James Crawford - The Creation of States in International Law
James Crawford - The Creation of States in International Law
James Crawford - The Creation of States in International Law
JAMES CRAWFORD
SC, FBA, BA, LLB (Adel), DPhil (Oxon), LLD (Cantab)
Whewell Professor of International Law, University of Cambridge
Former Member of the International Law Commission
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
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The first edition of this book was based on a thesis, supervised by Ian Brownlie,
which was submitted in 1976 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University
of Oxford. At around 180,000 words the thesis was almost too long to be examined;
it also took too long to be published in full. An abbreviated version, updated as far
as possible to 31 December 1977, was published by Oxford University Press in
1979. It was awarded the American Society of International Law's Certificate of
Merit in 1981.
Since the first edition much has happened in international relations and
international law, not least in relation to the subject matter of this book. If its
argument—that the creation of States is a matter in principle governed by
international law and not left to the discretion of individual States—is now widely
accepted, the illustrations and the specific instances that could be used to
substantiate and illustrate that arguments have multiplied. Some outstanding
disputes then pending (South-West Africa (Namibia); Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe); the 'divided States', especially Germany; the micro-States; East
Timor; Hong Kong, the Baltic States) have been more or less resolved . With a few
exceptions (Palestine and Western Sahara the most significant) decolonization
has been largely achieved. But new situations have arisen, especially those
resulting from the dissolution of States in Central and Eastern Europe.
The case law is still not rich but there have been major additions to it. Although the
first edition retained the only comprehensive treatment of statehood in international
law in the English language and although there were frequent requests for a reprint,
this did not seem appropriate when so much had changed and when so much new
material was available. I also came to regret some of the suppressions from the
original thesis.¹ Given complete latitude by the Press in terms of the length of a
second edition I have taken the opportunity of restoring some of the material and
of updating and revising all of it.
At one level, this was easier to do because I still maintained the basic argument.
I do not see how international law can coherently leave these issues to be decided
as a matter of discretion by individual States, as the rhetoric of recognition implies.
I believe that international law is, at least to this minimum extent, a
¹ For example a whole section on Palestine was omitted, producing puzzlement among reviewers
who could reasonably be expected to find it among the cases studied. See now Crawford, 'Israel (1948–
49) and Palestine (1998–99): Two Studies in the Creation of States' in Goodwin-Gill and Talmon (eds),
Reality of International Law, 95–124, and Chapter 9 below .
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coherent system. Moreover, the values that international law in this context
represents—self-determination, non-annexation of territory by force, fundamental
human rights—cannot be protected if the only basis for statehood is 'effectiveness',
if power grows, irrespective, out of the barrel of some or many guns. For international
law to concede that its most fundamental concept is purely a question of fact would
amount to a form of unilateral disarmament, given its now-parallel profession that
these basic values are peremptory.
At another level it has been a major exercise, because so much has happened
and so much more has been written. The result of the revision is a much longer
book than the first edition, even if one is still faithful to its main themes and
arguments. I also hope this edition corrects some of the faults of the first edition. A
fellow Australian, Hedley Bull (who I regret never meeting) commented in his Times
Literary Supplement review of the first edition that it was infuriatingly indecisive. I
agree, and I have tried to come off some of the fences on which the young scholar
rather awkwardly sat. But some might now complain that even longer discussions
of past problems are unnecessary in an era of universal United Nations membership,
where formal equality is the order of the day and all the forms of dependence are
now expressed in different, mostly extra-legal ways. Why go at length, it may be
asked, into the status of special entities such as Transkei or Berlin or Danzig or
Tangier or the British Dominions whose likes we will never see again? Here I
disagree. There is a wealth of historical experience which is, in the first place,
interesting in itself.
The periods of colonization and decolonization, of Great Power world-making and
remaking, of the dissolution of Empires and Cold War-waging were expressed in a
variety of specific forms, and the conflicts over them cannot be understood if their
actual expression is ignored. The past was experienced—and experienced as
present—not in swathes but in particulars, and a careful account of the particulars
still carries useful lessons even if we believe our circumstances to be new ones.
And anyway we are more likely to fall into mistakes of the past if we are ignorant of
it. When the government of the United States sought to detain aliens without trial
on the 'perpetual leasehold' of Guantanamo Bay, it was helpful to be reminded of
the English Court of Appeal's decision in 1960 that for habeas corpus what matters
is present territorial administration, not the location of residual sovereignty.² Thus
the old law of protectorates re-emerged in the brave new world of the 'war against
terror'.
² 'Later cases confirmed that the reach of the writ depended not on formal notions of territorial
sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of “the extent and nature of the jurisdiction or
dominion exercised in fact by the Crown”.' Rasul v Bush 124 S Ct 2686, 2696–7 (Stevens J) (2004),
quoting Ex parte Mwenya [1960] 1 QB 241, 303; 28 ILR 48, 79–1 (CA) (Lord Evershed MR); and see Chapter 7.
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Acknowledgments
I am immensely grateful to those who assisted in the task of preparing this edition. In particular
I owe a special debt of gratitude to my former doctoral student, Dr Tom Grant, who has
combined constant support, extraordinary knowledge of the field and meticulous attention to
detail. Without his dedication and persistence this edition could not have been completed.
In addition, much help was given by the following students, former students and colleagues:
Catherine Bidart, Simon Connal, Angelos Dimopoulos, Catherine Dobson, Shauna Gillan,
Edward Guntrip, Jocelynn Liu, Jana McLean, Vipin Narang, Samuel Ollunga, Kate Parlett,
Professor Ryszard Piotrowicz; Assistant Professor Michael Reynolds; Christine Ruest, Mark
Searl, Elizabeth Stark, Dr Christian Tams, Sue Anne Teo, Dr Ralph Wilde, Marcus Wischik,
Sir Michael Wood and Anastasios Xeniadis. Thanks also to William Noblett, Head of Official
Publications, University Library, Cambridge and David Wills and his staff at the Squire Law
Library for repeated assistance.
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Traditionally, the criteria for statehood have been regarded as resting solely on considerations
of effectiveness. Entities with a reasonably defined territory, a permanent population, a more
or less stable government and a substantial degree of independence from other States have
been treated as States. Other factors, such as permanence, willingness to obey international
law and recognition, have usually been regarded as of rather peripheral importance. To some
extent this represents the modern position. However, several qualifications are necessary.
In the first place, this standard view is too simple. Much depends on the claims made
by the entities in question, and on the context in which such claims are made. In some
circumstances, criteria such as independence or stable government may be treated
as flexible or even quite nominal; in other cases they will be strictly applied. Apart,
however, from the necessary elaboration of the criteria for statehood based on
effectiveness, a serious question arises whether new criteria have not become
established, conditioning claims based on effectiveness by reference to fundamental
considerations of legality. Practice in the field of self-determination territories is the
more developed, but the same problem arises in relation to entities created by illegal
use of force. These criteria, taken together, are on the whole reflected in United Nations
practice; they also provide a flexible but generally applicable standard against which to
consider the status of the numerous unusual or 'anomalous' territorial entities (Taiwan,
the Holy See, Andorra and so on).
Problems of the creation of States have commonly been regarded as matters 'of fact
and not of law'. This view was again simplistic, since it assumed the automatic
identification of States, whether by recognition or the application of criteria based on
effectiveness. In practice, identification and application of the criteria to specific cases
or problems raise interesting and difficult problems, some of which are dealt with in Part
II of this study. These problems do not of course occur in isolation; they are
classifications, rather than exclusive mandatory 'modes' of the creation of States.
However, the problems discussed in each context (dependent States, devolution,
secession and so on) have common features that justify such separate classification.
While the States of the world form a community governed by international law...
Contents—Summary
xiv Contents—Summary
Conclusions 718
Appendices:
1. List of States and Territorial Entities Proximate to States 2. 727
League Mandates and United Nations Trusteeships 3. The 741
United Nations and Non-Self-Governing Territories,
1946 to 2005 746
4. Consideration by the International Law Commission
of the Topic of Statehood (1996) 757
Contents
xvi Contents
Contents xvii
xviii Contents
Contents xix
xx Contents
Contents xxi
xxii Contents
Contents xxiii
xxiv Contents
Contents xxv
xxvi Contents
Contents xxvii
xxviii Contents
Conclusions 718
Appendices:
1. List of States and Territorial Entities Proximate to States 2. 727
League Mandates and United Nations Trusteeships 3. The 741
United Nations and Non-Self-Governing Territories,
1946 to 2005 746
4. Consideration by the International Law Commission
of the Topic of Statehood (1996) 757
Table of Cases
East Timor Case (see Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) )
Eastern Carelia Opinion (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Eastern Greenland Case (1933) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267–68
Ecoffard v Cie Air France (1964) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .316
Efrat Ungar v Palestine Liberation Organization (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . .17, 62, 148, 434 El
Caso de Belice (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,638, 665
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xl Table of Cases
Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41, 169, 520, 585
Montefiore v Belgian Congo (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277
Moore v Attorney General (1935) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .362
Mordovici v General Administration of Posts & Telegraphs (1929) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .518
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co v Republic of Palau (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .572
Morgan Guaranty Trust v Republic of Palau (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .583, 655
Morocco Case (France v USA) (see Rights of Nationals of the United
States of America in Morocco (France v United States) )
Muller v Rockling Bros (1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .234
Murarka v Buckrack Bros (1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .367–68
Murray v Parkes (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
Muscat Dhows Arbitration (1904) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315, 321
MV Nonsuco Inc v IRC (1956) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,373
Wall Case (see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) )
Wandeweghe v BCI (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .496
Warman v Francis (1958) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269–70
Weber v USSR (1942) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .679
Webster Claim (1925) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .270
West Rand Central Gold Mining Co v R (1905) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .276
Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41, 60, 116, 123–24, 237, 258,
259, 262, 265, 266–67, 384, 432, 479,
567, 602, 605, 613, 615, 616–17, 620,
621, 639 –40, 644, 646, 698 White
v McLean (1890) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265 Wildermann
v Stinnes (1924) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53, 518 Williams v Bruffy
(1877) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .652 Williams v Lee
(1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .273 Winterbottom v
Vardan & Sons Ltd (1921) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265 Wiparata v Bishop
of Wellington (1877) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265–66 Witrong & Blany
(1674) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .278, 676 Worcester v State of
Georgia (1832) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269, 273–74, 300 Wulfsohn v RSFSR
(1923) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17, 23 Wurttemberg & Prussia
v Baden (1927) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .486 Yrisarri v Clement
(1825) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
1849 10 Apr Articles between Russia and Turkey for the more 507
effective protection of the immunities and
privileges of the principalities of Moldavia and
Wallachia (Treaty of Balta–Liman)
1852 Nov 20 Treaty relative to the Succession to the 542
Crown of Greece (Great Britain–Bavaria–
Russia–France–Greece)
1854 Mar 28 British Declaration of the Causes of 506
War against Russia
1856 March 30 Treaty of Paris (General Treaty for the 14, 507–8, 514,
Re-establishment of Peace) (Great Britain– 536
Austria–France–Prussia–Russia–
Sardinia–Turkey)
1862 March 22 Convention of Good Neighborhood 736
(Italy–San Marino)
1865 May 7 International Telegraph Union 493
1881 3 Aug Convention between Great Britain and the 276, 690
Transvaal Burghers
1885 Feb 26 General Act of the Conference respecting the Congo 301, 307, 509
1912 Mar 30 Treaty for the Organization of the Protectorate 294–6, 307,
(Treaty of Fez) (France–Morocco) 734
1915 26 Apr Treaty of London (Secret Treaty of London) 511, 516, 532,
(France–Great Britain–Italy–Russia) 541
31 Oct Agreement between the United States and the United 194
Nations Regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations
29 Nov Future Government of Palestine, 424–36
GA Res 181(II) (Partition Resolution)
1955 15 May State treaty for the re-establishment of an independent 33, 65, 106,
and democratic Austria 519, 521, 728
(Austria–France–USSR–UK–USA)
20 Sep Treaty concerning relations between the 455, 459
USSR and the GDR
1957 Mar 25 Treaty Establishing the European Economy 293, 351, 461,
Community 496–7, 499
25 Mar Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 496–7
Energy Community
(Senegal–Gambia)
17 Dec Agreement concerning the Establishment of a 490
Senegambia Confederation
17 Dec Protocols Concerning the Establishment of a 490
Senegambian Confederation
1982 Dec 10 United Nations Convention on the 47
Law of the Sea
1995 Nov 10 Agreed Principles for the Interim Statute for 529
the City of Mostar
21 Nov General Framework Agreement for Peace in 25, 106, 400,
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton 407, 491,
Agreement) (Bosnia and Herzegovina– 528–9, 600
Croatia–FRY)
21 Nov Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace 529
Settlement (Dayton Agreement Annex 1-A)
1996 Aug 23 Agreement on the Normalization of Relations 529, 690–1
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and the Republic of Croatia
31 Aug Joint Declaration and Principles for 409
Determining the Fundamentals for Mutual
Relations between the Russian Federation
and the Chechen Republic
1998 May 5 Noumea Accord (New Caledonia) 334, 632
23 Oct Wye River Memorandum (Israel–PLO) 444
Brierly, Collected Papers (ed H Lauterpacht and CHM Waldock, Oxford, 1958)
Brierly, Basis of Obligation JL Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law
Briggs, Law of Nations HW Briggs, The Law of Nations. Cases, Nations
Documents and Notes (2nd edn, NY, 1952)
Brownlie, Principles Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford,
6th edn, 2003)
Brownlie, Use of Force Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by Force
States (Oxford, 1963)
BY British Yearbook of International Law
California WJIL California Western Journal of International Law
Can BR Canadian Bar Review
Can YIL Canadian Yearbook of international law
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
Charpentier J Charpentier, La Reconnaissance internationale et l'évolu-tion du
droit des gens (Paris, 1956)
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction 4
[T]he existence of a State is a question of fact and not of law. The criteria
of statehood is not legitimacy but effectiveness...²
[N]otre pays s'est toujours fondé, dans ses décisions de reconnaissance d'un
État, sur le principe de l'effectivité, qui implique l'existence d'un pouvoir
responsable et independent s'exerçant sur un territoire et une population.³
¹ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 264, §209; (8th edn), vol 1, 544, §209. See also 9th edn) vol 1, 677, §241.
² Foreign Minister Eban (Israel), arguing against a request for an advisory opinion of the
International Court on the status of Palestine: SCOR 340th mtg, 27 July 1948, 29–30.
³ President Mitterand (France), with respect to Palestinian statehood, reported in Le Monde, 24
November 1988, 7, col 1.
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1.1 Introduction
At the beginning of the twentieth century there were some fifty acknowledged States.
Immediately before World War II there were about seventy-five. By 2005, there were
almost 200—to be precise, 192. ÿThe emergence of so many new States represents
one of the major political developments of the twentieth century. It has changed the
character of international law and the practice of international organizations. It has been
one of the more important sources of international conflict.
But the fact that some development is of importance in international relations does
not entail that it is regulated by international law. And it has long been asserted that
'The formation of a new State is . . . a matter of fact, and not of law.'ÿThis position was
supported by a wide spectrum of legal opinion. For example, one of the most common
arguments of the declaratory theory (the theory that statehood is a legal status
independent of recognition) is that, where a State actually exists, the legality of its
creation or existence must be an abstract issue: the law must take account of the new
situation, despite its illegality.ÿ Equally, so it is said, where a State does not exist, the
rules treating it as existing are pointless, a denial of reality. The criterion must be
effectiveness, not legitimacy. On the other hand, according to the constitutive theory
(the theory that the rights and duties pertaining to statehood derive from recognition by
other States), the proposition that the existence of a State is a matter of fact seems
axiomatic. If 'a State is, and becomes, an International Person
ÿ That is to say, 191 UN Members plus the Vatican City. This does not include Taiwan, Palestine
or various claimant entities discussed in Chapter 9. See Appendix I, p 725 for a complete list.
ÿ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 264, §209(1); cf Erich (1926) 13 HR 427, 442; Jones (1935) 16 BY
5, 15–16; Marston (1969) 18 ICLQ 1, 33; Arangio-Ruiz (1975–6) 26 OzföR 265, 284–5, 332. See
also the formulation in Willoughby, Nature of the State, 195: 'Sovereignty, upon which all legality
depends, is itself a question of fact, and not of law.' See also Oppenheim (8th edn), vol 1, 544, §209;
and the somewhat different formulation in Oppenheim (9th edn), vol 1, 120–3, §34.
ÿ Cf Chen, Recognition, 38 ('a State, if it exists in fact must exist in law'). This proposition is a tau-
tology, and the problem of separate non-State entities was not at issue in the passage cited.
Elsewhere Chen accepts the view that statehood is a legal concept not a 'physical existence' (ibid,
63), as well as the possibility of the illegality of the creation or existence of a 'State' (ibid, 8–9). Cf
Charpentier, Reconnaissance, 160–7. Lauterpacht's formulation is preferable: 'The guiding juridical
principle applicable to all categories of recognition is that international law, like any other legal
system, cannot ignore facts and that it must be based on those provided they are not in themselves
contrary to international law' ( Recognition, 91). But in view of the gnomic character of this proposition,
it can hardly be regarded as a 'guiding juridical principle'. For Lauterpacht's interpretation of the
formula that the existence of a State is a matter of fact only see ibid, 23–4. 'To predicate that a given
legal result is a question of fact is to assert that it is not a question of arbitrary discretion...The
emphasis . . . on the principle that the existence of a State is a question of fact signifies that,
whenever the necessary factual requirements exist, the granting of recognition is a matter of legal duty'.
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through recognition only and exclusively',ÿ and if recognition is discretionary, then rules
granting to an unrecognized community a 'right to statehood' are excluded.
Fundamentally the question is whether international law is itself, in one of its most
important aspects, a coherent or complete system of law.¹ÿ According to predominant
nineteenth-century doctrine there were no rules determining what were 'States' for the
purposes of international law ; the matter was within the discretion of existing recognized
States.¹¹ The international law of that
ÿ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 109, §71; (8th edn), vol 1, 125–7, §71 (modified with emphasis on
limits to the discretion of the recognizing State). Cf Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim, 130–1, §40.
ÿ Cf Lauterpacht, Recognition, 45–50 for an effective critique of the 'State as fact' dogma. His dis-
missal of the declaratory theory results in large part from his identifying the declaratory theory with
this dogma.
ÿ Cf Kelsen (1929) 4 RDI 613, 613. Waldock (1962) 106 HR 5, 146 correctly describes the prob-
lem as a 'mixed question of law and fact'.
¹ÿ Cf Chen, Recognition, 18–19: 'to argue that a State can become a subject of international law
without the assent of the existing States, it is necessary to assume the existence of an objective
system of law to which the new State owes its being.' The point is that if the State owes its existence
to a system of law, then that existence is not, or not only,
a 'fact'. ¹¹ Cf Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 108, §71; contra (8th edn), vol 1, 126, §71: 'Others hold
the view that it is a rule of International Law that no new State has a right towards other States to be
recognized by them, and that no State has the duty to recognize a new State...[A] new State before
its recognition cannot claim any rights which a member of the Family of Nations has as against other
members.' Cf the heavily qualified statement in the 9th edn, vol 1, 132–3, §40.
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is useful for reviewing the changing opinions on the topic since the seventeenth
century. Grotius, for example, defined the State as 'a complete association of free
men, joined together for the enjoyment of rights and for their common interest'.¹ÿ His
definition was philosophical rather than legal: the existence of States was taken for
granted; the State, like the men who composed it, was automatically bound by the law
of nations which was practically identical to the law of nature: 'outside of the sphere of
the law of nature, which is also frequently called the law of nations, there is hardly any
law common to all nations.'¹ÿ So the existence of States as distinct subjects of that
universal law posed no problem. Much the same may be said of Pufendorf, who
defined the State as 'a compound moral person, whose will, intertwined and united by
the pacts of a number of men, is considered the will of all, so that it is able to make
use of the strength and faculties of the individual members for the common peace and
security.'¹ÿ Pufendorf agreed both with Grotius and Hobbes¹ÿ that natural law and the
law of nations were the same:
Nor do we feel that there is any other voluntary or positive law of nations which has
the force of law, properly so-called, such as binds nations as if it proceeded from a
¹² The same incoherence has been noted in respect of the legality of war: Lauterpacht, Recognition, v–vi,
4–5; and the discretionary character of nationality: Brownlie (1963) 39 BY 284, 284; Principles (2nd edn), 73;
(6th edn), 69. Cf Briggs (1950) 44 PAS 169, 172.
¹³ Cf Charter Art 2(4); Corfu Channel Case, ICJ Rep 1949 p 4, 35. ¹ÿ Cf
Nottebohm Case, ICJ Rep 1955 p 4. ¹ÿ Cf Guggenheim (1971) 3 U Tol LR 203. ¹ÿ De Iure Belli ac
Pacis (1646), Bk I, ch I , §xiv. ¹ÿ Ibid. Grotius
excepts certain regional customs. For discussion of State sovereignty in Grotius see Dickinson, Equality of
States, 55–60; Kennedy (1986) 27 Harv ILJ 1, 5; Tuck, Rights of War and Peace, 82–96. ¹ÿ De Iure Naturae
et Gentium Libri Octo, Bk VII, ch 2, §13, para 672. ¹ÿ De Cive, ch 14, paras 4–5.
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superior...[Convergences of State behavior] belong either to the law of nature or to the civil law
of different nations . . . But no distinct branch of law can properly be constituted from these,
since, indeed, those laws are common to nations, not because of any mutual agreement or
obligation, but they agree accidentally, due to the individual pleasure of legislators in different
states . Therefore, these laws can be and many times are changed by some people without
consulting others.²ÿ
A perfect State or community . . . is one which is complete in itself, that is, which is not a part
of another community, but has its own laws and its own council and its own magistrates, such
as is the Kingdom of Castile and Aragon and the Republic of Venice and the like...Such a state,
then, or the prince thereof, has the authority to declare war, and no one else.²¹
Every Nation which governs itself, under whatever form, and which does not depend on any
other Nation, is a sovereign State. Its rights are, in the natural order, the same as those of
every other State. Such is the character of the moral persons who live together
²ÿ Bk II, ch 3, §156.
²¹ De Indis ac de Iure Belli Relectiones (publ 1696, ed Simon); De Iure Belli, para 7, §§425–
6. ²² Le Droit des Gens (1758), vol I, Introduction, §1; ch I, §I. ²³ Introduction, §15.
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in a society established by nature and subject to the law of Nations. To give a Nation
the right to a definite position in this great society, it need only be truly sovereign and
independent; it must govern itself by its own authority and its own laws.²ÿ
The novel element in this definition is the wide-reaching implications Vattel draws
from the notion of the equality of States, the effect of which is to make each State
the sole judge of its rights and obligations under the law of nations.
Thus, 'the Law of Nations is in its origin merely the Law of Nature applied to
Nations . . . We use the term necessary Law of Nations for that law which results
from applying the natural law to Nations...'²ÿ Although the positive law of nations
may not, in principle, conflict with this necessary law, the latter is 'internal' to the
State while the positive law is 'external', and other sovereigns are only entitled and
able to judge the actions of other independent States by this external standard: 'A
Nation is . . . free to act as it pleases, so far as its acts do not affect the perfect
rights of another Nation, and so far as the Nation is under mere obligations without
any perfect external obligation. If it abuses its liberty it acts wrongly; but other
Nations can not complain, since they have no right to dictate to it.'²ÿ Here a
deduction from 'sovereignty' overturns what has previously been held to be the
basis of the law of nations. But as yet, no further deduction is drawn from this
independence or sovereignty to deny the juridical existence of new States;
sovereignty is inherent in a community and is thus independent of the consent of
other States: 'To give a Nation the right to a definite position in this great society, it
need only be truly sovereign and independent...'²ÿ The link between these Earlier
views and the
nineteenth-century positivist view of statehood may be illustrated from Wheaton's
classic Elements of International Law. Under the influence of Hegel,²ÿ he came to
regard statehood for the purposes of international law as something different from
actual independence:
Sovereignty is acquired by a State, either at the origin of the civil society of which it
is composed, or when it separates itself from the community of which it was previously
²ÿ Introduction, Bk I, ch I, §4. But he subsequently stated that authority and laws are not enough for
sovereignty where there is no control over foreign affairs (treaties, making war, alliances): ibid, §11. ²ÿ
Introduction, §§6–7 (original emphasis). The 'necessary Law of Nations' was thus peremptory, ²ÿ
ie permanent and imprescriptible (§9). Ibid, §20.
²ÿ Ibid, Bk I, ch I, §4 (emphasis added).
²ÿ Grundlinien der Philosophie des Recht, vol VIII; Hegel, Werke (1854) VIII, Pt 3, para 331; cited by
Alexander (1958) 34 BY 176, 195: In Nisbet's translation the passage reads: 'The state has a primary
and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power in the eyes of others, ie to be
recognized by them. At the same time, however, this entitlement is purely formal, and the requirement
that the state should be recognized simply because it is a state is abstract. Whether the state does in fact have
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formed a part, and on which it was dependent. This principle applies as well to
internal as to external sovereignty. But an important distinction is to be noticed...
between these two species of sovereignty. The internal sovereignty of a State does
not, in any degree, depend upon its recognition by other States. A new State,
springing into existence, does not require the recognition of other States to confirm
its internal sovereignty...The external sovereignty of any State, on the other hand,
may require recognition by other States in order to render it perfect and complete ...
[I]f it desires to enter into that great society of nations...such recognition becomes
essentially necessary for the complete participation of the new State in all the
advantages of this society. Every other State is at liberty to grant, or refuse, this recognition...²ÿ
As was to be expected, this view was combined with a denial of the universality of
international law³ÿ and of the law of nature as its foundation.³¹
It will be noted that, although Wheaton reproduces Vattel's 'internal/external'
terminology, he puts it to a different use. For Vattel the 'internal' law was the law of
nature, the necessary though imperfect element of the law of nations. Wheaton,
having dispensed with the law of nature, means by 'internal' those aspects of the
government of a State confined to its own territory and distinguished from 'foreign
affairs'.³² By Wheaton's time the positive law of nations was concerned essentially
with the latter; nor could there be anything
being in and for itself depends on its content—on its constitution and condition; and recognition, which
implies that the two [ie form and content] are identical, also depends on the perception and will of the
other state. Without relations with other states, the state can no more be an actual individual than an
individual can be an actual person without a relationship with other persons. [On the one hand], the
legitimacy of a state, and more precisely—in so far as it has external relations—of the power of its
sovereign, is a purely internal matter (one state should not interfere in the internal affairs of another ).
On the other hand, it is equally essential that this legitimacy should be supplemented by recognition on
the part of other states...When Napoleon said before the Peace of Campo Formio “the French Republic
is no more in need of recognition than the sun is ," his words conveyed nothing more than that strength
of existence which itself carries with it a guarantee of recognition, even if this is not expressly formulated.'
Hegel, Elements (1991), 366–67. ²ÿ Elements (3rd edn,
1846), Pt I, ch II, §6. For his earlier hesitations see the 1st edn (1836), Pt I, ch II, §§15–18. ³ÿ Ibid, Pt
I, ch I, §11: 'The
law of nations or international law, as understood among civilized, Christian nations, may be defined
as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the nature
of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be
established by general consent.' In the 3rd edition (1846), the definition was retained, as §14, but with
the qualification 'christian' omitted. This is consonant with treaty practice involving the Ottoman Empire
in the 1840s, which Wheaton discussed in the 3rd edition, Pt I, ch I, §13.
³¹ Ibid, Pt I, ch 1, §5 (quoting Hobbes on the law of nature and international law). There was no
changes between the 1836 and 1846 editions.
³² Vattel made the same distinction, although it is not developed and is inconsistent with other
elements of his work. For Vattel's influence see Ruddy, International Law in the Enlightenment, 119–44;
Tourmé-Jouannet, Emer de Vattel et l'émergence doctrinale du droit international classique, 319–40.
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³³ Thus international law abandoned the 'just war' doctrine and left the question whether to wage
war to the domestic jurisdiction of States. Hall, Treatise (8th edn), 82: 'International law has . . . no
alternative but to accept war, independently of the justice of its origin, as a relationship which the
parties to it may set up if they choose, and to busy itself only in regulating the effects of the
relationship'; Röling, in Miller and Feindrider, Nuclear Weapons and the Law, 181; Dinstein, War,
Aggression and Self-Defence (3rd edn), 71.
³ÿ On competing views as to the starting point of the European States system, see Koskenniemi
(1990) 1 EJIL 4.
³ÿ On the Peace of Westphalia see Nussbaum, Concise History of the Law of Nations, 115–18;
Rapisardi-Mirabelli (1929) 8 Bib Viss 5; Gross (1948) 42 AJIL 20; Braubach, Acta pacis Westphalicae;
Harding and Lim, Renegotiating Westphalia, 1; Steiger (1999) 59 ZaöRV609; Ziegler (1999) 37
Archiv der Völkerrechts 129. For the conventional view, see, eg, Schrijver (1999) 70 BY 65, 69;
Osiander (2001) 55 Int Org 251.
³ÿ Cf Pufendorf, De jure Naturae et Gentium, Bk VII, ch 3, §9, para 690.
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the Netherlands (1559–1648)³ÿ broke away from Spain. What was unclear was
whether the revolutionary entity could be treated as an independent State before
its recognition by the parent State. Pufendorf thought not, on the grounds that '. . .
if a man who, at the time, recognizes the sovereignty of another as his superior, is
to be able to become a king, he must secure the consent of that superior who will
both free him and his dominions from the bonds by which they were tied to him.'³ÿ
Vattel was less categorical: a subject remained bound to the sovereign 'without
other conditions than his observation of the fundamental laws', and thus, in most
cases, secession was contrary to the basic compact that was the foundation of the
State. However, if a sovereign refuses to come to the aid of part of the nation, it
might provide for its own safety by other means.
It was for [this] reason that the Swiss as a body broke away from the Empire, which
had never protected them in any emergency. Its authority had already been rejected
for many years when the independence of Switzerland was recognized by the Emperor
and by all the German States in the Treaty of Westphalia.³ÿ
The Swiss cantons, referred to by Vattel, retained tenuous links with the Empire
until their complete independence was recognized at the Peace of Westphalia. Part
IV of the Treaty of Osnabrück stated:
And whereas His Imperial Majesty... did, by a Particular Decree... declare the said city
of Bazil, and the other Swiss Cantons to be in possession of a quasi-full Liberty and
Exemption from the Empire, and so no way subject to the Tribunals and Sentences of
the said Empire, it has been resolved that this same Decree shall be held as included
in this Treaty of
³ÿ See Blok and Vetter (1986) 34 Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 708; Borschberg, Hugo
Grotius 'Commentaries in theses XI' (1994), 180–1.
³ÿ Pufendorf, De jure Naturae et Gentium (1688), Bk VII, ch 3, §9, para 690. ³ÿ Le Droit des Gens,
Bk I, ch 17, §202; cf Gentili, On the Law of War (1612), Bk I, ch XXIII, §§185–7. ÿÿ 1 CTS 119. Cf the unconditional reference
to the
Netherlands in Art 1: 'Premièrement declare ledit Seigneur Roy et reconnoit que lesdits Seigneurs États Generaux des Pays-
Bas Unis, et les Provinces d'iceux respectivement avec leurs Pays associeés, Villes et Terres y appartenants sont libres et
Souverains États . . .'.
ÿ¹ See Frowein (1971) 65 AJ 568; Smith, GB & LN, vol I, 115–70; Bethell (ed), The Independence of
Latin America. See also de Martens, Nouvelles Causes celebre du droit des gens (1843), vol 1, 113–
209, 370–498 (American War of Independence). Cf Wheaton, Principles, Pt I, ch II, §26.
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The impression given by this brief review is that, despite the limited amount
of State practice, nothing in early international law precluded the solution of the
legal problems raised by the creation and existence of States. That impediment,
as we shall see, arose later with the application by nineteenth-century writers of
a thoroughgoing positivism to the concept of statehood and the theory of
recognition.
When recognition did begin to attract more detailed consideration, about the
middle of the eighteenth century, it was in the context of recognition of monarchs,
especially elective monarchs: that is, in the context of recognition of governments.
Von Steckÿÿ and later Martensÿÿ discussed the problem and reached similar
conclusions. Recognition, at least by third States in the case of secession from a
metropolitan State, was either illegal intervention or it was
ÿ² De Iure Naturae et Gentium, Bk VII, ch 3, §9, para 689. ÿ³ (1958) 34 BY 176, 176.
ÿÿ Versuche über verschiedene Materienpolitikcher und rechtlicher Kenntnisse
(1783). ÿÿ A Compendium of the Law of Nations (1789), 18 ff.
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unnecessary.ÿÿ As one writer put it, '. . . in order to consider the sovereignty of
a State as complete in the law of nations, there is no need for its recognition by
foreign powers; although the latter may appear useful, the de facto existence of
sovereignty is sufficient.'ÿÿ Thus, even after the concept of recognition had become
a separate part of the law, the position was still consistent with the views held by
the early writers.
The writers of the early period of eighteenth century positivism, whenever faced with the
eventuality of recognition as a medium of fitting the new political reality into the law, on
the whole rejected such a solution, choosing the solution more consistent with the natural
legal tradition. Even if the law of nations was conceived as based on the consent of
States, this anti-naturalist trend was not yet allowed to extend to the field of recognition.ÿÿ
. . . le droit international, qui est contractuel et qui a par conséquent la liberté immanente
de s'étendre aux partenaires de son choix, comprend tels États dans sa communauté et
n'y acceuille pas tels autres...[L]a reconnaissance est un accord. Elle signifie l'exten-sion de la
communauté de droit international à un nouvel État.ÿ²
to attempt a summary of the position with regard to statehood and recognition in the
late nineteenth century. There was of course no complete unanimity among text-
writers: nevertheless what we find is an interrelated series of doctrines, based on the
premise of positivism, the effect of which was that the formation and even the existence
of States was a matter outside the accepted scope of international law. Oppenheim's
International Law provides the clearest as well as the most influential expression of
these interrelated doctrines.
ÿ² Redslob (1934) 13 RDI, 431. The essential problem relates to the duties of the new State rather than
its rights. Existing States could consent to the rules of law in respect of yet-to-be-created States, but those
States could not for their part so consent (eg, Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internazionale(3rd edn), vol I, 163–
6 cited Jaffé, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, 90n) and mutuality was required, as in any contract.
Cf, however, Lauterpacht, Recognition, 2. See further Devine (1984) 10 S Af YBIL 18, Hillgruber (1998) 9
EJIL 491, 499–502. ÿ³ Cited by Smith, GB & LN, vol I, 12, 14. ÿÿ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 17, §12; (8th
edn), 18, §12: 'New States which came into existence and were through express or tacit recognition
admitted into the Family of Nations thus consented to the body of rules for international conduct [1st edn:
'in existence'; 8th edn: 'in force'] at the time of their admittance.' The 9th edition treats the matter as follows:
'Thus new states which came into existence and were admitted into the international community thereupon
became subject to the body of rules for international conduct in force at the time of their admission.' Ibid,
vols 1, 14, §5; see also ibid, vol 1, 29, §10.
ÿÿ On Turkey's 'membership' see General Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia and Turkey for Re-establishment of Peace, Paris, 30 March 1856, 46 BFSP 12, esp para
VII, in which the allied monarchs 'déclarent la Sublime Porte admise à participer aux avantages du droit
public et du concert Européens.' See also Smith, GB & LN, vol I, 16–17; Hall, International Law (2nd edn),
40; Wood (1943) 37 AJ 262; Hillgruber, Die Aufnahme neuer Staaten in die Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft,
394. In European Commission of the Danube, PCIJ ser B no 14 (1927), 40,
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members are either original members because the Law of Nations grew up gradually
between them through customs and treaties, or they are members as having been
recognized by the body of members already in existence when they were
born.ÿÿ (2) States as such were not necessarily members of the society of nations.
Recognition, express or implied, made them members and bound them to obey
international law. ÿÿ States not so accepted were not (at least in theory) bound by
international law, nor were the 'civilized nations' bound in their behavior towards them,
as was implied by their behavior with regard to Africa and China.ÿÿ (3) Only
States then, or rather only those entities recognized as States and accepted into
international society, were bound by international law and were international persons.
Individuals and groups were not subjects of international law and had no rights as
such under international law. 'Since the Law of Nations is based on the common
consent of individual States, and not of individual human beings, States solely and
exclusively are the subjects of International Law'.ÿÿ
(4) The binding force of international law is derived from this process of seeking to be
recognized and accepted.
Thus new States which came into existence and were admitted into the international community
thereupon became subject to the body of rules for international conduct in force at the time of
their admittance.ÿÿ
International Law does not say that a State is not in existence as long as it is not recognized,
but it takes no notice of it before its recognition. Through recognition only and exclusively a
State becomes an International Person and a subject of International Law.ÿ¹
Art VII of the Treaty of Paris was said to have effected 'the elevation of the position of Turkey in Europe'. Among
the enormous literature on the extension of international law beyond Europe see Andrews (1978) 94 LQR 408;
Grewe (1982) 42 ZaöRV 449; Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht; Sinha, Legal Polycentricity
and International Law; Onuma (2000) 2 J Hist IL 1. On inter-national law in relation to specific regions and States,
see, eg, Eick, Indianerverträge in Nouvelle-France: ein Beitrag zur Völkerrechtsgeschichte; Ziegler (1997) 35
Archiv des Völkerrechts 255; Ando (ed), Japan and International Law.
ÿÿ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 17, §12; (8th edn), vol 1, 125, §71. See also 9th edition, vol 1, 14, §5. ÿÿ
Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 17, §12, 108, §71; (9th edn), vols 1, 14, §5, 128, §39. ÿÿ Oppenheim
(1st edn), vol 1, 34, §28; (8th edn), vol 1, 50, §28. Lauterpacht omitted the sen-tence 'It is discretion, and not
International Law, according to which the members of the Family of Nations deal with such States as still remaining
outside that family' and characterized 'the question of membership of the “Family of Nations ” . . . a matter of purely
historical interest.' Cf ibid (9th edn), vol 1, 87, §22. ÿÿ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 18 (§12). By 'States' Oppenheim
apparently
meant 'recognized States'. ÿÿ Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 17, §12; (9th edn), 14, §5. ÿ¹ Oppenheim (1st edn),
vol 1, 110, §71. The second sentence only is in the 8th edn, vol 1, 125, §71. US Secretary of State Webster put it
as follows: 'Every nation, on being received at its own request, into the circle of civilized governments, must
understand that she not only attains rights of
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This satisfied the positivist canon that could discover the obligation to obey
international law only with the consent of each State.
(5) According to how an entity became a State was a matter of no importance to
international law, which concentrated on recognition as the agency of admission into
'civilized society'—a kind of juristic baptism, entailing the rights and duties of
international law. Unrecognized entities had not agreed to be bound by international
law, and neither had the existing community of recognized States accepted them or
agreed to treat them as such. Nascent States (States 'in statu nascendi') were not
international persons. How they acquired territory, what rights and duties they had or
owed to others as a result of events before they were recognized, these were irrelevant
to international law: they were matters 'of fact and not of law'.
The formation of a new State is, as will be remembered from former statements, a
matter of fact, and not of law. It is through recognition, which is a matter of law, that
such new States become a member of the Family of Nations and subject to
International Law. As soon as recognition is given, the new State's territory is
recognized as the territory of a subject of International Law, and it matters not how
this territory was acquired before the recognition.ÿ²
Phillimore: 'The question as to the origin of States belongs rather to the
province of Political Philosophy as well as of International Jurisprudence.'ÿ³
Hence the acquisition of territory by a new State was not regarded as a mode
of acquisition of territory in international law, although revolt was a method of
losing territory. 'Revolt followed by secession has been accepted as a mode of
losing territory to which there is no corresponding mode of acquisition.'ÿÿ
sovereignty and the dignity of national character, but that she binds herself also to the strict and
faithful-ful observance of all those principles, laws and usages which have obtained currency among
civilized states...'. Letter to Mr Thompson, Minister to Mexico, 15 April 1842. Moore's Digest, vol I, s
1, 5–6. ÿ² Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 264, §209; (8th edn), vol 1, 544, §209. In the 9th edition,
vol 1, 677, §241, the position is reformulated thus: 'When a new state comes into existence, its title
to its territory is not explicable in terms of the traditional “modes” of acquisition of territory ...The new
state's territorial entitlement is more to do with recognition; for, as soon as recognition is given, the
new state's territory is recognized as the territory of a subject of international law; although, questions
of succession and of the legal history of the territory may also be involved where particular
boundaries, or the precise extent of the territory, are doubtful or disputed.' See also ibid (9th edn),
vol 1, 120, §34: 'A state proper is in existence when a people is settled in a territory under its own
sovereign government.' ÿ³ Phillimore, Commentaries on International Law (2nd edn), vol I, 79. ÿÿ
Oppenheim (1st edn), vol 1, 297–8, §246; (9th edn), vol 1, 717, §276. See also ibid (9th edn), vol
1, 717, §276, to similar effect but with the following qualification: 'It is perhaps now questionable
whether the term revolt is entirely a happy one in this legal context. It would seem to indicate a
particular kind of political situation rather than a legal mode of the loss of territorial sovereignty. If a
revolt as a matter of fact results in the emergency of a new state, then this matter is the situation
discussed [under the category 'acquisition'].'
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ÿÿ And even where the results were unfortunate: the Second Circuit of the US Court of Appeals held that,
absent recognition, notified to the court by the executive branch, Hong Kong could not be treated as a State for
jurisdictional purposes, and a corporation organized under the laws of Hong Kong, thus 'stateless', was unable
to maintain an action in US federal court. Matimak Trading Co v Khalily, 118 F 3d 76 (2nd Cir, 1997, McLaughlin,
CJ). The Third Circuit took the view that Hong Kong corporations could be treated as UK subjects and the
problem thus avoided: Southern Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc v Wah Kwong Shipping Group Ltd, 181 F 3d
410 (3rd Cir 1999, Becker, CJ). The Supreme Court resolved the matter in favor of federal jurisdiction: JP
Morgan Chase Bank v Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd, 536 US 88, 122 S Ct 2054 (Souter J 2002). ÿÿ
This was not always so: Yrisarri v Clement (1825) 2 C & P 223, 225. For an
illuminating dis-cussion of the case in which Lord Eldon laid down the orthodox common law rule see Bushe-
Foxe (1931) 12 BY 63; (1932) 13 BY 39. See also Jaffé, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, 79.
ÿÿ Luigi Monta of Genoa v Cechofracht Co Ltd [1956] 2 QB 522 (term 'government' in a charter party);
Kawasaki Kisn Kabashiki Kaisha of Kobe v Bantham Steamship Co Ltd [1939] 2 KB 544 ('war'), 9 ILR 528. For
an extreme case of 'construction' see The Arantzazu Mendi [1939] AC 256, 9 ILR 60, criticized by Lauterpacht,
Recognition, 288–94.
ÿÿ Duff Development Co v Kelantan Government [1924] AC 797, 825 (Lord Sumner); and cf the certifi-cate
in Salimoff v Standard Oil Co, 262 NY 220 (1933) just before US recognition of the Soviet government. ÿÿ
Luther v Sagor[1921] 3 KB 532; but cf Carl Zeiss Stifftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967]
1 AC 853, 953–4 (Lord Wilberforce), 43 ILR 23. For more recent cases, see, eg, Caglar v HM Inspector of
Taxes, 1996 Simon's Tax Cases 150; 108 ILR 150. The American position was historically less rigid: Wulfsohn
v RSFSR, 234 NY 372 (1923); Sokoloff v National City Bank, 2 ILR 44, 239 NY 158 (1924); Bank of China v
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co, 209 F2d 467 (1953). US courts often defer to executive determinations
(eg, Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc, 917 F 2d 278, 291–
3 (Ind, 1990) 108 ILR 488; Smith, (1992) 6 Temple ICLJ 169, 178–90), but not always: Efrat Ungar v Palestine
Liberation Organization, 402 F3d 274, 280 (1st Cir, 31 March 2005, Selya, CJ) (slip op), 14: '[T]he lower court's
immunity decision neither signaled an official position on behalf of the United States with respect to the political
recognition of Palestine nor amounted to the usurpation of a power committed to some other branch of
government.
After all, Congress enacted the [Anti-Terrorism Act], and the President signed it. The very purpose of the law is
to allow the courts to determine questions of sovereign immunity under a legal, as opposed to a political, regime.'
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Whether the law of the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' could be applied to
a tort claim even though the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had certified
that the United Kingdom did not recognize that entity as a State:
The distinction has also been expressed as one between private international
law and the law or practice of foreign relations:
[P]rivate international law is designed to find the most appropriate law... and it is not
concerned with adjusting the mutual relationship of sovereigns. Therefore, foreign law
applied under private international law principles should not be limited to the law only
of a recognized State or Government; effectiveness of foreign law should not depend
on recognition.ÿÿ
leaders that they are, or should be, free to recognize or not to recognize on the
grounds of their own choosing.ÿ³ If this is the case, the international status and
rights of whole peoples and territories will seem to depend on arbitrary decisions
and political contingencies .
ÿ³ Cf the statement of Sir Percy Spender, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, cited in O'Connell (ed), International
Law in Australia, 32; and US Ambassador Warren Austin, SCOR 3rd yr 294th mtg, 16. See also MJ Peterson (1982) 34
World Politics 324. ÿÿ Cf Bot, Non-Recognition and Treaty Relations, 1. ÿÿ
Constitutive writers include the following: Le Normand, La
Reconnaissance Internationale et ses Diverses Applications; Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre (5th edn), 273;
Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internazionale (3rd edn); Kelsen (1941) 35 AJ 605; Lauterpacht, Recognition; Schwarzenberger,
International Law (3rd edn), vol I, 134; Patel, Recognition in the Law of Nations, 119–22; Jennings (1967) 121 H.R.
327, 350; Verzijl, International Law, vol II, 587–90 (with reservations); Devine [1973] Acta Juridica 1, 90–145. Hall's
position is of interest: 'although the right to be treated as a state is independent of recognition, recognition is the
necessary evidence that the right has been acquired': International Law (8th edn, 1924, Higgins ed), 103. Cf also the
German argument in the Customs Union Case, PCIJ ser C no 53, 52–3. Schachter argues that Secretariat practice (in
one case, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1947) is implicitly constitutive: 25 BY (1948)
91, 109–15. This is doubtful. It is also argued that the Permanent Court adopted a constitutive position in Certain
German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, PCIJ Ser A No 7 (1926), 27–9, but this was in the context of the belligerency
of the Polish National Committee, not the existence of Poland as a State. ÿÿ Lauterpacht, Recognition, 38–9; but cf
Jaffé, 80–1. ÿÿ Cf Chen, Recognition, 18 n 41.
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ÿ¹ Even after the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (known as FYROM) was admitted to the UN (GA res
225, 8 April 1993) it remained for a time unrecognized by Greece. See Riedel (1996)
45 Sudöst-Europa 63; Craven (1995) 16 AYIL 199; Pazartzis (1995) 41 AFDI 281.
ÿ² For the Czech position, see Statement by the Czech Republic in reply to the Statement by the Principality of
Liechtenstein, Plenary meeting of the 10th OSCE Economic Forum, 29 May 2002; for the Liechtenstein position,
see Review of the Implementation of OSCE Commitments in the Economic and Environmental Dimension, Statement
to Agenda Point OSCE document EF.DEL/12/04, 4 June 2004.
ÿ³ See Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the US, §202, Comment f, 'Unlawful recognition-
tion or acceptance', and further Chapter 3.
ÿÿ
Recognition, 234 n3 (Italian and German recognition of the Franco regime 'illegal ab initio'); cf ibid, 95 n2. ÿÿ
Kelsen (1941)
35 AJ 605, 609. On Kelsen's position see Pauly, in Diner and Stolleis (eds), Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, 45,
46–7.
ÿÿ Cf Verhoeven, Reconnaissance, 714–15. Kelsen himself was previously a declaratist: (1929) 4 RDI 613, 617–
18: 'en présence des règles positives incontestables du droit international, [on] ne peut l'État nouveau ait des droits
et des obligations internationales avant même d'être reconnu par nier que les anciens États.' ÿÿ
Recognition, 67.
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reflection upon international law'.ÿÿ Moreover, in his view '[i]t cannot be explained
away . . . by questionable analogies to private law or to philosophical relativism.'ÿÿ
But if a central feature of the constitutive position is open to such criticism the
position itself must be flawed.ÿÿ Aside from
other objections,ÿ¹ Lauterpacht's own position is dependent on
a straightforward statement about State practice:
. . . much of the available evidence points to what has here been described as the
legal view of recognition. Only that view of recognition, coupled with a clear realization
of its constitutive effect, allows us to introduce a stabilizing principle into what would
otherwise be a pure exhibition of power and a negation of order...ÿ²
ÿÿ Recognition, 78.
ÿÿ Ibid. Lauterpacht proposed the collectivization of recognition as a solution. Developments in that direction
are addressed in Chapters 4 and 12, below. ÿÿ A hybrid position
would be to require recognition by one or several States as a prerequisite: eg, Green, International Law, 34:
'Unrecognized by at least one State, the entity will have no claim to be considered as a subject of international
law.' But why should any one State be allowed to change the legal position of others by an isolated and perhaps
aberrant act of recognition? And what should the first recognizing State do, if it is seeking to act in accordance
with international law? On Green's view, the first State to recognize acts unlawfully—in which case the origins of
every State must be illegitimate. ÿ¹ Eg, the difficulty of a duty to recognize an entity that has, prior to recognition,
ex hypothesis
no rights: see Recognition, 74–5, 191–2. In Lauterpacht's view the duty is owed to the society of States at
large: that society is 'entitled to claim recognition', but this is an unenforceable or imperfect right. This is a mere
construct, bearing no relationship to State practice or general legal opinion. Cf Chen, Recognition, 52–4. ÿ²
Recognition, 77–8. But cf ibid, 78: 'We are not in a position to say...that there is a clear and uni-form practice of
States in support of
the legal view of recognition...'. ÿ³ The United Kingdom alone seems to have accepted a duty to recognize:
(1951) 4 ILQ 387–8, and even its statement is not an assertion of the
constitutive theory. Cf Verhoeven, Reconnaissance, 576–86; Rich (1993) 4 EJIL 36. ÿÿ Cf Recognition, 78. ÿÿ
See Chen, Recognition, for a full discussion of this position. Green's annotations to the published edition are
consistently constitutivist: in this respect Green follows Schwarzenberger rather than Chen. ÿÿ Charpentier,
Reconnaissance, 15–68, 160–7.
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and practical difficulties involved in constitutive theory, while still accepting a role for
recognition as a matter of practice. It has the further, essential, merit of consistency
with that practice, and it is supported by a substantial body of opinion. The following
passage from Taft CJ's in the Tinoco Arbitration is frequently cited as the classic
statement of the declaratory position:
But this was a case of recognition of governments, and it is arguable that while
recognition of governments may be declaratory in effect, recognition of new States
goes further. Where an authority in fact exercises governmental functions within an
area already accepted as a State, there seems to be nothing for recognition to
constitute, at least at the level of international personality. But the establishment of a
new State involves the demarcation of a certain area as a 'State-area' for the purposes
of international relations, with consequent legal effects. In such a case it might be
argued that recognition, at least in the non-formal sense of 'treating like a State', is
central rather than peripheral to international capacity.ÿÿ
ÿÿ (1924) 18 AJ 147, 154; cf also Hopkins Claim (1927) 21 AJ 160, 166. The matter was put even
more strongly by Commissioner Wadsworth in Cuculla v Mexico, Mex-US Cl Com (1868), in respect
of the premature and unauthorized recognition by the US Minister of the Zuloaga Government as the
de facto Government of Mexico: 'Where then, is the evidence of the de facto government? The
possession of the capital will not be sufficient, nor recognized by the American minister with or without
the appraisal of his government. Recognition is based upon the pre-existing facts; does not create the fact.
If this does not exist, the recognition is falsified . . . If, therefore, the Zuloaga movement in Mexico
was the government de facto, it was because the facts existing at the time made it so. If it was a
government, the government in Mexico, it was because it claimed and possessed the sovereignty
over that independent nation we call 'the Republic of the United Mexican State.' Moore, IA III, 2873,
2876–7. See also Wulfsohn v RSFSR, 138 NE 24, 25 (1923); app diss 266 US 580 (1924): 'The
results we reach depend upon more basic considerations than recognition or non-recognition by the
United States. Whether or not a government exists clothed with the power to enforce its authority
within its own territory, obeyed by the people over whom it rules, capable of performing the duties
and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power, able to enforce its claims by military force, is a
fact not a theory. For its recognition does not create the state
although it may be desirable.' ÿÿ See Le Normand, 268, cited by Chen, Recognition, 14 n 1.
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But neither legal opinion nor State practice draws from this the conclusion that the several acts of
recognition by other States constitute the entity being recognized or are conclusive as to its status. As a
German–Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal stated in reference to the existence of the new State of Poland:
'. . . the recognition of a State is not constitutive but merely declaratory. The State exists by itself and the
recognition is nothing else than a declaration of this existence, recognized by the States from which it
emanates.'ÿÿ Less well known in this context is the Report of the Commission of Jurists on the Åland
Islands.
The passage of the Report dealing with the independence of Finland enumerated the
various recognitions given to Finland, but went on to say that:
these facts by themselves do not suffice to prove that Finland, from this time onwards, became
a sovereign State . . . [T]he same legal value cannot be attached to the recognition of new States
in war-time, especially to that accorded by belligerent powers, as in normal times . . .
In addition to these facts which bear upon the external relations of Finland, the
very abnormal character of her internal situation must be brought out.
This situation was such that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the
formation of a sovereign State did not exist.¹ÿÿ
Evidently the Commission, while accepting the legal value of recognition as evidence,
were not prepared to accept it as conclusive, but instead referred to the 'conditions
required for the formation of a sovereign State'.¹ÿ¹
On this matter the Arbitration Commission established to advise the European
Peace Conference on Yugoslavia was categorical. In its first opinion, on 29 November
1991, the Commission stated that 'the effects of recognition by other States are purely
declaratory.'¹ÿ² This was reiterated in further opinions.¹ÿ³ It has, however, been
suggested that the actual practice of States respecting the dissolution of Yugoslavia
may have been constitutive in effect;
indeed the debate continues to rage between those who attribute the troubles of
Yugoslavia to premature recognition and those who blame European governments for
not intervening earlier and more decisively.¹ÿÿ It is difficult to reach a conclusion on this
without examining in detail the bases for some of the particular claim to statehood, a
matter addressed in Chapters 12 and 17. But overall the international approach to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, unhappy as it has been, does not support the constitutive
theory,¹ÿÿ still lacks demand that we adopt it as a general matter. The International
Court in the Bosnian Genocide case, although not addressing the matter of recognition
directly,¹ÿÿ may be seen, by implication, to have favored the view that statehood and
its attendant rights exist independently of the will of other States. The Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY) had argued that the Court was not competent to adjudicate
questions under the Genocide Convention, because the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina
had not recognized each other at the time proceedings were instituted. The Court
dismissed this argument on the basis that (as mutual recognition had been subsequently
given in the Dayton Accord)¹ÿÿ any defect was merely procedural and could be repaired
simply by refiling the claim, which would relate back to alleged acts of genocide
occurring previously to 1995.¹ÿÿ The result is consonant with the declaratory view: the
rights of Bosnia-Herzegovina (under the Genocide Convention or otherwise) were
opposable to the FRY from the time the former became a State, whether or not the
FRY had yet recognized it as such.
¹ÿÿ On recognition of constituent entities emerging from the former SFRY see Hillgruber (1998)
9 EJIL 491; Warbrick and Lowe (1992) 41 ICLQ 473, Craven (1995) 66 BY 333, Crawford, Selected Essays,
213–21. ¹ÿÿ Thus
Macedonia was not recognized for some years (due to political problems with Greece), yet it was treated by
all as a State. Serbia and Montenegro was not recognized as the continuation of the old SFRY, and most States
had limited diplomatic relations with it as a result. But its statehood was never in doubt.
¹ÿÿ 'For the purposes of determining its jurisdiction in this case, the Court has no need to settle the question
of what the effects of a situation of non-recognition may be on the contractual ties between parties to a multilateral
treaty.' ICJ Rep 1996 p 595, 613. ¹ÿÿ General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995, 35 ¹ÿÿ ICJ Rep 1996 p 595, 612–13.
ILM 75.
¹ÿÿ Principles (2nd edn), 94; (6th edn), 89–90 (emphasis in original); see also cf (2nd edn), 90–3; (6th edn),
86–8. Among older authorities, those supporting the declaratory position include: Erich
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(2) Conclusions
It is sometimes suggested that the 'great debate' over the character of recognition
has done nothing but confuse the issues, that it is mistaken to categorize
recognition as either declaratory or constitutive in accordance with some general
theory. According to Brownlie:
in the case of 'recognition', the theory has not only failed to enhance the subject but
has created a tertium quid which stands, like a bank of fog on a still day, between the
observer and the contours of the ground which calls for investigation. With rare
exceptions the theories on recognition have not only failed to improve the quality of
thought but have deflected lawyers from the application of ordinary methods of legal analysis.¹¹³
(1926) 13 H.R. 427, 457–68; Jaffé, Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations, 97–8; Borchard (1942) 36 AJ 108; Brown
(1942) 36 AJ 106; Kunz (1950) 44 AJ 713; Chen, Recognition; Marek, Identity and Continuity, 130–61; Charpentier,
Reconnaissance, 196–200; Lachs (1959) 35 BY 252; Waldock (1962) 106 HR 147–51; Brierly, Law of Nations (6th
edn), 139; Higgins, Development, 135–6; Starke, Studies in International Law, 91–100; O'Connell, International
Law (2nd edn), vol I, 128–34; Fawcett, The Law of Nations (2nd edn), 49, 55; Akehurst, Modern Introduction (3rd
edn), 60–3. See also the Resolutions of the Institut du Droit International(1936): 'La reconnaissance a un effet
déclaratif.
L'existence de l'État nouveau avec tous les effets juridiques qui s'attachent à cette existence n'est pas affectée
par le refus de reconnaissance d'un ou plusieurs États': Wehberg (ed), Institut de Droit International, Table Général
des Résolutions 1873–1956, ii; and cf Brown [1934] Annaire 302–57.
Among more recent writers see Davidson (1980) 32 NILQ 22; Menon, (1989) 67 RDISDP 161, 176; Weston, Falk
and D'Amato, International Law and World Order(2nd edn), 847; Verhoeven (1993) 39 AFDI 7; Warbrick, in Evans
(ed), Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in Contemporary Europe, 9; Emanuelli, Droit international public,
189 (para 385). See also Restatement 3rd, §202, Reporters' Note 7 (1987): 'This section tends towards the
declaratory view . . .'; and, ibid, §202, comment b: 'An entity that satisfies the requirements of §201 is a state
whether or not its statehood is formally recognized by other states.'
¹¹ÿ Cf the Protocol of the London Conference, 19 February 1831: 18 BFSP 779, 781 (concerning Belgium);
Marek, Identity and Continuity, 140. Non-recognition of North Korea and of Israel was not regarded as precluding
the application of international law rules to the Korean and Middle East wars: Brownlie, Use of Force, 380. See
also Briggs (1949) 43 AJ 113, 117–20; Charpentier, Reconnaissance, 45–8, 56–8; Whiteman, 2 Digest, 604–5.
¹¹¹ See Bot, Non-Recognition and Treaty Relations; Whiteman, 2 Digest, 524–604, and for the older practice
see Moore, 1 Digest, 206–35; Hackworth, 1 Digest, 327–63. ¹¹² Cf Lachs
(1959) 35 BY 252, 259; Higgins, Development, 164–5; Verhoeven, Reconnaissance, 721. ¹¹³ Brownlie (1982)
53 BY 197, 197.
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But this does not mean that recognition does not have important legal and
political effects.¹¹ÿ Recognition is an institution of State practice that can resolve
uncertainties as to status and allow for new situations to be regularized.
That an entity is recognized as a State is evidence of its status; where recognition
is general, it may be practically conclusive. States, in the forum of the United
Nations or elsewhere, may make declarations as to status or 'recognize' entities
the status of which is doubtful:¹¹ÿ depending on the degree of unanimity and other
factors this may be evidence of a compelling kind.¹¹ÿ Even individual acts of
recognition may contribute towards the consolidation of status: in Charpentier's
terms, recognition may render the new situation opposable to the recognizing
State.¹¹ÿ
In some situations, the term 'recognition' may also be used to describe acts that
are proper speaking constitutive of a particular State; for example, a multilateral
treaty establishing a new State will at the same time extend the
¹¹ÿ De Visscher, Problems d'interpretation judiciaire en droit international public, 191; de Visscher, Théories et Réalités (4th rev
edn), 258; Salmon, La Reconnaissance d'État, 19 ff. Cf Charpentier, Reconnaissance. Verhoeven, Reconnaissance, 548 refers in the
same vein to a 'dialectical relationship' between recognition and the criteria for statehood, although his basic position remains
declaratist: ibid, 545, 714–15, 720, esp 547–8: 'Force est en effet de convenir que pareille aptitude n'est originellement q'une virtualité
qui doit être impérativement présumée dés l'instant où sont réunis les critères traditionnels de l'État, sans reserve d'une verification de
la “viabilité” de l'Etat, sous reserve d'une verification de la proposition illustre néanmoins indirectement cette caractéristique
fondamentale de l'effectivité étatique, d'être principalement une effectivité par rapport à autrui, qui privilégie autant qu'elle problématise
l'autorité “externe” par rapport à l' autorité interne. Cette effec-tivité par rapport á autrui introduit une relation dialectique entre
l'effectivité purement matérielle et la reconnaissance qu'elle conditionne, qui complique singulièrement la verification de celle-lá. Il
n'est en effet guère douteux que dans la réalité des rapports internationaux la reconnaissance comme fait a fréquemment une portée
constitutive et devient l'élément d'une effectivité qui théoriquement la conditionne.' ¹¹ÿ Cf Restatement 3rd, §202, comment c. ¹¹ÿ Eg,
GA res 195 (III) declaring the Republic of Korea and its government to be representative
signatories' recognition of that State.¹¹ÿ But the constitutive acts here are those
involving the establishment of the State, the stipulation of its constitution, the
definition of its borders, etc. Collective recognition is ancillary and is not a
substitute for action by the competent authorities.¹²ÿ
The conclusion must be that the status of an entity as a State is, in principle,
independent of recognition, although the qualifications already made suggest
that the differences between declaratory and constitutive schools are less in
practice than has been depicted. But this conclusion assumes that there exist in
international law and practice workable criteria for statehood. If there are no
such criteria, or if they are so imprecise as to be practically useless, then the
constitutive position will have been returned, as it was, by the back door.¹²¹ The
question whether such criteria exist will be discussed in the next chapter .
¹¹ÿ Eg, the recognition of Cyprus by the Treaty of Guarantee, Art II, 16 August 1960, 382 UNTS 3. ¹²ÿ For
collective action in the creation of States see further Chapter 12. ¹²¹ Cf Anzilotti,
Corso di Diritto Internationale (3rd edn) , vol I, 163–6. ¹²² See, eg, Kelsen,
Principles of International Law (2nd edn), 573–4; Barberis, Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, 25; Cassese,
International Law in a Divided World, 74–104; Jennings and Watts, Oppenheim (9th edn), 119–20 (§33), 330–1
(§103); Hickey (1997) 2 Hofstra LPS 1; Charlesworth and Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, 124–5;
Shinoda, Re-examining Sovereignty, 17–18; Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002), 10–18;
Brownlie, Principles (6th edn), 648–50 (respecting personality of international organizations); Shaw, International
Law (5th edn), ¹²³ Schwarzenberger, Manual, 53. 175–201. ¹²ÿ Cf Danzig Railway Officials, PCIJ ser b No 15
Selected (1928) 17–18. ¹²ÿ See Crawford,
Essays, 17, 26–9; Brownlie, Principles (2nd edn), 73, (6th edn), 69: 'The
state is a type of legal person recognized by international law. Yet, since there are other types of legal persons
so recognized...the possession of legal personality is not in itself a sufficient mark of statehood.'
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between being a beneficiary of rights or a bearer of duties, on the one hand, and
being an active participant on the international level, on the other. Individuals and
companies can bring claims in international forums established by treaty (and not
only as delegates of the States parties to these treaties¹²ÿa ). But it remains true
that these forums are created and ultimately controlled by States or by
intergovernmental organizations, and it is these entities that remain the gatekeepers
and legislators of the international system.¹²ÿ As an aspect
of the developments in doctrine and practice in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, international legal personality came to be regarded as
synonymous with statehood.¹²ÿ For example, it was never definitively settled
whether the League of Nations had international personal-ity.¹²ÿ The question
arose with respect to the United Nations soon after its foundation: could the United
Nations bring a claim for injury (a) to itself and (b) to its agents caused by the
conduct of a non-member State? In the Reparations Opinion the International
Court gave an affirmative answer in both respects. It reformulated that question in
the following terms:
. . . Whether the Charter has given the Organization such a position that it possesses,
in regard to its Members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect. In other
words, does the Organization possess international personality? This is no doubt a
doctrinal expression, which has sometimes given rise to controversy. But it will be
used here to mean that if the Organization is recognized as having that personality, it
is an entity capable of availing itself of incumbent obligations upon its Members.¹²ÿ
As to whether the United Nations might claim reparations for injury to its agents
committed by nationals of a non-Member state, the Court gave an affirmative
answer, stating that '...fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of
the international community, limit the power, in conformity
¹²ÿa See Occidental Exploration & Production Co v Republic of Ecuador, 'the investor is given direct
standing to pursue the state.' [2005] EWCA Civ 1116, Times, 23 Sept 2005 (Mance LJ), para 16.
¹²ÿ See Oppenheim (9th edn), 119–20, §33; Malanczuk, in Weiss et al (eds), International Economic
Law With a Human Face, 64; Brownlie, in Evans (ed), Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in
Contemporary Europe, 5; Virally (1985) 183 HR 9, 71–2. ¹²ÿ Crawford,
Selected Essays (2002) 17, 19; Nijman, in State, Sovereignty, and International Governance, 109.
¹²ÿ Williams, Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 38, 43; Zimmern, The League
of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918–1935, 277–85; Brierly (1946) 23 BY 83, 85.
¹²ÿ Reparations Case, ICJ Rep 1949, p 174, 178 (emphasis added). On the legal personality of inter-
national organizations generally, see Menon (1992) 70 RDI 61; Bederman (1996) 36 Va. JIL 275; Seidl-
Hohenveldern and Loibl, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen, (6th edn), 43; Lim, in Harding
(ed), Renegotiating Westphalia, 53, Amerasinghe, Principles of the International Law of International
Organizations (2nd edn), ch 3. Regarding the legal personality of particular organizations, Bernhardt
(1982) 18 Europarecht 199; Khodakov (1993) 7 Emory ILR 13; Head (1996) 90 AJ 214, 221; Packer
and Rukare (2002) 96 AJ 365.
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questions, it is not in the bulk of cases but, rather, in the marginal ones that the
more difficult questions are likely to arise.¹³ÿ
a sense, the whole of this work is an attempt to define and elucidate the concept of
statehood as it operates in present-day international law. In particular, the criteria for
statehood, ancient and modern, are examined in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. Despite
its importance, statehood 'in the sense of international law' has not always been a
clearly defined concept. Although the United Kingdom and Indian Governments
thought a definition of the term 'State' a prerequisite for the proposed Draft Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of States,'¹³ÿ the International Law Commission (ILC)
concluded:
that no useful purpose would be served by an effort to define the term 'State'. . . In the
Commission's draft, the terms . . . is used in the sense commonly accepted in international practice.
Nor did the Commission think that it was called upon to set forth . . .the qualifications to be possessed
by a community in order that it may become a State.¹³ÿ
¹³ÿ See, eg, Tabory in Shapira (ed), New Political Entities, 139 (Palestine); Morin (1984) 1 Rev
Québéquoise IN 163 (Quebec); Mushkat (1994) 24 HKLJ 328 (Macau); Crawford, Rights in One
Country (Hong Kong). ¹³ÿ ILC, Preparatory Study, A/CN.4/2, 1948, 50. ¹³ÿ ILC, Report 1949: A/
925, 9. ¹³ÿ See ILC YBk, 1949, 61–8, 70–1, 84–6, 138, 173.
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(3) Sovereignty
The term 'sovereignty' has a long and troubled history, and a variety of meanings.¹³ÿ In
its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term for the 'totality of international
rights and duties recognized by international law' as remaining in an independent
territorial unit—the State.¹ÿÿ It is not itself a right, nor is it a criterion for statehood
(sovereignty is an attribute of States, not a precondition). It is a somewhat unhelpful, but
firmly established, description of statehood; a brief term for the State's attribute of more-
or-less plenary competence.
Unsurprisingly, the term has drawn criticism. According to Charney: 'The word
“sovereignty” should be stricken from our vocabulary. It evokes the anachronistic idea of
the total independence and autonomy of the state, and has no real meaning today. Use
of the word calls to mind a fundamentalist view that is difficult to debate in light of its
emotive baggage.'¹ÿ¹ But the term seems to be ineradicable, and anyway its eradication
might only make matters worse.
Better, one might think, 192 sovereigns than one or a few. Associated with the concept
of sovereign equality, the term is a normative one and may be unobjectionable. What is
objectionable is the abuse of language involved in statements of the form 'State A is
sovereign therefore its conduct is unquestionable' (a statement normally used to defend
the conduct of one's own State, not that of others). As a United States court observed:
¹³ÿ See 10 Enc PIL 397, 399; Wildhaber, in Macdonald and Johnston (eds), The Structure and Process of International
Law, 425; Hinsley, Sovereignty (2nd edn 1986), 224–35; Kranz (1992) 30 Archiv des Völkerrechts 411; Bartelson, A Genealogy
of Sovereignty; E Lauterpacht (1997) 73 Int Affairs 137; Dupuy, Dialectiques du droit international; Merriam, History of the
Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau; Rawls, Law of Peoples, 27, 79; Jackson (2003) 97 AJ 782; Sarooshi (2004) 25
Michigan VIL 1107; Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 3–25. ¹ÿÿ Cf Reparations Case, ICJ Rep 1949 p 174, 180.
See generally Whiteman, 1 Digest 233–82; Korowicz, Organizations
internationales et souveraineté États membres; Sukiennicki, La Souveraineté des Etats en droit internationale moderne;
Crawford, Selected Essays, 95. Kamal Hossain, 'State Sovereignty and the UN Charter' (MS DPhil d 3227, Oxford, 1964)
distinguishes three meanings of sovereignty: (1) State sovereignty as a distinctive characteristic of States as constituent units
of the international legal system; (2) Sovereignty as freedom of action in respect of all matters with regard to which a State is
not under any legal obligation; and (3) Sovereignty as the minimum amount of autonomy which a State must possess before it
can be accorded the status of a 'sovereign state'. There is a fourth meaning: sovereignty as plenary authority to administer
territory. The first meaning seems to be reflected in the following UK Government statement: 'Sovereignty is an attribute which
under international law resides inherently in any independent state recognized as such. By virtue and in the exercise of their
sovereign authority, states conduct dealings with one another internationally.' HL Debs, vol 566, WA 85, 16 October 1995. ¹ÿ¹
Charney (1997) 91 AJ 394, 395 (cited Henkin).
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¹ÿ² Heller v US, 776 F 2d 92, 96–7 (3rd Cir 1985). ¹ÿ³
Cf Harris v The Minister of the Interior [1952] 2 SA (AD) 428. The confusion was reflected in the
plaintiff's argument in Blackburn v AG [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 52 ILR 414. On the 'sovereignty of parliament
' in relation to the incorporation of European law into UK law, see Akehurst (1989) 60 BY 351.
¹ÿÿ
Eg, The Philippines by the Constitution of 1935 as amended, Art II(3).
¹ÿÿ
Eg, Austria by the State Treaty of 1955, 217 UNTS 223, Art 13.
¹ÿÿ
Eg, Switzerland, by the 'public law of Europe': McNair, Law of Treaties, 50. ¹ÿÿ
The utility of the term is not increased by a good deal of writing loosely suggesting the eclipse of
States, the lapse of sovereign equality and the value of 'relative' sovereignty. See, eg, Simonovic (2000)
28 Georgia JILC 381; Wriston (1993) 17 Fletcher Forum World Aff 117, 117; Schreuer (1993)
4 EJIL 447–71; Cullet (1999) 10 EJIL 549, 551; Williams (2000) 26 Rev Int Stud 557, 557–73. See also
Kingsbury (1998) 9 EJIL 599. ¹ÿÿ Cf
Westlake, International Law, vol I, 237 (cited in translation in the French Counter-Mémoire, The Lotus,
PCIJ ser C, no 13-II, 275); Hart, The Concept of Law (1961), 217–18. See also Reisman (1990) 84 AJ
866; Henkin (1999) 68 Fordham LR 1; Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.
¹ÿÿ See Whiteman, 1 Digest 911–16; Jennings (1967) 121 H.R. 350–2; Arangio Ruiz (1975)
OZFÖR 265, 260; Verhoeven, Reconnaissance, 66–71.
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is then a clear distinction in principle between the legal personality of the State and its
government for the time being.¹ÿÿ This serves to distinguish in turn the field of State
personality (which includes the topic of identity and continuity of States) and that of
State succession.¹ÿÿ State succession depends upon the conclusion reached as to
State personality.¹ÿÿ This is not to say,
26 May 1939; noted (1944) 21 BY 195. See also Spanish Civil War Pension Case (1978, Federal Social
Court, FRG) 80 ILR 666, 668–70. ¹ÿÿ
The transition of the FRY (Serbia & Montenegro) from predecessor to successor State is dis-
cussed in Chapter 17.
¹ÿ¹ Cf State Succession, vol I, 30–5. The argument, for opposite reasons, was advanced by La Forest
(1966) 60 PAS 103; cf the reactions of Briggs, ibid, 125, Aufricht, ibid, 126. ¹ÿ²
See Crawford, Selected Essays, 243 for a detailed study in the context of O'Connell's own work
and that of the ILC.
¹ÿ³ In recent practice the recognition of newly emerging States has often been conditional on their
acceptance of obligations arising under certain treaties to which the 'parent' State had been party. The 1991
EC Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union provided that
States accepted 'all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well
as to security and regional stability' '31 ILM 1486'. European States required, under the rubric of disarmament,
that States established on the territory of the former Soviet Union accept the obligations contained in the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which the Soviet Union had signed on 19 November 1990
(30 ILM 1 ( 1991)). See, eg, 63 BY 637 (EC Presidency statement regarding Kyrghyzstan and Tadzhikistan,
specifying requirement to observe, inter alia, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). This
practice has tended to be specific and of variable quality; its impact on general issues of treaty succession
is doubtful.
¹ÿÿ Cf O'Connell, State Succession, vol I, 3; O'Connell, 1972 Grotius SP 23, 26–8; Charpentier,
Reconnaissance, 15–16.
¹ÿÿ Marek, Identity and Continuity, 9–14, describes the two as 'mutually exclusive'; cf Pereira, Succession
d'États en Matière de Traité, 7–11. The ILC resisted attempts at eroding the distinction in its work on State
succession: see, eg, ILC Ybk, 1974/II(1), 14–16, 30–1.
¹ÿÿ Hall, International Law (8th edn), 114, cited O'Connell, State Succession, vol I, 3.
Machine Translated by Google
however, that the topic of State succession is irrelevant to this study. Views
taken of particular State succession situations may illuminate related problems
of personality. In some areas, at least, the principles and policy considerations
involved are similar. The problem of 'State succession' in the case of devolving
territories such as the British Dominions, 1919 to 1945, was in part a matter of
succession and in part a matter of personality or agency. Nonetheless the
concepts of continuity and succession remain distinct, and blurring them serves
no useful goal.¹ÿÿ
¹ÿÿ For the outcome of the ILC's work on State succession see Vienna Convention on Succession of States
in respect of Treaties (1978) (entered into force 6 November 1996), 1946 UNTS 3, (1978)
17 ILM 1488; Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
(1983), (1983) 22 ILM 298, A/CONF/117/15, 7 April 1983.