Exempting circumstances.

• Definition
• Exempting circumstances are those grounds for exemption from punishment
because there is wanting in the agent of the crime any of the conditions
which make the act voluntary or negligent.
• Basis
• The exemption from punishment is based on the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on
the part of the accused.
Circumstances which exempt from criminal
liability.
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of
the same court.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause
In exempting circumstances, there is a crime
committed but no criminal liability arises.
• Technically, one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances commits a crime, although by the complete absence of
any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of
the act, no criminal liability arise.
Burden of proof.
• Any of the circumstances mentioned in Art. 12 is a matter of defense
and the same must be proved by the defendant to the satisfaction of
the court.
An imbecile or an insane person, unless the
latter has acted during a lucid interval.
• Imbecility distinguished from insanity.
• This paragraph establishes the distinction between imbecility and insanity,
because while the imbecile is exempt in all cases from criminal liability, the
insane is not so exempt if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid
interval.
• An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development
comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age.
• An imbecile within the meaning of Art. 12 is one who is deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
To constitute insanity, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence or that there be a total
deprivation of the freedom of the will.
• he acts without the least discernment; or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
• Thus, mere abnormality of mental faculties is not enough, especially if
the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. At most, it is only
a mitigating circumstance.
Procedure when the imbecile or the insane
committed a felony.
• The court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the court.
But the court has no power to permit the insane person to leave the
asylum without first obtaining the opinion of the Director of Health
that he may be released without danger.
Insanity at the time of the commission of the
felony distinguished from insanity at the time of
the trial.
• When a person was insane at the time of the commission of the
felony, he is exempt from criminal liability.
• When he was sane at the time of the commission of the crime, but he
becomes insane at the time of the trial, he is liable criminally. The
trial, however, will be suspended until the mental capacity of the
accused be restored to afford him a fair trial.
When defense of insanity is not credible.
• apellant was able to recall all incidents, we cannot understand why his
memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to
return at the snap of the finger as it were, after he accomplished the act of
stabbing his victim. (People vs. Renegado, No. L-27031)
• Before the killing, he was working for a living through fishing three times a
week and he himself fixed the prices for his catch. The presumption of
sanity has not been overcome. (People vs. Magallano, No. L-32978, Oct. 30,
1980, 100 SCRA 570, 577-578)
• The accused was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction" but knew what he
was doing. The accused was not legally insane when he killed the hapless
and helpless victim. (People vs. Puno, No. L-33211, June 29,1981,105 SCRA
151, 156, 159)
Dementia praecox is covered by the term
insanity.
• when a person is suffering from a form of psychosis, a symptom of
dementia praecox, homicidal attack is common, because of delusions
that he is being interfered with sexually, or that his property is being
taken. During the period of excitement, such person has no control
whatever of his acts. (People vs. Bonoan, supra)
Schizophrenia, formerly called dementia
praceox.
• Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality
and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. (People vs.
Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451 (1986)
• Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through
odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of
impulsive destructiveness and immature and exaggerated
emotionality, often ambivalently directed.
Kleptomania.
• The case of a person suffering from kleptomania must be investigated by
competent alienist or psychiatrist to determine whether the impulse to
steal is irresistible or not. If the unlawful act of the accused is due "to his
mental disease or a mental defect, producing an irresistible impulse, as
when the accused has been deprived or has lost the power of his will which
would enable him to prevent himself from doing the act," the irresistible
impulse, even to take another's property, should be considered as covered
by the term "insanity.“

• On the other hand, if the mental disease or mental defect of the accused
only diminishes the exercise of his will-power, and did not deprive him of
the consciousness of his acts, then kleptomania, if it be the result of his
mental disease or mental defect, is only a mitigating circumstance.
Epilepsy may be covered by the term
"insanity."
• Epilepsy is a chronic nervous disease characterized by fits, occurring
at intervals, attended by convulsive motions of the muscles and loss
of consciousness. Where the accused claimed that he was an
epileptic but it was not shown that he was under the influence of an
epileptic fit when he committed the offense, he is not exempt from
criminal liability. (People vs. Mancao and Aguilar, 49 Phil. 887)
Feeblemindedness is not imbecility.
• In the case of People vs. Formigones, supra, it was held that
feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the offender could
distinguish right from wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot
distinguish right from wrong.
Pedophilia is not insanity
• pedophilia is a sexual disorder wherein the subject has strong,
recurrent and uncontrollable sexual and physical fantasies about
children which he tries to fulfill, especially when there are no people
around. (People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 130210, Dec. 8,1999)
Amnesia is not proof of mental condition of
the accused.
• Amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge unless it is
shown by competent proof that the accused did not know the nature
and quality of his action and that it was wrong. Failure to remember is
in itself no proof of the mental condition of the accused when the
crime was performed. (People vs. Tabugoca.G.R. No. 125334, Jan. 28,
1998)
Other cases of lack of intelligence
• 1. Committing a crime while in a dream. (People vs. Gimena, 55 Phil.
604)
• Somnambulism or sleepwalking, where the acts of the person afflicted are automatic, is
embraced in the plea of insanity and must be clearly proven.

• 2. Committing a crime while suffering from malignant malaria.

• one who was suffering from malignant malaria when she wounded her husband who
died as a consequence is not criminally liable, because such illness affects the nervous
system and causes among others such complication as acute melancholia and insanity at
times. (People vs. Lacena, 69 Phil. 350)
Basis of paragraph 1.
• The exempting circumstance of insanity or imbecility is based on the
complete absence of intelligence, an element of voluntariness.
Paragraph 3, Article 12 RPC impliedly
repealed by Republic Act No. 9344.
• "Section 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child
shall be subject to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of
this Act.
• A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subject to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
Meaning of "discernment."
• The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from
criminal liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine,
who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records
in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the
trial. (People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580, 583; Guevarra vs. Almodovar,
G.R. No. 75256, Jan. 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 476, 481)
Discernment and Intent distinguished.
• The terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person,
"intent" refers to the desired act of the person while "discernment"
relates to the moral significance that a person ascribes to the said act.
Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware
of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to
the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. (Guevara vs.
Almodovar, supra, at 481)
Discernment may be shown by the manner the crime
was committed, or the conduct of the offender after its
commission.
• 1. Manner of committing the crime. Thus, when the minor committed the
crime during nighttime to avoid detection or took the loot to another town
to avoid discovery, he manifested discernment. (People vs. Magsino, G.R.
No. 40176, May 3, 1934)
• 2. Conduct of offender. The accused, 11 years old (disregard age: Case cited
to illustrate discernment of a minor) shot the offended party, who had
caught him shooting at the latter's mango fruits, with a slingshot hitting
the latter in one of his eyes, and after having done so said: "Putang ina mo,
mabuti matikman mo." It was held that the first part of the remark clearly
manifested the perverted character of the accused and the second part
reflected his satisfaction and elation upon the accomplishment of his
criminal act. These facts indicate discernment on the part of the minor.
(People vs. Alcabao, C.A., 44 O.G. 5006)
Basis of paragraph 3.
• The exempting circumstance in paragraph 3 of Art. 12 is based also on
the complete absence of intelligence.
Elements of paragraph 3.
• 1. A person is performing a lawful act;
• 2. With due care;
• 3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
• 4. Without fault or intention of causing it. (See People vs. Vitug, 8 CAR
[2s] 905, 909)
Striking another with a gun in self-defense, even if it
fired and seriously injured the assailant, is a lawful act.
• But the act of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, not being
in self-defense, is unlawful—it is light threat
The person performing a lawful act must do
so with due care, without fault or negligence.
• this exempting circumstance cannot be applied to the appellant
because its application presupposes that there is no fault or
negligence on the part of the person performing the lawful act with
due care, whereas, in this case, the prosecution had duly established
that the appellant was guilty of negligence. (People vs. San Juan, C.A.,
65 O.G. 11264)
Examples of accident.
• The accused, while hunting, saw wild chickens and fired a shot. The slug, after hitting a
wild chicken, recoiled and struck the tenant who was a relative of the accused. The man
who was injured died. (US. V. Taneda)
• A chauffeur, while driving his automobile on the proper side of the road at a moderate
speed and with due diligence, suddenly and unexpectedly saw a man in front of his
vehicle coming from the sidewalk and crossing the street without any warning that he
would do so. Because it was not physically possible to avoid hitting him, the said
chauffeur ran over the man with his car. It was held that he was not criminally liable, it
being a mere accident. (U.S. vs. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476)
• Just as the truck then being driven by the accused was passing the slow-moving road
roller, a boy about 10 or 12 years of age jumped from the step of the side board of the
road roller directly in front of the truck, and was knocked down, ran over and instantly
killed. The accused was acquitted of all criminal liability arising out of the unfortunate
accident which resulted in the death of the boy. (U.S. vs. Knight, 26 Phil. 216)
What is an accident?
• An accident is something that happens outside the sway of our will,
and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies
beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences.
• If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of
negligence. (Albert)
Accident presupposes lack of intention to
commit the wrong done.
• The exempting circumstance of Art. 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code
refers to purely accidental cases where there was absolutely no
intention to commit the wrong done. It contemplates a situation
where a person is in the act of doing something legal, exercising due
care, diligence and prudence but in the process, produces harm or
injury to someone or something not in the least in the mind of the
actor — an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. (People vs.
Gatela, 17 CAE [2s] 1047, 1055)
Case of negligence, not accident.
• As the two persons fighting paid him no attention, the defendant
drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice in the air. The bout continued,
however, so he fired another shot at the ground, but unfortunately
the bullet ricocheted and hit Eugenio Francisco, an innocent
bystander, who died thereafter. Held: The mishap should be classed
as homicide through reckless imprudence. It is apparent the
defendant wilfully discharged his gun, without taking the precautions
demanded by the circumstances that the district was populated, and
the likelihood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of
the thoroughfare. (People vs. Nocum, 77 Phil. 1018)
Accident and negligence, intrinsically
contradictory.
• Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot
exist with the other. (People vs. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4,
2004)
When claim of accident not appreciated.
• 1) Repeated blows negate claim of wounding by mere accident. (People vs.
Taylaran, No. L-49149, Oct. 23,1981,108 SCRA 373, 376)
• 2) Accidental shooting is negated by threatening words preceding it and
still aiming the gun at the prostrate body of the victim, instead of
immediately helping him. (People vs. Reyes, No. L-33154, Feb. 27, 1976, 69
SCRA 474, 478)
• 3) Husband and wife had an altercation. The absence of any powder burns
at the entrance of the wound in the body of the deceased is convincing
proof that he was shot from a distance, and not with the muzzle of the gun
almost resting on his shoulder or the back of the neck. (People vs. Samson,
No. L-14110, March 29, 1963, 7 SCRA 478, 482-483)
Basis of paragraph 4.
• The exempting circumstance in paragraph 4 of Art. 12 is based on lack
of negligence and intent. Under this circumstance, a person does not
commit either an intentional felony or a culpable felony.
Par. 5. — Any person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force.
• Elements:
• 1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force.
• 2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
• 3. That the physical force must come from a third person.
Before a force can be considered to be an
irresistible one
• it must produce such an effect upon the individual that, in spite of all
resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument and, as such,
incapable of committing a crime. It must be such that, in spite of the
resistance of the person on whom it operates, it compels his
members to act and his mind to obey. Such a force can never consist
in anything which springs primarily from the man himself; it must be
a force which acts upon him from the outside and by a third person.
(U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209)
Basis of paragraph 5.
• The exempting circumstance in paragraph 5 of Art. 12 is based on the
complete absence of freedom, an element of voluntariness.
• A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not
act with freedom. (People vs. Loreno, No. L-54414, July 9, 1984, 130
SCRA 311, 321)
Nature of force required.
• The force must be irresistible to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such
a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat. (People vs. Loreno, No. L-54414, July 9,
1984, 130 SCRA 311, 321-322, citing People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil.
450)
Par. 6. — Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
• This exempting circumstance also presupposes that a person is
compelled to commit a crime by another, but the compulsion is by
means of intimidation or threat, not force or violence.
• Elements:
1. existence of an uncontrollable fear;
2. the fear must be real and imminent; and
3. the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed. (People vs. Petenia, No. L-51256, Aug. 12, 1986, 143
SCRA 361, 369)
The accused must not have opportunity for
escape or self defense.
• A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of
such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape
or self-defense in equal combat.
• Duress is unavailing where the accused had every opportunity to run
away if he had wanted to or to resist any possible aggression because
he was also armed. (People vs. Palencia, No. L-38957, April 30, 1976,
71 SCRA 679, 690; People vs. Abanes, No. L-30609, Sept. 28, 1976, 73
SCRA 44, 47)
Speculative, fanciful and remote fear is not
uncontrollable fear.
• Mere fear of a member of the Huk movement to disobey or refuse to
carry out orders of the organization, in the absence of proof of actual
physical or moral compulsion to act, is not sufficient to exempt the
accused from criminal liability. (People vs. Fernando, No. L-24781,
May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 149, 157)
A threat of future injury is not enough.
• To appreciate duress as a valid defense, a threat of future injury is not
enough. It must be clearly shown that the compulsion must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.
(People vs. Palencia, No. L-38957, April 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 679, 690;
People vs. Abanes, No. L-30609, Sept. 28, 1976, 73 SCRA 44, 47)
Distinction between irresistible force and
uncontrollable fear.
• In irresistible force (par. 5), the offender uses violence or physical
force to compel another person to commit a crime; in uncontrollable
fear (par. 6), the offender employs intimidation or threat in
compelling another to commit a crime.
Basis of paragraph 6.
• The exempting circumstance in paragraph 6 of Art. 12 is also based on
the complete absence of freedom.
• "Actus me invito factus non est meus actus." ("An act done by me
against my will is not my act.")
Par. 7. — Any person who fails to perform an act
required by law, when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause.
• Elements:
• 1. That an act is required by law to be done;
• 2. That a person fails to perform such act;
• 3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or
insuperable cause.
When prevented by some lawful cause.
• Example: A confessed to a Filipino priest that he and several other
persons were in conspiracy against the Government. Under Art. 116,
a Filipino citizen who knows of such conspiracy must report the same
to the governor or fiscal of the province where he resides. If the priest
does not disclose and make known the same to the proper authority,
he is exempt from criminal liability, because under the law, the priest
cannot be compelled to reveal any information which he came to
know by reason of the confession made to him in his professional
capacity. (Vide, Sec. 24[d], Rule 130, Rules of Court)
When prevented by some insuperable cause.
• Examples:
• 1. The municipal president detained the offended party for three days
because to take him to the nearest justice of the peace required a
journey for three days by boat as there was no other means of
transportation. (U.S. vs. Vicentillo, 19 Phil. 118, 119).
• 2. A mother who at the time of childbirth was overcome by severe
dizziness and extreme debility, and left the child in a thicket where
said child died, is not liable for infanticide, because it was physically
impossible for her to take home the child. (People vs. Bandian, 63
Phil. 530, 534-535)
Basis of paragraph 7.
• The circumstance in paragraph 7 of Art. 12 exempts the accused from
criminal liability, because he acts without intent, the third condition
of voluntariness in intentional felony.
In all the exempting circumstances, intent is
wanting in the agent of the crime.
• Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of
intelligence. Hence, in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Art. 12, the imbecile,
insane, or minor, not having intelligence, does not act with intent. The
person acting under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 12, not having freedom of action, does not
act with intent. In paragraph 4 of Art. 12, it is specifically stated that
the actor causes an injury by mere accident without intention of
causing it.
Distinction between justifying and exempting
circumstances.
• (1) A person who acts by virtue of a justifying circumstance does not
transgress the law, that is, he does not commit any crime in the eyes of the
law, because there is nothing unlawful in the act as well as in the intention
of the actor. The act of such person is in itself both just and lawful.

• In justifying circumstances, there is neither a crime nor a criminal. No civil liability,

except in par. 4 (causing damage to another in state of necessity).

• (2) In exempting circumstances, there is a crime but no criminal liability.

The act is not justified, but the actor is not criminally liable. There is civil
liability, except in pars. 4 and 7 (causing an injury by mere accident; failing
to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause) of Art. 12. (See Art. 101 which does not mention pars. 4
and 7 of Art. 12)
Absolutory causes
• Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime but
for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty
imposed.
Other absolutory causes.
• Art. 6. — The spontaneous desistance of the person who commenced the
commission of a felony before he could perform all the acts of execution.
• Art. 20. — Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who
are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling
with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
• The provisions of paragraph 1 of Art. 19 read, as follows:
"By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects
of the crime."
Other absolutory causes.
• Art. 124, last paragraph. — The commission of a crime, or violent insanity
or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient
in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any
person.
• Art. 247, pars. 1 and 2. — Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
• If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
Other absolutory causes.
• Art. 280, par. 3. — The provisions of this article (on trespass to
dwelling) shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter
another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm
to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it
be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the
purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to
anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses,
while the same are open.
Other absolutory causes.
• Art. 332. — Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but
only civil, liability shall result from the commission of the crime of
theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually
by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line; 2. The widowed spouse with
respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse
before the same shall have passed into the possession of another;
and 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if
living together.
Other absolutory causes.
• Art. 344, par. 4. — In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
Instigation is an absolutory cause.
• He wa s instigated to commit the crime of smoking opium. (U.S. vs.
Phelps, 16 Phil. 440)
• Suppose that the agent in that case induced the accused to sell opium
to him and the accused sold opium, could the accused be held liable
for illegal possession of opium?
Yes, because the accused was then in possession of opium and the mere
possession of opium is a violation of the law within itself.
Basis of exemption from criminal liability.
• A sound public policy requires that the courts shall condemn this
practice (instigation) by directing the acquittal of the accused.
Entrapment is not an absolutory cause.
• the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime
that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or
that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity
in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission.
• In entrapment, a person has planned, or is about to commit, a crime
and ways and means are resorted to by a public officer to trap and
catch the criminal. Entrapment is not a defense.
Entrapment and instigation distinguished.
• There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for
while in the latter case the instigator practically induces the would be
accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal, in entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of
his criminal plan. Entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and
conviction of the lawbreaker. But when there is instigation, the
accused must be acquitted. (People vs. Galicia, C.A., 40 O.G. 4476;
People vs. Yutuc, G.R. No. 82590, July 26, 1990, 188 SCRA 1, 21;
People vs. Payumo, G.R. No. 81761, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 64, 71;
Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-46638, July 9, 1986,142 SCRA 534,
540)
Instigation must be made by public officers or
private detectives.
• A criminal act may not be punishable if the accused was induced to
commit it by active cooperation and instigation on the part of public
detectives. (State vs. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76,16 S.W. 514, 24 Am. St. Rep.
360)
• If the one who made the instigation is a private individual, not
performing public function, both he and the one induced are
criminally liable for the crime committed: the former, as principal by
induction; and the latter, as principal by direct participation.