
from the structure of confrontation towards cooperation which will open new vistas for
advances in international cooperation on both global and regional levels as well as in
bilateral relations between different countries, and that this is creating favorable conditions
for the full normalization of the Japan-Russia bilateral relations;
20
Namely Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, Shikotan Island and the Habomai Islands.
21
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/declaration.html. Accessed on December
6, 2022.
New Developments in Japan-Russia Relations 53
(abridged)
Determined that Japan and the Russian Federation should work together on the basis of
the spirit of international cooperation, overcoming the legacy of totalitarianism, to build a
new international order and to fully normalize their bilateral relations,
Declare the following:
1. (abridged)
2. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation, sharing the
recognition that the difficult legacies of the past in the relations between the two
countries must be overcome, have undertaken serious negotiations on the issue of
where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands belong. They agree that
negotiations towards an early conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of this
issue on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on the documents produced with
the two countries’ agreement as well as on the principles of law and justice should
continue, and that the relations between the two countries should thus be fully normal-
ized. In this regard, the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian
Federation confirm that the Russian Federation is the State retaining continuing identity
with the Soviet Union and that all treaties and other internationals [sic] agreements
between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be applied between Japan and the
Russian Federation. ...
Under international law, such as the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in

respect of Treaties, it is only natural that the Russian Federation has the obligation to
continue to apply all treaties and other international agreements between Japan and
the Soviet Union as the State retaining the continuing identity with the Soviet Union.
This is guaranteed in Article 12 of the agreement on the establishment of the
Commonwealth of Independent States signed at Minsk in December 1991, and
was already mentioned at the time Japan recognized the Government of Russia.22
However, there was a difference in opinion between Japan and the Soviet Union with
regard to the Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR of 1956, so it is particularly
noteworthy that President Yeltsin clarified at the joint press conference held on
October 13 that the Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR of 1956 was included
in “treaties and other international agreements.”
Thus, Yeltsin’s visit to Japan marked an important first step in a new era in
Japan-Russia relations.
The year 1996 marked the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic
relations and the signing of the Joint Declaration by Japan and the USSR. It was also
an election year for the Russian presidency. Although Foreign Minister Ikeda
Yukihiko visited Russia, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō held a summit meeting
in Moscow during his attendance at the Nuclear Security Summit, and a
Japan-Russia foreign ministers’ meeting was held at the G7 Lyon Summit, no
progress was made. The leaders of Japan and Russia exchanged messages in October
to commemorate the 40th anniversary of normalizing diplomatic relations, and
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov visited Japan the following month,
22
For implementation of the continuation of Japan’s treaties, see Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai. 2001.
Nihon no jirei kenkyū (5): Jōyaku hō (Study of Practices in Japan, Vol. 5: Law of Treaties). Tokyo:
Keio University Press.
confirming once again that progress was being made in bilateral relations under the
Tokyo Declaration. At this time, the Japanese side emphasized the need for efforts to
be taken to improve the environment for the resolution of the territorial issue in
tandem with the territorial negotiations. In response, the Russian side expressed its
belief that while efforts to improve the environment should first be made, such
efforts should not serve as an alternative to the resolution of the territorial issue or
work to hinder it. It also put forward the idea of advancing “joint economic
activities” on the four islands.
In 1997, Ikeda visited Russia in May where he held a regular meeting with
Primakov, and following a summit meeting between Hashimoto and Yeltsin on the
sidelines of the Denver Summit in June, Hashimoto visited Krasnoyarsk in
November for informal and open talks with Yeltsin.23 In particular, with regard to
the territorial issue, both agreed “to make utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty
by 2000 based on the Tokyo Declaration.” This is the Krasnoyarsk Agreement. They
also agreed to conclude negotiations on a framework for fishing by Japanese vessels
in the waters around the Northern Territories by the end of the year, with these
negotiations effectively concluded by the end of that year. In February 1998, both
countries signed the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Govern-
ment of the Russian Federation on certain aspects of cooperation in the fishing of
marine living resources.24 Ten days after the summit meeting, Primakov visited
Japan and followed up on the summit meeting. It was agreed to set up a group
headed by both foreign ministers, in which negotiations would be conducted at the
vice-ministerial level. Vice minister level talks were held in January 1998 on
negotiations for a peace treaty, and the Japanese-Russian Joint Committee on the
Conclusion of a Peace Treaty was launched, jointly chaired by the foreign ministers
of both countries.
An informal summit meeting was held in April 1998 in Kawana, Itō City,
Shizuoka Prefecture. The Japanese side presented the Kawana Proposal. The details
of this proposal have yet to be officially released, but the proposal contained the
following elements according to newspaper reports. The government did not com-
ment on these reports.
Japanese newspapers reported simultaneously on April 20 that Hashimoto had
proposed the demarcation of the Japan-Russia border at the meeting on April 19.
According to these reports, the Japanese side envisioned, inter alia, the following:
1. Clearly demarcate the border on the northern side of the four islands in a treaty
and confirm Japanese sovereignty over these islands;
2. Subsequently establish a transitional period, during which Japan will recognize
Russian control, although the area will be open to free movement between the two
sides;
23
24
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202718/Part/volume-2718-I-48102.pdf.
Accessed on March 1, 2023.
New Developments in Japan-Russia Relations 55
3. Discuss the length of the transitional period with Russia and confirm at the time
of the signing of the treaty; and
4. Work together with the Russian side during this period to develop infrastructure
on the four islands to make them similar to the Japanese mainland, as well as to
make preparations for transfer of control to the Japanese side.25
This proposal shared similar characteristics with the “Five-Step Proposal”26
presented by President Yeltsin in order to solve the territorial issue. It was reported
that the Japanese side decided to submit its own proposal based on the view that
without explicit reference to the timeline for reversion of control the situation would
end up like that of Okinawa prior to reversion, and that even though it may be viewed
as a step backward from the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, in which the return of
two islands was promised, the Japanese public was unlikely to protest fiercely even if
such a bold compromise were to be made.27
It was reported that Yeltsin responded in the meeting to the proposal by calling it
“interesting,” and during the press conference, he said “while I cannot respond
immediately to the proposal, I feel optimistic about it.” Reportedly, Yeltsin was
about to say “da” to express his approval but was stopped by his aides. For the
Japanese side, the proposal was a gamble.
Hashimoto later resigned and his successor, Obuchi Keizō, made an official visit
to Russia in November 1998, the first such visit in 25 years by an incumbent
Japanese prime minister, where he signed the Moscow Declaration on Establishing
a Creative Partnership between Japan and the Russian Federation. This declaration
aimed to further strengthen bilateral cooperation in various fields, and it contained
the Russian side’s response to the Kawana Proposal with regard to the issue of
concluding a peace treaty.
It instructed both governments to accelerate negotiations based on the Tokyo
Declaration, Krasnoyarsk Agreement, and Kawana Proposal, form a border confir-
mation committee and joint economic activities committee, and allow unrestricted
visits by former island residents. In June 1999, at the summit meeting held on the
sidelines of the G8 Cologne Summit, Obuchi invited Yeltsin to Japan, but Yeltsin
resigned suddenly at the end of the year, to be replaced by the Putin administration.
25
Yomiuri Shimbun, April 20, 1998, evening edition.
26
Yeltsin, as a member of the parliament and a reform leader of the Soviet Union, visited Japan in
1990 and proposed a five-step process leading to the resolution of the territorial issue: (1) The Soviet
Union acknowledges the territorial issue; (2) Make the four islands a “Free Enterprise Zone” where
Japanese companies can easily establish operations; (3) Demilitarize the four islands; (4) Conclude
a peace treaty; and (5) Leave the resolution of the territorial issue to the next generation when
political culture matures, mutual exchange and mutual understanding advances between the nations,
and public opinion changes for the better.
27
Asahi Shimbun, April 21, 1998.
President Putin and the Irkutsk Statement
For Japan, the Kawana Proposal was a carefully timed initiative and a major gamble.
The tide changed with Yeltsin’s departure, however, and the proposal was thrown
into a state of limbo. Acting President Vladimir Putin faced an election in March
2000. After the election, he needed to first review fully the overall relationship with
Japan before heading into territorial negotiations.
On the Japanese side, Prime Minister Obuchi suddenly passed away. The Mori
Yoshirō administration took over with all previous ministerial appointments intact. It
engaged in a series of dialogues with the Putin administration and held a
Japan-Russia summit meeting on the sidelines of the G8 Kyūshū/Okinawa Summit
in July 2000. President Putin also paid an official visit to Japan in September.
Another Japan-Russia summit meeting was held at the time of the APEC Summit
in Brunei in November, and Prime Minister Mori visited Irkutsk in March 2001
where he met with Putin and they signed the Irkutsk Statement.
With regard to the Irkutsk Statement, the Government of Japan considered that
“Japan and Russia have made collective efforts toward the signing of a peace treaty
based on the Krasnoyarsk Agreement and now a new foundation has been formed for
future peace treaty negotiations.”28 In particular, the Statement was well regarded by
Japan as “affirming that a basic legal document is in place which forms a departure
point for negotiation processes based on the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration.” The
Irkutsk Statement reaffirms that the issue of attribution of the four islands must be
resolved based on the Tokyo Declaration of 1993 before a peace treaty can be
signed.
As was often the case, however, there was a difference in interpretation between
the Japanese and Russian sides concerning Paragraph 9 of the Japan-Soviet Joint
Declaration. In an interview with Reuters on April 4, immediately after the issuance
of the Irkutsk Statement, the Russian vice foreign minister stated that the extreme
stance on the Japanese side was that of “two islands plus two islands” while the
extreme stance on the Russia side was that all four islands were Russian territory.
When asked “What happened in Irkutsk? Did Russia make a concession?” he
responded, “A statement about the effectiveness of the 1956 Joint Declaration
cannot be called ‘a concession.’ This document is a mark of progress given that
the Joint Declaration was the basis for our relationship and yet for the longest time it
was not mentioned.” Later, Jiji Press reported on July 17 that the Soviet minutes of
the 1956 negotiations revealed that Khrushchev had imposed his position on the
Japanese side that “the reversion of the two islands is our final response.” It also
reported that “The joint statement made at the Irkutsk meeting in March this year
clearly referred to it as a fundamental legal document. At this time, the President
pointed out that there were differences of interpretation on the Joint Declaration, and
that if it were to make maximum concessions in future negotiations, the Russian side
would remain adamant about its stance vis-à-vis the final decision regarding the two
28
Background of Japan-Russia Negotiations and Measures for Achieving a Solution 57
islands.”29 This speculation by Jiji Press differed slightly from the nuance of the
Russian vice foreign minister’s response, demonstrating that Jiji Press’s understand-
ing of the course of Japan-Russia negotiations to date was slightly problematic.
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile pointing out that such a view did exist.
Background of Japan-Russia Negotiations and Measures

for Achieving a Solution
Developments in Japan-Russia Negotiations and Their
Significance in the Contemporary Context
Developments in negotiations between Japan and Russia as seen from the Japanese
side are as follows. As was explained in Chapter 1, Southern Sakhalin, the Kurile
Islands, and the Northern Territories were occupied by the Soviet Union during
World War II. The postwar settlement process started with the San Francisco Peace
Treaty; Japan then began peace treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, which had
not participated in that treaty.
The San Francisco Peace Treaty did not include a definition of “the Kurile
Islands.” During territorial negotiations, Khrushchev said he would return the
Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island but was firmly against returning Kunashiri
Island and Etorofu Island, whereas Japan demanded that Kunashiri Island and
Etorofu Island be returned as well. The negotiations thus reached an impasse, and
no peace treaty was signed; in its place, the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was
concluded. Next for the Japanese side, the Soviet Union persisted in its stance that
the “territorial issue had already been settled,” despite the fact that Kunashiri Island
and Etorofu Island were included in the scope of negotiations. So, the time came for
the Japanese side to seek confirmation that the four islands were included among the
unresolved issues between Japan and the Soviet Union, and Japan focused its efforts
to have the Soviet Union confirm that Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island were
included in the scope of negotiations. This was confirmed verbally during the
Tanaka-Brezhnev meeting of 1973, but not confirmed in writing.
After the end of the Cold War, this was confirmed in writing in 1991 with
Gorbachev’s visit to Japan and, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and
establishment of Russia, in the Tokyo Declaration of 1993, in which resolving the
issue of the Four Northern Islands and concluding a peace treaty was clearly
mentioned in writing. The Kawana Proposal was made during this time, and with
Putin taking power, a fresh start was made with the Irkutsk Statement.
To sum up, Japan has continually called for the return of the Habomai Islands,
Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island and Etorofu Island. The basis for this claim is “The
Northern Territories, which consist of Etorofu Island, Kunashiri Island, Shikotan
29
Kōbe Shimbun, July 18, 2001.
Island, and the Habomai Islands, have been handed down from generation to
generation by Japanese people, and are inherent territories of Japan which have
never been part of a foreign country.”30 The Soviet and Russian sides, for their part,
asserted that the territorial issue had already been resolved through the Yalta
Agreement, Potsdam Declaration, and surrender documents, and that subsequent
peace treaty negotiations and the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration had only served to
confirm this fact. In other words, their position has changed from two islands (1956
Declaration) to “already settled” (since the new Japan-US Security Treaty) and then
back to two islands (Irkutsk Statement). Currently, according to the statements the
Russian vice foreign minister made during the interview post-Irkutsk Meeting, the
idea of “two islands plus two islands” represents the extreme stance of the Japanese
side, while the extreme stance on the Russian side is that “all four islands belong to
Russia.” The Russian stance is not clear. The Irkutsk Meeting gave both leaders the
opportunity to send a message to each other’s people. Putin gave an interview to
NHK in which he said, “Regarding the Declaration of 1956, I recall that it states the
following: the (then) Soviet Union agreed to return two islands to the Japanese side
under the condition that a peace treaty be signed. This Declaration was ratified by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviets. In other words, this Declaration is binding on
us.”31 The true intent of Putin’s remarks, however, was likely to lay the groundwork
for asserting that although the Declaration bound Russia to return the two islands, it
was unable to do so because Japan continued to hold out for the four islands and
would not conclude a peace treaty.
Legal discussions at the time are addressed in Takano Yūichi’s Nihon no ryōdo
[Japan’s Territory] (University of Tokyo Press, 1962), and afterwards in his
Kokusaihō kara mita hoppō ryōdo [The Northern Territories from the Perspective
of International Law] (Iwanami Shoten, 1986), which was published as part of
Iwanami Shoten’s booklet series. Also, Taijudō Kanae’s “Ryōdo mondai—hoppō
ryōdo, Takeshima, Senkaku shotō no kizoku [The Attribution of the Northern
Territories, Takeshima, and the Senkaku Islands],” Jurist 647, (1977) is recorded
in Ryōdo kizoku no kokusaihō. Furthermore, it is worthwhile reading historian Wada
Haruki’s Hoppō ryōdo mondai o kangaeru [Considering the Northern Territories
Issue] (Iwanami Shoten, 1990), which examines the scope of “the Kurile Islands”
from a linguistic perspective and offers realistic proposals for improving Soviet-
Japanese relations. Each of these was written during the Cold War era, so discussions
and a new perspective that take into account the 10 years of relations with the newly-
formed Russia are needed.
In this sense, it is important to point to the opening words of the Tokyo
Declaration of 1993: “Based upon the recognition that, with the end of the Cold
30
“The Government of Japan’s Position and Basic Policy on the Northern Territories Issue.” https://
www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/taiou/index.html. Accessed on December 6, 2022.
31
Presentation entitled “Irukutsuku shunō kaidan go no nichiro kankei (Japan-Russia Relations
following the Irkutsk Summit Meeting)” by Togo Kazuhiko, director-general of the European
Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the 36th research presentation session of the Japan
Cultural Association on April 19, 2000.
War, the world is moving away from the structure of confrontation towards coop-
eration which will open new vistas for advances in international cooperation on both
global and regional levels as well as in bilateral relations between different countries,
and that this is creating favorable conditions for the full normalization of the
Japan-Russia bilateral relations; (abridged) Determined that Japan and the Russian
Federation should work together on the basis of the spirit of international coopera-
tion, overcoming the legacy of totalitarianism, to build a new international order and
to fully normalize their bilateral relations.” For this reason, expectations are for a
resolution to be reached based on the principles of “law and justice.”
The shift from Stalin’s Cold War to Khrushchev’s Peaceful Coexistence brought
about the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. Yet, this occurred within the confines of
the Cold War, nevertheless. As such, this era was different from the Yeltsin/Putin era
of the post-Cold War. The cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy is the Japan-US
Alliance. Until the end of the Cold War, Japan-USSR relations were at times tossed
about or disrupted altogether by developments in US-Soviet relations. In that sense,
there was a limit to what could be achieved in the territorial negotiations. In the early
post-Cold War era, however, it was viewed that Japan shared the same fundamental
values with Russia, which was undergoing democratization and pursuing a market
economy. The territorial issue must be resolved in the context of the overall
relationship with our neighbor, Russia.
When viewed over the long span of history, the debate about the scope of the
“Kurile Islands,” apart from the important facts pointed out by Wada Haruki, has left
resentment on the Japanese side, and likely will not contribute to stable bilateral
relations between Japan and the Russian Federation. This is because the US side
reminded the Japanese side that it could not reopen discussions on the peace treaty
proposal during a meeting between Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, and John Foster Dulles, a special envoy, held 2 days before the
San Francisco Peace Conference. Yoshida mentioned the four islands by name
during his acceptance speech, but only to call attention to the issue. The Soviet
Union accepted the principle of no territorial aggrandizement through its participa-
tion in the Potsdam Declaration, and during the peace conference the Soviet repre-
sentative criticized the United States for violating this very principle with regard to
the proposal to place Okinawa under UN Trusteeship. Based on the principle of no
territorial aggrandizement advocated by the Allies, the “Kurile Islands” defined in
peaceful diplomatic negotiations between Japan and Russia was not included in the
areas “taken by violence and greed” as referred to in the Cairo Declaration. It is
therefore not the case that Japan was forced to promise to give up the Kurile Islands,
if not Southern Sakhalin.
Regardless, from the perspective of stable bilateral relations, there is no better
resolution than the border drawn in the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and
Delimitation between Japan and Russia of 1855, which both parties entered into
voluntarily. This is because, although the Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the
Kurile Islands of 1875 was concluded peacefully after the Treaty of Commerce,
Navigation and Delimitation, it was a source of dissatisfaction among the people of
Japan at the time and eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War and the Portsmouth
Peace Treaty of 1905, which required the cession of Southern Sakhalin. This caused
indignation among the people of Russia and resulted in the recapture of Southern
Sakhalin through World War II and its unspeakable hardships.
We need to put this unfortunate history behind us.
Although there is no denying that the numerous interactions between Japan and
Russia in the 50 years after World War II carry weight, from the standpoint of “law
and justice” it would be best to bury the past and return to the line drawn by the
Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation, which is free of resentment and
bitterness on both sides.
Steps to be Taken for a Resolution
According to the director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ European

Affairs Bureau, there were 2000 Russians living on Shikotan Island at the time of
the Irkutsk Meeting. Yet, not once had the fate of these 2000 Russian nationals been
discussed in the territorial negotiations until then.
In April 1989, a reporter for Hokkaidō Shimbun became the first journalist to visit
Kunashiri Island and cover the lives of the 7500 people living there. He reported the
words of the chairman of the Yuzhno-Kurilsk regional executive committee who
said, “Some of us are already members of the third generation. We have nowhere
else to go.” Some experts on the matter were of the view that it was possible to return
the two islands if three conditions were met. Namely, guaranteeing the livelihood of
the 6500 people living on Shikotan Island and the island’s economic development by
establishing a fisheries factory after the reduction of US military forces in Okinawa
and its reversion to Japan.32 In other words, they called on Japan to allow the
Russian population to continue living there and to permit a Soviet factory to operate
there indefinitely. A dozen years later, a reporter allowed to travel to the island
without a visa in August 2001 as part of an exchange program found that a new
company, Gidrostroy, was supporting the economy of the Northern Territories,
which operated three plants on Etorofu Island and one plant on Shikotan Island as
part of its hatcheries operation, an integrated business covering fishing, processing,
and transport, with sales from the previous year amounting to 2.14 billion yen.
Additionally, humanitarian assistance from Japan helped to support the lives of
islanders in the wake of the earthquake that struck off the eastern coast of Hokkaidō
in 1994. Furthermore, a thermal power plant and a barge (planned for donation by
the Government of Japan) were being used (or were to be used) to power the island’s
fisheries processing plant, and it was reported that a regular transportation service to
Kunashiri Island was being considered. This report also conveyed the voices of
32
49. See Wada Haruki. 1990. Hoppō ryōdo mondai o kangaeru (Considering the Northern
Territories Issue). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
former islanders who said they were “worried how people’s feelings would change if
their lives improved.”33 As for the visa-free exchange program, a male resident of
Shikotan Island had a positive view: “We will be able to get to know each other
better and foster awareness about the issues.”
I mention these examples because they indicate that the framework for crossings
that has been established up to now, including exchanges with the four islands and
grave visits to the Northern Territories, as well as the freedom of passage, has played
a very important role in promoting the understanding and cooperation between the
peoples of both Japan and Russia. In order to dispel the concerns of the population,
there is a need to put forward a realistic approach regarding guarantees of the human
rights of islanders. Individual issues must be discussed carefully and thoroughly,
including whether to grant current islanders permanent resident status or allow them
their choice of nationality, whether to guarantee business rights, and how to address
specific issues in daily life. In this regard, the 25 measures proposed in the report
“Hoppō yontō fukki ni tomonau shomondai (Problems Accompanying the Return of
the Northern Territories),” prepared by the Research Society on Issues Posed by the
Return of the Northern Territories in March 1999, contain useful suggestions.34 As
basic principles for addressing the return of the four islands, this report proposed that
first, people residing on the islands for a certain period be granted permanent resident
status if they so desire; second, appropriate assistance be provided to Russians who
wish to repatriate; and third, development of the four islands should take full account
of preserving the natural environment. In accordance with these principles, the report
also called for the human rights of Russians wishing to continue to reside on the Four
Northern Islands to be respected and various provisions be made to preserve their
lifestyles, with the freedom of residence, schooling, and occupation guaranteed, and
measures implemented to ensure that the interests of residents of Russian descent are
not unjustly violated as a result of problems that might arise from the co-habitation of
Japanese and Russian residents. These issues should be discussed widely and
awareness of these issues fostered among the public.
33
Hokkaidō Shimbun, September 4, 2001; et al.
34
A private-sector research society whose members included former Japanese Ambassadors to the
Soviet Union, Katori Yasue and Nakagawa Tōru, as well as Suetsugu Ichirō, chairman of the
Council on National Security Problems.
parts of it.
Chapter 3
The Senkaku Islands
China’s Claim Prompted by Potential Oil Reserves
The Senkaku Islands are a group of small islands located 160 km north of the
Yaeyama Islands, Okinawa Prefecture. “The Senkaku Islands” is the collective
term that refers to Uotsuri Island, Kitakojima Island, Minamikojima Island, Kuba
Island (Kōbisho), Taishō Island (Sekibisho), Okinokitaiwa, Okinominamiiwa, and
Tobise. Their total land area is approximately 6.3 km2. The largest island, Uotsuri
Island, covers about 3.6 km2. Apart from the period when Japanese people inhabited
them, the Senkaku Islands were, and are still, uninhabited. The islands were thought
to have no valuable natural resources, and therefore escaped the world’s attention
(Fig. 3.1).
This changed in the autumn of 1968, when the United Nations Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE; now the United Nations Economic
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) released a report of a geophysical
survey led by Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese scientists of a vast area of the East
China Sea. The ECAFE report concluded that there is a possibility of prolific oil
reserves on the seafloor of roughly 200,000 km2 northeast of Taiwan. This drew the
attention of the international community to the Senkaku Islands. By late 1970, China
began making territorial claims over the islands.1
Chapter 6 of this book discusses how negotiations between Japan and China over
fishing rights around the Senkaku Islands have been handled. The Chinese govern-
ment first began to officially assert sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in a
Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated December 1971. On March
8 of the following year, Japan released a document entitled “The Basic View on the
Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” This work will
primarily analyze these two documents.
1
For more on issues concerning petroleum, see Takahashi, Shōgorō. 1979. Senkaku rettō nōto
(Notes on the Senkaku Islands). Tokyo: Seinen Publishing.
© Kreab K.K. 2023 63

64 3 The Senkaku Islands
Fig. 3.1 Location of the Senkaku Islands
Examination of China’s Argument and Its Basis
Examination of the Argument Asserting the Illegality of the Inclusion of the Senkaku
Islands into the “Reversed Areas” of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.
The Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of
China dated December 30, 1971 begins as follows:2
In the past few years, the Japanese Sato government, ignoring the historical facts and the
strong opposition of the Chinese people, has repeatedly claimed that Japan has the so-called
2
30, 1971. English translation in Peking Review, January 7, 1972, p. 12. http://www.massline.org/
PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972-01.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2022.
Examination of China’s Argument and Its Basis 65
‘title’ to China’s territory of the Diaoyu3 and other islands and, in collusion with U.-
S. imperialism, has engaged in all kinds of activities to invade and annex the above-
mentioned islands. Not long ago, the U.S. Congress and the Japanese Diet one after the
other approved the agreement on the ‘reversion’ of Okinawa. In this agreement, the
Governments of the United States and Japan flagrantly included the Diaoyu and other
islands in the ‘area of reversion.’ This is a gross encroachment upon China’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate this!
The same statement elaborated on the point as follows:

After World War II, the Japanese government illicitly handed over to the United States the
Diaoyu and other islands appertaining to Taiwan, and the United States Government
unilaterally declared that it enjoyed the so-called ‘administrative rights’ over these islands.
This in itself was illegal. . . . Now the U.S. and Japanese Governments have once again made
an illicit transfer between themselves of China’s Diaoyu and other islands. This encroach-
ment upon China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty cannot but arouse the utmost
indignation of the Chinese people.
The premise of this Chinese argument can be summarized in connection with the San
Francisco Peace Treaty as follows. In this argument, the Chinese insist that the
Senkaku Islands were part of the region including Taiwan (Article 2) that was
eventually separated from the territory of Japan under the terms of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. They were not included in the region that, while remaining part of
Japanese territory, would be placed under US administration for the time being, like
the Nansei Shotō Islands (Article 3). Furthermore, the argument goes that the
Senkaku Islands continued to be under Chinese sovereignty even when the Okinawa
Reversion Treaty was signed on June 17, 1971 and entered into force on May
15, 1972.
Indeed, with regard to such areas as Taiwan and other territories, China began the
process of “reversion” of “Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands” to China, as provided
for in the territorial clause of the Potsdam Declaration soon after Japan accepted the
Declaration on August 14, 1945. On August 29, it had already appointed the
governor-general of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office and
the Garrison Command. The Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office
Organization Regulation was promulgated on September 20, shortly after Japan
signed the Instrument of Surrender on September 2. Specific steps were taken
towards the seizure of Taiwan beginning in October. Taiwan was formally restored
to China as its territory on October 25, through the formal procedures for the transfer
called the “surrender ceremony.” China introduced the same administration system
in Taiwan as in its other territories. In this manner, such areas as Taiwan were
incorporated into China through a purely domestic procedure based on the territorial
clause of the Potsdam Declaration, prior to the signing of the peace treaty.4 Taking
these developments into account, the San Francisco Peace Treaty had Japan
renounce Taiwan and other territories. From the viewpoint of China, which did
3
The citations from Peking Review used “Tiaoyu” following an older style of romanization.
4
Irie, Keishirō. 1951. Nihon kōwa jōyaku no kenkyū (Study of the Treaty of Peace with Japan).
Tokyo: Itagaki Shoten, pp. 61–64.
not attend the deliberations on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the acceptance of the
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 and the Joint Statement between Japan and
China of 1972, in which Japan maintained its position based on Article 8 of the
Potsdam Declaration, gave final legal standing to China on the reversion of Taiwan
and the Pescadores Islands to China. Thus, closely examining the Chinese argument
from a legal perspective, it can be said that China’s exact legal claim is that the
Senkaku Islands were already part of Chinese territory at the time the San Francisco
Peace Treaty was signed. This interpretation can be deduced from a message
delivered on Radio Peking on December 30, 1971:
It is even more absurd for the United States to want to include China’s territory Diaoyu and
other islands it has occupied into the ‘area of reversion’ in accordance with the Okinawa
‘reversion’ agreement. After World War II, Japanese imperialism returned Taiwan and the
Penghu Islands5 to China. It was illegal in itself that Japan handed over the Diaoyu and
other islands appertaining to Taiwan to the United States. There were no legal grounds for
this action.6
With respect to the occupation of Okinawa, US forces landed on the Kerama Islands
on March 26, 1945, then on the main island of Okinawa on April 1. Following
Japan’s surrender, the US Navy military government promulgated Proclamation
No. 1-A “To the People of the Nansei Shotō Islands and Adjacent Waters” on
November 26, 1945 for the Miyako Islands, the Yaeyama Islands and the Amami
Islands. Shortly afterward, US forces began to occupy the Miyako Islands and the
Yaeyama Islands in March and the Amami Ōshima Islands the following January.
Actual military rule was enforced in the Miyako Islands on December 8 and in the
Yaeyama Islands on December 28.
During the military occupation of Okinawa, the United States kept the adminis-
trative areas of the former Okinawa Prefecture in place as they had been before.
When the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the General Head-
quarters (GHQ), issued a memorandum entitled “Governmental and Administrative
Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan” on January 29, 1946, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan informally submitted to GHQ a list of the islands
comprising the Nansei Shotō Islands. The list named Sekibisho, Kōbisho, Kitajima
Island, Minamijima Island, and Uotsuri Island as comprising the “Senkaku Islands”
and included the islands within Okinawa Prefecture. This series of events all took
place after China’s incorporation of Taiwan and other areas into its territory.
However, there is no evidence that China lodged protests of any kind against
these events, despite being fully aware of them as a member of the Allied powers. On
April 20, 1971, Wei Yu-sun, spokesperson for Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
explained that “the islands were occupied by the U.S. military, but our government
5
More commonly known as the Pescadores Islands.
6
English translation from “Tiaoyu and Other Islands Have Been China’s Territory Since Ancient
(U.S.-Japanese Reactionaries’ Vain Efforts)” in Peking Review, January 7, 1972, pp. 13–14. http://
www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972-01.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2022.
believed this was a necessary step at the time out of consideration for the safety of the
joint defense zone,” but he did not provide any evidence to support this.7
Furthermore, China responded to “The Basic View of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,” a March 8, 1972 document outlining Japan’s position on the Senkaku
Islands, with a statement in Peking Review on April 7 of that year. It stated, “As is
well known, after World War II, the Japanese Government handed over to the United
States the Diaoyu and other islands appertaining to Taiwan and the U.S. Government
unilaterally declared that it had so-called ‘administrative rights’ over them. This is
illegal in the first place, and the Chinese Government and people have never
recognized it.”8 Even here, however, there is no evidence that any objections were
lodged against the Senkaku Islands being within the US “area of occupation” or its
“area of administration,” nor is there any evidence whatsoever that China
disapproved of these actions.
Of course, the inclusion of the Senkaku Islands “within the administered reversed
areas” does not in and of itself provide the basis for Japan possessing sovereignty
over these islands. That is because if they had been arbitrarily included within
Japanese territory when the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed, then the Chinese
objections would be legitimate.
However, were the Senkaku Islands actually continuously part of Chinese terri-
tory until the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty after World War II, as China
asserts?
The biggest hole in the Chinese argument is that on October 25, 1945, about
2 months before the US occupation began on the Yaeyama Islands of Okinawa
Prefecture, which had been under the prefecture’s administration prior to the war,
China had completed its incorporation of territories including Taiwan. Furthermore,
documents compiled by Taiwan Province after World War II identified that Pengjia
Islet, situated slightly north of the main island of Taiwan, constitutes the northern
end of Taiwan Province. Maps published in Taiwan and Beijing excluded the
Senkaku Islands from Chinese territory and marked them as a part of the Ryūkyū
Islands. These facts not only show that China did not recognize the Senkaku Islands
as its own territory, but that it clearly considered them to be a part of Japan. That is
because if China had thought of the Senkaku Islands as Chinese territory and that
they were included in the reference in the Cairo Declaration to “the territories stolen
from China by Japan—including Manchuria, the island of Taiwan and the Pescado-
res Islands,” then it is unthinkable that China, a victor in the war, would face any
difficulties or obstacles in incorporating the Senkaku Islands into its territory as it did
immediately after the war’s end with islands like Taiwan.
7
The same reference, without supporting evidence, is also made in a book written by a former vice
chairman of the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association: Lin Chin-ching. 1987. Sengo no nikka kankei
to kokusaihō (Postwar Japan-Republic of China Relations). Tokyo: Yūhikaku Publishing, p. 182.
8
English translation from “Sato Government Tries to Annex China’s Tiaoyu And Other Islands
(So-Called ‘Administrative Rights’ Illegal)” in Peking Review, April 7, 1972, p. 14. http://www.
massline.org/PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972-14.pdf. Accessed on November 30, 2022.
In contrast, even under the US Civil Administration following US military

occupation, Japan undertook numerous significant initiatives in the form of actions
taken by the US Civil Administration of the Ryūkyū Islands and the Government of
the Ryūkyū Islands.
First, the Law Concerning the Organization of the Gunto Governments (Military
Government Ordinance No. 22), the Provisions of the Government of the Ryukyu
Islands (Civil Administration Ordinance No. 68) and the geographical boundaries of
the Ryukyu Islands (Civil Administration Proclamation No. 27) defined areas under
the jurisdiction of authorities, including the US Civil Administration of the Ryūkyū
Islands and the Government of the Ryūkyū Islands, by indicating latitude and
longitude coordinates, and naturally included the Senkaku Islands in these areas.
Secondly, in 1951 the US Navy set up maritime areas for aerial bombing training
exercises on Kōbisho and Sekibisho, with the former designated as a special exercise
area. Taishō Island (Sekibisho), which was State-owned land, was designated as an
exercise area after April 16, 1956. For the privately-owned land of Kuba Island
(Kōbisho), the US Civil Administration concluded Basic Lease GRI Nr. 183-1 on
July 1, 1958 between its agent, the Ryūkyū government, and the landowner, Koga
Zenji. Accordingly, a lease was paid to Mr. Koga. The Ryūkyū government had been
levying a fixed asset tax9 on the four islands he owned, and after the Basic Lease was
concluded, it began to withhold taxes from the revenue earned from the utilization of
military land on Kuba Island. According to an understanding reached between the
Japanese and US governments during the Okinawa reversion negotiations, the
Japanese government would provide firing ranges on Taishō Island and Kuba Island
to the US forces in Japan as facilities and areas under the Japan-US Security Treaty,
and under the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement after the islands were restored
to Japan.
Thirdly, Japan took measures against the dismantlement of submerged ships on
Minamikojima Island by Taiwanese people in August 1968. On August 12, an
officer of the Immigration Agency of the Ryūkyū government’s Legal Department
discovered that Xingnan Engineering, a Taiwanese salvage company, had set up a
tent workshop and cranes for the dismantlement of submerged ships. As the com-
pany did not have a permit to enter the area, the agency ordered the intruders to
immediately leave and recommended that the company apply for entry onto the
islands. The Taiwanese workers soon exited and applied for entry to Minamikojima
Island. On August 30, 1968 and on April 21, 1969, the company received a permit to
enter the area with the approval of the High Commissioner of the Ryūkyū Islands.
The High Commissioner issued a permit retroactively to allow Taiwanese workers to
9
The fixed asset tax was described as follows in an interview conducted by the author with the city
of Ishigaki’s financial affairs section on March 3, 1983. Taishō Island (Sekibisho: Block 2394,
Tonoshiro, Ishigaki) is State-owned land. Koga Zenji, who was residing in the city of Naha at the
time, sold Uotsuri Island (Block 2392, Tonoshiro, Ishigaki), Kitakojima Island (Block 2391), and
Minamikojima Island (Block 2390) on June 21, 1974 to Kurihara Kunioki, a resident of Ōmiya,
Saitama Prefecture. Therefore, Koga paid a fixed asset tax of 90,000 yen for Kuba Island (Kōbisho:
Block 2393), while Kurihara paid a fixed asset tax of 450,000 yen for the other three islands.
enter the area from August 1, 1968 to October 31, 1969, and permission was also
issued for them to bring some equipment and facilities into the area as well. No
nation protested this matter. Incidentally, the head of the salvage company had
licenses including a dismantlement license issued by the Taiwanese Ministry of
Communications, as well as an exit permit issued by the Taiwanese garrison head
office. This, along with the absence of protests, provides sufficient grounds to
presume that Taiwanese authorities did not consider Minamikojima Island as their
territory.
From July 8 to 13, 1970, the Ryūkyū government erected a territorial signboard
on the Senkaku Islands. (Radio Peking criticized these moves on December
30, 1971, calling them the government’s “attempt to make Japan’s ‘possession’ of
these islands a fait accompli.”) China claimed title to the Senkaku Islands for the first
time, albeit informally, on December 4 of that year, as the Xinhua News Agency
criticized the joint development of resources on the continental shelf in the East
China Sea by Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The People’s Daily
also reported on December 29 that “Japan is also trying to incorporate into its
territory even some islands and waters that belong to China, including Diaoyu”
and that “islands, including Diaoyu, Huangwei, Chiwei, Nanhsiao, and Peihsiao,
have, as has Taiwan, been the territories of China since ancient times.” In other
words, China never made territorial claims and never lodged effective protests from
1945 to 1970. To put it differently, Japan exercised State control over the Senkaku
Islands in a peaceful and continuous manner for 25 years after World War
II. However, the Government of the Republic of China (ROC), with which Japan
had diplomatic relations until 1972, granted a permit to an American oil company to
explore for oil along the continental shelf including the Senkaku Islands. At the
House of Councillors’ Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Problems on
August 10, 1970, the Japanese government reported that it had issued a statement to
the ROC government that “these kinds of unilateral measures are invalid under
international law.”10 In addition, in testimony during a secret meeting at the Legis-
lative Yuan on September 4, Taiwanese Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming said for the
first time that the Senkaku Islands “are five islands that belong to the national
government.” His remarks were reported the following day. However, the basis
for this statement is unknown.
In light of the foregoing, one cannot but conclude that the Chinese argument that
the Senkaku Islands have always been part of Chinese territory, or that at the least
they were already Chinese territory at the time of the conclusion of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty as well as the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, is made on very weak
grounds.
10
Asahi Shimbun, August 11, 1970.
Analysis of the Arguments that the Senkaku Islands Appertain

to Taiwan
The Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
dated December 30, 1971 reads as follows:
The Diaoyu and other islands have been China’s territory since ancient times. Back in the
Ming Dynasty, these islands were already within China’s sea defence areas; they were
islands appertaining to China’s Taiwan but not to Ryukyu, which is now known as Okinawa.
The boundary between China and Ryukyu in this area lies between Chiwei Yu and Kume
Island and fishermen from China’s Taiwan have all along carried out productive activities
on the Diaoyu and other islands. During the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese
Government stole these islands and in April 1895 it forced the government of the Ching
[Qing] Dynasty to conclude the unequal “Treaty of Shimonoseki” by which “Taiwan,
together with all islands appertaining to Taiwan” and the Penghu Islands were ceded.11
The December 30, 1971 broadcast by Radio Peking provided more details:
To resist harassment by Japanese invaders, China’s Ming Dynasty in 1556 appointed Hu
Tsung-hsien [Hu Zongxian] commander of the punitive force in charge of military action
against the Japanese invaders in the coastal provinces. The islands such as Diaoyu Island,
Huangwei Yu and Chiwei Yu were then within the scope of China’s coastal defence. It was
more specifically stated in the records of missions sent to the Ryukyu Islands by China’s
Ming and Ching [Qing] Dynasties and in geography and history books that these islands
belong to China and that the demarcation line between China and the Ryukyu Islands lies
between Chiwei Yu and Kome Island, namely, present-day Kume Island.
In 1879, when Li Hung-chang [Li Hongzhang], Minister Superintendent of Trade for the
Northern Ports of China of the Ching [Qing] Dynasty, held negotiations with Japan on the
title to the Ryukyus, both the Chinese and Japanese sides held that the Ryukyus comprised
36 islands. Diaoyu and the other islands were not among those 36 islands at all.
The Diaoyu and other islands were under China’s jurisdiction for several centuries, and
it was only in 1884 that the Japanese “discovered” them. The Japanese Government
immediately plotted to annex them, but dared not lay hands on them then. It was in 1895
when the defeat of the government of the Ching [Qing] Dynasty in the [First] Sino-Japanese
War had become inevitable that these islands were grabbed by Japan. The Japanese
Government then compelled the Ching [Qing] Dynasty government to sign the “Treaty of
Shimonoseki” which ceded “Taiwan, together with all islands appertaining to Taiwan” and
the Penghu Islands to Japan.12
These statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Radio Peking can
be summarized in the following four points; each of them shall be examined
individually.
1. The Senkaku Islands were within China’s coastal defense zone as early as the
Ming period, and the islands appertained to the Chinese territory of Taiwan.
11
30, 1971. Op. cit.
12
“Tiaoyu and Other Islands Have Been China’s Territory Since Ancient (U.S.-Japanese Reaction-
aries’ Vain Efforts)”, op. cit.
2. As historical sources such as the records of investiture missions make clear, the
border between China and the Ryūkyū Kingdom lay between Sekibisho and
Kume Island (modern-day Kuba Island).
3. In the Sino-Japanese negotiations regarding the so-called Ryūkyū issue, both
sides recognized that the Senkaku Islands were not included in the “36 islands of
Ryūkyū.”
4. The Japanese discovered the Senkaku Islands in 1884, only after they had already
become part of China hundreds of years before. When the defeat of the Qing
dynasty government became certain during the First Sino-Japanese War of 1895,
Japan “stole” the Islands. Soon afterward, the Japanese government forced the
Qing administration to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, under the terms of which
Taiwan and all its affiliated islands, along with the Pescadores Islands, were
ceded to Japan.
Detailed Examinations of Each of China’s Arguments
1. While the statements from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not cite Ming
documents proving that the Senkaku Islands were within China’s coastal defense
zone, it can be surmised from various studies that the source they are referring to
is Chou Hai Tu Bian (An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security), edited
by Hu Zongxian in the mid-sixteenth century.13
According to Inoue Kiyoshi, in the first volume, “Map of Coastal Mountains,” the
maps “Fujian 7” and “Fujian 8” show the coastal seas of Luoyuan and Ningde
counties, with the following islands running from west to east: Jilong Shan
(“shan” literally means “mountain” but used in reference to an island), Pengjia
Shan, Diaoyu Yu, Huaping Shan, Huangwei Shan, Ganlan Shan, and finally Chi
Yu. These islands start off the coast of Keelung, Taiwan, which is located in the
seas of southern Fuzhou Province. The line along which the islands are situated
heads eastward, and they “undoubtedly include the Diaoyu Islands.” “These maps
show that the Diaoyu Islands were added to the islands in Chinese territory in the
coastal waters of Fujian. Volume 1 of Chou Hai Tu Bian shows maps, starting in
the southwest and moving northeast, of not only Fujian, but also all the Chinese
coastal waters that Japanese pirates would raid. None of these maps include any
areas outside of Chinese territory, so there is no basis for only excluding the
Diaoyu Islands from Chinese territory.”14
13
See sources such as: Inoue, Kiyoshi. 1972. Senkaku rettō (The Senkaku Islands). Tokyo: Gendai
hyōronsha, p. 32; Ozaki, Shigeyoshi. “Senkaku shotō no kizoku ni tsuite (Territorial Sovereignty
over the Senkaku Islands) (Part 3-2),” Reference 263, p. 158. Ozaki wrote further on the historical
examination section of his paper: Ozaki, Shigeyoshi. 1995. “Senkaku shotō no kokusaihō-jō no chii
(The Status of the Senkaku Islands in International Law),” Tsukuba hōsei (Tsukuba Law and
Policy) 18(1), March.
14
Inoue, op. cit. 32.
Incidentally, does Inoue’s argument stand up to scrutiny? According to Ozaki

Shigeyoshi, Volume IV of Chou Hai Tu Bian contains a “Map of the Coast of
Fujian Province.” While the map contains the Pescadores Islands, it does not
mark Taiwan, Keelung Islet northeast of Taiwan, Pengjia Islet, nor the Senkaku
Islands. “This is based more on the true situation at the time.” Other more recent
sources, including the Luoyuan County Annal (1614, during the Ming dynasty)
and the Ningde County Annal (1718, Qing dynasty), both official local publica-
tions, indicate that at the time the Senkaku Islands were not included in the
administrative control of these counties in Fujian Province. Further still, the
Senkaku Islands are not charted in the “Map of Fujian’s Coastal Defenses” in
Volume I of another government publication called Chongzuan Fujian Tongzhi
(Recompiled General Annals of Fujian; 1838, Qing dynasty). Moreover,
according to Okuhara Toshio, if Chou Hai Tu Bian is cited as a source, “it
would be appropriate to say that ‘Borders of Fujian,’ the seventeenth map of
Volume I, shows the borders of Fujian Province at the time.”15 While this map
does mark the Pescadores Islands, Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands are not drawn
on it. In other words, the Senkaku Islands did not belong to Fujian Province.
Hu Zongxian was appointed as supreme commander in charge of repelling the
Japanese pirates in 1556, several years before Chou Hai Tu Bian was written. In
any case, at the time that the Japanese pirates were most violent, between 1553
and 1559, China had to primarily focus on defending the coastal areas of its
mainland. Consequently, the Ming dynasty could not even extend its defensive
capabilities to the Pescadores Islands. While the pirates travelled quite freely
between mainland China and the Ryūkyū Kingdom, particularly between the
Miyako and Yaeyama Islands, it has not been confirmed in either Chinese or
Ryūkyū historical records whether Ming military ships reached as far as the
Ryūkyūs in pursuit of the pirates.
Wang Zhi, who had mustered several dozen Japanese pirate groups in 1553,
was a Chinese man from the same town as Hu Zongxian. The pirate leader was
lured to his hometown and was executed in 1560. Considering this, the fact that
the Senkaku Islands are depicted only in “Map of Coastal Mountains” means
simply that these islands either lay along the routes the Japanese pirates used in
their raids or were in the vicinity of waters infested by the pirates. Therefore, this
would merely indicate that the area was one warranting attention for the sake of
defending the mainland. The text of Chou Hai Tu Bian does not make any
mention that the Senkaku Islands were inside the Japanese pirate defense zone
at the time, but even if there are any other sources unnoticed by the studies
conducted thus far that indicate that the Senkaku Islands were within China’s
coastal defense zone as early as the Ming period, the aforementioned facts make it
inconceivable that Chinese control did in fact extend to the Senkaku Islands in
any form.
15
Okuhara, Toshio. 1978. “Senkaku shotō ryōyūken no konkyō (Evidence for the Territorial Rights
over the Senkaku Islands).” Chūōkōron (Central Review), July.
Then were the Senkaku Islands appertaining to the Chinese territory of Taiwan
during the Ming period? In History of Ming, an official Chinese historical record,
Taiwan was included in the “Biographies of Foreign Countries” as a foreign
territory of the east, while Jilong Shan of northern Taiwan (modern-day Keelung)
was also included in the “Biographies of Foreign Countries.” Thus, during the
Ming period, Chinese control did not extend to northern Taiwan (Keelung), nor to
islands northeast of Taiwan such as Pengjia Islet, Huaping Shan, or Mianhua
Yu. In addition, China did not consider these places as its territory. Although
Taiwan was conquered by the Sui and the Yuan dynasties of China, the land
remained undeveloped. Taiwan became a base for Japanese pirates during the
Ming period, and by the end of the dynasty’s rule in the beginning of the
seventeenth century, the Dutch had constructed outposts like Fort Zeelandia
where the present-day city of Tainan is located. The Spanish came from Manila
to establish trading outposts in such locations as Keelung in northern Taiwan. The
Dutch soon drove them off, however, and Taiwan was under the continuous rule
of the Netherlands for about 40 years.
The Ming dynasty collapsed in 1644 when the Qing dynasty entered Beijing.
The Qing later conquered southern China as well by 1681. However, Zheng
Chenggong, who led a resistance movement against the Qing, crossed over to
Taiwan in 1661 and drove out the Dutch. He made his base there to continue the
resistance, but in 1683 surrendered to the Qing armies dispatched to Taiwan. This
is when the Qing first added Taiwan to its territory. The island became Taiwan
Prefecture, a part of Fujian Province. Accordingly, it would be proper to say that
the Senkaku Islands did not in fact appertain to the Chinese territory of Taiwan
during the Ming period.
Zheng Shungong wrote Riben Yijian (A Chronicle on Japan) in 1556 based on
materials he had accumulated after returning from an investigation of Japan’s
state of affairs and its geography under the orders of Hu Zongxian’s predecessor.
In a section of the book, “Wanli Chang-ge (Ballad of 10,000 Li),” Zheng makes
mention of “small islands of Xiaodong.” This shows that Zheng thought of the
Diaoyu Islands as being small islands affiliated with, or near to, Xiaodong
(Taiwan). Although the information presented thus far indicates that the Senkaku
Islands were not included within the territory incorporated into the Qing
dynasty’s territory together with Taiwan, this does not provide a definitive answer
to the question. In any case, Zheng was merely an individual person acting in an
unofficial capacity.
2. China argues that, as historical sources such as the records of investiture missions
make clear, the border between China and the Ryūkyū Kingdom lay between
Sekibisho and Kume Island.
The first formal negotiation between China and the Ryūkyū Kingdom took
place in 1372. Soon after, Emperor Taizu of the Ming dynasty (personal name
Zhu Yuanzhang) overthrew the Yuan dynasty and acceded to the throne. He
dispatched a mission to the Ryūkyū Kingdom to provide notification on the
unification of China and to urge the kingdom’s submission to the Ming court.
Responding to and accepting this notice of the emperor, called a zhao yu
(invitation), the Ryūkyū King of Chūzan dispatched an envoy to the Ming court
in the same year. (Emissaries were also sent that year to the Muromachi shogun-
ate in Japan. As the Ryūkyū Kingdom did, Shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu
accepted the zhao yu and pledged his loyalty as “the King of Japan, by your
grace.”)
When small neighboring States dispatched envoys to the Ming court and
pledged their allegiance as a response to the invitation, the Ming court called
this act ru gong or chao gong. The gifts presented to the Ming court at the time of
ru gong were called gong wu or fang wu (meaning “tribute”). The diplomatic
missions and the ships that carried them to the court were called by such names as
chao gong, ru gong, or jin gong chuan (this last literally meaning “tribute ship”).
The Ming emperor, in return for the tributes, issued an imperial decree that
conferred the title of “kings of tributary States” on the kings of their nations by
granting chi shu (investiture). As this tribute-investiture relationship16 between
Ryūkyū and China became formalized incrementally, the preparations for and the
formality of the tribute and investiture ceremonies were considered highly impor-
tant national events in Ryūkyū. Customarily, Ryūkyū sent envoys called qing
feng shi for the entreaty for investiture to China 2 years after the demise of the
previous Ryūkyū king. There were two major ceremonies necessary to mark an
investiture: the funeral for the previous king (yu zhai) and the conferment of the
title of the new king (the aforementioned qing feng shi). China dispatched
investiture missions to Ryūkyū 23 times during the 500-year period spanning
from 1372 to 1879, the year that the Meiji government abolished the domain of
Ryūkyū, established Okinawa Prefecture, and prohibited its tributary relations
with China. Of these 23 instances, 15 took place during the Ming dynasty and
eight took place during the Qing dynasty. For its part, Ryūkyū dispatched ships
for various purposes to China other than tribute ships, particularly during the
Ming period. For example, Ryūkyū dispatched ships called jie feng chuan to
Fuzhou, the capital of Fujian Province, to escort Chinese investiture ships prior to
their departure from Fuzhou City. Ryūkyū also dispatched ships called xie en
chuan to escort Chinese investiture missions on their return voyages from
Ryūkyū to China in order to express its appreciation, as well as qing he chuan
(celebratory ships) for some celebratory events. During the Ming dynasty,
Ryūkyū dispatched ships on as many as 171 instances. As this number indicates,
Ryūkyū ships travelled to China far more often than Chinese ships to Ryūkyū.
During the Ming dynasty, Ryūkyū also conducted trade with Korea and South
Pacific countries. As a result, Ryūkyū flourished as a trading hub, making its
people well acquainted with the sea routes in surrounding waters, particularly the
sea routes between Ryūkyū and China.
Chinese investiture missions not only absorbed knowledge of the Ryūkyū
Kingdom, but also customarily kept records of all their experiences and
16
For more on the significance of the chao gong system in East Asia, see Hamashita, Takeshi. 1997.
Chōkō shisutemu to kindai ajia (The Tributary System and Modern Asia). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.
knowledge, such as matters relating to navigation, all ceremonial customs, as well

as the state of affairs in the Ryūkyū Kingdom. These records served as guidelines
for subsequent missions.17 According to Taira Kazuhiko, the earliest record of the
investiture missions in existence is Chen Kan’s Shi Liuqiu Lu (The Records of the
Imperial Title—Conferring Envoys to Ryūkyū) of 1535, in which the descrip-
tions of islands such as Diaoyu Yu [Uotsuri Island], Huangwei Yu [Kōbisho], and
Chiwei Yu [Sekibisho] can be seen for the first time. Today there exist 13 such
records including Shi Liuqiu Lu, ranging up to the last mission conducted by Zhao
Xin for the investiture of Shō Tai, the last king of Ryūkyū.18
(a) Chen Kan’s Shi Liuqiu Lu (Records of the Imperial Missions to Ryūkyū):
journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1534.
(b) Guo Rulin’s Chongke Shi Liuqiu Lu (Supplementary Records of the Imperial
Missions to Ryūkyū): journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1561.
(c) Xiao Chongye’s and Xie Jie’s Shi Liuqiu Lu (Records of the Imperial Mis-
sions to Ryūkyū): journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1579.
(d) Xia Ziyang’s and Wang Shizhen’s Shi Liuqiu Lu (Records of the Imperial
Missions to Ryūkyū): journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1606.
(e) Hu Jing’s Dutianshi Cefeng Liuqiu Zhenji Qiguan (A Report on Ryūkyū,
Written by the Chinese Envoy Du Tian): senior envoy Du Sance, deputy
envoy Yang Lun, and their subordinate Hu Jing journeyed to Ryūkyū
in 1633.
(f) Zhang Xuezha’s Shi Liuqiu Ji (Report of the Imperial Missions to Ryūkyū):
journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1663.
(g) Wang Ji’s Shi Liuqiu Zalu (Miscellaneous Records of the Imperial Missions
to Ryūkyū): journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1683.
(h) Xu Baoguang’s Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu (Missives to Zhongshan): senior
envoy Hai Bao, deputy envoy Xu Baoguang journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1719.
(i) Zhou Huang, Liuqiuguo Zhilue (Brief Gazetteer of Ryūkyū): senior envoy
Quan Kui, deputy envoy Zhou Huang journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1756.
(j) Ji Dingyuan’s Shi Liuqiu Ji (Report of the Imperial Missions to Ryūkyū),
senior envoy Zhao Wenjie, deputy envoy Ji Dingyuan journeyed to Ryūkyū
in 1800.
(k) Qi Kun’s and Fei Cizhang’s Xu Liuqiuguo Zhilue (Supplement to Brief
Gazetteer of Ryūkyū): journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1808.
(l) Senior envoy Lin Hongnian and deputy envoy Gao Renjian journeyed to
Ryūkyū in 1838, but as the records are currently unavailable their course
must be elucidated from the following source.
17
Kishaba, Kazutaka. “Senkaku shotō to sakuhōshi roku (The Senkaku Islands and Chinese
Envoys).” Kikan Okinawa (Okinawa Quarterly) 63.
18
Taira, Kazuhiko. “Chūgoku shiseki ni arawaretaru Senkaku (Chōgyo) shotō (The Senkaku
[Diaoyu] Islands in Chinese Historical Records).” Ajia/Afurika shiryō tsūhō (Asia and Africa
Document Bulletin) 10, No. 4 & 6.
(m) Zhao Xin’s and Qian Guangjia’s Xu Liuqiuguo Zhilue (Supplement to Brief
Gazetteer of Ryūkyū): journeyed to Ryūkyū in 1866.
Of all of the records, the following two are particularly important in terms of the
influence they had on other records and the frequency of reference. The first is Shi
Liuqiu Lu, written by Chen Kan during the Ming dynasty. As the oldest record in
existence, it was highly valued as a primary source and served as a guideline of
sorts to the succeeding missions and records. The second is Zhongshan Chuanxin
Lu (Missives to Zhongshan) by Xu Baoguang. This record serves as a represen-
tative example of the mission records during Japan’s Edo period (1603–1867)
and as a guideline for many scholars and intellectuals.19
Inoue Kiyoshi, whose article was translated wholesale into Chinese, and
introduced in the Guangming Daily and the People’s Daily published in Beijing
on May 4, 1972, attaches importance to the following passages of these mission
records. In Chen Kan’s records it is written, “On the evening of the 11th, Gumi
Shan (now called Kume Island) was in sight. It belongs to Ryukyu.” Guo Rulin’s
records state that “Chi Yu is a hill bordering on Ryukyu territory.” Wang Ji, who
travelled to Ryūkyū in the Qing dynasty era, writes, “An island came into sight on
the morning of the 25th. Although Huangwei should come first, followed by Chi
Yu later, we somehow arrived at Chi Yu without having sighted Huangwei
Yu. On the evening of that day, we passed through the jiao. The winds and
waves were very rough. . . . I inquired as to the meaning of the jiao and was
informed that it was the boundary between inside and outside. I asked how one
can identify the boundary, to which I was told one only estimates its location.” In
his records Xu Baoguang writes such entries as, “Gumi Shan is a garrison hill on
the southwest border of Ryūkyū . . .”20
Considering that a full translation of Inoue’s article was introduced in the
People’s Daily, perhaps it contains the basis for the assertions made in the
statement by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Judging only from the passages reviewed above, the only thing that is certain
is that Kume Island was within Ryūkyū territory. This would make one think at
first that the Senkaku Islands are outside Ryūkyū territory. However, in order to
fully understand these writings, one must also note the condition of the sea routes
at the time and what the authors wrote on their return journeys, not only on their
way to Ryūkyū. That is the careful scrutiny that these records warrant as historical
documents. When doing so, one finds that not all the writings are necessarily
supportive of China’s territorial claim over the islands.
Navigating from Fuzhou to Ryūkyū at the time, all of the islands on the route
to Kume Island were uninhabited after passing the island currently known as
Taiwan. There was absolutely no activity of substantial utility on these islands.
19
Kishaba, op. cit.
20
Inoue, op. cit.; Taira, op. cit.; Kishaba, op. cit. See an English version at “The Tiaoyu Islands
(Senkaku Islands) and Other Islands Are China’s Territory” in Peking Review, May 12, 1972,
pp. 18–22. http://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1972/PR1972-19.pdf. Accessed on December
1, 2022.
Kume Island was the first inhabited island on the sea route from Fuzhou.
Moreover, it was recognized that along the Fuzhou-Ryūkyū sea route, Kume
Island was the southwest boundary of lands inhabited by the people of the
Ryūkyū Kingdom. In order to be considered part of the territory of the Ryūkyū
Kingdom of the time, i.e., the 36 islands of Ryūkyū, an island had to be inhabited
and had a duty to pay tribute to the king’s court in Shuri, the capital of Ryūkyū.
Only those islands that satisfied these conditions were marked as territories under
the administration of the king.
In this light, Kume Island was the southwestern boundary of Ryūkyū, and
Hateruma Island and Yonaguni Island of the Yaeyama Islands were the most
southern areas of Ryūkyū.21 The Senkaku Islands were not within the territory of
the Ryūkyū Kingdom which requires such conditions as human habitation and
tribute. Likewise, none of the official local publications from either Fujian
Province during the Ming and Qing dynasties, or from Taiwan Province during
the Qing dynasty (after Taiwan Prefecture was established upon the island of
Taiwan, becoming part of Chinese territory), indicate that the Senkaku Islands
were under the administrative control of either Fujian Province or Taiwan
Province.22 In other words, in terms of administration, the fact is that there is
no definitive evidence showing that the Senkaku Islands were incorporated into
the Ryūkyū Kingdom, Fujian Province, or Taiwan Province. Accordingly, the
most natural way to view mentions of such islands as Uotsuri Island in the
mission records is as landmarks on the sea routes then running between Fujian
and Ryūkyū.
Navigation records of return journeys to China further underscore these views.
Investiture ships that left Naha Port, after passing the Baji and Gumi “mountains”
(islands), took a sea route north of islands of Huangwei, Chiwei, Diaoyu, and
Xiaoliuqiu, and then south of the “mountains” of Nanba, Fengwei, Yu, Tai, and
Lima as they entered Dinghaisuo in Fujian and proceeded to Geanzhen An. Xu
Baoguang, in the volume entitled “Zhenlu (Course)” in his Zhongshan Chuanxin
Lu, refers to the title of the islands for the first time on his journey from Ryūkyū,
when Nanba Shan, an island that belongs to Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province,
becomes visible in the distance. This style stands in contrast to that of Chen
Kan’s records, who wrote of Gumi Shan on his way to Ryūkyū: “The island
belongs to Ryūkyū.” Xu Baoguang’s delegation departed for China on February
16, 1720. On February 24, he wrote, “In the morning, steering southwest of the
compass for one geng (about 60 miles), we arrived at Yu Shan and Fengwei Shan.
These two shan (mountains) belong to Taizhou. The investiture ship left the
compass to the same direction and headed to Nanba Shan in Wenzhou. The Yu
and Fengwei mountains are located 500 Chinese miles from Nanba Shan.” Xu
Baoguang made no reference to the title of the islands comprising the present day
Senkaku Islands, which were located on the sea route to the two mountains. On
21
Kishaba, op. cit.
22
Ozaki, op. cit. (Part 3-2), 160.
the other hand, it is only after touching upon Yu Shan and Fengwei Shan that he
wrote that “both mountains belong to Taizhou.” This indicates basically the same
thing as investiture missions and other envoys, who noted Kume Island as the
southwestern boundary of Ryūkyū when they traveled there.
Zhao Xin, on the last investiture mission which arrived at Ryūkyū in 1866,
describes in his record the conditions of the return route of the previous investi-
ture mission in 1838. He states that after departing Naha Port on October
12, 1838, and passing Gumi Shan on the following day, “On the 18th a wind
blew over the sea from the north-northeast. Therefore, we are using the jiuxuzhen
method of orientation, following a bearing between west and west-northwest. In
the early morning we could see mountains beyond China’s realm. In the
mid-afternoon we could see Nanba Shan and began using the weishenzhen
method of orientation, following a bearing between south-southwest and west-
southwest. On the 19th we passed Dingmei at around noon and entered the
Wuhumen (Five Tiger Passage) in the mid-afternoon.”
The record presents, however, no explanations of the islands along the sea
route on the way to the mountains beyond China’s realm. The records of the
return voyage include no references to the Senkaku Islands, except for islands
near present-day Taiwan. As historian Kishaba Kazutaka says, descriptions such
as “Nanba Shan (mountain) in Wenzhou” and “shan (mountains) beyond China’s
realm” are equivalent in meaning to the descriptions “the island belongs to
Ryūkyū,” “a garrison hill on the southwest border of Ryūkyū” and “a mountain
that marks the border of Ryūkyū Region.” They are inextricably linked. Thus, in
the end these islands near both points of departure and arrival were for mariners
nothing more than markers that they needed to confirm along their route. Accord-
ingly, it would be improper to see these passages from the mission records as
definitive indicators of territory. Moreover, as Kishaba has examined in detail,
upon examining the use of terminology such as jiao and gou (i.e., “boundary
between inside and outside”)23 in the mission records, keeping in mind such
matters as how ships navigated at the time, the presence of the Kuroshio Current
that flows across the sea routes, and religious beliefs associated with the ocean in
that era, one comes to the conclusion that these words do not hold territorial
meaning as a border separating inside and outside, but are rather merely intended
to describe “pathways on the waters.”
The examination thus far has shown that China’s argument that historical
sources such as the records of investiture missions show that the border between
China and the Ryūkyū Kingdom lay between Sekibisho and Kume Island rests on
weak grounds, and that the assertion is not necessarily clear.
23
Kishaba, op. cit. p. 71 ad passim.
3. China argues that during the Sino-Japanese negotiations regarding the Ryūkyū
issue,24 both sides affirmed that the Senkaku Islands were not included in the “36
islands of Ryūkyū.”
However, as noted earlier, the so-called 36 islands of Ryūkyū refers to
inhabited islands within the territorial extent of the Ryūkyū Kingdom at the
time. These islands were obligated to pay tribute to the king’s court in Shuri.
Therefore, it must be remembered that these islands, and only such islands, were
cited as the territories of Ryūkyū in the Ryūkyū’s historical records and in records
of imperial missions. As far as what is evident in the local annals of Fujian
Province and Taiwan Province during the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Senkaku
Islands were not included within the administrative area of either Fujian Province
or Taiwan Province. Equally, it can be said that the Senkaku Islands were not
under the administrative area of Ryūkyū, in that they were not included among
the 36 islands of Ryūkyū that satisfy the criteria that such an island must be
inhabited and obligated to pay tribute. Accordingly, the fact that the Senkaku
Islands were not included among the “36 islands of Ryūkyū” cannot be supposed
to have any legal meaning whatsoever with regard to territorial sovereignty of the
Senkaku Islands. This does not provide conclusive evidence supporting the
argument that the Senkaku Islands were Chinese territory.
4. China also makes the following argument. The Japanese discovered the Senkaku
Islands in 1884, hundreds of years after they had already become part of China.
When the defeat of the Qing dynasty government became certain during the First
Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Japan “stole” the Islands. Immediately afterward, the
Japanese government forced the Qing government to sign the Treaty of Shimo-
noseki, under the terms of which Formosa (Taiwan) and all islands appertaining
or belonging to the said island of Formosa, along with the Pescadores Islands,
were ceded to Japan.
It is unclear what exactly the Chinese mean when they say that the Japanese
“discovered” the Senkaku Islands in 1884. However, Governor of Okinawa
Nishimura Sutezō submitted a written report to Minister of Home Affairs Yama-
gata Aritomo by September 22, 1885 that stated:25
Under secret orders recently received by chief secretary Morimoto, currently stationed
in Tokyo, we have conducted a survey of the uninhabited islands lying between Okinawa
Prefecture and Fuzhou of the Qing Dynasty. As outlined in the appended documentation,
24
For more on the Sino-Japanese negotiations concerning the sovereignty over Ryūkyū see
Hanabusa, Nagamichi. 1955. “Okinawa kizoku no enkaku (A History of the Attribution of
Okinawa),” in Japanese Society of International Law. Okinawa no chii (The Position of Okinawa).
Tokyo: Yūhikaku, pp. 20–40.
25
Existing primary document on territorial incorporation of the Senkaku Islands in Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan, Teikoku hanto kankei zakken (Miscellaneous Records Related to Imperial
Territory). Quotation included in Kikan Okinawa 56. Also see Okuhara, Toshio, “Senkaku rettō no
ryōdo hennyū keii (The Circumstances Leading to Territorial Incorporation of the Senkaku
Islands),” Kokushikan daigaku seikei gakkaishi (Journal of the Politics and Economics Society of
Kokushikan University) 4.
the islands have long been referred to within the prefecture as Kumeaka Island, Kuba
Island, and Uotsuri Island. Furthermore, they are uninhabited islands that are located
near islands under the jurisdiction of the prefecture, such as Kume Island, the Miyako
Islands, and the Yaeyama Islands. Therefore, there are no objections to considering
these islands as being under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. However, their
terrain does differ from that of the Daitō Islands, which were reported earlier, and there
are doubts over whether the islands may be the same as those mentioned in Zhongshan
Chuanxin Lu (Records of the Messages from Zhongshan): Chogyo-dai [Uotsuri Island],
Kōbisho, and Sekibisho. If they were the same, then clearly the Qing would have already
known the islands in detail from investiture missions to the former King of Chūzan, have
already given names to each of them, and have used them as markers for navigation to
and from Ryūkyū. Therefore, we are hereby requesting permission to conduct an on-site
survey and erect a national marker thereat as was done on the Daitō Islands. The hired
steamship Izumo-maru is scheduled to depart in mid-October for the Sakishima Islands.
On its return we intend to conduct the survey. I would like to receive orders concerning
the survey and the erection of national markers.
After receiving this report, Home Minister Yamagata wrote the following rec-
ommendation that proposed to the Grand Council of State (Dajōkan, equivalent to
today’s Cabinet) the “erection of national markers on Kumeaka Island and two
other uninhabited islands”:
With regard to the survey of Kumeaka Island and the two other uninhabited islands lying
between Okinawa Prefecture and Fuzhou Province of the Qing Dynasty, as explained in
the appended documents, the islands reported upon by the prefecture’s governor seem to
be the same islands mentioned in Zhongshan Chuanxin Lu (Records of the Messages
from Zhongshan). However, the islands were merely used as course markers by the Qing
and no evidence can be confirmed that they belong to the Qing. In addition, the names of
the islands vary between what we and they call them, and they are uninhabited islands
located near the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands, both of which are under the
jurisdiction of Okinawa. Therefore, I believe that there is no problem with Okinawa
Prefecture erecting national markers upon conducting a survey. Accordingly, I ask you
to give this matter urgent consideration, along with the content of the appended
documents.
Consequently, these official documents and the actual situation of the investiture
relationship between China and Ryūkyū, as described above, demonstrate that
there is absolutely no basis for the Chinese argument that the Japanese discovered
the Senkaku Islands in 1884. Moreover, if discovery refers to the finding of
economic value and utility from the Senkaku Islands, then this sort of discovery
by the Japanese occurred in 1885 as described in an application to lease State-
owned lands that Koga Tatsushirō, a private citizen, submitted on June 10, 1895.
Koga wrote, “When I took a boat and landed on Kuba Island in 1885, I
unexpectedly discovered a colony of albatrosses, colloquially called baka-dori.
I have heard that albatross feathers are highly prized by Westerners, so I am
certain that these feathers will be of great value as products for overseas export.”
Yamagata consulted with Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru on October 9 and
asked his opinion on the 1885 proposal to erect national markers before submit-
ting the issue to a Cabinet meeting. Inoue’s response dated October 21 stated:
. . .[Senkaku islands] are in proximity to the national border with the Qing Dynasty, their
circumferences appear smaller than those of the Daitō Islands, . . . and . . . their names
are being attached by the Qing Dynasty. There are rumors recently circulated by Qing
newspapers and others, including one that say[s] our government is going to occupy the
islands in the vicinity of Taiwan that belong to the Qing Dynasty, which are arousing
their suspicions towards our country and frequently alerting the Qing government for
caution. If we promptly took measures such as publicly erecting national markers, it
would result in making the Qing Dynasty suspicious. Therefore, we should have the
islands surveyed and details—such as the configuration of harbors and the prospect of
land development and local production—reported and stop there. We should deal with
the erection of national markers, land development, and other undertakings some other
day.26
This demonstrates the diplomatic deference that Japan, the smaller power, gave
toward the Qing dynasty, the larger power. It is alleged that Japanese private
citizens, including Koga, had landed on the islands after 1885 and that the
warships Kongo and Kaimon conducted field surveys on the Senkaku Islands in
1887 and 1892, respectively. The Qing did not protest these activities. Despite the
critical opinion of Japan in Qing newspapers, the Qing government appears not to
have taken any action, as can be seen from Inoue’s response. Compared to the
Clipperton Island case, in which Mexico dispatched the gunboat La Democrata
and France immediately lodged a protest upon realizing this, it is sufficient to
infer from these facts that the Qing did not recognize the Senkaku Islands as its
own territory. It was no earlier than in 1971 that China objected that Japan “stole”
the islands, an objection that carries no legal weight.
Lastly, the issue of the “names” of the island, which Inoue Kaoru mentioned in
his response, should be briefly touched upon.
The names of the islands comprising Okinawa, not only those included among
the “Oki,” are clearly Japanese names: Iejima Island, Minna Island, Sezoko
Island, Yonaguni Island, Iriomote Island, Kuruma Island and Kudaka Island.
When the Meiji government carried out the Ryūkyū Disposition27 in 1879, the
King of the Ryūkyū Kingdom asked the Qing dynasty for aid. In response, He
Ruzhang, the Chinese ambassador to Japan, argued that Ryūkyū was China’s.28
At that time, however, Higashionna Kanjun, a historian from Okinawa, addressed
the naming of the islands in a counterargument in which he pointed out that the
individual names of the islands are in fact Japanese, not Chinese. Takahashi
Shōgorō, executive director of the Association for the Promotion of International
Trade, takes a similar approach in his counterargument asserting that the names of
26
English from “Reference 1: A letter dated October 21, 1885, sent by Foreign Minister Inoue to
Interior Minister Yamagata.” https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.
27
See Chapter 1 for more on the Ryūkyū Disposition.
28
For more on the argument’s relationship with the Ryūkyū Disposition see Ōyama Azusa.
“Ryūkyū kizoku to nissei fungi (Attribution of the Ryūkyūs and Japan-Qing Dynasty Dispute)”
in Ōyama Azusa (ed). 1980. Nihon gaikōshi kenkyū (Studies in Japanese Diplomatic History).
Tokyo: Ryōsho fukyūkai, pp. 107–151.
Huangwei Yu, Chiwei Yu, and Diaoyu Yu,29 which are Chinese, clearly indicate
that these three islands are part of the Taiwanese chain of islands including
Huaping Yu, Mianhua Yu, and Pengjia Yu and that they are Chinese territory.30
However, research conducted before and after World War II by Higashionna
Kanjun, Fujita Motoharu, and other scholars has found that the people of Oki-
nawa had names for these islands long before, such as “Igun Kubajima,” “Yukun
Kubajima,” and “Yukun Kuba.” Additionally, it is quite conceivable that such
names as “Igun (or Yukun),” which had been passed down in Ryūkyū, were
transcribed during investiture missions by Ryūkyūan sailors who accompanied
the delegations and that the names became established as Chinese words,31 taking
into consideration the research Miyanaga Masamori conducted for his Yaeyama
gōi before the war,32 as well as the situation in Ryūkyū at the time written by
Chen Kan during an investiture mission (“The people of Ryūkyū do not study
Chinese characters. There are no relevant records. No Chinese people go there
[i.e., to the Senkaku Islands].”)
Regardless, although the names of the islands are of great significance for
identifying the islands in dispute, under international law, names alone are not
decisive factors for determining possession of territory. Let us review some
related cases. Clipperton Island, claimed by both France and Mexico (the dispute
was later settled through arbitration in France’s favor) is believed to have been
named after a British adventurer who used the island as a refuge in the early
eighteenth century. The Island of Palmas (today a part of Indonesia) was
contested by the Netherlands and the US (eventually awarded to the former
after arbitration). Although Palmas was discovered by Spain, it was given a
Portuguese name. Furthermore, the name of islands claimed at the heart of the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case (concerning small islands lying between the main-
land of France and the British-held Channel Islands, settled by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) in the United Kingdom’s favor) clearly have French-
oriented names. Although the language currently spoken on the Channel Islands
is English, French is used for rituals. Nonetheless, these names had no major
significance in terms of determining sovereignty over the territory at issue.
Accordingly, even if the names of Kōbisho and Sekibisho originate from Chi-
nese, this fact alone does not give greater credence to China’s claim.
29
In Japanese, Kōbisho and Sekibisho are written with the same characters as used in Chinese,
while the Japanese name of the third island, Uotsuri Island, inverts the first two of the three
characters.
30
Takahashi, op. cit.
31
See Ozaki, op. cit. (Part 2-1).
32
Miyanaga, Masamori. 1930. Yaeyama gōi (Lexicon of the Yaeyama Islands). Tokyo: Tōyō
Bunko.
Examination of Japan’s Argument 83
Examination of Japan’s Argument
The basic view on the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan released on March 8, 1972 states the following; it seems
that Japan’s argument rests solely on the occupation of terra nullius:33
From 1885 on, surveys of the Senkaku Islands had been thoroughly conducted by the
Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and through other
means. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands had been not
only uninhabited but also showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing
dynasty of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet
Decision on January 14, 1895, to erect markers on the islands to formally incorporate the
Senkaku Islands into the territory of Japan.
“The Senkaku Islands,” a Ministry of Foreign Affairs document dated January 1978,
largely contains the same content as a pamphlet of the same title that was published
by the Ministry’s Public Information Bureau in 1972. The 1978 document contains
the following on the Islands’ incorporation into Japanese territory:
1. Deliberate process of incorporation
In 1879, the Meiji government abolished the domain of Ryukyu and set up Okinawa
Prefecture. Afterward, from 1885 onward the Japanese government conducted surveys of
the Senkaku Islands through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and through other means,
taking as long as ten years. After having carefully ascertained that there had been no trace
of control over the Senkaku Islands by the Qing Dynasty, under the cabinet decision on
January 14, 1895, the Japanese government decided to place the Senkaku Islands under the
jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture and erect national markers on the islands.
Thus, the Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japanese territory. (This incorpora-
tion occurred before April 17, 1895, the day of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that
provided for the cession of Taiwan to Japan as a result of the [First] Sino-Japanese War.
Therefore, the Senkaku Islands have never been treated as part of Taiwan) . . .
The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture submitted proposals on three occasions: the

aforementioned first proposal in 1885; the second on January 13, 1890 entitled
“Inquiry Concerning the Matter of the Uninhabited Islands: Kuba and Uotsuri
Islands”; and the third on November 2, 1893. As a result, the Cabinet decision on
January 14, 1895 was adopted as follows: “Regarding the matter submitted by the
Home Minister for deliberation: In recent years, certain persons have sailed in the
direction of the uninhabited islands known as Kuba Island and Uotsuri Island
situated northwest of the Yaeyama Islands of Okinawa Prefecture with the intent
to engage in fishing and other activities. Given the need to control such activities,
there is no hindrance to determining that the said islands come under the jurisdiction
of Okinawa Prefecture and permitting the erection of jurisdictional markers as
requested in the petition of the Okinawa Prefectural Governor.” An order dated
January 21 was issued to the governor of Okinawa Prefecture which stated:
“Approved the proposal concerning the erection of markers as requested.” Although
it remains unconfirmed whether Okinawa Prefecture erected the markers on the
33
See the section on occupation in Chapter 1.
Senkaku Islands under this order, this was how the Islands were incorporated into
Japan.
However, in addition to Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island (Kōbisho), which were
mentioned in the Cabinet decision, the Senkaku Islands include Sekibisho (known as
Kumeaka Island in Okinawa), as well as two small islands north and south of Uotsuri
Island and reefs. Since Minamikojima Island and Kitakojima Island, along with the
reefs of Tobise, Okinominamiiwa, and Okinokitaiwa, are a part of the same island
chain with Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island (Kōbisho), these small islands and reefs
were also considered within the scope of the territorial incorporation, even without
explicit mention in the Cabinet decision. A district system was introduced in
Okinawa Prefecture based on the imperial edict of April 1, 1896. Under the system,
both Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island were incorporated into Yaeyama District
shortly afterwards and were designated as State-owned land along with
Minamikojima Island and Kitakojima Island. However, it was only on July
25, 1921 that Kumeaka Island (Sekibisho) was designated as State-owned land,
listed in the national land register, and renamed Taishō Island.
Does this show that Kumeaka Island was incorporated into Japanese territory in
1921, as some people argue? To reach that conclusion from these events in 1921 is
unnatural. The Cabinet decision of 1895 was based on the proposals submitted by
the governor of Okinawa Prefecture. Given that the governor’s proposals in 1885
and 1890 include Sekibisho by referring to “Uotsuri Island and two other islands,”
there is no particular reason to distinguish and exclude Sekibisho from the scope of
the Cabinet decision (although the 1893 proposal by the governor of Okinawa
Prefecture is not necessarily clear). After the decision, Koga Tatsushirō started
developing Kuba Island (Kōbisho), and in May 1900 he went to Sekibisho and
erected wooden markers there. The waters around Sekibisho have strong currents of
two to three knots from the Kuroshio Current that turn turbulent as they envelop the
isle. This makes it difficult for ships to land on the island, even on calm, sunny days.
Moreover, the island did not have much appeal in terms of exploitation since it did
not seem to have valuable resources and its entire area is a rugged mountain, making
it unsuitable for development. These factors explain the delay in Sekibisho’s desig-
nation as State-owned land.
However, the territorial incorporation of the Senkaku Islands would seem to be
irregular as this measure was not accompanied by the notifications, announcements
or edicts Japan used when incorporating other islands into the territory, and because
it is not possible to verify whether the markers were actually erected.34
As is well known, for occupation to be legitimate under international law, the
territory in question must be terra nullius and effectively occupied by a State with
the intention of possessing said territory. In other words, the problem is about the
State indicating intention to possess the territory as the subjective requirement of
occupation, and its effective occupation as the objective requirement. Typically,
34
See Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai. 1990. Nihon no kokusaihō jirei kenkyū (3): Ryōdo (Study of
Practices in Japan, Vol. 3: Territory). Tokyo: Keio University Press.
intention to take possession of land is indicated by declaring the State’s intent to

incorporate the area into its territory, or to incorporate it through legislative or
administrative means, or by notifications delivered to other countries. Some argue
that, as provided by Chapter VI, Article 34 of the General Act of the Berlin
Conference of 1885 on the partition of Africa, notification is a required condition
in order to complete occupation. But only the signatories to the Act were obliged to
obey its provisions, so this is not part of general international law. Furthermore, as
can be seen from the decisions made in the cases of Palmas Island and of Clipperton
Island,35 the prevailing theory denies such an argument.36 According to the
prevailing theory, even if no notification is made, it is sufficient if intention to
possess the territory is expressed by other means. It is possible to confirm that
Japan’s intention to possess the Senkaku Islands fulfills the criteria of international
judgments and the prevailing theory.
There are two views on the definition of effective occupation. One is that it means
physical occupation in the form of actually utilizing the land or establishing a
settlement there. The other defines effective occupation as social occupation via
the establishment of control over the land. All international judicial precedents
support the social occupation theory, as exemplified by the rulings in such cases as
those concerning the Palmas, Eastern Greenland, as well as Minquiers and Ecrehos.
This means that in the case of an uninhabited island, simply discovering the island
and hoisting one’s national flag upon it in a symbolic act of territorial incorporation
does not constitute an effective occupation. As demonstrated in the judgment of the
Palmas case, the prevailing theory does accept the inchoate title of discovery, but
acquisition of territory is incomplete if effective occupation does not follow. This
norm has been part of international law since the nineteenth century. Accordingly,
even if markers had been erected, this alone would not complete Japan’s occupation
of the Senkaku Islands. According to the international law of the nineteenth century,
the occupation of an uninhabited island is not effective unless the functions of the
State extend to the said island, such as through regular patrols by warships or other
government vessels.
As explained earlier, the Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japanese terri-
tory via a Cabinet decision of January 14, 1895. Koga Tatsushirō submitted an
application to lease State-owned lands on June 10 of that year, and the Japanese
government granted Koga permission in September 1896 to lease four islands,
namely Uotsuri Island, Kōbisho, Kitakojima Island, and Minamikojima Island, for
30 years free of charge for the purpose of promoting their development. During this
time, however, the peace treaty that ended the First Sino-Japanese War was signed
on April 17, 1895, its instrument of ratification was exchanged on May 8, and the
cession of Taiwan was completed on June 2. Clearly Japan exerted valid control over
35
For details on these rulings, see Serita, Kentarō. 1999. Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai
kakutei (Sovereignty over Islands and the Delimitation of Economic Zones). Tokyo: Yūshindo
Kōbunsha.
36
This point is addressed further in Chapter 4, “Takeshima.”
the Senkaku Islands, but this was mostly during Japan’s administration of Taiwan,
after the island had been ceded. Therefore, despite the lack of objections from China,
it may not necessarily be possible to distinguish between whether Japan controlled
islands that were terra nullius prior to occupation, or whether the control was over
islands that were ceded. In this sense, it might be possible that the actions taken by
Japan up until its defeat on August 14, 1945 may be frozen, and that only the actions
taken after the war may be counted as effective occupation. However, for good or
bad, it was in 1971 that China began lodging objections and claiming the Senkaku
Islands as its own territory. This means that the “critical date”37 can be set as June
17, 1971, the date on which the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed.38
So, were the Senkaku Islands terra nullius prior to occupation in 1895, which can
be subject to occupation? China argues that the islands were Chinese territory, using
historical records from diplomatic missions as evidence. As addressed earlier in our
examination of China’s argument and its basis, China asserts that the border between
it and Ryūkyū lay between Sekibisho and Kume Island. However, in investiture
mission records, their return journey described the islands known by the Chinese as
Yu Shan and Fengwei Shan with the phrase “both shan (mountains) belong to
Taizhou.” This, along with phrases like “Nanba Shan in Wenzhou” and “outlying
shan (mountains) of China,” indicates that it is natural to consider that the Senkaku
Islands, which lay upon the sea route between Fuzhou and Ryūkyū, were noted in
these historical mission records as navigational markers. In addition, China did not
take any sort of measures to improve safety along the route. However, even if there
were evidence that it had taken some measures, this would still be insufficient. In the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case,39 France made its argument by citing facts, regarding
Minquiers, showing it had conducted field investigations for hydrographic surveys,
installed lights and buoys, and established temporary markers for conducting field
research. But in its judgment, the ICJ stated, “The Court does not find that the facts,
invoked by the French Government, are sufficient to show that France has a valid
title to the Minquiers. . . . such acts can hardly be considered as sufficient evidence of
the intention of that Government to act as sovereign over the islets . . .”40 In many
cases, actions by a State for the sake of safety of ships are taken irrespective of the
intention to possess an island as territory, and it is difficult for such actions to be
direct evidence of title to sovereignty. Therefore, it can be inferred that the Senkaku
Islands were terra nullius.
37
This can be interpreted as a deadline for permissible evidence, as any facts arising after this date
will not be accepted for examination as evidence in an international court.
38
Matsui Yoshirō believes that the most appropriate and equitable date is mid-February 1971, when
China or Taiwan lodged its first objection and claim. See Matsui, Yoshiro, “International Law of
Territorial Acquisition and the Dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” The Japanese Annual
of International Law 40 (1997): 8.
39
A case filed and lost by France.
40
International Court of Justice, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France/United Kingdom)
Judgment of 17 November 1953, p. 71.
Next, assuming from the copious Chinese documents available, even if new ones
were discovered that provide clear proof of the Senkaku Islands being Chinese
territory, a distinction must be made between the “creation of rights” and the
“existence of rights,” as the judgment in the Palmas case makes clear. With regard
to this point, neither the Ming nor the Qing dynasties utilized the Senkaku Islands for
economic purposes, and even if China acquired original title to the islands arising as
a result of their discovery and that the title remained in China’s possession in
inchoate form until 1895, such inchoate title must give way to continuous and
peaceful display of sovereignty by another state.
Accordingly, the basis of Japan’s position on sovereignty over the Senkaku
Islands is first of all, occupation of terra nullius, which seems favorable according
to private sector research, even if the critical date is set as 1895. However, by setting
the critical date as June 17, 1971, when the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was signed,
the actions taken by Japan between 1895 and 1970, facts that show valid control by
Japan, can be considered permissible evidence. Therefore, in addition to the occu-
pation of terra nullius, the title arising from the “continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty”41 should also be insisted upon. At least, so long as China denounces the
Okinawa Reversion Treaty’s inclusion of the Senkaku Islands in the “reversed areas”
and asserts that it has retained continuous sovereignty over the Islands, it would be
logical to set the critical date to the time when the Okinawa Reversion Treaty was
signed.
In that case, it can be noted that Japan exerted “continuous” control for 75 years
beginning in 1895, while there were no objections lodged by China; in other words,
this is more than sufficient to prove that Japan exercised State authority over the
Islands in a “peaceful” manner. However, even if the Senkaku Islands are not
considered as having been terra nullius, there is no room to argue the permanent
title, which Judge Max Huber called the “continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty,” if the islands were ceded, along with Taiwan, to Japan in accordance
with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. That is because this cession constitutes a clearer
source of title. But were the Senkaku Islands actually included as islands
appertaining or belonging to Taiwan under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki?
The fact that, according to local government publications from Fujian Province
and Taiwan Province during the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Senkaku Islands were
not considered within the administrative control of either province has been
addressed above. The instrument of ratification for the Treaty of Shimonoseki was
exchanged on May 8, 1895. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Treaty, plenipotentiary
Kabayama Sukenori of the Japanese delegation and plenipotentiary Li Jingfang of
the Qing delegation signed the “Note on the delivery of Taiwan” on June 2. On this
occasion, the following conversation took place between plenipotentiary Li and
41
A precedent set by the Palmas case.
Minister Resident Mizuno Jun of Japan regarding the scope of the islands
appertaining or belonging to Taiwan:42
Li: “Is it not necessary to list in the index the names of the islands described as islands
appertaining or belonging to Taiwan? In the Treaty of Peace, the area of the Pescadores
Group is clearly demarcated with latitude and longitude coordinates. However, the Treaty
does not specify the area of the islands appertaining or belonging to Taiwan. I worry that it
may bring a dispute if Japan, at a later time, will point to the islands near Fujian Province and
assert that they are islands appertaining or belonging to Taiwan.”
Mizuno: “If we list the names of the islands as you say, there may be islands that are
omitted from the list, or islands which do not have any names, in which case this would mean
that such islands do not fall under the territory of either government. That is an inconvenient
result. In addition, in nautical charts, maps, and other sources, it has been recognized
officially, referring to the islands near Taiwan, that these islands belong to Taiwan. The
Japanese government will never claim that the islands near Fujian Province are appertaining
or belonging to Taiwan. I will surely explain this point to Governor-General Kabayama on
the return ship. This is more true when considering the fact that the Pescadores Group lies
between Fujian Province and Taiwan. Your concern will be proved unfounded, Your
Excellency.”
Li: “Agreed.”
The maps and nautical charts of Taiwan published in Japan before 1896 identified
without exception that Taiwan extended up to Pengjia Islet. Both Japan and the Qing
dynasty seemed to share the view that the Senkaku Islands were not included in the
“islands appertaining or belonging to Taiwan as recognized officially in nautical
charts, maps, and other materials,” i.e., the islands over which an issue was raised at
the time of Taiwan’s delivery.
Approaches to a Final Settlement
The way to pursue the settlement of a dispute differs depending on which side
actually holds the disputed island. In the case of the Senkaku Islands, they are under
Japan’s control, and thus, until a final settlement is reached, Japan should simply
maintain control and there is no particular need to strengthen it.
Twenty years ago, in the early morning of April 12, 1978, the date on which the
negotiation concerning the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the
People’s Republic of China was conducted, a large number of Chinese fishing
vessels appeared in the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. The
Japan-China negotiations on the Treaty, which had just resumed, were temporarily
suspended. On April 15, Vice Premier Geng Biao stated, “The [Senkaku] incident
was incidental. The settlement of this issue of small islands should be left to the
future.” After the statement, all Chinese fishing vessels were cleared from the
territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.
42
Inō, Kanori. 1965. Taiwan bunkashi (3) (Cultural History of Taiwan [Vol. 3]). Tokyo: Tōkō
Shoin. Reprint, pp. 936–937.
Approaches to a Final Settlement 89
The negotiations later resumed in Beijing, and Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao
arrived in Beijing on August 8. After his talks with Foreign Minister Huang Hua on
August 9 and with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on August 10, the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China was signed on
August 12. At a press conference following the signing, Sonoda stated in his opening
remarks, “I explained the position of the Japanese government regarding the
Senkaku Islands during my talks with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on the afternoon
of the 10th. The Vice Premier responded that the Chinese government would never
repeat confrontations like the recent incident.” Deng’s comment was repeatedly
brought up during the treaty deliberations at the Diet in Japan. During a session of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on October
13, Sonoda stated, “I explained the position of Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands.
I said that we feel disturbed by incidents like the previous one, and strongly
requested the Chinese government to prevent such incidents. Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping responded that the incident was incidental and that they would never
engage in such an incident again.”43 On the following day, October 14, Sonoda
stated, “Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping stated clearly at an official meeting that the
previous incident was incidental and that they would never engage in such incidents
again. This is in the record of discussion. I believe these incidents will not occur in
the future.”44
Deng visited Japan from October 22 to 29 for the exchange of the instruments of
ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s
Republic of China. He held a press conference at the Japan Press Center on October
25 and commented on territorial title over the Senkaku Islands: “When we normal-
ized diplomatic relations between our two countries, both parties promised to leave
the issue aside. At this time of negotiation on the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, we
agreed to leave the issue aside in much the same way . . . I think it is better to avoid
the issue when our countries have negotiations. Even if this means the issue is
temporarily shelved, I don’t think I mind. I don’t mind if it’s shelved for 10 years.”
This Chinese decision to place the territorial issue on the shelf was beneficial to
Japan.
Minister of Transport Moriyama Kinji stated at a press conference on January
16, 1979 that “In order to build facilities on the Senkaku Islands of Okinawa
Prefecture, where issues with China have not been ultimately addressed, the Oki-
nawa Development Agency will start conducting surveys in fiscal 1979. To support
this survey, the Japan Coast Guard will consult with the Okinawa Development
Agency to build a temporary heliport on Uotsuri Island (an uninhabited island) of
the Senkaku Islands.” As a result, the Senkaku Islands were again on the agenda at
the 87th session of the Diet. In connection with the 30-million-yen survey cost and
the issue of the heliport’s construction, Foreign Minister Sonoda stated, “It is in the
43
Foreign Minister Sonoda, 85th Diet, Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
of Representatives, 1st session.
44
Ibid., 2nd sess.
interest of Japan to quietly continue its current valid control over the islands.
However, if the heliport is going to be constructed as an evacuation area or for the
safety of the residents and fishermen in the area, then construction should proceed
while provoking China as little as possible. It is problematic if the heliport is being
constructed to flaunt our valid control.”45 Sonoda further stated that while the
Senkaku Islands were Japanese territory, provocative actions were not desirable.46
Nonetheless, it led Director Shen Ping of the Department of Asian Affairs of China’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon Ban Shōichi, chargé d’affaires ad interim of
the Japanese embassy in China, to the ministry to verbally express his regret on May
29. The following is the full text of Xinhua News Agency’s article on that date
regarding the protest that Shen lodged:47
This morning, Shen Ping, Director of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, met with Shoichi Ban, Japanese chargés
d’affaires ad interim to China. Discussion took place on the Japanese government’s recent
dispatch of the patrol vessel Soya for the transport of personnel and equipment to China’s
Diaoyu Island, the establishment of a temporary heliport and the dispatch of survey missions
and vessels.
Islands including Diaoyu Island have been part of the territory of China since ancient
times. On December 30, 1971, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement to
this effect. However, China and Japan have different views regarding the issue of the
attribution of island territories, including the Diaoyu Islands. When diplomatic relations
were normalized between China and Japan, and when the Treaty of Peace and Friendship
was concluded, the two parties agreed to leave this issue aside for the sake of the China-
Japan friendship, and to settle the issue in the future.
In accordance with this agreement, Director Shen Ping noted, ‘The Japanese side is
clearly betraying the aforementioned bilateral understanding. We are forced to express
regret over the actions of Japan. Moreover, we do not deem that Japan’s actions have legal
value.’
Shen Ping also stated, ‘We would like the Japanese government to adopt a broad
perspective and respect the understanding that our countries’ leaders reached on the
issue of Diaoyu Island, and to take measures to refrain from all activities that undermine
the bilateral friendship and neighborly cooperative relations.’
Regarding the above protest, Sonoda responded at the Diet that, “As long as our
counterpart has lodged a protest, we are compelled to understand that China
interpreted our action as an activity intended to demonstrate our valid control.”48
It would seem that Sonoda’s idea was that the government’s top policy priority
should be for Japan to quietly maintain its current possession of the islands.
However, what must be kept in mind is that, as explained earlier, while France
argued in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case that it had conducted field investigations
for hydrographic surveys, installed lights and buoys, and established temporary
45
Committee on Cabinet, 14th session, 23.
46
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 13th session, May 30, 30.
47
For an English summary of the account, see May 29 “Chronicle” item on front page of Beijing
Review, June 8, 1979. http://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1979/PR1979-23.pdf. Accessed
on March 25, 2023.
48
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 13th session, May 30, 30.
Approaches to a Final Settlement 91
markers for conducting field research, the ICJ determined, “The Court did not find
that the facts invoked by the French Government were sufficient to show that France
has a valid title to the Minquiers.” Thus, action taken solely for the safety of ships is
insufficient grounds. However, the case of Grisbadarna, in which Norway and
Sweden engaged in a dispute over the border between their southern territorial
waters, must also not be forgotten. Sweden, which had erected markers, conducted
maritime surveys, and installed lights, considered such actions not only as the
exercise of its rights, but also as “the fulfillment of duties.” Meanwhile, since
Norway expressed nearly no interest in the waters with regard to these actions, the
court decided that the shoal belongs to Sweden.
Accordingly, as can be seen from the case described above, the reason why Japan
should maintain its current control of the Senkaku Islands and why there is no
particular need to further strengthen the said control is as follows. Since Japan holds
territorial sovereignty over the Islands, rather than taking some sort of action to
exercise its rights, Japan should simply continue carrying out the actions it has thus
far. To elaborate, since May 15, 1972, when administrative rights over the Nansei
Shotō Islands reverted to Japan, Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and aircraft have
continued to monitor the areas around Okinawa in the same manner as before,
including the Senkaku Islands. They still regulate intrusion into territorial waters
and illegal fishing in such waters. Therefore, it is proper for Japan to warn Chinese
civil activists who in recent years have conducted demonstrations at sea and forcibly
entered the territory, and request that they leave. It should be noted that the actions
taken by States after the critical date are not permissible as evidence of valid control.
Thus, such measures as the Law of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which China enacted in 1992 treating the
Islands as its own territory, are meaningless under international law.
parts of it.
Chapter 4
Takeshima
The Republic of Korea’s Declaration Concerning Maritime

Sovereignty: The Origin of the Dispute
Takeshima is located in the Sea of Japan (37°9′30″ north latitude and 131°55′ east
longitude), 115 nautical miles from the Japanese mainland, approximately 90 nauti-
cal miles from the Oki Islands, and 120 nautical miles from the Republic of Korea
(ROK) mainland, approximately 50 nautical miles from Ulleungdo. It comprises two
islands, one to the east and one to the west, and numerous reefs connected to these
islands. It has a total land area of approximately 0.23 km2, making it slightly larger
than Hibiya Park in Tokyo. Takeshima is exposed to strong sea winds, and apart
from some weeds growing on the islands’ southwestern side, it consists of bare rocks
that cannot even sustain trees. The east and west islands are separated by a channel of
water approximately 150 m wide. The coastline of continuous sheer cliffs is
subjected to high waves, and since drinking water is also scarce, Takeshima is
unsuited to human habitation. In a Cabinet decision on January 28, 1905, Japan
named the islands Takeshima, incorporated it into Japanese territory, and put it under
the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands office affiliated to Shimane Prefecture. The
governor of Shimane Prefecture was then directed to announce the Cabinet’s
decision; based on this directive, he made a public announcement to that effect on
February 22, 1905 by means of a prefectural notice (Fig. 4.1).
After World War II, the ROK ceased being a Japanese colony and became
independent. In September 1951, when the Treaty of Peace with Japan was signed
and the restoration of Japan’s sovereignty became a certainty, the ROK established
fishery protection zones on the Korean coast and ramped up efforts to regulate
fishing activities by foreign countries. The ROK issued the Presidential Proclama-
tion of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas (the Syngman Rhee Line Declaration) on
© Kreab K.K. 2023 93

94 4 Takeshima
128˚ 132˚
Okinoshima Island (Okinohirajima Island)
38˚
Ulleungdo (Utsuryo Island)
Ojima Island
Takeshima (Nishijima Island) Mejima Island
264 (Higashijima Island)
Oki Islands 220
515 207
Tsushima Island
34˚
Takeshima
Fig. 4.1 Takeshima
January 18, 1952, unilaterally proclaiming ROK sovereignty over sea areas that
included Takeshima.1
Japan immediately lodged a protest with the ROK side on January 28, stating with
regard to Takeshima that, “in the proclamation the Republic of Korea appears to
assume territorial rights over Takeshima (otherwise known as Liancourt Rocks). The
Japanese Government does not recognize any such assumption or claim by the
Republic of Korea concerning these islets which are without question Japanese
territory.”2 The ROK responded on February 12 of the following year, countering
that Japan’s assertion was unreasonable in light of the instruction note issued by the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers No. 677 (SCAPIN No. 677). The two
countries have continued to trade barbs ever since, right up to the present day.
ROK security personnel (police) have been stationed on Takeshima’s
Higashijima (Mejima) Island since around July 1954. Higashijima (Mejima) Island
is equipped with living quarters, a lighthouse, observation posts, antennas, and other
facilities, and the ROK is bolstering this presence year by year.3
In essence, the ROK’s argument is that, to begin with, Takeshima has been
Korean territory since long ago; secondly, that Japan’s territorial incorporation of
Takeshima in 1905 is invalid; and thirdly, that a series of measures, from the Cairo
1
For details of the problems from the standpoint of the Law of the Sea, see Oda, Shigeru. 1972.
Kaiyōhō no genryū o saguru (Exploring the Origins of UNCLOS). Tokyo: Japan Fisheries
Association; and Kawakami, Kenzō. 1972. Sengo no kokusai gyogyō seido (The Postwar Interna-
tional Fisheries System). Tokyo: Japan Fisheries Association.
2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. January 28, 1952. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/shiryo/
takeshima/detail/t1952012800101.html. Accessed on December 2, 2022.
3
Rough seas made landing on the island impossible on July 25, 1983, so the ceremony to
commemorate the 30th anniversary of the deployment of the Dokdo Volunteer Guard was held
by shifting the venue from Dokdo to Ulleungdo. Ahead of a Japan-ROK Ministerial Meeting on
August 29 and 30, 1983, the Asahi Shimbun raised this issue in the Shinso column in its August
28, 1983 edition and published photographs of the islands and the ROK’s facilities.
Examining the ROK Side’s Arguments and Their Basis 95
Declaration during World War II through to postwar peace treaties, confirm that
Takeshima is Korean territory.
Examining the ROK Side’s Arguments and Their Basis
Examining the Argument that Takeshima Has Been Korean

Territory since Long Ago
These days Takeshima is known as “Dokdo” in the ROK, but according to the ROK,
previously it was called “Usando” or “Sambongdo,” and subsequently it was also
recorded as “Jasando” and “Usando” (written with slightly different characters).
Long ago in Japan, Takeshima was known by the name “Matsushima.” It was given
the names “Liancourt Rocks” and “Hornet Rocks” as a result of European naval
voyages in the nineteenth century. Thus, it was also familiarly known by the name
“Ryanko Island,” a corruption of “Liancourt.” As this shows, Takeshima might have
had around ten names. The examination that follows is based largely on Kawakami
Kenzō’s Takeshima no rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyū (A Geographical Study of the
History of Takeshima, Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1966), along with Hori Kazuo’s “1905-
nen Nihon no Takeshima ryōdo hennyū (Japan’s Incorporation of Takeshima into its
Territory in 1905)” in Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū (Bulletin of Society for Study
in Korean History 24, March 1987), which is a critical examination of
Kawakami’s work.
According to the ROK, the first person who discovered Takeshima was a Korean.
Takeshima appears in a Korean document, Sejong sillok jiriji (Geographical Appen-
dix to the Veritable Records of King Sejong) from 1454 (effectively 1432, according
to Hori), which states “Usando and Mureungdo . . . The two islands are not far from
each other so that one is visible on a clear day.” This predates any mention in
Japanese documents by some 200 years. In notes verbales from the ROK’s diplo-
matic mission in Japan, the ROK asserts that the Mureungdo mentioned here was
another name for Ulleungdo that was used in the Silla period, meaning the document
is referring to a separate island to Ulleungdo, that the two islands can be seen from
each other on a clear day, and so conceivably, that Usando, Takeshima, and Dokdo
are one and the same.4
In response to this, Kawakami states that the Usando that appears in ancient
Joseon documents is another name for Ulleungdo, and the location of Sambongdo
was not confirmed by a survey conducted by a private citizen named Kim Jaju, nor
by a number of surveys conducted by the government, and consequently nothing
4
ROK’s diplomatic mission in Japan, official notes dated September 9, 1953; September 25, 1954;
and January 7, 1959; in Kawakami, Kenzō. 1966. Takeshima no rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyū
(A Geographical Study of the History of Takeshima). Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, pp. 114–117.
96 4 Takeshima
whatsoever can be found to actively substantiate that these references correspond to

the Takeshima of today.5 Hori Kazuo, meanwhile, is thoroughly critical of
Kawakami’s assertion that Usando does not exist, and attempts to verify that the
existence of Usando was widely known in the Korea Peninsula.
Historically, Ulleungdo was an independent State, Usan-guk (the State of Usan),
before yielding allegiance to the Silla Kingdom at the beginning of the sixth century.
But assuming that Usando is not another name for Ulleungdo, then even if Usan-guk
were made up of Ulleungdo and Usando as the ROK claims, to have used Usando
(i.e., Takeshima)—uninhabitable rocky hills without water 100 km away from the
inhabited Ulleungdo—as the name of the country, while not impossible, is certainly
unusual, as Taijudō Kanae points out.6, 7 Assuming that Usando is Takeshima, then
surely the country would have been known as “Ulleung-guk,” or by Ulleungdo’s
other names of Mureung-guk or Ureung-guk, rather than “Usan (i.e., Takeshima)-
guk”?
In any event, Hori concludes that “The Joseon government recognized
Takeshima/Dokdo as its own territory, Usando, from the fifteenth century, and
while periods of confusion did occur, it clarified this territorial awareness once
again at the end of the nineteenth century.”8 However, the accounts in the various
records also reveal some confusion, making it difficult to believe that the descrip-
tions were undertaken based on a clear awareness at the time. Furthermore, although
the ROK’s note verbale of September 1953 mentions that Kim Jaju saw Sambongdo
(which it says Dokdo was called from the early stages of the Joseon Kingdom) from
afar, given that he was not actually able to land on the island, even if Takeshima was
discovered by the Joseon, this document does not demonstrate that the kingdom
actually administered the island.
From the fifteenth century the Joseon government adopted a “vacant island”
policy on Ulleungdo, effectively abandoning it. During this period, based on a
“Takeshima (today’s Ulleungdo) Voyage License” obtained from the shogunate in
1618, the Ōya and Murakawa families developed and utilized Ulleungdo. In the
course of making round trips to and from Ulleungdo, they also developed and
utilized today’s Takeshima (called Matsushima at the time), and the island’s indig-
enous produce was presented to the shogunate also. The two families’ management
of Ulleungdo continued for around 80 years without interference from the Joseon. A
5
Separate to Kawakami’s argument, there is an additional theory that Sambongdo is also another
name for Ulleungdo.
6
Taijudō, Kanae. 1966. “Takeshima funsō (The Takeshima Dispute),” Kokusaihō gaikō zasshi (The
Journal of International Law and Diplomacy) 64, No. 4–5: p. 111.
7
According to recent reports, Usando is apparently used on Ulleungdo as the historic old name for
the island. There is an Usan Culture Festival held on Ulleungdo, and a Jasan Middle School there,
for example. See Sankei Shimbun, March 19, 1997, Ringoku e no ashioto (7).
8
Kazuo, Hori. 1987. “1905-nen Nihon no Takeshima ryōdo hennyū (Japan’s Incorporation of
Takeshima into its Territory in 1905)” in Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū (Bulletin of Society for
Study in Korean History) 24, March: p. 101.
large number of the Joseon confronted them for the first time in 1692, after which
trouble ensued.9
This “Takeshima Affair” (Takeshima Ikken) at the end of the seventeenth century
concluded with the January 1696 decision to ban voyages to Takeshima (today’s
Ulleungdo) by the Ōya and Murakawa families. Subsequently the Joseon govern-
ment began dispatching an inspector to Ulleungdo once every 3 years. However,
even under the national seclusion of the Edo period, voyages to Takeshima (Matsu-
shima at the time) were not banned. Taijudō Kanae says this is also clear from a
verdict reached against ship merchant Imazuya Hachiemon of Hamada in 1836.
Imazuya was given the death penalty for violating a ban by traveling to Ulleungdo,
but in the wording of said verdict it states that he “[t]raveled to Takeshima (today’s
Ulleungdo) under the pretense of voyaging to Matsushima (today’s Takeshima).”
This wording therefore suggests that even after the ban on voyaging to Ulleungdo
was in place, voyaging to today’s Takeshima (Matsushima at that time) posed no
problems whatsoever.
The period of approximately 50 years following that is unknown, but at the very
least, from the Meiji period many Japanese citizens were traveling to Ulleungdo, at
that time still a vacant island, for logging and fishing. Then, a Joseon inspector’s
discovery of this activity in 1881 triggered a protest from the Joseon government to
the Government of Japan. This resulted in Japan confirming that Ulleungdo was the
territory of the Joseon Kingdom and banning Japanese fishermen from traveling to
the island. It was at this point that the Joseon government revised the existing vacant
island policy and decided to develop Ulleungdo.
With the above in mind, the argument that the Takeshima of today has been
Korean territory since ancient times does not necessarily have a sufficient historical
basis. What can be said, based on the way the Takeshima Affair of the Edo period
and the logging incident of 1881 were dealt with, is that in the respective eras, the
Joseon’s actual control did not extend to Ulleungdo, and consequently Japanese
citizens were visiting and utilizing the island in large numbers. Nevertheless,
Ulleungdo was confirmed to be Joseon territory by Japan’s handling of these
incidents. Regardless of the position of Ulleungdo, however, it would be a stretch
to declare that both sides perceive today’s Takeshima as “Ulleungdo’s territorial
island” and that as a territorial island its fate is always shared with that of Ulleungdo.
Conversely, it can be surmised that, historically, Korea’s control has never extended
to today’s Takeshima.
9
See Kawakami, 1966, p. 93; and Taijudō, op. cit. 113. However, according to Hori Kazuo, “A
major clash occurred on Ulleungdo in 1693, between a party from the Ōya family and An Yong-bok
and other Korean fishermen who had gone fishing from Gyeongsang,” (Hori, op. cit. 101).
98 4 Takeshima
Examining the Argument that Japan’s 1905 Territorial

Incorporation of Takeshima Is Invalid
The ROK’s argument regarding this point can be summarized as follows.10

First, Japan’s unilateral domestic measure was an act of title by occupation of
terra nullius, but because Takeshima is Korean territory and not terra nullius, the
measure is invalid.
Second, Japan’s announcement of its intent of territorial acquisition took the form
of a notification by Shimane Prefecture, but that notification was undertaken
extremely stealthily, and the Korean government was not notified, so it is invalid.
Third, even if the Korean government had known this fact at that time, it was not
in a position to raise objections with the Government of Japan as a result of the
Protectorate Treaty of 1904, the First Japan-Korea Agreement.
Fourth, with regard to Japan’s activities following its territorial incorporation
measure, the surveys and other activities undertaken by the Government of Japan
were carried out as one part of its activities for invading Korea, and consequently
they are not acceptable as ongoing activities of territorial control based on
international law.
Now, the first of the ROK’s assertions is the same point as the discussion above
relating to whether or not today’s Takeshima was Korean territory since ancient
times. Thus, as has already been revealed in this examination, it is not possible to say
unequivocally that Takeshima was Korean territory. Incidentally, the Government of
Japan does not recognize this territorial incorporation as an act of title by occupation
of terra nullius. In its argument regarding this point, Japan expresses the view that
international laws did not apply to Japan before the opening of the country, and at
that time, Japan actually believed that Takeshima was Japanese territory and treated
it as such, and unless another country disputed that, then this was sufficient to
constitute possession.
Even so, in terms of the form of the acquisition of territorial title, the measure that
Japan adopted took the form of an act of title by occupation, and where this point is
concerned there is a need to examine how Japan defined its neighboring territories as
a whole towards the end of the Edo period and during the Meiji period.11 In the case
of the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands, which Japan incorporated into Japanese territory
in 1876, the Meiji government argued that it was self-evident that they came under
Japan’s jurisdiction, but the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries
were not necessarily convinced of this, and the jurisdiction was decided following
10
Minagawa, Takeshi. 1963. “Takeshima funsō to kokusai hanrei (The Takeshima Dispute and
International Precedent)” in Kokusaihōgaku no shomondai: Maehara Mitsuo kyōju kanreki kinen
(Issues of International Law: In Commemoration of Professor Maehara Mitsuo’s 60th Birthday).
Tokyo: Keio University Press; and Taijudō, op. cit.
11
See Chapter 1.
complex and difficult diplomatic negotiations.12 No disputes over Takeshima had

arisen with any countries, including Korea. Japan adopted the incorporation measure
in order to control the hunting of sea lions, as overhunting took place on a large scale
from around 1903.13 In regard to this point, Korea took no action against the
overhunting of sea lions and did not suppress such activities, suggesting that it did
not recognize Takeshima as its own territory.
The ROK’s second assertion rests on the issue of whether a State’s declaration of
its territorial intention is required to follow a defined format under international law.
The ROK argues that, because no particular notification was made to the Korean
government, Japan’s declaration was invalid. Recent research by a Korean scholar of
international law14 also argues that this notification duty exists under
international law.
However, this research is not necessarily adequate or accurate in the way it
interprets the arbitral award in the Clipperton Island case15 or its in interpretation
of theory, for example. In addition to international judicial precedents, the theories
advanced by the UK’s L. F. L. Oppenheim and Ian Brownlie, France’s Charles
Rousseau and Paul Reuter, and Japan’s Yokota Kisaburō and Taoka Ryōichi, among
others, state that where title by occupation is concerned, a definite format such as
notification is not required, and conversely the key point is “effectiveness.” As
Rousseau states, the goal of the rules in the Act of Berlin was also to make
“fictitious” occupation into effective occupation.16 Reuter points out that if the
possession is effective it is inconceivable that it could remain a secret,17 and as
Taoka says, notification is only “desirable for the safety of legal communication.”18
Incidentally, the General Act of the Berlin Conference of 1885 considered the
establishment of regional authority as well as notification to be obligatory require-
ments for title by occupation, but the Act of Berlin’s validity was regionally limited
to the African continent’s coast. Moreover, the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which
12
See Ueda, Toshio. 1952. “Ryōdo kizoku kankeishi (History related to Territorial Attribution),” in
Japanese Society of International Law. Heiwa jōyaku no sōgōteki kenkyū (Comprehensive Studies
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan). 1; and Kuribayashi, Tadao. “Ogasawara,” in Kokusaihō Jirei
Kenkyūkai. 1990. Nihon no kokusaihō jirei kenkyū (3): Ryōdo (Japanese Practices [Vol. 3]:
Territory). Tokyo: Keio University Press.
13
Yokokawa, Arata. “Takeshima,” in Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai. 1990. Nihon no kokusaihō jirei
kenkyū (3): Ryōdo (Japanese Practices [Vol. 3]: Territory). Tokyo: Keio University Press.
14
See the chapter “Nihon no sensen shuchō to tsūkoku gimu (Japan’s Assertion of Prior Occupation
and Obligation of Notification),” in Kim Myung-ki. 1991. Dokudo to kokusaihō (Takeshima and
International Law). This book was a privately published Japanese translation of the Korean edition:
Kim Myung-ki. 1987. Dokdo wa gukjebeop (Takeshima and International Law). Seoul: Hwahaksa.
15
Serita, Kentarō. 1999. Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei (Sovereignty over Islands
and the Delimitation of Economic Zones). Tokyo: Yūshindo Kōbunsha; and Kim, op. cit. 149.
16
Rousseau, Charles. 1970. Droit International Public (Public International Law), 5th edition.
Paris: Dalloz, pp. 148–149.
17
Reuter, Paul. 1973. Droit International Public (Public International Law), 4th edition. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, p. 143.
18
Taoka, Ryōichi. 1955. Kokusaihō kōgi (Lecture on International Law). Tokyo: Yūhikaku, p. 338.
100 4 Takeshima
annulled the Act of Berlin in 1919, confirmed the duty to maintain regional authority
but excluded the duty of notification.
Furthermore, although the ROK states that Japan carried out the territorial
incorporation measure “stealthily,” in fact the notice was officially announced
publicly, and moreover, it was also reported in newspapers.
Thirdly, the ROK says that even if it had known of the matter at the time, Japan
had made the Korean government promise to appoint a foreigner recommended by
the Government of Japan as a diplomatic advisor, and so Korea was in no position to
raise objections with the Government of Japan. Certainly, based on the power
relationship between the two countries at the time, there is room to be sympathetic
to the ROK’s position. The individual who was actually appointed, however, was the
American Durham Stevens, and it is doubtful Korean diplomacy was influenced by
him. In the verdict reached in the case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear,19
considering that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) placed emphasis on the fact
that Thailand did not protest against France, then even if assuming the situation that
existed was as the ROK claims, it would not make the incorporation measure invalid
as the ROK asserts. What is important is that Korea was fully in a position to be able
to exercise effective control over Takeshima prior to 1904, yet it did not exercise that
authority.
Incidentally, to summarize Hori Kazuo’s views on Japan’s declaration and the
Korean side’s response, “The Korean side learned of Japan’s territorial incorporation
of Takeshima in March 1906, 1 year after the measure was taken.”20 1906 was the
year a delegation led by Shimane Prefecture administrative official Jinzai Yoshitarō
undertook an inspection survey of Takeshima, stopping off at Ulleungdo on its way
back. On March 28 the delegation visited Shim Heung-taek, the island’s magistrate,
and notified him of Takeshima’s incorporation into Japanese territory. Surprised by
this unexpected news, Shim promptly sent a report to his central government the
following day and requested instructions. The central government’s instructions are
not clear in the form of an administrative document, but leading newspapers in
Korea of the time picked up the story: “It is certain that many Korean people learned
through this newspaper coverage of the Japanese move to incorporate Takeshima/
Dokdo into its territory and must have viewed it as an invasion of Korean territory.”
In summary:
Korea’s central government, the local Ulleungdo county magistrate, and civilians all
considered Japanese incorporation of Takeshima/Dokdo as aggression [invasion] at that
time. But, by that time, Japan had virtually started colonial rule over Korea, by establishing
the Residency-General in Korea. That is why no further development could be made within
the Korean government to cope with the problem of Takeshima/Dokdo. As the entire country
was being robbed of its sovereignty and vanishing, it could not afford to pay attention to
trifling matters such as a small rocky island. However, that the Korean people clearly raised
19
Cambodia, which had become independent from France, became involved in a dispute with
Thailand over the possession of the Preah Vihear Temple on the Cambodia-Thailand border, and the
land in the temple’s vicinity. Cambodia won the case.
20
Hori, op. cit., pp. 118–120.
objection to the Japanese action of incorporating Takeshima/Dokdo is a decisively impor-

tant fact worthy of historical evaluation.21
This point that historian Hori raises is very important in terms of understanding how
Koreans today feel about Takeshima; it should be listened to empathetically. If one is
to calmly analyze international judicial precedents on territorial disputes and view
them with the eyes of a lawyer, however, it must be said that, when making a legal
assessment, the significant points are that the Korean government did not lodge a
protest (the administrative documents outlining the moves made by the central
government at that time have not been disclosed), and above all else, that Korea
had not been taking any effective measures with regard to Takeshima prior to its
incorporation into Japanese territory.
Fourthly, the ROK argues that where Japan’s activities following its territorial
incorporation were concerned, the surveys and other activities undertaken by the
Government of Japan were carried out as part of its activities for invading Korea, and
consequently are not acceptable as ongoing activities of territorial control based on
international law. As noted earlier, this argument does not constitute a reason unless
it can be verified that Takeshima was Korean territory.
With regard to this point, Taijudō Kanae states that “As a result of using the harsh
term ‘invasion,’ Korea appears to have indirectly acknowledged that Japan had
effectively occupied Takeshima and acknowledged that Korea itself did not exercise
effective control over Takeshima.”22 In other words, Japan’s 1905 territorial incor-
poration can only be described as invalid by verifying that Takeshima had been
effectively under Korean possession. Incidentally, in Korea’s Imperial Decree
No. 41 issued on October 27, 1900, which is titled “The renaming of Ulleungdo to
Uldo and the promotion of the post of the Island Chief [dogma] to county magistrate
[gunsu],” Article 2 states that “The county office shall be located at Taeha-dong, and
as regards its districts, all of Ulleungdo as well as Jukdo and Seokdo shall be placed
under the jurisdiction of [Uldo-gun (Uldo county)],” and consequently the ROK
claims that Takeshima was already incorporated as Korean territory
administratively.23
However, the Takeshima of today came to be called “Takeshima” after Japan
incorporated it into its territory. It was never called “Takeshima” in Korea at that
time. In Korea, today’s Takeshima is called “Dokdo,” and according to research by a
Korean scholar,24 the origins of the name are not necessarily clear—it is said to have
been named to mean distant island, or alternatively it was called Dokdo to mean
21
English adapted from Hori, Kazuo. “Japan’s Incorporation of Takeshima into Its Territory in
1905,” in Korea Observer, Autumn 1997, pp. 520–524. The article was slightly revised from the
original in Hori, op. cit.
22
Taijudō, op. cit.
23
For example, Mainichi Shimbun, April 4, 1996. The English text here follows that found on page
24 in “Dokdo, Beautiful Island of Korea – Pamphlet” at https://dokdo.mofa.go.kr/eng/pds/pdf.jsp.
Accessed on March 7, 2023.
24
Taijudō, op. cit., p. 115.
102 4 Takeshima
rocky island because rocks are known as “dok” in the dialect of South Gyeongsang
Province. However, “Ulleungdo residents probably gave it that name after
Ulleungdo was opened up in 1881.” Accordingly, it is not possible to identify
which islands are the “Jukdo and Seokdo” referred to in this decree. There are
suggestions that it may refer to “Jukdo” adjacent to the east coast of Ulleungdo, but
in any event, the lack of clarity means it cannot be said to verify Korea’s effective
control.
Examining the Argument that in Addition to the Cairo

Declaration, a Series of Postwar Measures Confirm Takeshima
to be Korean Territory
The Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943 states that “Japan will be expelled
from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” Article 8 of the
Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 states that “The terms of the Cairo Declaration
shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”
Accordingly, the ROK argues that Japan assumed an obligation to fulfil the Cairo
Declaration as a result of agreeing to and accepting the Potsdam Declaration, thus
determining that Takeshima, which Japan supposedly took from Korea through
violence and greed, would be separated from Japan. Additionally, Japan ceased
exercising authority over Takeshima after Takeshima was included in the certain
regions to be administratively separated from Japan along with Jeju Island and
Ulleungdo that were designated as a result of SCAPIN No. 677, “Governmental
and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan,” dated
January 29, 1946. In addition, regulations on the passage of mainstream commercial
vessels and fishing vessels were eased immediately after Japan’s defeat in the war,
and the MacArthur Line was established on June 22, 1946, restricting the operating
zones of fishing vessels. Takeshima was placed outside the operating zones of
Japanese fishing vessels, however.25 The ROK invokes these facts to assert that
Takeshima was separated from Japan and became Korean territory.
The Japanese government refutes these assertions by the ROK as entirely without
foundation.
To begin with, Paragraph 6 of SCAPIN No. 677 states: “Nothing in this directive
shall be construed as an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate determi-
nation of the minor islands referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration.” As
such, it was a provisional measure under the Occupation and did not exclude
Takeshima from Japan’s territory.
25
For information on the MacArthur Line, see Kawakami, 1972, Chapter 1, Paragraph 1, “The
MacArthur Line.”
Examining the Japanese Side’s Arguments 103
Paragraph 5 of SCAPIN 1033/1, which was the note that established the
MacArthur Line, clearly states that the note is “not an expression of [A]llied policy
relative to [the] ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international bound-
aries or fishing rights in the area concerned or any other area.”
Japan’s territory following its defeat in the war was settled in the Treaty of Peace
with Japan signed in San Francisco (San Francisco Peace Treaty), which entered into
force on April 28, 1952. The treaty also determined the ownership of Takeshima:
Article 2 (a) of that treaty determines that “Japan, recognizing the independence of
Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart
[Jeju Island], Port Hamilton [Geomundo] and Dagelet [Ulleungdo].” It excludes
Takeshima from the regions renounced by Japan. The name Takeshima had been
clearly stated in SCAPIN No. 677; the fact that it disappeared in the Treaty of Peace
with Japan must be considered to be materially significant.26 Assuming that there
was the intention of recognizing Takeshima, a solitary island approximately 90 km
away from Ulleungdo, as Korean territory, that fact would no doubt have had to have
been clearly stated in the treaty in the same way that the treaty made clear mention of
Port Hamilton (Geomundo), which is somewhat separated from the Korean
mainland.
Examining the Japanese Side’s Arguments
Japan argues that its view is that international laws were not applicable to it before
the opening of the country, that at that time Japan actually believed that Takeshima
was Japanese territory and treated it as such, and that unless another country disputed
that, then it was sufficient to constitute possession. Japan cites the fact that Ōya
Jinkichi and Murakawa Ichibei, merchants from Yonago, Hōki Province, received
permission in 1618 for passage to Ulleungdo from the shogunate via Matsudaira
Shintarō (Ikeda Mitsumasa), a feudal lord. Subsequently, they traveled to Ulleungdo
to engage in fishing every year, customarily presenting the abalone they gathered
there to the shogunate.
As explained earlier, after the Ōya and Murakawa families obtained a voyage
license (the “Takeshima Voyage License” of 1618, for Ulleungdo was known as
Takeshima at the time), they administered Takeshima (today’s Ulleungdo) for
80 years with no interference. The two families also managed Matsushima (today’s
Takeshima), which is located on the way to Takeshima (today’s Ulleungdo), and
they were newly granted around 1661 a voyage license to Matsushima as well.
Today’s Takeshima first appears in Japanese documents in Onshū shichō gōki
(Records of Observations in Oki Province) of 1667, written by Saitō Hōsen, an
Izumo feudal retainer, where it is cited alongside Takeshima (today’s Ulleungdo)
26
For a similar view, see Taijudō, op. cit., p. 130; and Takano, Yūichi. 1962. Nihon no ryōdo
(Japan’s Territory). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, p. 69.
104 4 Takeshima
using the name Matsushima. There are descriptions in materials cited by Kawakami
such as “Matsushima in the vicinity of Takeshima,” “Matsushima in the neighbor-
hood of Takeshima,” and “a small island in the neighborhood of Takeshima,” which
very interestingly demonstrate the different usage values assigned to the two islands
at the time. However, given the distances between the two islands, it is not possible
to declare that today’s Takeshima (Matsushima at that time) is a dependent domain
of today’s Ulleungdo (Takeshima at that time). In any event, compared to the
Japanese side, which knew about the form of these two islands in considerable
detail, the Korean side had almost no detailed knowledge of Takeshima (then-
Matsushima) at that time (which is perhaps only natural, for although Korea super-
vised today’s Ulleungdo by dispatching an inspector there once every 3 years after
the aforementioned Takeshima Affair, there is no record that today’s Takeshima was
inspected).27 Even after Japanese authorities prohibited the voyaging to today’s
Ulleungdo, they did not prohibit voyaging to Takeshima. Subsequent records,
such as the Takeshima zusetsu illustrated work that was compiled in the Hōreki
period (1751–1763), contain the expression “Okinokuni Matsushima,” while the
account Chōsei Takeshima ki of 1801 mentions “the westernmost part of Japan,”
indicating that, either way, Matsushima (today’s Takeshima) is Japanese territory.
The positional relationship of today’s Takeshima is accurately recorded in maps,
including Nagakubo Sekisui’s Nihon yochi rotei zenzu (1773), said to be the first
Japanese map to use a graticule.
Nevertheless, Japan’s knowledge was extremely disordered as a result of contact
with Europe and the United States from the latter part of the Edo period to the early
years of the Meiji period. Successive French and British vessels that entered the Sea
of Japan at the end of the eighteenth century “discovered” Ulleungdo, and because
locational surveying was inaccurate, the island was referred to as two separate
islands, Dagelet and Argonaute, and today’s Takeshima was given the name
“Liancourt.” Even on maps, Ulleungdo was depicted as two islands—Takeshima
and Matsushima—while today’s Takeshima was omitted; the existence of
Argonaute was denied; or, in contrast to the Edo period, Ulleungdo was called
“Matsushima,” and some maps showed only one island in the Sea of Japan.
Unconnected to this, Japanese private forays to Ulleungdo intensified and the
government received requests to develop it. In connection with the “Argument for
the Development of Matsushima,” the warship Amagi carried out an on-site survey
in July 1880 that established that the Matsushima referred to in the development
requests was Ulleungdo, and thus all the development requests were rejected.
Nevertheless, Japanese citizens continued to visit Ulleungdo for logging and fishing
as usual, and when this was discovered by a Joseon inspector in 1881, the Joseon
government promptly referred the incident to the Japanese government and
requested that these voyages be banned. The Japanese government acknowledged
Ulleungdo to be the territory of the Joseon Kingdom, and it took action in 1883 by
27
Hori, op. cit., p. 101. For the wording in the records of the various documents, see Yokokawa,
op. cit., pp. 166–167.
Approaches to the Takeshima Issue until a Final Decision is Reached 105
forcibly repatriating all of the 254 Japanese citizens residing on Ulleungdo.28 No

such action whatsoever was taken with today’s Takeshima, however.
It appears there were ongoing voyages to Ulleungdo from regions around Japan
even after the removal of Japanese citizens en masse in 1883. The administration of
Takeshima was also moving ahead. To regulate the excessive hunting of
Takeshima’s sea lions, it was decided in January 1905 to name the islands
Takeshima, incorporate Takeshima into Japanese territory, and put it under the
jurisdiction of the Oki Islands branch office attached to the Shimane Prefectural
Government. That April, Shimane Prefecture amended its fishing industry control
regulations to introduce a licensing system for sea lion hunting at Takeshima, and
approved applications by Nakai Yozaburō and other hunters. Sea lion hunting and
the harvesting of abalone, seaweed, and other produce from the island ebbed and
flowed but nonetheless continued until being suspended in 1941 as a result of the
war; license holders continued to pay land usage fees into the national coffers every
year. In this way, Japan’s effective control over Takeshima continued peacefully
until the end of World War II.
Approaches to the Takeshima Issue until a Final Decision is

Reached
The process for resolving the dispute will differ depending on which side actually
occupies the island while it is under dispute. Takeshima is in fact occupied by the
ROK, which will undoubtedly maintain that occupation until a final resolution is
arrived at. Consequently, from a legal perspective, in addition to proposing peaceful
resolutions, Japan will have to take actions such as lodging effective protests
proactively and repeatedly.
The Government of Japan sent a series of notes verbales of protest to the
Government of the ROK between 1952 and 1960. They comprised five notes in
1953, when an incident occurred in which ROK authorities at Takeshima fired upon
a Japan Coast Guard patrol boat; nine notes in 1954, when ROK authorities became
permanently stationed on Takeshima; and one note each year in other years.29
Beginning in 1971, Japan has published its response to Takeshima in its Diplomatic
Bluebook. There is only one mention in the 1992 edition: “As for the territorial
dispute over Takeshima between Japan and the ROK, it is clear on both historical
and legal grounds that the islets are a part of Japanese territory. From this standpoint,
Japan has made protests against the ROK whenever necessary.”30
28
Hori, op. cit., p. 107.
29
For the content of the note verbale of December 26, 1961, see Yokokawa, op. cit., p. 177.
30
“Section 1. Asia-Pacific; 2. The Korean Peninsula; 2-3. The Republic of Korea; (2) Relations with
Japan” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1992/1992-3-1.htm#2.%20The%20Korean.
106 4 Takeshima
In a note verbale dated September 12, 1954, Japan proposed to the ROK that the
dispute be resolved through the ICJ, but on October 28 of the same year the ROK
rejected this proposal in a memorandum, in which it asserted the following: “The
proposal of the [Japanese] government [that the dispute be submitted to the Inter-
national Court of Justice] is nothing but another false attempt disguised in the form
of judicial procedures. Korea has the territorial rights ab initio over Dokdo and sees
no reason why she should seek the verification of such rights before any international
court.”31
Following this, Japan and the ROK started negotiations in 1951 that concluded in
June 1965 with the signing of the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the
Republic of Korea. No progress whatsoever was made on the Takeshima issue,
however, and the matter simply ended with the Exchange of Notes concerning the
Settlement of Disputes between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
Certainly, this exchange of notes stipulated that “Unless otherwise agreed on in
advance, the two governments are to seek to settle disputes through diplomatic
routes. In cases where disputes cannot be settled in this manner, the governments
are to attempt to achieve resolution through conciliation as per the procedures agreed
by the two countries.” The ROK foreign minister told an ROK National Assembly
special committee in August 1965 that “Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Shiina
Etsusaburō and Prime Minister Satō Eisaku accepted that this did not include the
Dokdo problem,” an assertion that Foreign Minister Shiina and Prime Minister Sato
both rejected in their responses at a special committee of the House of Representa-
tives on the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the ROK later that
October. As these events show, discrepancies exist between Japan’s and the
ROK’s interpretations of the exchange of notes concerning the settlement of dis-
putes; this exchange of notes is not functioning in terms of resolving the Takeshima
issue. It is unclear whether or not the Japanese side has thus far made any proposals
aimed at reconciliation. Consequently, the current situation is as stated in the above-
mentioned Diplomatic Bluebook, namely, that Japan is making protests against the
ROK whenever necessary, based on Japan’s standpoint.
Therefore, in light of the examination just made of both countries’ arguments, it is
difficult to detect a legitimate reason why Takeshima should belong to the ROK
historically. However, could it not be said that Japan’s protest was no more than a
“paper protest” as described by Judge Levi Carneiro in his separate opinion in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case mentioned earlier, whereby “The British Government
. . . continued to exercise its sovereignty [while] the French Government was
satisfied to make a ‘paper’ protest (protester ‘sur le papier’). Could it not have
done anything else? It could have, and it ought to have, unless I am mistaken,
31
“Q&A on Dokdo: What was the Korean government’s response to its Japanese counterpart’s
proposal in 1954 to refer the issue of Dokdo to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?” https://
dokdo.mofa.go.kr/m/eng/dokdo/faq14.jsp. Accessed on December 3, 2022.
Approaches to the Takeshima Issue until a Final Decision is Reached 107
proposed arbitration.”32 “The failure to have not made such a proposal deprives the
claim of much of its force; it may even render it obsolete.”33 In other words,
diplomatic protests are not enough to prevent origin of rights from being obtained
based on unlawful occupation. Alongside the legal maxim “ex injuria non oritur jus”
(unjust acts cannot create law), the normative force also has to be considered. That is
because the legal maxim “ex factis oritur jus,” in which the existence of facts creates
law, also exists.
Naturally, Japan must avoid resorting to the use of force at any cost. But if it
maintains a passive attitude, then ultimately third parties are likely to accept that
Japan tacitly consents to the ROK’s territorial claim to Takeshima. If strictly limiting
resolution standards to international law is not considered to be politically desirable,
then undoubtedly it would make sense to take equitable factors into consideration.
Certainly, there are also emotive issues that arise from Japan’s 36-year colonial
rule over Korea, and it has to be acknowledged that difficult circumstances exist,
including problems between the two countries that are yet to be resolved even today.
Even now in the ROK, comments that reflect a detailed knowledge of Japan—not
just pro-Japanese comments—seem to spark fierce attacks from the government and
the media. Furthermore, the reality is that in school education, ROK students are
taught that Takeshima is ROK territory, and there is even a widely-known song to
that effect, yet in Japan not even law students know of Takeshima’s existence.
In addition, the existence in Japan of ethnocentric history textbooks and the fact
that its prime ministers offer prayers at Yasukuni Shrine, where Class A war
criminals are enshrined, are also issues that serve to inflame the sentiments of the
Korean people and ignite nationalism. On occasion, ROK politicians can also be
seen using these sentiments of the Korean people for political ends. Taking these
various circumstances into account, the most important thing for the two countries to
do is to decide first and foremost to reform the current approach of one side making
dogmatic decisions on the matter. Where resolving the Takeshima issue is
concerned, rather than taking the course of blowing up Takeshima, as a certain
high-level ROK official is reported to have suggested, the issue should pursue a
constructive course.34
32
International Court of Justice. 1953. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and
Orders, p. 107.
33
Ibid., 108.
34
See the proposal by Serita in the April 4, 1996 edition of the Mainichi Shimbun, and Chapter 7.
108 4 Takeshima
parts of it.
Chapter 5
Territorial Sea and Exclusive
Economic Zone
Classification of the Sea: Territorial Sea, High Seas,

and Exclusive Economic Zone
The seas that cover the earth are classified as those that are the territory of a nation
(territorial sea), those that no nation can lay claim to and that cannot be subject to
sovereignty (high seas), and those that lie between the territorial sea and high seas,
and that no nation can lay claim to but that can be subject to sovereign rights and
jurisdiction (exclusive economic zone (EEZ)).
Territorial Sea
Territorial sea, in a broad sense, includes all the seas that are the territory of a State.
This also includes ports, bays, and inland seas, which these days are referred to as
internal waters (also used to refer to lakes, rivers, and other such waters within a
territory). The baseline is the line that separates internal waters and territorial sea;
normally this is the low-water line along the coast, as marked on the large-scale
charts officially recognized by a coastal State (the spring tide is the lowest tide, but
this is generally understood to be the coastline in nautical charts). However, if the
coastline is deeply indented or cut into, or if there is a series of islands along the coast
in its immediate vicinity, the straight baseline method may be used to join appro-
priate points along the coastline.
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal
waters, to an adjacent belt of the sea, described as the territorial sea, and to the air
space over the territorial sea as well as its seabed and subsoil. The coastal State has
the right to prohibit foreign nations from fishing in its territorial sea, to restrict
coastal transport (also called coastal trade; at present, it generally refers to transport
between the ports of that nation) to only its national citizens, and to exercise police
© Kreab K.K. 2023 109

110 5 Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone
authority in those seas. Furthermore, if any foreign ship violates the laws of the
coastal State while in its territorial sea or internal waters, the nation may engage in
continuous pursuit of that foreign ship and arrest it on the high seas (even if the ship
itself is on the high seas, when the boats and crew on board are in the territorial sea,
the ship on the high seas is also deemed as being in the territorial sea). This is
referred to as the right of hot pursuit.1
This is how territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of its coastal State,
although, since ancient times, the seas have been used for international transport,
and hence the sovereignty of a coastal State over its territorial sea is restricted for the
purpose of international transport. As such, a system has been established to allow
for innocent passage2 in the seas that balances the interests of coastal States with the
interest of international transport. Accordingly, a coastal State must allow the
continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships in its territorial sea, provided
that such passage does not harm the nation’s peace, good order, or security.
Correspondingly, a foreign ship is naturally prohibited from engaging in military
training exercises, as well as fishing, research, communication jamming, and other
1
The right of hot pursuit: This action can only commence once a ship or aircraft of the coastal State
has launched a visual or audio stop signal from a distance that the suspicious ship can confirm by
sight or sound. The pursuit must continue without interruption, and it is to end if the suspicious ship
is no longer in sight or if it enters the territorial sea of its flag State or that of another country. The
pursuit is usually carried out by an ordinary ship that issues warnings and intimidations while
pursuing the suspicious ship, but pursuit by aircraft may also be used. In that case, the aircraft must
pursue the suspicious ship by taking active measures to alert the ship of its presence and pursuit,
such as by buzzing, whereby the aircraft repeatedly swoops near the ship, etc. Relay pursuit may
also be used, whereby the pursuit alternates between a high-speed ship and ordinary ship, etc.;
however, the suspicious ship may not be ambushed during the pursuit. During a March 1999
incident, Japan Coast Guard patrol ships and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force escort ships
engaged in pursuit of a suspicious ship detected in the territorial sea of the Noto Peninsula while
firing warning shots, and an aircraft was also used in the pursuit. The pursuit ended, however, when
the suspicious ship left Japan’s Air Defense Identification.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognizes the right of hot
pursuit of a coastal State, also in the event of the violation of the laws and regulations of the coastal
State by a foreign ship in the EEZ and continental shelf—including the safety zone surrounding the
equipment in the continental shelf—to which those laws and regulations apply. A suspicious ship,
thought to be a remodeled fishing ship, was detected in the EEZ off the coast of Amami Ōshima
Island in Kagoshima Prefecture in December 2001. It was pursued by a Japan Coast Guard patrol
ship to 4,000 km offshore in China’s EEZ of the East China Sea; after an exchange of fire between
the suspicious ship and the patrol ship, the suspicious ship sank. See Serita, Kentarō. 2001. “Heiwa
ya jinken ni somukanu kokusai kyōchō o (International Cooperation that Does not Infringe upon
Peace or Human Rights),” Kōbe Shimbun, January 30.
2
It has long been debated whether warships have the right of innocent passage, but the provisions of
UNCLOS can be positively interpreted that they do. If any warship does not comply with the laws
and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any
request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the
territorial sea immediately. Refer to the Soviet Nuclear Submarine Incident on August 21, 1980, in
which a Soviet nuclear submarine caught fire on the high seas to the east of Okinawa while
forcefully passing through the territorial sea (strait) of Japan between Okinoerabu Island and
Yoron Island, amid protests by the Japanese government.
Classification of the Sea: Territorial Sea, High Seas, and. . . 111
such activities in that sea; additionally, it must also not engage in the loading and
unloading of any commodity, currency, and person that violates the coastal State’s
current customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations. Furthermore, a
coastal State may designate sea lanes and prescribe navigation and traffic separation
schemes, and require foreign ships to use them, in order to prevent accidents from
occurring in its territorial sea in the event of maritime traffic congestion.
The authority of a coastal State in its inland waters is more exclusive than that in
its territorial sea; it is virtually the same as the authority it has in its territory.
Accordingly, a coastal State is not subject to any duty similar to that of innocent
passage. The Seto Naikai of Japan is an inland sea, and while foreign ships are able
to pass through it, it does not mean they have the right of innocent passage.
In the 1958 Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, innocent
passage is permitted for a ship passing through a strait used for international
navigation, in other words an international strait being a body of water that is a
territorial sea; and unlike in other territorial seas, innocent passage was never
suspended in those waters. However, when the breadth of the territorial sea is
expanded from 3 to 12 nautical miles, the section of the high seas which foreign
ships and aircraft can freely pass through under the existing freedom of the high seas
then newly becomes part of the territorial sea of the coastal State bordering the strait.
A foreign ship has the right of innocent passage in territorial seas; however, the air
space over a territorial sea is territorial air space, and hence a foreign aircraft must
obtain permission from a coastal State in order to fly in that air space. This
substantially impedes the freedom of movement of not only private aircraft but
also carrier-based aircraft, and it requires submarines to navigate on the sea surface.
Furthermore, a coastal State can block the passage of non-innocent foreign ships,
and this may also interrupt international transport in the seas if there is no other way
for the ships to pass.
A regime of passage through straits used for international navigation was newly
established in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) to recognize the right of transit passage that is unimpeded by the ship
or aircraft of any country. This regime also takes into consideration the military
strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union, and it is separate from the regime
of innocent passage in territorial seas, insofar as it endeavors to ensure the effective
freedom of passage on the high seas. In Japan’s case, when its territorial sea was
expanded to 12 nautical miles, five of the approximately 70 straits included within
this geographic scope (the Sōya Strait, Tsugaru Strait, the East and West Channels of
the Tsushima Strait, and the Ōsumi Strait) were stipulated as “the designated areas”
based on the fact that they were key points in international transport for connecting
major seas, and because they were third State routes through which many foreign
ships pass. Limiting the breadth of the territorial sea to 3 nautical miles in these areas
opens up a path for securing freedom in international navigation and flight.
High Seas: International Waters
The high seas do not belong to any country (freedom from possession) and are open
to the citizens of all nations to be used freely (freedom of use). The typical freedom
referred to here is freedom of navigation and fishery on the high seas, and the
traditional order of the ocean is precisely this freedom of the high seas. Oceanic
States have so far been able to enjoy freedom of the high seas within a narrow
3 nautical mile territorial sea amid the vast ocean. This also applies to Japan. During
the era of the 3 nautical mile territorial sea, each State aimed to monopolize its
offshore fishery area for its own citizens and shut out foreign fishing vessels from
it. This was known as the 12 nautical mile fishery zone.
The 1982 UNCLOS established the system of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea and
200 nautical mile EEZ under the jurisdiction of a coastal State. Subsequently, in the
era of the 3 nautical mile territorial sea, there was an overwhelmingly large number
of near-coastal voyages navigating the offshore high seas within a distance of 4 or
5 to 10 nautical miles and from which land and the outline of any islands are still
visible. As such, ships could freely navigate the high seas then. These days,
however, ships navigate these waters under the system of innocent passage. In the
past, Japan freely caught most of its fish in waters within a 200 nautical mile range.
Now, however, these waters have come under the jurisdiction of a coastal State. So,
in that sense, the traditional high seas system has been laid to rest and replaced with a
new high seas system that has internationalized the waters. Freedom of fishery is no
longer, and other freedoms have been recognized to facilitate international transport,
including freedom of navigation and overflight, and the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines.
So, what about the seabed of the high seas? The exploitation of offshore petro-
leum fields was already being debated in the 1930s. In September 1945, immediately
after World War II, the US government issued the Truman Proclamation on the
Continental Shelf, which declared that the area under the high seas is contiguous
with the US coast and the natural resources in its seabed belong to the United States
and are under its jurisdiction and regulation. Many other nations followed suit, and
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean quickly asserted their claim to the
marine resources offshore from their coast. Another example of this is the Syngman
Rhee Line (the Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Seas on
January 18, 1952) that dominated the fishery negotiations held between Japan and
the Republic of Korea (ROK) from February 1952 to June 1965. This is how the
continental shelf regime, which recognizes the sovereign rights of a coastal State for
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, was approved in the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea I in 1958. The Convention is the basis for establishing the current EEZ,
and it recognizes the sovereign rights of a coastal State over the seabed and area
subjacent to it within 200 nautical miles from its coast; hence, this is of significance
for continental shelves that extend beyond 200 nautical miles offshore.
Expansion of the Territorial Sea Breadth from 3 to 12 Nautical Miles 113
The high seas do not belong to any nation; therefore, to maintain order of the high
seas, any ship on the high seas is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ship’s
nationality (the ship navigates on the high seas while raising the flag of its country of
registration, which is referred to as the flag State). In other words, the laws and
regulations of the flag State apply to that ship, and any incident involving it is
deliberated at the courts and government ministries and agencies of the flag State.
This is known as the flag State doctrine, which rules out interference from any other
country, apart from the flag State, in the matters of a ship on the high seas. However,
a warship of any nation has the right to board and inspect a ship suspected of
engaging in piracy or slave trade.3
Expansion of the Territorial Sea Breadth from 3 to 12

Nautical Miles
In the 1960s, Japan, as a pelagic fishery nation looking for fish as far up as offshore
the coastline of foreign countries, did not recognize the 12 nautical mile fishery zone
system established in international law. In reality, however, in order to ensure
trouble-free fishery in the offshore waters of partner countries, Japan concluded
“similar circumstances but different objectives” or “shelving-style” fishery agree-
ments with each nation. Then, in 1965, Japan concluded the Agreement on Fisheries
Between Japan and the Republic of Korea (Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement), based
on the 12 nautical mile fishery zone.4 This was followed by Japan’s adoption of the
1977 Territorial Waters Act stipulating a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, and the
Fishery Zone Temporary Measures Act stipulating a 200 nautical mile fishery zone.
Subsequently, Japan adopted the Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Conti-
nental Shelf in 1996.
The Declaration of Neutrality that Japan issued in the Franco-Prussian War on
July 28, 1870 states Japan’s territorial sea to be “not only within the harbor and
inland sea, but also within a distance of 3 nautical miles from the open sea, in which
the passage of warships and commercial ships of both countries is to be permitted.”5
Later, on August 29, the Grand Council of State Proclamation No. 546 revised
“within a distance of three ri” to be “within a distance of three ri from any point of
land, such that it could be reached by a cannonball.” This was the start of prohibiting
the combat of warring nations within 3 nautical miles from the coast. Notably, there
3
UNCLOS, Article 110.
4
On January 23, 1998, the Japanese government announced a Cabinet decision to end the Agree-
ment and duly notified the ROK side of its decision. The Agreement was subsequently terminated
one year later, and in this state of no agreement, both Japan and the ROK actively proceeded with
negotiations that resulted in the signing of a new Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement on November
28, 1998, which came into effect on January 22, 1999. See Chapter 6.
5
Grand Council of State Proclamation No. 492.
was no law in existence at that time which stipulated the territorial sea breadth to be
3 nautical miles. Japan’s expansion of the territorial sea breadth to 12 nautical miles
was triggered by the approach of foreign fishing vessels, particularly from the former
Soviet Union, to the coastal waters of Japan.6 Then-Minister of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries Abe Shintarō had already proposed to the Diet in 1975 the necessity of
expanding the territorial sea breadth to 12 nautical miles. Subsequently, a Cabinet
decision was made in January 1977 to formulate the Territorial Waters Act, and the
decision to present the Territorial Waters Draft Bill to the Diet was made at the
Cabinet meeting on March 29, 1977.
So why was it considered necessary to formulate a statute law such as the
Territorial Waters Act? Prime Minister Miki Takeo, at a plenary session of the
House of Representatives on January 26, 1976, indicated the government’s policy
of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Then, at a meeting of the House of Represen-
tatives Budget Committee on February 2, he stated his intent to resolve this issue
within the year, irrespective of the conclusions reached at UN Conference on the
Law of the Sea sessions, and to uphold the three non-nuclear principles of Japan.
There, the government outlined its reasoning for requiring a legal basis to expand the
territorial sea breadth:7
At present, there is no international law that has set the territorial sea breadth at 12 nautical
miles . . . so it is only natural that Japan make a decision to this end. Incidentally, the
existing territorial sea breadth of 3 nautical miles is an international law that is also
recognized as law in Japan. Therefore, our new decision aims to change this standard
territorial sea breadth of 3 nautical miles . . . we deem that realizing such a change is not the
sole domain of the executive branch.
Expanding the territorial sea will also naturally widen the scope covered by Japan’s
domestic laws; however, the scope of application of these laws is, of course, to be stipulated
in the laws themselves, provided there is no express mandate otherwise. Such an expansion
of the territorial scope of application of Japan’s domestic laws will directly impact the rights
and duties of Japanese citizens and as such needs to be referred to the legislative branch.
The positive acceptance of the need for a new law to this effect is therefore anticipated.
Put simply, if a 12 nautical mile territorial sea were established in international law,
then there would perhaps be no need to formulate a law specifically for it. However,
as it is a 3 nautical mile territorial sea that has been established in international law, it
is necessary for a State to unilaterally establish a new law for setting its territorial sea
breadth at 12 nautical miles. It should be noted that in 1976, there was already a
permissible rule in international law for a 12 nautical mile territorial sea, and a State
was able to unilaterally expand its territorial sea breadth to 12 nautical miles.
Furthermore, although in international law it is acceptable for the executive branch
of a State to unilaterally declare the expansion of its territorial sea breadth, widening
the application scope of domestic law will impact the rights and duties of its national
citizens. As such, it is necessary to formulate a new law. In other words, the
existence of a 3 nautical mile territorial sea that is established in international law
6
Mizukami, Chiyuki. 1995. Nihon to kaiyōhō (Japan and UNCLOS). Tokyo: Yūshindō Kōbunsha.
7
House of Representatives Budget Committee, No. 9, February 6, 1976, 10.
Expansion of the Territorial Sea Breadth from 3 to 12 Nautical Miles 115
requires no further action by a State, as all countries naturally have a 3 nautical mile
territorial sea breadth. Conversely, the fact that a 12 nautical mile territorial sea has
not been established in international law requires further action by a State in order to
establish a 12 nautical mile territorial sea breadth; moreover, a State cannot be
denied the right to freely determine its territorial sea breadth up to a maximum of
12 nautical miles. To reiterate, there is a permissible rule in international law for a
12 nautical mile territorial sea. This customary international law is codified in the
1982 UNCLOS as, “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles . . .”
The 1977 Territorial Waters Act established a 12 nautical mile territorial sea
breadth; however, the five designated waters of the Sōya Strait, Tsugaru Strait, the
East and West Channels of the Tsushima Strait, and the Ōsumi Strait have a
territorial sea with a limit of 3 nautical miles. The 12 nautical mile fishery zone
stipulated in the 1965 Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement was only relevant to Japan in
terms of these designated areas; the ROK did not object otherwise. Incidentally, in
1977, the global trend towards setting a zone of 200 nautical miles also saw Japan
enacting the Fishery Zone Temporary Measures Act, which in one sweep stipulated
a 200 nautical mile fishery zone that so far had not been recognized as a system in
international law. The Act also set the fishery zone to be the whole of the Pacific
Ocean and only east of the Sea of Japan from a longitude of 135° east. Furthermore,
the Act only applied to the former Soviet Union and its fishing vessels.8
Japan ratified UNCLOS in 1996, while also adopting the straight baseline method
for its territorial sea and establishing its own EEZ. With these actions, Japan entered
the era of a new maritime order.
As for bilateral treaties, in addition to the Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement, there is
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, and also the Japan-China Fishery Agree-
ment.9 In regard to general issues between Japan and the ROK and China, as has
already been briefly mentioned, these concern the territories of Takeshima and the
Senkaku Islands.
There is also the issue of the status of the 200 nautical mile fishery zone
established off the far south Okinotorishima Island.
Unless all of these issues are fully understood and coordinated by all sides, it is
difficult to declare the beginning of a new maritime order. Therefore, prior to
discussing EEZs, it is perhaps useful to review the background of establishing the
EEZ regimes in the international law of the sea, and to clarify the implication of the
issues in this area of law.
Furthermore, new fishery agreements and treaties have been concluded between
Japan, and the ROK, and China. According to precedent and the prevailing view,
8
For further details see the section on the 1977 Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery
Waters in this chapter.
9
A new Agreement was signed on November 11, 1997, which the Japanese Diet approved in April
1998. However, delays with procedures in China resulted in the Agreement only coming into effect
on June 1, 2000. See Chapter 6.
under the duty to observe international law as stipulated in Article 98 (2) of the
Japanese Constitution, legal force follows the order of the Constitution, then treaties,
and then laws, which would lead to the partial suspension of the binding force of
domestic laws such as those on EEZs. In regard to issues in international law,
consistency with the following Article 311 (3) of UNCLOS would become a moot
point:
Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the opera-
tion of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations between them,
provided that such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of this Convention,
and provided further that such agreements shall not affect the application of the basic
principles embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do not affect the
enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations
under this Convention.
The 200 Nautical Mile Fishery Zone and 1977 Fishery Zone
Temporary Measures Act
The International Nature of the Delimitation of Maritime Areas
On December 18, 1951, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on a dispute
between the United Kingdom and Norway, known as the Fisheries Case, concerning
the method Norway used to draw a baseline to delimit the fishery zone for its
fishermen. The following is an excerpt from the ruling:
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent
merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true
that the act of delineation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is
competent to undertake it, the validity of the delineation with regard to other States depends
upon international law.10
Incidentally, the Territorial Waters Act and the Fishery Zone Temporary Measures
Act, Japan’s two maritime laws that were promulgated on May 2, 1977 and took
effect on July 1, were valid until the revision, abolition, and formulation of domestic
laws related to UNCLOS of June 1996; each had established the territorial sea and
fishery zone of Japan to be from the baseline to a breadth of 12 nautical miles and
200 nautical miles, respectively. The abovementioned domestic legislation stipu-
lated the sovereignty and fishery jurisdiction of Japan, and also had an evident effect
on international law. How legislation is evaluated in light of international law
depends on the interpretation of relevant international law currently in force. This
section therefore first examines the trends of postwar international law of the sea,
while considering the issues of territorial sea, continental shelves, and fishery zones.
10
International Court of Justice. 1951. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and
Orders, p. 132.
The 200 Nautical Mile Fishery Zone and 1977 Fishery Zone. . . 117
It will then look at what constitutes unilateral measures under international law and
their significance, and finally, review the two now-lapsed maritime laws of 1977.
Trends in the Law of the Sea Leading Up to the Emergence of a

200 Nautical Mile Fishery Zone
1. Overview
It was the Truman Proclamation that spurred other countries to assert their
maritime claims after World War II, and subsequently to successively issue
their respective statements on continental shelves that highlighted the dependence
of their coastal citizens on marine resources or stressed the urgency of protecting
their fishery resources from destructive exploitation by foreign pelagic fisheries.
Moreover, once it became evident that calls for placing the seabed resources of
continental shelves under the rule of coastal States would likely be gradually
integrated into international law as new rules and without any opposition from
major marine nations, the claims of coastal States moved toward new and strong
demands expanding their jurisdiction in fisheries.
The International Law Commission (ILC), which organized the UN Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea I, first deliberated the issue of continental shelves and
fishery on the high seas. However, faced with the reality of the postwar claims of
coastal States on continental shelves and fishery being merely one aspect of a
move towards expanding their territorial sea, the issue was addressed in its
entirety. Consequently, the ILC draft of the law of the sea included rules on a
general system for territorial seas and high seas. Regrettably, despite 8 years of
studies on the matter, the ILC left several issues unresolved, the most important of
which, it goes without saying, was the issue of the territorial sea breadth. The
draft of the law of the sea recognized that each country had varying customary
practices in regard to its territorial sea breadth, while also clarifying that
expanding the territorial sea to beyond 12 nautical miles was not permitted in
international law.
The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea I and II, held in 1958 and 1960,
respectively, failed to produce a consensus on the issue of territorial sea breadth,
which can be regarded as the core of the maritime system. Despite this, the
conferences achieved landmark results in the history of international law with
the formation of four key conventions covering all areas of the law of the sea. As
for the issue of the territorial sea breadth, given the fact that the interests of
fisheries and strategic interests were closely entwined, it is well known that
several compromises were proposed including a combined territorial sea and
fishery zone within 12 nautical miles of the coast. The United States and
Canada put forth an amended proposal at the 1960 Conference; it was approved
by 54 States and opposed by 28, with 5 States abstaining from voting. Although
this proposal fell just short of the majority vote required, the fact that it was
approved in such large numbers indicated that the institutionalization of the

12 nautical mile fishery zone contained in the proposal had considerable support.
The codification of the continental shelf regime in the 1958 convention therefore
turned the interest of other nations toward fishery zones.
2. Legal nature of the 12 nautical mile fishery zone
The following is an excerpt from the ICJ’s judgment in the Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion Case, which the United Kingdom filed against Iceland in July 1972 in regard
to a dispute over the expansion of an exclusive fishery jurisdiction to 50 nautical
miles.
Legislation developed from State practices based on the discussions and near-
agreements at UN Conference on the Law of the Sea II, namely “Two concepts
have crystallized as customary law in recent years . . . The first is the concept of
the fishery zone, the area in which a State may claim exclusive fishery jurisdiction
independently of its territorial sea; the extension of that fishery zone up to a
12-mile limit from the baselines appears now to be generally accepted. The
second is the concept of preferential rights of fishing.”11 This fishery zone was
specified by the Court as a “tertium genus between the territorial sea and the high
seas.”
Incidentally, the ICJ gave no grounds for its judgment in the July 1974 case,
most likely because it regarded such grounds as irrelevant considering the
concepts were firmly established as customary law. However, here several cus-
tomary practices of States shall be described in order to understand the facts
supporting this judgment.
The countries that unilaterally established a 12 nautical mile fishery zone from
1960 onwards are listed below. It should be noted that at the time Japan’s two
laws of the sea were enacted in 1977, about half of these countries established a
12 or 200 nautical mile territorial sea. The following countries successively
established a 12 nautical mile fishery zone: Albania (1960); Norway, Senegal
(1961); Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia (1962); Uruguay, South Africa, Yemen
(1964); Denmark, New Zealand (1965); Pakistan, Portugal, the United States,
Brazil, Mexico (1966); Spain, France, Australia, Dominican Republic, Côte
d’Ivoire, Monaco (1967); Nauru, Sweden (1968); Poland (1970); and Malta
(1971).
On May 18, 1966, 5 months prior to the establishment of the United States’
own 12 nautical mile fishery zone, the US State Department expressed its view
that, in light of the progression of international practices from 1960 onwards,
establishing a 12 nautical mile fishery zone was not in violation of international
law. This view was not solely based on such unilateral domestic legislation;
rather, it had taken into consideration international practices including interna-
tional treaties such as the Great Britain-Norway Fishery Agreement of November
17, 1960, the Soviet Union-Norway Fishery Agreement of 1961, the European
Fisheries Convention of March 9, 1964, and the agreement concluded with
11
International Court of Justice. 1974. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, p. 23.
Norway and exchange of notes between the UK, Poland, and the Soviet Union to
facilitate the approval of a British 12 nautical mile fishery zone that became
effective on September 30, 1964.
Against this backdrop Japan negotiated with other countries and concluded the
following agreements: the Japan-US Fisheries Agreement on May 9, 1967; the
Japan-New Zealand Fisheries Agreement on July 12, 1967; the Japan-Mexico
Fisheries Treaty on March 7, 1968; and the Japan-Australia Fisheries Agreement
on November 17, 1968. However, each of these agreements carefully avoided
approving the 12 nautical mile fishery zone of the partner country (a shelving
style of agreement). The only exception to this was the Japan-ROK Fisheries
Agreement concluded on June 22, 1965. Japan took a different position to the US
and did not recognize a 12 nautical mile fishery zone as an established system in
international law.
Incidentally, the territorial sea and fishery zone are interconnected in a rather
interesting way. The establishment of a 12 nautical mile fishery zone peaked in
1966 and 1967, while the setting of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea became
prevalent after that, namely in 1966 with three countries, 1967 with eight
countries, 1968 with three countries, 1969 with eight countries, and 1970 with
three countries; and as previously mentioned, some countries switched over from
a fishery zone to a territorial sea. Hence, the regulations on territorial sea in
international law in the 1970s included a permissible rule that allowed each
country to unilaterally establish a fishery zone from 3 to 12 nautical miles.
In light of this, even the unilateral establishment of a 12 nautical mile fishery
zone, which was initially considered to be illegal, was on an individual level an
infringement of the rights and interests of other nations while also seemingly in
violation of the high seas regime. However, it came to constitute a new customary
law as a result of being practiced widely and being given tacit approval by other
states.
The 12 nautical mile fishery zone system has countervailing power against all
nations, and it is a zone of a coastal State in which it can exercise its jurisdiction
for the purpose of its fisheries. While there are examples of interpreting this
system to permit foreign fisheries inside this zone for an indefinite or fixed period
(phase out style), nevertheless these foreign fisheries were still under the juris-
diction of the coastal State.12
3. Emergence of a 200 nautical mile fishery zone
The claims of coastal States on marine resources were not, however, confined
to within a 12 nautical mile fishery zone. In 1972, Kenya proposed the concept of
an economic zone, and various Caribbean countries put forth the Patrimonial Sea
Concept; these were some of the assertions that emerged at the time for jurisdic-
tion over resources in a 200 nautical mile zone. The concept of an economic zone
was first advocated as a single draft and revised draft at UN Conference on the
12
Oda, Shigeru. 1971. Umi no shigen to kokusaihō (Ocean Resources and International Law)
I. Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
Law of the Sea III, which commenced its substantive session in 1974. The
following is a list of countries that unilaterally established a 200 nautical mile
zone before May 1977, when Japan’s two maritime laws were promulgated.
A total of 28 countries: Bangladesh in 1974 (economic zone; EZ); Costa Rica,
Iceland in 1975 (fishery zone; FZ); Senegal (FZ), Benin (formerly the Republic of
Dahomey, territorial sea), Mexico, Guatemala, Mozambique, Pakistan, Liberia,
Angola (all EZ) in 1976; and by May 1997, seven countries in the European
Community (EC) (the UK, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland: FZ); Norway (FZ); Canada (FZ); India, Sri Lanka, Cuba (all
EZ); the US, the Soviet Union, Burma, Japan (all FZ); and Vietnam (EZ). Adding
to this the ten countries with a 200 nautical mile territorial sea before the
economic zone concept emerged (Chile, Peru, El Salvador, Ecuador, Panama,
Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Sierra Leone, Somalia), as well as Nicaragua (which
had a 200 nautical mile fishery zone), meant that 39 countries actually had, in
some way, unilaterally established a 200 nautical mile zone at the time Japan’s
two maritime laws were enacted in 1977.
In a word, this trend can be summarized as the unilateral measures exemplified
by the establishment of a 200 nautical mile zone by the EC, the US, the Soviet
Union, and Japan. While these measures dominated the discussions at UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea III, they were fundamentally different to the
economic zone concept. The following is an examination of why this was
the case.
The first crucial point to note here is that conserving and securing marine
resources was becoming a matter of urgency. At the first substantive session of
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III in 1974, just 1 month after the judgment
on the Iceland Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, a 200 nautical mile economic zone
received clear and overwhelming majority support at the close of the Caracas
session. A single informal negotiation draft was subsequently distributed at the
Geneva session in 1975, and after 8 weeks of discussions at the New York spring
session in 1976, relevant sections of the single draft were kept as is.
According to the second section of the revised single draft at the New York
spring session in 1976, the rights exercised by a coastal State in an economic
zone were: (1) sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, conservation,
and management of all living and non-living resources in the seabed, soil, and
waters of the zone, (2) exclusive jurisdiction over the installation and usage of
artificial islands, equipment, and structures, (3) exclusive jurisdiction over the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, along with other activities and
scientific research, and (4) jurisdiction over the preservation of the marine
environment. Hence, the legal standing of an economic zone was stipulated as a
third zone that is different from the high seas and territorial sea.13 To summarize
this simply and somewhat boldly, this was an assertion of the jurisdiction of
coastal States over marine and mining resources, and their right to carry out
13
Articles 44 and 75.
scientific research and preserve the marine environment (the other side of the coin
being, the right to regulate navigation).
When broken down in this way, in terms of positive law, the jurisdiction over
mining resources noted in the second section means that each nation can actually
access these resources based on the current international law of the continental
shelf regime. Canada established an antipollution zone in 1970, with the US
moving towards similar legislation without any apparent sense of urgency to
make it a domestic law. That said, the general postwar trend was to settle the
issues concerning continental shelves, and so the remaining issue to be addressed
was the coastal States’ assertion of their jurisdiction over fishery resources. Such
was the urgency of this fishery issue that it could not wait for the conclusions
reached at the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea sessions, which is why from
1973 to 1974 major States took legislative action. In the US, a bill was submitted
to the two chambers of Congress proposing an expansion of the country’s fishery
jurisdiction to beyond 12 nautical miles; it was an interim measure until a
consensus was reached on an international agreement. Supreme Soviet law and
Japanese legislation followed suit with provisional measures taken as a unilateral
act under international law.
Incidentally, each nation’s legislation limited the rights that could be exercised
within a 200 nautical mile zone as exclusive fishery jurisdiction over all living
creatures in the zone14 and jurisdiction over fisheries and the like.15 It did not
include jurisdiction over the exploitation of mining resources in continental
shelves, scientific research, or the prevention of marine pollution. Even if such
areas were included, they would be handled as secondary to other rights. Hence,
this could be interpreted as enabling the expansion of the 12 nautical mile fishery
zone established in customary law to 200 nautical miles.
However, the problem remained of whether a State could unilaterally act to
expand its 12 nautical mile fishery zone to 200 nautical miles, or establish a new
200 nautical mile fishery zone; in other words, was the establishment of a
200 nautical mile fishery zone regarded as customary law? If a 200 nautical
mile fishery zone was deemed a system in customary law, then each nation had
the right to unilaterally establish a 200 nautical mile fishery zone.
1977 Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters
On April 13, 1976, US President Gerald Ford signed the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, Public Law 94-265. The US then began to exercise its
fishery regulatory authority in its 200 nautical mile zone on March 1, 1977. The US
Coast Guard carried out an on-board inspection on April 9 of a Soviet trawler
14
1976 US Law Article 102 (1).
15
Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters, Article 1.
suspected of fishing more than the regulated quantity and detained the ship. It has
been pointed out that this law has several problematic areas, and the unilateral
expansion of a fishery zone by a coastal State (as per in this law) is noted as being
a violation of international law. Moreover, this point was also discussed in the US
Congress, citing the July 1974 ICJ judgment on the Iceland Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case.
At the time of Japan’s enactment of the 1977 Act on Temporary Measures
Concerning Fishery Waters, as previously mentioned, there were already 28 coun-
tries (39 when including the countries with a 200 nautical mile territorial sea) that
had unilaterally set a 200 nautical mile zone, including the US, the Soviet Union,
Japan, and the EC (the nations that stood to gain the most from doing so). Moreover,
the conclusion of agreements such as those between the US and the Soviet Union,
the US and Japan, and Japan and the Soviet Union, meant that upon the enactment of
Japan’s two laws of the sea of 1977 which recognized a 200 nautical mile zone, the
200 nautical mile fishery zone had become a system in customary law.
However, at the time the US had established its 200 Nautical Mile Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, there were only a few nations with 200 nautical
mile zones, and so it was difficult to consider that such a system had become
customary law. Hence, by making a 200 nautical mile zone a domestic law, the
US can be regarded as violating customary law, namely, the freedom of the seas
principle noted in Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas in international law.
The US held countervailing power against other nations it had concluded bilateral
treaties with and that approved its 200 nautical mile zone, or that gave their tacit
consent by not protesting it. In international law, as long as a State does not violate
jus cogens (the freedom of the seas principle is not jus cogens), all types of treaties,
even those that violate general international law, can be concluded and are hence
valid.16 Therefore, the aforesaid comments on the US 200 nautical mile zone
legislation can be applied similarly to the Soviet Union 200 nautical mile zone.
That being the case, how does this apply to Japan’s two laws, the Territorial
Waters Act and the Fishery Zone Temporary Measures Act (the Fishery Zone Act)?
As for the former, although issues can arise with the interpretation and setting of
baselines, such as in Sagami Bay and the West Channel of the Tsushima Strait, these
are not notable problems in international law. Therefore, the discussion from hereon
16
See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53.
will focus on the latter.17, 18 The main fishery nations in the waters surrounding
Japan are the Soviet Union (at the time; now Russia), the ROK, and China. These are
all concerned nations of the past and present.
In short, this legislation, when read together with the draft Cabinet Order, can be
regarded as having been only applicable to the Soviet Union and its citizens, which
can also be gleaned from the fact that it emerged as a part of negotiations between
Japan and the Soviet Union.
Incidentally, the legal system of a fishery zone is, as has already been discussed,
opposable à tous towards all other nations as an area under the jurisdiction of a
coastal State. The US Fishery Conservation and Management Act was in violation of
international law at the time of its establishment and had no general countervailing
power; despite this, the US insisted on such a power erga omnes (towards all other
nations). So, if a 200 nautical mile zone had been confirmed as becoming customary
law in 1977, this fishery zone would also have general countervailing power towards
all other nations.
17
Structure of the Fishery Zone Act: Article 3(3) of the Act stipulates Japan’s fishery zone to be the
waters from the baseline to a breadth of 200 nautical miles; however, Cabinet Order-designated
waters are not a fishery zone. This means that Japan’s fishery zone is wholly determined by a
Cabinet Order, under a system in which it may suddenly change in size one day as the government
decrees. The waters designated by a draft Cabinet Order and that do not constitute Japan’s fishery
zone are the area westward off the coast of Fukui Prefecture on the Sea of Japan side and westward
off the coast of Kagoshima Prefecture on the Pacific Ocean side (Yomiuri Shimbun, April 20, 1977
edition), or the western section of the Sea of Japan, the Eastern Sea, the Yellow Sea, and part of the
south-western section of the Pacific Ocean contiguous to the Eastern Sea side (Mainichi Shimbun,
April 27, 1977 edition). Also, the areas included in the aforementioned fishery zone within the
designated waters noted in Clause 2 of the Territorial Waters Act supplementary provisions are only
the Sōya Strait and Tsugaru Strait; these designated waters form the 12 nautical mile exclusive
fishery zone (EFZ) that foreign fisheries are prohibited from entering (Article 5(1)). Foreign
fisheries are able to operate in the other designated waters within the 12 nautical mile area.
However, Article 1 of the 1965 Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement stipulates these waters to also be
an EFZ.
It should be noted that the regulations on foreign fishery in the fishery zone (Articles 5 to 11) do
not apply to Koreans or Chinese (Article 14 and the draft Cabinet Order). Moreover, neither do they
apply to the waters of the four Northern Islands (Asahi Shimbun, May 25, 1977 edition).
18
Legality of the Fishery Zone Act: It is difficult to simply brand this unilateral measure by Japan as
a violation of international law, as is the case with the United States and the Soviet Union. This is
mainly because the two superpowers established a 200 nautical mile zone, while Japan did not
recognize this zone and alleged the illegality of the 1976 US law right up until the first and second
rounds of negotiations with the United States in August and November 1976, respectively.
However, Japan appeared to have accepted the US claims at the third round of negotiations in
December 1976 in Washington, D.C. Subsequently, it signed an interim agreement on February
10, 1977 (an exchange of notes, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Notification No. 50, Official Gazette of
March 3, 1977, No. 15042), which was followed by the provisional signing of a long-term
agreement on March 18. Then, at the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on
April 27, 1977, Director-General Nakajima of the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
commented, “A new norm in international law is gradually emerging; it is now possible to set not a
12 nautical mile but a 200 nautical mile fishery zone, as has become the common international
practice.”
Furthermore, as Japan’s Fishery Zone Act was only applicable to the then Soviet
Union and its citizens by Cabinet Order (mandated by national law), it seems to have
been designed to only have countervailing power towards the Soviet Union. If,
however, the unilateral establishment of a 200 nautical mile zone was in violation of
international law at the time of its enactment in Japan as well, then Japan would have
also established an illegal 200 nautical mile zone just as the Soviet Union had done,
by a Cabinet Order that was only applicable to the Soviet Union.
Hence, in this view, Japan carried out a unilateral measure generally recognized
as a reprisal in international law. Of course, the Cabinet Order mandate also took into
consideration the interests of Japan’s fisheries in the waters surrounding the ROK
and China, as well as the territorial issue of the attribution of Takeshima and the
Senkaku Islands. However, when the Cabinet Order of Article 14 in the Fishery
Zone Act is included, Japan’s unilateral measure appears to be an act of self-help in
the nature of reprisals in international law. In that sense, Japan’s unilateral estab-
lishment of a 200 nautical mile zone ensures legality towards the Soviet Union, as
well as countervailing power. This is no more than a trump card for use in diplomatic
negotiations, however; it is not an assertion of a fishery zone in the general sense. It
therefore loses all significance once diplomatic negotiations are concluded.
Meanwhile, the Cabinet Order of Article 3(3) in the Fishery Zone Act states that if
waters are not designated, then Japan’s fishery zone will be the waters (including the
exclusive fishery zone in the designated zone) that are 200 nautical miles (or,
according to the situation, up to the median line or agreed upon line) from the
territorial sea baseline away from the coast. This fishery zone asserts an erga omnes
countervailing power, which is congruent with the legal principles of the fishery
zone system in customary law.
This analysis of Japan’s Fishery Zone Act has revealed its two-tiered structure of
a reprisal-like nature entwined with an assertion of a general fishery zone system,
through its linkage with Cabinet Orders. Furthermore, the reprisal-like nature of the
Act came to the forefront during fishery negotiations between Japan and the Soviet
Union. However, it was already predicted that the general fishery zone assertion
would surface in light of the foreseen issues of ROK fishing vessels operating in
Japanese waters and Soviet Union fishing vessels operating in a Cabinet Order-
designated zone in the not too distant future. From that perspective, Japan’s Fishery
Zone Act had a different legal nature due to its linkage with Cabinet Orders.
Moreover, as of June 6, 1977, when I had finished the special feature article on the
law of the sea that Hōritsu no Hiroba, a general law journal, asked me to contribute
and the June Cabinet Order had not yet been issued, the impression I was left with
was that the Act was a quick-fix without any principles, although it was difficult to
determine.
Regarding the legality of a 200 nautical mile fishery zone, the US Fishery
Conservation and Management Act was the trigger for a succession of unilateral
measures to establish such a zone, which Japan also recognized for the US in the
Japan-US Fishery Agreement on March 18 and for the Soviet Union in the Japan-
Soviet Union Fishery Provisional Agreement on May 24. Such actions were taken
between superpowers, with each nation taking what it called interim measures within
EEZ Enclosing Marine Resources 125
its domestic law. Underlying this was the general consensus reached on economic
zones in the legal sense at UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III. Furthermore,
the 200 nautical mile fishery zone also had the subjective element of being
established in international customary law, namely opinio juris sive necessitatis
(an opinion of law or necessity), as well as the objective element of a rapid
succession of individual practices that at first were in violation of the freedom of
the high seas. Despite this, a new customary law had been established. This fishery
zone was positioned as a third category (tertium genus) between the high seas and
territorial sea.
Need for Review from the Perspective of Securing

and Distributing Protein Resources of the World
If the 200 nautical mile fishery zone were to become a system in customary law as a
zone under the jurisdiction of a coastal State, then ensuring Japan’s fishery in the
200 nautical mile zone of countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the ROK, and
China would thus be a political issue centering on diplomatic negotiations.
A general issue warranting additional discussion is the fishery resources that
belong to a coastal State once a 200 nautical mile zone is established. It is preferable
to review this from the perspective of securing and distributing protein resources of
the world, rather than only taking the view that these are simply resources of a
coastal State.
EEZ Enclosing Marine Resources
United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea
As previously mentioned, it was the Truman Proclamation issued by the US imme-

diately after World War II that triggered further claims from a number of countries,
including countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, asserting their rights to the
marine resources offshore from their coast and declaring a 200 nautical mile
territorial sea. Another example of this is the Syngman Rhee Line that was the
main issue at the fishery negotiations held between Japan and the ROK from 1952 to
1965.19 As a result, the traditional maritime order—namely a narrow territorial sea
and vast high seas, based on the freedom of the high seas—was in disarray. Hence,
the UN held the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea I in 1958, at which the
19
Oda, Shigeru. 1972. Kaiyōhō no genryū o saguru (Exploring the Origins of UNCLOS). Tokyo:
Japan Fisheries Association; and Kawakami, Kenzō. 1972. Sengo no kokusai gyogyō seido (The
Postwar International Fisheries System). Tokyo: Japan Fisheries Association.
following four conventions of the law of the sea were adopted: Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, and Convention on
the Continental Shelf. The first two Conventions were a codification of customary
law, while the latter two were new international legislation put in place to address
new circumstances that had arisen.
Agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea could not be reached, however,
owing to a clash of fishery interests as well as differences between the United States
and the Soviet Union stemming from their military strategies; and so, the UN
Conference on the Law of the Sea II in 1960 also ended without a successful
outcome. During this period, the 12 nautical mile fishery zone system was being
established, as described earlier in this chapter.
As space exploration progressed in the 1960s, the interest of developed nations
naturally turned toward marine exploration. Remarkable advancements in science
and technology also meant the seabed was in danger of being partitioned among
developed nations, as pointed out by the small Mediterranean country of Malta. At
the 1967 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Malta proposed the peaceful
use of the seabed and ocean floor, as well as their resources, as a “common heritage
of mankind,” while also taking into consideration the interests of developing nations.
Then, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor was set up
the following year, and issues concerning the exploration and exploitation of these
areas in the sea were discussed at the UN. In 1969, Malta proposed a conference to
review the Convention on the Continental Shelf, although the US, the Soviet Union,
Western European nations, and Japan were not so keen on the proposal. Developing
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, many of which gained independence in
the 1960s, called for a comprehensive revision of the law of the sea to take into
account the interests of developing nations, considering that the 1958 Conventions
are codification of the traditional law of the sea, which favors developed nations. As
a result, a resolution was passed at the 25th UNGA in 1970 to hold UN Conference
on the Law of the Sea III in 1973.
Incidentally, as described earlier, the reference to a 200 nautical mile zone was
seen first in the assertions for a 200 nautical mile territorial sea made by countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean. However, it wasn’t until 1972 that the concept of
an economic zone was proposed, as a claim for jurisdiction over resources in a
200 nautical mile zone. That year, at the Yaoundé Convention held by African
nations, these countries adopted the recommendation to establish an EEZ outside of
the territorial sea where a State can exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the
exploration and exploitation of all living and non-living resources. Furthermore,
the Santo Domingo Declaration was adopted at the 1972 Specialized Conference of
Caribbean Countries on Problems of the Sea; a sub-section of that Declaration
entitled the “patrimonial sea” established waters in which a coastal State has
sovereign rights over all natural resources in a 200 nautical mile zone from the
outer edge of its territorial sea.
This formed the basis for the proposal put forward in 1972 to the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor. At the first substantive session of
EEZ Enclosing Marine Resources 127
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III in 1974, most nations advocated with one
voice the establishment of a 200 nautical mile EEZ; only Japan stood out for its
opposition to the proposal. This led to many nations enacting domestic legislation,
with such names as the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone Act or 200 nau-
tical mile Exclusive Fishery Zone Act, and establishing a 200 nautical mile fishery
zone enclosing fishery resources. Although debate on such a zone went through a
difficult process at UN Conference on the Law of the Sea III, UNCLOS was
established in 1982.
EEZ as a System Derived from Fishery Zones
The Convention comprehensively covers the bulk of the law of the sea in 17 sections
with 320 articles and is supplemented with the following nine annexes: Highly
Migratory Species; Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; Basic
Conditions of Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation; Statute of the Enterprise;
Conciliation; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; Arbitra-
tion; Special Arbitration; and Participation by International Organizations.
UNCLOS was adopted on April 30, 1982, as was a resolution20 to set up a
Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority and the International
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, and a resolution on preliminary investment in
multiple metallic masses. However, the US, the UK, (the former) West Germany,
and a number of other countries, expressing dissatisfaction over Part XI of the
Convention on the deep seabed, did not sign it. The world underwent dramatic
political and economic upheaval in the years after the adoption of the Convention. In
particular following the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a growing depen-
dence on market economy principles primarily by former socialist countries and
developing nations. Hence, nations held unofficial talks from 1990 to 1994, presided
over by the UN Secretary General, with the aim of modifying Part XI of the
Convention. These talks led to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea to revise Part XI, which was
adopted on July 28, 1994 and came into effect on July 28, 1996.
UNCLOS includes provisions on EEZs and the continental shelf in Part V
(Articles 55 to 75) and Part VI (Articles 76 to 85), respectively. The provisions on
the continental shelf stipulate the distance to be 200 nautical miles from the baseline
to a maximum of 350 nautical miles, and they outline the establishment of a
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for determining the outer limit
of those shelves that exceed 200 nautical miles, as well as state the allocation of
proceeds from the exploitation of that section of the continental shelf. While
basically following the Convention on the Continental Shelf, UNCLOS contains
20
The resolution on a preparatory commission for the deep seabed authority.
highly detailed provisions on EEZ, as it is a newly created concept with an outer

limit of 200 nautical miles (Article 55).
Article 56 stipulates the following rights of a coastal State in an EEZ:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and man-
aging the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent
to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone. . .;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with
regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
In summary, a coastal State firstly has sovereign rights over living and non-living
resources, secondly has jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial
islands, installations and structures, and thirdly has the right to marine scientific
research21 and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.22 As for
the sovereign rights over non-living resources, from the perspective of positive law,
each nation already has access to these resources via vested interests, in accordance
with the continental shelf system in current international law. Hence, the scope of
application of the newly established Part XI of the Convention on the deep seabed
system—namely, the issue arising from delimiting the border of the deep seabed that
is a “common heritage of mankind” and the continental shelf of each nation—is
newly regulated in Part VI on the continental shelf (although fundamentally, it does
not differ from the Convention on the Continental Shelf).23 Provisions on coordi-
nating the rights of other countries in an EEZ are specified in Articles 58 and
59, while Article 60 contains relatively detailed provisions on artificial islands, etc.
Furthermore, the provisions on EEZs are quite specific in regard to living resources.
The provisions on fisheries in the EEZ of the Convention from the draft stage
include those relating to maximum sustainable yield, optimal usage, total catch,
surplus, catch quota, and fishing fees that had been invoked in fishery negotiations of
some states. Hence, historically, the EEZ is a system derived from fishery zones, as
described above.
21
UNCLOS, Part XIV, Articles 238 to 265.
22
UNCLOS, Part XII, Articles 192 to 237.
23
For further discussion of this parallel principle, see Nakamura, Kō. 1986. “Haitateki keizai suiiki
to tairikudana no kankei (The Relationship between EEZs and Continental Shelves)” in Yamamoto,
Sōji (ed). Kaiyōhō no rekishi to tenbō (The History and Developments of UNCLOS, Oda Shigeru
60th birthday edition). Tokyo: Yūhikaku.
Japan-ROK Agreement on the Continental Shelf and EEZ 129
Japan-ROK Agreement on the Continental Shelf and EEZ
Oda Shigeru pointed out early on that the parallel principle of the UNCLOS pro-
visions on an EEZ (Part V) and continental shelf (Part VI) was a problem;24 it
remains an issue that is relatively difficult to resolve of two regimes occurring within
and outside an EEZ. Outside an EEZ, the coastal State can establish the outer edge of
the continental margin to a maximum of 350 nautical miles wherever the margin
extends beyond 200 nautical miles.25 It is in this area that the continental shelf
regime exists.
Even if within an EEZ, because the Convention itself defines the continental shelf
as “the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend . . . to the outer edge of
the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles. . .,” there exist such
seabed and subsoil without the topography and geological features of a continental
shelf.26 Hence, “An EEZ and continental shelf each have different origins, and
therefore cannot be assumed to have the same breadth.” This is due to the Conven-
tion stipulating the delimitation of an EEZ and continental shelf to achieve an
“equitable resolution” of this issue. “However, the ‘equity’ of a continental shelf
border and EEZ border are not necessarily always the same.”27 Accordingly, if
seeking to set the same border for both an EEZ and continental shelf, logically this
will give rise to the problem of which “equity” should take precedence.
Incidentally, in 1974 Japan and the ROK concluded two agreements on the
continental shelf adjoining both countries. These are the Agreement between
Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Establishment of Boundary in
the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries (Northern
Part Agreement), which is considered to be based on an equidistant median line, and
the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Devel-
opment of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries
(Southern Part Agreement).
The latter Southern Part Agreement is based on an overlap of Japan’s assertion of
an equidistant median line and the ROK’s assertion of a natural prolongation of the
shelf, which created a zone for joint development within the Japan-side of the
median line of the continental shelf adjoining both countries; the agreement was
reached “[d]esiring to promote the friendly relations existing between the two
countries; [c]onsidering their mutual interest in carrying out jointly exploration
and exploitation of petroleum resources in the southern part of the continental
shelf adjacent to the two countries, [and] [r]esolving to reach a final practical
24
In his dissenting opinion in the ICJ judgment on the 1982 Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf
Incident.
25
UNCLOS, Article 76.
26
Ibid.
27
Oda, Shigeru. 1985. Chūkai kokuren kaiyōhō jōyakujō (Commentary on UNCLOS). Tokyo:
Yūhikaku.
solution to the question of the development of such resources.”28 The Southern Part
Agreement was signed on January 30, 1974 and came into effect on June 22, 1978,
4 years before UNCLOS was adopted. Although it will remain valid for 50 years,
Article 28 of the Agreement stipulates, “Nothing in this Agreement shall be regarded
as determining the question of sovereign rights over all or any portion of the Joint
Development Zone, or as prejudicing the positions of the respective Parties with
respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf.” Hence, it does not address the
delimitation issue.
Furthermore, until the conclusion of the new Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement that
came into effect in 1999, the original Fishery Agreement concluded in 1965 desig-
nated a 12 nautical mile fishery zone and jointly regulated waters. However, due to
the enactment of the 1977 Territorial Sea Act that set Japan’s territorial sea at
12 nautical miles, and the absence of protests from the ROK to this, the fishery
zone of this Agreement only applied to the designated zone that set Japan’s territorial
sea to be no more than 3 nautical miles. The ROK also took similar measures to
Japan in accordance with the 1977 Territorial Sea Act. It should be noted that both
Japan and the ROK are parties to the 1982 UNCLOS.
So, based on these facts, how should the relation between an EEZ and continental
shelf be viewed? The Northern Part Agreement sets out 35 coordinates, with the
straight lines connecting those coordinates in sequence being the boundary line of
the continental shelves appertaining to both countries. Furthermore, Article 7(1) of
the new Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement that came into effect in 1999 stipulates the
EEZ border in the northern part of the Japan-ROK continental shelf as being the line
that connects the same 35 coordinates in Article 1(1) of the Northern Part Agree-
ment. Why is it, however, that the border of the new EEZ and the border of the
continental shelf are the same? Although it is not entirely clear from the details of the
negotiations, it can only be surmised that at the very least, upon the conclusion of the
1974 Convention, the same continental shelf existed in the northern waters; and as
there were no special circumstances then, it was considered “equitable” to base
delimitation on an equidistant median line. Moreover, at the 1998 Convention, as
there were also no special circumstances during the delimitation of the EEZ based on
distance, it can only be surmised that both Japan and the ROK agreed that an
equidistant median line was “equitable.”
Now, with regard to the situation in the southern waters, as already mentioned,
the Southern Part Agreement was concluded amid opposing views of the two sides,
and was based on an overlap of both countries’ claims that created a joint develop-
ment zone; it did not address the delimitation issue. Subsequently, the diplomatic
negotiations on delimitation of an EEZ in the new Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement
were in accordance with UNCLOS, to which both countries are parties. The
28
No. 19778 Japan and Republic of Korea: Agreement concerning joint development of the
southern part of the continental shelf adjacent to the two countries (with map, appendix, agreed
minutes and exchanges of notes). Signed at Seoul on 30 January 1974. https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/unts/Volume%201225/volume-1225-I-19778-English.pdf. Accessed on December
3, 2022.
Convention stipulates that delimitation of an EEZ shall be done by consensus and in

accordance with international law, in order to achieve an equitable resolution.
In international law, an equitable delimitation is achieved when a delineation is
reached based on “a combined equidistance-special circumstances rule.”29 There-
fore, if both countries reach consensus on an equidistant median line or on an
amended equidistant line taking into account special circumstances, then the conti-
nental shelf within the EEZ is defined by joint development, not by the drawing of a
border based on the Southern Part Agreement in 1974. Hence, an EEZ and conti-
nental shelf exist as two separate regimes. In reality, however, Japan and the ROK
were unable to reach a consensus on the border, and Article 9(2) of the new Japan-
ROK Fishery Agreement established a “provisional measures zone.” The northwest
line of this “provisional measures zone” (that Japan asserted was an equidistant
median line) ran slightly along the north of the ROK-side line stipulated in the
Southern Part Agreement. Meanwhile, the southeast line (that the ROK asserted was
an equidistant median line) ran through the joint development zone of which over
three-quarters was drawn as being on the Japan side. Based on paragraph 2 of Annex
II, each country’s zone marked by these lines was deemed to be an EEZ. Accord-
ingly, for Japan, the seabed of the EEZ stipulated in the new Japan-ROK Fishery
Agreement (in other words, part of the continental shelf) remained as a continental
shelf zone for joint development based on the Southern Part Agreement and
throughout the period of its validity.
This is reflected in the fact that throughout the world there are agreements on
continental shelf delimitation and joint development. However, in reality it is not
likely that any issues will arise, primarily because petroleum development is being
carried out in these zones based on agreements reached between nations, or
prospecting there reveals no petroleum to be exploited.
As is well known, prospecting was previously carried out in the joint develop-
ment zone stipulated in the Southern Part Agreement concluded between Japan and
the ROK, but no successful outcome was reported. It is generally said that
non-renewable petroleum resources will dry up within the next 50 years, and once
that happens the continental shelf regime will no longer be significant in reality. In
that sense, signs of the end of the continental shelf regime are already being seen.
From that perspective, the current concomitant systems of the EEZ and continental
shelf are not so much a newly posed problem arising from unclear provisions on the
relationship between them as stipulated in UNCLOS, but rather an issue of the
relationship between the systems established in the agreements of each nation, such
as the current agreement on continental shelf delimitation and joint development,
and the newly established EEZ regime in accordance with UNCLOS.
In fact, prior to the new Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement that entered into force in
January 1999, there was also the Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement concluded in 1965.
This agreement emerged from negotiations on fisheries, which was one of the key
29
Serita, Kentarō. 1999. Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei (Sovereignty over Islands
and the Delimitation of Economic Zones). Tokyo: Yūshindo Kōbunsha.
issues of the talks on normalizing bilateral relations between Japan and the ROK that
commenced in February 1952, along with basic relations, claims, and the legal status
of ROK nationals living in Japan. The central theme of these fishery negotiations
was how to handle the Syngman Rhee Line.30 At the time, Japanese fishermen who
would fish in the waters on the ROK side experienced problems due to these
provisions. The Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement was effective for 5 years, and
included stipulations such as “[d]esiring that the maximum sustained productivity
of the fishery resources in waters of their common interest be maintained; [b]eing
convinced that the conservation of the said resources and their rational exploitation
and development will serve the interest of both countries; [and c]onfirming that the
principle of the freedom of the high seas shall be respected unless otherwise
specifically provided in the present Agreement . . .” It was agreed to terminate the
Agreement 1 year after a notification of intent to do so was issued; in January 1998,
Japan issued a notification of termination to that effect (Fig. 5.1).
First of all, the Agreement stated the territorial sea of both countries is 3 nautical
miles and established a fishery zone spanning up to 12 nautical miles from the
respective coastal baselines offshore on the high seas. Secondly, the Agreement went
even further to establish a “joint regulation zone” in the ROK coastal waters where
fishery is regulated. Furthermore, both countries are to consult with each other if
either one uses the straight baseline method to establish its fishery zone, and an
exchange of notes was effected concerning the straight baseline of the ROK fishery
zone. Thirdly, the Agreement also implies that a coastal State naturally has the right
of regulation and jurisdiction in its fishery zone, but that as the waters outside the
zone constitute the high seas, these waters fall under the flag State doctrine.31 Either
way, the Agreement took into consideration the disparate fishery capacity of Japa-
nese and ROK fishing vessels. The ROK’s fishery industry continued to develop,
and as the fishery environment was changing with trouble between local fishermen
and ROK fishing vessels operating along the Hokkaidō coast, along with the
deteriorating situation of resources in the waters around the ROK’s Jeju Island,
both Japan and the ROK agreed to self-regulate activities in the waters from October
1980 to January 1998. It should be noted that the ROK also expanded the breadth of
its territorial sea in 1977 to 12 nautical miles in accordance with the Territorial Sea
Act (using the straight baseline method); subsequently, until Japan’s full application
of the EEZ regime in January 1997, the remaining fishery zone for both countries
covered only specified parts of the West Channel of the Tsushima Strait and of the
area around Jeju Island.32
Diplomatic negotiations between the Japan and the ROK based on the EEZ
regime fully took into account the provisions stipulated in the original Japan-ROK
Fishery Agreement and the two nations’ fishery relations, including self-regulation
30
Oda, Shigeru. 1956. Kaiyō no kokusaihō kōzō (The International Legal Structure of the Oceans).
Tokyo: Yūshindō Kōbunsha; and Kawakami, op. cit.
31
See the section on the flag State doctrine earlier in this chapter.
32
See Fig. 5.1 depicting the relations outlined in the original Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement.
ROK territorial sea
Joint
control
zone
Joint
control
zone ROK
Japan territorial sea
Kyushu
Fig. 5.1 Relationship diagram of the original Japan-ROK fishery agreement

on both sides, as described above. When read together with the previously analyzed
continental shelf relations of Japan and the ROK, one could say that fishery
considerations take precedence over those of the continental shelf. Within the
international rulings on fisheries, one case worth highlighting is the Maritime
Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway;
Jan Mayen) case, in which the ICJ ruled that among access to resources, population,
socio-economic factors, and security, access to resources was the only relevant
matter that should be taken into consideration in delimitation. Furthermore, although
there was scarce information on seabed mining resources, saltwater (smelt) fishery
was covered in detail, and the ICJ ruled it was necessary to ensure such fishery so as
not to impart a catastrophic effect on the welfare of the citizens of the nations
concerned. Also, in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Marine
Area (Canada/United States; US-Canada Gulf of Maine) case, regarding the second
section of the sea for delimitation, the ICJ ruled that fishery, navigation, defense, and
the exploration and exploitation of petroleum could not be considered as relevant
matters in delimitation. It should be noted that the Court also examined whether
there is no fundamental inequality that will have a catastrophic effect on the welfare
and daily lives of the citizens of the nations concerned.33
What is particularly important when considering the state of resources in the
future is that, more than non-renewable resources, the focus should be on how to
utilize the renewable resources of fisheries, which relates not only to Japan and the
ROK, but the world in general. From that viewpoint as well, rather than exploiting
mining resources and several years’ worth of petroleum, priority should be placed on
living resources that can potentially provide a perpetually sustainable yield so long
as there is no imminent danger of overfishing or environmental degradation. Fur-
thermore, due consideration should be paid to vulnerable fishing communities, in
which the daily lives and welfare of the residents are affected by the reserves of their
fish species and performance of their fishery industry.
Hence, an EEZ can still be cultivated as a regime for conserving and utilizing
fishery resources including sedentary fish species (which are currently regarded as
continental shelf resources). This is still possible even when viewed concomitantly
with the continental shelf regime for the time being, and even after the eventual end
of the continental shelf as a regime for the exploitation of non-living resources. In
that sense, in the present day, whereby in UNCLOS living resources are also
recognized as a common heritage left to mankind, it is incumbent on the wisdom
of mankind to once again give consideration to the next generation by shifting from a
stance of enclosing resources to the joint use of resources.
33
For more details on these incidents see Serita, op. cit.
Military Use and Scientific Research in EEZs 135
Military Use and Scientific Research in EEZs
UNCLOS stipulates the rights of a coastal State in an EEZ in the following three
categories:
1. Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from
the water, currents and winds.
2. Jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to
the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; marine
scientific research; and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
3. The Convention also states that a coastal State must give due regard to the rights and
duties of other States in exercising its rights and performing its duties. This section does
not cover the rights and duties of a coastal State in regard to the use and conservation of
living resources, and particularly focuses on the authority of a coastal State concerning
provisions on scientific research and navigation.
In regard to the rights of other States in an EEZ, the Convention first stipulates the
freedom “of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms
. . . and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.”34 It then outlines
the right to conduct marine scientific research.35 These freedoms are the rights of all
nations in the high seas. However, the Convention states an EEZ is neither territorial
sea nor the high seas, but a “specific legal regime.”36 Therefore, the high seas regime
for these freedoms in an EEZ is not a suitable approach to take. Moreover, marine
scientific research in the EEZ is subject to Part XIII of the Convention.
Military Use
While it goes without saying that the freedom of navigation that causes marine
pollution in a country’s EEZ is out of the question, the issue here is military use, such
as for fleet exercise and live-fire training. Military use in the high seas has tradition-
ally been recognized alongside the four archetypal freedoms cited as the freedom of
the high seas in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, as “[other freedoms] which
are recognized by the general principles of international law.” However, as was
evident in the 1954 incident involving the Daigo Fukuryū Maru,37 the setting of an
34
Article 58.
35
Article 238.
36
As positioned in Article 55.
37
The Daigo Fukuryū Maru, a tuna fishing boat from the Port of Yaizu in Shizuoka Prefecture, was
exposed to nuclear fallout on March 1, 1954 from the US Castle Bravo thermonuclear weapon test
at Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific Ocean. At the time, the boat was outside the extensive danger
Status of activities of Chinese vessels
Japan-China Median Line
EEZ of China
Shanghai Areas where research activities
Areas where military were conducted from
exercises were July 10-25, 2001
conducted in March 2000
China Petroleum &
gas fields
Areas where military
exercises were conducted
in May & July, 1999
Amami
Ōshima
Island
Okinawa
Senkaku Islands Areas where marine research is
conducted
Areas where suspected resource research
is conducted
Areas where military exercises are
Taiwan conducted
EEZ of Japan Areas where research activities are
conducted by information collection ships
Fig. 5.2 China has repeatedly carried out marine research and military exercises in the high seas
extensive and long-term danger zone for nuclear tests is considered an abuse of
rights and therefore problematic. Hence, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
restrictively legalized military use, stating that such freedoms “shall be exercised by
all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas” (Fig. 5.2).
Similar provisions were outlined in UNCLOS, in addition to generally stipulating
the bona fides (good faith) principle. UNCLOS also states, “In exercising their rights
and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from
any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,”38 and particularly notes in a separate
Article that “the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”39
zone that the United States set up in the high seas for carrying out the hydrogen bomb test. One of
the Japanese crew died as a result of exposure to the nuclear fallout. This incident led to heightened
debate in Japan on banning atomic and hydrogen bombs. Meanwhile, in order to quell the backlash
from the Bravo test, the US expressed its remorse over the incident on April 9 that year, and paid
compensation to the victims the following year.
38
Article 301.
39
Article 88.
Military Use and Scientific Research in EEZs 137
Therefore, it is questionable as to whether the freedom of military use is included

as is within the conventional freedom of the high seas. (That said, without the
context of the Convention’s provisions, and commenting only on the interpretation
of the phrase “peaceful usage,” similar to the Outer Space Treaty and the like, it can
be interpreted as such. In other words, it can be said that the interpretation that all
military use is not for peaceful purposes is the minority view. Thus, it must stand that
the prevailing interpretation is that military use that does not violate the UN Charter
is consistent with peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, there needs to be further consid-
eration of the significance of incorporating Article 88, in addition to the general
provision of Article 301.)
As already discussed, although an EEZ is a superjacent zone, it is not regarded as
having the same features as the high seas, and so military use of an EEZ by a foreign
country cannot be regarded as fundamentally the same as the right of all countries for
military use, as per the freedom of the high seas. Essentially, since it is not clear if
military exercises conducted in another country’s EEZ can be described as for
“internationally lawful uses,” countries must not conduct exceedingly dubious
military exercises in an EEZ. Any military exercises carried out in an EEZ without
prior consent will, at the very least, be viewed as unfriendly acts.
Scientific Research
The other principal freedom of the high seas stipulated in the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas is the freedom of scientific research. Part XIII was included in
UNCLOS from the perspective of international cooperation in marine research and
publishing and disseminating the findings resulting from it. All countries have the
right to conduct marine scientific research, provided it is “exclusively for peaceful
purposes.” However, scientific research itself does not constitute legal grounds for
asserting the claim to the marine environment and its resources.
The high seas stipulated in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas is all of the sea
not including the 3 nautical mile territorial sea of each nation and the internal waters.
However, as discussed earlier, a coastal State is able to expand its territorial sea
breadth up to 12 nautical miles, and furthermore, establish an EEZ up to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline. Consequently, the conventional zone for scientific research
is now primarily the EEZ of a coastal State, and hence the provisions of UNCLOS
exclusively apply to scientific research in an EEZ and continental shelf. In principle,
all countries and international organizations with the authority to conduct scientific
research have the right to carry out marine scientific research;40 such international
organizations include the Food and Agriculture Organization; Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
40
Article 238.
Cultural Organization; United Nations Environment Programme; International Mar-

itime Organization; and the World Meteorological Organization.
First, coastal States have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct scientific
research in their EEZ and on the continental shelf, and that research can only be
carried out with the consent of the coastal State. It has always been the case that
coastal States grant consent “in normal circumstances,” which may exist in spite of
the absence of diplomatic relations between the coastal State and the researching
State. It should be noted that coastal States may at their discretion withhold their
consent to the conduct of a marine scientific research project that has direct impact
on the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in its EEZ and continental
shelf.41
Next, research States and international organizations have a duty to provide
information to a coastal State at least 6 months prior to the scheduled start date of
the marine scientific research project. This information must fully describe the
project and include: the nature and objectives of the project; the method and
means to be used, including name, tonnage, type, and class of vessels, and a
description of scientific equipment; the precise geographical areas in which the
project is to be conducted; the expected date of first appearance and final departure
of the research vessels, or deployment of the equipment and its removal, as appro-
priate; the name of the sponsoring institution, its director, and the person in charge of
the project; and the extent to which it is considered that the coastal State should be
able to participate or to be represented in the project. The research States and
international organizations may proceed with a marine scientific research project
6 months after the date upon which the required information was provided to the
coastal State.42 Furthermore, the research States and international organizations must
ensure the right of the coastal State, if it so desires, to participate or be represented in
the marine scientific research project, especially on board research vessels and other
craft or scientific research installations, when practicable.43
This is how marine scientific research is carried out in an EEZ and continental
shelf, namely by striking a balance between the rights of coastal States and the rights
of research States. In essence, however, a coastal State has sovereign rights in its
EEZ and continental shelf, and so a research State must act in accordance with the
principle of respecting its sovereign rights and jurisdiction.
Above all, it is paramount that marine scientific research is carried out not for the
national interest of one country, but for the interest of all humankind.
As for marine scientific research carried out in Japan’s EEZ and continental shelf,
domestic legislation on this matter requires the research States to publish the
research project details and results; this is both a right and a duty. Furthermore, a
coastal State has the right to request the suspension or completion of a research
project, and it can board a research vessel in its waters to check if the research is
41
Article 246.
42
Article 252.
43
Article 249.
1996 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act 139
being conducted in accordance with the information provided by the research

country.
1996 Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act
Enactment, Revision, and Abolition of Domestic Legislation

Pursuant to Japan’s Ratification of UNCLOS
In preparation to ratify UNCLOS, Japan first amended its 1977 Territorial Sea Act,
established a contiguous zone, and then established the Act on Amending the Act on
Territorial Waters and Contiguous Water Area44 which entered into force on July
20, 1996. The designated areas were set at the standard territorial sea breadth of
3 nautical miles, and the straight baseline method was newly adopted.45 The current
ordinance on the straight baseline method was put into force across the board on
January 1, 1997.
Japan then successively enacted the following legislation: Act on the Exclusive
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf;46 Act on the Exercise of the Sovereign Right
for Fishery, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone;47 and Act on the Preservation and
Control of Living Marine Resources.48 The Act on the Exercise of the Sovereign
Right for Fishery, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone led to the abolishment49 of
the aforementioned Act on Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters.50 All
of these laws were put into force from July 20, 1996, when UNCLOS entered into
force in Japan (Fig. 5.3).
In short, all of these laws led to Japan adopting the straight baseline method for its
territorial sea, and fully establishing an EEZ. As for the living resources in the waters
and continental shelf on the perimeter of the EEZ designated in the Act on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, according to the Act on the
Exercise of the Sovereign Right for Fishery, etc. in the Exclusive Economic Zone,
“the provisions of Article 3 through to the preceding Article shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the Fishery, the harvest of aquatic animals and plants, and the Survey
pertaining to sedentary species,”51 and “Japan shall have the primary interest and
responsibility under 1 of Article 66 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
44
June 14, 1996, Act No. 73.
45
Enforcement ordinance of the Act on Territorial Waters and Contiguous Water Area (1977
Ordinance No. 210, last revised on December 28, 2001 Ordinance No. 434).
46
June 14, 1996, Act No. 74.
47
June 14, 1996, Act No. 76.
48
June 14, 1996, Act No. 77.
49
Article 3 of the Annex of the same Act.
50
1977, Act No. 31.
51
Article 14.
Fig. 5.3 Japan’s Straight Baseline
the Sea even in the sea area outside the Exclusive Economic Zone with regard to
anadromous stock that lay eggs in Japan’s inland water.”52
52
Article 15.
Adoption of the Straight Baseline Method

for the Territorial Sea
The straight baseline method came into force in Japan from January 1, 1997. As
discussed previously, the outer limit of the territorial sea line at any point is the line
that is equidistant from the closest point above the baseline. Normally, the baseline is
the low-water line along the coast, as marked on the large-scale charts officially
recognized by a coastal State. However, if the coastline is deeply indented or cut
into, or if there is a series of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, straight
baselines may be used to join appropriate points along the coastline. The principle
behind this is the ICJ ruling on the 1951 Fisheries Case concerning a conflict of
interests between the Norwegian coastal fishery and the UK pelagic trawler fishery.
The particular problem in this case was Norway’s two coves with an entrance of
over 40 nautical miles. It was ruled that the baseline of these waters was within a
rational limit from the general direction of the coast, and furthermore the fishery in
these waters was indispensable to the livelihood of the citizens and a long-
established customary practice. The wording of this ruling was adopted as is in the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; it was also
emulated in the 1982 UNCLOS. Japan did not adopt the straight baseline method
until the law was revised in 1996. The Convention established a category for
archipelagic nations, including both coastal archipelagos and oceanic archipelagos
such as Indonesia, and recognized the adoption of a maximum 125 nautical mile
straight baseline (archipelagic baseline) for such countries.
Incidents Involving Foreign Fishing Vessels Operating in New

Territorial Seas
On September 11, 1998, the Hiroshima High Court ruled on nine incidents involving
ROK fishing vessels that were detained by the Japan Coast Guard for operating in
the new territorial sea off the Hamada coast in Shimane Prefecture, which extended
to 12 nautical miles from the straight baseline. In five of these cases a summary order
for the payment of a fine was issued, in two cases a suspended indictment was issued,
and the remaining two cases are currently still on trial for the violation of foreign
fishery regulations.53
Regarding the August 15, 1997 ruling of the Hamada branch of the Matsue
District Court on the incident involving an ROK fishing vessel that was detained
in the new territorial sea off the Hamada coast in Shimane Prefecture, although the
waters in which the vessel was operating became part of the territorial sea from
January 1997 onwards, the area was still outside Japan’s fishery zone stipulated in
53
Sankei Shimbun, September 11, 1998, evening edition.
the 1965 Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement. Hence, as the Agreement stated that the
flag State has the right of regulation in the waters outside the fishery zone, the Court
concluded “the treaty of the Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement takes precedence over
the domestic legislation of the amended Territorial Sea Act; therefore, the jurisdic-
tion does not cover the waters in which the vessels were detained”; the case was then
dismissed.54
Conversely, in the June 24, 1998 ruling of the Nagasaki District Court on the
incident involving an ROK fishing vessel that was detained while operating in the
new territorial sea off the Gotō coast in Nagasaki Prefecture, irrespective of the
Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement, Japan was deemed to have the right of regulation
and jurisdiction in the new territorial sea that had been extended by adopting the
straight baseline method in accordance with Article 2(1) of the enforcement ordi-
nance of the new Territorial Sea Act that came into effect in January 1997.55
Although the defendant appealed the ruling, the appeal was dismissed by the
Fukuoka High Court on April 28, 1999.
The prosecutor appealed the ruling of the Hamada branch of the Matsue District
Court. The ruling of the Matsue branch of the Hiroshima High Court on September
11, 1998 stated, “the jurisdiction of Japan in the new territorial sea is a matter of
course under international law, and is not subject to the limitations of the Japan-ROK
Fishery Agreement”; consequently, the first ruling was annulled, and the trial
returned to the Matsue District Court, upon which the defendant immediately filed
a final appeal.
Although the ruling of the Hamada branch of the Matsue District Court recog-
nized the right of a coastal State to exercise its sovereign right in the territorial sea, it
also interpreted Article 4(1) of the Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement as a provision that
limits Japan’s right of regulation and jurisdiction, despite the fact that it was only
later on that the waters outside the fishery zone were designated part of the territorial
sea. In other words, in cases limited only to fishery, the ruling interpreted this
provision as renouncing Japan’s right to exercise its sovereign right in the territorial
sea in the waters outside the fishery zone.
However, as was also stated by the Hiroshima High Court, this interpretation is
incorrect. As it stands now, until an EEZ is systemized, in international law the ocean
is divided into the territorial sea under the sovereignty of a coastal State, and the high
seas that are open for use by all people as a free zone which no country can claim as
its territory. It was also stipulated that a coastal State is able to establish a fishery
zone, where it can exercise exclusive jurisdiction in fishery, in a certain area of the
high seas that is contiguous to its territorial sea. Accordingly, as was recognized by
the Hiroshima High Court, it is not possible for this fishery zone to overlap with the
territorial sea. Within this certain area of the high seas that is contiguous to its
territorial sea, in addition to a fishery zone, a coastal State is able to establish a
54
See the morning editions of various Japanese newspapers on August 16, 1998 for more details.
55
Asahi Shimbun, June 25, 1998, morning edition; for details on the verdict see Hanrei jihō
(Chronicle of Legal Rulings) 1648: p. 158, and Hanrei taimuzu (Legal Ruling Times) 998: p. 279.
contiguous zone where it can exercise authority to “prevent infringement of its

customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or
territorial sea.”
At any rate, although a fishery zone creates some restriction of movement in the
high seas, it does not do so in a territorial sea, nor does it form an exception to the
territorial sea. The Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement regulates the high seas, and the
right of regulation and jurisdiction in the waters outside the fishery zone, namely the
high seas, are in accordance with the flag State doctrine as per the freedom of the
high seas principle. As such, the Agreement only confirmed that which is a matter of
course in international law.
In regard to Japan’s current use of the straight baseline method, the ruling of the
Hamada branch of the Matsue District Court raised some questions on legality in its
relation to the duty of consultation stipulated in the provision of Article 1 of the
Japan-ROK Fishery Agreement. However, the ROK is also a party to UNCLOS, and
hence follows the Convention in legally expanding its territorial sea. Therefore, there
are no particular problems in terms of the procedures taken. There are currently over
70 countries around the world (compared to only 21 in 1977 when the original
Territorial Sea Act was enacted), including Japan’s neighbors the ROK and China,
that have adopted the straight baseline method. Although, as was stated in the ruling
on the previously discussed Norway Fisheries Case, “The delimitation of waters is
normally of an international nature, and therefore cannot be in accordance solely
with the intentions of a coastal State as expressed in its domestic law.” In that sense,
it does not mean one cannot argue whether Japan’s adoption of the straight baseline
method is appropriate in light of international law.
However, in this incident, it was also stated in the opposing argument to the
appellant’s (original defendant) written reason for an appeal on January 27, 1998
(1997, c., no. 32), “As a lawyer, in this appeal I will not argue if the Act on Territorial
Waters and Contiguous Water Area is legal in accordance with the provisions of
UNCLOS.” Therefore, since the use of the straight baseline method was not argued,
it was deemed a matter of course in international law for a coastal State to exercise its
sovereign right in its territorial sea within a set zone from the baseline. As such, the
ruling of the Hamada branch of the Matsue District Court was deemed an incorrect
interpretation due to insufficient knowledge of rudimentary treaty law and the law of
the sea.
In the final appeal, the defendant completely reversed his position and argued the
legality of Japan’s adoption of the straight baseline method, stating, “At present
(1998), Japan’s straight baseline consists of a total 194 points spanning the country’s
entire coast. When analyzing this by similar examples, 60% are baselines set mostly
due to the existence of islands, 32% are baselines set according to the complexity of
the coastline, and 8% are baselines set by the closing line of a bay entrance. In terms
of length, the most common is baselines of under 10 nautical miles with 100 points,
while baselines of 40 nautical miles and over have 21 points, baselines of 24 nautical
miles and under have 117 points, and baselines over 24 nautical miles have
46 points.” Furthermore, the defendant asserted that the straight baseline of the
zone in question in this incident was not set in accordance with the standards
stipulated in UNCLOS, and hence could not be regarded as legal in international

law. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the final appeal with the ruling of “the
appeal is simply a claim of the violation of the law, including a breach of the
Constitution, and therefore does not constitute a grounds for appeal in accordance
with Article 405 of the Criminal Procedure Code.”56
Treatment of the Seabed Zone in the Act on the Exclusive

Economic Zone and Continental Shelf
Article 1(1) of the Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf states,
“In accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), there is hereby established the exclusive economic zone, as a zone in
which Japan exercises its sovereign rights and other rights as a coastal State as
prescribed in Part V of UNCLOS.” This is clearly a provision stipulating the new
establishment of an EEZ. Meanwhile, Article 2 confirms the content of a continental
shelf, stating “The continental shelf over which Japan exercises its sovereign rights
and other rights as a coastal State in accordance with UNCLOS (the continental
shelf) comprises the seabed and its subsoil subjacent to the following areas of the
sea.”
According to Article 1(2) of the Act, an EEZ “comprises the areas of the sea
extending from the baseline of Japan (as defined in the amended Act on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone) to the line every point of which is
200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the baseline of Japan (excluding
therefrom the territorial sea) and its subjacent seabed and its subsoil.” It also states
the median line to be the line between Japan and the foreign coast that is opposite the
coast of Japan. Furthermore, if there is such a median line (or a substitute line for the
median line, which is agreed upon between Japan and a foreign country), an EEZ is
the area of the sea extending up to the agreed upon line and its subjacent seabed and
subsoil. Article 2 first stipulates the continental shelf to be the seabed and its subsoil
extending 200 nautical miles from the baseline of Japan, or the median line (or a
substitute line for the median line) as mentioned in Article 1. Article 2 also stipulates
the continental shelf to be “the areas of the sea adjacent seaward to the areas of the
sea referred to in the preceding subparagraph (limited to the part of the sea delimited
by the line every point of which is 200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the
baseline of Japan), as prescribed by Cabinet Order in accordance with Article 76 of
UNCLOS” (Fig. 5.4)57
56
Supreme Court of Japan. Saikōsai keiji hanrei shū (Collection of Supreme Court Rulings) 53, No.
8, p. 1045.
57
With regard to the continental shelf that extends beyond 200 nautical miles, Japan conducted
scientific research and submitted a report to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
on November 12, 2008. In the August/September session of the Commission, a subcommittee was
E E E E E E
Mogikaizan area
Shikoku basin area
Ogasawara plateau area

Minamitorishima area
Southern area of Okinodaitō ridge

Minami Iwojima area
Southern area of Kyushu-Palau ridge
E E E E E E
Fig. 5.4 Japan’s Continental Shelf Zone Beyond 200 Nautical Miles
According to the above, the continental shelf as stipulated in Japanese law is

firstly a designated area of the sea, and the seabed and subsoil subjacent to it. This is
different from the continental shelf of a coastal State as stipulated in Article 76(1) of
UNCLOS, which “comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.”
Basically, in Japanese law, the continental shelf is positioned as the seabed and
subsoil of the designated superjacent area of the sea; in that sense, it is based on the
assumption of this superjacent area being an EEZ.
Incidentally, Japan has not ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
although the continental shelf regime has been established as customary law and
appears to apply the concept of natural prolongation as grounds in the establishment
set up and deliberations were initiated. The final decision will be made after consultations with the
Commission.
of a continental shelf.58 However, as previously mentioned, this concept does not

exist in Japanese law, and a continental shelf is simply defined as the seabed and
subsoil subjacent to an EEZ. Thus, if nothing else, it can be said that a continental
shelf within a 200 nautical mile area has no relevance as a continental shelf in
customary law.
Principle of Delimitation in the Act on the Exclusive Economic

Zone and Continental Shelf
According to Article 1(2) of the Act, an EEZ “comprises the areas of the sea
extending from the baseline of Japan (as defined in the amended Act on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone) to the line every point of which is
200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the baseline of Japan (excluding
therefrom the territorial sea) and its subjacent seabed and its subsoil.” It also states
the median line to be the line between Japan and the foreign coast that is opposite the
coast of Japan. Furthermore, if there is such a median line (or a substitute line for the
median line, which is agreed upon between Japan and a foreign country), an EEZ is
the area of the sea extending up to the agreed upon line and its subjacent seabed and
subsoil. Furthermore, Article 2 states the continental shelf to be the seabed and its
subsoil extending 200 nautical miles from the baseline of Japan, or the median line
(or a substitute line for the median line) as mentioned in Article 1. Article 2(2) also
stipulates the continental shelf to be “the areas of the sea adjacent seaward to the
areas of the sea referred to in the preceding subparagraph (limited to the part of the
sea delimited by the line every point of which is 200 nautical miles from the nearest
point on the baseline of Japan), as prescribed by Cabinet Order in accordance with
Article 76 of UNCLOS.”
Although the Act does not include any specific clauses on delimitation, Articles
1 and 2 clearly specify the median line to be “the line every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest point on the baseline of Japan, and the nearest point on
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea pertaining to the foreign
coast which is opposite the coast of Japan is measured.” Originally, the median line
has also been defined in parentheses as “a substitute line for the median line, which is
agreed upon between Japan and a foreign country”; hence, although it is a median
line in principle, it can be regarded as a line that is determined through diplomatic
negotiations and by taking into consideration a range of circumstances.
This has been a traditional assertion of Japan, and one that is clearly adopted in
domestic legislation as a delimitation method for defining borders with adjacent
countries. In that sense, the concept of natural prolongation has no longer been
regarded as relevant since the emergence of a 200 nautical mile EEZ. As is known,
Articles 74 (EEZ) and 83 (continental shelf) of UNCLOS include provisions on
58
See the ICJ judgment on the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.
delimitation that state in paragraph 1, “the delimitation of the exclusive economic

zone (continental shelf) between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be
effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable
solution.”
Changing Relevance of the “Median Line” Claim
In regard to the issue of delimitation of the continental shelf, Japan belongs to the
“equidistant median line” group, as opposed to the “natural prolongation principle”
group with the ROK and other countries.
Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf stipulates that delim-
itation of the continental shelf as being determined by the agreement of the
concerned States. Specifically, “[w]here the same continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the
boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined
by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median
line . . .”59 In reality, however, until the 1969 ICJ rulings on the North Sea Conti-
nental Shelf cases, and even afterwards, there have been numerous international
agreements concluded on the basis of an equidistant median line.60
Incidentally, although agreements based on an equidistant median line were
concluded between countries for the North Sea continental shelf, in the course of
negotiations involving West Germany and its neighbors Denmark and the Nether-
lands, West Germany asserted the just and equitable share of an undelimited area,
while the other two countries insisted on using the equidistance method. The three-
nation dispute reached the ICJ in 1967, with the Court ruling that the continental
shelf is the appurtenance of a coastal State, and in accordance with its rights, the
continental shelf comprises the area of natural prolongation in the direction of the sea
of the coastal State’s land domain. The Court ruled that this fact is rooted in the
sovereignty of the coastal State’s land territory, and it has always been as such.
Moreover, if the seabed area is not a part of the natural prolongation of the coastal
State’s territory, it does not belong to the coastal State irrespective of how close it
may be to the State’s territory. Accordingly, the equidistance method was clarified as
not being inherent to the continental shelf regime.61
59
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_continental_shelf.pdf.
60
For further details on a combined equidistance-special circumstances rule, see Serita, op. cit.
61
International Court of Justice. 1969. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, p. 3.
Fig. 5.5 Median Line of the East China Sea

Okinawa Trough
Okinawa Trough
1 ,000m
Ryūkyū Trench
Natural prolongation
5,000m
Median line
As for the East China Sea, its continental shelf extends out from the continent
until the Pacific Ocean side beyond the Ryūkyū Islands spanning the southern tip of
Kyūshū to Taiwan. At the northeast end of the East China Sea on the northwest side
of the Amami Islands lies the approximately 1000 m deep Okinawa Trough, while
on its northwest side facing the Pacific Ocean is the Ryūkyū Trench reaching a depth
of 5000 m (Fig. 5.5).
“This continental shelf extends from the direction of China and the Korean
Peninsula towards Japan in the east and right in front of the Ryūkyū Islands. It is a
large, initial back-arc rifting basin stretching out toward the Pacific Ocean, and
beyond it lies the Ryūkyū Islands. This is Japan’s understanding of this single
continental shelf” . . . hence, “Japan regards the median line method as appropriate
for delimitation.”62 The ROK’s response was to assert its continental shelf to be the
area extending to the Okinawa Trough, in accordance with the principle of natural
prolongation of land territory; namely, the continental shelf ended at the large, initial
back-arc rifting basin, as described by Japan. A joint development zone was subse-
quently set up in the overlapping area based on the assertions of Japan and the ROK,
with both countries then concluding the Southern Part Agreement.63
This is how the median line used in the delimitation of a continental shelf became
a marker denoting the boundary beyond which a coastal State could not assert its
rights. Correspondingly, Article 57 of UNCLOS recognized the right of a coastal
State to extend its EEZ up to 200 nautical miles, and the overlapping area in which
62
House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 1, 1977.
63
Mizukami, op. cit.
both countries could assert their rights for up to 200 nautical miles is the appropriate
area for delimitation. The median line method is one method of dividing the area of
overlapping claims.
Japan’s domestic legislation of the Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf states that an EEZ is the area of the sea extending up to 200 nautical
miles from the baseline of Japan; it also stipulates that it extends up to the median
line or agreed upon line between Japan and an adjacent foreign country. However,
this median line is merely a line provisionally drawn in the absence of an agreement,
as was expressed in the ICJ ruling on the Jan Mayen case64 that the conjoint conduct
of both Parties of restraining the exercise of jurisdiction beyond the median line
cannot be interpreted to mean that a delimitation line has already been defined.
Accordingly, the ICJ independently determined the delimitation line for both coun-
tries in this case.
In the case that the countries concerned are unable to reach an agreement, the
median line used in the delimitation of a continental shelf effectively becomes a line
for limiting a country’s claim. In contrast, the median line used in the delimitation of
an EEZ is the line that curtails the exercise of a country’s jurisdiction. This difference
in the nuance of assertions on the median line must be recognized in discussions of
this matter (Fig. 5.6).
64
A delimitation dispute over an approximately 250 nautical mile area of water between Denmark’s
territory of Greenland and Norway’s territory of the solitary Jan Mayen Island (no resident
population). In June 1980, Denmark extended its 200 nautical mile fishery zone, which it partially
established in 1976, as far as the east coast of Greenland. Although it did not exercise its fishery
jurisdiction beyond the median line in accordance with its relation to Jan Mayen Island, in 1981
Denmark fully asserted its rights in the entire 200 nautical mile fishery zone. Meanwhile, in May
1980, Norway established a 200 nautical mile fishery zone surrounding Jan Mayen Island; however,
in accordance with its relation to Greenland, Norway did not extend its zone beyond the median
line. Subsequently, from June 1980 to August 1981, the median line was the effective delimitation
line for both countries in exercising their fishery jurisdiction.
GREENLAND SEA
Shannon Island
GREENLAND H
Zone 3
K
O
Zone 2
L I
N
J
E
Zone 1
X JAN MAYEN
G F
Scoresby Sund
D
M
C B
T
AI
S TR
K
AR
E NM
D NORWEGIAN SEA
Kolbeinsey
ICELAND
Fig. 5.6 Border between Greenland and Jan Mayen. Created by Serita from maps 1 and 2 of the
lines drawn in the Judgment. A-X represents the 200 nautical mile line from Jan Mayen, A-I-J-B
represents the 200 nautical mile line from Greenland, and A-K-L-D represents the median line
parts of it.
Chapter 6
Exclusive Economic Zones Between Japan
and the Republic of Korea, and Japan and
China
Main Causes of Difficulties with Demarcation of Boundaries
In principle, the obstacles to determining the boundaries of the exclusive economic

zones (EEZs) between Japan and China and between Japan and the Republic of
Korea (ROK) are that firstly, China is contesting Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over
the Senkaku Islands, and secondly, that the ROK occupies Takeshima, over which
Japan asserts its sovereignty.
Furthermore, as a State practice, continental shelf boundary delimitation serves as
a reference when delimiting the boundaries of EEZs, but “islands” on continental
shelves are known to significantly affect boundary delimitations. Nevertheless, if
looked at from the perspective of what impact and effect “islands” have had, there
are discrepancies in the assertions respective States make with regard to the effect
“islands” have when delimiting boundaries.1 Above all else, islands that are in the
middle of disputes cannot be considered as a datum point for delimiting boundaries.
In other words, such islands are assigned no effect whatsoever in boundary
delimitations.
Furthermore, looked at from the perspective of international law, Takeshima and
the Senkaku Islands may well fall under this category.
Additionally, according to Article 121, Paragraph 3 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), “Rocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf.” Under international law, an “island” is “a naturally
formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,”2 so
even if an area that is only around the size of two tatami mats (equivalent in size to a
double bed) is above the water at high tide (as is the case with Okinotorishima
1
For details, see Serita, Kentarō. 1999. Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei (Sover-
eignty over Islands and the Delimitation of Economic Zones). Tokyo: Yūshindo Kōbunsha.
2
UNCLOS, Article 121, Paragraph 1.
© Kreab K.K. 2023 153

154 6 Exclusive Economic Zones Between Japan and the Republic of Korea,. . .
Island), it constitutes an island that possesses territorial seas, an EEZ, and a conti-
nental shelf. “Rocks” do not constitute “islands,” however. Even so, there is no
definition of “rocks” in UNCLOS, and definitions of “rocks” are extremely varied.3
If Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands are considered to constitute rocks, then they
will have no impact on boundary delimitations. In addition, where islands are
concerned, there also appear to be conflicting interpretations regarding the effects
that they exert, including which of the islands that exist between two countries
should be taken as datum points, and whether they should be considered to have a
100% effect or a 50% effect.4
Gap Between the Claims of Japan and the ROK
Incidentally, in the negotiations between the ROK and Japan, for argument’s sake, if
the ROK side were to propose a compromise and state that “Dokdo (i.e., Takeshima)
corresponds to what are called ‘rocks’ in UNCLOS, so it is not necessary to take
Dokdo into consideration,” would the Japanese side be able to accept this compro-
mise proposal?
The answer is probably “no.” That is because from Japan’s standpoint, it would
have to consider what the repercussions of accepting this proposal would be. In other
words, what ramifications would it have for the Senkaku Islands? Moreover, what
ramifications would it have for the remote Okinotorishima Island, far off in the
Pacific Ocean? Because given that Takeshima is about the size of Hibiya Park in
Tokyo, if the island were designated as “rocks” then it would clearly be untenable to
argue that Okinotorishima Island, an area only about the size of two tatami mats at
high tide, were not. Furthermore, if Okinotorishima Island were “rocks,” it could
result in the loss of the extensive EEZ that Japan currently possesses.5
Then again, as has already been demonstrated, fishing zones and EEZs are
different, and so Okinotorishima Island would no doubt retain the “200 nautical
mile fishing zone” established under international customary law.6 In light of the fact
that no country has been protesting the domestic legislative measures that Japan
adopted after UNCLOS entered into force, it could be argued that Okinotorishima
3
Serita, op. cit.
4
See Serita, op. cit.
5
“Koto Okinotorishima ga kieru—gyogyō suiiki 400,000 heihō kiro ushinau osore (The Risk of
Okinotorishima Island Disappearing and the Loss of 400,000 Square Kilometers of Fishing
Grounds),” Kobe Shimbun, September 2, 1987; “Ryōdo, tetsu no gādo sakusen (Strategy for the
Ironclad Guarding of Japan’s Territories),” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 21, 1988, evening edition;
“Burokku 8950-ko de hōi—Okinotorishima, keizai suiiki 400,000 heihō kiro no meiun nigiru
(Taking Control of the Fate of Okinotorishima Island and 400,000 Square Kilometers of Economic
Zone, with an 8950 Block Enclosure),” Yomiuri Shimbun, May 21, 1988, evening edition.
6
See the Preamble to UNCLOS: “Affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue
to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law,” etc.
Gap Between the Claims of Japan and the ROK 155
Island would continue to maintain an EEZ. Conversely, this hypothetical ROK

proposal could in itself potentially saddle the ROK side with problems also, such
as how Heuksando off the northwest coast of Jeju Island would be dealt with when
negotiating the boundary delimitations of the economic zone between the ROK and
China. That being the case, these are questions well worth asking even though
sufficient information does not exist.
What would the outcome be if the Japanese side were to propose that “Takeshima
is currently in dispute, so let’s both stop using it a datum point”? As already shown,
insofar as the ROK side adopts the position that the matter of Takeshima, which it
occupies, is not in dispute, the ROK would probably be unable to accept this
proposal.
However, when considered in this way, it appears to suggest that it would be
possible for Japan and the ROK to both agree to remove Takeshima (i.e., “Dokdo”)
as a datum point so long as the basis for doing so were not questioned. Thus, the
future is not necessarily completely bleak.
What would be the outcome if Takeshima (i.e., “Dokdo”) were acknowledged as
a datum point? In one case, full 100% effect would be given to the island in the
delimitation process; in another case, only partial (half) effect would be given to it,
following the example set in the arbitration decision over the channel between the
United Kingdom and France. In either case, because delimitation as ROK territory
and delimitation as Japanese territory would occur simultaneously, it would surely
give rise to overlapping areas of ocean where rights are claimed. Conceivably it
would be possible to propose to designate these areas of overlapping claims as joint
use maritime areas. However, this concept assumes that the ROK side recognizes
that the sovereignty over Takeshima (i.e., “Dokdo”) is in dispute, which the ROK
side would have difficulty accepting, it must be said. A joint use maritime area
concept that would be acceptable to the ROK would undoubtedly take the form of a
maritime area where claims overlap, and a form that recognizes a broader joint use
maritime area to take into account the track record of ROK’s fisheries industry, and a
form in which the influence or effect of Takeshima’s existence is not discernable.
Such a case would have to take the form of a jointly administered fisheries area, and
delimiting the boundaries of EEZs would be difficult.
In fact, as is discussed later, the new Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement that took
effect on January 22, 1999 was applied to both Japan’s and the ROK’s EEZs overall
and employed a regime of “reciprocal access” in which each country permits fishing
by the other country’s citizens in its own EEZ. However, a Provisional Measures
Zone (PMZ)—a maritime area where the reciprocal access measure is not adopted—
was established in part of the Sea of Japan as a result of the two sides being at a loss
over how to handle Takeshima and Yamatotai. Furthermore, they could not reach
agreement on how to determine a datum point in the East China Sea, and so a PMZ
was also established here. The agreement stipulates that boundary delimitation
negotiations will continue, but there are many difficulties.
Gap Between the Claims of Japan and China
The circumstances between Japan and China are the same as well. The Japanese
side’s assertion is that the median line is between the Senkaku Islands and the
Chinese mainland. China’s argument is vague at present, but like the ROK, China
too has been adopting the concept of natural prolongation in relation to continental
shelves. In reality, however, China is not behaving in a way that will deliberately
cause disputes in developing its continental shelf: it seems to be granting exploration
and prospecting rights for developing the continental shelf in areas of ocean that are
closer to the continent than the median line between the Senkaku Islands and the
China mainland. Incidentally, China enacted the Law on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone in February 1992, which designates Taiwan and islands such as
Uotsuri Island as Chinese territory. Japan immediately lodged an official protest
stating it could not accept this measure.
Bathymetric charts of Japan’s coastal waters show very clearly that the Nansei
Shotō Islands and the Ryūkyū Trench run from mainland China and Kagoshima to
Taiwan on either side of the East China Sea, and they face one another. As is widely
known, Point 67 (established in Article 2 of the Agreement Between Japan and the
Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the
Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries) is said to be the equidistant
midpoint of Japan, China, and the ROK. Furthermore, in the new Japan-China
Fisheries Agreement of September 1997, it was agreed that the coverage would be
north of 27° north latitude, the same as in the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement of
August 15, 1975, while the line at 30°40′ north latitude was designated as the
northern limit. In other words, care was taken that the agreements would not have
an impact on the equidistant midpoint of Japan, China, and the ROK (Fig. 6.1).
However, the southern limit of the 27° north latitude parallel was agreed upon in
the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement of 1975. Reportedly, this took into account
relations with Taiwan, since delineation between Japan and China north of this line
would not affect Taiwan. That being the case, this approach was probably followed
in this new agreement as well. However, even though this line is derived by drawing
a median line between Japan and China while ignoring the Senkaku Islands as a
datum point (as opposed to drawing a median line between the Senkaku Islands and
mainland China as the Japanese side argues for), more of the Japanese side’s portion
is designated as a joint-use maritime area, temporarily, than it would be if it was
based on a median line drawn between the Senkaku Islands and China by awarding
the Senkaku Islands full 100% effect and including the Japanese side’s portion (and
naturally including the Chinese side also). In any event, a temporary agreement
appears to have been reached within parameters where the Senkaku Islands would
not have a major impact, or rather, by setting the Senkaku Islands aside even while
acknowledging it. In that respect, it has to be said that delineating the boundaries of
the EEZs between Japan and China is extremely difficult.
7
30°46.2′ north latitude, 125°55.5′ east longitude; shown as Point E in Fig. 6.1.
Gap Between the Claims of Japan and China 157
125˚E Russia
China
ne
n li
2
tio
rca
ma
A´
A´
A
de
M
ry
lita
O L
Mi
N
38˚N 4
21
3
ROK
P K
5 B
Q 135˚30E
Japan
7 C J
6
9
10
13 D
R
11
12
S
14 a E j
30˚N
15 H
F 135˚E
g
1. Cape Povorotny; 2. Musudan; 3. Takeshima;
4. Hegurajima Island; 5. Changi Peninsula; 6. Nagao-ha-na
e
27˚N (Mishima Island); 7. Ulgi; 8. Shitazaki (Tsushima Island);
f 16
9. Jeju Island; 10. Saganoshima Island;
17 11. Torishima Island; 12. Higashijima (Mejima) Island;
19 18 13. Marado; 14. Yongampo; 15. Kitauoshima Island;
G
16. Torishima Island; 17. Sekibisho; 18. Uotsuri Island;
19. Mianhua Islet; 20. Yonaguni Island; 21. Saruyama Cape
20 (Noto Peninsula)
122˚E
Fig. 6.1 Continental shelf and exclusive economic zone borders, provisional measures zones,
hypothetical median lines, etc., in the Sea of Japan/East China Sea. (Source: Japan Coast Guard
Chart Application No. 140024)
New Fisheries Agreements Between Japan and China,

and Japan and the ROK, and the Establishment of PMZs
Regulations Leading up to the New Fisheries Agreements
In addition to Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese, these waters are fished by Taiwanese
and Russians. Japan and Russia already had a shared history in this regard from
1976, which marked the opening of the 200 nautical mile era. Japan’s Act on
Temporary Measures Concerning Fishery Waters of 1977 was applied to the Pacific
overall, and in the Sea of Japan, to the seas east of 135° east longitude only.
Furthermore, it only covered the citizens of Russia (then the Soviet Union).8 The
ROK and China had been regulated through the respective fisheries agreements.9
A fundamental flaw of bilateral treaties is that, by nature, they only regulate the
two countries, and cannot restrain third countries. As just mentioned, Japan’s fishery
zone was not enforced in the Sea of Japan west of 135° east longitude. Consequently,
it was not possible to control either Taiwanese or Chinese fishing boats fishing there.
Furthermore, the old Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement was concluded in the era of
12 nautical mile fishery zones, which meant that in principle, ROK fishing boats that
were in the high seas 12 nautical miles or further from each other’s territorial sea
baselines could only be controlled based on the flag State doctrine, in accordance
with the principles of international law. Self-regulatory measures were employed
between Japan and the ROK from 1980; in the seas in the vicinity of Hokkaido, ROK
trawlers were banned from operating within Japan’s otter trawl prohibition line, and
a self-restraint period was established for each ROK trawler. In the seas in the
vicinity of Western Japan, a fixed area of sea where trawl-fishing operations were
prohibited was added; guidance and supervision was strengthened, but there were
said to be constant violations.10 In other words, the situation could be described as
being almost completely uncontrolled from the standpoint of preserving fisheries
resources.
The same circumstances also exist in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, with a
mix of Japanese, Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese operating in these fishing
grounds, too. How to deal with Taiwan posed a problem in both the Japan-China
negotiations and the China-ROK negotiations. Accordingly, the Japan-China fish-
eries agreement was considered to only cover the area of ocean north of 27° north
latitude, an area not affected by Taiwan. The same is true of the latest Japan-China
fisheries agreement.
8
See Chapter 5, in particular the section on the 1977 Act on Temporary Measures Concerning
Fishery Waters onwards.
9
However, the Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement of 1965 ended in January 1999 and the new
agreement came into force. A new fisheries agreement between Japan and China was established
in November 1997.
10
This triggered calls to the Government of Japan from Japanese fishermen for the Japan-ROK
Fisheries Agreement to be revoked.
New Fisheries Agreements Between Japan and China, and Japan and the ROK,. . . 159
Provisional Measures Under the New Fisheries Agreements
In the negotiations on the new Japan-China Fisheries Agreement, one problem was
related to the Senkaku Islands and another problem was delineating the area of ocean
where the 200-mile EEZ claims overlap. As has already been shown, the principle of
boundary delimitations adopted in Japan’s Continental Shelf and EEZ Act is “up to
the median line” or “up to an agreed line” with the foreign country being faced. In
Japan’s boundary delimitations with China, however, reaching an agreement over
what should be taken as a datum point is difficult to begin with, and the two sides
even have opposing opinions on the “median line” itself. Agreeing on “an agreed
line” is also difficult. That being the case, setting the boundaries of the PMZ in the
areas of overlapping claims naturally proved challenging in the Japan-China nego-
tiations. The two sides’ opinions are said to have clashed in the negotiations, with the
Chinese side demanding broader boundaries to allow its current hauls to be
maintained, and the Japanese side keen to broaden the boundaries to which its
own jurisdiction extended.11
In the end, it was decided that the new agreement would apply to both Japan’s and
China’s EEZs overall (the previous agreement had only applied to the East China
Sea and part of the Yellow Sea).12 However, boundary delimitation of the EEZs did
not occur, and the PMZ was designated as being the area of ocean between a line at
30°40′ north latitude and a line of 27° north latitude, comprising an area of ocean
that excludes areas up to roughly 52 nautical miles from the baselines of both
countries’ territorial seas.13 The excluded waters are the countries’ respective
EEZs, and the agreement states14 that to operate there requires the permission,
etc., of the partner country, as stipulated in UNCLOS. In the PMZ, the flag State
doctrine is employed so the supervisory authority lies with the flag State; however,
management of fisheries and marine resources is to be carried out jointly.15 A
Japan-China Joint Fisheries Committee, newly established under Article 11 of the
new agreement, oversees specific regulatory measures. The area south of 27° north
latitude and water area west of 125°30′ east longitude to the south of the East China
Sea (excluding the People’s Republic of China’s EEZ in the East China Sea) had not
been covered by the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement in the past; in the new
agreement, it was decided that “essentially the existing fisheries order will be
maintained,” and so the area was considered to be outside the coverage of the coastal
State principle.
11
See articles published on September 4, 1997 in the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun,
respectively.
12
New China-Japan Fisheries Agreement, Article 1.
13
More accurately, the waters enclosed by a line formed by using a series of straight lines to connect
the 11 points cited in Paragraph 1, Article 7 of the Agreement.
14
New China-Japan Fisheries Agreement, Article 1 and 2.
15
Ibid., Article 7, Paragraphs 2 and 3.
But what about the area of ocean between Japan and the ROK? For a clear
understanding of the points at issue, it is worthwhile examining the points that were
in question on September 5, 1998, when the Japan-ROK negotiations reached their
final stages, based on newspaper reports that had appeared up to then. It can probably
be surmised from the reports that in principle, as with the new Japan-China Agree-
ment, the applicable water area under the new Japan-ROK agreement was consid-
ered to be all of the EEZs of both Japan and the ROK, with a PMZ to be established
in areas of ocean where the EEZs overlapped.
To begin with, one point that the two countries were conceivably in agreement on
was that the line delineating the Sea of Japan’s central portion is the median line of
North Korea, the ROK, Russia, and Japan. (This is based on the arguments that
appeared in newspaper reports16 before the Japanese side announced in January
1998 that the agreement had been completed, in other words, during the period when
the negotiations had broken down.) Where the lines of the ROK’s east coast and
Japan’s north coast are concerned, it appears that the ROK was asserting a line
34 nautical miles from the coast, while Japan was asserting a line 35 nautical miles
from the coast. The ROK asserted the eastern tip of the Sea of Japan to be at 136°
east longitude and Japan asserted it to be the 135th meridian east.17 Moreover,
according to one report,18 the compromise plan consisted of the Japanese side
accepting the ROK side’s argument regarding the boundaries west of 135° east
longitude, in return for the ROK accepting Japan’s proposal to set the eastern tip of
the PMZ as 135° east longitude. The other content of the agreement relates to issues
such as ensuring the previous fishing catch levels remain the same, as argued by the
ROK, and approaches to resource management within the PMZ.
What can be surmised from this is that the areas up to just over 35 nautical miles
from the respective coasts were considered to be the respective country’s EEZ, and
vessels operating there would require the approval, etc., of the partner country.
Furthermore, other areas of ocean west of 135° east longitude were designated to
be a PMZ where the flag State doctrine would apply and the supervisory authority
would lie with the flag State, but with management of fisheries and marine resources
to be conducted jointly. Where specific regulatory measures are concerned, as
before, an ROK-Japan joint fisheries committee was to be set up for that purpose.
Incidentally, there are no reports whatsoever mentioning the East China Sea from the
Tsushima Strait, but based on the line that was established in the Agreement
Between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Development of the
Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, a median line
would be drawn here, or alternatively because it involves boundary delimitation with
16
Asahi Shimbun, January 24, 1998, morning edition; Kōbe Shimbun, January 23, 1998, morning
edition.
17
Serita, Kentarō. 1998. “Nikkan gyogyo kyotei haki no ho to gaiko (Law and Diplomacy relating
to the Abolition of the Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement).” Jurist, March 15.
18
Kōbe Shimbun, August 31, 1998, morning edition.
China, it was considered to be an area of water excluded from the coverage of the
agreement. This is completely unclear from newspaper reports.
Therefore, after ratifying UNCLOS, Japan and the ROK began diplomatic nego-
tiations in May 1996 on the new Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement, which was an
outstanding issue for the two countries. Following a temporary suspension in those
negotiations, an agreement was reached early on the morning of September
25, 1998, and the negotiations concluded for the first time in 2 years and 9 months.
The agreement was subsequently signed on November 28 and entered into force on
January 22, 1999. This new Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement comprises a Preamble,
17 Articles that form the body of the agreement, and concluding clause, as well as
Annexes I and II, which form an indivisible part of the main agreement. Other related
documents include the agreed minutes, which record items relating to the areas of sea
established in the East China Sea, an exchange of notes concerning measures for
instances when vessels are operated in violation of the provisions of the agreement,
and a Japanese note concerning catch quotas for ROK citizens and fishing boats.
The areas of sea that this agreement applies to are considered to be the EEZs of
Japan and the ROK in their entirety.19 As with the New Japan-China Fisheries
Agreement, a regime of “reciprocal access” was adopted whereby each contracting
party permits the citizens and fishing boats of the other contracting party to fish
within its own EEZ.20 In areas of sea where the reciprocal access measure is not
adopted, a PMZ was established in part of the Sea of Japan and part of the East China
Sea.21 (According to Annex II, in this zone each country will respectively take
measures based on the flag State doctrine.)
135°30′ east longitude was designated as the eastern limit of the Sea of Japan’s
PMZ, but a portion north of 38°37 north latitude was protruded in order to include
Yamatotai, a good fishing area, in the PMZ.22 This resulted in approximately 45% of
Yamatotai being included in the PMZ, which is said to have angered Japanese
fishermen.
Additionally, the area of sea in the vicinity of Takeshima, which is an area of
mutually overlapping claims, was included in the PMZ in the Sea of Japan, and
portions of the EEZs that could be described as inherent to each party were also
included. Was this potentially influenced by the fact that Japan’s Act on Temporary
Measures Concerning Fishery Waters of 1977 had not established a 200 nautical
mile area of sea west of 135° east longitude? Additionally, is the PMZ’s legal status
the high seas? Incidentally, the latitude/longitude point of intersection at the 38°37′
north latitude and 131°40′ east longitude23 that is the western limit of the PMZ is
conceivably the median point between the ROK and the Democratic People’s
19
New Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement, Article 1.
20
Ibid., Article 2 to Article 6.
21
Ibid., Article 8 and 9.
22
Ibid., Article 9, Paragraph 1.
23
Shown as Point O in Fig. 6.1.
Republic of Korea (North Korea).24 Based on further conjecture, it is also possible to

imagine that conceivably, the apex of the protruded triangular portion is the median
point between Russia’s Cape Povorotny, Takeshima, and Saruyama Cape on the
Japan side, not Hegurajima Island on the Noto Peninsula coast, with the protruding
portion forming an isosceles triangle.25
Partly because the same line as the boundary established in the agreement
between Japan and the ROK Concerning the Establishment of the Boundary in the
Northern Part of the Continental Shelf was employed26 as the boundary of the two
countries’ EEZs, the end point in this agreement on the northern part of the
continental shelf (which is also the starting point of the Agreement Concerning
Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf) was adopted as the
starting point of the East China Sea’s PMZ.27 This can be thought of as the median
line linking the ROK’s Jeju Island and Torishima Island in Japan’s Danjo Archipel-
ago. However, where other points are concerned, although there appears to be
agreement between the two countries with regard to drawing median lines, the
northwest line is drawn slightly north of the line established in the Agreement
Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf, for
example. This conceivably reflects the Japanese side arguing for the ROK’s Marado
off the coast of Jeju Island and Japan’s Torishima Island as datum points, while the
southeast line conceivably reflects the ROK side arguing for its own Marado and
Ujishima Island and Kusagakishima Island as datum points and for Japan’s Danjo
Archipelago to be ignored. No agreement between the two countries over which
islands should be used as datum points can be detected, and as a result, conceivably,
the area where the countries’ claims overlap was designated as a PMZ. Incidentally,
the southern limit is only designated to be “north of the southernmost parallel of the
ROK’s EEZ.” Since it is not presented as a latitude, it is not necessarily clear. At the
same time, because Point 628 (established in Article 2 of the Agreement Concerning
Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf) is said to be the
median point between Japan, China, and the ROK, if this point were taken to be the
southernmost point of the ROK’s EEZ, the East China Sea PMZ established in the
Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement would be to the north of the PMZ established in the
Japan-China Fisheries Agreement, so the two areas of sea would not overlap.
In these PMZs in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, the two countries
decided that with regard to their own citizens and fishing boats29 they would take the
necessary measures to ensure appropriate management, including conserving living
24
At the same time, North Korea does not recognize the new Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement,
claiming it to be invalid.
25
Some areas of sea on the northern side of Points M, N, and O in Fig. 6.1 are excluded from the
coverage of the agreement under Appendix II.
26
New Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement, Article 7.
27
Ibid., Article 9, Paragraph 2.
28
Shown as Point E in Fig. 6.1.
29
New Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement, Appendix I.
marine resources and setting the maximum numbers of vessels by fishing category
that may operate there, in accordance with the decisions of the ROK-Japan Joint
Fisheries Committee.
Incidentally, decisions regarding the conditions, etc., for operating in each sea
area in 2010 were made at the Japan-China Joint Committee on Fisheries held in
Beijing in December 2009, and the Japan-ROK Fisheries Joint Committee held in
Seoul in February 2010.
parts of it.
Chapter 7
A Proposal for Stability and Coexistence
in East Asia
Acknowledging the Issues: Looking Squarely at the Causes

of Instability
Territorial disputes are inclined to make people emotional, lose their power of
reason, and lose their composure. Moreover, there are even those who exploit this
provocative effect that territorial disputes have on people, fiercely stirring up the
disputes with the nationalistic goal of inflaming the situations.
The factors causing instability between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK),
and Japan and China include a number of issues relating to Japan’s former colonial
rule such as the problem of the perceptions of history and the textbook issue, as well
as the issue of Japanese prime ministers visiting Yasukuni Shrine, where war
criminals are enshrined. However, the disputes relating to Takeshima and the
Senkaku Islands, insofar as they are territorial problems, are major flashpoints that
will not readily disappear. Furthermore, untangling the knotted threads of this issue
will require an extraordinary effort given that it also involves the utilization of both
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the
vicinity of these islands. A thorough examination of the respective facts and what
surrounds them should yield some clues as to resolving these problems, however.
As is well known and as has already been noted, the Senkaku Islands suddenly
came to the attention of the countries of the world after a scientific seafloor survey by
the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East raised the possibility of a
deposit of crude oil resources in the continental shelf of the East China Sea. In
considering how to go about reaching a desirable solution, it will be necessary to
return to this starting point. Furthermore, what triggered Takeshima to emerge as a
problem was the ROK’s attempt to use the Syngman Rhee Line to preserve its
fishery resources by standing up to, and shutting out of its coastal sea areas, Japanese
fishing boats whose superior technical strengths were enabling them to operate off
the coast of the Korean Peninsula and catch large quantities of fish. These develop-
ments coincide with a general trend in post-World War II international law of the sea
© Kreab K.K. 2023 165

166 7 A Proposal for Stability and Coexistence in East Asia
of coastal States seeking to secure the use of maritime resources, particularly fishery
resources and oil resources.
Where fishery resources are concerned, we have managed to conclude a new
Japan-China Fisheries Agreement and a new Japan-ROK Fisheries Agreement for
the 200 nautical mile era, and to establish Provisional Measures Zones (PMZs), for
the time being, and efforts are being made to have a clearer outlook for managing
and preserving those resources. Accordingly, the major problem that remains in the
East Asia ocean area is the development of the continental shelf in the vicinity of the
Senkaku Islands and the struggle between Japan and China over the continental
shelf. In other words, behind the problem of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands
lies the problem of continental shelf boundary delimitation in connection with the
exploitation of petroleum, as well as marine resources surveys in economic zones.
This is the biggest challenge.
Neither, however, can these two new fisheries agreements escape the constraints
that arise from bilateral treaties, namely, that treaties only impose obligations on the
State parties to the treaties. In other words, the Japan-China agreement naturally
applies to Japanese and Chinese fishing boats: it establishes that in the PMZs the
State parties have supervisory authority over their own vessels and can caution the
partner State’s vessels, but it does not apply to ROK or Taiwanese fishing boats. In
this respect it is insufficient from the standpoint of preserving resources and con-
serving the environment. In the same way, the Japan-ROK agreement applies to
ROK and Japanese fishing boats, but Chinese and Taiwanese fishing boats also
operate in the sea areas that the agreement covers. The problems of resource
management, resource preservation, and environmental conservation will not be
resolved by Japan and the ROK alone. As the fishermen know from daily experience,
in the field of fishery resources utilization unstable factors also remain.
In the interests of resolving these problems on a realistic basis and in a future-
oriented way, I present the following two proposals, which are based on the out-
comes of the issues that have been considered up to Chapter 6. The first proposal is to
establish a Senkaku Islands nature reserve and a Takeshima nature reserve. The other
proposal is that Japan, China, the ROK, and Taiwan should set up joint fishing areas,
as an international regime for conserving the resources and environment in the Sea of
Japan, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea. The aim of these proposals is to make Japan
a stable presence that is trusted in East Asia and the world.
Acknowledging the Issues: Looking Squarely at the Causes of Instability 167
Establishing the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima Nature

Reserves
Other Countries’ Precedents for Dealing with Island Territories
While keeping the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima in mind, we shall now examine
treaties that have addressed and resolved problems of sovereignty over islands in
conjunction with continental shelf boundary delimitation.1
The first is the agreement between Abu Dhabi and Qatar reached on March
20, 1969. A territorial problem existed between the two countries with regard to
three islands: Lasahat (Al Ashat), Shura’awa (Shara’iwah), and Daiyina (Dayyinah).
Qatar and Abu Dhabi are adjacent to each other. Daiyina is slightly larger than the
other two islands, and it flanks a median line. As a result of negotiations, it was
decided that the first two islands, which lie toward Qatar, would be designated as
Qatar’s territory, and that they would be completely disregarded as datum points
when undertaking continental shelf boundary delimitation. Daiyina, however, would
be permitted to have 3 nautical mile territorial waters (Qatar and Abu Dhabi both
have 3 nautical mile territorial waters). Accordingly, the agreed line is a median line
that ignores the presence of the three islands, but with a circular projection to the
Qatar side, around the circumference of Daiyina.
The second case is the Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of
Papua New Guinea concerning matters of sovereignty and maritime boundaries in
the area known as the Torres Strait, and related matters, which was signed in Sydney
on December 18, 1978. The islands in the Torres Strait remained Australian territory
even after Papua New Guinea became independent, but three islands, namely Boigu,
Daunan, and Saibai, were problematic. In all cases the islands are separated from the
Australian mainland by distances of 140 km or more, but they are less than 4 km
away from the coast of Papua New Guinea, and around 700 people live on them.
Following negotiations, it was decided that these three islands’ territorial waters
would be 3 nautical miles, even if Australia’s territorial waters were extended to
12 nautical miles in the future.
What is extremely interesting to note is that the decision resolved four problems
altogether—not simply the problem of sovereignty but also the delimitation of the
continental shelf, the allocation of fishing zones, and the preservation of the indig-
enous people’s lifestyle—while using a different method for resolving each. The
continental shelf’s boundary line runs close to Papua New Guinea, but the above-
mentioned islands are completely disregarded as datum points. The boundaries of
the fishing zones are taken to be the boundaries of the continental shelf, but special
judicial authority is established for both countries. To the extent that at one point
there was reportedly a proposal to try to make these three islands into a nature
reserve, both countries have a duty to preserve and conserve the environment, and
1
See Chapter 1 of Serita, Kentarō. 1999. Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei
(Sovereignty over Islands and the Delimitation of Economic Zones). Tokyo: Yūshindo Kōbunsha.
mining and commercial fishing are regulated so that traditional fishing by the
indigenous people is not interfered with.
In considering the problem of the Senkaku Islands, these two treaties may seem
too different to be able to serve as references, given the different circumstances of the
countries concerned, the different circumstances that the islands are in, and the
different positional relations of the islands at issue. Nevertheless, in terms of
providing clues for resolving problems, these treaties are certainly not lacking in
value.
Next it is worthwhile to examine the significance of islands in relation to
continental shelf boundary delimitation.
As illustrated in Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei, practices differ
by country, and through various proposals at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea as well as some State practices and international precedents,
some standards are provided respectively for the size of islands, their position,
population, political and economic status, and so on. Of those standards, based on
international judicial precedents that emphasize the geography itself, it can be
surmised that the “size” of an island and its “position” are of considerable impor-
tance. As is well known, Article 121, Paragraph 3 of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates that “Rocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic
zone or continental shelf.” No definition of any kind is offered for the “rocks” cited
here. However, without the addition of artificial means, the Senkaku Islands and
Takeshima could not conceivably sustain human habitation.
When the influence and effects that islands exert on continental shelf boundary
delimitation are classified on the basis of continental shelf boundary delimitation
treaties and other such agreements that countries have concluded thus far, it reveals
the following:
1. Islands within a country’s own territorial waters and/or running alongside its
coast qualify as datum points.
2. When the island in question is located around the median line, which is provi-
sionally drawn without considering the existence of the island, that island is either
completely disregarded as a datum point or is granted territorial waters only.
3. In the case of a solitary island in distant seas, such as Rockall Island in British
territory, claiming a continental shelf on the basis of that island alone is
problematic.
4. Islands that are far removed from the country concerned and close to another
country will have territorial seas only, and depending on the circumstances, the
territorial seas themselves will also be limited, as is stipulated in the treaty
between Australia and Papua New Guinea of December 18, 1978. Or alterna-
tively, the islands will have no territorial seas whatsoever, as with Argentina’s
small island of Martín García, which is on the Uruguayan side of a boundary line
established in a treaty between Argentina and Uruguay on November 19, 1973.
Incidentally, Martín García Island in Argentine territory agreed in the Argentina-
Uruguay treaty, is to be used exclusively as a nature reserve intended for the
Acknowledging the Issues: Looking Squarely at the Causes of Instability 169
conservation and preservation of indigenous flora and fauna, according to Article

45 of the treaty.
Characterization of the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima
It is possible to characterize the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima as islands under

dispute, as uninhabited islands, as islands far from a mainland, and as small islands
on and around a median line. In this regard, it must be noted that Tsushima Island
and Ikinoshima Island are considered as datum points for measuring the intermediate
line stipulated in the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea
concerning Establishment of Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental
Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries (Boundary Agreement), while Takeshima is
not taken into account whatsoever. In other words, disputed islands are disregarded
as datum points for delimitation of the continental shelf, meaning they have no effect
on delimitation.
Additionally, the Senkaku Islands are no more than uninhabited islands with a
total land area of a little over 6.3 km2, comprising the largest island, Uotsuri Island,
which has a land area of 4.32 km2, followed by Kōbisho (1.08 km2), Minamikojima
Island (0.46 km2), Kitakojima Island (0.31 km2), and Sekibisho (0.15 km2).
Takeshima meanwhile has a total land area of 0.23 km2. Tsushima’s Kamijima
Island, which was taken into account as a datum point in the Japan-ROK Boundary
Agreement, has around 40 times the land area of the Senkaku Islands, making it
roughly the same size as Iriomote Island or Ishigaki Island.
Understandably, there are islands that, based on their size, population, and
geographical location, cannot be completely disregarded when it comes to drawing
median lines, while neither is it possible to grant them full effect. In the case of the
Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration Award, a precedent existed in State
practice of a partial (half) effect approach being adopted, namely that Kharg Island,
an island in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, belongs to Iran. Kharg Island is located
approximately 17 miles off the coast of Iran and has a land area of approximately
20 km2. However, excepting cases where there is a resident population, conceivably
it is difficult to grant effect to an uninhabited island.
Under international law, it is possible to argue that both the Senkaku Islands and
Takeshima are in all cases islands. Namely, they are “a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” and consequently they
possess “an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.”2
Uotsuri Island is approximately 90 nautical miles from Iriomote Island and
approximately 120 nautical miles from Taiwan’s Keelung Port, while Takeshima
is a distance of 120 nautical miles from the Korean Peninsula and 115 nautical miles
from the Japanese mainland. At the same time, there are also examples of an island
that is far away from a main island being granted effect. The agreement reached
2
UNCLOS, Article 121, Paragraph 1 and 2.
between Indonesia and Malaysia on October 27, 1969 is one such case. Under this
agreement, even though Indonesia’s Natuna and Anambas islands in the Borneo Sea
are approximately 250 nautical miles away from the Borneo mainland, they are
granted full effect in delimiting the boundary of the continental shelf between the
Malay Peninsula and Sarawak.
Establishing Joint-Use Nature Reserves
The conclusion that we can reach from the above examination is that even if the
sovereignty disputes were resolved, there would have to be cumulative and seem-
ingly endless and futile debate in negotiating boundary delimitations, beginning with
the positioning of the datum points. Immeasurable amounts of energy and time
would have to be devoted to that.
Unnecessary discord could well emerge during that time. So, it would clearly be
more prudent to utilize that energy and time for mutual friendship. Accordingly, the
following are proposals for the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima.
The first proposal is the adoption of a collective approach to dealing with the
Senkaku Islands through the establishment of a nature reserve and the joint devel-
opment of the continental shelf.
Rather than Japan and China contesting the Senkaku Islands by both claiming the
continental shelf, they should deal with the issues all at once by making the Senkaku
Islands a nature reserve, thus redressing the overhunting of albatrosses, which once
inhabited the islands in such large numbers that they were dubbed “baka-dori”
(meaning “idiot birds” in Japanese, so called because they were so easy to catch),
while simultaneously developing the continental shelf jointly through economic
cooperation. It would undoubtedly be the best policy, since it would put to rest the
issue of the Senkaku Islands once again, and, as they apparently had in the past, both
Japan and China would mutually benefit from the joint development of the conti-
nental shelf in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. The only way to reach a final
resolution would be to deal with the related issues collectively, not only the territorial
right issue alone.
The second proposal is to establish Takeshima as a nature reserve.
No problem relating to continental shelf resources exists in the vicinity of
Takeshima, so conceivably the only issue is fishing in the surrounding area. Addi-
tionally, as the area of water that encompasses Takeshima is currently a PMZ, this
proposal would not involve transferring Takeshima to Japan, and neither would it
involve making concessions to Japan over the issue. Consequently, establishing
Takeshima as a nature reserve could be assumed to present virtually no emotional
difficulties to the ROK people. Rather than blowing up the islands in order to resolve
territory problems as a high-level ROK official is reported to have suggested, the
best policy would surely be to make the islands into nature reserves, enabling all
parties to work together in a forward-looking manner.
As a common proposal for both cases, instead of establishing territorial seas
around these Senkaku Islands and Takeshima nature reserves, it would be better to
Establishing an International Regime for Preserving the Resources and. . . 171
make 3 nautical mile or 12 nautical mile zones into fishing-prohibited areas. Cur-
rently fishing is not taking place in the area of water around Takeshima, and fishing
is apparently not being carried out around the Senkaku Islands either, so this idea
poses no particular obstacles. Above all else, this proposal can be recommended
from the perspective of conserving marine resources, and furthermore, it would also
generate positive outcomes for fishing and the state of resources in the surrounding
ocean areas.
Another proposal is described below regarding the management of the Senkaku
Islands nature reserve and Takeshima nature reserve. Since the Senkaku Islands are
currently under Japan’s control, it would make sense for Japan to manage them, and
since Takeshima is currently occupied by the ROK, it would make sense for the
ROK to manage it. In that way, the current circumstances would not change greatly,
and neither would it be likely to irritate citizens. Researchers should be free to land
on these nature reserves in order to conduct international or domestic joint research.
Accordingly, the respective authorities should in principle approve such visits and
the outcomes of the academic research should be promptly published.
Establishing an International Regime for Preserving

the Resources and the Environment in the Sea of Japan,
Yellow Sea, and East China Sea: Establishing a Joint Fishing
Zone by Japan, China, the ROK, and Taiwan
In addition to Japanese fishermen, there are also ROK, Chinese, and Taiwanese
fishermen operating in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea; no
doubt North Koreans will also be a presence in these seas before long. The Japan-
ROK Fisheries Agreement and the Japan-China Fisheries Agreement apply to this
area of sea, but as has already been noted, neither agreement can escape the
limitations of being a bilateral agreement. Consequently, it would be desirable to
develop a regime based on a multilateral treaty. That said, enormous amounts of
energy were expended just to negotiate the present agreements, and conceivably
even more energy would be needed to adopt a multilateral treaty. Accordingly, a
realistic first step would be to begin by utilizing the existing agreements.
So what should be done specifically? The handling of Taiwan becomes an issue in
connection with the One China principle. It is an issue that warrants careful discus-
sion, taking into account the 20 million or more people living in Taiwan and the
betterment of the relationship across the Taiwan Strait. A good start for the time
being might be holding a joint resources protection sub-meeting or joint environ-
mental conservation sub-meeting of the China-Japan Joint Fisheries Committee and
the ROK-Japan Joint Fisheries Committee. Or, if this proves too political, the parties
could hold a joint scientific research sub-meeting on the state of resources or the
situation with regard to environmental destruction. To that end, the ultimate goal
must be confirmed.
The ultimate goal (which is sure to be debated, and in fact should be broadly
debated) should be the conclusion of a multilateral treaty among the countries/
regions of Japan, China, the ROK, and Taiwan that contains the following:
1. Designate the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, and East China Sea, west of 135°30′ east
longitude as the area of sea that the treaty applies to;
2. Maintain the EEZs of each country/region at 35 to 52 nautical miles offshore, and
designate the area beyond the EEZs a joint fishing zone;
3. Establish an international committee, which might be called the East Asian
Fisheries Committee, in order to preserve and manage fishery resources and
conserve the marine environment; and
4. Grant this joint committee the authority to enforce regulatory measures, such as
the fish catches allocated to each country/region, and grant the committee itself
the authority to supervise offending vessels rather than entrusting the supervision
of vessels violating the treaty to each treaty party according to the flag State
doctrine, in order to make the treaty something that is viable.
This proposal is not meant to exclude the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea), and the door should always remain open. In any event, a start first
needs to be made, based on a clear vision of establishing order in East Asia.
parts of it.
Chapter 8
Territorial Air Space and Air Defense
Identification Zones
Territorial Air Space and Outer Space
Air space first became an issue in international law in the twentieth century when
aircraft were invented and began flying over territorial land. At first, there were two
conflicting views on the matter. There were those who believed that the skies were
free and open, and those who believed that the sovereignty of an aerial space
belonged to the country below it. However, the use of aircraft for military purposes
in World War I proved to be the decisive turning point; eventually, following the
war, the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris Con-
vention) was signed in Paris in 1919. The Convention stipulated that “every Power
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory.” The
Paris Convention was superseded in 1944 by the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention), which was adopted in Chicago; this convention has
been maintained until the present day. The fact that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory is an established principle
of international law.
The vertical bound of such territory, however, remains undefined. Given the state
of aviation, those at the time did not feel the need to define the term “air space,” nor
were they particularly hindered by this fact. However, the launch of Sputnik in 1957
marked the start of the space age, and the term “air space” could no longer remain
undefined.
Interestingly, there have been many different arguments on this subject. For
example, there were some who argued for unlimited territorial air space, in other
words that there was no vertical bound on a terrestrial nation’s territorial rights. Then
again, the fact that the Earth orbits the sun and rotates on its axis obviously renders
this argument an irrational one. In addition, because the Paris Convention and the
Chicago Convention stipulated that the air space over which every State had
sovereignty was “air space,” there were those who argued that air space was limited
to space in which there was air. There were yet others who argued that territorial air
© Kreab K.K. 2023 173

174 8 Territorial Air Space and Air Defense Identification Zones
space should be limited to the extent that can be reached through buoyant flight using
air flow since these conventions recognized sovereignty over air space at a time
when people had envisioned conventional aircraft based on aerodynamic buoyance.
By now, however, different States have already launched thousands of artificial
satellites. The UN General Assembly adopted the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies in 1966, which prohibited national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty. In light of this, at the very least, it became the dominant
view that territorial air space was limited to the perigee of the orbit of a satellite or
other spacecraft around the Earth. In terms of a specific number, this limit was
100 km above sea level. In any case, the boundary between territorial air space and
outer space is undefined. Of course, the space above an exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) or the high seas does not belong to any State, and it is known as “international
air space.”1
Freedom of Flight for Civil Aircraft
Foreign aircraft cannot freely fly through territorial air space. While the right of
innocent passage is recognized in territorial seas, no such right is recognized in
territorial air space. Nevertheless, for the sake of international transit, it was deemed
necessary to scrap the inconvenient practice of seeking permission from a territorial
State every time a flight is made and instead establish a system that permitted flight,
however limited it may be. Such a regime, first established under the Paris Conven-
tion of 1919, currently is based on the Chicago Convention of 1944. In addition to
stipulating the general principles of international civil aviation, the Chicago Con-
vention established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO;
headquartered in Montreal, Canada) and its mission.
The Chicago Convention applies only to the civil aircraft of the parties to the
Convention, including all types of airplanes, helicopters, and airships, but excluding
pilotless aircraft. Military or other government aircraft, however, must not fly over or
land in another State’s territory, unless so permitted by a special agreement or other
means.
Apart from when providing regular air services, civil aircraft hold the right to
enter the territory of other parties to the Convention, fly through a territory without
landing, or land in the territory for purposes other than transportation such as
refueling or maintenance, without needing to seek prior approval. That being said,
civil aircraft must of course abide by any landing requests made by the State, follow
the flight paths designated by the State, and so on.
1
The development of outer space has advanced significantly in recent years. For more details, see
Aoki, Setsuko. 2006. Nihon no uchū senryaku (Japan’s Space Strategy). Tokyo: Keio University
Press.
Air Defense Identification Zones 175
The Chicago Convention thus made a distinction between irregular flight and
regular international air services. The freedom of flight was only recognized for
irregular flight, whereas regular flight, which primarily takes the form of interna-
tional air services, was not liberalized. Regular flight was instead regulated by the
International Air Services Transit Agreement and the International Air Transport
Agreement; international air services could only be conducted upon the conclusion
of bilateral aviation agreements. At present, States around the world have concluded
an intricate network of aviation agreements. As things currently stand, negotiations
on such agreements impact the interests of the States involved and are therefore
usually very problematic.2
Air Defense Identification Zones
In general, a coastal State establishes an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over
a fixed area above its EEZ or the high seas for ensuring its own security. In
establishing an ADIZ, the State requests all aircraft flying through it to present
their flight plans and report their position, in an attempt to swiftly and accurately
identify and confirm the position of such aircraft.
This practice was first begun by the United States in 1950. In order to be able to
identify, locate, and control all aircraft within a certain distance from the coast, the
US required, under domestic law, that all applicable aircraft report their position and
other information, and established penal provisions for those who violated the law.
Subsequently, many other countries, including Canada, France, Iceland, the United
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, took similar measures.
In Japan’s case, this was done for the sake of easily identifying aircraft flying in
the vicinity of Japan, which was deemed to assist the implementation of effective
measures against aerial incursions of Japan’s territory, as stipulated in the Self-
Defense Forces (SDF) Act. For the ADIZ implemented by Japan’s Defense Agency,
the pilots of SDF aircraft that fly through the zone are obligated to report the time and
location at which they expect to enter the zone, among other information, to a radar
site. The scope of the Act is stipulated in accordance with a government directive on
flight in the ADIZ.3 Civil aircraft, meanwhile, are identified through the reporting of
their flight plans and other relevant information by the Ministry of Land, Infrastruc-
ture, Transport, and Tourism (Fig. 8.1).
In addition, to avoid accidental collisions between Japanese SDF aircraft and the
military aircraft of the Republic of Korea (ROK), a dedicated hotline has been
established between the two countries. This was first proposed by the ROK side in
1990, and the two sides voluntarily established measures in July 1995 for preventing
2
Sakamoto, Akio and Miyoshi, Susumu. 1999. Shin kokusai kōkūhō (New International Aviation
Law). Tokyo: Yūshindō Kōbunsha.
3
Defense Agency Directive No. 36, 1969.
Japan’s ADIZ
Fig. 8.1 Japan’s ADIZ

Air Defense Identification Zones 177
accidental collisions, whereby each side would inform the other of the flight plans of
any of its military aircraft that intended to enter the other’s ADIZ. The notification
would be made through the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network
(a network for civil aviation) or on-board radio.4 Therefore, no scramble will be
made in principle against applicable aircraft entering the area, provided their flight
plans have been notified. Furthermore, aircraft must constantly monitor the interna-
tional air distress frequency when flying within the ADIZ or in the vicinity of the
territorial air space of another country. Consultations between the Japanese and
ROK sides continued thereafter, and they decided to set up a dedicated hotline5
for the notification of flight plans between the two sides in order to prevent
accidental collisions more effectively. The hotline went into operation in
September 1997.
The issue, in terms of international law, occurs when Japan’s ADIZ is applied to
foreign aircraft operating beyond Japan’s territorial air space in air space above its
EEZ or the high seas (not when it is applied internally to SDF aircraft or when
issuing scramble orders in response to external information). This is because all
aircraft have the freedom to fly in air space above EEZs or the high seas. The
grounds for the unilateral establishment of such an ADIZ are not necessarily clear,
although some have attempted to justify it by likening it to the case of contiguous
zones and calling for the restriction of the freedom of the high seas (in this case the
freedom of flight above them) to protect a coastal State’s legal interests, or by citing
the principle of self-defense.
Another type of air space is flight information regions (FIRs), in which each State
has the responsibility to provide aircraft with air traffic control services, flight
assistance services, and flight navigation services, to ensure safe and efficient flight.
The ICAO-designated FIRs were established for air spaces that include territorial air
space and air space over the high seas, with smooth air traffic, rather than sover-
eignty over air space, in mind. FIRs are not named after any State and are instead
named after the control center or flight information center providing the flight
services in it. The FIRs under Japanese jurisdiction are the Tokyo FIR and the
Naha FIR, and flight services are provided by their respective air traffic control
centers. Thus ADIZs and FIRs differ in purpose and usually also scope.
4
The area in question is the space above the EEZ and high seas south of 37° north latitude, which is
adjacent to the ADIZs of both countries.
5
The hotline was set up between Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s Kasuga Air Base in Kasuga,
Fukuoka Prefecture on the Japanese side and Osan Air Base on the ROK side.
parts of it.
Epilogue
In writing this book, I have sought primarily and in principle to brush up and revise
previous works I have authored regarding Japan’s territory, while also adding new
text to create a clearer overview and give the work a sense of consistency.
In Chapter 1, “Development of Japan’s Territory,” I have revised an essay written
for Nihon no kokusaihō jirei kenkyū (3): Ryōdo (Study of Japanese Practices (Vol.
3): Territory) published by Keio University Press in 1990, and which was compiled
by Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai, a study group that analyzes Japanese practices
related to international law. I have added several explanatory notes regarding various
historical facts and explained specialized terminology in order to illustrate the
current state of Japan more clearly.
Chapter 2, “The Northern Territories (Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island, Habomai
Islands, and Shikotan Island),” is a comprehensive description of the state of affairs
up to autumn 2001. The reason I have made no mention whatsoever of the “parallel
consultation” is because the Russian side has shown no signs of acknowledging it. It
is not the case that mention of the parallel consultation has been deleted after the fact
owing to the occurrence of a variety of incidents.
Chapter 3, “The Senkaku Islands,” and Chapter 4, “Takeshima,” are based on the
sections on these issues in Serita Kentarō, Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai
kakutei (Sovereignty over Islands and the Delimitation of Economic Zones)
published by Yūshindo Kōbunsha in 1999, to which I have added new material
and made revisions.
In Chapter 5, “Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone,” I have added new
material related to the various principles of the law of the sea to help the reader
understand the overall picture more easily and to place the focus of the chapter more
clearly on the various issues that Japan faces.
Chapter 6, “Exclusive Economic Zones between Japan and the Republic of
Korea, and Japan and China,” is also based on the relevant sections of this work.
Chapter 7, “A Proposal for Stability and Coexistence in East Asia,” is an attempt
to better clarify a long-standing argument of mine. I strongly hope that this proposal
will be widely discussed and eventually realized.
© Kreab K.K. 2023 179

K. Serita, The Territory of Japan, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-3013-5
180 Epilogue
Chapter 8, “Territorial Air Space and Air Defense Identification Zones,” was
newly composed for this book. It is worth pointing out that since the completion of
this chapter, there has been much coverage of Japan’s air defense identification
zone—not in relation to its originally intended purpose of facilitating scrambles to
prevent aerial incursions into Japanese territory, but in light of its use in pursuing
suspicious vessels in the Sea of Japan. As such, I feel the chapter is slightly
incomplete.
In fact, that is not the only section that I feel to be incomplete. For example, it is to
my regret that while Chapter 5 touches upon internal waters, it should have also
made mention of particularly problematic aspects of internal waters, namely the
legal status of foreign vessels in a harbor and the rights of coastal States. Issues have,
in fact, also occurred in relation to fires onboard foreign vessels at anchor and I hope
to add a section on the subject, should the opportunity present itself.
On a side note, my interest in territorial matters first arose while I was studying in
France from 1969 to 1971, when I came across a record of lectures on France’s
territory in a Parisian book shop. Surprised to find that such a work by a scholar of
international law existed, I decided to one day write my own book on Japan’s
territory. Having studied the legal precedents of various territorial disputes, I first
had the opportunity to work on territorial matters when I helped to put together a
report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the subject, led by the late Prof. Taijudō
Kanae, from 1980 to 1981.
I was one of the founders of Kokusaihō Jirei Kenkyūkai and the third topic that
we looked at was territorial matters. I was in charge of writing an overview of the
topic and studied the related historical developments. Discussions with fellow
members of the study group also deepened my understanding of the subject. After
writing Shima no ryōyū to keizai suiiki no kyōkai kakutei, I presented a copy to my
colleague, Professor Iokibe Makoto. At a tennis gathering held to celebrate the
publication of this work, Professor Iokibe, perhaps having read the sections on the
territorial issues related to the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima, recommended that I
publish a work under the title of Japan’s Territory and took the trouble to introduce
me to Asō Akihiko in the editing department of Chūōkōron-Shinsha. Professor
Iokibe also asked to write a review of my book once it was published. Unfortunately,
the publication was delayed by almost a year and Professor Iokibe is currently
carrying out research at Harvard University.
Although I did so for the purpose of studying maritime societies, I found visiting
Japan’s surrounding islands and exploring various fishing harbors and villages,
while maintaining an interest in territorial and security issues, highly valuable for
writing about Japan’s territories. Not only that, but I was also given access to the
facilities of the Japan Coast Guard and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and I
was able to hold hearings with them. I travelled to Tsushima Island, the Sakishima
Islands in Okinawa, and even to faraway Yonaguni Island and Hateruma Island. I
headed to Hachijōjima Island, too. As a student, I could never have dreamed that I
would be doing this: that I would look out at Kaigarajima Island from Cape Nosappu
on the Nemuro Peninsula and think to myself how close it was, or look out from
Cape Sōya and think of faraway Sakhalin.
Epilogue 181
Finally, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Iokibe, who

took pains to introduce me to Mr. Asō of Chūōkōron-Shinsha, and also to Mr. Asō
himself, for being the first person to read this book, and for his scrupulous criticism
as well.
May 19, 2002
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Kentaro Serita

The Territory of Japan

ISBN 978-981-99-3012-8 ISBN 978-981-99-3013-5 (eBook)

Translation from Japanese language edition: Nihon no Ryōdo, published by CHUOKORON-

© Kreab K.K. 2023. This book is an open access publication.

The Northern Territories: Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island,

As touched on in Chapter 1, the entry into force of the Soviet-Japanese Joint

The Senkaku Islands

Yokohama, Japan Kentaro Serita

repeated for a period of time, eventually forming proto-countries. Today that is

Kobe, Japan Kentaro Serita

In general, the transfer of wartime territories is ultimately decided by a peace

1 Development of Japan’s Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 The Northern Territories (Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island, the

5 Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

7 A Proposal for Stability and Coexistence in East Asia . . . . . . . . . . 165

Delimitation and Expansion of Peripheral Territories

Delimitation of Peripheral Territories in the Late Edo and Meiji

The Northern Territories, the Kurile Islands, and Sakhalin

© Kreab K.K. 2023 1

the following year of a mission to Japan undertaken by Commodore Matthew

gained widespread support. Vice Admiral Enomoto Takeaki became Minister to

The Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands and Okinawa

The Senkaku Islands and Takeshima

Territorial Expansion During the First Sino-Japanese War,

The Cession of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula

The Cession of Sakhalin and the Annexation of the Korean

The Portsmouth Peace Treaty, signed on September 5, 1905, forced Russia to

Leases, Settlements, and Special Interests in China, Acquisition

The End of World War II and Territorial Issues

Acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration

Japan’s leases and its interests in Manchuria were recognized by international

Drafting the Treaty of Peace with Japan

The Current State of Japan’s Territory

Renunciation of Japan’s Expanded Territory: Korea, Taiwan,

Renunciation of the Kurile Islands and the Issue

1) National boundaries based on Kamchatka 2) National boundaries based on Kamchatka

3) National boundaries based on Kamchatka 4) National boundaries based on Kamchatka

Sea of Okhotsk Sea of Okhotsk

Upon reviewing the major

Fig. 1.1 National Boundaries with Russia

Reversion of the Administrative Rights from the US: Amami,

Fig. 1.2 The Ogasawara

reversion in June 1968)

Clashes with Other Countries’ Sovereignty: Takeshima

The Antarctic and Japan

New Zealand Australia

Claimed sectors Antarctic research stations

Sector claimed by Argentina A Argentine It Italian

Fig. 1.3 Antarctica

As discussed in Chapter 1, Japan delineated its peripheral territories between itself

Background of the Issue

© Kreab K.K. 2023 37

demarcation of territories between the two countries as well as a series of documents

Atlasov Island Shumshu Island

Simushir Island North Pacific

Sakhalin Uruppu Island

(The names of each of the Kurile

Fig. 2.1 The Northern Territories and the Kurile Islands