Who Has The Power

WHO HAS
THE POWER?
SOUTH AFRICA’S
ENERGY PROFITEERS
An Open Secrets
Investigation
Published by Open Secrets in November 2023
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Authors: Zen Mathe, Michael Marchant, Abby May and Luvano Ntuli
Researchers: Khwezi Matangana, Luthando Vilakazi, Jane Borman and
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The publication of this report has been made possible by Open Secrets’
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WHO HAS
THE POWER?
SOUTH AFRICA’S
ENERGY PROFITEERS
An Open Secrets
Investigation
NUMBERS AT A GLANCE:
R218 BILLION
1%
South Africans
R14.5 TRILLION
The possible value of
the Karpowership
who hold 42.2% of
the country’s wealth. How much a Special
deal.
South Africa is the most Investigating Unit (SIU) report
unequal country of the 164 found Eskom’s emergency coal
countries assessed by the
World Bank in a recent report contracts signed in 2008 may have
published in 2022. cost the country. The SIU called this a
“self-created emergency”.
59 HOURS R1.5 TRILLION

[2.5 DAYS] How much the South African
government says it needs to
The longest continuous finance the JET IP.
period without load-
shedding in South Africa
from January to October 2023.
461 The number of people

who died in the floods in
Kwa-Zulu Natal in 2022.
R55 TRILLION
The estimated cost of extreme weather globally between
2000–2019 that can be attributed to climate change.
Incidences of natural disasters have increased in sub-Saharan
Africa at a faster pace than any other region.
1.5 DEGREES
The level of global
warming that would
R3.5 BILLION
cause “unavoidable The amount BP, Shell, Exxon,
increases in multiple
climate hazards and
Total, and Chevron spend every
present multiple risks year to block, delay, or control
to ecosystems and
humans”. binding climate-related policy.
34% The reduction in agricultural productivity growth in Africa

since 1961 due to climate change, more than any other region.
700 MILLION
The number of people the World
Health Organisation warns may be
displaced by drought by 2030.
W H O H A S T H E P OW E R ? – 0 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE REGULATIONS
PAGE 08
ABBREVIATIONS
PAGE 10
INTRODUCTION
PAGE 12
WHO HAS THE POWER? SOUTH

AFRICA’S ENERGY PROFITEERS
PAGE 18
COAL
PAGE 21
DIESEL
PAGE 30
GAS
PAGE 35
RENEWABLE ENERGY
PAGE 45
NUCLEAR
PAGE 51
0 6 – O P E N S EC R E T S
A JUST TRANSITION
IN SOUTH AFRICA
PAGE 55
CLIMATE PROFITEERS:
OBSTACLES TO A JUST TRANSITION
PAGE 67
WHO PROFITS FROM THE STATUS QUO AND

WHO WILL CONTROL THE TRANSITION
PAGE 73
RECOMMENDATIONS
PAGE 75
ENDNOTES
PAGE 79
Energy, Environment, and Climate Change:
Key Legislation, Policies, and Regulators CONSTITUTION
Section 24 of South Africa’s Constitution outlines our environmental rights. It states that: Everyone has the
right (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and (b) to have the environment
protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other
measures that— (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting
justifiable economic and social development. 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
LEGISLATION:
2
National NEMA creates the legal framework for Gas Act 48 of 2001.
section 24 of the Constitution. It provides for
Environmental
‘co-operative environmental governance’
Management aimed at preventing environmental
Act 107 of 1998 degradation. It also provides for the The Gas Act establishes a
(“NEMA”) development of norms and standards to national regulatory framework
implement these goals. for the development of the
piped gas industry. The National
Energy Regulator of South
3
The Public The PFMA provides the framework Africa (NERSA) is the custodian
for the regulation of the financial of piped gas and manages,
Finance among other things, the issues
management of national
Management government and provincial of permits and licenses related
Act 1 of 1999 governments, as well as state to the transmission of gas and
(PFMA) owned enterprises (SOEs). It construction of gas-related
governs public procurement. infrastructure.
The Mineral and Petroleum National Energy Created NERSA to regulate

Resources Development Act Regulator Act 40 the electricity, piped gas,
and petroleum pipeline
28 of 2002 (“MPRDA”) of 2004 industries.
4
5
The MPRDA is the principal Establishes NERSA as the custodian of the Electricity
legislation which governs national electricity framework. The Act Regulation Act
the extraction and provides for NERSA’s management of
exploitation of natural electricity generation, transmission,
4 of 2006
resources in South Africa, distribution, reticulation, trading, importing
including mineral and and exporting by electricity generators.
petroleum resources. The
State is the custodian of all
mineral and petroleum 6
resources in South Africa The National Promotes standards and
that have not yet been Energy Act No specifications for
mined or produced. 34 of 2008 the equipment, systems and
processes used in energy
production, supply, and
7
Draft Climate The Draft Bill aims to enable the consumption. In terms of this Act
development of an effective climate the Minister of Energy is required to
Change Bill change response and implementation publish a National Integrated Energy
of the just energy transition. The bill Plan (IEP) which provides a roadmap
was passed by the National Assembly for investment, infrastructure
in October 2023 and sent on to the development, and policy
National Council of Provinces. development for the energy sector.
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL POLICIES:
9
United Nation’s South Africa is a signatory to the Sets out key objec- Southern
Paris Paris Agreement, a legally tives and guidelines African
binding international treaty for collaboration in
Agreement aimed at lowering carbon the development of
Development
(Treaty) emissions and curbing the effects national energy Community
8
of climate change. Countries who policies within the (SADC) 1996
are signatories to the treaty region. Energy Protocol
pledge to create social and
economic transformation in their
countries, while increasing their
ambitions to reduce emissions.
The White
Paper on
Renewable
Energy of 2003
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES: 11
White Paper The first post 1994 This White Paper is a foundational policy
on the Energy energy policy doc- document outlining South Africa’s ten year
ument outlines the targets for the promotion of renewable energy
Policy of the energy sector land- technologies including wind, solar, hydro, and
Republic of scape, broad policy objec- biomass. These targets centre around creating a
South Africa of tives, as well as challenges fiscal climate that is conducive to the
1998 10
in the energy sector. development of renewable energy technologies
12
The National Development Plan (NDP) sets out goals for social and economic National
transformation to be completed by 2030. The NDP sets ambitious and broad Development
policy objectives, including to; create an environmentally stable society, invest and
expand a low carbon economy and infrastructure, and ensure that the alleviation
Plan: Vision
of poverty and inequality are at the center of the transition to low carbon 2030
economy. However, the NDP also envisions a big role for natural gas, including
exploiting shale gas in the Karoo Basin and offshore gas exploration on the
West Coast. The DMRE’s 2021 “gas master plan” is heavily based on the NDP.
JETIP A five year plan (2023 -2027) which estimates the level of investment needed to
2022 reach our decarbonisation commitments. The JETIP creates an International
Partner Group (IPG) between South Africa, France, Germany, United Kingdom,
United States, and the European Union in terms of which the partners have agreed
to mobilise investment for South Africa’s energy transition.
13
The National
Energy Regulator
REGULATORY BODIES/PROGRAMMES: of South Africa
(NERSA)
Renewable REIPPP is an the Independent Power NERSA is a
Energy Producers Procurement Programme regulatory body
(IPPPP) which aims to bring addition created in terms
Independent
energy generation capacity onto of the National Energy Regulator Act 40
Power Producer South Africa’s electricity system of 2004. NERSA oversees the energy
Programme through private sector Independent industry and ensures compliance with
(REIPPP) Power Producers (IPP). REIPPP domestic laws. A key goal of NERSA is
provides for competitive tender to support the development of a
processes called bid windows. sustainable energy sector.
ABBREVIATIONS
ANC African National Congress

AREP African Rainbow Energy and Power
B4SA Business for South Africa
BEE Black Economic Empowerment
BII British International Investment
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BUSA Business Unity South Africa
CCGT closed cycle gas turbine
CEF Central Energy Fund
CEO chief executive officer
CER Centre for Environmental Rights
COP Conference of Parties / United Nations Climate Change Conference
CSP concentrated solar power
DEA Department of Environmental Affairs
DMRE Department of Mineral Resources and Energy
ECB Electricity Control Board
EIA environmental impact assessment
EIUG Energy Intensive Users Group
GTL gas-to-liquids
HCI Hosken Consolidated Investments
IDC Industrial Development Corporation
IEJ Institute for Economic Justice
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPG International Partners Group
IPP independent power producer /
Independent Power Producer (office)
IRP Integrated Resource Plan
JET IP Just Energy Transition Investment Plan
JETP Just Energy Transition Partnership
LNG liquified natural gas
10
MCSA Mineral Council of South Africa
MEC minerals-energy complex
Natref National Refiners of South Africa
NBI National Business Institute
NDC nationally determined contribution
NDP National Development Plan
NERSA National Energy Regulator of South Africa
NGO non-governmental organisation
OCGT open cycle gas turbine
PASA Petroleum Agency SA
PCC Presidential Climate Commission
PV photovoltaic (solar power)
REFIT renewable energy feed-in tariff
REIPPPP Renewable Energy Independent Power
Producer Procurement Programme
SANPC South African National Petroleum Company
Sapref South African Petroleum Refineries
SBM single buoy mooring (system)
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US United States
11
This is Open Secrets’ first report examining
the energy sector and climate crisis. It
shows who holds the power in South
Africa’s energy sector and spotlights the
key private players in the coal, gas, diesel,
and renewable energy industries—who we
call ‘energy profiteers’.
INTRODUCTION
We focus on corporate
actors deliberately, to
demonstrate that South
Africa’s energy and climate
crises are not solely the fault
0
A TIME OF CRISES
In 2022, devastating floods ripped through
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) killing more than 400
people. Poor residents living in informal set-
tlements already neglected by the state were
worst affected. Shack dwellers organisation,
Abahlali base Mjondolo, perfectly summed
up the situation for residents of KZN: “Nat-
ural disasters become entwined with political
disasters, often resulting in devastation for
the poor”. 1
of the state and the result of Climate scientists concluded that these
the collapse of Eskom. floods were more intense and that they would
occur more frequently due to human-caused
global warming.2 Communities in KZN have
also long borne the impact of industries that
contribute to carbon emissions and global
warming. This has included gas explosions
and fires, which have been regular events in
south Durban, home to many oil refineries
and tank farms.3 Further, like all people in
South Africa, communities in KZN live with
daily rolling blackouts, rarely having access
to electricity for more than 12 hours a day.
The story of KZN is emblematic of South
Africa’s multifaceted energy, social, and
climate crisis. There is insufficient energy
production to meet demand, leading to the
rolling blackouts. At the same time, Eskom
and municipalities are hiking electricity
prices massively, undermining access to
electricity for millions of people in South
13
Africa. In March 2023, an annual electricity
tariff increase of 18.65% was approved by the A KEY CROSSROADS
National Energy Regulator of South Africa
The minerals-energy complex (MEC) was the
(NERSA).4 The increase occurred concur-
bedrock of the apartheid economy. Narrowly
rently with regular load-shedding. The public
understood, the MEC refers to an industrial
is receiving less electricity while paying more
sector made up of mining, energy, and related
money for it.
industries. The Institute for Economic Justice
The electricity that is generated still comes
(IEJ) has, however, argued that the MEC is
predominantly from coal, contributing to
better understood as a system—one of “cap-
South Africa’s status as one of the world’s larg-
italist accumulation based on the alignment
est carbon emitters and to numerous, serious
of political and economic interests within
health issues, faced particularly by commu-
the mining, energy, and related sectors, that
nities near power stations, oil refineries, and
has been fundamental to the structure of the
mines. South Africa is already directly affect-
South African economy and have shaped the
ed by rising global temperatures and extreme
exploitation of productive labour… [and]…
climate events and is deeply vulnerable to the
reproductive labour”.12 It is a system of mak-
long-term effects of climate change on, not
ing money from mining and energy that still
only the climate itself, but also on agricul-
impacts all South Africans, often negatively.
ture and food production5, and to extreme
The MEC not only contributes the ma-
weather events. The floods in KZN are but
jority of South Africa’s carbon emissions but
one example of this. The heightened risks of
is also a massive consumer of the electricity
extreme weather—including drought, floods,
produced in the country. The MEC has also
and storms—will impact most regions of the
done extraordinary damage to nature and
country.
to the health of workers and communities.
At the same time, South Africa has per-
The corporations that are central to the MEC
sistently high unemployment: one in three
still enjoy significant profits at the expense of
South Africans are unemployed, according to
people and the planet.
the narrow formal measure,6 and the coun-
While fossil fuels remain central to South
try’s youth unemployment rate is 60.7%.7 So-
Africa’s energy and industrial mix, a signifi-
cial protection systems are strictly controlled,
cant shift has begun. A declining coal power
restrictive, or absent all together. Those in
fleet, South Africa’s ambitious commitments
employment face decreasing or stagnant
to reduce carbon emissions, and the chang-
real incomes. Meanwhile, just 1% of South
ing costs related to renewable energy produc-
Africans hold 42.2% of the country’s wealth,
tion mean that significant new investment in
with the latter a figure that has increased in
renewable energy projects has begun. But the
recent years.8 As a result, South Africa is the
nature and pace of this transition is deeply
most unequal country of the 164 countries
contested. On the one hand, the Presidential
assessed by the World Bank in a recently
Climate Commission (PCC), which was es-
published report in 2022.9 In 2023, the price
tablished by President Cyril Ramaphosa, in
of the average household food basket in the
September 2020, to “support the delivery of
country stands at more than R5,000.10 This is
just transition in South Africa”, has set out a
more than the amount that people getting the
plan to reform South Africa’s energy sector
statutory minimum wage earn in a month.
while promising social inclusion, consul-
As a result, millions of people cannot afford
tation, and a focus on jobs.13 On the other
enough food.11
hand, the Department of Mineral Resources
The government’s response to this multi-
and Energy (DMRE) and its current minis-
faceted crisis has been incoherent and inad-
ter, Gwede Mantashe, regularly champion
equate. In part, this is because contemporary
new oil and gas production, while spreading
state capture and corruption have hollowed
misinformation about the phasing out of coal
out state institutions and gutted the state’s fi-
power in South Africa. Further, communities
nances. But it is also because of powerful cor-
and civil society voices are regularly side-
porations and vested interests that have long
lined from the conversation, even as private
profited from the status quo in South Africa.
corporations enjoy a direct say in the nature
They are resistant to changes in the structure
and pace of the change.
of the country’s energy mix while seeking to
The result is an inconsistent and disjointed
control the pace and nature of the change.
approach to South Africa’s energy transition.
Whether it is the continued investment in The report is structured as follows:
outdated and dangerous fossil fuels, or a hap-
hazard shift to renewable energy sources, the • Section 1 maps the private actors and
evidence is that corporations are currently set state institutions that dominate the ener-
to be the key beneficiaries. Such an approach gy sector in South Africa. It looks both
will not address the multiple overlapping cri- backwards and forwards, exploring those
ses discussed above that have emerged from a companies that have interests in activities
deference to private interests. South Africans linked to coal, diesel, gas, and renewables.
cannot afford more of the same. These sectors are large and complex, and
Who Has the Power? South Africa’s Energy so we limit our scope to those private
Profiteers is Open Secrets’ first report exam- actors linked most closely to the energy
ining the energy sector and climate crisis. sector and the provision of power in South
The report shows who holds the power in Africa’s energy mix.
South Africa’s energy sector and spotlights • Section 2 explores the ongoing debate
the key private players in the coal, gas, diesel, around what a ‘just transition’ would be in
and renewable energy industries—who we South Africa. Borrowing heavily from the
call ‘energy profiteers’. We identify the pri- work of others in defining a just transition,
vate corporations that stand to benefit from we seek to show how the actors identified
maintaining the status quo, i.e. a reliance on in section 1 loom large as obstacles to
fossil fuels, in South Africa’s energy sector. such a transition, albeit in different ways.
We also identify the corporations that stand This section looks at global and local ex-
to benefit from South Africa’s transition to perience of large corporations seeking to
new energy sources. block efforts to reconstruct energy indus-
We focus on corporate actors deliberately, tries in cleaner, more equitable, and more
to demonstrate that South Africa’s energy inclusive ways.
and climate crises are not solely the fault • Section 3 and 4 conclude by looking at
of the state and the result of the collapse of which corporations and politicians are
Eskom. In doing so, we hope that the report currently poised to control and profit
contributes to the ongoing conversation on from South Africa’s energy transition.
the climate crisis and energy transition in And provide recommendations about
South Africa and helps identify those corpo- how to challenge these corporate interests
rate interests that may stand in the way of a and ensure that the transition serves the
just transition. Challenging these, we argue, public interest.
is fundamental to challenging South Africa’s
role in the planetary climate crisis. Open Secrets is committed to investigative
work on private actors who profiteer in South
Following spread: In 2022, devastating Africa’s energy sector. If you have informa-
floods ripped through KwaZulu-Natal (KZN)
killing more than 400 people. Poor residents
tion that you think would help us, particu-
living in informal settlements already larly information linked to any allegations
neglected by the state were worst affected. of wrongdoing or corruption, we encourage
you to get in touch with us.
The minerals-energy complex
(MEC) was the bedrock of the
apartheid economy. The rise of the
MEC helped to establish powerful
private corporations and a white
elite and contributed to the
financing of the apartheid regime.
WHO HAS THE
POWER? SOUTH
AFRICA’S ENERGY
PROFITEERS
1
THE MINERALS-ENERGY
COMPLEX
From the 1860s, when diamonds were dis-
covered in Kimberly, and the 1880s, when
gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand,
a few corporations enjoyed control of and
profited from South Africa’s economy and
development policy.1 Chief amongst these
corporations were, De Beers and Anglo
American, owned by the Oppenheimer fam-
ily. Ernest Oppenheimer and his partners
launched Anglo American, in 1917, with
financial backing from JP Morgan, and a
decade later, the company had taken control
of De Beers, formerly under the control of
Cecil John Rhodes. Anglo American and De
Beers controlled almost all of South Africa’s
diamond industry, nearly 50% of its platinum
and gold, and around 25% of the country’s
coal.2
The minerals-energy complex (MEC) was
the bedrock of the apartheid economy. The
rise of the MEC helped to establish powerful
private corporations and a white elite and
contributed to financing of the apartheid
regime. The MEC shaped South Africa’s po-
litical economy—one with deep divides and
high levels of inequality, with most of the
country’s wealth concentrated in the hands
of a few.
In 1996, the hearings held by South Af-
rica’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission
determined that the country’s mining indus-
try had “direct involvement with the state
19
in the formulation of oppressive policies or 2019 and guides South Africa’s energy gen-
practices that resulted in low labour costs eration mix. It sets out a plan to meet South
(or otherwise boosted profits) [and which] Africa’s electricity demands over the next 20
can be described as first-order involvement years. The 2019 IRP envisages major shifts
[in apartheid]… The shameful history of in the country’s energy mix over the next
subhuman compound [hostel] conditions, 10 years, with coal set to account for 59% of
brutal suppression of striking workers, rac- electricity generation by 2030 and renewables
ist practices and meagre wages is central for almost 25% (the latter currently accounts
to understanding the origins and nature of for only 11%).8
apartheid”.3 In late 2021, in the run-up to the 26th
Despite the findings of the TRC, the Conference of Parties to the United Nations
corporations that benefitted from apartheid Framework Convention on Climate Change
and its systemic abuses were not held ac- (UNFCC)—or, more simply, the 26th Unit-
countable, nor did they pay reparations. The ed Nations Climate Change Conference
economic underpinnings of the minerals and (COP26)—South Africa updated its nation-
energy sectors were left largely unchanged by ally determined contribution (NDC) to set
the democratic transition. Like many other even more ambitious targets for moving away
parts of the economy, those that came to from fossil fuels, reducing emissions, and
form part of the new elites were brought in to embracing renewables.9 This will be expen-
benefit from industries tied to the MEC, but sive. The NDC states that South Africa hopes
poor labour conditions and environmental to receive up to $8 billion (R150 billion) per
destruction continued apace. In democratic year in climate finance by 2030, to assist in
South Africa, corporations in the MEC have the transition away from coal. New invest-
also pursued financialisation: investing in ment in, and development of, South Africa’s
short-term speculative financial assets in- renewable energy sector offer a chance for a
stead of re-investment in productive activi- decentralisation of energy production, and
ties.4 In democratic South Africa, this pattern a way of tackling part of the sources of the
has continued to benefit a small elite. climate crisis. However, renewable energy
This inherited legacy finds voice in the is not a silver bullet when it comes to a just
words of academic, Ali Mazrui, in a speech transition. As we discuss later in this section,
made in Cape Town in 1998 and echoed by private companies might very well swoop in
Khadija Sharife and Patrick Bond: to control and monopolise ownership and
“You [wear] the crown, we’ll keep the jew- investment in this space, thus perpetuating
els”, referring to black political domination— the status quo.
the crown of the state—and white control of To reach the targets set out in South Afri-
intellectual, economic and other “jewels”.5 ca’s National Development Plan (NDP) will
The MEC was constructed on the basis of also require the state to challenge embedded
the extraction and use of fossil fuels, chief vested interests in the country’s coal and min-
amongst which was coal. Its growth was ing sector. While continued use of coal-fired
based on the “intensive use of fossil fuel power will be disastrous for the planet and
energy at preferential tariffs”, and this way the health of people in South Africa while
of producing energy remains the largest con- having significant long-term costs, there are
tributor to South Africa’s carbon emissions— still short-term profits to be made. Those
around 80%.6 In turn, less than 30 companies who stand to benefit are already spending
consume nearly half of all the energy pro- resources on slowing down the transition
duced in South Africa. Most of these are part from coal and other fossil fuels.10 We should
of the MEC.7 In this way, environmental de- anticipate this fightback to become more
struction has not only been wrought by a few pronounced as the push for a just transition
actors but also served their narrow financial gains pace.
interests.
While this has been the nature of South Following spread: Narrowly understood, the MEC refers to
Africa’s economy for generations, the state an industrial sector made up of mining, energy, and related
has signalled its intention to make a rapid industries. The Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) has, however,
argued that the MEC is better understood as a system—one
shift, at least in respect of the sources of the of “capitalist accumulation based on the alignment of political
country’s energy mix. The Integrated Re- and economic interests within the mining, energy, and related
source Plan (IRP) was gazetted in October sectors, that has been fundamental to the structure of the South
African economy and have shaped the exploitation of productive
labour… [and]… reproductive labour”. - IEJ
province that produces 83% of the country’s
OLD KING COAL coal, has been plagued by air pollution and
deadly air quality.15
In keeping with South Africa’s history, coal
Research studies have found that the facil-
remains at the heart of the country’s energy
ities responsible for the deadly air pollution
mix. According to the South African gov-
in Mpumalanga are owned by Eskom and
ernment’s most recent energy sector report,
Sasol.16 The air pollution in South Africa that
South African Energy Sector Report 2021,
is directly linked to fossil fuel power plants
65% of the energy mix came from coal in
causes up to 2,239 premature deaths every
2018. According to the report, in the same
year. Civil society has acted and taken the
period, crude oil made up 18% of the coun-
matter to court successfully, with the court
try’s energy supply and natural gas made up
agreeing that the deadly air in Mpumalanga
3%, followed closely by nuclear contributing
is a violation of section 24 of the Constitu-
2%. Renewables made up only 11% of the
tion, which provides that, “everyone has the
primary supply.11
right to an environment not harmful to their
Not only is South Africa dependent on
health or wellbeing”.17 This case is discussed
coal for its domestic economy, it also gen-
in more detail in section 3.
erates revenues from coal exports. In 2022,
South Africa exported just over 50 million
tonnes of coal from the Richards Bay Coal HISTORY
Terminal, earning around R150 billion in In South Africa, coal was first discovered in
revenue.12 However, this tonnage was a dra- the middle of the 1800s, in the provinces of
matic decline, of 18%, from the previous year the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. How-
and marked the lowest level of coal exports ever, it was only much later, in the 1870s, that
from the Richards Bay terminal since 1993. coal mining began in earnest in the Eastern
This was caused by the decline of Transnet’s Cape’s Molteno-Indwe coalfield, spearhead
infrastructure and locomotives, which meant by efforts to supply energy to the then recent-
that the rail system did not have the capacity ly discovered diamond fields of Kimberly.
to properly supply coal to the terminal for Not long thereafter, in the 1880s, commercial
export, reducing export revenue by as much coal mining commenced in KZN and the
as R30 billion.13 Witwatersrand, after gold was discovered in
Depending on precisely how it is mea- the region in 1886. Commercial coal
sured, South Africa ranks between the 12th mining in Mpumalanga also
and 14th biggest carbon emitters in the began during the same
world and is comfortably the largest in Af- period.18 All this un-
rica.14 In terms of corporations, Eskom is the derscores the
largest emitter through its coal-fired power
stations, followed closely by Sasol that uses
coal to produce fuel. When it comes to coal
power plants, not only are they amongst the
biggest climate change contributors in South
Africa, but they also pollute the areas in
which they are built and endan-
ger communities nearby.
Mpumalanga, the close historic
South African relationship be-
tween energy production
and consumption within the MEC.
Kimberly was the first town in South
Africa to get public electricity, with electric
streetlights installed in the town in 1882.19
In 1891, moving past the first lights of South
Africa’s diamond town (Kimberly), the es-
tablishment of the Harbour Board building
in Cape Town marked the development of
South Africa’s first central power station and
distribution system.20
W H O H A S T H E P OW E R ? – 21
Mining, transport, and industry fostered Falls and Transvaal Power Company.24
an ever-increasing need for cheap and re- In the period following 1939, as South
liable electricity as the country’s economy Africa industrialised, coal demands saw ex-
grew and developed. It was the railways in ponential expansion. The 1970s gave rise to
particular that sought cheap and reliable the global oil crisis, with this energy crisis
electricity to power trains. Consequently, the leading to corporations competing for coal
railway sector’s demand for power became resources from export markets to serve glob-
a strong push factor and motivation for the al demand. This broader context prompted
formation of the Electricity Supply Commis- the establishment of the Richards Bay Coal
sion, or Escom.21 Terminal in South Africa, in 1976, which was
Prior to 1923, before Escom was es- developed by the prominent coal companies
tablished, the generation and provision of at the time.25
electricity in South Africa was overseen by From its inception, Escom played a vital
an assortment of bodies, which included role in steering the development of the coun-
around 18 private corporations and 40 mu- try’s capitalist economy by making power
nicipalities. The top private corporations that available cheaply, which was essential for the
dominated the sector were the, Victoria Falls growth and development of South Africa’s
and Transvaal Power Company and the Rand manufacturing, transport, and mining sec-
Mines Power Supply Company. In 1923, Es- tors. White people in South Africa were also
com was established by the Electricity Act (42 the chief beneficiaries that were able to re-
of 1922).22 This Act also saw to the develop- ceive cheap, good quality services during the
ment of the Electricity Control Board (ECB), apartheid regime. The growth of Escom saw
which set tariffs and licenced and controlled the utility progressively take over indepen-
electricity supply. Following its inception, dent and private power stations. By 1948, it
Escom’s first power stations were built in the had become a vertically integrated state utili-
middle of 1928—the Salt River Power Station ty, which facilitated generation, transmission,
in Cape Town and the coal-fired Congella and distribution of power in the country.26 As
Power Station in Durban.23 a cheap electricity producer, providing power
Another of Escom’s first coal-fired power to the railways, industry, and mining, Escom
stations was Witbank Power Station, which was central to the growth and development
began operations in 1926 and was established of large-scale private monopoly capital and
as part of efforts to supply power to the coun- the minerals-energy complex.27
try’s mining industry. This power station was In a 1987 rebranding exercise, Escom
built and run by the Victoria Falls and Trans- was renamed “Eskom”, by merging the acro-
vaal Power Company in partnership with Es- nyms “Escom” (as the entity was known in
com. In 1948, Escom bought out the Victoria English) and “Evkom” (in Afrikaans).28 With
From its inception, Escom played a vital role

in steering the development of the country’s
capitalist economy by making power available
cheaply, which was essential for the growth and
development of South Africa’s manufacturing,
transport, and mining sectors.
24 – O P E N S EC R E T S
the ushering in of South Africa’s democratic experienced by the country is a stark reality
era in 1994, Eskom’s mandate broadened to that is negatively impacting the economy and
include the provision of power to the homes the lives of people in the country.
of those previously excluded, while continu- The energy crisis faced by the country is
ing to provide cheap power to facilitate eco- no doubt largely rooted in Eskom’s ageing
nomic growth. The 1998 Eskom Amendment coal fleet that underperforms due to poor
Act allowed for the expansion of the govern- maintenance, mismanagement, and corrup-
ment’s powers over Eskom and gave it signifi- tion. The major coal-fired power plants of Es-
cant influence over investment decisions and kom are now nearing the end of their lifespan
company policy.29 and experiencing routine breakdowns. Over
In 1988, the National Party government the past five years, the electricity produced by
earmarked Eskom for privatisation as part Eskom’s major power plants has decreased by
of its efforts to address the apartheid state’s 33%.36 Even the new power plants in Eskom’s,
debt crisis.30 However, this sat uneasily with Kusile and Medupi, have not been able to
the first democratically elected government provide the necessary buffer, with struggling
of the African National Congress (ANC), infrastructure that can be attributed to flaws
which resulted in the entrenchment of Es- in their design.37
kom as a state-owned corporation in South Kusile and Medupi have also cost signifi-
Africa’s democracy.31 Today, there are re- cantly more than initially estimated. Orig-
newed debates about the privatisation of Es- inally budgeted to cost R81 billion (Kusile)
kom, which has been anticipated by the long and R79billion (Medupi), the costs ballooned
promised unbundling of the state-owned to R161.4 billion and R145 billion respective-
corporation’s generation, transmission, and ly. This money was spent while much needed
distribution businesses, and National Trea- investment in renewables was stalled by a le-
sury’s insistence that Eskom not invest in any thargic government. What is more, a signifi-
new generation capacity, but rather procure cant portion of Medupi’s costs was funded by
it from private businesses.32 a World Bank loan, which taxpayers are stuck
Today, Eskom remains the dominant paying off in the form of bailouts provided to
energy supplier, generating around 90% of Eskom and increased tariffs.38 This should be
South Africa’s electricity. It also sells this on considered an odious debt, given that Hitachi
to other countries in Southern Africa, chief was fined in the United States (US) for paying
amongst which include, Botswana, eSwatini a bribe to the ANC’s investment company,
(Swaziland), Lesotho, Mozambique, and Chancellor House, to benefit from the Kusile
Zimbabwe.33 deal. There has yet to be any accountability
In early 2008, Eskom introduced for this in South Africa.
load-shedding, or nationwide power cuts, Along with ballooning costs and failing
for the first time. Since then, South Africa infrastructure, another of the major issues
has been faced with rolling blackouts and faced by Eskom has been corruption. The
can be said to be in an energy crisis. The State Capture Report, released by the Zondo
introduction of load-shedding came a de- Commission, found Eskom to have been a
cade after a government White Paper had massive crime scene, with R14.7 billion loot-
raised the alarm about electricity supply, ed over a 10-year period. Central to this were
predicting shortages by 2007.34 Despite this, Matshela Koko and Anoj Singh, amongst
not enough was done to invest in new and other senior Eskom officials at the time, as
greener electricity supply. In a way then, well as private corporations including Tril-
the blackouts of 2008 arrived as predicted. lian, ABB, and McKinsey.39 One of the root
However, it has since surfaced in reports causes of corruption at Eskom lie in its coal
of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) that supply chain. A previous Eskom employee,
the load-shedding introduced at that time turned independent energy analyst, the late
was likely a manufactured crisis that could Ted Blom, noted that pervasive corruption
have been avoided and, was essentially, used in Eskom’s coal supply chain added up to
to fast-track irregular coal procurement at around R2 billion to R3 billion per month.
significantly inflated prices by the power And, although there have been some efforts
utility.35 Notwithstanding, the fact remains to rectify issues, through changes to the man-
that today, South Africa’s energy crisis and agement and board at Eskom, this corruption
the consequent prolonged load-shedding remains a major problem. 40
TABLE 1. LIST OF COMPANIES SUPPLYING ESKOM WITH COAL IN 2015 43
African Exploration Mining and Anglo American Inyosi Coal Anglo American Thermal Coal
Finance Corporation SA (Pty) Ltd
Anglo/Exxaro JV Becsa (BHP Billiton Energy Coal BHP Billiton

South Africa)
Exxaro Coal HCI Khusela Coal Hlagisa Mining
Iyanga Just Coal CC Keaton Mining
Kuyasa Mining Liketh Investments Lurco Coal
Ntshovelo Mining Resources Optimum Coal Holdings Perisat Investments
Shanduka Coal Stuart Coal Sudor Coal
Umcebo Mining Universal Coal Development Vunene
Wescoal Mining Xstrata/African Rainbow Minerals JV
COAL PRODUCERS Eskom’s complex and large structure is such

that in many ways, the power utility simply
South Africa is amongst the world’s top coal cannot function without the private sector.
producers, with an output of more than 250 Private sector entities have been integral
million tonnes a year.41 This yearly output both to the power utility’s success and dire
means that it is the world’s seventh largest failures.45
coal extractor, contributing approximately In a 2015 presentation to Parliament, then
4.9% of the world’s coal output. China is the Public Enterprises Minister Lynn Brown
largest coal producer in the world by some (who has also been named in allegations of
margin, followed by India, the United States, state capture and corruption) revealed a list
Australia, Indonesia, and Russia. South of over 20 companies supplying Eskom with
Africa is next on the list, and it produces coal. These companies are listed in table 1.
more than 80% of the coal on the African In 2019, the Mail and Guardian accessed
continent.42 25 Eskom coal contracts signed that year. It
South Africa exports between 25% and reported that there were unusually high dis-
30% of the coal that it produces. This coal is crepancies between the amounts Eskom paid
exported mainly through the country’s Rich- these different suppliers for the same quality
ards Bay Coal Terminal. The majority of coal coal.46 For example, Eskom paid Glencore
produced in the country is used domestically more than double the price it paid Stuart
for electricity production (53–63%) and the Coal in contracts signed in the same period,
remainder is utilised in industrial processes with similar discrepancies noted between
by local industries, including in the produc- other contracts.47 The differences amounted
tion of, inter alia, steel, cement, and iron to billions of rand in extra payments from
ore.43 44 Eskom.
Eskom does not publicly share
WHO SUPPLIES ESKOM? information about its coal supply
contracts, claiming that much of the
Most of South Africa’s power stations are op- information contained in them is
erated and owned by Eskom. As mentioned commercially sensitive.48 The 2015
earlier, it provides 90% of the country’s elec- list announced by Brown suggested
tricity. Although Eskom is a public entity, it that there was a large, diversi-
has close ties with the private sector. In fact, fied group of coal suppliers to
Eskom.
ESKOM’S ‘BIG TWO’
Exxaro, formerly Kumba, is a publicly
traded South African company, with a
market capitalisation of R76 billion at the
end of 2022.49 It owns five coal mines and
two wind farms in South Africa as part
Seriti Resources is a private company,
of its R85 billion in assets. Just over 30%
incorporated in 2017 to purchase coal
of Exxaro is owned by a special purpose
assets from Anglo American. It has four
vehicle called Eyesizwe, which was set
anchor shareholders—Thebe Investment
up to hold the black empowerment shares
Corporation, Masimong, Zungu Invest-
in the company, and 23% is owned by
ments, and Community Investment
the Industrial Development Corporation
Holdings—each of whom hold 23%.51 It is
(IDC).50 Exxaro’s board chair is Mvuleni
led by Board Chairperson Anna Mokgokong
Qhena and its chief executive officer (CEO)
and CEO Mike Teke, who is a donor to Cyril
is Nombasa Tsengwa.
Ramaphosa. While Seriti Resources is still
predominantly focussed on coal mines—
including a new coal mine, the New Largo
Project, adjacent to Kusile power station—
it has also ventured into renewable energy
through the acquisition of Windlab South
Africa in December 2022.52
49 50 51 52
However, today, there are two companies and Duhva power stations and also provide
that dominate the supply of coal to the power coal for export via Richards Bay.57 Indicating
utility. According to October 2021 figures, the magnitude of its desire to get the deal
the largest coal suppliers to Eskom are Seriti done, South32 sold its assets to Seriti for R1
Resources Holdings and Exxaro Resources. and actually paid billions of rand for vendor
Together, the two entities account for ap- financing and to cover mine rehabilitation
proximately 80% of Eskom’s coal supply per and fund loss-making mines.58
annum.53 The Seriti purchase from South32 was also
While several prominent corporations controversial for other reasons. Notably, as
have been exiting their coal assets in South soon as it was confirmed that Seriti was going
Africa (notably Anglo American and to purchase South32’s assets, Eskom renego-
South32), Seriti Resources has consolidated tiated with South32 to extend its contract to
its hold in the coal sector. Anglo Ameri- supply the power utility with coal at favour-
can sold all its Eskom-tied coal operations able terms. Further, the CEO of Seriti, Mike
to Seriti in 2017,54 and then it spun off the Teke, met with executives from South32 and
remainder of its South African coal Seriti, as well as officials from the DMRE,
assets, in 2021, when Thungela was before the deal was announced, with one
listed separately on the Johannesburg source in the DMRE saying that the meeting
Stock Exchange (JSE).55 was “strange” and other bidders did not get
In 2017, Seriti Resources was the same access.59
incorporated and spent R2.5 billion Concern was heightened because Teke is
to purchase all of Anglo’s Eskom-tied a public supporter of Cyril Ramaphosa and
coal facilities at New Vaal, New donated R600,000 to his campaign for the
Denmark, and Kriel collieries, as ANC presidency in 2017. This led critics to
well as four closed collieries.56 In suggest that the timing of the deal and Seriti’s
2021, it also finalised a deal with treatment was suspicious. Seriti’s response
the Australian firm South32 to was to say that Teke’s donation to Ramaphosa
purchase its coal operations at was in his personal capacity and was totally
Khutala, Klipspruit, and Mid- unrelated to the company.60
delburg Mines Services North Unsurprisingly, Exxaro and Seriti have
and South mines, which been vocal defenders of coal’s dominance in
provide coal to the Kendal South Africa’s energy mix.61 As we discuss in
TABLE 2.SOUTH AFRICA’S MAJOR OPERATING COAL MINES 62
PROJECT/MINE NAME PROVINCE OWNED BY
Grootgeluk Mine Limpopo Exxaro Resources

New Vaal Mine Free State Seriti Resources Holdings
Wolvekrans Middelburg Mpumalanga Seriti Resources Holdings
Complex Mine
Syferfontein Mine Gauteng Sasol
Kriel Mine Mpumalanga Seriti Resources Holdings
Zibulo Mine Mpumalanga Thungela Resources, Inyosi Consortium
Middelbult Mine Mpumalanga Sasol
Tweefontein Division Mines Mpumalanga Glencore; African Rainbow Minerals
Khutala Mine Mpumalanga Seriti Resources Holdings
Mines of Izimbiwa Coal Mpumalanga Glencore; Phembani Group
TABLE 3. SOUTH AFRICA’S MAJOR COAL MINES UNDER DEVELOPMENT 63
PROJECT/MINE NAME PROVINCE OWNED BY
New Largo Project Mpumalanga Seriti Resources Holdings; Industrial

Development Corporation of South
Africa; undisclosed company
Paardekop Mine Mpumalanga Glencore
Boikarabelo Coal Mine Limpopo Resource Generation, Fairy Wing
Trading 136 Limited
Sukuma Project Gauteng Canyon Coal Ltd
Thabametsi Project Limpopo Exxaro Resources
Waterberg Project Limpopo Firestone Energy; Sekoko Resources Ltd
T Project (CEF (SOC) Ltd.) Mpumalanga CEF Ltd
Elders Project Mpumalanga Thungela Resources; Inyosi Consortium
Rietkuil Project Mpumalanga Anglo African Capital Ltd; undisclosed
company
Matla Expansion Project Mpumalanga Exxaro Resources
32.46 M
Above: According to Global Energy Monitor
and reports by Oxpeckers, there are currently
23 new coal mines under development in
South Africa. Table 3 highlights some of these
mines and their owners. TONNES
section 3 of this report, Exxaro has also been the continued financing of fossil fuel projects
named as one of the biggest sources of lobby- despite the known human cost.66
ing to slow down or water down legislation South African banks are big funders of
in South Africa to address climate change coal and other fossil fuel projects in South
and to tax and regulate carbon emitters and Africa and Africa. In 2022, new research
polluters. 62 63 from a coalition of civil society organisations
The large coal suppliers also own the larg- from around the world showed that 10 Afri-
est coal mines (see table 2). The top five big- can commercial banks provided $2.8 billion
gest coal mines in South Africa are Grootge- in loans to the coal industry between 2019
luk Mine (owned by Exxaro), New Vaal Mine and 2021.67 Of this, 97% came from South
(owned by Seriti Resources), Wolvekrans Africa’s five big banks: Standard Bank, Fir-
Middelburg Complex Mine (owned by Ser- stRand, Nedbank, Absa, and Investec. Stan-
iti), Kriel Mine (owned by Seriti), and Syfer- dard Bank was the single biggest provider,
fontein Mine (owned by Sasol).64 having loaned $426 million.68
Although the South African government Looking beyond coal to fossil fuel projects
has professed commitments to move away in Africa, South African banks provided $8.4
from coal, there are a number of coal mines billion in finance for at least 58 fossil fuel
under development in the country, and, in projects and 24 fossil fuel companies between
fact, according to Global Energy Monitor 2016 and 2021.69 In terms of direct funding
and reports by Oxpeckers, there are current- of these projects on the continent, Standard
ly 23 new coal mines under development in Bank, which provided $2.3 billion, is the
South Africa.65 Table 3 highlights some of seventh biggest financier of all private banks
these mines and their owners. globally, with Absa and Nedbank also in the
top 15.70 Just as this report was finalised, ac-
tivists were violently removed from Standard
WHO FINANCES COAL?
Bank offices in Johannesburg for protesting
An important element of the political econ- this kind of investment.71 A journalist from
omy of fossil fuels is the investment and fi- Daily Maverick—Lerato Mutsila—was pres-
nancing of fossil fuels. Fossil fuel dependant ent and manhandled, and had their phone
investment is detrimental to both the coun- taken and photos deleted by Standard Bank
try and the environment. That is why it is im- staff. Standard Bank has since apologised to
portant to spotlight corporations that fund Daily Maverick and Mutsila for what it calls
and invest in fossil fuels. They have skin in an “unfortunate incident”.72
the game, so to speak—with a direct interest Standard Bank and other South African
in ensuring that fossil fuels dominate South financial institutions that are investing in
Africa’s energy supply. Work by civil society fossil fuels are essentially undermining glob-
organisations like, JustShare, sheds light on al commitments towards a just transition, by
pumping millions of rands into supporting
fossil fuels at a pivotal time when action
should be taken to phase out dirty energy.
IN 2022, THE TOP FIVE

COAL MINES PRODUCED
1
GROOTGELUK
MINE 2
NEW VAAL
77 MILLION TONNES
3 OF COAL
WOLVEKRANS
15.91 M 4
TONNES 11.3 M SYFERFONTEIN

5
TONNES KRIEL
9.89
7.91
produce electricity. It is both very expensive
DESPERATE DAYS, DIRTY and very bad for the environment, generating
significant carbon dioxide and other harmful
DIESEL emissions. However, analysts agree that the
high cost of diesel is far outweighed by the
Over the last two decades, rolling power out-
devastating economic costs of load-shed-
ages have become a daily reality in South Af-
ding. As such, as long as using diesel to pow-
rica, with power being unavailable for up to
er the OCGTs can reduce load-shedding, it
10 hours a day when the system becomes se-
arguably remains rational to keep purchasing
verely strained.73 As discussed earlier, this is
diesel for this purpose.76 This is because the
largely due to breakdowns at coal-fired pow-
costs of load-shedding are somewhere be-
er plants, which provide most of the power
tween R10 and R85 per kilowatt-hour while
to the grid. As a result of this, Eskom has
the cost for Eskom to generate power using
become increasingly dependent on diesel to
OCGTs is around R7 per kilowatt-hour.77
power its open cycle gas turbines (OCGTs),
It is likely that the need to burn diesel for
which were only meant to function as emer-
power will remain in the short and medium
gency or reserve power sources. In February
term while renewables are added to the grid.
2023, in his State of the Nation Address, Pres-
Some reports, including one by Meridian
ident Cyril Ramaphosa announced that he
Economics, argue that increasing the supply
intended to appoint a minister of electricity
and storage of diesel for OCGTs is one of the
in response to the national energy crisis.74 In
most important short-term priorities to ad-
April 2023, Minister of Electricity Kgosient-
dress load-shedding.78 Given this, the cost at
sho Ramokgopa, announced that the govern-
which Eskom purchases diesel is crucial, and
ment planned to spend R30 billion on diesel
addressing any price gouging and corruption
procurement for the use of OCGTs and that
in the procurement process is a priority.
it would continue to rely on diesel as a power
source, which would be crucial to solving the
Below: Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, South
issue of rolling blackouts in the short term.75 Africa’s electricity minister, speaks with
In an ideal world, South Africa would journalists on day two of the BRICS summit
not be heavily reliant on burning diesel to at the Sandton Convention Center in Sandton.
THE KEY STATE INSTITUTIONS AND COMPANIES time of writing.86 Both, Gwede Mantashe and
Ayanda Noah, chairperson of the CEF, have
IN THE OIL SECTOR described the merger as crucial for economic
The Strategic Fuel Fund was established in growth and are pushing for it to be finalised
1964 and manages South Africa’s strategic “before the end of the term of this adminis-
crude oil stockpile and commercialisation tration”.87 This is part of Mantashe’s broader
of crude oil storage in Saldanha Bay in the championing of new fossil fuel exploration
Western Cape.79 This storage terminal is the and exploitation in South Africa.
largest in the southern hemisphere and is Despite a history of exploration, South
used to store government-owned reserves of Africa has limited proven oil reserves and
crude oil, with excess storage being leased to thus imports the majority of its crude oil
international crude oil trading companies.80 for domestic refining and use. This crude
As discussed in more detail in the later oil makes landfall through the single buoy
discussion on gas, offshore oil and gas ex- mooring (SBM) system, which is a floating
ploration in South Africa has been ongo- port off the coast of Durban that allows large
ing since the 1960s. Petroleum Agency SA tankers carrying crude oil to moor offshore
(PASA), a company that works on behalf of and offload their cargo. The SBM system is
the government to explore and promote on- managed and operated by South African
shore and offshore oil and gas resources, was Petroleum Refineries (Sapref) and is owned
established in 1999. The new state oil compa- by BP, Engen, and Shell, which each own
ny, PetroSA, was formed in 2002 as a result of 26%, as well as Sasol Oil and TotalEnergies,
a merger of three entities: Soekor (Pty) Ltd, which own 16% and 6% respectively.88 These
Mossgas (Pty) Ltd, and parts of the Strategic companies hold an operating license that was
Fuel Fund Association. PetroSA is a sub- issued by the National Energy Regulator of
sidiary of the Central Energy Fund (CEF), South Africa in March 2009. Shell and Sapref
a state-owned energy company that has the operate and manage the SBM on behalf of the
DMRE as its “shareholder department”.81 other companies.89
In March 2021, the CEF briefed Par- The oil and diesel industry in South Africa
liament on a proposed merger of its three is dominated by seven large players, namely
subsidiaries, namely PetroSA, iGas, and Stra- BP Southern Africa, Astron Energy (formerly
tegic Fuel Fund.82 This new proposed entity Caltex until it was sold by US multinational
would be named the South African National Chevron), Engen Petroleum, PetroSA, Shell
Petroleum Company (SANPC) and would South Africa, Sasol Oil, and TotalEnergies
“allow the state to participate meaningfully South Africa.90 Five of them are linked to
in oil and gas developments”, according to multinational operations—Astron Energy
Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy, is owned by Swiss multinational Glencore,
Gwede Mantashe.83 The new entity is in- while Shell and BP are British-headquartered
tended to oversee the “strategic planning, corporations. TotalEnergies is a subsidiary
coordination and governance” of petroleum of the French multinational and Engen is
resources in the country.84 In the early stages majority-owned by the Malaysian Petronas
of talks around the merger, the parliamentary group.
portfolio committee expressed several reser- Most of these seven oil companies own
vations regarding it, specifically the deadline refineries and operate distribution facilities
of the merger, the issue of PetroSA’s liquidity, and storage terminals throughout the coun-
as well as issues raised in the Strategic Fuel try, and all, but PetroSA, have large fuel sta-
Fund and PetroSA’s forensic reports.85 tion networks across the country.91 As of May
The merger was approved by Cabinet fol- 2022, only one oil refinery was operational;
lowing tabling of the Upstream Petroleum this was the National Petroleum Refiners of
Resources Development Bill, or SANPC Bill, South Africa (Natref) refinery in Sasolburg,
in July 2021, which relates to the exploration which is owned by Sasol and TotalEnergies.92
of petroleum, as well as the licencing and Astron Energy owns the Chevref refinery
management of petroleum rights. The SAN- based in Cape Town, which closed down in
PC Bill has been submitted for constitutional July 2020 following a fire before reopening
certification and was set to be gazetted for in the fourth quarter of 2022.93 Similarly, En-
public comments in July 2023, but it had gen’s Enref refinery in Durban closed down
not been made available to the public at the after a fire in December 2020, but it has yet to
reopen; while Sapref, the Durban-based re- PETROSA PROFITS FROM THE CRISIS
finery owned by Shell and BP, stopped refin-
ing activities and became an import storage The increased need to power diesel-fuelled
terminal at the end of March 2022.94 open cycle gas turbines has raised major
Engen Petroleum was founded in 1881 concerns around Eskom’s budget and the
and is a South African oil company. Up until procurement process, as well as the actors
1990, it was part of American oil compa- involved in this. In the 2022/2023 financial
ny Mobil, but it is now majority-owned by year, Eskom exceeded its diesel budget of
Petronas, a Malaysian energy group, with a R6.1 billion, by spending R21 billion. Four
74% holding.95 Meanwhile, 21.2% of Engen months into the 2023/2024 financial year, it
is owned by Phembani, a black-controlled, had already spent R9.2 billion on diesel, or
South African industrial holding company around a third of its nearly R30 billion diesel
founded by former MTN CEO, Phuthuma budget for the year.104
Nhleko, in 1994. The remaining 4.8% of the As it stands, PetroSA is the largest diesel
company is owned by a Phembani-led con- supplier to Eskom, though the power utility
sortium. Phembani entered into negotiations also purchases diesel from commercial sup-
with Shanduka Group, founded by Rama- pliers including Astron, Engen, and Shell.105
phosa in 2001, with the view to acquiring In February 2023, energy expert, Chris Yel-
Shanduka’s assets. The deal was finalised in lend and his consultancy group, EE Business
2015, resulting in R8 billion in assets in the Intelligence, found that Eskom pays R20.36
combined portfolio.96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 per litre for diesel from Engen and R20.28
PETROSA’S HISTORY OF PetroSA has been unprofitable for many

years, with the auditor general casting
SCANDAL doubt on the company’s viability as early
PetroSA has a long history of being used as 2017, following a R1.4 billion annual
for narrow political gain and corruption. In loss.100 The year before, PetroSA was forced
2002, the same year PetroSA was formed, a to impair R14.5 billion in assets due to a
company called Imvume won a R750 million failed gas project called Ikwezi. PetroSA’s
contract to supply oil to PetroSA. In 2005, leadership sought to have the parliamentary
the Mail and Guardian exposed that Imvume hearing into this issue and a related forensic
was effectively a front company for the report kept secret.101 Its financial struggles
African National Congress (ANC) and had have accelerated following the closure of
diverted R11 million from the contract to the its Mossel Bay refinery in 2020. In June
ANC in the run-up to the 2004 elections.97 2023, Africa Intelligence described PetroSA
In 2013, new stories emerged about a series as an, “almost bankrupt firm hobbled by
of irregular payments in less than a year inept management and an allegedly cavalier
under the acting leadership of Yekani Tenza. chairman”.102 In 2023, the Department of
In 2015, Tenza was ordered by a court to Mineral Resources and Energy was forging
repay R83 million to PetroSA due to a series ahead with the formation of the South
of irregular procurement decisions.98 This African National Petroleum Corporation,
was linked to Tenza’s irregular appointment which is to be created through the merger
of lawyer George Sabelo in connection with of PetroSA, the Strategic Fuel Fund, and
PetroSA’s attempt to acquire Sabre Oil and iGas. Minister Gwede Mantashe urged
Gas Holdings, a “British Virgin Islands- members of Parliament to complete the
based company with an opaque ownership legislative process by the end of 2023 to
structure, which owned offshore oil acreage allow “the state to participate meaningfully
in Ghana”.99 in oil and gas developments”.103
32
and R20.22 from Astron and Shell respec- Media reports from February 2023 con-
tively, but pays a premium price to PetroSA, firmed that when Eskom raised the alarm
from which it buys diesel for R 23.51 per li- in November 2022, it received suggestions
tre.106 This is part of a concerning pattern in from the Department of Mineral Resources
which Eskom appears to pay a premium to and Energy and the Department of Public
PetroSA for its diesel. Enterprises, as well as members of the Eskom
At the end of 2022, already far over its board, with names of alternative, uncontract-
annual diesel budget, Eskom requested R19.5 ed diesel suppliers.111 According to EE Busi-
billion from National Treasury to buy diesel ness Intelligence, Eskom did not take these
in order to fuel its open cycle gas turbines, suggestions on board because the multiple
as it said that it no longer had the funds to proposed suppliers were offering very similar
purchase the diesel.107 Treasury denied this prices, just slightly less than the price Petro-
request, and Minister of Finance, Enoch SA had proposed, with Eskom suggesting this
Godongwana, criticised the power utility, sounded like it may be collusive behaviour.112
accusing it of mismanagement and reckless PetroSA released a media statement denying
expenditure.108 Eskom was forced to use R1.3 the claim that it overcharged Eskom on 2
billion in funds from its savings in capital February 2023. It stated that the contractual
and operational expenditure to secure an terms between itself and Eskom are based on
emergency procurement of 50 million litres the basic fuel price pricing mechanism.113
of diesel from stock held by PetroSA in late However, after nearly a decade of financial
November 2022.109 This equated to R26 per crisis, it was reported, in August 2023, that
litre, significantly more than the R23.51 it PetroSA was set to make a profit of R2.4 bil-
usually paid (which was already an elevated lion for its 2023/2024 financial year, marking
price). On 6 January 2023, Eskom made a the first time the entity has reported a profit
second payment of R 1.3 billion to PetroSA in eight years.114 This has been attributed to
for 56 million litres, though this time at a the higher cost of petrol sales, a reversal of an
lower price. Later, on 23 January, Eskom investment in its subsidiary in Ghana, and,
made a third purchase of R1.5 billion. Eskom crucially, revenue from its direct sales of die-
thus paid just over R4 billion to PetroSA in sel to Eskom.115 PetroSA’s chairperson, Nku-
the space of three months to urgently procure luleko Poya, has said that its contract with
diesel at inflated prices. For all the payments, Eskom ends in 2025, but they are in talks
PetroSA demanded full upfront payment due regarding an extension of that contract.116
to its own cash flow concerns.110 In December 2022, it was also confirmed
that the DMRE had denied an application
from Eskom for a license to import its own
fuel directly, which would result in a price
closer to R16 per litre and lead to billions in
savings for Eskom.117 This decision, coupled
with PetroSA’s financial reliance on Eskom
purchases, has led to concern that the DMRE
would prefer to lock Eskom into buying
diesel from PetroSA at above-market prices
to support the financially vulnerable state
entity.118
33
GAS(LIGHTING)
HISTORY: GAS BUT NOT FOR POWER
Gas exploration in South Africa dates back to
the establishment of the Cape Gas and Coke
Company in Cape Town in 1847124 and the
Johannesburg Lighting Company in 1892.125
Gas Works—the city utility that took over
WHAT ROLE FOR GAS IN SOUTH the Johannesburg Lighting Company—ex-
panded the gas network in Johannesburg,
AFRICA’S JUST TRANSITION? sparking the development of the synthetic
fuel industry in the country.126 This industry
Driven by a desire to exploit the final boom continues to be the predominant consumer
of the fossil fuel industry—a campaign of gas in South Africa today.127
for gas is being waged, based not on what In the 1960s, the government formed Soe-
our electricity system needs, but on what kor to begin onshore exploration in Algoa,
a handful of politicians, and oil and gas the Zululand Basins, and the Karoo. South
executives want. Africa began offering offshore concessions
~ Susan Comrie, investigative journalist119 to multinational corporations, such as Gulf
Oil, Shell, Total, Superior, and Esso, after the
It is not in dispute that when it comes to passing of the Mining Act in 1967. This led to
South Africa’s energy mix, coal is the coun- the first offshore drilling in search of gas and
try’s history, and renewable sources like solar the discovery of gas off the coast of Mossel
and wind its future. The role of gas during the Bay in 1969.128 Economic sanctions against
transition over the coming decades is more South Africa’s apartheid regime saw inter-
contested. On the one hand, there is growing national companies gradually withdrawing
consensus that there is a very limited role for from the country, and the heavily state-sub-
gas, and any investment in large-scale gas-to- sidised Soekor became the sole offshore gas
power plants does not make economic sense explorer in the country from the mid-1970s
and poses significant risks to South Africa’s to the late 1980s. Multinationals were wel-
carbon emission reduction commitments.120 comed back to South African offshore explo-
On the other hand, some politicians and ex- ration in 1994 through a licensing round.129
ecutives at oil and gas companies are trying As discussed in an earlier part of this report,
to sell gas as a “critical transition fuel” that the Petroleum Agency of South Africa was
South Africa should invest hundreds of bil- established in 1999 and Soekor and Mossgas
lions of rand in immediately.121 merged in 2002 to create a new national oil
Minister of Mineral Resources and Ener- company—PetroSA.130
gy, Gwede Mantashe, is leading the calls for In 2004, an 865 km pipeline began pump-
investment in new oil and gas exploration ing gas between Mozambique and South
and power plants, and he spends much of Africa through the collaborative efforts of
his time urging corporations to continue in- Sasol, the Central Energy Fund, and Empresa
vesting in this regard. Responding to oppo- Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos. This remains
sition and court challenges by communities a central source of gas for South Africa,
and civil society against offshore oil and gas though Sasol sold a large share to South Af-
exploration and new gas-to-power plants, rica’s state-owned gas development company,
Mantashe said, in May 2023, that “people can iGas, and Mozambique’s CMG (Companhia
take us to court as many times as they can. Mozambique de Gasuduto) in 2021.131
We will continue with gas and petroleum Mozambique is the perfect example of a
exploration”.122 country vulnerable to climate change, but
Here we discuss how much gas South Af- with rich fossil fuel deposits eyed by multina-
rica might need, who stands to benefit from tional corporations for profit. The exploita-
large-scale investment in gas exploration and tion has occurred at the expense of the en-
gas-to-power plants, and why there are real vironment and the Mozambican people who
risks that such investments will, in all likeli- have seen little benefit. In late March 2021, an
hood, reap short-term profits for private ac- Islamic insurgency targeted Total’s $20 billion
tors and impose serious long-term economic liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Cabo
and climate-related costs on the public.123 Delgado in Mozambique. As noted by Patrick
Bond, French President Emmanuel Macron Gwede Mantashe’s Department of Mineral
jumped to defend Total’s investment by Resources and Energy, supported by business
pressuring the governments of Rwanda and groups such as, Business for South Africa
South Africa to deploy thousands of soldiers (B4SA),135 plan to create “anchor demand”
into the area.132 This appears to represent a for gas in the electricity sector through new
continuity in practice of defending multina- investment in gas-to-power infrastructure.136
tional corporations and their extraction of Yet such an approach comes with significant
dangerous fossil fuels, at the expense of the risks and appears to ignore the real risks of
environment and local people. More than 20 stranded assets, as well as South Africa’s am-
countries have also deployed troops to the bitious emission reduction commitments.
region, alongside private military contractors Notably, the country’s largest gas consumer—
like the Russian Wagner Group and South Sasol—has indicated that it has no interest in
African Dyck Advisory Group (DAG).133 being such an anchor consumer in the future
and has abandoned planned investments in
HOW MUCH GAS DOES SOUTH AFRICA NEED? new gas pipelines to Mozambique. Sasol has
highlighted fears of “infrastructure lock-in”
South Africa currently has no gas-fired pow- when it comes to gas, and instead indicated it
er in its electricity mix. The relatively low will be focussing on other technologies such
annual demand for gas comes almost entirely as green hydrogen.137
from the synthetic fuels and industrial sec- Discussions about the role of gas in South
tors, including for the use of Mozambican Africa’s energy mix are not new, but the rapid
gas in Sasol’s Secunda plant and the use of changes in technology and costs of renewable
the offshore gas reserves at Mossel Bay’s gas- energy over the last decade require a funda-
to-liquids (GTL) operations.134 Sasol is still mental rethink of the government’s stance.
the largest consumer of gas in the country The National Development Plan, now more
through its own GTL operations. So how than a decade old, envisioned that both re-
might South Africa get hooked on gas? The newables and gas would play bigger roles as
likely route favoured by some politicians the use of coal-fired power declines.138 139
and big corporations is to build massive
infrastructure through state financing or
subsidies, accompanied by a massive push
for exploration to recoup the costs. This dis-
tortionary incentive, through public monies,
would then drive a new domestic gas supply
chain, likely making money all along the val-
ue chain for politically connected elites while
fuelling the climate crisis.
STRANDED ASSETS CARBON TAX RISKS
A stranded asset is one where investors It should be noted that there are risks
or governments are unable to recover of carbon tax increases, particularly
their investments. “Stranding can be for the global South. For example,
caused by a number of factors related a newly introduced European law,
to the asset, including regulation of its which is the first ever carbon border
impact on the environment (including tax in the world, is set to be gradually
climate change), changing availability or implemented over the course of the
price of resources (including fuel), falling next three years, commencing in
costs of alternatives, social pressure, October 2023. The carbon tax is a fee
consumer behaviour, new government that will be imposed on the emissions
regulations, and litigation”139 of greenhouse gas in efforts to ensure
that companies adopt cleaner, climate-
friendly production methods. Although
The NDP saw a big role for gas as a cleaner the law has been touted as a welcome
step in efforts to combat climate
alternative to coal and spoke to the possibili-
change in the global North, there have
ty of exploiting shale gas in the Karoo Basin,
been many concerns raised that the law
offshore gas exploration on the West Coast, is not just, as it will disproportionately
investment in liquefied natural gas landing affect countries in the global South. For
infrastructure, and gas-to-power production example, recent estimates reveal that
through contracting private sector service Africa could lose $25 billion per year
providers.140 As we discuss later, the idea that if the European carbon adjustment
gas is “cleaner” than coal deliberately ob- mechanism is implemented.144
scures the extraordinary climate impacts of
methane. In addition, the process of exploit-
ing gas through fracking contains serious
risks related to the contamination of ground Taking these changes into account, a 2022
and surface water, the creation of toxic waste, study by researchers at Meridian Economics
and the depletion of precious water reserves concluded that “the only economically ratio-
in places like the Karoo.141 nal role for gas in power generation for the
In 2021, the DMRE published a “gas mas- foreseeable future is now as a fuel for peaking
ter plan” that is heavily based on the 2012 plants—a small, intermittent but crucial role
NDP. It also calls for investment in gas-to- currently provided by diesel”. 145 These peak-
power projects to create “anchor demand” ing plants would lie idle for well over 90% of
to develop the gas sector.142 However, various the time, meaning that they would consume
studies undertaken over recent years have very little gas.
shown how the assumptions made by the Even the study published by the National
NDP—based on the reality in 2012—have Business Institute (NBI) in 2021, in part-
changed considerably. First, the cost of nership with Business Unity South Africa
renewable energy has come down dramati- (BUSA) and the Boston Consulting Group, is
cally. In 2012, power from wind and circumspect about the possible role of gas in
solar was around 50% more expensive generating power in South Africa. The NBI
than power produced from gas, but it membership includes several prominent oil
is now significantly cheaper.143 Second, and gas companies, which may explain why
South Africa’s climate commitments to re- it includes a more gas-friendly scenario as
duce harmful emissions have increased sig- one of its options and calls gas a key “transi-
nificantly, as have the economic and human tion fuel”.146 Even so, the NBI’s CEO, Joanne
costs of continuing to emit. Yawitch—who also sits on the Presidential
Climate Commission—told Susan Comrie,
of amaBhungane, that the DMRE’s plans for
large-scale gas investment were “not logical”
and “cost too much money” and that there
was no role for gas after 2045.147
when a factor—like warming—creates a
cyclical chain reaction that reinforces the
original impact. For example, a warming
THE CONSULTANTS atmosphere leads to water evaporating into
In addition to the study published the air; that water in the atmosphere retains
with the National Business Institute more heat, leading to more warming and
and Business Unity South Africa, the more evaporation.156 A tipping point occurs
Boston Consulting Group authored when a threshold is reached where large and
a report for another business lobby irreversible changes to the climate occur,
group, Business for South Africa, in usually with potentially catastrophic con-
2020. This report also pushed for gas- sequences for people. Some tipping points
to-power projects to anchor demand in
are imminent, while others, like the collapse
a domestic gas sector as an economic
of the Greenland ice cap, may already have
stimulus.148 Another global consulting
giant, McKinsey, has similarly talked passed.157
up gas in South Africa. In 2014, then Further, as noted by the International
President Jacob Zuma launched Institute for Sustainable Development, gas-
Operation Phakisa, an initiative aimed to-power’s climate impact should be com-
at stimulating the country’s economy pared with renewables, and not with coal.158
and creating jobs. Phakisa, which was If investment in gas delays or displaces
in part designed by McKinsey, focussed investment in renewables—a risk identified
heavily on the role of oil and gas in the by South African researchers159—this means
“ocean economy”.149 In 2015, McKinsey higher cumulative emissions from pursuing
released a report arguing that natural
gas.160 For example, groundWork has noted
gas power plants should be one of the
that proposed new gas projects in South Afri-
country’s “Big 5” priorities.150
ca are more likely to displace or delay renew-
able energy projects, rather than existing coal
power plants. Even if gas is used for peaking
If there is indeed, no such role for gas beyond open cycle gas turbines, emissions should
2045, the risk of stranded assets is immense, then be compared with alternatives such as
and casts doubt on the case for any new gas- batteries and other emerging technologies;
to-power investment in South Africa. This the comparison of gas with coal in terms of
is already a global reality. For example, 60% emissions is thus a “false metric”.161
of gas-fired power capacity was declared In March 2022, a British media outlet, The
stranded in India in 2015, and estimates are Guardian, reported how climate scientists
that a third of existing gas-fired capacity in had identified over 1,000 “super-emitter” sites
the United States is already unprofitable.151 of methane globally, with most being oil and
gas facilities.162 It also identified 55 “methane
THE CLIMATE AND HEALTH IMPACT OF GAS bombs”; extraction sites where “gas leaks
alone from future production would release
The NDP and other proponents of gas always levels of methane equivalent to 30 years of all
emphasise that burning gas produces much US greenhouse gas emissions”. These levels
less carbon dioxide than burning coal does. are so high because methane leaks get worse
This is true, but it ignores the impact of as equipment ages and global temperatures
methane, which escapes (or is deliberately re- rise, and because methane is also regularly
leased) into the atmosphere at various stages deliberately “vented” into the ocean or air by
of the gas value chain from extraction to stor- governments and fossil fuel corporations.163
age.152 Methane is a potent greenhouse gas In addition to the impact of gas on global
and has a particularly high impact on warm- climate change, exploiting natural gas has
ing temperatures in the short term.153 It has other significant risks, including air pollution,
a global warming potential that is 85 times land destruction and wildlife damage, high
stronger than that of carbon dioxide over a water use and pollution, and earthquakes.164
20-year period.154 Given the urgent need to These impacts are caused by gas extraction
limit warming in the immediate future, and (whether offshore or on land), transmission,
the risk of feedback loops and tipping points, and use. Human beings also have their health
the impact of gas in this shorter period is compromised, especially when natural gas
the most relevant.155 A feedback loop occurs plants are near communities. The burning of
natural gas produces nitrogen oxide; a pre- the Mossel Bay onshore pipeline, the risks
cursor to smog, sulphur, mercury, and other of this plan are high. Despite these risks, in
particulate matter.165 The negative health October 2023, Environment Minister Bar-
effects associated with air pollution include bary Creecy, gave Total the greenlight to drill
reduced lung function, increased hospi- in Block 5/6/7 which covers around 10,000
tal admissions for asthma, and premature square kilometres offshore between Cape
deaths.166 Communities are also impacted Agulhas and Cape Town. Creecy rejected
by gas explosions and fires, which have been an appeal by 18 NGOs and individuals that
regular events in places like south Durban, raised concerns about oil spills, the impact
which is home to many refineries and tank on the marine environment, and inadequate
farms.167 public consultation.171 Total has also lodged
further exploration applications for offshore
WHO STANDS TO BENEFIT? areas on the south-west coast and west coast,
and the coast of Namibia. Its planned invest-
There is growing evidence of the significant ments in South Africa are running at over
economic, human, and climate-related risks R50 billion and it intends to extract gas from
from gas exploration, extraction, and use. these sites for two decades.172
Given this, why is the government—led by Total is not the only company with an
the DMRE and Gwede Mantashe—insisting interest in Block 11B/12B, where the Brul-
that “oil and gas will be [a] gamechanger for padda and Luiperd wells are situated. While
our economy” and key to energy security?168 it holds 45% of the rights, Qatar Petroleum
To answer this, it is helpful to identify the holds 25% and CNR International 20%,
significant corporate and political interests while the last 10% is held by a South African
that might stand to benefit from investment consortium called Main Street 1549.173 At the
in gas. time of the gas discoveries, Main Street was
49% owned by Africa Energy and 51% by
OFFSHORE EXPLORATION Phuthuma Nhleko’s Arostyle. Arostyle’s stake
The first in line to benefit from offshore gas was backed by a loan from Impact Oil and
extraction is French oil giant Total, which Gas, a “frontier exploration company” that
found gas reserves at its Brulpadda and Lu- exclusively invests in deepwater oil and gas
iperd wells in 2019 and 2020 respectively. exploration projects off the African coast.174
Both wells are off the Cape’s south coast.169 In However, Africa Energy later acquired Im-
September 2022, Total applied for a produc- pact’s financial interest and has initiated a
tion right to these wells and indicated a plan transaction to assume the full 10% interest in
to build a 109 km pipeline to the existing Block11B/12B.175
30-year-old pipeline infrastructure at Mossel Africa Energy is part of the Lundin Group
Bay that is owned by PetroSA.170 Given the and is headquartered in Canada, though its
rough seas around these wells, the age of the exclusive focus is on investments in South
PetroSA infrastructure, and recent leaks at Africa. In 2021, Swedish authorities formally
charged Ian Lundin, Chairman of Lundin
Energy, and Alex Schneiter, Lundin’s former
CEO, with aiding and abetting war crimes by
the al-Bashir regime in South Sudan between
1999 and 2003.176 The prosecution alleges
that a consortium led by the Lundin Group
Founded by Swedish business magnet sought the assistance of the Sudanese armed
Adolf Lundin, the Lundin Group forces to secure its oil fields and displace
describes itself as neither a corporate communities from areas it wanted to oper-
entity nor a parent company, but rather ate in. This led to cases of rape, abduction,
as consisting of a “group of companies and torture and the forced displacement of
that share the benefits of the Lundin 200,000 people. The indictment suggests
Family’s expertise, evaluation, guidance that the consortium “allegedly knew that
and funding. The Lundin Family is such crimes were committed, enabled their
usually one of the largest shareholders commission, took no effective action to stop
of each of the companies through
their occurrence, and worked alongside their
several family trusts”.178
perpetrators”.177 178
POLOKWANE
BOTSWANA
GABERONE
GABORONE
NAMIBIA MOZ.
AT L A
PRETORIA
JOHANNESBURG
JOHANNESBERG MAPUTO
NTIC
LINE IAN
ESWATINI
MED
OCEA
N
E ALEXANDER BAY
N LIN BLOEMFONTEIN
DIA
PORT NOLLOTH RICHARD’S BAY
ME
SOUTH AFRICA LESOTHO
DURBAN
PORT ST JOHN’S
PLETTENBERG BAY
GQEBERHA
EAST LONDON
MOSSEL BAY
SALDHANA BAY
CAPE TOWN
EST
IN TER
OF
EA
AR
INDIAN OCEAN
KEY Above: This map has been

adapted from PetroSA’s website
OIL AND GAS PROJECTS STALLED RECONNAISSANCE PERMIT AREA
which can be accessed here:
OIL AND GAS PROJECTS IN PROCESS 3D SEISMIC SURVEYS OPERATIONAL AREA www.petrosa.co.za
PRODUCTION RIGHTS 3D SEISMIC SURVEYS APPLICATION AREA
EXPLORATION RIGHTS KARPOWERSHIPS
MARINE PROTECTED AREAS
Most of South Africa’s oceans have

been earmarked for offshore gas and oil
exploration. Some of South Africa’s energy
profiteers, such as Total Energies, have
already been given permission to drill.
Impact Oil and Gas also holds the ex- deal (worth around R5.2 billion at the time)
ploration licenses for the Algoa block, close with Russian state exploration company
to Block 11B/12B; the large Transkei block Rosgeo to explore for oil and gas in Blocks 9
between Port Alfred and Port Edward; and and 11A.187 The deal was signed at that year’s
the south Tugela block off the KZN coast.179 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
In 2020, Impact granted Shell a 50% working South Africa) summit in China and followed
interest in the Transkei and Algoa explora- a 2015 Memorandum of Understanding be-
tion rights, and in 2021, Shell announced its tween PetroSA and Rosgeo. In September
intention to begin a seismic survey off the 2017, the month the deal was announced,
Wild Coast. However, court action by com- the Sunday Times revealed that Gayton McK-
munities and fishers from Port St Johns and enzie and Kenny Kunene had travelled to
the Kei River Mouth, along with supporting Moscow with then Minister of State Security
NGOs, successfully stopped the process. The David Mahlobo and a delegation from the
court agreed that there had been insufficient Central Energy Fund, just prior to the BRICS
consultation with coastal communities and summit.188 The trip was apparently to sell
that there were serious environmental con- Kunene and McKenzie as Black Economic
cerns that needed to be determined before Empowerment (BEE) partners on the Rosgeo
any exploration took place.180 A similar inter- exploration deal. Infamous for being convict-
dict was obtained against Shell’s intention to ed of fraud and bank robbery respectively,
undertake surveys on the Cape’s West Coast. Kunene and McKenzie today lead the reac-
Again, communities had not been consulted tionary political party, the Patriotic Alliance.
and the impact on the marine environment
was insufficiently considered.181 This case is ONSHORE EXPLORATION
discussed in more detail later.
The key local investor to bet big on off- While offshore exploration is at the forefront
shore gas exploration is, Hosken Consolidat- of the debate on new gas investment in South
ed Investments (HCI), led by former trade Africa, there are some key onshore gas proj-
unionist Johnny Copelyn. HCI holds around ects in the country, and the ongoing energy
half of Impact Oil and Gas, and Copelyn is supply crisis has reinvigorated interest in
chairman of Impact’s board. HCI has also fracking for onshore gas deposits.
invested huge sums into Impact over the last South African company Renergen cur-
two years, likely more than any other invest- rently operates the only onshore gas project
ment in HCI’s history.182 After a R376 share in the country at its 187,000ha site in the Free
subscription in April 2023, HCI committed State, from which it is producing both nat-
to invest another R513 million in August ural gas and helium and is building a plant
2023, and it has incurred over R1 billion in to produce LNG for the local market.189 The
finance costs alone over the last year.183 Central Energy Fund has a 10% share in the
Impact Oil and Gas has expressed the project, based on a R1 billion investment,
most optimism about the Venus deep-sea oil and it has been designated a strategic infra-
field, 290km off the coast of Namibia, saying structure project by the government, which
that it “exceeded expectations”.184 Impact fast-tracks various regulatory approvals and
holds a 20% stake in the Venus exploration. shortens the time allowed for public com-
On the South African front though, Copelyn ment and engagement.190
has criticised President Cyril Ramaphosa In May 2023, the government announced
for being evasive on new oil and gas explo- new plans to auction off at least 10 shale gas
ration, which Copelyn trumpets as a route blocks in the Karoo for companies that wish
to produce “cleaner” and cheaper electricity, to undertake gas exploration for shale gas.
contrary to the consensus of most scientists Shell recently gave up its right to explore a
on these matters.185 Responding to the claims vast 90,000km2 tract in the Karoo, but a
that Shell’s seismic activity off the coast would range of international mining companies re-
endanger marine life, Copelyn—drawing main interested.191 The auction—expected to
from an unnamed well of scientific exper- take place in the next two years—is reinvig-
tise—was quoted as saying these concerns orating plans for fracking in the Karoo that
were “poppycock”.186 have been on hold for nearly a decade due to
Adjacent to the Brulpadda find is Block huge local concerns about its impact on the
11A. In 2017, PetroSA signed a $359 million soil and air quality, as well as the heavy use
of water in such a water-scarce area. Frack- and technical cooperation permits related to
ing (hydraulic fracturing) is incredibly water any petroleum and liquid fuels. However, it
intense because water and chemicals are in- also gave PASA the function of promoting
jected into rock fissures to free gas.192 Frack- the onshore and offshore exploration and
ing is extensively used in the United States. production of petroleum.197 This dual man-
Researchers there have documented that not date comes with the risk of serious conflicts
only does fracking pollute water and release of interest. More fundamentally, it is unclear
methane, but also that there are reported as- how the promotion of oil and gas exploration
sociations between residing close to fracking and production can have any role in South
activities and experiencing adverse health Africa’s future, given the devastating impact
impacts including cancer, asthma, and harm of these industries.
to pregnant women.193 More disturbing is the fact that new draft
legislation does nothing to change this and
DEMAND TO MEET THE SUPPLY appears to lock in the financial interests of
the state with oil and gas exploration and
The government has expressed a desire to production. The Upstream Petroleum Re-
create anchor demand in the energy sector. sources Development Bill has been in draft
Although the DMRE’s Independent Power form for many years and is subject to com-
Producer (IPP) office has not yet opened the ment, but it has not yet been signed into law.
gas bid window, there are still 28 individual Unbelievably, while trumpeting economic
gas power projects with a combined capacity growth through exploiting oil and gas, the
of 25,000MW.194 This is totally out of propor- bill makes no mention of the climate emer-
tion, given that the 2019 Integrated Resource gency. A group of civil society organisations
Plan only called for 3,000MW of new gas, commenting on the bill noted how it ap-
and more recent evidence casts doubt on the peared completely “incompatible with the
need for any significant new investment. state’s constitutional imperatives to protect
The state’s plans include an Eskom propos- South Africans against the impacts of climate
al to build a huge 3,000MW closed cycle gas change”.198 Their comment also raised the
turbine (CCGT) at Richards Bay. After delays alarm on the lack of transparency require-
due to a procedural hurdle with NERSA, Es- ments and inadequate consultation provided
kom has indicated a desire to forge ahead. It for in the bill.
had also reported an intention to install new While the bill makes no improvements
CCGT plants at four decommissioned coal- in respect of the gaps in the current Miner-
fired power stations, though in mid-2022, al and Petroleum Resources Development
it indicated it would not go ahead with that Act, it doubles down on the state’s financial
plan, with gas prices being so high.195 If all interests in new oil and gas. For example,
these projects did proceed, Eskom estimat- it ensures that PetroSA has a 20% “carried
ed a capital spend of R159 billion on new interest” in all exploration and production
gas capacity. As noted by groundWork, that rights.199 This cost is borne by the holder of
is before the inevitable cost escalations and the right and is to the exclusive benefit of
procurement corruption that define mega the state through PetroSA. That these ben-
infrastructure projects and were endemic in efits flow, not via a tax or royalty, but via a
Eskom’s Medupi and Kusile plant builds.196 notoriously corrupt state-owned entity to
the fiscus is concerning. It could enable the
PASA: REGULATOR OR PROMOTER? kind of corruption and profiteering between
The discussion so far has focussed on the role the state and multinational corporations that
of the DMRE in promoting gas-fired elec- defined state capture.
tricity generation for South Africa. Another Taken together, the evidence shows that
state body that is a vocal advocate of devel- the government and large corporations are
oping a market for gas in South Africa is the preparing to accelerate exploration for nat-
Petroleum Agency of South Africa. PASA is ural gas, and pair it with investment in the
a state-owned company that was established electricity sector to provide for gas-fired
in 1999. In 2004, the energy ministry desig- power plants. This is the solution to the sup-
nated PASA as the entity that would manage ply and demand conundrum the government
applications for the issuing and granting of has identified.
exploration, production, reconnaissance, These plans may well be lucrative to select
corporate interests and political players, but Another significant concern related to
they fly in the face of all the evidence regard- the environmental impact of gas-fired ships
ing the safest, cleanest, and most economical operating in South Africa’s ports and Kar-
solution to South Africa’s energy and climate powership’s repeated apparent attempts and
crisis. It is vital that the public and civil soci- failure to meet the required environmental
ety continue to monitor these interests in the impact assessment (EIA) deadlines after their
gas sector, and to challenge new investments first EIA had been rejected as insufficient in
that could lock South Africa onto a path with 2021. In May 2023, civil society organisations
devastating social, health, environmental, challenged the decision of the Department
and economic costs. of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment
to allow Karpowership to again submit an
KARPOWERSHIP amended EIA for its application for Richards
Bay.203 Minister Barbary Creecy dismissed
The decision to select Karpowership SA—a the appeal. Fishing communities and envi-
subsidiary of Turkish company Karadeniz— ronmental organisations have consistently
to provide 1,220 MW of power to South Af- raised concerns around the damaging meth-
rica, under the Risk Mitigated Independent ane emissions from gas-powered ships that
Power Producer Procurement Programme, could run for two decades. Impacts on the
captured the state’s incoherent approach to marine environment and fishing areas that
addressing the electricity crisis while pur- support local livelihoods are a particular
suing a just transition. In March 2021, the concern.204 Adding to these concerns, recent
DMRE nominated Karpowership as a pre- increases in the price of gas have led sources
ferred bidder to moor three “power ships”— in the government to fear that Karpowership
i.e. ships that produce electricity from burn- may turn to burning heavy fuels, instead of
ing liquified natural gas—along the coast at just gas, which is likely to increase the envi-
Richards Bay, Ngqura, and Saldanha.200 The ronmental costs.205
government announced the deal as being key
to addressing the load-shedding crisis.
However, the decision was controversial
KARPOWERSHIP CHALLENGED
for a number of reasons. For one, the DMRE
announced that the contract would run for In May 2023, civil society organisations
20 years, though there are now discussions challenged the decision of the
to reduce this. A 20-year deal would lock the Department of Forestry, Fisheries, and
state into a long-term contract and is not a the Environment to allow Karpowership
to again submit an amended EIA for its
short-term “emergency” fix. It also meant
application for Richards Bay. These
that the cost could run to over R200 billion were the South Durban Community
over the contract’s lifetime, not taking into Environmental Alliance, groundWork,
account possible changes in the price of the Green Connection, Natural Justice,
gas.201 The executive director of the Presiden- and the Centre for Environmental
tial Climate Commission, Crispian Olver, Rights (CER). Minister Barbary Creecy
indicated that the proposed length of the dismissed the appeal.
contract raised serious concerns regarding
both cost and possible corruption.202
Karpowership’s long-running difficulty in Notably, the agreement between Karaden-
acquiring environmental approval has been iz and BHI also envisions that Karpowership
compounded by numerous banks and fi- will “participate in a new LNG Terminal
nancial institutions becoming more cautious planned for the Port of Ngqura”. This R13.6
about financing Karpowership due to the billion LNG terminal is something that
controversy and possible reputational risk.206 another Mokgokong company—Tamasa
In addition to the deal in South Africa, Ka- Investment Holdings—will be building to-
radeniz has faced allegations of dubious pay- gether with the Strategic Fuel Fund.214 In
ments to politically connected middlemen in February 2023, then Minister of Transport
both Pakistan and Yemen.207 The pressure the Fikile Mbalula granted Karpowership per-
company is under has been compounded by mission to moor a ship at Ngqura, but added
the fact that under increasing pressure from a requirement that Karpowership use this
civil society, the government has indicated it planned LNG terminal to source gas. The
wishes to renegotiate the deal down to just agreement thus envisions Karpowership
five years, instead of twenty.208 purchasing gas from the terminal that Tama-
Despite this, Gwede Mantashe and the sa will be building, while Mokgokong has
DMRE continue to champion the project as agreed to give Karpowership an interest in
the key to end load-shedding right now.209 the terminal in exchange for BHI obtaining
Karpowership has clearly not given up either. shares in Karpowership.215 This appears to
In September 2023, it was revealed that the solve the great risk of building a huge LNG
company had purchased a game farm for plant in the absence of any demand for gas—
Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, with an agreement by ensuring that Karpowership will create
that the wildlife authority would not make that demand. However, if the agreement is
any objection regarding its project at Rich- limited to five years, this would again be put-
ards Bay.210 Not only does this raise concerns ting the new terminal at risk of becoming a
around the presence of a quid pro quo ar- stranded asset.
rangement, but the effort to provide “ecolog-
ical compensation” also appears to concede
that the environmental damage Karpower-
ship will do in Richards Bay cannot be in any
other way avoided, restored, or mitigated.211
In September 2023, more concerning
details emerged in court regarding how the
Karpowership deal might finally be sealed.
Karadeniz’s previous BEE partner, Power-
group SA, went to court, albeit unsuccessful-
ly, to have its 49% stake in the venture rein-
stated.212 The court papers revealed details of
a confidential agreement between Karadeniz
and its new partner, BHI Energy. BHI Energy
is chaired by businesswoman Anna Mok-
gokong, who also chairs Seriti Resources and
has interests in other energy companies. The
agreement, first drafted in November 2022,
envisioned Mokgokong assisting in obtain-
ing outstanding licenses and permits from
the government, though it is unclear why she
would be best placed to do so. Mokgokong
has responded that this would only be done
through using BHI’s “existing relationships”
in the industry and there is nothing unusual
or untoward about it.213
crisis and understanding them as a solution
RENEWABLE ENERGY— to the climate crisis has increased. It is only in
recent policy frameworks that South Africa
RENEWAL OR REPETITION? has made the outright claim that it intends
to get to net zero greenhouse gas emissions
Renewable energy sources, notably solar and
by 2050.
wind, will be vital in South Africa’s transition
It is important to be aware of this tension
away from a coal and fossil fuel-dependent
as it helps us understand the power dynam-
economy. Yet, in discussions around this
ics at play within South Africa’s renewable
transition, South Africa’s contribution to the
energy sector. A closer look at the sector
climate crisis appears to take a back seat to
demonstrates that the South African govern-
its energy supply crisis. In their 2015 report,
ment has used the implementation of a large-
which investigated the interests of varying
scale renewables programme to motivate
stakeholders within South Africa’s energy
private sector actors to invest in and fund
sector and foreseeable climate-related policy
renewable energy in the country. A potential
changes in it, scholars Mike Morris and Lucy
consequence of this is that a few private com-
Martin concluded that:
panies may soon monopolise South Africa’s
The driving force pushing South Africa
renewable energy sector. As we demonstrate
into renewable energy policies and modali-
in the discussion that follows, many of these
ties of implementation was not a result of a
companies are dominated by international
major commitment to addressing the issues
interests, which raises the additional concern
of climate change. The change in the renew-
that benefits associated with these contracts
able energy policy debate and policy imple-
will flow out of the country, mimicking the
mentation was triggered by a crisis in the
saturation of multinationals in the fossil fuel
supply of electricity.216
sectors. This would undermine the country’s
They found that the energy transition was
long-term ambition for a just transition that
motivated by the energy supply crisis rather
goes beyond technological changes and con-
than the legitimate concern of a global cli-
tributes to a more equal, participatory, and
mate crisis that is impacting, and will impact,
just society.
all aspects of South African life, with a dis-
proportionate impact on vulnerable commu-
nities. Eight years since the publication of that
research, the tension between understanding
HISTORY
renewables as a solution to an energy supply Renewable power production uses energy
sources that are continually replenished by
nature—the sun, wind, water, and plants,
as well as the earth’s heat. Renewable ener-
gy technologies turn these fuels into usable
forms of energy—mostly electricity, but also
heat, chemicals, or mechanical power.217 The
basic principle of using renewable energy is
to regenerate it from natural processes con-
stantly occurring in the environment.218
Three government policy papers have laid
the ground for the South African renewable
45
energy sector, with each reinforcing princi- Taken together, these three White Papers
ples established in the Constitution’s Bill of laid the foundation for how renewable ener-
Rights.219 The first is the 1998 White Paper on gy was to play an important role in moving
Energy Policy, which was significant in that South Africa away from its energy depen-
it was the first government document that dency on coal and in combatting greenhouse
emphasised the need for a diversification of gas emissions within the country. Yet, despite
energy sources within South Africa’s energy commitments and plans dating back 25 years,
landscape.220 This White Paper identified the investment in renewables has been slow and
opportunity for renewable energy to extend inconsistent. This has contributed to the cur-
the grid to where it was not “feasible for rent energy crisis.
the grid to reach” and to move away from
coal-dominated energy supply.221 RENEWABLE ENERGY INDEPENDENT POWER
The second is the Renewable Energy
PRODUCER PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME
White Paper of 2003, which clearly states that
the South African government should work (REIPPPP)
towards the reduction of emissions that are South Africa’s evolving policy framework of
harmful to the environment.222 Importantly, renewable energy and its voluntary pledge,
this policy document also introduced the made in 2009 at Copenhagen, to reduce car-
requirement for government to enact inte- bon emissions incentivised thinking on new
grated resource planning, which envisioned procurement initiatives for renewable ener-
Eskom not being the country’s sole electricity gy.227 South Africa first explored the possibil-
power producer. ity of a renewable energy feed-in tariff (RE-
Finally, the then Department of Envi- FIT) to increase renewables.228 A REFIT is a
ronmental Affairs’ (DEA) National Climate policy that encourages people and businesses
Change Response Policy White Paper of 2011 to invest in clean energy by guaranteeing
has also been influential in respect of the prices for their utility, i.e. for all the electrici-
country’s renewable energy landscape.223 The ty they generate and provide to the grid. This
DEA based its 2011 White Paper on com- is often be done through long-term contracts
missioned research on long-term mitigation that offer above-market or set prices and is a
strategies to combat South Africa’s role in cli- model popularised by Germany.229
mate change. This research was the founda- In 2009, the National Energy Regulator
tion for then President Jacob Zuma’s pledge of South Africa published a tariff policy, but
that South Africa would reduce its CO2 the proposed programme encountered sev-
emissions by 34% below business-as-usual by eral roadblocks.230 These included questions
2020 and 42% by 2025, at the 2009 United Na- surrounding the legality of REFIT in South
tions Climate Change Conference (COP15) Africa’s procurement framework and uncer-
in Copenhagen. The pledge envisioned this tainty over Eskom’s willingness to enter pow-
would be achieved through financial aid and er purchasing agreements with independent
the transfer of appropriate technology to im- power producers (IPPs).231 By August 2011,
plement renewable energy.224 NERSA scrapped the REFIT programme and
In April 2023, the Department of Forestry, the Department of Energy—now known as
Fisheries, and the Environment published the Department of Mineral Resources and
the 8th National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Energy—announced the launch of a compet-
Report. It showed that in the period between itive bidding process for renewable energy
2017 and 2020, net greenhouse gas emissions called the Renewable Energy Independent
declined by 5.9%. However, it credited this Power Producer Procurement Programme
improvement to the lack of activity forced by (REIPPPP).232 The programme’s purpose was
the Covid-19 pandemic, and not to substan- to bring additional power into the electricity
tial changes made in the energy sector, which system through private sector investment in
remains the country’s largest greenhouse gas onshore wind power, photovoltaic (PV) so-
emitter.225 lar power, concentrated solar power (CSP),
The DEA White Paper was published prior biomass, landfill gas, and small hydro tech-
to the 17th United Nations Climate Change nologies. The REIPPPP constitutes one of the
Conference (COP17) in Durban in 2011.226 energy mixes, as outlined in the National De-
The White Paper created a policy framework velopment Plan and the Integrated Resource
for South Africa’s response to climate change. Plan of 2010.
In 2018, power production through the II Fund, an investment fund belonging to
REIPPPP was dominated by onshore wind British International Investment (BII) and
power at 60%, followed by PV solar power domiciled in Mauritius. BII started its life, in
at 30%. Concentrated solar power and small 1948, as the British Colonial Development
hydro technologies contributed 10% and 1% Corporation, and it is still wholly owned by
respectively. A total of 10,809GWh was pro- the British government.238 Evolution II is,
duced in 2018.233 In its 2021 Energy Sector in turn, managed by a firm called Inspired
Report, the DMRE stated that the energy Evolution, based in Cape Town.239 In the
supply capacity per technology is currently REIPPPP’s last bid window —bid window
dominated by onshore wind power at 52%, 6 —Red Rocket was awarded a tender to
followed by PV solar power (36%) and CSP create the Good Hope Solar Park in the Free
(9%).234 State. It, in turn, created a company called
Antlia Energy Pty Ltd to manage the devel-
CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP opment and operations of the solar park.240
The majority of projects awarded tenders by
The REIPPPP has acted as the main frame- the REIPPPP are centred on a project com-
work through which ownership patterns pany like Antlia Energy. These are companies
within the South African renewable energy created by the developer for the sole purpose
sector have been established. It particularly of developing, operating, and owning the
influences the ownership patterns of large- renewable energy project on behalf of the
scale renewable projects that sell to the international developer.241
state. A large-scale renewable project refers Each project company must have South
to a power plant with a capacity of more African participation (minimum 40%), black
than 10MW that produces electricity from ownership (minimum 12%, with a target of
a renewable energy source.235 Large-scale 20%), and community ownership, i.e. by a
renewable projects in South Africa have community living within a 50km radius of
mostly been created through the REIPPPP. the project, (minimum 2.5%).242 The way
Private companies that finance the creation in which the community is represented is
of large-scale renewable projects through often through a community trust. However,
the REIPPPP intend to make a return on various concerns have been raised about
their investments by selling the energy their possible abuses of these requirements. This
project creates to Eskom through long-term includes the possibility of companies using
contracts. community trusts—which are opaque and
The REIPPPP has contributed to the com- with little monitoring—as little more than
plex nature of ownership within the renew- fronts.243 South Africa’s recent experience
able energy sector, as there are many differ- with state capture demonstrated how inter-
ent national and international stakeholders national firms regularly used shell companies
in play.236 The most important actors in the in South Africa to act as fronts, with little or
REIPPPP are the private companies provid- no benefits remaining in the country. This
ing the investment to build a renewable proj- remains a risk, and the DMRE’s promise to
ect through the programme. These actors are properly monitor and prevent this type of
usually large international investment firms fronting by IPPs must be carefully moni-
that are known as the project’s developers. tored.244 Research by academic Lucy Baker
Once a project is awarded a tender by the has also demonstrated the oftentimes poor
REIPPPP, the developer will usually create a implementation of community trusts. Baker
project company to manage the operations of found that a common experience was for
the project. As many developers are interna- project companies and powerful stakehold-
tional entities, they usually create a company ers to dictate terms to communities, and that
within South Africa to do so. any revenue streams would often only flow
An interesting example of this model is to communities 15 years after the project’s
Red Rocket. Red Rocket is based in Cape start.245
Town and describes itself as an African in- The REIPPPP caters to a variety of re-
dependent power producer.237 It has solar, newable technologies but most of the al-
hydro, and wind projects in South Africa, as location of bids has been for wind, solar
well as one solar project in Uganda. How- PV, and solar CSP.246 In their 2015 paper,
ever, Red Rocket is owned by the Evolution energy researchers, Lucy Baker and Holle
Operational
Export credit
shareholder
agency
e.g EGP
Equity
DFI investors Debt finance DFI
(shareholders) (lenders)
Financial
shareholder SHAREHOLDER LOAN AGREEMENT Commercial
e.g Investec
AGREEMENT Bank
POWER
PURCHASE
Project AGREEMENT
Off-taker
company (government or
(SPV) corporate)
IMPLEMENTATION
AGREEMENT OR SOVERAIGN
Sub- GUARANTEE OF Government of
contractor(s) SUBCONTRACT
STATE-OWNED UTILITY, country where
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK project is located
Engineering Operation & Figure 1: An example of project finance

Technology
Procurement maintenance structuring for a renewable electricity
supplier(s)
Construction project 254
Wlokas, documented the number of projects Spain, and the United States.251 Though the
allocated for each technology across the early REIPPPP has been designed to prioritise
rounds of the REIPPPP. In bid rounds 1–3, South African ownership of renewable ener-
33 solar PV projects, with a total capacity of gy projects, there is an increasing pattern of
1,484MW, were awarded. Norwegian devel- funding coming from outside the country.
oper, Scatec, and South African firm, Mulilo Baker and Wlokas have also shown a
Energy, had particularly big solar projects. concerning trend: from bid rounds 1 to 3,
22 wind projects, with a total capacity of ownership amongst project developers be-
1,983MW, and 7 solar CSP projects, with a came concentrated, with fewer companies
total capacity of 400MW, were awarded.247 In winning more MWs. This was particularly
these early rounds, only one landfill gas proj- true for successful wind and solar PV proj-
ect and one biomass project were awarded. At ects.252 For example, as Baker and Wlokas
the end of March 2023, 89 projects out of the show, the 435MW for wind power in round 3
90 scheduled to be operational and procured was split among only three developers: Italy’s
during bid rounds 1–5 had reached their Enel Green Power, Ireland’s Mainstream Re-
commercial operation date.248 This meant newables, and China’s Lonyuan Power. Enel
that to date, 89 projects had been successfully Green also led in terms of MWs awarded
constructed and integrated into the grid. across rounds 1–3 for solar PV; while Main-
However, in bid round 6, which sought stream Renewables, in a joint venture with
proposal submissions by 3 October 2022, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Globeleq, also
the outcome of successful projects was low- developed wind and solar PV projects in
er than expected because of concerns over round 1.253 254
grid availability.249 But the lack of submis- This concentration of companies winning
sions could also be attributed to the influx bids from the REIPPPP comes with other
of foreign investment into the programme risks. In July 2023, it emerged that nearly half
turning it into a competition among a few of the projects awarded in the latest round of
large firms. In rounds 1–5, the REIPPPP bidding had failed. The Ikamva Consortium
saw total investment of R228 billion. This won 12 of the 25 projects chosen in bid win-
included R42.9 billion in foreign investments dow 5, yet none reached financial conclusion
from renewable energy project developers.250 due to fundraising and cost constraints.255
The primary foreign developers have come The Ikamva Consortium includes Globeleq,
from countries like Germany, France, Italy, which is discussed later. It also includes
Oslo-listed Aker Horizon’s Mainstream, local its energy projects across the globe.262 Enel
firm H1 Holdings, and South African bil- Green Power was founded in December 2008
lionaire Patrice Motsepe’s African Rainbow by the Enel Group with the purpose of de-
Energy and Power (AREP).256 Motsepe, like veloping and managing power generated by
others, has identified the renewables space renewable energy sources.263 The company
as an important new frontier for profit, and manages over 12,000 power plants across five
AREP is invested in six solar and two wind continents.264 Enel Green Power South Africa
projects across South Africa. In 2021, AREP (SA) is the South African subsidiary manag-
and Absa launched a new renewable energy ing Enel Green’s renewable projects within
investment platform called African Rainbow the country. On its website, Enel states that it
Energy. Absa agreed to transfer its R5 billion presently has 12 wind and solar power plants
in renewable energy assets to African Rain- operating in South Africa.265 This excludes
bow Energy and invest a further R500 mil- the two most recent projects it secured in
lion up front.257 the REIPPPP bid window. Enel Green Power
Recent bid rounds in the REIPPPP have SA’s 12 power plants have a total capacity of
shown that this pattern of concentration is 1.26GW.266
increasing. In the most recent REIPPPP bid
round (bid round 6), four of the six awarded MAINSTREAM RENEWABLE POWER
projects were split between just two devel-
opers.258 Enel Green Power and Italy’s Red Mainstream Renewable Power, founded in
Rocket Energy have two solar PV projects 2008, has its global headquarters in Dublin,
each between them.259 In many ways, the Ireland.267 Mainstream South Africa boasts,
concentration of developers in international on its website, of being the “most successful
energy firms has become an increasing pat- company in the history of REIPPPP”, hav-
tern within the REIPPPP. Next, we explore ing been awarded 2GW across various bid
some of the main identified players. rounds up to 2023.268 Mainstream SA was the
first company to build wind and solar plants
in South Africa following the REIPPPP’s
WHO BENEFITS?
first bid round.269 The company manages
With the REIPPPP having reached its sixth nine primarily wind and solar plants in
bid window now, the number of contracts South Africa.270 Mainstream has contributed
awarded through the programme provide a approximately 15% of the total renewable
significant indication of which companies energy generation capacity delivered under
appear to be ahead of the pack in terms of the programme.271 In 2021, the South African
gaining contracts from the state for large- entities of its investments had generated a
scale renewable projects. The following is not profit of 16 million Norwegian krone, which
an exhaustive list of these companies; rather, is approximately R28 million.272
it represents the companies that have been
awarded contracts for the highest amount GLOBELEQ
of energy generation across the six bid win-
dows. It must be emphasised that they are not Globeleq was founded in 2002. It is jointly
the only ones that may benefit from the in- owned by British International Investment
creasing commercialisation of South Africa’s (formerly the British Colonial Development
renewable energy sector. Corporation), the UK government’s develop-
ment finance institution, which holds 70%,
and Norfund, a Norwegian development
ENEL GREEN POWER ENERGY PTY
finance institution owned by the Norwegian
The Enel Group began as Enel, Italy’s nation- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which holds
al entity for electricity, in 1962.260 Following 30%.273 Its head offices are in London, but it
the liberalisation of Italy’s electricity market, also operates in Cape Town, South Africa,
Enel went private with a business model and Nairobi, Kenya.274 Globeleq South Africa
centred on the production, distribution, and Management Services is the South African
supply of energy.261 It is now the largest pri- company that operates and manages the
vate distributor of electricity globally. In its renewable energy projects of the company.
annual report for the 2022 financial year, it It manages eight renewable energy power
reported a 63.9% increase in its revenue and plants in South Africa and has been operat-
a gross profit of just under €19 billion from ing in South Africa since 2012.275
It is difficult to provide accurate figures for for renewables being sold to the state and
the profits that the South African divisions of hoping to leverage a close existing relation-
these global firms make. Most of the annual ship with Eskom.
and financial reports do not distinguish be- Then, there is contestation regarding the
tween the profits made by different projects community ownership of the renewable
in different countries and just place them energy projects. The ownership by com-
under a regional title like “Africa”. Some of munities of a renewable energy project is
these firms, like Globeleq, do not have acces- represented through a community trust.
sible financial reports; rather, they only have However, beyond the point that the commu-
sustainability reports on their websites, and nity is defined as those living within a 50km
not financial reports.276 This is an indication radius of the project, there is much contesta-
of the complexity regarding who the power tion about who gets to sit on the community
players in South Africa’s renewable energy trust’s board and how much influence these
sector may be. This is an emerging sector that representatives hold.282 There is also a risk of
has been placed at the centre of addressing the political capture of community groups,
both the country’s energy crisis and its cli- with intra-party politics factionalised and
mate goals. polarised around energy interests around
particular projects.283
EXXARO Reports have surfaced detailing ways in
which developers of large-scale renewable
Exxaro symbolises the corporate contradic- projects have failed to ensure benefits to the
tions that stem from South Africa attempting communities that such projects are meant
to balance its energy crisis and climate cri- to serve. In August 2022, Daily Maverick
sis. Exxaro is one of South Africa’s top five reported that the R56 million meant to ben-
coal producing companies and is one of the efit the rural Eastern Cape communities of
largest black-empowered, diversified com- Molteno and Sterkstroom near the Dorper
panies.277 As discussed earlier, it is one of the Wind Farm had been wasted.284 The money
top two suppliers of coal to Eskom. It is also was spent on a failed laundromat, and there
a fierce supporter of continued use of fossil was withholding of payments to a school
fuels and regularly lobbies to weaken climate programme Dorper Wind Farm had initiat-
related legislation. In 2020, Exxaro produced ed.285 Dorper Wind Farm’s primary foreign
47.4 million tonnes of coal, while attempting shareholder is the Japanese investment firm,
to work towards the company’s purported Sumitomo Corporation’s African subsidiary
goal of decreased carbon emissions.278 – Sumitomo Corporation Africa (Pty) Ltd
Exxaro established a clean energy forum – which holds a 30% share in the project.286
in 2007 and entered a 50:50 joint venture with The story was exacerbated when, LifeCo, the
a subsidiary of India’s Tata Power, Khopoli contractor Dorper Wind Farm, was fired for
Investments, which led to the formation of not implementing its socio-economic devel-
the renewable energy company Cennergi in opment initiatives for the community—lev-
April 2012.279 By April 2020, it was reported elled accusations that Dorper Wind Farm
that Exxaro had bought out Tata Power’s was more interested in achieving its targeted
share in the joint venture, making Exxaro spend per year and earning BEE and compli-
the sole shareholder in Cennergi.280 Cen- ance points than in wanting to develop the
nergi has two wind farms in South Africa wind farm’s community.287
with a capacity of 134.4MW. The largest of The story is a microcosm of the precarious
them is near Bedford in the Eastern Cape. nature of the role of big private corporate
Named Amakhala Emoyeni, the facility was firms in large-scale renewable projects. While
commissioned in 2016 and is 95% owned by renewables are positioned as a core solution
Cennergi. The company also has a 75% stake to South Africa’s energy crisis, the profit mo-
in the Tsitsikamma Wind Farm. With a ca- tives of investors in the sector risk conflicting
pacity of 95.3MW, the wind farm is located with the targets of the country’s transition
near the town of Kareedouw in the Eastern towards a just energy sector. Furthermore,
Cape. Both wind farm projects were awarded there is a lack of substantial clarity on how
through the REIPPPP.281 As one of Eskom’s benefits will be returned to vulnerable com-
biggest coal suppliers, Exxaro may also be munities. The risk here is that protection of
positioning itself as the favoured contractor the environment is intertwined with altera
motives, such protection only being possible
if it holds any form of substantial financial IS NUCLEAR STILL PART OF
gain for the foreign private corporate actors
involved. While the shift away from dirty fos- THE PLAN?
sil fuels is crucial, how will this truly be any
State capture during Jacob Zuma’s presiden-
different to the way environmental destruc-
cy, between 2010 and 2018, saw billions loot-
tion by a few large coal corporations has been
ed from the public purse and state-owned
warranted by their pursuit of financial gains?
enterprises and spirited away to tax havens
It is an important question to keep in mind
like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and
as the tensions unfold in the move towards a
Hong Kong. The state capture system was
just transition.
based around manipulating large-scale pub-
South Africa’s renewable energy sector
lic procurement to extract benefits for private
is increasingly viewed through the lens of
individuals and companies, with politicians
addressing the energy crisis. The just transi-
and enablers taking a cut. The direct losses
tion framework that is discussed in the next
and ongoing costs flowing from public debt
section has made it evident that the South
and eroded public institutions have been
African government also wants to prioritise
enormous. Yet it could have been worse. Sev-
the social and economic impact an energy
eral possible deals for capture and extraction
transition will have on South Africa’s people.
were stopped before they could take off. One
This would include diversifying ownership
of the largest was the nuclear deal that Jacob
in the energy sector and ensuring that bene-
Zuma’s administration relentlessly pursued
fits—whether in the form of jobs, investment,
with Russia.
or social protection—flow to local commu-
In their book, Nuclear: Inside South Afri-
nities. This part of the report, though, has
ca’s Secret Deal, Karyn Maughan and Kirsten
demonstrated that the current surge towards
Pearson detail how Zuma personally went
renewable energy sources risks recreating old
to extraordinary lengths to commit South
patterns of monopolistic power and might
Africa to a nuclear deal with Russia and its
only benefit a few large international and
atomic energy corporation, Rosatom, to
domestic firms.
build a “full nuclear fleet” to deliver 9.6GW
of power.288 Despite significant red flags
about the R1.2 trillion deal that could have
seen debt repayments of R1 billion per year,
Zuma and a coterie of loyal politicians and
public servants tried to force through a deal
and bypass National Treasury and any public
participation process to make it a reality. The
Zuma administration used the 2010 Integrat-
ed Resource Plan to justify a nuclear deal,
though that document does not clearly call
for nuclear as a recommended policy shift.289
51
Nuclear convincingly shows that the deal was This new proposed capacity is in addition
pursued in part due to Zuma’s ideological to ongoing efforts to extend the lifespan of
commitment to aligning the country with South Africa’s nuclear power plant at Koeberg
Russia and his “friend” Vladimir Putin, and that usually contributes around 1,800MW to
that his administration was pursuing it with the grid. The Koeberg plant was built in 1984
little regard to the economic and other risks and granted the standard 40-year operating
associated with the project. license. Eskom is undertaking extensive
Ultimately, the deal was halted by the cou- upgrades and refurbishment work and has
rageous work of civil society organisations, applied to have the license extended for a fur-
EarthLife Africa and the Southern African ther 20 years—as called for in the 2019 IRP.293
Faith Communities’ Environment Institute Though the immediacy of the energy crisis
(SAFCEI). Under intense pressure and de- may support these efforts to extend Koeberg’s
spite receiving personal threats, they success- license, the delays—largely unexplained
fully had the inter-governmental agreements by the state—experienced in that limited
between South Africa and Russia that related project raise serious doubts about the much
to the nuclear deal set aside in court. The more complex and costly process involved in
court agreed with their arguments that much building new nuclear capacity in the medium
of the process had been kept secret and that term.294 Beyond cost, any call for new nuclear
the agreements sought to establish binding capacity would also need to account for the
commitments between the countries without significantly higher life-cycle greenhouse gas
the required public participation and over- emissions of nuclear power compared with
sight in South Africa.290 renewable energy sources, as well as the risks
This does not mean that the government’s and uncertainties around handling nuclear
nuclear ambitions have been abandoned, waste and decommissioning plants in the
however. In April 2023, the DMRE chas- future.295
tised the Presidential Climate Commission’s
draft report on South Africa’s energy future
because it did not provide for enough fund-
ing for nuclear power. They demanded it be
amended.291 A month later, Minister Gwede
Mantashe said that South Africa must “not be
afraid of nuclear energy” and announced that
the government would issue a request for
proposals for 2.5GW in new nuclear energy
generation capacity.292
Photo credit: SAFCEI
South Africa’s renewable energy sector
is increasingly viewed through the lens
of addressing the energy crisis. The just
transition framework that is discussed
in the next section has made it evident
that the South African government
also wants to prioritise the social and
economic impact an energy transition
will have on South Africa’s people.
A JUST
TRANSITION IN
SOUTH AFRICA
“A shift towards a low-carbon
2
PEOPLE AND PLANET—THE
COSTS OF DIRTY ENERGY 1
The previous section has examined the ac-

tors that profit from the energy sector, but
these profits come at great social and human
cost. The climate crisis most affects poor and
working-class people. They are not insulated
from the impacts of climate change through
insurance from natural disasters, nor do they
have access to adequate healthcare to reme-
dy illnesses that they may contract from the
decline in water and air quality. Apartheid’s
legacy of segregated spatial planning contin-
economy will, therefore, require
ues to house the workforce of the country in
not only technical changes in how communities that are on the peripheries of
energy is produced, but also a business districts in many towns and cities.
restructuring of the energy sector Globally, these are communities that are dis-
and the MEC in a manner that proportionately affected by the rapid climate
moves away from fossil fuels to change that is caused by the powerhouses of
the world that mine, produce, transport, dis-
serve people and the environment,
pose, sell, and make coal, gas, diesel, and re-
rather than profit.” newable energy accessible to global markets.
~ Institute for Economic Justice1
THE IMPACT OF COAL: THE DEADLY AIR CASE
In March 2022, the Pretoria High Court
released its judgment in the Mpumalanga
“Deadly Air” case. The Mpumalanga com-
munity’s environmental justice organisation,
Vukani Environmental Justice Movement
in Action, and environmental justice group
groundWork approached the court to chal-
lenge the poor ambient air quality in the
55
Highveld region. The focus was on eastern various stages of exploration for oil and gas
Gauteng and Mpumalanga, which house off South Africa’s coast.
12 of Eskom’s coal-fired power stations and In 2021, Shell announced its intention to
Sasol’s coal-to-liquid-fuels refinery that are begin a seismic survey off the Wild Coast
all supplied by numerous coal mining op- of the Eastern Cape. A seismic survey is
erations.2 The environmental justice groups conducted through a seismic vessel, which
wanted the poor air quality in the Highveld releases pressurised air 20–80kms into the
region to be declared a violation of section ocean. The air generates sound waves that are
24 of the South African Constitution, which directed towards the seabed and the waves
provides that “everyone has the right to an are recorded by multiple hydrophones. The
environment not harmful to their health or waves are then analysed to determine from
wellbeing”.3 They asked the court to order the which areas the company (Shell) will likely be
government to take the necessary additional able to extract oil and gas.8 The Eastern Cape
measures to improve the air quality in the coast is attractive to entities desiring to ex-
area. plore mineral and petroleum resources from
Various studies conducted on the effects its seabed, but there were significant con-
of air pollution in South Africa have found cerns that the Shell survey would negatively
that: impact the livelihood, fishing, and religious
It is commonly accepted that the air rights of coastal communities.9
pollution in the Highveld Priority Area is Nine community and environmental
responsible for premature deaths, decreased groups, along with supporting NGOs and
lung function, deterioration of the lungs and legal organisations, successfully challenged
heart, and the development of diseases such Shell’s plans in court. The court agreed with
as asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, tubercu- the communities that there was a failure to
losis and cancer. It is also acknowledged that consult key stakeholders in coastal com-
children and the elderly, especially with ex- munities, and no consideration had been
isting conditions such as asthma, are particu- made regarding the potential harm to ma-
larly vulnerable to the high concentrations of rine and bird life and to communities with
air pollution in the Highveld Priority Area.4 spiritual and cultural rights, which is a legal
In a landmark judgment, Judge Colleen requirement10 in terms of the environmental
Collis found that “poor air quality falls dis- authorisation process.11 The court added that
proportionately on the shoulders of margin- meaningful consultations require engaging
alised and vulnerable communities who bear in a genuine substantive two-way process
the burden of disease caused by air pollution”.5 aimed at achieving consensus.12 This would
The court further emphasised that consistent have meant that the communities should
failure to satisfy air quality standards threat- have been notified of the application for the
ens and compromises the health, well-being, survey in languages that are accessible to the
and human rights of the people subjected to affected communities and in a form that was
that air.6 The court confirmed that the levels accessible.13 Using a website when the pop-
of air pollution in the Highveld Priority Area ulation of the Eastern Cape coast is a rural
are not consistent with the section 24(a) community, where many lack access to in-
right to an environment that is not harmful ternet facilities, resulted in the consultation
to health or well-being, but it went further process being inaccessible and ineffective.14
to conclude that there can be no doubt that While the matter was ultimately decided
unsafe levels of ambient air pollution directly on the basis of a lack of adequate consulta-
threaten constitutional rights in general.7 tion, the communities had also raised the
importance of the ocean for local cultural
THE IMPACT OF GAS: SHELL SEISMIC SURVEY practices and activities like small-scale fish-
ing that sustains many livelihoods. For this
CASE
reason, and considering the ecological value
Gas exploration causes land and marine of the area and the presence of many criti-
degradation and risks destroying ecosystems cally endangered, threatened, and protected
that our planet needs to withstand the effects species, they argued that the area required
of climate change. As noted in the earlier dis- a particularly high level of protection.15 In
cussion on gas, a host of companies including its judgment, the court recognised that the
Shell, Total, and Impact Oil and Gas are at Eastern Cape coast is home to communities
that use the ocean for customary rituals and done to seek his influence to secure lucrative
communities whose livelihood comes from contracts for Bosasa.18 The commission rec-
fishing and other marine resources; that the ommended a further investigation into Man-
beach is used for leisure activities; and that tashe’s conduct and possible prosecution for
it is also a haven for marine and bird life in- the crime of corruption. Mantashe has since
cluding those that are endangered species.16 taken the commission’s report on review.
The Shell case garnered national attention
and highlighted a key tension in debates
around fossil fuel investment in South Af- WHAT IS A JUST TRANSITION?
rica. Minister Gwede Mantashe’s response
was to bemoan these legal challenges as “co- The term “just transition” is a deeply contest-
lonialism of a special type” and indicative of ed one. We do not aim to redefine it in this
environmental NGOs vetoing development. report. Rather, we only seek to outline some
Mantashe’s cynical response was to ignore the of the key elements most associated with a
concerns of local communities and dismiss just transition in the South African context.
them as pawns in a larger game. The commu- We draw on the state’s official stance to do so,
nities of the Wild Coast that had made the but we also outline the contributions of South
challenge gave the following response: African civil society to our understanding.
Blaming white environmentalists, to us, is This allows us to discuss how the profiteers
a demonstration of your arrogance and un- identified in section 1 pose a significant
willingness to listen to us, the people of the threat to a just transition in South Africa.
coast—the people of Port St Johns, of Cen- The roots of the term “just transition”
tane, of Dwesa-Cwebe, of Xolobeni, of Am- can be traced back to the US labour move-
athole region. It also saddens us, as it makes ment and trade unions in the 1970s. The
us think that you believe that we are unable emergence of the term was different from
to think or decide for ourselves how we wish other developmental and environmental
our communities to be developed. You insult concepts of the time, such as green growth
us if you imply that this is only their strug- and sustainable development, in that it was
gle. This is all of our struggle. The sea is our both socially and environmentally grounded.
Great Home. It is the source of all life and is It emerged as part of efforts to advance and
a sacred place as it is the home of many of uphold the livelihoods of both communities
our Ancestors. We are angry that you dare to and workers while also placing environmen-
question our beliefs and our choices. We ask tal issues and preservation at the forefront.19
you to respect our culture, our lives and our These efforts culminated in an “environmen-
livelihoods and protect the future of all.17 tal strike”, which protested safety issues and
The response captures a desire to break health concerns at Shell refineries across four
from South Africa’s past when economic and US states. The strike action picked up speed
political elites decided the country’s trajecto- and spread across North America, with
ry behind closed doors. It also asserts a right union activists joining in across the region.20
to self-determine a future. Crucially, Man- The concept has since developed and tak-
tashe’s dismissal of these communities, and en on new meaning in different contexts as
their response, confirms that the contesta- the climate crisis has become a more acute
tion around South Africa’s energy future are threat to the environment, and lives and
not narrow, technical ones. Rather, it raises livelihoods around the world. At its core,
overlapping questions and concerns about the idea of a just transition includes the idea
environmental and health harms, econom- that an energy transition is not only about
ic opportunities and livelihoods, cultural phasing out fossil fuels and replacing them
rights, and financial interests. with renewable energy sources. It recognis-
It is noteworthy that when Mantashe es that while we may share one planet “we
made these statements, evidence had already do so in an unequal and frequently unjust
been presented at the Zondo Commission way”.21 Our society, like so many others, has
implicating him in state capture. In March a host of systemic dysfunctions, “each with
2022, the Zondo Commission report’s third its own ecological, economic, and social di-
part found a “reasonable suspicion” that mensions without simple cause or solution”.22
Mantashe received free installations from Addressing these various challenges, from
Bosasa for his homes knowing that this was combatting environmental destruction to
“Blaming white environmentalists, to us, is a demonstration of
your arrogance and unwillingness to listen to us, the people of
the coast—the people of Port St Johns, of Centane, of Dwesa-
Cwebe, of Xolobeni, of Amathole region. It also saddens us,
as it makes us think that you believe that we are unable to
think or decide for ourselves how we wish our communities to
be developed. You insult us if you imply that this is only their
struggle. This is all of our struggle.
The sea is our Great Home. It is the source of all life and is
a sacred place as it is the home of many of our Ancestors.
We are angry that you dare to question our beliefs and our
choices. We ask you to respect our culture, our lives and our
livelihoods and protect the future of all”
~ Excerpt from open letter from
Coastal Links Eastern Cape,
Amadiba Crisis Committee (ACC),
and Dwesa-Cwebe Communal
Property Association (CPA) to
Minister Gwede Mantashe and
Minister Barbara Creecy.
Date: 14 Dec 2021
59
creating jobs and addressing social justice, contributes to the goals of decent work for
are usually incorporated into definitions of a all, social inclusion and the eradication of
just transition. poverty. A just transition puts people at
Despite this, there continues to be con- the centre of decision making, especially
testation among activists, researchers, and those most impacted, the poor, youth, wom-
practitioners about the key elements of a just en, people with disabilities, and the youth—
transition. This is partly the inevitable result empowering and equipping them for the
of different conceptions of justice.23 opportunities of the future. A just transition
builds the resilience of the economy and
THE SOUTH AFRICAN STATE’S VIEW people through affordable, decentralised, di-
versely owned renewable systems, conserva-
The Paris Agreement, which is a legally tion of natural resources, equitable access of
binding international treaty on climate water resources; an environment that is not
change, and adoption of the Sustainable De- harmful to one’s health and well-being; and
velopment Goals, in 2015, were watershed sustainable, equitable, inclusive land-use
moments in the international community’s for all, especially for the most vulnerable.29
efforts to address the climate crisis. While
progress towards the agreement remains dis- The above definition makes it clear that in the
appointing, the inclusion of the concept of a South African context, people and socio-eco-
just transition in the Paris Agreement firmly nomic development are placed at the centre
placed it on the global agenda. The term has of a just transition.30 While it sets the target
spread across various constituencies and is of South Africa reaching net zero green-
found in the messaging of environmental house gas emissions by 2050, it prioritises
groups, governments, international global managing the social and economic conse-
agreements, and the private sector, including quences of climate mitigation and adaptation
fossil fuel companies.24 policies and seeks to address South Africa’s
By 2019, many countries, including key social crises of poverty, inequality, and
South Africa, began to deliver on their just unemployment.31
transition policies through the creation of
commissions that would provide expert ad-
vice on achieving a just transition.25 Some
of these commissions are also tasked with
monitoring laws and policies that would as-
sist in delivering a just transition.26 In South
Africa, the Presidential Climate Commis-
sion is a multi-stakeholder body established
by the country’s President to advise on its
climate change response and support a just
transition to a low-carbon, climate-resilient
economy and society.27 The PCC developed
the Framework for a Just Transition in South
Africa, which sets out the principles for the
way in which the country would transition
to a low-carbon economy. In September
2022, it was approved by the South African
government and is effectively the national
framework guiding South Africa’s just transi-
tion efforts.28 It defines a just transition in the
following way:
A just transition aims to achieve a quality
life for all South Africans in the context of
increasing the ability to adapt to the ad-
verse impacts of climate, fostering climate
resilience and reaching net zero green-
house gas emissions by 2050 in line with
best available science. A Just Transition
THE JUST ENERGY INVESTMENT PLAN economic opportunities such as green hy-
drogen and electric vehicles amongst other
This just transition framework is not only interventions to support South Africa’s shift
ambitious but needs to be financed. The Just towards a low carbon future”.35
Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP), The JET IP priorities four areas: the elec-
released by the Presidency in 2022, seeks to tricity sector, the new energy vehicle sector,
map out the investment needed to address the green hydrogen sector, and cross-cutting
the country’s carbon-intense energy sector.32 investments. The JET IP also requires ex-
It is meant to run for an initial period of five tensive financing to ensure that the plan is
years (2023–2027) and gives effect to the Just implemented efficiently and effectively. The
Energy Transition Partnership (JETP), which government estimates that it will need R1.5
was established at the 26th United Nations trillion to finance the JET IP. So far, the mon-
Climate Change Conference, between the ey committed includes grants, and conces-
South African government and the govern- sional and commercial loans. 36 Though very
ments of France, Germany, the United King- little has been received to date, France and
dom, the United States, and the European Germany have provided $300 million (about
Union (forming the International Partners R5 billion) in concessional loans. However,
Group, or IPG).33 this has not yet been allocated to specific
The partnership is premised on the Par- projects outlined in the JET IP.37
is Agreement, which requires developed The main investment priority is decom-
countries to provide financial assistance to missioning the coal plants, while timeously
developing countries to mitigate climate strengthening transmission grid infra-
change, strengthen resilience, and support structure to accommodate the transition to
decarbonising their economies.34 The gov- renewable energy, ensuring a modernised
ernment describes the JETP as “an ambitious electricity distribution system.38 But shut-
long-term partnership to support South ting down coal-fired power plants requires
Africa’s pathway to low emissions and cli- alternative employment opportunities and
mate resilient development, to accelerate provincial plans for a new economic trajec-
the just transition and the decarbonisation tory for a long-term regional transition away
of the electricity system, and to develop new from coal.39 The transition needs to signifi-
cantly contribute to economic resilience in
communities; rehabilitate the environment;
create new, safer, and fair-paying jobs; in-
crease human capacity; and facilitate new
economic opportunities, in areas where coal
plants and mines are shutting down.40 The
JET IP recognises that coal mines and power
plants provide direct employment to many
individuals and support the livelihoods of
many people in surrounding communities.
It aims to ensure that those most directly
affected by a transition from coal—workers
and communities—“are not left behind”.41
61
WHO HAS A SEAT AT THE TABLE? Echoing this view, a report by non-profit
organisation Project 90 by 2030 argues that a
While the JET IP appears ambitious at first successful and just transition must include, at
glance, climate advocacy lawyer Brandon a minimum, diversification of regional econ-
Abdinor, of the Centre for Environmental omies, new jobs, as well as extensive training
Rights (CER), has expressed concerns that and retraining for workers. It must also pro-
it is not ambitious enough to reduce South vide for fairly paid labour and address histor-
Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions. Because ic gender imbalances in the energy industry,
South Africa is warming at around double as well as provide adequate social protections
the average global rate, “we have much to for affected communities and workers.47
lose from an additional 0.5 global average That report, as well as the report by the IEJ,
warming. South Africa needs to do better stress that such changes can only come about
with its emissions reductions than envisaged if there are robust and continued negotia-
in the Investment Plan”.42 tions and social dialogue between affected
The authors of the JET IP claim that the communities, labour groups, government,
process of its drafting and conceptualisation industry, civil society, and academics.48 At
was deeply collaborative and inclusive. How- the moment, the evidence is that honest and
ever, representatives of civil society disagree. open engagement of this nature is, at best,
According to the CER, “civil society networks inconsistent, and there remains significant
offered support and requested opportunities distrust among communities that their input
to participate in the development of the in consultations will lead to action.49 Such
JET IP but their inputs were limited to one a radical but necessary change of the struc-
meeting and rushed submissions without ture of power in the energy sector will not
the benefit of access to the draft investment come about from a corporate or market-led
plan”.43 A coal campaigner for environmental process.
justice group Life After Coal, Thomas Mn-
guni, added that affected communities and
TRANSITION OR CRISIS MANAGEMENT?
their knowledge had not been fully incorpo-
rated into the plan: “The Plan does not yet Another key tension in South Africa’s ap-
reflect the priorities of local people directly proach to a just transition is that it currently
affected by the transition. Inputs from com- faces an acute energy crisis due to Eskom’s
munities living next to closed oil refineries inability to supply the country with power.
and coal-fired power stations and mines, Those who benefit from the use of coal and
including workers and ex-workers, can en- see new opportunities in oil and gas, often
rich the Investment Plan with critical local use this crisis to scapegoat efforts to transi-
knowledge”.44 tion away from fossil fuels. While the energy
The absence of proper consultation and crisis is devastating for ordinary people and
the inclusion of civil society and affected businesses, it presents opportunities for prof-
communities is deeply concerning. Many iteering for those in the energy sector.
have been advocating for a just transition Further, the government’s messaging on
long before the South African government ways to address the crisis often does not
published the JET IP and the PCC was estab- make mention of the framework for decar-
lished, and they have much to contribute to bonisation laid out in the PCC’s framework
ensure that South Africa’s transition disrupts or South Africa’s commitments to a just tran-
the status quo. The Institute for Economic sition. On 25 July 2022, in his State of the Na-
Justice has raised concerns that the state’s tion Address, South African President Cyril
current approach to the transition does more Ramaphosa announced a plan aimed at re-
to reproduce the existing economic structure solving South Africa’s energy supply crisis.50
and power dynamics than it does to disrupt The State of the Nation Address came weeks
them.45 It argues that the approach so far has after Eskom’s announcement of moving the
favoured market-based and technological country’s national load-shedding schedule
solutions, and has not done enough to pro- from stage 4 to stage 6.51 At each stage of
tect workers and affected communities; nor load-shedding, Eskom rations the country by
has the approach included a discussion on 1,000MW of power (1,000,000 kilowatts).52
accountability and reparation for loss and If you were one of the millions affected by
damage caused by climate change.46 load-shedding during the president’s speech,
you would have had to catch up with the growth driven by mining and reliance on
news updates the following day. This real- abundant sources of low-cost coal for its elec-
ity of darkness has become the norm for tricity. The extensive dependence on cheap
people in South Africa and the president’s coal for electricity generation has been en-
speech promised a path out of it. A year later, vironmentally unsustainable for a long time,
when this report was being written, stage 6 and deadly for many living near the power
load-shedding remained common. stations.56
The Presidency’s energy crisis plan has The electricity crisis has also been used as
two fundamental objectives. The first is to a justification to allow Eskom to bypass legal
improve the performance of Eskom’s existing requirements around harmful emissions. In
(coal-fired) power stations.53 The second is June 2023, it was announced that the De-
to add as much new generation capacity to partment of Forestry, Fisheries, and the En-
the grid as possible and to do so quickly. 54 vironment had granted Eskom permission to
The way in which this will be achieved is by run its Kusile coal-fired power plant without
generating energy from a variety of sources having met legal emissions standards until
and ensuring that restrictions on this new at least March 2025.57 The motivation is to
energy generation capacity are removed. 55 help ease load-shedding by allowing Kusile
Renewable energy sources are intimately to return to service early, after a 2022 chim-
intertwined with these objectives and how ney collapse. Yet estimates indicate that the
they will be achieved, but the rush to achieve decision could result in 280,000 extra tonnes
it comes with many risks, as discussed earlier. of sulphur dioxide being emitted and lead to
The plan makes little mention of how the around 680 deaths a year in Mpumalanga.58
initiatives to tackle the energy supply crisis The state has proceeded despite the Deadly
will play a role in addressing South Africa’s Air case discussed earlier, in which the court
need to reduce carbon emissions. It does not found that air quality leading to premature
grapple with how the country has been struc- death in Mpumalanga violated numerous
turally dependent on the energy-intensive constitutional rights.
Those who benefit from the use of

coal and see new opportunities in
oil and gas, often use this crisis to
scapegoat efforts to transition away
from fossil fuels. While the energy
crisis is devastating for ordinary
people and businesses, it presents
opportunities for profiteering for
those in the energy sector.
Photo credit: James Oatway,
Centre for Environmental Rights
(CER), Earthlife Africa.
CLIMATE
PROFITEERS:
OBSTACLES TO A
JUST TRANSITION
3
The slow pace of a global transition away
from fossil fuels risks imperilling life on
earth. The United Nations (UN) Secretary
General remarked on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly, in September 2022, that
“Humanity has opened the gates of hell”.1
While we may just have enough time to turn
back, the window for us to decelerate the im-
pact of the climate crisis is closing fast.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) is the UN body responsi-
ble for assessing the science behind climate
change, its future impact, and ways in which
to prevent it.2 In its synthesis report for
policymakers on climate change, the panel
identified that human-caused climate change
“Humanity has opened is already affecting weather and climate ex-
tremes in every region on earth.3 The IPCC
the gates of hell” findings suggest that urgent change is needed
~ António Guterres to avoid catastrophic harm to the environ-
UN Secretary 2023 ment, people, and biodiversity around the
world.
The report also acknowledges that vulner-
able communities who have historically con-
tributed the least to current climate change
are disproportionately affected by its dev-
astating impact on the environment.4 This
devastation occurs in multiple ways, through
the loss of homes, jobs, and the social struc-
tures of communities, who are left displaced
because of environmental extremes. The
inequality created by environmental changes
is worsened by powerful actors attempting
to co-opt the just transition to benefit their
interests.
Despite the urgency of reducing carbon
67
emissions, powerful corporations are spend- This mobilisation of resources, gained
ing a vast amount of money to slow down the from extractive industries that have devas-
process and to muddy the waters by denying tated people and the planet, also targets the
the link between their activities and climate international arena. In 2022, the United Na-
change. tions Climate Change Conference was held
in Egypt. Non-profit organisations Global
Witness, Corporate Accountability, and Cor-
THE GLOBAL FOSSIL FUEL porate Europe Observatory made the con-
servative estimate that at least 636 fossil fuel
LOBBY lobbyists were in attendance.9 The estimate
only included those individuals who had dis-
If you visit the websites of the world’s largest closed their links to a fossil fuel company or
fossil fuel companies, you could be forgiven trade group—and so many more would not
for thinking that they are leading the fight to have been counted. This number was double
transition to cleaner technologies and fuels. the size of the UN delegation representing
Sustainability and the transition away from indigenous people and was larger than the
fossil fuels appear prominently. The reality representatives of the 10 countries most im-
is that these firms and various aligned trade pacted by climate change.10
organisations spend extraordinary resources This influence in domestic politics and in
to slow down or prevent new regulations, the arena of international policy allows fossil
laws, and policies that could support a just fuel companies and interest groups to engage
transition. in greenwashing: misleading the public about
In the United States, corporate and trade their commitment to reduce emissions, even
associations opposed to new climate-related as the industry does everything it can to lock
policies spent at least $2 billion on advertis- in continued fossil fuel production for as
ing, political funding, and lobbying between long as it can, regardless of the devastating
2008 and 2018—outspending climate-sup- consequences.11
porting groups by 27 to 1.5 Forbes estimates
that the world’s largest publicly traded oil
and gas companies—BP, Shell, Exxon, Total,
and Chevron—directly spend at least $200
SOUTH AFRICAN
million (around R3.5 billion) every year to
block, delay, or control binding climate-re-
CORPORATIONS PUSH BACK
lated policy.6 A lot of this money goes to Multinational corporations and South Af-
public relations and advertising campaigns, rican companies have already borrowed
but much is also spent to fund research. Both heavily from this playbook. There is already
strategies are used to try and discredit what considerable evidence of the role of South
the oil and gas industry’s own scientists have African corporations in lobbying to continue
known for at least 50 years—that the use of the use of fossil fuels, as well as to weaken
their product leads to catastrophic climate new laws to stop pollution and tax carbon
change. For example, recent disclosures show emissions.12 In February 2023, think-tank,
that the American oil giant Exxon’s internal InfluenceMap, released an analysis of the
scientists predicted the impacts of oil and policy engagement of 16 major companies
gas on global warming with “breath-taking and 12 industry associations related to new
accuracy” in the 1970s.7 The company then climate laws in South Africa, including the
engaged in systematic disinformation for de- Climate Change Bill and Carbon Tax Act.13
cades to protect its profits. Its CEO in 2013, It concluded that despite having mixed po-
Rex Tillerson, argued that there remained sitions on climate ambition, the corporations
“uncertainties” over the models and the im- and industry groups were largely a blockage
pact of burning fossil fuels.8 Tillerson would to progressive policies and had a large impact
later go on to serve as US Secretary of State on watering down and delaying key regula-
under Donald Trump in 2017 underscor- tions. Key findings included the following:
ing the revolving door between big oil and
politics.
1. Sasol, Business Unity South Africa, the “climate-obstructive associations”, but it
Mineral Council of South Africa (MCSA), is noteworthy that most of the companies
and the Petroleum Industry Association analysed are members of at least one or-
were the “strongest opponents” to a car- ganisation that pushes for policies that
bon tax. They and other industry players are not aligned to South Africa’s climate
took part in a concerted effort to push for commitments.17
“extra tax allowances, lower tax rates, and
delaying the timeframe”.14 This is likely only the tip of the iceberg in
2. The mining industry was the most sig- terms of industry’s engagement with politi-
nificant lobby group for continuing to cal interests. There is very little transparency
use coal for energy in South Africa. This required in South African law around lob-
included companies such as Exxaro—one bying, meaning that companies do not need
of the members of the Energy Intensive to disclose much of what they do and have
Users Group (EIUG). 15 access to “non-public engagement pathways”
3. Eskom, BUSA, MCSA, and the Chemical to influence policy.18 Companies like Exxaro
and Allied Industries’ Association all lob- and Thungela have also resisted efforts by
bied to water down the Climate Change civil society organisations like JustShare and
Bill, pushing to weaken penalties for high FossilFree South Africa to get them to dis-
emitters.16 close whether their lobbying, as well as that
4. Anglo American, South32, and Arce- of associations of which they are members,
lorMittal have the most memberships of is consistent with the Paris Agreement on
reducing carbon emissions.19
The Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), made up

of 27 companies, consumes more than 40% of all of
South Africa’s electricity produced. Most of these
companies form part of the MEC:
AECI Afrox Air Liquide Arcelor Mittal AWS Anglo American
Anglo American (Iron Ore and Kumba Iron Ore) Colombus Stainless Consol
Exxaro Mondi Glencore Harmony Gold Fields Hulamin
Implats Sibanye Stillwater Rand Water Richards Bay Minerals
Samancor Sasol Transalloys Kumba Iron Ore
South32 Thungela Vedanta Assmang
69
A related risk lies in the host of private
WHO BENEFITS FROM GOING companies that have emerged to assist cor-
porations—whether in the energy sector or
GREEN? not—to greenwash their activities.
The role of private corporations and their
In addition to the corporations that seek to
interest in investing in and implementing a
halt or slow the move away from fossil fuels,
just transition should not be taken at face val-
there are many (including fossil fuel firms)
ue. The reality is that there is a genuine lack of
that are positioning themselves to profit from
commitment when it comes to corporations
“green” energy. There is enormous private
and governments across the world moving
sector investment in low-carbon economies
away from fossil fuel-dependent economies
that risk leaving intact the inequalities that
because they generate enormous profits and
exist, and that would see benefits flow exclu-
have done so for centuries. The priority is not
sively into private hands. In the discussion
to ensure that climate change is stopped in a
on renewable energy, we looked at how most
manner that fulfils the human rights of com-
projects awarded tenders through the Re-
munities; rather, it is to ensure that whatever
newable Energy Independent Power Produc-
the world may look like without fossil fuels
er Procurement Programme have benefited
must still be profitable.23
international corporations. In many instanc-
es, the domestic partner simply owns the
project on behalf of an international player.
This is just one way in which the transition
to green energy can reinforce old patterns of
extraction and facilitate elite enrichment at
the expense of local communities. Several
global examples reveal these risks. Located
between Oregon and the northern region
of Nevada in the United States is the Protect
Thacker Pass Campaign. It is a grassroots
movement that aims to protect the Thacker
Pass from Lithium Nevada Corporation’s
Thacker Pass Lithium Mine Project.20 The
motivation behind the mining project is to
mine lithium to be used for electric vehicles
and in turn to reduce carbon emissions.
However, in exchange for this, the Thacker
Pass would have to be plundered. The pass is
a critical habitat for endangered wildlife and
endemic species. It is also the historical site
of two massacres of indigenous American
tribes, thus having great cultural and histor-
ical significance.21 Lithium America has also
been involved in human rights violations
in Argentina, and critics have suggested
that its project in Thacker Pass is a form of
greenwashing.22 This is one example of ac-
tivities supporting greener technologies for
a so-called low carbon economy, recreating
the status quo and contributing to new vi-
olations against the environment and local
communities.
The priority of energy profiteers
Operational
shareholder
Export credit
agency
e.g EGP
is not to ensure that climate
DFI
Equity
investors Debt finance DFI
change is stopped in a manner

(shareholders) (lenders)
Financial
SHAREHOLDER LOAN AGREEMENT Commercial
that fulfils the human rights
shareholder
e.g Investec
AGREEMENT Bank
POWER
of communities; rather, it is to
PURCHASE
Project AGREEMENT
Off-taker
company (government or
(SPV) corporate)
ensure that whatever the world
Sub-
IMPLEMENTATION
AGREEMENT OR SOVERAIGN
GUARANTEE OF Government of
country where
may look like without fossil fuels
STATE-OWNED UTILITY,
contractor(s) SUBCONTRACT
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK project is located
must still be profitable.

Technology
supplier(s)
Engineering
Procurement
Construction
Operation &
maintenance
71
WHO PROFITS
FROM THE STATUS
QUO AND WHO
WILL CONTROL
4
South Africa finds itself in the midst of inter-
linked economic, social, energy, and climate
crises. There is insufficient energy production
to meet demand, leading to rolling blackouts.
At the same time, Eskom and municipalities
are raising prices and undermining access
to electricity for millions of people in South
Africa. The electricity that is generated still
comes predominantly from coal, contrib-
uting to South Africa’s status as one of the
world’s largest carbon emitters and killing
many people who live near power stations.
South Africa is already directly affected by
rising global temperatures and extreme cli-
THE TRANSITION? mate events, and these risks will increase as

time goes by without radical shifts at home
and around the world.
This report has sought to identify the
private actors who are profiting from South
Africa’s energy sector today, and those who
There remains the possibility of stand to benefit from a transition—wheth-
an energy transition in South er that is exclusively to renewable energy
Africa that not only reduces the sources or also to new investment in oil and
country’s carbon emissions but gas. In doing so, it has further outlined how
does so in a way that disrupts the these corporations may prove to be obstacles
to a just transition, which not only ensures
economic status quo. energy security and access but also changes
the underlying economic and social order of
South Africa’s past to ensure fair work, social
support, and justice.
While the challenges and complexities
of the near future are many, it is possible to
group the major risks under two main sce-
narios that would undermine the pursuit of
a just transition.
73
Scenario 1: The first is that the corpo- Unfortunately, the South African expe-
rate and political interests that make up the rience so far has seen a “disturbing trend…
minerals-energy complex deliberately slow where the transition to renewable energy
down or undermine efforts to decarbonise has also meant privatization” and the flow
the energy mix and water down and/or of benefits primarily to private hands.4 As
bypass new regulations to protect people the discussion on renewables in this report
and the environment from their activities. shows, many of the corporations currently set
The companies that make up the MEC profit to benefit from South Africa’s push into green
from the status quo in South Africa and have energy are international corporations. There
historically made super profits on the back has also been insufficient and incoherent
of the poor in South Africa. These compa- planning by the state to ensure localisation of
nies not only contribute the vast majority of production linked to green energy technolo-
South Africa’s emissions but also consume gies and to create jobs.5 One example is the
the majority of the energy.1 A clear example announcement following the BRICS summit
of this is the Energy Intensive Users Group, in Johannesburg in August 2023 that South
made up of 27 companies that consume more Africa would be relying on China to set up
than 40% of all of the electricity South Africa solar PV panel manufacturing facilities in
produces. Most of these companies form part South Africa, and that China would assist in
of the MEC. prolonging the life of coal-powered plants.6
As the previous section has shown, many
of these companies are willing to spend sig-
nificant resources to ensure that their inter- A DIFFERENT WAY
ests are protected in the short term, including
by blocking efforts to shift quickly away from Neither scenario outlined above is inevitable.
fossil fuels. This risk already looms large in There remains the possibility of an energy
the South African context. The discussion transition in South Africa that not only re-
on coal and gas in this report shows clearly duces the country’s carbon emissions but
that local and global corporations, along with does so in a way that disrupts the economic
the South African government, are actively status quo. Such an approach could see the
pursuing significant new investments in gas well-being and interests of people put above
exploitation, while criticising efforts to close the profit margins of large corporations,
down failing and dirty coal plants. The cor- and it would require embracing a different
porations that look poised to benefit from economic model. As the IEJ argues, a just
this are the same local and multinational fos- transition cannot bow to the interests of the
sil fuel and mining companies that have long corporations that have always benefitted
benefitted from South Africa’s economy and from South Africa’s economic structure.
pattern of energy consumption. Rather, this different approach would require
Scenario 2: The second scenario is that a revaluation of what is valuable, “prioritising
South Africa rapidly changes its energy mix well-being and respect for one another and
in a way that increases electricity supply and the environment over money and power to
reduces emissions, but it does so without allow for the flourishing of individuals, soci-
changing the unequal and exploitative ety and the ecosystem”.7
characteristics of the current social and eco- The following recommendations can help
nomic structure that underpins the MEC. ensure that South Africa’s transition does not
Historically, monopolistic corporations in prioritise elite interests:
the MEC have benefitted from exploitation of
both nature and people in South Africa. They
have benefitted from the dangerous working
conditions for their employees, while relying
on the unpaid care work of black women to
subsidise their profits.2 In turn, these profits
have largely been financialised or external-
ised, with ever shrinking reinvestment into
productive and job-creating activities. In
this way, the MEC is a central contributor
to wealth inequality and the multiple social
crises facing South Africa.3
1 2
REGULATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LOSS LISTEN TO THE PEOPLE, NOT CORPORATIONS
AND DAMAGE This report identifies two concerning trends
Like many contemporary challenges, an in South Africa that mirror the global ex-
essential part of a just transition will be ac- perience. The first is that large corporations
countability and effective regulation of cor- radically outspend civil society to lobby law-
porate interests. This accountability should makers and state institutions around climate
be both forward- and backward-looking. change issues. These resources are used, as
Looking forward, it is imperative that there indicated above, to water down key laws and
are adequate penalties for polluters in new regulations that aim to reduce emissions,
legislation to tackle climate change, and that protect communities, and ensure proper
the price for emitting carbon is sufficient to public participation in decision-making.
disincentivise excessive emissions. It is no This resource imbalance will always remain,
surprise that the biggest emitters—also some and so it is incumbent on public officials to
of the largest corporations in the country— ensure that this access does not give corpora-
have spent a great deal of resources trying tions a greater say in policy. Further, Parlia-
to water down this new legislation. It is im- ment should ensure legislation is passed that
perative that lawmakers resist these vested ensures greater transparency and reporting
interests and make the law tough enough to by corporations in relation to their spending
change the current incentive structure. on lobbying.
Looking backwards, it will be key to ex- The second concern is that when it comes
plore ways of holding corporations and the to key policy decisions related to the just
government responsible for the harm their transition, civil society, workers, and affected
conduct and activities has caused. This can communities have repeatedly indicated a lack
be done for specific affected groups, such as of proper consultation. If a just transition
in the case of the latest class action litigation is one that will change the power dynamics
launched to seek damages from coal mining that have long dominated the energy sector
companies for lung diseases contracted while in South Africa, it can only be effective if
working for corporations like South32, BHP, previously marginalised voices are included
and Seriti Power.8 However, there may well in the decision-making. While the PCC and
be routes to broader accountability for the others in the state have indicated that this
loss and damage so many millions have suf- will happen, the experience of the public so
fered due to the environmental devastation far has been that this has been absent, or at
wrought by the MEC in South Africa. For best inconsistent.
example, there are currently more than two
dozen lawsuits active in the United States that
seek damages from oil and gas companies for
the harm they have done to communities
and the environment. Crucially, these suits
do not just allege the damage done, but argue
that these corporations made the crisis worse
through long-term and knowing deception
to the public about the real impact of fossil
fuels.9
3 4
GREATER TRANSPARENCY NO MORE MONOPOLIES
The state must proactively publish detailed While the country’s climate and energy crises
information about all procurement and other are complex and multi-dimensional, there is
contracts related to energy in South Africa. a key issue at their core—monopolistic con-
At the moment, such access is piecemeal and trol of power and resources. South Africa’s
often impossible to access. This creates signif- history is defined by monopolistic control by
icant opportunities for corruption and other a small group of corporations that have made
abuses outside the public eye. In particular, immense profit at the expense of both peo-
it is vital, in the short term, for the public to ple and nature. While technologies may be
monitor who is benefitting from contracts changing swiftly, this report shows that this
that are entered into swiftly, and often in an is no guarantee of broader structural chang-
attempt to address the energy crisis. They es in who benefits. South Africa’s transition
cannot do so if information about contracts must provide opportunities for communities
is not immediately and easily accessible in and a wider group of people to benefit from
forms and languages that affected communi- energy production and its use, while taking
ties can understand. environmental impacts into account.
We should not be surprised to learn

that influential lobby groups—
particularly corporations invested
in coal and gas—are funding political
parties or individual politicians. This
potential corruption of politics must
be monitored with great care.
5
FOLLOW THE MONEY
There are vast fortunes to be made by those
who control the energy sector and the con-
tinued lifespan of renewables. We should not
be surprised to learn that influential lobby
groups—particularly corporations invested
in coal and gas—are funding political parties
or individual politicians. This potential cor-
ruption of politics must be monitored with
great care. It risks not only distorting policy
but selling out the planet and people for a
handful of silver.
NOTES:
10: Pietermaritzburg Economic Justice & Dignity Group
(PMBEJD) (September 2023), ‘Household Affordability
Index’, pg. 1, URL: https://pmbejd.org.za/wp-content/
uploads/2023/09/September-2023-Household-Affordabil-
ity-Index-PMBEJD_27092023.pdf [Accessed: 13 October
2023].
11: ibid.
12: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
KEY LEGISLATION, POLICIES, AND REGULATORS Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
1: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper, pg. 6.
2: National Environmental Management Act 107, 1998. 13: Presidential Climate Commission (2023), ‘About the Pres-
3: The Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999. idential Climate Commission’, URL:https://www.climatecom-
4: National Energy Regulator Act 40, 2004. mission.org.za/about [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
5: Electricity Regulation Act 4, 2006.
6: The National Energy Act No 34, 2008.
7: Draft Climate Change Bill, B9 2022. WHO HAS THE POWER? SOUTH AFRICA’S ENERGY
8: Paris Agreement 2015 (2016) 55 ILM 743 (2016).
9: SADC Protocol on Energy, 1996. PROFITEERS
10: The White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of 1: Khadija Sharife and Patrick Bond (23 March 2018), ‘Chap-
South Africa (GN 3007 GG 19606 of 17 December 1998). ter 14—Above and beyond South Africa’s minerals-energy
11: The White paper on the Renewable Energy Policy of the complex’, New South African Review 2: New paths, old
Republic of South Africa (GN 513 in GG 26169 14 of May compromises?
2004). 2: ibid.
12: The National Development Plan: Vision 2030, 2023. 3: ibid.
13: Just Energy Transition Framework, 2022. 4: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
14: Just Energy Transition Investment Plan, 2022. Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
INTRODUCTION Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper, pg. 6.
5: Ali Mazrui (1998) in Khadija Sharife and Patrick Bond (23
1: Abahlali Basemjondolo (12 April 2022), ‘The floods have March 2018), ‘Chapter 14—Above and beyond South Africa’s
affected the poorest of the poor the most’, press statement, minerals-energy complex’, New South African Review: 2
URL:https://abahlali.org/node/17478/ [Accessed 7 Septem- New paths, old compromises?
ber 2023]. 6: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
2: World Weather Attribution (13 May 20220), ‘Climate Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
change-exacerbated rainfall causing devastating flooding for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
in Eastern South Africa’ URL:https://www.worldweatherat- Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper, pg. 7.
tribution.org/wp-content/uploads/WWA-KZN-floods-scien- 7: ibid.
tific-report.pdf [Accessed 7 September 2023]. 8: Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) (October 2019), Department
3: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022), of Mineral Resources and Energy, URL: http://www.energy.
‘Contested transition: State and capital against community’, gov.za/IRP/2019/IRP-2019.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023]
groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 224. 9: Onke Ngcuka (29 September 2021), ‘South Africa takes
4: Eskom Holdings SOC (18 March 2023), ‘Eskom clarifies bolder steps to reduce emissions, but are they enough?’,
the 18.65% tariff increase’ URL:https://www.eskom.co.za/ Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/
eskom-clarifies-the-18-65-tariff-increase/ [Accessed: 13 article/2021-09-29-south-africa-takes-bolder-steps-to-
October 2023]. reduce-emissions-but-are-they-enough/ [Accessed: 13
5: Duncan Masiwa (15 September 2023), ‘7 impacts of climate October 2023].
change on South African agriculture’, foodforMzansi, URL: 10: InfluenceMap (February 2023), ‘Industry lobbying
https://www.foodformzansi.co.za/7-impacts-of-climate- imbalance putting South Africa’s climate goals at risk’,
change-on-south-african-agriculture/ [Accessed 29 August InfluenceMap, URL: https://influencemap.org/pressrelease/
2023]. Industry-Lobbying-Imbalance-Putting-South-Africa-s-Cli-
6: Statistics South Africa, (2023), ‘Beyond unemployment – mate-Goals-At-Risk-21162 [Accessed 29 August 2023].
Time-Related Underemployment in the SA labour market’ 11: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (2021), The
Statistics South Africa,URL: https://www.statssa.gov. South African Energy Sector Report 2021, URL: http://
za/?p=16312 [Accessed: 13 Ocotber 2023]. www.energy.gov.za/files/media/explained/2021-South-Afri-
7: Trading Economics, (2023) ‘South Africa’s unemployment can-Energy-Sector-Report.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
rate’, URL: https://tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/ 12: Brendan Ryan (26 January 2023), ‘RBCT coal exports fall
unemployment-rate [13 October 2023]. to lowest level since 1993 after Transnet’s horror fourth
8: Ed Stoddard (16 August 2023), ‘South Africa’s wealth quarter’, MiningMX, URL: https://www.miningmx.com/
inequality has increased markedly over the past two news/energy/51886-richards-bay-coal-exports-fall-to-low-
decades’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.dailymaverick. est-level-since-1993-after-horror-fourth-quarter/ [Accessed
co.za/article/2023-08-16-south-africas-wealth-inequali- 26 September 2023].
ty-has-increased-markedly-over-past-two-decades-ubs/ 13: ibid.
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 14: Africa Check (April 2021), ‘South Africa the 12th biggest
9: Victor Sulla, Precious Zikhali, and Pablo Facundo source of greenhouse gasses? Yes, but that’s not the only
Cuevas ( July 2022), ‘Inequality in Southern Africa: measure that matters’, URL: https://www.polity.org.za/
An assessment of the Southern African Customs article/south-africa-the-12th-biggest-source-of-green-
Union’, The World Bank, pg. 1. URL:https://documents. house-gases-yes-but-thats-not-the-only-measure-that-mat-
worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/ ters-2021-04-19 [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
documentdetail/099125303072236903/p1649270c02a1f- 15: GlobalData (28 June 2023), ‘Coal production in South Africa
06b0a3ae02e57eadd7a82 [Accessed 13 October 2023]. and major projects’ URL: https://www.mining-technology.
com/data-insights/coal-in-south-africa/?cf-view&cf-closed
[Accessed: 13 October 2023].
16: Andrew Gray (3 June 2019), ‘Air quality impacts and health 41: Lars Kamer (26 June 2023), ‘Coal production in Africa as of
effects due to large stationary source emissions in and 2020, by country’, StatsSA, URL: https://www.statista.com/
around South Africa’s Mpumalanga Highveld Priority Area statistics/1275700/coal-production-in-africa-by-country/
(Hpa)’, URL:https://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ [Accessed: 30 September 2023].
Andy-Gray-Report.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 42: ibid.
17: Centre for Environmental Rights (2022), ‘ANALYSIS: Why 43: Jimmy Swira (March 2015), ‘27 coal suppliers to Eskom
the #DeadlyAir High Court judgment matters’, URL: https:// announced’, Transform SA, URL: https://transformsa.
cer.org.za/news/analysis-why-the-deadlyair-high-court- co.za/2015/03/27-coal-suppliers-to-eskom-announced/
judgment-matters [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. [Accessed: 30 September 2023].
18: 18AB Cook (1994), ‘Coal and progress: The South 44: Department of Energy (2021), ‘Coal resources overview’,
African story’, URL: https://www.saimm.co.za/Journal/ URL: https://www.energy.gov.za/files/coal_overview.html
v094n11p329.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. [Accessed: 30 September 2023].
19: ibid. 45: Lauren Hermanus (2019), ‘Eskom’s links to the private
20: ibid. sector are central to its dysfunction’, BusinessDay,
21: ibid. URL:https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2019-07-
22: Leonard Gentle (2009), ‘Escom to Eskom: From racial 01-eskoms-links-to-the-private-sector-are-central-to-its-
Keynesian capitalism to neo-liberalism (1910–1994)’, in dysfunction/ [Accessed: 30 September 2023].
David MacDonald (ed), Electric Capitalism: Recolonising 46: Sabelo Skiti (5 April 2019), ‘Eskom loses billions on coal
Africa on the Power Grid, Cape Town: HSRC Press. contracts’, Mail & Guardian, URL: https://mg.co.za/arti-
23: ibid. cle/2019-04-05-00-eskom-loses-billions-on-coal-contracts/
24: ibid. [Accessed 26 September 2023].
25: ibid. 47: ibid.
26: ibid 48: ibid.
27: ibid. 49: Exxaro 2022 Annual Report, URL: https://investor.exxaro.
28: ibid. com/integrated-reports2022/about-exxaro.php [Accessed
29: ibid. 26 September 2022].
30: Sarah Smit (7 March 2023), ‘Fix Eskom, because the energy 50: ibid.
revolution won’t be privatised’, Mail & Guardian, URL: 51: Seriti Resources (2021), Fact sheet, URL: https://seritiza.
https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2023-03-07-fix- com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Seriti-Fact-Sheet_2021.
eskom-because-the-energy-revolution-wont-be-privatised/ pdf [Accessed 26 September 2023].
[Accessed 26 September 2023]. 52: Seriti Resources (2023), ‘About us’, URL: https://seritiza.
31: Khaya Sithole (1 March 2023), ‘How echoes of 1988 com/business/green/ [Accessed 26 September 2023].
loom in the ANC’s conversations about privatizing SOEs’, 53: Eskom (October 2021), ‘Media Statements: Exxaro and
News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/fin24/opinion/ seriti resources join forces with eskom in realising a just
khaya-sithole-how-echoes-of-1988-loom-in-the-ancs-con- energy transition to a low carbon future in South Africa’,
versations-about-privatising-soes-20230301 [Accessed 26 Eskom, URL:https://www.eskom.co.za/exxaro-and-seriti-
September 2023]. resources-join-forces-with-eskom-in-realising-a-just-en-
32: Sarah Smit (7 March 2023), ‘Fix Eskom, because the energy ergy-transition-to-a-low-carbon-future-in-south-africa/
revolution won’t be privatised’, Mail & Guardian, URL: [Accessed: 30 September 2023].
https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opinion/2023-03-07-fix- 54: Anglo American (10 April 2017), ‘Anglo American announc-
eskom-because-the-energy-revolution-wont-be-privatised/ es sale of Eskom-tied thermal coal operations in South Af-
[Accessed 26 September 2023]. rica’, press release, URL: https://www.angloamerican.com/
33: Anusha Rathi (8 July 2022), ‘Why South Africa is in the media/press-releases/archive/2017/10-04-2017 [Accessed 11
dark, again’, Foreign Policy, URL: https://foreignpolicy. September 2023].
com/2022/07/08/south-africa-energy-crisis-eskom-pow- 55: David Whitehouse (24 May 2023), ‘South Africa: Anglo
er-cut/ [Accessed 26 September 2023]. American coal spinoff Thungela faces emissions criticism
34: ibid.. ahead of AGM’, Africa Report, URL: https://www.theafri-
35: Sipho Masondo and Nicki Gules (31 March 2019) ‘Eskom’s careport.com/206312/south-africa-anglo-american-coal-
massive coal contract splurge’, City Press, URL: https:// spinoff-thungela-faces-emissions-criticism-ahead-of-agm/
www.news24.com/citypress/News/eskoms-massive-coal- [Accessed 11 September 2023].
contract-splurge-20190331 [Accessed: 26 September 56: Anglo American (10 April 2017), ‘Anglo American announc-
2023]. es sale of Eskom-tied thermal coal operations in South Af-
36: Susan Comrie (28 September 2022), ‘The collapse of old rica’, press release, URL: https://www.angloamerican.com/
king coal accreditation’, amaBhungane, URL: https://www. media/press-releases/archive/2017/10-04-2017 [Accessed 11
news24.com/fin24/economy/amabhungane-the-collapse-of- September 2023].
old-king-coal-20220927 [Accessed: 26 September 2023]. 57: Staff Writer (1 June 2021), ‘Seriti renames SAEC to Seriti
37: ibid.] Power’, Mining Review Africa, URL: https://www.minin-
38: Antoinette Slabbert, (August 2019), ‘Eskom’s woes greview.com/coal/seriti-renames-south32-sa-coal-hold-
continue, this time over World Bank loan penalties’, City ings-to-seriti-power/ [Accessed 11 September 2023].
Press URL: https://www.news24.com/citypress/news/ 58: Tim Cohen (18 April 2021), ‘Seriti deal shows just how
world-bank-flags-eskom-project-20190817 [Accessed: 30 badly Australia’s South32 wants to exit South Africa’,
September 2023]. Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/
39: Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture (2022), opinionista/2021-04-18-seriti-deal-shows-just-how-badly-
The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into State Capture Re- australias-south32-wants-to-exit-south-africa/ [Accessed 11
port: Part IV, Volume 4: The Capture of Eskom, URL: https:// September 2023].
www.statecapture.org.za/site/files/announcements/683/ 59: ibid.
OCR_version_-_State_Capture_Commission_Report_Part_IV_ 60: Sabelo Skiti and Thandoxolo Jika (6 September 2019), ‘Big
Vol_IV_-_Eskom.pdf [Accessed: 30 September 2023]. deal over “strange” coal mine meeting’, Mail & Guardian,
40: Online Tenders (2021), ‘Coal supply pipeline remains the URL: https://mg.co.za/article/2019-09-06-00-big-deal-over-
root cause of corruption’, URL: https://www.onlinetenders. strange-coal-mine-meeting/ [Accessed 11 September 2023].
co.za/news/coal-supply-pipeline-remains-the-root-cause-of- 61: Thabo Molekwa (19 June 2023), ‘South Africa’s coal lobby
corruption [Accessed: 30 September 2023]. is resisting a green transition’, Climate Change News,
URL: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/06/19/
south-africa-coal-energy-fossil-fuels-climate-lobby/
[Accessed 29 August 2023].
62: GlobalData (28 June 2023), ‘Coal production in South Africa 83: Staff Writer (16 May 2023), ‘Big shift for petrol in South
and major projects’, GlobalData, URL: https://www.min- Africa—with new state-owned company’, BusinessTech,
ing-technology.com/data-insights/coal-in-south-africa/?cf- URL: https://businesstech.co.za/news/government/688487/
view&cf-closed [Accessed: 30 September 2023]. big-shift-for-petrol-in-south-africa-with-new-state-owned-
63: ibid. company/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
64: Market Data (September 2021), ‘Five largest coal mines 84: ibid.
in South Africa in 2020’, Market Data, URL: https://www. 85: ibid.
mining-technology.com/marketdata/five-largest-coal- 86: ibid.
mines-south-africa-2020/ [Accessed: 30 September 2023]. 87: ibid.
65: Andiswa Matikinca (2021), ‘Is coal really on its way out 88: Who Owns Whom ( July 2022), ‘The South African Petro-
in South Africa?’, Oxpeckers, URL: https://oxpeckers. leum Industry’, Who Owns Whom, p. 2.
org/2021/02/coal-on-its-way-out/ [Accessed: 30 September 89: NERSA Petroleum Pipelines Licenses (23 September 2020),
2023]. ‘COL BP SA Engen Sasol Oil Shell SA Total SA Operation
66: JustShare (2023), ‘Financing’, JustShare, URL:https://just- SBM Duran_23/09/2022’, National Energy Regulator of
share.org.za/page/2/?s=financing [Accessed: 30 September South Africa, URL:https://www.nersa.org.za/wp-content/
2023]. uploads/2021/01/SAPREF-Multi-Year-Tariff-Application-for-
67: Life After Coal (16 February 2022), ‘New research shows no the-SBM-facility-in-Durban-2020-2021-tariff-period.pdf
end to coal financing in sight’, URL: https://lifeaftercoal.org. [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
za/media/news/new-research-shows-no-end-to-coal-financ- 90: South African Petroleum Industry Association (2022),
ing-in-sight [Accessed 26 September 2023]. ‘Overview: Oil industry in South Africa’, South African
68: ibid. Petroleum Industry Association, URL: https://www.sapia.
69: Isabelle Geuskens and Henrieke Butijn (March 2022), org.za/overview/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
‘Locked out of a fossil fuel transition: Fossil fuel financing 91: ibid.
in Africa’, BankTrack, Milieudefensie, and Oil Change 92: Who Owns Whom ( July 2022), ‘The South African Petro-
International. leum Industry’, Who Owns Whom, pp. 2–3.
70: ibid. 93: ibid. p. 2.
71: Lerato Mutsila and Julia Evans (20 September 2023), 94: ibid. pp. 2–3.
‘Climate activists, journalists forcibly ejected from 95: Engen (2023), ‘Ownership’, Engen, URL: https://www.engen.
Standard Bank HQ anti-fossil fuel protest’, Daily Maverick, co.za/about/ownership [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-09-20- 96: Phembani (2020), ‘History’, Phembani, URL: https://www.
climate-activists-journalist-ejected-from-standard-bank- phembani.com/index.php/our-history/ [Accessed: 13
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September 2023]. 97: Stefaans Brummer and Sam Sole (15 July 2005), ‘Oilgate
72: Standard Bank (22 September 2023), ‘Standard Bank company was ANC front’, Mail & Guardian, URL: https://
issues an apology to Daily Maverick’, URL: https://www. mg.co.za/article/2005-07-15-oilgate-company-was-anc-
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room/standard-bank-issues-an-apology-to-daily-maverick 98: Craig McKune (6 January 2015), ‘PetroSA’s ex-boss must
[Accessed 26 September 2023]. repay R83 million’, Mail & Guardian, URL: https://mg.co.
73: Hartmut Winkler (7 June 2023), ‘South Africa’s power crisis za/article/2015-01-08-petrosas-ex-boss-must-repay-r83m/
will continue until 2025—and blackouts will take 5 years to [Accessed 27 September 2023].
phase out’, The Conversation, URL: https://theconversation. 99: ibid.
com/south-africas-power-crisis-will-continue-until-2025- 100: Linda Ensor (2 October 2017), ‘Unprofitable PetroSA’s
and-blackouts-will-take-5-years-to-phase-out-206343 future hangs in the balance, says Auditor-General’,
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. Business Day, URL: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/
74: The Presidency (26 May 2023), ‘President sets out roles companies/energy/2017-10-02-unprofitable-petrosas-fu-
and responsibilities of the Minister of Electricity’, URL: ture-hangs-in-balance-says-auditor-general/ [Accessed 27
https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/press-statements/presi- September 2023].
dent-sets-out-roles-and-responsibilities-minister-electricity 101: Parliamentary Monitoring Group (1 November 2016),
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. ‘PetroSA’s R14.5 billion impairment forensic report:
75: Ray Mahlaka (2 May 2023), ‘Ramokgopa’s power plan to Department of Energy and PetroSA Board briefing’, Energy
ease rolling blackouts could be undermined by Eskom’s Committee of the National Assembly, URL: https://pmg.
diesel budget’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.dailymav- org.za/committee-meeting/23555/ [Accessed: 13 October
erick.co.za/article/2023-05-02-ramokgopas-power-plan-to- 2023].
ease-rolling-blackouts-could-be-undermined-by-eskoms- 102: Clotilde Ravel (12 June 2023), ‘State-owned PetroSA in
diesel-budget/[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. death throes as national energy crisis persists’, Africa
76: Adam Roff, Celeste Renaud, Rian Brand, Lonwabo
Intelligence, URL: https://www.africaintelligence.com/
Mgoduso, Grové Steyn, and Emily Tyler ( June 2022), ‘Hot
southern-africa-and-islands/2023/06/12/state-owned-
air about gas: An economic analysis of the scope and role
for gas-fired power generation in South Africa’, Meridian petrosa-in-death-throes-as-national-energy-crisis-per-
Economics, pg. ii. sists,109992767-ge0 [Accessed 27 September 2023].
77: ibid. pg. 5. 103: Staff Writer (16 May 2023), ‘Big shift for petrol
78: ibid. pg. ii. in South Africa—with new state-owned company’,
79: CEF Group (2023), ‘SFF’, CEF Group, URL: https://www. BusinessTech, URL: https://businesstech.co.za/news/
cefgroup.co.za/cef-group/sff/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. government/688487/big-shift-for-petrol-in-south-africa-
80: ibid. with-new-state-owned-company/ [Accessed 27 September
81: Who Owns Whom ( July 2022), ‘The South African Petro- 2023].
leum Industry’, Who Owns Whom, pg. 2. 104: Terrence Creamer (13 August 2023), ‘With R9.2 billion
82: Sahlulele Lupizo (2 March 2021), ‘Merger of PetroSA, iGas spent since April, government insists Eskom is not
and Strategic Fuel Fund; update on CEF Group Forensic Re- exceeding diesel budget’, Engineering News, URL: https://
ports and Project Ikhwezi—Briefing by CEF, with Minister’, www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/with-r92bn-spent-
Parliamentary Monitoring Group, URL:https://pmg.org.za/ since-april-govt-insists-eskom-is-not-exceeding-diesel-
committee-meeting/32407/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. budget-2023-08-13 [Accessed 11 September 2023].
105: Staff Writer (3 February 2023), ‘PetroSA explains why 124: Department of Minerals and Energy Republic of South
Eskom’s diesel prices are so high’, BusinessTech, URL: Africa (2005), Gas Infrastructure Plan, URL: https://www.
https://businesstech.co.za/news/energy/661927/petrosa- energy.gov.za/files/media/explained/statistics_gas_infra-
explains-why-eskoms-diesel-prices-are-so-high/ [Accessed: structure_2005.pdf [Accessed 13 October 2023].
13 October 2023]. 125: Anton Putter (2018), ‘Natural gas in Southern Africa, part
106: ibid. 1: Current supply and demand’, Owner Team Consultation,
107: Bloomberg (2 December 2022), ‘Eskom asks for R20 URL: https://www.ownerteamconsult.com/wp-content/
billion for more diesel’, BusinessTech, URL: https://busi- uploads/2020/03/Insight-Article-055-Natural-Gas-Indus-
nesstech.co.za/news/energy/648717/eskom-asks-for-r20- try-in-SA-Part-1-Status.pdf [Accessed 13 October 2023].
billion-for-more-diesel/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 126: ibid.
108: Mariam Isa and Chris Yelland (2 February 2023), ‘Diesel or 127: National Business Initiative, Business Unity South Africa,
darkness: PetroSA charges Eskom unfair prices, extracts and Boston Consulting Group (2022), ‘The role of gas
upfront payments’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www. in South Africa’s pathway to net-zero’, Chapter 3 in Just
dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-02-diesel-or-dark- Transition and Climate Pathways Study for South Africa.
ness-petrosa-charges-eskom-unfair-prices-extracts-up- 128: Petroleum Agency SA (n.d.), ‘History of exploration and
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109: ibid. index.php/24-petroleum-geology-resources/65-histo-
110: ibid. ry-of-exploration-and-production [Accessed 13 October
111: ibid. 2023].
112: ibid. 129: ibid.
113: PetroSA (2 February 2023), ‘Media Statement: PetroSA 130: ibid.
Refutes Claims That It Over Charges Eskom For Diesel’, 131: Patrick Bond (15 December 2022), ‘French fossil imperi-
URL: https://www.petrosa.co.za/PressReleases/Pages/Pe- alism, South African sub-imperialism, and anti-imperial
troSA-REFUTES-CLAIMS-THAT-IT-OVER-CHARGES-ESKOM- resistance: Tripping up Total’s dash for Southern African
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114: Mpumzi Zuzile (6 August 2023), ‘PetroSA on track to post imprimer&id_article=21253 [Accessed 27 September
R2.4bn profit’, News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/ 2023].
citypress/business/petrosa-on-track-to-post-r24bn-prof- 132: ibid.
it-20230806 [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 133: ibid.
115: Mpumzi Zuzile (6 August 2023), ‘PetroSA on track to post 134: Muhammed Anwar, Patrick Neary, and Matthew Huxham
R2.4bn profit’, News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/ (November 2022), ‘Natural gas in Africa amid a global
citypress/business/petrosa-on-track-to-post-r24bn-prof- low-carbon energy transition’, African Climate Foundation.
it-20230806 [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 135: Business for South Africa (B4SA) is an offshoot of Busi-
116: ibid. ness Unity South Africa.
117: Helena Wasserman and Lista Steyn (30 December 2022), 136: Susan Comrie (27 May 2022), ‘An evaporating case for
‘DMRE rejects Eskom’s bid for diesel license’, News24, case: Why does SA keep investing in it?’, amaBhungane,
URL: https://www.news24.com/fin24/economy/dmre-re- URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-05-27-
jects-eskoms-bid-for-diesel-licence-20221230 [Accessed 11 an-evaporating-case-for-gas-why-does-sa-keep-investing-
September 2023]. in-it/ [Accessed 11 August 2023].
118: Mariam Isa and Chris Yelland (2 February 2023), ‘Diesel or 137: ibid.
darkness: PetroSA charges Eskom unfair prices, extracts 138: National Planning Commission (2012), National Develop-
upfront payments’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www. ment Plan 2030: Our Future—Make It Work, URL: https://
dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-02-02-diesel-or-dark- www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/
ness-petrosa-charges-eskom-unfair-prices-extracts-up- ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf [Accessed 13
front-payments/ [Accessed 11 September 2023]. October 2023].
119: Susan Comrie (27 May 2022), ‘An evaporating case for 139: Richard Halsey, Richard Bridle and Anna Geddes (March
case: Why does SA keep investing in it?’, amaBhungane, 2022), ‘Gas Pressure: exploring the case for gas-fired pow-
URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-05-27- er in South Africa’, International Institute for Sustainable
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120: Adam Roff, Celeste Renaud, Rian Brand, Lonwabo ment Plan 2030: Our Future—Make It Work, URL: https://
Mgoduso, Grové Steyn, and Emily Tyler ( June 2022), ‘Hot www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/
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Economics. 141: Centre for Environmental Rights (14 November 2022), ‘As
121: Susan Comrie (27 May 2022), ‘An evaporating case for climate impacts mount, fracking for more fossil fuels is
case: Why does SA keep investing in it?’, amaBhungane, not the answer’, CER, URL: https://cer.org.za/news/as-cli-
URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-05-27- mate-impacts-mount-fracking-for-more-fossil-fuels-is-not-
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in-it/ [Accessed 11 August 2023]. 142: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (2021),
122: Lameez Omarjee (18 May 2023), ‘Government ready to South African Gas Master Plan: Basecase Report, Depart-
“endure” legal challenges to block oil and gas—Mantashe’, ment of Mineral Resources and Energy.
News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/fin24/climate_fu- 143: Adam Roff, Celeste Renaud, Rian Brand, Lonwabo
ture/energy/govt-ready-to-endure-legal-challenges-to- Mgoduso, Grové Steyn, and Emily Tyler ( June 2022), ‘Hot
block-oil-and-gas-mantashe-20230518 [Accessed 11 air about gas: An economic analysis of the scope and role
August 2023]. for gas-fired power generation in South Africa’, Meridian
123: Richard Halsey, Richard Bridle, and Anna Geddes (March Economics.
2022), ‘Gas pressure: Exploring the case for gas-fired pow- 144: Preggie Moodley ( July 2023), ‘EU’s carbon border tax:
er in South Africa’, International Institute for Sustainable New report shows Africa stands to lose US$25 billion
Development, IISD Report. a year’, SABCNews, URL: https://www.sabcnews.com/
sabcnews/eus-carbon-border-tax-new-report-shows-africa-
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145: Adam Roff, Celeste Renaud, Rian Brand, Lonwabo 162: Damian Carrington (6 March 2023), ‘Revealed: 1,000 su-
Mgoduso, Grové Steyn, and Emily Tyler ( June 2022), ‘Hot per-emitting methane leaks risk triggering climate tipping
air about gas: An economic analysis of the scope and role points’, The Guardian, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/
for gas-fired power generation in South Africa’, Meridian environment/2023/mar/06/revealed-1000-super-emitting-
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146: Susan Comrie (27 May 2022), ‘An evaporating case for [Accessed 14 August 2023].
case: Why does SA keep investing in it?’, amaBhungane, 163: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022),
URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-05-27- ‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi-
an-evaporating-case-for-gas-why-does-sa-keep-investing- ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 223.
in-it/ [Accessed 11 August 2023]. 164: ibid.
147: ibid. 165: National Planning Commission (2012), National Develop-
148: Business for South Africa (10 July 2020), ‘A new ment Plan 2030: Our Future—Make It Work, URL: https://
inclusive economic future for South Africa: delivering an www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/
accelerated economic recovery strategy’, URL: https:// ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-workr.pdf [Accessed: 13
www.businessforsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ October 2023].
B4SA-A-New-Inclusive-Economic-Future-for-South-Afri- 166: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020, ‘Air
ca-Presentation-10-July-Final.pdf [Accessed 17 October Pollution’, URL: https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/
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149: Patrick Bond (2019), ‘Blue economy threats, contradic- 167: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022),
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Political Ecology, Vol. 26, No. 1. ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 224.
150: McKinsey Global Institute (September 2015), ‘South 168: Lameez Omarjee (18 May 2023), ‘Government ready to
Africa’s big five: Bold priorities for inclusive growth’, “endure” legal challenges to block oil and gas—Mantashe’,
URL:https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/ News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/fin24/climate_fu-
Featured%20Insights/Middle%20East%20and%20Africa/ ture/energy/govt-ready-to-endure-legal-challenges-to-
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ities_for_inclusive_growth%20Executive_summary.pdf 169: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022),
[Accessed 17 October 2023]. ‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi-
151: Richard Halsey, Richard Bridle, and Anna Geddes (March ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 212.
2022), ‘Gas pressure: Exploring the case for gas-fired pow- 170: ibid. pg. 216.
er in South Africa’, International Institute for Sustainable 171: Ed Stoddard (2 October 2023), ‘Drill baby, drill: Environ-
Development, IISD Report, pgs. 11–12. ment Ministry gives Total green light for Western Cape
152: ibid. coast offshore drilling’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.
153: Jeff Tollefson (2013), ‘Methane leaks erode green creden- dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-10-02-drill-baby-drill-
tials of natural gas’, Nature Magazine, 493, pg. 12. environment-ministry-gives-total-green-light-for-western-
154: Staff writer, (2014), ‘Environmental impacts of natural cape-coast-offshore-drilling/ [Accessed 19 October 2023].
gas’, Union of Concerned Scientists, URL: https://www. 172: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022),
ucsusa.org/resources/environmental-impacts-natural-gas ‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi-
[Accessed 24 May 2023]; and Richard Halsey, Richard ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 216.
Bridle, and Anna Geddes (March 2022), ‘Gas pressure: 173: Paul Burkhardt (2 December 2022), ‘Total takes next step
Exploring the case for gas-fired power in South Africa’, to develop SA gas fields’, Bloomberg News, URL: https://
International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD www.news24.com/fin24/companies/total-takes-next-step-
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155: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022), 2023].
‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi- 174: Impact Oil and Gas (2023), ‘Strategy’, URL: https://im-
ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 222. pactoilandgas.com/about/strategy/ [Accessed 14 August
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Tipping Points, URL: https://www.climaterealityproject. 175: Africa Energy Corp ( January 2023), ‘Exploration and
org/sites/default/files/climate-101-tipping-points-and-feed- development in South Africa’, press release, URL: https://
back-loops-factsheet.pdf [Accessed 11 September 2023]. thelundingroup.com/site/assets/files/9978/aec-corp-pres-
157: Damian Carrington (8 September 2022), ‘World on brink jan-2023.pdf [Accessed 14 August 2023].
of five “disastrous” tipping points, study finds’, The 176: Business and Human Rights Resource Centre ( July 2023),
Guardian, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/environ- ‘Lundin Energy lawsuit (re complicity in war crimes,
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points-study-finds [Accessed 11 September 2023]. en/latest-news/lundin-petroleum-lawsuit-re-complici-
158: Richard Halsey, Richard Bridle, and Anna Geddes (March ty-war-crimes-sudan/ [Accessed 14 August 2023].
2022), ‘Gas pressure: Exploring the case for gas-fired pow- 177: ibid.
er in South Africa’, International Institute for Sustainable 178: Lundin Group, ‘About us’, URL: https://thelundingroup.
Development, IISD Report. com/about-us/ [Accessed 14 August 2023].
159: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022), 179: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2020),
‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi- ‘“The elites don’t care”: People on the front lines of coal,
ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 222. Covid and the climate crisis’, groundWork, groundWork
160: Richard Halsey, Richard Bridle and Anna Geddes (March Report, pg. 116.
2022), ‘Gas Pressure: exploring the case for gas-fired pow- 180: JP Mbenenge, Sustaining the Wild Coast and others
er in South Africa’, International Institute for Sustainable against the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy
Development, IISD Report, pg. 9. and others, High Court Eastern Cape Division, case no.
161: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022), 3491/2021.
‘Contested Transition: State and capital against communi- 181: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022),
ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 216. ‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi-
ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 214.
182: March Hassenfus (29 June 2023), ‘Too much mystery 200: Roland Ngam (24 March 2022), ‘One year on, the
over HCI oil and gas’, Financial Mail, URL: https://www. Karpowership deal is stuttering and staggering along but
businesslive.co.za/fm/special-reports/2023-06-29- is by no means dead in the water’, Daily Maverick, URL:
too-much-mystery-over-hci-oil-and-gas/ [Accessed 11 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2022-03-
September 2023]. 24-one-year-on-the-karpowership-deal-is-stuttering-and-
183: ibid. staggering-along-but-is-by-no-means-dead-in-the-water/
184: Katharine Child (18 July 2022), ‘HCI partner targets up [Accessed 12 September 2023].
to R1 billion for oilfield drilling in Namibia’, Business Day, 201: ibid.
URL: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/ener- 202: Lameez Omarjee (26 May 2023), ‘SA needs gas, but 20-
gy/2022-07-18-hci-partner-targets-up-to-r1bn-for-oilfield- year power ship contracts are “ill conceived”—Olver’, News
drilling-in-namibia/ [Accessed 11 September 2023]. 24, URL: https://www.news24.com/fin24/climate_future/
185: Kabelo Khumalo (1 August 2023), ‘Ramaphosa evasive energy/sa-needs-gas-but-20-year-power-ship-contracts-
about oil and gas exploration, says Johnny Copelyn’, are-ill-conceived-olver-20230526 [Accessed 12 September
Business Day, URL: https://www.businesslive.co.za/ 2023].
bd/national/2023-08-01-ramaphosa-evasive-about-oil- 203: Centre for Environmental Rights (May 2023), ‘Civil society
and-gas-exploration-says-johnny-copelyn/ [Accessed 11 organisations challenge decision to give Karpowership
September 2023]. yet another opportunity to amend their EIA reports for
186: Felix Njini (25 January 2023), ‘Its “poppycock”: Shell’s Richards Bay’, press statement.
SA partner HCI blasts seismic survey uproar’, Bloomberg, 204: ibid.
URL: https://www.news24.com/fin24/companies/its-pop- 205: Mandisa Nyathi (6 June 2023), ‘Karpowership: Contract to
pycock-shells-sa-partner-hci-blasts-seismic-survey-up- be negotiated amid heavy fuel oil fears’, Mail & Guardian,
roar-20220125 [Accessed 11 September 2023]. URL: https://mg.co.za/environment/2023-06-06-karpower-
187: Lameez Omarjee (20 November 2019), ‘PetroSA: $359 ship-contract-to-be-negotiated-amid-heavy-fuel-oil-fears/
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geo-deal-has-been-a-long-time-coming-20191120-2. for choppy financial waters’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://
188: Mzilikazi wa-Afrika and Thanduxolo Jika (17 Septem- www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-06-18-karpower-
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[Accessed 14 August 2023]. ership seriously’, News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/
192: ibid. fin24/economy/mantashe-doubles-down-load-shedding-
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194: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022), 2023].
‘Contested transition: State and capital against communi- 211: ibid.
ty’, groundWork, groundWork Report, pgs. 219–220. 212: Susan Comrie (5 October 2023), ‘Karpowership: Failed
195: ibid. pg. 221. interdict unearths “state capture on steroids” agreement’,
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197: PASA Annual Report 2020–2021, pg. 24, URL: https:// article/2023-10-05-karpowership-failed-interdict-un-
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217: K Tromly (March 2001), ‘Renewable energy: An overview’, 238: British International Investment, ‘Our history’, URL:
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218: Faxri Hamitov (2022), ‘What is renewable energy?’, 239: Inspired Evolution (2023), ‘Funds,’ Inspired Evolution,
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219: South African Department of Energy (2015), ‘History of 240: Antlia Energy (RF) Pty Ltd (2022), NERSA application,
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224: Anton Eberhard, Joel Kolker, and James Leigland (May 242: ibid.
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225: Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries, and the Environment space.wits.ac.za/server/api/core/bitstreams/ecb2d291-
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228: ibid. Town, pg. 6, URL:https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/
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of Renewable Energy in South Africa, pgs. 25–26, URL: view’, pgs. 16–18, URL:https://www.google.com/
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Program: Success factors and lessons’, PPIAF, pg. 8, The fice%2520Q4%2520Overview%25202022-23_Final.pd-
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233: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (2022), 249: ibid.
The South African Energy Sector Report 2021, compiled 250: ibid.
by Keneilwe Ratshomo and supervised by Ramaano 251: ibid..
Nembahe, URL: http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/ 252: Lucy Baker and Holle Linnea Wlokas (2015), ‘South
explained/2021-South-African-Energy-Sector-Report.pdf Africa’s renewable energy procurement: A new
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. frontier?’, Energy Research Centre, University of Cape
234: ibid. Town, pgs. 7–8, URL:https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/
235: Theresa Smith (4 May 2023), ‘SA: Private energy pro- handle/11427/13566/15-Baker-Wlokas-RE_frontier.pdf
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www.esi-africa.com/industry-sectors/future-energy/ 253: ibid.
sa-private-energy-procurement-landscape-is-changing/ 254: Lucy Baker (2022), ‘Procurement, finance and the energy
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. transition: Between global processes and territorial
236: Lucy Baker (2022), ‘Procurement, finance and the energy realities,’ Nature and Space, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1738–1764, DOI:
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237: Red Rocket, ‘Who we are’, URL: https://redrocket.energy/
about/who-we-are/ [Accessed 28 September 2023].
255: Promit Mukherjee (18 July 2023), ‘SA’s renewable power 283: ibid.
push stumbles as projects fail’, Business Day, URL: https:// 284: Ethan van Diemen (10 August 2022), ‘R56m destined for
www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2023-07-18-sas-re- Eastern Cape wind farm beneficiaries “wasted” on failed
newable-power-push-stumbles-as-projects-fail/ [Accessed: projects,’ Daily Maverick, in Travails of Transition (Part
13 October 2023] . One), URL: https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-
256: ibid. 08-10-r56m-destined-for-eastern-cape-wind-farm-benefi-
257: Admire Moyo (10 August 2021), ‘Patrice Motsepe, Absa ciaries-wasted-on-failed-green-energy-projects/ [Accessed:
launch R5.6 billion renewable energy fund’, ITWeb, URL: 13 October 2023]
https://www.itweb.co.za/content/xA9POvNZOaKvo4J8 285: ibid.
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 286: Sumitomo Corporation (2023), ‘Who we are’, URL: https://
258: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy, REIPPPP www.sumitomocorp.com/en/africa/scaf/whoweare
bid window, List of successful bidders, URL: https://www. [Accessed: 13 October 2023]
ipp-renewables.co.za/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 287: Ethan van Diemen (18 December 2022), ‘Gag orders and
259: ibid. “disinformation”—Contractor accuses Dorper Wind Farm
260: 260Enel Group, ‘Our history’, URL: https://www.enel.com/ of paying lip service to beneficiaries,’ Daily Maverick,
company/about-us/our-story [Accessed: 13 October 2023] . in Travails of Transition (Part Two), URL:https://www.
261: ibid. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-12-19-gag-orders-and-dis-
262: Enel Group (2022), Enel Group Integrated Annual Report, information-contractor-accuses-dorper-wind-farm-of-pay-
pgs. 1–10, URL: https://www.enel.com/content/dam/enel- ing-lip-service-to-beneficiaries/ [Accessed: 13 October
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annuali/en/integrated-annual-report_2022.pdf [Accessed: 288: Karyn Maughan and Kirsten Pearson (2022), Nuclear:
13 October 2023] Inside South Africa’s Secret Deal, Tafelberg: Cape Town.
263: Enel Green Power (2023), ‘Sustainable energy for every- 289: ibid. pg. 55.
one: Our company and who we are’, URL: https://www. 290: ibid. pg. 135.
enelgreenpower.com/who-we-are/our-company [Accessed: 291: Neil Overy and Ulrich Steenkamp (28 May 2023), ‘Nuclear
13 October 2023] power is neither reliable nor “green” and is not suitable
264: ibid. for the just transition’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.
265: Enel Green Power (2023), ‘Country, projects, South Africa’, dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-05-28-nuclear-power-is-
URL: https://www.enelgreenpower.com/countries/africa/ neither-reliable-nor-green-and-is-not-suitable-for-the-just-
south-africa [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. transition/ [Accessed 29 August 2023].
266: Enel Green Power (2023), ‘Country, projects, South 292: Sandra Laurence (16 May 2023), ‘South Africa to issue
Africa’, URL: https://www.enelgreenpower.com/countries/ RFP for 2.5GW of nuclear power this year’, Tech Central,
africa/south-africa [Accessed: 13 October 2023]; Enel URL: https://techcentral.co.za/south-africa-to-issue-rfp-
Green Power (30 December 2022), ‘For Enel Green for-2-5gw-of-nuclear-power-this-year/225692/ [Accessed
Power South Africa, “The rainbow nation is greener than 29 August 2023].
ever”’, news, URL: https://www.enelgreenpower.com/ 293: Hartmut Winkler (22 August 2022), ‘SA’s nuclear sector
media/news/2022/12/energy-results-south-africa-2022 has failed its test: The Koeberg life extension’, Mail &
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. Guardian, URL: https://mg.co.za/thoughtleader/opin-
267: Mainstream Renewable Power (2023), ‘About us’, URL: ion/2022-08-22-sas-nuclear-sector-has-failed-its-test-the-
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ireland/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023] 294: ibid.
268: ibid. 295: Neil Overy and Ulrich Steenkamp (28 May 2023), ‘Nuclear
269: ibid. power is neither reliable nor “green” and is not suitable
270: ibid. for the just transition’, Daily Maverick, URL: https://www.
271: ibid. dailymaverick.co.za/article/2023-05-28-nuclear-power-is-
272: ibid. neither-reliable-nor-green-and-is-not-suitable-for-the-just-
273: Globeleq (2023), ‘Our company overview’, URL: https:// transition/ [Accessed 29 August 2023].
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October 2023]
274: ibid. A JUST TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA
275: ibid. 1: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
276: Globeleq (2023), ’Company Profile’ URL: https://www. Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
globeleq.com/?s=financials [Accessed: 13 October 2023] for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
277: Leadingedgeonly (2023), ‘Carbon Tracking’, URL: https:// Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper.
www.leadingedgeonly.com/organisation/exxaro/car- 2: Trustees for the time being of Groundwork Trust and
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278: ibid. (39724/2019) [2022] ZAGPPHC 208 (18 March 2022),
279: Lucy Baker (2015), ‘Renewable energy in South Africa’s para. 17, URL: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGP-
minerals-energy complex: A “low carbon” transition?’, PHC/2022/208.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023]
Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 42, No. 144, 3: Centre for Environmental Rights (2021), ‘The struggle
245–261, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2014.953471 to breathe clean air in Mpumalanga goes to court’, URL:
280: Jean Marie Takouleu (22 April 2020), ‘South Africa: https://cer.org.za/news/the-struggle-to-breathe-clean-air-in-
Exxaro buys out Tata Power’s shares held in Cennergi mpumalanga-goes-to-court [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
joint venture’, Afrik21, URL: https://www.afrik21.africa/en/ 4: Trustees for the time being of Groundwork Trust and
south-africa-exxaro-buys-out-tata-powers-shares-held-in- Another v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others
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281: ibid. http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2022/208.pdf,
282: Lucy Baker (2022), ‘Procurement, finance and the energy para. 70, [Accessed: 13 October 2023] .
transition: Between global processes and territorial 5: ibid. para. 9
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Vol. 5, No. 4, 1738–1764.
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the #DeadlyAir High Court judgment matters’, URL: https:// IP) 2023–2027, pgs. 19, 25, URL: https://www.thepresiden-
cer.org.za/news/analysis-why-the-deadlyair-high-court- cy.gov.za/content/south-africa%27s-just-energy-transition-
judgment-matters [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. investment-plan-jet-ip-2023-2027 [Accessed: 13 October
8: Sustaining the Wild Coast NPC and Others v Minister of 2023].
Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (3491/2021) 33: ibid.
[2022] ZAECMKHC 55; 2022 (6) SA 589 (ECMk) (1 Septem- 34: United Nations (2015), Paris Agreement on Climate Change,
ber 2022), para. 23, URL: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ art. 9, URL: https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
ZAECMKHC/2022/55.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf
9: ibid. para. 3 [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
10: National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal 35: South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Investment Plan ( JET
Management Act 24 of 2008. IP) 2023–2027, pg. 1, URL: https://www.thepresidency.gov.
11: 11Sustaining the Wild Coast NPC and Others v Minister za/content/south-africa%27s-just-energy-transition-invest-
of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others (3491/2021) ment-plan-jet-ip-2023-2027 [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
[2022] ZAECMKHC 55; 2022 (6) SA 589 (ECMk) (1 Septem- 36: ibid.
ber 2022), para. 31, URL: http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ 37: Jessie Taylor ( June 2023), ‘Funding, skills development,
ZAECMKHC/2022/55.pdf [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. and capacity building: The way forward for a just energy
12: ibid. para. 95 transition’, Public Sector Leaders, URL: https://publicsector-
13: ibid. para. 94 leaders.co.za/the-way-forward-for-just-energy-transition/
14: ibid. para. 101 [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
15: ibid. para. 32 38: South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Investment Plan ( JET
16: ibid. para. 2 IP) 2023–2027, pg. 9, URL: https://www.thepresidency.gov.
17: Coastal Links Eastern Cape, Amadiba Crisis Committee za/content/south-africa%27s-just-energy-transition-invest-
and Dwesa-Cwebe Communal Property Association ment-plan-jet-ip-2023-2027 [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
(14 December 2021), ‘An open letter from under-threat 39: ibid.
small-scale fishers to the ministers of mineral resources 40: ibid.
and energy and forestry, fishing and environment’, cited 41: European Commission (2022), ‘Joint statement: South
in David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022), Africa Just Energy Transition Investment Plan’, URL: https://
‘Contested transition: State and capital against community’, ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/state-
groundWork, groundWork Report. ment_22_6664 [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
18: Matthew Savides and Mawande Amashabalala (1 March 42: Life After Coal (2022), ‘Release of SA’s Just Energy
2022), ‘Zondo report finds reasonable suspicion against Transition Investment Plan’, URL: https://lifeaftercoal.org.
Gwede Mantashe’, Sunday Times, URL: https://www. za/media/news/release-of-sas-just-energy-transition-invest-
timeslive.co.za/politics/2022-03-01-zondo-report-finds- ment-plan [Accessed: 13 October 2023]..
reasonable-suspicion-against-gwede-mantashe/ [Accessed: 43: Centre for Environmental Rights (2022), ‘Will South Afri-
13 October 2023]. ca’s “green deal” deliver as promised?’, URL: https://cer.org.
19: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development za/news/will-south-africas-green-deal-deliver-as-promised
(UNRISD) (December 2018), Mapping Just Transition(s) to a [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
Low-Carbon World: Research Report of the Just Transition 44: Life After Coal (2022), ‘Release of SA’s Just Energy
Research Collaborative, pgs. 3–33. Transition Investment Plan’, URL: https://lifeaftercoal.org.
20: ibid. pgs. 3–33. za/media/news/release-of-sas-just-energy-transition-invest-
21: John Blewitt (2008), Understanding Sustainable Develop- ment-plan [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
ment, London: Earthscan. 45: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
22: D Mebratu (1998). ‘Sustainability and sustainable devel- Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
opment: Historical and conceptual review’, Environment for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
Impact Assessment Review, 18, 493–520. Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper, pg. 14.
23: Raphael J Heffron (2021), ‘What is the just transition’, 46: ibid. pg. 16.
in Achieving a Just Transition in a Low-carbon Economy, 47: Richard Halsey, Neil Overy, Tina Schubert, Ebenaezer
pgs. 9–19, URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publi- Appies, Liziwe McDaid, and Kim Kruyshaar (September
cation/357480895_Achieving_a_Just_Transition_to_a_ 2019), ‘Remaking our energy future: Towards a Just Energy
Low-Carbon_Economy [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. Transition ( JET) in South Africa’, Project 90 by 2030, pgs.
24: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 34–35.
(UNRISD) (December 2018), Mapping Just Transition(s) to a 48: ibid. pg. 30.
Low-Carbon World: Research Report of the Just Transition 49: David Hallowes and Victor Munnik (December 2022),
Research Collaborative, pp. 3-33. ‘Contested transition: State and capital against community’,
25: Raphael J Heffron and Darren McCauley (2022), ‘The “just groundWork, groundWork Report, pg. 83.
transition” threat to our Energy and Climate 2030 targets’, 50: EyeWitness News (25 July 2022), ‘President Ramaphosa to
in Energy Policy, URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/ address nation on energy crisis’, YouTube, video file, URL:
science/article/abs/pii/S0301421522001744 [Accessed: 13 https://www.youtube.com/live/ohg6POoyS68 [Accessed: 13
October 2023]. October 2023].
26: ibid. 51: Eskom (28 June 2022), ‘Due to unlawful industrial action,
27: Presidential Climate Commission ( June 2022), ‘A frame- Stage 6 loadshedding will regretfully be implemented at
work for a just transition in South Africa’, URL:https:// 16:00 until 22:00 this evening. Stage 4 will then continue
pccommissionflo.imgix.net/uploads/images/A-Just-Transi- to be implemented until midnight’, media statement, URL:
tion-Framework-for-South-Africa-2022.pdf [Accessed: 13 https://www.eskom.co.za/due-to-unlawful-industrial-ac-
October 2023]. tion-stage-6-loadshedding-will-regretfully-be-implement-
28: ibid. ed-at-1600-until-2200-this-evening-stage-4-will-then-
29: ibid. continue-to-be-implemented-until-midnight/ [Accessed: 13
30: ibid. October 2023].
31: ibid. 52: Phillip de Wet (7 December 2022), ‘Stage 6 load shedding:
What it means, and how bad it is’, News24, URL: https://
www.news24.com/news24/bi-archive/stage-6-load-shed-
ding-what-it-means-and-how-bad-it-is-2022-6 [Accessed: 13
October 2023].
53: Presidency (25 July 2022), Confronting the Energy 12: Thabo Molekwa (19 June 2023), ‘South Africa’s coal lobby
Crisis: Actions to End Load Shedding and Achieve is resisting a green transition’, Climate Change News,
Energy Security, pg. 2, URL: https://www.google.com/ URL: https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/06/19/
url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=r- south-africa-coal-energy-fossil-fuels-climate-lobby/
ja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjL-Mq8numBAxXlxQIHHXjBCd- [Accessed 29 August 2023].
0QFnoECBcQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thepresidency. 13: InfluenceMap (February 2023), ‘Climate policy engagement
gov.za%2Fdownload%2Ffile%2Ffid%2F2532&usg=AOv- in South Africa’, InfluenceMap, URL: https://influencemap.
Vaw1DcY2xI3Km1368LrKKN93p&opi=89978449 [Accessed: org/report/Climate-Policy-Engagement-in-South-Afri-
13 October 2023]. ca-20575 [Accessed 29 August 2023].
54: ibid. 14: InfluenceMap (February 2023), ‘Industry lobbying
55: ibid. imbalance putting South Africa’s climate goals at risk’,
56: Lucy Baker, Peter Newell, and Jon Phillips (2014), ‘The InfluenceMap, URL: https://influencemap.org/pressrelease/
political economy of energy transitions: The case of South Industry-Lobbying-Imbalance-Putting-South-Africa-s-Cli-
Africa’, Taylor and Francis, pg. 2. <Please double-check> mate-Goals-At-Risk-21162 [Accessed 29 August 2023].
57: Lameez Omarjee (24 June 2023), ‘Eskom gets pollution 15: ibid.
exemption at Kusile, may help to cut two stages of 16: ibid.
loadshedding’, News24, URL: https://www.news24.com/ 17: ibid.
fin24/climate_future/news/eskom-gets-pollution-exemp- 18: InfluenceMap (February 2023), ‘Climate policy engagement
tion-at-kusile-may-help-to-cut-two-stages-of-load-shed- in South Africa’, InfluenceMap, URL: https://influencemap.
ding-20230624 [Accessed 9 September 2023]. org/report/Climate-Policy-Engagement-in-South-Afri-
58: ibid. ca-20575 [Accessed 29 August 2023].
19: Darren Parker (8 May 2023), ‘JustShare says Thungela,
Exxaro refuse to table shareholder-proposed climate
CLIMATE PROFITEERS: OBSTACLES TO A JUST lobbying resolutions’, Engineering News, URL: https://www.
engineeringnews.co.za/article/just-share-says-thungelaexx-
TRANSITION aro-refuse-to-table-shareholder-proposed-climate-lobby-
1: UN News (11 September 2023), ‘“Humanity has opened ing-resolutions-2023-05-08 [Accessed 29 August 2023].
the gates to hell” warns Guterres as climate coalition 20: Protect Thacker Pass, URL: https://www.protectthacker-
demands action’, URL: https://news.un.org/en/sto- pass.org/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023]..
ry/2023/09/1141082 [Accessed: 13 October 2023]. 21: Protect Thacker Pass, ‘What is at stake’, URL: https://www.
2: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2023), protectthackerpass.org/whats-at-stake/ [Accessed: 13
‘Overview’, URL: https://www.ipcc.ch/about/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
October 2023]. 22: Max Wilbert (14 December 2022), ‘Why is Lithium
3: Intergovernmental panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2023), Americas splitting into two companies?,’ URL: https://www.
‘Climate Change 2023 synthesis report: A summary for protectthackerpass.org/why-is-lithium-americas-split-
policymakers’, IPCC, pg. 5, URL: https://www.ipcc.ch/ ting-into-two-companies/ [Accessed: 13 October 2023]..
report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf 23: Raphael J Heffron (2021), ‘What is the just transition,’ in
[Accessed: 13 October 2023]. Achieving a Just Transition in a Low-carbon Economy, pgs.
4: ibid. 9–19, URL: https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/
5: Christian Downie and Robert Brulle (13 February 2023), bitstream/handle/10023/19037/McCauley_CriticalRe-
‘Big oil’s trade group allies outspent clean energy groups view_JustTransition_AAM.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
by a whopping 27x, with billions in ads and lobbying to [Accessed: 13 October 2023].
keep fossil fuels flowing’, The Conversation, URL: https://
theconversation.com/big-oils-trade-group-allies-outspent-
clean-energy-groups-by-a-whopping-27x-with-billions-in- WHO PROFITS FROM THE STATUS QUO AND WHO
ads-and-lobbying-to-keep-fossil-fuels-flowing-198286 [Ac-
cessed 27 August 2023].
WILL CONTROL THE TRANSITION?
6: Niall McCarthy (25 March 2019), ‘Oil and gas giants 1: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
spend millions lobbying to block climate change Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
policies’, Forbes, URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/ for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
niallmccarthy/2019/03/25/oil-and-gas-giants-spend-mil- Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper.
lions-lobbying-to-block-climate-change-policies-infograph- 2: ibid.
ic/?sh=7528791b7c4f [Accessed 27 August 2023]. 3: ibid.
7: Oliver Milman (12 January 2023), ‘Revealed: Exxon made 4: ibid. pg. 30.
“breathtakingly” accurate climate predictions in 1970s and 5: ibid. pg. 30.
1980s’, The Guardian, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/ 6: Promit Mukherjee (23 August 2023), ‘South Africa, China
business/2023/jan/12/exxon-climate-change-global-warm- sign power deals during BRICS summit’, Reuters, URL:
ing-research [Accessed 27 August 2023]. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/south-africa-
8: ibid. china-sign-power-deals-during-brics-summit-2023-08-23/
9: Global Witness (10 November 2023), ‘Over 100 more fossil [Accessed 29 August 2023].
fuel lobbyists than last year, flooding crucial COP climate 7: Basani Baloyi, Julia Taylor, Katrina Lehmann-Grube, and
talks’, Global Witness, URL: https://www.globalwitness. Lutfiyah Suliman (August 2022), ‘Towards a just transition
org/en/press-releases/over-100-more-fossil-fuel-lobbyists- for workers and affected communities’, Institute for
last-year-flooding-crucial-cop-climate-talks/ [Accessed 27 Economic Justice, IEJ Position Paper, pg. 21.
August 2023]. 8: Lameez Omarjee and Lisa Steyn (15 August 2023),
10: ibid. ‘South32, BHP Billiton and Seriti Power hit with class
11: Lucas Thompson (9 December 2022), ‘Oil companies action from coal miners’, News24, URL: https://www.
“could doom global efforts” around climate change, House news24.com/fin24/climate_future/news/south32-bhp-bil-
Committee finds’, NBC News, URL: https://www.nbcnews. liton-and-seriti-power-hit-with-class-action-from-coal-min-
com/science/environment/oil-companies-doom-global- ers-20230815 [Accessed 9 September 2023].
efforts-climate-change-house-committee-finds-rcna59443 9: Chris McGreal (30 June 2021), ‘Big oil and gas kept a dirty
[Accessed 28 August 2023]. secret for decades. Now they may pay the price’, The
Guardian.
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WHO HAS

ISBN: 978-0-7961-3347-2 (print) / ISBN: 978-0-7961-3348-9 (digital)

59 HOURS R1.5 TRILLION

461 The number of people

34% The reduction in agricultural productivity growth in Africa

WHO HAS THE POWER? SOUTH

WHO PROFITS FROM THE STATUS QUO AND

The Mineral and Petroleum National Energy Created NERSA to regulate

ANC African National Congress

From its inception, Escom played a vital role

Anglo/Exxaro JV Becsa (BHP Billiton Energy Coal BHP Billiton

Exxaro Coal HCI Khusela Coal Hlagisa Mining

Iyanga Just Coal CC Keaton Mining

Kuyasa Mining Liketh Investments Lurco Coal

Ntshovelo Mining Resources Optimum Coal Holdings Perisat Investments

Shanduka Coal Stuart Coal Sudor Coal

Umcebo Mining Universal Coal Development Vunene

Wescoal Mining Xstrata/African Rainbow Minerals JV

COAL PRODUCERS Eskom’s complex and large structure is such

PROJECT/MINE NAME PROVINCE OWNED BY

Grootgeluk Mine Limpopo Exxaro Resources

TABLE 3. SOUTH AFRICA’S MAJOR COAL MINES UNDER DEVELOPMENT 63

PROJECT/MINE NAME PROVINCE OWNED BY

New Largo Project Mpumalanga Seriti Resources Holdings; Industrial

IN 2022, THE TOP FIVE

TONNES 11.3 M SYFERFONTEIN

PETROSA’S HISTORY OF PetroSA has been unprofitable for many

KEY Above: This map has been

EXPLORATION RIGHTS KARPOWERSHIPS

MARINE PROTECTED AREAS

Most of South Africa’s oceans have

Engineering Operation & Figure 1: An example of project finance

The previous section has examined the ac-

Those who benefit from the use of

The Energy Intensive Users Group (EIUG), made up

AECI Afrox Air Liquide Arcelor Mittal AWS Anglo American

Exxaro Mondi Glencore Harmony Gold Fields Hulamin

Implats Sibanye Stillwater Rand Water Richards Bay Minerals

Samancor Sasol Transalloys Kumba Iron Ore

South32 Thungela Vedanta Assmang

change is stopped in a manner

must still be profitable.

THE TRANSITION? mate events, and these risks will increase as

We should not be surprised to learn

THE BOTTOM LINE:

FRONTS, FAKES AND FAÇADES

BAD COPS, BAD LAWYERS:

JOINING THE DOTS:

JOIN US ON THIS JOURNEY, SHOW YOUR

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