Terror from Above

How the Commercial Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Revolution

Threatens the US Threshold
Maj Bryan A. Card, USAFR
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be con-
strued as carrying the official sanction of the Department of Defense, Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air
University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. This article may be reproduced in whole or in part
without permission. If it is reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy line.

A mazon is not the only organization interested in using unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (UAV) to deliver packages. Soon, terrorist organizations may also em-
ploy UAVs for their diabolic purposes. The US is on the cusp of a burgeoning
commercial UAV revolution. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations
have limited commercial employment of UAVs within the US; however, this is
changing with newly implemented FAA guidelines.1 As the regulatory impediments
to using UAVs in the US for commercial purposes continue to decrease, commercial
demand will increase, and UAV technology providers will develop more capable
and user-friendly UAVs and control systems. Unfortunately, greater commercial ac-
cessibility to UAV technology will make UAVs more attractive as a delivery method
for terrorist attacks, and policy makers should consider different courses of action
to combat this emerging threat.

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The DOD classifies UAVs into five different groups, based on the gross weight,
operating altitude, and speed of the UAV.2 This article will focus on the small UAVs
in groups 1 and 2, which include UAVs under 55 lbs., flying under 3,500 feet above
ground level, and under 250 knots. There are two primary reasons for focusing on
these UAVs. First, the FAA has created a new remote pilot certification for UAV opera-
tors, no longer requiring UAV operators to hold a recreational, sport, or commercial
pilot’s license for unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 lbs.3 With this new regula-
tion, it is anticipated that most commercial development into pilot-less systems in
the US will fall into unmanned aircraft of this size. Second, it is more likely that indi-
viduals or a small group can build a group 1 or 2 UAV in a garage, on a small budget,
for use in a terror attack without attracting suspicion.

Definitions
First, it is helpful to look at some of the terms and acronyms associated with un-
manned aerial vehicles:
• Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV): UAV refers to an actual air vehicle, sometimes
simply referred to as an unmanned aircraft (UA).
• Unmanned aerial system (UAS): This term typically refers to the entire system
of systems that allows a UAV to fly and perform its mission, including the
ground station, telemetry, communication and navigation equipment, sensor
package, and the UAV itself.
• Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA): An unmanned aircraft controlled by a trained
pilot; this is a term primarily used by the USAF to denote unmanned aircraft.4
• Drone: A common term used to refer to UAVs but can refer to any form of auto-
mated robot or machinery.
Despite the distinctions among these terms, they are often used interchangeably.
This article will primarily use the term UAV unless referencing a complete system
of systems, in which case the term UAS will be used.
Last, the following terms will be used to characterize potential terrorist targets
and assets that law enforcement and defensive planners wish to protect.
• High-value target: A target whose loss will significantly bolster the terrorist’s
campaign, due to several factors that could include the symbolic nature of the
target and the amount of media attention the target would generate.5
• High-risk personnel: Personnel who, by their position, grade, assignment, or
symbolic value, are likely to be attractive terrorist targets.6
• High-risk event: An event that due to its symbolic value, mass attendance, or
media attention, is likely to be an attractive and accessible terrorist target.

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Current Assessments of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

as Threats to National Security
Until recently, the literature discussing the threat from UAVs focused on either
large-scale UAVs that pose an external threat to US security or on domestically oper-
ated UAVs that could threaten the privacy of citizens. Recent events, such as the
UAV crashing on the White House lawn and UAV sightings in France—throughout
Paris and at nuclear power plants throughout the country—have brought attention
to the use of small UAVs and the potential danger they pose.7
One of the most critical pieces of research to date examining the threat of UAVs
to the US homeland is a RAND Corporation study entitled Evaluating Novel Threats
to the Homeland: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Cruise Missiles, henceforth referred
to as the Novel Threats study. This 2008 study conducts a “Red” analysis of alterna-
tive attack modes, comparing “the suitability of cruise missiles and UAVs against
other options, such as vest bombs, car bombs, and mortars.”8 The success of poten-
tial attacks is based on three primary tactical outcomes:
1. Targeted individuals are injured or killed.
2. Property is damaged or destroyed.
3. An activity in or by the target state is disrupted.9
To determine if an attack mode could successfully achieve these tactical out-
comes, the study considered: (1) warhead effectiveness (measured by weight of
payload); (2) the type of ordinance delivered; (3) the accuracy of the weapon; and
(4) the probability of reaching the target. Generally speaking, the larger the payload
that can be delivered, the less accuracy required to achieve the tactical objective.
The study concludes that UAVs and cruise missiles best provide the following
five operational advantages:
1. Circumventing perimeter defenses
2. Attacking from outside national borders
3. Staging multiple simultaneous attacks
4. Sustaining protracted terrorist campaigns and
5. Dispersal of unconventional weapons.10
Despite these operational advantages, the study claims that UAVs are unlikely to
be widely embraced due to their “greater complexity, technological uncertainty,
cost, and risks.”11 The authors do concede that attack methods are “driven by the ac-
tions of the defense or security measures” in place; however, they conclude that sig-
nificant soft targets within the US exist to make it unnecessary for terrorists to em-
ploy UAVs for attacks.12
In arriving at their conclusion, the Novel Threats authors failed to take into con-
sideration two important factors that will contribute to terrorist use of UAVs. First,
they do not consider communication, or “messaging,” as a tactical objective of ter-
rorist violence. Second, the study does not account for the commercial expansion of

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UAVs that the US is now beginning to experience or the effects commercialization is

having on the costs and accessibility of UAVs. Consideration of these two factors
will demonstrate that the use of UAVs in terrorist attacks can no longer be dis-
missed as highly unlikely.

Terrorism as Communication
A key component of terrorism is communication. In Communicating Terror, Jo-
seph Tuman proposes that terrorists engage in violence to send a message to a tar-
get audience. He writes: “The primary audience will be those who witness and ob-
serve the violence and destruction and engage in discourse about what they have
seen.”13 Thus, the message is not the violence or destruction itself, but rather the
message is either embedded within the violence or follows from it in subsequent
messaging.14 Therefore, the tactical output of a terrorist action may not be the peo-
ple killed or the damaged property but rather the message it sends to a target audi-
ence that is separate from those targeted in the attack.
By striking a particularly high-value target, such as a high-ranking political figure,
celebrity, or athlete, a terrorist organization can demonstrate its ability to overcome
the defensive capabilities of the state, displaying the terrorists’ strength and the
state’s weakness. The more attention the action will garner—through sheer destruc-
tion or due to the target’s high value—the more lucrative a particular target be-
comes. Simply assuming that terrorists will attack soft targets rather than protected
ones due to the additional operational complexity is simplifying the issue too much.
By failing to address the idea that terrorism is communication through violence, the
Novel Threats authors discount the real possibility that terrorists may choose an ac-
curate delivery method capable of circumventing perimeter defenses to strike at a
high-value target and thus garnering the terrorists a high degree of attention and
infamy. By not addressing terrorists’ propensity for choosing targets of symbolic sig-
nificance or for media attention, the Novel Threats study comes to the rebuttable
conclusion that UAVs are not a probable threat. UAVs are indeed a probable threat.

The Commercialization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

A second factor the Novel Threats study fails to account for is the burgeoning
commercial UAV revolution. Missy Cummings, a former Navy fighter pilot and the
director of the Humans and Autonomy Lab at Duke University, has stated:
We’re going to see many commercial applications and much more civilian development than in
the military. In 15 years, you could look up in the sky and see UAVs doing window washing
and building inspections. You also could see every jealous ex-husband or wife following their
significant other around. For good or bad, we are on the cusp of a new era.15
One’s imagination may be the only limiting factor to the multitude of uses for
UAVs. Current commercial uses include aerial photography, monitoring oil fields and
pipelines, transporting critical goods, and conducting search and rescue operations.
One example of this new demand for UAVs is provided by University of Nebraska

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journalism professor Matt Waite, who spent almost two decades as a reporter cover-
ing natural disasters. At a digital-mapping conference he saw the GateWing X100 UAV,
which can fit in the back of a sport utility vehicle, is hand-launchable and equipped
with a downward-facing high resolution camera. Controlled by a tablet computer us-
ing a digital map, one simply touches the screen and tells it where to fly—no piloting
skills required. The X100 is extremely useful for reporting on fires, floods, hurricanes,
and tornadoes—just about any situation where it is prohibitively dangerous to fly a
manned aircraft.16 This utility was demonstrated recently in the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Harvey, where the FAA issued at least 43 authorizations to fly commercial UAVs
in support of recovery efforts, helping local authorities “assess damage to homes,
roads, bridges, power lines, oil and gas facilities, and office buildings.”17
Human supervisory control is one of the largest advantages of UAV technology,
allowing those with minimal training to control these aircraft. Instead of having to
understand aeronautical principles and the complex controls of an aircraft—as a pi-
lot must—UAV operators are performing, human supervisory control, a higher-level
function where the operator “encourages” the aircraft to do what she or he wants.18
Thus, you have UAVs that fly themselves to waypoints without the operator having
to know the first thing about aerodynamics. Engineers, surveyors, search and rescue
crews, and other professionals who would benefit from a UAV can simply go
through minimal training and operate the aircraft themselves.
In one of Cummings’ experiments with human supervisory control, micro-aerial
vehicle visualization of unexplored environments (MAV VUE), researchers had an
operator in Seattle, Washington controlling a micro-UAV in an open field in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.19 The controller used an iPhone connected to the internet
via a wireless hotspot while the UAV communicated with a ground-station, also con-
nected to a wireless hotspot. The operator had two levels of control—waypoint con-
trol and nudge control. Using waypoint control, the operator simply clicked on a
digital map to tell the UAV where to fly. Using nudge control, the operator, with the
help of a forward-facing view from the UAV’s camera, flew the UAV by tilting the
iPhone in the direction she wanted it to go. The researchers also selected random
passersby to control the UAV to demonstrate how a minimally trained operator
could easily operate a small UAV. Test subjects received three minutes of instruc-
tion and were able to successfully control the UAV and perform tasks like identify-
ing people through the video feed sent to the iPhone from the UAV’s camera. Such
technology allows operators to move away from traditional command and control
systems that require them to micromanage the behavior of the vehicle, and to con-
centrate instead on the more mission-relevant part of command and control.
Additionally, the relatively low cost of group 1 and 2 UAVs will make them a vi-
able delivery mechanism for terrorists. Exemplifying the increased accessibility of
UAVs is the hobbyist website DIYDrones.com. DIYDrones.com is dedicated to helping
drone enthusiasts gather and exchange ideas and information about how to build
and operate drones. Through it, a person can learn to build a UAV equipped with
high-definition (HD) cameras, telemetry, and control systems. These hobby-built
UAVs can be assembled with a full telemetry kit and autopilot for a cost of between
$2,000–$10,000.20 Chris Anderson, founder of DIYDrones.com stated, “If we make
the technology cheap, easy and ubiquitous, regular people will figure it out.”21 Cer-

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tainly if your average person can build a UAS, so can a terrorist, and the $2,000–
$10,000 price range falls well within the historical costs of many terrorist attacks.22
In 2012, Cummings stated, “companies are chomping at the bit” to integrate UAVs
into their operations, “and there’s no technical reason we can’t do this now. . . the
only reason we don’t is regulatory issues.”23 Now, with the barriers to operating UAVs
in the US diminishing, we will see a rise in commercial development, leading to
greater accessibility for individuals and businesses. Unfortunately, such increased
accessibility will also make UAVs more attractive to those who would use them for
nefarious purposes, thus eliminating the barriers to entry into the realm of airpower.

The Attraction of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

With the understanding that terror attacks are communication through violence
and that the technical and monetary costs of using UAVs are decreasing, we will
now highlight some of the characteristics of UAVs that make them well-suited for
terrorist attacks. The Novel Threats study argues that the primary reason UAVs are
attractive as a delivery mechanism is their inherent mobility—the ability to conduct
attacks over perimeter defenses. While many potential terrorist targets in the US
lack perimeter defenses or barriers, “individual protected targets may still be attrac-
tive to an adversary if a successful strike on such a target is viewed as particularly
valuable in advancing the group’s goals.”24 For instance, it is not hard to imagine the
media sensation that would occur if terrorists are able to successfully fly a weapon-
ized UAV into a huddle of football players during the next Super Bowl, an outdoor
music concert, or an elementary school playground at recess. Another frightening
example would be if a UAV were flown toward the US president at the next inaugu-
ration. Even a minimal 1–2 lb. explosive charge could cause deaths and severe inju-
ries, all while 100 million people watch in horror.
This ability of a UAV to bypass perimeter defenses is exemplified by several re-
cent events. In 2013, at a campaign event in Dresden, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel and Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière were interrupted by a quadcop-
ter flying onto the stage (fig. 1).25 In January 2015, a quadrotor UAV crash landed on
the White House lawn and three months later a gyrocopter—the size of a larger
UAV—landed on the lawn near the US Capitol, flying unimpeded through restricted
airspace.26 In these examples, no one was injured, and there was no demonstrable
malicious intent on the part of the operators; however, they show how easily UAVs
can access secure areas. Either of these events could have been tragic had the op-
erator’s intent been nefarious and the aircraft carrying energetic material.
A second reason terrorists will adopt UAVs is their ability to lower operational
risks to the terrorists themselves. While some terrorists have shown a willingness to
sacrifice themselves for their cause, others may be attracted to the ability to com-
mit a terrorist attack with a much lower risk of apprehension, allowing for the pos-
sibility of conducting a protracted terror campaign. The MAV VUE project demon-
strates how a UAV operator can be 3,000 miles away, controlling a UAV over the
internet. Someone would certainly need to be on the ground to deploy the UAV;
however, a UAV equipped with a 3G or 4G cellular phone can be controlled from

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virtually anywhere. Such operations would significantly complicate law enforce-

ment investigations because of the limited footprint that terrorists would leave on
the ground near the attack. A weaponized UAV could be launched miles away from
the intended target, forcing law enforcement to greatly expand the search area for
potential witnesses and/or physical evidence.

Courtesy of ArsTechnica

Figure 1. German chancellor Angela Merkel smiles as a Parrot AR drone comes in for a crash landing
during a Christian Democratic Party campaign event 15 September 2013. (Reprinted from “German
Chancellor’s Drone ‘Attack’ Shows the Threat of Weaponized UAVs,” ArsTechnica, 8 September 2013, https://
arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/09/german-chancellors-drone-attack-shows-the-threat-of
-weaponized-uavs/.

A final reason that UAVs are attractive to terrorists is that it would be difficult to
thwart an attack in progress. It is difficult to detect UAVs using radar, the traditional
method of detecting air defense threats. The gyrocopter that landed on the Capitol
building lawn exemplifies this difficulty. White House spokesman Josh Earnest said
that the low-speed, low-altitude flight made it difficult to detect the small gyrocop-
ter on radar.27 Marcus Weisgerber, a Defense One writer, stated, “Radars can only see
above the treeline so if he’s flying on the treeline they are going to have a hard time
spotting him.”28 Additionally, the small size of UAVs makes them difficult to detect
on radar, since “(existing radar systems) are not designed to look for something like
a quadcopter.”29 Finally, by the time UAVs are detected, their high speed (70–plus
mph) can make them difficult to defeat or evade.
There are already weaponized, small-scale UAVs developed for military applica-
tion, designed to be rapidly deployable, easily controlled and equipped to destroy
soft targets. AeroVironment’s “Switchblade is designed to provide the warfighter

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with a back-packable, non-line-of-sight precision strike solution with minimal collat-

eral effects.”30 The Switchblade weighs 2.8 kg, carries a 0.45 kg payload, and can
reach an estimated top speed of 80–100 mph.31 AeroVironment claims “the vehicle’s
small size and quiet motor make it difficult to detect, recognize and track even at
very close range.”32 While the Switchblade may well never fall into terrorist hands
due to sales and export restrictions, the principle of the Switchblade—a small, fast
UAV with an onboard camera for targeting—provides an important example of the
potential of this threat.

Figure 2. X8 Flying Wing internal storage

One example of a hobbyist remote control (R/C) aircraft that can be converted
into a weaponized UAV is the X8 Flying Wing. The X8 has ample space for electron-
ics and a small explosive. (fig. 2) It weighs a mere 2.2 kg, is capable of holding an
additional 2.3 kg payload, can cruise at 40 mph with a maximum speed of 70 mph,
and has an endurance of up to three hours.33 The base kit can be purchased for

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$160; a complete system with an engine, autopilot, first-person view HD camera

and video transmitter can cost an amount between $2,000–$10,000. There are also
options to purchase the X8 as a turn-key UAS. Spain-based Airelectronics sells the
X8 Flying Wing complete with a ground station, its U-Pilot autopilot, and a sensor
suite. Airelectronics claims an endurance of up to three hours, with redundant nav-
igation using dead reckoning if GPS signals are lost. This system is estimated to cost
approximately $20,000.34 The X8 is just one of several hobby-grade UAVs that can be
used for attacks, highlighting once again the real terrorist threat UAVs pose today.

Defensive Approach
US military joint doctrine discusses both defensive and offensive methodologies
for countering air threats.35 Borrowing from this operational concept, we will exam-
ine both active and passive defense, as well as a more proactive approach utilizing
intelligence and law enforcement operations before a possible UAV attack. Active
defense consists of “direct defensive actions taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air” threats, while passive defense includes measures “taken
to minimize, mitigate, or recover from the consequences of attack aircraft and mis-
siles.”36 Finally, intelligence and law enforcement operations can be used to seek
out and apprehend terrorists before they strike.

Active Defense
UAVs are not a traditional air defense threat as they are generally smaller than
manned aircraft and fly lower and slower, making them harder to detect, thereby
complicating the role of active defense. Radars can only detect objects within their
direct line of sight, and the lower an object flies, the shorter the possible detection
range due to being masked behind trees and buildings. Finally, the small size of
UAVs further complicates detection with radars. Based on an Army Research Lab
report, a small UAV may have an approximate radar cross-section (RCS) of -15 dBsm,
or decibels referenced to a square meter, which is a logarithmic measure of how
much a particular object will reflect electromagnetic energy.37 This is comparable to
a large bird (-20 dBsm), while, on the other hand, a large commercial airliner could
have an RCS around 40 dBsm and a small jet might be in the 1–2 dBsm range.38
Therefore, even if a UAV is detected on radar, it may be disregarded as a bird due to
their similar size, altitude and speed.
To make matters worse, even if a UAV threat is identified, the options for dealing
with the threat are limited. First, in urban environments, where attacks are more
likely, law enforcement and the military will be averse to shooting UAVs down be-
cause any projectile used for a kinetic attack may cause collateral damage when it
returns to the ground. Furthermore, many UAVs would likely be difficult to shoot
down due to their light weight, requiring minimal lift to remain airborne.39 UAVs
made of Styrofoam, fiberglass or similar materials could likely take several hits and
remain operational unless a critical component is damaged—such as the engine,
navigation, or receiver. The use of an explosive ordinance could help alleviate this

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issue, but it will add additional concern about collateral damage and public safety.
Lastly, a kinetic model for defending a target in an urban environment could re-
quire several systems with trained operators to be in place along likely air avenues
of approach to adequately defend the area. This model will increase the cost of de-
fending against UAV threats, perhaps prohibitively so, which is one of the reasons
the Novel Threats study does not recommend the development of a robust active de-
fense system for this threat.
One form of active defense that does hold promise, however, is the use of jam-
ming to block the command channel and/or telemetry of UAVs. Jamming can be
particularly effective against hobby-grade UAVs because their command frequen-
cies are regulated; therefore, anything purchased off the shelf will be in a frequency
range that can be anticipated. By jamming the most common frequencies, one
could effectively eliminate the ability of a terrorist UAV operator to conduct accu-
rate targeting within the denied area. Additionally, unlike kinetic fires, jamming
would not necessarily require the same type of tracking precision to engage the
threat. Jamming can be omnidirectional, thus only requiring the threat be detected
within a certain proximity, allowing for nontraditional methods of detection, such
as acoustic and radio frequency detection.
There are three basic factors to consider debating when attempting to jam a UAV
command channel or its telemetry data:
• Transmit power of both the control station and the UAV
• Antenna gain of the transmitters
• Radio-frequency (RF) noise level in the environment.
For a terrorist to conduct dynamic targeting, the control station and UAV need to
communicate. By preventing this communication, an attack may be thwarted or, at
a minimum, cause a loss of precision in targeting, which is critical when consider-
ing the small payload of these UAVs.
Theoretically, radio waves, by which the ground station and UAV communicate,
travel infinitely; however, as they travel, they disperse, and their signal weakens by
the square of the distance they travel.
1
( Intensity x Distance 2
)
This rule is known as the inverse square law of propagation, and it is the major de-
terminant of the range in which a UAV control station can make contact with a re-
ceiver. Antenna gain also affects this distance in that the better the antenna can
translate power into radio waves, the further the usable signal will travel. Third, the
signal needs to overcome the RF noise level in the environment. Once the signal
can no longer be discerned from the noise, it becomes unusable. Jamming works
by effectively raising the RF noise level, preventing a useful transmission from
reaching the receiver on the UAV. As the UAV approaches the defended asset and
collocated jammer, the harder it is for the transmitter to overcome the RF noise of
the signal jammer.

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Transmitter Power

RF Noise Level

Control Antenna Distance RF Jammer

Figure 3. Transmitter power versus RF noise level

Figure 3 shows how such a jammer would work by raising the RF noise level in
the vicinity of the area that is to be defended. Once the signal from the control an-
tenna falls below the RF noise level, the operator would no longer be able to control
the UAV. To overcome the signal jammer, the terrorist would then have to change
frequency bands, increase transmit power, or get closer to the target area, none of
which are particularly easy. Changing the frequency band or increasing the power
output of the transmitter would require significant knowledge of electrical and ra-
dio frequency engineering, unlikely to be had except in the case of the most deter-
mined and/or technical of terrorists. Additionally, forcing the terrorist to move
closer to the target raises the operational risk for the terrorist since he then may be
observed and interrupted midoperation, thus negating some of the operational ad-
vantages of UAVs.
One of the downsides of using jamming against UAVs, however, is that there are
many users of the electromagnetic spectrum, and jamming may disrupt legitimate
users of the spectrum. R/C aircraft and UAVs are only authorized to utilize certain
frequencies: 27 MHz, 49 MHz, 50 MHz, 53 MHz, 72 MHz, and 75 MHz for single
channel use and 2.4 GHz for spread spectrum use.40 Additionally, telemetry kits
that send back video and positioning information can usually be found in the 433
MHz, 900 MHz, 2.4 GHz, and 5.8 GHz ranges. While the single-channel control fre-
quencies would not be particularly problematic to jam, the 433 MHz, 900 MHz, 2.4
GHz, and 5.8 GHz ranges are part of what is known as the industrial, scientific and
medical bands (ISM), and jamming them could cause undesirable interference.
Common devices that use these bands include Bluetooth devices, cordless phones,
and wireless internet protocol networks. Additionally, a complicating factor in the
utilization of jammers is the use of cellular networks to control UAVs. To extend the
range of UAVs and the telemetry they send back, terrorists may attempt to utilize
cellular networks by integrating a smartphone or other wireless mobile device into
their UAV design, as exemplified in the MAV VUE experiment. Jamming such sig-
nals would require interrupting cellular services within a given area. The general

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public would likely disapprove of continuous, unnecessary interruptions of cellular

services and other wireless functions in protected areas. Fortunately, there are
ways to help mitigate undesired interference.
Active and passive detection systems—radars, acoustic sensors, and RF detectors—
can help mitigate interference with the general public use of cellular services and
the ISM bands by allowing jamming only when a UAV is detected within restricted
airspace. Radars optimized against small, low, and slow UAVs—such as those using
new holographic and micro-Doppler radar technology—may be effective at detecting
and identifying UAVs operating in restricted airspace.41 Additionally, nontraditional
detection methods such as acoustic and radio frequency sensors may also prove
useful in both detecting UAVs and distinguishing them from other objects like birds.
Acoustic systems detect the relatively unique audio signature that UAVs produce
from their propellers, while RF detection involves creating a mesh network of re-
ceivers “that can triangulate moving transmitters.”42 Thus, once a UAV is detected
entering restricted airspace or approaching a high-risk event, jammers can then be
turned on to defeat the threat, minimizing the interruption of cellular services and
the ISM bands and alleviating public concerns.
Obviously, the choice to interrupt cellular service, wireless networks, and Blue-
tooth devices should not be taken lightly; however, when faced with the alternate
choice of expending live ordinances over a population center in order to disable a
threatening UAV, the prudent choice to use jamming is clear. The use of a warning
network—radar, acoustic sensors, and RF detectors—to detect UAV threats com-
bined with RF jamming of UAV command and telemetry systems seems to be a
highly promising way to defeat such threats.

Passive Defense
One of the best methods of mitigating a UAV terrorist attack is through a strong
passive defense. Passive air defense measures can include detection and warning
systems, camouflage and concealment, deception, and hardening. One particularly
effective passive method for defeating UAV attacks is to host high-risk events indoors.
Most commercial structures provide adequate physical protection—hardening—from
the warheads that small UAVs would be able to carry, approximately 1–5 kg. By
merely hosting events inside, one could greatly reduce the likelihood of being tar-
geted. While it may be possible to fly a UAV inside a structure, it is not desirable
due to a lack of mobility, difficulty in route planning and the strong possibility of
losing RF signals indoors. Hosting an event indoors removes the ability of the UAV
to bypass perimeter defenses and would likely cause a terrorist to choose a different
target or delivery method.
In case of an outdoor event, passive defenses can still be implemented. By utiliz-
ing detection systems to provide advanced warning, high-risk personnel can be
moved to a sheltered area if a UAV were to enter into a restricted area. Since small
UAVs cannot carry a large payload, this shelter could range from an armored vehi-
cle to a nearby building. For outdoor events on a covered stage, deployable netting
could prove effective at preventing a UAV from getting close to an intended target.

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Passive defense can even act as a deterrent against attacks since terrorists may be
led to believe that their weapons would not be able to reach the desired target.
Finally, traditional forms of operational security can help protect high-risk per-
sonnel from being targeted by UAV attacks. Such measures include using unpredict-
able transport routes and varying the times that high-risk personnel arrive and leave
work and residences, as well as not announcing arrival and departure times of high-
risk personnel at high-risk events. These measures generally make it harder for ter-
rorists to target high-risk personnel using any method of attack, not just UAVs.

Intelligence
Currently, almost all of the technology related to hobby-grade R/C aircraft and
UAVs is widely available, and it would be nearly impossible to stop the proliferation
of this technology.43 However, it may be possible to discover those who are building
UAVs that can be operated beyond visual range. The one distinction between UAVs
and R/C aircraft is navigational control. Navigational control can be separated into
two distinct pieces of technology—GPS receivers and autopilots. While GPS receiv-
ers are commonplace, the autopilot fills a highly specialized role, as it is only pro-
cured by individuals operating aircraft or building UAVs. Because the development
and use of a UAV require this highly specialized piece of technology, law enforce-
ment, and intelligence agencies have something they can specifically look for in
screening for potential terrorist threats.
If law enforcement and intelligence personnel gained the ability to monitor pur-
chases of autopilots, they could then cross-reference those purchases against other
indicators of terrorist activity, such as ties to extremist groups and the purchase of
chemicals that can be used in making explosives. Similarly, the purchase of any
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) UAV that includes an autopilot and is capable of
holding a 1–5 kg payload (or more) could be monitored. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that provisions be put in place that would enable law enforcement and ap-
propriate intelligence agencies to monitor purchases of autopilots and COTS UAVs.

Conclusion
The employment of UAVs by terrorists is not a far-off threat. The commercializa-
tion of UAVs is occurring now and with the latest announcement from the FAA,
creating an operator status for small UAVs, eliminating the costly requirement of a
licensed pilot, we will see more commercial demand. UAV companies and technol-
ogy providers will endeavor to make UAV technology even more accessible to both
businesses and individual hobbyists to increase its marketability. Unfortunately,
commercial development will make such technology more attractive and accessible
to terrorists, as well.
Terrorists will seek to acquire small UAVs because of their significant potential
benefits. Terrorists use violence as communication, and they understand that it is
not necessary to kill numerous people to send a message. UAVs provide the ability
to bypass defensive perimeters, allowing terrorists to strike high-risk personnel or

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events, which can produce immediate, live media coverage and depict weakness in
the government for its inability to protect such targets. Additionally, using UAVs
provides a certain degree of safety for the terrorist by enabling him to be farther
away from the target location, possibly allowing the terrorist to conduct subsequent
attacks before being apprehended. Terrorists are now increasingly able to capitalize
on the benefits of using UAVs through technological advances such as those in human
supervisory control and through a decrease in the costs of obtaining a UAV. All in
all, the likelihood of seeing UAVs used in terror attacks is significantly increasing.
While UAVs may be more difficult to defeat than traditional air threats, there are
measures that can be taken to help mitigate the threat from small UAVs. Hosting
high-risk events and the appearances of high-risk personnel indoors is probably the
best way to protect against the threat from small UAVs. This passive defense mea-
sure also happens to have the fewest negative consequences and is probably the
lowest cost option among the alternatives. Of course, it will not always be possible
to host an event indoors. Events such as the Boston Marathon will still provide lu-
crative targets for terrorists; however, risk can be mitigated through active defense
measures. Radar assets can be brought to bear to detect these threats, providing
early warning that enhances passive defense. Also, jamming can be utilized as part
of an active defense to disable UAVs once they are detected entering into a re-
stricted area. Finally, by monitoring those who purchase autopilots and COTS UAVs
that have built-in autopilots and a certain payload capacity can help law enforce-
ment and intelligence operations can help discover, ahead of time, those who would
use UAVs (among other tools) to harm us.
Unfortunately, the reality today is that UAVs complicate matters for security per-
sonnel and defensive planners. They democratize airpower, forcing the consideration
of the third-dimension when thinking about potential threats to high-risk personnel
and events. The advantages gained by utilizing UAVs will undoubtedly attract terror-
ists to potential targets that will now be more accessible. While resources may be
limited to adequately protect the vast number of potential targets, small-scale UAVs
are a growing threat and one for which the US government should be preparing. 

Notes
1. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), “Summary of Small Unmanned Aircraft Rule (Part 107),”
FAA News, 21 June 2016, https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf.
2. “United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009–2047,” (Washington, DC:
Headquarters, USAF, 2009), 25, http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf.
3. FAA, “DOT and FAA Finalize Rules for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” 21 June 2016, https://
www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515.
4. Air Force Instruction 11-202, vol. 3, Flying Operations: General Flight Rules, 10 August 2016, 69,
http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3/publication/afi11-202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf.
5. This is similar to the term used by the DOD; see “Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Dept. of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 15 March 2015, 108, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new
_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
6. JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 24 November 2010, GL-6, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/docnet/courses
/operations/icdjo/resources/JP3_07X2.pdf.
7. Michael D. Shear and Michael S. Schmidt, “White House Drone Crash Described as a U.S. Worker’s
Drunken Lark,” New York Times, 27 January 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white

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Card

-house-drone.html?_r=0; and Amar Toor, “Paris has a Drone Problem,” The Verge, 26 February 2015,
http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/26/8113291/paris-drone-uav-eiffel-tower-charlie-hebdo.
8. Brian A. Jackson, David R. Frelinger, Michael J. Lostumbo, and Robert W. Button, Evaluating Novel
Threats to the Homeland: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Cruise Missiles, Rand Corporation: National De-
fense Research Institute, 2 March 2008, 8, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG626.html.
9. Ibid., 13.
10. Ibid., 58–59.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Joseph Tuman, Communicating Terror, 2nd ed. (Los Angeles, Sage Publications: 2010), 34.
14. Ibid., 32.
15. Patrick Hruby, “Out of ‘Hobby’ Class, Drones Lifting Off for Personal, Commercial Use,” Wash-
ington Times, 14 March 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/14/out-of-hobby-class
-drones-lifting-off-for-personal/?page=all.
16. Ibid.
17. Aarian Marshall, “Above Devastated Houston, Armies of Drones Prove Their Worth,” Wired.com,
4 September 2017, https://www.wired.com/story/houston-recovery-drones/.
18. Missy Cummings, “Can a ‘Computer Co-pilot’ Help Anyone Be a Surgeon?” TEDTALK 2012, 10
July 2012, http://www.tedmed.com/talks/show?id=7355&videoId=6923&ref=about-this-talk.
19. Tom Koehler, “Smart Phones Fly Mini Drones,” Boeing, 29 August 2011, http://www.boeing.com
/Features/2011/08/corp_drone_08_29_11.html.
20. This range includes the cost of the hobby aircraft, autopilot, telemetry kit, and ground-station.
More information on various pricing options can be found on the DIYDrones.com website and the af-
filiated 3DRobotics website: http://www.diydrones.com and http://3drobotics.com, respectively.
21. Hruby, “Out of ‘Hobby’ Class.”
22. Eben Kaplan, “Tracking Down Terrorist Financing,” Council on Foreign Relations, 4 April 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-financing/tracking-down-terrorist-financing/p10356#p4.
23. Ibid.
24. Jackson et al., Evaluating Novel Threats, 29.
25. Sean Gallagher, “German Chancellor’s Drone ‘Attack’ Shows the Threat of Weaponized UAVs,”
ArsTechnica, 18 September 2013, http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/09/german
-chancellors-drone-attack-shows-the-threat-of-weaponized-uavs/.
26. Shear and Schmidt, “White House Drone Crash Described;” and Krishnadev Calamur, “Florida
Mailman Who Flew Gyrocopter onto Capitol Lawn Charged,” the two-way, 16 April 2015, http://www.npr
.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/04/16/400195580/florida-mailman-who-flew-gyrocopter-onto-capitol
-lawn-charged.
27. Calamur, “Florida Mailman Who Flew Gyrocopter.”
28. Robin Young, “How Did This Pilot Make it All the Way to the Capitol Lawn?” Here and Now, 16
April 2015, http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2015/04/16/gyrocopter-capitol-security.
29. Tereza Pultarova, “Drone-detecting Air-traffic Radar Successful in Trials,” Engineering and Tech-
nology Magazine, 6 May 2015, https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2015/05/drone-detecting-air
-traffic-radar-successful-in-trials/.
30. “Switchblade,” AeroVironment, 13 June 2015, https://www.avinc.com/uas/adc/switchblade/.
31. “2010–2011 UAS Yearbook,” The Global Perspective—8th Edition, June 2010, http://uas.usgs.gov
/UAS-Yearbook2010/pdf/P161-195_World-UAS-Reference-Section.pdf; and Gary Mortimer, “Lethal Min-
iature Aerial Munition System (LMAMS) to be Deployed Soon?,” UAS News, 1 January 2011, http://
www.suasnews.com/2011/01/3260/lethal-miniature-aerial-munition-system-lmams-to-be-deployed-soon/.
32. AeroVironment, “Switchblade.”
33. “Airelectronics X8 Flying Wing Datasheet,” Airelectronics website, 13 June 2015, http://www.air
electronics.es/products/x8_brochure.pdf?PHPSESSID=itg7avr0agek17jv0o6njqt7h3.
34. Airelectronics does not publicly state the cost of the complete system, but the ground station,
autopilot, and control software retails for approximately $16,000, which would be the bulk of the cost
of the system.
35. “JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats,” 21 April 2017, I-3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine
/new_pubs/jp3_01_20172104.pdf.

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 Terror from Above

36. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, I-6 and V-15.
37. Thomas J. Pizzillo, “RCS Measurements of a PT40 Remote Control Plane at Ka-Band,” Army Re-
search Laboratory, March 2005, http://www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/2005/ARL-TN-238.pdf.
38. J. A. Spruyt and Ph. van Dorp, “Detection of Birds by Radar,” TNO Physics and Electronics Labo-
ratory, August 1996, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA321060; and Merrill I. Skolnik,
Introduction to Radar Systems, 2nd ed. (London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981), 44.
39. Quadcopters may be more susceptible to kinetic fires due to their reliance upon multiple mo-
tors to maintain lift.
40. Academy of Model Aeronautics, “Frequency Chart for Model Operation,” 13 June 2015, http://
www.modelaircraft.org/events/frequencies.aspx.
41. Tereza Pultarova, “Drone-detecting Air-traffic Radar;” and P. Molchanov, K. Egiazarian, J. Astola,
R. I. A. Harmanny, and J. J. M. de Wit, “Classification of Small UAVs and Birds by Micro-Doppler Sig-
nature,” Proceedings of the 10th European Radar Conference, 9–11 October 2013, http://www.cs.tut.fi/~mol
chano/papers/EuRad2013.pdf.
42. Bryan Lifkin, “Detection Systems Listen for Drones Flying Under the Radar,” Gizmodo, 18 May
2015, http://gizmodo.com/detection-systems-listen-for-drones-flying-under-the-ra-1704764102; and
“Credible Personal Drone Detection Systems Now Available on Kickstarter from Domestic Drone
Countermeasures LLC,” PR Newswire, 13 June 2014, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases
/credible-personal-drone-detection-systems-now-available-on-kickstarter-from-domestic-drone-counter
measures-llc-263016721.html.
43. Ajay Lele and Archana Mishra, “Aerial Terrorism and the Threat from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,”
Journal of Defense Studies 3:3 (July 2009): 54–65, http://skyjack.co.il/pdf/jds_3_3_alele_amishra.pdf.

Maj Bryan A. Card, USAFR

Major Card (AB Stanford University; MS, University of Texas at El Paso) is the chief of
weapons and tactics for the 710th Combat Operations Squadron, Joint Base Langley–Eustis,
Virginia. He is responsible for training and tactics development and evaluation to support
air component operations. He recently returned from the US Air Forces Central Com-
mand Combined Air Operations Center, where he worked as a nonkinetic duty officer,
integrating air, space, and cyber capabilities into joint operations. Major Card is also a
project manager with the US Army Fires Center of Excellence, Capabilities Development
and Integration Directorate, providing command and control and tactical data link sup-
port to the Army and Joint Staff. Before joining the Air Force Reserve, he spent five years
in the US Army, serving as an air defense artillery fire control officer, responsible for the
control and coordination of surface-to-air missile fires. He also served as an infantryman
before his commissioning through the Officer Candidate School. Major Card has deployed
to Afghanistan and Qatar, and he is a graduate of the US Air Force Weapons School and
the Joint Interface Control Officer Course.

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/ASPJ/

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