When Brown Meets Red

1
When Brown Meets Red: Nazi-

Communist Collaboration 1919-1945
By Nevin Gussack
2
One key aspect of the Nazi period that is overlooked in most historical treatments of the
Third Reich is the degree of cooperation between Hitler and the international communist
movement. It is quite possible that such collaboration between the communists and the Nazis
were downplayed as a result of:
1) The organized communist movement and the Left in general would be embarrassed at
any revelation of commonalities between National Socialism and Bolshevism. Both
sides were effectively presented by mainstream and leftwing, Marxist historians as
uncompromising opponents.
2) Lack of a comprehensive, historical portrait which highlighted the cooperation
between the Nazis and Communists.
To be sure, the National Socialists and Communists were indeed officially and
diametrically opposed on the following issues:
1) The legitimacy of the class struggle.
2) The role of Race in the construction of a new, utopian order.
3) The legitimacy of the institution of private property and profit-making.
The Nazis and Communists differed on the form of socialism that was to take root on the
path to the classless society. However, on the negative issues, the National Socialists and
Communists were often in wholehearted agreement. Both movements jointly opposed:
1) Liberal (i.e. free market) capitalism.
2) Limited representative government modeled on Britain and the United States.
3) Democratic socialist movements such as the German Social Democrats (SPD).
As far back as the 1800s, Germany and the Russian Empire/Soviet Union intermittently
cooperated on military and economic affairs. German businessmen and military officers
cooperated with their Soviet counterparts on economic and military matters. Another example of
German-Soviet collaboration was in the intelligence field against the interests of the Western
powers. One major task of the Fourth Department of Soviet intelligence was to cooperate with
the Reichswehr intelligence service on issues of mutual concern. Reichswehr military attachés
gathered a great deal of information on foreign military developments, much of which was then
transferred to Moscow. The Reichswehr intelligence service transmitted information on military
developments in Britain, Poland, the United States, and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. The
German intelligence gathered on the American military was so comprehensive that one Soviet
official noted that “the achievements of American military techniques are greatly accessible to
the Reichswehr.” 1 German industrialists also established economic cooperation with the enemies
of capitalism in Moscow. The Soviet Union was viewed by Germany’s capitalists as one vast
market for the exports of goods and services. Along with the Communist Party (KPD), the
German industrialists were the chief lobbyists for trade between Moscow and Berlin. The
Germans exported machinery and goods necessary for the Soviet production of tanks, airplanes,
and poison gas. In return, the Soviets allowed their territory to be used by the Reichswehr in
exercises hidden from Allied observers. 2
1
Leonard, Raymond W. Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918-
1933 (Greenwood Publishing Group 1999) page 152.
2
Sutton, Antony C. National Suicide: Military Aid to the Soviet Union (New Rochelle, New
York: Arlington House
3
Despite the setbacks of the 1930s, German-Soviet cooperation came to the fore with the
signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and subsequent trade agreements.
Hitler and his top associates opposed Soviet Communism on the grounds that it represented:
1) The alleged Jewish-internationalist conspiracy.
2) The quest for Lebensraum in the territories of the USSR.
3) Disgust for alleged Slavic racial inferiority.
4) Ongoing concerns that Stalin maintained plans to attack the Third Reich in violation
of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.
Hitler himself maintained a “love-hate” relationship and opinion towards both the Soviet
Union and the domestic communist party in Germany (KPD). While Hitler opposed the class
atomism of Marxism, he admired the revolutionary commitment and militancy of the German
Communists. In the early days of the Nazi Party, Hitler made his admiration for communism
very apparent before crowds of German citizens. In 1920, during an intra-party strife, Hitler
noted that he would “prefer to be hanged in a Bolshevik Germany than be happy in a Gallicized
Reich.”3 Hitler noted at a public meeting in Munich in February 1921 that he would prefer to
give up 500,000 rifles to the communists than surrender them to the Entente. 4 Hitler also
expressed concerns about the attraction communism presented to members of the Nazi
movement. In 1923, Hitler warned that “either we act now or our SA people will go over to the
communists.”5
Former Nazi Gauleiter Hermann Rauschning provided probably the most comprehensive
testimony on the nature of Hitler’s admiration of various aspects of Communism. According to
Rauschning, Hitler directly remarked to him that “It is not Germany that will turn Bolshevist, but
Bolshevism that will become a sort of National Socialism. Besides, there is more that binds us to
Bolshevism than separates us from it. There is, above all, genuine revolutionary feeling, which is
alive everywhere in Russia except where there are Jewish Marxists. I have always made
allowance for this circumstance, and given orders that former Communists are to be admitted to
the party at once. The petit-bourgeois Social-Democrat and the trade-union boss will never make
a National Socialist, but the Communist always will.” 6
Hitler also admitted to Rauschning that he learned much of his propaganda techniques
and mass mobilization programs from the Communists and radical elements of the Social
Democrats: “I have learned a great deal from Marxism, as I do not hesitate to admit. I don’t
mean their tiresome social doctrine or the materialist conception of history, or their absurd
‘marginal utility’ theories and so on. But I have learned from their methods. The difference
1973) Accessed From: http://www.alexanderhamiltoninstitute.org/lp/Hancock/CD-

ROMS/GlobalFederation%5CGlobal%20-
%2051%20%20National%20Suicide%20%E2%80%93%20Military%20Aid%20to%20the%20S
oviet%20Union.html
3
Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn. Leftism Revisited: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Pol Pot
(Regnery Gateway 1990) Accessed From: http://mises.org/document/6581/Leftism-From-de-
Sade-and-Marx-to-Hitler-and-Marcuse
4
Laqueur, Walter. Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict (Transaction Publishers, 1965)
pages 67-68.
5
Tolstoy, Nikolai. Stalin’s Secret War (J. Cape, 1981) pages 85-86.
6
Rauschning, Hermann. The Voice of Destruction (G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1940) Accessed From:
https://archive.org/stream/VoiceOfDestruction/VoiceOfDestructionJr_djvu.txt
4
between them and myself is that I have really put into practice what these peddlers and
penpushers have timidly begun. The whole of National Socialism is based on it. Look at the
workers’ sports clubs, the industrial cells, the mass demonstrations, the propaganda leaflets
written specially for the comprehension of the masses; all these new methods of political struggle
are essentially Marxist in origin. All I had to do was to take over these methods and adapt them
to our purpose. I had only to develop logically what Social Democracy repeatedly failed in
because of its attempt to realize its evolution within the framework of democracy. National
Socialism is what Marxism might have been if it could have broken its absurd and artificial ties
with a democratic order.”7
After the advent of the Third Reich in January 1933, Hitler continued to give voice to his
respect for the German Communists. Hitler recognized that the communists would prove
amenable to the Nazi “education” programs, which exhibited a collectivist ideology that
extinguished individualism. Hitler stated that “That is why they (the communists) will accept our
principles of education and schooling. The reactionaries and democrats however will not.
Because they are only interested in the advancement of their own children. But we are interested
in the elite of the whole nation.”8
Clearly, Hitler also continued to display a “soft spot” for his communist rivals through a
shared sense of revolution and commitment to the goal of socialism in one form or another.
Hitler noted in an October 1935 speech that if the communists “comes back to his senses and
returns to his nation then he is highly welcome to us.” Labor Front leader Robert Ley recorded in
1936 that Hitler was mingling with assembled workers at a Party Congress in 1935 and came
across one who told Hitler that he was a communist. Ley noted that Hitler took “the head of the
young man between his hands looks at the young man for a long time and says ‘So will you all
come! You must all come this way!’” 9
During the period of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, Hitler bluntly admitted the
commonality of National Socialism and Communism. In a speech delivered on February 24,
1941, Hitler stated that “basically National Socialism and Marxism are the same.” 10 Even
during the war against the Soviet Union, the Fuhrer still continued his admiration for the
communists and their militancy. He denied that the majority of the remaining communists
opposed Nazi rule. Instead, Hitler claimed that the communists were absorbed into the Nazi
movement. Hitler noted in November 1941 that between “the communists and us, those were the
only ones who also had women who did not flinch when the shooting started. Those are decent
people with whom alone you can maintain a state.” During a visit and subsequent meeting with
the Bulgarian Regency Council in March 1944, Hitler stated that “In Germany the National
Socialist Party had completely absorbed the communists with the exception of the criminal
elements who had been brutally suppressed.”11
Hitler strongly respected the fighting spirit and militancy of the German Communists
during the height of the war against Stalin. In 1941, Hitler reminisced with other Party members
7
8
Zitelmann, Rainer. Hitler: The Policies of Seduction (London House, 1999) page 107.
9
Ibid, page 420.
10
Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group
2011) page 259.
11
Zitelmann, Rainer. Hitler: The Policies of Seduction (London House, 1999) pages 420-421.
5
about the 1922 Coburg fight between the Nazis and the Communists: “Later on the Reds we had
beaten up became our best supporters. When the Falange imprisons its opponents, it’s
committing the gravest of faults. Wasn’t my party at the time of which I’m speaking composed of
90 percent of left-wing elements? I needed men who could fight.” 12
Even during the height of World War II, the Fuhrer also admitted his admiration for the
Soviet economic model. According to Hitler’s Table Talk, the German dictator stated that the
Soviet system “drove their workers to an astonishing degree, and the Soviet worker was taught
by means of the Stakhanov system to work both harder and longer than his counterpart in either
Germany or the capitalist States.” Hitler reserved special praise for the labor discipline and
competition imposed by the Stakhanovite system: “It is very stupid to sneer at the Stakhanov
system. The arms and equipment of the Russian armies are the best proof of its efficiency in the
handling of industrial man-power. Stalin, too, must command our unconditional respect. In his
own way he is a hell of a fellow! He knows his models, Genghiz Khan and the others, very well,
and the scope of his industrial planning is exceeded only by our own Four Year Plan. And there
is no doubt that he is quite determined that there shall be in Russia no unemployment such as
one finds in such capitalist States as the United States of America…” 13
On varying occasions, other top Nazis expressed admiration for the Soviets and their
German communist counterparts. Perhaps the most well-known Nazi admirer of Bolshevism was
Joseph Goebbels. Goebbels wrote in his diary in October 1925 that “After everything is said and
done, I would rather perish with Bolshevism than live in the eternal slavery of capitalism.”
Goebbels also noted in a January 1926 edition of the Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte that
“The destruction of Russia means that the dream of a National Socialist Germany would have to
be buried once and forever.”14 Goebbels noted in 1925 that “Lenin sacrificed Marx and in return
gave Russia freedom…no czar understood the Russian people in its depth, in its suffering, in its
national instincts, as well as Lenin.” 15
Other early, radical Nazis also admired communism, while others harked from political
backgrounds rooted in the left. Early Nazi party founders such as Anton Drexler and Karl Harrer
always referred to the NSDAP as a “party of the Left” 16 In April 1923, the Volkischer
Beobachter noted that Hitler was the “Lenin of Germany.” 17 Theo Habicht, who was Hitler’s
agent in Austria, was a former communist. Drexler believed that Marxists made the best Nazis.
Roland Freisler, who was the chief justice of the Nazi People’s Courts, was originally a Soviet
commissar in Ukraine in 1920 and an admirer of the USSR.18 In the fall of 1919, Dietrich Eckart
and Gottfried Feder recruited communists in Nuremberg to the Nazis. At a 1920 Nazi Party
assembly in Munich, Eckart noted that the communists were idealistic militants who worked for
the common good and Germany’s salvation. In an article entitled German and Jewish
12
Methvin, Eugene. Rise of Radicalism (Arlington House, 1973) pages 478-481.
13
Hitler, Adolf. Hitler’s Table Talk (Enigma Books New York 2000) Accessed From:
http://vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres10/HTableTalk.pdf
14
15
Tolstoy, Nikolai. Stalin’s Secret War (J. Cape, 1981) page 86.
16
Methvin, Eugene. Rise of Radicalism (Arlington House, 1973) page 474.
17
Kele, Max. Nazis and Workers (University of North Carolina Press, 1972) page 58.
18
6
Bolshevism, Eckart called for a German Bolshevism that would force the rich to surrender their
profits to the government. 19
Many of the Gauleiters and Party theoreticians such as Gregor and Otto Strasser, Joseph
Goebbels, and Erich Koch were all staunchly pro-Soviet. Nazi Gauleiter Erich Koch admitted to
Carl Burckhardt, the League of Nations Commissioner for Danzig, that “he, Koch would have
become a fanatic communist had he not encountered Hitler.” 20 Koch also noted in his 1934 book
Aufbau im Osten that the “young socialist peoples” of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
would shape the future in Europe and eventually the world.21 The Nazi agricultural State
Secretary Herbert Backe praised Soviet leaders whom he considered highly competent planners
and organizers. He noted that “Lenin, Rykov, Chicherin, Krylenko, Dzherzhinsky are worthy of
admiration.”22 An article in Goebbels’ newspaper Der Angriff noted in July 1931 that Stalin
utilized nationalist and capitalist techniques during the implementation of the First Five Year
Plan. An article in Der Angriff admitted the “public bankruptcy of the communist
idea…Marxism too in the form of the Russian experiment is at an end-we nationale Sozialisten
however stand at the beginning and Stalin’s speech proves anew that we are in the right.” 23 In
the view of Der Angriff, the Soviet Union under Stalin was moving towards a form of National
Socialism.
The leadership of the Nazi SA and Freikorps admired the brutality and military prowess
of the Soviet Union and the Red Army. A Freikorps officer who later became the head of the
western German SA forces, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, remarked that “Russia... gave the
example: Attack! Attack with arms! Attack by terror and atrocities! Attack to the point of
destruction!” Another Freikorps leader and prominent Nazi SA leader Manfred von Killinger
referred to his comrades as “we Bolshevists of the Right.” Von Killinger’s Freikorps Storm
Company fought alongside the Red Army of the USSR during its 1920 attempt to conquer
Poland.24
Social Democrats and early leftwing revolutionaries also became converted into Nazis.
The Waffen SS General Sepp Dietrich was originally elected to the office of chairman of the
leftist Soldier’s Council in November 1918. The Nazi economic theoretician Gottfried Feder
originally supported the Bavarian communist regime of Kurt Eisner in November 1918. Hitler’s
long time chauffeur Julius Schreck served in the German “Red Army” at the end of April 1919.
The early Nazi and Hitler ally Hermann Esser was originally a Social Democrat. 25
Even the staunch anti-Bolshevik Nazi Alfred Rosenberg was allegedly enamored by the
new Soviet state. It was reported by journalist William Shirer that Nazi leader Alfred Rosenberg
was in Moscow during the Bolshevik revolution and even considered becoming a young
19
pages 67-68.
20
Dallin, Alexander. German Rule in Russia 1941-1945 (Palgrave Macmillan Limited, 1981)
page 125.
21
Ibid, page 125.
22
Bramwell, Anna. Blood and Soil (Kensal Press, 1985) pages 96-97.
23
Kele, Max. Nazis and Workers (University of North Carolina Press, 1972) pages 186-187.
24
25
Kershaw, Ian. Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (W. W. Norton & Company, 2000) pages 118-119.
7
Bolshevik revolutionary. 26 When he discovered that Soviet Communism was an arm of the
alleged Jewish world conspiracy, Rosenberg then broke with his earlier flirtations. However,
with the onset of Stalin’s rule and subsequent admiration of the Soviet dictator by certain key
Nazis, Rosenberg briefly changed his tune. In 1929, Rosenberg’s newspaper Weltkampf spoke
positively of Stalin’s anti-Jewish views and he asserted that the USSR was no longer a Jewish
state.27 By the 1930s, Rosenberg then shifted back to an anti-communist position once again.
As the Nazis imposed their totalitarian regime in Germany, some well-known Social
Democrats appreciated the Nazis’ support for nationalization of industries and large landholdings
and other forms of economic interventionism. Some even acted as apologists for Hitler’s “go-
slow” policy in respect to the nationalization of private property. The prominent Social
Democrat Hugo Ramm predicted in 1933 that Hitler would clash with the “capitalistic big
bourgeoisie, reactionary monarchism in enforcing socialistic principles.” Ramm also noted that:
“As to nationalization of banks and trusts, every Socialist knows that you cannot produce ready-
made socialism from a hat like a conjurer’s rabbit. Chancellor Hitler is determined to satisfy the
workers and sooner or later will come into conflict with the reactionary big bourgeoisie.” 28
Another SPD politician, Karl Severing, proclaimed himself in favor of Hitler and National
Socialism in 1934. Severing stated: “As far back as 1932, I said at the Socialist Congress: ‘If
National Socialism proves de facto that it is in a position to develop fruitful activity, the Social
Democratic Party will acknowledge this movement.’” 29
Some members and officials of the German trade union movement sympathized with
Nazism. Others believed that organized labor needed to submit to Nazi direction. August Winnig
asserted that the interests of the workers should be subordinated to the Nazi state. In the last issue
of the trade union journal Gewerkschaftszeitung (April 29, 1933), one writer called for a “firm
plan of nationalization of industry.” The writer expected that Hitler would nationalize the banks,
key industries, power stations, and other large enterprises. It was also predicted in the article that
the state would assume control over foreign trade and develop a planned economy to replace
capitalism.30
During the struggle to subvert the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), the Nazis and
Communists often aligned with each other on the political, legislative and paramilitary fronts.
Such collaboration appeared in the early days of the Weimar government. The common enemies
were free market capitalism, democratic socialism, the Western Allies, reparations, and a
government which abided by checks and balances. In the June 1920 issue of Der Deutsche
Sozialist, Julius Streicher called upon “the Brothers of the USPD 31, MSP32, KPD” to attack
26
Shirer, William. Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (Original Publication: Simon and Schuster
1959) Accessed From: http://ajaytao2010.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/rise-and-fall-of-the-third-
reich-william-shirer-pdf.pdf
27
Tucker, Robert C. Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941 (W. W. Norton &
Company, 1992) page 235.
28
Gedye, G.E.R. “Nazis Seen Veering Toward Socialism” New York Times May 7, 1933 page
E2.
29
“Severing Espouses Hitler’s Doctrines” New York Times April 1, 1934 page 16.
30
Pascal, Roy. The Nazi Dictatorship, Volume 3 (Routledge, 2010) page 66.
31
The USPD was the radical wing of the Social Democratic Party.
32
The MSP was the acronym for the Majority Social Democrats.
8
financial capital, instead of industrial capital which provided the workers with employment. 33 A
high level Party leader named Bernhard Rust 34 stated that he had “more sympathy with the
Communists than with any Social Democrats or the so called black, red, and white leaders of
Germany.” Another Nazi named Karl Kaufmann, later the Gauleiter of Hamburg, replied to a
German Communist that, if Germany signed a pact with the Western powers, “the N.S.D.A.P.
would fight shoulder to shoulder with the K.P.D. against the Social Democratic crooks.” 35 A
Nazi speaker noted in Duisberg in October 1925 that he supported the Soviet government’s
record which “liberated the Russian people from the Tsarist mire and put them on the right
path.” He continued: “The Nazis would march alongside their communist brothers on the orders
of the Soviet government against Social Democratic profiteers and the Western alliance.” 36
Agursky reported that a Nazi deputy in the Reichstag, Count Ernst Graf zu Reventlow, openly
discussed the possibility of an alliance with the German Communists (KPD). Agursky also noted
that KPD officials addressed Nazi meetings, while Nazis attended KPD meetings. The Nazis
promised the KPD full support in expelling and purging their Jewish members while KPD
officials of Jewish origin preached violence against Jewish capitalists. 37
The Nazi and Communist Reichstag deputies also jointly voted “yes” on a number of
economic, political, and foreign policy bills. Professor P. Valkenburg, a political scientist from
the Dutch Groningen University, noted in 1983 that Nazi and Communist Deputies in the
German Reichstag voted identically 70% of the time. 38 Nazi Reichstag Deputies voted with their
KPD and SPD counterparts against tax increases on workers and against tariffs which would
have protected German industry against unfair competition. The Nazi, KPD, and SPD Deputies
also voted for increased state expenditures and social welfare measures. In 1927, the Nazis and
the KPD supported a program which mandated that the Ruhr iron and steel firms repay the
Weimar Republic for compensation funds provided as a result of reparations deliveries to the
Allies. The Nazi and Communist Deputies also opposed the government’s unemployment
insurance program on the grounds that it was anti-worker. The Nazis also joined with the KPD in
the Reichstag in an effort to lower taxes for the workers and simultaneously increase higher,
more progressive rates on the wealthy. The Nazis joined with the Communists in the Reichstag
in 1928 to support increased, direct compensation for workers locked out of their jobs by the iron
and steel industries in the Ruhr. The Nazis joined with the SPD and KPD in the Reichstag in
restoring the 8 hour workday and opposing any effort to lengthen the number of working hours
an employer can request from his workers. Not unsurprisingly, Turner wrote that “the rhetoric of
33
Reiche, Eric G. The Development of the SA in Nurnberg, 1922-1934 (Cambridge University
Press 2002) page 16.
34
Bernhard Rust became the Nazi Minister of Education, Science, and National Culture.
35
Carsten, Francis L. The Rise of Fascism (University of California Press, 1982) pages 125-126.
36
Turner, Henry Ashby. German big business and the rise of Hitler (Oxford University Press,
1985) page 280-281.
37
Agursky, Mikhail. The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR (Westview Press,
1987) page 302.
38
Vermaat, Emerson. “Nazi and Communist Collaboration In Germany During the Decade
Preceding Hitler’s Third Reich (1923-1933)” April 22, 2008 Accessed From:
http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/3438
9
the Nazi deputies rivaled that of the communists for vehement anti-capitalism.”39 The Nazis in
the Reichstag joined the KPD in an effort to support striking workers in Berlin. When
unemployed KPD workers demonstrated at the Reichstag in January 1929, the Nazi delegates
rose to applaud with the KPD. 40 In October 1930, the Reichstag opposed a resolution for a “vote
of no confidence” in the Weimar Republic. This resolution was jointly proposed by the Nazis
and the KPD. A speech made by SPD Reichstag Deputy Herman Muller in October 1930 was
interrupted by the KPD and Nazi Deputies.41 In June 1931, the KPD, Nazi, and DNVP 42
Deputies sponsored a bill to dissolve the Prussian Landtag.43 It should be no surprise that Pravda
praised the Nazi behavior in the Reichstag, noting that the National Socialists acted “much more
proletarian” than the SPD. 44
The Nazi and Communist-controlled labor unions and paramilitary gangs also cooperated
in joint efforts to cripple the government and the capitalist system during the Weimar Republic.
On May 1, 1929, the Nazis and Communists joined in a protest against the suppression of
political marches in Berlin. 45 In November 1932, the Nazi NSBO and the KPD’s Revolutionary
Union Opposition (RGO) jointly launched a strike against the Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft firm
over wage reductions. 46 In April 1927, the SPD reported that the SA and the Red Front in Berlin
signed a non-aggression pact. Under the terms of this alleged pact, the SA would attack the
SPD’s Reichsbanner and the Red Front would attack the right wing Verbande. One Nazi faction
known as the Greater German People’s Community (GVG) appealed to communists to abandon
their “Jewish members” and fight alongside each other as comrades. Communists at one meeting
then suggested “Good we’ll work together; you hang the Jews and we’ll hang the other
capitalists!” One SA commander indicated that he would never lead his men against the KPD
and would prefer to work with it. Another Nazi official stated that the only group with an
acceptable policy were the communists. 47
The Communists also admitted their admiration for the socialism of the Nazis. Much of
the communist support for the Nazis stemmed from the adherence to the COMINTERN’s
“united front” strategy to destabilize and evict the government of the Weimar Republic. Dimitry
Manuilski, a high ranking Soviet Comintern official, noted in December 1931 that “The chief
39
1985) pages 61-67.
40
41
42
The DNVP was the acronym for the German Nationalist People’s Party. It supported a
nationalist, authoritarian version of conservatism and was opposed to the Weimar Republic.
43
44
45
46
47
Fischer, Conan. The German communists and the rise of Nazism (Macmillan, 1991) page 107.
10
enemy is not Hitler, the chief enemy is the system of Severing, Bruning, Hindenburg. With
Hitler’s help will we first destroy the Social-Democratic Party apparatus as well as the Bruning
state apparatus. In the present phase of the development of the German revolution Hitler
unmistakably is our ally.”48
In April 1932, two workers in a Silesian meeting noted “Although we are pro-communist
we will therefore vote Nazi.” 49 KPD party chief Ernst Thalmann stated in October 1932 that
“When strikes are being organized in firms and companies, it is absolutely essential and
desirable that Nazis are invited to take part in the Strike Committees.” 50 A Communist leader in
Saxony named Karl Sindermann stated “Oh yes, we admit that we’re in league with the National
Socialists…Bolshevism and Fascism share a common goal: the destruction of capitalism and
of the Social Democratic Party. To achieve this aim we are justified in using every means.” A
local KPD leader in Pomerania informed SPD Reichsbanner fighters that KPD members “would
rather vote for Hitler than Hindenburg” in the 1932 presidential election. 51 German Communist
spokesman Hermann Remmele stated: “The National Socialist Party, like all other socialist
organizations, has within its ranks a number of convinced and honest people. Dedicated to a
cause we reject, they pledge to it their lives. This courage and bravery we honor and respect.” 52
Another German Communist leader named Heinz Neumann spoke at a Nazi rally and stated:
“Young Socialists! Brave fighters for the nation: the Communists do not want to engage in
fraternal strife with the National Socialists.” 53
Like two rival gangs, the Nazis and Communists constantly poached each other for
members and officials through ideological appeals, bribes, and promises of positions and power.
It should be noted that between 1925 and 1927, 7% of Nazi Party members came from
Communist and Social Democratic backgrounds. 54 Part of this appeal was the communist use of
nationalism and anti-Western themes to recruit Nazis, while the Nazis used Marxist-style
language to hook the Reds into Hitler’s cause. The Volkischer Beobachter, Arbeitertum, and Der
Angriff used KPD terminology in its articles. These Nazi newspapers appealed to the proletariat
with the slogans of “workers break your chains,” “workers unite,” and denunciations of
“imperialism.”55 In addition, the KPD even used its Jewish members to attract anti-Semites from
the Nazi camp. For example, the KPD official Ruth Fischer exhorted the communists to attack
the Jewish capitalists: “Whoever cries out against Jewish capitalists is already a class warrior,
48
49
50
51
52
Abraham Ascher and Guenter Lewy, “National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany: Alliance of
Political Extremes Against Democracy,” Social Research Winter 1956, page 468.
53
Abraham Ascher and Guenter Lewy, “National Bolshevism in Weimar Germany: Alliance of
Political Extremes Against Democracy,” Social Research Winter 1956 page 478
54
Weber, Eugen. Varieties of Fascism (Van Nostrand, 1964) page 55.
55
11
even when he does not know it…Kick down the Jewish capitalists, hang them from the lampposts,
and stamp upon them.”56
The Soviet/COMINTERN appeal to the anti-Versailles, anti-Allied sentiment amongst
the extreme nationalists and Nazis commenced with the Schlageter appeal. In 1923, Karl Radek
spoke at a meeting which honored a German nationalist Freikorps terrorist named Leo
Schlageter: “Against whom did the German people wish to fight: against the Entente capitalists
or against the Russian people? With whom did they wish to ally themselves: with the Russian
workers and peasants in order to throw off the yoke of Entente capital for the enslavement of the
German and Russian peoples?...If the patriotic circles of Germany do not make up their own
minds to make the cause of the majority of the nation their own, and so create a front against
both the Entente and German capital, then the path of Schlageter was the path into the void, and
Germany, in the face of foreign invasion, and the perpetual menace of the victors, will be
transformed into a field of bloody internal conflict, and it will be easy for the enemy to defeat her
and destroy her…But we believe that the great majority of the nationalist-minded masses
belong not to the camp of the capitalists but to the camp of the workers. We want to find, and
we shall find, the path to these masses. We shall do all in our power to make men like
Schlageter, who are prepared to go to their deaths for a common cause, not wanderers into the
void, but wanderers into a better future for the whole of mankind; that they should not spill their
hot, unselfish blood for the profit of the coal and iron barons, but in the cause of the great toiling
German people, which is a member of the family of peoples fighting for their emancipation.” 57
Clearly, the organs of law enforcement in the Republic monitored the flow of members
between the KPD and the Nazis. The Reichs Commissar for the Surveillance of Public Order
noted in an October 1927 report that “…Communist workers are transferring to the National
Socialists and are actually being given positions as officials.” 58 Police in Cologne noted in
October 1932 that “countless members (of the Nazi movement) have gone over to the KPD.” 59 In
September 1931, the leader of the Stuttgart-Stockach Fighting League (Red Front) went over to
the SA, along with its members. 60
A former SA Sturmfuhrer defected to the KPD and was involved in recruiting Nazis into
the communist party. 61 Pravda urged that the “proletarian elements” within the SA turn against
the Nazis and “march to the left.” Another top SA officer Richard Scheringer defected to the
communist side in 1931.62 The Ruhr Fighting League (Red Front) noted in May 1931: “Leading
National Socialists from the SA or SS are coming over to us daily; individual local groups must
go about their work with fiery determination to win back as many as possible of these misled
workers for the red class front.” In August 1932, an entire SA unit transferred to the Fighting
League (Red Front) in Chronstau. In December 1932, 40 SA men joined the Fighting League
56
Goldberg, Jonah. Liberal Fascism (Crown Publishing Group 2008) page 76.
57
Radek, Karl. “Leo Schlageter: The Wanderer into the Void” June 1923 Accessed From:
http://www.marxists.org/archive/radek/1923/06/schlageter.htm
58
1985) pages 280-281.
59
Brown, Timothy Scott. Weimar radicals: Nazis and communists between authenticity and
performance (Berghahn Books, 2009) pages 79-80.
60
Ibid, pages 79-80.
61
Ibid, pages 79-80.
62
Ibid, pages 17-19.
12
(Red Front) in Dortmund. In Recklinghausen, SS and SA members transferred to the Fighting

League (Red Front). 63
In December 1931, the RGO noted “The National Socialist-minded workers also belong
in the United Front to fight for work, bread, and freedom.” Working and lower middle class
Nazis were involved in RGO committee work in some areas, while Nazis appeared as delegates
at some regional KPD United Front congresses during late 1931. In the spring of 1932, a KPD
Central Committee official reported that the Nazi workers at the Appel foodstuffs factory in
Hanover were more lively and revolutionary than their SPD colleagues: “We can’t do anything
with the old, ossified SPD workers. The Nazis are much more lively intellectually. We have
discussion evenings with the Nazis and the result is always a declaration by the National
Socialists that ‘If things don’t turn out as we expect in our party, then we’ll come over to your
side.’” The Arbeiter Zeitung reported that the working class Nazis and KPD adhered the goal of
socialist construction: “We all want socialism.” 64
By the early 1930s, the Soviets banked on the looming possibility that the Nazis would
take power in Germany by virtue of their numerical strength; their appeals to extreme
nationalism; and a continued adherence to an unorthodox brand of socialism that was against
capitalism. The Soviets believed that the Germans would concentrate their war planning against
the West and maintain the traditional friendly relations with Moscow. Stalin noted in a
conversation with the top German Communist Heinz Neumann at the end of 1931:“Don’t you
believe, Neumann, that if the Nationalists seize power in Germany they will be so completely
preoccupied with the West that we’ll be able to build up socialism in peace?” In July 1932, the
counselor of the German Embassy in Moscow, Gustav Hilger held discussions with the head of
TASS, Jacob Doletsky. Doletsky noted to Hilger “his conviction that healthy political common
sense would win out in a National Socialist government; even the Nazis would be sensible and
continue a policy toward Russia that, in his opinion, was consonant with the long-range interests
of Germany.” Hilger later recalled that “The general impression in the German Embassy was
that the Soviet government would have liked to establish contact with the National Socialists for
the purpose of preventing such temporary difficulties.” 65
Stalin’s friendly sentiments to the Nazis even allegedly translated into funding for
Hitler’s movement. According to the German nitrate industrialist Arnold Rechberg, Stalin urged
Reichswehr General Kurt von Schleicher to provide massive funds to the National Socialists for
their campaign during the 1930 Reichstag elections. Stalin believed this funding would re-
establish the anti-Western German-Soviet alliance of the Rapallo period. General von Schleicher
recalled that “Stalin let me know that the situation was becoming more and more ripe for Russia
and Germany (in 1930), since France and England neglected their armaments in their silly
confidence in the League of Nations. But in order to achieve an active German-Russian policy, a
rapid rearmament of Germany was necessary. I, General von Schleicher, had to start a
campaign to that effect in Germany; and he, Stalin, believed that Hitler was the man suitable for
that purpose. Therefore, the Reichswehr ought to finance Hitler.” 66 According to postwar
63
1985) pages 280-281.
64
65
Robert C. Tucker, “The Emergence of Stalin’s Foreign Policy,” Slavic Review, December
1977, pages 231-232.
66
Viereck, Peter. Conservatism Revisited (Transaction Publishers, 1950) pages 184-185.
13
American intelligence reports, the records of the interrogations of Arnold Rechberg noted that
General von Schleicher told him in 1933 that “Stalin had provided Hitler with substantial funds
on the theory that Hitler’s rise would bring about civil war in Germany, from which the
communists would emerge a victor.” 67
Former top American Communist Benjamin Gitlow recalled that Soviet money and
agents played a large role in attempting to convert the Nazis to Communism: “…Stalin sent as
his personal envoy to Germany none other than the former labor Zionist Neumann. No longer
the Jew, but the Communist, the Internationalist, Neumann appealed on a program of extreme
German chauvinism to Hitler’s Aryan hoodlums and to Streicher’s Jew-baiters to join hands
with the communists. Neumann sought also to get individual Nazis, especially group and district
leaders and officers of the Storm Troopers, to join the German Communist party by offering
them bribes and well-paying positions backed up with Moscow gold. But Hitler at that time
wanted to play a lone hand. He answered the pleas of Neumann and the German Communist
party by asking them to give up the Communist party for a truly great German party, letting them
know at the same time that only Aryan communists would be admitted. Neumann’s campaign
went into reverse. Instead of the Nazis joining the Communist party many communists, especially
from the youth movement, joined the Nazis. After Hitler came into power the movement of
communists into Nazi ranks became a flood.”68
Shortly after the Nazis took power in January 1933, elements of the Soviet leadership
continued to display admiration for the militant and revolutionary qualities of the SS and SA.
Top Bolshevik and COMINTERN leader Karl Radek praised the SA as “great guys” and noted
“we can see on the faces of German students wearing brown shirts the same devotion and the
same inspiration which shone on the faces of Red Army officers.” 69 On another occasion, Radek
remarked: “There are magnificent lads in the SA and SS. You’ll see, the day will come when
they’ll be throwing hand grenades for us.”70 The Soviet Embassy in Berlin cabled the Soviet
leadership that “Moscow is convinced that the road to Soviet Germany leads through Hitler.” 71
The Soviet representative in Danzig I.P. Kalina admitted to the Nazi defector Hermann
Rauschning that “your National Socialism is certainly revolutionary…”72
During 1933 and 1934, Red Front fighters and KPD activists flooded into the Nazi Party
in order to infiltrate it (“boring from within”), to escape imprisonment, or out of genuine
ideological conversions. Eugene Methvin commented that “True to his (Hitler’s) word, after he
seized power, he saw to it that thousands of Communists were enrolled in the NSDAP. They were
particularly effective in the Gestapo and in the SA, where they formed perhaps a third of the total
membership. Indeed, there were so many of them that they were given a special name. They were
67
Midstream Volume 28 1982 page 58.
68
Gitlow, Benjamin. The Whole of the Their Lives (Charles Scribner’s Sons New York 1948)
pages 169-170.
69
Suvorov, Viktor. The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II (Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2008) page 13.
70
Dallin, Alexander. Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1990 (Garland Pub., 1992) page 53.
71
1977, page 582.
72
14
known popularly as the ‘Beefsteak Nazi’—Brown on the outside, Red on the inside…” 73 Former
Gestapo officer Hans Gisevius reported that “… within a few months the enormously expanded
SA consisted, at least a third of it, of former adherents of the old parties of the Left. It is well
known that in June and July of 1933 there were some SA units which were almost entirely
Communist. The popular phrase for them was ‘Beefsteak Nazis’ -- Brown on the outside, Red
inside. These noble fellows were by no means any gentler with folk of their own kind. They were
even worse.”74 Gisevius elaborated that many of the KPD-turned-Nazis were either actual
genuine converts or infiltrators for Moscow.
The SA leadership claimed 55% of its forces consisted of Communists. Communists also
joined the more elite paramilitary forces of the SS. Thirty out of fifty members of the intelligence
platoon of the SS in the Altona District in Hamburg reportedly were communists. The right hand
man of the unit commander was also a communist. The SS leadership reported that “The
comrades report unanimously that the tone of the SS men is ‘rosy’ and each one assumes the
other is a Beefsteak.” 75 Other SS leaders continued to admire the Soviet Union and Communism
for their revolutionary spirit and opposition to the old political order. In June 1934 a SS
Sturmfuhrer commented at a meeting in Krefeld: “Hitler must call for struggle against the
Bonzen then we will be with him. If he doesn’t do it then he’ll be buried together with the other
Bonzen. We must conquer the old Communists for our side; they are guys that you can really
start something with…In Russia it is good. Everything there goes from the bottom up, not the
way it is here where everything comes down from the Bonzen. In Germany we have to get rid of
the Bonzen and create a Reich that will really show Russia something.” 76 Years later, former
high ranking SS boss and Holocaust architect Adolf Eichmann recalled that “My political
sentiments inclined toward the Left and emphasized socialist aspects every bit as much as
nationalist ones.” Eichmann also added that he and his other SS comrades viewed National
Socialism and Communism as “quasi-siblings.”77
Other Communists joined the Nazis out of personal grudges against individual
employers, particularly if the businessman was Jewish. A German Jew dismissed a worker at his
factory in Germany for spreading communist propaganda. By 1933 the Communist joined the
Nazis and triumphantly entered the factory as the head of a band of SA storm troopers. 78 The
Nazis also freely used the properties and symbols of the Communists. In early 1933, many of the
Nazi flags were simply re-adapted from old KPD and SPD flags, with the center cut out to
accommodate the swastika. In the concentration camps, the KPD militants murdered their non-
communist opponents, often with the consent of the SS and SA. 79
73
74
Gisevius, Hans. To the Bitter End (Da Capo Press, 1947) page 105.
75
Brown, Timothy Scott. Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists Between Authenticity and
Performance (Berghahn Books, 2009) pages 137-139.
76
Ibid, pages 126-127.
77
Aly, Gotz. Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State (Picador
2008) pages 16-17.
78
Tolstoy, Nikolai. Stalin’s Secret War (J. Cape, 1981) pages 44-45.
79
15
The SPD newspaper Munchener Post rightfully concluded in March 1933 that “Had it
not been for the KPD, Hitler would never have become Reich Chancellor nor would he have
triumphed on March 5. The leadership of this party installed the hatred of Social-Democrats into
the hearts of millions of workers, and this very hatred now caused them to flee to the brown
ranks of the swastika. Many Communists who on Saturday were still wearing the Soviet star as
they were walking, manifested themselves as crack new Nazis on election day.” 80
While the Nazis were ideological anti-communists, they also initially desired to maintain
trade relations with Moscow in an effort to maintain continuity from the times of the Republic
and the last days of Imperial Germany. In March 1933, Hitler noted that “It is above all the
government of the National Revolution who feel themselves in a position to adopt such a positive
policy with regard to Soviet Russia…The fight against Communism in Germany is our internal
affair in which we will never permit interference from outside. Our political relations with other
Powers to whom we are bound by common interests will not be affected thereby.” Hitler
highlighted the common political and economic interests of the USSR and Germany in a meeting
with the Soviet Ambassador Lev Kinchuk. Hitler noted that the USSR and the Nazis had the
same challenges and the same enemies. 81
Hitler received Soviet Ambassador Kinchuk in April 1933 to discuss German-Soviet
relations. Der Angriff also issued a statement which urged the Nazis “to support the purged
Derop82 in a way that corresponds to the government’s aim in promoting trade between
Germany and Russia.”83 As early as September 1933, Vyacheslav Molotov also commenced
negotiations with Nazi Germany. During this time period, the high level CPSU official and close
Stalin ally Andrei Zhdanov was a strong believer in coming to terms with Hitler. 84 The
suppression of the KPD did not interrupt relations between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
In 1933, Foreign Commissar Litvinov noted to the German Foreign Ministry that the USSR
“considers it quite natural that Germany should treat communists in Germany exactly as
enemies of the state are treated in Russia.” 85 Karl Radek wrote in July 1934 that “There is no
reason why Fascist Germany and Soviet Russia should not get on together inasmuch as the
Soviet Union and Fascist Italy are good friends.” 86 In October 1934, Soviet figurehead
President Mikhail Kalinin noted to the German Ambassador that “Too much importance should
not be attached to the outcry in the press…The peoples of the two countries were in many ways
dependent upon each other.”87 In November 1934, the Soviet Ambassador to Germany Yakov
Suritz noted to a German Foreign Ministry official that Soviet reservations about Germany
80
81
1977, page 234.
82
DEROP was the acronym for the Oil German Marketing Company for Russian Oil Products.
83
“Hitler Now Seeks Soviet Friendship” New York Times April 29, 1933 page 9.
84
85
Ibid, page 398.
86
Ibid, page 88.
87
1977, pages 347-350.
16
“could only be dispelled and the atmosphere calmed on a realistic basis…”88 French police
raided a home of a German journalist in September 1939 and found a bronze medal decorated
with the Nazi swastika and the Soviet Hammer and Sickle which was embossed with the date
1934. Such an item hinted at a deal between the Nazis and Soviets at that time and opens up the
potential for renewed historical discussions regarding secret cooperation between Moscow and
Berlin.89
Despite the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviets and Nazis did not fully close the door on
political relations. In May 1935, Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov informed German
Ambassador Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg of Moscow’s desire to conclude a “general
pact” with the Nazis. Litvinov noted that it would “lessen the significance of the Franco-Soviet
Pact” and “lead to an improvement in relations with Germany, which the Soviet Government
desired above all things and which they now considered possible.” 90 In early 1935, Vasilenko,
the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Kiev Regional Soviet, noted to the German
Embassy counselor Gustav Hilger that “…How absurd of Soviet Russia to ally herself with a
‘degenerate’ state like France! Peace would be secure only through friendship with Germany.
Who cares about the racial concepts of National Socialism?”91 Soviet NKVD chief Nikolai
Yezhov remarked that “Germany is strong. She is now the strongest power in the world. Hitler
has made her so. Who can doubt it? How can anyone in his senses fail to reckon with it? For
Soviet Russia there is but one course…We must come to terms with a superior power like Nazi
Germany.”92
Top Soviet Communist Karl Radek explained in articles published in Pravda and
Bolshevik (June 1933) that Hitler’s conciliatory measure vis-à-vis the USSR was a strategy of
buying time to gain strength and to provide economic benefits to export-hungry German
industrialists who wanted to retain Soviet orders during the Great Depression. 93 The Nazis
continued trade relations, albeit in a reduced amount, with the Soviet Union. Even strategic
goods, credits, and the occasional turnkey factory were exported from Nazi Germany to the
USSR. In January 1939, Dynamic America noted that “Soviet trade with Nazi Germany grows
steadily in volume and the number of trade attaches in the Berlin Amtorg is reported
quadrupled…Cynics are beginning to raise their eyebrows and speak of a coming Nazi-Soviet
rapprochement.”94
88
1977, pages 347-350.
89
“Old Red-Nazi Deal Hinted” New York Times September 10, 1939 page 46.
90
1977, pages 347-350.
91
1977, page 348.
92
Krivitsky, Walter. In Stalin’s Secret Service (Harper and Brothers Publishers New York and
London 1939) Accessed From:
http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?.../In_Stalins_Secret_Service
93
1977, page 235.
94
Sargent, Porter. Getting US Into War (Porter Sargent 1941) Accessed From:
http://webdev.archive.org/stream/gettingusintowar00sargrich/gettingusintowar00sargrich_djvu.tx
t
17
Early in the Nazi era, proponents of a rapprochement with the Soviet Union consisted of
Dr. Schacht’s circle, pro-Moscow elements of the Nazi Party, the Reichswehr, and some export-
hungry industrialists. Stalin himself commented: “Well now, how can Hitler make war on us
when he has granted such loans? It’s impossible. The business circles in Germany are too
powerful and they are in the saddle.”95 German commercial and industrial circles believed that
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union could have trade relations on the grounds that “business is
business.” Dr. Schacht and pro-Soviet elements within the Nazi Party also advocated such trade
on the grounds that commerce did not imply recognition or acceptance of the communist
ideology.96 According to General Walter Krivitsky of the NKVD, Karl Radek noted remarked
that the German army and “German business circles, who were doing a large trade with us (the
Soviets)” were the “pillars of German-Soviet relations.”97 The Soviets occasionally even went to
great lengths to appease Hitler even during the period of the Anti-Comintern Pact. For example,
in January 1937, the Soviets ended a highly favorable trade agreement with Metaxas’ Greece in
the fear of upsetting Hitler. 98 The organized lobby of “private” German industry clearly
supported trade with the Soviet Union. Since “private” industry was tightly controlled by the
Nazi Party, Hitler could have easily cancelled trade with the USSR. However, despite his anti-
Marxist ideology, Hitler continued economic relations with Moscow to maintain export markets
for the industrialists. The Russia Committee on German Industry constantly urged its members
during the 1930s “to become even more strongly interested in exports to Russia.” 99
The Soviets and Germans maintained two-way trade relations, often to the benefit of
Berlin. Nazi Germany also occasionally provided the USSR with credits to purchase German-
made goods. Soviet payments were made in gold, bartered goods, and hard currency. In the first
6 months of 1934, the Soviet imported 36 million Reichsmarks worth of goods from Nazi
Germany and exported 30 million Reichsmarks worth of goods to the Third Reich.100 In total,
Nazi Germany imported 140 million Reichmarks worth of Soviet goods for the entire year of
1934.101 The Reichsbank received 190 million Reichmarks worth of Soviet gold since the
beginning of 1934.102 It was reported in 1934 that the USSR imported spare parts and
replacements for machines that were previously purchased from Germany.103
95
Freeze, Gregory L. and Nekrich, Aleksandr. Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet
relations, 1922-1941 (Columbia University Press, 1997) pages 95-96.
96
“Trade With Soviet Urged in Germany: Industrial and Financial Circles Alive to Possibilities”
New York Times April 19, 1937 page 8.
97
Krivitsky, Walter. In Stalin’s Secret Service (Harper and Brothers Publishers New York and
London 1939) Accessed From:
http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?.../In_Stalins_Secret_Service
98
99
Ericson, Edward E. “Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1936-1941”
German Studies Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May, 1998) page 268.
100
“US-Soviet Moves Worry Germans” New York Times August 23, 1934 page 10.
101
Long, Robert Crozier. “Reich Import Curb of Doubtful Value” New York Times October 15,
1934 page 27.
102
Ibid.
103
Duranty, Walter. “Germany Alters Anti-Soviet Stand” New York Times November 19, 1934
page 11.
18
The Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin was a key intermediary in Soviet-German

negotiations during the 1930s104 The USSR received a 200 million Reichmark credit from Nazi
Germany to purchase goods in 1935. The agreement was signed between Reichsbank President
Dr. Schacht and Soviet Trade Mission chief representative David Kandelacki. A consortium of
German banks disbursed this credit to the USSR. 105 Payment was remitted to Germany in hard
currencies, gold, and bartered goods. 106 In April 1935, the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin
received a 16.66 million pound credit from Germany that was funded by the Dresdner and
Deutsche Banks. According to the agreement, Soviet exports to the Nazis exceeded 150 million
Reichsmarks.107
By 1936, Soviet-German trade fell sharply, but never fully disappeared. In 1934,
Germany sold the Soviet Union a total of $86 million worth of goods; $58 million in 1935; and
$20 million in 1936. Some of the goods that were shipped to the USSR included strategic items
and even entire factories. For example, the Soviets acquired a mill for the production of steel
cables from Krupp.108 The German firm Deschimag AG Wesser provided the USSR with
submarine designs. 109 As of August 1937, German exports to the USSR totaled 5.75 million
British pounds, while in 1936 German exports to the USSR totaled 3.75 million British pounds.
Imports from the USSR to Nazi Germany fell to 1.666 million British pounds by August 1937 as
opposed to 2.146 million British pounds in 1936.110
Elements of the international Communist movement initially welcomed the Nazi takeover
as a blow to free market capitalism, democratic socialists, and parliamentary forms of
government. As late as April, 1934, the Presidium of the COMINTERN noted that the Nazi
regime destroyed “all the democratic illusions of the masses and liberating them from the
influence of Social Democracy” which “accelerates the rate of Germany’s development towards
proletarian revolution.” Communist Party USA leader Earl Browder noted in January 1934 that
“the victory of Hitler inaugurates a protracted period of fascist reaction and a long-time defeat
of the revolution…Fascism, he explained, destroys the moral base for capitalist rule, discrediting
bourgeois law in the eyes of the masses; it hastens the exposure of all demogogic supporters of
capitalism, especially its main support among the workers--the socialist and trade union leaders.
It hastens the revolutionization of the workers, destroys their democratic illusions and thereby
prepares the masses for the revolutionary struggle for power.” 111
104
1977, pages 347-350.
105
“Germany Extends Credit to Soviet: Moscow Accepts a 200,000,000 Mark Offer for
Purchase” New York Times April 10, 1935 page 30.
106
1977, pages 347-350.
107
“Soviet Pact with Reich” The Financial Times April 10, 1935 page 7.
108
Denny, Harold. “Soviet Cuts Trade with Germany 65%: Bought Only $20,000,000 Worth of
Goods This Year” New York Times December 30, 1936 page 12.
109
Suvorov, Viktor. The Chief Culprit: Stalin’s Grand Design to Start World War II (Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2008) page 127.
110
“Favourable German Trade with Russia” The Financial Times August 3, 1937 page 4.
111
Lyons, Eugene. The Red Decade: The Stalinist Penetration of America (Bobbs-Merrill
Company 1941) pages 83-84.
19
When the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed in August 1939, a new
chapter in relations between Moscow and Berlin was opened. The close economic and political
relations between Nazi Germany and the USSR during the period of the Non-Aggression Pact
were confirmed by foreign visitors to the Soviet Union, as well as defectors who formerly
worked for Stalin. The book Riddle of the Reich quoted an American who visited Berlin during
the Nazi-Soviet Pact period and observed: “I was in Berlin for a few days, and it happened that
my hotel was filled with Soviet officials who were coming to Berlin in swarms with official
delegations. I was amazed at their reaction. They found Berlin ‘swell’ at a time when potatoes
were just rationed and no vegetables were available; when people tried hopelessly to get some
seed for vegetables, which they wanted to grow in window boxes; when you could not get more
than three cigars after a long wait in line; when you could not buy an umbrella or anything else
of importance, except fine silk or luxurious goods in the department stores; when the hotel was
not heated for a week because of lack of coal; and when you could not buy a pair of stockings or
a shirt, even if ‘you had the money.’ Those Russian officials ‘liked’ Berlin. As one of them
remarked to me in broken English, it looked to him, as he said, like heaven. He admired the
German organization and what he called ‘abundance.’ It was clear to me that it meant
abundance as compared with Russia’s…One thing he didn’t like in particular, as he told me, was
that the simple common people had become actively anti-Semitic. They think that the Jewish
‘plotters’ in all the countries are responsible for the war. He, although not Jewish, looked Jewish
and had had some very bad experiences. Asked whom he considered responsible, he said, of
course, ‘capitalism.’ Asked about the alliance of his country with a capitalist country like
Germany, he got excited and denied that. ‘Germany is on the way to a revolution, is in a
permanent revolution, and will very soon be near the Russian achievements.’ ‘We will convince
the Germans,’ he said, ‘that not the Jews, but British and American capitalism are chiefly
responsible for this war. Hitler is very intelligent; he will get it.’” 112
The defecting Soviet Purchasing Commission official Victor Kravchenko summarized
Moscow’s new propaganda line during the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact period: “We
now repeated endlessly that French and British imperialists, backed by American big business
and Polish landlords, were engaged in a conflict to repress German imperialism and the
outcome was of no importance to the one ‘socialist’ nation.” Anti-fascist literature and films
such as Professor Mamlock and The Family Oppenheim were suppressed by the Soviets.
Libraries were purged of anti-fascist books. The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign
Countries (VOKs) favored ties with German cultural institutions. Kravchenko observed that Nazi
exhibits in Moscow focused on the artistic and military achievements and glories. Theaters
showed German films. Hundreds of German military men and trade officials were lodged in
Moscow’s hotels and purchased goods in the state-owned shops. Kravchenko noted that the
communists and the Germans “were busy with the gigantic program of Soviet economic help to
Hitler’s crusade against the ‘degenerate democracies.’”113
The Nazi press endorsed the new friendship with the Soviet Union. Some denied that the
Pact would open the door to communism in Germany, while many other Party newspapers
applauded the alliance of the two socialisms in Berlin and Moscow. Erich Schultze commented
in the National Zeitung in 1940 that “There are some foreigners who think themselves very
clever and who say that thanks to the political and economic cooperation recently established
112
Williams, Wythe. Riddle of the Reich (Prentice Hall New York 1941) pages 293-297.
113
Kravchenko, Victor. I Chose Freedom (Scribner’s New York 1946) pages 333-334.
20
between Germany and the Soviet Union the German people will now fall prey to international
communism. They do not see that Germany during the six years of Hitler’s rule has become as
immune to the communist ideas which have advanced to her frontiers as to the enticements of
democratic, pacifist, and capitalist theories.”114 Goebbels provided secret instructions to the
German press, which ordered them to treat the German-Soviet rapprochement as “total and
final.”115
Journalist Howard K. Smith noted that “Nazi newspapers which had daily for six years
carried flaming attacks on Russia and Communism had suddenly ceased even mentioning those
two subjects. One newspaper which published over an account of the British Russian
negotiations for a mutual defense pact, the headline ‘London bows its head to bloody Moscow’
was confiscated an hour after the edition had reached the newsstands…In bookshop windows the
barricade of viciously anti-Soviet books became conspicuous by their sudden disappearance.” 116
In September 1939, the Volkischer Beobachter provided an orientation for the German people on
Soviet terminology such as “People’s Commissar,” “Soviet,” and “USSR.”117
Rudolf Kirchner of the Frankfurter Zeitung noted in 1939 that Germany “was never the
enemy of nationalist Soviet Russian Bolshevism but the enemy only of an international, an
expansive, that is a world revolutionary Bolshevik agitation.” Some Nazi writers even admitted
that despite the anti-communism within Germany, relations with the Soviet Union were never
truly broken. E.F. Rasche wrote in the Neues Wiener Tagblatt in 1939 that “The tradition of
German-Russian relations is deeply planted in the German people. The Russian people has
always felt great affection for Germany. Even in the period when the conflict of theories broke
out into fierce battles of words, these true foundations were concealed, but not destroyed. The
planned economy of the Soviet Union and the system of economic control established under the
Four Year Plan in the Reich can be brought to the highest pitch of their efficacy through careful
cooperation with one another.”118
The Nazis also viewed their pact with the Soviets as a reflection of a larger ideological
alliance against Western capitalism and as a force to promote the liberation of oppressed peoples.
Other German newspapers praised the USSR’s role in promoting various nationalist revolutions
in the Third World. Another article in the same newspaper hailed the Nazi-Soviet Pact as “the
first act of a great evolutionary process which will end in the liberation of the peoples from the
114
Royal Institute for International Affairs. Review of the Foreign Press 1939-1945 Series A
Volume II Enemy Countries; Axis Controlled Europe Nos. 14-39 Royal Institute for
International Affairs. Review of the Foreign Press 1939-1945 Series A Volume III Enemy
Countries; Axis Controlled Europe Nos. 40-66 (Kraus, 1980)
115
page 34.
116
Smith, Howard K. Last Train From Berlin (A. A. Knopf 1942) page 39.
117
“Leading Nazi Paper Tells Meaning of Soviet Terms” New York Times September 3, 1939
page 15.
118
Volume 1 Enemy Countries Axis Controlled Europe October 3, 1939 to December 23, 1939
(Kraus, 1980)
21
strait-waistcoat of Western European plutocracy.”119 The SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps

also noted that “The young Soviet Union appeared suddenly after the war as the helper of the
young nationalism of Turkey and Persia and enabled their rulers Kemal Pasha and Ali Risa to
rescue their countries from utter disaster to force the Allied troops to retreat and to establish
Nation States endowed with the power to grow in strength.” 120 In November 1939, the Berlin
Borsen Zeitung noted “First Germany, then Italy, then Japan, eventually Soviet Russia that is
the order in which the Western capitalism wishes to liquidate the revolt of the disinherited
Socialist economy and re-establish the dominance of the Western minority over the majority of
the peoples.”121 The Lokalanzeiger noted “neither Russia nor Germany will ever put themselves
at the service of British and French plutocracy.”122 By December 1939, the Volkischer
Beobachter referred to Soviet Communism and German National Socialism as forms of “Young
European Socialism.” Kurt Seesemann wrote in the Hitler Youth magazine Wine and Macht an
article titled “Revolt against Capitalism.” Seesemann noted that “Together with our partner, the
world power of Soviet Russia, we accept the challenge and the fight which has been forced on us
and which we consider as the revolt of the young nations against the old capitalism of Western
Europe.”123
Other Nazi newspapers praised Stalin’s promotion of cooperation with the Third Reich
and his personal leadership qualities in general. In December 1939, the German press reportedly
undertook a pro-Soviet campaign. The Boersen Zeitung noted that “the peoples of the Soviet
Union celebrate the sixtieth birthday of a man who as a revolutionary found his way to a
position guiding Russia’s fate. His statesmanship showed itself particularly last summer when he
avoided an agreement with the Western Powers.” 124 The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung noted
that “It is known that Stalin personally and most vigorously is promoting German-Russian
cooperation.”125
The pro-Soviet elements within the Nazi Party resurfaced out in the open and praised the
Pact between Moscow and Berlin. During the Pact period, Gauleiter Erich Koch resurrected his
119
(Kraus, 1980)
120
(Kraus, 1980)
121
(Kraus, 1980)
122
Tolischus, Otto. “Hitler Felicitates Stalin on Birthday” New York Times December 22, 1939
page 1.
123
“Berlin+Moscow=War on Capitalism” Catholic Herald December 1, 1939 Accessed From:
http://archive.catholicherald.co.uk/article/1st-december-1939/5/berlin-moscow-war-on-
capitalism
124
Tolischus, Otto. “Hitler Felicitates Stalin on Birthday” New York Times December 22, 1939
page 1.
125
Ibid.
22
vision of a German-Soviet continental union in Europe.126 It was also known that Foreign
Minister Joachim Ribbentrop hated Britain and admired the Soviet Union. He desperately
opposed the declaration of war against the USSR in late June 1941. 127
On the other hand, anti-Soviet elements in German society were reportedly marginalized
or even oppressed. The Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 was the final straw which finalized the
disillusionment of the industrialist Fritz Thyssen with the Nazis. It was also reported in October
1939 that anti-Soviet members of the “Old Fighters” of the Nazi Party, right-wing elements,
Wehrmacht officers, and industrialists were arrested for criticizing Hitler and his shift to a pro-
Soviet policy.128 At the same time, the SA continued to be a hotbed of “Beefsteak” (Brown
Outside, Red Inside) attitudes. Such reports indicated KPD/Soviet infiltration or a continued
influence of the leftwing of the Nazi Party. Smith noted that in 1939, two whole district troops of
the SA were disbanded and imprisoned because they were discovered to be almost all
communists.129
Meanwhile, at the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, Ribbentrop and Stalin
enjoyed warm conversations and exchanged toasts. They characterized Britain as always
attempting to disrupt Soviet-German relations. Ribbentrop and Stalin agreed that the Anti-
Comintern Pact was not directed at Moscow, but actually aimed at the Western democracies and
“frightened principally the City of London (i.e., the British financiers) and the English
shopkeepers.”130 In August 1939, Ribbentrop recalled that his meeting with the Soviets “…felt
like being among old party comrades.” Ribbentrop was much at ease with the Soviets, “as
among my old Nazi friends.” Stalin toasted Hitler and noted that “knew how much the German
people loved the Fuhrer.” 131
Internal Nazi documents that were declassified after World War II pointed to officials of
the Third Reich as being ideologically supportive of the Non-Aggression Pact via the jointly held
anti-capitalism and anti-liberalism of the Axis Powers and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, they
reasoned that if the USSR and Fascist Italy maintained cordial relations and economic
cooperation, then why not Germany? The Secretary in the German Foreign Office Ernst von
Weizsacker observed in an April 1939 cable that “Russian policy had always moved in a straight
line. Ideological differences of opinion had hardly influenced the Russian-Italian relationship,
and they did not have to prove a stumbling block with regard to Germany either. Soviet Russia
had not exploited the present friction between Germany and the Western democracies against
us, nor did she desire to do so. There exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us
on a normal footing. And from normal, the relations might become better and better.” German
negotiator Karl Schnurre observed in a July 1939 memo to the Foreign Office that “despite all
126
page 126.
127
128
“Many Arrests in Reich” Argus October 13, 1939 page 1.
129
Smith, Howard K. Last Train From Berlin (A. A. Knopf 1942) page 261.
130
131
Johnson, Paul. Modern Times (Harper Collins Publishers 1983) page 360.
23
the differences in Weltanschauung, there was one thing in common in the ideology of
Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies. Neither we nor
Italy had anything in common with the capitalism of the West. Therefore it would appear to us
quite paradoxical if the Soviet Union, as a Socialist state, were to side with the Western
democracies.” In August 1939, the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop noted in a cable to the
Nazi Ambassador to the USSR von Schulenburg that “The Reich Government and the Soviet
Government must, judging from all experience, count it as certain that the capitalistic Western
democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and of the U.S.S.R.
They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive the U.S.S.R. into
the war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is the
compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and
of the U.S.S.R., which would profit only the Western democracies.” 132
The Soviets appeared to have committed themselves to the spirit and tenets of the Non-
Aggression Pact and supported a strong Third Reich. Stalin stated in September 1939 that “If,
against all expectation, Germany finds itself in a difficult situation then she can be sure that the
Soviet people will come to Germany’s aid and will not allow Germany to be strangled. The
Soviet Union wants to see a strong Germany and we will not allow Germany to be thrown to the
ground.”133 Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov noted to the Supreme Soviet in October 1939
that “The English government has declared its war aims as nothing more nor less than the
annihilation of Hitlerism…A war of this kind cannot be justified in any way. The ideology of
Hitlerism, like any ideological system, can be accepted or rejected—this is a question of political
opinion. But anyone can understand that an ideology cannot be destroyed by force…This is why
it is senseless, indeed criminal, to wage any such war for the elimination of Hitlerism.” 134
The Soviets and the Nazis also allegedly sought to merge their two economic, political,
and military institutions during the period August 1939 to June 1941. During the Pact period, the
Nazis proposed to the Soviets the following measures to merge the two systems of Soviet
Communism and National Socialism:
1) The dissolution of the institution of political commissars in the Red Army and the
granting of absolute authority to professional officers.
2) The introduction of formal military ranks in the Red Army and Navy.
3) The strict adherence to military protocols such as salutes.
4) The transfer of elite Soviet units to the Caucasus region.
5) The introduction of the seven-day work week to increase production.
6) The introduction of a youth labor service in the USSR.
7) The reorganization of the Soviet customs service.
8) The re-introduction of private property in the USSR under strict government and
CPSU control.
The book Riddle of the Reich noted that the introduction of government-controlled
private property in the USSR was “now said by the Nazis to be under consideration by Stalin’s
132
The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Accessed From: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ns034.asp
133
“World War II Behind Closed Doors” Accessed From:
http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/episode-1/ep1_stalins_pact.html
134
Lorimer, Doug. The Collapse of Communism in the USSR (Resistance Books 1997)
Accessed From: http://readingfromtheleft.com/PDF/CollapseOfCommunism.pdf
24
principal brain trusters and their German advisers. Because of the tremendous scope of this
measure it must be introduced in slow stages…With the adoption of this measure, the conversion
of Russia to National Socialism will be completed. So boast the Nazis.” Wehrmacht officers
advised the Soviet Commissariat of Defense on measures to reorganize the Red Army. German
Reichsbahn experts advised the Soviets on their rail networks. German road and canal experts
provided advice to the Soviet on various construction projects. German oil industry experts
provided the Soviets with updated drilling and refining methods. So-called “press
correspondents” from Nazi Germany were also dispatched to the USSR. 135
There were indications that the USSR and Nazi Germany were prepared to cooperate
with each other on deeper ideological issues, such as campaigns against organized religion. In
May 1940, it was reported that Soviet Academy official Boris Deborin asserted that the chief
achievement of the Nazis was their war against organized religions. Deborin was sent by the
Soviets to confer with the Nazis on their plans to combat religion. Deborin noted in a public
lecture in Moscow that it was the duty of Soviet atheists “to come to the aid of the Germans in
their fight against religion.” The Soviet anti-religious newspaper Bezbozhnik published the “ten
commandments” for Soviet-German collaboration: “(1) Whoever opposes Soviet-German
cooperation is an enemy of the Soviet Government and of Communism; (2) Germany and the
Soviet are unitedly fighting against capitalism, against religion and for a new social order; (3)
the German nation, like the Soviet people, are against religion and for Socialism; (4) the
German-Soviet pact killed the war campaign conducted by the Church; (5) Stalin and Hitler are
against religion and capitalism; (6) the pact with Germany resulted in creation of new political
positions for the Soviet in northern and eastern Europe; (7) the political and economic structure
of the Soviet and Germany are as yet not the same; (8) It is already clear that after the war
Germany will have to continue on the road to real Socialism; (9) Owing to the cooperation with
Germany, it has been made possible for Communism to penetrate into other countries; (10)
Stalin requires loyalty to Communism, world revolution and atheism.” 136
In 1940, the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Komsomol was advised by
its general secretary, H.H. Mikhailov that the USSR and Nazi Germany would engage in a united
effort to destroy religion. One of the participants at the plenary session asked: “Does this mean
that the Nazi views on the Jewish question are acceptable by our party?” Mikhailov replied:
“Our cooperation with Germany on the anti-religion front will have its limitations. The Soviets
conduct their fight against religion on the basis of materialistic principles only and not on a
racial basis. We reject the racial principles and this automatically excludes the possibility of
coordination of our activities with those of the Reich in questions concerning the Jews.”
Mikhailov noted that the Soviets planned to alter the atheist education program through the
Bezbozhnik (Godless) and “other organizations” that were German. Hitler’s Deputy Rudolf Hess
also ordered that German translations of Soviet antireligious literature to be printed within the
Third Reich.137
135
Williams, Wythe. Riddle of the Reich (Prentice Hall New York 1941) pages 293-297.
136
“Moscow, Berlin Push Plans for United Drive on Religion” JTA May 6, 1940 Accessed
From: http://archive.jta.org/article/1940/05/06/2850152/moscow-berlin-push-plans-for-united-
drive-on-religion
137
“Reds Unite with Nazis on Anti-Religion Drive but Bar Racialism” JTA January 26, 1940
Accessed From: http://archive.jta.org/article/1940/01/26/2849410/reds-unite-with-nazis-on-
antireligion-drive-but-bar-racialism
25
The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact also brought forth cooperation on the cultural
front between Moscow and Berlin. In December 1939, a delegation of German artists left for
Moscow to set up exhibits. 138 In Moscow, special showings of Wagner’s operas were shown to
Soviet audiences. 139 In December 1940, Der Neue Tag reported that Soviet officials collected
and destroyed all anti-Nazi literature in the USSR and that “new political literature” would be
published.140 In 1941, the Wagner play The Valkyries was shown in Moscow. The Nazi
newspapers praised the Soviet composer Serge Eisenstein. For example, the Hamburger
Fremdenblatt noted “The very strongest and most important feature of the performance is the
missenses directed by Eisenstein. His culture, intelligence and talent made the performance an
immense artistic achievement. The producer has deep and unequalled understanding of the
German national epic poem.” The German Ambassador to the USSR also praised Eisenstein and
the singer, Reissner.141 Until June 1941, the Soviet state tourist agency Intourist operated an
office in Berlin. 142
There was even evidence that the Soviets were planning to purge their governmental
apparatus of Jews in order to placate the Nazis. Stalin ordered Molotov in 1939 to “Clean out the
synagogue,” which was a code phrase directed towards Jews employed in the Commissariat of
Foreign Affairs. In 1940, Stalin noted to Ribbentrop that “as soon as he had adequate cadres of
Gentiles he would remove all Jews from leading positions.”143 Jews were even forcibly
conscripted on projects that benefited the joint economic needs of the USSR and Nazi Germany.
In 1940, a decree issued by Nazi Governor-General of Poland Hans Frank drafted German and
Polish Jews to construct a highway that linked Berlin and Moscow. 144
Other reports even pointed to the possibility that Moscow was considering a Nazi-style
anti-Jewish campaign in the USSR. In 1939, the noted journalist Oswald Garrison Villard
reported that “responsible circles in Germany” indicated that the Soviet Union would implement
the Nazi Nuremberg Laws towards the Jews of the USSR. 145 In 1939, it was reported that the
Scherl Printing House in Berlin printed millions of anti-Semitic tracts in the Russian language.
The tracts demanded that Jewish communists in the USSR be replaced by “younger men.” The
German Consul-General Von Saucken in Moscow approved the text of these tracts. Hitler hoped
138
“Reich, Russia to Blend Cultures” New York Times December 17, 1939 page 42.
139
140
Volume II Enemy Countries; Axis Controlled Europe Nos. 14-39 (Kraus, 1980)
141
“Nazi Papers Praise Jewish Producer in Moscow” JTA March 25, 1941 Accessed From:
http://archive.jta.org/article/1941/03/25/2853691/nazi-papers-praise-jewish-producer-in-moscow
142
Smith, Howard K. Last Train From Berlin (A. A. Knopf, 1942) pages 146-147.
143
Burleigh, Michael. Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II (Harper Collins 2011)
page 460.
144
“Nazis Draft Jews to Build Berlin-Moscow Highway Through Poland” JTA January 15, 1940
Accessed From: http://archive.jta.org/article/1940/01/15/2849280/nazis-draft-jews-to-build-
berlinmoscow-highway-through-poland
145
“Nuremberg Laws for Soviet Jews Seen in Reich As Part of Red-Nazi Pact” JTA December
29, 1939 Accessed From: http://archive.jta.org/article/1939/12/29/2849084/noremberg-laws-for-
soviet-jews-seen-in-reich-as-part-of-rednazi-pact
26
to arouse Soviet youth to “get rid of powerful Soviet officials who are hostile to Russia’s present
pro-German policy.”146
German big business and state-owned Nazi firms also promoted export trade with the
Soviet Union. In November 1939, the governing body of the Russian Committee of the German
Economy consisted of the following firms: Siemens Schuckertwerke, Deutsche Banks, Dresdner
Bank, AEG, IG Farben, Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke, Hamburg-
Amerika Linie, Carl Zeiss, Friedrich Krupp AG, Friedrich Krupp Grusonwerk AG, Klockner,
Mannesmannrohrenwerke, and the Hermann Goering concern. It was noted that this list
“indicates how closely German business men are being associated with the development of
Russo-German trade.”147 Through the Inter-ministerial Committee for Trade with Russia,
Goering appealed to German industrialists to export goods to the USSR with great efficiency. 148
During the Non-Aggression Pact period, German-Soviet economic cooperation was deep,
with Berlin receiving much of the benefits. Between 1939 and 1941, Stalin provided the
Germans the following items: one million tons of grain, 900,000 tons of oil (including 100,000
tons of aircraft fuel), iron ore, manganese, and cotton. 149 Other Soviet goods sent to Germany
included lumber, feed grain, oil cake, phosphate, and platinum. 150 The German-Soviet
Commercial Agreement of 1940 called for the USSR to supply Germany with 650 million
Reichsmarks worth of goods. The massive exports of strategic raw materials and agricultural
goods to Germany prompted Hitler to confidently comment to his generals “We need not be
afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc.” 151
Meanwhile, Moscow strongly objected to the British blockade of Nazi Germany in October and
December 1939.152
The Germans did supply the USSR with military goods and industrial machinery.
Between 1939 and 1941, Germany delivered 6,500 machine tools for Soviet war industries. 153
Stalin received torpedoes, mines, aircraft engines, and blueprints for naval vessels from the
Nazis.154 The 1940 German-Soviet trade agreements provided Stalin with the Lutzow cruiser
hull, a number of heavy gun turrets, 31,000 tons of ship armor plate, 24 German military aircraft,
equipment for engineers, a fully equipped Panzer III tank, an antiaircraft artillery battery, 300
146
“Berlin Printing Millions of Anti-Semitic Leaflets in Russian, Paris Hears” JTA November
29, 1939 Accessed From: http://archive.jta.org/article/1939/11/29/2848730/berlin-printing-
millions-of-antisemitic-leaflets-in-russian-paris-hears
147
(Kraus, 1980)
148
Schwendemann, Heinrich. German-Soviet economic relations at the time of the Hitler-Stalin
pact, 1939-1941 Accessed From:
http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_1252-6576_1995_num_36_1_2425
149
150
151
Ibid, page 110.
152
153
154
27
machine tools for civilian and arms production, ammunition, equipment for mining and oil
industries, and 52.5 million Reichsmarks worth of anthracite. Germany supplied 46% of Soviet
machine tool imports. In the 21 days of June 1941, Stalin delivered 135,000 tons of grain, at least
35,000 tons of crude oil products, and 12,000 tons of manganese ore to Nazi Germany.155 In
early 1940, Germany delivered 2 Dornier-115s, five Messerschmitt-110s, and 2 Junker-88s to the
USSR.156
Soviet aircraft designers such as Alexandr S. Yakovlev visited Nazi Germany in October
1939. He spent considerable time in the Third Reich with other designers and spent time at the
Heinkel Works in Rostock-Marienehe. He supervised the assembly of 5 Heinkel He-100 fighters
that were purchased by the USSR. In late 1938, a secret accord was signed between the USSR
and Germany where the Soviets would ship raw materials in exchange for the right of Soviet
technical delegations to inspect any Nazi weapon system they wished to see. The German
aircraft industry was instructed to distribute samples of aircraft to the Soviets upon request. In
1940, Goering provided Fiesler Storch STOL aircraft to the USSR. In the winter of 1939 and
1940, the USSR received Heinkel He-100 fighters, Messerschmitt Bf-109Cs, Me-100C fighters,
and Dornier Do-215B bombers. 157
The Soviets ignored the evidence that Hitler was prepared to break the Non-Aggression
Pact. Stalin clearly admired Hitler and could not bring himself to believe that the Fuhrer would
break their alliance. A Soviet agent of Czech nationality, Skvor, reported in April 1941 that
German troops were moving towards the USSR and that the Nazis instructed the Skoda plant to
cancel all orders by the USSR. Stalin red inked the report and remarked: “This informant is an
English provocateur. Find out who is making this provocation and punish him.” 158
As the clouds of war gathered on the horizon, the Soviets continued their massive
deliveries of goods to the Third Reich. In April 1941, the Soviets shipped 208,000 tons of grain,
90,000 tons of oil, 8,300 tons of cotton, 6,340 tons of copper, tin, nickel, and other metals, and
4,000 tons of rubber to Germany.159 From April to June 1941, the Soviet Union exported to the
Nazis 560,000 tons of grain. The Germans exported to the USSR 16.6 million Reichsmarks
worth of machine tools. The Soviets exported to the Nazis 131,926 tons of grain. In May 1941,
the Soviets shipped 76,217 tons of fuel to Germany.160 Even on June 22, 1941, Soviet trains
filled with grain were still in transit to Germany. 161
Third countries also assisted Nazi Germany in supplying goods to the USSR and vice
versa. Between March 1939 and August 1940, more than 85% of exports from the Protectorate
155
Wagner, Bernd. From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939-1941
(Berghahn Books Providence Oxford 1997) pages 105 and 110.
156
Ericson, Edward E. Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany,
1933-1941 (Greenwood Publishing Group) page 114.
157
Albrecht, Ulrich. The Soviet Armaments Industry (Routledge 1993) pages 14-18.
158
Salisbury, Harrison. The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad (Da Capo Press, 2009) page 61.
159
Ibid, page 63.
160
161
Ibid.
28
of Bohemia-Moravia to the USSR consisted of machines, iron, and steel products. 162 In February
1940, Anastas Mikoyan discussed with Stalin and Molotov the possibility of importing oil from
the United States that was previously paid for by Nazi Germany. The Soviets would then pay the
Germans for the American oil by swapping petroleum that was extracted from Baku. American
oil producers were also willing to ship petroleum to the Soviet port of Murmansk. The Germans
built storage tanks in Murmansk, which held the oil imported from the United States. The oil was
then shipped from Murmansk to Nazi Germany. 163
Soviet foreign trade corporations were also willing to front for German interests and
purchase goods on behalf of the Third Reich. The German ambassador to the USSR von
Schulenburg noted that “The discussion brought out the readiness on the part of the Soviet
government to let its own organizations effect the purchase of raw materials for us and ship them
to Odessa.” The German Embassy official Karl Schnurre remarked “The Soviet Union declared
her willingness to act as buyer of metals and raw materials in third countries…Stalin himself has
repeatedly promised generous help in this respect…The Agreement means a wide open door to
the East for us.” 164
In February 1940, the German-Soviet trade agreement stipulated that “The Government of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall instruct the proper Soviet commercial organizations
to enter into negotiations with the German organizations and firms designated by the
Government of the German Reich in regard to the purchase by the Soviet Union of metals and
other goods in third countries and in regard to the sale of these metals and goods to Germany.”
Seventy percent of the payments were to be made in hard currency and thirty percent in
Reichsmarks.165 It was also reported that the Special Committee on Un-American Activities (the
Dies Committee) ascertained that the Soviet Central Bank transferred at least $15 million to the
Germans and other Axis Powers by January 1941. Congressman Martin Dies (D-TX) reported
that the USSR served as the “financial front” in the United States for the Axis Powers. More
money was provided, through Soviet state banks and organizations, to the Axis than the
Americans provided to Great Britain. 166
Meanwhile, the Soviets also engaged in traditional military cooperation with the Third
Reich during the period of the Non-Aggression Pact. The Red Army even absorbed aspects of
162
Sutton, Antony C. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930-1945
(Hoover Institution Press Stanford University CA 1971) Accessed From:
http://archive.org/stream/Sutton--Western-Technology-1930-1945/Sutton--
WesternTechnologyAndSovietEconomicDevelopment1930To1945_djvu.txt
163
Sanchez-Sibony, Oscar. Red Globalization (Cambridge University Press 2014) pages 59-60.
164
Jason, Alexander. “Delivering the Goods to Hitler” Reason Magazine August 1985 page 32.
165
German–Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940) Economic Agreement of February 11, 1940,
Between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, translated by the U.S.
Department of State Division of Language Services Reference: (1954) THE WAR YEARS ,
September 4, 1939-March 18, 1940, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 Series D,
volume VIII. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov. Printing Office Accessed From:
http://en.wikisource.7val.com/wiki/German%E2%80%93Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940
)
166
Dorris, Henry N. “Dies Says Nazis Get Russian Funds Here, Reports $15 Million Shifted in 2
Months” New York Times January 4, 1941 page 1.
29
Nazi military trappings. For example, the Prussian goose step was adopted by the Soviet army
during this time period.167
German Navy instructors were dispatched to the USSR after August 1939. About 70 Nazi
engineers and fitters worked on cruisers in Leningrad under the direction of Admiral Otto Feige.
Cooperation with German technicians in the Leningrad shipyards lasted until May 1941. 168 The
German Navy used the Soviet naval base at Murmansk. German auxiliary cruisers were also
equipped at the Soviet naval base at Murmansk. German blockade busting vessels also sought
refuge at Murmansk. German U-boats were based at the combined German-Soviet naval base at
Basis Nord (Zapadnaya Litza Bay). The Soviets also allowed German Navy vessels to use Basis
Nord, which greatly assisted in the 1940 Nazi invasion of Norway. 169 In the winter of 1939 and
1940, a Soviet icebreaker opened the frozen Baltic port of Lulea for the German Navy and
merchant marine. 170 Even Soviet slave labor proved helpful to the Nazi war effort. Basis Nord
was constructed by Soviet slave laborers who were loaned to the Nazis by the GULAG
administration. 171 In September 1939, General Hans Jeschonnek called the German Embassy in
Moscow to request that the Soviet Union retain its Minsk radio station in order for German pilots
to use it for navigational purposes against Polish targets. 172
Cooperation was also reached between the German Gestapo and the Soviet NKVD in
repressing common enemies in occupied Poland. The Nazi newspaper Krakauer Zeitung depicted
two officials-General Yegnarov and Herr Schon in the April 1940 article Discussion of German-
Russian Refugee Exchange. This article praised the joint intelligence work of the Soviets and
Germans in occupied Poland. A German diplomat in Moscow, Johnnie von Herwarth, reported
that Gestapo and NKVD officers greeted each other warmly at Moscow Airport in 1939. The two
services exchanged files and political refugees. 173
In March-April 1940, the Gestapo and NKVD met in Krakow in occupied Poland. The
Nazi Gestapo admitted their admiration of NKVD methods in repressing various underground
movements. Margarete Buber, a German-Jewish Communist, described how she and other Reds
were handed over to the Gestapo by the Soviet NKVD. The Soviet officers crossed the bridge at
Brest-Litovsk and handed over a number of Jewish KPD members to the SS and Gestapo. The
Soviet and Gestapo/SS commanders saluted each other and proceeded to read the names of the
German Communists to be handed over. A joint NKVD-Gestapo training center was established
in the Polish city of Zakopane. In March 1940, officers of the NKVD and Reich Main Security
Office (RSHA) met and discussed strategies and operations. By the summer of 1941, over 4,000
German-Jewish Communists were handed over by the USSR to Nazi Germany. Joint military
167
Tolstoy, Nikolai. Stalin’s Secret War (J. Cape, 1981) pages 391, 397, 398, 399, 359.
168
Sutton, Antony C. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1930-1945
(Hoover Institution Press Stanford University CA 1971) Accessed From:
http://archive.org/stream/Sutton--Western-Technology-1930-1945/Sutton--
WesternTechnologyAndSovietEconomicDevelopment1930To1945_djvu.txt
169
170
Ibid, page 397.
171
Ibid, page 397.
172
173
Watson, George. Lost Literature of Socialism (James Clarke & Company 1998) page 90.
30
parades of Nazi and Soviet troops occurred in cities like Grodno and Brest. Soviet corps
commander Vasily Chuikov, General Heinz Guderian, and Soviet brigade commander Semyon
Kryvoshein attended joint Soviet-Nazi parades in Brest and Grodno. In December 1939, Nazi
and Soviet secret police officers met in Zakopane, Poland, where the NKVD officers proposed
the creation of a secret Communist organization of agents provocateurs in the General-
Government to penetrate the bona fide Polish underground and pass intelligence to the Gestapo
and the NKVD. 174
Elements of the international communist movement attempted to sabotage the Allied war
effort against the Nazis through propaganda, terrorism, strikes, and espionage. It was reported in
1940 that the Nazis hosted two communist radio propaganda stations. One was located in
Germany, while the other one was allegedly located either in East Prussia or the Soviet-occupied
zone of Poland. The first station was called the Voice of Humanity and it allegedly operated
from the Black Forest region in Nazi Germany. Its communist propaganda was beamed to
France. The other station was called the Voice of Peace and it beamed its propaganda to the
Balkans and Baltic nations. 175
Another reported indicated that Hitler allowed the COMINTERN to set up a central
office that would spearhead the dissemination of propaganda in France and Great Britain. The
office was allegedly established in Stuttgart and consisted of Georgi Dimitrov’s agents and
French Communists. British communists were also believed to have been proposed to be
included as office personnel. A secret radio station called the Voice of Freedom beamed
propaganda to French peasants and workers to demoralize them and prevent them from
supporting the war effort. 176
Perhaps the worst example of cooperation between a local communist party and the Nazis
occurred in France. In 1935 and 1937, the French Communist Party issued secret orders “to
organize the struggle of the masses for the disintegration of the bourgeois army.” By 1938, a
number of secret cells were planted in the French army. During the 1939-1940 war against Nazi
Germany, French Communists bombarded the army soldiers with leaflets that stated “Soldiers,
while you receive 15 sous pay, while your families starve, while you risk your life…the
capitalists are getting rich! Down with capitalist war!” In May 1940, the French Communists
barraged the French army and civilians with slogans such as “Peace, immediate peace” and
other calls for French women to demand the return of their sons from the front “before it is too
late.” One scholar noted that “A primary cause of the collapse was the disintegration of military
morale accomplished by the Communist defeatist campaign carried on among the French
soldiers in the months following the signing of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact. The fall
of France was celebrated in both Moscow and Berlin, for France was as much a victim of
Communist antimilitarism as of German militarism.” 177
174
“Soviet NKVD Nazi Gestapo Cooperation Forgotten Story” Accessed From:
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?36517-Soviet-NKVD-Nazi-Gestapo-
cooperation-forgotten-story
175
Philip, P.J. “Nazis Inject ‘Boos’ in Churchill Talk” New York Times February 3, 1940 page
3.
176
Augur. “Comintern Base in Reich Reported; Aim Is to Hurl Propaganda at Allies” New York
Times February 2, 1940 page 3.
177
Methvin, Eugene. The Riot Makers (Arlington House 1970) pages 295-298.
31
In 1940, it was discovered in Alsace that Nazi agents were ordered to drop anti-
communist propaganda and concentrate on anti-Jewish agitation. The Nazi instructions to its
agents in Alsace read “It should be understood that all attacks against any member of the Soviet
Government are to be dropped. Also, attacks against Communism as such must be diminished
and ultimately dropped. On the other hand, propaganda against the Jews must become more
severe and the guiding policy must be that Jewry, having lost its chances with Stalin, has joined
the western capitalist democracies for the purpose of destroying by war the two great countries--
Germany, which has already emancipated itself from the Jews, and Russia, whose leader
realized in time the danger of a new capitalist re-Judaization and who acted accordingly. Russia
and Germany did not want this war, which is in the interests of the Jewish capitalists. It must be
seen to that the neutral countries contribute to the formation of an anti-Jewish coalition. The lull
produced by the dropping of anti-Communism from our propaganda should be balanced by
increased propaganda against the Jewish democratic western capitalism” 178
The French Communists printed flyers for their countrymen to collaborate with the
German soldiers: “Do Not Fire on Germans-Not a Single Round! Long Live Stalin-Long Live
Hitler!” One French Communist named Roger Ramband, was caught by the French security
police while he was engaged in tampering with the fuel supply of airplanes at the Farman Works.
Ramband allowed the fuel supply to leak on the red hot exhaust pipes which caused the
explosions of 17 planes. Communist workers poured screws into the gears of the Char B tanks at
the Renault Works. Two hundred barrels of anti-aircraft guns were rendered unusable by
communist saboteurs.179
Since mid-May 1940, the French Communist press supported the notion that a
communist revolution could only be achieved through a peace agreement with Germany. The
French Communists launched a campaign for the “social and national liberation of France” and
the creation of “Popular Committees” as the beginning of a “Popular government under
communist control.” The French Communist Party Politburo noted in secret instructions dated
from late June and early July 1940 that “not a single paper directly attacks the communist party.
They even seem to make concessions to our political programme, thus justifying it. The CP is no
longer completely illegal. It is half-legal. Thus, the distributors of our leaflets, when arrested by
the French police, are released the day after through the intervention of the (German)
Kommandantur. The political prisoners in the occupied regions, with the exception of all the
deputies, have been liberated by the German troops, together with the members of the fifth
column…To sum up, the immediate objective is the struggle for the lifting of the ban upon the
party.” In mid-June 1940, the chief of the Cadres Commission of the French Communist Party
Maurice Treand contacted the German Kommandantur through the intermediary of Denise
Ginollin, a Communist Party member and Deputy. The Nazi official in Paris, Otto Abetz,
preferred for the Germans to cooperate with the French Communists. Treand noted that
“Humanite, as we intend to publish it, would make it its aim to denounce the agents of British
imperialism attempting to drag the French colonies into the war, and to appeal to the colonial
peoples to fight for their independence against the imperialist oppressors…and to support a
178
“Drop Anti-Red Propaganda and Center on Jews, Berlin Reported Ordering Agents Abroad”
JTA January 4, 1940 Accessed From: http://archive.jta.org/article/1940/01/04/2849157/drop-
antired-propaganda-and-center-on-jews-berlin-reported-ordering-agents-abroad
179
Frieser, Karl Heinz, Greenwood, John T. The Blitzkrieg Legend (Naval Institute Press, 2005)
page 321.
32
policy of European pacification as well as the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet pact of friendship

which would constitute a counterpart to the German-Soviet pact.” Borkenau reported that “The
very words ‘Hitlerism’ and ‘Nazism’ remained banned from all communist publications, from
the moment the politburo had recovered its contacts with the Soviet embassy. The communist
party was even assuming the role of production promoter, carrying through a constant campaign
in favor of the resumption of work and the need for a hard effort of reconstruction, thus
recommending itself to Hitler.” 180 In July 1940, a secret issue of the French Communist Party
newspaper L’Humanite noted that “It is particularly comforting, in these times of misfortune, to
see many Parisian workers engaged in friendly conversations with German soldiers, either in the
street or in the corner cafe. Bravo, comrades, continue, even if this displeases certain bourgeois,
as stupid as they are malicious.”181
In June 1940, there were reports that after the French government withdrew from Paris, a
“Soviet” developed where the top Communist Jacques Duclos became the resident-ruler of Paris
at the Elysee Palace. 182 German occupation officials such as Dr. Friedrich Grimm also tried to
win over the French Communists to the Nazi side by stressing their mutual battle against
common enemies: priests, Jews, and the upper middle class. The German Ambassador to
occupied Paris Otto Abetz encouraged these contacts. 183
Maurice Thorez of the French Communist Party proposed a plan to the Soviet Union for
the creation of a German-sponsored leftist state in France. In this projected new government:
1) The French Communists would adhere to the Petain armistice.
2) The French Communists would also receive political power in the unoccupied zone of
France.
3) The occupied territories in France would be governed by commissars representing a
“Republic of French Workers.”
This plan was submitted to the Soviets on June 29, 1940. Soviet Vice-Commissar for
Foreign Affairs S.A. Lozovsky stated in response to Thorez’s representative Andre Marty: “We
are going to take up the matter with Hitler to find out whether he will accept your plan.” 184
The Yugoslav Communist Party also sabotaged the pro-Allied government after the pro-
Axis regime of Prince Paul was overthrown. During Belgrade’s battle with the Germans, a
resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia noted that “First, the
mobilized members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia must undermine the resistance of the
Yugoslav army making intrigues and causing confusion among the soldiers and
officers…Second, all required support should be given to the Ustashas and other separatist
organizations within the country, which are for its breaking up…Thus Yugoslavia will be
disintegrated into several parts, and the Communist Party will subsequently be active in each of
them...” It was reported that in April 1941, a member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the chief of the Communist Party in Croatia, Vladimir
180
Borkenau, Franz. European Communism (Harper, 1953) pages 308-311.
181
Weitz, Margaret Collins. Sisters in the Resistance: how women fought to free France, 1940-
1945 (Wiley 1998) page 271
182
Paxton, Robert O. Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (Columbia University
Press, 2001) pages 13-14.
183
Ibid, pages 13-14.
184
Axelsson, George. “Extremist Regime Feared in Paris” New York Times July 20, 1940 page
2.
33
Bakaric, drove through Zagreb and met with the fascist-separatist Ustasha second-in-command
Milo Budak. Bakaric and Budak agreed that the Croatian communists would enter the fascist
Ustasha government or the rubber stamp Assembly as a loyal opposition party. 185
In Poland, the Communist Party also supported the German war effort and denounced the
Allies as imperialist warmongers. In fact, the COMINTERN issued an appeal in early October
1939, which described the Nazi and Soviet invasions of Poland as “an example of cooperation of
socialist nations against Anglo-French imperialism.” 186 The propaganda efforts of the Polish
Communist Party proved to be unsuccessful in the eyes of the masses. Stefan Korbonski noted
that “…it was the Communists who were propagating among them slogans for the efficient
transport of supplies, mainly crude oil and foodstuffs, from Russia to Germany. The
Communists…advanced the view that the war had been provoked by Western imperialists and
capitalists In order to enslave the Germans, and that for this purpose they made use of the silly
Poles, That slogan, however, did not work…” 187
Nazi agents also agitated in Portuguese industrial areas, where they proclaimed that both
the German and Soviet systems vowed to crush capitalism and improve the standard of living of
the laboring classes. Nazi agents resident in Portugal observed that the middle classes and the
capitalists in Germany were in the process of disappearing and had limited influence in the Third
Reich. Nazi speakers in Portugal also claimed that the workers in Germany were liberated from
the capitalists and when the Germans won the European conflict, the liberation of the Portuguese
workers would be next. While there were small disagreements between Germany and the USSR,
both regimes were said to support the provisioning of free education, higher wages, cheap food,
shorter working hours, and actions against middlemen and speculators.188
Along with many fascists and appeasement-minded politicians, the British Communists
also opposed the war effort against Hitler. British Communist newspapers such as the London
Daily Worker published anti-war propaganda during the Non-Aggression Pact period. While the
Germans were bombing British cities, communist agents such as J.B.S. Haldane and Ivor
Montagu transmitted information on British air defenses and damage reports from German
bombing runs to Soviet NKVD agents. 189 The COMINTERN attempted to induce British seamen
to desert and sabotage ships which supplied Britain.190
Even elements of the American Communist movement secretly adhered to an ideological
kinship to the radical leftwing faction of the Nazi Party. According to the former secret
American communist and Soviet espionage agent Whittaker Chambers, a communist colleague
of his named “Herman” was a “professional Germanophile.” Chambers recalled: “From him I
185
Vojinovic, Dr. Novica. “Communist Crimes Against Serbs and Russians” July 8, 2010
Accessed From:
http://www.akademediasrbija.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=789:comm
unist-crimes-against-serbs-and-russians&catid=45:english&Itemid=59
186
“The Soviet Invasion of Poland” Accessed From: http://www.17september1939.com/
187
Korbonski, Stefan. Fighting Warsaw (George Allen and Unwin Ltd Ruskin House London
1956) Accessed From:
http://www.archive.org/stream/fightingwarsaw001906mbp/fightingwarsaw001906mbp_djvu.txt
188
“Nazi Agents in Portugal” Times (London) September 23, 1939 page 5.
189
“Treacherous Ally: The Soviets in WWII” The Other Half of History Accessed From:
http://historyhalf.com/treacherous-ally-the-soviets-in-wwii/
190
34
first learned to my surprise that there was a large group in the Nazi party to which Communists
felt extremely close.” 191 The Non-Aggression Pact also forced the Communist Party USA
(CPUSA) to undergo an ideological about-face which abruptly ended the denunciations of
fascism and National Socialism to a benign toleration of these philosophies. Even worse was the
CPUSA’s cooperation with German and Soviet efforts to sabotage American aid to the Allies.
Colegrove observed that “Communists here who for several years had branded Hitler as a
‘monster’ now praised him as a ‘great leader.’”192
In 1940, Stalin ordered the CPUSA-controlled United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Workers Union to call for a strike in the Allis Chalmers plant in Milwaukee, which manufactured
tanks for Great Britain and France. A strike idled the North American Aircraft plant in Ingleside
California. These strikes trimmed down the amount of war supplies sent to the Allies in Western
Europe.193 The head of the CPUSA, Earl Browder, published a book called The Second
Imperialist War which condemned the British war effort against Nazi Germany.194
The CPUSA formed the American Peace Mobilization (APM) by 1940 to protest
American involvement in World War II. In 1940, the People’s World declared after the fall of
Norway that the British were the “greatest danger to Europe and all mankind.” 195 The CPUSA
developed the slogan “No Convoys!” to protest Lend Lease aid to the Allies. The CPUSA
secretly agreed that they possessed common goals with the neutralist, antiwar America First
Committee. In the spring of 1940, the CPUSA infiltrated local chapters of the America First
Committee.196
The Communists even committed espionage on the behalf of the Nazis. Former top
American Communist Maurice Malkin reported that “The communists who had cells in these
companies worked with the Nazis to obtain blueprints and plans for this bombsight and ship
them to the USSR.” 197 Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle reported that the German and
Soviet Embassies in Washington DC exchanged information concerning their mutual enemies. 198
Even in America’s backyard, the Nazis and Communists cooperated to stir up anti-British
sentiment. In Buenos Aires, the British diplomat Nicholas Cheetham reported that Nazi
diplomats “are collaborating with local communists in a very dangerous attempt to win over the
masses with the cry of ‘away with British capitalism and commercial exploitation.’” 199
Even in the last days of the Non-Aggression Pact, the CPUSA refused to believe reports
that Hitler and the Axis Powers were preparing to attack the USSR. The June 20, 1941 issue of
the Daily Worker noted that “Reports of a ‘break’ between the Soviet Union and Germany with
rumors of war continue to flare up in the capitalist newspapers. What is immediately noticeable
about this whole press campaign is the lying character of the stories being published as the
191
Chambers, Whittaker. Witness (Regnery Publishing) page 314.
192
Colegrove, Kenneth Wallace. Democracy Versus Communism (Institute of Fiscal & Political
Education, 1957) page 374.
193
Ibid.
194
“Treacherous Ally: The Soviets in WWII” The Other Half of History Accessed From:
http://historyhalf.com/treacherous-ally-the-soviets-in-wwii/
195
Isserman, Maurice. Which Side Were You On? (University of Illinois Press, 1993) page 65.
196
Ibid, pages 84-85.
197
Malkin, Maurice. Return to My Father’s House (Arlington House 1972) page 181.
198
Knickerbocker: the magazine of the low countries, Volume 1 1941 page 6.
199
35
gospel truth.” On June 21, 1941, the Daily Worker dismissed war rumors as “wishful thinking on
the part of the monopoly publishers and the imperialist war mongers.” 200
Some communist newspapers weaved anti-Jewish, anti-capitalist, and anti-Allied themes
into their cartoons. Revolutionary solidarity between the Wehrmacht and French army and
workers in the struggle against British imperialism was favorably highlighted by communist
newspapers. In mid-September 1939, the COMINTERN, the KPD, and the Swedish Communist
Party published a newspaper titled Die Welt. In October 1939, issues of Die Welt featured
cartoons which was described by the former German Communist Franz Borkenau as having
“hardly differed from those of the notorious Stuermer (except in the absence of the sex aspect).
The title-page of the issue of October 11th shows a caricature of Léon Blum, wearing
unmistakably the countenance and features of a Jewish black-marketeer, as the Nazis would
picture one. And even worse, because actually a pictorial innuendo on the level of high policy,
the issue of October 18th carries a title page with a map of Western Europe, with, in the
background, a German and a French soldier shaking hands across the frontier--one might think
in an act of revolutionary fraternization, but no, for at the same time a French worker, in the
foreground, is pointing a revolver directly at London. Far in the background, a German worker
is pointing a gun at a German profiteer, again drawn in Stuermer’s anti-Semitic fashion.”
In February 1940, KPD leader Walter Ulbricht wrote in Die Welt that “…Not only the
communists, but also many social-democratic and national-socialist workers regard it as their
task not in any circumstances to permit a breach of the (Hitler-Stalin) pact. Those who
intrigue against the friendship of the German and Soviet people are enemies of the German
people and are branded as accomplices of British imperialism. Among the German working
class greater and greater efforts are being made to expose the followers of the Thyssen clique,
who are the enemies of the Soviet-German pact. There have been many demands that these
enemies shall be removed from their army and government positions, and that their property
shall be confiscated…” Borkenau also observed that the Ulbricht article “contained an offer of
co-operation with the ‘anti-capitalist’ wing of the Nazi party against the German High
Command (then still under the influence of the conservatives) and, of course, against the
West.”201
After the German occupation of Oslo, Norway in 1940, the local communists contacted
the German High Command. The Germans allowed the Norwegian communists to maintain their
offices and allowed the publication of their newspaper Arbeideren. The Norwegian Communists
noted that “It is time to make an end of franc-tireur activities, which only help to bring disaster
upon the civilian population. But organized resistance is of no greater use for ourselves and our
people…It is therefore in the interest of the Norwegian people that this resistance cease.” A
group of former Norwegian Communists led by Halvard Olsen and Haakon Meyer approached
the Germans with a request to seize control of the labor movement. The Germans acceded to the
requests of the Norwegian Communists. The Norwegian Communists displayed the attitude that
“in relation to Germany and to the fighting Norwegian government there was at that time no
difference between Arbeideren and Fritt Folk.” Agents of the fascist group Nasjonal Samling
and the Communists cooperated in seizing control of the Norwegian trade union movement. The
pro-German communist collaborators launched a political program in June 1940. It called for an
immediate peace with Germany, removal of the old government, a new constitution, and the
200
Isserman, Maurice. Which Side Were You On? (University of Illinois Press, 1993) page 102.
201
Borkenau, Franz. European Communism (Harper, 1953) pages 246-251.
36
development of a new regime that was supported by “organizations of the working class.”
Opponents of these communist measures were denounced to the Gestapo. 202
According to the Party newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo, the Bulgarian Communists
welcomed the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 as a means of preventing their nation from being
dragged into war by England and France. A pamphlet authored by the communist Todor Pavlov
laid out the view that the Soviet invasion of Poland was in actuality a liberation of fellow Slavs.
As Miller noted “the Party discovered that its new stance toward Germany coincided with
official government policy.” The Communists attacked the Western Powers and accused the anti-
fascist democratic opponents in Bulgaria of being war mongers. Rabotnichesko Delo demanded
that the government take action against opposition figures: “Rejected by the Bulgarian people
they see that their only hope of coming to power is to get the support of Great Britain and
France…And what is…the government doing about all of this? While saying Bulgaria will
defend its neutrality it allows these Anglo-French agents to operate freely in the country.” Over
500 Bulgarian leftists who fought in the Spanish Civil War were pardoned by the government.
Bulgaria was soon flooded with Soviet books, films, and newspapers. In early 1940, the Soviet
soccer team Spartak visited Bulgaria. 203
The Nazis conveyed the notion that they sought to construct socialism in a conquered
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Nazis carefully avoided any discussion of the restoration of the
Czarist regime or capitalism in conquered Soviet territories. The Germans decided against
restoring the old landowners to their former properties and spread flyers indicating their
opposition to “the return to reaction and the age of the landlords is out of the question.” 204 A
Nazi leaflet printed in Russian noted “Return of capitalist landlords will not take place.” 205
Hitler and his top Party leaders were very aware that the Soviets successfully inculcated an anti-
capitalist worldview within the mindset of the Russian people. In reality, such “socialism” would
result in the enslavement of the Russian peoples. Hitler believed that Soviet Communism was a
false socialism: “Russia is the very personification of the Capitalist State, and there is no other
Capitalist State in the world like it: a population of two hundred millions, iron, manganese,
nickel, oil, petrol—everything one could desire, in limitless quantities, and all belonging to the
State…’”206 Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary on June 16, 1941 that “real
socialism” would be restored in the USSR and that there would be no restoration of the Czars in
Russia.207
In June 1941, the Zeitschriften-Dienst noted in the instructions titled “Suggestions and
Guidelines for Magazine Articles against the Soviet Union” that “…We also reject the czarist
system that proceeded Bolshevism. It was a reactionary, plutocratic regime. We must absolutely
avoid the impression that we want to bring back the czarist era. The Germans are coming not to
202
203
Miller, Marshall Lee. Bulgaria During the Second World War (Stanford University Press,
1975) pages 16-19.
204
page 321.
205
“Leaflet in Russian” Accessed From:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=36&t=53315
206
Hitler, Adolf. Hitler’s Table Talk (Enigma Books New York 2000) Accessed From:
https://archive.org/stream/HitlersTableTalk/HitlersTableTalk_djvu.txt
207
Watson, George. Lost Literature of Socialism (James Clarke & Company 1998) page 83.
37
destroy socialism, but rather to establish social justice. Soviet propaganda deceived the
oppressed peoples by claiming that socialism prevailed in the Soviet state. In truth the crassest
social injustice prevails there. In contrast to countries like England and America where high
capitalism exploits people, the highest form of capitalism prevails in the Soviet Union. The
worker is not subordinate to individual big companies, but rather to a single huge concern, the
Bolshevist state, which has made him into a slave, a serf…The Germans will put an end to
Bolshevist slavery of workers, farmers, and all other working people. Just as the Germans have
gotten rid of exploiters in their own country, they will be sure that social justice prevails in the
former Soviet Union. Germany is a socialist and anti-capitalist state.” 208 Wolfgang Diewerge
noted in 1941 that the Soviets hypocritically maintained trade and political agreements with their
capitalist enemies: “The presumed state of workers and soldiers had secret agreements with the
plutocracies and capitalism.”209
Christopher Butsavage noted that the Nazi radio propaganda sought to attract the Soviet
people to the Nazi cause via socialism, anti-capitalism, and land hunger: “While the higher
standard of living in Germany was stressed, the idea of private property was also reconciled
with National Socialism and its allegedly anti-capitalist ethos…In National Socialist Germany,
capitalism was destroyed, but private property, far from being abolished is further
encouraged…Any employee or peasant may open his own business…Every employee, worker
and peasant is able to own his own home and garden…The houses are nicely built and
comfortably furnished.”210 Robert Edwin Herzstein noted that the Wehrmacht and the Nazis
believed that they could attract Russians to Hitler’s socialism via an anti-capitalism and anti-
Semitism rooted in the Soviet and Czarist traditions: “The OKW211 propagandists believed that
the Russians were particularly vulnerable to an anti-capitalist, anti-Jewish line…In the view of
the German military propagandists, the Russian peasant and small townsman would also
respond well to their attacks on British, American, and Russian-Jewish rapacious capitalism.
This line was a staple of the propaganda materials that reached Smolensk and Orel.” 212
During the war against the Soviet Union, captured Nazi and dissident Marxist prisoners
eagerly found ideological positions in common and damned the liberal-minded POWs and
political internees. Raphael Rupert was imprisoned in a Soviet GULAG with SS Major Gustav
Lombard and Lenin’s translator: “By one of the ironies of camp life, General Lombard’s bunk
neighbour had been Lenin’s official interpreter, another fanatic, but this time a Marxist fanatic.
Although diametrically opposed politically, these men were able to forgive one another their
208
“Anregungen und Richtlinien fur die Zeitschriftenarbeit gegen die Sowjet-Union,”
Zeitschriften-Dienst, Nr. 113 (27 June 1941), Accessed From:
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/zeitschriften-dienst8.htm
209
Diewerge, Wolfgang. Deutsche Soldaten sehen die Sowjet-Union. Feldpostbriefe aus dem
Osten (Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert-Verlag, 1941) Accessed From:
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/feldpost.htm
210
Butsavage, Christopher J. German Radio Propaganda in the Soviet Union: A War Words
Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park 2012 Accessed From:
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/12607/1/Butsavage_umd_0117N_12973.pdf
211
The OKW was the acronym for the Wehrmacht High Command.
212
Herzstein, Robert Edwin. “Anti-Jewish Propaganda in the Orel Region of Great Russia, 1942-
1943: The German Army and Its Russian Collaborators” Accessed From:
http://motlc.wiesenthal.com/site/pp.asp?c=gvKVLcMVIuG&b=395147
38
different ideologies. They even claimed to understand one another’s points of view. But they
could not forgive me for believing in Western liberal ideals.” 213 The Nazi propaganda directed at
converting Soviet POWs to Hitler’s philosophy was similar to the boilerplate of the communists.
A former Soviet POW in Germany recalled the following: “…the devices of Nazi propaganda
were well known to me: they were the same as ours. One of them was criticism of the Western
democracies by their own spokesmen. There were translations into German of articles and books
by American politicians and journalists. And the Nazi journal Plutocrat: plutocracy is the power
of money. The journal was devoted to exposing the vices and imperialist machinations of Anglo-
American capital and world Jewry. Exactly what we were to see in Russia after the war.” 214
Even during the height of Operation Barbarossa, Stalin reached out to Hitler to negotiate
a peace treaty as a means of regrouping Soviet power. It was to mirror the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk. Stalin put forth diplomatic feelers via neutral Sweden to negotiate with Hitler in
December 1942 and the summer of 1943. Deputy Foreign Minister and former USSR
Ambassador Vladimir Dekanozov traveled to Stockholm, Sweden in 1943 to negotiate with the
Nazis. The Soviets offered massive territorial concessions and a generous trade deal. Hitler
stated in November 1942 that “There will no longer be any peace offers coming from us.” 215
In the very last days of the war, the leftwing Nazis Joseph Goebbels and Martin Bormann
sought to negotiate with the Soviets to surrender Berlin. In exchange, the Soviets would allow
Goebbels and Bormann to assume power in Admiral Doenitz’s government. They dispatched
Army Chief of General Staff Hans Krebs to meet with Soviet General Vasily Chuikov. An
exchange of pleasantries followed on April 30 th and May 1, 1945. This snippet of the
conversation between Krebs and Chuikov attempted to highlight the mutual support of
international workers’ solidarity as supported on May Day:
“Krebs: Today is the First of May, a great holiday for our two nations.
Chuikov: We have a great holiday today. How things are with you over there it is hard to
say.”216 Clearly, the Soviets were no longer in the mood to negotiate with the German invaders
and despoilers of their nation.
In April 1945, Grand Admiral Doenitz and Field Marshal Keitel issued a planning
document that laid out a revived Soviet-German alliance that would be committed to socialism
and hostile to Western capitalism: “The German Freedom Movement...disassociates itself
from…falling back into the capitalistic system. Germany and the present Soviet Union join
together in creating a ‘Socialist Union.’ Tying in with the independence of the sixteen Soviet
Republics in 1943, the European peoples form nationally defined, self-governing states, allied
through a defense and economic union. Internal forms within the states are to be decided by the
people. The whole Socialistic Union supports Germany, especially through deliveries of raw
materials. Germany supports Soviet Russia in the reconstruction of the war-devastated areas.
The two great peoples, the Russians and the Germans, have extraordinary possibilities for
development without collision of their interests. The chief emphasis in this bloc will shift more
and more to the racially superior, intellectually more active and more energetic (people); that
213
Rupert, Raphael. A Hidden World (World Pub. Co., 1963) page 89.
214
Kabo, V.R. The Road to Australia (Aboriginal Studies Press, 1998) page 75.
215
Johnson, Paul. Modern Times (Harper Collins Publishers 1983) pages 410-411.
216
39
means to Europe. Thus would be formed an alliance between the young Socialist forces against
the old rotten entrenched powers of the West.” 217 Many former Nazis fled to East Germany,
where they found a successor state to the Third Reich. Behind the internationalist, humanist
rhetoric, East Germany retained the trappings of Prussian militarism, discipline, and even covert
anti-Semitism that was “near and dear” in the hearts of unreconstructed Nazis. The postwar East
German usage of former Nazi personnel is covered in my book The Red Prussians: East German
and Soviet Plans for Conquest of West Germany During the Cold War.
In conclusion, the purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive historical portrait
of Nazi-Communist collaboration between the years 1919 and 1945. The Nazis and Communists
collaborated with each other in order to subvert and collapse their mutual enemies. The mutual
Nazi-Communist targets included the Weimar Republic, the Western powers, and liberal
capitalism. Both the Nazis and Communists portrayed themselves as stern opponents of free
market capitalism, government of checks and balances, and foreign economic “colonialism.”
The Nazis and Communists viewed their movements as socialistic in their ideological
persuasions and were animated by the supremacy of the collective over the individual. Hence,
these movements had more in common with each other than one would initially realize. Nazis
were motivated by the integrity and organic unity of the Volk and Nation, while the Communists
were motivated by the triumph of the proletariat in the class struggle. Another motivation for
Nazi-Communist collaboration was economic. Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union maintained
trade relations from 1918 to 1941, where machinery, capital goods, and raw materials were
exchanged. Such trade dried up immediately after the Germans and their Axis allies invaded the
USSR on June 22, 1941. A contemporary parallel to Nazi-Communist cooperation was the
collaboration between the Left and radical Islamic movements and governments. While both
were diametrically opposed on the issue of the legitimacy of the class struggle, the communists
and Islamists were united in the joint battle against Western and American imperialism, Zionism,
and capitalism. Observers and policymakers should never underestimate such an alliance, since
such arrangements historically injured the cause of freedom. The case of the Nazi-Communist
collaboration is an instructive example of this point.
217
Tetens, T.H. Germany Plots with the Kremlin (Henry Schuman New York 1953) pages 239-
242.

When Brown Meets Red

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1

When Brown Meets Red: Nazi-

1973) Accessed From: http://www.alexanderhamiltoninstitute.org/lp/Hancock/CD-

(Red Front) in Dortmund. In Recklinghausen, SS and SA members transferred to the Fighting

The Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin was a key intermediary in Soviet-German

strait-waistcoat of Western European plutocracy.”119 The SS newspaper Das Schwarze Korps

policy of European pacification as well as the conclusion of a Franco-Soviet pact of friendship

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