TQ2_T1_Week 3 UCV4612 2023/2024

Short Essay Question

Answer the following in a separate situation

(support your answer with at least one case law)

1. What is cause of action and how should one say that he has a cause of action?

Introduction

A cause of action can be defined as a specific legal assertion that one party seeks to pursue
against another in a legal proceeding. This term encompasses the reasons or circumstances
leading to a court action and serves as the foundation for initiating a lawsuit. Additionally,
the term cause of action encompasses all the essential facts that the plaintiff must substantiate
to warrant a court order or judgment in a civil case.

Besides, the term COA denotes the set of circumstances that precipitate a legal action in
court, constituting a collection of crucial facts that the plaintiff must establish to succeed in
the action.

For instance, consider a scenario where A and B enter into a contract for the distribution of
B's goods. A fulfils the contractual obligations, but B refuses payment. In this case, A can file
a lawsuit against B for breach of contract, as the cause of action arises from the breach—A's
rights have been adversely affected by B's actions, entitling A to seek legal recourse.

Similarly, if A is struck by a motorcar driven by B, A has a cause of action against B based

on negligence. A can initiate legal proceedings against B, seeking damages for the tort of
negligence, as A has suffered pain and suffering due to the incident, constituting a cause of
action in negligence against B. In the eyes of the law, A possesses the right to seek a remedy
against another individual.

Definition of cause of action stated by cases:

In the Nasri v Mesah case, Gill FJ asserted that a cause of action encompasses the entire set
of facts that forms the basis of a legally enforceable claim. Additionally, the case of Cooke v
Gill defined cause of action as every fact crucial to be proven for the plaintiff to succeed, a
definition later endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Reed v Brown. Lord Esher M.R. clarified
that it includes every fact that, if contested, the plaintiff must prove to substantiate their right
to a court judgment.

In Government of Malaysia v Lim Kit Siang, Salleh Abas L.P. explained that a cause of
action is a statement of facts alleging that a plaintiff's right, either in law or by statute, has
been adversely affected or prejudiced by the defendant's actions. Furthermore, in Lim Kean
v Choo Koon, cause of action is described as a factual situation entitling one person to seek a
remedy against another in court.

In the case of Letang v Copper, as stated by Diplock L.J., defines cause of action as a factual
situation entitling one person to obtain a remedy from the court against another. This

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definition outlines five elements: a situation, a plaintiff, a defendant, a suitable court, and a
remedy to be granted by the court.

Vellasamy a/l Ponnusamy & Ors v Gurbachan Singh a/l Bagawan Singh & Anor
clarified that a cause of action comprises two substantive rights: liability and relief. This
implies that once liability is established, the appropriate relief must be granted, and
procedural rules cannot diminish substantive rights. A cause of action involves the plaintiff
claiming to have suffered a legal wrong and proving that the defendant is liable, seeking the
remedy or relief from the court.

In Taib bin Awang v Mohammad bin Abdullah & Ors, proving a cause of action requires
demonstrating all the separate elements giving rise to the claim. For instance, establishing
malicious prosecution necessitates proving that the prosecution concluded in the plaintiff's
favor; failure to establish this element renders the cause of action incomplete.

In the case of Hock Hua Bank Bhd v Leong Yew Chin, Syed Agil Barakbah SCJ observed
that a cause of action can be succinctly defined as a factual situation, the existence of which
entitles the plaintiff to seek a remedy from the court against the defendant.

Example of cause of action by cases:

In the case of Sio Koon Lin & Anor v S.B Mehra, the respondent contributed money to a
partnership with an agreed-upon amount to be repaid. However, there was no provision in the
agreement stating that in case of default on any one installment, the remaining installments
would become immediately due and payable. The court held that on October 7, the
respondent did not have any cause of action in respect of the $85,000 because no installments
were then due. The court emphasized that a cause of action must be based on facts that have
occurred, and since no installments were due at that time, the respondent had no valid cause
of action.

In the case of Simetech (M) Sdn Bhd v Yeoh Cheng Liam Construction, the defendant, the
main contractor for the construction of an office building, entered into a sub-contract with the
plaintiff for certain works. The plaintiff claimed that the work was completed, but the
defendant failed to pay the outstanding amount. The plaintiff took legal action against the
defendant to claim the sum. Before the defendant filed a defense, the plaintiff amended the
statement of claim, increasing the amount claimed. The plaintiff used an adjusted sum from a
consulting engineer to amend the claim. The court held that the amendment related back to
the date of the original pleading, and no new cause of action accrued since the original
pleading. Consequently, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim an additional sum that became
due and payable only after the date of the issuance of the writ and statement of claim.

When the cause of action accrues?

In Pirelli General Cable Works v Oscaro, it was established that the cause of action does
not accrue until damage occurs, typically in the form of cracks resulting from a defect, even if
those cracks or the defect are undiscovered. The date of accrual for a tort cause of action
related to damage caused by negligent design or construction of a building is the date when
the damage comes into existence, not when it is discovered or could reasonably have been
discovered.

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In Cartledge v Joplingo the plaintiff, employed as steel dressers in the defendants' factory,
contracted a disease and claimed damages for negligence and breaches of statutory duty. The
cause of action was deemed to accrue when there was wrongdoing by the defendant resulting
in loss or damage to the plaintiff, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of such loss or
damage. Patrick O'Connor noted that the cause of action arises when a breach of duty and
damage occur.

In Sivapiran v Lim Yoke Kongo, the appellant was knocked down by the respondent on a
motorcycle, suffering personal injuries. The cause of action accrued on the date of the
accident, but the right of action was concealed by the fraud of the defendant and the
insurance company. The court held that the limitation period would not begin until the
plaintiff discovered the fraud or could have reasonably discovered it.

Pang Yeow Chow v Advance Specialist Treatment Engineering Sdn Bhd involved a
claim related to the appellant's professional negligence. The cause of action for professional
negligence arose when the suit was struck out, not when the damage occurred. The court
rejected the argument that the suit could be filed afresh after the limitation period expired,
emphasizing that this was not a case of latent defect but a breach of fiduciary duty.

In Credit Corp (M) Sdn Bhd v Fong Tak Sino, the respondent was injured in an accident
and filed a claim for damages. The court determined that the cause of action accrued on the
day of the accident, and the application to add a new party after the expiry of the limitation
period was not allowed. The court held that knowledge of the respondent as to the identity of
the appellant was irrelevant, and Section 29(C) of the Limitation Act did not apply.

In the case of Gibbs v Guild, Viscount Dunedin defined a cause of action as that which
renders legal action possible. To illustrate, in a contractual context, the potential for legal
action arises as soon as there is a breach of the contractual duty. Similarly, in cases of
negligence, a cause of action arises when damage occurs since negligence is only legally
actionable upon the establishment of damages. Therefore, to substantiate negligence as a
cause of action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had a duty towards the
plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty by failing to meet the required standard of care, the
defendant's negligent behavior resulted in harm to the plaintiff, and consequently, the
plaintiff was indeed harmed or damaged.

Why cause of action varied from case to case? (additional point stated during class)

A cause of action is typically based on material facts that demonstrate a violation or

infringement of the plaintiff's legal rights. The adverse effect on the plaintiff's rights could be
due to various reasons, such as a breach of contract, negligence, or other legal wrongs
committed by the defendant.

In the case of a breach of contract, a cause of action arises when one party fails to fulfill the
terms and conditions of the contract, leading to harm or loss for the other party. The affected
party has the right to bring a legal action to recover damages or seek specific performance as
a remedy.

As in your example of reckless driving, negligence becomes actionable when it results in

damage or injury to another person or their property. Before the actual harm occurs, the
negligent act alone may not give rise to a cause of action. It becomes actionable when it
causes tangible harm to someone's rights or interests

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How should one say that he has a cause of action?

In legal terms, a cause of action must be complete or matured before a party can bring a claim
in court. This means that all the essential elements or facts that give rise to the claim must
have occurred or been fulfilled. The cases you provided illustrate this principle:

Taib B. Awang v Mohamad B. Abdullah & Ors the plaintiff brought an action for
malicious prosecution in a civil court against the defendants. The court held that, for the
plaintiff to succeed in a claim for malicious prosecution, one crucial element was that the
proceedings complained of must have terminated in his favor.

The appeal related to the Kadi Court decision had not been disposed of yet when the plaintiff
brought the action in the civil court. As a result, the court deemed the action premature
because the necessary element (favorable termination of the proceedings) had not occurred.

Sio Koon Lin v SB Mehra, this case emphasizes the requirement for completeness of a
cause of action. The defendant had agreed to pay the plaintiff by installments, but the
agreement did not specify that in case of default, the remaining installments would become
immediately payable. The court held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action because
the agreed terms were not violated yet (no default had occurred), and the lawsuit was initiated
before the due date for the payments. The cause of action was not complete.

In the case of Lim Kean v Choo Koon, the plaintiff sought to recover excess rent paid to the
landlord and applied to the Rent Assessment Board (RAB) for this purpose. The defendant
contended that the claim was time-barred. The court held that the limitation period
commenced from the date of the RAB's order, emphasizing that a cause of action arises when
there is a person who can be sued, another who can sue, and when all the material facts have
occurred to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. The key legal principle established was that the
cause of action's limitation period does not start until there is a complete cause of action—
when all the essential facts have taken place. In this instance, the plaintiff's cause of action
only accrued upon obtaining an order from the RAB, determining the legally recoverable
amount of rent.

Conclusion:

In summary, a cause of action is rooted in the harm or infringement of legal rights, and it
allows the affected party to seek redress in court. Whether it's a breach of contract,
negligence, or other legal violations, the key is that the actions of one party have had a
detrimental effect on the rights of another, providing a legal basis for seeking a remedy.

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2. What happens if there is no cause of action in an action taken by the Plaintiff?

O.18 R 19(1) of the Rules of court 2012

The defendant holds the right to petition for the dismissal of an action due to a lack of cause
of action, as stipulated in O. 18 R. 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012. This provision allows
the court, at any stage of the proceedings, to strike out or amend pleadings if they are deemed
to lack a reasonable cause of action, are scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or may prejudice a
fair trial. The cause of action, being a prerequisite for commencing legal proceedings,
necessitates that every claim reveals a valid cause before the court can proceed with dispute
resolution. In cases where a cause of action is absent, the court has the authority to strike out
the action, leading to no remedy being awarded to the plaintiff.

Exception: Cause of action is not required

However, an exception exists when a party seeks a declaration, as no cause of action is

required in such instances, given that there is no specific defendant to be sued. This exception
facilitates the commencement of civil actions where the plaintiff seeks declaratory relief
without identifying a defendant. Precedents, such as Teow Chuan v YAM Tunku
Nadzaruddin and Tan Sri Haji Othman Saat v Mohamed Bin Ismail, establish that no
present cause of action is necessary when seeking relief through a declaratory judgment,
provided the plaintiff has a legitimate interest in the subject matter.

Caxton (Kelang) Sdn Bhd v Susan Joan Labrooy & Anor further elucidates the criteria for
a declaratory order, emphasizing the need for a controversy, involvement of a "right,"
standing, jurisdiction, opposition from a defendant with a proper interest, and the practical
utility of resolving the issue

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the ability to strike out an action for lack of cause of action, as outlined in O.
18 R. 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, underscores the importance of a valid cause of
action as a foundational requirement for initiating legal proceedings. The provision empowers
the court to maintain the integrity of the legal process by dismissing actions that lack merit,
are frivolous, vexatious, or may impede a fair trial. Notably, an exception exists when a party
seeks a declaration, where the absence of a cause of action is permissible due to the absence
of a specific defendant.

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Problem Solving: Answer the following in a separate situation

Question 1

Firdaus bought a house from the Developer on 31 st January 2017. In 2023, he discovered
deep cracks on the wall of his dining and living rooms. A house consultant report was made,
and it was stated that the cracks had occurred in 2019, two years after Firdaus moved in.

Assess the limitation of period for the cause of action.

Issue:

whether the action initiated by

Firdaus falls under the Limitation
Period of the
Limitation Act 1953
Whether the action initiated by Firdaus falls under the Limitation Period of the Limitation
Act 1953

Law:

Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 states that an action in tort shall not be brought
after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. The
limitation period shall not be extended after six years

Cartledge v Jopling, the plaintiff, employed as steel dressers in the defendants' factory,
contracted a disease and claimed damages for negligence and breaches of statutory duty. The
cause of action was deemed to accrue when there was wrongdoing by the defendant resulting
in loss or damage to the plaintiff, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of such loss or
damage. Patrick O'Connor noted that the cause of action arises when a breach of duty and
damage occur.

In Credit Corp (M) Sdn Bhd v Fong Tak Sino, the respondent was injured in an accident
and filed a claim for damages. The court determined that the cause of action accrued on the
day of the accident, and the application to add a new party after the expiry of the limitation
period was not allowed. The court held that knowledge of the respondent as to the identity of
the appellant was irrelevant, and Section 29(C) of the Limitation Act did not apply.

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Section 6A of the Limitation Act 1953 applies to negligence cases involving latent damage
in construction cases where the damage is not discoverable through general inspection, and
the person having the cause of action did not know or could not have reasonably expected the
damage

Section 6A (2) of the Limitation Act 1953, an action to which this section applies shall not
be brought after the expiration of three years from the starting date if the period of three years
expires later than the period of limitation prescribed in subsection 6(1)

Section 6A (2), illustrations (c) of the Limitation Act 1953, C bought a house from D in
2000. In 2005, C discovered a crack which damaged the walls badly. A building report made
by a consultant revealed that the cracks had appeared in 2002, two years after C moved into
the house. C has three years from 2005 to file an action in court against D for damages

Pirelli General Cable Works v Oscar Faber & Partners, it was established that the cause
of action does not accrue until damage occurs, typically in the form of cracks resulting from a
defect, even if those cracks or the defect are undiscovered. The date of accrual for a tort cause
of action related to damage caused by negligent design or construction of a building is the
date when the damage comes into existence, not when it is discovered or could reasonably
have been discovered.

Ambank (M) Bhd v Kamariyah bt Hamdan & Anor, introduced the discoverability rule,
under which the limitation period runs from the date the damage could have first been
discovered by reasonable diligence

Application:
Firdaus acquired his property on January 31, 2017, only to uncover deep cracks in his dining
and living room walls in 2023. Despite the house consultant's report attributing the cracks to
2019, two years after Firdaus moved in, the application of Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation
Act 1953, prior to its amendment, indicated no time bar, as the limitation period remained
below six years, rendering it valid. Citing the precedents of Cartledge v Jopling and Credit
Corp (M) Sdn Bhd v Fong Tak Sin, it was established that Firdaus lacked knowledge of the
cracks until a thorough property inspection, placing the discovery within the six-year
limitation period.

Post-amendment, with the introduction of Section 6A of the Limitation Act 1953, an

extension of three years is permissible, provided it does not stretch the limitation period to 15
years. Since Firdaus identified the substantial cracks in his dining and living room walls in
2023, the limitation period spans from 2023 to 2026. In alignment with legal precedents such
as Pirelli General Cable Works v Oscar Faber & Partners and Ambank (M) Bhd v
Kamariyah bt Hamdan & Anor, the countdown commences from the year of discovery,
granting Firdaus the right to initiate legal action within the three-year extension, culminating
in 2026.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, Firdaus is still within the limitation period to make his case and will likely
succeed in doing so.

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Question 2

Ri Jung Hyuk is a popular singer from Korea. His first visit to Malaysia was during the
Korean Week Festival in Kuala Lumpur in 2021. Since then he regularly visited Malaysia
and at the same time he had a joint business venture with Madex Co. After sometime he
decided to buy a semi-detached house at Damansara Perdana through his friend, Sudin. In
July 2022, he and Sudin decided to go for a holiday in Penang. They took a taxi driven by
Sarip Dol to go to the airport. Unfortunately, the taxi they were travelling in collided with a
motor lorry driven by Ajis from the Ministry of Defence. Ri suffered serious injury while
Sudin died in the accident. Dr. Manisah who treated him advised him to take a long rest and
told him that he may not be able to sing anymore. He was depressed and tried to kill himself
during the treatment. Fortunately, Dr.Manisah managed to save him and later they got
married. She advised Ri to take legal action.

Explain the above issue.

Issue:

Whether there is a limitation period on Ri Jung Hyuk’s cause of action against Ajis

Law:

Order 76 Rule 1 of ROC, “person under disability” means a person who is a minor or a
patient

Order 76 Rule 1 of ROC, “patient” means a mentally disturbed person within the meaning
of the Act

S 6(1)(a) of the Limitation act 1953, save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall
not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action
accrued, that is to say actions founded on tort

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Pirelli General Cable Works v Oscar, the date of accrual of cause of action in tort for
damages caused by the negligent design or construction of a building was the date when the
damage came into existence and not the date when the damage was discovered or could with
reasonable diligence have been discovered

In Cartledge v Joplingo, the plaintiff, employed as steel dressers in the defendants' factory,
contracted a disease and claimed damages for negligence and breaches of statutory duty. The
cause of action was deemed to accrue when there was wrongdoing by the defendant resulting
in loss or damage to the plaintiff, regardless of the plaintiff's knowledge of such loss or
damage. Patrick O'Connor noted that the cause of action arises when a breach of duty and
damage occur.

Credit Corp (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin, court held that time begins to run from the date of
the damage although the plaintiff is ignorant of the defendant’s identity. The limitation law is
promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiff from sleeping on their actions
and to have definite end to litigation. This is accordance to the maxim interest “Republicae ut
si finis litium” that in the interest of the state there must be an end to litigation

Sivapiran v Lim Yoke Kong, plaintiff was knocked down by a motorcycle and face
exceptional difficulties in his attempts to identify the insurer of the motorcycle to bring a
claim in negligence. Letter was issued to all insurance companies in West Malaysia to
identify the relevant insurer well before the expiry of the limitation period. However, it was
only after the limitation period had expired that the plaintiff finally found out the identity of
the insurance company. The insurance company had concealed the plaintiff’s right of action
by fraud. The six-year limitation period which expired should thus be postponed until
plaintiff had discovered the fraud

S 24(2) of Limitation Act 1953 Where any such person as is referred to in subsection (1) of
this section was on such date under two disabilities or where before the disability which he
was under on such date had ceased he was affected by another disability he shall be deemed
for the purposes of this section to have continued under a disability until both such
disabilities have ceased

S 2(a) of Public Authorities Protection Act 1948, any action commenced in the Federation
against any person for any act does in pursuance of any written law or of any public duty or
authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written
law, duty or authority, the action shall be instituted within 36 months next after the act,
neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within
36 months next after the ceasing thereof

Lee Hock Ning v Govt of Malaysia, the court held that the non-payment of money was not
in pursuance of a public duty. It is immaterial that the contract may had been entered into for
the purpose of performing a statutory duty. If the act complained is a breach of contract, then
the statutory cannot be invoked on the ground that the contract was entered for the purpose of
carrying out duties imposed by the statute

Phua Chin Chew v KM & Ors, the respondent, a permanent teacher placed under the
pensionable scheme, was admitted for treatment while labelling an attach under
schizophrenia. The respondent wrote a letter to the appellant, purporting to resign from his
service as a teacher. The letter was accepted and his service was terminated accordingly. In
1982, the respondent’s 2 brothers applied to court and were appointed by a committee to file

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a suit against the government on the terminated of service. Issue: whether the time of 36
months began to run from the appointment of the committee or from the date of letter of
resignation. The court stated that time begins to run from the date of appointment of the
committee, and not from the date of the letter of resignation being accepted by the
government, and the action was well within the period of S 2(a) of PAPA. The court finds
that S 24(1) of Limitation Act applied in the present application, therefore the plaintiff was
suffering from a mental disability when his right of action accrued when a committee was
appointed

Wee Choo Keong v Ketua Pengarah Perkhidmatan Awam Malaysia, plaintiff obtained
ex-parte injunction against appellant and two defendants. Appellant evaded service of the
injunction and breach the same. High court found him guilty of contempt and sentenced to
jail. Appellant disqualified from being an MP for second term under Art 48(1)(e) of FC. In
mid-2007, Appellant succeeded to set aside injunction and strike out suit and enquired
Pensions Department for their failure to pay him his pension for his first term as MP.
Pensions Department informed that he had lost his entitlement. Although the High court held
that the disqualification only applied to a criminal offence and not to a civil contempt, which
Wee was found guilty of, it dismissed Wee’s application on the ground it was time-barred
under s 2(a) of PAPA.

Application:

In accordance with Order 76, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court (ROC), Ri Jung Hyuk is
categorized as a "person under disability" due to being a patient after sustaining severe
injuries in an accident caused by Ajis from the Ministry of Defence. These injuries
necessitated an extended period of rest and rendered him incapable of singing. Consequently,
he falls under the classification of a "person under disability."

Additionally, following Order 76, Rule 1 of the ROC, Ri Jung Hyuk can be considered a
"patient" due to his experience of depressive illness and a suicide attempt during treatment,
indicating mental distress.

Under Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953, as the accident occurred in July 2022, Ri
Jung Hyuk is obligated to initiate legal proceedings for personal injuries against Ajis within
six years, before July 2028.

Referencing the Pirelli General Cable Works case, the accrual date of the cause of action in
tort for damages caused by Ajis, who collided with Ri Jung Hyuk and Sudin while driving a
motor lorry, is established from the July 2022 accident during their journey to the airport in a
taxi driven by Sarip Dol.

Applying the principles from the Cartledge case, Ri Jung Hyuk's cause of action arises from
Ajis breaching his duty to drive carefully, leading to a collision with Ri Jung Hyuk's taxi.
This resulted in Sudin's death, and Ri Jung Hyuk suffering serious injuries and depression,
attempting suicide during treatment, establishing damages. Consequently, Ri Jung Hyuk has a
cause of action to sue Ajis within the prescribed six-year period.

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As per the Credit Corp and Sivapiran cases, Ri Jung Hyuk's time for the cause of action
commences from the date of the damage, starting in July 2022, encompassing damages to Ri
Jung Hyuk's health and career as a singer. This permits the initiation of the cause of action
from July 2022 until July 2028.

However, considering Ri Jung Hyuk's status as a patient and a "person under disability,"
Section 24(2) of the Limitation Act 1953 dictates that his cause of action to sue Ajis starts
upon the cessation of both disabilities—serious injury and depression. The cause of action
initiates when Ri Jung Hyuk recovers from both illnesses.

A potential issue arises concerning Ajis being associated with the Ministry of Defence, which
might shorten Ri Jung Hyuk's cause of action to 36 months. Yet, given the circumstances that
Ajis was not driving a government vehicle during the accident but a motor lorry, it is likely
that S 2(A) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 does not apply.

Moreover, citing the Lee Hock Ning case, Ajis driving the motor lorry does not constitute an
act in pursuance of public duty. The argument that Ajis, as a Minister of Defence, driving a
motor lorry is performing public duty due to his government position is deemed immaterial.
This strengthens the position that S 2(A) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 is
inapplicable in the current scenario.

Additionally, drawing on the Phua Chin Chew and Wee Choo Keong cases, Ajis is likely
unable to utilize S 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 as a defense,
asserting that Ri Jung Hyuk is outside the limitation period. This is because, during the
accident, Ajis was in the capacity of an ordinary resident and not in the position of the
Ministry of Defence.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, Ri Jung Hyuk’s cause of action against Ajis start when Ri Jung Hyuk
recovered from the diseases that she suffered.

2nd issue:

Whether Ri can bring action against Ajis for causing Sudin’s death?

Law:

S 7(5) of Civil Law Act, only one action can be brought on the same subject matter of
complaint, and every such action shall be brought within 3 years after the death of the person
deceased

S 7(2) of Civil Law Act, Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband,
parent, and child, if any, of the person whose death has been so caused and shall be brought
by and in the name of the executor of the person deceased

Kuan Hip Peng v Yap Yin & Anor, the plaintiff appellant claim compensation under the
Civil Law Ordinance for loss arising from the death of his father as a result of the negligent
driving of a motor vehicle owner by the first respondent and driven by the second respondent.
The provisions of S 7(5) of CLA are absolute and contain no exceptions. Therefore, the writ

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which was filed and issued 4 days after the expiry of the period of 3 years must be struck out
and the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff is therefore just another abuse of the process
of the court

Lee Lee Cheng v Seow Peng Kwai, it also held that the court has no discretionary power to
enlarge the limitation period.

Application:

In the current scenario, Sudin passed away in July 2022. According to Section 7(5) of the
Civil Law Act, any legal action must be initiated within 3 years, meaning the cause of action
will cease in July 2025. Referring to the Kuan Hip Peng case in conjunction with Lee Lee
Cheng, there is no provision for an extension of the limitation period.

As outlined in Section 7(2) of the Civil Law Act, Ri is not eligible to pursue a dependency
claim since Ri is not dependent on Sudin for support. The appropriate plaintiff to bring forth
this dependency claim against Ajis is either Sudin's spouse, child, or parent who is reliant on
Sudin's support, which has now been terminated due to Sudin's demise.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, Ri cannot bring action against Ajis for causing Sudin’s death

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