Tenebro v.

CA, 423 SCRA 272

Republic v. CA, Molina, 268 SCRA 198
Barcelona v. CA 412 SCRA 41
Tongol v. Tongol 537 SCRA 135
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, 266 SCRA 324
Carino v. Carino, 351 SCRA127
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572
Felicitas Amor Catalan v. CA, et. al. G.R. No. 167109, Febraury 7, 2007

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with the private complainant Leticia Ancaias on April
1990. Later on, Ancaias was informed of a previous marriage of Tenebro to a certain Hilda Villareyes
dated November 10, 1986. Petitioner later left the conjugal dweling and cohabited with Villareyes. On
Jan 25, 1993, a third marriage was contracted with a certain Nilda Villegas.

Private complainant Ancaias filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner with RTC of lapu lapu city.
RTC found the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as affirmed by the CA.
Among other issues, the petitioner argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on
the ground of Psychological incapacity retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
celebrated. Hence the elements of the crime of bigamy are lacking.

WON Psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage in the case of
Bigamy.

No.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:

(1) that the offender has been legally married;

(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

Bigamy penalizes any person who contracts a second marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved. As soon as the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence of the valid marriage,
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.

Court explained that the nullity of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not
grounded on the lack of essential or formal requisites for validity of marriage. In this case, all the
essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied in the second marriage. Even if
the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts tot
eh date of the celebration of marriage, the same marriage still has legal effects, like children born before
the nullity of marriage are still considered legitimate.

*issue: The first marriage does not exist, petitioner presented a certification by the national
statistics offie and city civil registry of manila attesting that there is no reord of a marriage
celebrated between Veronico Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes. Court held that the mere fact that
no record of a marriage exist does not invalidate the marriage, furthermore the marriage
contract that was presented by the prosecution between tenebro and Villareyes is a positive
evidence which was given greater credence than the documents testifying absence of record.
Further considering that the law did not require a condition precedent that documents be
submitted to the civil registrar for the validity of marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL

OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

Private respondet Roridel and Reynaldo Molina were married in April 14, 1985, and was later blessed
with a son Andre Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signes of immaturity and
irresponsibility as a husband and father, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance and never
honest with his wife in regard to their finanes, in 1986 he was relieved of his job and Roridel was sole
breadwinner of the family. In 1987 Roridel resigned from her job and went to live with her parents, since
then, Reynaldo left Roridel and his child and since then abandoned them. In August 16 1990, Roridel
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Ithe petition shows that Reynaldo was psychologically incapacle of complying with essential
marital obligation,a nd it would be to best interst to have their marriage declared null and void. The trial
court rendered judgement declaring the marriage as affirmed by the CA. the OSG inisist that opposing
and conflicting personalitis is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

WON the CA erred in declaring the nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

YES. Psychological incapacity should be characterized by Gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In the rpesent case, it appears to the court as a difficulty or ceglect in the performance of some marital
obligation. The mere showing of irreconciliable difference and conflicting personalities does not
constitutue PI. They also failed to show that the incapacity to do those obligations is due to a
psychological illness. The expert testimony showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility.

This case also laid down the guidlens in interpreting the application of Art 36 of the family code.

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not
physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of
the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
 The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON,

respondents.

Respondent Tadeo Bengzon and Petitioner Diana Barcelona were legally married and had five children,
during their marriage they had frequent quarrels, due to petitioner’s several miscarriages she withdrew
herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband. The petitioner then requested the respondent
to leave their conjugal dwelling temporarilry- the petitioner opposed but no amount of plea could
dissuade her demand. This separation later on resulted in the complete estrangement between the
couple that lead to legal separation and likewise agreed on the custody and support of their children. On
March 1995 respondent Tadeo filed a petition for annulment of marriage against petitioner Diana but
later withdrew its petition which the trial court granted. On July 21, 1995 respondent filed a new
petition for annulment of marriage against petitioner diana on the ground of psychological incapacity
founded in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship of the petitioner and
respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition fails to state a cause
of action she contends that the petition is fails to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity,
that I existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent and incurable, nor was the
reference of the grave nature of the ilnes bring about the disability. –(and second it violates the rule on
Forum shopping.) The trial court deffered the motion to dismiss until the parties ventilate their
arguments in hearing. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing the
trial court order. The CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion.

WON allegation of the second petition state a cause of action.

YES. The court held that second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action.

Section The rules of procedure on petition for nullity of void marriages provide

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

Court held that the expert opinion need not to be alleged in the petitioner since only experts in thefield
are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new rules do not
require the petition to allege the expert opinion, it follows that there is no need to allege in the petition
the root cause of the psychological incapacity.

*issue on Forum shopping

ORLANDO G. TONGOL, petitioner, vs. FILIPINAS M. TONGOL, respondent.

Petitioner Orlando and Respondent Filipinas got married over the objection of their families. Their
marriage was not happy respondent being greatly influenced by her parents treated the petitioner with
contempt even at the early stages of their marriage. Petitioner started a junkshop but instead of support
respondent ridiculed him. Later on the business became successful and he embarked on a
pharmaceutical company, respondent now became interested and interfered in the operation of
business however because of her bad attitude towards employees they became aloof and she resented
her husband who gets along well with them. Their fighting persisted and affected their children and
efforts and reconciliation proved futile. Orlando decided to live separately and a petition for dissolution
of their property relation was granted.

Orlando filed before the RTC petition for declaration nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground
of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. The petition relied heavily on findings
of Dr. villegas stating that respondent is suffering from an inadequate personality disorder with
hysterical coloring which reners her psychologically incapacitated.

RTC denied the petition as affirmed by the CA

WON evidence to prove psychological incapacity of the respondent was sufficient.

NO. Based on the explanation of Dr. villegas on the psychological illness. that as a child, Filipinas had
always felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those feelings of rejection even
when she became an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy and temper tantrums, every time
she sees her husband having a good interaction with their employees, are ways of coping up with her
feelings of rejection. However, dr villegas failed to link the respondents Personality disorder to her
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

What has been established in the instant case is that, by reason of her feelings of inadequacy
and rejection, respondent not only encounters a lot of difficulty but even refuses to assume
some of her obligations towards her husband, such as respect, help and support for him.
However, this Court has ruled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.
Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the personality disorder of
respondent is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable.
Fourth, Molina requires that the psychological incapacity as understood under Article 36 of the
Family Code must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Memorandum submitted to the trial court, claimed that their quarrels arose solely from their
disagreement on how to run their business
Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also
one's obligation toward their children. In the present case, no evidence was presented to show
that respondent had been remiss in performing her obligations toward their children

Court Concluded that while the respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder, this idisorder does
not show the kind contemplated by Art 36 of FC to render one incapale of complying with the essential
obligation of marriage.

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
Petitioner Chi ming and respondent Gina got married, however from date of their marriage on May 22,
1988 until March 15 1989 they never had coitus even if they slept together in the same room. Because
of this they submitted themselves for medical examination which resulted that Gina is healthy, normal
and still a virgin while Chi ming’s examination was kept confidential. Respodnetn filed an annulment of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. She claims that the petitioner is impotent, a closet
homosexual and only married her to acquire or maintain his residency status in the country.

The petitioner admitted that there was no sexual contact between them but blames it to his wife saying
that she avoided him whenever he caresses her private parts and when he tried to force her to have sex
he did not continue because she was shaking and does not like it. He was also physically examined
finding there is no evidence of impotency. He had a penis size of two inches which lengthened by one
but still capable of having sexual intercourse.

RTC rendered the marriage void as affirmed by the CA.

The petitioner contends that alleged refusal by the parties to have sex with each other does not
constitute psychological incapacity of both.

WON CA erred in declaring the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Court held that

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
 the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal
of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its
mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.

SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages, first was with the petitioner Susan Nicdao with
two children and the second was with the respondent Susan Yee who he had no children but
cohabited with him for 10 years. SPO4 Santiago died leaving his heirs with death benefit claims
amoungitng to 146,000.

Respondent Susan Yee filed a case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao to
return atleast one half of the deathbenefits she received. Respondent admitted that her
marriage took place during the subsistence of the first marriage with the petitioner but she had
no knowledge of it. Furthermore, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner the first
wife and Santiago is void ab intiio because it was solemnized without the required marriage
license- evidenced by their marriage license without marriage license number.

Trial court ruled in favor of the respondent second wife. Which was later affirmed by the CA.

WON the court has jurisdiction to rule over the validity of the marriage of petitioner first wife and
Santiago

Yes.Article 40 of the family code states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purpose of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring it void. However for other
purpose such as determination of heirship or legitimacy settelments of estate or others of the same
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of parties.
WON the first wife petitioner and Santiago marriage is valid

No. A marriage license is indispensable to the validity of their marriage, marriage between them having
been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being exempt from the marriage
license requirement is void ab initio.

WON the second wife respondent and Santiago marriage is valid

No. the nullity of the previous marriage of the first marriage does not valiate the second marriage. Since
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the prior marriage void.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the property regime would not be absolute
community but rather of co-ownership. PRoperoty regime of unions without marriage.

“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...”

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to
share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal
partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And with respect to the right of the second
wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for
judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of
one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21

ROBERTO DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA

represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA, Respondents.

Petitioner Roberto Domingo and respondent Delia Avera were married on November 29, 1976,
unknown to the respondent Delia the petioner had a previous marriage with one Emerlina Dela Paz on
April 23, 1969 which marriage is still valid existing. It only came to her knowledge when petitioner was
sued for bigamy .
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed the petition On May 29, 1991, entitled “Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” against Roberto Domingo. The petition, which was
filed before Pasig RTC, alleged the following:

4) Since 1979, respondent Delia has been working in Saudi Arabia and is only able to stay in the
Philippines when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her employer;

5) Roberto has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;

6)Her personal properties amounting to P350,000.00 are under the possession of Roberto, who
disposed some of the said properties without her knowledge and consent;

7) While Delia was on her vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the declaration of their marriage, which is void
ab initio, is superfluous and unnecessary. He further suggested that private respondent should have filed
an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired by their union.

RTC and CA dismissed the petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. (If in the affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.)

2) Whether or not the petition entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property” is
the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly
belonging to her exclusively.

HELD:

1) Yes. The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished
merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this
so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky
foundation.

On the other hand, the clause “on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void” in
Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only
for purpose of remarriage.

2) Yes. The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other
incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property
according to the regime of property relations governing them.

Hence, SC denied the instant petition. CA’s decision is affirmed.

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B.
CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, respondents.

Petitioner Felicitas Catalan married respondent Orlando Catalan on June 4, 1950 at Mabini, Pangasinan,
they migrated to US and allegedly became naturalized citizens, after 38 years of marriage they had a
divorce. Two months after the divorce Orlando married the respondent Merope Braganza, in Calasio,
Pangasinan. Petitioner then filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages conteding
that the marriage between the respondents were bigamous. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of cause of action since the petitioner is not a real-party in interest.

RTC rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner, but was reversed by the CA.

WON the petitioner has leagal standing to file the case.

Under Section 2(a) of the Rules on Declaration of Absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of
void marriages. A petititon for the declation of nullity may be filed solely by the husband and wife.

Court held that the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove the naturalization and divorce of
Felicitas Catalan and Orlando Catalan. Without it, the issue of personality to file the pettion cannot be
ruled.

If the respondent was granted an absolute divorce decree then the court must dismiss the petition for
lack of legal personality to do the same. On the contrary if the divorce decree did not allow the
respondent to remarry, then the marriage between Orlando and his second wife Merope is bigamous
and damages must be paid. Hence, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceeding.