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Mental Models: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods

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DOI: 10.5751/ES-03802-160146

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Jones, N. A., H. Ross, T. Lynam, P. Perez, and A. Leitch. 2011. Mental models: an interdisciplinary
synthesis of theory and methods. Ecology and Society 16(1): 46. [online] URL: http://www.
ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art46/

Research, part of a Special Feature on Mental Models

Mental Models: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods

Natalie A. Jones 1, Helen Ross 1, Timothy Lynam 2, Pascal Perez 3,4, and Anne Leitch 2,5

ABSTRACT. Mental models are personal, internal representations of external reality that people use to
interact with the world around them. They are constructed by individuals based on their unique life
experiences, perceptions, and understandings of the world. Mental models are used to reason and make
decisions and can be the basis of individual behaviors. They provide the mechanism through which new
information is filtered and stored. Recognizing and dealing with the plurality of stakeholder’s perceptions,
values, and goals is currently considered a key aspect of effective natural resource management (NRM)
practice. Therefore, gaining a better understanding of how mental models internally represent complex,
dynamic systems and how these representations change over time will allow us to develop mechanisms to
enhance effective management and use of natural resources. Realizing this potential, however, relies on
developing and testing adequate tools and techniques to elicit these internal representations of the world
effectively. This paper provides an interdisciplinary synthesis of the literature that has contributed to the
theoretical development and practical application of the mental model construct. It explores the utility and
applicability of the construct in the context of NRM and includes a review of elicitation techniques used
within the field. The major theoretical and practical challenges that arise in drawing on the construct to
provide a cognitive dimension to NRM are also addressed.

Key Words: cognition; elicitation; mental model; natural resource management

INTRODUCTION must know about their environment so they can exist

within it (Moore and Golledge 1976). Mental
Gaining insight into those aspects of human models are conceived of as a cognitive structure that
cognition that underpin preferences, action, and forms the basis of reasoning, decision making, and,
behavior is of great value to the field of natural with the limitations also observed in the attitudes
resource management (NRM). Environmental literature, behavior. They are constructed by
problems are largely driven by human decisions and individuals based on their personal life experiences,
actions, as are the strategies designed to address perceptions, and understandings of the world. They
such problems. In the past, NRM researchers have provide the mechanism through which new
attempted to understand behavior by focusing on information is filtered and stored.
stakeholders’ attitudes, preferences, and values.
These social science constructs, while providing Peoples’ ability to represent the world accurately,
important insights, fail to account for the human however, is always limited and unique to each
capacity to predict outcomes or analyze cause-effect individual. Mental models are therefore characterized
relationships and hence frame their selection of as incomplete representations of reality. They are
responses. also regarded as inconsistent representations
because they are context-dependant and may change
It is widely accepted in the cognitive science and according to the situation in which they are used. In
psychology literature that people develop and use essence, mental models have to be highly dynamical
internal representations, i.e., ‘mental models’, of models to adapt to continually changing
external reality that allow them to interact with the circumstances and to evolve over time through
world (Craik 1943, Johnson-Laird 1983). People learning. Conceptualizing cognitive representations

1
School of Integrative Systems, University of Queensland, 2CSIRO, Sustainable Ecosystems, 3CSIRO, Marine & Atmospheric Research, 4ANU, RMAP/
RSPAS, 5ARC CoE Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University
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as dynamic, inaccurate models of complex systems Craik’s claim that people reason by way of thought
acknowledges the limitations in peoples’ ability to experiments using internal models.
conceive such complex systems.
Another major body of research that draws on the
Mental models exist within the mind and are mental model construct is known as ‘naive theory’,
therefore not available for direct inspection or also referred to as ‘naive physics’. Research
measurement. Finding ways of eliciting a mental explores how people develop an understanding of
model presents a major challenge to any discipline causal processes associated with physical or
interested in using the construct as a means to gain mechanical systems. Studies have led theorists to
insight into people’s internal representations of the assert that mental models are formed through
world. A variety of elicitation tools and techniques analogical thinking. According to Collins and
have been developed and used in different fields of Gentner (1987), when a person explains a domain
applied research, including organizational research with which they are unfamiliar, they tend to draw
(Hall et al. 1994, Swan and Newell 1998, Sterman on a familiar domain, which they perceive as
2000), risk communication (Breakwell 2001, similar. This involves tapping into an existing
Morgan et al. 2002, Hodgkinson et al. 2004, Lowe mental model and importing its relational structure
and Lorenzoni 2007), human-computer interaction to another domain. For example, a mental model of
(Cooke 1999), and education (Osborne and water flow may be used to explain electrical current;
Cosgrove 1983, Vosniaudou and Brewer 1992, entities and relations corresponding to the former
Samarapungavan et al. 1996, Dove et al. 1999). are mapped on to the model representing the latter.
Studies show that phenomena that cannot be
To understand the role of mental models in NRM perceived directly are often explained this way
we need to know what they are and how they have (Rickheit and Sichelschmidt 1999).
been conceptualized in different disciplines. We
provide theoretical background to the empirical Gentner and Gentner (1983) and Collins and
analysis of the papers in this issue by presenting an Gentner (1987) questioned whether people use
interdisciplinary synthesis of the mental model analogies as a convenient way of talking about
literature. The paper defines mental models and another domain or whether they actually think in
shows how the construct is used across disciplines. analogies. Experimental studies examining peoples
It discusses the potential contribution of the mental explanations of electricity (Gentner and Gentner
model construct to the field of NRM, and the major 1983) and water molecules (Collins and Gentner
challenges that must be addressed to realize this 1987) provide evidence in support of the idea that
potential. people do indeed use analogies in their cognitive
processes. Analogical thinking allows people to
“create new mental models that they can then run
WHAT IS A MENTAL MODEL ? to generate predictions about what should happen
in various situations in the real world” (Collins and
A cognitive representation Gentner 1987:243). Mental models thus act as
inferential frameworks (Gentner and Gentner
Mental models are cognitive representations of 1983), as originally posed by Craik.
external reality. The notion of a mental model was
originally postulated by the psychologist Kenneth Abel et al. (1998), in acknowledging that theory on
Craik (1943) who proposed that people carry in their cognitive mapping originated from spatial cognition
minds a small-scale model of how the world works. studies, conceptualize a cognitive map as a ‘spatial
These models are used to anticipate events, reason, mental model’. ‘Cognitive mapping’ is the process
and form explanations. Decades later, psychologist through which a person acquires, stores, codes, and
Johnson-Laird (1983) further developed Craik’s recalls information about the world. Like Craik’s
idea of a mental model in his research on human notion of a mental model, the process of cognitive
reasoning. For Johnson-Laird, a mental model is a mapping provides a reasoning and predictive
reasoning mechanism that exists in a person’s capacity: it “enables people to generalize on the
working memory. His research, carried out within basis of past experiences and to use these
the domain of experimental psychology, supports generalizations (or generic information) in other
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contexts” (Downs 1976:69). However, reasoning purpose of answering a specific question (following
and prediction processes are carried out via Brewer’s definition noted above). This involves
associations and networks of mental objects, often drawing on existing, deeply held, generic
referred to as ‘schema’, rather than qualitative knowledge to compile a specific knowledge
thought experiments using symbolic models, as structure to answer a given question. Drawing on
proposed by Craik and Johnson-Laird. long-term knowledge structures and combining
them in short-term memory involves a degree of
Although the literature shows consensus on the abstraction. This is therefore likely to increase the
point that mental models are typically analogous degree of representational inaccuracy in the
representations, a discrepancy exists over where in generated mental model, or espoused theory.
the mind mental models are hypothetically located: According to Argyris and Schon (1974), when
working memory (Johnson-Laird 1983, Wilson and someone ‘acts’ they rely on tacit knowledge
Rutherford 1989, Vosniaudou 1994), long-term structures, what is referred to as the ‘theory in use’,
memory (Craik 1943, Bainbridge 1991, Moray which may be equated with mental models existing
2004), or both (Nersessian 2002). Johnson-Laird in long-term memory. Although these internal
has provided tangible evidence supporting the idea representations of the world may be less error prone,
that mental models are temporary structures that Argyris and Schon’s work suggests they are much
occupy working memory, based on psychological more difficult to elicit. This highlights one of the
experiments involving simple, static phenomena. key challenges associated with applying the mental
He agrees, however, that a mental model can model construct, not only to NRM, but all
represent either long-term or short-term knowledge disciplines interested in the theoretical and practical
(1989) and can represent physical or conceptual application of the construct. That is, how can we
entities (Johnson-Laird 1983). differentiate and elicit the mental models that people
rely on to make decisions and act, rather than the
Those who conceptualize mental models as residing mental models which equate with Argyris and
in long-term memory, i.e., mainly naive theory and Schon’s ‘espoused theory’?
systems researchers, view them as long-term
knowledge structures that ‘support’ reasoning and Mental models stored in long-term memory are also
understanding (Nersessian 2002). In that sense, of particular interest to the field of cognitive
mental models are similar to the ‘schema’ construct. anthropology, which explores “how cultural
Originally introduced by Bartlett (1932), schema knowledge is organized in the mind” (D'Andrade
are conceived of as long-term knowledge structures 1995:279) . Studying culture at a cognitive level,
which people use to interpret and make predictions cognitive anthropologists use schema to explain
about the world around them. In the early 1980s, cultural understanding. Quinn (2005:38) defines
Johnson-Laird (1983) stated that the difference schema as “a generic version of (some part of) the
between schemata and mental models is yet to be world built up from experience and stored in
resolved, others have since differentiated between memory”. ‘Cultural schema’ are therefore
the concepts (Table 1). developed through “shared” experiences (Quinn
2005:38). Over time, as a given group of people
Nersessian (2002) bridges the working memory vs. internalize their shared experiences, cultural
long-term memory discrepancy by stating that meaning is created, which individuals use to
mental models that exist as knowledge structures in perceive and relate to the world around them (Quinn
long-term memory are called upon to support the 2005).
mental models formed in working memory that are
used to support reasoning and problem-solving. Cultural models are discussed in a similar light to
Conceiving a mental model as a cognitive structure collective mental models and shared mental models
that may exist in either working memory or long- in that they all refer to a degree of shared
term memory is reminiscent of Argyris and Schon’s understanding among a group people. The field of
(1974) ‘theories of action’. They suggest that what organizational research takes a keen interest in
people say, the ‘espoused theory’, is different than collective mental models on the assumption that
what they do, the ‘theory in use’. Asking someone “effective team functioning requires the existence
about their thoughts or beliefs on an issue elicits an of a shared or team mental model among members
espoused theory that can be equated with a mental of a team” (Langan-Fox et al. 2000:242). It is
model generated in working memory for the interesting to note that some of this literature uses
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Table 1. Differences between mental models and schemata.

Author Basis of Differentiation Schemata Mental Models

Rutherford and Wilson Static vs. dynamic “...A procedural data structure in Use procedural data “in a
(2004:312) structure memory”. computationally dynamic
manner”.

Holland et al. (1986:13) Representational Inflexible knowledge structures Flexible knowledge structure that
flexibility stored in long-term memory combines multiple schemata to
provide “predictive knowledge represent or simulate an
for highly regular and routine unfamiliar situation.
situations”.

Brewer (1987:189) Generic vs. specific “...Precompiled generic “Specific knowledge structures
knowledge knowledge structures.” that are constructed to represent a
new situation through the use of
generic knowledge of space, time,
causality, and human
intentionality”.

the terms ‘shared’ and ‘team’ mental models A dynamic representation

interchangeably (e.g., Klimoski and Mohammed
1994), however, the two are usually defined as There is widespread agreement in the literature that
distinct constructs. A shared mental model is the mental models are ‘working models’ (Craik 1943,
mental model constructed and shared when Johnson-Laird 1983) and are therefore dynamic.
individuals interact together in a team setting, it The dynamic character of a mental model is
represents the shared cognition among groups of discussed in the literature in three ways, in relation
individuals (Langan-Fox et al. 2001). A team model to reasoning, causal dynamics, and learning.
is the collective task and team relevant knowledge
that team members bring to a situation (Cooke et al. Reasoning
2000). The team’s collective and dynamic
understanding that they bring to a specific situation A defining feature of a mental model from a
is referred to as a team situation model (Cooke et psychology perspective is that it is a computational
al. 2000). structure (Rutherford and Wilson 2004). A mental
model is constructed in working memory and can
Practitioners in the field of NRM have also recently then be run like a computer simulation allowing an
taken an interest in the idea of the collective or individual to explore and test different possibilities
shared mental model (Abel et al. 1998). To mentally before acting. Working memory is the
encourage people with contrasting views to work system responsible for selecting and manipulating
together, it is necessary to identify and support a information for the purpose of reasoning and
shared understanding among relevant stakeholders learning. Changes made to a mental model in the
and to enhance the collective decision making simulation process represent what would happen if
process. The expansion of mental models research such changes took place in reality.
from an individual to a collective focus stems from
a growing recognition that there is a social Causal dynamics
component to cognition at the individual level, and
that decision making occurs at a range of scales from The second dynamic attribute of a mental model
an individual to group to societal level. discussed at length in the literature refers to ‘causal
knowledge’. The capacity of a mental model to
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represent (perceived) cause-and-effect dynamics of reality that allows people to interact with the world.
a phenomenon is studied from a systems dynamics Because of cognitive limitations, it is neither
and naive theory perspective. Researchers possible nor desirable to represent every detail that
interested in systems dynamics use the mental may be found in reality. Aspects that are represented
model construct in a pragmatic sense: as a tool to are influenced by a person’s goals and motives for
better understand complex, dynamic systems to constructing the mental model as well as their
ultimately improve their design and usability (Doyle background knowledge or existing knowledge
and Ford 1998, Moray 2004). A widely cited structures, which, as noted above, may be
definition of a mental model in this context is that conceptualized as ‘mental models existing in long
of Rouse and Morris (1986) who consider a mental term memory’. Mental models thus play a role in
model in terms of its functionality and conceive it filtering incoming information. The theory of
as a cognitive structure that enables a person to ‘confirmation bias’ (Klayman and Ha 1989)
describe, explain, and predict a system’s purpose, suggests that people seek information that fits their
form, function, and state. Given the focus on current understanding of the world. Incoming
dynamic phenomena, a mental model in this field information may reinforce existing mental models
has been conceived of as a model that is built of or may be rejected outright.
“causal knowledge about how a system works”
(Moray 1998:295). Different fields of study are interested in, and
therefore view, the inaccurate and incomplete
Learning quality of mental models differently. Those
applying the mental model construct to complex
The capacity of mental models to change over time systems regard the mapping process involved in
through experience and learning is another dynamic constructing a mental model as a many-to-one
quality often referred to in the literature. ‘homo-morphic’ mapping. This involves decomposing
Researchers, mainly from the fields of human- a complex system into a number of smaller models
computer interaction (HCI), education, and representing subcomponents of the system.
organizational studies, take interest in the difference Conceiving the construction of mental models in
between lay (or student) and expert mental models this way suggests that the model is an “imperfect
in terms of knowledge content and organization. representation” and acknowledges that people make
Research shows that lay understanding is errors (Moray 2004). Similarly, systems dynamics
characteristically concrete while expert understanding researchers draw attention to peoples’ cognitive
is more abstract (DiSessa 1983, Greeno 1983, limitations in terms of processing information
Larkin 1983). This highlights the idea that the feedback, particularly when there are long time
formation of a mental model in a person’s mind is delays between action and response (Sterman
the result of both biology, i.e., an ability inherent to 1994). Controlled experiments, mainly computer-
the human mind, and ‘learning’ (Nersessian 2002). based, show that people’s mental models
Nersessian (2002:140) states that, “the nature and demonstrate a limited capacity to take account of
richness of models one can construct and one’s feedback delays and the side effects of decisions
ability to reason develops with learning domain- made (Doerner 1980, Brehmer 1992). In his study
specific content and techniques”. of mental models, Sterman (1994:305) concluded
that “people generally adopt an event-based, open-
Systems dynamics researchers focus on the role of loop view of causality, ignore feedback processes,
mental models in information feedback loops. They fail to appreciate time delays between action and
are particularly interested in the problems which response and in the reporting of information, and
hinder information feedback in a system and are insensitive to non-linearities that may alter the
therefore hinder learning (Doerner 1980, Brehmer strengths of different feedback loops as a system
1992). evolves”. This literature treats these limitations in
people’s mental models as presenting an
impediment to learning; it assumes that addressing
An inaccurate and incomplete representation the limitations and critical flaws in mental models
can improve system functionality.
Mental models tend to be functional rather than
complete or accurate representations of reality. A Despite their potential limitations, individuals’
mental model is a simplified representation of mental models are not necessarily amenable to
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alteration. As the psychology literature recognizes, that stakeholders consider relevant or important to
people tend to filter new information according to a domain, and of the way in which stakeholders
its congruence or otherwise with their existing structure or organize those concepts cognitively.
understandings, beliefs, and values. They may reject This provides insight into stakeholders’ understanding
discrepant evidence, or compartmentalize it within of the interconnected and dynamic attributes of
a subsystem of larger systems of understanding. NRM systems. Biggs et al. (2008:3) situate the
Acceptance of new information is also related to construct within the field of NRM by defining it as
personal orientations toward learning. Some mental a cognitive structure comprised of “representations
models research therefore focuses on communication of objects, their relationships and dynamics as well
toward outcomes such as behavior change, seeking as the attributes or characteristics of these and the
to provide information in forms compatible with person’s valence (cognitive and emotional) to the
current understandings (Morgan et al. 2002). objects, relationships, and dynamics”.

A variety of elicitation techniques have been used

MENTAL MODEL ELICITATION IN in the field of natural resource management to serve
NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT different purposes. The majority of procedures used
are based on the assumption that an individual’s
Interest in mental models is gaining momentum mental model can be represented as a network of
within the domain of NRM as practitioners concepts and relations. Some procedures are
increasingly recognize the need to take into account designed to elicit a network representation of a
the plurality of values and goals linked to a given mental model directly from the interviewee through
resource and the range of stakeholder perceptions a diagrammatic interview. Other procedures require
concerning how NRM systems function. Mental the researcher to re-create, or infer, the network
models are elicited for the following reasons: from oral interview data or questionnaire data.
● To explore similarities and differences
between stakeholders’ understanding of an Direct elicitation
issue to improve communication between
stakeholders (Abel et al. 1998) ; Direct elicitation procedures require interviewees
to form a representation of their understanding of a
● To integrate different perspectives, including given issue. Participants may be asked to draw a
expert and local, to improve overall diagrammatic representation of their mental model,
understanding of a system (Ozesmi and using pictures, words, and symbols, or they may be
Ozesmi 2004); provided with existing concepts on a set of cards
and asked to arrange them into a representation.
● To create a collective representation of a Assisting participants to view the external
system to improve decision making processes representation of their mental model through the
(Dray et al. 2006); nature of the elicitation process provides an
immediate means of verification that is lacking in
● To support social learning processes (Pahl- the indirect elicitation procedures.
Wostl and Hare 2004);
Kearney and Kaplan propose the Conceptual
● To identify and overcome stakeholders’ Content Cognitive Map (3CM) method (originally
knowledge limitations and misconceptions developed by Austin, cited in Kearney and Kaplan
associated with a given resource (Morgan et 1997). This technique involves asking participants
al. 2002); to identify concepts they consider important to a
domain and then asking them to spatially/visually
● To develop more socially robust knowledge organize them in a way that depicts how they
to support negotiations over unstructured understand that domain (see Kearney and Kaplan
problems in complex, multifunctional 1997). The spatial mapping exercise is believed to
systems (Kolkman et al. 2005). be highly compatible with human information
processing (Pezdek and Evans, as cited in Kearney
and Kaplan 1997). A major strength of the approach
The mental model construct is attractive to NRM is that the mapping exercise assists interviewees to
practitioners in that it takes account of the concepts explore their own cognitive structure as they engage
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with the task (Austin 1994). This stance is supported within a system can be used to build computer
by studies that suggest cognition is not only simulation models that explore different resource
language-based but also image-based and that management scenarios. Local stakeholders thus
verbal and imagistic thought are carried out by two play a key role in building the models that guide
distinct, though partly connected, systems (Kearney resource management policy and planning. Ozesmi
and Kaplan 1997:595). The 3CM technique has and Ozesmi (2004) state that this form of
been used in the field of NRM to explore the nature participatory modeling is preferable to other forms
of different stakeholders’ perspectives in the context of science-based ecological modeling in situations
of forest management (Austin 1994, Kearney et al. where 1) expert and scientific data is limited,
1999, Tikkanen et al. 2006). Analysis involves a whether it be uncertain and/or unavailable, and 2)
combination of qualitative and quantitative stakeholder support for management initiatives is
procedures to determine the similarity and required.
dissimilarity in stakeholder’s views.
Dray et al. (2006) used a similar diagrammatic
Ozesmi and Ozesmi (2004) used a similar approach, interview method to elicit understanding of causal
referred to as fuzzy cognitive mapping, to explore dynamics of groundwater management in the atoll
stakeholders’ perceptions of the causes and effects of Tarawa, Republic of Kiribati. This experiment
of lake eutrophication. Similarly to Kearney and involved asking participants to build a diagram by
Kaplan’s 3CM approach, Ozesmi and Ozesmi elicit placing cards indicating relevant concepts (factors
mental models by asking interviewees to begin by or dynamics) on a large piece of paper and drawing
defining the important variables in a given system. the relations between them. The data was combined
These are written on a set of cards. Participants are with data collected from a photo interpretation and
then given the opportunity to arrange the cards to a spatial mapping exercise, to build a ‘collective
reflect their understanding of a given issue. Ozesmi representation’ of the groundwater system. This
and Ozesmi’s approach is designed to elicit an provided the basis upon which an agent-based
interviewee’s causal understanding of a system and model and role playing game were designed that
thus targets the cause and effect relationships were used as negotiation and decision making
between concepts. Participants are asked to specify support tools in the context of groundwater
these relationships in the constructed diagram. management. Through interacting with these tools,
Graph theory tools that apply mathematical participants were able to explore and challenge their
algorithms are then used to explore the complexity own and others’ mental models (Dray et al. 2007).
of the network diagrams, their density, i.e., how
connected or sparse they are, as well as the type and Participatory modeling initiatives relying on mental
frequency of variables featured. Ozesmi and model elicitation techniques to build a collective
Ozesmi (2004) state that “By examining the representation, or ‘shared mental model’, of a given
structure of maps we can determine how system have also been used in a number of resource
stakeholders view the system, for example whether management projects to support collective decision
they perceive a lot of forcing functions affecting the making (Lynam et al. 2002) and social learning
system which are out of their control, or whether processes (Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004). The Actors,
they see the system as hierarchical or more Resources, Dynamics and Interaction (ARDI)
democratic” (Ozesmi and Ozesmi 2004:50). method is one such method used for this purpose
According to Ozesmi and Ozesmi (2004:50), “If (Etienne et al. 2011, Mathevet et al. 2011). It
some groups perceive more relationships, they will involves systematically asking participants, either
have more options available to change things. Thus individually or as a group, who and what they
these groups may be a catalyst for change”. It is consider to be the key actors, resources, and
important to note that this does not mean that a processes, or dynamics, within a system and the
greater understanding of how a system functions interactions between these. This exercise creates a
equates with a greater capacity to initiate change representation of an individual or group mental
because other factors come into play including the model of the system in the form of an influence
social, political, and economic context. The authors diagram that can be used to guide the development
suggest that a more comprehensive understanding of a resource management plan or used as a dialogue
of a given system means a wider range of support tool.
interventions can be explored. Data representing
peoples’ mental models of cause and effect relations
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Indirect elicitation cognitive anthropology, is designed to investigate

the distribution of cultural knowledge among a
Carley and Palmquist (1992) propose that a given group of people. Cultural knowledge is
representation of a mental model, made up of conceived of as an ‘information pool’ that is held
concepts and relations, can be extracted from within the minds of individuals. It is assumed that
written documents or verbal text, which may be there is variability in the amount of information held
elicited via an interview. The verbal structure by each individual and the extent to which this
identified within a text is a sample of the full information is shared. The consensus analysis
symbolic representation of an individual’s cognitive literature refers to the part of the information pool
structure (Carley, Fauconnier, and Sowa, as cited in that each individual holds within their mind as
Carley and Palmquist 1992). ‘schema’. These are defined as “networks of
strongly connected cognitive elements that
Abel et al. (1998) used the transect walk method represent the generic concepts stored in memory”
involving a combination of open-ended and (Strauss and Quinn 1997:6) and thus can be thought
semistructured interview questions while walking of as mental models.
an area to elicit people’s understanding of causal
dynamics of landscape processes. The aims of this Consensus analysis was designed to investigate the
study were to develop a methodology to elicit content of individual’s mental models, referred to
mental models of landscape systems, and to explore as ‘schema’, and the extent to which there is an
similarities and differences in stakeholder groups’ overlap in content, or ‘shared understanding’,
understanding in the context of land management. among a given group of people. Concepts are
The study was motivated by an acknowledgment identified using open-ended interviews or free
that differences in understanding hinder communication listing tasks that involve asking interviewees to list
and cooperation between stakeholders and therefore items relevant to a given topic, for example,
impede management efforts. Interview data from medicinal plants found in a given area. Thereafter,
pastoralists, extension officers, and research in a second phase a different set of interviewees are
scientists was analyzed using content analysis then asked to sort, rank, or answer yes/no questions to
statistical analysis to identify and compare determine the similarity of responses across
differences between interviewees in emphasis on interviewees or items. Consensus analysis relies on
landscape characteristics and ecological processes, statistical analysis, i.e., factor analysis or cluster
and the causal linkages between these. Direct causal analysis, to measure the degree of consensus, or
connections between landscape variables were ‘shared knowledge’, among individuals.
recorded in a matrix. The matrix data was then
converted into an influence diagram, also referred
to as a ‘causal network diagram’, using Vensim, a CHALLENGES IN APPLYING THE
simulation and decision support package, then the MENTAL MODEL CONSTRUCT TO
INFLUENCE program (Walker 1997). The NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
resulting diagrams were taken as representing
stakeholders’ mental models of the causal dynamics The mental model construct has the potential to
of the system. The authors remind us, however, that provide insight into peoples’ understanding of
these representations of mental models are natural processes and hence natural resource
influenced by the skill of the interviewer and the management. It provides a mechanism that may
extent to which the interviewee is able to verbalize enhance our ability to understand the motivations
his or her understanding of causal dynamics. This for human behavior where other social science
capacity is likely to differ across individuals and constructs, such as attitudes, values, and beliefs,
groups, with researchers and extension officers have proved limited. In realizing this potential, a
presumably more versed in communicating their number of research challenges must be addressed.
ideas in such a context (Abel et al. 1998).
An initial challenge involves the issue of elicitation,
One approach to mental model elicitation that does which raises a number of pertinent methodological
not seek to represent a mental model as a network research questions. What are the relative strengths
of concepts and relations is consensus analysis and weaknesses of direct and indirect mental model
(discussed in greater detail in Stone-Jovicich et al. elicitation, and particular elicitation and analysis
2011). This approach, originating in the field of techniques? Do different methods suit different
 Ecology and Society 16(1): 46
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contexts and purposes? How well do they overcome concepts are organized cognitively and the dynamic
the challenge of valid external representation of interactions between them. It offers some insight
barely accessible modes of thinking? How into how people comprehend a system, how they
successful are they in their own rights, and how believe the system might respond to interventions,
much do they depend on the skill of the social and how they might intervene themselves.
scientist conducting and interpreting the elicitation Similarities and differences in understanding can be
method? To what extent do interpersonal factors, compared across time and space to improve overall
such as trust and honesty, affect the process of understanding of a given system and to support
elicitation and consequently the external representation collective action.
of a mental model and its future use? These
questions cannot readily be answered from the Theoretical evidence continues to mount within the
literature available to date; they are the subject of fields of psychology and cognitive science that
further research by the authors. people do indeed use mental models to reason and
make predictions about the world around them.
A problem closely tied to this issue of elicitation However, there remain a number of challenges to
relates to Argyris and Schon’s (1974) ‘theories of be able to situate the construct effectively within the
action’. That is, how do we know whether the NRM domain. One initial challenge is to continue
elicited mental model represents the interviewee’s to improve methods of eliciting mental models.
‘espoused theory’ (what they say) or their ‘theory Systems of interest in the domain of NRM are
in use’ (what they do)? The eventual discrepancies complex and dynamic, functioning at a range of
between these often explain conflicts observed temporal and spatial scales. Elicitation techniques
between mental and, so-called, behavioral models. therefore need to be capable of incorporating this
If mental models are assumed to be the cognitive complexity and they need to be capable of clear and
mechanism upon which reasoning, decision legitimate representation of people’s thinking.
making, and behavior are based, in some cases, Although other fields of study, such as systems
depending on the research purpose, it is the ‘theory- research and risk communication, have much to
in-use’ version of the mental model in which we are offer in this regard, further research is required to
most interested. assess the relative merits of existing techniques and
develop new techniques suited to the NRM field.
If the mental model construct is to be used as a Actors within the NRM context are typically
theoretical tool to better understand how people diverse, coming from a range of socio-cultural
think about and thus interact with natural resource backgrounds. Elicitation techniques therefore need
systems, or a practical tool to support collective to cater to the interpersonal diversity and
decision making and action, further research on the complexity of actor relationships inherent to the
relationships between individual and collective field of NRM. A rich mental models approach in
mental models is also required. NRM might thus seek to build communication and
collaboration across actors by using mental models
as a means of mutual understanding (Abel et al.
CONCLUSION 1998). It would ensure elicitation of mental models
in a holistic way, that goes beyond mental models
Using the mental model construct to gain insight of biophysical and tangible processes to incorporate
into how people conceive, and therefore are inclined peoples’ understandings of governance, and inter-
to act toward, the world around them is, theoretically actor relationships, including trust and differing
speaking, an attractive proposition for natural values.
resource management practitioners. A mental
model approach to cognition goes beyond
stakeholders’ preferences, goals, and values Responses to this article can be read online at:
associated with a given resource, to provide a rich http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art46/
responses/
picture of how stakeholders perceive natural
resource systems to function. This picture can tell
us not only what concepts stakeholders’ consider
important to a given issue, but also how these
 Ecology and Society 16(1): 46
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