F 14d Manual

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1 THE

1
AIRCRAFT
INDOCTRINATION 2
NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL NORMAL

PROCEDURES
3
NAVY MODEL
F−14D FLIGHT
CHARACTERISTICS
4
AIRCRAFT
EMERGENCY
5
PROCEDURES
THIS PUBLICATION IS INCOMPLETE WITHOUT
NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1 AND NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A
TACTICAL SOFTWARE EFFECTIVITY: OFP D04 ALL−WEATHER

6
OPERATIONS
COMM
7
PROCEDURES
WEAPON
8
SYSTEMS
FLIGHTCREW
9
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C Distribution authorized to U.S. Govern- COORDINATION
mentAgencies and their contractors to protect publications required
for official use or for administrative or operational purposes only
(1 January 1991). Other requests for this document shall be referred to
NATOPS
Commanding Officer, Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service 10
EVALUATION
Command, Naval Aviation Depot North Island, Bldg. 90, Distribution, P.O.
Box 357031, San Diego, CA 92135−7031.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE For unclassified, limited documents, destroy PERFORMANCE

11
by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction DATA
of the document.
ISSUED BY AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS INDEX &

AND UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE FOLDOUTS
COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
0801LP1032160 1 (Reverse Blank) 15 APRIL 2002
Change 2 — 15 JANUARY 2004
1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL
NATEC ELECTRONIC MANUAL

NOTICE NOTICE
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
16 JANUARY 2004
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1, Change 2, dated 15 January 2004, has a print error on page 65
(incorrect configuration). Remove and discard previously provided page 65/66 and
replace with attached pages.
Place this page behind title page after incorporation.
NOTICE NOTICE
INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY
The following Interim Changes have been canceled or previously incorporated in this manual:
INTERIM
CHANGE REMARKS/PURPOSE
NUMBER(S)
1 through 26 Previously incorporated
The following Interim Changes have been incorporated in this Change/Revision:
INTERIM
NUMBER(S)
27 Modifies the L and/or R Fuel Press Light(s) and Warning Tone Emergency Procedure,
and Adds Fuel Imbalance / Fuel Quantity Balancing Emergency Procedure.
Interim Changes Outstanding To be maintained by the custodian of this manual:
INTERIM
ORIGINATOR/DATE PAGES
(OR DATE/TIME GROUP) AFFECTED
NUMBER
5 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 2

ORIGINAL
PTTUZYUW RULSABU1234 2032006-UUUU--RHMCSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
P 212006Z JUL 04 ZYB
FM COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//4.0P//
TO ALL TOMCAT AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
AL ALL TOMCAT AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
INFO COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//5.0F/4.1//
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//11//
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA//N421B//
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N421B1//
COMFITWINGLANT OCEANA VA//N4//
NAVAIRDEPOT JACKSONVILLE FL//3.3.3//
NAVSURVTRAINST PENSACOLA FL//02/025//
BT
UNCLAS //N03711//
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/4.0P//
SUBJ/F-14ABD AIRCRAFT NATOPS PUBLICATIONS INTERIM CHANGE -
/SAFETY OF FLIGHT//
REF/A/EML/COMNAVAIRFOR/20JUL2004//
REF/B/MSG/FITRON ON ZERO ONE/021438ZJUN2004//
REF/C/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/D/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/E/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/F/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/G/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/H/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
NARR/REF A IS NATOPS REQUEST FOR RELEASE.
REF B IS NATOPS URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATION.
REF C IS F-14D POCKET CHECKLIST (PCL) 01-F14AAD-1B, DTD 15 APR 02
WITH CHANGE 2 DTD 15 JAN 04.
REF D IS F-14D FLIGHT MANUAL (NFM) 01-F14AAD-1, DTD 15 APR 02 WITH
CHANGE 2 DTD 15 JAN 04.
REF E IS F-14B POCKET CHECKLIST (PCL) 01-F14AAP-1B, DTD 01 AUG 01
REF F IS F-14B FLIGHT MANUAL (NFM) 01-F14AAP-1, DTD 01 AUG 01 WITH
REF G IS F-14A POCKET CHECKLIST (PCL) 01-F14AAA-1B, DTD 15 MAY 03
REF H IS F-14A FLIGHT MANUAL (NFM) 01-F14AAA-1, DTD 15 MAY 03 WITH
CHANGE 1 DTD 15 JAN 04.//
RMKS/1. IRT REFS A AND B, THIS MESSAGE ISSUES INTERIM CHANGE (IC)
NUMBER 18 TO REF C, INTERIM CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 29 TO REF D, INTERIM
CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 33 TO REF E, INTERIM CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 49 TO REF
F, INTERIM CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 107 TO REF G AND INTERIM CHANGE (IC)
NUMBER 151 TO REF H.
2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES MAKE MINOR CORRECTIONS TO REFS C
THROUGH H FOR THE L AND/OR R FUEL PRESS LIGHT(S) AND WARNING
TONE EMERGENCY PROCEDURE. THE CORRECTIONS FOLLOW A SIMPLE AND
LOGICAL PROGRESSION THROUGH EACH PCL AND NFM AS INDICATED.
3. CHANGE REF C (F-14D PCL) AS FOLLOWS:
A. PAGE 114, TITLE:
(1) DELETE: WARNING TONE.
(2) ADD: 10 SEC WARNING TONE.
NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 1 of 3 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 151

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 107
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 49
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 33
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 29
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 18
B. PAGE 114, LINE 3 (AFTER STEP 2):
(1) DELETE: AND WARNING TONE
(2) ADD: NA
C. PAGE 114, LINE 20 (AFTER WARNING PARAGRAPHS):
(1) DELETE: AND THE WARNING TONE
(2) ADD: NA
D. PAGE 114A, NOTE SECTION, SECOND NOTE PARAGRAPH, LINE 1:
(1) DELETE: AND
(2) ADD: AND/OR
4. CHANGE REF D (F-14D NFM) AS FOLLOWS:
A. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-18, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, TITLE:
(1) DELETE: WARNING TONE
B. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-18, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, LINE 3:
(2) ADD: NA
C. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-18, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, SECOND COLUMN,
LINE 13:
(2) ADD: NA
D. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-18, SECOND COLUMN, SECOND NOTE PARAGRAPH,
LINE 1:
(1) DELETE: AND
(2) ADD: AND/OR
5. CHANGE REF E (F-14B PCL) AS FOLLOWS:
A. PAGE 123, TITLE:
(2) ADD: NA
C. PAGE 124, LINE 1:
(2) ADD: NA
D. PAGE 124A, NOTE PARAGRAPH, LINE 1:
(1) DELETE: AND
(2) ADD: AND/OR
6. CHANGE REF F (F-14B NFM) AS FOLLOWS:
(2) ADD: NA
C. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-19, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, LINE 20:
(2) ADD: NA
D. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-19, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, SECOND COLUMN,
SECOND NOTE PARAGRAPH, LINE 1:
(1) DELETE: AND
(2) ADD: AND/OR
7. CHANGE REF G (F-14A PCL) AS FOLLOWS:
A. PAGE 94, TITLE:

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 107
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 49
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 33
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 29
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 18
(2) ADD: NA
C. PAGE 94, LINE 20 (AFTER WARNING PARAGRAPHS):
(2) ADD: NA
D. PAGE 94A, NOTE SECTION, SECOND NOTE PARAGRAPH, LINE 1:
(1) DELETE: AND
(2) ADD: AND/OR
8. CHANGE REF H (F-14A NFM) AS FOLLOWS:
(2) ADD: NA
C. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-15, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, SECOND COLUMN,
LINE 1:
(2) ADD: NA
D. CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-15, PARAGRAPH 14.6.1.1, SECOND COLUMN,
SECOND NOTE PARAGRAPH, LINE 1:
(1) DELETE: AND
(2) ADD: AND/OR
9. POINTS OF CONTACT:
A. F-14ABD NATOPS PROGRAM MANAGER, LT KYLE MILLER, TEL DSN 433-5147,
OR COMM (757)433-5147, EMAIL: MILLERKA(AT)VF101.NAVY.MIL
B. NAVAIR POCS:
1. LT MIKE DOXEY, F-14ABD CLASS DESK, TEL DSN 757-7021, OR COMM
(301)757-7021, EMAIL: MICHAEL.DOXEY(AT)NAVY.MIL
2. LCDR JR NASH, 4.0P NATOPS OFFICER, TEL DSN 995-2052, OR
COMM (301)995-2052, EMAIL: JAMES.NASH(AT)NAVY.MIL
3. KRISTIN SWIFT, 4.0P NATOPS CHIEF ENGINEER, TEL DSN 995-4193,
OR COMM (301)995-4193, EMAIL: KRISTIN.SWIFT(AT)NAVY.MIL
10. THIS MESSAGE WILL BE POSTED ON THE NATEC WEBSITE,
WWW.NATEC.NAVY.MIL WITHIN 15 DAYS OF RELEASE. NEW NATOPS IC MESSAGES
MAY BE FOUND IN TWO PLACES ON THIS WEBSITE:
(1) IN THE NATOPS IC DATABASE FOUND UNDER THE TMAPS OPTION, AND
(2) IN THE AFFECTED PUBLICATIONS(S) JUST AFTER THE IC SUMMARY PAGE
IF THE IC MESSAGE INCLUDES REPLACEMENT PAGES, THEY WILL BE
ADDITIONALLY PLACED WITHIN THE MANUAL AND REPLACED PAGES DELETED.
MESSAGES ARE NORMALLY POSTED IN THE DATABASE BEFORE APPEARING IN THE
PUBLICATION. THIS MESSAGE WILL ALSO BE POSTED ON THE NATOPS WEBSITE,
NATOPS.NAVAIR.NAVY.MIL. IF UNABLE TO VIEW THIS MESSAGE ON EITHER
THE NATEC OR NATOPS WEBSITES, INFORM THE NATOPS GLOBAL CUSTOMER
SUPPORT TEAM AT (301) 342-3276, DSN 342-3276, OR BY EMAIL AT
NATOPS(AT)NAVY.MIL.//
BT
#1234
NNNN

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 107
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 49
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 33
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 29
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 18
PTTUZYUW RULSABU1234 2032005-UUUU--RHMCSUU.
ZNR UUUUU
P 212005Z JUL 04
FM COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//4.0P//
TO ALL TOMCAT AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
AL ALL TOMCAT AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES
INFO COMNAVAIRSYSCOM PATUXENT RIVER MD//5.0F/4.1//
COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//11//
COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N421B1//
COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA//N421B//
COMFITWINGLANT OCEANA VA//N4//
NAVAIRDEPOT JACKSONVILLE FL//3.3.3//
NAVSURVTRAINST PENSACOLA FL//02/025//
FITRON ONE ZERO ONE
BT
UNCLAS //N03711//
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/4.0P//
SUBJ/F-14ABD AIRCRAFT NATOPS PUBLICATIONS INTERIM CHANGE -
/SAFETY OF FLIGHT//
REF/A/EML/COMNAVAIRFOR/20JUL2004//
REF/B/MSG/FITRON ONE ZERO ONE/011815ZJUL2004//
REF/C/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/D/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/E/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/F/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/G/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
REF/H/DOC/COMNAVAIRSYSCOM/15JAN2004//
NARR/REF A IS NATOPS REQUEST FOR RELEASE.
REF B IS NATOPS URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATION.
REF C IS F-14D POCKET CHECKLIST (PCL) 01-F14AAD-1B, DTD 15 APR 02
REF D IS F-14D FLIGHT MANUAL (NFM) 01-F14AAD-1, DTD 15 APR 02 WITH
REF E IS F-14B POCKET CHECKLIST (PCL) 01-F14AAP-1B, DTD 01 AUG 01
REF F IS F-14B FLIGHT MANUAL (NFM) 01-F14AAP-1, DTD 01 AUG 01 WITH
REF G IS F-14A POCKET CHECKLIST (PCL) 01-F14AAA-1B, DTD 15 MAY 03
REF H IS F-14A FLIGHT MANUAL (NFM) 01-F14AAA-1, DTD 15 MAY 03 WITH
CHANGE 1 DTD 15 JAN 04.//
RMKS/1. IRT REFS A AND B, THIS MESSAGE ISSUES INTERIM CHANGE (IC)
NUMBER 17 TO REF C, INTERIM CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 28 TO REF D, INTERIM
CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 32 TO REF E, INTERIM CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 48 TO REF
F, INTERIM CHANGE (IC) NUMBER 106 TO REF G AND INTERIM CHANGE (IC)
NUMBER 150 TO REF H.
2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING CHANGES MAKE CORRECTIONS TO
REFS C THROUGH H FOR THE FUEL IMBALANCE/FUEL QUANTITY BALANCING
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE. THE CORRECTIONS FOLLOW A SIMPLE AND LOGICAL
PROGRESSION THROUGH EACH PCL AND NFM AS INDICATED. CHANGES MAY
REQUIRE THE INSERTION OF A NEW PAGE IN SOME PCLS. REPLACEMENT
PAGES CONTAINING THIS INTERIM CHANGE FOR DOWNLOADING AND
INSERTION INTO REFS C THRU H WILL BE ATTACHED TO THIS INTERIM

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
CHANGE MSG WHEN IT IS POSTED ON THE NATEC AND NATOPS
WEBSITES (SEE LAST PARA BELOW)).
3. CHANGE REF C (F-14D PCL), FUEL CHAPTER, PAGE 118, AS FOLLOWS:
A. (1) DELETE: STATEMENTS UNDER FIRST WARNING: "DURING AB
OPERATIONS, NORM SHALL BE SELECTED. FWD OR AFT COULD DEPLETE THE
SUMP TANKS."
(2) ADD (REPLACE WITH): "AB OPERATION IS NOT RECOMMENDED WITH
A FUEL IMBALANCE OR WITH INDICATIONS OF VENTING FUEL."
B. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): NOTE PARAGRAPH BEFORE THE EXISTING
NOTE PARAGRAPH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCEDURE TO READ:
"FUEL QUANTITY BALANCING IS NOT REQUIRED PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF
WING/EXTERNAL TANK TRANSFER OR UNTIL ONE FUSELAGE TAPE DROPS BELOW
4,500 POUNDS."
C. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD: STATEMENT IN CAPITAL ITALICS, PRIOR TO STEP 1, TO
READ: "WITH A FUEL STATE BELOW 4500 POUNDS IN A SINGLE FEED GROUP
AND A FUEL SPLIT GREATER THAN 1500 POUNDS BETWEEN THE AFT/LEFT AND
FWD/RIGHT FEED GROUPS:"
D. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): NOTE PARAGRAPH IMMEDIATELY AFTER STEP 2
TO READ: "IF PRACTICAL, OBTAIN A VISUAL INSPECTION FOR VENTING
FUEL.DO NOT DELAY EXECUTION OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR VISUAL
INSPECTION."
E. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): NOTE PARAGRAPH AFTER PRECEDING (INSERTED)
NOTE PARAGRAPH, BUT PRIOR TO THE EXISTING WARNING PARAGRAPH TO READ:
"INDICATION OF FUEL BALANCING SHOULD APPEAR WITHIN 3 MINUTES OF
SELECTING THE HIGH FUSELAGE TAPE SIDE."
F. (1) DELETE: ENTIRE WARNING THAT BEGINS WITH "AIRCRAFT
ATTITUDE WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE..."
(2) ADD: NA
G. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (MOVE): FIRST NOTE PARAGRAPH OF EXISTING PROCEDURE
THAT BEGINS, "WITH A HIGH QUANTITY...", TO A POSITION IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE SECOND ADDED NOTE PARAGRAPH BETWEEN STEPS 2 AND 3.
UPDATE THE NOTE PARAGRAPH TO READ: "WITH A HIGH QUANTITY IN THE
FWD/RT FUEL SYSTEM, THE GREATER STATIC HEAD PRESSURE, PARTICULARLY
IN NOSE-UP ATTITUDES CAN CAUSE OVERFILLING OF THE AFT/LT FUEL SYSTEM
AND SUBSEQUENT FUEL VENTING. TO PREVENT THIS, THE FEED SWITCH
SHOULD BE RETURNED TO NORM BEFORE THE AFT/LT TAPE REACHES 6,200
POUNDS. OVERFILLING IS INDICATED BY A QUANTITY OF 6,600 POUNDS OR
GREATER IN THE FWD/RT SYSTEM OR 6,200 POUNDS OF GREATER IN THE
AFT/LT SYSTEM."
H. (1) DELETE: STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING STEP 3 THAT
READS: "IF FUEL IMBALANCE INCREASES:"
(2) ADD (REPLACE WITH): "IF NO VENTING IS OBSERVED
AND/OR THE FUEL IMBALANCE IS CORRECTED WITH THE FUEL FEED
SWITCH:"
I. (1) DELETE: EXISTING STEP 3.
(2) ADD (REPLACE WITH): "3. FUEL FEED SWITCH - AS REQUIRED
AND LAND AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE."
J. (1) DELETE: NA

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
(2) ADD (INSERT): STATEMENT IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO STEP 4 TO
READ: "IF FUEL VENTING EXISTS AND/OR FUEL IMBALANCE EXCEEDS
2,000 POUNDS:"
K. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): NEW STEP 4 TO READ: "FUEL FEED SWITCH -
NORM."
L. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): WARNING PARAGRAPH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING NEW
STEP 4 TO READ: "VENTING FUEL IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN UNCONTROLLABLE
FUEL SPLIT IS INDICATIVE OF A MOTIVE FLOW FAILURE AND CAN RESULT IN
THE HIGH FEED GROUP HAVING TRAPPED/UNUSABLE FUEL. IF THIS OCCURS,
AIRCREW MAY HAVE AS LITTLE AS 4,500 POUNDS OF USABLE FUEL REMAINING
AND A NEW BINGO PROFILE MAY BE REQUIRED."
M. (1) DELETE (CHANGE): RENUMBER EXISTING STEP 4 TO NEW STEP 5
WITHOUT CHANGING VERBIAGE.
N. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): STATEMENT AFTER NEW STEP 5 TO
READ: "IF INDICATIONS OF A FUEL LEAK EXIST:"
O. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): NEW STEP 6 AFTER STATEMENT TO READ:
"6. REFER TO FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE (PAGE 116)."
4. CHANGE REF D (F-14D NFM), CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-20, PARAGRAPH
14.6.6 AS FOLLOWS:
SUMP TANKS."
B. (1) DELETE: NA
4,500 POUNDS."
C. (1) DELETE: NA
D. (1) DELETE: NA
INSPECTION."
E. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD (INSERT): NOTE PARAGRAPH AFTER PRECEEDING (INSERTED)
(2) ADD: NA
G. (1) DELETE: NA

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
AFT/LT SYSTEM."
SWITCH:"
J. (1) DELETE: NA
2,000 POUNDS:"
K. (1) DELETE: NA
NORM."
L. (1) DELETE: NA
N. (1) DELETE: NA
O. (1) DELETE: NA
"6. REFER TO FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE (PAGE 14-19)."
5. CHANGE REF E (F-14B PCL), FUEL CHAPTER, PAGE 127 & 128 AS
FOLLOWS:
SUMP TANKS."
(2) ADD (REPLACE WITH): "AB OPERATION IS NOT RECOMMENDED
WITH A FUEL IMBALANCE OR WITH INDICATIONS OF VENTING FUEL."
B. (1) DELETE: NA

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
4,500 POUNDS."
C. (1) DELETE: NA
D. (1) DELETE: NA
INSPECTION."
E. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD: NA
G. (1) DELETE: NA
AFT/LT SYSTEM."
SWITCH:"
J. (1) DELETE: NA
2,000 POUNDS:"
K. (1) DELETE: NA
NORM."
L. (1) DELETE: NA

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
N. (1) DELETE: NA
O. (1) DELETE: NA
"6. REFER TO FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE (PAGE 126A)."
6. CHANGE REF F (F-14B NFM), CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-20A, PARAGRAPH
14.6.6 AS FOLLOWS:
SUMP TANKS."
B. (1) DELETE: NA
4,500 POUNDS."
C. (1) DELETE: NA
D. (1) DELETE: NA
INSPECTION."
E. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD: NA
G. (1) DELETE: NA
AFT/LT SYSTEM."

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
SWITCH:"
J. (1) DELETE: NA
2,000 POUNDS:"
K. (1) DELETE: NA
NORM."
L. (1) DELETE: NA
N. (1) DELETE: NA
O. (1) DELETE: NA
7. CHANGE REF G (F-14A PCL), FUEL CHAPTER, PAGE 98, AS FOLLOWS:
SUMP TANKS."
B. (1) DELETE: NA
4,500 POUNDS."
C. (1) DELETE: NA
D. (1) DELETE: NA
INSPECTION."
E. (1) DELETE: NA

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
(2) ADD: NA
G. (1) DELETE: NA
AFT/LT SYSTEM."
SWITCH:"
J. (1) DELETE: NA
2,000 POUNDS:"
K. (1) DELETE: NA
NORM."
L. (1) DELETE: NA
N. (1) DELETE: NA
O. (1) DELETE: NA
"6. REFER TO FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE (PAGE 97)."
8. CHANGE REF H (F-14A NFM), CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-17, PARAGRAPH

14.6.6 AS FOLLOWS:
SUMP TANKS."

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
(2) ADD (REPLACE WITH): "AB OPERATION IS NOT RECOMMENDED
WITH A FUEL IMBALANCE OR WITH INDICATIONS OF VENTING FUEL."
B. (1) DELETE: NA
4,500 POUNDS."
C. (1) DELETE: NA
D. (1) DELETE: NA
INSPECTION."
E. (1) DELETE: NA
(2) ADD: NA
G. (1) DELETE: NA
AFT/LT SYSTEM."
SWITCH:"
J. (1) DELETE: NA
2,000 POUNDS:"
K. (1) DELETE: NA
NORM."

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
L. (1) DELETE: NA
N. (1) DELETE: NA
O. (1) DELETE: NA
9. POINTS OF CONTACT:
A. F-14ABD NATOPS PROGRAM MANAGER, LT KYLE MILLER, TEL DSN 433-5147,
OR COMM (757)433-5147, EMAIL: MILLERKA(AT)VF101.NAVY.MIL
B. NAVAIR POCS:
1. LT MIKE DOXEY, F-14ABD CLASS DESK, TEL DSN 757-7021,
OR COMM(301)757-7021, EMAIL: MICHAEL.DOXEY(AT)NAVY.MIL
2. LCDR JR NASH, 4.0P NATOPS OFFICER, TEL DSN 995-2052, OR
COMM (301)995-2052, EMAIL: JAMES.NASH(AT)NAVY.MIL
3. KRISTIN SWIFT, 4.0P NATOPS CHIEF ENGINEER, TEL DSN 995-4193,
OR COMM (301)995-4193, EMAIL: KRISTIN.SWIFT(AT)NAVY.MIL
10. THIS MESSAGE WILL BE POSTED ON THE NATEC WEBSITE,
WWW.NATEC.NAVY.MIL WITHIN 15 DAYS OF RELEASE. NEW NATOPS IC MESSAGES
MAY BE FOUND IN TWO PLACES ON THIS WEBSITE:
(1) IN THE NATOPS IC DATABASE FOUND UNDER THE TMAPS OPTION, AND
(2) IN THE AFFECTED PUBLICATIONS(S) JUST AFTER THE IC SUMMARY PAGE.
IF THE IC MESSAGE INCLUDES REPLACEMENT PAGES, THEY WILL BE
ADDITIONALLY PLACED WITHIN THE MANUAL AND REPLACED PAGES DELETED.
MESSAGES ARE NORMALLY POSTED IN THE DATABASE BEFORE APPEARING IN THE
PUBLICATION. THIS MESSAGE WILL ALSO BE POSTED ON THE NATOPS WEBSITE,
NATOPS.NAVAIR.NAVY.MIL. IF UNABLE TO VIEW THIS MESSAGE ON EITHER
THE NATEC OR NATOPS WEBSITES, INFORM THE NATOPS GLOBAL CUSTOMER
SUPPORT TEAM AT (301) 342-3276, DSN 342-3276, OR BY EMAIL AT
NATOPS(AT)NAVY.MIL.//
BT
#1234
NNNN

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
F-14D AIRCRAFT
NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL
INTERIM CHANGE 28 & 29
REPLACEMENT PAGES
---------------------------
1. Replacement pages for Interim Change Numbers 28 & 29 to the F-14D

NFM, NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1 dated 15 Jan 2004, are attached as follows:
Page Page Version Marking

------ ----------------------
14-17 Change 2
14-18 Change 2 W/ IC 29
14-19 Change 2
14-20 Change 2 W/ IC 28
14-20a Change 2 W/ IC 28
14-20b Change 2 W/ IC 28

A1-F14AAA-1B IC 106
A1-F14AAP-1 IC 48
A1-F14AAP-1B IC 32
A1-F14AAD-1 IC 28
A1-F14AAD-1B IC 17
Note 14.5.13.1 OIL PRESS Light and/or

Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi- Abnormal Oil Pressure
nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights. 1. Throttle (affected engine) IDLE.
Above about 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and
ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated. If oil pressure is below 15 psi, above 65 psi, or engine
These should clear with a MASTER RESET fol- vibration:
lowing a programmer reset. If shutdown is feasible:
8. Affected INLET RAMPS switch AUTO. 2. Throttle (affected engine) OFF.
9. Remain below 1.2 TMN. 3. Refer to Single Engine Cruise Operations, para-
graph 14.5.3.2.
When AICS programmer reset attempts are completed:
If shutdown is not feasible:
12. Wing sweep drive cb’s Reset (LD1 and LE1).
4. Rpm Set Minimum Rpm.
14.5.12 INLET ICE Light
5. Avoid high−g or large throttle movements.
1. ANTI−ICE switch ORIDE/ON. 6. Land as soon as practicable.
When clear of known icing conditions:
14.5.13.2 L or R OIL HOT Light
2. ANTI−ICE switch AUTO/OFF.
Illumination of an OIL HOT caution light may be

Ice may form on inlet and ramp surfaces without
an indication of above normal gearbox scavenge
any other visual indications, which may cause
oil temperature or high supply temperature. Con-
compressor stalls and/or FOD.
tinuous engine operation will result in reduced
gearbox life and lubrication degradation.
Note
On deck, OIL HOT light may be caused by
The formation of ice on pitot−static sensors may underservicing or by excessive temperature on
result in DFCS detected failures that may not deck. In the event of OIL HOT light on deck posi-
clear with a MASTER RESET. tion throttles to OFF.
1. Oil pressure Check.
14.5.13 Oil System Malfunction
2. Throttle (affected engine) 85−Percent Rpm.
Malfunctions in the oil system are indicated by an L or
R OIL HOT light, OIL PRESS light, or by oil pressure below If after 1 minute light is still illuminated:
or above normal. 3. Throttle (affected engine) OFF.
If oil pressure is over 65 psi, retard power until pressure 4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para-
is within the normal range. If pressure cannot be reduced, the graph 14.5.3.2.
engine should be shut down to avoid rupturing oil lines. If oil
5. Relight engine for landing, if necessary.
pressure is less than 15 psi, bearing wear can be minimized
by maintaining a constant throttle setting and avoiding 6. Land as soon as possible.
unnecessary aircraft maneuvers. Bearing failure is normally
If light goes out, land as soon as practicable.
characterized by vibration, increasing in intensity with
bearing deterioration. When vibration becomes moderate to
14.5.14 RATS Operation In Flight
heavy, engine seizure is imminent if engine is not shut down.
Continued operation of an engine with oil pressure less than 1. Tailhook DOWN.
15 psi is likely to result in illumination of OIL HOT light or
If conditions permit:
an engine seizure. If conditions permit it is advisable to shut
down the engine to reduce damage and to save it for 2. ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD/AIR
emergency use. cb Pull (8C2).
14−17 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
6. Land as soon as possible.
D Pulling the ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK

CONT/ WSHLD/AIR cb (8C2) disables D Illumination of both lights and the warning
RATS. Inform CV of increased wind−over− tone may be indicative of a total motive−flow
deck requirements and gross weight settings failure. Zero− or negative−g flight should be
for a non−RATS arrestment. avoided.
D With the circuit breaker in and RATS operat- D Complete loss of motive flow will result in the
ing, there is reduced thrust available for sump tank interconnect and the engine feed
approach and use of afterburner may be crossfeed valve remaining in the closed posi-
required to arrest sink rate. tion, isolating the forward and aft systems. Con-
sequently, single−engine operation will cause
fuel on the opposite side to be unavailable.
If one light remains on:
3. No afterburner above 15,000 feet.
ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD/ 4. Fuel distribution  Monitor (balance if required).
AIR circuit breaker (8C2) must be in prior to
hook transition. Avoid icing conditions and rain 5. Land as soon as practicable.
with circuit breaker pulled. If migration occurs after balancing, as indicated by a
Note 100 to 300 PPM increase on the inoperative side or a 100 to
300 PPM decrease on the operative side above expected burn
D If RATS secures when the hook is raised with rate according to indicated fuel flow:
no other weight−on−wheels indication, failure
is internal to the RATS circuitry. 6. FUEL PRESS ADVSY CB − PULL (8F1).
D With ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/ Note
WSHLD/AIR cb (8C2) pulled, approach Pulling the FUEL PRESS ADVSY CB will cause
indexers will flash. the engine crossfeed valve to close and the in-
operative side fuselage motive flow shutoff valve
14.6 FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS to open. This will reduce the amount of fuel
transfer from the operative side to the inoperative
14.6.1 Fuel Pressure Caution Lights/Low Fuel side.
Pressure Warning Tone Note
Afterburner operations place an extreme demand on the The L or R FUEL PRESS light and/or warning
engine fuel feed system. Aircraft maneuvers in the zero to tone will extinguish when the FUEL PRESS
negative 0.5g flight regime aggravate the effect and may gen- ADVSY CB is pulled.
erate a situation where afterburner blowout and engine flame- 7. Maintain cruise power or less.
out occur. The first indication of this condition may be a fuel
8. Fuel distribution − monitor (balance if required).
pressure light or an aural tone (engine stall warning tone).
14.6.1.1 L and/or R FUEL PRESS Light(s) and

10 sec Warning Tone
1. Both throttles MIL Power or Less. If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed,
selecting AFT or FWD on the FEED SWITCH
2. Restore aircraft to 1.0g flight. could result in fuel migration to the inoperative
side. If fuel migration occurs after selecting AFT
If both lights remain on:
or FWD on the FEED SWITCH (as indicated by
3. Increase positive g’s to greater than 1.0g. a 100 to 300 PPM increase on the inoperative
side), immediately return the feed switch to
4. Descend below 25,000 feet. NORM.
5. Maintain cruise power settings or less. 9. Land as soon as possible.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 w/ IC 29 14−18
14.6.2 L or R FUEL LOW Light

1. DUMP switch  OFF.
2. Fuel distribution  Check (balance if required).
CV arrestment, CV touch and go, or normal field
If wing and/or external fuel remaining: landings with full or partial fuel in the external
tanks is not authorized because of overload of the
3. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE. nacelle backup structure. Only minimum descent
4. Land as soon as practicable. rate landings are authorized.
14.6.3.3 Wings Do Not Accept Fuel With Switch

14.6.3 Fuel Transfer Failures
in ALL EXTD Position
1. REFUEL PROBE switch  FUS EXTD.
2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF.
14.6.3.4 Wings Accept Fuel With Switch in

Wing and external fuel will not transfer with FUS EXTD Position
refuelprobe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe exten-
sion required, select FUS EXTD to enable transfer. 1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.
Note
Note With AIR SOURCE OFF pushbutton selected,
Fuel management panel will be inoperative if external fuel tanks will not transfer.
FUEL MGT PNL cb (RD1) is out.
14.6.4 Uncommanded Dump
1. Fuel Management Panel cbCheck in (RD1). 1. DUMP switch  Check OFF.
2. FUEL FEED/DUMP cb  Pull (RE1).
14.6.3.1 Wing Fuel Fails To Transfer
If wing fuel fails to transfer:

1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.
Pulling the FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker
One wing still does not transfer: (RE1) isolates the right and left fuel systems. It
also deactivates the function of the feed switch,
2. FEED switch  Select High Fuselage Tape Side. the automatic balance functions, and the fuel
dump system. Should single engine operation
If wing fuel does not decrease after 2 minutes or wing subsequently become necessary, useable fuel
fuel transfer complete: willbe limited to only what is available on the
3. FEED switch  NORM. operating side.
14.6.3.2 External Tanks Fail To Transfer or 14.6.5 Fuel Leak

Transfer Slowly In the absence of actual visual detection, a fuel leak
Note resulting from a malfunction or failure of a fuel system
Descending below freezing level may thaw component will usually result in a split in the fuel quantity
possible frozen valves. tapes or feeds. The flightcrew must determine from available
instruments (fuel flow and total fuel quantity) whether the
1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE. aircraft is losing more fuel than the engines indicate they are
If fuel continues to transfer improperly or does not using. Corrective steps are based on confirmation of the leak.
transfer: Upon confirmation of abnormal decrease in fuel quantity:
2. REFUEL PROBE switch  All Extend, Then
Retract.
3. Apply cyclic positive or negative g’s.
4. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF then RAM then
ON (below 35,000 feet, less than 300 knots). Use of afterburner with fuel leak should be lim-
itedto emergency use only.
14−19 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF. 14.6.6 Fuel Imbalance/Fuel Quantity Balancing

If abnormal fuel quantity decrease ceases, fuel leak is
inwing/wing pivot or attachment points for auxiliary tanks:
Note
This cannot be determined until the fuel level has AB operation is not recommended with a fuel
decreased to below the source of the leak. Do not imbalance or with indications of venting fuel.
proceed until the wings are empty.
Note
If leak is not stopped, it is in engine/nacelle area, pro- Fuel quantity balancing is not required prior to
ceed immediately with next step. completion of wing/external tank transfer or until
3. FUEL FEED/DUMP cb  Pull (RE1). one fuselage tape drops below 4,500 pounds.
WITH A FUEL STATE BELOW 4500 POUNDS IN EITHER

THE AFT/LEFT OR FWD/RT FEED GROUPS AND A FUEL
SPLIT GREATER THAN 1500 POUNDS BETWEEN THE
Pulling the FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker AFT/LEFT AND FWD/RIGHT FEED GROUPS:
(RE1) isolates the right and left fuel systems. It
also deactivates the function of the feed switch, 1. Both throttles − MIL power or less.
the automatic balance functions, and the fuel
dump system. Should single engine operation 2. FEED SWITCH − select high fuselage tape side.
subsequently become necessary, useable fuel
Note
will be limited to only what is available on the
operating side. D If practical, obtain a visual inspection for vent-
Note ing fuel. Do not delay execution of emer-
gency procedures for visual inspection.
Enough time should be allowed for quantity
tapes/ feeds to develop split so that leak can be D Indication of fuel balancing should appear
isolated to left or right feed group. Affected side within 3 minutes of selecting the high fuselage
will be low side. tape side.
4. Throttle (affected side)  OFF.
D With a high quantity in the FWD/RT fuel sys-
5. Conditions permitting, allow rpm to decelerate to tem, the greater static head pressure, particu-
windmill rpm. larly in nose−up attitudes can cause overfilling
6. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (affected side)  Pull. of the AFT/LT fuel system and subsequent fuel
7. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para- venting. To prevent this, the feed switch should
graph 14.5.3.2. be returned to NORM before the AFT/LT tape
reaches 6,200 pounds. Overfilling is indicated
Setting the WING/EXT TRANS switch to OFF stops by a quantity of 6,600 pounds or greater in the
motive flow to the wings and inhibits external tank transfer FWD/RT system or 6,200 pounds or greater in
and fuselage tank pressurization. Pulling the FUEL FEED/ the AFT/LT system.
DUMP circuit breaker (RE1) isolates the right and forward
system and the left and aft fuel system. This aids in determin- If no venting is observed and/or the fuel imbalance is
ing the location of the leak and prevents loss of fuel from the corrected with the fuel feed switch:
good side via the fuel system interconnects. The circuit
breaker also deactivates the function of the FEED switch, the 3. FUEL FEED SWITCH − As required and land as
automatic balance functions, and the fuel dump system. soon as practicable.
Securing the engine and, if necessary, pulling the FUEL
SHUTOFF handle should stop most engine leaks.
If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed

closed, selecting AFT or FWD on the FUEL
FEED SWITCH could result in rapid increase of
the fuel imbalance. If this occurs (as indicated by
an imbalance increase of 100 to 300 PPM) imme-
diately return the FEED SWITCH to NORM.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 w/ IC 28 14−20
If fuel venting exists and/or fuel imbalance exceeds 14.7.1.1 L or R GEN Light
2,000pounds:
1. Generator (affected generator switch)  OFF/
4. FUEL FEED SWITCH − NORM. RESET, Then NORM.
Note
If the generator fault is corrected, the generator will
Venting fuel in conjunction with an uncontrol- be reconnected and the caution light will go off.
lable fuel split is indicative of a motive flow fail-
ure and can result in the high feed group having If generator does not reset:
trapped/unusable fuel. If this occurs, aircrew
may have as little as 4,500 pounds of usable fuel 2. Generator (affected generator switch)  TEST.
remaining and a new bingo profile may be
required. If the light goes off with the switch in TEST, the
fault is in the respective electrical distribution sys-
5. Determine useable fuel and land as soon as possible. tem. If light remains illuminated, the generator has
been disconnected automatically and the fault is in
If indications of a fuel leak exist: IDG or generator control unit.
6. Refer to FUEL LEAK PROCEDURE (page 14−19). 14.7.1.2 L or R GEN and TRANS/RECT Lights
14.7 ELECTRICAL FAILURE 1. Generator (affected generator switch)  OFF/
RESET, Then NORM.
14.7.1 Generator Failure
2. If L GEN and TRANS/RECT lights remain illumi-
A mechanical generator failure or an overheating nated, select EMERG GEN on MASTER TEST panel.
automatically causes the CSD unit of the generator transmis-
sion to decouple from the engine. Once disengaged, the CSD Note
cannot be reconnected in flight.
With R GEN and TRANS/RECT lights illumi-
Either generator by itself is capable of supplying the nated, ac essential power is supplied by the L
electrical requirements of the aircraft. Even double generator GEN. Selecting EMER GEN on the MASTER
failure will not cause total loss of electrical power; the 5−kVA TEST panel (with R GEN and TRANS/RECT
emergency generator will automatically pick up the load for lights) will not provide any additional power but
the essential ac and dc buses No. 1 and No. 2, and the DFCS may cause an interrupt as the supply is trans-
bus. ferredfrom the L GEN to the EMER GEN.
If the bidirectional pump is operating and pressure 3. Land as soon as practicable.
dropsto between 2,000 and 1,100 psi (dependent upon the
load placed on the generator), the emergency generator will 14.7.2 Double Generator Failure
automatically shift to the 1−kVA mode and power only the
essential ac and dc No. 1 buses. If combined system hydraulic 1. Both generator switches  Cycle.
pressure subsequently recovers, the emergency generator
switch must be cycled through OFF/RESET to NORM to If operating on emergency generator, the following
regain the essential No. 2 ac and dc buses. Figure 14−5 lists important systems are inoperative:
theequipment available with only the emergency generator
operating. 1. Emergency flight hydraulics.
With both engines inoperative, windmilling engine(s) 2. Outboard spoiler module and emergency flap
provide(s) hydraulic pressure for both the flight controls and activation.
the emergency generator. However, the flight controls have
first priority and may cause the emergency generator to loiter 3. OBOGS concentrator heater (OBOGS may still
when low airspeeds reduce engine windmilling rpm. Approx- function at a reduced but adequate level).
imately 450 knots must be maintained to ensure adequate
engine windmilling rpm for hydraulic pressure.
14−20a CHANGEORIGINAL
2 w/ IC 28
If temporary loss of combined system pressure causes MASTER RESET will be required to regain
emergency generator to shift to 1 kVA mode (to drop No. 2 SAS,spoiler, authority stop, and ARI functions.
essential bus):
Note
2. EMERG generator switch  Cycle.
DFCS synchronization can take up to 2 seconds
following a power interrupt. If the MASTER
RESET pushbutton is depressed during the syn-
chronization time, an additional depression of
theMASTER RESET pushbutton will be
required to restore spoiler functionality.
A shift to 1 kVA mode will cause loss of all DFCS
functions and spoilers without illumination of 4. Land as soon as practicable.
caution lights. If the 5 kVA mode is regained, a
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 w/ IC 28 14−20b
SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE TECHNICAL DIRECTIVES
Information relating to the following recent technical directives has been incorporated in this manual.
CHANGE DATE INC. VISUAL

DESCRIPTION
NUMBER IN MANUAL IDENTIFICATION
AFC 793 Standard Central Air Data Computer 30 Sep 94 None
AFC 795 Radar Warning Receiver Modification 30 Sep 94 None
Panel size increased on

AFC 832 Incorporation of Unmodified OBOGS Monitor 15 May 95
pilot’s right console
5A BOL PWR circuit

AFC 843 BOL Chaff Incorporation 1 Feb 97
breakers at 2I9, 2I10
AFC 850 F−14D GPS Aircraft Mod 15 April 2002 None
AFC 874 Modification of Color Cockpit Television 15 April 2002 Effectivity: All F−14D and
System (CCTVS) Wiring (LECP 1291N5−001) F−14D(R)s
AFC 880 AN/AVX−3 Tactical Imaging Set 15 April 2002 None
AVC 4412 Incorporation of Low Fuel Pressure Aural 15 April 2002 None
Tone Alarm (ECP 222)
AFC 919 NGS SAHRS 15 May 2003 None
Information relating to the following applicable technical directives will be incorporated in a future change.
CHANGE VISUAL
DESCRIPTION
NUMBER IDENTIFICATION

ORIGINAL
RECORD OF CHANGES
CHANGE NO. AND DATE OF PAGE COUNT VERIFIED BY
DATE OF CHANGE ENTRY (SIGNATURE)

F−14D NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL

CONTENTS
Page
No.
PART I  THE AIRCRAFT
CHAPTER 1  AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE
1.1 AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−1

1.1.1 Aircraft Weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−1
1.1.2 Cockpit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−1
1.1.3 Electronic Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2
1.1.4 Technical Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2
1.1.5 Block Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2
CHAPTER 2  SYSTEMS
2.1 AIR INLET CONTROL SYSTEM (AICS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−1

2.1.1 Normal AICS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−1
2.1.2 AICS Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−1
2.1.3 AICS Failure Modes of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−4
2.1.4 AICS Anti−Ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−9
2.2 ENGINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−9

2.2.1 Engine Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−11
2.2.2 Variable Exhaust Nozzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−16
2.3 FATIGUE ENGINE MONITORING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−18

2.3.1 FEMS Functional Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−18
2.3.2 FEMS Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
2.3.3 FEMS and OBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
2.4 ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21

2.4.1 Motive Flow Fuel Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
2.4.2 Engine Fuel Boost Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
2.4.3 Main Fuel Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
2.4.4 Main Engine Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
2.4.5 Afterburner Fuel Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−23
2.4.6 Afterburner Fuel Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−23
2.5 THROTTLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−23

2.5.1 Throttle Control Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−23
2.6 ENGINE BLEED AIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−27

2.6.1 Engine Anti−Ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−27
2.6.2 Environmental Control System Leak Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−29
2.7 ENGINE COMPARTMENT VENTILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30

2.7.1 Engine In−Flight Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
2.7.2 Engine Ground Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
11 ORIGINAL
Page
No.
2.8 ENGINE IGNITION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30

2.8.1 Main High−Energy Ignition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
2.8.2 Afterburner Ignition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
2.8.3 Backup Ignition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
2.9 ENGINE STARTING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32

2.9.1 External Airstart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
2.9.2 Engine Crank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
2.9.3 Crossbleed Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34
2.9.4 Airstarts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34
2.10 ENGINE OIL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34

2.10.1 Oil Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
2.10.2 Oil Pressure Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
2.10.3 OIL HOT Caution Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
2.11 ENGINE INSTRUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35

2.11.1 Engine RPM Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
2.11.2 Exhaust Gas Temperature Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
2.11.3 Fuel Flow Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
2.11.4 Engine Instrument Group BIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
2.11.5 Engine Instrument Group Self−Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
2.11.6 Engine Oil Pressure Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
2.11.7 Exhaust Nozzle Position Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
2.11.8 Engine Monitor Display Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
2.11.9 MFD Engine Caution Legends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
2.11.10 Engine Stall/Overtemperature Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
2.12 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−39

2.12.1 Fire Detection Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40
2.13 FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40

2.13.1 Fire Extinguisher Pushbuttons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40
2.13.2 Fire Extinguisher Advisory Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40
2.13.3 Fire Extinguisher Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40
2.14 AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40

2.14.1 Fuel Tankage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−42
2.14.2 Fuel Quantity System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−42
2.14.3 Engine Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−43
2.14.4 Fuel Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−50
2.14.5 Fuel Quantity Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−54
2.14.6 Fuel Transfer/Feed During Single−Engine Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−54
2.14.7 Fuel Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−55
2.14.8 Internal Tank Pressurization and Vent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−56
2.14.9 Fueling and Defueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−56
2.14.10 In−Flight Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−57
2.14.11 Hot Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−58
2.14.12 Automatic Fuel Electrical Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
2.15 ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59

2.15.1 Normal Electrical Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
ORIGINAL 12
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No.
2.15.2 Electrical Power Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−61

2.15.3 Degraded Electrical Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−62
2.16 HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−69

2.16.1 Flight and Combined Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−69
2.16.2 Hydraulic Power Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−72
2.16.3 Outboard Spoiler System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−73
2.16.4 Backup Flight Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−73
2.17 PNEUMATIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77

2.17.1 Normal Canopy Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
2.17.2 Auxiliary Canopy Open Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
2.17.3 Emergency Gear Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
2.18 MISSION COMPUTER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77

2.18.1 Aircrew Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
2.18.2 Operational States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−79
2.18.3 Aircraft Master Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−79
2.19 STANDARD CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−79

2.19.1 Standard Central Air Data Computer Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−79
2.20 WING−SWEEP SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−82

2.20.1 Wing−Sweep Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−82
2.20.2 Wing−Sweep Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−83
2.20.3 Wing−Sweep Interlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−87
2.20.4 Wing−Sweep System Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−87
2.21 FLAPS AND SLATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−89

2.21.1 Flap and Slat Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−89
2.21.2 Flap and Slat Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−93
2.22 SPEEDBRAKES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−95

2.22.1 Speedbrake Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−95
2.23 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−97

2.23.1 Longitudinal Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−97
2.23.2 Integrated Trim System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−97
2.23.3 Lateral Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−102
2.23.4 Spoiler Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−105
2.23.5 Yaw Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−107
2.23.6 Direct Lift Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−109
2.24 DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−109

2.24.1 Stability Augmentation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−110
2.24.2 Voltage Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−125
2.24.3 Autopilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−125
2.24.4 Pilot Relief and Guidance Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−126
2.24.5 DFCS Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−129
2.24.6 DFCS Control Panel Fault Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−131
2.25 LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−132

2.25.1 Landing Gear Handle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−132
2.25.2 Main Landing Gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−133
13 ORIGINAL
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No.
2.25.3 Nose Landing Gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−133

2.25.4 Landing Gear Normal Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−135
2.25.5 Emergency Gear Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−136
2.26 WHEELBRAKE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−136

2.26.1 Brake Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−138
2.26.2 Normal Braking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−138
2.26.3 Antiskid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−138
2.26.4 Auxiliary Brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−140
2.26.5 BRAKES Warning Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−140
2.26.6 Parking Brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−140
2.26.7 Wheel Antirotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−141
2.27 NOSEWHEEL STEERING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−141

2.27.1 Nosewheel Steering Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−141
2.27.2 Nosewheel Centering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143
2.27.3 Shimmy Damping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143
2.28 NOSEGEAR CATAPULT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143

2.28.1 Nose Strut Kneel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143
2.28.2 Launch Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145
2.28.3 Holdback Fitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145
2.29 ARRESTING HOOK SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145

2.29.1 Arresting Hook Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145
2.30 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−148

2.30.1 ECS Air Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−148
2.30.2 Cockpit Air−Conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−151
2.30.3 Electronic Equipment Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−152
2.30.4 Pressurization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−152
2.30.5 Windshield Air and Anti−Ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−154
2.30.6 Gun−Gas Purging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−154
2.30.7 Degraded ECS Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−154
2.31 OXYGEN SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−157

2.31.1 On−Board Oxygen Generating System (OBOGS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−157
2.31.2 Backup Oxygen System (BOS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−159
2.31.3 BOS Pressure Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−160
2.31.4 Emergency Oxygen Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−160
2.32 PITOT−STATIC SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−160

2.32.1 Pitot−Static Heat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−160
2.33 CONTROL AND DISPLAY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−161

2.33.1 Display Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−161
2.33.2 Display Processors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−169
2.33.3 System Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−169
2.33.4 Heads−Up Display (HUD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−169
2.33.5 Multistatus Indicator (MSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−170
2.33.6 Multifunction Displays (MFD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−174
2.33.7 Cursor Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−174
2.33.8 Displays, Formats, and Symbology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−176
2.33.9 MFD Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−197
ORIGINAL 14
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
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No.
2.34 DATA ENTRY UNIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-242

2.34.1 Data Entry Unit Operating Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-242
2.34.2 DEU Menu Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-248
2.35 FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-248

2.35.1 Standby Attitude Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-248
2.35.2 Standby Airspeed Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-250
2.35.3 Standby Altimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-250
2.35.4 AN/APN-194(V) Radar Altimeter System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-250
2.35.5 Vertical Velocity Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.35.6 Standby Compass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.35.7 Clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.36 ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251

2.36.1 AOA Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.36.2 AOA Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.36.3 AOA Indexer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.36.4 Approach Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-251
2.37 CANOPY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-254

2.37.1 Canopy Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-255
2.38 EJECTION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-256a

2.38.1 Ejection Seat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-258
2.38.2 Command Ejection Lever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-263
2.38.3 Ejection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-263
2.38.4 Seat Operation After Ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-265
2.39 LIGHTING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-265

2.39.1 Exterior Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-265
2.39.2 Interior Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-268
2.39.3 Warning and Indicator Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-269
2.40 STORES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM/JETTISON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-278

2.40.1 SMS Weapons Replaceable Assemblies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-278
2.40.2 Multistatus Indicator (MSI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-279
2.40.3 Stores Jettison Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-279
2.41 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-283

2.41.1 Boarding Ladder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-283
2.41.2 Nose Radome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-283
2.41.3 Systems Test and System Power Ground Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-283
2.41.4 External Baggage Container (CNU-188/A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-284
CHAPTER 3 — SERVICING AND HANDLING
3.1 SERVICING DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3.1.1 Ground Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1
3.1.2 Engine Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3.1.3 Integrated Drive Generator Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3.1.4 Hydraulic Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4
3.1.5 Pneumatic Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8
3.1.6 Backup Oxygen Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8
15 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Page
No.
3.2 GROUND HANDLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8

3.2.1 Danger Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8
3.2.2 Radar Radiation Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8
3.2.3 Towing Turn Radii and Ground Clearances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−15
3.2.4 Tiedown Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−15
CHAPTER 4  OPERATING LIMITATIONS
4.1 LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1

4.1.1 Engine Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.1.2 Starter Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.1.3 Airstart Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.1.4 Crosswind Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.1.5 Ground Operations Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.1.6 Ejection Seat Operation Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.1.7 Autopilot Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
4.2 AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1

4.2.1 Maximum Airspeeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5
4.3 ACCELERATION LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5

4.3.1 Cruise Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5
4.3.2 Approach Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5
4.4 ANGLE−OF−ATTACK LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5

4.5 MANEUVERING LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10

4.5.3 Rolling Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10
4.5.4 Sideslip Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10
4.5.5 Prohibited Maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10
4.6 SAS LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
4.7 TAKEOFF AND LANDING FLAP AND SLAT AND TRANSITION LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
4.7.1 Clean and Symmetric Stores Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
4.7.2 External Stores Loading With Up to 66,000 Inch−Pounds (5,500 Foot−Pounds) Asymmetry
(AIM−7 on Stations 1B or 8B equals 63,000 inch−pounds) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
4.7.3 External Stores Loading With Greater Than 66,000 Inch−Pounds (5,500 Foot−Pounds) Asymmetry 4−18
4.8 GROSS WEIGHT LIMITS TAKEOFF, LAUNCH, AND LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
4.9 BARRICADE ENGAGEMENT LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
4.10 CENTER OF GRAVITY POSITION LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
ORIGINAL 16
Page
No.
4.11 EXTERNAL STORES AND GUN LIMITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19

4.11.1 280−Gallon External Fuel Tank Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19
4.11.2 External Baggage Container (CNU−188/A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19
4.11.3 Gun Burst Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19
4.11.4 Launch Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19
4.11.5 Jettison Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−20
4.12 BANNER TOWING RESTRICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−20
4.13 TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE POD SYSTEM LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21

4.13.1 Authorized Stores Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21
4.13.2 Interim AIM−7 as Ballast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21
PART II  INDOCTRINATION
CHAPTER 5  INDOCTRINATION
5.1 GROUND TRAINING SYLLABUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−1

5.1.1 Minimum Ground Training Syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−1
5.1.2 Waiving of Minimum Ground Training Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−1
5.2 FLIGHT TRAINING SYLLABUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2

5.2.1 Flightcrew Flight Training Syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2
5.2.2 Flightcrew Flight Training Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2
5.3 OPERATING CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2

5.3.1 Ceiling/Visibility Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2
5.3.2 NATOPS Qualification and Currency Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−3
5.3.3 Requirements for Various Flight Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−4
5.3.4 Mission Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−4
5.3.5 Minimum Flightcrew Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−5
5.4 FLIGHT CREWMEMBER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−5
PART III  NORMAL PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 6  FLIGHT PREPARATION
6.1 PREFLIGHT BRIEFING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6−1

6.1.1 Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6−1
6.1.2 Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6−1
CHAPTER 7  SHORE−BASED PROCEDURES
7.1 CHECKLISTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1

7.1.1 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
7.2 EXTERIOR INSPECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1

7.2.1 Area Around Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
7.2.2 Foreign Object Damage and Leak Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
7.2.3 Ground Safety Devices and Covers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
7.2.4 Surface Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
17 ORIGINAL
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7.2.5 Security of Panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2

7.2.6 Leaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
7.2.7 Movable Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
7.2.8 Inspection Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
7.3 EJECTION SEAT INSPECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−6
7.4 PILOT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−8

7.4.1 Interior Inspection Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−8
7.4.2 Prestart Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−10
7.4.3 Engine Start Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−11
7.4.4 Poststart Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−13
7.4.5 Taxiing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−18
7.4.6 Taxi Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−20
7.4.7 Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−20
7.4.8 Flaps−Up Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−21
7.4.9 Formation Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−22
7.4.10 Takeoff Aborted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−22
7.4.11 Takeoff Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−22
7.4.12 Ascent Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−23
7.4.13 In−Flight BIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−23
7.4.14 Preland and Descent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−23
7.4.15 Pattern Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−24
7.4.16 Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−24
7.4.17 Landing Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−26
7.4.18 Postlanding Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−27
7.5 RIO PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−28

7.5.1 Interior Inspection RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−28
7.5.2 Prestart RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−29
7.5.3 Engine Start RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−30
7.5.4 Poststart RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−30
7.5.5 Taxi RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−32
7.5.6 In−Flight Reconnaissance System Check RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−32
7.5.7 TARPS Degraded Mode Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−33
7.5.8 Postlanding RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−34
7.6 HOT REFUELING PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−34
7.7 DECK−LAUNCHED INTERCEPT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−35

7.7.1 Pilot Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−35
7.7.2 RIO Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−35
7.8 HOT SWITCH PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36

7.8.1 On−Deck, Maintenance Troubleshooting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36
7.8.2 Hot Switch Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36
7.9 FIELD CARRIER LANDING PRACTICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36

7.9.1 Preflight Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36
7.9.2 Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−37
7.9.3 Radio Procedures and Pattern Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−37
7.9.4 Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−37
7.9.5 Night FCLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−37
ORIGINAL 18
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CHAPTER 8  CARRIER−BASED PROCEDURES
8.1 CARRIER PREFLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1

8.1.1 Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
8.1.2 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
8.1.3 Preflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
8.2 START AND POSTSTART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1

8.2.1 Carrier Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
8.2.2 SAHRS Standalone Carrier Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−3
8.2.3 GPS On−Deck IFA Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−3
8.3 TAXIING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4

8.3.1 Nosewheel Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4
8.3.2 Taxi Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4
8.3.3 Final Checker Aboard CV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4
8.4 CATAPULT HOOKUP (DAY) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4

8.4.1 Catapult Trim Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−5
8.4.2 Catapult Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−5
8.4.3 Catapult Abort Procedures (Day) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−6
8.5 LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−7

8.5.1 Carrier Landing Pattern (VFR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−7
8.5.2 Manual Approach Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−7
8.5.3 Approach Power Compensator Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9
8.5.4 Waveoff Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9
8.5.5 Bolter Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9
8.5.6 Bingo Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9
8.5.7 Arrested Landing and Exit From the Landing Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
8.5.8 Carrier−Controlled Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
8.5.9 Hold Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
8.5.10 Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
8.5.11 Ten−Mile DME Fix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
8.5.12 Six−Mile DME Fix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
8.5.13 Meatball Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.6 WAVEOFF AND BOLTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7 NIGHT FLYING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12

8.7.1 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7.2 Preflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7.3 Poststart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7.4 Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7.5 Catapult Hookup (Night) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7.6 Catapult Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
8.7.7 Catapult Abort Procedures (Night) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−13
8.7.8 Arrested Landing and Exit From Landing Area (Night) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−13
CHAPTER 9  SPECIAL PROCEDURES
9.1 IN−FLIGHT REFUELING PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−1

9.1.1 In−Flight Refueling Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−1
9.1.2 In−Flight Refueling Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−1
9.1.3 In−Flight Refueling Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−1
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9.2 FORMATION FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−2

9.2.1 Parade Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−2
9.2.2 Break Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−3
9.2.3 Diamond Four−Plane Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−3
9.2.4 Cruise Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−3
9.2.5 Aircraft Lighting During Night Formation Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4
9.3 BANNER TOWING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4

9.3.1 Ground Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4
9.3.2 Shipboard Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4
9.3.3 Flight Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4
9.4 FUEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−7
CHAPTER 10  FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES
10.1 FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−1
10.2 CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−1

10.2.1 General Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−1
10.3 FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES (PILOT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−2

10.3.1 Prestart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−2
10.3.2 Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−2
10.3.3 Poststart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−6
10.3.4 Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−13
10.3.5 Engine Runup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−13
10.3.6 Takeoff and Climb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−14
10.3.7 Ten Thousand Foot Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−15
10.3.8 Fifteen Thousand Foot Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−16
10.3.10 Airstarts (Twenty Thousand Feet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−20
10.3.11 Climb to Thirty−Five Thousand Feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−20
10.3.12 High−Speed Dash (Thirty−Five Thousand Feet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−21
10.3.13 Zoom Climb (Forty Thousand Feet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−22
10.3.14 Twenty Thousand Foot Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−22
10.3.16 Approach and Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−27
10.4 FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES (RIO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−27

10.4.1 Prestart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−27
10.4.2 Poststart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−27
10.4.3 Taxi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−28
10.4.4 Takeoff and Climb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−28
10.4.7 Twenty−Five Thousand Foot Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−29
10.4.8 Climb to Thirty−Five Thousand Feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−29
10.4.9 High−Speed Dash (Thirty−Five Thousand Feet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−29
10.4.10 Descent/Twenty Thousand Foot Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−29
10.4.11 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−31
10.4.12 Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−32
10.4.13 In Chocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−32
10.4.14 Postflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−32
ORIGINAL 20
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PART IV  FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
CHAPTER 11  FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
11.1 PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1

11.1.1 Pitch Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1
11.1.2 Roll Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1
11.1.3 Directional (Yaw) Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1
11.1.4 Stability Augmentation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1
11.2 SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2

11.2.1 Maneuver Flaps and Slats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
11.2.2 Landing Flaps, Slats, and DLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
11.2.3 Speedbrakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
11.3 GENERAL FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2

11.3.1 Static Longitudinal Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
11.3.2 Dynamic Longitudinal Response Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
11.3.3 Maneuvering Stick Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
11.3.4 Roll Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−3
11.3.5 Roll Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−3
11.3.6 Dutch Roll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−3
11.3.7 Trim Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−4
11.4 ASYMMETRIC THRUST FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS IN COMBAT

AND CRUISE CONFIGURATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−4
11.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−4
11.5 ENGINE STALLS AND FLAMEOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−5

11.5.1 Medium and High−Subsonic Airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−5
11.5.2 Low Subsonic Airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
11.6 HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6

11.6.1 Directional Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
11.6.2 Dihedral Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
11.6.3 External Stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
11.6.4 DFCS Stability Augmentation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
11.6.5 Maneuvering Flaps and Slats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−7
11.6.6 Lateral Control Reversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−7
11.6.7 Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
11.6.8 Stall Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
11.6.9 Vertical Stalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
11.6.10 DFCS Degraded Control Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
11.7 DEPARTURE FROM CONTROLLED FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−10

11.7.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−10
11.7.2 Lateral Stick−Induced Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−13
11.7.3 Rudder−Induced Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−13
11.7.4 Multi−Axis Control−Induced Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−13
11.7.5 Asymmetric−Thrust−Induced Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−14
11.7.6 Accelerated Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−14
11.7.7 Inertia Coupling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−14
11.7.8 Departure Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−15
11.7.9 Upright Departure Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−15
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11.7.10 Flat Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20

11.7.11 Negative AOA Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20
11.7.12 Inverted Stall/Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20
11.7.13 Inverted Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−21
11.8 TAKEOFF AND LANDING CONFIGURATION FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−21

11.8.1 Baseline Flight Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−21
11.8.2 Crosswind Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
11.8.3 Normal Stalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
11.8.4 Stall Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
11.8.5 Asymmetric Thrust Flight Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
11.8.6 Degraded Approach Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27
11.8.7 Outboard Spoiler Module Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27
11.8.8 SAS Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27
11.8.9 Aft Wing−Sweep Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27
11.8.10 DFCS Degraded Control Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−30
11.9 ASYMMETRIC WING SWEEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−31

11.9.1 Wing−Sweep Design Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−31
11.9.2 Asymmetric Wing−Sweep Flight Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−32
11.10 DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURES BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROL MODULE

FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−33
11.10.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−33
11.10.2 Low Mode Cruise and Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−36
11.10.3 High Mode Cruise and Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−36
11.10.4 In−Flight Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−36
11.10.5 Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−37
11.10.6 BFCM Thermal Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−37
11.11 FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS WITH AFT CG LOCATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38

11.11.1 Store Effects on Cg Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
11.11.2 Wing−Sweep Effects on Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
11.11.3 Cruise and Combat Flight Characteristics With Aft Cg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
11.11.4 Takeoff and Landing Configuration Flight Characteristics with Aft Cg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
PART V  EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 12  GROUND EMERGENCIES
12.1 ON−DECK EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1

12.1.1 Engine Fire on the Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.2 Abnormal Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.3 START VALVE Light After Engine Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.4 Uncommanded Engine Acceleration on Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.5 Ground Egress Without Parachute and Survival Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
12.1.6 Emergency Entrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
12.1.7 Weight On−Off Wheels Switch Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
12.1.8 Binding/Jammed Flight Controls On Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−4
12.1.9 Brake Failure at Taxi Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−4
ORIGINAL 22
Page
No.
CHAPTER 13 TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES
13.1 ABORTED TAKEOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−1

13.1.1 Aborted Takeoff Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−1
13.2 SINGLE−ENGINE FAILURE FIELD/CATAPULT LAUNCH/WAVEOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2

13.2.1 Angle−of−Attack/Endspeed Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.2 Rate of Climb Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.3 Stores Jettison Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.4 Aircrew Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.5 Single−Engine Failure Field/Catapult Launch/Waveoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3
13.3 BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3

13.3.1 Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff Aborted or After Landing Touchdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3
13.3.2 Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff Continued or After Landing Go−Around . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3
CHAPTER 14 IN−FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
14.1 COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1

14.1.1 Flightcrew Attention Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
14.1.2 COMM−NAV Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
14.2 PITOT−STATIC SYSTEM FAILURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
14.3 EMERGENCY JETTISON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−2
14.4 FIRE LIGHT AND/OR FIRE IN FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−4
14.5 ENGINE EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5

14.5.1 Compressor Stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5
14.5.2 Airstarts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−7
14.5.3 Single−Engine Flight Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−11
14.5.4 Engine Overspeed (N1 or N2 OSP Legend) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
14.5.5 Engine START VALVE Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
14.5.6 Engine Transfer to SEC Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
14.5.7 Uncommanded SEC Mode Rpm Decay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−13
14.5.8 Uncommanded Engine Acceleration Airborne (No Throttle Movement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15
14.5.9 Exhaust Nozzle Failed (No Nozzle Response to Throttle Movement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15
14.5.10 Stuck/Jammed Throttle(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15
14.5.11 AICS Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−16
14.5.12 INLET ICE Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−17
14.5.13 Oil System Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−17
14.5.14 RATS Operation In Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−17
14.6 FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−18

14.6.1 Fuel Pressure Caution Lights/Low Fuel Pressure Warning Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−18
14.6.2 L or R FUEL LOW Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
14.6.3 Fuel Transfer Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
14.6.4 Uncommanded Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
14.6.5 Fuel Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
14.6.6 Fuel Imbalance/Fuel Quantity Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20
14.7 ELECTRICAL FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20

14.7.1 Generator Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20
14.7.2 Double Generator Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20a
23 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
Page
No.
14.7.3 Double Transformer−Rectifier Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22

14.7.4 TRANS/RECT Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22
14.7.5 Electrical Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22
14.7.6 Total Electrical Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−24
14.8 ECS MALFUNCTIONS/FAILURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−25

14.8.1 ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke and Fumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−25
14.8.2 COOLING AIR Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−27
14.8.3 TARPS ECS Lights Illuminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−27
14.8.4 SENSOR COND Light Illuminated and/or PUMP Phase Circuit Breakers Popped
or APG−71 PM Acronym . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
14.8.5 Cockpit Temperature Control Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
14.8.6 Cockpit Overpressurization on Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
14.8.7 CABIN PRESS Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
14.8.8 WSHLD HOT Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
14.9 OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−29

14.9.1 OBOGS Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−29
14.9.2 B/U OXY LOW Light (Both Cockpits) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−29
14.9.3 B/U OXY LOW Light (Pilot Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−30
14.9.4 B/U OXY LOW Light (RIO Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−30
14.10 LAD/CANOPY LIGHT AND/OR LOSS OF CANOPY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−30

14.10.1 LAD/CANOPY Light With RIO CANOPY Light/Canopy Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−30
14.10.2 LAD/CANOPY Light Without RIO CANOPY Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31
14.11 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31

14.11.1 Combined Pressure Approximately 2,400 to 2,600 Psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31
14.11.2 Flight Pressure Approximately 2,400 to 2,600 Psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31
14.11.3 Combined Pressure Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−32
14.11.4 Flight Pressure Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−33
14.11.5 Both Combined and Flight Pressure Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−33
14.11.6 Backup Flight Module Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35
14.11.7 Low Brake Accumulator Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35
14.12 FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURES OR MALFUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35

14.12.1 Controllability Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35
14.12.2 Uncommanded Roll and/or Yaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−37
14.12.3 DFCS Flight Control Failures or Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−38
14.12.4 Rudder Authority Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−40
14.12.5 Horizontal Tail Authority Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−42
14.12.6 Spoiler Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−42
14.12.7 FLAP Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−45
14.12.8 Flap and Slat Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−46
14.12.9 WING SWEEP Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−47
14.12.10 Unscheduled Wing Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−47
14.12.11 CADC Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−47
14.12.12 AUTOPILOT Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−48
14.12.13 Weight On−Off Wheels Switch Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−48
14.13 DEPARTURE/SPIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−49

14.13.1 Vertical Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−49
14.13.2 Upright Departure/Flat Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−49
14.13.3 Inverted Departure/Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−50
ORIGINAL 24
Page
No.
CHAPTER 15  LANDING EMERGENCIES
15.1 DUAL−ENGINE LANDING, ONE OR BOTH ENGINES IN SECONDARY MODE . . . . . . . . . . . 15−1
15.2 SINGLE−ENGINE LANDING PRIMARY MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−1
15.3 SINGLE−ENGINE LANDING SECONDARY MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−3

15.3.1 Single−Engine Landing SEC Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−4
15.4 LANDING GEAR EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−6

15.4.1 Landing Gear Emergency Lowering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−6
15.4.2 Landing Gear Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−8
15.4.3 LAUNCH BAR Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−9
15.5 BLOWN−TIRE LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10
15.6 FLAP AND SLAT LANDING EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10

15.6.1 No−Flaps and No−Slats Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10
15.6.2 Auxiliary Flap Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10
15.7 WING−SWEEP EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−11

15.7.1 Aft Wing−Sweep Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−11
15.7.2 Asymmetric Wing Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−11
15.8 AFT HUNG ORDNANCE LANDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−16

15.8.1 Landing with Aft Hung Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−17
15.9 FIELD ARRESTMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−17

15.9.1 Field Arresting Gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−17
15.9.2 Short−Field Arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
15.9.3 Long−Field Arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
15.9.4 Engaging Speeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
15.10 BARRICADE ARRESTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
15.11 ARRESTING HOOK EMERGENCY DOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
15.12 FORCED LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
15.13 GROUND ROLL BRAKING FAILURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
CHAPTER 16  EJECTION
16.1 EJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−1

16.1.1 Ejection Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−1
16.1.2 Ejection Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−5
16.1.3 Ejection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6
16.2 MANUAL BAILOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6
16.3 SURVIVAL/POSTEJECTION PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6

16.3.1 Manual Man/Seat Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7
16.3.2 Survival Kit Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7
16.3.3 Parachute Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
16.3.4 Parachute Landing Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
16.3.5 Raft Boarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
25 ORIGINAL
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PART VI  ALL−WEATHER OPERATIONS
CHAPTER 17  INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES
17.1 AUTOMATIC CARRIER LANDING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−1

17.1.1 Mode I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−1
17.1.2 Mode II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−1
17.1.3 Mode III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−1
17.1.4 Flight Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−1
17.2 AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2

17.2.1 Data Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2
17.2.2 Digital Flight Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2
17.2.3 Radar Beacon (AN/APN−154) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2
17.2.4 ACLS Beacon Augmentor (R−1623) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2
17.2.5 Approach Power Compensator Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−3
17.2.6 ACLS/ILS Displays (MFD and HUD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−3
17.2.7 Instrument Landing System (AN/ARA−63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−5
17.3 SURFACE SUBSYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−8

17.3.1 Automatic Landing System (AN/SPN−42) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−8
17.3.2 Instrument Landing System (AN/SPN−41) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−8
17.4 ACLS PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−10

17.4.1 Preflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−10
17.4.2 Poststart Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−10
17.4.3 Approach Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−10
17.4.4 Landing Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−12
CHAPTER 18  EXTREME WEATHER OPERATIONS
18.1 ICE AND RAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−1

18.1.1 Icing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−1
18.1.2 Rain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−1
18.2 HYDROPLANING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−2

18.2.1 Dynamic Hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−2
18.2.2 Viscous Hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−3
18.2.3 Combined Dynamic andViscous Hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−3
18.2.4 Reverted Rubber Skids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−3
18.2.5 Landing On Wet Runway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4
18.3 TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4

18.3.1 In the Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4
18.4 COLD−WEATHER OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4

18.4.1 Preflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5
18.4.2 Engine Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5
18.4.3 Taxiing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5
18.4.4 Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5
18.4.5 Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
18.4.6 After Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
18.4.7 Before Leaving Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
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18.5 HOT−WEATHER AND DESERT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6

18.5.1 Taxiing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
18.5.2 Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
18.5.3 Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
PART VII  COMMUNICATIONS−NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
CHAPTER 19  COMMUNICATIONS
19.1 COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1

19.1.1 Communications Antennas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
19.1.2 Communications Antenna Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
19.1.3 Mutual Interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
19.2 INTERCOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1

19.2.1 Audio Warning Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−5
19.2.2 Pilot Tone Volume/TACAN Command Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7
19.3 V/UHF RADIO (AN/ARC−182) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7

19.3.1 Preset Channel(s) Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7
19.3.2 Built−In Test (BIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7
19.3.3 Have Quick (Antijam) Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7
19.3.4 Have Quick Load Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−12
19.3.5 Radio Frequency Control/Indicators (RFCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−18
19.4 V/UHF AUTOMATIC DIRECTION FINDER (OA−8697) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−18
19.5 UHF VOICE SECURITY EQUIPMENT (TSEC/KY−58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−19

19.5.1 KY−58 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−19
19.5.2 Prelaunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−19
19.5.3 Postlaunch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−19
19.5.4 After Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−19
19.6 JOINT TACTICAL INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−19

19.6.1 JTIDS Terminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−21
19.6.2 JTIDS Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−23
19.6.3 Mission Data Loader (MDL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−23
19.6.4 JTIDS System Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−23
19.7 IN−FLIGHT VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27
19.8 GROUND HANDLING SIGNALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27
CHAPTER 20 NAVIGATION SYSTEM
20.1 NAVIGATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−1

20.1.1 AN/ASN−139 Inertial Navigation Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−1
20.1.2 Miniature Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−3
20.1.3 AN/USN−2(V) Standard Attitude Heading Reference System (SAHRS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−5
20.1.4 Mission Computer System (MCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−5
20.1.5 Navigation Data Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−6
20.1.6 Displays Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−6
20.1.7 Programmable Tactical Information Display (PTID) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−6
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20.1.8 Converter Interface Unit (CIU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-6

20.1.9 Standard Central Air Data Computer (SCADC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-6
20.1.10 AN/ARN-118 Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) System or
AN/URC-107 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-8
20.1.11 AN/ASW-27C Data Link (D/L) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-11
20.1.12 UHF Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-11
20.1.13 Bearing Distance Heading Indicator (BDHI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-11
20.1.14 AN/URC-107 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-12
20.2 NAVIGATION SYSTEM DATA DISTRIBUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-12

20.2.1 Navigation Data Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-12
20.3 NAVIGATION SYSTEM OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-20

20.3.1 GPS Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-20
20.3.2 Navigation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-27
20.3.3 MAGR Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-37
20.3.4 INS and SAHRS Concurrent Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-38
20.3.5 Concurrent Carrier Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-45
20.3.6 Initially Entered Navigation Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-52
20.3.7 Navigation Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-55
20.3.8 Flight Plan Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-59
20.3.9 Tactical Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-72
CHAPTER 21 — IDENTIFICATION
21.1 IDENTIFICATION TRANSPONDER (AN/APX-100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1

21.1.1 IFF Transponder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-1
21.1.2 Altitude Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-6
21.2 IFF INTERROGATOR (AN/APX-76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-6

21.2.1 IFF Self-Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-7
PART VIII — WEAPON SYSTEMS
CHAPTER 22 — TARPS SUBSYSTEM
22.1 RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-1

22.1.1 TARPS Pod . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.1.2 Serial Frame Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.1.3 Panoramic Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.1.4 Data Display System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.1.5 TARPS Environmental Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.1.6 Controller Processor Signal Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.2 DISPLAY SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
22.3 TARPS EQUIPMENT CIRCUIT BREAKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-2
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22.4 RECONNAISSANCE DISPLAYS AND FORMATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-9

22.4.1 MFD RECON DATA Status Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-9
22.4.2 Reconnaissance Fault/Problem Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-9
22.4.3 Reconnaissance Steering Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-11
22.4.4 HUD/VDI Symbology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-13
22.5 RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-13

22.5.1 Reconnaissance Parameter Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-13
22.5.2 In-Flight Entry of Reconnaissance Waypoint Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21
22.5.3 One-Fix Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21
22.5.4 Plotting Command Course/Map Target Leg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21
22.5.5 Cycling Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21
22.6 PILOT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21

22.6.1 Navigation Visual Surface Waypoint Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21
22.6.2 Pilot TARPS Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-21
22.6.3 Identification of Targets Using Television Camera Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-22
22.6.4 Altitude (AGL) Mechanization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-22
22.7 SENSOR CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-22

22.7.1 Lineal Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-22
22.7.2 Serial Frame Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-22
22.7.3 Panoramic Camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-23
22.7.4 Long-Range Oblique Photography Camera (KS-153A With 610-mm Lens) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-24
22.7.5 Photographic Film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-26
22.7.6 Digital Data System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-26
CHAPTER 23 — NAVIGATION COMMAND AND CONTROL GRID
23.1 NAVIGATION COMMAND AND CONTROL GRID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-1

23.1.1 NAV GRID Data Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-1
23.1.2 NAV GRID Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-3
CHAPTERS 24 TO 36 — (REFER TO NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1A)
PART IX — FLIGHTCREW COORDINATION
CHAPTER 37 — FLIGHTCREW COORDINATION
37.1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1
37.2 PILOT AND RIO RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1

37.2.1 Aircrew Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1
37.2.2 Pilot Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1
37.2.3 Radar Intercept Officer Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1
37.2.4 Mission Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1
37.2.5 Specific Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37-1
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37.3 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4

37.3.1 Functional Checkflights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
37.3.2 Formation Flights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
37.3.3 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
37.3.4 SAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
37.4 PROCEDURES, TECHNIQUES, AND CHECKLISTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4

37.4.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
37.4.2 Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−5
37.4.3 RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−5
CHAPTER 38  AIRCRAFT SELF−TEST
38.1 AIRCRAFT SELF−TEST OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−1
38.2 MASTER TEST PANEL CHECKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−1

38.2.1 MASTER TEST Switch Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−3
38.3 ON−BOARD CHECKOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−3

38.3.1 Built−in−Test Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−7
38.3.2 Test Prerequisites/Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−9
38.3.3 Avionic BIT Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−10
38.3.4 Joint Tactical Information Distribution System On−Board Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−36
38.4 COOPERATIVE SUPPORT SOFTWARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−40

38.4.1 CSS Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−40
38.5 RADAR SYSTEM BUILT−IN TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−47

38.5.1 BIT Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−48
38.5.2 Radar BIT Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−51
38.5.3 Flycatcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−70
PART X  NATOPS EVALUATION
CHAPTER 39  NATOPS EVALUATION AND QUESTION BANK
39.1 NATOPS EVALUATION PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−1

39.1.1 Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−1
39.1.2 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−1
39.1.3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−1
39.2 GROUND EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2

39.2.1 Open−Book Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.2.2 Closed−Book Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.2.3 Oral Examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.2.4 Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.2.5 Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.2.6 MFT and WST Procedures Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.2.7 Grading Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
39.3 FLIGHT EVALUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2

39.3.1 Instrument Flight Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
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39.4 OPERATIONAL DEPLOYABLE SQUADRONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.5 TRAINING AND EVALUATION SQUADRONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6 FLIGHT EVALUATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3

39.6.1 Mission Planning and Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.2 Preflight and Line Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.3 Taxi and Runup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.4 (*) Takeoff and Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.5 Climb and Cruise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.6 (*) Approach and Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.7 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.8 (*) Emergency and Malfunction Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.9 Postflight Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.6.10 Mission Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3
39.7 RECORD AND REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-3

39.7.1 Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-4
39.8 FLIGHT EVALUATION GRADING CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-4

39.8.1 Flight Evaluation Grade Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-4
39.8.2 Final Grade Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-4
39.9 APPLICABLE PUBLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-4
39.10 NATOPS EVALUATION QUESTION BANK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39-4
PART XI — PERFORMANCE DATA (REFER TO NAVAIR 01-F14AAP-1.1)

CHAPTER 40 — TACTICAL IMAGING SET
40.1 AN/AVX-3 TACTICAL IMAGING SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-1

40.1.1 Remote Control Unit (RCU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-1
40.1.2 Image Transceiver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-1
40.1.3 Video Tape Recorder (VTR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-1
40.1.4 Interface Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-3
40.2 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-3

40.2.1 Powerup Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-3
40.3 RESETTING RCU AND IMAGE TRANSCEIVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-4
40.4 SETTINGS MENUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-5

40.4.1 Settings Menus’ Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-5
40.4.2 Send-to-Call-Sign-Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-6
40.4.3 Modify Call Sign Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-6
40.4.4 Edit Call Sign Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-6
40.4.5 Send/Delete Function Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-6
40.4.6 Capture Rate Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-6
40.4.7 Capture Time Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-7
40.4.8 Max Key Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-7
40.4.9 Automatic Transmit Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-7
40.4.10 Compression Method Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-7
40.4.11 Compression Ratio Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40-8
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40.4.12 PTAC Quick Start Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−8

40.4.13 Local Call Sign Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−8
40.4.14 Display Brightness Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−9
40.4.15 Image Dimension menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−9
40.4.16 View Communications Cable Identification Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−9
40.4.17 EIS Configuration Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−9
40.4.18 Date and Time Menus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−10
40.4.19 Format SRAM Card Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−10
40.4.20 Waveburst Version Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−10
40.5 POWER DOWN SEQUENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−10
40.6 CAPTURING/COMPRESSING/SAVING/TRANSMITTING/RECEIVING IMAGES . . . . . . . . . . 40−10

40.6.1 Voice and Data Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−10
40.6.2 Capturing Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−11
40.6.3 Compressing/Saving Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−12
40.6.4 Transmitting Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−13
40.6.5 Receiving Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−13
40.7 VIEWING IMAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−14
40.8 CONTROLLING VTR FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−17

40.8.1 Function Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−18
40.9 ERROR MESSAGES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−19

40.9.1 DEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−19
40.9.2 COMMS ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−19
40.9.3 INTERNAL ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−19
40.9.4 COMMAND ERROR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−19
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 32
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
No.
CHAPTER 1 AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE
Figure 11. Aircraft Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2

Figure 12. Characteristics and Limitations (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−3
Figure 13. Electronic Nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−5
CHAPTER 2  SYSTEMS
Figure 21. Air Inlet Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−2

Figure 22. AICS Control and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−3
Figure 23. Variable−Geometry Inlet Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−5
Figure 24. AICS Normal Operating Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−6
Figure 25. Fail−Operational Mode No INLET Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−6
Figure 26. Fail−Safe Mode INLET Light Illuminated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−7
Figure 27. Ramp Monitor Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−8
Figure 28. AICS Anti−Ice System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−10
Figure 29. F110−GE−400 Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−10
Figure 210. ENG MODE SELECT Panel and ENG SEC Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−12
Figure 211. AFTC Functional Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−13
Figure 212. Rich Stability Cutback F110−GE−400 Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−15
Figure 213. Variable Area Exhaust Nozzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−17
Figure 214. FEMS Multifunction Display Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−18
Figure 215. Fatigue Engine Monitoring System Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−19
Figure 216. Flight Maintenance Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−20
Figure 217. Engine Fuel System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−22
Figure 218. Afterburner Fuel Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−24
Figure 219. Throttle Interlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−25
Figure 220. Throttle Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−26
Figure 221. Autothrottle Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−28
Figure 222. Engine Bleed Air/Compartment Ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
Figure 223. Anti−Ice Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−31
Figure 224. Engine Start System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−33
Figure 225. Engine Instruments (F110−GE−400) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−36
Figure 226. MFD Engine Monitor Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
Figure 227. Fire Detection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−39
Figure 228. Fire Extinguishing Switches and Advisory Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−41
Figure 229. Fuel Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−41
Figure 230. Fuel Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−44
Figure 231. Engine Fuel Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−47
Figure 232. Aft Fuselage Fuel Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−49
Figure 233. Forward Fuselage Fuel Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−50
Figure 234. Wing and External Tank Fuel Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−52
Figure 235. Fuel Vent and Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−56
Figure 236. Refueling System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−57
Figure 237. Generator Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−60
Figure 238. Circuit Breaker Alphanumeric Index (Sheet 1 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−64
Figure 239. Hydraulic System Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−70
Figure 240. Outboard Spoiler System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−74
Figure 241. Backup Flight Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−75
33 ORIGINAL
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No.
Figure 242. Mission Computer System Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−78

Figure 243. CADC Functional Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−80
Figure 244. CADC Processor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−80
Figure 245. CADC Processor Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−81
Figure 246. Wing−Sweep Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−84
Figure 247. Wing−Sweep Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−86
Figure 248. Wing−Sweep Interlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−88
Figure 249. Flap and Slat Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−90
Figure 250. Wing Control Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−92
Figure 251. Maneuver Flap Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−94
Figure 252. Maneuver Slat/Flap Automatic Schedule for CADC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−94
Figure 253. Speedbrakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−95
Figure 254. Speedbrake Control and Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−96
Figure 255. Control Surface Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−98
Figure 256. Longitudinal Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−100
Figure 257. Longitudinal System Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−100
Figure 258. Control Stick and Trim (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−101
Figure 259. Integrated Trim Schedules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−103
Figure 260. Lateral Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−103
Figure 261. Lateral System Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−104
Figure 262. Spoiler Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−105
Figure 263. Spoiler Gearing Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−106
Figure 264. Yaw Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−108
Figure 265. Yaw System Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−108
Figure 266. DFCS Rates and Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−110
Figure 267. DFCS Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−111
Figure 268. DFCS Up and Away ARI Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−114
Figure 269. DFCS Pitch Interfaces and Control Functions (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−117
Figure 270. DFCS Failure Modes and Indications (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−121
Figure 271. DFCS DCP System Display Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−131
Figure 272. Landing Gear Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−134
Figure 273. Wheelbrake Controls and Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−137
Figure 274. Antiskid BIT Box . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−139
Figure 275. Nosewheel Steering Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−142
Figure 276. Launch Bar Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−144
Figure 277. Nosewheel Strut and Launch Bar Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−146
Figure 278. Arresting Hook Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−147
Figure 279. Air−Conditioning and Pressurization Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−149
Figure 280. Avionic Equipment Liquid Cooling Controls and Lights (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−153
Figure 281. Cabin Pressure Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−155
Figure 282. Canopy Defog Controls and Windshield Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−156
Figure 283. Oxygen System Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−158
Figure 284 . Backup Oxygen Duration Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−161
Figure 285. Airstream Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−162
Figure 286. Display Systems Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−163
Figure 287. Display Format Groups (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−167
Figure 288. Heads−Up Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−170
Figure 289. Pilot Displays Control Panel (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−171
Figure 290. Multistatus Indicator Symbols/Meanings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−174
Figure 291. Multifunction Display (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−175
Figure 292. Cursor Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−177
Figure 293. Warning, Caution, Advisory Functions (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−179
Figure 294. Test Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−182
ORIGINAL 34
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Page
No.
Figure 2-95. HUD TLN Basic Format (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-183

Figure 2-96. HUD Declutter Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-187
Figure 2-97. HUD Added Symbology (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-189
Figure 2-98. HUD Symbology Available on TLN Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-191
Figure 2-99. HUD A/A Search Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-193
Figure 2-100. HUD Symbology Available on A/A Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-195
Figure 2-101. HUD A/G Basic Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-198
Figure 2-102. HUD Symbology Available on A/G Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-199
Figure 2-103. HUD Overlay Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-201
Figure 2-104. HUD Manual Reticle Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-202
Figure 2-105. Slaved DEU Page Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-203
Figure 2-106. MFD MENU Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-204
Figure 2-107. MFD Spin Indicator Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-206
Figure 2-108. MFD Warning/Caution/Advisory and Message Overlays (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-207
Figure 2-109. Computer and OBC Messages (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-209
Figure 2-110. Typical MFD Alphanumeric Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-213
Figure 2-111. MFD VDI Formats — Takeoff, Landing, Navigation (Sheet 1 of 9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-215
Figure 2-112. MFD VDI Symbology Available on TLN Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-224
Figure 2-113. MFD VDI Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Formats (Sheet 1 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-226
Figure 2-114. MFD VDI Symbology Available on Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . 2-231
Figure 2-115. MFD VDI Air-to-Ground (A/G) Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-233
Figure 2-116. MFD VDI Recon Overlay Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-234
Figure 2-117. MFD VDI Radar and IRSTS Overlay Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-235
Figure 2-118. MFD HSD Format (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-237
Figure 2-119. Plot Line and Course Line Displays (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-241
Figure 2-120. MFD SMS Format—CAP/Attack, Fighter Wingforms (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-243
Figure 2-121. MFD Engine Monitor Format (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-245
Figure 2-122. Data Entry Unit/Main Menu Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-247
Figure 2-123. Data Entry Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-249
Figure 2-124. Angle-of-Attack Conversion (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-252
Figure 2-125. Angle-of-Attack Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-254
Figure 2-125A. Auxiliary Pneumatic Selector Valve Reset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-256
Figure 2-126. Cockpit Canopy Control Handle and Indicator Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-257
Figure 2-127. Ejection Seat (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-259
Figure 2-128. Survival Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-262
Figure 2-129. Command Ejection Lever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-264
Figure 2-130. Cockpit Light Controls (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-266
Figure 2-131. Pilot Indicator Lights (Sheet 1 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-270
Figure 2-132. RIO Indicator Lights (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-275
Figure 2-133. Multistatus Indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-279
Figure 2-134. Jettison Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-281
Figure 2-135. ACM Jettison Selection and Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-282
Figure 2-136. Systems Test and System Power Ground Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-283
Figure 2-137. CNU-188/A External Baggage Container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-284
CHAPTER 3 ¾ SERVICING AND HANDLING
Figure 3-1. Aircraft Servicing Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Figure 3-2. Aircraft Servicing Data (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2
Figure 3-3. Aircraft Servicing (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5
Figure 3-4. Runup Danger Areas — Exhaust Jet Wake Velocity and Temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9
Figure 3-5. Radar Radiation Hazard Areas (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10
Figure 3-6. Noise Danger Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
35 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Page
No.
Figure 37. Towing Turn Radii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−16

Figure 38. Towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−17
Figure 39. Tiedown Arrangement (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−18
CHAPTER 4  OPERATING LIMITATIONS
Figure 41. Store Station Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−2

Figure 42. Instrument Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−3
Figure 43. Engine Operating Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−4
Figure 44. Maximum Allowable Airspeeds (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−6
Figure 45. Variation of Maximum Allowable Normal Load Factor With Gross Weight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−9
Figure 46. Maximum Allowable Angle of Attack Rudder Deflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−11
Figure 47. Angle−of−Attack Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−12
Figure 48. Maneuvering Limits Cruise Configuration (Roll SAS Off or Degraded DFCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
Figure 49. Maneuvering Limits Rolling (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−14
Figure 410. Flap Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−17
CHAPTER 7  SHORE−BASED PROCEDURES
Figure 7−1. Exterior Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2

Figure 7−2. Ejection Seat Safe−and−Arm Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−7
Figure 7−3. Taxi Turn Radii (Maximum Nosewheel Steering 70_) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−19
Figure 7−4. Field Carrier Landing Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−38
CHAPTER 8  CARRIER−BASED PROCEDURES
Figure 8−1. Catapult Launch Trim Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−5

Figure 82. Center−of−Gravity Variation With Fuel Loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−6
Figure 8−3. Carrier Landing Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−8
Figure 84. Carrier−Controlled Approach (Typical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−11
CHAPTER 10  FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES
Figure 10−1. Flight Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−1
CHAPTER 11  FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
Figure 11−1. Lateral−Control−Induced Departure Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−8

Figure 112. Cross−Control−Induced Departure Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−12
Figure 11−3. F−14 Departure Recovery Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−16
Figure 11−4. Spin Arrow Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−18
Figure 11−5. MFD−1/PTID Right Spin Display (INS and SAHRS Failed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−19
Figure 11−6. Stall Speeds for Wing Rock at 25 Units AOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−23
Figure 11−7. Minimum Control Speed, Ground (VMCG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−24
Figure 11−8. Rudder Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−25
Figure 11−9. Landing Approach Airspeed (15 Units AOA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−28
Figure 11−10. Asymmetric Wing−Sweep Landing Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−34
Figure 121. Emergency Entrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−3
ORIGINAL 36
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CHAPTER 14  IN−FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
Figure 14−1. Airspeed Indicator Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−2

Figure 14−2. External Stores Jettison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−3
Figure 14−3. Airstart Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−9
Figure 144. Secondary Mode Thrust Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−14
Figure 14−5. Emergency Generator Distribution (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−21
Figure 146. Failure of Both Transformer−Rectifiers Equipment Inoperative List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−23
Figure 15−1. Landing Gear Malfunction Emergency Landing Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−7

Figure 15−2. Asymmetric Wing−Sweep Landing Approach Airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−12
Figure 15−3. Emergency Field Arrestment Guide (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−19
Figure 16−1. Minimum Ejection Altitude (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−2

Figure 16−2. Proper Ejection Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6
Figure 16−3. Ejection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7
Figure 16−4. Life Preserver Assembly Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−8
CHAPTER 17  INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES
Figure 17−1. Radar Beacon Panel (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−4

Figure 17−2. ACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−6
Figure 17−3. AN/ARA−63 Decoder Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−9
Figure 17−4. ACLS Mode I and II Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−11
Figure 17−5. SPN−41 ILS Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−14
CHAPTER 18  EXTREME WEATHER OPERATIONS
Figure 18−1. Icing Danger Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−2

Figure 18−2. Combined Viscous and Dynamic Tire Hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−3
CHAPTER 19  COMMUNICATIONS
Figure 191. Communications and Associated Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−2

Figure 19−2. Antenna Select Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−3
Figure 19−3. Intercommunication Controls (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−4
Figure 19−4. Glossary of Tones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−6
Figure 19−5. Pilot TONE VOLUME/TACAN CMD Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−8
Figure 19−6. AN/ARC−182 V/UHF Control Panel (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−9
Figure 19−7. Radio Frequency/Channel Indicator (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−11
Figure 19−8. Pilot VOLUME Control Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−13
Figure 199. Common BIT Indications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−14
Figure 19−10. Example of an ARC−182 Have Quick II MWOD Fill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−14
Figure 19−11. Have Quick II Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−18
Figure 19−12. KY−58 Controls (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−20
Figure 19−13. JTIDS Control Panels (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−24
Figure 19−14. In−Flight Communications (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27
Figure 19−15. Deck/Ground Handling Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−31
37 ORIGINAL
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No.
CHAPTER 20  NAVIGATION SYSTEM
Figure 20−1. Navigation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−2

Figure 20−2. NAV MODE Select/Computer Reset Panel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−4
Figure 20−3. DEU Navigation Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−7
Figure 20−4. TACAN Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−9
Figure 20−5. Navigation System Data Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−13
Figure 20−6. HUD Navigation Outputs (TLN Basic) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−14
Figure 20−7. MFD VDI (TLN Basic) Navigation Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−16
Figure 208. Own−Aircraft Basic Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−17
Figure 20−9. MFD HSD Format Navigation Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−18
Figure 20−10. Navigation Data Display Summary (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−21
Figure 2011. GPS Status Format (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−24
Figure 20−12. Crypto Loading Panel Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−27
Figure 20−13. Navigation Modes and Navigation Sensor Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−28
Figure 2014. NAV System Aid Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−28
Figure 2015. INS In−Flight Align Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−32
Figure 2016. Secondary Navigation Mode Manually Selected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−33
Figure 2017. IMU Backup Navigation Mode Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−34
Figure 20−18. SAHRS Backup SLV and DG Modes (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−36
Figure 20−19. MFD MENU1 and MENU2 Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−39
Figure 20−20. DEU Own−Aircraft Data Entry (Typical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−40
Figure 20−21. DD/PTID Own−Aircraft Data Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−41
Figure 2022. MFD Ground Alignment Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−42
Figure 2023. GPS On−Deck IFA Alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−44
Figure 2024. CV Alignment Formats SINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−46
Figure 2025. CV Alignment Formats Manual (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−47
Figure 20−26. DD Align Data Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−50
Figure 20−27. SAHRS Standalone Align MFD Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−50
Figure 20−28. Data Entry Unit Waypoint Pages (Typical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−53
Figure 2029. MFD Waypoint Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−54
Figure 20−30. DD Waypoint Data Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−54
Figure 2031. Magnetic Variation Source Selection and DD Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−56
Figure 20−32. Waypoint Numbering Scheme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−58
Figure 20−33. DEU Waypoint Type Format. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−58
Figure 20−34. Waypoint Types and Associated Symbols. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−59
Figure 20−35. MFD Flight Plan Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−60
Figure 20−36. MDL Reversionary Waypoint Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−61
Figure 2037. Flight Plan Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−62
Figure 20−38. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Add Page (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−64
Figure 2039. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Replacement Page (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−67
Figure 20−40. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Transfer Page (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−69
Figure 20−41. MDL Reversionary Waypoint Format MDL Waypoint Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−71
Figure 20−42. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Delete Page (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−73
Figure 20−43. Steering Mode Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−76
Figure 20−44. Destination Steering Displays (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−78
Figure 20−45. TACAN Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−80
Figure 20−46. Typical GPS Steering Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−82
Figure 20−47. Auto Waypoint Steering Displays (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−84
Figure 20−48. Commanded Ground Speed Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−86
Figure 20−49. Manual Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−87
Figure 20−50. Data−Link Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−89
Figure 20−51. INS UPDATE MFD Formats (Sheet 1 of 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−92
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No.
Figure 20−52. DD Control Panel With GND MAP Selected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−96

Figure 20−53. MFD TSD Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−97
Figure 20−54. HUD/Designate Position Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−98
Figure 20−55. Navigation System Continuous Update MFD Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−100
Figure20−56. Surface Waypoint Position MFD Formats (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−101
Figure 20−57. Cursor Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−104
CHAPTER 21  IDENTIFICATION
Figure 21−1. IFF Control Panels (Sheet 1 of 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21−2

Figure 21−2. Mode 4 Caution and Reply Light Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21−5
Figure 21−3. IFF Display Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21−8
CHAPTER 22  TARPS SUBSYSTEM
Figure 22−1. Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−1

Figure 22−2. TARPS Component Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−3
Figure22−3. Controller Processor Signal Unit (Sheet 1 of 5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−4
Figure 22−4. MFD MENU2 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−9
Figure 22−5. MFD RECON DATA Status Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−10
Figure 22−6. TARPS Advisories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−10
Figure 22−7. MFD OBC/Maintenance Failure Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−12
Figure 22−8. HUD/VDI Reconnaissance Symbology (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−14
Figure 22−9. HUD Reconnaissance Display (Command Course Steering) (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−16
Figure 22−10. Dynamic Steering Point Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−18
Figure 22−11. MFD RECON WPT DATA 1 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−19
Figure 22−12. MFD RECON WPT DATA 2 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−19
Figure 22−13. DEU Reconnaissance Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−20
Figure 22−14. KS−87D Serial Frame Camera Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−23
Figure 22−15. KA−99A Panoramic Camera Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−24
Figure 22−16. KS−153A Still Picture Camera Characteristics (610−Mm Standoff Configuration) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−25
CHAPTER 23  NAVIGATION COMMAND AND CONTROL GRID
Figure 231. DEU NAV GRID Data Entry Typical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23−2

Figure23−2. DD NAV GRID Data Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23−3
Figure 23−3. PTID NAV GRID Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23−4
Figure 23−4. TSD NAV GRID Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23−5
CHAPTER 38  AIRCRAFT SELF TEST
Figure 38−1. On−Board Checkout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−2

Figure 38−2. Test Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−3
Figure 38−3. Master Test Panel (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−4
Figure 38−4. Subsystem BIT Mode Test Times (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−6
Figure 38−5. Definition of BIT Status Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−8
Figure 38−6. Equipment Subsystem BIT Status Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−9
Figure 38−7. BIT Interlocks Test Restrictions (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−11
Figure 38−8. OBC Display Format Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−13
Figure 38−9. OBC Failure Acronyms (Sheet 1 of 11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−14
Figure 38−10. DFCS Caution Lights and Acronyms (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−25
Figure 3811. DFCS Fault Codes (Sheet 1 of 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−27
Figure 38−12. OBC Basic Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−33
39 ORIGINAL
Page
No.
Figure 38−13. Format Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−34

Figure 38−14. OBC Computer Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−37
Figure 38−15. OBC/CSS Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−38
Figure 38−16. OBC−Related Warning/Caution/Advisory Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−39
Figure 38−17. DEU CSS Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−41
Figure 38−18. DEU Pages for Operator Code and Data Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−41
Figure 38−19. DEU Flycatcher Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−42
Figure 38−20. MD CSS Display Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−43
Figure 38−21. Flycatcher Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−44
Figure 38−22. DEU Block Address Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−45
Figure 38−23. DEU Trap Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−46
Figure 38−24. Block Address/Trap Error Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−47
Figure 38−25. DD Radar Warning Maltese Cross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−48
Figure 3826. MFD/PTID ORT Abort Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−50
Figure 38−27. Test−in−Progress Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−52
Figure 38−28. WRA Common Names and Designators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−53
Figure 3829. BIT Menu Display Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−54
Figure 38−30. Degraded Mode Assessment Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−54
Figure 38−31. Maintenance Display Format (Test Complete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−55
Figure 38−32. Maintenance Display (Test Complete) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−55
Figure 38−33. Test Target Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−56
Figure 3834. Continuous Monitor Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−57
Figure 38−35. Radar Continuous Monitor Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−58
Figure38−36. OBC Continuous Monitor Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−59
Figure 38−37. PTID Menu for TCS IBIT, In Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−61
Figure 38−38. TCS BIT Prompts and RIO Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−61
Figure 38−39. Initial C/D TEST Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−62
Figure 38−40. C/D TEST 1 Display (After Aging Is Completed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−62
Figure 38−41. C/D TEST 2 Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−63
Figure 38−42. C/D TEST 3 Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−63
Figure 38−43. DD Responses for SCU/SSP/DD Select Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−64
Figure 38−44. DD Responses for SHC Select Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−64
Figure 38−45. DD Responses for PTID Select Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−64
Figure 38−46. BIT Static DD Display (ATTK Selected) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−65
Figure 38−47. BIT Static PTID Display (ATTK Selected) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−66
Figure 38−48. BIT Static DD Display (GND STAB or TV Selected)(Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−67
Figure 38−49. BIT Static PTID Display (Non−ATTK Selection) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−69
Figure 38−50. BIT DD Dynamic Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−70
Figure 3851. BIT Dynamic PTID Display (ATTK Selected) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−71
Figure 38−52. Special Test 80−Instrumentation Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−71
CHAPTER 40 TACTICAL IMAGING SET
Figure 40−1. Tactical Imaging Set Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−2
Figure 40−2. Settings Menus Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−5
ORIGINAL 40
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
A AGR Air−to−ground ranging.
AIC Air inlet control; air intercept control.

A/A Air−to−air.
AICS Air inlet control system.
AAA Anti−aircraft artillery.
A/J Antijam.
AAC Aviation armament change.
AM Amplitude modulation.
AAI Air−to−air interrogator.
A/N Alphanumeric.
AAW Anti−air warfare.
AOA Angle of attack.
AB Afterburner.
AOB Angle of bank.
ac Alternating current.
AON Angle−off−the−nose.
ACC Aircrew system change.
APC Approach power compensator.
ACL Automatic carrier landing.
APCS Approach power compensator system.
ACLS Automatic carrier landing system.
ARDP Advance radar data processor.
ACM Air combat maneuver.
ARI Automatic rudder interconnect.
ACQ Acquisition (TCS).
ARSP Advance radar signal processor.
ACS Automatic channel select.
ASC Advanced signal converter.
A/D Analog−to−digital.
ASE Allowable steering error.
ADAC Airborne data acquisition computer.
ASH Automatic stored heading.
ADF Automatic direction finder.
ASPJ Airborne self−protection jammer.
ADI Altitude director indicator.
ASR Air surveillance radar.
ADL Armament datum line.
ATDC Airborne tactical data control.
ADRL Automatic distribution requirements list.
ATDS Airborne tactical data system.
AEC Automatic exposure control.
ATLS Asymmetric thrust limiting system.
AFB Airframe bulletin.
AVB Avionic bulletin.
AFC Airframe change.
AVC Avionic change.
AFTC Augmenter fan temperature control.
AVIA TID AOA, VV, ILS, and ACLS.
A/G Air−to−ground.
AWCS Airborne weapons control system.
AGI Armament gas ingestion.
AWL All−weather landing.
AGL Above ground level.
AYC Accessories change.
41 ORIGINAL
B CAT Catapult.
CATM Captive air training missile.

BARO Barometric.
CATCC Carrier air traffic control center.
BATR Bullet at target range.
CAW Caution, advisory, warning.
BCD Binary code decimal.
cb Circuit breaker.
BDA Bomb damage assessment.
CC Cubic centimeter.
BDHI Bearing distance heading indicator.
CCA Carrier controlled approach.
BER BIT evaluation report.
CCIP Continuously computed impact point.
BFCM Backup flight control module.
CCRS Command course.
BIDI Bidirectional hydraulic pump.
CCTVS Color cockpit television sensor.
Bingo Return fuel state.
CDI Course deviation indicator.
BIST Built−in self test.
CDIR Camouflage detection infrared.
BIT Built−in test.
cg Center of gravity.
BLD Basic landing display.
CGTL Command ground track line.
BMT BIT moving target.
Charlie time Expected time over ramp.
BOL BOFORS launcher.
CIC Combat information center.
Bolter Hook down, unintentional touch and go.
CICU Computer integrated converter unit.
BOS Backup oxygen system.
CIPDU Control indicator power distribution unit.
BPS Beam power supply.
CIU Converter interface unit.
BRU Bomb rack unit.
CM Continuous monitor.
BSF Band suppression filter.
CMB Code matrix box.
BTOF Bullet time of flight.
CMM Continuous monitor mode.
CMPTR Computer.
C
CNI Communication−navigation−identification.
CA Cartridge actuated device. CNO Chief of Naval Operations.
CADC Central air data computer. COT Crew operation trainer.
CAINS Carrier aircraft inertial navigation system. CP Central processor.
CAP Combat air patrol; computer address panel. CPS Controller processor signal unit; cycles per second.
CARQUAL Carrier qualifications. CRT Cathode ray tube.
CAS Calibrated airspeed. CSD Constant speed drive.
ORIGINAL 42
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CSS Control stick steering. DRO Destructive readout.
CV Aircraft carrier. DROT Degraded range on target.
CVA Aircraft carrier approach. DSPT Dynamic steering point.
CVIC Aircraft carrier intelligence center. DSS Data storage set.
CVS Course vectoring symbols. DSU Data storage unit.
CWI Continuous-wave illuminator. DTM Data transfer module.
D E
D/A Digital-to-analog. EAC Expected approach clearance time.
dB Decibel. EAS Equivalent airspeed.
dc Direct current. ECA Expanded chaff adapter.
DD Digital display. ECCM Electronic counter-countermeasures.
DDP Digital data processor. ECM Electronic countermeasures.
DDPG Digital data processor group. ECS Environmental control system.
DDS Data display system; digital data system. ECU Electronic control unit.
DECM Defensive electronic countermeasures. EED Electroexplosive devices.
DEST Destination. EGT Exhaust gas temperature.
DEU Data entry unit. EIF Exposure interval factor.
DF Direction finder. EIG Engine instrument group.
DFCS Digital flight control system. EMCON Electronic radiation control.
DFM Dogfight mode. EMSP Engine monitoring system processor.
DG Directional gyro. ETA Estimated time of arrival.
D/L Data link.
DLC Direct lift control. F
DLS Data-link system. FAM Familiarization.

DMA Degraded mode assessment. FCF Functional checkflight.
DME Distance measuring equipment. FCLP Field carrier landing practice.
DP Decision point. FD Fault direction.

DPG Data processor group. FEMS Fatigue engine monitoring system.
DPGS Data processing ground station. FF Fuel flow.
DR Dead reckoning.
43 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
F/F Fighter to fighter. H
FF/DL Fighter-to-fighter data link. HDG Heading.
FHF Failure history file. HEFOE Hydraulic electric fuel oil engine.
FI Fault isolation. HERO Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance.
FL Flight level. hot start A start that exceeds normal starting

temperatures.
FLOLS Fresnel lens optical landing system.
HPRF High pulse repetition frequency.
FLRP Fighter link reference point.
HSD Horizontal situation display.
FMC Fighter mode command; forward motion compensa-
tion; forward motion correction. HSI Horizontal situation indicator.
FMI Flight maintenance indicator. HUD Heads-up display.
FMLP Field mirror landing practice. hung start A start that results in a stagnated rpm and
temperature.
FOD Foreign object damage.
FOV Field of view.

I
fpm feet per minute.
IAS Indicated airspeed.
FRL Fuselage reference line.
IBIT Initiated BIT.
FRS Fleet replacement squadron.
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization.
FTCM Flight test continuous monitoring.
ICS Intercommunications systems.
FTJU Fuel tank jettison unit.
IDG Integrated-drive generator.
FWD Forward.
IF Intermediate frequency.
IFB Interference blanker.

G
IFF Identification, friend or foe.
G Guard channel.
IFOV Instantaneous field of view.
g Gravity.
IFR Instrument flight rules.
G/A Ground to air.
IFT In-flight training.
GACH Gimble angle crosshair.
IFX IFF transponder.
GCA Ground-controlled approach
IGV Inlet guide vane.
GCI Ground-controlled intercept.
ILCOS Instantaneous lead computed optical sight.
GCU Generator control unit; gun control unit.
ILS Instrument landing system.
GPS Global positioning system.
IMC Instrument meteorological conditions.
GSS Gun scoring system.
GT Ground track.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 44
IMN Indicated Mach number. L
IMU Inertial measurement unit. LAOT Low−PRF antenna on target.

InHg Inch of Mercury. LAR Launch acceptability region.
INS Inertial navigation system. LARI Lateral automatic rudder interconnect.
IP Initial point. LBA Limits of basic aircraft.
IPF Interference protection feature. LCD Liquid crystal display.
IR Infrared. LCOS Lead computing optical sight.
IRCM Infrared countermeasures. LCU Load control unit.
IRLS Infrared line scanner. LE Leading edge.
IRNR Infrared not ready. LOROP Long−range oblique photography.
IRRS Infrared reconnaissance set. LOS Line of sight.
IRST Infrared search and track. LOX Liquid oxygen.
IRT Infrared test. LPA Life preserver assembly.
IRW Infrared wide. LPRF Low pulse repetition frequency.
ITER Improved triple ejector track. LS Line scanner.
ITS Integrated trim system. LSO Landing signal officer (Paddles).
IU Interface unit. LTE Launch to eject.
J
M
JAT Jam angle track.
M Mach.
JTIDS Joint tactical information distribution system.
MAC Mean aerodynamic chord.
K MAD Magnetic azimuth detector.
KCAS Knots calibrated airspeed. MAG VAR Magnetic variation.
KCP Keyer control panel. MAN Manual.
KEAS Knots equivalent airspeed. MAS Missile auxiliary subsystem.
kHz Kilohertz. MATS Missile auxiliary test set.
KIAS Knots indicated airspeed. MAX Maximum.
KTS Knots. MCF Motion compensation factor.
45 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
MCM Monitor control message. N
MCS Mission computer system. NACES Navy aircrew common ejection seat.
MCT Memory confidence test. NAG Air-to-ground mode.
MDL Mission data loader. NATOPS Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures
Standardization.
meatball Glideslope image of mirror landing system.
NATSF Naval Air Technical Services Facility.
MEC Main engine control.
NAV GRID Navigation command and control grid.
MER Multiple ejector rack.
NAVRIT Naval airborne video recorder and image
MFD Multifunction display. transceiver.
MFT Mission flight trainer. NDRO Nondestructive readout.
MHz Megahertz. NECT Net entry control terminal.
MIL Military. NFL Notch filter let.
MITS Missile interface test set. NFO Naval flight officer.
MLC Mainlobe clutter. NFOV Narrow field of view.
MLG Main landing gear. NFR Notch filter right.
MMGS Multiple mode gunsight. nm Nautical miles.
MOAT Missile on aircraft test. NOTAM Notice to airmen.
MPRU Missile power relay unit. NOZ Nozzle.
MPS Missile power supply. NPG Network participant group.
MR Maintenance readout. NPS Navigation power supply.
MRL Manual rapid lock-on. NR Number.
MRT Military rated thrust. NRNG No range.
MSEC Message security. NSV Navigation state vector.
MSI Multistatus indicator. NTDS Naval tactical data system.
MSL Mean sea level. NTR Network time reference.
MSS Mission support system. NVIS Night vision imaging system.
MTDS Marine tactical data system. NWP Naval warfare publication.
MTM Magnetic tape memory. NWPM Non-write-protected memory.
MTP Master test panel. NWS Nosewheel steering.
MVR Mission video recorder. N1 Low-pressure compressor rotor speed.
MWOD Multiple word of day. N2 High-pressure compressor rotor speed.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 46
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
O PPC Powerplant change.
OAT Outside air temperature. pph Pounds per hour.
OBC On-board check. PPI Plan position indicator.
OBCCM On-board check continuous monitor. PPLI Precise participant location and identification.
OBOGS On-board oxygen generating system. PRI Primary.
OFT Operational flight trainer. PS Pulse search.
OFP Operational flight plan. Ps Static pressure.
ORT Operational readiness test. psi Pounds per square inch.
OSP Overspeed. PSTT Pulse single-target track.
OWF Overwing fairing. PSU Power switching unit.
PT Engine power trim.

P
Pt Total pressure.
Paddles Landing signal officer.
PTID Programmable tactical information display.
PA Power approach.
PTO Pilot takeover.
PAL Pilot automatic lock-on.
PTP Point to point.
PAN Panoramic.
PT7 Turbine exhaust pressure.
PAP Precision approach point.
PAR Precision approach radar. Q

PC Pulse compression. Q Dynamic pressure.
PCD Precision course direction.
R
PD Pulse Doppler.
RACH Radar angle crosshair.
PDCP Pilot display control panel.
RARI Rudder automatic rudder interconnect.
PDS Pulse Doppler search.
RATS Reduced arrestment thrust system.
PDSTT Pulse Doppler single-target track.
RDO Recovery duty officer.
PFPM Potential flightpath marker.
RDP Radar data processor.
PGU Improved round for the M-61 gun (new bullet).
RDR Radar.
PH Phoenix missile.
RDSCU Radar sensor control unit.
PID Positive identification.
RECON Reconnaissance.
PIO Pilot-induced oscillation.
RF Radio frequency.
PLM Pilot lock-on mode.
RFCI Radio frequency/control indicators.
POL Petroleum, oil, lubricants.
RGSTT Range-gated single target track.
PP Peak power.
47 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
RHA Recording head assembly. SEC Secondary.
RIO Radar intercept officer. SHC Sensor hand control.
RNAV Area navigation. SHDG Stored heading ground align.
ROE Rules of engagement. SIF Selective identification feature.
ROM Read−only memory. SINS Ship’s inertial navigation system.
ROT Range on target. SMAL Single−mode alignment.
rpm High−pressure compressor rotor speed (N2). SMDC Shielded mild detonator cord.
RRC Rounds remaining counter. SMP Store management processor.
R/T Receiver−transmitter. SMS Stores management system.
RTF Return to force. SOP Standard operating procedures.
RTGS Real time gunsight. SP Sparrow missile.
RTT−I Round trip timing interrogation. SPAM Special aid to maintenance.
RWR Radar warning receiver. SPS Solenoid power supply.
RWS Range while search. SRA Shop replaceable assembly.
STAB AUG Stability augmentation.

S STBY Standby.
SA Semiautomatic acquisition mode. STN Source track number.
SAHRS Standard attitude heading reference system. STT Single−target track.
SAM Surface−to−air missile. SSI Standard serial interface.
SAR Search and rescue. SW Sidewinder missile.
SAS Stability augmentation system.
SAT Simultaneous alignment and test. T
SC Sensor control. TACAN Tactical air navigation.
SCADC Standard central air data computer. TAC DRO Tactical destructive readout.
SCP Sensor control panel. TADIL Tactical digital information link.
SDIS Sensor display indicator set. TAMPS Tactical aviation mission planning system.
SEAD Suppression of enemy air defense. TARPS Tactical air reconnaissance pod system.
SEAM Sidewinder expanded acquisition mode. TAS True airspeed.
SEAWARS Seawater−activated release system. TBT Turbine blade temperature.
ORIGINAL 48
TCA Turbine compressor assembly. TVT Television track.
TCR Time code readout. TWS Track while scan.
TCS Television camera set.

U
TDC Throttle designator controller.
UHF Ultra high frequency.
TDRS Tactical data recording system.
UHT Unit horizontal tail.
TDMA Time−division multiple access.
UTM Universal test message.
TDS Tactical data system.
TED Trailing edge down. V

TER Triple ejector rack. Vc Closing velocity rate.
TEU Trailing edge up. vC Computed MAG VAR.
TID Tactical information display. VDI Vertical display indicator.
TIMS Terminal input messages. VDIG Vertical display indicator group.
TIS Tactical imaging set. VEC Vector.
TIT Turbine inlet temperature. VERT Vertical.
TLN Takeoff, landing, navigation. VFR Visual flight rules.
TMA Target under missile attack. Vg/H Velocity/height.
TMN True Mach number. V/H Velocity altitude factor (Vg/H).
TOD Time of day. VHF Very high frequency.
TOF Time of fall. VID Visual identification.
TOMS Terminal output messages. VLA Vertical lever arm.
TOT Time on target. vM Manual MAG VAR.
T/R Transformer−rectifier. Vmcg Minimum control groundspeed.
TS Static temperature. VMCU Voltage monitor control unit.
TSD Tactical situation display. VR Rotation speed.
TSEC Transmission security. VSL Vertical scan lock−on.
TT2 Compressor inlet temperature. VSV Variable stator vane.
TT4 Compressor discharge temperature. VSWR Voltage standing wave ratio.
TTG Time to go. VTR Videotape recorder.
TV Television. VV Vertical velocity.
TVS Television search. V1 Critical engine failure speed.
49 ORIGINAL
W WSPD Windspeed.
WCS Weapon control system. WST Weapons system trainer.
WDIR Wind direction.

Y
WFOV Wide field of view.
YY Geographic reference point for NAV GRID.
WOD Wind over the deck; word of the day.
WOW Weight on wheels or weight off wheels. Z

WPM Weapons program memory. ZTOD Zulu time of day.
WRA Weapons replaceable assembly. ZTOT Zulu time on target.
ORIGINAL 50
PREFACE
SCOPE tribution Requirements List (ADRL) maintained by Naval

Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command, in
This NATOPS flight manual is issued by the authority San Diego, CA. If there is a continuing need for this publica
of the Chief of Naval Operations and under the direction of tion, each activity’s Central Technical Publication Librarian
Commander, Naval Air Systems Command in conjunction must send a revised ADRL report on floppy disk to Naval Air
with the naval air training and operating procedures standard Technical Data and Engineering Service Command. If an
ization (NATOPS) program. This manual, together with the activity does not have a library, then send a letter to the
supplemental manuals listed below, contains information on Commanding Officer, Naval Air Technical Data and Engi
all aircraft systems, performance data, and operating proce neering Service Command, Naval Air Depot North Island,
dures required for safe and effective operations. However, it Bldg. 90, Code 3.3A, P.O. Box 357031, San Diego, CA
is not a substitute for sound judgment. Compound emergen 92135−7031, requesting assignment of a distribution account
cies, available facilities, adverse weather or terrain, or con number (if necessary) and automatic mailing of future issues
siderations affecting the lives and property of others may of the publications needed.
require modification of the procedures contained herein.
Read this manual from cover to cover. It is your responsibility Note
to have a complete knowledge of its contents.
The ADRL floppy disk can be used only to place
APPLICABLE PUBLICATIONS an activity on the mailing list for automatic dis
tribution of future issues of the publications. It
The following applicable publications complement cannot be used to make one−time orders of publi
this manual: cations from current stock. To get publications
from stock, see One−Time Orders above.
NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1 (Performance Charts)
Once established on automatic distribution for this or
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A (Supplemental)
any other NAVAIR technical publication, an activity must
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B (Pocket Checklist) submit an ADRL report on floppy disk at least once every
12months to update or confirm their automatic distribution
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1F (Functional Checkflight requirement.
Checklist) Note
HOW TO GET COPIES Activities not submitting an ADRL report on
floppy disk for more than 12 months may be
One−Time Orders dropped from distribution of all NAVAIR techni
cal publications.
If this publication is needed on a one−time basis (with
out future updates), it can be ordered IAW NAVSUPP 409 UPDATING THE MANUAL
(MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP) from NAVICP Philadelphia via
DAAS through the local supply system or the requisition may To ensure that the manual contains the latest proce
be submitted to Naval Supply System Command, Naval Lo dures and information, NATOPS review conferences are held
gistics Library (NLL) web site www.nll.navsup.navy.mil. in accordance with the current OPNAVINST 3710.7 series.
This publication is also available to view or download from
the NATEC website www.natec.navy.mil CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS
Automatic Distribution (With Updates)
Recommended changes to this manual or other
NATOPS publications may be submitted by anyone in accor
This publication and changes to it are automatically dance with the current OPNAVINST 3710.7 series.
sent to activities that are established on the Automatic Dis
51 ORIGINAL
Routine change recommendations are submitted WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES

directly to the model manager on OPNAV 3710/6 shown on
the next page. The address of the model manager of this The following definitions apply to WARNINGs,"
aircraft is: CAUTIONs," and Notes" found throughout this manual.
Commanding Officer
Fighter Squadron 101
NAS Oceana
Virginia Beach, VA 23460−5220
Attn: F−14D Model Manager An operating procedure, practice, or condition,
etc., that may result in injury or death if not care
Change recommendations of an URGENT nature fully observed or followed.
(safety of flight, etc.,) should be submitted directly to the
NATOPS advisory group member in the chain of command
by priority message.
YOUR RESPONSIBILITY
An operating procedure, practice, or condition,
NATOPS flight manuals are kept current through an etc., that may result in damage to equipment if
active manual change program. Any corrections, additions, not carefully observed or followed.
or constructive suggestions for improvement of its content
should be submitted by routine or urgent change recommen Note
dation, as appropriate.
An operating procedure, practice, or condition,
etc., that is essential to emphasize.
NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL INTERIM CHANGES
WORDING
Flight manual interim changes are changes or correc
tions to the NATOPS flight manuals. They are issued by CNO
The concept of word usage and intended meaning that
or NAVAIRSYSCOM either as printed pages or as a naval
has been adhered to in preparing this manual is as follows:
message. The Interim Change Summary page is provided as
a record of all interim changes. Each manual custodian
should check the Interim Change Summary page to see that Shall" has been used only when application of a pro
all interim changes have been incorporated. cedure is mandatory.
CHANGE SYMBOLS Should" has been used only when application of a

procedure is recommended.
Revised material is indicated by a black vertical line in
either margin of the page like the one printed next to this May" and need not" have been used only when
application of a procedure is optional.
paragraph. The change symbol shows where there has been
a change. The change might be material added or information
restated. A change symbol in the margin by the chapter num Will" has been used only to indicate futurity, never to
ber and title indicates a new or completely revised chapter. indicate any degree of requirement for application of
a procedure.
ORIGINAL 52
NATOPS/TACTICAL CHANGE RECOMMENDATION

OPNAV 3710/6 (4−90) S/N 0107−LF−009−7900 DATE
TO BE FILLED IN BY ORIGINATOR AND FORWARDED TO MODEL MANAGER
FROM (originator) Unit
TO (Model Manager) Unit
Complete Name of Manual/Checklist Revision Date Change Date Section/Chapter Page Paragraph
Recommendation (be specific)
CHECK IF CONTINUED ON BACK

Justification
Signature Rank Title
Address of Unit or Command
TO BE FILLED IN BY MODEL MANAGER (Return to Originator)
FROM DATE
TO
REFERENCE
(a) Your Change Recommendation Dated
Your change recommendation dated is acknowledged. It will be held for action of
the review conference planned for to be held at
Your change recommendation is reclassified URGENT and forwarded for approval to

by my DTG .
/S/ MODEL MANAGER AIRCRAFT
53 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 54
PART I
The Aircraft
Chapter 1 Aircraft and Engine
Chapter 2 Systems
Chapter 3 Servicing and Handling
Chapter 4 Operating Limitations

CHAPTER 1
Aircraft and Engine
1.1 AIRCRAFT arecarried on the movable portion of the wing. The fuel
system incorporates both in−flight and single−point ground
The F−14D aircraft is a supersonic, two−place, twin− refueling capabilities. Aircraft general dimensions are shown
engine, swing−wing, air−superiority fighter designed and in Figure 11. FO−1 shows the general placement of com
manufactured by Grumman Aerospace Corporation. In addi ponents within the aircraft. A summary of aircraft limita
tion to its primary fighter role, carrying missiles (Sparrow tionsand characteristics are shown in Figure 12. Refer to
and/or Sidewinder) and an internal 20−mm gun, the aircraft Chapter 4 for detailed information on operating limitations.
is designed for fleet air defense (Phoenix missiles) and
ground attack (general purpose and precision ordnance) 1.1.1 Aircraft Weight
missions. Armament and peculiar auxiliaries used only dur
ing secondary missions are installed in low−drag, external The basic weight of the aircraft is approximately
configurations. Mission versatility and tactical flexibility are 43,735 pounds, which includes trapped fuel, oil, gun, and
enhanced through independent operational capability or pylons. Consult the applicable Handbook of Weight and
integration under existing tactical data systems. Balance (NAVAIR 01−1B−40) for the exact weight of any
series aircraft.
The forward fuselage, containing the flightcrew and
electronic equipment, projects forward from midfuselage 1.1.2 Cockpit
and wing glove. Outboard pivots in the highly swept wing
glove support the movable wing panels, which incorporate The aircraft accommodates a pilot and RIO in a tandem
integral fuel cells and full−span leading−edge slats and seating arrangement. To maximize external field of view,
trailing−edge flaps for supplemental lift control. In flight, the stations within the tandem cockpit are prominently located
wings may be varied in sweep, area, camber, and aspect atop the forward fuselage and enclosed by a single clamshell
ratioby selection of any leading−edge sweep angle between canopy. Integral boarding provisions to the cockpit and
20_ and 68_. Wing sweep can be automatically or manually aircraft top deck are on the left side of the fuselage. Each
controlled to optimize performance and thereby enhance air crewstation incorporates a rocket ejection seat that is
craft versatility. Separate variable−geometry air inlets, offset vertically adjustable. A single environmental control system
from the fuselage in the glove, direct primary airflow to two provides conditioned air to the cockpit and electronic bays
F110−GE−400 dual−axial compressor, turbofan engines for pressurization and air−conditioning. Oxygen for breath
equipped with afterburners for thrust augmentation. The dis ing is supplied to the crew under pressure from an on−board
placed engine nacelles extend rearward to the tail section, oxygen generating system with stored gaseous oxygen as
supporting the twin vertical tails, horizontal tails, and ven backup. The cockpit arrangement provides minimum dupli
tralfins. The middle and aft fuselage, which contains the cation of control capability, thereby necessitating two air
main fuel cells, tapers off in depth to the rear where it crew for safe flight.
accommodates the speedbrake surfaces and arresting hook.
All control surfaces are positioned by irreversible hydraulic 1.1.2.1 Pilot Cockpit
actuators to provide desired control effectiveness throughout
the flight envelope. Stability augmentation features in the The forward station of the cockpit is arranged and
flight control system enhance flight characteristics and equipped for the pilot (FO−3). In addition to three electronic
thereby provide a more stable and maneuverable weapons displays for viewing tactical, flight, navigational, and ECM
delivery platform. The tricycle−type, forward−retracting data, the pilot instrument panel also contains armament con
landing gear is designed for nosegear catapult launch and trols, flight and engine instruments. Engine controls, fuel
carrier landings. Missiles and external stores are carried from management, auxiliary devices, autopilot, and communica
eight hardpoint stations on the center fuselage between the tion control panels are on the left console. Display, power,
nacelles and under the nacelles and wing glove; no stores lighting, and environmental controls are on the right console.
1−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 11.Aircraft Dimensions
1.1.2.2 RIO Cockpit tions. The following are types of technical directives used in
this manual:
The aft station of the cockpit is equipped for the RIO
(FO−4). This instrument panel contains controls and three AAC Aviation Armament Change
electronic displays for the radar, tactical, and navigational ACC Aircrew System Change
flight instruments. Armament controls, sensor controls, and
AFC Airframe Change
communication panels are on the left console. The right
console contains a navigational display, data entry unit, AVB Avionics Bulletin
ECMcontrols, data−link controls, lighting controls, and the AVC Avionics Change
IFF panel.
AYC Accessories Change.
1.1.3 Electronic Nomenclature 1.1.5 Block Numbers
Figure 13 is an alphabetical listing of the tactical, The following production block numbers include the
communication, navigation, flight control, and instruments indicated aircraft serial numbers (BuNo). Selected aircraft in
in the aircraft. blocks 85 and 110 have been updated to create the F−14D/
block 170 configuration.
1.1.4 Technical Directives
Block No. Serial No. (BuNo)
As technical changes are made to the aircraft, those that 160 163412 − 163418
affect aircraft operation or pilot and RIO need−to−know
operation will be incorporated in the appropriate sections and 165 163893 − 163904
listed in the Summary of Applicable Technical Directives in 170 164341 − 164351 and 164599 − 164604
the front of this manual. In some instances, technical 85 159592, 159595, 159600, 159603,
directives may be incorporated in the aircraft while it is still 159610, 159613, 159618, 159619,
on the production line. Check the Technical Directives 159628 − 159630
Section of the Aircraft Log Book for applicable modifica
110 161159, 161163, 161166.
ORIGINAL 1−2
F−14D AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS
Aircraft Dimensions Starter Cranking Limits
Length 62′ 8.5″ Cross bleed 2 min continuous then 10 min off
Height (Tail) 16′ 0″ Start Cart 5 min continuous then 10 min off
Wingspan @ 20_ wingsweep 64′ 1.5″
1 5″
Wingspan @ 68_ wingsweep 38′ 2.5″ Idle
Wingspan in oversweep 33′ 3.5″
3 5″
Wing Area 565 sq/ft RPM = 62 − 78% OIL PRESS = 15 − 45 psi
EGT = 350 − 650_C NOZ POS = 100%
Gross Weights FF = 950 − 1400 PPH HYD PRESS = 3000 psi
Empty A/C (w/crew & trapped fuel) 43,735 lbs MIL (and above)
Catapult 76,000 lbs
Field takeoff 72,000 lbs RPM = 95 − 104% OIL PRESS = 25 − 65 psi
Min descent rate landing (350 fpm) 72,000 lbs EGT = 780 − 935_C
935 C NOZ POS INFLIGHT:
Field landing (max 500 fpm ROD) 60
60,000
000 lbs MIL = 3 − 10%
Carrier/FCLP land 54,000 lbs Min AB = 5 − 12%
Max AB = 60 − 90%
T/O & Land Flap/Slat Transition Limits Ground Start Malfunctions

AOB < 45_ HOT START: 890_C (will normally peak
ROLL SAS ON @ 30 − 40% RPM)
Min 200′ AGL for flaps/slats up on takeoff HUNG START: Hung RPM below 63% with rising EGT
Min 800′ AGL for dirty−up WET START: No lightoff within 20 sec of
Min 180 kts for retraction of flaps throttle to IDLE
12 units AOA for all transitions
225 kts max flap/slat speed
INST Test
280 kts max landing gear speed
Landing & Braking RPM = 96%

EGT = 950 ± 10_C
10 C
(initiates engine overtemp alarm)
15 kts min speed for antiskid operation
FF = 10 500 pph
10,500
145 kts max wheel braking g ((51.0 k A/C))
AOA = 18 ± 0.5 UNITS
165 kts
kt max wheel
h l braking
b ki (46 k A/C)
W/S = 45 ± 2.5_
2.5
190 kts max tire speed
FUEL = 2,000 ± 200# (all tapes and windows)
145 kts max E
E−55 engagement speed (69.8 k A/C)
LIGHTS: L and R FUEL LOW
175 kts max E−28 engagement
g g speed
p
20 kts
kt max 90_ crosswind
i d componentt
60 kts max canopy open Oil System
Engine Speeds (RPM) Normal Range 25 − 65 psi
10% Ignition system becomes operative Min (stabilized idle) 15 psi
30 − 46% Engine crank switch will not engage O pressure light
Oil on @ 11 psi decreasing
20% Min RPM with throttle at idle off @ 14 psi increasing
30% Max RPM with pneumatic starter
30% RPM must fall below for generator Pneumatic Pressure
auto−reset
50% Engine crank switch automatically shuts off
60% Generator comes on line Min auxiliary canopy (3000 psi) 800 psi
50% G
Generatort lilightht ill
illuminates
i t (if RPM ffalling)
lli ) Min normal canopy (3000 psi) 1200 psi
60% Ensure engine g crank off (osp/valve)
( p ) C S accumulator
CHS 1800 psi
62 − 78% Normal
N l idle
idl FHS accumulator 1800 p
psi
75 − 90% Auto throttle range g Mi emergency gear preflight
Min fli ht 3000 psii
95 − 104% MIL & above
b Min emergency
g yg
gear extension 1800 psi
p
107 7% Overspeed
107.7% p (chevrons
( flash)) Wh l brake
Wheel b k accumulator
l t (2 gages)) 1900 ± 50 psii
110.0%
110 0% Engine
E i secures (fuel (f l shutoff)
h t ff) Arresting
g hook dashpot
p 800 ± 10 p
psi
Figure 12.Characteristics and Limitations (Sheet 1 of 2)
1−3 ORIGINAL
F−14D AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS (CONTINUED)
Fuel System In−Flight Refueling

Aft−Left Tank Group Capacity 5900 − 6200 lbs 170 − 200 Approach configuration
Fwd−Right Tank Group Capacity 6300 − 6600 lbs 200 − 300/0.8 TMN Cruise configuration
Max split between cockpit totals 300 lbs 400/0.8 TMN Max IFR probe speed
Fuel dump p rate 1500 lbs/min
F l dump
Fuel d auto
t shutoff
h t ff with
ith 4000 lb
lbs remaining
i i
Ground refuel rate @ 50 psi 450 gal/min SAS Stability Augmentation System
In−flight refuel rate @ 57 psi 475 gal/min
FCS CAUTION
CAUTION: Ai
Airspeed d < 600 kts/1.3
kt /1 3 TMN
Hydraulic System > 0.5 TMN/10 units No cross controls
> 0.6/15 units AOA coordinate all
lateral stick
Normal Hyd. system operating press 3000 ± 100 psi
BIDI activates when one system is < 2100 psi PITCH SAS: No Limitations
BIDI output w/3000 psi on good side 2400 − 2600 psi
BIDI shuts off when failed system
y is < 500 psi
p for ROLL DGR/YAW DGR Airspeed <1.0 TMN
10 sec and/or ARI DGR
Emer. Flt. Hyd. on if both systems < 2100 psi
Outb’d Spoiler Module ARI/SAS OUT: Airspeed
p <1.0 TMN,,
electrically inhibited @ 62_ W/S AOA − max 15 units
it
Outb’d
Outb d Spoiler Module No aggressive maneuvering
depressurized @ 65_ W/S
Miscellaneous Prohibited Maneuvers
450 Windmill airstart airspeed required 1. Intentional Spins.

300 Spooldown airstart airspeed required 2. During AB operations; sustained 0 to −0.5 g flight;
250 With RUDDER AUTH, limit inputs to <10_ −0.5 g to −2.4 g’s for more than 10 seconds.
400 Rudder authority limits inputs to < 9.5_ 3. At MIL power or less; zero or negative g flight for more
400/0.9 With HZ TAIL AUTH, limit lateral stick<1/4 throw than 20 seconds.
400 Speedbrake blowback
4. AIM−9 launch with flaps/slats extended.
300 Hook blowback in transit
300/0.8 TMN Max speed w/ airsource off (overwing fairing) 5. Fuel dump while in AB or with S/Bs extended.
350/1.5 TMN Max ramdoor open airspeed − heat from 6. Dual eng AB takeoff, waveoffs, bolters or cat launches.
friction 7. Single eng MAX AB takeoff, waveoff, bolter, or
> 0.7 TMN Coordinate stick and rudder input cat launches.
> 0.5 TMN No cross controls above 8. Rolling maneuvers with bank angle changes in excess
2.4 TMN Reduce speed light (airframe limit) of 360 degrees.
Ejection G Limits
Zero − 250 KIAS Ejection Safe

250 − 600 KIAS Ejection Hazardous
> 600 KIAS Ejection Extremely Hazardous
Gear Down Symmetric
y Limit 0 − 2.0
G
Gear Down
D R
Rolling
lli
External Tank Limits ((coordinated turns onlyy 225 − 280 KTS)) 0 − 2.0
Fl
Flaps/Slats
/Sl t Down
D 0 − 2.0
20
68,000 lb aircraft symmetric limit 4.6
650 Max below 12,000
, ft 58,000
, lb aircraft symmetric
y limit 5.5
700 Max
M 12 − 2525,000
000 ft 53 000 lb aircraft
53,000 i ft symmetric
t i lilimit
it 6
6.0
0
650 Max 25 − 34,000 ft 50,000 lb aircraft symmetric limit 6.5
1.75 TMN Max above 34,000 ft
1.6 TMN Max with ROLL SAS OFF
Figure 1−2. Characteristics and Limitations (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 1−4
TACTICAL
CHAFF DISPENSING SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ALE−39
DIGITAL DATA LINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ASW−27B/C
ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ALQ−165
FUZE FUNCTION CONTROL SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/AWW−4
GUN CONTROL UNIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C−11414/AYQ−15
IFF INTERROGATOR SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/APX−76C
IFF TRANSPONDER SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/APX−100(V)
INTERFERENCE BLANKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MX−10666/A
IRSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/AAS−429XN−1
JOINT TACTICAL INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/URC−107
MISSILE LAUNCHER/BOL CHAFF DISPENSER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LAU−138A/A
MISSILE POWER SUPPLY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PP−8043/A
MISSION COMPUTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/AYK−14 9XN−60 PMM
PANORAMIC CAMERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KA−99A
RADAR SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/APG−71 (XN−1)
RADAR WARNING SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ALR−67(V)
SERIAL FRAME CAMERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KS−87B
STANDARD CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CPU−175/A
STORES MANAGEMENT SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/AYQ−15
TARPS POD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LA−610
TELEVISION CAMERA SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/AXX−1
COMMUNICATION
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TSEC/KY−58
INTERCOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LS−460B/AIC
VHF/UHF COMMUNICATIONS SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ARC−182
NAVIGATION
AUTOMATIC DIRECTION FINDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OA−8697/ARD
INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ASN−139
MAGNETIC AZIMUTH DETECTOR SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DSU−4A/A
MINIATURIZED AIRBORNE GPS RECEIVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . R−2512
MISSION DATA LOADER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MU−1053/A
RADAR ALTIMETER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/APN−194(V)
RADAR BEACON AND AUGMENTOR SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/APN−154(V) and R−1623/APN
RECEIVER DECODER GROUP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .AN/ARA−63
STANDARD ATTITUDE HEADING REFERENCE SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/USN−2(V)
TACTICAL NAVIGATION SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ARN−118(V)
FLIGHT CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTS

AIR INLET CONTROL PROGRAMMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C−8684B/A
APPROACH POWER COMPENSATOR SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ASN−146
DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AN/ASW−59
BEARING DISTANCE HEADING INDICATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ID−663D/U
STANDBY AIRSPEED INDICATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AVU−30/A
STANDBY COCKPIT ALTIMETER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AAU−39/A
STANDBY COMPASS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AQU−5/A
VERTICAL VELOCITY INDICATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AAU−8/A
Figure 13.Electronic Nomenclature
1−5 (Reverse
1−5 Blank) ORIGINAL
CHAPTER 2
Systems
2.1 AIR INLET CONTROL SYSTEM (AICS) 2.1.1.1 Ground and Low−Speed Operation
The purpose of the AICS is to decelerate supersonic air
During ground static and low−speed (Mach < 0.35)
and to provide even, subsonic airflow to the engine
operation, the inlet ramps are mechanically restrained in the
throughout the aircraft flight envelope. The AICS consists of
stowed (retracted) position. The predominant airflow is
two variable−geometry intakes, one on each side of the
concentrated about the lower lip of the inlet duct and is
fuselage at the intersection of the wing glove and fuselage.
supplemented by reverse airflow through the fixed bleed
Intake inlet geometry is varied by three automatically
door, around the forward lip of the third ramp. As flight speed
controlled hinged ramps on the upper side of the intakes. The
is increased to 0.35 Mach, hydraulic power is ported to the
ramps are positioned to decelerate supersonic air by creating
ramp actuators but the ramps are not scheduled out of the
a compression field outside the inlet and to regulate the
stowed position until Mach 0.5 (see Figure 24). The fixed
amount and quality of air going to the engine. The
bleed door bleeds low−energy, boundary layer air from the
rectangular intakes are separated from the fuselage to
movable ramps.
minimize boundary layer ingestion and are highly raked to
optimize operation at high angle of attack.
2.1.1.2 Subsonic and Transonic Speeds
Inlet ramps are positioned by electrohydraulic actua
tors that respond to fixed schedules in the AICS program At airspeeds greater than 0.5 Mach, the ramps program
mers. Separate programmers, probes, sensors, actuators, and primarily as a function of Mach for optimum AICS perfor
hydraulic power systems provide completely independent mance. At transonic speeds, a normal shock wave attaches to
operation of the left and right air inlet control systems. the second movable ramp. The third ramp deflects above
Figure 21 shows the basic elements of AICS mechanization. 0.9Mach to maintain proper bleed slot height (∆h) for
Electrical power for the AICS programmers is pro transonic and low−supersonic flight.
vided by the ac and dc essential No. 2 buses. The ramp stow
function is powered by the dc essential No. 1 bus. Hydraulic At supersonic speeds, four shock waves compress and
power is supplied individually to the left AICS from the decelerate the inlet air. The bleed slot removes boundary
combined hydraulic system and to the right AICS from the layer air and stabilizes the shock waves. This design results
flight hydraulic system. The left AICS programmer also in substantially higher performance above Mach 2 than
functions as a wing−sweep backup computer. simpler inlet designs.
2.1.1 Normal AICS Operations 2.1.2 AICS Test
No pilot control is required during the normal (AUTO) Two types of AICS tests are provided to check the
mode of operation. Electronic monitoring in the AICS general condition of the AICS and to pinpoint system com
detects failures that would degrade system operation and ponents causing detected failures: AICS built−in test and
performance (refer to AICS BIT). AICS caution lights (L and on−board check.
R INLET, L and R RAMPS) and INLET RAMPS switches
are shown in Figure 22. 2.1.2.1 AICS Built−In Test
Sectional side views of representative variable geome
try inlet configurations scheduled by AICS programmers and BIT in the AICS computer programmer is automati
descriptive nomenclature are shown in Figure 23. cally and continually initiated within the programmer to
check AICS components when the programmer is energized.
2−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 21.Air Inlet Control System
ORIGINAL 2−2
NOMENCLATURE FUNCTION
1 INLET RAMPS AUTO − Inlet ramp position is determined by the AICS programmer.
switches STOW − Electrically commands the respective inlet ramp actuator to the stow
position; opens the appropriate hydraulic shutoff valve.
WARNING
• DO NOT take off with the INLET RAMPS switches in STOW.

Hydraulic power is on and may drive the ramps out of the stow locks
during certain servocylinder failure modes causing an engine stall.
• If wing−sweep advisory light illuminates, cycling L AICS circuit
breaker (LF1) may cause unintentional wing sweep unless WING
SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/ MANUV
FLAP (LE1) circuit breakers are pulled.
Note
Cycling either AICS circuit breaker while airborne may result in
DFCS air data failures, illuminating the FCS CAUTION and ARI
DGR lights, and cause degraded control system capability.
MASTER RESET should restore normal operation once the
cb(s) are reset.
2 RAMPS caution Indicates ramps not positioned in either stow or trail locks during critical flight
light conditions (see Figure 25).
Figure 22.AICS Control and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−3 ORIGINAL
3 INLET caution light Indicates AICS programmer/system failure: Reduce airspeed to Mach 1.2 and
check AICS acronym for failure indication.
AICS failure
Less than Mach 0.5: Ramps should be restrained by actuator stow locks.
Greater than Mach 0.5: Ramp movement is restrained by trapped hydraulic
pressure and mechanical locks, depending on Mach when INLET light illuminates.
Greater than Mach 0.9: Ramp movement is minimized by actuator spool valves and
the aerodynamic load profile in this Mach range and a RAMP light should illuminate.
Figure 2−2. AICS Control and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
The operational status of the AICS depends on hydraulic power. Detected AICS failures are indicated by
BIT−detected failures in AICS components. Failures of static AICS acronyms or AIC acronym(s) with associated INLET
or total pressure sensors; ramp No. 1, 2, or 3 positioning; caution light(s) displayed after completion of OBC.
programmer continuous end−to−end BIT; or hydraulic pres
sure to any of the ramp actuators would seriously degrade Note
AICS performance. Detected failures of these items cause the
D With INLET RAMP switches in STOW, AICS
AICS to automatically transfer to a significantly degraded
OBC will fail test and INLET lights will illu
fail−safe mode of operation, indicated by illumination of an
minate.
INLET caution light.
D If the engine enters secondary mode during
Detected failures of angle of attack, engine fan speed, OBC, the ramps will stow and fail OBC. To
or out−of−calibration detection of the difference between P1 reinitiate OBC, select primary mode and reset
and P2 (∆P), Ps or Pt sensors will cause the AICS to revert to the AICS.
the slightly degraded fail−operational mode of operation.
Nominal values of angle of attack, total temperature, or D An S4 acronym indicates the AICS program
engine fan speed are substituted for the failed values in the mers may be operating on the REV 4 (TF−30/
AICS programmer, without illumination of an INLET F14A) schedule. As a result, below 25,000 feet
caution light. at airspeeds greater than 1.1 Mach, unloading
the aircraft to less than 1g will reduce inlet sta
In both fail modes of operation, detected failures are bility and may result in inlet buzz and possibly
continuously registered by the in−flight performance moni an engine stall. Cycling AICS circuit breakers
toring system and displayed with air inlet control acronyms at a constant subsonic Mach number should
on the multifunction display and the programmable tactical eliminate the S4 acronym and reset the pro
information display (Figure 25 and Figure 26). grammer to the REV 5 (F−110) schedules.
2.1.2.2 AICS On−Board Check 2.1.3 AICS Failure Modes of Operation
OBC, initiated by the pilot during poststart or ground AICS mode of operation following a BIT−detected
maintenance checks, performs a dynamic check of the left failure may be either fail−operational mode (Figure 25) or
and right AICS. In addition to the regular AICS BIT program, fail−safe mode (Figure 26).
sensor calibration checks are made. The status of the pro
grammer electronics and the ramp actuators are checked 2.1.3.1 Fail−Operational
throughout an altitude and airspeed schedule as psuedo
pneumatic inputs to the programmer are varied to simulate a Failures in the AICS are detected by the AICS pro
flight sequence of maximum airspeed condition and back to grammer, which automatically initiates appropriate cor
static sea level conditions within 65 seconds. This cycles the rective action. Mode entry is indicated by the display of a
ramp actuators through their full range, illuminates the ramp fail−operational AIC acronym. The fail−operational mode
lights, exercises the complete AICS for preflight failure results in no significant degradation in AICS operation, and
detection, and ensures the ramps are in their stow locks. OBC the mission can be continued without any flight restrictions
is the only way to ensure stow lock integrity since it verifies or corrective action by the pilot.
the ramps are in the stowed position and then removes ramp
ORIGINAL 2−4
Figure 23.Variable−Geometry Inlet Configuration
2−5 ORIGINAL
ACTUATOR POSITION
HYDRAULIC POWER
FLIGHT CONDITION RAMP ACTUATORS RAMP NO. 1 RAMP NO. 2 RAMP NO. 3
M < 0.35 OFF Mechanically restrained by stow locks in stowed position;

electrical stow commands output from AICS programmer.
M > 0.35 to < 0.5 ON Electrical stow commands output from AICS programmer.
M > 0.5 to < 2.2 ON Variable position scheduled by AICS programmer as a

function of mach number, corrected engine fan speed, and
angle−of−attack. Ramps no. 1 and no. 2 begin positioning
at Mach 0.5; ramp no. 3 begins at Mach 0.9.
M > 2.2 ON Variable position scheduled by AICS programmer as a

function of Mach number.
Figure 24.AICS Normal Operating Mode
PTID FAILURE
MAINTENANCE DETECTED
READOUT ACRONYM FAILURE CAUSE RESULT
AIC S1 Ps, Pt or Limits exceeded. Ramps may not program during

(Possible only programmer out of OBC. Reset AICS L and R circuit
during OBC) calibration breakers (LF1, LG1) prior to
attempting another OBC.
NONE Engine fan speed Loss of engine fan Substitutes 7,300 rpm. Ramps do not
rpm from AFTC. speed signal. program during OBC.
AIC S3 None None Mask continuous monitor (CM) so

that subsequent AIC acronyms are
displayed.
AIC S4 Angle−of−attack or Limits exceeded. IN FLIGHT: Substitutes +2_

engine fan speed. angle−of−attack or 7,300 rpm.
AIC S4 Alpha delta pressure Limits exceeded. • Substitutes +2_ angle−of−attack

(During OBC) sensor out of Augmenter fan value until reset.
calibration or engine temperature
fan speed. controller (AFTC) may • Substitutes 7,300 rpm.
be in secondary mode.
AIC A4 Open wire Open wire None
Note
AIC symbol has L or R appended (AICL (AICL, AICR) to
identify on which side failure was detected.
Figure 25.Fail−Operational Mode  No INLET Light
ORIGINAL 2−6
RESULT
FAILURE MAINTENANCE DETECTED
READOUT ACRONYM FAILURE CAUSE MACH < 0.5 MACH > 0.5
AIC P AICS programmer Failed end−to−end Hydraulic shutoff Ramp movement is
(P) BIT valve remains closed. restrained by actuator
Ramp actuators mechanical locks if
AIC S1
remain mechanically failure occurred with
Static pressure (Ps) Minimum or
restrained within stow ramps within locks.
maximum limits
AIC S2 locks, provided they Otherwise ramp(s)
Total pressure (Pt ) exceeded
failed within stow move slowly with
locks. aerodynamic loads.
AIC A1 Ramp No. 1 Sustained command
and
d feedback
f db k error
AIC A2 Ramp
p No. 2
AIC S3 Ramp No. 3
AIC A1, Hydraulic pressure Sustained error due Ramp(s) may move
AIC A2, or loss of ramp No. 1, to loss of hydraulic if failure occurred
AIC A3 No. 2, or No. 3 pressure with ramp(s) out of
(INLET caution light mechanical locks.
eventually illuminates RAMP light will
> 0.5 Mach) illuminate.
NONE (No INLET caution Loss of hydraulic
light < 0.5 Mach) pressure
Note
AIC symbol has L or R appended (AICL, AICR) to identify on which side failure was detected.
Figure 26.Fail−Safe Mode  INLET Light Illuminated
Note Note
Transferring to SEC mode will revert the AICS Fail−safe operations result in a slight degradation
programmers to the REV 4 (TF−30/F14A) sched of cruise and excess thrust performance because
ule because of the loss of the AFTC N1 speed of the off−optimum configuration.
signal and will display an S4 acronym. Below
If the hydraulic shutoff valve closes above Mach 0.9,
25,000 feet and at airspeeds greater than 1.1
the ramps are normally in an unsafe configuration and the
Mach, unloading the aircraft to less than 1g will
appropriate RAMPS caution light will accompany the
reduce inlet stability and may result in inlet buzz
INLET caution light (Figure 27). Above Mach 0.9, the
and possible engine stall. To restore full REV 5
No. 3 ramp normally begins programming below the actuator
(F110/F14B/D) schedule and eliminate S4 acro
stow lock. When the fail−safe mode is entered above Mach
nym following an airborne engine mode reset to
0.9, the unpowered No. 3 ramp will eventually move and may
PRI, recycle AICS circuit breakers at constant
cause compressor stalls at higher power settings. The aircraft
subsonic Mach number.
shall be decelerated below 1.2 Mach, and the appropriate
2.1.3.2 Fail−Safe Mode INLET RAMPS switch shall be selected to STOW.
The fail−safe mode results in significantly degraded
AICS operation. Mode entry is indicated by the display of a
fail−safe AIC acronym and illumination of the appropriate
INLET caution light. Under these conditions, the AICS
Do not select STOW at speeds greater than
programmer provides a shutoff signal to close the ramps’
1.2 Mach. Compressor stalls may occur because
hydraulic shutoff valve. If the hydraulic shutoff valve closes
of ramp mispositioning.
below Mach 0.9, the ramps are normally in a safe configura
tion (No. 1 and No. 2 ramp within trail locks and No. 3 ramp 2.1.3.3 Stow Mode of Operation
in stow locks are restrained by trapped hydraulic pressure).
Engine operations may be successful below 1.2 Mach in this The STOW position of the INLET RAMPS switch
configuration; however, corrective procedures shall be commands the appropriate hydraulic shutoff valve to open
performed.
2−7 ORIGINAL
Figure 27.Ramp Monitor Logic
and provides a direct electrical signal to the ramp actuators, Whenever the hydraulic shutoff valve closes (i.e., fail−
porting hydraulic pressure directly to the retract side of the safe mode entry), hydraulic spool valves in the ramp actua
actuator. When the ramps are retracted to the stow position, tors sense the absence of pressure and block the actuator
the RAMPS light will extinguish and the stow locks should pressure and return ports, causing a hydraulic lock (dump
remain engaged even if hydraulic power is subsequently lost. inhibit). This feature reduces ramp movement when an AICS
Once in STOW, AICS programmer−detected electronic failure occurs and the ramps are not being restrained by
failures may be reset below Mach 0.5. mechanical actuator locks. Although dump inhibit prevents
the ramp from rapidly extending and causing an engine stall,
2.1.3.4 Hydraulic Shutoff and Dump Inhibit
the ramps will still slowly move. Under normal circum
The AICS hydraulic systems include a hydraulic shutoff stances, the pilot will have sufficient time to select STOW
valve to control hydraulic system pressure. The hydraulic and prevent an engine stall. F−14A flight test results show that
shutoff valve is normally controlled by the AICS programmer, with dump inhibit, the time interval between illumination of
which removes the hydraulic−on signal below 0.35M or in the a RAMPS caution light and engine stall following an AICS
event of a programmer failure. The STOW position of the failure is 15 to 40 seconds on the ground at military power,
INLET RAMPS switch bypasses the AICS programmer to and approximately 50 seconds at 10,000 feet at military
energize the hydraulic shutoff valve, providing pressure for power.
ramp motion. To ensure hydraulic pressure is shut off, the
respective AICS programmer must be deenergized by pulling 2.1.3.5 Ramp Actuator Mechanical
the circuit breaker (LF1, left or LG1, right) and the INLET Locks/Positioning
RAMPS switch placed in the AUTO position.
In addition to the actuator stow locks, the first and
Note
second ramp actuators have another set of latches (trail locks)
Cycling either AICS circuit breaker while air that prevent further ramp actuator extension after a failure
borne may result in DFCS air data failures, illu within these trail locks. The actuator stow and trail locks
minating the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR restrain actuator movement in tension only. Hydraulic
lights, and cause degraded control system capa pressure (500 psi) is required to disengage the lock finger
bility. MASTER RESET should restore normal latches.
operation once the cb(s) are reset.
ORIGINAL 2−8
Safe positioning of the ramp actuators is monitored fail−safe operation. In flight, the No. 1 and 2 ramps tend to
by the ramp monitor logic shown in Figure 27. A RAMPS blow back to the stow position or are restrained within the
light should always be accompanied by an INLET light with trail locks because of aerodynamic loads. The hydraulic
the landing gear handle UP. With the landing gear handle restriction of all ramps during loss of hydraulic power and
DOWN, a RAMPS light can be illuminated without an after fail−safe mode entry should prevent rapid ramp
INLET light. The emergency procedure in any case is the movement. Internal failure of an actuator especially the
same. RAMPS lights will extinguish when a safe configura No. 3 ramp actuator, may allow rapid ramp extension and
tion is attained. cause engine stall. Additionally, failure to stow the ramps in
a reasonable amount of time after INLET light illumination
Note or inability to stow following a hydraulic system failure may
D Following an AICS programmer/ramps fail result in compressor stalls at high power settings. Engine start
ure, the safest configuration results when the attempts may not be successful unless the ramps are stowed
ramps are in the stowed position. The pro (RAMPS caution light extinguished).
grammers are disabled by pulling the affected
AICS circuit breaker and returning the INLET 2.1.4 AICS Anti−Ice
RAMPS switch to AUTO.
AICS anti−ice is activated only by selecting ORIDE/
D Cycling either AICS circuit breaker while air ON with the AICS ANTI−ICE switch and airspeed between
borne may result in DFCS air data failures, illu 0.35 to 0.9 Mach (hydraulic power is available at 0.3 Mach).
minating the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR Above and below these airspeeds the AICS anti−ice is
lights, and cause degraded control system disabled. When the ENG/PROBE anti−ice switch is in
capability. MASTER RESET should restore AUTO, the AICS anti−ice is off. When AICS anti−ice is
normal operation once the cb(s) are reset. activated, the AICS programmer repositions the No. 1 and
No. 2 ramps to positions below the No. 3 ramp (Figure 28)
In the event of an engine or hydraulic failure, the so that ice will not form above the No. 3 ramp.
following conditions exist with respect to AICS reset:
2.2 ENGINE
1. If hydraulic pressure is zero, there is no need to safe
the ramps (by stowing ramps, pulling AICS circuit The aircraft is powered by two F110−GE−400 turbofan
breakers, and returning to AUTO) since selecting engines (Figure 2−9) with variable exhaust nozzles and AB
STOW will have no effect without hydraulic augmentation. They are dual−rotor engines consisting of a
pressure. three−stage fan driven by a two−stage, low−pressure turbine
2. If airspeed is less than .35 Mach, there is no need to and a mechanically independent, aerodynamically balanced,
safe the ramps since hydraulic pressure has already nine−stage, high−pressure compressor driven by a single−
been removed and ramps should be in the stow stage, air−cooled high−pressure turbine. Engine operation is
locks. If the ramps are not in the stow locks, the automatically regulated and maintained electrically by the
RAMPS light will illuminate when the landing gear augmenter fan temperature control unit and by throttle inputs
handle is lowered. If the RAMPS light does illumi to the main engine control.
nate, then the ramps should be stowed and the AICS
programmer reset. (Depressing MASTER RESET Each engine is slung in a nacelle with the thrust axis
following an AICS programmer reset should restore laterally offset approximately 4½ feet from the aircraft
normal DFCS operation.) centerline. The installed static engine thrust at military power
is 13,800 pounds and, at maximum AB power, thrust is
3. If hydraulic pressure is greater than zero and air 23,600 pounds. Installed engine thrust at maximum AB at
speed is greater than .35 Mach, then the ramps 0.9M at sea level is 30,200 pounds. Acceleration time from
should be stowed and, if time allows, the program idle to military power is approximately 4 seconds.
mer reset after engine failure or a low hydraulic
pressure situation. This will ensure that if the ramp During operation, air entering the engine is directed
is out of the stow lock (as is normal above .5 Mach), into the fan, which initially compresses the air and directs
it will be returned to the stow lock and kept there for its flow into the engine core compressor and fan bypass duct.
landing regardless of subsequent hydraulic or Direction of airflow into the fan is optimized by variable−
electrical malfunctions. geometry inlet guide vanes (IGV) and into the compressor by
variable geometry stator vanes. The high−pressure compres
2.1.3.6 AICS Failure In−Flight Operation sor further compresses the air through the nine−stage com
pressor before discharging it into the annular combustion
Most AICS failures occurring in flight do not require
chamber to mix with fuel from the fuel nozzles. This fuel−air
rapid pilot response because of system design features for
2−9 ORIGINAL
Figure 28.AICS Anti−Ice System
Figure 29.F110−GE−400 Engine
ORIGINAL 2−10
mixture is initially ignited by the main spark igniter in the Note

combustion chamber. As a result of this combustion,
expanding gases drive the high− and low−pressure turbines. SEC mode transfer while in AB may result in pop
Power to drive the two accessory gearboxes is obtained from stalls. Nonemergency manual selection of SEC
the high−pressure rotor. mode on the ground should be performed in basic
engine. Nonemergency manual selection of SEC
From the turbine section, the exhaust gases pass into mode airborne should be performed in basic
the afterburner section and are mixed with air from the fan engine with power set above 85−percent rpm.
bypass duct. During AB operation, fuel is sprayed into this
mixed airflow and ignited for additional thrust. Transferring to SEC mode will revert the AICS pro
grammers to the REV 4 (TF−30/F14A) schedule because of
the loss of the AFTC N1 speed signal and will display an
OBC AICS − LEFT (RIGHT) and ANGLE OF ATTACK
acronym. Below 25,000 feet and at airspeeds greater than 1.1
TMN, unloading the aircraft to less than 1g will reduce inlet
stability and may result in inlet buzz and possible engine
During night and/or IFR conditions, the
stall. To restore the full REV 5 (F110/F14B/D) schedule and
increased acceleration during AB use will result
eliminate the OBC acronym following an airborne engine
in inner ear disturbances. In addition, the large
mode reset to PRI, cycle AICS circuit breakers at constant
amount of light generated by the AB exhaust
subsonic Mach number.
reflecting around the aircraft will compound this
condition. These factors may result in severe
aircrew disorientation/vertigo. 2.2.1.1 Main Engine Control
The MEC is a hydromechanical control that provides
2.2.1 Engine Control fuel shutoff, variable stator vane scheduling, and main fuel
metering in both primary and secondary modes. The MEC
The engine is controlled by three units: the hydro controls fuel flow until 59−percent rpm and provides
mechanical main engine control, the electronic augmenter high−pressure compressor rotor overspeed protection auto
fan temperature control, and the AB fuel control. There are matically by securing fuel flow to the engine when an
two modes of operation: primary (electronic) and secondary overspeed condition of 110 percent is reached.
(mechanical), with provisions for automatic and manual
switchover to secondary. Manual selection is controlled Note
through the ENG MODE SELECT panel (Figure 210).
Automatic or manual selection of the secondary mode illu D To regain engine operation following an auto
minates an ENG SEC caution light. When one engine reverts matic engine overspeed shutdown, the throttle
to secondary mode, the other engine continues in primary must be cycled to OFF then IDLE.
mode. Cycling the ENG MODE SELECT switch may reset D An overspeed condition in excess of 110
the AFTC if the faults are temporary. If the change back to percent will result in momentary loss of rpm
primary mode is successful, the ENG SEC light will go out. indication until N2 rpm falls below 110 ± .5
Automatic or manual selection of secondary mode is possible percent. EGT and FF indicators will continue
throughout the flight envelope. Selection of secondary mode to function normally.
will cause a loss of fan speed signal to the AICS.
2.2.1.2 Augmenter Fan Temperature Control
The AFTC is a modular solid−state electronic device
that performs control schedule computations, integration and
logic functions, limit control, failure detection, and provides
engine core speed (N2) signal for instrument display and
SEC mode transfers with throttles in AB above engine fan speed (N1) signal to the AICS. It also controls the
450 KCAS could result in pop stalls and damage distribution of electrical power to the entire engine electrical
to the IGV linkage. and monitoring systems. Figure 211 shows the various
interface signals used by the AFTC. Normally the CADC
supplies Mach number value to the AFTC. If this signal is
erroneous, the AFTC assumes a default Mach number value
in order to continue operation.
2−11 ORIGINAL
1 ASYM LIMITER ON Reduces AB thrust asymmetry in the event of AB blowout or if

(guarded) one engine fails to light when commanded to AB. Limits operating
switch engine to minimum AB until other engine attains minimum AB.
OFF Either engine may operate at any AB power setting independently

of the other engine.
2 L/R ENG MODE PRI Primary mode, AFTC controls main and AB fuel flow, fan inlet
guide vanes, nozzle area, and ignition.
SELECT switch
SEC Secondary mode, main fuel flow is scheduled hydromechanically

by the MEC. AB is inhibited.
3 L/R ENG SEC caution Illuminates when the engine is in secondary mode. AB operation is inhibited
for engine with light illuminated. AICS on affected engine side reverts to REV 4
light (TF−30/F−14A) schedule.
Figure 210.ENG MODE SELECT Panel and ENG SEC Lights
ORIGINAL 2−12
Figure 211.AFTC Functional Relationships
engine operation with unrestricted throttle movement

throughout the flight envelope. The AFTC computations are
used to control basic engine and AB fuel flow, IGV, and AB
nozzle positioning; VSV positioning is controlled by the
The loss of Mach number signal from the CADC MEC. The AFTC incorporates independent control sched
results in the loss of both airflow limiting and idle ules that are prioritized so that the optimum amount of fuel
lockup functions of the AFTC. This may result in flow is provided to the main combustor. At any given time,
pop stalls while supersonic on a cold day, or at only one of these schedules is actually in control of fuel flow.
high power settings, or at idle. Inlet buzzing may The remaining schedules are always active and are calculat
also result at high power settings. If occurring ing the change in fuel flow required (if any) to attain the
while supersonic and at high power settings, desired value of their assigned parameter. The selection of
decelerate at military power until subsonic. the schedule in control is accomplished by a series of
minimum and maximum selectors. These selectors control
2.2.1.3 Afterburner Fuel Control scheduling of the following:
The AFC is controlled by the AFTC for afterburner
operation. The AFTC computes AB fuel flow ratios and 1. Acceleration/deceleration
provides them to the AFC. The AFC converts ratio com
2. Minimum/maximum compressor discharge
mands to metered fuel flows into local, core, and fan AB fuel
pressure
manifolds. When staging up the AB, local fuel flow is
initiated first, followed by core and fan flow last. When 3. Minimum/maximum rpm
staging down, the reverse sequence occurs. Thrust changes
are smooth when staging up or down. 4. Fan speed limiting
2.2.1.4 Primary Mode 5. Maximum turbine blade temperature limiting

In the primary mode, the AFTC controls the MEC, 6. Idle lockup speed.
AFC, and AB nozzle hydraulic pump to provide optimum
2−13 ORIGINAL
Other AFTC functions include engine start control,

asymmetric thrust limiting, reduced arrestment thrust, auto
matic relight, and fault detection. Fault detection automati
cally switches the engine control to the secondary mode in
the event of core overspeed, fan speed signal loss, nozzle full SEC mode transfers with throttles in AB above
open when engine is not at idle or maximum AB, AFTC 450 KCAS could result in pop stalls and damage
power deviations, fuel flow demand mismatch with throttle to the IGV linkage.
settings, fan speed greater than 800 rpm and not accelerating,
or throttle signal error. Note
D SEC mode transfer from AB may result in pop
2.2.1.4.1 AB Operation (Primary Mode)
stalls. Nonemergency manual selection of
SEC mode on the ground should be performed
For AB operational characteristics, refer to Figure 212. in basic engine. Nonemergency manual selec
Unrestricted throttle operation into and out of AB is per− tion of SEC mode airborne should be per
mitted throughout the flight envelope. During AB operation, formed in basic engine with power set above
rpm, EGT, fuel flow, and nozzle position vary with altitude 85−percent rpm.
and airspeed. The nozzle position will also increase as the
throttle is transitioned from minimum AB to maximum AB. D If the fan speed limiter circuit has failed, engine
If an AB blowout occurs, the autorelight feature attempts to rollback may occur with selection of SEC
reinitiate AB without throttle movement. The engine has mode. In the event of engine rollback, PRI
reduced AB region of operation at high altitudes and low air mode must be reselected above 59−percent rpm
speeds. An AFTC automatic rich stability cutback" feature or flameout will occur and airstart will not be
reduces or limits maximum AB fuel flow at high possible.
altitudes and low airspeeds to prevent AB instabilities
(Figure 212). Indication of rich stability cutback is a nozzle 2.2.1.6 Engine Alternator
position of approximately 30 to 50 percent at maximum AB
rather than the normal 60 to 70 percent. Also, because of air Each engine’s electrical system is powered by an alter
flow and temperature characteristics, AB light−off character nator mounted on the engine aft gearbox. The alternator
istics are slower at high altitudes and low airspeeds. consists of four windings. Two windings are redundant in
providing power to the AFTC and its components. A third
2.2.1.5 Secondary Mode winding provides power for both main high−energy ignition
and AB ignition. The fourth winding provides power to the
Basic engine operation in SEC mode is extremely reli engine monitoring system processor (for FEMS), and a signal
able. In the secondary mode, the electronic functions per for the rpm gauge. The last winding is also an alternate source
formed by the AFTC are eliminated. The MEC provides of power for the fan speed limiting circuit. The fan speed
complete control of the engine with the exception of fan limiting circuit may be powered by either the essential
speed limiting. SEC mode is manually selected via the No. 2 dc bus or the engine−driven alternator winding, depend
ENG MODE SELECT switch or the autopilot emergency ing on which source has the highest stable output.
disengage paddle switch, or via automatic default. In
SEC MODE, the exhaust nozzle is commanded full closed, If engine alternator power output drops below a preset
the nozzle position indicator goes to the not−powered value, engine control will automatically transfer to SEC
position (subzero indication), the IGVs are fixed full open, mode, illuminating the respective engine SEC light. If the
high−energy ignition is continuously energized, AB is engine reverts to SEC mode as a result of a sheared alternator
inhibited, and idle lockup protection is lost. shaft, engine high−energy ignition will not be available and
the engine SEC light will not illuminate. Cockpit indications
In SEC mode, engine stall margin is decreased at low are loss of engine rpm and nozzle position indicating below
rpm because of IGV positioning. The FEMS engine stall zero. In failure modes, redundant aircraft electrical power
detection circuit is inoperative, but overtemperature warning will be available for fan overspeed protection.
is still available. A low−level vibration/rumble may be sensed
in ground idle operation when in secondary mode. This The engine is completely operable should the aircraft
vibration/rumble has no adverse affect on the engine and experience a complete electrical failure. The engine operates
disappears when the throttle is advanced slightly (5−percent in either PRI or SEC mode, which can be selected automati
rpm increase or less). Maximum thrust available at military cally or manually. In case of a complete electrical failure all
power in SEC mode is depicted in Chapter 14, Figure 144. engine lights and indicators are inoperative.
ORIGINAL 2−14
Figure 212.Rich Stability Cutback  F110−GE−400 Engine
2−15 ORIGINAL
2.2.1.7 Turbine Blade Temperature (Pyrometer) gear with the hook handle down or the hook out of the stowed
position. The RATS light, located on the pilot’s advisory
The pyrometer is a fuel−cooled, photodiode, optical
panel, illuminates when the aircraft circuit is activated but it
unit that measures infrared radiation from the metal surface
is not an indication that the engines are operating at reduced
of the high−pressure turbine blades. This temperature signal
thrust.
is transmitted to the AFTC and is used to regulate engine fuel
flow, which maintains turbine blade temperature within Note
limits. Cockpit indications of turbine blade temperature
The RATS light will be illuminated anytime the
appear on the MFD.
aircraft circuit is enabled, even if the engines are
operating in SEC mode or the engine circuit has
2.2.1.8 Flame Sensor
been overridden by selection of AB.
The flame sensor is an ultraviolet radiation sensing unit
in the AB duct. During AB operation, ultraviolet rays 2.2.2 Variable Exhaust Nozzle
detected through a quartz window activate a gas filled sensor
Engine exhaust gases at higher thrust settings are
that electrically transmits a flame−present signal to the
discharged through the nozzle throat at sonic velocity and
AFTC. Without this signal, only minimum AB fuel flow is
are accelerated to supersonic velocity by the controlled
available. AB will be inhibited if the flame sensor fails on.
expansion of the gases. Varying nozzle throat area controls
A L/R AUG acronym is displayed in the ENGINE FAULTS
fan stall margin, which optimizes performance.
block of the MFD engine page.
The variable exhaust nozzle is a three−flap, convergent−
2.2.1.9 Asymmetric Thrust Limiting
divergent−type nozzle. Nozzle variation is accomplished by
The asymmetric thrust limiting circuit is designed to axial movement of four hydraulic actuators mechanically
hold both engines to minimum AB until both ABs are lit off. synchronized for geometric stability. These hydraulic actua
The AFTC releases the hold on the AB when both engine AB tors use oil from a separate compartment in the engine oil
pumps are on and both engine flame sensors are on. Selecting storage tank and are operated by a hydraulic pump that
the ASYM LIMITER switch to OFF (guard cover up) responds to AFTC signals. A failed open nozzle may be
overrides the comparison of left and right AB status and caused by an oil leak, but if the leak is in the nozzle system,
allows each AB to operate independently. only a portion of the main engine lube oil will be lost. During
basic engine operation, the nozzle area is modulated to a near−
closed position, and, in AB, the nozzle area is infinitely vari
able to a full−open position. The nozzle will go full open
airborne with the throttle at IDLE at low altitude and airspeeds
(Figure 213). A gauge for each engine on the pilot instrument
A malfunctioning or deselected ATLS can panel next to the engine instruments indicates nozzle position
greatly increase the magnitude of asymmetric in percentage from 0 to 100. Normal indication for maximum
thrust because of engine stall or failure. AB is approximately 70 percent.
2.2.1.10 Reduced Arrestment Thrust System Note

The RATS is a feature of the AFTC provided to reduce When AFTC is operating in secondary mode, the
thrust for carrier landings to a level consistent with carrier nozzle is commanded closed and the exhaust
(CV) wind−over−deck operations. When activated, the AFTC nozzle indicator is inoperative.
automatically reduces the military power core speed (N2)
by approximately 4.5 percent. This results in an approximate With the landing gear handle down, engine at IDLE,
20 to 25−percent decrease in thrust. and weight off wheels, the nozzle is restricted to a near closed
position (maximum 26 percent) to prevent exhaust nozzle
RATS employs two enabling circuits: an engine circuit flap contact with the deck/hook during landing. Five seconds
incorporated within each engine’s AFTC, and an aircraft after weight on wheels, the nozzle resets to full open to
circuit. The engine circuit is enabled by the aircraft circuit via reduce idle power during landing rollout and while taxiing.
switch closure. Since the engine circuit is a function of the On deck in PRI mode with throttle above IDLE detent, nozzle
AFTC, it is not available in SEC mode and can be overridden position varies linearly with throttle position.
in PRI mode with selection of AB. The aircraft circuit is
enabled when weight is placed on either or both main landing
ORIGINAL 2−16
Figure 213.Variable Area Exhaust Nozzle
2−17 ORIGINAL
Figure 214.FEMS Multifunction Display Configuration
2.3 FATIGUE ENGINE MONITORING SYSTEM The FEMS consists of the following components (see
Figure 215).
2.3.1 FEMS Functional Description
2.3.1.1 Engine Monitoring System Processor
The FEMS is a solid−state electronic system that
provides data acquisition, processing, and storage. FEMS The EMSP is engine−mounted, engine−powered, and
information is displayed on the MFDs (Figure 214). The converts control system electrical signals from the AFTC
system accumulates airframe stress and fatigue data and into digital format for transmission to the ADAC. It also
relevant engine performance data, both in flight and on deck, receives and digitizes other noncontrol system−related data
from the engine monitoring system processors. Engine faults such as anti−icing system status, lube oil level, and lube tem
are isolated to the appropriate WRA or combinations of perature data for transmission to the ADAC. In addition, the
WRAs and recorded for later transfer to the DPGS for EMSP calculates and stores engine cycle count data, making
diagnostic analysis, troubleshooting, and appropriate main this data readily available for each serial−numbered engine
tenance. The DPGS also computes and stores engine parts even when the engine is not installed in an aircraft.
life tracking and failure−trending data. This tracking of Note
engine data extends the life and safety of fleet aircraft by EMSP is only operational with the engines in
permitting maintenance routines at periodic intervals. FEMS primary mode.
also provides a signal to the stall warning system that initiates
a 10−second warning tone (identical to overtemperature tone) 2.3.1.2 Airborne Data Acquisition Computer
and illuminates the L or R STALL warning legend on the The ADAC is the central processor of FEMS and
MFD/HUD indicating an engine stall. FEMS will record executes airframe and engine fatigue algorithms. The ADAC
aircraft overstress when it determines that normal accelera acquires aircraft data by direct analog and digital inputs.
tion has exceeded: Additional aircraft data received by the ADAC from the CIU
1. 7.5g with landing gear UP and Mach greater to be stored as a result of structural, engine, or other mission
than .24 events are transferred to the DSS for postflight analysis. In
addition, ADAC stores fault code messages, in nonvolatile
2. 4.5g with landing gear DOWN (as in hard landing) memory, for display on the FMI. ADAC is powered by the
3. 4.5g when Mach is .24 or less. 28−Vdc right main bus.
ORIGINAL 2−18
Figure 215.Fatigue Engine Monitoring System Diagram
2−19 ORIGINAL
2.3.1.3 Data Storage Set
The DSS, located in the nosewheel well has a remov

able DSU that provides in−flight recording of engine and CSS
data for analysis. In flight, the MCS transfers engine−related
data via the 1553 bus to the DSU for postflight analysis. This
data is collected for engine diagnostic purposes and compiled
for long−term maintenance records. A fault code on the FMI
will alert the maintenance crew when the DSU has reached
80 percent of its capacity for engine data recording. If the
DSS is inoperative or is not loaded with a DSU, engine part−
life tracking data is maintained only by the EMSP.
2.3.1.4 Flight Maintenance Indicator
The FMI (Figure 216) displays to the maintenance

crew ADAC data for engine/airframe status. It is mounted in
an easily accessible location on the forward bulkhead in
the nose wheelwell. After each flight, the FMI FAIL,
CAUTION, and/or FLUIDS fault trip indicators will be
either black, signifying the absence of a FEMS−detected fail
ure, or white, indicating FEMS detected a failure. The indica
tors should normally be reset by maintenance personnel prior
to flight. With electrical power applied to the aircraft, press
ing the STATUS SWITCH button displays either a fault code
(if a fault is present) or NONE in the STATUS window. All
fault codes may be scrolled line by line by pressing the
STATUS SWITCH button once for each line. When no more Figure 216.Flight Maintenance Indicator
fault codes are displayed, the display will read END*. When
END* is displayed, pressing and holding the CLEAR button
changes the display from END* to CLR for approximately
5. Exhaust nozzle off schedule or signal out of range
5 seconds followed by NONE, erasing all fault codes.
6. Fan inlet guide vanes off schedule or signal out of
Note range
The FMI is designed to be a maintenance tool 7. AB fuel valve operation (dry power)
only and should not be used as a go/no−go device
by aircrew on preflight. Likewise, aircrew 8. AB fuel schedule fault or signal out of range
should not take it upon themselves to reset the
device. Do not press both CLEAR and STATUS 9. AB signal on but not selected
SWITCH at the same time. Failure to comply
will result in the FEMS onboard clock being 10. No AB light−off signal
altered.
11. AB blowout
The following is a composite listing of the data auto
matically recorded in memory for maintenance and dis 12. Secondary mode operation
played in numeric code on the FMI:
13. Pilot−initiated EMS data
1. Fan/core overspeed
14. Anti−icing fault
2. Decay in core speed or signal out of range
15. Low oil quantity or signal out of range
3. Compressor stall
16. Oil overtemperature
4. Turbine blade temperature limit exceeded or signal
out of range 17. AFTC power out of limits
ORIGINAL 2−20
18. Throttle/AFTC signal fault 2.4.1 Motive Flow Fuel Pump
19. Mach signal to AFTC fault The motive flow fuel pump is a gear−driven centrifugal
pump on each engine accessory gearbox that returns
20. Aircraft 28−volt supply to AFTC fault high−pressure fuel to the fuselage and wing tanks to effect
normal fuel transfer. Motive flow is used to power the boost
21. EMSP fault pump in the respective sump tank. This fuel continues
through control valves to ejector pumps in the fuselage and
22. ADAC/EMSP interface fault wing fuel tanks. There is no cockpit control for the motive
flow fuel pumps. Failure of one pump illuminates the R or L
23. ADAC BIT fault and system failure FUEL PRESS caution light and reduces the rate of fuel
transfer but does not inhibit the transfer of fuel from any tank.
24. ADAC battery low Motive flow pump failures cause the engine to draw fuel
through suction feed. Higher altitudes and decreased ambient
25. Data storage set memory full and requires service
pressure result in reduced fuel flow, which may cause engine
26. Aircraft overstress flameout because of fuel starvation. With a single motive
flow fuel pump failure, AB selection above 15,000 feet MSL
27. System DSS may cause engine flameout. With failure of both motive flow
fuel pumps, high power settings in basic engine may cause
28. ADAC A−6 failure flameout above 25,000 feet MSL. If a dual motive flow fuel
pump failure occurs, wing fuel will not be available.
29. RATS failure.
2.4.2 Engine Fuel Boost Pump
2.3.2 FEMS Operation
The engine (total flow) fuel boost pump is an
FEMS data acquisition for monitoring engine perfor engine−driven centrifugal pump on the aft accessory gearbox
mance is automatic. However, the pilot may encounter that provides boosted pressure and flow from the fuel supply
unusual engine behavior of a nature that does not automati system to meet main and AB fuel requirements. The pump
cally initiate data recording. This data is valuable for receives fuel at aircraft boost pressure and boosts fuel
diagnosis of the cause of unusual behavior and should be pressure to levels adequate to operate the engine at all power
recorded by the pilot by depressing the ENG RCD button on settings (maximum 40−psi pressure rise). During non−AB
the fuel management panel. Pressing the ENG RCD button operation, some fuel is circulated between AB fuel control
momentarily causes 21 seconds of engine data to be and the engine fuel boost pump so that fuel pressure is readily
recorded: 6 seconds before and 15 seconds after switch available to the spray bars for AB light−off.
initiation. It is important to remember that if a transient
problem is to be recorded by FEMS, the ENG RCD button 2.4.3 Main Fuel Pump
must be activated quickly so the actual event is not missed.
Manual recording will not interfere with data automatically The main fuel pump is a two−stage pump that receives
saved by the FEMS. fuel flow from the engine fuel boost pump. It provides
additional fuel pressurization and transmits mechanical−
gear−driven power to the MEC from the gearbox.
2.3.3 FEMS and OBC
FEMS is checked during OBC preflight and in flight 2.4.4 Main Engine Control
(Class III). It is designated by a FEM acronym. This acronym
is displayed at the completion of OBC if FEMS fails its BIT The MEC is a fuel−operated, hydromechanical fuel
during OBC. Engine−life tracking data is still available flow regulator that operates in tandem with the main fuel
through EMSP if FEMS is lost. pump and is capable of operating in two modes. In the
primary mode, it meters main fuel flow as commanded by the
AFTC and provides VSV scheduling. The secondary mode
2.4 ENGINE FUEL SYSTEM
hydromechanically meters main fuel flow to govern N2 speed
The engine fuel system, which is identical for each based on pilot throttle commands and provides basic engine
engine, provides motive flow fuel to effect fuel transfer and control except for AFTC fan speed limiting.
metered fuel for combustion as a function of pilot throttle
commands and numerous engine parameters (Figure 217).
2−21 ORIGINAL
Figure 217.Engine Fuel System
ORIGINAL 2−22
VSVs aerodynamically match high− and low−pressure 2.5 THROTTLES

compressor stages by changing the angle at which airflow
enters the compressor rotor blades. The MEC contains the Two throttle levers for regulating engine thrust are on
scheduling mechanism and provides fuel pressure to vary the left console of the forward cockpit. Unrestricted engine
VSV positioning. A flexible mechanical cable provides feed operation under independent control is afforded; however,
back from the compressor stator to the MEC. normal symmetric thrust control is provided by collective
movement of the throttle levers. Numerous engine control
2.4.5 Afterburner Fuel Pump and subsidiary functions are performed by movement of the
The AB fuel pump is a centrifugal gear−driven pump throttle levers within the full range of travel as shown in
that receives fuel from the engine boost pump, increases Figure 219. The forward and aft throw of each throttle lever
pressure, and delivers fuel to the AB fuel control. During in the quadrant is restricted by hard detents at the OFF, IDLE,
non−AB operation, fuel is circulated between the AB fuel MIL, and MAX (AB) positions. At the OFF and IDLE det
control and the engine boost pump; the AB fuel pump ents, the throttles are spring loaded to the inboard position.
impeller runs dry with the bearings lubricated by the engine At the MIL detent, the throttles can be shifted outboard to the
oil system. Failure of an AB fuel pump will result in an AB AB sector or inboard to the basic engine sector of operation
blowout. by merely overcoming a lateral breakout force. Lateral shift
ing of the throttles at the MIL detent does not affect engine
2.4.6 Afterburner Fuel Control control. Thus, placement of the throttle outboard at MIL
provides a natural catapult detent to prevent unintentional
The AB fuel control is a fuel−operated, electrohydro retarding of the throttles during the launch. This, however,
mechanical unit that regulates fuel flow in response to AFTC does not inhibit the selection of afterburner. The friction
scheduling and compressor discharge pressure. Fuel pressure control lever on the outboard side of the quadrant permits
from the AB fuel control provides on−off signals to the AB adjustment of throttle friction to suit individual require
fuel pump. ments. With the friction lever in the full aft position, no
The AB fuel control splits fuel flow into three metered throttle friction is applied at the quadrant; increased throttle
streams (local, core, and fan) on a sequential basis into the friction is obtained by forward movement of the lever.
AB manifolds for distribution through spraybars in the AB
duct. Throttle commands initiate local fuel flow and AB A locking pin device prevents the left throttle from
ignition (minimum AB). Once local fuel flow and flame are moving into the cutoff position when the right throttle is
established, core fuel flow commences. As maximum core either traversing or at rest on the face of the right−hand idle
fuel flow is established, fan fuel flow commences and stop block.
increases until maximum AB is achieved. The transitions
between local, core, and fan fuel flow are smooth and 2.5.1 Throttle Control Modes
unnoticed (Figure 218). During non−AB operation, fuel
flow is circulated through the AB manifolds to prevent thrust Manual, boost, and automatic are the three modes of
lags and surges when AB is initiated. throttle control over engine operation selectable by the
THROTTLE MODE switch located outboard of the quadrant
on the pilot console. The toggle switch must be lifted out of
a detent to select MAN from BOOST or BOOST from MAN.
The switch is solenoid held in AUTO upon successful
D Zero− or negative−g flight longer than 10 sec engagement of the automatic mode. A functional schematic
onds in AB or 20 seconds in MIL or less will of throttle control modes, including system major compo
deplete the fuel sump tanks (cells 3 and 4), nents, is shown in Figure 220. Except for the autothrottle
resulting in flameout of both engines. computer and mode control switch, the throttle control
D To prevent engine instability and/or flameout, system for each engine is completely redundant. Independent
avoid holding zero or negative g when doing engine operation is possible in the manual or boost mode of
a low−altitude, maximum−thrust acceleration. throttle control; however, full system operation is necessary
in the automatic mode since operation under single−engine
D With fuel in feed group below 1,000 pounds, control is impracticable because of asymmetric thrust
AB operation could result in AB blowout. considerations.
Note
Fuel dump operations with either engine in AB
are prohibited. The fuel dump mast can be
torched.
2−23 ORIGINAL
Figure 218.Afterburner Fuel Sequencing
ORIGINAL 2−24
Figure 219.Throttle Interlocks
2.5.1.1 Manual Throttle Mode electric clutch in the throttle servoactuator, which is also
mounted to the power lever shaft, is disengaged in the manual
The manual throttle is a degraded mode of operation mode to reduce operating forces.
and was designed as a backup system. Because of hysteresis
With the throttle friction lever in OFF, approximately
and friction in the manual system, engine rpm may vary from 8 pounds of force per throttle must be applied at the grip to
the boost mode at a given throttle position. If an engine fails
operate the throttles in the IDLE to MAX range.
to secure when the throttle is moved to the OFF position, the
throttles have probably reverted to the manual mode and are
2.5.1.2 Boost Throttle Mode
slightly out of rig. Cycling the throttle switch to MAN and
back to BOOST may allow engine shutdown. If shutdown is The boost mode of throttle is used for normal
unsuccessful, then the engine may be secured with the FUEL operations. A force of 2 to 3 pounds at the grip is required to
SHUTOFF handle. move each throttle throughout its range with the throttle
friction lever off. Essentially, the boost mode provides
electric throttle operation, with the push−pull cables serving
as a backup control path. Throttle movement is detected by
the throttle position sensor. The signal is resolved in the
amplifier to provide positional followup commands to the
D Engine shutdown at high power settings using actuator. Movement of the actuator rotates the engine power
the FUEL SHUTOFF handle may result in lever shaft, which drives the push−pull cable.
damage to the aircraft fuel system.
If a boost system malfunctions, applying approxi
D Engine startup in manual mode may cause
mately 17 pounds at the throttle grip automatically reverts the
tailpipe fires as fuel flow may not be secured.
throttle control to the manual mode by disengaging the
In the manual mode of operation, movement of each actuator electric clutch. The throttle control reverts to
throttle is mechanically transmitted to the respective engine manual mode in 0.25 second. In the event of a boost system
by a push−pull cable and a rack and sector mechanism malfunction, the throttle mode switch will remain in the
mounted to the main engine control power lever shaft. An BOOST detent. By manually placing the throttle mode
2−25 ORIGINAL
Figure 220.Throttle Control
ORIGINAL 2−26
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
switch in MAN and then back to BOOST, transient failures selecting AUTO to ensure a valid test. Once AUTO is
in the boost mode can be reset. Additionally, if an actuator engaged, the control stick should be programmed fore and aft
seizes, a mechanical clutch in the actuator will slip when a to check for the appropriate power response.
force of approximately 50 pounds is applied at the throttle
grip. This permits the pilot to override an actuator seizure.
There is no visible warning of these anomalies only the
noticeable increase in the forces required to manipulate the
affected throttle.
High-power settings may result during aft stick
2.5.1.3 Approach Power Compensator deflection.
(Automatic Throttle Mode)
The automatic mode of throttle control is a closed-loop If the THROTTLE MODE switch does not remain
system that automatically regulates basic engine thrust to engaged or the APC does not respond properly to indicated
maintain the aircraft at 15 units angle of attack for landing. AOA and longitudinal stick movements, a malfunction exists
All components of the throttle control system except the in the autothrottle system.
throttle position sensor are used in the automatic mode of
control. The AOA signal from the AOA probe on the left side Depressing and holding the autopilot emergency dis-
of the forward fuselage is the controlling parameter within engage paddle switch with weight on wheels causes the
the autothrottle computer. Additional parameters are inte- throttle control system to be placed in the manual mode. If the
grated within the computer to improve response. The air automatic mode was selected before depressing the paddle
temperature switch on the pilot left console effects a switch, the THROTTLE MODE switch will automatically
computer gain change to compensate for pilot-preferred move to BOOST. The THROTTLE MODE switch must be
reaction rate. In order to engage the autothrottle, throttles moved from BOOST to MAN while holding the paddle
must be between 75 to 90-percent rpm with weight off switch depressed if the manual mode is desired after the
wheels, gear handle down, and throttle friction off. With all paddle switch is released.
conditions met, the throttle mode switch will be held by an
electrical solenoid when placed in AUTO. The throttle 2.6 ENGINE BLEED AIR
control mode automatically reverts to the boost mode upon Bleed air is extracted from the high-pressure compres-
interruption of any interlock in the system or by manually sor to perform engine-associated services and to supply hot,
overriding the throttles with a force of approximately high pressure air for operation of auxiliary equipment.
11 pounds per throttle in either direction. The throttle Fifth-stage bleed air supplies hot air for the engine anti-icing
mode switch automatically returns to BOOST and the system and is used to draw cooling air through the aircraft
AUTO THROT caution light illuminates for 10 seconds. hydraulic heat exchangers to cool flight and combined
See Figure 2-21 for autothrottle controls. fluids and to ventilate the nacelle when weight is on wheels
(Figure 2-22). Ninth-stage bleed air supplies hot air to the
The pilot can revert from automatic to boost mode by environmental control system, provides air for crossbleed
selecting the CAGE/BRST (UP) position on the CAGE/ engine starts, and draws air through the integrated drive
SEAM switch located on the inboard throttle grip. This pro- generator heat exchanger (ventral fin) when weight is on
vides a smooth throttle override for an automatic-to-boost wheels.
mode approach, while maintaining a grip on both throttles.
2.6.1 Engine Anti-Ice
2.5.1.3.1 Autothrottle Test
The fan IGV and nosedome are susceptible to icing
An automatic check of the autothrottle control system under a wider range of conditions, particularly at static or low
while on deck is accomplished during OBC. Signals to the speed with high engine rpm, than that which cause ice to form
servoactuators are inhibited during the OBC autothrottle test on external surfaces of the airframe. Ice formation at the fan
so that the engines remain at idle thrust. A malfunction is face can restrict engine maximum airflow, which results in a
indicated by an APC acronym at the conclusion of OBC. thrust loss, decreased stall margin, and dislodgment of ice,
which can damage the compressor. The engine anti-icing
Rotating the MASTER TEST switch to FLT GR DN system is designed to prevent the formation of ice rather than
and depressing it bypasses the autothrottle weight-on-wheels de-ice the IGV and nose dome. Hot bleed air (5th stage) is
interlock and an end-to-end check of the autothrottles may be passed through the hollow IGV to the nose dome and is
performed on deck. The throttles should be placed at about discharged into the engine along the vanes and at the rotor
80-percent rpm and the throttle mode switch placed in hub. Cockpit control of the engine anti-icing system is
AUTO. The throttles must be positioned above idle before effected through the ANTI-ICE switch (Figure 2-23).
2-27 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Figure 221.Autothrottle Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−28
1 THROTTLE MODE switch AUTO Engine thrust is automatically regulated by the throttle control computer
to maintain optimum angle of attack for landing.
BOOST Normal operating mode. Reduces effort required to move throttles
y with friction control aft.
manually
MAN Movement of each throttle is mechanically transmitted to the respective
engine cross−shaft by a push−pull cable.
2 THROTTLE TEMP switch Used with the AUTO throttle mode to effect throttle computer gain changes to
compensate for air temperature
temperature.
HOT Increases normal throttle computer gain.
NORM Normal throttle computer gain.
COLD Decreases normal throttle computer gain.
3 AUTO THROT caution light Auto throttle mode is disengaged. During preflight check, remains illuminated for
10 seconds, then goes off and throttle mode switch automatically returns to BOOST.
Note
If the auto throttle is disengaged by deselecting the throttle
mode switch, the AUTO THROT light will not illuminate.
4 CAGE/SEAM switch When in TLN master mode with the throttle mode switch in AUTO, selecting the
CAGE/BRST position on the CAGE/SEAM switch reverts the throttles to the
BOOST mode.
5 Autopilot emergency paddle Reverts throttle system from AUTO or BOOST mode to MAN mode only while
disengage depressed and with weight on wheels.
Figure 2−21. Autothrottle Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
Note from 520° to 1,180_ F inside the bleed air portion of the
Because of its adverse effects on engine perfor ECS, and from 400_ to 500_ F inside the hot air portion
mance, the engine anti−icing system should be (400_ F manifold).
used only when icing conditions exist or are
anticipated. The entire bleed air portion of the ECS, from engine
bleed air shutoff valves to the primary heat exchanger, is mon
During engine start, the engine anti−ice valve remains itored by two detection systems. Fire detection circuits moni
open to bleed the compressor to prevent engine stall. The tor the bleed air system from each engine to its respective
valve closes when the engine approaches idle rpm. In flight, firewall. When a fire detection circuit in an engine compart
the valve is normally closed unless the ANTI−ICE switch is ment senses temperatures above threshold, the appropriate
in ORIDE/ON, or AUTO/OFF, when the ice detector probe L or R FIRE warning light illuminates (refer to fire detection
in the left inlet is activated. Ice accumulation on the ice system). The remainder of the bleed air system, from engine
detector illuminates the INLET ICE caution light. The firewalls to the primary heat exchanger, is monitored by bleed
engine anti−icing control valve on the engine is powered air leak−sensing elements. When the bleed air leak−detection
closed (fails open) from the essential dc No. 2 bus through the circuit detects temperatures in excess of 575_ F, the BLEED
ENG/PROBE/ANTI−ICE circuit breaker (RG2). DUCT caution light illuminates.
2.6.2 Environmental Control System The hot air portion of the ECS is monitored by hot air
Leak Detection leak−sensing elements. The hot air system extends from the
primary heat exchanger through the 400_ manifold to the
Thermal detection circuits are routed in proximity to cockpit floor. When the hot air detection circuit detects
ECS ducts and components to provide cockpit indications of temperatures in excess of 255_ F, the BLEED DUCT caution
high−temperature air leaks. Normal air temperatures range light illuminates.
2−29 ORIGINAL
Figure 222.Engine Bleed Air/Compartment Ventilation
2.7 ENGINE COMPARTMENT VENTILATION 2.7.2 Engine Ground Ventilation
Each engine compartment is completely isolated from With weight on wheels, cooling airflow through the
the primary air inlet, and the efficiency and cooling of the engine compartment is induced by the hydraulic heat
variable−area exhaust nozzle are not dependent upon nacelle exchanger ejector in the forward end of the compartment. Air
airflow. Therefore, within the bounds of the forward firewall enters through the nacelle ram−air scoop on the left side, passes
(landing gear bulkhead) and the nozzle shroud, the cooling through the hydraulic heat exchanger and is discharged into
system for each engine compartment is a separate entity. the engine compartment. The air flows through the full length
Cooling requirements for the turbofan engine are mini− of the nacelle to discharge overboard through a louvered port
mized by the annular fan bypass duct. Figure 222 shows atop the nacelle on the outboard side of the vertical tail.
cooling airflow patterns through the engine compartment
during ground and flight operations. Two air−cooled heat 2.8 ENGINE IGNITION SYSTEM
exchangers are also shown; however, only the hydraulic There are three electrical ignition circuits, each utilizing
heat exchanger cooling airflow is associated with engine
a dedicated igniter, for each engine: main high energy, after
nacelle cooling. Fire access doors are on the outboard side
burner, and backup.
of the nacelles at the forward end to permit application of
fire suppressing agents by ground personnel in event of an
2.8.1 Main High−Energy Ignition
engine compartment fire.
The main high−energy ignition provides ignition in the
2.7.1 Engine In−Flight Ventilation combustion chamber for ground and air starts. It is powered
by one of the four windings in the engine−driven ac alternator.
In−flight cooling of the engine compartment is accom The AFTC provides logic to control main high−energy igni
plished by nacelle ram−air scoops, circulating boundary− tion automatically. Ignition is available when N2 rpm is 10
layer air through the length of the compartment and expelling percent or greater and is automatically provided from 10−to
the air overboard through louvered exits, just forward of the 59−percent rpm when the throttle is above cutoff. Ignition
engine nozzle shroud.
ORIGINAL 2−30
1 ANTI−ICE switch ORIDE/ON Overrides ice detector system to turn on INLET ICE caution
light, and activate external probe heaters and engine anti−ice.
Commands the anti−ice mode to the AICS programmers.
AUTO/OFF When icing is sensed, ice detector activates engine anti−ice
system, turns on INLET ICE caution light, activates external
probe heaters with weight off wheels, and disables anti−ice
mode to AICS programmers.
OFF/OFF Engine anti−ice system and probe heaters shut off. INLET
ICE caution light disabled. Disables anti−ice mode to AICS
programmers.
2 INLET ICE caution light Illuminates when ice accumulates on ice detector with ANTI−ICE switch in
AUTO/OFF or if ORIDE/ON is selected. Does not illuminate with switch
in OFF/OFF.
3 BLEED DUCT caution light Illuminates when bleed air leak sensing elements detect temperatures
greater than 575_ F between the left and right firewalls, past the primary
heat exchanger and up to the right diverter area. Also illuminates when an
additional sensor detects temperatures of 255_ or greater from the right
diverter area, along the 400_ manifold and into the bootstrap turbine
compartment.
Figure 223.Anti−Ice Control
2−31 ORIGINAL
is secured 0.5 second after N2 rpm rises above 59 percent. At The air hose is connected to the aircraft fitting in the
rpm above 59 percent, ignition is provided if N2 deceleration left sponson area, behind the main gear strut. Ground start air
exceeds a 5 percent rpm per second rate. Ignition continues is ducted into a central bleed air (9th stage) manifold, which
for 20 seconds after N2 deceleration falls below the 5 percent interconnects the air turbine starters on both engines.
rpm per second rate. Main high−energy ignition is provided The air supply to each air turbine starter is pressure regu
continuously when the engine is in the secondary (SEC) mode. lated(52.5 psi) and controlled by a shutoff and regulating
valve at the turbine. Each pneumatic starter is composed of
2.8.2 Afterburner Ignition a turbine, gear train, sprag clutch with a speed−sensing
device, and an overspeed disengagement mechanism with a
The AB ignition ignites AB fuel flow for AB light−offs shear section. Shutoff valves in the bleed air manifold selec
and relights (in the event of an AB blowout). The AB ignition tively isolate the other starter, subsidiary bleed lines, and the
is powered by the same winding in the engine−driven alterna environmental control system air supply. Maximum engine
tor that powers the main energy ignition. The AFTC provides motoring speed with the pneumatic starter is approximately
logic to control AB ignition automatically and prevents 30−percent rpm.
simultaneous powering of the main high−energy and AB igni
tions. In the event of an AB blowout, relight is normally 2.9.2 Engine Crank
provided within 1.5 seconds. AB ignition is not powered if
the engine is in SEC mode. Placing the ENG CRANK switch in either L or R opens
the corresponding starter pressure shutoff valve to allow
2.8.3 Backup Ignition pressurized air to drive the turbine. The ENG CRANK switch
energizes the appropriate shutoff valves to configure the
The backup ignition provides ignition in the combus bleed manifold for starting.
tion chamber for ground and air starts when the BACK UP
IGNITION switch on the THROTTLE CONTROL panel is 2.9.2.1 Engine Crank Switch
set to ON. It is powered by the essential No. 1 ac bus and
provides less power than main high−energy ignition. After The ENG CRANK switch is held in L or R by a holding
use, the BACK UP IGNITION switch should be set to OFF. coil. At approximately 50−percent rpm, a centrifugal cutoff
To allow ground checkout of backup ignition, main high− switch closes the turbine shutoff valve and returns the ENG
energy ignition is disabled when the BACK UP IGNITION CRANK switch to the center or off position. A START
switch is ON and weight is on wheels. VALVE caution light illuminates if the starter valve remains
in the open position after the ENG CRANK switch automati
cally returns to the center (off) position.
The BACK UP IGNITION switch shall be

selected to OFF prior to applying external elec
trical power to prevent ignition of fuel puddled D If the starter valve does not close during
in the engine. engine acceleration to idle rpm, continued air
flow through the air turbine starter could
2.9 ENGINE STARTING SYSTEM result in catastrophic failure of the starter
turbine.
Each engine is provided with an air turbine starter that D If the START VALVE caution light illumi
may be pressurized from an external ground starting cart or nates after the ENG CRANK switch is off,
by crossbleeding high−pressure bleed air from the other select AIR SOURCE to OFF to preclude
engine. Figure 224 shows the components associated with starter overspeed.
the engine start system.
D If the ENG CRANK switch does not automati
2.9.1 External Airstart cally return to the OFF position by 50 percent,
ensure that the ENG CRANK switch is off by
60−percent rpm to avoid starter turbine failure
A high−pressure (75 psi) air source and 115 volt, 400 Hz
as a result of an inoperative automatic starter
ac power are required for engine start on the deck.
cutout.
ORIGINAL 2−32
Figure 224.Engine Start System
2−33 ORIGINAL
Return of the ENG CRANK switch to the center or off D When attempting a crossbleed or normal
position resets the bleed air manifold valves to permit 9th− ground start, do not attempt to reengage the
stage bleed air to flow to the environmental cooling system ENG CRANK switch if the engine is spooling
and ejectors in the engine compartment. down and rpm is greater than 46 percent. At
rpm’s of 30 to 46−percent rpm, the ENG
Starter cranking limits: CRANK switch may not stay engaged
because of normal variations in starter cutout
1. Crossbleed  2 minutes continuous then 10 speed.
minutes OFF.
D The ENG CRANK switch should automati
2. Start cart  5 minutes continuous then 10 minutes cally disengage between 49 to 51−percent rpm
OFF. during a crossbleed or normal ground start.
2.9.3 Crossbleed Start 2.9.4 Airstarts
Engine cranking procedures during a crossbleed start AFTC logic provides main high−energy ignition auto
are the same as with a ground start cart. Engine crossbleed matically during automatic and manual spooldown, cross
start on the ground can be accomplished with the throttle on bleed, and windmill airstarts. Selecting the BACKUP
the operating engine at or above idle rpm. When high− IGNITION switch to ON provides continuous backup
residual EGT (remains from a hot start) and/or throttles are ignition to both engines, and backs up main high−energy
advanced from OFF to IDLE prior to 20−percent rpm, higher ignition during manual spooldown, crossbleed, and windmill
than normal EGT readings may occur. airstarts.
When initiating crossbleed starts with ambient temper 2.10 ENGINE OIL SYSTEM
ature less than 40° F (4° C), the starter torque load is
increased. Above 80° F (27° C), engine bleed air provides Each engine has a self−contained, dry sump non−
less energy potential to the starter turbine. Either extreme can pressure regulated oil system that provides filtered oil for
affect engine starting acceleration rates, resulting in hotter− lubricating and cooling engine main shaft bearings, oil seals,
than−normal starts. When crossbleed starting with an operat gearboxes, accessories, and provides a hydraulic medium to
ing engine at idle, the operator should be aware of either operate the engine exhaust nozzles (FO−5).
condition and increase the operating engine rpm in 5−percent
increments until normal starting acceleration rate is A storage tank feeds oil to an oil pump that supplies oil
achieved. Low percentage rpm−to−EGT ratio can increase under pressure to the forward sump in the engine front hub,
turbine distress without necessarily exceeding the EGT limit. the mid sump in the fan hub, the aft sump in the turbine hub,
and the inlet and accessory gearboxes. Oil is recovered from
When performing an idle crossbleed start, advance the the sumps and accessory gearboxes, pumped past a chip
throttles from OFF to IDLE at 20−percent rpm or greater detector, and cooled in a fuel/oil heat exchanger before
while monitoring EGT. If EGT rises rapidly, advance the returning to the storage tank.
operating engine rpm to slightly above idle. The exhaust
nozzles start to close when rpm is slightly above idle. A separate compartment in the storage tank provides
oil to the exhaust nozzle hydraulic system. Oil returning from
Note the nozzle to the tank provides auxiliary oil supply to the
No. 3 bearing when normal supply is interrupted or during
engine spooldown.
D To prevent possible engine overtemperature
during crossbleed and backup ignition start
attempts, select AIR SOURCE for the oper The oil system permits engine operation under all flight
ating engine and return to BOTH after rpm conditions. During zero− or negative−g flight, oil pressure may
stabilizes at idle or above. decrease to zero but will return to normal when positive−g
flight is resumed. Normal oil consumption is 0.03 gallon per
D If attempting a ground restart after a hot start, operating hour with the maximum being 0.1 gallon per oper
windmill the engine until EGT is below ating hour. Capacity of the oil storage tank is 3.7 gallons,
250° C prior to advancing the throttle from with 2.9 gallons usable. A sight gauge on the side of the
OFF to IDLE to avoid a subsequent hot start.
ORIGINAL 2−34
storage tank indicates down to a 2−quart−low oil level. The 300° F during a temperature increase and go out at 280° F
protrusion of a bypass indicator underneath the oil scavenge minimum during a temperature decrease. The caution lights
pump indicates a clogged filter element. also illuminate when respective forward engine gearbox
scavenge temperature exceeds 375° F during a temperature
Note increase, and go out at 345° F minimum during a temperature
decrease.
D Engine oil level must be checked within
30minutes of engine shutdown, otherwise the 2.11 ENGINE INSTRUMENTS
engine must be run at 80−percent rpm or greater
for 10 minutes to ensure proper servicing. Instruments for monitoring engine operation are on the
pilot left knee panel (Figure 225). Engine operating parame
D A failed−open nozzle may indicate an oil leak; ters are displayed on the engine instrument group which is a
however, if the leak is in the nozzle hydraulic single WRA with LCD readouts. The display provides white
circuit, only that portion of the main engine readout segments and scales on a dark background and is red
lube oil will be lost. backlighted for night operations. Left and right engine com
pressor speed (rpm), EGT, and fuel flow are displayed on the
2.10.1 Oil Cooling EIG. Adjacent to the EIG are circular instruments for both
engines’ oil pressure and nozzle position. Takeoff checks at
Filtered and scavenged oil is cooled by a fuel/oil heat military (MIL) thrust should display evenly matched tapes on
exchanger. This oil is then used in a heat exchanger to cool corresponding vertical scale instruments and all pointers on
the exhaust nozzle oil. A cold−oil bypass valve opens when the circular instruments should be at the 9−o’clock position.
the heat exchanger pressure differential is 44 psi, because of Data on engine operating limits are provided in Chapter 4.
reduced oil temperature or exchanger blockage, allowing oil
flow to bypass the heat exchanger (for example, during cold 2.11.1 Engine RPM Indicator
engine starts).
The RPM indicators (Figure 225) have a range of 0 to
2.10.2 Oil Pressure Indicators 110 percent. The tape display steps in 5−percent increments
and the upper segment flashes to indicate rpm increasing at
An oil pressure transducer in each engine’s oil supply more than 0.4 percent per second from 0 to 60−percent rpm.
line provides a continuous signal to the oil pressure indicator. The tape steps in 1−percent increments when greater than
Another, independent oil pressure switch in each oil supply 60−percent rpm. Nominal indications are 62 to 78 percent at
line activates the OIL PRESS light when either engine’s oil idle and 95 to 104 percent at military and above. At 107.7
pressure decreases to 11 psi. The oil pressure switches and percent and above, the affected engine’s exceeded portions
lights receive electrical power from the essential No. 2 ac of the chevrons will flash at a rate of 2 to 3 flashes per second.
bus. The OIL PRESS light and oil pressure indicator are At 20−percent rpm a horizontal segment will illuminate
independent of each other. giving an indication of proper motoring speed to start the
engine. There is an rpm reading for each engine.
Note
Note
D During cold starts, oil pressure may exceed
65 psi. The 65 psi oil pressure limit should not An overspeed condition in excess of 110 percent
be exceeded for more than 1 minute. will result in momentary loss of rpm indication
until N2 rpm falls below 110 ± 0.5 percent. EGT
D Maneuvers that result in zero or negative−g on and fuel flow indicators will continue to function
the engine (such as rapid rolls, pushovers, or normally.
bugout maneuvers) may cause oil pressure
fluctuations and momentary illumination of 2.11.2 Exhaust Gas Temperature Indicator
the low oil−pressure light.
The EGT indicators (Figure 225) provide a nonlinear
2.10.3 OIL HOT Caution Lights vertical scale with a range of 0 to 1,100° C. The compressed
lower portion has a range of 0 to 600° C. The expanded
The L or R OIL HOT caution light may be illuminated upper portion of the scale has a range of 600 to 1,100° C.
by either high engine oil temperature or by high forward− The display moves in 50° increments in the compressed
engine gearbox scavenge oil temperature. The caution lights portion and 10° increments in the expanded portion of the
illuminate when respective engine oil temperature exceeds
2−35 ORIGINAL
Figure 225.Engine Instruments (F110−GE−400)
ORIGINAL 2−36
display. The normal indications are 350 to 650° C at idle and 2.11.6 Engine Oil Pressure Indicator
780 to 935° C at MIL and above. Above 940° C, the affected
engine’s exceeded portions of the chevrons flash. With a The engine oil pressure indicators display oil pressure
reading of 940° C, the stall warning light and the aural from 0 to 100 psi. Normal oil pressure is 25 to 65 psi and
warning tone will be activated signifying an engine over increases in proportion to engine rpm within the pressure
temperature condition. The tone is present for a maximum of limit range. Stabilized idle oil pressure may be a minimum
10 seconds unless the fault clears sooner. There is an EGT of 15 psi. The OIL PRESS caution light illuminates at 11 psi
reading for each engine. with decreasing oil pressure and extinguishes at 14 psi with
increasing oil pressure. Maximum allowable oil pressure
2.11.3 Fuel Flow Indicator fluctuation is ± 5 psi.
The fuel flow indicators have a nonlinear vertical scale, 2.11.7 Exhaust Nozzle Position Indicator
with a range of 0 to 17,000 pph. The expanded lower portion
of the scale has a range of 0 to 5,000 pph. The compressed The nozzle position indicators (Figure 225) have
upper portion of the scale ranges from 5,000 to 17,000 pph. a range of 0 to 100−percent open. Normal indications
The display moves in 100 pph increments in the expanded (Figure 213) are l00 percent at idle with WOW and vary in
portion and in 500 pph increments in the compressed portion flight: 3 to 10 percent at MIL thrust, 5 to 12 percent at
of the display. Normal indications on deck are 350 pph MIN AB, and 60 to 90 percent at MAX AB.
starting, 950 to 1,400 pph at idle, and approximately 10,100
pph at military and above. The fuel flow reading for each Note
engine indicates only basic engine consumption and does not
indicate AB fuel flow. When operating engine in SEC mode, the nozzle
position indicator is inoperative and indicates
2.11.4 Engine Instrument Group BIT below zero. No nozzle position indication is
available in SEC mode.
A degraded mode of EIG operation is indicated if the
BIT segment on the top left side of the EGT indicator illumi 2.11.8 Engine Monitor Display Format
nates. This means that either the primary or backup micro
processors, or the primary or backup power supply channels A display of engine parameters (Figure 226) can be
(internal to the EIG), have failed. An automatic switch to the selected on the MFD by pressing the pushbutton adjacent to
operative microprocessor/channel takes place if a failure is the ENG legend on the own−aircraft menu. The display pre
detected. The instrument still monitors engine operation and sents N1 (fan speed), TBT (turbine blade temperature), FF/M
accurately reflects rpm, EGT, and fuel flow. If the input (fuel flow main engine) or FF/T (fuel flow total, main engine
processing circuit fails, the affected scale reading goes to zero. and AB), and NP (exhaust nozzle position). FF/M scale indi
cates main engine fuel flow and is similar to the fuel flow
2.11.5 Engine Instrument Group Self−Test displayed on the EIG. NP is the same as the nozzle position
indicators. Numerical readouts below the N1 and TBT verti
EIG self−test is selected by the MASTER TEST switch cal scales digitize the indicated value. The TIME readout
in INST. When master test is selected, all display segments below the FF/M vertical scale indicates time in hours and
illuminate, scales drive to maximum readings, and warning minutes that fuel will last based on current consumption
chevrons (stripes) flash for 5 seconds. BIT segment on the top rates. Directly below the TIME readout, engine faults are
left side of EGT indicator illuminates. L and R STALL displayed based on current engine operating conditions of
warning acronyms appear on the HUD and MFD and stall both engines processed by FEMS. If more than three faults
warning/overtemp tone is present in pilot earphones for exist at the same time, the acronyms will continuously scroll
10 seconds. After 5 seconds, all EIG scales decrease to pre upward. The ten possible acronyms and their definitions are:
determined values of equal height that correspond to an EGT
reading of 950 ± 10° C. If BIT segment remains illuminated, 1. L MACH # or R MACH #  Mach number signal
EIG has failed self−test and BIT remains illuminated until to designated engine has failed.
self−test is reinitiated. Total self−test time is 15 seconds. If
2. L LO THR or R LO THR  Designated engine may
master test is deactivated prior to this, EIG returns to normal
be producing less than expected thrust.
mode after the 15−second test. If the MASTER TEST switch
remains in INST for more than 15 seconds, the EIG retains 3. L A/ICE or R A/ICE  Designated engine anti−ice
equal height readings until master test is deselected. is on or anti−ice valve has failed opposite com
manded position.
2−37 ORIGINAL
Figure 226.MFD Engine Monitor Display
4. L OIL LO or R OIL LO  Designated engine oil 4. L FLMOUT or R FLMOUT  Designated engine

level is approximately two quarts low. Postflight, flameout.
engine at idle.
5. L IGV SD or R IGV SD  Designated engine inlet
5. L AUG or R AUG  Designated AB control system guide vane off schedule.
has failed. AB is not available.
6. L STALL or R STALL  Designated engine stall
Refer to Chapter 12, WARNING/CAUTION/ detected (also on HUD).
ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS for the
appropriate pilot/RIO response. 7. L FIRE or R FIRE  Designated engine fire/
overheat condition in engine nacelle (also on HUD).
2.11.9 MFD Engine Caution Legends
Refer to Chapter 12, WARNING/CAUTION/
In addition to the engine caution lights on the pilot ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS for the ap
CAUTION/ADVISORY panel, illumination of the READ propriate pilot/RIO response.
MFD caution light indicates that one or more of the following
caution legends on the upper left quadrant of the MFD is 2.11.10 Engine Stall/Overtemperature Warning
activated:
An engine stall detection circuit in FEMS monitors
1. L N2 OSP or R N2 OSP  Designated engine N2 each engine. When a stall condition is detected, a L or R
overspeed condition. STALL warning legend is displayed on the HUD and MFD
2. L N1 OSP or R N1 OSP  Designated engine N1 until the condition is cleared. In addition, an aural warning
overspeed condition. tone is activated through the pilot ICS for up to 10 seconds.
There is no pilot check of the FEMS engine stall detection
3. L TBT OT or R TBT OT  Designated engine system.
turbine blade overtemperature.
ORIGINAL 2−38
Note the entire length of the engine compartment on both sides

above the nacelle door hinge line. The tube sheath, which is
In SEC mode, FEMS and, therefore, the engine clamped in grommets to the engine compartment structure,
stall detection circuit, is inoperative. However, contains a ceramic−like thermistor material in which are
overtemperature warning is still available and embedded two electrical conductors; one of the conductors
will activate both the STALL warning legends is grounded at both ends of the loop. Electrical resistance
and aural warning tone. between two conductors varies inversely as a function of
temperature and length, so that heating of less than the full
When an overtemperature condition occurs, the EGT length will require a higher temperature for the resistance to
display rises above 940° C, the warning chevrons begin to decrease to the alarm point. The L or R FIRE warning lights
flash, and a signal from the EGT indicator activates the in the cockpit illuminate when the respective entire sensing
STALL warning legend and the aural tone. The overtempera loop is heated to approximately 600° F or when any 6−inch
ture warning system is checked by the pilot during prestart as section is heated to approximately 1,000_ F.
part of the MASTER TEST check in INST test.
The fire alarm output relay to the light is a latching type
2.12 FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM that remains in the last energized position independent of
power interruptions until the fault clears.
The fire detection system provides a cockpit indication
of fire or overheating in either engine compartment. There is False alarms triggered by moisture in the sensing ele
a separate system for each engine compartment, each consist ment and connectors or by damage resulting in short circuits
ing of a thermistor−type sensing loop monitored by a transis or grounds in the sensing element are unlikely because of the
torized control unit. The system is powered by 28 volts from system design. Additionally, there is no loss or impairment
the essential dc No. 1 bus. Figure 227 is a functional sche of fire detector capability from a single break in the sensing
matic of the system. element as long as there is no electrical short. With two
breaks in the sensing element the section between the breaks
The sensing loop for each engine compartment consists becomes inactive although the remaining segment ends
of a 45−foot continuous tubular element routed throughout remain active.
Figure 227.Fire Detection System
2−39 ORIGINAL
Fire detection circuits in the engine compartments be pulled to make the pushbutton for that engine accessible
detect a leak in the high−temperature duct and illuminate the (see Figure 228). If the left or right fire extinguishing
appropriate FIRE warning light and activate the L FIRE or pushbutton is activated, the contents of both extinguishing
R FIRE warning legend on the MFD and HUD. The warning containers are discharged into the selected engine and its
legend is a repeat of a discrete signal from the fire detect accessory section. Since it is a one−shot system, both system
system. advisory lights, ENG FIRE EXT and AUX FIRE EXT, will
illuminate and remain illuminated after container pressures
2.12.1 Fire Detection Test drop below a preset level.
An integrity test of the fire detection system can be 2.13.2 Fire Extinguisher Advisory Lights
performed by selection of FIRE DET/EXT on the pilot
MASTER TEST switch. The integrity test simultaneously Two advisory lights are provided to indicate low
checks the sensing element loops of both engine compart pressure in the fire extinguishing agent containers. The
ments for continuity and freedom from short circuits, and the lights, ENG FIRE EXT and AUX FIRE EXT, illuminate
fire alarm circuits and FIRE warning lights for proper when container pressure drops 90 psi below a nominal
functioning. Presence of a short circuit or control unit pressure of 600 psi at 70° F (see Figure 228).
malfunction causes the warning light to remain out. Fire
detection test is not available on the emergency generator. 2.13.3 Fire Extinguisher Test
The fire extinguishing system is tested by raising and
2.13 FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
rotating the MASTER TEST switch to FIRE DET/EXT and
The fire extinguishing system is capable of discharging depressing the knob. If the fire extinguisher test passes, the
an extinguishing agent into either engine nacelle and its GO light illuminates; if the NO GO light illuminates or if both
accessory section. The system consists of two containers of or neither GO and NO GO lights illuminate, the system has
extinguishing agent, piping and nozzles to route and not tested properly and a failure exists somewhere in the
discharge the agent, cockpit switches to activate the system, system.
and advisory lights that alert the flightcrew to a drop in
system pressure below a predetermined level. 2.14 AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEM
The aircraft fuel system normally operates as a split
The fire extinguishing agent is a clean, colorless, odor
less, and electrically nonconductive gas. It is a low−toxicity feed system, with the left and aft tanks feeding to the left
engine and the right and forward tanks feeding the right
vapor that chemically stops the combustion process. It will
engine (refer to FO−6). Except for the external tanks, the
not damage equipment because it leaves no water, foam,
system uses motive flow fuel to transfer fuel. The supply of
powder, or other residue.
high−pressure fuel from engine−driven motive fuel pumps
operates fuel ejector pumps to transfer fuel without the need
The retention time of an adequate concentration of the
of moving parts. The system is not dependent on electrical
extinguishing agent in the engine compartment will deter
power for normal fuel transfer and feed. Total internal and
mine probability of reignition, and, therefore, the probability
external fuel quantity indication is provided, with a select
of aircraft survival. At high airspeeds, where airflow through
able quantity readout for individual tanks. Fuel system
the engine compartment is increased, agent retention time is
management requirements are minimal under normal opera
reduced.
tion for feed, transfer, dumping, and refueling. Sufficient
cockpit control is provided to manage the system under
The slower the airspeed at the time the extinguisher is
failure conditions. The aircraft fuel system is designed so that
fired, the higher the probability of fire extinction and the
all usable fuel will normally be depleted under two or
lower the probability of reignition.
single−engine operating conditions before an engine flame
out occurs from fuel starvation. However, with complete
Circuit breaker protection is provided on the RIO
motive flow failure, engine fuel starvation can occur with
essential No. 1 circuit breaker panel by the R FIRE EXT
usable fuel aboard.
(7C4) circuit breaker and the L FIRE EXT (7C5) circuit
breaker.
Note
2.13.1 Fire Extinguisher Pushbuttons All fuel weights in this manual are based on
The discharge pushbuttons for the fire extinguishing the use of JP−5 fuel at 6.8 pounds per gallon,
system are located behind the FUEL SHUT OFF handles. JP−4 fuel at 6.5 pounds per gallon, or JP−8 fuel at
The FUEL SHUT OFF handle for the affected engine must 6.7 pounds per gallon.
ORIGINAL 2−40
Figure 228.Fire Extinguishing Switches and Advisory Lights
Figure 229.Fuel Tanks
2−41 ORIGINAL
2.14.1 Fuel Tankage forward−most cell in the aft tank group (cell No. 5) lays
laterally across the center fuselage. Extending aft are two
Figure 229 shows the general fuel tankage arrange coffin−shaped tanks that contain two cells (Nos. 6 and 8) on
ment in the aircraft. The fuel supply is stored in eight separate the right side and one cell (No. 7) plus an integral fuel vent
fuselage cells, two wing box cells, two integral wing cells, tank on the left side. The coffin tanks straddle the center
and (optional loading) two external fuel tanks. trough area, which contains the control rods, Sparrow missile
launchers, and electrical and fluid power lines. All fuel cells
2.14.1.1 Sump Tanks in the aft tank group are interconnected by one−way flapper
valves at the base for aft−to−forward fuel gravity transfer.
The engine feed group, consisting of the left and right
box−beam tanks and the left and right sump tanks, spans the 2.14.1.4 Wing Tanks
fuselage slightly forward of the mid−center of gravity. Fuel
in each box−beam tank gravity flows to its respective sump There are integral fuel cells in the movable wing panels
tank. The sump tanks (self−sealing) are directly connected between the front and aft wing spars. Because of the wing−
to the box−beam tanks and contain the turbine−driven sweep pivot location and the extensive span (20 feet) of the
boost pumps. The feed tanks supply fuel to the engine. wing tanks, wing fuel loading provides a variable aft cg con
A negative−g check valve traps fuel in the feed tank during tribution to the aircraft longitudinal balance as a function of
negative−g flight. wingsweep angle. Each wing panel consists of the integral
fuel cell, which is designed to withstand loads because of fuel
sloshing during catapulting and extreme rolling maneuvers
with partial or full wing fuel. Fuel system plumbing (transfer
and refuel, motive flow, and vent lines) to the wing tanks
D Zero− or negative−g flight longer than 10 sec incorporate telescoping sealed joints at the pivot area to pro
onds in AB or 20 seconds in MIL or less will vide normal operation independent of wing−sweep position.
deplete the fuel sump tanks (cell Nos. 3 and 4),
resulting in flameout of both engines. 2.14.1.5 External Tanks
D AB operation in the 0 to 0.5−g regime may Fuel, air, electrical, and fuel precheck line connectors
result in air ingestion into the fuel boost are under the engine nacelles for the external carriage of two
pumps, causing possible AB blowout or fuel tanks. Check valves in the connectors provide an auto
engine flameout. matic seal with the tank removed. Although the locations are
D With fuel in feed group below 1,000 pounds, designated as armament stations Nos. 2 and 7, no other store
AB operation could result in AB blowout. is designed to be suspended there so that the carriage of
external fuel tanks does not limit the weapon−loading capa
Note bility of the aircraft. Suspension of the drop tanks and their
AB operation with less than 1,000 pounds in fuel content has an insignificant effect on the aircraft longitu
either feed group may illuminate the FUEL dinal center of gravity, and, even under the most adverse
PRESS light because of uncovering of the boost asymmetric fuel condition, the resultant movement can be
pump inlet. compensated for by lateral trimming.
2.14.1.2 Forward Tank
The forward fuselage fuel tank is between the inlet

ducts and immediately ahead of the feed group. The forward
tank is partitioned into two bladder cells (Nos. 1 and 2) that See Chapter 4 for external tank limitations.
are interconnected by open ports at the top for vent and over
flow purposes. Flapper valves at the base provide for 2.14.2 Fuel Quantity System
forward−to−aft fuel gravity transfer.
The fuel quantity measurement and indication system
2.14.1.3 Aft Tank provides the flightcrew with a continuous indication of total
internal and external fuel remaining, a selective readout for
The aft fuselage fuel tank group is partitioned into four all fuel tanks, independent low−fuel detection, and automatic
bladder cells (Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8) and a vent tank. The fuel system control features.
ORIGINAL 2−42
2.14.2.2 FUEL LOW Caution Lights

A L FUEL LOW or R FUEL LOW caution light
illuminates with 1,000 ± 200 pounds of fuel remaining in the
To prevent fuel spills from an overfilled vent tank respective feed group. The RIO is provided with a single
caused by a failed level−control system, set the FUEL LOW caution light that illuminates with one or both
WING/EXT TRANS switch to OFF if the of the pilot FUEL LOW caution lights.
left tape reading reaches 6,200 pounds or the
right tape reading reaches 6,600 pounds. If either Each FUEL LOW caution light is illuminated by two
fuel tape reading is exceeded, the aircraft shall be thermistors operating in series. One set of thermistors is in the
downed for maintenance inspection. right box−beam tank and cell No. 2. The other set of thermis
tors is in the left box−beam tank and cell No. 5. The FUEL
Note LOW light illuminates only if both thermistors operating in
series are uncovered.
Fuel in the vent tank is not gauged.
The quantity measurement system uses dual−element,

capacitance−type fuel probes to provide the flightcrew with
a continuous display of fuel quantity remaining. Fuel therm
istor devices and caution light displays provide a backup fuel D If the thermistors in either cell No. 2 or No. 5
low indicating system, independent of the capacitance gaug remain covered during a fuel transfer failure,
ing system. Additionally, the pilot is provided with a BINGO it is possible to partially deplete the sump tank
set capability on the fuel quantity indicator to preset the total without illuminating the respective FUEL
quantity level for activation of a BINGO caution light. LOW caution light.
D When both FUEL LOW caution lights illumi
Note nate, less than 1 minute of fuel is available if
both engines are operating in zone five AB.
Fuel quantity system malfunctions that result in
erroneous totalizer readings will invalidate the D If the BINGO CAUTION circuit breaker
use of the BINGO caution light. (8F6) is pulled, the L and R FUEL LOW
caution lights will be disabled.
2.14.2.1 Fuel Quantity Indicators
2.14.2.3 Fuel Quantity Indication Test
The pilot and RIO fuel quantity indicators are shown in Actuation of the master test switch in INST causes the
Figure 230 with a definitive breakdown of tape and counter fuselage tapes and total and feed/wing/external fuel quantity
readings. The white vertical tapes on the pilot indicator show indicators to drive to 2,000 pounds and illuminates the FUEL
fuselage fuel quantity. The left tape indicates fuel quantity in LOW caution lights. The test can be performed on the ground
the left feed and aft fuselage; the right tape indicates fuel or in flight. The test does not check the fuel probes or the
quantity in the right feed and forward fuselage. The L" and thermistors. A test of the BINGO set device can be obtained
R" labeled counters display either feed group, wing tank, or concurrently with the INST test by setting the BINGO level
external tank fuel quantity on the side selected using the at greater than 2,000 pounds. In this case, the BINGO caution
QTY SEL rocker switch on the fuel management panel. The light will illuminate when the totalizer reading decreases to
rocker switch is spring loaded to FEED. The pilot TOTAL a value less than the BINGO setting.
quantity display and the RIO display indicate total internal
and external fuel.
2.14.3 Engine Feed
Note The feed group for each engine is comprised of a
box−beam tank and a sump tank. Each box−beam tank holds
The RIO fuel quantity indicator is a repeater of approximately 1,300 pounds of fuel and is fed from external
the pilot total fuel indicator. The difference tank transfer, wing transfer, and fuselage transfer from cell
between the two should not exceed 300 pounds. No. 2 or 5. When a box−beam tank is full, excess fuel is
returned to the fuselage tanks through an overflow pipe. The
sump tanks, which hold approximately 300 pounds of fuel
2−43 ORIGINAL
Figure 230.Fuel Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−44
1 QTY SEL switch WING Fuel quantity in each wing is displayed on L and R counter of
pilot’s fuel quantity indicator.
FEED Spring−loaded rocker switch returns to FEED when not held in
WING or EXT. FEED group fuel quantity displayed on L and R
counter of pilot’s fuel quantity indicator
EXT Fuel quantity in each external tank displayed on L and R counter
of pilot’s fuel quantity indicator.
2 FEED switch FWD Both engines feed from right and forward tanks. Opens sump
tank interconnect valve, box beam vent valves, fuselage motive
flow isolation valve, defueling and transfer selector valve, and
shuts off motive flow fuel to all aft tank ejector pumps.
NORM Right engine feeds from forward and right tanks. Left engine
(guarded feeds from aft and left tanks.
tanks
position)
AFT Both engines feed from aft and left tanks. Opens sump tank inter
connect valve, box beam vent valves, fuselage motive flow isola
tion valve, defueling and transfer selector valves, and shuts off
motive flow fuel to forward tank ejector pumps.
3 WING/EXT TRANS ORIDE Airborne − Allows transfer of wing fuel, fuselage tank
switch pressurization, and pressurization and transfer of external tanks
with landing gear down, and with electrical malfunction in transfer
system. Weight on Wheels −Allows transfer of wing and external
tank fuel.
AUTO Airborne − Normal position. Wing fuel is automatically transferred.
Transfer of external fuel and fuselage pressurization is automatic
with landing gear retracted. Automatic shut off of wing and
external tanks when empty. Weight on Wheels −Automatic
transfer of wing and external tank fuel cannot be accomplished;
switch must be set to ORIDE for wing fuel transfer.
OFF Closes solenoid operated valve to shut off motive flow fuel to
wing and also inhibits external tank transfer and fuselage
pressurization. Spring return to AUTO when master test switch
is actuated in INST, and when either thermistor in cell 2 and 5 is
uncovered, when DUMP is selected, and when REFUEL PROBE
switch is in ALL EXTD.
4 In−flight refueling probe Illuminates whenever probe cavity forward door is open during retraction or
transition light extension of probe.
5 DUMP switch OFF Dump valve closed.

DUMP Opens a solenoid operated pilot valve, which ports motive flow
fuel pressure to open the dump valve and allows gravity fuel
dump overboard from cells 2 and 5. Wing and external tank
transfer automatically initiated. Dump electrically inhibited with
weight on wheels or speed brakes not fully retracted.
Figure 2−30. Fuel Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 3)
2−45 ORIGINAL
6 REFUEL PROBE switch ALL EXTD Extends refueling probe. Shuts off wing and external
tank fuel transfer to permit refueling of all tanks.
Returns transfer switch from OFF to AUTO.
FUS EXTD Extends refueling probe. Normal transfer and feed.
Used for practice plugins, fuselage−only refueling,
or flight with damaged wing tank.
RET Retracts refueling probe.
7 Left and right FUEL SHUT Pulling respective handle manually shuts off fuel to that engine.
OFF PULL handles Push forward resets engine fuel feed shutoff valve to open.
8 L and R FUEL LOW Fuel thermistors uncovered in aft and left or forward and right feed group.
caution lights Illuminates with approximately 1,000 pounds remaining in individual feed
(Also single light on RIO group and the respective fuselage tanks empty.
CAUTION panel.)
9 BINGO caution light Illuminates when total fuel quantity indicator reads lower than BINGO
counter value.
10 L and R FUEL PRESS Indicates insufficient discharge pressure (less than 9 psi) from respective
caution lights turbine−driven boost pump.
NOTE
If fuel pressure light is illuminated an engine overtemp warning
tone will sound.
Figure 2−30. Fuel Controls and Indicators (Sheet 3 of 3)
each, are located directly beneath the box−beam tanks and tank. The pressure head at interconnect A or B created
have three sources of fuel (see Figure 2-31 for identification by the higher vertical location of the fuel in the box−
of tank interconnects): beam tank, is greater than that created at interconnect
1. Interconnect A or B provides gravity sump from C or D by the fuel in either cell No. 2 or 5. Therefore,
the respective box−beam tank. fuel to replenish the sump tanks will come from the
2. Interconnect C or D connects the sump tank to its box−beam tanks through interconnects A and B.
respective fuselage tank (cell No. 4 to cell No. 2/ 2. Situation 2
cell No. 3 to cell No. 5). a. Fuel in cell Nos. 2 and 5
3. The sump tank interconnect line and valve E b. FEED switch in NORM
connect the two sump tanks. c. High−engine fuel demands (afterburner).
The proportion of fuel supplied to each sump tank Under these conditions the sump tank interconnect
through the five interconnects (A through E) is a function of valve is closed and the left and right systems are
the pressure differential existing at each of the interconnects. isolated. Engine fuel demand can exceed the transfer
The interconnect with the highest pressure differential will rate into the box−beam tank. If this occurs, the fuel level
provide the most fuel. Valve E is commanded open during in the box−beam tank will start to drop; however the
low−fuel states and during fuel balancing when the FEED box−beam tanks are not vented, resulting in a pressure
switch is selected FWD or AFT. drop above the declining fuel level. This reduced
In a normal sequence, three situations can be defined: pressure lowers the total pressure at A and B, below the
1. Situation 1 pressure at C and D. Therefore, the majority of the fuel
a. Fuel in cell Nos. 2 and 5 to replenish the sump tanks comes directly from
b. FEED switch in NORM fuselage cell Nos. 2 and 5 through interconnects C and
c. Normal engine fuel flow (MIL thrust or less). D, respectively. The reduction in box−beam tank fuel
quantity should not normally result in a feed group
Under these conditions, the sump tank interconnect quantity indication of less than 1,200 pounds. If the
valve is closed, and the left and right systems are feed groups drop and then hold in the 1,200−pound
isolated. The transfer capacity into the box−beam tank range during a high−speed dash, the system is working
exceeds the engine demand, ensuring a full box−beam normally.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 2−46
Figure 231.Engine Fuel Feed
2−47 ORIGINAL
3. Situation 3 only in emergencies. Suction feed is drawn from an inlet at

the bottom of the fuel cell that does not incorporate a flexible
a. Fuel in either cell No. 2 or 5 has been depleted pendulum pickup.
b. FEED switch in NORM
c. Any normal engine demand.
When the low−level thermistor in either cell No. 2 or 5

is uncovered, both box−beam tanks are vented and the With a left or right FUEL PRESS light, flight at
sump tank interconnect valve is opened. The two zero or negative g should be avoided or engine
groups become a common system and will seek a fuel starvation may result.
common level to equalize the static pressure head. Fuel
will flow through the open sump tank interconnect With both FUEL PRESS caution lights illuminated,
valve only as a function of differential pressure. With there is a potential that total loss of motive flow pressure has
open vent valves, the fuel in both box−beam tanks has occurred because both motive flow pumps are not function-
a positive vent pressure, forcing the fuel into the ing. Total loss of motive flow pressure will preclude transfer
respective sump tank through interconnect A or B. of any remaining wing fuel or fuel dump and result in total
segregation of the FWD/RIGHT and AFT/LEFT systems
Fuel in the sump tank is picked up by the turbine−driven since motive flow provides the force to open the sump tank
boost pump through a flexible pendulum pickup, boosted to interconnect valve. Without motive flow pressure, all fuse-
greater than 10 psi, and fed to the engine through the engine lage fuel transfer is by gravity, which makes the quantity of
feed line. Normally the right boost pump only feeds the right usable fuel a function of aircraft attitude. At cruise attitude,
engine and the left boost pump only feeds the left engine; approximately 400 pounds of usable fuel will be trapped in
however, the boost pump output lines are connected by a the aft fuselage. After illumination of both fuel pressure
normally closed engine automatic crossfeed valve. If either caution lights, any of the following events indicate that some
boost pump output pressure falls below 9 psi, as indicated by motive flow pressure is available:
the illumination of the appropriate FUEL PRESS caution
1. Wing fuel transfer
light, the engine automatic crossfeed valve is commanded
open. The engine automatic crossfeed valve allows fuel from 2. With the FEED switch in FWD or AFT and no
the operating boost pump to supply pressurized fuel to the transfer of external fuel
engine on the failed side. The engine automatic crossfeed
valve is also opened when either of the low level thermistors a. The feed group of the selected side remains full.
in cell No. 2 or 5 is uncovered; however if equal boost pump
pressures exist, negligible flow will occur through the valve. b. Fuel migration from one side to the other.
2.14.3.1 L/R FUEL PRESS Caution Lights NOTE
Illumination of the L or R FUEL PRESS caution light If fuel pressure light is illuminated an engine
results from a malfunction of the boost pump, failure of the overtemp warning tone will sound.
motive flow pump, exhaustion of fuel, or fuel flow interrup-
tion. With illumination of the caution light, the engine auto- 2.14.3.2 Engine Fuel Feed During Afterburner
matic crossfeed valve is commanded open and the fuselage Operations
motive flow shutoff valve on the failed side is automatically
closed. Because of the reduced pumping and transfer capac- High AB fuel consumption places extreme demands on
ity while operating on a single boost pump, afterburner the engine feed system. In addition, the g forces experienced
operation is restricted to altitudes below 15,000 feet. Fuel to with AB use, especially during unloaded accelerations
both engines is supplied from the side with the operating (bugouts") and low−g nose−high maneuvering, tend to
boost pump; therefore a fuel quantity imbalance will result. reduce forward fuel transfer to cell No. 5 and the left engine
Use of the FEED switch to balance fuel quantity will override sump tank (cell No.3). When these conditions are sustained,
the low−fuel pressure signal to the fuselage motive flow shut- fuel in cell No. 5 is depleted by both high suction feed through
off valve, allowing normal fuel balancing procedures. Illumi- the gravity transfer line (C, Figure 2-32), and by reducing
nation of both FUEL PRESS caution lights indicates gravity fuel transfer from cell Nos. 6 and 7. Zero− or low−g
reduced (< 9 psi) or loss of boosted fuel pressure to both (less than 0.5) flight tends to force the fuel remaining in cell
engines. Fuel will continue to be supplied by suction feed; No. 5 toward the aft wall of the tank or, at reduced fuel level,
however, thrust settings should be minimized and AB used uncovers gravity transfer line (C) and allows air to be
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 2−48
Figure 232.Aft Fuselage Fuel Transfer
drawn into the sump tank. Continued zero− or low−g (less D In the presence of a fuel pressure light, fuel
than0.5) maneuvers will aggravate this condition and demand must be reduced and positive g
increase the probability of air ingestion. If air enters the boost restored to prevent possible engine flameout.
pump and engine feed line, the fuel pressure light will
illuminate. If the maneuver is continued, the left AB will 2.14.3.3 Fuel Shutoff Handles
blow out and subsequent left−engine flameout can occur.
Right−engine flameout can follow after left−engine flameout Individual engine fuel feed shutoff valves in the left
because engine feed crossfeed operation will reduce the and right feed lines at the point of nacelle penetration are
effective output of the right boost pump. Aircraft decelera connected by control cables to the FUEL SHUT OFF handles
tion can further interrupt fuel transfer from cell No. 2 to the on the pilot instrument panel. During normal operation, the
right sump through the gravity transfer line (D, Figure 233). handles should remain pushed in so that fuel flow to the
Once initiated, this sequence can occur rapidly and is engine fuel feed system is unrestricted. If a fire is detected in
independent of total fuel state. the engine nacelle, the pilot should pull (approximately 3 or
4 inches) the FUEL SHUT OFF handle on the affected side
to stop the supply of fuel to the engine.
D During zero− or negative−g flight, the oil

pressure light will normally illuminate and
activate the master caution light. Subsequent Securing the engine at high power settings using
illumination of a fuel pressure light may go the FUEL SHUTOFF handles may result in
unnoticed, allowing the pilot to continue the damage to the aircraft fuel system.
maneuver to the point of AB blowout and
engine flameout.
2−49 ORIGINAL
Figure 233.Forward Fuselage Fuel Transfer
Note The path of the motive flow fuel is essentially the same
Engine flameout will occur approximately 4 sec for either side. Fuel from the engine feed line is pressurized
onds after the FUEL SHUT OFF handle(s) is by the engine−driven motive flow pump and initially routed
pulled with the throttle(s) at MIL. With lower through the boost pump turbine. The motive flow fuel is then
power settings, time to flameout will increase routed through its respective transfer system. As the pres
(approximately 30 seconds at IDLE). surized fuel passes through each ejector pump, it induces
transfer fuel to flow along with the motive flow fuel. This
combination of fuel eventually is transferred into the respec
2.14.4 Fuel Transfer
tive wing box−beam tank.
2.14.4.1 Motive Flow Transfer There are four valves that control motive flow transfer:
With the exception of the external tanks, which utilize
bleed air, all fuel transfer is accomplished by gravity and 1. Motive flow isolation valve Normally closed, but
motive flow. In motive flow, a relatively small amount of when the low−level thermistor in cell Nos. 2 or 5 is
pressurized fuel moves at high speed through ejector pumps, uncovered or the FEED switch is out of NORM, the
using the venturi effect to induce flow of the transfer fuel. valve is commanded open, providing a path for
The ejector pumps have no rotating parts or power require motive flow fuel from a normally operating side to
ments other than motive flow. cross over and power a malfunctioning opposite
side.
Like other elements of the fuel transfer system, motive
flow transfer is initially segregated to right and left. The 2. Forward fuselage motive flow shutoff valve
motive flow pump driven by the right engine provides motive Normally open except when the R FUEL PRESS
flow and pressure to drive the right boost pump and to run the caution light is illuminated or the FEED switch is in
ejector transfer pumps in the forward fuselage and right wing. AFT. When the valve is closed, all motive flow
The motive flow pump driven by the left engine provides transfer in the forward fuselage is shut off. If the
motive flow and pressure to drive the left boost pump and valve is closed because of the R FUEL PRESS
runs the ejector transfer pumps in the aft fuselage and left caution light, positioning the FEED switch to FWD
wing. will open the valve.
ORIGINAL 2−50
3. AFT fuselage motive flow shutoff valve lage, aft fuselage transfer does not have any high−level control
Normally open except when the L FUEL PRESS associated with it. Excess fuel in the box−beam tank passes
caution light is illuminated or the FEED switch is in through an overflow pipe back into cell No. 5. When cell No.5
FWD. When the valve is closed, all motive flow is full, the fuel cascades into cell Nos. 6, 7, and 8. The aft
transfer in the aft fuselage is shut off. If the valve is fuselage fuel will continue to circulate until consumed by the
closed because of the L FUEL PRESS caution light, engine. When their respective cells are empty, the motive flow
positioning the FEED switch to AFT will open the ejector pumps will be shutoff by their own low−level floats.
valve. The scavenge ejector pumps do not incorporate shutoff floats.
In the event of loss of aft fuselage motive flow transfer, fuel
4. Wing motive flow shutoff valve The motive flow may be gravity fed forward to cell No. 5 and eventually to the
to each wing passes through separate paths in a left sump tank through interconnect C.
single motive flow shutoff valve. The valve is nor
mally open except when: 2.14.4.4 Wing Transfer
a. The WING/EXT TRANS switch is in OFF or in Wing fuel is transferred by two motive flow ejector
AUTO with both left and right wing thermistors pumps located in each wing. To prevent overfilling the fuse
dry. lage, entry of wing fuel into the box−beam tank is controlled
by the refueling/transfer shutoff valve. In the forward fuse
b. Weight is on wheels.
lage, excess fuel overflows through an overflow pipe from
c. The REFUEL PROBE switch is in ALL EXTD. the right box−beam tank into cell No. 2, and then cascades
into cell No. 1. A high−level pilot valve senses when cell
In any case, the wing motive flow shutoff valve can be No.1 is full and sends a signal to close the right refueling/
commanded open by selecting ORIDE on the WING/EXT transfer shutoff valve, preventing additional wing fuel from
TRANS switch. entering. When engine fuel consumption provides room in
cell No. 1 for additional fuel, the high−level pilot will signal
the refueling/transfer shutoff valve to open. The sequence is
2.14.4.2 Forward Fuselage Transfer
identical for the left box−beam tank and aft fuselage with the
Fuel in cell No. 1 flows by gravity into cell No. 2 where exception that the high−level pilot valve is located in cell
two motive flow ejector pumps transfer it into the right wing No.7 and controls the left refueling/transfer shutoff valve
box−beam tank at approximately 18,000 pph. Fuel entering (see Figure 234 for wing and external tank fuel transfer).
the box−beam tank beyond engine demands overflows
through an overflow pipe back into cell No. 2. There is no fuel Normally wing fuel can only transfer to the box−beam
level control associated with fuselage motive flow transfer; tank on its respective side, except when the thermistor in
therefore, the fuel will continue to circulate from cell No. 2 either cell No. 2 or 5 is uncovered or the FEED switch is
into the right box−beam tank and back through the overflow selected FWD or AFT. For either condition, the motive flow
pipe. When the fuel in cell Nos. 1 and 2 is depleted, the isolation valve opens, making motive flow pressure available
motive flow ejector pumps are shut off by their own low−level to either wing from either engine, and the two defuel/transfer
floats. In the event of failure of the forward fuselage motive selector valves open, permitting fuel from either wing to
flow, the fuel can reach the right sump tank by gravity flow transfer to either box−beam tank. Total loss of wing motive
through interconnect D. flow will preclude transfer of any remaining wing fuel.
Failure of either high−level pilot valve or refueling/transfer
2.14.4.3 Aft Fuselage Transfer shutoff valve to the closed position could cause a single−wing
transfer failure. Selection of FWD or AFT on the FEED
Fuel in the aft fuselage is transferred forward by
switch opens the defuel/transfer selector valves allowing the
scavenge ejector pumps in cell No. 8 and the vent tank, single trapped wing fuel to transfer to the opposite box−beam fuel
ejector pumps in cell Nos. 6 and 7, and two ejector pumps in
tank.
cell No. 5. All aft motive flow transfer is into the left box−
Note
beam tank, producing a rate of approximately 36,000 pph.
This flow rate is approximately twice that of the forward Premature automatic wing motive flow valve
fuselage transfer rate because there are more motive flow shutoff may occur because of formation of air
ejector pumps in the aft transfer system. More fuel tanks and bubbles in the wingtip fuel thermistors. Pilot
thus more motive flow ejector pumps are required in the aft selection of ORIDE with the WING/EXT
transfer system than the forward transfer system because of TRANS switch will re−enable fuel transfer.
the aircraft structural configuration. Like the forward fuse
2−51 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-34. Wing and External Tank Fuel Transfer
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-52
Note bypass the landing gear down interlock in the external tank
transfer circuit, the WING/EXT TRANS switch may remain
D ORIDE transfer should not normally be used in the AUTO (normal) position for this check.
unless AUTO transfer fails to complete trans
fer of wing or external tank fuel. ORIDE use Note
when the wing tanks are dry may allow air to D Verifying tank operation by observing fuel
enter the box−beam tanks, reducing the effi transfer is both time consuming with a full fuse
ciency of gravity transfer to the sump tanks. lage fuel load and aggravates fuel slosh loads
D When the thermistor in either cell No. 2 or 5 in the external tanks during catapult launch.
is uncovered, the WING/EXT TRANS switch D Engine rpm above idle may be required to
will be deenergized from OFF to AUTO. This provide sufficient bleed air pressure for a sat
automatic feature is to ensure all wing and isfactory check.
external fuel has been transferred. After 5 sec
onds, the pilot may reset this switch to OFF. 2.14.4.6 Vent Valve Failure
A weight−on−wheels inhibit function prevents opening The vent valves in the right and left box−beam tank are
of the wing motive flow shutoff valve. To transfer wing fuel always commanded open with the sump tank interconnect
during ground operations, the WING/EXT TRANS switch valve, making the right and left feed groups a common
must be set to ORIDE to bypass the weight−on−wheels system. This function occurs when the low−level thermistor
function. in cell No. 2 or 5 is uncovered. To equalize the static pressure
head at the interconnect valve, the fuel in the sump tanks will
Activation of fuselage fuel dump automatically initi seek a common level. At matched engine demands, each
ates wing fuel transfer in sequence after external tank transfer engine will feed from its own side and negligible flow will
by automatically moving the WING/EXT TRANS switch to occur across the sump tank interconnect valve. If a vent valve
AUTO if in OFF. Positioning the REFUEL PROBE switch to fails to open, the additional vent pressure on top of the fuel
ALL/EXTD also releases the solenoid holding the WING/ on the vented side creates a pressure differential between the
EXT TRANS switch in OFF. left and right sump tanks and results in migration through the
interconnect valve to the side with the inoperative vent valve.
2.14.4.5 External Tank Transfer Therefore, sump tank replenishment of fuel to the side with
the failed vent valve will come primarily from the opposite
External tank transfer is also controlled by the WING/ sump tank because the head pressure at the interconnect
EXT TRANS switch. When external tanks are installed, valve (E) may be higher than that at interconnects A, B, C,
transfer from the wings and external tanks occurs concur or D (Figure 231). A fuel quantity imbalance will occur with
rently. Transfer from the wings and external tanks cannot be the side of the properly operating vent valve decreasing more
accomplished separately; however, the external tanks should rapidly than the malfunctioning side. The box−beam tank
complete transfer before the wing tanks. External tank fuel with the malfunctioning vent valve will eventually vent
is transferred by bleed air pressure regulated to 25 psi. Maxi through the overflow pipe when the respective fuselage tank
mum transfer rate of each external tank is approximately (cell No. 2 or 5) is empty. If for any reason the fuel is not
45,000 pph. External tank fuel transfer into the fuselage is transferred out of the respective fuselage tank, the imbalance
controlled by the same valves that control wing transfer. will continue until the vented sump tank fuel quantity is
Fuselage level is controlled by the refueling/transfer shutoff low enough to uncover the interconnect valve and line
valves and, until both the defuel/transfer valves are com (256 pounds approximately). This permits venting of the
manded open, external tank fuel can only transfer into the unvented side and permits use of the balance of the fuel in
box−beam tank located on the same side of the aircraft. the sump tanks.
External tank transfer can be checked on the deck by Vent valve malfunctions can create disconcerting fuel
placing the WING/EXT TRANS switch to ORIDE, or select imbalances. Although engine operation is not affected and all
ing FLT GR UP with the MASTER TEST switch and noting of the fuel in the aircraft is available, AB use should be
depletion of external tank fuel quantity. In addition, when avoided when low feed group fuel quantities are indicated. If
FLT GR UP is selected, the GO/NO GO light on the both engine/boost pumps are operating, there is no advantage
MASTER TEST panel is illuminated by a pressure switch in in using the cockpit fuel FEED switch to attempt to correct
the aircraft pressure line leading to the external tanks and the imbalance. Positions other than NORM may simply
indicates status of line pressure. Since FLT GR UP serves to aggravate the imbalance.
2−53 ORIGINAL
2.14.5 Fuel Quantity Balancing 2.14.6 Fuel Transfer/Feed During Single−Engine

Operation
Fuel quantity balancing is not normally required prior
to completion of wing/external tank transfer or until one
Loss of an engine before the low−level thermistor in
fuselage tape drops below 4,500 pounds. The procedure
either cell No. 2 or 5 is uncovered will terminate all motive
requires use of the FEED switch that opens the sump tank
interconnect valve, joining the FWD/R and AFT/L systems. flow transfer on the failed side. External tank fuel will con
tinue to transfer if room is available in the failed side fuselage
With a high quantity in the FWD/R group, the greater static
tanks. If no pilot action is taken, the operating engine will
head pressure, particularly in noseup attitudes, can cause
feed only from its own side. This will lead to a fuel imbalance
overfilling of the AFT/L group. To prevent this, the FEED
that can normally be corrected through the use of the fuel
switch should be returned to NORM before the AFT/L tape
FEED switch. Selecting the high side (inoperative engine
reaches 6,200 pounds.
side) results in the following:
When the FEED switch is moved to select the high−fuel 1. Selected side fuselage motive flow shutoff valve is
quantity side, the following occurs: opened. The valve was commanded closed when the
1. Sump tank interconnect valve opens and provides a FUEL PRESS caution light illuminated.
fuel path between the right and left tanks.
2. Operating side fuselage motive flow shutoff valve
2. Both box−beam tank vent valves open and provide is closed and stops operating side fuselage fuel
equal vent pressure on top of the fuel in each box− transfer into the box−beam tank.
beam tank, regardless of the fuel level.
3. Motive flow isolation valve opens. Operating side
3. Fuselage motive flow shutoff valve on the non− motive flow pressure now powers the inoperative
selected (low−fuel quantity) side closes and termi side. Failed side fuselage fuel will begin transfer
nates the last source of transfer of that fuselage fuel ring into its respective box−beam tank.
into its respective box−beam tank.
4. Sump tank interconnect valve opens and provides a
4. Motive flow isolation valve opens and provides a path for the inoperative side fuel to reach the oper
path for the nonselected side motive flow pressure ating engine.
to reach the opposite side. Thus motive flow transfer
should maintain a full box−beam tank on the 5. Wing box−beam tank vent valves open and equalize
selected side. the pressure above the fuel in each wing box−beam
tank, permitting the higher static pressure created
5. Both defuel/transfer selector valves open and by the full wing box−beam tank on the inoperative
permit either wing/external tank to transfer into side to induce flow through the open sump tank
either wing box−beam tank. interconnect valve to the operating engine.
The higher static pressure head created by the full box− 6. Both defuel/transfer selector valves open and allow
beam tank on the selected side results in the nonselected side either wing or external tank fuel to transfer into
engine feeding primarily from the sump tank interconnect either wing box−beam tank.
rather than interconnects A, B, C, or D. With both engines
feeding from the fuel in primarily one side, the correction rate If no crew action is taken with the FEED switch, the
of the fuel quantity imbalance is essentially a function of same fuel system functions are automatically provided when
engine demand. the thermistor in either cell No. 2 or 5 is uncovered. Addi
tional actions that will occur when the cell No. 2 or 5 thermis
tor is uncovered are:
1. Both right and left fuselage motive flow shutoff

valves open, overriding any previous commands to
D During AB operations, NORM shall be close. Manual override of each valve is still pro
selected. FWD or AFT could deplete fuel in vided through the FEED switch.
sump tanks.
D Aircraft attitude will have a significant influ
ence on the direction of fuel movement if
FWD or AFT is selected. Nosedown attitude
will transfer fuel forward, and noseup attitude
will transfer fuel aft.
ORIGINAL 2−54
2. Engine crossfeed valve receives a redundant com 2.14.7 Fuel Dump

mand to open. An initial command was provided
when the FUEL PRESS caution light illuminated. Figure 235 shows aircraft fuel system components
associated with fuel dump operation. Fuel dump standpipes
3. WING/EXT TRANS switch will automatically go in the forward (cell No. 2) and aft (cell No. 5) fuselage tanks
to AUTO if originally in OFF. If desired, OFF can are connected to the fuel dump manifold at the dump shutoff
be reselected after 5 seconds. valve. The manifold extends aft to the fuselage boattail.
Actuation of the fuel DUMP switch to DUMP supplies power
2.14.6.1 Sump Tank Interconnect Valve Failure (dc essential No. 2) to open the solenoid−operated pilot valve,
which ports motive flow fuel pressure to open the dump
The major fuel system consideration while operating shutoff valve with weight off the main landing gear and the
single engine is that the sump tank interconnect valve opens speedbrakes retracted.
when commanded. This constitutes the only path through
which inoperative side fuselage fuel can reach the operating The fuel DUMP switch circuit is deactivated on deck
engine. While the probability of an inoperative sump tank or with speedbrakes extended. Fuel dump with the speed
interconnect valve is very low, the consequences of a mal brakes extended is inhibited because of the resulting flow
function under single−engine conditions are severe, particu field disturbance, which would result in fuel impingement on
larly at landing fuel weights. With a failed closed sump tank the fuselage boattail and exhaust nozzles. The speedbrake
interconnect and full fuselage cells on the inoperative side, switch is electrically bypassed during a combined hydraulic
only the wing fuel on the inoperative side and external fuel system failure, enabling the pilot to dump fuel when the
can be transferred into the operating side fuselage. Attempts speedbrakes are floating. The electrical bypass is accom
to transfer the fuel from the inoperative side with the FEED plished whenever the combined pressure falls below 500 psi.
switch compound the problem when the motive flow isolation
valve and inoperative side motive flow shutoff valve open.
Operating side motive flow fuel, pumped through the open
motive flow isolation valve to permit inoperative side wing
and/or fuselage motive flow transfer cannot be retrieved. Fuel
migration is approximately 100 pounds per minute because The speedbrake/fuel dump interlock does not
of wing transfer, and approximately 200 pounds per minute prevent speedbrakes from being deployed if fuel
for fuselage transfer. Coupled with a normal engine demand dump is activated. It only prevents the dumping
of approximately 100 pounds per minute, a balancing attempt of fuel if the speedbrakes are already extended.
will result in usable fuel in the operative side being depleted
at approximately 400 pounds per minute. Note
D The FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker (RE1)
Note
is on the pilot right−knee circuit breaker panel.
Operating side fuel remaining can be protected
D Dump operations with either engine in after
by pulling the FUEL SHUT OFF handle for the
burner should be avoided since the fuel dump
inoperative side and concurrently selecting the
mast discharge will be torched.
operative side on the FEED switch. This will elim
inate a potential fuel path across the engine auto D After terminating fuel dump, wait approxi
matic crossfeed valve, through the inoperative mately 1 minute to allow residual fuel in the
sump tank boost pump into the inoperative side. fuel dump line to drain before extending
speedbrakes or lighting afterburners.
If the sump tank interconnect is failed closed, the
following additional considerations apply: Fuel in the wings and external tanks is dumped by
transferring to the fuselage. When the fuselage fuel dump
With the FEED switch selected to the operating side. circuit is activated, wing and external tank transfer to the
box−beam tanks is automatically initiated. Fuel dump is by
1. Wing and external tank fuel from both sides will gravity flow with a nominal discharge rate of 1,500 pounds
transfer into the operating side fuselage if the per minute. The dump rate is affected by aircraft pitch atti
inoperative side fuselage is full. tude and total fuselage fuel quantity with discharge flow
inhibited at nosedown conditions. The standpipes in the fuel
2. If DUMP is selected, wing motive flow is auto cells control the minimum fuel dump level in the tanks,
matically activated; therefore, approximately 100 which, under normal operations (feed group full), is approxi
pounds per minute of fuel available to the operating mately 4,000 pounds.
engine will be lost.
2−55 ORIGINAL
Figure 235.Fuel Vent and Dump
2.14.8 Internal Tank Pressurization and Vent 2.14.9 Fueling and Defueling
The internal fuel vent system is shown in Figure 235. Figure 236 shows the refueling system. The aircraft is
It is an open−vent−type system, pressurized by ram air and equipped with a single−point refueling system, which enables
engine bleed air from the 25−psi external tank pressure pressure filling of all aircraft fuel tanks from a single recep
system that is reduced to 1.75 psi by a fuselage pressure tacle. The receptacle is at the recessed ground refuel and
regulator and distributed to all tanks through the fuselage defuel station, behind a quick−access door on the lower right
vent system. This air is automatically supplied when the side of the forward fuselage. The maximum refueling rate is
landing gear handle is UP or the WING/EXT TRANS switch 450 gallons per minute at a pressure of 50 psi. Since ground
is in ORIDE. When the WING/EXT TRANS switch is in and air refueling connections use a common manifold, the
OFF, the low−pressure bleed air is cut off. refueling sequence is the same.
In flight, the vent tank is maintained at a positive Standpipes refuel the aft and forward fuselage tanks by
pressure up to 2.5 psi maximum. This pressure is fed by overflow from the left and right box−beam tanks. A high−
connecting lines to all internal tanks. These connecting lines level pilot valve at the high point of the forward tank shuts
are routed to provide venting to both the forward and aft end off the fuselage refueling valve in the right box−beam tank
of each fuselage tank so it can function as both a climb and when the forward tank group is full. Fuel flows from the left
dive vent. Venting of the box−beam tanks is controlled by box−beam tank to cell No. 5, after which it overflows to the
solenoid−operating valves, which when closed, provide right side, then the left side. A high−level pilot valve at the
suction transfer through the gravity flow paths in cell Nos. 2 high point of the left box−beam tank and aft tank (cell No. 7)
and 5 to the sump tanks. shuts off the fuselage refueling valve in the left box−beam
tank when the aft tank group is full. Individual wing and
external tank filling is accomplished by flow through a
shutoff valve in each tank.
ORIGINAL 2−56
Figure 236.Refueling System
vent pressure indicator monitors pressure in the vent lines.

The gauge consists of a pointer on a scale having two bands,
one green and one red.
Gravity refueling of the aircraft fuel system The green band indicates a safe pressure range (0 to
should be accomplished only under emergency 4 psi), and the red band indicates an unsafe range (4 to 8 psi).
situations. While performing such an operation,
avoid introducing contaminants into the fuel tanks
or damaging the fuel quantity probes and wiring.
2.14.9.1 Precheck System During ground refueling operations, the direct−

reading vent pressure indicator shall be observed
Ground refueling control is by two precheck selector and refueling stopped if pressure indicates in the
valves and a vent pressure gauge adjacent to the refueling red band (above 4 psi).
receptacle on the ground refuel and defuel panel. The
precheck valves functionally test high−level pilot valve 2.14.10 In−Flight Refueling
operation incident to ground pressure refueling; the valves
Note
separately check the pilot valves in the fuselage tanks and the
wing and external tanks. In addition to this precheck See paragraph 9.1 for in−flight refueling
function, the precheck valves can be used for ground procedures.
selective refueling of only the fuselage or all tanks. Since the The in−flight refueling system permits partial or
precheck valves, which are manually set by the groundcrew, complete refueling of the aircraft fuel tanks while in flight.
port pressurized servo fuel to the high−level pilot valves and The retractable refueling probe has an MA−2−type nozzle,
subsequently to the shutoff valves, no electrical power is which is compatible with any drogue−type refueling system.
necessary on the aircraft to perform ground refueling A split refueling system is provided with fuel routed into the
operations. Additionally, ground refueling control without left and right box−beam tanks for initial replenishment of
engines running is completely independent of switch posi sump tank fuel. Selectable fuel management controls dictate
tioning on the fuel management panel. The direct−reading the extent of further distribution to the wing tanks, external
2−57 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
tanks, and/or fuselage tanks. The maximum refueling rate is

approximately 475 gallons per minute (3,000 lbs per minute
depending on fuel type) at a pressure of 57 psi.
Loss of combined pressure may indicate impend-
ing fluid loss. Without fluid in the combined
system return line, the in-flight refueling probe
To prevent fuel fumes from entering the cockpit will not extend with the handpump. Early exten-
through the ECS because of possible fuel spill sion of the refueling probe at the first indication
during in-flight refueling, select L ENG air of a combined system malfunction is recom-
mended in a carrier environment.
source.
Note
D Extension or retraction of the refueling probe
using the hydraulic hand pump requires the
refuel probe switch to be placed in EXT or RET
D 57 psi limitation could be exceeded when (as appropriate), combined system fluid in the
refueling from some aircraft operating more return line, and essential dc No. 2 electrical
than one transfer pump. Damage to fuel sys- power. With a total loss of combined hydraulic
tem can result. pressure in flight, fluid trapped in the return
line/handpump reservoir can be isolated,
D Maximum airspeed for extension or retraction
exclusively for refueling probe extension, by
of the refueling probe is 400 knots (0.8 Mach).
placing the landing gear handle in the up posi-
Note tion. Extension of the refueling probe requires
approximately 25 cycles of the pump handle.
D With the in-flight refueling probe extended,
the pilot and RIO altimeter and airspeed and D Probe retraction is not available if the FUEL P/
Mach indicators will show erroneous indica- MOTIVE FLOW ISOL V (P-PUMP) circuit
tions because of changes in airflow around the breaker (RG1) is pulled.
pitot static probes. 2.14.10.2 Refueling Probe Transition Light
D Flight operations with the in-flight refueling The red probe transition light immediately above the
probe door removed are not recommended REFUEL PROBE switch illuminates whenever the probe
because of the effects of water intrusion, cavity forward door is not in the closed position. Since the
exposure to elements, and structural fatigue to closed-door position is indicative of both the probe retracted
electrical hydraulic hardware assemblies. If and extended position, the light serves as a probe transition
operational necessity dictates, the door may indicator as well as a terminal status indicator. The probe
be removed to prevent damage, loss or engine external light illuminates automatically upon probe exten-
FOD. sion with the EXT LTS master switch ON.
D The RUDDER AUTH caution light may
illuminate when the in-flight refueling probe 2.14.10.3 In-Flight Refueling Controls
is extended. Press the MASTER RESET Regardless of fuel management panel switch position-
button to reset the light. ing, at low-fuel states the initial resupply of fuel is discharged
into the left and right box-beam tanks. The split refueling
2.14.10.1 In-Flight Refueling Probe system to the left and right engine feed group provides for a
relatively balanced cg condition during refueling. Selective
The retractable in-flight refueling probe is in a cavity
refueling of the fuselage or all fuel tanks is provided on the
on the right side of the forward fuselage section, immediately
REFUEL PROBE switch with the probe extended. In
forward of the pilot vertical console panel.
FUS/EXTD normal fuel transfer and feed is unaltered. This
Extension of the refueling probe is provided through position is used for practice plug-ins, fuselage-only re-
redundant circuits by the REFUEL PROBE switch. A fueling, or return flight with a damaged wing tank. The
hydraulic actuator within the probe cavity extends and ALL/EXTD position shuts off wing and external drop tank
retracts the probe. The probe actuator is powered by the transfer to permit the refueling of all tanks.
combined hydraulic system. It can be extended and retracted
by means of the hydraulic handpump in the event of 2.14.11 Hot Refueling
combined system failure. Hot refueling can be accomplished with the refueling
probe extended or retracted. If the probe is extended, control
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-58
of the tanks to be refueled is accomplished in the same 2.15 ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
manner as during in−flight refueling. If the probe is not
extended, select WING/EXT TRANS switch to OFF to refuel In normal operation, ac power is supplied by the
all tanks. Select ORIDE to refuel the fuselage only. engine−driven generators. This ac power is converted by two
transformer−rectifiers (T/R) into dc power (refer to FO−8).
2.14.12 Automatic Fuel Electrical Controls One generator is capable of assuming the full ac power load
and one T/R is capable of assuming the full dc power load.
2.14.12.1 Automatic Low−Level Wing Transfer Additionally, a hydraulically driven emergency generator
Shutoff provides an independent backup supply of both ac and dc
power for electrical operation of essential buses. Ground
A thermistor is located at the low point in each wing operation of all electrically powered equipment is provided
cell. When both are uncovered, a discrete electrical signal is through the supply of external ac power to the aircraft.
generated, and through a control, the wing motive flow Switching between power supply systems is automatically
shutoff valve is energized and closes, terminating all wing accomplished without pilot action; however, sufficient
transfer. If either or both thermistors are again submerged, control is provided for the flightcrew to selectively isolate
wing transfer resumes. power sources and distribution in emergency situations. See
Figure 237 for a functional description of the control
Failure of this override system could result in a wing switches. All electrical circuits are protected by circuit
transfer failure. Selection of WING/EXT TRANS switch to breakers accessible in flight to the pilot and RIO.
ORIDE removes all power from the wing motive flow shutoff
valve, permitting it to open. 2.15.1 Normal Electrical Operation
2.14.12.2 Automatic Fuel Low−Level Override 2.15.1.1 Main Generators
Under normal operating conditions, the forward and Two engine−driven, oil cooled, integrated drive gener
right fuselage tank complex is isolated from the aft and left ators (IDG) produce the normal 115−volt, 400 Hz, three−
tank. This is necessary for proper longitudinal cg control and phase ac electrical power. The normal rated output of each
battle damage conditions. However, as fuel depletion prog generator is 75 kVA, which is sufficient to individually
resses to the point of sump tank only remaining, it becomes assume the complete electrical load of the aircraft. Each main
mandatory that the tanks be connected to maintain an equal ac generator is controlled by a separate switch on the pilot
balance. To accomplish this, two thermistors are located at MASTER GEN control panel. Indication of a main power
the low points in cell Nos. 2 and 5, and when either is supply malfunction is provided by a L GEN and R GEN
uncovered (approximately 1,700 to 2,000 pounds per side) caution light. The IDG oil system is used for cooling as well
the following operations are electrically performed: as lubricating the IDG. The oil is normally cooled by the IDG
air/oil cooler and returned to the constant speed drive (CSD)
1. Sump tank interconnect valve is opened. for recirculation. When AB is used, additional cooling is
provided by the AB fuel/oil cooler before returning to the
2. Motive flow isolation valve is opened.
IDG. Should an excessive amount of heat be developed in an
3. Box−beam vent valves are opened. IDG, a thermal (390_ F) actuated device automatically
decouples the input shaft from the remainder of the CSD,
4. Engine crossfeed valve is opened. protecting both the CSD and generator. There are no provi
sions for recoupling the IDG unit in flight.
5. WING/EXT TRANS switch is energized to move
from OFF to AUTO. This signal is maintained for
5 seconds.
6. Defuel transfer selector valves are opened.
Failure of the weight−on−wheels circuit to the in−

flight mode while on the deck will cause the loss
of ECS engine compartment air ejector pumps,
causing a subsequent IDG disconnect and illumi
Uncovering either thermistor in cell No. 2 or 5 nation of the GEN light.
will move the WING/EXT TRANS switch from
OFF to AUTO but under no circumstances will
it override a wing transfer failure.
2−59 ORIGINAL
1 MASTER GEN NORM Connects the generator to the main buses through the line contactor.
switch OFF/RESET Disconnects generators from the buses. Resets the generator if tripped by
(lock lever) an overvoltage, undervoltage, or fault condition.
TEST The generators are energized but are not connected to the buses. Provides
a means to analyze a system malfunction indicated by a generator caution
light when an attempt to reset a generator is unsuccessful.
2 EMERG NORM Safety guard down. Electrically controlled by a solenoid control valve
generator energized by the left main dc bus. Operation is automatically initiated,
switch connecting to the essential buses, with the loss of the left main dc bus,
regardless of other sources of ac or dc power. Total loss of ac or dc power
will result in the loss of the left main dc bus and, therefore, activation of the
emergency generator.
OFF/RESET Safety guard must be lifted. Disconnects the emergency generator from the
essential buses. Resets the generator if tripped by an undervoltage or
under−frequency condition.
3 L GEN and R GEN caution lights are on the pilot’s caution/advisory light panel. Each light is tied to its
GEN caution respective main ac contactor and is powered by the essential bus no. 2. Illumination of the
lights L GEN or R GEN caution light indicates that the corresponding generator is not supplying
power, due to a fault in the generator, generator control unit, or electrical distribution
system.
4 TRANS/RECT A TRANS/RECT advisory light is on the lower half of the pilot’s caution/advisory indicator
advisory light panel. Illumination of the TRANS/RECT advisory light indicates either a single or dual
transformer−rectifier failure has occurred.
Figure 237.Generator Panel
ORIGINAL 2−60
2.15.1.1.1 Generator Control Units An external power monitor prevents application of external
power that is not within tolerances and disconnects external
Generator output voltage and frequency are individu- power from the buses if undervoltage, overvoltage, under-
ally monitored by GCUs, that prevent application of inter- frequency, overfrequency, or phase−reversal occurs. Power
nally generated power to the aircraft bus system until the can be reapplied to the aircraft by pressing the reset button
generator output is within prescribed operating limits. With adjacent to the receptacle, provided it is within prescribed
the main generator switch in NORM, the applicable genera- limits. External electrical power is automatically inhibited
tor is self−excited, so that during the engine start cycle, it from HUD, MFD, AICS, APX−76, CADC, and CIU without
automatically comes on−line at approximately 50−percent external air−conditioning connected to the aircraft. When the
rpm under normal load conditions. Likewise, during engine left generator comes on the line during start, it automatically
shutdown, the GCU automatically trips the generator off the disconnects external power. Although there is no direct
line as the power output decreases below prescribed limits at cockpit indication of external power being applied after one
approximately 55−percent rpm. generator is operating, the HYD TRANSFER PUMP will not
operate if the external power plug is still in the aircraft
During normal operations, the generator control receptacle.
switches remain in NORM continuously. However, subse-
quent to an engine shutdown, stall, or flameout in flight 2.15.2 Electrical Power Distribution
where the GCU has tripped the generator off−line, the relight
of the engine will not automatically reset the generator unless Electrical power is distributed through a series of
the engine speed decreased below about 30−percent N2 rpm. buses. Under normal operation, the ac generator power dis-
If a transient malfunction or condition causes the generator tribution is split between the left and right main ac buses.
to trip, the generator must be manually reset by cycling the Failure of either main ac generator trips a tie connector to
applicable generator control switch to OFF/RESET then connect both buses to the operative generator. If the bus tie
back to NORM. fails to trip when the generator goes bad, the respective
transformer−rectifier will not be powered and the indication
When normal reset cannot be accomplished, TEST, on of this double failure will be a L GEN or R GEN caution light
the generator control switch, allows the generator to be and a TRANS/RECT advisory light. The left and right main
excited but not connected to the aircraft buses. In test, a CSD, ac buses in turn supply ac power directly to the respective
generator, or GCU failure causes the GEN light to remain transformer−rectifiers, and the left main ac bus also supplies
illuminated. If the light goes out, the problem is in the dis- power to both essential ac buses under normal operation.
tribution system.
External power is distributed through the aircraft elec-
2.15.1.2 Transformer−Rectifiers trical system in the same manner as main generator power.
Like the main ac generators, dc power distribution from the
Two transformer−rectifiers convert internal or external two transformer−rectifiers under normal operations is split
ac power to 28−Vdc power. A single TRANS/RECT advisory between the left and right main dc buses. Failure of either
light on the pilot advisory panel provides failure indication transformer−rectifier trips the respective tie contactor to
for one or both transformer−rectifiers. No flightcrew control connect both main dc buses to the operative transformer−
is exercised over transformer−rectifier operation aside from rectifier. The TRANS/RECT advisory light provides a direct
controlling the ac power supply or circuit breakers for the indication of dc bus tie status. An interruption−free dc bus
power converters. The transformer−rectifiers have a rated interconnects the left and right main dc buses to provide a
output of 100 amperes each. Each unit is capable of assuming continuous source of dc power with failure of either main ac
the complete dc electrical load of the aircraft. Forced air generator and/or transformer−rectifier. The left main dc bus
cooling is provided with engines running to dissipate the heat additionally supplies power to both essential dc buses under
generated by the power converters. normal operations. Power to the DFCS bus is normally
supplied from the interruption−free dc bus; however, with an
2.15.1.3 External Power output failure from both transformer−rectifiers, the DFCS bus
load is automatically transferred to the essential No. 2 bus.
Ground power is applied through a receptacle just aft Loss of main dc power automatically activates the emer-
of the nosegear. The pilot has control over external power gency generator. The emergency generator is electrically
application only through hand signals to the plane captain.
2−61 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
inhibited by a solenoid control valve energized by the left 5 are on the RIO’s left and panels 6 to 9 are on the RIO’s right.
main dc bus. Operation of the generator is automatically The pilot left and right knee panels are designated L and R,
initiated, connecting to the essential buses, with the loss of respectively.
the main dc bus, regardless of other sources of ac or dc power.
Total loss of ac or dc power will consequently result in the The first digit in the three-part locator is the alpha-
loss of the left main dc bus and, therefore, activation of the numeric that identifies the circuit breaker panel. The second
emergency generator. This, in turn, trips power transfer part is a letter that designates the row in which the circuit
relays to change essential ac & dc bus loading from the left breaker will be found. The top row is designated A, the next
main ac and dc buses to the emergency generator, regardless row lower is B, etc. The third part is a number and designates
of main generator output status. the column in which the circuit breaker will be found. The
innermost column of each panel 1, 2, 5, 8, and 9 or aft most
2.15.2.1 Circuit Breakers column on each panel 3, 4, 6, 7 L and R is designated “1,”
the next outboard/forward column is 2, etc. Figure 2-38 is an
Individual circuit protection from an overload condi- alphanumeric listing of circuit breakers.
tion is provided by circuit breakers, which are all located in
the cockpits for accessibility in flight. The appropriate circuit Note
breaker will pop out and isolate a circuit that draws too much
current, thus preventing equipment damage and a possible D Panel No. 1 row A, the column numbering is
fire. different from rows B to J.
D Panel No. 2 rows A to F, the column number-
ing is different from Rows G to I.
2.15.3 Degraded Electrical Operation

Popped circuit breakers should not be reset more
than once nor held depressed unless the associ- 2.15.3.1 Emergency Generator
ated equipment is absolutely required by opera- The emergency generator provides a limited but
tional necessity. A popped circuit breaker indi- independent backup source of ac (5 kVA, 115/200 volts) and
cates an equipment malfunction or an overload dc (50 amperes, 28 volts) power for flight-essential compo-
condition. Repeated resets or forced depressions nents. It is driven by combined hydraulic system pressure.
of popped circuit breakers can result in equip-
ment damage and/or serious electrical fire. With normal combined hydraulic system operation, the
emergency generator powers the essential ac and dc No. 1
Cockpit circuit breaker panels are shown on FO-8 and and No. 2 buses and the DFCS dc bus in the 5 kVA mode.
FO-9. Circuit breakers in the pilot cockpit comprise the Operation of the generator is automatically initiated with the
majority of those required for essential aircraft systems. The loss of dc left main bus even if other dc buses remain ener-
circuit breakers are arranged in rows and are oriented so that gized. Approximately 1 second elapses from the time of auto-
the white banded shaft of a popped breaker is readily visible matic initiation before the generator delivers rated power to
to the flightcrew. Panels, rows, and columns of breakers are flight-essential ac and dc buses. This delay will force the
identified to facilitate breaker location and designation. Plac- DFCS computers into a power-up BIT sequence, requiring a
ards adjacent to the breakers identify individual circuit MASTER RESET to regain SAS and ARI functions.
breakers by affected components; amperage ratings are indi-
cated on top of each circuit breaker.
2.15.2.1.1 Circuit Breaker Location
The alphanumeric system for locating circuit breakers The spoiler actuators are mechanically biased to
in the aircraft is as follows. the retracted position in order to cause the
spoilers to retract in the event that the command
The panels in the RIO cockpit are labeled 1 through 9 signal from the DFCS is lost (i.e., DFCS power
starting left-aft and proceeding clockwise. Thus, panels 1 to failure).
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-62
If this bias is reversed, the affected spoiler will The exact hydraulic pressure at which the emergency
extend instead of retracting when the command generator is unable to power all three buses is dependent on
signal is lost. A DFCS power failure coupled the load placed on the generator and can vary from 2,000 to
with a reverse spoiler bias will result in a fully 1,100 psi indicated. If the emergency generator is required
deployed spoiler. All unaffected spoilers will and there is a hydraulic emergency that could lower com
remain retracted and will not respond to flight bined system operating pressure, the ac essential No. 2 and
control inputs until the DFCS command signals dc essential No. 2 and dc DFCS buses can be powered with
are restored. lower hydraulic pressure securing nonessential equipment in
order to reduce the electrical load and to maintain DFCS
Note
functionality.
D DFCS synchronization can take up to two
seconds following a power interrupt. If the Note
MASTER RESET pushbutton is depressed D When the emergency generator is operating
during the synchronization time, an addi with one main hydraulic system inoperative,
tional depression of the MASTER RESET large hydraulic flow requirements for flight
pushbutton will be required to restore spoiler controls may cause loss of the essential ac and
functionality. dc No. 2 and DFCS buses. To regain these
D Do not press and hold the MASTER RESET buses the emergency generator switch must be
pushbutton. Pressing and holding the cycled through OFF/RESET to NORM after
MASTER RESET pushbutton during the syn the hydraulic pressure recovers. Engine
chronization time will have no effect since the instruments are powered by essential ac bus
DFCS computers only recognize the leading No. 1. Engine instruments will be available or
edge of the pulse from the MASTER RESET restored at lower engine rpm. The airspeed at
pushbutton, and not the fact that the button is which engine instrumentation is restored
continuously depressed. (either automatically or by pilot cycling the
emergency generator switch) could be higher
Pilot control of the emergency generator is through the than the maximum airspeed.
guarded EMERG switch on the MASTER GEN control
panel. The emergency generator is electrically inhibited by D In the event of L and R generator failure, an
a solenoid control valve energized by the left main dc bus. attempt should be made to reduce unneces
sary electrical loads to maintain DFCS SAS
With the switch in NORM, operation of the generator and ARI functionality.
is automatically initiated, connecting to the essential buses,
with the loss of the left main dc bus, regardless of other 2.15.3.1.2 Emergency Generator Test
sources of ac or dc power. Total loss of ac or dc power will
consequently result in the loss of the left main dc bus and An operational check of the emergency generator can
activation of the emergency generator. The OFF/RESET be accomplished anytime the combined system is pressur
switch position provides the pilot with the capability of ized and at least one main generator is on the line by selecting
isolating emergency electrical power from the aircraft buses EMERG GEN on the master test switch and depressing the
(as in the case of an electrical fire) or resetting the generator. switch. This provides 28 Vdc to activate the emergency
generator and checks the tie contactors by connecting
2.15.3.1.1 Emergency Power Distribution electrical power to the essential ac and dc buses. The GO light
on the MASTER TEST panel indicates a satisfactory check.
An emergency generator control unit monitors the A malfunction in the emergency generator operation is
emergency generator output. If it senses that the emergency indicated by the NO GO light.
generator cannot supply power within the proper frequency
and voltage tolerances, the control unit disconnects the Note
essential ac and dc essential No. 2 and the dc DFCS buses
from the emergency generator (1 kVA mode). It is possible During the emergency generator test the essen
that this could happen if the combined hydraulic system is not tial ac No. 2 bus is switched between the left main
operating normally. If combined hydraulic pressure subse and emergency generator. The DFCS computers
quently recovers, the emergency generator switch must be detect this as a loss of ac power and perform a
cycled through OFF/RESET and back to NORM to regain the power−up BIT sequence when the emergency
5 kVA mode, restoring power to the essential No. 2 and DFCS generator test is completed. A MASTER RESET
buses. The DFCS computers will respond with a power up is required to regain SAS and ARI functions.
BIT sequence, requiring a MASTER RESET to regain SAS
and ARI functions.
2−63 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
3F6 26 VAC BUS FDR 8E6 APN-154

3F7 AC ESS BUS NO. 2 FDR PH A 4D6 APX-100 AC
4F1 AC ESS BUS NO. 2 FDR PH B 7F7 APX-100 DC
4F2 AC ESS BUS NO. 2 FDR PH C 7C2 ARC-182 NO. 1
2I4 ACM LT/SEAT ADJ/STEADY POS LT 7C1 ARC-182 NO. 2
3C6 ADF AC 8A5 ARMT GAS/L ENG AFT CONT/RAT IND
8D6 ADF DC 9A4 ASC
RC2 AFCS/NOSE WHEEL STEER 1D2 ASC PH A
LF1 AICS L 1D5 ASC PH B
2I5 AICS L HTR 1D6 ASC PH C
8E2 AICS L LKUP PWR/EMER GEN TST
1F1 ASPJ AUG PH A
7A6 AICS L RAMP STOW
1F3 ASPJ AUG PH B
LG1 AICS R
1F6 ASPJ AUG PH C
2I8 AICS R HTR
1F2 ASPJ BASIC PH A
8E1 AICS R LKUP PWR/ANTI SKID
7A5 AICS R RAMP STOW 1F4 ASPJ BASIC PH B
RD2 AIR SOURCE CONTROL 1F5 ASPJ BASIC PH C
8C2 AIR/ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD 9G5 ASPJ DC
9B6 ALE-47 CHAFF/FLARE DISP 9G6 ASW-27
9B5 ALE-47 SEQ 1 & 2 SQUIBS 1J2 ASW-27 AC
RB1 ALPHA COMP/PEDAL SHAKER LA3 AUTO PITCH DRIVE TRIM
4F4 ALPHA HTR 1J1 AUTO THROT AC
2H1 ALR-67 CMPTR 9B7 AUTO THROT DC
9F5 ALR-67 CONTR 8G3 AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR
2H3 ALR-67 RCVR PH A
2H6 ALR-67 RCVR PH B 7D3 BARO ALT/TURN SLIP
2H9 ALR-67 RCVR PH C 3D4 BDHI INST PWR/JTIDS/DPG
7B6 ALT LOW WARN 8E7 BDHI/JTIDS DPG
9D1 AMC BIT/R DC, TEST 1B3 BEAM PS
7A3 ANGLE OF ATTACK IND DC 8F6 BINGO CAUTION
3F3 ANGLE OF ATTK IND AC 8F2 BLEED AIR/L OIL HOT
4F5 ANL ATTK/TOTAL TEMP HTR 4B4 BLEED DUCT AC
9C2 ANN PNL DIM CONTR 7A4 BOS CONTR/B/U OXY LOW
8C1 ANN PNL PWR 9D5 BRAKE ACCUM SOV
9A6 ANT LOCK EXCIT 7A2 B/U OXY PRESS IND
1C2 ANT SVO HYD PH A
1C4 ANT SVO HYD PH B 8A1 CABIN PRESS
1C6 ANT SVO HYD PH C 8C5 CAN/LAD CAUTION/EJECT CMD IND
8C2 ANTI-ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/ LA2 CHAN 1 CADC PH A
WSHLD/AIR LB2 CHAN 1 CADC PH B
8E1 ANTI SKID/R AICS LKUP PWR LC2 CHAN 1 CADC PH C
2I1 ANTICOLL/SUPP POS/POS LT
LD2 CHAN 2 CADC
RG2 ANTI-ICE/ENG/PROBE
3E7 CIU PH A
6C3 AN/AWW 4 PH A
4E1 CIU PH B
6C2 AN/AWW 4 PH B
4E2 CIU PH C
6C1 AN/AWW 4 PH C
9A2 APG-71 ANT 3B3 COMB HYD PRESS IND
2G3 APG-71 PUMP PH A 9F4 COOLING INTLK/GND PWR
2G6 APG-71 PUMP PH B 8D8 CURSOR CONT/SNSR
2G7 APG-71 PUMP PH C
1I1 APG-71 XMTR AC 7B5 DC ESS NO. 1 FDR
9A3 APG-71 XMTR DC 8A2 DC ESS NO. 2 FDR
Figure 2-38. Circuit Breaker Alphanumeric Index (Sheet 1 of 5)
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-64
7A7 DC L TEST/RUDDER TRIM RF2 FLT CONTR AUTH DC

9D1 DC R TEST/AMC BIT 2A1 FLT HYD BACKUP PH A
9B2 DD ENABLE/RDP 2C1 FLT HYD BACKUP PH B
9I6 DEKI 2E1 FLT HYD BACKUP PH C
8B1 DFCS BUS FDR 3B4 FLT HYD PRESS IND
3F4 DP 1 PH A 3A2 FORM LT/TAXI
4F3 DP 1 PH B RE1 FUEL FEED/DUMP
4F6 DP 1 PH C 8F7 FUEL LOW CAUTION
1G2 DP 2 PH A RD1 FUEL MGT PNL
1G4 DP 2 PH B 8F1 FUEL PRESS ADVSY
1G6 DP 2 PH C RG1 FUEL P/MOTIVE FLOW ISOL V
9G2 DSS 3C3 FUEL QTY IND AC
RE1 DUMP/FUEL FEED 7D1 FUEL QTY IND DC
9E7 DYHR UNIT 8E4 FUEL TRANS ORIDE
8F9 FUEL VENT VALVE
8D4 ECS TEMP CONTR DC
9H3 ELECT COOLING 8F5 GEN L CAUTION
8F4 GEN R CAUTION
7B2 EMER FLT HYD AUTO
9F4 GND PWR/COOLING INTLK
7B1 EMER FLT HYD MAN
8G1 GND ROLL BRAKING/SPOILER POS IND
9I2 EMER GEN CONTR
9D6 GND TEST
8E2 EMER GEN TEST/L AICS LKUP PWR
3E2 GPS
7E3 EMER JETT #1
8E9 GPS ANT AMPL
7E2 EMER JETT #2
6A1 GUN CONTRL PWR AC
RC1 ENG ANTI−ICE VALVES
5D2 GUN PWR NO. 1
7D5 ENG INST NO. 1
5C2 GUN PWR NO. 2
7D4 ENG INST NO. 2
8A5 ENG L AFT CONT/ARMT GAS/RATS IND 1H1 HUD CAMERA PH A
3A3 ENG L BACKUP IGN 1H5 HUD CAMERA PH B
3B1 ENG L OIL PRESS 1H7 HUD CAMERA PH C
8A4 ENG R AFT CONT/EXHAUST NOZZLE 3C1 HUD PH A/MFD 1
3A4 ENG R BACKUP IGN 4C5 HUD PH B/MFD 1
3B2 ENG R OIL PRESS 4C6 HUD PH C/MFD 1
8D1 ENG OIL COOL 1A1 HV PWR SUP PH A
8D3 ENG SEC 1A3 HV PWR SUP PH B
8F10 ENG STALL TONE 1A5 HV PWR SUP PH C
RF1 ENG START 7B3 HYD PRESS IND
RG2 ENG/PROBE/ANTI−ICE 8G11 HYD PUMP SPOILER CONTR
8A4 EXHAUST NOZZLE/R ENG AFT CONT 8E5 HYD VALVE CONTR
8G10 EXT LT CONTR
LE3 ICE DET
9D2 FEMS 7F3 ICS NFO
7C7 FIRE L DET LT 7F2 ICS PILOT
7C5 FIRE L EXT 1J7 IFF A/A AC
7C6 FIRE R DET LT 9F6 IFF A/A DC
7C4 FIRE R EXT 8C7 ILS ARA−63 DC
8G3 FLAP CONTR/AUX FLAP 3E5 ILS ARA−63 PH A
3D6 FLAP IND/TAIL/RUDDER 4E3 ILS ARA−63 PH B
RA2 FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF 4E4 ILS ARA−63 PH C
9B6 FLARE DISP/ALE−39 CHAFF 8G9 INBD SPOILER CONTR
LC1 FLT CONTR AUTH AC 1I7 INS BATT PWR
Figure 2−38. Circuit Breaker Alphanumeric Index (Sheet 2 of 5)
2−65 ORIGINAL
3C7 INS PH A LE2 MACH TRIM AC

4C1 INS PH B RE2 MACH TRIM DC
4C2 INS PH C 1A8 MAIN L XFMR RECT
3E4 INS SYNC 2F4 MAIN R XFMR RECT
3A1 INST LTS LE1 MANUV FLAP/WG SWP DR NO. 2
3F5 INSTR BUS FDR 5A2 MASTER ARM
1I2 INTEG TRIM AC 9H4 MASTER TEST
9F3 INTEG TRIM DC 9G3 MDL
9I5 INTRF BLANKER 9G4 MFA
9I1 INTRPT FREE DC BUS FDR NO. 1 3C1 MFD 1/HUD PH A
9C6 INTRPT FREE DC BUS FDR NO. 2 4C5 MFD 1/HUD PH B
9D4 IRST DC 4C6 MFD 1/HUD PH C
2G2 IRST PH A 1G1 MFD 2/MFD 3 PH A
2G5 IRST PH B 1G3 MFD 2/MFD 3 PH B
2G8 IRST PH C 1G5 MFD 2/MFD 3 PH C
1G1 MFD 3 PH A/MFD 2
1J4 JTIDS BATT HEATER
1J3 JTIDS DPG PH A 1G3 MFD 3 PH B/MFD 2
1J5 JTIDS DPG PH B 1G5 MFD 3 PH C/MFD 2
1J6 JTIDS DPG PH C 8G5 MLG HANDLE RLY NO. 1
8E7 JTIDS DPG/BDHI 8G4 MLG HANDLE RLY NO. 2
3D5 JTIDS RT PH A 7F5 MLG SAFETY RLY NO. 1
4D3 JTIDS RT PH B 7F4 MLG SAFETY RLY NO. 2
4D4 JTIDS RT PH C 9D3 MONITOR BUS CONTR
3D4 JTIDS/DPG/BDHI INST PWR RG1 MOTIVE FLOW ISOL V/FUEL P
7C3 KY−58/Z−AHP 5B2 MPRU DC PWR
6D3 MPRU PH A/SMP
LF1 L AICS 6D2 MPRU PH B/SMP
2I5 L AICS HTR 6D1 MPRU PH C/SMP
8E2 L AICS LKUP PWR/EMER GEN TST 8C8 MSL PWR HUD TEST
7A6 L AICS RAMP STOW 6B3 MSL PWR SUP PH A
7A7 L DC TEST/RUDDER TRIM 6B2 MSL PWR SUP PH B
8A5 L ENG AFT CONT/ARMT GAS/RATS IND 6B1 MSL PWR SUP PH C
3A3 L ENG BACKUP IGN 3C5 MSN CMPTR NO. 2 PH A
3B1 L ENG OIL PRESS 4C3 MSN CMPTR NO. 2 PH B
7C7 L FIRE DET LT 4C4 MSN CMPTR NO. 2 PH C
7C5 L FIRE EXT 1D1 MSN CMPTR NO. 1 PH A
8F5 L GEN CAUTION 1D3 MSN CMPTR NO. 1 PH B
1A8 L MAIN XFMR RECT 1D7 MSN CMPTR NO. 1 PH C
8F2 L OIL HOT/BLEED AIR
3B7 L PH A TEST/P−ROLL TRIM 8A3 NLG STRUT LCH BAR ADVSY
4B1 L PH B TEST/P−ROLL TRIM RC2 NOSE WHEEL STEER/AFCS
4B2 L PH C TEST/P−ROLL TRIM 2I2 NFO CONSOLE LT
4E5 L PITOT STATIC HTR
8C5 LAD CAUTION/EJECT CMD IND/CAN 3C4 OBOGS CONC
9E1 LANTIRN POD CONT/RECON ECS 7A1 OBOGS CONTR
9E2 LANTIRN POD PWR/RECON CONTR 8F2 OIL L HOT/BLEED AIR
2C3 LANTIRN PWR/RECON HTR 3 PH 8D2 OIL R HOT
2H10 LIQUID COOLING CONTR AC 9C5 OUTBD SPOILER CONTR
9B4 LIQUID COOLING CONTR DC 2B3 OUTBD SPOILER PUMP
ORIGINAL 2−66
2H5 OXY CONC HTR 9B1 RDP

8F6 OXY/BINGO CAUTION 1E4 RDP PH A
1E5 RDP PH B
3B7 P−ROLL TRIM/L PH A TEST 1E6 RDP PH C
4B1 P−ROLL TRIM/L PH B TEST 9B2 RDP/DD ENABLE
4B2 P−ROLL TRIM/L PH C TEST 2G4 RECON ECS CONT AC
4A6 PANEL FLOOD LTS 9E1 RECON ECS/LANTIRN POD CONT
RB1 PEDAL SHAKER/ALPHA COMP 9E2 RECON CONTR/LANTIRN POD PWR
3B7 PH A L TEST/P−ROLL TRIM 2C3 RECON HTR/LANTIRN PWR 3 PH
4B1 PH B L TEST/P−ROLL TRIM 1E2 RECON POD
4B2 PH C L TEST/P−ROLL TRIM 9E4 RECON POD DC PWR NO. 1
2H2 PH A R TEST 9E3 RECON POD DC PWR NO. 2
2H4 PH B R TEST 1A8 RECT/L MAIN XFMR
2H8 PH C R TEST 5H1 REL PWR/STA 1 TYPE I DCDR
4A5 PILOT CONSOLE LTS 5G1 REL PWR/STA 1 TYPE II DCDR
4A3 PILOT LCD INST LTS 5F1 REL PWR/STA 3 DCDR
LB1 PITCH A AC 5E1 REL PWR/STA 4 DCDR
8B7 PITCH A DC 5D1 REL PWR/STA 5 DCDR
LH1 PITCH B AC 5C1 REL PWR/STA 6 DCDR
8B3 PITCH B DC 5B1 REL PWR/STA 8 TYPE I DCDR
4E5 PITOT STATIC HTR L 5A1 REL PWR/STA 8 TYPE II DCDR
4E6 PITOT STATIC HTR R LB3 ROLL A/YAW M
8F3 PLT ANN PNL AUX PWR/TR ADVSY 8B4 ROLL A DC
2I1 POSLT/ANTICOLL/SUPP POS LA1 ROLL B AC
4A4 PROBE LT 8B2 ROLL B DC
RG2 PROBE/ANTI−ICE/ENG 9A7 RSP
1B2 RSP PH A
LG1 R AICS 1B5 RSP PH B
2I8 R AICS HTR 1B8 RSP PH C
8E1 R AICS LKUP PWR/ANTI SKID 3D7 RUDDER TRIM PH A
7A5 R AICS RAMP STOW 4D1 RUDDER TRIM PH B
8A5 RAT IND/L ENG AFT CONT/ARMT GAS 4D2 RUDDER TRIM PH C
9D1 R DC TEST/AMC BIT 7A7 RUDDER TRIM/L DC TEST
8A4 R ENG AFT CONT/EXHAUST NOZZLE 3D6 RUDDER/TAIL/FLAP IND
3A4 R ENG BACKUP IGN
3B2 R ENG OIL PRESS 9I3 SAHRS DC
7C6 R FIRE DET LT 1I3 SAHRS A
7C4 R FIRE EXT 1I5 SAHRS B
8F4 R GEN CAUTION 1I6 SAHRS C
2E4 R MAIN XFMR RECT 2I4 SEAT ADJ/STDY POS LT
8D2 R OIL HOT RA2 SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF/FLAP
2H2 R PH A TEST 7E5 SMP ESS
2H4 R PH B TEST 6D3 SMP/MPRU PH A
2H8 R PH C TEST 6D2 SMP/MPRU PH B
4E6 R PITOT STATIC HTR 6D1 SMP/MPRU PH C
4B3 RADAR ALTM 8D8 SNSR/CURSOR CONT
1C3 RADAR DD PH A 1B1 SOL PWR SUP PH A
1C5 RADAR DD PH B 1B4 SOL PWR SUP PH B
1C7 RADAR DD PH C 1B7 SOL PWR SUP PH C
2−67 ORIGINAL
RB2 SPD BK P−ROLL TRIM ENABLE 6F6 STA 8B PWR PH A

8G1 SPOILER POS IND/GND ROLL BRAKING 6F5 STA 8B PWR PH B
5D3 STA 1 AIM−9 COOL 6F4 STA 8B PWR PH C
2I10 STA 1 BOL PWR 8F8 STARTER VALVE LT
5I3 STA 1 IFOL 3A7 STBY ATTD IND PH A
5H1 STA 1 TYPE I DCDR/REL PWR 4A1 STBY ATTD IND PH B
5G1 STA 1 TYPE II DCDR/REL PWR 4A2 STBY ATTD IND PH C
6A3 STA 1A AIM−9 PWR AC 2I1 SUPP POS/ANTICOLL/POS LT
5B3 STA 1A AIM−9 PWR DC 2I6 STORM FLOOD LTS
5J2 STA 1B NO. 1/2 DC
6A6 STA 1B PWR PH A 3D6 TAIL/RUDDER/FLAP IND
6A5 STA 1B PWR PH B 3A2 TAXI/FORM LT
6A4 STA 1B PWR PH C 1H2 TCS PH A
5F1 STA 3 DCDR/REL PWR 1H3 TCS PH B
5I2 STA 3 NO. 1/2 DC 1H6 TCS PH C
6B6 STA 3 PWR PH A 9C3 TCS SEL
6B5 STA 3 PWR PH B 4B5 TEMP CONT AC
6B4 STA 3 PWR PH C 4F5 TOTAL TEMP HTR/ANL ATTK
5H3 STA 3/6 IFOL 8F3 TR ADVSY/PLT ANN PNL AUX PWR
5E1 STA 4 DCDR/REL PWR 7D3 TURN SLIP/BARO ALT
5H2 STA 4 NO. 1/2 DC
7F6 UHF CONTR/VHF
6C6 STA 4 PWR PH A
3A6 UTILITY LTS
6C5 STA 4 PWR PH B
6C4 STA 4 PWR PH C
7F6 VHF/UHF CONTR
5G3 STA 4/5 IFOL
5D1 STA 5 DCDR/REL PWR LE1 WG SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV FLAP
5G2 STA 5 NO. 1/2 DC 7D6 WHEELS POS IND
6D6 STA 5 PWR PH A 3F2 WING POS IND AC
6D5 STA 5 PWR PH B 7D2 WING POS IND DC
6D4 STA 5 PWR PH C LD1 WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1
5C1 STA 6 DCDR/REL PWR 8C3 WSHLD DEFOG CONTR
5F2 STA 6 NO. 1/2 DC 8C2 WSHLDAIR/ANTI ICE CONTR/
6E6 STA 6 PWR PH A HOOK CONT
6E5 STA 6 PWR PH B
6E4 STA 6 PWR PH C 8B6 YAW A DC
5C3 STA 8 AIM−9 COOL 8B5 YAW B DC
2I9 STA 8 BOL PWR LD3 YAW A AC
5F3 STA 8 IFOL LC3 YAW B AC
5B1 STA 8 TYPE 1 DCDR/REL PWR LB3 YAW M/ROLL A
5A1 STA 8 TYPE II DCDR/REL PWR
6F3 STA 8A AIM−9 PWR AC 3F6 26 VAC BUS FDR
5A3 STA 8A AIM−9 PWR DC
5E2 STA 8B NO. 1/2 DC
ORIGINAL 2−68
2.16 HYDRAULIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS transfer pump. This unit consists of two hydraulic pumps, one
in each of the main hydraulic systems, interconnected by a
The aircraft employs two main, independent, engine− common mechanical shaft. Thus, a pressure deficiency in
powered hydraulic systems, supplemented by two electro one system is automatically augmented using pressure in the
hydraulic power modules, a bi−directional transfer unit, and other system as the motive power. The result is bi−directional
a cockpit handpump. The systems are pressurized to 3,000 psi transfer of energy without an interchange of system fluid.
and use MIL−H−83282 hydraulic fluid circulated through The efficiency of the pump is such that a 3,000 psi system on
stainless steel and titanium lines. Hydraulic fluid is cooled by one side will pressurize the other system to approximately
heat exchangers that use ejector air on deck. Hydraulic power 2,400 to 2,600 psi.
system controls and indicators are shown in Figure 239. The
components serviced by each hydraulic power system are To prevent damage to the hydraulic transfer pump with
shown in FO−10. the loss of system fluid on one side and to conserve hydraulic
power in the remaining good system, the pump is automati
2.16.1 Flight and Combined Systems cally secured when pressure less than 500 psi is detected on
either side of the pump for 10 seconds. In addition, the pilot
2.16.1.1 Engine−Driven Pumps can manually shut off the hydraulic transfer pump by lifting
the guarded HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch, located aft on
The flight and the combined systems are each pressur the right outboard console.
ized by engine−driven pumps. The flight hydraulic system
pump is driven by the right engine and the combined hydrau
lic system pump by the left engine. Each of the main systems
is normally pressurized to 3,000 $ 100 psi at any time the
respective engine is operating.
If pressure in either system remains below 500
2.16.1.2 Hydraulic Pressure Light psi for 5 seconds, immediately lift the guard and
select SHUTOFF with the HYD TRANSFER
A HYD PRESS caution light illuminates when the dis PUMP switch. Failure of the hydraulic transfer
charge pressure from either engine−driven hydraulic pump pump to automatically shut off after 10 seconds
falls below 2,100 psi; thereafter, the light goes out when below 500 psi may cause the driving system to
pressure in both systems via the engine−driven pumps cavitate and overheat.
exceeds 2,400 psi. If the HYD PRESS caution light has been
illuminated by low pressure in one main system, pressure With ground electrical power connected to the aircraft,
failure in the other system will not cause the MASTER the hydraulic transfer pump is deactivated and can only be
CAUTION light to illuminate again. The COMB and FLT energized by a switch on the ground check panel. Normally,
gauges on the hydraulic pressure indicator reflect system with both engines running, the hydraulic transfer pump is off.
pressure provided by either the engine−driven pumps or the However, with less than 2,100 psi hydraulic pump discharge
hydraulic transfer pump. With both systems normally pres pressure from either system, the pump will automatically
surized to 3,000 psi, the gauge needles form a horizontal line. come on and supply hydraulic power to the faulty system. In
addition, the HYD PRESS caution light will also illuminate.
Note The pilot has no direct control over the direction of pump
flow, the system automatically shifts in the direction that
High−rate lateral movements may illuminate the supplemental power is required. Because of the location of
HYD PRESS light when engines are at idle the flight and combined system pressure switches, the pres
power. surization contribution of the hydraulic transfer pump is
reflected on the hydraulic pressure indicator but the HYD
2.16.1.3 Hydraulic Transfer Pump PRESS caution light will remain illuminated. Operation on
(Bi−Directional Pump) the hydraulic transfer pump may produce slight pressure
fluctuations. If the failed system discharge pressure is
To assure the continuance of main system hydraulic restored to normal operating pressure (>2,400 psi) by the
pressure with an engine or engine−driven pump inoperative, engine−driven pump, this HYD PRESS light will go out and
a second source of pressure is provided by the hydraulic the hydraulic transfer pump will shut off.
2−69 ORIGINAL
Figure 239.Hydraulic System Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−70
1 HYD PRESS indicator COMB and FLT Indicates pump discharge pressure on each engine,
normally 3,000 psi, or hydraulic transfer pressure
approximately 2,400 psi.
SPOIL When the outboard spoiler hydraulic module is pressurized
(1,950 to 2,050 psi) the ON flag appears. If pressure drops
below 1,900 to 1,800 psi, the OFF flag appears.
EMER FLT When pressure from the backup flight control hydraulic
module reaches 500 $ 50 psi the ON flag appears.
Pressure below 350 $ 50 psi: the OFF flag appears.
2 HYD ISOL switch FLT Combined system hydraulic pressure is shutoff to landing
gear, nosewheel steering, antiskid, and wheel brakes.
T.O./LDG Hydraulic pressure is available to all combined system
components.
3 BRAKE PRESSURE AUX Green segment indicates hydraulic pressure (2,150 $ 50
gage to 3,000 psi) in the auxiliary brake accumulator; auxiliary
braking may be applied by rudder toe pedals (approximately
13 to 14 applications available). Red segment indicates
1,900 to 2,150 psi (approximately 5 applications available).
PARK Green segment indicates hydraulic pressure (2,150 $ 50
to 3,000 psi) in the parking brake accumulator. The
parking/emergency brake handle must be pulled to apply
emergency braking (approximately 3 applications available).
Red segment indicates 1,900 to 2,150 psi.
4 HYD PRESS caution Illuminates when hydraulic pressure from either engine−driven pump is below
light 2,100 psi. It will go out with pressure in both systems at 2,400 psi or above, if
pressure is provided by engine−driven pumps.
5 HYD TRANSFER SHUTOFF Guard must be lifted. Shuts off hydraulic transfer pump.
PUMP switch The pump should be secured when hydraulic pressure
drops below 500 psi and does not rise again within
5 seconds.
NORMAL Safety guard down. Pressure loss below 2,100 psi in one
(Guarded) hydraulic system activates hydraulic transfer pump to
supply pressure from the other system.
6 EMERG FLT HYD HIGH Guard must be lifted. Activates the power module
switch (high speed mode) bypassing flight and combined
2,100−psi switches.
LOW Guard must be lifted. Activates the backup power module
(low−speed mode) bypassing flight and combined
2,100−psi switches.
AUTO (LOW) Safety guard down. The backup flight control system is
automatically activated (low−speed mode) when pressure
in both the flight and combined systems is less than
2,100 psi.
Figure 2−39. Hydraulic System Controls and Indication (Sheet 2 of 2)
2−71 ORIGINAL
2.16.1.4 Cockpit Handpump Major components in the combined and flight hydrau
lic power supply systems are shown on FO−10. Each system
A manually operated pump handle is provided as a has a piston−type reservoir and filter module in the sponson
supplementary source of power for ground operations with aft of the main landing gear strut on the respective side
engines shut down and as a backup for the loss of combined (combined−left; flight−right). Protrusion of mechanical pins
system pressure to operate the in−flight refueling probe or on each filter module indicates a clogged filter.
charge the brake accumulator. It is an extendable handle in
the pilot cockpit between the left console and ejection seat. 2.16.2.1 Hydraulic Priority Valves
Forward and aft stroking of the handpump operates a double−
acting wobble pump. The pump, which draws fluid from the The combined and flight hydraulic systems each incor
combined system return line, recharges wheelbrake accumu porate two priority valves (1,800 psi and 2,400 psi) shown on
lator pressure when the landing gear handle is down. With the FO−10. Hydraulic fluid will not pass through the one−way
gear handle up, it also serves as a backup means of extending priority valves unless the input pressure exceeds the cracking
or retracting the in−flight refueling probe by placing threshold of the valve. Basically, the 2,400 psi priority valves
the REFUEL PROBE switch in the desired position (EXT give priority of the individual engine−driven pump discharge
or RET). pressure to the primary flight controls (horizontal tails,
rudders, inboard spoilers) and stability augmentation actua
The handpump is the only means of pressurizing the tors. Conversely, the 1,800 psi priority valves give priority to
radome fold actuator, an operation that must be manually the remaining systems on the other side (inlet ramps, wing
selected and the radome unlocked on deck from the nose sweep, etc.) with pressure supplied by the hydraulic transfer
wheelwell. The recommended rate of operation is approxi pump. Under such circumstances, the pilot should be aware
mately 12 cycles per minute (a cycle is a complete forward of the hydraulic energy available and demands of the various
and aft movement of the pump handle). system components. Large and abrupt control commands can
rapidly consume total energy with the engine(s) at IDLE
2.16.2 Hydraulic Power Distribution speed. For example, during a single−engine landing rollout,
if excessive horizontal tail movements are commanded, the
The distribution of hydraulic power in the flight and nosewheel steering and wheelbrake operation could be
combined systems is shown on FO−10. Except for the left temporarily lost.
empennage control surfaces, the flight system services only
those components on the right side of the aircraft and does not 2.16.2.2 Normal Hydraulic Isolation
penetrate into the wings. The combined system distribution
is more extensive throughout the aircraft, yet its services are The combined system incorporates isolation circuits to
predominantly concentrated to the left side and extend to the limit distribution to flight essential components. With the
inboard sections of the movable wing panels and to the LDG GEAR handle UP, normal isolation may be selected by
landing gear. Although the flight and combined systems are the pilot to prevent loss of hydraulic fluid in the event of
completely independent of each other, in certain components material failure or combat damage to the isolated systems.
both pressure sources are used without an interchange of Normal isolation electrically shuts off hydraulic pressure to
fluid. Both systems operate in parallel to supply power for wheelbrakes, antiskid, landing gear and nosewheel steering.
operation of the primary flight control surfaces (except It is activated by placement of the HYD ISOL switch to FLT
spoilers) and stability augmentation actuators; if one system on the landing gear panel. Placement of the gear handle to DN
fails, the other can continue to supply pressure for operation mechanically cams the HYD ISOL switch to T.O./LDG or the
(with reduced power capability of such components). If pilot can manually select it before lowering the landing gear.
either or both main hydraulic systems should fail, backup Such action returns all combined−system components to nor
sources provide the capability for safe return flight and mal operation.
landing.
ORIGINAL 2−72
2.16.3 Outboard Spoiler System 2.16.4 Backup Flight Control System
The outboard spoilers are powered by a separate The backup flight control system consists of a two−
closed−loop system, independent of the main hydraulic sys speed electrohydraulic power module known as the backup
tems (see Figure 240). An electrohydraulic power module flight control module. The BFCM provides fluid energy to
supplies hydraulic pressure for outboard spoiler deflection operate the horizontal tails and rudders at a reduced rate
and provides a backup power source for the main flaps and (see Figure 241). Emergency power provides sufficient
slats. Outboard spoiler operation is electrically inhibited at pitch, roll, and yaw control for return flight and landing with
wing−sweep angles greater than 62_ and the power module both main hydraulic power systems inoperative.
is deactivated at wing−sweep angles greater than 65.
Return flow from the combined side of the rudder and
A thermal cutout circuit secures the system in the event stabilizer actuators is first used to ensure the BFCM reservoir
of overheating. Normal operation is automatically restored is filled. When filled, a reservoir bypass valve opens, which
when fluid temperature falls below the prescribed limit. The allows return flow to the combined system. A priority valve
thermal cutout circuit is disabled with the gear handle down connects the BFCM return to the aircraft’s combined sys−
and weight off wheels to prevent overtemperature shutdowns tem return. When the combined system pressure falls below
during takeoff or landing. To avoid overheating due to pro 300 psi, the priority valve closes, isolating the BFCM return
longed ground operations, the outboard power module is from the combined system return. When the combined pres
deactivated with the flap handle up when on internal electri sure exceeds 500 psi, the priority valve opens allowing the
cal power with weight on wheels. Electrical power for the backup system return to flow into the combined system
outboard spoiler system motor is supplied from the right main return. A check valve isolates backup system pressure from
ac bus. The module can be activated using external ac electri the combined system when the BFCM is energized.
cal power. With the module pressurized, the ON flag appears
in the SPOIL window at the bottom of the hydraulic pressure 2.16.4.1 Backup Flight Control Operation
indicator; otherwise, an OFF indication is displayed in the
window. The BFCM may be operated in two modes: emergency
and ground test. In the emergency mode, the BFCM is con
trolled by the EMERG FLT HYD switch, on the MASTER
Reservoir servicing level is shown by an indicator rod
protruding from the integral power package. A fluid tempera TEST panel. The switch has three positions:(AUTO) LOW,
LOW, and HIGH mode. Electric power to the motor is sup
ture gauge that registers current and retained peak system
plied by the right main ac electrical bus through the FLT
temperatures is on the power module. Protrusion of a red−
HYD BACKUP PH A (2A1), PH B (2C1), and PH C (2E1)
tipped pin on the integrated filter package is an indication of
a clogged filter. circuit breakers located on right main ac circuit breaker panel
(No. 2) in the rear cockpit. Loss of both engine−driven electri
cal generators eliminates in−flight use of the BFCM.
2.16.3.1 Flap and Slat Backup Operation
Although normal operation of the main flap and slat

segments is powered by a combined system motor on the flap
and slat gearbox, an auxiliary motor powered by the outboard
spoiler system is geared to the same shaft to provide for Never use the three−phase circuit breakers (PH A,
emergency operation (retraction and extension) of the main PH B, and PH C) to start or shut off the BFCM as
flaps and slats at a reduced rate. Failure of combined system damage to the motor may result. These circuits
pressure activates the auxiliary motor to drive the flap and must be engaged prior to any system test.
slat gearbox when selected by the normal flap handle or
maneuvering flap thumbwheel. Automatic control of the BFCM is provided by the
closing of both flight and combined hydraulic system pres
sure switches. Since the switches are set at 2,100 psi, both
flight and combined hydraulic system pressures must drop
below 2,100 psi before the BFCM is turned on in the
2−73 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-40. Outboard Spoiler System
ORIGINAL 2-74
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-41. Backup Flight Control System
2-75 ORIGINAL
automatic low mode. Once in this automatic mode of Ground checks of the BFCM are performed by the pilot
operation, the BFCM cannot be turned off unless either or using the EMER FLT HYD switch. Before performing
both flight and combined systems are pressurized above ground checks, the combined and brake system accumulators
2,400 psi. The EMERG FLT HYD switch is used to select the must be charged. The BFCM has a small volume capacity,
low or high mode. Either of these positions overrides the 1,000 cc (@ 1 qt.) when full, but will decrease in volume
circuitry of the automatic low mode and the BFCM will to 500 cc (@ ½ qt.) when the aircraft is not in use.
remain on even if either or both system pressures become Below 500 cc (@ ½ qt.), cavitation of the pump and overheat
pressurized above 2,400 psi. When the BFCM pump reaches ing of the motor may occur. If the accumulators are not
500 psi, the ON flag appears in the selected window at the charged prior to starting the BFCM, depletion of the reservoir
bottom of the hydraulic pressure indicator. hydraulic fluid will occur. If this occurs too frequently, sys
tem damage and failure may result. Both hydraulic system
In the low−speed mode, the system can operate indefi pressures should indicate zero in order to fully test indepen
nitely and should be used for maximum range and endurance. dent operation of the BFCM.
Emergency power (high mode) provides a maximum
unloaded horizontal tail deflection rate approximately one
fourth of that available from a full powered hydraulic system
(10_ per second vice 36_ per second). The maximum deflec
tion rate available will decrease as airloads increase.
D A 180_F thermal cutoff switch is bypassed
when the BFCM is selected on with the
EMERG FLT HYD switch. Prolonged ground
operation in the emergency mode will result
in BFCM burnout.
When operated in conjunction with zero com D Since flight control demands can exceed
bined system pressure, some BFCM hydraulic BFCM capability, all surface demands must
fluid will be forced out by thermal expansion. be performed slowly and cautiously in order
The BFCM will remain fully serviced and will not to exceed the output rate of the system.
operate normally as long as the elevated temper Excessive system demands will cause the
atures are maintained. Once operating, the pump to cavitate and the motor to overheat.
BFCM should not be turned off in flight without Checks should be made slowly enough to
combined system pressure available to reservice ensure continuous on indication in the
it. Doing so would result in fluid contraction and hydraulic pressure indicator.
an underserviced condition that could prevent
subsequent pump operation. 2.16.4.2.1 Ground Test Mode
The ground test mode of operation is controlled by the

AUX HYD CONT switch on the ground test panel in the rear
cockpit. In this mode, the BFCM operates in the high mode
only. Ground test from the rear cockpit is electrically inhib
D If either the flight or the combined hydraulic ited when the aircraft is on internal electrical power.
system pressure drops below 2,100 psi with
out illuminating the HYD PRESS caution
light, the automatic low mode of the backup
flight control system may be inoperative.
D Prolonged use (approximately 8 minutes
cumulative time) of the BFCM in the high The ground test mode incorporates a solenoid
mode may result in a failure of the BFCM. valve that allows the BFCM to pressurize the
entire combined hydraulic system. If the com
2.16.4.2 Ground Operations bined and brake accumulators are not fully
charged (brake pressure indicator at top of
For ground inspection purposes, protrusion of a red− green), or if the combined system is not fully
tipped button on either the inlet or outlet filter cases is a serviced, the reservoir will be depleted and the
positive indication of a dirty filter. Both such indications may motor will cavitate and overheat. This could
be observed through an access door on the underside of the result in motor failure prior to activation of the
aft fuselage. thermal cutoff switch.
ORIGINAL 2−76
2.17 PNEUMATIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS side of the nose wheelwell. Expenditure of bottle pressure
is controlled by a twist−pull operation of the landing
The pneumatic power supply systems consist of three gear handle. Minimum bottle pressure for accomplishing
independent, stored pneumatic pressure sources for normal emergency extension of the gear to the down−and−locked
and auxiliary operation of the canopy and for emergency condition is 1,800 psi. Normal preflight bottle pressure is
extension of the landing gear. The high−pressure bottles for 3,000 psi at 70_ F.
normal canopy operation and emergency landing gear exten
sion are ground−charged through a common filter connection Note
in the nose wheelwell to 3,000 psi at 70_ F ambient tempera D Emergency extension of the landing gear shall
ture. Individual bottle pressure is registered on separate be logged in the Maintenance Action Form
gauges on the right side of the nose wheelwell. An auxiliary (OPNAV Form 3760−2).
canopy−open N2 bottle, filter valve, and gauge is on the
turtleback behind the cockpit to allow opening the canopy D Once the landing gear is extended by emer
from the cockpit or ground. Charges may be compressed air; gency means, it cannot be retracted while
however, pressurized dry nitrogen is preferred because of its airborne and must be reset by maintenance
low moisture content and inert properties. personnel.
D Use of emergency gear extension results in
2.17.1 Normal Canopy Control loss of nosewheel steering.
The bottle that supplies a pressurized charge for normal 2.18 MISSION COMPUTER SYSTEM
operation of the canopy is on the right side of the forward
fuselage, inboard of the air refuel probe cavity. Expenditure The MCS consists of two AN/AYK−14 digital com
of bottle pressure for normal operation of the canopy is puter (MC1 and MC2) and the dual redundant MIL−
controlled by three (pilot, RIO, and ground) canopy control STD−1553B buses. The MCS is operated at 16 MHz clock
handles. A fully charged bottle provides approximately 10 speed to perform 1 million instructions per second using up
complete cycles (open and close) of the canopy before to 1 megabyte of memory. The 1553B bus system in the
reaching the minimum operating pressure of 225 psi. F−14D uses time division multiplexing (TDM) with informa
tion coded into 20−bit words.
2.17.2 Auxiliary Canopy Open Control
Communication protocol is established by a command
The auxiliary canopy air bottle supplies a pneumatic response system in which all bus transmissions occur under
charge to translate the canopy aft so that the counter−poise command of a bus controller or, in case of failure of primary
action of the canopy actuator facilitates opening. It is on the bus controller, a backup bus controller. Each bus is capable
turtleback behind the canopy hinge line. of addressing up to 31 remote terminals; however, address 31
is not used in the aircraft. Figure 242 depicts the physical
Activation of the auxiliary mode can be effected from connection of the WRAs in the MCS data bus system.
either of the three (pilot, RIO, or ground) canopy control Remote terminals incapable of communicating directly with
handles. After activation of the auxiliary open mode, the the MCS on the 1553 data buses are routed through the
control system will not return to the normal mode of opera converter interface unit for required analog−to−digital and
tion (canopy will lower but will not translate forward) until digital−to−analog conversion.
the auxiliary selector valve on the aft canopy deck is manu
ally reset (lever in vertical position). Servicing of the auxil 2.18.1 Aircrew Interface
iary canopy air bottle is through the small access panel imme
diately behind the canopy on the turtleback. The reservoir is The principle aircrew interface with the MCS is
normally serviced to 3,000 psi at 70_ F ambient temperature. accomplished through the pushbuttons on each MFD. The
A fully charged bottle provides more than 20 operations RIO has an additional interface through the DEU communi
in the auxiliary open mode. Minimum preflight pressure is cating directly with the MCS as a remote terminal. The RIO
800 psi. can also interface indirectly with the MCS through the radar
system digital display.
2.17.3 Emergency Gear Extension
The bottle that supplies the pneumatic force for a

single emergency extension of the landing gear is on the right
2−77 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-42. Mission Computer System Architecture (Sheet 1 of 2)
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-78
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-42. Mission Computer System Architecture (Sheet 2 of 2)
2-78a (Reverse
2-78a Blank) CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
2.18.2 Operational States 2.19 STANDARD CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER
The MCS has three operational states: startup, full up, Note
and backup. These states are mutually exclusive and are
determined automatically based on aircraft operation and The acronyms SCADC and CADC are used
MC1/MC2 condition. interchangeably throughout this manual.
The SYS RESET button on the NAV MODE panel The SCADC CPU−175/A is installed in F−14D aircraft
forces both mission computers to transition to the startup incorporating AFC 793. The SCADC is functionally inter
state and execute cold start logic. It can be used to assure the changeable with the CADC 1166B/A with one difference,
aircrew that the MCS is functioning properly and/or to the SCADC software incorporates the static−error source−
reinitialize the MCS by restarting the OFP. When SYS correction curve required for the true values of Mach
RESET is pressed, the following events occur: number,airspeed, and altitude. In aircraft prior to AFC 793
(CADC 1166B/A), aircrew should refer to performance
1. The MCS immediately stops executing the OFP. charts, NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1 for HUD−displayed alti
tude and Mach number correction curves.
2. The mission computers go off line and run software
BIT. Note
3. The OFP is automatically restarted. The standby airspeed indicator is not corrected
for position error.
4. The aircraft goes into the TLN master mode.
The SCADC is a single−processor digital computer
5. Displays revert to defaults. with a separate, independent, analog, backup wing−sweep
channel. It is capable of making yes and no decisions, solving
Recycling power (by cycling circuit breakers) to the mathematical problems, and converting outputs to either dig
MCS has the same effect as pressing the SYS RESET except ital or analog form as required by each aircraft system. The
that both hardware and software BIT is performed. SCADC gathers, stores, and processes pitot pressure, static
pressure, total temperature and AOA data from the aircraft
Note airstream sensors (see Figure 243). It performs wing−sweep
and flap and slat schedule computations, limit control and
Cycling subsystem circuit breakers initiates a electrical interlocks, failure detection, and systems test logic.
cold start for that subsystem. A system reset may Major systems that depend on all or part of these CADC
be required to resynchronize the MCS and the functions are shown in Figure 244.
restarted subsystem.
The following legends appear on the MFD when acti
Refer to the Supplemental NATOPS, NAVAIR vated by the CADC:
01−F14AAD−1A for a complete description of the MCS
architecture, operational states, and backup operation. 1. RDC SPD (warning legend)  (REDUCE SPEED)
 Indicates flaps down above 225 knots; maximum
2.18.3 Aircraft Master Modes safe Mach exceeded (2.4 Mach/total temperature
above 388_ F).
There are three aircraft master modes of operation:
takeoff−landing−navigation (TLN), air−to−air (A/A), and air− 2. W/S (caution legend)  (WING SWEEP) 
to−ground (A/G). The controls, displays, and avionics equip Indicates dual wing−sweep channel failure or wing−
ment are tailored as a function of the master mode selected sweep detent disengaged.
by the pilot. The TLN master mode is entered automatically
when power is applied to the aircraft, when the landing gear 2.19.1 Standard Central Air Data Computer Tests
is down, or when the TLN master mode pushbutton is
selected on the PDCP. The A/A master mode is entered by 2.19.1.1 Built−In Test
pressing the A/A master mode pushbutton on the PDCP,
selecting an air−to−air weapon with the weapon select switch BIT capabilities provide continuous monitoring of the
on the pilot control stick, or by commanding a radar dogfight SCADC and its inputs and outputs. The failure indicator
mode. The A/G master mode is entered by pressing the A/G matrix (Figure 245) tabulates the functions that are moni
master mode pushbutton on the PDCP. tored and associated fail indications.
2−79 ORIGINAL
Figure 243.CADC Functional Relationships
Figure 244.CADC Processor
ORIGINAL 2−80
NG LEGEND
LEGEND
N LIGHT
Y LIGHT
N LIGHT
IGHT
INDICATION
MACH TRIM CAUTION LIG

WING SWEEP CAUTION L
REDUCE SPEED WARNIN
RUDDER AUTH CAUTION

WING SWEEP ADVISORY
HZ TAIL AUTH CAUTION

FLAP CAUTION LIGHT
CADC CAUTION LIGHT
REMARKS
FAILURE
CADC − PS/Pt SENSOR COMPARE DIGITAL WING−SWEEP LIMIT BUG MAY BE INACCURATE, MAXIMUM
PROCESSOR F F F F F F F SAFE MACH INDICATOR MAY BE INACCURATE, MANEUVER
FLAPS.
CADC WING−SWEEP COMMAND
(SINGLE FAILURE)
F F
CADC WING−SWEEP COMMAND AUTO WING SWEEP INOPERATIVE
(DUAL FAILURE)
F F F
WING SWEEP (SINGLE FAILURE) F
WING SWEEP (DUAL FAILURE) F F AUTO WING SWEEP INOPERATIVE
CADC MANEUVER FLAP COMMAND F F MANEUVER FLAPS VIA THUMBWHEEL INOPERATIVE
MANEUVER FLAP − COMMAND AND MANEUVER FLAPS VIA THUMBWHEEL INOPERATIVE

SERVO MISCOMPARE
F [
MANEUVER FLAP − HYDRAULIC VALVE
AND/OR ACTUATOR MISCOMPARE
F [
MANEUVER FLAP − HANDLE AND/OR
HYDRAULIC VALVE MISCOMPARE
F
AUXILIARY FLAP AND MANEUVER FLAP

MISCOMPARE
F
AUXILIARY FLAP ASYMMETRY F

CADC RUDDER OR STABILIZER
COMMAND AUTHORITY
F F F
ANGLE−OF−ATTACK SIGNAL ANGLE−OF−ATTACK DISPLAY NOT PRESENT ON HUD DURING

F LANDING MODE
TOTAL TEMPERATURE SIGNAL AUTO PILOT CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATES IF IN ALTITUDE
HOLD. ALTITUDE HOLD WILL BE DISENGAGED. VERTICAL
F SPEED NOT PRESENT ON HUD DURING TAKEOFF AND
LANDING MODE
CADC WING SWEEP INDICATOR OUTPUT F WING SWEEP INDICATOR INACCURATE
ECS FAILURE AND MACH >0.25. CABIN TEMPERATURE MAY RISE AFTER LANDING. COOLING
F AIR ADVISORY LIGHT MAY ILLUMINATE
ECS FAILURE AND MACH >0.4. F
CADC− DIGITAL DATA TO CSDC ALTITUDE AND MACH NOT DISPLAYED ON HUD. ANGLE−OF−
F ATTACK DURING LANDING DISPLAY NOT ON HUD. DURING
TAKE OFF AND LANDING VERTICAL SPEED NOT ON HUD.
ALTITUDE HOLD OUTPUT AUTO PILOT CAUTION LIGHT ILLUMINATES IF IN ALTITUDE
F HOLD. ALTITUDE HOLD WILL BE DISENGAGED
ALTITUDE RATE OUTPUT
MACH TRIM OUTPUT F F
* REDUCE SPEED LEGEND WILL APPEAR IF AIRSPEED >225 KNOTS AND FLAPS ARE DOWN OR MAXIMUM SAFE MACH EXCEEDED
2.4 IMN/TOTAL TEMPERATURE ABOVE 388_ F.
Figure 245.CADC Processor Indicators
2−81 ORIGINAL
2.19.1.2 On−Board Checkout Under normal operating conditions, the wings are
automatically positioned to the optimum sweep angle for
The CADC performs a self−test during OBC only with
maximum maneuvering performance. The pilot can selec
weight on wheels. When OBC is initiated, normal air data
tively position the wings at sweep angles aft of optimum.
inputs are locked out and in their place constants from the
computer memory are received. Self−test detected failures A mechanical backup control system is provided for
may be manually reset by pressing the MASTER RESET emergency and oversweep operations. Details of the wing−
pushbutton. sweep system are shown in FO−11.
Pressing the MASTER RESET pushbutton for 1 second The outboard location of the wing pivot reduces the
resets transient failures in the CADC. Activating the master change in longitudinal stability as a function of wing−sweep
reset circuit recycles the failure detection process in the angle. Two independently powered, hydromechanical screw
CADC. This recycling process puts off the caution and jack actuators, mechanically interconnected for synchro
advisory light(s) and may take as long as 10 seconds to check nization, position the wings in response to pilot or CADC
out the status of the system. If a failure exists, the light(s) will commands. In flight, the wings can be positioned between
illuminate again. If a transient failure existed, the light(s) 20_ and 68_ wing sweep angle. On the deck, the range is
will remain off. extended aft to 75_ (oversweep position) to reduce the span
for spotting. Such authority results in a variation of wing span
The following caution and advisory lights are activated
from approximately 64 to 33 feet.
by the SCADC:
Cavities above the engine nacelles and the midfuselage
1. CADC
accommodate the inboard portions of the wing panels as they
2. FLAP sweep aft. Sealing of the underside is by a wiper seal and
airbag. The bag is pressurized by engine bleed air. Airbag
3. WING SWEEP (advisory)  If the WING SWEEP pressure is released during oversweep to avoid overloading
advisory light does not recycle when MASTER of the flap mechanism. An overwing fairing encloses the wing
RESET pushbutton is depressed, the light is acti cavity and provides a contoured seal along the upper surface
vated by the wing flap controller. of the wing for the normal range of in−flight sweep angles. The
Three independent SCADC fail signals drive the DFCS left and right overwing fairing actuators are pressurized by
failure detection circuits. If these signals exist, the DFCS will the combined and flight hydraulic systems, respectively.
illuminate the following lights:
2.20.1 Wing−Sweep Performance
1. CADC fail signal pitch computer  No Light
Maximum wing−sweep rate (approximately 15_ per
2. CADC fail signal to yaw computer  RUDDER
second) is adequate for most transient flight conditions;
AUTH and HZ TAIL AUTH however, wing−sweep rate can be significantly reduced or
3. CADC fail signal to roll computer  MACH TRIM. stalled by negative−g or large positive−g excursions. Suffi
(FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights will also be cient capability has been provided in the system, consistent
illuminated.) with the sustained performance capabilities of the aircraft.
With a failure of either the combined or flight hydraulic
Note systems, the wings will move at a reduced rate.
If autopilot is engaged the AUTOPILOT light
will illuminate when any of the three fail signals
exist. If ACL is engaged the AUTOPILOT and
ACLS/AP lights will illuminate when any of the
three fail signals exist. Slower than normal wing sweep cycling times
Pressing MASTER RESET pushbutton will also may also be indicative of a failed hydraulic wing
update the wing−sweep and flap commands to their respec sweep motor or an impending failure. With air
tive feedback signals. As a result, there may be movement in craft on the ground and both FLT and COMB
the wings and maneuver flaps when MASTER RESET hydraulic power, the time to sweep the wings
pushbutton is depressed. from 68° to 20° should not exceed 9 seconds.
Note
2.20 WING−SWEEP SYSTEM
D The overwing fairings and flaps are suscepti
The variable geometry of the wing−sweep system
ble to a high frequency (60 cycles per second),
provides the pilot with considerable latitude for controlling
low−amplitude oscillation that can be felt in
wing lift and drag characteristics to optimize aircraft
the cockpit. This overwing fairing and flap
performance over a broad flight spectrum.
ORIGINAL 2−82
buzz is normal and is influenced by the rigging optimum sweep angle for developing maximum maneuver
of the fairings and air in the hydraulic systems. ing performance. In addition to providing an automatic wing
D Overwing fairing and flap buzz is usually positioning function, the programmer also defines the
encountered between 0.9 and 1.4 Mach. forward sweep limit that cannot be penetrated using any of
the other electrical (manual or bomb) modes. The forward
2.20.2 Wing−Sweep Modes sweep limiter prevents electrical mispositioning of the wings
from a wing structure standpoint.
Normal control of the wing−sweep position in AUTO,
AFT, FWD, and BOMB modes is by the four−way wing− Pilot selection of the AUTO mode or automatic transfer
sweep switch on the inboard side of the right throttle grip from the manual mode causes the AUTO flag to appear in the
(Figure 246). As an emergency mode of control, changes in wing−sweep indicator. Once in the AUTO mode, the four−
wing−sweep position can be selected manually with the way wing−sweep switch can be in the center position without
emergency WING SWEEP handle on the inboard side of the changing the command mode.
throttle quadrant. The handle is connected directly to the
wing−sweep hydraulic valves. The command source for 2.20.2.2 Manual Mode
positioning the wings depends upon the mode selected by the
pilot or, in certain cases, is automatically selected. Electrical The manual wing−sweep mode is commanded by
and mechanical wing−sweep command paths are shown on selecting AFT or FWD from the neutral position of the
FO−11. Wing−sweep modes are shown in Figure 247. wing−sweep switch, driving the wings in the commanded
direction to any wing−sweep position aft of the automatic
program. The switch is spring−loaded to return to the center
position. Manual command mode exist unless the wing−sweep
program is intercepted, at which point transfer to the AUTO
mode is automatic. Indication of the existing mode is provided
The emergency wingsweep handle can be moved by the AUTO and MAN flags in the wing−sweep indicator.
independent of the wings and wingsweep indica
tors when no hydraulic power and/or electrical 2.20.2.3 Bomb Mode
power are on the aircraft. Care must be taken to
accurately determine the position of the emer Bomb mode is selected by moving the wing−sweep
gency wingsweep handle prior to application of switch to the down (BOMB) position. With the switch in
hydraulic power. Inadvertent wingsweep to the BOMB, the following occurs:
position selected by the emergency wingsweep
1. Wing SWEEP indicator shows MAN flag.
handle may occur anytime hydraulic power is on,
resulting in potential damage to the aircraft. 2. If wing sweep is less than 55_, wings will drive
When positioning the wings during ground to 55_.
operation other than pilot poststart or post
3. If wing sweep is greater than 55_, wings will not
landing checklist procedures, use the emergency
move.
wingsweep handle to minimize the possibility of
moving the wings inadvertently. 4. If maneuver flaps are extended, they will retract and
wings will sweep to 55_.
Note
As the aircraft accelerates and the AUTO wing−sweep
D When positioning the wings, do not command
schedule is intercepted, the wings will follow the AUTO
opposite direction until wings have stopped in
schedule even though the switch remains in BOMB mode.
original commanded position (all sweep
Upon decelerating, the wings will sweep forward to 55_ and
modes) to increase motor life.
stop.
D The optimum wing position (triangular index)
and the AUTO/MAN flags may be unreliable 2.20.2.4 Emergency Mode
when the CADC caution light is illuminated.
During normal mode operation of the wing−sweep
2.20.2.1 AUTO Mode system, the wing−sweep control drive servo drives the
hydraulic valve command input through a spider detent
Selection of the AUTO mode is made by placing the mechanism. The emergency handle under a transparent
four−way wing−sweep switch in the upper detented position guard is moved in parallel with the servo output. The
(AUTO) permitting the CADC wing−sweep program to emergency mode provides an emergency method of control
position the wings automatically. The program positions the ling wing sweep. It bypasses the normal command path of the
wings primarily as a function of Mach number but includes system (CADC and control drive servo loop).
pressure altitude biasing. Wing position is scheduled to the
2−83 ORIGINAL
1 Wing sweep switch AUTO Wing sweep angles are determined by CADC according to wing
sweep program. Detented switch position.
BOMB Wings are positioned at 55_ or further aft if commanded by the
CADC program. Detented switch position.
AFT/FWD The pilot can select AFT or FWD wing positions within limits
imposed by the wing sweep program. Switch is spring−loaded to
the center position. When the forward limit is intercepted, the
mode is transferred to AUTO.
2 Emergency WING Provides a mechanical means of wing sweep control that overrides the
SWEEP handle CADC program commands. Wing sweep angles between 20_ and 68_ are
unrestricted except for flap interlocks. Oversweep 75_ is provided with
weight−on−wheels, horizontal stabilizer authority restricter in reduced range,
and air bag pressure dumped.
3 Wing SWEEP Displays (from right to left) actual wing sweep position, commanded position
indicator and wing sweep program position, which is the maximum forward angle at
present airspeed and attitude. Indicator windows show the operating mode.
4 W/S caution legend Indicates failure of both wing sweep channels and/or disengagement of spider
on MFD detent. Wing sweep positioning requires using the emergency wing sweep
handle.
Figure 246.Wing−Sweep Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−84
5 CADC caution light Indicates hardware failure and/or that certain computations of the air data
computer are unreliable. Illumination of WING SWEEP advisory light and/or
W/S caution legend on MFD determines pilot action.
6 WING SWEEP Indicates failure of a single channel in the system. Illumination of both
advisory light WING SWEEP advisory and CADC caution light indicates failure of one
channel in CADC.
Figure 2−46. Wing−Sweep Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
To select emergency mode, the handle must be D If operating in the emergency wing−sweep
extended vertically. The guard should be moved out of the mode, positively confirm all flaps are
way before the handle is operated. Vertical extension of retracted prior to attempting AFT wing
the emergency handle provides for better accessibility and sweep.
leverage. The detent is not disengaged by raising the handle Note
vertically. An initial fore or aft force of up to 30 pounds
In certain failure modes, the flap indicator may
breakout and 13 pounds maximum is necessary for operation.
not accurately reflect the position of all flaps.
The spider detent is reengaged if the handle is
repositioned to the detent (servo) position. Since the wing−sweep program acts as a forward limiter
only for the normal modes of operation, the pilot must follow
The emergency WING SWEEP handle incorporates the following schedule in the emergency mode:
locks at approximately 4_ increments between 20_ and 68_.
1. 0.4 Mach  20_
These locks are provided to eliminate random wing move
ment in the emergency mode should electrical system 2. 0.7 Mach  25_
transients be experienced. When the locks are engaged, wing
movement is inhibited provided that the wings match handle 3. 0.8 Mach  50_
position. The wing−sweep locks eliminate the need for the 4. 0.9 Mach  60_
installation of wing−sweep servo cutout switches. Locks are
engaged by raising the handle 1 inch from the stowed 5. 1.0 Mach  68_.
position. In order to bypass the locks and select a wing When operating in the emergency mode, pulling the
position, the handle is raised an additional 1 inch (2 inches WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR
from stowed) and moved to the desired position. The handle NO.2/MANUV FLAP (LE1) circuit breakers on the pilot left
is spring−loaded to return to the lock position when released. knee panel assures that the electrical command path cannot
The handle can be raised from 20_ to 68_ and oversweep, but interfere with the emergency mode.
can only be returned to the stowed position at 20_ and
oversweep. This feature is intended to prevent inadvertent 2.20.2.5 Oversweep Mode (75_)
engagement of the AUTO MODE, commanding the wings to
spread causing possible damage to the aircraft or injury to The wing oversweep mode allows sweeping the wings
personnel in a confined area. The handle is spring−loaded aft of 68_ to 75_ during on−deck operation only, thereby
toward the stowed position, but requires depressing the reducing the overall width of the aircraft for deck spotting.
release button on the inboard side of the lever in order to At 75_, the wing trailing edge is over the horizontal tail surface.
return the handle to the stowed position.
If the over" flag is not displayed in the wing

sweep indicator with the wings in oversweep, the
D Except for wing flap (main and auxiliary) and
stick should remain centered.
oversweep interlocks in the control box, the
emergency mode does not prevent pilot mis With the wings at 68_, oversweep can be initiated by
positioning of the wings from a structural raising the emergency WING SWEEP handle to its full
standpoint. extension and holding. Raising the handle releases air pressure
2−85 ORIGINAL
Figure 247.Wing−Sweep Modes
ORIGINAL 2−86
from the wing−seal airbags and activates the horizontal tail 2.20.3 Wing−Sweep Interlocks
authority system, restricting the surface deflections to 18_
Automatic limiting of wing−sweep authority is pro
trailing edge up and 12_ trailing edge down. During motion
vided under normal in−flight control modes to prevent
of the horizontal stabilizer restrictors, the HZ TAIL AUTH
mispositioning of the wings at conditions that could result in
caution light is illuminated. When the horizontal tail
authority restriction is accomplished (approximately 15 the penetration of structural boundaries. Wing−sweep inter
locks within the CADC are shown in Figure 248. Wing
seconds), the HZ TAIL AUTH caution light will go off and
sweep is also electrically inhibited at normal accelerations
the OVER flag on the wing−sweep indicator will be visible.
less than −0.5 g.
This advises the pilot that the oversweep interlocks are free,
allowing movement of the emergency WING SWEEP handle
to 75_ and stow. The EMER and OVER flags on the 2.20.3.1 Flap and Slat Wing−Sweep Control Box
wing−sweep indicator will be visible. Electromechanical (auxiliary flaps, oversweep enable)
and mechanical (main flap) interlocks in the control box limit
aft wing−sweep commands at 21_15′, 50_, and 68_. Inter
locks in the control box are shown in Figure 248.. These
interlocks, which serve as a backup to the electronic
interlocks in the CADC, are imposed on both the normal and
D Failure of the oversweep interlocks while the emergency inputs to the control box and assure non
trying to achieve oversweep may result in interference between movable surfaces and the fuselage.
damage to the wingtip and horizontal tail
trailing edges, and the maneuver flap actuator. 2.20.4 Wing−Sweep System Test
D If unusual resistance is encountered while
2.20.4.1 Continuous Monitor
attempting to put the wings into oversweep,
continued aft pressure on the WING SWEEP The command and execution of the wing−sweep
handle may cause failure of the wing−sweep system is continually monitored by a failure detection
actuator. system. The failure detection system in the CADC governs
the change from wing−sweep channel 1 to channel 2 or the
The reverse process takes place when sweeping for disabling of wing−sweep channel 1 or 2 by switching the
ward from oversweep. However, there is no need to hold the respective control drive servo off. A single channel failure in
emergency handle in the raised position at 68_. Motion out the wing−sweep electrical command path is indicated by
of oversweep is completed (wing−seal airbag pressure estab illumination of the WING SWEEP advisory light followed
lished and horizontal tail authority restriction removed) by normal operation on the remaining channel. Failure of the
when both the OVER flag and the HZ TAIL AUTH caution remaining channel is indicated by a W/S caution legend on
lights are off. Six seconds later the WING SWEEP advisory the MFD and requires that wing−sweep control be exercised
light will illuminate. Upon engagement of the spider detent through the emergency WING SWEEP handle. Transient
by further unsweeping the emergency handle, MASTER failures in the CADC can be reset by pressing the MASTER
RESET pushbutton is pressed to clear the WING SWEEP RESET pushbutton, which recycles the failure detection
advisory light, thus activating the electrical command cir system.
cuits of the wing−sweep system.
2.20.4.2 Preflight Check
A preflight check of the wing−sweep system to assure
proper operation of the electrical command circuits without
moving the wings should be accomplished after starting
engines while the wings are in oversweep (75_).
When coming out of oversweep and a 68_ wing
position is desired, the wings should be moved 1. Set wing−sweep mode switch to AUTO.
forward to approximately 60_ and then back
to 68_. Note
The CADC caution light will illuminate and test
will not run if AUTO is not selected on the wing−
sweep switch.
2−87 ORIGINAL
Figure 248.Wing−Sweep Interlocks
ORIGINAL 2−88
2. Press MASTER RESET pushbutton. 2.21.1.1.1 Emergency Flaps
3. Set MASTER TEST switch to WG SWP. EMER UP enables the pilot to override any electro
mechanical commands that may exist because of mal
4. Monitor test by observing: function of the CADC. To position the flaps, move the FLAP
handle to the end of the normal travel range; then, move the
a. Wing−sweep limit pointer drives to 44°. handle outboard and continue moving to extreme EMER UP.
While moving the handle, forces may be higher than normal.
b. Illumination of the WING SWEEP advisory light EMER DN has no function.
and FLAP caution light.
Note
The WING SWEEP advisory light will illumi
nate 3 seconds after test starts, then go off and A slip clutch assembly is installed between the
illuminate again at 8 seconds into test. combined system forward flap hydraulic motor
and the center gearbox assembly. While this will
c. RDC SPD warning legend on MFD. relieve some stall torque on the hydraulic motor,
extremely fast reversals of flap direction while
d. At end of test (approximately 25 seconds) the flaps are in motion may result in eventual failure
limit pointer will drive to 20_ and the above of the flap and slat flexible driveshaft.
lights will go off.
2.21.1.2 Maneuver Flap and Slat Thumbwheel
5. Set MASTER TEST switch to OFF.
The maneuver flap and slat thumbwheel is located on
Note the left side of the stick grip and is spring loaded to the center
position. With LDG GEAR and FLAP handles up, automatic
Ignore illumination of RUDDER AUTH caution
CADC flap and slat positioning can be overridden with pilot
or MACH TRIM advisory lights and motion of
thumbwheel inputs to partially or fully extend or retract the
the control stick if they occur during the test.
maneuvering flaps and slats; however, the next time angle of
attack crosses an extension or retraction threshold, the
2.21 FLAPS AND SLATS
automatic command will again take precedence, unless
The flaps and slats form the high−lift system, which manually overridden again. Manual thumbwheel command
provides the aircraft with augmented lift during the two is a proportional command.
modes of operation: takeoff or landing, and maneuvering
flight. The flaps are of the single−slotted type, sectioned into 2.21.1.3 Main Flaps
three panels on each wing. The two outboard sections are the The main flaps on each wing consist of two sections
main flaps utilized during both modes of operation. The simultaneously driven by four mechanical actuators geared
inboard section (auxiliary flap) is commanded only during to a common flap driveshaft. Each wing incorporates a flap
takeoff or landing. The slats consist of two sections per wing asymmetry sensor and flap overtravel switches for both the
mechanically linked to the main flaps. Flaps down greater extension and retraction cycles.
than 10_ enables the wheels warning light interlock, and
Cove doors, spoilers, eyebrow doors, and gusses
greater than 25_ enables direct lift control and power
operate with the flaps to form a slot to optimize airflow
approach spoiler gearing.
over the deflected flap. The cove doors are secondary
surfaces along the underside of the wing forward of the flap
2.21.1 Flap and Slat Controls
(Figure 250.) As the flaps pass 25_ deflection, a negative
Pilot controls for flap and slat takeoff, landing, and command received from the DFCS depresses the spoilers to
maneuvering modes are illustrated in Figure 249. − 4½_ to meet with the cove doors. Because the spoilers do
not span the entire wing as do the flaps, gusses inboard and
2.21.1.1 FLAP Handle outboard of the spoilers perform the flaps−down function of
the spoilers. With the flaps retracted, the eyebrow doors,
The FLAP handle, located outboard of the throttles, is which are the forward upper surface of the flaps, are
used to manually command flaps and slats to the takeoff and spring−loaded in the up position to close the gap between
landing position. Flap handle commands are transmitted by the trailing edge of the spoiler or guss and the leading edge
control cable to the flap and slat and wing−sweep control box of the flaps. Mechanical linkage retracts the eyebrow door
where they are integrated with CADC electromechanical when the flaps are lowered to provide a smooth contour over
inputs to command proper flap and slat position. the upper surface of the deflected flap.
2−89 ORIGINAL
1 FLAP handle UP Normal retraction of main and auxiliary flaps.
DN Normal extension of main and auxiliary flaps.
EMER UP Emergency retraction of main flaps to full up overriding any

electromechanical command faults.
EMER DN No function.
Figure 249.Flap and Slat Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−90
2 Flaps and Slats

Power off; maneuver slats extended.
Indicator
Slats position is an electrical

Slats extended (17_). pickoff of right slat position only.
Slats retracted (0_).
Flap position is pickoff from

Flaps full up (0_).
hydraulic motor for main flaps only.
Maneuver flaps down (10_).
Flaps full down (35_).
3 RDC SPD legend on Main flap comparator failures with flaps not retracted and airspeed
MFD and HUD >225 KIAS (see Figure 243).
Maximum safe Mach exceeded (2.4 M).
Total temperature exceeds 388_F.
4 FLAP caution light Disagreement between main and/or AUX flap position (10 second light)
or asymmetry lockout (3 second light).
CADC failure. WG SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV FLAP (LE1) circuit breaker

pulled.
5 Maneuver flap
p and slat Forward Commands maneuver flaps and slats to retract.
thumbwheel
th b h l
Neutral Automatic CADC program.
Aft Commands maneuver flaps and slats to extend.
Figure 2−49. Flap and Slat Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
2−91 ORIGINAL
Figure 250.Wing Control Surfaces
ORIGINAL 2−92
2.21.1.4 Auxiliary Flaps 2.21.2.3 Flap Wing Interlocks

The auxiliary flaps are inboard of the main flaps and are The main flap and auxiliary flap commands are
powered by the combined hydraulic system. The actuator is interlocked electrically and mechanically with the wing
designed to mechanically lock the auxiliary flaps when in the sweep to prevent flap/fuselage interference. An electrical
up position. In the event of high dynamic pressure conditions, interlock in the CADC and a mechanical command in the
a bypass valve within each control valve opens causing the wing−sweep control box prevent wing sweep aft of 22_ with
auxiliary flap to be blown back, thus avoiding possible auxiliary flaps extended. In a similar manner, upon extension
structural damage. During loss of electrical power, the of the main flaps, the wings are electrically and mechanically
control valve is spring−loaded to retract, retracting the limited to wing−sweep angles less than 50_. The FLAP
auxiliary flaps within 1 minute. The auxiliary flaps use cove handle is mechanically prevented from moving to the down
doors, eyebrow doors, and gusses identical in purpose and position if wing position is aft of 50_. If flaps are lowered
operation with those associated with the main flaps. with wings between 21_ and 50_, main flaps will extend but
auxiliary flaps will remain retracted.
2.21.1.5 Slats
The slats on each wing are divided into two sections,
both of which are driven simultaneously by a single−slat
driveshaft. The slats are supported and guided by seven
curved tracks. D If flaps are extended with wings between 21_
and 50_, auxiliary flap extension is inhibited and
2.21.2 Flap and Slat Operation a large nosedown pitch trim change will occur.
D Pulling the FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF
Note circuit breaker (RA2) will eliminate flap over
travel protection, could eliminate mechanical or
D There is no automatic flap/slat retraction. electrical main and auxiliary flap interlocks and
may allow the wings to be swept with the flaps
D With flaps extended by the FLAP handle and partially or fully down in the wing−sweep
an airspeed of 225 knots or greater, the RDC emergency mode.
SPD legend appears on the MFD and HUD.
2.21.2.4 Maneuver Flap and Slat Mode
2.21.2.1 Normal Operation
The main flaps can be extended to 10_ with the slats
The main flap and slat portion of the high−lift system extended to 7_ within the altitude and Mach envelope shown
is positioned with a dual redundant hydromechanical servo in Figure 251.
loop in response to the FLAP handle command. The auxiliary
flap is a two−position control surface powered by the Maneuver flaps and slats are automatically extended
combined hydraulic system. With the FLAP handle exceed and retracted by the CADC as a function of angle of attack
ing 5_ deflection, the auxiliary flaps fully extend. Con and Mach number (Figure 252). The schedule commands
versely, they retract for a FLAP handle position equal to or full maneuver flaps and slats as soon as the slatted wing
less than 5_. The torque of the flap and slat drive hydraulic maneuvering efficiency exceeds that of the clean wing.
motor is transmitted by flexible driveshafts to each wing.
Note
2.21.2.2 Degraded Operation CADC maneuver flap commands are automati
cally reset when the flap handle is placed down
In the event of a combined hydraulic system failure, greater than 2_, wing−sweep BOMB mode is
outboard spoiler module fluid is automatically directed to a selected, or maneuver flaps are commanded to less
backup hydraulic motor to lower main flaps and slats only. In than 1_ by the CADC because of dynamic pressure.
the event of main flap asymmetry greater than 3_, slat
asymmetry greater than 4_, or flap surface overtravel, the The angle−of−attack input to the CADC from the alpha
flap and slat system is disabled. Flaps and slats will remain computer is inhibited and will retract the maneuver devices
in the position they were in when failure or malfunction if they are extended when the LDG GEAR handle is lowered.
occurred. The auxiliary flaps are automatically commanded This is to ensure that the maneuver devices are retracted
to retract. There is no asymmetry protection for the auxiliary before lowering the FLAP handle. Maneuver devices
flaps. extended condition is indicated by a SLATS barberpole and
an intermediate (10_) flap position.
2−93 ORIGINAL
Figure 251.Maneuver Flap Envelope
Figure 252.Maneuver Slat/Flap Automatic Schedule for CADC
ORIGINAL 2−94
To avoid fuel impingement on the fuselage boattail and

nozzles, fuel dump operations are prevented with the speed
brakes extended.
If maneuver devices are not retracted prior to low Note

ering the FLAP handle, a rapid reversal of the flaps
will occur with possible damage to the flap system. D Loss of combined hydraulic pressure with the
speedbrakes retracted or extended will cause
2.22 SPEEDBRAKES the speedbrakes to move to a floating position.
The speedbrakes consist of three individual surfaces, D The speedbrake/fuel dump interlock is elec
one upper and two lower panels on the aft fuselage between trically bypassed during a combined hydrau
the engine nacelles (Figure 253). The speedbrakes may be lic system failure, enabling the pilot to dump
infinitely modulated on the extension and retraction cycle. fuel when the speedbrakes are floating or
Operating time for full deflection is approximately 2 seconds. modulating. The electrical bypass is enabled
Hydraulic power is supplied by the combined hydraulic whenever the combined pressure falls below
system (nonisolation circuit), and electrical power is through 500 psi.
the essential No. 2 dc bus with circuit overload protection D Do not extend the speedbrakes in flight within
on the pilot right circuit breaker panel (SPD BK P−ROLL 1 minute (nominal) after terminating fuel
TRIM ENABLE) (RB2). dump operations to allow residual fuel in the
dump mast to drain.
2.22.1 Speedbrake Operation
D A throttle must be held in MIL (or greater) for
Pilot control of the speedbrakes is effected by use of the approximately 3 seconds in order for the
three−position speedbrake switch on the inboard side of the automatic function to completely retract the
right throttle grip (Figure 254). Automatic retraction of speedbrake. Anything less will cause partial
the speedbrakes occurs with placement of either or both retraction.
throttles at MIL or loss of electrical power.
Figure 253.Speedbrakes
2−95 ORIGINAL
1 Speed brake switch EXT Momentary position used for partial or full extension.
When released, switch returns to center (hold) position.
RET Normal position of switch. Retracts and maintains speed

brakes closed.
2 SPEED BRAKE indicator

Partial extension (hold).
Full extension (60_).
Full retracted position.
Speed brakes power off.
Note
Automatic retraction of speed brakes occurs
when either or both throttles are at MIL.
Figure 254.Speedbrake Control and Indicator
ORIGINAL 2−96
The speedbrakes will start to blowback (close) at and pitch acceleration are produced by fore and aft bob
approximately 400 knots and will continue toward the closed weights. Aircraft overstresses from abrupt stick inputs are
position as airspeed increases to prevent structural damage. minimized by an eddy current damper that resists large, rapid
A reduction in airspeed will not automatically cause the control deflections.
speedbrakes to extend to the originally commanded position.
2.23.1.2 Longitudinal Trim
2.23 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEMS
Longitudinal trim is provided by varying the neutral
Flight control is achieved through an irreversible,
position of cam and roller feel assembly with an electro
hydraulic power system operated by a control stick and
mechanical screwjack actuator. The manual pitch trim button
rudder pedals. Aircraft pitch is controlled by symmetrical
on the stick is a five−position switch, spring loaded to the
deflection of the horizontal stabilizers. Roll control is
center (off) position (Figure 258). The fore and aft switch
effected by differential stabilizer deflections and augmented
positions produce corresponding nosedown and noseup trim,
by spoilers at wing−sweep positions less than 62_. Direc
respectively. The manual trim switch is deactivated when the
tional control is provided by dual rudders. During power
autopilot is engaged.
approach maneuvers, the aircraft flightpath can be controlled
through symmetric spoiler displacement by the pilot select
ing direct lift control. Control surface indicators are shown 2.23.1.3 Mach Trim
in Figure 255. Mach trim control is provided by the DFCS and is
The horizontal stabilizer and rudders are powered by continuously engaged to provide automatic Mach trim
the flight and combined hydraulic systems and controlled by compensation during transonic and supersonic flight. A
pushrods and bellcranks. A third independent flight control failure of Mach trim compensation is indicated by the
hydraulic power source is provided by the backup module. MACH TRIM advisory light. Transient failures can be reset
Spoiler control is effected by an electrohydraulic, fly−by− by depressing the MASTER RESET pushbutton.
wire system and powered by the combined hydraulic system The manual and DFCS automatic trim and Mach trim
(inboard spoilers) and outboard spoiler module (outboard actuator is installed in parallel with the flight control system.
spoilers). Trim actuation produces a corresponding stick and control
The DFCS includes a stability augmentation system, surface movement.
an autopilot and auxiliary control functions for spoiler
control, rudder authority control, lateral stick authority 2.23.2 Integrated Trim System
control, and Mach trim compensation. The ITS is incorporated to reduce longitudinal trim
changes because of the extension and retraction of flaps and
2.23.1 Longitudinal Control speedbrakes. Disagreement of command position removes
Longitudinal control (Figure 256) is provided by power from the motor and illuminates the INTEG TRIM
symmetric deflection of independently actuated horizontal advisory light. Transient failures can be reset by pressing the
stabilizers. Control stick motion is transmitted to the MASTER RESET pushbutton. ITS schedules are shown in
stabilizer power actuators by pushrods and bellcranks to dual Figure 259.
tandem actuators independently powered by the flight and
combined hydraulic systems. The power actuators control
the stabilizers symmetrically for longitudinal control and
differentially for lateral control. This is accomplished by
mechanically summing pitch and roll commands at the When the AIM−54 weapon rail pallet(s) is
pitch−roll mixer assembly. Nonlinear stick−to−stabilizer gear installed, the speedbrake compensation schedule
ing provides appropriate stick sensitivity for responsive and in the integrated trim computer changes. If less
smooth control. Longitudinal system authority is shown in than four AIM−54 missiles are carried on the
Figure 257. weapon rails, the ITS may overcompensate for
the speedbrake trim change. In the worst case
2.23.1.1 Longitudinal Feel (low altitude, between 0.7 and 0.8 Mach, PITCH
SAS OFF, and weapon rails without AIM−54 mis
Artificial feel devices in the control system provide the siles), the ITS can cause an incremental 2 g nose
pilot with force cues and feedback. A spring−loaded cam and down trim change when the speedbrake is
roller assembly produces breakout force when the stick is extended. Under these conditions with the
displaced from neutral trim and provides increasing stick PITCH SAS engaged, maximum trim change is
forces proportional to control stick displacement. Control reduced to approximately 1 g.
stick forces, proportional to normal acceleration (g forces)
2−97 ORIGINAL
1 SPOILER position indicators

Spoilers down (flush with wing
surface).
Note
A right inboard or outboard
spoiler position indicator Either spoiler of the appropriate pair is
showing one position higher extended more than 0_.
than the corresponding
spoilers actual position indi
cates a possibility of ground Both spoilers of the appropriate pair at
roll braking in flight and loss of a dropped position (0−4½_ below wing
spoiler asymmetry protection surface)
due to a failed zero degree
switch.
2 RUDDER position indicator Individual rudder pointers marked R (right) and L (left) display the
trailing−edge position of the rudders in degrees (0 to 30).
Figure 255.Control Surface Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−98
3 HORIZONTAL tail Indicated by two pointers marked R (right) and L (left) on a scale
stabilizers position 35_ up and 15_ down. Scale is graduated in 2_ increments.
The inner pointer indicates left wing down or right wing down
(differential stabilizer position).
4 ANTI SKID SPOILER BOTH Antiskid activated. Spoiler brakes operate with weight on
BK switch wheels and throttle at IDLE.
OFF Antiskid and spoiler brakes inoperative with weight on wheels.
SPOILER BK Spoiler brakes operate with weight on wheels and

both throttles at IDLE. Antiskid is deactivated.
5 HZ TAIL AUTH Failure of lateral tail authority actuator to follow schedule or CADC
caution light failure.
6 RUDDER AUTH Disagreement between command and position, failure of rudder

caution light authority actuators to follow schedule, or CADC failure.
Note
The RUDDER AUTH caution light may illuminate when the

in−flight refueling probe is extended. Press the MASTER
RESET button to reset the light.
7 SPOILERS caution Spoiler system failure, causing a set of spoilers to be locked down.
light
Note
SPOILERS caution light will not illuminate with SPOILER

FLR ORIDE switches in ORIDE position.
8 INTEG TRIM advisory Discrepancy between input command signal and actuator position
light or an electrical power loss within the computer.
9 MACH TRIM advisory Failure of Mach trim actuator to follow schedule.

light
Note
Transient failures involving HZ TAIL AUTH, RUDDER

AUTH, or SPOILERS caution lights and INTEG TRIM and
MACH TRIM advisory lights can be reset by pressing the
MASTER RESET pushbutton.
10 RUDDER TRIM switch Controls the electromechanical actuator that varies the neutral position
of the mechanical linkage for rudder trim.
Figure 2−55. Control Surface Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
2−99 ORIGINAL
Figure 256.Longitudinal Control System
COCKPIT CONTROL STABILIZER SURFACE PARALLEL TRIM
ACTUATION MODE MOTION AUTHORITY RATE AUTHORITY AVERAGE RATE
Control Stick Manual 4 inches forward 10_ TED 36_ per second 9_ TED 1_ per second
5.5 inches aft 33_ TEU 18_ TEU
DFCS Series None $3_ 20_ per second

(SAS)
Parallel 4 inches forward 10_ TED 36_ per second 9_ TED 0.1_ per second
Automatic 5.5 inches aft 33_ TEU 18_ TEU
Carrier
Landing
(ACL only)
Maneuver Flap Series $45_ DLC 8.4_ TED 36_ per second
Integrated Thumbwheel Maximum
Trim System Mode
(ITS) and DLC
Thumbwheel
$45_ Maneuver $3_ 3_ per second

Flap Mode
Figure 257.Longitudinal System Authority
ORIGINAL 2−100
1 Bomb release button Pilot control for release of stores. In aircraft with the weapons rail
defensive electronic countermeasures (DECM) chaff adapter,
the bomb release button is used to dispense chaff.
2 Pitch and roll trim button Spring−loaded to (center) off position. Up and down positions
control pitch trim and left and right positions control roll trim.
Manual trim is inoperative during autopilot operation.
3 Weapon Selector switch LR Selects Phoenix missiles.

MR Selects Sparrow missiles.
SR Selects Sidewinder missiles.
GN Selects gun.
4 Maneuver flap,
p slat, and Spring−loaded to a neutral position.
DLC command d
With DLC engaged: Forward rotation extends spoilers
(aircraft down); aft rotation retracts spoilers (aircraft up).
With gear and flaps up: Forward rotation retracts maneuvering

flaps/slats; aft rotation extends maneuvering flaps/slats.
Figure 258.Control Stick and Trim (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−101 ORIGINAL
5 DLC engage, disengage, Momentary depression of the switch with flaps greater than 25 degrees
and chaff switch down, throttle less than MIL, and no failures in spoiler system engages
DLC. With flaps up, switch will dispense chaff or flares. DLC is
disengaged by momentarily pressing the switch, raising the flaps,
or advancing either throttle to MIL.
6 Autopilot reference and With weight on wheels, nosewheel steering can be engaged by
nosewheel steering depressing switch momentarily. Weight off wheels and autopilot engaged;
pushbutton switch engages compatible autopilot modes. The switch also disengages
ACL mode.
7 Autopilot emergency Disengages all autopilot modes and DLC. Releases all autopilot switches.
disengage paddle Depressing the paddle switch reverts throttle system from AUTO or
BOOST mode to MAN mode and reverts engines to SEC MODE only
while depressed and with weight on wheels.
8 Camera and forward Pilot control of CCTVS, gun camera, and/or forward firing weapons.
weapon firing trigger First detent of trigger starts gun camera and color cockpit television
sensor (CCTVS).
Figure 2−58. Control Stick and Trim (Sheet 2 of 2)
2.23.2.1 Preflight 2.23.3.2 Lateral Trim

Lateral trim is by differential deflection of the
The ITS is automatically energized with hydraulic and
horizontal stabilizers. The wing spoilers are not actuated for
electrical power applied. It can be checked by operating flaps
lateral trim control. Trim is provided by adjusting the neutral
or speedbrakes and observing a change in indicated stabilizer
position of the spring roller−cam−feel assembly with an
position.
electromechanical screwjack. Left or right deflection of the
roll trim button on the stick grip produces corresponding stick
2.23.3 Lateral Control
movement and left or right wing−down trim, respectively.
The normal stick grip trim switch is inoperative when the
Lateral control (Figure 260) is effected by differential autopilot is engaged.
displacement of the horizontal stabilizers and augmented by
wing spoilers at wingsweep positions of less than 62_. With Note
gear handle up, a ±½−inch stick deadband is provided to With lateral trim set at other than 0_, maximum
preclude spoiler actuation with small lateral stick commands. spoiler deflection is reduced in the direction of
The spoilers are commanded to the flush−down (0_) position applied trim.
at wing−sweep angles of greater than 62_, and roll control is
provided entirely by differential stabilizer. At wing−sweep 2.23.3.3 Lateral Control Stops
angles of 65_ and greater, the hydraulic power to the spoiler To limit the torsional fuselage loads, variable lateral
actuators is cut off, locking the spoiler in the 0_ position. control authority stops are installed. The lateral stick stops
Lateral stick commands are transmitted by pushrods and bell vary according to dynamic pressure airloads from full stick
cranks to the independent stabilizer power actuators and authority at low Q, to one−half−stick throw limits at high−Q
electrically to the spoiler actuators. Lateral system authority conditions. Failure of the lateral stick stops is indicated by the
is tabulated in Figure 261. HZ TAIL AUTH caution light. Transient failures can be reset
with the MASTER RESET pushbutton. Failure of the stops
2.23.3.1 Lateral Feel in the one−half−stick position limits low−Q rolling perfor
mance. However, ample roll control is available for all
An artificial feel system provides the pilot with force landing conditions and configurations. Failure in the open
cues and feedback. The lateral feel mechanism is a spring condition with SAS ON requires the pilot to manually limit
roller−cam assembly with a neutral stick position detent and stick deflection at higher speeds to avoid exceeding fuselage
a constant stick deflection force gradient. torsional load limits, as lateral stops do not limit SAS
authority.
ORIGINAL 2−102
Figure 259.Integrated Trim Schedules
Figure 260.Lateral Control System
2−103 ORIGINAL
COCKPIT CONTROL SURFACE PARALLEL TRIM

CONTROL
SURFACE
ACTUATION MODE MOTION AUTHORITY RATE AUTHORITY RATE
Differential Control Stick Manual 3.5 inches $7_ 36_ per $3 3/8_ per
Stabilizer left second second
3.5 inches
right
DFCS Series None $5_ 33_ per

second
Inboard Control Stick Manual 3.5 inches $55_ 250_ per None None
and for left second
Outboard Ω v62_ 3.5 inches
Spoilers right
DFCS (ACL) Series None 15_ maximum 250_ per None None
(inboard only) 8_ neutral second
DLC/ Manual DLC/ inbd only 125_ per None None

Maneuver Maneuver 17.5_ neutral second
Flap Flap −4.5_ down (minimum)
(inboard only) Command +55_ up
Thumb−
wheel
$45_
Ground Roll Series None 55_ up 250_ per None None

Braking second
Armed,
Weight−on−
Wheels
*Lateral Control Stick Manual 1.75 inches $3½_ Diff. 36_ per
Stops Restricted left Stabilizer second
1.75 inches **28_Spoiler 250_ per
right second
* Programmed by CADC (Horizontal Tail Authority) as a function of dynamic pressure.

** Maximum SAS off deflection limits with full lateral stops engaged.
Figure 261.Lateral System Authority
ORIGINAL 2−104
Figure 262.Spoiler Control System
2.23.4 Spoiler Control for all landing configurations, the DFCS uses the power
approach spoiler gearing whenever the landing gear or main
Four spoiler control surfaces (Figure 262) on the upper
flaps are down. With DLC engaged in the power approach
surface of each wing augment roll control power and
mode, the inboard spoilers are positioned from normal − 4.5_
implement aerodynamic ground−roll braking. The inboard
to +17.5_ position. Lateral stick inputs result in the spoilers
spoilers also provide DLC. The inboard and outboard spoilers extending on one side in the direction of stick displacement
are powered and controlled by separate hydraulic and
and depressing toward the landing flaps down drooped
electrical command systems. The DFCS monitors each spoiler
(− 4.5_) stowed position on the other side. This is the primary
panel individually. The pitch computer and outboard spoiler
reason for better roll response in the landing configuration
module control the outboard spoilers; and the roll computer with DLC engaged.
and the combined hydraulic system control the inboard
spoilers. (Refer to digital flight control system in FO−12.)
2.23.4.1 Lateral Trim and Spoiler Deflection
The inboard spoilers are controlled and monitored by
As mentioned earlier, lateral trim is provided by
the ROLL A and PITCH A computer segregations respec
adjusting the neutral position of the stick. This movement of
tively. The outboard spoilers are controlled and monitored by
the neutral position has an effect on the amount of spoiler
the PITCH B and YAW B computer segregations respec
deflection available. That is, as lateral trim is applied away
tively. Hydraulic actuation of the servo actuators is con
from the neutral trim position, maximum spoiler deflection
trolled by electric servo valves at the actuator and com
is reduced in the same direction (right trim less right wing
manded by control stick displacement. The aircraft has two
spoiler deflection).
spoiler gearing curves called cruise and power approach.
Cruise spoiler gearing is the schedule that spoilers follow in
the clean configuration and is shown in Figure 263. Power
approach is the schedule that spoilers follow with the flaps
down greater than 25° and is shown in Figure 263 (DLC
engaged). The power approach spoiler gearing schedule is Full slat asymmetry (17_) can result in an out−of−
modified to provide predictable roll response with lateral control situation at 15 units AOA or greater even
stick deflection. To provide the appropriate spoiler gearing with 55_ of spoilers available.
2−105 ORIGINAL
Figure 263.Spoiler Gearing Schedule
ORIGINAL 2−106
Full lateral trim in the same direction as lateral stick signal from the DFCS is lost (i.e., DFCS power
displacement will still provide approximately 25_ to 35° of failure). If this bias is reversed, the affected
spoiler deflection to counteract an asymmetric flap and slat spoiler will extend instead of retracting when the
condition (see Figure 263). This is sufficient to control full− command signal is lost. A DFCS power failure
flap asymmetry with symmetrically down slats. coupled with a reverse spoiler bias will result in
a fully deployed spoiler. All unaffected spoilers
2.23.4.2 Ground−Roll Braking will remain retracted and will not respond to
flight control inputs until the DFCS command
Aerodynamic ground−roll braking is provided by signals are restored.
symmetric deflection of all spoilers to +55_. Ground−roll
braking is controlled by the ANTI SKID SPOILER BK Note
switch on the pilot left vertical console. The three−position D DFCS synchronization can take up to two
switch allows optional selection of BOTH (spoiler brake and seconds following a power interrupt. If the
wheel antiskid braking), SPOILER BK (spoiler brake only), MASTER RESET pushbutton is depressed
or OFF where neither spoilers nor antiskid is armed. With during the synchronization time, an addi
SPOILER BK or BOTH selected, two conditions are required tional depression of the MASTER RESET
to actuate the spoilers: pushbutton will be required to restore spoiler
1. Weight on wheels functionality.
D Do not press and hold the MASTER RESET
2. Both throttles at idle.
pushbutton. Pressing and holding the
Failure to satisfy any one of the above conditions will MASTER RESET pushbutton during the
cause the spoilers to return to the down position. synchronization time will have no effect since
the DFCS computers only recognize the
leading edge of the pulse from the MASTER
RESET pushbutton, and not the fact that the
button is continuously depressed.
Ground−roll braking may fail to extend spoilers D On deck, when the flap handle is cycled to UP,
on touchdown due to a momentary miscompare the outboard spoiler module is shut down.
of the weight−on−wheels switches. MASTER This will cause the outboard spoilers to
RESET should restore normal ground−roll remain extended if activated. If this occurs,
braking operation. position the flap handle to DN and deactivate
Note the spoilers. This may also cause the spoiler
During initial spoiler brake operation, it is indicators to inaccurately indicate a droop or
normal for the indicators in the SPOILER down position. If this occurs, position the flap
window to momentarily flip−flop. handle to DN and move the control stick
laterally to correct spoiler indicators.
2.23.4.3 Spoiler Failure
2.23.4.4 Spoiler Test
Spoiler monitoring is accomplished by directly
comparing the commanded spoiler position with the actual Proper spoiler operation is verified when IBIT is run
spoiler position. When a miscompare is detected, the affected during startup if wings are at 20 degrees and flaps are down.
individual spoiler panel and the corresponding spoiler panel See Chapters 7 and 38.
on the opposite wing are commanded to − 4½_ and the
SPOILERS caution light illuminated. Transient spoiler 2.23.5 Yaw Control
failures can be reset by depressing the MASTER RESET Yaw control (Figure 264) is effected by twin rudders,
pushbutton. If the affected spoiler panel is mechanically one on each vertical tail. The rudder pedals adjust through a
stuck−up, the DFCS automatically restores normal operation 10−inch range in 1−inch increments with the adjust control on
of the opposite spoiler panel within 2 seconds. the lower center pedestal, forward of the control stick.
Yaw commands are transmitted mechanically from the
rudder pedals to the rudder power actuators by pushrods and
bellcranks. Tandem power actuators are powered indepen
dently by the flight and combined hydraulic systems. Yaw
The spoiler actuators are mechanically biased to
system authority is tabulated in Figure 265.
the retracted position in order to cause the
spoilers to retract in the event that the command
2−107 ORIGINAL
Figure 264.Yaw Control System
COCKPIT CONTROL RUDDER SURFACE PARALLEL TRIM
ACTUATION MODE MOTION AUTHORITY RATE AUTHORITY AVERAGE RATE
Rudder Manual 3 inches left, $30_ 106_ per 7_ 1.13_ per second
Pedals (unrestricted) 3 inches right maximum second
*Manual 1 inch left, $9.5_ 106_ per 7_ 1.13_ per second

(restricted) 1 inch right minimum second
DFCS Series None *$19_ 80_ per

second
*Stops programmed by CADC (rudder authority) as a function of dynamic pressure.
Figure 265.Yaw System Authority
ORIGINAL 2−108
2.23.5.1 Rudder Feel Before DLC can be engaged, the following conditions
are required:
Artificial feel is provided with a spring roller−cam
mechanism similar to the longitudinal and lateral feel systems. 1. Flaps down greater than 25_.
Rudder force with pedal deflection is nonlinear with a 2. Throttles less than MIL power.
relatively steep gradient about the neutral detent and
gradually decreasing with increased pedal travel. 3. Inboard spoilers operational.
2.23.5.2 Rudder Trim 4. Pitch B, and yaw B computers operational.
Rudder trim is effected by varying the neutral position 5. Operable combined hydraulic pump.
of the feel assembly with an electromechanical screwjack
actuator. Rudder trim control is actuated by a three−position 2.23.6.1 DLC Operation
switch on the left console outboard of the throttle quadrant. DLC is engaged with the control stick DLC switch and
Left (L) and right (R) lateral switch movement commands commanded by the thumbwheel. The thumbwheel is spring−
left and right rudder trim, respectively. The switch is loaded to a neutral position. Forward rotation of the wheel
spring−loaded to the center off position. Trim actuation extends spoilers and aft rotation retracts them proportionally
produces an associated movement of the rudder pedals, to the degree of thumbwheel rotation. Absolute spoiler
rudders, and rudder indicator. deflection is dependent upon lateral stick position (see
Figure 263). DLC is provided by the yaw computer.
2.23.5.3 Rudder Authority Stops
Upon engagement of DLC, the roll computer extends
Rudder authority control stops limit rudder throws in the inboard spoilers from the landing flaps down drooped
the high−Q flight environment. Rudder deflection limits are (− 4½_) position to +17.5_ above the flush (0_) position. The
scheduled by the CADC, commencing at about 250 knots. pitch computer displaces the trailing edges of the horizontal
Above approximately 400 knots, the stops are fully engaged, stabilizers 2.75_ down from their trim position. If the
restricting manual rudder deflection to 9.5_. Disagreement thumbwheel control is rotated fully forward, the spoilers
between command and position removes power from the extend to their 55_ position and the stabilizer trailing edges
motor and illuminates the RUDDER AUTH caution light. remain at 2.75_. This increases the rate of descent. If the
thumbwheel control is rotated fully aft, the spoilers retract to
their − 4.5_ position and the stabilizer trailing edges return
to the trim position. This decreases the rate of descent.
A CADC failure may drive the rudder authority 2.24 DIGITAL FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
stops to 9.5_. This condition should be deter The DFCS (FO−12) augments the aircraft natural
mined prior to making a single−engine or cross damping characteristics and provides automatic commands
wind landing. With the 9.5_ stops in, rudder for control of attitude, altitude, heading, and approach modes
control may be insufficient to maintain direc selected by the pilot. All DFCS functions are integrated into
tional control with single−engine afterburner the primary flight control system.
operation or during crosswind conditions. Nose
wheel steering authority is greatly reduced with The DFCS also provides an Up and Away Automatic
the 9.5_ stops engaged. Rudder Interconnect (UA−ARI) to enhance departure resist
ance, spin recovery and high angle of attack flying qualities,
2.23.5.4 Rudder Pedal Shaker and a Power Approach Automatic Rudder Interconnect
(PA−ARI) to enhance the landing approach flying qualities.
The rudder pedal shaker operates during IBIT and in The DFCS consists of three computers, one computer for
flight when the landing gear is extended and angle of attack each axis (pitch, roll, and yaw). Each computer has two
is above ~20 units. Rudder pedal shaker will deactivate once distinct and independent processors called channels or
the angle of attack is reduced below ~19 units. segregations (one A" and one B" channel per axis), each
controlling one of the dual series servoactuators. All
2.23.6 Direct Lift Control channels share data through cross channel data links.
During landing approaches, the inboard spoilers and A BIT capability is provided to exercise in−flight
horizontal stabilizers can be controlled simultaneously to monitoring and to conduct an automatic operational readi
provide vertical glidepath correction without changing ness test for preflight checks. DFCS rates and authorities are
engine power setting or angle of attack. Only the inboard tabulated in Figure 266.
spoilers are used for DLC.
2−109 ORIGINAL
AXIS ACTUATOR SURFACE AUTHORITY SURFACE RATE

Pitch Dual Series SAS Stabilizer ± 3_ 20_ per second
Dual Series ITS Stabilizer ± 3_ 3_ per second
Parallel (ACL only) Stabilizer 10_ TED 36_ per second
33_ TEU
Parallel Trim Stabilizer 10_ TED 0.1_ per second
18_ TEU
Roll Dual Series Differential Stabilizer ± 5_ 33_ per second
Spoilers (ACL) 15_ maximum 250_ per second
Yaw Dual Series Rudder ± 19_ 80_ per second
Figure 266.DFCS Rates and Authorities
2.24.1 Stability Augmentation System Note
Stability augmentation is provided for all three aircraft Depressing the paddle switch does not disable
axes (pitch, roll, and yaw) and is controlled by the three the PITCH and ROLL SAS. If problems are
STAB AUG switches on the upper half of the DFCS control suspected with any SAS axis, the appropriate
panel (DCP) (Figure 267). SAS is engaged by placing these STAB AUG switch must be manually selected
switches to ON during normal poststart procedures. The OFF. Depressing the paddle switch will dis
PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB AUG switches are manually engage the autopilot and DLC inflight, revert the
operated toggle switches mechanically held in the selected throttles to MANUAL mode on deck, and revert
ON or OFF position. fuel control to SEC mode.
The PITCH SAS incorporates a pitch rate feedback 2.24.1.1 DFCS Control Panel/Fault Display
function that is reduced as airspeed is increased above 650 The DFCS control panel (Figure 267), located on the
KIAS. This is necessary to maintain adequate control system pilot’s left side console, includes all the controls for the
stability and is not noticeable. The ROLL SAS is independent DFCS and an LED alphanumeric fault display with the
with the landing gear up, at low angle of attack (less than 15 associated INC and DEC pushbuttons to control display
units), and at supersonic flight conditions. At all other condi operation. This fault display is intended for ground use only
tions, the ROLL SAS is part of the UA−ARI and PA−ARI. to assist in the troubleshooting and repair of the DFCS and
Similar to the PITCH SAS, the roll rate feedback is reduced related components.
as airspeed is increased above 300 KIAS. With the landing
gear down, the YAW SAS becomes part of the PA−ARI. 2.24.1.2 Up and Away Automatic Rudder
Interconnect (UA−ARI)
All SAS switches should remain ON during flight.
Deselection of either the ROLL or YAW SAS switch will The UA−ARI is selected when the landing gear handle
disable the affected SAS axis and all ARI functions, and is up and provides several functions designed to improve high
illuminate the ARI/SAS OUT caution light. Deselection of angle of attack flying qualities and departure resistance
the PITCH SAS switch will disable the PITCH SAS, but no (Figure 267). These include:
caution light will illuminate since no restriction exists for D Differential Stabilizer Fadeout
PITCH SAS OFF.
D Lateral Stick−to−Rudder Interconnect (LSRI)
D Low airspeed/high angle of attack cross
control (LSXC)
D Wing Rock Suppression
Maneuvering with YAW SAS OFF or inoperative
shall not be conducted above 15 units AOA with D Spin Recovery Function.
landing gear retracted.
ORIGINAL 2−110
Figure 267.DFCS Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 3)
2−111 ORIGINAL
1 PITCH STAB AUG Engages dual−channel pitch stability augmentation.

engage switch
2 ROLL STAB AUG Engages dual−channel roll stability augmentation.
engage switch
3 YAW STAB AUG Engages dual−channel yaw stability augmentation.
engage switch
4 DFCS fault display With weight on wheels, the DFCS fault display yields three categories of fault
codes including: currently existing failures (FAIL), in−flight detected failures
(FLT), and IBIT detected failures (IBIT).
5 INC pushbutton With weight on wheels, depressing the INC pushbutton scrolls forward through
logged DFCS fault codes.
6 DEC pushbutton With weight on wheels, depressing the DEC pushbutton scrolls backward
through logged DFCS fault codes.
7 AUTOPILOT ENGAGE− ENGAGE Engages autopilot. PITCH, ROLL, and YAW SAS switches
OFF switch must be engaged. No warmup required. Engages attitude hold.
Requires weight off wheels.
OFF Disengages autopilot.
8 HDG−OFF−GT switch HDG Autopilot will lock on constant aircraft heading when aircraft is
less than "5 roll.
OFF Disengages heading hold and ground track.
GT Selects autopilot ground tracking computed at time of
engagement using inertia navigation system (INS) data.
Engaged by nosewheel steering pushbutton.
9 ALT−OFF switch ALT Autopilot will maintain barometric altitude. Engaged by
nosewheel steering pushbutton.
OFF Disengages altitude mode.
10 VEC/PCD−OFF−ACL VEC/PCD Autopilot roll axis commands steer aircraft using data link
switch signals for vectoring. If the precision course direction (PCD)
discrete is present, both roll and pitch axis commands are used.
Engaged by nosewheel steering pushbutton.
OFF Disengages VEC/PCD and ACL modes.
ACL Autopilot will accept data link signals for carrier landing, using
spoilers for roll and parallel servo for pitch. Only pitch
commands are transmitted to stick movement. Engaged and
disengaged by nosewheel steering pushbutton.
11 ACLS/AP caution light Autopilot and automatic carrier landing system (ACLS) mode disengaged.
12 A/P CPLR advisory Indicates the aircraft can be coupled to the ACL system for a mode I or
legend on MFD mode IA approach. A/P CPLR legend remains displayed in conjunction
with the CMD CTRL legend after coupling is accomplished.
13 A/P REF advisory Autopilot mode is selected but is not engaged. (Except attitude and
legend on MFD heading hold.)
Figure 2−67. DFCS Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−112
14 PITCH SAS caution light Indicates inoperative pitch channel or PITCH SAS failure.
15 FCS CAUTION light Indicates DFCS failure has occurred. If no other lights are illuminated, indicates
loss of redundancy only (subsequent failure may result in loss of significant
DFCS functionality).
16 ROLL DGR caution light Indicates inoperative roll channel and degraded roll authority.
17 ARI DGR caution light Indicates degraded ARI performance. If caused by loss of a Mach number
signal, LSXC and wing rock suppression functions will be inoperative.
18 YAW DGR caution light Indicates inoperative yaw channel and degraded yaw authority.
19 ARI/SAS OUT caution Indicates loss of either ROLL or YAW SAS and all ARI functions.
light Will be illuminated if either the ROLL STAB AUG or YAW STAB AUG switches
are selected off.
20 AUTOPILOT caution light Indicates failure of one or more of pilot relief modes.
21 Autopilot reference and Engages the ALT, GT, ACL or VEC/PCD autopilot mode selected.
nosewheel steering Autopilot must be engaged and compatible autopilot modes selected.
pushbutton Also disengages ACL mode. Requires weight off wheels.
22 Autopilot emergency Disengages all autopilot modes and releases all autopilot switches.
disengage paddle
23 PLM pushbutton With the A/P CPLR legend and the VEC/PCD ACL switch latched in the
ACL position, depressing the PLM pushbutton engages and disengages
the ACL mode and autopilot.
Figure 2−67. DFCS Controls and Indicators (Sheet 3 of 3)
These functions are active throughout the subsonic by activation of LSXC or spin recovery functions). As Mach
flight envelope and are scheduled with Mach number and number is increased, the differential stabilizer is faded out at
angle of attack (Figure 268). The effects of these functions a lower AOA. This reduces the effects of kinematic coupling
on flight characteristics are discussed in Chapter 11. and results in less adverse sideslip with lateral stick deflec
tion as angle of attack is increased and reduces the tendency
Note for lateral control induced departures.
The primary AOA input for control law schedul
ing is based on degrees AOA provided by the ARI The LSRI function gradually applies coordinating
alpha nose−probe vice units AOA as displayed on rudder with lateral stick as angle of attack is increased above
the cockpit AOA indicator provided by the ADD ~15 units AOA. A maximum of +/−19 deg coordinating
AOA side−probe. Descriptions of control law rudder is provided by the LSRI above ~23 units AOA. This
functions are written in units AOA, but it should results in the desired roll response with lateral stick input
be noted that the correlation between units and alone at elevated AOA.
degrees AOA is a function of Mach number.
The LSXC function provides a means to override the
The differential stabilizer fadeout function reduces the differential stabilizer fadeout and LSRI functions when
amount of differential stabilizer the pilot can command as CADC Mach number is below 0.4 and angle of attack is
angle of attack and Mach number are increased. Below ~15 above ~30 units. At these conditions, the pilot can command
units angle of attack, the pilot can command up to the maxi up to +/−10 deg differential stabilizer deflection in the direc
mum +/−12 deg differential stabilizer authority. Above ~30 tion of lateral stick and up to +/−30 deg rudder deflection in
units angle of attack, the differential stabilizer is limited to the direction of commanded rudder. Because rudder
a maximum of +/−2 deg deflection (except when overridden
2−113 ORIGINAL
Figure 268.DFCS Up and Away ARI Functions
ORIGINAL 2−114
effectiveness is diminished above 30 units angle of attack, the roll rate. Because the pilot’s roll rate command
LSXC function is necessary to provide adequate roll/ yaw is based upon lateral stick position from a
maneuvering capability at extreme angles of attack. When trimmed position, it may be necessary to select
LSRI is no longer effective, the aircraft can still be rolled ROLL SAS OFF, trim the airplane, and then rese
through LSXC by manually applying greater than 1.75 inch lect the ROLL SAS ON. The same procedure
of rudder pedal in the direction of the desired roll, and greater may be necessary to trim an airplane with a lat
than 1 inch lateral stick in the opposite direction. This will eral store asymmetry, trapped wing fuel, etc.
create an adverse yaw response causing the aircraft to
The LSRI function gradually fades in coordinating
roll/yaw in the same direction as the rudder input.
rudder with lateral stick as angle of attack is increased above
The wing rock suppression function uses roll rate ~10 units AOA. This minimizes adverse yaw response from
feedback to command the differential stabilizer and rudder to lateral stick only inputs, greatly enhancing heading and
damp lateral−directional oscillations from between 20 to 30 centerline capture during lineup corrections. At normal
units AOA. This results in smoother tracking capability for approach conditions (15 units angle of attack, flaps down), up
the majority of the maneuvering flight envelope. Wing rock to +/− 19 deg coordinating rudder is provided by the LSRI.
suppression is disabled when a pedal input greater than 2 Raising the flaps decreases the amount of coordinating
inches is applied or CADC Mach number is above 0.77 to rudder available.
prevent the system from applying inadvertent cross control
The Dutch roll damping function provides sideslip rate
inputs and allow the pilot to roll the aircraft with rudder
feedback to the rudder to reduce directional nose wandering
inputs alone.
during approach. Airplane roll rate, yaw rate, lateral
The spin recovery function applies full SAS authority acceleration, Mach number, and angle of attack are used to
of up to +/−19 deg rudder and up to +/−5 deg differential calculate sideslip rate. At normal approach conditions, the
stabilizer to oppose yaw rate during a departure. The spin sideslip rate feedback to rudder provides a deadbeat Dutch
recovery function is activated when angle of attack is above roll response.
~30 units and yaw rate is above 20 deg/sec. The spin recovery
The spiral mode stabilization function provides yaw
inputs are in addition to the pilot’s mechanical inputs,
rate feedback to the differential stabilizer to reduce bank
providing full control surface authority for departure recov
angle excursions during stabilized turns. At normal approach
ery (+/−30 deg rudder opposite roll/yaw and +/−12 deg
conditions, the yaw rate feedback to differential stabilizer
differential stabilizer into roll/yaw). Misapplied pilot
provides an essentially neutral spiral mode.
recovery inputs are limited to +/−11 deg pro−spin rudder and
+/−2 deg pro−spin differential stabilizer.
2.24.1.4 Aircraft Sensors
2.24.1.3 Power Approach ARI The DFCS uses the aircraft sensor inputs distributed to
the various computer channels as shown in Figure 269. The
The PA−ARI is selected when the landing gear handle
DFCS distributes sensor inputs to all computer channels
is down and provides roll rate command, LSRI, Dutch roll
through cross channel data link (CCDL) communication.
damping, and spiral mode stabilization functions. In addi
Each computer channel compares like sensor data (for
tion, the spoiler gearing has been modified for 0.1 inch lateral
example, yaw rate A, B, and M) to determine validity of each
stick spoiler breakout to improve roll sensitivity and
input and then consolidates the good inputs. The consoli
predictability.
dated sensor inputs are then used to generate output
The roll rate command function tailors differential commands. This provides an additional level of monitoring
stabilizer to maintain a constant lateral stick to roll rate and redundancy.
relationship. This is achieved by comparing the roll rate
command (based upon lateral stick position as measured Note
from trimmed position) to the actual roll rate, then increasing Loss of a computer segregation or individual
or decreasing the differential stabilizer deflection to maintain cross channel data link will result in loss of
the commanded roll rate. The control gains are designed to sensor information provided by the affected seg
provide approximately 20 deg/sec roll rate per inch of lateral regation or link and illuminate the appropriate
stick deflection from trim. caution/advisory lights.
Note The aircraft sensors are supplemented by a pitch/roll
The PA−ARI will perceive a lateral trim offset as voter monitor and air data redundancy management algo
an uncommanded roll rate and will attempt to rithm to provide a fail−operational capability following a
reduce roll rate to zero with the stick in the single sensor failure. Following a second sensor failure, the
trimmed position. As a result, it is possible to DFCS reverts to a fail−safe configuration.
have the stick offset due to lateral trim with zero
2−115 ORIGINAL
2.24.1.4.1 Pitch/Roll Voter Monitor

The pitch/roll voter monitor (PQVM) algorithm pro
vides triple redundancy for the existing duplex pitch and roll
rate gyro sensors. The PQVM operates by calculating aircraft Pulling the Alpha computer circuit breaker will
pitch and roll attitudes from three axis rate information and result in loss of the primary AOA source. This
comparing this against pitch and roll attitudes supplied by the may degrade DFCS performance as the backup
IMU/INS. If a pitch or roll rate sensor miscompare occurs, ADD AOA is subject to sideslip−induced errors.
the PQVM algorithm is used to select the remaining good For the DFCS to operate properly, the Alpha
sensor signal. The monitor does not provide additional rate computer should not be disabled.
information for averaging with the sensor signals. Since only
pitch and roll attitude are available from the IMU/INS, the The primary Mach number input is provided by the
effectiveness of the monitor depends on aircraft attitude. The CADC calculated from the left and right pitot−static probe
monitor is incapable of detecting pitch rate failures with the inputs. Total and static pressure data (Mach number) inputs
wings near vertical (±90 deg bank angle) or roll rate failures from the left and right AICS programmers are used for
with the fuselage near vertical (±90 deg pitch angle). comparison. Similar to the AOA implementation, the upwind
AICS Mach number is selected based upon estimated sideslip
Note and is compared with the CADC Mach number. When the
estimated sideslip angle is less than 2 deg, the Mach
Transient IMU/INS attitude failures will result in calculations from both the left and right AICS programmers
a PQVM miscompare. This will be indicated by are cross checked to determine pressure validity. An AICS
an FCS CAUTION light accompanied by PS and cross check miscompare (1st Mach fault) results in a loss of
RS acronyms. Depressing the MASTER RESET Mach redundancy and is indicated by an FCS CAUTION
pushbutton will restore normal PQVM operation light and PS acronym. Mach scheduling functions are still
and clear the failure indications. Failed velocity being performed using the CADC Mach number. A single
information from the IMU/INS does not affect Mach miscompare between the CADC Mach number and the
operation of the PQVM function. upwind AICS Mach number results in a default Mach number
being set and is indicated by FCS CAUTION, ARI DGR
2.24.1.4.2 Angle of Attack / Mach Redundancy caution lights and PS acronym. Any subsequent Mach failure
Management (2nd Mach fault) results in the UA control laws configuring
to a fail−safe degraded mode and is indicated by PITCH SAS,
The primary angle of attack (AOA) input is provided
FCS CAUTION, ROLL DGR, ARI DGR, and ARI/SAS
by the ARI alpha nose−probe (AOA range 0° to +37°). The
OUT caution lights and PS acronym with the landing gear
fuselage−mounted ADD AOA side−probe (AOA range −4° to
handle up. Subsequent Mach failures do not further degrade
+24° for Mach <0.4) is used for comparison and as a backup
the PA control laws and are indicated by an FCS CAUTION,
AOA source in the event of a detected failure of the ARI
ARI DGR lights and PS acronym with the landing gear
AOA input. Although two AICS AOA inputs are available
handle down.
(AOA range 0° to +30° for Mach >0.5), significant
sideslip−induced errors distort these measurements as a
function of their locations on either side of the fuselage.
Location of sensor probes is discussed in paragraph 2.32
(Pitot Static System). A sideslip estimation routine, based Pulling either AICS programmer circuit breakers
upon lateral acceleration, differential stabilizer, and rudder (LF1 or LG1) will result in DFCS air data failures
position, is implemented to select the upwind AICS AOA and degraded control system capability. This will
source. This AICS AOA is utilized as a triplex monitor to be indicated by one or more of the following
vote out a failed ARI or ADD AOA (1st AOA fault), but is not caution lights depending on flight condition:
of sufficient accuracy to be used as a primary source for FCS CAUTION, PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, and
control law gain scheduling. In the event of a subsequent ARI DGR. Once the AICS circuit breaker is
miscompare between the remaining AOA sources (2nd AOA reset, depressing MASTER RESET should
fault), the ARI control laws are reverted to fail−safe fixed restore normal operation and clear the failure
values for AOA. First AOA miscompares are indicated by an indications.
FCS CAUTION light and PS acronym. Second AOA Note
miscompare are indicated by FCS CAUTION, ROLL DGR,
ARI DGR, and ARI/SAS OUT caution lights and PS acronym D Extremely aggressive maneuvering at high
with the landing gear handle up and FCS CAUTION, ARI AOA or intermittent CADC problems may
DGR caution lights and PS acronym with the landing gear result in a transient AOA or Mach mis
handle down. compare. Depressing the MASTER RESET
ORIGINAL 2−116
Figure 269.DFCS Pitch Interfaces and Control Functions (Sheet 1 of 3)
2−117 ORIGINAL
Figure 2−69. DFCS Pitch Interfaces and Control Functions (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−118
Figure 2−69. DFCS Pitch Interfaces and Control Functions (Sheet 3 of 3)
2−119 ORIGINAL
pushbutton will restore normal operation and 2.24.1.6 Digital Flight Control Computers
clear the failure indications for all single
The DFCS consists of three computers, one for each
failure situations. Dual failure of either the
axis (pitch, roll, and yaw) (Figure 269). Each computer has
Mach or AOA inputs is not resettable with
two distinct channels/segregations (A and B), each in turn
MASTER RESET.
controlling one of the dual series servoactuators in the
D With a dual AOA or Mach failure set, lower respective axis. The DFCS uses cross channel data link
ing the landing gear handle will result in the communication to provide redundancy management so that
PITCH SAS (Mach only), ROLL DGR, and a miscompare between the A and B channels of a given axis
ARI/SAS OUT lights extinguishing. This cannot result in a loss of the entire axis. Each A channel (for
does not imply the dual failure is no longer example, pitch A) is monitored by every B channel (pitch B,
present, only that the impact of the dual fail roll B, and yaw B) and conversely each B channel is
ure on PA control functions are less severe monitored by every A channel. As a result of this monitoring
than on the UA control functions due to the structure, loss of a single channel will only result in loss of
more confined operational flight envelope. functions controlled by that channel and the corresponding
series servoactuator, rather than the entire axis (sensor
2.24.1.5 Sensor Failures information provided by the affected channel will also be
lost). Loss of a second channel will significantly degrade
First sensor input failures are indicated by the FCS DFCS performance or result in a complete loss of all DFCS
CAUTION light and the appropriate acronym (PS, RS, YS, functions. Computer failure effects and cockpit indications
or AM). An FCS CAUTION light with no other lights indi are summarized in Figure 270.
cates a loss of sensor redundancy with no loss of function
ality. The only single sensor failure to light more than the 2.24.1.6.1 Flight Control Computer Reset
FCS CAUTION light is a single Mach miscompare that is
Each computer channel is independently powered and
indicated by FCS CAUTION, ARI DGR caution lights and
can be disabled by pulling the appropriate DC or AC circuit
PS acronym. With a single Mach miscompare, the LSXC and
breaker. In general, there should be no need to cycle DFCS
wing rock suppression functions will be lost. Depressing the
circuit breakers. If power is removed from a channel and then
MASTER RESET pushbutton should clear transient first
restored, the pilot must depress MASTER RESET to restore
sensor failures and failure indications. Second sensor failures
full DFCS functionality. If power is removed from two or
result in loss of functions in the affected axis. The affected
more of the same letter" channels/segregations, most or all
axis will be indicated by a PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, or YAW
of the DFCS functions will be lost. Restoring power will
DGR caution light. For failures affecting either the roll or
cause the DFCS to execute a power on reset" (POR) and the
yaw axis, all ARI functions may be lost. Partial loss or
system will re−initialize interpreting the current sensor
degrade of the ARI is indicated by an ARI DGR caution light.
information as valid. This can create a potentially hazardous
Complete loss of the ARI is indicated by the ARI/SAS OUT
situation under conditions where a dual sensor failure
light. For second AOA, Mach, or roll rate sensor failures the
occurred prior to restoring power. When the DFCS re−
spin recovery function is retained even though the ARI/SAS
initializes it is possible for the failed signals to be interpreted
OUT light is illuminated.
as valid and the remaining good signal to be interpreted as
invalid. Therefore, careful consideration should be given
DFCS failure indications and effects are summarized
before executing a POR airborne, since it can result in
in Figure 270. The DCP fault codes are listed in alpha−
erroneous DFCS commanded control deflections.
numeric order followed by their classification to the IBIT
and/or OFP fault group(s). The IBIT fault group includes
fault codes generated by the IBIT self−test and will be identi
fied in the DCP FAULT DISPLAY following the IBIT"
group header. The OFP fault group includes fault codes gen
erated by the PBIT and/or ABIT self−test(s) and will be iden
If a dual failure has been declared, performing a
tified in the DCP FAULT DISPLAY following the FAIL"
power on reset" to clear the failure can result in
and/or FLT" group header. The failure indication and poten
erroneous DFCS commanded control deflections.
tial functions lost are listed for each individual fault code.
The associated caution lights and maintenance file acronyms When performed on deck, the DC breakers (ROLL A
are listed for each fault code in addition to any applicable DC, YAW B DC, and YAW A DC − 8B4, 8B5, 8B6) are
notes. In certain cases, potential functions lost for multiple generally used to avoid inadvertently inducing additional
failures (also known as a dual faults or 2nd faults) have been faults. A MASTER RESET is required to extinguish the
identified. resulting DFCS caution lights following restoration of power.
ORIGINAL 2−120
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CAUTION LIGHTS
RUDDER AUTH
HZ TAIL AUTH
FCS CAUTION
ARI/SAS OUT
FAILURE FUNCTIONS LOST
AUTOPILOT
MACH TRIM
PITCH SAS
DCP CODE
ROLL DGR
ACRONYM
SPOILERS
YAW DGR
ACLS A/P
ARI DGR
SENSOR FAILURES
PITCH RATE 1F X PS PGYx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
PITCH RATE 2F X X + + PS PGY7 PITCH SAS OFF.
ROLL RATE 1F X RS RGYx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
ROLL RATE 2F X X X X + + RS RGY7 ROLL SAS/ARI OFF. SPIN
RECOVERY RETAINED.
YAW RATE 1F X YS YGYx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
YAW RATE 2F X X X X + + YS YGYx YAW SAS/ARI OFF. ALSO
(PA MODE) GENERATES PQVM FAULT.
YAW RATE 2F X X X X X + + YS YGYx ROLL AND YAW SAS/ARI
(UA MODE) OFF. ALSO GENERATES
PQVM FAULT.
LATERAL X AM LATx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
ACCELERATION 1F
LATERAL X X X X + + AM LATx YAW SAS/ARI OFF.
ACCELERATION 2F
(PA MODE)
LATERAL X X X X X + + AM LATx ROLL AND YAW SAS/ARI
ACCELERATION 2F OFF.
(UA MODE)
LATERAL STICK X RS RCPx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
POSITION 1F
LATERAL STICK X X X X X RS RCPx ROLL SAS/ARI OFF.
POSITION 2F NO SPOILERS.
RUDDER PEDAL X YS RPPx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
POSITION 1F
RUDDER PEDAL X X YS RPPx NO PEDAL FADEOUT
POSITION 2F (NO SLIPPED
(PA MODE) APPROACHES).
RUDDER PEDAL X X YS RPPx NO LSXC OR WING ROCK
POSITION 2F SUPPRESSION.
(UA MODE)
ANGLE OF ATTACK X PS NOTE(1) REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.
1F
ANGLE OF ATTACK X X PS NOTE(1) SLIGHTLY DEGRADED
2F (PA MODE) PA-ARI FUNCTIONS.
Figure 2-70. DFCS Failure Modes and Indications (Sheet 1 of 4)
2-121 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CAUTION LIGHTS
RUDDER AUTH
HZ TAIL AUTH
FCS CAUTION
ARI/SAS OUT
AUTOPILOT
MACH TRIM
PITCH SAS
DCP CODE
ROLL DGR
SPOILERS
ACRONYM
YAW DGR
ACLS A/P
ARI DGR
ANGLE OF ATTACK X X X X PS NOTE(1) ROLL SAS/ARI OFF. SPIN
2F (UA MODE) RECOVERY RETAINED.
MACH NUMBER 1F X X + PS AD02 NO LSXC OR WING ROCK

SUPPRESSION.
MACH NUMBER 1F X X + PS NOTE(2) SLIGHTLY DEGRADED

OR 2F (PA MODE) DUTCH ROLL DAMPING.
MACH NUMBER 2F X X X X X + + PS NOTE(2) PITCH AND ROLL SAS/ARI

(UA MODE) OFF. SPIN REC. RETAINED.
AICS MACH X PS AICX REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.

CROSS CHECK
AICS MACH X X X PS AICX PITCH SAS OFF. SLIGHTLY

CROSS CHECK DEGRADED ROLL SAS.
(QBAR>1230)
INS ATTITUDE X + + PS, IMUx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.

(PQVM ATTITUDE RS
MONITOR)
SCADC VALID TO + + AD03 NO AUTOPILOT.

PITCH COMPUTER
SCADC VALID TO X X X + + PS AD04 NO AUTOPILOT OR MACH

ROLL COMPUTER TRIM. MACH FAULT SET.
SCADC VALID TO X X AD05 NO AUTOPILOT OR

YAW COMPUTER AUTHORITY STOPS.
MAIN LANDING RS LDGx REDUNDANCY LOSS ONLY.

GEAR 1F
MAIN LANDING X RS LDGx DEFAULTS TO UA-ARI

GEAR 2F (SAME AS AFCS AT 15U).
(PA MODE)
MAIN LANDING RS LDGx REMAINS IN UA-ARI.

GEAR 2F
(UA MODE)
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-122
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CAUTION LIGHTS
RUDDER AUTH
HZ TAIL AUTH
FCS CAUTION
ARI/SAS OUT
AUTOPILOT
MACH TRIM
PITCH SAS
DCP CODE
ROLL DGR
ACRONYM
SPOILERS
YAW DGR
ACLS A/P
ARI DGR
COMPUTER FAILURES
PITCH A CHANNEL X X X X X + + PS, PC05 HALF AUTHORITY PITCH

PC,PA SAS. NO INBOARD SPOIL-
RA, RS ERS,
DLC, OR AUTOPILOT.
PITCH B CHANNEL X X X X X PS, PC, PC06 HALF AUTHORITY PITCH
PA, SAS. NO OUTBOARD SPOIL-
RS ERS, DLC, OR AUTOPILOT.
MACH FAULT SET.
ROLL A CHANNEL X X X X X + + PS, RS, RC05 HALF AUTHORITY ROLL
RC, RA SAS/ARI. NO INBOARD
SPOILERS, DLC, MACH
TRIM, OR AUTOPILOT.
ROLL B CHANNEL X X X X RS, RC, RC06 HALF AUTHORITY ROLL
SAS/ARI. NO MACH TRIM
OR AUTOPILOT.
YAW A CHANNEL X X X X X PS, YS, YC05 HALF AUTHORITY YAW
YC, YA, SAS/ARI. NO AUTHORITY
AM STOPS.
YAW B CHANNEL X X X X X X + + PS, PA, YC06 HALF AUTHORITY YAW
YS, SAS/ARI. NO OUTBOARD
YA(4), SPOILERS, DLC, OR
YC, AM AUTHORITY STOPS.
ACTUATOR FAILURES
ROLL OR YAW X — — INDICATES ROLL OR YAW

STAB AUG SAS/ARI SELECTED OFF.
SWITCH OFF
PITCH SERIES X PA PSA1 HALF AUTHORITY PITCH
SERVO 1F OR SAS.
PSA2
PITCH SERIES X + + PA PSA1 PITCH SAS OFF.
SERVO 2F AND
PSA2
ROLL SERIES X X RA RSA1 HALF AUTHORITY ROLL
SERVO 1F OR SAS/ARI.
RSA2
2-123 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CAUTION LIGHTS
RUDDER AUTH
HZ TAIL AUTH
FCS CAUTION
ARI/SAS OUT
AUTOPILOT
MACH TRIM
PITCH SAS
DCP CODE
ROLL DGR
SPOILERS
ACRONYM
YAW DGR
ACLS A/P
ARI DGR
ACTUATOR FAILURES (continued)
ROLL SERIES X X X + + RSA1 RSAA/B ROLL SAS/ARI OFF
SERVO 2F AND
RSA2
YAW SERIES SERVO X X YSA1 YSAA/B HALF AUTHORITY YAW
1F OR SAS/ARI (GAINS DOUBLED).
YSA2
YAW SERIES SERVO X X X + + YSA1 YSAA/B YAW SAS/ARI OFF.
2F AND
(PA MODE) YSA2
YAW SERIES SERVO X X X X + + 11 YSAA/B ROLL AND YAW SAS/ARI OFF.
2F
(UA MODE)
INBOARD SPOILER X + + SP1/2 SP1/2/ AFFECTED SPOILER PANEL
ACTUATOR L/R L/R INOPERATIVE.
OUTBOARD X + + SP3/4 SP3/4/ AFFECTED SPOILER PANEL
SPOILER L/R L/R INOPERATIVE.
ACTUATOR
RUDDER X RUDA FROZEN AT LAST
AUTHORITY ACTUA- COMMANDED POSITION.
TOR
HORIZONTAL TAIL X HZTA FROZEN AT LAST
AUTHORITY ACTUA- COMMANDED POSITION.
TOR
MACH TRIM ACTUA- X MTRM FROZEN AT LAST
TOR COMMANDED POSITION.
PITCH PARALLEL X X PA PPA NO ACLS.
ACTUATOR
(ACL ENGAGED)
DLC TRIM X + + PA DLT1 NO DLC.
ACTUATOR
PITCH AUTOTRIM X + PA PTRM NO AUTOPILOT.
ACTUATOR
+ Lights will illuminate only if autopilot or ACL mode engaged when failure occurs.
“x” or “xx” in fault code depicts multiple numeral possibilities.
NOTE: 1. DCP CODES MAY INCLUDE AOAC, AOAT, DPSR, DPSL, AOAL, AOAR, AC28.
2. DCP CODES MAY INCLUDE AD01, AD02, AD04, CAD7, SPSR, SPSL, TPSR, TPSL, MACL,
MACR, AICX.
3. DCP CODES MAY INCLUDE SPSR, SPSL, TPSR, TPSL, LAIC, RAIC
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-124
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Note 2.24.3 Autopilot

z DFCS synchronization can take up to two
seconds following a power interrupt. If the The autopilot is controlled by four switches on the
MASTER RESET pushbutton is depressed lower half of the DFCS control panel (Figure 2-67) and the
during the synchronization time, an addi- autopilot reference and nosewheel steering pushbutton on the
tional depression of the MASTER RESET stick grip. With all three SAS axes engaged, autopilot opera-
pushbutton will be required to restore spoiler tion is commanded by placing the ENGAGE/OFF switch to
functionality. ENGAGE. No warmup period is required. The autopilot may
be engaged with the aircraft in any attitude. If, however,
z Do not press and hold the MASTER RESET aircraft attitude exceeds ±30 in pitch and ±60 in roll, the
pushbutton. Pressing and holding the autopilot will automatically return the aircraft to these limits.
MASTER RESET pushbutton during the Normally, IMU/INS is the prime reference and SAHRS a
synchronization time will have no effect since backup.
the DFCS computers only recognize the
leading edge of the pulse from the MASTER 2.24.3.1 DFCS Series Actuator
RESET pushbutton, and not the fact that the
button is continuously depressed.
The series actuator is a dual-channel servoactuator that
An IBIT must always be run following POR on deck to is controlled and commanded by the DFCS computers to
ensure full system capability is restored. provide a low-authority input that can be mechanically over-
ridden by the pilot. Each servo of the dual actuator is moni-
Note tored to provide failure detection and automatic shutdown of
a malfunctioning actuator channel. The remaining functional
Both pitch rate gyros are powered through the channel will continue to provide half authority in the affected
Pitch A AC circuit breaker (LB1), while both roll axis. In the yaw axis, the output command is doubled to
rate gyros are powered through the ROLL B AC provide normal YAW SAS response up to the authority of the
circuit breaker (LA1). Removing DFCS Pitch A remaining yaw series servoactuator (+/-9.5 deg). Autopilot
or Roll B computer channel AC power via one of modes may be engageable but will have reduced authority. A
these circuit breakers for more than ~15 seconds dual pitch series servoactuator failure results in loss of the
either on deck or airborne can result in latched PITCH SAS. A dual roll or yaw series servoactuator failure
dual rate sensor faults requiring a POR to clear. results in loss of the affected SAS and all ARI functions.
The only situation in which an airborne power on reset With landing gear retracted, the ROLL SAS will be disabled
should be considered is when a DFCS failure has resulted in whenever ARI functions are lost. This is to minimize risk
unsuitable controllability for landing approach (i.e., com- of departure if a dual failure occurs during aggressive
plete loss of spoilers and asymmetric load condition). In this maneuvering.
case, the risk of potential uncommanded SAS inputs is
outweighed by the risk of attempting landing with marginal Pitch series servoactuator failures are indicated by the
or uncontrollable flying qualities at approach speed. Refer to PITCH SAS caution light and PA acronym. Roll series servo-
Chapter 14.12.1 – Controllability Check. actuator failures are indicated by the ROLL DGR, ARI DGR
caution lights and RA acronym for a first failure and ROLL
2.24.2 Voltage Monitoring DGR, ARI DGR, ARI/SAS OUT caution lights and RA acro-
nym for a second failure. Yaw series servoactuator failures
The DFCS monitors voltage levels internally and no are indicated by the YAW DGR, ARI DGR caution lights and
longer requires the VMCU. When a low voltage condition of YA acronym for a first failure and YAW DGR, ARI DGR,
88.5 volts ac or less or a high voltage condition of 126.5 volts ARI/SAS OUT caution lights and YA acronym for a second
ac or more is detected, the computer channel detecting the failure. With landing gear handle up, the ROLL DGR caution
abnormal voltage will be isolated and its associated functions light will also be illuminated indicating inhibited UA ROLL
will be lost. Failure indications for an isolated computer SAS. Series servoactuator failure effects and cockpit indica-
channel are shown in Figure 2-70. Depressing MASTER tions are summarized in Figure 2-70.
RESET will restore normal system operation once the
voltage is within allowable limits. Note
Similar to the ac power, when dc voltage drops below Taxiing with one engine shut down and the
11.0 volts, the affected computer channel will be isolated and HYD TRANSFER PUMP off may illuminate
the associated functions will be lost. Depressing MASTER the PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, ARI DGR, and
RESET will restore normal system operation once the YAW DGR caution lights.
voltage is within allowable limits.
2-125 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.24.3.2 DFCS Pitch Parallel Actuator 2.24.3.4 Autopilot Emergency Disengage

The DFCS pitch parallel actuator is a single-channel Operation of the autopilot emergency disengage
electrohydraulic servoactuator that provides automatic longi- paddle on the control stick (Figure 2-58), disengages the
tudinal control during mode I and mode IA ACLS approaches. autopilot and DLC. Depressing the paddle with weight on
Pitch commands received by the data link are supplied to the wheels reverts throttle system from the auto or boost mode
parallel actuator via the DFCS pitch computer. As a safety to the manual mode; reverts the engines to SEC mode only
feature, the parallel actuator system contains a mechanical while depressed.
force link that is designed to disconnect the actuator from the Note
control system when excessive force (greater than 90 pounds)
The AUTO PILOT light may or may not illumi-
is encountered at the actuator control rod, thus uncoupling the
nate when the autopilot is disengaged with the
autopilot from the ACL system. Upon ACL engagement, the
autopilot emergency disengage paddle.
parallel actuator centers itself automatically as a function of
stick position, pitch rate, and pitch attitude. Coupling with the
aircraft out of trim or in a climb or descent will result in 2.24.4 Pilot Relief and Guidance Modes
improper centering of the parallel actuator and decreased
2.24.4.1 Control Stick Steering
actuator authority in one direction. This will greatly increase
the probability of uncoupling during the approach since the With the autopilot engaged, the aircraft may be
actuator may command the control systemagainst thephysical maneuvered using control stick steering. In control stick
stop in the direction of reduced authority and disconnect the steering mode, the DFCS automatically synchronizes to the
force link. Similarly, it is possible for the force link to new attitude.
disconnect during pilot OBC if longitudinal trim is not
properly set prior to OBC commencement. Once the force link 2.24.4.2 Attitude Hold
is disconnected, further mode I or mode IA approaches will
Attitude hold is selected by setting the AUTOPILOT
be impossible until the force link is reset by maintenance.
ENGAGE switch to ENGAGE. To change attitude, use
control stick steering. Reengagement is achieved by releas-
ing pressure on the stick. The autopilot will hold pitch
attitudes up to ±30 and bank angles up to ±60 . Inertial
measurement unit failure will cause mode disagreement and
z It is absolutely imperative that the aircraft be the engage switch will return off. The mode may be
trimmed hands-off in level, on-speed, wings- reengaged using SAHRS as a reference.
level flight with landing checks complete prior
to coupling in order toachieve propercentering 2.24.4.3 Heading Hold
of the pitch parallel actuator. Engagement of
ACL in anyother flight condition willseriously Heading (HDG) hold is engaged by setting the
degrade mode I/IA flight characteristics and HDG-OFF-GT switch to HDG. After maneuvering the
aircraft to the desired reference heading, release the control
may result in a force link disconnect. The
stick at a bank angle of less than ±5 . The autopilot will then
recommended method for coupling is to
engage ACL after 15 to 30 seconds of flight in hold the aircraft on the desired heading. Heading reference
the landing configuration with DFCS attitude is obtained from the SAHRS via the CIU.
and altitude hold engaged to utilize the DFCS
2.24.4.4 Ground Track
automatic pitch trim system.
z Commencement of OBC with longitudinal To engage ground track, set the HDG-OFF-GT switch
trim set below zero units with flaps up or to GT. When the A/P REF legend appears, press the
3 units nose up with the flaps down will likely nosewheel steering pushbutton on the control stick grip.
result in a force link disconnect when the When the A/P REF legend goes out, the mode is engaged.
control stick hits the forward stop during Disengagement will occur if more than 1½ pounds
DFCS pitch parallel actuator checks. lateral stick force is applied and will be indicated by the A/P
2.24.3.3 Automatic Pitch Trim REF legend. The ground-track mode may be reengaged by
releasing the stick force and pressing the nosewheel steering
Automatic pitch trim is used in all autopilot pitch modes pushbutton.
to trim the aircraft in order to minimize pitch transients when
disengaging autopilot functions. The pitch servo position is Ground-track steering computations are performed by
monitored to drive the aircraft pitch trim motor at one-tenth the weapon system computer, based on inputs from the CIU,
manual trim rate. The pilot manual trim button on the control IMU, and SAHRS. The computer output, in the form of
stick is inoperative during all autopilot operations. ground-track error signals, is processed in the CIU, which
ORIGINAL 2-126
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
generates steering commands to the autopilot roll axis. Bank roll computers in response to inputs from the data-link
angles are limited to ± 30°. Failure of the INS or SAHRS will converter and IMU. If the data-link vector discrete is present,
cause loss of ground-track steering. the autopilot roll axis will respond to data-link heading
commands and bank angle authority will be limited to ± 30 .
Note
Performing a system reset with ground track (GT) When the PCD discrete is present, the autopilot roll and
engaged will cause the DFCS AUTO PILOT pitch axes will respond to data-link commands.
caution light to illuminate, which may cause the
ground-track mode to disengage. 2.24.4.7 Automatic Carrier Landing
The DFCS incorporates ACLS software with control
2.24.4.5 Altitude Hold laws provide a vertical rate (h-dot) command system with
Altitude hold mode is engaged by setting the ALT-OFF integrated direct lift control (DLC). These control laws
switch to ALT. When the A/P REF legend appears, press the provide corrections for glidepath deviations commanded
nosewheel steering pushbutton when at the desired altitude. directly by horizontal stabilizer and DLC through altitude
This will engage the altitude hold mode and the A/P REF rate “h-dot” feedback. Since the F-14 DFCS does not have a
legend to go out. Applying 10 pounds longitudinal stick force direct altitude rate input from the IMU/INS, the DFCS has
will cause the A/P REF legend to appear. The mode may be incorporated the normal accelerometer (Nz) sensor to derive
reengaged by depressing the nosewheel steering pushbutton a pseudo vertical rate feedback signal by sensing motion in
on the stick grip, when at the desired altitude, and observing the vertical axis. This normal accelerometer is the same
that the A/P REF legend goes out. Altitude hold should not sensor used in the autothrottle approach power compensator
be engaged during any maneuvers requiring large, rapid, (APC) system and the autopilot altitude hold mode.
pitch trim changes because of limited servo authority and ACLS control of the aircraft is achieved through the
slow automatic trim rate. Disengagement of altitude hold is autopilot by pitch parallel servo actuator and DLC com-
accomplished by applying 10 pounds or more longitudinal mands in pitch and spoiler commands in roll. The pitch
stick force or by placing the ALT-OFF switch to OFF. parallel actuator is utilized to command the control stick and
Note horizontal stabilizers to provide a large amplitude, low
frequency control response. The integrated “blended” DLC
z Do not actuate in-flight refueling probe with is utilized to provide a small amplitude, high frequency
altitude hold engaged because of large tran- control response. This system is significantly more capable
sients in pitot-static systems sensed by the than previous versions of compensating for varying engine
CADC. response, winds, and/or deck motion. The DFCS continues to
z Altitude hold performance in the landing con- provide roll control through the spoilers only and does not
figuration with cg forward of 12% will be capitalize on the full benefits of the automatic rudder
degraded due to rapid limiting of servoactua- interconnect (ARI). The lateral axis is the primary limitation
tor authority. Aircrew should avoid aggressive of the F-14 DFCS ACLS and must be closely monitored for
power or bank angle changes in this condition any unacceptable course deviations during the approach.
or undesirable pitch attitudes may result (with-
out decoupling of AUTOPILOT switch). Note
If the pitch parallel actuator force link is mechan-
2.24.4.6 Data-Link Vector — ically disconnected, the A/P REF legend indicat-
Precision Course Direction ing ACL mode engagement may go out when
coupling is attempted, but the aircraft will not
This mode is engaged by placing the VEC/PCD switch
respond to SPN-46 commands and the autopilot
to VEC/PCD and pressing the nosewheel steering push-
will then uncouple from the ACLS when the first
button. Mode engagement is evidenced by the A/P REF
pitch commands are received.
legend going out.
The F-14 DFCS ACLS control laws require the
Disengagement of the mode is accomplished by
incorporation of a software upgrade in the AN/SPN-46
application of stick forces of 7½ pounds lateral or 10 pounds
Automatic Carrier Landing System.
longitudinal, or by placing the VEC/PCD switch to OFF. If
the switch is left in VEC/PCD, the A/P REF legend will Note
appear and the mode may be reengaged by depressing the
ACLS mode I/IA approaches are authorized for
autopilot reference and nosewheel steering pushbutton.
F-14 DFCS aircraft incorporating OFP 4.4 or
Determination of whether data link or precision course subsequent only.
direction signals are present is made in the DFCS pitch and
2-127 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
the ACL mode. DLC disengagement during an

approach will result in automatic downgrade.
z When the ACL mode is engaged, the DLC
neutral spoiler position is shifted from 17.5°to
DFCS software OFP 4.4 is not compatible with
8°. In the event of a downgrade, the DLC
AN/SPN-42 systems. ACLS mode I/IA ap-
neutral spoiler position will return to 17.5°.
proaches are only authorized with AN/SPN-46
This slight transient will occur over a 1 sec
systems.
fade-in schedule so as not to result in any
perceptible change in aircraft energy and/or
2.24.4.7.1 ACL Operation
rate of descent during the approach.
Prior to ACLS engagement, the aircraft should be in the z Between the time the autopilot ACL mode is
landing gear down, full flaps, speedbrakes extended engaged (A/P REF legend goes out) and transi-
approach configuration with direct lift control (DLC), tion to command control (CMD CONTROL
autothrottle approach power compensator (APC), and auto- legend appears), the aircraft may experience a
pilot altitude hold mode engaged. slight altitude deviation of less than 100 feet.
Normal system operation should correct for
this deviation prior to tip-over.
z Care should be taken not to couple above glide-
slope. If above glideslope or reference altitude
ACLS mode I/IA approaches are not authorized wheninitial pitchcommands aresent, theresult-
withtheTHROTTLE MODEswitchinMANUAL. ing nose downcorrection may cause a force link
disconnect resulting in automatic decouple and
Note
an inability to perform mode I/IA approaches
The APG-71 should be in STBY to avoid beacon until maintenance action is performed.
interference problems.
z Care should be taken not to couple after tip
With a valid ACLS coupler discrete (A/P CPLR legend), over or prior to tip over with greater than 500
the autopilot can be armed in the ACL mode with the A/P REF foot per minute rate of climb or descent. If
advisory legend displayed, indicating that a pilot relief mode coupling is attempted after tip over, degraded
(in this case, ACL) has been selected, but not engaged (altitude system performance should be expected,
hold mode will automatically disengage). The pilot can then possibly requiring a PTO no later than 200 feet
couple the autopilot ACL mode to the data link by means of or ½ mile on final. If excessive climb/descent
the autopilot reference pushbutton on the control stick, at rate is established prior to coupling, system
which time, if the DFCS is functioning properly and the ACL control authority may be insufficient to arrest
mode interlocks are satisfied, the AP REF light will be the trend and capture reference altitude.
extinguished. The pilot should report coupled and the
The ACL mode (and autopilot) will be automatically
controller will then send a discrete command control message
disengaged by loss of any aircraft autopilot or ACL mode
that illuminates the CMD CONTROL light. The Naval interlock requirement, if the information stored in the data
Tactical Data System (NTDS) begins transmitting ACLS
link is not updated within any 2-second period, or the aircraft
data-link pitch and bank commands to the aircraft. The
exceeds the flightpath control envelope. The DFCS will
autopilot actuates the appropriate control surface to execute
revert to basic stability augmentation and the pilot can
the desired command, while the autothrottle APC maintains continue the descent in mode II or mode III.
approach angle of attack by controlling the throttle setting.
Note
z Application of more than 2 to 3 pounds of
stick force while attempting to couple will
cause the AUTOPILOT caution light to illu- If the autopilot/ACLS uncouples after approach
minate and coupling cannot be accomplished. commencement, donot attempt to recouple with the
It is imperative that any stick force be avoided CMD CONTROL light illuminated. To do so could
while depressing the autopilot reference cause abrupt attitude changes and a possible force
pushbutton to preclude illumination of the link disconnect. The pilot should verbally instruct
AUTOPILOT caution light. the approach controller, “downgrade to mode II.”
Upon downgrading, the CMD CONTROL
z In the autopilot ACL mode, the ACLS control
lawsutilize DLCtoaugment glideslope control.
DLC engaged is an interlock requirement for
ORIGINAL 2-128
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
light should go out. The ACL RDY and A/P aircraft bolters or if the pilot decides to go around, the
CPLR legends must be displayed prior to any autopilot/ACL mode is disengaged automatically by weight-
attempt at recoupling. on-wheels or overriding the control stick, as the pilot enters
the bolter/waveoff pattern. If the aft longitudinal stick force
Until 12.5 seconds from touchdown, the landing
method is used at or inside the in-close position, the pilot
system commands the aircraft to follow a stabilized glide-
must avoid over-rotation. The waveoff technique described
slope. Inside of 12.5 seconds, the landing system commands
in Chapter 8 applies.
the aircraft to follow the vertical movement of the intended
touchdown point. As a result, some deviations from the
SLOLS glideslope will be noted with large pitching deck
motions.
Between 12.5 and 1.5 seconds from touchdown, the A PTO initiated by autothrottle APC disengage-
approach controller sendsan automatic waveoffdiscrete if any ment with large power additions prior to uncou-
part of the carrier-based equipment fails and up to 5 seconds pling from ACLS will result in large nose down
from touchdown if the aircraft exceeds the AN/SPN-46 commands. A force link disconnect may occur if
flightpath control envelope. Waveoff signals may also be the control stick hits the forward stop.
issued by the final controller between lock-on and touchdown
and the landing signal officer between 1 mile and touchdown.
Approaches must be waved off at precision approach weather
minimums if the pilot cannot see the meatball.
At 1.5 seconds from touchdown, the landing system The paddle switch will disengage the autopilot.
freezes the vertical rate command and sends a bank command Use of the paddle switch to disengage DFCS for
to return the aircraft to a wings-level attitude. The DFCS mode IA landing is not recommended since DLC
follows these commands to touchdown, unless the pilot elects will also be disengaged. The PITCH and ROLL
to disengage from the ACL mode via pilot takeover. SAS switches will remain engaged.
Note
z The paddle switch will revert throttles to
MANUAL mode with weight-on-wheels.
z The paddle switch, control stick forces, or loss
If the pilot and/or LSO recognizes a course drift of any aircraft ACL mode interlock will
immediately prior to or at command freeze, the illuminate the MASTER CAUTION light,
pilot will be required to make a lateral correction AUTOPILOT caution light, and ACLS/AP
toprevent unacceptable deviation fromcenterline. caution ladder light.
Pilot takeovers (PTO) may be desired/required during ACL mode disengagement via the autopilot reference
ACLS approaches. In the case of an ACLS mode IA approach pushbutton or PLM pushbutton will illuminate the ACLS/AP
the PTO shall be executed prior to 200-feet altitude and caution ladder light, but not the MASTER CAUTION and
½ -mile. All approaches must be waved off at precision AUTOPILOT caution lights. The PLM pushbutton com-
approach weather minimums if the pilot cannot see the mands the radar to pilot lock-on mode when the A/P CPLR
meatball. The recommended method for a PTO is via the legend is not displayed. However, when the A/P CPLR
autopilot reference pushbutton located on the control stick to legend is displayed, selection of the PLM pushbutton
disengage the ACL mode and the CAGE/SEAM pushbutton disengages the ACL mode. ACL mode disengagement via
on the throttle to disengage autothrottle APC. An alternative control stick forces or the emergency disengage paddle will
method to disengage the ACL mode is via the PLM illuminate the MASTER CAUTION light, the AUTOPILOT
pushbutton. Another method to disengage the ACL mode is caution light, and the ACLS/AP caution ladder light.
via the manual deselection of the ACL or AUTOPILOT Manually disengaging the ACL mode and/or AUTOPILOT
switches. Manual deselection of the THROTTLE MODE switches will illuminate the ACLS/AP caution ladder light,
switch will disengage the autothrottle APC. Manual deselec- but not the MASTER CAUTION and AUTOPILOT caution
tion of these switches may be difficult to accomplish, lights.
especially during the final stages of the approach. The paddle
switch will disengage the ACL mode and autopilot, but will 2.24.5 DFCS Test
also disengage DLC. As a last resort, overriding the control
stick with 10 pounds longitudinal or 7 pounds lateral control The DFCS has several self-test modes. These include
stick force will disengage the ACL mode and 11 pounds of power-up BIT (PBIT), initiated BIT (IBIT), and automatic
force per throttle will disengage the autothrottle APC. If the BIT (ABIT). The results of these tests are indicated by the
2-129 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
illumination of applicable caution lights, maintenance file serve as an indication that IBIT is running. The IBIT
acronyms, and DFCS control panel (DCP) fault display sequence will continue with the pitch trim check (slow longi-
codes. tudinal stick motion), PITCH SAS actuator check (no longi-
tudinal stick motion), the pitch parallel actuator check (rapid
2.24.5.1 DFCS Power-up BIT (PBIT) longitudinal stick motion), the individual spoiler operation
check (from right to left), and the ROLL and YAW SAS
A DFCS power-up BIT is an automatic function of actuator checks. DFCS IBIT concludes with disengagement
the DFCS that is initiated when power is initially applied of the AUTOPILOT switch, activation of the rudder pedal
to the aircraft. Power-up BIT is completed in approximately shaker check, and illumination of an alternating test pattern
2 seconds. Following a successful power-up BIT, the flight to test all pixels of the DCP LED fault display.
control computers will synchronize and enter the operational
flight program mode following depression of the MASTER Premature termination of the IBIT sequence will cause
RESET pushbutton. Failure of power-up BIT will result in the ACLS/AP and AP REF lights to stop flashing and leave
illumination of caution lights and DCP fault display codes all other DFCS caution lights illuminated. The DCP fault
(Figure 2-71) associated with the failed computer(s) that will display will indicate “ABRT” when IBIT is terminated
not reset with MASTER RESET. The failed computer(s) prematurely.
will remain isolated and will not enter the operational flight
program mode. Following completion of a successful IBIT, all DFCS
caution lights will be extinguished, the AUTOPILOT switch
2.24.5.2 DFCS Initiated BIT (IBIT) will be OFF, and the DFCS will automatically enter the
operational flight program mode. The DCP will display a
A DFCS Initiated BIT is a thorough preflight indication “PASS” indication in the DCP fault display.
of DFCS performance and can be obtained during poststart
OBC or a DFCS BIT. All SAS switches must be engaged, Following an IBIT with one or more failures, caution
weight-on-wheels, flaps extended greater than 25°or wings lights and acronyms for the detected failures will be dis-
swept aft of 62°, and ANTI-SKID SPOILER BK switch OFF. played. The DCP fault display will indicate “NO GO” and
If one of these interlocks is not satisfied the DFCS will not fault codes for the specific failed WRAs can be viewed using
enter the IBIT ARM state. The AUTOPILOT switch must be the INC and DEC pushbuttons. The DFCS will automatically
engaged to test autopilot functions and can only be engaged enter the operational flight program, even though IBIT has
in the IBIT ARM state. detected failures. Depression of the MASTER RESET push-
button will extinguish caution lights and acronyms, but will
Longitudinal trim should be greater than 0°for flaps up not clear DCP IBIT fault codes. Any discrepancies detected
and greater than 3° for flaps down. The MASTER TEST by IBIT may still exist even though caution lights have been
switch must be selected to “IBIT ARM” by raising and rotat- extinguished with MASTER RESET. Another IBIT must be
ing to the “OBC” or “DFCS BIT” position. The DCP fault completed to ensure proper system operation.
display will alternate between an “IBIT” and “ARM” indica-
tion to confirm that IBIT is in the armed state. The AUTO-
PILOT switch can be engaged at this time in order to test
autopilot functions during IBIT. If the INC or DEC push-
buttons are depressed in the IBIT ARM state the DCP will
indicate any existing fault display codes. In this case, the Following an IBIT, a MASTER RESET will
DFCS is still in the IBIT ARM mode and the depression of clear the IBIT caution/advisory light failure indi-
a MASTER RESET will restore the IBIT ARM codes to the cations, but will not clear the FAULT DISPLAY
fault display, but is not required. A DFCS IBIT test sequence IBIT codes. This does not indicate that the fail-
will commence upon depression of the MASTER TEST ures detected during IBIT are resolved. The
switch in the “DFCS BIT” position, or a complete OBC DFCS should not be considered fully opera-
encompassing all aircraft functions may be subsequently tional. Only the successful completion of another
initiated by the RIO with the MASTER TEST switch in the IBIT can verify proper system operation.
“OBC” position.
Note
The DFCS IBIT sequence will commence with the
following: The DCP fault display will alternate between an Spoiler actuator IBIT tests are run only with the
“IBIT” and “RUN” during the entire IBIT run sequence. All wings forward and flaps down. During IBIT,
ten DFCS caution lights (including the HZ TAIL AUTH, spoilers are deflected individually, one at a time
RUD AUTH, and SPOILERS lights) will illuminate and the starting with the right no. 4 spoiler.
ACLS/AP and AP REF lights will flash once per second to
ORIGINAL 2-130
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CODE REMARKS
ARM IBIT is armed awaiting BIT initiate (alternates between “IBIT” and “ARM”).
RUN Indication that IBIT is running (alternates between “IBIT” and “RUN”).
ABRT IBIT has aborted before it completed.
PASS IBIT passed without any failures.
NOGO IBIT completed with failures.
GO No current, in-flight, or IBIT failures have been logged.
FAIL Failures following this code are current fault indications.
FLT Failures following this code were logged during flight.
IBIT Failures following this code were logged during the most recent IBIT run.
END Failure list end has been reached.
CLR Failure clearing sequence has been started.
---- Indicates completion of clearing sequence.
Figure 2-71. DFCS DCP System Display Codes
If the pitch parallel actuator is functioning properly, 2.24.6 DFCS Control Panel Fault Reporting
large longitudinal control stick deflections should be
observed during IBIT. An IBIT with the flaps down requires The DFCS control panel (DCP) incorporates an LED
a longitudinal trim of 3 or more noseup; an IBIT with the alphanumeric fault display. This fault display is intended for
wings at 68 requires not less than 0 noseup. A pitch parallel ground use only to assist in the troubleshooting and repair of
actuator force link disconnect during IBIT is indicated by the DFCS and related components. The DCP will not display
illumination of the AUTOPILOT caution light, a PA any fault data with weight off wheels. DFCS operational DCP
acronym, and the absence of large control stick deflections. system display codes are listed in Figure 2-71. The fault dis-
It is possible for the force link to be partially disconnected; play will group faults into three categories: currently existing
that is, disconnected mechanically while electrical faults (FAIL), faults detected in flight (FLT), and faults that
continuity is maintained. If this has occurred, the are detected during initiated BIT (IBIT). Fault codes will be
AUTOPILOT caution light or PA acronym may be absent displayed in order by repeated depression of the INC push-
after IBIT, but no large stick deflection will be observed. The button. Current failures will be displayed first followed by
implications of this condition are the same as for a total in-flight detected failures, and any IBIT detected failures.
disconnect (no ACL capability). This will be indicated by “FAIL” followed by any current
failures, then “FLT” followed by any in-flight logged fail-
2.24.5.3 DFCS Automatic BIT (ABIT) ures, and finally by “IBIT” followed by failures detected
during the last executed IBIT. If there are no failures in a
A DFCS Automatic BIT provides continuous failure
particular group that group’s header will not be displayed.
monitoring of the DFCS. Test coverage for ABIT is not as
When all faults have been displayed, “END” will be dis-
extensive as IBIT and should not be used as a replacement for
played. The INC or DEC pushbuttons may be used to scroll
performing a pre-flight IBIT. ABIT failures will be recorded
forward or backward through the fault codes. If no failures
in a maintenance data store and are listed on the DCP fault
have been logged, depression of the INC or DEC pushbutton
display following the “FAIL” and “FLT” headers. Depending
will display a “GO” indication.
on the severity of the problem detected, functionality may be
lost and the appropriate caution/advisory lights illuminated
and acronyms displayed.
2-131 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.24.6.1 Current Faults message for 3 seconds followed by a flashing “CLR” mes-
sage for 4 seconds. Once all FLT fault codes are cleared, all
On the ground, currently existing faults are indicated center segments “----” will be illuminated and the INC and
by a combination of caution/advisory lights and acronyms. DEC pushbuttons can then be released. IBIT faults can only
After momentary depression of the INC or DEC pushbutton, be cleared by the completion of a successful IBIT “PASS,”
the current fault codes will be listed following the “FAIL” a power on reset, or loss of system power. Current FAIL faults
header. The current faults are logged in volatile memory and can be cleared from the display by depressing MASTER
will be lost following removal of system power. If faults exist RESET once the fault no longer exists or loss of system
when the aircraft goes weight off wheels, they are added to power.
the in-flight fault listing.
2.24.6.2 In-Flight Detected Faults
In-flight faults will be logged and stored in chronologi-

cal order. During the normal startup or shutdown sequence, Following an IBIT, a MASTER RESET will
depressing the INC or DEC pushbuttons will indicate if any clear the IBIT caution/advisory light failure indi-
in-flight faults were logged. In-flight faults will be listed cations, but will not clear the FAULT DISPLAY
following the “FLT” header. Each particular fault code will IBIT codes. This does not indicate that the fail-
only be displayed once regardless of the number of failures ures detected during IBIT are resolved. The
recorded during the flight, unless a POR is recorded in which DFCS should not be considered fully opera-
case the sequence is allowed to repeat previously listed tional. Only the successful completion of another
codes. In-flight faults remain in memory until manually IBIT can verify proper system operation.
cleared by the pilot or ground crew. To avoid confusion,
in-flight faults should be cleared just prior to each flight. Loss 2.25 LANDING GEAR SYSTEMS
of system power does not remove FLT faults from memory
to enable reference by maintenance personnel during post- The aircraft has fully retractable, tricycle landing gear
flight troubleshooting. operated by combined hydraulic pressure in the normal mode
of operation and a stored source of pressurized nitrogen for
2.24.6.3 IBIT Detected Faults emergency extension. The landing gear retract forward so
that airloads and gravity assist on emergency extension. Air-
Successful completion of IBIT is indicated by the oil shock struts with oil metering pins reduce landing loads
absence of caution/advisory lights and acronyms. A “PASS” transmitted to the airframe, and the struts are fully extended
indication will also be displayed on the DCP. Depressing with the gear in the wells. All landing gear doors remain open
MASTER RESET will then blank the display (or will return with the gear extended. Design limit landing sink speed for
to alternating “IBIT” and “ARM” if all IBIT interlocks are the aircraft is 1,520 feet per minute (nominal landing sink
still valid). IBIT detected faults are indicated by the appropri- speed is about 650 feet per minute).
ate caution/advisory lights and acronyms, and a “NOGO”
indication on the DCP. After momentary depression of the 2.25.1 Landing Gear Handle
INC or DEC pushbutton, fault codes from the most recent
IBIT run will be listed following the “IBIT” header. The IBIT The landing gear handle mechanically positions the
faults are logged in volatile memory and will be lost follow- landing gear valve for normal operation. Pulling the handle
ing removal of system power. mechanically selects emergency extension of the gear using
the pneumatic backup source. Both modes of gear operation
2.24.6.4 Clearing Fault Indications can be accomplished without electrical power except for the
gear position indication, which requires dc essential No. 2
Simultaneous and continuous depression of the INC bus power. Gear downlock actuators incorporate internal
and DEC pushbuttons for 7 sec will clear any logged FLT mechanical finger locks that maintain the downlock inserted
fault codes. This will be indicated by a steady “CLR”
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-132
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
position in the absence of hydraulic pressure. The landing

gear handle contains other interlocks that are discussed under
their respective systems such as weapons firing, jettison
systems, APC, maneuvering flaps, and ground power system
test panel.
z Illumination of indexer lights does not indi-
Normal and emergency controls and displays associated cate that the main landing gear are clear of the
with operation of the landing gear are shown in Figure 2-72. runway. Raising the gear before a positive rate
of climb is established will result in blown
2.25.2 Main Landing Gear main tires.
z Illumination of indexer and approach lights is
Each main landing gear shock strut consists of an upper not an indication of gear down and locked.
outer cylinder and a lower internal piston, which has a maxi-
mum stroke of 25 inches. A hard step (31,000 pounds 2.25.3 Nose Landing Gear
required for further compression) in the strut air curve pro-
vides a consistent 4-inch stroke remaining in the ground The dual-wheel nose landing gear has a shock strut
static condition. A side-brace link is mechanically extended consisting of an outer cylinder and a lower internal piston that
from the inboard side of the strut outer cylinder to engage in has a maximum stroke of 18 inches. During normal ground
a nacelle fitting and thus provides additional side load operations, the strut is fully extended. Pilot control is pro-
support for ground operations. vided to kneel the strut (4 inches stroke remaining) for cata-
pult operations (see Figure 2-77). During retraction, the fully
The path of the wheel assembly is controlled by the extended nose strut is rotated forward by the retract actuator
drag brace as it folds (jackknifes upwards) during gear retrac- into the well and enclosed by two forward and two aft doors.
tion and unfolds during extension. The fully extended shock The forward doors are operated by a separate actuator that
strut and jackknifed drag brace retracts forward and rotates also engages the gear uplock, whereas the two aft doors are
the wheel assembly 90 to lie flat in the wheelwell. Inboard, mechanically linked to the shock strut. An uplock hook
outboard and aft main gear doors are individually actuated actuator engages a roller on the lower piston to hold the gear
closed in sequence to provide fairing for the retracted gear. and doors in the retracted position. During extension, the
An uplock hook on the shock strut engages a roller in the telescoping drag brace compresses so that a downlock actua-
wheelwell to hold the gear in the retracted position. The main tor mechanically locks the inner and outer barrel to form a
landing gear actuator on the inboard side of the shock strut rigid member for transmission of loads to the airframe.
retracts and extends the gear assembly.
The gear downlock actuator, mounted at the drag brace Note
knee pin, extends to prevent unlocking (jackknifing) of the z There is no foolproof visual check of the nose
drag brace. Hydraulic pressure must be supplied to the landing gear locked-down status. Neither the
downlock actuator in order to retract it against the spring downlock mechanism, which is concealed in
action of the integral locking mechanism. A paint stripe the fuselage nor insertion of the ground lock
across the drag brace knee pin provides an external visual pin will provide a positive indication of
indication of the drag brace locked condition. A ground lock gear-locked status. In flight, the pilot must
device clamps onto the downlock actuator rod for safetying normally rely on his indicator. Visual deter-
the main gear. mination of nose landing gear unlocked status
Maximum strut extension and wheel alignment are is assisted by a red band painted on the nose
controlled by torque arms that incorporate cam-operated landing gear drag brace. If red is visible, the
microswitches to detect a weight-on-wheels condition nosegear is not locked.
(greater than 5 inches of strut compression). The single z An additional sequencing switch in series with
split-type wheel assembly incorporates thermal fuse blow the existing down-and-locked switch provides
plugs and a pressure relief device to prevent overinflation of the pilot with a positive indication of nosegear
the tire.
2-133 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 WHEELS warning light Light flashes with flaps greater than 10_ deflection and either or both
throttles less than approximately 85% rpm, and all landing gear not down
and locked. Approach lights and indexer will illuminate when the LDG
GEAR handle is placed in the down position, but this is not an indication
of gear down and locked.
2 LDG GR indicator
— Landing gear down and locked (except main landing gear
sidebrace actuator).
— Landing gear retracted and doors closed.
— Unsafe gear or power off indication.
3 Landing gear transition On whenever gear and door positions (including main landing gear
light sidebrace actuators) do not correspond to handle position. Off when gear
and doors are locked in position selected by handle.
Figure 2-72. Landing Gear Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-134
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
4 HYD ISOL switch FLT — Combined system hydraulic pressure is shut off to the
landing gear, nosewheel steering and wheel brakes.
T.O./LDG — Switch is automatically placed in this position with gear
handle down. Combined hydraulic pressure is available to
all components.
5 DOWN LOCK ORIDE Down — Weight-on-wheels indication, prevents gear handle being
lever retracted without pilot override (raising lever).
Up — Weight-off-wheels indication, does not inhibit pilot raising
gear handle. Automatic operation by electrical solenoid.
6 LDG GEAR handle Normal — Up and down overcenter action provides normal retraction
and extension by the combined hydraulic system.
Emergency — Down-push-turn-clockwise pull action provides emergency
extension of all gear by a compressed nitrogen charge.
Figure 2-72. Landing Gear Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
position. If the nose landing gear is unsafe in locked in the down position with weight on wheels to
the down position because of premature prevent inadvertent gear retraction. Pilot override of the
deployment of the nose landing gear locking solenoid-operated handle lock can be effected by lifting the
pin, the nosegear indicator will indicate downlock lever next to the gear handle. Vertical movement
unsafe and the transition light will illuminate. of the gear handle causes a corresponding up and down selec-
tion of the landing gear with the combined hydraulic system
Maximum strut extension and wheel steering angle are pressurized. Three flip-flop indicators provide a position
controlled by torque arms interconnecting the steering collar display for each of the landing gear, and a gear transition light
and the lower piston (see Figure 2-77). The split-type wheel on the control panel illuminates anytime the gear position
assembly incorporates a tire pressure relief device to prevent and handle do not correspond. In addition, a WHEELS
overinflation of the tire. Additional hardware on the nose warning light alerts the pilot if the landing gear is not down
landing gear include the launch bar, holdback fitting, with flaps deflected greater than 10 and either or both
approach lights, nosewheel steering actuator, and taxi light. throttles set for less than approximately 85-percent rpm.
The wheel axles incorporate recessed holes for attachment of
a universal tow bar with maximum steering angle of ± 120 .
z Unless attempting fast-cycle troubleshooting

for gear that indicates unsafe nosegear down,
Restrict nosewheel deflection to ±90 to prevent transition light illuminated, wait for gear to
structural damage to the nosewheel steering unit. completely transition (15 seconds with
normal hydraulic pressure) before recycling
the landing gear handle. When fast cycling the
2.25.4 Landing Gear Normal Operation
gear handle, the pilot must immediately
return the gear handle to the down position to
The landing gear handle is mechanically connected to
avoid damaging the main landing gear doors
the landing gear valve that directs combined hydraulic fluid
and inducing a possible combined hydraulic
into the gear-up and gear-down lines and provides a path for
or brake system failure.
return flow. In the down position, the handle mechanically
sets the hydraulic isolation switch to provide hydraulic pres- z Maximum landing gear tire speed is 190 knots.
sure for gear operation. The handle is electromechanically
2-135 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.25.4.1 Landing Gear Handle Up The emergency landing gear nitrogen bottle is located
in the nose wheelwell. Normal preflight bottle pressure is
Placement of the landing gear handle to UP actuates the 3,000 psi at 70_ F. Minimum bottle pressure for accomplish-
landing gear valve that ports hydraulic pressure to the down- ing emergency extension to the down-and-locked position is
lock actuators, gear retract actuators, and, in sequence, to the 1,800 psi.
door and uplock actuators. The gear shock strut and door
uplocks are hydraulically operated into a mechanical over- Pneumatic pressure is directed by separate lines to
center position. An UP indication is displayed on the gear power open the gear door actuators in sequence, release the
position indicators when the gear are in the uplock and all gear uplock actuators, pressurize the nosegear actuator to
doors closed. extend the gear (main gear free fall), and pressurize the
downlock actuators. A normal gear-down indication is
2.25.4.2 Landing Gear Handle Down achieved upon emergency gear extension. Following emer-
gency gear extension, nosewheel steering is disabled. Once
Placement of the LDG GEAR handle to DN actuates the landing gear is extended by emergency means, it cannot
the gear control module to port hydraulic pressure to the door be retracted while airborne and must be reset by maintenance
uplocks, door actuators, and the strut uplocks. The landing personnel.
gear are hydraulically extended and assisted by gravity and
airloads. A gear-down symbol (wheel) is displayed on the
gear position indicators when the gear downlocks are in the
locked position. The gear transition light will go out when the
main gear side-brace links are engaged.
D Emergency extension of the landing gear shall
Note be logged in the Maintenance Action Form
(OPNAV Form 3760-2).
With the main gear downlock inserted but the
side-brace link not engaged, landing sink speed D To facilitate in-flight refueling probe exten-
is restricted to 480 feet per minute. Minimize sion when the landing gear has been blown
yaw and sideslips on touchdown and rollout. down, raise the landing gear handle to give
priority to the refueling probe system.
2.25.5 Emergency Gear Extension
2.26 WHEELBRAKE SYSTEM
Although emergency gear extension can be initiated
with the landing gear control handle in any position, it is The wheelbrake system provides power boost hydrau-
preferable that the LDG GEAR handle be placed in DN lic control of the multiple disk-type main wheelbrakes using
before actuating the emergency extension system. pressurized fluid in the landing gear down line from the
combined hydraulic system. Individual or collective wheel-
brake control can be modulated by depression of the rudder
toe pedals, or collective, unmodulated brake control is avail-
able with the parking brake. An antiskid system is provided
to operate electrohydraulically in conjunction with the
The landing gear handle must be held in the fully normal wheelbraking mode. Wheelbrake controls are shown
extended emergency position for a minimum of in Figure 2-73.
1 second to ensure complete actuation of the air
release valve. Approximately 55 pounds pull Brake pedal and parking brake control motions are
force is required to fully actuate the emergency mechanically transmitted to the power brake module
nitrogen bottle. The pulling motion should be together with the antiskid valve. Separate hydraulic lines
rapid and continuous to ensure the air release transmit normal and emergency fluid pressure from the
valve goes completely overcenter to the locked power brake module to the left and right wheelbrake
position. The landing gear handle will be loose assemblies. At each brake assembly, the normal and
(fore and aft) in its housing as an indication of emergency lines input fluid to the brake shuttle valve, which
complete extension of the handle. An incomplete applies brakes as a function of normal or emergency line fluid
handle motion could cause partial porting of pressure. Two wear-indicator pins on the brake piston
gaseous fluid, initiating the emergency dump housing measure lining wear for preflight inspection. For
sequence. Interruption of handle motion without new brakes, these pins extend approximately one-half inch
completing the overcentering action of the valve above the piston housing. When the pin is flush with the
could cause the extending gears to contact and piston housing with the parking brake applied, the brake
damage the strut doors. assembly is worn to the point of replacement.
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-136
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 Parking brake handle Forward — Parking brake released. Modulated braking action avail-
able with brake pedal depression.
Aft — Parking brake set. No modulation of control, locks both
main wheel brakes.
2 BRAKES warning light Indicates parking brake handle is pulled, antiskid has failed, or operation is
in auxiliary brake mode when brake pedals are depressed.
3 Brake Pedals Press top of rudder pedals to command normal or auxiliary braking.
4 Hand pump Recharges auxiliary and parking brake accumulators with gear handle
down. With REFUEL PROBE switch in FUS or ALL EXTD, provides
emergency extension or retraction of refueling probe regardless of gear
handle position.
5 BRAKE PRESSURE Provides pilot indication of brake accumulator pressure remaining which is
gage indicative of auxiliary and emergency brake cycles remaining.
6 ANTI SKID SPOILER BK BOTH — Antiskid activated. Spoiler brakes operative with weight
switch on wheels and both throttles in IDLE.
OFF — Antiskid deactivated, spoiler brakes inoperative.
SPOILER BK — Spoiler brakes operate with weight on wheels and both
throttles IDLE. Antiskid is deactivated.
Figure 2-73. Wheelbrake Controls and Indicators
2-137 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Four thermal relief plugs are mounted in each main 2.26.2 Normal Braking
wheel assembly to relieve tire pressure and thus avert a blow- In the normal mode of operation, wheelbrake applica-
out because of hot brakes if the local wheel temperature tion is modulated by brake pedal depression using pressur-
exceeds 428 F. ized fluid from the combined hydraulic system through the
brake module and through the normal brake line to the brake
The capacities of the wheelbrake assemblies are suffi- assembly. In the normal mode of operation, the brake
cient to restrain the aircraft in a static condition on a dry pressure gauge indication should continue to indicate a full
surface with MIL power set on both engines. The minimum charge on the brake accumulators since this fluid energy is
hydroplaning speed for the main tires on a wet runway is maintained by the combined hydraulic system. Normal
approximately 90 knots. combined-system operations can result in pressure excur-
sions that will be trapped in the brake system. This can cause
2.26.1 Brake Characteristics the brake pressure indicators to read beyond the full range of
the gauges. This will not affect system performance.
Because carbon brakes contain solid disk-shaped
carbon rotors and stators, they cannot shingle. The thermal
characteristics prevent them from fusing together during or
following heavy braking.
z After heavy or repeated braking or if hot
Carbon brakes may produce a sudden increase in brake
brakes are suspected, allow a 5 to 10-minute
torque as brake pedal force is smoothly increased. This can
cooling period with the gear extended before
produce grabbing at low brake pedal force inputs. This grab-
bing is caused by excessive air in the combined hydraulic retracting the gear.
system. Open-loop bleeding of the combined hydraulic sys- z If heavy braking is used during landing or
tem by maintenance personnel will reduce the amount of air taxiing followed by application of the parking
in the system and should eliminate any associated grabbing. brake, normal brake operation may not be
If grabby brakes are experienced, smooth modulation to available following release of the parking
higher braking forces is easily accomplished after the initial brake if the brakes are still hot. Check for nor-
grabbing. The sudden increase in torque is most noticeable mal brake operation after releasing the park-
at moderate to slow taxi speeds. As groundspeed increases, ing brake and prior to commencing taxiing.
the kinetic energy of the aircraft increases and the effect of
the sudden torque increase is significantly reduced. Normal 2.26.3 Antiskid
braking technique should be used during normal rollout. The antiskid system operates electrohydraulically in
conjunction with the normal mode of wheelbrake operation
The pilot must apply maximum pressure on the brake to deliver maximum wheelbraking upon pilot command
pedals to hold the aircraft static at MIL. If carbon brakes have without causing a skid. Essential No. 2 bus dc power for
been heated up by a full-stop landing, and for about 45 min- antiskid operation is supplied through the ANTI SKID/R
utes thereafter, they will probably not hold the aircraft static AICS LKUP PWR circuit breaker (8E1) and controlled by
with military power set on both engines even with the parking the ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch (Figure 2-73). When
brake set. In this case, 75 to 100 pounds of pedal force will energized, approximately 200 milliseconds are required for
hold the aircraft static with afterburner set on one engine and antiskid system warmup. Individual wheel rotational veloc-
idle power set on the other. In all cases, holding the aircraft ity is sensed by skid detectors mounted in the wheel hubs and
static at high power settings depends on adequate runway and transmitted to the skid control box. The control box detects
tire conditions. Degraded conditions such as wet runways or changes in wheel deceleration and reduces fluid pressure in
worn tires may result in tire skid at high power settings. the normal brake lines to both wheels, simultaneously, to
prevent a skid.
With the antiskid system armed in flight, the touch-
down circuit in the control box prevents braking until weight
is on both main gear and the wheels have spun up, regardless
of brake pedal application. The antiskid system is inoperative
When the antiskid system becomes inoperative at groundspeeds of less than 15 knots. During maximum-
at 15 knots during a maximum-effort stop, effort antiskid braking, expect a rough, surging deceleration.
carbon brakes can lock the wheels and pedal When the ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch is in BOTH
pressure should be relaxed as the aircraft deceler- during low-speed taxi (less than 10 knots for more than a few
ates through 15 knots during a maximum effort seconds), subsequent acceleration of the aircraft through
antiskid stop. approximately 15 knots will cause a temporary loss of brakes
ORIGINAL 2-138
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
lasting from 2 to 10 seconds. Should this happen, use of the electrical failure occurs in the antiskid system or if hydraulic
brakes can be regained instantly by turning antiskid OFF. To pressure is withheld from either brake for greater than 1.2
preclude this possibility, antiskid must be OFF during taxi. seconds by the control box, the system automatically becomes
inoperative and illuminates the BRAKES warning light with
the ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch in BOTH.
2.26.3.1 Antiskid Ground Test

z Failure of the weight-on-wheels switch During ground operation, a self-test of the antiskid
results in continuous release signal with anti- system can be initiated on the face of the control box with the
skid selected. Normal braking is available system energized, parking brake handle released, and the
with antiskid off. aircraft in a ground static condition. Before taxiing (chocks
z If the antiskid system fails, allowing antiskid in place), but after releasing the parking brake and while the
to operate below 15 knots, place the ANTI pilot presses the toe pedal brakes, the plane captain should
SKID SPOILER BK switch in OFF; otherwise press the antiskid test pushbutton on the control box in the
the aircraft cannot be stopped using normal nose wheelwell. Approximately 10 seconds is required for
braking. self-test, which checks the operational status of the control
box, brake valve, and wheel sensors. Any discrepancies
detected will be displayed by the BIT flags on the face of the
control box (Figure 2-74).
Failure to release brakes prior to deselecting A valid BIT test requires that three criteria be met: the
ANTI SKID may result in blown tires. BIT flags on the face of the control box must check good,
the pilot must feel both brakes release during BIT test, and
The antiskid system is inoperative when the wheel- the BRAKES warning light must not remain illuminated. A
brakes are in the auxiliary or parking modes of operation flash of the BRAKES light coinciding with brake pedal
since the emergency brake lines bypass the brake valve. If an thumps during the antiskid BIT check is acceptable.
Figure 2-74. Antiskid BIT Box
2-139 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Before initiating antiskid self-test by pressing the

D Even though braking action is available at
antiskid pushbutton on the control box, ensure
accumulator pressures less than 3,000 psi,
that the aircraft chocks are in place. Initiation of
braking force is proportional to pressure
antiskid self-test will release aircraft brakes.
remaining. Red band pressure (1,900 psi) is
sufficient to hold the brakes locked with the
2.26.4 Auxiliary Brake
aircraft stationary in all deck conditions;
Two different auxiliary brake systems are presently however, rolling motion greatly increases
incorporated in the aircraft. Entry into the auxiliary brake pressure requirements. Accumulator pressure
mode is the same for both systems. Transfer of normal brake of up to 2,100 psi may be required to stop a
operation to the auxiliary mode is automatic without the moving aircraft in a 4_ deck roll. In deck rolls
requirement for pilot action upon the loss of combined greater than 6_, 3,000 psi may not be suffi-
hydraulic system pressure. Both auxiliary braking systems cient to stop a moving aircraft.
have two brake accumulators that provide pressure for D Complete loss of hydraulic fluid through the
auxiliary and parking brake modes of operation when
wheelbrake hydraulic lines will render
combined hydraulic system is not available. Accumulators
parking brake ineffective.
deliver 3,000 psi when fully charged by the combined
hydraulic system or hydraulic handpump (with the gear
2.26.5 BRAKES Warning Light
handle down only). When the combined hydraulic system
pressure decreases below 1,425 psi, the shuttle valve in the
power brake module shifts the brake system to the auxiliary The BRAKES warning light will illuminate whenever
brake mode. auxiliary brake pressure is applied to the brakes via the brake
pedals, indicating the combined hydraulic system pressure is
Approximately 13 to 14 full dual-brake applications not available to the brakes and cautioning the pilot to monitor
are available in the auxiliary mode. Dual pneumatic BRAKE brake application with the auxiliary brake pressure indicator.
PRESSURE gauges on the front cockpit center pedestal show A postlight is installed above the BRAKE PRESSURE gauge
auxiliary and parking brake accumulator pressures. Full to illuminate the dial.
capability operations of the brake accumulators in the
auxiliary modes of operation is predicated on the system Note
serviced with a nitrogen precharge of 1,900 ± 50 psi. The
green band of the dial indicates pneumatic pressure between The postlight requires electrical power. Brake-
3,000 psi at the top of the band to 2,150 psi; the red band riders on carrier night respot must use a flashlight
indicates pneumatic pressures between 2,150 and 1,900 psi to check the cockpit brake pressure gauge.
at the bottom of the band. Approximately five auxiliary brake
applications are available in the red band. Once the auxiliary 2.26.6 Parking Brake
braking system is depleted, braking must be accomplished by
the emergency/parking brake. Three applications of the The parking brake mode provides a means for collec-
parking brake are available. tive locking of the wheelbrakes to maintain a ground static
position during normal operations or during emergency con-
With either auxiliary brake system, additional braking ditions. Aft movement of the parking brake handle provides
can be achieved only by pulling the parking brake handle aft. for unmodulated porting of accumulator fluid pressure
If the shuttle valve in the power brake modules does not through emergency lines to the shuttle valve at the wheel-
return to the normal position with combined hydraulic brake assembly. In the parking brake mode, the brake pedals
pressure greater than 2,000 psi, the BRAKES warning light have no effect on wheelbrake operation. Pushing the parking
will illuminate when a brake pedal is depressed. In this brake handle forward releases wheelbrake pressure and the
instance the wheelbrake accumulators can be recharged only power brake module reverts to the normal and auxiliary
by the hydraulic handpump with the landing gear handle braking mode. When auxiliary mode braking action is no
down. Pilot manual isolation, or system automatic isolation longer available by depression of the brake pedals, sufficient
of the combined hydraulic system, cuts off the supply of accumulator fluid pressure remains for a minimum of three
combined hydraulic pressure to the power brake module so parking brake applications.
that depression of the brake pedals will cause depletion of the
brakes’ accumulator charge.
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-140
damping, and nosewheel centering. The power unit is located

on the lower portion of the nose landing gear strut outer
cylinder, which, through a ring gear, controls the directional
alignment and damping of the lower piston assembly.
For shipboard operations, before breaking down
and moving an aircraft without combined Combined hydraulic system pressure is the motive power
hydraulic pressure, the parking brake handle used for steering and centering. Electrical power is supplied
should be cycled and the toe brakes should be from the essential dc bus with circuit protection by the NOSE
tested for effectiveness. (The AUX and PARK WHEEL STEER/AFCS circuit breaker (RC2) on the pilot right
brake needles should drop slightly after brake knee panel. Hydraulic pressure is derived from the gear−down
application.) The brake pressure indicator should line such that steering control is disabledsubsequent to
then be pumped back up to the top of the green emergency extension of the landing gear (Figure 2-75).
band with the cockpit handpump. The indicator Note
should be maintained in the green band until the
If nosewheel steering is inoperative, the emer-
aircraft is secured. Full 3000 psi pressure is
gency gear extension air release valve may be
required if conditions are severe (greater than
4degree roll, wet brakes, etc.). tripped, which will prevent gear retraction.
2.27.1 Nosewheel Steering Control
Nosewheel steering control during ground operations
is energized by momentarily pressing the autopilot reference
and nosewheel steering pushbutton on the lower forward side
Normal brakes are not available with parking of the pilot stick grip (see Figure 2-75). The system cannot
brake handle pulled. If parking brake accumula- be engaged without weight on wheels. The system will
tor pressure is depleted, aircraft brakes are iso- remain engaged until weight is off wheels, electrical power
lated from brake pedal master cylinders. Parking is interrupted, or the pushbutton switch is pressed again.
Brake handle shall be pushed in to restore normal Engagement of nosewheel steering is indicated by illumina-
brake operation. tion of the NWS ENGA caution light. An automatic
In the absence of a pressurized combined hydraulic nosewheel steering system disengage feature is provided. If
system, the wheelbrake accumulators can only be recharged this feature has been activated by cycling the hook on deck
by the pilot hydraulic handpump with the landing gear handle with the throttles at idle, then the nosewheel steering will be
in the down position. disengaged and the NWS ENGA light extinguished when the
launch bar is lowered. The nosewheel steering automatic
disengage feature is deactivated if the nosewheel steering
button is depressed.
With the system engaged, nosewheel steering is
Complete loss of hydraulic fluid through the controlled by rudder pedal position. Centering is unaffected
wheelbrake hydraulic lines will render parking by directional trim displacement. Maximum steering author-
brake ineffective. ity is 70_ either side of neutral, and the nosewheel can swivel
2.26.7 Wheel Antirotation a maximum of 120_ about the centered position. With greater
During the initial phase of the landing gear retraction weight on the nosewheel (wings forward, high gross weight,
cycle, pressurized fluid from the gear−up lines is directed to etc.) the steering torque can only turn the nosewheel ± 5_
the power brake module to displace the normal metering with the aircraft static. However, only a slight forward
valves to stop main wheel rotation before the wheels enter the movement will provide the pilot with full−power steering
wells. This feature is not provided for the nosewheels. authority. In a full pedal−deflection turn using nosewheel
steering, the aircraft pivots about a point between the main
gear such that the inboard main wheel rolls backward. Under
this condition, application of either main wheelbrake will
only serve to increase the radius of turn. Because of the
Illumination of indexer lights is not a positive indi- outboard location of the engines, the application of thrust in
cation that the main landing gear is clear of the run- tight turns should be made on the outboard engine to
way. Raising the gear before a positive rate of efficiently complement the turning movement of the nose-
climb is established will result in blown main tires. gear. Nosewheel centering is enabled by the same latching
relay that enables nosewheel steering automatic disengage-
2.27 NOSEWHEEL STEERING SYSTEM ment with launch bar lowering. Therefore, if the nosewheel
The electrohydraulic nosewheel steering system provides steering is automatically disengaged when the launch bar is
for on−deck aircraft directional control, nosewheel shimmy lowered, the nosewheels will be hydraulically centered.
2−141 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 NWS ENGA caution light Illumination when nosewheel steering engaged and will respond as a
function of rudder pedal displacement. Nosewheel steering automatically
centers with hook down. Nosewheel centering requires throttles at IDLE
and weight-on-wheels with hook down.
2 Autopilot reference and Press to engage and disengage nosewheel steering.

nosewheel steering Requires weight-on-wheels.
pushbutton
3 Rudder pedals Controls nosewheel steering position with system engaged.
Figure 2-75. Nosewheel Steering Controls
ORIGINAL 2-142
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.27.2 Nosewheel Centering 2.28.1 Nose Strut Kneel

The nosewheel is automatically centered during gear Prior to catapult hookup, the nose strut is compressed
retraction before the nosewheel enters the wheelwell. During 14 inches. Control of the nose strut kneel function is provided
gear retraction with weight off wheels, hydraulic pressure by the NOSE STRUT switch on the landing gear control
from the combined system bypasses the steering unit shutoff panel (see Figure 2-76.) The three-position (EXTD, OFF,
valve to center the nosewheel independent of rudder pedal and KNEEL) toggle switch is spring-loaded to return to the
movement. If the nosewheel is cocked beyond 15 either side center detent position of OFF. The position of the strut
of center after takeoff, the nosewheel is automatically remains in the last commanded position independent of
prevented from retracting and the LAUNCH BAR advisory electrical or hydraulic power interruptions. In both cases, the
light illuminates. transfer control valve source of electrical power is the
essential No 2 bus and combined hydraulic system fluid is
During carrier arrestment, the nosewheel is centered used as the transfer medium. With external electrical power
with weight on wheels and hook down when both throttles are on the aircraft, the combined hydraulic system must be
retarded to IDLE to prevent castoring during rollback. After pressurized (>500 psi) before the control switch can com-
arrestment and rollback, the nosewheel will remain centered mand a position change of the transfer control valve. The
until nosewheel steering is engaged. control switch need only be held momentarily to effect a
change in transfer control valve position.
Selection of KNEEL releases hydraulic fluid from the

shock strut transfer cylinder to the combined hydraulic sys-
Nosewheel centering can contribute to launch bar tem return line, causing the weight of the aircraft to compress
misalignment in the catapult shuttle, which could the shock strut 14 inches. Stroking of the nose strut causes the
result in premature launch bar separation during aircraft to rotate about the main wheels. The aircraft may be
launch. The nosewheel centering latching relay taxied or towed in the strut-kneeled position except for the
must be deactivated by depressing the nosewheel nuisance trip of the launch bar at greater than 10 steering
steering button after the hook check and prior to angle; this is the position used for taxiing onto the catapult
entering the catapult. As this will also deactivate and enhances accessibility to the forward fuselage compart-
the nosewheel steering automatic disengagement ments during ground maintenance. Since the nose strut is
function, the nosewheel steering must be manu- bottomed during the catapult launch stroke, the energy stored
ally disengaged when entering the catapult. in the last 4 inches of strut-piston stroke is released upon
shuttle release at the end of the catapult stroke to impart a
noseup pitching moment to rotate the aircraft to the fly-away
2.27.3 Shimmy Damping
attitude without any control required by the pilot. All the
Shimmy damping is provided in the steering actuator. stored energy is expended before the nosewheels leave the
Increased shimmy damping action is obtained with NWS deck edge.
disengaged.
Note
Under certain launch conditions (high wind over
deck and light aircraft gross weights) the nose
strut will not be fully compressed during the cata-
If excessive nosewheel shimmy is encountered,
disengage nosewheel steering. pult stroke. Subsequent nose rotation following
shuttle release will be at a less than normal rate.
Aircraft launch bulletins for the aircraft are
2.28 NOSEGEAR CATAPULT SYSTEM
written to ensure that catapult launch pressures
Catapult connection components on the nose landing are sufficient to provide safe launch pitch rates
gear shock strut piston provide nosegear catapult capability. and fly-away capability.
A launch bar attached to the forward face of the nosegear
steering collar guides the aircraft onto the catapult track and Full extension of the nose strut after launch and weight
serves as the tow link that engages the catapult shuttle. A off wheels provides a redundant and automatic transfer of the
holdback fitting secures the holdback restraint prior to control valve to the extend position. With weight off wheels,
launch. The two-piston nose strut uses the stored energy the NOSE STRUT switch is inoperative.
catapult principle to impart a positive pitch rotation move-
ment to the aircraft at shuttle release, thus providing for a
hands-off launch fly-away technique.
2-143 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 NOSE STRUT switch EXTD — Hydraulic pressure causes strut to extend. Combined hydraulic
system must be pressurized before switch is activated on external
power. Launch bar is lifted into the up-lock position by torque arms
as strut extends 14 inches.
OFF — Spring-loaded return position.
KNEEL — Nose strut transfer control valve releases pressure in the shock
strut, which strokes 14 inches. Combined hydraulic system must
be pressurized before switch is active on external power. Launch
bar uplock can be released manually to allow bar to lower to deck,
or by turning nosewheel ± 10 .
2 LAUNCH BAR Illuminates under the following conditions:
advisory light Weight On Wheels
Aircraft kneeled, throttles less than MIL (goes out when throttles are
advanced to MIL to provide lights out criterion for catapult launch).
Launch bar not up and locked (normal operation)
Weight Off Wheels (inhibits nosegear retraction)

Launch bar not up and locked
Nosewheel not within ± 15 of center
Nose strut not fully extended
3 LAUNCH BAR switch ABORT — Enables pilot to disengage the launch bar from the catapult while
remaining at MIL power and in the kneel position.
NORM — Allows launch bar to be lowered.
Figure 2-76. Launch Bar Controls
ORIGINAL 2-144
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.28.2 Launch Bar deck-secured fittings. Prior to the application of single-

engine high power, the nose strut should be kneeled and slack
The launch bar is attached to the nosegear and serves
taken out of the holdback mechanism, otherwise dynamic
as the tow link for catapulting the aircraft (see Figure 2-77).
loads may exceed mechanism design strength conditions.
With the nose strut extended, the launch bar is held in the
retracted position. The launch bar can be lowered by kneeling
2.29 ARRESTING HOOK SYSTEM
the aircraft and turning the nosewheel greater than ±10 from
the centered position. The launch bar can also be lowered by The arresting hook installation consists of a stinger
the deck crew with no pilot action after the aircraft has been tailhook and associated control mechanism mounted to the
kneeled. A proximity sensing switch on the uplock detects underside of the center fuselage. The hook shank is free to
the latch out of the locked position and illuminates the pivot up and down at its attachment point. A pneumatic
LAUNCH BAR advisory light (see Figure 2-76). Ears on the dashpot preloads the hook down to minimize hook bounce on
head of the launch bar engage under the lip of the catapult contact with the deck. The hook shank is free to pivot left or
lead-in track and the head serves as a guide to steer the right within a ± 26 sway angle with positive centering
nosewheel on the catapult track and engage the shuttle. For action provided by a pneumatic damper housed inside the
an abort, the launch bar cannot be raised until the shuttle is tailhook shank. The trail angle of the arresting hook provides
disengaged. for hookpoint-deck contact even with the nose landing gear
strut fully compressed.
2.28.2.1 LAUNCH BAR Light
2.29.1 Arresting Hook Operation
The LAUNCH BAR advisory light is interlocked to go
off when both throttles are at MIL even though the launch bar Normal operation of the arresting hook requires
position and mechanism remain unchanged; this action is combined and flight hydraulic system pressure, dashpot
effected to establish a “lights out” criterion for launch. The charged, and dc essential No. 2 electrical power. Because of
light circuit is disabled with nosegear up and locked. A a redundant means of pilot control (electrical and mechani-
pilot-controlled LAUNCH BAR switch is installed that cal), emergency extension of the arresting hook can be
enables the pilot to disengage the launch bar from the accomplished without these sources of power.
catapult while remaining at MIL power and in the kneel
position. This switch is on the pilot left vertical console. Note
Hook retraction requires electrical and combined
hydraulic power.

To avoid damage to the launch bar retract mech- Normal operation (Figure 2-78) on the pilot hook
anism, do not set the LAUNCH BAR switch to control consists of a straight down-up movement of the
ABORT with the nosewheel deflected off center. HOOK handle. This action actuates switches that provide
After the catapult launch stroke, extension of the strut electrical command signals to the hook control valve. For
mechanically cams the launch bar up to the retracted-and- lowering the hook, the uplock is released and the lift cylinder
locked position. If the launch bar is not engaged in the uplock is vented. Flight hydraulic pressure is the medium that
with weight off wheels, the LAUNCH BAR advisory light disengages the hook uplock actuator. When flight hydraulic
will illuminate and nosegear retraction will be electrically pressure drops below 2,100 psi with weight off wheels, the
inhibited. hook/auxiliary flap isolation relay circuit is energized. This
disables the arresting hook control valve and, therefore,
2.28.3 Holdback Fitting disallows normal hook extension. This condition remains
until either the starboard engine-driven hydraulic pump
The holdback fitting is provided on the nose strut for (flight) produces greater than 2,400 psi or weight on wheels
insertion of the holdback bar. Groundcrew must manually is restored.
attach the bar before the aircraft is taxied into the catapult
lead track. The holdback bar is reusable and provides for Note
repeated releases at a tow force of 76,000 pounds. Force
greater than this on launch causes the holdback bar to release If emergency hook extension is inoperative in
the aircraft holdback fitting. conjunction with a flight hydraulic failure,
cycling the HYD VALVE CONTR circuit
Single-engine, high-power turnup operations can use breaker (8E5) with the hook handle down will
the holdback fitting to attach aircraft restraining hardware to permit hook extension.
2-145 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-77. Nosewheel Strut and Launch Bar Positions
ORIGINAL 2-146
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 Arresting HOOK UP — Electrically energizes hydraulic retract actuator to raise

handle hook into uplock.
DN — Electrically releases hydraulic uplock actuator and allows
hook to extend by dashpot pressure and gravity.
EMERG
DOWN — (Pull-twist) mechanically releases uplock actuator and
allows hook to extend by gravity and dashpot pressure.
2 Hook transition light Illuminates whenever arresting hook position does not correspond with
handle position. Light will not go out in down position until hook is in full
trail angle.
3 HOOK BYPASS FIELD — Used for nonarrested landings. Bypasses the flashing fea-
switch ture of the approach lights and indexer when landing gear is
down and hook retracted.
CARRIER — Used for arrested landings. Approach lights and indexer
flash when landing gear is down and the hook retracted.
Figure 2-78. Arresting Hook Controls
2-147 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.29.1.2 Hook Retraction 3. Cockpit pressurization

For hook retraction, the control valve pressurizes the 4. Canopy seals
retract side of the lift cylinder and the lock side of the
actuator. 5. Windshield and canopy defogging
6. Windshield ant-ice
7. Anti-g suit inflation
Do not attempt to raise the hook when the hook 8. Wing airbag seals
is engaged in the arresting gear.
9. Gun-gas purging
When the arresting hook roller engages the uplock 10. Electronic equipment cooling and pressurization
mechanism, the lift cylinder is depressurized. On deck, hook
retraction time is approximately 3 seconds. The hook transi- 11. Temperature control of liquid coolant supplied to
tion light is illuminated as long as a discrepancy exists APG-71 radar control system, television camera set,
between the hook and cockpit handle positions. On-deck and infrared search and track.
extension requires approximately 1 second. The transition
light will remain illuminated, unless the aircraft is kneeled, 2.30.1 ECS Air Sources
as contact with the deck precludes full hook extension.
2.30.1.1 Bleed Air
Note
The hook transition light may remain illuminated The normal source of ECS air is ninth-stage bleed air
when the hook handle is lowered at airspeeds from both engines. Through a series of manifolds and valves,
greater than 300 knots because of hook blowback. this air is cooled and mixed to reduce temperature and pres-
sure to usable levels. The primary valves are the two engine
2.29.1.3 Emergency Hook Extension bleed air shutoff valves, the dual pressure regulating and
The emergency control system lowers the hook by shutoff valve, and the turbine compressor modulating and
mechanically (cable) tripping the uplock and venting the shutoff valve, which are all controlled by the AIR SOURCE
hook lift actuator pressure. Emergency extension of the hook selector pushbuttons: L ENG, R ENG and BOTH ENG
may be initiated when the handle is in either UP or DN. In (Figure 2-79.)
either case, the hook handle is pulled aft (approximately
4 inches) and turned 90 counterclockwise. Rotation 90 2.30.1.2 RAM AIR Source
counterclockwise will lock the handle in the extended
position. With the handle locked, the hook will not retract If either the RAM or OFF pushbutton is selected by the
regardless of the handle position (UP or DN). pilot, the cooling turbine compressor is shut down and emer-
gency ram air can be used to ventilate the cockpits and pro-
Note vide cooling air to the service and suit heat exchanger and
After emergency hook extension, the hook can be those electronic subsystems requiring forced air cooling.
retracted airborne or on deck provided that the However, if OFF is selected, pressurization to the service
handle is rotated 90 clockwise, pushed full systems (canopy seal, anti-g suit, external fuel tank, wing
forward, and placed in UP. Combined and flight airbag seal, OBOGS), and 400 F air supply to the windshield
hydraulic system pressures are required to retract air defog and heating systems is lost. Selecting AIR
the hook while airborne. On deck, only combined SOURCE RAM will provide air to the service systems and
hydraulic system pressure is required to retract the 400 F manifold air to the defog and heating systems.
hook.
2.30 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM

The ECS regulates the environment of flightcrew and
electronic equipment. The system provides temperature-
Selection of the AIR SOURCE pushbutton to
controlled, pressure-regulated air for the following systems.
RAM with a failure of the 400 F temperature
1. External drop tank pressurization manifold will continue to circulate 400 F air
throughout the system surrounding aircraft
2. OBOGS
components and may cause a fire.
ORIGINAL 2-148
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 TEMP mode selector AUTO — Cockpit and pressure suit temperature is automatically
switch maintained at that comfort level selected on the temperature
control selector.
MAN — Cockpit temperature and air flow must be manually selected

as airspeed and altitude change to maintain a desired
temperature.
2 CABIN PRESS switch NORM — Cockpit pressure will be maintained at an altitude of
Lever-lock switch which 8,000 feet up to 23,000 feet, above which the regulator
must be lifted to be maintains a 5-psi pressure differential. (See Figure 2-81).
moved to DUMP.
DUMP — The cockpit safety valve Is opened, depressurizing the
cockpit.
3 RAM AIR switch OPEN/
CLOSE — Manually modulates the ram air door and regulates the
amount of ram air supplied to the cabin and electronics bay
after the AIR SOURCE pushbutton is selected to RAM or
OFF (Approximately 50 seconds to full open.)
Figure 2-79. Air-Conditioning and Pressurization Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
2-149 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
4 AIR SOURCE selector RAM Closes the bleed air flow modulator pressure regulator
pushbuttons and shutoff valve, thereby securing the cooling bootstrap
turbine compressor. Inhibits gun firing. The RAM AIR
switch is enabled. Combined ram air and regulated 400_
F bleed air are available to the cockpits and air cooled
electronic equipment for temperature control. When
either BOTH ENG, L ENG or R ENG are selected, the
ram air door automatically closes.
L ENG The left engine is the source of bleed air for the environ
mental control system and the right engine bleed air shut
off valve is closed.
R ENG The right engine is the source of bleed air for the environ
mental control system and the left engine bleed air shutoff
valve is closed.
BOTH ENG The right and left engine bleed air shutoff valves are open
and both supply bleed air to the environmental control
system. This is the normal position. Automatically closes
ram air door.
OFF Both the left and right engine bleed air shutoff valves
and the dual pressure regulator valve are closed. Inhibits
gun firing. Pressurization and air conditioning are not
available. Enables the RAM AIR switch.
5 TEMP thumbwheel control Selects cockpit and suit air temperature. It can be rotated through a 300_
arc (0 to 14) with mechanical stops at each end placarded COOL and
WARM. A midposition temperature (7) is approximately 70_F in the
automatic mode. With the TEMP mode selector switch in AUTO the
temperature selected is automatically maintained by the modulating
temperature control valves. In MAN, the TEMP control thumbwheel must
be repositioned to maintain cockpit and suit air temperature. Air flow and
temperature will not change as a function of airspeed and altitude.
6 CABIN PRESS ALT Displays cabin pressure altitude in 1,000−foot increments from
indicator 0 to 50,000 feet.
7 BLEED DUCT caution light Indicates overheating (575° F or greater) along the high−temperature
bleed air duct routing forward of the engine fire wall past the primary heat
exchanger and then up to the right diverter area. An additional sensor,
detecting temperatures of 255° F or greater, senses from the right diverter
area, along the 400° F manifold and into the bootstrap turbine
compartment.
8 CABIN PRESS caution Indicates cabin pressure is less than 5−psi absolute pressure or cockpit
light (RIO’s cockpit) altitude is above 27,000 feet.
Figure 2−79. Air−Conditioning and Pressurization Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−150
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Interconnects inhibit gun firing with RAM or OFF remainder is further cooled by the turbine compressor. Here
selected. The emergency ram-air door is on the lower right the air is compressed, run through the secondary heat
side of the fuselage, inboard of the right glove. To activate the exchanger, and then expanded in the turbine section,
ram air door, either the OFF or RAM AIR SOURCE resulting in cold air that is mixed with 340_ F air to obtain
pushbutton must be depressed and the RAM AIR switch on any temperature desired. The primary and secondary heat
the air-conditioning control panel must be moved to OPEN. exchangers are between the left and right engine inlets and
the fuselage. At speeds above 0.25 Mach, ram air across the
heat exchangers is used for cooling. During ground opera-
tions and at airspeeds less than 0.25 Mach, airflow across the
heat exchanger is augmented by air-powered turbine fans.
Note
D Before opening the ram air door, reduce air- With the system in MAN to increase airflow to
speed to 350 knots or 1.5 Mach, whichever is forced-air-cooled equipment, place CANOPY
lower, to prevent ram air temperatures above DEFOG-CABIN AIR control lever in CANOPY
110_ F from entering the system. After ram air DEFOG.
flow is stabilized, airspeed may be varied as
The third heat exchanger is the service air-to-air heat
required for crew comfort or to increase flow
exchanger. This normally uses cold air from the cold-air
to electronic equipment.
manifold as a heat sink but can use emergency ram air if the
D With AIR SOURCE OFF selected, limit air- cold-air manifold is not operating. Air from the service heat
speed to less than 300 knots/0.8 Mach to pre- exchanger is used by the pressure suit, anti-g suit, canopy
vent damage to the deflated wing airbag seals. seal, OBOGS, servo air, and for pressurization of wave-
guides, the radar liquid cooling loop tank, and the television
For maximum cockpit ram-air flow, the cockpit
camera set.
pressurization must be dumped. Pressing either L ENG, R
ENG or both ENG pushbuttons automatically closes the
2.30.2.1 Temperature Management
ram-air door if it is open.
The pilot can control cockpit temperature by selecting
2.30.1.3 External Air either a manual (MAN) mode or automatic (AUTO) mode
with the TEMP mode selector switch (Figure 2-79). In the
The adapter for connecting a ground air-conditioning
AUTO mode, temperature (60_ F to 80_ F) is selected by
unit is under the fuselage, aft of the nose wheelwell. An
the pilot with the TEMP thumbwheel control. This desired
additional provision for connecting an external source of
temperature is maintained by a cabin temperature sensor in
servo air is in this same area.
the forward left side of the cockpit. In the MAN mode, the
External electrical power is automatically inhibited TEMP thumbwheel control maintains airflow and tempera-
from AYK-141, IRST, TR1, TR2, and the CIU if external ture. If cockpit inlet airflow temperature (in either AUTO or
air-conditioning is not connected to the aircraft. A pressure MAN) exceeds 250_ F, a cockpit overtemperature switch
switch interrupts electrical power to the above forced-air- closes the hot-air-modulating valve.
cooled equipment.
The conditioned air entering the cockpit is divided
forward and aft, with 50 percent of the air going to each
2.30.2 Cockpit Air-Conditioning
cockpit. A CANOPY air diffuser lever on the right console
ECS manifolding consists of: in each cockpit individually controls the percentage of
airflow through the cockpit diffusers and the canopy defog
1. The high-temperature (bleed air) manifold nozzles. When the lever is in CABIN AIR (full aft), 70
2. The 400_ manifold percent of the air is directed through the cockpit diffusers and
30 percent through the canopy defog nozzles. In DEFOG, 100
3. The cold-air manifold. percent of the air is directed through the canopy defog
High-temperature engine bleed air is routed through nozzles.
the primary heat exchanger. The cooled output of this heat
exchanger is split and a portion is mixed with hot engine 2.30.2.2 Vent Airflow Thumbwheel
bleed air to a temperature of approximately 340_ F; the This control has no function.
2-151 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
2.30.2.3 Anti−G Suit 2.30.3.1.2 Ground Operation

Each anti−g suit is connected to the aircraft pressuriza During ground operation with electrical power, exter
tion system by an anti−g suit hose that delivers pressurized air nal air−conditioning, and servo air available to the aircraft
to the suit control valve and then to the suit through a and the GND CLG switch in RADAR, the cockpit low−flow
composite disconnect. Below 1.5g, the suit remains deflated. sensor is overridden. The OFF position of the GND CLG
A spring−balanced anti−g valve automatically opens when switch enables cockpit air priority. With engines running on
g forces exceed 1.5g. Operation of the anti−g suit valve may the ground, select OFF on the ground cooling switch.
be checked by depressing the test button marked G VALVE
on each flightcrew’s left console. 2.30.3.2 Cockpit Air Priority Function
2.30.3 Electronic Equipment Cooling The cockpit air priority function is operational during
all engine−on operations (FO−14). It provides the cockpit with
Ambient cooled equipment in the electronic bays is
priority over the radar liquid−cooling loop in the event there
cooled by the air exhausted from the cockpits. Equipment
is a shortage of conditioned air. On engine power the GND
incapable of being cooled by free convection is cooled from
CLG switch (Figure 280.) should always be in OFF and the
the cold−air manifold.
canopy locked to enable the cockpit air priority function.
A schematic of the radar and electronic equipment
There is no indication to the flightcrew that the cockpit
cooling is shown in FO−14. Controls and lights are shown in
priority action is taking place unless it progresses to the point
Figure 280.
that the SENSOR COND advisory light illuminates. Even
then, it is only one of several problems that could have
2.30.3.1 Radar Liquid Cooling
triggered the light.
Radar equipment is cooled by liquid coolant (FO−14).
The heat is rejected in the ram air heat exchanger. This is 2.30.4 Pressurization
accomplished by circulating coolant fluid through the
electronics and ram−air heat exchanger and/or the radar heat 2.30.4.1 Cockpit Pressurization
exchanger. The cooling loop is also used for automatic
warmup of the radar using 400_F manifold. From sea level to 8,000 feet altitude the cockpit is
unpressurized. Between altitudes of 8,000 feet to 23,000 feet
The radar liquid cooling loop incorporates a separate the system maintains a constant cockpit pressure altitude of
ram−air liquid−heat exchanger. A ram−air door is located 8,000 feet. At altitudes above 23,000 feet, the cockpit
under the right glove, forward of the primary heat exchanger pressure regulator maintains constant 5−psi pressure differen
inlet. There are no cockpit controls for this ram−air door. It tial greater than ambient pressures. An illustration of the
is controlled by the radar controller and is independent of the cabin pressure schedule is shown in Figure 281.
air−conditioning and pressurization system. The radar system
ram−air heat exchanger automatically maintains the liquid 2.30.4.1.1 Cockpit Pressure Indicators
temperature within operating limits when ram air is used for
cooling. A cockpit pressure altimeter (Figure 279) is provided
for the pilot. The rear cockpit has a CABIN PRESS light on
2.30.3.1.1 Controls and Lights the CAUTION and ADVISORY panel. The CABIN PRESS,
light illuminates when cockpit pressure drops below 5 psi
Figure 280 shows the controls and lights associated absolute pressure or cockpit altitude is above 27,000 feet.
with the radar cooling loop. The radar cooling loop is
activated by the RADAR COOLING switch on the RIO left 2.30.4.1.2 Cockpit Pressure Malfunctions
outboard console. In ON, the radar cooling loop is activated
for airborne operation. A temperature sensor in the heat If the cockpit pressure regulator malfunctions, the
exchanger outlet illuminates the SENSOR COND advisory cockpit safety valve will open to prevent a cockpit pressure
light when the liquid temperature goes above 104_F. In differential from exceeding a positive 5.5−psi or a negative
addition, a pressure switch in the radar pump illuminates the differential of 0.25 psi. The cockpit pressure regulator and
SENSOR COND advisory light when pump output pressure the safety valve are pneumatically operated and function
is too low. independently through separate pressure sensing lines.
If the coolant pump temperature rises to 230 ± 5_F, the

thermal switch opens, shutting down the pump to prevent
pump failure and illuminating the SENSOR COND advisory
light.
ORIGINAL 2−152
1 RADAR COOLING switch OFF Deactivates the radar cooling pumps.
ON Activates the radar cooling pump for ground and airborne thermal
conditioning.
2 RADAR ENABLE Indicates that radar operation on the ground is possible.

caution light
3 COOLING AIR Illuminates after a delay of 25 to 40 seconds when insufficient cooling is

advisory light provided to the electronic forced air cooling system. Degraded cooling
may result from cooling system failure, turbine failure, or ECS duct failure.
4 SENSOR COND Illuminates when coolant exiting the heat exchanger is greater than 104° F,
advisory light or pump output pressure is too low, or when the overtemperature switch
shuts down the radar, television camera set (TCS), and the infrared
search and track (IRST).
Figure 280.Avionic Equipment Liquid Cooling Controls and Lights (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−153 ORIGINAL
5 GND CLG switch APG−71 Cockpit low flow sensor is overridden.

CAUTION
• Servo air required to actuate servo operated valves.
• Use RADAR only when engines are shut down.
OFF Cockpit low flow interlock is operational. OFF shall be selected
when engines are operating.
6 C & D HOT caution light Indicates DD or PTID overheat condition.
Figure 2−80. Avionic Equipment Liquid Cooling Controls and Lights (Sheet 2 of 2)
2.30.4.1.3 Cockpit Pressure Dump D Extended operations in clear air with the
windshield air on may cause windshield
Cockpit pressurization can be dumped by the pilot by cracking and discoloration.
selecting DUMP with the CABIN PRESS switch. When
DUMP is selected the safety valve is immediately opened 2.30.6 Gun−Gas Purging
and the cockpit is depressurized. External airflow is used to ventilate the gun compart
ment for gun−gas purging. A flush air inlet on the fuselage
2.30.4.2 Canopy Seal Pressurization gun bump and an aft louvered door containing a FOD screen
provide a continual flow of air to purge gun gases.
Pressurized air from the air−conditioning system is
ducted through the cockpit to the canopy seal. The seal is 2.30.7 Degraded ECS Operation
automatically inflated when the canopy actuator is moved to
the closed position. A check valve in the canopy pressure There are various temperature and pressure safeguard
regulating valve prevents the loss of canopy seal pressuriza systems that cause the ECS system to shut down if an unsafe
tion if the conditioned air manifold is depressurized. Initial situation is detected. A complete failure of the dual valve will
movement of the canopy actuator automatically deflates the cause it to shut down the pressurization and air−conditioning
seal. system. Should that fail to close, a pressure switch will
close both engine bleed air shutoff valves if an overpressure
2.30.5 Windshield Air and Anti−Ice (155 psi) situation exists in the outlet of the primary heat
exchanger. A shutdown of the bleed air supply duct, either
automatically or pilot−selected AIR SOURCE OFF push
Compressor bleed air at approximately 340_F and at
button, will cause total ECS air shutdown.
high pressure is directed over the outside of the windshield
through a fixed−area nozzle. This blast of hot air over the
windshield will evaporate rain and ice and prevent its further
accumulation. It is activated by selecting ON with the
WSHLD AIR switch. A temperature overheat sensor at the
base of the windshield protects the windshield from over
heating. When the sensor detects overheating (300_F), a Failure of the left or right weight−on−wheels
signal closes the pressure regulating valve and illuminates switches to the in−flight mode can cause loss of
the WSHLD HOT advisory light on the pilot CAUTION engine ejector air to the IDGs and hydraulic heat
ADVISORY light panel (Figure 282). exchangers causing thermal disconnect and/or
heat damage to the generators and aircraft
hydraulic systems.
Note
After an automatic shutdown of the system, the
pilot should select either OFF or RAM AIR
D Selecting WSHLD AIR ON prior to entering SOURCE to enable the emergency ram−air door
rain or icing conditions may cause windshield and then hold ram air switch to OPEN for approx
cracking because of the rapid cooling effects imately 50 seconds to provide ram−air cooling to
of precipitation. electronic equipment and to the cabin.
ORIGINAL 2−154
Figure 281.Cabin Pressure Schedule
Note 1. No cockpit airflow.
D Loss of electrical power with bleed air still 2. RIO COOLING AIR advisory light illuminated.
operating will result in smoke entering the
3. RIO SENSOR COND advisory light illuminated.
cockpit through the ECS when the aircraft is
on the deck. In flight only cold air will be sup 4. If ram−air cooling is not selected, extended flight
plied to the cabin and suit. Icing of the water with AIR SOURCE OFF could cause an over
separator may occur, causing reduced flow to heating condition of the converter interface unit and
the cabin. Since the ECS panel is dependent a subsequent loss of primary attitude and naviga
on electrical power, selector pushbuttons will tional indications (i.e., multifunction displays,
be inoperative. HUD, NAVAIDs).
D Retarding throttles to IDLE above 30,000 feet The pilot should press the AIR SOURCE RAM
may result in a considerable reduction in ECS pushbutton and set the RAM AIR switch to OPEN to open the
airflow, leading to a loss of cockpit pressur ram−air door to provide forced−air cooling to the electronic
ization, SENSOR COND light, and/or equipment and to the cabin.
COOLING AIR light.
ECS duct failures may be indicated by diminishing
If the 400_ manifold reaches 475_ F, a 400_F shutoff cabin cooling airflow and/or cabin pressurization with or
valve closes, stopping the flow of unconditioned engine without COOLING AIR advisory light illumination. Duct
bleed air to the 400_ F manifold. If either compressor inlet failures may additionally be indicated by pressurization loss
or turbine inlet temperature becomes excessive, the refrig to the service systems and airflow loss to rain removal, defog,
eration unit will shut down. Cockpit indications will be as and heating systems. This cannot be verified if the system is
follows:
2−155 ORIGINAL
1 WSHLD AIR switch ON Provides a continuous blast of hot air (340°) over the
exterior windshield. Used for windshield anti−ice.
OFF Closes the shutoff valve after a 5−second delay.

The system is deenergized.
2 WSHLD HOT advisory light Light illuminates when a sensor in the warm air nozzle to the center
windshield indicates overheat (300° F).
3 CANOPY air diffuser lever CABIN AIR 70% of the conditioned air directed through the cockpit
(both cockpits) air diffusers and 30% is through the canopy defog rails.
This is normal position.
DEFOG Air flow is directed through the canopy defog rails only.
Figure 282.Canopy Defog Controls and Windshield Air
ORIGINAL 2−156
not in use. Selection of AIR SOURCE OFF and RAM AIR concentrator and the monitor continue to function as long as
OPEN is appropriate when any indication of duct failure the OBOGS switch is in the ON position. The monitor will
exists. ECS malfunctions that are not caused by duct failure automatically shift back to the OBOGS supply source when
are usually indicated by loss of temperature control without it detects adequate concentrator output.
a cabin or system airflow/pressurization degradation. Failure
Power to the monitor is provided by 28 Vdc OBOGS
of the 400_F modulating valve or duct should not cause
control power from the essential dc bus No. 1 when the
illumination of the cooling air light. Any duct failure in this
OBOGS master switch is in the ON position. The sensor in
area associated with the COOLING AIR light is strictly
the monitor is heated for proper operation. Upon initial
coincidental. However, the duct failure between the primary
selection of the OBOGS master switch to ON, the OBOGS
heat exchanger and the turbine compressor assembly, or
is powered and functioning but the monitor will not be
between the secondary heat exchanger and the turbine
accurately detecting oxygen concentration until the sensor is
compressor assembly, could cause degraded cooling airflow
warmed up. This can take up to 2 minutes, depending on the
and a COOLING AIR light to illuminate.
ambient temperature. The OBOGS light will not be illumi
Actuation of the overtemperature switch results in nated during the warmup period. The pilot may test operation
cycling of the 400_F valve. During this period the heating of the monitor via the press−to−vent TEST button. The button
capacity of the 400_ F manifold would be degraded. actuates a valve that must be held for up to 1 minute to vent
oxygen sensor. Laboratory testing has demonstrated that the
2.31 OXYGEN SYSTEM test can normally be completed in approximately 15 seconds.
Once vented, the monitor will sense insufficient oxygen,
Breathing oxygen is provided to each crewmember by illuminating the cockpit caution lights and shifting the
the OBOGS. A backup oxygen system provides a supply of oxygen supply source to BOS. The monitor will automati
gaseous oxygen sufficient for a maximum range descent in cally shift back to OBOGS operation and extinguish the
the event of a failure of the OBOGS. In addition, emergency caution light after release of the TEST button. Testing has
oxygen is available to each crewmember through a high− demonstrated this occurs within 5 to 7 seconds, but may take
pressure, gaseous oxygen bottle located in the ejection seat up to 20 seconds.
survival kit.
2.31.1 On−Board Oxygen Generating System

(OBOGS)
The OBOGS provides 95−percent pure pressure− and
temperature−regulated oxygen to each crewmember. The The aircrew will not have any indication of a fail
system includes an oxygen concentrator, an oxygen monitor, ure of the monitor. If the aircrew suspects the
and two regulators. Controls and indicators for the OBOGS onset of hypoxia at any time, immediately select
are shown in Figure 283. BACKUP. The monitor may be tested once the
aircraft has descended to a cabin altitude of
The oxygen concentrator is in the right side of the 10,000 feet or less and the ON position on the
fuselage adjacent to and beneath the forward cockpit. OBOGS master switch has been reselected.
Filtered and cooled ECS service air is directed to the oxygen
concentrator when ON is selected on the OBOGS master The OBOGS regulators are chest−mounted, pressure−
switch on the pilot cockpit panel. A molecular sieve in the demand type through which pressure−and temperature−
concentrator removes the nitrogen from the compressed air, regulated oxygen is provided to each crewman. Pressure
leaving a breathing gas equivalent in concentration to breathing is activated above 34,000−foot cabin altitude.
95−percent oxygen at 34,000 feet. The oxygen concentrator When the OBOGS master switch is on, filtered, cooled
receives 115−Vac motor power from the pilot ac essential bus engine bleed air is directed to the oxygen concentrator where
No. 1 and heater power from the ac right main bus. OBOGS a molecular sieve removes the nitrogen from the compressed
28−Vdc control power is provided by essential dc bus No. 1 air, leaving a breathing gas consisting of 95−percent oxygen.
via the OBOGS CONTR circuit breaker (7A1). The oxygen monitor checks system operation to ensure that
The oxygen monitor is on the pilot right console. It a sufficient concentration of oxygen is being generated,
constantly monitors the oxygen concentrator output to ensure provides a cockpit indication, and brings the backup gaseous
a sufficient concentration of oxygen is being generated. supply on line as required. A test button on the monitor
When the monitor detects an oxygen partial pressure less enables the pilot to verify that the monitor and the backup
than 182 mm Hg, it generates an alarm signal that illuminates oxygen system are functioning. When pressed, the OBOGS
the OBOGS caution lights, shuts off output from the advisory light illuminates indicating the system is in backup.
concentrator and enables the backup oxygen system. The
2−157 ORIGINAL
Figure 283.Oxygen System Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−158
1 OBOGS master switch BACKUP Deenergizes oxygen concentrator and Process Air Shutoff
Valve. Enables Backup Oxygen.
ON Applies power to oxygen generator and oxygen monitor.
Opens solenoid valve providing ECS Service Air to Oxygen
Concentrator.
OFF Removes power from OBOGS and BOS. Process air shutoff
valve closes.
2 VENT AIRFLOW NOT FUNCTIONAL.
3 OXYGEN SUPPLY valve ON Opens oxygen supply permitting OBOGS or BOS oxygen flow
to crewmember.
OFF Secures OBOGS and BOS oxygen flow to crewmember.
4 OBOGS caution light Illuminates when OBOGS has failed or OBOGS master switch is in OFF
or BACKUP
5 B/U OXY LOW caution Illuminates when pressure remaining in BOS assembly oxygen cylinder
lights is below 200 psi.
6 BACKUP OXY PRESS Indicates pressure remaining in BOS assembly oxygen cylinder.
Indicator
7 OXYGEN MONITOR Provides functional test of the oxygen monitor, BOS, and OBOGS control
TEST Button systems.
Figure 2−83. Oxygen System Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
2.31.2 Backup Oxygen System (BOS) The BOS assembly consists of an oxygen cylinder,
pressure gauge, pressure regulator, fill port, pressure trans
The BOS consists of a BOS assembly, BOS controller,
ducer, low−pressure switch, manual shutoff valve, and quick
B/U OXY LOW caution light, and a BACKUP OXY PRESS
disconnect on a palletized assembly that is removable for
indicator. This system was designed to provide only enough
servicing and maintenance. A 200−cubic−inch, high−pressure
oxygen for maximum−range descent. In the event of an cylinder containing 500 to 590 liters of gaseous oxygen at
OBOGS failure, the aircrew must take immediate action to
1,800 to 2,100 psi, respectively, provides a backup oxygen
conserve backup oxygen.
supply to the OBOGS. The BOS assembly is located on the
Switching to the backup system can be accomplished right forward side of the fuselage, just below the forward end
three ways: of the pilot cockpit.
1. Automatically upon monitor detection of an
The BOS controller enables flow from the BOS assem
OBOGS failure or loss of OBOGS control power
bly via a diaphragm valve. This diaphragm valve is con
2. Manually via direct selection of BACKUP on the trolled by two solenoid valves and an aneroid valve. The BOS
OBOGS master switch controller is in the BOS assembly compartment. Power for
automatic operation of the BOS controller is provided by
3. Automatically with total loss of electrical power or 28 Vdc essential bus No. 1 via the OBOGS CONTR circuit
selection of OFF on the OXYGEN system master breaker (7A1). Alternate power is provided via the BOS
switch, when the aircraft is above 10,000 feet MSL. CONTR/B/U OXY LOW circuit breaker (7A4) for automatic
Backup oxygen cannot be disabled above 10,000 feet activation of backup oxygen in the event of a failure of the
MSL by turning the OXYGEN system master switch OBOGS control relay and when BACKUP is manually
off. Therefore, the individual OXYGEN SUPPLY valves selected.
(Figure 283.) in both cockpits must be used to turn off
oxygen flow to the personnel regulators.
2−159 ORIGINAL
The B/U OXY LOW caution light is actuated by the The pitot−static system is composed of two separate
BOS assembly low−pressure switch when the BACK UP systems with individual pitot−static probes, one on each side
OXY PRESS gauge reads less than 200 psi, or when BOS of the forward fuselage.
CONTR/B/U OXY LOW power is lost. Figure 284 provides
The left pitot pressure (PT) probe supplies the pilot
backup oxygen breathing time for two crewmembers for
standby airspeed indicator and the left AICS programmer.
various cabin altitudes based upon BOS oxygen cylinder
The right pitot pressure (PT) probe supplies the RIO standby
pressure.
airspeed indicator, the right AICS programmer, and the
CADC with airspeed indications. An electrical PT input from
2.31.3 BOS Pressure Indicator
the left AICS programmer is supplied to the CADC backup
The BACK UP OXY PRESS indicator (Figure 283.), channel as airspeed indications for wing sweep.
on the right side of the pilot right knee panel, shows the
The left and right forward static ports (PS1) are
pressure in the BOS assembly oxygen cylinder. The indicator
manifolded to provide static pressure to the pilot standby
will not function unless the BOS manual shutoff valve on the airspeed indicator, standby altimeter, vertical speed indica
BOS assembly is open.
tor, and the CADC. Static pressure from the right aft (PS2)
static ports supply the RIO standby airspeed indicator,
2.31.4 Emergency Oxygen Supply standby altimeter, and the right AICS programmer. The static
The 50−cubic−inch oxygen cylinder in the survival kit pressure from the left aft (PS2) static ports supply the static
of each ejection seat provides a limited supply of gaseous pressure to the left AICS PS sensor. An electrical PS input
oxygen. This oxygen cylinder can be manually activated in from the left AICS programmer is supplied to the CADC
the event of a failure of the OBOGS and depletion of the backup channel for wing sweep. Static pressure from the left
backup supply. The cylinder is charged to 1,800 to 2,100 psi aft (Ps2) static ports supply the left AICS programmer.
and a pressure gauge is visible on the inside face of the The CADC and AICS programmers provide Mach
left−thigh support. Flow from the emergency cylinder is number information to the digital flight control computers
routed through a pressure reducer and a shuttle valve, then (DFCCs). The alpha computer, angle of attack probe (used
follows the path of the normal oxygen system, flowing for displaying angle of attack to the pilot), and the AICS
through the oxygen regulator to the face mask. The supply of programmers provide angle of attack information to the
oxygen available in the emergency cylinder is adequate for DFCCs. Electrical interfaces are shown on Figure 285.
up to 8 to 10 minutes, depending upon altitude. The manual
actuation handle is a green ring under the left side of the Note
survival kit cushion.
D With the in−flight refueling probe extended,
the pilot and RIO standby altimeters and air
speed indicators show erroneous readings
because of changes in airflow around the
Turn the OXYGEN supply valve to OFF before pitot−static probes.
pulling the emergency oxygen manual actuating D The RUDDER AUTH caution light may illu
handle if contamination of the normal system is minate when the in−flight refueling probe is
suspected. Failure to do so will inhibit seatpan extended. Press the MASTER RESET button
shuttle valve operation, preventing flow of emer to reset the light.
gency oxygen.
2.32.1 Pitot−Static Heat
Note
Each pitot−static probe is equipped with electrical
Flow of oxygen from the emergency cylinder can heating elements to prevent icing. Pitot−static heat is
be stopped by reseating the manual actuation controlled by the pilot through the ANTI−ICE switch on the
handle. pilot right console. In AUTO/OFF, pitot probe heat is
available only with weight off wheels. ORIDE/ON activates
2.32 PITOT−STATIC SYSTEM the probe heat elements independently of the weight−on−
wheels switch and illuminates the INLET ICE caution light
The pitot−static pressure system supplies impact (pitot) on the CAUTION ADVISORY panel. OFF/OFF removes
and atmospheric (static) pressure to the pilot and RIO flight heat from the probes.
instruments, to the CADC, and to the engine AICS program
mers. Some systems require static pressure only; others
require static and pitot pressure (see Figure 285).
ORIGINAL 2−160
BACK−UP OXYGEN PRESSURE

CABIN ALTITUDE
2000 1600 1200 800 400 200
35 & ABOVE 100 80 60 40 20 10
30 72 58 43 29 14 7
25 52 42 31 21 10 5
20 41 33 24 16 8 4
15 32 26 19 13 6 3
10 27 22 16 10 5 2.9
8 24 19 14 9 4 2.5
5 21 17 12 8 4 2.2
SL. 17 14 10 7 3 1.8
Minutes remaining based on two−man consumption.

Duration data should be used as a guide
Consumption rate based on 13.1 liters per minute per man.
Figure 284.Backup Oxygen Duration Chart
1. Calligraphic or stroke writing is displayed on the

HUD, MFDs, and the DD.
2. Raster video (for example, radar, and television)

The ANTI−ICE switch should normally be in generated internally (VDI formats) or provided by
AUTO/OFF during takeoff and landing. Engine an external sensor, with or without a stroke overlay,
anti−icing has adverse effects on engine stall mar is displayed on the MFDs and the DD.
gin.
3. Alphanumeric data is displayed on the multistatus
2.33 CONTROL AND DISPLAY SYSTEM indicator and the radio frequency and radio frequen
cy/control indicators.
The control and display system (Figure 286) provides
the crew with navigation, aircraft status, and flight tactical Displays presented on the HUD and MFDs are
information. The control and displays system consists of two identified as formats. The formats are categorized as display
display processors (DP1 and DP2), three multifunction format groups.
displays (pilot center MFD1, pilot right MFD2, and RIO
MFD3), and a heads−up display system, cockpit television HUD format groups consist of takeoff/landing/
sensor, HUD−VIDEO panel, pilot displays control panel, and navigation (TLN), air−to−air (A/A), air−to−ground (A/G), and
a multistatus indicator. multimode formats that can be overlaid on the other three.
The control and display system also sends display The HUD also displays a manual reticle and a test pattern.
information to the digital display, the radio frequency
indicator, radio frequency/control indicator, and the mission MFD display format groups are shown in Figure 287.
video recorder. The HUD and MFD VDI format groups are basically the
same; however, HUD symbology is scaled to be overlaid on
The data entry unit is a remote terminal that communi the real world, and certain differences, such as symbol
cates with the mission computers via the multiplex buses. location, addition, and deletion occur between the HUD and
MFD VDI formats. MFDs also display repeats of the PTID
2.33.1 Display Types and DD as well as TCS and CCTVS video.
The following types of display information are pro
vided by the MFD system:
2−161 ORIGINAL
Figure 285.Airstream Sensors
ORIGINAL 2−162
Figure 286.Display Systems Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 4)
2−163 ORIGINAL
Figure 2−86. Display Systems Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 4)
ORIGINAL 2−164
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-86. Display Systems Controls and Indicators (Sheet 3 of 4)
2-165 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Figure 2−86. Display Systems Controls and Indicators (Sheet 4 of 4)
ORIGINAL 2−166
DISPLAY FORMAT FORMATS WITHIN GROUP
MFD Vertical Display

p y Indictor ((VDI)) /HUD Formats TLN BASIC (TLN−GU, TLN−GD)
TLN DESTINATION
TLN MANUAL
TLN TACAN
TLN DATA LINK
AWL (All Weather Landing)
A/A BASIC
A/A SPARROW SEARCH
A/A PHOENIX SEARCH
A/A SIDEWINDER SEARCH
A/A PHOENIX TRACK
A/A SPARROW TRACK
A/A SIDEWINDER TRACK
A/A TRACK WHILE SCAN
A/A MULTIPLE MODE GUN SIGHT (MMGS)
A/A GUN BACKUP
A/G BASIC
A/G CCIP
A/G MANUAL
RECON
IRSTS TWS
MFD Horizontal Situation Display

p y ((HSD)) Formats WAYPOINTS
TACAN
CDI TACAN
GPS
AUTO
OWN A/C and WAYPOINT Formats OWN A/C BASIC

OWN A/C GROUND
OWN A/C CVA
OWN A/C IFA
WAYPOINT DATA 099
Figure 287.Display Format Groups (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−167 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
DISPLAY FORMAT FORMATS WITHIN GROUP

NAV Align Formats CV MAN DATA
CV Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) DATA
IFA
Standard Attitude Heading Reference System (SAHRS)
(Norm Mag SHDG)
SAHRS CV
Inertial Navigation
g System
y (INS)
( ) UPDATE Format
Continuous Update Formats NAV AID CORRECTIONS
NAV AID ENABLED
NAV AID OPTIONS
SURFACE WAYPOINT POSITION Format
Stores Management System (SMS) Format
SPIN INDICATOR Format
ENGINE MONITOR Format
On Board Checkout (OBC) Formats OBC BASIC
OBC Groups: CD, CNI, FLT, NAV, AUX, TAC, EW,
SMST, and SNSR
OBC Failed Data: CADC, CIU, SAHRS, DINS, GPS,
DEU, DP1, DP2, MC1, MC2, MDL/DSS, APC, EMSP1,
EMSP2, IFX, SMS, SWITCHES, RWR, and RDR/TCS
MAINT Format
Failure Historyy Format (FHF)
( )
Cooperative Support Software (CSS) Format
Missile Status Readout Formats MISSILE SUBSYSTEM 1
MISSILE SUBSYSTEM 2
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)
( ) Format
Recon Formats RECON DATA
RECON WPT DATA1
RECON WPT DATA2
Tactical Situation Display (TSD) TSD MENU
TSD PRIORITY
TSD DECLUTTER 1
TSD DECLUTTER 2
TSD COMMAND
TSD REPLY
TSD TARGET MODIFIER
JTIDS Data Readouts (JDR) OWN AIRCRAFT PPLI
AIR PPLI
NON-AIR PPLI
INDIRECT PPLI
Infrared Search and Track (IRST) Formats IRSTS NORMAL
IRSTS CSCAN
IRSTS SUMMARY
Figure 2-87. Display Format Groups (Sheet 2 of 2)
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-168
2.33.2 Display Processors is on the PDCP and the MFD power switches are on each
MFD as a part of the DAY/AUTO/NIGHT switch.
Two display processors (DP1 and DP2) drive the
display system. The DPs receive various signal inputs from After a short warmup (under 2 minutes), the default
the aircraft systems. These signals are processed and formats appear on the displays. The default formats, with
converted to display information for the HUD, MSI, MFDs, weight on wheels, are as follows:
DD, RFI, RFCI, and the mission video recorder.
1. HUD TLN basic
2. MFD VDI TLN basic
During normal operation, DP1 drives the HUD and
MFD1, while DP2 drives MFD2 and MFD3. Should either 3. MFD2 OBC basic
DP fail, the mission computer commands backup operation,
where the remaining DP provides limited functions. 4. MFD3 OWN A/C basic.
If the mission computers are not in communication,
2.33.2.2 DP Backup Operation test patterns will appear on all four displays.
During backup operation, the remaining DP drives the Format selection for the HUD is made by use of the
HUD, and MFD1. Should one of these three displays be OFF MODE pushbuttons on the PDCP and by the type of steering
or subsequently selected off, then MFD2 will operate. If both selected. MFD format families are selected by pressing the
stroke generators in the remaining DP are in use, an MFD pushbutton adjacent to a menu legend or by cursor designa
format that is normally produced by stroke writing may be tion of the legend. Every MFD format (except repeats) has
generated in raster. With the following exception, either DP MENU select as the center pushbutton on the lower edge of
can perform any display function: Mission video record is not the display. Also appearing on all formats for immediate
performed during backup operation. selection are SMS to the left of MENU and ECM to the right
of MENU. Other selections vary according to format
2.33.2.3 Data Failure Modes requirements. When a repeat format (HUD, DD, or PTID) is
In addition to the backup mode, there are other failure being displayed on the MFD, no legends are available for
modes. Some examples are as follows. format selection. To change formats from a repeat, press any
pushbutton. This returns MENU1 to the MFD, permitting
If the DPs fail to receive pitch and roll data, the other format selections to be made. Cursor designation of
message PITCH/ROLL FAIL will appear on the MFDs and legends cannot be used with repeat displays.
all pitch/roll−related symbols are removed from the displays.
The symbols are returned if pitch and roll information is 2.33.4 Heads−Up Display (HUD)
restored.
The HUD (Figure 288) provides a combination of
If the DPs lose communication with the MCS, a manual real−world cues and flight direction symbology, projected
reticle will appear on the HUD and the MFDs will display directly on a combining glass assembly. The flight informa
only the message DP−MC COMM FAIL and MENU1. The tion on an optical combiner is projected in the pilot forward
lighted MODE pushbuttons also turn off with a loss of MCS field of view. The display is focused at infinity, thereby
communication. Should communications be restored, the creating the illusion that the symbols are superimposed on the
DP−MC COMM FAIL message is removed and the MODE real world (and so that visual cues received from outside the
buttons are lighted again. If the MC performed a cold start or aircraft are not obscured). The pilot usually steers based on
a system reset, default formats are presented on the displays. interpretation of the visually observed real world. The HUD
can be selected to be the primary flight reference for all flight
2.33.3 System Operation regimes displaying navigation and weapon delivery informa
The display system requires 115 V, 400 Hz electrical tion. The HUD symbol brightness control is on the HUD; all
power DP1, HUD, and MFD1 receive power from ac other HUD controls are on the PDCP.
essential No. 2 bus and DP2, MFD2, and MFD3 are on the ac
left main bus. All displays and DPs are electrically protected 2.33.4.1 Pilot Displays Control Panel (PDCP)
by circuit breakers. There are no power switches for the DPs. The PDCP on the pilot right console (Figure 289)
Each of the displays has a power switch that is normally provides control of the mode and display presentation of the
turned off at the conclusion of flight. The HUD power switch
2−169 ORIGINAL
Figure 288.Heads−Up Display
HUD, VDI, ECM, and TCS formats. Display informa an MFD, or is being recorded, bright white flashes of video
tion is dependent on the mode selected with the A/A, A/G, will be displayed or recorded. This is normal for BIT
and TLN pushbuttons. operation.
2.33.4.2 Color Cockpit Television Sensor 2.33.5 Multistatus Indicator (MSI)

(CCTVS)
The MSI is an LCD panel on the lower center
The CCTVS is an electro−optical system that images instrument panel below the center MFD (MFD1)
symbology present on the HUD combiner and outside world (Figure 286). The MSI displays the weapon type and status
information as well. The unit consists of a video sensor head on each store station.
on the HUD and an electronic unit in the HUD−VIDEO panel
The lower row displays weapon status: ready,
(Figure 286)). The sensor signal can be fed to the mission
degraded, ready/selected or degraded/selected. The selected
video recorder and can be displayed on the MFDs. Operation
symbol never appears alone; it is always superimposed over
of the CCTVS is controlled by the VIDEO CONTROL
the ready or degraded symbol. Figure 290 provides a
switch on the HUD−VIDEO control panel.
representative display of available MSI symbols along with
their meanings.
2.33.4.3 HUD−VIDEO Control Panel
The upper row of the display identifies the weapon.
Operation of the CCTVS is controlled by the HUD− Two dashed lines at a store station indicate that the missile at
VIDEO control panel (Figure 286)). The panel contains the that station has failed or is hung. A blank display on a station
two−position VIDEO CONTROL toggle switch, a BIT indicates no weapon is loaded or the weapon loaded is not
button, a green GO light, and a yellow NO GO light. Setting recognized.
the VIDEO CONTROL switch to ON provides power to the
CCTVS; selecting OFF removes power. Depressing the BIT There are no controls on the MSI. Power to the MSI is
button initiates a CCTVS self−test. A good test results in a provided by the HUD subsystem. The MCS must be
momentary flash of the yellow NO GO light followed by a transmitting data for a display to be presented. Selecting
steady green GO light. A failure results in a steady yellow NO TEST on the HUD PWR switch causes all LCD segments on
GO light. During BIT, if CCTVS video is being displayed on the MSI to be displayed.
ORIGINAL 2−170
1 MODE Switch DAY Provides a full range of HUD symbol brightness control: 0 to 100%.
Disables automatic brightness control.
AUTO Provides automatic symbol brightness operation superimposed on
the level selected with the symbol brightness control.
NIGHT Provides a HUD symbol brightness control range of 0 to 1.0% of
DAY level.
Note
When switching from NIGHT to DAY, the brightness
level gradually increases until it reaches the level
established for DAY.
2 Display MODE A/A Provides selection of air−to−air display mode.

Pushbuttons
A/G Provides selection of air−to−ground display mode.
TLN Provides selection of takeoff/landing/navigation mode.
Figure 289.Pilot Displays Control Panel (Sheet 1 of 3)
2−171 ORIGINAL
3 TCS FOV (Television NAR Selects TCS narrow field of view for display on pilot’s MFD1.
Camera Field of View) WIDE Selects TCS wide field of view for display on pilot’s MFD1.
4 ECM switch ORIDE Enables ECM display to override whatever is being displayed on
MFD2 for as long as the threat is being reported.
OFF ECM display override not enabled.
5 ELEV LEAD Control A continuous rotary control that provides a range of elevation positions for the
HUD manual reticle with the 0 mr setting coincident with the armament datum
line (ADL). Clockwise rotation increases elevation lead.
6 HUD/VDI ALT source BARO Selects barometric altimeter as source for display of altitude on
switch HUD and VDI.
RDR Selects radar altimeter as source for display of altitude on HUD
and VDI. Radar altitude is displayed as follows:
• Below 5000 feet AGL
• Radar altitude valid
• AOB ≤ 45_
7 HUD PWR switch TEST (Momentary) Presents an intersecting vertical and horizontal line at
(lever lock) the center of the HUD field of view, and illuminates all segments of
the multistatus indicator (MSI).
ON Provides power to HUD and MSI.
OFF Removes power from HUD and MSI.
8 FORMAT switch ANLG Selects analog dial format for HUD display of airspeed and
altitude.
BOTH Selects a combination of analog dial and digital readout for HUD
display of airspeed and altitude.
DGTL Selects digital readout format for HUD display of airspeed and
altitude.
9 DECLUTTER switch NORM Normal display symbology is presented.

LVL 1 Depending on MODE selected, the following symbols are
removed:
TLN GEAR UP
(AOA bracket and target pointer/AON are not displayed)
• Vertical velocity
• AOB scale
• Peak G
Figure 2−89. Pilot Displays Control Panel (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−172
9 DECLUTTER switch TLN GEAR DOWN

(
(continued)
) ((Target
g p pointer/AON and Mach are not displayed)
p y )
• Peak G ((displayed
p y as required
q in normal mode only)
y)
• AOB scale l
• Radar
R d altitude
ltit d
A/A
• Radar
R d altitude
ltit d readout
d t
A/A and A/G
(Vertical
(V ti l velocity,
l it AOB scale, l andd AOA b
bracket
k t are nott di
displayed)
l d)
• AOA readout
d t
• Potential flight path marker (PFPM)
LVL 2 − Depending on MODE selected, the following additional symbols are
removed:
TLN GEAR UP
• AOA
• Mach
• Nav range
• PFPM
• Radar altitude readout
• Digital boxes
• Clock/Timer readout
• Steering
S g Mode/WPT
/ #/
#/Range
g
TLN GEAR DOWN
• AOA
• Digital boxes
• PFPM
• Vertical velocity
• Steering Mode/WPT #/Range
A/A
• Nav range
A/G
(Closure and target pointer/AON are not displayed)
• Radar altitude readout
A/A and A/G
(AOB scale,
scale AOA bracket,
bracket and vertical velocity are not displayed)
• Mach number
• Peak G
• Digital
g boxes
• Heading
H di scale l
• Ghost
Gh t FPM
• Steering Mode/WPT #/Range
10 CAGE ENBL/DSBL Momentary contact pushbutton used to enable/disable HUD CAGE option.
Pushbutton Caging restricts pitch ladder and flight path marker symbols in azimuth to the
center of the HUD display.
Figure 2−89. Pilot Displays Control Panel (Sheet 3 of 3)
2−173 ORIGINAL
Figure 290.Multistatus Indicator Symbols/Meanings
An MFD displays tactical and flight command situa Normally the pilot uses the MFD below the HUD
tions, navigation, and discrete information either separately on the aircraft centerline as the primary in−the−cockpit flight
or simultaneously with radar and TV data. There is also a instrument.
power/brightness select switch above the display screen
Attitude information is displayed on the MFD VDI
(Figure 291).
format by an aircraft reticle, a horizon line, and a calligraphic
pitch ladder. The aircraft reticle is fixed at the center of the
2.33.6 Multifunction Displays (MFD)
display, and the horizon line and pitch ladder move about it
The three identical MFDs are CRT displays with 20 in accordance with the aircraft pitch and roll attitudes.
pushbuttons around the perimeter of the display screen. The The flight parameters displayed include magnetic
MFD pushbuttons with adjacent legends are used for menu
heading, data link (D/L), commanded airspeed (Mach
selection, data entry/readout, and system test and/or status
number), airspeed, altitude, and vertical velocity.
indications. The three programmable MFDs, two in the pilot
instrument panel and one in the RIO instrument panel
Note
provide display flexibility such that either crewmember is
able to select any display available, allowing the pilot and If pitch or roll data is not updated within 240
RIO to monitor and back up each other. The HUD format may milliseconds, the pitch ladder and roll marker
be repeated on any MFD by depressing pushbutton No. 11 will be blanked and the horizon, sky, and ground
from the MENU1 format. plane will darken.
Multifunction pushbuttons with adjacent CRT legends
located around the perimeter of the MFD are used for menu 2.33.7 Cursor Controls
selection, data entry/readout, and system test and/or status Both the pilot and RIO have cursor controls
indications. An MFD displays tactical and flight command (Figure 292) that permit the remote selection of MFD
situations, navigation, and discrete information either sepa pushbutton options as well as symbol and spot hooking. A
rately or simultaneously with radar and TV data. symbol is hooked when the cursor is placed over a format
ORIGINAL 2−174
1 Power switch OFF Power removed from MFD.
Note
Selecting NIGHT AUTO, or DAY applies power to the

MFD, however a DP must be on and providing data to
the MFD for a format to be displayed.
NIGHT Disables automatic contrast adjustment and limits automatic

brightness adjustment to a small percentage of the DAY range.
AUTO Automatic adjustment of brightness and contrast to compensate

for changing light conditions as seen by sensors above the BRT
and CONT controls.
DAY Full range of manual brightness and contrast control. Disables

automatic brightness and contrast adjustment.
Figure 291.Multifunction Display (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−175 ORIGINAL
2 Pushbuttons 20 momentary contact pushbuttons that provide for selection of display,

operating modes, and system parameters. A selected legend is normally
enclosed by a rectangular box. A dashed rectangular box indicates that a
legend has been selected but is not available.
3 CONT control Varies the amplitude of the shades of gray. Effects are most visible when
viewing video or raster graphics.
4 BRT (brightness) Varies intensity of overall display. As brightness is decreased, fewer shades
control of gray are discernable.
Figure 2−91. Multifunction Display (Sheet 2 of 2)
symbol and cursor designate is activated. Hooking is used to 2.33.7.3 Cursor Hooking Functions
set waypoints on the HSD waypoint format and to select
Spot, symbol, and MFD pushbutton hooks can be
tracks and other symbols, for the purpose of obtaining
performed by the pilot on the HUD or MFD by activation
information, or identifying symbols of interest on the TSD
of the TDC or on the PTID or MFD by the RIO through use
format. The cursor symbol is a small circle inside a larger
circle when displayed on the MFDs and a circle with four tic of the sensor hand control.
marks extending from the circle inward at 0_, 90_, 180_, and Normal symbol hooking is accomplished by placing
270_ when displayed on the HUD. the cursor over the desired symbol using either the TDC or
the SHC and activating the appropriate cursor designate
2.33.7.1 Throttle Designator Controller (TDC) switch. The hooked symbol brightens and the previously
hooked symbol returns to normal intensity. Symbol hooks are
The pilot controls cursor position with the throttle des used to display additional information about those symbols
ignator controller. The TDC is a circular disk that is a com or to designate tracks for functions that are format dependent.
bination fourway force sensor and momentary switch on the Only HUD, PTID, TSD, and IRST normal format support
outboard throttle grip. Finger pressure on the outer edges of symbol hooking.
the control will move the cursor in the direction selected.
MFD pushbutton hooks permit remote activation of
When cursor movement exceeds the limit of a display that is
MFD pushbutton functions through the TDC or SHC. They
adjacent to another display (e.g., the right edge of MFD1 or
are accomplished by positioning the cursor over the desired
the bottom of the HUD), the cursor will move to the adjacent
MFD menu choice and activating the cursor designate
display. If the cursor symbol reaches a display limit that is not
switch.
adjacent to another display (e.g., the right edge of MFD2),
the cursor remains at that limit. Depressing and releasing the
2.33.8 Displays, Formats, and Symbology
TDC designates the cursor position.
The paragraphs that follow describe the HUD and MFD
2.33.7.2 RIO Cursor Control displays. Sample formats from format families are illus
trated, symbols associated with these families are identified
The RIO cursor control is on the sensor hand control. and defined, and format selection is described.
It consists of a four−position select switch, a two−position
Many symbols are common to more than one format
(half−full action) trigger switch, and a handgrip. When the
family. Once a symbol has been defined for a format family,
top, bottom, or right edge of the select switch is pressed, the
the definition is not repeated when describing other format
DD, PTID, or MFD3, respectively, is selected for cursor dis
families. Certain features, such as changes in scaling
play. Pressing the left edge toggles sensor control between
between formats, that are obvious when viewing the display
radar and infrared. The cursor symbol becomes visible when
are not covered.
the trigger switch is pressed to the half−action position. Full
trigger depression designates the cursor position. Cursor All symbols available to a format are illustrated;
symbol movement is controlled by handgrip movements. however, they will rarely be displayed at the same time. Not
all formats are illustrated. Where only minor differences
exist, they will be noted. Formats that contain only alpha
numerics are described but are not illustrated.
ORIGINAL 2−176
Figure 292.Cursor Controls
2−177 ORIGINAL
2.33.8.1 Warning, Caution, Advisory Indicators Note
Warnings are displayed on the lower center of the HUD The large cross that appears on the HUD when
viewing area. These warnings are: L FIRE, R FIRE, L the HUD PWR switch is set to TEST is generated
STALL, R STALL, and RDC SPD. The CLSN advisory is by the HUD, independent of the DP, and is used
also displayed on the HUD. If there are more than two warn to check HUD operation.
ings, then they will scroll up at the rate of one warning per The HUD and MFD test patterns also momentarily
second. appear during IBIT and following a system reset. Both test
patterns are written in stroke and are used to check stroke
On the MFDs, warning/caution/advisory indications accuracy.
are shown in a viewing window that appears on all formats
except repeats. This window is displayed in the upper left of The MFD/KROMA test pattern (a future−growth color
the MFD and is referred to as the CAW (Caution Advisory display) includes an MFD TEST legend, used to select the
Warning) window or CAW box. The message window allows MFD RASTER test pattern.
up to four CAWs to be displayed at one time. If more than four
CAWs are to be displayed, they scroll up from the bottom of The MFD RASTER test pattern allows for testing of
the window at a rate of one per second. Warning, caution, individual pushbuttons. When a button is pressed, a solid−line
advisory legends are independent of format and may be box appears around the PRESS legend; pressing the button
directed to a specific crewmember. Figure 293 lists specific again removes the box. The diamond and blinking break
CAWs and the crewmember to whom they are directed. away symbol are used to check RASTER accuracy. Numerics
0 through 7 check RASTER shades of gray. Selecting EXIT
When warning, caution, or advisories are displayed, returns the display to MFD/KROMA test pattern.
pressing the pushbutton above the CAW window (PB6) will
remove the window and replace it with a boxed CAW legend. 2.33.8.3 HUD Formats
Pressing the CAW pushbutton when the legend is boxed HUD format category (TLN, A/A, A/G) is normally
returns the window and indications to the display and
selected by use of MODE buttons on the PDCP. However,
removes the box from the legend.
air−to−air formats are selected automatically if the pilot
selects a weapon using the weapon select switch on the stick
Note grip; selects RDR PLM/PAL, IR PLM/PAL (all with gear up)
If a repeat format is on MFD1, the CAW window with the sensor mode switch; lifts the ACM guard; or if VSL
is shifted to MFD2 in its current state, open or HI/VSL LO is selected with the sensor mode switch or DD.
closed (acknowledged). New CAWs continue to Air−to−ground formats are automatically selected when an
be displayed on MFD2 until the repeat format is air−to−ground weapon is selected on the SMS format. The
removed from MFD1. If a repeat format is dis HUD default format is the TLN basic format (Figure 295).
played on both MFD1 and MFD2 or on MFD3, This format is displayed on power−up and if DP1 experiences
receipt of CAW data removes the repeat format a cold start (power outage of over 1 second).
from MFD1 and/or MFD3 and displays a new The amount of information displayed on HUD formats
format with the CAW in the appropriate window. is pilot selectable by means of the FORMAT and DECLUT
Receipt of a data−link advisory removes the TER switches on the PDCP. Symbols are also added or
repeat format from MFD1 (if appropriate) and deleted by the mission computer depending on aircraft status,
MFD3 and displays the menu format with data− steering mode, and weapon selection. When the FORMAT
link advisories. (DD and PTID displays are switch is set to BOTH, airspeed and altitude information are
repeats on MFD1; HUD, DD, and PTID displays displayed as boxed digital readouts with analog dials. In the
are repeats on MFD2 and MFD3). ANLG position, the boxes are removed from the digital
readouts. In the DGTL position, only the boxed digital
2.33.8.2 Test Patterns readout is presented and the analog dials are removed.
The test patterns (Figure 294) appear on the HUD and The position of the HUD/VDI ALT switch on the PDCP
MFD when the display system is turned on with the MCs off selects the type of altitude data that is to be displayed, either
during ground tests and are generated by the DP. radar or barometric. If radar is selected and a valid
ORIGINAL 2−178
ACRONYM TYPE AIRCREW DISPLAY FUNCTION
L STALL W BOTH HUD/MFD Warns of left engine stall.
R STALL W BOTH HUD/MFD Warns of right engine stall.
L FIRE W BOTH HUD/MFD Warns of fire in left engine.
R FIRE W BOTH HUD/MFD Warns of fire in right engine.
RDC SPEED W PILOT HUD/MFD Safe Mach number exceeded for current
position of flaps.
W/S C PILOT MFD Indicates failure of wingsweep system.
L N2 OSP C PILOT MFD Indicates overspeed of left rotor N2.
R N2 OSP C PILOT MFD Indicates overspeed of right rotor N2.
L N1 OSP C PILOT MFD Indicates overspeed of left rotor N1.
R N1 OSP C PILOT MFD Indicates overspeed of right rotor N1.
L TBT OT C PILOT MFD Indicates overtemp of left turbine blade.
R TBT OT C PILOT MFD Indicates overtemp of right turbine blade.
L FLMOUT C PILOT MFD Indicates left engine flameout.
R FLMOUT C PILOT MFD Indicates right engine flameout.
L IGV SD C PILOT MFD Indicates left inlet guide vane adjust schedule
is not correct.
R IGV SD C PILOT MFD Indicates right inlet guide vane adjust schedule
is not correct.
A/P REF A PILOT MFD Indicates autopilot mode is selected but not
engaged.
CLSN A PILOT HUD Indicates collision course steering to target has

been selected.
IFF ZERO A RIO MFD Indicates the identification friend or foe

transponder is not operating correctly.
Figure 293.Warning, Caution, Advisory Functions (Sheet 1 of 3)
2−179 ORIGINAL
AAI ZERO A RIO MFD Indicates the air to air intercept interrogator is
not operating correctly.
SDU ALM C RIO MFD Indicates the JTIDS Secure Data Unit is not
operating properly or does not contain valid
JTIDS crypto keys. Under certain conditions the
display of this alarm is normal.
ASPJ HOT C RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the airborne
self−protection jammer.
JTID HOT C RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the JTIDS
R/T.
RWR C RIO MFD Indicates the radar warning receiver is not
operating correctly.
FWD ASPJ C RIO MFD Indicates the forward ASPJ is not operating
correctly.
AFT ASPJ C RIO MFD Indicates the aft ASPJ is not operating cor
rectly.
AFT CG C BOTH MFD Indicates that stores station status has shifted
center of gravity to preclude landing without
correction.
MC 1 C RIO MFD Indicates mission computer 1 is not operating
correctly.
MC 2 C RIO MFD Indicates mission computer 2 is not operating
correctly.
CIU C RIO MFD Indicates the computer interface unit is not
MC1 HOT C RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the mission
computer #1.
MC2 HOT C RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the mission
computer #2.
INS A RIO MFD Indicates the inertial navigation system is not
IMU A RIO MFD Indicates the inertial measurement unit is not
GPS FAIL A RIO MFD Indicates the MAGR unit is failed or turned off.
POSITION A RIO MFD Position differs. Will be displayed if:
D GPS and INS differ by more than 4 nm.
D GPS and SAHRS differ by more than 11 nm.
D SAHRS and INS differ by more than 13 nm.
Figure 2−93. Warning, Caution, Advisory Functions (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−180
GPS QUAL A RIO MFD Degradation of GPS occurred so GPS output

is invalid.
VELOCITY A RIO MFD Feet/second.
CIU HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the CIU.
DP1 HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of display

processor 1.
DP2 HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of display

processor 2.
SMS HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the stores

management system.
RDR HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the radar

system.
HUD HOT A PILOT MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the HUD.
RWR HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the radar

warning receiver.
DSS HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the data

storage system.
DEU HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the data

entry unit.
MPS HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the missile

power supply.
IRSTS HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the infrared

search and track system.
TARPS A RIO MFD Indicates the tactical air reconnaissance pod

system is not operating correctly.
IPF A RIO MFD Indicates a failure in the JTIDS R/F output

detected by the JTIDS Interference Protection
Feature.
JTID A RIO MFD Indicates the joint tactical information distribution

system is not operating correctly.
SAHR HOT A RIO MFD Indicates an overtemp condition of the standard

attitude heading reference set.
Figure 2−93. Warning, Caution, Advisory Functions (Sheet 3 of 3)
2−181 ORIGINAL
Figure 294.Test Patterns
ORIGINAL 2−182
Figure 295.HUD TLN Basic Format (Sheet 1 of 4)
2−183 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Water line Indicates fuselage reference line (FRL). Displayed when attitude information
is not valid. Also displayed when gear down or the flight path marker is at,
or beyond the HUD’s full field of view.
2 Heading pointer Actual aircraft heading is displayed below the stationary heading pointer.
3 Pitch/flight path ladder Ladder displays aircraft climb/dive angle and roll angle. Aircraft vertical flight
path angle is indicated by the position of the flight path marker on the pitch/
flight path ladder. Positive pitch lines are solid and negative pitch lines are
dashed. To aid in determining flight path angle when it is changing rapidly,
the pitch lines are angled toward the horizon at an angle half that of the
flight path angle. For example, in a 40_ climb, the pitch lines are angled 20_
toward the horizon. "Up" appears at +90_ and "down" appears at −90_.
4 Ghost flightpath marker Displayed at the true velocity vector position when the flight path marker is
caged and the true velocity vector position differs from the caged position in
azimuth. When the true flight path marker position is actually outside the
HUD total field of view, the symbol will be pegged at the edge of the total
FOV and flash.
5 Radar altitude indicator Displays radar altitude when the aircraft is below 5000 feet AOL and bank
angle is less than 45_. If RDR is selected as the altimeter source and valid
radar altitude exists, the radar altitude is displayed within the dial, replacing
the barometric altitude. An R is displayed to the right of dial to indicate radar
altitude. If BARO is selected and a valid radar altitude exists, radar altitude
is displayed above the altitude dial or box.
6 Altitude analog dial The HUD analog altimeter consists of ten dots encircling the altitude read
out. Each dot indicates altitude in hundreds of feet with the zero mark
located at the top center of the dial.
7 Altitude pointer An analog pointer indicating altitude moves uniformly around the inside of
the altitude dial based on indicated altitude. Increasing altitude is indicated
by clockwise rotation of this pointer.
8 Digital altitude readout Digital barometric, radar, or GPS altitude is displayed depending on the
source of the data. When the ALT switch is in the BARO position, baro
metric altitude is displayed. When the ALT switch in the RDR position and
if aircraft altitude is 5000 feet or lower, radar altitude is displayed within the
dial and is identified by an R to the right of the least significant digit. If the
radar altitude becomes invalid by exceeding 5000 feet or 45_ AOB, baro
metric altitude is substituted and a B will flash to indicate that barometric
altitude is being displayed rather than radar altitude. A G is only displayed
when SCADC altitude becomes invalid and the GPS altitude is used. The
G acronym will flash if RADALT is selected and both SCADC and radar
altitude are invalid.
9 Vertical velocity readout The vertical velocity readout consists of a maximum of five digits for a posi
tive vertical velocity indication and a maximum of four digits with a leading
minus sign for a negative vertical velocity indication. If the limit 32,999 or
−9,999 is exceeded, a minus sign with four X’s (−XXXX) is displayed. It is
displayed below the six o’clock dot of the altitude dial.
Figure 2−95. HUD TLN Basic Format (Sheet 2 of 4)
ORIGINAL 2−184
SYMBOL FUNCTION
10 Negative three degree Indicates the negative 3 degree position on the pitch ladder.
marks
11 Barometric pressure The barometric pressure setting used by the display system and the weapon
setting system is the value set on the pilot’s barometric altimeter.
The setting will be displayed for up to 5 seconds on the HUD and VDI
in the TLN mode when the setting is changed. At 18,000 feet, if it is off,
the symbol comes on and blinks for 5 seconds.
12 Navigation source and WPT, GPS or TCN; waypoint number, range.
range readout
13 Clock/timer readout Derived from the GPS clock. Default time is ZTOD. Options selectable from
the HSD ZTOD pushbutton are ZTOD, TTG, TTGT, TREL, ETA, ET and CD.
14 Bank scale Provides indication of bank angle to ±45_. Tick marks are provided at 0_,
±10_, ±20_, ±30_ (slightly larger) and ±45_.
15 Bank angle pointer Moving pointer provides indication of aircraft bank angle. At bank angles in
excess of ±45_, the pointer will be pegged at ±50_ and will flash.
16 Warning/caution/ The warnings L STALL, R STALL, L FIRE, R FIRE, and RDC SPEED and the
advisory readout CLSN advisory will appear on the HUD in the steady condition. Up to two
indications may be displayed at any one time. When more than two indica
tions are present, they scroll up from the bottom at the rate of one
per second.
17 Mach number Indicates speed of the aircraft in mach.
18 Peak aircraft g Peak Aircraft g is displayed on the HUD as follows;

TLN Gear Down: If aircraft g falls below +0.0 or exceeds +2.0.
TLN Gear Up, A/A, A/G: If aircraft g falls below −2.0 or exceeds +4.5.
Peak g indication is displayed until a declutter mode is cycled.
19 Aircraft g Aircraft g is displayed on the HUD as follows;
TLN Gear Down: If aircraft g falls below +0.5 or exceeds +1.5.
TLN Gear Up, A/A, A/G: If aircraft g falls below −2.0 or exceeds +4.5.
20 Angle of attack Indicates angle of attack in units.
Note
When the TLN gear down format is displayed, the AOA readout is
removed when AOA is between 14 and 16 units. If AOA is greater than
14 units and decreasing, the readout remains off until AOA decreases
below 13 units. If AOA is less than 16 units and increasing, the readout
remains off until AOA increases above 17 units.
21 Airspeed pointer An analog pointer indicating airspeed moves uniformly around the inside
of the airspeed dial based on indicated airspeed. Increasing airspeed is
indicated by clockwise rotation of the pointer.
22 Airspeed dial The HUD analog airspeed dial consists of ten dots encircling the airspeed
readout. Each dot indicates airspeed in tens of knots with the zero mark
located at the top center of the dial.
23 Extended horizon line Represents the horizon with respect to the aircraft and changes orientation
with any change in aircraft pitch or roll.
2−185 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
24 Digital airspeed readout Provides digital readout of calibrated airspeed.
25 Flight path marker The flight path marker is displaced in azimuth and elevation to present
computed flight path. Aircraft vertical flight path angle is indicated by the
position of the flight path marker on the pitch/flight path ladder. In the caged
mode, the flight path marker is caged in azimuth and the true flight path
marker position is indicated by the display of the ghost flight path marker
when the true position is more than 2_ from the caged position. The flight path
marker can be caged or uncaged by alternately pressing the CAGE/SEAM
switch. On selection of TLN or A/A, the flight path marker is initially caged;
selection of A/G presents the uncaged mode initially.
26 Heading scale Aircraft magnetic heading is indicated by the moving 360_ heading scale.
In TLN, the major divisions are numbered every 10 degrees. In A/A, the major
divisions are numbered every 20 degrees.
Note
When the aircraft is in the TLN mode with the gear handle down, the
heading scale remains 2 degrees above the position of the flight path
marker. The lowest point of the heading scale, including the numbers,
will never rise above the normal (gear up) position. The heading scale is
occluded by the altitude and airspeed dials and readout.
27 Angle of attack The AOA bracket is a pitch related variable that indicates the deviation of the
bracket current AOA from a desired value and is vertically referenced to the left wing
of the flight path marker symbol. The center of the bracket represents the opti
mum AOA. The bracket moves lower with respect to the flight path marker as
AOA increases and it moves higher as AOA decreases.
28 Potential flight path Indicates the acceleration along the flight path marker. Provides a graphical
marker (PFPM) representation of the ability to change the flight path angle by varying the
thrust acceleration and/or angle of attack. Deceleration is indicated by the
PFPM below the flight path marker and acceleration by the PFPM above the
flight path marker.
radar altitude exists (altitude < 5,000 feet and AOB < 45_), 2.33.8.3.1 Takeoff/Landing/Navigation Formats
radar altitude is displayed in the center of the altitude dial. If
TLN formats are categorized by the selected steering
the aircraft’s altitude exceeds 5,000 feet or the radar altitude
mode and landing gear position. TLN basic, the HUD default
becomes invalid, the system automatically substitutes baro
format, does not display steering information. Refer to
metric altitude and a B" will flash to the right of the analog
dial to indicate radar altitude is not being used. Switching Figure 2−95 for the location and description of TLN basic
symbology.
HUD/VDI ALT to BARO removes the flashing B."
Steering mode selection is made through MFD push
The symbols removed by the DECLUTTER switch button or cursor designate action on the VDI AWL formats.
vary with formats and are discussed in the applicable para TCN, DEST and GPS steering mode selections are also
graphs. Refer to Figure 296 for declutter information in available on the HSD by boxing the TACAN data buffer or
TLN−GD, TLN−GU, A/A, and A/G modes. waypoint data buffer. Making a steering mode selection
changes TLN basic to TLN TCN (TACAN), MAN (manual),
DEST (destination), GPS, D/L (data link), or AWL (all−
weather landing).
ORIGINAL 2−186
HUD MODES/DECLUTTER SWITCH SELECTION

SYMBOL NAME TLN−GD TLN−GU A/A A/G
N 1 2 N 1 2 N 1 2 N 1 2
MACH*
ÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏÏÏÏ ÏÏ ÏÏÏ
AIRCRAFT G
ÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
PEAK G
DIGITAL BOXES
ANALOG DIALS
ÏÏÏÏ
AOB SCALE
ÏÏÏÏ
AOA READOUT
HEADING SCALE
NAV RANGE
ÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
PFPM
GHOST FPM
ÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
AOA BRACKET
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
RADAR ALTITUDE READOUT
VERTICAL VELOCITY
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏ
WATERLINE
ÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏ ÏÏ
A/A RANGE
CLOSURE
ÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏ
TARGET POINTER/AON
PITCH LADDER
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏÏ *
NOT PRESENT
PRESENT
ÏÏÏ
ÏÏÏ AS REQUIRED
*Pitch ladder replaced on Spin
Figure 296.HUD Declutter Levels
2−187 ORIGINAL
Steering mode is identified on the HUD by a legend in the 2.33.8.3.2 Air−to−Air Formats
data readout display area. Steering modes are described in
A/A formats (Figure 299 and Figure 2100) are pre
Chapter 20.
sented when the pilot selects the A/A pushbutton on the pilot
1. TCN selection adds a course−steering arrow and displays control panel, when a weapon is selected, the radar
course−deviation dots. Distance to the TACAN sta hot modes are selected, or when the ACM guard is lifted. The
tion is displayed to the right of the TCN legend. A/A formats provide target acquisition, weapon status, and
shoot prompts as well as primary flight information. Target
2. MAN steering selection adds a commanded heading data and the selection legends A/A, PH, SP, SW, and G are
marker to the heading scale. The commanded head displayed. Quantity of the selected weapons is also shown.
ing marker also appears on destination, datalink, When GUN is selected, the quantity number indicates rounds
and AWL formats. remaining in hundreds. A large X" through a weapon
selection legend indicates that the master arm switch is
3. DEST steering selection adds the waypoint destina SAFE.
tion range to TLN basic format.
Refer to the Supplemental NATOPS Flight Manual,
4. D/L selection displays the range to the data−link NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A, for a description of air−to−air
destination. A large flashing X" will appear in the attack.
center of the display when a data−link waveoff
command is received. 2.33.8.3.3 Sensor Mode Indications
Radar modes are indicated on the HUD via alpha
5. AWL steering selection provides for the display of numerics. The radar mode alphanumerics are removed when
ACL and ILS, ACL only, ILS only, or no ACL and the radar is off or in the computer mode. An X" overlays the
ILS glidepath situation displays. The display of the mode indication if the IRST is failed (Figure 299). The radar
HUD flight director glideslope and centerline steer mode alphanumerics are as follows:
ing can also be independently controlled. Selections
are made via MFD pushbutton activation on the VDI 1. Hot range while search (HRWS)
AWL format. A large, flashing X" will appear in
the center of the display when a waveoff command 2. Manual rapid lock−on (MRL)
is received. Distance to the TACAN station is dis
played as is the TCN legend. 3. Pilot automatic lock−on (PAL)
When the landing gear handle is placed in the down 4. Pilot lock−on mode (PLM)
position, the HUD cage/uncage function is enabled on the
CAGE/SEAM switch located on the inboard throttle, the 5. Pulse Doppler search (PDS)
system transitions to TLN−GD mode, and all weapon
selections are cleared. In TLN−GD mode, the Mach number 6. Pulse Doppler single−target track (PDSTT)
is removed and aircraft g is displayed if the g’s fall below
+0.5 or exceed +1.5; peak g is displayed in normal declutter 7. Pulse search (PS)
mode if aircraft g falls below 0.0 or exceeds +2.0; the horizon
line is extended across the HUD field of view and a flying 8. Pulse single−target track (PSTT)
W" (waterline) symbol is added at the fuselage reference
line. 9. Range while search (RWS)
10. Range while search velocity (RWSV)

Note
The waterline symbol is also added in other HUD 11. Sniff (SNIFF)
formats when the flight path marker is at or
12. Standby (STBY)
beyond the HUD field of view or when altitude
data is lost. 13. Track while scan automatic (TWSA)
Figure 297 shows the symbols that are added during
TACAN and AWL flight director steering modes, landing 14. Track while scan manual (TWSM)
gear down, with digital or analog display selection. Refer to
Figure 298 for a description of the symbols that are available 15. Vertical scan lock−on high (VSLHI)
for TLN formats.
16. Vertical scan lock−on low (VSLLO).
ORIGINAL 2−188
Figure 297.HUD Added Symbology (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−189 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Command heading This symbol indicates the heading required to achieve the selected course.
marker Course selection may be manual, data link commanded, or waypoint destination.
Where commanded heading is beyond display scale limits, the symbol will be
pegged at the nearest edge to the commanded heading. This symbol does not
appear on the basic or TACAN formats.
2 Waterline Indicates fuselage reference line (FRL). Displayed when attitude information is not
valid. Also displayed when gear down or TLN Gear Up, or the flight path marker is at
or beyond the HUD’s full field of view.
3 Breakaway, waveoff A large flashing X will appear in both D/L and AWL steering modes if a
WAVEOFF command has been received.
4 ILS precision course Consists of two independent needles (vertical and horizontal) which form a cross
needles pointer. The horizontal needle responds to ILS glide slope error and the vertical
needle responds to ILS localizer error. Null/center indications are provided to enable
the pilot to null the error and keep the vertical and horizontal needles centered.
5 AWL legend This message indicates that the all weather landing steering mode has been
selected.
6 Range Depending on the format, this message will indicate either the range to the TACAN
station, data link destination or distance to waypoint destination. The legends TCN,
D/L, or WPT may also appear. When in the manual steering mode no range appears
but the MAN legend is displayed.
7 Extended horizon line Indicates the horizon with respect to the aircraft with landing gear down. Changes
orientation with any change in aircraft pitch and roll.
8 Course arrow and The course arrow represents the selected course to the TACAN station. Two dots
deviation dots will appear on the side of the flight path marker toward the course arrow and perpen
dicular to the arrow. The dot closest to the flight path marker represents a half scale
deflection of 4_ off course, while the outermost dot represents full scale deflection
of 8_ off course. When the aircraft crosses the selected course, the arrow moves to
the opposite side of the flight path marker and the dots would appear on that side.
For deviations of more than 9_, the arrow pegs. If the arrow is centered on course,
the dots disappear. Flight path marker centered over the course arrow indicates
being on course. For TACAN bearings aft of ±90_, the arrow will be dashed.
9 Angle−of−attack The AOA bracket is a pitch−related variable that indicates the deviation of the current
bracket AOA from a desired value and is vertically referenced to the left wing of the flight
path marker symbol. The center of the bracket represents the optimum AOA.
The bracket moves lower with respect to the flight path marker as AOA increases
and it moves higher as AOA decreases.
10 Flight director The flight director symbol provides glide slope and centerline steering information
computed by the mission computer using navigation system parameters and
Data Link information from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system. The box with the three
dots will provide the pilot with optimal glide path intercept and following when the
flight path marker is inside the flight director box and the three dots are aligned with
the wings and the tail of the flight path marker. The same procedures are used
whether the flight path marker is caged or uncaged. The flight director symbol is
removed from the HUD when the FLT DIR pushbutton on the VDI is unboxed.
11 ACL steering indicator Provides ACL steering commands driven by the ASW−27C data link.
Figure 2−97. HUD Added Symbology (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−190
FORMAT
SYMBOL DATA
BASIC AWL LINK DESTINATION MANUAL TACAN
Aircraft G Readout (On all formats except GEAR DOWN & DECLUTTER2)
Airspeed Dial (On all formats except DIGITAL)
Airspeed Readout Box (On all formats except ANALOG or DECLUTTER2)
Airspeed Readout (On all formats)
Altitude Dial (On all formats except DIGITAL)
Altitude Readout Box (On all formats except ANALOG or DECLUTTER2)
Altitude Readout (On all formats)
AngleofAttack Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Bank Scale (On all formats except DECLUTTER1 and 2)
Baro Setting Readout (5 sec) + + + + + +
Ghost flight path marker + + + + + +
Extended Horizon Line (On all formats when GEAR DOWN)
Heading Scale + + + + + +
Horizon (On all formats when GEAR UP)
Reference Markers + + + + + +
Mach Readout (On all formats except GEAR DOWN and GEAR UP DECLUTTER2)
Peak A/C G Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER1 and 2)
Pitch Ladder TLN + + + + + +
Radar Altitude Readout (On all formats except GEAR DOWN DECLUTTER1 & 2 and GEAR UP
DECLUTTER2)
Flight Path Marker + + + + + +
Vertical Velocity Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER1 & 2 in GEAR UP and DECLUTTER2
in GEAR DOWN)
Clock/Timer Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Figure 298.HUD Symbology Available on TLN Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−191 ORIGINAL
FORMAT
SYMBOL DATA
BASIC AWL LINK DESTINATION MANUAL TACAN
Waterline (On all formats or when flight path marker pegged or altitude data invalid)
Altitude Source B, R, or G + + + + + +
HUD Cursor + + + + + +
Potential Flight Path Marker (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Angle of Attack Bracket (On GEAR DOWN only. All formats)
IRST Pointer + + + + + +
TCS Pointer + + + + + +
Caution/Advisory/Warning + + + + + +
Breakaway Symbol o + + o o o
Command Heading Marker o + + + + o
HUD Steering Legend AWL o + o o o o
HUD Steering Legend TCN o + o o o +
HUD Steering Legend D/L o o + o o o
HUD Steering Legend MAN o o o o + o
HUD Steering Legend WPT o o o + o o
ILS Precision Course Needles o + o o o o
Range Readout o + + + o +
ACL Steering Indicator Tadpole o + o o o o
Flight Director o + o o o o
Course Arrow & Deviation Dots o o o o o +
Notes:
+ indicates that the symbol is available for display on the selected format.
o indicates that the symbol is not available for display on the selected format.
Figure 2−98. HUD Symbology Available on TLN Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−192
Figure 299.HUD A/A Search Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−193 ORIGINAL
1 Radar target Indicates the radar line of sight (LOS) to the target. Symbol is displayed on all
designator and target A/A weapon modes when radar is tracking a target. The symbol is positionable
aspect over the total HUD field of view (FOV). When the target moves beyond the
FOV limits of the HUD, the symbol will peg and flash. In STT, target aspect is
represented by a pointer which points in the direction of the aspect angle.
Zero target aspect is straight down.
2 Target pointer Indicates the direction of the target designator (TD) box position on the HUD.
The target pointer is present when pointing to a TD box under the following
conditions: 1) FONO 1 track is outside the IFOV (Instantaneous Field of View).
2) PTID hooked track is outside the IFOV with no FONO 1 present. 3) Closest
TMA is outside the IFOV and there is no FONO 1 PTID hooked track.
3 Angle−off−the−nose The angle−off−the−nose (AON) indicator defines the angle between the FRL
indicator and the target line of sight that the target pointer is pointing to, in the plane
described by the FRL and the target pointer. When the target designator is
being pointed to by the target pointer, a three digit readout is displayed
indicating the AON of that target. The AON indicator is not earth stabilized.
The AON readout is centered below the origin of the target pointer and is
given in degrees.
4 Steering tee Provides azimuth steering only, in search mode. Provides elevation and
azimuth steering in track mode.
5 IRST symbol Indicates IRST target location. Up to four displayed.
6 Target range Range of closest radar target in nautical miles and tenths. Numeric is dis
played only when range is valid.
7 Target altitude Altitude of closest radar target in thousands of feet. Displayed only when
information is valid.
8 Target closing velocity Displays closing rate to radar target. A minus sign indicates an opening
velocity.
9 Target ID Target ID display.
10 Navigation data Displays steering mode, waypoint selected or range (DEST or D/L).
11 Clock/timer readout TTG is selected from the HSD ZTOD pushbutton, and indicates time−to−go to
read designated waypoint.
12 IRST mode indicator Displays current IRST mode.
13 Radar mode indicator Displays current radar mode.
14 Weapon select legend Displays missile type and quantity, if selected, or gun and rounds remaining,
in hundreds. If no weapon is selected, displays A/A.
15 Master arm safe cue A large X through the A/A or weapon select legend indicates the Master Arm
Switch is in SAFE.
16 TCS pointer Indicates TCS track location.
17 NCTR Indicates non−cooperative target recognition is available.

Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A.
Figure 2−99. HUD A/A Search Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−194
FORMAT
PHOENIX SPARROW SIDEWINDER
GUN
SYMBOL BASIC SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK MMGS BACKUP
Aircraft G Readout + + + + + + + + +
Airspeed Readout Box (On all formats except ANALOG & DECLUTTER2)
Altitude Readout Box (On all formats except ANALOG & DECLUTTER2)
Angle of Attack Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Baro Setting Readout + + + + + + + + +
Clock/Timer Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Ghost Flight Path Marker (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Heading Scale (On all formats except DECLUTTER 1 & 2)
Horizon + + + + + + + + +
Reference Markers + + + + + + + + +
Mach Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER2)
Peak A/C G Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER2) + + +
Pitch Ladder (On all formats except DECLUTTER1 & 2)
Radar Altitude Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER1 & 2)
Flight Path Marker + + + + + + + + +
Waterline (On all formats when flight path marker pegged, gear is down, or altitude information is
invalid.)
Altitude Source B or R + + + + + + + + +
HUD Cursor + + + + + + + + +
IRST Pointer + + + + + + + + +
TCS Pointer + + + + + + + + +
Caution/Advisory/Warning + + + + + + + + +
Breakaway Symbol + + + + + + + + +
Command Heading Marker + + + + + + + + +
Select Legends, A/A PH# PH# SP# SP# SW# SW# G# G#

Weapon Qty
Figure 2100.HUD Symbology Available on A/A Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−195 ORIGINAL
FORMAT
GUN
SYMBOL BASIC SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK MMGS BACKUP
Master Arm Switch Safe + + + + + + + + +
Cue
Target Range RNG, # + o + o + o + o +
Target Range Indicator + o + o + o + o o
Waypoint Select o + o + o + o o o
Steering Tee + o + o + o + o o
Target Designator + o + o + o + + o
Target Closing Velocity + o + o + o + o o
Target Altitude + o + o + o + o o
Target ID + o + o + o + o o
TACAN Digital Readout o + o + o + o o o
Flood Illumination Pattern o o o + o o o o o
Sidewinder Seeker Circle o o o o o + + o o
SHOOT Cue o o + o + o + o o
Reticle o o o o o o o + o
Reticle A o o o o o o o + o
Reticle B o o o o o o o + o
Target Range Tape o o o o o o o + o
Target Lead Cue o o o o o o o + o
BATR Symbol o o o o o o o + o
Gun Mode o o o o o o o o +
Indication MAN
Reticle Depression # o o o o o o o o +
A/A Gun/Backup Mode o o o o o o o o +

Reticle
Notes:
+ indicates that the symbol is available for display on the selected format.
Figure 2−100. HUD Symbology Available on A/A Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−196
IRST modes are indicated on the HUD via alpha format (Figure 2104) allowing gun aiming by displaying the
numerics. The IRST mode alphanumerics are removed when A/A gun/backup mode reticle. The reticle depression angle,
the IRST is failed. The IRST alphanumerics are as follows: adjusted by the ELEV LEAD knob on the PDCP is shown in
the lower right corner of the HUD along with the MAN
1. Cooldown (COOL) gun−mode indication.
2. Hot IR (HOTIR) 2.33.9 MFD Formats
3. Pilot automatic lock−on (PAL) Initial turn on or a cold start (defined as a system reset
or a MCS power outage of at least 300 milliseconds) causes
4. Pilot lock−on mode (PLM) the following default formats to be displayed: With gear
down and weight on wheels, VDI/TLN basic on MFD1, OBC
5. Single−target track (STT) basic on MFD2, and OWN A/C on MFD3; with gear down
and weight off wheels, VDI/TLN basic on MFD1, HSD on
6. Standby (STBY) MFD2, and HSD on MFD3; and with gear up and weight off
wheels, TSD on MFD1, HSD on MFD2, and HSD on MFD3.
7. Track while scan automatic (TWSA)
The actual format displayed on MFD3 depends on the
8. Track while scan manual (TWSM). navigation mode selected and the conditions existing at the
time. If the NAV MODE switch is at OFF, the OWN A/C
2.33.8.3.4 Air−to−Ground Formats basic format is displayed.
Pushbutton selection on the PDCP or selection of an MFD3 may also act as a controller of the DEU in that,
when certain formats are being displayed on MFD3, the DEU
air−to−ground weapon places the A/G basic format on the
is commanded to display corresponding slaved formats.
HUD (Figure 2101 and Figure 2102). The A/G basic
Refer to Figure 2105 for a listing of MFD3/DEU slaved
format can display waypoint and TACAN information. A/G
DECLUTTER and ANLG and DGTL displays are similar to control conditions.
A/A formats. Refer to the Supplemental NATOPS Flight With the exception of high−priority formats (ECM and
Manual, NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A. spin), which appear when required, most MFD formats are
selectable by means of MFD pushbutton or cursor designa
2.33.8.4 Overlay Symbology tion. The actual format that will appear may depend on other
factors, however, such as master mode selection, aircraft
Symbology (Figure 2103) may be overlaid on dis
state (TLN, A/A, or A/G), steering mode selection, and the
played HUD formats when additional information is
alignment condition. The MENU legend appears on every
required. These include RECON, TWS, and IRST TWS.
MFD format except for HUD, DD, and PTID repeats. These
RECON, used with the TARPS pod, is selected as an repeat formats do not display selections; pressing any
overlay from the MFD RECON formats. This overlay adds pushbutton when in a repeat mode will place MENU1 on the
the RECON command heading marker, command ground− MFD. The MENU legend is located above the center
track line, RECON steering symbol, target−designator hexa pushbutton on the lower edge of the MFDs. Also appearing
gon, and camera selection legend. on every MFD format are the SMS and ECM pushbutton
legends (Figure 2106).
Radar track while scan adds up to four radar target
diamonds that indicate the four closest targets. Size of the Repeated depressions of the ECM or SMS pushbuttons
symbols indicates relative proximity (i.e., the largest is the toggle between these formats and the previously selected
closest). The four symbols are of preset sizes, not scaled to display. This permits the crew to quickly check ECM or SMS
reflect actual distances. conditions without having to reselect previous formats.
The infrared search and tracking system TWS adds up Selecting MENU places menu 1 on the display. The
to four triangular IRST symbols to existing formats. Unlike legend reads MENU1 and is enclosed by a rectangular box.
TWS, these symbols are all the same size. Both IRST and Selecting MENU1 when it is boxed places menu 2 on the
TWS symbols are added automatically when a target is being display with the legend MENU2 displayed in the box. The
tracked. MENU pushbutton toggles between MENU1 and MENU2.
Menu selection changes the pushbutton legend but does not
2.33.8.5 Manual Reticle alter the display being presented.
If the mission computer loses communication with
both DPs, the DP driving the HUD provides a manual reticle
2−197 ORIGINAL
1 Waypoint select Displays destination waypoint selection.
2 Range to waypoint Displays range to selected waypoint.

readout
3 Clock/timer readout TTG to reach designated waypoint (based on HSD format clock/timer
select [PB7]).
4 Select legend Displays mode/weapon selected. Will display A/G If no weapon has been
selected.
Figure 2101.HUD A/G Basic Format
ORIGINAL 2−198
FORMAT
SYMBOL
BASIC CCIP MANUAL
Aircraft G Readout o o o
Airspeed Readout Box (On all formats except ANALOG & DECLUTTER − 2)
Altitude Readout Box (On all formats except ANALOG & DECLUTTER − 2)
Angle of Attack Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 1 & 2)
Baro Setting Readout + + +
Clock/Timer Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 2)
Ghost flight path marker (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 2)
Heading Scale (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 2)
Horizon + + +
Reference Markers + + +
Mach Readouts (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 2)
Peak A/C G Readout (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 2)
Pitch Ladder (On all formats)
Radar Altitude Indicator (On all formats except DECLUTTER − 2)
Flight Path Marker + + +
Altitude Source−B or R + + +
HUD Cursor + + +
Figure 2102.HUD Symbology Available on A/G Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−199 ORIGINAL
FORMAT
SYMBOL
BASIC CCIP MANUAL
IRST Pointer + + +
TCS Pointer + + +
Caution/Advisory/Warning + + +
Breakaway Symbol o + o
Command Heading Marker + + +
Select Legends, Weapon Qty A/G G G
Master Arm Switch Safe Cue + + +
Pull Up Cue o + o
Waypoint Select + + +
Steering Tee + + +
TACAN Digital Readout + + +
Gun Mode Indication o CCIP MAN
Gun Rounds Remaining (100’s) o + +
Max. Gun Firing Range o + o
Reticle o + +
Target Range Tape o + o
Reticle Depression Numerics o o +
Notes:
+ indicates the symbol is available for display on the selected format.
Figure 2−102. HUD Symbology Available on A/G Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−200
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Recon command Indicates the magnetic heading to the dynamic steering point or commanded
heading marker heading in the 90 deg − 270 deg maneuver during map steering.
2 Target designator, Displays target position. Positioned by on−board sensors or data link.
hexagon
3 Command ground Displays the path of the command ground track.

track line
4 Camera selection Displays the camera operational mode. First letter indicates frame position:
legend V = vertical, forward, or blank. Second letter indicates pan position:
C = center, R = right, L = left, or blank. Third letter indicates IRLS position:
N = narrow field of view, W = wide field of view, S = standby, or blank.
5 Recon steering Provides elevation and azimuth steering information.

symbol
Figure 2103.HUD Overlay Formats
2−201 ORIGINAL
Figure 2104.HUD Manual Reticle Format
With a MENU display selected, format legends the RIO cockpit. Either OWN A/C basic, ground
(Figure 2106) are displayed around the edges of the CRT. A align, CVA (carrier align), or IFA (in−flight align)
format is selected by cursor designation or by pressing the formats will be displayed.
pushbutton adjacent to the legend. When a format is selected,
its legend on the display is enclosed by a rectangular box. 2. PB2 NAV  Selecting NAV presents one of a
number of NAVAID or SAHRS ALIGN formats,
When a display processor acknowledges a pushbutton depending on alignment mode conditions. Formats
being depressed, the legend is boxed with a dashed line. that may be displayed include NAV AID options,
When the MC acknowledges the pushbutton request, the line NAV AID corrections, NAV AID enabled, SAHRS
becomes solid. If the MC does not acknowledge the request, ALIGN (NORM, MAG, SHDG), or SAHRS ALIGN
the dashed box disappears. This system is used to show the (CV).
crew that the display system has received the request.
Selecting MENU only changes the pushbutton legends. The 3. PB3  No selection.
current display remains until a selection is made from
MENU. 4. PB4 TSD  Selection results in placement of the
tactical situation display format on the selected
For convenience in describing format selection, num
MFD. Switching logic prevents the TSD from
bers are assigned to the pushbuttons starting from the lower
appearing on two MFDs at the same time. There
left side and counting clockwise. On the MENU1 display,
fore, selecting TSD on MFD1, while TSD is
PB1 is the pushbutton corresponding to the DATA legend.
displayed on MFD2, will result in the TSD moving
From MENU1 the following formats may be selected: to MFD1 and MENU1 appearing on MFD2. Refer
to the Supplemental NATOPS Flight Manual,
1. PB1 DATA  This selection presents one of four NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−lA, for a description of TSD
OWN A/C formats. The format to be displayed de− formats.
pends on the position of the NAV MODE switch in
ORIGINAL 2−202
SLAVED DEU 5. PB5 VDI  This selection places one of several

MFD3 FORMAT VDI formats on the display. VDI formats are head
FORMAT
down attitude displays presenting basic flight infor
OWN A/C BASIC OWN A/C mation as well as steering and weapon delivery
cues. Format selection depends on PDCP MODE
OWN A/C GROUND OWN A/C
pushbutton selection, steering selection, weapon
OWN A/C CVA OWN A/C selection, and track or search modes.
OWN A/C IFA OWN A/C
6. PB6  No selection.
HSD TACAN OWN A/C
GPS STAT OWN A/C 7. PB7 CTVS  This selection displays video from
the HUD color cockpit television sensor on the
HSD WAYPOINT WAYPOINT PLOT
MFD. The video consists of a real−world view plus
WAYPOINTS DATA (Note 1, 2) WAYPOINT the symbology appearing on the HUD.
FLIGHT PLAN WAYPOINT
8. PB8 OBC  Selecting OBC places the ON BOARD
RECON WPT DATA 1 (Note 6) WAYPOINT CHECKOUT basic format on the display. From the
RECON WPT DATA 2 (Note 7) WAYPOINT basic format, other OBC formats can be selected,
CV MAN DATA (Note 3) CV ALIGN allowing BITs to be commanded and test results to
be displayed. There are 10 OBC formats. Refer to
CV SINS DATA (Note 4) CV ALIGN Chapter 38 for a description of these formats and
CSS CSS their use.
SMS SMS
9. PB9 CHKLST  This selection initially places the
SAHRS ALIGN (NORM, MAG, OWN A/C TAKEOFF checklist on the MFD. From the TAKE
SHDG) OFF format, the LANDING checklist may be
selected. PB9 toggles between TAKEOFF and
SAHRS ALIGN (CV) CV ALIGN
LANDING when CHKLST has been selected.
NAV AID OPTIONS NAV AID
NAV AID ENABLED (Note 5) NAV AID 10. PB10  No selection.
TSD NAV GRID
11. PB11 HUD  This selection displays a repeat of the
current HUD symbology on the MFD.
Notes:
(1) No slaved DEU format shall be established if MFD 12. PB12 PTID  This selection displays a repeat of
3’s previous format was WAYPOINT DATA 2 or the programmable tactical information display
RECON WPT DATA 1. presentation on the MFD.
( ) No slaved DEU format
(2) f shall be established iff MFD
3’s previous format was WAYPOINT DATA 1 or 13. PB13 DD  This selection displays a repeat of the
RECON WPT DATA 2. 2 digital display presentation on the MFD.
(3) No slaved DEU format shall be established if MFD
3’ss previous format was CV SINS DATA.
3 14. PB14 TCS  This selection displays the video from
the television camera set on the MFD.
(4) No slaved DEU format shall be established if MFD
3 s previous format was CV MAN DATA.
3’s
15. PB15 IRST  This selection displays the infrared
(5) No slaved DEU format shall be established if MFD search and track system normal format on the MFD.
3
3’ss previous format was NAV AID CORRECTIONS.
(6) No slaved DEU format shall be established if MFD 16. PB16 HSD  This selection displays one of three
3’ss previous format was RECON WPT DATA 2.
3 horizontal situation display formats on the MFD.
(7) No slaved DEU format shall be established if MFD The format displayed will be the last previously dis
3’s previous format was RECON WPT DATA 1. played. If no HSD format has been selected after a
cold start or system reset, then the HSD waypoint
format will be presented.
Figure 2105.Slaved DEU Page Control
2−203 ORIGINAL
Figure 2106.MFD MENU Displays
ORIGINAL 2−204
17. PB17 ECM  This selection displays the ECM is frozen, and an X is superimposed over the spin
format on the MFD. A second selection of ECM arrow. The airspeed, AOA, and altimeter scales are
while viewing the ECM format returns the previous not obscured (refer to Chapter 11).
format to the MFD, providing that ECM ORIDE has
been selected and a threat is being reported. 2.33.9.1.2 ECM Format
18. PB18 MENU1  This legend will be boxed. Selec If the pilot and/or RIO ECM switches (Figure 286)
tion of MENU1 when boxed presents MENU2. are set to ORIDE and a threat is reported, the ECM format
will override the present formats on MFD 2 and/or MFD 3.
19. PB19 SMS  This selection displays the stores ECM override is enabled independently by pilot and RIO and
management system format on the MFD. In addi may be deselected independently. When the threat is no
tion to weapon test and select via the SMS format, longer being reported, the ECM format is replaced by the
TACTS and SIM modes are enabled. Refer to previous format. If MFD 2 is not on, the ECM format is
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A for a complete descrip established on MFD 1. Only the spin indicator format can
tion of TACTS and SIM modes. A second selection override the ECM format.
of SMS while viewing the SMS format returns the The ECM format can also be selected manually by
previous format to the MFD. pushbutton selection. The ECM legend appears on all MFD
formats above PB17. When selected, the legend is boxed.
20. PB20  No selection.
Pressing PB17 with ECM boxed returns the previous format
MENU2 (Figure 2106) allows selection of the to the display. For further information, refer to NAVAIR
RECON and JTIDS formats on the MFD. 0l−F14AAD−1A.
21. PB21 JTID  This selection displays the JTIDS 2.33.9.2 Warning/Caution/Advisory, System
OWN A/C DATA format. From the JTIDS OWN Message, and Advisory Formats
A/C DATA format, the TSD MENU (TMENU) or
JTIDS Hook −TSD or PTID format can be selected. Warning/caution/advisory indications and data−link
advisory readouts appear as overlays on displays as required.
2.33.9.1 High−Priority Formats Figure 2108 shows the locations of these overlays and
describes their control logic.
High−priority formats include spin indicator, ECM,
warning/caution/advisory and system message displays. Warning/caution/advisory indications are displayed on
the MFD in the upper left readout, and data−link JTIDS
2.33.9.1.1 Spin Indicator advisories are displayed in the upper right readout. The
readouts have the capability to present up to four indications
If a spin condition is detected, that is, if body yaw rate at a time with each indication consisting of up to eight
exceeds 30° per second, a spin indicator format (Figure 2107) characters in length. When more than four indications are
is displayed on MFD 1 and the PTID, MFDs 2 and 3 display designated for display within a readout, the indications will
the VDI. If MFD 1 is not on, the spin display will appear on cyclically scroll up from the bottom at a rate of one indication
MFD 2. When the spin condition is no longer valid (yaw rate per second. The warning/caution/advisory indications are
of 27° per second or less), the spin indicator format is removed capable of being acknowledged and removed from the
and the previous format is restored to the display except as display whereas the data−link/JTIDS advisories are not
follows: acknowledgeable. When a warning/caution is displayed, the
MASTER CAUTION light flashes and the READ MFD
1. If conditions for the display of the ECM format caution lights come on.
exist, the ECM format will appear on the display
instead. Systems messages are generated by the mission
computer to alert the crew of system conditions. Two
2. If the previous format was a HUD, DD, or PTID categories of system messages are displayed: computer
repeat, MENU with a display of warning/caution/ messages (those that can appear on any MFD format),
advisory and/or data link (D/L) advisory messages and OBC messages (those that can only appear on the
will be displayed. OBC and maintenance current−failure display formats).
The OBC and maintenance current−failure display formats
3. If INS and SAHRS failures occur while the spin are capable of supporting both categories of system messages
arrow format is displayed, the pointer on the yaw simultaneously. The messages are displayed on the upper
rate scale is removed from the MFD, the spin arrow
2−205 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Airspeed scale Presents indicated airspeed in knots on a vertical tape.
2 AOA scale Presents angle−of−attack in units on a vertical tape.
3 Altitude scale Presents altitude in thousands of feet on a vertical tape. The tape flashes
when altitude is below 10,000 feet MSL.
4 Engine stall indicator Displays either R STALL on right side of MFD or L STALL on left side of
MFD to indicate a stalled engine.
5 Spin arrow Displays an arrow pointing either left or right indicating direction of spin.
6 Yaw rate scale Moving carat indicates yaw rate in degrees per second against a stationary
scale.
Figure 2107.MFD Spin Indicator Display
ORIGINAL 2−206
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Warning/caution/ The Warning/caution/advisory readout is referred to as the CAW box.

advisory readout The CAW box is selected on and off via PB6. When the CAW box is not dis
played, the CAW select legend is displayed and boxed (CAW). The
CAW box displays warning messages steady and bright, cautions at normal
intensity flashing at a 3 Hz rate, and advisories at normal intensity and
steady. If the caution is displayable in the pilot cockpit, pressing the
MASTER CAUTION light causes the caution message to become steady.
2 Computer message The first row of ASCII characters is used to display the computer messages
for all display formats. See Figure 2−109 for a listing of these messages.
3 Data link/JTIDS advisory Provides display of data link/JTIDS advisories. The data link JTIDS advisory
readout indications are not acknowledgeable. Indications that will be presented on
the HUD and MFD and their logic are described in the Supplemental
NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A.
Figure 2108.MFD Warning/Caution/Advisory and Message Overlays (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−207 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
4 OBC messages The second row of ASCII characters is used to display the OBC messages
on the OBC and maintenance current failure formats. See Figure 2−109 for
a listing of these messages.
5 Acknowledge (ACK) The ACK pushbutton legend appears whenever a system message is dis
pushbutton played. When the ACK pushbutton is pressed the message will be removed
from the MFD. System messages must be acknowledged before new mes
sages can be displayed.
Figure 2−108. MFD Warning/Caution/Advisory and Message Overlays (Sheet 2 of 2)
center portion of the MFD and consist of two rows of 3. RECON WPT DATA 2 −This format displays way
19 ASCII characters, each row displaying a category of point information for waypoints 11 through 20 as
system messages. System messages (Figure 2109) appear as well as latitude, longitude, altitude information for
required on the MFDs. They may be computer or OBC the selected waypoint. It is selected via PB9 (R−2)
messages. When a system message is displayed an ACK from formats RECON DATA and RECON WPT
(acknowledge) legend appears above PB20. System mes DATA 1 (Figure 225 and Figure 226).
sages remain displayed until the ACK button is pressed.
Should a subsequent message be sent while one is already Note
being displayed, the first must be acknowledged before the
next will be displayed. See Chapter 22 for more information on recon
naissance formats.
2.33.9.3 Alphanumeric (Data) Formats
4. TAKEOFF CHECKLIST  This format lists the
items be checked before takeoff; it is selected via
Many MFD formats have no symbols, but rather
PB9 (CHKLST) and PB7 (T/O) on the LANDING
display navigation, alignment, weapon, avionics, and diag
CHECKLIST format.
nostic data. Takeoff and landing checklists may also be
selected. Use of such formats is explained in the chapter 5. LANDING CHECKLIST  This format lists the
where it pertains. Data formats are identified by titles items to be checked before landing; it is selected via
displayed just below the upper pushbutton legends. When a PB7 (LDG) on the TAKEOFF CHECK−LIST
format is selected, its pushbutton legend is boxed. The format.
following paragraphs describe these formats and how they
are selected. Figure 2110 shows a typical format. 6. OWN A/C formats  These formats consist of
basic, ground, CVA (carrier align), and IFA (inflight
1. RECON DATA  This format permits selection align). OWN A/C basic displays own−ship data such
of reconnaissance waypoint and steering mode as latitude, longitude, altitude, groundspeed, mag
(point−to−point, commanded course, map) to way netic variation, true airspeed, navigation quality,
point; displays selected waypoint and mission data; wind speed and direction, barometer (altimeter) set
and displays camera status. It is selected via PB8 ting, and true heading (Figure 2015). The other
from formats MENU2, RECON WPT DATA 1 OWN A/C formats are alignment−related and add
and RECON WPT DATA 2 (Figure 225 and alignment information to the basic format, includ
Figure 226). ing an alignment quality indicator scale. These for
mats are selected via PB1 (DATA) on MENU1,
2. RECON WPT DATA 1  This format displays
VDI, HSD, NAV AID, GPS STAT, and SAHRS
waypoint information for waypoints 1 through 10 as
ALIGN formats. The format displayed depends on
well as latitude, longitude, and altitude information
the alignment mode. As transitions occur between
for the selected waypoint. It is selected via PB7
alignment modes, the formats will automatically
(R−1) from formats RECON DATA and RECON
change. On MFD 3, an alignment or INS mode tran
WPT DATA 2 (Figure 225 and Figure 226).
sition will cause the current format to be replaced by
an OWN A/C, CV DATA, or IFA format.
ORIGINAL 2−208
COMPUTER MESSAGE PRIMARY MFD SECONDARY MFD
NOT OPERATIONAL (Note 7) 

WAYPOINT INVALID (Note 7) 
TCN STEER INVALID (Note 9) 
SEL TACAN STEERING (Note 7) 
TEST COMPLETE−GGGGG (Note 1) (Note 7) 
PREFLT OBC COMPLETE 1,3 2 (Note 8)
INFLT OBC COMPLETE 1,3 2 (Note 8)
ALIGN SUSPENDED 1,3 2 (Note 8)
RETEST COMPLETE 1,3 2 (Note 8)
OBC SEQ ABORTED 1,3 2 (Note 8)
RETEST ABORTED 1,3 2 (Note 8)
OBC FAIL DETECTED 1,3 2 (Note 8)
INVALID WWWWW LOAD (Note 2) 1,3 2 (Note 8)
MC1 ERROR CODE XXX (Note 3) 1,3 2 (Note 8)
MC2 ERROR CODE XXX 1,3 2 (Note 8)
E BLOCK ADD SSSS (Note 4) 3 
E FLYCH ADD SSSS 3 
FLYCH EXISTS SSSS 3 
E TRAP ADD SSSS NN (Note 5) 3 
E 4 TRAPS SSSS NN 3 
E TRAP VAR SSSS NN 3 
E TRAP ALGO SSSS NN 3 
E FLYCH INC SSSS 3 
N FLYCH IN SSSS 3 
E FLYCH DEC SSSS 3 
NO TRAP NO. SSSS NN 3 
TRAP TRU INB SSSS NN 3 
ILS STEER INVALID (Note 9) 
ACL STEER INVALID (Note 9) 
D/L STEER INVALID (Note 9) 
TACAN NOT AVAIL (Note 7) 
SET PARKING BRAKE 1,3 2 (Note 8)
NO IFA/NO VEL 3 
32 PLOTLINE DEFINED 3 
E NOT AVAIL SSSS 3 
DEST STEER INVALID (Note 9) 
MAN STEER INVALID (Note 9) 
DATA REQUIRED 13 2
PILOT OBC DISABLE 1 2
INTERLOCK ABORT 1,3 2 (Note 8)
Figure 2109.Computer and OBC Messages (Sheet 1 of 4)
2−209 ORIGINAL
RDR ALLOTMENT GFL 3 2

CHALLENGE IFF 3 2
INVALID PLOT WPT 3 2
VIDEO REC NOT AVAIL 3 
VIDEO SWITCH ERROR 3 
VIDEO REC LOST 3 
ECM DATA INVALID (Note 9) 
BAD RWR LOAD 1,3 (Note 9) 2 (Note 8)
RDR CFL 3 
ASPJ CFL GO TO SA 3 
ASPJ CFL GO TO PH 3 
ASPJ CFL GO TO SD 3 
ASPJ CFL 3 
AAAAA ALGN COMPL (Note 6) 3,1 2 (Note 8)
GB−NORM 3 
GB−INIT ALIGN 3 
GB−SLEW 3 
GB−CARD ALIGN 3 
GB−GND CAL COMPL 3 
GB−SEA CAL COMPL 3 
NO AIC − DSS LOAD 3 2 (Note 8)
NO AIC − NET ENTRY 3 2 (Note 8)
NO AIC − XMIT MODE 3 2 (Note 8)
NO AIC − NO RESPONSE 3 2 (Note 8)
NO AIC − REQ DENIED 3 2 (Note 8)
JTIDS NOT AVAIL 3 2 (Note 8)
NO LOAD − NEED DSS 3 2 (Note 8)
NO LOAD − DSS FAIL 3 2 (Note 8)
LOAD ERROR − JTIDS 3 2 (Note 8)
JTIDS FAIL DETECTED 3 2 (Note 8)
MCS FULLUP ENTERED 3,1 2 (Note 8)
MCS FULLUP AVAIL 3,1 2 (Note 8)
MCS COLD START 3,1 2 (Note 8)
NO CHNG RECON WPTS 1,3 2 (Note 8)
GPS FAIL 1,3 2 (Note 8)
IFA AVAILABLE 1,3 2 (Note 8)
MDL FAIL DETECTED 1,3 2 (Note 8)
INVALID MDL FORMAT 1,3 2 (Note 8)
Figure 2−109. Computer and OBC Messages (Sheet 2 of 4)
ORIGINAL 2−210
Notes:
(1) through (6) indicates the range of the ADVISORY DATA from the application function and the
corresponding ASCII strings:
(1) GGGGG (3) XXX 0−999
1 AUX
2 CD (4) SSSS
3 CNI 6 MDS1
4 FLT 8 CIU
5 NAV 9 DEU
6 EW 10 MC1
7 TAC 11 MDS2
8 IRST 12 ADAS
(2) WWWWW 13 SMS
1 MC1 15 MC2
2 MC2 16 IRST
4 DEU 17 SDIS
5 MDS1 18 JTIDS
6 MDS2 (5) NN 0−99
7 RDR (6) AAAAA
8 CIU
9 SAHR 1 INS
10 SMS 2 SAHRS
11 ADAC
12 DSS
13 ASPJ
14 PWR
15 IRST
16 SDIS
(7) The MFD these messages are presented on is the MFD from which the pushbutton causing the message
is received or on other MFDs when unique display conditions exist.
(8) MFD 2 is secondary only when MFD 1 fails.
(9) These computer messages are displayed on all MFDs displaying a VDI format. If no VDI format is dis
played on MFD 1 and MFD 2 2, this computer message is displayed on MFD 1 (provided no repeat format is
displayed) with MFD 2 as a secondary when MFD 1 fails.
2−211 ORIGINAL

OBC/CSS Messages Removed After 3 Seconds
WOW NOT SATISFIED
TAS NOT SATISFIED
MULTI INTLK NOT MET
EQUIPMENT CONFLICT
NO COMMAND BIT
OBC SEQ IN PROGRESS
RETEST IN PROGRESS
OBC/CSS Messages Removed When Condition Change
MASTER TEST NOT SET
HANDBRAKE NOT SET
7. CV DATA formats  These formats consist of CV using arrows (PB 4 and PB 5) and the waypoint
MAN DATA and CV SINS DATA. Data presented name, number, latitude, longitude, and altitude will
is similar to OWN A/C except that it includes addi be displayed in the lower left of the display
tional information from manual entry or the ship’s (Figure 2035 and Figure 2037).
SINS. These formats are selected via PB3 (CV) on
OWN A/C CVA and SAHRS ALIGN formats. The 11. INS UPDATE  This format is used to update and
format displayed depends on whether or not data correct INS information. Update data may be
link is providing SINS data. PB5 (MAN) on the CV selected via radar, TACAN, visual sighting, JTIDS,
DATA format toggles between MAN and SINS or HUD hooking. The format is selected via PB13
(Figure 2024 and Figure 2025). (UPDT) on the HSD formats as well as PB15 (SWP)
on the SURFACE WPT format.
8. IFA  This format presents similar data to OWN
12. SURFACE WPT  This format permits the cre
A/C and also provides selection of in−flight align
ation of new waypoints or the update of existing
ment. It is selected via PB4 (IFA) on the OWN A/C
waypoints. It is selected via PB15 (SWP) on the INS
IFA format (Figure 2023).
UPDATE format.
9. WPT DATA  Up to 649 waypoints are stored on 13. NAV AID formats  The NAV AID formats, which
the MDL. This format displays the latitude, longi consist of NAV AID OPTIONS, NAV AID
tude, and altitude of these waypoints as well as CORRECTIONS, and NAV AID ENABLE, permit
OWN A/C and CVA, INS/SAHRS formats. Ten updating of navigational information for greater
waypoints are presented on each waypoint data page accuracy. The formats are selected via PB2 (NAV)
and the waypoint page number is indicated at the top on the HSD, OWN A/C, CV DATA, or IFA formats.
of the display. The data page can be incremented The format displayed depends on the selection or
(PB 10) or decremented (PB 9). To select the way deselection of alignment mode, continuous data
points for display, PB 1 through PB 5 and PB 11 source, and whether ENABLE (PB8 on NAV AID
through PB 15 may be used to box waypoint data, CORRECTIONS) was previously selected. PB7
highlighting waypoints of interest (Figure 2029). (GEO/REL) is used to select which JTIDS naviga
tion data is used for track corrections and continu
10. FLIGHT PLAN This format is selectable from
ous position updates.
the OWN A/C formats or HSD format. This format
shows the waypoints contained in Flight Plans 1 14. SAHRS ALIGN formats  These formats SAHRS
through 7. The flight plans are selected by incre ALIGN (NORM, MAG, and SHDG) and SAHRS
menting (PB 10) or decrementing (PB 9). The ALIGN (CV), permit selection of data to be used in
format presents the flight plan number and up to SAHRS alignment. They are selected via PB2
50 waypoints associated with waypoints by name or (NAV) on the HSD, OWN A/C, CV DATA, or IFA
by number when NUM (PB 11) is boxed. The indi formats. The format presented depends on align
vidual waypoint in each flight plan can be selected ment mode selection and SAHRS test status.
ORIGINAL 2−212
Figure 2110.Typical MFD Alphanumeric Format
Also, the display automatically transitions to a when awaiting test, is flashing during test, and is
SAHRS ALIGN format from a NAV AID format displayed at normal brightness after test. An align
when align mode changes from none or IFA to an ment quality indicator appears on all OBC formats
alignment mode. to inform the crew of the progress of the alignment
while tests are being performed (Figure 3812 and
Note Figure 3813).
Refer to Chapter 20 for more information on
navigation related formats. 17. MAINTENANCE  Displays a list of current
WRA failures. It is selected via PB9 (FAULT) on the
15. MISSILE SUBSYSTEM formats  Two formats OBC formats. It is also selected via PB3 (FHF) on
display the status of the missiles. Refer to the the FAILURE HISTORY FILE and PB4 (CSS) on
Supplemental NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR the COOPERATIVE SOFTWARE SUPPORT for
01−F14AAD−1A. mat. These legends appear boxed before selection.
16. OBC formats  There are 10 OBC formats. They 18. FAILURE HISTORY FILE  The FHF format lists
are used to initiate BIT of the avionics equipment the WRA failures, the type of failure, if this infor
and to display test results. OBC basic presents an mation is available to the MCS, and the time of up
overall view of subsystem test results and allows for to 10 failure occurrences since the file was cleared.
selection of the other OBC formats. It is selected via This format is available via PB3 (FHF) on the
PB8 on the MENU1 format. It may also be selected MAINTENANCE and CSS formats.
from the other OBC formats by pressing the push
button for the boxed legend (the format being 19. COOPERATIVE SOFTWARE SUPPORT  The
displayed). The legends on OBC basic show CSS format is a diagnostic tool that can be used by
which groups of subsystems may be selected. The maintenance personnel to troubleshoot system and
OBC subsystem formats display failures to the WRA anomalies. It is selected via PB4 (CSS) on the
WRA level. A WRA legend is brightly displayed MAINTENANCE and FHF formats (Figure 3820).
2−213 ORIGINAL
Note vectors, indicators, range, and breakaway symbols. There is

one level of declutter on VDI formats that adds a waterline
Chapter 38 includes a complete description of symbol and removes information such as airspeed, altitude,
the OBC, MAINTENANCE, FHF, and CSS barometric pressure setting, etc. Figure 2111 identifies and
formats with a discussion of their use and describes TLN symbol functions in various steering and
interpretation. tracking modes. The last example in Figure 2111 illustrates
VDI declutter. Refer to Figure 2111 for a listing of symbols
20. IRSTS SUMMARY  This format, which is used available on VDI TLN formats in normal and declutter
in conjunction with other IRSTS formats, provides modes.
information on the hooked IRSTS target. It can be
selected via PB13 (SMY) on the IRSTS NORMAL
2.33.9.4.2 VDI Air−to−Air (A/A) Formats
and IRSTS CSCAN formats.
With A/A selected on the PDCP, one of a number of
21. JTIDS DATA formats  There are four alpha VDI A/A formats will appear when VDI is selected on an
numeric JTIDS data formats. They are the OWN MFD from the MENU1 or RECON DATA format. The actual
A/C DATA, F−14D PPLI, Non−F−14D PPLI, and format that is presented depends on which weapon has been
TARGET formats. The OWN A/C format displays selected. With no weapon selected, the A/A basic format is
own−ship PPLI data and JTIDS status. The PPLI presented. Most symbols are common between VDI formats
formats display the data received for the hooked and have been shown in Figure 2112. Figure 2113 describes
PPLI. The TARGET format displays data associated additional target symbology and data that is provided in VDI
with a hooked target (radar, IRST, or JTIDS). The A/A formats.
PPLI and TARGET formats are available for a
hooked symbol on either the TSD or PTID. Unlike HUD A/A formats that have unique search
symbols depending on weapon selection, all VDI A/A search
2.33.9.4 VDI Formats formats are identical except for the weapon select legends.
VDI basic, gun, and missile track formats add a steering T,"
The VDI presentation on the MFD provides essentially range bar, and target aspect symbols as well as target range,
the same information as that displayed on the HUD. altitude, and closing velocity and DD selected range digital
However, in order to more easily distinguish between information. The missile tracking formats also add maxi
ground, horizon, and sky, shading simulation is used. The mum, optimum, and minimum range symbols to the range
format is generated by internal raster scanning with the sky bar and an allowable steering error circle. Figure 2114 lists
being presented in lighter shades than the ground. the symbols available on VDI A/A formats.
VDI formats consist of TLN basic, TLN AWL, TLN
data link, TLN destination, TLN manual, TLN TACAN, A/A 2.33.9.4.3 VDI Air−to−Ground (A/G) Formats
basic, A/A Phoenix search, A/A Phoenix track, A/A Sparrow When VDI is selected from the MENU1 or RECON
search, A/A Sparrow track, A/A Sidewinder search, A/A DATA format with the A/G MODE button on the PDCP
Sidewinder track, A/A gun, A/G, and TWS and recon selected, that MFD displays the VDI A/G format. Unlike
overlays. HUD A/G formats, the VDI A/G format does not have target,
aiming, gun, or pullup information, nor does it have any
2.33.9.4.1 VDI TLN Formats unique VDI symbols other than the A/G select legend.
Figure 2114 shows the A/G symbol set and Figure 2115
With TLN selected on the PDCP (TLN MODE button
shows the format.
depressed), selecting VDI via PB5 on the MENU1 or
RECON DATA formats presents one of a number of TLN
Note
formats on the MFD from which the selection was made. The
format displayed will depend on whether a steering mode has In A/G mode the basic VDI symbology and for
been previously selected. Initially TLN basic, the MFD 1 mat will generally be the same as TLN with the
default format, is used to select the steering mode. When any following differences: (1) selection of manual,
steering mode (all weather landing, TACAN, destination, TACAN, and all−weather landing steering modes
data link, or manual) is selected, formats on both the HUD will not be provided; (2) the waterline reference
and MFD change to accommodate the selection. These other dot and the heading and course select settings
VDI TLN formats have pushbutton selections to change the will not be displayed; and (3) the pitch/flightpath
steering mode. When steering is selected, a heading com ladder will be compressed and modified.
mand scale is added as well as steering aids such as steering
ORIGINAL 2−214
Figure 2111.MFD VDI Formats  Takeoff, Landing, Navigation (Sheet 1 of 9)
2−215 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Heading scale Aircraft magnetic heading is indicated by the moving 360_ heading scale.
In TLN, the major divisions are numbered every 10 degrees.
2 Heading pointer Actual aircraft heading is displayed below the stationary heading pointer.
3 Pitch/flight path ladder Ladder displays aircraft pitch angle and roll angles. Aircraft vertical flight
path angle is indicated by the position of the flight path marker on the pitch/
flight path ladder. Positive pitch lines are solid and negative pitch lines are
dashed. To aid in determining flight path angle when it is changing rapidly,
the pitch lines are angled toward the horizon at an angle half that of the
flight path angle. For example, in a 40° climb, the pitch lines are angled 20°
toward the horizon. UP appears at +90° and DOWN appears at −90°.
4 Radar altitude indicator Displays radar altitude when the aircraft is below 5,000 ft AGL. When radar
altitude is selected for display on the HUD and MFD (via the switch located
on the pilot display control panel) the radar altitude indicator will be
decluttered from the display.
5 Vertical velocity Displays aircraft rate of climb/descent. Descent will be indicated by a
negative (−) sign.
6 Altitude Barometric, radar, or GPS altitude may be displayed depending on the
source of data. When the ALTITUDE switch is in BARO, barometric altitude
is displayed. When the ALTITUDE switch is in RDR, radar altitude is dis
played and is identified by an R next to the altitude. If the radar altitude is
invalid, barometric altitude will be displayed and a B next to the altitude will
be flashed to indicate that barometric altitude is being displayed rather than
radar altitude. A G is only displayed when SCADC altitude becomes invalid
and the GPS altitude is used. The G acronym will flash if radar altitude is
selected and both SCADC and radar altitude are invalid. The bottom of the
altitude box is positioned at the waterline reference position.
7 BARO pressure setting Enables display of the barometric pressure setting used by the display
pushbutton system and the weapon system. Successive depression of the pushbutton
will cause the setting to alternately appear and disappear.
8 Barometric pressure The barometric pressure setting used by the display system and the
setting weapon system is the value set via pilot’s barometric altimeter. When the
BARO setting is changed, the BARO setting will be momentarily displayed
for 5 seconds after the change is made.
9 DEST steering Enables selection of the destination steering mode.
pushbutton
10 D/L steering pushbutton Enables selection of the data link steering mode.
11 Course select setting Indicates the magnetic course selected by the pilot via the COURSE knob.
12 DCL pushbutton In TLN, selection of the declutter button removes the airspeed Mach
number, altitude, vertical velocity and heading and course line settings, and
adds waterline reference indicators. Selection of the declutter option is
indicated by a box around the DCL legend.
Figure 2−111. MFD VDI Formats  Takeoff, Landing, Navigation (Sheet 2 of 9)
ORIGINAL 2−216
SYMBOL FUNCTION
13 Bank scale Provides indication of bank angle to 60°. Marks are provided at 0°, 5°,10°,
20_, 30_, 45_ and 60_.
14 ECM display Selects the ECM threat display. Once depressed, subsequent depression of
pushbutton the ECM pushbutton will return the display to the VDI display. This will
permit a quick look at the threat display and provide a quick return to the
VDI display.
15 MENU display Depression of menu will result in the MENU list to appear in the border area
pushbutton of the VDI display for subsequent selection.
excess of 65° the pointer will be removed from the display.
17 SMS display Selects the SMS display. Once depressed, subsequent depressing of the
pushbutton SMS pushbutton will return the display to the VDI display. This will permit a
quick look at the SMS display and provide a quick return to the VDI display.
18 Heading select setting Indicates the magnetic heading selected by the pilot.
19 TCN steering Selects the TACAN steering mode.

pushbutton
20 Ground plane The dark shaded ground plane.
21 MAN pushbutton Selects the manual steering mode.
22 Waterline In TLN, a fuselage reference line appears at the optical center to denote
the waterline reference position.
23 Horizon Denotes demarcation between the ground and the sky. It represents the
horizon with respect to the aircraft and changes orientation with any change
in aircraft pitch or roll.
24 Airspeed Provides display of indicated airspeed. The bottom of the airspeed box is
positioned at the waterline reference position.
25 Mach number Provides display of aircraft speed in mach to the nearest hundredth.
26 AWL steering Selects the all weather landing (AWL) steering mode. Selection permits
pushbutton option to display either ACL, ILS, both or no steering information on the
VDI and/or HUD.
Note
With VDI on MFD 3, AWL selection is possible, but

deselection is inhibited.
2−217 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
27 Flight path marker The vertical position of the flight path marker with respect to the flight path
ladder indicates the vertical flight path angle of the aircraft.
28 Sky plane The light shaded area represents the sky.
TLN TACAN STEERING Note

The following changes or additions occur when
TACAN steering is selected.
1 Command heading marker Command heading marker is positioned relative to the magnetic heading
scale. Where commanded heading is beyond display scale limits, the
marker will be pegged at the edge nearest to the commanded heading.
2 TACAN range Indicates distance to the selected TACAN station.
3 VDI selected course Indicates selected course.

indicator
4 TACAN steering mode Box around TCN pushbutton legend indicates the TACAN steering mode
selection has been selected.
5 Course arrow Represents the pilot selected course to the TACAN station. Two dots will
appear on the side of the flight path marker toward the course arrow and
perpendicular to the arrow. The dot closest to the flight path marker repre
sents a deflection of 4_ off course, while the outermost dot represents a
deflection of 8° off course. When the aircraft crosses the selected course,
the arrow moves to the opposite side of the flight path marker and the dots
would appear on that side. For deviations of more than 9°, the arrow pegs.
If the arrow is centered on course, the dots disappear. The flight path
marker centered over the course arrow indicates being on course.
For TACAN bearings aft of +90_, the arrow will be dashed.
TLN DEST STEERING Note

The following changes or additions occur when des
tination steering is selected.
1 Command heading marker Indicates the heading required to steer to the waypoint selected by the pilot/
RIO. Where commanded heading is beyond display limits, the marker will
be pegged at the edge nearest to the commanded heading.
2 Destination range Indicates distance to the selected waypoint.
3 DEST steering mode Box around DEST pushbutton legend indicates the destination steering
selection mode has been selected.
Figure 2−111. MFD VDI Formats  Takeoff, Lading, Navigation (Sheet 4 of 9)
ORIGINAL 2−218
2−219 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 2−220
SYMBOL FUNCTION
TLN DATA LINK Note

STEERING
The following changes or additions occur when data
link steering is selected.
1 Command Mach Indicator Indicates data link commanded mach number.
2 Command heading marker Command heading marker is positioned relative to the magnetic heading
scale to indicate data link command heading. Where commanded heading
is beyond display scale limits, the marker will be pegged at the edge
nearest to the commanded heading.
3 Data link range Indicates data link commanded range.
4 Command altitude indicator Indicates data link commanded altitude. The two digits displayed represent
thousands of feet.
5 Breakaway Appears as a flashing symbol in the center of the display. Symbol is

commanded by data link to indicate an immediate change in flight path is
warranted.
6 D/L steering mode Box around D/L pushbutton legend indicates the data link steering mode
selection has been selected.
2−221 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
TLN AWL STEERING Note
The following changes or additions occur when AWL

steering is selected.
1 Command heading marker Positioned relative to the magnetic heading scale to indicate ACL data link
command heading. Where commanded heading is beyond display scale
limits, the marker will be pegged at the edge nearest to the commanded
heading.
2 Precision course needles Consist of two independent vectors (vertical and horizontal) which form a
cross pointer. The horizontal vector responds to ILS glide slope error and
the vertical vector responds to ILS localizer error. Null/center indications
are provided to enable the pilot to null the error and keep the vertical and
horizontal needles centered.
3 Flight Director The pilot’s FLT DIR pushbutton controls the display of the flight director on
the HUD. The FLT DIR pushbutton legend is displayed on the AWL VDI for-
mat when valid navigation data is available and a/c vector or ACL data link
mode is selected. The pushbutton will toggle between boxed and unboxed
upon selection if the data link mode is ACL. The HUD flight director is dis-
played when the FLT DIR pushbutton is boxed if the autopilot is not
engaged and MODE I control commands are being sent to the aircraft.
4 ACL steering indicator Provides ACL steering commands driven by the ASW−27C data link.
5 Waveoff During carrier landings, a large X will appear flashing in the center of the
display to indicate a waveoff command.
6 MFD AWL display select Permits option to display AWL (both ACL and ILS), ACL, ILS or no steering
information on the MFD. Initial selection of the AWL steering mode on the
basic VDI format displays both ACL and ILS steering information on the
MFD. This will be indicated by AWL in the box adjacent to the MFD legend.
Successive depression of the pushbutton cycles AWL, ILS, ACL, and no
steering information on the MFD, in that order.
7 HUD AWL display select Permits option to display AWL (both ACL and ILS), ACL, ILS, or no steering
information on the HUD. Initial selection of the AWL steering mode on the
basic VDI format displays both ACL and ILS steering information on the
HUD. The HUD flight director is displayed when the FLT DIR pushbutton is
boxed (only available when the autopilot is not engaged) and flight director
commands are being sent to the aircraft. If the pilot intends to make a
MODE I approach, he must advise the ground controller of his intentions.
The ground controller will then disable the flight director commands and
enable the autopilot commands. Until this is done, the pilot will not have the
capability to couple the autopilot to the ACLS commands. The only informa-
tion that is displayed on the HUD during MODE I approaches is the ACLS
tadpole situation information and the ILS needles situation information.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 2−222
SYMBOL FUNCTION
TLN AWL DECLUTTER
1 Waterline reference The waterline reference indicators are displayed when DCL is selected and
indicators indicate the fuselage reference line.
2−223 ORIGINAL
FORMAT
DATA
SYMBOL BASIC AWL LINK DESTINATION MANUAL TACAN
Aircraft Readout & Box (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Altitude Readout and Box (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Bank Scale + + + + + +
Baro Setting Readout (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Course Line Setting−CSEL, # (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Heading Select Point Setting− (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
HSEL, #
Heading Scale + + + + + +
Horizon/Ground Plane + + + + + +
Ground/Sky Texture + + + + + +
Ground Perspective Lines + + + + + +
Mach Readout (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Pitch Ladder−VDI + + + + + +
Radar Altitude Readout + + + + + +
Flight Path Marker + + + + + +
Vertical Velocity ’Readout’ (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Altitude Source−‘B’ or ‘R’ (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
MFD Cursor + + + + + +
VDI Center + + + + + +
Caution/Advisory/Warning + + + + + +
Breakaway Symbol o + + o o o
Command Heading marker o + + + + +
Command Alt Data Link−CMD, # o o + o o o
Figure 2112.MFD VDI Symbology Available on TLN Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−224
FORMAT
DATA
SYMBOL BASIC AWL LINK DESTINATION MANUAL TACAN
Command Mach−CMD, # o o + o o o
MFD Steering Legend−AWL + o + + + +
MFD Steering Legend−TCN + + + + + +
MFD Steering Legend−D/L + + + + + +
MFD Steering Legend−MAN + + + + + +
MFD Steering Legend−DEST + + + + + +
MFD Steering Legend−AWL/HUD o + o o o o
MFD Steering Legend−AWL/MFD o + o o o o
HUD FLT DIR Legend−FLT DIR o + o o o o
VDI DECLUTTER Legend−DCL + + + + + +
Format Select Legend−SMS + + + + + +
Format Select Legend−MENU + + + + + +
Format Select Legend−ECM + + + + + +
Baro PB Legend−B + + + + + +
PB Legend Crossouts + + + + + +
Waterline (Added to all formats during DECLUTTER)
ILS Precision Course Needles o + o o o o
Range Readout−RNG, # o o + + o +
ACL Steering Indicator Tadpole o + o o o o
Course Arrow & Deviation Dots o o o o o +
Note:
‘+’ indicates that the symbol is available for display on the selected format.
‘o’ indicates that the symbol is not available for display on the selected format.
Figure 2−112. MFD VDI Symbology Available on TLN Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
2−225 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
A/A Basic − Search Note
In A/A search mode and no weapon selected, the basic

VDI symbology and format will generally be the same as
TLN with the following differences: (1) selection of
manual, TACAN and all weather landing steering modes
will not be provided; (2) the waterline reference and the
heading and course select settings will not be displayed;
(3) the heading scale numerics will be provided at 20
degree intervals, and (4) the pitch/flight path ladder will
be compressed and modified.
1 Heading scale Aircraft magnetic heading is indicated by the moving 360_ heading scale in
A/A. The major divisions are numbered every 20 degrees.
2 Heading pointer Actual aircraft heading is displayed below the stationary pointer.
3 Command heading marker Positioned along the heading scale to correspond with the command
heading.
Figure 2113.MFD VDI Air−to−Air and Air−to−Ground Formats (Sheet 1 of 6)
ORIGINAL 2−226
SYMBOL FUNCTION
4 Pitch/flight path Ladder displays aircraft pitch angle and roll angle. Aircraft vertical flight path
angle is indicated by the position of the flight path marker on the pitch/flight
path ladder. Positive pitch lines are solid and negative pitch lines are dashed.
To aid in determining flight path angle when it is changing rapidly, the pitch
lines are angled toward the horizon at an angle half that of the flight path
angle. For example, in a 40° climb the pitch lines are angled 20° toward the
horizon. UP appears at +90° climb and DOWN appears at −90° dive. The
VDI pitch ladder will always be caged.
5 Radar altitude indicator Displays radar altitude when the aircraft is below 5,000 ft AGL. When radar
altitude is selected for display on the HUD and MFD (via the HUD/VDI ALT
switch located on the pilot display control panel), the radar altitude indicator
will not be displayed.
6 Vertical velocity Displays aircraft rate of climb/descent In feet per minute. Descent will be
indicated by a negative (−) sign. Absence of the negative sign indicates a
positive value.
7 Altitude Barometric, radar, or GPS altitude will be displayed depending on the source
of data. When SCADC altitude is invalid, GPS altitude will be displayed and
identified by a G next to the altitude. When the ALTITUDE switch is in RDR,
radar altitude will be displayed and will be identified by an R next to the
altitude. If the radar altitude is invalid, barometric altitude will be displayed
and a B next to the altitude will be flashed to indicate that barometric altitude
is being displayed rather than radar altitude. If both radar and SCADC
altitude are invalid, GPS altitude will be indicated by a flashing G next to
the altitude. The bottom of the altitude box will be positioned at the waterline
reference position.
8 Altitude source Indicates source of altitude data.
9 Barometric pressure In A/A and A/G, pushbutton enables momentary display of the barometric
setting pushbutton pressure setting on the pilot’s altimeter. The setting will appear for 5 seconds
each time the pushbutton is depressed. However, in TLN the barometric
pressure setting will be displayed continuously on the HUD and VDI.
10 Barometric pressure The barometric pressure setting used by the display and weapon system is
setting the value entered on the pilot’s altimeter. When the baro setting is changed
on the DEU in the A/A and A/G mode, the baro setting will be momentarily
displayed for 5 seconds after the change is made or will appear for
5 seconds when the barometric pressure setting pushbutton is depressed.
It will also appear and flash for 5 seconds when the aircraft drops below
10,000 feet, 300 knots.
11 DEST steering button Selects destination steering mode.
Figure 2−113. MFD VDI Air−to−Air and Air−to−Ground Formats (Sheet 2 of 6)
2−227 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
12 D/L steering pushbutton Selects data link steering mode.
13 A/A mode selection Indicates selection of the A/A mode.

legend
14 Declutter In A/A, selection of the declutter option removes the indication of airspeed,
(DCL pushbutton) Mach number, altitude and vertical velocity from the display, and adds
waterline reference indicators. Selection of the declutter option is indicated
by a box around the pushbutton legend.
15 Bank scale Provides indication of bank angle to ±60_. Marks are provided at 0_, ±5_,
±10°, ±20_, ±30_, ±45_ and ±60°.
16 ECM pushbutton Selects the ECM threat display once depressed. Subsequent depression of
the ECM pushbutton will return the display to the previous format. This will
permit a quick look at the threat display and provide a quick return to the
previous format.
17 MENU pushbutton Depression of MENU will result in the MENU list to appear in the border
area of the display. Subsequent depression of the pushbutton will result in
the alternate presentation of the MENU1 and MENU2 list in the border area
of the display.
excess of 65° the pointer will be removed from the VDI display.
19 SMS pushbutton Selects the SMS display. Subsequent depression of the SMS pushbutton
will return the display to the previous format. This will permit a quick look at
the SMS display and provide a quick return to the previous format.
20 Master arm switch safe An X through the A/A mode selection legend indicates that the master arm
indication switch is in the safe position.
21 Ground plane The dark shaded ground plane.
22 Horizon Denotes demarcation between the ground and the sky. It represents the
horizon with respect to the aircraft and changes orientation with any change
in aircraft pitch and roll.
ORIGINAL 2−228
SYMBOL FUNCTION
23 Airspeed Provides display of indicated airspeed. The bottom of the airspeed box is
positioned at the waterline reference position.
24 Mach number Provides display of aircraft speed in Mach to the nearest hundredth.
25 Flight path marker The vertical position of the flight path marker with respect to the pitch ladder
indicates the vertical flight path angle of the aircraft.
26 Sky plane The light shaded area represents the sky.
A/A Weapon − Search Note

When a weapon has been selected for launch in the A/A search
mode the basic VDI symbology and format will generally be the
same as A/A search mode with no weapon selected. The selec
tion of the missile type and quantity of ready missiles will replace
the A/A mode selection legend and the master arm switch safe
indication will appear as appropriate.
1 Selected weapon type and Indicates which missile has been selected for launch via the weapon select switch,
quantity indication the type and the quantity available for launch are displayed. Selections are PH
(Phoenix), SP (Sparrow), SW (Sidewinder), and G (gun).
2 Master arm switch safe An X through the weapon type and quantity indicates that the master arm switch
indication is in the safe position.
A/A Weapon − Radar STT Note
When a weapon has been selected for launch in the A/A radar
single target track (STT) mode and the radar target is FONO 1,
the basic VDI symbology and format will generally be the
same as the A/A radar STT mode with no weapon selected.
Selection of a missile in radar STT will enable the display of an
allowable steering error (ASE) circle, range bar and DD range
scale selection.
1 Range bar The range bar is a fixed length vertical bar range scale against which maximum,
minimum and present range of the radar STT FONO 1 target may be displayed.
Scaling changes are determined by DD selection. Scaling is for 200, 100, 50, 20,
10, and 5 miles. The range bar moves sideways as a function of target azimuth.
The upper tic represents maximum range. The middle tic represents optimum
range and the lower tic represents minimum range. The circle represents the target
and moves vertically as a function of range. Target aspect is represented by a
pointer which points in the direction of the aspect angle. Zero target aspect is
straight down.
2−229 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 2−230
SYMBOL FUNCTION
2 Radar STT FONO 1 target Range, altitude and closing velocity of the radar STT FONO 1 target.
data
3 Allowable steering error ASE circle indicates the steering error allowed for launching a missile.
circle Size of the circle is variable and is determined by the magnitude of the
allowable error.
4 Selected weapon type and When missiles are selected for launch via the weapon select switch, the
quantity indication type and the quantity available for launch are displayed. An X through
the indication will signify that the master arm switch is in the safe position.
5 DD range scale Readout provides indication of RIO’s DD range scale selection of 5, 10, 20,
indication 50, 100, or 200 miles.
FORMAT
SYMBOL BASIC SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK GUN
Aircraft Readout and Box (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Altitude Readout and (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)

Box
Bank Scale + + + + + + + +
Baro Setting Readout (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Heading Scale + + + + + + + +
Horizon Line, Ground + + + + + + + +

Plane
Command Attitude D/L + + + + + + + +
Command Mach + + + + + + + +
Pitch Ladder + + + + + + + +
Radar Altitude Readout + + + + + + + +
Flight Path Marker + + + + + + + +
Vertical Velocity Readout (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
Altitude Source (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)

‘B’ or ‘R’
Figure 2114.MFD VDI Symbology Available on Air−to−Air and Air−to−Ground Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−231 ORIGINAL
FORMAT
SYMBOL BASIC SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK SEARCH TRACK GUN
Mach Readout (On all formats except when DECLUTTER)
MFD Cursor + + + + + + + +
Warning/Caution/ + + + + + + + +
Advisory
Breakaway Symbol + + + + + + + +
Command Heading + + + + + + + +
Marker
Select Legends, Weapon A/A PH# PH# SP# SP# SW# SW# G#
Qty
Sky Texture + + + + + + + +
Push Button LegendSMS + + + + + + + +
Push Button Legend + + + + + + + +
MENU
Push Button LegendECM + + + + + + + +
Push Button LegendD/L + + + + + + + +
Push Button Legend + + + + + + + +
DEST
Push Button LegendDCL + + + + + + + +
BARO PB Legend B + + + + + + + +
PB Legend Crossout + + + + + + + +
Master Arm Safe Cue + + + + + + + +
Waterline (Added to all formats during DECLUTTER)
Steering RangeRNG, # o + + + + + + +
Steering Tee + o + o + o + +
Range Bar + o + o + o + +
Max/Min/Opt* Range o o + o + o + o
Target Range Heading + o + o + o + +
Target Range Numeric + o + o + o + +
Target Closing Velocity + o + o + o + +
A/A Target Altitude + o + o + o + +
DD Selected Range + o + o + o + +
ASE Circle o o + o + o + o
Note
‘+’ indicates that the symbol is available for display on the selected format.
‘o’ indicates that the symbol is not available for display on the selected format.
* Sidewinder does not display opt range.
Figure 2−114. MFD VDI Symbology Available on Air−to−Air and Air−to−Ground Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−232
Figure 2115.MFD VDI Air−to−Ground (A/G) Format
2.33.9.4.4 VDI Overlay Formats When the IRSTS detects valid targets, IRSTS triangles
are overlaid on VDI formats. Position scaling is the same as
The MFD VDI overlay formats are track while scan
that of radar priority target diamonds. However, since range
(TWS), infrared search and tracking system−TWS (IRSTS−
cannot be accurately determined by the IRSTS, no range
TWS), and reconnaissance.
information is presented on this overlay.
When RECON is selected from the RECON DATA
Both target diamonds and IRSTS triangles may be
formats, reconnaissance symbols are overlaid on the HUD
overlaid at the same time on VDI A/A or A/G formats.
and any MFD (Figure 2116) that is displaying a VDI format.
An exception is when a weapon has been selected; then only
2.33.9.5 HSD Formats
the MFD displays the overlay.
The HSD formats provide system navigation informa
When radar detects a valid target, a priority target
tion such as magnetic heading, magnetic course, wind
diamond is overlaid on VDI formats. The diamond’s lateral
direction and speed, true airspeed, groundspeed, waypoint
position indicates the target’s position relative to own aircraft
data, and TACAN data.
and the angular scaling is the same as the VDI A/A pitch
ladder. The diamond vertical position indicates target The HSD format family consists of HSD waypoint,
altitude relative to own aircraft and the scaling is 10,000 TACAN, and TACAN CDI. Selection of PB16 from the
feet/0.8 inch. (The distance between pushbuttons is 0.8 inch.) MENU, OWN A/C, CV, IFA, WPT DATA, RECON DATA,
A target at the horizon line would be at the same altitude as INS UPDATE, NAV AID, SURFACE WPT, GPS STAT, FLT
own aircraft. Up to four target diamonds may be displayed at PLN, MDL WPTS, or SAHRS ALIGN formats will place the
one time. Unlike the HUD diamonds, which are sized to previously selected HSD format on the MFD. After a cold
indicate target proximity, VDI target diamonds are the same start, the HSD waypoint format is shown. Figure 2118
size. Target range in nautical miles is shown by the numbers describes HSD symbols. Figure 2119 illustrates the activa
appearing directly above the symbol. The radar target tion of the plot line display and shows the selected course line
overlay example in Figure 2117 shows the radar TWS mode that appears when a steering mode (in this case, destination
and is overlaid on an A/A basic format. steering) has been selected.
2−233 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Recon Command Heading Indicates the magnetic heading for Recon steering.
Marker
2 Recon Steering Symbol Provides elevation and azimuth steering information when in reconnais
sance mode. When steering symbol is coincident with flight path marker,
the aircraft is flying the bank command to the dynamic steering point.
3 Target Designator, Displays target position. Positioned by on−board sensors or data link.
Hexagon When displayed on VDI formats, the degrees per inch scaling of the symbol
corresponds to the scaling of the rungs of the pitch ladder of the format
being overlaid (TLN, A/G, or A/A).
4 Command Ground Displays the path of the command ground track. When displayed on VDI
Track Line formats the degree scaling of rotation corresponds to the scaling of the
rungs of the pitch ladder for the format being overlaid (TLN, A/G, A/A).
Figure 2116.MFD VDI Recon Overlay Format
ORIGINAL 2−234
Figure 2117.MFD VDI Radar and IRSTS Overlay Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−235 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
Radar Target Overlay Note
In the A/A radar track while scan (TWS) mode and no weapon
selected, the basic VDI symbology and format will generally be
the same as A/A radar single target track except that up to
4 target priority diamonds may be displayed to show direction and
relative altitude of the 4 closest radar targets. IRST TWS targets
may be displayed simultaneously with radar TWS targets. When
this situation occurs, the target data will pertain to the closest
radar TWS targets.
1 Radar target data Range, altitude, and closing velocity of the closest radar TWS target will be
presented.
2 Radar TWS target Up to 4 target priority diamonds may be displayed to show direction and
priority diamonds relative altitude of the 4 closest radar targets. The numerics above the
diamonds indicate the target range to the nearest nautical mile.
IRSTS Target Overlay Note
In the A/A IRST track while scan (TWS) mode and no weapon
selected the basic VDI symbology and format will generally be the
same as A/A radar track while scan except that up to 4 target
priority triangles may be displayed to show direction and relative
altitude of the 4 closest IRST targets. IRST TWS targets may be
displayed simultaneously with radar TWS targets. When this
situation occurs, the target data will pertain to the closest radar
TWS targets.
1 Target data Range, altitude, and closing velocity of the closest IRST TWS target will be
presented.
2 IRST TWS target priority Up to 4 TWS target priority triangles may be displayed to show direction
triangles and relative altitude of the 4 closest IRST targets.
Figure 2−117. MFD VDI Radar and IRSTS Overlay Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−236
Figure 2118.MFD HSD Format (Sheet 1 of 4)
2−237 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Clock/timer pushbutton Selects clock/timer display for HUD and corresponding readout. Options are
ZTOD, ETA, TTG, ET, or CD.
2 Wind Displays wind direction in degrees and wind speed in knots.
3 True airspeed Displays true air speed in knots.
4 Ground speed Displays ground speed in knots.
5 Steering mode pushbutton STR pushbutton cycles through steering modes: DEST, AUTO, GPS, and
TACAN.
6 Lubber line The lubber line indication (diamond) is fixed at the top of the compass rose
and indicates aircraft magnetic heading.
7 Ground track line The ground track line rotates inside the compass rose to represent the
ground track.
8 ADF pointer The ADF symbol shows the direction of the nearest automatic direction
finder station.
9 Heading select pointer Displays selected or commanded heading. The symbol rotates outside the
compass rose when manually controlled by the heading potentiometer knob
located in the pilot’s crew station.
10 TACAN data Displays TACAN channel, range, bearing, and time−to−go to the selected
TACAN station.
11 TACAN display option Enables the presentation of the TACAN situation symbol, selects TACAN
pushbutton steering mode, results in the appearance of the TACAN, course deviation
indication (CDI) pushbutton selection, and AWL pushbutton selection.
Selection is indicated by a box around the TACAN data.
12 Waypoint symbol The numbers (1 to 750) adjacent to the symbol identify the waypoint and
are located on the display to provide an indication of relative range and
bearing from own A/C.
13 Set pushbutton Enables the establishment of a waypoint at the designated cursor position
on the HSD.
14 Aircraft symbol The stationary aircraft symbol is positioned in the center of the compass
rose. The symbol in conjunction with the compass rose indicates magnetic
heading.
Figure 2−118. MFD HSD Format (Sheet 2 of 4)
ORIGINAL 2−238
SYMBOL FUNCTION
15 Update (UPDT) Selects the INS update format on the MFD.

pushbutton
16 Plot pushbutton Enables/disables the display of plotted lines between waypoints on the HSD
waypoint format.
17 Course line setting Indicates selected course in degrees.
18 Enter (ENT) Selects the boxed waypoint for destination steering.

pushbutton
19 Steering readout Steer mode indication and steerpoint.
20 Time remaining readout Selected automatically based on steering mode target selected or weapon
selected. Options are TTG, TTGT, or TREL.
21 Clock/timer readout Clock indication per PB7 selection.
22 Scale (SCL XXX) Selects range scale (200, 100, 50, 25, and 10 nautical miles).
pushbutton The scale is the distance from the aircraft symbol to the inside edge of the
compass rose. Successive depressions of the pushbutton causes the range
scale to decrement and then start again at 200 miles.
23 ECM pushbutton Selects the ECM threat display. Subsequent depression of the ECM push
button will return the display to the previous format. This will permit a quick
look at the threat display and provide a quick return to the previous format.
24 MENU pushbutton Selects the MENU displays. Depression of MENU will result in the MENU1
list to appear in the border area of the display. Subsequent depression of
the pushbutton will result in the alternate presentation of the MENU2 and
MENU1 list in the border area of the display.
25 SMS pushbutton Selects the SMS display. Subsequent depression of the SMS pushbutton
will return the display to the previous format. This will permit a quick look at
the SMS display and provide a quick return to the previous format.
26 ZTOD readout Zulu time of day always displayed in this location on HSD formats.
27 Navigation mode Indicates the current navigation mode.
28 DATA pushbutton Selects own A/C data format.
2−239 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
29 Heading select setting Indicates the magnetic heading selected.
30 FLT PLAN pushbutton Selects the appropriate NAV AID or SAHRS ALIGN format as determined
by the mission computer.
31 Waypoint decrement Selects the decrement of the waypoint number of the associated waypoint
(down arrow) data display and is used to select the waypoint for destination steering.
pushbutton
32 Waypoint number Indicates the selected waypoint number (via the increment/decrement push
buttons) of the associated waypoint data display and the desired waypoint
for destination steering.
33 Waypoint increment Selects the increments of the waypoint number of the associated waypoint
(up arrow) data display and is used for the selection of the waypoint for destination
pushbutton steering.
34 Waypoint (WPT) display Enables the presentation and activation of waypoint−related symbology and
option pushbutton display options. Selection of this option allows the appearance of the plot
line display selection. Selection of this option is indicated by a box around
the waypoint data.
35 Waypoint bearing Provides bearing indication of the waypoint entered by the aircrew for
pointer destination steering.
36 Waypoint data Range, bearing and time−to−go to the waypoint selected via the increment/
decrement pushbuttons.
37 Compass rose The compass rose is a circular magnetic scale that consists of major divi
sions at 10 degree intervals, minor divisions at 5 degree intervals, numerics
at 30 degree increments and cardinal points at 90 degree increments.
38 TACAN bearing pointer Provides bearing indication to and from the selected TACAN station.
head and tail
ORIGINAL 2−240
Figure 2119.Plot Line and Course Line Displays (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−241 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Plot lines Dashed plot lines are drawn between waypoints to aid in navigation.
The waypoints for plotting are selected via the DEU.
2 PLOT pushbutton Box around the PLOT pushbutton legend indicates the display of plotted
lines between waypoints has been enabled.
3 Selected course line The course line rotates within the compass circle and depicts the aircraft
commanded course during the destination steering mode.
Figure 2−119. Plot Line and Course Line Displays (Sheet 2 of 2)
HSD steering is selected by PB9 (STR). Selecting the 2.33.9.8 IRSTS Formats
pushtile cycles through the available steering modes: DEST
There are three dedicated IRSTS formats in the IRSTS
(destination), AUTO (automatic), GPS, TACAN, and blank.
format family. They are IRSTS normal, IRSTS CSCAN, and
CDI can be selected from TACAN or GPS steering.
IRSTS summary (refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A). Other
IRST information and symbols appear on the HUD, VDI, and
Chapter 20, NAVIGATION, describes the use of the HSD
TSD formats.
formats.
2.33.9.9 TSD Format
2.33.9.6 SMS Formats
The TSD format is chosen via the TSD legend on
Selection of the SMS formats may be made from any MENU1. The format consists of five distinct legend sets that
format via PB19 (SMS). Depressing PB19 a second time appear in response to crew MFD inputs. Refer to NAVAIR
returns the previously selected display. This toggle action 01−F14AAD−1A for a description of the TSD format and
permits the crewmember to check the weapon status quickly. associated symbols.
The MC determines the wingform configuration that will be
displayed. The CAP/attack and fighter configurations are 2.33.9.10 JTIDS Data Readout Formats
shown in Figure 2120. Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A.
For SMS symbols, configurations, and phases of 2.34 DATA ENTRY UNIT
launch, including an explanation of the AIM−54 MOAT and
DMA results, refer to the Supplemental NATOPS Flight The DEU (Figure 2122) on the RIO right vertical
Manual, NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A. console provides manual data entry and control of certain
mission functions. The DEU is a remote terminal that
2.33.9.7 Engine Monitor Format communicates with the mission computers via the multiplex
buses. The DEU is powered by the 28−Vdc main bus. The
The engine monitor format (Figure 2121) is DEU consists of a DEU control knob, data entry display, 20
selected via PB15 (ENG) on the OWN A/C formats. This option keys, and four option display legends. The DEU
format includes a representation of the aircraft engine control knob controls power, brightness, and the test
instruments, displaying instrument readings for left and right function. The option display legends display the options for
engines, fuel endurance (based on existing conditions), and the function or parametr selected. The option keys enable
any engine exceedance conditions. Rpm is provided as N1 selection of the desired menu functions and entry of required
and temperature as turbine blade temperature (TBT not mission parameters. The data entry display is a two−line
EGT). Fuel flow is shown as either main (M) or total (T), display. The top line indicates the currently selected
depending on power setting (either nonafterburner or after parameter while the bottom line (scratchpad) is used to enter
burner range). This information is provided by the FEMS. data. The scratchpad consists of a 14−character display. The
Engine monitor format is not provided while in SEC mode. character locations are often denoted by underlines that, as
Refer to FEMS in this chapter for additional information. data is keyed in, disappear.
2.34.1 Data Entry Unit Operating Modes
As selected by the RIO, the DEU operates in one of two
modes: slaved to the RIO multifunction display (MFD3) or
ORIGINAL 2−242
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-120. MFD SMS Format—CAP/Attack, Fighter Wingforms (Sheet 1 of 2)
2-243 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 ARM/SAFE status SAFE or ARM is displayed to indicate the status of the master arm switch.
indicator
2 Rounds remaining Rounds remaining is indicated in hundreds (6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0) by a

single digit. An X will appear when the gun is empty. HI or LO indicates the
selected fire rate.
3 HI/LO gun rate pushbutton Toggles the HI or LO rate of gun fire. HI rate is default mode.
4 PGU/M56 Toggles the PGU or M56 round.
5 Store station numbers Indicates the location of the stores (weapons and fuel tanks) loaded on the
(1A, 1B, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, aircraft.
8A, and 8B)
6 Manual (MAN) gun Selects the manual option during air−to−ground operations. CCIP mode is
mode pushbutton the primary gun mode and is obtained immediately upon gun selection.
(A/G only) A box will appear around the pushbutton legend to indicate the manual
option has been selected. Refer to the Supplemental NATOPS Flight
Manual, NAVAIR 01 −F14AAD−1A.
7 Missile status (MS) Selects the missile status display.

pushbutton
8 CAP/attack wingform Wingform provides a plan view of the stores carried on an aircraft
configured for the CAP/attack role.
9 SMS pushbutton Box around the SMS pushbutton legend indicates the SMS display is
selected. Once selected, a subsequent depression of the SMS pushbutton
will enable return to the previous display.
10 Fighter wingform Wingform provides a plan view of the stores carried on an aircraft
configured for the fighter role.
Figure 2−120. MFD SMS FormatCAP/Attack, Fighter Wingforms (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−244
Figure 2121.MFD Engine Monitor Format (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−245 ORIGINAL
SYMBOL FUNCTION
1 Rotor speed Left and right rotor speeds (N1) are displayed both in an analog and digital
format in percent RPM. The digital indications are located immediately
below the corresponding analog scale.
2 Turbine blade temperature Left and right engine turbine blade temperature (TBT) are displayed both
in an analog and digital format. The analog scale ranges from 500 to
1200 degrees Fahrenheit. The digital indications are located immediately
below the corresponding analog scale.
3 Main fuel flow Left and right main fuel flow (FF/M) are displayed in an analog format in
thousands of pounds per hour (PPH). The analog scale ranges from 0 to
17,000 PPH.
4 Fuel endurance Readout provides an indication of the flight time remaining in hours and
minutes. The readout is based on the existing fuel supply for the selected
engine condition (normal or afterburner).
5 Engine exceedance Up to three engine exceedance conditions are capable of being displayed
conditions at a time. The indications will scroll upward at a rate of 1 per second when
more than three exceedance conditions exist. The indications may be:
L/R MACH #, L/R LO THR, L/R A/ICE, L/R OIL LO, or L/R AUG.
6 Nozzle position Left and right engine nozzle positions (NP) are displayed in an analog for
mat between 0 and 100 percent to indicate relative position from fully
closed to fully open, respectively.
7 Data pushbutton Enables the presentation of the OWN A/C DATA display
8 Total fuel flow Left and right engine total fuel flow (FF/T) are displayed in an analog
format in thousands of pounds per hour (PPH). The analog scale ranges
from 0 to 100,000 PPH.
Note
D Engine data is not provided while in SEC mode.

D When afterburner is selected, the total fuel flow con
sists of main and augmented fuel. This format illus
trates the afterburner condition where total fuel flow
are displayed.
Figure 2−121. MFD Engine Monitor Format (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−246
1 Data Entry Display Displays the name of the page selected and provides a scratchpad used
to enter and change data as required.
2 DEU control knob Initial clockwise rotation past the detent turns system power on; continued
rotation increases brightness of the data entry display and option legend
placarding. When depressed, a self−test of the panel is initiated.
3 Option keys (twenty) Selects the desired menu options and used to enter required mission
data.
4 Option legend Displays the various menu options for the function or parameter selected.
Option legends vary with page selection.
Figure 2122.Data Entry Unit/Main Menu Page
2−247 ORIGINAL
independent of MFD3. Initially, when the DEU is powered 2.34.2.2 Subpages

on, it defaults to the slave mode. The slave and independent
The operating characteristics of the subpages are as
modes are toggled by pressing the SLV/INDP option key.
follows: Parameters requiring input often have associated
When operating in the slave mode, the data entry display on
limits and qualifiers. Data entry parameters are shown in
the main menu page reads MENU−DEU SLV (Figure 2122).
When the MFD displays a format to which the DEU is slaved, Figure 2123. All data input left to right is validated character
by character. This includes the parameter of latitude,
the DEU configures the corresponding page (Figure 2105.
longitude, and time. Data input from right to left is validated
However, when the MFD displays a format to which the DEU
upon depression of the ENT option key. When latitude and
cannot slave, the DEU remains on whatever format it is
displaying. Operating in the independent mode enables longitude are input from left to right, leading zeroes must be
entered but trailing zeroes for minutes and minute fractions
access to all menu options without being affected by changes
are not required. Keying additional numerics after the
to the MFD3 display. When the MENU option key is pressed,
the main MENU page is displayed with the present DEU dedicated character locations are filled will not change the
initial keyed−in data. The applicable East, West, North, or
mode displayed on the scratchpad.
South (E, W, N, S) can be keyed in before, during, or after
numerical data entry. The backspace option key (BKSP) is
2.34.2 DEU Menu Pages
used to delete data in the reverse order of entry. The return
The DEU consists of the following menu pages. option key (RTN) is used to display the next higher level page
in the branch category.
2.34.2.1 Main Menu Page
2.35 FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS
The main menu page (Figure 2122) enables access
to the various subpages. Pressing the desired option key on
2.35.1 Standby Attitude Indicator
the main menu displays the desired subpage. The subpages
are as follows: A 3−inch standby gyro horizon indicator on the left side
of the pilot instrument panel and another on the left side of
1. SMS − Stores management system.
the RIO instrument panel are for emergency use should the
2. OWN A/C − Own aircraft. system (INS or SAHRS) attitude information become
unreliable. It is a self−contained, independent gyro that
3. WPT − Waypoint.
displays aircraft roll and pitch from the horizontal and
4. CV ALGN − Carrier align. includes a standard turn−and−slip indicator.
5. NAV AID − Navigation aid. The presentation consists of a miniature aircraft
viewed against a rotating gray and black background, which
6. NAV GRID − Navigation grid.
represent sky and ground conditions, respectively. Caging
7. JTID RNAV − JTIDS relative navigation. should be accomplished at least 3 to 4 minutes before takeoff
to allow the spin axis to orient to true vertical. After the gyro
8. JTID COMM − JTIDS communications. has erected to vertical, the miniature aircraft reference may
9. JTID PPLI − JTIDS precise participant location be raised or lowered +5_, −10_ to compensate for pitch trim
identification. by turning the adjustment knob in the lower right corner of
the instrument. Electrical power should be applied for at least
10. JTIDS MODE − JTIDS mode. 1 minute before caging. The unit should be caged prior to
11. DOWN LOAD − JTIDS initialization. engine start during cockpit interior inspection. In flight,
recaging should be initiated only when error exceeds 10_ and
12. IFT − Nonfunctional. only when the aircraft is in a wings−level normal cruise
13. PLOT − Plot. attitude. Errors of less than 10_ will automatically erect out
at a rate of 2.5_ per minute.
14. CSS − Cooperative support software.
Electrical power is supplied by the essential ac buses.
15. SLV/INDP − Slave/independent. An OFF flag appears on the right side of the instrument face
when power is removed or when the gyro is caged, but the
16. ALT MENU − When available. gyro is capable of providing reliable attitude information
(within 9_) for up to 3 minutes after a complete loss of power.
17. CLK Clock control.
The gyro can be manually caged by pulling the pitch trim
knob on the lower right corner of the instrument. Depressing
TEST centers the ARA−63 needles and the turn−and−slip
pointer deflects to the right and lines up with the fixed
marker.
ORIGINAL 2−248
VARIABLE
INPUT NAME UNITS LIMITS SIGN FIELD/PROMPT DIR OF ENTRY
ALTITUDE FT −5000 to ±(1) QXXXXXX (2) RT to LT
+131071 (5)
Baro pressure IN HG 25 to 35 NONE XX.XX RT to LT
Bearing DEG 1 to 360 NONE XXX RT to LT
Channel number  0 to 127 NONE XX RT to LT
Coverage DEG 0 to 180 NONE XXX RT to LT
Direction DEG 1 to 360 NONE XXX RT to LT
Heading DEG 1 to 360 NONE XXX RT to LT
Latitude DEG, MIN −90 to +90 S, N (3) QbXXbXX.XX (4) LT to RT
Longitude DEG, MIN −180 to +180 W, E (3) QbXXXbXX.XX (5) LT to RT
Magnetic variation DEG −180 to +180 W, E (3) XXX.XbQ RT to LT
lFT number  0 to 31 NONE XX RT to LT
Waypoint number  1 to 750 NONE XX RT to LT
Weapon option  0 to 6 NONE X RT to LT
Range NM 0 to 500 NONE XXX.X RT to LT
Sector  1 to 6 NONE X RT to LT
Carrier speed KNOTS 0 to 64 NONE XX RT to LT
IFT TGT speed KNOTS 0 to 2047 NONE XXXX RT to LT
Wind speed KNOTS 0 to 200 NONE XXX RT to LT
Time HRS 0 to 23 NONE XXXXbXX (4) LT to RT
MIN, SEC 0 to 59 (5)
Vertical lever arm FT to 128 NONE XXX RT to LT
Map lines  to 99 NONE XX RT to LT
Map offset FT ±131071 ± (1) QXXXXXX RT to LT
Target length NM 0−2048 NONE XXXX.X RT to LT
Command course DEG 1−360 NONE XXX RT to LT
Notes:
(1) If a sign is not input, the number is assumed positive.
(2) Prompt underscores disappear as numerics are input. Pressing ‘BKSP’ will delete a keyed−in numeric
and the underscore will reappear. Continued backspacing will delete inputs in the reverse order in
which they were input. If the prompt is a single underscore, it disappears upon the first keyed entry.
When backspacing, it will reappear when the first keyed entry has been deleted.
(3) Qualifiers ‘S’, ‘N’, ‘E’, ‘W’, ‘+’ and ‘−’ can be keyed in before, after or during keying of numeric data.
‘BKSP’ will not delete these symbols; however, they can be overwritten. The last keyed symbol
will be implemented. Depression of ‘CLR’ will also reset the total scratchpad.
(4) Trailing zeroes for minutes and seconds will be assumed if not entered from keypad.
(5) ‘b’ implies blank or space; ‘Q’ implies qualifier (S, N, E, W, +, −).
Figure 2123.Data Entry Parameters
2−249 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.35.1.1 Turn-and-Slip Indicator Reliable system operation in the altitude range of 0 to

5,000 feet permits close altitude control at minimum altitudes.
The standby attitude indicator includes a standard
The system will operate normally in bank angles up to 45_
needle and ball turn-and-slip indicator. The pointer is tested
and in a climb or dive except when the reflected signal is too
when the TEST button is pressed and it deflects to the right
weak.
and lines up with the fixed marker.
The system includes a height indicator (altimeter), a test
2.35.2 Standby Airspeed Indicator
light on the indicator, a low-altitude warning tone, a radar
The standby airspeed indicator on the pilot and RIO receiver-transmitter under the forward cockpit, and two
instrument panels is a pitot-static instrument that displays antennas (transmit and receive) one on each side of the IR
indicated airspeed from 0 to 800 knots. The indicator is fairing, in the aircraft skin. During descent, the warning tone
graduated in 10-knot increments up to 200 knots, then in is heard momentarily (landing gear handle down) when the
50-knot increments. aircraft passes through the altitude set on the limit index. If
Note the landing gear handle is up, the tone will remain on
continuously until the landing gear handle is placed down or
The indicated airspeed displayed is not corrected aircraft altitude rises above the limit index setting. When the
for position error. aircraft is below the altitude index limit setting, a night vision
compatible post light will illuminate with a yellow radiance.
2.35.3 Standby Altimeter
The post light is located just below the height indicator, on
Both the pilot and RIO standby altimeters display the forward instrument panel.
altitude up to 99,000 feet on the five-digit counter but only
Note
the left two digits are moveable. The pointer moves about a
dial calibrated from 0 to 1,000 feet in 50-foot increments. D Radar altimeter can read as much as 100 feet
A BARO setting knob, on the bottom left, is used to set higher than actual altitude when operating
in the local atmosphere pressure (INCHES HG) between over water.
28.10 to 30.99 inclusive. The four-digit counter displays the D The low altitude warning light is an anvis
BARO setting. The BARO setting from the pilot standby green grimes light mounted on a bracket
altimeter is provided to the mission computers via the below the RADALT.
converter interface unit and can be displayed on the HUD and
the MFDs. The radar altimeter receives power from the ac essential
bus No. 1 through the RADAR ALTM circuit breaker (4B3)
2.35.4 AN/APN-194(V) Radar Altimeter System and from dc essential bus No. 1 through the ALT LOW WARN
The radar altimeter is a low-altitude (0 to 5,000 feet), circuit breaker (7B6). The radar altimeter has a minimum
pulsed, range-tracking radar that measures the surface or warmup time of 3 minutes. During this time, failure indica-
terrain clearance below the aircraft. Altitude information is tions and erroneous readouts should be disregarded.
developed by radiating a short-duration radio frequency pulse
from the transmit antenna to the Earth’s surface and 2.35.4.1 Radar Altimeter
measuring elapsed time until radio frequency energy returns The radar altimeter (FO-12) on the pilot instrument
through the receiver antenna. The altitude information is panel has the only controls for the system. The indicator
continuously presented to the pilot, in feet of altitude, on an displays radar altitude above the Earth’s surface on a
indicator dial. The system also outputs a digital signal for single-turn dial that is calibrated from 0 to 5,000 feet in
display of radar altitude on the HUD from 0 to 5,000 feet decreasing scale to provide greater definition at lower
during takeoff and landings. altitudes. The control knob in the lower right corner of the
The radar altimeter has two modes of operation. In the indicator is a combination power switch, self-test switch, and
search mode, the system successively examines increments positioning control for the low-altitude limit bug.
of range until the complete altitude range is searched for a
return signal. When a return signal is detected, the system 2.35.4.2 Altimeter BIT
switches to the track mode and tracks the return signal to Depressing and holding the control knob energizes the
provide continuous altitude information. self-test circuitry; the green test light illuminates, the
When the radar altimeter drops out of the track mode, indicator reads 100 ± 10 feet, and the HUD altitude scale
an OFF flag appears and the pointer is hidden by a mask. The reads approximately 100 feet. If the indicator passes below
altimeter remains inoperative until a return signal is received, the altimeter limit bug setting, the aural and visual warnings
at which time the altimeter will again indicate actual altitude are triggered. Normal operation is resumed by releasing the
above terrain. control knob.
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-250
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.35.4.3 Low-Altitude Aural Warning with the landing gear handle down and the switch in
ORIDE/ON. With weight on wheels, the position OFF/OFF
A low-altitude aural warning alarm provides a
and AUTO/OFF deactivate the probe heating element.
1,000-Hz tone, modulated at two pulses per second and is
available to both crewmembers. The tone activates for 3 to
2.36.1 AOA Test
5 seconds when aircraft altitude descends below the limit
index setting, with the landing gear handle in the DOWN A safety of flight check of the AOA indicator and other
position. If the landing gear handle is in the UP position, the aircraft instruments can be performed while in flight or on the
tone will remain on continuously. deck. When INST is selected on the pilot’s MASTER TEST
switch, the reference bar on the AOA indicator should
2.35.5 Vertical Velocity Indicator indicate 18.0 ±0.5 units. A check of the index can be made
by selecting LTS on the MASTER TEST switch.
The vertical velocity indicator on the left side of the
pilot and RIO instrument panel is a sealed case connected to
2.36.2 AOA Indicator
a static pressure line through a calibrated leak. It indicates
rate of climb or descent. Sudden or abrupt changes in attitude This indicator (Figure 2-125) displays the aircraft
may cause erroneous indications because of the sudden AOA and provides a stall warning reference marker, a climb
change of airflow over the static probe. bug, cruise bug, and an AOA approach reference bar for
landing approach.
2.35.6 Standby Compass AOA is displayed by a vertical tape on a calibrated
A conventional standby compass is above the pilot scale from 0 to 30 units, equivalent to a range of -10_ to +40_
instrument panel. It is a semifloat-type compass suspended of rotation of the probe. The approach reference bar is
in compass fluid. provided for approach (on speed) AOA at 15 units. The AOA
indexer and approach lights will automatically follow the
2.35.7 Clock indicator.
The climb reference marker is set at 5.0 units, the cruise
A mechanical 8-day clock is on the instrument panel in marker at 8.5 units, and the stall warning marker at 29 units.
each cockpit. It incorporates a 1-hour elapsed-time capabil- These reference markers are preset to the optimum AOA
ity. A winding and setting selector is in the lower left corner values and cannot be changed by the pilot.
of the instrument face. The knob is turned in a clockwise
direction to wind the clock and pulled out to set the hour and 2.36.3 AOA Indexer
minute hands. An elapsed time selector in the upper right
The AOA indexer on the pilot glareshield
corner controls the elapsed time mechanism. This mecha-
(Figure 2-125) has two arrows and a circle illuminated by
nism starts, stops, and resets the sweep second and elapsed
colored lamps to provide approach information. The relay-
time hands. operated contacts in the AOA indicator also control the AOA
indexer. The upper arrow is for high AOA (green), the lower
2.36 ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SYSTEM arrow is for low AOA (red), and the circle is for optimum
The AOA system measures the angle between the AOA (amber). When both an arrow and a circle appear, an
longitudinal axis of the aircraft and the relative wind. This is intermediate position is indicated.
used for approach monitoring and to warn of an approaching 2.36.3.1 Indexer Lights
stall. Optimum approach AOA is not affected by gross
weight, bank angle, density altitude, or load configuration The indexer lights function only when the landing gear
(see Figure 2-124 for AOA conversions). handle is down. A flasher unit causes the indexer lights to
pulsate when the arresting hook is up and the HOOK
The system includes a probe-type transmitter, BY-PASS switch is in CARRIER. The intensity of the
approach lights, an indicator, and an indexer. The indexer and indexer lights is controlled by the INDEXER thumbwheel
approach lights are controlled by the indicator, which is control on the pilot MASTER LIGHT panel.
electrically slaved to the sensor probe transmitter. In flight,
the probe, which is on the left side of the fuselage, aligns itself 2.36.4 Approach Lights
with the relative airflow like a weather vane.
The approach lights consist of red, amber, and green
Probe anti-icing is provided by means of a 115-Vac indicator lights above the nosegear strut. The lights are
heating element along the probe and probe housing. The actuated by the AOA indicator and provide qualitative AOA
heating element is controlled by the ANTI-ICE switch on the information to the landing signal officer during landing
pilot right console. During ground operation, probe heat is on approaches. A flasher unit in the AOA system will cause
2-251 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Figure 2124.Angle−of−Attack Conversion (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−252
Figure 2−124. Angle−of−Attack Conversion (Sheet 2 of 2)
2−253 ORIGINAL
the approach lights to pulsate when the arresting hook is up

with the landing gear down and the HOOK BY−PASS switch
is in the CARRIER position. When the FIELD position of the
HOOK BY−PASS switch is selected, the flasher unit is
disabled. The maximum permitted taxi speed and head
A green approach light indicates a high AOA, slow wind component with the canopy open is
airspeed; an amber light indicates optimum AOA; and a red 60 knots.
approach light indicates a low AOA, fast airspeed. Note
An occasional howl inside the canopy may occur
2.37 CANOPY SYSTEM in some aircraft when subjected to an approxi
The cockpit is enclosed by a one−piece, clamshell, mate 4g maneuver. The howl has been attributed
rear−hinged canopy. Provisions are included to protect the to the canopy rain seals; when they are removed
pilot and RIO from lightning strikes by the installation of the howl disappears. A canopy howl in aircraft
aluminum tape on the canopy above the heads of the crew. with rain seals installed does not limit aircraft
Normal opening and closing of the canopy is by a pneumatic operation.
and hydraulic actuator with a separate pneumatic actuator The canopy system is controlled with the canopy
for locking and unlocking. The canopy can be opened to control handle under the right forward canopy sill at each crew
approximately 25_ for ingress and egress in approximately position. An external canopy control handle is on the left side
8 to 10 seconds. In emergencies, the canopy can be jetti− of the fuselage directly below the boarding ladder. A
soned from either crew position or externally from either CANOPY caution light on the RIO CAUTION ADVISORY
side of the forward fuselage. For rescue procedures, see panel illuminates when the canopy is not locked. A LAD/
paragraph 12.1.6. CNPY caution light on the pilot CAUTION ADVISORY
panel illuminates when the canopy is not locked or the ladder
is not stowed. Electrical power for the caution lights
is supplied from the essential dc bus No. 2, through the
Figure 2125.Angle−of−Attack Displays
ORIGINAL 2−254
CAN/LAD/CAUTION/EJECT CMD IND circuit breaker

(8C5). A 1−inch by 2−inch white stripe is painted on the
canopy frame and sill above the canopy control handle panel.
Alignment of this stripe provides an additional visual guide
that the canopy is in a closed−and−locked position. Flightcrews shall ensure that hands and foreign
objects are clear of front cockpit handholds, top
Pneumatic pressure for normal canopy operation is and sides of ejection seat headboxes, and canopy
stored in a high−pressure, dry−nitrogen reservoir. Servicing is sills to prevent personal injury and/or structural
accomplished externally through the nose wheelwell. Nor damage during canopy opening or closing
mal pressure should be serviced to 3,000 psi. A pressure sequence. Foreign objects can catch ejection sys
gauge in the nose wheelwell should be checked during tem initiators on the right aft side of the ejection
preflight. A fully charged nitrogen bottle provides approxi seat headboxes causing inadvertent ejection even
mately 10 complete cycles (open and close) of the canopy with seat locking handles safe. Only minimum
before the system is reduced to a minimum operating clearance is afforded when canopy is transiting
pressure of 225 psi. If pneumatic pressure drops below 225 fore or aft.
psi, the canopy control module automatically prevents
further depletion of the main reservoir and the canopy must 2.37.1.2.1 Open
be opened by the auxiliary mode. When OPEN is selected, nitrogen is ported to the
locking actuator through the control module and the canopy
2.37.1 Canopy Operation is moved aft disengaging the canopy hooks from the sill
hooks. Pneumatic pressure is then ported to the canopy
2.37.1.1 External Canopy Controls actuator to raise the canopy.
Access to the external canopy control is obtained 2.37.1.2.2 Hold
through an access door on the left fuselage directly below the
boarding ladder. Pulling the handle out and rotating it Selection of CANOPY HOLD during transition of the
counterclockwise to NORM CL closes the canopy. Rotating canopy stops the canopy in any intermediate position
further counterclockwise to the BOOST close position will between closed and open by pressurizing the lock valves in
allow the canopy to be closed under a high headwind or cold the canopy actuator. These lock valves stop the transfer of
weather conditions. If BOOST is used to close the canopy, the pneumatic pressure.
handle should be returned to NORM CL. Rotating it With the canopy in any intermediate (CANOPY
clockwise to NORM OPEN opens the canopy under normal HOLD) position, moving the handle slowly toward OPEN
operating conditions and rotating it further to AUX OPEN will allow the canopy to begin to close until the handle is
allows the canopy to be opened manually. finally in OPEN. This occurs because the first motion of the
handle moves the selector valve cam, which vents pressure
Note from the lock valves and allows the canopy weight to transfer
pneumatic pressure. Once the selector valve cam is com
NORM OPEN is not detented; therefore, do not pletely moved to OPEN, pressure is then applied to the open
rotate the handle further clockwise unless the side of the canopy actuator.
AUX OPEN position is desired. Using AUX
OPEN unnecessarily will deplete the auxiliary
uplock nitrogen bottle.
2.37.1.2 Cockpit Canopy Controls If the canopy handle is left in an intermediate

The canopy pneumatic and hydraulic system is oper position for an extended period, the canopy will
ated by actuation of either of the cockpit control handles slowly close.
(Figure 2126), or the external control handle, which posi 2.37.1.2.3 Close
tions valves within the pneumatic control module to open or
close the canopy. The canopy pneumatic and pyrotechnic Selecting CLOSE allows the canopy to close under
systems are shown on FO−15. Modes of operation available normal conditions (30−knot headwind) using its own weight
are: OPEN, AUX OPEN, HOLD, CLOSE, and BOOST. without an expenditure of stored nitrogen. When the control
2−255 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
handle is set to CLOSE, both sides of the canopy actuator are mode, the canopy control handle in the cockpit must be
vented to the atmosphere, allowing the canopy to lower itself. rotated outboard to move the handle past the OPEN stop and
The final closing motion actuates a pneumatic timer which then pulled aft to AUX OPEN. This activates a pneumatic
directs pressure from the control module to the locking valve, which admits regulated pneumatic pressure from an
actuator and the canopy is moved forward to engage the auxiliary nitrogen bottle to the locking actuator and moves
canopy hooks in the sill hooks. the canopy aft out of the sill locks. When the canopy is
unlocked, pneumatic pressure from the main reservoir is
To close the canopy under high headwind conditions ported to the open side of the canopy actuator to counterbal-
(30 to 60 knots) or when difficulty is experienced because of ance the weight of the canopy, allowing the canopy to be
hot or cold temperatures, BOOST is used. The BOOST mode manually opened or closed by the flightcrew.
is activated by rotating the canopy control handle outboard
past the CLOSE stop and pushing the handle forward. With Before leaving the cockpit, the control handle should
the control handle in this position, the control module ports be returned to HOLD. If left in AUX OPEN, the canopy’s
additional regulated pneumatic pressure to the closed side of own weight or a tailwind could force the canopy down
the canopy actuator. If BOOST is used to close the canopy, with low pressure in the main reservoir. Once the auxiliary
the handle should be returned to CLOSE. canopy unlock bottle is used, the canopy will not return to
the normal mode of operation and cannot be locked closed
2.37.1.3 Auxiliary Canopy Opening until the auxiliary pneumatic selector valve on the aft canopy
deck is manually reset (lever in vertical position). (See
When the main pneumatic reservoir pressure is Figure 2-125A.)
reduced to 225 psi, the canopy control module automatically The auxiliary canopy unlock nitrogen bottle is on the
prevents further depletion of reservoir pressure and the turtleback behind the canopy hinge line (refer to FO-15).
canopy must be opened using the auxiliary mode. Actuation Servicing of the auxiliary bottle is through the small access
of the auxiliary mode can be affected from either the pilot or panel immediately behind the canopy on this turtleback. A
RIO canopy control handle or from the ground external fully charged bottle will provide approximately 20 canopy
canopy control. To open the canopy from the cockpit in this cycling operations in the auxiliary open mode.
Figure 2-125A. Auxiliary Pneumatic Selector Valve Reset
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-256
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
2.37.1.4 Canopy Jettison appropriately marked for rescue. Opening either access door
and pulling the T-handle fires an initiator that detonates the
The canopy can be jettisoned from either cockpit
canopy separation charge and actuates the canopy gas
or from external controls on each side of the fuselage.
generator. The sequence is the same as when the cockpit
An internal canopy jettison handle in each cockpit
handles are pulled. The external canopy jettison handles
(Figure 2-126) is on the forward right side of each flightcrew require squeezing the inner face of the handle and then
instrument panel and is painted yellow and black for ease of
pulling for actuation. The length of pull is approximately
identification. To activate the canopy jettison handle,
one-half to three-quarter inch and the T-handle comes free on
squeeze the inner face of the handle and then pull.
the aircraft when actuated. Refer to Chapter 12 for canopy
The length of pull is approximately one-half to external jettisoning procedures.
three-quarter inch, and the handle comes free of the aircraft
when actuated. Pulling either CANOPY JETTISON handle 2.38 EJECTION SYSTEM
actuates an initiator that ignites the canopy separation charge
The aircraft is equipped with an automatic electroni-
and actuates the canopy gas generator. The canopy separation
cally sequenced command escape system incorporating two
charge ignites the expanding, shielded, mild-detonating cord
Navy aircrew common ejection seat (SJU-17(V) 3/A (pilot)
lines, routed through the canopy sill hooks, breaking the sill
and SJU-17(V) 4/A (RIO)) rocket-assisted ejection seats.
hook frangible bolt. This allows the hooks to rotate upward,
Both seats are identical in operation and differ only in nozzle
releasing the canopy. The canopy gas generator produces
direction of their lateral thrust motors, which provide a
high-pressure gas that forces the canopy hydraulic actuator
divergent ejection trajectory away from the aircraft path.
shaft upward, ballistically removing the canopy.
When either crewmember initiates the command escape
Ejection through the canopy can result in injury and is system, the canopy is ballistically jettisoned and each
provided only as a backup method; therefore, the canopy is crewmember is ejected in a preset-time sequence. The RIO
jettisoned as part of the normal ejection sequence. An upward is ejected to the left and the pilot to the right.
pull on the ejection seat firing handle jettisons the canopy
Safe escape is provided for most combinations of
prior to ejection.
aircraft altitude, speed, attitude and flightpath within an
envelope from zero airspeed, zero altitude in a substantially
2.37.1.4.1 External Canopy Jettison Handles
level attitude to a maximum speed of 600 KCAS between
There are two external canopy jettison handles located
on the lower left and right fuselage below the pilot cockpit,
2-256a (Reverse
2-256a Blank) CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
1 CANOPY caution light Advises that the canopy is not in a down and locked position.
2 LAD/CANOPY caution Advises that the boarding ladder is not in the up and locked position or that
light the canopy is not in the down and locked position.
3 BOOST Used to close the canopy in cold or hot weather or when headwinds are
greater than 30 to 60 knots.
4 CLOSE Closes canopy under normal conditions.
5 HOLD Used to hold canopy in any position other than closed.
6 OPEN Used to open the canopy under normal conditions.
7 AUX OPEN Used to open canopy manually, which is required when nitrogen bottle
pressure drops below 225 psi.
8 CANOPY JETTISON Used to jettison canopy.
handle
Figure 2126.Cockpit Canopy Control Handle and Indicator Lights
2−257 ORIGINAL
zero altitude and 50,000 feet. Preflight procedures are shown 2.38.1.1 Seat Firing Handle
in Chapter 7 of this manual; ejection procedures are
Ejection is initiated by pulling up on the seat firing
discussed in Chapter 16. Ejection sequence is illustrated in
handle on the front of the seat bucket between the crewmem
FO−16 and FO−17.
ber’s thighs. A pull force of 25 to 40 pounds is required to
remove the firing handle from its housing. A continued pull
force of 30 to 60 pounds is required to initiate ejection. This
action operates linkage that withdraws the sears from the two
seat initiator cartridges, commencing the ejection sequence.
D Regardless of the SJU−17 Ejection Seat limi
tations, any person whose nude body weight 2.38.1.2 SAFE/ARMED Handle
is below 136 pounds or above 213 pounds is
subject to increased injury from ejection. The SAFE/ARMED handle on the right side of the seat
bucket forward of the manual override handle is the only
D Loose gear in the cockpit is a FOD and missile control for arming and safing the seat. (On the ground, a
hazard, especially during carrier operations, safety pin is also installed in the seat firing handle.) The
maneuvering flight, or ejection sequences. handle locks in the selected position. It is operated by
Carriage of gear that cannot be contained in releasing a catch to remove the locking plunger. When the
the cockpit storage compartment shall be kept handle is rotated forward (up) to safe the seat, the SAFE
to a minimum consistent with mission legend is displayed on a white background and a safety
requirements and the mission environment. plunger is inserted into the firing handle linkage so that the
handle cannot be pulled up, rendering the seat inoperative.
2.38.1 Ejection Seat Rotating the handle aft (down) displays the ARMED legend
on a yellow−black striped background. This pulls the safety
The Navy Aircrew Common Ejection Seat (NACES)
plunger from the firing handle linkage, freeing the handle and
(Figure 2127) is provided with a rocket−deployed 6.5 meter
allowing the seat to be fired. With the canopy closed, the
(20−foot), aeroconical, steerable parachute that is packed
SEAT UNARMED caution light in the RIO cockpit is
with a ribbon extraction drogue in a container behind the seat
illuminated if the SAFE/ARMED handle on either seat is in
occupant’s head. The seat bucket holds the survival kit and
the SAFE position.
also has the seat firing handle and other operating controls.
The parachute risers attach to the crewmember’s torso
harness by means of seawater−activated release switches. 2.38.1.3 Manual Override Handle
Normal ejection includes canopy jettison before the seats are The manual override handle on the right side of seat
catapulted out of the cockpit; however, the parachute bucket behind the SAFE/ARMED handle is connected by
container is fitted with canopy penetrators. This permits a linkage to the lower harness lock release mechanism and to
backup ejection through the canopy after a time delay in the an initiator in the seat bucket. The handle is locked in the
event of safe−and−arm unit failure or failure of the canopy to down position by a catch operated by a thumb button at the
separate from the aircraft. forward end of the handle. Depressing the thumb button
After ejection has been initiated, two pitot heads allows the handle to be rotated aft. Operating the handle also
mounted next to the parachute container are deployed. rotates the SAFE/ARMED handle to the SAFE position. A
Airspeed and altitude are provided to the battery−operated catch in the lower part of the manual release handle must be
electronic sequencer mounted under the parachute container. reset before the handle can be returned to the down position.
The sequencer uses the information to determine the release With the seat in the aircraft, operation of the handle linkage
time for the drogue bridles, the deployment time for the is restricted by the pin puller and releases only the lower
parachute, and release time for the harness locks. Depending locks, and the leg restraint line locks to permit emergency
on MSL altitude and airspeed, the seat drogue, which is ground egress with the survival kit attached.
catapult−deployed from a canister on the back of the seat and
has a three−point attachment bridle, can be used to stabilize Note
the seat, slow its descent, or be jettisoned before the The parachute risers and personnel services must
parachute deployment rocket is fired. To ensure parachute be disconnected manually.
deployment and man−seat separation, a barostatic release
operates to fire the parachute deployment rocket and release After ejection, the pin puller disengages permitting
the harness locks in the event of complete or partial further movement of the linkage so that operating the handle
sequencer failure. As a further backup, operating the manual releases the lower harness locks and fires the manual override
release handle on the seat bucket will also fire the parachute initiator that provides gas pressure to release the upper torso
deployment rocket and release the harness locks. harness locks and fire the parachute deployment rocket in the
event of automatic sequencing failure.
ORIGINAL 2−258
Figure 2127.Ejection Seat (Sheet 1 of 2)
2−259 ORIGINAL
Figure 2−127. Ejection Seat (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 2−260
2.38.1.4 Torso Harness The switch is spring loaded to the center OFF position
RAISE is aft and LOWER is forward. Electric power is
The torso harness is worn by the crewmember and
supplied from phase B of the right main ac bus through the
takes the place of a separate lapbelt and shoulder harness.
ACM LT/SEAT ADJ/STEADY POS LT circuit breaker (2I4).
The upper torso harness is connected by release fittings
(Koch fittings) to the inertial reel via straps passed through
roller yokes attached to the parachute risers. The release
fittings incorporate SEWARS to allow automatic release on
saltwater entry. Two buckles on the lower part of the torso
harness connect to the seat lapbelt fittings. Lapbelt girth can
be adjusted to accommodate the individual crewmember by The seat height actuator motor has a maximum
adjusting each belt strap. duty cycle of 1 minute on in any 8−minute period.
2.38.1.5 Harness Lock Control Lever 2.38.1.9 Survival Kit
The harness lock control lever on the left side of the The survival kit (Figure 2128) forms the sitting
seat bucket has two detented positions. In the forward platform for the crewmember and consists of a fabric survival
(locked) position, forward movement of the occupant is aids container covered by a contoured, rigid platform with a
restricted and any slack created by rearward movement is cushion on top to provide a firm seat and additional comfort
taken up by the inertial reel. The control is locked in this for the crewmember. The kit is retained in position by pivot
position by a detent. In the aft position, the occupant can fittings at the front and lugs attached to the lower harness
move forward freely, unless the reel locks owing to excessive locks at the rear. Attached to the lower harness lock lugs are
forward velocity. When the forward velocity decreases two adjustable harness lap straps with integral lapbelt release
sufficiently, the inertia straps are released without the fittings.
necessity of repositioning the manual control. Both straps The survival kit accommodates a liferaft, an emer
feed from the same shaft, and it is impossible for one to lock gency oxygen cylinder, and the survival aids. The emergency
without the other. If the reel is locked manually the control oxygen cylinder is mounted to the underside of the platform,
must be positioned aft to the unlocked position to release the a pressure gauge is on the left thigh support, and a green
straps. manual operating handle is on the left side of the platform.
2.38.1.6 Leg Restraints The emergency oxygen is also automatically activated
during ejection by a static line connected to the cockpit floor.
The leg garters and restraint cords keep the occupant’s
Note
legs firmly against the leg rests during ejection. The garters
are placed around the leg below the calf and above the knee. Flow of oxygen from the emergency cylinder can
be stopped by reseating the manual actuation
The leg−restraint cords are attached to the aircraft deck
handle.
and routed through the seat snubber box structure. They are
then passed through garter rings and snapped into the leg−line A URT−33C radio locator beacon is in a cutout in the
locks. The garter rings are snapped into the bayonet fitting left thigh support and is connected to the cockpit floor by a
when strapping in. Leg−line release is accomplished by static operating cable so that it can be automatically actuated
pulling the manual override handle. Leg restraints may be during ejection. The fabric survival aids container can be
adjusted by pulling the tab on the inner side of each leg−line deployed on a lowering line after ejection by pulling on either
snubber box. of the two yellow handles located on the back side. The
liferaft is automatically inflated when the survival aids
2.38.1.7 Negative−G Strap
container is deployed. Contents of the survival aids container
The negative−g strap is not incorporated in the F−14D may vary depending on the area of operation, but the
NACES ejection seat. following is a typical list:
2.38.1.8 Seat Height Adjustment Switch 1. Liferaft dye markers
Seat height is adjusted by an actuator driven by a
single−phase 115−Vac electric motor. Operation of the actua 2. Signal flares
tor is controlled by a three−position switch on the right aft side
3. Morse code and signal card
of the seat bucket marked RAISE, OFF, and LOWER.
4. Space blanket
2−261 ORIGINAL
Figure 2128.Survival Kit
ORIGINAL 2−262
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
5. Desalter kit or canned water full-aft (MCO) position. Adjusting the handrest
6. 50 feet of nylon cord to the full-down position will minimize this
interference and should allow normal operation
7. Bailing sponge of the CMD EJECT lever.
8. SRU-31/P flightcrew survival kit.
2.38.3 Ejection Initiation
If over water, the survival aids container should be
deployed on its lowering line before reaching the surface to With the SAFE/ARMED handle in the ARMED
make the raft immediately available on landing. If over land, (down) position, pulling the seat firing handle upward to the
it should not be deployed. This will reduce the risk of extent of its travel begins the ejection by pulling the sears on
entanglement and protect against injury. the seat initiators. The following events occur:
1. Canopy jettison is initiated.
2.38.1.10 Rocket Motor
2. The powered inertia reel retracts, pulling the crew-
The rocket motor is on the bottom of the seat bucket. member back in the seat.
It is ignited by a lanyard attached to the cockpit floor as the 3. The delay initiators are activated. These initiators
catapult nears the end of its stroke. The rocket thrust is have built-in delays of 1.0 second for the RIO seat
approximately 4,800 pounds for .25 second and sustains the and 1.5 seconds for the pilot seat.
thrust of the catapult to carry the seat to a sufficient height for
a safe zero/zero ejection from a level attitude. The rocket 4. The restriction is removed from the manual override
motor nozzles are inclined so that the thrust passes close to mechanism.
the cg of the seat and occupant. The motor also includes a 5. The 4.0-second delay cartridge for the barostatic
lateral thrust nozzle that imparts a divergent trajectory release is initiated.
carrying the seat away from the aircraft flightpath. 6. The safe and armed device is armed.
2.38.2 Command Ejection Lever When canopy jettison is complete, a lanyard attached
to the canopy pulls a sear, firing the safe and arm device. This
A command ejection lever (Figure 2-129) above the initiates the thermal batteries that power the seat electronic
RIO left outboard console allows the RIO to select either sequencer and fires the two-stage catapult, ejecting the seat.
pilot or RIO control of the command ejection system. Each The RIO seat is fired immediately on firing of the safe and
position has an internal locking detent. The handle is arm device, while the pilot seat is delayed 0.4 second. The
unlocked by lifting upward and moved by a forward or aft IFF switch is actuated when the pilot seat is fired.
motion. If the handle is released before reaching the aft
position, it is spring loaded to return forward. It will If the canopy fails to separate or the safe and arm device
automatically lock in the forward position; however a does not fire, the backup initiators operate at the expiration
downward motion is required to positively lock it into the aft of their delays, firing the RIO seat 1.0 second after firing
position. To select MCO command ejection position, raise handle actuation and the pilot seat 0.5 second later, through
the handle and pull aft. An EJECT CMD flip-flop-type the canopy.
indicator on the landing gear panel indicates the command As the seat ascends the guide rails, the following events
mode selected. The RIO may eject individually when the occur:
command ejection lever is in the pilot control position. When
1. The multipurpose initiator lanyards begin to
the command ejection lever is in the MCO command
withdraw.
position, the RIO can initiate ejection of both seats.
Regardless of the position of the command ejection lever, 2. Personnel services between seat and aircraft are
an ejection initiated by the pilot will always eject both disconnected.
crewmen. Command ejection by either crewmember will 3. The emergency oxygen supply is initiated.
eject the RIO first and the pilot 0.4 second later Depending 4. The emergency locator beacon is activated.
on aircraft dynamics, the total time for command ejection of
5. The leg restraint lines are drawn through the snub-
both seats in the normal (safe and arm device) mode is from
bers and restrain the crewmember’s legs to the front
0.4 to 0.9 second; in the backup initiator mode, the total time
of the seat bucket. When the leg restraint lines
is 1.5 second.
become taut, the break ring in each line fails and the
lines are freed from the aircraft. The snubbers pre-
vent forward movement of the legs.
At the end of the catapult stroke (approximately
In aircraft with an LCP installed, the controller
35 inches of seat travel), the multipurpose initiator lanyards
handrest may interfere with the CMD EJECT
become taut and withdraw the firing unit sears. This routes
lever, preventing the handle from reaching the
gas pressure to the electronic sequencer start switches,
2-263 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
1 EJECT CMD lever PILOT− Ejection initiated by the pilot will eject pilot and RIO (RIO first).
(RIO cockpit) Ejection initiated by the RIO will eject only the RIO.
Pilot eject command indicator pilot.
MCO − Ejection initiated by the pilot will eject pilot and RIO (RIO first).
Ejection initiated by the RIO will eject pilot and RIO (RIO first).
Pilot eject command indicator − MCO.
2 EJECT CMD (flip−flop) PILOT− Indicates command ejection lever is in PILOT. Only the pilot can
indicator eject pilot and RIO. RIO−initiated ejection will eject only RIO.
MCO − Indicates command ejection lever is in MCO. Both pilot and RIO
can eject both flightcrew members. RIO will eject first.
Figure 2129.Command Ejection Lever
ORIGINAL 2−264
beginning sequencer timing to the pitot deployment mecha 2.38.4.2 Barostatic Release
nisms and to the rocket motor, firing it. The electronic
To ensure that the parachute is deployed and the
sequencer determines the proper mode of seat operation
harness locks are released, the barostatic release unit,
based on altitude and airspeed.
consisting of a barostat and a cartridge, provides an
independent automatic backup to the electronic sequencer.
2.38.4 Seat Operation After Ejection
The cartridge is fired one of three ways: electrically by the
Post−ejection operation (FO−16 and FO−17) begins at sequencer at a preset altitude of 18,000 feet (FO−16 and
the end of catapult travel when the rocket motor fires and the FO−17), mechanically by the barostatic release unit between
start switches actuate. In normal operation, the electronic 14,000 and 16,000 feet; or mechanically by gas pressure from
sequencer selects the operating mode depending on altitude a 4−second delay cartridge when the manual override handle
and airspeed. A barostatic release unit provides an automatic is pulled. After the time delay, gas pressure is applied to the
backup for electronic operation. Four seconds after the seat barostat cartridge firing mechanism. Above the barostat
firing handle is pulled, the barostatic unit is armed permitting altitude setting, the mechanism is restricted from moving; at
parachute deployment and harness release as determined by or below the barostat altitude it is free to move and fire the
the barostat setting if the sequencer has not functioned. As a cartridge if it has not already been fired electrically. When
further backup, the crewmember can manually fire the fired, the barostat cartridge provides gas pressure to fire the
parachute deployment rocket and release the harness locks by parachute deployment rocket and operate the harness lock
using the manual override handle. release.
2.38.4.3 Manual Override
2.38.4.1 Electronic Sequencing
After ejection, the manual override handle provides a
In all modes, following start switch actuation, the pitot further backup to both the electronic sequencer and the
heads extend, environmental sensing for mode selection barostatic release. Pulling the handle fires a cartridge that
commences, and the seat drogue is deployed on its three− provides gas pressure to fire the parachute deployment rocket
point bridle to stabilize and slow the seat. While this is and operate the harness lock release.
occurring, the sequencer selects one of the five operating
modes (FO−16 and FO−17) from its lookup tables based on 2.39 LIGHTING SYSTEM
sensed altitude and airspeed. The modes are described as
follows: 2.39.1 Exterior Lights
1. Mode 1  This is the low−altitude, low−airspeed The exterior lights include position lights, formation
mode. The bridles are released 0.32 seconds after lights, anticollision lights, a taxi light, approach lights, and
seat first motion. The parachute deployment rocket an air refueling probe light. All exterior lighting controls,
fires to deploy the parachute and the harness release except for the air refueling probe light and approach lights,
system operates to free the occupant from the seat. are located on the MASTER LIGHT panel on the pilot right
console. The exterior lights master switch on the outboard
2. Modes 2, 3, and 4  These modes are for low to throttle must be on for any exterior light to function (except
medium altitudes. The seat is decelerated by the for approach lights). The pilot light control panel is shown in
drogue and after a time delay determined by the Figure 2130. A two−channel flasher unit is used for flashing
electronic sequencer, the parachute deployment lights. One channel flashes the anticollision and position
rocket fires to deploy the parachute before the lights and has circuit protection from the ANTICOLL/SUPP
drogue bridles are released. The harness release sys POS/POS LT circuit breaker (2I1). The second flasher
tem operates to free the occupant from the seat. channel flashes the AOA indexer and approach lights and has
circuit protection from the ANGLE OF ATTK IND AC
3. Mode 5  This mode is selected at high altitude. circuit breaker (3F3).
The seat (with drogue bridles connected) descends Note
to 18,000 feet, where the bridles are released.
The parachute deployment rocket fires to deploy the The anticollision, position, and supplementary posi
parachute and the harness release system operates to tion, formation, and taxi lights are inoperative when
free the occupant from the seat. operating on emergency generator.
In all modes, parachute deployment lifts the crew− 2.39.1.1 Position Lights
member and survival kit from the seat, pulling the sticker
straps from the clips. The position lights consist of a red light on the left
wingtip, a green light on the right wingtip, and a white
position light in the left fin cap assembly. Supplemental
2−265 ORIGINAL
Figure 2130.Cockpit Light Controls (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−266
1 ANTI COLLISION light ON and OFF Energizes or deenergizes the anticollision lights. When
switch anticollision lights are on, the flasher unit for the position
lights is disabled.
2 POSITION lights flasher FLASH Causes the wing or supplementary tail and position lights
switch to operate in a flashing mode with landing gear up. With
gear down supplementary lights operate steady only.
STEADY With the wing and tail (or either) position lights on, lights
are on steady.
3 TAIL POSITION light BRT Bright tail light.
switch
OFF Deenergizes tail position light.
DIM Dim tail light.
4 WING POSITION light BRT Bright wing lights switch.
switch
OFF Deenergizes wing lights.
DIM Dim wing lights.
5 LCD panel light 0 to 1 Pilot’s liquid crystal display (LCD) and EIG white
thumbwheel backlighting on.
1 to 14 Sets intensity of pilot’s LCD.
6 INDEXER thumbwheel 0 to 14 Sets intensity of indexer lights.
7 TAXI light switch ON Nose gear must be down and locked and the master
exterior light switch must be on.
OFF Turns light off.
8 INSTRUMENT lights 0 to 1 Turns instrument panel lights on.

thumbwheel 1 to 14 Sets instrument lights intensity, maximum brightness
at 14.
9 WHITE FLOOD lights BRT Bright white flood lights.
switch
DIM Dim white flood lights.
Note OFF Turns white flood lights off.
Switch must be pulled
up to be moved to BRT
or DIM.
10 NVG FLOOD lights control Variable control Sets intensity of green instrument and console flood
lights from DIM to BRT.
11 CONSOLE lights 0 to 1 Turns console lights and console white flood lights on.
thumbwheel
1 to 14 Sets console lights intensity, maximum brightness at 14.
12 FORMATION lights 0 to 1 Turns formation lights on.
thumbwheel 1 to 14 Sets formation of light intensity, maximum at 14.
Figure 2−130. Cockpit Light Controls (Sheet 2 of 3)
2−267 ORIGINAL
13 Exterior lights master ON Enable all exterior lights except approach lights.
switch Dims approach lights to night intensity.
OFF Permits pilot to turn off all exterior lights except approach
lights. Sets daylight intensity on approach lights.
14 RIO’s light control RFCI Variable control Sets intensity of green flood light illuminating Radio
Frequency Control Indicator.
Figure 2−130. Cockpit Light Controls (Sheet 3 of 3)
position lights include upper and lower red lights on the left All formation lights are green. Intensity of the lights
wing glove and upper and lower green lights on the right wing is controlled by the FORMATION thumbwheel on the
glove. When the wing−sweep angle is forward of 25_, the MASTER LIGHT panel. Electrical power is supplied
wingtip position lights are operational; when the wings are through the right main bus with circuit protection on the RIO
swept aft of 25_, the wingtip position lights are disabled and ac right main circuit breaker panel TAXI/FORM LT (3A2).
the glove position lights are operational. When operating in
steady mode with the nosegear down and locked and the 2.39.1.4 Taxi Light
wings forward of 25_, both the wingtip position lights and the
glove position lights are operational. The position lights are The taxi light installed on the nosewheel is a fixed−
powered from the right main ac bus through the exterior position light. A limit switch on the nosegear door will turn
lights master relay. the light off when the gear is retracted. A two−position, ON
and OFF, switch is on the MASTER LIGHT panel. Electrical
power is supplied through the right main bus with circuit
Note
protection on the RIO circuit breaker panel TAXI/ FORM LT
When the anticollision lights are on, the flasher (3A2).
for the position lights is disabled and the lights
revert to steady. 2.39.2 Interior Lights
The interior lighting of the cockpit consists of green
2.39.1.2 Anticollision Lights floodlights mounted on the glareshield, the instrument
There are three red, flashing anticollision lights. One console and above each outboard console, and utility lights
anticollision light is installed in the bottom of the infrared for each flightcrew station. The MASTER LIGHT panel, at
pod on the lower forward fuselage. Another anticollision the pilot’s station on the right outboard console, permits
light is installed in the top forward part of the left vertical varying the intensity of the floodlights from dim to bright.
stabilizer and its lens is blacked out except for 1½ inches at The RIO’s interior lights control panel permits varying the
the rear of the light. The third anticollision light is on the top intensity of his interior lighting.
aft part of the right vertical stabilizer and directs its
anticollision beacon up and down. 2.39.2.1 Instrument and Console Panel Lights
The lower fuselage forward anticollision light remains All flight instruments in the pilot and RIO instrument
off during takeoff and landing with the nosewheel door open. panel and console panel lights are lighted by white lighting.
With the nosewheel door closed, the lower fuselage forward Individual thumbwheel controls are provided for the pilot
anticollision light will operate with the ANTI COLLISION and RIO instrument and console lighting. The thumbwheels
light switch set to ON. The anticollision lights are powered have 14 variable selections from 0 to 14. Initial rotation from
through the right main bus with circuit protection on the RIO 0 to 1 activates the circuitry and provides a low−intensity
ac right main circuit breaker panel TAXI/FORM LT (3A2). light. Further rotation up to a maximum intensity (14)
increases the brightness. The INSTRUMENT thumbwheel
2.39.1.3 Formation Lights also controls the intensity of the CAUTION ADVISORY
panels, the left and right vertical consoles, and the digital data
The formation lights consist of wingtip lights on each indicator lights, which consist of high− and low−intensity
wing, fuselage lights, and vertical fin tip lights on both sides lighting. The console lights thumbwheel turns power on for
of the aircraft. both the console lights and the floodlights. The pilot and
ORIGINAL 2−268
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
RIO instrument and console lights are protected by circuit of the lamp to reselect a white light with a flood or spot
breakers. Lighting for the pilot turn-and-slip indicator is illumination option. An alligator clip and swivel mounting
controlled by the INSTRUMENT lighting thumbwheel. The allow the light to be positioned on a clipboard or other
engine indicator group uses integral white lighting for convenient location. A flasher button on the heel of the lamp
daylight operations, and liquid crystal display brightness is allows either crewmember to use the light as a signal lamp.
controlled by the LCD thumbwheel. The utility and map lights are supplied electrical power from
the ac essential No. 2 bus and are protected by the UTILITY
Note LTS circuit breaker (3A6).
When pilot’s instrument panel lighting is turned 2.39.3 Warning and Indicator Lights
off (daytime or to enable NVD compatibility),
RIO instrument panel and console panel lighting Warning, caution, and advisory lights (Figure 2-131
is disabled. and Figure 2-132) are provided in both cockpits to alert the
pilot and RIO of aircraft equipment malfunctions, unsafe
2.39.2.2 Floodlights operating conditions, or that a particular system is in
operation.
The floodlights consist of night vision green flood-
lights that illuminate the instrument and console panels. Warning lights illuminate red with black letters to warn
When navigating around thunderstorms, the storm flood- of hazardous conditions that require immediate corrective
lights should be turned on bright to assist in preventing action. Caution lights show yellow letters on an opaque
temporary blindness from lighting. The WHITE FLOOD background to indicate an impending dangerous condition.
toggle switch on the pilot master light panel and another on The lower half of the CAUTION ADVISORY panel consists
the RIO light panel are safety interlock switches that must be of advisory lights that show green letters on opaque
pulled up to be positioned to BRT or DIM. In DIM, background. Advisory lights indicate degraded operations
low-intensity floodlighting is provided. During NVIS mode, that may require corrective action.
rotating the NVIS FLOOD potentiometer on the RIO interior
light panel to vary the intensity of the NVIS flood lights will
also vary the intensity of the backlighting on the CDNU.
Note
Radiation hazard exists on deck when the RDR
When the storm floodlights are on (BRT or DIM), ENABLED caution light is illuminated. The
the intensity of the CAUTION and ADVISORY light indicates that the RADAR TEST ENABLE
panel lights is increased to day (bright) illumi- switch (maintenance switch) is in the “A” (radi-
nation mode. ate and scan) position. This condition permits the
weight-on-wheels interlock to be bypassed,
Console and instrument panel floodlights are available
allowing the transmitter to radiate through the
in BRT. In the MED and DIM, only console floodlights are
antenna when RADAR XMIT is selected on the
available. The green console and instrument panel flood-
hand control unit. Illumination of the light does
lights are continuously variable in intensity using the NVG
not indicate a weight-on-wheels failure.
FLOOD control on the pilot’s MASTER lights and RIO’s
interior light controls. The panel floodlights are protected by
2.39.3.1 MASTER CAUTION Light
a PANEL FLOOD LTS circuit breaker (4A6) on the RIO ac
essential No. 1 circuit breaker panel. The white floodlights The pilot MASTER CAUTION light is centrally
are protected by the STORM FLOOD LTS circuit breaker located on the master caution/master arm control panel, and,
(2I6) on the RIO ac right main circuit breaker panel. in the aft cockpit, the RIO MASTER CAUTION light is on
the left instrument panel. When the lights are illuminated,
2.39.2.3 Utility and Map Lights yellow letters show on an opaque background. Individual
MASTER CAUTION lights flash whenever a caution light
The pilot utility and map light is on a bracket above the
on the respective caution and advisory panel illuminates.
right outboard console. The RIO utility and map light is in a
A MASTER CAUTION light may be turned off by depress-
bracket above and midway along the right and left console.
ing its lens. This will activate a reset switch that rearms the
Each light has a rheostat control including an ON and OFF
master circuit for a subsequent caution light. A caution light
on the rear of the lamp. A night vision green filter may be
lit on the caution and advisory panel will not be turned off by
selected by rotating the face of the lamp. Pressing the
resetting the MASTER CAUTION light.
locking button on top of the lamp permits rotating the face
2-269 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Figure 2-131.Pilot Indicator Lights (Sheet 1 of 5)
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 2−270
1 SAM Steady illumination when a surface−to−air missile tracking radar is

(warning) detected. Flashing for missile launched condition.
AAA Steady illumination when an anti−aircraft artillery tracking radar is
(warning) detected.
Flashing when AAA radar firing signal is detected.
CW Indicates continuous wave emitter detected.
(warning)
AI Steady illumination indicates airborne interceptor tracking condition is
(warning) detected.
2 WHEELS Flashes with flaps down more than 10_, either throttle below approxi-
(warning) mately 85%, and any landing gear not down and locked.
BRAKES Indicates antiskid failure or failure of priority valve in the brake power
(warning) module to switch to combined hydraulic system (operating in AUX brake
mode). Illuminates when parking brake is pulled.
ACLS/AP Auto pilot and automatic carrier landing system mode disengaged.
(caution)
NWS ENGA Indicates nosewheel steering is engaged and will respond as a function of
(caution) rudder pedal displacement.
AUTO THROT Indicates APC has been disengaged by means other than the
(caution) THROTTLE MODE switch.
3 LOCK Indicates radar locked on target.

(advisory)
4 SHOOT Indicates target meets specified LAR requirements.

(advisory)
5 HOT TRIG Indicates that firing logic conditions are available. Pilot’s trigger or bomb
(warning) button and RlO’s launch button will fire or release ordnance when
actuated.
6 MASTER CAUTION Flashes when any light on the pilot’s CAUTION ADVISORY panel
(caution) illuminates.
7 FIRE Fire/overheat condition in engine nacelle.

(warning)
8 EMERG STORES Indicates EMERG STORES pushbutton is activated.

JETT/ACK
(warning)
9 LOW ALTITUDE Illuminates NVIS Green to indicate that the aircraft has descended below
WARNING LIGHT the altitude set by the low altitude limit bug.
Figure 2−131. Pilot Indicator Lights (Sheet 2 of 5)
2−271 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
Note
The following lights on the CAUTION ADVISORY

panel are in alphabetical order.
10 ARI DGR Indicates degraded ARI performance. If caused by loss of a Mach number
signal, LSXC and wing rock suppression functions will be inoperative.
ARI/SAS OUT Indicates loss of either ROLL or YAW SAS and all ARI functions.
Will be illuminated if either the ROLL STAB AUG or YAW STAB AUG
switches are selected OFF.
AUTO PILOT (caution) Indicates failure of one or more pilot relief modes.
AUX FIRE EXT (advisory) Indicates low pressure (approximately 90 psi below the nominal 600 psi)
in the auxiliary fire extinguishing agent container.
BINGO (caution) Indicates total fuel quantity indicator is less than BINGO preset value.
BLEED DUCT Indicates bleed air leak sensing elements detect temperatures greater
(caution) than 575_F between engine and primary heat exchanger. Also indicates
hot air leak detection (excess of 255_F) between primary heat exchanger
and ECS turbine compressor.
B/U OXY LOW (caution) Indicates backup oxygen system pressure is 200 psi or less.
CADC (caution) Indicates failure associated with central air data computer.
ENG FIRE EXT Indicates low pressure (approximately 90 psi below the nominal 600 psi)
(advisory) in the fire extinguishing agent container.
L ENG SEC Indicates augmenter fan temperature controller (AFTC) is in secondary
R ENG SEC mode. Afterburner is inoperative and thrust levels can vary from as little
(caution) as 65% to as much as 116% of primary mode MIL thrust.
FCS CAUTION Indicates DFCS failure has occurred. If no other lights are illuminated,
indicates loss of redundancy only (subsequent failure may result in loss of
significant DFCS functionality).
FLAP (caution) Indicates: Disagreement between main and/or auxiliary flap position;
asymmetry lockout; CADC failure; WG SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV FLAP
(LE1) circuit breaker pulled; or, landing flaps down and airspeed greater
than 225 knots.
L FUEL LOW Indicates fuel thermistors uncovered in aft and left or forward and right
R FUEL LOW fuel feed group (approximately 1,000 pounds remaining in individual fuel
(caution) feed group).
L FUEL PRESS Indicates insufficient discharge pressure (less than 9 psi) from respective
R FUEL PRESS turbine driven boost pump.
(caution)
L GEN Indicates that corresponding generator is inoperative because of fault in
R GEN generator, control unit, or electrical distribution system.
(caution)
ORIGINAL 2−272
10 HYD PRESS Indicates hydraulic pressure from either engine−driven pump is less than
(caution) 2,100 psi.
HZ TAIL AUTH Indicates failure of lateral tail authority actuator to follow schedule or
(caution) CADC failure.
R INLET Indicates AICS programmer and/or system failure.

L INLET
(caution)
INLET ICE Indicates ice accumulated on ice detector in left inlet with ENG/PROBE/
(caution) AICS ANTI−ICE switch in AUTO/OFF or ORIDE/ON selected.
INTEG TRIM Indicates a discrepancy between input command signal and actuator
(advisory) position, or an electrical power loss within the computer.
LAD/CANOPY Advises that the boarding ladder is not in an up and locked position or
(caution) that canopy is not in down and locked position.
LAUNCH BAR Weight−on−Wheels:

(advisory) • Aircraft kneeled, either throttle less than MIL, launch bar not up
and locked (normal indication until MRT checks).
Weight−off−Wheels:
• Launch bar not up and locked.
• Launch bar not within ±15_ of center, cocked nosegear.
• Nose strut not fully extended.
MACH TRIM Indicates failure of Mach trim actuator to follow schedule.

(advisory)
OBOGS Indicates a switchover to backup oxygen or OBOGS switch OFF.

(caution)
L OIL HOT Indicates oil temperature too high. May be an indication of the
R OIL HOT high−scavenge oil temperature; continued engine operation will result
(caution) in reduced gearbox life and lubrication degradation.
OIL PRESS Indicates left or right engine oil pressure is 11 psi or less.
(caution)
PITCH SAS Indicates inoperative pitch channel or PITCH SAS failure.
L RAMPS Indicates ramps are neither positioned in stow nor trail locks during
R RAMPS critical flight conditions. (See Figure 2−5.)
(caution)
RATS RATS operation is enabled.

(advisory)
2−273 ORIGINAL
10 READ MFD Indicates any or all of the following warning/caution legends that appear
(caution) on the upper left corner of the MFD.
L N2 OSP
R N2 OSP
L N1 OSP
R N1 OSP
L TBT OT
R TBT OT
L FLMOUT
R FLMOUT
L IGV SD
R IGV SD
W/S
ROLL DGR Indicates inoperative roll channel and degraded roll authority.
RUDDER AUTH Indicates disagreement between position and command failure of rudder
(caution) authority actuators to follow schedule, or CADC.
SAHRS Indicates attitude or heading information from SAHRS is unreliable.

(advisory)
SPOILERS Indicates spoiler failure causing a set of spoilers to be locked down.

(caution)
START VALVE Starter solenoid air valve open after start. Starter overspeed and/or
(caution) destruction possible.
TRANS/RECT Indicates one operable transformer−rectifier is powering the total dc load,

(advisory) or dual transformer−rectifier failure.
WING SWEEP Indicates failure of a single channel in the system.

(advisory)
WSHLD HOT Indicates center windshield is overheated.

(advisory)
YAW DGR Indicates inoperative yaw channel and degraded yaw authority.
ORIGINAL 2−274
Figure 2132.RIO Indicator Lights (Sheet 1 of 3)
2−275 ORIGINAL
1 INS status indicators Not operational.
2 IFF Indicates mode 4 interrogation was received, but system has not
(advisory) generated reply.
RCV Indicates ALQ−165 is receiving a threat identification signal.
(advisory)
XMIT Indicates ALQ−165 is transmitting.
(advisory)
SAM Steady illumination when a surface−to−air missile tracking radar is
(warning) detected. Flashing when a missile has been launched.
AAA Steady illumination when an anti−aircraft artillery tracking radar
(warning) is detected. Flashing when an AAA radar firing signal is detected.
CW Indicates a continuous wave emitter is detected.
(warning)
Al Steady illumination indicates an airborne interceptor tracking is detected.
(warning)
3 MASTER CAUTION Flashes when any caution light on the RIO’s CAUTION ADVISORY panel
(caution) illuminates.
4 C&D HOT Indicates DD and/or PTID controls and displays are overheating.
(caution)
CABIN PRESS Indicates aircraft cabin pressure has dropped below 5−psi pressure differ
(caution) ential or cockpit altitude is above 27,000 feet.
FUEL LOW Indicates fuel thermistors uncovered in aft and left or forward and right
(caution) fuel feed group (approximately 1,000 pounds) remaining in individual fuel
feed group.
B/U OXY LOW Indicates backup oxygen system pressure is 200 psi or less.
(caution)
CANOPY Indicates that canopy is not in down and locked position.
(caution)
POD HOT Indicates LANTIRN pod overheat condition exists.
(caution)
POD FAIL Indicates a failure with the LANTIRN pod.
(caution)
Figure 2−132. RIO Indicator Lights (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 2−276
4 SEAT UNARMED Indicates either seat is in the SAFE position.

(caution)
RDR ENABLED Indicates that radar operation on the ground is possible or failure of right
(caution) main landing gear safety switch or wiring.
READ MFD Indicates any or all of the following warning, caution, or advisory legends
(caution) that appear on the upper left corner of the MFD.
SDU ALARM IMU
ASPJ HOT CIU HOT
JTID HOT DP1 HOT
RWR DP2 HOT
FWD ASPJ SMS HOT
AFT ASPJ AFT CG
MC1 HUD HOT
MC2 RWR HOT
MC1 HOT DSS HOT
MC2 HOT DEKI HOT
CIU IRST HOT
INS MDL HOT
GPS FAIL
BINGO Indicates total fuel quantity indicator is less than BINGO preset value.
(caution)
SENSOR COND Indicates coolant temperature exiting heat exchanger is 104_F, radar
(advisory) coolant pump output pressure is below 60 psi, or the overtemperature
switch has shut down the coolant pump.
COOLING AIR Indicates an overtemperature condition exists in the electronic forced air
(advisory) cooling system. With degraded cabin pressure or flow, indicates possible
bleed duct failure forward of primary heat exchanger and 400° modulating
valve.
OBOGS Indicates a switchover to backup oxygen or OBOGS switch OFF.

(caution)
SAHRS Indicates attitude or heading information from SAHRS is unreliable.

(advisory)
Figure 2−132. RIO Indicator Lights (Sheet 3 of 3)
2−277 ORIGINAL
2.39.3.2 Indicator Lights Test The RIO caution and advisory lights are tested in the
same manner on the TEST panel on the right console.
A check of all indicator lights can be performed while
airborne or during on−deck operations. The pilot caution and
2.40 STORES MANAGEMENT SYSTEM/
advisory lights, the MASTER CAUTION light, and all
JETTISON
associated circuitry are tested through the MASTER TEST
panel. The test is initiated by selecting LTS and pressing the The SMS is the interface between aircraft stores and the
master test knob. Electrical power is routed through the mission computer system. It provides signal processing and
circuitry to provide simulated failure signals to the caution logic control required for inventory and identification of all
and advisory lights. Illumination of each warning, caution, stores; preparation and test of missiles; and weapon select,
and advisory light verifies proper continuity of the indicator arm, and launch functions. The emergency generator (1 kVA
lights. A malfunction is indicated by failure of a light to mode) provides backup power (28 Vdc essential) for
illuminate. emergency jettison. The SMS has extensive self−test capabil
Illumination of any caution light causes the MASTER ities and reports failures to the MCS for display to the crew.
CAUTION light to flash. If the MASTER CAUTION light
illuminates steadily during the LTS test, it indicates a failure 2.40.1 SMS Weapons Replaceable Assemblies
of the MASTER CAUTION light primary power failure, The SMS consists of the following WRAs:
failure of the flasher module, or that failure has been detected
by the BIT circuits. 1. Stores management processor
The following indicator lights are also illuminated by 2. Fuel tank jettison unit
the LTS test through the MASTER TEST panel: 3. Type 1 decoders
1. ACLS/AP 4. Type 2 decoders
2. Approach indexer 5. Gun control unit
3. AUTO THROT 6. Missile power relay unit
4. BRAKES 7. Missile power supply
5. EMER STORES 8. AWW−4.
6. FIRE
2.40.1.1 Stores Management Processor (SMP)
7. GO/NO GO
The SMP is a programmable, digital computer that
8. HOOK light provides the central processing and command functions of
9. HOT TRIG the SMS. It operates as a remote terminal on MBUS−2. The
SMP communicates with the SMS WRAs and acts as the bus
10. LDG GEAR transition light controller on the armament bus. The SMP controls emer
11. LOCK gency jettison, the gun, and some AIM−9 functions via
discretes that are independent of the ARMBUS. The SMP
12. NWS ENGA also controls weapon select, SMS and weapon BIT, monitors
13. RATS aircraft safety interlocks, and controls the launch−to−eject
sequence.
14. JETT
15. Refueling probe transition light 2.40.1.2 Fuel Tank Jettison Unit (FTJU)
16. SAM Two FTJUs, one each for stations 2 and 7, are located
in the engine nacelles. The FTJUs provide eject pulses to the
17. SHOOT squibs in the jettison release mechanism for emergency,
ACM, or selective jettison of the fuel tanks.
18. WHEELS.
For a description of Type 1 decoders, Type 2 decoders,
gun control unit, missile power relay unit missile power
Note
supply, AWW−4, and SMS functions, refer to NAVAIR
The DATA LINK power switch must be on to 01−F14AAD−1A.
check the DDI lights.
ORIGINAL 2−278
2.40.2 Multistatus Indicator (MSI) External fuel tanks, Phoenix, and Sparrow missiles can
be released in EMERG, ACM, and SEL jettison modes only.
The MSI (Figure 2133) is a liquid crystal display
Air−to−ground (A/G) weapons loaded on BRU−32 bomb racks
located below MFD 1. The MSI is powered by the HUD
can be released in all four jettison modes. ITERs and
subsystem. MSI displays are dependent on the MCS. When
weapons loaded on ITERs cannot be released from their
the HUD PWR switch is set to TEST, all LCD segments on parent BRU−32 bomb racks in any of the jettison modes.
the MSI are displayed. The MSI displays weapon type and
Sidewinder missiles (rail launched) cannot be jettisoned.
status of each store station. The upper row of the display
identifies the weapon. The lower row displays weapon status.
Two horizontal dashed lines at a store station indicate that the
missile at that station has FAILED or is HUNG. A blank
display on a station indicates no weapon is loaded or the
weapon loaded is not recognized. D Stores shall be jettisoned above the minimum
fragmentation clearance altitude, when pos
2.40.3 Stores Jettison Modes sible, even though weapon arming and fuzing
is safed/disabled in all jettison modes.
Four jettison modes are available: D Jettisoning A/G stores during a normal release
1. Emergency (EMERG) train may result in store−to−store collision in
near proximity to the aircraft.
2. Air combat maneuver (ACM) D If jettisoned during a takeoff emergency,
3. Selective (SEL) external fuel tanks may collide with the air
craft because of their unstable characteristics.
4. Auxiliary (AUX). D If a jettison or delivery condition existed such
Weapon arming and fuzing and missile motor ignition that A/G stores were released from stations 3
are safed/disabled during all jettison release modes. and 6 and not from stations 4 and 5, an AFT
CG advisory on the MFDs will not be posted.
Figure 2133.Multistatus Indicator
2−279 ORIGINAL
2.40.3.1 Emergency Jettison Note
Emergency jettison is used to separate all jettisonable ACM JETT selections are retained in SMP non
stores from the aircraft as fast as possible. The only interlock volatile memory. This allows selections to be
requirement for jettisonable stores is weight off wheels. The retained and enables ACM JETT without an
emergency jettison circuit is electrically isolated from all operable MCS. However, ACM JETT designa
other release functions of the SMP and has a separate electri tions must be reselected after performing system
cal path to each jettisonable store station. The mode is ini reset to restore ACM JETT symbology on the
tiated by depressing the EMER STORES JETT pushbutton MFD SMS format.
on the landing gear control panel with weight off wheels ACM jettison is initiated by the pilot raising the ACM
(Figure 2134). Emergency jettison has priority over all other guard (Figure 2134) and depressing the ACM JETT push
SMS functions. This momentary, nonlatching pushbutton button. For single stores loaded on a station, stores will be
and the EMERG STORES JET (ACK) light are illuminated jettisoned at 100−millisecond intervals in the following
for 5 seconds by the SMP to indicate emergency jettison has sequence:
been commanded. For single stores loaded on a station, stores
will be jettisoned at 100−millisecond intervals in the follow 1. Stations 2 and 7 simultaneously
ing sequence: 2. Stations 1B and 8B simultaneously
1. Stations 2 and 7 simultaneously 3. Station 4
4. Station 5
2. Stations 1B and 8B simultaneously
5. Station 3
3. Station 4
6. Station 6.
4. Station 5
After the release attempt is completed, the SMS up−
5. Station 3 dates the stores inventory. Unlike emergency jettison, a store
that is not released is declared HUNG. Such stores are not
6. Station 6. eligible for launch but are still eligible for emergency or
selective jettison. Additionally, A/G stores loaded on
After the release sequence is completed, the SMS BRU−32s will still be eligible for auxiliary jettison.
updates the stores inventory. Unlike other jettison modes or
launch attempts, a store that is not released is not declared a 2.40.3.3 Selective Jettison
HUNG store and is eligible for subsequent jettison or launch.
Selective jettison is used to separate single jettisonable
2.40.3.2 ACM Jettison stores station−by−station and also allows simultaneous jetti
son of both fuel tanks. The RIO selects the desired station(s)
for selective jettison.
ACM jettison provides for rapid release of any prese
lected combination of jettisonable stores. In addition to RIO Selective jettison is accomplished by placing the MA
selection of those stations to be separated, the only ACM ARM switch to ON, the LDG GEAR handle UP, the
jettison interlock is the LDG GEAR handle UP. JETTISON STA SEL knob set to the desired station, and the
SEL JETT switch to JETT. After the release attempt is
Stations are selected for jettison via the DEU. completed, the SMS updates the stores inventory. Unlike
Figure 2134 and Figure 2135 illustrates selection and dis emergency jettison, a store that is not released is declared
play of external fuel tanks for ACM jettison. Only those HUNG. Such stores are not eligible for launch, but are still
stations having a jettisonable store loaded that have not been eligible for emergency or selective jettison. A/G stores
declared failed are available for ACM jettison selection. loaded on BRU−32s will still be eligible for auxiliary jettison.
Each depression of a station button causes that button

display to toggle between JETT and SAFE. The DEU selec
tions are not forwarded to the SMS until the enter button is
depressed. Selected stations are indicated on the MFD SMS
Do not attempt jettison of external fuel tanks
format with an inverted V" above the station number. The
until wing fuel tanks are depleted. Wing fuel may
symbol is removed if deselected by the RIO and upon
be lost if the external tank quick−disconnect
completion of an ACM jettison attempt or successful jettison.
valve sticks in the open position.
ORIGINAL 2−280
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
1 ACM JETT pushbutton Enables ACM jettison. Pushbutton is under ACM switch cover.
When pressed, only those stores selected via the DEU are jettisoned.
To ensure release of all selected stores, the ACM JETT pushbutton must
be depressed and held for at least 2 seconds.
2 ACK light Redundant indicator for emergency jettison activation. Illuminates for
5 seconds, indicating the SMP has acknowledged the emergency
stores jettison command.
3 EMERG STORES JET Enables the separation of all jettisonable stores. When depressed with
pushbutton/light weight off wheels, activates emergency stores jettison signal to the SMS
and illuminates light for 5 seconds, indicating the SMP has acknowledged
the emergency stores jettison command. Jettison function is disabled with
weight on wheels.
4 SEL JETT switch With Master Arm on and gear up, allows RIO to jettison from selected sta-
tion(s). It is a three-position, lever-locked switch with guarded positions.
JETT - Actuates normal selective jettison of the store(s) located at the
station(s) designated by the JETTISON STA SEL switch.
SAFE - Normal operating position. Inhibits jettison in selective mode.
AUX - Releases all A/G stores loaded on BRU-32s from the station selected
on the JETTISON STA SEL switch with a single switch movement.
5 JETTISON STA SEL Allows selective jettison of Phoenix or Sparrow missiles and auxiliary tanks.
switch Allows selective or auxiliary jettison of air-to-ground stores.
OFF - Inhibits selective and auxiliary jettison.
Station - Selects store(s) for jettison.
Figure 2-134. Jettison Controls
2-281 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 2-135. ACM Jettison Selection and Display
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 2-282
2.40.3.4 Auxiliary Jettison clearance of 16 feet is required when opening the radome.
The radar antenna must be stowed before opening the
Auxiliary jettison is a nonejection release mode for
radome. Antenna stow position is 0_ azimuth and 60_ tilted
single A/G stores loaded on BRU−32s (Figure 2134). Like
down.
selective jettison, this mode requires the MA ARM switch to
be set to ON and the LDG GEAR handle UP. This mode is Note
activated by the RIO selecting the station to be jettisoned via After the nose radome is raised and the jury strut
the jettison STA SEL switch and then selecting AUX on the fastened in position, release hydraulic pressure to
SEL JETT switch. Auxiliary jettison of an A/G store loaded take the load off the hydraulic system.
directly on a BRU−32 is via gravity force only.
2.41.3 Systems Test and System Power
Ground Panel
The SYS TEST and SYS PWR ground check panel
(Figure 2136) is on the RIO right console panel (accessible
Since auxiliary jettison for single A/G stores from the boarding ladder with the canopy open) for
loaded directly on BRU−32s is a gravity drop controlling the activation of electrical circuits using ground
rather than an ejection separation, the aircraft external power. The panel cover is designed so that, when it
will be restricted in its flight envelope when jetti is closed, the switches inside are in the proper position for
soning through this mode. flight. In addition, when the landing gear handle is in UP, all
switches are deactivated. The panel serves a maintenance
2.41 MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT and preflight purpose and is not intended for use by the
flightcrew.
2.41.1 Boarding Ladder
A boarding ladder consisting of three folding sections
is housed in the left fuselage between the two cockpits. It is
held in the closed position by two mechanical locking pins
actuated by the ladder control handle in the face of the
boarding ladder. The ladder must be manually released or
stowed from the ground level. Unfolding the remaining two
sections places the ladder in a fully extended position. The
bottom rung of the ladder is approximately 26 inches above
the deck when in a fully extended position, with the nosegear
unkneeled, and 12 inches above the deck if the nosegear is
kneeled. A LAD/CANOPY caution light on the pilot caution
advisory panel advises the pilot that the boarding ladder is not
in a full up−and−locked position.
2.41.1.1 Boarding Steps and Handhold

There are two positive locking board steps, one on
either side of the boarding ladder directly below each
cockpit. They may be opened or closed from either cockpit
or while standing on the boarding ladder. A single handhold
is directly above the boarding ladder. It is a spring−loaded
door that fairs with the fuselage when released.
2.41.2 Nose Radome

The nose radome is attached to the aircraft by a top
hinge and bottom mounted latches, permitting it to be rotated
up for access and maintenance. A jury strut attached to the
lower part of the dome can be fastened to the aircraft Figure 2136.Systems Test and System Power
bulkhead to hold the dome open. A minimum overhead Ground Panel
2−283 ORIGINAL
2.41.4 External Baggage Container (CNU−188/A) of two sets of seatbelt straps that form a crossover pattern to
secure baggage to the shelf. The external baggage container
The external baggage container (Figure 2137) is a
may be loaded with any equipment that fits within the
modified Aero ID 300−gallon fuel tank that incorporates
confines of the shelf, does not exceed the shelf weight, and
forward and aft baggage compartments. Each compartment
maintains the cg limits. Locate baggage as near the center of
has an access door (forward, left side, aft, right side), a shelf the shelf as possible. Care should be taken to ensure that
and abaggage tiedown harness. The tiedown harness consists
straps are tight to preclude any significant shift of cargo.
Figure 2137.CNU−188/A External Baggage Container
ORIGINAL 2−284
CHAPTER 3
Servicing and Handling
3.1 SERVICING DATA refueling is controlled by two precheck selector valves and
the vent pressure gauge adjacent to the refuel receptacle on
The following servicing data is for use by the flight the ground refuel and defuel panel. Positioning of these
crew and maintenance crews who are unfamiliar with servic valves can be used for selective ground refueling of either the
ing the aircraft (Figure 31). When operating in and out of fuselage or wing and drop tanks. The direct reading vent
military airfields, consult the current DOD IFR Supplement pressure gauge indicates pressure in the system vent lines.
for compatible servicing units, fuel, etc. Figure 32 provides When aircraft fuel tanks are full, fueling stops automatically.
a tabulation of servicing data and power units required to For hot refueling procedures, refer to paragraph 7.6. For
support the aircraft. defueling procedures, refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−2−1.
3.1.1 Ground Refueling The maximum refueling rate is approximately

500gpm at a pressure of 50 psi. Nominal and minimum
Single−point refueling is provided for pressure filling pressure is approximately 15 psi; maximum pressure is
of all aircraft fuel tanks through a standard refueling recep 50psi.
tacle on the lower right side of the forward fuselage. Ground
Figure 31.Aircraft Servicing Locations
3−1 ORIGINAL
DOD IFR
DESIGNATION NATO COMMERCIAL SUPPLEMENT
ITEM SPECIFICATION CODE EQUIVALENT CODE REMARKS
FUEL MIL−T−5624 (JP−5) F−44 Jet A JP−5 Selector (main engine

MIL T 5624 (JP
MIL−T−5624 4)
(JP−4) F 40
F−40 Jet B JP 4
JP−4 control) on both engines
MIL−T−83133 (JP−8) F−34 Jet A−1 JP−8 should be set for
type fuel in use.
(JP−8 is equivalent
JP 5 )
to JP−5.)
Engine oil MIL−L−23699 0−156 None 0−156 Use MIL−L−7808 when

MIL−L−7808 0−148 None 0−148 ground temperature
g p is
−40_F
40_F ((−40_C).
40_C)
Integrated Drive MIL−L−23699 0−156 None 0−156 Use MIL−L−7808 when

Generator ((IDG)) MIL−L−7808 0−148 None 0−148 ground temperature
g p is
Transmission
T i i oilil −40_F
40_F ((−40_C).
40_C)
Hydraulic fluid MIL−H−83282 None None None
Oxygen MIL−O−27210 Type I None None HPOX LPOX Survival kit shall be
(Gaseous) removed from aircraft
for servicing emergency
oxygen bottle.
bottle
Nitrogen BB−N−411 None None None Use clean, oil−free

((Type
yp I, Grade A)) filtered dryy air,
if nitrogen
it g iis nott
available.
il bl
Liquid Coolant Coolant 25, 25R None NA None Either coolant may be
(Monsanto mixed without adverse
Ch i l Co)
Chemical C ) reaction.
ti
Chevron Flo−Cool None NA None

180 (Chevron
Chemical Co)
Wipe On Rain MIL−W−6882 None None None Clean and dry

Repellant Fluid windshield Apply with
windshield.
cloth using overlapping
wipes.
ip Aft
After 1
1−minute
i t
d yi g, wipe
drying, ip clean
l with
ith
soft
f cloth.
Figure 32.Aircraft Servicing Data (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 3−2
POWER
PNEUMATIC ELECTRICAL AIR
STARTING POWER CONDITIONING HYDRAULIC
Acceptable USN ASHORE: NC8A NR 5C (Electrical) AHT−63/64
Units NCPP−105 MD−3 NR 8 (Diesel) TTU–228/E (AHT–73)
RCPT−105 MD−3A MA−1 MJ−3
A/M47A−4 MD−3M MA−1A
MA−3MPSU A/M32C−5
AFLOAT: A/M32A−60 A/M32C−6
A/S47A−1 A/M32A−60A
Ground Support 200 lb/min at 75 ± 3psi 115 ± 20 V ac, 70 lb/min at 3 psi 50 gal/min maximum
Equipment (STD. DAY) 400 ± 25 Hz, and 60_F at 3,000 psi
Requirements 60 kVA, 3 phase
rotation
PNEUMATIC PRESSURE TIRES
SYSTEM PRESSURE TYPE OPERATION PRESSURE
Emergency Landing Gear 3,000 psi at

70_F Nose (2) Ashore 105 psi
22 × 6.6−10
Combined Hydraulic 1,800 psi at
70_F 20 Ply Afloat 350 psi
Flight Hydraulic 1,800 psi at

70_F Main (2) Ashore 245 psi
37 × 11.50−16
Canopy Normal 3,000 psi at
(1,200 psi Minimum) 70_F 28 Ply Afloat 350 psi
Canopy Auxiliary 3,000 psi at

(800 psi Minimum) 70_F
Note
Wheel brake accumulators (2) 1,900 psi at 70_F
Dry nitrogen, specification BB−N−411, Type 1,
Arresting Hook Dashpot 800 ± 10 psi Grade A is preferred for tire inflation and charg
ing pneumatic systems since it is inert, and there
Main Gear Shock Struts (2) 980 psi fore will not support combustion.
Nose Gear Shock Strut 1,300 psi
Figure 3−2. Aircraft Servicing Data (Sheet 2 of 2)
3−3 ORIGINAL
Ensure that both the fueling unit and the aircraft

D Lubricating oil (MIL−L−23699) is toxic and
are properly grounded, bonding cable is con
flammable. Protection includes chemical
nected between aircraft and refueling source, and
splashproof goggles, gloves, and good ven
that fire extinguishing equipment is readily
tilation; keep sparks, flames, and heat away.
available.
Keep lubricating oil off skin, eyes, and
clothes; do not breathe vapors. Wash hands
thoroughly after handling.
D Do not overservice oil storage tank. Over
servicing can cause scavenge pump failure
During ground refueling operations, the direct− and subsequent engine failure.
reading vent pressure indicator shall be observed
and refueling stopped if pressure indication is in Note
the red band (above 4 psi).
Engine oil level should be checked within
Note 30minutes of engine shutdown, otherwise run
D If the aircraft is being regularly serviced with engine at 80 percent or greater for 10 minutes to
JP−4 type fuel, the main fuel−control, fuel− ensure proper servicing.
grade (specific gravity adjustment) selector
on each engine should be reset to the JP−4 3.1.3 Integrated Drive Generator Oil
position. If the aircraft is being regularly ser
viced with JP−8 or JP−5 fuel, the fuel−control, The IDG has a filter bypass indicator at the bottom of
fuel−grade (specific gravity adjustment) the filter bowl (Figure 33, sheet 2). Extension of the indica
selector on each engine should be reset to the tor indicates contamination of the filter and the need for filter
JP−8 or JP−5 position. Satisfactory engine per element replacement. Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−2−1 for
formance depends upon trimming of the IDG oil filter replacement and servicing.
engine fuel controls to ensure rated thrust to
prevent exceeding engine temperature limits, IDG oil level is checked at the IDG mounted on the
and to ensure airflow compatibility with the forward right side of the forward accessory gearbox of each
air inlet duct opening. engine. It is serviced at the pressure fill port on the right side.
D Removal of JP−8 type fuel from the aircraft is 3.1.4 Hydraulic Systems
not required before refueling with JP−5. If
removal of JP−8 from the aircraft aboard ship
The main hydraulic systems are serviced at the flight
is necessary, it shall not be defueled into the
and combined hydraulic system ground servicing panels. A
storage tanks containing JP−5.
hydraulic pressure filling cart is required to service the sys
3.1.2 Engine Oil tems with fluid, and an air−nitrogen cart is required to preload
the reservoirs. The outboard spoiler backup module is ser
viced at the servicing panel on the outboard nacelle of the
Engine oil level is proper when overflow oil starts to
port engine. Additional hydraulic servicing is required at the
exit the discharge port during servicing. For normal servic
main landing gear shock strut (Figure 33, sheet 2), the nose
ing, the sight gauge on the oil storage tank is the primary
wheel shock strut (Figure 33, sheet 2), and the arresting
indicator determining when servicing is required. During
hook dashpot (Figure 33, sheet 1).
servicing, overflow oil exits the overflow discharge port
when the tank is properly serviced (Figure 33, sheet 2).
The flight reservoir fill and ground hydraulic power
Servicing is accomplished using PON−6 servicing cart.
access panel and the flight system filter module (Figure 33,
Normal oil consumption is 0.03 gallon per hour with the
sheet 1) are on the starboard side. The combined hydraulic
maximum being 0.1gallon per hour. For oil servicing pro
system reservoir fill and filter module (Figure 33, sheet 3)
cedures,refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−2−1. The protrusion
are on the port side of the aircraft. Indication of hydraulic
of a bypass indicator underneath the oil scavenge pump indi
system fluid contamination can be detected by the position
cates a clogged filter element and requires replacement.
of the buttons on the Delta−P type filter units.
ORIGINAL 3−4
Figure 33.Aircraft Servicing (Sheet 1 of 3)
3−5 ORIGINAL
Figure 3−3. Aircraft Servicing (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 3−6
Figure 3−3. Aircraft Servicing (Sheet 3 of 3)
3−7 ORIGINAL
Temperature recording gauges at the filter modules D Suction at the air intake is strong enough to
indicate the maximum temperature attained by the hydraulic kill or seriously injure personnel by drawing
fluid during the last turnup or flight. After a reading has been them into or against the inlet.
taken, the temperature gauges must be reset prior to the next
D All personnel in the immediate area shall
turnup.
wearear protection whenever an engine is
operating.
3.1.5 Pneumatic Systems
Note
The pneumatic power supply systems, which provide
for normal operation of the canopy and for emergency exten D If engines are run up in front of a blast deflec
sion of the landing gear, are ground charged through a com tor, exhaust jet wake is deflected up and to the
mon filler in the nose wheelwell (Figure 33, sheet 3). The sides resulting in distortion of the patterns
auxiliary canopy open pneumatic bottle is in the turtleback shown.
behind the cockpit (Figure 33, sheet 1). Additional pneu
matic servicing points are at both hydraulic systems servicing D At maximum afterburner power, nozzles are
panels, brake systems, and arresting hook. nearly fully open; at military power, the
nozzles are nearly fully closed.
Individual pneumatic servicing point and pressure
gauges are provided for the auxiliary and parking brake 3.2.2 Radar Radiation Areas
systems.
Note The following paragraphs describe the hazards to per
sonnel, hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance
Dry nitrogen, specification BB−N−411, Type 1, (HERO), and fuel ignition hazards generated during AN/
Grade A, is preferred for tire inflation and for APG−71 radar operation.
charging pneumatic systems since it will not sup
port combustion.
3.1.6 Backup Oxygen Supply

The backup gaseous oxygen supply is serviced to a Illumination of RDR ENABLE caution light on
maximum of 2,100 psi from an access in the forward right RIO CAUTION ADVISORY panel indicates
side of the fuselage. Servicing pressure can be observed on possible radar radiation on deck.
a gauge in the pilot’s cockpit.
3.2.2.1 Hazards to Personnel
3.2 GROUND HANDLING
Minimum safe distances for personnel from ground
3.2.1 Danger Areas operating radar are indicated in Figure 35, sheets 1 and 2.
When the planar array radar antenna is not radiating, mini
Engine exhaust and intake danger areas are shown in mum safe distance from other radiating antennas is 6feet.
Figure 34. Noise danger areas are shown in Figure 36.
(Figure 34 shows temperature distribution with afterburners 3.2.2.2 HERO Condition
at maximum nozzle opening for idle, military, and maximum
power.) Figure 34 shows exhaust jet wake velocity distribu HERO conditions exist when ordnance or weapons
tion with afterburner at maximum nozzle opening for idle, containing electroexplosive devices (EED) are present. Haz
military, and maximum power. ard to personnel and equipment is greater because of the
lower power density level at which EED react to radio fre
quency radiation. The requirement to maintain a minimum
safe distance from ground operating radar causes the RF
radiation hazard area to increase in size, thereby overlapping
into previously safe areas for personnel. During HERO con
ditions, minimum safe distances (personnel) from ground
D The high temperature and velocity of the
operating radar (Figure 35, sheets 1 and 2) shall not be con
engine exhaust is extremely dangerous.
sidered safe. Minimum safe distances during HERO condi
Stayoutside engine exhaust area included tions are shown in Figure 35, sheets 3 and 4.
within a 90_ cone extending 900 feet behind
the aircraft.
ORIGINAL 3−8
Figure 34.Runup Danger Areas  Exhaust Jet Wake Velocity and Temperature
3−9 ORIGINAL
Figure 35.Radar Radiation Hazard Areas (Sheet 1 of 4)
ORIGINAL 3−10
Figure 3−5. Radar Radiation Hazard Areas (Sheet 2 of 4)
3−11 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 3−12
3−13 ORIGINAL
Figure 36.Noise Danger Areas
ORIGINAL 3−14
HERO unsafe ordnance conditions include assembly/ 3.2.2.4 Transmission Aboard Carrier
disassembly of ordnance systems, tests involving electrical
connections to the ordnance, such as primer resistance check, Radar transmission aboard carrier shall be limited to
continuity checks, bare squibs, primers, blasting caps, and over−the−side operation at the discretion of the commander.
other EED having exposed wire leads and unshielded The aircraft shall be spotted so the nose radome overhangs
ordnance subassemblies such as rocket motors, warheads, the side of the carrier. All necessary safety precautions shall
and exercise heads. be enforced to prevent injury to personnel and damage to
equipment aboard the carrier and on adjacent ships that may
HERO susceptible ordnance systems are any ordnance accidentally stray into the main beam of the radar.
systems proven (by tests) to contain EED that can be
adversely affected by RF energy to the point that the safety 3.2.3 Towing Turn Radii and Ground Clearances
and/or reliability of the system is in jeopardy when the
system is employed in expected RF environments. Some Forward and rearward towing (Figure 37 and
systems are susceptible to the RF environment for only a Figure 38) can be accomplished with a standard tow bar
small part of the stockpile−to−launch sequence. For example, (NT−4 aircraft universal tow bar) and the tow tractor. The
the connection of an umbilical cable in the loading procedure pilot cockpit shallbe manned with qualified personnel dur
may be the only time the system is considered susceptible. At ing towing operations.
all other times in the system’s life, it may be considered
HERO safe ordnance. HERO safe ordnance are any ordnance
sufficiently shielded or protected that all EED contained by
the item are immune to adverse effects that degrade safety or
reliability when employed in its expected RF environment
(provided that general HERO requirements have been com
Before and during towing, ensure that the
plied with). needle(s) in the AUX/PARK brake pressure
gauge(s) remains in the green band to ensure suf
3.2.2.3 Fuel Ignition Hazard ficient pressure to lock the wheels.
When performing fueling or defueling operations, use 3.2.4 Tiedown Points
minimum safe distances outside of radiation hazard areas.
Fuel ignition hazard occurs within 90 feet of the aircraft
Aircraft tiedown points are illustrated in Figure 39.
where RF radiation induced sparks could ignite flammable
When mooring a parked aircraft, do not depend upon chocks
vapors of fuels. Fuel ignition hazard is based on 5W/cm2 alone to hold the aircraft in position. Tiedowns shall be
peak power density. installed in a symmetrical pattern being careful not to chafe
against the aircraft structure.
Good housekeeping operations are of utmost impor
tance in areas where radar transmission is anticipated. RF The normal six−point tiedown (Figure 39, sheet 1)
radiation may cause steelwool to be set afire or metallic chips locations permit all maintenance servicing, including engine
to produce sparks, which in turn may ignite spilled fuels or
removal, jacking, and weapons loading. Standard chain−type
oils around aircraft and buildings. Keep all areas clean and
tiedowns are used for an 18−point symmetrical tiedown dur
refuse in approved containers. ing heavy weather (Figure 39, sheet 2).
3−15 ORIGINAL
Figure 37.Towing Turn Radii
ORIGINAL 3−16
Figure 38.Towing
3−17 ORIGINAL
Figure 39.Tiedown Arrangement (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 3−18
Figure 3−9. Tiedown Arrangement (Sheet 2 of 2)
3−19 (Reverse
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
CHAPTER 4
Operating Limitations
4.1 LIMITATIONS 2. Maximum canopy open speed ¾ 60 knots.
This section includes the aircraft and engine limita-

tions that must be observed during normal operations. The
aerodynamic and structural limitations in this section apply
only to F-14D aircraft for the store station configurations
shown in Figure 4-1. Engine limitations apply to all aircraft Use of antiskid must be in accordance with the
with the F110-GE-400 engine. following procedures:
D Select antiskid while stopped on the runway
4.1.1 Engine Limits in the takeoff position; after landing, turn
antiskid off once slowed below 15 knots
Engine instrument markings for various operation lim- prior to clearing the runway.
itations are shown in Figure 4-2. Engine operating limita-
tions are shown in Figure 4-3. D Use only during landing or aborted takeoff.
D Do not use antiskid while taxiing.
The engine secondary (SEC) mode may be intention-
ally selected in flight only under the following conditions: 4.1.6 Ejection Seat Operation Limits
1. Engine operating between 85-percent rpm and mili-
See ejection envelope curves, Chapter 16, Figure 16-1.
tary power.
2. Airspeed less than 1.0 IMN. 1. Maximum speed (seat) ¾ 600 knots.
4.1.2 Starter Limits
The starter cranking limits are as follows:
1. Cross bleed ¾ 2 minutes. Ejection above 350 knots is hazardous, the deci-
sion to exceed 350 knots rests with the aircrew.
2. Start cart ¾ 5 minutes.
4.1.7 Autopilot Limits
When the time limit is reached, 10 minutes cooling is
required between cranking. Autopilot should not be used under the following
conditions:
4.1.3 Airstart Envelope
1. Airspeeds greater than 400 KCAS/0.9 IMN.
The engine spooldown and windmill airstart envelopes 2. Altitude above 42,500 feet.
are shown in Chapter 14, Figure 14-3.
4.2 AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS
4.1.4 Crosswind Limits
The limits and restrictions in this part represent the
Crosswind takeoffs and landings are permitted with a maximum capability of the aircraft commensurate with safe
crosswind component not to exceed 20 knots at 90°. operations. Aerodynamic and structural excesses of these
limits shall be entered on the maintenance action form for
4.1.5 Ground Operations Limits appropriate maintenance action.
1. Maximum tire speed ¾ 190 knots.
4-1 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
STORE AIRCRAFT STORE STATION

CONFIGURATION 1A 1B 2 3, 4, 5, & 6 7 8B 8A
1A(*) − − − − − − −
1B1 AIM−9 AIM−9 − − − AIM−9 AIM−9
1B2 AIM−9 − − − − − AIM−9
1C − − TANK − TANK − −
2A(*) − − − 4 AIM−7 − − −
2B1 AIM−9 AIM−9 − 4 AIM−7 − AIM−9 AIM−9
2B2 AIM−9 − − 4 AIM−7 − − AIM−9
2B4 − AIM−7 − 4 AIM−7 − AIM−7 −
2C(*) − − TANK 4 AIM−7 TANK − −
2C1 AIM−9 AIM−9 TANK 4 AIM−7 TANK AIM−9 AIM−9
2C2 AIM−9 − TANK 4 AIM−7 TANK − AIM−9
2C4 − AIM−7 TANK 4 AIM−7 TANK AIM−7 −
3A(*) − − − 4 AIM−54 − − −
3B2 AIM−9 − − 4 AIM−54 − − AIM−9
3B4 − AIM−7 − 4 AIM−54 − AIM−7 −
3B6 − AIM−54 − 4 AIM−54 − AIM−54 −
3C(*) − − TANK 4 AIM−54 TANK − −
3C2 AIM−9 − TANK 4 AIM−54 TANK − AIM−9
D (*) These store configuration limits also apply when multipurpose stub pylons are carried at stations 1 and 8.
D Flight operating limitations applicable to the above configurations are also applicable to down loadings, except down load of external
tank to MXU−776/777 which shall be considered as a clean store station for limitation purposes.
D For captive carriage of inert or live AIM−54, installation of ejector cartridges in LAU−132 is mandatory in order to provide jettison
capability.
D For captive carriage of inert or live AIM−7, installation of ejector cartridges in LAU−92 is mandatory in order to provide jettison
capability. Thisdoes not apply to CATM−7F−2 missiles used for ballast (refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−75 Weapon Stores Loading
Manual).
D For shore−based operations all CATM−7F−1 (Sparrow training rounds) shall be configured with a modified shear wafer to preclude
inadvertent activation of the guidance and control unit, and subsequent ejection of the missile.
D Simultaneous loading of AIM−7 on store station 4 and AIM−54 on store stations 3 and 6 is an authorized configuration. Limitations of
fuselage AIM−54 apply for carriage, individual missile limitations apply for launch/jettison.
D AIM−9 configurations include both LAU−7 and LAU−138 carriage.
D In all cases the center of gravity position must remain within limits. The aft limit can be easily exceeded
if stations 3 and 6 are not loaded.
D With MA ARM ON and all conditions satisfied for AIM−54 launch, an ATM−54 (training round) will be
ejected if the trigger or launch button is depressed.
D With MA ARM ON and all other conditions satisfied for AIM−7 launch, a CATM−7F−1 (Sparrow training
round) will be ejected when the trigger or launch button is pressed unless a modified shear wafer is
installed. Emergency/selective jettison of a CATM−7F−1 is still possible with a modified shear wafer
installed.
Figure 41.Store Station Configuration
ORIGINAL 4−2
Figure 42.Instrument Markings
4−3 ORIGINAL
F110−GE−400
OIL: MIL−L−23699 OR MIL−L−7808

FUEL: MIL−J−5624 (JP−5)(JP−4, JP−8 ALTERNATES)
OPERATING CONDITIONS OPERATING LIMITS

MAXIMUM MEASURED NORMAL OIL PRESSURE
THRUST SETTING
EXHAUST GAS TEMP (_C) (PSIG)
MAXIMUM 935 25 TO 65
(AFTERBURNING)
MILITARY 935 25 TO 65
IDLE STABILIZED 935 15 TO 45
STARTING 890 
(GROUND) 890 
(AIRSTART)
NOTE
D OIL PRESSURE WILL INCREASE PROPORTIONATELY WITH RPM.
D UNDER COLD CONDITIONS, OIL PRESSURE MAY EXCEED 65 PSI FOR
1 MINUTE.
RPM LIMITS
ANY EXCEEDED LIMIT SHOULD BE REPORTED AS A DISCREPANCY

AND MAXIMUM RPM, EGT, AND TIME NOTED.
OPERATING CONDITIONS OPERATING LIMITS
STEADY STATE OR TRANSIENT 107.7% RPM
Figure 43.Engine Operating Limits
ORIGINAL 4−4
4.2.1 Maximum Airspeeds 4.2.1.3 In−Flight Refueling
Maximum speeds are presented in calibrated knots and 1. Refueling probe  400 KCAS/0.8 TMN.
true Mach number. These values are derived from the posi
tion error−correction curves of the production pitot−static− 2. In−flight refueling (cruise configuration)  200 to
operated airspeed and altitude system. AOA is presented 300 KCAS/0.8 TMN.
utilizing the conventional indicated units AOA while sideslip
3. In−flight refueling (approach configuration)  170
angle limits are presented in terms of degrees of rudder
to 200 KCAS.
deflection.
4.3 ACCELERATION LIMITS
Note
Note
Unless otherwise specified, the limits presented
herein pertain to flight with the stability D Limits are based on a gross weight of 49,548
augmentation system on. pounds. See Figure 45 for the variation of
maximum load factor with gross weights
4.2.1.1 Cruise Configuration greater than 49,548 pounds.
D Coordinated turns with small rudder and lat
With wing sweep in the MANUAL or AUTO mode, the
eral stick inputs are defined as symmetrical
maximum allowable airspeeds are shown in Figure 44.
flight.
In emergency wing−sweep mode, the following com
4.3.1 Cruise Configuration
bination of Mach and wing−sweep schedule must be used:
See Figure 45 and Figure 48.
1. ≤ 0.4 TMN  20°.
2. ≤ 0.7 TMN  25°. 4.3.2 Approach Configuration

1. Landing gear and/or landing flaps and slats
3. ≤ 0.8 TMN  50°. extended  0 to 2.0g (symmetrical or rolling).
4. ≤ 0.9 TMN  60°.
4.4 ANGLE−OF−ATTACK LIMITS
5. > 0.9 TMN  68_.
4.4.1 Cruise Configuration
4.2.1.2 Approach Configuration
AOA is limited by the maximum allowable load factor
1. Landing gear  280 KCAS. of Figure 45. For wing sweep not in AUTO, AOA limits of
Figure 47 still apply. Since ROLL SAS now increases depar
2. Landing flaps and slats  225 KCAS. ture resistance at higher AOA, it should be left on for all flight
conditions. With operating ARI, subsonic pilot control inputs
with landing gear retracted are not limited by AOA or side
slip and therefore Figure 48 applies only with ROLL SAS
OFF or a Degraded DFCS condition.
D With the landing gear extended or in transit,

abrupt rolls or uncoordinated turns above 225
KCAS can cause structural failure of the land
ing gear doors. D Aircraft has significantly improved roll rate
capability with ROLL SAS ON, which
D After takeoff, move the FLAP handle to the increases susceptibility to inertia coupled
UP position passing 180 KCAS to ensure flap departures due to overly aggressive multi−axis
and slat airspeed limits are not exceeded. control inputs.
D With ROLL SAS ON, departure resistance is
increased because of DFCS ARI functionality
and therefore should remain on at all times.
4−5 ORIGINAL
Figure 44.Maximum Allowable Airspeeds (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 4−6
Figure 4−4. Maximum Allowable Airspeeds (Sheet 2 of 3)
4−7 ORIGINAL
Figure 4−4. Maximum Allowable Airspeeds (Sheet 3 of 3)
ORIGINAL 4−8
Figure 45.Variation of Maximum Allowable Normal Load Factor With Gross Weight
4−9 ORIGINAL
4.4.2 Approach Configuration D If outboard spoilers fail with airspeed greater

than 400 KCAS and wing sweep less than 62°,
Maximum allowable AOA and rudder deflection with limit lateral stick deflection to one−half pilot
landing gear and flaps extended is shown in Figure 46. authority.
4.5 MANEUVERING LIMITS Note

AOA limitations shown in Figure 47 apply to
4.5.1 Approach Configuration
designated configurations (wing sweep not in
AUTO, pylon mounted AIM−54).
With landing gear and/or landing flaps and slats
extended, abrupt yaws are prohibited. Refer to Figure 46 for
4.5.4 Sideslip Limits
approach configuration sideslip limits.
4.5.4.1 All External Store Configurations
With landing gear extended or in transit, abrupt
rolls and uncoordinated turns shall not be performed above
1. Below 0.7 TMN  Rudder inputs as required to
225 KCAS.
maneuver aircraft at high AOA.
4.5.2 Cruise Configuration 2. Above 1.7 TMN  Intentional sideslips prohibited.
With maneuver slats/flaps extended, maximum allow

able load factor is 6.5g or the limits of Figure 45, whichever
is less. No additional g and/or AOA limits are placed on
ROLL SAS ON maneuvering, or cross control inputs.
If a supersonic engine stall and/or failure occurs,
arrest roll rate with lateral stick only. Yaw SAS
will maintain sideslip angle within acceptable
limits.
Maneuvering with YAW SAS OFF or inoperative Note

shall not be conducted above 15 units AOA with
landing gear retracted. Use of full available rudder is permitted at all
airspeeds if required to counteract adverse yaw
Since inoperative auto−maneuvering devices may encountered in maneuvering flight.
signal improper operation of DFCS primary AOA input,
uncoordinated lateral control inputs shall not be used in the 4.5.5 Prohibited Maneuvers
area of the flight envelope indicated in Figure 48 when auto−
maneuvering flaps/slats are not operating. The following additional maneuvers are prohibited:
4.5.3 Rolling Limits 1. Intentional spins.
With maneuver slats and flaps extended, maximum 2. During afterburner operations:
allowable load factor is 5.2g or the limits of Figure 49
e. Sustained 0 to −0.5g flight.
whichever is less. Rolling limits are shown in Figure 49.
f. Flight from −0.5g to −2.4g’s for more than
10 seconds.
3. At MIL power or less: zero or negative−g flight for

more than 20 seconds.
D Do not initiate full lateral stick inputs above
4.5g if a 5.2g limit applies or above 3.5g if a
4.0g limit applies. Control system dynamics
may cause load factor to increase beyond
limits.
ORIGINAL 4−10
Figure 46.Maximum Allowable Angle of Attack Rudder Deflections
4−11 ORIGINAL
Figure 47.Angle−of−Attack Limits
ORIGINAL 4−12
Figure 48.Maneuvering Limits  Cruise Configuration (Roll SAS Off or Degraded DFCS)
4. AIM−9 launch with landing flaps and slats extended. 4.7 TAKEOFF AND LANDING FLAP AND SLAT
AND TRANSITION LIMITS
5. Fuel dumping with afterburner operating or with
speedbrakes extended.
4.7.1 Clean and Symmetric Stores Loading
6. Dual−engine afterburner takeoffs, waveoffs, bolters,
or catapult launches. See Figure 410.
7. Use of maximum AB in event of engine failure dur 1. All transitions will be made in less than 45° bank
ing takeoff, catapult launch, waveoff or bolter. angle, ROLL SAS ON.
8. Rolling maneuvers with AOB change greater than 2. All normal (flaps and slats fully down) takeoff
360° are prohibited. transitions will be initiated at a minimum altitude of
200 feet AGL.
4.6 SAS LIMITS
3. All other transitions will be made at standard field
FCS CAUTION . . . . . Airspeed < 600 kts/1.3TMN operating altitudes, but no less than 800 feet AGL.
> 0.5TMN/10 units AOA
4. All flap and slat extensions and retractions will be
− No cross controls
made at a maximum of 12 units AOA.
> 0.6TMN/15 units AOA
− Coordinate all lateral stick
PITCH SAS . . . . . . . . No Limitations
ROLL DGR/YAW DGR
and/or ARI DGR . . . . Airspeed <1.0TMN
ARI/SAS OUT . . . . . . Airspeed <1.0TMN
− AOA: max 15 units
− No aggressive maneuvering
4−13 ORIGINAL
Figure 49.Maneuvering Limits Rolling (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 4−14
Figure 4−9. Maneuvering Limits  Rolling (Sheet 2 of 3)
4−15 ORIGINAL
Figure 4−9. Maneuvering Limits  Rolling (Sheet 3 of 3)
ORIGINAL 4−16
STORE FLAP LIMITATIONS (INCH−POUNDS)

ORDNANCE/STATION 1A 1B 3 6 8B 8A 2 7
SIDEWINDER 27,220 24,820 − − 24,820 27,220 − −
SPARROW − 63,000 10,500 10,500 63,000 − − −
PHOENIX − 126,000 15,000 15,000 126,000 − − −
TANKS (EMPTY) − − − − − − 14,260 14,260
TANKS (FULL) − − − − − − 126,852 126,852
WING FUEL WINGS 20° ONE WING FULL, OTHER EMPTY 431,405
Note
Do not attempt shipboard landing with inoperative ROLL SAS and greater than
170,000 in−lbs asymmetry unless divert field unavailable.
FLAP TRANSITIONS:
UP TO 66,000 IN−LBS GREATER THAN 66,000 IN−LBS

CLEAN OR SYMMETRICAL
ASYMMETRY ASYMMETRY
1. Less than 45° angle of bank 1. Wings level 1. Wings level

2. ROLL SAS ON 2. ROLL SAS ON 2. ROLL SAS ON
3. Minimum 200 feet AGL on 3. Minimum 200 feet AGL 3. Minimum altitude of 1,200 feet AGL for
takeoff takeoff and landing
4. Dirty−up altitude minimum 4. Dirty−up at minimum 4. Minimum 180 knots.
800 feet AGL 800 feet AGL
5. Minimum 180 knots 5. Minimum 180 knots
Available roll control will be marginal

to inadequate in event of asymmetric
flap/slats without lockout.
Note
Incompatibility of flap transition limit
with existing Case I procedures rec
ognized. Although improvement of
flap/slat system reliability has been
accomplished, not enough data is
available concerning failure mode/
rate of improved asymmetry sensor.
Minimum flap transition altitude may
be waived in cases of operational
necessity.
Figure 410.Flap Limitations
4−17 ORIGINAL
4.7.2 External Stores Loading With Up to 4. Only normal minimum descent rate landings are
66,000 Inch−Pounds (5,500 Foot−Pounds) permitted while carrying AIM−7E/F and/or AIM−9
Asymmetry (AIM−7 on Stations 1B or 8B on the multipurpose pylon, or AIM−7E/F missiles on
equals 63,000 inch−pounds) fuselage stations until the following AAC are incor
porated:
1. All transitions will be made in wings−level flight
with ROLL SAS ON. a. AAC 618  Modifies multipurpose pylon.
2. All normal (flaps and slats fully down) takeoff tran b. AAC 673  Modifies fuselage backup structure.
sitions will be initiated at a minimum altitude of 200
feet AGL. c. AAC 688  Modifies pylon−mounted sway
braces.
3. All flap and slat extensions and retractions will be
made at a maximum of 12 units AOA. 4.9 BARRICADE ENGAGEMENT LIMITS
4.7.3 External Stores Loading With Greater 1. Wings at full forward sweep angle (20°)  51,800
Than 66,000 Inch−Pounds (5,500 pounds (maximum).
Foot−Pounds) Asymmetry
a. Flaps and slats extended or retracted.
1. All transitions will be made in wings−level flight
b. No external stores except AIM−7 or AIM−54 on
with ROLL SAS ON at a minimum altitude of 1,200
fuselage stations only.
feet and at a maximum of 12 units AOA.
c. Empty external fuel tanks permitted only for
4.8 GROSS WEIGHT LIMITS TAKEOFF, landing gear malfunction.
LAUNCH, AND LANDING
2. Wing−sweep angle greater than 20° up to 35_ 
1. Catapult launch  76,000 pounds. 46,000 pounds (maximum).
a. Flaps and slats extended or retracted.
b. No external stores, except empty external fuel

tanks for landing gear malfunction.
Single−engine rate of climb at 76,000−pound
gross weight using optimum flight control 3. Wing−sweep angle greater than 35°  Not per
technique is predicted to be between 300 and 600 mitted.
fpm. Emergency jettison of stores may be
required to establish adequate rate of climb. 4.10 CENTER OF GRAVITY POSITION LIMITS
1. Field takeoff and emergency landing (minimum rate Unless otherwise stated, the following cg limits apply:
of descent only)  72,000 pounds.
2. Field landings  60,000 pounds.

MAXIMUM MAXIMUM
STORE CONFIGURATIONS FORWARD AFT
3. Carrier landings  54,000 pounds
Field carrier landing practice  54,000 pounds. 1A, 2A 6.3% MAC 18.5% MAC
Note 1B1, 1B2, 1C, TARPS, 6.3% MAC 17.5% MAC

2B1−4, 2C, 2C1−4
Landing approaches to touchdown should not
All other 6.3% MAC 17.0% MAC
exceed 17 units AOA to avoid nozzle/ventral fin
configurations
damage.
ORIGINAL 4−18
Throughout these flight operating limits, all cg posi 4.11.2 External Baggage Container (CNU−188/A)
tions are quoted at the following reference conditions:
The external baggage container (blivet) may be carried
1. Zero fuel gross weight (includes weight of stores on station 4 or 5 with all loadings authorized for the TARPS
carried on flight). pod. Simultaneous carriage of a blivet and a TARPS pod or
two blivets is not authorized. The blivet must be configured
2. Wing−sweep angle equals 20°. with a long tail cone and no fins.
3. Landing gear and flaps extended. 1. Maximum airspeed  520 KCAS/0.90 TMN.
2. Acceleration limit  LBA.

WARNING
3. AOA limit  Figure 47.
The aft cg limit will be exceeded if all stations are 4. Jettison  Not authorized.
configured for AIM−54 missiles or MK 83/84
bombs and only stations 4 and 5 are loaded or 5. Carrier operations  Authorized.
remain as a result of firing, dropping, or jettison
of stations 1, 3, 6, and 8. If the aft cg limit is 6. Maximum load:
exceeded, airspeed/AOA control may be diffi
200 pounds maximum  forward shelf
cult. Fuel states of 5,000 to 6,000 pounds result
150 pounds maximum  aft shelf
in the most favorable cg position. Slightly aft
350 pounds total.
wing−sweep positions of 25_to 30_ will move the
neutral point aft and should restore normal
4.11.3 Gun Burst Limits
longitudinal stability.
1. Burst limit  200 rounds.
4.11 EXTERNAL STORES AND GUN LIMITS
If two consecutive 200−round bursts are fired, a
4.11.1 280−Gallon External Fuel Tank Limits 30−second cooldown period is required.
1. Catapult launch with a partially filled external
4.11.4 Launch Limits
tank is not authorized because of surge load
considerations.
Maximum flight conditions for launch of external
2. Carriage of external tanks not incorporating AYC stores are listed in the following paragraphs.
598 is limited to 300 KCAS/0.72 TMN.
4.11.4.1 AIM−7F/M
Note
Missiles with K−9 autopilot are identified by a
CV arrestment, CV touch and go, or normal field segmented black line under the missile serial
number or letters POP" after the serial number.
landings with full or partial fuel in the external
1. Stations 1B and 8B  Vmin to 1.3 TMN, all alti
nacelle backup structure. Only minimum descent
tudes, +1g to limits of basic aircraft for non−zero
rate landings are authorized.
bank angles and limits of basic aircraft for zero bank
angle.
2. Stations 3 and 6  Vmin to Vmax for 0g to +2g, Vmin

to 1.4 TMN for +2g to +4g, and Vmin to 1.2 TMN
greater than +4g, all altitudes, +1g to limits of basic
Dive angles in excess of 10_ nose down with aircraft for non−zero bank angles and 0g to limits of
900 pounds or more fuel in an external tank will basic aircraft for zero bank angle.
result in fuel venting (dumping).
4−19 ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
3. Station 4 ¾ Vmin to 0.9 TMN for less than 15,000 4.11.5.1 AIM-7F/M
feet MSL for 0g to +1g, Vmin to Vmax greater than
15,000 feet MSL for 0g to +1g, and Vmin to Vmax 1. Stations 1 and 8 ¾ Vmin to Vmax, all altitudes, +1g
greater than +1g, all altitudes, +1g to limits of basic to limits of basic aircraft for non-zero bank angles
aircraft for non-zero bank angles, and 0g to limits of and 0g to limits of basic aircraft for zero bank angle.
basic aircraft for zero bank angle.
2. Stations 3 and 6 ¾ Vmin to 350 KCAS, all altitudes,
4. Station 5 ¾ Vmin to 650 KCAS less than 30,000 feet +1g for straight and level flight.
MSL for 0g to +1g, Vmin to Vmax greater than 30,000
feet MSL for 0g to +1g, and Vmin to Vmax greater 3. Stations 4 and 5 ¾ Vmin to 400 KCAS, all altitudes,
than +1g, all altitudes, +1g to limits of basic for non- +1g for straight and level flight.
zero bank angles, and 0g to limits of basic aircraft
for zero bank angle.
4.11.4.2 AIM-9L/M
1. All stations ¾ Vmin to Vmax, all altitudes, -1.0g to AIM-7 on stations 3 and 6 exhibit pronounced
limits of basic aircraft. outboard movement when jettisoned.
4.11.5.2 AIM-54C
1. Stations 1B and 8B ¾ Vmin to Vmax, all altitudes,

+ 1g to +6g for non-zero bank angles and 0g to +6g
AIM-9 launch is prohibited with landing flaps for zero bank angle.
and slats extended.
Note 2. Stations 3 and 6 ¾ Vmin to 1.4 TMN, all altitudes,
+1g for non-zero bank angles and 0g to +1g for zero
Engine stall may result from firing of AIM-9 bank angle.
missiles. Engine exhaust gas temperature should
be monitored after each firing. 3. Stations 4 and 5 ¾ Vmin to Vmax, all altitudes, +1g
for non-zero bank angles and 0g to +1g for zero bank
4.11.4.3 AIM-54C angle.
Note
1. Stations 1B and 8B — Vmin to Vmax, all altitudes,
+1g to limits of basic aircraft for non-zero bank For zero bank angle, limit Vmin to Vmax, all alti-
tudes, 0g to limits of basic aircraft.
angles, 0g to limits of basic aircraft for zero bank
angle.
4.11.5.3 Capped 280-Gallon External Fuel Tank
2. Stations 3 and 6 — Vmin to Vmax 0g to +2g and Vmin (Landing Gear and Flaps Retracted)
to 1.4 IMN +2g to +6g, all altitudes, +1g to +6g for
non-zero bank angles and 0g to +6g for zero bank 1. Full, partial, or empty tanks - Less than 0.90 TMN,
angle. all altitudes, +1g to +3g.
3. Stations 4 and 5 — Vmin to Vmax, all altitudes, +1g 2. Landing gear and/or flaps extended (emergency
to +5g for non-zero bank angles and 0g to +5g for only) ¾ Less than 225 KCAS, all altitudes, +1g for
zero bank angle. straight and level flight.
4.11.5 Jettison Limits 4.12 BANNER TOWING RESTRICTIONS
1. Airspeed ¾ 220 KCAS maximum recommended.

Flight conditions for jettison (emergency only) of
external stores are listed in the following paragraphs. 2. Maximum angle of bank ¾ 30°, 20_ throttles at idle
below 5,000 feet.
3. Use of speedbrakes ¾ Prohibited in flight.
CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL 4-20
Note
D During takeoff, adequate clearance exists to

use speedbrakes for takeoff abort without con
tacting tow cable. MACH TRIM circuit breaker should be reset
prior to landing. Attempt reset below 0.6 TMN
D The maximum aircraft gross weight for a ship above 5,000 feet, if possible, to minimize trim
board banner launch is 67,000 pounds.
change transients. Failure to reset circuit breaker
may result in reduced nosedown longitudinal
4.13 TACTICAL AIR RECONNAISSANCE POD control authority. Reduced authority may de
SYSTEM LIMITATIONS grade the pilot’s ability to counter pitchup during
waveoffs with aft cg.
See F14A/B/D A/G Tactical Manual (NWP 3−22.5−
F14A/B/D, Volume III, NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1T−2) for air 5. AIM−54 carriage/launch is not authorized at any
speed limits and store loadings authorized with TARPS pod. station.
4.13.1 Authorized Stores Loading 6. Special weight and balance information for TARPS
pod configuration is available. Refer to handbook of
1. Downloading is authorized for store stations 1, 2, 7, weight and balance (NAVAIR 01−1B−40).
and 8 only. Stations 3 and 6 must remain loaded for
cg control. 4.13.2 Interim AIM−7 as Ballast
2. Carrier and field arrestment operations are TARPS−equipped aircraft are authorized to use
authorized. specially configured interim AIM−7 missiles as ballast.
AIM−7 missiles specially configured for TARPS use will be
3. Aft cg limit is 17.5−percent MAC, nonjettisonable
designated as CATM−7E−2 or CATM−7F−2. Until then,
(captive carry) AIM−7 missiles, specially config
R40293, R40268, R40302, R40264, R40144, R40298,
ured interim AIM−7 missile or AIM−54 rails and
R40674, R40297, R40274, R40267, and R40235 are
fairings on stations 3 and 6 shall be carried for cg authorized as TARPS ballast, and weight and balance
control (see Interim AIM−7 as ballast). Full
information provided for AIM−7F missiles shall be used to
ammunition pod, ALQ−100/126 or other authorized
determine weight and balance of aircraft.
equipment substitution may be required along with
AIM−7 missiles or AIM−54 fairings and rails to 1. CATM−7E−2  360 pounds per missile located at
maintain cg within aft limit. Individual weight and aircraft station 381.7.
balance calculations shall be performed to ensure cg
limits are not exceeded. 2. CATM−7F−2  440 pounds per missile located at
aircraft station 381.7.
4. Pulling MACH TRIM circuit breaker will eliminate
stick force requirement during low−altitude, high−
speed flight.
4−21 (Reverse
PART II
Indoctrination
Chapter 5 Indoctrination

CHAPTER 5
Indoctrination
5.1 GROUND TRAINING SYLLABUS 5.1.1.5 Field Carrier Landing Practice/Carrier

Qualification Flight Support Lectures
5.1.1 Minimum Ground Training Syllabus
1. Mirror and Fresnel lens optical landing system
The ground training syllabus sets forth the minimum
ground training that must be satisfactorily completed prior to 2. Day landing pattern and procedures
operating the F−14D. If the aircrewmember has a current
3. Night landing pattern and procedures
F−14A/B NATOPS qualification, the ground syllabus will
consist of the F−14D unique systems. The ground training 4. Shipboard procedures and landing patterns
syllabus for each activity will vary according to local condi
tions, field facilities, requirements from higher authority, and 5. CCA/ACLS procedures
the immediate unit commander’s estimate of squadron readi
ness. The minimum ground training syllabus for the pilot and 6. In−flight refueling (day/night).
the RIO is set forth in the following paragraphs.
5.1.2 Waiving of Minimum Ground Training
5.1.1.1 Familiarization Requirements
1. Flight physiological training as appropriate All F−14D flight crewmembers shall be instructed on
the differences from model in which qualified and comply
2. F−14D flightcrew academic course
with those items listed below, as directed by the unit com
3. F−14D MFT/WST (within 5 days). manding officer.
5.1.1.2 Flight Support Lectures Where recent crewmember experience in similar air
craft models warrant, unit commanding officers may waive
1. F−14D flightcrew academic course. the minimum ground training requirements provided the
flight crewmember meets the following mandatory
5.1.1.3 5.1.1.1 Intercept Flight Support qualifications:
1. Has obtained a current medical clearance

1. F−14D flightcrew academic course.
2. Is currently qualified in flight physiology
5.1.1.4 Weapons Firing Flight Support Lectures
3. Has satisfactorily completed the NATOPS flight
1. Weapons preflight procedures manual open− and closed−book examinations
2. Arming/dearming procedures 4. Has completed at least one emergency procedure
period in the MFT/WST (within 10 days)
3. Firing procedures
5. Has received adequate briefing on normal and
4. Safety procedures emergency operating procedures
5. Jettison/dump areas. 6. Has received adequate instructions on the use and

operation of the ejection seat and survival kit.
5−1 ORIGINAL
5.2 FLIGHT TRAINING SYLLABUS 5.2.2.3 Weapons System Employment
5.2.1 Flightcrew Flight Training Syllabus Qualification is in accordance with existing training
and readiness directives.
Before flight, all flight crewmembers will have com-
pleted the familiarization and flight support lectures pre- 5.2.2.4 Field Carrier Landing Practice and
viously prescribed. A qualified FRS instructor pilot will Carrier Qualifications
occupy the rear seat for the first familiarization flight. A
qualified FRS instructor RIO can occupy the rear seat if the Qualification is in accordance with existing training
pilot in command has been previously NATOPS qualified in and readiness directives.
the F−14A/B. The geographic location, local command re-
quirements, squadron mission, and other factors will influ- 5.3 OPERATING CRITERIA
ence the actual flight training syllabus and the sequence in
which it is completed. The specific phases of training are 5.3.1 Ceiling/Visibility Requirements
listed in the following paragraphs.
Before the pilot becomes instrument qualified in the
5.2.2 Flightcrew Flight Training Phases aircraft, field ceiling, visibility, and operating area weather
must be adequate for the entire flight to be conducted in a
5.2.2.1 Familiarization clear airmass according to visual flight rules. After the pilot
becomes instrument qualified, the following weather criteria
1. Military power takeoffs apply:
2. Buffet boundary investigation CEILING AND VISIBILITY
F−14D HOURS (FEET) (MILES)
3. Approach to stalls
Less than 10 VFR
4. Slow flight 10 to 20 800 and 2; 900 and 1½;
1,000 and 1
5. Acceleration run to Mach 1.3
20 to 45 700 and 1; 600 and 2;
6. Subsonic and supersonic maneuvering 500 and 3
45 and
d above
b Fi ld minimums
Field i i or 200 and
d
7. Investigate all features of the DFCS/stab aug ½, whichever is higher.
8. Formation flight
F−14A/B FLEET
9. Aerobatics
EXPERIENCED
10. Single−engine flight at altitude and airstarts AIRCREW CEILING AND VISIBILITY
(F−14D HOURS) (FEET) (MILES)
11. Simulated single−engine landings Less than 10 VFR
10 to 30 700 and 1; 600 and 2;
12. Landing with full and with no flaps
500 and 3
13. Acceleration runs at various altitudes. 30 and above Field minimums or 200 and
½, whichever is higher.
5.2.2.2 Instruments
1. Basic instrument work Where adherence to these minimums unduly hampers

pilot training, commanding officers may waive time−in−
2. Penetration and approaches series requirements for actual instrument flight, provided
pilots meet the following criteria:
3. Local area round−robin (day and night) flights.
1. Have a minimum of 10 hours combined time in the
An F−14D pilot is considered instrument qualified if F−14A/B/D
currently instrument qualified in the F−14A/B.
2. Completed two simulated instrument sorties
CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL 5−2
3. Completed two satisfactory TACAN penetrations 5.3.2.3 NATOPS Currency
4. Completed five satisfactory ground−controlled Flight crewmembers who have more than 45 hours in
approaches. F−14A/B/D aircraft model are considered current in aircraft
series, provided they continue to satisfy the following
5.3.2 NATOPS Qualification and Currency requirements:
Requirements
1. Have satisfactorily completed the ground phase of
F−14 NATOPS qualifications are for a specific aircraft the NATOPS evaluation check, including OFT/
series. The following terms are defined for use in interpreting COT/WST/MFT emergency procedures check (if
the F−14 qualification and currency requirements. available) and have completed a NATOPS evalua
tion check with a grade of Conditionally Qualified
1. Aircraft type  The broadest classification of air or better within the past 12 months.
craft as to its physical characteristics (e.g., fixed
wing or rotary wing). 2. Have flown 10 hours in aircraft model, 5 hours of
which shall be in aircraft series, and made five
2. Aircraft model  The basic mission symbol and de takeoffs and landings in aircraft model within the
sign number of an aircraft (e.g., P−3, F−14, H−3). last 90 days.
3. Aircraft series  The specific version of an aircraft 3. Are considered qualified by the commanding offi
model (e.g., F−14A, F−14B, or F−14D). cer of the unit having custody of the aircraft.
5.3.2.1 Initial NATOPS Qualification in Aircraft Flight crewmembers who are current in the F−14A and
Series F−14D are considered current in the F−14B. NATOPS requali
fication for the F−14A, and F−14B can be accomplished
Initial F−14 NATOPS qualification in series shall in during the same evaluation check, provided the NATOPS
clude satisfactory completion of the following requirements: open, closed, boldface, and currency requirements are met
for each series.
1. Formal ground phase training.
5.3.2.4 Currency Renewal
2. The NATOPS open−book, closed−book, and bold
face exams. Flight crewmembers who have not remained current
shall complete the following requirements in order to
3. A flight syllabus at a fleet replacement squadron.
reestablish currency:
The syllabus shall include 10 flight hours under
instruction, 4 hours of which may be flown in a 1. Fight crewmembers who have not maintained
CNO−approved flight simulator for the same aircraft 10 hours in model, 5 hours of which shall be in
series. aircraft series, and five takeoffs and landings in
aircraft model within the last 90 days, shall do the
4. A NATOPS evaluation check in a CNO approved
following:
flight simulator by an FRS instructor. If a simulator
is not available, a separate NATOPS evaluation a. Complete a safe−for−flight simulator check with
checkflight is required. a squadron NATOPS instructor.
5. Fleet replacement squadron commanding officers b. Be considered qualified by the commanding offi
may waive the flight hour requirement for radar cer of the unit having custody of the aircraft.
intercept officers.
2. Flight crewmembers who are current in series ex
5.3.2.2 Continued NATOPS Qualification cept for a NATOPS evaluation check within the last
12 months shall do the following:
To maintain a continued NATOPS qualification after
initial qualification in aircraft series until currency is estab
lished, pilots and RIOs shall comply with the minimum flight
hour requirements in each specific phase as determined by
the unit commanding officer.
5−3 ORIGINAL
a. Complete a NATOPS evaluation check (includ 2. Have a valid instrument card.

ing emergency procedures simulator check,
NATOPS open−book, closed−book and boldface 3. Have completed at least one night familiarization
examinations) with the squadron NATOPS flight in the F−14A/B/D or fly with a qualified
instructor. instructor RIO.
b. Be considered qualified by the commanding offi 4. Have completed maintenance checkout for servic
cer having custody of the aircraft. ing aircraft.
3. Flight crewmembers without a current NATOPS 5.3.3.4 Cross Country  RIO

evaluation check and who have not maintained
10 hours in model, 5 hours in aircraft series, and five 1. Have completed at least one night familiarization
takeoffs and landings in aircraft model within the flight in the F−14A/B/D or fly with a qualified
last 90 days shall do the following: instructor pilot.
a. If 6 months or less since last flight: 5.3.3.5 Air−to−Air Missile Firing  Pilot
(1) Perform an emergency procedures and 1. Have a minimum of 15 hours combined time in the
safe−for−flight check in a CNO−approved F−14A/B/D, 5 of which must have been flown in
simulator. the F−14D.
(2) Fly one flight with squadron NATOPS 2. Be considered qualified by the commanding officer.
instructor.
5.3.3.6 Air−to−Air Missile Firing  RIO
(3) Complete a NATOPS evaluation check
(including NATOPS open−book, closed− 1. Have a minimum of 25 hours combined time in the
book, and boldface examinations). F−14A/B/D as crewmember, 10 of which must be in
the F−14D.
(4) Be considered qualified by the commanding
officer of the unit having custody of the 2. Have satisfactorily completed a minimum of two in
aircraft. tercept flights during which simulated firing runs
were conducted utilizing the voice procedures and
b. If greater than 6 months since last flight, a clear−to−fire criteria to be utilized in live firing.
repeat of the initial NATOPS qualification
requirements is required at the fleet replacement 3. Be considered qualified by the commanding officer.
squadron.
5.3.3.7 Carrier Qualifications
5.3.3 Requirements for Various Flight Phases
Each crewmember will have a minimum of 50 hours
5.3.3.1 Night  Pilot combined time in the F−14A/B/D (15 hours minimum in
F−14D), of which 15 hours is night time (5 night hours
1. Combined time in F−14A/B/D not less than in F−14D) and meet the requirements set forth in the CV
10 hours. NATOPS manual. Minimum hour requirement for radar
intercept officers may be waived by the commanding
5.3.3.2 Night  RIO officer based upon individual experience level and crew
composition.
1. Combined time not less than 3 hours in the F−14A/
B/D as crewmember.
5.3.4 Mission Commander
5.3.3.3 Cross Country  Pilot
The mission commander shall be a NATOPS−qualified
1. Have a minimum of 15 hours total in the F−14A/B/D pilot or RIO, qualified in all phases of the assigned mission,
and designated by the unit commanding officer.
as first pilot or fly with a qualified instructor RIO.
ORIGINAL 5−4
5.3.5 Minimum Flightcrew Requirements 5. Steel−toed flight safety boots
The pilot and the RIO (or two pilots) constitute the 6. Life preserver
normal flightcrew for performing the assigned mission for all
flights. Unit commanders may authorize rear−seat flights for 7. Harness assembly
personnel other than qualified pilots and RIOs provided such
8. Shroud cutter
personnel have received thorough indoctrination in the use of
the ejection seat and oxygen equipment and in the execution 9. Sheath knife
of rear−seat functions and emergency procedures. Where op
erational necessity dictates, unit commanders may authorize 10. Flashlight (for all night flights)
flights with the rear seat unoccupied provided the require
ment for such flight clearly overrides the risk involved and 11. Strobe light
justifies the additional burden placed on the pilot. In no case
is solo flight authorized for shipboard operations, combat, or 12. Pistol with tracer ammunition or approved flare gun
combat training missions.
13. Fire−retardant flight gloves
5.4 FLIGHT CREWMEMBER FLIGHT EQUIPMENT
REQUIREMENTS 14. Identification tags
15. Antiexposure suit in accordance with OPNAVINST

In accordance with OPNAVINST 3710.7, the flying
3710.7
equipment listed below will be worn or carried, as applicable,
by flight crewmembers on every flight. All survival 16. Personal survival kit
equipment shall be secured in such a manner that it will be
easily accessible and will not be lost during ejection or 17. Other survival equipment appropriate to climate of
landing. All equipment shall be the latest available as the area
authorized by the Aircrew Personal Protective Manual,
NAVAIR 13−1−6. 18. Full pressure suit and Mk 4 life preserver on all
flights above 50,000 feet MSL
1. Protective helmet
19. Pocket checklist
2. Oxygen mask
20. Navigation packet.
3. Anti−g suit
4. Fire−retardant flightsuit
5−5 (Reverse
PART III
Normal Procedures
Chapter 6 Flight Preparation
Chapter 7 Shore−Based Procedures
Chapter 8 Carrier−Based Procedures
Chapter 9 Special Procedures
Chapter 10 Functional Checkflight Procedures

CHAPTER 6
Flight Preparation
6.1 PREFLIGHT BRIEFING 7. Ordnance and stores carried/preflight/restrictions
on use
Preflight briefings shall be conducted immediately 8. Communications plan
before the launch of scheduled flights and must be carried out
in an expeditious but thorough manner. Ample time should 9. Area/NOTAMs
be given for briefing with external assets as well as for
conducting internal element briefs. When scheduling a brief, 10. Clearance/NAVAIDs
consideration should be made to ensure that enough time is
given for the aircrew to finish briefing, don all flight gear, 11. Ground/deck procedures
check out any special items required for the mission
(authenticators, cameras, guns), read the aircraft discrepancy 12. Takeoff/departure/rendezvous
book, and man up the aircraft in order to make the scheduled
launch time. For this reason, it is imperative that all pilots and 13. En route/formation
RIOs be in flightsuits ready for the brief at the designated
14. Tanking plan
time.
15. Combat checks/alpha check
The brief should optimally be conducted in a desig
nated briefing room, free of distractions, with a white dry 16. Recovery procedures (VFR/IFR)
erase board and 1/72 scale aircraft models. A briefing board
should be put up prior to the brief, depicting applicable admin 17. Joker/bingo fuel
items, mission objectives, flight conduct, special instruc
tions, and necessary diagrams. Aircrew should utilize ap 18. NORDO procedures
propriate tactical manuals and current weapon school manu
als and journals for mission planning. The brief shall include, 19. Emergencies/diverts/SAR/birdstrike
but not be limited to, the following.
20. Training rules
6.1.1 Administration
21. Contingencies.
The following items should be covered for each flight, 6.1.2 Missions
regardless of the mission.
1. Event number Aircrew should brief each section that applies to their
expected mission. Missions not specifically discussed in this
2. Launch/recovery times/recovery order chapter should be covered using the appropriate tactical
manual.
3. Lineup/call signs/avionics plan
4. Mission assigned/alternate missions 6.1.2.1 Low−Level/Strike Ingress
5. External assets/call signs 1. Time hack
6. Weather 2. Controlling agency route brief
a. Base, en route, target, area, divert a. Restrictions/hot areas
b. Water/air temperature, sea state
6−1 ORIGINAL
3. Current charts/Chart Update Manual 8. Weaponeering/switchology
4. Entry/exit times a. Target type
5. Formation/altitude/airspeed b. Weapon
6. Navigation mode/plan c. Attack/delivery mode
a. Waypoint LAT/LONG d. Fuze/delay
7. Communications e. Functioning delay
8. Checkpoints/turnpoints f. Interval
9. Timing/corrections g. Stick length
10. Radar plan/search contracts h. Frag pattern
11. Threat awareness (SAM, AAA, A/A) i. Manual MIL setting
12. DECM/RWR/expendables j. Stations selected
13. Target area ingress Initial point/target k. Laser codes
14. Abort criteria/procedures 9. Release conditions
15. Safety. a. Dive angle
6.1.2.2 Air−to−Ground Strike b. Airspeed/Mach
1. Time hack c. Release/recovery altitude
2. A/G checklist complete d. Heading
3. Range/area e. Slant range
4. Time on target f. Time of fall
5. Communications 10. Off−target rendezvous/egress/RTF
6. Swing fighter consideration 11. Hung ordnance/jettison
7. Target area tactics 12. Abort criteria/procedures
a. SEAD window 13. Safety.
b. Target ID/acquisition 6.1.2.3 Air−to−Air
c. Tactic/backup tactic 1. Mission type/objectives/strike integration/friendly

assets
d. Aircraft interval/sequence
2. Threat awareness (A/A, SAM, AAA)
e. Aim points/backup aim points
3. ROE/PID criteria
f. Threat awareness (SAM, AAA, A/A)
4. GCI/control/bullseye
g. DECM/RWR/expendables
ORIGINAL 6−2
5. Precommit 9. Postmerge/egress
a. Position/time/CAP management a. Target area considerations/frag
b. Formation/visual lookout b. Flow/new ROE
c. Radar gameplan c. Radar gameplan
d. Defense in depth d. Visual lookout doctrine/commit
6. Commit e. Rendezvous
a. Authority/criteria 10. Defensive considerations
b. Abort/reset a. Communications
7. Intercept b. Threat/nose position/RWR
a. Geometry/flow c. Missile/guns defense
b. Formation/altitude/airspeed d. E−pole.
c. Communications (cadence/priority) 6.1.2.4 TARPS

d. Radar search responsibilities 1. Mission type
e. Meld/targeting a. SSC/mapping/standoff/point target
f. Sort/lock range/no sort 2. Pod checks  on deck/airborne
g. Missile employment 3. Operating area/route/TOT
h. Crank/expendables 4. Navigation mode/plan  primary/secondary
i. Drop criteria/factor bandit range a. INS/GPS/visual/DR
j. Degrades b. Checkpoint
k. Float/split c. Post target IPs
l. Preplanned coordinated maneuvers d. Topography/terrain
m. Radar warning receiver 5. Target acquisition/ID/placement
n. Abort/reset 6. Sensors
8. Approaching the merge/merge a. Primary/secondary/tertiary
a. Fuel package b. Vg/H settings
b. IRCM c. Troubleshooting
c. Section/division maneuvering
d. Engage/blowthrough
6−3 ORIGINAL
7. Formation/altitude/airspeed 12. Egress
8. Communications a. Target area considerations/frag
9. Radar plan b. Rendezvous/RTF
10. Threat awareness (SAM, AAA, A/A) 13. Abort criteria/procedures
11. DECM/RWR/expendables 14. Safety.
ORIGINAL 6−4
CHAPTER 7
Shore−Based Procedures
7.1 CHECKLISTS have been properly corrected or deferred prior to accepting

the aircraft as ready for flight.
Aircraft checklists are available in two forms, based on
the degree of flightcrew familiarization; since the sequence 7.2.1 Area Around Aircraft
remains the same, the only difference in the forms is the
degree of amplification. As the flightcrew becomes more En route to the aircraft, attention should be directed to
proficient in type, a more abbreviated form is available to the maintenance effort going on in the line area. The flight
promote operational efficiency, and safety is not compro crew should ensure that no hazardous situations exist. The
mised since, in all instances, the thoroughness of checks entire area should also be generally examined for FOD
remains the same. The placarded takeoff and landing check hazards.
lists on the forward cockpit instrument panel is a funda
The area around the aircraft that may not be visible
mentalelement in all instances. In the interest of procedural
from the cockpit should be examined. Particular attention
standardization, the shore−based and carrier−based proce
should be paid to support equipment adjacent to the aircraft.
dures are maintained the same, except for the response rela
It should be determined that the wings and flight controls can
tive to the checks. The expanded procedures presented in
be safely moved and that the effect of jet blast during start and
thisflight manual describe in detail those items that should
taxi will not create a dangerous situation.
be checked on each flight. Adherence to these procedures
will provide the flightcrew with a detailed status of weapons
7.2.2 Foreign Object Damage and
system performance incident to flight. However, it is incum
Leak Inspection
bent on the flightcrew to expand the checks as necessary to
verify the corrective status of previously reported discrep Engine intakes and adjacent deck area are of prime
ancies. Reference should be made to the functional check concern since the F110−GE−400 is highly susceptible to FOD
flight procedures (Chapter 10, paragraph 10.2) for more damage and the engines are capable of picking up objects
detailed tests that can be performed on the aircraft and from the deck. AICS ramps, bleed doors, ECS cooling
weapons systems if deemed necessary. The flightcrew intakes, exhausts, and afterburner ducts are catchalls for
shouldbe thoroughly familiar with the details of the proce loose objects. They should be closely inspected for security
dures outlined herein so that the abbreviated checklist forms and foreign objects. Inspect all panels for security and loose
of the procedures may be safely employed. As the first level fasteners. While inspecting the aircraft for FOD, the flight
of simplification, NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B (F−14D Pocket crew should also be alert for any evidence of oil, hydraulic
Checklist), contains a reprint of the normal procedures, with fluid, or fuel leaks.
less amplifying information.
7.2.3 Ground Safety Devices and Covers
7.1.1 Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
The following items should be installed:
A [T] preceding the text of a procedural step identifies
items pertaining only to TARPS aircraft. 1. Main landing gear ground safety locks (two)
7.2 EXTERIOR INSPECTION 2. Nose landing gear ground safety pin
A proper preflight inspection begins with a thorough 3. Tailhook safety pin (ashore)
review of aircraft status and past maintenance history. An 4. Wheel chocks
understanding of previous discrepancies, corrective action
and their impact on the flight can best be gained at this time. 5. LAU−7/LAU−138/LAU−92 ground safety pins
The flightcrew should ensure that any and all discrepancies
6. Sidewinder seeker−head covers (if applicable).
7−1 ORIGINAL
The following items should be removed: 7.2.7 Movable Surfaces

All movable surfaces (flight controls and high−lift
1. Intake, probe, bleed door, and ECS duct covers
devices) should be inspected for position, clearance, and
2. Water−intrusion tape obvious damage.
3. Launch abort mechanism lock (if the aircraft is to be 7.2.8 Inspection Areas
towed) The following exterior inspection is divided into
10areas. (See Figure 7−1.) Checks peculiar to only one side
4. Tailhook safety pin (shipboard). are designated (L) or (R) for the left or right side. Both the
pilot and RIO should preflight the entire aircraft individually.
7.2.4 Surface Condition
All surfaces should be checked for cracks, distortion, 7.2.8.1 A Forward Fuselage
or loose or missing fasteners. All lights and lenses should be 1. Access panel fasteners forward of engine inlets 
checked for cracks and cleanliness. No Loose or Missing Fasteners.
7.2.5 Security of Panels 2. Gun  Safety Pin Installed in Clearing Sector Hold
back Assembly, Louvers Clear, cannon plug con
All fasteners should be flush and secure on all panels. nected, wheelwell armament safety override switch
guard down.
7.2.6 Leaks
3. Probes  Secure, Openings Clear, AOA Probe Free
All surfaces, lines, and actuators should be checked for For Rotation.
oil, fuel, and hydraulic leaks. Particular attention should be
4. Nose wheelwell:
paid to the underside of the fuselage, engine nacelles, and
outer wing panels. a. Electrical leads Connected, No Evidence of
Overheating.
Figure 71.Exterior Inspection
ORIGINAL 7−2
b. Hydraulic lines  No Chafing or Leaks. 7.2.8.2 B Right Inlet
c. Doors and linkages  Cotter Pins Installed, 1. Ramps, metal seals, and rubber seals Intact, Free
NoDistortion. of Dirt, Grit, and Cracks.
d. Brake accumulators  1,900 Psi Minimum. 2. IGV Blades and Stators Free of Nicks and
Cracks.
e. Canopy air bottle gauge 1,200 Psi Minimum.
Plane captain to verify that all visible damage has
f. Emergency landing gear nitrogen bottle gauge been blended.
3,000 Psi Minimum.
3. ECS heat exchanger inlet and fan
g. Emergency landing gear air release valve
Ensure That Valve Is in Closed Position. a. Fan Free Rotation.
h. Retract actuator Piston Clean, No Leaks. b. Overspeed pin Recessed.
i. Flight maintenance indicator Secure. c. ECS inlet Free of FOD, Cables Connected
(two).
j. Antiskid control box BIT flags Not Tripped.
4. Inlet Free of Standing Water, Drains Clear.
k. Cabin pressure port screens Clean.
7.2.8.3 C Right Nacelle and Sponson
l. Master arm override Cover Closed.
1. Station 7 and 8 stores
5. Nose strut Piston Clean, Free of Cracks and
Scoring, and Uplock Roller Free.
a. Stores Aligned.
6. Steering actuator Secure, No Leaks. b. Access panels Secure.
7. Launch bar and holdback fitting
c. Sidewinder missile launcher
a. Abort Full Up.
(1) LAU−7 Sidewinder coolant doors
b. Roller Free Rotation. Latched.
c. Uplatch and holdback Free Movement.
(2) LAU−138 chaff loading and gas bottle safety
8. Nosewheels and tires Inflation, No Cuts, Bulges, handle Stowed.
Uneven Wear, or Imbedded Objects.
d. Stores safety pins Installed.
9. Drag brace No Leaks, Door Secure.
If external tank/MXU − 611 aboard:
10. Approach lights Lenses Clean, No Cracks,
Secure. d. Ground safety handle Pulled.
11. TV camera Check, Blue Desiccant. e. Fuel quantity sight gauge Ball Float Vertical.
12. Dual chin pod IRST, TV Cameras (or simula f. Sway braces Tightened Down.
tors), and Anticollision Light Secure.
g. Hook latched indicator White Vertical Line
13. Radome Lock Handle Fastened, Rosemont Probe Visible.
Straight.
h. Inboard and outboard fuel caps Fastened With
14. OBOGS concentrator vent outlet No Butterfly Latch Secured Facing Aft.
Obstructions.
7−3 ORIGINAL
2. Main wheelwell Note

a. Doors and linkages Secure. Engine must be running for an accurate reading.
b. Uplock microrollers Free.
13. Hook dashpot pressure gauge 800 ±10 Psi.
c. Uplock hooks Secure.
14. Ventral No Damage, IDG Oil Cooler Intake
d. Hydraulic lines No Chafing or Leaks. Clear.
3. Drag brace Secure, Downlock Safety Pin
Forward. 7.2.8.4 D Right Glove and Wing
4. Side brace Seated in Latch. 1. Slats, flaps, and cove doors Surfaces and Hinges
Secure.
5. Main struts Pistons Clean, Free of Cracks or
Scoring. 2. Wing cavity seal Free of Cuts and Chafing.
6. Brakes Pucks Safety − Wired; Wear Indicators
Visible (pins at least flush). Lower Torque Arm 3. Formation and position lights Intact, Lenses
Swivel; Key and Key Retainer Properly Installed Clean.
and Safety Wired.
7.2.8.5 E Aft and Under Fuselage
7. Hubcap Secure, Safety−Wired.
1. Horizontal tails Leading Edges Free of Damage.
8. Main wheels and tires
2. Exhaust nozzles and fairings:
a. Wheels and tires Inflation, Cuts, Bulges,
Uneven Wear, Imbedded Objects (look behind a. Nozzles and fairings No Cracked or Missing
chocks) Flaps or Seals.
b. Fairing cable Properly Tensioned (pull on
b. Uplock Hooks Secure.
cable, fairing flaps should not move).
9. Gear down microrollers Contact Made.
c. Bottom surface No Scrapes or Cracks.
10. Engine compartment (if applicable)
d. Spray bars and flameholder Intact.
a. Integrated drive generator − transmission fluid e. Turbine blades No Evidence of Overheating.
Fluid Visible, Filter Pins (two) Flush.
3. Fuel vent No Leakage or FOD.
b. Engine oil servicing caps Check.
4. Tailhook
c. Bilges No FOD, Evidence of Overheating, or
Leakage. a. Hook point Smooth.
d. Fuel, oil, and hydraulic lines Free of chafing b. Nut and cotter pin Installed.
or Leaks.
c. Safety pin Remove if Hook Is Securely
e. Bleed air lines No Heat Discoloration or Latched Up.
Damage.
5. Backup flight control module No Leaks (feel aft
f. AB fuel pump filter Pin Flush. of inspection doors), Filter Pins Flush, Close Both
Access Doors.
g. Lube and scavenge bypass filter Pin Flush.
6. Fuel dump No Leakage From Mast, Free of FOD.
h. Oil nozzle filter Pin Flush. 7. Stations 3 through 6 stores
11. Flight hydraulic reservoir 1,800 Psi Minimum, a. Stores Aligned.
Filter Pins Flush.
b. Access panels Secure.
12. Flight hydraulic system tape gauge Minimum of
c. Stores safety pins Installed.
Seven on Tape.
ORIGINAL 7−4
8. Fuel cavity drains No Leakage. 2. Main wheelwell
9. [T] Pod Check for Security. a. Doors and linkages Secure.
10. [T] Protective window covers Removed. b. Uplock microrollers Free.
11. [T] Camera windows Clean. c. Uplock hooks Secure.
12. [T] Camera sensor control As Briefed. d. Hydraulic lines No Chafing or Leaks.
13. [T] Light meter Facing Outboard. 3. Drag brace Secure, Down Lock Safety Pin
Forward.
14. [T] Lens filter As Briefed.
4. Side brace Seated in Latch.
7.2.8.6 F Left Glove and Wing
5. Main struts Pistons Clean, Free of Cracks or
Scoring.
1. Slats, flaps, and cove doors Surfaces and Hinges
Secure. 6. Brakes  Pucks Safety−Wired; Wear Indicators
Visible (pins at least flush). Lower Torque Arm
2. Wing cavity seal Free of Cuts and Chafing. Swivel; Key and Key Retainer Properly Installed
and Safety−Wired.
3. Formation and position lights Intact, Lenses
Clean. 7. Hubcap Secure, Safety−Wired.
7.2.8.7 Left Nacelle and Sponson 8. Main wheels and tires

G
a. Wheels and tires Inflation, Cuts, Bulges,
1. Station 1 and 2 racks and stores Uneven Wear, Imbedded Objects (look behind
chocks).
a. Racks and stores Aligned.
b. Uplock hooks Secure.
b. Access panels Secure.
9. Gear−up microrollers Contact Not Made.
c. Sidewinder missile launcher
10. Engine compartment (if applicable)
(1) LAU−7 Sidewinder coolant doors
Latched. a. IDG Fluid Visible (two) Pins Flush.
(2) LAU−138 chaff loading and gas bottle safety b. Engine oil servicing caps Check.
handles Stowed.
c. Bilges No FOD, Evidence of Overheating, or
d. Stores safety pins Installed. Leakage.
If external tanks aboard: d. Fuel, oil, and hydraulic lines Free of Chafing
or Leaks.
e. Ground safety handle Pulled.
e. Bleed air lines No Heat Discoloration or
f. Fuel quantity sight gauge Ball Float Vertical. Damage.
g. Sway braces Tightened Down. f. Afterburner fuel filter Pin Flush.
h. Hook latch indicator White Vertical Line g. Lube and scavenge bypass filter Pin Flush.
Visible.
h. Oil nozzle filter Pin Flush.
i. Inboard and outboard fuel caps Fastened With
Butterfly Latch Secured Facing Aft.
7−5 ORIGINAL
11. Combined hydraulic reservoir 1,800 Psi Mini− 6. Speedbrake No Distortion or Leaks.
mum, Filter Pins Flush.
7. Vertical tails and rudders No Distortion, Lights
12. Combined hydraulic system tape gauge Mini Intact.
mum of Seven on Tape.
7.2.8.10 J Canopy
Note
Engine must be running for an accurate reading. 1. Canopy lanyard Connected, Yellow Flag
Attached at Both Ends.
13. Airstart door Ground Hydraulic and Electric
Covers Tight. 2. Auxiliary canopy bottle Cable Taut.
14. Ventral No Damage, IDG Oil Cooler Intake 3. Canopy hooks and seal Secure, Seal Intact.
Clear.
4. Ejection seat safe−and−arm device safety pins
(see Figure 7−2 ) Pulled.
7.2.8.8 H Left Inlet
5. Auxiliary canopy bottle gauge 800 psi
1. Ramps, metal seals, and rubber seals Intact, Free Minimum.
of Dirt, Grit, and Cracks.
6. Blade antennas Intact.
2. IGV Blades and Stators IGV Free of Nicks and
Cracks. 7. Canopy Clean, Free of Cracks and Deep
Scratches.
Plane captain to verify that all visible damage has
been blended. 7.3 EJECTION SEAT INSPECTION
3. Ice detector (L) Secure. The pilot and RIO shall perform the following checks
on their respective ejection seats prior to flight. The ground
4. ECS heat exchanger inlet and fan safety pin in the seat firing handle is the only ground safety
device. It must be removed and stowed before flight. Abbre
a. Fan Free Rotation. viated preflight checklists for the ejection seat are provided
in the pocket checklist and on the ejection seat headbox.
b. Overspeed pin Recessed.
1. SAFE/ARMED handle SAFE.
c. Inlet  Free of FOD, Cables Connected (two).
2. Manual override handle Full Down and Locked.
5. Outboard spoiler module temperature indicator
and servicing No Leaks, Fluid Indicator Rod 3. Catapult manifold valve Secure, Hoses
Protruding. Connected.
6. Inlet Free of Standing Water, Drains Clear. Check that retaining pin is installed.
4. Top latch mechanism Latched.

7.2.8.9 I Fuselage Top Deck and Wings
Check that indicator plunger is flush with end of top
1. Bleed exit doors Free of FOD, Hardware Intact. latch plunger.
2. ECS heat exchanger exhausts Free of FOD and

Cracks.
3. Antennas Check.
If the top latch mechanism is not latched, the seat
4. Overwing fairings No Cracked or Bent Fingers. could rise up the catapult rails during aircraft
maneuvers.
5. Eyebrow doors Intact.
ORIGINAL 7−6
5. Parachute withdrawal line Connected. b. Emergency oxygen manual actuator Con

nected and Stowed.
Check that parachute withdrawal line is correctly
secured to parachute deployment rocket stirrup. c. Emergency oxygen and locator beacon lanyards
Connected to Deck.
6. Left pitot head Stowed.
13. Oxygen/communications and anti−g lines Con
7. Thermal batteries Not Expended. nected to Aircraft Connections.
Check that battery−expended indicator on electronic 14. Personnel services disconnect block Secured to
sequencer is not activated. Seat Bucket, Lanyard Attached to Deck.
8. Left trombone tubes Connected, Retaining Pin 15. Lapbelts Secure.

Installed.
Pull up on each lapbelt to ensure that lugs are secure
9. Leg restraint lines Secured to Deck, Not Twisted, in seat bucket locks.
End Fittings Secured in Seat Bucket Locks.
16. Right trombone tubes Connected, Retaining Pin
10. Seat firing initiators Firing Linkage Connected Installed.
to Sears.
17. Right pitot head Stowed.
11. Pyrotechnic quick disconnects Connected, Red
Bands Not Visible. 18. Parachute container lid Secure, Sealed.
12. Survival kit Check. Check environmental seal indicator for correct
indication.
a. Oxygen pressure gauge In the Black.
Figure 72.Ejection Seat Safe−and−Arm Module
7−7 ORIGINAL
19. Parachute risers Properly Routed. 4. ICS panel

Check that risers are routed down forward face of a. VOL knob As Desired.
parachute container and behind retention strap.
b. Amplifier NORM.
20. Ejection seat and canopy pins Stowed.
c. Function switch COLD MIC.
7.4 PILOT PROCEDURES 5. Radio VOLUME panel.
The interior inspection provides a systematic coverage a. JTIDS SEL switch Set.
of all cockpit controls to ensure proper setup prior to the
b. VOLUME knobs As Desired.
application of external power, assuming no external air−con
ditioning source will be used prior to engine start. These 6. TACAN mode switch OFF.
checks correspond to the condition that the plane captain
should set up in the cockpit as part of the preflight. Each a. Channel Set.
cockpit setup consists of a sequential sweep of controls on the
left console, instrument panel, and right console. b. VOL knob Counterclockwise.
7. STAB AUG switches OFF.
7.4.1 Interior Inspection  Pilot
8. U/VHF OFF.
NATOPS prohibits the attaching or stowing of

unauthorized equipment on or above the canopy The emergency wingsweep handle can be moved
rails during CV launch and arrestment, due to the independent of the wings and wingsweep indica
potential for missile hazard. tors when no hydraulic power and/or electrical
power are on the aircraft. Care must be taken to
1. Harnessing Fasten. accurately determine the position of the emer
gency wingsweep handle prior to application of
a. Leg restraint lines and garters Connect. hydraulic power. Inadvertent wingsweep to the
Ensure that leg lines are not twisted or looped. position selected by the emergency wingsweep
handle may occur, resulting in potential damage
b. Lapbelt Connect and Adjust. to the aircraft. When positioning the wings dur
Connect lapbelt straps and adjust snug so as to ing ground operation other than pilot poststart or
provide secure lap restraint in flight and seat kit postlanding checklist procedures, use the emer
suspension for ground egress or ejection. gency wingsweep handle to minimize the possi
bility of moving the wings inadvertently.
c. Parachute release fittings Attach to Harness
Buckles. 9. Wing−sweep switch MAN.
d. Anti−g and oxygen/communication leads 10. Emergency wingsweep handle Corresponding.
Attach.
11. Left and right throttles OFF.
When connecting the oxygen/communication
fitting, avoid twisting the hard hose. 12. Exterior lights master switch Set.
e. Inertia reel Check. Position switch in accordance with standard proce
dures for day or night and field or carrier operations.
Position shoulder harness lock lever forward to
lock position. Check that both shoulder straps 13. FLAP handle CORRESPONDING.
lock evenly and securely. Move lever aft to 14. Throttle friction leverOFF (aft).
unlock harness.
15. ASYM LIMITER switch ON (guard down).
Attach composite fitting without causing unnec
essary twisting of hard hose. 16. L and R ENG mode switches PRI.
17. BACK UP IGNITION switch OFF.
2. OBOGS master switch OFF.
3. TONE VOLUME controls Set. 18. THROTTLE TEMP switch NORM.
ORIGINAL 7−8
19. THROTTLE MODE switch BOOST. 35. Circuit breakers Checked.
20. L and R INLET RAMPS switches AUTO. 36. HYD HAND PUMP Check.
21. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch OFF. Extend handpump handle and stroke to check
firmness of pumping action and an indication of
22. FUEL panel pressure buildup on the brake pressure gauge. Stow
handpump handle in a convenient position for ready
a. WING/EXT TRANS switch AUTO. access.
b. REFUEL PROBE switch RET.
37. HOOK handle Corresponding.
c. DUMP switch OFF.
38. GUN ROUNDS panel Set.
d. FEED switch NORM (guard down).
39. DISPLAYS panel
23. LDG GEAR handle DN. a. HUD MODE switch Set.
Check HYD ISOL switch in TO/LDG. b. HUD DECLUTTER switch Set.
24. NOSE STRUT switch OFF. c. HUD FORMAT switch Set.
25. Parking brake Pull. d. HUD/VDI ALT switch BARO.
26. Altimeter Set. e. HUD PWR switch OFF.
Set field or carrier elevation as applicable. f. ECM switch Set.
27. Radar altimeter OFF. g. TCS FOV switch Set.
28. Standby attitude gyro Caged. 40. ELEV LEAD knob Set.
29. Left and right FUEL SHUT OFF handles In. 41. SW COOL switch Set.
30. MA ARM switch OFF (guard down). 42. L and R generator switches NORM.
31. ACM switch OFF (guard down).
32. Multifunction display mode switches OFF.
Note Ground engine operation without electrical pow

er supplied by either the generators or external
Visually check for security of cockpit equipment,
particularly the multifunction displays, HUD, power may cause 20−mm ammunition detonation
and instrument panel gauges. because of excessive heat in the gun ammunition
drum.
33. Clock Wind and Set.
43. EMERG generator switch NORM (guard down).
34. Fuel BINGO Set.
44. Air−condition controls
Set total fuel remaining value for initial activation a. TEMP mode select switch AUTO.
of fuel BINGO caution reminder consistent with
mission profile to be flown. b. TEMP thumbwheel control As Desired
(5 to 7 midrange).
7−9 ORIGINAL
c. CABIN PRESS switch NORM.

d. AIR SOURCE OFF.
45. WSHLD AIR switch OFF.
46. ANTI−ICE switch AUTO/OFF. Wings will move to emergency handle position
regardless of wing−sweep cb position.
47. ARA−63 panel
a. CHANNEL selector  Set. Note
b. POWER switch OFF. If wings are in OV SW, do not extend handle.

48. MASTER LIGHT panel controls As Required. 3. ICS Check.
Set external and interior lighting controls consistent 4. Landing gear indicator and transition light 
with day or night and field or carrier operating Check.
conditions.
Check gear position indication down and transition
49. MASTER TEST switch OFF. light off.
50. EMERG FLT HYD switch AUTO (guard down). 5. MASTER TEST switch Check.
51. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch SHUTOFF Coordinate with RIO.
(guard up).
a. LTS.
52. CANOPY air diffuser lever CABIN AIR.
Check that all warning, caution, and advisory
53. VIDEO CONTROL switch OFF.
lights illuminate. The brightness of the indexer
54. Storage case Inspect. lights should be set during the test.
b. FIRE DET/EXT.
Check adequacy of flight planning documents and
storage of loose gear.
L and R FIRE lights illuminate to verify
continuity of respective system. The GO light
7.4.2 Prestart Pilot
will illuminate verifying continuity through the
1. External electrical power ON. four squib lines, that 28 Vdc is available at
the left and right fire switches, and that the fire
2. If wings are not in OV SW: extinguisher containers are pressurized.
a. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP DR c. INST

NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb’s Pull (LD1, LE1).
Check for the following responses after 5 seconds:
b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Extend
(1) RPM 96 percent.
and Match Captain Bars With Wing Position
Tape. (2) EGT  950 ± 10_C.
Initiates engine overtemperature alarm.
(3) FF 10,500 Pph.
(4) AOA (units) 18 ± .5
Reference and indication.
(5) Wing sweep 45 ± 2.5_.
Program, command, and position.
ORIGINAL 7−10
(6) FUEL QTY 2,000 ± 200 Pounds (both 7.4.3 Engine Start Pilot
cockpits).
Prior to engine start, the pilot and plane captain should
(7) Backup oxygen pressure 1,800 to 2,100 ascertain that the turnup area is clear of FOD hazards, ade
Psi. quate fire−suppression equipment is readily available, and
engine intakes and exhausts are clear. Although the engines
(8) L and R FUEL LOW lights Illuminated cannot be started simultaneously, either can be started first.
(both cockpits). The following procedure establishes starting the right engine
first. Whenever possible the aircraft should be positioned so
d. MASTER TEST switch OFF. as to avoid tailwinds, which can increase the probability of
hot starts.
6. Ejection seat SAFE/ARMED handles  ARMED.
Verify seat armed with RIO.
7. CANOPY Clear RIO To Close.

Coordinate movement of any external surfaces
and equipment with the plane captain or director.
Flightcrews shall ensure that hands and foreign

objects are clear of front cockpit handholds and
top of ejection seats and canopy sills to prevent
personal injury and/or structural damage during D If engine chugs and/or rpm hangup is encoun
canopy opening or closing sequence. Only mini tered with one engine turning during normal
mum clearance is afforded when canopy is tran ground start, monitor EGT for possible hot
sitioning fore and aft. start. AIR SOURCE pushbutton should be set
for the operating engine until rpm stabilizes at
Note idle; then set to BOTH ENG.
If CLOSE does not close the canopy, depress the D To prevent possible engine overtemperature
grip latch, release and push handle outboard and during crossbleed start attempts, select the op
forward into BOOST. If it is necessary to use erating engine for air source and return to
BOOST, the handle shall be returned to CLOSE BOTH ENG after rpm stabilizes at idle or
to avoid bleed−off of pneumatic pressure. above.
8. LAD/CANOPY light OFF. 1. ENG CRANK switch L (left engine).
2. ENG CRANK switch  OFF.

Plane captain shall stow boarding ladder and steps.
3. ENG CRANK SWITCH  R (right engine).
9. Inform RIO Ready To Start.
4. ENG CRANK SWITCH OFF.
10. Starter air ON.
5. EMERG FLT HYD switch LOW−HIGH−AUTO
(LOW).
a. EMERG FLT HYD switch LOW.
The ECS air source shall remain off during Check that ON flag is displayed in EMER FLT
engine start until external air is disconnected in LOW hydraulic pressure window. Verify control
order to reduce the possibility of bleed air duct over horizontal tail and rudder control surfaces as
contamination. viewed on surface position indicator.
7−11 ORIGINAL
b. EMERG FLT HYD switch HIGH. D If the START/VALVE caution light illumi
nates after the ENG CRANK switch is off, se
Check that ON flag is displayed in EMER FLT HI lect AIR SOURCE to OFF to prevent starter
hydraulic pressure window. Verify control over overspeed.
empennage flight control surfaces and higher
D When attempting a crossbleed or normal
surface deflection rate.
ground start, do not attempt to reengage the
c. EMERG FLT HYD switch AUTO (LOW). ENG CRANK switch if the engine is spooling
down and rpm is greater than 46 percent. Be
tween 30 and 46−percent rpm, the ENG
Check that OFF flags are displayed in both
CRANK switch may not stay engaged be
EMER FLT HI and LOW hydraulic pressure
cause of normal variations in starter cutout
windows.
speed.
Note
During cold starts, oil pressure may exceed 65
psi. This pressure limit should not be exceeded
Combined and brake accumulators should be for more than 1 minute.
charged prior to backup module checks. Checks
7. Right throttle IDLE at 20−Percent Rpm.
should be made slowly enough to ensure con
tinuous ON indication in the hydraulic pressure
indicator and to prevent damage to the pump or
motor.
Note
If an idle crossbleed start is attempted with high−
Ensure combined and flight hydraulic pressures residual engine EGT and/or throttles are ad
are zero prior to testing emergency flight hydrau vanced from OFF to IDLE prior to 20−percent
lic system to allow proper check of 300−psi rpm, higher than normal EGT readings may
priority valve. occur. If the EGT appears to be rising abnormal
ly, increasing the supply engine to 80−percent
6. ENG CRANK switch R (right engine). rpm may yield a normal start temperature.
Place the crank switch to the R position where the Note

switch is solenoid held until automatically released
to the neutral (OFF) position at the starter cutout D Advancing the R throttle from OFF to IDLE
speed of approximately 49 to 51−percent rpm. automatically actuates the ignition system.
Manual deselect of the switch to OFF will interrupt An immediate indication of fuel flow (300
the crank mode at any point in the start cycle. Oil to 350 pph) will be exhibited and light−off
pressure and flight hydraulic pressure rise will (EGT rise) should be achieved within 5 to
become evident at 20−percent rpm. 15 seconds. Peak starting temperatures will be
achieved in the 40 to 50−percent rpm range.
After a slight hesitation, the EGT will return
to normal. Exceeding 890_C constitutes a
hot start. During the initial starting phase,
the nozzle should expand to a full−open
(100 percent) position.
D If no oil pressure or hydraulic pressure is indi
cated, start shall be aborted by setting ENG D Loss of electrical power may result in smoke
CRANK switch to OFF. entering the cockpit via the ECS.
D If the ENG CRANK switch does not automati

cally return to the OFF position by 50−percent
rpm during start, ensure that the ENG
CRANK switch is off prior to 60−percent rpm
to prevent starter overspeed.
ORIGINAL 7−12
8. R GEN light  OUT. 15. Repeat steps 6 through 10 for left engine.
The right generator should automatically pick up 16. Starter air Disconnect.
the load on the left and right main ac buses as
indicated by the R GEN light going out at approxi 17. AIR SOURCE L ENG, R ENG, then BOTH ENG.
mately 59−percent rpm.
Verify cockpit airflow in each position.
9. R FUEL PRESS light OUT.
The fuel−pressure lights should go off by the time
the engine achieves idle rpm.
10. Idle engine instrument readings Check.

a. RPM  62 to 78 Percent. Ensure ECS service air is available to OBOGS
prior to selecting the OBOGS master switch ON.
b. EGT 350 to 650_C (nominal).
18. OBOGS master switch ON.
c. FF 950 to 1,400 Pph (nominal).
d. NOZ position 100 Percent. 19. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch NORMAL.
e. OIL 25 to 35 Psi (nominal) (15 psi minimum). 20. Ground safety pins Remove and Stow.
f. FLT HYD PRESS 3,000 Psi.
Plane captain should remove landing gear pins and
11. External power Disconnect. tailhook safety pin (ashore) and stow them.
7.4.4 Poststart Pilot
1. STAB AUG switches All ON.
Ground engine operation without electrical pow 2. MASTER TEST switch EMERG GEN.
er supplied by either the generators or external
power may cause 20−mm ammunition detonation The resultant power interruption should cause the
because of excessive heat in the gun ammunition DFCS flight control computers to self−isolate,
drum. activating the lights listed below. With a good
emergency generator check, (green ‘GO’ light)
12. ENG CRANK switch L (left engine). ensure that all lights clear with a MASTER RESET
prior to deselecting the emergency generator. DFCS
When combined hydraulic pressure reaches 3,000 voltage monitoring should result in illumination of
psi, return switch to neutral (center position). all lights when emergency generator is deselected.
13. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch NORMAL Lights will remain on when normal voltage is
Hydraulic transfer pump will operate from flight regained, requiring a MASTER RESET to
side to maintain the combined side between 2,400 re−engage DFCS flight control computers. STAB
to 2,600 psi. AUG switches should remain engaged.
DFCS caution/advisory lights:

PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, FCS CAU
TION, ARI DGR, ARI/SAS OUT, HZ TAIL AUTH,
RUDDER AUTH, SPOILERS, AUTO PILOT, &
If the transfer pump does not pressurize the com MACH TRIM.
bined system within 5 seconds, immediately set
HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch to SHUTOFF.
14. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch SHUTOFF.
7−13 ORIGINAL
3. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress. 9. Emergency WING SWEEP handle OV SW.

Verify DFCS caution lights extinguished.
Note
An FCS CAUTION at this point probably indi
cates a PQVM fault due to a lack of pitch and roll If the over" flag is not displayed in the wing−
attitude inputs from the IMU (DCP FAIL group sweep indicator with the wings in oversweep, the
will indicate IMU). stick should remain centered.
4. MASTER TEST switch OFF. If wings are not in oversweep, move the wings to
68_ using wing sweep emergency handle in
5. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress. raised position. Then raise handle to full exten
Verify DFCS caution lights extinguished. STAB sion and hold until HZ TAIL AUTH caution light
AUG switches should not disengage. goes out and OVER flag appears on wing−sweep
indicator. Move handle to full aft OV SW and
6. Advise RIO that test and checks are completed. stow.
7. Controls and displays ON.
10. WING−SWEEP MODE switch AUTO.
8. AFTCCheck.
11. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SW DR
a. L ENG MODE SELECT switch SEC. NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb’s IN (LD1, LE1).
L ENG SEC light illuminates; left NOZ indicator 12. WING/EXT TRANS switch OFF.
pointer below zero.
13. OXYGEN SUPPLY valve ON.
b. L ENG MODE SELECT switch PRI.
Turn OXYGEN SUPPLY valve ON, place mask to
L ENG SEC light goes out, left NOZ indicator to
face and check for normal breathing, regulator, and
100 percent.
mask operation. Turn OXYGEN SUPPLY valve
c. R ENG MODE SELECT switch SEC. OFF, check no breathing.
R ENG SEC light illuminates, right NOZ 14. COMM/NAV/GEAR/DISPLAYS ON.

indicator pointer below zero.
a. V/UHF RADIO MODE switch
d. R ENG MODE SELECT switch PRI. T/R or T/R & G.
R ENG SEC light goes out, right NOZ indicator b. TACAN function selector T/R.
to 100 percent.
c. MFDs ON.
d. ARA−63 POWER switch ON.
e. HUD PWR switch−ON.

Selecting secondary (SEC) mode closes exhaust f. Radar altimeter ON.
nozzles increasing exhaust nozzle jet−wake
hazard. g. VIDEO control switch ON.
Note 15. Trim Set 000.
D Performing AFTC check during OBC inhibits 16. Standby gyro Erect.
AICS ramps from programming. Ramps
must be reset before another OBC can be 17. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress.
performed.
D Operating engines in secondary mode inhibits
the engine monitoring system portion of
FEMS until primary mode is reselected.
ORIGINAL 7−14
18. DCP Verify codes (FAIL, FLT, IBIT). b. AUTO THROTTLE.

This test is a computer self−test with output
Note
commands inhibited to prevent throttle
An FCS CAUTION at this point probably indi movement.
cates a PQVM fault due to a lack of pitch and roll
attitude inputs from the IMU (DCP FAIL group c. Verify DFCS IBIT operation by flashing A/P
will indicate IMU). This fault will not affect REF and ACLS advisories. During the course of
DFCS IBIT results and can be cleared with a the test, the DFCS caution lights remain illumi
MASTER RESET before or after, but not during nated until the test is satisfactorily completed.
OBC. All lights should be off at termination of test.
Observe following:
19. MASTER TEST switch OBC.
D DFCS caution and advisory lights
20. AUTOPILOT switch ENGAGE.
D Pitch trim check (slow longitudinal
stick motion)
D Pitch parallel actuator (rapid longitudi
nal stick motion)
D Individual spoiler operation (only if
OBC commencement with autopilot engaged wings 20° and flaps down)
and nose down trim may result in a force link dis
D Stab actuator tests (horizontal tail and
connect when the stick hits the forward stick stop
rudder movement)
during the pitch parallel actuator checks.
D Autopilot disengage
21. Failure History File Clear.
D Rudder pedal shaker
22. MFD OBC TEST Select.
D DCP display LED check
(Coordinate with RIO and plane captain.)
d. Check for PASS" in DCP. If faults are displayed,
record FCS fault codes using INC/DEC push
buttons. Ensure FAIL and FLT codes are cleared
prior to takeoff.
D Increased suction around intakes during inlet 23. Speedbrake switch EXT, then RET.
ramp programming and the automatic move Cycle speedbrake switch to EXT; release and check
ment of the horizontal stabilizers presents a for partial extension. Select EXT again, checking
FOD hazard and a potential for injury to indicator for transition for full extension. Select
ground personnel not clear of these areas. RET and check indicator for an indication of full
retraction. Check for stabilizer position fluctuation
The following systems are automatically exercised during speedbrake extension and retraction to verify
during the 1½ minutes required to complete the integrated trim operation.
OBC tests. Failures are displayed on the TID
display. 24. REFUEL PROBE switch ALL EXT, then RET.
a. The AICS self−test turns on hydraulic power and Cycle the probe to the extend position, noting
exercises the ramps through full cycle: STOW− illumination of the probe transition light with
EXTND−STOW. During the test, the respective switch−probe position disparity. Check probe nozzle
RAMP light illuminates until the ramps return to head for condition. Retract probe and again check
the fully stowed position and the hydraulics are that transition light goes out when fully retracted
shut off. A failure is indicated by an INLET light and doors closed.
and/or OBC readout.
7−15 ORIGINAL
25. WSHLD AIR switch Cycle. 33. Flight controls Cycle.
26. MASTER TEST switch OFF. Complete full cycle sweep of longitudinal, lateral,
directional, and combined longitudinal−lateral con
If engaged, verify that autopilot disengages trols while checking for full authority on surface
automatically. position indicator. Check that all spoilers extend at
the same rate with slow lateral stick deflections and
27. WING/EXT TRANS switch OFF. extend to full up position.
28. Trim Checked and set 000. Observe the following:
a. Pitch control 36_ TEU to 9_ TED horizontal

tail (33° to 12° without ITS).
b. Lateral control 24_ total differential tail.

Ensure adequate clearance before moving wings.
Sweep times from 68° to 20° in excess of 9 sec c. Directional control ± 30_ rudder.
onds may be indicative of an impending wing
sweep motor failure and should be further d. Longitudinal/Lateral combined 35_ TEU,
investigated. 15_ TED horizontal tail.
e. Spoilers 55°.
Note
For CV operations, omit steps 29 through 55. Note
29. EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle 20_. A stabilizer vibration may occur when the con
trol system linkage is held in contact with the tail
Move the emergency WING SWEEP handle to 20_ stops fully engaged during stick cycling checks.
(full forward) and engage the spider detent. Stow This vibration is acceptable, provided it damps
handle and guard. HZ TAIL AUTH light illuminates when the control stick is moved to clear the stop
coming out of OVSW. Light goes off when OVSW in contact. Clearance from the stop can best be
stops removed. verified by movement of the matching stabilizer
indicator needle away from its maximum travel
30. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress. position.
34. DLC Check.
The WING SWEEP warning and advisory lights go
out and the AUTO and MAN modes are enabled. Verify horizontal tail shift with DLC input.
35. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch SPOILER
31. External lights Check (prior to night/IMC flight). BK.
36. Spoilers and throttles Check.
37. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch OFF.
38. DCP Verify codes (FAIL, FLT, IBIT).
During night operations, aircraft with inoperable
tail and aft anticollision lights will not be visible
from the rear quadrant even under optimum me
teorological conditions, thus increasing midair
potential.
Aircraft shall be considered down with PFCC,
32. Flaps and slats DN. RFCC, or YFCC codes in the DCP FAIL group
or with an inoperative DCP display. Initiation of
OBC/IBIT with this condition will result in
Check for full deflection of the flaps and slats to
invalid IBIT indications.
the down position and automatic activation of the
outboard spoiler module. Check for 3_ TEU
stabilizer position.
ORIGINAL 7−16
39. MASTER TEST switch DFCS BIT(IBIT ARM). display 0 feet; warning tone signal (both cockpits)
(Coordinate with RIO and plane captain.) and ALT LOW light illuminated momentarily.
40. AUTOPILOT switch ENGAGE. 57. Displays/SMS Check.
41. MASTER TEST switch DFCS BIT (IBIT RUN). Note

(Coordinate with RIO and plane captain.) If tanks are not ID’d on the SMS page, the possi-
bility exists that they will jettison with weight off
42. DCP Verify & record codes (FAIL, FLT, IBIT).
wheels or fail to jettison if selected airborne.
Check for PASS" in DCP. If faults are displayed,
record FCS fault codes using INC/DEC push- 58. TACAN BIT.
buttons. 59. ARA−63 BIT.
43. DCP Clear codes (FAIL & FLT). 60. HUD−VIDEO BIT.
Ensure FAIL and FLT codes are cleared prior to 61. Altimeter Set.
takeoff.
Barometric setting and error determined.
44. Flaps and slats UP.
62. Compass CHECK.
45. Maneuver flaps DN. Validate inertial navigation system desired heading
46. WING−SWEEP MODE switch MAN 50°. on the display by cross−checking with the SAHRS
derived heading on the BDHI. Cross−checking can
also be accomplished by cycling the navigation
system between INS and SAHRS.
63. SAHRS attitude reference Check.

If wing−sweep commanded position indicator
With parking brake in, check SAHRS attitude
(captain bars) does not stop at 50_, immediately
reference by boxing, then unboxing SAHRS on the
select AUTO with WING−SWEEP switch.
MFD OWN A/C format. HUD attitude should not
47. Maneuver flaps Crack up. change.
Note
48. WING−SWEEP MODE switch BOMB.
Do not perform this check by boxing SAHRS,
Check maneuver flap retraction.
then boxing INS. This will manually select INS,
49. EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle 68_. preventing an automatic change to SAHRS in the
event of INS failure.
50. EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle OV SW.
64. Flight instruments  Check.
51. WING−SWEEP MODE switch AUTO.
65. Oxygen monitor Test.
52. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress.
7.4.4.1 Final Checker (Ashore)
53. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch BOTH.
1. NOSE STRUT switch KNEEL; Check Launch
54. ANTI SKID BIT. Bar DN.
Ensure coarse alignment is completed before releas-
ing parking brake.
55. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch OFF.
Note Ensure all tiedowns have been removed before
selecting KNEEL.
CV checklist resumes.
2. Hook DN; Check RATS Advisory Light On,
56. Radar altimeter BIT. Then Up.
Depress SET knob; check that radar altitude 3. LAUNCH BAR switch  Cycle.
displays 100 feet and indicator green light is
illuminated. Release knob and pointer should 4. NOSE STRUT switch  EXTD.
7−17 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
7.4.4.2 Final Checker Aboard CV D To prevent overheating, do not ride the wheel
brakes.
1. Hook Down On Director’s Signal; Check RATS
Advisory Light On, Then Up. Note
When shutting down one engine during taxiing,
only the right engine should be shut down so that
normal braking is maintained.
7.4.5.2 Taxi Interval

Carrier operations with an inoperative RATS
will increase CV wind−over−deck requirements. The taxi interval should be sufficient to avoid taxiing
Failure to notify CV OPS may result in damage through another aircraft’s jet wash, which presents additional
to the ship’s arresting gear and aircraft tailhook FOD potential. Although the antiskid system is armed at
assembly structure. Consult applicable recovery speeds less than 15 knots, the antiskid system is not operative.
bulletins. The nosewheel steering can remain engaged throughout the
2. Nosewheel steering Cycle OFF, Then ON. taxi phase. Application of wheelbrakes in conjunction with
nosewheel steering should be performed symmetrically to
minimize nose tire side loads. In minimum radius turns
(Figure 7−3) using nosewheel steering, the inboard wheel
rolls backwards as the axis of rotation is between the main
gear. Because of the distance from the cockpit to the main
Failure to cycle nosewheel steering following landing gear, the pilot should make allowance for such to
hook check will permit nosewheel steering cen prevent turning too soon and cutting corners short.
tering to remain engaged and can cause misposi
tioning of the launch bar during catapult hookup. 7.4.5.3 Crew Comfort
This may result in launch bar disengaging from Crew comfort during taxi operations is affected by the
shuttle during catapult stroke. nose strut air curve characteristics, that maintains the strut in
the fully extended (stiff strut) position except during decel
7.4.5 Taxiing eration. Because of the wide stance of the main gear, differen
tial application of wheelbrakes is effective for turning the
To set the aircraft in motion starting from a static posi aircraft without the use of nosewheel steering. Subsequent to
tion requires advancing the throttles slightly. While depart flight, while returning to the line at light gross weights, one
ing the line area, flightcrew should clear the extremities of
engine may be shut down to prevent excessive taxi speeds at
the aircraft and the wings should remain at 68_ or in OV SW
IDLE thrust.
to minimize the span clearance. Once in motion, IDLE thrust
is normally sufficient to sustain taxi speeds and full nose
wheel steering authority may be realized.
7.4.5.1 Taxi Speed
Taxi speed should be maintained at a reasonable rate D On−deck engine operations for extended peri
consistent with traffic, lighting, and surface conditions. ods can result in an unacceptable buildup in
Subsequent to flight, while returning to the line at light fluid (hydraulic, engine oil, and IDG oil) tem
gross weights, the right engine may be shut down to prevent peratures by taxing heat exchanger capacities.
excessive taxi speeds at IDLE thrust. Since the left IDG supplies the majority of the
electrical power, it is more susceptible to
overheating than the right. Tail winds or large
power demand, or both, at high ambient air
temperatures, increase the chance of fluid
overtemperature.
D Before taxiing aircraft with wings in over D Since the outboard spoiler module is automat
sweep and full wing fuel tanks, trim stabilizer ically energized with the flap handle down
to zero to prevent wingtip and stabilizer inter and weight on wheels, it is necessary to re
ference. strict the amount of flaps down operation on
D When taxiing across obstacles ensure nose the deck to prevent module fluid overheating,
wheel is centered to preclude launch bar from or pull outboard spoiler module circuit
impacting nose wheelwell doors. breaker.
ORIGINAL 7−18
Figure 73.Taxi Turn Radii (Maximum Nosewheel Steering 70_)
7−19 ORIGINAL
7.4.6 Taxi Pilot Hold in position for takeoff using the toe pedal brakes
with nosewheel steering engaged. Perform engine checks at
85 to 90−percent rpm. Select MIL on the roll and monitor
engine performance.
Taxiing with the left engine secured is not autho

rized. Normal braking and nosewheel steering
control will be lost if the hydraulic transfer pump Takeoffs with the HUD uncaged can produce
(BI−DI) fails while taxiing with the left engine HUD symbology that is difficult to interpret dur
secured. ing turning or asymmetric flight conditions. If
takeoff is anticipated following an uncaged land
1. Parking brake Release. ing, selecting the cage/seam switch on the in
2. Nosewheel steering Check. board throttle will ensure the HUD returns to the
caged format.
NWS ENGA light illuminates upon engagement.
Check control and polarity in static position before Note
commencing to taxi.
D Do not use the parking brake to restrain the
Note aircraft under the high−power conditions since
tire skid might result.
If nosewheel steering is inoperative, the emer
gency gear extension air release valve may be D If static engine runup greater than 90−percent
tripped, which will prevent gear retraction. rpm is required, runup should be performed
one engine at a time.
3. Brakes Check.
7.4.7.1 Afterburner Takeoff
Check for proper operation by applying left or right
brake individually and observing brake pressure Afterburner takeoffs are limited to single−engine, mini
recovery to the fully charged condition. mum afterburner takeoffs, waveoffs, bolters, or catapult
launches. Dual−engine afterburner and single−engine maxi
4. Turn−and−slip indicator Check. mum afterburner takeoffs, waveoffs, bolters, or catapult
launches are prohibited. Refer to Chapters 4 and 11.
5. Ordnance Safe.
Perform the following functions at prescribed 7.4.7.2 Brake Release
location prior to takeoff in accordance with base
After takeoff power checks are completed and at a safe
operating procedures:
interval behind the preceding aircraft, release the toe pedal
a. Missile seeker and tuning Check. brakes. Nosewheel steering should be used for directional
control during the initial takeoff roll. Although the rudder
b. Gun and external stores  Ground Safety Pins becomes effective at 40 to 60 knots, to ensure adequate direc
Removed and Armed. tional control in the event of an engine failure, nosewheel
steering should remain engaged until 100 KCAS. Refer to
7.4.7 Takeoff NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1 for nosewheel steering on and off
abort data.
The aircraft takeoff checklist should be completed
prior to calling for takeoff clearance, and all annunciator Note
lights should be off, except NWS ENGA. Full flaps and slats
D Takeoffs performed with standing water on
are optional for all takeoff regardless of thrust or gross weight
the runway may result in unstable engine op
conditions. Flightcrew should be operating in HOT MIC dur
eration because of water ingestion.
ing this phase of flight to enhance communications in event
of emergency. Upon tower clearance and after visually clear D The nose strut should return to the fully ex
ing the approach zone, the pilot should taxi onto the runway tended position (+1.5° pitch attitude) upon
(take downwind side if another aircraft to follow) and roll brake release; failure to do so will increase the
straight ahead to align the nosewheel and to check compass takeoff ground roll. Use of differential brak
alignment. ing to control directional alignment should be
avoided because of its attendant effect on
ground roll distance.
ORIGINAL 7−20
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
7.4.7.3 Takeoff Roll/Lift-Off wings-level flight or effecting gradual turns with symmetric
thrust. Before reaching the flap (225 KCAS for 10_ flaps) and
Minimum ground roll takeoff procedures do not differ gear (280 KCAS) limit speeds, the pilot should ascertain that
from the normal procedures. Maintain the control stick at the all devices are properly configured for higher speed flight.
trimmed condition during the prerotation ground roll phase The combined hydraulic system nonflight essential compo-
to minimize aircraft drag. After the pre-computed rotation nents (landing gear, brakes, and nosewheel steering) may be
speed (refer to NAVAIR 01-F14AAP-1.1), smoothly pull the isolated by selecting FLT on the hydraulic isolate switch. A
control stick aft to position the HUD waterline at a 7_ to 10_ gradual climbout pitch attitude should be maintained until
pitch attitude until safely airborne. With the flaps down, the intercepting the optimum climb speed. A recheck of engine
aircraft seems to balloon from the runway in a near-level nose instruments and configuration status should be performed
attitude with a more docile transition to flight than character- after cleanup during the climbout phase.
istic of swept-wing aircraft.
7.4.8 Flaps-Up Takeoff
Note
Before the takeoff roll, the procedures for flaps-up
D The use of excessive back stick on takeoff takeoff are identical to flaps down, except that the flaps re-
may cause the tail surfaces to stall, delaying main retracted and only inboard spoiler brakes are available.
aircraft rotation and extending takeoff During the prerotation ground roll phase, maintain the con-
distance. trol stick at the trimmed condition to minimize aircraft drag.
At the pre-computed rotation speed, smoothly pull the con-
D Although on-deck pitch attitude rotation in trol stick aft to position the HUD waterline at a 7_ to 10_ pitch
excess of 10_ provides marginal tail-ground attitude until safely airborne.
clearance, the aircraft is airborne well before
such a phenomenon becomes a limiting Do not exceed 10_ of pitch attitude until well clear of
factor. the runway, as excessive noseup attitudes will cause the verti-
cal fins and tailpipes to contact the runway surface.
7.4.7.4 After Lift-Off
After lift-off, relax the aft stick force as the aircraft

accelerates toward an in-trim condition. Raise the landing
gear control handle after ensuring that the aircraft is definite-
ly airborne. Pitching moments associated with gear retrac- Because of increased longitudinal control effec-
tion are negligible and a gear-up indication should be tiveness with the flaps retracted, overcontrol of
achieved about 15 seconds after initiation. pitch attitude during takeoff is possible. Large or
abrupt longitudinal control inputs should be
avoided until well clear of the runway.
Transition to flight will occur smoothly as compared to

the ballooning effect in flaps-down takeoffs. After main gear
Illumination of indexer lights is not a positive in- lift-off, relax the aft stick force as the aircraft accelerates.
dication that the main landing gear are clear of
the runway. Raising the gear before a positive Because of the smooth, flat transition to flight, care
rate of climb is established will result in blown should be taken to avoid premature landing gear retraction
main tires. and resulting blown tires. Raise the landing gear control
handle only after ensuring that the aircraft is airborne.
At approximately 180 KCAS (depending on longitudi-
nal acceleration) and at a minimum of 200 feet AGL, the Note
FLAP handle can be placed in the UP position. A moderate
noseup pitching moment occurs during the flap and slat re-
D During flaps-up takeoffs, all flap/wing elec-
traction phase, which takes approximately 8 seconds. Imme-
tromechanical interlocks are removed from
diately after liftoff, do not attempt to counter a lateral drift
the CADC and wing-sweep control box,
caused by a crosswind condition. The use of large lateral
allowing possible inadvertent wing sweep in
control deflection should be avoided to keep from breaking
the event of a CADC failure.
out the wing spoilers, which have a negative effect on lift and
drag. Differential tail authority within the spoiler deadband D Outboard spoilers are inoperative with weight
(½-inch lateral stick deflection) is adequate for maintaining on wheels.
7-21 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
7.4.8.1 Maneuvering Flaps Takeoff

Maneuvering flaps provide improved takeoff perfor
mance when compared to the flaps−up configuration and
eliminate the pitching moment associated with main flap and
In the event of an aborted takeoff, the aborting
slat retraction after takeoff. Slow−speed handling character
aircraft must immediately notify the other air
istics are superior to the flaps−up configuration. Additionally,
craft and the tower. The aircraft not aborting
possible automatic maneuvering flap/slat extension during
should ensure positive wingtip separation is
rotation/transition to flight can be avoided by extending ma
maintained and select full military power to ac
neuvering flaps before takeoff.
celerate ahead of the aborting aircraft. This will
allow the aborting aircraft to move to the center
7.4.9 Formation Takeoff
of the runway and engage the available arresting
Formation takeoffs are permitted in the flaps−up/ ma gear, if required.
neuvering flaps−down configurations for section only. How
ever, they shall not be permitted at night with: crosswind
component in excess of 10 knots; standing water on the run
way; runways less than 8,000 feet long and 200 feet wide; or
with dissimilar aircraft. All aspects of the takeoff must be
briefed by the flight leader. Briefing should include flap set It is imperative that the wingman be alert for the
ting, power settings, use of nosewheel steering, abort proce overrunning situation and take timely action to
dures, and signals for power and configuration changes. preclude this occurrence. Should an overrunning
situation develop after becoming airborne, the
7.4.9.1 Military Lead wingman should immediately increase lateral
separation from the leader to maintain wing
With the completion of the takeoff checks, the lead
position. Safe flight of both aircraft must not be
aircraft will take position on the downwind side of the run
jeopardized in an attempt to maintain position.
way with the wingman on a normal parade bearing with no
wing overlap. Upon signal from the leader, the engines will
7.4.10 Takeoff Aborted
be advanced to 90−percent power. When ready for flight, the
pilots shall exchange a thumbs−up signal. On signal from the See Chapter 13, paragraph 13.1.
leader, brakes are released, MIL is selected, and the leader
then reduces power by 2 percent. Directional control is then 7.4.11 Takeoff Checklist
maintained with nosewheel steering until rudder becomes
effective. During takeoff roll, the leader should make only Prior to takeoff, the checklist will be completed by the
one power correction to enhance the wingman position. If challenge (RIO) and reply (pilot) method via the ICS on HOT
optimum position cannot be obtained, relative position MIC as a double−check of the aircraft configuration status.
should be maintained until the flight is safely airborne. At the For CV operations, steps 1 through 9 may be completed
precomputed rotation speed, the leader should rotate the air while tied down. For field operations, steps 1 through 14
craft 7_ to 10_ noseup on the HUD or MFD and maintain this should be completed in the warmup area.
attitude until the flight is airborne. Turns into the wingman
should not be made at altitudes less than 500 feet above RIO CHALLENGE PILOT RESPONSE
ground level. "CHECK OK, ACCUMULA
1. "BRAKES"
TOR  PRESSURE UP"
7.4.9.2 Wingman
2. FUEL TOTAL "NORMAL FEED, AUTO
The wingman should strive to match the leader’s atti ________lb" TRANSFER, DUMP OFF,
tude as well as maintain parade bearing with wingtip separa TRANSFER CHECKED
tion. When both aircraft are safely airborne, the gear is re
(If AUX tanks carried),
tracted on signal from the leader.
TOTAL ________
WINGS, EXT (If app.)
AFT AND LEFT ________
FORWARD AND
RIGHT ________
FEED TANKS FULL
BINGO SET "
ORIGINAL 7−22
RIO CHALLENGE PILOT RESPONSE 7.4.12 Ascent Checklist

3. CANOPY CLOSED, CLOSED, LOCKS EN-
LOCKS ENGAGED, GAGED, LIGHT OUT, SEAL At level−off or 15,000 feet (whichever occurs first):
LIGHT OUT, STRIPES INFLATED, HANDLE IN
ALIGNED, HANDLE IN CLOSE POSITION" 1. Cabin pressurization Check.
CLOSE POSITION"
4. SEAT . . . ARMED, ARMED, STRAPPED IN 2. Fuel transfer Check.
STRAPPED IN EIGHT EIGHT WAYS, PILOT/MCO
WAYS COMMAND IN WINDOW" (as indicated) 3. Oxygen monitoring system Test.
EJECT" (as briefed)
5. STAB AUG" ALL ON"
6. ATLS" ON"
7. ALL CIRCUIT ALL IN"
BREAKERS SET"
8. MASTER TEST OFF" Subsequent failure of the oxygen monitor system
SWITCH" will not be evident to the aircrew resulting in OB-
9. BI−DIRECTIONAL" NORMAL"
OGS output of unknown quality.
10. COMPASS, STANDBY COMPASS SYNCHRO-
GYRO, TURN NEEDLE NIZED, STANDBY GYRO
Note
AND ALTIMETER" ERECT, GOOD TURN
NEEDLE, AND ALTIMETER
Pilot should ensure oxygen monitor test button is
SET (local settings)" released as soon a possible after illumination of
the OBOGS caution light to preclude unneces-
CV APPROACHING sary depletion of the backup oxygen system.
CAT ON DIRECTOR’S SIGNAL
11. OXYGEN" OBOGS ON, MONITOR 7.4.13 In−Flight BIT
CHECKS GOOD"
12. WINGS (visually "20", AUTO, NO WING−SWEEP If desired or required IBIT check should be run.
checked)" CAWs"
1. OBC disabled on pilot MASTER TEST PANEL
13. FLAPS AND SLATS" AS REQUIRED. Check.
(visually checked)
14. SPOILERS AND "SPOILER MODULE ON,

2. Verify MA ARM OFF.
ANTI−SKID" SPOILER BRAKES
SELECTED" (field) "SPOILER 3. Multifunction display.
MODULE ON, SPOILER
BRAKES OFF" (CV). a. Select OBC basic format.
15. TRIM" 0.0.0," (field) AS
REQUIRED (CV)
b. Depress desired test.
16. SAHRS ATTITUDE GOOD SAHRS ATTITUDE" This initiates the in−flight BIT.
REFERENCE"
17. DISPLAYS" SET FOR TAKEOFF, 7.4.14 Preland and Descent

HUD CAGED"
1. HOOK/HOOK BYPASS As Desired.
18. HARNESS LOCKED" LOCKED"
19. CONTROLS" "FREE, 33° AFT STICK, FULL
SPOILER DEFLECTION LEFT 2. Exterior lights As Desired.
(RIO visually check for
full spoiler deflection) AND RIGHT, HYDRAULICS
3,000 PSI" 3. Displayed heading/BDHI Check With MAG
20. ALL WARNING AND "ALL WARNING AND Compass.
CAUTIONS OUT" CAUTIONS OUT"
4. Wing−sweep switch As Desired.
ASHORE IN TAKEOFF POSITION
21. ANTI−SKID/SPOILER BOTH" (if operable) 5. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch BOTH
BRAKES" (If operable, CV−OFF).
6. Altimeter Set.
7−23 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
7. Radar altimeter — ON/BIT Check. 7.4.15 Pattern Entry
8. Fuel quantity and distribution — Check. Entry to the field traffic pattern will be at the speed and
altitude prescribed by local course rules. When approaching
9. Armament — Safe. the initial for the break, wings may be positioned manually
full aft to facilitate multiplane entry and break deceleration.
10. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever — DEFOG.
Break procedures shall comply with squadron, field, and/or
11. ANTI-ICE switch — AUTO/OFF. CV standard operating guidelines.
12. Display mode — TLN. 7.4.16 Landing
13. Steering — AWL. 7.4.16.1 Approach
14. ARA-63/ACLS — ON/BIT Check. At the abeam position for landing, the aircraft should
be at the prescribed altitude, trimmed up to 15 units AOA
15. RADAR WARNING RCVR PWR switch — OFF. with the Landing Checklist completed.
16. ASPJ SYS switch — STBY.
Indicated airspeed should be cross-checked with gross
17. AN/ALE-47 DCDU, MODE/PWR switch — OFF. weight in wings-level flight to verify AOA accuracy. Direct
lift control and the approach power compensator should be
18. RDR switch — STBY OR XMIT (pulse). engaged as desired and checked for proper operation. The
turnoff from the 180_ position should be made based on
surface wind conditions and interval traffic (type, pattern,
touch-and-go or final landing, etc.) so as to allow sufficient
straightaway on final prior to touchdown.
The RIO should place RDR switch to STBY or The quality of the approach and touchdown is
XMIT (pulse) on final approach to prevent un- enhanced by starting from on-speed and on-altitude. The low
necessary exposure of flight deck personnel to thrust required in the landing approach leaves little margin
RF radiation hazard. for corrections from a high, fast position. Therefore, the pilot
must control these parameters precisely from the onset of the
19. [T] Resolution run — Complete. approach to touchdown. Inertia and tail movement in con-
junction with engine thrust response characteristics dictate
Note the use of small, precise corrections on the glideslope for the
most effective control technique.
Before reconnaissance system shutdown, run
film leader to protect target imagery from The landing should be planned for the downwind side
inadvertent exposure during film download. of the runway with traffic behind, or opposite, the nearest
traffic on landing rollout, or on the turnoff side of the runway.
20. [T] FRAME switch — OFF. When surface wind is not a factor, pilots should practice
flying on the field optical landing aid system whenever pos-
21. [T] PAN switch — OFF.
sible. Fly the aircraft down to the deck without flaring so as
22. [T] FILM switch — OFF. to accurately establish a touchdown point and achieve initial
compression of main gear struts to arm the spoiler brakes.
Note
Landing with DLC engaged will reduce the
amount of aft stick deflection available. DLC
Before selecting system switch to OFF, delay should be deselected when established on land-
15 seconds for sensor shutdown, and mount to ing rollout.
drive to vertical.
23. [T] TARPS control panel SYSTEM switch — OFF.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 7-24
7.4.16.2 Touchdown Follow the Postlanding Checklist for proper configura

tion cleanup procedures. Clear the area behind before turning
To avoid tail−ground clearance problems, pitch attitude
off across the runway. The right engine may be shut down to
should not exceed 15 units AOA. At touchdown, immediate
reduce residual thrust during low−gross−weight taxiing.
ly retard throttles to IDLE and confirm spoiler brake deploy
ment. Expeditiously lower the nosegear to the deck and,
7.4.16.4 Touch and Go
without allowing the nose to come up, smoothly program the
stick full aft.
For touch−and−go landings, MIL thrust is applied after
touchdown while thumbing speedbrakes in manually to con
7.4.16.3 Rollout
figure the aircraft for a go−around. Automatic retraction of
The braking technique to be utilized with or without speedbrakes occurs upon application of MIL thrust as a safety
antiskid selected is essentially the same; a single, smooth backup mode of retraction. Control for rotation is greater
application of brakes with constantly increasing pedal pres than experienced on takeoff, although the aircraft has the
sure. Do not pump the brakes. Directional control during same basic lift−off characteristics. Fuel required per pass is
rollout may require some differential braking. normally 300 pounds, contingent on traffic pattern.
Nosewheel steering may be used during rollout but it
7.4.16.5 Minimum Descent Rate Landings
must be engaged with the rudder pedals centered to avoid a
directional swerve upon engagement. Restrict the use of
Minimum descent rate landings are required for heavy
nosewheel steering during rollout until or unless required for
weight and landing gear emergency landings. Aircraft pitch
directional control. Under conditions of normal braking
attitude at touchdown is critical.
(antiskid selected), the antiskid system is passive and has no
effect on wheelbrake operation. However, if maximum
deceleration is desired, commence braking as the nose is
lowered and smoothly apply sufficient pressure to activate
the antiskid system. When an impending skid is sensed,
antiskid operation will result in a series of short wheel−
brake releases and a surging deceleration. Constant pedal Do not exceed 10_ pitch attitude (on the water
pressure should be maintained. Approaching taxi speed line) and 14 units AOA at touchdown to prevent
(about 15 knots), ease brake pressure and deselect antiskid. speedbrake, exhaust nozzle, and/or ventral fin
damage.
After touchdown, throttles should be immediately

placed at the idle stops. The nosewheel should be lowered to
the ground, fully compressing the main landing gear struts.
Delaying either action will delay the deployment of ground
D If brakes are lost, release brake pedals and roll braking spoilers and may increase landing rollout. Addi
secure antiskid. tionally, until ground roll braking spoilers are deployed,
D If antiskid is not deselected before 15 knots, lateral control remains responsive and pilot−induced lateral
continued hard braking could result in blown oscillation is possible. Aerodynamic braking should not be
tires. used as speedbrakes, exhaust nozzle, and/or ventral fin dam
age may occur.
D Ensure feet are off brakes before crossing
field arresting gear. The Fresnel lens may be used for precise glideslope
D If nosewheel steering hardover is suspected control until arresting the approach rate of descent. Do not
upon engagement of NWS, deselecting NWS, attempt to recenter a high ball in close. The approach should
lowering the hook, and/or differential braking be flown on−speed at 15 units AOA. At approximately 30 feet
may be required to regain directional control. AGL (2 to 3 seconds prior to touchdown), arrest the rate of
descent by a slight addition of power. Maintain approach
Note attitude until touchdown. If the Fresnel lens is not available
If maximum−effort braking or antiskid is not re or runway length is critical, fly a shallow approach to touch
quired, or antiskid is not selected, delaying brake down in the first 1,000 feet of runway. If runway length is
application until the aircraft aerodynamically critical, consideration should be given to reducing touch
decelerates below 80 knots greatly reduces the down speed by flying a no DLC approach.
possibility of blown tires and overheated brakes.
7−25 ORIGINAL
7.4.16.6 Crosswind Landings 4. If a rollout landing is desired, touch down on center

line within the first 500 feet of runway. Landing rol
Crosswind landings may be accomplished using either lout procedures are the same as in a normal landing.
the sideslipped or crabbed technique, up to the crosswind When directional control is clearly established, uti
limit (20 knots). The roll rate command function and revised lize normal braking. During the high−speed portion
spoiler gearing of the DFCS affect crosswind landing flight of the landing roll, little or no deceleration may be
characteristics. During a sideslipped approach the DFCS felt. Do not allow the aircraft to deviate from a
spoiler gearing schedule results in nearly immediate spoiler straight track down the runway. If a skid develops,
breakout with lateral stick deflection from trim. This spoiler release the brakes, and use rudders or nose−wheel
breakout may result in an overly sensitive roll response dur steering for directional control. Reapply the brakes
ing lineup corrections. Because crabbed approaches are cautiously. If the skid continues and adequate run
flown without this offset lateral stick input and do not exhibit way remains, select power as required and fly away.
this characteristic, pilots may find this technique easier for If conditions do not permit flyaway, use the long
DFCS equipped aircraft. field overrun gear if required. If the aircraft is leav
ing the runway to an unprepared surface, secure
If a landing must be made in crosswind conditions in both engines.
excess of the limits, the techniques must be changed. At some
crosswind component, the upwind wing will be raised exces Note
sively and, as a result, directional control will be marginal.
It is estimated that this will occur with a greater than 25−knot A blown tire on landing rollout may result in
crosswind component. If after touchdown the wing is raised directional control difficulties, particularly at
excessively, the spoiler brakes should be turned off and later high speeds. Refer to Chapter 15, Landing Emer
al stick applied to maintain a wings level attitude. If the gencies, for blown−tire emergency procedures.
crosswind component is greater than 25 knots, do not arm the
spoiler brakes for landing and again maintain a wings level 7.4.17 Landing Checklist
attitude with lateral stick. It must be realized that antiskid
will not be available. The placarded Landing Checklist should be completed
in sequence prior to arriving at 180_ abeam the touchdown
7.4.16.7 Landing On Wet Runways point. All checklist items are essential elements to be
checked prior to each landing. With the ICS on HOT MIC,
If operable, antiskid shall be used on wet runways to the pilot shall call out the accomplishment of each step so that
minimize the possibility of skidding or blowing tires. Stand the RIO can double−check that all items have been
ing water greatly decreases braking effectiveness and may performed.
cause total hydroplaning in certain conditions. (Refer to
1. Wing−sweep mode switch 20_ AUTO.
Chapter 18, Extreme Weather Operations.) Intermittent
puddles may cause wheels to lock while braking with antiskid
Check wings in AUTO sweep control mode and
not engaged. As the locked wheel leaves the puddle and
encounters a good braking surface, it will skid and blow verify at 20_.
unless brake pressure is released. The following procedures
2. Wheels THREE DN.
are recommended when landing on a wet runway:
1. Determine field condition before approach (braking Check for wheels−down indication on all three gear,
action, crosswind component, arresting gear status). LAUNCH BAR light, and that gear transition light
is out. Check that brake accumulator pressure is
2. If adverse wind and runway conditions exist, make fully charged.
a short−field arrested landing. In the event that the
arresting gear is not engaged, execute a waveoff or During aircraft carrier (CV) qualifications and other
bolter as appropriate. operations when the landing gear are not raised after
catapult launch, the pilot shall check the LAUNCH
3. Consideration should be given to reducing touch BAR advisory light is off prior to each landing.
down speed by flying a no−DLC approach. Plan the
pattern to be well established on final in a wings− 3. SAS ON.
level attitude (crab, if required) on speed. Land on
runway centerline, using normal FCLP landing
techniques.
ORIGINAL 7−26
4. Flaps Full DN. 7. DCP Verify & record codes (FAIL, FLT, IBIT).
Check for flap and slat full−down indication and no 8. Right throttle OFF.
FLAP light.
Note
5. DLC Checked.
6. Hook As Desired. D Care should be taken when shutting down the
right throttle (with the left throttle at IDLE) to
Transition light should be out. prevent inadvertent contact with the left
7. Harness Locked. throttle, moving it aft to the cutoff position.
8. Speedbrakes EXT (out). D Run both engines at idle for 5 minutes before
shutdown, especially if they have been run at
Check indicator for full speedbrake extension. high power.
9. Brakes Check.
9. OBOGS master switch OFF (alert RIO).
10. Fuel Check.
10. OXYGEN SUPPLY valve OFF.
7.4.18 Postlanding Pilot
1. Speedbrake switch RET. 11. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch SHUTOFF.
(after BI−DI check)
2. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch OFF.
3. Flaps and slats UP. Check hydraulic transfer pump operation in the
combined−flight direction with the HYD PRESS,
Move FLAP handle UP and check for complete
OIL PRESS, R GEN, and R FUEL PRESS caution
retraction of main flaps and slats and auxiliary flaps
lights illuminated.
(flaps indicator 0_ and no FLAP caution light).
Check automatic deactivation of the outboard 12. Ejection seats Safe (coordinate with RIO).
spoiler module. As soon as the auxiliary flaps are
13. Ordnance Dearm (field).
retracted (8 seconds) the wings will sweep aft if
commanded. Dearm and safety ordnance in accordance with local
operating procedures.
4. Wing−sweep mode switch BOMB.
14. Wheels Chocked.
15. Parking brake Pull.
Ensure that emergency WING SWEEP handle

and wings move to 55_.
5. Emergency WING SWEEP handle OV SW. Do not pull parking brake subsequent to a field
landing if the brakes have been used extensively.
Raise handle and move aft to 68_. Raise handle to
16. V/UHF RADIO MODE switch OFF.
full−up extension and hold. When HZ TAIL AUTH
caution light goes out and the OVER flag appears, 17. Standby attitude gyro Cage.
move EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle full
aft (75_ sweep position) and stow. Rotate handle 18. Left throttle OFF (alert RIO).
guard to stowed position.
6. Avionics OFF. Alert RIO and upon signal from plane captain,
secure left engine. Check emergency generator
Turn off all avionics (data link, radar altimeter, automatic operation upon shutdown.
displays, TACAN, ARA−63) except V/UHF radio.
19. EMERG generator switch OFF.
20. Lights OFF.
Turn off internal and external light switches.
7−27 ORIGINAL
21. EJECT CMD indicator Verify PILOT. 7. SENSOR control panel
22. CANOPY handle Clear RIO To Open. a. TCS FOV WIDE.
23. Flightcrew Egress. b. TCS trim As Set.
7.5 RIO PROCEDURES c. MVR source As Briefed.

7.5.1 Interior Inspection RIO d. MVR RECORD OFF.
8. TACAN mode switch OFF.
9. JTIDS
NATOPS prohibits the attaching or stowing of a. MODE switch STBY.

unauthorized equipment on or above the canopy Note
rails during CV launch and arrestment, due to the
potential for missile hazard. If the primary link system for the mission is
JTIDS, ensure the JTIDS MODE switch is in
1. Circuit breakers Set. STBY position. STBY provides the backup
battery power required to hold the crypto vari
2. Left and right foot pedals Adjust. ables and initialization data required for JTIDS
missions.
3. Harnessing Fasten.
10. KY MODE/TACAN/CMD panel As Desired.
a. Leg restraint lines and garters Connect
Ensure that leg lines are not twisted or looped. 11. KY−58
b. Lapbelt Connect and Adjust. a. PLAIN switch PLAIN.
Connect lapbelt straps and adjust snug so as to b. Power switch OFF.

provide secure lap restraint in flight and seat kit
suspension for ground egress or ejection. c. MODE As Desired.
c. Parachute release fittings Attach to Harness d. FILL switch As Set.

Buckles.
12. V/UHF radio MODE switch OFF.
d. Anti−g and oxygen/communication leads
ATTACH. 13. RADAR COOLING switch OFF.
When connecting the oxygen/communication 14. EJECT CMD lever Set.
fitting, avoid twisting the hard hose.
Determined by squadron policy.
e. Inertia reel Check.
15. Data storage unit Secure.
Position shoulder harness lock lever forward to
lock position. Check that both shoulder straps 16. ARMAMENT control panel
lock evenly and securely. Move lever aft to
a. SEL JETT switch SAFE.
unlock harness.
b. MSL PREP switch OFF.
4. ANT SEL panel As Desired.
c. MSL SPD GATE knob Per SOP.
5. [T] TARPS control panel switches OFF.
d. MSL OPT switch NORM.
6. ICS panel
e. JETTISON STA SEL switch OFF.
a. VOL knob Set.
b. Amplifier NORM. 17. Radio frequency control indicator As Desired.
c. Function selector COLD MIC.
ORIGINAL 7−28
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
18. Standby attitude gyro ¾ Caged, Turn Needle/Ball Note

Centered.
The data-link MODE switch must be set to the
19. Clock — Set and Wind. required link system (JTIDS or TAC) for
appropriate MFD display processing.
20. Sensor hand control panel.
f. ADDRESS — Set.
a. RDR switch — OFF.
b. FIRST switch — OFF. 33. APX-76 — OFF.
c. TCS switch — OFF. 34. IFF MASTER knob — OFF.

35. MODE 4 switch — OUT.
21. Programmable tactical information display — As
Desired. 36. IFF ANT switch — DIV.
Note 37. INTERIOR LIGHTS panel — As Desired.
PTID NAV MODE and DEST switches are 38. RADAR BEACON switch — OFF.
inoperative. 39. RADAR BEACON MODE switch — As Desired.
22. DD power switch — OFF. 40. GND CLG switch — OFF.
23. MFD 3 power — OFF. 41. SYS TEST-SYS PWR ground check panel —
Closed.
24. ECM switch — OFF.
42. POWER SYS TEST switch — OFF.
25. NAV MODE switch — OFF.
7.5.2 Prestart — RIO
26. Data entry unit power — OFF
The following checks are performed by the RIO after
27. RADAR WARNING RCVR starting air and electrical power are applied prior to starting
engines.
a. PWR switch — OFF.
b. DISPLAY TYPE switch — As Desired.
28. ASPJ
a. SYS switch — OFF.
D Starting air, which provides full ECS capabili-
b. BIT switch — OFF. ty, must be connected to the aircraft with elec-
trical power to cool temperature-critical
c. TAC switch — NORM.
avionics.
29. MFA priority switch — NORM. D If starting air is not available, a forced-air
ground cooling unit and servo air must be con-
30. AN/ALE-47 DCDU, MODE/PWR switch — OFF. nected before turning on avionics equipment.
31. AN/ALE-47 Ground Test/Dimmer PNL — D If electrical power is not connected with spare
GUARD DOWN starting air, the ECS will drive to full hot.
32. Data-link panels D To prevent overheating the outboard spoiler

module, pull the OUTBD SPOILER PUMP
a. TEST/NORM/AJ switch — NORM. circuit breaker (2B3) anytime external power
is connected and the flaps are extended.
b. FREQ selector — Set.
D Failure of the COOLING AIR light to illumi-
c. Power switch — OFF. nate on external electrical power indicates a
d. REPLY switch — NORM. miswired or failed sensor. The COOLING
AIR light will not be available to indicate a
e. MODE switch — TAC/JTIDS (as required). subsequent ECS turbine failure.
7-29 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
1. Seat, ICS, and U/VHF foot switches Adjust. mum clearance is afforded when canopy is tran
siting fore and aft.
Adjust seat height so helmet is beneath the canopy
breaker. Adjust ICS and UHF foot pedal fore−aft
Note
position for sitting comfort.
If CLOSE does not close the canopy, depress the
2. External power and air ON. grip latch and release and push handle outboard
3. ICS Check. and forward into BOOST. If it is necessary to use
BOOST, the handle shall be returned to CLOSE
Verify two−way communications between flight to avoid bleed off of pneumatic pressure.
crewmembers and adjust volume to a comfortable
level. 10. Acknowledge Ready To Start.
4. DL, JTIDS, TACAN, and U/VHF Set.
7.5.3 Engine Start RIO
Set communications/TACAN/command control in
accordance with mission and flightcrew operating The RIO must monitor pilot procedures and plane cap
procedures. tain signals to ensure maximum safety during the engine start
sequence.
5. Fuel quantity Check.
6. Lights Check. 7.5.4 Poststart RIO
Check for illumination of console and instrument 1. NAV MODE switch Align.
lighting.
2. DD power switch ON.
7. LTS test Check.
Failure to turn DD power on prior to RDR switch
Check that all caution and advisory lights and ECM
causes a false DD power fault indication in ORT.
lights illuminate.
3. RDR switch XMIT.
Note
Verify that the SENSOR COND advisory light
During pilot INST test, the RIO should observe illuminates.
fuel counter decrease to 2,000 pounds and
MASTER CAUTION and FUEL LOW lights 4. RADAR COOLING switch ON.
illuminate.
Verify that the SENSOR COND advisory light goes
8. Ejection seats ARMED. out.
Arm ejection seat by releasing catch and rotating 5. MFD 3

SAFE/ARMED handle down to ARMED.
a. Power switch DAY/NIGHT/AUTO.
9. CANOPY handle CLOSE. b. BRIGHTNESS and CONTRAST Set.
RIO will normally close canopy. Ensure verbal
6. DEU On.
clearance from pilot. Check that CANOPY light
goes out with full forward transition of canopy into 7. MSL PREP switch As Required.
the sill locks. Check that SEAT UNARMED light
does not illuminate. 8. TCS switch ON.
9. Align coordinates Verify/Update.
10. OXYGEN SUPPLY valve ON.

Flightcrews shall ensure that hands and foreign
objects are clear of front cockpit handholds, top Turn OXYGEN SUPPLY valve ON, place mask to
of ejection seats, and canopy sills to prevent per face, and check for normal breathing and regulator
sonal injury and/or structural damage during and mask operation. Turn OXYGEN SUPPLY valve
canopy opening or closing sequence. Only mini OFF; ensure oxygen flow has stopped.
ORIGINAL 7−30
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
11. [T] TARPS control panel SYSTEM switch — RDY. l. RANGE scale — As Required.
Observe DATA/MAN/Vg/H light illuminated. m. THLD — As Required.
12. TACAN mode switch — T/R. n. CLSN — OFF.
13. IFF MASTER knob — STBY. o. BRIGHT control — Set.
a. Set CODE knob — As Required. p. CONTRAST — Set.
b. IFF panel — Test. 20. Hand control — Set.
(1) MC switch — Out. 21. ASPJ SYS switch — STBY.
(2) Ml, M2, M3 — Test. 22. RADAR WARNING RCVR panel — Set.
Select NORM and observe that TEST light a. Display type switch — NORM.
illuminates.
b. PWR switch — ON.
(3) MC — Test.
c. TEST switch — SPL.
Observe that TEST light illuminates. d. MODE button — LMT.
c. IFF ANT switch — As Desired. 23. DATA LINK power — As Required.
14. JTIDS MODE switch — As Required. 24. D/L reply — As Required.
15. Communications — ON/Set. 25. AAI control panel — Set.
16. KY-58 — As Required. a. TEST/CHAL CC switch — Test.
17. Standby attitude gyro — Erect.
Check DD display.
18. DD — Set.
26. AN/ALE-47 DCDU, MODE/PWR switch —
19. PTID controls — Set. STBY.
a. POWER — As Required. Note

b. SYM ELEM — ON. Ensure correct mission loadout is displayed in
c. DATA LINK — As Required. LED window.
d. NON ATTK — As Required. 27. CANOPY DEFOG-CABIN AIR lever — CABIN

AIR.
e. RU — As Required.
28. Indicator lights — Test.
f. EXP — As Required.
g. LAUNCH ZONE — As Required. 29. [T] V/H check
h. JAM strobe — As Required. a. Manual V/H thumbwheels set — 360 Knots/

200 Feet.
i. TCS — As Required.
b. V/H switch — Test.
j. RIDD — OFF.
c. Observe MAN V/H light is out.
k. PTID Display Mode — As Required.
d. V/H switch — MANUAL.
7-31 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
30. [T] Vertical frame check After INS ALIGN COMPLETE computer message or when
ready for takeoff:
a. Manual V/H thumbwheels set 350 Knots/
1,800 Feet 33. NAV mode switch INS.
b. FRAME switch VERT. Observe MFD transition from align format. Wait
5 seconds.
c. FILM switch RUN.
34. NAV mode switch IFA.
Observe exposure interval of 1.0 second, frame 35. DEST data Verify.
camera green light illuminated, and check
camera frame counter for proper operation. 36. BRG/DIST to destination Check.
d. FILM switch OFF. 37. OWN A/C groundspeed Check.
e. FRAME switch VERT. 38. MAG VAR Check.

39. Notify pilot Ready To Taxi.
31. [T] PAN autocycle check.
a. PAN switch CTR. 7.5.5 Taxi RIO
b. FILM switch RUN. The RIO primary responsibility during taxiing is to act
as copilot/safety observer. BIT checks may be performed
Observe exposure interval of 1.0 second, green while taxiing, provided that RIO attention is not diverted
PAN light illuminated, and check camera frame from copilot/safety observer duties.
counter for proper operation. 1. Record ORT/IBIT and maintenance display results
on BER form.
c. PAN switch LEFT or RIGHT.
2. OWN A/C groundspeed Check.
Observe exposure interval of 2.0 seconds, PAN
Own−aircraft groundspeed when stopped should be
go light illuminated, and check camera frame
less than 3 knots.
counter for proper operation.
3. [T] OWN A/C altitude CHECK.
d. FILM switch OFF.
7.5.6 In−Flight Reconnaissance System
Check RIO
En route to target area:
1. [T] FRAME switch VERT.

Do not run PAN BIT (it may cause film jams).
2. [T] PAN switch CTR.
32. [T] PAN pulse mode check.
3. [T] FILM switch RUN.
a. Manual V/H thumbwheel set 350 Knots/
13,500 Feet. Run only long enough to check operation and
observe FRAME, and PAN green lights illuminated
b. PAN switch CTR. and check frame and foot counters.
c. FILM switch RUN. 4. [T] FILM switch OFF.

5. [T] PAN switch LEFT or RIGHT.
Observe exposure interval of 5.0 seconds, green
PAN light illuminated, and check camera frame 6. [T] FRAME switch FWD.
counter for proper operation.
Note
d. FILM switch OFF. Prior to selecting FILM switch to RUN, delay
15 seconds for camera positioning.
e. PAN switch OFF.
ORIGINAL 7−32
7. [T] FILM switch RUN. If not corrected:
Run only long enough to check operation and 2. [T] FRAME switch OFF.
observe FRAME and PAN green lights illuminated
and check for proper film counter operation.
8. [T] FILM switch OFF.
9. [T] FRAME switch OFF.
10. [T] PAN switch OFF. D Initiate corrective action only one time.
D If mount light does not go off, secure sensor
Note and wait 5 minutes to try again.
Keep manual V/H thumbwheels matched with
7.5.7.3 Panoramic Camera Failure
actual altitude and airspeed to avert possible
degraded imagery if an automatic shift to the
1. [T] FILM switch Cycle OFF/RUN.
manual mode occurs.
7.5.7 TARPS Degraded Mode Procedures
3. [T] PAN switch Cycle OFF/CTR.
If not corrected:
Prior to initiating corrective action on malfunc
tioning sensors, ensure that other sensors are 5. [T] FILM switch OFF.
either in OFF or STBY.
6. [T] PAN selector LEFT or RIGHT.
7.5.7.1 Serial Frame Camera Failure 7. [T] FILM switch RUN.
1. [T] SYSTEM switch Cycle OFF/RDY.
If not corrected:
2. [T] FILM switch Cycle OFF/ RUN/OFF.
3. [T] FRAME switch Cycle OFF/VERT or FWD.
4. [T] FILM switch RUN. 9. [T] PAN selector−−OFF.

6. [T] V/H MANUAL.
7. [T] Thumbwheels Set High Vg/H Value.
Do not initiate BIT.
7.5.7.4 Manual V/H Failure
If not corrected:
1. [T] Thumbwheels 350 Knots/200 Feet.
2. [T] V/H switch Test.
10. [T] FRAME switch OFF.
3. [T] MAN V/H light out Good Test.
7.5.7.2 Mount Failure
4. [T] MAN V/H light on Thumbwheel Failure.
1. [T] FRAME switch−Cycle to Opposite Position.
7−33 ORIGINAL
7.5.8 Postlanding RIO 17. Standby attitude gyro CAGE.
Note 18. OXYGEN supply valve OFF.
Before shutdown, run IBIT. Note results on BER 19. V/UHF radio MODE switch OFF.
card.
20. [T] TARPS control panel switches OFF.
1. Ejection seat SAFE (coordinate with pilot).
21. DEU OFF.
2. EJECT CMD lever PILOT.
22. MFD OFF.
3. Harnessing Unstrap.
23. Report Ready for Shutdown.
4. Radar beacon OFF.
After shutdown of both engines:
5. IFF MODE 4 HOLD, Then OFF.
24. CANOPY handle OPEN (alert pilot).
6. Data link OFF.
25. Flightcrew Egress.
7. ASPJ SYS switch OFF.
7.6 HOT REFUELING PROCEDURES
8. INS VIS FIX.
Before commencing ground hot refueling operations,
9. NAV MODE switch OFF.
a qualified groundcrew shall inspect the exterior of the air
10. RECORD switch OFF. craft for any discrepancies that might be hazardous to refuel
ing or further flight operations. One groundcrew shall remain
in a position on the right side of the aircraft within view of
Requires at least 20 seconds to allow tape to
both the pilot and refueling crew. Any hazardous condition
unthread prior to removal of electrical power.
requires the immediate termination of refueling operations.
11. IRST switch OFF.
After refueling, the flightcrew should refer to appro
12. RDR switch OFF. priate checklists to configure the aircraft for takeoff, depend
ing on intentions.
13. DD power switch OFF.
1. Fire extinguishing equipment Available.
14. RADAR COOLING switch OFF.
2. All emitters STBY or OFF.
15. TACAN mode switch OFF.
3. Right throttle OFF.
16. JTIDS MODE switch STBY/OFF.
4. Wheels Chocked.
Note
5. Parking brake Pull.
If network operations are anticipated within
24 hours, select STBY; otherwise, select OFF. Do
not leave the system in DATA SILENT or NORM
for more than 90 seconds without electrical pow
er or the battery will be depleted.
ORIGINAL 7−34
4. Left engine IDLE.
5. Right engine IDLE.
6. Displays ON.
If heavy braking is used during landing or taxing
followed by application of the parking brake, 7. OBC Select.
normal brake operation may not be available
following release of the parking brake if the 8. SW COOL NORM.
brakes are still hot. Check for normal brake
9. OBC Deselect.
operation after releasing the parking brake and
before commencing taxiing. 10. Hook operation Check.
6. REFUEL PROBE switch FUS EXTD/ALL
EXTD (as desired). 11. Takeoff Checklist.
7. WING/EXT TRANS switch As Desired. 12. Ordnance crew Arm.

Note
7.7.2 RIO Procedures
D If external tanks or wings accept fuel in 1. NAV MODE switch CV ALIGN.
FUS EXTD, select ORIDE on WING/EXT
TRANS switch. 2. CAINS/WPT Select.
D If wings or external tanks do not accept fuel
in ALL EXTD, select FUS EXTD and turn 3. MFD 3 ON.
WING/EXT TRANS switch OFF.
4. Alignment coordinates Verify/Update.
8. REFUEL PROBE switch RET. 5. Seat Arm.
9. WING/EXT TRANS switch OFF. 6. RDR switch XMIT.

7. TCS switch ON.
7.7 DECK−LAUNCHED INTERCEPT
PROCEDURES 8. IRST switch ON.
Note 9. MSL PREP switch NORM.
These procedures assume that a quick reaction, 10. [T] TARPS control panel SYSTEM switch RDY.
full−mission−capable launch is essential. Prestart 11. Takeoff Checklist (complete non−OBC functions).
procedures and cockpit configuration may vary
in accordance with airwing policy and specific When ALIGN QUALITY ≤2.0:
EMCON conditions. All CNI equipment as ap
plicable, should be placed in ON or STBY, all 12. NAV MODE INS.
SAS switches on, and the HYD TRANSFER 13. Wait for IFA AVAILABLE." NAV MODE IFA.
PUMP switch should be in NORMAL before
application of electrical power. The LTS, INST, 14. Ordnance crew Arm.
EMERG GEN, and DFCS IBIT tests on
MASTER TEST panel should be conducted and Note
verified during periodic aircraft turnups. Com
pliance with the Takeoff Checklist is mandatory D Sparrow tune occurs after CW is enabled and
to ensure proper aircraft configuration before can complete after transmitter timeout.
launch.
D PH attack capability is present after launch
7.7.1 Pilot Procedures and Sparrow tune occurs automatically when
ever CW is enabled.
1. External electrical power ON.
2. Seat ARM.
3. Fire detect Check.
7−35 ORIGINAL
7.8 HOT SWITCH PROCEDURES 11. THROTTLE MODE switch MAN.

12. Throttle friction lever Increase.
7.8.1 On−Deck, Maintenance Troubleshooting
13. Ejection seats SAFE.
14. Flightcrew Unstrap.
15. Cockpit Check for FOD.
16. CANOPY handle−OPEN.
To ensure a safe in−cockpit maintenance trouble
shooting evolution, the following procedures 17. Flightcrews Switch.
should be used. 18. Flightcrew Strap In.
1. Parking brake Pull. 19. Ejection seats Armed.
20. CANOPY handle CLOSE.
2. THROTTLE MODE switch MAN.
21. FIRE DET/TEST TEST.
3. Throttle friction lever INC.
22. THROTTLE MODE switch BOOST.
4. Ejection seats SAFED, CMD − PILOT. 23. Throttle friction lever As Desired.
5. Flightcrew Remain strapped in. 24. Left engine Start.
25. RDR switch STBY.
7.8.2 Hot Switch Procedures
26. TCS switch STBY.
Increased potential hazards exist in hot switch opera
27. IRST switch STBY.
tions when an engine is running with canopy open and front
seat unoccupied. To minimize this potential hazard, mini
mum time should be spent in this condition. Pilot switch
should be expedited and crew unstrap should be done with
canopy closed. Pilot−to−pilot brief should be accomplished
with a pilot in the aircraft.
Ensure TARPS maintenance personnel have
Note loaded sensors and cleared aircraft before ini
tiating power to TARPS pod.
The RIO will vacate the aircraft first. When the
RIO is on the ground, flight deck, or hangar deck, 28. [T] TARPS control panel SYSTEM switch RDY.
the pilot will exit. This is particularly important
during shipboard operations. Note
1. Parking brake Pull. The Poststart Checklist shall be completed with
2. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch NORMAL. respect to aircraft configuration and switch posi
tions prior to taxi.
3. RDR switch OFF.
7.9 FIELD CARRIER LANDING PRACTICE
4. IRST switch OFF.
5. TCS switch OFF. 7.9.1 Preflight Inspection
6. RECORD switch OFF.
A normal preflight inspection will be conducted with
7. [T] TARPS control panel SYSTEM switch OFF. specific attention directed to tire condition, nosestrut exten
8. Left throttle OFF. sion, AOA probe conditions, and windshield cleanliness.
Check that the hook bypass switch is in FIELD.
9. ASYM LIMITER switch ON (guard down).
10. ENG MODE SELECT PRI.
ORIGINAL 7−36
7.9.2 Takeoff tion (see Figure 7−4). The length of the groove should be
adjusted to give a wings−level descent on the glideslope of 15
The takeoff will be individual. to 18 seconds (approximately ¾ mile). For maximum gross
weight at touchdown, refer to Chapter 4, Operating Limita
7.9.3 Radio Procedures and Pattern Entry tions. The turn to the downwind leg should be commenced
after climbing to pattern altitude (600 feet AGL) utilizing
A radio check with Paddles is advisable before pattern 30_ angle of bank and 150 KCAS. Turning from the 180_,
entry to confirm Charlie time. Approaches to the field for power should be adjusted to maintain optimum angle of at
break will be controlled by the tower and then switched to tack. A gradual descent may be commenced at this position
Paddles for FCLP pattern control. At no time will an aircraft with a minimum altitude of 450 feet AGL at the 90_ position
remain in the pattern without a UHF receiver. On each and 350 feet AGL as a minimum until the pilot is receiving
succeeding pass, the following voice report will be made at glideslope information. At approximately 45_, the meatball
normal meatball acquisition positions: appears on the Fresnel lens. Fly a rate of descent such that
the ball is centered as the aircraft arrives wings−level in the
1. Side number groove. For manual, automatic, and DLC approach tech
niques, refer to Carrier−Based Procedures, Chapter 8.
2. TOMCAT
7.9.5 Night FCLP
3. Ball/Clara
All provisions that apply to day FCLP also apply to
4. Fuel state
night FCLP, plus the following items:
5. Type of approach, if appropriate (automatic,
1. External lights BRIGHT and STEADY.
degraded, etc.).
2. Hook bypass switch FIELD.
7.9.4 Pattern
When comfortably situated in the pattern, instruments
The pattern should be a racetrack with the 180_ should be flown as much as possible up to the 45_ position.
approximately 1¼ miles abeam at 600 feet above field eleva
7−37 ORIGINAL
Figure 74.Field Carrier Landing Practice
ORIGINAL 7−38
CHAPTER 8
Carrier−Based Procedures
8.1 CARRIER PREFLIGHT 8.2 START AND POSTSTART

8.1.1 Launch Shipboard start and poststart procedure abbreviations
of the shore−based checklists are as delineated for the
Applicable aircraft launching bulletins, the CV and
poststart−pilot procedures. Certain steps are omitted because
LSO NATOPS Manuals and the pertinent CV air operations
aircraft are spotted too close together to allow the wings to
manual shall be read by all flight crewmembers prior to be swept forward while tied down. Cranking the left engine
carrier qualification. In addition, the predeployment lecture
prior to starting the right, as outlined in the shore−based
syllabus contained in Chapter 1 of the CV NATOPS Manual
procedures, will ensure that auxiliary brake pressure is
shall be completed.
available and will ensure that backup flight control module
8.1.2 Briefing is full of hydraulic fluid prior to cycling.
A thorough briefing shall be accomplished by the flight 8.2.1 Carrier Alignment
leader prior to launch. This briefing should call particular
Carrier alignment of the INS and SAHRS concurrently
attention to current BINGO fields, emergency procedures or of the INS alone can be accomplished using SINS data
peculiar to carrier operations, operating area NOTAMs, fuel
or manually entered ship’s position, speed, and heading.
management, and ship NAVAID status. Aircraft configura
A stored heading SINS alignment is also available.
tion, gross weight, expected WOD, and applicable launch
trim settings will be verified prior to man−up. 8.2.1.1 Concurrent SINS Alignment
8.1.3 Preflight For either data−link or deck−edge−cable transmission of
SINS data:
Preflight inspection should be accomplished with
particular attention given to nosestrut, main landing gear 1. DATA LINK power switch  ON.
tires, hook, and underside of the fuselage. Note carefully the
2. DATA LINK MODE switch  CAINS/WPT.
actual wing sweep, the lateral spacing between parked
aircraft, and the general direction of engine exhaust. Do not 3. Verify parking brake is set.
preflight the aircraft topside aft of the bleed air doors if
Note
spotted with the tail outboard of the safety nets. In the
cockpit, particular attention should be given to the flightcrew Application of SAHRS power prior to selecting
displays to ensure that they are properly secured and that the CV ALIGN will not allow SAHRS to properly
retaining devices have been installed. Ensure that the WING align.
SWEEP handle is secure in the oversweep position when
applicable. If the wings are not in oversweep, ensure that 4. NAV MODE switch  CV ALIGN.
the emergency WING SWEEP handle position corresponds 5. Select OWN A/C MFD format by depressing DATA
with the actual wing position. Leave the emergency pushbutton on MFD MENU1 display. The CV SINS
WING SWEEP handle guard up, extend the emergency DATA format will appear.
WING SWEEP handle, and pull WING SWEEP DRIVE
NO. 1 and WG SW DR NO. 2/ MANUV FLAP circuit 6. Verify that SHDG is not boxed. If it is, depress the
breakers (LD1, LE1). Crossbleed starts should not be SHDG pushbutton to unbox it.
performed unless the area aft of the aircraft is clear. Tiedowns 7. Monitor the progress of alignment by observing the
should not be removed and engines should not be started QUAL and TIME acronyms and the align scale on
unless the auxiliary brake air pressure gauge indicates a full the MFD OWN A/C format. The SINS (ship) lati
charge. tude, longitude, and INS north and east velocities
can be evaluated on the MFD OWN A/C format. An
INS ALIGN COMPLETE message will normally
occur in 7 minutes. At this time the align quality
should be below 1 nm per hour.
8−1 ORIGINAL
Note 1. Repeat steps 1 through 7 of concurrent SINS

alignment.
Do not select SAHRS during CV ALIGN to
check alignment progress. Wait until INS align 2. Verify that SHDG is boxed on CV SINS DATA MFD
ment is complete and INS has been selected on format.
the NAV MODE switch before selecting
3. Repeat steps 9 and 10 of concurrent SINS align
SAHRS.
ment.
8. SAHRS alignment progress may be monitored at
this time by selecting the NAV page. 8.2.1.3 Concurrent Manual Carrier Alignment
Note The INS and SAHRS will initiate ground alignments if
D The SAHRS alignment process will initiate there is no SINS data. The CV MANUAL format will be
after the INS determines a valid true heading displayed after the ship’s data is entered.
(approximately at INS quality value of 5). 1. Repeat steps 1 through 8 of concurrent SINS carrier
SAHRS quality value should reinitiate to align.
approximately 31.2 at that time.
Note
D If power has been applied to the aircraft for an
extended period of time prior to INS CV align If the SINS or data link is not operating or if a
being initiated, the SAHRS may complete a manual carrier alignment is desired, skip steps 2
ground align (NORM) and a SAHRS com and 3.
plete message appears on the MFD. After the
2. Enter best knowledge of ship’s latitude, longitude,
INS CV align is initiated, the SAHRS will ini
speed, and heading via the DEU or DD. When
tiate a concurrent CV align normally, but
the DATA pushbutton on the MFD is depressed, the
another SAHRS align complete message may
CV MANUAL DATA format appears.
not appear.
9. It is advisable to continue alignment after appear Note
ance of the INS ALIGN COMPLETE message if
time permits. When ready to take the alignment, the D If SINS is restored, MAN must be unboxed on
inertial navigation mode may be selected by setting the CV DATA format in order to return to a CV
the NAV MODE switch to INS, waiting for 5 sec RF alignment.
onds, then setting it to IFA. The RIO may take the D Entry of VLA is never required for manual
alignment anytime the QUAL reaches 1.0 nm per carrier alignment.
hour. The NAV Mode switch should be rotated to the D When using the DEU, data entry is made via
INS position for a few seconds then rotated to the the DEU CV ALIGN format, using the LAT,
IFA position. This places the navigation system in LONG, CSPD and CHDG pushtiles, and the
the INS/GPS mode of operation. appropriate quadrant and numerals.
Note D Data entry using the DD requires selection of
Although SINS alignment normally requires no the NAV category from the MFK pushtile and
entry of data, if a SINS alignment takes place at the boxing of the OWN A/C acronym prior to
any carrier location other than the flight deck, entering the carrier latitude and longitude via
then it is advisable to enter the correct vertical the DD LAT, LONG, quadrant and numeral
lever arm via the DEU. This is the height in feet pushtiles. Entry of carrier speed and heading
of the aircraft INS above the carrier SINS loca via the DD requires the boxing of the WIND
tion. This entry can be made only via the DEU by acronym prior to using the DD SPD, HDG and
calling up the DEU CV ALIGN page and de numeric pushtiles.
pressing the VLA option key.
3. Repeat steps 9 through 11 for concurrent SINS
8.2.1.2 Concurrent SINS Stored Heading Carrier carrier align.
Alignment
Note
Perform a reference alignment by following the SINS
carrier align procedure in paragraph 8.2.1.1. When the INS In concurrent manual carrier align, the INS
ALIGN COMPLETE message appears on the HUD/VDI ALIGN COMPLETE computer message may
formats, return the NAV MODE switch to OFF. take 15 minutes or longer to appear. The naviga
tion quality at this time may not be better than
3 nm per hour. Because of the extensive align
ORIGINAL 8−2
ment time, it may be necessary to launch prior Note

to the receipt of the INS ALIGN COMPLETE INS alignment to GPS data via the INS/GPS
computer message. mode is not always optimum from a cold start. It
8.2.2 SAHRS Standalone Carrier Alignment may require up to 10 minutes (plus up to 2 min
utes for MAGR initialization), compared to only
The SAHRS standalone CV alignment mode is manu 5 minutes for a normal carrier (CV) alignment. If
ally selected via the SAHRS ALIGN MFD format by movement of the aircraft during alignment is not
depressing the SAHR and then CV pushbutton. There are two anticipated, a normal concurrent CV alignment
SAHRS standalone align modes. Which mode obtained followed by placing the NAV MODE switch to
depends on when CV is selected. If CV is selected prior to the INS momentarily, then selecting IFA (In−Flight
INS determining true heading (approximately INS quality of Alignment) may be more expeditious and will
5) and initiating the SAHRS CV concurrent align, a SAHRS yield the same system accuracy.
standalone align is commanded when the SAHRS has no
heading information. Global Positioning System satellite acquisition nor
mally takes from 90 seconds to 3 minutes, depending on
Note location and LOS (line−of−sight) blockage by other aircraft
Currently there is no indication on the MFD dis and carrier island, etc.
plays that the SAHRS has gone into the standa
To get an IFA Alignment on deck, perform the
lone mode except the SAHRS quality value will following steps:
remain 10.0, the timer will be 00, SAHRS con
current CV align will not initiate, and there will 1. Place the NAV MODE switch in IFA at application
be no attitude information available from the of aircraft power.
SAHRS for up to 6 minutes or more. Reinitiating 2. Verify OWN A/C position is correct. Verify correct
the INS alignment will allow a concurrent align date and time on the GPS Status page. If satellites
ment to occur. have been acquired, the OWN A/C data page will
The SAHRS has no true standalone carrier align mode show own aircraft position based on GPS, if GPS is
like the INS. During concurrent INS/SAHRS carrier align boxed.
modes, the SAHRS depends on the INS to provide an initial Note
input of true heading. Since this is not available in SAHRS If GPS data is lost during alignment, the naviga
standalone carrier alignment, when the SAHRS CV push tion system will go to align hold.
button is depressed in SAHRS standalone operation, it
3. Monitor the GPS Status page to ensure satellites are
is commanded to a DG mode. Once the parking brake is
acquired within a few minutes of placing the NAV
released a DG heading can be entered via the DEU. When the
MODE switch out of the OFF position to IFA. IFA
aircraft is airborne, the slaved mode can be selected or if a alignment will not commence until satellites are
system velocity source is present, in−flight restart can be
acquired. If satellites are not acquired after a few
selected to bring the SAHRS to a normal operational mode.
minutes, transition to a normal CV alignment (on
If CV is selected after the INS has initiated the SAHRS NAV Mode Switch select OFF then CV).
CV concurrent alignment, the SAHRS alignment proceeds 4. The alignment will progress on its own. When the
but is no longer receiving updated position and velocity QUAL gets to 1.0, the system will automatically
information from the INS. The alignment will be consider take the alignment and display the INS ALGN
ably slower than concurrent alignment. The SAHRS is CMPLT message. You can taxi and even take off
commanded to NORM mode. An in−flight restart may or may without disrupting the align process.
not be required depending on the SAHRS alignment quality.
Note
SAHRS cannot be commanded to a CV mode unless
the INS is in CV. If the INS is unavailable, the SAHRS will The pilot will not have an FPM (Flight Path
attempt a normal ground align. Marker) until the alignment is complete.
8.2.3 GPS On−Deck IFA Alignment 5. If the system loses GPS quality at any time during
flight or while on the CV deck due to satellite drop
This method of alignment will take about 5 minutes outs or antenna blanking, the system will continue
longer than a normal carrier (CV) alignment, but only in INS mode until FOM is ≤ 4 and will use GPS data.
requires you to place the NAV MODE switch in IFA and leave
Note
it there. Another advantage of GPS IFA Alignment is that you
can taxi while aligning in this mode, but the satellites must The NAV MODE switch must remain in the IFA
be acquired before alignment begins. position to remain in the primary navigation
8−3 ORIGINAL
mode, INS/GPS. This mode can also be obtained tering to remain engaged and can cause misposi
by conducting a normal CV alignment, followed tioning of the launch bar during catapult hookup.
by moving the NAV MODE switch from CV to This may result in launch bar disengaging from
INS to IFA. GPS FOM ≤ 4 to be effective. shuttle during catapult stroke.
8.3 TAXIING 8.4 CATAPULT HOOKUP (DAY)
Shipboard taxi operations differ slightly from the field. Set the attitude displays to show level flight at normal
Taxiing aboard ship requires higher power settings and must strut extension. Proper positioning on the catapult is easily
be conducted under positive control of a plane director. Any accomplished if the entry is made with only enough power to
signal from the plane director above the waist is intended maintain forward motion and if the plane director signals are
for the pilot and any signal below the waist is intended for followed explicitly.
deck−handling personnel.
8.3.1 Nosewheel Steering
The nosewheel steering system characteristics are
excellent and enable extremely tight cornering capability. At
full nosewheel steering deflection (70°), the inside main D All functional checks shall be performed be
mount wheel backs down and turn radius will be restricted if fore taxiing onto the catapult. Ensure that the
the inside brake is locked. For a minimum radius turn, Takeoff Checklist is complete and that the
momentarily depress the brake on the inside wheel and then proper trim is set for launch before entering
allow the inside wheel to roll freely while controlling the turn the nosetow approach ramp.
rate by braking the outside wheel. For normal turns,
symmetric brake applications should be applied to control D All catapult launches shall be conducted with
aircraft forward motion. Forward motion should be initiated the HUD in the caged mode. If approaching
before effecting a tight radius turn to reduce power require the catapult after an uncaged HUD landing,
ments. cycle the TLN display mode button to ensure
the HUD defaults to the caged format.
8.3.2 Taxi Speed
The catapult director will direct the pilot to approach
Taxi speed should be kept under control at all times, the catapult track, using nosegear steering and brakes. Upon
especially on wet decks and approaching the catapult area. signal from the plane director and when positioned immedi
Be prepared to use the parking brake should normal braking ately behind the mount of the lead−in track, kneel the aircraft.
fail. While taxiing, both ejection seats should be armed. The If the launch bar is to be lowered from the cockpit, upon
parking brake is an excellent feature that may be used to signal from the plane director, deflect the nosewheel to lower
prevent leg fatigue during taxi delays. However, it should not the launch bar, center the nosewheel, and disengage nose
be used once forward of the jet−blast deflector. wheel steering. If the launch bar is to be lowered by the deck
8.3.3 Final Checker Aboard CV crew, no pilot action is required. After the hold−back bar has
been attached to the aircraft and checked by squadron
1. Hook Down On Director Signal; Check RATS maintenance personnel, the catapult director will direct the
Advisory Light On, Then Up. aircraft forward until the holdback bar is snug against the
catapult buffer unit. The aircraft will be stopped in position
for shuttle tension up. The attitude displays will show 2° to
3° nosedown with the aircraft in the kneeled position.
Carrier operations with an inoperative RATS
will increase CV wind−over−deck requirements.
Failure to notify CV OPS may result in damage
to the ship’s arresting gear and aircraft tailhook Nosewheel centering can contribute to launch
assembly structure. Consult applicable recovery bar misalignment in the catapult shuttle, which
bulletins. could result in premature launch bar separation
2. Nosewheel steering Cycle OFF, Then ON. during launch. The nosewheel centering latching
relay must be deactivated by depressing the nose
wheel steering button after the hook check and
before entering the catapult. It will also deacti
vate the nosewheel steering automatic disen
Failure to cycle nosewheel steering following gagement function; nosewheel steering must be
hook check will enable nosewheel steering cen manually disengaged when entering the catapult.
ORIGINAL 8−4
8.4.2 Catapult Launch

Aircraft launch gross weight will be cross−checked and
verified by signal with the flight deck personnel prior to
kneel. If the aircraft is to be catapulted with a partial fuel
D If the LAUNCH BAR light illuminates imme load, the pilot should ensure that longitudinal trim settings
diately upon selecting KNEEL with the are adjusted if necessary (Figure 8−1). Upon receipt of the
NOSE STRUT switch, a malfunction in the tension−up and release brakes" signal, release the brakes,
system has occurred and the landing gear will ensure the parking brake is off, and advance the throttles to
not retract following the catapult launch. MIL. Ensure nosewheel steering is disengaged prior to
performing control wipeout. When a turnup signal is
D Nosewheel steering is designed to disengage
received from the catapult officer, grip the throttles firmly,
and the NWS ENGA light goes off when deck
personnel lower the launch bar on the cata check engine instruments, ensure that the caution and
advisory panel is clear, and the RIO is ready. When satisfied
pult. The arresting hook must have been
that the aircraft is functioning properly, salute the catapult
cycled on deck and the throttles set at IDLE
officer. Normally, a 3 to 5−second delay will occur before the
to enable the system. This feature prevents
the pilot from inadvertently damaging the catapult fires. Optimum launch technique is to maintain a
loose grip on the control stick while allowing it to move aft
launch bar during control checks after final
during the catapult stroke.
tensioning.
8.4.1 Catapult Trim Requirements
The following requirements are applicable to clean
aircraft or any combination of air−to−air store, external tank,
gross weight combinations, and launch cg locations between
7.0−percent and 18.5−percent MAC. D Failure to allow the control stick to move aft
during the catapult stroke will result in
Note
degraded pitch rate and excessive sink rate
To determine center of gravity for a particular off the bow.
aircraft, refer to NAVAIR 01−1B−4, Handbook of
D Catapult launch with a partially filled external
Weight and Balance.
tank is not authorized.
Figure 8−1 lists recommended catapult launch longitu
Initial catapult firing results in a short−term vertical
dinal trim settings.
acceleration of 15 to 20gs caused by full compression of the
stored−energy nosestrut. Firmly restrain the throttles to
prevent their aft travel during the catapult stroke.
Anticipated Longitudinal Trim (degrees)
End Trailing Edge Up The F−14 must be flown off the catapult by the pilot. At
Airspeed shuttle release, the energy stored in the nose strut is released,
Above Cg Cg Cg rotating the aircraft to the initial flyaway attitude of
Minimum between between between approximately 12−15 degrees nose−up on the VDI and HUD.
(Knots) 7.0% and 11% and 16% and The aircrew should plan for the standard excess endspeed of
11% MAC 16% MAC 18.5% MAC 15 knots, unless notified otherwise. Lower excess endspeed
than anticipated or a lower pitch trim setting than recom
0 to 9 9 6 3 mended will require the pilot to use backstick at the end of
the catapult stroke to capture and maintain the desired
10 to 20 8 5 2 climbout pitch attitude of 10 degrees. Higher endspeed than
expected or a higher pitch trim setting than recommended
21 to 50 7 4 0 will require the pilot to stop the rotation at 10 degrees with
slight forward stick. While rotating to the flyaway attitude,
Figure 81.Catapult Launch Trim Requirements the flightcrew will feel the aircraft settle approximately 5 feet
before commencing a climb. For catapult launches with
excess endspeed less than 15 knots, the AOA will rise
abruptly to 17 units and then gradually decrease as airspeed
increases during the flyaway.
8−5 ORIGINAL
Figure 82.Center−of−Gravity Variation With Fuel Loading
Aircrew coordination is particularly critical in this shaking his head from side to side. Never raise the hand into
regime, since the aircrew must ensure that initial flyaway view or make any motion that might be construed as a salute.
parameters are maintained while remaining alert for any After the catapult officer observes the pilot’s no−go signal, he
abnormal launch characteristics and engine malfunctions. will cross his forearms over his head, and then give the
High endspeed and/or single−engine flyaway with trim standard release tension signal. When the catapult is
settings above 2 degrees may require significant forward untensioned, the catapult officer will signal the pilot to raise
stick pressure. In all configurations, the use of afterburner the launch bar. The pilot shall ensure that the throttles are
and/or level rapid acceleration will require reduced nose trim seated in the catapult detent and will raise the launch bar with
settings. The RIO shall scan a repeat of the pilot’s heads up the LAUNCH BAR ABORT switch.
display and associated standby flight instruments to ensure
the correct flyaway conditions are met (airspeed, altitude and
attitude).
Additional considerations exist for night/IFR catapult
launches. Aircraft acceleration and the lack of external visual
To avoid damage to the launch bar retract mecha
cues will cause the aircrew to sense that the nose is higher
nism, do not actuate the LAUNCH BAR ABORT
than actual and can result in spatial disorientation. Under
switch with the nosewheel deflected off center.
these conditions, a vigilant instrument scan is required to
ensure that the proper attitude is maintained throughout the When the launch bar is clear of the shuttle, the catapult
launch and subsequent climbout. officer will move the shuttle forward of the aircraft launch
8.4.3 Catapult Abort Procedures (Day) bar. At this point the aircraft is no longer in danger of being
launched. The catapult officer will signal the pilot to lower
If after turnup on the catapult, the pilot determines that the launch bar and then step in front of the aircraft and signal
the aircraft is down, the pilot gives the no−go signal by the pilot to throttle back.
ORIGINAL 8−6
D If the aircraft is down prior to it being pushed D The LSO and tower must be informed if the
or pulled back for release from the holdback landing is to be made in any wing or flap con
fitting and when directed by the catapult offi figuration other than 20° wing sweep, flaps
cer, the launch bar shall be raised by the and slats down, or RATS inoperative, to
LAUNCH BAR ABORT switch. ensure wind−over−deck requirements are met.
D Unkneeling the nosegear while the launch bar D Do not attempt shipboard landing with
is in the catapult track or shuttle will damage inoperative ROLL SAS and store asym−
the launch bar linkage and bungees. The pilot metry greater than 170,000 inch−pounds
should unkneel the aircraft only when he is because of lateral pilot−induced oscillation
sure that the launch bar is free to rise and in the approach unless field divert is not
upon signal from the catapult officer or taxi possible. (Example: weapon rail at station 6
director. and AIM−54 missile at station 8 equals
170,000 inch−pounds.)
If the aircraft is down after the go signal is given,
transmit the words Suspend, Suspend"; however, the Note
flightcrew should be prepared for the catapult stroke and to
perform emergency procedures if required. With the hook down, airspeed in excess of
300 knots may cause the hook transition light to
8.5 LANDING illuminate.
8.5.1 Carrier Landing Pattern (VFR) 8.5.2 Manual Approach Technique
The VFR carrier landing pattern (Figure 8−3) shall be The rapid engine response characteristics allow the
in accordance with the CV NATOPS manual. The pattern pilot to make timely, small amplitude power changes to make
starts with the level break at 800 feet and 300 to 350 knots. glideslope corrections. Because of the rapid engine response
The break interval will be approximately one−half of the and high−throttle sensitivity, the pilot must avoid over
desired ramp interval time (15 to 17 seconds normal controlling power. DLC should be engaged for all ap
interval). When established wings level on the downwind proaches. Approaches flown without DLC will degrade
leg, descend to and fly the pattern at 600 feet MSL. Engage flying qualities resulting in significant glideslope and lineup
DLC upon completion of flap extension. deviations. Pitch compensation for DLC inputs is optimized
for approach airspeeds. Activation of DLC at higher
Note
airspeeds will result in inducing noticeable changes in pitch
Selection of DLC during the flap extension cycle attitude. DLC may be employed by vernier or bang−bang
can generate excessive pitch rates. DLC is to be control depending on the extent of the correction required.
selected only upon completion of the flap cycle. DLC is most effective in correcting for glideslope deviations
DLC must be deselected prior to flap retraction caused by gusty conditions or ship burble. Caution should be
to avoid excessive pitch trim change with auto taken not to use DLC to compensate for a major overpowered
matic DLC stowage during the flap retraction or underpowered condition.
cycle.
Slow to 15 units AOA or computed on−speed (which
ever is faster) and verify airspeed/AOA correlation, engage
APC if desired, check for proper DLC operation, and
complete the Landing Checklist prior to reaching the 180°
position. The 180° turn is commenced 1 to 1.2 nm abeam the Caution must be taken to avoid sustained full−
LSO platform to arrive at the 90° position at approximately down DLC commands for a high condition at the
450 feet MSL. The nominal bank angle throughout the turn ramp as this will result in excessive sink rates and
should be 25° to 27°. Glideslope meatball acquisition subsequent hard landings.
will occur at approximately 0.6 nm. Do not descend below
300 feet prior to acquiring the ball. On rollout to final,
slightly overshoot the ship’s wake. Optimum time on
glideslope is approximately 15 to 18 seconds.
8−7 ORIGINAL
Figure 83.Carrier Landing Pattern
ORIGINAL 8−8
Once established on glideslope, keep the scan going, 8.5.4 Waveoff Technique
cross−checking meatball, lineup, and AOA. Be alert for a
A waveoff will be initiated immediately upon a signal
waveoff. With rough seas and pitching decks, some erratic
or voice call from the LSO. MIL power should be used for all
meatball movements may be encountered. If this is the case,
dual−engine waveoffs. Maintain the landing attitude until a
average out the ball movement to maintain smooth and safe
rate of descent. To avoid being cocked up," arrest a come positive rate of climb is established. Do not over rotate the
aircraft in close as this significantly increases the chance of
down in close" with power and up DLC. Attempts to arrest
in−flight engagement.
high sink rates with nose attitude alone could result in landing
damage to the ventral fins and afterburner. Also, avoid
dropping the nose prior to touchdown as this significantly
increases the chances of a hook skip bolter. Upon touchdown,
add full MIL power, manually retract speedbrakes, and
maintain aft stick pressure to minimize chances of a hook Dual engine afterburner waveoffs are prohibited.
skip bolter. Selection of MIL power will automatically Inadvertent arrestment or in−flight engagement
disengage DLC and retract the speedbrake. in dual afterburner would result in catastrophic
damage to the aircraft and/or arresting gear.
A good start is imperative to minimizing lineup
corrections while on the glideslope and will prevent the Normally, waveoffs will be taken straight ahead,
tendency to chase lineup. Small, coordinated rudder inputs especially when close in. When using APC, waveoff
should be used to reduce the nose yaw that is easily generated technique is the same as for manual approaches except that
by lateral stick inputs. a force of approximately 8 pounds is required to disengage
the throttle torque switches. Disengagement of the APC by
8.5.3 Approach Power Compensator Technique overriding the throttle forces results in the throttle MODE
Practice is required to develop the proper control habits switch automatically returning to BOOST and illuminates
necessary to use the APC. For the APC to perform the AUTO THROT light on the pilot left−hand ladder light
satisfactorily, smooth attitude control is essential. Large, assembly. A time delay relay holds the AUTO THROT light
abrupt attitude changes result in excessive power changes. on for 10 seconds following APC disengagement.
APC use is not recommended in gusty conditions. The APC
will overcontrol AOA fluctuations resulting in large airspeed
and/or glideslope deviations. The APC system was designed
to be used with the engines operating in the primary mode and
is not recommended with either one or both of the engines in If a force in excess of 14 pounds is applied to
secondary mode. break the throttles out of the automatic mode, the
As the initial turn from the 180° position is made, throttle MODE switch will return to BOOST but
the throttle mode will revert to manual. The
the aircraft will momentarily indicate up to 2 units slow. The
switch must be cycled to MAN and back to
APC will adjust power to correct back to onspeed condition
throughout the remainder of the turn. Upon rollout on BOOST to regain the BOOST mode.
glideslope, the pilot must override the tendency for the nose 8.5.5 Bolter Technique
to pitch up by maintaining slight forward stick. The aircraft
will indicate 1 to 2 units fast, which will slow to onspeed The bolter maneuver is effected by selecting MIL and
within 5 seconds. The use of DLC in conjunction with small slight aft control stick until the desired flyaway attitude is
attitude changes to maintain glideslope will minimize AOA established.
deviations and result in optimal APC performance. Timely
use of DLC can also be used to more rapidly correct from a
fast or slow condition. Close−in corrections are very critical.
If a high in−close situation develops, the recommended
procedure is to stop the meatball motion and not attempt to The use of excessive backstick on a bolter may
recenter it. A low in−close condition is difficult to correct cause the tail surface to stall, delaying aircraft
with APC and often results in an over−the−top bolter. It may rotation and causing the aircraft to settle off the
be necessary to disengage or manually override APC in order angle.
to safely recover from a low in−close situation. Throughout
the approach, the pilot should keep his hand on the throttles 8.5.6 Bingo Fuel
in the event APC disengages inadvertently. A smooth throttle Fuel reserves should be programmed depending on
transition from AUTO to BOOST mode can be achieved distance of the field from the CV, aircraft configuration, and
by depressing the CAGE/SEAM button on the inboard en route weather. This bingo fuel quantity should be set
throttle grip. before takeoff.
8−9 ORIGINAL
8.5.7 Arrested Landing and Exit From the 2. Accomplish final changes to radio and IFF upon
Landing Area departing marshal or earlier. After these changes are
made, the pilot should make no further changes
As the aircraft touches down, advance throttles to MIL. except under emergency conditions.
Upon completion of landing rollout, reduce power to IDLE.
Raise the hook and flaps and select wing−sweep BOMB while 3. When commencing penetration, initiate a standard
allowing the aircraft to roll aft. Apply brakes on signal. Flaps descent: 250 knots, 4,000 fpm, speedbrakes as
retraction requires approximately 7 seconds. When the flaps required.
are fully retracted the wings will sweep aft. Engage
nosewheel steering and taxi forward on the come−ahead
signal. If the wings sweep aft to 55_, auxiliary and main flap
retraction has been verified and full−aft wing sweep may be
selected using the emergency handle. The RIO should If a gear and/or flaps down penetration is re
monitor wing−sweep position while taxiing. Oversweep quired, ensure that the wings are programmed
should be selected prior to final spot and shutdown. The forward of 22° prior to lowering flaps. If flaps are
engines should remain running until the cut signal is given by lowered with wings swept aft of 22_, auxiliary
the plane director. If at any time during this phase of flap extension will be inhibited resulting in rapid
operations a brake failure occurs, pull the parking brake. If nosedown pitch rates.
the aircraft continues to roll, drop the hook, advise the tower,
and signal for chocks to be installed. Use nosewheel steering 4. Radar and barometric altimeters shall be cross−
to ensure that the aircraft remains on the deck. Do not checked continuously when below 5,000 feet.
unstrap, dearm the ejection seat, or leave the cockpit until
tiedowns have been installed. 8.5.10 Platform
At 20 miles passing through 5,000 feet, aircraft descent
Note shall be slowed to 2,000 fpm. At this point, a mandatory,
unacknowledged voice report will be broadcast by each pilot.
Aircrew shall inform tower in the event of RATS
The aircraft side number will be given and platform" will be
failure on landing.
reported. Continue descent to 1,200 feet.
8.5.8 Carrier−Controlled Approaches
8.5.11 Ten−Mile DME Fix
Should these procedures conflict with the applicable
CV Air Operations manual, the latter shall govern. Detailed 1. Commence transition to landing configuration,
pilot−controller voice procedures must be established in unless otherwise directed by CCA, maintaining
accordance with each ship’s CCA doctrine. Figure 84 shows 1,200 feet.
a typical carrier−controlled approach. Mode I, mode IA, and
2. Gear and flaps shall be down by 8 miles.
mode II ACLS approaches are described in Chapter 17,
Automatic Carrier Landing System. Aircrew should have a 3. Complete the landing checklist. Check anti−ice,
thorough understanding of this chapter and the DFCS and lights, and rain removal, as required.
APC portions of Chapter 2 prior to attempting a coupled
ACLS approach. 8.5.12 Six−Mile DME Fix
8.5.9 Hold Phase For a precision radar approach, maintain 1,200 feet
at approach speed until intercepting the glidepath at 3 to
Five minutes before penetration, defogging shall be
3.25 miles, unless otherwise directed.
actuated and maximum comfortable interior temperature
will be maintained to prevent possible fogging or icing on the For an air surveillance radar approach, a gradual
windshield and canopy. descent of 600 fpm can be commenced departing the 6−mile
DME fix. Maintain 600 feet until the aircraft intercepts the
Note center of the glideslope at 1¼ to 1½ miles on a 3.5° slope.
Commence a descent of 500 to 700 fpm, using the following
Fuel dump is accomplished by gravity flow and checkpoints:
its effectiveness is reduced during the pene
tration descent. Fuel dump, if required, should be 1. 1 mile  460 feet.
planned accordingly for the level leg. 2. ¾ mile  360 feet.
1. Before descent, check shoulder harness handle 3. ½ mile  260 feet.
locked, set lights as directed by existing weather,
and lower arresting hook.
ORIGINAL 8−10
Figure 84.Carrier−Controlled Approach (Typical)
8−11 ORIGINAL
8.5.13 Meatball Contact 8.7 NIGHT FLYING

When transitioning to a visual approach (at approxi Night carrier operations will have a much slower
mately ¾ of a mile), make a report call with the following tempo than daylight operations and it is the pilot’s responsi
information: side number, TOMCAT, meatball or Clara (no bility to maintain this tempo. Normal day carrier operations
meatball), fuel state, and type pass. The LSO will acknowl shall be used except as modified below.
edge, and instructions from the final controller will cease.
8.7.1 Briefing
Pilots are cautioned against premature contact reports and
transition to visual glideslope during night recoveries when Before initial night flight operations, all pilots should
visibility permits sighting the ship beyond 2 to 3 miles. The receive an additional briefing from the following persons:
height and dimension of the entire lens or mirror optical beam
at 1¼ miles is over 200 feet and the true center cannot be 1. Flight deck officer
distinguished. This, coupled with the relatively short length 2. Catapult officer
of the runway lights, will give the pilot the illusion of being
high when, in fact, the aircraft may be well below optimum 3. Arresting gear officer
glideslope. An additional advantage of delaying the meatball 4. LSO
report (even though the ball is in sight) is that the final
controller will continue lineup instructions that can greatly 5. CATCC.
assist the pilot in establishing satisfactory lineup. Use the Individual flight briefings will include all applicable
vertical velocity indicator to set up a rate of descent of 500 items outlined above, with particular emphasis on weather
to 700 fpm. The AN/ARA−63 instrument landing system and bingo fuel.
(ILS) is an excellent aid during the approach and should be
used whenever possible. ILS glideslope azimuth and eleva 8.7.2 Preflight
tion signals are provided as command fly to" indications and In addition to normal cockpit preflight, ensure that
are displayed via the VDI and/or the HUD in the TLN mode. external light switches are properly positioned for poststart
8.6 WAVEOFF AND BOLTER light check. Install night filters on applicable cockpit
displays.
In the event of a waveoff or bolter, climb straight ahead
to 1,200 feet and maintain 150 knots. When directed by CCA, 8.7.3 Poststart
initiate a level turn to the downwind leg reporting abeam with Adjust cockpit light to desired brightness. When ready
fuel state. (If no instructions are received within 2 minutes or for taxi, indicate with appropriate signal.
4 miles DME, attempt radio contact; if unable, assume
communications failure and initiate the downwind turn to the 8.7.4 Taxi
reciprocal of final bearing reporting abeam with fuel state. Night deck−handling operations are of necessity slower
If no acknowledgment is received, start a turn at 4 miles than those used during the day. When a doubt arises as to the
or 2 minutes to intercept final bearing.) A 20° bank angle at meaning of a signal from a taxi director, stop.
150 knots on the upwind turn establishes the aircraft at the
desired 2 miles abeam on the downwind leg. 8.7.5 Catapult Hookup (Night)
CATCC clears the aircraft to turn inbound to intercept Procedures for aircraft catapult hookup at night are
final bearing. A level, on−speed approach turn of 18° to 22° identical to those used during day operations. However, it is
bank angle from the normal downwind position allows the difficult to determine your speed or degree of motion over
aircraft to properly intercept final bearings at a minimum of the deck. The pilot must rely upon, and follow closely, the
3 miles aft of the ship. Traffic spacing ahead may require that plane director’s signals.
the aircraft continue on downwind leg well past the normal
8.7.6 Catapult Launch
abeam position before being directed to turn to final bearing.
No attempt should be made to establish visual contact with On turnup signal from the catapult officer ensure
the ship when executing a CCA until the final approach turn throttles in MIL and check all instruments. When ready for
has been executed. launch, place external light master switch ON (bright and
steady). After launch, establish an 8° to 10_ pitch attitude,
Note
cross−checking instruments to ensure a positive rate of climb.
The radar beacon (AN/APN−154) should be Retract the landing gear. An altitude of 500 feet is considered
turned off as soon as practicable after landing to to be minimum altitude for retraction of flaps.
avoid causing interference with AN/SPN−42
control of other aircraft in the pattern.
ORIGINAL 8−12
When well established in a climb, switch lights to flashing or

as applicable for an instrument climbout. The standby
indicator should be used in the event of a primary display(s)
malfunction.
If the aircraft is down after the go signal is given,
transmit the words Suspend, Suspend"; how
ever, the flightcrew should be prepared for
the catapult stroke and to perform emergency
procedures if required.
If wings sweep back inadvertently, close atten
tion should be paid to maintaining positive rates
of climb. The loss of lift incurred by premature
wing sweep aft can result in significantly de
creased rates of climb, with very little change in
pitch attitude and trim requirements.
D If the aircraft is down prior to it being pushed
8.7.7 Catapult Abort Procedures (Night) or pulled back for release from the holdback
The pilot no−go signal for night launches will be to not fitting and when directed by the catapult
turn on the exterior lights, and to transmit on the land/launch launching officer, the launch bar shall be
frequency the aircraft side number, the catapult the aircraft raised by the LAUNCH BAR ABORT switch.
is on, and the words Suspend, Suspend." After the catapult D Unkneeling the nosegear while the launch bar
is untensioned, the catapult officer will signal to raise the is in the catapult track or shuttle will damage
launch bar. The pilot shall ensure that the throttles are seated the launch bar linkage and bungees. The pilot
in the catapult detent or throttle friction is full forward before should unkneel the aircraft only when sure
raising the launch bar with the LAUNCH BAR ABORT that the launch bar is free to rise and upon sig
switch. When the launch bar is clear of the shuttle, the nal from the catapult officer or taxi director.
catapult officer will move the shuttle forward of the aircraft
launch bar. At this point the aircraft is no longer in danger of 8.7.8 Arrested Landing and Exit From
being launched. The catapult officer will signal the pilot to Landing Area (Night)
lower the launch bar and then step in front of the aircraft and During approach, all lights shall be on bright and
signal the pilot to throttle back. steady. At the end of arrestment rollout, turn off external
lights and follow the director’s signals while effecting the
normal aircraft cleanup procedures.
8−13 (Reverse
CHAPTER 9
Special Procedures
9.1 IN−FLIGHT REFUELING PROCEDURES 5. REFUEL PROBE switch  As Desired (transition

light OFF).
Note
6. Wing−sweep switch  MAN/wing−sweep angle 
Before commencing in−flight refueling opera As Desired.
tions, each flight crewmember shall become
familiar with the NATOPS Air Refueling Manual, 7. Visors  Recommended Down.
NAVAIR 00−80T−110, and in−flight refueling sys
tem description.
9.1.1 In−Flight Refueling Controls

Regardless of fuel management panel switch position To prevent fuel fumes from entering the cockpit
ing, at low fuel states the initial resupply of fuel is discharged through the environmental control system (ECS)
into the left− and right−wing box tanks. Thereafter distribu because of possible fuel spills during in−flight re
tion of the fuel to the forward, aft, wing, and external tanks fueling, select AIR SOURCE pushbutton L ENG.
is controlled by the WING/EXT TRANS switch position.
The split refueling system to the left and right engine feed 9.1.3 In−Flight Refueling Techniques
group provides for a relatively balanced center of gravity Note
condition during refueling. Selective refueling of the fuse
lage or all fuel tanks is provided on the REFUEL PROBE The following procedures, as applied to tanker
switch with the probe extended. In the FUS/EXTD position, operation, refer to single−drogue tanker only.
normal fuel transfer and feed is unaltered. This position is
used for practice plugins, fuselage only refueling, or return Refueling altitudes and airspeeds are dictated by
flight with a damaged air−refueling probe. The ALL/EXTD receiver and/or tanker characteristics and operational needs,
shuts off wing and external tank transfer to permit the consistent with the tanker’s performance and refueling capa
refueling of all tanks. The REFUELING PROBE switch bilities. This covers a practical spectrum from the deck to
circuit uses essential dc No. 2 power to control operation of 35,000 feet, 170 to 300 knots, and wing−sweep angles of
the probe actuator through redundant−extend solenoids and 20° to 68°. Optimum airspeed and wing−sweep position is
a single−retract solenoid. 240 knots and approximately 40° wing−sweep. This configu
ration increases aircraft angle of attack enough to lower the
9.1.2 In−Flight Refueling Checklist receiver’s vertical tails below the tanker’s jetwash and
decreases bow wave effect. SAS−off tanking can most easily
The in−flight refueling checklist shall be completed
be performed at 200 KCAS with 40° of wing−sweep.
before plug−in.
9.1.3.1 Approach
1. RDR switch  STBY.
Once cleared to commence an approach and with refuel
2. Arming switches  SAFE. ing checklists completed, assume a position 5 to 10 feet in trail
of the drogue with the refueling probe in line in both the hori
zontal and vertical reference planes. Trim the aircraft in this
4. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  L ENG.
9−1 ORIGINAL
stabilized approach position and ensure that the tanker’s evident in the refueling hose. The tanker’s drogue and hose
(amber) ready light is illuminated before attempting an must be pushed forward 3 to 5 feet by the receiver probe
approach. Select a reference point on the tanker as a primary before fuel transfer can be effected. This advanced position
alignment guide during the approach phase; secondarily, rely is evident by the tanker’s amber ready light going out and the
on peripheral vision of the drogue and hose and supplementa green fuel transfer light coming on. While plugged in, merely
ry remarks by the RIO. Increase power to establish an fly a close tail−chase formation on the tanker. Although this
optimum 3 to 5−knot closure rate on the drogue. It must be tucked−in condition restricts the tanker’s maneuverability,
emphasized that an excessive closure rate will cause a violent gradual changes involving heading, altitude, and/or airspeed
hose whip following contact and/or will increase the danger may be made. The precise flying imposed on both the tanker
of structural damage to the aircraft; too slow a closure rate and receiver pilots requires a lot of heads down" time, yet
results in the pilot fencing with the drogue as it oscillates in a sharp lookout doctrine must be maintained. This is the
close proximity to the aircraft nose. During the final phase of receiver RIO’s primary responsibility.
the approach, the drogue has a tendency to move slightly
upward and to the right as it passes the nose of the receiver 9.1.3.4 Disengagement
aircraft because of the aircraft−drogue airstream interaction.
Small corrections in the approach phase are acceptable. Disengagement from a successful contact is accom
However, if alignment is off in the final phase, it is best to plished by reducing power and backing out at a 3 to 5−knot
immediately return to the initial approach position and separation rate. Care should be taken to maintain the same
commence another approach, compensating for previous relative alignment on the tanker as upon engagement. The
misalignments by adjusting the reference point selected on receiver probe will separate from the drogue coupling when
the tanker. Small lateral corrections with a shoulder probe" the hose reaches full extension.
are made with the rudder, and vertical corrections with the When clear of the drogue:
horizontal stabilizer. Avoid any corrections about the
longitudinal axis since they cause probe displacement in both 1. REFUEL PROBE switch  RET.
the lateral and vertical reference planes. 2. Probe transition light  Check Out.
9.1.3.2 Missed Approach 3. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  BOTH ENG.
If the receiver probe passes forward of the drogue 4. Wing−sweep switch  AUTO.
basket without making contact, a missed approach should be Resume normal flight operations.
initiated immediately. Also, if the probe impinges on the
canopy−lined rim of the basket and tips it, a missed approach 9.2 FORMATION FLIGHT
should be initiated. Realization of this situation can be
readily ascertained through the RIO. A missed approach is The following formation descriptions are recom
executed by reducing power and backing to the rear at an mended guidelines for F−14 multiplane positioning.
opening rate commensurate with the optimum 3 to 5−knot
closure rate made on an approach. By continuing an approach
past the basket, a pilot might hook the probe over the hose
and/or permit the drogue to contact the receiver aircraft
fuselage. Either of the two aforementioned hazards require Parade formation IFR/VFR and loose cruise
more skill to calmly unravel the hose and drogue without flight shall not be performed with the flight lead
causing further damage than to make another approach. If the utilizing autopilot ground−track destination
initial approach position is correctly in line with the drogue, steering because of the midair collision potential
the chance of hooking the hose is diminished as the need for associated with inadvertent way−point steering
last−minute corrections is minimized. After executing a selection and rapid aircraft AOB changes.
missed approach, analyze previous misalignment problems
and apply positive corrections to preclude a hazardous 9.2.1 Parade Formation
tendency to blindly stab at the drogue.
The basic parade position is either left or right echelon,
9.1.3.3 Contact or a combination of both, as in fingertip three−plane
formation. The parade formation is used primarily for
When the receiver probe engages the basket, it will seat multiplane maneuvering at night, in IMC, or during entry into
itself into the drogue coupling and a slight ripple will be or exit from an airport traffic area.
ORIGINAL 9−2
Wing sweep: 20_ 2. Wingtip separation is determined by a position on

Configuration: Clean or dirty. the bearing line where the trailing edges of the lead
aircraft’s ventral fins are aligned. At this position,
1. Line of bearing is determined by placing the upper the trailing edge of the exhaust nozzles should ap
leading edge of the lead aircraft’s intake on the ex pear in line to the RIO.
plosive seat warning triangle below the RIO cockpit.
3. Stepdown is determined by allowing approximately
2. Wingtip separation is determined by a position on 6 inches of the lead’s opposite engine nacelle to
the bearing line where the leading edges of the lead show below the near engine nacelle.
aircraft’s ventral fins are aligned.
This position should provide the wingman with
3. Stepdown is determined by aligning the lead’s approximately 12 feet of wingtip separation and 12 feet of
opposite engine nacelle just under the near engine stepdown.
nacelle. Slot (dash−4)
This positioning should provide the wingman with 1. Line of bearing is determined by lining up on the
approximately 5 feet of wingtip separation and 10 feet of lead aircraft’s centerline.
stepdown.
2. Approximately 20 feet of nose−to−tail separation
9.2.2 Break Formation can be established by placing the wingman’s canopy
bow on the lead aircraft’s exhaust nozzles.
The basic break formation is either left or right
echelon, or a combination of both as in a fingertip three−plane 3. Approximately 25 feet of stepdown should be used.
formation. This formation is used primarily for multiplane This position may be cross−referenced by placing
entry into the overhead break pattern. the upper leading edge of dash−2’s or dash−3’s
intake on the pilot’s helmet.
Wing sweep: 68°
Configuration: Clean. 9.2.4 Cruise Formation
1. Line of bearing is determined by placing the upper Cruise is the basic formation used for multiplane transit
leading edge of the lead aircraft’s intake on the ex to or from an operating area where increased maneuver
plosive seat warning triangle below the RIO cockpit. ability is desired.
2. Wingtip separation is determined by a position on Wing sweep: 20°
the bearing line where approximately 1 foot of the Configuration: Clean.
forward edge of the lead’s opposite ventral fin
shows in front of the near ventral fin. 1. Line of bearing is determined by placing the upper
leading edge of the lead aircraft’s intake on the
3. Stepdown is determined by aligning the lead’s RIO’s canopy bow.
opposite engine nacelle just under the near engine
nacelle. 2. A second line of bearing is determined by placing
the lead aircraft’s wingtip light on the forward upper
This position should provide the wingman with UHF antenna.
approximately 15 feet of wingtip separation and 10 feet of
stepdown. 3. Wingtip separation is determined by allowing
approximately 1 foot of the lead’s opposite exhaust
9.2.3 Diamond Four−Plane Formation nozzle to show behind the near exhaust nozzle.
The diamond is the basic four−plane formation used for This position should provide the wingman with
entry into the overhead break or for aerial fly−bys. approximately 64 feet of wingtip separation and 10 feet of
Wing sweep: 68_ nose−to−tail separation.
Configuration: Clean.
Right and left echelon (dash−2 and dash−3, respectively)
1. Line of bearing is determined by placing the upper
leading edge of the lead aircraft’s intake on the
pilot’s helmet.
9−3 ORIGINAL
9.2.5 Aircraft Lighting During Night deck personnel. Tow aircraft holds this position
Formation Flight until released by catapult director.
The lead aircraft anticollision lights will normally be 2. When signaled to do so, banner crew lays banner on
off during night formation flight in parade. However the flight deck 45 feet starboard of waist catapult
possibility exists that the wing aircraft can inadvertently centerline and 10 feet aft of unit horizontal stabila
stray into a position aft of the normal bearing where only a tor, with banner bar perpendicular to the catapult
single white tail light on lead is visible. In this position, centerline.
serious misjudgment of separation and closure rate can occur.
To prevent this, lead aircraft anticollision lights should be on 3. Banner crew sequentially positions nylon towline
when the wing aircraft is not in normal parade and mission bundle lengthwise and parallel to catapult track in
requirements permit. position in front of banner. Nylon towline, with pre
9.3 BANNER TOWING pared end facing banner buckle, is attached to ban
ner using swivel and connecting link. Steel cable
leader (75 feet of 3/16−inch diameter) is attached to
9.3.1 Ground Procedures
forward end of nylon towline bundle using connect
The following procedures are provided for guidance. ing link.
Local course rules may dictate modification of these steps:
4. Banner crew then unrolls leader forward, down
1. When tower clearance onto the duty runway has angle deck and parallel to catapult track to prevent
been received, tow aircraft taxis to position as di entanglement and kinks. The forward end of leader
rected by tow hookup crew. Tow aircraft holds this is brought back and laid on deck near the aircraft’s
position until released by tow hookup crew. Escort right main landing gear. Forward end of leader has
aircraft maintains position on taxiway at approach Mk 8 Mod 0 target release ring attached to it.
end of runway.
2. When signaled to do so by tow hookup crew, tow air 5. Upon clearance from catapult officer, banner crew
craft proceeds to taxi down runway. member crawls underneath aircraft with leader in
hand, just aft of right ventral fin, and attaches Mk 8
3. Upon receipt of visual taxi signal from tow hookup Mod 0 target release ring to banner tow adapter.
crew to slow down, escort aircraft relays this signal Upon appropriate signals from the flight deck direc
to tow aircraft via UHF radio. tor, the pilot lowers hook to assure proper detach
4. Upon receipt of visual taxi signal from tow hookup ment of target release ring and then raises the hook.
crew to stop, escort aircraft relays this signal to tow The banner crewmember will then reattach target
aircraft via UHF radio. release ring.
5. Upon receipt of signal from tow hookup crew that 6. After hookup, the banner crewmember exits from
tow hookup is complete, escort aircraft requests tow beneath aircraft at same place he entered. He then
aircraft to take up slack. walks toward island and gives thumbs up signal to
catapult officer. The banner, towline, and leader are
6. Tow aircraft proceeds to taxi down the runway. now ready for launch.
7. When banner moves forward onto runway, escort
9.3.3 Flight Procedures
aircraft transmits, Tow aircraft hold, good banner,"
and taxis onto runway abeam banner for takeoff. Flight tests have demonstrated no significant degrada
tion of aircraft performance and handling characteristics
8. When ready, tow aircraft transmits, Tower, Lizard
when towing a banner.
616 for banner takeoff, escort to follow banner."
9. After banner becomes airborne, escort aircraft com
mences takeoff roll.
9.3.2 Shipboard Procedures Angle of bank should be limited to 30_ or less to
preclude contact between the tow cable and
The following procedures are provided for guidance.
Local rules may dictate modification of these steps: afterburner nozzle.
1. When clearance has been received, tow aircraft tax

is to the catapult shuttle in use as directed by flight
ORIGINAL 9−4
Note 9.3.3.2 Cruise/Pattern

Depending on the airspeed of the tow aircraft, the No special pilot techniques are required when towing
banner will normally hang 200 to 400 feet below a banner. En route cruising speeds of 180 to 220 KIAS will
the tow aircraft’s altitude. provide adequate energy for mild maneuvering while
minimizing banner fray. If a low−pattern airspeed is desired,
Refer to Chapter 4 for banner towing restrictions. extend flaps/slats if necessary to maintain AOA at or below
9.3.3.1 Takeoff 12 units. The tow aircraft must call all turns to allow the chase
aircraft to position itself on the outside of the turn.
Normal takeoff procedures, including rotation speeds
and techniques, are suitable for takeoff with the banner. If the banner is shot off or falls off in flight, the
remaining cable should be dropped in the gunnery area or in
D Takeoff ground roll with banner can be esti a confirmed clear area. After the cable is released, a chase
mated by adding a factor of 10 percent to basic aircraft should join to verify that the cable has been dropped.
aircraft takeoff performance. If aircraft lift−
off will not occur prior to crossing the long−
field arresting gear, the gear must be removed
to preclude the banner being torn off.
D If the crosswind component is in excess of
10 knots, the takeoff roll should be made on Without the banner, any remaining cable will
the upwind side of the runway to prevent the flail unpredictably. The chase should approach
banner from striking the runway lights on the tow aircraft from abeam, avoiding a cone−
the downwind side of the runway. shaped area defined by the tow’s 4− to 8−o’clock
positions.
Note
9.3.3.3 Descent
Adequate clearance exists to prevent contact be
tween the tow cable and speedbrakes during Airspeeds of 160 to 220 KIAS should be used for
ground operation. If takeoff is aborted, basic descent. Flaps and slats may be utilized to increase the rate
emergency procedures are applicable. The tow of descent as desired.
cable will be released when the tailhook is
lowered.
After lift−off, continue rotation to 15° (maximum of
20_), while raising the landing gear. Do not exceed 17 units
AOA. Climb out at 180 to 200 KIAS until the flaps are up, Speedbrakes should not be used while towing
then continue climb at 200 to 220 KIAS. since limited clearance exists between the cable
and speedbrakes during extension and retraction
Note in flight.
D Avoid use of afterburner to prevent damage to 9.3.3.4 Banner Drop

tow cable.
The tow aircraft should extend its flaps and reduce
D Tow airspeeds in excess of 220 KIAS will re airspeed (140 to 160 KIAS, 12 units AOA maximum) for the
sult in excessive banner fraying. drop. The banner should be dropped in wings−level flight at
For shipboard operations, after lift−off, rotate to 15° a minimum aircraft altitude of 1,000 feet AGL. The chase
(20° maximum) not to exceed 17 units AOA while raising aircraft should ensure adequate clearance exists between the
the gear and flaps. Prior clearance must be received from the banner and ground obstacles during approach to the drop
tower for an unrestricted climb. Maintain heading until the zone and provide calls to assist in lineup. Release is normally
banner is well clear of ship. Climb out at 180 to 200 KIAS until called by the tower when the banner is over the center of the
flaps are up, then continue to climb out at 200 to 220 KIAS. drop zone. Release is accomplished by lowering the tailhook.
In most cases, the banner will hit down range of the release
Note point. However high−wind conditions may require the tow
aircraft to adjust the release point to avoid downwind travel
The maximum aircraft gross weight for a ship of the banner. Following banner release, the tailhook should
board banner launch is 67,000 pounds. be raised.
9−5 ORIGINAL
9.3.3.5 Shipboard Banner Drop Have escort pilot confirm that banner breaks off on
ground collision, and determine length of remaining
The tow aircraft should extend its flaps and reduce
tow cable.
airspeed (140 to 160 KIAS, 12 units AOA maximum) for the
drop. The banner should be dropped in a clear area in
wings−level flight at a minimum altitude of 1,000 feet MSL.
If a clear area is not available, the banner should be dropped
approximately 1 nm abeam the port side of the carrier.
Release is called by the air officer when the banner is over
The escort pilot must remain well clear of
the drop zone. Banner release is accomplished by lowering
the remaining cable. The last 25 percent of the
the tailhook.
remaining cable will flail unpredictably.
2. If 100 feet or greater of remaining tow cable length is

confirmed by escort pilot, plan to touch down 1,000 to
1,500 feet long, runway length permitting.
When the tailhook is lowered for banner release,

ensure that the balance ball is centered or slightly
right (left yaw). If any right yaw is present, tow
cable/tailhook entanglement is possible.
Every effort must be made by the tow pilot not to
9.3.3.6 Banner Release Failure drag the remaining tow cable across lines,
If the arresting hook fails to extend, the banner cannot fences, or other obstacles because of property
be released. In this case, the following procedure is damage that will result.
recommended:
Note
1. In gunnery range (or other cleared area) descend to
low altitude, extend flaps, slow to 140 to 160 KIAS, The long touchdown should be carefully planned
12 units AOA maximum and descend to 100 to 200 feet because long−field arrestment is impossible.
AGL. This will drag banner off on ground (or water).
ORIGINAL 9−6
9.4 FUEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CHECK

The following fuel management system operational check can be used by flightcrews to perform a check of the fuel
transfer system, including FUEL FEED switch, WING/EXT TRANS switch, sump tank interconnect valve, fuselage motive
flow isolation valves, low−level thermistors, and box−beam vent valves. In addition, the procedure tests for proper functioning
of the automatic electrical controls in the fuel feed system. The final four procedures (steps 5 through 8) can best be performed
in a shore−based environment where minimum fuel on deck requirements are not as restrictive.
PROCEDURES COMMENTS
Initial conditions: Ensure 4,500 pounds on tapes for operation of

FEED switch.
FWD/R & AFT/L  3,000 pounds (approximately)
L & R FEED 1,500 to 1,750 pounds (full)
L/R WINGS  Empty (0 to 200 pounds)
TOTAL  6,000 pounds (approximately)
1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF. 1. Switch should not move until automatic inter−
connect occurs. Verifies proper automatic electrical
operation.
2. FUEL FEED switch  FWD/R 2. Verifies sump tank interconnect valve open via
Monitor 500−pound split, AFT/L high. manual operation and aft fuselage motive flow
valve shut off.
3. FUEL FEED switch  AFT/L 3. Same as step 2 except forward fuselage motive
Monitor 500−pound split, FWD/R high. flow valve shut off.
4. FUEL FEED switch  NORM 4. Verifies system returns to isolated mode with
Verify FWD/R high split remains constant. no leaks.
5. Monitor WING/EXT TRANS switch returns to AUTO. 5. Verifies cell No. 2 or 5 low−level thermistor’s proper
AFT/L  1,700 ± 200 pounds, or operation to trigger automatic interconnect function.
FWD/R  2,100 ± 200 pounds.
6. Monitor tapes/feeds for system balancing. 6. Verifies sump tank interconnect valve opens via
automatic operation and L/R box−beam vent
Note valves open. Verifies proper operation of
Balancing normally begins 6 to 9 minutes FWD/AFT motive systems.
after WING/EXT TRANS switch returns to
AUTO.
7. After landing, run both engines with matched throttles 7. Verifies proper operation of cell Nos. 2 and 5,
until R and L FUEL LOW lights Illuminate. Verify: and left box−beam and right box−beam
low−level thermistors.
R FUEL LOW at L FEED  1,000 ± 200 pounds,
L FUEL LOW at R FEED  1,000 ± 200 pounds.
8. Shut down left engine and pull L FUEL SHUTOFF 8. Verifies sump tank interconnect valve remains
handle. Continue to run right engine to verify continued open via right side motive flow pressure.
L FEED quantity decrease. Then shut down right This verifies proper operation of motive flow
engine. isolation valve.
9−7 (Reverse
9−7 Blank) CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 9−8
CHAPTER 10
Functional Checkflight Procedures
10.1 FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHTS
Functional checkflights will be performed when

directed by, and in accordance with, OPNAVINST 4790.2
series and the directions of NAVAIRSYSCOM type com
manders, or other appropriate authority. Functional check
flight requirements and applicable minimums are described
below. Functional checkflight checklists are promulgated
separately.
10.2 CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES
A flight profile has been established for each check

flight condition and is identified by the letter corresponding
to the purpose for which the checkflight is being flown (A,
B, C, as shown in Figure 10−1). The applicable letter identify
ing the profile precedes each item in the functional check
flight checklist (NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1F). Postmainte
nance checkflight procedures are specific and are to be
performed in conjunction with normal NATOPS operating
procedures (Part III). Checkflight personnel shall familiarize
themselves with the profile requirements before each flight.
A daily inspection is required before each checkflight. An
aircraft is considered high gross weight for profile purposes
if over 56,000 pounds total weight. Aircrew shall be cogni
zant of the aircraft’s configuration and the cumulative nega
tive effects of weapons rails and external stores on aircraft
stability. Figure 101.Flight Profile
Note
valuable service to the maintenance department by carrying
Shipboard constraints can preclude completion out this function. The quality of service provided by check
of some items on the applicable flight profile crews reflects directly in the quality of maintenance and
checklist. subsequently enhances flight operations. The commanding
officer shall ensure that thoroughness, professionalism, and
10.2.1 General Conduct safety are observed throughout the checkflight evolution and
that check crews strictly adhere to the profile checklist.
Thorough, professional checkflights are a vital part of Safety is a primary consideration during all checkflights.
the squadron maintenance effort. Check crews perform a
longwordwithnobreak.
10−1 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
10.3 FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES (PILOT)
10.3.1 Prestart
ABC 1. Fuel quantity and distribution. Check for proper fuel quantities in each system. Left tape 6,200
pounds maximum, right tape 6,600 pounds maximum, wings approximately 2,000 pounds
each, and the external tanks approximately 1,800 pounds. Check total quantity.
Left Right
FEED
FUS
WING
EXT
TOTAL
A 2. ICS.
a. Normal.
b. Backup.
c. Emergency.
A 3. Refuel probe.
a. Extend (with handpump).
b. Retract (with handpump).
A 4. OXYGEN SUPPLY valve ON.
A 5. Backup oxygen Check.
A 6. Seat adjustment Check.
A 7. Canopy rigging.
a. Both cockpit handles in same position during operation.
b. BOOST not required to close.
10.3.2 Start
ABC 8. ENG CRANK switch L (left engine).

a. Observe AUX and PARK brake pressure rise. Observe combined hydraulic system pressure
rise.
b. Press left rudder pedal fully forward until rudder stop is contacted. Rudder display pointer L
and R shall read 30 deg +/− 3.5 deg and be within 2 deg of each other.
c. Verify proper rudder operation through at least five cycles and confirm both rudders return to
neutral when commanded.
If hydraulic lines are crossed, the rudder will remain hardover.
ORIGINAL 10−2
PROFILE
ABC 9. ENG CRANK switch OFF.
ABC 10. ENG CRANK switch R (right engine).

a. Observe flight hydraulic system pressure rise.
b. Press right rudder pedal fully forward until rudder stop is contacted. Rudder display pointer L
and R shall read 30 deg +/− 3.5 deg and be within 2 deg of each other.
c. Verify proper rudder operation through at least five cycles and confirm both rudders return to
neutral when commanded.
If hydraulic lines are crossed, the rudder will remain hardover.
ABC 11. ENG CRANK switch OFF.

Note
Plane captain will bleed FLT and COMB HYD
systems during steps 8 and 10.
ABC 12. EMERG FLT HYD switch CYCLE.

a. EMERG FLT HYD switch LOW.
Check that ON flag is displayed in EMER FLT LOW hydraulic pressure window. Verify control
over horizontal tail and rudder control surfaces as viewed on flight control surface position
indicator.
b. EMERG FLT HYD switch HIGH.
Check that ON flag is displayed in EMER FLT HI hydraulic pressure window. Verify control
over horizontal tail and rudder control surfaces and higher surface deflection rate as viewed on
flight control surface position indicator.
c. EMERG FLT HYD switch AUTO (LOW).
Check that OFF flags are displayed in both EMER FLT HI and LOW hydraulic pressure
windows.
Combined and brake accumulators should be charged

prior to backup module checks. Checks should be
made slowly enough to ensure continuous ON indica
tion in the hydraulic pressure indicator.
ABC 13. BACKUP IGNITION ON.

Note
With weight on wheels and BACK UP IGNITION
switch ON, main high−energy ignition is disabled.
ABC 14. ENG CRANK switch R (Right engine).

Place the crank switch to the R position where the switch is solenoid held until automatically
released to the neutral (OFF) position at the starter cutout speed of 45−percent rpm. Manual
deselect of the switch to the OFF position will interrupt the crank mode at any point in the start
cycle. Oil pressure and flight hydraulic pressure rise will become evident at 10−percent rpm.
10−3 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
Note
When using wells system air for engine start, manual
deselection of starter crank switch may be required.
ABC 15. Right throttle IDLE (20−percent rpm)
D Attempting a ground start at lower engine rotor speeds

will aggravate hot−start tendencies. Exceeding 890_C
EGT constitutes a hot start. Advance the throttle from
OFF to IDLE when the rotor speed exceeds 20 percent
rpm; this action automatically actuates the ignition
system. An immediate indication of fuel flow (300 to
350 pph) will be exhibited and light−off (EGT rise)
should be achieved within 5 seconds, but no more than
20 seconds. The rapid rise in EGT should be carefully
monitored for overtemperature tendencies. Peak start
ing temperatures will be achieved in the 40 to 50 per
cent rpm range when, after a slight hesitation, a reduc
tion will return the EGT to the nominal 350 to 650_C
level. During the initial starting phase, the nozzle
should expand to a full−open position indication of
100%.
D If an idle crossbleed start is attempted with high resid
ual EGT (after hot start) and/or throttle is advanced
from OFF to IDLE prior to 20 percent rpm, higher than
normal EGT readings may occur. If the EGT appears
to be rising abnormally, increasing the supply engine
to 80 percent rpm may yield a normal start temperature.
Note
D If the engine has been shut down within the past
60minutes, monitor it closely for a hot/hung start. If
the start is aborted because of a hot start (EGT above
890_ C), motor the engine until the EGT is less than
250_ C.
D Loss of electrical power may result in smoke entering
the cockpit via the ECS.
ABC 16. Right engine instrument readings.

a. RPM 62 to 78−percent.
b. EGT 350 to 650_C (nominal).
c. FF 950 to 1,400 pph (nominal).
d. NOZ position 100% (open).
e. OIL 25 to 35 psi (nominal) (15 psi minimum, 65 psi maximum for one minute on a cold day
start).
f. FLT HYD 3,000 psi.
ORIGINAL 10−4
PROFILE
ABC 17. External power Disconnect.

Removal of ground electrical power causes the right generator to supply power to the right and
left main electrical buses.
A 18. Tailhook EMERG DOWN.

Check the mechanical release of the tailhook uplock without combined hydraulic power.
ABC 19. ENG CRANK switch L (left engine).

When combined hydraulic pressure reaches 3,000 psi, return switch to neutral (center) position.
ABC 20. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch NORMAL.

Hydraulic transfer pump will operate from flight side to maintain the combined side between 2,400
to 2,600 psi.
If the transfer pump does not pressurize the combined

system within 5 seconds, immediately set HYD
TRANSFER PUMP switch to SHUTOFF.
ABC 21. ENG CRANK switch OFF and check BI−DI.
Verify hydraulic transfer pump pressure operation with slight rudder inputs.
ABC 22. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch SHUT OFF.
ABC 23. Repeat steps 14, 15, and 16 for left engine.
ABC 24. BACK UP IGNITION switch OFF.
ABC 25. Starter air Disconnect
ABC 26. ECS

a. AIR SOURCE pushbuttons L ENG, R ENG, OFF, BOTH ENG. There should be no excessive
interruption in cockpit airflow with single−engine air source changes. Selection of OFF should
stop airflow and BOTH ENG should provide greatest airflow.
b. TEMP mode selector switch Check MAN−AUTO. Cockpit temperature control and flow
should be checked in both MAN and AUTO modes to ensure proper temperature control.
ABC 27. Right throttle OFF then immediately to IDLE.

Observe rpm decrease, then rise to IDLE rpm.
Note
Failure of the engine to relight above 59−percent rpm
indicates a failure of the N2 deceleration auto−relight
logic.
ABC 28. Left throttle OFF, then immediately to IDLE.
Observe rpm decrease, then rise to idle rpm.
Note
Failure of the engine to relight above 59−percent rpm
indicates a failure of the N2 deceleration auto−relight
logic.
10−5 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
ABC 29. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch NORMAL.

ABC 30. Restore normal tailhook and raise.
ABC 31. Ground safety pins Remove and stow.
ABC 32. Idle engine instrument readings.
Left Right Nominal
NOZ position 100% open
OIL (psi) 25 to 65 (15 minimum)
RPM (%) 62 to 78
EGT (_C) 350 to 650
FF (pph) 950 to 1,400
ABC 33. OBOGS MASTER switch ON.
Ensure ECS service air is available to OBOGS prior to

selecting the OBOGS MASTER switch ON.
10.3.3 Poststart
ABC 34. MASTER TEST switch EMERG GEN.

The DFCS caution/advisory lights may be illuminated prior to selection of EMERG GEN on the
MASTER TEST panel. These lights should extinguish with a MASTER RESET with the possible
exception of the FCS CAUTION light due to IMU/INS alignment (PQVM fault). Subsequent
selection of EMERG GEN with the MASTER TEST switch may or may not illuminate DFCS
caution lights. Following a good emergency generator check, (green ‘GO’ light) ensure that all
lights clear with a MASTER RESET prior to deselecting the emergency generator. When the
emergency generator is deselected, the resultant power interruption should cause the DFCS flight
control computers to self−isolate due to voltage monitoring resulting in illumination of all the
DFCS caution/advisory lights listed below. These lights will remain on when normal voltage is
regained, requiring a MASTER RESET to re−engage the DFCS flight control computers. The
STAB AUG switches are mechanically held and should remain engaged during this test.
DFCS caution/advisory lights:
a. PITCH SAS
b. ROLL DGR
c. YAW DGR
d. FCS CAUTION
e. ARI DGR
f. ARI/SAS OUT
g. HZ TAIL AUTH
h. RUDDER AUTH
i. SPOILERS
j. AUTO PILOT
k. MACH TRIM.
CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL 10−6
PROFILE
ABC 35. AFTC Check.
a. L ENG MODE switch SEC.

L ENG SEC light illuminates; left NOZ position indicator pointer is below zero.
b. L ENG MODE switch PRI.

L ENG SEC light goes out; NOZ position indicator to 100 percent.
c. R ENG select switch SEC.

R ENG SEC light illuminates; right NOZ position indicator pointer is below zero.
d. R ENG select switch PRI.

R ENG SEC light goes out; NOZ position indicator to 100−percent.
Selecting secondary (SEC) mode closes exhaust

nozzles, increasing exhaust nozzle jet wake hazard.
Note
D Performing AFTC check during OBC inhibits AICS
ramps from programming. Ramps must be reset before
another OBC can be performed.
D NOZ position indication is lost in SEC mode.
ABC 36. MASTER TEST switch WG SWP.

Wing−sweep mode switch must be in AUTO.
Wing−sweep program index moves from 20_ to 44_ and back to 20_. The following lights
illuminate at start of test and are out at test completion (approximately 25 seconds): WING
SWEEP, FLAP, CADC, and REDUCE SPEED.
Note
D During the wing−sweep preflight test, both altimeters
may fluctuate momentarily.
D The WING SWEEP advisory light illuminates 3 sec
onds after the test starts, then goes out and illuminates
again 8 seconds into the test.
D The WING SWEEP, FLAP, CADC, and REDUCE
SPEED lights are out at the end of the test. The
RUDDER AUTH, HZ TAIL AUTH, and MACH
TRIM lights illuminate for the entire test and remain
illuminated at the end of the test.
A 37. UHF/VHF/JTIDS/ICS Check.

Check complete operation of throttle communications switch UHF 1, UHF 2, JTIDS, ICS.
10−7 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
ABC 38. MASTER TEST switch OBC (AUTOPILOT switch ENGAGE).
Run at least one OBC or IBIT with the WINGS AUTO 20°, FLAPS DOWN,
ANTISKID/SPL BRK OFF, AUTOPILOT ON to fully test the system. Also run MAN DFCS
BIT via the MASTER TEST panel. Running OBC by selection of OBC via the MASTER TEST
switch will automatically run DFCS IBIT in addition to the standard OBC. Selection of DFCS BIT
via the MASTER TEST switch will run only the DFCS IBIT. When the MASTER TEST switch
is rotated to the OBC or DFCS BIT position, an IBIT ARM acronym will flash in the DCP display
indicating that a DFCS IBIT may be executed upon depression of the switch. In the IBIT ARM
mode, the AUTOPILOT switch may be engaged ON. If the INC/DEC pushbuttons are depressed
during this period, the IBIT ARM display will be removed even though the system is still in IBIT
ARM mode. When the MASTER TEST switch is depressed the display will indicate IBIT RUN
and the DFCS BIT will commence as the AFC acronym begins to flash. After the DFCS IBIT has
commenced, the AUTOPILOT switch cannot be ENGAGED ON and therefore will not be tested.
OBC commencement with nose down trim may result

in a force link disconnect when the stick hits forward
stick stop during the pitch parallel actuator checks.
Note
D An FCS CAUTION light at this point probably indi

cates a PQVM fault due to a lack of pitch and roll atti
tude inputs from the IMU. This fault will not affect
DFCS IBIT results and can be extinguished with a
MASTER RESET either before or after, but not during
OBC.
D At least one IBIT must be performed with the wings
at 20°, flaps extended and the autopilot engaged to
fully exercise spoiler test logic and autopilot/ACLS.
a. Pull ALPHA COMP cb RB1.
Verify LDG2 displayed in DCP under FAIL. Pulling the ALPHA COMP cb removes power
from the landing gear handle position switch #2 relay resulting in a LDG2 FAIL code.
b. OBC Initiate (coordinate with RIO and plane captain).
ORIGINAL 10−8
PROFILE
c. After ramps are extended − Select RAMPS to STOW.
d. Verify RAMP lights go out and INLET lights illuminate.
e. When OBC is completed:
(1) Verify FCS CAUTION light illuminated; AOAC and AC28 displayed in DCP under IBIT.
AOAC and AC28 are detected as a result of the ALPHA COMP cb being pulled.
(2) Reset ALPHA COMP cb, both AICS cb’s, and check INLET RAMPS switches AUTO.
(3) Reinitiate complete normal OBC (AUTOPILOT switch ENGAGE). Verify DFCS IBIT
operation by flashing A/P REF legend and ACLS lights. Observe the following:
(a) 10 DFCS caution/advisory lights.
(b) Pitch trim check (slow longitudinal stick motion).
(c) Pitch parallel actuator check (rapid longitudinal stick motion).
(d) Individual spoiler operation (check in mirrors).
(e) Stab & rudder actuator check (horizontal tail and rudder movement).
(f) Autopilot disengage check.
(g) Rudder pedal shaker check.
(h) DCP display LED check.
The standard DFCS IBIT will check the following in order. All DFCS caution/advisory
lights will illuminate and the ACLS and A/P REF advisories will flash upon commencement
of the test. This will be followed by slow fwd/aft motion of the stick and stab (pitch trim)
followed quick fwd/aft motion of the stab SAS actuators (no stick movement), and then rapid
fwd/aft motion of the stick and stab (pitch parallel actuator). Following the rapid stick and
stab motion the spoilers will extend individually in the order SP4R, SP3R, SP2R, SP1R,
SP1L, SP2L, SP3L, and SP4L. Pilot should verify spoiler position indicator corresponds
with spoiler deployment and note any discrepancies. This will be followed by rapid left/right
motion of the differential stabilizer SAS actuators and left/right rudder SAS actuator checks.
This will then be followed by AUTOPILOT switch disengagement, rudder pedal shakers,
and the DCP display LED check.
f. Attempt MASTER TEST switch DFCS BIT with ROLL SAS switch deselected.
Verify IBIT does not run.
IBIT should not run with any STAB AUG switch deselected. Deselection of the ROLL and/or
YAW SAS should result in an ARI/SAS OUT caution light. Deselection of the PITCH SAS
should not illuminate any caution lights.
g. Check DCP fault codes using INC/DEC pushbuttons. Record IBIT fault codes and clear FAIL
and FLT fault codes prior to takeoff.
Check the DCP fault codes FAIL/FLT/IBIT using INC/DEC pushbuttons. IBIT fault codes can
only be cleared by running another IBIT. The FAIL codes can only be cleared by resolving the
problem and depressing MASTER RESET. The FLT codes can only be cleared by simultaneous
depression of the INC/DEC buttons for 6−7 seconds and is confirmed by a single line in the DCP
display. These codes will not clear with the MASTER TEST switch in the IBIT ARM or IBIT
RUN position.
10−9 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
ABC 39. Speedbrake switch.
a. EXT−RET.
b. Verify stabilizers shift 1° nosedown (clean) or 3° nosedown (AIM−54 rails) on extension and
opposite on retraction (ITS).
ABC 40. Flaps down.
a. Verify stabilizer shifts 3° nose up (ITS).
ABC 41. Flight controls Trim.
Verify full range of trim authority in all axes and power approach spoiler gearing with full left/right
lateral trim and corresponding full left/right lateral stick (spoiler deflection should be reduced to
35° deployment with full trim into stick displacement). Careful attention should be given to the
operation and accuracy of the control surface position indicator during this test. This gauge is
utilized routinely to determine DFCS flight control functionality airborne and any inaccuracies
or friction in the indicator will impact the ability to resolve DFCS operation. A useful technique
is to trim full authority in one direction, observe the position indicator and then move the control
stick/rudder pedals slightly in the same direction of trim and release and note any change in the
position indicator due to inaccuracy/friction in the gauge.
a. Trim Full Nose Down, check 9° TED.
b. Stick full aft Check for free movement.
c. Trim Full nose up, check greater than 18° TEU (17 to 19 seconds).
d. Stick full forward Check for free movement.
e. Yaw trim 7° Left to 7° Right (12 to 14 seconds).
f. Trim Full Left, check 6° differential tail split.
g. Stick full left Check power approach spoiler gearing and uniform 35° to 55° spoiler exten
sion.
h. Trim Full right; check 6° differential tail split (16 to 18 seconds).
i. Stick full right Check power approach spoiler gearing and uniform 35° to 55° spoiler exten
sion.
ABC 42. Flight controls Cycle.
Verify full range of control surface authority. As above identify the operation and accuracy of the
control surface position indicator. Note the 0.1 inch lateral stick deflection spoiler breakout in
the power approach (PA) configuration. Spoiler breakout in the gear up configuration is 0.5 inch.
Observe the following:
a. Longitudinal 36° TEU to 9° TED horizontal tail (33° to 12° without ITS).
b. Lateral 24° total differential tail.
c. Directional 30° rudder.
ORIGINAL 10−10
PROFILE
d. Longitudinal/Lateral combined 35° TEU to 15° TED.

e. Spoilers 55° extension.
Note
A stabilizer vibration may occur when the control sys
tem linkage is held in contact with the tail stops fully
engaged during stick cycling checks. This vibration is
acceptable, provided it damps when the control stick
is moved to clear the stop in contact. Clearance from
the stop can best be verified by movement of the
matching stabilizer indicator needle away from its
maximum travel position.
ABC 43. Spoiler checks.
a. DLC Check.
Verify DLC engagement/operation and stabilizer shift upon engagement and subsequently
upon up" DLC commands via the thumbwheel.
(1) DLC Engage. Verify stabilizer shifts 2¾° below trim. Inboard spoilers extend to 17½°.
(2) Full up DLC. Verify stabilizer returns to trim. Inboard spoilers go to −4½°.
(3) Full down DLC. Verify stabilizer remains 2¾° below trimmed position and inboard
spoilers extend to 55°.
(4) Stick 2 inches left (check spoiler gearing). Left wing outboard +30° and inboard +55°.
Right wing both inboard/outboard −4½°.
(5) Stick 2 inches right (check spoiler gearing). Right wing outboard +30° and inboard 55°.
Left wing both inboard/outboard −4½°.
(6) DLC Disengage.
b. SPOILER BK Select.
SPOILER BK selection to verify ground roll braking operation.
c. SPOILER BK/Throttle interlocks Check.

(1) SPOILER BK Deselect.
(2) Pull O/B SPOILER PUMP cb 2B3 (coordinate with RIO).
Pulling the O/B SPOILER PUMP cb will de−energize the outboard spoiler module.
The SPOILERS caution light will not illuminate until a lateral stick sweep is performed
which will be detected by the DFCS as a failure of the outboard spoiler actuators and result
in isolation of both left and right outboard spoilers. The DCP will only report fault codes
in the FAIL group of the left or right outboard spoiler pair in the direction of initial stick
displacement. MASTER RESET will reset the spoiler control logic and a subsequent initial
stick displacement in the opposite direction will result in the DCP reporting FAIL codes
for the other side. Reset cb and a MASTER RESET will extinguish the SPOILERS caution
light and remove DCP FAIL codes.
(a) Verify no SPOILERS caution light.
10−11 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
(b) Perform lateral stick sweep. Observe SPOILERS caution light, verify DCP FAIL fault
codes SP3 and SP4 (L or R on initial lateral stick input).
(c) Reset cb and perform MASTER RESET. Verify light and DCP fault codes removed.
A 44. Radar altimeter Test.
A 45. Displays CHECK.
A 46. TACAN BIT.
A 47. ARA−63 BIT.
A 48. Gunsight Check (manual mode).

a. Select A/A mode, Weapon select switch GUN.
b. Select manual mode via CAGE/SEAM switch.
c. Set +34 mils. Verify the manual reticle is positioned over the HUD heading tick.
d. Weapon select switch OFF.
AB 49. Emergency disengage paddle.

The emergency disengage paddle will not disengage SAS operation nor will it deselect any STAB
AUG switches.
a. Paddle switch Hold Depressed.
b. Verify throttles in manual mode.
c. Engines revert to SEC mode.
A 50. OXYGEN Monitor TEST.

Release the TEST button as soon as the OBOGS light is illuminated. Verify OBOGS light is out
within 20 seconds.
The monitor will fail without any indication to the air

crew. For this reason, it is essential that the pilot test
the monitor function prior to launch and prior to
ascending above 10,000 feet MSL. If the aircrew sus
pects the onset of hypoxia at any time, immediately
select BACKUP. The monitor may be tested once the
aircraft has descended to a maximum cabin altitude
of 10,000 feet by reselecting ON on the OBOGS
MASTER switch.
Note
The monitor can take up to 2 minutes to warm up,
depending on the ambient temperature. The OBOGS
light will not be illuminated during the warmup
period.
ORIGINAL 10−12
PROFILE
10.3.4 Taxi
ABC 51. Turn needle/slip indicator Check.
10.3.5 Engine Runup
AB 52. Engine runup Check at MIL, Read out to RIO.
Engine checks shall not be performed in tension and

shall be performed with the shuttle forward of the
launch bar.
D Shipboard use of MRT and minimum AB is restricted

to a maximum of 30 seconds to prevent damage to the
holdback bar and the JBD. JBD cooldown requires
both throttles at IDLE for 30 seconds and may be nec
essary during these checks.
D Shipboard use of excessive asymmetric thrust may
damage the holdback.
Left Right Limits
NOZ position 3 to 10 nominal (closed)
OIL (psi) 25 to 65
RPM (%) 95 to104 nominal (107.7 maximum)
EGT (_C) 935_
FF (pph) 9,000 to 12,000
Note
Ashore engine checks must be performed with oppos
ing engine at IDLE for the brakes to hold.
a. Verify hook stowed and RATS light out.
b. Both engines MODE SEC.
c. Both throttles MIL.
Note acceleration time (less than 10 seconds).
d. Both engines MODE PRI.
Record engine parameters.
e. Hook handle DOWN.
Verify RATS light and 3 to 6−percent rpm decay.
10−13 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
f. Right throttle MIN AB.
Verify rpm increases 3 to 6 percent.
g. Right throttle MIL.
h. Left throttle MIN AB.
Verify rpm increases 3 to 6 percent.
i. Left throttle MIL.
j. THROTTLE MODE switch MAN.
k. Both throttles IDLE.
l. THROTTLE MODE switch BOOST.
m. Hook handle UP.
Verify hook stowed and RATS light out.
n. Perform AICS programmer reset.
o. Throttles MIL.
p. Flight control wipeout.
10.3.6 Takeoff and Climb
A 53. Landing gear Retract (9 to 15 seconds nominal).
A 54. Servo and radar altimeters Check below 5,000 feet.
A 55. REFUEL PROBE switch EXT−RET.
AB 56. AFTC Check.

Note
D SEC mode transfer while in minimum AB may result
in pop stalls. Non−emergency manual selection of SEC
mode airborne should be performed in basic engine
with the power set above 85−percent RPM.
D If the fan speed limiter circuit has failed, engine roll
back may occur with the selection of SEC mode. In the
event of engine rollback, PRI mode must be reselected
above 59−percent rpm or flameout will occur and an
airstart will not be possible.
a. L ENG mode switch SEC.
b. Left throttle Check basic engine power response.
c. L ENG mode switch PRI.
d. R ENG MODE switch SEC.
ORIGINAL 10−14
PROFILE
e. Right throttle Check basic engine power response.
f. R ENG MODE switch PRI.
g. Cycle AICS cb’s at a constant subsonic Mach.
Note
Cycling AICS cb’s while airborne may illuminate the
FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.
10.3.7 Ten Thousand Foot Checks
AB 57. OXYGEN monitor TEST.
Release the TEST button as soon as the OBOGS light is illuminated. Verify OBOGS light is out
within 20 seconds.
The monitor will fail without any indication to the air

crew. For this reason, it is essential that the pilot test
the monitor function prior to launch and prior to ascend
ing above 10,000 feet MSL. If the aircrew suspects the
onset of hypoxia at any time, immediately select
BACKUP. The monitor may be tested once the aircraft
has descended to a maximum cabin altitude of 10,000
feet by reselecting ON on the OBOGS master switch.
Note
The monitor can take up to 2 minutes to warm up,
depending on the ambient temperature. The OBOGS
light will not be illuminated during the warmup
period.
AB 58. ECS check (Airspeed 250 KCAS).
In CV environment, ensure external tanks are empty

prior to ECS checks.
ECS check should be performed at altitudes above 8,000 feet so cabin pressurization can be
checked, but low enough to prevent large cockpit pressure changes when cockpit air is secured.
a. Cabin altitude approximately 8,000 feet.
b. Air distribution CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR.
c. WCS switch STBY (coordinate with RIO).
d. AIR SOURCE pushbutton OFF.
Cockpit pressurization will quickly bleed off and cabin pressure altimeter should indicate
aircraft altitude.
10−15 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
e. CABIN PRESS switch DUMP.
Cockpit will completely depressurize.
f. RAM AIR switch INCR (35 to 50 seconds to fully open ram air door).
As ram air door opens (up to 50 seconds to open fully), there will be an increase in cockpit
airflow.
g. AIR SOURCE pushbutton RAM.
With RAM selected, 400° manifold is re−pressurized, which maintains canopy seal, airbags,
and antenna waveguides pressurization. As canopy seal re−inflates, cockpit pressurization
available from ram air will be much more apparent.
h. RAM AIR switch DECR/CLSD.
Observe reduction in cockpit airflow.
i. CABIN PRESS switch NORM.
j. AIR SOURCE pushbutton BOTH ENG.
k. WCS switch XMT (Coordinate with RIO).
10.3.8 Fifteen Thousand Foot Checks
ABC 59. Fuel transfer Check.
AC 60. Basic SAS checks (Airspeed 300 KCAS).
Deselection of the ROLL and/or YAW SAS switch should result in an ARI/SAS OUT caution light.
Deselection of the PITCH SAS switch should not illuminate any caution lights.
a. Pitch pulse forward and aft PITCH SAS OFF/ON.
Pitch pulse is executed with a partial fwd/aft motion and release of the control stick followed
by observation of resultant aircraft motion. Observe increased damping of aircraft response
with PITCH SAS ON.
b. Full stick roll ROLL SAS OFF/ON.
Note ARI/SAS OUT light when ROLL SAS OFF. Note full extension of down wing spoilers.
Check for 14° of differential stab split with ROLL SAS OFF, and >20° of stabilizer split with
ROLL SAS ON. Full stick roll acceleration with ROLL SAS OFF will be significantly less than
with ROLL SAS ON because of reduced horizontal tail authority. In addition residual aircraft
motion will be less dampened with the ROLL SAS OFF. Observe slight reduction in differential
tail at high roll rates with ROLL SAS ON due to roll rate feedback limiting.
c. Rudder pulse left and right YAW SAS OFF/ON.
Note ARI/SAS OUT light when YAW SAS OFF. Rudder pulse is executed with a partial
left/right motion and release of the rudder pedals followed by observation of resultant aircraft
motion. Observe Dutch roll response with YAW SAS OFF. Yaw excursions should cease
immediately upon engagement of YAW SAS ON.
ORIGINAL 10−16
PROFILE
AC 61. Wing−sweep and maneuver devices check (airspeed 0.5 Mach).

a. Lateral trim check. Observe <2° differential tail split.
Trim aircraft for hands off level flight turn needle/ball and yaw string centered. Observe normal
lateral trim requirement. Do not retrim during subsequent wing sweep checks. Aircraft
horizontal stabilizer rigging should require <2° differential tail split to maintain wings level
flight throughout wing program schedule. (<500 lb wing fuel split or wings empty).
b. Maneuver devices EXT.
c. WING SWEEP MODE switch AFT (check that wings stop at 50°).
d. Maneuver flaps partial up with thumbwheel. Ensure that devices retract.
e. WING SWEEP MODE switch BOMB.
(1) Verify maneuver devices automatically retract and then wings sweep to 55°.
f. WING SWEEP MODE switch MAN FULL AFT.

(1) Note whether aircraft requires retrim of rudder or differential stab to remain wings level/
no sideslip.
(2) Release controls and measure elapsed time to 30° bank angle. If <6 seconds, reattempt
check with wing fuel cells empty.
g. WING SWEEP MODE switch AUTO.
h. EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle Cycle 22_, 68_, 22_.
(1) Verify spider detent is engaged, emergency WING SWEEP warning light out.
(2) MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress, check WING SWEEP advisory light out.
i. Maneuver devices EXT.
j. Accelerate to >0.79 Mach and check maneuver devices remain retracted (maneuver devices
start automatic retraction at 0.68 $0.02 Mach).
k. Decelerate to <0.68 Mach and check maneuver devices remain retracted.
l. WING SWEEP MODE switch AUTO. Verify wings are in AUTO mode.
ABC 62. ASYM LIMITER switch Check (airspeed 300 KCAS).

a. Throttles MIL or Less.
b. ASYM LIMITER switch OFF.
c. Left throttle MAX AB.
Observe full AB available.
d. ASYM LIMITER switch ON.
Observe reduction to min AB (12−percent).
e. Repeat steps a through d for right engine.
ABC 63. High AOA Mach lever/AUTO MAN devices.
a. Throttles IDLE.
10−17 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
b. Slowly increase aircraft AOA and allow aircraft to stabilize; maneuver devices extended at
10.5 units AOA.
This is the first comparison of ARI alpha nose−probe (radome) and ADD AOA side−probe
(left fuselage) AOA inputs and any disparity could indicate potential limited DFCS
functionality.
Note
The maneuver device AOA signal from the ARI alpha
nose−probe to the CADC has a faster response rate
than the signal from the ADD AOA side−probe to the
AOA indicator, causing a low reading (error) on the
indicator. This error is directly proportional to the air
craft AOA maneuver rate. Therefore, to determine
when maneuver device extension occurs, perform the
high−AOA maneuver device check by slowly increas
ing/decreasing aircraft AOA and allowing aircraft to
stabilize.
c. Recover to <8 units AOA. Verify maneuver devices retract at 8 units AOA.
Maneuver devices should retract at 2 units less than extension to provide a deadband" to
reduce stress associated with automatic extension/retraction commands on the maneuver
flaps/slats.
ABC 64. UA−ARI checks. Approaches to stalls.
a. Clean stall with maneuvering devices extended.

(1) Stabilize in level flight, speedbrakes out, 15 units AOA.
(2) Verify maneuvering devices extended.
(3) Slowly decelerate to buffet onset. Note AOA (light airframe buffet at 13 to 14 units AOA).
(4) Differential Tail Fadeout (DTF) / Lateral Stick−to−Rudder Interconnect (LSRI) check.
DTF/LSRI functionality is active between approximately 10 to 28 units AOA. The
functionality reduces full lateral stick differential tail authority from a 24° to 4° split as
aircraft AOA and Mach increase.
(a) Stabilize at 10−12 units AOA. Make full lateral stick input, note no initial rudder
deflection in direction of lateral stick and full differential tail available (>20° split).
(b) Continue deceleration to stabilize at 25−28 units AOA. Make full lateral stick input,
note initial 19° rudder deflection in direction of stick input and reduced differential
tail authority (10 $ 4° total split). Observe roll in direction of stick input.
(5) Wing Rock Suppression (WRS) check.
WRS functionality is active between approximately 20 to 30 units AOA. The functionality
is designed to prevent wing rock from starting and may only be marginally effective at
reducing an established wing rock.
(a) Stabilize at 22−25 units AOA.
(b) Observe no wing rock.
ORIGINAL 10−18
PROFILE
(c) Select ROLL SAS switch OFF, initiate mild wing rock with small stick and rudder
inputs.
(d) Select ROLL SAS switch ON, hold stick/rudder centered and observe reduction or
elimination of wing rock.
(6) Low Speed Cross Control (LSXC) check.
LSXC functionality is effective above 30 units AOA and below 0.4 Mach. During this
maneuver the pilot should slowly continue to decelerate to full aft stick with the nose less
than 30° pitch attitude. The pilot should then input full left lateral stick and observe the
4° differential tail fadeout and full 19° rudder in the direction of stick. When the pilot
inputs full right rudder pedal the differential tail fadeout will be overridden and allow a 20°
differential tail split LWD and a full 30° right rudder as commanded. The low speed cross
control functionality will provide for a sluggish right roll/yaw response with rudder at high
AOA.
(a) Continue deceleration to full aft stick, <30° pitch attitude (>30 units AOA).
(b) Lateral stick Full left. Observe 4° differential tail split LWD and 19° left rudder.
(c) Rudder pedal Full right (with full aft/left stick). Observe sustained 20° differential
tail split LWD, 30° right rudder, and aircraft right roll/yaw response.
Note
Reduction to original authorities can occur if AOA
falls below 30 units or yaw rate exceeds 20 deg/sec as
the LSXC functionality is overridden.
(7) Recover to <15 units AOA, retract maneuvering devices when proper DFCS control inputs
and right roll/yaw response observed or when aircraft <30° nose down pitch attitude.
b. Clean stall with maneuvering devices retracted.

(1) Stabilize in level flight, speedbrakes out, 15 units AOA.
(2) Ensure maneuver devices retracted using thumbwheel, maintain power setting.
(3) Slowly decelerate to buffet onset and note AOA (light airframe buffet at 12 to 13 units,
increasing to moderate intensity at 15 units AOA).
(4) Continue deceleration to 28 units AOA. Note any abrupt or significant rolloff tendencies.
ABC 65. Structural integrity check (airspeed 0.9 Mach at 10,000 feet).
a. High−speed dash MIL THRUST.
b. High−g turn.
c. Anti−g valve operation.
d. Accelerometer Check.
10−19 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
10.3.10 Airstarts (Twenty Thousand Feet)
AB 66. Radar power switch OFF (coordinate with RIO).
AB 67. Spooldown airstart.

a. Stabilize at 300 KCAS.
b. Right throttle OFF, then IDLE at 60−percent rpm.
Note
Sub−idle stall can be cleared by cycling the throttle to
OFF and immediately returning it to IDLE.
c. Stabilize at 300 KCAS.
d. Left throttle OFF, then IDLE at 60−percent rpm.
Note
D Sub−idle stall can be cleared by cycling the throttle to
OFF and immediately returning it to IDLE.
D A left generator transient may cause a Mach fault illu
minating the FCS CAUTION, ARI DGR, HZ TAIL
AUTH, RUD AUTH and MACH TRIM lights. This
should clear with a MASTER RESET.
AB 68. Radar power switch XMT (coordinate with RIO).
10.3.11 Climb to Thirty−Five Thousand Feet
AB 69. Fuel management.
Left Right
FEED
FUS
WING
EXT
TOTAL
AB 70. ECS check

a. Automatic cabin temperature control.
b. Manual cabin temperature control.
c. Cabin altitude schedule (approximately 14,000 feet at 35,000 feet).
AB 71. Afterburner light−off Check (airspeed 210 KCAS).

a. ASYM LIMITER switch OFF.
b. Throttles MAX AB (verify AB light−off within 10 seconds).
ORIGINAL 10−20
PROFILE
c. Throttles Less than MIL.
d. ASYM LIMITER switch ON.
AB 72. Wing sweep Verify program.
Mach Wingsweep
0.4 20_
0.7 21_
0.8 40_
0.9 60_
>0.93 68_
AB 73. Engine instruments (engine MIL power at 0.9 Mach) Monitor and read out to RIO.
Left Right Limits
OIL (psi) 25 to 65
RPM (%) 107.7 maximum
EGT (_C) 935_
10.3.12 High−Speed Dash (Thirty−Five Thousand Feet)
AB 74. Idle lockup Check.

a. Jam throttles MAX AB.
b. Both throttles to IDLE at 1.1 Mach. Verify less than 2−percent rpm decay.
Monitor rpm decay while retarding throttles to idle to

ensure proper idle lockup operation. Discontinue idle
lockup check if rpm decays more than 2 percent above
1.1 Mach. Place throttles to MIL and decelerate.
c. Jam throttles MAX AB. Accelerate to 1.5 Mach.
d. Engine instruments Monitor and read out to RIO.
Left Right Limits
NOZ position (%) 50 to 60 (open)
OIL (psi) 25 to 65
EGT (_C) 935_
e. Mach trim compensation Check.
10−21 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
f. Compare pitot−static instruments (pilot and RIO). Pilot should report Mach in increments of
0.1 Mach. RIO should indicate 0.1 Mach less than pilot’s Mach indication.
Pilot STBY RIO STBY Calibrated

Altitude
Airspeed
Note
A significant difference between front and rear air
speed indications may result in compressor stalls
because of inlet ramp mispositioning.
g. Throttles IDLE (MIL if idle−lockup check failed).
Monitor rpm decay while retarding throttles to idle to

ensure proper idle lockup operation. Discontinue idle
lockup check if rpm decays more than 2 percent above
1.1 Mach. Place throttles to MIL and decelerate.
10.3.13 Zoom Climb (Forty Thousand Feet)
AB 75. Pitch up to Flight level 400.
AB 76. Cabin pressurization and ECS Check (approximately 17,000 feet at 40,000 feet).
10.3.14 Twenty Thousand Foot Checks
A 77. Autopilot modes check (airspeed 250 to 350 KCAS).

a. Attitude hold.
(1) Autopilot Engage. Verify no transient.
(2) Check for smooth operation in CSS.
b. Heading hold.
(1) Heading hold Engage.
(2) Left and right pedal sideslip Check return to reference heading.
(3) CSS left or right to 5° bank angle Aircraft should return to 0° bank angle.
c. Altitude hold.
(1) ALT hold Select. Verify A/P REF legend appears.
(2) A/P REF/NWS pushbutton Depress. Verify A/P REF legend goes out.
(3) Check for altitude control.
(a) $30 feet in level flight.
(b) $60 feet in 30° of bank angle.
(4) Check for stick force breakout function.
ORIGINAL 10−22
PROFILE
d. Ground track hold.

(1) GT hold Select. Verify A/P REF legend appears.
(2) A/P REF NWS pushbutton Depress. Verify A/P REF legend goes out.
(3) Check A/P establishes crab into wind to hold selected track.
e. Emergency disengage paddle Depress. Verify autopilot disengages, AUTOPILOT caution

light illuminates, and clears with a MASTER RESET.
A 78. Air−to−air check (coordinate with RIO).
a. Radar modes Check.
b. PDCP A/A, MASTER ARM switch − TNG.
c. Weapon select switch PH (IFT).

(1) Attack steering LAR Vc.
(2) Collision steering.
d. Weapon select switch SP (IFT).

(3) TCS HUD/VDI display.
e. Weapons select switch SW (IFT).

f. WCS checks against suitable airborne target.

(1) VSL high.
(2) VSL low.
(3) Pilot VSL.
(4) MRL.
(5) PLM.
(6) PAL.
g. Gunsight Check.
(1) Weapon select switch GUN.
(2) Observe proper HUD display.
(3) Uncage gunsight.
(4) Fly level coordinated turn pulling enough g’s to place the center of reticle 15 mils from
the center of the ADDITIONAL along the horizontal line of the ADL.
(5) Results should be 3 g turn in 45 $ 6 seconds with reticle displaced 15 mils horizontally.
(6) Weapon select switch OFF.
10−23 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
AB 79. Negative alpha/FOD check (airspeed 300 KCAS)
It is imperative that the procedures in this check be fol

lowed exactly and negative−g maneuvering at high
gross weight (over 56,000 pounds) should be avoided
because of the high probability of engine stalls and/or
aircraft departures.
a. Throttles MIL.
b. Raise nose to 10 degrees above horizon, roll inverted (ensure wings level).
c. Smoothly apply forward stick pressure (not to exceed 1.0 g).
d. Check for normal engine operation and FOD or loose gear.
e. Release forward stick and perform a coordinated roll to upright wings level attitude.
A 10.3.15 Fifteen Thousand Foot Checks
A 80. Fuel dump check.

a. Speedbrake switch EXT.
b. DUMP switch DUMP (observe no fuel dump)
c. Speedbrake switch RET (observe fuel dump).
d. DUMP switch OFF (observe no fuel dump).
A 81. Fuel system transfer check (total fuel less than 8,000 pounds).
a. WING/EXT TRANS switch OFF.
b. FUEL FEED switch FWD/R.
Monitor 500 pound split, AFT/L high.
c. FUEL FEED switch AFT/L.
Monitor 500 pound split, FWD/R high.
d. FUEL FEED switch NORM.
Verify FWD/R high split remains constant.
ABC 82. PA−ARI checks. DLC, autothrottles, and dirty stall.

a. Approach configuration check.
(1) Perform landing checklist.
(2) DLC Engage.
(a) Observe no significant lateral trim requirements.
(b) Observe no significant pitching with DLC commands.
(c) Observe proper stab motion with up" DLC commands.
ORIGINAL 10−24
PROFILE
(3) AUTO THROTTLE/DLC.
(a) Response to longitudinal stick.
(b) Response to turn entry, steady rollout.
(c) Response to DLC (should be minimal).
(d) Response in HOT/NORM/COLD.
(e) AUTO THROT light.
1) Manual override.
2) CAGE/SEAM pushbutton.
b. Dirty Stall, 15,000 feet.

(1) Slowly decelerate in level flight to 16.5 to 17.0 units AOA.
(2) Throttles MIL.
(3) Continue to decelerate to a maximum of 25 units AOA (NATOPS limit is 25.6 units above
5,000 ft AGL). Check lateral control effectiveness at 2 unit intervals up to 20 units AOA.
(4) Note pedal shaker at 20.5 $ 1.5 units AOA.
(5) Note any abrupt or significant rolloff tendencies.
c. Attempt speedbrake extension at MIL power.
Verify throttle interlock does not permit speedbrake extension at MIL power.
AC 83. PA−ARI checks. LSRI, yaw damping, and spiral mode stability.
a. Lateral Stick−to−Rudder Interconnect check.

(1) Input lateral stick, ROLL SAS ON;
Observe initial coordinating rudder in direction of lateral stick input.
(2) Input lateral stick, ROLL SAS OFF;
Observe no initial rudder in direction of lateral stick input.
(3) ROLL SAS ON.
b. Yaw Damping check.

(1) Perform rudder pulse, YAW SAS ON;
Observe deadbeat yaw damping (no overshoot).
(2) Perform rudder pulse, YAW SAS OFF;
Observe decreased yaw damping (approximately one overshoot).
(3) YAW SAS ON.
c. Spiral Mode Stabilization check.
Trim airplane to stabilized wings level with ROLL SAS OFF to neutralize SAS actuators.
Re−engage ROLL SAS switch to activate lateral stick roll rate command functionality. Stabilize
in a 10° bank angle and release stick. Aircraft should maintain this bank angle and
10−25 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
not deviate to double or half original bank angle in <20 seconds. This functionality will be
degraded at steeper bank angles.
(1) Trim laterally wings level, ROLL SAS OFF.
(2) Select ROLL SAS ON and smoothly stabilize left and right 10° bank angle, hands off
stick.
(3) Observe approximately neutral spiral stability (test valid if time to double or half amplitude
>20 sec).
A 84. Air−to−Ground check (coordinate with RIO).
Recovery from 30° dive delivery profiles should be a

5 g pull, started no later than 4,000 ft AGL.
a. Select PDCP A/G, Weapon select switch OFF.
b. RIO select COMPTR/TGT attack mode and MK−84L.

(1) Verify symbology.
(2) Execute 30° dive 12,000 foot AGL roll−in.
(3) Designate target, verify solution.
(4) Maneuver, verify designator remains on target.
(5) Complete 30° dive.
c. RIO selects COMPTR/PILOT attack mode.

(2) Execute 30° dive 12,000 foot AGL roll−in.
(3) Fly impact point over target.
d. Air−to−ground GUN sight COMPTR/PILOT check.

(1) Weapon select switch GUN.
(2) RIO select A/G GUN switch OFF.
(3) Dive angle greater than 10°.
(4) Verify symbology when in range (gun 6,000 feet) diamond disappears.
e. RIO select MANUAL attack mode.

f. Exit A/G.
ORIGINAL 10−26
PROFILE
10.3.16 Approach and Landing

ABC 85. Landing Checklist complete.
ABC 86. ACLS/ARA−63 Check.
ABC 87. Airspeed and AOA (15 units AOA) Check.
a. AOA, INDEXER, HUD.
D Gross weight _____________ pounds.
D Airspeed _______ KCAS
121 KCAS $ 4 KCAS at 42,000−pounds gross weight. Add 3 KCAS per 2,000 pounds over
42,000 pounds.
ABC 88. Approaches.

a. Perform normal landing approaches followed by lateral offset or overshooting approaches that
require centerline correction to verify proper function of DFCS PA−ARI control laws.
ABC 89. Exhaust nozzle check.

a. Verify less than 26 percent.
b. Three to seven seconds after touchdown, nozzles 100 percent.
ABC 90. Walkaround inspection Complete.
10.4 FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT PROCEDURES (RIO)
10.4.1 Prestart
A 1. ICS.
a. Normal.
b. Backup.
c. Emergency.
ABC 2. IND LT TEST.
A 3. Seat adjustment Check.
A 4. Canopy rigging.
a. Both cockpit handles same position during operation.
b. BOOST not required to close.
ABC 5. NAV MODE switch ALIGN.

a. After displays are on, verify and/or enter alignment coordinates.
10.4.2 Poststart
A 6. Multifunction display.
a. Verify navigation display.
A 7. ALR−67 BIT.
10−27 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
A 8. Altimeter Set and Check; Record Error _______________.

When the local barometric pressure is set, all altimeters should agree within 75 feet at field
elevation in both modes, and the primary or standby readings should agree within 75 feet. In
addition, the allowable difference between primary mode readings of altimeters is 75 feet at all
altitudes..
10.4.3 Taxi
A 9. BDHI Cross−Check Heading With HUD.
A 10. NSV Check (at takeoff end of runway).
Groundspeed Time
10.4.4 Takeoff and Climb
AB 11. Engine runup Check at MIL.
Left Right Limits

NOZ position (%) nominal 3 to 10
OIL (psi) 25 to 65
95 to 104 nominal
RPM (%)
107.7 maximum
EGT (_C) 935_
FF (PPH) 9,000 to 12,000
A 12. Airspeed Check (200 knots).
Pilot Standby RIO Standby HUD

____________KIAS ____________KIAS ____________KCAS
A 13. Altimeter Check.
INS/SAHRS ALTIMETER
A 14. TACAN and NSV position Cross−Check.

A 15. INS navigation and radar mapping check.
a. Radar map Check All Range Scales.

AB 16. ECS check.
a. Set radar power switch STBY (prior to ECS check).
10.4.6 Fifteen Thousand Foot Checks

ABC 17. Structural integrity check.
a. Anti−g valve operation.
ORIGINAL 10−28
PROFILE
10.4.7 Twenty−Five Thousand Foot Checks
AB 18. Radar power switch OFF (prior to airstarts).
AB 19. Radar power switch XMIT (airstarts complete).
10.4.8 Climb to Thirty−Five Thousand Feet
AB 20. Engine instruments Record (MIL power/0.9 mach).
Left Right Limits

OIL (psi) 25 to 65
EGT (_C) 935_
A 21. D/L Check.
A 22. Select assigned frequency and ADDRESS.
A 23. Receive D/L messages.
a. Steering symbols.
b. TBD target data.
c. Data−link messages.
10.4.9 High−Speed Dash (Thirty−Five Thousand Feet)
AB 24. Engine instruments Record.
Left Right Limits

NOZ position (%) 50 to 60 (open)
OIL (psi) 25 to 65
EGT (_C) 935_
10.4.10 Descent/Twenty Thousand Foot Checks
A 25. Air−to−air check
a. Radar modes
(1) PULSE.
(2) PD SRCH.
(3) RWS.
(4) TWS AUTO.
10−29 ORIGINAL
PROFILE
(5) TWS MAN.
(6) HRWS.
b. MLC switch OUT−AUTO−IN (PD SRCH).
c. MASTER ARM (training mode check).
(1) Pilot select PH and TNG, RIO select missile preparation (coordinate with pilot).
(2) RIO verify weapons loadout on SMS after PREP timeout.
d. Weapon systems checks against suitable airborne targets.
(1) Intercept targets, check operation in PD SRCH, RWS, and TWS MAN.
(a) Observe transition to PULSE STT.
(b) Return to PULSE SRCH.
(c) Close to visual range and verify DD display.
(2) VSL mode HI−LO LOCK−ON.
(3) MRL mode Check LOCK−ON.
e. IFF Check Modes 1, 2, 3, and 3C.
ABC 26. Negative alpha/FOD check (20,000 feet, 300 KIAS)
It is imperative that the procedures in this check be fol

lowed exactly and negative−g maneuvering at high
gross weight (over 56,000 pounds) should be avoided
because of the high probability of aircraft departures.
a. Confirm throttles MIL.
b. After pilot raises nose to 10 degrees above horizon and rolls inverted wings level (not to exceed
−1.0 g), check for FOD or loose gear.
ORIGINAL 10−30
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
PROFILE
A 27. Air-to-ground check — coordinate with pilot.
a. Select A/G.
b. Select CTGT mode.

(2) 30° dive 12,000-foot roll-in.
(3) Designate target.
(4) Verify solution.
(5) Maneuver-designator remains on target.
c. Select CCIP mode.

(2) 30° dive 12,000-foot roll-in.
(3) Fly impact point over target.
d. Air-to-ground GUN sight.

(1) Select GUN.
(2) Dive angle greater than 15°.
(3) Check symbology.
e. Exit A/G.
f. HRM check.
ABC 28. Perform radar IBIT and record results.
A 29. NSV — SAHRS.
a. Pilot check HUD and VDI display and maneuver aircraft.
b. Radar antenna scan — Check.
10.4.11 Approach
A 30. Airspeed
a. Compare with pilot airspeed at 15 units AOA; record error _________ knots.
10-31 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
PROFILE
10.4.12 Landing
ABC 31. Radar PS, or power switch STBY.
10.4.13 In Chocks
ABC 32. INS/SAHRS and visual Check and Update in Chocks (Vis Fix disabled if GPS is boxed).
a. Record closeout error.
n Latitude n Latitude n Time Groundspeed

INS
SAHRS
b. Initiate fix enable.
c. Observe aircraft symbol shift on PTID.
ABC 33. Call up maintenance current failures.
Record
10.4.14 Postflight
ABC 34. Walkaround inspection Complete.
ORIGINAL 10−32
PART IV
Flight Characteristics
Chapter 11 Flight Characteristics

CHAPTER 11
Flight Characteristics
11.1 PRIMARY FLIGHT CONTROLS 11.1.3 Directional (Yaw) Control

Primary flight controls are devices that change the Twin rudders furnish directional control. Through
flightpath of the aircraft. They consist of the differential strong dihedral effect (roll because of sideslip), good roll
horizontal stabilizer for pitch and roll control, the spoilers for control is also available from rudder inputs at medium and
supplementary roll control, and the rudders for directional high AOA. Rudder power is sufficient to provide adequate
control. A stability augmentation system is provided for the control under all asymmetric store loading conditions.
three axes of aircraft motion.
11.1.4 Stability Augmentation System
11.1.1 Pitch Control
PITCH SAS increases damping of the longitudinal,
The horizontal tail is effective from under 100 KIAS to short−period dynamic response, but the aircraft can be
over Mach 2. Its effectiveness gives the aircraft several operated safely throughout the flight envelope without it.
capabilities not enjoyed by other fighters, including low
ROLL SAS increases roll acceleration during the
takeoff rotation speeds and the ability to reach or exceed limit
initial lateral stick input. The SAS reduces differential tail
load factor over much of the subsonic and supersonic
deflection to limit maximum roll rate to less than 200 deg/sec
envelope; it is also an excellent drag device below 100 KIAS
to reduce aft fuselage loads and to prevent roll coupling in the
on landing rollout. The major disadvantages of the large
transonic speed range. The DFCS ROLL SAS differential tail
horizontal stabilizer authority are that the pilot can generate
authority has been tailored to reduce structural loads and
high enough pitch rates (particularly in the nosedown
provide expanded, simplified rolling maneuver envelopes
direction) to cause coupling under certain conditions, and
defined in Chapter 4. ROLL SAS differential tail inputs
that a pitch attitude sufficient to scrape tailpipes and ventral
are automatically faded out over the airspeed range from
fins can be attained on landing rollout or takeoff rotation.
approximately 400 to 500 KIAS. An undesirable byproduct
11.1.2 Roll Control of the roll−rate limiting is an oscillatory roll rate perceived
as a nonlinear roll response encountered in aggressive
Differential deflection of the horizontal tail surfaces
rolling maneuvers at medium subsonic speeds and higher.
provides primary roll control throughout the flight envelope Because ROLL SAS provides structural protection, flight
and is the only roll control when the wings are swept beyond
above 1.0 TMN is prohibited without ROLL SAS with
62_ (disabling the spoilers).
wing−mounted AIM−54 (loadings 3B5, 3B6, 3C5, 3C6).
Note Should tactical considerations necessitate violating this
restriction, restrict rolls to less than full lateral stick
Spoilers are activated to 62° of wing sweep, deflection and to not more than 180_ of bank angle change
reducing aft fuselage structural loads during roll at one time. This minimizes the possibility of aircraft
maneuvers. damage. Initial roll acceleration is slower without ROLL
Spoilers are very effective at low to medium AOA for SAS. High AOA handling qualities are significantly im
roll control, and reduce the aft fuselage torsional loads proved by keeping ROLL SAS on (see paragraph 11.6).
induced by the differential tail. The spoilers are also the Over the majority of the flight envelope, YAW SAS is
primary mechanism for direct lift control and spoiler braking. the most critical of the stability augmentation functions.
With flaps down, the spoilers provide the majority of Directional dynamic response (yaw oscillations or dutch roll)
available roll control power.
11−1 ORIGINAL
is poorly damped without it. In regions of reduced directional means to slow the aircraft is to reduce thrust while applying
stability above 24 units AOA or when supersonic, the SAS g, since the speedbrakes are marginally effective at moderate
dampens yaw rates that might otherwise cause loss of control, to low speeds. Extension and retraction of the speedbrakes
or structural damage. Below 1.0 TMN,with YAW SAS OFF, results in a pitch trim change that varies with flight conditions.
normal maneuvering can be accomplished if extra care is In general, this change is not objectionable except at higher
taken to control yaw and sideslip excursions with rudder airspeeds where the rapidity of the change (1.5 seconds for
(maintain coordinated flight), but high AOA maneuvering full extension) may prevent fine (± 3 mil) gunsight tracking
(above approximately 15 units AOA) should be avoided due and possibly lead to a minor case of pilot−induced oscillation.
to increased probability of departure from controlled flight.
11.3 GENERAL FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
At high AOA flight conditions, both the ROLL and
11.3.1 Static Longitudinal Stability
YAW SAS are required to provide automatic rudder intercon
nect (ARI) functions which significantly improve the Static longitudinal stability indicates the direction of
handling qualities, departure resistance, and recovery capa longitudinal stick force required with changing airspeed
bility of the aircraft. from a trim condition. At slow speeds where the wings are not
11.2 SECONDARY FLIGHT CONTROLS sweeping, static longitudinal stability is slightly positive
(forward stick is required for increasing speeds, aft stick is
Secondary flight controls affect the flightpath of the required for decreasing speeds). At speeds where the wings
aircraft although they have other primary purposes, such as are automatically sweeping aft, static stability becomes
increasing lift or drag. Secondary flight controls of the neutral to slightly negative.
aircraft include main, auxiliary, and maneuver flaps, leading
edge slats, speedbrakes, DLC, and the variable sweep wing. In the transonic region, from Mach 0.8 to 1.5, static
longitudinal stability is essentially neutral. There is, howev
11.2.1 Maneuver Flaps and Slats er, a minor reversal in the stick force gradient (forward stick
force may have to be relaxed to maintain level flight when
Maneuver flaps and slats provide increased turn
accelerating) at approximately Mach 0.95. Above Mach 1.5,
performance (increased turn rate/decreased turn radius)
the stick force gradient becomes neutral. Since the engine
when extended. Additionally, the extension of the maneuver
line of thrust is below the aircraft cg, reducing power causes
slats decreases departure susceptibility by increasing posi
a slight nosedown pitch; power addition causes a noseup
tive dihedral effect (roll because of sideslip). The longitudi
pitch.
nal trim change upon extension and retraction of the devices
is slight (2 to 4 pounds aft on extension, approximately 11.3.2 Dynamic Longitudinal Response
2 pounds forward on retraction). Characteristics
11.2.2 Landing Flaps, Slats, and DLC The initial response of the aircraft to a longitudinal
stick input is greatly dependent on the dynamic longitudinal
Trim changes during extension and retraction of
response or short period" characteristics. Dynamic longitu
flaps/slats are significant. During extension of flaps/slats at
dinal response to pilot inputs is somewhat sluggish in cruise
200 KIAS, an initial push force of approximately 5 pounds
and approach configurations when compared to most other
is required followed by a pull force of up to 15 pounds.
modern day fighters. In cruise configuration this may not be
Engagement of DLC at approach speeds causes essentially
evident until high gain, close coupled tasks, such as fine
no trim change. Forces during retraction of the flaps/slats are
gunsight tracking, are attempted. Here, the pilot’s tendency
generally opposite and of approximately the same magni
is to overdrive the aircraft with the control stick resulting in
tude. The force required during retraction of flaps/slats may
a slight porpoising of the nose. This can be avoided by
be less objectionable than those during extension, as the flaps
applying a longitudinal stick input and waiting for a nose
are generally raised at a slower airspeed and, therefore,
response before applying a further correction.
require less opposing force.
In approach configurations, the sluggish nose response
Note
will be most noticeable during approaches without DLC, as
Retracting the flaps with DLC engaged may more nose movement must accompany the larger power
require up to 30 pounds push force to maintain adjustments required to maintain onspeed AOA when flying
pitch attitude when the DLC automatically the ball.
disengages as the flaps pass 25_.
11.3.3 Maneuvering Stick Force
11.2.3 Speedbrakes Maneuvering stick force, or stick force per g of the
The speedbrakes provide some deceleration capability aircraft, is predictable throughout most of the flight
throughout the flight envelope. However, the most effective envelope.
ORIGINAL 11−2
That is, an increase in force commands a corresponding at high airspeeds. Smoother and/or smaller lateral stick
increase in g (approximately 4 pounds per g). The stick force inputs will reduce or eliminate this oscillatory roll response
per g generally changes very little with altitude, airspeed, at these flight conditions.
loading, or cg position.
At high angles of attack, the up−and−away (UA)
Stick displacements required during maneuvering are UA−ARI control functions dramatically improve the roll
relatively large and may be uncomfortable to some pilots. response of the aircraft. The roll reversal characteristic
While the stick forces are not especially high, the stick must experienced without ARI is eliminated throughout the
be placed relatively close to the pilot’s torso to attain a given majority of the available AOA range. Roll response is in the
g. This gives the pilot less leverage with his arm and is more direction of commanded lateral stick up to and beyond 30
tiring, especially at lower airspeeds and higher AOA, where units AOA. Some variation in normal roll response may be
stick force per g can be as high as 10 pounds per g. seen due to aircraft control system and/or wing sweep and
flap rigging tolerances, external store loading, or wing fuel
11.3.4 Roll Performance
imbalance. Maximum roll rate commanded by lateral stick
The roll performance (maximum roll rate attainable) is decreases as AOA increases, decreasing to near zero above
generally satisfactory, particularly at high airspeeds. At 30 units AOA, without pilot commanded coordinating rudder
lower speeds, however, the high−aspect ratio and roll inertia inputs. Proper sense roll response can be attained at
of the aircraft restrict its time to roll to considerably less than increasingly higher AOA through use of pilot coordinating
that of smaller, more nimble tactical aircraft (A−4, F−16). rudder. At very low airspeed and high AOA conditions (less
Note than 0.4 Mach and above 30 units AOA), the Low Speed
Cross Control feature (LSXC) can be safely utilized to obtain
Although DFCS improves maximum roll rate ca a transient roll maneuvering capability. This feature is
pability at low airspeed and high AOA, these enabled by applying rudder in the desired roll direction,
flight conditions are definite tactical limitations. while applying an opposite lateral stick input. Peak roll rate
of approximately 60 deg/sec is available through the use of
Large aft stick inputs applied with lateral stick during LSXC. If long duration inputs are utilized, the roll response
supersonic rolling maneuvers result in increased adverse may become oscillatory, with hesitations in bank angle and
sideslip and should be avoided. High Mach number, high−al roll rate. Precise bank angle control is typically not possible
titude rolling maneuvers may result in oscillatory sideslip with LSXC, but the feature can be effectively utilized during
and roll ratcheting during aggressive maneuvering with sustained slow speed / high AOA maneuvering such as a flat
ROLL SAS off. Depending on the phasing of these dynamics, scissors engagement.
centering lateral stick may be insufficient to stop the rolling
motion and opposite lateral stick may be required in order to In the landing configuration, the power approach
terminate roll. (PA−ARI) control functions and modified spoiler gearing
provide a crisp roll response to pilot lateral stick inputs.
Control gains are scheduled with AOA to provide a linear roll
response of approximately 20 deg/sec roll rate per inch of
lateral stick deflection. This responsiveness may lead to a
tendency to overcontrol bank angle if large amplitude stick
Large sideslip angles generated during full later
al stick supersonic rolling maneuvers at high alti inputs are utilized. Therefore, relatively small stick deflec
tions are required to perform these corrections. Once
tudes may result in engine stalls.
accustomed to the increased roll response in the landing
11.3.5 Roll Response configuration, pilot workload to perform lateral corrections
and precisely maintain lineup will be significantly reduced,
In the cruise configuration, the roll response to lateral
allowing the pilot to devote valuable time to controlling both
stick inputs is generally satisfactory throughout the flight
glideslope and AOA.
envelope. The increased roll acceleration and peak roll rate
attainable with ROLL SAS on significantly improves the 11.3.6 Dutch Roll
tactical maneuvering capability. However, at high airspeeds,
the roll command augmentation (CAS) and roll rate limiting Dutch roll is characterized by a wallowing, snaky
motion of the nose that severely degrades heading and/or
feature of the ROLL SAS can cause high roll accelerations
lineup control. Large lateral stick inputs can excite the Dutch
and marked variations in roll rate during aggressive rolling
maneuvers with large lateral stick inputs. This effect is most roll mode of the aircraft in the cruise configuration, but the
most severe degradation in flying qualities from the Dutch
pronounced at high subsonic airspeeds (from approximately
roll is in the approach configuration. The period of this
0.7 to 0.93 Mach) and medium to low altitudes (below
motion is quite long and has the unfortunate result that the
approximately 20,000 feet). This characteristic may lead to
bank angle overshoots during maximum roll rate maneuvers pilot perceives a heading error when referenced to centerline,
11−3 ORIGINAL
when in fact the flightpath is correct. In the landing via directional yaw trim first then followed by lateral stick
configuration, the PA−ARI control functions provide a nearly roll trim.
deadbeat directional response. Precise lineup control is
exhibited due to the increased Dutch roll damping and the
automatic stick to rudder interconnect function which
provides coordinating rudder inputs with lateral stick
deflection. Additional pilot coordinating rudder inputs are
typically not required during approach, but may be used for Excessive lateral trim requirements will result in
aggressive bank and/or lineup corrections if desired. increased roll rates and structural loads during
rolling maneuvers opposite the direction of trim.
11.3.7 Trim Characteristics This is particularly evident at transonic and su
The trim rate in pitch is slow. During acceleration runs personic flight conditions. For this reason, trim
in MAX power at low altitude, trim may have to be run nearly yaw first, then roll.
continuously to maintain longitudinal stick force at or near Changes in thrust settings normally require a trim
zero. Lateral control authority and roll rates at slow speeds change, particularly in the approach configurations. A
will be reduced by almost one−half with full stick deflection reduction in power causes a slight nosedown pitch.
in the direction of full lateral trim because of decreased spoiler
deflection (see spoiler gearing schedules in Figure 263). In the landing configuration, the DFCS includes a roll
Therefore, when maximum lateral control authority is rate command function. Pilot lateral stick deflection com
required, such as during an asymmetric flap condition, trim mands a desired roll rate, which is provided through
in the direction of stick displacement should be avoided. differential tail and spoiler inputs. Once this commanded roll
rate is achieved, ROLL SAS inputs will stabilize the aircraft
Runaway trim in any axis is controllable. During field at the commanded rate. Likewise, any roll rate not command
landings, the aircraft can be recovered safely with runaway ed by lateral stick deflection (gust, turbulence, lateral
trim; however, carrier approaches with full runaway pitch asymmetry, etc.) is sensed as a roll rate error. The ROLL SAS
trim may be difficult. will automatically provide inputs through the roll series
Trimming the aircraft to level flight can be broken servos to stop this uncommanded rate. Sufficient gain exists
down into two areas. At airspeeds slower than those using in this control function to essentially provide an auto−trim"
automatic wing−sweep programming, the aircraft is relative capability in the roll axis for many lateral asymmetry
ly easy to trim to level flight because it has positive situations. Because of this characteristic, precise lateral trim
longitudinal static stability. At airspeeds where the wings may be slightly more difficult to achieve in the landing
automatically move with a change in airspeed, it becomes configuration. In some cases, it may be possible to slowly
very difficult to achieve a hands−off trim. Because of the move lateral stick trim from left to right with no appreciable
change in aircraft pitching moment caused by movement of change in aircraft bank angle or roll rate. Because much of
the wings, the nose tends to pitch further down with each the lateral trim is now being provided through biasing of the
increase in speed or further up with each decrease in speed. roll series servos in one direction, the aircraft may subse
quently exhibit an asymmetric roll rate in response to pilot
Trimming the aircraft laterally/directionally may be lateral stick inputs. Should this bias become objectionable,
required to compensate for lateral asymmetry resulting from the aircraft can be trimmed both laterally and directionally
either asymmetric stores, wing fuel imbalance, or control with the ROLL SAS OFF, reselecting ROLL SAS ON once
surface rigging tolerances. Lateral trim requirements will trim is established. This action should eliminate any bias
result in a stick displacement and a corresponding differential present in the roll series servos and provide symmetric roll
tail split that will reduce the amount of effective differential response.
tail authority in the direction of trim and increase the amount
of effective differential tail authority opposite trim. As a 11.4 ASYMMETRIC THRUST FLIGHT
result, aircraft response will be reduced for lateral stick CHARACTERISTICS IN COMBAT
deflections in the direction of trim and increased for lateral AND CRUISE CONFIGURATION
stick deflections opposite the direction of trim. The com
bined effects of lateral trim and any CG displacement 11.4.1 General
associated with the asymmetry may result in increased With one engine inoperative, flight characteristics are
departure susceptibility and severity. In addition, excessive considerably affected by the thrust asymmetry generated by
lateral trim requirements will result in increased roll rates and the operating engine. The distance of the engines from the
structural loads during rolling maneuvers opposite the aircraft centerline produces flight control requirements and
direction of trim. This is particularly evident at transonic flying qualities not present in centerline thrust aircraft. Flight
and supersonic flight conditions. For this reason, lateral/ control requirements are a function of the thrust setting on the
directional trim requirements should be managed primarily
ORIGINAL 11−4
operating engine. The thrust required to maintain flight, and should be engaged from startup to shutdown. ATLS can be
therefore the magnitude of the thrust asymmetry, is a function turned off if required for tactical considerations such as a
of the following. single−engine ACM bugout.
11.4.1.1 Gross Weight 11.5 ENGINE STALLS AND FLAMEOUT
Heavier gross weights require higher thrust settings to The F110 engines demonstrate exceptional operability
maintain level flight and, therefore, larger control deflections throughout the flight envelope. No hung stalls" (similar to
to counter the greater asymmetric thrust. the classic TF−30 stall) have been observed in flight tests.
Self−clearing pop" stalls, which may produce an audible
11.4.1.2 Configuration bang," may occur above 35,000 feet when below 100 knots
Aircraft configuration varies the amount of thrust in MAX power and usually occur in conjunction with an
required at a particular flight condition. At cruise configura afterburner blowout. To date these stalls have resulted in no
tion airspeeds, control requirements will be significantly engine damage, are self−clearing in approximately 1 second,
reduced compared to landing configurations, which will and have required no pilot action for engine recovery.
require significantly higher thrust settings and in turn larger However, throttles should be reduced to idle when subsonic
control forces to maintain desired flightpath. (MIL when over 1.1 Mach) to minimize the possibility of
engine damage during all engine stalls. A supersonic stall
11.4.1.3 Airspeed may cause inlet buzz resulting in a rough, bumpy ride (+2.5
At maximum endurance airspeeds, minimum thrust is to −1g at 6 cycles per second). Inlet buzz should subside when
required to maintain level flight; therefore, the smallest decelerating below 1.2 Mach. When supersonic, any wing
asymmetric moment is produced. Higher or lower airspeeds drop tendencies should be controlled with lateral stick alone.
will require higher power settings and, therefore, increased 11.5.1 Medium and High−Subsonic Airspeed
control forces. At airspeeds above maximum endurance, the
greater asymmetry will be offset largely by the additional Above approximately 100 knots, sufficient controlla
bility exists to control a maximum AB/stalled engine thrust
control power available. Minimum control speed is reached
asymmetry with operative ATLS. Aircraft response to an
at the point when maximum rudder deflection is no longer
engine failure is generally mild and is characterized by slow
sufficient to maintain directional control.
buildup in yaw rate followed by slowly increasing rolloff in
11.4.1.4 Altitude the same direction as yaw. This response is insidious since the
aircrew will only notice the roll as it masks the yaw rate.
Net thrust is strongly dependent on altitude. For
Rudder is the primary control to offset yawing moment from
a constant throttle setting, the asymmetric thrust is con
asymmetric thrust. Higher airspeeds provide more rudder
siderably higher at sea level than at higher altitudes. The
effectiveness and increase pilot ability to control yaw caused
F110 produces considerably more thrust than the TF−30
by asymmetric thrust.
powered F−14A. At maximum afterburner, the F110’s thrust
at 10,000 feet is equivalent to that of the TF−30 at sea level.
11.4.1.5 Bank Angle
Bank angle increases induced drag and, therefore, The use of lateral stick to offset the uncomman
requires higher thrust settings to maintain level flight. The ded roll caused by yaw from asymmetric thrust
higher thrust setting demands increased rudder deflection in at high AOA will generate adverse yaw and ag
a turn compared to that required in level flight at the same gravate the yaw caused by asymmetric thrust.
airspeed. Turn direction into or away from the failed engine The result may be a yawing, rolling departure.
significantly affects rudder requirements. In straight−line Although DFCS reduces this effect due to differ
flight, some amount of rudder deflection will be required to ential tail fadeout and automatic stick−to−rudder
offset the yawing moment from asymmetric thrust at zero interconnect functions reduce this effect, depar
bank angle. A five degree bank angle into the good engine ture could still result.
will introduce a side force component countering the thrust
Yaw rate increase after an engine stall or failure may be
asymmetry and thereby reducing the rudder requirement.
completely masked by roll if the pilot does not recognize that
11.4.1.6 Asymmetric Thrust Limiting System the engine malfunction has occurred and that aircraft motion
(ATLS) is the result of that malfunction. Therefore, when any
uncommanded rolloff or yaw rate occurs during maneuver
With operative ATLS, the magnitude of any asymmet
ing flight with maximum thrust, the pilot should reduce
ric thrust in MAX power will be reduced, thereby reducing
AOA, reduce thrust, counter with rudder, and avoid the use
the control requirements to maintain the flight condition or
of lateral stick alone.
reducing time to recover if a departure has occurred. ATLS
11−5 ORIGINAL
11.5.2 Low Subsonic Airspeed 11.6.2 Dihedral Effect

As aircraft speed approaches zero, flight control Dihedral effect is the tendency of the aircraft to roll in
effectiveness also approaches zero and maximum thrust reaction to sideslip being generated. The F−14 exhibits
asymmetry could generate a rapid yaw rate buildup if positive dihedral effect throughout the positive−AOA enve
corrective action is not taken. If thrust asymmetry is lope (tending to roll away from sideslip) but negative
encountered, the pilot should immediately retard both dihedral effect at negative AOA. This tendency is borne out
throttles smoothly to IDLE, while maintaining neutral by the aircraft response from a rudder input. When right
control. rudder is applied from a straight−and−level flight condition,
the aircraft sees sideslip from the left and so rolls to the right
These actions should prevent yaw rate buildup and
or away from the sideslip. Positive dihedral effect is a
allow the aircraft nose to fall through and regain flying speed.
stabilizing influence in the area of reduced directional
After throttles are reduced, the pilot should lock his harness
stability (high−AOA flight). At negative AOA, dihedral
in anticipation of a possible departure.
effect is negative such that a right rudder input will produce
a left roll. In the PA configuration, negative AOA can be
encountered at 1 g flight at the higher limit airspeeds for the
configuration.
Loss of thrust on one engine while maneuvering 11.6.3 External Stores
at low airspeed must be dealt with immediately
since flight control effectiveness may be insuffi As external stores are added to the aircraft, the
cient to counter the yaw rate generated by asym high−AOA flying qualities degrade because of a decrease in
metric thrust. directional stability. Flight tests have shown that no one store
is significant by itself. Rather, each store causes a small
If both engines are stalled after retarding throttles to decrease in directional stability that accumulates as addition
IDLE, at least one engine must be secured immediately to al stores are loaded. In addition to degrading directional
prevent turbine damage and provide maximum potential for stability, external stores increase aircraft basic weight. As
an airstart. If possible, secure the engine that did not stall aircraft weight is increased, more AOA is required to produce
initially (the second engine to stall). The cause of the first the same normal acceleration or g. As AOA increases above
engine stall may not be known at this point; however, it is 12 to 14 units AOA, directional stability decreases. There
possible that the second stall may have been induced during fore, external stores may have a twofold effect on directional
the throttle transient to IDLE. Leaving one engine in hung stability. High AOA flight tests with all SAS on have shown
stall minimizes the likelihood of total loss of hydraulic and that no higher AOA maneuvering limits are imposed with a
electrical power (emergency generator). See Chapter 14 for fully operational DFCS system. No significant change in
a detailed discussion of compressor stall and airstart flying qualities occurs because of aft cg location.
emergency procedures.
11.6 HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK FLIGHT

CHARACTERISTICS
Several characteristics of the F−14 affect its behavior in Maneuvering with significant external store
high AOA flight. Among these are directional stability, loadings should be approached with caution if
dihedral effect, stores loading, the stability augmentation the pilot is used to maneuvering the clean or near
system, and maneuver flaps/slats. ly clean aircraft, since the high−AOA flying qual
ities will be degraded from the clean aircraft.
11.6.1 Directional Stability
11.6.4 DFCS Stability Augmentation System
Directional stability is the tendency of the aircraft to
return to trimmed, zero sideslip when disturbed. At low The effect of the SAS on aircraft high AOA flight
AOA, the aircraft exhibits positive directional stability and, characteristics ranges from minor to very significant. With
if sideslip is generated by a control input or turbulence, the the PITCH SAS OFF, the nose will be slightly more sensitive
aircraft will return to the trimmed, zero−sideslip condition. during close controlled tasks such as gunsight tracking.
During large amplitude maneuvers, slightly higher AOA may
As AOA increases, directional stability begins to drop be reached. In general, PITCH SAS ON or OFF will not
and, for a clean aircraft, becomes negative at approximately significantly influence departure characteristics or recovery
20 to 22 units AOA. At high AOA with negative directional and no limitations concerning its use are necessary. With the
stability, the aircraft becomes more difficult to fly because ROLL SAS OFF, or with a complete ROLL SAS failure as
the pilot or stability augmentation system must control indicated by illumination of the ROLL DGR, ARI DGR, and
sideslip with rudder inputs. ARI/SAS OUT caution lights, maximum differential tail
ORIGINAL 11−6
authority commanded by lateral stick is ±7°. High AOA with automatic flaps/slats, since the high−
maneuvering should always be conducted with both the AOA flying qualities will be degraded from
ROLL and YAW SAS ON, as control functions in both axes the automatic flap/slat aircraft. If maneuver
are required to provide a fully operational UA−ARI. Depar ing flaps/slats are inoperative, maintain coor
ture inducing differential tail inputs are faded out at high dinated flight with lateral inputs and rudder.
AOA, while beneficial coordinating rudder inputs are D Inoperative maneuver flaps/slats could be in
automatically provided with lateral stick deflection to dicative of a malfunctioning primary AOA
preserve proper sense roll response throughout the majority source.
of the available AOA range. Roll rate feedback is provided
11.6.6 Lateral Control Reversal
to the roll and yaw axes to damp divergent wing rock above
20 units AOA and improve air−to−air tracking capability. Since roll control is provided by wing−mounted
Finally, yaw rate feedback to the differential stabilizer and spoilers and differential stabilators, the aircraft exhibits
rudders provides an enhanced departure/spin recovery capa proverse yaw throughout the flight envelope (yaw in the
bility by automatically commanding these control surfaces to direction of the lateral stick input). The DFCS fades out
oppose yaw rate buildup. Thus, above 30 units AOA and differential tail inputs at high AOA while providing auto
greater than 20o per second yaw rate, 19o rudder opposite and matic coordinating rudder inputs through the lateral stick−to−
± 5o differential tail into the turn needle are commanded. rudder interconnect function (LSRI). Essentially, the DFCS
Unless otherwise noted, the high AOA flight characteristics uses lateral stability (dihedral effect) to roll the aircraft at
discussion assumes both ROLL and YAW SAS are ON. high AOA. Proper sense roll response to lateral stick is
generally exhibited up to and beyond 30 units AOA. Other
11.6.5 Maneuvering Flaps and Slats factors such as external store loading, lateral asymmetry, and
control surface rigging tolerances may degrade system
Maneuver flaps and slats extension delays buffet onset performance enough to cause neutral to slightly adverse roll
below 0.7 Mach, reduces the intensity of the buffet, reduces response (i.e. roll reversal) above 30 units AOA. Additional
the effects of adverse yaw at high AOA through increased pilot coordinating rudder inputs at high AOA can reduce this
positive dihedral effect (roll caused by sideslip), and in tendency and improve roll response.
creases the sustained g available. Above 0.7 Mach, buffet
Note
onset occurs prior to the maneuver flap/slat extension thresh
old, but once the maneuver flaps/slats are fully extended, Through use of pilot coordinating rudder inputs,
buffet is reduced. Maneuver flaps/slats will not extend above it is possible to command rudder deflection in ex
0.85 Mach because of the wing−sweep interlocks. Although cess of total control surface authority. If this oc
maneuver flaps/slats may increase the severity of the wing curs, the rudder pedal will kick back" to reduce
rock between 20 and 28 units AOA, overall departure resist the pilot’s input while maintaining maximum
ance of the aircraft is greatly improved (Figure 11−1). This rudder authority.
wing rock may be damped with rudders, but greater difficulty At extremely high AOA and low airspeed conditions
may be encountered with maneuver flaps and slats extended, (above 30 units AOA and less than 0.4 Mach), where rudder
particularly at low airspeeds. Damping of the wing rock effectiveness is significantly reduced due to fuselage blank
mode is provided by the DFCS. However, in some cases ing effects, adequate roll rate may not be available through
minor wing rock may still develop during sustained high the combination of lateral stick and coordinating rudder. In
AOA maneuvering, particularly above 30 units AOA. If this this region, the low speed cross control (LSXC) feature can
occurs, the wing rock may be damped by neutralizing the be utilized to cross control the aircraft (rudder in direction of
lateral and the directional controls and momentarily reducing roll, lateral stick opposite) and obtain a transient roll
AOA to below 20 units. Since maneuver flaps and slat exten maneuvering capability. The LSXC permits up to 10°
sion and retraction is fully automatic, no changes in high− differential tail deflection by overriding the AOA scheduled
AOA flying techniques are required. Maneuver flaps/ slats differential tail fadeout and LSRI functions. It should be
should be utilized in the automatic mode from takeoff to understood that a LSXC maneuver is basically an intentional
landing. departure from controlled flight and should not be utilized
unless insufficient roll response is obtained with proper
sense" lateral stick and coordinating rudder. However, at
these flight conditions the airspeed is low enough that rapid
yaw rate buildup is not experienced. If the LSXC input is
maintained for a long duration (more than about 3 seconds),
D Maneuvering with inoperative maneuvering a ratcheting roll response will occur causing hesitations in roll
flaps/slats should be approached with caution rate, bank angle, and yaw rate.
if the pilot is used to maneuvering the aircraft
11−7 ORIGINAL
Figure 111.Lateral−Control−Induced Departure Areas
ORIGINAL 11−8
11.6.7 Miscellaneous may be accompanied by large random yawing and/or rolling

motions that will generally dampen without pilot action as
Speedbrake position has no effect on high−AOA flight
the aircraft accelerates.
characteristics. Wing−sweep angles aft of the AUTO sched-
ule reduce buffet intensity, but departure resistance is
reduced and more altitude is required for dive pullout when
recovering after a departure. Therefore, the AUTO sweep
schedule is best for high−AOA maneuvering.
The use of lateral stick to offset the random yaw-
11.6.8 Stall Characteristics ing and/or rolling motion may generate enough
adverse yaw to cause a yawing/rolling departure.
The 1g level stall (maneuver flaps/slats retracted)
The controls should be released below 100 knots
is characterized by the onset of light airframe buffet at 12
during the vertical stall to prevent inadvertent
to 13 units AOA. This increases to moderate intensity at
inputs that may lengthen recovery and/or cause
15 units AOA with essentially no change in intensity at AOA
a departure.
as high as 60_. Buffet is not a satisfactory cue to determine
airspeed or AOA during high−AOA maneuvering. If decel- Control inputs should not be applied until the aircraft
eration is continued to full aft stick deflection, AOA will is nose down and accelerating through 100 knots. Rudder and
stabilize at approximately 35° to 45° depending upon stores lateral stick are also effective in damping oscillations once
loading. The cockpit AOA indicator pegs at 30 units AOA, the aircraft is nose low and accelerating. The aircraft is very
which is equivalent to approximately 25_ true AOA. Pitch responsive to longitudinal stick inputs at all AOAs at speeds
attitude at stall is between 10_ to 20_ above the horizon with above 100 knots.
no external stores and 10_ to 15_ below the horizon
with maximum external load. Some longitudinal porpoising Refer to paragraph 11.5.2, Low−Subsonic Airspeed for
may occur at full aft stick. procedures to follow in the event of an engine stall. Refer to
Chapter 14 for vertical stall recovery procedures.
Maneuver flaps and slats delay buffet onset to 13 to
14 units AOA and reduce the magnitude of buffet in During flight tests, vertical stalls in maximum after-
high−AOA flight. burner power sometimes resulted in afterburner blowouts on
one or both engines possibly followed by pop stalls that may
The clean stall is defined as the application of full aft or may not be audible to the pilot. All the stalls were self
stick combined with rates of descent up to 9,000 fpm. As clearing with no tendency for EGT to rise out of limits. As the
much as 5,000 feet is required for recovery from the fully aircraft recovered and airspeed increased, the afterburner
developed stall. relit if the throttle remained in the afterburner detent. When
practicing vertical stalls, basic engine power settings are
Satisfactory lateral and directional control is main-
recommended to avoid inducing engine afterburner tran-
tained beyond the AOA where the basic airframe directional
sients that have an unknown effect on engine life. Maximum
stability becomes negative. Lateral stick and rudder inputs
engine stall margin for the F110 is obtained at IDLE power.
can be used to adjust and maintain desired bank angle
throughout the stall. Control inputs are provided to suppress 11.6.10 DFCS Degraded Control Modes
wing rock motion up to 30 units AOA, but some mild wing
rock may still occur. Above 30 units AOA, the wing rock The DFCS has the capability to function in several
suppression feature is inhibited and rudder effectiveness degraded modes of operation. Air sensor data failures,
decreases sharply. Large rudder or lateral stick inputs actuator failures, or DFCS computer failures can all affect the
produce an increase in AOA as sideslip increases. high AOA flying qualities of the aircraft. Failure modes
which would significantly affect high AOA flight character-
11.6.9 Vertical Stalls istics are discussed below. It should be understood that the
failures listed do not comprise all possible failure modes, but
If the aircraft is allowed to decelerate to zero airspeed
are examples of those types which would have the most
in a vertical or near vertical attitude, it will slide backwards
significant effect on high AOA flight.
momentarily, then pitch over (usually backwards) to a near
vertical dive. Aircraft motions during the initial fall will be
predominantly inertial with random pitching and yawing as 11.6.10.1 Air Data Failures
the aircraft accelerates. After the initial nosedown pitch, the Actual air data failures could occur at any point in the
aircraft may pass through the vertical to near level flight flight envelope due to associated failures of the SCADC,
attitude, yaw in one direction, and then return to a vertical AICS, or AOA computer inputs to the DFCS. However,
dive attitude. This may occur more than once. This tendency transient or nuisance air data sensor failures due to input
is more pronounced at aft wing sweeps, but can usually be miscompares (Mach number or AOA inputs) are more likely
controlled with longitudinal control inputs. Some recoveries
11−9 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
to be experienced during maneuvering flight at high AOA 11.6.10.3 DFCS Computer Failures
than at low AOA or high airspeed conditions. In general,
Each of the three DFCCs contains two distinct
single failures of the air data sensors have negligible or only
computer processors called computing segregations, one A"
minor effects on high AOA flying qualities.
segregation and one B" segregation in each axis. Each
Failure of a single AOA input does not result in a segregation commands different series servo and/or spoiler
functional downgrade, only a loss of redundancy, since the sets. If a computing segregation fails, all actuators command-
AOA input is triplex. Single failure of the Mach number ed by that segregation are rendered inoperative. Similarly, all
inputs (SCADC or AICS) will downgrade the UA−ARI to a sensor information associated with that segregation is
fixed gain Mach control mode. In this mode, the wing rock declared invalid. Functionality loss associated with each of
suppression and LSXC control functions are inoperative. the segregations, and effect on high AOA flying qualities, are
Therefore, wing rock tendency will be increased and the discussed below.
aircraft will be difficult to roll above 30 units AOA. The
differential tail fadeout, LSRI, and spin recovery functions Pitch A − Half authority PITCH SAS, no inboard spoilers,
remain operational. single AOA failure, single Mach failure. Inoperative
wing rock suppression and LSXC functions.
Dual failure of either the Mach or AOA inputs causes
loss of all UA−ARI functions except the spin recovery Pitch B − Half authority PITCH SAS, no outboard
function. This will cause the aircraft to be more prone to wing spoilers, single Mach failure. Inoperative wing rock
rock and less resistant to all types of control−induced and suppression and LSXC functions.
asymmetric thrust induced departures. DFCS spin recovery
Roll A − Half authority ROLL SAS/ARI, no inboard
capability is retained.
spoilers, single AOA failure. Degraded UA−ARI
performance due to loss of the roll A series servo.
11.6.10.2 Actuator Failures
Failure of the pitch series servos or any of the spoiler Roll B − Half authority ROLL SAS/ARI, single Mach
actuators has little effect on high AOA flight characteristics. failure. Degraded UA−ARI performance due to loss
Single failure of any roll or yaw series servo will result in of the roll B series servo. Inoperative wing rock sup-
degraded UA−ARI performance (i.e., decreased departure pression and LSXC functions.
resistance, increased wing rock tendency) in the associated Yaw A − Half authority YAW SAS/ARI, single AOA fail-
axis due to the decreased control authority, however all ure. Degraded UA−ARI performance due to loss of
UA−ARI functions are retained. the yaw A series servo.
Dual failure of both roll or both yaw series servos Yaw B − Half authority YAW SAS/ARI, no outboard
results in a complete loss of all UA−ARI functions, and spoilers, single AOA failure. Degraded UA−ARI
significantly degrades the high AOA flying qualities. With a performance due to loss of the yaw B series servo.
dual roll series servo failure, all roll axis functions are
inhibited and the yaw axis downgrades to basic SAS" mode
Combined failure of any two segregations results in
(loss of ARI functionality). In the event of a DFCS dual roll
combined loss of all associated functions, actuators, and in
series servo failure or manually selecting the ROLL STAB
most cases, additional failures. High AOA flying qualities
AUG switch to OFF, the maneuvering limits described in
are significantly degraded in all multiple segregation failure
Chapter 4 Maneuvering Limits" must be observed. Failure
cases.
of both yaw series servos, or manually selecting the YAW
STAB AUG switch to OFF, inhibits all yaw and roll axis
11.7 DEPARTURE FROM CONTROLLED FLIGHT
UA−ARI and SAS functions, resulting in a severe degradation
in high AOA flying qualities. 11.7.1 General
Although the F−14 is an honest aircraft with moderate
departure resistance, departures can be induced by large or
sustained control inputs that generally feel unnatural to the
pilot. Since the aircraft has an essentially unrecoverable
Maneuvering with YAW SAS OFF or inoperative flat−spin mode, yaw rate must be controlled before it can
shall not be conducted above 15 units AOA with build and the aircraft transitions to the flat−spin mode. In
landing gear retracted. The aircraft will be prone general, departures are characterized by increasing yaw rate
to departure from controlled flight. with oscillations in roll and yaw. Yaw rate is masked by the
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 11−10
roll rate and is not evident to the pilot until approximately In an upright departure at approximately 50_ per
90_ per second yaw rate (2 eyeball−out" g) is reached. second yaw rate or less, if full forward stick is applied to
reduce AOA, the aircraft will generally recover. At over 50_
A predominant stability characteristic of the F−14 is
per second yaw rate, lateral/directional control inputs (rudder
positive dihedral effect, which is the tendency for the aircraft
opposite yaw, lateral stick into yaw) are required to recover
to roll to reduce sideslip. This effectively serves to delay yaw
rate buildup associated with loss of directional stability at
high AOA.
11−10a (Reverse
11−10a Blank) CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 11−10b
the aircraft. If these inputs are not made, the yaw rate will itself. Rather, each store causes a small degradation in flying
continue to build and the aircraft may enter the flat spin. DFCS qualities that accumulates as additional stores are added. In
will significantly enhance these recovery characteristics. general, fuselage−mounted stores have less effect than pylon−
or nacelle−mounted stores.
The time to reach 50_ per second yaw rate after control
input or engine failure is very critical. If 50_ per second yaw
11.7.1.4 Asymmetric Fuel/Stores
rate is reached in 5 seconds or less, the pilot may not have
enough time to neutralize, analyze, and apply recovery Flying qualities with asymmetric stores are most
controls before the aircraft enters a flat spin depending on affected by the store weight imbalance which results in a
type and severity of departure, altitude and AOA at entry, redistribution of lateral control power (differential tail) due
and aircraft configuration. The time to reach 50_ per second to the trim required. There are no significant differences due
yaw rate for various aircraft configurations as a result of to aerodynamic asymmetries at high AOA. Therefore, rudder
lateral stick, rudder, or cross−control inputs is presented in inputs generate similar aircraft response both into and away
Figure 11−1 and Figure 112. The figures are applicable to from the store(s). However, the aircraft response to large
DFCS with ROLL SAS OFF or a complete roll axis failure lateral stick inputs, at AOAs where lateral stick generates a
as indicated by illumination of the ROLL DGR, ARI DGR, roll response opposite to the direction of the input (roll
and ARI/SAS OUT caution lights. Generally, the most severe reversal AOA), can vary significantly from the symmetric
departures are induced through the differential tail, which is stores case depending on the amount of store asymmetry.
commanded by lateral stick. Rudder inputs, asymmetric
thrust, and inertia coupling can cause or contribute to the The maximum asymmetry which has been flight tested
severity of departures. thus far is 189,000 in−lbs, which resulted in a lateral trim bias
of 40 − 90% of available trim authority, depending on trim
In addition to the enhanced departure resistance, the airspeed. This asymmetry is equivalent to a 900 lb wing fuel
DFCS automatically provides anti−spin rudder and differen split.
tial tail inputs to the maximum ROLL and YAW SAS
authority limits as a function of yaw rate. This increases Due to the lateral trim required to offset the asymmetry,
aircraft spin resistance. Flight tests indicate that the aircraft the amount of lateral stick displacement (and therefore
will recover from high yaw rates without pilot−commanded differential tail) which can be commanded from the trimmed
lateral/directional control inputs, due to these automatic stick position is greater into the store asymmetry than away
rudder and differential tail inputs. Refer to 11.7.8 for from the asymmetry. Aircraft response to large lateral stick
discussion of departure recovery characteristics. inputs is thus amplified for stick deflections into the stores
and reduced for stick deflections away from the stores.
11.7.1.1 Mach and AOA Effects Lateral stick−induced departures are caused by the
inadvertent application of differential tail at high AOA.
As Mach number increases, flight−control−induced
The greater the amount of differential tail commanded, the
departure susceptibility and severity increases. Generally, as
greater the aircraft response, and potentially the more severe
AOA increases, the severity of the departure increases. For
the departure. Since the direction of a laterally induced
example, a lateral stick input at 0.9 Mach, 30 units AOA, will
departure is opposite to the direction of the lateral stick input,
produce a more violent departure than the same input at 0.9
departures away from the store asymmetry can be more
Mach, 20 units AOA. The one exception is rudder−induced
severe. For example, a right−wing heavy aircraft will depart
departures. As AOA is increased to about 30_ (over 30 units
faster in the nose−left direction. The degree of this asym
AOA), rudder effectiveness decreases as the rudder is washed
metric response varies in proportion to the amount of
out and rudder−induced departures become less severe.
asymmetry, and also the magnitude and duration of the
control input. This same effect is present during the use of
11.7.1.2 Maneuver Flaps/Slats
cross controls (rudder in direction of roll, lateral stick
Extended maneuver flaps and slats significantly de opposite) to further augment roll response of the aircraft at
crease departure susceptibility and severity through in high AOA and can lead to potentially more severe depar−
creased dihedral effect. tures. Caution should be exercised when cross−controlling
to increase high AOA roll response away from the store
11.7.1.3 External Stores asymmetry. Use of cross controls to roll into the
store asymmetry will be less effective than normal.
As external stores are added, departure susceptibility
and severity increase. No one store is significant in and of
11−11 ORIGINAL
Figure 112.Cross−Control−Induced Departure Areas
ORIGINAL 11−12
11.7.2 Lateral Stick−Induced Departures 11.7.4 Multi−Axis Control−Induced Departures

Roll and yaw in direction of lateral stick command is Combined lateral stick and rudder control inputs can
typically retained up to 30 units AOA, due to the combined produce oscillatory aircraft response and high yaw rates at
effects of differential tail fadeout and lateral stick−to−rudder some flight conditions.
interconnect functions provided by DFCS. Maximum roll
rate commanded by lateral stick decreases as AOA increases, 11.7.4.1 Cross Control−Induced Departures
decreasing to near zero above 30 units AOA without pilot
commanded coordinated rudder inputs. Some variation in Sustained cross control inputs produce oscillatory roll
AOA at which neutral roll response occurs and/or mild roll and yaw rates in the direction of the rudder input. The
reversal may be expected due to effects of external stores, amplitude of the oscillations decreases as AOA increases.
wing fuel state, or flight control system rigging tolerances. Differential tail fadeout and lateral stick to rudder intercon
During flight tests, only mild roll reversal departures were nect functions limit maximum control authorities to ±2°
experienced. These departures were characterized by a mild differential tail and ±11° rudder, causing maximum yaw rate
roll and yaw opposite the lateral stick command. With to remain below 50 deg/sec at all flight conditions. At very
maneuver flaps retracted, there was no appreciable degrada low airspeed and high AOA flight conditions (less than 0.4
tion in departure resistance. No high AOA maneuvering Mach and above 30 units AOA), the low speed cross control
restrictions regarding lateral stick inputs are required for function (LSXC) is enabled to provide a transient roll and
flight with a fully operational UA−ARI. yaw maneuvering capability. LSXC permits the pilot to
command up to ±10° differential tail and ±30° rudder
11.7.3 Rudder−Induced Departures deflection during cross control maneuvers. Peak roll rate of
approximately 60° per second is available through the use of
Full rudder inputs at high AOA produce a roll and yaw
LSXC. If long duration inputs are utilized, the roll response
rate in the direction of the rudder input. At moderate AOA
will become oscillatory, with hesitations in bank angle and
(approximately 15 to 25 units), this response is oscillatory
roll rate. Precise bank angle control is typically not possible
and a definite hesitation in roll and yaw rate will be noted
with LSXC, but the feature can be effectively utilized during
for long duration inputs. Inertia coupling effects will also
sustained slow speed / high AOA maneuvering such as a flat
cause pitch rate and AOA oscillations. As AOA increases to
scissors engagement. The spin recovery function will start to
30 units, the response is less oscillatory but remains in the
reduce these control authorities at approximately 20° per
direction of the rudder input. Above 30 units AOA, rudder
second yaw rate and will apply the maximum reduction in
effectiveness is significantly reduced and little response is
control authority back to the ±2° differential tail / ±11° rudder
obtained from a full rudder input. The departure resistance
limits at approximately 25° per second yaw rate to preserve
features of the UA−ARI limit maximum yaw rate to less
departure resistance.
than 50 deg/sec over the majority of the high AOA
flight envelope. However, at airspeeds above approximately
11.7.4.2 Coordinated Control−Induced
250 knots and low to moderate AOA (less than 25 units),
rapid yaw acceleration can occur in response to a sustained Departures
full rudder input such that 50 deg/sec yaw rate can be initially During flight tests, full sustained coordinated lateral
exceeded. Flight test data indicate that yaw rates decreased stick and rudder inputs produced high roll and yaw rates in
to less than 50 deg/sec even when sustained full rudder inputs the medium to high airspeed regime (above 250 knots) at low
were maintained for 10 sec. Roll response using lateral stick to moderate AOA (less than 25 units). However, no tested
alone in this airspeed and AOA range is typically sufficient, condition resulted in sustained yaw rate above 50° per
such that large rudder inputs should not be required to obtain second. The roll and yaw rates are in the direction
desired roll performance. commanded and produce highly oscillatory, potentially
disorienting motion with significant nose up coupling in the
pitch axis. At these flight conditions, roll response due to a
pure lateral stick input (no pilot−commanded coordinating
rudder) is satisfactory and additional coordinating rudder
should not be required to obtain desired roll performance.
Sustained large rudder inputs at high airspeeds At lower airspeeds and/or increased AOA, coordinated
(above 250 knots) can cause high yaw accelera lateral stick and rudder inputs produced a smoother, less
tion and yaw rate.
11−13 ORIGINAL
oscillatory roll and yaw response. In this flight regime, 11.7.6 Accelerated Departures
coordinating rudder can be used to supplement lateral stick
Accelerated departures are initially characterized by a
for increased roll rate.
rapid increase in lateral acceleration but may become
violently oscillatory about all three axes. Flight tests with
legacy SAS (pre−DFCS) have shown aircraft rates in excess
of 120° per second in roll and 70° per second in yaw. Pitch
rates oscillate up to ±30° per second and lateral acceleration
oscillates up to ±0.8g. These oscillations may cause pilot
Sustained large rudder inputs at high airspeeds disorientation, and proper recovery controls may not be
(above 250 knots) can cause high yaw accelera obvious. If this occurs, the proper response would be to
tion and yaw rate. neutralize rudders and lateral stick, apply forward longitudi
11.7.5 Asymmetric−Thrust−Induced Departures nal stick, and lock the shoulder harness. Recovery indications
should become apparent within two turns.
Asymmetric−thrust−induced departures are similar to
those induced by the flight controls. At high altitude (greater 11.7.7 Inertia Coupling
than 20,000 feet), asymmetric thrust results in a mild Coupling occurs when motions in more than one axis
departure characterized by mild roll and yaw rates into the interact. Combined motion on two axes will always result in
dead engine if the airspeed is above 100 knots. The yaw rate motion in the third axis. The F−14, like all high−performance
is usually masked by the roll rate. If no pilot action is taken, aircraft capable of producing high−rate, multiple−axis motion,
the aircraft usually stabilizes at some moderate yaw rate from is susceptible to coupling. High−rate, multiple−axis motions,
which recovery is easily accomplished. On occasion, the yaw particularly at high AOA, can produce violent coupled
rate will continue to increase slowly, taking 20 seconds or departures. In flight tests with legacy SAS (pre−DFCS), a
more to reach 50_ per second. At lower altitudes (15,000 guns−defense/collision−avoidance maneuver using full rud
feet) yaw rate may reach 50_ per second in 10 seconds der followed by full coordinated lateral and aft stick produced
because of increased thrust asymmetry. Departures induced violent coupled departures with up to 66° per second yaw rate
by asymmetric thrust alone below 100 knots or when airspeed in less than 2 seconds. Yaw rates of this magnitude require
drops below 100 knots in the departure are characterized by prompt positive recovery inputs by the pilot. External stores
mild roll and a smooth gradual increase in yaw rate that will contribute to the severity of the departure by decreasing
attain values well over 50_ per second. The DFCS spin directional stability and increasing inertia. Most coupled
recovery function automatically commands recovery differ departures in the F−14 are induced by combined high pitch and
ential tail and rudder inputs to oppose yaw rate buildup and roll rates (causing a rapid departure in yaw). Typically, these
reduces the severity of asymmetric thrust induced departures. departures are initiated at comparatively low AOA (below 15
These inputs are most effective if airspeed remains above 100 units) where the aircraft is capable of generating both high
knots. Departures induced by asymmetric thrust are still pitch and roll rates. It should be noted that since the ROLL
capable of reaching 50°/sec yaw rate at low altitudes, SAS will remain on, this will provide increased roll control
however, the yaw rate onset is much less severe, allowing the authority, throughout the flight envelope.
pilot more time to counter rate.
Note
In flight tests, the DFCS did not prevent coupled
departures from occurring. However, the DFCS
spin recovery function prevented excessive yaw
The pilot’s natural tendency is to oppose uncom rate buildup.
manded roll with lateral stick, but this can aggra No DFCS flight test departure maneuvers exceeded
vate the departure. 70° per second yaw rate, and progression into the flat spin
During maneuvering flight, uncommanded roll should mode following this type of departure.
be countered by rudder and a reduction in AOA. DFCS
automatically provides coordinating rudder with lateral stick
deflection which decreases departure susceptibility. See
additional discussions on asymmetric thrust flight character
istics in this chapter.
Avoid high−rate, multiple−axis motion because
of possible violent departures.
ORIGINAL 11−14
11.7.8 Departure Recovery ment indication of yaw direction is the roll direction. In an
upright departure, the aircraft yaw rate is the same direction
Before recovery controls are applied, the crew must
as the roll rate. Typically, roll rate is much more evident to
analyze flight conditions to determine the departure mode
the pilot than yaw rate. The turn needle and PTID spin arrow
entered. The turn needle indicates only the direction of yaw
may be backed up by referencing the roll direction.
and not magnitude of yaw rate, since it pegs at 4_ per second
yaw rate. An upright departure is indicated by AOA pegged Reducing thrust asymmetry during recovery by retard
at 30 units; an inverted departure by AOA of 0 units. ing the throttles to IDLE removes any possible thrust
Generally, increasing airspeed and AOA sustained between asymmetry, places the engines in the region of greatest stall
0 and 30 units is indicative of a recovery in progress, as is margin, and reduces time to recover. Maintaining a thrust
positive aircraft reaction to pilot control inputs. asymmetry, particularly with the good engine in MAX A/B,
will delay recovery at high altitudes and may prevent
11.7.9 Upright Departure Recovery
recovery at lower altitudes since flight controls may not be
Recovery from upright departures is positive and powerful enough to overcome asymmetric thrust. Asymmet
generally rapid. The high control power that allows the pilot ric thrust has its greatest effect upon upright departure
to depart the aircraft also enables the pilot to recover when recovery at low airspeed, where flight controls are not as
the controls are properly applied and sufficient altitude is effective, and low altitude, where asymmetric engine thrust
available for recovery. is the largest.
Successful upright departure recovery depends on
recognition of the departure from controlled flight, applica
tion of appropriate recovery control inputs, and subsequent
recognition of when the aircraft has recovered. Departure
Retarding throttles to idle during a departure or
from controlled flight is usually characterized by an uncom
high AOA maneuvering may induce a compres
manded roll/yaw or an abrupt nose slice or pitch. Common
sor stall on the operating engine. If both engines
examples of these motions are lateral control reversal at high
are stalled, one engine must be immediately se
AOA, or uncommanded roll and yaw resulting from asym
cured (while maintaining the correct departure/
metric thrust. When appropriate recovery controls are
spin recovery inputs) to prevent turbine damage
applied and maintained as discussed in detail below, recovery
and provide maximum potential for a successful
from an upright departure will be indicated by decreasing
airstart.
yaw rate, decreasing AOA, and increasing airspeed. The
decrease in AOA and increase in airspeed during recovery Recovery from slightly higher yaw rates (approximate
will be evident to the pilot by the aircraft response to control ly 60 to 70 deg/sec) is possible with forward stick and
inputs. The aircraft may stop rolling because of sideslip and opposite rudder alone, due to the automatic anti−spin
begin to roll because of differential tail commanded by the differential tail and rudder inputs provided by the spin
pilot or DFCS for recovery from higher yaw rate departures. recovery function. Above these yaw rates, additional pilot−
A nose drop and associated unload may occur, and the roll commanded lateral stick into yaw rate/turn needle will likely
rate may increase under these conditions. be required to recover the aircraft. Yaw rates of 100_ per
Note second or more can be identified by sustained eyeball−out g.
The most important action of any upright depar During recovery from departures where yaw rates of 50_ to
ture recovery is reducing the AOA. This is en 100_ per second are experienced, the aircraft may stop
hanced by timely application of forward stick rolling because of sideslip and begin to roll because of
and countering the yawing motion of the aircraft differential tail commanded by the pilot or DFCS for
with rudder. recovery. A nose drop and an associated unload may occur.
These are indications of a positive recovery in progress.
If the AOA is pegged at 30 units or increasing rapidly,
smoothly apply forward stick as required to reduce AOA. During flight tests with DFCS, a sustained mild
Full forward stick may be required. In an upright departure auto−roll" tendency was exhibited during recovery from
where less than 50_ per second yaw rate is observed, if full some intentional departure maneuvers. This motion typically
forward stick is applied to reduce AOA, throttles retarded to occurred when the pilot failed to input enough forward stick
idle, and rudder is applied opposite the yaw direction, the to reduce and maintain AOA below 20 units. With neutral
aircraft will generally recover, as shown in Figure 11−3. controls or slightly forward stick only (no pilot rudder or
Cockpit indications of yaw direction are the pilot’s turn lateral stick input), the aircraft can continue to roll and yaw
needle and the spin arrow displays on the PTID and MFD mildly in the direction of the original departure. These rates
(Figure 11−4). Refer to paragraph 11.7.9.1 for a detailed are approximately 40 deg/sec in roll and 20 deg/sec in yaw.
discussion of spin arrow displays. An additional noninstru AOA is sustained between 20 and 25 units. Aircrew should
11−15 ORIGINAL
Figure 113. F−14 Departure Recovery Diagram
ORIGINAL 11−16
recognize that the departure is substantially recovered at this

point, as indicated by the sustained AOA below 30 units,
blanked spin arrow, and a nose low attitude with increasing
airspeed. Any subsequent positive pilot control input will
cause the aircraft to cease the auto−roll motion. This can be Maintaining aft and lateral stick recovery con
accomplished by applying enough forward stick to reduce trols below approximately 100_ per second yaw
and maintain AOA below 20 units, applying opposite rudder rate can result in large AOA excursions and os
and/or lateral stick, or a combination of any of these three cillations in roll and pitch, which may compli
inputs. cate recognition of recovery from an upright de
Once recovery indications from a low yaw−rate parture and delay recovery. Maintaining these
departure (less than 50_ per second) are verified, the forward controls below approximately 80_ per second
longitudinal stick should be relaxed to maintain 17 units will delay recovery and increase the potential for
AOA, which will minimize altitude loss for recovery and yaw rate reversal and progressive departure in
avoid negative g as airspeed builds. Rudders should be the opposite direction.
neutralized as rotation stops. As recovery from higher 11.7.9.1 Spin Arrow Displays
yaw−rate departures is indicated, the lateral stick that was
held into the turn direction should be neutralized, and the At yaw rates greater than 30_ per second, the spin
forward longitudinal stick should be relaxed to minimize arrow displays (Figure 11−4) have priority and override all
altitude loss for recovery and avoid negative g as airspeed other display formats on the MFD1 and the PTID. MFD2 and
builds. The aircraft is very responsive to longitudinal stick MFD3 display the VDI format. When a yaw rate exceeding
inputs at all AOA at speeds above 100 knots. Pullout should 30_ per second is detected, the current format on these
be accomplished at 17 units AOA. Lateral stick and rudder displays is overridden by the spin indicator format. In this
may be used to counter any remaining roll and yaw format, the spin arrow points in the direction of the spin.
oscillations. Above the spin arrow in the MFD format, vertical tape
displays provide airspeed, altitude, and AOA indications. If
Centrifuge tests indicate the pilot begins to sense
required, an indication of left or right engine stall is provided.
eyeball−out g at about 2g, which occurs at approximately 90_
A moving caret shows yaw rate from 30_ to 180_ per second.
to 100_ per second yaw rate. If sustained eyeball−out g is
If the yaw rate exceeds 180_ per second, the caret is pegged.
sensed, it is likely that 100_ per second yaw rate has been
exceeded and optimum recovery controls are full rudder Note
opposite the yaw rate/turn needle, full lateral stick into the
turn needle, as much aft stick as possible (while maintaining D If MFD1 is not operating, the spin indicator
full lateral stick. The DFCS provides the capability to format is displayed on MFD2.
command full ROLL SAS ON differential tail authority for D If INS and SAHRS failures occur while the
recovery as a basic feature of the UA−ARI. Refer to spin arrow format is displayed, the pointer on
Chapter 14 for upright departure/flat spin emergency proce the yaw rate scale is removed from the MFD,
dures. Recovery controls should be applied and maintained the spin arrow is frozen, and an X" is super
until recovery is indicated, ejection altitude is reached, or imposed over the spin arrow. The airspeed,
increasing eyeball−out g threatens aircrew incapacitation. AOA, and altimeter scales are not obscured
As yaw rate decreases during recovery from very high (Figure 11−5).
yaw−rate departures (above 100_ per second, or where
At yaw rates over 30_ per second, the PTID display is
sustained eyeball−out g is sensed), the aft stick and full lateral
blanked and the spin arrow appears pointed in the direction
stick recovery controls result in some−what different recov
of yaw. If the yaw rate exceeds 90_ per second, the spin arrow
ery characteristics. If these recovery controls are maintained
will flash at a 4−times−per−second rate. A fixed scale from
below a yaw rate of approximately 100_ per second, large
30_ to 110_ per second increasing in the direction of yaw in
AOA oscillations may be experienced as well as oscillations
increments of 20_ will be displayed below the spin arrow.
in roll and pitch. The overall recovery may feel very rough
A diamond will be positioned above the numbers to indicate
and oscillatory. If these recovery controls are maintained
the existing yaw rate. For yaw rates in excess of 110_ per
below approximately 80_ per second, recovery will be
second, the diamond will travel past 110 and be positioned
delayed and the potential for yaw rate reversal and progres
over a + sign.
sive departure in the opposite direction is greatly increased.
For these reasons, the control stick that was maintained aft Note
and into the turn should be moved forward and into the turn
when sustained eyeball−out g is no longer sensed or spin D The primary reference for the spin arrow, the
arrow yaw rate has decreased below 100 deg/sec. Further INS, is valid for yaw rates up to 300_ per
recovery can then be accomplished as previously described.
11−17 ORIGINAL
Figure 114.Spin Arrow Displays
ORIGINAL 11−18
Figure 115.MFD−1/PTID Right Spin Display (INS and SAHRS Failed)
11−19 ORIGINAL
second; the backup reference, the SAHRS, is departure, low−speed stalled engine, etc.). The time between
valid for the same yaw rates. recognition of a flat spin and buildup of incapacitating
longitudinal−g forces is dependent upon aircraft loading,
D If INS and SAHRS failures occur while the
thrust asymmetry, flight control position during spin entry,
spin arrow format is displayed, the pointer on
locked or unlocked harness, tightness of the lap restraints,
the yaw rate scale is removed from the PTID
and flightcrew physical condition and stature. Test data
and a breakaway X is super−imposed over the
indicate that following recognition of a flat spin, the pilot
spin arrow display (Figure 11−5).
may be able to maintain antispin controls for 15 to 20 seconds
The algorithm that provides yaw rate and direction of (approximately 7 to 10 turns) but may severely jeopardize his
turn information for the spin arrow display has not been flight ability to eject because of the incapacitation that occurs as the
test validated at all aircraft attitudes and rates. Hence, the g forces build. Consistent successful F−14 flat spin recovery
spin arrow may not operate properly at extreme aircraft procedures have not been demonstrated; therefore, once the
attitudes and rates. The spin arrow has operated properly, aircraft is confirmed to be in a flat spin, the flightcrew should
providing accurate yaw rate and direction information to the eject. This decision should not be delayed once the flat spin
aircrew, during flight test where nominal aircraft departures is recognized.
were encountered.
It is important to understand that longitudinal g forces
11.7.10 Flat Spin can be present in accelerated departures from controlled
flight and ejection initiated solely because of longitudinal g
The only true upright, fully developed spin in the F−14 forces is premature.
is the flat spin. It is recognized by the flat aircraft attitude
(approximately 10_ nose down with no pitch or roll To preclude premature ejection from a recoverable
oscillations), steadily increasing yaw rate, and high−longitu aircraft, verify that the aircraft is not rolling or oscillating in
dinal acceleration (eyeball−out g). It may develop within two pitch or is not in a coupled departure. If any of these
to three turns following a departure if yaw is allowed to characteristics are evident, then a flat spin has not developed
accelerate without rapid, positive steps to effect recovery. and departure recovery procedures should be continued.
High yaw−rate departures are usually induced by aerodynam
11.7.11 Negative AOA Departures
ic controls, resulting in inertia coupling and possibly
aggravated by a thrust asymmetry. The aircraft may first During flight test, a negative AOA departure mode has
enter an erect oscillatory spiral as airspeed rapidly decreases. been experienced. Cross−control inputs in the low to medium
Frequent hesitations in yaw and roll may occur as yaw rate Mach (less than 0.6 Mach) and low to medium AOA (AOA
increases. The turn needle and the spin arrow are the only less than 25 units) area resulted in rapid transition to negative
valid indications of yaw and spin direction as they always AOA with up to 2.5 negative g. Inertia coupling effects will
indicate turn direction correctly, whether erect or inverted. cause a nose down pitch and AOA decrease any time roll and
AOA will peg at 30 units, and airspeed will oscillate between yaw rates are generated in opposite directions. A cross
0 and 100 knots. The aircraft may also depart by entering a control input at low AOA, where the aircraft still rolls in the
coupled roll where yaw rate may build up without being direction of lateral stick, is capable of producing this type of
noticed, to the point that when roll stops, yaw rate is sufficient motion. The motion was very disorienting, uncomfortable,
to sustain a flat spin. A large sustained thrust asymmetry at and confusing. Neutralizing controls would produce a
low airspeed (particularly at low altitude), may also produce recovery from this departure; use of aft stick would speed
sufficient yaw rate to drive the aircraft into a flat spin if recovery.
proper recovery controls are not used. In all instances,
recovery should be accomplished by prompt application of
departure recovery procedures to reduce AOA and control
yaw rate.
Regardless of the method of entry, once the flat spin has
developed, the flat aircraft attitude (10_ nose down), steadily Use of cross−control in the low to medium Mach
increasing yaw rate, and buildup of longitudinal−g forces not (less than 0.6) and low to medium AOA (AOA
accompanied by roll and/or pitch rates will be apparent to the less than 25 units) may result in negative−g
flightcrew. AOA will be pegged at 30 units, yaw rate will be departures.
fast (as high as 180_ per second) and altitude loss will be 11.7.12 Inverted Stall/Departure
approximately 700 feet per turn. Longitudinal acceleration
(eye−ball−out g) at the pilot’s station will be 5.5 to 6.5g and As in normal stall approaches, there is no clearly
at the RIO’s station, 3.5 to 4.5g. Time between aircraft defined inverted stall. A moderate rate application of full
departure and flightcrew recognition of a fully developed flat
spin depends upon the nature of the entry (accelerated
ORIGINAL 11−20
forward stick in inverted flight results in a negative AOA of combination through 360_ of roll. Pro spin controls need not
about −30_. be held to maintain the aircraft in a spin. The inverted spin
is primarily identified from cockpit instruments by less than
zero g and an AOA of zero units. Since the inverted spin is
quite disorienting, spin direction must be determined by
observing the turn needle deflection and spin arrow. Altitude
loss during the inverted spin is 800 to 1,800 feet per turn and
Dynamic forward stick inputs of moderate rate time per turn is 3 to 6 seconds. Nose attitude in the inverted
may exceed the negative−g limit of −2.4g. Indi spin is approximately 25_ below the horizon. Warning of
cated AOA will show zero beyond about −5_ true possible inverted spin usually occurs sufficiently in advance
AOA. for the aircrew to take corrective action. Warning is usually
very noticeable in the form of a nosedown pitch (negative g)
Dihedral effect is negative at negative AOA. There with a yawing and possible rolling motion that is quite
fore, a right rudder input produces right yaw, but left roll. uncomfortable to the aircrew. In the fully developed inverted
This feels natural to the pilot in inverted flight, and enables spin, rudder opposite yaw/turn needle is the strongest
raising a wing with opposite rudder when inverted. At antispin control. Aft stick is a strong antispin control during
negative AOA, oil pressure will indicate zero and illuminate the incipient spin phase and a weak antispin control in the
the OIL PRESS caution light and MASTER CAUTION light. inverted spin. In the absence of asymmetric thrust, the
antispin control inputs will recover a fully developed
inverted spin within one turn. Lateral stick opposite yaw is
an antispin control, however, it is not included in the recovery
procedures because opposite rudder recovers the aircraft so
effectively. If opposite rudder and lateral stick were used, the
Zero− or negative−g flight in excess of 10 seconds recovery would occur very rapidly and a postrecovery
in afterburner or 20 seconds in military power or departure in the direction of stick and rudder would be highly
less depletes fuel feed tanks (cells 3 or 4), causing probable. Refer to Chapter 14 for inverted departure/spin
flameout of both engines. emergency procedures.
Recovery from an inverted stall is performed by
applying full aft stick, while neutralizing lateral stick, to 11.8 TAKEOFF AND LANDING CONFIGURATION
return to positive−g flight. Recovery from negative−g condi FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS
tions will usually occur immediately. Return to level flight 11.8.1 Baseline Flight Characteristics
can then be performed from the resultant nosedown attitude
by rolling erect with rudder and/or lateral stick and pulling The aircraft exhibits a sluggish pitch response to
out at 17 units AOA. longitudinal stick inputs. Frequent power adjustments are
required in conjunction with longitudinal stick inputs to
Excessive negative−g maneuvering can also exceed the properly maintain glideslope on approach. DLC is very
aircraft lift limit and cause departure. Aircraft motion effective for making glideslope corrections while at the same
following departure will be very erratic and disorienting; any time minimizing the need for nose movement and/or power
induced yaw rate can result in upright or inverted spin entry. corrections. During full flap takeoffs, more longitudinal stick
Aircraft at high gross weights with external tanks and stores is required to rotate the aircraft as compared to either the flaps
require a relatively minor negative load to induce this type of up or maneuver flap takeoff configurations. Pitch sensitivity
departure. and over−rotation tendency is more pronounced with maneu
ver flaps or flaps up, particularly with aft CG locations.
The PA−ARI control functions combine to provide a
crisp roll response and essentially deadbeat dutch roll
damping. Additionally, the PA spoiler gearing relationship is
Negative−g maneuvering at high gross weights modified to eliminate the non−linear roll response by moving
should be avoided because of a high probability the spoiler breakout point to only one−tenth inch lateral stick
of departure. deflection. The aircraft is very responsive to lateral inputs
and some tendency to overcontrol bank may be experienced.
11.7.13 Inverted Spin The DFCS also provides automatic coordinating rudder
An inverted spin may be encountered if the aircraft inputs with lateral stick deflection such that the vast
unloads while there is a yaw rate present. In flight tests, the majority of lateral corrections can be made with feet
inverted spin has been caused by holding full forward stick on the floor." An undesirable by−product of this improved
while inverted, applying full rudder, and holding this
11−21 ORIGINAL
coordination is a minor pitch up in response to moderate to wing rock at 26 units AOA. Figure 11−6 shows stall speeds for
aggressive lateral inputs, which requires pilot compensation standard day temperature at sea level with slats/flaps
to maintain constant AOA. This effect is more pronounced extended and gear down.
with DLC off. Finally, the spiral mode is neutrally dampened,
such that the aircraft will tend to hold a constant bank angle Note
once established in a turn.
Maximum allowable AOA gear down is 20.6
11.8.2 Crosswind Landings units below 5,000′ AGL and 25.5 above 5,000′
Crosswind landings may be accomplished using either AGL.
the sideslipped or crabbed technique, up to the crosswind 11.8.4 Stall Recovery
limit (20 knots). The PA−ARI roll rate command function and
revised spoiler gearing affect crosswind landing flight Stall recovery is easily accomplished by relaxing aft
characteristics. The DFCS commands ROLL SAS inputs to stick force and easing the stick forward, if necessary, to
achieve a commanded roll rate which is proportional to the decrease AOA to less than 16 units. Maintain 15 to 16 units
pilot’s lateral stick input. During a sideslipped approach AOA and stabilized military or afterburner thrust during
(wing down, top rudder"), the pilot applies a constant lateral recovery to level flight. Recovery to level flight requires
stick input which is not intended to command roll rate, in about 1,000 feet of altitude.
order to hold the aircraft in a steady slip. To accommodate
this technique, ROLL SAS inputs are faded out as the pilot
applies rudder pedal. However, the spoiler gearing schedule
results in nearly immediate spoiler breakout with lateral stick
deflection from trim (one−tenth inch lateral stick input). This
spoiler breakout may result in an unpredictable or overly Avoid high−rate, multiple−axis motion because
sensitive roll response during tightly controlled tasks such as of possible violent departures and engine stalls.
fine lineup corrections late in the approach. Because crabbed
approaches are flown without this offset lateral stick input
and do not exhibit this characteristic, pilots may find this
technique easier. Method of crosswind approach is pilot’s
option.
Use of cross−control in the low to medium Mach
11.8.3 Normal Stalls
(less than 0.6) and low to medium AOA (AOA
During deceleration in a level, 1g stall approach, light less than 25 units) may result in negative−g
buffet starts at about 19 units AOA. Buffet does not departures.
significantly change thereafter as the AOA is increased and
11.8.5 Asymmetric Thrust Flight Characteristics
provides no usable stall warning. For this reason, with the
landing gear handle down, DFCS incorporates rudder pedal
shaker beginning at approximately 21 units AOA to alert the 11.8.5.1 Takeoff Configuration
pilot. A reduction in stick force is felt between 24 and 28 units Afterburner takeoffs are prohibited specifically be
AOA. At 25 units AOA, divergent wing rock and yaw cause of controllability concerns in the event of an engine
excursions define the stall. Sideslip angle may reach 25_, and failure during takeoff. An engine failure during a MIL power
bank angle 90_ within 6 seconds if the AOA is not lowered. takeoff with the F110 engine will produce significant thrust
Lateral stick inputs result in significantly reduced adverse asymmetry. The high compression ratio of the compressor
yaw and continue to provide excellent roll response up to 25 section will result in very rapid spooldown during an engine
units AOA. Above 25 units AOA, the ARI is disabled and failure and rotor lock can be anticipated within several
DFCS control laws revert to basic SAS in each axis. seconds of the engine failure. An engine failure in the takeoff
Extending the speedbrakes slightly aggravates the stick force configuration produces rapid nose movement in the direction
lightening at 24 units AOA but improves directional stability of the failed engine. The pilot’s first impression is usually
significantly, reducing the wing rock and yaw tendency at 25 that the aircraft will depart the runway. Even if the aircraft’s
units AOA. Stall approaches should not be continued beyond heading swerve is corrected, the aircraft may continue to skid
the first indication of wing rock. When wing rock occurs, the sideways across the runway. The wing on the side of the
nose should be lowered and no attempt should be made to failed engine may rise 10_ to 15_. This is noticeable to the
counter the wing rock with lateral stick or rudder. Stalls with pilot, but easily corrected with lateral stick. If the airspeed is
the landing gear extended and flaps up are similar to those high enough to allow correction of the heading swerve, all
with flaps extended. Buffet starts at 16 to 18 units AOA and lateral drift can be stopped.
ORIGINAL 11−22
Figure 116.Stall Speeds for Wing Rock at 25 Units AOA
11−23 ORIGINAL
Aircraft controllability during asymmetric thrust take

off emergencies is influenced by rudder position, thrust
asymmetry, airspeed, nosewheel steering, and pilot reaction
time, with pilot reaction time being the most critical factor.
During the takeoff roll, rudder control power increases as the Failure to limit pitch attitude will place the air
airspeed increases, thus improving the pilot’s ability to craft in a regime of reduced directional stability,
control an asymmetric thrust condition. Below minimum rudder control, and rate of climb. The aircraft
control groundspeed (VMCG), insufficient rudder control may be uncontrollable at AOA above 20 units.
power will be available (nosewheel steering OFF), and large Smooth rotation to 10_ pitch attitude (approxi
lateral runway deviations will be experienced if the takeoff mately 14 units AOA) will provide good initial
is continued. The lower the airspeed at which the asymmetry flyaway attitude, ensure single−engine accelera
occurs, the larger the lateral deviation. Longer pilot reaction tion, and generate adequate rate of climb. See
times result in dramatically larger lateral deviations. VMCG Chapter 13 for single−engine takeoff emergency
speeds (takeoff continued) for the F−14B/D are presented in procedures, and NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1 for
Figure 11−7. Even if the takeoff is aborted, significant runway single−engine performance data.
lateral deviations may occur before the aircraft is brought
back under control. 11.8.5.2 Landing Configuration General
Asymmetric thrust flight in the landing configuration
VMCG SPEEDS must be approached with caution. Gross weight should be
MAXIMUM 50 FT reduced prior to landing in order to improve waveoff
THRUST FLAP LATERAL performance. Rudder trim, augmented as necessary by
ASYMMETRY POSITION DEVIATION additional rudder pedal deflection, should be used to counter
thrust asymmetry.
Military − IDLE Extended 132 to 138 knots
Speedbrakes should remain retracted during actual
Military − IDLE Retracted 135 to 140 knots single−engine approaches. A straight−in approach should be
flown. Avoid turns into the dead engine. Steep angle of bank
turns into the dead engine reduce climb performance and may
Figure 117.Minimum Control Speed, Ground (VMCG) result in rudder requirements exceeding available control
deflection causing loss of control. The pilot may have to
Use of the nosewheel steering up to 100 knots will reduce the thrust on the operating engine to regain control,
reduce the amounts of deviation during the abort. For which may not be feasible at low altitude. By performing
example, if the engine fails at 90 knots, the lateral deviation turns away from the failed engine, both thrust and rudder
will be 10 to 15 feet with nosewheel steering engaged, and requirements will be reduced. Any maneuvering required
approximately 50 feet with nosewheel steering disengaged. prior to final approach should be accomplished using a
If the single−engine failure occurs during or after maximum of 20_ angle of bank in turns away from the failed
lift−off or catapult launch, the aircraft is controllable if proper engine.
aircrew techniques are employed. Airborne rudder effective
ness is presented in Figure 11−8. Rudder is the primary Note
control for countering yaw because of asymmetric thrust.
Beneficial coordinating rudder is automatically applied with The role of the RIO is critical in this regime. He
a lateral stick input and helps to limit yaw rate and sideslip should closely monitor airspeed, bank angle, and
buildup. However, pilot commanded rudder remains the AOA throughout the approach.
required recovery control for the DFCS. At the first Refer to Chapter 15 for single−engine landing emer
indication of an engine failure, the pilot should not hesitate gency procedures and NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1 for single−
to apply up to full rudder to counter roll and yaw. Above 100 engine performance data. For additional discussion of
knots, rudder effectiveness without nosewheel steering is landing configurations and techniques, see paragraphs
sufficient to control this deviation adequately. In addition, 11.8.5.3 and 11.8.5.4. For additional discussion of asymmet
use of nosewheel steering is undesirable above 100 knots ric thrust flight characteristics, see paragraph 11.8.5.
because of a directional pilot induced oscillation tendency
and the potential for a cocked nosegear if takeoff is 11.8.5.3 Landing Configuration
continued. Engine in Primary
DLC will not be available with the left engine secured.
With the left engine operating in primary mode and 3,000 psi
ORIGINAL 11−24
Figure 118.Rudder Effectiveness
11−25 ORIGINAL
combined hydraulic pressure, DLC should be engaged when and is prohibited. The aircraft is extremely difficult to control
established on final approach. Any maneuver required prior in MAX A/B and large bank angles into the operating engine
to rolling out on final approach should be accomplished using are required to maintain centerline. Late or inadequate
12 units AOA or less. Once established on final approach, fly control inputs during a MAX A/B waveoff can result in large
15 units or faster (DLC engaged) or 14 units or faster (no lateral flightpath deviations. If unable to control yaw rate
DLC) to provide additional control power. during A/B waveoff (possible ATLS failure), immediately
reduce power to MIL.
Note
11.8.5.4 Landing Configuration
While shipboard recoveries mandate the use of Engine in Secondary
the minimum recommended approach airspeed
because of aircraft and arresting gear structural Approaches in single−engine SEC mode are considered
limitations, field recoveries benefit from slightly extremely hazardous. Thrust response in secondary mode is
faster airspeeds because of the increased control nonlinear and very sluggish. At military power, thrust in
power and reduced apparent thrust asymmetry. secondary mode can vary from as little as 65 percent to as
much as 116 percent of primary mode thrust at MIL power.
Airspeed control for a 14−unit approach is difficult, Although the majority of engines produce greater than
therefore, there may be a tendency to overcontrol power. An 90 percent of primary mode thrust (at MIL power), the
effective technique is to have the RIO provide airspeed calls possibility exists that in the full flap configuration, a
(i.e., 2 knots slow/fast") to the pilot during final approach. low−thrust engine will not provide enough thrust for level
With DLC engaged, minimize use of the throttle in close and flight. Engine acceleration times can also vary and can be as
use DLC for fine glideslope corrections. Decreasing the much as three times longer than in primary mode. Aircraft
amount of throttle activity will limit excitation of the dutch should recover ashore. Shipboard landings should only be
roll. RATS will engage on touchdown, but does not attempted as a last resort and only if performance is adequate.
significantly affect CV bolter performance. MIN A/B (ATLS See Chapter 15 for performance check and specific emergen
on) may be used if required. During a bolter, apply rudder cy procedures.
simultaneously with power addition to maintain centerline.
Adequate directional control power exists to prevent drift on DLC should not be engaged for any single−engine SEC
bolter. mode approaches. Any maneuver required prior to rolling out
on final approach should be accomplished using 10 units
Military thrust waveoff performance in primary mode AOA or less. Once established on final approach, fly 13 units
is good, averaging 30 to 40 feet of altitude loss from a or faster to improve waveoff capability and provide addition
nominal 600−fpm sink rate. Waveoff performance from high al control power.
sink rates is improved using MIN A/B (ATLS on). Altitude
loss is minimized by maintaining approach AOA (slight, Note
gradual pitch rotation required). While shipboard recoveries mandate the use of
the recommended approach AOA because of air
Note craft and arresting gear structural limitations,
field recoveries benefit from slightly faster air
Altitude loss during a single−engine waveoff is
speeds because of the increased control power
minimized by maintaining approach AOA until
and reduced apparent thrust asymmetry.
a positive rate of climb is established. Avoid
overrotating in close as this will increase the Airspeed control for a 13−unit approach is difficult,
chance of an in−flight engagement. MIN A/B therefore, there may be a tendency to overcontrol power. An
(ATLS on) may improve waveoff performance effective technique is to have the RIO provide air−speed calls
from high sink rates. (i.e., 2 knots fast") to the pilot during final approach.
Extreme care should be used when working off a high and/
Sufficient rudder control power exists to maintain
or fast condition as any large power reduction could result in
control of the aircraft during MIL and MIN A/B single−en
a situation requiring military power for correction. Use small
gine waveoffs, provided AOA is not allowed to increase
throttle movements and small attitude adjustments for
above 18 units. Simultaneously add rudder (approximately
glideslope corrections. Avoid nosedown attitude changes just
two−thirds to three−fourths deflection) with power to counter
prior to touch−down as this will minimize the chance of a
the asymmetric thrust and track centerline. If a yaw rate
hook skip bolter. In the event of a bolter, rotate to a 10_ pitch
develops into the failed engine, immediately apply full
attitude, not to exceed 14 units AOA. During a bolter, apply
opposite rudder to arrest the yaw rate and then reduce rudder
rudder simultaneously with power addition to maintain
as required to track center−line. Rudder may be supplemented
centerline. Adequate directional control power exists to
by small lateral stick inputs. The use of MAX A/B offers little
prevent drift on bolter.
or no improvements in single−engine waveoff performance
ORIGINAL 11−26
Waveoff performance in secondary mode may be poor dation in approach handling characteristics and is generally
and high sink rates must be avoided. The poor engine only apparent when large bank angle changes are command
acceleration in SEC mode makes engine rpm at waveoff ed, such as during roll into and out of the approach turn. If the
initiation a major factor in waveoff performance. Grossly outboard spoiler module fails when the flaps and slats are
underpowered conditions must be avoided. During single− down, the spoilers may float up and lock at some position
engine waveoffs in secondary mode, rotate the aircraft above neutral. This may be accompanied by trim changes in
slightly to capture/maintain 14 to 15 units AOA as this will all three axes, which can be trimmed out. Approach speed
help to break the rate of descent. will increase slightly if a spoiler float occurs. If the failure
occurs when the flaps are up, spoiler float is minimized.
WARNING
Single−engine waveoff performance with operat

ing engine in SEC mode will be severely de In the event of outboard spoiler module failure,
graded. Extreme care should be used to avoid an do not engage DLC or ACLS.
underpowered, high rate−of−descent situation.
11.8.8 SAS Off
11.8.6 Degraded Approach Configuration
Approach characteristics with either ROLL or YAW
Refer to Chapter 15 for degraded approach emergency SAS OFF will be significantly degraded compared to the
procedures. baseline PA−ARI flying qualities. Failure of either ROLL or
YAW SAS (or selecting either ROLL or YAW STAB AUG
11.8.6.1 No Flaps, No Slats, and Wings at 20_
switch OFF) will revert the DFCS from the PA−ARI control
If a no−flap, no−slat landing is anticipated, a straight−in mode to basic SAS" control mode (loss of ARI functional
approach should be performed because of the narrow margin ity). Directional damping and roll response to lateral stick
afforded between 15 units AOA and the onset of airframe inputs will both be significantly reduced compared to
buffet. The approach is flown at 15 units AOA. Airframe baseline performance.
buffet will occur at 16 to 17 units AOA with wing drop
11.8.9 Aft Wing−Sweep Landings
(5_to 10_) and/or an increase in sink rate occurring at 16.5
to 17.5 units AOA. Spoiler effectiveness is slightly degraded The aircraft may be safely landed with the wings as far
because of the absence of the aerodynamic slot formed when aft as 40_ (CV) and 68_ (field). If the wings fail to respond
the flaps are extended. Precise airspeed control is essential to command, the emergency wing−sweep handle should be
for a no−flap/no−slat approach. Fast or high/ fast approaches used to match the captain bars (commanded position) with
result if timely throttle adjustments are not made throughout the wing−sweep position tape. Matching the captain bars with
the approach. The pilot must wave off approaches that result the position tape ensures the commanded position is the same
in large throttle reductions (to near idle) in close. as the actual position, removing hydraulic pressure from the
wing−sweep motors (hydraulic pressure will still remain
present at the wing−sweep control servo valve/four way
valve). This reduces the likelihood of hydraulic failure or
asymmetric wing sweep because of the failure of the
Nose attitude control is more sensitive during a crossover shaft. Optimum AOA for shipboard aft wing sweep
no−flap approach, and care must be exercised not approaches is 15 units. AOA may be increased up to 17 units
to overcontrol nose corrections in close. Cocked− maximum for field landings to minimize approach airspeed
up, high−sink landing can result in damage to for normal field landings or remain within published
ventral fins and/or afterburners. arresting gear limitations for short−field arrested landings.
At wing−sweep angles of ≥ 51_, each 1−unit increase in
11.8.7 Outboard Spoiler Module Failure approach AOA reduces approach airspeed by approximately
5 knots. Airspeeds for various configurations are shown in
When the wings are forward of 62_, loss of outboard
Figure 11−9.
spoilers results in a decrease in roll authority and in lateral
control effectiveness. Such loss causes no significant degra
11−27 ORIGINAL
Figure 119.Landing Approach Airspeed (15 Units AOA)
ORIGINAL 11−28
With the wings frozen forward of 50_, the main flaps/ aircraft rate of descent during a waveoff. Single−engine
slats should be used. A normal 15−unit approach should be approaches with aft wing sweep have not been tested and
used in this configuration and approach speeds will remain rudder control power may be limited in this condition. Fuel
within field arresting gear limitations. If main flaps/slats are permitting, aircraft handling and stall characteristics as well
not available, maneuvering flaps should be used. Extension as waveoff performance should be evaluated at altitude prior
of the main flaps/slat only will result in a flap light with the to commencing an aft wing−sweep approach.
wings aft of 20_.
If using an approach AOA greater than 15 units, nozzle
clearance at touchdown is reduced. Additionally, the high
rate of descent (approximately 1,000 fpm on a 3.25_
glideslope) and high touchdown speed place high stress on
the main landing gear tires. The recommended technique for
If maneuvering flaps are used, ensure that the field landings is to maintain a maximum of 17 units AOA
maneuver flap thumbwheel is not actuated dur while attempting to minimize the rate of descent just prior to
ing the approach. touchdown. Do not attempt to flare the landing and do not
Note aerobrake.
Main flaps/slats extension with the wings aft of
20_ will result in a large nosedown pitch tran
sient.
DLC should not be engaged as it increases final
approach speeds. APC gains are not optimized for wing Nozzle clearance is reduced at elevated approach
sweeps other than 20_ and, therefore, APC should not be AOA. Ensure that a maximum of 17 units AOA
used. Reducing gross weight will reduce approach speed by is maintained at touchdown.
about 3.5 knots for each 2,000−pound reduction in gross
weight at the 68_ wing−sweep position. Pilot over−the−nose Aft wing−sweep touch−and−go performance has not
been flight tested; however, rotation speeds approaching or
visibility is adequate at both 15 and 17 units AOA. The RIO
possibly exceeding tire limitations should be expected. Nose
will lose sight of the ball because of the higher pitch attitude
tire limitations, runway remaining, status of long−field
at 16 to 17 units AOA on the standard 3.25_ field glideslope.
arresting gear, and tire pressurization must all be factored
Flying characteristics in aft wing−sweep configurations into a decision to go around following a hook skip. If
are dependent on wing−sweep angle and AOA. As wing− committed to landing following a hook skip with operative
sweep angle increases, trimmed stick position moves aft. At hydraulics, consideration should also be given to securing the
68_ sweep, roll performance is sluggish but adequate at up starboard engine in order to reduce residual thrust.
to 17 units AOA with ROLL SAS engaged. At up to 62_ wing
Engagement speeds listed in the emergency field
sweep, differential tail is augmented with spoiler for roll
arrestment guide are groundspeeds. Headwind may be
control. The aircraft exhibits a very strong dihedral effect
with the wings swept aft, enabling rudder to be used to subtracted from final approach airspeed, tailwinds must be
added, and compensation must be made for field elevation
augment roll performance, if desired. Crosswind landings
(add approximately 10 knots to arresting gear limit for a field
have not been evaluated at or near the aircraft crosswind
elevation of 4,000 feet).
limit, but a crabbed approach is recommended vice the
wingdown, top−rudder technique. Ensure that the fuselage is If speedbrakes are not available, thrust requirements on
aligned with the runway prior to touchdown. glideslope are decreased and judicious throttle management
is more critical.
Although pitch control is adequate, maintaining trim
airspeed is increasingly difficult with increasing sweep angle
because of low stick force cues for airspeed deviations. This
necessitates close monitoring of airspeed by the aircrew since
the approach indexers are unusable above 16 units AOA. As
wing sweep progresses further aft, stall becomes less clearly
defined. There is no strong aircraft buffet when AOA is If maneuver flaps are used, the pilot must ensure
increased beyond 17 units. Aircraft waveoff performance is that the maneuver flap thumbwheel is not actu
ated during the approach.
adequate at both 15 and 17 units AOA. During single−engine
operation, up to maximum power may be required to arrest
11−29 ORIGINAL
11.8.10 DFCS Degraded Control Modes A normal landing approach can be flown with any
single segregation failure. Combined failure of any two
The DFCS is capable of operation in numerous
segregations results in combined loss of all associated
degraded mode control configurations. Description of all
functions, actuators, and in most cases, additional failures.
possible degraded modes is not practical; however, several of
Failure of both pitch or both roll segregations results in loss
these modes are listed below with a description of resulting of all spoilers and severely degraded roll performance.
functionality and effect on approach flying qualities.
Failure of both roll or both yaw segregations results in loss
of PA−ARI and downgrade to basic SAS" mode in the
11.8.10.1 DFCS Computer Failures remaining axes. This will be manifested by significantly
Each of the three DFCCs contains two distinct decreased roll performance and significantly decreased
computer processors called computing segregations, one directional damping. A straight−in approach with as little
A" segregation and one B" segregation in each axis. Each crosswind as possible is recommended. Lateral stick inputs
segregation commands different series servo and/or spoiler may require coordinating rudder to obtain adequate roll
sets. If a computing segregation fails, all actuators command response and to minimize dutch roll disturbances.
ed by that segregation are rendered inoperative. Functional
ity loss due to failure of each of the segregations and effect 11.8.10.2 DFCS Air Data Failures
on takeoff and landing flight characteristics are as follows: Failure of the Mach number or AOA inputs to the
DFCS results in degraded mode operation for several
Pitch A − Half authority PITCH SAS, no inboard PA−ARI control functions. These control modes still provide
spoilers, no DLC. Slightly decreased pitch damp excellent flying qualities such that a normal approach can be
ing, decreased roll performance. flown, but are somewhat degraded from the fully operational
PA−ARI performance.
Pitch B − Half authority PITCH SAS, no outboard
spoilers, no DLC. Slightly decreased pitch damp A DFCS Mach failure will always occur due to failure
ing, decreased roll performance. of the SCADC, but may also occur independently from a
SCADC failure. Mach failure results in a nearly transparent
Roll A − Half authority ROLL PA−ARI/SAS, no inboard degrade in directional damping, which may become notice
spoilers, no DLC. Decreased roll performance. able at conditions slower than on−speed. A single AOA
failure results in no degradation in flying qualities, only a loss
Roll B − Half authority ROLL PA−ARI/SAS. Slightly of redundancy, since the input is triplex. Dual AOA failure
decreased roll performance. results in decreased directional damping, decreased roll
performance, and decreased spiral mode damping.
Note
Note
Autopilot control modes, including ACLS, are
not available with any pitch or roll segregation Significant PA−ARI functionality is retained with
failed. dual Mach or dual AOA failures as compared to
UA−ARI. For this reason, ROLL DGR and ARI/
Yaw A − Half authority YAW PA−ARI/SAS. Decreased
SAS OUT caution lights will be automatically
directional damping. This may only be apparent
extinguished upon selection of the landing gear
during moderate to aggressive maneuvering, since
handle from the up to the down position.
the gain in the yaw channel B is doubled to com
pensate for the loss of the yaw A series servo. Full
11.8.10.3 Series Servo Failures
YAW SAS performance is thus retained up to the
authority limit of the remaining yaw series servo Reduced authority and rate damping performance will
(+9.5_ rudder). be experienced in the affected axis. Failure of both roll or
both yaw series servos results in loss of PA−ARI and
Yaw B − Half authority YAW PA−ARI/SAS, no outboard downgrades the DFCS to the basic SAS" control mode in the
spoilers, no DLC. Decreased directional damping, remaining axes. Decreased roll performance and decreased
but only for aggressive maneuvers as previously de directional damping will be exhibited. A normal approach
scribed for the yaw A segregation. Decreased roll can be flown with any single failure, a dual pitch, or a dual
performance. roll series servo failure. In case of dual failure of the yaw
series servos, recommend a straight−in approach using
smooth lateral inputs with coordinating rudder to minimize
dutch roll disturbances.
ORIGINAL 11−30
11.8.10.4 Spoiler Failures Rudder Pedal Position − No pedal fadeout for lateral stick
to rudder interconnect or roll rate command func
As described under DFCC computer failures, failure of
tions in the PA−ARI control mode. These pedal fade
four of the six segregations will result in loss of a spoiler set
out features are incorporated to improve the pilot’s
(inboard or outboard) and associated decreased roll perfor
ability to command a steady sideslip condition dur
mance. DLC is not functional with any inboard spoiler
ing a slipped (i.e., wing−down−top−rudder) cross
failure, but is available with any or all outboard spoilers
wind approach. With a pedal position failure, pre
failed. Failure of any single spoiler panel will result in
cisely controlling bank angle during a slipped
mirror−image" spoiler operation of the remaining spoilers,
approach is more difficult than with the baseline
as long as the failed spoiler responds to the automatic
system. A crabbed technique is recommended.
isolation command (returns to stowed position). For exam
ple, failure and successful isolation of the Left #4 spoiler Landing Gear Handle Position − No PA−ARI, downmode
panel also results in automatic isolation of the Right #4 to UA−ARI control mode for all flight configura
spoiler panel. Symmetric, but slightly degraded roll perfor tions. During normal operation, mode switching be
mance will be evident. A normal approach can be flown in tween the PA−ARI and UA−ARI control modes is
this case. If a spoiler failure results in a stuck−up spoiler, controlled by sensing of the landing gear handle
normal control of the mirror−image" panel will be automati
position. If a dual failure of this triplex input fails,
cally restored to provide maximum roll control power to
the DFCS can no longer accurately determine the
counter the rolling moment induced by the stuck−up spoiler.
actual gear handle position. The fail−safe condition
Refer to Spoiler Malfunction emergency procedures for
in this case is to revert to the UA−ARI (i.e., gear up)
landing in this configuration.
control mode. This results in decreased roll perfor
mance and decreased directional damping. A nor
11.8.10.5 Sensor Failures
mal approach can be flown.
Single failure of any DFCS sensor input does not result
in a flying qualities downgrade, only a loss of redundancy, Note
since all sensor inputs are triplex. Dual failure of a sensor
input causes loss of the functions associated with that sensor. If a dual failure of the landing gear handle posi
A list of these sensor inputs and associated dual failure tion input to the DFCS occurs, the ARI/SAS
functionality loss are as follows: OUT caution light will illuminate when flaps are
lowered past the 25° position. This indicates loss
Pitch Rate − No PITCH SAS. Decreased pitch damping. of normal PA−ARI function.
A normal approach can be flown.
11.9 ASYMMETRIC WING SWEEP
Roll Rate − No ROLL SAS, no PA−ARI. Decreased roll
11.9.1 Wing−Sweep Design Limitations
performance and decreased directional damping.
A normal approach can be flown. An understanding of the wing−sweep design limita
tions is necessary to cope successfully with an in−flight
Yaw Rate − No YAW SAS, no PA−ARI. Decreased roll asymmetric wing condition to avoid the possibility of
performance and significantly decreased direction structural damage and to minimize the possibility of loss of
al damping. Recommend straight−in approach using aircraft control. The following discussion is therefore
smooth lateral inputs with coordinating rudder to offered.
minimize dutch roll disturbances.
The wing−sweep feedback position and interlock
Lateral Acceleration − No YAW SAS, no PA−ARI. De functions for the auxiliary flaps, main flaps/slats, and spoiler
creased roll performance and significantly de cutout are controlled by the left wing−sweep actuator.
creased directional damping. Recommend straight− Cockpit wing−sweep position indication is controlled by the
in approach using smooth lateral inputs with right wing−sweep actuator.
coordinating rudder to minimize dutch roll distur The existence of wing−sweep position feedback on the
bances. left wing only can have a definite impact during a jammed
wing−sweep actuator/failed synchronizing shaft condition. A
Lateral Stick Position − No ROLL SAS, no PA−ARI, no jammed right wing−sweep actuator will result in normal left
spoilers. Severely degraded roll performance and wing operation because wing−sweep commands are nulled
decreased directional damping. Recommend out by the left wing−sweep actuator position. A jammed left
straight−in approach with as little crosswind as pos wing−sweep actuator in an intermediate position, in conjunc
sible. Lateral stick inputs may require coordinating tion with a wing−sweep command, will result in a constant
rudder to obtain adequate roll response.
11−31 ORIGINAL
command to the right wing−sweep actuator that cannot be Note

nulled, since the right wing has no position feedback. In this
case, the right wing will travel to the overtravel stop (19_ or Extending the main flaps with the auxiliary flaps
69_) in the direction of the last command. The right wing can inhibited will result in a large nosedown trim
be positioned in either the 19_ or 69_ position only, but not change.
in any intermediate position since there is no way to null out The wing−sweep control drive servo is powered
the command. A condition similar to a jammed wing−sweep through WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP
actuator occurs when one hydraulic system has failed in DR NO. 2/MANUV FLAP (LE1) circuit breakers. Pulling
conjunction with a synchronizing shaft failure. these circuit breakers inhibits all electrical command paths
A temporary actuator jam on one side while the wings to the wing−sweep control valve. Manual commands to the
are sweeping, in conjunction with a broken synchronizing valve are available through the emergency WING SWEEP
shaft, will result in resumption of operation with asymmetri handle. Pulling the WG SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV FLAP
cal wing positions. Symmetrical wing position, within 1_, (LE1) circuit breaker removes power from the maneuver
can be achieved again by commanding the wings full forward devices and inhibits automatic retraction of the maneuver
or full aft (20_ or 68_). The direction to command the wing devices with landing gear handle extension. The maneuver
is dependent on whether the right wing is forward or aft of the devices should be commanded up prior to pulling the WG
left position. The right wing position is displayed by the wing SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV FLAP circuit breaker. It may also
position tape on the cockpit wing−sweep indicator. If for be necessary to utilize emergency up on the flap handle to
example, the right wing is forward of the left wing, the wings achieve full flap and slat retraction.
should be commanded full forward to 20_. The right wing 11.9.2 Asymmetric Wing−Sweep Flight
will drive to the 19_ overtravel stop and remain there until the Characteristics
left wing reaches 20_, nulls the command, and hydraulic
power is shut off. If the right wing is aft of the left wing, the Asymmetric wing−sweep failures will be manifested as
wings could be commanded full aft to 68_. The right wing a wing heaviness accompanied by a WING SWEEP advisory
will drive to the 69_ overtravel stop and remain there until the light, indicating a failure of the primary wing−sweep channel.
left wing reaches 68_, nulls the command, and hydraulic A subsequent failure of the backup wing−sweep channel will
power is shut off. illuminate the WING SWEEP warning light.
Normal symmetrical wing−sweep operation, within 1_, Flight tests have shown that the aircraft may be safely
should follow. Some jeopardy exists during aft command landed with asymmetric wing sweep as long as spoiler
operation since spoiler control will be lost when the left wing control is retained following the wing−sweep failure.
obtains 62_. The aircraft is not controllable for landing with a wing
asymmetry such as the left wing aft of the spoiler cutout angle
Note (62_) and the right wing forward at 20_. The maximum
A mechanical jam in the wing−sweep system may asymmetry demonstrated for landing was 20_/60_, although
prevent the wings from being resynchronized. tests of 20_/68_ at altitude indicate that this configuration is
This may be because of the failed synchronizing landable if spoilers are operational (that is, the left wing is at
shaft jamming an actuator. 20_ and the right wing is at 68_). The high approach speeds
coupled with reduced lateral control authority obtained with
The auxiliary flaps/main flap interlocks are controlled asymmetric sweep become limiting factors for aircraft
by the left wing−sweep actuator. This means that during carrier (CV) operations. If at all possible, the flightcrew
asymmetric wing conditions, it is possible to satisfy the should attempt to divert for a field landing. In−flight refueling
interlock requirements with the left wing and damage aircraft was not evaluated during flight tests. Cruise configuration
structure with the off−schedule right wing. For example, if the flying qualities in the normal refueling airspeed range
left wing is at 20_ and the right wing is at 35_, the 21_ (approximately 250 knots) were qualitatively assessed to be
interlock in the auxiliary flap system is satisfied by the left suitable for the task. The effects of asymmetric sweep are
wing. Lowering the flaps without inhibiting auxiliary flaps diminished as airspeed increases (decreasing angle of
will drive the auxiliary flaps through the fuselage in the attack), so that using a higher than normal tanking speed may
vicinity of the flight hydraulic system. Pulling the AUX decrease pilot workload. Lateral and directional trim should
FLAP/FLAP CONTR circuit breaker (8G3) will remove be utilized to decrease lateral stick force during refueling and
electrical power to the auxiliary flaps and prevent auxiliary cruise flight.
flap deployment.
ORIGINAL 11−32
Note the existence of significant pitch−roll coupling. This is

especially critical with flaps up. In general, the aircraft tends
The use of lateral trim to reduce stick force dur to increase angle of attack when rolling toward the forward
ing approach and landing should be avoided, wing and decrease angle of attack when rolling toward the aft
however, because it reduces the amount of spoil wing. In order to provide adequate maneuvering margin
er available for roll control. below the stall buffet region, recommended approach AOA
Asymmetric wing sweep is primarily a lateral control is 14 units for all flap−up, asymmetric wing configurations
problem, increasing in severity as angle of attack increases up to 40_ differential split (Figure 11−10). A landing with
and as flap deflection increases. The aircraft will roll toward the maximum possible asymmetry of 20_/68_ will require
the aft wing and yaw toward the forward wing. For example, 13 to 14 units AOA to provide adequate control for approach
right wing forward of left wing causes left−wing−down roll and landing as long as spoilers are available (left wing at
and nose−right yaw. The resultant sideslip angle is favorable 20_, right wing at 68_). Recommended approach AOA is
from a controllability standpoint and should be removed with 15 units for all flap−down, asymmetric wing configurations
rudder only if it is uncomfortable to the pilot. Rudder trim (Figure 11−10).
into the forward wing may be utilized, if desired, to increase If the left wing is positioned aft of the spoiler cutout
sideslip angle and generate a restoring rolling moment via sweep angle (62_) the spoilers are inoperative and lateral
dihedral effect (right rudder trim for right wing forward of control is limited to differential tail only. Flight tests indicate
left, and vice versa). Lateral stick force will be accordingly that the maximum controllable asymmetry at 14 units AOA
reduced. in this configuration is a 15_ differential split. The preferable
Main flaps should be utilized to decrease approach action in this case is to attempt to move the left wing forward
airspeed for asymmetric sweep landings if both wings are of the spoiler cutout angle to regain spoiler control. If this is
forward of 50_ sweep. During flight tests, a flap setting of not possible, an attempt should be made to command the
20_ to 25_ was found to provide the best flying qualities in right wing as far aft as possible in order to minimize the wing
comparison to the other flap settings tested (0_, 10_, 35_). asymmetry, and then perform a slow flight check at altitude
Safe landings may be performed, however, with all the flap to determine the minimum control speed. The pilot must then
configurations evaluated. In the flaps−up configuration, determine if the configuration provides a reasonable ap
undesirable prestall buffet is experienced at 16 to 16.5 units proach airspeed.
AOA for all wing asymmetries. Sideslip−induced pitot static system errors may be
Stall−induced buffet is not experienced in flaps−down experienced with all asymmetric wing−sweep configura
configurations because the leading edge slat delays wing tions. Accurate airspeed/AOA indications may be obtained
stall. Airframe buffet may occur, however, because of the by bringing the aircraft to a zero−sideslip condition. A
turbulent airflow that passes through the auxiliary flap hole wingman may provide an airspeed check prior to landing.
that impinges on the horizontal tails. This buffet increases
with increasing flap deflection and is significantly worse 11.10 DUAL HYDRAULIC FAILURES BACKUP
with 35_ flaps as compared to 10_ or 20_. In addition to FLIGHT CONTROL MODULE FLIGHT
increased buffet levels, the 35_ flap configuration is prone to CHARACTERISTICS
lateral PIO during high−gain tasks such as close−in lineup
11.10.1 General
corrections. This is primarily because of the increased spoiler
effectiveness obtained with power approach spoiler gearing. Several factors work in concert to affect the handling
The PIO tendency is eliminated by selecting flaps 25_ or less, qualities of the F−14 when operating with a dual−hydraulic
which causes a switch to cruise spoiler gearing. Raising the failure. The first is the total loss of the SAS in all three axes.
flaps only causes the spoilers to move from the drooped" Since the bare airframe is lightly damped in both pitch and
position to the zero position, retaining power approach yaw, gusts and small control inputs result in uncommanded
spoiler gearing. This configuration is not flight tested in responses or oscillations. The pilot’s general impression is
DFCS. that the aircraft is sloppier in all axes and precise control is
more difficult. The pilot does have some control over these
All asymmetric wing configurations require precise
characteristics as they are very dependent on configuration
monitoring of AOA during lateral maneuvering because of
and airspeed.
11−33 ORIGINAL
Figure 1110.Asymmetric Wing−Sweep Landing Approach
ORIGINAL 11−34
The second factor is the capabilities of the remaining available, but may be aggravated by large lateral or
flight control system. The inboard spoilers, speed−brakes, directional flight control inputs that further reduce the flow
and auxiliary flaps are inoperative, and the in−board spoilers available to command the stabilizer and, therefore, increase
and speedbrakes can be expected to float. The degree of the susceptibility to rate limiting in pitch. LOW mode is
spoiler float will be a function of airspeed, AOA, sideslip, extremely limited in its ability to accommodate rapid control
flap setting, and the mechanical condition of individual inputs, while the HIGH mode can accommodate moderate
spoiler actuators. During flight test, changes in float are very pilot control inputs.
slow and do not generate any abrupt rolling moments but do
The abrupt degradation that occurs with rate limiting
impose significant lateral trim changes. Outboard spoilers
makes the handling qualities hazardous. The handling
remain fully functional because of the independent nature of
qualities of the aircraft while operating with the BFCM in
the outboard spoiler module, which also serves to power the
HIGH are generally good for moderate gain tasks, and it is
main flaps and slats via the flap handle or the maneuver flap
virtually transparent to the pilot that the flight control system
thumbwheel. Lastly, only the rudders and horizontal stabiliz
is degraded. However, when operating near the rate limit of
ers are powered by the BFCM. Because of the low output of
the system, very small increases in pilot gain will result in an
the BFCM, the stabilizers are dramatically reduced in their
abrupt and dramatic loss of control and the task being
ability to respond to pilot commands. The stabilizers are rate
performed must be aborted (i.e., the aircraft cannot be
limited to 10_ per second in HIGH and 5_ per second in LOW
controlled adequately to continue the task). Uncontrollable
as opposed to a normal rate of 36_ per second. This can be
pitch attitude oscillations of +10_ can develop in less than
a severe limitation to the pilot’s ability to control the aircraft,
3 seconds. Regaining control is simply a matter of loosely
depending on the abruptness of the pilot commands.
releasing the stick, permitting the oscillations to dampen, and
Each of these factors influences the handling qualities then smoothly reapplying control to restore the aircraft to the
in different regions of the flight envelope. Handling qualities desired flight condition. In summary, if the system is not rate
at speeds in excess of 200 KCAS are primarily constrained limited, the handling qualities are good; if the system is rate
by the absence of PITCH SAS and the limitations of the limited, the aircraft rapidly becomes uncontrollable.
BFCM. At approach speeds, the handling qualities are
primarily affected by floating spoilers and the loss of YAW 11.10.1.2 Task Performance
SAS, although rate limiting of the stabilizer can occur.
There are four variables that the aircrew can control to
11.10.1.1 Rate Limiting maximize the probability of successfully completing mission
tasks. Selection of an appropriate motor speed is the first
The pilot will observe rate limiting both in the feel of controllable variable. Tightly controlled tasks such as
the control stick and in the response of the aircraft. In the F−14 landing, close formation, and in−flight refueling require the
flight control system, the stick is mechanically connected to control rates available with HIGH mode. Judicious selection
the stabilizer. With normal hydraulics, there is virtually no of airspeed can also influence successful task performance.
time delay between the pilot’s command and the stabilizer With SAS OFF, the sensitivity of the aircraft increases
moving in response to the command. With the BFCM significantly with airspeed. The slower the airspeed, the
providing significantly less hydraulic flow, at a substantially slower the response. For tightly controlled tasks, the flight
reduced pressure, the stabilizer moves so slowly that it is control system must be capable of responding faster than the
possible for rapid pilot inputs to exceed the stabilizer natural dynamic character of the aircraft, or the pilot must
maximum deflection rate. When this happens, the pilot will accept undesirable overshoots and oscillations. The flight
feel an abrupt increase in stick force until the stabilizer control system capabilities with the BFCM in either LOW or
catches up to the pilot’s command. If the pilot feels an abrupt HIGH are very restricted. Part of the solution is to slow down
increase in stick forces, the stabilizer is operating on its rate the aircraft and its response as much as is practicable to give
limit. This can be observed during the prestart BFCM checks the flight control system the best chance of keeping ahead of
and is most severe in LOW. the aircraft. The third variable is configuration, some of
which is more suited to specific tasks. Lastly, pilot technique
The pilot’s perception of the aircraft response is
may limit the ability of the aircraft to perform some tasks.
likewise affected by rate limiting because of slower response
The slower and smoother the input, the less likely rate
of the stabilizer to deflection commands. If slow control
limiting will be encountered. Flight tests performing each of
inputs are made, the delay is insignificant, aircraft response
the following tasks have revealed the mixture of the above
appears normal, and control is unaffected. If control inputs
variables whereby successful recovery of the aircraft can best
are abrupt, however, with many reversals in direction (such
be ensured.
as might be required to tank, land, or fly close formation), the
pilot and the stabilizers can be out of phase with one another,
and a divergent PIO will develop that results in loss of
control. This occurs in pitch caused by larger deflections
11−35 ORIGINAL
11.10.2 Low Mode Cruise and Formation technique. The best success can be expected at 180 KCAS
with maneuvering flaps and a smooth technique. There are
Cruise handling qualities in LOW mode are degraded
two reasons for the strong influence of airspeed. First of all,
but satisfactory. Roll response is very sluggish and some
tanking is easier to perform at slower speeds because the
over−shoots can be expected when trying to establish a bank
aircraft is much less sensitive, the bow wave is considerably
angle. In pitch, any abrupt pitch input at 250 KCAS or faster reduced, and the probe position can be more predictably and
will result in multiple oscillations when trying to precisely set
smoothly controlled, reducing the necessity for aggressive
a pitch attitude. Flying very loose formation is fairly easy,
plays to seat the probe. Secondly, the BFCM has an easier job
provided tight control is not attempted. Any attempt to finely
keeping up with aircraft dynamics, decreasing the likelihood
control vertical elevation relative to a lead aircraft (≤ 2 feet) of rate limiting. Any attempt to tank faster than 200 KCAS
will result in rate limiting the stabilizers and loss of control.
will result in loss of control. Tanking handling qualities are
Control can be reestablished by relaxing the grip on the stick,
unaffected by landing gear position and are improved with aft
allowing the oscillations to dampen, and then smoothly wing sweeps in the event that the wings are trapped aft. Flaps
reapplying control. Slower airspeeds (200 KCAS) provide
should be selected to 10_ with the maneuver flap thumb
for more predictable control as discussed in paragraph
wheel, which still functions normally with outboard spoiler
11.10.1. Do not attempt IMC formation, close night forma
module power. Lastly, the influence of technique is that the
tion, in−flight refueling, or landing while in LOW mode. rate limiting is caused by abrupt control inputs and counter
LOW mode control is satisfactory for the performance of
corrections. The 2 seconds surrounding contact are the
configuration changes such as lowering gear and flaps.
critical phase since the controls can be three times more
active than during the approach or stabilized refueling.
While spotting the basket is common throughout the
F−14 community, it is the surest way to place excessive
demands on the flight control system during the second or
A pitch PIO will develop if any tight longitudinal two prior to contact and provoke a loss of control. The best
control is attempted. Control can easily be re way to avoid abrupt inputs is for the pilot to resist spotting the
gained by relaxing the grip on the stick, allowing basket and instead rely on the RlO’s directive commentary.
any oscillations to dampen, and then smoothly Since the stabilized refueling is easy and requires only
reapplying longitudinal stick to reestablish the moderate flight control activity, the airspeed can safely be
desired flight condition. Do not attempt IMC increased to 200 KCAS once engaged if additional airspeed
formation or close night formation while in LOW is required to obtain proper store operation (as might be
mode. required with ram−powered buddy stores such as the D−704
Note or D−301). While not flight tested, a very low gain technique
must be used at the minimum airspeed attainable by the
Airspeeds less than 250 KCAS while operating in tanker if the only resource is a large body tanker such as the
LOW mode will reduce the susceptibility to rate KC−10, for which 180 KCAS might be impossible. The pilot
limiting. must respond to any undesired motion by loosely releasing
11.10.3 High Mode Cruise and Formation the stick and allowing the aircraft to dampen itself
Up and away flying qualities in HIGH mode are
generally excellent, with the only noticeable degradation
being a slight sluggishness in roll response. Cruise and
formation tasks are very easy, provided that very tight D Any abrupt control input to effect engagement
tolerances are not attempted (< ±1 foot). Higher speeds (>
can rate limit the stabilizers and result in
250 KCAS) will increase the probability of rate limiting
loss of control. To avoid rate limiting, the
during parade formation. Close IMC or night formation is
pilot should resist spotting the basket and
possible but not advisable because the divergent PIO occurs
instead rely on RIO commentary to perform
very abruptly with no warning. The F−14 with the hydraulic
engagement.
failure should lead any formation flight except as required for
in−flight refueling. D If any undesirable motions or oscillations oc
curs during or after engagement, the pilot
11.10.4 In−Flight Refueling must immediately release the stick and permit
In−flight refueling can be safely performed but is very the motions to dampen before resuming active
dependent on flight condition, configuration, and pilot control.
ORIGINAL 11−36
ommended range. Smoothly rotate nose to

flyaway attitude on bolter.
D Carrier landings with a dual−hydraulic failure
Do not attempt in−flight refueling from wing− are very hazardous and should not be attempted
mounted stores of large−body tankers (VC−10 because of the abrupt and unpredictable nature
Canberra) where nose−to−tail overlap is present. of rate limiting. Control would most probably
The basket does trail adequately aft of the tail for be lost between the in−close and at−the−ramp
KC−130 and airwing assets. positions when the pilot or LSOs could not
avert a catastrophic flight deck mishap.
Note
If the air refueling store does not adequately
transfer fuel at 180 KCAS once engaged, the air
speed can safely be increased to 200 KCAS to
improve the transfer rate. Waveoff performance from low power settings is
very poor. Carrying extra speed during approach
11.10.5 Landing will improve waveoff performance by permitting
Landing handling qualities are primarily affected by the smooth rotation to 15 units AOA to break the rate
loss of SAS, inboard spoilers, speedbrakes, auxiliary flaps, of descent while engines are spooling up.
and DLC, rather than limitations of the BFCM itself. 11.10.6 BFCM Thermal Durability
Longitudinal control is generally good provided no large
The thermal behavior of the BFCM and its isolated
abrupt pitch changes are attempted. Lateral control is
hydraulic loop determine the durability of the system. With
degraded by virtue of the inoperative SAS and inboard
the motor operating in LOW, the temperature of the motor
spoilers. Spoiler float and its impact on lateral control is
and the fluid will stabilize and the motor can run indefinitely.
considerably aggravated by slower airspeeds and increased
In HIGH, however, the motor can heat up within 8 minutes
flap deflections. Consequently, field landings should be
to temperatures at which it might fail. The motor should be
performed with the maneuver flaps down, and the MANUV
selected to HIGH only after the aircraft is on final with intent
FLAP/WG SWP DR NO. 2 circuit breaker pulled to lock them
to land, unless tanking is required. The motor should be
down (LE1). Airspeed control is degraded because of the
selected to LOW once safely airborne following waveoff,
dramatically decreased drag and low approach power setting.
missed approach, or bolter and then HIGH reselected on
Any airspeed from 15 units AOA to 180 KCAS should be
final. The elapsed time on HIGH must be closely monitored
considered acceptable with the wings at 20_; waveoff
if in−flight refueling is required. Once disengaged, LOW
performance is dramatically improved if some additional
must be immediately selected.
speed is carried. Fifteen units should be used if the wings are
trapped significantly aft. Speeds in excess of 180 KCAS on
final should otherwise be avoided because of the increased
susceptibility to rate limiting. Lateral control is degraded but
satisfactory, and a straight−in approach to an arrested landing D Operations of more than 8 minutes total in
should be performed. The very low drag, runway length, long HIGH may fail the BFCM motor. Extended
field gear, and length of time while operating on the BFCM LOW operation (> 30 minutes) after in−flight
must all be considered in choosing a game plan for handling refueling will permit several additional min
bolters. The nose must smoothly be rotated to the flyaway utes of use for subsequent landing.
attitude if a go−around is elected. Flaps can be selected to full
D Do not return to the AUTO (LOW) mode once
once on deck to obtain the additional drag from the outboard
module is selected on (HIGH or LOW) with
flap panels and ground roll braking from the outboard spoilers.
operating flight hydraulic system. When oper
ated in conjunction with zero combined pres
sure, some backup module fluid will be
expelled by thermal expansion. The module
will remain fully serviced and operate nor
D Aggressive nose movement in close or on mally as long as elevated temperatures are
bolter can rate limit the stabilizer resulting in maintained. Once operating, the module
low altitude loss of control. Do not use APCS. should not be turned off in flight without com
Glideslope is satisfactorily controlled with bined system pressure available to reservice it.
appropriate use of power and smooth pitch in Doing so would result in fluid contraction and
puts, allowing airspeed to vary within the rec an underserviced condition that could prevent
subsequent pump operation.
11−37 ORIGINAL
11.11 FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS WITH wing sweep, 250 KCAS, and a zero fuel gross weight cg of
AFT CG LOCATIONS 18.6 percent, the aircraft exhibits some reduction in static
stability and is slightly more responsive to pitch inputs,
11.11.1 Store Effects on Cg Location although this increase in responsiveness may not be signifi
cant enough to be noticed during normal flight operations.
The normal NATOPS cg limits are expressed relative Wing−mounted stores or external tanks have no adverse
to a reference condition known as zero fuel gross weight. effects on aft cg flying qualities.
This configuration is defined as wings at 20_, gear and flaps
down, zero fuel on board. Adding fuel or raising the gear 11.11.4 Takeoff and Landing Configuration Flight
and/or flaps will move the cg position forward from the zero Characteristics with Aft Cg
fuel gross weight position. The limit for zero fuel gross
With the gear and flaps lowered and 20_ of wing sweep
weight cg locations with tunnel−mounted stores is 17.0−per
with a zero fuel gross weight cg location of 18−percent MAC
cent MAC. On a typical fleet aircraft, one Mk 84
or greater, the static margin is greatly reduced from normal
2,000−pound bomb placed on station 4 or 5 results in a zero and can be negative for the extremely aft cg locations
fuel gross weight cg aft of 17.0−percent MAC, possibly as far
produced by 4,000 pounds of bombs on the aft weapon
aft as 18.5 to 19−percent MAC. Two aft hung Mk 84s can
stations. The aircraft is extremely susceptible to pilot−in
produce a zero fuel gross weight cg of up to 22−percent MAC.
duced oscillations during closely controlled tasks such as
Aft wing sweep can be used to move the neutral point of the close formation or flying the ball. Loss of control is likely.
F−14 aft and restore normal static longitudinal stability
With a wing sweep of 26_ for zero fuel gross weight cg
margin and normal flying qualities even with extremely aft
locations up to 18.6−percent MAC, normal static margin is
cg locations. In−flight actual cg location varies as fuel is
restored and normal flying qualities are regained. For zero
burned but remains relatively constant at its most forward fuel gross weight cg location greater than 18.6−percent MAC,
position between 5,000 to 10,000 pounds. Below 5,000
30_ of wing sweep is sufficient for normal handling qualities
pounds, the cg moves aft toward the zero fuel gross weight
to be regained.
position. Wing−mounted AIM−7/9s move the zero fuel gross
weight cg location slightly forward, while external tanks Wing−mounted stores and external tanks reduce later
have no effect on the cg location. al−directional stability in the takeoff and landing configura
tion slightly, although the difference in flying qualities is not
11.11.2 Wing−Sweep Effects on Stability
significant and may not be noticeable. Once established in
Static stability of an aircraft is determined by the the optimum wing−sweep configuration appropriate for the
difference in location of the neutral point, where the lift amount of ordnance hung on the aft stations, normal
component can be assumed to act, and the cg position. A approach techniques can be used. However, a straight−in
positive static margin exists as long as the neutral point approach should be flown as power requirements in a turn
remains aft of the cg location. As the wings of the F−14 sweep with aft wing−sweep are significantly different than normal
aft, the cg location also moves slightly aft but the greatest and could produce a severely underpowered approach. No
change is in the neutral point position that moves further aft abnormalities in aircraft response or performance are
as well. Aft wing sweep can be used in conjunction with an apparent during landing approaches at 15 units, even with
aft cg position to restore the normal margin between the 4,000 pounds of aft hung ordinance. APC is not optimized for
neutral point and the cg, producing the same level of stability aft wing−sweep landings and should not be used. DLC should
and normal flying qualities. not be used as it adds 8 knots to recovery WOD requirements
and has improper pitch trim response at aft wing−sweep.
11.11.3 Cruise and Combat Flight Characteristics Expect on−speed airspeed for 25_ of wing−sweep to increase
With Aft Cg 6 knots over the normal DLC on 20_ of wing−sweep approach
Flying qualities at aft cg locations up to 22−percent speed, and 12 knots increase if wings are at 30_. For CV
MAC with gear and flaps up are only slightly degraded. This arrestments, the appropriate recovery bulletin should be
degradation will probably not be apparent to the pilot. No consulted.
change in flying qualities is noted during dive recoveries Ashore, a field arrestment is recommended with
between 400 and 500 KCAS. Stick force per g remains spoiler brakes dearmed because of the large noseup pitch
relatively nominal even with 4,000 pounds of aft hung occurring at spoiler deployment. If a field arrestment is not
bombs. No degradation to any aspect of flying qualities is possible, expect to use full forward stick to counter the
noted above 300 KCAS as the wings remain sufficiently aft noseup pitching moment and to maintain forward stick until
on the normal wing−sweep schedule to produce a positive below 80 KCAS with a resultant longer rollout.
static margin for even the most aft cg locations. At 20_ of
ORIGINAL 11−38
ąNAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1
PART V
Emergency Procedures
READ
AND
HEED
INTRODUCTION b. Land as soon as practicable − Extended flight is
not recommended. The landing site and duration
Part V consists of Chapter 12, Ground Emergencies; of flight is at the discretion of the pilot in com
Chapter 13, Takeoff Emergencies; Chapter 14, In−Flight mand.
Emergencies; Chapter 15, Landing Emergencies; and Chap
ter 16, Ejection. These chapters cover the recommended pro Note
cedures for coping with emergencies and malfunctions that
may be encountered during aircraft operations. Knowledge D The ground, takeoff, in−flight, and landing
of the aircraft systems and emergency procedures must be emergency procedures are sequenced as out
reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the flightcrew will lined in the Emergency Procedures Table of
take the correct course of action under adverse conditions. Contents.
Each emergency presents a different problem that D Decision factors (if" statements) are provided
as a guide in selecting certain procedures.
requires positive, specific, remedial action in accordance
with recommended procedures and good airmanship. Judg
Critical Procedures (Boldface Procedures)
ment, precision, and teamwork are essential during emergen
cies. The flightcrew must weigh all the factors of a given
Procedures marked with asterisks (*) are considered
situation and then take appropriate action. This section dis
critical and are referred to as boldface" procedures. The
cusses the preplanned, likely courses of action and recom
boldface procedures in this part are provided as a study refer
mended procedures for certain emergencies. As soon as pos
ence and are not intended to be used as an alternate to the
sible, the pilot should notify the RIO, flight leader, flight, and
amplified procedures contained in Chapters 12, 13, 14, 15,
ground station in as much detail as possible of the existing
and 16 or the abbreviated procedures contained in NAVAIR
emergency and of the intended action. When an emergency
01−F14AAD−1B. Flight crewmembers should be able to
occurs, three basic rules are established that apply to airborne
accomplish boldface procedures without reference to the
emergencies. They should be thoroughly understood by all
NFM or PCL.
flightcrew.
1. Maintain aircraft control. Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays
2. Analyze the situation and take proper action. The warning, caution, advisory lights/displays are
3. Land as the situation dictates. listed together with the cause and corrective action.
a. Land as soon as possible − Land at the first site at
which a safe landing can be made.
63 ORIGINAL
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
No.
12.1 ON−DECK EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1

12.1.1 Engine Fire on the Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.2 Abnormal Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.3 START VALVE Light After Engine Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.4 Uncommanded Engine Acceleration on Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
12.1.5 Ground Egress Without Parachute and Survival Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
12.1.6 Emergency Entrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
12.1.7 Weight−On−Off Wheels Switch Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
12.1.8 Binding/Jammed Flight Controls On Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−4
12.1.9 Brake Failure at Taxi Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−4
CHAPTER 13  TAKEOFF EMERGENCIES
13.1 ABORTED TAKEOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−1

13.1.1 Aborted Takeoff Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−1
13.2 SINGLE−ENGINE FAILURE FIELD/CATAPULT LAUNCH/WAVEOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2

13.2.1 Angle−of−Attack/Endspeed Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.2 Rate of Climb Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.3 Stores Jettison Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.4 Aircrew Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2
13.2.5 Single−Engine Failure Field/Catapult Launch/Waveoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3
13.3 BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3

13.3.1 Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff Aborted or After Landing Touchdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3
13.3.2 Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff Continued or After Landing Go−Around . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3
CHAPTER 14  IN−FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
14.1 COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1

14.1.1 Flightcrew Attention Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
14.1.2 COMM−NAV Emergency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
14.2 PITOT−STATIC SYSTEM FAILURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
14.3 EMERGENCY JETTISON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−2
14.4 FIRE LIGHT AND/OR FIRE IN FLIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−4
14.5 ENGINE EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5

14.5.1 Compressor Stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5
14.5.2 Airstarts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−7
14.5.3 Single−Engine Flight Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−11
14.5.4 Engine Overspeed (N1 or N2 OSP Legend) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
14.5.5 Engine START VALVE Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
ORIGINAL 64
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Page
No.
14.5.6 Engine Transfer to SEC Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-12

14.5.7 Uncommanded SEC Mode Rpm Decay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-13
14.5.8 Uncommanded Engine Acceleration Airborne (No Throttle Movement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15
14.5.9 Exhaust Nozzle Failed (No Nozzle Response to Throttle Movement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15
14.5.10 Stuck/Jammed Throttle(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-15
14.5.11 AICS Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-16
14.5.12 INLET ICE Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-17
14.5.13 Oil System Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-17
14.5.14 RATS Operation In Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-17
14.6 FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-18

14.6.1 Fuel Pressure Caution Lights/Low Fuel Pressure Warning Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-18
14.6.2 L or R FUEL LOW Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-18
14.6.3 Fuel Transfer Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-18
14.6.4 Uncommanded Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-19
14.6.5 Fuel Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-19
14.6.6 Fuel Imbalance/Fuel Quantity Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-20
14.7 ELECTRICAL FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-20

14.7.1 Generator Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-20
14.7.2 Double Generator Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-20
14.7.3 Double Transformer-Rectifier Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-22
14.7.4 TRANS/RECT Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-22
14.7.5 Electrical Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-22
14.7.6 Total Electrical Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-24
14.8 ECS MALFUNCTIONS/FAILURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-25

14.8.1 ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke and Fumes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-25
14.8.2 COOLING AIR Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-27
14.8.3 TARPS ECS Lights Illuminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-27
14.8.4 SENSOR COND Light Illuminated and/or PUMP Phase Circuit Breakers Popped
or APG-71 PM Acronym . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-28
14.8.5 Cockpit Temperature Control Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-28
14.8.6 Cockpit Overpressurization on Deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-28
14.8.7 CABIN PRESS Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-28
14.8.8 WSHLD HOT Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-28
14.9 OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-29

14.9.1 OBOGS Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-29
14.9.2 B/U OXY LOW Light (Both Cockpits) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-29
14.9.3 B/U OXY LOW Light (Pilot Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-30
14.9.4 B/U OXY LOW Light (RIO Only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-30
14.10 LAD/CANOPY LIGHT AND/OR LOSS OF CANOPY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-30

14.10.1 LAD/CANOPY Light With RIO CANOPY Light/Canopy Loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-30
14.10.2 LAD/CANOPY Light Without RIO CANOPY Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-31
14.11 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-31

14.11.1 Combined Pressure Approximately 2,400 to 2,600 Psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-31
14.11.2 Flight Pressure Approximately 2,400 to 2,600 Psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-31
14.11.3 Combined Pressure Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-32
14.11.4 Flight Pressure Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-33
14.11.5 Both Combined and Flight Pressure Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-33
14.11.6 Backup Flight Module Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-35
14.11.7 Low Brake Accumulator Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-35
65 ORIGINAL
CHANGE 2
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Page
No.
14.12 FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURES OR MALFUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-35

14.12.1 Controllability Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-35
14.12.2 Uncommanded Roll and/or Yaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-37
14.12.3 DFCS Flight Control Failures or Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-38
14.12.4 Rudder Authority Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-40
14.12.5 Horizontal Tail Authority Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-42
14.12.6 Spoiler Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-42
14.12.7 FLAP Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-45
14.12.8 Flap and Slat Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-46
14.12.9 WING SWEEP Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-47
14.12.10 Unscheduled Wing Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-47
14.12.11 CADC Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-47
14.12.12 AUTOPILOT Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-48
14.12.13 Weight On-Off Wheels Switch Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-48
14.13 DEPARTURE/SPIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-49

14.13.1 Vertical Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-49
14.13.2 Upright Departure/Flat Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-49
14.13.3 Inverted Departure/Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-50
15.1 DUAL-ENGINE LANDING, ONE OR BOTH ENGINES

IN SECONDARY MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1
15.2 SINGLE-ENGINE LANDING PRIMARY MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-1
15.3 SINGLE-ENGINE LANDING SECONDARY MODE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-3

15.3.1 Single-Engine Landing  SEC Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-4
15.4 LANDING GEAR EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-6

15.4.1 Landing Gear Emergency Lowering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-6
15.4.2 Landing Gear Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-8
15.4.3 LAUNCH BAR Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-9
15.5 BLOWN-TIRE LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-10
15.6 FLAP AND SLAT LANDING EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-10

15.6.1 No-Flaps and No-Slats Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-10
15.6.2 Auxiliary Flap Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-10
15.7 WING-SWEEP EMERGENCIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-11

15.7.1 Aft Wing-Sweep Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-11
15.7.2 Asymmetric Wing Sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-11
15.8 AFT HUNG ORDNANCE LANDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-16

15.8.1 Landing with Aft Hung Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-17
15.9 FIELD ARRESTMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-17

15.9.1 Field Arresting Gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-17
15.9.2 Short-Field Arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-18
15.9.3 Long-Field Arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-18
15.9.4 Engaging Speeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-18
ORIGINAL 66
Page
No.
15.10 BARRICADE ARRESTMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
15.11 ARRESTING HOOK EMERGENCY DOWN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
15.12 FORCED LANDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
15.13 GROUND ROLL BRAKING FAILURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
16.1 EJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−1

16.1.1 Ejection Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−1
16.1.2 Ejection Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−5
16.1.3 Ejection Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6
16.2 MANUAL BAILOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6
16.3 SURVIVAL/POSTEJECTION PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6

16.3.1 Manual Man/Seat Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7
16.3.2 Survival Kit Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7
16.3.3 Parachute Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
16.3.4 Parachute Landing Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
16.3.5 Raft Boarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
67 ORIGINAL
BOLDFACE PROCEDURES
ENGINE FIRE ON THE DECK BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF; TAKEOFF

*1. Both FUEL SHUT OFF handles . . . . . . Pull CONTINUED OR AFTER LANDING GO−AROUND
*2. Both throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF *1. Throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As Required

*2. Landing gear and flaps . . . . . Leave as Set
UNCOMMANDED ENGINE ACCELERATION
ON DECK for Takeoff
GROUND ROLL BRAKING FAILURE
*1. Paddle switch . . . . . . . . Depress and Hold
*1. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch . . . Check
*2. Throttle(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As Desired
*2. MASTER RESET pushbutton . . . Depress
*3. ENG MODE SELECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SEC
*4. THROTTLE MODE switch MAN FIRE LIGHT AND/OR FIRE IN FLIGHT
BRAKE FAILURE AT TAXI SPEED *1. Throttle (affected engine) . . . . . . . . . . IDLE
*1. ANTI SKID SPOILER *2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
BK switch . . . . . . . . . SPOILER BK or OFF
*3. OBOGS master switch . . . . . . . . BACKUP
ABORTED TAKEOFF
If light goes off (and no other secondary
*1. Throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IDLE indications):
*2. Speedbrakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EXT *4. MASTER TEST switch . . . FIRE DET TEST
*3. Stick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AFT If light remains illuminated, FIRE DET test fails, or
other secondary indications:
*4. Hook . . . . . . . . . DN (1,000 feet before wire)
*5. FUEL SHUT OFF handle
*5. Brakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . As Required
(affected engine) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pull
*6. Right engine . . . . . . . . . . . OFF (if required)
*6. Throttle (affected engine) . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
SINGLE−ENGINE FAILURE FIELD/
*7. Climb and decelerate.
CATAPULT LAUNCH/WAVEOFF
*1. Set 10° pitch attitude on the waterline *8. Fire extinguisher pushbutton . . . Depress
(14 units AOA maximum). COMPRESSOR STALL
*2. Rudder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opposite Roll/yaw *1. Unload aircraft (0.5g to 1.0 g).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supplemented by
If greater than 1.1 Mach:
Lateral Stick
*2. Both throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MIL
*3. Both throttles . . . . . . . . . . . As Required for
Positive Rate of Climb When 1.1 Mach or less:
*4. Landing gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UP *3. Both throttles . . . . . . . . . Smoothly to IDLE
*5. Jettison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If Required If EGT above 935_C and/or engine response
abnormal:
BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF; TAKEOFF
ABORTED OR AFTER LANDING TOUCHDOWN *4. Throttle (stalled engine) . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
*1. Nosewheel steering . . . . . . . . . . . Engaged ENGINE FLAMEOUT
*2. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK *1. Throttle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IDLE or Above
switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SPOILER BK (affected engine)
*2. BACK UP IGNITION switch . . . . . . . . . . ON
ORIGINAL 68
If hung start or no start: UPRIGHT DEPARTURE/FLAT SPIN

*3. Throttle . . . . . . . . . . . Cycle OFF, Then IDLE *1. Stick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Forward/Neutral
(affected engine) Lateral, Harness−Lock
If still hung or no start:
*2. Throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Both IDLE
*4. ENG MODE SELECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SEC
*3. Rudder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rudder−Opposite
If one engine is operable, perform a crossbleed Turn Needle/Yaw/Spin Arrow
airstart.
If both engines flamed out/inoperative or If no recovery:
crossbleed not possible:
*4. Stick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Into Turn Needle
*5. Airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 Knots
(altitude permitting) If yaw rate is steady/increasing, spin arrow
RAMPS LIGHT/INLET LIGHT flashing, or eyeball−out g is sensed:
*1. Avoid abrupt throttle movements. *5. ROLL SAS  On; Stick  Full Into Turn
*2. Decelerate to below 1.2 TMN. Needle and Aft.
*3. Affected INLET RAMPS switch . . . . STOW
If recovery indicated:
ELECTRICAL FIRE
*6. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NEUTRALIZE
*1. L and R generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
If uncommanded SAS or spoiler inputs present: *7. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as
required.
*2. PITCH, ROLL, and
YAW STAB AUG switches . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
If flat spin verified by flat attitude, increasing Yaw
ECS LEAKS/ELIMINATION OF rate, increasing eyeball−out g, and lack of pitch
SMOKE AND FUMES and roll rates:
*1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton . . . . . . . . . . . OFF
*8. Canopy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jettison
*2. OBOGS master switch . . . . . . . . BACKUP
*9. EJECT . . . . . . . . . . . (RIO Command Eject)
*3. If smoke or fumes present:
a. Altitude Below 35,000 Feet INVERTED DEPARTURE/SPIN
b. CABIN PRESS switch DUMP
*1. Stick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Full Aft/Neutral
*4. RAM AIR switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPEN Lateral, Harness  Lock
LAD/CANOPY LIGHT WITH RIO’S CANOPY LIGHT/ *2. Throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Both IDLE
CANOPY LOSS
*1. Canopy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BOOST CLOSE *3. Rudder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rudder−Opposite
(canopy remaining) Turn Needle/Yaw/Spin Arrow
UNCOMMANDED ROLL AND/OR YAW

If recovery indicated:
*1. If flap transition:
FLAP handle . . . . . . . . . Previous Position *4. Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Neutralize
*2. Rudder and stick . . . . Opposite Roll/Yaw *5. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as
required.
*3. AOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Below 12 Units
*4. Downwing engine . . . . . . . . MAX THRUST If spinning below 10,000 feet AGL:
(if required)
*5. MASTER RESET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Depress *6. EJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . (RIO Command Eject)
69 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
WARNING/CAUTION/ADVISORY LIGHTS/DISPLAY LEGENDS
WARNING *WARNING LIGHT AND/OR DISPLAY LEGEND CAUTION

(HUD HUD/MFD, MFD) DISPLAY LEGEND
ADVISORY
LIGHT/LEGEND CAUSE ACTION
AAA tracking radar detected. As briefed.
ACLS or autopilot Take control for manual landing approach.

disengagement.
AAI ZERO (MFD) Improper IFF interrogator As briefed.
operation.
Airborne interceptor tracking As briefed.
detected.
L A/ICE Designated engine anti−ice If INLET ICE light on, perform appropriate procedure.
R A/ICE is on or anti−ice valve has If INLET ICE light off, inlet ice may be on though not
(MFD) failed opposite commanded commanded. Report to maintenance.
position.
A/P REF (MFD) Selected A/P reference is not Depress autopilot reference pushbutton to engage AP
engaged. reference mode.
ARI DGR Indicates degraded ARI 1. MASTER RESET Depress.
performance. 2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive
maneuvering should be terminated.
3. Remain below 1.0 TMN.
ARI/SAS OUT Loss of ROLL or YAW SAS, 1. Ensure ROLL and YAW STAB AUG switches
and all ARI functions ON.
2. MASTER RESET Depress.
If light remains illuminated:
3. Leave STAB AUG switches ON.
To take advantage of any remaining capability
that the DFCS may be able to provide.
Terminate aggressive maneuvering and remain
below 1.0 TMN.
Improper ALQ−165 position. As briefed.
(MFD)
ALQ−165 self−protection jam Secure ALQ−165.
mer overheated.
(MFD)
L AUG AB is not available and oppo No immediate action required; assess operational
R AUG site engine is limited to MIN impact.
(MFD) AB if ATLS is on.
Warning, Caution, Advisory Lights/Displays (Sheet 1 of 15)
ORIGINAL 70

AUTOPILOT
Autopilot or reference failure. 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress.
1. Assume manual/boost control.

Autothrottle has been
2. Satisfy APC interlocks.
disengaged.
3. Reengage APC AUTO.
AUX FIRE EXT Low−extinguisher agent Report to maintenance.

(MFD) pressure.
Totalizer less than preset Pilot option.

value.
Bleed duct overheat *1. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

condition or ECS regulating *2. OBOGS  BACKUP.
failure.
*3. If smoke or fumes present:
a. Altitude Below 35,000 feet.
b. CABIN PRESS  DUMP.
*4. RAM AIR  OPEN.
5. Airspeed  <300 Knots/0.8 Mach.
6. Nonessential electrical  Secure.
7. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever
CANOPY DEFOG.
If electrical fire:
9. Follow electrical fire procedures.
Operating in auxiliary brake 1. Turn antiskid off.

mode, antiskid failure, or 2. Cautious brake application.
parking brake set.
3. Release emergency brake.
71 ORIGINAL

Backup oxygen less than 200 psi. B/U OXY LOW light (both cockpits):
1. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.
If BACKUP OXY PRESS < 200 PSI:
2. Cabin alt  Less than 10,000 Feet.
3. Oxygen supply  OFF.
4. Oxygen masks  Release One Side.
Before landing:
5. Oxygen masks and supply  ON.
6. Emergency oxygen  Activate.
If BACKUP OXY PRESS > 200 psi:
2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Monitor.
B/U OXY LOW light (pilot only):
1. BOS CONTR/B/U
OXY LOW cb  Check In (7A4).
B/U OXY LOW Light (RIO Only):
Cabin pressure failure. 1. Oxygen mask  ON.
If below 15,000 feet.
2. CABIN PRESS  Cycle.
CADC failure. 1. MASTER RESET  Depress
2. CADC cb’s (LA2, LB2, LC2, LD2)  Cycle.
3. MASTER RESET  Depress.
If light still remains illuminated:
4. Remain below 1.5 Mach.
Canopy not locked. *1. Canopy  BOOST CLOSE (canopy
remaining).
*2. EJECT CMD  PILOT.
3. Airspeed and altitude  Below 200
Knots/15,000 Feet.
4. Seats and visors  DOWN.
5. If canopy has departed aircraft,
perform controllability check.
Controls and displays hot. 1. Select cabin air.
2. WCS switch OFF.
Improper operation of converter− Expect loss of CIU inputs/outputs.

interface unit.
(MFD)
ORIGINAL 72

CIU HOT Converter−interface unit over Pull cb’s 3E7, 4E1, 4E2.
(MFD) heated.
CLSN RIO has collision steering Pilot option.

(HUD) selected.
COOLING Indication of possible bleed duct 1. AIR SOURCE  OFF.

AIR failure forward of the pressure 2. OBOGS  BACKUP.
(IN FLIGHT) primary heat exchanger and
If associated with any other direct or indirect
400°F modulating valve.
indication of ECS malfunction:
3. Perform ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke
and Fumes Procedure.
If not associated with any other direct or indirect
indication of ECS malfunction and operational
requirements dictate temporary reselection of ram
to regain lost service systems:
3. AIR SOURCE  RAM.
4. RAM AIR door  FULLY OPEN.
5. AIR SOURCE  OFF.
6. Land as soon as practicable.
COOLING Inadequate cooling. 1. AIR SOURCE  Check L ENG, R ENG, or

AIR BOTH ENG.
(ON DECK) 2. Throttles  Advance Without Closing
Nozzles.
3. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever 
CANOPY DEFOG.
4. ECS  MAN/FULL HOT (CONT).
If light goes out:
5. Throttles  IDLE.
6. ECS  As Desired.
If light remains illuminated
7. Secure systems.
Continuous−wave emitter As briefed.

detected.
DEU HOT (MFD) Data entry unit overheated. Expect loss of DEU.
DP1 HOT Display processor overheated. Pull cb’s 1G2, 1G4, 1G6, 3F4, 4F3, 4F6.
DP2 HOT (MFD)
DSS HOT Data storage set overheated. Expect loss of DSS.

(MFD)
73 ORIGINAL

EMERG JETT When depressed with weight None.
PUSHBUTTON/ off wheels, activates emer
ACK LIGHT gency stores jettison signal
to the SMS and illuminates
light for 5 seconds. Jettison
function is disabled with
weight on wheels.
ENG Low−extinguisher agent Report to maintenance.
FIRE EXT pressure.
(MFD)
Engine mode control in If engine transfers to sec mode:

secondary. 1. Throttle  Less Than MIL.
2. ENG MODE SELECT  Cycle.
If PRI mode restored.
3. Maintain constant subsonic airspeed in level
flight.
4. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle.
If engine remains in SEC:
3. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.
4. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.
Fire/overheat condition in If HUD/MFD message:

engine nacelle. Message is a repeat of a discrete from the fire detect
system. If FIRE warning light is off and FIRE DET
TEST checks 4.0, then assume message was incorrect
(HUD/MFD)
and keep engine on line.
If FIRE warning light and message:
*1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.
*2. AIR SOURCE  OFF.
*3. OBOGS  BACKUP.
If light goes OFF and no secondary indications:
*4. MASTER TEST  FIRE DET TEST.
If light remains illuminated, FIRE DET TEST fails, or
other secondary indications:
*5. FUEL SHUT OFF  Pull.
*6. Throttle  OFF.
*7. Climb and decelerate.
*8. Fire extinguisher  Depress.
*9. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations.
11. If fire persists  Eject.
ORIGINAL 74

DFCS failure has 1. MASTER RESET Depress.

FCS CAUTION occurred. With no If light remains illuminated:
other lights, indicates
loss of redundancy 2. Airspeed Remain below 600 knots or 1.3 TMN and
only. adhere to the following limitations:
a. Above 0.5 TMN, no cross control inputs permitted
above 10 units AOA.
b. With maneuvering devices retracted, coordinate all
lateral stick inputs above 0.6 TMN and 15 units AOA.
Flap position disparity 1. Airspeed  Below 225 Knots.

with a commanded 2. FLAP handle  Ensure Full Up.
position or flap/slat 3. MASTER RESET  Depress.
asymmetry.
4. While holding MASTER RESET pushbutton depressed,
maneuver flap thumbwheel  Full Forward.
5. Check FLAP light out.
If after landing/takeoff flap transition, or reillumination after
above procedures:
2. If light still illuminated, check FLAP handle and indicator
position, then proceed with appropriate steps below.
Flap handle up and flaps not fully retracted
1. Flap handle  EMER UP.
Flap handle up and flaps indicating full up:
1. Flaps  Cycle.
Flap handle down and flaps not fully extended:
1. Wing−sweep  Ensure at 20°.
Flap handle down and flaps down:
1. Wing−sweep  Ensure at 20°.
Flap and slat asymmetry:
Refer to Chapter 14.
Engine flameout. Check engine gauges.

If invalid, report anomaly to maintenance.
(MFD) If valid, perform the following:
*1. Throttle  IDLE or Above.
*2. BACKUP IGNITION switch  ON.
If hung start or no start:
*3. Throttle  Cycle OFF, Then IDLE.
75 ORIGINAL

Engine flameout. If still hung or no start:
*4. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC.
If one engine is operable, perform a cross
(MFD) bleed airstart.
If both engines flamed out/inoperative or
crossbleed not possible:
*5. Airspeed  450 Knots.
6. OBOGS  BACKUP.
When start complete:
7. BACKUP IGNITION  OFF.
8. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.
9. OBOGS  ON.
When primary mode restored:
10. Maintain constant subsonic Mach in
level flight.
11. Affected AICS cb  Cycle.
Usable fuel in L and AFT or R and 1. DUMP switch  OFF.
FWD fuselage tanks 1,000 pounds. 2. Fuel distribution  Check.
If wing and/or external fuel remaining:
3. WING/EXT TRANS  ORIDE.
Sump tank boost pump discharge less 1. Both throttles  MIL Power or Less.
than 9 psi. 2. Restore aircraft to 1.0g flight.
If both lights remain on:
3. Increase positive g’s to > 1.0g.
4. Descend below 25,000 feet.
5. Maintain cruise power settings or less.
If one light remains on:
4. Fuel distribution  Monitor.
Generator failure and/or disconnected 1. Generator  OFF/RESET,
from its ac bus. Then NORM.
If generator does not reset:
2. Generator  TEST.
a. GEN light off distribution system.
b. GEN light illuminated IDG or GCU.
GPS failure. Non−GPS primary navigation modes in use

GPS FAIL (INS navigation mode).
(MFD)
Firing logic met. Pilot’s trigger will fire Pilot option.
weapon when squeezed.
ORIGINAL 76

Combined or flight pump discharge Refer to Chapter 14 for appropriate
pressure 2,100 psi or less. procedure.
CADC failure or failure of actuators to 1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

follow schedule. If light remains illuminated:
2. ROLL STAB AUG  OFF.
3. Above 400 knots, restrict lateral control
to one−quarter throw.
4. ROLL STAB AUG  ON for Landing.
5. Do not select OV SW after landing.
IFF Mode 4 interrogation received; no reply As briefed.
generated.
IFF ZERO (MFD) Improper IFF transponder operation. As briefed.
Inlet guide vanes off schedule. AICS fail operation mode in use.
Stall margin may be very slightly reduced but
still remains satisfactory and greater than that
(MFD) in SEC mode.
High−power thrust may be reduced.
IMU Improper operation of inertial measure Secondary navigation mode is in use.
(MFD) ment unit.
INS Improper operation of inertial naviga Secondary navigation mode is in use.
(MFD) tion system.
INTEG Power loss or discrepancy between MASTER RESET.
TRIM input signal and position.
Computer malfunction or ramp mis *1. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.
positioning. *2. Decelerate below 1.2 TMN.
*3. Affected INLET RAMPS  STOW.
If RAMPS light remains illuminated:
4. Throttle  80 percent or Less.
5. Affected AICS cb  Pull.
6. Affected INLET RAMPS  AUTO.
If INLET light only illuminated, attempt AICS
program reset:
4. Decelerate below 0.5 TMN.
5. Affected AICS cb  Cycle.
If INLET light goes off:
If INLET LIGHT remains illuminated:
6. Affected AICS cb  Pull.
77 ORIGINAL

Icing condition exists in inlet or ENG/ 1. Select ORIDE/ON.
PROBE ANTI−ICE switch is on. When clear of icing conditions:
2. ANTI−ICE  AUTO/OFF.
IPF JTIDS is failed, a momentary glitch, Select IPF RESET on JTIDS control panel.
or 20−percent duty cycle has been
exceeded.
IRSTS HOT Infrared search and track system Secure system.

(MFD) overheated.
JTID HOT Possible loss of cooling air or a high Secure system.

(MFD) JTIDS transmit duty cycle.
With RIO CANOPY light, canopy *1. Canopy  BOOST CLOSE.

unlocked. *2. EJECT CMD  PILOT.
3. Airspeed and altitude  Below 200 Knots/
15,000 Feet.
4. Seats and visors  DOWN.
5. If canopy has departed aircraft, perform
controllability check.
Without RIO CANOPY light, ladder 1. Airspeed minimum.

not stowed. 2. Obtain in−flight visual check if possible.
LAUNCH Launch bar unlocked, engines less As appropriate.

BAR than MIL thrust.
(Ground)
LAUNCH Launch bar not locked in up position or 1. Landing gear  Leave Down.
BAR cocked nosegear. 2. Obtain visual inspection.
If nosegear cocked, refer to Landing Gear
(Flight)
Malfunction guide.
If launch bar down or visual inspection not
available:
3. Request removal of arresting cables for
field landing.
4. Request removal of crossdeck pendants
1 and 4 for CV landing.
L LO THR Designated engine may be produc If associated with RATS check, monitor engine
R LO THR ing less than expected thrust. gauges and FEMS engine data for normal rpm,
FF, and temperatures. If no anomalies, message
(MFD) is false alarm triggered by the hook.
If not associated with a RATS check, record
FEMS data and abort.
ORIGINAL 78

LOCK Radar locked on target. Pilot option.
L MACH # Mach number signal to designated In flight  Remain below 1.1 TNM.
engine has failed. Small throttle reductions below MIL at
R MACH #
high Mach can result in engine stall.
(MFD)
On deck  Assess operational impact of speed
restriction for mission.
MACH TRIM Failure of Mach trim actuator to fol 1. MASTER RESET.
(MFD) low program. 2. Retrim manually.
Actuated by any caution light on Push to reset after discrete MSG noted.
caution panel.
Improper operation of mission Backup operation selected automatically.

computer.
(MFD)
Mission computer overheated. Backup operation selected automatically.
(MFD)
Engine fan rpm exceeds 106 per 1. Throttle  IDLE.

cent. Check rpm gauge for N2 and FEMS
engine data on MFD for N1 to determine
(MFD) validity of overspeed message.
If overspeed continues:
If overspeed condition persists:
3. Throttle  OFF.
4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations.
Engine core rpm exceeds 1. Throttle  IDLE.

107.7 percent. Check rpm gauge for N2 and FEMS engine data
on MFD for N1 to determine validity of overspeed
(MFD) message.
79 ORIGINAL

Nosewheel steering is engaged. Disengage when appropriate.
Engine oil temperature limits On deck:

exceeded or high scavenge oil 1. Throttle  OFF.
temperature.
In flight:
1. Oil pressure  Check.
2. Throttle  85−percent rpm.
3. If after 1 minute, light still illuminated
 Throttle OFF.
6. Relight engine for landing if necessary.
L/R OIL LO Designated engine oil level is Alert ground personnel; servicing required.
(MFD) approximately 2 quarts low
Postflight, engine at idle.
L or R oil press <11 psi. 1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.

If oil pressure below 15 psi, above 65 psi, or
engine vibration:
If shutdown feasible:
2. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.
3. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operation
(Chapter 14).
If shutdown not feasible:
2. RPM  Set Minimum Rpm.
Low percent oxygen. 1. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check.
Indicates inoperative pitch channel 1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

PITCH SAS or PITCH SAS failure. 2. If light remains illuminated 
No limitations.
ORIGINAL 80

Computer/mechanical malfunction or Refer to INLET light.

RAMPS ramp mispositioning.
RATS RATS operation enabled. 1. Tailhook  DOWN.
2. ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/
WSHLD/AIR cb  Pull (8C2).
RCV ALQ−165 is receiving threat As briefed.

identification signal.
Airspeed >225 KIAS with flaps down. 1. Reduce speed.

Airspeed >2.4 M. 2. Check FLAP handle.
Total temperature >388° F. 3. MASTER RESET.
(HUD/MFD)
RDP FAN Radar data processor fan failure. Expect overheat.
Radar operation on ground is pos Radar POWER switch to STBY

sible. (as applicable).
RDR HOT Radar system overheated. Select STBY.

(MFD)
Warning or caution message(s) being As appropriate to displayed message(s).

displayed on MFD.
Indicates inoperative roll channel and 1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

ROLL DGR degraded roll authority. 2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive
maneuvering should be terminated.
81 ORIGINAL

CADC failure or failure of actuator 1. MASTER RESET  Depress (10 seconds).

to follow schedule. 2. If light remains illuminated  Above 250
Knots, Restrict Rudder Inputs to < 10°.
Improper ALR−67 radar warning As briefed.

receiver operation.
(MFD)
RWR ALR−67 overheated. Secure ALR−67.

HOT
SAHRS SAHRS not available. Avoid IFR flight if INS is degraded.
Steady  Tracking radar detected. As briefed.
Flashing  Missile launch detected.
Improper operation of KY−58, As briefed.

JTIDS not keyed.
(MFD)
SENSOR Overheat or pump loss in radar 1. RADAR COOLING  OFF.

COND coolant loop. 2. RDR  OFF.
3. APG−71 PUMP PH A, B, C cb  Pull.
If other conditions exist that may indicate an ECS
malfunction, either directly or indirectly, perform
ECS leak/elimination of smoke and fumes
procedures:
SHOOT Target meets LAR requirements. As briefed.
SMS HOT Store management system (MFD) Expect loss of SMS.

(MFD) overheated.
Symmetric spoiler detector has If associated with abnormal roll and/or yaw:
locked down spoilers.
1. Counter roll with at least 1 inch of lateral
stick.
2. Visually check spoiler position/operation.
ORIGINAL 82

Starter solenoid air valve open after 1. Ensure ENG CRANK  OFF.
engine start. 2. AIR SOURCE  OFF.
If on deck:
If airborne:
3. ENG START cb  Pull (RF1).
Engine stall and/or overtemperature. *1. Unload aircraft (0.5g to 1.0g).

If greater than 1.1 Mach:
*2. Both throttles  MIL.
(HUD/MFD)
When 1.1 Mach or less:
*3. Both throttles  Smoothly to IDLE.
Check EGT and FEMS engine data for
TBT to determine validity of stall message.
If EGT above 935°C and/or engine response
abnormal:
*4. Throttle (stalled engine)  OFF.
If EGT normal and/or airstart successful:
5. Perform engine operability check.
Turbine blade overtemperature. 1. Throttle  IDLE.

Check EGT gauge and FEMS engine data
on MFD for TBT to determine validity of
(MFD) overtemperature message.
If still overtemperature:
TRANS/RECT Lack of dc output from either or 1. Generator  OFF/RESET, Then NORM.

both T/R. 2. If both lights remain illuminated, select
EMERG GEN on MASTER TEST panel.
Landing gear not down with flaps Lower gear.

down and either throttle ≤ 85 percent.
83 ORIGINAL

Failure of both wing−sweep chan Advisory light only, no loss of normal control:
nels or spider detent disengaged. 1. MASTER RESET  Depress.
(MFD)
WING SWEEP light and W/S legend, no automatic
or manual control:
1. Airspeed  Decelerate to 0.9 or Less.
2. Check spider detent engaged.
If WING SWEEP light and W/S caution legend
illuminate again:
4. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP
DR NO. 2 MANUV FLAP cb  Pull.
5. Emergency WING SWEEP handle −
Comply With Schedule.
WING Failure of one wing−sweep channel. Advisory light only:

SWEEP 1. MASTER RESET  Depress.
WSHLD HOT Center windshield temperature 1. WSHLD AIR  OFF.

300_F.
2. AIR SOURCE  OFF.
4. RAM AIR  OPEN.
5. Reduce airspeed < 300 knots or 0.8 Mach.
Indicates inoperative yaw channel 1. MASTER RESET  Depress.

YAW DGR and degraded yaw authority. 2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive
maneuvering should terminated.
ORIGINAL 84
CHAPTER 12
Ground Emergencies
12.1 ON−DECK EMERGENCIES Note

12.1.1 Engine Fire on the Deck D If hot start on deck, windmill engine until EGT
is below 250 °C before attempting restart.
PILOT
D If wet start, continue cranking until tailpipe is
*1. Both FUEL SHUT OFF handles  Pull. clear of fuel.
*2. Both throttles  OFF.
3. If conditions permit  Windmill Engine. 12.1.3 START VALVE Light After Engine Start
4. BACK UP IGNITION switch  Check OFF. 1. Ensure ENG CRANK switch  OFF.
2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.
Excessive windmilling of engine with oil system

failure may increase combustion/smoking (blue/
white) and result in greater difficulty extinguish-
ing, causing further damage to engine. D If the starter valve does not close during engine
acceleration to idle rpm, continued airflow
If FIRE light and/or other secondary indications: through the air turbine starter could result in
5. Fire extinguisher pushbutton (affected engine)  catastrophic failure of the starter turbine.
Depress. D If the START VALVE caution light illumi-
6. Egress. nates after the ENG CRANK switch is off, or
RIO if the ENG CRANK switch does not automati-
cally return to the off position, ensure that the
1. Notify ground and/or tower. ENG CRANK switch is off by 60−percent rpm
2. Egress. and select AIR SOURCE to OFF to preclude
starter overspeed.
12.1.2 Abnormal Start
1. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF. 12.1.4 Uncommanded Engine Acceleration
2. BACK UP IGNITION switch  Check OFF. on Deck
Uncommanded engine acceleration may or may
not be associated with throttle movement. Uncommanded
throttle(s) are characterized by increased or decreased throttle
settings caused by failures of the throttle control system.
A catastrophic Hot Start will occur if the affected Uncommanded engine acceleration without throttle
throttle is not immediately secured following a movement is a result of an AFTC or MEC failure normally
loss of electrical power during an engine start associated with one engine. Selection of either L or R ENG
with the RPM below forty percent. Air flow will select switch to SEC may restore throttle authority.
be cut off and fuel will continue to be scheduled
to the engine with the ignitors firing, causing a
rapid and severe rise in EGT that will not be
observed on the EIG due to power loss.
12−1 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
*1. Paddle switch  Depress and Hold. required to minimize risk of injury. Spacing of pitot static
probes along both sides of the forward fuselage will allow for
*2. Throttle(s)  As Desired. an unobstructed egress.
Note
In SEC mode, nozzle is commanded fully closed. D Standing and jumping from the cockpit or
attempting to slide down the nose of the air
*4. THROTTLE MODE switch  MAN. craft during ground egress can result in severe
injury.
If engine(s) still uncommanded and aircraft is not in catapult
tension: D If the ENG/PROBE ANTI−ICE switch is in
the ORIDE position, touching the pitot probes
5. Throttle(s)  OFF. with bare skin will cause burns.
6. FUEL SHUT OFF handle(s)  Pull. 1. Kneel aircraft (if possible).
Note 2. Canopy  OPEN or JETTISON

D Approximately 50 pounds of force must be 3. Parking brake  Pull.
applied to the throttles to override the boost
system to ensure disengagement of APC BIT 4. Ejection seat  SAFE.
self−test. (Safe by raising the SAFE/ARMED handle)
D The quickest and most reliable method to
secure uncommanded throttles is to revert the 5. All fittings (Restraint fittings and oxygen hose) 
Release.
throttle system to the manual mode and secure
the throttle(s). Since manual is, by design, a
backup mode, the throttle rigging may not be Note
the same as the boost mode. It may take a hard To retain survival kit, do not release lapbelt
snapping motion to position the throttle into restraint fittings.
OFF. If throttle(s) are misrigged in manual
mode, the OFF position may not secure fuel 12.1.6 Emergency Entrance
flow to the engine.
D Both throttles cannot be secured simulta See Figure 121 for procedures for entering the cockpit
neously; however, reverting to manual mode for emergency rescue.
will allow both throttles to be repositioned to
IDLE simultaneously. 12.1.7 Weight On−Off Wheels Switch Malfunction
12.1.5 Ground Egress Without Parachute and There are WOW switches on the left and right main
Survival Kit gear that interact with many aircraft subsystems to provide
safety interlocks. The interlocks prevent operation of various
Methods and routes of ground egress will vary with the components or systems on deck or in flight, as appropriate.
situation. In all cases, kneeling the aircraft (conditions per
mitting) via the nose strut switch will facilitate a safer exit for
the aircrew. If sufficient time does not exist for ground per
sonnel to deploy the boarding ladder, aircrew should egress
to the rear of the aircraft, over the horizontal stabilizers or
wings, or directly to the deck from the cockpit if the tail is Failure of the left or right WOW switches to the
over water. In the case of fire, the location and intensity of the in−flight mode can cause loss of engine ejector
fire will dictate the safest escape route. If electing to egress air to the IDGs and hydraulic heat exchangers
directly from the cockpit, aircrew should grasp the canopy causing thermal disconnect and/or heat damage
rail with both hands, hang to full body extension, and drop to to the generators and aircraft hydraulic systems.
the ground. A parachute−landing fall maneuver may be
ORIGINAL 12−2
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Figure 12-1. Emergency Entrance
12-3 ORIGINAL
12.1.7.1 Failure Of Weight On−Off Wheels to a. Radar can scan and radiate.
In−Flight Mode
b. ALQ−165 can transmit.
INDICATIONS:
c. Probe heaters will be on in AUTO.
1. WOW acronym displayed.
d. ALQ−167 can radiate (TARPS).
2. Approach indexers illuminated.
e. BOL chaff can dispense.
3. Nozzles may be partially closed at idle rpm.
4. Nosewheel steering inoperative. 12.1.8 Binding/Jammed Flight Controls On Deck
5. Launch bar light illuminated (if nosegear turned 1. Hold light pressure against binding/restriction to
>10_). facilitate maintenance troubleshooting procedures.
6. Ground−roll braking inoperative.
7. Wing−sweep MASTER TEST disabled.
8. Oversweep disabled.
Do not attempt to free controls by force, as fur
9. Outboard spoiler module on with FLAP handle UP
ther damage to flight control system may result.
(wings less than 62°).
10. Aircraft will not kneel. 2. Abort mission.
If two or more of the preceding anomalies are detected, 12.1.9 Brake Failure at Taxi Speed
the following action should be taken:
*1. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch  SPOILER BK
PILOT or OFF.
1. Clear runway (if applicable). 2. NWS  Verify Engaged.

2. Generators  OFF. 3. Parking brake  PULL (if required) (applying
3. Throttles  OFF (after downlocks are in place). parking brake will lock both main wheels.)
Failure of the left or right WOW switches to the Normal brakes are not available with parking
in−flight mode can cause loss of engine ejector brake handle pulled. If parking brake accumula
air to the IDGs and hydraulic heat exchangers tor pressure is depleted, aircraft brakes are iso
causing thermal disconnect and/or heat damage lated from brake pedal master cylinders. Parking
to the generators and aircraft hydraulic systems. Brake handle must be pushed in to restore normal
brake operation.
RIO
1. RDR switch  OFF.
Complete loss of hydraulic fluid through the

wheelbrake hydraulic lines will render the park
ing brake ineffective.
With failure of the WOW switch to the in−flight If brakes still inoperative:
mode, the following functions are enabled:
4. Hook  DN.
ORIGINAL 12−4
After lowering the hook, NWS will automati

cally center and will remain centered until NWS
is cycled.
5. Lights  ON.
6. Notify ground and/or tower.
7. Both throttles  OFF (If required).
If collision imminent, DO NOT delay step 7.
During shipboard operations, aircrew should not

delay ejection decision if aircraft departure from
flight deck is imminent.
12−5 (Reverse
CHAPTER 13
Takeoff Emergencies
13.1 ABORTED TAKEOFF

Emergencies during takeoff are extremely critical and
require fast analysis and quick decision by the pilot. The
decision to abort should not be delayed just because
emergency arresting gear is available at the end of the Rolling over an arresting wire with brake pres
runway. Whether to abort or continue the takeoff depends on sure applied may result in blown tires.
the length of runway remaining, refusal speed, best single− If arresting gear is available, use it to avoid rolling off
engine climb speed, and the arresting gear available. Failure the runway. Always inform the control tower of your
of either engine, a fire warning light or a blown tire during intention to abort the takeoff and engage the arresting gear,
takeoff dictates an immediate abort if enough runway is so that aircraft landing behind you can be waved off. Lower
available. The ejection seats will provide safe escape at the hook in sufficient time for it to fully extend (normally
ground level and low airspeeds. Therefore, if a safe aborted 1,000 feet before engagement). Use nosewheel steering to
takeoff cannot be performed and takeoff is impossible, eject. maintain directional control and aim for the center of the
In an aborted takeoff, aerodynamic ground−roll brak runway. At night, use the taxi light to see the arresting gear.
ing is assisted by simultaneous deflection of all spoilers (flaps If off center just before engaging the arresting gear, do not
down) or inboard spoilers only (flaps up) to 55_ when both turn the aircraft but continue straight ahead, parallel to the
throttles are retarded to IDLE. centerline.
Note If aborting with a blown nosewheel tire, it is likely that

either or both engines have FOD. In the event of any blown
Moving flap handle down activates outboard tire during an aborted takeoff, the flaps should not be moved
spoilers to assist in aerodynamic ground−roll until they can be inspected for FOD.
braking.
Aircraft control following loss of an engine during the
When securing the starboard engine, use caution to takeoff roll is a function of thrust setting and airspeed. In most
prevent inadvertent shutdown of both engines. If both cases, an aborted takeoff will be required. Refer to paragraph
engines are shut down, hydraulic pressure is lost along with 11.8 for additional discussion of takeoff configuration,
antiskid, nosewheel steering, spoiler braking, and normal asymmetric thrust flight characteristics.
braking. Full aft stick is used to augment aerodynamic
braking. Care should be taken while positioning the stick aft 13.1.1 Aborted Takeoff Checklist
to avoid any nose rotation. The aircraft’s tendency to rotate
is accentuated with the flaps up because of increased *1. Throttles  IDLE.
longitudinal control effectiveness, and aft stick must be *2. Speedbrakes  EXT.
applied at a slower rate to avoid rotation.
*3. Stick  AFT.
Note
The stick should be positioned fully aft at a rate
that will not cause any nose rotation.
Maximum braking effort in aborts initiated near
rotation speed at takeoff gross weights may result *4. Hook  DN (1,000 feet before wire)
in blown tires even with antiskid engaged.
*5. Brakes  As Required.
13−1 ORIGINAL
*6. Right engine OFF (if required). 13.2.2 Rate of Climb Consideration
Rate of climb may be increased by selecting afterburn
er with ASYM LIMITER switch in ON. Only minimum AB
is available. The most adverse drag condition is with the
wings level on a constant heading, but techniques used by
traditional multiengine aircraft (such as raising the dead
Aircrew should expect hot brakes following engine with 5° angle of bank) are applicable for the F−14.
heavy gross weight, high speed aborts. Applica Airspeed and angle of bank control will also greatly affect
tion of the parking brake could cause the brake rate of climb (refer to NAVAIR 01−F 14AAP−1.1 for all of
assembly to fail and result in a brake fire. these effects).
Note Under normal circumstances, 180 knots is used as the
If performing no flap/maneuvering flap takeoff, flaps up speed. However, if during a single−engine takeoff the
lowering the flap handle slightly during an abort aircraft has achieved a safe flying speed and a positive rate
will deploy all spoilers for ground−roll braking if of climb but has difficulty achieving flap speed, moving the
SPOILER BRAKE or BOTH is selected, assist flaps up in increments prior to 180 knots will enhance
ing in decelerating the aircraft. acceleration and climb capabilities.
13.2 SINGLE−ENGINE FAILURE 13.2.3 Stores Jettison Considerations

FIELD/CATAPULT LAUNCH/WAVEOFF If an acceptable rate of climb cannot be maintained or
Initial aircraft controllability is highly dependent on deceleration cannot be countered by thrust alone, jettison
timely and proper rudder usage. Rudder is the primary should be selected. The benefits of an instantly lighter
control for countering yaw caused by asymmetric thrust since aircraft and lower drag configuration always produce
lateral stick inputs alone will induce adverse yaw in an positive effects on performance. Separation characteristics
already critical flight regime. Compounding the situation, of the external tanks in this configuration, however, have
visual cues for ascertaining yaw excursions may be absent at never been verified by flight tests and consequently may
night. While roll caused by yaw will always be apparent, yaw result in stores−to−aircraft collision with unknown conse
excursions during night/IFR conditions may be first indi quences. The use of ACM jettison, which will selectively
cated by the turn and slip indicator and heading indicator if bypass nonselected stores, could be utilized but does not offer
in near wings−level flight. The pilot should be prepared to the same gross weight reduction and requires the additional
apply up to and including full rudder at the first indication of interlocks of gear handle plus ACM guard up.
an engine failure. Do not rotate aircraft below 130 knots
in any configuration. Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1, 13.2.4 Aircrew Coordination
Chapter 26 for higher rotation speeds. Additional areas for Each launch must be made with the aircrew prepared
consideration are discussed below. for the worst case. Even when mentally prepared to handle
this emergency the F−14 crew faces a difficult task in
13.2.1 Angle−of−Attack/Endspeed Consideration executing a safe flyaway. Of paramount importance is a
Failure to limit AOA will place the aircraft in a regime knowledgeable understanding by both pilot and RIO of what
to reduce directional stability, rudder control, and rate of to expect when confronted with an engine failure during
climb. The aircraft may be uncontrollable at AOA above 20 launch. Both must have already determined during a preflight
units. Smoothly rotating to 10° pitch attitude on the waterline briefing the points to be considered, that is, controllability,
and approximately 14 units indicated AOA provides the best AOA/pitch attitude, engine, rate of climb, and jettison
compromise between controllability, good initial flyaway considerations. The pilot will probably be the only one to
attitude, and adequate single−engine performance. For know if an engine fails during launch. The RIO will probably
compromise, normal 15−knot excess endspeed catapult be the only one in a position to successfully initiate ejection
launches (mandatory from catapult No. 4 and highly prior to departing the ejection envelope.
recommended from catapult No. 3) will place the aircraft in
the approximate 14−unit AOA regime. Zero excess endspeed
launches on hot days, where single−engine performance is
marginal, will place the aircraft in the approximate 18−unit
AOA regime and will require the pilot to precisely fly the
aircraft away from the water, avoiding sudden pitch control
inputs.
ORIGINAL 13−2
13.2.5 Single−Engine Failure Field/Catapult *2. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch  SPOILER
Launch/Waveoff BK.
*1. Set 10° pitch attitude on the waterline (14 units
AOA maximum). CAUTION
*2. Rudder  Opposite Roll/Yaw Supplemented By
Lateral Stick
D Do not delay engaging nosewheel steering in
*3. Both throttles  As Required for Positive Rate of order to center rudder pedals.
Climb D Aircraft should have ground locks installed
and engines secured before moving aircraft.
*4. Landing gear  UP.
Note
*5. Jettison  If Required.
Antiskid will sense a constant release on a drag
6. If banner tow, hook DOWN. ging blown tire.
7. If unable to control aircraft Eject. 13.3.2 Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff Contin
ued or After Landing Go−Around
8. Establish 10−unit AOA climb.
*1. Throttles  As Required.
9. Climb to safe altitude.
*2. Landing gear and flaps  Leave As Set for Takeoff.
10. Flaps UP.
11. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, CAUTION

Chapter 14.
13.3 BLOWN TIRE DURING TAKEOFF Blown tire(s) can cause engine FOD and/or struc
tural damage.
If a tire blows during the takeoff roll and an abort is
impossible, do not raise the landing gear or flaps. Leave the 3. HYD ISOL switch FLT.
landing gear down to avoid fouling the blown tire in the
wheelwell. Leave the flaps down; they may be damaged by Note
pieces of ruptured tire. Also, climbing with the gear and flaps This will require bending the cam on the gear
down is an optimum flight attitude for emergency fuel handle in order to move the HYD ISOL switch to
dumping. FLT.
13.3.1 Blown Tire During Takeoff; Takeoff 4. Refer to BLOWN TIRE LANDING procedures
Aborted or After Landing Touchdown paragraph 15.5.
*1. Nosewheel steering  Engaged.
13−3 (Reverse
CHAPTER 14
In−Flight Emergencies
14.1 COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE 3. Attempt home base location by radar mapping or

DR to best known position. Attempt marshal pattern
1. Check mikes and earphone plugs. location by APX−76 interrogation.
2. Check oxygen mask connections and oxygen hose 4. Drop four bundles of chaff at 2−mile intervals, then
disconnect.
complete series of four standard left−hand 360_
3. RIO check console connector adjacent to shoulder turns at 20−second intervals.
harness control lever. Pilot check console connector
aft of g valve. 5. If no chaff, fly minimum of two triangular patterns
to left with 1−minute legs.
4. Increase ICS volume and attempt B/U and EMERG
positions. 6. Repeat patterns at 20−minute intervals.
5. Attempt intercommunications with VHF/UHF 7. Conserve fuel throughout and facilitate radar
transceiver. pickup by maintaining highest feasible altitude con
sistent with situation.
6. If cockpit altitude is safe, oxygen mask can be
removed so that when helmet earmuff is held open, 8. Be alert for aircraft attempting to join.
verbal communications can be maintained. Pilot
may need to turn off ECS briefly to effectively 9. After joining, communicate with appropriate hand
communicate. or light signals.
14.1.1 Flightcrew Attention Signals 14.1.2.2 Lost (Without Navigation Aids But With
Radio Receiver)
When no other method of communicating exists, the
following signals should be used: 1. Same as without radio, but make turns to right.
1. Pilot will attract RIO by rocking of wings. 14.1.2.3 No Radio (With Navigation Aids)
2. RIO will attract pilot by shouting.
1. Proceed to alternate marshal.
3. Attempt to pass notes.
2. Energize ID function at least once each minute.
4. Acknowledgment will be thumbs−up, high on left−
hand side of cockpit, and future communications 3. Commence penetration or letdown at EAC. If not
will be conducted by visual hand signals using given EAC, commence approach at estimated time
HEFOE code. of arrival.
14.1.2 COMM−NAV Emergency Procedures 4. Be alert for aircraft vectored to join.
14.2 PITOT−STATIC SYSTEM FAILURES

14.1.2.1 Lost (Without Navigation Aids or Radio
Receiver)
If the altimeter and Mach airspeed indicators are erro
1. Pilot select running lights on FLASH. neous, pitot pressure, static pressure, and total temperature
inputs to the central air data computer may also be inaccurate.
2. RIO squawk mode 3 Code 7600.
14−1 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Placing the ANTI−ICE switch in ORIDE/ON or

AUTO/OFF may restore operation if the malfunction was EMERG STORES JETT PUSHBUTTON ANGLE−
caused by icing.  DEPRESS. OF−
ATTACK
Note
FLIGHT CONDITION UNITS
D Pitot−static system failures because of icing CATAPULT (15 KNOTS EXCESS)
may input an erroneous Mach number to the
AICS programmer, which will result in Transition From Catapult MRT 14.0
AB 13.0
the ramps being in the wrong position for the
actual Mach number (engine stall may result). MILITARY POWER CLIMB
If this erroneous Mach number is outside 0.3 All Drag Index Sea Level 6.0
to 0.9 band, the AICS anti−ice positioning fea Combat Ceiling 9.5
ture will be overridden. MAXIMUM POWER CLIMB
D With known or suspected pitot−static mal All Drag Indexes Sea Level 5.0
functions, do not exceed 0.9 TMN. Combat Ceiling 8.0
D Pitot−static failures will generally be detected CRUISE AT ALTITUDES BELOW
by the DFCS and may result in an FCS CAU 20,000 FEET (All Gross Weights)
TION light as another secondary indication. If
Drag Index = 8 8.0
the condition causing the failure is resolved, Drag Index = 100 9.0
the fault may be cleared with a MASTER
RESET. CRUISE AT OPTIMUM ALTITUDE
All Drag Index 8.0
If it is apparent that icing is not the problem, use the
AOA indicator in place of airspeed for flight conditions MAXIMUM ENDURANCE
as shown in Figure 14−1. Descend to an altitude below 23,000 All Drag Indexes, All Altitudes 10.0
feet. When cabin altitude stabilizes at 8,000 feet, aircraft IDLE DESCENT
altitude will be approximately 23,000 feet. Below 23,000
250 KCAS 9.0
feet, aircraft altitude can be determined by dumping cabin
Maximum Range 10.0
pressure and using the cabin altitude indicator above 5,000
feet. Below 5,000 feet, use the radar altimeter. GEAR AND FLAPS EXTENSION
Safe Gear Extension (Flaps UP) at
Reduce airspeed and set wing sweep to 20_ using the 280 KIAS 6.5
emergency wing−sweep mode. The landing should be
without the autothrottle engaged. If the mission computer Safe Flap Extension (Gear DN) at
computations are affected, the RIO can manually enter 225 KIAS 9.0
estimated wind direction and velocity through the computer APPROACH
address panel or the DEU. CCA/GCA Pattern; 220 KCAS; Gear
UP; Flaps UP; 54,000 pounds. 9.0
14.3 EMERGENCY JETTISON Final ON SPEED Approach (Gear DN):
All stores including external fuel tanks (stations 2 Two Engines (All Flap Configurations) 15.0
and 7), but excluding Sidewinder missiles (AIM−9), are Single Engine/PRI:
jettisoned in a fixed interval between sequenced stations to FULL FLAP,, DLC ENGAGED 15.0
avoid store−to−aircraft collision. See Figure 14−2 for external FULL FLAP, DLC STOWED 14 0
14.0
stores jettison table. NO FLAP 14 0
14.0
Single Engine/SEC:
FULL FLAP ((CV ONLY)) 13.0
NO FLAP (FIELD ONLY) 15 0
15.0
D With landing flaps and slats down, do not fire DRAG INDEX CONFIGURATION
Sidewinder missiles. 8 (4) AIM−7
100 (6) AIM−54
D If jettisoned during takeoff emergency, exter (2) 267−gallon external tanks
nal fuel tanks may collide with the aircraft
because of their unstable characteristics.
Figure 141.Airspeed Indicator Failure
1. EMERG STORES JETT pushbutton Depress.
ORIGINAL 14−2
TYPE OF STORES
JETTISON EXTERNAL SIDE− AIR TO
MODE TANKS PHOENIX SPARROW WINDER GROUND REMARKS
VERIFY ON DURING
EMERGENCY (i) LTS CHECK
(PILOT) 4 4 4  4 PRESTART − PILOT
1
SEQUENCE
JETTISON
(i)
ACM SELECTED
(PILOT) 4 4 4  4 STATIONS
2 4 5
SELECTIVE
(RIO) 4 4 4  4 2 3 5
NOTE
• FUZING SAFED IN ALL JETTISON MODES. (DOES NOT PRE
CLUDE INADVERTENT ARMING OF MECHANICAL FUZES.)
• SIDEWINDER CANNOT BE JETTISONED.
INTERLOCKS (i) JETTISON SEQUENCE
STATIONS 1B, 8B, 2, 7, −4D, −5D, −4A, −5A, −4C,

1 WEIGHT OFF WHEELS (EITHER RIGHT OR −5C, 4B, −5B, −3D, −6D, −3A, −6A, −3C,
LEFT MAIN GEAR) −6C, −3B, −6B
NOTE
2 LANDING GEAR HANDLE UP
• THE TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN STATIONS
INDICATED BY (−) IS 100 MS.
3 MASTER ARM SWITCH ON
• SUBSTATIONS A, B, C, AND D OF RAIL ARE
NUMBERED CLOCKWISE, LOOKING DOWN
4 ACM COVER UP AT RAIL WITH A THE LEFT REAR STATION
ON EACH RAIL.
5 STATION SELECT • STATIONS 1B, 8B, 2, AND 7 ARE

JETTISONED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
Figure 142.External Stores Jettison
14−3 ORIGINAL
Note 2. Intermittent bursts of white sparks in the vicinity of

the aft edge of the overwing fairing.
D The EMERG STORE JETT function is dis
abled with weight on wheels. 3. Sparks turning to flames.
D The EMERG STORES JETT and ACK lights
illuminate when emergency jettison is acti 4. Continuous yellow sparks in an area of increasing
vated. size.
D A weight−off−wheels signal from the left or 5. Flames and/or smoke spreading forward to wing
right main wheel is sufficient to enable emer pivot point and encompassing the area of the over
gency jettison. wing fairing.
D A complete emergency store jettison 6. Flames, smoke, and/or heat crossing the centerline
sequence can take 1.7 seconds. of aircraft and exiting in the other overwing fairing
area.
If step 1 fails, proceed with ACM jettison.
These indications may or may not be accompanied by
ACM jettison will release all stores selected except a FIRE light and a HUD/MFD legend. This midship passage
Sidewinder missiles. of heat and flames could be through the area containing the
flight control system control rods, which run fore and aft
1. LDG GEAR handle  UP.
through the back of the aircraft. Heat and flames progressing
through this area would impinge on the longitudinal and
2. Station select switches  As Required.
lateral directional control rods causing possible distortion or
3. ACM guard  UP (cover up). failure. Loss of aircraft may follow. The flightcrew faced
with this type of fire in flight must react immediately.
4. ACM JETT  Depress and Hold (at least
2 seconds). Note
Note If the FIRE warning light is off and a HUD/MFD

legend is displayed, verify FIRE DET TEST
D ACM jettison follows the same sequence as checks 4.0. Assume message was incorrect and
emergency jettisoning but requires individual keep engine on line. The legend is a repeat of a
selection of stations to be released. Station not discrete from the fire detection system.
selected is skipped.
*1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.
D When jettisoning bombs from stations 3, 4, 5,
and 6, the interval between sequenced stations *2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.
is automatically designated at 100 millisec
onds to avoid store−to−store and store−to−air *3. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.
craft collision.
14.4 FIRE LIGHT AND/OR FIRE IN FLIGHT
Fire may be accompanied by other indications such as

explosion, vibration, smoke, or fumes in the cockpit, trailing Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited
smoke, or abnormal engine instrument indications. and requires immediate mission planning. See
OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 284
A fire in flight precipitated by a failure in the engine for oxygen breathing time remaining.
can be catastrophic in an extremely short period of time.
The shrapnel generated by the engine can rupture fuel Note
and/or hydraulic lines, resulting in a raging fire. The se
quence of events for the failure could include all or some of When ECS service air to the OBOGS concentra
the following: tor is shut off, the aircrew has approximately 30
seconds before depleting residual OBOGS pres
1. A low−amplitude vibration and noise. sure and mask collapse.
ORIGINAL 14−4
Note b. Rapid yaw or nose slice

Restoration of service air (selecting RAM) will c. Increasing EGT
return OBOGS to operation.
d. Rpm rollback and/or thrust loss
If light goes off (and no other secondary indications):
e. Lack of throttle response
Note
f. Inlet buzz (supersonic only)
Fire detection test is not available on the emer
gency generator. g. Fireball emanating from the exhaust and/or
intake.
*4. MASTER TEST switch  FIRE DET TEST.
*1. Unload aircraft (0.5g to 1.0g).
If light remains illuminated, FIRE DET test fails, or
other secondary indications: If greater than 1.1 Mach:
*5. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (affected engine)  Pull. *2. Both throttles  MIL.
*6. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF. When 1.1 Mach or less:
*7. Climb and decelerate. *3. Both throttles  Smoothly to IDLE.
*8. Fire extinguisher pushbutton  Depress. Note
Note If above 1.1 Mach, monitor minimum rpm to

ensure proper functioning of idle lockup to avoid
Ensure BACK UP IGNITION switch is OFF. inducing a stall.
9. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para If EGT is above 935°C and/or engine response is
graph 14.5.3.2. abnormal:
10. Land as soon as possible. *4. Throttle (stalled engine)  OFF.
11. If fire persists  Eject.
If EGT normal and/or airstart successful:
14.5 ENGINE EMERGENCIES 5. Perform engine operability check.
14.5.1 Compressor Stall Note
A compressor stall is an aerodynamic disruption of the After any stall, throttle movement should be mini
airflow through the compressor. Compressor stalls may occur mized until engine operability checks are per
at any altitude/airspeed combination, including supersonic, formed. Engines should be exercised at 10,000
and can be identified by any one or a combination of the feet in cruise and then at approach speeds, one at
following indications. a time, to ensure stall−free performance is avail
able for landing. If engine performance is abnor
Note mal, set power as necessary and avoid further
The loss of Mach number signal from the CADC throttle movement. Land as soon as practical.
results in the loss of both airflow limiting and idle
lockup functions of the AFTC. This may result in Flight test operations have not produced any fully
pop stalls at supersonic speeds (on a cold day) at developed engine stalls. Pop stalls have been observed and
high power and inlet buzz, resulting in pop stalls were self−clearing with no adverse operational impact.
at idle power. Engine ground testing has shown that a hard stall (character
ized by loud bang) can result in substantial damage to the
a. Loud bangs or vibrations IGV system. The damage resulted in complete detachment of
the IGV from the external linkage. There was no FOD.
14−5 ORIGINAL
When the IGV linkage breaks, the IGVs assume a fixed Step 1: Unload the aircraft (0.5g to 1.0g)  Unloading the
aerodynamic trailing position. This position is near normal aircraft reduces the likelihood of a departure, while
for MIL or AB power settings, but is too far open at lower providing a more normal engine inlet airflow. It is
throttle positions. This reduces fan stall margin with the not intended that the pilot push full forward stick or
greatest reduction halfway between IDLE and MIL. Air induce negative g, but merely that any g load on the
borne, a hard stall may result in similar damage and will aircraft be reduced to as near 1.0g as possible. In
likely have been the result of an AICS malfunction and/or the nose−high, slow−airspeed case, the pilot may
fuels/engine control system failure. If a stall occurs during temporarily lose control effectiveness. This should
AB operation, the asymmetric thrust limiting circuit should not be cause for alarm and the pilot should be able
reduce the good engine to minimum AB. Asymmetric thrust to expeditiously establish a wings−level, nose−low
may produce adverse flying qualities under low airspeed attitude as long as step 2 is followed immediately.
and/or high AOA conditions.
Step 2: If speed is 1.1 Mach or greater, both throttles 
MIL. Setting the throttles to MIL will both help
reduce the asymmetric thrust developed during the
stall and potentially help the engine recover from
the stall. It is not recommended to retard the
Do not delay securing an overtemped engine. throttle to below MIL until the aircraft is below 1.1
Undue delay will greatly increase the likelihood Mach. The engine may automatically switch to
of severe turbine damage and decrease the SEC mode, and a throttle setting below MIL may
chance for a successful airstart. If both engines result in inlet buzz (idle speed lockup is lost in SEC
are overtemped, one engine must be secured mode) compounding the stall problem and poten
immediately to provide maximum potential for tially inducing a stall in the operating engine.
a successful airstart.
Step 3: Throttle(s)  If speed is 1.1 Mach or less, retard
Note smoothly to IDLE. During a departure, retarding
Airspeed and altitude will determine whether both throttles to IDLE will help recover the aircraft
both engines can be safely shut down (with dual by minimizing the asymmetric thrust. In the case of
compressor stalls), or whether one should be a violent slicing departure involving asymmetric
secured and relit prior to shutting down the other. thrust, reduction of throttles to IDLE is the most
If airspeed is insufficient to provide windmill critical step and must be done immediately. If con
rpm for hydraulic pressure, one engine should be trol of the aircraft is not in question, there is no
left in hung stall. need to retard the throttle on the operating engine.
Retarding only the stalled engine throttle reduces
There is a threefold danger present when one engine the remote probability of inducing a dual−engine
has experienced a compressor stall. The most serious danger stall. In addition, thrust from the operating engine
manifests itself at slow airspeeds and high power settings, may be required during low−altitude emergencies.
where the sudden thrust asymmetry (a stalled engine yields Minimizing asymmetric thrust at high AOA and
negligible thrust) will induce or aggravate a departure and low airspeed shall be accomplished whenever pos
may produce sufficient yaw rate to cause a flat spin if proper sible. Obviously, there are situations (landing pat
recovery controls are not used. tern, catapult launch, low altitude, and airspeed)
where idle power is unacceptable, and emergency
The other two dangers from a compressor stall are that procedures must be tempered by pilot judgment.
the stalled engine may suffer overtemperature damage and
that the good engine might also stall. Although the emer Step 4: Stalled engine, throttle off  When an engine
gency procedures are designed to address all three dangers, stalls, the combustor flame does not extinguish.
the pilot must understand that aircraft controllability takes Airflow through the engine and cooling flow to the
priority over engine considerations and involves both throttle turbine blades are severely reduced, and the tur
position and flight controls. Reference to the engine instru bine blades may suffer overtemperature damage.
ments will probably be required to determine the stalled Securing the stalled engine to OFF extinguishes
engine. If the aircraft has departed controlled flight, this the combustor flame, thereby reducing the turbine
should not be attempted until the pilot has ensured that thrust blade temperature.
asymmetry has been minimized and that yaw rate and AOA
are under control. The rationale for each individual step in the
emergency procedure is as follows:
ORIGINAL 14−6
14.5.1.1 Supersonic Airspeed stall minimizes the likelihood of total loss of hydraulic and
electrical power (emergency generator).
Supersonic compressor stalls will produce inlet buzz.
This results in a rough, bumpy ride (+2.5g to −1g at six cycles
per second). The proper technique to recover from a super
sonic compressor stall is to smoothly retard throttles to MIL,
keep feet on the deck, and control any wing−drop tendencies Leaving one engine in hung stall may catastroph
with lateral stick. ically damage the turbine. It is, therefore,
imperative that the pilot expeditiously secure
14.5.1.2 Dual Compressor Stall and relight one engine to prevent turbine dam
age. Attention should be given to the remaining
stalled engine as soon as possible.
14.5.2 Airstarts
D During recovery from a dual−engine compres
The most likely reasons to perform an airstart are that
sor stall (with both engine−driven generators
the engine has shut down because of control system failure,
having dropped offline), flight control inputs
hardware failure, fuel feed failure, FOD, or engine stall. The
may temporarily reduce the combined
augmenter fan temperature control contains diagnostic logic
hydraulic system pressure. If combined
to identify primary (PRI) engine mode failures and automati
hydraulic system pressure drops to between
cally transfers to secondary (SEC) mode when required. If
2,000 and 1,100 psi, the emergency generator the shutdown was not pilot commanded, the engine may
will automatically shift to the 1−kVA mode
switch to SEC mode automatically. The first airstart attempt
and power only the essential No. 1 buses. If
should be made in the engine mode selected by the AFTC
the combined hydraulic pressure continues to
(either PRI or SEC). If an initial PRI mode airstart is unsuc
fall, the essential No. 1 buses will drop offline, cessful, the ENG MODE SELECT switch should be in SEC
resulting in a total electrical failure.
for any subsequent airstart attempts.
D Complete loss of electrical power will result
in loss of ICS, OBOGS, backup oxygen If an engine flames out, the automatic relight feature
(below 10,000 feet MSL), engine instru will attempt to restart the engine immediately; however, if
ments, spin direction indicators (spin arrow rpm is decaying below the throttle−commanded level, spool
and turn needle), and displays. down airstart procedures should be initiated immediately. If
engine flames out because of an automatic shutdown caused
D If combined hydraulic system pressure recov by an overspeed greater than 110 percent, there will be no
ers, the emergency generator should automat
automatic relight. To regain fuel flow, the throttle must be
ically reestablish 1−kVA power to the essen
cycled to OFF then to IDLE.
tial No. 1 buses. The emergency generator
switch must be cycled through OFF/RESET Note
to NORM to regain the 5−kVA mode to the
essential No. 2 buses. An overspeed condition in excess of 110 percent
will result in momentary loss of rpm indication
D Engine instruments are powered by the essen until N2 rpm falls below 110 ±.5 percent. EGT
tial No. 1 bus but may not be automatically and FF indicators will continue to function
restored with the 1−kVA mode. It may be nec normally.
essary to cycle the emergency generator
switch through OFF/RE−SET to NORM to There are three airstart phases: spooldown, crossbleed,
regain lost engine instruments. and windmill. Spooldown is the first phase and provides the
best opportunity for a rapid start. Windmill is the last phase
If both engines are stalled after retarding throttles to and is available only in very high−energy conditions.
IDLE, at least one engine must be immediately secured to
prevent turbine damage and provide maximum potential for Spooldown airstarts should be initiated immediately
an airstart. If possible, secure the engine that did not initiate when it is apparent that an engine has lost thrust and that rpm
the event (the second engine to stall). The cause of the first will decay below the throttle−commanded level. High rpm,
engine stall may not be known at this point; however, it is
possible that the second stall may have been induced during
the throttle transient to IDLE. Leaving one engine in hung
14−7 ORIGINAL
high airspeed, and low altitude increase the likelihood of a Once established at 450 knots, approximately 20_ nose
successful spooldown start. See Figure 14−3. The best down is required to maintain constant airspeed. While
conditions for both PRI and SEC mode spooldown starts are attempting airstarts, flight control authority is critical. As
below 30,000 feet, above 300 knots, and with rpm greater rpm decreases, sufficient hydraulic pressure for smooth flight
than 30 percent. Spooldown airstarts that light−off with rpm control inputs should be available with one engine windmil
as low as 30 percent can take up to 90 seconds to accelerate ling above 18 percent or two engines windmilling above 11
to idle and 20 seconds when initiated at 50 percent or greater. percent. At 450 knots, 15_ dive, a 2g pullup should be initi
ated at 2,000 feet. Once the windmill airstart is considered to
When initiating a spooldown airstart to clear a stall, be unsuccessful, the aircraft shall be decelerated to less than
cycle the throttle OFF then to IDLE with the engine in either 350 knots and ejection performed before controllability is
PRI or SEC mode. EGT and rpm indications should rapidly lost.
decrease when the throttle is OFF confirming throttle posi
tion. If OFF is selected to clear an engine stall, the throttle
should remain in OFF for a few seconds until the stall clears.
Typically, airstarts are characterized by a rapid light−off and
initial EGT rise with a slow initial increase in rpm. In the
low−rpm range, it may take up to 10 seconds to observe an D When advancing both throttles from OFF,
apparent increase in rpm. The rpm display should be flashing cycle the right throttle first to a position above
if the rpm is increasing. IDLE, to avoid the throttle quadrant locking
pin feature.
Hung starts are characterized by the rpm stagnating D Main generators drop off at 55−percent rpm.
below idle. The current engine indicating system (EIG) will The emergency generator will drop off at 11
stop flashing if the next higher segment is not reached within to 12−percent rpm. Engine ignition will not be
10 seconds. A low−range (less than 45 percent) hung start can available below 10 percent.
be overcome with the assistance of crossbleed air. A
midrange hung start at subidle rpm (50 to 60 percent) can be D Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is lim
corrected by cycling the throttle OFF then to IDLE. Above ited and requires immediate mission plan
45 percent, the starter will not engage. At the completion of ning. See OBOGS emergency procedure. See
the start sequence the engine corresponds to actual throttle Figure 284 for oxygen breathing time
position. remaining.
Note
14.5.2.1 Dual−Engine Airstart (Or Airstart of One
Engine With the Other Engine Secured) D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concen
trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxi
Dual−engine redundancy and automatic relight makes mately 30 seconds before residual OBOGS
this situation extremely unlikely. Dual engine windmill air pressure and mask collapse.
start procedures after unsuccessful automatic and manual D Airstart can be performed on both engines
spooldown airstart attempts should be considered tertiary and simultaneously.
performed with serious consideration given to airspeed alti
tude and safe ejection limitations. Flight test data indicate 14.5.2.2 Engine Flameout
nominal windmill airstart airspeed requirements to be in the
vicinity of 450 knots. Depending on airspeed and altitude *1. Throttle  IDLE or Above (affected engine).
available at windmill aircraft profile commencement, a dive
angle of up to 45_ may be required to achieve nominal airstart *2. BACK UP IGNITION switch  ON.
airspeeds.
Note
Spooldown airstarts can take up to 90 seconds to
reach idle rpm if light−off occurs at low rpm, low
airspeed, and high altitude.
Dive angle should not exceed 45_. At 7,500 feet
AGL and less than 450 knots, commence a If hung start or no start:
smooth, 2g pull converting airspeed to altitude
and eject when less than 350 knots. *3. Throttle (affected engine)  Cycle OFF, Then
IDLE.
ORIGINAL 14−8
Figure 143.Airstart Envelope
14−9 ORIGINAL
If still hung or no start: 9. OBOGS master switch  ON.
If one engine is operable, perform a crossbleed airstart,

paragraph 14.5.2.3.
Ensure ECS service air is available to OBOGS
If both engines flamed out/inoperative or crossbleed prior to selecting the OBOGS master switch ON.
not possible:
When primary mode is restored:
10. Maintain constant subsonic Mach in level flight.
11. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,

right).
D A dual−engine compressor stall may result in
a total electrical failure, rendering the ICS,
OBOGS, backup oxygen (below 10,000 feet
MSL), engine instruments, spin direction
indicators (spin arrow and turn needle), and
displays inoperative.
If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,
D If sufficient hydraulic pressure restores the cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause
1−kVA mode of the emergency generator, it unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP
may be necessary to cycle the emergency gen- DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/
erator switch through OFF/RESET to NORM MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.
to regain lost engine instruments.
14.5.2.3 Crossbleed Airstart
D Ejection above 350 knots is hazardous; the
decision to exceed 350 knots rests with the air-
1. Throttle (bad engine)  OFF.
crew.
D Sufficient hydraulic pressure for smooth 2. FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Check In.
flight control inputs should be available with
one engine windmilling at 18−percent rpm or 3. Throttle (good engine)  80−Percent Rpm
two engines at 11 percent. (minimum).
D Dive angles should not exceed 45°. At 7,500 4. BACK UP IGNITION switch  ON.
feet AGL minimum, commence a smooth 2g
pullup to a 20° dive, maximum. At 2,000 feet 5. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI.
AGL minimum, pull up to level flight. If the
airstart is unsuccessful, convert airspeed to 6. ENG CRANK switch (bad engine)  ON.
altitude and eject at 350 knots or less before
controllability is lost. 7. Throttle (bad engine)  IDLE Immediately.
*5. Airspeed  450 Knots (altitude permitting). Note
6. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP. Quickest light−offs are achieved with throttle to
IDLE at less than 10−percent rpm. Light−offs can
When start is completed: take as long as 45 seconds.
7. BACK UP IGNITION switch  OFF. If hung start:
8. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI. 8. Throttle (bad engine)  OFF Then IDLE.
If still hung:
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 14−10
When start is completed: Turbine failure for example, may appear only as an
apparent loss of thrust and/or the inability to obtain a success-
10. BACK UP IGNITION switch  OFF. ful airstart. For confirmed mechanical failures, the engine
should be secured and the FUEL SHUT OFF handle pulled.
When primary mode is restored:
12. Maintain constant subsonic Mach in level flight.

If an engine fails or a mechanical malfunction
13. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,
has been determined, the respective FUEL
right).
SHUT OFF handle shall be pulled immediately
after engine shutdown to reduce the possibility of
fire or fuel migration.
Note
If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated, ECS service air pressure may be inadequate for
cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause OBOGS when operating on a single engine at
unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP idle. Increasing the throttle position for the oper-
DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/ ating engine above IDLE will increase pressure.
MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled. This will also close the nozzle, increasing
descent range.
14.5.3 Single−Engine Flight Characteristics
14.5.3.2 Single−Engine Cruise Operations
Single−engine flight characteristics are dependent on
gross weight, configuration, angle of attack, wing sweep, and 1. FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Pull (inoperative
maneuvering requirements. In the cruise configuration, with engine).
one engine operating at military/high power settings, rudder
deflection and/or trim is required to prevent yaw toward the 2. If on final approach or landing, refer to single engine
failed engine. However, single−engine performance capabili- landing procedures, paragraphs 15.2 and 15.3.
ties can be significantly restricted by adverse flying qualities
in approach power configuration, particularly at high gross When either fuselage tape reaches 4,500 pounds of fuel
weights in turning flight because of the effects of thrust asym- or less:
metry at normal approach speed. This degrades with turns
into the failed engine such that rudder requirements to main- 3. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF.
tain level flight can exceed available rudder control. Flight
in this configuration should be planned to avoid turns into the Note
failed engine with bank angles limited to 20 degrees maxi-
mum and AOA limited to 12 units. The aircraft design is such The WING/EXT TRANS switch automatically
that no one system (flight control, pneumatic, electrical, etc.) returns to AUTO if the REFUEL PROBE switch
depends on a specific engine. Therefore, loss of an engine is placed to ALL EXTEND, DUMP is selected,
does not result in loss of any complete system as long as the or there is 2,000 pounds remaining in the low
HYD TRANSFER PUMP is operative. Refer to NAVAIR side. The WING/EXT TRANS switch can be
01−F14AAP−1.1 for single−engine performance data. reselected to OFF after a 5−second delay, the
REFUEL PROBE is retracted, or DUMP is
14.5.3.1 Single−Engine Failure During Flight secured.
4. FEED switch  Operating Engine Side.

It is uncommon to encounter compressor stalls that
require immediate engine shutdown. Occasionally, mechani- When pilot workload permits close monitoring of fuel
cal failure of F110 engine components results in engine fail-
distribution:
ure. These failures may be obvious as when accompanied by
severe engine vibration or may be subtle as indicated by a 5. FEED switch  Inoperative Engine Side.
lack of engine response to throttle changes.
14−11 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
If the fuselage quantity on the inoperative engine side 14.5.5 Engine START VALVE Light
begins to increase:
1. Ensure ENG CRANK switch  OFF.
6. FEED switch  Immediately Move to Operating
Engine Side. 2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.
Note
If operational necessity dictates, AIR SOURCE
L ENG or R ENG may be selected provided the
START VALVE light remains out. Crossbleed
An increase in fuel quantity on the inoperative
airstarts may not be available to the affected
engine side indicates that the sump tank intercon
engine after a START VALVE light illuminates,
nect valve is not open. Fuel available is limited because of possible overspeed damage.
to the quantity on the operating engine side.
If on deck:
If the fuselage fuel quantity on the inoperative engine
side begins to decrease: 3. Throttle (affected engine)  OFF.
6. FEED switch  Remain On Inoperative Engine.
If airborne:
7. WING/EXT TRANSFER switch  AUTO.
3. ENG START cb  Pull (RF1).
8. Refer to appropriate hydraulic system failure.
4. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP.
14.5.4 Engine Overspeed (N1 or N2 OSP Legend)
1. Throttle (affected engine)  IDLE.
Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited
2. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC. Verify ENG SEC and requires immediate mission planning. See
light illuminated. OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 284
for oxygen breathing time remaining.
Note
D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concen
Note trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxi
mately 30 seconds before depleting residual
D Fuel flow is automatically secured when rpm OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.
reaches 110 percent. To regain fuel flow, the
D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM)
throttle must be cycled OFF then to IDLE.
will return OBOGS to operation.
D An overspeed condition in excess of 110 per
cent will result in temporary loss of rpm indi 14.5.6 Engine Transfer to SEC Mode
cation until N2 falls below 110 ±.5 percent.
EGT and FF indicators will continue to func
tion normally.
4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para

graph 14.5.3.2.
In SEC mode, idle lockup protection is lost
Decelerate below 1.1 TMN before retarding
throttle to IDLE to avoid supersonic inlet buzz
and possible compressor stall.
ORIGINAL 14−12
Note 14.5.6.1 Transfer to SEC Mode Results

D Engine ac generator failure, indicated by loss 1. SEC mode transfer from AB may result in pop stalls.
of rpm and nozzle gauge indications, will shift
the engine into SEC mode without illuminat 2. Nozzle fully closed (higher taxi thrust).
ing the SEC light. Main high−energy ignition
will be inoperative. Backup ignition is 3. Stall warning is inoperative (engine overtemp warn
required for airstarts. ing still available).
D SEC mode transfer while in AB may result in 4. No nozzle position indication.
pop stalls. Nonemergency manual selection
of SEC mode airborne should be performed in 5. No AB capability.
basic engine with the power set above 85−per
cent rpm. 6. Decrease stall margin at low rpm.
If engine transfers to SEC mode: 7. 65 to 116 percent basic engine thrust available (see
Figure 144).
1. Throttle (affected engine)  Less Than MIL.
8. Main engine ignition continuously energized.
2. ENG MODE SELECT  Cycle.
9. No idle lockup protection.
If PRI mode is restored:
10. IGV fixed full open (lower windmill airspeed).
3. Maintain constant subsonic airspeed in level flight.
11. RATS inoperative.
14.5.7 Uncommanded SEC Mode Rpm Decay

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause
unintentional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP
DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/ Engine will flameout if transfer is delayed to
MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled. below 59−percent rpm.
4. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1, 1. ENG MODE SELECT  PRI (greater than
right). 59−percent rpm).
If engine remains in SEC: If PRI mode is restored:
3. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC. 2. Maintain constant subsonic airspeed in level flight.
4. Avoid abrupt throttle movements.

cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause
DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/
Landing in SEC mode may increase landing roll MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.
because of loss of nozzle reset. If runway length
or braking conditions warrant, make an arrested 3. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,
landing. right).
14−13 ORIGINAL
Figure 144.Secondary Mode Thrust Levels
ORIGINAL 14−14
14.5.8 Uncommanded Engine Acceleration Note

Airborne (No Throttle Movement)
In SEC mode, nozzle indicator is inoperative.
Uncommanded engine acceleration is characterized by 4. Obtain visual inspection.
an increase in thrust without throttle movement as a result of
an AFTC or MEC failure normally associated with one If nozzle is open in SEC mode or abnormal response:
engine. Selection of the ENG MODE SELECT switch(es) to
SEC may restore throttle authority.
6. Assume mechanical failure and land as soon as
1. ENG MODE SELECT  SEC. practicable.
If dual engine uncommanded acceleration is associated If nozzle is closed or a visual inspection is not possible:
with CADC failure, normal primary mode may be regained
by reselecting PRI mode with the gear handle down. 5. ENG MODE SELECT  Remain in SEC.
6. Assume electrical failure and land as soon as practi
If engine is still uncommanded and engine shutdown is cable.
necessary:
14.5.10 Stuck/Jammed Throttle(s)
One or both throttles may become jammed in the
3. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para afterburner range because of misadjustments or FOD within
graph 14.5.3.2. the throttle quadrant. Selection of SEC mode may be required
to control rapid fuel consumption and airspeed and/or
14.5.9 Exhaust Nozzle Failed (No Nozzle altitude. If the problem cannot be corrected, engine shutdown
Response to Throttle Movement) with the fuel shutoff handle may be necessary to abort a
takeoff, to control a stalled engine, or to effect a safe landing.
Nozzle position is hydraulically operated by engine oil If the afterburner detent lever is misadjusted, the right throttle
from a separate compartment in the oil storage tank. A rup may not move inboard through the AB detent into the basic
ture in this system could render the nozzles inoperative and engine range.
would generally cause the nozzles to blow open. This could An additional failure mode has been identified that
result in engine mislight, AB blowout, and low thrust. may cause one or both throttles to become stuck in the basic
Exhaust nozzles failed closed could result in engine stalls if engine range. If a large idler bearing in either electromechan
afterburner is selected, and excess residual thrust will be ical rotary actuator fails, it can jam the gear train and create
present on landing rollout. An exhaust nozzle electrically side loads on the mechanical clutch sufficient to lock it and
failed open may be closed by selecting SEC mode. prevent further throttle movement. Failure may occur at any
power setting between idle and military and is more likely to
1. Monitor engine oil pressure/rpm.
be observed when throttles are retarded. While failure will
2. Throttles  Basic Engine Only (use minimum prevent the affected throttle from being retarded any further,
power required). it may be possible to move it forward.
Note 14.5.10.1 Stuck or Jammed Throttle(s)

in Afterburner
D SEC mode transfer while in AB may result in
pop stalls. Nonemergency manual selection of Note
SEC mode should be performed in basic engine D Spoiler brake will be inoperative with either
with the power set above 85−percent rpm. throttle stuck above idle.
D If the fan speed limiter circuit has failed, D Speedbrake and DLC will be inoperative with
engine rollback may occur with the selection either throttle stuck above military.
of SEC mode. In the event of engine rollback,
PRI mode must be reselected above 59−percent 1. L ENG MODE SELECT and/or R ENG MODE
rpm or flameout will occur and an airstart will SELECT  SEC.
not be possible. 2. Apply maximum inboard force on throttles and
retard as required.
14−15 ORIGINAL
If throttle(s) will not retard below minimum AB: 6. Affected L or R AICS cb  Pull (LF1, left or LG1,
right).
3. Match throttles.
Note
4. Relax aft pressure on throttles. Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi
5. While forcing throttles apart laterally: nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.
a. Pull throttles straight aft to MIL detent. ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated.
b. Move throttles inboard and aft. These should clear with a MASTER RESET fol
lowing a programmer reset.
6. Do not reselect afterburner.
7. Affected INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.
If right throttle will not retard:
7. Right FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Pull (if
required). If INLET light only is illuminated, attempt AICS pro
grammer reset:
8. Right throttle  MAX AB (after shutdown).
4. Decelerate below 0.5 TMN.
Note
5. If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated:
Failure to move the right throttle full forward Wing sweep drive cb’s Pull (LD1 and LE1).
may limit the left throttle to 88 percent or less
after it is retarded below the MIL stop.
9. Refer to single−engine procedures (Chapter 15).
If left throttle will not retard: If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated,
10. Left FUEL SHUT OFF handle  Pull (if required). cycling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause
11. Refer to single−engine procedures (Chapter 15). DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/
14.5.11 AICS Malfunctions MANUV FLAP (LE 1) cb’s are pulled.
14.5.11.1 RAMPS Light/INLET Light 6. Affected L or R AICS cb  Cycle (LF1, left or LG1,
right).
*1. Avoid abrupt throttle movements. Note
*2. Decelerate to below 1.2 TMN. Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi
nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.
*3. Affected INLET RAMPS switch  STOW.
Note ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated.
These should clear with a MASTER RESET fol
A RAMPS light should always be accompanied lowing a programmer reset.
by INLET light when the landing gear handle is
UP. If INLET light goes off:
If RAMPS light remains illuminated: 7. Affected INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.
4. Throttle (bad engine)  80 Percent or Less. If INLET light remains illuminated:
5. If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated
Wing sweep drive cb’s Pull (LD1 and LE1).

pulling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause
If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated, DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/
pulling L AICS circuit breaker (LF1) may cause MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled.
DRIVE NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/ 7. Affected L or R AICS cb  Pull (LF1, left or LG1,
MANUV FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pullled. right).
ORIGINAL 14−16
Note 14.5.13.1 OIL PRESS Light and/or

Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi- Abnormal Oil Pressure
nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights. 1. Throttle (affected engine) IDLE.
ROLL DGR lights will also be illuminated. If oil pressure is below 15 psi, above 65 psi, or engine
These should clear with a MASTER RESET fol- vibration:
lowing a programmer reset. If shutdown is feasible:
8. Affected INLET RAMPS switch AUTO. 2. Throttle (affected engine) OFF.
9. Remain below 1.2 TMN. 3. Refer to Single Engine Cruise Operations, para-
graph 14.5.3.2.
When AICS programmer reset attempts are completed:
If shutdown is not feasible:
12. Wing sweep drive cb’s Reset (LD1 and LE1).
4. Rpm Set Minimum Rpm.
14.5.12 INLET ICE Light
1. ANTI−ICE switch ORIDE/ON. 6. Land as soon as practicable.
When clear of known icing conditions:
14.5.13.2 L or R OIL HOT Light
2. ANTI−ICE switch AUTO/OFF.
Illumination of an OIL HOT caution light may be

Ice may form on inlet and ramp surfaces without
an indication of above normal gearbox scavenge
any other visual indications, which may cause
oil temperature or high supply temperature. Con-
compressor stalls and/or FOD.
tinuous engine operation will result in reduced
gearbox life and lubrication degradation.
Note
On deck, OIL HOT light may be caused by
The formation of ice on pitot−static sensors may underservicing or by excessive temperature on
result in DFCS detected failures that may not deck. In the event of OIL HOT light on deck posi-
clear with a MASTER RESET. tion throttles to OFF.
1. Oil pressure Check.
14.5.13 Oil System Malfunction
2. Throttle (affected engine) 85−Percent Rpm.
Malfunctions in the oil system are indicated by an L or
R OIL HOT light, OIL PRESS light, or by oil pressure below If after 1 minute light is still illuminated:
or above normal. 3. Throttle (affected engine) OFF.
If oil pressure is over 65 psi, retard power until pressure 4. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para-
is within the normal range. If pressure cannot be reduced, the graph 14.5.3.2.
engine should be shut down to avoid rupturing oil lines. If oil
5. Relight engine for landing, if necessary.
pressure is less than 15 psi, bearing wear can be minimized
by maintaining a constant throttle setting and avoiding 6. Land as soon as possible.
unnecessary aircraft maneuvers. Bearing failure is normally
If light goes out, land as soon as practicable.
characterized by vibration, increasing in intensity with
bearing deterioration. When vibration becomes moderate to
14.5.14 RATS Operation In Flight
heavy, engine seizure is imminent if engine is not shut down.
Continued operation of an engine with oil pressure less than 1. Tailhook DOWN.
15 psi is likely to result in illumination of OIL HOT light or
an engine seizure. If conditions permit it is advisable to shut
down the engine to reduce damage and to save it for 2. ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD/AIR
emergency use. cb Pull (8C2).
14−17 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
D Pulling the ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK

CONT/ WSHLD/AIR cb (8C2) disables D Illumination of both lights and the warning
RATS. Inform CV of increased wind−over− tone may be indicative of a total motive−flow
deck requirements and gross weight settings failure. Zero− or negative−g flight should be
for a non−RATS arrestment. avoided.
D With the circuit breaker in and RATS operat- D Complete loss of motive flow will result in the
ing, there is reduced thrust available for sump tank interconnect and the engine feed
approach and use of afterburner may be crossfeed valve remaining in the closed posi-
required to arrest sink rate. tion, isolating the forward and aft systems. Con-
sequently, single−engine operation will cause
fuel on the opposite side to be unavailable.
If one light and the warning tone remains on:
ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/WSHLD/ 4. Fuel distribution  Monitor (balance if required).
AIR circuit breaker (8C2) must be in prior to
hook transition. Avoid icing conditions and rain 5. Land as soon as practicable.
with circuit breaker pulled. If migration occurs after balancing, as indicated by a
Note 100 to 300 PPM increase on the inoperative side or a 100 to
300 PPM decrease on the operative side above expected burn
D If RATS secures when the hook is raised with rate according to indicated fuel flow:
no other weight−on−wheels indication, failure
is internal to the RATS circuitry. 6. FUEL PRESS ADVSY CB − PULL (8F1).
D With ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK CONT/ Note
WSHLD/AIR cb (8C2) pulled, approach Pulling the FUEL PRESS ADVSY CB will cause
indexers will flash. the engine crossfeed valve to close and the in-
operative side fuselage motive flow shutoff valve
14.6 FUEL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS to open. This will reduce the amount of fuel
transfer from the operative side to the inoperative
14.6.1 Fuel Pressure Caution Lights/Low Fuel side.
Pressure Warning Tone Note
Afterburner operations place an extreme demand on the The L or R FUEL PRESS light and warning tone
engine fuel feed system. Aircraft maneuvers in the zero to will extinguish when the FUEL PRESS ADVSY
negative 0.5g flight regime aggravate the effect and may gen- CB is pulled.
erate a situation where afterburner blowout and engine flame- 7. Maintain cruise power or less.
out occur. The first indication of this condition may be a fuel
8. Fuel distribution − monitor (balance if required).
pressure light or an aural tone (engine stall warning tone).
14.6.1.1 L and/or R FUEL PRESS Light(s) and

Warning Tone
1. Both throttles MIL Power or Less. If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed,
selecting AFT or FWD on the FEED SWITCH
2. Restore aircraft to 1.0g flight. could result in fuel migration to the inoperative
side. If fuel migration occurs after selecting AFT
If both lights and warning tone remain on:
or FWD on the FEED SWITCH (as indicated by
3. Increase positive g’s to greater than 1.0g. a 100 to 300 PPM increase on the inoperative
side), immediately return the feed switch to
4. Descend below 25,000 feet. NORM.
5. Maintain cruise power settings or less. 9. Land as soon as possible.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 14−18
14.6.2 L or R FUEL LOW Light

2. Fuel distribution  Check (balance if required).
CV arrestment, CV touch and go, or normal field
If wing and/or external fuel remaining: landings with full or partial fuel in the external
3. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE. nacelle backup structure. Only minimum descent
4. Land as soon as practicable. rate landings are authorized.
14.6.3.3 Wings Do Not Accept Fuel With Switch

14.6.3 Fuel Transfer Failures
in ALL EXTD Position
1. REFUEL PROBE switch  FUS EXTD.
2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF.
14.6.3.4 Wings Accept Fuel With Switch in

Wing and external fuel will not transfer with FUS EXTD Position
refuelprobe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe exten-
sion required, select FUS EXTD to enable transfer. 1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.
Note
Note With AIR SOURCE OFF pushbutton selected,
Fuel management panel will be inoperative if external fuel tanks will not transfer.
FUEL MGT PNL cb (RD1) is out.
14.6.4 Uncommanded Dump
1. Fuel Management Panel cbCheck in (RD1). 1. DUMP switch  Check OFF.
14.6.3.1 Wing Fuel Fails To Transfer
If wing fuel fails to transfer:

1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE.
Pulling the FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker
One wing still does not transfer: (RE1) isolates the right and left fuel systems. It
also deactivates the function of the feed switch,
2. FEED switch  Select High Fuselage Tape Side. the automatic balance functions, and the fuel
If wing fuel does not decrease after 2 minutes or wing subsequently become necessary, useable fuel
fuel transfer complete: willbe limited to only what is available on the
3. FEED switch  NORM. operating side.
14.6.3.2 External Tanks Fail To Transfer or 14.6.5 Fuel Leak

Transfer Slowly In the absence of actual visual detection, a fuel leak
Note resulting from a malfunction or failure of a fuel system
Descending below freezing level may thaw component will usually result in a split in the fuel quantity
possible frozen valves. tapes or feeds. The flightcrew must determine from available
instruments (fuel flow and total fuel quantity) whether the
1. WING/EXT TRANS switch  ORIDE. aircraft is losing more fuel than the engines indicate they are
If fuel continues to transfer improperly or does not using. Corrective steps are based on confirmation of the leak.
transfer: Upon confirmation of abnormal decrease in fuel quantity:
2. REFUEL PROBE switch  All Extend, Then
Retract.
3. Apply cyclic positive or negative g’s.
4. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF then RAM then
ON (below 35,000 feet, less than 300 knots). Use of afterburner with fuel leak should be lim-
itedto emergency use only.
14−19 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF. Note

If abnormal fuel quantity decrease ceases, fuel leak is With a high quantity in the FWD/RT Fuel sys-
inwing/wing pivot or attachment points for auxiliary tanks: tem, the greater static head pressure, particularly
in nose−up attitudes, can cause overfilling of the
Note AFT/LT fuel system. To prevent this, the feed
This cannot be determined until the fuel level has switch should be returned to NORM before the
decreased to below the source of the leak. Do not AFT/LT tape reaches 6,200 pounds.
proceed until the wings are empty.
1. Both throttles − MIL power or less.
If leak is not stopped, it is in engine/nacelle area, pro-
ceed immediately with next step. 2. FEED SWITCH − select high fuselage tape side.
Aircraft attitude will have a significant influence

Pulling the FUEL FEED/DUMP circuit breaker on the direction of fuel movement if FWD or
(RE1) isolates the right and left fuel systems. It AFT is selected. A nosedown attitude will cause
also deactivates the function of the feed switch, fuel to transfer forward, and a noseup attitude
the automatic balance functions, and the fuel will cause fuel to transfer aft.
subsequently become necessary, useable fuel If fuel imbalance increases:
will be limited to only what is available on the
operating side. 3. FEED SWITCH − NORM
Note
Enough time should be allowed for quantity
tapes/ feeds to develop split so that leak can be
isolated to left or right feed group. Affected side
will be low side. If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed
closed, selecting AFT or FWD on the FUEL
4. Throttle (affected side)  OFF. FEED SWITCH could result in rapid increase of
5. Conditions permitting, allow rpm to decelerate to the fuel imbalance. If this occurs (as indicated by
windmill rpm. an imbalance increase of 100 to 300 PPM) imme-
6. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (affected side)  Pull. diately return the FEED SWITCH to NORM.
7. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para-
graph 14.5.3.2. 4. Determine useable fuel and land as soon as possible.
14.7 ELECTRICAL FAILURE

Setting the WING/EXT TRANS switch to OFF stops
motive flow to the wings and inhibits external tank transfer
and fuselage tank pressurization. Pulling the FUEL FEED/ 14.7.1 Generator Failure
DUMP circuit breaker (RE1) isolates the right and forward A mechanical generator failure or an overheating
system and the left and aft fuel system. This aids in determin- automatically causes the CSD unit of the generator transmis-
ing the location of the leak and prevents loss of fuel from the sion to decouple from the engine. Once disengaged, the CSD
good side via the fuel system interconnects. The circuit cannot be reconnected in flight.
breaker also deactivates the function of the FEED switch, the
automatic balance functions, and the fuel dump system. Either generator by itself is capable of supplying the
Securing the engine and, if necessary, pulling the FUEL electrical requirements of the aircraft. Even double generator
SHUTOFF handle should stop most engine leaks. failure will not cause total loss of electrical power; the 5−kVA
emergency generator will automatically pick up the load for
14.6.6 Fuel Imbalance/Fuel Quantity Balancing the essential ac and dc buses No. 1 and No. 2, and the DFCS
bus.
If the bidirectional pump is operating and pressure
dropsto between 2,000 and 1,100 psi (dependent upon the
load placed on the generator), the emergency generator will
During AB operations, NORM shall be selected.
automatically shift to the 1−kVA mode and power only the
FWD or AFT could deplete the sump tanks.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 14−20
essential ac and dc No. 1 buses. If combined system hydraulic 14.7.2 Double Generator Failure
pressure subsequently recovers, the emergency generator
switch must be cycled through OFF/RESET to NORM to 1. Both generator switches  Cycle.
regain the essential No. 2 ac and dc buses. Figure 14−5 lists
theequipment available with only the emergency generator If operating on emergency generator, the following
operating. important systems are inoperative:
With both engines inoperative, windmilling engine(s) 1. Emergency flight hydraulics.

provide(s) hydraulic pressure for both the flight controls and
the emergency generator. However, the flight controls have 2. Outboard spoiler module and emergency flap
first priority and may cause the emergency generator to loiter activation.
when low airspeeds reduce engine windmilling rpm. Approx-
3. OBOGS concentrator heater (OBOGS may still
imately 450 knots must be maintained to ensure adequate
function at a reduced but adequate level).
engine windmilling rpm for hydraulic pressure.
If temporary loss of combined system pressure causes
14.7.1.1 L or R GEN Light
emergency generator to shift to 1 kVA mode (to drop No. 2
1. Generator (affected generator switch)  OFF/ essential bus):
RESET, Then NORM.
2. EMERG generator switch  Cycle.
Note
If the generator fault is corrected, the generator will
be reconnected and the caution light will go off.
If generator does not reset: A shift to 1 kVA mode will cause loss of all DFCS
functions and spoilers without illumination of
2. Generator (affected generator switch)  TEST. caution lights. If the 5 kVA mode is regained, a
MASTER RESET will be required to regain
If the light goes off with the switch in TEST, the SAS,spoiler, authority stop, and ARI functions.
fault is in the respective electrical distribution sys-
tem. If light remains illuminated, the generator has Note
been disconnected automatically and the fault is in
IDG or generator control unit. DFCS synchronization can take up to 2 seconds
14.7.1.2 L or R GEN and TRANS/RECT Lights RESET pushbutton is depressed during the syn-
1. Generator (affected generator switch)  OFF/ theMASTER RESET pushbutton will be
RESET, Then NORM. required to restore spoiler functionality.
2. If L GEN and TRANS/RECT lights remain illumi- 4. Land as soon as practicable.

nated, select EMERG GEN on MASTER TEST panel.
Note
With R GEN and TRANS/RECT lights illumi-
nated, ac essential power is supplied by the L
GEN. Selecting EMER GEN on the MASTER
TEST panel (with R GEN and TRANS/RECT
lights) will not provide any additional power but
may cause an interrupt as the supply is trans-
ferredfrom the L GEN to the EMER GEN.
14-20a (Reverse Blank)

14−20a CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 14−20b
ESSENTIAL BUSES NO. 1 (1 KVA MODE)
AICS RAMP STOW FIRE EXTINGUISHING PILOT LCD LIGHTS

ANGLE OF ATTACK IND FLOOD LIGHTS PITCH/ROLL TRIM
ALTITUDE LOW WARNING FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR PROBE LIGHT
BACKUP CONTR/B/U OXY LOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE RADAR ALTIMETER
BACKUP IGNITION INDICATION RUDDER TRIM
BACKUP OXY PRESSURE IND ICS STANDBY ATTITUDE
BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER IFF/SIF STORE MANAGEMENT
CONSOLE LIGHTS (PILOT) INSTRUMENT BUS FEEDER PROCESSOR
DC ESSENTIAL NO. 1 FEEDER INSTRUMENT LIGHTS TAIL/RUDDER/FLAP INDICATOR
DC TEST JETTISON (EMERGENCY) TURN AND SLIP INDICATOR
ENGINE INSTRUMENT GROUP MAIN LANDING GEAR SAFETY VHF/UHF RADIO 1 & 2
RELAYS VOICE SECURITY EQUIPMENT
ENGINE INSTRUMENT GROUP
WHITE LIGHTS OBOGS CONTR WHEELS POSITION
ENGINE START OBOGS CONCENTRATOR INDICATIONS
FIRE DETECTION PANEL FLOODLIGHTS WING POSITION INDICATIONS
ESSENTIAL BUSES NO. 2
AICS CABIN PRESSURE ENGINE STALL TONE

AICS LOCKUP POWER CADC EXHAUST NOZZLE
AIR SOURCE CONTROL CANOPY LIGHT EXTERIOR LIGHTS CONTROL
ALPHA COMPUTER CIU FLAP/SLAT CONTROL SHUTOFF
ALPHA HEATER CURSOR CONTROL FLIGHT CONTROL AUTHORITY
ANNUNCIATOR PANEL POWER DC ESSENTIAL NO. 2 FEEDER FUEL DUMP
ANTI−ICE CONTROL DEKI LIGHTS FUEL FEED
ANTI−ICE PROBE DFCS FUEL MANAGEMENT PANEL
ANTI−SKID POWER DFCS BUS FEEDER FUEL PRESSURE LIGHT
ARMAMENT GAS DISPLAY PROCESSOR FUEL TRANSFER OVERRIDE
ARRESTING HOOK CONTROL ECS TEMPERATURE CONTROL FUEL VENT VALVE
AUTOMATIC DIRECTION EJECTION COMMAND FUEL LOW LIGHT
FINDER INDICATOR GENERATOR LIGHTS
AUXILIARY FLAP/FLAP EMERGENCY GENERATOR TEST GPS
CONTROL ENGINE AFTC GROUND ROLL BRAKING
BDHI ENGINE ANTI−ICE INDICATOR
BINGO POWER ENGINE ANTI−ICE VALVES HUD
BLEED AIR LIGHT ENGINE OIL COOLING
BLEED DUCT ENGINE SECONDARY MODE
Figure 145.Emergency Generator Distribution (Sheet 1 of 2)
14−21 ORIGINAL
ESSENTIAL BUSES NO. 2 (continued)
HYDRAULIC PUMP SPOILER MISSION COMPUTER NO. 2 ROLL COMPUTER

CONTROL MOTIVE FLOW ISOLATION RUDDER TRIM
HYDRAULIC VALVE CONTROL NOSE GEAR STRUT LAUNCH SENSOR CONTROL
INBOARD SPOILER CONTROL BAR LIGHT SPEED BRAKES ENABLE
INSTRUMENT LANDING NOSE WHEEL STEERING SPOILER INDICATOR
SYSTEMS (ARA−63) OIL HOT LIGHTS STARTER VALVE LIGHT
INS PEDAL SHAKER TAXI/FORMATION LIGHTS
INS SYNCH PILOT ANNUNCIATOR PANEL TRANSFORMER/RECTIFIER
JTIDS (AUX POWER) LIGHTS
LADDER LIGHT PITCH COMPUTER UTILITY LIGHTS
MACH TRIM PITCH−ROLL TRIM ENABLE WINDSHIELD AIR
MAIN LANDING GEAR RELAYS PITOT HEAT WINDSHIELD DEFOG
MFD NO. 1 RADAR BEACON CONTROL
MISSILE POWER HUD TEST (AN/APN−154) YAW COMPUTER
Figure 14−5. Emergency Generator Distribution (Sheet 2 of 2)
14.7.3 Double Transformer−Rectifier Failure transfer pump is operating and pressure drops to between
2,000 and 1,100 psi (dependent upon the load placed on the
The 5−kVA emergency generator will automatically
generator), the emergency generator will automatically shift
activate and power the essential ac and dc No. 1 and No. 2 and
to the 1−kVA mode and power only the essential ac and dc
DFCS buses. See Figure 146 for listing of inoperable
No. 1 buses. If combined hydraulic pressure subsequently
dc−powered equipment. recovers, the EMERG generator switch must be cycled
through OFF/RESET to NORM to regain the essential ac and
14.7.4 TRANS/RECT Light dc No. 2 and DFCS buses.
The TRANS/RECT light will illuminate if either or
both T/R malfunction. If one T/R fails, the operating T/R will 14.7.5 Electrical Fire
assume the dc load. If both T/Rs fail, the emergency
Electrical fires may be indicated by visual or audible
generator will go on the line and tie to essential dc buses
arcing or an ozone odor in the cockpit and popping circuit
No. 1 and No. 2. Land as soon as practicable.
breakers. Electrical fires produced by 400°F air leaks can
Popped circuit breakers should not be reset more than result in any one or combination of the following:
once or be held depressed unless the associated equipment is
1. Pinballing caution/advisory lights and instrument
absolutely an operational necessity. A popped circuit breaker
indications.
indicates an equipment malfunction or an overload condi
tion. Repeated resets or forced depressions of popped circuit 2. CADC associated caution/advisory lights.
breakers can result in equipment damage and/or serious
3. Uncommanded movement of electrically controlled
electrical fire.
components (SAS, spoilers, wing sweep, throttles).
The loss of one generator and/or failure to tie the ac main
4. Complete electrical failure.
buses will illuminate the affected GEN light. The TRANS/
RECT light will also illuminate because the affected genera 5. Smoke, fumes, and/or heat in the cockpit.
tor’s associated T/R is not receiving ac power to convert. Upon
The most effective method to extinguish an electrical
observing a TRANS/RECT light, the pilot can check that the
fire is to secure all electrical power. However, some
aircraft is actually experiencing a T/R failure and not a bus
conditions may not permit securing the emergency generator
tie failure. If the seat adjust, white floods, or instrument lights
after both main generators are secured. Night/IFR flight or
are still operative with the R GEN light illuminated, the bus
ECS−duck−leak−induced electrical fires are cases where
is tied. If the throttles are operating on the boosted mode with
securing all electrical power is not feasible.
a L GEN light illuminated, the bus is tied.If the hydraulic
ORIGINAL 14−22
ACM LIGHT EMERGENCY GENERATOR MONITOR BUS CONTROL

AIRBORNE SELF−PROTECTION CONTROL MULTI−FILTER ASSEMBLY
JAMMER FLIGHT HYDRAULIC BACKUP MULTI−FUNCTIONAL DISPLAYS 2
AIR SOURCE CONTROL GROUND POWER COOLING AND 3
ALE−39 CHAFF/FLARE INTERLOCK NFO CONSOLE LIGHT
ALR−67 GROUND TEST OUTBOARD SPOILER
AMC BIT GUN POWER CONTROL AND PUMP
AN/AWW−4 HUD CAMERA POSITION LIGHTS
ANNUNCIATOR PANEL DIM HV POWER SUPPLY RADAR COMPONENTS
CONTROL IFF AIR−TO−AIR RECONNAISSANCE EQUIPMENT
ANTENNA HYDRAULIC SERVO INS BATTERY POWER RIGHT DC TEST
ANTENNA LOCK INTERFERENCE BLANKER RIGHT MAIN TRANSFORMER
ANTI−COLLISION LIGHT INTEGRATED TRIM RECTIFIER
ASW 27 INTERRUPTION FREE SAHRS
AUTO THROTTLE DC BUS SEAT ADJUST
BEAM PS IRST SOLENOID POWER SUPPLY
BOL CHAFF DISPENSERS JTIDS DATA PROCESSOR AND STATION 1, 1A, AND 8 AIM−9
BRAKE ACCUMULATOR BATTERY HEATER COOLING POWER
SHUTOFF VALVE LEFT/RIGHT AICS HEATER STATION 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, AND 8
COUNTING ACCELERATOR LEFT MAIN DECODER RELAY POWER
DATA LINK TRANSFORMER/RECTIFIER STEADY POSITION LIGHTS
DATA PROCESSORS LIQUID COOLING STORES MANAGEMENT
DATA STORAGE SET MASTER ARM PROCESSOR
DEHYDRATOR MASTER TEST STORM FLOOD LIGHTS
DEU MDL SUPPLEMENTAL POSITION
DIGITAL DISPLAY ENABLE MISSILE POWER RELAY UNIT LIGHTS
ELECTRONIC COOLING MISSION COMPUTER NO. 1 TELEVISION CAMERA SET
Figure 146.Failure of Both Transformer−Rectifiers Equipment Inoperative List
*1. L and R generators  OFF. If conditions permit:
Note
OBOGS concentrator heater power will be lost.
OBOGS may still function at a reduced but ade
quate level. OBOGS will shut down if all electrical power is
lost. BOS will be activated above 10,000 feet MSL
If uncommanded SAS or spoiler inputs are present: but will not be available below 10,000 feet MSL.
*2. PITCH, ROLL and YAW STAB AUG switches

OFF.
If associated with any other direct or indirect indication

of ECS malfunction, perform ECS Leak/Elimination of Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited
Smoke and Fumes procedure, paragraph 14.8.1. and requires immediate mission planning. See
3. EMERG generator switch  OFF.

Note
An electrical fire may affect the CADC and
AICS systems causing random movements of the Securing all electrical power while airborne
wings and ramps. causes the ECS to go full cold.
14−23 ORIGINAL
If cause of fire can be isolated: 2. Attempt to contact radar facilities or other aircraft
by handheld survival radio.
4. Pull cb’s of affected equipment.
3. Make arrested landing as soon as possible.
5. All generators  NORM.
The following systems are still available:
If cause of fire cannot be isolated:
a. Airspeed indicator.
6. Secure all unnecessary equipment.
b. Altimeter (STBY mode).
7. EMERG generator switch  NORM.
c. Cabin pressure altimeter.
8. Land as soon as possible. d. Vertical velocity indicator.
e. Arresting hook (emergency extension only).
f. Standby attitude gyro (3 minutes).
g. Emergency wing sweep.
Do not operate engines on the ground without
electrical power. Ground cooling fans are shut h. Landing gear.
off, causing hot bleed air to cook off oil and
i. Main flaps/slats.
hydrocarbons in the ECS ducting, resulting in
smoke in the cockpit and possible damage to the j. Standby compass.
ECS turbine compressor.
k. Backup oxygen system (above 10,000 feet
14.7.6 Total Electrical Failure MSL).
1. Descend or climb to known VFR conditions.
Ground engine operation without electrical

power supplied by either the generators or exter
nal power may cause 20−mm ammunition deto
All DFCS functions and spoilers will be lost. nation because of excessive heat in the gun
This will have an adverse effect on flying quali ammunition drum.
ties. Terminate aggressive maneuvering imme
diately and remain subsonic. Expect minimal
damping of oscillations in pitch and yaw and
severely degraded roll control with flaps
extended. Perform controllability check.
D OBOGS will shut down if all electrical power
Note is lost. BOS will be activated above 10,000
feet MSL but will not be available below
D The standby attitude gyro is capable of provid 10,000 feet MSL.
ing reliable attitude information (within 9°) for D Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is lim
up to 3 minutes after a complete loss of power. ited and requires immediate mission plan
D Cabin pressure will be lost and ECS will go ning. See OBOGS emergency procedure. See
full cold. Figure 284 for oxygen breathing time
remaining.
D Do not operate engines on the ground without
electrical power. Ground cooling fans are shut
off, causing hot bleed air to cook off oil and
hydrocarbons in the ECS ducting, resulting in
smoke and possible damage to the ECS tur
bine compressor.
ORIGINAL 14−24
Note If warning or caution systems do not function, the first

indication of an ECS leak can vary. The presence and order
D Total electrical failure will cause the sump of appearance of indications depend on the size and location
tank interconnect, engine crossfeed, and of the leak.
motive flow isolation valves to close, fully
isolating both tank systems. Wing and exter Direct and indirect indications are listed below in a
nal fuel will transfer into the fuselage. representative order of appearance; however, they can appear
in any sequence. The presence of any one direct indication or
D If possible, a section IFR descent should be any two indirect indications shall be treated as an ECS leak.
conducted to VFR conditions for landing.
Direct indications:
All other normal system and cockpit cues are not
available. 1. BLEED DUCT caution light.
When all electrical power is shut off, the cockpit dump 2. FIRE warning light.
valve closes and the environmental control system supplies
only cold air to the cockpit and forced air cooled avionics. 3. Smoke or fumes in the cockpit.
Pressurization will slowly bleed off. If operational necessity
prohibits immediate descent, maintain cockpit altitude at the 4. Heat emanating from behind aft right corner of RIO
highest practicable level to conserve BOS. Otherwise, cockpit.
descend to a cabin altitude less than 10,000 feet. If the system
5. Complete loss of ECS airflow.
failure occurs in the day or night VFR environment, immedi
ate return to base and an emergency landing shall be accom
plished. In the day or night IFR environment, ascend or Indirect indications:
descend to known VFR conditions. (Extreme care should be
6. Audible pop or squeal from ECS.
exercised because of partial panel environment.) Reduce
power setting to maximum endurance. Contact nearest 7. Rapid drop in cockpit airflow.
ground facility by handheld survival radio. Once positive
radar identification is made, follow controllers’ directions to 8. Electrical fire indications.
landing.
9. Any ECS advisory light (SENSOR COND or
14.8 ECS MALFUNCTIONS/FAILURES COOLING AIR).
14.8.1 ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke When an ECS duct leak is indicated or ECS turbine
and Fumes whine is heard, AIR SOURCE should be immediately
selected OFF. ECS leaks may melt wiring splice junctions
Bleed air leaks, hot air leaks, and ECS turbine failures and create conditions that may induce an electrical fire. If an
have similar indications and results and shall be treated as associated electrical fire occurs, smoke, fumes, heat, and
one failure, ECS leaks. All can cause unsurvivable damage damage to the surrounding aircraft structure may intensify.
when not recognized and corrected expeditiously. Bleed air Since electrical fire procedures are not compatible with mea
leaks in the engine compartment illuminate the appropriate sures to eliminate smoke and fumes, canopy jettison may
FIRE warning light, and FIRE light procedures apply. Bleed become necessary as a last ditch procedure.
air leaks outside the engine compartment and other hot air
leaks illuminate the BLEED DUCT caution light. Illumina
tion of the appropriate caution/warning light should be the
first indication of an ECS leak. ECS turbine failures can
cause hot air leaks. After a compressor−side failure, cata
strophic thermal damage can be caused by heat generated Failure to immediately select AIR SOURCE
during turbine winddown. Wire bundles, flight control rods, OFF upon indication of an ECS leak may result
and SMDC lines are in the vicinity of the ECS turbine and hot in severe aircraft damage and loss of aircraft.
air manifold. Both turbine and compressor−side failures may
cause a whining noise emanating from below and behind the
right side of the RIO cockpit, and other indications of an ECS
air leak follow.
14−25 ORIGINAL
Note
Ram air door may take up to 50 seconds to fully
open.
Selection of AIR SOURCE to RAM allows bleed
air to circulate throughout the 400° F manifold 5. Airspeed  Below 300 knots/0.8 Mach.
system.
6. Nonessential electrical equipment  Secure.
7. CANOPY DEFOG/CABIN AIR lever  CANOPY

DEFOG.

and requires immediate mission planning. See If electrical fire:
for oxygen breathing time remaining. 9. Follow Electrical Fire procedures, paragraph 14.7.5.
Note
The EMERG generator switch should be left in
OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.
NORM unless there are overriding considerations
D Restoration of service air (selecting RAM) that mandate turning the emergency generator off.
Note
*1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.
D Selecting AIR SOURCE OFF eliminates
*2. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP. pressurization to the service system (canopy,
g−suit, external fuel tanks, pressure/ventila
tion suit, and airbag seals). Rain removal,
defog, OBOGS, and heating systems are also
eliminated. Judicious reselection of AIR
SOURCE to BOTH or RAM to regain critical
Oxygen breathing time on BACKUP is limited support/ service systems is predicated on
and requires immediate mission planning. See severity of ECS malfunction and operational
OBOGS emergency procedure. See Figure 284 requirements.
for oxygen breathing time remaining. D If ECS airflow continues, ensure AIR
SOURCE CONTROL cb (RD2) is in. If cb
Note RD2 has popped, ECS control is lost.
D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concen D Securing all electrical powerwhile airborne
trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxi closes cockpit dump valve and cabin hot air
mately 30 seconds before depleting residual valve, opens bleed air shutoff valves and dual
OBOGS pressure and mask collapse. pressure regulator, and the ram air door
remains at its last commanded position (ram
air door takes up to 50 seconds to open). This
results in full cold air to the cockpit, uncon
*3. If smoke or fumes are present: trolled bleed air to circulate, and the loss of
normal cabin dump capability. Minimize low
a. Altitude  Below 35,000 Feet. speed (less than 0.25 Mach) and ground
operations as the heat exchanger cooling fan
b. CABIN PRESS switch  DUMP. will be inoperative and ECS overheat condi
tion will result.
*4. RAM AIR switch  OPEN.
ORIGINAL 14−26
Note
Elimination of smoke or fumes without electrical
power may be accomplished by ECS airflow. To
obtain maximum smoke/fume removal capabil
ity under this condition, fly below 8,000 feet
and requires immediate mission planning. See
MSL and set the throttle to maximum practical
position. This will open the cabin regulator valve
for maximum ECS airflow. If smoke or fumes are
not eliminated, it is most probable that smoke/
Note
fumes are being regenerated by an ECS air leak.
As a last resort, jettison the canopy.
14.8.2 COOLING AIR Light trator is shut off, the aircrew has approxi
14.8.2.1 On Deck OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.
1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  Check L ENG, R will return OBOGS to operation.
ENG, or BOTH ENG.
If associated with any other direct or indirect indication
2. Throttles  Advance Without Closing Nozzles. of ECS malfunction:
3. CANOPY DEFOG−CABIN AIR lever  CANOPY
3. Perform ECS Leak/Elimination of Smoke and
DEFOG. Fumes procedure, paragraph 14.8.1.
4. ECS  MAN/FULL HOT.
If not associated with any other direct or indirect indi
cation of ECS malfunction and operational requirements dic
If light goes out:
tate temporary reselection of RAM to regain lost service
5. THROTTLES  IDLE. systems (external fuel transfer, OBOGS, cabin pressure, rain
removal, engine anti−ice, etc.):
6. ECS  As Desired.
3. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  RAM.
4. RAM AIR door switch  Full Increase.
7. Secure systems.
5. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF (when service
system is no longer required).
14.8.2.2 In Flight
1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.
14.8.3 TARPS ECS Lights Illuminate
1. TARPS sensors  OFF.
2. SYSTEM switch  OFF.

Failure to immediately select AIR SOURCE
pushbutton OFF upon indication of an ECS leak 3. Pull TARPS cb’s:
(bleed air or hot air leak indication) or upon hear
ing ECS turbine whine may result in an uncon a. RECON ECS/LANTIRN POD CONT (9E1)
trollable electrical fire, catastrophic ECS com
ponent failure, and/or loss of flight controls. b. RECON ECS CONT AC (2G4)
2. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP. c. RECON HTR/LANTIRN PWR 3 PH (2C3)
14−27 ORIGINAL
d. RECON POD (1E2) 4. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  RAM (below 35,000

feet).
e. RECON CONTR/LANTIRN POD PWR (9E2)
5. RAM AIR switch  OPEN (select amount of ram
f. RECON POD DC PWR NO 2 (9E3) air desired for flightcrew comfort).
g. RECON POD DC PWR NO 1 (9E4)
4. Ask for visual check of pod by wingman.

High−cockpit temperature and smoke during
14.8.4 SENSOR COND Light Illuminated and/or ground operation indicates ECS cooling fan shut
PUMP Phase Circuit Breakers Popped down. This will occur with an external air source
or APG−71 PM Acronym (start cart) without electric power on the aircraft.
This results in an overtemperature condition
1. RADAR COOLING switch  OFF. caused by operating without ground cooling fans.
2. RDR switch  OFF. 14.8.6 Cockpit Overpressurization on Deck
3. APG−71 PUMP PH A, B, and C cb’s  Pull (2G3, Cockpit overpressurization is sensed by the aircrew
2G6, 2G7). and verified by lower than normal cockpit altitude on the
cabin pressure altimeter This condition could be caused by
If other conditions exist that may indicate an ECS a faulty cabin pressure controller or regulator.
malfunction, either directly or indirectly, perform ECS
Leak/Elimination of Smoke and Fumes procedure, 1. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF.
paragraph 14.8.1.
2. CABIN PRESS switch  DUMP.
3. Canopy  OPEN (when cockpit pressure altimeter
14.8.5 Cockpit Temperature Control Malfunction equals the field elevation).
1. TEMP mode switch  MAN.
2. TEMP thumbwheel  As Desired.
If temperature control is not regained: The canopy may explosively leave the aircraft
upon unlocking of the canopy sill locks if cockpit
3. VENT AIRFLOW thumbwheel  OFF. overpressure is not reduced.
14.8.7 CABIN PRESS Light
1. Oxygen mask  ON.
Reduce airspeed to 350 knots or 1.5 Mach, If below 15,000 feet:

whichever is lower, to prevent ram air at temper
ature above 110°F from entering aircraft. After 2. CABIN PRESS switch  Cycle.
ram air flow is stabilized, airspeed may be
increased as required for flightcrew comfort or to 14.8.8 WSHLD HOT Light
increase flow to electronic equipment.
1. WSHLD AIR switch  OFF.
2. AIR SOURCE pushbutton  OFF (below 35,000

feet).
ORIGINAL 14−28
Note
If light remains illuminated after air source is off,
the indication is faulty. Turn ECS on and land as
soon as practicable. The aircrew will not have any indication of a fail
ure of the monitor. If the aircrew suspects the
3. OBOGS master switch  BACKUP. onset of hypoxia at any time, immediately select
BACKUP. The monitor may be tested once the
aircraft has descended to a cabin altitude of
10,000 feet or less and the ON position on the
OBOGS master switch has been reselected.

and requires immediate mission planning. See
Note and requires immediate mission planning. See
D When ECS service air to the OBOGS concen Figure 284 for oxygen breathing time remaining.
mately 30 seconds before depleting residual 14.9.1 OBOGS Light
OBOGS pressure and mask collapse.
4. RAM AIR switch  OPEN.
5. Reduce airspeed to less than 300 knots or 0.8 Mach.

6. Land as soon as practicable. and requires immediate mission planning. See
Figure 284 for oxygen breathing time remaining.
14.9 OXYGEN SYSTEM FAILURE
2. OBOGS concentrator and OBOGS control cb’s
Check in (3C4, 7A1).
If operational necessity prohibits immediate descent,
maintain cockpit altitude at the highest practicable level to
conserve BOS. Depressurizing the cabin will increase the 14.9.2 B/U OXY LOW Light (Both Cockpits)
duration of the backup and emergency oxygen supply. If fuel
is not a problem and flight conditions permit, descend below
10,000 MSL. BOS will not be available; therefore, it will be
If BACKUP OXY PRESS is less than 200 psi:
necessary to release one side of the oxygen mask in order to
breathe unless emergency oxygen is used. Emergency oxy
gen can be shut off and reactivated as required. It is recom Note
mended that emergency oxygen be reserved for final Prepare for mask collapse. Breathing time can
approach, permitting the aircrew to refasten oxygen masks. vary from 2 to 4 minutes, depending upon cabin
altitude.
2. Cabin altitude  Less Than 10,000 Feet.
3. OXYGEN SUPPLY valves  OFF.
4. Oxygen masks  Release One Side.
14−29 ORIGINAL
Before landing: nications will probably be impossible above 200 knots,

although the pilot will be able to effectively utilize V/UHF
5. Oxygen masks and OXYGEN SUPPLY valves  at airspeeds up to approximately 400 knots. After lowering
ON. the seat, the RIO should lean forward to take advantage of the
wind blast protection provided by the detail data display and
6. Emergency oxygen  Activate. instrument panel, while the pilot decelerates the aircraft by
utilizing idle power, speedbrakes, and moderate g. The RIO
If BACKUP OXY PRESS is greater than 200 psi: should deselect HOT MIC ICS to prevent interference with
V/UHF communications caused by wind blast across the oxy
Note gen mask microphone. Helmet loss will result in severe dis
orientation because of a total loss of communications and
Failure of the B/U OXY LOW pressure relay will
vision impairment caused by wind blast.
illuminate both pilot and RIO B/U OXY LOW
light. BACKUP OXY PRESS indicator remains
If canopy loss is experienced at high speed, or if helmet
functional and displays true BOS reserve.
loss appears to be possible because of wind blast or buffeting,
2. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Monitor. retain the helmet by pulling down on the visor cover (keeping
arms close to the body).
Note
The pilot LAD/CANOPY caution light may be acti
Emergency oxygen can be shut off and reacti vated by a mispositioning of either the boarding ladder or the
vated as required. canopy. If both the pilot LAD/CANOPY and the RIO CAN
OPY lights are illuminated, then the problem is with the
14.9.3 B/U OXY LOW Light (Pilot Only) canopy system. If the RIO CANOPY light is working but not
illuminated, then the problem is with the boarding ladder.
1. BOS CONTR/B/U OXY LOW cb  Check In
(7A4).
Note If both the pilot and RIO caution lights are illumi
nated, indicating a canopy problem, a later prob
Failure of the BOS CONTR/B/U OXY LOW cir
lem with the boarding ladder will not activate the
cuit breaker will illuminate only the pilot B/U
LAD/ CANOPY or the MASTER CAUTION
OXY LOW light. BACKUP OXY PRESS indi
lights.
cator remains functional and displays true BOS
reserve.
Note
14.9.4 B/U OXY LOW Light (RIO Only) If the RIO CANOPY light is not illuminated,
ensure that it is operating by selecting IND LT on
3. BACKUP OXY PRESS  Check. the RIO TEST panel before assuming a boarding
ladder problem.
14.10 LAD/CANOPY LIGHT AND/OR
LOSS OF CANOPY 14.10.1 LAD/CANOPY Light With RIO
CANOPY Light/Canopy Loss
In the event of canopy loss in flight, the pilot will be
adequately shielded by the forward windscreen to maintain *1. Canopy  Boost Close (canopy remaining).
control of the aircraft. Vision may be impaired briefly by dust
in the cockpit, and moderate head buffet may occur, which 2. Airspeed and altitude  Below 200 Knots/15,000
can be alleviated by lowering the seat and/or leaning forward. Feet.
The RIO will be exposed to a significantly more hazardous
and disorienting environment, which will include vision 3. Seats and visors  Down.
impairment, loss of communications, wind blast injury, and
breathing difficulties. The degree to which these will be expe 4. If canopy has departed aircraft, perform control
rienced is directly related to airspeed and seat height. In addi lability check.
tion, the possibility of helmet loss becomes greater as airspeed
increases above 300 knots. ICS and RIO VHF/UHF commu 5. Land as soon as possible.
ORIGINAL 14−30
14.10.2 LAD/CANOPY Light Without 6. L INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO.

RIO CANOPY Light
7. DLC  Do Not Engage.
1. Airspeed  Minimum Safe Operating.
2. Obtain in−flight visual check if possible. 8. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final, com
mitted to landing).
14.11 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS
14.11.1 Combined Pressure Approximately 2,400
to 2,600 Psi
D Loss of combined pressure may indicate

impending fluid loss. Without fluid in the
combined system return line, the in−flight
If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the refueling probe will not extend with the hand
hydraulic system, component rupture is immi pump. Early extension of the refueling probe
nent. Turn the hydraulic transfer pump switch at the first indication of a combined system
OFF. malfunction is recommended in a carrier
1. HYD ISOL switch  FLT. environment.
Note D Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure
since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD
Monitor AUX BRAKE PRESSURE gauge. Tap PRESS lights will not illuminate if the
wheelbrakes to seat priority valve if pressure is remaining systems fail.
decreasing.
2. In−flight refuel PROBE switch  EXTD (in carrier Note
environment). To extend or retract the refueling probe using the
hydraulic handpump requires the landing gear
handle to be in the up position, combined system
fluid in the system return line, and essential dc
No. 2 electrical power. Extension of the in−flight
Wing and external fuel will not transfer with refueling probe requires approximately 25 cycles
refuel probe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe of the pump handle.
extension required, select FUS EXTD to enable
transfer. 14.11.2 Flight Pressure Approximately 2,400 to
3. Wing sweep  Set at 20_. 2,600 Psi
4. L INLET RAMPS switch  STOW (less than 1.2
Mach).
If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the

hydraulic system, component rupture is imminent.
If WING SWEEP advisory light is illuminated, Turn the hydraulic pump switch (BI−DI) OFF.
pulling L AICS cb (LF1) may cause uninten 1. Wing sweep  Set at 20°.
tional wing sweep unless WING SWEEP DRIVE
NO. 1 (LD1) and WG SWP DR NO. 2/MANUV 2. R INLET RAMPS switch  STOW (less than 1.2
FLAP (LE1) cb’s are pulled. Mach).
5. Left AICS cb  Pull (LF1). 3. Right AICS cb  Pull (LG1).
Note Note
Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi Pulling the AICS cb while airborne may illumi
nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights. nate the FCS CAUTION and ARI DGR lights.
Above 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and ROLL Above 600 knots, the PITCH SAS and ROLL
DGR lights will also be illuminated. These DGR lights will also be illuminated. These
should clear with a MASTER RESET following should clear with a MASTER RESET following
programmer reset. programmer reset.
14−31 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
4. R INLET RAMPS switch  AUTO. operated in conjunction with zero combined

5. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final, com pressure, some backup module fluid will be
mitted to landing). expelled by thermal expansion. The module
will remain fully serviced and operate nor
mally as long as elevated temperatures are
maintained. Once operating, the module
should not be turned off in flight without com
Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure bined system pressure available to reservice
since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD PRESS it. Doing so would result in fluid contraction
lights will not illuminate if the remaining sys and an underserviced condition that could
tems fail. prevent subsequent pump operation.
The following important equipment is inoperative:

a. NORMAL HOOK  Restored by weight on
wheels. Hook handle restowed.
Note
D Loss of combined pressure with landing flaps
Arrested landing will require emergency hook down may allow the auxiliary flaps to cycle,
extension. causing moderate pitch oscillations.
D Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure
14.11.3 Combined Pressure Zero since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD
PRESS lights will not illuminate if the
1. HYD ISOL switch  FLT. remaining systems fail.
2. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch  SHUTOFF.
Note
3. REFUEL PROBE  EXTD (in CV environment).
Complete loss of combined hydraulic pressure
will result in the following caution lights due to
the loss of a single channel SAS actuator func
tion: PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, ARI
Wing and external fuel will not transfer with refuel DGR, and SPOILERS lights.
probe switch in ALL EXTD. If probe extension
required, select FUS EXTD to enable transfer. The following important equipment is inoperative:
4. Wing sweep  Set at 20°. a. L AICS.
5. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW. b. Nosewheel steering.
c. Gun drive.
d. Inboard spoilers.
D If the INLET RAMPS switch is not placed in e. Hook extend (emergency actuation available).
STOW prior to the pressure reaching zero, do f. Flaps and slats (emergency actuation available).
not place it in STOW after complete loss of
g. Landing gear (emergency actuation available).
pressure. Trapped fluid may be the only thing
holding the affected ramp in position. h. Wheelbrakes (emergency actuation available).
D An outboard spoiler module failure with flaps i. Refueling probe (emergency actuation available
extended, below 180 knots, and with a com if fluid remains in return line).
bined hydraulic failure rendering the inboard
j. Emergency generator.
spoilers inoperative, can result in asymmetric
spoiler float such that the aircraft may not be k. Auxiliary flaps.
flyable at normal approach airspeeds. A small l. DLC.
amount of spoiler float can significantly
increase approach speeds. m. Speedbrakes.
D Do not return to AUTO (LOW) mode once n. Normal hook.
module is selected on (HIGH or LOW) with o. One−half authority of SAS/ARI actuators in
operating flight hydraulic system. When pitch, roll, and yaw.
ORIGINAL 14−32
6. LDG GEAR  Emergency lower. Refer to Landing The following important equipment is inoperative:
Gear Emergency Lowering, paragraph 15.4.1 a. One−half authority of SAS/ARI actuators in
7. Hook  Emergency down. Refer to Arresting Hook pitch, roll, and yaw.
Emergency Down, paragraph 15.11. b. ACLS.
8. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb  Pull (8G3). c. R AICS.
9. Flaps (no auxiliary flaps)  DN. d. Normal hook  Restored by weight on wheels.
Hook handle restowed.
10. Brake accumulator (handpump)  Check.
4. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final, com
11. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch  SPOILER BK mitted to landing).
(OFF for CV).
12. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (on final com
mitted to landing). Note
Arrested landing will require emergency hook
extension.
14.11.5 Both Combined and Flight Pressure Zero
Do not return to AUTO (LOW) mode once mod 1. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW.
ule is selected on (HIGH or LOW) with operating
flight hydraulic system. 2. Do not attempt CV recovery. Divert if possible.

After landing:
14. Do not taxi out of arresting gear. D If any undesirable motions or oscillations
15. Engines  OFF. occur, immediately release the stick and per
mit the motions to dampen before resuming
14.11.4 Flight Pressure Zero active control.
1. HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch  SHUTOFF. D Do not attempt IMC or close night formation
flight while in the LOW mode.
2. Wing sweep  Set at 20°. D Operations of more than 8 minutes total in
3. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW. HIGH mode may fail the BFCM motor. The
LOW mode should be selected as soon as prac
ticable following a waveoff or bolter and the
HIGH mode reselected on the subsequent
approach.
If the INLET RAMPS switch was not placed in D Inboard spoilers can be expected to float, caus
STOW prior to pressure reaching zero, do not ing uncomfortable lateral stick requirements
place it in stow after complete loss of pressure. for level flight. Do not trim out lateral forces.
Trapped fluid may be the only thing holding the
affected ramp in position. 3. Reduce airspeed below 250 knots if practicable.
Note
Airspeeds less than 250 knots while operating in
LOW mode will reduce susceptibility of exceed
ing maximum stabilizer deflection rate.
Monitor remaining hydraulic system pressure
since the MASTER CAUTION and HYD PRESS The following important equipment is operative in
lights will not illuminate if the remaining sys flight:
tems fail. a. Horizontal stabs (significantly reduced rate, no
SAS/ARI).
Note
Complete loss of flight hydraulic pressure will b. Rudders (slightly reduced rate, no SAS/ARI).
result in the following caution lights due to the c. Main flaps and slats (reduced rate, via thumb
loss of a single channel SAS actuator function: wheel or flap handle).
PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, and ARI d. Outboard spoilers.
DGR lights.
14−33 ORIGINAL
e. Hydraulic handpump. 13. Hook  EMERG DN.

f. Landing gear (emergency actuation available).
14. Brake accumulator  Check.
g. Hook extend (emergency actuation available).
Established on final, committed to landing:
h. Refuel probe (emergency actuation available, if
fluid remains in return line). 15. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH.
i. Wheelbrakes (emergency actuation available).
If in−flight refueling required:
4. Decelerate with tanker to 180 knots. D Aggressive nose movement in close can rate
limit the stabilizers, resulting in low altitude
5. Maneuver flaps  Extend. loss of control. Do not use APCS.
D Inboard spoilers can be expected to float, caus
6. EMERG FLT HYD switch  HIGH (prior to mov
ing uncomfortable lateral stick requirements
ing to precontact).
for level flight. Do not trim out lateral forces.
7. Avoid abrupt control inputs during contact.
D Waveoff performance from low power set

tings is very poor. Carrying extra speed during
D Any abrupt control input to affect engagement IMC approach will improve waveoff perfor
can rate limit the stabilizers and result in loss mance by permitting smooth rotation to 15
of control. The pilot must resist spotting the units AOA to break the rate of descent while
basket and rely on RIO commentary to per the engines are accelerating.
form the engagement.
D Prolonged operation of the BFCM in the
D Extended LOW operation (greater than 30 HIGH mode may cause failure of the module.
minutes) after in−flight refueling will permit The LOW mode should be selected as soon as
several additional minutes in HIGH mode for practicable following a waveoff or bolter and
subsequent landing. the HIGH mode reselected on the subsequent
approach.
D Tanking from large body tankers (KC−130,
KC−10, KC−135) is hazardous and should not
If wings are 20°:
be attempted.
16. Fly straight−in approach at 15 units AOA and
Note 180 knots.
If the air refueling store does not adequately
transfer fuel at 180 knots, once engaged, the air If wings are greater than 20°:
speed can be safely increased to 200 knots to
17. Fly straight−in approach at 15 units AOA.
improve fuel transfer rate.
Note
8. EMERG FLT HYD switch  LOW (immediately
once clear of tanker). Control in LOW mode is satisfactory for per
forming transition to dirty configuration. Pitch
9. Maneuver flaps  Retract. ing moment because of flap transition is easily
countered with electrical trim caused by very
Field recovery: slow extension rate.
10. LDG GEAR handle  EMERG DN.
After landing:
11. Maneuver flaps  Extend With Thumbwheel.
19. Do not taxi out of arresting gear.
12. MANEUVER FLAPS cb  Pull (LE1).
20. Throttles  OFF.
ORIGINAL 14−34
14.11.6 Backup Flight Module Malfunction 14.12 FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURES

OR MALFUNCTIONS
There are a myriad of possible causes to binding flight
controls. Unfortunately, unless the cause is a foreign object
jammed in the cockpit controls and visible to the pilot, it may
be impossible for the aircrew to determine the true cause. If
Prolonged use of the backup flight control mod the aircraft is in a controllable state, execute the Controllabil
ule in the high mode may result in a failure of the ity Checklist. If the aircraft is uncontrollable, an attempt
module. should be made to release pressure on the flight controls so
that any potential foreign objects may be dislodged. If the
1. FLT HYD BACKUP PH A, B, and C cb’s  In
controls are still inhibited, apply negative g, flight conditions
(2A1, 2C1, 2E1).
permitting, to forcefully dislodge the object. In the low
2. Land as soon as possible. altitude environment, applying negative g may not be
possible. As always, the aircrew must decide if such an action
will further jeopardize the aircraft. Finally, the pilot should
14.11.7 Low Brake Accumulator Pressure
use whatever force necessary in the direction of the bind in
order to break any jamming foreign object. If unsuccessful,
In flight:
the aircrew should conduct a controllability check using
alternative means to maneuver the aircraft to determine
1. HYD ISOL switch  T.O./LDG.
suitability for a safe landing. Consider using different axes to
coordinate aircraft movement. Yaw through rudder displace
If pressure does not recover:
ment or asymmetric thrust can be substituted for roll
2. LDG GEAR handle  DN. commands via lateral stick and vice versa. Aircraft configu
ration (flap setting, wing sweep), airspeed/ thrust, or sideslip
3. HYD HAND PUMP  Recharge Accumulator. may assist in inducing pitch commands in the event of
inhibited control stick. The aircrew should thoroughly
Note investigate all possible alternative control methods at a
sufficient altitude to allow safe ejection should the aircraft
D Monitor AUX BRAKE PRESSURE gauge. depart controlled flight. Do not delay eject decision if
Tap wheelbrakes to seat priority valve if pres approaching edge of the ejection envelope. If the aircraft is
sure is decreasing. suitable for landing with restricted rudder pedal authority,
D Approximately 13 to 14 differential pedal consider an arrested landing.
applications of auxiliary brakes are available.
14.12.1 Controllability Check
If accumulator cannot be recharged: There are several malfunctions that may significantly
affect the handling characteristics in the cruise and landing
4. Make arrested landing as soon as practicable. configurations. These malfunctions include, but are not
limited to:
5. Parking brake  Pull (to lock wheels).
1. Spoiler malfunction*
2. Flap/slat asymmetry*
3. Structural damage
Complete loss of hydraulic fluid through the 4. Uncommanded SAS inputs*
wheelbrake hydraulic lines will render parking
brake ineffective. 5. Rudder malfunction (hardover)*
6. Wing−sweep asymmetry*
7. Jammed flight controls
8. ARI failure*
Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake application is *These malfunctions, which have unique NATOPS
165 knots at a gross weight of 46,000 pounds and procedures specific to a particular failure mode, should be
145 knots at 51,000 pounds. performed before beginning a controllability check.
14−35 ORIGINAL
NATOPS procedures cannot account for every poten D A controllability check requires the total
tial malfunction. It is absolutely imperative that the aircrew attention and awareness of the aircrew. The
thoroughly and safely evaluate the degraded handling char aircrew must be prepared to encounter
acteristics of the damaged or malfunctioning aircraft prior to unusual handling characteristics, since the
continued flight and landing. This check does not take prior aerodynamic properties of the aircraft may be
ity over existing emergency procedures. significantly changed. Stall speed, as well as
flight and ground handling characteristics,
Upon encountering a problem that alters the handling
may be drastically different from normal.
qualities of the aircraft, the aircrew should realize that the
aircraft may no longer be a stable airframe, especially in the Note
landing configuration. In addition, the flight characteristics
If flight control malfunction is due to uncom
may rapidly degrade or even become uncontrollable when
manded stab aug transients, spoiler malfunction,
normal configuration changes are introduced or during
flap/slat asymmetry, rudder malfunction (hard
airspeed changes. Increased awareness of flight parameters
over), and/or wingsweep malfunctions; perform
should prevail following a malfunction until the aircraft is
applicable emergency procedure(s) as necessary
safely on deck.
before beginning a controllability check.
Even though the aircraft may possess significantly
different or even hazardous flying qualities, the pilot and RIO 1. Climb to 10,000 feet AGL minimum.
have numerous cues available to them to warn of potential
problems. Some of these cues include: 2. Obtain visual check if possible.
1. Turn needle and ball position. 3. Decelerate gradually to 200 knots if feasible.
2. AOA.
4. Dirty aircraft  One configuration change at a time,
3. Buffet. while flying straight and level.
4. Yaw string position. Note
5. Flight control positions. Landing gear should be lowered before flaps. Do
6. Trim settings. not lower arresting hook until landing gear is
confirmed down and locked.
7. Roll−off.
5. If flaps are lowered, do so incrementally and be alert
8. Rate of descent. for a flap/slat asymmetry.
All cues should be very closely monitored, since they 6. If maneuver flaps are used for landing approach:
tell the pilot what the aircraft is doing or is about to do. wing sweep drive no. 1 and WG SWP DR No. 2/
Stall/departure recovery procedures and ejection MANUV FLAP cb’s pull (LD1 and LE1).
should be discussed prior to any controllability check. In the
Note
event of a stall/departure, NATOPS procedures should be
applied immediately. If during flap/slat transition, follow D Failure to pull wing sweep drive circuit break
uncommanded roll/yaw procedures. A rapid increase in ers (LD1 and LE1) could result in inadvertent
airspeed can be attained through judicial use of forward stick maneuver device retraction or wing sweep
and military power. during approach.
After a thorough controllability check (to include D Wingsweep warning, wingsweep advisory,
approach and waveoff/bolter performance and flight charac and flap caution lights will illuminate with
teristics), the aircrew must make the decision as to whether both wing sweep drive circuit breakers pulled
the aircraft can be safely landed aboard the carrier or should (LD1 and LE1).
be diverted.
7. Use differential thrust, if required, to achieve
acceptable flight characteristics.
8. Slow−fly aircraft to determine approach handling

D If aircraft stalls or departs in dirty configura
characteristics, including turns.
tion, immediately unload and place throttles
at military. Do not raise flaps until recovered.
(If during flap/slat transition, follow uncom
manded roll/yaw procedures.)
ORIGINAL 14−36
9. Fly simulated approach to evaluate lineup correc c. Asymmetric flaps and/or slats.
tions, power changes, and waveoff/bolter perfor
mance and flight characteristics. d. Uncommanded differential stabilizer and/or rud
der automatic flight control system inputs caused
10. For landing, use minimum safe control speed, but no by abnormal power transients.
slower than optimum AOA.
e. Rudder hardover.
11. If performance and flight characteristics dictate that
a CV landing is not possibledivert. *1. If flap transition: FLAP handle  Previous Position.
12. If diverting with a flight control malfunction *2. Rudder and stick  Opposite Roll/Yaw.
make an arrested landing, if possible.
Note
Note For spoiler malfunction, use lateral stick as pri
mary lateral control and rudder only as needed to
If normal landing rollout is attempted, flap han
maintain balanced flight.
dle should be checked down on deck with spoiler
brake selected to enable full ground roll braking *3. AOA  Below 12 Units.
authority.
*4. Downwing engine  MAX THRUST (if required).
13. If directional controllability is in question:
a. A shorebased arrested landing should be flown to *5. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress.
touchdown at or just prior to arresting gear.
Note
b. Use a landing signal officer if possible.
c. If arresting gear not engaged and performance following a power interrupt. If the MASTER
and flight characteristics permit, execute wave RESET pushbutton is depressed during the syn
off/touch−and−go, if possible. chronization time, an additional depression of
the MASTER RESET pushbutton will be
d. Expect directional excursions during waveoff/ required to restore spoiler functionality.
bolter, arrested landing, or landing rollout.
6. ROLL SAS  ON.
e. Nosewheel steering should not be engaged if rud
der pedal authority is restricted. 7. Roll trim  Opposite Stick (if required).
f. Use rudder, lateral stick, and/or differential brak
ing to oppose any directional excursions during 8. Out of control below 10,000 feet  Eject.
normal landing rollout.
9. Control regained, climb and investigate for the
g. Brief runway departure prior to landing and iden following:
tify any obstructions in close proximity to runway.
a. Flap and slat asymmetry.
14.12.2 Uncommanded Roll and/or Yaw b. SAS malfunction.
Note Note
D If uncommanded roll and/or yaw occurs dur SAS failure may cause uncommanded roll and/or
ing high AOA maneuvering (above 15 unit), yaw, even without illumination of the associated
assume departure from controlled flight and lights.
apply appropriate departure and/or spin
recovery procedures. c. Spoiler malfunction.
D Failures that may cause uncommanded roll d. Hardover rudder.
and/or yaw include, but are not limited to:
e. Structural damage.
a. Engine failure.
10. Slow−fly aircraft to determine controllability at
b. Stuck up spoiler. 10,000 feet AGL minimum.
14−37 ORIGINAL
14.12.3 DFCS Flight Control Failures aggressive maneuvering should be terminated. Departure
or Malfunctions resistance and landing characteristics may be significantly
degraded. Refer to Chapter 11 for high AOA flight character
Figure of DFCS caution lights: istics. Consideration should be given to performing a straight
in approach to a landing.
PITCH SAS ROLL DGR YAW DGR
In the pitch axis, it is not always possible to resolve
FCS CAUTION ARI DGR ARI/SAS OUT whether the loss is partial or total. Regardless, the difference
in flying qualities is small and no flight restriction is applied
DFCS caution lights fall into 3 levels of severity. due to PITCH SAS degrades.
Loss of redundancy The FCS CAUTION light indi 14.12.3.1 FCS CAUTION Light
cates some loss of DFCS redundancy. If FCS CAUTION is
on alone, then no DFCS authority or function has been lost. Note
It indicates that some sensor or function has been determined
faulty but that other sensors or functions are redundantly Verify maintenance file fault reporting acronyms
providing all the input necessary to enable the DFCS to use (RIO) to troubleshoot system for maintenance
full authority to provide all designed functions. The AFC debrief.
acronyms in continuous monitoring (CM) will also give some
indication of which axis or sensor has been declared invalid. 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress
Emergency procedures recommend limited supersonic
operations and adhering to high angle of attack maneuvering If light remains illuminated:
limitations (Figure 48) because a subsequent sensor failure
may abruptly restrict DFCS authority at a point that it is
needed for departure resistance or supersonic stability.
Loss of some authority The failure of certain sensors

or control surface actuators will cause some loss of authority
D The DFCS has lost redundancy, but has not
in part of the DFCS. If enough sensors or actuators become
lost any authority.
faulty, then a light in addition to the FCS CAUTION light will
illuminate. The light will indicate which axis or function has D The DFCS is potentially one failure away
become degraded. Loss of some authority will illuminate one from losing authority and may degrade to
of the caution lights in the top row or the ARI DGR light. The ROLL SAS OFF or YAW SAS OFF character
basic SAS and primary features of the system are operating istics with a subsequent failure
with some loss of authority. Some failures may not be readily
apparent to the aircrew until particular parts of the envelope 2. Airspeed Remain below 600 knots or 1.3 TMN
are reached. Check of acronyms in CM can help to define the and adhere to the following limitations:
exact nature of the degrade. For degraded authority in roll,
yaw or ARI, aggressive maneuvering should be terminated a. Above 0.5 TMN, no cross control inputs per
and speed reduced to subsonic if the lights do not clear with mitted above 10 units AOA.
MASTER RESET.
b. With maneuvering devices retracted, coordinate
Complete loss of SAS in an axis or ARI A complete all lateral stick inputs above 0.6 TMN and 15
loss of authority in the roll or yaw axis or in the ARI will be units AOA.
accompanied by the ARI/SAS OUT light. Determination of
which axis or function is lost depends upon what additional 14.12.3.2 PITCH SAS degrade
lights are illuminated. For example, complete loss of ARI
function is indicated by illumination of both ARI lights (the PITCH SAS failures do not significantly degrade per
ARI DGR and ARI/SAS OUT). Selecting roll or yaw STAB formance in the longitudinal axis, and incur no flight enve
AUG switches off will disable all ARI but will illuminate lope restrictions. It is possible that the spoilers may be inop
only the ARI/SAS OUT light. Adhere to SAS OFF limits. erative with a complete failure of the pitch axis.
Similarly in roll and yaw axis, illumination of both 14.12.3.2.1 PITCH SAS Light
lights in an axis (i.e., ROLL DGR and ARI/SAS OUT) indi
cates complete loss of authority in the associated axis (Roll 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress.
axis). With the complete loss of ROLL or YAW SAS or ARI,
ORIGINAL 14−38
2. If light remains illuminated No limitations. 14.12.3.4 ROLL SAS, YAW SAS, or ARI failure
More serious failures that shut down all inputs in the

roll or yaw axis will light the ARI/SAS OUT light along with
the ROLL DGR or YAW DGR light. If all ARI functions are
lost then both ARI DGR and the ARI/SAS OUT light will
D The spoilers may be inoperative (ground roll illuminate. Failure of both roll or yaw series actuators will
braking) with a complete failure of the pitch also illuminate the ARI/SAS OUT light. The ROLL STAB
computer. AUG switch will remain in the ON position. In the DFCS, the
switch is over center".
D If spoilers are inoperative the degradation in
the roll axis may be severe and a careful slow Complete ROLL SAS failures create a very significant
flight should be conducted to determine loss of the DFCS capabilities. CV landings with ROLL SAS
whether a CV approach should be attempted. failures can be accomplished with moderate effort provided
Refer to spoiler failure procedure. all spoilers are operating. If spoilers are inoperative the deg
radation in the roll axis may be severe and a careful slow
Note flight should be conducted to determine whether a CV
D The PITCH SAS light will illuminate with any approach should be attempted. Refer to spoiler failure proce
degrade to authority. Additional failures or a dures, section 14.12.6.
complete loss of SAS functions in the pitch
axis may not provide any further warning. A second yaw series failure or a complete loss of yaw
axis authority is indicated when the ARI/SAS OUT light
D The autopilot will not be operational with a illuminates in addition to the YAW DGR light. The YAW
complete PITCH SAS failure. STAB switch is not automatically positioned to OFF. CV
landings with total YAW SAS failure require increased atten
14.12.3.3 ROLL SAS, YAW SAS, or ARI degrade tion to control of directional oscillations especially in turbu
lence and/or during lineup corrections. Severely decreased
When the roll or yaw axes become degraded, the yaw damping will be evident throughout the envelope.
affected axis and ARI will operate with reduced authority.
Single series actuator failure or any other degrade to author 14.12.3.4.1 ARI/SAS OUT Light (with ROLL DGR,
ity is indicated by the ROLL DGR or YAW DGR light in YAW DGR or ARI DGR Light)
conjunction with the ARI DGR light. This indicates that
affected axis and ARI has less than normal authority. This 1. Ensure ROLL and YAW STAB AUG switches
may not be readily apparent to the pilot at all flight condi ON.
tions. However, since the control system has malfunctioned
and lost authority, departure resistance may be significantly 2. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress.
reduced. Certain air data failures can cause the ARI to
degrade without loss of authority in either the roll or yaw If lights remain illuminated:
axis. For all Roll, Yaw and ARI degrades, supersonic flight
and aggressive maneuvering should be terminated. Precau 3. Leave STAB AUG switches ON
tionary flight restrictions are imposed as listed below.
To take advantage of any remaining capa−
14.12.3.3.1 ROLL DGR Light, YAW DGR Light bility that the DFCS may be able to provide.
and/or ARI DGR Light Terminate aggressive maneuvering and remain
below 1.0 TMN.
2. If light remains illuminated, aggressive maneuver

ing should be terminated.
3. Remain below 1.0 TMN. Maneuvering with YAW SAS OFF or inoperative
shall not be conducted above 15 units AOA with
Note landing gear retracted.
Rudder pedal shakers inop if YAW B fail.
14−39 ORIGINAL
4. Perform Controllability Check procedure. 14.12.4 Rudder Authority Failure

Scheduling of allowable rudder deflection is computed
in the CADC as a function of dynamic pressure. If the
command signals and position feedback do not agree, power
is removed, stopping further movement and the RUDDER
AUTH light illuminates. Directional authority is never less
D If spoilers are inoperative the degradation in than 9.5° of rudder.
the roll axis may be severe and a careful slow
flight should be conducted to determine 14.12.4.1 RUDDER AUTH Light
whether a CV approach should be attempted.
Refer to spoiler failure procedure. 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress
(10 seconds).
D CV landings with total YAW SAS failure
require increased attention to control of direc 2. If light remains illuminated  Above 250 Knots,
tional oscillations especially in turbulence restrict rudder inputs to less than 10°.
and/or during lineup corrections.
D Rudder pedal shakers inop if YAW B fail.
Note
D With rudder authority stops failed open,
ROLL DGR and ARI/SAS OUT lights may auto excess rudder authority is available and could
matically extinguish upon selection of gear han result in structural damage above 250 knots.
dle down. This is indicative of a DFCS dual air
data failure (AOA or Mach sensor inputs). These D After landing, nosewheel steering authority
failures inhibit ROLL SAS and ARI functions in may be restricted to 10° (with neutral direc
cruise configuration, but not in the landing con tional trim) and differential braking is
figuration. required coming out of the arresting gear.
14.12.3.5 STAB AUG Transients 14.12.4.2 Rudder Hardover

A rudder hardover will result in a single fully deflected
1. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress (over 30 degrees, pegged on cockpit indicator) inboard or
outboard rudder with possible restricted opposing good"
2. Airspeed Decelerate below 400 knots or 1.0 TMN.
rudder authority and a flight hydraulic failure. Rudder trim
3. STAB AUG switches All OFF. and rudder pedal authority may also be restricted. This
procedure only applies to a true rudder hardover failure, not
a YAW SAS hardover failure which will be manifested by both
Note
rudders being deflected up to 9.5 degrees with mechanical
With ROLL or YAW STAB AUG OFF, the ARI/ rudder authority still available. A YAW SAS hardover should
SAS OUT light will be illuminated. be easily controlled with rudder trim and the available
mechanical rudder. In cruise configuration above 15 units
4. STAB AUG switches Reset (reset individually to angle of attack, a departure from controlled flight may occur
isolate failure). with a rudder hardover. Upright departure/spin recovery
procedures may not fully recover the airplane, and it may be
5. Perform Controllability Check procedure. necessary to perform uncommanded roll/yaw procedures.
14.12.3.6 Single PITCH or ROLL STAB Light
1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.

With zero flight hydraulic pressure, ensure
hydraulic transfer pump is secured as soon as
possible. In the event of hydraulic malfunction
refer to appropriate hydraulic emergency proce
dure and execute appropriate steps in parallel as
required.
ORIGINAL 14−40
After completion of uncommanded roll/yaw procedures: Note
1. Confirm rudder hardover via cockpit indicator Recommend practice approach to cv, fuel
and/or RIO/wingman visual inspection. permitting.
6. If no suitable divert available and controlled cv
Note
approach is in question, perform a controlled ejection.
Restriction of authority, if any, of opposing
Prior to landing:
good" rudder may be determined by reference
to the cockpit indicator.
2. If carrier−based, divert to an airfield with short field

arresting gear.
Controllability of a rudder hardover airborne is
3. Perform controllability check procedure. no indication of the ability to maintain direc
tional control on deck. Upon touchdown, expect
Note the aircraft to experience uncontrollable direc
tional excursions potentially departing the land
D Expect roll and yaw oscillations during ing area/runway.
throttle and control movements. Undesirable Note
airspeed increase may occur due to differen
tial thrust. Airspeed control may also be D Ensure familiarity with landing consider
influenced by flap position and pilot work ations of controllability check procedures.
load. Specifically, evaluate the effects of any D Simulation indicated that bank angle control
required differential thrust on lineup correc was enhanced by leading lateral stick inputs
tions, waveoff/bolter performance, and flight with differential thrust.
characteristics.
D Simulation has indicated that full flap setting 7. Lateral trimNeutralize.
combined with severely restricted opposing Note
rudder results in more pronounced roll and
yaw oscillations. The use of lateral trim to reduce stick forces dur
ing actual approach and landing should be
4. During cruise, use differential thrust, rudder, lateral avoided as this reduces the spoiler deflection
stick, and rudder trim to relieve pilot workload and available for roll control.
control forces. Use lateral trim as necessary.
8. ASYM thrust limiter SWOff (if required).
If jettison is required, consideration should be Asymmetric thrust limiter should only be dis
given to keeping the wing stations symmetric and abled if required to assist/maintain control.
avoiding aft cg. conditions.
9. Perform arrested landing.
Note
It is unknown what the fuel consumption will be
in this configuration. Therefore, fuel quantity
must be closely monitored. Recommend using
gear up, flaps down, single engine bingo charts. Use only opposing throttle for waveoff/bolter.
Fuel imbalance may occur during prolonged
flight with higher demands on one engine. Use
feed switch to minimize fuel split.
5. If no suitable divert available and aircraft suffi

If rudder pedal authority is restricted, nosewheel
ciently controllable for cv approach, attempt cv
steering should not be engaged upon landing
arrested landing.
rollout.
14−41 ORIGINAL
14.12.4.3 Runaway Stabilizer Trim pressure. Failure of the lateral stick stops is indicated by the
HZ TAIL AUTH caution light. Failure of the stops in the fully
A runaway trim failure is sensed by the pilot by both
closed position does limit low−speed rolling performance,
uncommanded stick motion and by changes in aircraft pitch
but ample roll control is available for all landing conditions
and load factor. This failure state causes the horizontal tail to
and configurations. Failure in the open condition, with SAS
move along the normal stick−to−tail gearing curve for the on, requires the pilot to manually limit stick deflection to
hands−off condition. Aircraft response to a runaway stabilizer
prevent exceeding fuselage torsional load limit.
trim, even in the high−speed configuration, is slow enough
(about 1° per second stabilizer change) to be recovered from 14.12.5.1 HZ TAIL AUTH Light
safely.
The most critical steady−state trim conditions are those 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress
for which the greatest stick force is required. A field or carrier (10 seconds).
landing with either a full noseup or nosedown runaway stabi If light remains illuminated above 400 KIAS/0.9 IMN:
lizer trim requires an average stick force of 14 to 19 pounds
to maintain longitudinal control. If pilot fatigue becomes a 2. ROLL STAB AUG switch  OFF.
factor with full noseup trim, stick forces may be significantly
reduced by placing the wings aft of 21° and lowering the Note
FLAP handle causing the main flaps to extend while the ARI/SAS OUT light will illuminate.
auxiliary flaps remain retracted.
3. Restrict lateral control inputs above 400 KIAS/
This overrides the wing sweep 21° interlock and the 0.9 IMN to one−quarter throw.
FLAP light will be illuminated. This configuration is not
recommended for landing. At approach speed, the worst
nosedown trim condition requires a maximum stick pull of
27 pounds without DLC engaged and approximately 24
pounds with DLC engaged. A full noseup runaway trim
requires a maximum of 17 pounds of stick push without DLC
Above 400 KIAS/0.9 IMN there is a danger of
engaged and 23 pounds with DLC engaged.
torsional overstress to the fuselage with large
Note lateral stick deflections.
With abnormal stabilizer trim response, continu 4. Reduce airspeed and remain below 400 KIAS/
ing to trim may preclude ability to retrim to a 0.9 IMN.
neutral position.
Below 400 KIAS/0.9 IMN:
1. SPD BK/P−ROLL TRIM ENABLE cbPull
(RB2). 5. ROLL STAB AUG switch  ON.
2. Decelerate to below 300 knots. Note
3. Use DFCS, if available, in cruise configuration to At low airspeeds, lateral control effectiveness
reduce pilot workload. may be reduced.
4. Minimum stick forces are achieved under the fol 6. Do not select OV SW after landing.
lowing conditions:
a. Runaway nosedown  flaps up. 14.12.6 Spoiler Malfunction
b. Runaway noseup  flaps down. Spoiler monitoring and fault isolation is internal to the
DFCS. DFCS should recognize and disable any malfunction
5. Straight−in approach. ing spoiler and permit other spoilers to operate normally.
Note DFCS will therefore automatically maintain greater control
authority in event of a spoiler malfunction.
Force required (push or pull) may be as much as
30 pounds. For malfunctions where failed spoilers are successfully
commanded to trail, straight−in full flap CV approaches can
14.12.5 Horizontal Tail Authority Failure be accomplished with minor degradation in handling quali
ties. The control capability remaining with a failed up spoiler
Lateral stick input are limited by control authority is influenced by flap position, SAS operation, and availabil
stops scheduled by the CADC as a function of dynamic ity of the remaining spoilers.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 14−42
14.12.6.1 SPOILERS Caution Light/Spoiler the critical factor. With flaps down, roll control
Malfunction/Spoiler Stuck Up using lateral stick alone may be impossible.
However, with flaps up, adequate roll control to
regain wings level flight is available with use of
lateral stick alone. Choice of flap position for
landing and CV recovery/divert decision should
be made following a controllability check.
If the current configuration is acceptable for
landing, careful consideration should be given 4. Perform Controllability Check procedure, para
before depressing MASTER RESET when a graph 14.12.1, using maneuvering flap/slat
spoiler actuator mechanical malfunction is sus (preferred) or no flap configuration only.
pected. A deployed spoiler that resulted from
Note
DFCS computers dropping off line is not consid
ered a mechanical failure. If controllability is unsuitable for landing
approach due to a complete loss of spoilers, con
Note
sideration may be given to attempting a Power
D Use lateral stick as primary control and rudder On Reset (POR) in an attempt to regain at least
only as needed to maintain balanced flight. one spoiler set. See DFCS POR procedures
paragraph 14.12.6.3.
D Subsequent depression of the MASTER
RESET pushbutton may clear failure until If controllability satisfactory:
spoiler is commanded to move again. 5. Perform maneuver flap/slat or no flap straight−in
approach at or above minimum control airspeed.
If controllability still unsatisfactory:
Note
RESET pushbutton is depressed during the syn
With both INBD and OUTBD spoiler control cb’s
the MASTER RESET pushbutton will be
pulled, all opposing spoiler control will be lost.
required to restore spoiler functionality.
If failure remains/reoccurs:
2. Avoid abrupt lateral control movements and high
roll rates. Marginal control or loss of control may be expe
rienced due to removal of a spoiler set with multi
ple failures present.
Note
With wings forward of 62°, excessive horizontal If multiple failed up spoiler panels result in unsat
tail differential may cause severe structural isfactory handling qualities regardless of flap
damage. position, an attempt may be made to fail the panels
down by removing power via the corresponding
If spoiler(s) fail down: spoiler control cb’s. This may take as long as 60
3. Perform Controllability Check procedure, para seconds, and result in a marginal control situation
graph 14.12.1. or loss of control situation because power to the
other spoilers has been removed. Therefore, it
If spoiler(s) remain up or floating, or if control should be considered only as a last resort.
unsatisfactory with flaps down:
5. SPOILER CONTR cb for affected pair Pull (8G9
Note for INBD, 9C5 for OUTBD).
Any single, fully deflected, failed up spoiler is
If uncontrollable roll, or no improvement in
controllable even with flaps down and ROLL
controllability:
SAS OFF if the remaining spoilers are operating.
With multiple failures, aircraft configuration is 6. SPOILER CONTR cb (affected spoiler) Reset.
14−43 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
7. MASTER RESET pushbutton Depress. 2. Evaluate flaps−down lateral control characteristics

Functionality lost from cycling spoiler control cb at safe altitude.
will not be regained until the MASTER RESET
pushbutton is depressed. If unacceptable:
8. If Unsuitable for landing, Perform Controlled 3. Make flaps−up landing.

Ejection.
14.12.6.3 DFCS Power On Reset (POR)
If controllability improves:
If controllability is unsuitable for landing approach due
9. Perform straight−in approach in best configuration to complete loss of spoilers or other major flight control
with cb(s) out. malfunction, consideration may be given to attempting a
flight control computer reset in an attempt to regain adequate
Note controllability for landing. A POR will reinitialize the DFCS
computers, interpreting the current sensor information as
D Outboard spoiler position indicators will indi valid. This can create a potentially hazardous situation under
cate down with cb 9C5 pulled. conditions where a dual sensor failure occurred prior to
restoring power. When the DFCS reinitializes, it is possible
D With cb’s 8G9 and 9C5 pulled, ground roll
for the failed signals to be interpreted as valid and the remain
braking is not available. Reset on landing rol
ing good signal to be interpreted as invalid. Therefore, care
lout if desired. ful consideration should be given before executing a POR
airborne, since it can result in erroneous DFCS commanded
14.12.6.2 Outboard Spoiler Module Malfunction control deflections. Aircrew must be alert for erroneous
uncommanded SAS and/or spoiler control inputs following
an airborne POR.
An outboard spoiler module failure with flaps

extended, below 180 knots, and with a combined
hydraulic failure rendering the inboard spoilers If a dual failure has been declared that will not
inoperative, can result in asymmetric spoiler clear with a MASTER RESET, performing a
float such that the aircraft may not be flyable at power on reset (POR) to clear the failure can
normal approach airspeeds. result in erroneous uncommanded SAS and/or
spoiler control inputs.
Note
As with any controllability check, a POR should
If outboard spoilers fail with airspeed greater be performed above 10,000 ft AGL and in the
than 225 knots and wing sweep is less than 62°, cruise configuration between 250 and 300 knots
limit lateral stick to one−half pilot authority. if possible to minimize the potential effects of
transient series servo actuator inputs.
1. OUTBD SPOILER PUMP cb  Check (2B3).
1. BOTH SPOILER CONTR cb’s Pull (8G9, INBD
a. If OUT  Attempt Reset. and 9C5, OUTBD).
b. If IN and outboard spoiler module flag indicates 2. PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB AUG switches
OFF  Pull. OFF.
The following important equipment is inoperative: 3. ROLL A DC, YAW B DC, and YAW A DC cb’s
(8B4, 8B5, and 8B6) Cycle (RIO). Observe
(1) Outboard SPOILERS. PITCH SAS, ROLL DGR, YAW DGR, FCS CAU
TION, ARI DGR, ARI/SAS OUT, SPOILERS, HZ
(2) FLAP and SLAT BACKUP. TAIL AUTH, RUDDER AUTH, and AUTOPILOT
caution lights illuminated.
(3) ACL.
ORIGINAL 14−44
Note If no uncommanded ROLL SAS control inputs:

Attempt to reset cb’s 8B4, 8B5, and 8B6 simulta 6. Reset SPOILER CONTR cb’s.
neously to optimize DFCS power−up sequence.
7. Perform Controllability Check procedure.
14.12.7 FLAP Light
Observe all lights extinguished with the exception of
ARI/SAS OUT light due to ROLL and YAW STAB
switches OFF. 14.12.7.1 Not After Landing/Takeoff Flap
Transition
1. Airspeed  Below 225 Knots.
2. FLAP handle  Ensure Full Up.
D If the system continues to display any DFCS
related caution lights following MASTER
RESET, this could be indicative of a recurring 4. While holding MASTER RESET pushbutton
flight control malfunction. depressed, maneuver flap thumbwheel  Full
D If a SPOILERS caution light will not extin Forward.
guish following the execution of a POR,
5. Check FLAP light out (light can take up to 10 sec
selection of ROLL STAB AUG switch ON
onds to reilluminate).
can result in erroneous uncommanded SAS
control inputs.
14.12.7.2 After Landing/Takeoff Flap Transition,
D When attempting to individually reset or Reillumination After Above
PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB AUG Procedures
switches, be prepared to isolate the affected
STAB AUG switch OFF if any uncommanded 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.
SAS inputs are observed.
2. If light still illuminated, check FLAP handle and
Note indicator position, then proceed with appropriate
D Minimize control stick inputs during or fol steps below.
lowing MASTER RESET as this can result in
the SPOILERS caution light with SPOILER 14.12.7.3 FLAP Handle Up and Flaps Not Fully
CONTR cb’s pulled. Retracted
D More than one MASTER RESET may be 1. FLAP handle  EMER UP.
required to extinguish all caution lights.
If FLAP handle or flaps will not respond or FLAP
5. Individually select PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB light remains illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat
AUG switches ON. Asymmetry procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.
If any uncommanded SAS control inputs: 14.12.7.4 FLAP Handle Up and Flaps Indicating
Full Up
6. Affected STAB AUG switch OFF.
1. Flaps  Cycle.
light remains illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat
Asymmetry procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.
If uncommanded ROLL SAS inputs are observed
following a POR, reselection of the SPOILER 14.12.7.5 FLAP Handle Down and Flaps Not Fully
CONTR cb’s can result in full spoiler deflection Extended
and an out of control aircraft.
1. Wing sweep  Ensure at 20°.
7. If uncommanded ROLL SAS control inputs, DO
NOT reset SPOILER CONTR cb’s. Flaps will not respond or FLAP light remains
illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat Asymmetry
8. Perform Controllabilty Check procedure. procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.
14−45 ORIGINAL
14.12.7.6 FLAP Handle Down and Flaps Down 1. FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF cb  Check
In (RA2).
2. Wing sweep  Ensure at 20_.
3. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress (allow 10

seconds for auxiliary flaps to extend).
Note Lack of asymmetry protection (RA2 circuit

breaker out) may cause uncommanded roll
and/or yaw during flap or landing gear handle
light remains illuminated, refer to Flap and Slat
movement.
Asymmetry procedures, paragraph 14.12.8.
2. FLAPS  Match Handle With Flaps Position.
14.12.8 Flap and Slat Asymmetry
3. Obtain visual check if possible to ascertain position
Flap and slat asymmetry can occur with failure of an of all flap and slat surfaces.
asymmetry sensor and subsequent failure of the flap and slat
drive mechanism for one wing. The pilot’s only indication 4. Slow−fly aircraft in approach configuration at or
will be an uncommanded roll followed by a FLAP light above 10,000 feet AGL to determine approach char
approximately 10 seconds later. The flap indicator does not acteristics, conditions permitting.
indicate actual flap position, but the position to which the flap
and slat control box has been driven. The slat indicator shows 5. Land as soon as practicable if aircraft is controllable
up, down, or transition (barber pole) for the starboard slat and minimum approach airspeed is within ship
only. The port slat position is not monitored. Asymmetric board arresting gear limits.
flaps cause an immediate roll. Asymmetric slats may not be
apparent until just before wing stall. Asymmetric slats can If asymmetry is so large as to make landing impossible
cause rapid rolloff above 15 units AOA. Slat position must be or minimum safe approach speed is above shipboard arrest
monitored by the RIO during transition. ing gear limits with no possible divert field available:
6. Climb above 10,000 feet AGL.
7. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb  Pull (8G3).
The use of lateral trim to reduce stick force will

reduce spoiler control significantly. An uncon
trollable situation can develop if lateral trim is
out of neutral before flap and slat asymmetry or
Failure to complete step 7 before the subsequent
if the pilot trims laterally in the neutral direction
(opposite the roll) during flap and slat transition. steps can result in large uncommanded pitch trim
This situation will be aggravated and recovery changes because of auxiliary flap movement.
may not be possible with ROLL SAS OFF
8. FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF cb  Pull
because of reduced differential tail authority.
(RA2).
Once asymmetry occurs, do not trim out stick
forces. If lateral control is marginal, trim oppo 9. Slowly move FLAP handle in direction to minimize
site to the natural direction until full spoiler asymmetry and/or lateral control requirements.
deflection is available. For example, stick to the
right, trim left. 10. Stop flap and slat travel before reaching full up or
down.
If a roll is encountered during flap and slat transition or
if RIO notes asymmetric slat extension or retraction: 11. FLAP/SLAT CONTR SHUT−OFF cb  Reset
(RA2).
Note
Uncommanded roll/yaw procedures take prece
dence if appropriate. Otherwise perform the pro
cedures below.
ORIGINAL 14−46
14.12.10 Unscheduled Wing Sweep
1. Emergency WING SWEEP handle  Raise and

Hold.
Asymmetric slats may not be apparent until just
before wing stall. Asymmetric slats can cause
rapid rolloff above 15 units AOA.
12. If asymmetry has been corrected, land using 15 units

AOA. Unscheduled wing sweep at supersonic speed
may cause structural damage.
13. If asymmetry has not been corrected, flaps and slats
did not respond to above procedure, or lateral con 2. Airspeed  Decelerate to 0.6 TMN or Less in 1g
trol problems exist, land using minimum safe AOA Nonmaneuvering Flight.
if landing is elected.
3. Emergency WING SWEEP handle  Full Forward.
14.12.9 WING SWEEP Lights
If wings do not move full forward:
14.12.9.1 Advisory Light Only − No Loss of
Normal Control 4. EMERGENCY WING SWEEP handle  Match
With Actual Wing Position.
5. WING SWEEP DRIVE NO. 1 and WG SWP DR
14.12.9.2 WING SWEEP Light and W/S Caution NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb  Pull (LD1, LE1) (refer
Legend  No Automatic or Manual to aft wing−sweep landing).
Control
6. Land a soon as practicable.
1. Airspeed  Decelerate to 0.9 Mach or Less.
Note
2. Check spider detent engaged.
D After a wing−sweep malfunction, the WING
3. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress (wait SWEEP advisory light and the W/S legend
15 seconds to determine system status). may take 15 seconds to illuminate/display.
D FLAP light will be illuminated with cb LE1
If WING SWEEP light and W/S caution legend pulled.
illuminate again:
14.12.11 CADC Light
NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb  Pull (LD1, LE1). 1. MASTER RESET pushbutton  Depress.
5. Emergency WING SWEEP handle  Comply with 2. CADC cb’s (LA2, LB2, LC2, LD2)  Cycle.
below schedule:
a. ≤ 0.4 Mach  20°.
b. ≤ 0.7 Mach  25°. If light still remains illuminated:
c. ≤ 0.8 Mach  50°. 4. Remain below 1.5 Mach.
d. ≤ 0.9 Mach  60_.
One or more of the following systems may be affected
e. > 0.9 Mach  68°. by CADC malfunction that illuminates only the CADC light.
a. Maximum safe Mach.
b. Autopilot.
Avoid ACM and aerobatics. c. Idle lockup function of AFTC.
14−47 ORIGINAL
d. Wing−sweep indicator.
e. Cockpit cooling less than Mach 0.25.
f. HUD Display. With RATS enabled airborne, military power

provides 20 to 25 percent less thrust than normal,
Note resulting in less than optimum waveoff and
bolter performance.
D Erroneous Mach inputs to the AFTC may
cause uncommanded acceleration of both
If two or more of the above anomalies are detected, the
engines to near−military values in the PRI
following action should be taken:
engine mode.
D If illumination of the CADC light is accompa 14.12.13.1 In Flight Pilot
nied by other caution or advisory light(s),
refer to the appropriate procedure that will 1. Throttles  Any Position Except IDLE.
dictate the most restrictive limitation.
14.12.12 AUTOPILOT Light

Do not move both throttles to IDLE unless ANTI
SKID SPOILER BK switch is set to OFF if
14.12.13 Weight On−Off Wheels Switch weight on−off wheels switch is suspected because
Malfunction of loss of thrust and lift caused by nozzles open
ing and spoilers deploying.
For most systems, failure of both the left and right
WOW switches is required to cause the systems to revert to 2. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch  OFF.
the on−deck mode. Should such failures occur, the following
anomalies can result: 3. Land as soon as practicable.
1. Approach indexers are inoperative.
2. APC will not engage.
3. Outboard spoiler module is inoperative (flaps up). If weight on−off wheels switch failure is sus
pected, cocked up, high sink rate landing with
4. Nozzles may go full open (with LDG GEAR handle throttles at idle can result in damage to the after
down, throttles IDLE). burner.
5. Ground−roll spoiler braking (throttles IDLE).
14.12.13.2 In Flight RIO
6. Radar will not scan.
1. MLG SAFETY RLY NO. 1 and NO. 2 cb 
7. Autopilot cannot be engaged. Pull (7F5, 7F4).
Note
8. BOL chaff will not dispense.
D Circuit breakers can be reset after touchdown
9. At high altitude, ground cooling fans may over to enable ground−roll braking, antiskid,
speed and shut down, causing smoke in cockpit. nozzles open at idle, and nosewheel steering.
10. RATS will be enabled airborne with the hook handle D Circuit breakers must be reset simultaneously
down or the hook out of the stowed position. (within 0.1 sec) once on deck or a secondary
fault may be incurred which will inhibit
ground roll braking.
ORIGINAL 14−48
14.13 DEPARTURE/SPIN 3. If roll and/or yaw develop, wait until aircraft is in a

nosedown attitude and accelerating before correct-
Successful recovery from out−of−control flight requires ing with rudder or lateral stick.
correct situation analysis, timely and correct application of
procedures, crew coordination, and recognition of recovery. 4. Use longitudinal control as necessary to keep nose
Departure from controlled flight should be recognized and down and accelerating.
the appropriate recovery procedures initiated as soon as the
aircraft begins uncommanded motion. Throttles should be 5. Above 100 knots, pull out, using 17 units AOA.
immediately placed to IDLE to ensure maximum stall margin
6. Recovery to level flight from point of pitchover can
and prevent asymmetric thrust from delaying recovery. If
normally be completed in less than 10,000 feet.
recovery is not immediately apparent, instrument cues must
be cross−checked. Full departures/spins are indicated by
14.13.2 Upright Departure/Flat Spin
pegged AOA (30 units for upright, 0 units for inverted), low
airspeed (less than 150 knots), and sustained yaw rate as
*1. Stick  Forward/Neutral Lateral
indicated by the turn needle and/or spin arrow. The spin
Harness  Lock
arrow is the best indicator of yaw direction if it is available.
If the above indications are not present, neutralize the con- *2. Throttles  Both IDLE.
trols and fly the aircraft as airspeed increases. Recovery con-
trols should be applied and maintained until recovery is indi- *3. Rudder  Rudder−Opposite Turn Needle/Yaw/
cated, minimum altitude reached, or an increase in Spin Arrow.
eyeball−out g threatens aircrew incapacitation. The most pos-
itive indication of recovery is a break in AOA as yaw rate is If no recovery:
reduced, followed by an increase in airspeed and g load in the
direction commanded by longitudinal stick. To minimize *4. Stick  Into Turn Needle.
altitude loss for recovery, pull out at 17 units AOA.
If yaw rate is steady/increasing, spin arrow is flashing, or
Crew coordination is essential. The RIO must be able eyeball−out g is sensed:
to analyze the situation and provide timely and accurate
information and procedural backup to the pilot without *5. ROLL SAS  ON
excess communication. The RIO should use airspeed, alti- Stick  Full Into Turn Needle and Aft.
tude remaining, and the spin arrow as cues. Lateral stick
application can be confirmed by observing spoilers deflected If recovery is indicated:
up on the wing pointed to by the spin arrow. Ejection in an
out−of−control flight situation can best be accomplished by *6. Controls  Neutralize.
the RIO after consultation with the pilot. A thorough under-
standing of Chapter 11, Flight Characteristics, is required of *7. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as required.
the aircrew when dealing with these high task emergencies.
If flat spin verified by flat attitude, increasing yaw rate,
14.13.1 Vertical Recovery increasing eyeball−out g, and lack of pitch and roll rates:
1. Above 100 knots, use longitudinal stick to pitch the *8. Canopy  Jettison.
nose down. At extreme nose−high attitudes, aft stick
facilitates recovery time and will avoid prolonged *9. EJECT  RIO Command Eject.
engine operation with zero oil pressure.
2. Below 100 knots, release controls and wait for air-

craft to pitch nose down. This prevents depletion of
hydraulic pressure in the event both engines are lost
and provides quickest recovery. Ejection guidelines are not meant to prohibit ear-
lier canopy jettison and/or ejection. If insuffi-
cient altitude exists to recover from departed
flight, the flightcrew should not hesitate to eject.
14−49 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
Note If recovery is indicated:
D At high yaw rates where eyeball−out g is *4. Controls  Neutralize.

sensed, aft stick and full lateral stick into the
*5. Recover at 17 units AOA, thrust as required.
turn needle may arrest the yaw rate and
increase the possibility of recovery. At these
If spinning below 10,000 feet AGL:
yaw rates, the additional differential tail pro-
vided by ROLL SAS ON will also increase the *6. EJECT  RIO Command Eject.
possibility of recovery.
D It may be necessary to center stick laterally
momentarily to engage ROLL SAS.
14.13.3 Inverted Departure/Spin

Dual compressor stalls may be expected in an
*1. Stick  Full AFT/Neutral Lateral inverted spin.
Harness  Lock.
Note
*2. Throttles  Both IDLE.
If pedal adjustment and/or pilot positioning
*3. Rudder  Rudder−Opposite Turn Needle/Yaw/Spin (because of negative g forces) is such that full
Arrow. rudder pedal travel cannot be obtained, full
lateral control opposite the turn needle/yaw may
provide an alternate recovery method. Aft
longitudinal stick should be relaxed enough to
allow full lateral stick application.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 14−50
CHAPTER 15
Landing Emergencies
15.1 DUAL−ENGINE LANDING, ONE OR degrade waveoff performance. The LSO should move the
BOTH ENGINES IN SECONDARY MODE waveoff window such that only minor glideslope/lineup
corrections are required from in the middle position.
With either one engine in secondary mode (the other
engine in primary) or both engines in secondary mode, a
straight−in approach should be conducted with slats and flaps
fully extended, 15 units AOA, DLC engaged, and speed
brakes extended. Approaches can be accomplished safely up
to the normal gross weight limits of the aircraft. Throttle Waveoff performance with both engines in SEC
position in secondary mode will be 5° to 10° higher than in mode may be severely degraded. Extreme care
primary mode for the same amount of thrust. Thrust response should be used to avoid an underpowered,
in secondary mode is nonlinear and very sluggish. Engine high−rate−of−descent situation.
acceleration time can be as much as three times longer than
in primary mode. Secondary mode MIL power thrust levels 15.2 SINGLE−ENGINE LANDING PRIMARY MODE
can vary from as little as 65 percent to as much as 116 percent
of primary mode MIL thrust. Perform a straight−in approach with flaps and slats
extended and speedbrakes retracted (to reduce thrust
required). External tanks have a negligible effect on thrust
required and need to be dropped only if necessary for gross
weight considerations. If operating on the left engine, DLC
is available and is recommended. DLC can be used to aid in
For shipboard landing, the LSO and tower must the control of glideslope, thereby minimizing required power
be informed if the landing is to be made with both changes and the resultant lateral/directional deviations. The
engines in secondary mode to ensure wind− 8−knot increase in airspeed with DLC engaged results in more
over−deck requirements are met as RATS is not control authority and improved waveoff and bolter perfor
operative in secondary mode. mance. Flight in the power approach configuration is critical.
Turns should be made away from the failed engine using
During flight tests with one engine in secondary mode, bank angles that do not exceed 20°. Remain below 12 units
optimum results were obtained by matching the engines’ AOA until established on final approach. Final approach
rpm prior to commencing final approach and maintaining the should be conducted at 15 units AOA with DLC engaged/14
throttle split when making power corrections. Use of DLC to units with DLC stowed (DLC is not available when combined
make small glideslope changes will improve lineup control hydraulic system is pressurized by the BI−DI pump). Small
by reducing throttle activity and the associated yaw excur rudder inputs should be made in conjunction with power
sions. Waveoff and bolter performance is essentially the changes to reduce the amount of yaw.
same as in dual−engine primary mode except for a slight yaw
into the secondary mode engine. Waveoff and bolter (with RATS) may be accomplished
up to normal gross weight limits of the aircraft. Test results
With both engines in secondary mode, expect very have shown that MIL power provides satisfactory waveoff
sluggish power response and throttle positions 5° to 10° more performance. Minimum AB (ATLS on) reduces altitude loss
forward than in primary mode. Extreme care should be taken when waveoff occurs from a high rate of descent. The use of
to avoid an underpowered condition as this will significantly maximum AB is prohibited.
15−1 ORIGINAL
No significant difference in altitude loss during the yaw rate and then reduce the rudder as required to track
waveoff was noted between minimum AB and maximum centerline. If unable to control yaw rate during AB waveoff
AB. The aircraft is extremely difficult to control in maximum (possible ATLS failure), immediately reduce power to MIL.
AB and large bank angles into the operating engine are
required to maintain centerline. Late or inadequate control
inputs during a maximum AB waveoff can result in large
lateral flightpath deviations. Waveoff technique is to select
MIL or minimum AB (ATLS on), maintain approach AOA
until a positive rate of climb is established, then accelerate Use of maximum AB during waveoff or bolter is
and climb out at the airspeed indicated in the Climb prohibited. If unable to control yaw rate (possible
Performance After Takeoff (Single Engine) Charts in ATLS failure), immediately reduce power to
NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1. MIL.
During single−engine operations at fuel states above

Note 4,000 pounds, a fuel split will develop between the aft/left
and forward/right sides. When either cell No. 2 or cell No. 5
Altitude loss during a single−engine waveoff is thermistor is uncovered (at approximately 2,000 pounds on
minimized by maintaining approach AOA until either tape), or when FWD or AFT is selected on the FEED
a positive rate of climb is established. Avoid switch, the motive flow isolation and sump tank interconnect
overrotating in close as this will increase the valves open, making wing and fuselage fuel on both sides
chance of an in−flight engagement. Minimum available to the operating engine. However, if the sump tank
AB (ATLS on) will improve waveoff perfor interconnect valve fails to open, fuel will migrate to the wing
mance (minimize altitude loss) from high sink and fuselage tanks on the inoperative engine side and will not
rates. be available to the operating engine. Under these conditions,
the maximum migration rate could reach 300 ppm. If the
The bolter maneuver is affected by selecting MIL or FUEL SHUT−OFF handle on the inoperative engine is not
minimum AB (ATLS on) and slight aft control stick until the pulled, an additional migration path could exist through the
desired flyaway attitude is established. During a bolter engine crossfeed valve. During single−engine operation, the
following a DLC stowed approach, nose rotation will be following procedures will minimize fuel migration if the
more sluggish than normal (because of the slower approach sump tank interconnect valve fails to open.
speed) requiring a slightly more aggressive aft control stick
1. FUEL SHUT OFF handle (inoperative engine)
input.
Pull.
If not on final approach:
2. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para
graph 14.5.3.2.
If after commencing final approach or in landing pattern:
The use of excessive backstick on a bolter may
cause the tail surface to stall, delaying aircraft 2.ATLS Check ON.
rotation and causing the aircraft to settle off the
angle deck.
As power is advanced during a waveoff or bolter,

simultaneously apply rudder (approximately two−thirds to Use of maximum AB during waveoff or bolter is
three−fourths of full deflection) to counter the asymmetric prohibited and provides little or no improvement
thrust and prevent lateral drift. Rudder may be supplemented over minimum AB. If unable to control yaw rate
with small lateral stick inputs. If yaw rate develops into the (possible ATLS failure), immediately reduce
dead engine, immediately apply full opposite rudder to arrest power to minimum AB or MIL.
ORIGINAL 15−2
Note
Altitude loss during waveoff is minimized by
maintaining approach AOA until positive rate of
climb is established. Avoid overrotating in close If combined hydraulic pressure is zero, do not
as this will increase the chance of an in−flight return to AUTO (LOW) mode once module is
engagement. Minimum AB (ATLS on) will selected on. If module is shut off after operation
improve waveoff performance (minimize alti commences, it may not restart.
tude loss) from high sink rates.
14. For landing pattern use 12 units AOA for pattern
3. Afterburner operation (airspeed > 170 knots, fuel airspeed and do not attempt turns greater than 20_
permitting, and full rudder authority) (RUDDER angle of bank.
AUTH light out) Stage to Verify Proper
Operation of ATLS.
4. Wing sweep Set at 20_ (EMER).

Extreme caution must be exercised when per
forming turn into dead engine. Decaying
airspeed/increasing AOA can rapidly result in a
situation where there is not enough rudder
authority to return the aircraft to level flight, and
If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the insufficient altitude to effect a recovery.
hydraulic system, component rupture is immi
nent. Turn the HYD TRANSFER PUMP switch 15. Final approach airspeed:
(BI−DI) off. DLC engaged 15 Units AOA.
DLC stowed 14 Units AOA.
5. Reduce gross weight/minimize lateral asymmetry
into the inoperative engine as required.
6. Speedbrakes RET (on final approach).

Military power climb performance during heavy
7. LDG GEAR handle DN (if combined hydraulic waveoffs may not adequately arrest high−sink−
pressure zero EMERG DN). rate conditions. Use of AB provides an increase
in climb performance. Up to full rudder may be
8. Hook As Required. required to counter AB asymmetric thrust yaw
ing moment during waveoff or bolter. Do not
9. Check SAS ON.
exceed 14 units AOA during waveoff or bolter.
10. If combined pressure is zero Pull AUX FLAP/
FLAP CONT Cb (8G3). 15.3 SINGLE−ENGINE LANDING
SECONDARY MODE
11. Flaps DN. Approaches in single−engine secondary (SEC) mode
are considered extremely hazardous. Engine military (MIL)
12. DLC (if operating on right engine) Do Not
power thrust levels can vary from as little as 65 percent to as
Engage.
much as 116 percent of primary mode MIL thrust. Although
the majority of engines produce greater than 90 percent of
If operating on the left engine and 3,000 psi combined
primary mode thrust (at MIL power), the possibility exists
pressure  Engage on Final.
that in the full−flap configuration, a low−thrust engine will not
13. EMERG FLT HYD switch HIGH (on final, provide enough thrust for level flight. Engine acceleration
times also vary and can be as much as three times longer than
committed to landing).
15−3 ORIGINAL
in primary mode. Aircraft in this configuration should The natural tendency will be to underestimate the sluggish
recover shore based. Shipboard landings should be attempted power response resulting in an underpowered condition.
only as a last resort and only if performance is adequate. For Waveoff capability is dependent on engine thrust, thrust
example, 72 percent of primary mode MIL thrust is response, aircraft rate of descent, and power setting at
considered the minimum required for a safe CV approach waveoff initiation. Waveoffs should be conducted by rotating
with a 48,000−pound aircraft with no stores. toward 14 units (maximum) AOA until a positive rate of
climb is attained, then slowly reducing AOA to 10 units AOA
To accomplish the performance check, configure the to achieve maximum rate of climb. Bolters should be con
aircraft at 2,000 feet AGL or greater and 10 units AOA with ducted by rotating to 10_ pitch attitude not to exceed 14 units
the maneuvering flaps down (if available) and leave the AOA. Avoid increasing AOA, as performance will degrade
landing gear up. With the engine at MIL thrust, establish a and wing drop will occur at 16.5 to 17.5 units AOA.
constant airspeed climb (±5 knots) at the airspeed corre
sponding to 10 units AOA. The minimum change in altitude
required in 30 seconds is as follows:
CHANGE IN ALTITUDE FEET

Waveoff performance from high rates of descent
MANEUVER MANEUVER in SEC mode may be severely degraded.
FLAPS DN FLAPS UP Extreme care should be used to avoid an under
powered, high rate−of−descent situation.
2,000 feet 950 feet 900 feet
4,000 feet 800 feet 750 feet Shipboard landings in single−engine SEC mode are not
recommended and should be attempted as a last resort (divert
not available) and if the performance check is successful.
Jettison all external stores and reduce fuel weight as much as
Note practicable to reduce gross weight and drag. Configure the
aircraft for landing no lower than 2,000 feet AGL.
Climb performance will improve by 20 feet in a Approaches should be conducted with the flaps and slats fully
30−second climb for every 1,000−pound gross extended, speedbrake retracted, and DLC stowed.
weight reduction.
Conduct a straight−in approach. Any turns should be
If the test is passed based on predicted gross weight, do made away from the dead engine using bank angles that do
not lower the landing gear and flaps until the predicted gross not exceed 20_. Maintain 10 units AOA until established on
weight is reached. If the performance test is passed and divert final, at which time the aircraft should be slowed to 13 units
is not possible, a CV approach may be attempted. The (maximum) AOA. Extreme care should be used when
minimum performance is required for optimum conditions working off a high and/or fast condition, as any large power
(day, VMC, steady deck, experienced aircrew, normal wind reductions could result in an underpowered situation. A high
over deck, etc.). For degraded conditions, the minimum and/or fast condition should be corrected using only small
performance should be increased based on judgment. If the power reductions. Upon detection of a deceleration or settle,
minimum performance test is not passed, and all other immediate selection of MIL power may be required to correct
options are exhausted (stores jettisoned, gross weight the situation in a timely manner. To minimize the chance of
minimized, divert not possible), eject under controlled a hook−skip bolter, it is important to maintain aft stick
conditions. pressure on touchdown. Waveoffs should be conducted by
rotating the aircraft to 14 units (maximum) AOA until a
For shore−based landings, conduct a straight−in positive rate of climb is attained, then slowly reducing AOA
approach with flaps up and speedbrakes retracted. If con to 11 to 12 units to achieve a maximum rate of climb. Bolters
ditions warrant a full−flap landing, conduct a performance should be conducted by rotating to 10_ pitch attitude not to
test and proceed as in the case of a shipboard landing. Gross exceed 14 units AOA.
weight should be reduced as much as practicable to improve
flyaway performance. Maintain 10 units AOA in the pattern 15.3.1 Single−Engine Landing SEC Mode
slowing to 15 units AOA at touchdown when a safe landing
is assured. Use extreme caution when working off a high 1. FUEL SHUTOFF handle (inoperative engine)
and/or fast situation, avoiding any large power reductions. Pull.
ORIGINAL 15−4
2. In CV environment Divert. If configured for landing:

3. Refer to Single−Engine Cruise Operations, para 4. Throttle MIL.
graph 14.5.3.2, and Engine Transfer to SEC Mode
procedures, paragraph 14.5.6. 5. Ensure a minimum of 500−fpm rate of climb at
14 units AOA available for CV approach.
If not preparing for CV approach:
See step 6. When preparing for landing:
If divert is not possible:
Shipboard recovery in single−engine SEC mode

Engine thrust and thrust response can be severely is considered extremely hazardous and should be
degraded such that level flight cannot be main conducted only as a last resort and if the perfor
tained in the full−flap landing configuration. DO mance check is successful.
NOT configure for landing until the performance
test has been accomplished. 6. RUDDER AUTH light Verify Out.
If not configured for landing: 7. Wing sweep Set at 20°.
4. Perform constant airspeed climb (±5 knots) at
10 units AOA, landing gear up, maneuvering flaps
down (if possible), above 2,000 feet. Minimum
climb required in 30 seconds is as follows:
If hammering (cavitation) is experienced in the
CHANGE IN ALTITUDE FEET hydraulic system, component rupture is
imminent. Turn the HYD TRANSFER PUMP
MANEUVER MANEUVER switch (BI−DI) off.
FLAPS DN FLAPS UP
8. External stores Jettison for Shipboard Recovery.
4,000 feet 800 feet 750 feet 9. Fuel Dump or Burn (reduce as much as
practicable).
10. Speedbrakes RET (on final approach).
11. LDG GEAR handle DN (if combined hydraulic
pressure zero EMERG DN).
12. Hook As Required.
If minimum performance test is passed based on
predicted gross weight, do not lower landing gear
and flaps until predicted gross weight is reached.
Note
Climb performance will improve by 20 feet in a Shore−based landings should be conducted with
30−second climb for every 1,000−pound gross flaps up. If conditions warrant a full−flap landing,
weight reduction. Minimum performance conduct a performance test and proceed as in the
criteria is based on optimum conditions (day, case of shipboard landing.
VMC, steady deck, experienced aircrew, normal
wind over deck, etc.) and should be increased for 13. Check SAS ON.
degraded conditions based on judgment. 14. If combined pressure is zero Pull AUX FLAP/
5. If minimum performance criteria are not passed and FLAP CONTR Cb (8G3).
all options are exhausted (stores jettisoned,
minimum gross weight, and divert not possible),
eject under controlled conditions.
15−5 ORIGINAL
15. Flaps  DN (shipboard recovery), As Required 15.4 LANDING GEAR EMERGENCIES

(field landing).
15.4.1 Landing Gear Emergency Lowering
16. DLC Do Not Engage.
Use emergency lowering of the landing gear only as a
17. EMERG FLT HYD switch HIGH (on final,
last resort. Once this system is used, the gear cannot be
committed to landing). retracted; therefore, the landing must be made in whatever
configuration you have at that time. If a long flight is nec
essary to make a field landing, it will have to be made with
the gear down (see Figure 15−1).
1. Airspeed Less Than 280 Knots.

If combined hydraulic pressure is zero, do not
return to AUTO (LOW) mode once module is 2. LDG GEAR handle DN.
selected on. If module is shut off after operation
commences, it may not restart.
18. For landing pattern, use 10 units AOA for pattern

airspeed and do not attempt turns greater than 20_
angle of bank.
The LDG GEAR handle should be pulled with a
rapid and continuous 55−pound force until the
handle is loose (fore and aft) in its housing as an
indication of complete extension of the handle.
3. Push LDG GEAR handle in hard, turn it 90_ clock

Extreme caution must be exercised when wise, pull, and hold.
performing turns into a dead engine. Decaying
airspeed/increasing AOA can rapidly result in a 4. Gear position indication Check (12 seconds).
situation where there is not enough rudder
authority to return the aircraft to level flight and 5. Make arrested landing if available.
insufficient altitude to effect a recovery.
Note
19. Final approach airspeed 13 Units (CV), (field
landing slow to 15 units, no flaps at touchdown).
D The nosegear cannot be confirmed as locked
by visual observation. If both the indicator
and transition light indicate unsafe, assume
that the downlock is not in place.
D If there is disagreement between the indicator
Waveoff performance from high rates of descent and light and the gear appears down, the mal
in SEC mode may be severely degraded. function may be because of a faulty contact on
Extreme care should be used to avoid an under the nosegear downlock microswitch.
powered, high−rate−of−descent situation.
D Use of emergency gear extension results in
Note loss of nosewheel steering.
D To facilitate in−flight refueling probe exten
D Waveoff should be conducted by rotating to sion when the gear has been blown down,
14 units (maximum) AOA until a positive rate raise the LDG GEAR handle to give priority
of climb is attained. to the refueling probe system.
D Bolters should be conducted by rotating to If any gear does not come down:
10_ pitch attitude not to exceed 14 units AOA.
6. Increase airspeed. Do not exceed 280 Knots.
7. Apply positive and negative g to force gear down.
ORIGINAL 15−6
FIELD LANDING
ARRESTING NO ARRESTING
CARRIER LANDINGS GEAR AVAILABLE GEAR AVAILABLE
FINAL
CONFIGURATION NOTES NOTES NOTES
Cocked Nose Land 1, 8, 11 Arrested Landing 6, 8, 9, Land 6, 9, 11,
Gear 11, 12, 13
13
Side−Brace Land 1, 2, 8, No Arrested 3, 6, 7, Land 3, 6, 7,
Not In Place 11 Landing 8, 11 8, 11
Nose Gear Up/ Land 1, 2, 4, No Arrested 4, 6, 8, Land 6, 8, 9,
Unsafe Down 8, 11 Landing 9, 10, 11 10, 11
Stub Nose Gear Land 1, 2, 4, No Arrested 4, 6, 8, Land 6, 8, 9,
8, 11 Landing 9,10,11 10, 11
Nose Gear Up, Eject Pilot Option 1, 2, 4, Pilot Option 6, 8, 10, Eject
One Main Up To Land If Tanks 8, 11 Eject Or Arrest 11, 12
Installed
One Main Up/ Land 1, 2, 8, Arrested Landing 6, 8, 10, Pilot Option Eject 5, 6, 8,
Unsafe Down 11 11, 12, Or Land 10, 11,
13 13
Both Main Up/ Eject Pilot Option 1, 2, 8, Pilot Option 6, 8, 10, Pilot Option Eject 6, 8, 10,
Unsafe Down To Land If Tanks 11 Eject Or Arrest 11, 12 Or Land 11
Installed
Mains One Or Land 1, 2, 4, No Arrested 4, 5, 6, Land 5, 6, 8,
Both Stub/Mount/ 8, 11 Landing 8, 11 11
Hyperextended/
Wheel Cocked
All Gear Up Eject Pilot Option 1, 2, 8, Pilot Option 4, 6, 8, Pilot Option Eject 6, 8, 10,
To Land If Tanks 11 Eject Or Land 10, 11 or Land 11
Installed
1. Divert if possible.
2. Hook down barricade engagement.
3. Minimize skid and drift rollout.
4. Remove all arresting gear.
5. Land off center to gear down side.
6. Minimum rate of descent landing (480 fpm max).
7. Gradual symmetrical braking.
8. Retain empty drop tanks.
9. Lower nose gently prior to fail through.
10. Secure engines at airframe contact.
11. External ordnance −SEL JETT if required. Activate emerg landing gear lowering to enable raising gear
handle for SEL or ACM JETT.
12. Hold damaged gear off deck until pendant engagement.
13. Engage NWS if operable, use as required.
Figure 151.Landing Gear Malfunction Emergency Landing Guide
15−7 ORIGINAL
8. Obtain visual in−flight check if possible. 15.4.2.2 Landing Gear Indicates Unsafe Gear
Down, Transition Light Out
If still unsafe and visually confirmed unsafe, or gear position
cannot be confirmed: This indication means a failure in one of the dual−pole
downlock microswitches.
9. Refer to Figure 15−1 (as appropriate).
15.4.2 Landing Gear Malfunctions 1. Transition light bulb Check (LTS TEST).
1. Remain below 280 knots.

2. Combined hydraulic pressure Check.
3. If less than 3,000 psi, refer to combined hydraulic
failure procedures in Chapter 14. If associated with LAUNCH BAR light, leave
gear down and obtain visual check.
15.4.2.1 Landing Gear Indicates Unsafe Gear Up
2. Landing gear Cycle.
or Transition Light Illuminated
If condition still exists:
1. LDG GEAR handle DN.
3. Obtain visual check if possible.
If safe gear down indication is obtained and transition light
out: 4. Make normal landing.
2. Landing gear Leave Down. 15.4.2.3 Landing Gear Indicates Unsafe, Gear
3. Obtain visual check of gear condition. Down, Transition Light Illuminated
Nosegear unsafe indicates that the downlock pin
through the drag brace is not in place. Visual determination
of nosegear−unlocked status is assisted by a red band painted
on the landing nosegear brace oleo. However, a positive
check for locked nosegear is not possible visually. Main gear
A hyperextended main strut, whether because of unsafe should be verified by visual inspection. If the drag
a broken piston or overextended piston barrel brace is fully extended, the main gear should be down and
and/or main strut with a cocked wheel, will likely locked.
result in a combined hydraulic system failure
1. Obtain visual check if possible.
while airborne and a sheared strut upon touch
down. A hyperextended main strut is evident to
a wingman by full vertical extension of the
scissors and broken brake lines and to the tower
or LSO by one main gear hanging noticeably
lower than the other. When either of these situ D Visual determination of nose landing gear−
ations occurs, landing procedures for a stub unlocked status is assisted by a red band
(MLG) mount must be followed. painted on the nose landing gear drag brace.
4. Land as soon as practicable. If red is visible, the nosegear is not locked.
D During an airborne visual inspection of the
main landing gear (even if the paint stripe
across the drag brace knee pin appears to be
straight), the possibility exists that the down
lock actuator has failed and the gear may not
If landing gear indicates unsafe after retraction be locked in the down position.
and a down−and−locked indication can be
obtained, the brake pedals should be depressed 2. LDG GEAR handle Cycle.
for 60 seconds to ascertain whether brake If still unsafe:
hydraulic lines have been severed. If brake
hydraulic lines are severed and a combined 3. Increase airspeed to 280 knots, pull positive g’s and
hydraulic failure occurs, refer to combined yaw aircraft.
hydraulic system failure procedures in
Chapter14. If main landing gear is still unsafe go to step 5.
ORIGINAL 15−8
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
If nose landing gear indicates unsafe, transition light illu- 15.4.2.4 Landing Gear Indicates Safe Gear
minated, continue with step 4: Down, Transition Light Illuminated
4. LDG GEAR handle — Cycle UP then DN in Less This indication can be caused by a malfunction of the
Than 2 Seconds. following:
a. Half of the dual-pole micro in the nosegear
downlock.
b. Half of the dual-pole micros in either of the main
gear downlocks.
Failure to place the LDG GEAR handle to DN
immediately after selecting UP may allow the c. The proximity micros in the sidebraces.
main landing gear doors to receive the signal to
close with main gear struts extended, causing d. Failure of the LDG GEAR handle position micro.
damage to the doors and inducing a possible
combined hydraulic or brake system failure. Do e. If a visual check confirms the gear is extended
not reselect UP with the LDG GEAR handle after and both sidebraces are in place, a malfunction
the doors attempt to close, as indicated by an of one of the transition light micros is indicated.
unsafe main mount or visual inspection. 1. LDG GEAR handle — Cycle.
Note
Use of the above procedure should be done at the
intended point of landing or within range of an
acceptable divert field exercising a gear-down
bingo profile. If associated with LAUNCH BAR light, leave
gear down and obtain visual check.
5. LDG GEAR handle — EMERG DOWN (refer to
landing gear emergency lowering). If transition light remains on:
Note 2. Obtain visual check.

Use of the emergency gear lowering procedure 3. Gear/sidebraces appear in place — Normal
will result in loss of nosewheel steering. Landing.
If still unsafe and visually confirmed unsafe, or gear position Sidebraces confirmed not in place:
cannot be confirmed:
4. Refer to Figure 15-1.
6. Refer to Figure 15-1.
15.4.3 LAUNCH BAR Light
1. Landing gear ¾ Leave Down.
2. Obtain visual inspection.
D When landing with nosegear unsafe down If nosegear cocked, see Figure 15-1.
indication, anticipate possible nose landing
If launch bar is down or visual inspection is not available:
gear collapse. This possibility shall be
reduced by using the brake pedals to prevent 3. Request removal of arresting cables for field
rollback as the arresting gear reaches full landing.
extension and by setting the parking brake
after the aircraft has stopped. 4. Request removal of cross-deck pendants Nos. 1 and
4 for CV landing.
D Do not attempt to tow aircraft by nosegear
until gear is secured in down position.
D Nose landing gear ground safety pin instal-
lation will not prevent nosegear collapse. The
nose landing gear strut must be restrained
against forward rotation.
15-9 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
15.5 BLOWN-TIRE LANDING 15.6 FLAP AND SLAT LANDING EMERGENCIES
Blown-tire landings should be performed into arresting 15.6.1 No-Flaps and No-Slats Landing
gear whenever possible. Rollout is extremely rough on blown A no-flaps and no-slats landing is basically the same as
tires. If go-around is elected, do not apply full aft stick in a normal landing except that the pattern is extended and the
attempt to rotate the aircraft before reaching flying speed. approach speed is approximately 15 knots faster than a
The drag from full-up deflection of the stabilizers is large and full-flap approach. Field arresting gear should be used if
significantly delays acceleration. Blown tires will frequently necessary. CV arrestments are permitted. Consult applicable
result in damaged main landing gear hydraulic lines. recovery bulletins for WOD requirements.
Anticipate possible combined hydraulic system failure and
attendant committal to gear-down bingo following a blown 1. Gross weight — Reduce (weight consistent with
tire. existing runway length and conditions).
2. Flaps — UP.
D Blown tire(s) can cause engine FOD and/or Setting the FLAP handle to the DN position
structural damage. Leave flaps and slats as inflight may create or aggravate a flap asymme-
set. Aircraft should have ground locks try condition and could make the aircraft uncon-
installed and engines secured before moving trollable.
aircraft. Note
D Do not allow the aircraft to roll backward after If outboard spoilers are needed for
the arrestment. The downlock actuator may ground-roll braking, FLAP handle must be
have been damaged by tire failure and lowered at least 5_ on landing rollout.
rearward movement of the aircraft could 3. Fly landing pattern slightly wider than normal or
cause the gear to collapse. make straight-in approach at 15 units AOA.
1. Obtain in-flight visual check if possible. 4. Use normal braking technique.
2. ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch — SPOILER BK

(OFF for CV).
3. HOOK — DN.
D Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake appli-
4. Make carrier or short-field fly-in arrested landing as cation is 165 knots at a gross weight of 46,000
soon as practicable. pounds and 145 knots at 51,000 pounds.
5. HYD ISOL switch — T.O./LND (on final). D Use of full aft stick during landing in this
configuration can result in tailpipe ground
If arresting gear is not available: contact.
D Avoid slow approaches. Wing drop and
6. Land on centerline. increased sink rate may occur at 16.5 to
17.5 units AOA.
7. Nosewheel steering — Engaged.
D Aircrew should expect hot brakes following
high speed landings. Application of the
parking brake could cause the brake assembly
to fail and result in a brake fire.
15.6.2 Auxiliary Flap Failure

Do not delay engaging nosewheel steering in
order to center rudder pedals. A no-auxiliary-flaps landing is basically the same
as a normal landing except that the approach speed is 6 knots
Note faster than with auxiliary flaps extended, and the longi-
tudinal stick position during the approach is further aft. CV
Antiskid will sense a constant release on a arrestments are permitted; consult applicable recovery
dragging blown tire. bulletin for WOD requirements.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 15-10
1. Wing sweep Ensure at 20_. If main flaps are inoperative:
2. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Pull (8G3). 4. Maneuvering flaps Extend.
3. Approach 15 Units AOA.
Note
With AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb pulled, If maneuvering flaps are used, ensure that the
wings will not sweep aft. maneuver flap thumbwheel is not actuated
during the approach.
15.7 WING−SWEEP EMERGENCIES
5. DLC and APC Do Not Engage.
15.7.1 Aft Wing−Sweep Landings
6. Slow−fly aircraft at a safe altitude to determine
CV arrestments are permitted with up to 40_ of wing approach airspeed (up to 17 units AOA for field
sweep, and emergency barricade engagements are permitted landings with wings aft of 50_) and to eval−
with up to 35_ of wing sweep. Shipboard aft wing−sweep uate handling/stall characteristics and waveoff
landings should be conducted at 15 units AOA. Field aft performance.
wing−sweep landings may be conducted at AOAs up to 17
units when wings are stuck aft of 50_ to minimize approach Note
airspeed for normal landings or remain within published field
arresting gear limitations for short−field arrested landings. D Refer to emergency field arrestment guide
Main flaps and slats should be utilized to reduce approach for maximum engagement speed if field
speed with aft wing sweeps up to 50_. Maneuver flaps may arrestment is desired.
be utilized if main flaps and slats fail to extend.
D Refer to Figure 11−9 for approach airspeeds.
If wings are determined to be stuck aft of 20_ position: 7. Fly straight−in approach at 15 units AOA (up to
17 units for field landings with wings aft of 50_).
1. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Match
Captain Bars With Actual Wing−Sweep Position
Tape.
Nozzle clearance is reduced at elevated approach

AOA. Ensure that a maximum of 17 units is
maintained at touchdown.
Closely monitor wing−sweep movement
when attempting to match handle with Note
wing−sweep position. If abnormal move
ment is noticed, immediately return handle Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake application is
to previous position. 165 knots at gross weight of 46,000 pounds and
145 knots at 51,000 pounds.
2. Gross weight Reduce as Required.
15.7.2 Asymmetric Wing Sweep
If wings ≤ 50_:
Refer to Chapter 11 for asymmetric wing−sweep design
3. Main flaps FULL DN.
limitations and flight characteristics.
Note With asymmetric wing−sweep emergency condition,
divert field landing is preferable to a CV landing attempt.
Main flap/slat extension with the wings
Aircrew must fully consider approach speed and aircraft
aft of 20_ will result in a large nosedown
controllability characteristics prior to attempting CV
pitch transient.
arrestment. See Figure 15−2 for recommended approach
airspeed for 14 or 15 units AOA with asymmetric wing
configurations.
15−11 ORIGINAL
Figure 152.Asymmetric Wing−Sweep Landing Approach Airspeed
ORIGINAL 15−12
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
To preclude potential damage to aircraft, avoid D Aircraft controllability in approach configu-

all wing-sweep commands prior to performing ration with spoilers inoperative and a large
steps 1 through 9. Limit maneuvering envelope wing-sweep asymmetry will range from diffi-
to 350 knots and 1.5g’s. cult to impossible depending on split.
1. Leave wings and flaps as set. D Upon lowering the landing gear an uncom-
2. Altitude — Climb/Remain Above 10,000 Feet manded but controllable roll transient may
AGL. occur because of spoiler gearing change from
cruise to PA.
3. Airspeed — 250 Knots/Do Not Exceed 12 Units
AOA. c. Landing gear — Down.
4. Maneuver devices — Thumbwheel Manual Retract. d. Leave flaps as set until further determinations are
complete.
NO. 2/MANUV FLAP cb’s — Pull (LD1, LE1). e. Slowly increase AOA to no more than 15 units
(attempt to maintain 0_ sideslip).
6. All SASs — ON.
f. Make small lateral stick inputs to simulate lineup
Note corrections.
If ROLL SAS will not engage, accelerate and If aircraft controllability is questionable for safe landing,
attempt to reset at approximately 20-knot inter- perform Asymmetric Wing Sweep Unacceptable for Landing
vals. Stick may have to be released laterally in procedure, paragraph 15.7.2.2.
order to reengage ROLL SAS. If aircraft controllability is safe for landing, perform
Asymmetric Wing Sweep Acceptable for Landing proce-
7. Confirm left and right wing position.
dure, paragraph 15.7.2.1.
Note
15.7.2.1 Asymmetric Wing Sweep Acceptable
Wing-sweep tape indicates actual right-wing for Landing
position. All other cockpit wing position indi- Establish final landing configuration as follows:
cations may be unreliable, including wing-
sweep handle position. Visually verify left-wing 1. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb - Pull (8G3).
position.
Note
If left wing is aft of 62_ spoiler cutout and right wing is 20_, Pulling the AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb (8G3)
perform Asymmetric Wing Sweep Unacceptable for Landing with the emergency WING SWEEP handle at the
procedure, paragraph 15.7.2.2. 20_ position disables wingsweep commands.
8. Perform preliminary controllability check as
follows: If both wings are forward of 50_:
a. Airspeed ¾ Below 225 Knots.
a. Trim away from forward wing (opposite stick
force) to ensure that maximum spoiler deflection
is available.
b. Assess spoiler function by controlled left- and
right-stick inputs. Extending the main flaps with either wing aft of
50_ could result in damage to both the flaps and
the aft fuselage.
15-13 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
b. Flaps Lower Incrementally 20_ to 25_. 2. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Leave
in Position that Established Satisfactory
Controllability.
3. Gross weight Reduce as Required.
4. DLC Stowed.
When flaps are set greater than 25_, lateral pilot−
induced oscillations are likely and may result in 5. Autothrottles (APC) Do Not Engage.
wingtip damage at touchdown and/or hard
landings. 6. Confirm flight characteristics by flying simulated
landing approach at safe altitude, to include lineup
Note corrections, power changes, and waveoff.
The 25_ flap position can be established by first
noting when the spoiler position indicators
switch to the drooped position during flap
extension. An uncommanded but controllable
roll transient because of spoiler gearing change
will also occur. Upon observing either event, Full spoiler authority will be required for
retract the flaps to just less than 25_. The roll landing with large wing−sweep asymmetry.
transient will occur in the opposite direction as Before attempting actual approach, trim
the flaps pass through 25_. Main flap extension away from the forward wing (opposite
without auxiliary flaps will require greater than stick forces) to ensure maximum spoiler
normal aft stick trim. deflection is available.
c. Approach airspeed 15 Units AOA. 7. Fly straight−in approach to arrested or normal

landing.
Note
Indicated AOA is subject to a 1 to 2−unit sideslip−
induced error. Verify proper AOA at zero
sideslip.
Avoid rapid lateral stick inputs, as significant
If either wing is aft of 50°:
pitch−roll coupling may result in roll ratcheting,
a. Flaps UP. pitching motion, and lateral PIO tendency; an
excessive descent rate may develop and/or wing
b. Approach airspeed 14 Units AOA. tip damage at touchdown may occur.
Note
D A crosswind from the swept−wing side is

favorable while a crosswind from the
Wing rock and wing stall may occur at 16 to forward−wing side is unfavorable.
16½ units AOA during flaps−up approaches.
D To reduce lateral stick force, the landing
Rapid lateral stick inputs will result in pitch
approach can be flown with rudder trim into
coupling. Excessive descent rates may develop
the forward wing, allowing aircraft to yaw
and/or wingtip damage at touchdown may occur.
into the forward wing. Sideslip should be
Precise AOA control and smooth lateral control
reduced with rudder just prior to touchdown.
inputs are required.
Note
Indicated AOA is subject to a 1 to 2−unit sideslip−
induced error. Verify proper AOA at zero
sideslip.
ORIGINAL 15−14
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Note If spoilers are operational:
D If desired, sideslip can be reduced to zero with a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — Input a
rudder at the beginning of the approach and Small Forward Command.
held to touchdown. Lateral stick force
increases as sideslip is reduced. Method of If spoilers are not operational:
approach is pilot’s option.
a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — Input a
D In the event of bolter or go-around, as airspeed Small Aft Command.
increases, the aircraft will roll toward the
swept wing and yaw toward the forward wing. 3. Note movement of left and right wings and attempt
to regain wing-sweep asymmetry by using the
D Maximum airspeed for wheelbrake appli-
following wing-sweep commands.
cation is 165 knots at gross weights of 46,000
pounds and 145 knots at 51,000 pounds.
If both wings are moveable and left wing is forward of right
15.7.2.2 Asymmetric Wing-Sweep wing:
Unacceptable for Landing
a. Airspeed — 300 Knots.
b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — 68_.
c. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — 20_.
Efforts to improve controllability by attempting d. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb ¾ Pull (8G3).

to minimize or eliminate wing-sweep mismatch
could result in an acceptable condition becoming e. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check
unacceptable. (step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).
Note If both wings are moveable and right wing is forward of left
wing:
Once spoiler operation is assessed, stick forces
may be trimmed to reduce pilot workload during a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle — 20_.
transit to field or CV. The use of lateral trim to
reduce stick forces during actual approach and b. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb — Pull (8G3).
landing should be avoided as this reduces the
spoiler deflection available for roll control. c. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check
(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2).
1. Flaps — UP.
If right wing is jammed and left wing is moveable:
2. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb — In (8G3).
a. Airspeed — 300 Knots.
Note
Note
D At any point during the following procedures,
if wing-sweep symmetry is regained at aft If right wing is jammed aft of spoiler cutout
wing-sweep position and runway length/ angle, matching left wing will result in loss of
approach speed permit, aircrew may elect to spoiler control. If this reduced lateral control is
perform Aft Wing-Sweep Landing emer- undesirable, left wing should be commanded just
gency procedure, paragraph 15.7.1. forward of spoiler cutout to regain spoiler
control.
D If left wing is jammed, wing-sweep command
can result in right wing driving to either 19_
(forward command) or 69_ (aft command)
actuator overtravel stop. Subsequent wing-
sweep commands may not move the right
wing.
15-15 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle Match the stores−aboard switch regularly occurred during flight test
Left Wing to Right Wing Position. and will indicate hung stores when none actually exists.
c. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Pull (8G3). In−flight actual cg location varies as fuel is burned but
remains relatively constant at its most forward position
d. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check between 5,000 to 10,000 pounds. Below 5,000 pounds, the cg
(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2). moves aft towards the ZFGW position. Landing should be
accomplished at 5,000 pounds of fuel or more if possible.
If left wing is jammed and spoilers are operational: Wing−mounted AIM−7/9s move the cg location slightly
forward and have no adverse effects on flying qualities.
a. Emergency WING SWEEP handle 20_. External tanks produce no change to the cg location and also
have no adverse effects. Combinations of forward and aft
b. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Pull (8G3).
stores will produce a cg change slightly less than considering
c. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check the difference as hung on the aft stations alone (i.e., the cg
(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2). location with 2,000 pounds forward and 4,000 pounds aft will
be slightly more forward than 2,000 pounds aft alone).
If left wing is jammed aft of spoiler cutout wing−sweep angle
and spoilers are inoperative: Flying qualities at aft cg locations with gear and flaps
up are only slightly degraded. This degradation will probably
a. Airspeed  300 Knots. not be apparent to the pilot. Stick force per g remains
relatively nominal even with 4,000 pounds of aft hung
b. Emergency WING SWEEP handle 68_. bombs. No change in flying qualities is noted during dive
recoveries between 400 and 500 KCAS. At 20_ of wing
c. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb Pull (8G3). sweep with the gear and flaps down and an aft cg, the aircraft
is extremely susceptible to pilot−induced oscillations during
d. Repeat preliminary landing controllability check closely controlled tasks such as flying the ball. Loss of
(step 9 of paragraph 15.7.2). control is likely.
If final wing configuration is unsafe for landing: The transition to landing configuration should be
performed in straight−and−level flight to allow handling
a. Prepare for and execute controlled ejection. qualities to be evaluated in benign conditions. Wings should
be swept to the desired position before the gear and flaps are
15.8 AFT HUNG ORDNANCE LANDINGS lowered. The AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR (8G3) cb should be
pulled in case of a wing/flap interlock failure and also to
The normal NATOPS cg ZFGW limit for tunnel− prevent the auxiliary flaps from deploying if 20_ of wing−
mounted stores is 17.0 percent. On a typical fleet aircraft, one sweep is inadvertently selected. Sweeping the wings with
Mk 84 2,000−pound bomb placed on station No. 4 or 5 result auxiliary flaps retracted results in significant pitch−trim
in a ZFGW cg aft of 17.0 percent MAC, possibly as far aft as changes. A straight−in approach should be flown as power
18.5 to 19.0 percent MAC. Two aft hung Mk 84s can produce requirements with aft wing sweep in a turn are significantly
a ZFGW cg of up to 22 percent MAC. These aft cg locations different than normal and could produce a severely
reduce the normal static stability of the F−14, producing a underpowered approach. Once established in the optimum
marked degradation in landing flying qualities. Aft wing−sweep configuration appropriate for the amount of
wing−sweep can be used to restore the normal static longi ordnance hung on the aft stations, normal approach
tudinal stability margin, regaining normal flying qualities techniques can be used. No abnormalities in aircraft response
even with extremely aft cg locations. or performance are apparent during landing approaches at
15 units, even with 4,000 pounds of aft hung ordnance. APC
Aircrew may have difficulty detecting aft hung is not optimized for aft wing−sweep landings and should not
ordnance following bomb release. The only cockpit indi be used. DLC should not be used as it adds 8 knots to recovery
cation of an unsuccessful release will be a hot trigger light WOD requirements and has improper pitch trim response at
that remains illuminated following the intended release of all aft wing−sweep. Expect onspeed airspeed for 25_ of wing−
selected stations. With MA ARM ON, individually selecting sweep to increase 6 knots over the normal DLC on, 20_ of
stations will illuminate the HOT TRIG light when the hung wing−sweep approach speed, and a 12−knot increase if wings
station is selected. Check SMS for hung stores. Obtain a are at 30_. For CV arrestments, the appropriate recovery
visual check if possible to validate this check as failures of bulletin should be consulted.
ORIGINAL 15−16
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Ashore, a field arrestment is recommended with

spoiler brakes dearmed because of the large noseup pitch
occurring at spoiler deployment. If a field arrestment is not
possible, expect to use full forward stick to counter the
noseup pitching moment and to maintain forward stick until Expect a significant nose pitchup during landing
below 80 KCAS with a resultant longer rollout. rollout as spoilers deploy. Full forward stick may
be required to avoid a tail strike.
15.8.1 Landing with Aft Hung Ordnance
15.9 FIELD ARRESTMENTS
1. Determine location of hung stores. Obtain visual
check if possible. 15.9.1 Field Arresting Gear
If hung ordnance exceeds 1,000 pounds: The types of field arresting gear in use include the
anchor chain cable, water squeezer, and Morest-type
2. Wing sweep — Set at 25_ if £ 2,000-Pounds Hung equipment. All require engagement of the arresting hook in
Aft; Set at 30_ if > 2,000 Pounds Hung Aft. a cable pendant rigged across the runway. Location of the
pendant in relation to the runway will classify the gear as
3. Perform transition to gear-down configuration in follows:
straight-and-level flight.
1. Short-field gear — Located 1,500 to 2,000 feet past
4. AUX FLAP/FLAP CONTR cb — Pull (8G3) approach end of runway. Usually requires prior noti-
fication in order to rig for arrestment.
5. Flaps — Full DN.
2. Midfield gear — Located near the halfway point of
6. Fly straight-in approach at 15 units AOA. Do not the runway. Usually requires prior notification in
engage APC or DLC. order to rig for arrestment in the direction desired.
3. Abort gear — Located 1,500 to 2,500 feet short of
CV approach: the departure end of the duty runway and usually
rigged for immediate use.
7. Perform CV arrestment in accordance with
applicable recovery bulletin. 4. Overrun gear — Located shortly past the upwind
end of the duty runway. Usually rigged for imme-
Field approach: diate use.
Some fields will have all types of gear, others none. For
7. Spoiler brake — OFF.
this reason, it is imperative that all pilots be aware of the type,
8. Perform field arrestment. location, and compatibility of gear in use with the aircraft,
and the policy of the local air station with regard to which
gear is rigged for use and when.
Note
As various modifications to the basic types of arresting
Refer to emergency field arrestment guide gear are made, exact speeds will vary accordingly. Certain
(Figure 15-3) for maximum engagement speed. aircraft service changes may also affect engaging speed and
weight limitations.
If arresting gear is not available:
8. If field arrestment is not available, spoiler brake —

BOTH.
An engagement in the wrong direction into chain

gear can severely damage the aircraft.
15-17 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
In general, arresting gear is engaged on the centerline 15.9.3 Long−Field Arrestment

at as slow a speed as possible. Burn or dump down to an
acceptable landing weight. Conditions permitting, make The long−field−arrestment is used when a stopping
practice passes to accurately locate the arresting gear. problem exists with insufficient runway remaining (that is,
Engagement should be made with feet off the brakes, aborted takeoffs, icy or wet runways, loss of brakes after
shoulder harness locked, and with the aircraft in a three−point touchdown, etc.). Lower the hook, allowing sufficient time
attitude. After engaging the gear, good common sense and for it to extend fully before engagement (normally 1,000 feet
existing conditions dictate whether to keep the engines before reaching the arresting gear). Do not lower the hook too
running or to shut down and egress the aircraft. early and weaken the hook point. Line up the aircraft on the
runway centerline. Inform the control tower of your
In an emergency situation, first determine the extent of intentions to engage the arresting gear, so that aircraft landing
the emergency by whatever means are available (instru behind you may be waved off. If leaving the runway is inevi
ments, other aircraft, LSO, RDO, tower or other ground table, secure the engines.
personnel). Next, determine the most advantageous arresting
gear available and the type of arrestment to be made under 15.9.4 Engaging Speeds
the conditions. Whenever deliberate field arrestment is
intended, notify control tower personnel as much in advance The maximum permissible engaging speed, gross
as possible and state estimated landing time in minutes. weight, and off−center engagement distance for field
arrestment are listed in Figure 15−3. The data in the long−field
If gear is not rigged, it will probably require 10 to landing columns may be used for lightweight aborted takeoff
20 minutes to prepare. If foaming of the runway or area of where applicable; data in the aborted takeoff columns may be
arrestment is required or desired, it should be requested by used for heavy gross weight landings.
the pilot at this time.
As various modifications to the basic types of arresting
If fuel is streaming from the bottom of the aircraft, a gear are incorporated, engaging speeds or gross−weight
field arrested landing is not recommended because of the limitations may change. For this reason and for more detailed
high probability of sparks and heat from the arresting hook information, the applicable aircraft recovery bulletin should
igniting the streaming fuel and air mixture. If an arrested be consulted.
landing is mandated because of the lack of adequate braking
or runway conditions, an effort should be made to foam the 15.10 BARRICADE ARRESTMENT
runway in the runout area of the arresting gear.
1. External stores Jettison (except AIM−7 or
15.9.2 Short−Field Arrestment AIM−54 on fuselage stations if wing is at full
for−ward sweep).
If at any time before landing a directional control 2. External tanks Jettison (empty tanks retained
problem exists or a minimum rollout is desired, a short−field only for landing gear malfunction).
arrestment should be made and the assistance of LSO
requested. The LSO should be stationed near the touchdown 3. Fuel Dump or burn (reduce to 2,000 pounds).
point and equipped with a radio. Inform the LSO of the 4. HOOK DN (Lower to permit engagement of a
desired touchdown point. A constant glideslope approach to cross−deck pendant, which will minimize barricade
touchdown is permitted (mirror or Fresnel lens landing aid) engagement speed and damage to aircraft).
with touchdown on centerline at or just before the arresting
wire with the hook extended. The hook should be lowered 5. Fly normal pattern and approach, on−speed, angle of
while airborne and a positive hook−down check should be attack, centerline, and meatball.
made. Use midfield gear or Morest−type, whenever
available. If neither is available, use abort gear. Use an Note
approach speed commensurate with the emergency experi
Anticipate loss of meatball for a short period of
enced. Landing approach power will be maintained until
time during the approach. Barricade stanchions
arrestment is assured or a waveoff is taken. Be prepared for
may obscure the meatball.
a waveoff if the gear is missed. After engaging the gear, retard
the throttles to IDLE or secure engines and abandon aircraft,
Upon engaging the barricade:
depending on existing conditions.
6. Throttles OFF.
7. Evacuate aircraft as soon as practical.
ORIGINAL 15−18
MAXIMUM ENGAGING SPEED (KNOTS)(D)
GROSS WEIGHT X 1,000 POUNDS

TYPE OF LONG− MAXIMUM
ARRESTING SHORT−FIELD FIELD ABORTED TAKEOFF OFF−CENTER
GEAR LANDING (K)(L) LANDING (A) ENGAGEMENT
(M) (FT)
40 44 48 51.8 54 57 60 64 68 69.8 72
E−28 176 180 179 178 177 176 175 174 172 172 171 40
(B)
E−28 (G) 176 176 160 160 160 160 156 145 145 145 145 40
(B)
M−21 130 130 130 130 125 125 120 115 115 115 113 10
BAK−9 160 160 160 155 150 144 138 131 124 122 118 30
BAK−12 (H) 160 160 159 146 137 118 (J) (J) (J) (J) (J) 50
DUAL BAK−12 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 30
(C)
BAK−13 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 40
(A) Data provided in aborted takeoff column may be used for emergency high gross weight arrestment.
(B) Maximum engaging speed limited by aircraft limit horizontal−drag load factor (mass item limit g").
(C) Dual BAK−12 limits are based on 150 to 300−foot span, 1¼−inch cross−deck pendant, 50,000−pound weight
setting, and 1,200−foot runout. No information is available regarding applicability to other configurations.
(D) Maximum engaging speed is limited by arresting gear capacity except as noted.
(E) Off−center engagement may not exceed 25 percent of the runway span.
(F) Before making an arrestment, the pilot must check with the air station to confirm the maximum engaging
speed because of a possible installation with less than minimum required rated chain length.
(G) Only for the E−28 systems at Keflavik and Bermuda with 920−foot tapes.
(H) Standard BAK−12 limits are based on 150−foot span, 1−inch cross−deck pendant, 40,000−pound weight setting,
and 950−foot runout. No information is available regarding applicability to other configurations.
(J) Engaging speed limit is 96 knots at 59,000 pounds. Because of runout limitations, it is recommended this
gear not be engaged at weights greater than 59,000 pounds.
(K) Maximum of 3.0_ glideslope.
(L) Consult appropriate section for recommended approach speed.
(M) Flared or minimum rate of descent landing.
Figure 153.Emergency Field Arrestment Guide (Sheet 1 of 2)
15−19 ORIGINAL
AIRCRAFT ENGAGING SPEED LIMITS

FOR E−5 EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR
AIRCRAFT: F−14 D
SHORT FIELD LANDING

SHORT−FIELD LONG FIELD LANDING
LONG−FIELD ABORTED TAKEOFF
UP TO 54,000 POUNDS UP TO 60,000 POUNDS 60,100 TO 72,000 POUNDS
ARRESTING STANDARD HEAVY STANDARD HEAVY STANDARD HEAVY
GEAR CHAIN CHAIN CHAIN CHAIN CHAIN CHAIN
RATING
E−5 E−5−1 E−5 E−5−1 E−5 E−5−1 E−5 E−5−1 E−5 E−5−1 E−5 E−5−1
E−5−2 E−5−3 E−5−2 E−5−3 E−5−2 E−5−3 E−5−2 E−5−3 E−5−2 E−5−3 E−5−2 E−5−3
COL. 1 COL. 2 COL. 3 COL. 4 COL. 5 COL. 6 COL. 7 COL. 8 COL. 9 COL. 10 COL. 11 COL. 12 COL. 13
300 to 349 39 ((D)) 39 ((D)) 40 ((D)) 40 ((D)) 37 ((D)) 37 ((D)) 38 ((D)) 38 ((D)) 33 ((D)) 33 ((D)) 34 ((D)) 34 ((D))
350 to 399 45 ((D)) 45 ((D)) 47 ((D)) 47 ((D)) 43 ((D)) 43 ((D)) 44 ((D)) 44 ((D)) 39 ((D)) 39 ((D)) 40 ((D)) 40 ((D))
400 to 449 51 (D) 51 (D) 54 (D) 54 (D) 48 (D) 48 (D) 51 (D) 51 (D) 44 (D) 44 (D) 47 (D) 47 (D)
450 to 499 57 ((D)) 57 ((D)) 61 ((D)) 61 ((D)) 54 ((D)) 54 ((D)) 58 ((D)) 58 ((D)) 49 ((D)) 49 ((D)) 53 ((D)) 53 ((D))
500 to 549 63 ((D)) 63 ((D)) 68 ((D)) 68 ((D)) 60 ((D)) 60 ((D)) 65 ((D)) 65 ((D)) 55 ((D)) 55 ((D)) 59 ((D)) 59 ((D))
550 to 599 69 (D) 69 (D) 76 (D) 76 (D) 65 (D) 65 (D) 72 (D) 72 (D) 60 (D) 60 (D) 66 (D) 66 (D)
600 to 649 75 ((D)) 75 ((D)) 84 ((D)) 84 ((D)) 71 ((D)) 71 ((D)) 79 ((D)) 79 ((D)) 65 ((D)) 65 ((D)) 73 ((D)) 73 ((D))
650 to 699 81 ((D)) 81 ((D)) 91 ((D)) 91 ((D)) 77 ((D)) 77 ((D)) 87 ((D)) 87 ((D)) 71 ((D)) 71 ((D)) 79 ((D)) 79 ((D))
700 to 749 87 (D) 87 (D) 99 (D) 99 (D) 83 (D) 83 (D) 94 (D) 94 (D) 76 (D) 76 (D) 86 (D) 86 (D)
750 to 799 93 ((D)) 93 ((D)) 107 ((D)) 107 ((D)) 89 ((D)) 89 ((D)) 102 ((D)) 102 ((D)) 82 ((D)) 82 ((D)) 93 ((D)) 93 ((D))
800 to 849 99 ((D)) 99 ((D)) 115 (D)

( ) 115 (D)
( ) 94 ((D)) 94 ((D)) 109 ((D)) 109 ((D)) 87 ((D)) 87 ((D)) 100 ((D)) 100 ((D))
850 to 899 105 (D) 105 (D) 123 (D) 123 (D) 100 (D) 100 (D) 117 (D) 117 (D) 93 (D) 93 (D) 107 (D) 107 (D)
900 to 949 111 (D)

( ) 111 ((D)) 131 ((D)) 131 ((D)) 106 ((D)) 106 ((D)) 125 ((D)) 125 ((D)) 98 ((D)) 98 ((D)) 114 ((D)) 114 ((D))
950 to 999 117 ((D)) 117 ((D)) 140 ((D)) 140 ((D)) 112 ((D)) 112 ((D)) 133 ((D)) 133 ((D)) 104 ((D)) 104 ((D)) 121 ((D)) 121 ((D))
1,000 to 1,049 123 (D) 123 (D) 148 (D) 148 (D) 118 (D) 118 (D) 140 (D) 140 (D) 109 (D) 109 (D) 129 (D) 129 (D)
1,050 to 1,099 129 ((D)) 129 ((D)) 150 ((D)) 156 ((D)) 123 ((D)) 123 ((D)) 148 ((D)) 148 ((D)) 115 ((D)) 115 ((D)) 136 ((D)) 136 ((D))
1,100 135 (D) 135 (D) 150 (D) 165 (D) 129 (D) 129 (D) 150 (D) 156 (D) 120 (D) 120 (D) 143 (D) 143 (D)
NOTES (E) AND (F) APPLY
Figure 15−3. Emergency Field Arrestment Guide (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 15−20
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
If light is illuminated and hook visually is checked down:
6. WSHLD AIR/ANTI-ICE HOOK CONT cb — Pull

(8C2).
Weight limits for barricade engagement are as
follows: Note
a. Wings at 20_ — 51,800 pounds (maximum). Cb 8C2 also controls windshield air and anti-ice.
b. Wing sweep 20_ < 35_ — 46,000 pounds 15.12 FORCED LANDING
(maximum).
Landing the aircraft on unprepared surfaces is not
c. Wings 35_ — Not permitted. recommended. If it is necessary to do so, landing with the
landing gear down, regardless of the terrain, will assist in
15.11 ARRESTING HOOK EMERGENCY DOWN absorbing the shock of ground impact and reduce possibility
of flightcrew injuries. External stores should be jettisoned in
1. HOOK handle — DN. a safe area prior to touchdown. External tanks should be
jettisoned if they contain fuel, but retained to absorb landing
2. HOOK handle — Pull, Then Rotate. shock if they are empty. If time permits, dump fuel to allow
touchdown at the slowest possible speed with full flaps.
Note
Pull handle aft approximately 4 inches and turn 15.13 GROUND ROLL BRAKING FAILURES
counterclockwise. This will mechanically
*1. ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch — Check.
release the uplatch mechanism and allow hook to
extend. *2. MASTER RESET pushbutton — Depress.
3. Hook transition light — Check OFF.
If light is illuminated and hook visually is checked up:
4. HOOK handle — Restow in Down Position.

Ground roll braking may fail to extend spoilers
5. HYD VALVE CONTR cb — Pull and Reset After 5 on touchdown due to a momentary miscompare
Seconds (8E5). of the weight-on-wheels switches. MASTER
RESET should restore normal ground roll
braking operation.
15-21 (Reverse
15-21 Blank) CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
CHAPTER 16
Ejection
16.1 EJECTION attempt is made during zoom, and there is no

evidence of a relight, eject at peak altitude. If no
Responsibility for the decision to eject shall be
airstart attempt is made, eject at peak altitude.
determined and briefed before flight. Thereafter the decision
to abandon the aircraft shall rest with the crewmember 3. If decision to abandon aircraft is made at high
assigned responsibility for that particular situation. The altitude, the recommended minimum altitude for
decision should be made before sink rate, altitude, and ejection is 10,000 feet AGL, or higher, if conditions
attitude conditions jeopardize safe ejections for both so indicate. Under any circumstances and if at all
occupants. In flight, the aircraft must be abandoned by means possible, ejection should be accomplished prior to
of the ejection seats since there is no provision for manual descending below 2,000 feet AGL.
bailout. Prior to ejection from a flyable or controllable
aircraft, it is the pilot’s responsibility to do everything 16.1.1 Ejection Envelope
reasonable to ensure that the abandoned aircraft will inflict
the least possible damage on impact. Figure 16−1 shows minimum ejection altitude for a
given airspeed and sink rate, bank angle, and dive angle. For
Ejection may be necessary as a result of fire, engine all ejections, it is recommended that airspeed be reduced as
failure, structural failure, midair collision, or when the much as practicable; however in uncontrolled situations, do
aircraft becomes uncontrollable. In each case, the pilot must not delay ejection because the aircraft is not within the
decide when to eject, using the following as a guide: published safe escape envelope. For ejection at low altitude,
it is recommended that a climb be initiated to convert excess
1. Ejection is mandatory under the following
airspeed into altitude. Although the escape system is capable
conditions except when unusual circumstances
of zero−zero ejection, it should be borne in mind that a
clearly indicate to the pilot that the cause of safety
combination of low airspeed and high rate of descent at low
to self and others will be better served by a flameout
altitude can present a condition more severe than zero−zero.
approach than by ejection.
Ejection sequences are shown in FO−16 and FO−17.
a. Serious, uncontrolled fire. For details of ejection seat mechanical operation, see
paragraph 2.38.
b. If aircraft is in uncontrolled flight at 10,000 feet
AGL or below.
c. When dual−engine flameout occurs below 1,500
feet AGL and 250 knots.
d. If repeated relight attempts are not successful During ejection seat development and testing,
between 30,000 and 10,000 feet, eject by 10,000 the SJU−17(V)3/A and SJU−17(V)4/A were
feet AGL. qualified for use by male aviators with nude
weights from 136 pounds to 213 pounds. Opera
e. If still on first or second relight attempt when tion of the seat by personnel not within these pa
passing through 10,000 feet AGL and it appears rameters subjects the occupant to an increased
that a relight is likely, airstart attempt may be risk of injury.
continued to a minimum of 5,000 feet AGL.
1. General Injury Risks:
2. If dual−engine flameout occurs below 10,000 feet,
zoom to convert excess airspeed to altitude. a. Ejection stability is directly related to occupant
Attempt airstart as time permits. If peak altitude is restraint. All occupants should be properly
above 5,000 feet AGL and airstart attempt is not restrained in the seat by their torso harness for
successful, eject no lower than 5,000 feet AGL. If optimum performance and minimum injury risk.
peak altitude is below 5,000 feet AGL and airstart
16−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 161.Minimum Ejection Altitude (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 16−2
Figure 16−1. Minimum Ejection Altitude (Sheet 2 of 3)
16−3 ORIGINAL
Figure 16−1. Minimum Ejection Altitude (Sheet 3 of 3)
ORIGINAL 16−4
b. Inertia reel performance may be degraded for oc ARMED/SAFE handle is at ARMED before trying again.
cupants outside of the qualified weight range. Ejection through the canopy is an automatic backup. There
Lighter occupants may be injured during the is no provision for manual bailout.
haulback, and both light and heavy occupants
may experience poor ejection positions, 16.1.2 Ejection Preparation
resulting in an increased risk of injury during
ejection.
2. Injury risks for aviators with nude weights less than
136 pounds:
Never pull the manual override handle before
a. The catapult was designed for the ejection seat ejection. Pulling the handle releases the
qualified weight range. Lighter weight crewmember from the seat and moves the
occupants are subject to a higher risk of injury ARMED/SAFE handle to SAFE, making it
from the catapult due to greater acceleration. impossible to initiate ejection from the seat.
Further, if ejection is initiated by the other
b. Lighter weight occupants are at a greater risk of crewmember, results could be fatal.
injury during ejections above 300 KIAS due to
instability during drogue deployment. Time permitting, perform all or as much as possible of
the following:
c. Lighter weight occupants are at a greater risk of 1. Place aircraft in safe envelope and attitude for
injury during ejections near the upper end of ejection.
Mode 1 (approaching 300 KIAS) due to high
parachute opening shock. 2. Warn other crewmember.
3. EJECT CMD lever  Select (RIO).
3. Injury risks for aviators with nude weights greater
than 213 pounds: 4. IFF/SIF  EMERG/7700 (RIO).
5. Position report  Transmit.
a. Larger occupants may not attain sufficient
altitude for parachute full inflation in zero−zero 6. Check altimeter.
cases or at extremely low altitudes and
7. Assume proper ejection position (see Figure 162).
velocities.
a. Head pressed back against headrest
b. Larger occupants may not attain sufficient
b. Chin slightly elevated (10° up).
altitude to clear the aircraft tail structure.
c. Back straight.
The escape system will function up to 0.9 IMN or 600 KIAS, d. Hips against seat back.
whichever is greater. However, human limitations are more
restrictive as indicated below: e. Thighs flat on seat survival kit.
1. Zero to 250 KIASSafe ejection (injury f. Outside of thighs pressed against side of seat.
improbable). g. Elbows and arms pressed firmly against body.
2. 250 to 600 KIASHazardous ejection (appreciable h. Feet on rudder pedals, heels on deck.
forces are exerted on the body, making injury i. Visor down, oxygen mask tightened, helmet
probable). secure.
3. Above 600 KIASExtremely hazardous ejection
(excessive forces are exerted upon the body, making
serious injury or death highly probable).
Usually, there will be enough time to do several things
to prepare for a successful ejection prior to pulling the seat D Positioning the legs aft prior to ejection will
firing handle. However, when the emergency condition cause the spine to flex and will increase the
requiring ejection is such that ejection must be made without possibility of spinal injury, and, will also
hesitation, simply grasp the handle and pull forcibly to the increase likelihood of seat/thigh slap with
fullest extent until the seat ejects. If the seat fails to eject, attendant leg injury.
immediately pull again. If the handle will not move, ensure
that the ground safety pin has been removed and that the D Proper body position is a critical factor in
preventing ejection injuries.
16−5 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
Figure 162.Proper Ejection Position
16.1.3 Ejection Initiation Note

See Figure 16−3 for ejection initiation. LPA inflation may not be desirable over land.
The paragraphs that follow provide procedures
After the seat firing handle is pulled:
applicable to the NACES seat. Additional post−ejection/
1. The harness retraction unit retracts the shoulder har survival procedures are to be found in the NATOPS Survival
ness pulling the occupant to an upright position. The Manual, NAVAIR 00−80T−101.
leg garters are retracted as the seat moves up the rail.
2. Ejection through the canopy is a backup method
only; therefore, canopy is jettisoned as part of
normal ejection sequence. Ejection through the D Ejection at low altitude allows only a matter
canopy or out of the aircraft occurs after a delay if of seconds to prepare for landing. Over water,
the normal sequence fails. inflation of the LPA is the most important step
3. Seats eject individually and in opposite directions to be accomplished. Release of the parachute
(pilot right, RIO left). quick−release fittings as the feet contact the wa
ter is the second most important step to prevent
16.2 MANUAL BAILOUT entanglement in the parachute shroud lines.
D When ejection is in the immediate vicinity of
There is no provision for manual bailout. Ejection the carrier, parachute entanglement combined
through the canopy is an automatic backup if the canopy fails with wake and associated turbulence can rap
to jettison or the safe and arm unit fails to fire. idly pull a survivor under.
16.3 SURVIVAL/POSTEJECTION PROCEDURES
Figure 16−4 describes step−by−step procedures for
inflation of the LPA configured with beaded handles and the
35−gram CO2 cylinder.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 16−6
Figure 163.Ejection Initiation
The deployed seat survival kit may contribute Locate the manual override handle on the right side of the
to shroud−line entanglement. The survivor seat bucket, depress the handle release button and pull handle
must be prepared to cut shroud lines that are sharply upward as far as possible. This fires a cartridge to
dragging him down. activate the parachute deployment rocket and release the
upper and lower harness locks. Man/seat separation occurs
D The crashed aircraft may release large
when the main parachute is extracted and deployed.
quantities of jet fuel and fumes that could
hamper breathing and create a fire hazard if
16.3.2 Survival Kit Deployment
smoke or flare marker is present. The
emergency oxygen system may be invaluable
in this case and discarding the seat pan would Note
terminate its use. However, totally discarding Survival kit deployment is not recommended in
the seat pan may be appropriate after an overland ejection situation. The kit can be
considering weather, sea conditions, and opened after landing by removing the closure
rescue potential. pins from the cones.
Note With either hand, locate one of the deployment handles
The variety and complexity of conditions at the rear of the seat kit. Firmly pull on the handle until it is
encountered during the time−critical movements free of the kit and the survival package falls away on its
following a low−altitude, overwater ejection dropline. The package remains attached to the kit lid by the
make it impossible to formulate procedures to dropline. At full dropline stretch, the liferaft is inflated
cover every contingency. automatically.
16.3.1 Manual Man/Seat Separation

If below 14,000 feet and man/seat separation have not
occurred, the procedure will have to be initiated manually.
16−7 ORIGINAL
Figure 164.Life Preserver Assembly Inflation
ORIGINAL 16−8
16.3.3 Parachute Steering 16.3.5 Raft Boarding

A gentle pull of approximately 6 inches on the left or
Note
right steering line (attached to the riser) will rotate the canopy
to enable steering. Pulling on the left line steers left. The D If the liferaft has not inflated automatically,
canopy will continue to rotate for a time after the steering line pull on the red operating handle on the
is released, so it is necessary to compensate for this lag by dropline to inflate.
releasing the steering line before the desired direction is
reached. D If the survival package has not been deployed
before water entry, first pull the yellow
16.3.4 Parachute Landing Preparation deployment handle then the red operating
handle.
Preparations over land and over water are essentially
When clear of the canopy, retrieve the raft by locating
the same except that over land the visor should be kept down,
the dropline and pulling the raft to you. The raft retaining
the gloves worn, and the survival kit should not be deployed.
lanyard is in a pocket next to the CO2 cylinder. Attach the end
In low−level, overwater situations, the mask and regulator
of the lanyard securely to the gated helo hoist ring on the
should be retained since they provide an underwater
harness, then ensure that the oxygen hose is disconnected
breathing capability. If there is time before a water landing,
from the kit lid and release the lapbelt quick−release fittings,
the gloves may be removed and stowed safely. This may
releasing the kit lid. Bring the raft around for entry from the
make it easier to operate the canopy releases.
small end (stem); grasp the stem, and forcibly push under
Try to determine the direction of the wind at the surface LPA waist lobes. Using the boarding handles, pull into the
using white caps, smoke from the wreckage, or known raft and turn into a comfortable, balanced, seated position.
surface winds in the vicinity. Note that surface winds may be Locate the dropline and retrieve the survival package.
quite different from those at altitude. When nearing the
surface, steer into the wind and assume the proper body
position for landing:
1. Feet together, knees slightly bent, toes pointed

slightly downward. Do not attempt to retrieve the kit lid. Any attempt
2. Eyes on the horizon. to do so could capsize the raft.
3. Grasp canopy risers and tuck elbows in prior to Close the canopy and orally inflate the canopy and
water entry. floor. An integral baler is provided to bale the raft as
necessary.
4. On water entry, release the canopy manually. The
SEWARS releases will operate the canopy release
fittings on saltwater entry as a backup.
16−9 (Reverse
PART VI
All−Weather Operations
Chapter 17 Instrument Procedures
Chapter 18 Extreme Weather

CHAPTER 17
Instrument Procedures
17.1 AUTOMATIC CARRIER LANDING SYSTEM 17.1.2 Mode II

ACLS approaches apply to properly configured The control of the aircraft remains with the pilot along
aircraft utilizing carrier or shore−based AN/SPN−10 or the entire glideslope to touchdown. Glideslope error signals
AN/SPN−42 ACLS radar facilities. Three primary modes of are transmitted to the aircraft for cockpit displays from the
operation and two submodes are available. AN/SPN−41 or the AN/SPN−42. The pilot flies the aircraft to
null the error and to keep the vertical and lateral crosshairs
1. Mode I approach automatically controlled to
centered. During a Mode II T approach, the final controller
touchdown
provides a Mode III−type talkdown to assist the pilot in flying
2. Mode IA approach automatically controlled to a his needles or for controller training.
minimum of 200 feet and one−half mile; manual
control remainder of approach 17.1.3 Mode III
3. Mode II approach manually controlled using AN/ The pilot flies the aircraft in response to voice radio
SPN−41 or AN/SPN−42 vertical display indicator commands from the final controller to keep the aircraft on the
and/or heads−up display presentation for glideslope proper glideslope. From the radar azimuth and elevation
and lineup information displays, the final controller determines the aircraft position
with respect to the desired glidepath and gives guidance to
4. Mode III approach manually controlled using only
the pilot.
CCA−controller−supplied information
5. Flight director approach manually controlled using 17.1.4 Flight Director
HUD flight director presentation derived from AN/
SPN−42/46 information and navigation system data The pilot flies the aircraft so that the FPM stays inside
for glidepath intercept and following. the flight director symbol on the HUD. The flight director
symbol provides glideslope and centerline steering
information computed by the mission computer using
17.1.1 Mode I
navigation system parameters and data−link information
Mode I provides a fully automatic, hands−off landing from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system. The box with the three
capability, called automatic carrier landing or all−weather dots provides the pilot with optimal glidepath intercept and
landing. The landing radar system (AN/SPN−42) tracks the following when the flightpath marker is inside the flight
aircraft and compares its position with the desired position. director box and the three dots are aligned with the wings and
The aircraft position is corrected to fly the desired glidepath the tail of the flightpath marker. The horizontal deviation of
by commands from the naval tactical data system using the flight director symbol from the FPM represents the error
the radar computer. These commands are transmitted over between the commanded and actual bank angle. The vertical
the UHF data link to the aircraft, where the automatic flight deviation represents the error between the commanded
control system executes the pitch and bank commands. vertical rate. The flight director symbol also rotates an
Additional ramp input commands tailored to each specific amount corresponding to the error between the bank
ship or field are applied at the proper time to assist the aircraft command and the bank attitude to give an indication of the
through the burble. In addition to control of the aircraft, size of the bank correction required (primarily useful for
discrete words and glideslope error signals are transmitted following large bank commands during centerline captures).
for cockpit displays to show the pilot where the aircraft is in The vertical deviation is scaled on the HUD so that it gives
relation to the desired glideslope. Independent glideslope an indication of the vertical flightpath angle correction
error signals from the AN/SPN−41 instrument landing system required.
may also be displayed. The pilot may take control at any time
and continue the landing via Mode II.
17−1 ORIGINAL
17.2 AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEMS Note

Mode I (automatic) landings are possible only if the If a pitch parallel actuator force link disconnect
ACLS installation, including data link, DFCS, radar beacon occurs prior to an ACLS approach, the A/P REF
and augmentor, inertial navigation system, and ACLS advisory may go out when coupling is attempted,
displays (MFD and/or HUD) are all fully operational. The but the aircraft will not respond to SPN−42
approach power compensator should be used during the commands and the aircraft will uncouple when
coupled portion of the approach. Mode II (manual) landings the first pitch commands are received.
can be made using displayed crosspointer information from
either the data link or the AN/ARA−63 receiver decoder, or Following ACL engagement, the pilot can take control
both (providing dual displays). of the aircraft by simply overriding the data−link commands
with his control stick. This causes immediate disengagement,
17.2.1 Data Link and the DFCS will again revert to STAB AUG. Refer to
paragraph 2.24.4.7, Automatic Carrier Landing, for further
Data−link (link 4A) messages are received and information on ACL.
transmitted by a UHF frequency−shift−key−modulated radio
link. Data link receives control messages in serial form from 17.2.3 Radar Beacon (AN/APN−154)
the NTDS and processes each message as necessary. For
ACL, the position error information is furnished to the MFD The radar beacon enhances aircraft tracking (range and
and/ or HUD ACL steering indicator, discrete messages accuracy) by ship and/or ground−based I−band radars for
appear on MFDs 1 and 3, and control information is provided precision vectoring. Pulsed (coded) I−band signals
for the DFCS. Reply messages are transmitted to the NTDS transmitted by the surface radar station are received by the
with detailed information on aircraft heading, speed, beacon and decoded; if they match the mode (six available)
altitude, fuel quantity, weapons, stores, and autopilot status. selected by the RIO, the beacon responds with a return pulse
to the radar site. The reply signal, considerably stronger than
The shipboard data link continuously transmits a a normal radar echo, enhances the radar acquisition and
universal test message and a monitor control message. When tracking capability of the surface station.
in operation, the UTM or MCM is used by the aircraft as a
self−test feature. The aircraft data−link system self−test is 17.2.4 ACLS Beacon Augmentor (R−1623)
performed by selecting AWL steering on the MFD. Only the
pilot can deselect AWL steering from the MFD VDI format The beacon augmentor is a crossband receiver that
once selected. extends the tracking capability of the AN/SPN−42 shipboard
radar with the capability of operating with either or both
Note channels of the AN/SPN−42 without interference.
AWL steering is only available in the TLN mode. The beacon augmentor eliminates radar scintillation
In A/A and A/G, the AWL pushbutton selection by providing a large source of reply energy from one point on
on the MFD VDI format is removed. the aircraft. The beacon augmentor receives interrogations
from the AN/SPN−42 carrier−based radar in the Ka−band at
17.2.2 Digital Flight Control System 33.0 to 33.4 GHz, processes them, and retransmits modulated
I−band pulses at 8.8 to 9.5 GHz to the AN/SPN−42, which has
The DFCS performs two functions: stability an I−band receiving system mounted contiguous with the
augmentation and autopilot.
basic Ka−band radar transmitting antenna. The unique
Stability augmentation (STAB AUG) provides added feature of the augmentor is that it uses the AN/ APN−154
stability to the aircraft and is, in general, necessary for beacon as its I−band transmitter. This is accomplished by
effective aircraft control. coupling the output of the augmentor to the AN/ APN−154
and triggering its modulator and transmitter. During the
The autopilot ACL mode can be engaged only after landing phase, it is necessary to manually place the radar
engaging all STAB AUG axes and then by placing the AUTO beacon MODE switch to ACLS. In this mode, the AN/
PILOT ENGAGE switch in ON. Selection of ACL on the APN−154 receiver is disabled to ensure that I−band signals in
DFCS control panel arms the mode and displays the A/P REF the area will not trigger the AN/APN−154 transmitter during
advisory on the pilot MFD No. 1. A/P REF indicates that an landing.
DFCS pilot relief mode has been selected (in this case, ACL),
but not engaged. The pilot engages ACL through the
reference engage switch on the stick grip, at which time
the A/P REF advisory goes out.
ORIGINAL 17−2
17.2.4.1 Beacon Controls degraded control on the glideslope and unacceptable

touchdown dispersion. A properly functioning APC should
The RADAR BEACON panel (Figure 17−1) is on the
hold the aircraft on−speed ±0.5 unit throughout the majority
RIO right console. POWER or STBY can be used for radar
of the approach. At tipover, the aircraft may accelerate to as
beacon warmup; to preclude response to a premature or
much as two units faster but should correct to on−speed within
unintentional interrogation, the STBY (ACLS not selected) 5 seconds. The APC should be checked for satisfactory
position should be used.
operation prior to coupling. If the performance of the APC
There are no cockpit displays for the beacon, although does not meet the above criteria, the approach should be
the ACLS TEST button will be illuminated if the beacon is downgraded to Mode II.
responding during an ACLS approach. A selfcheck of the
beacon ACLS mode is accomplished by depressing the 17.2.6 ACLS/ILS Displays (MFD and HUD)
ACLS TEST or performing an on−board check. Either of
ACLS and instrument landing system steering in
these two use the receiver video processing circuits of the
formation can be displayed on any MFD and the HUD
augmentor in the same manner as a Ka−band input from the
(Figure 17−2). When the AWL pushbutton is depressed, final
AN/SPN−42. If operation of the receiver is normal, the ACLS
determination of the display submode is governed by the
TEST pushbutton light on the RADAR BEACON panel will
HUD and MFD pushbuttons on the MFD when in AWL
illuminate. A BAG acronym will be displayed when
steering, which provide for separate ILS and ACLS selection
performing an OBC and in the event of a beacon augmentor
for both the HUD and MFD VDI format. This enables any
failure. The radar beacon has a minimum warmup time of 5
mix of ILS (ANN/SPN−41/AN/ARA−63), ACL (AN/
minutes. During this time, failure indications will be
SPN−42/data link), or no displays at the pilot’s option.
displayed and self−test results should be regarded as
inconclusive. A NO GO light during OBC should be verified The ILS and ACL displays differ in that the ILS errors
by depressing the ACLS TEST pushbutton. If the ACLS test are displayed by needles and the ACL errors are displayed
light illuminates, the system is functioning regardless of the with the ACL steering indicator. The ACL steering indicator
NO GO light indication. (Figure 17−2) represents where the intersection of ACL
needles would be if presented. Azimuth and glideslope
deviation are represented by the relationship of the velocity
vector to the needles/ACL steering indicator. Two different
means of displaying ILS and ACL steering are used to allow
the option of displaying both sources of information
If the aircraft is parked on the flight deck aft simultaneously on either display (MFD or HUD). Both
of the island, the radar beacon should be in either displays in the ACL mode display a command heading
OFF or STBY with ACLS not selected. With marker. This marker, during AN/SPN−42 approaches,
ACLS selected, stray energy can trigger beacon indicates final bearing.
response and may seriously degrade perfor
The ILS steering displays approach information in the
mance or preclude lockon of aircraft attempting
form of precision course vectors. A vertical vector is used for
ACLS approaches. After shipboard arrestment
azimuth steering while the horizontal vector is for elevation.
and upon clearing the landing area, the radar
The pair form a crosspointer and are displayed on the HUD
beacon power switch should be turned to OFF to
and VDI presentations simultaneously. Full−scale deflection
prevent possible beacon signal interference with
limits of the HUD and VDI vector symbols are 20 and 1.5
other aircraft.
inches, respectively. The vectors are limited to this deflection
to ensure the displayed symbol will always have an
Note
intersection. Full scale deflection limits correspond to 6° of
Do not depress the ACLS TEST pushbutton after lateral deviation from centerline and 1.4° of vertical
coupling on a Mode I approach as it will cause the deviation from glideslope.
ground station to break lock. The ACL submode uses the ACL steering indicator that
is driven by the data link instead of the AN/ARA−63 receiver
17.2.5 Approach Power Compensator decoder. Any combination of ILS needles, ACL steering
Performance indicator, or neither is available for the HUD or VDI
For successful Mode I and Mode IA ACLS approaches, presentations. Selection of each is controlled by the push
it is essential that the APC be functioning satisfactorily. buttons contained on the MFD once AWL steering is
Sluggish APC performance or its inability to maintain selected.
on−speed accurately during the approach will result in
17−3 ORIGINAL
1 MODE switch SINGLE Limits beacon response to single pulse of any code group
received.
DOUBLE Beacon response set to one of five double−pulse interrogations.
ACLS Enables augmentor operation.
WARNING
ACLS shall not be selected on the flight deck

when the power switch is in STBY or PWR, or
during the 5−minute beacon warm up period.
2 ACLS TEST PUSH On (green) Indicates a AN/SPN−42 lockon in ACLS mode; when pressed with
light/pushbutton radar beacon mode selector in ACLS, indicates a satisfactory
self−test of ACLS mode only.
Flashing Indicates AN/SPN−42 is sweeping through aircraft but has not
locked on.
Intermittent
(or no light) During self−test, indicates a fault In the ACLS mode only.
Figure 171.Radar Beacon Panel (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 17−4
3 Power switch PWR With radar beacon mode selector in ACLS, enables I−band replies
to Ka−band interrogations.
STBY Used for warmup with radar beacon MODE switch in SINGLE or
DOUBLE.
Note
The beacon will warm up with the switch in either
position STBY or PWR. To prohibit response to
premature or unintentional interrogations, warmup
should be accomplished in STBY. For optimum
performance allow 5−minute warmup.
OFF Turns off all power to radar beacon.
Figure 17−1. Radar Beacon Panel (Sheet 2 of 2)
Additionally, certain ACLS commands that are The aircraft system receives and decodes glideslope
uplinked to aircraft via the data−link system are displayed to azimuth and elevation signals that are converted into
both aircrew on MFD No. 1 and No. 3. command fly−to indications in the CIU and displayed via VDI
and/or HUD in the TLN mode (Figure 17−2). If the ILS or
Note
ACL landing submodes selected on the pilot display control
For more detailed information on the data link panel becomes invalid, the invalid submode symbology will
symbology, refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A. be removed. A computer message informing the aircrew
which submode became invalid will be posted on MFD No.
The ACLS and ILS systems provide angular situation
information (ILS needles and ACLS tadpole) of glidepath 1 and No. 3. As a backup to the display subsystem, ILS
steering indications are also displayed directly on the pilot
errors that requires the pilot to determine the corrections
standby attitude indicator vertical and horizontal needles.
needed to eliminate those errors, resulting in higher workload
and possible degraded approach performance (overshoots
and oscillations). The flight director display provides the Note
optimum glidepath steering information (as computed by the The ILS has a minimum warmup time of 1
mission computer using navigation system parameters and minute. During this time, a failure indication
data−link information from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system) to should be disregarded.
intercept and follow the glideslope and centerline, which
reduces pilot workload and improves approach performance. The ILS performs a self−test when the BIT pushbutton
The flight director symbol can be selected for display on the on AN/ARA−63 decoder panel is depressed and held.
HUD by boxing the FLT DIR pushbutton on the pilot AWL Response to the ILS self−test is displayed, providing ILS or
VDI MFD format. BOTH is selected on HUD and MFD. The correct ILS
landing mode display on the HUD and VDI display during
17.2.7 Instrument Landing System (AN/ARA−63) system checkout shows the vertical precision course vector
The aircraft ILS uses the AN/ARA−63 receiver decoder symbol slowly oscillating on the right side of the display, then
to process AN/SPN−41 confirmation. This system is used for on the left side. The horizontal precision course vector
manual instrument landing approaches or as an independent symbol remains stationary in the center of the display.
monitor during final approach with the ACLS. The AN/
ARA−63 decoder panel (Figure 17−3) is located on the pilot
right−side outboard console.
17−5 ORIGINAL
HUD Symbology TLN Gear Up Basic Format
1 Command Heading Indicates ACL data link final bearing. Where final bearing is beyond display scale
Marker limits the marker will be pegged at the edge nearest to the final bearing.
2 ILS Precision Course Consists of two independent vectors (vertical and horizontal) that form a cross
Vectors pointer. The horizontal vector responds to ILS glide slope error and the vertical
vector responds to ILS localizer error. Null/center indications are provided to enable
the pilot to null the error and keep the vertical and horizontal needles centered.
3 ACLS Tadpole Provides ACL Steering commands driven by the SPN−42 data link.
4 Waveoff A large X" will appear flashing in the center of the display to indicate a waveoff
data link discrete command.
5 All Weather Landing Indicates the selection of AWL Steering.

Steering Legend
6 TACAN Range Indicates distance to the TACAN station.
7 Clock/Timer Indicates time−to−go to selected destination (TACAN) if selected from HSD CLK
pushbutton.
Figure 172.ACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 17−6
VDI Symbology AWL Steering Mode

1 Command Heading Positioned relative to the magnetic heading scale to indicate ACL data link final
Marker bearing. Where final bearing is beyond display scale limits, the marker will be
pegged at the edge nearest to the final bearing.
2 D/L Message Window Provides certain ACLS commands that are uplinked to aircraft via the data link
system.
3 ILS Precision Course Consists of two independent vectors (vertical and horizontal) that form a cross
Vector pointer. The horizontal vector responds to ILS glide slope error and the vertical
vector responds to ILS localizer error. Null/center indications are provided to
enable the pilot to null the error and keep the vertical and horizontal needles
centered.
4 ACL Steering Indicator Provides ACL Steering commands driven by the SPN−42 data link.
5 Waveoff During carrier landings, a large X" will appear flashing in the center of the display
to indicate a waveoff data link discrete command.
Figure 17−2. ACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 2 of 3)
17−7 ORIGINAL
6 Flight Director The flight director symbol provides glide slope and centerline steering information
computed by the mission computer using navigation system parameters and Data
Link information from the SPN−42/46 ACLS system. The flight director provides the
pilot with optimal glide path intercept and following when the flight path marker is
inside the flight director box and the three dots are aligned with the wings and the
tail of the flight path marker. The same procedures are used whether the flight path
marker is caged or uncaged. The flight director symbol is removed from the HUD
when the FLT DIR pushbutton on the VDI is unboxed. The pushbutton is removed
from the VDI if the Flight director is not available for display (for example, a/c vector
or ACL data link mode is not selected).
7 MFD AWL Display Permits option to display AWL (both ACL and ILS), ILS, ACL, or NO STEERING
Option pushbutton information on the MFD. Initial selection of the AWL steering mode on the basic VDI
format displays both ACL and ILS steering information on the MFD. This will be
indicated by AWL in the box adjacent to the MFD legend. Successive depression of
the pushbutton cycles AWL, ILS, ACL and NO STEERING information on the MFD
in that order.
8 HUD AWL Display Permits option to display AWL (both ACL and ILS), ILS, ACL, or NO STEERING
Option pushbutton information on the HUD. Initial selection of the AWL steering mode on the basic VDI
format displays both ACL and ILS steering information on the HUD. This will be
indicated by AWL in the box adjacent to the HUD legend. Successive depression of
the pushbutton cycles AWL, ILS, ACL, and NO STEERING information on the HUD
in that order.
Note
The RIO is inhibited from deselecting AWL steering once
selected from any MFD.
Figure 17−2. ACLS/ILS Steering (Sheet 3 of 3)
17.3 SURFACE SUBSYSTEMS To satisfy the system capability and landing−rate

requirements, the shipboard subsystem landing control
17.3.1 Automatic Landing System (AN/SPN−42) central AN/SPN−42 has a dual−channel configuration. This
provides increased system reliability through redundancy. At
The AN/SPN−42 radar uses a conically scanning full operational capability, both channels are in use, con-
antenna beam of Ka−band energy, which is received at the trolling two aircraft on the glideslope at the same time. Two
aircraft in direct proportion to its position within the antenna aircraft are normally spaced approximately 60 seconds apart
coverage area. This microwave energy is received as along the glideslope. In addition, the three operating modes
amplitude modulation of the pulsed carrier and, by means of act as backups for each other should partial system failure
the beacon augmentor, the AM is put on the I−band beacon for occur.
retransmission back to the ship as an active radar signal. The
AM on this retransmitted signal is therefore identical to 17.3.2 Instrument Landing System (AN/SPN−41)
the AM received at the aircraft. By relating the amplitude of
the returned signal to the AN/SPN−42 antenna position within The aircraft ILS uses carrier or shore−based AN/
its conical scanning area, the system knows the exact location SPN−41 (C−scan) transmitters. The system operates in the
of the aircraft in relation to the axis of the conical scan, which K−band, between 15.4 and 15.7 GHz, on any of 20 channels.
is the desired glidepath. From this information, the system The transmitted azimuth signal produces a 2° beam, which
can generate corrections to bring the aircraft to the desired is scanned ± 20° from the deck centerline. The transmitted
glidepath. Additional ramp input pitch commands, tailored elevation signal produces a 1.3_ beam with a scan pattern
to each specific ship or field by the Naval Air Test Center from 0_ to 10_ above the horizon. A proportional azimuth
during Mode I certification, are applied at the proper time to angle for steering is 6° right or left of centerline; proportional
assist the aircraft through the burble. elevation angle for steering is 1.4° from the reference
glideslope (above or below).
Change 2
ORIGINAL 17−8
1 CHANNEL selector Twenty possible channel selections by rotation of selector knob.
2 BIT PRESS−to−test Depressing button activates BIT test circuitry. Landing symbols available on HUD
button and/or VDI if AWL or ILS display option is selected, and on pilot’s standby attitude
indicator.
3 POWER switch ON Activates receiver decoder for all−weather carrier landing.

(lock−lever)
OFF Turns system off. Lock−lever switch must be lifted to OFF.
4 Indicator light (light is Lights when AN/ARA−63 is on.

removed with AVC 2460)
Figure 173.AN/ARA−63 Decoder Panel
17−9 ORIGINAL
Operating range is approximately 20 nautical miles. 1. Data−link vector

The signal is transmitted in J−band on a carrier frequency of
15.4 to 15.7 GHz. 2. TACAN
The AN/SPN−41 can be used to guide the pilot to the 3. AWL.
window of the AN/SPN−42 radar for an ACL Mode I
approach and as an independent glideslope and azimuth All are directly selectable on the VDI format of the
display during a Mode I approach. Should the AN/SPN−42 MFD. Switching between submodes requires a choice
radar system fail, the AN/SPN−41 can be used for Mode II between DATA LINK, TACAN, and AWL steering. If a
approaches. submode selected becomes invalid, the steering information
will cease. The pilot has the option of reselecting another
17.4 ACLS PROCEDURES landing display submode. A computer message will also
inform the aircrew of invalid steering modes.
The successful completion of a Mode I or Mode IA
ACLS approach is dependent on the proper performance and During the letdown from marshaling, an AN/SPN−42
complex interaction of a variety of shipboard and aircraft channel is assigned to the aircraft and a computer program of
systems. It is the responsibility of the aircrew to verify that aircraft control parameters is selected. A data−link discrete
all ACLS−related aircraft systems are functioning properly message (the first of a series to be transmitted), LANDING
and that proper procedures are followed in order to ensure a CHECK, is sent to the aircraft to initiate communications
safe coupled approach. with CATCC and to indicate to the pilot that an AN/SPN−42
channel is available. The aircraft will usually already be in
17.4.1 Preflight a landing configuration upon receipt of LANDING CHECK.
During the exterior preflight, the aircrew should ensure 17.4.3.1 Data−Link Vector Approach
that both beacon antennas are in good repair and not painted.
The receive antenna is located on the lower starboard When DATA LINK is selected, the D/L vector display
fuselage just aft of the radome and is mounted flush with the is added to the basic landing display. Command heading
fuselage. The transmit antenna is a blade antenna located on relative to the heading tape is added to the HUD and VDI
the aft portion of the chin dome (IR/TV pod). Poor condition display along with commanded altitude and airspeed on the
of these antennas will seriously degrade beacon performance right and left side of the VDI display. Data−link vector
and will result in degraded tracking capability by the information is available only for the approach phase (i.e., to
AN/SPN−42 system. the radar acquisition window). When the aircraft is vectored
(D/L vector commands) to the acquisition window, the pilot
17.4.2 Poststart Checks has to make a new submode selection for the descent phase.
This is not the case with the TACAN submode, as TACAN
Following start, the aircrew should verify proper information is available throughout landing, from marshal
operation of the beacon and data−link systems along with ing to touchdown.
associated lights and advisories and indications by perform
ing the prescribed built−in tests. In addition, the pitch parallel 17.4.3.2 TACAN Approach
actuator should be checked during OBC to make sure that the
force link is not totally or partially disconnected. If any of The course deviation indicator is used for TACAN
these systems are not functioning properly, a coupled deviation along with a manually set command heading
approach will not be possible. indicator on both the HUD and VDI display.
17.4.3 Approach Phase 17.4.3.3 AWL Approach
In ACL, the purpose of the approach phase is to get the ILS information from the AN/SPN−41 is available
aircraft to the acquisition window (Figure 17−4). At the during both the approach and descent phase. Selection of
marshaling area, some 20 miles astern of the carrier, the AWL on the VDI display enables vertical and lateral
aircraft about to land are stacked according to fuel status and glideslope error display. Final determination of the AWL/
other relevant parameters that determine landing priority, the PCD mode is governed by the ILS/ACL selection, which
ILS (AN/ARA−63) system is energized, and the proper provides for separate HUD and VDI selection. Additionally,
channel and displays are selected. The pilot, in concurrence the pilot may independently select HUD flight director for
with the controller, has the option of choosing from three display by boxing the FLT DIR pushbutton on the AWL VDI.
display submodes to aid him in reaching the radar acquisition
window:
ORIGINAL 17−10
Figure 174.ACLS Mode I and II Approaches
17−11 ORIGINAL
The normal ACLS approach mode will display the 17.4.4.1 Mode I Landing Sequence
ACL tadpole situation information, the ILS needles situation
information, and the ACL flight director steering Note
information on the HUD. If the pilot intends to make a Mode
I approach, he must advise the ground controller of his D ACLS Mode I/IA approaches are authorized
intentions. The ground controller will then disable the flight with AN/SPN−46 systems.
director commands and enable the autopilot commands.
Until this is done, the pilot will not have the capability to D Refer to paragraph 2.24.4.7, Automatic
couple the autopilot to the ACLS commands. The only Carrier Landing (ACL), for further informa
information that is displayed on the HUD during Mode I tion on ACL.
approaches is the ACLS tadpole situation information and The landing system (CATCC) (Figure 17−4) generates
the ILS needles situation information. a coupler available discrete that displays the A/P CPLR
advisory and indicates that the pilot has the option of
17.4.4 Landing Phase coupling the DFCS to data−link commands of pitch and bank.
As the aircraft continues its approach and passes At this time, the aircraft should be in a landing configuration
through the 4−nm ACLS radar acquisition window, a smooth with APC, DLC, DFCS, and altitude hold engaged.
transition, not requiring pilot action, occurs. If TACAN
information has previously been selected (for the approach Note
phase), the pilot could use this information to land. Assume,
The radar should be in STBY or PULSE search
however, that AWL has been selected, ILS and ACL
information is being displayed on the HUD and VDI. to avoid beacon interference problems.
The DFCS should be armed in the ACL relief mode
At the radar acquisition window, the AN/SPN−42 radar
with the A/P REF displayed, indicating that a pilot relief
acquires the aircraft with the aid of the airborne radar beacon
mode (in this case, ACL) has been selected but not engaged.
augmentor, and the system automatically sends a discrete
indicating radar lock−on that displays the ACL RDY The pilot can couple the DFCS to the data link by means of
the autopilot engage button on his control stick, at which
advisory. Transmission of vertical and lateral glidepath
time, if the DFCS is functioning properly and the ACL
errors and flight director commands, derived by the AN/
interlock is true, the AP REF legend will go out. The pilot
SPN−42/46 radar, commences. The glidepath error signals
should report coupled; at which time, the controller will send
drive the ACL tadpole on the VDI and HUD. The flight
a discrete command control message that displays the CMD
director symbol is selected for display by boxing the FLT DIR
CONTROL advisory. The NTDS begins transmitting
pushbutton on the AWL VDI MFD format. The flight director
display information is computed by the mission computer data−link, pitch and bank commands to the aircraft. The
autopilot actuates the appropriate control surface to execute
using navigation system parameters and data−link informa
the desired command, while the autothrottle (APC)
tion, if desired. If the pilot intends to make a Mode I
maintains approach angle of attack by controlling the throttle
approach, he must advise the ground controller of his
intentions. The ground controller will then disable the flight setting.
director commands and enable the autopilot commands.
Until this is done, the pilot will not have the capability to Note
couple the autopilot to the ACLS commands. The only Care should be taken not to couple up in even a
information that is displayed on the HUD during Mode I slight climb. If above reference altitude when
approaches is the ACLS tadpole situation information and initial pitch commands are sent, the resulting
the ILS needles situation information. nose down correction is likely to cause a force
The HUD and VDI symbology has thus been link disconnect resulting in automatic decouple
determined for the landing phase and no further pilot and an inability to perform mode IA approaches
selection is required (unless a system malfunction occurs). until maintenance action is performed.
The mode of operation for this phase of the landing is a Whenever the aircraft exceeds the Mode I flightpath
function of the type of equipment used. In particular, there control envelope, the system automatically sends a signal to
are three modes of landing applicable: Mode I, Mode II, and uncouple the DFCS (A/P CPLR legend goes out). The
Mode III. approach may be continued in Mode II or Mode III. If the
flightpath error increases to the point where a large maneuver
is required to bring the aircraft back on course, the controller
will send a waveoff message that is displayed on the HUD
and VDI and turns on the WAVEOFF advisory. This discrete
also disconnects the autopilot (if engaged) and the DFCS
ORIGINAL 17−12
reverts to stability augmentation. The controller then D The paddle switch will illuminate the
transfers the guidance of the aircraft to the bolter/waveoff MASTER CAUTION light.
controller, who directs the pilot back into the landing
sequences. 17.4.4.2 Mode II Landing Sequence
If the information stored in the data link is not updated The early phases of a Mode II descent (Figure 17−5) are
within any 2−second period during the descent, the TLT identical to a Mode I descent sequence. The aircraft to be
advisory goes on (missed message) and the DFCS recovered is directed through the marshaling area, receives
automatically disconnects and reverts to STAB AUG. The LANDING CHK, and arrives at the ACLS radar acquisition
pilot can continue the descent in Mode II or Mode III. gate. When the lock−on discrete (ACL RDY) message is
received, the pilot continues to fly the aircraft manually
At 12.5 seconds from touchdown (approximately
(using APC as desired) in response to VDI and/or HUD
2,200 feet from the touchdown point), the 10 SECOND
displays.
advisory goes on, indicating deck motion data are being
added to the glidepath commands. This information is in the If there is an equipment failure, the system (CATCC)
form of a slight increase (or decrease) in aircraft altitude to will send a voice discrete signal that turns on the VOICE
adjust for the movement of the touchdown point caused by advisory, and the AN/SPN−42 error information displayed
the ship’s motion (roll, pitch, and heave). Between 12.5 and will be invalid and thus removed. The pilot then expects to
1.5 seconds from touchdown, the CATCC sends an automatic receive standard voice commands and will probably use the
waveoff if any part of the carrier−based equipment fails and redundant ILS information or switch to TACAN steering.
up to 5 seconds from touchdown if the aircraft exceeds the
AN/SPN−42 flightpath control envelope. Waveoff signals As long as the aircraft is located within the AN/SPN−42
also may be issued by the final controller (between lock−on flightpath control envelope for Mode II, the descent is
and touchdown) and the landing signal officer between 1 mile continued until visual contact is made with the Fresnel lens
and touchdown. Approaches must be waved off at weather optical landing system meatball. All waveoffs in Mode II
minimums (200−feet altitude and ½−mile visibility) if the are given by the final controller or the LSO. Approaches are
pilot cannot see the meatball. terminated at weather minimums (200−feet altitude and
½−mile visibility) if the pilot cannot see the meatball.
At 2 seconds from touchdown, the landing system
freezes the pitch and bank commands and the DFCS holds the At any time before 12.5 seconds from touchdown, the
aircraft’s attitude to touchdown unless the pilot elects to pilot can switch from a Mode II manual to a Mode I automatic
override the DFCS either by maneuvering the control stick or flightpath control, provided the coupler available discrete is
by manually disengaging the DFCS and assuming control. being received and the ACL interlock is true.
Aircraft may also be disengaged by momentarily depressing
the A/P REF / NWS pushbutton located on the control stick 17.4.4.3 Mode III Landing Sequence
(this will not illuminate a MASTER CAUTION light). If the Mode III descents follow the same general sequence as
aircraft bolters or if the pilot decides to go around, the DFCS that of Modes I and II, but Mode III approaches are talkdown
is disengaged automatically by means of overriding the landings; that is, all flightpath corrections are provided by
control stick, and the pilot enters the bolter/waveoff pattern. voice and no computerized discrete signals are sent. The use
Note of APC is optional. Approaches are terminated at the weather
minimums if the FLOLS (meatball) is not visible to the pilot
D The paddle switch will only disengage the for continuing the landing.
autopilot; the DLC as well as PITCH and
ROLL SAS will remain engaged.
D The paddle switch will still revert throttles to
MANUAL mode and the engines to emergen
cy SEC mode with weight−on wheels. The
paddle switch may revert the engines to the
emergency SEC mode in flight with a WOW
failure.
17−13 ORIGINAL
Figure 175.SPN−41 ILS Approach
ORIGINAL 17−14
CHAPTER 18
Extreme Weather Operations
18.1 ICE AND RAIN be made to eliminate the ice before landing by remaining
well below the freezing level for an extended period of time.
18.1.1 Icing
Icing conditions should be avoided whenever possible.
Before flight, check freezing levels and areas of probable
icing from weather service.
The primary concern with flying in icing conditions is Icing conditions can cause heavy ice
ice accumulation sufficient to cause engine damage. Ice accumulation in the inlet ramp areas or on engine
accumulation on engine probes located between the engine probes and the compressor face. Aircraft
guide vanes and above the number three inlet ramp is not maneuvers and arrested landings may dislodge
detectable from the cockpit. Aircraft maneuvers or landing this accumulation and cause extensive engine
impact can dislodge accumulated ice and can cause severe FOD or failure. A straight−in field landing is
FOD to the engine. Visual detection of icing on exterior preferred. Minimum power setting after landing
surfaces and/or illumination of the pilot’s INLET ICE is recommended.
caution light should be treated as indications of the
potentially more serious problems described above. The
following precautionary action should be taken immediately
in known or suspected icing environments:
1. ANTI−ICE switch  ORIDE/ON. Operation of main flaps/slats and maneuvering

devices increases the likelihood of a flap/slat
2. CABIN AIR DEFOG lever  FWD DEFOG. lockout because of shearing of the torque tube.
Attempt to descend below the freezing level for
3. Engine instruments  Monitor Frequently.
20 to 30 minutes before operating main or
Carefully monitor rpm and EGT indications. A maneuvering flaps/slats.
reduction of rpm or an increase in EGT accompanied by a
loss of thrust is an indication of engine icing. 18.1.2 Rain
4. Avoid clouds and other areas of visible Whenever rain is encountered, turn ANTI−ICE switch
precipitation. to AUTO/OFF.
5. If unable to avoid precipitation, adjust aircraft Mach Note

or altitude as necessary to remain outside of the
icing zone shown in Figure 18−1. In heavy rainfall, maintain a minimum engine
power setting of 70−percent rpm. This will assure
Extended operations in icing conditions should be adequate acceleration margin and prevent pos
considered an emergency situation. If time and fuel permit, sible engine speed hangup.
a descent below the freezing level is recommended. If
unable, altitudes above approximately 25,000 feet or 18.1.2.1 Takeoff in Rain
ambient temperatures below −30°C are generally free of icing
conditions. If inadvertent or unavoidable operation in known Takeoffs performed with standing water on the runway
or suspected icing conditions has occurred, an effort should may result in unstable engine operation because of water
ingestion.
18−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 181.Icing Danger Zone
18.1.2.2 Landing in Rain 18.2.1 Dynamic Hydroplaning

Selecting ON with the WSHLD AIR switch controls a Dynamic hydroplaning is a condition in which a fluid
blast of air that blows rain off the windshield. Be aware of the separates the tires from the runway surface. When standing
possibility of flameout in a heavy rain and of reduced braking water on a wet runway is not displaced by the tire fast enough
action because of a wet runway. to allow contact over the complete footprint area of the tire,
the tire rides on a wedge (or film) of water over all or part of
18.2 HYDROPLANING the footprint area. Total dynamic hydroplaning occurs when
the pressure between the tires and the runway lifts the tires
Operations on wet or flooded runways may produce off the runway surface to the extent that a nonrotating tire will
four conditions under which tire traction may be reduced to not spin up (landing) or a rolling, unbraked tire will slow in
an insignificant value. rotation and may actually stop (takeoff). Total dynamic
hydroplaning speed (in knots) is represented by the following
1. Dynamic hydroplaning
mathematical formulas: 9 times the square root of the tire
2. Viscous hydroplaning inflation pressure (in psi) for a rotating tire (as in takeoff);
7.7 times the square root of the tire inflation pressure for a
3. Reverted rubber skids nonrotating tire (as in landing).
Dynamic hydroplaning is insensitive to vertical load
4. Combined viscous and dynamic hydroplaning.
changes (weight), but is greatly affected by tire inflation
pressure and tire wear. Since the fluid cushion is incapable of
Note developing any appreciable shear force, braking and side
Hydroplaning has been experienced in the F−14 force coefficients become almost nonexistent.
at speeds down to 40 knots.
ORIGINAL 18−2
18.2.2 Viscous Hydroplaning and dynamic hydroplaning. As speed is further increased, a

point is reached where bulk water penetrates the entire
Viscous hydroplaning occurs when the tires are
footprint; this condition is called dynamic hydroplaning. If
separated from the runway surface by a thin film. Viscous
the runway is not flooded (no bulk water), such as on a
fluid pressures in the tire−ground contact zone of rolling tires
runway covered with heavy dew, it is possible for the second
build up with speed to the danger levels required for zone to cover the entire footprint as speed is increased or
hydroplaning only when water−covered pavements are
decreased. The pavement would have to be smooth or smooth
smooth or smooth acting, as when contaminants
acting, as in the case where contaminants are present, for this
considerably more viscous than water coat the pavements.
to take place; this is called viscous hydroplaning.
Since a tire operating on a surface with rubber deposits, paint,
fuel, or oil can only partially displace the trapped water film,
considerably higher hydroplaning pressures will be devel
oped in the tire footprint area with these more viscous fluids.
Even slight amounts of precipitation, for example, a heavy
dew that coats the pavement with a thin film of fluid, can
produce this effect. Because the tire footprint separates on the
runway with less fluid depth and at a lower relative
groundspeed than dynamic hydroplaning speed, viscous
hydroplaning is potentially more dangerous than dynamic
hydroplaning and is not greatly affected by changes in
vertical tire load or tire inflation pressure. Grooved tires offer
a greater advantage than smooth tires in reducing the effects
of viscous hydroplaning. The runway pavement surface
texture is also an important factor in combating viscous
hydroplaning effects.
18.2.3 Combined Dynamic and

Viscous Hydroplaning
Loss of tire friction with increasing or decreasing speed
on wet or flooded runway pavements can be caused by the
combined effects of viscous and dynamic hydroplaning.
Figure 18−2 shows a pneumatic tire rolling at medium speed
across a flooded pavement in a partial hydroplaning condi
tion. The first zone shows the fraction of the tire footprint that
is supported by bulk water (dynamic); the second zone, the
fraction supported by a thin film of water (viscous); and the
third zone, the fraction essentially in dry contact with the Figure 182.Combined Viscous and Dynamic
peaks of the pavement surface texture. The length of the first Tire Hydroplaning
zone represents the time required for a rolling tire in this
speed condition to expel bulk water from under the footprint; 18.2.4 Reverted Rubber Skids
correspondingly, the length of the second zone represents the
time required for the tire to squeeze out the residual thin A reverted rubber hydroplaning condition (also called
water film remaining under the footprint after the bulk water reverted rubber skid) takes place when a wheel skid has
has been removed. Since fluids cannot develop shear forces started on a wet runway and enough heat is produced to turn
of appreciable magnitude, it is only in the third zone the entrapped water to steam. The steam in turn melts the
(essentially dry region) that friction can be developed rubber in the tire footprint. The molten rubber forms a seal
between the tire and the pavement for steering, decelerating, preventing the escape of water and steam. Thus, the tire rides
and accelerating a vehicle. The ratio of the dry contact area on a cushion of steam that greatly reduces the coefficient of
(third zone) to the total tire footprint area (zones 1, 2, and 3) friction. On inspection of the portion of the tire involved, a
multiplied by the coefficient the tire develops on a dry patch of rubber would show signs of reverting to its uncured
pavement, yields the friction coefficient the tire develops for state and hence the name, reverted rubber. Once established,
this flooded pavement and speed condition. As speed is this condition may persist to very low groundspeeds. The
increased, a point is reached where the third zone disappears characteristic marks on a pavement for the reverted rubber
and the entire footprint is supported by either bulk water or skid are white, as opposed to the black marks left on the
a thin film. This speed condition is called combined viscous pavement during a dry skid. These white marks are
18−3 ORIGINAL
associated with the cleaning process of super−heated steam 18.3.1.1 If Necessary to Penetrate a
and high pressures that are present in the skid. The reverted Thunderstorm:
rubber condition tends to make all runway surfaces smooth
acting. Pavement surface texture, which has a large effect on 1. Slow to between 275 to 300 KIAS.
traction losses from dynamic and viscous hydroplaning, has
but little effect for the reverted rubber case with the possible 2. ANTI−ICE switch  AUTO/OFF.
exception of grooved surfaces. NASA research confirms the
theory that the reverted rubber skid is the most catastrophic 3. AUTO PILOT switch  OFF.
for aircraft operational safety because of the low−braking
friction and the additional fact that tire cornering capability 4. Loose equipment  Secured.
drops to zero when the wheels rotation is stopped.
5. Tighten lapbelt and lock shoulder harness.
18.2.5 Landing On Wet Runway 6. Cockpit lights  On Bright.
Refer to Chapter 7 for landing discussion.
7. Fly attitude and heading indicators primarily while
in extreme turbulence, because altimeter and
18.3 TURBULENCE AND THUNDERSTORMS
airspeed will fluctuate.
Unless the urgency of the mission precludes a deviation
from course, intentional flight through thunderstorms should Note
be avoided to preclude the high probability of damage to the
airframe and components by impact of ice, hail, and During severe icing conditions, the pilot can
lightning. Flameouts because of water ingestion or expect to lose airspeed indications even with the
compressor stalls caused by rapid changes in flight attitudes pitot heat on. Ground−controlled intercept
could also occur. Radar provides a means of navigating stations, if available, can aid the pilot with
between or around storm cells. If circumnavigating the storm tracking assistance through thunderstorm areas.
is impossible, penetrate the thunderstorm in the lower third Severe turbulent air at high altitudes may cause the
of the storm cell, away from the leading edge of the storm inlet airflow distribution to exceed acceptable limits of the
cloud, if possible. It is recommended that the autopilot engine, thereby inducing compressor stalls. To avoid
functions of DFCS be disengaged. Structural damage could compressor stalls during flight because of turbulent air,
result with the automatic functions operating. maintain 275 to 300 KIAS at all altitudes.
18.3.1 In the Storm 18.4 COLD−WEATHER OPERATIONS

Maintain a normal instrument scan with added A careful preflight will eliminate many potential
emphasis on attitude displays. Attempt to maintain a constant hazards found in cold−weather operations. Inspect engine
pitch attitude and, if necessary, accept moderate altitude and intakes for accumulation of ice and snow. If possible, preheat
airspeed fluctuations. In heavy precipitation, a reduction in the engine for easier engine starts. When removing ice and
engine speed may be necessary because of the increased snow from the aircraft surfaces, be careful not to damage the
thrust resulting from water ingestion. If compressor stalls or aircraft. Also, use precautions not to step on any no−step
engine stagnation develops, attempt to regain normal engine surfaces that could be covered with ice or snow. Check the
operation by momentarily retarding the throttle to IDLE then pitot−static tube for ice as well as the fuel pressurization ram/
advance to the operating range. If the stall persists, shut down air intakes, and yaw, pitch, and angle−of−attack transducers.
the engine and attempt to relight. If the engine remains
stagnated at reduced power and the EGT is within limits, Moisture in the fuel system greatly increases
maintain reduced power until clear of the thunderstorm. operational problems in cold weather. At lower temperatures,
While in the storm, the longitudinal feel trim, angle−of− the water−dissolving capacity of fuel is greatly reduced and
attack, total temperature, windshield overheat, static will result in considerably more water accumulation
pressure correction, and cabin pressurization systems may (as much as several gallons of water to 1,000 gallons of fuel).
experience some abnormalities because of rain, ice, or hail If the water separation occurs at below freezing tempera
damage. No difficulty should be encountered in maintaining tures, the water will crystallize on the fuel drain and internal
control of the aircraft; however, the rapid illumination of valves. Any water accumulation will settle to the bottom of
numerous warning lights may be somewhat distracting to the the tanks and freeze up the fuel drains.
pilot if he is not prepared. Normal operating procedures as outlined in Chapter 7,
Shore−Based Procedures, should be adhered to with the
following additions and exceptions.
ORIGINAL 18−4
18.4.1 Preflight Note
1. Check entire aircraft to ensure that all snow, ice, or If external transfer does not initiate or is in
frost is removed. complete, flight below the freezing level for 20
to 30 minutes will allow frozen valves to thaw
permitting external transfer.
In severely cold weather, allow a short time for warmup
before increasing rpm out of the idle range. If oil pressure is
low or fails to come up in a reasonable length of time, shut
Snow, ice, and frost on the aircraft surface are a down. Attempt another start after heating the engines.
major flight hazard. The result of this condition
is a loss of lift and increased stall speeds.
2. Shock struts and actuation cylinders  Free of Ice

and Dirt.
3. Fuel drain cocks  Free of Ice and Drain If abnormal sounds or noises are present during
Condensation. starting, discontinue starting and apply intake
duct preheating for 10 to 15 minutes.
4. Pitot tubes  Ice and Dirt Removed.
18.4.3 Taxiing
5. Exterior protective covers  Removed.
Avoid taxiing in deep or rutted snow since frozen
brakes will likely result.
18.4.2 Engine Start
To ensure safe stopping distance and prevent icing of
Be sure that the aircraft is adequately checked before aircraft surfaces by melted snow and ice blown by jet blast
engine start. of a preceding aircraft, increase spacing between aircraft
When operating in subfreezing temperatures, moisture while taxiing at subfreezing temperatures.
in the air entering the aircraft from the starting unit may
freeze, causing ECS malfunctions. Starting the aircraft with 18.4.4 Takeoff
the AIR SOURCE in OFF will prevent the problem. The AIR
When operating from runways that are covered with
SOURCE in BOTH ENG should be selected after both
excessive water, snow, or slush, highspeed aborts may result
engines have been started and the starter air disconnected.
in engine flameout because of precipitation ingestion. The
ECS malfunctions after engine start may still occur because
probability of flameout is highest when throttles are chopped.
of moisture internally present in the aircraft.
With a double flameout, normal braking, anti−skid and
nosegear steering will be lost as hydraulic pressure decreases
If this occurs, select: with engine spool down. Check applicable takeoff distance
1. TEMP mode selector switch  MAN. charts in NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1.
2. TEMP control thumbwheel  Full Hot (14). Thrust available will be noticeably greater in cold
temperatures during the takeoff run.
3. WSHLD AIR switch  ON.
4. With both engines at IDLE, the ECS should thaw in
about 20 minutes. During this warmup period, leave
all avionics and radar off.
If external fuel tanks are installed: Before initial takeoff roll, ensure that all
instruments are sufficiently warmed up. After
5. MASTER TEST switch FLT GR UP. takeoff, cycle landing gear a few times to prevent
the possibility of the gear freezing in the
Advance throttles as necessary to 80 percent wheelwells.
maximum to check for GO light and positive
external transfer. Once airborne, external fuel
transfer should not be delayed to ensure complete
external tank transfer.
18−5 ORIGINAL
18.4.5 Landing 18.5.1 Taxiing

Frozen downlock microswitch actuators, because of While taxiing in hot weather, the canopies may
moisture combined with extremely cold temperatures, can be opened, if necessary, to augment crew
cause spurious unsafe down indications when landing gear is comfort.
extended. Use antiskid during the landing roll.
Note
Hard braking on ice or a wet runway, even with
ANTISKID on, could result in dangerous
Do not operate the engines in a sand or dust
skidding.
storm, if avoidable. Park the aircraft crosswind
and shut down the engines to minimize damage
18.4.6 After Landing
from sand or dust.
During operations where the temperature is below
freezing with heavy rain, or expected to drop below freezing 18.5.2 Takeoff
with heavy rain, the aircraft may be parked with wings
The required takeoff distances are increased by a
forward (20°) and flaps in the full down position.
temperature increase. Check the applicable takeoff distance
charts in NAVAIR 01−F14AAP− 1.1.
18.4.7 Before Leaving Aircraft
Weather permitting, leave the canopy partially open to
allow for air circulation. This will help prevent canopy
cracking from differential cooling and decrease the
possibility of windshield and canopy frosting.
Do not attempt takeoff in a sand or dust storm, if
18.5 HOT−WEATHER AND avoidable, to prevent sand or dirt from blowing
DESERT OPERATIONS into the intake ducts and causing engine damage.
Check for accumulation of sand or dust in the intakes.
18.5.3 Landing
Normal starting procedures will be employed.
Anticipate a slightly longer landing distance and the
Normal operating procedures as outlined in Chapter 7,
possibility of turbulence because of thermal action of the air
Shore−Based Procedures, should be adhered to with the
close to the ground. Use the defogging system if necessary,
following additions and exceptions:
in warm, humid weather.
1. Expect higher temperatures than normally obtained
in operating ranges.
2. Engine ground operation should be minimized as

much as possible.
ORIGINAL 18−6
PART VII
Communications−Navigation Equipment
and Procedures
Chapter 19 Communications
Chapter 20 Navigation
Chapter 21 Identification

CHAPTER 19
Communications
19.1 COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED control panel controls antenna selection and is described in
EQUIPMENT Chapter 21. TACAN antenna selection is completely auto
matic. If a signal is lost or is too weak to maintain receiver
Figure 191 lists the CNI equipment associated with lockup, the TACAN cycles between the upper and lower
the aircraft/weapons systems. seeking a stronger signal. See Chapter 20 for TACAN
operation.
19.1.3 Mutual Interference

Mutual interference among the V/UHF communica
Operation of electronic equipment for more than tion radios and between the V/UHF communication radios
5 minutes without adequate cooling will perma and D/L can occur. In the UHF band, minimize mutual
nently damage the equipment. interference by selecting opposite antennas or a frequency
separation of at least 55 MHz between radios if both are being
19.1.1 Communications Antennas used. When D/L is in use, mutual interference can be
minimized by using VHF channels for voice communica
Four V/UHF/L−band, dual−blade antennas provide tions. If this is not possible, frequency separation of at least
omnidirectional coverage for V/UHF voice, JTIDS voice, 55 MHz and selection of opposite antennas for voice and D/L
UHF D/L, JTIDS Link 16, TACAN, and IFF/SIF transponder are recommended. If necessary, V/UHF 1 or 2 can be shut off.
operation. V/UHF 2, JTIDS voice and data, and TACAN UHF communications interference with D/L may cause the
share one set of antennas; the upper is immediately aft of the TILT computer message to appear and the autopilot ACL or
canopy turtleback and the lower is embedded in the left VEC/PCD mode to disengage. D/L interference with the
ventral fin. The F/UHF 1, D/L, and IFF/SIF share the second radios may cause audible chirping at the D/L message reply
set; the upper is the second antenna aft of the canopy rate.
turtleback and the lower is embedded in the right ventral fin.
Each system is connected to the appropriate portion of an In the VHF band, both radios should not be operated
upper and lower antenna through a coaxial switch and simultaneously at VHF frequencies.
diplexer. For information on the AN/ASW−27 DL (Link 4), JTIDS will not interfere with any of the V/UHF
and JTIDS (Link 16), refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A. communication radios or data link because it uses a higher
The APX−76 IFF interrogator antenna is an integral frequency band. TACAN compatibility, which is in the same
part of the radar antenna. See FO−1 and FO−2 for antenna frequency band (L−band) as JTIDS, is performed internally
locations. by JTIDS.
19.1.2 Communications Antenna Selection 19.2 INTERCOMMUNICATIONS
Selection of the upper or lower antenna for use by the The ICS provides normal, backup, or emergency
two communication radios and the D/L or JTIDS is manual communications between crewmembers. It also combines
and is controlled by switches on the RIO ANT SEL panel and amplifies audio signals received from other electronic
(Figure 19−2). The D/L is always on the opposite antenna receiving equipment (ECM, Sidewinder tone, IFF/SIF, radar
from V/UHF 1. Antenna selection for the IFF/SIF can be altimeter, and voice radios, etc.).
either automatic or manual. The ANT switch on the IFF
19−1 ORIGINAL
TYPE AND LOCATION

DESIGNATION FUNCTION RANGE OPERATOR OF CONTROLS
INTERCOM Provides voice communications Within the aircraft Both, and Pilot and RIO left
(LS−460B) between crewmembers and and groundcrew groundcrew console and in
between cockpit and personnel. personnel the nosewheel
groundcrew, also amplifies vari well
ous warning and weapon tones,
and voice communications.
JTIDS Provides jam−resistant, Line of sight (LOS) Both Pilot left console,
(AN/URC−107) cryptographically secure digital up to 300 nautical RIO right and left
voice and data, navigation, relay, miles. consoles
and TACAN.
TACAN Navigation aid provides bearing LOS up to 390 nm, Both Pilot and RIO left
(AN/ARN−118(V)) and distance information to local depending on console
(AN/URC−107) stations. altitude.
UHF DATA LINK Provides two−way digital LOS up to 180 Both RIO right console
(AN/ASW−27C) message communication. nautical miles.
V/UHF 1 Provides two−way voice and tone LOS up to 200 Both Pilot left console
COMMUNICATIONS communication. nautical miles.
SET (AN/ARC−182(V))
V/UHF 2 Provides two−way voice and tone LOS up to 200 Both RIO left console
COMMUNICATIONS communication. nautical miles.
SET (AN/ARC−182(V))
V/UHF DIRECTION Provides bearing information to LOS up to 180 Both Pilot and RIO left
FINDER selected stations. nautical miles. console
(OA−8697/ARD)
UHF VOICE Cryptographic encoding Same as radio in RIO Left console

SECURITY and decoding of UHF voice use.
EQUIPMENT (KY−58) communications.
IFF TRANSPONDER Responds to interrogations LOS. RIO Right console

(AN/APX−100) by other aircraft or ground
stations.
IFF INTERROGATOR Requests identification from LOS. RIO DD and right

(AN/APX−76B) other aircraft. console
RECEIVER Provides glideslope signals LOS up to 20 Pilot Right console

DECODER for carrier landing system. nautical miles.
(AN/ARA−63A)
RADAR ALTIMETER Displays height above earth’s 0 to 5,000 feet. Pilot Pilot’s instrument
(AN/APN−194) surface. panel
RADAR BEACON Aids in tracking by ship and LOS. RIO Right console
(AN/APN−154) ground−based x−band radars.
Provides down link for
automatic carrier landing system.
Figure 191.Communications and Associated Equipment
ORIGINAL 19−2
1 JTIDS antenna select AUTO Enables JTIDS to transmit on the upper antenna and to receive
switch on either the upper or lower antenna depending upon signal
strength.
LWR Enables JTIDS to transmit and receive on the lower antenna.
UPR Enables JTIDS to transmit and receive on the upper antenna.
BOTH Enables JTIDS to transmit and receive on both the upper and
lower antenna. 200 watt output power is equally divided between
the upper and lower antenna, 100 watts each.
2 V/UHF−1 DL antenna UPR/LWR Selects upper V/UHF 1 and lower D/L antenna.
select switch
LWR/UPR Selects lower V/UHF 1 and upper D/L antenna.
3 V/UHF−2 antenna UPR Selects upper V/UHF 2 antenna.

select switch
LWR Selects lower V/UHF 2 antenna.
Figure 192.Antenna Select Panel
19−3 ORIGINAL
1 Pilot’s COMM switch ICS Permits intercommunication when COLD MIC is selected on
function selector. Overrides V/UHF communications.
JTIDS Keys the JTIDS terminal for voice communications.
V/UHF 1 Keys ARC−182 radio for operation.
V/UHF 2 Keys ARC−182 radio for operation.
2 VOL control Controls intercommunication audio level at that cockpit station. Audio level at
other station not affected; however in EMER volume is controlled by other
station.
Figure 193.Intercommunication Controls (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 19−4
3 Amplifier selector B/U (Backup) used to bypass a fault amplifier and uses a backup
output amplifier at own station.
NORM (Normal) used when all amplifiers are functioning properly.
EMER (Emergency) uses the backup amplifier at own station, and
makes use of input amplifier of other station over the emergency
line. Volume is controlled by other station.
4 Function selector RADIO
OVERRIDE Attenuates non critical radio audio to emphasize
intercommunication when urgent.
HOT MIC Intercommunication without keying.
COLD MIC Intercommunication only when pilot actuates COMM switch on
inboard throttle or RIO actuates keying switch on left foot rest.
5 RIO’s ICS button Permits intercommunication if COLD MIC is selected on the function selector
(left foot rest) control. Overrides V/UHF communications.
6 RIO’s MIC button Permits transmission on V/UHF 1, V/UHF 2, or BOTH radios as well as JTIDS
(right foot rest) as selected on the radio frequency channel indicator (RFCI).
Figure 19−3. Intercommunication Controls (Sheet 2 of 2)
Identical ICS control panels (Figure 19−3) are on the

pilot and RIO left−side consoles. The ICS includes four
amplifiers, two at each cockpit station, that permit duplex
operation during normal operation. If one amplifier fails, it
may be bypassed by selecting either the B/U (backup) or With the front cockpit ICS amplifier selector
EMER (emergency) position on the ICS control panel. This knob in the EMER position, engine stall/
permits continued ICS operation. overtemperature and Sidewinder tones will not
be available to the pilot.
Note
Note
If two amplifiers fail at the same station,
intercommunication is impossible.
D Selection of EMER via the ICS amplifier
The external interphone connection is in the nose selector knob in either cockpit allows use of
wheelwell. When the pilot’s COMM switch is set to HOT the other cockpit’s input amplifier.
MIC, ground personnel can communicate with the cockpit
stations. D The RIO can obtain a Sidewinder and engine
stall/overtemperature tone by selecting
19.2.1 Audio Warning Signals EMER on his ICS panel. This allows the RIO
to use the pilot’s input amplifier.
Audio warning signals from the weapon system are
available to either or both crewmen through the ICS. Each Figure 19−4 provides a glossary of audio warning
signal has a distinct tone. A visual display accompanies most signals available within the aircraft weapon systems. Two
audio signals so that the flightcrew can expect the tone and 28−Vdc circuit breakers, ICS NFO (7F3) and ICS PILOT
interpret its meaning. Most audio signals may be attenuated (7F2), control power to and provide circuit protection for the
or turned off if not required, allowing the flightcrew to ICS. Power to both circuit breakers is from dc essential bus
concentrate on more critical tones. Critical warning tones No. 1. Approximately 1 minute of warmup is required in
cannot be attenuated by any mode of ICS operation. order to achieve normal operating temperature.
19−5 ORIGINAL
TONE POSITION CONTROLS FUNCTION CHARACTERISTICS
SIDEWINDER Pilot TONE, VOLUME/ Missile acquisition High frequency.

TACAN CMD panel Changes to indicate missile
self−track.
ALR−67 Pilot and TONE VOLUME/ TA Indicates a missile Low to high frequency,
RIO CAN panel alert, missile launch, determined by scan rate and
(PILOT) RADAR critical threat, and/or PRF of threat radar.
WARNING RCVR status change. Low− to high−frequency
panel (RIO) warble when missile
launch is detected.
Radar Altimeter Pilot and Radar altimeter Low−altitude 1,000 Hz tone, modulated at
RIO indicator (pilot) warning 2 pulses per second, lasting
5 seconds or until altitude is
increased/limit bug is
lowered.
Low−altitude landing Continuous tone below

gear up warning low−altitude index setting
with landing gear handle up.
Tone terminates 5 seconds
after landing gear handle is
placed in down position.
APX−100 RIO IFF control panel Valid mode 4 PRF of interrogation pulse
interrogation 2,000 and 6,000 Hz.
TACAN Pilot and TACAN control panel Station identification International morse code
RIO with three−letter designation.
AN/ARC−182 Pilot and V/UHF control panel Other aircraft International morse code,
RIO direction find (DF) voice.
reception.
ENGINE STALL/ Pilot None Engine stall Modulated 320 Hz for

OVERTEMPERATURE detection and/or 10 seconds maximum or
EGT until fault is removed,
over−temperature whichever comes first.
warning.
Figure 194.Glossary of Tones
ORIGINAL 19−6
19.2.2 Pilot Tone Volume/TACAN Command 6. Frequency mode control LOAD (frequency is
Panel stored in memory for CH 1).
The TONE VOLUME/TACAN CMD panel (Figure 7. Frequency mode control READ, Verify
19−5) on the pilot left console has two volume controls for Frequency Display.
regulating audio signals from the ALR−67 and Sidewinder
missile lock−on. 8. Enter frequency in quick reference directory for
CH1 (if desired).
19.3 V/UHF RADIO (AN/ARC−182)
9. Repeat steps 2 through 8 for subsequent channels.
The ARC−182 radio provides multimode, multi
channel, air−to−air/air−to−surface voice, tone, and antijam
19.3.2 Built−In Test (BIT)
(Have Quick) communications. The ARC−182 control panel
(Figure 19−6) is located on the pilot and RIO left console. BIT isolates faults in the RT to one module, two
Frequency range extends in four bands from 30 to 87.975, modules, and three modules. BIT should be initiated anytime
108 to 155.975, 156 to 173.975, and 225 to 399.975 MHz on the FREQ/(CHAN) display blanks or indicates an erroneous
any of 11,960 channels (separated by 25 kHz). Transmission readout. Proceed as follows:
and reception are available in AM or FM bands. The
modulation is selected automatically by the radio except in 1. MODE selector TEST.
the 225 to 399.975 band, which is reserved for antijam use.
There are 40 preset channels available. Channels 1 through 2. RT control As Required.
30 are used for normal voice communications. Channels 31
through 40 are used for antijam Have Quick communica 3. BIT requires approximately 10 seconds; observe
tions. Guard frequency of each band may be monitored FREQ/(CHAN) display.
simultaneously with any other frequency selected. The radio
a. No fault is indicated by 888.888.
is used with the OA−8697/ARO to provide automatic
direction finding to the transmitting station. The ARC−182 b. Faults are indicated by a number that identifies
operates with secure voice equipment (KY−58). Upper and the module or modules at fault.
lower antenna installations provide reliable line−of−sight
communications to 200 nm (depending on altitude and Note
atmospheric conditions). A radio frequency/channel indica
tor (Figure 19−7) on the pilot and RIO instrument panel If readouts 061 or 651 display, select other
displays the frequency or channel selected. A separate antenna and key transmitter for 5 seconds, then
VOLUME control panel (Figure 19−8) for the pilot is located repeat steps 1 through 3.
on the pilot left console.
Figure 199 lists the most common BIT fault codes and
Note their respective module failures.
Transmissions on both V/UHF 1 and V/UHF 2 19.3.3 Have Quick (Antijam) Mode
radios, while operating on the same frequency,
Have Quick is a tactical antijam system that utilizes
may result in a squeal. This is a normal condition
frequency hopping, a method where frequencies are changed
caused by RF interaction between the two
many times per second. The frequency hopping patterns,
radios operating on the same frequency in close
stored in memory and frequency tables, are selected by
proximity to each other.
word−of−day, net numbers, and a given date. The antijam
mode of the ARC−182 is enabled by selecting a net number
19.3.1 Preset Channel(s) Load
and by placing the NORM/AJ switch to AJ once all the
variables have been entered into the radio. For two or more
1. MODE selector T/R or T/R&G.
radios to successfully communicate on a Have Quick net,
2. Frequency mode control Reset. each radio must have the same TOD, WOD, and operating
net.
3. CHAN SEL switch Select Channel 1. The ARC−182’s Have Quick II system is compatible
with older Have Quick I systems.
4. Frequency mode control Read.
5. Frequency select switches Slew to Desired

Frequency.
19−7 ORIGINAL
1 ALR−67 volume control Clockwise rotation increases tone in pilot’s headset. Provides threat alert,
status and warning tones representing received threat radar signals.
2 SW (Sidewinder) Clockwise rotation increases missile tone in pilot’s headset.

volume control Counterclockwise rotation turns tone to low.
3 TACAN CMD control Illuminates when selected PLT or NFO, indicating crewman in command
switch/indicator of TACAN.
Figure 195.Pilot TONE VOLUME/TACAN CMD Panel
ORIGINAL 19−8
1 VOL control Adjusts level of audio signal. Clockwise rotation increases audio level. RlO’s
adjustments made only via the RFCI.
2 Squelch switch SQL Squelch circuit is operational and background noise is removed by
reducing receiver gain.
OFF Disables squelch circuit restoring receiver to full gain.
3 Frequency select Four frequency tuning switches are used to tune transceiver when the tuning
switches (spring return) selector switch is set to MAN (manual). The spring−loaded switches increase the
frequency in the up position and decrease frequency in the down position. The left
switch controls the hundreds and tens digits, the second switch controls units, the
third switch controls tenths, and the right switch controls hundredths and
thousandths.
4 FREQ/(CHAN) display Displays incandescent digital readouts of selected frequency or channel.
In TEST mode indicates receiver transmitter fault locations.
5 UHF mode selector Operational when tuned to frequencies in the 225.000 to 399.000 MHz band.
AM Selects amplitude modulation signals. Varies with atmospheric
conditions, susceptible to electromagnetic interference.
FM Selects frequency modulation signals. Reduces electromagnetic
interference.
Figure 196.AN/ARC−182 V/UHF Control Panel (Sheet 1 of 2)
19−9 ORIGINAL
6 BRT control Varies the FREQ/(CHAN) display light intensity. Clockwise maximum
intensity.
7 MODE switch OFF Secures V/UHF radio, unless frequency mode switch is set to 243.
T/R Energizes transmitter and main receiver.
T/R&G Energizes transmitter main, and guard receivers.
DF Provides automatic direction finding from 108 to 399.975 MHz.
TEST Indicates built−in−test (BIT) RT; displayed on FREQ/(CHAN)
indicator. Refer to Built−In−Test this chapter. Generates 1020 Hz un
attenuated tone.
8 TOD switch RCV Allows reception of TOD messages on preset channel selected.
SEND Allows transmission of TOD messages on preset channel selected.
9 NORM/AJ switch NORM Used for normal V/UHF communications.
A/J Provides jam resistant communications.
10 CHAN SEL mode 243 Turns on the receiver−transmitter (takes precedence over
switch (outer dial) operational mode control) and causes the transmitter main receiver,
and guard receiver to tune to 243.000 MHz (UHF guard frequency).
All functions except VOL, SQL and BRT are disabled.
MAN Permits manual selection of an operating frequency using the
frequency tuning switches. Transmitter and receiver are disabled
during a frequency change.
G Tunes the receiver−transmitter to the guard frequency in the band to
which the RT was last tuned.
PRESET Allows selection of any 1 of 40 present operating frequencies
with CHAN SEL switch. Selected channel is displayed in the two
center digit readouts of the FREQ/(CHAN) display. Channels 31
through 40 are for Have Quick (antijam) use.
READ Displays the frequency (rather than channel) of preset channel
selected.
LOAD Automatically places the displayed frequency into the memory for
the selected preset channel.
11 CHAN SEL switch Enables any 1 of 40 preset channels when the frequency mode switch is set to
(inner dial) PRESET.
Figure 19−6. AN/ARC−182 V/UHF Control Panel (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 19−10
1 VHF/UHF−1 and −2 Displays information for each radio (pilot and RIO) as follows:
frequency/channel
indicator • Left most LCD indicates secure voice selection : C (cypher) or P (plain)
• Right most LCD indicates whether radio is in use for transmission (T) or
reception (R)
• Displays frequency, channel number, or WOD channel number
• With anti−jam selected, the net number is prefixed by an A
• F is displayed if the RFCI fails periodic BIT
• If there is bad or no V/UHF data for 3 seconds, displays only a decimal point.
2 1−JTIDS−2 channel Displays channel selected (0 − 127) for JTIDS−1 and JTIDS−2 voice links
indicator (pilot and RIO) with alpha designator indicating transmit (T) or receive (R) for
radio in use.
3 TEST button Activates 10−second maximum internal test of the RFCI. On successful
completion of the test, the LCDs show the test display. If the TEST button is
held for more than 10 seconds the display will automatically return to the dis
play prior to test.
Figure 197.Radio Frequency/Channel Indicator (Sheet 1 of 2)
19−11 ORIGINAL
4 VOL control Enable RIO to adjust level of audio signal. Clockwise rotation increases audio
level.
5 XMTR SEL buttons Enables RIO to select desired radio for voice communications (V/UHF or
JTIDS).
Note
When JTIDS voice communications is selected V/UHF plain voice
communications are inhibited. If V/UHF encrypted voice communication is se
lected, both V/UHF (encrypted) and JTIDS will transmit simultaneously.
Figure 19−7. Radio Frequency/Channel Indicator (Sheet 2 of 2)
19.3.4 Have Quick Load Instructions 2. TRAINING

Have Quick antijam voice communications entry uses a. 00 Have Quick I Training.
preset channel 40. The contents of preset channel 40
designates the loading mode in which the unit is operating. b. 25 Have Quick II Training.
The following loading codes are used to operate and load in
Have Quick II: c. 50/75 Not Used.
1. 220.000 Operate in Have Quick II. The 1,000 combat nets range from 000 to 999. The
variables in these net numbers refer the radio to specific
2. 220.025 MWOD load mode. frequencies and algorithms within the radio’s memory. There
are five Have Quick I training nets displayed as A00.X00,
3. 220.050 MWOD erase mode. where X is 0 to 4. There are 16 Have Quick II training nets
displayed as A0X.X25, where X.X is 0.0 to 1.5. The variables
4. 220.075 FMT load mode. in these training net numbers tell the radio the training
frequency on which to begin hopping. Training nets are
If the aircrew desires to enter Have Quick without
activated by a special WOD (300.0XX) in segment one of the
loading or verifying, 220.000 should be loaded into preset
channel 40 using the procedures in paragraph 19.3.4.13. WOD used for that day. The last two digits determine the hop
rate. The same applies to the last two digits of the first
Otherwise, Have Quick I processing is used.
segment of combat WODs.
19.3.4.1 Net Selection
19.3.4.2 Word of Day/Multiple Word of Day
Have Quick I and II use the same method of net (WOD/MWOD)
selection. A net is a six−digit number that selects the
frequency table that will be hopped on. Net numbers are in A WOD/MWOD is a transmission security variable.
the form of AXX.XYY, where A indicates a Have Quick net, Have Quick I radios use a WOD consisting of six segments
X is a number from 0 to 9 defining the net, and YY is either of six digits each. Have Quick I radios use a MWOD that adds
00, 25, 50, or 75, which determines the combat or training a seventh segment containing a two−digit date tag and five
operational mode. The operational modes are more MWODs for 6 days of operation without reloading
WODs. The WOD/MWOD is loaded into the radio to key the
1. COMBAT Have Quick system to the proper hopping pattern, dwell time,
and hop rate. The hop rate is included in the first segment of
a. 00 Operate in Have Quick I. each WOD/MWOD, XXX.XYY, where YY is 00, 25, 50, 75,
denoting slow to fast hop rates. When operating with Have
b. 25 Have Quick II NATO. Quick I systems, only one of the six MWODs is used. See
Figure 19−10.
c. 50 Have Quick II Non−NATO.
d. 75 Not Used.
ORIGINAL 19−12
1 JTIDS SEL switch Selects JTIDS 1 or 2 voice channel for pilot’s voice transmissions.
Both channels are always selected to receive.
2 JTIDS−1, JTIDS−2, Clockwise rotation increases audio level of received transmission (Pilot only).
V/UHF−2 volume
control
Figure 198.Pilot VOLUME Control Panel
19−13 ORIGINAL
MODE DISPLAY FAULT INTERPRETATION

RCV • RMT or RT SELECT TEST MODE
XMT • LOW PWR SELECT TEST MODE
TEST • RMT CTRL DEFECTIVE CONTROL
TEST 888.888 NONE RT AND CTRL OK
TEST 465 RT MODULES 4, 5, OR 6 BAD
TEST 061 VSWR RT OR ANTENNA SYSTEM
TEST 651 FWD PWR RT OR ANTENNA SYSTEM
TEST 157 RT MODULES 1, 5, OR 7
TEST 333 RT MODULE 3 BAD
Figure 199.Common BIT Indications
1.1 289.950 2.1 295.850 3.1 290.450 4.1 275.950 5.1 270.450 6.1 300.050
1.2 299.000 2.2 289.600 3.2 279.000 4.2 269.300 5.2 259.000 6.2 249.000
1.3 298.100 2.3 288.000 3.3 278.600 4.3 268.000 5.3 258.600 6.3 248.900
1.4 297.000 2.4 287.900 3.4 277.400 4.4 267.000 5.4 257.800 6.4 247.100
1.5 296.000 2.5 286.300 3.5 276.500 4.5 266.700 5.5 256.000 6.5 246.100
1.6 295.000 2.6 285.300 3.6 275.100 4.6 265.500 5.6 255.500 6.6 245.200
1.7 11 2.7 12 3.7 13 4.7 14 5.7 15 6.7 16
8.1 = OPERATIONAL DAY
1.1 through 1.6 are WOD 1 segment numbers.
1.7 is the date tag for WOD 1.
2.1 through 2.6 are WOD 2 segment numbers
2.7 is the date tag for WOD 2.
3.1 through 6.7 is the same as above for WODs 3 through 6.
8.1 is the current Operational Day, which should match one of the date tags.
Note:
(1) If the current operational day was 11 (MWOD location 1), Have Quick II Combat net would be used with a hop rate
of 50 (included in the last two digits of segment 1.1). An appropriate Have Quick II operational net should be chosen.
(2) If the current operational day was 16, Have Quick II Training Net would be used because the first segment of
MWOD location 6 (6.1) is the special training segment. The hop rate would be 50 (last two digits of first segment).
An appropriate Have Quick II Training Net number should be chosen.
Figure 1910.Example of an ARC−182 Have Quick II MWOD Fill
ORIGINAL 19−14
19.3.4.3 Time of Day 6. Repeat steps 1 through 5 to load remaining

MWODs.
TOD is a signal that synchronizes Have Quick radios
to a common time for antijam operation. There are two ways
Note
to enter TOD. One method involves receiving UTC over the
air on a manually selected UHF frequency after power up.
The second method involves using the self−start (emergency D The desired frequencies are loaded in seg
time start) mode, which is used when acting as master clock ments 1 through 6 of each MWOD. The date
to transmit that time to other Have Quick systems. Within this tag for each MWOD is loaded into the seventh
TOD signal is the operational day. This is transmitted with segment and is a two−digit number corre
the TOD or loaded manually as in the self−start procedure. sponding to the operational day on which that
Refer to paragraph 19.3.4.12, TOD Load. The codeword for MWOD is to be used. It can be loaded or
TOD is Mickey." changed using the two middle frequency
select switches and the MWOD segment
19.3.4.4 MWOD Load Entry loading procedures above.
D The crew may not enter an out−of−range WOD
1. Frequency mode control Preset. frequency, segment, or date tag. When two
identical date tags are loaded, the last date
2. CHAN SEL switch Select Channel 40.
entered is valid and the old date is set to zero.
If the old date is viewed, 00 will be displayed.
3. Frequency mode control READ.
D The MWOD is not entered into the memory of
4. Frequency select switches Select 220.025. the unit until the date tag is loaded. Thus, if a
segment of an MWOD has been changed after
5. Frequency mode control LOAD. the MWOD was initially entered, the date tag
must be reentered to accept the MWOD
Note change.
If MWODs are being loaded to replace existing
ones, the old MWODs should be erased using the 19.3.4.6 MWOD Load Exit
procedures in paragraph 19.3.4.9. This proce
1. Frequency mode control −MAN (ready to receive
dure will erase all MWODs in the radio’s
TOD).
memory.
Note
19.3.4.5 MWOD Load When manual is selected on the frequency mode
1. Frequency mode control Preset (1.1 will be control to exit a load mode, the code to operate
displayed). in Have Quick II antijam without entering a load
mode (220.000) will automatically be loaded
2. Frequency select switches Select Desired WOD into preset channel 40.
and MWOD Segment Using Middle Two Frequency
Select Switches. 19.3.4.7 Operational Date Load
3. Frequency mode control READ (display shows The operational date is the calendar date of the mission
frequency indicating desired WOD segment). day. The range is 1 through 31. The MWOD that is used by
the unit for frequency hopping is the MWOD whose date tag
Note matches the operational day. Thus, if an operational day is
If the MWODs were erased using the MWOD entered or received via TOD transmission and no date tag
erase procedure in paragraph 19.3.4.9, the dis exists for that operational day, an error will occur and be
play will show 000.000 indicating that they had displayed. The operational day is loaded as follows:
been erased.
1. Perform steps 1 through 5 of paragraph 19.3.4.4.
4. Frequency select switches Select Desired Step 1 is not required if already in MWOD Load.
Frequency WOD Segment.
2. Frequency mode control PRESET (last WOD
5. Frequency mode control LOAD (desired and segment selected will be displayed).
frequency loaded into memory).
19−15 ORIGINAL
3. Frequency select switches Select 8.1. accessed with the FMT load code loaded into preset channel
40. Once the 16 training frequencies (7.01 through 7.16) are
4. Frequency mode control READ (last operational loaded, it is not necessary to reload them. Additionally, it is
date or 00 is displayed). not necessary to reload the special FMT MWOD segment
once it is loaded, as long as the date tag used is within the
5. Frequency select switches Selected Desired same MWOD as the special FMT segment. If using the
Date. self−start method of TOD, the operational day as well as the
date tag must be loaded into segments 8.1 and 1.7 (or the
6. Frequency mode control LOAD (Operational seventh segment of whichever MWOD is being used),
date is loaded into memory). respectively. Thus, combat Have Quick II and FMT can be
used interchangeably simply by loading one or more of the
Note MWOD first segments with the special training WOD
Out of range (<1 or >31) operational dates may segment. On every day that the operational day matches the
not be entered. date tag of the MWOD with the special FMT segment loaded
into its first segment, the unit will hop on the FMT training
19.3.4.8 MWOD Verify frequencies, regardless of the contents of the other segments
within that MWOD. See Figure 19−10, Note 2.
The aircrew may view the MWODs at any time for
1. Frequency mode control PRESET.
verification by reading the MWOD locations by using steps
1 through 3 in paragraph 19.3.4.5. 2. CHAN SEL switch Select Channel 40.
19.3.4.9 MWOD Erase
4. Frequency select switches Select 220.075
The following procedure enables the aircrew to erase
all MWODs stored in the nonvolatile memory. This proce 5. Frequency mode control LOAD.
dure is recommended before reloading all MWODs with new
6. Frequency mode control PRESET (first FMT
frequencies.
frequency segment 7.01 is displayed).
1. Frequency mode control PRESET. 7. Frequency select switch Select Desired FMT
Segment.
2. CHAN SEL switch Select Channel 40.
9. Frequency select switches Select Desired FMT
4. Frequency select switches Select 220.050 To Training Frequency.
Initiate MWOD Erase Function. 10. Frequency mode control LOAD (desired FMT
training frequency is stored in memory).
5. Function mode control LOAD (display will go
blank indicating MWODs have been erased). 11. Repeat steps 6 through 10 to load remaining desired
FMT training frequencies. The load function is
19.3.4.10 FMT Training Frequency Load exited by placing the frequency mode control to
MAN.
The Have Quick II FMT training net operates similar
to combat Have Quick II, as both the date tag and operational 19.3.4.11 FMT Net Operation
day functions are used. The FMT net, however, hops on its
own set of 16 frequencies loaded into a separate training Once the training frequencies have been loaded or
WOD. Additionally, a special MWOD segment for FMT verified, Have Quick II FMT net can be operated as follows:
(300.0XX, where XX is the hop rate) is loaded into the first
segment of the MWOD being used (usually 1.1, but any of 1. Perform steps 1 through 5 of paragraph 19.3.4.4.
the six MWODs can be used as long as the date tag for the
MWOD whose first segment contains 300.0XX matches
the operational day). The frequencies actually hopped on, 3. Frequency select switches Select Segment 1 of
however, are loaded into a separate FMT WOD that can be Desired MWOD To Be Used (1.1, 2.1, 3.1, etc.).
ORIGINAL 19−16
4. Frequency mode control READ (display shows 19.3.4.12.1 To synchronize and load Time/Date
frequency indicating desired WOD segment). from GPS system, perform the
following steps:
5. Frequency select switch Select Special FMT
Segment With Desired Hop Rate (300.0XX XX = 1. Select OWN A/C format and verify GPS is fully
00, 25, 50, 75). aligned (FOM = 1), GPS is boxed and navigation
mode is INS/GPS.
6. Frequency mode control LOAD (desired fre
quency loaded into memory). 2. Select GPS Status Format and verify RCV TOD is
not boxed.
3. On the VHF/UHF ARC−182 Control Panel:
8. Frequency select switches Select Segment 7
Mode Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .T/R
(date tag) of the Same MWOD Used Above (1.7,
Frequency Select Switch . . . . . . . 300.025
2.7, 3.7, etc.).
NORM/AJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NORM
9. Frequency mode control READ (display shows TDD switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MAN
two−digit date tag previously loaded or 00). WAIT 10 SECONDS
10. Frequency select switches Select Desired Date 4. On the GPS Status Page select RCV TOD. Verify it
Tag. remains boxed for 5 SECONDS.
11. Frequency mode control LOAD (desired date tag 5. On VHF/UHF ARC−182 Control Panel:
loaded into memory) NORM/AJ Switch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . AJ
Verify Frequency Indicator . . . . . . A00.25
12. Frequency mode control MAN (ready to receive
TOD). If a ? is displayed, lockup has not occurred.
19.3.4.12 TOD Load 19.3.4.13 Antijam Mode Selection

TOD may be loaded in any of the following ways. If entering Have Quick II from a previous load mode,
selecting MAN from that mode will automatically perform
1. Emergency or forced start entry of time/date is per steps 1 through 5 below. In this case, proceed to step 6.
formed by holding the TOD switch in receive
(RCV) position until decimal point flashes, then Note
momentarily setting TOD switch to SEND. Select TOD can be received from power up. It is not
ing the operational day is performed using steps in necessary to enter any other load or operate mode
paragraph 19.3.4.7. first.
2. To receive time/date over air (broadcast) in normal 1. Frequency mode control PRESET.
mode, momentarily push TOD switch to RCV when
TOD is transmitted over manually selected UHF 2. CHAN SEL switch Select Channel 40.
frequency. This will allow acceptance of TOD for
1 minute. 3. Frequency mode control READ.
3. To transmit time/date over air (broadcast) in normal 4. Frequency select switches Select 220.00.
mode, momentarily push TOD switch to SEND 5. Frequency mode control LOAD (the radio is now
while on a manually selected UHF frequency. At prepared to operate in Have Quick II).
this time, TOD signal is sent and a tone will be
heard. 6. Frequency mode control MAN.
4. To receive new time in A/J mode or to update clock, 7. TOD Received.
momentarily push TOD switch to RCV. This will al
8. Frequency select switches Select Desired Net
low acceptance of TOD for 1 minute.
Frequency.
5. To transmit time/date over air (broadcast) in A/J 9. NORM/A/J switch Select A/J on Command to
mode, momentarily push TOD switch to SEND.
GO ACTIVE" (first digit of net frequency will
This will send TOD signal to all units that are in A/J
display as A").
and using the same net.
19−17 ORIGINAL
19.3.4.14 Have Quick II Error Codes 5. Invalid net error code Verify that the correct net
is being used.
The Have Quick II radio generates different error
displays for three possible entry errors. If the radio has been 6. No TOD error code Attempt to receive another
initialized properly, an (A) will display in the left−most TOD from the master. If still unable to receive TOD,
display segment. use the self−start method and attempt to transmit
If a question mark (?) displays, the net number is TOD to other net participants if practical.
invalid. If a backward question mark ( ) displays, the
MWOD or operational data is invalid. If the display does not 19.3.5 Radio Frequency Control/Indicators (RFCI)
change when A/J is selected, then TOD has not been received Two RFCIs (Figure 19−7) are provided. Each has LCDs
or entered. The error display for each error is shown in that show the frequency or channel selected for V/UHF 1 and
Figure 19−11. 2 and JTIDS 1 and 2, their transmit/receive status, and
antijam and sure voice selection. The RFCIs are tested by
pressing the TEST button on the panel. An indication is
FREQUENCY provided if the RFCI fails BIT.
ERROR CONTROL
MODE
DISPLAY ERROR The RIO RFCI also contains transmit select buttons for
CONTROL
V/UHF 1 and 2 and JTIDS 1 and 2 as well as volume controls
XX.XXX MAN Invalid MWOD and for adjusting their audio level.
Date
?XX.XXX MAN Invalid Net Note
Number
D The RIO volume control knob on the
XXX.XXX MAN No TOD
ARC−182 control panel is not functional. The
Invalid MWOD and volume control knob on the RIO RFCI is used
X.X PRESET
Date to control volume.
XX PRESET Invalid Net Number D When JTIDS vice communication is selected,
?X, X PRESET No TOD V/UHF plain voice communications are
inhibited. If V/UHF encrypted voice commu
The X"s in the error display column nication is selected and JTIDS voice commu
represent digits 0 to 9. nication is selected, both V/UHF (encrypted)
and JTIDS will transmit simultaneously.
Figure 1911.Have Quick II Error Codes
19.4 V/UHF AUTOMATIC DIRECTION FINDER
(OA−8697)
19.3.4.15 Have Quick Basic Troubleshooting
Procedures. The V/UHF automatic direction finder is used with the
ARC−182 radio in the AM mode (voice is suppressed). ADF
1. Broken communications when A/J is selected provides relative bearings to transmitting ground stations or
Verify all segments of the current WOD or all the other aircraft. It can receive signals on any 1 of 30 preset
FMT frequencies are correct. channels or on any manually set frequencies in the 108 to
399.975 MHz range.
2. Lack of an A" in the first digit of the net frequency
displayed on the radio Receive another TOD The system has a line−of−sight range, varying with
transmission to resynchronize the radio. altitude. Operating power is 115 Vac from the essential No.2
bus, 28 Vdc from the essential No. 2 bus, and 26 Vac through
3. Broken communications after time, once good the RIO circuit breaker panels. The system requires a
communications have been established Receive 5−minute warmup period. During the warmup time, failure
another TOD transmission either in A/J or normal indications should be disregarded. The system uses a
mode to resynchronize the radio. solid−state segment rotation ADF antenna. Bearing to
transmitting stations is displayed on the pilot/RIO BDHI
4. Invalid MWOD or date tag error code Verify all (No.1 needle), and on the HSD format of any MFD. The
MWOD segments for the current day. ADF signal is interrupted during voice transmissions.
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 19−18
19.5 UHF VOICE SECURITY EQUIPMENT 7. After a 2−minute warmup period on the cipher se
(TSEC/KY−58) lected radio, listen for a steady, unbroken tone in the
headset followed by a double−pitched broken tone.
The security equipment is integrated, and operates,
with the V/UHF 1 and 2 communications sets to permit UHF 8. Key the appropriate radio selected for transmission,
secure voice in a hostile environment. It shall be operated as hold for approximately 2 seconds, and release.
directed by appropriate authority. Theory of operation and Double−pitched broken tone will cease and no sound
practical application are covered in the KY−58 operation will be heard.
manual.
The KY MODE switch and the KY−58 control panel 9. Key radio and hold. A single beep tone will be heard
(Figure 19−12) on the RIO left side console are the only in approximately 1½ seconds, if delay is selected;
cockpit controls for operating the KY−58 in either cipher or otherwise, beep is immediate. When this tone is
plain language. Electrical power is from the dc essential bus heard, the equipment is ready for cipher
No. 1 with circuit protection on the RIO dc essential No. 1 transmission.
circuit breaker panel, KY−58/Z−AHP circuit breaker (7C3).
10. After beep tone is heard, establish two−way cipher
The KY−58 has two states of operation: plain and radio communications with a cooperating ground
cipher (C). Plain is used during normal UHF communica station and check for readability and signal strength.
tions. Cipher is used when secure voice communications are
desired. There are two cipher modes: BB (baseband) for use 11. Set power and radio selector switches in accordance
with FM transmissions and DP (diphase) for use with AM. with the tactical situation.
The radio sets must be ON to attain secure operation. The
receiving station must be properly equipped to receive Note
transmissions in the proper cipher mode.
If a ground check of the equipment is not practi
cal, the above procedures may be used to perform
Note
an in−flight check of the equipment.
D Do not transmit plain voice on one radio 19.5.3 Postlaunch
during cipher receptions or while transmitting
on the other radio. The speech security equipment shall be operated as
directed by appropriate authority.
D Communications between KY−28 and KY−58
voice security equipment is not possible.
19.5.4 After Landing
19.5.1 KY−58 Operation 1. ZEROIZE switch ZEROIZE (as briefed).
Zeroize the code as directed by appropriate authority.
19.5.2 Prelaunch
2. Power switch OFF.
1. Determine that proper code has been set by person
nel qualified in voice security equipment. 19.6 JOINT TACTICAL INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
2. V/UHF radios ON.
The JTIDS is a high−capacity communications system
3. Power switch ON. providing jam−resistant, secure digital voice and data. This
system also provides voice and data relay, dual navigation
4. Cypher switch C/RAD 1 or C/RAD 2. grid operation, and TACAN data.
5. KY MODE switch As Required. The JTIDS digital voice function provides two secure,
jam−resistant, separate (J1 and J2) 16 KBS voice channels.
6. If a ground test of equipment is desired, establish These are integrated into both the pilot and RIO cockpits.
two−way plain text radio communications on the
plain voice radio with a suitable ground station and
request an equipment check.
19−19 ORIGINAL
1 ZEROIZE switch ZEROIZE Guard lifted. The preset codes are erased and must be reset on
the ground by qualified personnel before the cipher mode can
be used.
2 DELAY switch DELAY Provides a time delay between push−to−talk and actual
transmit.
3 Cipher switch C/RAD−2 Selects V/UHF 2 for secure voice.

PLAIN Enables plain audio to pass through without encryption.
C/RAD−1 Selects V/UHF 1 for secure voice.
4 FILL switch Selects the position to be loaded with data. MODE switch must be in LD
to load.
5 MODE switch OP Enables KY−58 operation after unit is loaded.

LD Used for loading data into KY−58 control panel.
RV Receiver variable is not operational at this time.
Figure 1912.KY−58 Controls (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 19−20
6 POWER switch ON Applies operating power to KY−58 system.
7 KY MODE switch BB Normal mode for FM transmission.

(operational only with
KY−58 installed) AUTO Provides automatic selection of BB/FM and DP/AM. Changes as
the frequency on the V/UHF is changed.
DP Normal mode for AM transmission.
Figure 19−12. KY−58 Controls (Sheet 2 of 2)
The JTIDS data communications function provides a When installed, the JTIDS receiver/transmitter
two−way data transfer between the F−14D and other JTIDS replaces the AN/ARN−118 TACAN system. Within the
users for position and identification, air intercept control, and JTIDS terminal (DPG and R/T), the equivalent functionality
fighter−to−fighter functions. Identification is accomplished of the AN/ ARN−118 TACAN system exists.
among participants, Navy (CVs, CGs, DDGs, E−2Cs, and
F−14Ds) and other services (E−3s, F−15s etc.) by the PPLI 19.6.1 JTIDS Terminal
message. The AIC function provides the exchange of
command and control information and own−ship sensor The JTIDS AN/URC−107 Class 2 terminal consists of
tracks/ stats between the F−14D and a control platform (E−2C the following WRAs:
or ship). Fighter−to−fighter functions provide the direct
1. Data processor group (interface unit and digital data
exchange of fighter tracks and status among fighters.
processor)
The relay function provides the capability for JTIDS to
transmit voice or data messages for extended−range commu 2. Secure data unit
nications. This function provides expanded battle group
operations by expanding communication ranges (voice, 3. JTIDS receiver transmitter
PPLI, etc.) beyond line of sight, greater than 300 nm, air to
air. 4. Battery assembly.
JTIDS operates in both the geodetic and relative 5. Circuit breaker protection is provided through the
navigation modes simultaneously. JTIDS also provides the 28−Vdc essential and 115−Vac essential buses.
MCS corrections to the own−ship navigation position, which
is calculated using data received from the link, and own−ship 19.6.1.1 Digital Data Processor (DDP)
INS or SAHRS data. See Chapter 20 for additional explana
The DDP is part of the JTIDS data processor group and
tion of JTIDS navigation functions.
the heart of the JTIDS Link−16 operation. It contains the net
The JTIDS communication system utilizes three major interface computer program. The DDP is common among all
tactical modes: surveillance, two−way AIC, and F/F. These Navy and most non−Navy JTIDS platforms. The DDP
modes are integrated into the aircraft controls and displays performs the following functions.
utilizing the PTID, DD, MFDs (TSD, VDI, and HSD formats)
and DEU. Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A for the detailed 1. TDMA and message management.
operation of the PTID, DD, and TSD. The JTIDS terminal
interfaces with the various aircraft systems via 1553 mission 2. Network synchronization and relative navigation
bus No. 2 and MCS. The majority of JTIDS processing is processing.
performed by mission computer 1. In the event of a mission
computer failure, the other computer will support TACAN 3. Receiver/transmitter control.
operation and provide own−ship position for the PPLI
4. Signal decoding and decryption.
message. JTIDS BIT function is provided via the OBC page
on the MFD.
19−21 ORIGINAL
19.6.1.2 JTIDS Interface Unit 19.6.1.3.2 Data Transfer Device (DTD)

The IU is part of the JTIDS DPG and is unique for the The AN/CZY−10 DTD is a handheld keyboard device
Navy air platforms (F−14D and E−2C). The IU provides all the used to control the loading of the crypto variables into the
unique interfaces for the aircraft. A 1553 digital mux bus KGV−8B SDU or KGV−8 (E2) SDU. The use of the DTD
connects the IU to the MCS via mission bus 2. The IU eliminates the need for KYK−13 and LCU when used with the
performs the following functions. KGV−8B SDU. With the KGV−8 (E2), the DTD eliminates
the KYK−13 but requires the addition of the LCU. The DTD
1. TADIL−J (Link 16) message generation and recep
interfaces directly with the KGV−8 (E2) or KGV−8B via a
tion processing.
cable that connects to the remote fill assembly. The remote
2. System control (TDMA OFF/STBY/NORM, fill assembly is located behind the aircraft crypto access
TACAN OFF/ON). panel. The DD can then be used to select the SDU location
and load and verify the crypto variables. Refer to the
3. Navigation data conversion. AN/CZY−10 DTD Users Manual NSA ON477340, and the
4. JTIDS initialization. User’s Guide To Link−16/JTIDS Crypto, OPNAVINST
C3120.43, Annex D.
5. Voice conversions (analog/digital and digital/
analog) and processing. 19.6.1.4 JTIDS Receiver−Transmitter
6. TACAN data (BDHI and 1553) and control panel in
The JTIDS R/T provides RF detection and frequency
terface.
translation between the L−band RF at the antennas and the
7. Aircraft interfaces (1553 and hardwired discrete 75−MHz IF at the DDP. The R/T also contains an RF power
signals). amplifier that provides 100 watts to each of two antenna ports
or 200 watts to one antenna port. Frequency tuning control
19.6.1.3 Secure Data Unit (SDU) for the R/T is provided from the DDP based on a pseudo
random sequence generated by the SDU. The JTIDS R/T also
There are two types of KGV−8 SDUs currently in use: performs most of the JTIDS TACAN processing. It provides
the KGV−8(E2) for lot 1 JTIDS systems and the KGV−8B for TACAN data (range and bearing) in digital format to the
lot 2 and newer systems. The KGV−8B will eventually DPG.
replace the older KGV−8(E2) SDU. The KGV−8 SDU is
bolted to the front of the IU and provides MSEC and TSEC 19.6.1.5 Battery Assembly
for JTIDS operations. Up to eight crypto variables can be
loaded into the KGV−8 and are addressable on a time A battery assembly containing lithium and nickel−
slot−to−time slot basis by the DDP. The eight locations are cadmium cells is used to maintain the following:
split into two groups of four locations. This allows loading
and storage of crypto variables for 2−day operation. This 1. NICAD
provides uninterrupted JTIDS operation through roll−over
(00: 00: 00 Zulu). The JTIDS initialization loads are set up a. Crypto variables (STBY up to 48 hours,
to use locations 0, 2, 4, and 6 for crypto period (day) 0 and DATA SIL/NORM during power transients).
locations 1, 3, 5, and 7 for crypto period 1. Refer to the Users’
b. Initialization (STBY 5 minutes, DATA SIL/
Guide to Link−16/JTIDS Crypto, OPNAVINST C3120.43,
NORM − during power transients).
Annex D, to determine the correct crypto period for the day.
2. LITHIUM
19.6.1.3.1 Load Control Unit (LCU)
The LCU issued to control the loading of the crypto a. JTIDS chronometer (all modes).
variables into the KGV−8(E2) SDU. The LCU and KYK−13
are connected to the remote fill assembly located in the Note
aircraft crypto access panel. The remote fill assembly
The battery assembly maintains terminal
provides access to the JTIDS terminal on the crypto access
memory during switchover from ground power
panel. This access allows the loading of JTIDS crypto
to engine power but does not maintain terminal
variables without opening the avionics bay containing
synchronization or communication.
JTIDS. To load variables, the KYK−13 fill device (containing
the crypto variables) and LCU are connected at the crypt
access panel. The LCU is then used to select the SDU
location, load the variable, and verify the load.
ORIGINAL 19−22
19.6.2 JTIDS Controls During alignment, the PPLI message will be

transmitted with position set to no statement.
The JTIDS control panel and DATA LINK MODE
panel are shown in Figure 19−13. In addition to the basic The following steps are required to power−up and
panels (ANT SEL, VOLUME, and the RFCIs), the MFD initialize JTIDS.
(TSD formats), PTID, DD, MDL, and DEU enable the crew
to interface with the aircraft weapon system to support JTIDS 19.6.4.1 Powerup
functions.
1. Verify STBY is selected on the JTIDS control panel
19.6.3 Mission Data Loader (MDL) and crypto has been loaded.
The MDL replaces the DSS in the rear cockpit and the 2. Verify/install the MDL cartridge.
DSS is installed in the nosewheel well. It consists of a
receptacle that is mounted in the aircraft and a removable Note
data transfer module (DTM) cartridge. The DTM cartridge
provides storage for the navigational database, including D With aircraftpower ON, the MDL 28 VDC
tactical waypoints, flight plan waypoints, reversionary C/B (9G3) should be disengaged before
waypoints, GPS almanac data, and JTIDS initialization data. installing or removing the MDL from its
The DTM cartridge is loaded via Tactical Aircraft Mission receptacle. Failure to remove the power can
Planning System (TAMPS). erase or damage the MDL cartridge.
19.6.3.1 Navigational Database Operation D JTIDS manually initiated BIT shall not be
performed without a fault indication by either
The MDL navigational data and GPS almanac data are background BIT or startup BIT. Manual BIT
automatically loaded on power up. Any changes to the operation with no posted fault(s) can give
tactical waypoints and flight plan waypoints will be recorded false indications of JTIDS WRA/SRA
on the DTM cartridge. The flight plan data can be reloaded failures.
via the RLD pushbutton on the Flight Plan format; however,
any manual changes to the flight plans will be lost. Once 3. Select JTIDS mode DATA SIL or NORM. This
updated tactical waypoints are permanently changed in the will power up the JTIDS part of the system.
MDL DTM if it is in place.
19.6.4.2 Initialization
19.6.3.2 JTIDS Initialization Data
Upon selection of DOWNLOAD on the DEU, the 1. MFD3 Select JTIDS own−aircraft data page and
mission computer requests the JTIDS initialization data ACK all computer messages.
stored on the DTM, processes it, and transfers it to the JTIDS
terminal. The exchange of JTIDS initialization data is 2. DEU Select DOWNLOAD, then load 1/2/3, then
performed between the MDL, mission computer, and JTIDS execute the load, then ENTR (initiates MCS down
via the 1553 bus and takes approximately 5 seconds to load of MDL JTIDS load to the JTIDS system).
complete. Without initialization data, JTIDS TACAN and
BIT functions will operate, but JTIDS synchronization, 3. MFD3 Verify MDL LOAD on own−aircraft data
navigation and communications functions will not be page changes to IN PROG (2 to 3 seconds) and final
available. ly to OK (6 to 8 seconds). Verify none of the
following JTIDS computer messages are displayed.
19.6.4 JTIDS System Operation
a. JTIDS NOT AVAIL Verify JTIDS is powered
Procedures for the operational use of the JTIDS system up and communicating on the bus.
are provided in the following paragraphs. These paragraphs
include power−up, initialization, and synchronization. These b. NO LOAD − NEED MDL Verify MDL
procedures are normally performed on the ground during installed and powered up.
aircraft startup; however, they can be performed anytime
power is applied to the aircraft and the MCS is in full−up c. NO LOAD − MDL FAIL MDL fail; try to clear
operation. failure.
Note
d. LOAD ERROR−JTIDS Bad JTIDS load; net
For other participants to display the F−14D PPL, operations will be affected.
the INS or SAHRS has to complete alignment.
19−23 ORIGINAL
Figure 1913.JTIDS Control Panels (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 19−24
1 ZEROIZE switch ZERO Zeroizes the crypto variables in the interface unit and the MDL
JTIDS initialization load.
NORM Normal switch position (spring loaded).
2 THRM ORIDE switch ON/OFF Enables manual override of thermal shutdown. Indicated by a
JTIDS HOT on the MFD caution advisory window.
3 JTIDS MODE switch OFF Removes all power from the JTIDS/Link−16 functions of the
JTIDS terminal and zeroizes the crypto. To power down the
JTIDS terminal, both JTIDS and TACAN have to be off.
STBY The JTIDS/Link−16 functions are off, the battery will hold crypt for
up to 48 hours and initialization data for 5 minutes.
DATA SIL The JTIDS/Link−16 is on but will not transmit except during BIT
and voice. Net Entry will perform passive sync and, once sync is
achieved, voice will transmit when keyed. TACAN transmissions
are not affected by this selection. Digital TACAN is available for
display on the MFDs and HUD.
NORM The JTIDS/Link−16 is on. Net Entry will perform active
synchronization and, once sync is achieved, all Link−16 transmit
functions are available. TACAN transmissions are unaffected by
this selection. Digital TACAN is available for display on the MFDs
and HUD.
POLL This mode is currently not used; however, if selected JTIDS/
Link−16 is on and digital TACAN is available for display
on the MFDs and HUD.
4 IPF RESET switch Re−enables Link−16 transmission when they are shut down by an IPF
detected failure.
5 REPLY switch NORM Enables Link−4 reply message transmission (no JTIDS function)
CANC Inhibits Link−4 reply message transmission (no JTIDS function)
6 DATA LINK MODE TAC Selects Link−4 (AN/ASW−27C) as the primary link system.
switch The following JTIDS functions operate in this mode.
• Synchronization
• Ownship PPLI messages are transmitted (Ownship System Status
messages are inhibited)
• JTIDS voice (transmit and receive)
• JTIDS navigation updates
• TACAN
JTIDS Selects Link−16 (AN/URC−107) as the primary link system.
All Link−4 functions are disabled.
Figure 19−13. JTIDS Control Panels (Sheet 2 of 3)
19−25 ORIGINAL
CAINS/
WPT Enables Link−4 carrier alignment and waypoint data to be received
every 16 ms with no reply data. The same JTIDS functions operate in
this mode as when TAC is selected.
Note
The status of this switch is sent to the MCS by the DEU. In the
event the DEU is not ready (No 1553 communications) the
mode will default to Link−4 (D/L). This will prevent loss of the
ACLS function in the event of a failure.
7 ADDRESS thumbwheel Selects fourth and fifth least significant octal digit for Link−4 address.
Figure 19−13. JTIDS Control Panels (Sheet 3 of 3)
4. MFD3 (own−aircraft data page) Verify correct c. On the DEU, select DOWNLOAD for JTIDS.
crypto period. To change crypto period:
d. OWN A/C format on MF03, select JTIDS.
a. DEU Select JTIDS COMM page, toggle
CRYPTO option switch to 0 or 1, then press e. On DEU, set RLY/NTR to ON.
ENTR. f. Set NET ENTR: ENT
b. MFD3 (own−aircraft data page) Verify crypto This may take several minutes to accomplish.
period selected. Confirm on MFD : MENU : JTIDS that time
c. JTIDS MODE switch Cycle MODE switch synched to UTC and a G prefix appears. If
from NORM or DATA SIL to STBY then back to ineffective, proceed to step 4.
NORM or DATA SIL.
4. DEU (time entry, JTIDS COMM page, TIME push
button) Enter hours, minutes, seconds, and select
Note ENT.
Cycling the JTIDS MODE switch is required to 5. MFD3 (own−aircraft data page) Verify correct
direct the DPG to access the desired crypto vari time.
ables. If the MODE switch is not cycled, the DPG
6. MFD3 (own−aircraft data page) Verify NET
will continue to access the previous crypto vari
ENTR NS (net entry not started), IN PROG
ables while displaying the desired crypto period
(attempting sync or course achieved), OK (synchro
on the own−aircraft data page and net entry will
nization complete/fine synchronization achieved).
not occur.
7. DEU (net entry, JTIDS MODE page) Press
19.6.4.3 Synchronization NET ENTR pushbutton and ENT.
The following steps are required to synchronize JTIDS 8. MFD3 (own−aircraft data page) Verify
with the network. NET ENTR IN PROG. Changes to OK synchro
nization complete (3 to 5 minutes normal mode,
1. Verify/select desired JTIDS antenna. 7 to 10 minutes data−silent mode).
2. MFD3 (own−aircraft data page) Verify JTIDS
time is ±6 seconds of net time (GOES time, NTR, or Note
any participant in the net).
Course sync can be verified by verifying the dis
3. Time synchronization from GPS play of PPLI messages on TSD, PTID, JTIDS
data readout pages, or IRST summary page.
a. Verify GPS is boxed and FOM = 1 on OWN A/C JTIDS must be selected on the DATA LINK con
format. trol panel to process PPLI messages.
b. On the JTIDS control panel, mode selection = 9. DATA LINK control panel Verify/select JTIDS
NORM. for JTIDS tactical functions.
ORIGINAL 19−26
19.6.4.4 JTIDS Shutdown 19.7 IN−FLIGHT VISUAL COMMUNICATIONS

If network operations are anticipated within 24 hours: Communications between aircraft are visual whenever
practicable. Flight leaders shall ensure that all pilots in the
1. JTIDS MODE switch STBY. formation receive and acknowledge signals when given. The
visual communication chapters of NAVAIR 00−80T−113, the
If network operations are not anticipated within 24 hours: Aircraft Signals NATOPS Manual, should be reviewed and
practiced by all pilots and RIOs. Common visual signals
2. JTIDS MODE switch OFF. applicable to flight operation are listed in Figure 19−14.
Note 19.8 GROUND HANDLING SIGNALS

Under no circumstances should the JTIDS Communications between aircraft and ground person
MODE switch be left in DATA SILENT or nel are visual whenever practicable, operations permitting.
NORM for greater than 90 seconds without elec The visual communication chapters of NAVAIR 00−80T−113
trical power on the aircraft. Doing this will de should be reviewed and practiced by all flightcrew and
plete the battery and require it to be charged by groundcrew personnel. For ease of reference, visual signals
maintenance personnel. Crypto variables cannot applicable to F−14 deck/ground handling are listed on Figure
be accepted or maintained if the battery is 19−15. During night operations, flashlights or wands shall be
depleted. substituted for hand and finger movements. Refer to
NAVAIR 00−80T−103 for aircraft arming and safing hand
signals.
MEANING SIGNAL RESPONSE
GENERAL CONVERSATION
Affirmative (I understand.) Thumb up, or nod of head.

Negative (I do not know.) Thumb down, or turn of head from
side to side.
Question (repeat); used in Hand cupped behind ear as if As appropriate.
conjunction with another signal, this listening.
gesture indicates that the signal is
interrogatory.
Wait Hand held up in a fist with palm
outward.
Ignore last signal Hand waved in an erasing motion in
front of face, with palm forward.
Perfect, well done Hand held up, with thumb and forefin
ger forming an O and remaining three
fingers extended.
Numerals, as indicated With forearm in vertical position, Nod of head (I understand).
employ fingers to indicate desired To verify numerals, addressee
numerals 1 through 5. With forearm repeats. If originator nods, inter
and fingers horizontal, indicate pretation is correct.
number which, added to 5, gives de If originator repeats numerals,
sired number from 6 through 9. addressee should continue to verify
A clenched fist indicates zero. them until they are understood.
Take over communications. Tap earphones, followed by lead Execute.
change signal.
Figure 1914.In−Flight Communications (Sheet 1 of 4)
19−27 ORIGINAL
CONFIGURATION CHANGES
Lower or raise landing gear Rotary movement of hand (flashlight Execute when hand/flashlight drops.
at night) in cockpit, as if cranking
wheels, pause, drop below canopy
rail.
Speed brakes Open and close four fingers rapidly Execute on head nod/light out.
and repeatedly. Flashlight at nighta
series of flashes followed by a steady
light; light out for execution.
Lower or raise flaps. Rotary movement of hand (flashlight Execute when hand/flashlight drops.
at night) in cockpit, as if cranking
wheels, pause, drop below canopy
rail.
FUEL AND ARMAMENT
Sweep wings aft. Hand held up, palm aft, and swept aft Execute on head nod/light out.
along canopy rail; at night, flashlight
swept aft along canopy rail.
Sweep wings forward. Hand held up, palm forward, and Execute on head nod/light out.
swept forward along canopy rail;
at night, flashlight swept forward
along canopy rail.
How much fuel have you? Raise fist with thumb extended in a Indicate fuel in tens of gallons or
drinking position. hundreds of pounds by finger
numbers.
Arm or safety missiles and ordnance. Pistol cocking motion with either Execute and return signal.
hand.
FORMATION
OK Section leader gives thumbs−up Stands by for reply from wingman,

signal. holding thumbs−up until answered.
Commence take off power Leader gives a two−finger Wingman returns two−finger
turn−up. turn−up signal. signal and executes.
I have completed my takeoff Section takeoff leader raises arm Wingman gives thumbs−up indicat
checklist and am, in all respects, overhead and waits for response from ing checklist complete, and ready in
ready for (section) takeoff. wingman. all respects for takeoff then lowers
arm and stands by for immediate
section takeoff.
Figure 19−14. In−Flight Communications (Sheet 2 of 4)
ORIGINAL 19−28
FORMATION (continued)
Takeoff path is clear. I am Section takeoff leader lowers arm. Wingman executes section takeoff.
commencing takeoff.
Take combat cruise. Leader holds up open hand palm out Execute.
towards his wingman and pushes out
and in.
Leader shifting lead to wingman. Leader pats self on head and points Wingman pats head and assumes
to wingman. At night, leader aircraft lead. At night, wingman puts external
switches lights to bright, and turns lights on dim, and turns anti−collision
anti−collision light on. light off when he accepts the lead.
If an external light failure, leader If an external light failure, wingman
shines flashlight on helmet, then shines flashlight at leader, then on
shines light on wingman. his helmet.
Leader shifting lead to division Leader pats self on head, points to Wingman relays signal; designated
designated by numerals. wingman, and holds up two or more division leader assumes lead.
fingers.
Take cruising formation. Thumb waved backward over the Execute.

shoulder.
I am leaving formation. Any pilot blows kiss. Nod (I understand.)
Aircraft pointed out, leave formation. Leader blows kiss and points to Execute.
aircraft.
Directs plane to investigate object or Leader beckons wing plane, then Wingman indicated blows kiss and
vessel. points to eye, then to vessel or object. executes.
Refers to landing of aircraft, Landing motion with open hand: Execute.

generally used in conjunction with 1. Pats head. Alternate signal Lower gear.
another signal: 2. Points to another aircraft.
1. I am landing
2. Directs indicated aircraft to land.
1. Join up or break up, as Flashing terminal lights. 1. Comply.

appropriate 2. Wingman continues approach in
2. On GCA/CCA final: Leader has accordance with standard
runway/ship in sight. operating procedures.
Wingman cross under. Leader raises forearm vertically. Execute.
Section cross under. Leader raises forearm vertically and Execute.

moves arm in pumping motion.
Refers to CV Case I/Case II 1. Leader gives a two finger turnup 1. Execute

Pattern: signal. 2. Counting from last aircraft in flight
1. Spin whole flight. 2. Turnup signal followed by specified number of aircraft
2. Indicated aircraft spin. number of aircraft to spin. execute spin.
19−29 ORIGINAL
AIR REFUELING
Extend Drogue Form coneshape with hand, and Tanker execute.

move hand aft.
Retract Drogue Form coneshape with hand, and Tanker execute.

move hand forward.
Secure Turbine One finger turnup signal followed by Tanker execute.

cut signal.
FORMATION SIGNALS MADE BY AIRCRAFT MANEUVER (COMBAT OR FREE CRUISE)
Single aircraft cross under in Single wing dip Execute.

direction of wing dip.
Section cross under Double wing dip Execute.
Close up. Series of small zooms Execute.
Join up; join up on me. Porpoise aircraft Expedite joinup.
ORIGINAL 19−30
Figure 1915.Deck/Ground Handling Signals
19−31 (Reverse
ORIGINAL 19−32
CHAPTER 20
Navigation System
20.1 NAVIGATION SYSTEM parameters can also be entered on the RIO digital display
keyboard. Flight planning and waypoint information can also
The navigation system (Figure 20−1) combines inputs be downloaded from the Mission Data Loader in the RIOs
from various on−board sensors with inputs entered by the cockpit. Navigation and steering displays are provided to the
crew and provides the following outputs of aircraft position: pilot and RIO by means of various formats on the three MFDs
velocity, attitude, heading, accelerations, and angular rates. and to the pilot on the HUD. The PTID can also provide most
This information is displayed to the crew and also used by the navigation displays to the RIO. A BDHI in each cockpit can
weapons system and other aircraft functions. The system also display aircraft heading from the SAHRS, TACAN range and
provides steering and control commands for display to the bearing, and UHF/ADF bearing.
crew as required.
Navigation information from equipment not on the
The AN/ASN−139 inertial navigation set is the primary standard data bus is converted to the proper format by the
navigation sensor. It provides inertial information to the CIU. These units and the information they provide are as
MCS via a standard data bus. As a backup to the INS, the follows:
AN/USN−2 (V) SAHRS can provide similar, but somewhat
degraded inertial information. Selection of SAHRS data is 1. Standard central air data computer Altitude,
either automatic on failure of the INS or by operator airspeed, and other air related data.
selection. The MCS processes inertial data along with
2. AN/ARN−118 TACAN Range and bearing from
information from other navigation aids to provide smoothed
tuned TACAN station.
and optimized outputs for display or for use by other aircraft
systems and functions. 3. AN/ASW−27C data link Ship inertial navigation
system data for carrier alignment, waypoint
The Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) coordinates, automatic carrier landing system
provides precise position information to the ASN−139 and the commands, and vector steering commands.
MCS. It uses the Global Positioning System (GPS) constel
lation of satellites to very accurately fix the aircraft’s position 4. Instrument landing system SPN−42 course and
in three dimensions, and provides a source of velocity glideslope deviation inputs.
information that can be used for in−flight alignments of the
INS. Under normal circumstances, the MAGR provides 5. UHF/ADF Relative bearing to the tuned station.
position and velocity updates to the ASN−139 and MCS at
one second intervals. Position accuracy can be maintained to 6. AN/APN−194 radar altimeter Height above the
within approximately 16 meters (spherical error probability) surface.
under the most severe dynamic conditions.
The CIU also converts MCS steering command outputs
The AN/URC−107 JTIDS provides navigation and roll and pitch attitude information from the INS into
correction data for use in updating the navigation system and analog form for the DFCS.
velocity data for aligning the INS in flight. When installed,
the JTIDS receiver/transmitter replaces the AN/ARN−118 20.1.1 AN/ASN−139 Inertial Navigation Set
TACAN. With JTIDS installed, the CIU is not used to convert
the TACAN data to a 1553 format; the data goes directly from The INS is the primary navigation sensor. It is a self−
JTIDS to the MCS on the 1553 bus. contained system that includes an inertial measurement unit,
processing equipment, and the supporting electronics and
Navigation information that requires data entry is power supply. It provides inertial navigation inputs to the
normally inserted by the RIO using the DEU; however, most MCS.
20−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 201.Navigation System
ORIGINAL 20−2
The IMU is an all−attitude strapdown navigation 20.1.2 Miniature Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR)
set that mounts three laser gyros for angular rate sensing
and three single−axis accelerometers for acceleration The MAGR is a 5−channel GPS receiver and data
measurement. processor, located in the MC2/ASPJ Bay. The MAGR uses
the signals from four satellites to provide navigation infor
Note mation. The fifth channel is used to sequentially monitor all
of the satellites in view to ensure that the best four are always
The DFCS uses IMU data to monitor the pitch used in the solution. Each MAGR channel precisely tracks
and roll rate gyros. An IMU invalid signal, or one satellite’s signals and demodulates the navigation
selection of the NAV MODE selector to OFF will message. This message includes timing and satellite position
result in a DFCS PQVM fault. The indications information, as well as diagnostic information about satellite
of this fault are the FCS CAUTION light health. The MAGR measures the signal transmission time to
accompanied by AFC PS and RS acronyms. This obtain pseudo−range and the Doppler shift of the carrier
is a redundancy degrade only, no functionality is signal to measure delta−range. Pseudo−range is the calculated
lost. Depressing MASTER RESET will clear distance to a satellite uncorrected for errors due to MAGR
fault indications once the IMU valid signal is clock bias, atmospheric delays, and receiver noise. Delta−
restored and the NAV MODE selector is not in range is a measure of the relative velocity between the
the OFF position. satellite and the GPS antenna. The MAGR filters the pseudo−
range and delta−range measurements to obtain true position,
In the strapdown configuration, the sensor assembly is velocity, and time information.
not isolated from the airframe by gimbals and senses aircraft
angular rate and accelerations directly. However, local level Radio Frequency signals (L−Band) from the GPS
and wander angle (the difference between initial pointing satellites are sensed by the AS/4336A Dual−Frequency GPS
angle and true north) must be established by alignment for the Antenna, which is located on the turtleback. A splitter−
INS to provide useful information. After alignment, the INS amplifier in the GPS antenna line provides GPS signals to
processor keeps track of the sensor assembly’s orientation weapon station B for LANTIRN pod use.
with respect to local level and true north by integrating the
sensed angular rates. The sensed accelerations are resolved To accelerate the satellite acquisition process, the
into north, east, and down components; corrected for coriolis MAGR uses stored almanac data. The almanac data is stored
and other factors; and integrated to provide velocity and in the MAGR in nonvolatile memory, supported by an
position information. internal battery. If this battery is removed or is low, the
MAGR requests almanac data from the MCS.
This information as well as accelerations, body rates,
attitude, and time tagging data is provided in digital form to Note
the MCS. Analog outputs of roll and pitch are provided to the
DFCS via the CIU.
D If valid almanac data is not available, the
MAGR will initiate a cold−start sky search for
The INS is controlled by the NAV MODE switch
visible satellites. Search and acquisition may
(Figure 20−2) on the RIO right console. This switch controls
take over 20 minutes. With valid almanac
power to the INS and selection of modes of alignment and
data, search time may be reduced to as little as
navigation. This switch is also used to control SAHRS
30 seconds. If a cold start is performed, the
alignment mode during concurrent alignment when both the
INS and SAHRS are being aligned in the same mode to the almanac is downloaded from the satellite
navigation message and stored for future use.
same data source. Data entry and selection of INS submodes
are by means of the MFD and DEU. D GPS satellite acquisition time may be affected
by a number of conditions, particularly
The INS uses 115 VAC from ac essential No. 2 bus L−band RF interference and line of sight
through INS PH A, B, and C circuit breakers (3C7, 4C1, and obstructions, as well as the currency of the
4C2). Refer to Chapter 2 for the alphanumeric listing of almanac data. On deck, aircraft proximity to
circuit breakers. large structures as a hangar or an aircraft
carrier island superstructure may delay or
The INS backup power supply is a separate unit that prevent satisfactory satellite acquisition until
provides 28−VDC power to the INS for transient protection the aircraft is moved.
for up to 20 seconds in flight and to 2 seconds on the ground.
Battery charging power is provided by the ac left main bus
through the INS BATT PWR circuit breaker 1I7.
20−3 ORIGINAL
1 NAV MODE selector NORM CV Initiates alignment with or without ships inertial navigation
system (SINS) data. Without SINS data, manual entry of the ships latitude,
longitude, true heading, and speed is required.
ALIGN GND Initiates alignment for shore base operations. Own aircraft
latitude and longitude required for initialization.
INS Selects GPS/INS navigation or INS navigation if GPS unavailable.
IFA Selects INS/GPS navigation. Can be used to align the INS using GPS
or other valid source of true heading.
ATT Selects the IMU backup navigation mode. May require entry of
aircraft true heading at least one time, via the DEU Own Aircraft format.
GB Gyro Bias mode, not functional.
TEST Provides Built−In−Test for installation and functional verification

(on deck only).
OFF Secures system function.
2 SYS RESET switch Resets transient failures in the data processor and mission computers.
Figure 202.NAV MODE Select/Computer Reset Panel
ORIGINAL 20−4
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
The MAGR provides a UTC synchronization signal to for direct use by the DFCS, and magnetic heading for the
JTIDS and ARC-182 “Have Quick II” radio sets. The JTIDS BDHI. The SAHRS is controlled by MFD formats. During
receives the UTC via data bus message. The JTIDS concurrent alignment with the INS, the NAV MODE select
references it to a precise 1-Hertz discrete sent by the MAGR. switch also controls the SAHRS. In its normal operating
The “Have Quick II” radios receive the UTC (“mickey”) as mode, the SAHRS is an inertial system with velocity aiding
a serial input on separate, direct-wired lines when RCV TOD selectable. It can also operate as a conventional attitude
(PB 3) is depressed on the GPS Status format. heading reference system having slaved, directional gyro, or
emergency compass modes available. The SAHRS receives
The MAGR is powered by 115 VAC through the GPS magnetic heading from the magnetic azimuth detector;
circuit breaker (3E2). MAGR power is software controlled provides compensation for aircraft magnetic errors; and
through the DPs via PB 4 (PWR ON/OFF) on the GPS Status provides magnetic heading to the BDHI using the best source
Format. The MAGR is energized on either internal or available as determined by the navigation system.
external power, and is energized by default if both DPs are
failed. The MAGR also uses three C-cell equivalent alkaline The SAHRS uses 115 VAC from the ac left main bus
batteries to support power-off memory storage and internal through SAHRS A, B, and C circuit breakers (1I3, 1I5, and
time keeping. 1I6). It may also use 28-VDC power from the interrupt-free
bus via SAHRS DC circuit breaker (9I3) if ac power is not
20.1.3 AN/USN-2(V) Standard Attitude Heading available. Refer to Chapter 2 for the alphanumeric circuit
Reference System (SAHRS) breaker listing.
Aircraft with AFC 919 incorporated utilize the Naviga- 20.1.4 Mission Computer System (MCS)
tion Guidance System (NGS) SAHRS. It is a self-contained
The navigation system includes the navigation
strapdown all-attitude INS that uses a single monolithic laser
computations performed by the MCS. The computations of
gyro to sense angular rates for all three axis and three single-
inertial parameters are performed respectively in the INS and
axis accelerometers for acceleration measurements. It uses
SAHRS processing modules that interface with the MCS.
an improved SSA (502A6) and replaces the flux valve with
The MCS processes this inertial data as well as initial entered
a Magnetic Azimuth Detector (MAD) (502A5). NGS
data and navigation aiding inputs. Processing includes
SAHRS interfaces in the same manner to other systems as the
generating other navigation parameters, filtering, time
existing SAHRS system.
tagging, storing, and distributing data to the displays and
other system functions.
In the strapdown configuration, the sensor assembly is
not isolated from the airframe by gimbals and senses aircraft The MCS consists of two AN/AYK-14 (XN-6) tactical
angular rate and accelerations directly. However, local level computers: MC1 and MC2. Normally MC2 performs
and wander angle must be established by alignment for navigation system processing and computations. Should
SAHRS to provide useful information. After alignment, the MC2 fail, MC1 will perform virtually all navigation system
SAHRS processor keeps track of the sensor assembly’s functions with the exception of data link, JTIDS and radar
orientation with respect to local level and true north by position updates, JTIDS continuous position update,
integrating the sensed angular rates. The sensed accel- JTIDS in-flight align, and surface waypoint position
erations are resolved into north, east, and down components; determination.
corrected for coriolis and other factors; and integrated to
provide velocity and position information. The MCS is the data bus controller; it accepts INS,
MAGR, and SAHRS data. It accepts navigation initialization
Note data from the DEU or the DD and sub-mode selections from
the MFDs, providing this information to the INS, MAGR,
The DFCS uses SAHRS as a backup for the INS and SAHRS in the required formats. It also provides JTIDS
data to provide autopilot capability in the event the INS or SAHRS data and accepts navigation correction
of a failed IMU. Any SAHRS invalid signal and TACAN data from JTIDS. Inputs from the various
airborne will be detected and logged on the DCP navigation aids are provided to the MCS via the data bus after
following flight. In addition to an actual SAHRS formatting in the CIU.
failure, this may be caused by selection of SAHR
MODE of SLV, DG, or EC via the NAV SYSTEM Based on crew mode selection, equipment availability
AID MFD format shown in Figure 20-18. and input data received, the MCS determines the mode of
operation and the parameters to be computed. It processes
Outputs to the MCS include velocity, heading, attitude, and stores these values, using them for other functions within
linear accelerations, angular rates, and time tagging data. the MCS as well as distributing them to the displays and other
The SAHRS also generates synchro outputs of roll and pitch aircraft functions.
20-5 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
20.1.5 Navigation Data Initialization the pilot and the three MFDs for both crewmembers. In
addition, certain MFD formats provide pushbutton legends
Initial manual entry of required navigation information that permit submode selection and selection of other related
is accomplished by the RIO. Either the DEU or the DD display formats. These include HUD, VDI, HSD, OWN A/C,
control panel can be used. NAV AID, SURFACE WPT, INS UPDATE, and several
alignment formats. A description of the outputs available and
20.1.5.1 Data Entry Unit (DEU) the use of these outputs can be found in paragraph 20.2,
Navigation System Data Distribution, and paragraph 20.3,
The DEU allows the RIO to manually enter the initial Navigation System Operation. The displays are discussed in
navigation information required for INS and SAHRS detail in Chapter 2.
alignments, GPS initialization, and for waypoint location.
Such required data inputs include latitude, longitude, 20.1.7 Programmable Tactical Information
altitude, waypoint type, date, time, carrier speed and Display (PTID)
heading, directional gyro magnetic heading, aircraft true
heading, and surface waypoint range and bearing. The The PTID provides the RIO an alternate means of
various DEU formats used are shown in Figure 20−3. This display for many of the alphanumeric and graphic outputs of
figure shows the DEU MENU display and the five DEU the navigation system. Information is transmitted from the
formats used for entry of initial data and navigation related MCS to the APG−71 and then to the PTID. Selection of
information. Use of these formats is discussed in paragraph display data is made via the DD.
20.3, Navigation System Operation. Refer to Chapter 2 for
detailed information on the DEU.
20.1.8 Converter Interface Unit (CIU)
20.1.5.2 Digital Display (DD)
The CIU accepts all non−data, bus−compatible navi
The APG−71 DD provides the RIO with an alternate gation aid inputs and converts them to the proper format. The
means of entering most initial navigation data into the system CIU also converts the steering error commands generated by
except for SAHRS DG heading, barometric altimeter setting, the MCS into the required analog signals for the DFCS. These
date, and time; and control of JTIDS navigation functions. navigation aids, as they pertain to the navigation system, are
Use of the DD for entry of navigation is provided in described in the following paragraphs.
paragraph 20.3, Navigation System Operation.
20.1.9 Standard Central Air Data Computer
20.1.5.3 GPS Initialization (SCADC)
MAGR initialization is improved when aircraft The SCADC is a single processor digital computer that
position, velocity, Zulu Time of Day (ZTOD), and date are gathers, stores, and processes pitot pressure, static pressure,
provided by the MCS. The correct time and date may also be total airstream temperature, and angle−of−attack data from
entered manually via the DEU OWN A/C format. Once the aircraft airstream sensors. In addition to performing wing
GPS begins navigation, ZTOD and date are provided to the sweep, flap and slat schedule computations, and limit
MCS by the MAGR and the ZTOD and date buttons on the controls for the flight control systems, the SCADC provides
DEU are removed. The MAGR maintains ZTOD and date air data related parameters to the MCS via the CIU. This
with its internal batteries when aircraft power is removed. information includes pressure altitude, pressure altitude rate
of change, true and calibrated airspeed, angle of attack, and
Note Mach number. True and calibrated airspeed, angle of attack,
and Mach number are displayed directly to the crew on the
Incorrect ZTOD or date values can delay or HUD and VDI format of the MFDs. Pressure altitude is
prevent satisfactory satellite acquisition. Correct corrected for nonstandard day conditions and then displayed
values should be verified on the GPS Status as system altitude. True airspeed may also be used in the
format and manually entered via the DEU if computation of wind. Wind provides a reference velocity
necessary. source for the INS or SAHRS for in−flight alignment and is
a component of system velocity during backup navigation
20.1.6 Displays Subsystem modes. A description of the pitot−static system and the
SCADC is provided in Chapter 2.
Navigation information is provided to the pilot and
RIO in both graphic and alphanumeric formats via HUD for
ORIGINAL 20−6
Figure 203.DEU Navigation Formats
20−7 ORIGINAL
20.1.10 AN/ARN−118 Tactical Air Navigation Note

(TACAN) System or AN/URC−107 Joint
Tactical Information Distribution System JTIDS TACAN has shown reduced receiver
(JTIDS) sensitivity on channel 83. Use of channel 83Y
(G/A and A/A) and 83X (A/A only) may not
receive accurate information outside 40 miles.
The TACAN system is a UHF navigation receiver−
transmitter that is used to provide navigation information by The TACAN has a memory feature that allows tracking
determining slant range and bearing to a selected TACAN to continue uninterrupted by momentary loss of received
station. Operating range is line of sight to approximately 300 signals. A range signal that has been tracked for at least 10
nm. Accuracies are 0.1 nm in range and 0.5_ in bearing. The seconds will be retained in memory for 13 to 17 seconds after
TACAN station can be surface (land based or shipborne) or signal loss; a bearing signal tracked for at least 15 seconds is
airborne. Surface stations can be either TACAN or VORTAC. retained for 2 to 4 seconds after signal loss. This feature
When operating in the REC or T/R modes, the system is allows for automatic antenna switching without loss of
capable of receiving signals from a ground station simulta TACAN outputs.
neously with 99 other aircraft. When in the A/A mode, the
system is capable of transponding with each of five cooperat If the signal from a TACAN station becomes unreliable
ing aircraft, providing slant range information to each; how or is lost for more than memory time, then the TACAN
ever, the system will interrogate and lock on to only one. In switches to self−test automatically. This may cause the BDHI
A/A mode, the second aircraft must be 63 channels apart. An relative bearing to be 270_ for 2 to 4 seconds. If the signal is
airborne station provides only slant range distance unless the not acquired during the self−test, the BDHI bearing pointer
aircraft is equipped with a bearing transmitter and a rotating will continuously slew in a counterclockwise direction and
antenna. The AN/ARN−118 or AN/URC−107 are not able to the TEST light on the TACAN control panel will light. If
transmit bearing information but can receive it from a spe the light remains on, a failure is indicated and TACAN
cially equipped aircraft. information should be disregarded. As in all TACAN sets,
undetected failures can occur, so information provided by the
TACAN should be cross−checked with other available
Available TACAN range and bearing information is
navigation information.
always displayed on the pilot and RIO BDHIs and can be
selected for display on the HUD and MFDs. The TACAN
The AN/ARN−118 TACAN uses 115 VAC from the ac
data supplied to the MCS can be used for a one−fix update of
the INS and SAHRS, continuous update of the system essential No. 2 bus through JTIDS RT PH A circuit breaker
(3D5), 28 VDC from dc essential bus No. 2 via BDHI/ JTIDS
navigation solution, or for steering. The AN/URC−107
DPG circuit breaker (8E7), and 26 VAC from the 26−volt
(JTIDS) TACAN requires the selection of DATA SIL,
NORM, or POLL on the JTIDS control panel (Figure 20−4) essential bus through JTIDS / DPG / BDHI INST PWR
circuit breaker (3D4). In addition to the power and circuit
to supply digital TACAN information to the MCS. This is
breakers used by the AN/ARN−118, the AN/URC−107
required for TACAN displays on the MFD, navigation
TACAN also requires 115 VAC from essential No. 2 bus
updates, and TACAN steering. Refer to paragraphs 20.3.9.3,
Navigation System Updates, 20.3.9.4, Continuous Position through JTIDS RT PH B and C circuit breakers (4D3 and
4D4). Refer to Chapter 2 for the alphanumeric circuit breaker
Updating, and 20.3.9.2, Display Steering Modes.
listing.
The TACAN has 126 X channels and 126 Y channels 20.1.10.1 TACAN Controls and Indicators
available 1 MHz apart. The TACAN uses two aircraft
antennas, automatically switching between the two at Two identical TCN control panels (Figure 20−4), one in
5−second intervals until a threshold signal is received. The each cockpit, are provided to permit either crewmember to
AN/ARN−118 requires approximately 2 minutes for warmup; operate the TACAN. To determine which crewmember con
AN/URC−107 (JTIDS) is operational once TACAN self−test trols the TACAN, each cockpit has an alternate action
is complete. If stable range and bearing indications are not TACAN CMD pushbutton that illuminates either PLT or
available after this time, tune another station or check circuit NFO to show which cockpit has command. Both buttons
breakers. allow each crewmember to either give or take command of
the TACAN. A BDHI in each cockpit provides range and
bearing to a tuned TACAN station. Other TACAN displays
may be selected.
ORIGINAL 20−8
Figure 204.TACAN Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 3)
20−9 ORIGINAL
1 BDHI TACAN needle Displays relative bearing to the selected TACAN station
2 BDHI UHF/ADF needle Displays relative bearing to a tuned UHF transmitter.
3 BDHI TACAN range Displays slant range to a selected TACAN station.

window
4 TACAN CMD buttons Selects pilot/RIO TACAN control for BDHI display. Alternate action lighted push
(Pilot and RIO) button that lights PLT or NFO to indicate which cockpit has command of the
TACAN. Pressing the button cycles command to the other cockpit and changes
light indication.
5 TACAN VOL control Varies level of the TACAN audio signal to the headsets. Clockwise rotation
increases volume.
6 TACAN mode switch OFF Power not applied to TACAN
REC Receive:
TACAN determines bearing from aircraft to selected TACAN
station. Bearing displayed on BDHI; available for MFD, HUD.
Station identifier is received, no range is calculated.
T/R Transmitreceive:
In addition to the REC functions, TACAN determines slant range
to selected TACAN station. Distance displayed on BDHI;
available for MFD, HUD.
A/A REC Air−to−air receive:

TACAN receives bearing information from a suitably equipped
cooperating aircraft and calculates the relative bearing to the coop
erating aircraft. No distance information is available.
A/A T/R Air−to−air transmitreceive mode:

TACAN receives both distance and bearing information from a
suitably equipped cooperating aircraft and calculates the slant
range distance and relative bearing of the aircraft. If the aircraft
is not equipped with bearing transmitting capabilities, only slant
range is available.
Note
• Air−to−air TACAN operation requires a 63 channel
separation between cooperating aircraft. Channel use
should be prearranged. Air−to−air TACAN between F−14s
is limited to slant range, no bearing is provided.
• When the AN/URC−107 (JTIDS) is installed, TACAN data
on the HUD and MFD requires the selection of DATA SIL,
NORM, or POLL on the JTIDS control panel.
7 Right hand channel The inner knob sets the channel number units digit. The outer knob sets
knob X and Y channels.
Figure 20−4. TACAN Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 3)
ORIGINAL 20−10
8 TEST button/light Initiates self−test. The light illuminates to indicate failure of continuous monitor
test or either manually or automatically initiated self−test.
9 Left hand channel knob Sets channel number hundreds and tens digits.
10 CHANNEL window Displays selected channel number and X or Y.
Figure 20−4. TACAN Controls and Indicators (Sheet 3 of 3)
20.1.10.2 TACAN Testing TEST light goes on at any time during flight, it indicates a
failure of automatic self−test and all TACAN information
TACAN testing includes continuous monitoring and should be disregarded.
commanded self−test. Continuous monitoring checks certain
internal functions of the TACAN on a continuous basis. 20.1.11 AN/ASW−27C Data Link (D/L)
Failure of one of these checks causes the TEST light on the
TCN panel to illuminate. Commanded self−test is either During carrier alignment, D/L provides SINS data to
manually or automatically initiated. The TEST button is a the INS via the CIU. This data is also provided to the SAHRS
momentary action pushbutton switch that is pressed to place during concurrent carrier alignment. Before takeoff the D/L
the TACAN into the commanded self−test mode manually. can be used to provide waypoint coordinates to the MCS via
The test may be accomplished in all operating modes. the CIU for later use in steering and position updating. After
Commanded self−test interrupts normal operation for a takeoff, the D/L provides control and steering commands that
22−second cycle and provides a high−confidence test of the are available for display or may be coupled to the autopilot
TACAN except for the antennas. When TEST is selected in during vector steering or ACL operation.
T/R, a power check is initiated for the transmitter, receiver,
distance, and bearing circuits. The BDHI bearing pointer
Refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−lA for a complete
should swing to 270_ in 2 to 7 seconds and the range OFF flag
discussion of data link.
should appear. After approximately 7−seconds, the BDHI
bearing pointer should swing to 180_ and the OFF flag should
20.1.12 UHF Automatic Direction Finder (ADF)
disappear. The distance indicator should read 000.0 nm. The
BDHI should return to its original bearing and distance
The UHF/ADF provides the relative bearing to a UHF
readings after 15 seconds. The TEST light will momentarily
flash when the test is initiated. If the light goes on and stays transmitting station from the aircraft. This information is
displayed directly on the BDHI and on the MFD HSD format.
on during test, a malfunction is indicated. In addition, the
OBC CNI format on the MFD displays a TACAN NO−GO or
NOT READY indication if there is a test failure. If a self−test 20.1.13 Bearing Distance Heading Indicator (BDHI)
in the T/R mode results in a failure indication, select REC and
perform the test again. If the failure indication is removed, A BDHI is on the left side of the pilot and RIO instru
bearing information is still valid. The AN/URC−107 ment panels (Figure 20−4). The BDHI is a remote heading
performs all the same TACAN tests as the AN/ARN−118. indicator that displays aircraft magnetic heading, TACAN
and UHF/ADF bearings, and TACAN slant range. The
It also performs a commanded self−test when a JTIDS rotating compass card receives its heading reference from the
OBC is selected on the MFD OBC page. JTIDS OBC SAHRS. Aircraft heading is read against a fixed index mark
provides TACAN fail data on the JTIDS fail data page. Refer at the 12−o’clock position. The two servo−driven needles are
to JTIDS self−test Chapter 27. The following will cause the positioned by relative bearing information provided by the
TACAN lock to break for 4 seconds: the power up or down UHF/ADF to the single bar (No. 1) needle and by the TACAN
of JTIDS, going from OFF or STBY to DATA SIL, NORM, to the double bar (No. 2) needle. Magnetic bearing to the
or POLL or back to STBY or OFF on the JTIDS control panel. station is read under the head of the needle. Relative bearing
The range off flag will appear and bearing will swing to 270_ can be determined by comparing the bearing reading with
for 2 seconds then reacquire lock to the station. magnetic heading. The range window on the right side of the
indicator displays TACAN slant range. When the TACAN is
Whenever a signal becomes unreliable (loss exceeds off or range is unreliable, an OFF flag covers the window.
memory time), self−test is initiated automatically. If the
20−11 ORIGINAL
20.1.14 AN/URC−107 Joint Tactical Information Dis The navigation update function has to be manually
tribution System (JTIDS) selected. These selections are JTIDS one−fix, continuous
position, and INS in−flight alignment. The aircrew has the
JTIDS is a jam−resistant communication system that ability to select either of the JTIDS grids via the NAV
provides the F−14D with two−way secure data and digital SYSTEM AID page. This selection determines which data
voice communication. In addition to the JTIDS commu the MCS will use to perform the track conversion and
nication functions, it also provides the F−14D with navigation continuous position updates. Independent of this selection,
and TACAN data. JTIDS one−fix and INS in−flight alignments will always be
performed using the geodetic data.
The JTIDS system internally computes relative navi
gation and position location information. All participants Internal to the JTIDS system is the equivalent of an
(JTIDS terminals) in the same net determine their position AN/ARN−118 TACAN system. Installation of JTIDS in the
relative to each other. This is referred to as the JTIDS relative aircraft replaces the AN/ARN−118 with the JTIDS receiver/
navigation function. The basis of this function is the TDMA transmitter. Refer to 20.1.10 for JTIDS TACAN operation.
architecture and precise synchronization of all participants to
a common time base (net time reference). This allows each 20.2 NAVIGATION SYSTEM DATA DISTRIBUTION
JTIDS system to accurately determine the time a message
The navigation system provides data to other systems
was transmitted and its TOA, and then compute the range
and functions as well as for display to the crew. In general,
from the source of the message. JTIDS computes an estimate
this is similar to displayed data, but such parameters as
of its own relative position coupled with the position and
aircraft angular rates, accelerations, and time tag data are
navigation quality contained in each participants PPLI
also included. Figure 20−5 summarizes navigation system
message. With data from multiple participants with equal or
outputs.
better position plus the navigation data from the INS, GPS,
or SAHRS, JTIDS can compute an excellent estimate of 20.2.1 Navigation Data Display
own−ship position and velocities. JTIDS will automatically
update the own−ship position in the PPLI message with its Navigation information is displayed to the aircrew in
estimated position. It also provides an estimated quality graphic form on the HUD and MFD and in tabular form on
(accuracy) of the position it computed. This quality is the MFD.
provided to the MCS and included in the PPLI message.
When the DISPLAYS panel TLN (takeoff, landing,
JTIDS is a dual grid system utilizing a geodetic and an navigation) MODE button is selected, both the HUD and the
independent relative grid. JTIDS can operate in both grids MFD VDI format show navigation information graphically
simultaneously, but the MCS is limited to operating in one in the vertical plane. The MFD can also show a HSD format
grid at a time. The relative mode requires a coordinated grid that provides graphic navigation information in the
origin (latitude and longitude) and the selection of NAV con horizontal plane.
troller (a high−quality navigation source). The geodetic grid
is the F−14D default mode and, unlike the relative grid, Tabular information relating to alignment, waypoints,
requires no special coordination. Refer to NAVAIR GPS status, flight plans, and own aircraft can be displayed on
01−F14AAD−1A for the MFD displays of JTIDS navigation the MFDs.
parameters.
The navigation information provided by the various
JTIDS receives navigation sensor data from the MCS display selections is described in the paragraphs that follow.
and returns navigation corrections. The sensor data is used by
20.2.1.1 HUD TLN Basic
JTIDS in its relative navigation calculations, own−ship
position in the PPLI message, and for calculating navigation The HUD provides primary flight and navigation
corrections. information in graphic and numeric form in a portion of the
pilot’s field of view through the windscreen encompassing
The JTIDS navigation correction data sent back to the ±10_ in azimuth and elevation (Figure 20−6). A repeat of this
MCS is used to perform track conversions and navigation information can be displayed on the MFD by selecting the
updates. The JTIDS correction data will only be used for HUD pushbutton on the MENU1 format, or on DD by
track conversions and navigation updates when it is valid and depressing MFK and RPTSPL then HUD.
has a quality ≤ 3 (≤ 18,080 feet in error). The track conversion
function uses the JTIDS delta navigation corrections to pad In addition to the information in Figure 20−6, other
all received and transmitted tracks on the JTIDS link into the HUD formats provide indications of glideslope and center
JTIDS navigation reference. This function is performed line errors for ACL and ILS steering modes as well as flight
automatically by the MCS. director steering information and commanded heading.
ORIGINAL 20−12
Figure 205.Navigation System Data Distribution
20−13 ORIGINAL
Figure 206.HUD Navigation Outputs (TLN Basic)
ORIGINAL 20−14
20.2.1.2 MFD VDI (Basic) Format, TLN Mode 20.2.1.4.1 HSD Waypoint Data Buffers
The MFDs provide a VDI format that is a represen Both the left and right data buffers behave differently
tation in the vertical plane of a field of view of ±45_ in depending on the choice of steering mode. The left data
azimuth and elevation. In the TLN basic mode (Figure 20−7), buffer (next to PB 5) always displays waypoint information.
the VDI format displays the same information as the HUD This waypoint information changes slightly based on
except for the airspeed and altitude dials, angle of attack, and steering mode and the waypoint displayed. The right data
g readouts. buffer displays either TACAN information or another
waypoint buffer.
This format also provides readouts of the course and
heading selected using the CRS and HDG knobs on the pilot The data buffers will only display waypoint
center instrument panel (FO−3). Pushbutton legends permit information for the 100 tactical waypoints and any defined
selection of destination (DEST), data link (D/L), TACAN waypoints in the active flight plan. If a flight plan is active,
(TCN), manual (MAN), GPS, AUTO, or all−weather landing when the inky−dink (increment−decrement) scrolls upward
(AWL) steering. through 100, it will jump to the first waypoint in the active
flight plan (i.e., 101, 201, 301, etc.). When scrolling down
In addition to the information in Figure 20−7, other through 1, it will jump to the last defined waypoint in the
MFD formats provide indications of ACL glideslope and active flight plan (i.e., 115, 237, 524, etc.).
centerline errors, glideslope and centerline errors from
ILS, flight director glideslope and centerline steering If both data buffers are displaying waypoint
information, commanded heading, commanded speed and information, the inky−dink arrow’s focus is assigned to the
altitude information, and HUD flight director declutter. desired buffer by pressing the pushbutton next to that buffer
(i.e., PB 5 or PB 11). The buffer with the inky−dink focus will
20.2.1.3 MFD Own−Aircraft (Basic) Data Format be displayed with a box around it, and the waypoint number
displayed in that buffer will be displayed between the
The MFD own−aircraft (basic) data format inky−dink arrows. If the steering mode is changed to one
(Figure 208) furnishes navigational data in tabular form. which displays TACAN information on the right, the
This format can be called up from several of the MFD formats inky−dink and box will be automatically assigned to the left
by selecting the DATA pushbutton legend. buffer, since they have no meaning for a TACAN station.
In addition to the parameters shown in Figure 208, Note

other own−aircraft MFD formats are available. During
A box around a waypoint buffer merely shows
alignment, these provide indications of alignment progress
where the inky−dink is assigned. It is unrelated to
in both numeric and graphic form and INS north and east
which waypoint is selected for steering.
velocities.
If a waypoint is desired as the steer point (DEST, GPS,
20.2.1.4 MFD HSD (Basic) Format, TLN Mode or AUTO steering), that waypoint should be selected with the
inky−dink arrows in one of the data buffers, and ENT (PB 15)
The MFDs provide a HSD format (Figure 20−9) selected. The waypoint selected with ENT will always be the
showing an aircraft centered representation of the situation one with the inky−dink focus.
in the horizontal plane. In the TLN basic mode, it furnishes
information on the position of waypoints, TACAN stations, 20.2.1.4.1.1 Left Buffer Behavior
and destination points with respect to the aircraft. The
distance scale from the aircraft symbol to the inner edge of The left data buffer always shows waypoint infor
the compass rose can be set at 200, 100, 50, 25, or 10 miles. mation. Normal display information includes waypoint
Numeric displays of range, bearing, and time−to−go to number, bearing, range, and time to go to the waypoint. Addi
selected waypoints or to a selected TACAN station are tionally, if a flight plan waypoint is selected, and that way
provided. point has a valid name defined, the waypoint name will
appear above the waypoint number (up to five characters).
In addition to the information shown in Figure 20−9,
other HSD formats provide AUTO, GPS, TACAN, data−link, If the steering mode is DEST or AUTO, and a route
destination, and manual steering displays (see paragraph waypoint is selected, the bearing will be replaced with the
20.3.9.2, Display Steering Modes). word ROUTE, and the range and time−to−go indications will
be shown along the route information to the route target
(if defined) or to the end of the route.
20−15 ORIGINAL
Figure 207.MFD VDI (TLN Basic) Navigation Outputs
ORIGINAL 20−16
Figure 208.Own−Aircraft Basic Data Format
20−17 ORIGINAL
Figure 209.MFD HSD Format  Navigation Outputs
ORIGINAL 20−18
20.2.1.4.1.2 Right Buffer Behavior the steering mode selected, information available and phase
of flight. The three modes are defined in the following table:
The right data buffer either displays direct steering
waypoint information (waypoint number, bearing, range, Function Description
time to go, and name if a flight plan waypoint), or it displays
TACAN steering information (channel, bearing, range, time TTG Time−to−Go represents (in an HH:MM:SS
to go), depending on steering mode. format) the time remaining to reach the
current steerpoint at the current ground speed.
In DEST, GPS, or AUTO steering, the right buffer dis Time−to−Go is the default time remaining
plays waypoint information. In all other steering modes, the function and the default display for the clock
right buffer displays TACAN steering information. buffer of the HSD format. It is displayed on
the HUD and the HSD format when the Clock
20.2.1.5 Navigation Clocks and Timers Select legend is TTG". It does not account
for time to turn to a direct heading.
To facilitate navigational timekeeping and sequencing, TTGT Time−to−Target is available when navigating
several clock and timer displays are available to the aircrew along an active flight plan with a defined route
on the HSD format and HUD Display. Figure 20−9 illustrates and a target waypoint. Time−to−Target
the HSD clock readout. The HSD format clock and timer represents (in an HH:MM:SS format) the time
displays are reconfigured automatically to coincide appro remaining to reach the designated target
priately with the HUD clock selection. One clock or timer waypoint along the flight plan route at the
may be displayed on the HUD, and all options are selected via current ground speed. When TTGT is
Clock Select (PB 7) on the HSD format. All clock functions available, it automatically replaces TTG as
that reference a time of day require ZTOD (Zulu Time Of the time remaining selection. It is displayed
Day) information provided by the GPS if available or by on the HUD and the HSD format when the
manual entry via the DEU. Clock Select legend is TTGT".
Note TREL Time−to−Release is available when an air−to−

ground weapon is selected and a target has
In the prime INS/GPS navigation mode, the been designated via CTGT, CWPT, or
MAGR updates ZTOD in the MCS only once per COAP mode (see Weapon Attack Modes
second. Including typical latencies to receive, section of the F−14D A/G Tactical
transfer, format and display ZTOD, the value Manual, NWP 55−5−F−14, Vol. II,
presented to the aircrew may lag the true ZTOD NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1T−1). Time−to−
transmitted by GPS (i.e., run slow") by 1 to 2 Release represents (in an HH:MM:SS
seconds. format) the time remaining until an automatic
bomb release point is reached. When TREL is
20.2.1.5.1 Zulu Time of Day (ZTOD) available, it automatically replaces TTG and
TTGT as the time remaining selection. It is
Zulu Time of Day is an actual time−of−day reference in displayed on the HUD and the HSD format
an HH:MM:SS format. ZTOD is always displayed in the when the Clock Select legend is TREL".
lower left corner of the HSD format and is the default clock
display on the HUD. It is displayed on the HUD when the
Clock Select legend is ZTOD". 20.2.1.5.3 Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA)
20.2.1.5.2 Time Remaining Functions Estimated Time of Arrival represents (in an

HH:MM:SS format) the ZTOD at which a specific steerpoint
Three time remaining functions are provided to present will be reached. When TTGT is the available time remaining
a cue of the time required to reach a specific steerpoint: Time function, ETA is calculated by adding TTGT to ZTOD and
to Go (TTG), Time to Target (TTGT), and Time to Release represents time over target following the active flight plan
(TREL). These three functions are mutually exclusive; that route. Otherwise, ETA is calculated by adding TTG to
is, only one of the three will be displayed or made available ZTOD, and represents time over waypoint if you went
for selection by the aircrew. The available time remaining present position, direct to waypoint. ETA is the default
function is selected automatically by the MCS, depending on display for the timer buffer of the HSD format. It is displayed
on the HUD when the Clock Select legend is ETA".
20−19 ORIGINAL
20.2.1.5.4 Elapsed Timer (ET) 20.3 NAVIGATION SYSTEM OPERATION
The ET represents (in a MM:SS format) the time Procedures for operational use of the navigation
elapsed since the MCS timer was started. It is displayed on system are provided in the paragraphs that follow including
the HUD and the HSD format when the Clock Select legend display formats and control selections for alignment, data
is ET". While ET is running, other clock and timer modes initialization, flight plan management, in−flight navigation,
still may be selected on the HUD and the HSD format. sensor selection, degraded mode operation, and tactical
Conversely, if ET is not running, it may still be selected for navigation. Tactical navigation includes: range and bearing
display. to selected waypoints; display of TACAN, GPS, destination,
and automatic waypoint steering; autopilot steering; AWL
The ET timer is controlled via the DEU as follows:
aircraft control; position updating; and surface waypoint
1. From the main menu format, depress CLK to select position determination. These procedures are normally
the Clock format. performed in the TLN mode; however navigation outputs are
available to other aircraft functions and displays in all modes.
2. Depress ET to select the ET mode.
20.3.1 GPS Operation
3. To start the ET timer depress STRT and ENT.
4. To stop the ET timer, depress STOP and ENT. The Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging
(NAVSTAR) Global Positioning System (GPS) is a radio
5. To reset the ET timer, depress ET, ENT, then navigation system using satellites in twelve hour orbits to
STOP, ENT provide timing signals derived from onboard atomic clocks.
These signals can be used to triangulate a three dimensional
20.2.1.5.5 Countdown (CD) Timer
position near the earth using an appropriate receiver. The
receiver detects the timing signals, compares them to its own
The CD timer represents (in a MM:SS format) the time
clock then converts the time obtained into a distance to the
to go to zero since the MCS timer was started from a preset
satellite using the speed of light as a conversion factor. By
value. It is displayed on the HUD and the HSD format when
obtaining signals from four satellites, the receiver can
the Clock Select legend is CD". While CD is running, other
determine position in three dimensions plus identify its own
clock and timer modes still may be selected on the HUD and
small clock error.
the HSD format. Conversely, if CD is not running, it may still
be selected for display. The default value for the CD timer is
06:00. The satellites transmit two different GPS signals in
combination on two different frequencies. C/A−code
The CD timer is controlled via the DEU as follows: (Coarse/Acquisition code) is used to help the receiver acquire
the GPS signal and provide hand−over information to the
1. From the main menu format, depress CLK to select primary navigation signal, the P−Code. GPS signals use two
the Clock format. frequencies, L1 (1575.42 MHz) and L2 (1227.60 MHz); C/A−
Code is normally transmitted only on L1, and P−Code (or
2. Depress CD to select the CD mode.
Y−Code, see below) is transmitted on both L1 and L2. Dual
3. To enter a CD time value, depress CD TIME to frequencies allow the receiver to make an estimate of iono
select the CD Time Entry format. Use the numeric spheric refraction, and help to improve overall GPS jamming
keypad and other control keys to enter the desired tolerance.
count−down time value.
Both the C/A−Code and P−Code contain a navigation
4. To start the CD timer, depress STRT and ENT. message with information about satellite position, time, the
5. To stop the CD timer, depress STOP and ENT. health of the satellite, and the complete constellation
almanac. A Hand−Over Word is included in the navigation
6. To reset the CD timer to the previous timer start message that tells a receiver tracking C/A−Code which part
value, depress STOP and ENT a second successive of the P−Code sequence the satellite is currently transmitting.
time. The theoretical accuracy of both C/A−Code and P−Code
signals is similar. The advantage of P−Code is derived from
20.2.1.6 Navigation Data Display Summary its transmission on two frequencies, and the subsequent
ionospheric refraction estimate that is possible thereby.
Figure 20−10 summarizes the navigation data available
on HUD and MFD formats.
ORIGINAL 20−20
DISPLAY NAVIGATION DATA DISPLAYED

Own Aircraft Inflight Latitude
Longitude
Altitude
Barometric Setting
Magnetic Variation
Wind Direction/Speed
True Airspeed
Groundspeed
True Heading
GPS Figure of Merit
Horizontal and Vertical of Current Navigation Mode
Own Aircraft Ground Align Latitude
Longitude
Altitude
Barometric Setting
Magnetic Variation
Groundspeed
True Heading
Align Time/Quality
North/East Velocities
GPS Figure of Merit
Aircraft Carrier (CV) Alignment Latitude
Longitude
Magnetic Variation
CV Speed
CV Heading
Vertical Lever Arm
Align Time/Quality
SAHRS Alignment Latitude
Longitude
CV Speed
CV Heading
HUD Display Roll (Symbols)
Pitch (Symbols)
Magnetic Heading (Symbol)
Flight Path Marker (Symbol)
Potential Flight Path Marker (Symbol)
System Altitude
Radar Altitude
Vertical Velocity
Calibrated Airspeed
Barometric Setting
Figure 2010.Navigation Data Display Summary (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−21 ORIGINAL
DISPLAY NAVIGATION DATA DISPLAYED
Flight Director Position and Rotation

AngleofAttack
Mach Number
Normal Acceleration (g)
ACL Lateral & Vertical Errors (Symbol)
ILS Azimuth & Elevation Deviation (Symbols)
Command Heading (Symbol)
Clock/Timer
Fly−To Caret
MFD VDI Format Roll (Symbols)

Pitch (Symbols)
Magnetic Heading (Symbol)
Flight Path Marker (Symbol)
System Altitude
Radar Altitude
Vertical Velocity
Calibrated Airspeed
Barometric Setting
Mach Number
ACL Lateral & Vertical Errors (Symbol)
ILS Azimuth & Elevation Deviation (Symbols)
Command Heading (Symbol)
Range to TACAN/Destination
D/L Command Alt/Mach No
D/L Command Heading (Symbol)
MFD HSD Format Magnetic Heading (Symbol)

Magnetic Course (Symbol)
Wind Direction/Speed
True Airspeed
Groundspeed
Way Point No/Brg/Range/TTG
TACAN Sta No/Brg/Range/TTG
TACAN Brg/Deviation (Symbols)
TACAN Command Course (Symbol)
Destination No
Destination Brg/Cmd Course (Symbols)
ADF Bearing (Symbol)
Command Heading
Course Select
Heading Select
Figure 21−10. Navigation Data Display Summary (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−22
The GPS utilizes a cryptographic scheme to convert System. Nor does receipt of P−Code guarantee
the P−Code signal into a Y−Code signal. By encrypting that PPS is in use. C/A−Code contains all the
the primary navigation signal, GPS can be rendered information required to provide a PPS solution.
impervious to spoofing" the intentional transmission of a All that is necessary is that the appropriate
false signal to mislead recipients. This function is termed crypto−codes be loaded into the receiver so that
Anti−Spoof" (A−S), and its use is mandated for all US the error message can be decrypted.
military GPS users. The MAGR will automatically switch to
this mode if the appropriate crypto−codes are loaded (see The receiver outputs a Figure of Merit (FOM) that
paragraph 20.3.1.3). provides, in a single digit number, a rough indication of the
overall quality of the navigation solution. FOM ranges from
Note 1 to 9, and includes estimates of signal quality and GDOP. A
properly operating GPS receiver, in PPS mode, will normally
The MAGR is unclassified even when the
display a FOM of 1, an operating SPS receiver (i.e., the
crypto−keys are loaded.
MAGR when the crypto−codes are not loaded) will display a
20.3.1.1 GPS Accuracy FOM of 4, and a functional receiver without a navigation
solution will display a FOM of 9. Intermediate values will
The quality of the received signals and the orientation appear, especially when the receiver first begins to track
of the satellites determine the actual quality of the position satellites, and when degradation due to jamming or signal
estimate provided by GPS. Jamming, obstructions, and loss occurs. The MCS receives the FOM from the MAGR and
multipath can degrade the quality of the received signal, outputs it for display on OWN A/C format of the MFD. The
while satellite constellation geometry can introduce position MCS and INS use FOM to assign appropriate weighting to
errors (termed Geometric Dilution of Precision GDOP). the GPS solution in the overall NSV.
The MAGR is designed to minimize these errors.
20.3.1.2 GPS Status Format
The GPS system provides two levels of accuracy. The
The GPS Status format displays the GPS parameters as
Precise Positioning System (PPS) is capable of accuracy
depicted in Figure 2011. All readouts (except MODE) will
better than 16 meters Spherical Error Probable (SEP) (i.e.,
be blanked while the GPS is performing a commanded BIT.
50% of the time the calculated position will be within a
sphere 16 meters in radius centered on the actual position). MODE will show TEST". MAGR power, transmission of
UTC synchronization to the HAVE QUICK radios, and
It is intended for military use only. PPS also provides time
display of the MAGR status are controlled from the GPS
with an error of less than 100 nanoseconds.
Status format.
Standard Positioning System (SPS) accuracy is
The MAGR power is toggled on and off by depressing
variable. When the satellites transmit their timing signals,
PWR (PB 4) on the GPS Status format. The appropriate ON
small, continuously varying errors are injected into the
navigation message of both the C/A−Code and the P/Y−Code or OFF status legend is also displayed. The default selection
is PWR ON.
signals to reduce the position and time accuracy a receiver
calculates. The size of the errors are encrypted and also sent
Note
as part of the satellite transmission. A PPS receiver requires
that the matching crypto−codes be loaded to resolve the error. The PWR ON legend only indicates that the
These are the same crypto−codes used for the Anti−Spoof MAGR has been energized. Boxing the GPS
function. legend (PB 13) on the OWN A/C or NAV System
Aid format makes GPS data available to the
The injected errors, termed Selective Availability navigation system.
(SA)", are controlled by the US Air Force on behalf of the
Department of Defense (DoD) so that, in a conflict, an enemy The UTC time of day is made available to the ARC−182
will not be able to use the system. In peacetime, the DoD Have Quick II" radios by momentarily depressing RCV
guarantees SPS precision will not exceed 100 meters TOD (PB 3) while the MAGR is in the NAVIGATE mode.
horizontally with 95% confidence (i.e., the horizontal RCV TOD is inoperative in the TEST and INITIALIZE
position will be within 100 meters at least 95% of the time). modes, and is not available with MAGR power off (see
In peace, SA is turned off; thus, SPS and PPS solutions have Chapter 19 for radio time sync operation).
the same accuracy.
When the MAGR is operating at its peak performance,
Note the GPS Status format will look like the display in
It is not necessary to receive P−Code (or Y−Code) Figure 2011. The figure legend contains the possible ranges
in order to make use of the Precise Positioning for the GPS Status Format Parameters.
20−23 ORIGINAL
PARAMETER RANGES REMARKS
1 MAG VAR Not operable in D03B.
2 CODE PRECISE Type of code the MAGR is tracking. PRECISE indicates that the
COARSE MAGR is using P or Y Code, COARSE indicates that the MAGR is
using C/A Code. COARSE will not be observed, or observed very
briefly as the receiver acquires satellites, if the receiver is operating
normally.
3 PROCESSOR GO The operational status of the MAGR processor. GO indicates that

NO GO data bus communication between the MAGR and the MCS exists
NOT READY and the processor is operating properly. NO GO indicates that the
processor failed a start−up or commanded BIT or a continuous
self−test. NOT READY indicates that data bus communication
between the MAGR and the MCS has not been established.
4 BATTERY1 GO MAGR battery operational status. GO indicates a satisfactory

LOW battery power level. LOW indicates that the battery has failed or
has a marginal power level. Battery power is only required to
maintain MAGR memory when the MAGR is powered off.
Report any LOW indications to maintenance.
Figure 2011.GPS Status Format (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 20−24
5 ALMANAC GO The status of the MDL almanac data available to the MAGR.
NO DATA GO indicates that the valid MDL almanac data is available. All
MDL NOT READY other conditions indicate that valid almanac data is unavailable.
MDL FAIL NO DATA indicates that almanac data is not present on the MDL or
is more than one month old. MDL NOT READY indicates that
there is either no data bus communication or no cartridge in the
MDL. MDL FAIL indicates that an MDL failure is preventing access
to almanac data.
Note
If valid almanac data is not available, either within MAGR memory
or on the MDL, the MAGR will initiate a cold start sky search for
visible satellites. Search and acquisition may take over 20 minutes.
Once satellites are received, the MAGR will extract the Almanac
from the GPS navigation message and store it in volatile memory
for future use.
6 ZTOD HH:MM:SS In NAVIGATE mode, indicates Zulu Time of Day. In the INITIALIZE
mode, momentarily indicates the time of MAGR initialization. A
blank field is displayed if no valid time is
available.
7 DATE MM/DD/YY In the NAVIGATE mode, indicates the current date. MM/DD/YY
is displayed if no valid date is available or the MAGR is not in
NAVIGATE mode.
8 DATA (PB 1) Returns the OWN A/C Basic format with DEU slaved for Own A/C
data entry.
9 NAV (PB 2) Returns the Navigation format.
10 RCV TOD Depressing RCV TOD pushtile provides time to the ARC−182
(PB 3) Have Quick II" radios.
11 PWR (PB 4) Selecting PWR pushtile toggles MAGR power ON or OFF.

Default is power on.
12 CRYPTO KEY VERIFIED The status of the GPS crypto keys. VERIFIED indicates that the
UNVERIFIED loaded key matches that used by the satellites. UNVERIFIED
INCORRECT indicates that the loaded key has not yet been verified through
PARITY ERROR comparison with the satellites. INCORRECT indicates that the
NO KEYS loaded key is incorrect. PARITY ERROR indicates that the
[BLANK] MAGR detected a parity error in the loaded key the key should
be reloaded. NO KEYS indicates that no key is loaded. The crypto
key is BLANK until NAVIGATE mode is entered.
Figure 20−11. GPS Status Format (Sheet 2 of 3)
20−25 ORIGINAL
13 SATELLITES 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 The number of satellites being tracked with maximum available

precision. Four satellites are normally needed for navigation. If
altitude is available from the MCS, a three satellite solution will
provide horizontal position and velocities.
14 RECEPTION GOOD GOOD indicates clear GPS reception of four satellites.

DEGRADE DEGRADE indicates partial track of at least one satellite.
[BLANK] If degraded reception persists, MAGR FOM and estimated
Horizontal and Vertical GPS position errors will increase. The
RECEPTION field is blank if the MAGR is not in NAVIGATE
mode.
15 FOM 9 to 1 MAGR Figure of Merit. FOM is a numerical indicator of receiver

accuracy and system integrity. It should not be used for decisions
concerning position accuracy (use the Horizontal and Vertical
Error estimates on the Own A/C format). FOM is based on a
number of factors that contribute to the overall system including,
and tends to be conservative with regard to system accuracy:
D MAGR receiver state (e.g., code tracking, carrier

tracking, acquisition, etc.)
D Carrier to noise ratio
D Satellite geometry (GDOP)
D Satellite range accuracy
D Ionospheric measurement or modeling error
D MAGR aiding
D MAGR Position Error estimates
16 MODE TEST With PWR ON, TEST appears for about 30 seconds as the
INITIALIZE MAGR self−test is run (provided MAGR was off for at least 30
NAVIGATE seconds). INITIALIZE then appears for about five seconds, then
[BLANK] NAVIGATE appears. With PWR OFF, this field is BLANK.
Note
When a commanded BIT is run from the OBC NAV format,

TEST will appear for up to 3 minutes during the Initiated BIT.
17 JTOD XFER Enables synchronization of JTIDS using GPS time. Available

only when JTIDS is operational and GPS is in NAVIGATE".
Note: 1. The battery is used to maintain GPS Almanac and Crypto Keys in volatile memory when the primary
power is off.
Figure 20−11.GPS Status Format (Sheet 3 of 3)
ORIGINAL 20−26
Figure 2012.Crypto Loading Panel Location
20.3.1.3 GPS Crypto Keys overridden by manual aircrew selections. Navigation sensors
used are listed in the lower center legend of the NAV (Navi
The MAGR crypto key is loaded by maintenance
gation) System Aid format (see Figure 2014). With a fully
personnel via the Crypto Load Panel on the right−hand side
operational system, this legend should read INS/GPS".
of the aircraft (Figure 20−12). The required codes are changed
daily, but multiple codes may be loaded into the MAGR at Manual selections are made via the INS, SAHR, and
one time. If the codes do not match the keys in the satellite, GPS legends on the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid format.
the MAGR will still operate, but in SPS mode only. Manual selection of INS or SAHRS is indicated by an M"
on the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid format, adjacent to the
20.3.2 Navigation Modes sensor legends. The absence of an M" indicates automatic
The navigation system can operate in four basic states mode selection is available. Normally INS will be automat
(primary, secondary, tertiary and backup), depending on the ically selected. Automatic deselection of GPS is indicated by
selection of navigation sensors. A summary of these states a dash−boxed GPS legend on the OWN A/C or NAV System
and the navigation sensor data used for the various modes is Aid formats (Figure 208 and Figure 2014), indicating that
provided in Figure 20−13. The primary mode couples the automatic reselection is available. The inability to box a
MAGR and the INS to derive an extremely accurate navi legend corresponding to a specific navigation sensor
gation solution. In all other modes, if GPS information is indicates that the sensor is unavailable for selection.
available, it is used directly to update the NSV position in the Note
MCS due to its inherent accuracy. Navigation State Vector
velocity and heading are updated by INS, SAHRS, GPS, or D During aircraft start, GPS should automati
external sources, in order of priority. Either the INS or cally box once a FOM of 4 is achieved. GPS
SAHRS provides attitude, accelerations, and angular rates will be boxed (dashed) on start up.
for NSV computations. In all modes, the functions and D If the MAGR degrades to a FOM of 8 or 9, it
outputs normally provided by the navigation system are will declare its output invalid to the MCS,
made available to the maximum extent possible. resulting in automatic deselection of GPS
(dashed box) and downgrading of the
The navigation system automatically selects the best navigation mode.
operating mode based on available sensors, unless
20−27 ORIGINAL
MODE HSD NAV MODE OWN AC POSITION VELOCITY ATTITUDE

SWITCH DATA PAGE SOURCE SOURCE SOURCE
Primary
y Provides superior navigation under all flight conditions.
INS/GPS lFA INS & GPS boxed INS INS INS
INS* INS INS boxed INS INS INS
*For non−GPS equipped aircraft or GPS powered off or unboxed.
Secondary
y Provides satisfactory navigation in maneuvering flight
GPS/INS INS INS & GPS boxed GPS INS INS
Tertiary
y Provides adequate navigation in non−maneuvering flight.
GPS/SAHRS GPS boxed GPS SAHRS SAHRS
GPS/IMU ATT GPS boxed GPS IMU IMU
Backup
p Provides marginal navigation for emergency purposes. Heading based on GPS N & E Velocity.
GPS OFF GPS boxed GPS GPS NA
Figure 2013.Navigation Modes and Navigation Sensor Data
Figure 2014.NAV System Aid Format
ORIGINAL 20−28
20.3.2.1 Primary Navigation updates, and an ALIGN SUSPENDED computer message

will be displayed. However, INS information will continue
20.3.2.1.1 INS/GPS Mode Operation to be sent to the MAGR for GPS aiding. If the MAGR
sufficiently recovers for at least 8 seconds, INS/GPS mode
INS/GPS mode is the primary navigation mode. This will be reselected automatically, provided the NAV MODE
mode is the default selection when the system achieves an switch remains in the IFA position.
alignment with the NAV MODE switch in IFA (In Flight
Alignment) with valid GPS information available. This is Whenever INS/GPS mode is available but not selected,
the recommended mode when all systems are operating GPS/INS mode will be displayed on the OWN A/C page as
normally, as it provides the most accurate navigation solution the current NAV mode. This will occur if the INS has
available. In this mode, the INS uses GPS horizontal position completed alignment and the MAGR is in NAVIGATE mode
and velocity information, combining it with its own navi and is boxed but INS, vice IFA, is selected using the NAV
gation solution for the best combination of the two. INS/GPS MODE switch.
mode horizontal position accuracy typically is within 20 feet
when the MAGR has achieved a FOM of 1, and remains In flight, if IFA is selected on the NAV MODE switch,
extremely stable during dynamic maneuvering flight. but the MAGR is not available or deselected, the INS will
align to the external velocity reference source selected on
In INS/GPS mode, the INS horizontal channel is the IFA format, with considerably reduced quality (see
continually updated using GPS information. The MAGR paragraph 20.3.2.3).
provides GPS position, velocity, and quality data directly to
the INS, bypassing the MCS. The INS uses GPS information 20.3.2.1.3 SAHRS Velocity Referencing
in its Kalman filter to correct and optimize its own horizontal
navigation solution, which is then sent to the MCS for Once the SAHRS is aligned, it generates its own
Navigation State Vector (NSV) computations. GPS infor velocity outputs similar to the INS. However, SAHRS
mation is not used directly for NSV updates. In turn, the INS velocities are not as accurate as INS velocities, with errors in
provides its own position and velocity coordinates to the each axis ranging between 5 and 10 feet per second. Further
MAGR, which allows it to extrapolate aircraft and satellite more, these errors are subject to additional drift over time.
positions more accurately during maneuvering flight, Poor SAHRS alignment and/or performance will cause the
antenna masking, signal dropouts, and jamming. NSV NSV attitude and heading and SAHRS velocities to degrade
attitude and heading are provided directly by the INS. quickly. An indication of poor SAHRS performance may be
the appearance of an ATTITUDE, VELOCITY or
During INS/GPS operations on deck, the parking brake POSITION CAW (Caution/Advisory/Warning).
may be released and the aircraft taxied without interrupting
an alignment in progress. In flight, an alignment can be SAHRS performance is improved by referencing it to
accomplished with align quality similar to that possible with a velocity source external to the SAHRS. However, GPS is
a ground alignment. The only restriction is that the aircraft unavailable as an external velocity reference source.
should not be maneuvered in a manner that masks the GPS Although NSV velocities may be modified with available
antenna from available satellites for more than a few seconds GPS information within the MCS, the SAHRS itself does not
early in the alignment. couple with nor is it directly aided by the MAGR. By default,
if no external velocity source is selected, SAHRS will use its
Because of the high degree of position accuracy in the own inertially derived velocity.
INS/GPS mode, one−fix INS position updates are
unavailable. Note
20.3.2.1.2 INS/GPS Mode Selection D A SAHRS external velocity reference source

should always be selected, even when a good
The INS/GPS mode is entered when the INS and GPS INS alignment has been achieved and the INS
legends are automatically selected (boxed) on the OWN A/C is known to be operating satisfactorily.
or NAV System Aid format, and IFA is selected on the NAV
MODE switch. Selection of this mode is verified with the D After a system reset, SAHRS velocity
display of INS/GPS" on the lower left of the HSD format, reference becomes unboxed. Reselection of a
OWN A/C format, and NAV System Aid format. SAHRS velocity reference following a
system reset is highly recommended to
If a GPS QUAL CAW is posted, the INS/GPS mode maintain the best possible SAHRS navigation
will be automatically deselected after a 30−second delay. The solution in case of degraded navigation mode
INS will then operate in its inertial mode without GPS operation.
20−29 ORIGINAL
Available external velocity sources are selected by output invalid to the MCS (FOM > 7), GPS/INS mode will be
depressing SAHR VEL REF on the NAV System Aid format. automatically deselected and the boxed GPS legend on the
The listed sources are: OWN A/C or NAV System Aid format will appear dashed.
The navigation system will then operate in the inertial−only
SAHRS VELOCITY SOURCES INS mode (see paragraph 20.3.2.2). If the MAGR recovers to
FOM ≤ 7, GPS/INS mode will be reselected automatically,
SYS System NSV velocity, computed using all valid provided that GPS was not deselected manually.
velocity sources. SYS is recommended if GPS
is selected, since it is the only source that 20.3.2.2.2 INS Mode
includes GPS information
TCN TACAN−relative computed velocity The INS mode provides the most accurate navigation
solution if GPS information is unavailable, and is the default
JTID JTIDS computed velocity.
non−GPS navigation mode. INS mode operation is the same
AIR True airspeed, computed by the SCADC and as that in previous F−14D configurations without GPS, with
compensated for winds. a performance typically within 1 nm per hour. Navigation
State Vector updates are derived from weighted mixes of INS
RDR Radar−relative computed velocity.
and SAHRS inputs.
INS INS inertial velocity. If GPS is not selected,
INS provides the best reference velocity. The INS mode is entered at the completion of an INS
alignment when the NAV MODE switch is placed in INS, or
automatically if the aircraft becomes airborne and the NAV
20.3.2.2 Secondary Navigation MODE switch is still in an align position, provided sufficient
alignment quality has been achieved. Selection of this mode
is verified with the display of INS" on the lower left of the
20.3.2.2.1 GPS/INS Mode
HSD format.
GPS/INS is the next best mode. GPS/INS is selected
Note
with the NAV MODE switch in INS after achieving a com
plete alignment, and then boxing GPS. This mode does the Selection of INS on the NAV MODE switch with
filtering of GPS with INS information in the MC. The main a displayed alignment quality of 5.0 or higher
difference between GPS/INS and INS/GPS is that in the lat will result in entry into the IMU (Inertial
ter, the velocities input to the NSV are more accurate and the Measurement Unit) mode (see paragraph
INS is continuously updated by the MAGR. Good long−term 20.3.2.4.2).
navigation performance may be expected in GPS/INS. How
ever, dynamic response will not be as precise as with the 20.3.2.2.3 INS Velocity−Aided IFA Mode
prime INS/GPS mode, and with extensive dynamic maneu
vering this accuracy will degrade. Navigation accuracy in The INS Velocity−Aided IFA mode aligns the INS in
GPS/INS mode is nevertheless superior to an inertial−only flight without GPS velocity or position information, using a
mode. selectable external velocity reference source. Since INS IFA
mode uses the current system position information, a one−fix
In GPS/INS mode, the NSV position is derived directly position update is recommended before selecting INS IFA
from GPS information. Navigation State Vector velocity, atti mode.
tude, and heading are provided directly by the INS. There is
no direct transfer of data between the INS and the MAGR.
GPS/INS mode is entered when INS and GPS are

selected on the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid format, and
the NAV MODE switch is placed in INS. Selection of this
INS performance following a non−GPS in−flight
mode is verified with the display of GPS/INS" on the lower
alignment depends on the accuracy of the
left of the HSD format. These conditions will also generate
selected velocity reference source. Therefore,
an IFA AVAILABLE computer message.
INS IFA mode is recommended only if mission
accomplishment is otherwise jeopardized.
If the MAGR FOM increases, the MCS will continue
to use GPS position information. If the MAGR declares its
ORIGINAL 20−30
Available external velocity sources are JTID, SYS, and 5. Place the NAV MODE switch to INS when the INS
AIR. The preferred velocity sources, in order of priority, are: ALGN CMPLT computer message is displayed, or
if the aircraft is to be maneuvered dynamically.
EXTERNAL VELOCITY SOURCES
Note
JTID JTIDS information, available to the MCS
only when operating in a JTIDS network. Because of the extensive time required for an
INS lEA with quality JTIDS information INS IFA (up to 35 minutes), the NAV MODE
typically requires 12 to 15 minutes. The switch may be placed to INS before the INS
quality of a JTIDS INS lEA will increase ALGN CMPLT message is displayed. Either
with the number of JTIDS participants. the INS mode or IMU mode will be selected
automatically, depending on the quality of the
SYS System velocity represents a weighted
alignment when INS is selected on the NAV
mix of all available velocity sources. It is
MODE switch.
subject to errors in any of the involved
velocity sources. 6. Verify the navigation mode legend on the lower left
AIR Air data provided by the SCADC. of the HSD format.
Accuracy depends on that of the computed
or entered winds. Because of the potential Note
for poor accuracy, the INS ALGN CMPLT Selection of INS on the NAV MODE switch
computer message may never be with a displayed alignment quality of 5.0 or
displayed. AIR should be selected only higher will result in entry into the IMU mode
as a last choice and only when the INS (see paragraph 20.3.2.4.2).
is degraded enough to prevent mission
accomplishment. This takes up to 20.3.2.3 Tertiary Navigation
35 minutes.
20.3.2.3.1 GPS/SAHRS Mode
The INS IFA mode is entered if INS is selected on The GPS/SAHRS mode provides reasonable naviga
the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid format, the NAV tion in non−maneuvering flight due primarily to the use of
MODE switch is placed in IFA, and GPS is not available. GPS position information. However, it is not as accurate as
In INS IFA mode, INS" is displayed on lower left of the HSD the primary or secondary navigation modes, and substantial
format, so selection of this mode must be verified by errors may accrue during extended maneuvering flight using
referencing the IFA format. See Figure 2015. Specific INS SAHRS inputs.
IFA procedures are:
In GPS/SAHRS mode, there is no direct transfer of
1. From the OWN A/C format, select SAHR as a valid information between the MAGR and the SAHRS. NSV
source of true heading. If reasonable SAHRS position is derived directly from GPS information, and
heading information is not available, then enter the NSV velocities, attitude, and heading information are
best estimated true heading from the DEU OWN derived from SAHRS.
A/C format.
The GPS/SAHRS mode is entered when GPS and
2. Select IFA on the NAV MODE switch. The IFA SAHR are selected on the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid
format will appear. format. Selection of this mode is verified with the display of
GPS/SAHRS" on the lower left of the HSD format.
Note
To ensure good initial alignment, straight and to use GPS position information. If the MAGR declares its
level flight should be maintained from 1 to 5 output invalid to the MCS (FOM > 7), then GPS/SAHRS
minutes after IFA is selected on the NAV mode will be automatically deselected and the boxed GPS
MODE switch. legend on the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid format will
appear dashed. The navigation system will then operate in the
3. From the IFA format, select a velocity source from inertial−only SAHRS mode (see paragraph 20.3.2.3.3). If the
JTID, SYS, or AIR selections. MAGR recovers to FOM ≤7, GPS/SAHRS mode will be
reselected automatically, provided that GPS was not
4. Observe the alignment progress on the IFA format. deselected manually.
20−31 ORIGINAL
Figure 2015.INS In−Flight Align Formats
ORIGINAL 20−32
20.3.2.3.2 GPS/IMU Mode If the MAGR FOM increases, the MCS will continue
to use GPS position information. If the MAGR declares its
The GPS/IMU mode provides reasonable navigation in output invalid to the MCS (FOM > 7), GPS/IMU mode will
non−maneuvering flight due primarily to the use of GPS be automatically deselected and the boxed GPS legend
position information. However, substantial errors will accrue (PB 13) on the OWN AC or NAV System Aid format will
during extended maneuvering flight. appear dashed. The navigation system will then operate in
Navigation State Vector position is derived directly the attitude−only IMU mode (see paragraph 20.3.2.4.2). If the
from GPS information. If SAHRS velocity is valid, it is used. MAGR recovers to FOM ≤7, GPS/IMU mode will be
If not, NSV velocity is derived by mixing GPS and other reselected automatically, provided that GPS was not
available system velocities, which could include JTIDS and deselected manually.
Air Data. Attitude and heading are derived from inertial 20.3.2.3.3 SAHRS Normal Mode
angles provided by the IMU.
The SAHRS Normal mode uses dynamic inputs sensed
The GPS/IMU mode is entered when INS and GPS are by the SAHRS in its normal mode, with the same function
selected on the OWN A/C and NAV System Aid format, the ality as INS mode. The Normal mode provides reasonable
SAHRS is unavailable, and the NAV MODE switch is placed short−term inertial navigation. NSV position, velocity,
to ATT, or to INS with only the IMU sub−mode available. attitude, and heading are updated directly by the SAHRS.
Availability of the IMU sub−mode of the INS is verified by However, because of the reduced sensitivity and precision
the display of IMU" in the center legend of the NAV System within the SAHRS, performance typically is between 2 and
Aid format, which depicts available sensors. Selection of this 10 nm per hour, depending upon the quality of the initial
mode is verified with the display of GPS/IMU" on the lower SAHRS alignment.
left of the HSD format.
The SAHRS Normal mode is entered when SAHR (PB
Note 12) is selected as the sole navigation aid source on the OWN
If the INS degrades to the IMU sub−mode, the A/C or NAV System Aid format (Figure 2016). An M" will
SAHRS will be selected automatically for be displayed adjacent to the SAHR legend if the selection is
navigation reference, if it is available. The IMU manual, indicating that automatic sensor selection is not
will be selected if the SAHRS is not available. available. Selection of this mode is verified with the display
of SAHRS" on the HSD format.
Figure 2016.Secondary Navigation Mode Manually Selected
20−33 ORIGINAL
20.3.2.4 Backup Navigation adjacent to the altitude display to alert the pilot that a backup
altitude source is selected.
20.3.2.4.1 GPS Mode
GPS mode provides minimal navigation information to to use GPS position information. If the MAGR declares its
the aircrew, all of which is derived directly from MAGR output invalid to the MCS (FOM >7), GPS mode will be
outputs and available external velocity reference sources. automatically selected and the boxed GPS legend (PB 13) on
True airspeed and altitude, as computed by the SCADC, are the OWN AC or NAV System Aid format will dash. All
sent continually to the MAGR to improve its dynamic navigation information except available air data will be lost.
response. Due to the absence of aircraft−sensed inertial data If the MAGR recovers to an FOM ≤ 7, GPS mode will be
to stabilize the MAGR, increased errors may be expected in reselected automatically, provided that GPS was not
maneuvering flight or if L−band jamming is encountered. deselected manually.
In GPS mode, NSV position is derived directly from 20.3.2.4.2 IMU Backup Mode
GPS information. The NSV velocities are derived by mixing
GPS and other valid velocities. Attitude data is not available Inertial Measurement Unit mode provides minimal
(except from the standby attitude indicators) and will not be safety−of−flight information to the aircrew but no inertial
displayed on the HUD or the VDI. Heading is computed by navigation capability. All navigation information is derived
the MCS using GPS north and east velocities, and will be in directly from the IMU outputs of the INS and from available
error due to the drift caused by wind. Wind speed and external velocity references.
direction may be entered manually via the DEU OWN A/C In the IMU mode, aircraft attitude is derived directly
format. from IMU inertial angles. Initial true heading is also
GPS mode is entered when GPS is selected as the sole calculated, but may not be accurate. Heading also will be in
navigation aid source on the OWN A/C or NAV System Aid error by drifts caused by winds. True heading, wind speed and
format. Selection of this mode is verified with the display of wind direction may be entered manually via the DEU OWN
GPS" on the HSD format. A/C format.
If SCADC air data is lost and the radar altimeter is The IMU mode is selected when INS is selected as the
invalid or turned off, GPS altitude will be displayed on the sole navigtion aid source on the OWN A/C and NAV System
HUD and VDI. This will be indicated by a G" acronym Aid format (Figure 2017), the SAHRS and MAGR are
Figure 2017.IMU Backup Navigation Mode Selection
ORIGINAL 20−34
unavailable or deselected, and either the NAV MODE switch In addition to automatic selection, SAHRS submode
is placed to ATT or to INS with only the IMU sub−mode of operation may be manually selected via the NAV SYSTEM
the INS available. Availability of the IMU sub−mode of the AID MFD format shown in Figure 20−18. This is done by first
INS is verified by the display of IMU" in the center legend selecting SAHRS by depressing the SAHRS pushbutton on
of the NAV System Aid format, which depicts available the upper right portion of the NAV SYSTEM AID MFD
sensors. format and verifying that SAHRS is boxed. A SAHRS
submode may be selected by depressing the SAHR MODE
If the INS degrades to the IMU sub−mode, SAHRS will pushtile on the lower left of the same MFD format until the
be selected automatically (if it is available). If SAHRS is not desired submode is boxed.
available, IMU will be selected. If the INS was selected
manually (i.e., an M adjacent to the INS legend), then
automatic sensor selection will not be available and IMU will
be selected even if SAHRS is available.
Selection of this mode is verified with the display of Do not attempt this on deck. A weight−on−wheels
IMU" on the lower left of the HSD format. interlock for the in−flight restart will freeze the
SAHRS in the restart mode until weight off
wheels. There will be no attitude information
available from the SAHRS when this situation
occurs
If ATT has been selected manually, the INS will Note
degrade from an inertial mode to an attitude Although it is possible to cycle through the SLV,
reference mode, and reversion to viable INS DG, EC submodes, reversion to NORM requires
function may be difficult or impossible unless an in−flight restart. In−flight restart will automati
GPS is available. A GPS−aided IFA (via prime cally be initiated when the selection pushbutton
INS/GPS mode) will produce results similar to is depressed to roll from EC to NORM or can be
alignments attainable on the ground. An IFA accomplished by depressing the in−flight RST
using other velocity sources will perform less pushbutton.
predictably.
Considerable degradation in accuracy from the
20.3.2.4.3 SAHRS Backup Mode primary and secondary and even the IMU backup modes can
be expected when the SLV and DG modes are selected. The
The SAHRS Backup mode provides minimal safety−
SAHRS EC submode will not provide navigation parameters
of−flight information to the aircrew, but no inertial navigation
to the system although some air data parameters will be
capability. All information is derived directly from angles
available.
provided by the SAHRS and available external velocity ref
erence sources. Selection of the slaved submode will result in magnetic
heading information derived from the magnetic azimuth
The SAHRS Backup mode operates in one of three detector (flux valve) and true heading computed from this
sub−modes, based on the heading reference source. These source plus magnetic variation. Attitude information is
sub−modes are selected via SAHR MODE on the NAV derived from SAHRS using first−order leveling and,
System Aid format. In order of desirability, they are: therefore, may be subject to certain dynamic errors.
SAHRS BACKUP SUB−MODES Selection of the DG submode will allow entry of a
desired grid heading via the DEU, using the DEU NAV
SLV (Slaved) Magnetic heading is sensed by the mag
netic azimuth detector (flux valve) and converted to AID−DG HDG format (Figure 20−18). This entered
true heading using computed or manually entered parameter will be the initial heading reference until a new
magnetic variation. Attitude is derived directly from DG heading entry is made. In the system, it is treated as a
SAHRS angles. magnetic−referenced parameter. Attitude information is
derived from the SAHRS using first−order leveling and, like
DG (Directional Gyro) Magnetic heading is entered the SLV mode, is subject to dynamic errors.
manually via the DG HDG selection on the DEU
NAV Aid format. Attitude is derived directly from The SAHRS EC sub−mode provides only magnetic
SAHRS angles. heading outputs using the magnetic azimuth detector as the
EC (Emergency Compass) Magnetic heading is input source. It is not a navigation mode, and only magnetic
sensed directly by the flux valve, without heading and certain air data parameters will be available
compensation. Attitude is not available. when it is selected.
20−35 ORIGINAL
Figure 2018.SAHRS Backup SLV and DG Modes (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−36
Figure 20−18.SAHRS Backup SLV and DG Modes (Sheet 2 of 2)
The SAHRS Backup mode is entered when SAHR is of the SAHRS to its normal mode. The data to which the
selected as the sole navigation aid source on the OWN A/C SAHRS is reinitialized is the current value of the navigation
or NAV System Aid format, with only the SAHRS backup system position and velocity.
sub−modes available. A degraded SAHRS is verified by the
selection of a SAHRS heading source other than NORM on It is also possible to perform an in−flight restart from
the NAV System Aid format. (Figure 20−18). Selection of this the SAHRS normal mode. This should be done only if serious
mode is verified with the display of SAHRS" on the lower SAHRS degradation is suspected.
left of the HSD format.
20.3.3 MAGR Initialization
20.3.2.4.4 SAHRS In−Flight Restart
Before the MAGR can be used for navigation, it must
If the SAHRS is operating in a degraded submode, it acquire signals from at least four satellites. To accelerate the
may be possible to revert to the normal mode of operation via signal acquisition, the MAGR uses stored almanac data. The
an in−flight restart. Prior to attempting an in−flight restart, the data is stored in non−volatile memory supported by the
selection of SYS as the SAHRS velocity reference is receiver’s internal batteries. If these batteries are removed or
recommended. In addition, aircraft position data should be are low, the MAGR requests almanac data from the MCS.
evaluated and a position update should be performed if large The MCS loads the almanac data from the MDL if it is
position errors exist. An in−flight restart may now be initiated available on the cartridge.
by selecting NORM as the SAHRS mode by depressing the
indicated pushbutton on the lower left portion of the NAV Note
SYS AID MFD format; or by depressing the RST pushbutton
If a valid almanac is not available; the MAGR
on the right center of the same MFD format (Figure 20−18).
will initiate a cold start, wherein the receiver
The subsequent boxing of the NORM legend in the SAHR
does a sky search for visible satellites. Search
MODE selector box on this format indicates a reinitialization
and acquisition can take over 20 minutes.
20−37 ORIGINAL
Note nearest 0.1 arc minute. Longitude entries on the DD

below 100_ do not require a 0 prior to entering the
GPS satellite acquisition time can be affected by numerals.
a number of conditions, particularly L−band RF
interference and line of sight obstructions, as 3. Verify parking brake is set.
well as the currency of the almanac data. On the
ground, aircraft proximity to large structures 4. Set NAV MODE switch to GND. The OWN A/C
such as a hangar or an aircraft carrier island may GRND format will be displayed on the MFD
delay or prevent satisfactory satellite acquisition (Figure 2022).
until the aircraft is moved.
5. Verify that SHDG is not boxed. If it is, press the
Besides almanac data, the MAGR requires an estimate SHDG pushbutton to unbox SHDG.
of current position, date, and time to speed acquisition. If any
of these quantities are in error, the speed of acquisition will Note
decrease. Generally, a position error of a few miles and a time
error of a few minutes will not degrade acquisition per Unboxing of SHDG must be performed within
ceptibly. The aircrew should verify that the correct data is 17 seconds of selecting GND ALIGN on the
available from the MCS by checking the OWN A/C MFD NAV MODE switch or the boxed SHDG will
format (for position) and GPS Status MFD format (for date be selected and unboxed by the system and
and time) during the GPS startup, and correct any significant deselection will not be available.
errors.
6. Verify latitude and longitude and enter correct
values if necessary. If new entries are required at this
20.3.4 INS and SAHRS Concurrent Alignment time, the alignment time may be extended, depend
ing on the differences between the newly entered
In all modes of concurrent alignment, both the INS and values and those displayed when alignment was ini
the SAHRS are aligned in the mode selected on the NAV tiated.
MODE switch (Figure 20−2). The system will always align
to WPT 1 unless manual entries are made. Normal operation 7. Alignment progress can be monitored by observing
of the MCS and MFD is required for any alignment. the QUAL and TIME acronyms and the alignment
scale on the MFD OWN A/C format. The indicator
20.3.4.1 Normal Concurrent Ground Alignment on the alignment progress scale changes from a V"
to a diamond symbol at the first tic mark. This
1. Select own−aircraft MFD format, (Figure 208 ) by represents an 8 nm per hour estimated navigation
depressing DATA" pushtile on the MFD MENU1 quality. The second tic mark represents an estimated
page (Figure 20−19). 2 nm per hour quality and the third an estimated 0.8
nm per hour quality. At this point a dot appears in the
2. Verify displayed latitude and longitude. If incorrect, diamond. An INS ALIGN COMPLETE message
enter correct coordinates via the DEU or DD. For normally appears at the top of the MFD display in
DEU data entry, the DEU OWN A/C page is 4 minutes. At this time the QUAL acronym is near
selected and the latitude and longitude coordinates or slightly below 1 nm per hour and the pointer on
may be entered to 0.01 arc minute using the LAT and the align scale should be near the last tic mark.
LONG pushtiles and the proper hemisphere numer
als (Figure 20−20). On the DEU, longitude entries 8. During concurrent alignment, it is advisable to
less than 100_ require a 0 be entered prior to the monitor the SAHRS alignment progress by pressing
value. For DD data entry the DD control panel is the SAHR pushbutton on the MFD. The OWN A/C
used with the NAV category selected using the MFK MFD format will show SAHR boxed; and the
pushtile (Figure 20−21). The OWN A/C acronym is QUAL and TIME acronyms and the align scale now
then boxed by depressing the corresponding push refer to the SAHR. A SAHRS ALIGN COMPLETE
tile and the coordinates are entered via the LAT, message normally appears in approximately 2.5 to
LONG, hemisphere, and numeric pushtiles shown 3 minutes from the time when the parking brake was
on the computer address panel on the lower left set. The QUAL will be approximately 10 (nm per
portion of the DD control panel. Latitude and longi hour) at this time.
tude coordinates may be entered via the DD to the
ORIGINAL 20−38
Figure 2019.MFD MENU1 and MENU2 Displays
20−39 ORIGINAL
Figure 2020.DEU Own−Aircraft Data Entry (Typical)
ORIGINAL 20−40
Figure 2021.DD/PTID Own−Aircraft Data Entry
20−41 ORIGINAL
Figure 2022.MFD Ground Alignment Formats
ORIGINAL 20−42
9. Alignment may be continued after the appearance Perform a reference alignment by following the normal
of the INS ALIGN COMPLETE message if time ground align procedure in paragraph 20.3.4.1. When the INS
permits. This will provide only slight improvement ALIGN COMPLETE message appears on the HUD and/or
in alignment quality but will provide some gyro VDI format, return the NAV MODE switch to OFF. The
biasing and eliminate unnecessary drift in the INS aircraft heading should now be stored in the INS and should
mode. If the parking brake is released during be available for the next alignment as long as the aircraft has
alignment, the INS and SAHRS will go to a not been moved.
SUSPEND ALIGN state as indicated by the
computer message on the OWN A/C MFD format. Note
Alignment will be resumed upon application of the Selecting the SAHR pushbutton on the
parking brake. The numerical alignment quality OWN A/C or NAV DATA MFD formats
displayed will never be lower than 0.50. Actual before the diamond reaches the second tic
INS/SAHRS drift rate is normally less than 0.50 nm mark will inhibit a subsequent stored heading
per hour. alignment.
10. The RIO may take the alignment anytime the QUAL 1. Repeat steps 1 through 4 for normal ground
reaches 1.0 nm per hour. The NAV MODE switch alignment.
should be rotated to the IFA position once IFA
AVAILABLE" is displayed. This places the 2. Verify that SHDG is boxed on the OWN A/C MFD
navigation system in the INS/GPS mode of format (Figure 2022). Do not depress the SHDG
operation. If GPS is available when the switch is in pushbutton.
the INS position, the GPS INTLKSEL IFA" 3. Repeat steps 6 through 9 as in normal ground align
message will post to remind the aircrew that a better procedure.
navigation mode exists.
20.3.4.3 GPS On−Deck IFA
11. If GPS is not available, INS performance may be
improved by performing the following procedure. This method of alignment normally takes 3 to 4
minutes longer than a normal ground alignment, but requires
a. Initiate a standard alignment. only that the NAV MODE switch be placed in IFA and a GPS
solution be available. It can be used ashore or aboard a CV.
b. Allow alignment to continue until an INS
The aircraft can be moved during a GPS IFA alignment, so
ALIGN COMPLETE message appears on the
taxi and take−off may take place while the alignment is under
MFD.
way. GPS satellite acquisition normally takes from 30 sec
c. Without changing the NAV MODE switch onds to 3 minutes, depending on the initial estimates of posi
position, taxi the aircraft to a convenient tion, date, and time; satellite position; and LOS
location, changing the heading by at least 70_, (line−of−sight) blockage by hangars, carrier island, etc.
with 180_ heading change being optimal.
To get an IFA Alignment on the ground, perform the
d. Reapply the parking brake and allow the INS to following steps:
continue alignment for a minimum of 1 minute 1. Place the NAV MODE switch in IFA at application
(7 to 8 minutes desired). of aircraft power (see Figure 2023).
Note 2. Verify correct date and time on the GPS Status page.
If satellites have been acquired, the OWN A/C data
The latitude and longitude of waypoint 1 will page will show own aircraft position based on GPS,
be updated to current aircraft position when if GPS is boxed.
the NAV MODE switch is placed to INS.
3. Monitor the GPS Status page to ensure satellites are
20.3.4.2 Stored Heading Concurrent INS/SAHRS acquired within a few minutes of moving the NAV
Alignment MODE switch out of the OFF position to IFA. IFA
alignment will not commence until satellites are
Stored heading alignment is performed when rapid acquired. If satellites are not acquired after a few
system reaction is operationally required. Under normal minutes, transition to a normal ground alignment
conditions, stored heading alignment can reduce ground (on the NAV Mode Switch, select OFF then GND).
align time by 1 minute. This procedure requires that a
previous reference alignment be performed and that the 4. When the QUAL gets to 1.0, the system will auto
aircraft remain stationary until the subsequent stored heading matically take the alignment and display the INS
alignment is completed. ALIGN COMPLETE message.
20−43 ORIGINAL
Figure 2023.GPS On−Deck IFA Alignment
ORIGINAL 20−44
Note procedure is used, after verifying proper operation of the

MCS and MFD.
D The pilot will not have a FPM (Flight Path
Marker) until a dot appears in the diamond. 1. Ensure SAHRS A, B, C, and DC circuit breakers
(1I3, 1I5, 1I6, 9I3) pulled prior to application of
D If GPS data is lost during alignment, the electrical power.
navigation system will align to waypoint 1.
Therefore, aircrew should always ensure 2. DATA LINK power switch ON.
waypoint 1 coincides with actual aircraft
location. 3. DATA LINK MODE switch CAINS/WPT.
D The NAV MODE switch must remain in the
4. Verify parking brake is set.
IFA position to remain in the primary
navigation mode, INS/GPS. This mode can
Note
also be obtained by conducting a normal
ground alignment, followed by moving the Application of SAHRS power prior to
NAV MODE switch from INS to IFA. GPS selecting CV ALIGN will not allow SAHRS
FOM ≤ 4 to be effective. to properly align.
D INS alignment to GPS data via the INS/GPS
mode is not always optimum from a cold start. 5. NAV MODE switch  CV ALIGN.
It may require up to 10 minutes (plus up to 2
6. Reset SAHRS cb’s.
minutes for MAGR initialization), compared
to only 4 or 5 minutes for a normal alignment. 7. Select OWN A/C MFD format by depressing DATA
If movement of the aircraft during alignment pushbutton on MFD MENU1 display. The CV SINS
is not anticipated, a normal concurrent ground DATA format will appear (Figure 2024).
or CV alignment followed by placing the
NAV MODE switch to INS momentarily, then 8. Verify that SHDG is not boxed. If it is, depress the
selecting IFA (In−Flight Alignment) may be SHDG pushbutton to unbox it.
more expeditious and will yield the same sys
tem accuracy. 9. Monitor the progress of alignment by observing the
QUAL and TIME acronyms and the align scale on
20.3.5 Concurrent Carrier Alignment the MFD OWN A/C format. The SINS (ship’s)
latitude, longitude, and INS north and east
Carrier alignment of the INS and the SAHRS requires velocities can also be evaluated on the MFD OWN
knowledge of the carrier motion and position. This A/C format. An INS ALIGN COMPLETE message
information is best provided by the SINS. A stored heading will normally occur in 7 minutes. At this time the
carrier alignment is also available using SINS inputs, after a align quality should be below 1 nm per hour.
reference alignment has been performed. For SINS stored
carrier alignment, the stored parameter is actually the Note
aircraft’s spotting angle on the carrier.
Do not select SAHR during CV ALIGN to
In the event that SINS data is unavailable, carrier check alignment progress. Wait until INS
alignment can take place by manual entry of ship’s position, alignment is complete and INS has been
speed, and heading. This procedure is called manual carrier selected on the NAV MODE switch before
align. Because of the entry of fixed parameters, its real values selecting SAHR.
may be changing and extended alignment time with lesser
alignment quality can be expected for manual carrier 10. SAHRS alignment progress may be monitored at
alignment. this time by selecting the NAV page.
20.3.5.1 Concurrent SINS RF or Cable Carrier Note

Alignment
D The SAHRS alignment process will initiate
Carrier alignment using SINS data from the ASW−27C after the INS determines a valid true heading
D/L can be implemented by either cable or RF transmission, (approximately at INS quality value of 5).
depending on whether the SINS cable from the deck−edge SAHRS quality value should reinitiate to
box to the nose wheelwell connector is plugged in. For either approximately 31.2 at that time.
mode of data transmission, the following alignment
20−45 ORIGINAL
Figure 2024.CV Alignment Formats SINS
ORIGINAL 20−46
Figure 2025.CV Alignment Formats Manual (Sheet 1 of 2)
D If power has been applied to the aircraft for an Note

extended period of time prior to INS CV align
Although SINS carrier alignment normally
being initiated, the SAHRS may complete a
requires no entry of data, if a SINS alignment
ground align (NORM) and a SAHRS
takes place at any carrier location other than the
complete message appears on the MFD. After
the INS CV align is initiated, the SAHRS will flight deck, then it is advisable to enter the
correct vertical lever arm via the DEU. This is the
initiate a concurrent CV align normally, but
height in feet of the aircraft INS above the
another SAHRS align complete message may
carrier’s SINS location. This entry can be made
not appear.
only via the DEU by calling up the DEU CV
ALIGN page and depressing the VLA pushtile
11. It is advisable to continue alignment after appear shown in Figure 2025.
ance of the INS ALIGN COMPLETE message if
time permits. When ready to take the alignment, the 20.3.5.2 Concurrent SINS Stored Heading
inertial navigation mode may be selected by setting Carrier Alignment
the NAV MODE switch to INS. The RIO may take
Carrier alignment time can be reduced by 1 minute by
the alignment anytime the QUAL reaches 1.0 nm
performing a stored heading carrier alignment. This
per hour. The NAV MODE switch should be rotated
procedure requires that a reference alignment be performed
to the IFA position once the IFA AVAILABLE"
using SINS data and that the aircraft’s position on the carrier
message appears. This places the navigation system
remain stationary until the completion of the subsequent
in the INS/GPS mode of operation.
stored alignment.
Perform a reference alignment by following the SINS
carrier align procedure in paragraph 20.3.5.1. When the INS
ALIGN COMPLETE message appears on the HUD/VDI
formats, return the NAV MODE switch to OFF.
20−47 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−25. CV Alignment Formats  Manual (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−48
Note entering the carrier latitude and longitude via

the DD LAT, LONG, quadrant and numeral
D Do not box SAHR on the DATA or NAV pushtiles, as shown in Figure 20−26. This is
formats during the reference alignment. This done in a similar manner as described in
will prevent the reference alignment and paragraph 20.3.4.1 and shown in Figure
SHDG will not be boxed when alignment is 20−21. Entry of carrier speed and heading via
initiated. the DD requires the boxing of the WIND acro
nym prior to using the DD SPD, HDG and
D Do not cycle the parking brake during the numeric pushtiles as shown in Figure 20−26.
reference alignment. This will prevent the
reference alignment and SHDG will not be 3. Repeat steps 9 through 11 for concurrent SINS
boxed when alignment is initiated. carrier align (paragraph 20.3.5.1).
1. Repeat steps 1 through 7 of concurrent SINS carrier Note
align.
In concurrent manual carrier align, the INS
2. Verify that SHDG is boxed on CV SINS DATA MFD ALIGN COMPLETE computer message may
format (Figure 2024). take 15 minutes or longer to appear. The
3. Repeat steps 9 and 10 of concurrent SINS carrier navigation quality at this time may not be
align. better than 3 nm per hour. Because of the
extensive alignment time, it may be necessary
20.3.5.3 Concurrent Manual Carrier Alignment to launch prior to the receipt of the INS
ALIGN COMPLETE computer message.
The INS and SAHRS will initiate ground alignments if
there is no SINS data. The CV MANUAL format will be 20.3.5.4 INS Standalone Alignment
displayed after the ship’s data is entered.
When the SAHRS is not available or has failed, the
1. Repeat steps 1 through 8 of concurrent SINS carrier alignment procedure for the INS is exactly the same as for
align. concurrent alignment described above in paragraph 20.3.4.
A SAHRS failure is indicated by the inability to box SAHRS
Note on the MFD OWN A/C and align formats as well as its
appearance in the failure history file and in the MFD OBC−
If the SINS or data link is not operating or if
NAV format as described in Chapter 27.
a manual carrier alignment is desired, skip
steps 2 and 3. 20.3.5.5 SAHRS Standalone Alignment
2. Enter best knowledge of ship’s latitude, longitude,
When the INS has failed or is not available or if a
speed, and heading via the DEU or DD. When the
DATA pushbutton on the MFD is depressed, the CV SAHRS alignment mode other than that of the INS is desired,
then a SAHRS standalone alignment can be selected from the
MANUAL DATA format, shown on Figure 2025
MFD SAHRS ALIGN format (Figure 20−27). This format
appears.
will appear by depressing the NAV pushbutton on the OWN
Note A/C MFD format. An INS failure is indicated by the inability
to box INS on the MFD align or OWN A/C formats as well
D If SINS is restored, MAN must be unboxed on as its appearance in the failure history file and in the MFD
the CV DATA format in order to return to a CV OBC−NAV format as described in Chapter 27.
RF alignment.
As shown in Figure 20−27, the possible SAHRS
D Entry of VLA is never required for manual standalone alignment modes include normal ground align
carrier alignment. (NORM), stored heading ground align (SHDG), magnetic
D When using the DEU, data entry is made via initiated ground align (MAG), and carrier align (CV). These
the DEU CV ALIGN format, using the LAT, are described below.
LONG, CSPD and CHDG pushtiles, and the
appropriate quadrant and numerals shown in 20.3.5.5.1 SAHRS Standalone Normal Ground
Figure 2025. Alignment
D Data entry using the DD requires selection of
SAHRS normal ground alignment is the recommended
the NAV category from the MFK pushtile and
mode for SAHRS standalone alignment and it will be
the boxing of the OWN A/C acronym prior to
20−49 ORIGINAL
Figure 2026.DD Align Data Entry
Figure 2027.SAHRS Standalone Align MFD Format
ORIGINAL 20−50
automatically selected as the default mode when the INS is 20.3.5.5.4 SAHRS Standalone Carrier Alignment
not available. This can be ascertained by selecting the
SAHRS ground align MFD format and observing that the The SAHRS standalone CV alignment mode is
NORM legend is boxed. Verification of own−aircraft latitude manually selected via the SAHRS ALIGN MFD format by
and longitude should be made by observing the values depressing the SAHR and then CV pushbutton shown in
displayed on the SAHRS ALIGN MFD format, and, if Figure 20−27. There are two SAHRS standalone align modes.
necessary, new values should be entered via the DEU or Which mode obtained depends on when CV is selected. If CV
DD control panel as described in Normal Concurrent Ground is selected prior to the INS determining true heading
Alignment procedures, paragraph 20.3.4.1. The SAHRS (approximately INS quality of 5) and initiating the SAHRS
ALIGN COMPLETE message will usually appear in less CV concurrent align, a SAHRS standalone align is
than 3 minutes, with an align quality of less than 10 nm commanded when the SAHRS has no heading information.
per hour.
Note
20.3.5.5.2 SAHRS Standalone Stored Heading
Ground Alignment Currently there is no indication on the MFD
displays that the SAHRS has gone into the
standalone mode except the SAHRS quality
The SAHRS stored heading align mode is always
value will remain 10.0, the timer will be 00,
available subsequent to a previous alignment to a SAHRS
SAHRS concurrent CV align will not initiate,
ALIGN COMPLETE. However unlike an INS stored
and there will be no attitude information
alignment, the SHDG pushbutton on the SAHRS ALIGN
available from the SAHRS for up to 6 minutes or
MFD format must be depressed to select this mode
more. Reinitiating the INS alignment will allow
(Figure 20−27). As for all stored heading alignments, no data
a concurrent alignment to occur.
entries are required and the aircraft must not be moved subse
quent to SAHRS power down. Since this alignment mode
The SAHRS has no true standalone carrier align mode
uses predetermined heading, the alignment process will be
like the INS. During concurrent INS/SAHRS carrier align
shortened. SAHRS stored heading alignment should
normally provide a SAHRS ALIGN COMPLETE message modes, the SAHRS depends on the INS to provide an initial
input of true heading. Since this is not available in SAHRS
in less than 1 minute. The navigation quality value at this
standalone carrier alignment, when the SAHRS CV push
time will exceed 10 nm per hour, and, if time permits,
button is depressed in SAHRS standalone operation, it is
additional alignment is recommended and will take place as
long as the parking brake is set. commanded to a DG mode. Once the parking brake is
released a DG heading can be entered via the DEU. When
the aircraft is airborne, the slaved mode can be selected or
20.3.5.5.3 SAHRS Standalone Magnetic Initiated if a system velocity source is present, in−flight restart can
Ground Alignment be selected to bring the SAHRS to a normal operational
mode. This is described in SAHRS Backup Modes,
The SAHRS magnetic initiated ground alignment paragraph 20.3.2.4.3.
mode is manually selected from the SAHRS ALIGN MFD
format by depressing the MAG pushbutton shown in If CV is selected after the INS has initiated the SAHRS
Figure 20−27. Verification of own−aircraft latitude and longi CV concurrent alignment, the SAHRS alignment proceeds
tude on the above MFD format should be made, and, if neces but is no longer receiving updated position and velocity
sary, correct values entered as described in SAHRS Standa information from the INS. The alignment will be consider
lone Normal Ground Alignment, paragraph 20.3.5.5.1. Since ably slower than concurrent alignment. The SAHRS is
this alignment mode uses system magnetic heading to initial commanded to NORM mode. An in−flight restart may or may
ize heading, the alignment process will be shortened. A not be required depending on the SAHRS alignment quality.
SAHRS ALIGN COMPLETE message should normally
occur within 1 minute, although the navigation quality value SAHRS cannot be commanded to a CV mode unless
at this time may exceed 10 nm per hour. If time permits, the INS is in CV. If the INS is unavailable, the SAHRS will
additional alignment is recommended and will take place as attempt a normal ground align.
long as the parking brake is set. In this mode of alignment,
magnetic heading inputs from the magnetic azimuth detector 20.3.5.5.5 NGS In−Flight MAD Align
(flux valve) are used for initializing the SAHRS heading. AN/USN−180(V)
It should be selected only in areas where no magnetic inter
ference or anomalies exist.
Whenever the Fluxgate Magnetometer is replaced, an
in−flight alignment must be performed. The procedure for an
in−flight alignment is as follows:
20−51 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
1. Prestart: c. 400 Knots
a. Have Ground Crew in Preflight Verify: NORM d. Maintain Constant Speed

INIT BIT/ALIGN SWITCH S1 ON NGS e. TWO FULL 360 degree turns
(SSA) PLACED IN UP POSITION (INIT BIT/
ALIGN)) f. Maneuver complete in 2 minutes
b. Pull SAHRS (NGS) C.B.’s (PHA, PHB, PHC, j. Maneuver Complete, Check SAHRS Light:
DC) (1) Flashes 3 seconds ON/3 seconds OFF. Cal
ibration Successful
c. NMS: OFF
(2) SAHRS Light Solid ON. Calibration NOT
d. Parking Brake: SET Successful
2. Post Start (After one or both engines are on line) Note

a. Reset SAHRS (NGS) C.B.s Another attempt can be made by cycling the
SAHRS mode out of EC TO NORM WITH
b. NMS GND SAHRS VEL REF: SYS BOXED. Repeat
(1) INS ALGN CMPLT Steps h−j.
(2) SAHR ALGN CMPLT k. MFD: NAV AID: SAHR MODE BOX NORM
c. NMS: INS (1) VERIFY: SAHR VEL REF: SYS BOXED

(2) SAHRS CAUTION LIGHT OUT
d. PB RELEASED
(1) MFD: NAV AID PAGE 3. Post Flight
(2) SAHR MODE: NORM BOXED a. Have ground crew set NORM INIT BIT/Align
switch S1 on NGS SSA in the down position
(3) SAHR VEL REF: SYS BOXED
NORM.
e. Take off Straight and Level Flight
20.3.6 Initially Entered Navigation Parameters
f. Airspeed CHECK (400 Knots)
Prior to takeoff; either during or after alignment, it may
g. Altimeter CHECK 10,000 ± 5,000 Feet be desirable to enter certain initial navigation−related
parameters, in addition to those noted above that are required
h. NAV SYSTEM AID PAGE for alignment. It may also be possible to enter some of these
(1) VERIFY: SAHR MODE: NORM BOXED parameters at any time during flight. They include the
following and are discussed below:
(2) SAHR VEL REF: SYS BOXED
1. Barometric setting
i. SAHRS MODE BOX EC
2. Waypoint data
(1) Verify SAHRS caution light flashes at a 2
second rate 1 sec on/1 sec off. 3. Wind speed and direction
Note 4. Magnetic variation.
SOLID SAHRS LIGHT OCCURS, NGS 20.3.6.1 Barometric Setting
TEST CANNOT BE RUN
(2) (MUST START WITHIN 15 SECONDS OF The barometric setting is normally made by the pilot
BOXING EC) using his 2−inch barometric altimeter setting knob. The
setting range is from 28.10 to 30.99 inches of Hg. This will
a. Perform ONE FIGURE EIGHT
provide system altitude corrections to within a maximum
Maneuver
error of 16 feet. When the setting is changed, the new setting
b. 70 Degree Bank will be displayed momentarily in the HUD beneath the
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 20−52
barometer (Figure 20−6). A small difference between the The waypoint type is selectable from the DEU WPT
HUD and instrument values may be expected. This will menu, TYPE pushtile. The waypoint number for which the
usually be less than 0.01 inch of Mercury but may on type is being set is displayed in the DEU input window at the
occasion be 0.02 inch. If any difference is present, adjust the top. When a selection is made, it appears in the input window
altimeter so that the correct value is displayed on the lower as a selection in progress until the ENT button is pressed to
right side of the HUD. Barometric settings may also be made accept the change. If TGT is selected for a flight plan
by the RIO via the DEU. To do this, the altimeter must be waypoint, any previously designated target waypoint within
locked out by turning the setting knob to the minimum value the same flight plan will be changed back to type GEN. To
(28.10 in Hg). The DEU OWN A/C page can now be used to remove a selection and enter another one, press CLR. RTN
enter the required value after depressing the BARO pushtile will abort the change and return to the WPT menu, and
and the proper numeric values. MENU will abort changes and return to the main menu.
20.3.6.2 Waypoint Data Entry In addition to the above primary waypoint parameters,
four other parameters relating to the reconnaissance steering
Up to 100 tactical waypoints can be stored in the MCS function may also be entered when the specified waypoint is
waypoint file at any time. These can be entered manually, or to be used as a reconnaissance target point. These parameters,
downloaded from the MDL in accordance with procedures however, can only be entered via the DEU using the DEU
listed in paragraph 20.3.7, Navigation Database. The primary WPT page. They are as follows:
parameters that may be entered for each tactical waypoint are
latitude, longitude, altitude and flight plan. These may be RECONNAISSANCE RANGE
entered manually via the DEU by selecting the DEU WPT STEERING PARAMETER
page (Figure 20−28) and depressing the desired waypoint
number prior to entering the coordinates. Verification of Command course 0 to 360_
360
correct entry can be made by examining the MFD WPT Mapp lines 1 to 99
DATA format, selectable by depressing WPTS (PB7) on the
Target
g lengthg 0 to 2048 nm
MFD OWN A/C format and shown in Figure 2029.
Map offset 131,072 feet
The DD control panel may also be used for entering

these parameters for waypoints 1 to 20. When the DD control
panel is used, on the main menu, press the WP 1−10 or WP During on−deck carrier operations, some waypoint data
11−20 pushtile and then box the desired waypoint. The can be automatically provided from the D/L if provisions on
coordinates are entered using the quadrant and numeric the carrier have been made. This is called waypoint insertion.
pushtiles on the lower left portion of the DD control panel, The D/L must be operating with the reply panel MODE
as indicated on Figure 20−30. switch in CAINS/WPT. The NAV MODE switch should be
in any position other than CV. For these conditions, the
The primary waypoint parameters and their ranges are latitude and longitude of up to the first 16 waypoints may be
as follows: received.
20.3.6.2.1 Zulu Time On Target

WPT PRIMARY RANGE
PARAMETER Zulu time on target (ZTOT) can be entered for the
Longitude E/W 180
180_ active TGT waypoint within flight plan. Selecting ZTOT
Latitude N/S 90_ switches to a numeric entry format which allows 6−digit
ZTOT. Entering ZTOT within a flight plan maintains that
Altitude −5000 to 99,996
, feet ZTOT for the route even if the target waypoint is changed.
Type TGT, TCN, SAM, GEN
20−52a (20−52b
20−52ablank) CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 20−52b
Figure 2028.Data Entry Unit Waypoint Pages (Typical)
20−53 ORIGINAL
Figure 2029.MFD Waypoint Data Format
Figure 2030.DD Waypoint Data Entry
ORIGINAL 20−54
20.3.6.3 Wind Speed and Direction Entered values of magnetic variation can be made
using either the DEU or the DD control panel. When the
Wind parameters are normally generated by the DEU is used (Figure 20−20), the MVAR pushtile on the
navigation system using air data and INS or SAHRS OWN A/C or CV ALGN format is selected and the value
velocities. When the navigation system cannot compute is entered to the nearest tenth degree, preceded by an E or W
wind because of unavailability of the required velocity for east or west, respectively. When the DD control panel is
inputs, it will accept manual entries of wind from the DEU used (Figure 2031), the NAV category is selected and the
or the DD control panel. Entry of wind can be made prior to MAG VAR pushtile is depressed. Entry is made via the
takeoff with no sensor failure since SCADC true airspeed is numerics on the computer address panel on the lower left
not set valid until it reaches approximately 60 knots. portion of the DD by first depressing the HDG pushtile,
followed by the appropriate E or W, and the value to the
Wind is entered with the DEU (Figure 20−20) by nearest tenth degree.
selecting the OWN A/C DEU format and depressing the
WSPD and WDIR pushtiles and then the proper numerics.
20.3.7 Navigation Database
Wind is entered with the DD control panel (Figure
The navigation database consists of MDL tactical
20−26) by selecting NAV and then boxing WIND and using
waypoints, MDL flight plan waypoints, MDL reversionary
the proper numeric pushtiles on the lower left portion of the
waypoints, flight plan routes, and target steering data. This
DD control panel.
data is stored on the MDL cartridge using a TAMPS station
(TAMPS version 6.1 or later) and is selectively loaded into
Note
the MCS. Controls are provided to the aircrew to display, edit
For both DEU and DD entries, wind direction is and assign steering functions to information in the navigation
the direction from which the wind is blowing. database.
20.3.6.4 Magnetic Variation All Waypoint Data is displayed by selecting the WPT
(Waypoint) Data format from the WPT (PB7) on the Own
MAG VAR is available from the navigation system Aircraft format. Multiple pages are available on this format,
from a prestored table in the MAGR using aircraft coordi each page containing ten waypoints. Pages 0 through 9
nates. This value, when displayed on the MFD OWN A/C display tactical waypoints 1 to 100. Pages 10 through 19
format, is labeled MV−G. It may also be computed using the show data for Flight Plan 1 (FP1), etc. From page 10 through
difference between system true heading and magnetic head 74, the pages that would display waypoints reserved for MCS
ing from magnetic azimuth detector (labeled MV−C). In addi use (Figure 20−32) between flight plans are omitted. For
tion to this, the navigation system will accept and use a manu example, the page jumps from 14 to 20, 24 to 30, and so on,
ally entered value of magnetic variation from either the DEU up to 74, jumps to 80. Then from 80 to 99 pages continuously,
or the DD control panel (labeled MV−E). If only SAHRS is providing access to MDL Waypoints 801 through 999. The
available, an MV−S will be displayed. page numbers scroll rapidly if the pushbutton is held
depressed over the left or right arrows.
Magnetic variation from the MAGR table is the default
value and will be automatically selected and displayed to the In other words, to find the waypoint you want, go to the
nearest tenth degree. This is the recommended value and, page equal to the waypoint number with only the hundreds
unless aircraft position is unknown, will usually be the most and tens place displayed (i.e., waypoint 9 = 009 = page 0;
accurate. waypoint 126 = page 12; waypoint 889 = page 88, etc). Figure
20−32 depicts the waypoint numbering scheme.
Selection of computed or entered magnetic variation is
made by depressing the boxed MV pushbutton on the lower
right side of the MFD OWN A/C format or the DD
(Figure 2031). When this is done the MV−G legend in the
center of the format will cycle to MV−C, to MV−E, and back
to MV−G, indicating the source and value of magnetic
variation used by the navigation system. If GPS is not avail
able and SAHRS is available, MV−S will be the default.
20−55 ORIGINAL
Figure 2031.Magnetic Variation Source Selection and DD Entry
ORIGINAL 20−56
20.3.7.1 MDL Tactical Waypoints Waypoints 2 to 16 and 21 to 100 are general waypoints
and are used as required by the mission. The data of these
The MDL can store up to 100 tactical waypoints, points are retained after use.
numbered 1 through 100. MDL tactical waypoints are
available for GPS and destination steering, and navigation 20.3.7.2 MDL Flight Plan Waypoints
waypoints may be displayed in the data buffers on the HSD
format. Each consists of a latitude, longitude, altitude, The MDL can store seven flight plans of up to 50
number, and type. waypoints each, numbered as 101 through 150 up to 701
through 750 in blocks of 50. The waypoint numbers in
Tactical waypoints are listed on the WPT Data format between (151 to 200, 251 to 300, etc.) are used internally by
in blocks of 10, on pages 0 through 9. Tactical waypoint data the MCS and MDL for preflight planned flight plan storage
may be changed manually via the Waypoint format of the and cannot be addressed directly.
DEU or via hooking and then depressing SET (PB 12) or
UPDT (PB 13) on the HSD format, and by transferring
waypoints from the flight plan or MDL waypoints formats.
Waypoint type may be modified manually via the Waypoint
Type format of the DEU (Figure 20−33). Available types on
the DEU for tactical waypoints are GEN (General), TAC
(TACAN), and SAM (Surface−to−Air Missile). Changes to D All seven flight plans must be loaded via
tactical waypoints in the MCS are recorded onto the MDL TAMPS with at least one waypoint. System
cartridge immediately, so depressing RLD (PB 2) on the instabilities will result when trying to access
Flight Plan format has no effect on tactical waypoints. a blank flight plan for the first time.
Waypoint types and associated symbols are shown in D When loading any MDL waypoints via
Figure 20−34. TAMPS, only uppercase alphanumerics
should be used for waypoint descriptions.
20.3.7.1.1 Waypoint Data File Use
D Potential exists for an MC crash if Flight Plan
In general the 100 tactical waypoints can be used in Data or Waypoint Data formats are displayed
any manner described in paragraph 20.3.9, Tactical while updating waypoints via the DEU.
Navigation, for destination steering or for the one−fix
updating functions. Usually, however, certain of these points Flight plan waypoints are treated as a sequence in order
are reserved for special functions. from the first waypoint in the flight plan to the last waypoint
defined, without any blank waypoints in between, up to a
Waypoint 1 is usually reserved for homebase coor maximum of 50 waypoints per flight plan.
dinates. Its data is retained after use.
Note
Waypoint 17 is used as a dynamic steering point when
a reconnaissance steering mode is selected using the MFD D Trying to add flight plan waypoints more than
RECON DATA format. At this time any previously stored one waypoint number beyond the last flight
data in waypoint 17 become invalid and must be reentered. plan waypoint using the DEU will put the
waypoint in the next consecutive flight plan
Waypoint 18 is used for the coordinates of an agreed location in consecutive order.
point for data−link one−fix position update. Its data are still
D Attempting to access a waypoint number that
valid after update usage.
is inaccessible (i.e., 151 to 200, 251 to 300,
etc.) for flight plan modification results
Waypoint 19 is used for the coordinates of the fighter display of a WAYPOINT INVALID message.
link reference point, as described in the Supplemental
NATOPS Flight Manual, NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A. Its data
Each MDL flight plan waypoint, consisting of an
are still valid after usage for FLRP." alphanumeric label, latitude, longitude, altitude, number,
and type, can be displayed on the waypoint data format. The
Waypoint 20 is usually reserved for the approximate waypoint type is assigned by default or from the preflight
location and altitude of a hostile area. Its data are retained planned type, but may be modified manually via the WPT
after use. TYPE format of the DEU. Only one flight plan waypoint per
flight plan may be designated a TGT type for the purposes of
target steering and navigation.
20−57 ORIGINAL
Figure 2032.Waypoint Numbering Scheme.
Figure 2033.DEU Waypoint Type Format.
ORIGINAL 20−58
20.3.8 Flight Plan Management
Preplanned flight plan information is available for

display and navigation when an MDL cartridge is present.
Only one flight plan may be active in the MCS at any given
time. Active flight plan waypoints are available for
destination, GPS, or auto−waypoint sequence steering.
Navigation information for flight plan waypoints may be
displayed in the data buffers on the HSD format. Flight plan
management consists of:
1. Accessing flight plan data on the MDL
2. Viewing flight plan contents
3. Activating a specific flight plan for use by the

navigation system
4. Editing the contents of any flight plan
5. Plotting waypoints in a flight plan as a flight plan

route
6. Specifying various parameters for the purpose of

flight plan route target steering
20.3.8.1 Flight Plan Data

Figure 2034.Waypoint Types and Associated Symbols.
Flight plan waypoints are numbered starting with the
flight plan number in the hundreds position and the position
in the flight plan as the next two numbers (i.e. 101 to 150, 201
20.3.7.3 MDL Reversionary Waypoints to 250, 301 to 350, ... 710 to 750). Flight plans are treated as
a continuous block of waypoints, so no blank (or erased)
The MDL can store up to 199 reversionary waypoints, waypoints are allowed in the middle of a flight plan. Blanks
numbered 801 through 999. Mission Data Loader will be closed up automatically.
reversionary waypoints are not available directly for display,
steering, or modification; but their data may be transferred Up to seven flight plans of 50 waypoints each are
into flight plan or tactical waypoints and thereafter stored on the MDL and can be preflight planned (using
manipulated. Since their data is not stored in the MCS and TAMPS 6.1 or later). Both an original and a modified copy
cannot be modified directly, depressing RLD (PB 2) on the are stored on the MDL. The original flight plan can never be
Flight Plan format has no effect on reversionary waypoints. used directly. It is only used if RLD (PB 2) on the flight plan
However, reversionary waypoint data may be transferred into format is selected to overwrite changes to the modified flight
flight plan waypoints through the ADD (PB 12) or RPLA plan. When a flight plan is viewed or made active, it is the
(PB 13) functions on the flight plan format, or tactical modified copy that is used. Any manual changes are recorded
waypoints through the XFER (PB 14) function and thereafter onto the modified copy on the MDL, which are retained for
manipulated. future use. The modified copies are retained across system
resets, between flights or with the removal of the MDL
Each MDL reversionary waypoint consists of an cartridge. However, depressing RLD (PB 2) on the Flight
alphanumeric label, latitude, longitude, attitude, and number Plan format reloads the original MDL flight plan into the
and can be displayed from the waypoint data format or by modified copy and into the MCS (if it is active), overwriting
selecting MDL WPT from the flight plan menu. The all manual changes permanently. The data in the original
waypoint type is assigned by default but may be modified via MDL flight plan may only be altered via a TAMPS station,
the Waypoint Type format of the DEU after the waypoint is which will automatically update the modified copy in the
transferred into the tactical or flight plan databases in the loading process.
MCS.
20−59 ORIGINAL
Figure 2035.MFD Flight Plan Format
20.3.8.2 Flight Plan Menu can be used in flight. The waypoints in the database are
selected using a TAMPS station during preflight planning,
The Flight Plan Format is illustrated in Figure 20−35. and can be either added to a flight plan or used to replace an
The menu buttons and their functions are described in the existing flight plan waypoint. They can also be transferred to
legend. The flight plan menu is selected via FLT PLAN a tactical waypoint.
(PB 2), on the HSD format or PB 9 on the Own Aircraft
format. This is the primary display of flight plan data, listing Movement through the four pages of MDL waypoints
waypoints in an individual flight plan by name or number. is done with the page left and right buttons on PB 9 and
NUM (PB 11) toggles the list between numeric and alpha PB 10. The current page is shown by the range of waypoint
numeric labels. The default format is alphanumeric (NUM numbers displayed in the title bar on the page (i.e. MDL
legend not boxed). This is the only MFD format that displays WPTS 801−850).
flight plan route and target steering selections, and provides
The aircrew can preview information in a given
flight plan editing controls. Detailed waypoint data is also
waypoint in the bottom left buffer on the page using the
displayed for selected waypoints during editing operations.
cursor box in a manner similar to that used to view flight plan
Only those waypoints in a flight plan that have been defined
waypoints. Or, the cursor can be positioned over a waypoint
will be displayed.
to transfer it to a tactical waypoint, in exactly the same way
20.3.8.2.1 MDL Reversionary Waypoint Menu used for a flight plan transfer.
The MDL Waypoint format is very similar to the Flight Two menu items on the MDL Waypoints format were
Plan format, and can only be reached from the Flight Plan carried over from the Flight Plan format, and do not function
format by selected MDL WPTS (PB 1) (Figure 20−36). in an intuitive manner. The RLD (PB 2) legend has no
Instead of displaying one of the seven flight plans, the MDL function on MDL waypoints since there is only one copy of
Waypoints format displays one of four pages of reversionary MDL waypoints on the MDL, and these cannot be modified.
waypoints from 801−999. The second item is the PLAN DATA pushtile (PB 7).
Selecting PLAN DATA will call up the PLAN DATA format,
These waypoints are stored on the MDL and cannot be but unboxing the legend while on that format always returns
edited or deleted. They are stored with waypoint names, like you to the Flight Plan format. It does not return you to the
the flight plans, and represent a navigation aid database that MDL WPTS format.
ORIGINAL 20−60
Figure 2036.MDL Reversionary Waypoint Format
20.3.8.2.2 Flight Plan Data Format of waypoints per flight plan. If there are no waypoints defined
in the number range for the page you are on for the selected
Selecting PLAN DATA from the flight plan format flight plan (e.g., FP 6, 641−650 undefined) the page will have
(or the MDL WPT format) takes you to the plan data format no waypoint information deployed. Successive selections of
(Figure 2037), which displays detailed information on 10 the PAGE button will toggle through the 5 pages, eventually
waypoints. The Own Aircraft Data format is displayed bringing you to the desired page.
between two columns of waypoint data, just like the WPT
DATA format. The difference is that it starts on the pages 20.3.8.3 Flight Plan Activation
corresponding to the flight plan that was displayed on the
flight plan format when PLAN DATA was boxed (even if it Flight plans are activated on the Flight Plan format.
was boxed on the MDL WPTS format). A flight plan is selected for activation via the increment−
decrement arrows adjacent to the PLAN legend (PB 9 and
Each flight plan has five pages corresponding to its PB 10). Depressing ACTIVE (PB 8) causes the selected flight
fifty waypoints, whether they are defined or not. There is no plan to be loaded into the MCS and made available to the
direct indication of which page within a flight plan you are navigation system. Activation of a flight plan is verified by
on, other than the waypoint numbers of displayed waypoints, a box around the ACTIVE legend when that flight plan
if there are any defined in the number range for the page you number is displayed under the PLAN legend. A flight plan is
are on. There may be blank pages. deactivated by activating a different flight plan, or by
unboxing ACTIVE. The latter will result in no flight plan
A particular flight plan is selected with the left and being active in the MCS. An active flight plan is retained in
right arrows on PB 9 and PB 10, similar to the flight plan the MCS across a system reset. The default at system power
format. The PAGE button (PB 8) pages between the 5 pages up is no active flight plan.
20−61 ORIGINAL
Figure 2037.Flight Plan Data Format
Upon selection of an MDL flight plan for activation, transfer buffers display the waypoint name, number, latitude,
the MCS checks the number of waypoints listed in the flight longitude, and altitude.
plan. If the number exceeds 50, or the number is negative, the
MCS commands an MFD1 and MFD3 computer message A rectangular box is displayed over the currently
INVALID MDL FORMAT" and returns without further selected waypoint on each flight plan page. This box is called
processing of the discrepant flight plan or flight plan the flight plan cursor, and can be controlled through either the
waypoints. cursor right (→) and cursor down (↓) arrows on PB 5 and
PB 4, respectively, or with the SHC (Sensor Hand Control)
The format consists of a list of the waypoints defined cursor or TDC (Throttle Designator Controller).
in the flight plan, in columns of 10, starting in the upper left
of the list display with the first waypoint in the flight plan. The flight plan menu provides the means to change
The 11th waypoint in the flight plan will be displayed in the flight plan pages, reload the original flight plan over the
first position in the next column and so on. The flight plan modified version, or go to the MDL Waypoints format. It also
waypoints are displayed by default by their name (if no name provides a way to move the flight plan cursor box, display
is defined, the waypoint number is displayed instead). A flight plan waypoint data, activate a flight plan, page through
NUM button is available to toggle between waypoint names the 7 flight plan pages, and add, replace, transfer, or delete
and numbers. waypoints from a flight plan.
Flight plans are displayed one at a time as separate 20.3.8.4 Flight Plan Editing
pages. Depression of left or page right buttons (PB 9 and 10)
allow switching between pages. The current flight plan page Waypoints may be added, replaced, transferred or
is displayed between the left and right arrows, as well as on deleted within a flight plan via the Flight Plan format and its
the title bar above the waypoint list. various sub−formats. The Flight Plan format may be selected
on more than one MFD, and up to three separate flight plans
At the bottom of the display are two waypoint transfer (one per MFD) may be edited at any time. If the same flight
buffers that display the currently selected waypoint on the plan is selected simultaneously on more than one MFD, then
left at all times, and the on the right when in edit modes. The any edit operation on one MFD will lock out all edit
ORIGINAL 20−62
commands on the remaining MFDs until the edit operation is To add a waypoint to a flight plan, perform the
completed or canceled. Once an edit operation is completed following steps:
or canceled, the MFD automatically returns to the Flight Plan
format. Exiting an edit operation by any other means, such 1. Select FLT PLAN format (PB 2 on HSD).
as selecting HSD (PB 15), will suspend that edit operation
and that flight plan will be locked out for editing on any other 2. Position the flight plan cursor box where you are
MFD. inserting a waypoint (following waypoints will be
scrolled down) using either the MFD bullseye
Notes cursor, or the right/down arrows (PB 4/5).
3. Press ADD (PB12).

D Editing Flight Plan Waypoints via the DEU
will not be possible if the Waypoint Data 4. Enter the waypoint you wish to insert (leading zeros
page format (Figure 20−29) or Flight Plan are required, e.g., 004, 021, 053, etc.).
Data format (Figure 20−35) is displayed on
any MFD. 5. Check the waypoint information that appears in
bottom right buffer to ensure that this is the desired
D Manually−entered waypoints are specified
waypoint. If you entered a waypoint number that is
with 3 digits. Specification of waypoints
undefined, a WPT INVALID message is displayed.
1 through 99 require leading zeroes (e.g.,
0−0− 4, vice 4).
Select ENTER (PB 8) to accept, CANC (PB 9) to abort
D The cursor box may be positioned over any the addition operation, or BKSP (PB 7) to modify the entered
waypoint of interest or the first empty waypoint number.
waypoint on the Flight Plan format either
sequentially via the down (↓) and right (→) The process for waypoint addition is demonstrated in
cursor arrows (PB 4 and PB 5) or non− Figure 20−38.
sequentially via the manual cursor (TDC or
SHC). 20.3.8.4.2 Waypoint Replacement
(Flight Plan Replace Mode)
20.3.8.4.1 Waypoint Addition
(Flight Plan Add Mode) A tactical, flight plan, or reversionary waypoint may
be substituted anywhere in a flight plan. The technique is
A tactical, flight plan, or reversionary waypoint may be identical to that of adding a waypoint, except RPLA (PB 13)
inserted anywhere in a flight plan except past the end of a is depressed (see paragraph 20.3.8.4.1). The only distinction
flight plan. There are no embedded blanks. The cursor box is of the Replace Waypoint format is that the flight plan
placed over the desired entry point. When ADD (PB 12) is waypoints are not shifted down from the selected entry point,
depressed, the Add Waypoint format is selected (Figure and the left buffer will display the waypoint information for
20−38). All waypoints in the flight plan are shifted down one the waypoint that will be overwritten. The original data in
location in order, and a blank waypoint is added at the cursor. the selected entry waypoint is lost when replacement is
The waypoint to be added is specified by a 3−digit numeric completed.
label. A numeric entry format is displayed and BKSP (PB 7)
is provided to erase individual keystrokes. To replace a waypoint in a flight plan with another
waypoint, perform the following steps:
The insertion waypoint number is displayed in the left
buffer at the bottom of the Add Waypoint format. Once a 1. Select the FLT PLAN format (PB 2 on HSD).
valid waypoint number has been entered, data associated
with the waypoint to be added is also displayed in the right 2. Position the flight plan cursor box over the waypoint
buffer. Depress ENTER (PB 8) to insert the specified you are replacing, using either the MFD bullseye
waypoint into the flight plan. If all 50 waypoints in the flight cursor or the right/down arrows (PB 4/5).
plan were previously defined, the last waypoint will be lost
once ENTER is depressed. Depressing CANC (PB 9) cancels 3. Press RPLA (PB 13).
the addition operation, and no waypoint data will be lost.
4. Enter the waypoint that will replace the highlighted
waypoint (leading zeros are required, e.g., 004, 021,
053, etc.).
20−63 ORIGINAL
Figure 2038.Flight Plan Format Waypoint Add Page (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−64
Figure 20−38. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Add Page (Sheet 2 of 2)
20−65 ORIGINAL
5. Check the waypoint information that appears in waypoint you want to overwrite with the waypoint
bottom right buffer to ensure that this is the information in the left buffer. If you entered a
waypoint desired. If you entered a waypoint number waypoint number that is undefined, a WPT
that is undefined, a WPT INVALID message is INVALID message will be displayed.
displayed.
6. Select ENTER (PB 8) to accept, or CANC (PB 9) to
6. Select ENTER (PB 8) to accept, CANC (PB 9) to abort the addition operation.
abort the addition operation, or BKSP (PB 7) to
modify the entered waypoint number. The process for transferring tactical waypoints is
demonstrated in Figure 20−40 and Figure 20−41.
The process for waypoint replacement is demonstrated
in Figure 20−38. To transfer an MDL waypoint to a tactical waypoint,
perform the following steps:
20.3.8.4.3 Waypoint Transfer
(Flight Plan Transfer Mode) 1. Select the MDL Waypoints format (PB 1 on FLT
PLAN format).
A flight plan or reversionary waypoint may be
transferred into a tactical waypoint. The cursor box is 2. Position the MDL WPT cursor box over the
positioned over the flight plan or reversionary waypoint to be waypoint to be transferred using either the MFD
transferred. When XFER (PB 14) is depressed, the Transfer bull’s eye cursor, or the right/down arrows (PB 4/5).
Waypoint format is selected. Increment (PB 12) and The cursor position can be changed anytime during
Decrement (PB 13) controls are provided to select a tactical the transfer operation.
waypoint destination, which is displayed adjacent to these
controls. At the bottom of the Transfer Waypoint format, the 3. Press XFER (PB 14)
selected transfer waypoint is displayed by number with its
4. Scroll the waypoint number to the tactical waypoint
data in the left transfer buffer. The destination tactical
number into which the MDL waypoint will be
waypoint data is also displayed in the right transfer buffer,
transferred using the increment/decrement arrows
and updated as the tactical waypoint number is scrolled using
(PB 13/14). The existing content of the selected
the increment and decrement pushbuttons. Depressing
waypoint will be shown in the bottom right buffer.
ENTER (PB 8) completes the transfer. The existing tactical
waypoint is overwritten with the waypoint information of the 5. Check the waypoint information that appears in the
selected flight plan. Depressing CANC (PB 9) cancels the bottom right buffer to ensure that this is the
transfer operation. Flight plan and reversionary waypoints waypoint that will be overwritten. If an undefined
are never affected by the transfer operation. waypoint is entered, a WPT INVALID message will
appear.
To transfer a flight plan or reversionary waypoint into
a tactical waypoint, perform the following steps: 6. Select ENTER (PB 8) to accept, or CANC (PB 9) to
abort the transfer operation.
1. Select the FLT PLAN or reversionary format (PB 2
on HSD). The process for transferring an MDL waypoint is
2. Position the flight plan cursor box over the waypoint illustrated in Figure 20−41.
you are transferring using either the MFD bullseye
cursor, or the right/down arrows (PB 4/5). You can 20.3.8.4.4 Waypoint Deletion
change the cursor position at any time during the (Flight Plan Delete Mode)
transfer operation.
To delete a flight plan waypoint, the cursor box is posi
3. Press XFER (PB 14). tioned over the flight plan waypoint to be deleted. Depressing
DEL (PB 15) selects the Delete Waypoint format, which
4. Scroll the waypoint number to the tactical waypoint
blanks the selected waypoint. All subsequent waypoints
number you would like to transfer into on the
selected using the cursor are also blanked. At the bottom of
increment/decrement arrows on PB 12/13. The
the Delete Waypoint format, data is displayed for both blank
existing content of the selected waypoint will be
and non−blank waypoints selected via the cursor box.
shown in the bottom right buffer.
Depressing ALL (PB 1) will blank all waypoints in the flight
5. Check the waypoint information that appears in plan.
bottom right buffer to ensure that this is the
ORIGINAL 20−66
Figure 2039.Flight Plan Format Waypoint Replacement Page (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−67 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−39. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Replacement Page (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−68
Figure 2040.Flight Plan Format Waypoint Transfer Page (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−69 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−40.Flight Plan Format Waypoint Transfer Page (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−70
Figure 2041.MDL Reversionary Waypoint Format MDL Waypoint Transfer
20−71 ORIGINAL
Depressing ENTER (PB 8) deletes all blanked Routes are saved with the flight plan modified copies
waypoints. Depressing CANC (PB 9) cancels the delete on the MDL cartridge, so that they are retained across system
operation and no waypoint data is lost. resets, between flights, and with the removal of the MDL
cartridge.
To delete a waypoint, or several waypoints from a
flight plan, perform the following steps: 20.3.9 Tactical Navigation
1. Select the FLT PLAN format (PB 2 on HSD). The following paragraphs describe the procedures to
be used for tactical navigation. This includes a description of
2. Position the flight plan cursor box over a waypoint
various navigation information, display steering modes,
to be deleted using either the MFD bull’s eye cursor,
autopilot steering, all−weather landing, position updating,
or the right/down arrows (PB 4/5).
continuous position updating, and surface waypoint
3. Press DEL (PB 15). determination position.
4. The waypoint under the cursor will blank. The 20.3.9.1 Range, Bearing, and Time To Go to
cursor can be moved with either the HSD bull’s eye Waypoints and TACAN Stations
cursor or the right/down arrows (PB 4/5), and every
waypoint over which the cursor moves will blank. Range and bearing, and various time remaining
readouts available to any valid waypoint or TACAN station.
Note Paragraph 20.2.1 describes most of this information. In
addition, a number of specialized readouts and displays are
The waypoints are not actually deleted until provided, and are described below.
ENTER is selected.
5. Press DEL ALL if the entire flight plan is to be 20.3.9.1.1 HSD Commanded Ground Speed
emptied.
At times Commanded Ground Speed (CGS) replaces
6. Select ENTER (PB 8) to accept, or CANC (PB 9) to TAS at the top of the HSD (Figure 20−9). This occurs if the
abort the operation. steer point is a route waypoint, the steering mode is DEST or
AUTO, a target has been entered for the active flight plan,
The process for deleting a waypoint is illustrated in and a ZTOT has been entered for that target on the DEU. The
Figure 20−42. value is computed by the mission computer and represents
the ground speed required to achieve the ZTOT (Zulu Time
20.3.8.5 Flight Plan Routes On Target) by following the route.
Any or all waypoints in a flight plan may be linked If a CGS has been entered for the target using the DEU,
together into a flight plan route. Only one route may be the computed CGS is based on flying at the entered CGS from
specified in each flight plan. Flight plan routes are presented the route waypoint prior to the target. For example, assume
on the HSD format as a series of flight plan waypoints linked that a CGS of 500 was entered for the target, waypoint 105.
by plotlines if PLOT (PB 14) is selected on the HSD format If waypoints 101 to 104 are all route waypoints, then the
(see paragraph 20.3.9, Tactical Navigation). computed CGS enroute between waypoints 101 and 104
would be the ground speed required to fly from 104 to 105 at
Routes are specified on the Flight Plan format. The 500, and achieve the entered ZTOT. If ground speed matches
cursor box is positioned over a flight plan waypoint. CGS on the HSD, then the ETA on the HSD should match the
Depressing PLOT (PB 3) brightens the selected waypoint, ZTOT for the TGT.
indicating that it has been included in the flight plan route.
The PLOT legend is also boxed, indicating that any other 20.3.9.1.2 HSD Steering Aids
waypoint that is subsequently selected using the cursor will
also be included in the route, until PLOT is unboxed. The following paragraphs define some of the HSD
Waypoints selected as part of the flight plan route are format steering aids: Course Line Functionality, TACAN
displayed brightened on the Flight Plan format. If the cursor Needle Display, Waypoints and Plotlines, CDI (Course Devi
box is placed over a flight plan waypoint that is part of the ation Indicator) Functionality, and Cross Track Error Indica
route, PLOT will not box. In order to deselect that waypoint tion. Figure 20−9 lists some of the display items relevant to
as part of the route, PLOT must be depressed twice, once to these steering aids.
box the menu item, and a second time to deselect the point
as part of the route.
ORIGINAL 20−72
Figure 2042.Flight Plan Format Waypoint Delete Page (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−73 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−42. Flight Plan Format Waypoint Delete Page (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−74
20.3.9.1.2.1 HSD Course Line Functionality As with TACAN CDI, the scaling of the CDI offset dots
is based on gear up/gear down status. With the gear up, the
The course line on the HSD is drawn through the two dots on each side represent 2 and 4 nm offsets from the
current steer point or TACAN station and rotates with the selected course. With the gear down, they represent 0.5 and
selected course (CRS knob) while in GPS or TCN steering 1 nm offsets.
(Figure 20−45).
Note
20.3.9.1.2.2 HSD TACAN Needle Display GPS CDI is a fixed horizontal deviation where
the TACAN CDI deviation is an angular offset
The HSD TACAN needle is displayed as a cross− that corresponds to greater horizontal deviation
hatched head and tail pointer on the inside of the compass at greater range. The TACAN CDI actually gives
rose. In all steering modes, except GPS, it is displayed if valid finer resolution steering cues than the GPS CDI;
TACAN bearing is available and the head of the needle and the GPS CDI gives better accuracy at range.
always points to the station. In GPS steering modes, the At very short ranges from the waypoint or station
TACAN needle points to the selected steer point as if it were (i.e., less than 0.5 miles), the TACAN gives you
a TACAN station. more accurate cues and is more sensitive to small
deviations. The GPS is much more stable and is
20.3.9.1.2.3 HSD Waypoints and Plotlines not subject to swings" due to poor reception.
Waypoints and plotlines are displayed on the HSD. 20.3.9.1.2.5 HSD Cross Track Error Indication
Plotlines connect waypoints that are defined as route
waypoints (assuming more than one) within a flight plan. Cross Track Error is the perpendicular horizontal
deviation from a selected course to a waypoint (in GPS
There is a display limit of 32 plotlines and 30 steering) or from the route centerline (in DEST or AUTO
waypoints on the HSD. The current steer point will always be steering). Cross Track Error is displayed with accuracy to
displayed, along with the next closest 29 waypoints in range tenths of a nm. If the following conditions are met, Cross
to the aircraft. Plotlines are displayed independent of Track Error is displayed on the HSD just above the compass
waypoints. If a plotline does not appear to go to a waypoint, rose to the right:
it may be that the waypoint is not one of the closest 30.
D GPS, DEST, or AUTO steering
There is a capability in TAMPS to create a tactical D Current steer point is part of route beyond first
waypoint on the MDL with a blank" type associated with it. route waypoint for DEST and AUTO.
This allows the use of plotlines to box out operating areas
without having displayed waypoints at every point defining 20.3.9.2 Display Steering Modes
that area cluttering the display. However, these blank
waypoints count as part of the displayed" 30. Several steering modes, optimized for specific
missions and phases of flight, are available to the aircrew.
A route waypoint is one which is part of an active flight These steering modes, with their associated controls and
plan, and which has been brightened on the flight plan format displays, are summarized in Figure 20−43. Steering modes
with the PLOT" button. It will be displayed with a plotline may be selected by cycling through modes using STR (PB 9)
through it on the HSD if PLOT is boxed on the HSD. on the HSD format, or by making individual selections from
the menu presented on the VDI format. Although partial
The steer point is the waypoint that is currently selected steering cues may be presented on the HUD A/A and A/G
for waypoint steering in DEST, AUTO, or GPS steering formats, complete steering cues are always presented on the
modes. Its number is displayed next to the steering mode in TLN format.
the lower right of the HSD.
In most modes, the aircrew selects the navigation
20.3.9.1.2.4 HSD CDI Functionality steering waypoint manually via the HSD format, by the
following method:
When the steering mode is GPS and CDI (PB 14) is
boxed, the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) is displayed in 1. Depress the decrement (PB 4) or increment (PB 5)
place of the course line. The differences between this and the arrows until the desired waypoint is displayed
TACAN CDI are that the reference point is the selected steer between them. Navigation data for each waypoint is
point and the scaling is based on a horizontal distance from displayed in the boxed (left or right) data buffer as
the centerline of the selected course to that waypoint. it is selected.
20−75 ORIGINAL
SELECTION HSD RIGHT

STEERING SOURCE BUFFER DISPLAY
MODE AVAILABLE STEERING CUES AND CLOCKS
(LABEL) HSD VDI WPT TCN (HUD/VDI/HSD)
Destination X X X Command heading markers
(DEST) Destination bearing pointer (Course Line)
Destination bearing marker1
WPT range readout
Time−to−go to waypoint readout
Cross−track error if route waypoint selected
TACAN station bearing pointer (To and From)2
TACAN ((TACAN)) X X Course deviation markers
Course deviation indicator
Selected course line (through station)
TACAN range readout
Time−to−go to station readout
GPS Pseudo− X X Command heading markers
TACAN (GPS) Course deviation markers
Selected course line (through steer point)
GPS range readout
Cross−track error from course line readout
Auto−Waypoint
yp X X Command heading markers
S i 3
Sequencing Destination bearing pointer (Course Line)
(AUTO)
WPT range readout
Cross−track error from route line readout
Commanded X X Command heading markers
G
Ground
dS d3
Speed Destination bearing pointer (Course Line)
(AUTO)
WPT range readout
Time−to−target readout
Commanded ground speed readout
Ground speed error caret
Cross−track error from route line readout
NOTES: 1. Displayed in all steering modes if a valid destination steer point is entered in the MCS
2. Displayed in all steering modes if a valid TACAN signal is being received.
3. Automatically changes to DEST steering inbound to the target waypoint or once the last
waypoint on the flight plan route is overflown.
Figure 2043.Steering Mode Summary
ORIGINAL 20−76
2. Select ENT (PB 15) to make the displayed waypoint 20.3.9.2.2 TACAN Steering
the navigation steer−point. The waypoint number
will be displayed in the lower right corner of the In the TACAN steering mode (Figure 20−45), the pilot
HSD format along with the current steering mode. may steer to a selected TACAN radial using the various
course deviation displays on the HUD and MFD. The
In other modes, the navigation steer−point may be TACAN deviation is the angular difference between the bear
selected automatically by the MCS or is calculated from ing to the TACAN station (TACAN radial) and the command
encoded digital data link or analog RF signals, such as data course (TACAN course) selected by the pilot on the course/
link or TACAN. heading control panel.
Internal navigation calculations are computed using To enter the TACAN steering mode, the pilot depresses
the NAV State Vector, which is updated with INS, SAHRS the TCN pushbutton on the MFD VDI display format or
and/or GPS information, and is updated if any one of these selects TACAN by the STR pushbutton. After selection of a
constituent sources is valid. TACAN course, the TACAN deviation symbols are
displayed on the HUD, MFD VDI TACAN, and two possible
20.3.9.2.1 Destination Steering HSD TACAN formats. On the HSD TACAN format, the CDI
display mode may be selected by depressing the CDI
In the destination steering mode, the pilot maintains pushbutton. With CDI selected, the TACAN deviation is dis
a great circle route from the aircraft present position to a played in the form of a deviation bar whose offset is scaled
designated waypoint by steering to the command heading along a row of deviation tics. The arrowhead on the bar is
marker on the HUD and VDI. changed on the displays to indicate whether the TACAN
course is toward or away from the TACAN station. If the
The pilot selects the destination waypoint for steering TACAN deviation is less than 90°, a to" indication is shown
by depressing the up or down arrow pushbuttons on the HSD and, if greater than 90°, a from" indication. The TACAN
basic format and then pressing the ENTER push−button. This deviation bars on the HUD, MFD VDI TACAN display
results in the HSD format in Figure 20−44. The mission format and MFD HSD TACAN display format are solid bars
computer calculates range, bearing, and time to go from the when going to and dashed bars when coming from. The
aircraft position. This data is shown in the upper left data separation between deviation tics is 4°.
block on the HSD format. The destination display steering
mode may then be initiated by depressing the DEST If the CDI display is not selected, then the second HSD
pushbutton on the MFD VDI display format or by selecting format in Figure 20−45 is displayed. On this format the
DEST from the STR pushbutton on the HSD. The mission TACAN radial is still displayed passing through the aircraft
computer then calculates the command great circle course to symbol but instead of the deviation indication, the command
the selected waypoint and the command heading to fly to course pointer is shown passing through the station symbol.
make it good by considering drift angle.
TACAN steering provides course, bearing, range and
DEST steering provides bearing, range and time time information for navigation to a TACAN station either
information for navigation direct to or from a waypoint. All direct or along a specified course. Bearing and range to
navigation parameters are computed internally from inertial station are decoded from external analog RF TACAN signals.
coordinates (see Figure 20−44). TACAN steering requires an operative JTIDS receiver with
TACAN.
The command heading markers in the HUD heading
scale and along the HSD format compass rose provide a Note
wind−corrected heading cue direct to the destination
waypoint via Great Circle route. The HSD course line and Digital TACAN information is only available in
destination bearing marker provide non−wind−corrected the upper right HSD buffer while steering mode
bearing to the destination waypoint. The selected heading is TACAN or BLANK. The TACAN station bear
and course functions (HSEL [Heading Selected] and CSEL ing pointer and symbol are available in all steer
[Course Selected]) are not operable. The HSD left and right ing modes except GPS pseudo−TACAN.
hand data buffers display waypoint information.
20.3.9.2.3 GPS Steering (Pseudo−TACAN)
Note
GPS steering provides pseudo−TACAN" course,
The destination bearing marker on the HSD bearing, range and time information for navigation to a
format is displayed in all steering modes, waypoint either direct or along a specified course. The GPS
including steering off, if a valid destination steering emulates TACAN steering using precise GPS
waypoint is entered as the destination steer point. position information and requires an operative MAGR .
20−77 ORIGINAL
Figure 2044.Destination Steering Displays (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−78
Figure 20−44. Destination Steering Displays (Sheet 2 of 2)
Steering cues are similar to those in TACAN steering. AUTO steering is replaced with DEST steering
However, on the HUD and the VDI format the course automatically when any of the following conditions occur:
deviation marker scale is such that each dot represents a
2 nm deviation for a maximum deflection of 4 nm with the 1. The navigation steerpoint steps to the Target
landing gear handle up, and 0.5 nm deviation for a maximum waypoint
deflection of 1 nm with the landing gear handle down. 2. A waypoint not on the flight plan route is selected
Additionally, a cross−track error digital readout is displayed as the navigation steerpoint
on the HSD format, which provides actual lateral deviation
from the selected course line. The HSD left and right hand 3. The final waypoint on the flight plan route is
data buffers display waypoint information. Typical GPS reached
steering formats are illustrated in Figure 20−46.
4. The flight plan is deactivated or changed
20.3.9.2.4 Automatic Waypoint Sequence AUTO steering may be reselected once any other
Steering waypoint on the route is selected as the steerpoint. Cues for
AUTO steering are similar to those for DEST steering
(see paragraph 2 ). Additionally, a cross−track error digital
AUTO steering provides the functionality of DEST
readout on the HSD format provides actual lateral deviation
steering, with the additional MCS feature of automatic from the centerline of the current route leg. The HSD left and
stepping to successive waypoints along a fight plan route.
right hand data buffers display waypoint information. The
AUTO steering is only available with an active flight plan
changeover point for automatic waypoint sequencing and
route, and may be selected only if the current destination
typical AUTO steering displays are illustrated in
waypoint is included on that route but is not the designated
Figure20−47.
Target waypoint or the last waypoint in the selected
sequence. All navigation parameters are computed internally Automatic sequencing occurs when the current
from inertial coordinates. AUTO steering point is passed (90º or greater off the nose)
within 5nm.
20−79 ORIGINAL
Figure 2045.TACAN Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−80
Figure 20−45. TACAN Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
20−81 ORIGINAL
Figure 2046.Typical GPS Steering Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−82
Figure 20−46. Typical GPS Steering Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
20−83 ORIGINAL
Figure 2047.Auto Waypoint Steering Displays (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−84
Figure 20−47. Auto Waypoint Steering Displays (Sheet 2 of 2)
20.3.9.2.5 Commanded Ground Speed Steering The TGT, ZTOT and CGS parameters are entered via
the DEU as follows:
Commanded Ground Speed steering is a special sub
1. From the main menu, select WPT.
mode of AUTO steering which provides additional airspeed
cues for precise timing of arrival over a defined flight plan 2. Enter the desired TGT waypoint number and select
Target waypoint. Existing AUTO steering cues are still ENTER.
available, and the steering mode buffer of the HSD format
will display the AUTO legend. (See paragraph 20.3.9.2.4.) 3. Select TYPE, and from this submenu select TGT
and ENTER.
To enable CGS steering, the aircrew must specify the
following parameters for a flight plan route: TGT (Target 4. Select CGS, enter the desired ground speed in knots
Waypoint), CGS, and ZTOT. The MCS will attempt to for the terminal inbound leg to the TGT and
calculate and display on the HUD and the HSD format ENTER.
airspeed cues to achieve the specified time and airspeed over
5. Select ZTOT, enter the desired Zulu time on target
the TGT if the following conditions are met:
and ENTER.
1. A flight plan with a defined route is active.
In CGS steering, the MCS continually calculates the
2. The current destination waypoint is on the flight ground speed required to cover the distance from the current
plan route. aircraft location to the TGT along the active flight plan route,
and also accounts for the CGS specified for the final leg
3. AUTO steering is selected. inbound to the TGT. The difference between the aircraft’s
ground speed and the CGS is presented graphically on the
4. The TGT and ZTOT have been specified for the HUD and digitally on the HSD format. Commanded Ground
flight plan. Speed steering provides the aircrew with cues for airspeed
control to meet the timing requirements specified by CGS
5. Valid ZTOD from the MAGR is available.
20−85 ORIGINAL
Figure 2048.Commanded Ground Speed Indication
and ZTOT. The CGS cuues are displayed to the aircrew 20.3.9.2.6 Manual Steering
whenever valid, and are determined by the following criteria:
In the manual display steering mode, the pilot
1. CGS exceeds 133 knots maintains a command magnetic course by steering the
aircraft to the command heading marker on the HUD or MFD
2. The specified ZTOT can be met. VDI format.
When valid, CGS steering cues are displayed on all Initially the pilot selects a command course for manual
HUD master modes. In addition to normal AUTO steering display steering with the course select control (FO−3); this
cues, a caret is presented along the HUD airspeed dial edge results in the display of command course and a course line
that provides a fly−to" cue for airspeed (see Figure 20−48). pointer on the horizontal situation display MFD format. The
When the airspeed tic and the caret are aligned, specified manual display steering mode is initiated when the MAN
ZTOT and CGS requirements over the TGT will be met. If pushbutton on the MFD VDI display format is depressed.
the current ground speed differs from CGS by more than 30 When this is done, the mission computer calculates
knots, the caret becomes fixed at a preset angular limit command heading by offsetting command course for any
(three dots), and rotates with the airspeed tic until the wind drift that may be present.
difference becomes less than 30 knots. CGS also replaces the
TAS display under PB 8 on the HSD format. Figure 20−49 shows the display formats used for
manual steering. Manual steering mode can be selected as
Note follows:
Whenever CGS steering is valid, the HUD
1. Call the VDI MFD format.
analog airspeed dial and tic will be displayed
along with the HUD airspeed caret, regardless of 2. Using the pilot’s CRS select knob on the course/
the position of the HUD Format switch (ANLG, heading panel (FO−3), select a course.
BOTH or DGTL).
ORIGINAL 20−86
Figure 2049.Manual Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−87 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−49.Manual Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
3. Verify the selected course value under CSEL on the supplies command altitude and command speed that are
VDI MFD format. displayed on the MFD VDI D/L format. Command course is
displayed on the MFD HSD D/L format as a course line
4. Depress the MAN pushbutton on the VDI format. pointer.
Steer aircraft to the command heading marker on the Data−link steering using the ASW−27C or URC−107
HUD or VDI. JTIDS can be performed as follows:
20.3.9.2.7 Data Link Steering 1. Call the VDI and HSD display formats on the pilot
center and right MFDs, respectively.
In the data−link display steering mode (Figure 20−50),
the pilot maintains a command course, commanded by 2. Depress the D/L pushbutton on the center MFD VDI
external inputs from the ASW−27C data link or AN/URC−107 format.
JTIDS data link, by steering the aircraft to the command
3. Maintain the command altitude indicated on the
heading marker on the HUD, VDI, or HSD format. The pilot right side of the center MFD VDI format.
also adjusts aircraft altitude and speed in accordance with
commanded values appearing on the VDI D/L MFD format. 4. Maintain the command speed indicated on the left
The ASW−27C must be in its tactical mode (TAC selected on side of the center MFD VDI format.
the DATA LINK panel) or JTIDS must be in AIC and its
tactical mode (JTIDS on the DATA LINK panel). 5. Steer the aircraft to the command heading marker on
the HUD or center MFD VDI format.
The data−link steering mode is selected by depressing 6. A comparison between the command course
the D/L pushbutton on the MFD VDI display format. When received from the data link and the drift−
this is done, the mission computer then calculates command compensated command heading can be observed on
heading to be flown to make good the D/L supplied command the right−hand MFD HSD D/L format. Command
course by correcting for any wind drift. The resulting course is in the form of a course line pointer, and the
command heading marker appears on the MFD VDI D/L, command heading to be flown is indicated by
MFD HSD D/L, and HUD D/L formats. The D/L also captain’s bars.
ORIGINAL 20−88
Figure 2050.Data−Link Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−89 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−50. Data−Link Steering Mode Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
20.3.9.2.8 All−Weather Landing Steering Note
The mission computer provides the appropriate The autopilot data−link vector hold steering
steering information to the aircraft displays for a requested mode is not supported using JTIDS vector
AWL mode. This is derived from data supplied by the ILS steering data.
and ACLS. AWL information is available from either the
data link (AN/ASW−27C (ACL)) or the ILS receiver 20.3.9.2.10 No Steering Selected
(AN/ARA−63) or both. The AWL steering modes operate
continuously in the A/C landing phase to monitor and Steering is turned off if STR (PB 9) on the HSD format
respond to pilot AWL requests. The pilot steers to glidepath is cycled until the steering mode buffer displays a blank, or
situation displays (both ACL and ILS) and flight director if a boxed steering selection (other than AWL) is unboxed on
displays during the approach and descent phases of the the VDI format. The selected heading and course functions
landing phase. Chapter 2 describes the DFCS ACL function, (HSEL and CSEL) are not operable. The HSD right hand data
and Chapter 17 provides ACLS description and procedures. buffer displays TACAN information (TO" the station). No
steering is the default steering mode on aircraft power up.
Note
20.3.9.3 Navigation System Updates
The AWL function is not supported by the
JTIDS. Occasionally, when GPS is unavailable, the small
errors in the navigation system build up to a point that
20.3.9.2.9 Autopilot Steering requires position updating. The following paragraphs
provide a description of the procedures for performing
The mission computer provides the DFCS autopilot navigation system updates.
with a set of steering validity discretes and a computed
steering error for its engaged steering mode. The available All updates, except JTIDS, determine aircraft position
autopilot steering modes are: heading hold, ground track one time by computing its location with respect to a known
hold/destination hold, and data−link vector hold. Refer to waypoint. JTIDS updates use the navigation correction data
Chapter 2 for a description of these DFCS functions. computed by the JTIDS. The difference in the computed
ORIGINAL 20−90
position and the navigation system’s present position are boxed at this time, and delta LAT and delta LONG
displayed on the MFD or the DD as differences (deltas) in will appear as shown in Figure 20−51. Optimum
latitude and longitude. If these differences are reasonable, results will be obtained with low and slow flight
the operator may elect to update the navigation system, conditions.
including the INS and the SAHRS, by depressing the MFD
FIX ENABLE pushbutton. 4. Verify that the delta LAT/LONG corrections are rea
sonable.
Note
5. If the delta LAT/LONG corrections appear
Because of the high degree of accuracy available reasonable and a correction is required, press the
when in INS/GPS mode, one fix position updates FIX ENABLE pushbutton on the INS UPDATE
are not available while in that mode. GPS must MFD format. The corrections will be incorporated
be unboxed to do a navigation update. into the system and sensors and the correct latitude
and longitude will be displayed on the OWN A/C
A navigation update is performed by calling up the INS MFD format.
UPDATE MFD format shown in Figure 20−51 that will
appear when the UPDT pushbutton is depressed on the HSD 20.3.9.3.2 TACAN One−Fix Update
basic MFD format, shown Figure 20−9. The available types
of updates consist of visual, TACAN, radar, HUD/designate, TACAN one−fix update computes aircraft position
data link, and JTIDS. If a particular update type is not using TACAN measurements of range and bearing from a
available, an X" will appear over the acronym as shown in TACAN station whose coordinates are known and stored in
Figure 20−51. Since all updates except JTIDS use the the waypoint file. The procedure requires that the TACAN be
coordinates of a selected prestored waypoint, the coordinates operating and the station selected correspond to the waypoint
of the selected waypoint should be verified prior to that will be called up and whose coordinates will be used in
performing all updates except JTIDS. This is done by calling the updating process. The procedure can be performed by
up the WPT DATA MFD format containing the point as either the pilot or RIO as follows:
shown in Figure 20−29 that is available from the OWN A/C
basic format. The procedures for each of the types of updates 1. With the TACAN operating, select a TACAN
channel whose latitude and longitude coordinates
are provided below.
correspond to the referenced TACAN location
20.3.9.3.1 Visual One−Fix Update stored in the waypoint file.
2. Verify that the coordinates of the TACAN station are
Visual one−fix update computes the aircraft’s position
the same as those of the waypoint to be selected for
using the coordinates of a point selected and stored in
updating by calling up the appropriate WPT DATA
waypoint file and substituted for the aircraft’s position at the
MFD format Figure 20−29. If incorrect, enter the
instant of direct flyover. This requires that entry, selection,
correct values via the DEU or DD.
and verification of the waypoint be made prior to flying over
the point and that the VIS pushbutton on the INS UPDATE 3. Call up the INS UPDATE format, Figure 20−51.
MFD format be depressed at the time of flyover. When this Select the correct waypoint corresponding to the
is done, the INS UPDATE FORMAT shall display the coordinates of the TACAN station using the in
computed latitude and longitude differences for evaluation. crease/decrease pushbuttons on the right side of the
The procedure can be performed by either pilot or RIO as INS UPDATE MFD format.
follows:
4. Depress the TCN pushbutton. The legend will be
1. Verify the coordinates of the waypoint to be boxed and the computed delta LAT and delta LONG
overflown by calling up the appropriate WPT DATA will appear, as shown in Figure 20−51.
MFD format (Figure 20−29). If incorrect, enter the
correct coordinates for the point via the DEU or 5. Verify that the delta LAT/LONG corrections are rea
the DD. sonable.
2. Call up the INS UPDATE MFD format, Figure 6. If the delta LAT/LONG corrections appear
20−51. Select the correct waypoint corresponding to reasonable and a correction is required, depress the
coordinates of the visual update point via the FIX ENABLE pushtile on the INS UPDATE MFD
increase/decrease pushbuttons on the right side of format. The corrections will be incorporated into
the INS UPDATE MFD format. the system and sensors, and the correct latitude and
longitude will be displayed on the OWN A/C MFD
3. At the instant of direct flyover of the visual point format.
depress the VIS pushbutton. The VIS legend will be
20−91 ORIGINAL
Figure 2051.INS UPDATE MFD Formats (Sheet 1 of 4)
ORIGINAL 20−92
Figure 20−51. INS UPDATE MFD Formats (Sheet 2 of 4)
20−93 ORIGINAL
ORIGINAL 20−94
20.3.9.3.3 Radar One−Fix Update coordinates of the radar−identifiable point via the
increase/decrease pushbuttons on the right side of
Radar one−fix update computes aircraft position using the INS UPDATE MFD format.
radar measurements of range, azimuth, and elevation angles
from a radar−identifiable target whose coordinates are known 4. Select half−action mode by depressing the trigger
and are stored in the waypoint file. This procedure requires on the RIO sensor hand control to the first detent
that the radar is operating in the ground−map mode and that position.
the DD cursor be positioned over the DD displayed target
prior to designating via the sensor hand control as described 5. Place the DD cursor over the displayed radar target
below. Like other one−fix update modes it also requires that on the DD (Figure 20−52) using the sensor hand
the waypoint corresponding to the radar target coordinates is control and depress the trigger to the second detent
selected for the update as described below. Since this (full action).
procedure requires the use of the DD control panel, it can be
performed only by the RIO. The procedure is as follows: 6. Depress the RDR pushbutton on the INS Update
MFD format. The RDR legend will become boxed
1. Select the radar ground−map mode via the GND and the computed delta LAT/delta LONG will
MAP pushtile on the DD, shown in Figure 20−52. appear as shown in Figure 20−51.
2. Verify that the coordinates of the radar identifiable
point are the same as those of the waypoint to be 7. If the delta LAT/LONG corrections appear
selected for updating by calling up the appropriate reasonable and a correction is required, depress the
WPT Data MFD format, Figure 20−29. If incorrect, FIX ENABLE pushtile. The corrections will be
enter the correct values via the DEU or DD. incorporated into the system and the sensors and the
correct latitude and longitude will be displayed on
3. Call up the INS UPDATE format, Figure 20−51. the OWN A/C MFD format, which will now appear.
Select the correct waypoint corresponding to the
20−95 ORIGINAL
Figure 2052.DD Control Panel With GND MAP Selected
20.3.9.3.4 Data−Link One−Fix Update 3. Call up the INS Update MFD format (Figure 20−49)
and select waypoint 18 via the increase/decrease
Data−link one−fix update computes aircraft position pushbuttons.
using inputs from an external platform that measures the
aircraft position with respect to an agreed data−link target 4. Call up the TSD MFD format (Figure 20−53)
point whose coordinates are stored in a specific location in available from the MENU1 MFD format. Using the
the waypoint file. The measured information consist of pilot cursor control or the RIO sensor hand control,
components of slant range to the waypoint that are place the cursor over the data−link target point
transmitted to the aircraft via a specific data−link message. position and depress the switch.
The procedure requires that the coordinates of the agreed
data−link target point are stored as waypoint 18 in the way Note
point file and that the data link is operating in the tactical Both waypoint 18 from the waypoint file and
mode. Verification and selection of the waypoint are the data−link reported location of this point
performed similar to other one−fix update procedures but the appear on the TSD format. Since both
tactical situation display on the MFD is used for location and symbols represent the same point, the
designation of the data−link target point (Figure 20−53). Both difference in their location on the TSD MFD
the pilot and the RIO can perform this update procedure. The format is an indication of the aircraft position
pilot uses the cursor control switch on the throttle, and the error. A check should be made to ascertain
RIO uses the sensor hand control for designating and that this error is reasonable prior to
positioning the cursor. The procedure is as follows: performing the update.
1. Verify data−link operation in the tactical mode 5. Call up again the INS UPDATE MFD format.
(i.e., DATA LINK MODE switch is in TAC). Depress the D/L pushbutton. A delay of several
seconds may occur prior to the boxing of the D/L
2. Verify the coordinates of waypoint 18 are the
legend and the appearance of the delta LAT and
previously agreed values by calling up the
LONG displays (Figure 20−51).
appropriate page of the WPT Data MFD format.
ORIGINAL 20−96
Figure 2053.MFD TSD Format
6. If the errors appear reasonable and an update is to the HUD visual target via the increase/decrease
desired, depress the FIX ENABLE pushbutton. The pushbuttons on the right side of the format.
corrections will be incorporated into the system and
sensor and the correct latitude and longitude will be 3. Position the cursor over the visual target seen
displayed on the INS UPDATE format and will also through the HUD using the cursor control switch
appear on the OWN A/C MFD format. and then depress the switch (Figure 20−54).
20.3.9.3.5 HUD/Designate One−Fix Update 4. Depress the HUD pushbutton on the INS UPDATE
MFD format. The HUD legend will become boxed
HUD/designate one−fix update computes aircraft and the computed delta LAT/delta LONG will
position, using measurements of azimuth and elevation from appear as shown in Figure 20−51.
the HUD center to a designated target point that is visible
through the HUD and whose coordinates are known and
reasonable and a correction is required, depress the
stored in the waypoint file and system altitude. This
FIX ENABLE pushbutton on the INS UPDATE
procedure is performed only by the pilot using the cursor
MFD format. The corrections will be incorporated
control switch on the throttle to position the HUD cursor over
into the system and sensors and the correct latitude
the visually sighted target and to designate. Like other
and longitude will be displayed on the OWN A/C
one−fix update modes, it also requires that the waypoint
MFD format.
corresponding to the visual target coordinates is selected for
the update as described below.
20.3.9.3.6 JTIDS One−Fix Update
1. Verify that the coordinates of the HUD visual target
are the same as those of the waypoint to be selected JTIDS one−fix update uses the delta latitude and
for updating by calling up the appropriate WPT longitude information calculated by JTIDS to perform a
DATA MFD format (Figure 20−29). one−time update of the system and sensors. This function will
always use the JTIDS geodetic latitude and longitude
2. Call up the INS UPDATE MFD format correction data regardless of JTIDS NAV MODE. This
(Figure 20−51). Select the waypoint corresponding procedure requires JTIDS operating in the net as an active
20−97 ORIGINAL
Figure 2054.HUD/Designate Position Update
participant (NORM selected on JTIDS control panel) with 20.3.9.4 Continuous Position Updating
NET ENTR−OK. See Chapter 19 for JTIDS operating
procedures. The JTIDS geodetic position quality must be ≤3 In addition to one−fix position updates, the navigation
to display the data and allow the update. This procedure can system has the capability to accept continuous navigation
be performed by either the pilot or RIO as follows: corrections from external sources when they exist and are
valid. For the current configuration of the aircraft, the only
1. Verify JTIDS operating and in sync. two sources available for continuous position updating are
TACAN and JTIDS data. The TACAN mode of continuous
2. Call up INS UPDATE MFD format (Figure 20−51) updating uses TACAN measurements of range and bearing to
available from the MENU MFD format. a prestored selected waypoint that also is an active TACAN
station. Thus, as in one−fix updating, it is necessary to ensure
3. Depress the JTID pushbutton on the INS UP−DATE
that the selected waypoint corresponds to the TACAN station
MFD format.
that is being received. The JTIDS mode of continuous updat
ing uses delta latitude, longitude, and altitude calculated by
If the data from JTIDS is not valid or the quality
JTIDS to continuously update the navigation system. The
is >3, the JTID pushbutton will be crossed out.
JTIDS continuous update will update the navigation system
The JTID pushbutton boxes and the JTIDS com
with either geodetic latitude, longitude, and altitude correc
puted delta LAT and delta LONG will appear as tions in the GEO mode or relative latitude, longitude, and
shown in Figure 20−51.
geodetic altitude corrections in the REL mode. When the
JTIDS altitude correction data quality is ≤ 10, this function
reasonable and a correction is required, depress the will display and use only the latitude and longitude correc
tions.
FIX ENABLE pushbutton on the INS UPDATE
MFD format. The corrections will be incorporated
into the system and sensors and the corrected Selection of JTIDS continuous position updating
latitude and longitude will be displayed on the is made via the MFD NAV SYSTEM AID format
OWN A/C MFD format. (Figure 20−55) that will appear when the NAV pushbutton is
ORIGINAL 20−98
depressed on the MFD HSD or OWN A/C format. The On the SURFACE WPT POS MFD format
remaining procedures for JTIDS continuous update are the (Figure20−56), an X" over the legend for a position
same as JTIDS one−fix update. Depress the JTID pushbutton determination mode indicates that the mode is not available.
on the NAV SYSTEM AID−JTID format. If the data from Until one of the available modes is selected, the format
JTIDS is not valid or the quality is >3, the JTID pushbutton shown in Figure 20−56 displays only the mode legends, the
will be crossed out. The JTID pushbutton boxes and the boxed SWP legend, and the SURFACE WPT POS header.
JTIDS computed delta LAT, LONG, and ALT will appear as
shown in Figure 20−55. Depression of the ENABLE push When using the visual, radar, or HUD/designate
button on the top center of the NAV SYSTEM AID format procedure, after the surface waypoint latitude and longitude
now allows the corrections, which are continuously have been computed and displayed on the MFD, pressing the
computed, to update the system. ENTER pushbutton on the MFD format enters the
coordinates into the waypoint file in an assigned waypoint
Selection of continuous position updating is made via number. For the DEU method, the coordinates are also
the MFD NAV SYSTEM AID format (Figure 20−55) that will displayed on the MFD, but are entered by pressing the DEU
appear when the NAV pushbutton is depressed on the MFD ENTER pushtile. When using the PTID method, pressing the
HSD or OWN A/C format. If TACAN data is being received sensor hand control trigger enters the coordinates that are
from a transmitting station, the TCN legend will not be displayed on the MFD.
crossed out. The procedure for TACAN operation is the same
as for one−fix TACAN position update described in The paragraphs that follow describe the various
paragraph 20.3.9.3.2. Select the correct waypoint using the methods and provide procedures.
up or down arrows on the HSD format, then depress the NAV
pushbutton. Once this is done, depressing the TCN push 20.3.9.5.1 Visual Mode
button on the resulting NAV SYSTEM AID format boxes the
TCN legend and computed corrections for latitude and For a visual waypoint position determination, the air
longitude are then displayed. Depression of the ENABLE craft present−position coordinates are assigned to the way
pushbutton on the top center of the NAV SYSTEM AID point position at the instant of flyover. This requires that the
format now allows the corrections, which are being contin VIS pushbutton be pressed at that time. The assigned coordi
uously computed, to be provided to the system. nates are displayed when the VIS pushbutton is pressed. This
procedure can be performed by either crewmember.
Note
Note
For continuous position updating neither the INS
nor the SAHRS are updated. Once this aiding
mode is deselected or becomes invalid, the D Visual mode is inoperable with GPS boxed.
computed corrections will not be provided and a D For best results, the aircraft should be flown
change in position may occur. low and slow for this procedure.
20.3.9.5 Surface Waypoint Position 1. Call up the MFD INS UPDATE format
Determination (Figure 20−51).
The position of a surface waypoint is determined by 2. Depress the SWP pushbutton to display the MFD
measuring its location with respect to the aircraft or with SURFACE WPT POS update format.
respect to some other known point. The following sensors
and procedures can be used: visual, TACAN, radar, HUD/ 3. Depress the up or down arrow pushbutton until the
designate, DEU, and PTID. Selection is made from the desired waypoint number is displayed.
SURFACE WPT POS format on the MFD. The computed
4. At the instant of overflight, depress the VIS
latitude and longitude are displayed on the MFD or DD. The
push−button, boxing the VIS legend and displaying
SURFACE WPT POS format is called by selecting the SWP
the latitude and longitude of the surface waypoint.
pushbutton on the INS UPDATE format.
5. If the latitude and longitude appear reasonable,
Note press the ENTER pushbutton on the SURFACE
The INS UPDATE format is called by selecting WPT POS format. This enters the coordinates into
the UPDT legend on any of the HSD MFD the waypoint file; they can be verified by selecting
formats. the WPT DATA format (Figure 20−29).
20−99 ORIGINAL
Figure 2055.Navigation System Continuous Update MFD Format
ORIGINAL 20−100
Figure 2056.Surface Waypoint Position MFD Formats (Sheet 1 of 2)
20−101 ORIGINAL
Figure 20−56. Surface Waypoint Position MFD Formats (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 20−102
20.3.9.5.2 TACAN Surface Waypoint Position 5. Set the sensor hand control cursor switch to the up
Determination position (Figure 20−57).
For TACAN surface waypoint position determination, Select the half−action mode by depressing the trigger on the
the position of the TACAN station is computed using RIO sensor hand control to the first detent position.
TACAN measurements of range and bearing from aircraft
present position. This procedure can be performed by either 6. Using the RIO sensor hand control, place the DD
crewmember and requires that the TACAN be operating. cursor over the radar target and depress the trigger
to the second detent position (full action).
1. With the TACAN operating, select the channel for
the station location to be determined. 7. Depress the RDR pushbutton on the SURFACE
WPT POS format to display the waypoint latitude
2. Call up the INS UPDATE format (Figure 20−51). and longitude and box the RDR legend.
3. Depress the SWP pushbutton to display the MFD 8. If the coordinates appear reasonable, press the
SURFACE WPT POS format. ENTER pushbutton to place the surface waypoint
coordinates into the proper waypoint file; they can
4. Depress the up or down arrow pushbutton until the be verified by selecting the WPT DATA format.
desired waypoint number is displayed.
20.3.9.5.4 HUD/Designate Mode
5. Depress the TCN pushbutton on the MFD
SURFACE WPT POS format. This boxes the TCN Using the HUD/designate mode, the pilot uses the
legend and displays the TACAN station latitude and HUD cursor to designate a visual target and the target
longitude. position is computed using aircraft present position and
azimuth/elevation measured from the HUD center to the
6. If the coordinates appear reasonable, press the
designated target.
ENTER pushbutton to place the surface waypoint
coordinates into the proper waypoint file. They can 1. Call up the INS UPDATE format (Figure 20−51).
be verified by selecting the WPT DATA format
(Figure 20−29). 2. Depress the SWP pushbutton to display the
SURFACE WPT POS format and box the SWP
20.3.9.5.3 Radar Mode legend.
For a radar surface way−point position determination, 3. Depress the up or down arrow pushbutton until the
the position of a radar surface target is computed using radar desired waypoint number is displayed.
measurements of range, bearing, and elevation angle to the
target from the known aircraft present position. The radar 4. Using the TDC (Figure 20−57), place the HUD
must be in the GND MAP mode. This procedure can only be cursor over the visual target and depress the switch
performed by the RIO. to designate the waypoint.
1. On the DD control panel, select GND MAP. 5. Depress the HUD pushbutton on the SURFACE
WPT POS format to display waypoint latitude and
2. Call up the INS UPDATE format (Figure 20−51). longitude and box the HUD legend.
3. Depress the SWP pushbutton, which results in the 6. If the coordinates appear reasonable, depress
display of the SURFACE WPT POS format with ENTER pushbutton to place the surface waypoint
SWP boxed. coordinates into the waypoint file; they can be
verified by selecting the WPT DATA format.
4. Depress the up or down arrow pushbutton until the
desired waypoint number is displayed.
20−103 ORIGINAL
Figure 2057.Cursor Controls
ORIGINAL 20−104
20.3.9.5.5 DEU Mode 1. Set the sensor hand control cursor select switch to
the down (PTID cursor) position.
In the DEU mode, the position of a new waypoint is
computed based on its range and bearing from an existing 2. On the PTID control panel (FO−4), depress the
waypoint already in the waypoint file. The range and bearing NON ATTK and SYM ELEM pushbuttons.
values are entered by the RIO via the DEU (Figure 20−28).
3. Set the azimuth scan to ±20° on the sensor control
panel (FO−4) and adjust the antenna scan center to
1. On the DEU, select the number of the known zero.
waypoint to be used as a reference.
4. Call the WPT DATA MFD format and depress the
2. On the DEU, enter the range and bearing from the desired waypoint number to box the waypoint
reference waypoint to the new waypoint. legend.
3. On the DEU, press the SET pushtile and select a 5. On the PTID control panel, set the RANGE switch
waypoint number for the new waypoint. as required and the MODE switch to A/C STAB.
4. Press the ENTER pushtile on the DEU. This causes 6. Place the sensor hand control trigger to the half−
the coordinates of the new waypoint to be computed action position.
and entered into the waypoint file.
7. Place the PTID cursor on the desired screen location
5. The latitude and longitude of the new waypoint may and hook by selecting full action. This causes the
be verified by calling the WPT DATA format on the latitude and longitude of the hooked position to be
MFD. computed and entered in the waypoint file.
20.3.9.5.6 PTID Spot Hook Mode The coordinates of the hooked position can be verified
by calling the WPT DATA format.
In the spot hook mode, coordinates are computed for a
point designated by the RIO by spot hooking on the PTID
based on aircraft present position.
20−105 (Reverse
CHAPTER 21
Identification
21.1 IDENTIFICATION TRANSPONDER an antenna diversity comparator identifies which antenna

(AN/APX−100) received the strongest interrogation signal and automatically
selects that antenna to transmit the reply. It is therefore
21.1.1 IFF Transponder recommended that the antenna select switch be left in DIV
The APX−100 IFF transponder system is capable of at all times.
automatically reporting coded identification and altitude
signals in response to interrogations from surface (or
airborne) stations so that the stations can establish aircraft
identification, control air traffic, and maintain vertical
separation. The system has five operating modes (1, 2, 3/A, If either TOP or BOT is selected on the APX−100
C, and 4). Modes 1 and 2 are IFF modes, mode 3 (civil antenna select switch, a Mode IV reply will be
modeA) and mode C (automatic altitude reporting) are transmitted only if the Mode IV interrogation
primarily air traffic control modes, and mode 4 is the secure signal is strongest on the antenna selected. If the
(encrypted) IFF mode. The IFF control panel is in the rear stronger of the two antennas was not selected at
cockpit (Figure 21−1). the time of interrogation, the aircrew will not
have any indication that their aircraft was inter
21.1.1.1 Master Switch rogated or that no reply was made.
The MASTER switch applies power to all the trans
21.1.1.3 IDENT−OUT−MIC Switch
ponder system components except the altimeter components.
It is a four−position rotary switch placarded OFF, STBY, The IDENT−OUT−MIC switch is a three−position
NORM, and EMER. The switch must be lifted over a detent toggle switch. The spring−loaded IDENT adds an identifica
to switch to EMER or to OFF. STBY should be selected for tion of position pulse to mode 1, 2, and 3/A replies for a
2 minutes prior to switching to NORM to allow the period of 15 to 30 seconds. In MIC, the identification of
transponder to warm up. In NORM, the transponder system position function is activated for 15 to 30 seconds each time
is operational at normal receiver sensitivity. In EMER, the the UHF microphone switch is pressed.
transponder transmits emergency replies to mode 1, 2, or 3/A
interrogations. The mode 3/A emergency reply includes 21.1.1.4 Mode 1, 2, and 3/A Code Selectors
code7700. When EMER is selected, all modes are enabled
regardless of the position of the selector switches. When the The two mode l thumbwheel selector switches allow
front seat ejects, a switch is tripped that automatically selects selection of 32 mode 1 codes and the four mode 3/A
the emergency mode if the MASTER switch is in any thumbwheel selectors allow selection of 4096 mode 3/A
position other than OFF. codes. The mode 2 code that is set on the four MODE 2
selector switches may be read by moving the sliding cover.
21.1.1.2 Antenna Select Switch The code may be reset by inserting a pointed object like a pen
tip or a paper clip to rotate the thumbwheel. Mode 2 codes are
The position of the antenna select switch determines not normally changed in flight.
APX−100 antenna reply logic. Although the system is
designed to receive an interrogation on either antenna at all 21.1.1.5 Mode Switches
times regardless of switch position, with TOP or BOT
selected, it will only reply on the selected antenna, and only The four mode switches (M−1, M−2, M−3/A, and M−C)
if the strongest interrogation signal was received on that each have OUT, ON, and spring−loaded TEST positions. The
antenna. For example, if BOT were selected and the center position ON of each switch enables that mode. To test
interrogation signal was stronger from the top antenna, no the transponder, press the mode switch of each mode to
reply would be transmitted. In the DIV (diversity) position, TEST.
21−1 ORIGINAL
1 TEST light (GO) Illuminates when respective MODE switch TEST position is actuated;
indicates proper (GO) operation of modes 1, 2, 3/A, and C. Master
switch must be set to NORM.
2 TEST/MON light The light has two functions. Illuminates when respective MODE switch
(NO GO) TEST position is actuated; indicates failure (NO GO) of modes 1, 2, 3/A
and C. Master switch must be set to NORM.
3 ANT switch Selects upper (TOP), lower (BOT), or both (DIV) antennas. DIV
(diversity) permits the IFF to switch automatically for transmission to the
antenna that received the strongest interrogation signal.
4 MASTER switch OFF  Deenergizes set.

STBY  Energizes receiver−transmitter for immediate operation upon
switching to an operating position.
NORM  Allows receiver−transmitter response to interrogations.
EMER  Energizes receiver−transmitter and generates emergency
replies to mode 1,2 (thumbwheel settings), and 3/A (code
7700) and a normal reply to mode C, when interrogated,
whether mode switches are at ON or OUT.
Figure 211.IFF Control Panels (Sheet 1 of 3)
ORIGINAL 21−2
5 STATUS lights (red) ALT  Illumination indicates altitude encoder circuit failure during MODE C
test.
KIT  Illumination indicates KIT/KIR TSEC failure during MODE 4 test.
ANT  Illumination indicates excessive voltage standard wave ratio (VSWR)
to antenna during MODE C or MODE 4 tests.
6 RAD switch OUT  Deenergized position.
TEST  When selected, transponder replies to mode 3/A or 4 TEST mode

interrogations from a ramp test set during ground maintenance
testing.
7 IDENT  OUT  IDENT  Momentary position provides IDENT reply for 15 to 30 seconds after
MIC switch releasing switch; replies to interrogation in modes 1, 2, 3/A.
OUT  Deenergizes circuit.
MIC  Transfers IDENT reply activation switch from IDENT to radio

microphone switch
8 MODE 4 REPLY light Illuminates when system has successfully replied to a mode 4 interrogation
provided the AUDIO/LIGHT/OUT switch is not in the OUT position.
9 MODE 4 AUDIO/ LIGHT/ AUDIO  Enables: (1) An ICS tone indicating either incomplete signal reception
OUT switch or that the received interrogation code does not match the installed
code; (2) no go and IFF caution lights indicating no reply to a valid
mode 4 interrogation; and (3) MODE 4 REPLY light indicating a valid
mode 4 interrogation reply.
LIGHT  Enables: (1) no go and IFF caution lights indicating no reply to a valid
mode 4 interrogation; and (2) MODE 4 REPLY light indicating a valid
mode 4 interrogation reply. Disables ICS audio tone monitoring.
OUT  Disables all ICS tone and light monitoring of mode 4 interrogations,
replies, and nonreplies.
10 CODE selectors Code selectors are rotatable drums with imprinted numbers that appear in code
(MODE 1 and 3/A) selector windows, permitting selection of codes for mode 1 and 3/A.
11 MODE 4 switch ON  Enables mode 4.

See Figure 21−2 for mode 4 caution/reply light logic.
TEST  Activates KIT mode 4 computer self−test. TEST GO light illuminates if
system is functional, NO GO if it is not.
If KIT computer is at fault, STATUS KIT light illuminates red.
If KIT/KIR is not installed, NO GO and STATUS KIT lights illuminate.
Figure 21−1. IFF Control Panels (Sheet 2 of 3)
21−3 ORIGINAL
12 MODE 2 Code selectors are rotatable drums with imprinted numbers that can be seen when
sliding cover is moved out of view. Changing requires pointed object. Not normally
changed in flight.
13 MODE 4 CODE ZERO  Erases code 4 from KIR−1A and KIT−1A computers. IFF ZERO
switch advisory legend appears on upper left of RIO’s MFD.
B  Selects KIT−1A computer B code.
A  Selects KIT−1A computer A code.
HOLD  Retains code in KIR−1A computers when landing gear is down or when
system is turned off.
14 MODE switches TEST  GO TEST light illuminates if system is functioning properly;

(1,2, 3/A, and C)
NO GO TEST light illuminates if system failure.
ON  Permits selection of interrogating modes to which the transponder will

reply.
OUT  Deenergized position.
15 M4 ALARM OVER Disables the mode 4 tone alarm to the RIO’s ICS.
RIDE switch
16 FAULT light Indicates a malfunction of APX−76 receiver−transmitter, caused by receiver, video, or

transmitter signals.
17 CHAL light Remains Illuminated for the duration of a challenge period indicating correct
operation.
18 CODE selectors First thumbwheel selects mode, 1, 2, 3A, 4A, or 4B. Last four thumbwheel rotatable
drums with imprinted numbers appearing in code selector windows, permit selection
of desired interrogation code.
19 TEST−CHAL CC Momentary two−position center−return switch.

switch
TEST  Onboard transponder is triggered by onboard interrogator. Both sets

must have same code setting. IFF solid lines are displayed on DD at 3
and 4 miles.
CHAL CC  A selective identification feature (SIF) interrogation cycle starts

the 5 to 10−second challenge period. Only correct modes and code
replies are displayed (two brackets only on DD).
20 IFF warning legend Indicates mode 4 interrogation was received, but system has not generated a reply;
mode 4 KIT/KIR computers have been zeroized; or KIT/KIR has failed
self−test.
Figure 21−1. IFF Control Panels (Sheet 3 of 3)
ORIGINAL 21−4
TRANSPONDER INTERROGATOR
CAUTION REPLY (APX−100)
(APX−100) (APX−76)
4 OUT (A) STBY A ON OFF

4 ON (A) STBY A ON OFF
4 ON (A) NORM A OFF ON
4 ON (A) NORM B OFF OFF
4 ON (B) NORM A OFF OFF
4 ON (B) NORM B OFF ON
4 ON (B) STBY B ON OFF
4 ON (B) STBY B ON OFF
4 ON (A) NORM RAD VERIFY BIT 1 (A) OFF ON
TEST
4 ON (A) NORM VERIFY BIT 1 (A) ON OFF
4 ON (A) STBY VERIFY BIT 1 (A) ON OFF
KIT ZERO A OR B ON OFF
Figure 212.Mode 4 Caution and Reply Light Logic
Illumination of the GO TEST light indicates proper The MODE 4 CODE switch is placarded ZERO, B, A,
operation of that mode. Illumination of the NO GO TEST and HOLD. The switch must be lifted over a detent to switch
light indicates failure of the selected mode. The MASTER to ZERO. It is spring−loaded to return from HOLD to position
switch must be set to NORM for the test function to operate. A. Position A selects the mode 4 code for the present code
The modes not being tested should be OUT when testing on period and position B selects the mode 4 code for the
the ground to prevent unnecessary interference with nearby succeeding code period. Both codes are mechanically
ground stations. If a malfunction exists during these self− inserted into the transponder by maintenance personnel. The
tests, an IFX acronym will appear on the programmable codes are mechanically held in the IFF, regardless of the
tactical information display (PTID). The IFF transponder is position of the MASTER switch or the status of aircraft
also continuously checked by aircraft self−test. Failure causes power, until the first time the landing gear is raised.
the IFX acronym to be shown on the PTID. Calling up the Thereafter, the mode 4 codes will automatically zeroize
failure history file or the CNI OBC display on any MFD will anytime the MASTER switch or the aircraft electrical power
show whether the failure is in the transponder computer is turned off. The code settings can be mechanically retained
(IFA), the transponder (IFXPN), or the entire system (IFX). after the aircraft has landed (landing gear must be down and
locked) by turning the CODE switch to HOLD and releasing
21.1.1.6 RAD TEST−OUT Switch it at least 15 seconds before the MASTER switch or aircraft
electrical power is turned off. The codes again will be held,
The springloaded RAD TEST is used for testing. It regardless of the status of aircraft power or the MASTER
enables a mode−3/A code reply to a TEST mode interrogation switch, until the next time the landing gear is raised.
from a ramp test set. It also enables a mode 4 reply to a
VERIFY 1 interrogation from a surface station or a ramp test The mode 4 codes can be zeroized anytime the aircraft
set. A VERIFY 1 interrogation is a modified mode 4 power is on and the MASTER switch not OFF by turning the
interrogation used for testing. CODE switch to ZERO.
An audio signal, the REPLY light, and the IFF caution
21.1.1.7 Mode 4 Operation light are used to monitor mode 4 operation. The AUDIO/
Mode 4 operation is selected by setting the MODE 4 LIGHT/OUT switch controls these mode 4 indicators. When
toggle switch ON, provided that the MASTER switch is
NORM. Setting the MODE 4 switch to OUT disables
mode4.
21−5 ORIGINAL
the IFF MASTER switch is in NORM and the MODE 4 increments of 100 feet, and referenced to 29.92 inches of
TEST/ON/OUT switch is on, selecting AUDIO on the mercury.
MODE 4 AUDIO/LIGHT/OUT switch provides two types of
mode 4 caution indications: (1) an ICS audio tone indicating 21.2 IFF INTERROGATOR (AN/APX−76)
either incomplete signal reception or the received interroga
tion code does not match the installed code, and (2) a no go The AN/APX−76 provides radar identification of air
light and IFF caution light indicating the system is not borne and surface Mark 10 IFF systems. It operates in con
responding to a valid mode 4 interrogation. Selecting the junction with the radar and is automatically turned on when
light position disables the ICS audio tone and provides only ever the RDR power switch is placed to any position except
the IFF caution light and no go light. Selecting the OUT OFF. A minimum warmup time of 3 minutes is required
position disables the ICS tone, no go light, and IFF caution before successful operation or BIT can be performed. The
light indications and disables the REPLY light indication of system requires 115−VAC from the main ac bus through the
a valid reply. (Caution and REPLY light logic is shown in IFF A/A AC circuit breaker (1J7) and 28−VDC from the main
Figure 21−2.) dc bus through the IFF A/A DC circuit breaker (9F6). It is
capable of interrogation and display of modes 1, 2, 3A and
21.1.1.8 IFF Caution Light 4, and of displaying EMERG AND IDENT on the DD. Refer
to NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A, the Classified NATOPS Sup
The IFF caution light on the RIO’s ladder lights comes plement.
on to indicate that mode 4 is not operative. The light is opera
tive whenever aircraft power is on and the MASTER switch The APX−76 interrogator consists of an antenna array
is not OFF. However, the light will not operate if the mode 4 that is part of the radar antenna, a control panel, receiver−
computer is not physically installed in the aircraft. Illumina transmitter, switch amplifier, and for mode 4 operation, an
tion of the IFF caution light indicates that: (1) the mode 4 interrogator computer.
codes have zeroized, (2) the self−test function of
the KIT−1A/TSEC computer has detected a faulty computer The IFF antenna consists of six dipole antennas
or (3) the transponder is not replying to proper mode 4 inter mounted on the surface of the radar planar array antenna. The
rogations. antenna azimuth and vertical coverage is the same as that of
the radar antenna except that the beam width of the APX−76
If the IFF caution light illuminates, switch the MAS is 13°. The transmitter operates at a fixed frequency of
TER switch to NORM (if in STBY) and ensure that the 1,030MHz and the receiver operates at a fixed frequency of
MODE 4 toggle switch is ON. If illumination continues, 1,090 MHz.
employ operationally−directed flight procedures for an inop
erative mode 4 condition. Except for the display of IFF video, the APX−76 is the
same in all modes of radar operation. The radar analog signal
21.1.1.9 IFF ZERO CAW converter provides an IFF pretrigger for the purpose of syn
chronizing the IFF and radar. On receiving the pretrigger
An IFF ZERO CAW is displayed in the MFD CAW from the radar, the IFF synchronizer generates triggers that
window when a KIT computer is installed and the mode 4 establish the timing of transmission of challenges and de
codes have been zeroized. The IFF ZERO CAW is only valid coded reply video for display on the DD. With the radar in
if the APX−100 MASTER switch is not OFF. If the MASTER low PRF, IFF video is mixed with radar video and displayed
switch is OFF, the IFF ZERO CAW is displayed regardless in the radar format. In high PRF, the IFF video is displayed
of whether the IFF codes are zeroized or not. in a B−scan format without radar video. Figure 21−3 shows
IFF display formats.
21.1.2 Altitude Computations
The synchronizer also sends a mode 4 pretrigger to the
Altitude computations are performed by the CADC. interrogator computer.
The computer outputs are altitude information cor The interrogator computer generates mode 4 interroga
rected for static position error. The synchro output is supplied tions and interpolates mode 4 replies. Display of mode 4 is
to the altimeter providing the crew with a corrected altitude the same as all other modes. The mode 4 codes are prevented
indication. The digital output from the computer is applied from zeroing when the RDR power switch is cycled.
to the transponder for transmission on mode C, coded in
ORIGINAL 21−6
21.2.1 IFF Self−Test challenge by momentarily holding the CHAL CC/TEST

switch in CHAL CC in order to reset the BIT flags associated
Prior to APX−76 operation, self−test of the unit should with the APX−76. The APX−76 normally powers up with the
be performed. The APX−76 contains a self−test function that BIT flags in the fault position. The system will continuously
provides closed loop testing in conjunction with the on−board fault until the flags are reset. The APX−76 antenna is checked
APX−100 (IFF Transponder). To perform the self−test, the during the test by receiving actual video from the APX−100
RIO must set the mode and code switches on the control panel antenna. Failure of any part of the APX−76 closed loop test
to correspond with the mode and code switches of the APX− will cause IFI to be displayed in continuous monitor. A
l00. The APX−l00 must be in NORM or EMER before per further breakdown as to what portion of the system has failed
forming the test. The RIO may now initiate self−test by hold can be verified by calling up the maintenance file. Testing of
ing the TEST/CHAL CC switch in TEST for 5 to 10 seconds. all modes of the APX−76 should be performed independently.
Provided both the IFF and the APX−76 are functioning prop Failure of one mode does not necessarily mean that all modes
erly, two horizontal bars will be displayed across the DD at are malfunctioning.
approximately 4 and 5 miles. Illumination of the green
CHAL light on the control panel while the switch is being The APX−76 receiver−transmitter, switch amplifier, in
held in the test position also indicates that the APX−76 made terrogator (KIR) computer, and synchronizer are checked
a valid interrogation. The bottom line on the DD indicates during CNI OBC. Results can be called up on any MFD.
that the APX−100 responded in mode and the top line These units are also subject to continuous monitoring. Status
indicates it responded in code. Both lines together indicate can be read by calling up the failure history file. In addition,
that the APX−76 is decoding properly. Biasing of the mode the PTID displays the IFI acronym if the receiver−transmitter
and code lines enables them to be spread out on the DD during or switch transponder fails continuous monitoring. During
test. Figure 21−3 shows the correct IFF self−test display OBC, CHALLENGE IFF is displayed on MFD 3 in order to
format. If the first attempt to test the APX−76 fails because remind the RIO to reset the BIT flags by making a valid
of lack of video on the DD, or the amber fault light on the challenge.
control panel illuminates, the RIO should initiate a valid
21−7 ORIGINAL
Figure 213.IFF Display Formats
ORIGINAL 21−8
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
PART VIII
Weapon Systems
Chapter 22 — TARPS Subsystem
Chapter 23 — Navigation Command and Control Grid
The following chapters are to be found in NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1A:
Chapter 24 — F14D Weapon System
Chapter 25 — Weapon System Controls and Displays
Chapter 26 — AN/APG-71 Radar System
Chapter 27 — AN/AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track System
Chapter 28 — AN/AXX-1 Television Camera Set
Chapter 29 — Integrated Sensor Operation
Chapter 30 — Stores Management System
Chapter 31 — Air-to-Air Weapons
Chapter 32 — Air-to-Ground Weapons
Chapter 33 — LANTIRN Targeting System
Chapter 34 — Electronic Warfare Systems
Chapter 35 — Data-Link Systems
Chapter 36 — Weapon System Degraded Operation

ORIGINAL
CHAPTER 22
TARPS Subsystem
22.1 RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM This capability is compatible with the F−14 tactical air
reconnaissance pod system and includes target designation
The reconnaissance system establishes the aircraft as a
and steering command functions and reconnaissance sensor
multisensor reconnaissance aircraft with the flexibility for a
control as well as specific reconnaissance displays to crew
wide range of reconnaissance missions. Specific missions
and in−flight annotation of reconnaissance data.
include order−of−battle generation, prestrike/poststrike pho
tography, and maritime surveillance. The TARPS consists of the following components (as
shown in Figure 22−1):
The sensors and associated equipment are contained in
the pod’s four compartments (Figure 22−1). The sensors are: 1. TARPS pod
serial frame camera (KS−87D); and low− to medium−altitude
panoramic camera (KA−99), or long−range standoff frame 2. Serial frame camera
camera (KS−153A with 24−inch lens).
3. Panoramic camera or standoff frame camera
Figure 221.Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod System
22−1 ORIGINAL
4. Data display system displays, the RIO has full control of TARPS. A description
of the CPS controls and their functions are provided in
5. TARPS environmental control system Figure22−3.
6. Controller processor signal unit 22.2 DISPLAY SYSTEM
The TARPS location on the aircraft is shown in As described in Chapter 2, the display system provides
Figure 22−2. the following:
22.1.1 TARPS Pod 1. Selection of waypoint to be reconnoitered and
The TARPS pod (Figure 22−2) is 207.5 inches long and steering mode (point−to−point, command course, or
weighs approximately 1,625 pounds including sensor equip mapping) to be employed.
ment. The pod is nonjettisonable and is mounted to the
2. Display of reconnaissance steering cues and camera
aircraft on weapon station 5 with an integral pylon adapter.
status the HUD when valid steering is selected and
The adapter provides the pod with sensor control signals, data
the aircraft is not in A/A with a weapon selected.
annotation signals, electrical power, and ECS support from
the aircraft. Circuit breaker protection is provided through 3. Display of reconnaissance steering cues on the VDI
the ac left and right main circuit breaker panel. The pod is when the VDI is selected.
designed for carriage throughout the flight envelope.
4. Command steering displays using the reconnais
22.1.2 Serial Frame Camera sance steering symbol and reconnaissance command
The serial frame camera can be directed in flight either heading marker.
to the forward oblique position to obtain photographs of the
5. Displays of reconnaissance TARPS sensor status
area as seen by the pilot, or to a vertical position for use as
and camera solution cues to crew on the MFD
a backup sensor in the event the panoramic camera fails or for
RECON DATA status format.
mapping missions.
The serial camera mount assembly holds the camera 6. Display of target waypoint (reference point) data on
and provides the capability to move the camera in flight from the MFD RECON DATA status format.
the vertical position to the forward position. Controls for the
camera positioning are on the CPS. 7. Display of waypoint reconnaissance parameters
(command crossing angle, target length, map lines,
22.1.3 Panoramic Camera map separation distance (map offset)) on two
formats.
The panoramic camera offers full horizon−to−horizon
panoramic imagery over a broad velocity/above ground level 8. Provide selection of TARPS air−to−ground ranging
mission envelope. for altitude above ground level determination.
22.1.4 Data Display System 22.3 TARPS EQUIPMENT CIRCUIT BREAKERS

The DDS performs two basic TARPS functions. It The main power circuit breakers that control TARPS
provides coded annotation on the sensor film for future equipment are in the aft cockpit. FO−8 and FO−9 show their
interpretation of the recorded intelligence data and supplies location. The circuit breakers are numbered and labeled as
necessary control signals to the individual sensors. follows:
22.1.5 TARPS Environmental Control System CARD

The ECS supplies conditioned air for pod cooling and RECON POD 1E2
heating and for defogging the camera windows. RECON CONTR/LANTIRN POD PWR 9E2
RECON POD DC PWR NO. 1 9E4
22.1.6 Controller Processor Signal Unit RECON POD DC PWR NO. 2 9E3
RECON HTR/LANTIRN PWR 3 PH 2C3
The CPS (Figure 22−3) and cockpit displays provide RECON ECS CONT AC 2G4
the controls and information required by the RIO and pilot for RECON ECS/LANTRIN POD CONT 9E1
operation and checkout of TARPS. The CPS is in the aft
cockpit left console and contains the primary TARPS Refer to Chapter 2 for an alphanumeric listing of circuit
controls and indicators. Using the CPS with the multifunction breakers.
ORIGINAL 22−2
Figure 222.TARPS Component Locations
22−3 ORIGINAL
Figure 223.Controller Processor Signal Unit (Sheet 1 of 5)
ORIGINAL 22−4
1 FRAME lights Green FRAME light flashes once per camera cycle when serial frame camera is
• Amber activated and no failure exists. Amber FRAME light illuminates if failure exists in
• Green serial frame camera and green FRAME light goes off.
2 MOUNT light Illuminates indicating mount failure. This occurs when serial frame camera fails to
• Amber achieve directed position within 23 seconds. (It may be firmly locked in position
opposite to directed one.) CIPDU internal failure can also give mount failure
indication.
3 SC (Sensor Control) Illuminates when SC/DDS has failed to furnish Film Motion Compensation (FMC) or
light cycle commands to sensors. Failure to deliver formatted data on command to
• Amber sensors will not show SC failure. Consequently, SC GO indication can result in
good sensor imagery operation but without data annotation.
4 PAN lights Green PAN light flashes once per camera cycle when the panoramic camera has
• Amber been activated and no failure exists. Amber PAN light illuminates and green light
• Green goes out if failure occurs.
5 ECS (Environmental Illuminates only under failure condition (compartment temperature

Control System) light below 0_C or above 51_C). ECS is automatically activated on takeoff by weight−on−
• Amber wheels switch.
6 Frames and feet Display number of frames remaining in frame and pan cameras, and number of feet
(indicators) of film remaining in infrared sensor. Indicators are set initially as part of sensor
servicing via reset knobs directly under indicators. Each frame or pan camera cycle
decreases indication by 1.
7 MAN V/H light OFF Vg/H from aircraft computer within acceptable limits.
• Amber
ON Illuminated amber:
V/H switch in TEST. With VEL set at 90 (900 kts) and ALT set at 005
(500ft), or any equivalent of 1.8 ratio, the thumbwheel circuitry has failed if
the light stays on.
V/H switch in AUTO. Computer failed or computer fail discrete is received
with or without TARPS pod on aircraft. Manual Vg/H being used. Set correct
values to Vg/H in thumbwheels. Set V/H switch to MAN.
If negative AGL or computed Vg/H = 0, MAN Vg/H is being used.
Set corrected values of Vg/H in thumbwheels.
V/H switch in MAN. Manual V/H intentionally selected. Values set in
thumbwheels being used. Set correct values in thumbwheels.
• A TARPS advisory will appear on the Reconnaissance

MFD CAWS window when MAN V/H is selected
(Figure24−7). In addition, a TARP1 is generated on the
OBC Basic Display and Maintenance Failure Format
(Figure 24−8).
• If negative AGL or Vg/H = 0, and the TARPS pod is not on
the aircraft, there is no MAN Vg/H advisory.
Figure 22−3. Controller Processor Signal Unit (Sheet 2 of 5)
22−5 ORIGINAL
8 ALT FT × 100 Used to set manual altitude inputs to pod. Counter range is from 000 to 999,
read in multiples of 100 feet.
9 FILM switch MARK (momentary position) Allows RIO to mark special interest frame
with * in data block.
RUN Activates selected sensor when SYSTEM switch is set to RDY.
OFF Terminates TARPS sensor operation.
10 V/H selector switch MAN Selects manual thumbwheel inputs. (TARPS advisory appears on
MFD CAWS Figure 24−7. TARP1 appears on OBC Basic Display and
Maintenance Failure Format Figure 24−8).
AUTO Selects aircraft computer value of Motion Compensation Factor

(MCF).
TEST (Momentary position) Tests proper functioning of thumbwheels

Vg/H circuitry. With a 1.8 ratio set in the thumbwheels, a good test is
indicated by the MAN V/H light extinguishing.
11 EXPOSURE selector UNDER −1 f−stop exposure for doubled SC film setting.

switch
NORM Normal exposure for doubled SC film setting.
OVER +1 f−stop for doubled SC film setting.
12 SYSTEM switch OFF Aircraft power denied to TARPS. No sensors can be operated.
RDY Aircraft power available at sensor connectors. If respective sensor
moved from OFF position, sensor is placed in standby or ready mode.
RESET Clears TARPS failure signal. If failure is other than transient, TARPS
advisory remains.
ORIGINAL 22−6
13 VEL KT × 10 Use to set manual ground speed inputs to pod. Counter range is from 00 to 99,
thumbwheels read in multiples of 10 knots.
14 DATA light OFF Data received from computer ON −Data from aircraft computer failed
(via CPS DATA FAIL discrete).
Note
A TARPS advisory will appear on the Reconnaissance MFD CAWS
window (Figure 24−7) when MAN V/H is selected. In addition, a TARP1
and TARP2 are generated on the OBC Basic Display and Maintenance
Format. (Figure 24−8).
15 FRAME camera switch OFF Frame camera is shut off.

VERT SYSTEM switch is RDY. Power applied to frame camera.
Mount placed in vertical position. When FILM switch in RUN,
camera is cycling.
FWD SYSTEM switch in RDY; power is applied to frame camera.
Mount placed in forward position (depressed 16_ from horizon).
When FILM switch in RUN, camera is cycling.
Note
Requires approximately 15 seconds to transition betweenFWD and
VERT (The amber mount light illuminates if transition not completed in
23 seconds.)
22−7 ORIGINAL
16 PAN camera switch BIT (momentary position) SYSTEM switch must be in RDY to get BIT.
Applies power to pan camera. Initiates 12 second BIT. With FILM
switch to RUN, BIT will not function.
Do not run PAN BIT check. (May cause the film to jam)
OFF Pan camera is shut off.
CTR SYSTEM switch in RDY. Pan camera enabled. Awaiting operate
command.
FILM switch to RUN; pan camera cycling. Exposure, average of left
and right light sensors. Camera set for 55% overlap at NADIR.
KS−153A/24 inch: selects 21.4 degree scan centered on NADIR.
LEFT SYSTEM switch in RDY. Pan camera enabled. Awaiting operate
command.
FILM switch to RUN; pan camera cycling. Exposure controlled by left
light sensor. Camera set for 55% overlap at 30_ below left horizon.
KS−153A/24 inch: selects 21.4 degree scan centered on one of the
preset depression angles.
To prevent interference in coverage by the external fuel tanks the
following preset value is recommended: 27_ depression angle.
RIGHT SYSTEM switch in RDY. Pan camera enabled. Awaiting operate
command.
FILM switch in RUN; pan camera cycling. Exposure controlled by right
light sensor. Camera set for 55% overlap at 30° below right horizon.
KS−153A/24 inch: selects 21.4 degree scan centered on one of the
preset depression angles.
To prevent interference in coverage by the external fuel tanks the
following preset value is recommended: 31_ depression angle.
Note
LEFT or RIGHT positions should only be selected for high
altitude standoff, or low angle photography. With LEFT or
RIGHT selected, blurring of imagery at NADIR will occur at
lower altitudes because focus is set 30 degrees below horizon
slant range.
ORIGINAL 22−8
22.4 RECONNAISSANCE DISPLAYS 4. Provides selection of TARPS air−to−ground ranging

AND FORMATS for AGL determination and AGL data display.
The reconnaissance display symbology provides 22.4.2 Reconnaissance Fault/Problem Reporting
sensor status/reconnaissance steering selection (via the MFD
The reconnaissance system will report the TARPS
RECON DATA status page) and the steering cues (via
faults/problems via the MFD warning, caution, and advisory
HUD/VDI displays) to the flightcrew. In addition, the
window and store the faults in the OBC file and failure
position of the dynamic steering point can be displayed on the
history file.
horizontal situation display or programmable tactical infor
mation display/repeat on the MFD. 22.4.2.1 MFD Warning/Caution/Advisory
Window
The MFD RECON DATA status format is selected
from the MFD MENU2 format (Figure 22−4) by depressing The mission computer will report the following
the RECON pushbutton. advisories on the MFD (Figure 22−6):
1. TARPS Reports a general failure (crew alert)
22.4.1 MFD RECON DATA Status Format from the CPS. Monitor CPS to determine whether or
not this is a catastrophic failure (sensor(s) fail). A
This MFD format (Figure 22−5) provides the following
TARPS advisory need not scrub the reconnaissance
functions:
mission.
1. Selection of waypoint to be reconnoitered (via Note
increment/decrement pushtile on the upper left
corner of the MFD RECON DATA status format) A crew alert is generated from the CPS when any
and steering mode (point−to−point, command of the following conditions occur:
course, or mapping) to be employed. a. Sensor failure (includes serial frame camera
2. Displays TARPS sensor status, advisories and mount position).
camera solution cues to crew. b. ECS failure.
3. Displays target waypoint (reference point) data. c. SC/DDS failure.
Figure 224.MFD MENU2 Format
22−9 ORIGINAL
Figure 225.MFD RECON DATA Status Format
Figure 226.TARPS Advisories
ORIGINAL 22−10
d. Manual Vg/H in use. In addition, the algorithm will put the reconnaissance
target designator over the target on the HUD. The PTP
e. CPS data fail (a TARP2 will be simultaneously steering will transition into CCRS for final approach over the
stored in OBC/failure history file). target.
f. Manual Vg/H test fail. Note
22.4.2.2 OBC/Failure History File PTP remains boxed on the MFD RECON DATA
status format. The reconnaissance steering
The following faults will be simultaneously stored in
symbol and command ground−track line assist
the OBC and failure history file (Figure 22−7) when the
the pilot in a wings−level flight over the target.
TARPS advisory is displayed on the MFD:
PTP steering is deselected when the aircraft has flown
1. TARP1 Reports a general failure (crew alert) 0.5 nm past the target or the crew manually deselects PTP on
from the CPS. the reconnaissance MFD RECON DATA status format. At
this time, all steering cues are removed from the HUD and
2. TARP2 Reports a data communication failure VDI. In addition, the DSPT (waypoint 17) is removed from
between the mission computer and the CPS. This the HUD.
means that the annotation data and control signals
are no longer being transmitted to TARPS. 22.4.3.2 Command Course Steering
22.4.3 Reconnaissance Steering Selection CCRS is selectable if the navigation system is properly
operating and the selected waypoint to be reconnoitered has
There are three reconnaissance steering modes avail a nonzero value for target length. When the above conditions
able: PTP, CCRS, and mapping. They are selected via the are satisfied, the selection of CCRS on the MFD RECON
MFD RECON DATA status format in either TLN, A/G, or DATA status format will box CCRS. Immediately following
A/A. The steering function is initiated when a TARPS that, TARPS will compute the DSPT, which is displayed on
steering mode is selected. Steering cues will always be the HSD format, and the complete set of steering cues (the
computed when a steering mode is selected and will be reconnaissance steering symbol, CGTL, reconnaissance
displayed on the HUD except in A/A with a weapon selected. target designator, and reconnaissance command heading
The VDI will always display steering cues. marker) to guide the aircraft to fly over the target at a
Before a steering mode can be selected, the waypoint command crossing angle (stored in the waypoint file). When
must be selected. In order to do so, the up−down arrow on the the aircraft approaches the wings−level position (indicated
MFD RECON DATA status format is used to select the when the DSPT initiates movement to the target), the CGTL
desired waypoint number. Next, by hitting ENT, the desired will appear to provide additional visual cues for proper target
waypoint parameters will be displayed. Waypoint 17 is crossing.
inhibited for reconnaissance steering since this waypoint
contains the position of the DSPT. Note
PTP would be selected (instead of CCRS) if the
22.4.3.1 Point−to−Point Steering
target length is zero.
PTP is selected when the navigation system is properly CCRS steering is deselected when the aircraft has
operating. Selecting PTP on the reconnaissance MFD flown the target length (stored in the waypoint file) past the
RECON DATA status format immediately computes the target or when the crew manually deselects CCRS on the
wings−level position for the initial placement of the DSPT MFD RECON DATA status format. As in PTP, all steering
and computes a heading to command the pilot to fly to that cues are removed from the HUD and VDI. In addition, the
position. DSPT (waypoint 17) is removed from the HSD.
Note
The wings−level distance is approximately 4 to 8
nm from target (depends on velocity and
altitude).
22−11 ORIGINAL
Figure 227.MFD OBC/Maintenance Failure Formats
ORIGINAL 22−12
22.4.3.3 Mapping Steering The HUD/VDI symbols are listed and displayed in
Figure 22−8, Figure 22−9, and Figure 22−10.
MAP is selectable under the following conditions:
1. Navigation system is properly operating. 22.5 RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM OPERATION

The RIO is primarily responsible for the entry of
2. The selected waypoint to be reconnoitered has a reconnaissance parameters for waypoints and selection/
nonzero value for target length. operation of TARPS sensors. In addition, the RIO may assist
in updating the INS just prior to flying over the target and
3. The two map parameters, map offset (separation
plotting the target leg (in CCRS and MAP modes) on the
distance between adjacent map legs) and map lines, HSD.
are nonzero values.
When the above conditions are satisfied, the selection 22.5.1 Reconnaissance Parameter Entry
of MAP on the MFD RECON DATA status format will box
Reconnaissance parameters are entered into the way
MAP. TARPS will then compute the DSPT (displayed on the
point file (Figure 22−11 and Figure 22−12) by the RIO via the
HSD) and the complete set of steering cues (the
DEU. The maximum number of waypoints available for
reconnaissance steering symbol, CGTL, reconnaissance
reconnaissance is 19. (Waypoint 17 is reserved for the
target designator, and reconnaissance command heading
dynamic steering point. Waypoints 18 to 20 have dual
marker).
functions as recce files or as hostile area, FLRP, and data
MAP steering includes guidance through the required link.) In addition to the standard waypoint entry (target
90_ to 270_ turn maneuvers, using command heading and latitude, longitude, and altitude), the following reconnais
steering symbology, for the necessary return legs of the sance parameters are entered: command crossing angle,
reconnaissance missions. target length, map lines, and map offset (separation distance
between adjacent map legs). The altitude entered is the target
Note MSL altitude. The target length is entered via the DEU.
Figure 22−13 shows TARPS DEU entry matrix.
D PTP would be selected if only condition 1 was
valid. Insufficient parameters are available Note
for mapping.
D A target altitude of 0 is considered invalid. In
D CCRS would be selected if only conditions 1
the event that the radar altimeter and radar
and 2 were valid.
altitude from APG−71 is not available, then
MAP is deselected at the completion of the last map leg the AGL altitude will be the difference be
or when manually deselected by the crew on the MFD tween the system altitude and hostile area alti
RECON DATA status format. When MAP is deselected, the tude (and not the waypoint altitude).
following will occur: removal of the reconnaissance overlay
D Entries of odd tenths will be rounded to the
symbols (CGTL, reconnaissance command heading marker,
next lowest even digit.
reconnaissance target designator, and reconnaissance steer
ing symbol) from the HUD and VDI; removal of the DSPT
22.5.1.1 Reconnaissance Parameter Display
from the HSD; and MAP LINES REM (on the MFD RECON
DATA status format) will be zero. Reconnaissance parameters are displayed on the MFD
RECON WPT DATA 1 (Figure 22−11) and MFD RE−CON
22.4.4 HUD/VDI Symbology WPT DATA 2 formats (Figure 22−12). MFD RE−CON WPT
DATA 1 format contains the reconnaissance parameters for
The HUD/VDI symbology is available when there is a
the first ten waypoints. This page is selected by depressing
valid selection of reconnaissance steering. This symbology
the R−1 pushbutton on the MFD RECON DATA status
consists of the following functions:
format. The RECON WPT DATA 2 format contains the
1. Displays reconnaissance steering cues and sensor remaining ten waypoint reconnaissance parameters. These
status to the HUD when valid steering is selected parameters are accessed by depressing the R−2 pushbutton on
and the aircraft is not in A/A with a weapon selected the MFD RECON DATA status format.
(Figure 22−8 and Figure 22−9). The reconnaissance parameters consist of command
crossing angle, target length, map lines, and map separation
2. Displays reconnaissance steering cues on the VDI distance (map offset).
when the VDI is selected (Figure 22−8).
22−13 ORIGINAL
Figure 228.HUD/VDI Reconnaissance Symbology (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 22−14
1 Recon Command Indicates the magnetic heading for Recon steering.

Heading Marker
Primary steering cue for initial phase of PTP steering.
Indicates intended magnetic heading to DSPT (as commanded by the
Recon Steering Symbol).
2 Recon Steering Symbol Provides command bank information via azimuth displacement from velocity
vector.
3 Target Designator, Displays target position referenced to the aircraft navigation system.
Hexagon
4 Command Ground Displays the path of the command ground track. Indicates cross track
Track Line (CGTL) displacement error.
Camera Selection Displays the camera operational mode. First letter indicates frame position:
Legend V = vertical, F = forward, blank = not selected.
Second letter indicates pan position: C = center, R = right, L = left, or
blank = not selected.
Third letter indicates IRLS position: N = narrow field of view; W = wide field
of view; S = Standby; or blank = not selected.
(Note This is only available on the HUD)
Note
When weapon is selected in A/A, the Recon Steering Symbol set (which
includes the Recon Steering Symbol; GCTL; Recon Target Designator,
and Recon Command Heading Marker) will be displayed on the VDI.
Figure 22−8. HUD/VDI Reconnaissance Symbology (Sheet 2 of 2)
22−15 ORIGINAL
Figure 229.HUD Reconnaissance Display (Command Course Steering) (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 22−16
Figure 22−9. HUD Reconnaissance Display (Command Course Steering) (Sheet 2 of 2)
22−17 ORIGINAL
Figure 2210.Dynamic Steering Point Display
ORIGINAL 22−18
Figure 2211.MFD RECON WPT DATA 1 Format
Figure 2212.MFD RECON WPT DATA 2 Format
22−19 ORIGINAL
Figure 2213.DEU Reconnaissance Selection
ORIGINAL 22−20
22.5.2 In−Flight Entry of Reconnaissance 22.6 PILOT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATION

Waypoint Parameters
A sensor operating button is provided on the pilot
The RIO may update the waypoint file at any time control stick. With the SYSTEM switch on the controller
when a reconnaissance steering mode is engaged, without processor signal unit set to RDY and any or all sensor selector
affecting the current steering. In order for the pilot to use the switches in the ready position, the activated sensor can be
updated reconnaissance parameters, he must reselect the cycled by the pilot pressing the BOMB button on the control
steering mode. stick. This is the only TARPS control capability provided to
the pilot. Each camera will cycle at its proper rate for
22.5.3 One−Fix Update velocity/height ratio (V/H) and the IRLS will run
continuously at the proper speed until the pilot releases the
Unless the aircraft is flying in a JTIDS net, it is BOMB button.
recommended that one−fix position update be performed just
prior to flying over the intended target to minimize miss Note
distance. Refer to Chapter 20 for the procedures for one−fix
position updates. The BOMB button will not initiate camera
operation with the expanded chaff adapter
22.5.4 Plotting Command Course/Map Target Leg installed.
This optional procedure provides the flightcrew with
additional steering cue/information on the HSD. If a file 22.6.1 Navigation Visual Surface
waypoint is available, the RIO may use this waypoint to mark Waypoint Update
the end of a target leg by performing the following steps: Unless the aircraft is flying in a JTIDS net, it is
recommended that the one−fix position update be performed
1. On the DEU, select WPT and enter the designated just prior to flying over the intended target to minimize miss
waypoint for reconnaissance. distance. Refer to one−fix position update in Chapter 20 for
INS update operations.
2. Select RNG and enter the target length of the
reconnoitered target.
22.6.2 Pilot TARPS Steering
3. Select BRG and enter the command course of the TARPS aircraft steering is displayed on the VDI and on
reconnoitered target. the HUD in A/G and A/A (weapon not selected). The VDI is
selected via the MFD RECON DATA status format.
4. Press SET and enter the number of the available
(or free) waypoint. HUD TARPS steering using TARPS symbology
(Figure 22−9) is obtained by selecting a reconnaissance
5. Select MENU. steering mode (PTP, CCRS, or MAP) on the reconnaissance
MFD RECON DATA status format.
6. Select PLOT.
Note
7. Select DRAW. The DEU will respond
Plot from . . ." Enter waypoint number to which In addition to the steering cues, the reconnais
aircraft is flying. When DEU responds Plot to . . . ," sance target designator will be positioned on the
enter the waypoint number used in step 4. HUD/VDI to indicate actual target position. (It is
recommended to perform a surface waypoint up
22.5.5 Cycling Sensors date to the navigation system to ensure that the
reconnaissance target designator will overlay the
The RIO will put the FILM switch on the CPS in the expected target site.) Steering is accomplished
RUN position when the RANGE−TO−GO goes to zero or by noting the direction that the reconnaissance
transitions to RANGE REMAINING. The RIO will turn off steering symbol is displaced from the velocity
the selected sensors when RANGE REMAINING goes to vector. Banking the aircraft in the same direction
zero. to achieve and maintain alignment of the two
symbols will produce the desired flightpath. If in
PTP steering, match aircraft heading with recon
naissance command heading marker.
22−21 ORIGINAL
At the completion of a PTP, CCRS, or MAP mission, Note

the TARPS symbology will be removed from the HUD/ VDI.
In addition, the steering mode will become unboxed on the Valid target altitude is nonzero. An altitude of
MFD RECON DATA status format. There is no sequencing zero is considered invalid.
of waypoints. To steer to the next waypoint the desired
waypoint number must be selected. 4. Own−ship system altitude (hostile area)  Used
when the APN−194 and APG−71 derived altitude are
not available and the target altitude is invalid (way
point contains zero altitude). The AGL is calculated
as the navigation system altitude minus the hostile
area altitude. The hostile area altitude is chosen that
Following steering too closely can result in pilot represents the average terrain in the area of interest
fixation to the exclusion of safe altitude control. and inserted into the hostile area waypoint prior to
flight.
22.6.3 Identification of Targets Using In the event of data transmission failure or navigation
Television Camera Set system failure, as indicated by the DATA light on he CPS,
which is addressed by the TARPS advisory on the MFD, the
The aircrew can enhance their ability to identify
RIO must manually enter the velocity and AGL. This entry
ground targets by using the TCS. The TCS is slaved to the
of velocity (groundspeed) and AGL is facilitated via the
reconnaissance target line of sight when RADAR is selected
velocity and altitude thumbwheels on the CPS. Manual Vg/H
as MASTER on the SSP, MAN ACQ is selected on the DD,
(AGL) may be selected at any time by the RIO and should be
and wide field of view is selected.
used instead of steps 3 or 4 above when doubt exists also the
quality of the inputs.
22.6.4 Altitude (AGL) Mechanization
AGL information for F−14D/TARPS software calcula 22.7 SENSOR CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
tion of Vg/H uses following sources in the order given:
22.7.1 Lineal Coverage
1. APN−194 radar altimeter  This altitude source is
used under the following conditions (when the Total lineal coverage available for specific sensors
APN−194 is operating properly): depends on film load and altitude. Complete lineal coverage
data for all sensors will be provided in the F−14 Tactical
a. System altitude is less than 2,500 feet. Manual (NWP 3−22.5−F14A/B, NAVAIR 01−F14AAA−1T)
and Tactical Pocket Guide (NWP 3−22.5−F14A/B PG,
b. System altitude is between 2,500 and 5,000 feet NAVAIR 01−F14AAA−lT−3).
and radar altimeter is selected on the PDCP.
22.7.2 Serial Frame Camera
When the radar altimeter is being used, an R" is
The KS−87D serial frame camera has a fixed−focus,
placed by the altitude reading on the HUD/VDI.
6−inch focal length lens, weighs about 79 pounds, and can
(Figure 22−8)
hold up to 1,000 feet of 2.5 mil thick, 5−inch film.
2. APG−71 radar altitude  Altitude will be calculated The fixed focus is set at a hyperfocal distance of 1,339
using a 55_ lookdown angle, earth stabilized feet, which gives excellent imagery from about 750 feet to
antenna (TARPS AGR mode). This source will be medium altitudes. Below 750 feet, the imagery is less sharp
used if above 5,000 feet or the APN−194 is inopera but is still good down to about 500 feet. The KS−87D provides
tive. AGR must be selected on the MFD RECON a 41_ field of view with a 4.5 × 4.5−inch negative. A full
DATA status format. The radar altitude is being used 1,000−foot roll allows 2,400 exposures.
to compute the AGL when AGR is boxed (Figure
22−5). The RHA exposes a data block on each flame. The data
is encoded BCD, A/N, or alternate BCD and A/N. The data
3. Own−ship system altitude (selected waypoint)  block provides time, date, latitude, longitude, altitude, drift,
Used whenever the APN−194 and APG−71 derived heading, pitch, roll, classification (if known in advance), and
altitude are not available. AGL is calculated as a mission code. The BCD also provides Vg/H, which allows
system altitude minus selected waypoint altitude. the aircraft velocity to be calculated.
ORIGINAL 22−22
The KS−87D two−position mount allows the RIO to 22.7.3 Panoramic Camera
select vertical (VERT) or forward (FWD). In the vertical
The KA−99A is a 9−inch focal length, f/4.0 lens
position, the KS−87 backs up the pan camera and is also used
panoramic camera that provides high−quality, medium−to
for bomb damage assessment, route reconnaissance, and is
low−altitude imagery. Located in bay 2, the KA−99A offers
the primary camera for mapping missions. The forward
position looks 16_ down from the horizon and is very useful full horizon−to−horizon imagery with 55−percent overlap up
to a maximum of 1.06 Vg/H (8 cps). When external fuel tanks
for pilot’s view flightpath tracing and ship surveillance
are installed, the field of view is reduced about 25° on the
photography. Changing the mount position requires about 16
right and 17_ on the left. The film cassette will hold a
seconds and a mount fail indication will result if the transition
is not complete within 23 seconds. Frequent FWD−VERT maximum of 2,000 feet of film. A single exposure measures
4.5 × 28 inches, and a data code block appears between each
switching can cause the mechanical drive to overheat and
frame. The camera will indicate FAIL when the film load is
seize, resulting in a mount fail. The mount will automatically
move to vertical when the SYSTEM switch is at RDY and the down to approximately 40 exposures, preventing the film
bitter end from going through the high−speed drive gears and
FRAME switch is turned OFF, or if the landing gear handle
causing camera damage. The KA−99A will automatically
is moved to DN.
focus down to approximately 500 feet but will revert to a
The KS−87D can be reloaded or replaced in approxi focus altitude of 6,000 feet if the TARPS program fails to
mately 10 minutes and with the aircraft’s engines tuning, if input and there is no manual input of V/H from the CPS.
necessary.
The RIO may select CTR, LEFT, or RIGHT for the
Figure 22−14 summarizes some specific characteristics KA−99A on the CPS. When LEFT or RIGHT is selected, the
and information on the KS−87D serial frame camera. camera uses only the light sensor on the side selected
Focal length 6 inches

Diaphragm range f 2.8 to 6.7
Field of view 41_ × 41_
Negative Format 4.5 × 4.5 inches
Vg/H Range* 0.01 to 1.18
Maximum Cycle Rate 6 cycles per second
Effective Shutter Speeds 1/60 to 1/3,000
Filters Yellow, red, or none
Angle of View Vertical or Forward (16_ below horizon)
Hyperfocal Distance** 1339 feet (fixed focus)
*Vg/H is listed as a knots per foot of altitude ratio (computed for vertical camera position only).
The DDS is capable of generating a maximum of 1.42 Vg/H.
**The hyperfocal distance is the distance from the optical center of the lens to the nearest point of acceptable
sharp focus, when focused at infinity. The sensor may be effectively used well below the hyperfocal distance,
but will render increasingly soft imagery at lower altitudes.
The automatic exposure control (AEC) system uses an external light meter. The AEC can be overridden
(plus−or−minus one F−stop) on the CPS.
The mount requires approximately 16 seconds to move the camera from vertical to forward, or back to verti
cal. The CPS will display a mount fail light if the transition is not completed within 23 seconds.
Optional 3−inch focal length lens available.
Figure 2214.KS−87D Serial Frame Camera Characteristics
22−23 ORIGINAL
instead of averaging the two as it does when CTR is selected; 2. Medium−altitude standoff (610 mm/24−inch focal
in addition, the cycle rate and FMC are based on the slant length standoff configuration)
range distance from aircraft to the ground at a 30_ depression The 24−inch standoff configuration will be utilized to
angle. To avoid degraded imagery, do not use LEFT or replace the KA−93C LOROP sensor and will be mounted in
RIGHT settings below 1,500−foot altitude. The KA−99A can bay 2 of the TARPS pod in lieu of the KA−99.
be set for air to air (focus on infinity, no FMC, and 1 cycle per
second) on the CIPDU. There is no cockpit indication that The KS−153A features true angle corrected FMC
air−to−air settings have been selected. The KA−99 is favored across the entire film format for any oblique angle; automatic
by flightcrews on combat missions because its horizon−to− range focus from 1,000 feet to infinity, and self−contained
horizon lateral coverage allows it to be used with a automatic temperature/pressure focus compensation; shutter
considerable offset. This capability increases the flight priority automatic exposure control using preflight setting of
crew’s probability of successfully completing the mission in aerial film speed and aircraft V/H signal; 12−or 56−percent
defended areas where evasive combat maneuvering will be preflight−selectable overlap; roll compensation; and data
necessary. Although it is not necessary for the aircraft to be annotation. The 4.5−inch × 9−inch film format provides
flown wings level when photographing a target with the sequential frames 10.7_ along−track and 21.4_ across−track
KA−99 camera, the lack of roll−rate stabilization dictates that coverage on 9.5−inch wide film. This image format reduces
an established angle of bank be maintained while the target processing time and allows direct stereo viewing without
is within the camera’s FOV. cutting the film.
Figure 22−15 summarizes some specific characteristics The KS−153A can be programmed for any desired
and information on the KA−99A panoramic camera. depression angle from horizon to horizon, limited in
coverage only by the aircraft fuel tanks (17_ left, 25_ right).
22.7.4 Long−Range Oblique Photography Camera Typically, the KS−153A will be preprogrammed for the
(KS−153A With 610−mm Lens) following three depression angles: 27_ left oblique, vertical,
The KS−153A still picture camera set is a modular, and 31° right oblique. These are selected using the LEFT,
CTR, and RIGHT positions on the CPS PAN camera control
pulse−operated, sequential−frame camera designed for
switch. When selected, a 21.4_ scan will be used, centered
oblique or vertical reconnaissance photography at medium to
about the preset oblique angle. Depression angles cannot be
high altitude. Two configurations are available:
changed in flight.
1. Low−altitude, high−speed photography (80 mm Figure 22−16 summarizes some specific characteristics
focal length tri−lens configuration) and information on the KS−153A standoff camera.
Focal Length 9 inches

Maximum Aperture f/4.0
Field Of View 28_ × 180_
Negative Format 4.5 × 28 inches
Vg/H Range 0.5 to 1.06
Maximum Cycle Rate 8 cycles per second
Effective Shutter Speeds 1/43 to 1/22,600
Filters Yellow, red, or clear
Forward Overlap CTR 55% at NADIR; L/R 55% at 30_ below side horizon
Film Load 2,000 feet (2.5 mil); 800 exposures (750 usable)
Note
• The Automatic Exposure Control (AEC) system uses internally mounted light
meters which average the scanned field. AEC can be overridden
(± 1 Fstop) in−flight with the CPS.
• Sensor does not have roll stabilization, thus aircraft rolling will alter angle of
view and may blur imagery.
• Maximum listed Vg/H can be exceeded, but the imagery will be degraded by
incorrect FMC and reduced overlap.
Figure 2215.KA−99A Panoramic Camera Characteristics
ORIGINAL 22−24
Focal Length 24 inches/610 mm

Angular Field Of View 21.4 across track, 10.7 along track
Film Format 4.5 × 9.5 inches
Image Frame Format 9.06 inches across track, 4.53 inches along
track
Frame overlap (preflight selected) 12% or 56%
Film Capacity 200 feet of 2.5 mil /2.47 frames per foot
(500 feet optional)
Aperture Range f/4 to f/16 continuously
Maximum Cycle Rate 4 frames per second
Average Resolution 75 Lp/mm, EK 3412
Shutter Speed Range 1/150 to 1/2,000 sec
Film Speed (preflight setting) AFS 0 to AFS 999
Linear Coverage (200 feet film @ 30K, 12 nm 467 nm
standoff @ 56% overlap)
Weight (500 foot cassettes without film) 233 pounds
V/R Rate 0 − 0.196 knots/foot @ 56%
0 − 0.39 knots/foot @ 12%
1.25 knots/foot maximum
Camera Oblique Rotation (24 inch) +/ 86° of vertical
Angle of View (preflight adjustable) Vertical and left/right (at selected depression
angles)
Note
• Optional yellow, red, orange, or clear filters.
• Shutter priority automatic exposure control by preflight film speed setting and air
craft V/H signal, accuracy ½ f/stop.
• Sensor will automatically compensate for altitude pressure (sea level to 5,000 feet)
and temperature (25°C to 45°C stable within +/− 2°C).
• Sensor produces a LED matrix array data block with a 3 millisecond write time.
Figure 2216.KS−153A Still Picture Camera Characteristics (610−Mm Standoff Configuration)
22−25 ORIGINAL
22.7.5 Photographic Film color films are reversed in the processing, so that they
reproduce the colors in the original scene without printing.
Film can be separated by general type as follows:
These films are termed reversal or transparency film. CDIR
color film is used to show contrasts between live vegetation
1. Black and white film:
and camouflage material. This greatly increases the chances
a. Aerial film speed of locating difficult targets. Aerial color films require
expensive, complex processing that is not generally available
b. Resolution at sea.
c. Spectral sensitivity 22.7.6 Digital Data System
2. Color film: The reconnaissance pod carries a digital data system

that interfaces with the aircraft inertial navigational system,
a. Aerial film speed altimeters, computers, and standard heading reference
system to automatically control and integrate the reconnais
b. Negative/reversal sance system.
c. Camouflage detection infrared. Reconnaissance system control is accomplished by the

data converter. Sensor stabilization signals and operating rate
Film speed is a value assigned to a specific film to voltages are generated and routed to the sensors. Stabiliza
enable you to determine the correct exposure in various light tion signals are provided from the inertial navigation system,
conditions. High−speed films are required for low−available− or, if it fails, from the SAHRS. Operating rate signals are
light missions and for high−speed, low−level missions where determined from inertial navigation and radar altimeter
very fast shutter speeds are required. High−resolution films inputs. A semiautomatic backup method of generating Vg/H
provide greater detail but require more light. A film’s signals is available if the inertial navigation system fails. A
spectral sensitivity means some colors will reproduce on the fully manual option is available through the CPS if other
film better than other colors. Most of the common black and components (including the data converter) fail. Maximum
white films are panchromatic: sensitive to all three primary automatic Vg/H is 1.42 knots per foot.
colors (red, green, and blue) that are found in normal
daylight. Since the red light does not scatter in haze as much If the aircraft is carrying a TARPS pod, flying below
as blue, contrast filters are used to reduce the blue light. A sea level causes the MAN Vg/H light on the CPS panel to be
yellow filter will pass the green and red light, eliminating the lit. This light goes out when AGL becomes positive. Without
scattered blue light. A red filter will pass only the red light, a TARPS pod on the aircraft, negative AGL does not light the
eliminating the scattered blue and also the green (which MAN Vg/H light CADC or computer failure, however,
scatters less than the blue). However, the yellow filter will causes the light to be lit with or without a pod aboard.
normally require one additional f/stop of exposure and the Reconnaissance system integration is accomplished
dark red filter will normally require two additional f/stops of through digital information from the data converter, which is
exposure. Some black and white films have extra sensitivity translated into binary or alphanumeric form and added to
to infrared light. This film is most helpful in producing preset information and real time, which is adjusted prior to
contrast detail between some objects that would tend to blend flight. Code matrix boxes are printed on all imagery in either
with normal films. Most notable would be the difference binary or alphanumeric form. Integration information in
between water and vegetation. Color films produce greater cludes data, squadron and detachment, sortie, sensor identifi
shadow detail than black and white films and show color cation, system altitude, heading, roll, pitch, latitude, longi
separation in some objects that would reproduce at the same tude, radar altitude, time, inertial navigation system status,
density on black and white film. However, color film has less relative drift to ground track, and Vg/H.
fine resolution to show very intricate detail in a target. Some
ORIGINAL 22−26
CHAPTER 23
Navigation Command
and Control Grid
23.1 NAVIGATION COMMAND 23.1.1.1 DEU Data Entry Procedures

AND CONTROL GRID (See Figure 23−1)
NAV GRID enhances fleet air defense by providing 1. From the DEU menu page, select NAV GRID.
navigation command and control information during combat
air patrol operations and for fleet defense of a specific fixed 2. Using the NAV GRID page, enter the following
position. NAV GRID provides aircraft position relative to a parameters:
geographic reference point (grid origin) that is common to all
fleet defense units. This eliminates dependence on naviga a. Latitude and longitude (LAT, LONG) of grid
tion aids such as TACAN for position reference during AAW origin, or range and bearing (RNG, BRG) from
operations. Combat air patrols using NAV GRID can report own−aircraft to grid origin.
target contacts using grid coordinates or range and bearing
relative to grid origin in addition to normal reports referenced b. Threat axis heading (HDG) (0_ to 359_).
to own−aircraft position.
c. Grid coverage angle (COVR) (0_ to 180°).
23.1.1 NAV GRID Data Entry
d. Number of grid sectors (SECT) (1 to 6).
In order to display a NAV GRID, the RIO must first
define the following parameters: 23.1.1.2 DD Data Entry Procedures
1. Grid origin, either in latitude and longitude coordi 1. On the DD, press the MFK pushtile to bring up the
nates or as a range and bearing from own−aircraft. MFK menu on the display.
2. Grid heading (threat axis), in degrees, from 0° to 2. On the MFK menu, select the SPL legend to bring
359_ (magnetic). up the SPL menu on the display.
3. Grid coverage angle (threat sector, in degrees, from 3. Select NAV GRID legend on the SPL menu
0° to 180°). Grid heading will always define the (Figure23−2).
center of the total grid coverage.
4. On the DD keyboard, enter:
4. Number of grid sectors, from 1 to 6. Total grid cov
erage angle divided by the number of sectors yields a. Latitude and longitude (LAT, LONG) of grid ori
the angular coverage of each sector. gin, or range and bearing (RNG, BRG) from own−
aircraft to grid origin.
Grid parameters can be entered via the DEU or the DD
computer address panel. The DEU NAV GRID parameters b. Azimuth scan coverage (grid coverage angle)
are used for NAV GRID entries and are the primary entry (ALT) (0_ to 180_).
device with the DD as the backup.
c. Azimuth scan center (threat axis heading) (HDG)
(0_ to 359_).
d. Number of grid sectors (NBR) (1 to 6).
23−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 231.DEU NAV GRID Data Entry  Typical
ORIGINAL 23−2
Figure 232.DD NAV GRID Data Entry
23.1.2 NAV GRID Displays (threat axis) with each sector bounded by two strobes. Short
tic marks on the strobes represent 50−mile increments from
NAV GRID can be displayed independently on both the
grid origin; longer tic marks represent 100−mile increments.
TSD and PTID in either a ground−stabilized or aircraft−stabi
A maximum of seven range tics (350 miles) is displayed.
lized format.
When the grid contains six sectors, no range tics are
displayed on the center strobe.
23.1.2.1 Programmable Tactical Information
Display Selectable range scales are 25, 50, 100, 200, and 400
in either stabilized mode. A PTID offset can be utilized to
The PTID NAV GRID display is enabled by selecting reposition own−aircraft anywhere on the display. The grid is
the A/C STAB position of the PTID mode switch. Selecting repositioned accordingly and may only be partially displayed
this position directly from ATTK results in an aircraft− (Figure 23−3, details B and C). Offset positioning is canceled
stabilized NAV GRID. Own aircraft is fixed at the bottom by momentarily cycling out of the selected STAB mode.
center of the PTID with the top of the display oriented to
own−aircraft magnetic heading (Figure 23−3, detail A). Tactical use of the NAV GRID often makes it desirable
to reference tracks, waypoints, or own−aircraft position as a
A ground−stabilized NAV GRID display on the PTID range and bearing from grid origin rather than from
is achieved by moving the PTID MODE switch to GND own−aircraft. This is accomplished by RIO selection of NAV
STAB then to A/C STAB. Own aircraft is initially displayed GRID on the DD (SPL category) as shown in Figure 23−2.
at the center of the PTID. The top of the PTID is oriented to
magnetic north. Own−aircraft and sensor tacks transit the 23.1.2.2 Tactical Situation Display
display in the direction of magnetic heading at own−aircraft
groundspeed while the grid and any waypoint positions The TSD format can be selected on any MFD. NAV
remain fixed (Figure 23−3, detail B). GRID can be selected for display via the GRID pushtile on
the TSD DCL format (Figure 23−4). Like the PTID, the TSD
The grid itself is represented by grid strobes emanating
from grid origin. Grid center is oriented to grid heading
23−3 ORIGINAL
Figure 233.PTID NAV GRID Displays
ORIGINAL 23−4
Figure 234.TSD NAV GRID Display
can display the NAV GRID in either ground or aircraft− The grid itself is displayed as on the PTID with up to
stabilized formats as selected by the GSTAB or ASTAB six sectors defined by strobes emanating from grid origin and
pushtiles. The ASTAB display has own−aircraft position centered on grid heading (threat axis). Short and long tic
fixed on the lower third of the display with the top of the marks represent 50−and 100−mile increments, respectively.
display representing own−aircraft magnetic heading. The Any TSD range scale (25, 50, 100, 200, or 400) is selectable.
GSTAB display initializes with own−aircraft at the center of Future software will include an OFF−SET and EXPAND
the display. The top of the display represents magnetic capability for all TSD formats. Unlike the PTID, bearing and
north.Own−aircraft and sensor tracks transit the display based range data hooked tracks or waypoints cannot be referenced
on magnetic heading and groundspeed while the grid and any to grid origin.
waypoint positions remain fixed.
23−5 (Reverse
PART IX
Flightcrew Coordination
Chapter 37 Flightcrew Coordination
Chapter 38 Aircraft Self−Test

CHAPTER 37
Flightcrew Coordination
37.1 INTRODUCTION will normally be responsible for all communications except

in tactical situations as designated in squadron SOP.
The duties of the pilot and RIO are necessarily
integrated. The performance of one crewmember contributes
37.2.4 Mission Commander
to the performance of the other. Successful crew interaction
can provide cockpit synergy that significantly improves The mission commander may be either a pilot or a RIO.
mission success. However, a pilot/ RIO team that does not The mission commander shall be qualified in all phases of the
interact successfully can be a major detriment to mission assigned mission and be designated by the unit commanding
success. In this chapter, specific responsibilities are delin officer. When the assigned mission commander is a RIO, they
eated for each phase of flight. Specific mission flightcrew shall be responsible for all phases of the assigned mission
responsibilities are also delineated. except those aspects of safety of flight that are directly
related to the physical control of the aircraft. The mission
37.2 PILOT AND RIO RESPONSIBILITIES commander shall direct a coordinated plan of action and shall
be responsible for the effective execution of that plan.
37.2.1 Aircrew Coordination
37.2.5 Specific Responsibilities
Aircrew coordination is the flightcrew’s use and
integration of all available skills and resources in order to
37.2.5.1 Flight Planning
collectively achieve and maintain crew efficiency, situation
awareness, and mission effectiveness. Integration of the
37.2.5.1.1 Pilot
flightcrew’s activities will provide error protection through
human redundancy. Crew coordination is one of the most The pilot is responsible for the preparation of required
significant factors contributing toward mission success. charts, flight logs, and navigation computations including
fuel planning, checking weather and NOTAMS, and for filing
37.2.2 Pilot Responsibilities required flight plans.
The pilot is the aircraft commander and responsible for 37.2.5.1.2 RIO
the safe and orderly flight of the aircraft and the well−being
of the crew. In the absence of direct orders from higher The RIO is responsible for the preparation of charts,
authority cognizant of the mission, responsibility for starting flight logs, navigation computations including fuel planning,
or continuing a mission with respect to the weather, mission checking NOTAMs, obtaining weather for filing purposes,
environment, or any other condition affecting the safety of and completing required flight plans.
the aircraft rests with the pilot.
37.2.5.2 Briefing
37.2.3 Radar Intercept Officer Responsibilities The briefing shall include confirmation that those tasks
The RIO constitutes an extension of the pilot’s delineated in paragraph 37.2.5.1 have been or will be
observation facilities. By effective communication, the RIO accomplished.
should anticipate rather than await developments in flight.
The RIO will be a safety backup for the pilot. In this capacity, 37.2.5.2.1 Mission Commander
the RIO shall offer constructive comments and recommenda
tions, as necessary, throughout the mission in order to The mission commander, pilot or RIO, is responsible
maintain the safest and most effective flight environment. for briefing all crewmembers on all aspects of the mission to
The RIO will be responsible for the reading of appropriate be flown. Refer to Chapter 6 of this manual for specific items.
checklists utilizing a challenge and reply system. The RIO
37−1 ORIGINAL
37.2.5.3 Preflight 37.2.5.6.2 RIO

At completion of the emergency generator check, the
37.2.5.3.1 Pilot
RIO will perform the poststart checks prescribed in NAVAIR
The pilot is responsible for accepting and preflighting 01−F14AAD−1B. When OBC is completed and the inertial
the assigned aircraft and coordinating preflight operational navigation system aligned, the RIO informs the pilot, Ready
checks in accordance with this manual and appropriate to taxi."
preflight checks contained in NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B, the
F14−D NATOPS Pocket Checklist. 37.2.5.7 Pretakeoff
37.2.5.3.2 RIO 37.2.5.7.1 Pilot

The RIO will be capable of and proficient in perform The pilot will execute Pretakeoff, Instrument, and
ing a complete aircraft preflight, including armament, in Takeoff Checklists prescribed in NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B
accordance with this manual and appropriate preflight and as posted in the aircraft. The pilot will report to the RIO
checklists contained in NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B, the F14−D Takeoff Checklist items, using the challenge−reply method.
NATOPS Pocket Checklist. The pilot will receive the Ready for takeoff" report from the
RIO and advise him of type and configuration takeoff
37.2.5.4 Prestart planned, prior to rolling or catapulting. The pilot will report
Rolling" or Saluting," as appropriate, to the RIO.
37.2.5.4.1 Pilot
37.2.5.7.2 RIO
The pilot will execute prestart checks prescribed in
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B and, when external power is The RIO will execute Pretakeoff Checklists prescribed
applied and checks requiring external power are completed, in NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B; will initiate, using the
will inform the RIO Prestart checks completed. Ready to challenge−reply method, the posted Takeoff Checklist in the
start." aircraft; and, at completion of the Takeoff Checklist, RIO
informs the pilot Ready for takeoff."
37.2.5.4.2 RIO
37.2.5.8 Takeoff and Departure
The RIO will execute prestart checks prescribed in
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B and, when external power is
37.2.5.8.1 Pilot
applied, will inform the pilot Prestart checks completed."
The pilot shall ensure that the intercom remains in HOT
37.2.5.5 Starting MIKE for normal flight operations and will report Gear up"
and Flaps up" to the RIO insofar as safety permits. The RIO
37.2.5.5.1 Pilot should be advised of any unusual occurrences during takeoff
that may affect safety of flight. The pilot or RIO will request,
The pilot will start engines as prescribed in para− copy, and acknowledge all clearances.
graph 7.4.3 and will keep the RIO informed of any unusual
occurrences. 37.2.5.8.2 RIO
37.2.5.5.2 RIO Where departures are made in actual instrument
conditions, the RIO will monitor the published clearance
The RIO will remain alert for any emergency signal departure procedures and inform the pilot of any deviation
from the groundcrew and will inform the pilot if such signals from the prescribed flightpath. The RIO will copy all
are observed. clearances received and at all times be prepared to provide the
pilot with clearance information and/or navigational informa
37.2.5.6 Poststart tion derived from the RIO’s instruments. Built−in−test checks
will not be conducted during instrument climbouts.
37.2.5.6.1 Pilot
At completion of the emergency generator check, the 37.2.5.9 In Flight (General)
pilot will inform the RIO Emergency generator check
complete." The pilot will complete all poststart checks 37.2.5.9.1 Pilot
prescribed in NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B and coordinate with The pilot will inform the RIO of any unusual occur
the RIO the initiation of OBC. rences and will ensure that the aircraft is operated within
ORIGINAL 37−2
prescribed operating limitations at all times. The pilot or RIO descents (VFR or IFR), the RIO will report to the pilot the
will normally request, copy, and acknowledge all clearances. aircraft descent through each 5,000 feet of altitude above
5,000 feet and each 1,000 feet of altitude loss below 5,000
37.2.5.9.2 RIO feet, until, on reaching the desired altitude, the RIO will
report when altitude error exceeds 10 percent of actual
The RIO will assist the pilot in normal or emergency altitude or ±300 feet.
situations, including navigation, communication, and visual
lookout. The RIO will inform the pilot of the weapon system
37.2.5.12 Landing
status. During ascent or descent, the RIO will inform the pilot
1,000 feet prior to the intended level−off altitude.
37.2.5.12.1 Pilot
37.2.5.10 Intercept The pilot will utilize the Landing checklist and will
report each item to the RIO prior to reporting Gear down,
37.2.5.10.1 Pilot hook down" to the final controller, tower, or Pri−Fly. The pilot
will receive a Ready to land" report from the RIO.
The pilot will maneuver or coordinate aircraft maneu
vers with, or as directed by, the RIO, observing normal
37.2.5.12.2 RIO
operating limitations. The pilot will inform the RIO of
weapons status, weapons selected and armed, and when the In the landing pattern, the pilot shall read and the RIO
target is sighted visually. The pilot will monitor aircraft acknowledge the posted Landing Checklist. The RIO shall
position from initial vector through breakaway by pigeons visually check the flap position and landing gear position by
information or navigational display. looking through the opening on the left side of the instrument
panel. The RIO will report Ready to land" to the pilot.
37.2.5.10.2 RIO Built−in−test checks shall not be conducted while in the
landing pattern.
The RIO will handle all communications from initial
vector through breakaway, excluding missile−away transmis
37.2.5.13 Postflight
sions; provide the pilot with descriptive commentary,
including weapon status and target aspect, if available; and
37.2.5.13.1 Pilot
direct and coordinate aircraft maneuvers with the pilot, as
necessary, to complete the intercept. The pilot will inform the RIO of any unusual occur
rences on the landing roll or arrestment. The pilot will report
37.2.5.11 Instrument Approaches flap and wing position to the RIO when clear of the runway
or landing area and will report when the wing is actuated. The
37.2.5.11.1 Pilot pilot will receive a Ready for Shutdown" report from the
RIO. The pilot will inform the RIO when shutting down
The pilot is responsible for the safe control of the engines. The pilot will conduct a postflight inspection of the
aircraft, the decision to commence the approach with the aircraft.
existing weather, and the selection of the type of approach to
be made. The pilot, before commencing any penetration, will
37.2.5.13.2 RIO
report to the RIO the completion of each item of the
Instrument Checklist. In addition, the pilot will challenge the The RIO will challenge the pilot on flap position if the
RIO Instrument Penetration Checklist, as to approach plate report is not received. When informed by the pilot that the
availability and corrected altimeter setting. wing has been actuated, the RIO will visually verify wing and
spoiler positioning. The RIO will complete the built−in−test
37.2.5.11.2 RIO checks remaining and secure that rear cockpit for shutdown,
then notify the pilot Ready for shutdown." The RIO will
The RIO will monitor aircraft instruments and assist the pilot in conducting a postflight inspection of the
appropriate approach plate during holding, penetration, and aircraft.
approach and shall be ready to provide the pilot with any
required information. He shall be particularly alert to advise Note
the pilot of deviations from the course of minimum altitudes The RIO will vacate the aircraft first and after the
prescribed on the approach plate. Built−in−test checks will not aircraft is on the ground, flight deck, or hangar
be conducted in actual instrument conditions. The RIO will deck, the pilot will exit. This is particularly
inform the pilot of the status of the radar and will do nothing important during shipboard operations.
to cause the display to be lost. During penetrations and/or
37−3 ORIGINAL
37.2.5.14 Debriefing 37.3.2.3 RIO

The pilot and RIO will complete the yellow sheet and The RIO will monitor formation separation and closure
all required debriefing forms. during joinup and advise the pilot when an unsafe situation
exists.
37.2.5.14.1 Maintenance
The pilot and RIO will complete the yellow sheet, BER 37.3.3 Training
card, and all other required maintenance debrief forms. The
crew will ensure a complete debrief is provided for all 37.3.3.1 Instructors
maintenance discrepancies. All instructors will be designated in formal directives
by unit commanding officers. In FRS the instructor will be
37.2.5.14.2 Mission charged with authority and responsibility to provide proper
The mission commander will be responsible for direction to pilot and RIO replacements to ensure safe and
conducting a thorough mission debrief to include the successful completion of each training mission. On training
accomplishment of mission goals, adherence to SOP/ROE/ missions where a pilot under instruction is the pilot in
NATOPS, intercockpit and flight communication, and con command, the instructor’s guidance shall be advisory in
flict resolution. nature and under no circumstance shall the pilot in command
be relieved of his authority and responsibility as aircraft
37.3 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS commander. Termination of the training or evaluation
portions of the flight for reasons of safety, unsatisfactory
37.3.1 Functional Checkflights performance, or material discrepancy shall be the instruc
tor’s prerogative.
The pilot and RIO shall brief with maintenance to
determine the discrepancies that were corrected and the goals 37.3.4 SAR
of the functional checkflight.
The mission commander, or senior member of the
37.3.1.1 Pilot flight should the mission commander be unavailable, shall
assume responsibility for the rescue operation until relieved
The pilot is responsible for adherence to all FCF
on scene or fuel dictates a return to base. The primary
procedures as described in NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1F, the
responsibility of the on−scene commander will be commu
Functional Checkflight Checklist.
nication of the downed crew’s position and condition to
37.3.1.2 RIO potential rescue aircraft or vessels. Additionally, the on−
scene commander will ensure search coordination, traffic
The RIO is responsible for monitoring the FCF control on the scene, and communication with the downed
procedures and the completion of specific tasking outlined in crews, if feasible.
NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1F, the Functional Checkflight
Checklist. 37.4 PROCEDURES, TECHNIQUES,
AND CHECKLISTS
37.3.2 Formation Flights
37.4.1 General
37.3.2.1 Formation Leader
Even though some of the procedures, techniques, and
A pilot will be designated the formation leader. The
checklists are specifically designed for the pilot and RIO, the
status of each member of the formation shall be briefed and
entire contents of the flight manual and pocket checklist
clearly understood prior to takeoff. As a minimum, formation should be thoroughly read, understood, discussed, and agreed
brief items shall include loss of sight, lost communication,
upon collectively by the pilot−RIO team. Discrepancies in
inadvertent IMC, and formation integrity. The formation
procedures or the need for additional procedures should be
leader is responsible for the safe and orderly conduct of the
brought to the attention of the NATOPS evaluator and/or
formation. This includes visual lookout, the separation instructor. Most of the procedures (individual and coordi
between aircraft within the formation and during transition
nated) are covered in this manual and are grouped under flight
periods, breakups, and rendezvous.
phases and/or categories. Aircraft systems descriptions, with
37.3.2.2 Pilot their individual operating criteria, are covered in Chapter 2.
Classified systems descriptions and procedures, and some
The pilot is responsible for the safe separation of his limitations information, are covered in the classified supple
aircraft and the other aircraft in the formation. Lead changes ment (NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1A). The pocket checklist
will include a positive acknowledgment by both pilots. (NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1B) contains the pilot and RIO
ORIGINAL 37−4
checklist items for preflight, prestart, start, poststart, takeoff, 37.4.3 RIO
built−in test, instrument and descent, emergency and post
flight procedures. Improper crew coordination is usually The RIO should monitor all critical flight parameters
an attributable factor to improperly executed emergency and read all applicable checklists in a challenge and reply
procedures. system. He should assist in navigation, communication, and
coordinate with outside agencies and aircraft, but not to the
37.4.2 Pilot detriment of the resolution of an emergency.
The pilot should relate to the RIO all indications rele

vant to an ongoing emergency. The pilot should assess the
situation, set emergency priority, and direct the RIO to effec
tively assist him.
37−5 (Reverse
CHAPTER 38
Aircraft Self−Test
38.1 AIRCRAFT SELF−TEST OVERVIEW available in all system modes and are used for
troubleshooting and maintenance purposes.
Aircraft self−test allows testing of the operational status
of all major avionics and radar subsystems and display of the
38.2 MASTER TEST PANEL CHECKS
results. This capability is also referred to as OBC throughout
this section. Figure 38−1 identifies the major components Master test checks are initiated by the pilot through the
associated with this function. Most of the status information MASTER TEST panel (Figure 38−3) on the right outboard
is derived from BIT implemented within the avionics and console. These tests check the operational status of specific
radar subsystems. All operational aspects of aircraft self−test aircraft systems basic to safety of flight and mission success.
are fully supported by the MCS if one of the mission The OBC, WG SWP, FLT GR UP, and FLT GR DN positions
computers has failed. are used on the deck only and are prevented from inadvertent
use in flight by the weight−on−wheels safety switches. The
There are two categories of test: (1) tests that are
remaining tests, except for emergency generator, which also
performed by the system automatically; (2) those that require
requires combined hydraulic pressure, can be done whenever
initiation by the flightcrew. Testing should be initiated by the
electrical power and cooling air are available. For details of
flightcrew as part of the normal preflight checkout to obtain
specific aircraft systems tests, refer to the applicable system
the overall status of each system. Figure 38−2 is a summary
description.
description for the various test types, including origin and
purpose. Avionics testing is controlled by the pilot and the
RIO primarily through the MFDs and cockpit control panels.
Radar testing is controlled by the RIO via the DD and PTID.
The majority of the displayed information is the result of each
subsystem performing a particular mode of BIT or the MCS
During ground operations, once the OBC
performing data bus or software configuration tests. On an
position is selected, do not deselect OBC until
automatic (i.e., periodically by the MCS) basis, subsystems
the program has completed the entire cycle.
are polled by the MCS in order to determine their operational
When the disable signal, which inhibits throttle
status. Operational status is displayed at a subsystem and
movement, is removed, the APC will run through
WRA level through a series of OBC formats on the MFDs.
its BIT and advance the throttles to greater than
Both current and historical equipment status is displayable.
80 percent.
Warning/caution/advisory cues are displayed on the MFDs
for critical equipment failures and overtemperature
Note
conditions. Details of radar subsystem failures are available
only on the DD and PTID. Avionics and radar failure
acronyms are displayed on the PTID during normal tactical D Before starting the test, depress the MASTER
operation. RESET button on the left vertical console to
turn off any caution or advisory lights
Aircraft self−test also allows examination of memory associated with the air data computer.
contents for WRAs that support a CSS capability. CSS is
controlled with the DEU and the results are displayed on the D In LTS, the MASTER CAUTION light will
MFDs. The radar subsystem provides a similar but limited flash unless there is a circuit failure within the
capability that is controlled via the DD. These features are caution advisory indicator, in which case the
light will be steady.
38−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 381.On−Board Checkout
ORIGINAL 38−2
NAME ORIGINATOR PURPOSE

Master Test Checks PILOT Selectable tests of instruments, fuel system, warning system
(lights), wingsweep, AOA
Onboard Checkout (OBC) PILOT and RIO Tests various avionics, flight controls, actuators, AICS, and
Sequences computers
Continuous Monitor AUTOMATIC Monitors majority of avionics and radar functions for in−flight or
on−deck failures. Typically performed every 2 seconds
Unit/Subsystem Self−test PILOT and RIO Independent testing of individual, or groups of functionally
related subsystems
Data Bus Tests AUTOMATIC Tests each data bus channel for each subsystem bussed
Software Configuration Test AUTOMATIC Tests the compatibility of subsystem software program loads
Figure 382.Test Types

38.2.1 MASTER TEST Switch Operation if the MASTER TEST switch is not rotated out
of the DFCS BIT position following completion
The master test check is made by pulling the knob up,
of a DFCS IBIT.
rotating to the desired position, and depressing it. After the
test is completed, the MASTER TEST switch must be pulled Electrical power for the master test panel comes from
up and deselected to deenergize the system. the left main dc bus through the MASTER TEST circuit
breaker (9H4) on the DC MAIN circuit breaker panel. When
operating on aircraft power or when external electrical power
is connected to the aircraft, cooling air must be supplied to
all avionic equipment before a test is initiated.
Cycling the CIU PH A, B, and C circuit breakers
(3E7, 4E1, and 4E2) with the MASTER TEST 38.3 ON−BOARD CHECKOUT
switch in or above the OBC position will cause OBC checks the operational status of the equipment
the DFCS BIT sequence to initiate. DFCS BIT listed in Figure 38−4. It provides fault isolation to the WRA
sequence tests and deflects various aircraft con level without the use of ground support equipment. The
trol surfaces, which could be a hazard to system automatically monitors all equipment providing an
unsuspecting ground personnel. initial, periodic, or operator−initiated mode of BIT in order
System status and test results are indicated on the to detect failures or command subsystems into test as a result
cockpit instruments: GO−NO GO lights on the master test of selections made with the MFD OBC display formats.
panel; warning, caution, and advisory lights in both cockpits; When a test is completed, the tested equipment responds with
and displays including MFDs and PTID. either a GO (when all tests have passed) or NO GO (when at
least one test has failed) for each WRA tested. Detected
The GO−NO GO indicator lights on the MASTER failures are processed by the MCS in order to maintain
TEST panel will illuminate only in LTS, FIRE DET/EXT, current status and a historical record of failure information.
EMERG GEN, and FLT GR UP. In the LTS test position, only Test status is also used to control the operation of the system
the bulbs in the GO−NO GO indicators are checked. In and is displayable on the MFDs. OBC formats present failure
EMERG GEN, FIRE DET/EXT, and FLT GR UP, a GO light acronyms for failed equipment only (i.e., the absence of a
indicates a valid test and a NO GO light indicates an failure acronym implies that the equipment is operational).
unsatisfactory test. The DFCS BIT switch position allows the A historical record of failures is maintained during the course
independent execution of DFCS IBIT. DFCS IBIT is armed of a flight and is displayable at any time on the FHF format
by raising the MASTER TEST switch and rotating it to the including during postflight operations by maintenance
DFCS BIT position. Depressing the MASTER TEST switch personnel. The historical record of failures should be cleared
while DFCS IBIT is armed will initiate DFCS IBIT. Results (erased from the FHF) prior to a mission by the flightcrew so
of this test are displayed through the caution/advisory lights, that only failures relevant to the current mission are retained
acronyms on the MFDs, and fault codes on the DCP. by the system.
Note
The DCP fault codes cannot be cleared while
DFCS IBIT is armed. This condition will occur
38−3 ORIGINAL
1 MASTER TEST switch OFF Disables test functions.

LTS Tums on caution, warning, and advisory lights; emergency
stores jettison button; GO and NO GO lights; landing gear
and hook transition lights; approach indexer FIRE warning
lights.
FIRE DET/EXT L and R FIRE warning lights illuminate. If a circuit problem
exists, the corresponding FIRE light will not illuminate.
Simultaneously, the fire extinguishing system initiates a self−
test. If tests pass, the GO light illuminates. If the
NO−GO light illuminates or if both or neither GO or NO−GO
lights illuminate, a failure exists in the system.
Note INST Decreases the RIO’s fuel counter to 2000 pounds,
illuminates the FUEL LOW, MASTER CAUTION, and
• The 10 second audio alarm
BINGO (if the pilot bingo counter set >2000 pounds) lights.
goes on.
Displays the following pilot cockpit indications.
• If EIG fails self test, the BIT RPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96%
segment to the left of the EGT EGT . . . . 960_C (initiates engine over temperature alarm)
legend remains illuminated FF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,500 pounds per hour
FUEL QTY . . . . . . . . . 2,000 ± 200 pounds(both cockpits)
WING SWEEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45_ ± 2.5_
AOA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 ± .5_ units
BINGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON (if Bingo set > 2,000)
FEED/WING/EXT FUEL QTY . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000 pounds
Figure 383.Master Test Panel (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 38−4
OBC Enables preflight testing when selected prior to

selecting a subsystem for test via the MFDs. Failure
acronyms are displayed on the MFDs.
EMERG GEN Activates automatic transfer feature of generator and

checks tie connectors. GO lights indicate satisfactory
check. If the NO GO light remains illuminated, a
malfunction is indicated.
WG SWP Air data computer simulates that circuit to the

wing sweep system (wings do not move).
Requires wings in oversweep, and wing sweep button
in AUTO.
FLT GR DN Initiates ground check of auto throttle interlocks.

Requires throttles in AUTO throttle region and enables
ground selection of AUTO throttles. Engines will
respond to stick movement and nozzles remain
closed.
FLT GR UP Permits checking external fuel tank pressurization.

GO light indicates required pressure. WING/EXT
TRANS switch must be in AUTO and DUMP switch
set to OFF.
D/L RAD Tests the data link converter. Test results are available
on the MFDs. Inhibits tactical control messages during
test sequence. Symbology displayed is determined by
the display mode selected.
DFCS BIT Permits running DFCS IBIT independently of the

(after engine start) rest of OBC.
2 GO−NO GO lights GO Indicates valid test.
NO GO Indicates unsatisfactory test.

Note
Functional only in LTS,

FIRE DET/EXT, INST
EMERG GEN, and FLT
GR UP.
Figure 38−3. Master Test Panel (Sheet 2 of 2)
38−5 ORIGINAL
CONTINUOUS
SUBSYSTEM/DESIGNATION INITIAL COMMANDED MONITOR COCKPIT
ADAC CP1770 30 20 2 N/A

DFCS AN/ASW43 N/A 53 2 N/A
AICR C8684 N/A 63 2 N/A
AICL C8684 N/A 63 2 N/A
APC AN/ASW105 N/A 83 2 83
ASPJ AN/ALQ165 N/A 110 30 110
BAG AN/APN154 N/A 3 N/A N/A
BSF N/A 3 2 N/A
CADC CP1035 N/A 4 2 N/A
CIU 2 2 10 N/A
DEU N/A 20 2 N/A
DP1 N/A 40 5 N/A
DP2 N/A 40 5 N/A
DLS AN/ASW27C N/A 15 N/A (Note 2)
EMSP1 N/A N/A 2 N/A
EMSP2 N/A N/A 2 N/A
GPS 30 4 Mins N/A N/A
IFB N/A 3 2 N/A
IFI AN/APX76 N/A 2 N/A N/A
IFX AN/APX100 N/A 2 2 N/A
INS AN/ASN130 N/A 55 Mins 1 N/A
IRSTS N/A 30 2 N/A
JTIDS AN/URC107 10 15 12 N/A
MC1 AN/AYK14 2 12 10 N/A
MC2 AN/AYK14 2 12 10 N/A
MDL N/A (Note 3) 1 N/A
MFA LEFT N/A 2 N/A N/A
MFA RIGHT N/A 2 N/A N/A
RADAR AN/APG71 210 150 2 N/A
RALT AN/APN194 N/A 3 N/A (Note 4)
RFP AN/ARC182 N/A N/A 2 N/A
RFR AN/ARC182 N/A N/A 2 N/A
RWR AN/ALR67 N/A N/A 1 (Note 5)
SAHRS AN/USN2 16 5 5 N/A
SDIS 2 6 2 N/A
SMS AN/AYQ15 2 10 1 N/A
Figure 384.Subsystem BIT Mode Test Times (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 38−6
CONTINUOUS
SUBSYSTEM/DESIGNATION INITIAL COMMANDED MONITOR COCKPIT
TACAN AN/ARN118 or AN/URC107 (Note 6) (Note 6) (Note 6) (Note 6)
TARPS N/A N/A 2 N/A
Notes:
1. All test times are in seconds unless otherwise noted.
2. This test is the Data Link PAD (D/L RAD) test initiated by the RIO or Pilot. This test remains in effect for as long as the
MASTER TEST panel switch is in D/L RAD. Refer to Operator Initiated BIT section for more information.
3. MDL Commanded BIT times of 5.0 and 65.0 seconds correspond to the Mission Data Loader (MDL) test, and the MDL
test including the Bulk Memory Checksum test, respectively.
4. This test remains in effect for as long as the PUSH TO TEST knob on the RADAR ALTITUDE indicator is held
depressed.
5. This test remains in effect for as long as the TEST switch on the RADAR WARNING RCVR panel is held to BlT. Once
released, the test completes in approximately 13 seconds.
6. JTIDS initial BIT will cause a 4−second loss of TACAN lock. A TACAN self−test is performed during JTIDS OBC. See
Chapter 20 for additional details.
Figure 38−4. Subsystem BIT Mode Test Times (Sheet 2 of 2)
Current failure information is also displayed on the Continuous−monitor BIT is performed by each
PTID in the OBCCM window (refer to paragraph 38.5), and subsystem on a continuous and noninterfering basis (i.e.,
on the MFDs in the warning/caution/advisory window for subsystem continues to perform normal operational mode as
certain equipment failures. well). The BIT time is usually 2 seconds. The MCS monitors
each subsystem at a 1−second rate in order to establish current
38.3.1 Built−in−Test Description status (GO or NO GO).
Several types of BIT are supported by each subsystem Commanded BIT is performed by each subsystem
and are performed internally. These modes include: power− when commanded through the MFDs or by a cockpit control
up (or initial), periodic (continuous or automatic), and panel (when available). This mode is typically the most
commanded (includes both MFD and cockpit control panel comprehensive and provides the highest degree of fault
initiated) BIT. Refer to Figure 38−4 for approximate BIT isolation. When used, this mode interrupts normal operation
times for each subsystem. Regardless of the BIT type, of the selected subsystem. The MCS monitors the subsystem
detected failures are retained for the affected subsystem by while it is in test and responds with GO or NO GO at the
the MCS. Each mode of BIT contains a series of tests that completion of the test.
differ from mode to mode. Because of these differences, a
Data bus test is performed by the MCS in order to detect
priority for each subsystem determines when a subsystem
data bus (mission bus No. 1 and No. 2, and inter−computer
failure no longer exists. Other tests performed by the MCS
bus) channel failures. Computer bus channel failures are
include data−bus channel tests, and a test to determine the
detected and reported by the RDP to the MCS. Each channel
compatibility of each subsystem’s software load with the
is tested on MCS cold start, and when a subsystem first
MCS OFP. responds on the data bus. The test consists of transmitting
several test patterns of data across each channel to a
38.3.1.1 BIT Modes subsystem, and then reading back the data. A disagreement
The following is a brief description of each BIT mode. in the data establishes a NO GO for the data bus channel at
Refer to Figure 38−4 for subsystem applicability. fault. Since most bussed subsystems are dual redundant on
the data bus, a single−channel failure will not affect the
Initial BIT is performed by each subsystem upon the operation of the applicable subsystem. In the event that both
application of electrical power. This mode of BIT is only channel have failed, the subsystem will be maintained as
performed after power has been off for a specific length of NOT READY, making the subsystem unavailable to the rest
time (i.e., cold start) and then restored. For shorter power of the system.
interruptions (i.e., warm start), this mode of BIT is not
performed. The MCS monitors each subsystem for a response The isolation of DFCS faults to the WRA level requires
(GO or NO GO) at the completion of this mode. reference to the fault codes displayed on the DCP (See
Figure38−11).
38−7 ORIGINAL
STATUS DEFINITION
NOT READY Subsystem is not responding on a data bus as determined by the MCS, due to one of the
following conditions: power−down, not installed, remote terminal failure, bus message
error excessively busy, or failure of all data bus channels to a particular subsystem. In
addition, any bus subsystem that does not complete commanded BIT within a specified
period of time will be set to this status type.
NO GO Subsystem has at least one WRA fault detected as a result of performing one of its BIT
modes. These failures are reported to the MCS only after an appropriate failure threshold
has been reached. Depending on the extent of the failure, the subsystem may not be
operationally usable by the system, causing a degraded mode to be entered where
available. Subsystems that are not on a data bus and are not responding due to being
powered down or not installed are reported as NO GO.
CONFIG ERROR Subsystem has an inconsistent software program, or firmware load as determined by the
MCS. This type of failure does not preclude the system from operationally using the
affected subsystem. The subsystem can be powered down at the flightcrew’s discretion to
prevent the subsystem from being used by the system.
Figure 385.Definition of BIT Status Types
are displayed on the OBC formats for every failed item.

These acronyms identify failures at the subsystem and WRA
level on various OBC formats. Equipment BIT status is
displayed as either NO GO, NOT READY, or CONFIG
ERROR. Refer to Figure 38−5 for status−type definitions.
Aircraft shall be considered down with PFCC, RFCC,
Note that absence of a failure acronym indicates that the
or YFCC codes in the DCP FAIL group or with an inoperative
equipment is GO. Refer to Figure 38−6 for a list of subsystems
DCP display. Initiation of OBC/IBIT with this condition will
versus types of status. Note that when the MCS cold−starts as
result in invalid IBIT indications.
a result of a power−transient or a system reset, BIT status for
equipment that is NOT READY will not be displayed as such
Note
for 1 minute. After this time has elapsed, only equipment that
is currently NOT READY will be considered failed. This
If a flight control computer fault is detected during allows subsystems that need time to warmup or perform
DFCS IBIT, a PFCC, RFCC, or YFCC code will be logged initial BIT to do so without being prematurely reported as
on the DCP. However, additional fault codes will be NOGO.
suppressed, possibly masking other actual failures.
Each mode of subsystem BIT is weighted according to
Software compatibility test is performed by the MCS the amount of fault isolation that it provides. Subsystem
in order to detect incompatible software program loads as failures can be removed from the system (i.e., will clear any
compared to the configuration for the rest of the system. In equipment failure maintained by the MCS) only by one of the
addition, a subsystem will test and report the internal following:
compatibility between its main program load and firmware.
Each subsystem is tested by the MCS on MCS cold start and 1. Selecting system reset.
when a subsystem first responds on the data bus. When an
incompatibility is detected with a subsystem, the subsystem 2. Cycling power to the MCS.
status will be maintained as CONFIG ERROR, and a
computer message will be displayed indicating the WRA 3. Cycling power to subsystem (only pertains to equip
fault. ment on data bus). During power−off, equipment
BIT status reverts to NOT READY.
38.3.1.2 BIT Status/Priorities
4. CONFIG ERROR is overridden by NO GO or
OBC display formats provide the flightcrew with NOT READY.
continuous status of avionics and radar subsystems. Note that
weapon and stores status are displayed on the SMS format, 5. Equipment status of NO GO will remain unless
which is selectable from the menu format. Failure acronyms same or higher weight of BIT reports GO condition.
ORIGINAL 38−8
NOT CONFIG 38.3.1.3 MFD Commanded BIT

SUBSYSTEMS READY NO GO ERROR In addition to displaying equipment BIT status, the
ADAC X X X MFD OBC formats are the primary means for generating
AICL X(1) X command−initiated BIT. Testing can be controlled from any
MFD on which an OBC format is displayed. The only other
AICR X(1) X
available method of testing (for equipment listed in Figure
APC X(1) X 38−4) is to use a dedicated cockpit panel to control test on an
ASPJ X X X individual equipment basis. Test controls allow tests of the
BAG X(1) X selected subsystem(s) to be initiated or terminated. The OBC
BSF X(1) X display formats allow testing at several different levels,
including sequence testing, functional group testing, and
CADC X(1) X
individual (or unit) testing. Sequence testing allows several
CIU X X X items to be tested at the same time, with the MCS
DEU X X X automatically testing (i.e., in parallel or in sequence) the
DFCS X(1) X appropriate equipment. Functional group testing allows
functionally related equipment to be tested at the same time
DP1 X X X
in a similar manner to the sequence tests. Each OBC format
DP2 X X X generally contains a series of pushbutton legends represent
DLS X(1) X ing systems that have command−initiated BIT capability.
EMSP1 X X Commanded BIT can be initiated one at a time, or in any
EMSP2 X X combination, as long as the prerequisites for testing are
satisfied. Refer to paragraph 38.3.2 for commanded BIT test
GPS X X
prerequisites.
IFB X(1) X
IFI X OBC display formats also serve to provide feedback or
the progress of testing (i.e., in test, test complete, and
IFX X(1) X awaiting test) through MFD acronym status. Computer
INS X X X messages are generated and displayed on the MFDs in
IRSTS X X X response to invalid test selections.
JTIDS X X
MC1 X X X
38.3.1.4 Control Panel−Initiated BIT
MC2 X X X Control panel/initiated BIT is an alternate mode of BIT
MDL X X initiated from a cockpit control panel. Refer to Figure 38−4
for applicability. Control panel initiated BIT is described
MFA LEFT X
with the applicable subsystem.
MFA RIGHT X
RADAR X X 38.3.2 Test Prerequisites/Restrictions
RALT X(1) X
Commanded BIT testing requires that certain condi
RFP X tions be satisfied prior to the test command from the MCS for
RFR X safety−of−flight purposes. These conditions govern the
RWR X X X control of all commanded BIT initiated through the MFDs
SAHRS X X X and depend on the type of test. In addition, there are some
restrictions that disable tests because of equipment or
SDIS X X X
operational mode conflicts. (Initial and continuous BIT are
SMS X X X not subject to these conditions.)
TACAN X
TARPS X 38.3.2.1 BIT Interlocks/Test Restrictions
WOW X Preflight tests are enabled by the pilot selecting OBC
NOTE: (1) Subordinate to the converter interface unit on the MASTER TEST panel with weight on wheels, TAS
(CIU), and equipment status is displayable as <76 knots, and handbrake set. These tests are designated
NO GO as a result of a subsystem not com preflight and it is recommended that they be performed at this
pleting commanded BIT within a set time. time since a failure may constitute a flight safety hazard. All
interlocks are constantly checked for change in status to
Figure 386.Equipment Subsystem BIT Status Types ensure the safety of the aircraft. In−flight tests are performed
38−9 ORIGINAL
only when the aircraft is airborne with weight off wheels and sequence tests. Additional information for a subsystem
TAS > 76 knots. Refer to Figure 38−7. failure can be found on the corresponding functional group
format. Each acronym that appears on the OBC basic format
38.3.3 Avionic BIT Operation indicates that the subsystem is not currently operational.
Each acronym appears in a dedicated location as shown in
Avionic BIT operation is controlled through MFD Figure 38−12.
OBC display formats. For some systems, dedicated control
panels serve as a redundant and alternate means for
38.3.3.1.2 Functional Group Formats/
controlling BIT. All OBC formats display equipment status,
Fail Data Format
equipment failure acronyms for detected WRA failures, and
the progress of testing. These formats provide the capability The OBC functional group format display failures are
to manually initiate/terminate command BIT and to mask/ at the WRA level. Additional information for a WRA failure
unmask current failures on the displays. These formats are can be found on the corresponding fail data format for that
accessible on any MFD including the pilot center (MFD1), functional group. Subsystem failure status is indicated as
pilot right (MFD2), and RIO (MFD3) displays. either NO GO, NOT READY, or CONFIG for each
subsystem in the functional group. Refer to Figure 38−5 for
When the system is powered up from a cold−start
failure status types. When the status is NOT READY for a
condition (i.e., power to MCS off for greater than 300
subsystem on the bus, the WRA corresponding to the remote
milliseconds) or when system reset is ordered, the mission
terminal (i.e., the WRA that directly communicates on the
computers perform initial BIT. All other equipment takes
bus with the MCS) is displayed subordinate to the subsystem.
varying amounts of time to warm up or to complete initial
BIT. At the completion of mission computer initial BIT, A prompt (* NEXT PAGE *) on the bottom of an OBC
MFD2 will display the OBC BASIC format. At all other functional group format (or a fail data format) appears if there
times, the OBC BASIC format can be accessed on any MFD are additional failure acronyms for the group or additional
by selecting the MENU1 pushbutton followed by the OBC fail data pages. Pressing the PAGE pushbutton in response to
pushbutton. The OBC BASIC format allows initiation of the prompt will cause the next page of information to be
various test sequences, and also serves as the menu for access displayed. Paging past the last page will cause the first page
to all other OBC formats. Tests can also be commanded to be displayed again.
through OBC functional group formats. OBC computer
Fail data information is only displayed on a fail data
messages provide feedback to the flightcrew and are
format after at least one commanded BIT has been performed
displayed when testing is completed or in response to test
for the applicable subsystem.
selections that are not acceptable because of invalid inter
locks and operational conflicts.
Note
When the system is in a backup mode of operation
(only one mission computer operational), it will support all Fail data is available for display continuously for
the OBC functions that are normally provided in a full−up CADC, EMSP1, and EMSP2.
mode (i.e., both mission computers operational). Otherwise, if commanded bit has not been performed,
a prompt will be displayed on the first line of the fail data
38.3.3.1 MFD OBC Formats format as FAIL DATA NOT AVAILABLE for the applicable
There are several different types of OBC formats: WRA or system.
basic, functional group, fail data, maintenance, and failure
history file. Figure 38−8 identifies the equipment that can be 38.3.3.1.3 Failure Acronym Masking
commanded to test, or masked, from each of the format types. Masking removes or inhibits display of OBC equip
Figure 38−9 identifies all possible OBC failure acro ment failure acronyms for known WRA faults. Failure
nyms and failure history file acronyms that are displayed on acronyms will be removed from the OBC formats (basic and
OBC formats. It also provides an explanation and possible functional group) and from the PTID OBCCM window
action that the aircrew can take in response to the fault. regardless of the mode of BIT that detected the failure.
Failure acronyms are maskable at the OBC basic level, where
38.3.3.1.1 OBC Basic all currently failed equipment is affected, and also at the
The OBC basic format displays failures at the sub

system level and provides the capability to initiate the OBC
ORIGINAL 38−10
FLIGHT STATUS TEST SELECTS EQUIPMENT TESTED
PREFLIGHT Preflight test (1) CIU, CADC, APC, DFCS, AICS,

Weight−on−wheels, TAS < 76 KTS, RALT, IFB, ADAC, DSS, MDL, SMS,
Master Test switch set to OBC. (1) DLS, BSF, (2) SDIS, IRST, JTIDS
Parking brake set
Retest test (1) CIU, ADAC, DSS, MDL, DEU, SMS,
(3) ASPJ, (NON−RADIATE), SDIS, IRST
Individual/group test (1) CIU, CADC, APC, DFCS, AICS
Weight−on−wheels, parking brake set Individual/group test (3) INS, SAHRS, JTIDS, MDL, GPS
Weight−on−wheels, TAS < 76 KTS Individual/group test RALT
Retest test ADAC, DSS, MDL, DEU, SMS,
(2) ASPJ (NON−RADIATE), SDIS, IRST
INFLIGHT Inflight test IFB, DEU, IFX, BAG, SMS, (1) DLS,
Weight−off−wheels, TAS> = 76 KTS (2) ASPJ (RADIATE), MFA LEFT/RIGHT
SDIS, IRST
Individual/group test BAG, IFX, (3) ASPJ (RADIATE)
Retest test ADAC, DSS, MDL, DEU, SMS, (2) ASPJ
(RADIATE), SDIS, IRST, GPS
Preflight/Inflight Individual/group test (4) DP1, (4) DP2, DEU, IFB, (5) MC1,
(5) MC2, ADAC, (6) MDL, SMS,
(1) DLS, SDIS, IRST, GPS
Retest test ADAC, DSS, MDL, DEU, SMS, SDIS, IRST
NOTES:
(1) CIU/DLS:
When the CIU or DLS is selected for test through the MFDs, the system will reject the selection(s) if a CV
SINS mode of alignment is in progress. This allows the SINS alignment to continue to completion without
interruption.
(2) ASPJ:
In addition to the interlock conditions indicated above, the following switch settings must be made on the
ASPJ control panel in order to initiate test:
When the ASPJ is selected for test with the MFDs, the ASPJ will perform BIT and radiate
(i.e., transmit RF) only if XMIT switch is selected. If RCV is selected, the ASPJ will perform BIT without
radiating.
When the ASPJ Is selected for test with the MFDs, the ASPJ will not perform BIT if STBY or
OFF is selected.
Figure 387.BIT Interlocks Test Restrictions (Sheet 1 of 2)
38−11 ORIGINAL
(3) INS:
Prior to selecting INS for test with the OBC NAV format, TEST on the NAV MODE panel must be selected.
(4) DP1/DP2:
When DP1 or DP2 is selected for test through the OBC CD formats, the following restrictions apply:
ALLOWABLE TEST
SELECTION FLIGHT STATUS
DP1 or DP2 In−flight (Weight off wheels), both DP’s must be operationally GO
OR
Preflight (Weight on wheels)
NONE In−flight (Weight off Wheels), one DP not operationally GO

(5) MC1/MC2:
When MC1 or MC2 is selected for test with the OBC AUX formats, the following restrictions apply:
ALLOWABLE TEST
SELECTION FLIGHT STATUS
MC1 or MC2 In−flight (Weight off wheels), both MCs must be operationally GO
OR
Preflight (Weight on wheels)
NONE In−flight (Weight off wheels), one MC not operationally GO
(6) MDL:
Prior to selecting the MDL/DSS for test through the MFDs, the Mission Data Loader must be inserted into the
Mission Data Loader Receptacle (MDLR). MDL BIT will be limited (i.e., less bulk memory checksum test)
when the MDL is tested as part of a preflight or retest sequence. Otherwise, if the test selection is an
individual or functional group type made through the OBC AUX format, MDL BIT will include the performance
of the bulk memory checksum test. The bulk memory checksum test adds approximately 1 minute to the
overall test time.
Figure 38−7. BIT Interlocks Test Restrictions (Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 38−12
OBC DISPLAY TEST SELECTION functional group/unit level, where only equipment in the
FORMAT TYPE functional group is affected. Failure acronyms may also be
unmasked in order to cause their redisplay after having been
BASIC SEQUENCES: previously masked. Unmasking is initiated with OBC
Preflight formats or by the system as a result of performing
Inflight commanded BIT. Whichever level of masking/unmasking is
selected, all the corresponding equipment appearing on the
Retest OBC basic, OBC functional group, and PTID OBCCM
Functional group Group or individual: window will be affected. Format examples are shown in
Figure 38−13. Note that the OBC maintenance formats are
FLT (flight) DFCS, AICS, APC
unaffected by any masking operation. Masking and unmask
CNI (communication, RFP, RFR, BAG, IFX, ing is controlled via OBC basic, any OBC functional group,
navigation, IFI, RALT, TCN or any fail data format as follows:
identification)
NAV (navigation) CADC, CIU, DINS,
1. OBC basic masking is performed by selecting the
SAHR MSK function on the OBC basic format at which
time the MSK pushbutton legend will be boxed.
CD (controls and DEU, DP1, DP2 This allows all the equipment failure acronyms
displays) currently appearing on the OBC basic format to be
AUX (auxiliary) MC1, MC2, EMSP1, removed. Unmasking is performed by pressing the
EMSP2, ADAC, MDL, MSK pushbutton while it is boxed. As a result,
DBUS failure acronyms are displayed for equipment
currently failed and the MSK pushbutton legend is
SMST (stores SMS
unboxed to indicate that no failures are masked. The
management system)
MSK pushbutton appears boxed on the OBC BASIC
TAC (tactical) DLC, JTIDS format if there is at least one WRA failure masked
EW (electronic warfare) ASPJ, BSF, IFB, in the system.
RWR, MFA
2. Functional group masking is performed by selecting
SNSR (sensors) IRST RDR, SDIS, the ALL and MSK pushbuttons on the respective
TARPS OBC functional group format. The ALL pushbutton
FAIL DATA legend is boxed to indicate its selection and unboxed
if deselected. Group masking is only performed if
CNI
the ALL pushbutton is boxed prior to making the
NAV selection of the MSK pushbutton. Group masking
CD
will only remove failure acronyms associated with
equipment on the corresponding functional group
AUX format. Group unmasking is performed by
JTIDS deselecting the ALL/MSK pushbutton when the
MSK pushbutton legend is boxed. The MSK
SMST pushbutton legend appears boxed if there is at least
SMST SWITCHES one equipment that is masked on the corresponding
functional group format.
EW
SNSR 3. Unit masking is performed by selecting equipment
and MSK pushbuttons. Any number of WRAs may
GPS
be selected prior to selecting the MSK pushbutton
MAINTENANCE in order to mask more than one failure at the same
CURRENT FAILURES time. Each equipment pushbutton legend is boxed to
FAILURE HISTORY FILE indicate its selection and is unboxed if reselected.
Only those items that remain selected (i.e., boxed)
before selecting the MSK pushbutton will be
Figure 388.OBC Display Format Types masked. Unit unmasking is performed by selecting
the equipment and MSK pushbuttons when the
MSK pushbutton legend is boxed.
38−13 ORIGINAL
FHF
OBC ACRONYM ACRONYM DEFINITION REMARKS
ADAC ADAC Airborne Data Acquisition ADAC failure, Fatigue and Engine Monitor
Computer ing data records will no longer be
recorded on the DSS
DFCS DFCS Digital Flight Control Failure of a system WRA as shown below
System
ACCELEROMETER AFCAM
PITCH ACTUATOR AFCPA
PITCH COMPUTER AFCPC
PITCH SENSOR AFCPS
ROLL ACTUATOR AFCRA Aircrew should check the DCP fol

l i DFCS IBIT tto d
lowing determine
t i
ROLL COMPUTER AFCRC anyy flight
g control failures.
ROLL SENSOR AFCRS
YAW ACTUATOR AFCYA
YAW COMPUTER AFCYC
YAW SENSOR AFCYS
AICS AICS Air Inlet Control System Failure of AICL or AICR (See below)
AICS−L or AICS−R Air Inlet Control (Left or Indicates which AICS has failed.
Right) Used in conjunction with INLET/RAMPS
caution lights.
PROGRAMMER AILP Programmer failure, without INLET light,

AIRP computer uses normal values
Operational mode, no flight restriction
Figure 389.OBC Failure Acronyms (Sheet 1 of 11)
ORIGINAL 38−14
FHF
NO. 1 RAMP AILA1 NO. 1 actuator position does not agree with
ACTUATOR AIRA1 command
STATIC PRESSURE AILS1 Static pressure sensor With INLET light,

AIRS1 SENSOR fail safe mode. Without INLET
light, failure operational. No flight
restriction
TOTAL PRESSURE AILS2 Total pressure sensor. With INLET light,

AIRS2 SENSOR fail safe mode
ANGLE OF ATTACK AILS4 Angle−of−Attack (AOA) or engine fan
AIRS4 speed. (AFTC may be in secondary
mode.) Without INLET light, fail
operational. No flight restriction
ID/MCB AILID Identifier conflict

AIRID
APC APC Approach Power Auto throttle inspection. System will default
Compensator to BOOST automatically. A REV 4 AIC
programmer is installed in lieu of correct
REV 5 programmer.
ACCELEROMETER APCAM APC accelerometer fail
No associated light
Auto throttle inoperative
APC not authorized for landing
COMPUTER APCPU APC computer fail

Auto throttle inoperative
ASPJ ASPJ Airborne Self−Protection ASPJ failure. ECM may not be available.
Jammer Run commanded BIT
PROCESSOR SPJPR Possible processor failure. Run command
ed BIT to provide fault isolation
to WRA level
RECEIVER LOW SPJRL Low−band receiver failure
Figure 38−9. OBC Failure Acronyms (Sheet 2 of 11)
38−15 ORIGINAL
FHF
RECEIVER HIGH SPJRH High−band receiver failure
RECEIVER AUG SPJRA Augmentation receiver failure
TRANSMITTER LOW SPJTL Low−band transmitter failure
TRANSMITTER HIGH SPJTH High−band transmitter failure
TRANSMITTER AUG SPJTA High−band augmentation transmitter failure
RWR INTERFACE SPJRI Interface failure between ASPJ and RWR
BAG BAG Beacon Augmentor BAG not powered on
Run commanded BIT
Degraded position approach on automatic

carrier landing (ACL) and/or ground vectoring
BSF BSF Band Suppression Filters BSF failure
FILTER 1RWR 315 BSF1 BSF filter FWD 315 deg
FILTER 2RWR 45 BSF2 BSF filter FWD 45 deg
FILTER 3ASPJ BSF3 BSF filter ASPJ
CADC CADC Central Air Data Computer Check caution/advisory lights. Examine
CADC Fail Data Format
CIU CIU Converter Interface Unit CIU fail
DBUS Data Bus MIL−STD−1553 data bus channel failure

(See below)
ADAC MBUS 2 AAC2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail

CHAN A
ADAC MBUS 2 AAC2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
CHAN B
ARDP MBUS 1 RDP1A Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail

CHAN A
ORIGINAL 38−16
FHF
ARDP MBUS 1 RDP1B Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fail

CHAN B
ARDP MBUS 2 RDP2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail

CHAN A
ARDP MBUS 2 RDP2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
CHAN B
RM1C Computer Bus (Radar/MC1) channel fail
RM2C Computer Bus (Radar/MC2) channel fail
RCIUC Computer Bus (Radar/CIU) channel fail
ASPJ MBUS 1 SPJ1A Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail

CHAN A
ASPJ MBUS 1 SPJ1B Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fall

CHAN B
CIU MBUS 2 CHAN A CIU2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
CIU MBUS 2 CHAN B CIU2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
DSS MBUS 2 CHAN A DSS2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
DSS MBUS 2 CHAN B DSS2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
DP1 MBUS 1 CHAN A DP11A Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail
DP1 MBUS 1 CHAN B DP11B Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fail
DP2 MBUS 2 CHAN A DP22A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
DP2 MBUS 2 CHAN B DP22B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
DEKI MBUS 2 CHAN A DEU2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
DEKI MBUS 2 CHAN B DEU2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
INS MBUS 2 CHAN A INS2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
MDL MBUS 2 CHAN A MDL2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
MDL MBUS 2 CHAN B MDL2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
38−17 ORIGINAL
FHF
INS MBUS 2 CHAN B INS2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
IRST MBUS 1 CHAN A IR1A Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail
IRST MBUS 1 CHAN B IR1B Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fail
JTIDS MBUS 2 CHAN A JT2A
JTIDS MBUS 2 CHAN B JT2B
MC1 MBUS 2 CHAN A MC12A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
MC1 MBUS 2 CHAN B MC12B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
MC2 MBUS 1 CHAN A MC2IA Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail
MC2 MBUS 1 CHAN B MC2IB Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fail
MC2 IBUS CHAN A MC21A Intercomputer Bus NO. 1 channel A fail
MC2 IBUS CHAN B MC21B Intercomputer Bus NO. 1 channel B fail
SAHRS MBUS 1 CHAN A SHR1A Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail
SAHRS MBUS 1 CHAN B SHR1B Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fail
SDIS MBUS 1 CHAN A SDI1A Mission Bus NO. 1 channel A fail
SDIS MBUS 1 CHAN B SDI1B Mission Bus NO. 1 channel B fail
SMP MBUS 2 CHAN A SMP2A Mission Bus NO. 2 channel A fail
SMP MBUS 2 CHAN B SMP2B Mission Bus NO. 2 channel B fail
DEU DEU Data Entry Unit DEU failure
ORIGINAL 38−18
FHF
DINS DINS Digital Inertial Navigation INS or battery failure

System
INERTIAL NAV SYSTEM INS INS failure
GPS GPS Global Positioning GPS failure
System
INS BATTERY BACK−UP DNSPS INS battery failure
DLS DLS Data Link System Data Link powered off.

Run commanded BIT
JTIDS JTIDS Joint Tactical Information JTIDS failure

Distribution System
SDU JTSDU Secure Data Unit SDU (KGV−8) failure/JTIDS crypto keys
are not loaded.
BATTERY JTBAT JTIDS Battery JTIDS Battery Failure. Keys will not
load/hold in STBY with a failed battery.
RCVR/XMTR JTRT JTIDS JTIDS R/T failure. This can also affect
Receiver/Transmitter TACAN operation.
DATA PROCESSOR JTDDP JTIDS Digital Data JTIDS DDP failure. This unit is part
Processor of the JTIDS Data Processor Group.
INTERFACE UNIT JTIU JTIDS Interface Unit JTIDS IU failure. This unit is part of
the JTIDS Data Processor Group.
DSS DSS Data Storage Set DSS failure. Possible loss of data on
data storage unit.
EMSP1 EMSP1 Engine Monitoring Signal EMSP1 failure

Processor no. 1
EMSP2 EMSP2 Engine Monitoring Signal EMSP2 failure

Processor no. 2
IFB IFB Interference Blanker Possible interference between TACAN,

Radar Altimeter, IFF, APG−71, RWR,
and ASPJ
IRST IRST Infrared Search and Track IRST failure

SENSOR UNIT IRSU Sensor unit failure
ELECTRONIC UNIT IREU Electronic unit failure
IFI IFI IFF Interrogator APX−76 failure
RECEIVER/ TRANSMITTER IFIRT Receiver/transmitter failure
SWITCH/AMP IFISW Switch amplifier failure
KIR COMPUTER IFN APX−76 computer failure/not installed
SYNCHRONIZER IFISYS Synchronizer failure
38−19 ORIGINAL
FHF
IFX IX IFF Transponder APX−100 failure

TRANSPONDER IFXPN IFF failure. Set MASTER switch on IFF
control panel to NORM. Select test for
each mode and observe light.
COMPUTER IFA APX−100 computer failure
MC1 MC1 Mission Computer NO. 1 MC1 failure. System will revert to backup
mode if MC2 is functional.
MC2 MC2 Mission Computer NO. 2 M2 failure. System will revert to backup
mode if MC1 is functional.
MDS1 Multifunction Display MDS1 failure

System NO. 1
DISPLAY PROC DP1 DP NO. 1 failure
ESSOR
PILOT CENTER MFD1 Pilot center MFD failure
MFD 1
HUD HUD Head−up display failure
PILOT RIGHT MFD2 Pilot right MFD failure
MFD 2
RIO MFD 3 MFD3 RIO MFD failure
HUD INTERFACE HUDI Interface failure between DP NO. 1
and HUD, or HUD not powered up
MFD 1 INTERFACE MFD1I Interface failure between DP NO. 1 and
MFD NO. 1, or MFD NO. 1 not powered up
MDS2 Multifunction Display MDS2 failure

System NO. 2
DISPLAY DP2 DP NO. 2 failure. System will revert to DP.
PROCESSOR backup mode if DP NO. 1 is functional.
ORIGINAL 38−20
FHF
PILOT CENTER MFD1 Pilot center MFD failure

MFD 1
HUD HUD Head−up display failure
PILOT RIGHT MFD2 Pilot right MFD failure

MFD2
RIO MFD 3 MFD3 RIO MFD failure
HUD INTERFACE HUDI Interface failure between DP NO. 2 and

HUD, or HUD not powered up


DP1/DP2 DP12I Interface failure between DP NO. 1 and DP
INTERFACE NO. 2
MFAL Multiple Filter Assembly MFA left failure

Left
FILTER A MFALA Filter A failure
FILTER B MFALB Filter B failure
FILTER C MFALC Filter C failure
MFAR Multiple Filter Assembly MFA right failure

Right
FILTER A MFARA Filter A failure
FILTER B MFARB Filter B failure
FILTER C MFARC Filter C failure
RDR Radar APG−71 failure
RADAR Radar not powered/not installed
38−21 ORIGINAL
FHF
ARDP Advanced Radar Data ARDP failure

Processor
ARSP Advanced Radar Signal ARSP failure

Processor
BPS Beam Power Supply BPS failure
RCVR Receiver RCVR failure
DD Digital Display DD failure
RDHCU Sensor Hand Control SHC failure
XMTR Transmitter XMTR failure
CPS Collector Power Supply CPS failure
SPS Solenoid Power Supply SPS failure
ANT Antenna Array ANT failure
RIC Radome Interlock RIC failure
ASC Advanced Signal ASC failure

Converter
RDSCU Radar Sensor Control Unit RDSCU failure
PTID Programmable Tactical PTID failure

Information Display
TCS Television Camera TCS failure

System
RALT RALT Radar Altimeter RALT failure (OBC BASIC)
RADAR ALT RALT Radar Altimeter RALT failure (OBC CNI)
RFP RFP Radio Frequency Pilot Pilot RFI failure
RFR RFR Radio Frequency RIO RIO RFCI failure
SAHRS SAHRS Standard Attitude Heading SAHRS failure. Loss of back−up

Reference Set navigation mode
ORIGINAL 38−22
FHF
SDIS SDIS Sensor Display SDIS failure

Indicator Set
SENSOR CONTROL SDSCU Sensor control unit failure

UNIT
SENSOR SLAVING SDSSP Sensor slaving panel failure
PANEL
SMS Stores Management Set SMS failure
SMP SMP Stores management processor failure
MPRU MPRU Missile power relay unit failure
GUN CONT UNIT GCU Gun control unit failure
FTJU STA 2 FTJ2 Fuel tank jettison unit station No. 2 failure
FTJU STA 7 FTJ7 Fuel tank jettison unit station No. 7 failure
TYPE 1 DECODER D1S1 Type 1 decoder station 1A/B failure

1A/B
TYPE 1 DECODER 3/6 D1S36 Type 1 decoder station 3/6 failure
TYPE 1 DECODER 4/5 D1S45 Type 1 decoder station 4/5 failure
TYPE 1 DECODER D1S8 Type 1 decoder station 8A/B failure

8A/B
TYPE 2 DECODER 1B D2S1B Type 2 decoder station 1B failure
TYPE 2 DECODER 3 D2S3 Type 2 decoder station 3 failure
TYPE 2 DECODER 8B D2S8B Type 2 decoder station 8B failure
AWW−4 AWW−4 AWW−4 electrical fuzing switch failure
MISSILE PS MPS AIM−54 missile power supply failure
38−23 ORIGINAL
FHF
TCN TACAN Tactical Air Navigation TACAN failure (OBC BASIC)
TACAN TACAN Tactical Air Navigation TACAN failure (OBC CNI)
TARP1 TARP1 Tactical Airborne TARP system failure (crew alert)

Reconnaissance Pod
TARP2 TARP2 Tactical Airborne TARP/CIU communication failure

Reconnaissance Pod
RWR RWR Radar Warning Receiver RWR failure
COMPUTER RWRCP Analyzer (CP−1293) failure
CONTROL STATUS RWRCU Control status unit failure

UNIT
QUAD RECEIVER 45 RWRQ1 Quadrant receiver (45 degrees) failure
QUAD RWRQ2 Quadrant receiver (135 degrees) failure

RECEIVER135

RECEIVER225

RECEIVER315
SPECIAL RCVR RWRSR Superhet receiver failure
INTEGRATED RWRAN Integrated antenna failure

ANTENNA
ASPJ INTERFACE RWRAI Interface failure between RWR and ASPJ
IFB INTERFACE RWRBI Interface failure between RWR and IFB
WOW WOW Weight on/off wheel discrete failure
ORIGINAL 38−24
FAILED COMPONENT LIGHT OBC ACRONYM

Pitch Rate Gyro (1) FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
Pitch Rate Gyro (2) FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
PITCH SAS
Roll Rate Gyro (1) FCS CAUTION Roll Sensor
Roll Rate Gyro (2) FCS CAUTION Roll Sensor
ROLL DGR
ARI DGR
ARI/SAS OUT
Yaw Rate Gyro (1) FCS CAUTION Yaw Sensor
Yaw Rate Gyro (2, 3) FCS CAUTION Yaw Sensor
ARI DGR
YAW DGR
ARI / SAS OUT
Lateral Accel (1) FCS CAUTION Accelerometer
Lateral Accel (2, 3) FCS CAUTION Accelerometer
ARI DGR
YAW DGR
ARI / SAS OUT
Pitch Series Actuator (1, 2) PITCH SAS Pitch Actuator
Roll Series Actuator (1) ROLL DGR Roll Actuator
ARI DGR
Roll Series Actuator (2) ROLL DGR Roll Actuator
ARI DGR
ARI / SAS OUT
Yaw Series Actuator (1) ARI DGR Yaw Actuator
YAW DGR
Yaw Series Actuator (2) ARI DGR Yaw Actuator
YAW DGR
ARI / SAS OUT
Spoilers (Any Inboard) SPOILER Roll Actuator
Spoilers (Any Outboard) SPOILER Pitch Actuator
Pitch Parallel Actuator ACLS / AP Pitch Actuator
AUTOPILOT
DLC Trim Actuator PITCH ACTUATOR
Pitch Autotrim Actuator AUTOPILOT PITCH ACTUATOR
Mach Trim Actuator MACH TRIM
Lateral Authority Actuator HZ TAIL AUTH
Rudder Authority Actuator RUDDER AUTH
Figure 3810.DFCS Caution Lights and Acronyms (Sheet 1 of 2)
38−25 ORIGINAL
FAILED COMPONENT LIGHT OBC ACRONYM

Pitch Feel Switches ACLS / AP

AUTOPILOT
Right AICS Static Pressure FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
ARI DGR
Left AICS Static Pressure FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
ARI DGR
Right AICS Total Pressure FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
ARI DGR
Left AICS Total Pressure FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
ARI DGR
Right AICS AOA FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
Left AICS AOA FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
ADD (AOA side−probe) AOA FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
ARI (alpha nose−probe) AOA FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
Two or more of L/R AICS AOA, ADD side−probe FCS CAUTION Pitch Sensor
AOA, or ARI alpha nose−probe AOA ARI DGR
Any Internal DFCC Test PITCH SAS Pitch Computer
FCS CAUTION Roll Computer
ROLL DGR Yaw Computer
ARI DGR (as applicable)
YAW DGR
ARI / SAS OUT
Figure 38−10. DFCS Caution Lights and Acronyms (Sheet 2 of 2)
38.3.3.2 DFCS IBIT Sensor tests include stimulation of the rate gyros and lateral
accelerometers and reasonableness checks for the air data
38.3.3.2.1 IBIT Initiation sensors. The actuators which are tested are the pedal shaker
motor, the electro−mechanical actuators, and the electro−
DFCS IBIT is initiated automatically when OBC is hydraulic actuators. The electro−hydraulic actuators are
initiated. It can also be initiated independently through the exercised if either combined or flight hydraulic pressure is
DFCS position on the MASTER TEST switch. IBIT can be present. In the absence of hydraulic pressure, the electrical
initiated with the wings forward and the flaps down, or with circuits which drive the actuators are tested, but the actuators
the wings aft of 62°. Additional interlocks which must be themselves are not exercised.
satisfied include the PITCH, ROLL, and YAW STAB AUG
switches must be ON, ANTISKID SPOILER BK switch must 38.3.3.2.3 IBIT Indications
be OFF, the CADC must be operating properly, and the
aircraft must have weight−on−wheels. If it is desired to test IBIT status and results are displayed to the aircrew
autopilot WRAs during IBIT, the AUTOPILOT switch must through a combination of caution/advisory lights, TID
be ENGAGED while DFCS IBIT is armed. The aircraft must acronyms, and DCP codes as shown in Figures 38−10 and
not be in motion during IBIT operation or IBIT failures will 38−11.
result.
38.3.3.2.4 IBIT Armed
38.3.3.2.2 IBIT Tests
When IBIT is armed by raising the MASTER TEST
The DFCS IBIT performs tests designed to detect faults switch and rotating it to the DFCS BIT position, and all
within the DFCCs, the DFCC inputs and outputs, the various interlocks are satisfied, the DCP will alternately flash the
sensors and the actuators which are driven by the DFCCs. codes IBIT and ARM at a rate of 1 Hz.
ORIGINAL 38−26
DCP IBIT OFP MEANING

115V I Aircraft 115 VAC power supply out of tolerance fault.
28DC I Aircraft 28 VDC power supply out of tolerance fault.
AC28 I O Alpha computer/pedal shaker 28 VDC power supply input fault.
AD01 O Air data computer (CADC) general fault.
AD02 I Mach schedule (pitch) signal from CADC fault.
AD03 O Air data computer valid input (pitch) fault.
AD04 O Air data computer valid input (roll) fault.
AD05 O Air data computer valid input (yaw) fault.
AD06 O Mach trim schedule input fault.
AD07 O Lateral authority schedule input fault.
AD08 O Rudder authority schedule input fault.
AD09 I Autopilot altitude error signal from CADC fault.
AD10 I Autopilot altitude rate signal from CADC fault.
AD11 I Mach trim schedule 1 signal from CADC fault.
AD12 I Mach trim schedule 2 signal from CADC fault.
AD13 I Lateral authority schedule 1 signal from CADC fault.
AD14 I Lateral authority schedule 2 signal from CADC fault.
AD15 I Rudder authority schedule 1 signal from CADC fault.
AD16 I Rudder authority schedule 2 signal from CADC fault.
AHR1 O Attitude and heading reference system invalid input fault.
AHR2 O Attitude and heading reference system pitch synchro input fault.
AHR3 O Attitude and heading reference system roll synchro input fault.
AICX O Disagreement between left and right AICS fault.
AOAC I O ARI angle of attack sensor fault.
AOAL O Left AICS angle of attack sensor fault.
AOAR O Right AICS angle of attack sensor fault.
AOAT I O ADD angle of attack sensor fault.
APCA I Normal accelerometer sensor fault.
APCS I Scheduled outputs to approach power compensator fault.
CA28 I O Flight controls authority 28 VDC power supply input fault.
CSDC I Steering error signal from CSDC fault.
DCP1 O DFCS control panel Pitch SAS switch fault.
DCP2 O DFCS control panel Roll SAS switch fault.
DCP3 O DFCS control panel Yaw SAS switch fault.
DCP4 I O DFCS control panel Autopilot switch fault.
DLCT I DLC thumb−wheel sensor fault.
DLT1 I O DLC trim servo fault.
DLT2 O DLC trim servo isolation fault.
DPSL I Left AICS delta pressure (angle of attack) sensor fault.
DPSR I Right AICS delta pressure (angle of attack) sensor fault.
Figure 3811.DFCS Fault Codes (Sheet 1 of 6)
38−27 ORIGINAL

EDPS O Emergency disengage paddle switch discrete input fault.
FLAP O Flaps down discrete input fault.
GRBS O Ground roll braking system discrete input fault.
HT28 O Lateral authority actuator 28 VDC power input fault.
HZTA I O Lateral authority actuator fault.
IMU1 O Inertial measurement unit INS invalid input fault.
IMU2 O Inertial measurement unit pitch synchro input fault.
IMU3 O Inertial measurement unit roll synchro input fault.
IMU4 O Inertial measurement unit PQVM fault.
LAT1 I O Lateral accelerometer channel A fault.
LAT2 I O Lateral accelerometer channel B fault.
LAT3 I O Lateral accelerometer channel M fault.
LDG1 O Main landing gear input 1 fault.
MACL O SCADC to AICS Mach miscompare while left AICS was selected.
MACR O SCADC to AICS Mach miscompare while right AICS was selected.
MRS1 O Master reset switch input 1 fault.
MT28 I O Mach trim 28 VDC power supply input fault.
MTRM I O Mach trim actuator fault.
PC01 O Pitch A computer 115 VAC export power supply fault.
PC02 O Pitch B computer 115 VAC export power supply fault.
PC03 I Pitch A computer 28 VDC power supply monitor fault.
PC04 I Pitch B computer 28 VDC power supply monitor fault.
PC05 O Pitch A computer general fault.
PC06 O Pitch B computer general fault.
PC07 I Pitch A computer general fault.
PC08 I Pitch B computer general fault.
PC09 I Probable Pitch A computer isolation fault.
PC10 I Probable Pitch B computer isolation fault.
PC11 O Pitch A from Pitch B computer CCDL fault.
PC12 O Pitch B from Pitch A computer CCDL fault.
PC13 O Pitch A from Roll B computer CCDL fault.
PC14 O Pitch B from Yaw A computer CCDL fault.
PC15 O Pitch A from Yaw B computer CCDL fault.
PC16 O Pitch B from Roll A computer CCDL fault.
PC17 I Pitch A computer ±12 VDC exported power supply fault.
PC18 I Pitch B computer ±12 VDC exported power supply fault.
Figure 38−11. DFCS Fault Codes (Sheet 2 of 6)
ORIGINAL 38−28

PC19 I Pitch computer consolidated exported power supply fault.
PC20 I Servo isolation in Pitch A computer fault.
PC21 I Servo isolation in Pitch B computer fault.
PC22 I Pitch A computer ground test input fault.
PC23 I Pitch B computer spoiler servo amplifier fault.
PC24 I Pitch computer gyro input fault.
PC26 I Pitch computer autotrim command monitor fault.
PC35 I Pitch A computer consolidated exported power supply monitor fault.
PC36 I Pitch B computer consolidated exported power supply monitor fault.
PC37 I Pitch A computer 115 VAC power supply monitor fault.
PC38 I Pitch B computer 115 VAC power supply monitor fault.
PC39 I Probable Pitch A computer interface BIT circuit fault.
PC40 I Probable Pitch B computer interface BIT circuit fault.
PC41 I Pitch A computer AC analogue input interface fault.
PC42 I Pitch B computer AC analogue input interface fault.
PC45 O Pitch computer consolidated exported power supply fault.
PGY1 I O Pitch gyro channel A fault.
PGY2 I O Pitch gyro channel B fault.
PGY4 I O Pitch gyro channel A SMRD fault.
PGY5 I O Pitch gyro channel B SMRD fault.
PGY7 I Pitch gyro common mode fault.
POR NA NA In−flight power on reset.
PPA I O Pitch parallel actuator fault.
PSA1 I O Pitch series servo channel A fault.
PSA2 I O Pitch series servo channel B fault.
PSA3 O Pitch series servo channel A isolation fault.
PSA4 O Pitch series servo channel B isolation fault.
PTRM I O Pitch auto−trim actuator fault.
RC01 I Roll A computer 115 VAC export power supply fault.
RC02 I Roll B computer 115 VAC export power supply fault.
RC03 I Roll A computer 28 VDC power supply monitor fault.
RC04 I Roll B computer 28 VDC power supply monitor fault.
RC05 O Roll A computer general fault.
RC06 O Roll B computer general fault.
RC07 I Roll A computer general fault.
RC08 I Roll B computer general fault.
RC09 I Probable Roll A computer isolation fault.
RC10 I Probable Roll B computer isolation fault.
RC11 O Roll A from Roll B computer CCDL fault.
RC12 O Roll B from Roll A computer CCDL fault.
38−29 ORIGINAL

RC13 O Roll A from Yaw B computer CCDL fault.
RC14 O Roll B from Pitch A computer CCDL fault.
RC15 O Roll A from Pitch B computer CCDL fault.
RC16 O Roll B from Yaw A computer CCDL fault.
RC17 I Roll A computer internal power supply fault.
RC18 I Roll B computer ±12 VDC exported power supply fault.
RC19 I Roll computer consolidated exported power supply fault.
RC20 I Servo isolation in Roll A computer fault.
RC21 I Servo isolation in Roll B computer fault.
RC22 I Roll A computer ground test input fault.
RC23 I Roll A computer spoiler servo amplifier fault.
RC24 I Roll computer gyro input fault.
RC27 I Roll computer Mach trim actuator isolation fault.
RC28 I Roll computer Mach trim current monitor fault.
RC35 I Roll A computer consolidated exported power supply monitor fault.
RC36 I Roll B computer consolidated exported power supply monitor fault.
RC37 I Roll A computer 115 VAC power supply monitor fault.
RC38 I Roll B computer 115 VAC power supply monitor fault.
RC39 I Probable Roll A computer interface BIT circuit fault.
RC40 I Probable Roll B computer interface BIT circuit fault.
RC41 I Roll A computer AC analogue input interface fault.
RC42 I Roll B computer AC analogue input interface fault.
RC45 O Roll computer consolidated exported power supply fault.
RCP1 O Roll stick position input 1 fault.
RD28 O Rudder authority 28 VDC power input fault.
RGY1 I O Roll gyro channel A fault.
RGY2 I O Roll gyro channel B fault.
RGY4 I O Roll gyro channel A SMRD fault.
RGY5 I O Roll gyro channel B SMRD fault.
RGY7 I Roll gyro common mode fault.
RPP1 O Rudder pedal position sensor input 1 fault.
RSA1 I O Roll series servo channel A fault.
RSA2 I O Roll series servo channel B fault.
RSA3 O Roll series servo channel A isolation fault.
RSA4 O Roll series servo channel B isolation fault.
RUDA I O Rudder authority actuator fault.
ORIGINAL 38−30

SHKR O Rudder pedal shaker fault.
SP1L I O No. 1 left spoiler actuator fault.
SP1R I O No. 1 right spoiler actuator fault.
SPSL I Left AICS static pressure sensor fault.
SPSR I Right AICS static pressure sensor fault.
TPSL I Left AICS total pressure sensor fault.
TPSR I Right AICS total pressure sensor fault.
WOW1 O Weight−on−wheels input 1 fault.
WSP1 O Wingsweep input to Roll computer fault.
WSP2 O Wingsweep input to Pitch computer fault.
YC01 O Yaw A computer 115 VAC export power supply fault.
YC02 O Yaw B computer 115 VAC export power supply fault.
YC03 I Yaw A computer 28 VDC power supply monitor fault.
YC04 I Yaw B computer 28 VDC power supply monitor fault.
YC05 O Yaw A computer general fault.
YC06 O Yaw B computer general fault.
YC07 I Yaw A computer general fault.
YC08 I Yaw B computer general fault.
YC09 I Probable Yaw A computer isolation fault.
YC10 I Probable Yaw B computer isolation fault.
YC11 O Yaw A from Yaw B computer CCDL fault.
YC12 O Yaw B from Yaw A computer CCDL fault.
YC13 O Yaw A from Pitch B computer CCDL fault.
YC14 O Yaw B from Roll A computer CCDL fault.
YC15 O Yaw A from Roll B computer CCDL fault.
YC16 O Yaw B from Pitch A computer CCDL fault.
YC17 I Yaw A computer ±12 VDC exported power supply fault.
YC18 I Yaw B computer ±12 VDC exported power supply fault.
YC19 I Yaw computer exported M’ channel power supply fault.
YC20 I Servo isolation in Yaw A computer fault.
YC21 I Servo isolation in Yaw B computer fault.
YC22 I Yaw B computer ground test input fault.
YC24 I Yaw computer gyro input fault.
YC25 I Yaw computer accelerometer input fault.
YC29 I Yaw computer rudder authority actuator isolation fault.
38−31 ORIGINAL

YC30 I Yaw computer rudder authority current monitor fault.
YC31 I Yaw computer lateral authority actuator isolation fault.
YC32 I Yaw computer lateral authority actuator current monitor fault.
YC33 I Yaw computer 28 VDC power supply discrete input fault.
YC34 I Yaw computer pedal shaker fault.
YC35 I Yaw A computer exported ’M’ channel power supply monitor fault.
YC36 I Yaw B computer exported ’M’ channel power supply monitor fault.
YC37 I Yaw A computer 115 VAC power supply monitor fault.
YC38 I Yaw B computer 115 VAC power supply monitor fault.
YC39 I Probable Yaw A computer interface BIT circuit fault.
YC40 I Probable Yaw B computer interface BIT circuit fault.
YC41 I Yaw A computer AC analogue input interface fault.
YC42 I Yaw B computer AC analogue input interface fault.
YC43 O Yaw M AC export power supply fault.
YC44 O Yaw M AC power supply monitor fault.
YC45 O Yaw computer consolidated exported power supply fault.
YGY1 I O Yaw gyro channel A fault.
YGY2 I O Yaw gyro channel B fault.
YGY3 I O Yaw gyro channel M fault.
YGY4 I O Yaw gyro channel A SMRD fault.
YGY5 I O Yaw gyro channel B SMRD fault.
YGY6 I O Yaw gyro channel M SMRD fault.
YSA1 I O Yaw series servo channel A fault.
YSA2 I O Yaw series servo channel B fault.
YSA3 O Yaw series servo channel A isolation fault.
YSA4 O Yaw series servo channel B isolation fault.

38.3.3.2.5 IBIT Run 38.3.3.2.7 Completion without Faults
While IBIT is running, the ACL mode caution light, Upon completion of IBIT without any faults being
and the AP mode reference light will flash at a rate of 1 Hz. detected, all DFCS related caution/advisory lights, and
Additionally, the DCP will alternately flash the codes IBIT acronyms will be returned to the state that existed prior to
and RUN. All other DFCS related caution/advisory lights IBIT initiation, and the AUTOPILOT switch will revert to
will be illuminated, and all DFCS related TID acronyms will the OFF position. The DCP will display a PASS code which
be displayed. During the last three seconds of IBIT, the DCP can be extinguished by depressing MASTER RESET. At that
will display a test pattern which will allow the pilot to point the display will either be blanked or the IBIT ARM
determine if all the display segments are operating properly. message will be displayed, depending on MASTER TEST
38.3.3.2.6 Premature Termination switch position, and the DFCS will enter OFP.
If any interlocks are broken while IBIT is running, IBIT 38.3.3.2.8 Completion with Faults
will be aborted. This state will be indicated by extinguishing
of the ACL mode caution, and AP mode reference lights, and If faults are detected during IBIT, they will be indicated
illumination of all other DFCS related caution/advisory to the aircrew through the caution/advisory lights and TID
lights. The AUTOPILOT switch will revert to the OFF acronyms as indicated in Figure 38−10 along with any
position. Additionally, the DCP will display the ABRT, caution/advisory indications which existed before IBIT was
RBRT, or IBRT codes. Depressing pilot MASTER RESET initiated. Additionally, the DCP will show a NOGO code.
will reengage the DFCS and extinguish the ABRT DCP code.
ORIGINAL 38−32
Figure 3812.OBC Basic Format
Depressing the INC button will display the IBIT code the OBC tests. These should be cleared via the
followed by specific WRA codes for failures detected during CLR pushbutton to allow subsequent fault re
IBIT. Depressing MASTER RESET will clear the IBIT porting in OFP. Acronyms present following
failure indications along with any previously existing stand alone IBIT are generally valid.
resetable indications, but does not indicate that the detected
failures have been resolved. The DCP display will either be 38.3.3.3 Avionic Test Operation
blanked, or return to the IBIT ARM indication, depending on
MASTER TEST switch position, and the DFCS will enter Tests may be done in a sequence (preflight/in−flight,
OFP. IBIT failure codes will still be stored in the DCP display and retest sequence), or in groups (functional group), or on
and can be recalled with the INC/DEC buttons until another an individual basis. For any equipment selected and validated
IBIT is run or aircraft power is secured for test, the progress of testing is indicated on all OBC format
types that contain equipment pushbutton legends. Refer to
Figure 38−13 for format examples. Test progress is indicated
on the OBC formats as follows:
1. Equipment pushbutton legends appear bright and

Following an IBIT, MASTER RESET will clear steady when a test cannot begin immediately be
the IBIT failure indications including caution/ cause of a dependency with at least one other equip
advisory lights, but does not ensure the failures ment. When the dependency no longer exists, the
detected during IBIT are resolved. The DFCS equipment is commanded to test and the pushbutton
should not be considered fully operational. Only legend will then appear flashing.
the successful completion of another IBIT can
verify proper system operation. 2. Equipment pushbutton legends flash at bright inten
sity when an equipment is in test.
Note
3. Equipment pushbutton legends appear steady at a
AFC acronyms following OBC are invalid normal level of intensity when an equipment is not
because DFCS IBIT lasts longer than the rest of in test.
38−33 ORIGINAL
Figure 3813.Format Examples
ORIGINAL 38−34
Commanded BIT testing interferes with normal opera 6. The retest sequence is initiated through the OBC
tional modes of equipment. Testing can be initiated only basic format by pressing the RETEST pushbutton
when equipment is powered up and ready. If equipment is while the aircraft is on the ground or airborne.
currently not ready, equipment pushbutton legends will WRAs are selected by the system for retest if the last
remain steady. entry in the FHF indicates a NOT READY status
and if individual equipment interlocks are satisfied.
All testing is terminated by the system when any of the
Refer to BIT interlocks/restrictions for the equip
following occurs:
ment applicable to this sequence.
1. The ACM guard is lifted.
7. If interlock conditions/restrictions are not satisfied,
2. A weapon is selected. testing will not be initiated. Refer to paragraph
38.3.3.3.3 for computer message descriptions.
3. A radar ACM mode is selected.
8. If the interlock conditions are satisfied, the
4. Interlock status changes from those conditions satis RE−TEST pushbutton is boxed to indicate a valid
fied at the initiation of test. test selection and BIT is initiated in parallel or in
sequential order for all WRAs in the sequence that
Note that not all tests can be terminated. are powered on and ready.
38.3.3.3.1 Automatic Test Sequences 9. At the completion of the RETEST sequence, the last
FHF entry (indicating NOT READY) will be
There are three types of automatic test sequences, all
removed from the FHF for all equipment that
of which are initiated through the OBC basic format: in
currently indicates a status other than NOT READY.
flight, preflight, and retest. Each sequence allows the testing
of many WRAs with a single pushbutton. The system 10. Nominal test time varies based on the mix of
commands each WRA to test in a predetermined order so that equipment. Maximum test time is 35 seconds (Note:
equipment conflicts are eliminated. Refer to BIT interlocks/ Test times may vary as a function of equipment
restrictions for the tests in each sequence. status.)
1. In−flight/preflight test sequences are initiated
through the OBC basic format by pressing the TEST 11. Reselecting the RETEST pushbutton while the
pushbutton while the aircraft is on the ground or air sequence is in progress will terminate test for
borne. Depending on the flight status, either the equipment still in test. Equipment that cannot be
in−flight or preflight test sequence will be initiated terminated will continue in test to normal comple
(refer to BIT interlocks/restrictions). tion. When all tests are completed, the RETEST
pushbutton is unboxed to indicate that the sequence
2. If interlock conditions/restrictions are not satisfied, is no longer in progress.
testing will not be initiated and a computer message
will be displayed to indicate the reason for rejection. 38.3.3.3.2 Function Group/Unit Test
Refer to paragraph 38.3.3.3.3 for computer message
descriptions. OBC functional group formats allow groups of
functionally related or individual (i.e., unit) WRAs to be
3. If interlock conditions are satisfied, the TEST push selected for test. Refer to Figure 38−8. The OBC functional
button legend is boxed to indicate a valid test selec group formats are accessible from the OBC basic format:
tion and BIT is initiated in parallel or in sequential FLT, CNI NAV, CD, AUX, SNSR, SMS, EW, and TAC.
order for all WRAs in the sequence that are powered
on and ready. Group tests are initiated with the respective OBC
functional group format by pressing the ALL and TEST
4. Nominal test sequence time for preflight is 69 pushbuttons. The ALL pushbutton legend is boxed to
seconds, and in flight is 35 seconds. (Note: Test indicate its selection and is unboxed when deselected. Group
times may vary as a function of equipment status.) testing is only initiated if the ALL pushbutton is boxed prior
5. Reselecting the TEST pushbutton while the to making the selection of the TEST pushbutton. Depending
sequence is in progress will terminate test for WRAs on flight status, all WRAs that satisfy individual interlock
that are still in test. WRAs that cannot be terminated conditions will be initiated into test. Refer to Figure 38−7 for
will continue in test until normal completion. When group test selects.
all WRAs have completed test, the TEST 1. If interlock conditions/restrictions are not satisfied
pushbutton legend is unboxed to indicate that the se for at least one WRA, testing will not be initiated.
quence is no longer in progress.
38−35 ORIGINAL
2. If interlock conditions are satisfied for at least one Normally, OBC computer messages are displayed on
WRA, the TEST pushbutton legend is boxed or the the pilot center MFD and the RIO MFD. If the pilot center
applicable OBC functional group format to indicate MFD is powered off or failed, computer messages will be
a valid test selection and BIT is initiated in parallel displayed on the pilot right MFD. These messages are
or in sequential order for all powered−on and ready removed from the display head by pressing the ACK
WRAs in the sequence. pushbutton, which is boxed to indicate that at least one
display message requires acknowledgment (refer to Figure
3. Nominal test times may vary as a function of the 38−14).
selected functional group and are based on the
equipment initiated to test (refer to Figure 38−4). OBC/CSS messages are displayed on the MFD from
which the test selection is made and also displayed on the
4. Reselecting the ALL and TEST pushbuttons while same MFD if a CSS format is presented. There are two types
the functional group test is in progress will termi of messages within this class: 3−second type, displayed for
nate test for equipment in test. Equipment that 3 seconds and then removed by the system; conditionally
cannot be terminated will continue in test until nor removed type, displayed until either the applicable interlock
mal completion. When all equipment has completed condition is satisfied, or until the format is changed (refer to
test, the TEST pushbutton legend is unboxed to indi Figure 38−15).
cate that testing is complete.
38.3.3.3.4 OBC−Related Warning/Caution/
Unit tests are initiated from any OBC functional group
Advisory Messages
format by pressing equipment and TEST pushbuttons. Any
number of equipment pushbuttons may be pressed prior to Figure 38−16 shows acronyms that are displayed on
pressing the TEST pushbutton in order to test more than one MFD3 in response to equipment failures or overheating.
item at the same time. For each selection, the pushbutton
legend is boxed to indicate selection and unboxed when 38.3.3.3.5 Failure History File Format
deselected. Only equipment with a boxed legend will be
The FHF format displays a history of WRA failures.
tested. Depending on flight status, all equipment that satisfies There is a maximum of 10 entries per WRA for which the
individual interlock conditions will be initiated into test.
WRA failure status and the time of failure are displayed. The
Refer to Figure 38−7 for individual test selects.
time of failure is relative to the last time the system was cold
1. If interlock conditions/restrictions are not satisfied started or SYSTEM RESET was pressed. The FHF is cleared
for at least one equipment, testing will not be when the CLR pushbutton is pressed with preflight condi
initiated. tions satisfied. The preflight conditions are: weight on
wheels, TAS < 76 knots, pilot’s OBC discrete via the
2. If interlock conditions are satisfied for at least one MASTER TEST panel, and handbrake set.
equipment, the TEST pushbutton legend is boxed
on the applicable OBC functional group format to
38.3.4 Joint Tactical Information Distribution Sys
indicate a valid test selection and BIT is initiated for
tem On−Board Check
all equipment that is powered on and ready.
JTIDS OBC can be selected whenever electrical power
3. Nominal test times may vary as a function of the se
and cooling air are available. The JTIDS secure data unit
lected equipment initiated to test (refer to
needs to be installed and loaded for JTIDS to pass OBC.
Figure38−4).
Without the unit installed and loaded, JTIDS OBC will
4. Reselecting equipment and TEST pushbuttons display a DDP fail. A JTIDS download is not required for
while test is in progress will terminate test for equip JTIDS OBC; however, if the MDL is loaded, a download is
ment still in test. Equipment that cannot be termi recommended. The selection of JTIDS OBC when not in sync
nated will continue in test until normal completion. (receiving messages) will pass but the fail data will have bit
When all tests are complete, the TEST pushbutton 4 in word 11 and bit 8 in word 12 because no messages are
legend is unboxed to indicate that testing is no received.
longer in progress.
The selection of JTIDS OBC will interrupt TACAN
data (momentary display of TACAN fail detected computer
38.3.3.3.3 OBC Display Messages
message) and initiate a TACAN self−test. This will disable
OBC display messages are shown on the MFDs in TACAN steering and TACAN navigation updates, if se
response to invalid test selections resulting from interlocks lected; range will go invalid; bearing will display 270_; then
not being satisfied, interlocks changing, and for tests range will display 000 miles and bearing 180_.
completed.
ORIGINAL 38−36
COMPUTER MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
PRE−FLT OBC COMPLETE Displayed when the preflight OBC test sequence is completed. Message is
displayed if sequence completes normally or is terminated, or if interlock conditions
change.
IN−FLT OBC COMPLETE Displayed when the in−flight OBC test sequence is completed. Message is
displayed if sequence completes normally or is terminated, or if interlock conditions
change.
RETEST COMPLETE Displayed when the retest OBC sequence is completed. Message is displayed if
sequence completes normally or is terminated, or if interlock conditions change.
TEST COMPLETE Displayed when a functional group test is completed. Message is displayed if
− <GROUP NAME> group test completes normally or is terminated, or if interlock conditions change.
<GROUP NAME> appears as AUX, CD, CNI, FLT, NAV, EW, TAC, or IRST for the
functional group that completed test.
OBC SEQ ABORTED Displayed when an OBC sequence (preflight or in−flight) is terminated through the
OBC BASIC format while it is in progress.
RETEST ABORTED Displayed when a retest sequence is terminated through the OBC BASIC format
while it is in progress.
PILOT OBC DISABLE Displayed when the Pilot’s MASTER TEST panel switch remains in OBC
10 seconds after commanded BIT completes for an equipment that required this
interlock to initiate test.
INTERLOCK ABORT Displayed when an interlock condition changes state (i.e., no longer satisfied)
for an equipment that is already in test. Commanded BIT will be terminated for the
affected equipment.
CHALLENGE IFF Displayed when the IFF Interrogator has not been challenged prior to the selection
of a test sequence. This message is displayed only once at the time
of the test sequence selection. If the system cold starts, or SYSTEM RESET is
pressed, this message will be displayed again when a test sequence selection
is made.
INVALID <WRA NAME> Displayed when an equipment has an inconsistent firmware load, or is not
LOAD compatible with the mission computer software load. The <WRA NAME> field
applies to the following equipment: MC1, MC2, CIU, SAHR, MDS1, MDS2, DEU,
INS, ADAC, SMS, RWR, ASPJ, RDR, SDIS, IRST
Figure 3814.OBC Computer Messages
38−37 ORIGINAL
COMPUTER MESSAGE DESCRIPTION
WOW NOT SATISFIED Displayed when equipment is selected for test via a unit, inflight, or preflight test
selection, and the WOW (Weight−on/off−Wheel) interlock condition is not satisfied.
Testing will not be initiated for the selected equipment. Note that this message will
not be displayed for functional group or retest test selections.
TAS NOT SATISFIED Displayed when equipment is selected for test via a unit, inflight, or preflight test
selection, and the TAS (True Air Speed interlock condition less than or greater
than 76 knots) is not satisfied. Testing will not be initiated for the selected equip
ment. Note that this message will not be displayed for functional group or retest
selections.
MULTI INTLK NOT MET Displayed when equipment is selected for test via a unit, inflight or preflight test
selection, and more than one (i.e., multiple) interlock conditions are not satisfied
(WOW, TAS, PARKING BRAKE, or MTP). Testing will not be initiated for the
selected equipment. Note that this message will not be displayed for functional
group or retest selections.
EQUIPMENT CONFLICT Displayed when equipment is selected for test which conflicts with other equip
ment already in test. These conflicts are primarily between equipment subordinate
to the CIU, between CIU subordinate equipment and the CIU itself, between DP1
and DP2, and between MC1 and MC2. Testing will not be initiated for equipment
that conflict operationally.
NO COMMANDED BIT Displayed when equipment that does not support command BIT is selected
for test.
OBC SEQ IN PROGRESS Displayed when equipment is selected for test that is the same as equipment
already in test as part of an OBC inflight or preflight test sequence. Testing for the
selected equipment will not be initiated.
RETEST IN PROGRESS Displayed when equipment is selected for test that is the same as equipment
already in test as part of an OBC RETEST sequence. Testing for the selected
equipment will not be initiated.
MASTER TEST NOT SET Displayed when equipment is selected for test through a unit or preflight test
selection and the pilot’s MASTER TEST panel switch is not set to OBC. This
message is displayed as long as an OBC or CSS format is presented, and
removed when the switch is set to OBC.
HANDBRAKE NOT SET Displayed when equipment is selected for test via a unit or preflight test sequence
selection and the handbrake is not set. This message is continuously displayed
as long as an OBC or CSS format is presented and is removed when the hand
brake is set.
BAD JTID DATA LOAD Displayed when JTIDS test is selected during initialization (Down Load)
of JTIDS.
TACAN FAIL DETECTED Displayed for a TACAN failure or JTIDS NOT READY.
JTIDS FAIL DETECTED Displayed for a JTIDS failure or JTIDS NOT READY.
Figure 3815.OBC/CSS Messages
ORIGINAL 38−38
ACRONYM DISPLAYED CONDITION CAUSE
MC1 Mission computer No. 1 is NO GO or Mission computer No. 1 is failed,

NOT READY. or powered off.
MC2 Mission computer No. 2 is NO GO or Mission computer No. 2 is failed,

NOT READY. or powered off.
CIU CIU is NO GO or NOT READY. CIU is failed, or powered off.

INS INS is NO GO or NOT READY. INS is failed, or powered off.
IMU IMU is not valid. IMU is failed. Loss of inertial and attitude data
from INS.
GPS FAIL GPS is NO GO or NOT READY GPS failed, or powered off.
RWR RWR is NO GO or NOT READY. RWR is failed, or powered off.
FWD ASPJ ASPJ receiver (low or high), ASPJ transmitter ASPJ RECEIVER, TRANSMITTER,
(low or high) or processor is NO GO. or PROCESSOR is failed.
AFT ASPJ ASPJ processor, receiver augmentation or ASPJ PROCESSOR, RECEIVER AUG,
transmitter augmentation is NO GO. or TRANSMITTER AUG is failed.
MC1 HOT Mission computer No. 1 overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
MC2 HOT Mission computer No. 2 overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
ASPJ HOT ASPJ is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
CIU HOT CIU is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
DP1 HOT DP1 is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
DP2 HOT DP2 is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
SMS HOT SMS is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
RDR HOT RDR is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
HUD HOT HUD is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
RWR HOT RWR is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
DSS HOT DSS is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
DEU HOT DEU is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
MPS HOT MPS is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
IRST HOT IRST is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
SAHRS HOT SAHRS is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air.
JTID HOT JTIDS R/T is overheated. Possible loss of cooling air or a high JTIDS
transmit duty cycle.
IPF JTIDS Interference Protection Feature detected JTIDS is failed, a momentary glitch or 20% duty
failure. cycle has been exceeded in Limit". Select IPF
Reset on JTIDS Control Panel.
SDU ALRM JTIDS Secure Data Unit failure or no crypto SDU fail or the crypto key is erased.
load.
Figure 3816.OBC−Related Warning/Caution/Advisory Messages
38−39 ORIGINAL
38.4 COOPERATIVE SUPPORT SOFTWARE 3. Pressing the TM pushbutton allows CSS data to be
telemetered or down−linked to a ground−based
CSS allows capture and display of system data in real
station.
time and the optional recording of data from avionics
processors that are CSS compatible. CSS is typically used to 4. Pressing MC or MC2 allows CSS data to be stored
aid in troubleshooting system problems. The CSS compatible in mission computer No. 1 or mission computer
processors include mission computer No. 1, mission No.2 memory, respectively, and is only accessible
computer No. 2, multifunction display system No. 1, for future reference by the CSS function. A maxi
multifunction display system No. 2, airborne data acquisition mum of 300 blocks of CSS data can be stored in ei
system, stores management processor, converter interface ther mission computer. A block of data is saved
unit, data entry unit, infrared search and track system, joint when a trap or block address function completes,
tactical information distribution system, and sensor display and one block per second is saved for an active fly
indicator set. Note that radar flycatcher displays are provided catcher. This data will only be retained by the mis
on the programmable tactical information display. sion computers until the system cold starts or is re
set.
Note
5. Pressing the DSS pushbutton allows CSS data to be
The JTIDS processor only supports the fly recorded by the data storage set.
catcher functions (start address, increment,
decrement, and disable). The CSS OPER CODE page format (see Figure 38−18)
allows the optional selection of an operator code. This code
CSS supports the following modes, all of which are is used to identify the operator/aircraft when CSS data is
selectable on the DEU: flycatcher, block address, and trap. analyzed offline. The code is entered by pressing the
CSS data is displayed on the MFD CSS format. The CSS corresponding numerics and then pressing ENT.
format is selected by pressing the FAULT pushbutton on the
OBC basic format and then pressing CSS on the MAINT
38.4.1.2 Flycatcher Operation
CURRENT FAILURES format.
Flycatcher mode allows memory contents for a se
38.4.1 CSS Operation lected processor to be continuously examined and displayed
on the MFD CSS format. The contents of 16 contiguous
The CSS page (see Figure 38−17), displayed on the memory locations are displayed relative to a specified
DEU, allows the entry of DATA TYPE and OPER CODE flycatcher memory start address, updated at a 1−second rate.
used for data recording purposes, and allows the selection of A previously specified start address may be incremented or
all CSS modes including flycatcher, block address, and trap. decremented by a fixed bias. Each processor supports only
All CSS data is displayed on an MFD CSS format, using one flycatcher at a time.
pushbutton controls. Note that if the DEU is slaved to the
RIOMFD, selection of the CSS format on that MFD will Flycatcher is initiated or terminated as follows, using
cause the CSS page of the DEU to be displayed. the DEU (see Figure 38−19):
38.4.1.1 Data Recording Operations 1. Select flycatcher by pressing FLY CATC on CSS
page of DEU.
The CSS DATA TYPE page (see Figure 38−18) allows
the optional selection of a recording/storage device for the 2. Select processor to be examined by pressing one of
retention of data that is captured via a CSS mode. CSS data the WRA pushbuttons on F−CATC page.
can be telemetered or recorded for offline analysis based on
one or more of the following selections: 3. Initiate flycatcher. Press STRT ADRS to allow entry
of starting memory address for selected processor
1. Pressing the AUX pushbutton allows CSS data to be enter start address in hexadecimal with numeric
displayed on an auxiliary display (this function is pushbuttons. Press ENT to complete address entry
not available). and activate flycatcher.
2. Pressing the REC pushbutton allows CSS data to be 4. For flycatcher termination, press DSBL to deac
recorded on a flight recorder, if one is installed in the tivate current flycatcher.
aircraft.
5. Repeat steps 2 and 3 to initiate or terminate addi
tional flycatchers for other processors.
ORIGINAL 38−40
Figure 3817.DEU CSS Page
Figure 3818.DEU Pages for Operator Code and Data Type
38−41 ORIGINAL
Figure 3819.DEU Flycatcher Pages
ORIGINAL 38−42
Figure 3820.MD CSS Display Format
An active flycatcher can be biased by a fixed number field will display flycatcher last selected, if any,
of memory locations, relative to the current memory address when format is first displayed.
as follows, using the DEU (see Figure 38−19):
The messages shown in Figure 38−21 are displayed on
1. Select flycatcher by pressing FLY CATC on CSS the RIO MFD computer message area in response to an
page of DEU. invalid flycatcher operation.
2. Select INCR (to increment) or DECR (to decre 38.4.1.3 Block Address/Trap Operation
ment) pushbutton. Enter bias value in hexadecimal Block address allows the memory contents of a
with numeric pushbuttons and press ENT to com selected processor to be captured once upon its selection; trap
plete entry. allows data to be captured once upon the satisfaction of a
selected algorithm. Data captured as a result of either mode
3. Repeat step 2 for subsequent entry of bias values for
is displayed on the MFD CSS format. The contents of 16
selected processor.
contiguous memory locations are displayed relative to a
Flycatcher data is displayed on the left half of the CSS specified memory start address.
format anytime there is at least one active flycatcher as
Block address is initiated as follows, using the DEU
follows, using the MFD (see Figure 38−20).
(see Figure 38−22)(note that block address terminates
1. Select CSS format on any MFD by pressing FAULT automatically after its activation):
pushbutton on OBC basic format and then pressing
1. Select block address mode by pressing BLK ADRS
CSS pushbutton on MAINT CURRENT
on CSS page of DEU.
FAILURES format.
2. Select system to be examined by pressing one of
2. Select STEP pushbutton to display 16−word block of
equipment pushbuttons on B−ADRS page.
flycatcher data associated with next processor that
has active flycatcher. Note that flycatcher data word
38−43 ORIGINAL
MESSAGE (NOTE 1) REASON FOR DISPLAY
E FLYCH ADD {SSSS} Error in DEU entered flycatcher start address for the subsystem identified in
the {SSSS} field.
FLYCH EXISTS {SSSS} Only one flycatcher can be active per subsystem. The subsystem is
identified in the {SSSS} field. In order to setup the next flycatcher, the
previous flycatcher must be disabled.
E FLYCH INC {SSSS} Error in DEU entered flycatcher increment address for the subsystem
identified in the {SSSS} field.
N FLYCH IN {SSSS} Error in DEU entry to increment, decrement or disable a flycatcher for a
subsystem that has no active flycatcher. The subsystem is identified in
the {SSSS} field.
E FLYCH DEC {SSSS} Error in DEU entered flycatcher decrement address for the subsystem
identified in the {SSSS} field.
E NOT AVAIL Flycatcher not available. System is not ready. JTIDS tape recording
(TOMs 21−27) enabled.
Note:
(1) {SSSS} identifies the affected CSS compatible subsystem.
Figure 3821.Flycatcher Error Messages
3. Enter start address in hexadecimal with numeric a. Press ALGO to select algorithm that is used to
pushbuttons. Press ENT to complete the entry of trigger the capture of data. Enter algorithm
data and to activate block address mode. number with numeric keypads, and press ENT to
complete this entry.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for additional block address
operations for other systems. b. For each variable (i.e., V1, V2, V3) in selected
algorithm, press either an appropriate address
Trap is initiated or terminated as follows using the
pushbutton (V1 ADRS, V2 ADRS, V3 ADRS),
DEU (see Figure 38−23). There is a maximum of four taps per
or constant pushbutton (V1 CNST, V2 CNST,
processor:
V3CNST). Both selections require numeric
1. Select trap mode by pressing TRAP on CSS page of entry defining address of variable or actual
DEU. constant to be used in evaluation of algorithm.
Enter value with numeric pushbuttons and then
2. Select system to be examined by pressing one of press ENT to complete entry.
equipment pushbuttons on TRAP page.
c. Press DATA ADRS to allow entry of start address
3. Enter trap number (00 to 98) where number can for data. Enter address via numeric pushbuttons,
represent existing trap or new one (depending on the and press ENT to complete entry.
desired function).
d. Press COMP to complete the activation of tap.
4. Set up trap algorithm as indicated below, or press
DSBL to disable existing trap: 5. Repeat steps 2 through 4 to initiate or terminate
additional trap operations for other systems.
ORIGINAL 38−44
Figure 3822.DEU Block Address Pages
38−45 ORIGINAL
Figure 3823.DEU Trap Pages
ORIGINAL 38−46
MESSAGE (NOTE 1) REASON FOR DISPLAY

E BLOCK ADD {SSSS} Error in DEU entered block start address for the identified subsystem.
E TRAP ADD {SSSS} {NN} Error in DEU entered trap start address for the identified subsystem and trap
number.
E 4 TRAPS {SSSS} {NN} Current trap entry exceeds the maximum of 4 allowable traps per subsystem.
E TRAP VAR {SSSS} {NN} Error in DEU entered trap variable address for the identified subsystem and
trap number.
E TRAP ALGO {SSSS} {NN} Error in DEU entered algorithm code for the identified subsystem and trap
number.
NO TRAP NO. {SSSS} {NN} Error in DEU entered trap number that is selected to be disabled.
TRAP TRU IN {SSSS} Trap in identified subsystem has been triggered. Contents of the captured
data block can be displayed on the CSS format.
Note:
(1) {SSSS} identifies the affected CSS compatible subsystem. {NN} identifies a trap number ranging between
1 and 4.
Figure 3824.Block Address/Trap Error Messages
Block address and trap data are displayed on the right The messages shown in Figure 38−24 are displayed in
half of the MFD CSS format when there is at least one block the computer message area of the RIO MFD in response to
of data to be reported. As a maximum, only the last 15 invalid block address or trap operations.
block−address and trap reports will be retained by this
function. Displays are selected as follows: 38.5 RADAR SYSTEM BUILT−IN TEST
1. Select CSS format on any MFD by pressing Radar system BIT detects AN/APG−71 radar system
FAULTpushbutton on OBC basic format, and then hardware faults and provides assessment of tactical radar
pressing CSS pushbutton on MAINT CURRENT mode availability. BIT has four major capabilities:
FAILURES format.
1. Fault detection uses computer−controlled and RIO−
2. Press NEXT pushbutton to display next data report. initiated tests to detect failures in flight or on the
The number of block−address/trap reports indicates deck.
if any additional reports of data are available for
display and is decremented upon each depression of 2. Fault isolation allows isolation of a detected system
NEXT pushbutton. Note that block−address/trap failure by indicating DP and the suspect WRA or
data−words field will display last selected block of group of WRAs.
data, if any, when format is first displayed. Repeat
3. DMA provides a pass, fail, or degraded evaluation
this step as necessary to display each report.
of the operational modes.
3. Press CLR pushbutton to clear any data reports. This
4. CM automatically provides the RIO with a warning
action inhibits display of any remaining reports and
when system failures occur during tactical modes.
resets the number of block−address/trap reports to
zero.
38−47 ORIGINAL
Figure 3825.DD Radar Warning Maltese Cross
BIT provides indication of AN/APG−71 radar func 38.5.1 BIT Modes

tional status for ground−level maintenance and airborne
BIT allows the flightcrew to quickly assess radar set
operation. Prior to aircraft employment, or following an
status, identify hardware faults, and take the corrective
airborne mission, the groundcrew can execute BIT to
action. This assessment includes a radar confidence test
determine radar set status. Corrective maintenance action
recommendations are provided on the maintenance display. verification of controls and displays functionality, and, as
necessary, confirmation that the television camera set is
This display indicates the detected hardware failure(s) along
operational.
with replacement recommendations for associated WRA(s).
During tactical operation, the RIO will be alerted to The following BIT modes are available:
any anomalies that will impact radar or aircraft operation. A
Maltese cross is displayed in the lower left−hand quadrant of 1. Operational readiness test.
the DD if the radar has failed and/or the transmitter is not 2. Computer and displays mode test.
radiating (except in sniff mode). The Maltese cross is also
displayed when the radar is in standby or during initiated 3. Initiated radar test.
display test (Figure 38−25). The cross is not tied to the WOW 4. Initiated displays test.
switch, and will not be displayed solely for a WOW
condition. Radar anomalies will appear in the lower left 5. Television camera set test.
quadrant of the PTID as two−character acronyms. Aircraft 6. Digital display built−in self−test.
anomalies will appear on the PTID as three−character
acronyms, displayed below the radar acronyms. Acronyms 7. Initiated special test.
will be displayed continuously while the failure condition 8. Test−target BIT.
exists. If multiple failures occur, the appropriate acronyms
will be automatically cycled at a 2−second rate. More detailed 9. Continuous monitoring.
failure information is available on the continuous monitor
maintenance display. The RIO can initiate BIT at any time to
confirm that hardware status is unchanged.
ORIGINAL 38−48
38.5.1.1 Operational Readiness Test 38.5.1.2 Computer and Displays Mode Test
ORT is automatically initiated when aircraft power is CDM is automatically initiated when aircraft power is
applied to the radar, with the sensor hand control in either applied to the radar with the SHC in CMPTR. CDM is
STBY or XMIT or if a radar power interruption occurs for interruptible by pressing the PGM RST pushtile on the DD.
longer than 2.65 seconds. This radar confidence test includes This radar confidence test includes a subset of the tests
tests of radar computers, RF subsystems, system interfaces, performed during ORT. It differs from ORT in that the
and target detection capability. ORT requires nominally 3.5 antenna hydraulics and transmitter subsystem are not tested.
minutes to complete (including 3 minutes for transmitter CDM requires, nominally, 2.5 minutes to complete (the
warmup), but could take as long as 7 to 8 minutes if radar 3−minute transmitter warmup delay is not required). At the
functions are degraded. When ORT has completed, the DMA completion of CDM, the degraded mode assessment display
display is automatically displayed on the PTID and the BIT is automatically displayed on the PTID, and the BIT menu
menu will appear on the DD. The DMA algorithm provides will appear on the DD. The DMA algorithm will give an
an evaluation of the working status of tactical modes. If evaluation of the working status of tactical modes. If
additional information is required, the maintenance display additional information is required, the maintenance display
can be selected from the BIT menu. can be selected from the BIT menu.
At the completion of ORT, the following tests can be At the completion of CDM, the following tests can be
selected from the BIT menu on the DD: radar test, displays selected from the DD BIT menu: radar test; display, test,
test, television camera set test, special test or test target. If no television camera set test, special test or test target. If no
further testing is required, a tactical mode can be entered further testing is required, a tactical mode can be entered
directly by selecting the DD pushtile for the desired mode. directly by selecting the DD pushtile for the desired mode.
If ORT is running when a tactical situation arises, the
38.5.1.3 Initiated BIT (IBIT)
RIO can abort ORT by pushing the PGM RST button in the
lower right corner of the DD. ORT abort is not recognized The IBIT mode contains five submodes: radar BIT,
until after the initialization phase is complete (5 seconds or displays BIT, television camera set BIT, digital display
less). To report that ORT has been aborted, the CM acronym built−in self−test, and special tests BIT.
OA is displayed in the lower left position of the PTID and the
event is recorded in the failure history file. The system will 38.5.1.3.1 Radar BIT
transition to 5−nm pulse search. The 3−minute transmitter
warmup period will, however, still be in effect. This means Initiated radar test (RDR) allows retest of the radar
that the system capabilities will be limited to a nonradiation system. If the SHC is in either STBY or XMIT, radar BIT will
mode until warmup is complete. The system may have some be the same as ORT (with the exception that the 3−minute
performance degradation because of insufficient calibra transmitter warmup delay is not required). Consequently,
tions. These calibrations are normally executed during the radar BIT execution time is shorter. If the SHC is in CMPTR,
ORT sequence. Possible radar performance degradations are radar BIT will be the same as CDM.
as follows: Radar BIT is initiated by depressing the MFK pushtile
on the DD to obtain the radar modes menu, selecting the
1. LPRF pushtile adjacent to BIT to obtain the BIT submenu, and then
depressing the pushtile adjacent to RDR on the BIT menu.
a. Short pulse  Up to 500−foot range bias.
Test execution requires approximately 2.0 minutes, and is
b. Pulse compression  Up to 2−nm range bias. interruptible by a program restart (depressing PGM RST
pushtile on the DD), another BIT selection, or a radar mode
2. HPRF  RWS and PDS perform as required. selection.
3. RAM  RAM accuracy may be degraded. 38.5.1.3.2 Displays BIT
4. PDSTT/RGSTT  Noise jammer problem will DISP is a controls and displays subsystem confidence
occur first time until periodic calibrations are per check. The PTID and DD display a predefined set of static
formed. These calibrations shall be performed and dynamic symbology for evaluation of symbol intensity,
within 5 minutes of the ORT. completeness, contrast, and motion. Displays BIT symbol
ogy is dependent on the PTID mode switch setting and DD
keypad entry. The RIO must confirm visually that this
subsystem is functioning properly.
38−49 ORIGINAL
Figure 3826.MFD/PTID ORT Abort Displays
ORIGINAL 38−50
Displays BIT is initiated by depressing the MFK processing, and is playing reasonably sized targets. It is
pushtile on the DD to obtain the radar modes menu, selecting available in, and can be used to check the operation of low,
the pushtile adjacent to BIT to obtain the BIT submenu, and medium, or high PRF tactical modes. Test target entry is
then depressing the pushtile adjacent to DISP on the BIT indicated by a test target display on the lower left position of
menu. Displays BIT is interruptible by a program restart the PTID.
(depressing PGM RST pushtile on the DD), another BIT
To initiate test target BIT, MFK pushtile on the digital
selection, or a radar mode selection.
display is depressed, selecting the BIT menu. The test target
is selected by depressing the button adjacent to TEST TGT.
38.5.1.3.3 Television Camera Set BIT
To enable the location for test target injection, the pushtile
The TCS test verifies the status of the television camera adjacent to RDM TGT or RCVR TGT is depressed. To
set. The capability of the TCS slave modes is verified, the terminate the test target BIT, the pushtile adjacent to the
mechanical tracking functions (i.e., slewing and track) are enabled target injection location is reselected.
checked, and the radar−related TCS support functions are
monitored. Detected faults are displayed on the PTID at test 38.5.1.5 Continuous Monitoring (CM)
completion.
CM periodically samples mission essential radar set
TCS TEST is initiated by depressing the MFK pushtile signals during tactical operation, and informs the RIO of
on the DD to obtain the radar modes menu, selecting the detected problems.
pushtile adjacent to BIT to obtain the BIT submenu, and then
CM performs passive monitoring of key radar signals,
depressing the pushtile adjacent to TCS on the BIT menu.
a one−quarter/second rate. These signals include power
TCS testing is interruptible by a program restart (depressing
faults, overtemperature indicators, BIST status (i.e., equip
PGM RST pushtile on the DD), another BIT selection, or a
ment ready) signals, processor load status, transmitter peak
radar mode selection.
power, calibration failures, antenna hydraulic interlocks, and
transmitter interlocks.
38.5.1.3.4 Digital Display Built−In Self−Test
(BIST) Radar anomalies appear on the PTID, in the lower left
quadrant as two character acronyms. Acronyms will be
The DD has a standalone BIST capability that must be displayed continuously while a failure condition exists. If
initiated and evaluated by the RIO. It tests DD functions as multiple failures occur, the appropriate acronyms will be
well as its discrete interfaces with the sensor control unit, automatically updated at a 2−second rate. When an acronym
sensor hand control, and PTID. is displayed, the RIO can select the LM maintenance display
DD BIST is initiated by depressing the C/D TEST to obtain more detailed information on the specific unit that
pushtile on the radar control panel portion of the digital has a malfunction or anomaly. The RIO can also initiate BIT
display. When in flight continuous depression of the C/D at any time to confirm that hardware status is unchanged.
TEST pushtile clears DD display and initiates BIST. Release Aircraft system anomalies will appear on the PTID, in
causes the DD to revert to tactical operation. When not the lower left quadrant directly below the radar CM
airborne, the first depression clears the DD display and acronyms, whenever a fault is detected. Corresponding
initiates BIST; the second depression causes DD to revert to failure acronyms will be displayed for 2 seconds.
tactical operation.
38.5.2 Radar BIT Operation
38.5.1.3.5 Special Tests BIT
The radar BIT function is contained in the RDP. This
Initiated SPL TEST is designed to validate the specialized radar computer provides necessary timing and
operation of a specific radar submode or subfunction, and is control signals to F−14D radar subsystems to conduct various
used primarily for maintenance purposes. These tests are tests. BIT testing is generally independent of RIO inter
initiated with selection of the SPL TEST pushtile on the BIT action, with the exception of some manual switch settings,
menu, selection of the NBR pushbutton on the DD keypad, such as those on the SHC, which are not software
entering the appropriate test number and then pushing the controllable.
ENTER button.
BIT execution can be either automatic or operator
38.5.1.4 Test Target BIT initiated. Upon application of aircraft radar power, ORT is
automatically initiated. The RIO either switches the SHC
The test target function is a RIO activated and from OFF to CMPTR (to start CDM execution), or STBY or
evaluated end−to−end test of the radar system. It can be used XMT (to start ORT execution). After powerup, CDM or ORT
to quickly verify that the radar system is capable of detecting,
38−51 ORIGINAL
Figure 3827.Test−in−Progress Display
may be aborted by pressing the PGM RST button on the lower 38.5.2.1 BIT Display Formats
right corner of the DD. If CDM/ORT is not aborted, ORT
BIT displays provide feedback on test progress,
requires nominally 3.5 minutes to complete and CDM
required RIO actions, pass/fail status, detected faults, and
requires nominally 2.5 minutes to complete.
maintenance action recommendations. These displays in
The test−in−progress display is presented on the PTID clude the test in progress, BIT menu, degraded mode
(see Figure 38−27). The WRA unit designators blink for those assessment, maintenance display, test target CM, TCS test,
units that are undergoing test. Approximately 3 minutes after DD BIST, displays test (static and dynamic), and special test.
radar turn−on, an XMT acronym at the top of the PTID
prompts the RIO to switch to XMT, if the SHC switch is in 38.5.2.1.1 Test−in−Progress Display
STBY. The RIO has 25 seconds to respond. Failure to do so
within the allotted time results in bypassing the system The test−in−progress PTID display is presented upon
transmitter test. If the RIO responds in time, the transmitter initiation of ORT, CDM, or IRT (see Figure 38−27). This
test is executed and the transmitter subsystem unit group display provides status on WRA testing progress, OBC,
blinks, indicating that testing is in progress. At the comple continuous monitor failures, missile channel selection, and
tion of ORT (and CDM) DMA is presented on the PTID. This the DPs from previous ORT, CDM, IRT, or CM tests (if power
display provides an evaluation of the working status of the was not interrupted to the radar). The appropriate WRA
tactical modes. If the RIO desires more detailed information, reference designators blink for units undergoing test. WRA
the maintenance display can be selected by depressing the designators and their corresponding common names are
DD pushtile adjacent to MAINT DISP. This display provides listed in Figure 38−28.
test fail or pass status, the detected malfunctioning WRAs, At the completion of ORT, CDM or IRT, the degraded
and the associated DPs. DPs provide specific detailed mode assessment format (described in paragraph 38.5.2.1.3)
information on the faults detected within a particular unit. In is displayed on the PTID.
order to get back to the DMA display, the pushtile adjacent
to MAINT DISP is reselected.
ORIGINAL 38−52
The symbols that appear on the displays and the

WRA ID# corresponding modes or function named for the basic DMA
004 − Radar master oscillator (RMO) are as follows:
011 − Radar transmitter (TX) 1. PDS  Pulse Doppler search.
013 − Collector power supply (CPS) 2. RWS  Range while search.
014 − Beam power supply (BPS)
3. TWS  Track while scan.
015 − Solenoid power supply (SPS)
024 − Radar receiver (RCVR) 4. PDSTT  Pulse Doppler single−target track.
033 − Radar antenna (ANT) 5. MRL  Manual rapid lock−on.
034 − Analog signal converter (ASC) 6. PAL  Pilot automatic lock−on.
044 − Advanced Radar signal
7. PSTT  Pulse single−target track.
processor (ARSP)
8. RGSTT  Range−gated single−target track.
084 − Advanced Radar data processor
(ARDP) 9. VSL  Vertical scan lock−on.
551 − Digital display (DD) 10. PLM  Pilot lock−on mode.
580 − Programmable tactical information 11. PS  Pulse search.
display (PTID)
12. GM  Ground map.
818 − Television camera set (TCS)
819 − Radome interlock circuitry (RIC) 13. AGR  Air−to−ground ranging.
831 − Mission computer 2 (MC2) 14. BIT  Built−in test.
832 − Mission computer 1 (MC1) For a more detailed description of the pass/fail status
835 − Converter interface unit (CIU) of ORT, CDM, or IRT, the maintenance display format
844 − Sensor control unit (BCU) (described in paragraph 38.5.2.1.4) is called up on the PTID
by depressing the pushtile adjacent to MAINT DISP (on the
845 − Sensor hand control (SHC)
DD BIT menu). The DMA display format is restored by
reselecting the pushtile adjacent to MAINT DISP.
Figure 3828.WRA Common Names and Designators
Note
38.5.2.1.2 BIT Menu Display Format After a tactical mode is entered, the DMA dis
play format cannot be restored.
The DD BIT menu is presented at the completion of
ORT or CDM, and provides allowable RIO BIT test
selections (see Figure 3829). The RIO can initiate the 38.5.2.1.4 Maintenance Display Format
following tests from this menu: displays test, radar test, TCS The maintenance display is obtained by depressing the
test, special test, or test target. These tests are initiated by DD BIT menu pushtile adjacent to MAINT DISP. It can be
depressing the pushtile adjacent to the desired test name on selected during displays test, a tactical radar mode, or special
the DD. A highlighted box appears around the test name on test. It can also be obtained by transitioning from the DMA
the DD to indicate that a test has been selected. Tests cannot display (described in paragraph 38.5.2.1.3).
be initiated concurrently.
The maintenance display provides test pass or fail
The BIT menu can also be accessed while the radar is status to the RIO. If no faults are detected, a RDR PASSED
in a tactical mode by depressing the MFK pushtile to obtain indication is displayed near the top of the PTID, no WRA
the radar mode menu and then selecting BIT. designators are displayed, and a checkmark appears adjacent
to the appropriate test (see Figure 38−31). If a failure is
38.5.2.1.3 Degraded Mode Assessment Format detected, a RDR FAILED indication is displayed near the top
of the PTID, and the WRAs recommended for replacement
The display shown in Figure 38−30 is provided on the
along with the associated DPs, are displayed on the PTID
PTID at the completion of DMA. The purpose of DMA is to
(seeFigure 38−32). The WRA designators and their corre
give the RIO an evaluation of the working status of tactical
sponding common names are listed in Figure 38−28.
modes. An acronym for each mode is displayed on the PTID
and a pass (4), fail (X), degraded (p), or unevaluated
indication is presented with each acronym.
38−53 ORIGINAL
Figure 3829.BIT Menu Display Format
Figure 3830.Degraded Mode Assessment Format
ORIGINAL 38−54
Figure 3831.Maintenance Display Format (Test Complete)
Figure 3832.Maintenance Display (Test Complete)
38−55 ORIGINAL
Figure 3833.Test Target Menu
Detected failures are isolated to a maximum of six injected directly through the receiver, thus bypassing the
WRAs. A maximum of 10 DPs are displayed adjacent to the antenna. To terminate test target BIT, the pushtile adjacent to
test that was performed: ORT, IBIT (radar test, displays test), the enabled test target injection location is reselected.
or CM.
The RIO can now select any tactical mode by
Values for detection sensitivity and peak power for depressing the DD pushtile for the desired mode. The radar
HPRF and LPRF modes are displayed on the PTID along with test target will be processed and displayed on the DD and
the AIM−54 or AIM−7 channel being tested. PTID just as any newly detected target in the mode being
tested would be.
38.5.2.1.5 Test−Target BIT
In addition to testing the operation of the various
The test−target function is an end−to−end test of the modes, the test target can also be used to check many radar
radar system, initiated and evaluated by the RIO. It can be controls (such as display controls) and verify computer
used to quickly verify that the radar system is capable of functions such as hooking. For example, the RIO can hook
detecting, processing, and displaying reasonably sized the test target (which first appears as an unknown target) on
targets. It is available in and can be used to check the the PTID; designate it hostile (noting symbol change);
operation of low, medium, or high PRF tactical modes. initiate single−target track (noting operation of ANT and
RDR indicator lamps); enter data pertaining to the target; and
To initiate the test target, the DD MFK pushtile is used even test the track hold function after deselecting the test
to select the BIT menu. The test target is selected by target.
depressing the button adjacent to TEST TGT. The test−target
menu is displayed on the DD (see Figure 38−33). The test All targets have nominal initial values inserted for
target can be injected in two places depending on RIO switch range, range−rate, and target power level. HPRF targets have
activation. By depressing the pushtile adjacent to RDM TGT, initial range set to 20 miles and range−rate set to 800 knots
the target is injected through the radome radar test horn and (closing). LPRF targets have initial range set to 18 miles,
is received and processed through the antenna array. By with the DD range scale set to 20 or greater, or 4.5 miles, with
depressing the pushtile adjacent to RCVR TGT, the target is the DD range scale set to 5 or 10.
ORIGINAL 38−56
Figure 3834.Continuous Monitor Display
Target power level selection can be entered manually for MM) appear for 2 seconds when corresponding equip
after enabling test−target BIT. A power level is selected by ment is failed. The acronym MM overrides any previously
depressing the pushtile adjacent to TGT LVL and entering the displayed acronym for 4 seconds. The corresponding acro
following keyboard command: nym is masked when an equipment is masked through the
MFDs.
Low values of X are correlated with weak target returns
and allow for testing the radar’s sensitivity. High values of X A list containing the OBCCM acronyms that may
are correlated with strong target returns. appear as a result of aircraft CM failures is shown in
Figure38−36.
38.5.2.1.6 CM Display Format
38.5.2.1.7 TCS Test Format
CM fault detection is an integral part of the tactical
radar display. A two−character acronym is displayed in the The TCS test is a RIO initiated test of the TCS and
lower left quadrant of the PTID whenever a fault is detected associated switches. It is initiated by depressing the DD MFK
(see Figure 3834). This acronym is continually displayed pushtile to obtain the radar modes menu, selecting the
while the failure condition exists. If multiple failures occur, pushtile adjacent to BIT to obtain the BIT submenu, and then
failure acronyms will cycle at a 2−second rate. The RIO can depressing the pushtile adjacent to TCS. TCS testing is
obtain more detailed failure information by accessing the interruptible by a program restart (DD PGM RST pushtile),
BIT menu on the DD (depressing MFK pushtile) and another BIT selection, or a radar mode selection.
depressing the pushtile adjacent to MAINT DISP. The RIO
The TCS test function consists of 15 major subtests,
can also initiate BIT at any time to confirm that the hardware
that occur in the following order: TCS on−board checkout,
status is unchanged.
TCS cursor, manual acquisition, TCS slaved to radar, TCS
A list containing two letter acronyms that may appear return to search, TCS slaved to radar pointing accuracy test,
as a result of radar CM failures is shown in Figure 38−35. TCS slaved to computer pointing accuracy test, automatic
search, TCS scan pattern test independent mode, radar miles,
Aircraft anomalies will appear on the PTID (lower left
with the DD range scale set to 20 or greater, or 4.5 miles, with
quadrant directly below the radar CM acronyms) whenever
the DD range scale set to 5 or 10 slaved to TCS,
a fault is detected (see Figure 38−35). All acronyms (except
38−57 ORIGINAL
ACRONYM EQUIPMENT ACRONYM EQUIPMENT
BB Computer bus backup enabled MX RMX status word error

(DP 409) (DPs 40, 42, 44)
BF PTID buffer overload (DP 283) OA ORT has been aborted
CA Calibration failure OH Overheat (RMO, RX, DD, RDP, RSP,
(DPs 418−421, 426) ASC)(DPs 184, 198, 272, 397, 398,
399)
CB Computer bus status word error (DPs
32, 34, 36, 38) PH No PHX channels available
CC No sparrow CW channels available (DP 371)
(DP 373) PL RSP load error (DP 96)
CS RDP CPU checksum error (DPs 0−3) PM APG−71 liquid cooling pump failure
CW CW power failed to turn off or below (DPs 327, 331)
acceptable levels (DPs 354, 360) RO RMO status word error
CX Data check WMX CPU1, capacitor (DP 176−183)
voltage error, or data check WMX RP Radar power fault (RX, ARS, RMO,
CPU2 (DPs 4, 10,13) ANT, ASC, TX)(DPs 197, 385, 386,
387, 388, 390)
DD DD CM function fault (DPs 273, 274,
276−280, 282, 284) SA Semi−active decoder error (DP 187)
DP Display power fault (DD, PTID, SCU) SI PTID SSI parity error (DP 47)
(DPs 394, 395, 396)
SP No sparrow PD channels available
DR DD RAM checksum error (DP 275) (DP 372)
ER Equipment ready failure TT Test target switch enabled (DP 377)
(DPs 410−415)
XL XMTR dummy load switch failure
FA No frequency agility channels avail (DPs 336−338, 340)
able (DP 374)
XM XMTR peak power output below
HI Antenna hydraulics on interlock open minimum acceptable or XMTR is not
(DP 288) selected (DPs 352, 353)
HS RSP clock error (DP 51) XO Selected XMTR channel is not phase
MM Missed missile (AIM−54) message locked (DPs 185,189,190)
XT Transmitter subsystem failure
(DPs 320−326, 328−330, 332−334)
Figure 3835.Radar Continuous Monitor Acronyms
ORIGINAL 38−58
OBCCM OBCCM
ACRONYM EQUIPMENT ACRONYM EQUIPMENT
AIC Air inlet control system MC1 Mission computer no. 1
APC Approach power compensator MC2 Mission computer no. 2
BAG Beacon augmentor MDL Mission data loader
BSF Band suppression filters MFA Multiple filter assemblies
(Left or Right)
BUS Data bus
MFD MFD no. 1, MFD no. 2, or
CAD Central air data computer
MFD no. 3
CIU Converter interface unit
NPS Navigation power supply
DEU Data entry unit PDP Display processor no. 1 or display
DFC Digital flight control system processor no. 2
DLS Data link system POD Tactical airborne reconnaissance
POD
DSS Data storage set
RAD Radar altimeter
ECM Airborne self−protection jammer
RFP Radio frequency indicator − Pilot
FEM Airborne data acquisition comput
er, engine monitoring signal proc RFR Radio frequency control
essors 1/2 indicator − RIO
GCU Gun control unit RWR Radar warning receiver
HUD Head−up display SDI Sensor display and indicator set
IFB Interference blanker SMS Stores management system
IFI IFF interrogator SRS Standard attitude and heading refer
ence set
IFX IFF transponder
TCN Tactical air navigation
INS Inertial navigation system
WOW Weight−on/off−wheels sensor
IR Infrared search and track system
(BLANKS) No system failures
Figure 3836.OBC Continuous Monitor Acronyms
38−59 ORIGINAL
radar slaved to TCS pointing accuracy test, hand control b. C/D TEST 2 Display. When C/D TEST 2 is selected, the
forward right, hand control half−action, and TCS slewing display shown in Figure 38−41 will appear on the DD. The
test. numeric values next to BRT, CON, and SYM may differ
slightly from those shown in the Figure, depending on knob
When the TCS test begins, the display in Figure 38−37
position.
shall appear on the PTID. The TCS test−in−progress menu
consists of acronyms denoting the conditions of the asso C/D TEST 2 tests all front panel toggle and rotary
ciated TCS test function subtest. The RIO has 15 seconds to switches and potentiometers. As each of the SNIFF, TGT,
supply the indicated action for each prompt. Figure 38−38 TRACK, and MLC switches are toggled into their allowable
contains a list of the prompts and associated RIO responses. positions, an X will be displayed in the appropriate location.
Rotating the CHAN, FA/MAN, and JAM/JET switches into
38.5.2.1.8 Digital Display Controls and their allowable positions will cause corresponding symbolo
Displays Test (C/D Test) gy changes on the panel for the selected switch position.
Rotating each potentiometer through its full movement range
The DD has a standalone built−in self−test capability will display a corresponding decimal number that will vary
that must be initiated and evaluated by the RIO. It tests DD from 00 to 10 to 90 to 99.
functions as well as its discrete interfaces with the sensor
hand control and PTID. c. C/D TEST 3 Display. When C/D TEST 3 is selected, the
DD display shown in Figure 38−42 will appear. This display
C/D test is initiated with the DD radar control panel tests the capability of the DD to respond to signals from
C/D TEST pushtile. When the F−14D is airborne, continuous interfacing units and to other signals. When the SHC RDR
depression of the C/D TEST pushtile clears DD display and switch is set to CMTR, and the commands shown in Figure
initiates test. Release causes the DD to revert to tactical 38−43 are issued by the SCU, SSP, or DD, the indicated
operation. When the F−14D aircraft is not airborne, the first responses are displayed next to the associated C 3 display
depression clears the DD display and initiates test; the second legends. The SHC RDR CMPTR selection also enables tests
depression causes DD to revert to tactical operation. While initiated by other SHC controls and PTID controls. Selec
the C/D TEST pushtile is depressed, a diagonal line should tions and responses are shown in Figure 38−44 and Figure
be displayed on the PTID. 38−45, respectively.
After the C/D TEST is selected, the DD display will
appear as shown in Figure 38−39. Adjust DD BRT and CONT 38.5.2.1.9 Display Test Formats
controls for optimal viewing of the eight displayed shades of
The displays test gives the RIO standard test patterns
gray. Adjust the SYM control for best display of stroke
on the PTID and DD for evaluation. The displays test is
symbology. From this display, three separate tests may be
divided into static and dynamic testing. It is initiated by
selected by pressing the pushtiles (along the left edge of the depressing the MFK pushtile on the DD to obtain the radar
DD display) next to the legends (1, 2, and 3) displayed on the
modes menu, selecting the pushtile adjacent to BIT to obtain
CRT.
the BIT submenu, and then depressing the pushtile adjacent
a. C/D TEST 1 Display. When C/D TEST 1 display is to DISP.
selected, the background will be shades of gray. Right to left
a. Static Testing. When ATTK is selected with the PTID
sweeps start as soon as the display appears, with each sweep
MODE switch, the DD ANT, RDR, JAT, and TCS indicator
diminishing the intensity of the shades of gray (aging). After
lamps will illuminate. The PTID LAUNCH ZONE, VEL
13 sweeps, the shades of gray will have disappeared (the VECTOR, and CLSN indicator lamps will illuminate. The
background will be uniform).
PTID center drum and steering drum will be blank. The test
C/D 1 test is used to test all front panel momentary pattern shown in Figure 38−46 will be displayed on the DD,
pushtiles. As each of the DD front panel momentary pushtiles and the pattern shown in Figure 38−47 will be displayed on
are depressed, an X appears at the appropriate location on the the PTID.
CD TEST 1 display (see Figure 38−40).
When A/C STAB or GND STAB is selected with the
PTID MODE switch, all DD indicator lamps will go off. In
Note addition, all PTID indicator lamps will go off, the PTID
Depressing the C/D TEST pushtile will exit C/D center drum will read SENSOR, and the steering drum will
TEST. Depressing the pushtile adjacent to legend read MAN. The DD test pattern shown in Figure 38−48 will
2 or legend 3 will exit C/D 1 and initiate C/D 2 be displayed, and the PTID will display the pattern shown in
or C/D 3. Figure 38−49.
ORIGINAL 38−60
Figure 3837.PTID Menu for TCS IBIT, In Progress
PROMPT RIO RESPONSE

DISPLAY ON PTID UNIT ACTION
TCS CURSOR Sensor hand control Select TGS cursor

MAN ACQ Digital display Depress TCS MAN pushtile
TCS SLV RDR Sensor slaving panel Select TCS slave
TCS HALF−ACT Sensor hand control Select half action and release
AUTO SRCH Digital display Depress TCS ASCH pushtile
INDEP Sensor slaving panel Select TCS IND
RDR SLV TCS Sensor slaving panel Select RDR slave
HC FWD RT Sensor hand control Position hand control to upper right
corner
HC HALF−ACT Sensor hand control Select half action, maintaining HCN
in upper right corner
Figure 3838.TCS BIT Prompts and RIO Responses
38−61 ORIGINAL
Figure 3839.Initial C/D TEST Display
Figure 3840.C/D TEST 1 Display (After Aging Is Completed)
ORIGINAL 38−62
Figure 3841.C/D TEST 2 Display
Figure 3842.C/D TEST 3 Display
38−63 ORIGINAL
SCU CONTROL/SELECTION DD RESPONSE SHC CONTROL/SELECTION DD RESPONSE
STAB/IN IN HC MODE/IR/TV IR/TV

STAB/OUT OUT HC MODE/RDR RDR
FOV/WIDE WIDE HC MODE/PTID CURSOR PTID CURSOR
FOV/NAR NARROW HC MODE/DD CURSOR DD CURSOR
TCS TRIM/AZ −22 to +22 HANDGRIP ACTION SWITCH/ NO
TCS TRIM/EL −44 to +44 (NO DETENT)
AZ SCAN/±10° 10 HANDGRIP ACTION SWITCH/ HALF
(FIRST DETENT)
AZ SCAN/±20_ 20
HANDGRIP ACTION SWITCH/ FULL
AZ SCAN/±40_ 40
(FULL DETENT)
AZ SCAN/±65_ 65
HCX (HANDGRIP) −99 to + 99
EL BARS/1 1 LEFT/RIGHT
EL BARS/2 2 HCY (HANDGRIP) FORE/AFT −99 to + 99
EL BARS/4 4 MRL X
EL BARS/8 8 OFFSET X
SSP CONTROL/SELECTION DD RESPONSE
SLAVE/RDR RDR
SLAV/INDEP INDEP
SLAVE/TCS TCS
DD CONTROL/SELECTION DD RESPONSE
ACQ/AUTO SRCH AUTO SEARCH Figure 3844.DD Responses for SHC Select Tests
ACQ/MAN MANUAL
ACQ/AUTO AUTO
VSL/HI HI PTID CONTROL/SELECTION DD RESPONSE
VSL/OFF OFF
TRACK HOLD X
VSL/LO LO
PTID MODE/TV C
Figure 3843.DD Responses for SCU/SSP/DD Figure 3845.DD Responses for PTID Select Tests
Select Tests
ORIGINAL 38−64
Figure 3846.BIT Static DD Display (ATTK Selected)
38−65 ORIGINAL
Figure 3847.BIT Static PTID Display (ATTK Selected)
These test patterns should be examined by the RIO for initial point symbol is displayed for reference. To enter the
the absence of any required symbols, symbol intensity, and dynamic test, the RIO selects CLEAR, NBR, 1, 1, and ENT
symbol position. During the running of the static test, the RIO on the DD keypad.
should also select half action or full action on the hand
When the RIO selects ATTK with the PTID MODE
control. The RIO should ensure that the PTID cursor can be
switch, the displays on the PTID and DD (Figure 38−40 and
moved throughout the range of the PTID by moving the hand
Figure 38−41) will go through the following movements
control. Upon release of the action switch, the cursor symbols
every 2 seconds:
should return to their original positions.
On the DD, the following occur simultaneously:
The static portion of the displays test gives the RIO an
indication that the computer does or does not have the display 1. The artificial horizon steps in pitch from zero to
capability for each of the indicated symbols. It is more than +15° (up), +30_, +45_, 0_, −15_ (down), −30_, −45_,
a displays test because it also tests computer ability to then back to 0°.
generate symbols needed for a tactical situation. The
computer assists the RIO in the static portion of the displays 2. The artificial horizon steps in roll from 0_ to +15_
test by monitoring power failures that have occurred in the (right wing down), +30°, +45°, back to 0_, −15° (left
controls and displays units. A DISP FAILED indicator will wing down), −30°, −45°, and back to 0°.
appear on the maintenance display if a power failure is
detected. The maintenance display indicates DISP PASSED 3. The ASE circle steps from 0.8 inch in diameter to
until a failure occurs. 0.1, 0.3, 0.56, then back to 0.8.
b. Dynamic Testing. The dynamic test consists of a visual
4. The steering symbol steps around the ASE circle in
evaluation of the movement of the artificial horizon, ASE
a clockwise direction in steps from its position in the
circle, steering symbol, closing range rate indicator, launch
upper right quadrant to the lower right, lower left,
zone symbols, and a velocity vector with TUIR and TUOR
upper left, then back to the upper right quadrant.
markers that sequentially vary in size or position. A fixed
ORIGINAL 38−66
Figure 3848.BIT Static DD Display (GND STAB or TV Selected)(Sheet 1 of 2)
38−67 ORIGINAL
Figure 38−48. BIT Static DD Display (GND STAB or TV Selected)(Sheet 2 of 2)
ORIGINAL 38−68
Figure 3849.BIT Static PTID Display (Non−ATTK Selection)
On the PTID, the following occur simultaneously: 7. The velocity vector will vary in length from 1.5
inches to 0 inches, 0.5 inches, 1.0 inches, then back
1. The artificial horizon steps in pitch from zero to to 1.5 inches.
+15° (up), +30°, +45°, 0°, −15° (down), −30_, −45_
then back to 0°. 8. The F−14 bar origin will vary its distance above the
artificial horizon along the velocity vector from 1.5
2. The artificial horizon steps in roll from 0_ to +15° inches to 1.0 inches, 0.5 inches, 0 inches, then back
(right wing down), +30°, +45_, back to 0_, −15° (left to 1.5 inches.
wing down), −30_, −45°, and back to 0_.
9. The additional dot marker will vary its distance
3. The bar marker steps from 1.5 inches above the arti above the artificial horizon along the velocity
ficial horizon to 1.0, 0.5, 0, and back to 1.5 inches. vector from 0 to 0.5 inch, 1.0 inch, 1.5 inches, then
back to 0 inches.
4. The dot marker steps from above the artificial to 0.5,
1.0, 1.5 inches and back to the artificial horizon. The events occurring during the dynamic portion of the
test are repeated until the RIO selects another BIT sequence
5. The artificial horizon, ASE, and steering symbol test, selects another category, interrupts via a program restart,
move on the PTID at the same rate as the DD. or selects another radar mode.
6. The ASE circle steps from 2.0 inches in diameter to When the RIO selects A/C STAB or GND STAB with
the PTID MODE switch, the displays on the PTID and DD
0.2, 0.8, 1.4, then back to 2.0 inches in diameter.
will go through the following movements every 2 seconds.
38−69 ORIGINAL
Figure 3850.BIT DD Dynamic Display
Dynamic test in A/C STAB and GND STAB will have When commanded by this function, instrumentation mod
displays similar to those shown in Figures 38−50 and 38−51, ules in the RDP and RSP are configured to output repeatable
except that ATTK will blink above the BIT horizontal test patterns to the instrumentation recorders. Failure indica
boundary, and the artificial horizon, ASE circle, and steering tions are determined by analysis of these recordings offline.
symbol will be deleted. A DISP FAILED message will appear The display is shown in Figure 38−52.
on the PTID during the static or dynamic tests when a fault
is detected. A fault isolation display can be requested by 38.5.3 Flycatcher
depressing the pushtile adjacent to MAINT DISP on the DD
BIT menu. If a power fault or computer subsystem fault was Flycatcher is a computer routine that allows the
detected, the unit designator of the malfunctioned WRA is operator to examine the contents of specific RDP memory
displayed along with the associated DPs on the PTID. locations. This information is generally used in trouble
shooting. Flycatcher readouts will be displayed on the upper
left portion of the DD. The display will consist of the
38.5.2.1.10 Special Test Format
computer designation readout, address readout and data
Special test is initiated via the selection of the SPL readout (in hexadecimal).
TEST pushtile on the BIT menu, selection of the NBR
To initiate these readouts, the following sequence of
pushtile on the DD keypad, entering the appropriate test
entries on the CAP portion of the DD must be used:
number, and then pushing the ENT pushtile. Test execution
is continual while special test is selected. Testing is 1. CLR.
interruptible by a program restart (by depressing PGM RST
on the DD), another BIT selection, or radar mode selection. 2. 7.
The special test 80−instrumentation test verifies the
proper operation of the APG−71 instrumentation system. This 3. 1.
system includes the IST and ICU modules within the RDP
4. ENT.
and RSP, respectively, and the interface to the data recorder.
ORIGINAL 38−70
Figure 3851.BIT Dynamic PTID Display (ATTK Selected)
Figure 3852.Special Test 80−Instrumentation Test
38−71 ORIGINAL
A computer number of 1 selects the RDP memory, To decrement the displayed address, the following
currently the only valid selection. Next, a hexadecimal sequence must be entered:
memory address must be entered in the following sequence:
1. CLR.
1. 9.
2. 7.
2. 0.
3. S−W.
3. 1 to 5−digit hex address.
4. ENT.
4. ENT.
If an increment is performed, and no further CAP
The flycatcher has the capability to increment or selections have been made, subsequent increments or
decrement the displayed address. To increment the displayed decrements can be made by simply pressing the ENT pushtile
address, the following sequence must be entered: repeatedly.
1. CLR. The flycatcher is turned off with the following CAP

sequence:
2. 7.
1. CLR.
3. N+E.
2. 7.
4. ENT.
3. 0.
4. ENT.
ORIGINAL 38−72
PART X
NATOPS Evaluation
Chapter 39  NATOPS Evaluation and Question Bank

CHAPTER 39
NATOPS Evaluation
39.1 NATOPS EVALUATION PROGRAM 39.1.3 Definitions

The following terms, used throughout this chapter, are
39.1.1 Concept
defined below as to their specific meaning within the
NATOPS program.
The standard operating procedures prescribed in this
manual represent the optimum method of operating the air 39.1.3.1 NATOPS Evaluation
craft. The NATOPS evaluation is intended to evaluate com
pliance with NATOPS procedures by observing and grading A periodic evaluation of individual flightcrewmem
individuals and units. This evaluation is tailored for compati bers standardization consisting of an open−book examina
bility with various operational commitments and missions of tion, closed−book examination, oral examination, and flight
both Navy and Marine Corps units. The prime objective of evaluation.
the NATOPS evaluation program is to assist the unit com
manding officer in improving unit readiness and safety 39.1.3.2 NATOPS Reevaluation
through constructive comment. Maximum benefit from the A partial NATOPS evaluation administered to a
NATOPS program is achieved only through the vigorous flightcrewmember who has been placed in an Unqualified
support of the program by commanding officers as well as by status by receiving an Unqualified grade for any ground
flightcrewmembers. examination or for the flight evaluations. Only those areas in
which an unsatisfactory level was identified need be
39.1.2 Implementation observed during a reevaluation.
The NATOPS evaluation program shall be carried out 39.1.3.3 Qualified

in every unit operating naval aircraft. The various categories
of flightcrewmembers desiring to attain and retain qualifica The evaluation term applied to a flightcrewmember
who is well standardized and who demonstrates highly
tion in the F−14D shall be evaluated initially in accordance
professional knowledge of and compliance with NATOPS
with the current OPNAV Instruction 3710, and at least once
standards and procedures. Momentary deviations from or
during the 12 months following initial and subsequent evalu
ations. Individual and unit NATOPS evaluations will be con minor omission in noncritical areas are permitted if prompt
and timely remedial action was initiated by the evaluee.
ducted annually; however, instruction in and observation of
adherence to NATOPS procedures must be on a daily basis
39.1.3.4 Conditionally Qualified
within each unit to obtain maximum benefits from the pro
gram. The NATOPS coordinators, evaluators, and instructors The evaluation term applied to a flightcrewmember
shall administer the program as outlined in the current who is satisfactorily standardized, who may have made one
OPNAVINST 3710. Evaluees who receive a grade of or more significant deviations from NATOPS standards and
Unqualified on a ground or flight evaluation shall be allowed procedures but made no errors in critical areas and no errors
30 days in which to complete a reevaluation. A maximum of jeopardizing mission accomplishment or flight safety.
60 days may elapse between the date of the initial ground and
flight evaluation and the date that qualification is satisfacto 39.1.3.5 Unqualified
rily completed. F−14A/B NATOPS evaluations can be
The evaluation term applied to a flightcrewmember who
accomplished during the same evaluation flight provided the
is not acceptably standardized, who failed to meet minimum
currency requirements for each model established in Chapter
standards regarding knowledge of and/or ability to apply
5 are met. The results will be recorded on the NATOPS evalu NATOPS procedures, or who made one or more significant
ation report (OPNAV Form 3710/7).
deviations from NATOPS standards and procedures that could
jeopardize mission accomplishment or flight safety.
39−1 ORIGINAL
39.1.3.6 Area 39.2.6 MFT and WST Procedures Evaluation

An area is a routine of preflight, flight, or postflight. An MFT and WST may be used to assist in measuring
the flightcrewmember’s efficiency in the execution of
39.1.3.7 Subarea normal operating procedures and reaction to emergencies
A performance subdivision within an area that is and malfunctions. In areas not covered by the OFT and WST
covered and evaluated during an evaluation flight. facilities, this may be done by placing the flightcrewmember
in an aircraft and administering appropriate questions.
39.1.3.8 Critical Area and Subarea
39.2.7 Grading Instructions
Any area or subarea that covers items of significant
importance to the overall mission requirements, the marginal Examination grades shall use a 4.0 scale and be
performance of which would jeopardize safe conduct of the converted to an adjective grade of Qualified or Unqualified.
flight. 39.2.7.1 Open−Book Examination
39.2 GROUND EVALUATION To obtain a grade of Qualified, an evaluee must obtain
a minimum score of 3.5.
Prior to commencing the flight evaluation, an evaluee
must achieve a minimum grade of Qualified on the 39.2.7.2 Closed−Book Examination
open−book and closed−book examinations. The oral
examination is also part of the ground evaluation but may be To obtain a grade of Qualified, an evaluee must obtain
conducted as part of the flight evaluation. To assure a degree a minimum score of 3.3.
of standardization between units, the NATOPS instructors 39.2.7.3 Oral Examination and MFT and WST
may use the bank of questions contained in this chapter in Procedure Check (If Conducted)
preparing portions of the written examinations.
A grade of Qualified or Unqualified shall be assigned
39.2.1 Open−Book Examination by the instructor−evaluator.
The open−book examination shall consist of, but not be
limited to, the question bank. The purpose of the open−book 39.3 FLIGHT EVALUATION
examination portion of the written examination is to evaluate The flight evaluation may be conducted on any routine
the flightcrewmember’s knowledge of appropriate publica syllabus flight with the exception of flights launched for
tions and the aircraft. FCLP and CARQUAL or ECCM training. Emergencies will
39.2.2 Closed−Book Examination not be simulated.
The closed−book examination may be taken from, but The number of flights required to complete the flight
evaluation should be kept to a minimum, normally one flight.
shall not be limited to, the question bank and shall include
The areas and subareas to be observed and graded on a flight
questions concerning normal and emergency procedures and
evaluation are outlined in the grading criteria with critical
aircraft limitations. Questions designated critical will be so
marked. areas marked by an asterisk (*). Grades on subareas will be
assigned in accordance with the grading criteria. Grades on
39.2.3 Oral Examination subareas shall be combined to arrive at the overall grade for
the flight. If desired, grades of areas shall also be determined
The questions may be taken from this manual and may in this manner. At the discretion of the squadron or unit
be drawn from the experience of the instructor−evaluator. commander, the evaluation may be conducted in WST, MFT,
Such questions should be direct and positive and should in no or COT.
way be based solely on opinion.
39.3.1 Instrument Flight Evaluation
39.2.4 Emergency
Annual NATOPS instrument flight evaluations and the
An aircraft component or system failure or condition IFR portions of NATOPS flight evaluations, whether con
that requires instantaneous recognition, analysis, and proper ducted in flight or in an approved simulator, must be
action. conducted by a NATOPS−qualified pilot or RIO, who is
39.2.5 Malfunction designated in writing by the unit commanding officer. Such
instrument flight evaluations must be conducted in accor
An aircraft component or system failure or condition dance with the procedures outlined in the current OPNA
that requires recognition and analysis, but which permits VINST 3710.
more deliberate action than that required for an emergency.
ORIGINAL 39−2
39.4 OPERATIONAL DEPLOYABLE SQUADRONS 2. Takeoff (pilot)

Pilots and RIOs assigned to operational deployable 3. Transition to climb schedule.
squadrons will normally be checked as a team, with the flight
evaluation being conducted by the checkcrew flying wing. 39.6.5 Climb and Cruise
RIO commentary will be transmitted on the GCI or CIC
control frequency in use. 1. Departure (pilot)
39.5 TRAINING AND EVALUATION SQUADRONS 2. Climb and level−off (pilot)

Units with training or evaluation missions that are 3. Procedures en route (pilot)
concerned with individual instructor pilot or RIO standard
ization rather than with team standardization may conduct
39.6.6 (*) Approach and Landing
the flight evaluation with the checkcrew−pilot flying wing or
on an individual basis. A pilot may be individually checked 1. Radar, TACAN (pilot)
with the instructor−evaluator conducting the flight evaluation
from the rear seat. The RIO may be individually checked by 2. Recovery (pilot).
flying with the instructor−evaluator pilot.
39.6.7 Communications
39.6 FLIGHT EVALUATIONS
1. Receiving and transmitting procedures (pilot and
The areas and subareas in which pilot and RIOs may be
RIO)
observed and graded for adherence to standardized operating
procedures are outlined in the following paragraphs.
2. Visual signals (pilot and RIO)
Note
3. IFF and SIF procedures (RIO).
If desired, units with training missions may
expand the flight evaluation to include evaluation 39.6.8 (*) Emergency and Malfunction
of standardized training methods and techniques. Procedures.
(*) The IFR portions of the flight evaluation shall be in In this area, the pilot and RIO will be evaluated only in
accordance with the procedure outlined in the NATOPS the case of actual emergencies unless evaluation is conducted
Instrument Flight Manual. in the COT, WST, or OFT.
39.6.1 Mission Planning and Briefing 39.6.9 Postflight Procedures
1. Flight planning (pilot and RIO)
1. Taxi in (pilot)
2. Briefing (pilot and RIO)
2. Shutdown (pilot and RIO)
3. Personal flying equipment (pilot and RIO).
3. Inspection and records (pilot and RIO)
39.6.2 Preflight and Line Operations
4. Flight debriefing (pilot and RIO).
Inasmuch as preflight and line operation procedures
are graded in detail during the ground evaluation, only those 39.6.10 Mission Evaluation
areas observed on the flight check will be graded.
This area includes missions covered in the NATOPS
1. Aircraft acceptance (pilot and RIO) flight manual, F−14D tactical manual, and naval warfare
publications for which standardized procedures and tech
2. Start niques have been developed.
3. Before−taxiing procedures (pilot).
39.7 RECORD AND REPORTS
39.6.3 Taxi and Runup A NATOPS evaluation report (OPNAV Form 3710/7)
shall be completed for each evaluation and forwarded to the
39.6.4 (*) Takeoff and Transition evaluee’s commanding officer only. This report shall be filed
1. ATC clearance (pilot) and retained in the individual’s NATOPS jacket. In addition,
an entry shall be made in the pilot’s and RIO’s flight
39−3 ORIGINAL
logbooks under Qualifications and Achievements" as To determine the numerical grade for each area and the
follows: overall grade for the flight, add all the points assigned to the
subareas and divide this sum by the number of subareas
graded. The adjective grade shall then be determined on the
QUALIFICATION DATE SIGNATURE
basis of the following scale.
NATOPS (Date) (Authenticating
EVALUATION signature) 1. 0.0 to 2.19  Unqualified.
2. 2.2 to 2.99  Conditionally Qualified.

(Aircraft Model)
(Unit that 3. 3.0 to 4.0  Qualified.
administered
(Crew Position) evaluation) Example (add subarea numerical equivalents):
4+2+4+2+4 16
= = 3.20
3 20 or Qualified
5 5
39.7.1 Critique
The critique is the terminal point in the NATOPS 39.8.2 Final Grade Determination
evaluation and will be given by the evaluator−instructor The final NATOPS evaluation grade shall be the same
administering the check. Preparation for the critique involves as the grade assigned to the flight evaluation. An evaluee who
processing, reconstructing data collected, and oral presenta receives an Unqualified on any ground examination or the
tion of the NATOPS evaluation report. Deviations from flight evaluation shall be placed in an Unqualified status until
standard operating procedures will be covered in detail using a grade of Conditionally Qualified or Qualified is achieved
all collected data and worksheets as a guide. Upon comple on a reevaluation.
tion of the critique, the pilot and RIO will receive the
completed copy of the NATOPS evaluation report for 39.9 APPLICABLE PUBLICATIONS
certification and signature. The completed NATOPS evalua
tion report will then be presented to the unit commanding The NATOPS flight manual contains the standard
officer. operations criteria for F−14D aircraft. Publications regarding
environmental procedures peculiar to shorebased and ship
39.8 FLIGHT EVALUATION GRADING CRITERIA board operations and tactical missions are listed below:
Only those subareas provided or required shall be 1. F−14D tactical manuals
graded. The grades assigned for a subarea shall be deter
mined by comparing the degree of adherence to standard 2. NWPs
operating procedures with adjectival ratings listed below.
Momentary deviations from standard operating procedures 3. NATOPS Air Refueling Manual
should not be considered as unqualifying provided such
deviations do not jeopardize flight safety and the evaluee 4. Air Traffic Control NATOPS Manual
applied prompt corrective action.
5. Local Air Operations Manual
39.8.1 Flight Evaluation Grade Determination
6. Carrier Air Operations Manual.
The following procedure shall be used in determining
the flight evaluation grade. A grade of Unqualified in any 39.10 NATOPS EVALUATION QUESTION BANK
critical area and subarea will result in an overall grade of
The following bank of questions is intended to assist
Unqualified for the flight. Otherwise, flight evaluation (or
the unit NATOPS instructor−evaluator in the preparation of
area) grades shall be determined by assigning the following
ground examinations and to provide an abbreviated study
numerical equivalents to the adjective grade for each subarea
guide. The questions from the bank may be combined with
Only the numerals 0, 2, or 4 will be assigned in subareas. No
locally originated questions in the preparation of ground
interpolation is allowed.
examinations. The closed−book examination will consist of
1. Unqualified  0.0 not less than 25 questions nor more than 75 questions. The
time limit for the closed−book examination is 1 hour and 30
2. Conditionally Qualified  2.0 minutes. The requirements for the open−book examination
are the same as those for the closed−book examination,
3. Qualified  4.0. except there is no time limit.
ORIGINAL 39−4
NATOPS EVALUATION QUESTION BANK
1. The aircraft weighs approximately ________________ including trapped fuel, oil, gun, pilot and RIO.
2. The aircraft is __________ in length and has a wing span of __________at 20_ and ______________ in oversweep.
3. The L INLET and R INLET caution lights indicate __________________.
4. During normal system operation, the status of AICS ramp control is as follows:
SPEED Ramp Hydraulic Power
M < 0.35 ON/OFF Restrained by .
M 0.35 to 0.5 ON/OFF Commanded .
M > 0.5 ON/OFF Programmed as a function of .
5. An AICS failure that causes illumination of an INLET and/or RAMP caution light results in the following:
Speed Range Ramp Resultant
M < 0.35 .
M 0.5 to 0.9 .
M > 0.9 .
6. During the AICS portion of OBC, simulated variant flight conditions cycle the ____________________________ through
their full range of operation in about_______ seconds. This exercises the _______________________________________
and ensures ________________________________________.
7. Operation of the L and R AICS is completely independent.
a. True
b. False
8. AICS anti−ice is available between ________ Mach and ________ Mach.
9. With the gear handle down and one or more ramps not in the stow position, the ramp light will be illuminated.
a. True
b. False
10. The installed thrust of the F110−GE−400 engine is ________ pounds at MRT and ________ pounds at MAX A/B.
11. In SEC mode, both main engine fuel flow and compressor VSVs are scheduled ____________________________ by the
___________, and fan speed is limited __________by the ____________.
12. A 3−percent increase in windmill rpm can be achieved by selecting ___________.
13. Nonemergency selection of the SEC mode should be performed in _________________.
39−5 ORIGINAL
14. The augmenter fan temperature control system regulates five parameters of the engine to provide stall−free operation for
any rate of throttle movement throughout the flight envelope. These parameters are:
a.
b.
c.
d.
15. The engine electrical control subsystem is powered by an engine gearbox−mounted (ac or dc) alternator that
contains ______________ separate windings, which are:
a.
b.
c.
d.
16. What are the two power sources for fan speed limiting?
a.
b.
17. The backup ignition is powered by the aircraft ______________________bus.
18. Autorelight logic is provided by the ________________________.
19. What are the throttle interlocks at the military power detent?
a.
b.
c.
20. Autothrottle may be preflight ground tested on deck either in ______________________ or _______________________.
Indications that a malfunction exists in the autothrottle system are _________________________________________ or
________________________________________.
21. List oil pressure readings
a. MRT _______________________psi
b. Minimum at IDLE ___________psi
ORIGINAL 39−6
22. An engine stall with no overtemperature will illuminate the appropriate STALL WARNING light in both PRI and SEC
mode.
a. True
b. False
23. Normal ranges of nozzle position are:
a. IDLE weight on wheels
b. In−flight MRT
c. MIN A/B
d. MAX A/B
24. What interlocks must be satisfied to activate the nozzle to the full−open position to reduce residual thrust?
a.
b.
25. Minimum rpm for ground start of the F110−GE−400 engine is _____________________ percent rpm.
26. Maximum allowable EGT for ground starting the F110−GE−400 engine is ____________________C.
27. The starting temperature limits are the same for both ground starts and airstarts.
a. True
b. False
28. At EGT readings of ______________°C ±10, a warning tone is present in the pilot earphones.
29. At ____________°C, the EGT chevrons begin to flash.
30. A hot engine should not be started until EGT is below _______________C airborne.
31. Zero− or negative−g flight is limited to a maximum of ____________________ seconds in military power or less and
________ seconds in afterburner in order not to __________________________________________.
32. Above __________________ rpm, the MEC should shut off fuel flow to the F110−GE−400 engine.
33. If the throttle boost system fails, the throttles automatically revert to manual mode, and the throttle mode switch
returns to MAN.
a. True
b. False
34. What pilot action is required to reset the boost mode of throttle control subsequent to reversion to the manual mode?
35. ______________________________________________________________ is the controlling parameter for the APCS.
39−7 ORIGINAL
36. Autothrottle engagement range is between _______________ and _________________ percent rpm.
37. If the autothrottles are disengaged by any means, the AUTO THROT light illuminates for a 10−second duration.
a. True
b. False
38. Engine rpm must be above ___________ percent to supply sufficient power for the main engine ignition system.
39. When attempting a crossbleed or normal ground start, the ENG CRANK switch will not reengage if the engine is spooling
down and engine rpm is between ____________ and _____________ percent.
40. During spooldown airstarts, hung starts in the low rpm range (less than 45 percent) can be assisted with
___________________________. Hung starts in the mid−rpm range (50 to 60 percent) can be corrected by
___________________________.
41. If the IGV linkage breaks, the IGVs assume a _________________ position, which is near normal for
_________________ power settings.
42. The number of delta Ps to check on each engine during preflight is ________________________.
43. During an engine ground fire or abnormal start, be sure that the BACK UP IGNITION switch is in the
______________ position.
44. The L or R FIRE warning lights illuminate when the respective entire sensing loop is heated approximately
___________°F or when any 6−inch section is heated to approximately_______________F.
45. What procedures should be followed to check oil level if it was not checked within 5 to 30 minutes after shutdown?
46. During preflight, the oil sight gauge is always a reliable indicator of oil level.
a. True
b. False
47. The No. __________ bearing receives priority lubrication in the event of a loss of oil.
48. During cold starts, oil pressure greater than 80 psi should not be exceeded for more than _____________ minute(s).
49. The electrical source for the oil pressure indicator is _____________.
50. The OIL PRESS warning light will illuminate when the pressure drops below ______________ psi and extinguishes when
pressure rises above ___________ psi.
51. The L or R OIL HOT warning light indicates that the supply oil temperature has exceeded __________________ or the
scavenge pump temperature has exceeded _____________.
52. The INLET ICE caution light illuminates when ____________ or _______________.
53. In AUTO, pitot probe heat is available only with weight off wheels.
a. True
b. False
ORIGINAL 39−8
54. Which of the following would result in illumination of the FUEL PRESS caution light?
a. Failure of a motive flow pump.
b. Failure of a main fuel pump stage.
55. Failure of the second stage on the main engine fuel pump will have what effect on engine operation?
56. Failure of a motive flow fuel pump will have what effect on the engine and fuel system operation?
57. The loss of an engine−driven boost pump will have what effect on operation of both engines?
58. Selecting either AFT or FWD with the fuel FEED switch performs what functions in the fuel system?
a. c. e.
b. d.
59. The L/R FUEL LOW light illuminates with approximately ________________ pounds remaining in the respective
feed group.
60. Automatic shutoff of wing and drop tank transfer occurs with WING/EXT TRANS switch in either AUTO or ORIDE.
a. True
b. False
61. The engine boost pump is powered by ____________________________________________________.
62. To increase bingo fuel specifications, the engine mode select switch may be placed in ________________________
during descents or ____________________________________________________.
63. The BINGO caution light illuminates when _______________________________.
64. Is vent tank fuel quantity included in the fuel totalizer on the AFT and L indicator readings?
65. When should the FEED switch be activated to FWD or AFT?
66. What medium is used to actuate the feed tank interconnect valve, wing motive flow shut−off valves, and fuel dump valve?
67. Wing fuel is transferred by:

a. Engine bleed air
b. Motive flow fuel
68. The fuel thermistors in the outboard section of the wing tanks perform what function?
69. The fuel thermistors in fuel cell Nos. 2 and 5 perform these functions when either is uncovered:
a. d.
b. e.
c.
39−9 ORIGINAL
70. All fuel entering the vent tank is vented overboard through the vent mast in the tailhook attachment fairing.
a. True
b. False
71. Fuel transfer from the external drop tanks is accomplished by __________________.
72. External fuel transfer can be checked on the deck by __________ or __________.
73. Fuel dump is prohibited with speedbrakes open and/or afterburner operation.
a. True
b. False
74. When the fuel dump circuit is activated, wing and external drop tank transfer is automatically initiated.
a. True
b. False
75. Is it possible to refuel in flight and accomplish total fuel transfer without electrical power or a combined hydraulic system?
If not, why?
76. On engine start with the generator switch in normal, the generator is automatically excited and the generator control unit
brings it on the line when engine rpm is approximately ____________________ percent.
77. _________________ stage bleed air is used for IDG oil ground cooling.
78. If the thermal cutout decouples the drive clutch to either main generator in flight, the IDG may be recoupled (reset) a
maximum of three times.
a. True
b. False
79. Failure of either ac generator automatically connects the left and right main ac buses to the operative generator.
The cockpit indicator will be a __________________ caution light.
80. The emergency generator is powered by _____________________.
81. If the emergency generator switch is in NORM, it will come on the line automatically when ______________________
________________________________________________________.
82. When operating on the emergency generator, the cockpit lighting available consists of _______________________ and
___________________________.
83. A single engine−driven pump on the left powers the combined hydraulic system and a single engine−driven pump on the
right powers the flight hydraulic system.
a. True
b. False
ORIGINAL 39−10
84. If the pilot extinguishes the MASTER CAUTION light after a failure of one main hydraulic system, failure of the other
system (will or will not) illuminate the MASTER CAUTION light. Why?
85. List the requirements for operation of DLC.
86. With the left engine shut down in flight and 0 percent windmill rpm, the combined hydraulic system can be
powered by ______________________________.
87. With total loss of fluid from either main hydraulic system, the hydraulic transfer pump will ____________________
___________________________________________________________________________________________.
88. The cockpit handpump will charge the brake accumulator in flight if________________________________________
__________________________________________________.
89. Loss of all hydraulic fluid from the flight hydraulic system will mean loss of power to the right inlet ramps.
a. True
b. False
90. With loss of the combined hydraulic system (combined system pressure zero), the main flaps are powered by
___________________ and the auxiliary flaps are __________________________________________________.
91. With the landing gear emergency blown down, the nosewheel steering and normal brakes will operate after touchdown.
a. True
b. False
92. The outboard spoiler module uses combined system fluid.

a. True
b. False
93. Outboard spoilers are inoperative with wing−sweep angles aft of ___________.
94. The outboard spoiler module thermal cutout is inhibited when ______________________________________________
_______________________________________________.
95. The ON−OFF flag in the spoiler window of the hydraulic indicator indicates:
a. The outboard spoiler module is energized.
b. The outboard spoiler system is pressurized.
96. With loss of the combined hydraulic system (combined system pressure zero) the inboard spoilers will:
_________________________________.
97. The backup flight control module powers the _____________ and the _____________.
98. With the backup flight control module switch in AUTO, the module is automatically energized when
_______________________________________________________________________.
99. The backup flight control module switch has three positions: AUTO, ___________________ and _________________
___________________________.
39−11 ORIGINAL
100. The backup flight control module operates in the high−speed mode when ____________________________________
___________________.
101. Operational status of the backup flight control module is indicated in the cockpit by ___________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________.
102. DLC requires an operable outboard spoiler module.
a. True
b. False
103. Failure of either the combined or flight hydraulic system will have what effect on wing−sweep?
104. On the wing−sweep indicator, there are three position indicators. These show ______________________________
__________________ and ___________________ wing−sweep position.
105. The aircraft is being operated with the wings aft of the forward limit. The wing−sweep control mode indicator reads MAN.
If speed is now increased beyond where the wing−sweep angle and forward limit coincide, the control mode indicator
will read _______________ and the wings will __________________.
106. The most forward wing−sweep angle allowed in bomb mode is __________.
107. The emergency wing−sweep mode is a manual method of positioning the wings. This method incorporates locks every
_____________ from 20_ to 68_ to prevent random wing movement in this mode.
108. Illumination of the WING SWEEP warning light means: _________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________________.
109. Appearance of the W/S warning legend on the MFD means: ______________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________.
110. Transient failures in the CADC may be reset by: ________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________________________________.
111. The CADC is self−tested in _____________________________.
112. List the caution, advisory, and warning lights activated by the CADC directly or via the DFCS:
a. e.
b. f.
c. g.
d. h.
113. When instrument test has been selected on the MASTER TEST panel, the EIG indications after 5 seconds are:
a. RPM
b. EGT
c. FUEL
d. FLOW
ORIGINAL 39−12
114. A degraded mode of EIG operation is indicated by ___________________________.
115. Maneuver flaps can be lowered at any wing−sweep angle between 20° and ______________________.
116. The maneuvering flap thumbwheel will lower the main flaps ______________, the auxiliary flaps ____________,
and the slats ____________, Use of the maneuvering devices (does or does not) put more restrictive g limitations on the
aircraft.
117. What is the meaning of the following (besides CADC failure) ?
a. FLAP caution light
b. REDUCE SPEED warning (1)

(2)
(3)
118. Power for emergency extension of the landing gear is supplied by___________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________________.
119. The minimum bottle pressure for accomplishing emergency extension of the landing gear is _____ psi but minimum
preflight bottle pressure is ________ psi at 70_ F (21_ C).
120. Full lateral trim in the direction of stick displacement will reduce maximum spoiler deflection to
_____________ on that side.
121. Full slat asymmetry of 17_ can result in an out−of−control situation at _________ units AOA or greater, even with
55_ of spoilers available.
122. The rudder pedal shaker is armed with main flaps greater than _________________ _ and the ________________
computer operating.
123. With DLC engaged, full−up DLC positions the inboard spoilers at _______________ _ and the horizontal stab trailing
edges ______________.
124. The initial position for spoilers when DLC is engaged is _____________________.
125. The correct positioning for stabilizers when DLC is given a full−down command (from trim) is _________________
trailing edge ___________________.
126. Full rudder throw of ± _________________________ corresponds to ± inches of rudder pedal travel.
127. Control surface authority of the stability augmentation system is:

Pitch ± _.
Roll ± _.
Yaw ± _.
128. The gear handle is down and the three gear position indicators show the gear down, but the transition light is illuminated.
What does this indicate and what action should be taken?
39−13 ORIGINAL
129. The ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch is OFF and the BRAKE light is illuminated. This would indicate:
a.
b.
130. The BRAKE light (ANTI SKID SPOILER BK switch OFF) operates only when the brakes are depressed or the parking
handle is pulled.
a. True
b. False
131. The two procedures for lowering the launch bar are: ________________________ or __________________________.
132. Nosewheel steering cannot be engaged until weight is on wheels.
a. True
b. False
133. With the nosewheel <70°, the nosewheel assumes the position commanded by the rudder pedals when nosewheel steering
is engaged.
a. True
b. False
134. BLEED DUCT light indicates temperatures in excess of ________________ °F between engine and primary heat
exchanger or greater than ___________________°F between primary heat exchanger and the ECS turbine.
135. The ram air door can be opened only if the ___________ or ___________ button is depressed on the ECS control panel.
136. The ram air door automatically closes with selection of L ENG, R ENG, or BOTH ENG on the ECS control panel.
a. True
b. False
137. The ram air door requires ____________ seconds to go full open.
138. The RIO has a low−cockpit−pressure caution light (CABIN PRESS) that illuminates if ______________________
or _______________________.
139. With the OBOGS light on, each flightcrewmember should have _______________ hours of oxygen at 20,000 feet
(8,000 feet cabin altitude).
140. Pulling the emergency oxygen actuator releases gaseous oxygen charged to psi and will provide approximately
a _______________ minute supply.
141. Windshield rain removal is accomplished by blowing 390° F air over the outside of the windshield. If the temperature
sensor detects an overtemperature condition, the WSHLD HOT advisory light will illuminate
and ________________________.
142. Maximum allowable headwind for the open canopy is ____________________ knots.
ORIGINAL 39−14
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
143. When the canopy is jettisoned, the sill locks are released by _______________________________________________.
144. The canopy pneumatic reservoir must be serviced by ground servicing unit.
a. True
b. False
145. The pilot can tell the position of the command ejection lever by ____________________________________________.
146. The RIO can eject both himself and the pilot with EJECT CMD handle set to PILOT.
a. True
b. False
147. The pilot can eject both himself and the RIO with the EJECT CMD handle set to MCO.
a. True
b. False
148. In the event the canopy does not separate from the aircraft when either flightcrewmember has initiated ejection, “through
the canopy” ejection will not occur.
a. True
b. False
149. There are ___________________safety pins per ejection seat.
150. Command ejection by either flightcrewmember will eject the RIO in ____ seconds and the pilot ________ seconds later.
151. For a high-altitude ejection, the seat is allowed to free-fall to ± _____________________ feet.
152. All exterior lighting controls except for the ____________ light are located on the MASTER LIGHT panel on the pilot
console, and the exterior lights master switch on the outboard throttle.
153. When the wings are swept aft of __________, the _____________ position lights are disabled and the glove position lights
are operable.
154. When the ANTI-COLLISION light switch is ON, the ________________ position lights flasher switch is disabled.
155. A proper indicator lights test has the MASTER CAUTION light on steady.
a. True
b. False
156. The RIO can monitor SW tones by selection of ___________ position on the ICS panel.
157. The standby attitude indicator is capable of providing reliable attitude information within _______________ for up to
___________ minutes after a complete loss of power.
158. On deck, the allowable error between the pilot and RIO altimeter readings is ____________ feet at field elevation.
39-15 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
159. The angle−of−attack indicator is checked during ______________ and the indexer during ____________. Proper indi−
cations are:
a. Indicator 
b. Indexer  .
160. In the landing configuration, 15 units AOA is equivalent in airspeed for:
a. 48,000 pound (DLC not engaged) = KIAS
b. 48,000 pound (DLC engaged/neutral) = KIAS
c. 50,000 pound (DLC not engaged) = KIAS
161. With an airspeed indicator failure, list the angle of attack to fly for the following conditions (drag index 8):
a. Catapult _____________________________________________.
b. Climb (MIL) SL_____________________________________________ to combat ceiling.
c. Cruise at OPT. ALT.________________________________________________________.
d. Endurance a OPT. ALT.______________________________________________________.
162. Stores jettison is controlled by which aircraft system?
163. ACM jettison requires MASTER ARM ON.
a. True
b. False
164. Selective jettison can be completely controlled by either flightcrewmember.
a. True
b. False
165. In the emergency jettison mode, the weight−on−wheels interlock is bypassed.
a. True
b. False
166. Emergency jettison mode will jettison Sidewinders.
a. True
b. False
167. Sidewinder is jettisoned by firing the motor and safing the warhead.
a. True
b. False
ORIGINAL 39−16
168. The pretaxi (weight−on−wheels) OBC master test is a complete check of the SMS.
a. True
b. False
169. Selection of any pulse dogfight mode automatically provides stab out aircraft reference.
a. True
b. False
170. The pilot must clear maintenance display prior to running OBC for current test results
a. True
b. False
171. For normal UHF operation with the ARC−182, the AM/FM switch should be in the __________________________
position.
172. With track files established in TWS, the HUD and MFDs provide the pilot complete steering information to the centroid
of the targets.
a. True
b. False
173. The navigation system may be updated by five methods; they are:
a. d.
b. e.
c.
174. In TACAN BIT, the range and bearing on the HSD and BDHI should indicate _____________________ nm and
__________.
175. The target designator is valid to ± __________ off the nose.
176. With MASTER ARM OFF, the HUD and VDI armament legend will appear with _______________________.
177. To obtain an attack presentation, the air−to−air button must be selected on the PDCP.
a. True
b. False
178. The COOLING AIR light refers to air cooling out of tolerance while the SENSOR COND light indicates liquid cooling
out of tolerance.
a. True
b. False
39−17 ORIGINAL
179. The PTID is oriented to ___________________ north, with selection of GND STAB on the PTID mode switch.
180. Which of the following presentations are available to the pilot:
a. IRSTS
b. PS
c. PDS
d. All of the above.
181. A _____________ acronym indicates a failure of the SMS, thus preventing normal separation of stores in any launch
mode.
182. The RADAR COOLING switch in the RIO cockpit controls liquid coolant to __________________.
183. Hostile area altitude is entered in the _______ pseudo file to properly reject altitude line return.
184. Wind is automatically computed by the system in the INS mode.
a. True
b. False
185. A wind of 35 knots and 057_ relative to the duty runway represents a headwind component of ________________
knots and crosswind of _________ knots.
186. A blinking SHOOT cue indicates ______________________________________________________________.
187. Hydraulic power to drive the gun comes from the ___________________________________________ system.
ORIGINAL 39−18
PART XI
Performance Data
For aircraft performance data and charts, refer to NAVAIR 01−F14AAP−1.1.

CHAPTER 40
Tactical Imaging Set

AN/AVX−3
40.1 AN/AVX−3 TACTICAL IMAGING SET varies depending on the selected operating mode. Display
brightness is controlled via menu selection.
The Tactical Imaging Set, as installed in the F14D
aircraft, captures, digitizes, and compresses imagery from an
40.1.2 Image Transceiver
external RS 170 video source, then stores and/or transmits it
over a secure communications link. The external video Image Transceiver functions are controlled by a
source is typically a camera/video system such as the nose microprocessor. The Image Transceiver also has two
mounted Television Camera System (TCS), Low Altitude Personal Computer Memories Card International Associa
Navigation and Targeting System for Night (LANTIRN), tion (PCMCIA) card slots. The microprocessors executable
Head Up Display (HUD) camera, or other similar systems. program firmware is stored on an 8 Mbyte flash random
Maximum image capture rate is 4 images/second. The access memory, called the Program card, in slot 1 (left slot).
Tactical Imaging Set can also receive images transmitted by Upon power up or reset, the firmware is loaded into 6 Mbytes
other Tactical Imaging Sets or compatible systems (such as of the Image Transceiver 32 Mbyte image memory. The
ground or base stations). Selected images can be displayed on remaining 26 Mbytes of image memory is allocated for
the forward (Video Display Indicator−VDI) and/or aft storage of uncompressed image frames. The image memory
(Programmable Tactical Information Display − PTID) cock is volatile, and so stored image frames are lost when power
pit display. The Tactical Imaging Set converts standard is removed. The RCU sends RS−232 serial commands to
National Television Standards Committee (NTSC) video to this microprocessor to direct the functions of the Image
allow viewing of still−frame (single−image) imagery or Transceiver.
recorded video. The Image Transceiver accepts an RS 170 format video
The Tactical Imaging Set consists of a Remote Control input from the VTR (or an external video source via the
Unit (RCU), Image Transceiver, Video Tape Recorder VTR), digitizes the video to create an image frame, and
(VTR), Interface Box, and four interconnecting cables (not passes the image frame to an image buffer for output to the
including connecting aircraft wiring). The RCU mounts in aircraft cockpit display. The image memory stores selected
the aft cockpit at the inboard front of the right side console. image frames. Image frames stored in memory can be
The Image Transceiver, VTR, Interface Box, and cables are randomly accessed for viewing and/or cropping before
mechanically mounted as one unit, called the Naval Airborne compression. An image compressor (software algorithm)
Video Recorder and Image Transceiver (NAVRIT) Unit, reduces the size of image frames selected to be stored and
which is mounted in bay 2221−3. Controls and indicators are routes them to a 4 Mbyte non volatile static random access
shown in Figure 40−1. memory (SRAM) PCMCIA card, called the Image card, in
slot 0 (right slot) for storage or transmission. The stored
40.1.1 Remote Control Unit (RCU) image frame includes a clock time code.
The RCU interfaces with the Image Transceiver via an 40.1.3 Video Tape Recorder (VTR)
RS−232 serial bus to enable the Radar Intercept Officer to
remotely control the Image Transceiver functions. Com The VTR is an airborne video recorder that can record
mand signals are sent from the RCU to the Image Trans and play back up to 2 hours of information on a standard
ceiver, and data is sent from the Image Transceiver to the Hi 8 format cassette tape. It contains an internal heater to
RCU for display. The RCU display contains 2 lines of 24 prevent condensation. The VTR front panel controls are
green, night vision compatible, alphanumeric characters disabled; thus all VTR control is remotely performed. RS 422
each. The top line provides status and messages. The bottom serial command signals are sent from the Image Transceiver
line provides a command menu. The command menu defines to the VTR, and VTR status data is sent from the VTR to the
the functions of six pushbutton switches located below the Image Transceiver. Discrete control signals from the aft
display. The command menu, and thus the switch functions, cockpit Sensor Control Panel are sent to the VTR via the
40−1 ORIGINAL
Figure 401.Tactical Imaging Set Controls and Indicators (Sheet 1 of 2)
ORIGINAL 40−2
INDEX NAME FUNCTION
1 Display (RCU) 48−character alphanumeric display consisting of 2 rows of

24 characters each. Upper row shows operating status.
Lower row identifies functions of switches.
2 Switches (RCU) Six pushbutton switches. Functions are as defined by lower row of
display.
3 PCMCIA Card Cover Latch Opens/closes cover for PCMCIA card compartment.
(Image Transceiver)
4 Image Card Release Button Releases image card for removal.
(Image Transceiver)
5 R−W/WP switch Permits (R−W) or prevents (WP) recording (writing) on image card.
(Reading of image card is always permitted.)
6 LOCKED latch (Image Card) Latches and unlatches image card battery compartment.
7 Program Card Release Button Releases program card for removal.

(Image Transceiver)
8 LED 1 lamp (Image Transceiver) Indicates +28 VDC power is applied to Image Transceiver.
9 SW1 switch (Interface Box) Selects video output level.

UP nominal 2.2 V (for use with LANTIRN Control Panel installed)
DOWN nominal 1.25 V (for use with LANTIRN Control Panel not installed)
10 REC/STBY/UNTHRD/PLAY/ Non−functional
REW/FF control (VTR)
11 EMK REC switch (VTR) Non−functional
12 PULL OPEN/LOCK latch (VTR) Opens/closes VTR cassette compartment.
Figure 40−1. Tactical Imaging Set Controls and Indicators (Sheet 2 of 2)
Interface Box. Discrete status signals for certain VTR modes available commands which are selected using the corre
are also sent to the Sensor Control Panel Interface Box. sponding six pushbutton switches below the display.
40.1.4 Interface Box 1. In bay 2221−3:
The Interface Box provides mechanical mounting for a. Ensure Program card is installed in Image Trans
the VTR and Image Transceiver. Additionally, it provides ceiver slot 1 (left slot).
electrical connections for dc input power, and connections b. Ensure formatted Image card is installed in
and switching for digital and video input and output signals. Image Transceiver slot 0 (right slot).
The Interface Box also modifies the RS 170 video to make
c. Ensure tape cassette is not record protected (red
it compatible with the cockpit displays.
tab should not show) and is installed in VTR.
40.2 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS
Note
40.2.1 Powerup Sequence The VTR can record on either Hi 8 or standard
Power up is accomplished using the aft cockpit Sensor 8 mm tape; however, image quality can be sub
Control Panel. Once power is applied, the Remote Control stantially degraded when using standard tape.
Unit (RCU) controls all functions, although the Sensor
d. Set Interface Box SWl switch as appropriate up
Control Panel can control some Video Tape Recorder (VTR) if LANTIRN Control Panel is installed; down if
functions. The top line of the RCU display shows status and
LANTIRN Control Panel is not installed.
data. The bottom line of the RCU display shows up to six
40−3 ORIGINAL
2. Set aft cockpit Sensor Control Panel selector to 5. Boot up menu appears.
STBY. RCU displays following sequence:
CS:LOC=###### SND=@@@@@@
PHOTOTELESIS
Ok Ext NiteDay
Where ###### is the local call sign and @@@@@@ is
PHOTOTELESIS the first entry in the send to call sign directory. (These
entries can be changed using the Settings menus.)
RCU 403
then 6. Press switch corresponding to desired display
Waiting ATR startup brightness level (if current level is satisfactory, do
not press a switch):
Unit is
EXT−Not used
Waiting for ATR startup
NITE−Nighttime level from Settings menus
3. After Image Transceiver startup, the following mes
sage sequence appears: DAY−Daytime level from Settings menus
RCU RESET 7. Press OK switch. Main menu appears at currently

selected brightness level.
PHOTOTELESIS
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %+:$$$
RCU 403
BrstSnapSet ViewVoc Send
4. The following message should NOT appear. If it
does appear, there is no Image card in slot 0, or the Where ### is the number of image frames in the send queue,
Image card installed is not formatted. @@@ is the number of image frames in the hold queue,
&&& is the number of image frames in the receive queue, %
UNREADABLE IMAGE CARD is the VTR mode (S = standby, U = unthreaded, P = playback,
flashing R =recording, all others = blank), ± is either a or
Ok Fmt a + indicating tape location is before or after the reset point,
and $$$ is the VTR tape counter time in minutes. When the
Note system is in data mode (voice communication disabled), the
Pressing OK switch enables process to proceed &&& field flashes. (Specific switch functions displayed may
without resetting, but results are unpredictable. vary depending on previous actions; for example, when the
send and hold queues are empty, the SEND switch label is not
If message appears, either: displayed.).
a. (1) Install formatted Image card and simulta Note
neously press OK and FMT switches to reset
RCU and Image Transceiver. Following message If a value in a field is greater than 999, the display
sequence appears: shows ***.
RCU RESET 40.3 RESETTING RCU AND

IMAGE TRANSCEIVER
PHOTOTELESIS
The RCU and Image Transceiver may be reset
(rebooted) at any time by simultaneously pressing the two
RCU 403
outermost switches. When this is done, the following
ATR RESET message sequence appears:
or Note
b. (2) Ensure Image card is installed, and press The hold and compress queues are erased during
FMT switch to format card. Following message reset.
appears:
Formatting SRAM card
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 40−4
ATR RESET
Main
Ok
b
PHOTOTELESIS Send to Call Sign $ Modify Call Sign
RCU−403 b
Unit is Send/Delete Function $ Edit Call Sign

b
Waiting for ATR Startup
Capture Rate
RCU RESET
b
PHOTOTELESIS Capture Time
RCU−403 b
CS:LOC=###### SND=@@@@@@ Automatic Transmit

b
Ok Ext NiteDay
Compression Method
Where ###### is the local call sign and @@@@@@ is the b
first entry in the send to call sign directory.
[Wavelets] Compression Ratio
Pressing the OK switch displays the Main menu.
b
40.4 SETTINGS MENUS [JPEG] JPEG Quality Factor
The Settings menus are used to modify configuration b
parameters for capturing, compressing, transmitting, and [PTC] PTC Compression Quality
receiving image frames, as well as other system level
functions. The Settings menus are accessed and processed in b
sequence from the Main menu (by pressing the SET switch) PTAC Quickstart
as shown in Figure 40−2.
b
40.4.1 Settings Menus’ Format Local Call Sign
The Settings menus follow the general format: b
PARAMETER: ####### Display Brightness

b
End BackSet Fld PrevNext
Image Dimension
Where ####### (flashing) is the value of the parameter being b
set. Switch functions vary somewhat among menus, and are
explained as each menu is described. Comms Cable ID
b
Note
EIS Configuration
The FLD, PREV, and NEXT switches are used to b
cycle through sets of fields or values. When the
last entry in the set is displayed and the FLD or Date and Time
NEXT switch is pressed, the first entry in the set b
is displayed. When the first entry in the set is dis
played and the PREV switch is pressed, the last Format SRAM Card $ Waveburst Version Number
entry in the set is displayed.
Figure 402.Settings Menus Sequence
40−5 ORIGINAL
40.4.2 Send−to−Call−Sign−Menu PREV − Change currently displayed call sign to previous

call sign in directory
This menu is used to select/deselect the call signs to be
included in the next transmission. It provides access to NEXT − Change currently displayed call sign to next call
submenus, which are used to maintain the call sign directory. sign in directory
The menu contains one value field. When selected, the first
call sign in the directory is listed whether or not it is selected
for transmission. The directory can be stepped through using 40.4.4 Edit Call Sign Menu
the NEXT switch, and each entry can be selected or
deselected, as desired. The displays for a call sign value differ This menu is used to change the name of an existing
slightly depending on whether that value is selected or not call sign, including a newly added call sign (000000). Each
selected. character in the call sign is considered a separate value field.
Valid entries for each character are numerals, upper case
For a selected call sign value: letters, and blanks (H, located in sequence between Z and 0).
Blanks are not permitted within the body of the call sign;
SENDTO CALLSIGN <######> however, if a call sign has less than 6 characters, trailing
blanks must be added to complete the 6 character call sign.
End Mod Set Yes No Next Trailing blanks appear on the display only when the call sign
value field is being edited.
For a non−selected call sign value:
MODIFY CALLSIGN ######
SENDTO CALLSIGN ######
Ok Fld PrevNext
End Mod Set Yes No Next
OK − Return to Modify Send to Call Sign menu
END − Return to Main menu
MOD − Display Modify Call Sign menu FLD − Select next field in call sign
SET − Select next menu in sequence PREV − Change currently selected call sign character to
previous letter or number
YES − Select call sign
NEXT − Change currently selected call sign character to
NO − Deselect call sign
next letter or number
NEXT − Change currently displayed call sign to next call
sign in directory
40.4.5 Send/Delete Function Menu
This menu is used to toggle the send/delete mode
40.4.3 Modify Call Sign Menu
parameter on or off. In send/delete mode, captured images
This menu is used to add a new call sign to the directory are deleted as they are sent. With send/delete mode turned
or delete an existing call sign from the directory. It also off, images are copied to the receive queue as they are sent.
provides access to the Edit Call Sign menu, which is used to Valid values are YES and NO.
define a newly added call sign.
SEND AND DELETE: ###
MODIFY CALLSIGN ######
End BackSet Next
DoneDel New EditPrevNext
DONE −Return to Send to Call Sign menu
BACK− Display Send−to Call Sign menu
DEL − Delete the current call sign from the directory
SET − Display Capture Rate menu
and display the next value (if no next value,
default is 000000) NEXT − Toggle send and delete mode value
NEW − Create new unselected call sign with value of

000000 (if value 000000 already exists, switch 40.4.6 Capture Rate Menu
has no effect)
This menu is used to change the time interval between
image captures in burst mode. Valid values range from 0.1 to
EDIT − Display Edit Call Sign menu
ORIGINAL 40−6
999.0. Values are incremented or decremented in 0.1−second 40.4.8 Max Key Time
steps when the value is less than 1 second, and in 1−second
This menu is used to change the duration of time that
steps when the value is greater than 1 second. Incrementing
the Tactical Imaging Set transmits image data to a receiving
once from 999.0 or decrementing once from 0.1 disables
station. This menu allows the maximum transmitting time to
burst mode and enables single shot mode. In this case, the
value field indicates SINGLESHOT. be set between 10 and 180 seconds, using the change interval
of 1 second. The carrier DCRS stations are programmable
and are set for a Max Transmit Time of 30 seconds. The
Note
Tactical Imaging Set default setting is 30 seconds. The
The capture rate can be set to 0.1 or 0.2 seconds/ Tactical Imaging Set will always boot to the last set Max
image; however, these settings are below the Transmit Time.
Tactical Imaging Set minimum capture rate
value (fastest capture). If the capture rate is set to MAX KEY TIME ## SECS
0.1 or 0.2 seconds/image, the Tactical Imaging End BackSet PrevNext
Set will capture image frames at its fastest speed,
which is approximately 0.28 second/image in END − Return to Main menu
capture/hold mode. In capture/send mode, the
minimum capture rate value is substantially BACK− Display Capture Time menu
higher due to the compression required to trans
SET − Display Automatic Transmit menu
fer image frames to the send queue.
PREV − Decrement currently displayed menu
CAPTURE RATE: ##### SEC
EndBackSet PrevNext NEXT − Increment currently displayed value
40.4.9 Automatic Transmit Menu
BACK− Display Send/Delete menu
This menu is used to toggle the capture mode
SET − Display Capture Time menu parameter between capture/hold and capture/send modes. In
capture/hold mode, captured images are placed in the hold
PREV − Decrement currently displayed queue. In capture/send mode, captured images are placed in
the compress queue for transmission. Valid values are
NEXT − Increment currently displayed value CAPT&HOLD and CAPT&SEND.
AUTO TRANSMIT: #########

40.4.7 Capture Time Menu
End BackSet PrevNext
This menu is used to change the duration of image
captures in burst mode. Valid values range from 001 to 999. END − Return to Main menu
Values are incremented or decremented in 1−second steps.
Incrementing once from 999 or decrementing once from 001 BACK− Display Capture Time menu
selects continuous capturing. In this case, the value field
SET − Display Compression Method menu
indicates CONTINUOUS.
CAPTURE TIME ### SECS PREV − Toggle automatic transmission mode value
End BackSet PrevNext NEXT − Toggle automatic transmission mode value

40.4.10 Compression Method Menu
BACK− Display Capture Rate menu
This menu is used to select the compression method
SET − Display Max Key Time menu parameter. Valid values are WAVELET, JPEG, and PTC.
(PhotoTelesis Classic (PTC) compression is used mainly for
PREV − Decrement currently displayed value compatibility with older analysis systems.)
NEXT − Increment currently displayed value
40−7 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
COMPRESS METHOD: ####### BACK− Display Compression Method menu
End BackSet PrevNext SET − Display PTAC Quick Start menu

JPEG − JPEG Quality Factor menu
BACK− Display Automatic Transmit menu
FIX − Select fixed ratio parameter entry
SET − Display next menu depending on current com
PREV − Decrement compression ratio value
pression method value:
NEXT− Increment compression ratio value
WAVELET − Compression Ratio menu
PTC − PTC Compression Quality menu

40.4.12 PTAC Quick Start Menu
PREV − Select previous compression method value
This menu is used to toggle the PhotoTelesis Tactical
NEXT − Select next compression method value (PTAC) quick start parameter on or off. Valid values are OFF
and ON. The parameter indicates whether the PTAC protocol
used during transmission attempts to verify established
40.4.11 Compression Ratio Menu
connections before attempting to transmit images.
This menu is used to select the compression ratio
parameter when using Wavelet compression. Compression PTAC QUICK START: ###
ratio can be selected from fixed ratios of from 10:1 to 75:1 End BackSet PrevNext
in increments of 5, or a specific (variable) ratio between 10:1
and 150:1 can be selected by incrementing or decrementing END − Return to Main menu
the displayed value in steps of 1.
BACK− Display previous menu depending on current
compression method value:
For fixed compression ratio values:
WAVELET − Compression Ratio menu
COMPRESSION RATIO: ### :1
JPEG − JPEG Quality Factor menu
End BackSet Var PrevNext
PTC − PTC Compression Quality menu
SET − Display Local Call Sign menu
BACK− Display Compression Method menu
NEXT− Toggle quick start on/off value
SET − Display PTAC Quick Start menu
VAR − Select variable ratio parameter entry 40.4.13 Local Call Sign Menu
PREV − Select previous fixed compression ratio value This menu is used to modify the call sign associated
with the Tactical Imaging Set. Each character in the call sign
NEXT− Select next fixed compression ratio value
is considered a separate value field. Valid entries for each
character are numerals, upper case letters, and blanks (4,
For variable compression ratio values: located in sequence between Z and 0). Blanks are not
permitted within the body of the call sign; however, if the call
COMPRESSION RATIO: ### : 1
sign has less than 6 characters, trailing blanks must be added
End BackSet Fix PrevNext to complete the 6 character call sign. Trailing blanks
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 40−8
appear on the display only when the call sign value field is BACK − Display Brightness menu
being edited.
SET − Display View Communications Cable
LOCAL CALLSIGN ###### Identification menu
End BackSet Fld PrevNext PREV − Toggle image dimension parameter value
END − Return to Main menu NEXT − Toggle image dimension parameter value
BACK− Display PTAC Quick Start menu

40.4.16 View Communications Cable Identification
SET − Display Brightness menu Menu
FLD − Select next field in call sign This menu is used to view the type communications
cable connected to the Image Transceiver. (The cable code
PREV − Change currently selected call sign character to is hard−wired into the cable connection.) No changes can be
previous letter or number made from this menu. Normal value is KY−58 DATA.
NEXT − Change currently selected call sign character to CABLE: #################

next letter or number End BackSet
40.4.14 Display Brightness Menu
BACK− Display Image Dimension menu
This menu is used to set RCU display brightness level
for daytime or nighttime viewing, Valid values are SET − Display EIS Configuration menu
EXTERNAL (not used), DAY, and NIGHT.
40.4.17 EIS Configuration Menu
ADJUST DISPLAY: ########
This menu is used to change the internal Encryption
End BackSet Dim Brt Next Interface Subsystem (EIS) configuration file. Viewing file
names and exiting the menu does not change the configura
END − Return to Main menu tion file. The file is changed only by loading a new file. EIS
BACK− Display Local Call Sign menu files are stored on the Program Card. To load a configuration
file, use the PREV and/or NEXT switches such that the name
SET − Display Image Dimension menu of the desired file is displayed, then press the LOAD switch
DIM − Decrease brightness of display for selected DAY or to reboot. Normal value is EIS 0001.INI.
NIGHT value
EIS CONFIG: ###########
BRT − Increase brightness of display for selected DAY or
NIGHT value End BackSet LoadPrevNext
NEXT − Change currently selected brightness value to next END − Return to Main menu
value BACK− Display View Communications Cable
Identification menu
40.4.15 Image Dimension menu SET − Display Date and Time menu
This menu is used to toggle the image dimension LOAD −Load selected EIS configuration file
parameter value. This parameter defines the image size of
captured images. Valid values are 640 × 480 pixels (full PREV − Change currently displayed file name to previous
resolution, normal value) and 592 × 440 pixels (center 85%, file name in directory
used with PTC compression only).
NEXT − Change currently displayed file name to next file
name in directory
IMAGE DIMENSION: #######
End BackSet PrevNext When the LOAD switch is pressed, the display reads:
END − Return to Main menu Loading EIS Config
40−9 ORIGINAL
When file loading is complete, the RCU and Image FMT − Format Image card if format value is YES (if
Transceiver are automatically reset (rebooted). format value is NO, this switch has no effect)
40.4.18 Date and Time Menus NEXT− Toggle format yes/no value
This menu is used to change the Tactical Imaging Set Formatting an Image card causes all stored image frames in
date and time. The date and time are expressed in Zulu time the send and receive queues to be deleted and the display to
format. There are five parts of the date and time parameter. momentarily read:
Each part is considered a separate value field. Valid entries
for each field are as follows: Dumping SEND & RECV
FIELD/VALUES When all images are deleted, the display momentarily

changes to read:
D day of month (dd) / 1 thru 28, 1 thru 29, 1 thru 30,
1 thru 31 (depending on month and year) Formatting SRAM card
D hour of day (hh) / 00 thru 23 40.4.20 Waveburst Version Menu
D minute of hour (mm) / 00 thru 59
When formatting is complete, View Version Number menu
D month of year (###) / JAN, FEB, MAR, APR,
is displayed.
MAY, JUN, JUL, AUG, SEP, OCT, NOV, DEC
This menu is used to view the firmware version
D Year (yy) / 00 thru 99 (indicates 1994 thru 2093) number. No changes can be made from this menu.
DATE/TIME: ddhhmmZ ###yy WAVEBURST VERSION: #####
End BackSet Fld PrevNext End BackSet
END − Return to Main menu END − Return to Main menu
BACK− Display EIS Configuration menu BACK− Display Format SRAM Card menu
SET − Display Format SRAM Card menu
SET − Display Main menu
FLD − Select next field
40.5 POWER DOWN SEQUENCE
PREV − Change currently selected parameter part field to
previous value in sequence 1. Ensure tape in VTR is in unthreaded condition.
NEXT − Change currently selected parameter part field to
a. On Main menu, observe VTR mode field (%).
next value in sequence
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
40.4.19 Format SRAM Card Menu BrstSnapSet ViewDataSend
This menu is used to format the Image card (also called b. If field is any character other than U, sequentially
the Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) card) used to press VIEW, VTR, and UNTH switches.
store the image frames in the send and receive queues. Valid
values are YES and NO (NO is default). 2. Set aft cockpit Sensor Control Panel selector to
OFF.
FORMAT SRAM CARD: ###
End BackSet Fmt Next 40.6 CAPTURING/COMPRESSING/SAVING/
TRANSMITTING/RECEIVING IMAGES
40.6.1 Voice and Data Modes
BACK− Display Date and Time menu
The type of communications cable being used is coded
SET − Display View Version Number menu in the cable wiring, and can be observed on the View
Communications Cable Identification menu. The VOC
switch name appearing on the Main menu indicates the
ORIGINAL 40−10
Tactical Imaging Set is in voice mode (data mode selectable). 40.6.2.1.2 Capture/Send Mode
Pressing the VOC switch sets the Tactical Imaging Set to data
mode (voice mode selectable), and causes the following 1. From the Main menu, press the BRST or SNAP
menu to appear: switch. The capture sequence proceeds automati
cally with image frames being captured at the speci
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
fied rate for the specified duration (capture time).
BrstSnapSet ViewDatasend
Note
Pressing the DATA switch sets the Tactical Imaging Set to Due to the processor time required to compress
voice mode (data mode selectable), and the Main menu images, the maximum capture rate (minimum
appears. time/image) is substantially slower in capture/
send mode than in capture/hold mode.
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
2. While the image frames are being captured and sent,
BrstSnapSet ViewVoc Send the following menu sequence appears:
40.6.2 Capturing Images S=### H=@@@ R=&&&%:$$$

Image frames are captured in either burst mode or snap Stop Voc Send
mode. In burst mode, image frames are captured at predeter
mined intervals for a predetermined length of time. In snap S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
(single shot) mode, a single image frame is captured. The
captured image frames are then either transmitted immedi Stop Abrt
ately (capture/send mode) or stored in the image buffer/hold
3. When the burst duration has expired (image frames
queue (capture/hold mode). All modes and parameters are set
using the Settings menu. no longer being captured) but image frames are still
being sent, the following menu sequence appears:
40.6.2.1 Capturing Images in Burst Mode S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
Note BrstSnap View Abrt
If the specified capture rate is SINGLESHOT, 4. The send queue field (###) increases by 1 as each
the BRST switch label does not appear. image frame is captured. When the last captured
image frame is compressed and sent, the send queue
40.6.2.1.1 Capture/Hold Mode field changes to read 0.
Note
1. From the Main menu, press the BRST or SNAP Normally, image frames are continuously sent
switch. The capture sequence proceeds automati until the send queue is empty; however, at certain
cally with image frames being captured at the speci capture rate/time settings, transmission may
fied rate for the specified duration (capture time). cease prior to emptying the send queue, leaving
image frames in the send queue unsent. In these
2. While the image frames are being captured, the
cases, the send queue field is not 0 when the Main
menu appears as follows:
menu appears. Pressing the SEND switch on the
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$ Main Menu transmits the remaining images.
Stop Voc Send 5. When the last image frame in the send queue has
been sent and the next image frame has not yet been
3. The hold queue field (@@@) increases by 1 as each captured (send and hold queues are empty), the fol
image frame is captured. lowing menu appears:
Note S= O H= 0 R=&&& %:$$$

Stop Voc
If the hold queue is full (typically 188 image
frames), burst mode is discontinued automatically. 6. If it is desired to discontinue sending image frames
before the send queue has been emptied, press the
ABRT switch. The ABRT switch label flashes to
40−11 ORIGINAL
indicate the command has been received, and the 40.6.3 Compressing/Saving Images
transmission of image frames ceases. Image capture
Image compression is performed automatically when
continues until the burst duration has expired or the
an image frame is to be transmitted (sent) and/or stored on the
STOP switch is pressed.
Image card in slot 0. The image frame is either placed directly
7. If it is desired to discontinue capturing image frames into the compress queue as it is received (capture/send mode)
before the specified burst duration (capture time) or manually selected and transferred from the hold queue.
has expired, press the STOP switch. The transfer from the hold queue can be of all image frames
(using SAVE switch) or of individual image. Compression
8. If the capture rate is CONTINUOUS, press the method and parameters are set using the Settings menu.
STOP switch when desired to discontinue capturing When the image frame has been compressed, it is placed in
image frames. the send queue for transmission and/or storage with no
further user intervention.
Note
40.6.3.1 Saving Images
D If the send queue is full, burst mode is discon In capture/hold mode when no call signs are selected
tinued automatically. for transmission and reception is not occurring, all captured−
D When the burst duration has expired (image but−not−compressed image frames in the hold queue can be
frames no longer being captured) and trans compressed and stored in the send queue. In this situation, the
mission has ceased, the Main menu appears. following menu appears:
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$

40.6.2.2 Capturing Images in Snap Mode
BrstSnapSet ViewVoc Save
40.6.2.2.1 Capture/Hold Mode
Pressing the SAVE switch transfers all image frames
From the Main menu, press the SNAP switch. The currently in the hold queue to the compress queue for
capture sequence proceeds automatically with one image compression and storage in the send queue.
frame being captured. The Main menu remains unchanged,
except that the hold queue field (@@@) increases by 1. 40.6.3.2 Image Card Full
40.6.2.2.2 Capture/Send Mode If the Image card memory becomes full during
compression, one of the following occurs, depending on
From the Main menu, press the SNAP switch. The transmit/receive status:
capture sequence proceeds automatically with one image
frame being captured. The following menu appears: 1. If transmission is occurring, all image frames in the
compress queue are transferred to the rear of the
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$ hold queue. When the Image card memory becomes
BrstSnap View Abrt available (by image frames being deleted), the
image frames in the hold queue are automatically
1. When the SNAP switch is pressed, the send queue transferred into the compress queue for compres
field (###) increases by 1. When the last captured sion and storage on the Image card.
image frame is compressed and sent, the send queue
field changes to read 0. Image frames are continu 2. If reception is occurring, the Tactical Imaging
ously sent until the send queue is empty. Set must be reset (press the two outer switches
simultaneously).
2. If it is desired to discontinue sending image frames
before the send queue has been emptied, press the Note
ABRT switch. The ABRT switch label flashes to
indicate the command has been received, image All image frames in the hold and compress
capture is discontinued, the transmission of the queues are lost during reset.
image frames ceases, and the Main menu appears.
ORIGINAL 40−12
3. If neither transmission nor reception is occurring, are also transmitted. Image frames in the hold
the following menu appears: queue are not transmitted. After transmission is
complete, the Main menu appears.
IMAGES NOT SAVED: ###
b. If there are no image frames in the send queue,
Abrt Cont
all image frames in the hold queue are transferred
to the compress queue, then to the send queue and
Where ### is the number of image frames in the compress
transmitted. After transmission is complete, the
queue including the image frame which is causing the
Main menu appears and the Tactical Imaging Set
full−card condition: In flight, the operator must press the
automatically shifts to voice mode.
ABRT switch to transfer all image frames in the compress
queue to the rear of the hold queue. c. The S=00% displays to the aircrew the percent
age of transmitted data successfully received by
40.6.4 Transmitting Images the receiving station.
Image frames which have been captured and com
pressed can be automatically transmitted (capture/send mode 2. If it is desired to discontinue transmitting image
only) or sent using the SEND switch on the Main menu. The frames before all image frames have been sent,
SEND switch appears when the Tactical Imaging Set is not press the ABRT switch. The ABRT switch label
currently transmitting or receiving image frames, there is at flashes to indicate the command has been received,
least one image frame in the send and/or hold queue, and at the transmission of the image frames ceases, and the
least one send−to call sign is selected. New image frames can Main menu appears.
be captured during transmission. The PhotoTelesis Tactical
(PTAC) protocol is used for communication with the external 40.6.5 Receiving Images
stations. The PTAC quick start parameter indicates whether Image reception is normally accomplished after coor
the PTAC protocol attempts to verify established connections dinating voice communication with the transmitting station.
before attempting to transmit images. The mode (capture/ The Tactical Imaging Set must be in data mode to receive
send or capture/hold), the send−to call signs, and PTAC quick image frames, and the Main menu is normally active on the
start status are set using the Settings menu. Transmission in RCU. Image reception cannot occur during transmission, and
capture/send mode is automatic with no user intervention. the Image card must have sufficient memory available to
Transmission of image frames on command is accomplished store the received images. Reception is initiated when a
as follows: transmission to a call sign matching the local call sign is
Note received. The local call sign is set using the Settings menu.
Once reception is initiated, it proceeds until complete with no
The Tactical Imaging Set transmits image frames user intervention, although it can be aborted by user
to all selected call signs, but it does so sequen command. When reception is complete, the Tactical Imaging
tially, that is, it transmits all image frames to the Set sends an acknowledgement to the sending station, and the
first selected call sign, receives an acknowledge Main menu appears on the RCU.
ment (depending on PTAC protocol), then sends
all image frames to the second selected call sign, 1. On the Main menu, press the VOC switch. The
etc. It does not broadcast the image frames to Tactical Imaging Set shifts into data mode, and
multiple call signs simultaneously. the following menu appears with the &&& field
flashing to indicate data mode is selected:
1. On the Main menu, press the SEND switch. The
Tactical Imaging Set automatically shifts into data S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
mode, and the following menu appears:
BrstSnapset ViewDataSend
S=00% H=1 R=1 U+:$$$
2. When reception begins, the following menu appears
BrstSnap Set View Doc Send with the &&& field continuing to flash:
a. If there are image frames in the send queue, those S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
image frames are transmitted. Image frames
from the compress queue, which are placed into BrstSnapset View Abrt
the send queue before the send queue is emptied,
40−13 CHANGE 1
ORIGINAL
3. If it is desired to discontinue receiving image frames The View menu appears as follows:
before all image frames have been received, press
the ABRT switch. The ABRT switch label flashes to Note
indicate the command has been received, but the
reception of image frames continues until the send The View menu also provides access to the View
ing station ceases transmission or times out, at VTR menu which is used to control the VTR.
which time the following menu appears with the
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
&&& field continuing to flash:
End DumpSendHoldRecvVtr
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
Switch functions are as follows:
BrstSnapSet ViewDataSend
Note DUMP − Display View Dump menu
When the ABRT switch has been pressed, the SEND − Display View Send menu
Tactical Imaging Set does not send an acknowl
edgement to the sending station. HOLD − Display View Hold menu
4. Reception proceeds automatically until complete. RECV − Display View Receive menu
The &&& field is incremented as image frames are VTR − Display View VTR menu (for VTR
received. When reception is complete, the Main control)
menu appears with the &&& field continuing to
flash: Note
If the send, hold, or receive queue is empty, the
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$ corresponding switch name label is not dis
BrstSnapSet ViewDataSend played. If all queues are empty, the DUMP
switch label is also not displayed.
Note
2. The View menu function menus (except for the
The Tactical Imaging Set does not automatically View Dump menu) follow the general format:
revert to voice mode; therefore, voice mode must
be selected to restore voice communications. FUNCTION ### OF @@@
End Del MarkCropPrevNext
5. Press the DATA switch. The Tactical Imaging Set
shifts into voice mode, and the Main menu appears:
Where ### is the currently selected image index number and
S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$ @@@ is the total number of image frames in the selected
queue. An image index number is automatically assigned to
BrstSnapSet ViewVoc Send an image frame as it is stored, thus the more recent the image
Alphabetical Index frame, the higher the index number. As image frames are
deleted, index numbers are reassigned to the remaining
image frames so that the index numbers are always sequential
40.7 VIEWING IMAGES
from 1 to the total number of image frames with no gaps.
Images available for viewing are captured image frames
Switch functions vary somewhat among menus, and
in the hold queue, captured, marked, or sent image frames in
are explained as each menu is described.
the send queue, received, sent, or uploaded image frames in
the receive queue, and live/playback VTR output. When no
Note
viewing option is selected, Television Camera System (TCS)
output is displayed on the cockpit display. Image frames in The PREV and NEXT switches are used to cycle
the hold, send, and/or receive queue can also be deleted. All through the list of image index numbers in each
functions are accomplished using the View menu. queue. If the index number displayed is the last
index number in the list, pressing the NEXT
1. Pressing the VIEW switch on the Main menu switch displays the first index number in the list.
accesses the View menu. If the index number displayed is the first index
number in the list, pressing the PREV switch dis
plays the last index number in the list.
ORIGINAL 40−14
3. Viewing and Deleting Image Frames in the Send updated, and the decompressed next image
Queue appears on the cockpit display. (If the image
frame deleted is the only one in the send queue,
Compressed image frames in the send queue can be the Main menu is displayed.)
viewed or deleted using the View Send menu.
Note
a. From the View menu, press the SEND switch.
The View Send menu sequence appears as Pressing the DEL switch automatically and
follows, and the first image frame in the queue immediately deletes the image frame. There is no
is decompressed and appears on the cockpit further prompt to confirm the deletion.
display:
4. Viewing, Deleting, and Transferring Image Frames
SEND IMAGE OF in the Hold Queue.
End Del PrevNext
Uncompressed image frames in the hold queue can
SEND IMAGE OF be viewed or deleted using the View Hold menu.
. a. From the View menu, press the HOLD switch.
(Progress bar indicating status of decompression) The View Hold menu appears as follows, and the
image frame with the displayed index number
SEND IMAGE 1 OF @@@ appears on the cockpit display:
End Del PrevNext HOLD IMAGE 1 OF @@@
Switch functions are as follows: End Del MarkCropPrevNext
END − Return to Main menu Switch functions are as follows:

DEL − Delete current image frame END − Return to Main menu
PREV − Display next image frame in queue
DEL − Delete current image
NEXT − Display previous image frame in queue
MARK−Transfer image frame to compress queue
b. Press the PREV or NEXT switch until the desired
image frame is displayed CROP − Changes portion of image frame selected
PREV − Display previous image frame in queue

The decompressed image appears on the cockpit
display. The number of the image frame displayed
NEXT − Display next image frame in queue
is its position in the queue. This position is based on
the image frames assigned image code (time code for b. Press the PREV or NEXT switch until the desired
FTI−captured image frames, externally assigned for image frame is displayed
received and previously loaded image frames). The
queue wraps around so that the image frame selected The image appears on the cockpit display. The
by pressing the NEXT switch when viewing the last number of the image frame displayed is its position
image frame in the queue is image frame number 1, in the queue. This position is based on the image
and the image frame selected by pressing the PREV frames assigned image code (time code for FTI−cap
switch when viewing image frame number 1 is the tured image frames). The queue wraps around so
last image frame in the queue. that the image frame selected by pressing the NEXT
switch when viewing the last image frame in the
c. If the image frame is to be deleted, press the DEL
queue is image frame number 1, and the image
switch. The image frame is deleted, the index
frame selected by pressing the PREV switch when
number of the next image frame in the queue is
viewing image frame number 1 is the last image
displayed, the total number of image frames is
frame in the queue.
40−15 ORIGINAL
c. If the selected image frame is to be deleted, press a. From the View menu, press the RECV switch.
the DEL switch The View Receive menu sequence appears as fol
lows, and the image frame with the displayed
The image frame is deleted, the index number of index number is decompressed and appears on
the next image frame in the queue is displayed, the the cockpit display:
total number of image frames is updated, and
the next image appears on the cockpit display. RECV IMAGE OF
(If the image frame deleted is the only one in the
End Del Mark PrevNext
hold queue, the Main menu is displayed.)
SEND IMAGE OF
Note
.
Pressing the DEL switch automatically and
(Progress bar indicating status of decompression)
immediately deletes the image frame. There
is no further prompt to confirm the deletion.
RECV IMAGE 1 OF @@@
d. If the selected image frame is to be transferred to End Del Mark PrevNext
the compress queue for storage and/or sending:
Switch functions are as follows:
(1) Select the portion of the image frame to be
transferred by pressing the CROP switch. END − Return to Main menu
The cropping window over the image on the
cockpit display is initially set to select the DEL − Delete current image
entire image (100%). Pressing the CROP MARK − Transfer image frame to send queue
switch successively reduces the selected
portion to the center 75%, 50%, or 25% of PREV − Display image with previous index
the image, as shown by the cropping window number
on the cockpit display. Pressing the CROP
NEXT − Display image with next index number
switch when 25% is selected restores the
100% selection.
b. Press the PREV or NEXT switch until the desired
Note image frame is displayed
The center of the cropping window is fixed at The decompressed image appears on the cockpit
the center of the image. display. The number of the image frame displayed is
its position in the queue. This position is based on
(2) When the desired image frame portion has the image frames assigned image code (time code
been selected, press the MARK switch to for FTI−captured image frames, externally assigned
transfer the selected portion to the compress for received and previously loaded image frames).
queue. (The portion of the image frame out The queue wraps around so that the image frame
side the cropping window is discarded.) The selected by pressing the NEXT switch when view
image frame is automatically deleted from ing the last image frame in the queue is image frame
the hold queue, the total number of images number 1, and the image frame selected by pressing
in the hold queue is updated, the next image the PREV switch when viewing image frame num
frame in the hold queue is selected, and the ber 1 is the last image frame in the queue.
selected image appears on the cockpit dis
play. (If the image frame transferred is the
only one in the hold queue, the Main menu c. If the image frame is to be deleted, press the DEL
is displayed.) switch
5. Viewing, Deleting, and Sending Image Frames in The image frame is deleted, the index number
the Receive Queue of the next image frame in the queue is displayed,
the total number of image frames is updated, and
Compressed image frames in the receive queue can the decompressed next image appears on the
be viewed, sent, or deleted using the View Receive cockpit display. (If the image frame deleted is
menu.
ORIGINAL 40−16
the only one in the receive queue, the Main menu is 40.8 CONTROLLING VTR FUNCTIONS
displayed.)
The VTR can be controlled from either the RCU or the
Note aft cockpit Sensor Control Panel, with the Sensor Control
Panel taking precedence. When the Sensor Control Panel
Pressing the DEL switch automatically and
RECORD switch is set to OFF, power is removed from the
immediately deletes the image frame. There
Tactical Imaging Set, and the VTR tape is unthreaded. When
is no further prompt to confirm the deletion.
the Sensor Control Panel RECORD switch is set to RECD,
d. If the selected image frame is to be sent the VTR is commanded to record. When the Sensor Control
(forwarded), press the MARK switch to copy Panel is set to STBY (normal situation), the VTR is
the selected image frame to the send queue. commanded to perform the function set by the RCU. In either
case, the Sensor Control Panel indicator lights indicate
The image frame is retained in the receive queue. standby, end of tape (EOT), or unthreaded VTR status, as
While the image remains in the send queue, it cannot be applicable. In practice, it is recommended that if the Sensor
marked again for transmission. Control Panel is used to control the VTR record function, the
RCU have STBY selected. If the RCU is used to control the
6. Deleting All Image Frames in One or More Queues VTR functions, the Sensor Control Panel selector must be set
The send, hold, and/or receive queues can be emptied to STBY.
of image frames using the View Dump menu.
1. VTR control functions are part of the Tactical
a. From the View menu, press the DUMP switch Imaging Set view functions
The View Dump menu appears as follows: The View menu is accessed by pressing the
VIEW switch on the Main menu. The View menu
SELECT IMAGES TO DUMP appears as follows:
End SendHoldRecvAll S=### H=@@@ R=&&& %:$$$
Switch functions are as follows: End DumpSnd Hld Rcv Vtr
2. There are two levels of recorder functions menus;
SEND − Delete all image frames in the send the Record Level menu (indicated by the presence
queue of the REC switch name), and the Play Level menu
HOLD− Delete all image frames in the hold (indicated by the presence of the PLAY switch
queue name).
RECV− Delete all image frames in the receive a. Record Level Menu
queue
To access the Record Level recorder functions
ALL − Delete all image frames in all queues menu, press the VIEW switch on the Main menu,
then press the VTR switch on the View menu. The
Note Record Level menu appears on the RCU.
If the send, hold, or receive queue is empty, the
corresponding switch name position is blank. $$$$$$$$$$$$$$ +hh:mm:ss
End Set StbyRec UnthRset
b. Press the switch corresponding to the desired
queue(s) from which image frames are to be Where $$$$$$$$$$$$$$ is the current VTR func
deleted tion, ± is either a − or a + indicating tape location is
All image frames in the selected queue(s) are before (−) or after (+) the tape counter reset point,
deleted, and the Main menu is displayed. and hh:mm:ss is the tape counter time since reset in
hours, minutes, and seconds.
Note
VTR function indications are as follows:
Pressing the SEND, HOLD, RECV, or ALL
switch automatically and immediately deletes all BOT − Tape has been rewound to beginning
image frames in the selected queue(s). There is EOT − Tape has been forwarded to end
no further prompt to confirm the deletion.
40−17 ORIGINAL
F−FWD − VTR is fast−forwarding the tape Field definitions and VTR function indications are
the same as for the Record Level menu. Switch
PLAY − VTR is playing back a tape
functions are as follows:
RECORD − VTR is recording video
REWIND − VTR is rewinding the tape
BACK −Display Record Level menu
SCAN FORWARD − VTR is scanning the tape in
the forward direction STIL − Set VTR to pause (freeze frame) function
SCAN REVERSE − VTR is scanning the tape in PLAY − Set VTR to play function
the reverse direction
REW − Set VTR to rewind function
STANDBY − Tape is stopped and threaded on
VTR tape heads; VTR is not recording or FF − Set VTR to fast forward function
playing back video
STILL −Tape is stopped and threaded on VTR 40.8.1 Function Operations
tape heads, and VTR is outputting single
video image (pause or freeze frame) 1. Changing Between Record Level and Play Level
Menus
UNTHREAD − Tape is unthreaded from VTR
tape heads a. To change to the Play Level menu from the
Record Level menu, press the SET switch.
Note b. To change to the Record Level menu from the
If the VTR function is RECORD, the RSET Play Level menu, press the BACK switch.
switch is replaced by an EMK switch.
2. Recording Video
Switch functions are as follows: On the Record Level menu, press the REC
switch. The VTR terminates whatever function it,
END − Return to Main menu was performing and shifts into record mode. Tape
moves forward (unless it is at end of tape), and video
SET − Display Play Level menu
is recorded.
STBY − Set VTR to standby function 3. Event Marking
REC − Set VTR to record function On the Record Level menu while recording,
press the EMK switch. An event mark signal
UNTH − Set VTR to unthread function is recorded on the tape when the EMK switch is
pressed. Any number of event marks can be placed
RSET − Reset tape counter to +00:00:00 on the tape.
EMK − Place event mark signal on tape (during 4. Resetting Tape Counter
recording only)
On the Record Level menu while performing any
function except recording, press the RSET switch.
b. Play Level Menu The tape counter is reset to +00:00:00.
To access the Play Level recorder functions
menu, press the SET switch on the Record Level 5. Playing Back Video
menu. The Play Level menu appears on the RCU. On the Play Level menu, press the PLAY switch.
The VTR terminates whatever function it was
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ +hh:mm:ss
performing and shifts into play mode. Tape moves
End BackStilPlay REW FF forward (unless it is at end of tape), and video is
reproduced (played back) from the tape.
ORIGINAL 40−18
6. Pausing (Freeze Framing) 11. Stopping Tape

On the Play Level menu while in play function, On the Record Level menu, press the STBY
press the STIL switch. The tape stops moving, and switch. The tape stops moving, but remains
the VTR outputs the image recorded at that point on threaded Video is not reproduced (played back)
the tape. If this function is active for 5 consecutive from the tape. If this function is active for 5
minutes, the VTR automatically shifts into unthread consecutive minutes, the VTR automatically moves
function to protect the tape. the tape forward for 0.5 seconds to protect the tape.
7. Scanning Forward 12. Unthreading Tape

On the Play Level menu, press the PLAY switch, On the Record Level menu, press the UNTH
then the FF switch. The VTR terminates whatever switch. The tape stops moving, and the tape is
function it was performing and shifts into play, then unthreaded from the VTR tape heads. Video is not
scan forward mode. Tape moves forward (unless it reproduced (played back) from the tape. (Tape must
is at end of tape) at 7 times normal playback speed, be unthreaded before the tape cassette can be
and video is reproduced (played back) from the removed from the VTR).
tape. If an event mark is encountered while scanning
forward, VTR shifts into play function. 40.9 ERROR MESSAGES
8. Scanning in Reverse If a problem with the VTR exists, an error message

appears in the VTR function indication field of the Record
On the Play Level menu, press the PLAY switch, Level or Play Level menu, whichever is active. Possible error
then the REW switch. The VTR terminates what messages include:
ever function it was performing and shifts into play,
then scan reverse mode. Tape moves backward 40.9.1 DEW
(unless it is at beginning of tape) at 7 times normal
playback speed, and video is reproduced (played Condensation has occurred in the VTR (tape motion
back) from the tape. If an event mark is encountered and unthreading is inhibited until condensation evaporates).
while scanning in reverse, VTR shifts into play
function. 40.9.2 COMMS ERROR
An error, such as a framing or parity error, has occurred
9. Fast−Forwarding
in an RS−422 command to the VTR
On the Play Level menu when not in play
function, press the FF switch, or on the Play Level 40.9.3 INTERNAL ERROR
menu when in play function, press the FF switch
twice. The VTR terminates whatever function it was A problem inside the VTR (e.g., with the tape path,
performing and shifts into fast forward mode. Tape heads, or motors) exists.
moves forward (unless it is at end of tape) at high
speed. Video is not reproduced (played back) from 40.9.4 COMMAND ERROR
the tape. An impossible function (e.g., playing or recording with
no tape installed, playing or recording when tape is at its end,
10. Rewinding recording on write−protected tape) has been commanded.
On the Play Level menu when not in play
function, press the REW switch, or on the Play
Level menu when in play function, press the REW
switch twice. The VTR terminates whatever func
tion it was performing and shifts into rewind mode.
Tape moves backward (unless it is at beginning of
tape) at high speed. Video is not reproduced (played
back) from the tape.
40−19 (Reverse
ORIGINAL 40−20
INDEX
Page Page
No. No.
A APG−71 PM acronym . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28

Applicable publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Abnormal Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1 Approach:
Aborted takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−1 Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−251
Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−1 Pilot functional checklight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−27
Accelerated Departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−14 RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−31
Acceleration limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5 Approach power compensator:
Aft hung ordnance landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−16 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−3
Aft wing−sweep landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27, 15−11 Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9
After landing, cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6 Area around aircraft, inspection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
Afterburner: Arrested landing and exit from landing area . . . . . . . . 8−10
Fuel control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−13, 2−23 Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−13
Ignition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32 Arresting hook:
Air inlet control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−1 Emergency down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−16 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145
Air−conditioning, cockpit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−151 Ascent checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−23
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part I Asymmetric−thrust−induced departures . . . . . . . . . . . 11−14
Fuel system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40 Asymmetric thrust flight characteristics . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
Lighting during night formation flight . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4 In combat and cruise configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−4
Self−test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 38 Asymmetric wing sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−31, 15−11
Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2 Flight characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−32
Aircrew coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1 Audio warning signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−5
Single−engine failure field/catapult launch Authorized stores loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21
waveoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2 Automatic carrier landing system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−1
Airspeed: Beacon augmentor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1 Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−3
Subsonic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−5 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−10
Airstart(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32, 2−34, 14−7 Automatic fuel electrical controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1 Automatic landing system (AN/SPN−42) . . . . . . . . . . 17−8
External . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32 Autopilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−125
Twenty thousand feet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−20 Emergency disengage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−126
All−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part VI Light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−48
AN/APN−194(V) radar altimeter system . . . . . . . . . . 2−250 Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
AN/APX−76 identification friend or Auxiliary brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−140
foe interrogator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21−6 Auxiliary canopy open control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
AN/APX−100 identification transponder . . . . . . . . . . . 21−1 Auxiliary flap failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10
AN/ARC−182 V/UHF radio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7 Avionic bit operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−10
AN/ARN−118 tactical air navigation system . . . . . . . . 20−8
AN/ASN−139 inertial navigation set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−1
AN/ASW−27C data link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−11 B
AN/AVX−3 Tactical imaging set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−1
AN/URC−107 joint tactical information Backup flight control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−73
distribution system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−8, 20−12 Backup flight module malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35
AN/USN−2(V) standard attitude heading Backup ignition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
reference system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−5 Backup oxygen supply servicing data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8
Angle−of−attack: Backup oxygen system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−159
Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5 Banner towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−251 Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−20
Antennas, communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1 Barricade arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
Anti−ice, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−27 Barricade engagement limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
Antiskid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−138 Bearing distance heading indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−11
Index−1 ORIGINAL
Page Page
No. No.
Before leaving aircraft, cold−weather operations . . . . 18−6 Center of gravity:

Binding/jammed flight controls on deck . . . . . . . . . . . 12−4 Aft locations, flight characteristics with . . . . . . . . 11−38
Bingo fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9 Position limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
Bleed air, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−27 Checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−1
Block Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2 Checkout, on−board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−3
Blown tire: Clean and symmetric stores loading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
During takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3 Climb:
Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10 Flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Boarding ladder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−283 Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . 10−2
Bolter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12 RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−27
Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9 Climb to thirty−five thousand feet
Both combined and flight pressure zero . . . . . . . . . . 14−33 Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−20
Brake: RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−29
Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−138 Closed−book examination, NATOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
Failure at taxi speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−4 Cockpit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−1
BRAKES warning light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−140 Air−conditioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−151
Break formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−3 Overpressurization on deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
Briefing: Temperature control malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1 Cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4
Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Combined dynamic and viscous hydroplaning . . . . . . 18−3
Preflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6−1 Combined pressure approximately
B/U OXY LOW light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−29, 14−30 2,400 to 2,600 psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31
Built−in test: Combined pressure zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−32
Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−7 Command ejection lever . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−263
Engine instrument group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37 Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 19
And associated equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
C Antenna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
Emergency procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
CABIN PRESS light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28 Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
CADC light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−47 Flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Canopy: In−flight visual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27
Control, normal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77 Communications−navigation equipment
Open control, auxiliary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77 and procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part VII
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−254 Compressor stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5
Carrier: Controllability check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35
Landing pattern (VFR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−7 Controller processor signal unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2
Preflight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1 Converter interface unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−6
Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 8 COOLING AIR light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−27
Carrier−controlled approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10 Cooling, electronic equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−152
Catapult: Cooperative support software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−40
Launch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−5, 8−12 Coordination, aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1
System, nosegear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143 Coupling, inertia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−14
Trim requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−5 Crank, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
Catapult abort procedures Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−6 Cross−control−induced departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−13
Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−13 Crossbleed start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34
Catapult hookup Crosswind limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4 Cruise:
Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12 And combat flight characteristics with aft cg . . . . 11−38
Caution legends, multifunction display engine . . . . . . 2−38 Flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Caution light, OIL HOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35 Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−3
Ceiling/visibility requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2 Cursor controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−174
CHANGE
ORIGINAL1 Index−2
Page Page
No. No.
D Electrical fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22

Electrical operation:
Danger areas, ground handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8 Degraded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−62
Data: Normal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
Display system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2 Electrical power:
Entry unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−242 Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−61
Link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2 Supply system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
Deck−launched intercept procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−35 Electronic equipment cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−152
Definitions, NATOPS evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−1 Electronic nomenclature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−5
Defueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−56 Emergency entrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2
Degraded approach configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27 Emergency gear extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77, 2−136
Degraded electrical operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−62 Emergency jettison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−2
Departure: Emergency oxygen supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−160
From controlled flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−10 Emergency procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3, Part V
Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−15 Engaging speeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18
Spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−49 Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 1, 2−9
Descent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−23 Anti−ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−27
RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−29 Bleed air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−27
Diamond four−plane formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−3 Compartment ventilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
Digital data system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−26 Control, main . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Digital flight control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−109, 17−2 Crank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
Digital flight control system test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−129 Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5
Dihedral effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6 Feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−43
Direct lift control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−109 Fire on the deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
Directional (yaw) control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1 Fuel boost pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Directional stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6 Fuel system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Directives, technical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2 Ignition system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
Display system, TARPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2 Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−161 Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−6 Monitor display format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Distance measuring equipment fix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10 Overspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
Double generator failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20a Overtemperature warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
Double transformer−rectifier failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22 RPM indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
Dual hydraulic failures backup flight Runup, pilot functional checkflight procedures . . 10−13
control module flight characteristics . . . . . . . . . 11−33 Stall warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
Dual−engine landing, one or both engines in Stalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−5
secondary mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−1 START VALVE light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
Dump, fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−55 Starting system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32
Dutch roll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−3 Transfer to SEC mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
Dynamic hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−2 Engine instrument
Dynamic longitudinal response characteristics . . . . . . 11−2 Group built−in test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Group self−test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
E Engine oil:
Pressure indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Ejection: Servicing data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−4
Envelope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−1 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34
Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−5 Engine start:
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−256a Cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5
Ejection initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−263, 16−6 Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−11
Ejection seat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−258 RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−30
Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−6 Environmental control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−148
Operation limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1 Leak detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−29
Electrical controls, automatic fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59 Malfunctions/failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−25
Electrical failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20 Equipment:
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−24 Circuit breakers, TARPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2
Index−3 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
Page Page
No. No.
Communications and associated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2

Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−283 High angle of attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
Evaluation: Single engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−11
Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 With aft cg locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
NATOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 39 Flight control systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−97
Exhaust gas temperature indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35 Backup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−73
Exhaust nozzle: Failures or malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35
Failed (no nozzle response to throttle Flight evaluation(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
movement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15 Grade determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Position indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37 Grading criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−16 Flight pressure:
Exterior inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1 Approximately 2,400 to 2,600 psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31
Exterior lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−265 Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−33
External airstart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−32 Flightcrew:
External baggage container . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−284 Attention signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
External stores limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 37
Extreme weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 18 Flight training syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2
Forced landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21
Foreign object damage and leak inspection . . . . . . . . . 7−1
F Formation flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−2, 37−4
Aircrew coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1
Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−22
Fatigue engine monitoring system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−18
Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−176
Field arresting gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−17
Fuel:
Field arrestments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−17
Boost pump, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Field carrier landing practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36
Dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−55
Fifteen thousand foot checks:
Flow indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−16
Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−28
Management system operational check . . . . . . . . . . . 9−7
Final grade determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Pressure caution lights/Low Fuel
Fire: Pressure Warning Tone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−18
Detection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−39
Pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Electrical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22
Quantity balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−54
In Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−4 Quantity system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−42
Light in flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−4
Tankage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−42
Flameout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−5
Fuel system:
Flap and slat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−89 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−40
Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−46
Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Landing emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10
Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−18
Transition limits, takeoff and landing . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13 Fuel transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−50
FLAP light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−45
During single−engine operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−54
Flap(s):
Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
Maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−7 Fueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−56
Up takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−21
Functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 10
Flat spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20
Aircrew coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1
Flight: Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−2
And combined systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−69
RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−27
Equipment requirements, flight crewmember . . . . . . 5−5
Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−248
Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 6
Procedures, banner towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4 G
Training syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2
Flight characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 11; Part IV Gear extension, emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
Asymmetric thrust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22 Generator failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−20
Dual hydraulic failures backup flight Grade determination, flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
control module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−33 Grading criteria, flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
CHANGE
ORIGINAL2 Index−4
Page Page
No. No.
Grading instructions, ground evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2 In−flight emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 14

Gross weight limits, takeoff/launch/landing . . . . . . . . 4−18 In−flight reconnaissance system check, RIO . . . . . . . . 7−32
Ground clearances, towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−15 In−flight refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−57, 9−1
Ground egress without parachute and In−flight visual communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27
survival kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−2 Indicator(s):
Ground emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 12 Engine oil pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Ground evaluation, NATOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2 Engine RPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
Ground handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8 Exhaust gas temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27 Exhaust nozzle position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Ground operations limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1 Fuel flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37
Ground procedures, banner towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4 Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−269
Ground refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−1 Multistatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−170
Ground roll braking failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−21 Oil pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
Ground safety devices and covers, inspection of . . . . . 7−1 Indoctrination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 5
Ground training requirements/syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−1 Inertial navigation set (AN/ASN−139) . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−1
Gun: INLET ICE light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−17
Burst limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19 Inspection:
Gas purging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−154 Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19 Exterior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
Instrument:
Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35
H Flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 17
Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3 Instrument landing system:
Heads−up display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−169 AN/ARA−63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−5
Heads−up display symbology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−13 AN/SPN−41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−8
High angle of attack flight characteristics . . . . . . . . . . 11−6 Displays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−3
High energy ignition, main . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30 Integrated drive generator oil servicing data . . . . . . . . . 3−4
High speed dash (thirty−five thousand feet): Integrated trim system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−97
Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−21 Intercommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−29 Interference, mutual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
Hold phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10 Interim AIM−7 as ballast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21
Holdback fitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145 Interior inspection:
Horizontal tail authority figure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−42 Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−8
Hot refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−58 RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−28
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−34 Interior lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−268
Hot switch procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−36 Internal tank pressurization and vent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−56
Hot−weather and desert operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6 Inverted departure/spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−50
Hydraulic power: Inverted spin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−21
Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−72 Inverted stall/departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20
Supply systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−69
Hydraulic system:
Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−31 J
Servicing data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−4
Hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−2 Jettison:
Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−2
Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−20
I Joint tactical information distribution system . . . . . . 19−19
AN/URC−107 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−8, 20−12
Ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−1 On board check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−36
Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 21
Friend or foe interrogator (AN/APX−76) . . . . . . . . . 21−6
Transponder (AN/APX−100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21−1 L
Ignition system, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
In chocks, RIO functional checkflight L or R FUEL LOW light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−32 LAD/CANOPY light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−30, 14−31
Index−5 CHANGE 2
ORIGINAL
Page Page
No. No.
Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−24 Manual bailout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6

Carrier pattern (VFR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−7 Manual man/seat separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7
Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−26 Master test panel checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−1
Cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6 Master test switch operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−3
Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 15 Maximum airspeeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−5
Flaps, slats, and direct lift control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2 Meatball contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
Gross weight limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18 Medium and high−subsonic airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−5
Hot weather and desert operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6 MFT procedures evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
On wet runway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4 Minimum flightcrew requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−5
Preparation, parachute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9 Minimum ground training syllabus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−1
RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−32 Miscellaneous equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−283
With aft hung ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−17 Mission commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−4, 37−1
Landing configuration flight characteristics . . . . . . . 11−21 Mission computer system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77, 20−5
With aft cg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38 Mission evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Landing gear: Mission planning and briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−6 Motive flow fuel pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−21
Emergency lowering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−6 Movable surfaces, inspection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
Handle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−132 Multifunction display(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−174
Malfunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−8 Engine caution legends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
Normal operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−135 Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−176
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−132 Reconnaissance data status format . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−9
Lateral control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−102 Multistatus indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−170
Reversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−7 Mutual interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−1
Lateral−stick−induced departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−13
Launch:
Bar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−145
Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1 N
Gross weight limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18
Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−19 NATOPS evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part X
Single−engine failure field/catapult . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2 Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−1
Leak(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2 Qualification and currency requirements . . . . . . . . . . 5−3
Detection, environmental control system . . . . . . . . 2−29 Question bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Lighting system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−265 Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 20
Lights, approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−251 Command and control grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 23
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1 Navigation data:
Lineal coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−22 Display . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−12
Long−field arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18 Emergency procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1
Long−range oblique photography camera Initialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−6
(KS−153A with 610−mm lens) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−24 Navigation system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−1
Longitudinal control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−97 Data distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−12
Low brake accumulator pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−35 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−20
Low subsonic airspeed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6 NAVRIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−1
Negative angle−of−attack departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20
Night field carrier landing practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−37
M Night flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
No−flaps and no−slats landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−10
Nomenclature, electronic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2, 1−5
Main landing gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−133 Normal electrical operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
Malfunction procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Normal procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part III
Maneuvering: Normal stalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
Flaps and slats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2, 11−7 Nose landing gear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−133
Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10 Nose radome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−283
Stick force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2 Nose strut keel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143
Maneuvers, prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10 Nosegear catapult system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143
Manual approach technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−7 Nosewheel steering system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−141
ORIGINAL Index−6
Page Page
No. No.
O Postflight:
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
OA−8697 V/UHF automatic direction finder . . . . . . 19−18 RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−32
OBOGS light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−29 Postlanding:
Oil: Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−27
Cooling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35 RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−34
Pressure indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35 Poststart:
OIL HOT caution lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−35 Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
Oil system: Night flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
Engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34 Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−13
Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−17 Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . 10−6
On−board checkout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−3 RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−29
On−board oxygen generating system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−157 RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−27
On−deck emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1 Power supply system:
Open−book examination, NATOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2 Electrical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−59
Operating criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−2 Hydraulic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−69
Operating limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4 Pneumatic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77
Operational deployable squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Preflight:
Oral examination, NATOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2 And line operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Outboard spoiler module: Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6−1
Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27 Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−44 Cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5
Outboard spoiler system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−73 Night flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12
Overspeed, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12 Preland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−23
Oxygen system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−157 Pressurization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−152
Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−29 Prestart:
Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−10
Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . 10−2
P RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−29
Primary flight controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1
Panels, security of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2 Programmable tactical information display . . . . . . . . 20−6
Panoramic camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2, 22−23 Prohibited maneuvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10
Parachute: Publications, applicable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Landing preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9 PUMP phase circuit breakers popped . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28
Steering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
Parade formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−2
Parking brake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−140
Pattern entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−24 Q
Photographic film . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−26
Pilot tone volume/TACAN command panel . . . . . . . . 19−7 Question bank, NATOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−4
Pilot:
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−8
Reconnaissance operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−21
R
Relief and guidance modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−126
Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1
Pitch: Radar:
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1 Altimeter system, AN/APN−194(V) . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−250
SAS degrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−38 Beacon (AN/APN−154) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−2
SAS light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−38 Radiation areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8
Pitot−static system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−160 System built−in test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−47
Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1 Radar intercept officer:
Planning, mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−28
Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10 Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1
Pneumatic power supply systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−77 Raft boarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−9
Pneumatic systems servicing data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−8 Rain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−1
Index−7 ORIGINAL
Page Page
No. No.
Reconnaissance: Single−engine landing:

Displays and formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−9 Operation fuel transfer/feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−54
Fault/problem reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−9 Primary mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−1
Steering selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−11 SEC mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−3
Reconnaissance system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−1 Six−mile DME fix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−13 Slats, maneuvering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−7
Records and reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Special consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
Recovery, stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22 Special procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 9
Refueling: Specific responsibilities, aircrew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−1
Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−1 Speedbrakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−95, 11−2
Hot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−58 Spin:
In−flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−57 Flat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−20
Requirements for various flight phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−4 Inverted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−21
Reverted rubber skids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−3 Spoiler:
Roll: Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−105
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1 Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−42
DGR light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−39 Stability augmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−1
Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−3 Transients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−40
Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−3 Stability augmentation system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−110, 11−1
SAS degrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−39 DFCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
SAS failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−39 Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
Uncommanded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−37 Off . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−27
Rolling limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10 Stability, wing−sweep effects on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
Rpm decay, uncommanded SEC mode . . . . . . . . . . . 14−13 Stall(s):
Rudder authority failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−40 Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
Rudder−induced departures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−13 Compressor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−5
Runup, flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Normal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−22
Vertical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
S Warning, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38
Standard attitude heading reference system
Search and rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4 (AN/USN−2(V)) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−5
Seat: Standard central air data computer . . . . . . . . . . 2−79, 20−6
Ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−258 Standby airspeed indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−250
Operation after ejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−265 Standby altimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−250
Secondary flight controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2 Standby attitude indicator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−248
Security of panels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2 Start:
Self−test, engine instrument group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−37 Abnormal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
Sensor capabilites and limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−22 Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−1
SENSOR COND light illuminated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28 Crossbleed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−34
Serial frame camera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2, 22−22 Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . 10−2
Servicing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3 START VALVE light, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−12
Shimmy damping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−143 After engine start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
Shipboard procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9−4 Starter limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−1
Shore−based procedures checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1 Static longitudinal stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−2
Short−field arrestment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−18 Store(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−6
Sideslip limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−10 Effects on cg location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
Signals: Management system/jettison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−278
Audio warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−5 Stores loading:
Flightcrew attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−1 Authorized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21
Ground handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−27 Clean and symmetric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13
Single−engine failure field/catapult Stuck/jammed throttle(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15
launch/waveoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−2 Surface condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−2
Single−engine flight characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−11 Surface subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17−8
ORIGINAL Index−8
Page Page
No. No.
Survival kit deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−7 Towing turn radii and ground clearances . . . . . . . . . . 3−15
Survival/postejection procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16−6 Training:
Symbology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−176 Aircrew coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37−4
HUD/VDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−13 Evaluation squadrons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 2 TRANS/RECT light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−22
Test and system power ground panel . . . . . . . . . . . 2−283 Transfer, fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−50
Trim characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−4
TSEC/KY−58 UHF voice security equipment . . . . . . 19−19
T Turbulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4
Turn radii, towing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−15
Twenty thousand foot checks:
Tactical air navigation system
(AN/ARN−118) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−8, 22−1
Tactical air reconnaissance pod system . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−1
Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−1
Degraded mode procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−33 U
Environmental control system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−2
Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−21 UHF automatic direction finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20−11
Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 22 UHF voice security equipment (TSEC/KY−58) . . . . 19−19
Tactical Imaging Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40−1 Uncommanded dump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−19
Takeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−20 Uncommanded engine acceleration:
Aborted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−22, 13−1 Airborne (no throttle movement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15
And landing flap/slat transition limits . . . . . . . . . . . 4−13 On deck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12−1
Blown tire during . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13−3 Uncommanded roll and/or yaw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−37
Checklist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−22 Uncommanded SEC mode rpm decay . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−13
Cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5 Unscheduled wing sweep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−47
Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 13 Upright departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−49
Gross weight limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4−18 Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−15
Hot weather and desert operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−28 V
Takeoff configuration flight characteristics . . . . . . . 11−21
With aft cg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38 Variable exhaust nozzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−16
TARPS ECS light illuminate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−27 Ventilation, engine compartment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−30
Taxi: Vertical display indicator symbology . . . . . . . . . . . . 22−13
Flight evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−3 Vertical recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−49
Night flying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−12 Vertical stalls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−9
Pilot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−20 Viscous hydroplaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−3
Pilot functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−13 Voltage monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−125
RIO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−32 V/UHF automatic direction finder (OA−8697) . . . . . 19−18
RIO functional checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . 10−28 V/UHF radio (AN/ARC−182) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19−7
Taxiing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7−18, 8−4
Carrier−based procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−4
Cold−weather operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−5 W
Hot−weather and desert operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−6
Technical directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−2 Waiving of minimum ground training
Temperature warning, engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−38 requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5−1
Ten thousand foot check, pilot functional Warning light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−269
checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−15 Waveoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9, 8−12
Ten−mile DME fix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−10 Single−engine failure field/catapult launch . . . . . . . 13−2
Test prerequisites/restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38−9 Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8−9
Throttles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−23 Weapon systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part VIII
Stuck/jammed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−15 Procedures evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39−2
Thunderstorms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18−4 Weight, aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−1
Tiedown points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3−15 Weight on−off wheels switch malfunction . . . . 12−2, 14−48
Total electrical failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−24 Wheel antirotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−141
Index−9 ORIGINAL
Page Page
No. No.
Wheelbrake system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−136 Y

Windshield air and anti−ice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−154 Yaw:
WING SWEEP advisory light and W/S Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−107
caution legend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−47 SAS failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−39
Wing−sweep design limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−31 Uncommanded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−37
Wing−sweep effects on stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11−38
Wing−sweep emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15−11 Z
Wing−sweep system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−82 Zoom (forty thousand feet) pilot functional
WSHLD HOT light . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14−28 checkflight procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10−22
ORIGINAL Index−10
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
General Arrangement (Sheet 1 of 2)
FO-1 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
General Arrangement (Sheet 2 of 2)

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Pilot Instrument Panels and Consoles
FO-3 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 1

NAVAIR-01-F14AAD-1
RIO Instrument Panel and Console
FO-4 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 1

Engine Oil System
FO−5 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

NAVAIR-01-F14AAD-1
Aircraft Fuel System

NAVAIR-01-F14AAD-1
Electrical Power System

NAVAIR−01−F14AAD−1
AC Cockpit Circuit Breaker Panels

NAVAIR−01−F14AAD−1
DC Cockpit Circuit Breaker Panels

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Hydraulic System

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Wing Sweep and Control Surfaces

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Digital Flight Control System

NAVAIR-01-F14AAD-1
Environmental Control System

NAVAIR-01-F14AAD-1
Avionic Equipment Cooling

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Canopy Pneumatic and Pyrotechnic Systems

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Ejection Sequence (Sheet 1 of 2)

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Ejection Sequence (Sheet 2 of 2)

NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Effective Pages Page Numbers Effective Pages Page Numbers

Change 2 1 (Reverse Blank) Original 2-137 thru 2-139
Original 3 (Reverse Blank) Change 1 2-140
Change 2 5 (Reverse Blank) Change 2 2-141
Change 1 7 (Reverse Blank) Original 2-142 thru 2-148
Original 11 thru 14 Original 2-150
Change 1 15 Change 1 2-151
Original 16 thru 22 Original 2-152 thru 2-164
Original 24 thru 27 Original 2-166, 2-167
Change 1 28, 29 Change 1 2-168
Original 30 Original 2-169 thru 2-221
Change 1 31, 32 Change 2 2-222
Original 33, 34 Original 2-223 thru 2-242
Original 41, 42 Change 1 2-250, 2-251
Change 1 43, 44 Original 2-252 thru 2-255
Original 45 Change 1 2-256, 2-256a (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 46, 47 Original 2-257 thru 2-262
Original 48 thru 50 Change 1 2-263
Original 1-1 thru 1-5 (Reverse Blank) Change 2 2-270, 2-271
Original 2-1 thru 2-26 Original 2-272 thru 2-280
Change 1 2-27 Change 1 2-281, 2-282
Change 2 2-46 Original 3-1 thru 3-19 (Reverse Blank)
Original 2-47 Change 1 4-1
Change 2 2-48 Original 4-2 thru 4-19
Original 2-49 thru 2-51 Change 1 4-20
Change 1 2-52 Original 4-21 (Reverse Blank)
Original 2-53 thru 2-57 Original 57 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 2-58 Original 5-1
Change 2 2-61 Original 5-3 thru 5-5 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 2-62 Original 59 (Reverse Blank)
Original 2-63 Original 6-1 thru 6-4
Change 1 2-78, 2-78a (Reverse Blank) Original 7-18 thru 7-20
Change 1 2-121 thru 2-124 Original 7-22
Change 1 2-132 Change 1 7-24
Original 2-133 Original 7-25 thru 7-28
Original 2-135 Original 7-30
LEP-1 CHANGE 2
NAVAIR 01-F14AAD-1
Effective Pages Page Numbers Effective Pages Page Numbers

Original 7-32 thru 7-38 Original 87 (Reverse Blank)
Original 8-1 thru 8-13 (Reverse Blank) Original 19-1 thru 19-17
Change 1 9-7 (Reverse Blank) Original 19-19 thru 19-31 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 10-31 Change 1 20-51 thru 20-52b (Reverse Blank)
Original 10-32 Original 20-53 thru 20-105 (Reverse Blank)
Original 61 (Reverse Blank) Original 21-1 thru 21-8
Original 11-1 thru 11-8 Change 1 89 (Reverse Blank)
Change 2 11-9 thru 11-10a (Reverse Blank) Original 22-1 thru 22-26
Original 11-11 thru 11-38 Original 23-1 thru 23-5 (Reverse Blank)
Original 63, 64 Original 91 (Reverse Blank)
Change 2 65 Original 37-1 thru 37-5 (Reverse Blank)
Change 2 69 Original 93 (Reverse Blank)
Original 12-2 thru 12-5 (Reverse Blank) Original 39-16 thru 39-18
Original 13-1 thru 13-3 (Reverse Blank) Original 95 (Reverse Blank)
Change 2 14-10, 14-11 Original 40-5, 40-6
Original 14-12 thru 14-16
Change 1 40-7, 40-8
Change 2 14-17 thru 14-20a (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 40-13
Change 1 14-31
Original 40-14 thru 40-19 (Reverse Blank)
Original Index-1
Change 1 14-42, 14-43
Change 1 Index-2
Change 2 Index-3 thru Index-5
Change 2 14-49, 14-50
Original Index-6 thru Index-10
Original FO-1 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 15-9, 15-10
Original 15-11, 15-12
Change 1 FO-3 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 15-13
Change 1 FO-4 (Reverse Blank)
Original 15-14
Change 1 15-15
Original 15-16
Change 1 15-17
Original 15-18 thru 15-20 Original FO-9 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 15-21 (Reverse Blank) Original FO-10 (Reverse Blank)
Change 1 16-5, 16-6 Original FO-12 (Reverse Blank)
Original 16-7 thru 16-9 (Reverse Blank) Original FO-13 (Reverse Blank)
Original 85 (Reverse Blank) Original FO-14 (Reverse Blank)
Change 2 17-8 Original FO-16 (Reverse Blank)
Original 18-1 thru 18-6 Change 2 LEP-1, LEP-2
CHANGE 2 LEP-2

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NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1

NAVAIR 01−F14AAD−1 THE

NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL NORMAL

TACTICAL SOFTWARE EFFECTIVITY: OFP D04 ALL−WEATHER

DESTRUCTION NOTICE For unclassified, limited documents, destroy PERFORMANCE

ISSUED BY AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS INDEX &

3 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

Place this page behind title page after incorporation.

INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY

The following Interim Changes have been incorporated in this Change/Revision:

Interim Changes Outstanding To be maintained by the custodian of this manual:

5 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 2

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 1 of 3 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 151

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 2 of 3 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 151

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 3 of 3 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 151

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 1 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 2 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 3 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 4 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 5 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 6 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 7 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

8. CHANGE REF H (F-14A NFM), CHAPTER 14, PAGE 14-17, PARAGRAPH

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 8 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 9 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 10 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

1. Replacement pages for Interim Change Numbers 28 & 29 to the F-14D

Page Page Version Marking

NAVAIR 212005Z JUL04 Page 11 of 11 A1-F14AAA-1 IC 150

Note 14.5.13.1 OIL PRESS Light and/or

Illumination of an OIL HOT caution light may be

6. Land as soon as possible.

D Pulling the ANTI ICE CONTR HOOK

14.6.1.1 L and/or R FUEL PRESS Light(s) and

14.6.2 L or R FUEL LOW Light

14.6.3.3 Wings Do Not Accept Fuel With Switch

14.6.3.4 Wings Accept Fuel With Switch in

If wing fuel fails to transfer:

14.6.3.2 External Tanks Fail To Transfer or 14.6.5 Fuel Leak

2. WING/EXT TRANS switch  OFF. 14.6.6 Fuel Imbalance/Fuel Quantity Balancing

WITH A FUEL STATE BELOW 4500 POUNDS IN EITHER

If the sump tank interconnect valve has failed

SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE TECHNICAL DIRECTIVES

CHANGE DATE INC. VISUAL

AFC 795 Radar Warning Receiver Modification 30 Sep 94 None

Panel size increased on

5A BOL PWR circuit

AFC 850 F−14D GPS Aircraft Mod 15 April 2002 None

AFC 880 AN/AVX−3 Tactical Imaging Set 15 April 2002 None

AFC 919 NGS SAHRS 15 May 2003 None

7 (Reverse Blank) CHANGE 1

9 (Reverse Blank) ORIGINAL

F−14D NATOPS FLIGHT MANUAL

PART I  THE AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER 1  AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE

1.1 AIRCRAFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1−1

2.1 AIR INLET CONTROL SYSTEM (AICS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−1

2.2 ENGINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−9

2.3 FATIGUE ENGINE MONITORING SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2−18