JCRL Hilsenrath Amicus Brief

Case: 23-3030 Document: 31 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/01/2024
No. 23-3030
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
LIBBY HILSENRATH, on behalf of her minor child, C.H.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CHATHAMS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,
On appeal from the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey, No. 2-18-cv-00966
Hon. Kevin McNulty, District Judge
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

THE JEWISH COALITION FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
SUPPORTING APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE
Eric C. Rassbach Noel J. Francisco

THE HUGH AND HAZEL Counsel of Record
DARLING FOUNDATION Christopher Pagliarella
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC JONES DAY
Pepperdine University 51 Louisiana Ave., NW
Caruso School of Law Washington, DC 20001
24255 Pacific Coast Hwy. (202) 879-3939
Malibu, CA 90263 njfrancisco@jonesday.com
(310) 506-4611
eric.rassbach@pepperdine.edu
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty
FRAP 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty states that it has no parent
corporation and that no publicly held corporation owns any part of it.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
FRAP 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... iv
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS ................................................................ 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................... 3
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. 6
I. CONSTRUING KENNEDY’S HISTORICAL TEST TO

LIMIT PLURALISTIC EDUCATION WOULD BE
HARMFUL TO JEWISH CITIZENS. .............................................. 6
A. Antisemitism, and Anti-Semitic Attacks, Are on the Rise ........... 6
B. Ignorance of Minority Faiths Contributes to Hatred .................... 8
C. Fact-Based, Tolerance-Focused Education About Religion Is

Key to Combating Ignorance-Fueled Violence ............................ 11
II. KENNEDY SETS FORTH A HISTORICAL-HALLMARK

TEST IN PLACE OF LEMON ...................................................... 13
A. Kennedy Recognized That the Lemon Test Wrongly Pitted

the Religion Clauses Against Each Other ................................... 13
B. To Support a Complementary Understanding of the

Religion Clauses, Kennedy Defined the Establishment
Clause by Well-Known Hallmarks of Religious
Establishment .............................................................................. 15
C. The Contrary Approach of Appellant and AU Would Revive

Lemon ........................................................................................... 19
ii
III. UNDER THE HISTORICAL-HALLMARK TEST, THE

DISTRICT DID NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE ........................................................................................ 24
A. The District Did Not Compel Church Attendance ...................... 24
B. The School District Did Not Provide Exclusive Financial

Support to the Established Church ............................................. 26
C. No Other Historical Hallmark Applies ....................................... 28
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 33
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo,

No. 20A90 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2020) ............................................................ 7
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n,

588 U.S. 29 (2019) ............................................................................... 14
Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist.,

567 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2009) .................................................................. 20
Carson v. Makin,
596 U.S. 767 (2022) ....................................................................... 23, 27
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,

515 U.S. 753 (1995) ............................................................................. 14
Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater

Pittsburgh Chapter,
492 U.S. 573 (1989) ............................................................................. 12
Erie v. Hunter,
675 F. Supp. 3d 647 (M.D. La. 2023) .................................................. 18
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue,

591 U.S. 464 (2020) ............................................................................. 27
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp.,

330 U.S. 1 (1947) ........................................................................... 25, 27
Firewalker-Fields v. Lee,
58 F.4th 104 (4th Cir. 2023) ............................................................... 19
iv
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Cnty. of Lehigh,

933 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2019) .................................................................. 1
Fulton v. City of Phila.,

593 U.S. 522 (2021) ............................................................................. 32
Groff v. DeJoy,
600 U.S. 447 (2023) ............................................................................. 13
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.

E.E.O.C.,
565 U.S. 171 (2012) ....................................................................... 22, 24
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox

Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94 (1952) ............................................................................... 30
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) ..................................................................... passim
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.,

459 U.S. 116 (1982) ............................................................................. 32
Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) ............................................................................. 16
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971) ..................................................................... passim
Lozano v. Collier,
No. 22-40116, 2024 WL 1562765 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2024) ................. 18
Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................................. 26
v
Maddonna v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

No. 6:19-CV-3551-JD, 2023 WL 7395911
(D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2023) ........................................................................ 18
Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) ............................................................................. 14
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru,

140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) ......................................................................... 30
Rogers v. McMaster,
No. 6:19-CV-01567-JD, 2023 WL 7396203
(D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2023) ........................................................................ 18
Salazar v. Buono,
559 U.S. 700 (2010) ............................................................................... 6
Shurtleff v. City of Bos.,

596 U.S. 243 (2022) ..................................................................... passim
Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961) ............................................................................. 31
Town of Greece v. Galloway,

572 U.S. 565 (2014) ................................................................. 14, 16, 21
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,

582 U.S. 449 (2017) ....................................................................... 23, 27
Young Isr. of Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit

Auth.,
89 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2024) ............................................................. 1
Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952) ............................................................................. 24
vi
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Grethel Aguila, A Jewish Man Was Attacked Near a

Synagogue in Broward. Police Say It Was a Hate Crime.,
Miami Herald (Feb. 18, 2024)............................................................... 8
Anti-Defamation League, ADL Reports Unprecedented Rise

in Antisemitic Incidents Post-Oct. 7 (Dec. 11, 2023) ............................ 8
Anti-Defamation League, Antisemitic Attitudes in America:

Conspiracy Theories, Holocaust Education and Other
Predictors of Antisemitic Belief (Mar. 17, 2023) ................................... 9
Thomas Berg, Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation,

and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 175 (2011) .......................................................................... 29
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England............................................................................................... 29
Rob Boston, The National Day of Prayer Is a Christian

Nationalist Relic From the 1950s. Here’s How You Can
Push Back. Americans United (May 4, 2023) .................................... 21
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Agreeing to

Disagree: How the Establishment Clause Protects
Religious Diversity and Freedom of Conscience (2023) ...................... 31
Daniel L. Chen, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District: The

Final Demise of Lemon and the Future of the
Establishment Clause, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY PER
CURIAM 1 (Summer 2022) ................................................................... 19
Mira Fox, A Guide to the Talmud for All the Haters, Forward
(Jan. 11, 2024)..................................................................................... 10
vii
From George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in

Newport, Rhode Island, 18 August 1790, Founders
Online, National Archives (last visited April 4, 2024) ......................... 7
Masha Gessen, Why the Tree of Life Shooter Was Fixated on

the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, The New Yorker (Oct.
27, 2018) ................................................................................................ 9
Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, Americans United

(last modified Oct. 25, 2022) ................................................................. 5
Andrew Lapin, Man Arrested After Fort Lauderdale Chabad

Center Is Damaged in Apparent Arson Attack, Jewish
Telegraphic Agency (Mar. 18, 2024) ..................................................... 8
Talia Lavin, The San Diego Shooter’s Manifesto Is a Modern

Form of an Old Lie About Jews, Wash. Post (Apr. 29,
2019) ...................................................................................................... 9
Janet Maslin, The Exodus from Paducah, 1862,

N.Y. Times, (Apr. 4, 2012) .................................................................... 7
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment

at the Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2003)................................................... 17
New Survey by Claims Conference Finds Significant Lack of

Holocaust Knowledge in the United States,
Claims Conference (last accessed Apr. 16, 2024) ............................... 10
Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Protection, Hate

Crimes and Youth, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 2022) ........................ 11
Press Release, U.S. Attorney, D.N.J., Middlesex County Man

Admits Communicating Threats to Attack Synagogue
(Jul. 12, 2023) ..................................................................................... 10
viii
Dan Rosenzweig-Ziff, ‘People Are Afraid’: Antisemitic Fliers

Found In Atlanta Suburbs, Wash. Post
(Feb. 5, 2023)....................................................................................... 10
Mark Storslee, Church Taxes and the Original

Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 169 U. PA. L.
REV. 111 (2020) ................................................................................... 28
The White House, U.S. National Strategy to Counter Anti-

Semitism (May 2023) ................................................................ 9, 10, 12
UC Berkeley Police Release Photos of Suspects in Violent

Protest at Jewish Student Event, CBS News (Mar. 26,
2024) ................................................................................................ 8, 11
Dir. Christopher Wray, “Director Wray Addresses ADL at

Never Is Now Summit,” FBI.gov (November 10, 2022) ....................... 8
ix
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS1
Amicus Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty (JCRL) is a nonprofit
organization comprised of rabbis, lawyers, and professionals who practice
Judaism and are committed to religious liberty. JCRL aims to ensure
that all Americans can freely practice their faith while fostering
cooperation between Jews and other faith communities. Its founders
have litigated religious liberty issues, published op-eds in prominent
news outlets, and established an extensive volunteer network
encouraging Jewish communal leadership to make public statements and
act on religious liberty issues. JCRL has acted as party counsel and
amicus, including in this Circuit, advocating for a historically-grounded
understanding of the Establishment Clause that allows religious
diversity to flourish. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507
(2022) (amicus supporting prevailing petitioner); Freedom From Religion
Found., Inc. v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 933 F.3d 275, 277 (3d Cir. 2019) (amicus
supporting prevailing appellee); Young Isr. of Tampa, Inc. v.
1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amicus states
that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no
person other than amicus and its counsel made any monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(4)(E).
1
Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit Auth., 89 F.4th 1337, 1339 (11th Cir.
2024) (counsel to prevailing plaintiff-appellee in First Amendment
challenge to prohibition on religious advertisements on public property).
JCRL submits this brief to offer its expertise and to assist this
Court in properly interpreting and applying the “historical practices and
understandings” that guide courts’ application of the Establishment
Clause post-Kennedy. 597 U.S. at 535 (citation omitted). JCRL also
provides its unique perspective on this historical test’s benefits for
minority faith communities that faced exclusion from the public square
under now-“abandoned” Establishment Clause doctrines untethered
from the historical “hallmarks of religious establishments.” Id. at 534,
537; see Brief of JCRL et al., Kennedy, No. 21-418, 2022 WL 685804 (U.S.
Mar. 2, 2022). Factual education on the beliefs of unfamiliar faiths is a
key tool against the spread of falsehoods and conspiracy theories about
religious minorities, especially at a time when the Jewish community
faces increased violence motivated by such misinformation. Under
Kennedy, the Establishment Clause is no barrier to such education.
2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Encountering different religious views “is ‘part of learning how to
live in a pluralistic society,’ a trait of character essential to ‘a tolerant
citizenry.’” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. District, 597 U.S. 507, 538 (2022)
(citation omitted). Thus, when schools teach their students basic facts
about different religions, they are also teaching young citizens of a
diverse nation “mutual respect and tolerance” in line with “the best of our
traditions.” Id. at 514. For the Jewish community to which amicus
belongs, the growth of antisemitic rhetoric and violence—much inspired
by misinformation and conspiracy theories about Judaism—has
heightened the urgency and importance of such education.
Kennedy made clear that the Establishment Clause poses no
stumbling block to that pursuit. Under prior Establishment Clause case
law, efforts at religious inclusion in “‘the public sphere’”—including
public schools—were subject to challenge wherever “an objective observer
could reasonably infer” that the effort “endorses or ‘partakes of the
religious.’” Id. at 535 (citations omitted). No longer. Rather, government
action is tested against “‘historical practices and understandings’”—i.e.,
by reference to the “hallmarks of religious establishments the framers
3
sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment.” Id. at 535,
537 & n.5.
The district court correctly noted (as have numerous post-Kennedy
decisions) that Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Kennedy provided “guidance”
as to the relevant hallmarks by incorporating his prior concurrence in
Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. 243 (2022). App. 13; see Kennedy,
597 U.S. at 537 & n.5. Those hallmarks are (1) “government ... control
over the doctrine and personnel of the established church”;
(2) “government mandated attendance in the established church and
punish[ing] people for failing to participate”; (3) “punish[ment for]
dissenting churches and individuals for their religious exercise”;
(4) “restricted political participation by dissenters”; (5) “financial support
for the established church”; and (6) “government us[e of] the established
church to carry out certain civil functions.” Shurtleff, 596 U.S. at 286
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment). These six “traditional
hallmarks help explain many of [the Supreme] Court’s Establishment
Clause cases,” which often focus on avoiding “government control over
religion.” Id. at 286–87. And they prevent “a misconstruction of the
Establishment Clause” that would make the Free Exercise and
4
Establishment Clauses “at odds” rather than “complementary.”
Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 533, 543. Accordingly, the Court chose “these
hallmarks as the guiding principles for Establishment Clause
jurisprudence” going forward. App. 14 n.14.
Both Appellant and amicus Americans United for Separation of
Church and State (“AU”) seek to blur Kennedy’s concrete historical test
with a free-floating analysis of whether government has been “involved
in any way with religion” (Opening Br. 36), “endorsed religion,” (Opening
Br. 27), or “advance[d] religious views” (AU Br. 22 (citation omitted)).
But asking whether an action advances or endorses religion is simply to
apply the standard of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), “and its
endorsement test offshoot”—the precise tests Kennedy rejected, 597 U.S.
at 534 (citation omitted). Simply put, Kennedy’s clear guidance forecloses
the conclusion that “not much has changed” in the law, AU Br. 2—as AU
has acknowledged elsewhere. 2
2 See Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, Americans United (last

modified Oct. 25, 2022) https://perma.cc/3AQQ-BJ8F (stating that
Kennedy “undid fifty years of foundational First Amendment law” in
favor of requiring courts to “consider what the Founding Fathers would
have thought to be an Establishment Clause violation”).
5
In any event, confirming the historical-hallmark understanding of
Kennedy suffices to resolve this case—and to protect education promoting
religious tolerance. Here, as the district court found, the social-studies
lesson on Islam did not even “resemble” the relevant hallmarks of
historical establishment. App. 21. This Court may reserve for another
day how closely government conduct need parallel a hallmark, or
whether a free exercise or other constitutional claim might be a more
appropriate vehicle to address particular instances of alleged coercion.
For today, it is enough to say that the Establishment Clause does not bar
education about religion that teaches students the “[r]espect for religious
expressions”—familiar and unfamiliar—that “is indispensable to life in a
free and diverse Republic.” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 543.
ARGUMENT
I. CONSTRUING KENNEDY’S HISTORICAL TEST TO LIMIT

PLURALISTIC EDUCATION WOULD BE HARMFUL TO
JEWISH CITIZENS.
A. Antisemitism, and Anti-Semitic Attacks, Are on the

Rise.
At its best, the United States has thrived as a nation of
“unparalleled pluralism and religious tolerance.” Salazar v. Buono, 559
U.S. 700, 723 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). “[T]he
6
Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and
tolerance, not censorship and suppression” for diverse religious views.
Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 514. From the Founding, that tradition of mutual
respect has included American Jews. In a 1790 letter to the Hebrew
Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, George Washington wrote: “May
the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to
merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while every one
shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none
to make him afraid.” 3
Unfortunately, America has sometimes fallen short of these ideals.
Jews, for example, were targeted for expulsion from Tennessee during
the Civil War, and faced selective prosecution under New Deal health
laws. 4 While such official discrimination is less common today, another
form of intolerance has become more prevalent. As the Anti-Defamation
League has catalogued, Jewish Americans have faced a “terrifying
3 From George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport,

Rhode Island, 18 August 1790, Founders Online, National Archives,
https://perma.cc/H5WR-BQ3W (last visited April 4, 2024).
4 See Janet Maslin, The Exodus from Paducah, 1862, N.Y. Times, (Apr.
4, 2012) https://perma.cc/W3UT-7EQW; Brief of Muslim Public Affairs

Council et al. at 5–6, Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, No. 20A90, (U.S.
Nov. 17, 2020) (collecting sources).
7
pattern of antisemitic attacks” and harassment—including physical
assault—in the wake of the Hamas-led massacre in Israel on October 7,
2023. 5 This violence against Jewish persons and gathering places has
continued through the first half of 2024.6 And even before the October 7
massacre, the FBI estimated that 63% of all religiously motivated hate
crimes in the United States targeted Jews—even though Jews comprise
less than 3% of the population.7
B. Ignorance of Minority Faiths Contributes to Hatred.
Hatred and ignorance about minority faiths often travel together.
Many of the most prominent terrorist attacks on Jewish Americans were
committed by persons who professed belief in one or more conspiracy
5 Anti-Defamation League ADL Reports Unprecedented Rise in

Antisemitic Incidents Post-Oct. 7 (Dec. 11, 2023), https://perma.cc/Z23J-
9A64 (discussing a “337-percent increase” in “antisemitic incidents”
compared to the same two-month period a year before).
6 See, e.g., Grethel Aguila, A Jewish Man Was Attacked Near a
Synagogue in Broward. Police Say It Was a Hate Crime., Miami Herald

(Feb. 18, 2024), https://perma.cc/XPY8-PRQM; Andrew Lapin, Man
Arrested After Fort Lauderdale Chabad Center Is Damaged in Apparent
Arson Attack, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (Mar. 18, 2024),
https://perma.cc/T85G-296P; UC Berkeley Police Release Photos of
Suspects in Violent Protest at Jewish Student Event, CBS News (Mar. 26,
2024), https://perma.cc/D6RG-R7SK.
7 Dir. Christopher Wray, “Director Wray Addresses ADL at Never Is
Now Summit,” FBI.gov (November 10, 2022), https://perma.cc/K269-

A5AT.
8
theories about the Jewish people. The perpetrator of the Tree of Life
synagogue attack in Pittsburgh, for example, wrote extensively online
about his belief that Jews were working to import violent invaders into
the United States. 8 Shortly before his attack, the gunman who attacked
the Chabad of Poway completed a manifesto asserting a more extensive
version of the same conspiracy. 9
While such extremism remains rare, dangerous ignorance is not. A
recent University of Chicago study found that negative feelings toward
Judaism and Jewish persons are closely correlated not only with belief in
“a range of conspiracy theories,” but also with knowing “significantly less
about Jews, Judaism, and Jewish history.”10 Such ignorance is
particularly prevalent among young persons. In a 2020 survey cited in
the White House’s National Strategy to Counter Anti-Semitism, 63% of
8 Masha Gessen, Why the Tree of Life Shooter Was Fixated on the
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, The New Yorker (Oct. 27, 2018),
https://perma.cc/W2TF-W2MP.
9 Talia Lavin, The San Diego Shooter’s Manifesto Is a Modern Form of
an Old Lie About Jews, Wash. Post (Apr. 29, 2019),

https://perma.cc/AAH6-RBSP.
10 Anti-Defamation League, Antisemitic Attitudes in America:
Conspiracy Theories, Holocaust Education and Other Predictors of

Antisemitic Belief (Mar. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/9TCB-2A2S
(summarizing survey conducted with the National Opinion Research
Center of the University of Chicago).
9
millennials did not know how many Jews were murdered in the
Holocaust, while over 10% believed that Jews caused the Holocaust.11
Young persons may also have more exposure to the increased online
spread of false claims about Jewish religious texts and practices,
particularly lies about the contents of the Talmud.12
This sort of extreme ignorance and misinformation can lead to
danger. For example, in 2022, an 18-year-old from Sayreville, New
Jersey (a half-hour away from the school district here) prompted a state-
wide alert when he circulated a manifesto associating Jews with
historical crimes and threatening to attack a synagogue.13 Such threats
from an 18-year-old are not wild outliers; in fact, FBI hate crime statistics
11 The White House, U.S. National Strategy to Counter Anti-Semitism

13 (May 2023), https://perma.cc/W3EE-64FG; see New Survey by Claims
Conference Finds Significant Lack of Holocaust Knowledge in the United
States, Claims Conference, https://perma.cc/CZZ9-CB5G (last accessed
Apr. 16, 2024).
12 See, e.g., Mira Fox, A Guide to the Talmud for All the Haters,
Forward (Jan. 11, 2024) https://perma.cc/M76S-LYH2 (summarizing

false claims about Talmud content); Dan Rosenzweig-Ziff, ‘People Are
Afraid’: Antisemitic Fliers Found In Atlanta Suburbs, Wash. Post (Feb.
5, 2023), https://perma.cc/9K4K-9W2T (discussing fliers attacking the
Talmud and directing the reader to an anti-Semitic website).
13 Press Release, U.S. Attorney, D.N.J., Middlesex County Man
Admits Communicating Threats to Attack Synagogue (Jul. 12, 2023),

https://perma.cc/APM4-HQJK.
10
from 2020 showed that one out of every ten reported hate crimes was
committed by juveniles. 14 And more recent reports of violence associated
with anti-Israel rallies on college campuses suggest little has changed. 15
C. Fact-Based, Tolerance-Focused Education About

Religion Is Key to Combating Ignorance-Fueled
Violence.
It is a near-certainty that young people will continue to be exposed
to misinformation about Judaism and other minority faiths online. 16 As
such, secondary schools—including public schools—play a key role in
teaching “how to tolerate [faith] of all kinds,” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 538,
and in combating misinformation, see App. 19 (“Kennedy itself only
reinforces the view . . . that exposure to a variety of viewpoints, including
religious ones, is a proper goal. That goal is not undermined, and indeed
may be enhanced, by non-coercive exposure to opposing beliefs.”).
14 Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Protection, Hate Crimes

and Youth, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 2022), https://perma.cc/9RAK-
PATY (“Data Trends”).
15 E.g., Complaint, Kestenbaum v. President and Fellows of Harvard
College, No. 1:24-cv-10092 (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 2024), ECF 1 (alleging
assault and physical harassment following verbal calls for death to Jews
and Israel); UC Berkeley, supra note 6 (noting attack connected with
university rally).
16 Hate Crimes and Youth, supra note 14 (noting that roughly half of
young people are exposed to hate speech online, and discussing specific
hate-group recruitment tactics aimed at youth).
11
Accordingly, the White House’s National Strategy to Combat Anti-
Semitism places heavy emphasis on public education playing a larger role
in “help[ing] to inoculate young people against antisemitic stereotypes,
tropes, and conspiracy theories,” including by highlighting the “positive
contributions” of Jews to the nation and by teaching accurate Jewish
history. National Strategy at 14.
While education about minority faiths need not (and should not)
direct students to take those faiths as true, tolerance-focused education
necessarily portrays a religion, and the contributions its adherents have
made to American and world culture, in a positive light. See id. Yet so
long as “Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot” governed, Kennedy,
597 U.S. at 534, such positivity—even if well short of proselytizing—ran
the risk of being perceived as “advanc[ing],” “endors[ing],” or
“promot[ing]” religion, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am.
Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593
(1989). Such tests functionally forced religion from the “public sphere,”
Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 535, and if revived, could chill the important work
of pluralistic, tolerant education.
12
By contrast, Kennedy’s focus on historical hallmarks avoids all of
this. See infra Parts II–III. Where a public school lesson serves merely
to “educate students about world religions and the importance of avoiding
group generalizations,” App. 17, no religion has been “established” in any
sense recognizable to the Founders.
II. KENNEDY SETS FORTH A HISTORICAL-HALLMARK TEST

IN PLACE OF LEMON.
A. Kennedy Recognized That the Lemon Test Wrongly

Pitted the Religion Clauses Against Each Other.
The U.S. Supreme Court has “abrogated” the Lemon test, which
considered (among other things) whether a government action’s
“principal or primary effect was to advance religion.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600
U.S. 447, 460 (2023) (quotation marks omitted) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 612). Though the Lemon test sought to prevent the “evils against
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection,” 403
U.S. at 612, the test in practice incentivized a “modified heckler’s veto”
against visible religion in public life. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 534.
“[W]henever a ‘reasonable observer’ could conclude that the government
has ‘endorse[d]’ religion,” an Establishment Clause violation was found.
Id. at 533 (citation omitted). This rule “created a ‘minefield’ for
legislators” seeking to follow Lemon without suppressing or abridging
13
protected religious expression or speech. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 534 (citing
Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768–69 &
n.3 (1995) (plurality opinion)).
In contrast, Kennedy emphasized that the Establishment Clause
does not “compel the government to purge from the public sphere
anything an objective observer could reasonably infer endorses or
partakes of the religious.” 597 U.S. at 535 (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Instead, it works with the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses to “protect[] religious speech … [as] a natural outgrowth of the
framers’ distrust of government attempts to regulate religion and
suppress dissent.” See id. at 523–24. Whereas previously these Clauses
could be seen “as separate units,” Kennedy confirmed that they “have
‘complementary,’” not “warring,” purposes. Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
In adopting this approach, Kennedy followed (and further developed) a
line of precedent that looked to history and tradition—rather than
Lemon—to interpret and apply the Establishment Clause. E.g., Am.
Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 588 U.S. 29, 48–52, 60 (2019) (plurality
opinion); id. at 73–74 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); Town of
Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
14
U.S. 783 (1983). By doing so, Kennedy conclusively rooted all
Establishment Clause interpretation in “historical practices and
understandings.” 597 U.S. at 535–36 (citation omitted).
B. To Support a Complementary Understanding of the

Religion Clauses, Kennedy Defined the Establishment
Clause by Well-Known Hallmarks of Religious
Establishment.
Had Kennedy only referred to “historical practices and
understanding” without elaboration, the contours of the Establishment
Clause might remain uncertain. But the Court went further, instructing
reviewing courts to look to those “hallmarks of religious establishments
the framers sought to prohibit.” Id. at 537. To identify those hallmarks,
the Court first gave some examples, including “coercion along the[] lines”
of requiring “anyone to attend church,” “mak[ing] a religious observance
compulsory,” or “forc[ing] citizens to engage in ‘a formal religious
exercise.’” Id. It went on to incorporate prior judicial writings and
scholarship that provide a detailed roadmap for subsequent courts tasked
with applying this standard. Id. at 537 n.5. Indeed, this roadmap is the
“sole guide[] that Kennedy has furnished the lower courts for the
15
assessment of ‘coercion’ for purposes of an Establishment Clause
challenge in the context of public education.” App. 21. 17
The roadmap itself is located in footnote 5 of Kennedy. It first
introduces the hallmark analysis through Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In the cross-referenced section, Justice
Scalia concluded that “[t]he coercion that was a hallmark of historical
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of
financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.” Id. at 640 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The footnote then offers an extended citation to a recent
concurrence by Justice Gorsuch (the author of the Kennedy majority)
that, drawing on the scholarship of Professor Michael McConnell,
catalogued “certain other historical hallmarks of an established religion.”
597 U.S. at 537 n.5 (citing Shurtleff, 596 U.S. at 286 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the judgment)). Those six hallmarks include government
17 The district court quoted scholarship on Kennedy to refer to the

roadmap (favorably) as a “cipher” for interpreting the decision. App. 13.
To be clear, no de-coding is required; Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion
simply cross-references and incorporates reasoning from elsewhere,
including his prior writing on the subject. That approach is often used to
indicate that the Court is adopting reasoning from prior separate
writings. E.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 577 (incorporating reasoning
of prior partial dissent by Justice Kennedy in County of Allegheny).
16
“control over the doctrine and personnel of the established church,”
“government[-]mandated attendance in the established church,”
punishment of “dissenting churches and individuals for their religious
exercise,” “restrict[ions on] political participation by dissenters,”
“financial support for the established church,” and use of “the established
church to carry out certain civil functions.” Shurtleff, 596 U.S. at 286
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Michael W. McConnell,
Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131–81 (2003)).
The roadmap footnote “also cites directly to Professor McConnell’s
scholarship,” particularly its explication of the “hallmark” directly at
issue in Kennedy (mandated attendance at state church services).
App. 14 n.14; see 597 U.S. at 537 n.5 (citing McConnell, supra, at 2144–
46).
Armed with this guidance, the district court correctly determined
that “footnote 5” adopts “these hallmarks” from Shurtleff as the “guiding
principles for Establishment Clause jurisprudence” going forward.
App. 14 n.14. On this point, the district court is in good company.
Though few courts have needed to apply Kennedy, many that have
17
understand it to require Establishment Clause coercion claims to be
decided with reference to the “hallmarks” outlined in Shurtleff. For
example, in Maddonna v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
a district court found that the plaintiff’s coercion “claim of subtle and
indirect pressure” by a foster care agency’s religious practice did not
parallel the Shurtleff hallmark of a “monopoly” over a civil function, and
was not otherwise “a historically disfavored establishmentarian
practice.” No. 6:19-CV-3551-JD, 2023 WL 7395911, at *9–10 (D.S.C.
Sept. 29, 2023) (citation omitted); see Rogers v. McMaster, No. 6:19-CV-
01567-JD, 2023 WL 7396203, at *11–12 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2023) (parallel
case) (“Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show that the[] ‘hallmarks’
[identified in Shurtleff] exist here.”). And in a recent precedential
decision, the Fifth Circuit relied on allegations concerning a “hallmark[]
of religious establishment[]” to revive an Establishment Clause claim.
Lozano v. Collier, No. 22-40116, 2024 WL 1562765, at *9 (5th Cir. Apr.
11, 2024); see Erie v. Hunter, 675 F. Supp. 3d 647, 657 (M.D. La. 2023)
(forced attendance at worship service under threat of penalty fell within
a hallmark of establishment identified in Kennedy). Even courts that
have not yet had occasion to apply Kennedy recognize that it requires a
18
plaintiff to “prov[e] that [factual findings] align with a historically
disfavored establishmentarian practice.” Firewalker-Fields v. Lee, 58
F.4th 104, 122 & n.7 (4th Cir. 2023). In short, the roadmap footnote
“make[s] clear that government conduct violates the Establishment
Clause only when that conduct exhibits these historical characteristics of
a religious establishment.” Daniel L. Chen, Kennedy v. Bremerton
School District: The Final Demise of Lemon and the Future of the
Establishment Clause, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLICY PER CURIAM 1, 9
(Summer 2022); see App. 13 (citing same).
C. The Contrary Approach of Appellant and AU Would

Revive Lemon.
Appellant and AU take a different approach, insisting that the
“discussion of hallmarks of religious establishment” in Shurtleff and
Kennedy do not limit the scope of available Establishment Clause claims.
AU Br. 6; see Opening Br. 32. Instead, they offer a variety of general,
undefined categories of Establishment Clause violations, asking this
Court to consider whether, for example, the government has “endorsed
religion,” (Opening Br. 27), or otherwise “advance[d] religious views” (AU
Br. 22 (citation omitted)).
19
The problem with this approach is not only that it would effectively
reinstitute the “Lemon [standard] and its endorsement test offshoot” that
Kennedy rejected, 597 U.S. at 534, but that it fails to account for the
driving force behind Kennedy’s historical approach. As Kennedy
explained, a focus on advancement or endorsement of religion,
untethered to historical hallmarks of establishment, inevitably results—
and did result—in pressure to “‘censor’ private religious speech” and a
“purge from the public sphere [of] anything an objective observer could
reasonably infer endorses or ‘partakes of the religious.’” Id. at 534–35
(citations omitted); see, e.g., Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567
F.3d 89, 108 n.16 (3d Cir. 2009) (Hardiman, J., dissenting in part)
(rejecting the conclusion that prohibiting the sharing of scripture by a
parent for her student in a show-and-tell “was necessary to avoid an
Establishment Clause violation” under Lemon). Where a test would
functionally pit the Establishment Clause against the Free Exercise
Clause, it is a sign that “the project falters badly.” 597 U.S. at 542–43.
To be sure, the Establishment Clause bars many forms of
“coercion,” “indoctrination,” or “religious preference.” AU Br. 6. Kennedy
itself recognized that many of the historical hallmarks it references or
20
incorporates involve “coercion.” 597 U.S. at 537. But the reason Kennedy
carefully compared the facts of its case to “coercion along the[] lines” of
traditional hallmarks of religious establishment, id. (emphasis added),
was to avoid a “broad” interpretation of these terms, AU Br. 10, that
would generate the sort of “phantom constitutional violations” used by
the school district in Kennedy to restrict an employee’s personal prayer.
597 U.S. at 543.
The “standards” proposed by Appellant and AU present similar
risks. For example, AU’s conception of coercion relies on Thomas
Jefferson’s private letters to conclude that “‘recommendation’ of prayer,
even without the backing of legal force” by a public official constitutes
“coercion” in the form of “subtle pressure to conform.” AU Br. 10–11.
Such a rule would turn the presidential proclamation of the National Day
of Prayer into a constitutional violation—a conclusion AU advocates,18
but which works the exact “purge from the public sphere” of religion that
Kennedy corrected. 597 U.S. at 535; see also id. at 538–39 (noting Town
18Rob Boston, The National Day of Prayer Is a Christian Nationalist

Relic From the 1950s. Here’s How You Can Push Back. Americans United
(May 4, 2023), https://perma.cc/AHX2-BLWE.
21
of Greece rejects that “offense” or having to encounter “speech or prayer
of all kinds” might “equate to coercion”).
At base, both Appellant and AU appeal to the intuition that
government coercion of or preference for religious practice can be
unconstitutional even absent precise alignment with one of the historical
hallmarks of establishment identified in Kennedy. But that intuition is
entirely consistent with the Court’s guidance, for two reasons.
First, Appellant is correct both that “an exact match to history is
not required,” and that (for example) someone claiming compelled
participation in a religious exercise need not show “such extreme coercion
as existed in the colonies.” Opening Br. 33, 36. Courts may properly
review for modern analogues to the historical hallmarks identified by
Kennedy. That, in fact, is what the district court did here in assessing
whether the “curriculum and materials … bear or resemble the
‘hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit.’”
App. 21. The Supreme Court has likewise reasoned by analogy in finding
modern Establishment Clause violations, such as its prohibition on
applying employment law “to contradict a church’s determination of who
can act as its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
22
& Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171, 182, 185 (2012) (looking back to Church
of England limits on ministry service).
Second, and as AU agrees, concluding that not every form of
coercion or pressure can support an Establishment Clause claim does not
mean such coercion or pressure could not support other First Amendment
claims. See AU Br. 20 (noting that “the Free Exercise Clause also bars
religious coercion”). For example, the Supreme Court has (properly)
vindicated free exercise challenges to the “indirect coercion” wrought by
the exclusion of religious entities from government benefits. E.g., Carson
v. Makin, 596 U.S. 767, 778 (2022); Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449, 463 (2017). Such claims are not
bounded by historical analogues. But here, Appellant does not present a
free exercise or other constitutional claim. See App. 16 (noting no Free
Exercise claim was brought); cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 10–11 (disclaiming a
freestanding parental rights claim).19
19 AU frets that limiting the Establishment Clause to “bar only

coercion” would render it “duplicative of the Free Exercise Clause.” AU
Br. 20. But not all of the hallmarks Kennedy identifies necessarily
involve the coercion of individual religious practice. Supra Part II.B. In
any event, finding that the Clauses point in the same direction aligns
with both Kennedy’s conclusion that the Religion Clauses (and the Free
23
III. UNDER THE HISTORICAL-HALLMARK TEST, THE

DISTRICT DID NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE.
The application of Kennedy’s historical-hallmark test here yields a
straightforward result: the District did not violate the Establishment
Clause by teaching about the tenets of Islam as part of its social-studies
unit on Middle Eastern cultures. Appellant offers two of the six
hallmarks incorporated by Kennedy as analogues—“mandat[ing]
attendance in the established church” and “financial support for the
established church.” Opening Br. 33–34 (quoting Shurtleff, 596 U.S. at
286 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)). On the facts found by the
district court, neither these hallmarks, nor the others incorporated in
Kennedy, provide plausible support for Appellant’s claim.
A. The District Did Not Compel Church Attendance.
A clear historical hallmark of established religion is “mandat[ing]
attendance in the established church,” Shurtleff, 596 U.S. at 286
(Gorsuch, J.), or “coerc[ing] anyone to attend church” on threat of penalty,
Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 537 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314
Speech Clause) are “complementary,” 597 U.S. at 533, and the insight of
other cases that these provisions can work in tandem to bar certain
government actions, see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89.
24
(1952)); see McConnell, supra, at 2144 (describing fines, corporal
punishment, and other criminal penalties enacted by colonial
governments for nonattendance). This hallmark is recognized in
longstanding precedent holding that the government “[n]either can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
Here, the classroom instruction and homework at issue bore no
resemblance to “worship services.” McConnell, supra, at 2145. As the
district court explained, while the curriculum “expos[ed] students to the
tenets of religious faiths in various regions of the world,” it “did not
require or coerce students ‘to support or participate in’ the religious faith
covered by that unit.” App. 18. The challenged material was “used to
introduce students to the tenets of Islam” and to “assess the[ir]
understanding” of those tenets, not to “proselytiz[e]” or “to inveigle them
into praying.” Id. at 18–19. This remains true even if this same material
could be considered devotional “in the mouths of adherents.” Id. To
“teach and study about such statements is not to espouse them,” much
less to encourage others to do so—a fact the student here appears to have
recognized. Id. at 17–19 (finding that C.H. “perceived the purpose and
25
effect of the lessons as being to educate students about world religions
and the importance of avoiding group generalizations”).
For comparison, consider the regular occurrence of a public school
teacher taking students on a field trip to the National Gallery of Art.
There, students would be exposed to any number of “masterpieces with
religious messages” from the Christian faith, “notably the Last Supper,
and paintings depicting the Birth of Christ, the Crucifixion, and the
Resurrection.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676-77 (1984). But few
would contend that a teacher quizzing students on the scenes and
messages depicted in this historically significant artwork constitutes a
devotional exercise, even though the artwork expresses a religious view
and could be used devotionally in another context (e.g., on display in a
church sanctuary). The same principle governs exposure to the tenets of
minority faiths, including Islam and Judaism.
B. The School District Did Not Provide Exclusive

Financial Support to the Established Church.
Appellant also suggests that by permitting tax money to indirectly
support a school lesson on Islam, the District stumbled into a hallmark
of establishment. See Opening Br. 34. But the scholarship incorporated
26
in Kennedy shows that there is no analogy here to the type of financial
support that characterized a historical establishment.
At the Founding, financial support of “established churches” across
the Colonies took a few forms—compulsory religious taxes raised solely
for the support of churches and ministers (so-called “tithes”), direct
grants from the public treasury, dedicated taxes on products like liquor,
and land grants. McConnell, supra, at 2147–48, 2152. Such support was
direct, institutional, and preferential; it directly subsidized preferred
ministers and institutions of worship, while leaving disfavored churches
to “the voluntary support of their members.” Id. at 2154 (discussing
South Carolina).
This context is key, because history and precedent make clear that
financial support to religious entities for activity that happens to serve
government interests is not (and has never been) an establishment per
se. Indeed, in free exercise cases, the Supreme Court has required
funding for religious organizations that qualify for government support.
See Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S. 449; Carson, 596 U.S. 767; Espinoza v.
Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 591 U.S. 464, 488–89 (2020); see also Everson,
330 U.S. at 17 (school district’s funding of transportation to the parochial
27
schools did not violate the Establishment Clause). This aligns with
historical understanding, as “[b]oth before and after the ratification of
the First Amendment, the federal government and virtually every state
that ended church taxes also funded religious activity.” Mark Storslee,
Church Taxes and the Original Understanding of the Establishment
Clause, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 117 (2020).
Here, Appellant does not allege anything like direct, preferential
funding to an established denomination. At most, Appellant contends
that general funding for a nonreligious entity (a public school) indirectly
enabled the dissemination of religious speech (e.g., by linking YouTube
videos). See Opening Br. 34. That is a far cry from exclusive financial
support to one religious body, particularly where the lessons on Islam
were “part of a larger survey of world . . . religions” that “include[d]
similar units on, for example, Hinduism and Buddhism.” App. 20.
C. No Other Historical Hallmark Applies.
While Appellant does not invoke the remaining hallmarks
incorporated in Kennedy, a brief discussion of each illustrates how
Kennedy’s hallmark analysis both (1) accounts for the Court’s other
28
recent Establishment Clause decisions and (2) serves to increase, not
decrease, breathing room for free religious expression.
Governmental Control over Church Doctrine or Personnel. In
colonial America, it was not uncommon for formal legislation to address
articles of faith. McConnell, supra, at 2131, 2136. For example, in
Anglican colonies like Virginia, Parliament determined the articles of
faith for the Church of England and approved the text of the Book of
Common Prayer; it also stipulated that the King be Supreme Governor
of the Church and required all ministers to accept the Church of
England’s doctrines. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 364–83; see also Thomas Berg, Religious Freedom,
Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 175, 180 (2011). Colonies also exercised governmental
control over ministers; in South Carolina, for example, the colonial
government selected twenty laymen to discipline the church and remove
ministers. McConnell, supra, at 2142.
The Supreme Court has referenced such hallmarks of
establishment when applying “the general principle of church autonomy”
to preclude state interference in the selection of ministers or questions of
29
religious doctrine. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140
S. Ct. 2049, 2061 (2020). It has concluded that “the ‘background’ against
which ‘the First Amendment was adopted’” requires preserving religious
entities’ “authority to select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a
minister without interference by secular authorities.” Id. at 2060-61
(citation omitted). And it has pointed to that same background to
foreclose “state interference” in religious entities’ decisions on matters “of
faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 114, 116 (1952).
Plainly, this hallmark has no application here, as the lesson about
Islam neither interfered with the operation of any Muslim congregation
nor prescribed any particular version of Islam. Rather, it served merely
to educate students about what Muslims have historically believed.
Punishment of Dissenting Worship. Various colonies approved
imprisonment, corporal punishment, and even capital punishment
against dissenting adherents or religious persons showing disfavored
“evangelical enthusiasm.” McConnell, supra, at 2118, 2160–62, 2166.
The Supreme Court has described such “abuses” when outlining the
protections of the church autonomy doctrine. Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at
30
2061. Again, there is no analogue to the conduct challenged here, as
Appellant did not allege that her minor son was put to the choice of
following his own faith or suffering a negative consequence.
Restrictions on Political Participation. Before the Founding,
English law allowed only Anglicans to hold public office and vote.
McConnell, supra, at 2177. Similar restrictions on officeholding and
voting continued in colonial America, including by denying the franchise
to members of disfavored denominations, or extending the franchise only
to members of favored denominations. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael
W. McConnell, Agreeing to Disagree: How the Establishment Clause
Protects Religious Diversity and Freedom of Conscience 26–27 (2023).
The Supreme Court has applied this hallmark to strike down a Maryland
constitutional rule requiring professed belief in God to hold a state
commission. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961). Of course,
no political restriction is at issue here; to the contrary, the disputed
lessons were designed to improve civic tolerance by discouraging “group
generalizations.” App. 17.
Monopoly over Government Functions. At the Founding, states
delegated government duties to religious officials and entities in such
31
areas as social welfare, elementary education, marriages, public records,
and the prosecution of certain moral offenses. McConnell, supra, at
2169–77. The Supreme Court has invoked this hallmark in striking down
a statute giving churches the power to veto liquor licenses. See Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 n.10 (1982) (discussing historical
practice). But the Court has also distinguished, and protected, religious
organizations’ ability to perform important civil functions (and receive
funds to do so) alongside secular agencies. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of
Phila., 593 U.S. 522, 542 (2021) (foster care). In any event, there can be
no analogue to this hallmark here, as the District did not give control of
the curriculum to a religious body, but itself selected Islamic resources it
found useful for a social studies lesson. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28 (describing
Board of Education authority over the curriculum).
* * *
In sum, the historical-hallmark test reveals that Appellant has
identified a “phantom constitutional violation[],” that, if credited, would
unnecessarily pit the “complementary” purposes of the Religion Clauses
against each other. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 543. Presenting unfamiliar
religious faiths in a context of “mutual respect and tolerance” so as to
32
combat misunderstanding and hatred serves the “best of our traditions.”
Id. at 514. The Establishment Clause poses no obstacle to doing so.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm the decision below, and it should do so on
the basis that the challenged conduct fails to bear or resemble a hallmark
of a religious establishment under Kennedy.
May 1, 2024 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Noel J. Francisco
Noel J. Francisco
Christopher Pagliarella
JONES DAY
51 Louisiana Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 879-3939
njfrancisco@jonesday.com
Eric C. Rassbach
THE HUGH AND HAZEL
DARLING FOUNDATION
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLINIC
Pepperdine University
Caruso School Of Law
24255 Pacific Coast Hwy.
Malibu, CA 90263
(310) 506-4611
eric.rassbach@pepperdine.edu
33
COMBINED CERTIFICATIONS
I hereby certify the following:
1. I am a member of the Bar of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit.
2. This amicus brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed.
R. App. P. 29(a)(5) because it contains 6,401 words, excluding the parts
of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(f).
3. This amicus brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed.
R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a 14-point proportionally spaced
typeface (Century Schoolbook) using Microsoft Word 2019.
4. That the text of the electronic and paper versions of the foregoing
brief are identical.
5. That a virus check was performed on this brief using a commercial
virus detection program, Microsoft Safety Scanner—version 1.409, and
no virus was indicated.
6. That on May 1, 2024, I caused the foregoing to be filed with the
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF System, and all counsel of record in
this case is a Filing User who will receive notice of such filing.
34
Dated: May 1, 2024 /s/ Noel J. Francisco

Noel J. Francisco
35

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Case: 23-3030 Document: 31 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/01/2024

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

LIBBY HILSENRATH, on behalf of her minor child, C.H.,

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CHATHAMS, et al.,

On appeal from the United States District Court for the

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF

Eric C. Rassbach Noel J. Francisco

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

FRAP 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

FRAP 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................... iv

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS ................................................................ 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................... 3

I. CONSTRUING KENNEDY’S HISTORICAL TEST TO

A. Antisemitism, and Anti-Semitic Attacks, Are on the Rise ........... 6

B. Ignorance of Minority Faiths Contributes to Hatred .................... 8

C. Fact-Based, Tolerance-Focused Education About Religion Is

II. KENNEDY SETS FORTH A HISTORICAL-HALLMARK

A. Kennedy Recognized That the Lemon Test Wrongly Pitted

B. To Support a Complementary Understanding of the

C. The Contrary Approach of Appellant and AU Would Revive

III. UNDER THE HISTORICAL-HALLMARK TEST, THE

A. The District Did Not Compel Church Attendance ...................... 24

B. The School District Did Not Provide Exclusive Financial

C. No Other Historical Hallmark Applies ....................................... 28

Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo,

Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n,

Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist.,

Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,

Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue,

Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp.,

Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Cnty. of Lehigh,

Fulton v. City of Phila.,

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.

Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc.,

Maddonna v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,

Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru,

Shurtleff v. City of Bos.,

Town of Greece v. Galloway,

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,

Young Isr. of Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit

Grethel Aguila, A Jewish Man Was Attacked Near a

Anti-Defamation League, ADL Reports Unprecedented Rise

Anti-Defamation League, Antisemitic Attitudes in America:

Thomas Berg, Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation,

1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

Rob Boston, The National Day of Prayer Is a Christian

Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Agreeing to

Daniel L. Chen, Kennedy v. Bremerton School District: The

From George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation in

Masha Gessen, Why the Tree of Life Shooter Was Fixated on

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, Americans United

Andrew Lapin, Man Arrested After Fort Lauderdale Chabad

Talia Lavin, The San Diego Shooter’s Manifesto Is a Modern

Janet Maslin, The Exodus from Paducah, 1862,

Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment