CIVIL PROCEDURE Question and Answer 2
CIVIL PROCEDURE Question and Answer 2
CIVIL PROCEDURE Question and Answer 2
b.) No. Under S20 R3, the favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against
teh estate of a deceased person. P should file the judgment award in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of D as a money claim pursuant to R86.
Yes. The writ of attachment was not dissolved since the main action was not dismissed
but continues until final judgment. Hence, P is a preferred creditor over the property
attached.
b. Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of action on the
exclusive venue thereof.
(a) Purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is solely for
payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and
(b) The civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal
action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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SEC. 14. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. — The following pleadings, motions, or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
56. What are the pleading allowed by the Rules of Court? [61]
The pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court are as follows:
No, the grounds invoked by Jose Penduko in his motion to dismiss is unfitting.
1. The invocation of the Totality rule is misplaced. Under Art 360 of the RPC,
jurisdiction over a civil action for damages in cases of libel is with the RTC.
(Nocum v. Tan 23 Sept 2005). The said provision does not mention any
jurisdictional amount over such action. Hence, Totality Rule does not apply.
2. The Ground that the complaint mentioned the complainant’s office address
rather than his residence is of no moment since the complaint also stated that
the libelous article was printed and first published in Paranaque City. Under Art.
360 of the RPC, venue in civil actions for libel also lies in the place where the
libelous article was printed and first published.
b) I would not file a motion to dismiss but an answer and raise the ground for the
motion to dismiss under the pretences of failure to state a cause of action as an
affirmative defense in the answer which was stated under S6R16 I would plead in my
answer the claim for damages and removal as a compulsory counterclaim
c) Yes the judgement of the RTC may be set aside on the ground of Res judicata,
However RJ can be raised under the circumstance of being the first time to be raised
on appeal
Ramon’s counter claim of 130K will be barred since it is a compulsory counter claim
which was no set up in the answer under S2R9 A counter claim cannot be set up in a
motion to dismiss
(b) D is liable to pay docket fees on his cross-claim which was filed before the RTC,
pursuant to S7 (a) R141. The SC did not suspend the collection of docket fees on cross-
claims filed with the RTC.
106. Distinguish a counterclaim from a cross-claim.[118]
As to whom directed. A counterclaim is directed against the opposing party while a
cross-claim is directed against a co-party. AS TO CONNECTION WITH THE MAIN
ACTION. A counter claim may or may not arise out of the transaction constituting the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim while a cross-claim always arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein. AS TO COMPULSORINESS. A counterclaim may or may not be
compulsory while a cross-claim is always compulsory. (Sec.6&7, Rule 6, ROC)
124. X’s car collided with P’s car destroying the latter’s
car. P sues the insurer to recover the damages in his car
insurance policy. The insurer files a third-party complaint
against X. May X in his answer to the third-party complaint
raise the defense that P’s car was at the time of the
collision being driven by P’s friend who did not have a valid
driver’s license, thus violating the authorized-driver clause
of the car policy and barring P from recovering thereon? [136]
Yes. Under S13 R6, a third party defendant may allege in his answer defenses that the
third party plaintiff may have against the original plaintiffs claim. The violation of the
authorized-driver clause is a defenses that the insurer may have against the claim of
the insured P, yet this may be invoked by X in order to defeat or negate the insurer’s
claim pursuant to S13 R6.
Caption – sets the name of the court, title of the action and docket number if assigned
Body – the body sets the designation, allegations of the party’s claim or defenses,
relief prayed for and the date of pleading.
Signature and address - it includes matters stated in answer to the next question.
When two or more persons were not organized as an entity with juridical personality
enter into transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally
or commonly known. In answer of such defendant, names and address of the persons
composing said entity must be revealed. (s15 R3)
However, if defendants objects to such evidence, the court may nonetheless still
admit the evidence of the presentation of the merits of the action, and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The complaint shall be ordered
amended. (S5R10)
132. May the court in its final judgment award a claim
not alleged, or a relief different from, or more that that
claimed in the pleading?[144]
YES, (S2R141), the evidence on record should so warrant and the provisions of S5R10
should be taken into account. The docket fees on such award shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. (S2R141)
Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating either
case his address which should not be a post office box. (S3 R7)
If the acts of the party and his counsel clearly constitute wilful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as cause for administrative sanctions.
184. P and R are the children of the late CC. Upon the
demise of CC, his spouse and his children executed a deed
of partition wherein they waived their shares over the H
Lumber in favor of their co-heir Q. Q then sold the H
Lumber to R. Later R delivered a check for P200,000 to P
which the latter encashed. Subsequently R sued P to collect
on the P200,000 which R alleges was a loan. In her answer
with counterclaim, P alleged that the P200,000 was an
advance on her share in H Lumber and counterclaimed for
accounting and delivery of her share. R filed an answer to
the counterclaim wherein he alleged that P no longer had
any interest in H Lumber because of the execution of the
deed of partition and that he is now the owner of the H
Lumber by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his favor by
CC. R annexed copies of the deed of partition and of sale to
his answer to the counterclaim. P filed a reply and
countered that the deed of partition and the deed of sale
were not true and valid agreements and did not express
the true intention of the parties, and that the deeds were
only temporary paper arrangements executed upon advice
of counsel until all the heirs could reach a final agreement.
The trial court ruled in favor of R. P contended that it was
error for the trial court to admit mere copies of the deed of
partition and the deed of sale in violation of the best
evidence rule. Is P’s contention correct?[198] Explain.
No the petitioner's contention is not correct. The Supreme Court has held in Gaw vs.
Chua Gr No.160855, that production of the original may be dispensed with in the trial
courts discretion whether the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the documents and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
Here there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence the RTC correctly
admitted the photocopies in evidence. Petitioner admitted signing the deed of
partition.as for the deed of sale, petitioner in effect admitted the genuineness and due
execution of the deed of sale when she failed to specifically deny it pursuant to S8 R8.
The petitioner did not contest the contents of the deed but simply alleged that there
was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of hagonoy lumber to Chua Sioc
Juan was only temporary.