Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                

RULE 47 - Baclaran Marketing Corp V Nieva & Sibulo, Jr. G.R. No. 189881 (2017)

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 2

[G.R. No. 189881. April 19, 2017.

BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FERNANDO


C. NIEVA and MAMERTO SIBULO, JR., respondents.

|FACTS:
Petitioner BMC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of distribution, marketing
and delivery of cement. It is one of the defendants in a civil case for damages arising from a
vehicular collision between a 10-wheeler truck owned by BMC and driven by its employee
Ricardo Mendoza and a car owned and driven by Mamerto Sibulo, Jr. The Antipolo Court ruled
in favor of BMC and Mendoza and dismissed Sibulo's complaint. On appeal, the CA, in reversed
the RTC decision and held that Mendoza's negligence caused the collision.|||
In the absence of a motion for reconsideration, the Decision became final and executory. The
Antipolo Court issued a Writ of Execution. Then it directed the Deputy Sheriff, upon motion of
Sibulo, to implement the Writ of Execution against the real properties owned by BMC. The
sheriff levied BMC's real property in Parañaque City. He sold the property through public
auction to Respondent Fernando C. Nieva. BMC failed to redeem the property within one year
from the sale. Nieva then filed a Petition for cancellation of tile and issuance of new title in the
RTC Paranque, which was granted. Nieva then filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession against BMC.
BMC then filed a petition for Annulment of Judgement before the CA. BMC prayed for the
annulment of the following orders and decisions: (a) Writ of Execution dated January 16,
2006 issued by the Antipolo Court in Civil Case No. 1218-A; (b) Order dated February
23, 2006 of the Antipolo Court in Civil Case No. 1218-A ordering the implementation of
the writ of execution over the real properties of BMC; (c) Auction Sale dated April 17,
2006; (d) Decision dated March 26, 2008 of the Parañaque Court in LRC Case No. 07-
0119 canceling TCT No. 34587; and (e) Decision dated January 26, 2009 of the Parañaque
Court in LRC Case No. 08-0077, ordering the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
BMC alleged that its counsel, Atty. Isagani B. Rizon (Atty. Rizon), committed acts of gross
and inexcusable negligence constituting "extrinsic fraud," which deprived it of due process and
an opportunity to present its side. The CA denied BMC’s petition as well as the subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by the latter. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for Annulment of Judgement filed by
BMC
RULING:
No. The CA did not err in dismissing the petition for Annulment of Judgement filed
by BMC. The Court stated, In Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank & Trust
Company, we held that "given the extraordinary nature and the objective of the remedy of
annulment of judgment or final order," a petitioner must comply with the statutory
requirements as set forth under Rule 47. These are:
(1) The remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of the petitioner;
(2) The grounds for the action of annulment of judgment are limited to either
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction;
(3) The action must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic
fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by
laches or estoppel; and
(4) The petition must be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and
the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
BMC's petition for annulment of judgment fails to meet the first and second requisites.

Rule 47, Section 1 limits the applicability of the remedy of annulment of judgment
to final judgments, orders or resolutions. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto. This may be an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right,
or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription.
In contrast, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something
to be done upon its merits.
As stated in Guiang v. Co, “ The rule does not apply to an action to annul the levy and
sale at public auction of petitioner's properties or the certificate of sale executed by the deputy
sheriff over said properties. Neither does it apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution
because a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the
mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial
process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing party.”

Rule 47, Section 2 provides extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction as the exclusive
grounds for the remedy of annulment of judgment. Case law, however, recognizes a third
ground — denial of due process of law. Here, BMC invokes extrinsic fraud and lack of due
process as grounds for its petition for annulment of judgment. It claims that Atty. Rizon's gross
negligence in handling the case constitutes extrinsic fraud and deprived it of due process of
law.
We are not persuaded. Extrinsic fraud refers to a fraud committed to the unsuccessful party
by his opponent preventing him from fully exhibiting his case by keeping him away from
court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the
suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or when an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat
In this case, the CA correctly found that BMC neither alleged nor proved that the gross
negligence of its former counsel was done in connivance with Nieva or Sibulo. Therefore, it is
not the extrinsic fraud contemplated under Rule 47, Section 2.

You might also like