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The Motivated Mind

In the World Library of Psychologists series, international experts themselves present

career-long collections of what they judge to be their finest pieces – extracts from
books, key articles, salient research findings, and their major practical theoretical
contributions.
In this volume Arie Kruglanski reflects on the development throughout his
distinguished career of his wide-ranging research covering radicalisation, human
judgement and belief formation, group and intergroup processes, and motivated
cognition. This collection offers an invaluable insight into the key works behind
the formation of Kruglanski’s seminal theory of lay epistemics, as well as his
important input into a diverse range of fields of social psychology. A specially
written introduction gives an intimate overview of this career, and contextualises
the selection in relation to changes in the field during this time.
With continuing relevance today, and of vast historical importance, this collec-
tion is essential reading for anyone with an interest in goals, belief formation,
group processes, and social psychology in general.

Arie W. Kruglanski is a Distinguished University Professor at the University

of Maryland in the US, a recipient of numerous awards, and is a Fellow of the
American Psychological Association and the American Psychological Society.
He has served as editor of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes
and Social Cognition, editor of the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and associate
editor of the American Psychologist.
World Library of Psychologists

The World Library of Psychologists series celebrates the important contributions

to psychology made by leading experts in their individual fields of study. Each
scholar has compiled a career-long collection of what they consider to be their
finest pieces: extracts from books, journals, articles, major theoretical and practical
contributions, and salient research findings.

For the first time ever the work of each contributor is presented in a single volume
so readers can follow the themes and progress of their work and identify the
contributions made to, and the development of, the fields themselves.

Each book in the series features a specially written introduction by the contributor
giving an overview of their career, contextualizing their selection within the
development of the field, and showing how their thinking developed over time.

Discovering the Social Mind

Selected Works of Christopher D. Frith
By Christopher D. Frith

Towards a Deeper Understanding of Consciousness

Selected Works of Max Velmans
By Max Velmans

Thinking Developmentally from Constructivism to Neuroconstructivism

Selected Works of Annette Karmiloff-Smith
By Annette Karmiloff-Smith

Acquired Language Disorders in Adulthood and Childhood

Selected Works of Elaine Funnell
Edited by Nicola Pitchford, Andrew W. Ellis

Exploring Working Memory

Selected works of Alan Baddeley
By Alan Baddeley
The Motivated Mind
The Selected Works of
Arie W. Kruglanski

Arie W. Kruglanski
First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 Arie W. Kruglanski
The right of Arie W. Kruglanski to be identified as author of this work
has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or
other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying
and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Names: Kruglanski, Arie W., author.
Title: The motivated mind : the selected works of Arie W. Kruglanski /
Arie W. Kruglanski.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017060861 (print) | LCCN 2017061073 (ebook) |
ISBN 9781315175867 (Ebk) | ISBN 9781351708029 (Adobe) |
ISBN 9781351708012 ( Epub) | ISBN 9781351708005 (Mobipocket) |
ISBN 9781138039438 (hbk)
Subjects: LCSH: Motivation (Psychology) | Cognition.
Classification: LCC BF503 (ebook) |
LCC BF503. K78 2018 (print) | DDC 153.8—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017060861

ISBN: 978-1-138-03943-8 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-17586-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Baskerville
by Keystroke, Neville Lodge, Tettenhall, Wolverhampton
Contents

Acknowledgments vii

1 Speaking in general: Reflections on my work 1

KRUGLANSKI, A. W.

PART I
How people know 17

2 Three decades of lay epistemics: The why, how, and

who of knowledge formation 19
KRUGLANSKI, A. W., DECHESNE, M., OREHEK, E., &
PIERRO, A. (2009).

3 Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing” 60

KRUGLANSKI, A. W. & WEBSTER, D. M. (1996).

4 Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on

common principles 104
KRUGLANSKI, A. W. & GIGERENZER, G. (2011).

5 Political conservatism as motivated social cognition 129

JOST, J. T., GLASER, J., SULLOWAY, F. J., & KRUGLANSKI, A. W. (2003).

PART II
How people want 205

6 A theory of goal systems 207

KRUGLANSKI, A. W., SHAH, J. Y., FISHBACH, A., FRIEDMAN, R.,
CHUN, W. Y. & SLEETH-KEPPLER, D. (2002).
vi Contents
PART III
How people act 251

7 The rocky road from attitudes to behaviors: Charting

the goal systemic course of actions 253
KRUGLANSKI, A. W., JASKO, K., CHERNIKOVA, M., MILYAVSKY, M.,
BABUSH, M., BALDNER, C., & PIERRO, A. (2015).

8 To “do the right thing” or to “just do it”: Locomotion

and assessment as distinct self-regulatory imperatives 299
KRUGLANSKI, A. W., THOMPSON, E. P., HIGGINS, E. T., ATASH, M. N.,
PIERRO, A., SHAH, J. Y., & SPIEGEL, S. (2000).

9 To the fringe and back: Violent extremism and

the psychology of deviance 344
KRUGLANSKI, A. W., JASKO, K., CHERNIKOVA, M.,
DUGAS, M., & WEBBER, D. (2017).

Index 367
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Taylor & Francis for permission to include the following:
Kruglanski, A. W., Dechesne, M., Orehek, E., & Pierro, A. (2009). Three decades of lay
epistemics: The why, how and who of knowledge formation. European Review of Social
Psychology, 20, 146–191

I would like to thank the American Psychological Association for permission to

include the following:
Kruglanski, A. W. & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and
“freezing.” Psychological Review, 103(2), 263.
Kruglanski, A. W. & Gigerenzer, G. (2011). Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on
common principles. Psychological Review, 118, 97–109.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339–375.
Kruglanski, A. W., Jasko, K., Chernikova, M., Milyavsky, M., Babush, M., Baldner, C., &
Pierro, A. (2015). The rocky road from attitudes to behaviors: Charting the goal systemic
course of actions. Psychological Review, 122, 598–620.
Kruglanski, A. W., Thompson, E. P., Higgins, E. T., Atash, M., Pierro, A., Shah, J. Y., &
Spiegel, S. (2000). To “do the right thing” or to “just do it”: locomotion and assessment
as distinct self-regulatory imperatives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 793.
Kruglanski, A. W., Jasko, K., Chernikova, M., Dugas, M., Webber, D. (in press). To the
fringe and back: Violent extremism and the psychology of deviance. American Psychologist.

I would like to thank Elsevier for permission to include the following:

Kruglanski, A. W., Shah, J. Y., Fishbach, A., Friedman, R., Chun, W. Y., & Sleeth-Keppler,
D. (2002). “A theory of goal systems.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 34,
pp. 331–378.
1 Speaking in general
Reflections on my work
Arie W. Kruglanski, University of Maryland

My tortuous way to social psychology:

A personal history
“Life happens when you are busy doing other things,” goes the saying. My way
into the science of psychology illustrates how this can transpire, if you aren’t
careful. Fortuitous events, kind comments of friends and strangers, life’s ups and
downs, choices made, and paths pursued all conspired to miraculously bring me
herein, looking back at already a long (and hopefully much longer) career as a
psychological researcher and theorist.
Growing up in Poland and later Israel to a family whose business was textiles, it
never entered my mind to consider a scientific career, though the seeds of my fas-
cination with science were planted in my late teens by my uncle, a botanist. It was
during my furloughs from the army (I served in the Israeli air force), while visiting
the home of my aunt Sofia (Zuza) that uncle Zem (her spouse) treated me to articles
from the Scientific American that he collected. The calm, systematic and serenely
“serious” expositions of scientific research contrasted sharply with the rough
and tumble of army life and a youth culture centered on music, entertainment, and
“having a good time,” superficially defined. It was this juxtaposition that instilled in
me the notion of the “good” and worthy life as a life of serious study resistant to the
“siren call” of the vanities to which I gladly (even if guiltily) succumbed at the time.
Fresh out of the military service and anxious to move forward, I enrolled in the
school of architecture at the University of Toronto (the city where my mother
resided). This decision was heavily influenced by aunt Zuza’s advice and her (erro-
neous, it turns out) assumption that my (alleged) talent for drawing and my good
grades at math held the promise of an illustrious architectural career. That was
not to be, alas. My limited ability to imagine things in space, and my indifference
(to say the least) to engineering details and the intricacies of construction, contrib-
uted to my “fish out of water” sense with architectural nitty gritty. What broke the
proverbial camel’s back was a summer job experience at a Toronto architectural
firm. This outfit specialized in high-rise condos, and my mission as a junior
draftsman was to draw the bathrooms for thousands of apartments. This unhappy
experience brought me to the brink of despair or nearly so; to escape the morass
I decided to cut my losses and change course sooner rather than later.
2 Kruglanski
But what course to elect? was the question. This time, rather choosing rationally
based on what I might be good at, I chose to study a subject that intrigued me the
most: human behavior! Concretely, this meant enrolling in the department of
psychology (at the University of Toronto), which I hoped would train me to
become a wise psychoanalyst capable of interpreting the dreams of people,
explaining the mysteries of their conduct, and unraveling the psychological knots
that held them in bondage (just as was shown in Alfred Hitchcock’s Freud-inspired
films). That too wasn’t to be, however: In the early 1960s, the department of psycho-
logy at the University of Toronto was as far from psychoanalysis as one might
imagine. Instead, it was heavily populated by psychological super scientists. Animal
learning types, including Abram Amsel the frustration theorist, Endel Tulving and
Ben Murdock, both giants in the field of memory, George Mandler, a superstar
in the realm of emotion, Daniel Berlyne, a leader in the domain of motivation,
Jean Foley the perception expert, and other faculty of stellar scientific stature.
Though my hopes of a shining psychoanalytic career were dashed, I quickly fell
in love with the rigors of scientific psychology taught and practiced in Toronto. It
apparently hit a spot created by my uncle’s Scientific American articles I had perused
years ago and evoked a vision of scholarly pursuits and a life dedicated to ideas
and research.
While I found behavioral learning theory (the rage at the time) fascinating, I was
less enamored when it came to actual work with animals in the lab. The white rat
I tried to educate and train to press a bar escaped from the cage and bit me, and
while I was crawling on the lab floor trying to capture the escapee, a light went on
in my head, and two words rang in my ears: Social Psychology! Fortunately, I found
a wonderful mentor in this domain in the person of John Arrowood, whose encour-
agement, enthusiasm, and guidance made the study of social psychology seem like
an exciting adventure. When the time came to apply to grad schools, John recom-
mended that I work with Harold Kelley (his own mentor) at UCLA, and I did so. It
turned out to be one of the most important decisions I ever made. Hal was a truly
great scientist who inspired, challenged, and encouraged me like few others. From
that point on, the Social Psychology community became my extended family, the
group to which I was honored to belong and whose members came to be my role
models, colleagues, and dear friends. As you will see below, I wasn’t quite a proto-
typical member of the clan, and often found myself questioning some of the most
basic tenets of its shared knowledge and received views. My excuse was that the
problems I addressed were the major ones that social psychology has set for itself,
and in tackling them in the best way I could I felt I was carrying out its scientific
mission just as a “good” social psychologist was meant to do.

I. How People Know

The inferential process

Einstein is reputed to have quipped that “Everything should be made as simple as
possible, but no simpler.” When I look back on my work of almost 50 years, it
 Speaking in general 3
seems that I have followed a kindred principle in trying to make “everything” as
general as possible, though no more general. A good example of this approach has
been my work on lay epistemics; a theory of the process whereby people acquire
their subjective knowledge, that is, their beliefs on various topics. This theory,
exemplified by a sample of articles in the first section of this volume, grew out of
my work in attribution theory and the distinction between the contents of knowledge
and the process of knowledge acquisition.
It seemed to me that whereas attribution theory purported to address the process
of causal attribution, major theorists in this domain (the likes of Fritz Heider,
Bernard Weiner, Edward (Ned) Jones, or Harold Kelley) dwelled instead on the
contents of attributional categories. Heider (1958), for instance, and later Jones (e.g.,
Jones & Davis, 1965) talked about attributions to the person (referred to as internal
attributions) versus to the situation (referred to as external attributions), Kelley (1967)
distinguished between attributions to “entity,” “consensus,” and “time/modality,”
and Weiner (1985), addressing the achievement context, parsed the attributional
domain into ascriptions to “ability,” “luck,” “effort,” and “task difficulty.”
Though these attributional categories are of great interest, and have illuminated
important phenomena in specific domains, they do not (so I argued) describe the
general process of causal attribution as such. They pertain to the contents of possible
causal categories as did my own distinction between endogenous and exogenous
attributions proposed as an alternative to the ubiquitous internal–external
partition (Kruglanski, 1975).
In essence, the process of causal attribution should apply to all causal categories
not just to the select ones identified by attributional researchers. On careful exami-
nation, it turns out that once stripped of their content elements that process
embodies the principle of covariation. As Kelley (1973, p. 108) pointed out: “An
effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with which, over time, it cova-
ries.” Why is it so? Because that is precisely what the concept of “cause” (in part)
means. A cause (as commonly understood) is something that covaries with the
effect; therefore, something that covaries with the effect could well be its cause,
whereas something that does not so covary could not possibly be its cause. Plain
and simple. Because the concept of cause is what it is, we now know what evidence
is relevant to the inference of causality. In other words, our “theory” of causality
implies what the evidence for causality should consist of. This common “theory”
of causality warrants a deduction of causal conclusions from evidence according
to an “if–then” rule whereby: “if x covaried with y, then x is a possible cause of y.”
But then it struck me that it is possible (and desirable) to carry this reasoning
further. In the same way that notions like “internal,” “external,” “ability,” “luck,”
and so on, are special contents of the “cause” category, so the “cause” category
itself is a special instance of a “topic” category in which people may be interested.
Of course, the set of “topics” is infinitely diverse and it encompasses anything that
people may wish to address or to know. Yet while the contents of possible categories
are quite open-ended and varied the process whereby their knowledge is validated
appears to be uniform. And a critical aspect of that process, is the deductive
“if–then” reasoning identified above in reference to causality.
4 Kruglanski
Of course, whereas the (partial) evidence for causality is covariation, evidence for
other concepts derives from the specific theories we may hold about these concepts
and their properties. For instance, to discover whether a newly encountered animal
is a dog one may investigate whether it barks; this process may be guided by the
“if–then” rule (derived from our “theory” of dogs) whereby “if barks then dog,”
and so on. In short, my quest for generality led from specific causal contents to the
process of causal attribution and, more generally yet, to the deductive process
whereby all human knowledge (not only causal knowledge), both scientific and lay,
is validated.

Epistemic motivations
My argument that the inferential principle of lay knowledge is of the “if–then”
form was influenced by my immersion in the contemporary philosophy of
science that was making exciting strides in the 1960s and the 1970s, as
represented in the writings of Karl Popper (e.g., 1949, 1966), Thomas Kuhn
(1962), Imre Lakatos (1971), Paul Feyerabend (1975), and their counterparts.
One notion that their analyses made crystal clear is that the process of knowledge
formation is never complete. It is always possible to test one’s hypotheses again
and again, to gather further information, or replicate one’s former observations.
Confidence is never conferred by an objective state of affairs. It constitutes a
psychological state of mind rather than one uniquely determined by actual
states of the world. How is it, I then wondered, that individuals are able to reach
confident knowledge, and why is it that given the same amount of information
some persons may experience supreme confidence, whereas others may feel
uncertain and indecisive?
In my attempt to solve this puzzle, I proposed the notion of epistemic motivations.
These are motivations concerning the features of desired beliefs. I distinguished in
this regard between the needs for specific and nonspecific closure, the former
representing the quest for (non-directional) certainty on a topic—the latter the
need to reach judgments consistent with one’s wishes. The function of these
epistemic motivations is to serve as stopping mechanisms instilling in the individual
the confidence that she or he has enough evidence to warrant a definite judgment.
As mentioned earlier, such confidence constitutes a subjective experience and is in
the eye of the beholder.
The work on the need for cognitive closure benefited from my collaboration
with several outstanding researchers at diverse world locations: Antonio Pierro
and Lucia Mannetti of the University of Rome, Malgorzata Kossowska of the
Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Arne Roets of the University of Ghent, and
Ying Yi Hong of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. This research resulted in
scores of empirical articles including three theoretical analyses published in the
Psychological Review (Kruglanski, 1980; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kruglanski,
Pierro, Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). The most recent review of the closure work
was published in 2015 authored by an international team headed by Arne Roets
(Roets, Kruglanski, Kossowska, Pierro, & Hong, 2015).
 Speaking in general 5
Epistemic authority
The third facet of my theory of lay epistemics, concerned the source of the infor-
mation. The source may often serve as evidence for the validity of a proposition;
it may function as an antecedent in the inferential “if–then” rule according to a
premise of the kind “if the information comes from source X, then it can be
trusted.” There are two quintessential sources that fulfill this evidential function.
One is the individual’s own epistemic “machinery,” that is, her or his senses, per-
ceived access to information and self-ascribed deductive ability, on all of which
individuals may vary. In other words, individuals may attribute to themselves dif-
ferent degrees of epistemic authority, reflecting the degree of confidence they may
have in understanding a given aspect of the world on their own.
For instance, individuals may differ in the acuity of their eyesight, some boasting
20/20 vision while others having impaired vision for various reasons. A person
whose eyesight is weak would not trust the evidence of his or her eyes to the same
degree as a person whose eyesight was good, for example. One’s self-ascribed
epistemic authority might also vary across domains, depending on one’s extent of
training and expertise in a given subject matter. A person might feel confident
about his or her assessment of abstract art, but feel completely at a loss when it
comes to plumbing, car mechanics, medicine, etc.
The other source of knowledge on which we may rely is other people assumed to
have general or specific epistemic authority in various domains. It is to them that
we turn for interpretation and elucidation when our own perceived self-authority
in given domains is lacking. Little children rely in this way on their adult caregivers,
as do adults in areas outside their sphere of expertise.
These three dimensions of lay epistemics, the inferential, the motivational and the
evidential, are represented in Chapter 2, on the how, the why and the who of knowl-
edge formation. Chapter 3, on “seizing” and “freezing,” describes the extensive
work on the need for cognitive closure carried out by my colleagues and me,
looking at this motivation’s implications for judgment and decision making at the
individual level of analysis. Chapter 4 is written in collaboration with Gerd
Gigerenzer and is devoted to an analysis of the inferential aspect of epistemics.
This chapter argues that the basic inferential mechanism involved in what has
been generally regarded as two qualitatively distinct modes of reaching judg-
ments, that is, the “fast” and the “slow” ways of thinking (Kahneman, 2011) or the
reflexive and reflective modes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Indeed, this Kruglanski
and Gigerenzer chapter elaborates a parsimonious, evidence-based, alternative
to the popular dual process theories known as the unimodel, whereby the different
instances of judgment share the same underlying process and vary along quan-
titative parameters (e.g. on the extent of processing) rather than qualitatively.

Political ideology
The last chapter in this section is the most “famous” (i.e., most often cited) of the
four. It applies the theory of lay epistemics to the realm of political behavior, and
6 Kruglanski
in particular to a significant motivational difference between conservatives and
liberals on the need for cognitive closure. Specifically, a meta-analysis of the last
fifty years of research (up until 2003) on the motivational make-up of these
ideologies’ adherents yields evidence that the conservatives are significantly higher
on the need for cognitive closure than are the liberals. This relates to the assured
decision-making style of many conservative politicians (George W. Bush comes to
mind as a prototypical example), and to their apparent tendency to be more
group-centric (i.e., more nationalistic, and supportive of cultural traditions and
stereotypes) than are the liberals.
Of curious interest, the publication of the Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, and Sulloway
(2003) paper occasioned a flurry of intensely angered reactions on the part of
conservative pundits and journalists as well as a fair share of hate mail, largely by
individuals who didn’t actually read the original paper but rather learned about it
second-hand. This unwanted excitement about our work subsided when John Jost
and I published an opinion piece in the Washington Post that explained that the
need for cognitive closure isn’t necessarily a bad thing and that in certain
circumstances the confidence it instills is preferable to the indecision and lack of
resoluteness that the need to avoid closure may confer. In addition, the tendency
under high need for closure to be committed to one’s group (to one’s family,
one’s friends, one’s nation, or one’s values) is often considered a good thing, and
uncommitted relativism fostered by a low need for closure is often frowned upon.
So, as in nearly all domains of psychology, the consequences of a given variable or
factor are neither “good” nor “bad” universally. There are no panacea or silver
bullets in psychology, rather it is all a matter of tradeoffs.

II. How People Want

Goal systems
Throughout my whole career, I have been passionately interested in the topic of
motivation. As my views of human psychology crystallized I was increasingly
impressed by the central role that this aspect of our psyche plays in human behav-
ior; this includes motivation’s role in human cognition, which process is importantly
driven and selectively directed by epistemic needs for nonspecific and specific
closure. “Thinking is for doing,” William James famously asserted (1890/1983,
p. 18) and doing is guided by our wishes and desires; thus, ultimately thinking is
“for” the gratification of our wants. In this sense motivation is the dog and cognition
the tail, or to put it differently cognition serves as the handmaiden of motivation.
What makes things particularly intriguing is that motivation and cognition inter-
weave as if in a twisting and turning Moebius strip (see Figure 1). Even as cognition
is motivationally driven so motivation is cognitively represented; the two are
‘connected at the hip’ as it were and you can’t have the one without the other.
Throughout my career as a psychological scientist my work has invariably addressed
a motivational problem of some sort. Early on, as an attributional researcher I was
interested in the issue of intrinsic motivation; this is the aforementioned case where
 Speaking in general 7

Figure 1 Moebius strip.

an activity is perceived as its own end, being endogenously versus exogenously

attributed (Kruglanski, 1975).
Subsequently, I explored the motivational underpinnings of knowledge forma-
tion, resulting in my theory of epistemic motivations alluded to earlier. The latter
work may be described as representing a “motivation and cognition” paradigm that
assigned separate roles to the two; motivation driving the extent and directionality
of information processing and cognition representing the inferential logic of
forming judgments from considered evidence. A subsequent phase of my interest
in motivational phenomena represented a different “motivation as cognition” para-
digm that addressed the mental representation of motivational entities; namely,
goals and means and their various configurations. This work is featured in our theory
of goal systems (Kruglanski et al., 2002), Chapter 6 in Part II of this book.
One of this theory’s contributions lies in identifying and deriving the psycho-
logical implications of different cognitive architectures connecting goals and
means; specifically, the configurations of (1) equifinality in which the same goal may
be alternatively served by several different means, (2) multifinality in which the same
means at once serves several goals, and (3) counterfinality in which a means that
serves one goal at the same time undermines another goal.
Goal systems theory’s second contribution concerns the allocation of resources
to different goal pursuit systems and the finite and depletable pool of cognitive
resources available for goal-driven cognition and behavior. The notion of deplet-
able resources figures prominently in our theory of cognitive energetics (Kruglanski
et al., 2012) and is exemplified by Part II, How People Want.
By now, fifteen years after its publication, the theory of goal systems has been
applied to a variety of domains including addiction (Köpetz, Lejuez, Wiers, &
Kruglanski, 2013), close relations (Orehek & Forest, 2016), intrinsic motivation
(Kruglanski, Fishbach et al., 2017; Woolley & Fishbach, 2017), cognitive
8 Kruglanski
consistency phenomena (Kruglanski, Jasko, Milyavsky et al., 2017) and violent
extremism (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova et al.,
2017). The reason for its broad applicability is its content-free generality that,
as noted earlier, represents my preferred mode of thinking and theorizing about
psychological phenomena.

Goal shielding
A paper by Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2002) demonstrates the principle of
finitude (or constant sum) in reference to attentional resources allocated to goal
pursuit. Specifically, the greater the individual’s commitment to one of several con-
current goals, the lesser is this person’s commitment of resources to the remaining
goals. This phenomenon is capable of occurring outside individuals’ conscious
awareness and manifests itself in such micro phenomena as retarded latency of
responding to those alternative goals. Functionally, the reallocation of resources to
a committed goal shields it from distraction and interference from other concurrent
objectives. An interesting implication of the goal shielding phenomenon is the less-
ening or removal of constraints that the alternative goals may exercise on means to
the focal (highly committed to) goal (see Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach, & Kruglanski,
2011). Specifically, to the extent that these alternative goals were active, means that
the focal goal that undermined them would tend to be “disallowed,” or avoided.
For instance, a hungry person who at the same time was concerned about her or his
health and figure would tend to abstain from fattening, unhealthy, foods that while
satisfying the hunger-reduction goal were detrimental to the health goal. Under
those conditions, the individual may be selective in what she or he chooses to
consume and, should the appropriate foods be unavailable, be willing to bide her or
his time and postpone food consumption until they were found. In other words,
one’s active concern about the health goal would constrain the means to the hunger
reduction goal (foods one would allow oneself to eat) and restrict them to those
which alongside satisfying hunger are also healthy and nutritious.
However, if hunger became particularly intense, commitment to the hunger
reduction goal would be enhanced which (according to the goal shielding principle)
would reduce the commitment to the health/figure goal. In turn, this would
weaken or completely remove the constraints on means of hunger reduction,
expanding the set of available means to that goal. In consequence, one might
forego all constraints, pull out all the stops and be prepared to eat “anything that
moves” as it were, including unhealthy, fattening, and disgusting foods.

III. How People Act

Extremism
Recently we applied this type of reasoning to understanding the phenomenon of
extremism in general and the phenomenon of violent extremism in particular.
 Speaking in general 9
These are addressed in Part III, namely the work of Kruglanski, Gelfand et al.
(2014) and Kruglanski, Jasko, Chernikova et al. (2017). Extremism can be defined
as behavior, attitude, or opinion that runs counter to or deviates from what most
people (in a given group) would engage in or endorse. The latter behaviors and
attitudes characterizing a majority of persons represent moderation; they are
constrained by a variety of goals one may attempt to satisfy. But when one of those
objectives looms particularly large and becomes dominant, the others are
suppressed, their constraints are, therefore, removed, allowing deviant (and hence
‘extreme’) behaviors/attitudes/opinions eschewed by most people to be embraced
or enacted. In other words, I assume that people have a set of basic needs (cf. Ryan
& Deci, 2000; Fiske, 2010; Higgins, 2012), defining goals they strive to attain.
Such balanced striving defines moderation exhibited by most people. Only small
minorities are capable and willing to let those basic concerns be unaddressed or
frustrated; these are the people whose overriding commitment to one thing, their
“idée fixe,” prompts them to “forget all else.” In this way, daredevils who pursue
extreme sports (like bungee jumping, wingsuit flying, or rock skiing) are forgoing
concerns about safety and survival; similarly, individuals committed (addicted) to
various substances are willing (at certain moments) to relinquish their professional,
or familial, obligations only to feed their habit, and so on.
In the case of violent extremism, the quest for personal significance and mattering
(we argued) leads individuals to commit to various sanctified causes (e.g., their
religion or their nation) whose defense lends them the venerated status of martyrs
and heroes, and for which they are willing to risk life and limb (Kruglanski, Chen,
Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009; Kruglanski, Gelfand et al., 2014; Kruglanski,
Jasko, Chernikova et al., 2017).
Our Part III chapter on violent extremism (Chapter 9, Kruglanski, Jasko,
Chernikova et al., 2017) also addresses the question of means selection for serving
best the goal of personal significance. This function is fulfilled by a violence-justi-
fying narrative that identifies aggression and terrorism as the supreme road to
personal significance. It is here, at the level of the narrative, that counter- and
de-radicalization interventions may best succeed. The quest for personal matter-
ing and significance is fundamental and difficult to uproot. Nor would one want to
uproot it, for its immense motivating potential should not be wasted. What can be
done, instead, is to redirect it toward pro-social and constructive means, rather
than condoning violence and mayhem as representing the road to mattering.
Finally, understanding of violent extremism would be incomplete without
appreciating the role in this phenomenon of violence supporting social networks
(Sageman, 2004; 2007) and group dynamics that put individuals under the net-
works’ spell. As discussed earlier, individuals’ in-groups serve as revered epistemic
authorities; they validate the violence-justifying narrative and dispense the signifi-
cance (admiration, veneration) that the individual craves. Thus, they provide the
shared reality (Hardin & Higgins, 1996) concerning values and what it means to
matter, have significance, and lead a worthy life.
10 Kruglanski
Between liking and doing
Thinking in goal terms turns out to have intriguing implications for one of social
psychology’s most persistent questions, concerning the relation between attitudes
and behavior. Because prediction of behavior was hailed as one of psychology’s
main tasks (Watson, 1913, p. 158), and because attitudes were thought to lead to
behavior (that is, of approaching things which one liked, and avoiding things one
did not like), attitudes have become of central interest to social psychologists. But
is it necessarily so? Should attitudes necessarily prompt behavior? Chapter 7 (“The
rocky road . . .”) questions the assumption of a direct link between attitudes and
behavior and delineates the conditions under which attitudes will or will not
promote behavior. The novelty of this contribution is the introduction of the goal
concept as a critical moderator of conditions under which attitudes will or will
eventuate in behavior. Prior theories of the attitude behavior relations (extensively
reviewed in this “rocky road” chapter) did not explicitly mention goals though the
empirical research cited in their support implicitly created conditions where goals
were inevitably present. Unsurprisingly, this should have been so if we assume (as
most psychologists do) that behavior is purposive, that is goal driven. Nonetheless,
the goal construct was conspicuously absent from prior discussions of the attitude
behavior nexus; a gap in knowledge we set out to redress.
So, when do attitudes lead to behavior and when don’t they? They do so where
liking of (a positive attitude toward) an object or a state of affairs is translated into
an approach goal and disliking (or a negative attitude) is translated into an avoid-
ance goal. Such translation does not invariably take place. But liking and wanting
are hardly the same thing! Influential research by Kent Berridge and his colleagues
(e.g., Berridge, Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009; Berridge & Aldridge, 2008), compel-
lingly demonstrate the separateness of these concepts on the hormonal level. A
commonsensical analysis echoes this distinction: You may like something but
already have it, so not wanting it (in the sense of orienting toward a desirable
future state) is engendered. Also, you may like something that you do not have but
like it less than what you have, again without any implications for wanting. Or you
may dislike something (say a root canal) but like something else even less (having
one’s tooth extracted). In this case, an approach goal would be formed toward a
disliked procedure. To cut a long story short, wanting and consequent goal forma-
tion require a discrepancy between a present or impending (liked or disliked) state
of affairs and another future state that is liked more or disliked less than that
present (or impending state).

The psychology of looking and leaping

A different take on the problem of human action is represented in a theory of regu-
latory mode that Tory Higgins, Antonio Pierro, and I developed and extensively
researched over the last (nearly) two decades (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 2000, 2013,
2016; Higgins, Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003; Pierro et al., 2011) The attitude to
behavior sequence described in the “rocky road” chapter portrays a sequence of
 Speaking in general 11
(implicit or explicit) decisions that an individual makes en route to action: decisions
concerning whether there is a discrepancy between one’s liking for the present
and possible future state of affairs, whether the discrepancy is sufficiently large, and
whether the action involved (task) is worth the effort in light of other contem-
poraneous concerns, etc. (as discussed in our “Motivational Readiness” paper;
Kruglanski, Chernikova, Rosenzweig, & Köpetz, 2014). In contrast, regulatory
mode theory describes a tendency to dwell extensively and ponder painstakingly
each of those decisions, versus “breezing” through them quickly and leaping head-
strong into action.
The former, ponderous, mode is referred to as assessment; it entails a careful
evaluation of alternatives, extensive comparisons between possibilities, and a
reluctance to make a commitment for fear of making a mistake. The latter mode
is called locomotion; it portrays individuals’ proclivity to be in physical or psycho-
logical motion, to be “doing” things, experiencing and effecting change rather
being stuck in a given status quo. As the theory has it (and extensive research sup-
ports it) the assessment and locomotion modes represent orthogonal dimension of
individual differences, some people being higher on locomotion than on assess-
ment, others vice versa, and yet others having balanced (high or low) degrees of
each of those predilections. As with many other psychological states, those
of assessment and locomotion may be also induced by appropriate psychological
circumstances, that is, to be affected by the psychological situation. Chapter 8 (“To
do the right thing” or to “just do it”) represents a seminal paper that initiated what
was to become a particularly fruitful and prolific line of research, yielding scores
of papers in various domains of psychological science (including intrapersonal,
interpersonal, group, and organizational phenomena) to which the fundamental
dimensions of action are of relevance.

Epilogue
As I look back at this selection of papers and the body of my work more generally,
I am struck that implicitly or explicitly I was guided by the principle of the “gist”
(Kruglanski, 2004a), striving for the most general explanation of phenomena of
interest, as noted earlier. Typically, this entailed stripping from the phenomena
their enticing context and content, their so-called surface structure, and delving to
unearth their deep structure, the general underlying mechanism that made them
tick. This approach turned out to have several implications. Some of these were
beneficial to the work and enhanced its contribution. Others were less advantageous
and posed difficulties in communicating my ideas to colleagues.
A major advantage (at least, according to my philosophy of science) is that the
gist-guided approach afforded integration of research domains that previously
were considered foreign and unrelated to each other. For instance, cognitive con-
sistency theories (e.g., Heider, 1958; Festinger, 1957) were typically viewed as
having precious little to do with attribution theory (e.g., Jones & Davis, 1965;
Kelley, 1967), yet from the epistemic perspective both have to do with the principle
of knowledge validation (Kruglanski, 1989, chapters 4 and 5): consistency theories
12 Kruglanski
address the case where (desirable) knowledge is invalidated by information incon-
sistent with that knowledge, and attribution theory—where causal knowledge is
validated by information consistent with a given pattern of causality (what Harold
Kelley (1967) labeled as “attributional criteria”).
For another example, consider the “unimodel” (e.g. Kruglanski & Gigerenzer,
2011; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, Erb, & Chun, 2007; Kruglanski & Thompson,
1999); it underscores the fundamental inferential commonality between what
generally were considered two qualitatively distinct modes of judgment (i.e., the
central versus peripheral modes, the heuristic versus systematic modes, System 1 versus
System 2 ways of thinking, etc.). Instead, my colleagues and I proposed that in all
cases of judgment, individuals are guided by “if–then” rules and the differences
between instances of judgment reside in the contents of those rules (e.g., different
heuristics versus statistical rules), the number of rules considered, their accessibi-
lity etc., the latter representing quantitative continua rather than qualitative
dichotomies, as has been generally assumed.
For yet another example, consider our current work on intrinsic motivation, a
topic that was rarely connected to behavioral learning theory (but see Eisenberger
& Cameron, 1996). In a recent paper, however, we make the connection explicit
by proposing a means-ends fusion model defining a continuum of intrinsicality,
reflecting the degree of perceptual mesh between an activity and its goal
(Kruglanski, Fishbach, et al., 2017) and reflecting the phenomenon of secondary
reinforcement discovered long ago by animal learning researchers (cf. Hilgard,
Kimble, & Marquis, 1961). In short, the “gist-quest” approach that has guided my
research over the years led me to seek commonalities among rarely interconnected
phenomena, thus fostering integration under shared principles and reaching
across seemingly diverse topics highlighted at different periods in the history of
psychological science.
The disadvantage of the gist approach resided in the difficulty of communicat-
ing the integrative ideas and abstract formulae to the research community and
replacing in their terms familiar and cherished notions. Though I never intended,
nor do I feel comfortable to be cast in the role of a scientific “rabble rouser,” I may
have been perceived as such by colleagues and reviewers committed to prior, more
specific and contextualized, theories of phenomena. The theory of lay epistemics
(Kruglanski, 1989; 2004b), by now an innocuous “classic,” encountered consider-
able resistance on its first introduction, as Harold Kelley wisely presaged in his
generous introduction to my 1989 volume. Similar was the fate of the unimodel
that had to “fight” its way to the major journals over many years. And even as
I write this, a paper of ours that questions the widely presumed “general need for
cognitive consistency” is struggling against opposition by reviewers. In fact, it has
been my distinct impression that the more important a given paper was (in my
estimation of importance), the more “revolutionary” and integrative its message,
the tougher was its road to acceptance.
To clarify, I am not complaining. In fact, I consider myself very lucky for having
had the support I have had from colleagues and cherished students. Thus, basically
I am a happy scientist and grateful for the excitement that new ideas have brought
 Speaking in general 13
to my life. As for the struggles and the uphill battles, I relish them as well, and
gladly (would you believe, reluctantly) accept that there is a price to be paid for
having one’s voice heard (cf. Popper, 1949), and to challenging the shared reality
of one’s scientific community. As in most of life’s domains, the “no pain—no
gain” dictum holds fast in the realm of ideas as well.

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Part I

How people know

2 Three decades of lay
epistemics
The why, how, and who of
knowledge formation
Arie W. Kruglanski, Mark Dechesne, and
Edward Orehek, University of Maryland
Antonio Pierro, University of Rome “La Sapienza”

The label homo sapiens by which humankind is designated translates into “the
knowing person,” hinting at the essential importance for human affairs of knowl-
edge and its construction. As individuals we form new knowledge constantly and
continually. To carry out even the most mundane activities we need to know a
variety of things. Before embarking on a bit of intelligible behavior, no matter how
small, we need to orientate ourselves in time and space, decide what our imple-
mentation intentions are for that particular instant, divine their feasibility under the
circumstances, and so on. All these are types of knowledge that individuals need to
formulate on a moment-to-moment basis.
Our social interactions are also suffused with prior knowledge. We quickly form
a preliminary impression about our partners’ identity (e.g., as regards their age,
gender, nationality, or social status). We figure out what language they speak, what
they know about a topic at hand, and what their attitudes and opinions are, so that
we tailor our communications accordingly. In addition, our lives as group members
and participants in larger collectivities (societies or cultures) are fundamentally
guided by our shared knowledge of concepts, norms, and worldviews.
Given the ubiquity of knowledge formation concerns, and their essential psy-
chological relevance to human thought, feeling, and action, understanding how
knowledge is formed and changed defines a task of considerable importance for
psychological science. Indeed, psychological researchers and theorists have exam-
ined epistemic processes in a variety of paradigms including those concerned with
attitude formation and change (e.g., Maio & Haddock, 2007; Petty & Wegener,
1999), impression formation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), judgment
under uncertainty (Kahneman, 2003), and attribution (Hilton, 2007). Typically
too, such endeavors, though insightful and useful, have addressed localised issues
specific to a given content domain of knowledge (for a review see Kruglanski &
Orehek, 2007).
More than 20 years ago, a paper published in the Psychological Review (Kruglanski,
1980) became the first in what was to become a long string of research reports
and essays on the psychological factors involved in a general knowledge form-
ation process. A more elaborate theory on this topic was featured in a volume
20 Kruglanski et al.
called Lay Epistemics and Human Knowledge published nearly a decade later
(Kruglanski, 1989). Whereas the initial theoretical effort centered on a general-
ized, lay epistemic interpretation of attribution theory, subsequent work extended
the approach to further topics, including cognitive consistency theories, attitudes
and attitude change, cognitive therapy, social comparison processes, and the social
psychology of science.
Subsequent to this early publication, extensive empirical and conceptual develop-
ments in lay epistemics took place under the aegis of three fairly separate research
programs, namely those on closed-mindedness (see Kruglanski, 2004), the unimodel (see
Kruglanski et al., 2007), and epistemic authority (see Kruglanski et al., 2005). The
purpose of the present chapter is to offer an integrative, up-to-date synopsis of this
work, affording a bird’s eye perspective on knowledge formation processes and their
ramifications for a broad variety of social psychological phenomena.
In what follows we first briefly recapitulate the theory of lay epistemics and
describe the three separate research programs it inspired, including the descrip-
tion of substantial novel data not covered in prior reviews. We conclude with a
conceptual integration of these research programs and indicate how the processes
that they address form an integral part and parcel of the knowledge formation
enterprise of potentially considerable real-world relevance.

The theory of lay epistemics

The theory of lay epistemics concerns the process of knowledge formation. It out-
lines a general framework designed to pertain to all kinds of knowledge, scientific
and lay, including personal knowledge of people and the world, religious knowl-
edge, political knowledge, etc. Its point of departure has been Karl Popper’s (1959)
famous assertion that scientific knowledge is formed in the same general manner as
lay knowledge, and hence that science is “common sense writ large”. Popper and
other philosophers of science (e.g., Paul Feyerabend, or Imre Lakatos) have noted
that whereas knowledge formation is guided by the ideal of Truth, one can be
never certain that this ideal has been realized. This implies that the concept of
“knowledge” is best understood in its subjective sense, as a belief. This hardly implies
that knowledge must be solipsistic or idiosyncratic. On the contrary, knowledge
typically is socially shared, and knowledge construction (whereas scientific or lay) is
accomplished via a communal process (Hardin & Higgins, 1996).
According to our theory that regards knowledge as tantamount to belief, to have
knowledge in which one does not believe is a contradiction in terms. However, some
authors (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) have affirmed such a possibility, so
let us examine it carefully. For instance, consider an individual who knows the con-
tents of some stereotype (e.g., that all professors are absent-minded) yet does not
believe in it. Does that represent an inconsistency with our claim that subjective
knowledge represents a belief ? It does not! The confusion here is one between
“believing that” and “believing in.” Knowing the contents of a stereotype means
that one believes that such a stereotype exists. For instance, one may believe very
strongly that the stereotype of women states that women are relational, conflict
Another random document with
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 609. Edinburgh Ev. Courant, September 6, 1725. This paper remarks that the
extent of country which belonged to the late Earl of Seaforth, and disarmed on this
occasion, was no less than sixty miles in length and forty in breadth.
610. Lockhart Papers.
611. Miscellany Papers, Adv. Lib.
612. Ed. Ev. Courant.
613. D. Webster’s Account of Roslin Chapel, &c., Edinburgh, 1819.
614. Transactions of the Society of Improvers.
615. Caledonian Mercury, July 1735.
616. [Sinclair’s] Stat. Acc. Scot., xx. 74.
617. [Sinclair’s] Stat. Acc. Scot., viii. 525. A drawing and description of a
winnowing-machine used in Silesia appears in the Gentleman’s Magazine for 1747,
as a thing unknown in England.
618. Old Mortality, chap. vii.
619. Newspapers of the day.
620. Introduction to the Pirate—a novel, it need scarcely be remarked,
founded on the story of Gow.
621. ‘London, March 29, 1720.—Sunday evening the Duke of Douglas and the
Earl of Dalkeith fought a duel behind Montague House, and both were wounded.’—
Newspapers of the day.
622. Wodrow’s Analecta, iii. 208.
623. Lockhart Papers. Wodrow’s Analecta, iii. 210, et seq. Contemporary
narration.
624. See antea, under February 1697.
625. Sinclair’s Statistical Acc. of Scotland, article ‘Erskine.
626. Notice from the Edinburgh Post-office, Nov. 23, 1725.
627. Caledonian Mercury, Oct. 1733, and Jan. 1734.
628. Edin. Ev. Courant.
629. Chamberlayne’s Present State of Great Britain for the years cited.
630. Scottish Journal, p. 208.
631. Wodrow’s Analecta.
632. New Stat. Acc. of Scot., vi. 157.
633. Scrap-book of Dugald Bannatyne, quoted in New Stat. Acc. of Scot., vi.
231.
 634. Smollett’s Humphry Clinker.
635. Ramsay’s Works, i. 285.
636. Arnot’s History of Edinburgh, p. 366.
637. Mr Jackson had heard that Aston’s theatre was ‘in a close on the north
side of the High Street, near Smith’s Land. A Mrs Millar at that time was esteemed
a capital actress, and was also a very handsome woman. Mr Westcombe was the
principal comedian. The scheme was supported by annual tickets, subscribed for
by the favourers of the drama.’—Hist. Scot. Stage, p. 417.
638. Arnot’s Hist. Edinburgh, p. 366.
639. Analecta Scotica, ii. 211.
640. ‘Edinburgh, April 9, 1728.—Yesterday, Tony Astons, elder and younger,
stage-players, were committed prisoners to the Tolbooth. ’Tis said they are charged
with the crime of carrying off a young lady designed for a wife to the latter.’—Ed.
Ev. Courant.
641. Private Letters, &c.
642. Wodrow’s Analecta, iii. 309.
643. Printed by James Duncan, Glasgow, 1728, pp. 168.
644. Wodrow’s Analecta, iii. 318.
645. MS. in possession of the Junior United Service Club.
646. Struan Papers, MS. The Earl of Mar, writing to Struan from Paris,
January 6, 1724, says: ‘Our poor friend John Menzies has been very near walking
off the stage of life; but I now hope he may still be able to act out the play of the
Restoration with us, though he must not pretend to a young part.’ Among Struan’s
published poems is ‘an Epitaph on his Dear Friend John Menzies;’ from which it
would appear that Menzies had died abroad, and been buried in unconsecrated
ground.
647. History of the Robertsons of Struan.... Poems of Robertson of Struan,
Edinburgh, no date, p. 167.
648. Feb. 4, 1755. ‘At London, Edmund Burt, Esq., late agent to General Wade,
chief surveyor during the making of roads through the Highlands, and author of
the Letters concerning Scotland.’—Scots Mag. Obituary.
649. Burt’s Letters, ii. 189.
650. This poem exists in MS. in the library of the Junior United Service Club,
London.
651. Usquebaugh, whisky.
652. Library of the Junior United Service Club, London, to which body I have
to express my obligations for the permission to inspect and make extracts.
 653. Letters, &c. i. 77.
654. This road was completed in October 1729. See onward.
655. Select Transactions of the Society of Improvers.
656. Works of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, Dalloway’s ed., iii. 127.
657. Gentleman’s Magazine, iii. 515.
658. Cyc. of Pract. Medicine, iii. 749.
659. Analecta Scotica, ii. 322.
660. Boswelliana, privately printed by R. Monckton Milnes, Esq.
661. Edinburgh Ev. Courant.
662. Hist Acc. of the Bank of Scotland, 1728.
663. Analecta, iii. 476.
664. A Letter containing Remarks on the Historical Account of the Old Bank,
by a Gentleman concerned in neither Bank. Edin., James Davidson & Co., 1728.
665. This is a statement of the pamphlet last quoted, p. 30.
666. In British Museum, 8223 C2 (b2).

667. Analecta, iii. 302.

668. Burt’s Letters from the North of Scotland, 2d ed., i. 230.
669. Sharpe’s Introduction to Law’s Memorials, cvi.
670. Scott’s Letters on Demonology and Witchcraft, p. 328.
671. Representation by the linen-drapers at the bar of the House of Commons,
Jan. 1720.
672. Letter in the Paper-office, quoted by Chalmers, Caledonia, i. 873, note.
673. Analecta, iii. 452.
674. Private Letters, &c., p. 59.
675. Edinburgh Ev. Courant.
676. Mr Wodrow relates that, about the same time, a number of ministers in
England met occasionally together under the name of the Orthodox Club, and
‘frequently their conversation is gay and jocose’—‘gay and’ being here a Scotch
adverb meaning considerably.
677. Private Letters, &c., p. 61.
678. State Trials, ix. 26. Arnot’s Crim. Trials, p. 190.
679. Private Letters, &c., p. 64. Mr Lindsay was soon after lord provost and
member for the city, in which latter capacity he made a remarkably good speech in
the House of Commons on the bill for taking away the privileges of the corporation
in consequence of the Porteous Riot. See Gentleman’s Magazine, vii. 457.
680. What seems sufficient to set this matter in a clear light is the fact that, up
to this time, such a thing as a sawn deal was unknown in the Spey Highlands; they
could only split a tree, and chip the pieces into something like a deal; and some of
the upper rooms of Castle-Grant are actually floored of wood prepared in this
manner.
681. At the end of the voyage, he took the curragh upon his back, and trudged
back to the point of departure. An example of this primitive kind of canoe was
exhibited at the archæological museum connected with the British Association at
Aberdeen, September 1859.
682. [Leslie’s] Survey of the Province of Moray, 1798, p. 267. Anderson’s
British Poets, viii. 655.
683. Analecta, passim.
684. Private Letters, &c., p. 66; also newspapers of the day.
685. Wodrow’s Analecta, iv. 97.
686. See under the year 1716 for some notice of her Grace’s services to the
country as a promoter of agricultural improvements.
687. Faculty Records, quoted in Analecta Scotica, ii. 170. The plate of Sallust
is now shewn under a glass-case in the Advocates’ Library.
688. Biog. Memoirs of William Ged. Nichols, London, 1781. To a daughter of
Ged, it was proposed that the profits of this publication, if any, should be devoted;
hence it may be inferred that the family continued poor.
689. Mores’s Narrative of Block-printing, with Notes, apud Topham and
Willett’s Memoir on the Origin of Printing. Newcastle, 1820.
690. Maitland’s History of Edinburgh, p. 460.
691. Arnot’s History of Edinburgh, p. 546.
692. Gentleman’s Magazine, v. 555.
693. The remaining verses of the poem are thus given in the Scots Magazine
for June 1773:

‘Ah! where is now th’ innumerous crowd,

That once with fond attention hung
On every truth divine that flowed,
Improved from thy persuasive tongue!

’Tis gone!—it seeks a different road;

Life’s social joys to thee are o’er;
Untrod the path to that abode
 Where hapless Penury keeps the door.

Drummond! thine audience yet recall,

Recall the young, the gay, the vain;
And ere thy tottering fabric fall,
Sound forth the deeply moral strain.

For never, sure, could bard or sage,

Howe’er inspired, more clearly shew,
That all upon this transient stage
Is folly, vanity, or woe.

Bid them at once be warned and taught—

Ah, no!—suppress th’ ungrateful tale—
O’er every frailty, every fault,
Oblivion, draw thy friendly veil.

Tell rather what transcendent joy

Awaits them on th’ immortal shore,
If well they Summer’s strength employ,
And well distribute Autumn’s store.

Tell them, if Virtue crown their bloom,

Time shall the happy period bring,
When the dark Winter of the tomb
Shall yield to everlasting Spring.’

694. Letter by a clansman of the deceased. Edin. Ev. Courant.

695. Culloden Papers, p. 111. Edin. Ev. Courant, Oct. 9, 1729. This chronicle
adds: ‘They named the bridge where the parties met Oxbridge.’ A statement which
appears somewhat inconsistent with one already made in our general account of
the Highland roads.
General Stewart of Garth, in his interesting book on the Highland Regiments,
makes an amusing mistake in supposing that General Wade here condescended to
be entertained by a set of cearnochs, or cattle-lifters.
696. Notes to 2d ed. of Burt’s Letters. There being a distinction between
natural tracks, such as formerly existed in the Highlands, and made roads, and
‘made’ being used here in a secondary and technical sense, it is not absolutely
necessary to suppose, as has been supposed, that the author of this couplet was an
Irish subaltern quartered at Fort William.
697. In May 1711, the ‘relict’ of Sir John Medina, limner, advertised her having
for sale ‘a great many pictures of several of the nobility, gentry, and eminent
lawyers of this nation,’ at her lodging, ‘the first stone land above the Tron Church,
second story.’—Ed. Ev. Courant.
 698. Daniel Wilson states, in his work, Edinburgh in the Olden Time, that
Scougal possessed Sir James Steuart’s house in the Advocates’ Close, and there
fitted up an additional floor as a picture-gallery.
699. The document is fully printed in the Edin. Annual Register for 1816.
700. Caledonian Mercury.
701. Analecta, iv. 86, 162.
702. Minutely narrated in Burnet.
703. Caledonian Mercury, April 6, 1724.
704. Sir D. Brewster’s Life of Sir Isaac Newton, 1855, i. 57
705. Edin. Ev. Courant.
706. Stewart’s Highland Regiments, i. 49.
707. Dom. Annals, under March 1, 1701.
708. French, commère, a godmother.
709. An Essay on the Means of Inclosing Scotland, 1729, p. 229.
710. Records of the Bank, quoted in Chalmers’s Caledonia, i. 873, note.
711. Edin. Ev. Courant.
712. Wodrow’s Analecta.
713. Domestic Ann. Scot., ii. 495.
714. See under June 24, 1736.
715. It is rather curious that, in a subscription for the relief of the sufferers by
a fire in the Lawnmarket of Edinburgh, in 1725, ‘Colonel Francis Charteris, £4, 4s.’
is the only contribution from a private individual. Uncharitable onlookers would
probably consider this as intended for an insurance against another fire on the part
of the subscriber.
716. Private Letters, &c., p. 80.
717. Gentleman’s Magazine, ii. 674.
718. Caledonian Mercury.
719. Cal. Mercury, August 8, 1732.
720. Chalmers’s Life of Ruddiman, p. 136.
721. Caledonian Mercury, May and July 1733.
722. Caledonian Mercury, February 14, 1734.
723. Historical Register for 1721, p. 253.
724. July 21, 1744, died at his seat of Orangefield, in the shire of Ayr, James
Macrae, Esq., late governor of Fort George.
 725. The son, Captain James Macrae, was a person of most unhappy history,
having shot an innocent gentleman in a duel, and obliged, in consequence, to leave
his native country.
726. Caledonian Mercury, July and August 1733.
727. See under 1718, pp. 440, 441 of this volume.
728. A riding of the stang, attended with tragical results, happened in March
1736. George Porteous, smith at Edmondstone, having severely beaten and abused
his wife, was subjected to the ignominy by his neighbours; which so highly
‘affronted’ him, that he went and hanged himself.—Caledonian Mercury.
729. Caledonian Mercury, passim.
730. Edinburgh newspapers, passim.
731. James VII.’s First Parliament, chap. 12.
732. [Sinclair’s] Stat. Acc. Scot., xviii. 362.
733. Wodrow Pamphlets, vol. 275.
734. From Mein’s original paper, apparently prepared for publication, 1735.
MS. in possession of Society of Antiquaries.
735. Act of Town Council, August 29, 1740. Robert Mein died in 1776, at the
age of ninety-three.
736. Amongst the papers of General Wade, in the possession of the Junior
United Service Club, is a letter addressed to him by a lady who felt interested in
behalf of Porteous. It is here transcribed, with all its peculiarities of spelling, &c.,
as an illustration of the exceptive feeling above adverted to, and also as a curious
memorial of the literary gifts then belonging to ladies of the upper classes. The
writer appears to have been one of the daughters of George Allardice of Allardice,
by his wife, Lady Anne Ogilvy, daughter of the fourth Earl of Findlater:
‘I dute not Dear general waid but by this time yon may have heard the fattel
sentence of the poor unhappy capt porteous how in six weeks time most dye if he
riceve not speedy help from above, by the asistance of men of generosity and mercy
such as you realy are it is the opinion of all thos of the better sort he has been
hardly deelt by, being cond’mned but by a very slender proof, and tho he was much
provokted by the mob and had the provest and magestrets order to fire which th’y
now sheamfuly deney nor had he the leeberty to prove it tho even in his own
defence, but the generous major powl will assure you of the trouth, and yet tho the
capt had thos crule orders it is proven my [by] commiserer wesly mr Drumond
doctor horton and severel other gentel men of undouted crided he realy did not
make use of them, that there eyes were fixed on him all the while and have declar’d
upon oth he deed not fire, true it is he presented his firelock in hopes to frighten
the mob when ane unlucky felow at the same time and just by the capt fired which
lead the two witness into the fatel mistake that has condmn’d him the unfortenat
pannal both befor and after the dismal sentence protested befor god and the judges
he was entierly inesent puting all thes circomstances to gether the miserable state
he now is in most draw your generous pity on his side ther’for dr general waid
continwa your uswal mercy and plead for him and as our sex are neturly
compassinot and being now in the power of the quin, so generous a pleader as you
may easely persuad, considring it is a thing of great concquenc to the whol army
which yourself better knou then I can inform the duke of buccleugh, marques of
Lowding [Lothian] Lord morton geneal myls all the commissioners and chiff baron
are to join ther intrest with yours in this affair, by your own generous soul I beg
again Dear sir you will do whats in your power to save him, thos that think right go
not through this poor short life just for themselves which your good actions shou
you oft consider, and as many just now put a sincer trust in your generous mercy I
am sure they will not be disapointed throgh aney neglect of yours let this letter be
taken notes of amongst the nomber you will reseve from your frinds in Scotland in
behalf of the unfortunat capt which will intierly oblidg

Dear general waid

your most affectionate and most
obident humble servant
Catharine Allardice.

‘you would be sory for the unexresable los I have had of the kindest mother,
and two sisters I am now at Mrs Lind’s where it would be no smal satesfaction to
hear by a Line or two I am not forgot by you drect for me at Mr Linds hous in
Edenburg your letter will come safe if you are so good as to writ Mr Lind his Lady
and I send our best complements to you, he along with Lord aberdour and mr
wyevel how has also wrot to his sister mrs pursal go hand in hand togither makeing
all the intrest they can for the poor capt and meet with great sucess they join in
wishing you the same not fearing your intrest the generals Lady how is his great
friend were this day to speak to the Justes clarck but I have not since seen her, so
that every on of compassion and mercy are equely bussey forgive this trouble and
send ous hop’
737. Caledonian Mercury.
738. Statutes at large, vi. 51.
739. In November 1737, the poet is found advertising an assembly (dancing-
party) ‘in the New Hall in Carrubber’s Close;’ subscription-tickets, two for a
guinea, to serve throughout the winter season.—Cal. Merc.
740. Caledonian Mercury.
741. Newspapers of the time.
742. Caledonian Mercury.
743. Daily Post, Aug. 17, 1738, quoted in Household Words, 1850.
744. His name was William Smellie. The fact is stated in his Memoirs by
Robert Kerr, Edinburgh, 1811.
 745. Scots Magazine, January 1739.
746. Scottish Journal, p. 313.
747. Houghton’s Collections on Husbandry and Trade, 1694.
748. Arnot’s History of Edinburgh, 4to, p. 201.
749. Robertson’s Rural Recollections, 1829.
750. ‘The man has not been dead many years who first introduced from
Ireland the culture of the potato into the peninsula of Cantyre; he lived near
Campbelton. From him the city of Glasgow obtained a regular supply for many
years; and from him also the natives of the Western Highlands and Isles obtained
the first plants, from which have been derived those abundant supplies on which
the people there now principally subsist.’—Anderson’s Recreations, vol. ii. (1800)
p. 382.
751. ‘This singular individual died at Edinburgh [January 24, 1788]. In 1784,
he sunk £140 with the managers of the Canongate Poor’s House, for a weekly
subsistence of 7s., and afterwards made several small donations to that institution.
His coffin, for which he paid two guineas, with “1703,” the year of his birth,
inscribed on it, hung in his house for nine years previous to his death; and it also
had affixed to it the undertaker’s written obligation to screw him down with his
own hands gratis. The managers of the Poor’s House were likewise taken bound to
carry his body with a hearse and four coaches to Restalrig Churchyard, which was
accordingly done. Besides all this, he caused his grave-stone to be temporarily
erected in a conspicuous spot of the Canongate Churchyard, having the following
quaint inscription:

“HENRY PRENTICE,

Died.

Be not curious to know how I lived;

But rather how yourself should die.“‘
—Contemporary Obituaries.

752. Scots Magazine, Oct. 1740. Act of Town Council, Dec. 19, 1740.
753. Scots Magazine, July 1741.
754. Moncrieff’s Life of John Erskine, D.D., p. 110.
755. Scots Magazine, July 1742.
756. Scots Magazine, Oct. 1712. New Statistical Acc. Scot., art. ‘Lochbroom,’
where many curious anecdotes of Robertson, called Ministeir laidir, ‘the Strong
Minister,’ are detailed.
757. Lays of the Deer Forest, by the Messrs Stuart.
 758. Edin. Ev. Courant, Nov. 15, 1743.
759. Spalding Club Miscellany, ii. 87.
760. Old Statist. Acc. of Scot., xv. 379.
761. Domestic Ann. of Scot., ii. 392.
762. Memorabilia of Glasgow, p. 502.
763. Newspaper advertisement.
764. Jones’s Glasgow Directory, quoted in Stuart’s Notices of Glasgow in
Former Times.
765. Culloden Papers, p. 233.
766. Appendix to Burt’s Letters, 5th ed., ii. 359.
767. Tour in Scotland, i. 225; ii. 425.
768. Gentleman’s Magazine, xvi. 429.
769. Scots Magazine, 1750, 1753, 1754.
770. Tour through the Highlands, &c. By John Knox. 1787, p. 101.
771. [Sinclair’s] Stat. Acc. Scot., xx. 424. The minister’s version is here
corrected from one in the Gentleman’s Magazine for January 1733; but both are
incorrect in the historical particulars, there having been during 1728 and the
hundred preceding years no more than six kings of Scotland.
772. Printed in Spalding Club Miscellany, ii. 7.

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