NATO UNCLASSIFIED

AJP-3.3.1(B)

AJP-3.3.1
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
COUNTER – AIR

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AJP-3.3.1
ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
COUNTER – AIR

JULY 2010

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

91uly2010

I. AIP-3.3.I(B)- ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FORCOlJNTER- AIR is a NATO

UNCLASSIFIED publication. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in
STANAG 3880.

2. AJP-3.3.1(B) is effective on a date to be promulgated by the NSA When made effective it

shall supersede AIP-3.3.1(A) which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedures for
the destruction of documents.

tip¥!
Cihangir AKSIT, TUR Civ
Director, NATO Standardization Agency

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THIS PAGE IS RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF CHANGES

Identification of NATO By Whom Entered (Signature;

Change, Reg No. (if Date Entered Effective Rank, Grade or Rate; Name of
any), and Date Date Command)

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

2 USA

3 USA

4 ITA

5 BGR, ITA, USA

6 USA

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

NATION SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

BGR The Bulgarian Land Forces do not implement the requirements in Chapter
5, 0520, c, (2)
ITA a. Paragraphs 0414 and 0415 - These paragraphs are not in compliance
with the MC485 "NATO Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)
Policy", MC 64/10, ATP 44C and AIRNORTH MANUAL 80-6. In the
AJP-3.3.1(B) it is written that the SEAD operations can be achieved
through "destructive and disruptive means", while it is completely
omitted the function "detection" which, as reported in the MC 485, is a
primary task. Furthermore none of the above mentioned publications
include "self defence" as a stand alone SEAD mission. Self Defence is
to be deemed as an essential requirement for alI air assets operating in a
hostile environrnent.
b. Paragraph 0520 (a2) - The Fire Control Orders (FCO) listed in this
paragraph differ from those ones listed in the SUPPLAN 45600 D
"DECISIVE GUARDIAN" IADS-I (26 august 2009). In particular the
order "cease fire" has been omitted whilst the order "cover" is not
included as an FCO according to the IADS-I.
USA a. The United States does not accept the construct for “counter-air” as
defined in paragraph 0201 and in the lexicon and terms section of AJP-
3.3.1(B) Ratification Draft One (RD1). Specifically, AJP-3.3.1 (B)
RD1 states that the role of counter-air is to “attain and maintain a
desired degree of control of the air” rather than to “attain and maintain a
desired degree of air superiority” as it is currently defined in Allied
Administrative Publication (AAP)-6. This modified definition of
counter-air represents a significant departure from the approved
definition found in AJP-3.3.1(A), but was apparently made without
proper coordination and comment. Furthermore, AJP-3.3.1(B) RD1
now establishes “control of the air” as a framework that includes
“favourable air situation, air superiority and air supremacy,” whereas
AJP-3.3.1(A) uses the widely-accepted terms “air superiority and air
supremacy.”

Rationale. United States joint doctrine does not accept the idea that
counter-air is intended to achieve “a degree of control of the air” as a
framework, but rather it is intended to achieve “a degree of air
superiority” as determined by the joint force commander (JFC). The
application of this definition of air superiority allows the JFC to
determine the “given time and place” for achieving air superiority, i.e.,
both temporally and spatially. Because the accepted counter-air
definition does not include “control of the air,” that term is only used as
a matter of context in AJP-3.3.1(A), i.e., “The degrees of control of the
air are: air superiority and air supremacy,” and not an end in itself.
However, with “control of the air” now a precept in the definition of

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counter-air in AJP-3.3.1(B) RD1, it establishes a new framework as

follows:

“There are three degrees of control of the air:

(1) A Favourable Air Situation is one in which the extent of air effort
applied by enemy air forces is insufficient to prejudice success of
friendly sea, land or air operations.

(2) Air Superiority is defined as that degree of dominance in the air

battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations
by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and
place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

(3) Air Supremacy is defined as that degree of air superiority wherein

the opposing air forces are incapable of effective interference.”

Background. The framework described above and the term “favourable

air situation” were first introduced in the 2001 timeframe in the initial
study drafts of AJP 3.3, Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space
Operations, the “parent” doctrinal publication for AJP-3.3.1, which
resulted in critical comments from US. This same framework was also
rejected in Study Drafts 1-3 for AJP-3.3.1(A), and was finally removed
from Study Draft 4 and the current version of AJP-3.3.1(A), which was
ratified in April 2006. Unfortunately, the framework in question and the
term “favourable air situation” somehow made its way into the current
AJP-3.3 (Change 1), dated May 2002. It should be noted, though, that
the current (Ratification Draft 3) for the next version of AJP-3.3(A)
does not include “favourable air situation.”

b. The US does not subscribe to the omission of essential information in

paragraph 0302 regarding an Air Component Commander (ACC)
executing joint operational area (JOA)-wide missions and the
requirement to coordinate with appropriate commanders of designated
areas of operation (AOO) within the JOA.

Rationale. Essential aspects of the synchronization activities regarding

the surface component commander was left out. This clarifies who is
responsible for those key activities. The commander designated for an
AOO is responsible to synchronize maneuver, fires and interdiction (to
include counter-air) and determine the priority, timing and effects of all
operations within their AOO. Therefore, an ACC executing JOA-wide
missions must coordinate with the commander of an AOO for any such
missions within the AOO.

c. The US does not subscribe to the misuse of objective area of

operations in paragraph 0514a(2).

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Rationale. By definition a combat air patrol (CAP) mission is given an

objective area not a forward area of operations.

d. The US does not subscribe to the misuse of effects language in

paragraph 0602.

Rationale. Effects are created or generated to support achievement of

objectives. Effects are not capabilities or packaged items to be
delivered. They are the result of the employment of a capability.
Language must be consistent with higher level Allied Joint Publications.

e. The United States does not recognize the terms and definitions
included in the text and glossary as being NATO agreed upon that are:

(1) Defined in AAP-6 and not quoted verbatim: air component

commander, favorable air situation, target development, theater missile
and threat radar.

(2) Terms used in the text, but misquoted from AAP-6: airspace
control, counter-air operations and NATO assigned forces.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

0101 Origin 1-1

0102 Aim 1-1
0103 Scope 1-1
0104 Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations 1-1
0105 Application 1-1

CHAPTER 2 CONCEPT

0201 General 2-1

0202 Aim of Counter - Air Operations 2-2
0203 Relationship between Offensive and Defensive Counter - Air Operations 2-3
0204 Relationship of Counter – Air Operations with other Component Operations2-3
0205 Interoperability 2-3
0206 Co-ordination of Effort 2-3
0207 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance(ISR) 2-4
0208 Readiness 2-4
0209 Survivability 2-4
0210 Sustained Operations 2-4
0211 All- Weather Day/Night Operations 2-4

CHAPTER 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL

0301 General 3-1

0302 Command Relationships 3-1
0303 Joint Force Commander 3-2
0304 Air Component Commander 3-2
0305 Air Defense Commander 3-3
0306 Airspace Control 3-4
0307 Airspace Control Authority 3-4
0308 Command and Control System 3-4
0309 Rules of Engagement 3-5

CHAPTER 4 OFFENSIVE COUNTER - AIR OPERATIONS

0401 Objectives 4-1

0402 The Relationship of Offensive Counter - Air to the Allied Operation 4-1
0403 Offensive Counter - Air Resources 4-1
0404 Associated Resources 4-3
0405 Planning 4-4
0406 Offensive Counter - Air Tasks 4-4
0407 Targeting 4-5
0408 Information Operations 4-5
0409 Potential Offensive Counter - Air Targets 4-6

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0410 Control and Co-ordination 4-8

0411 Communications 4-8
0412 Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Objectives 4-8
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Planning 4-8
0414 Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Resources 4-9
0415 Execution 4-10

CHAPTER 5 DEFENSIVE COUNTER - AIR OPERATIONS

0501 General 5-1

0502 Active Air Defence Functions 5-1
0503 Active Air Defence Components 5-2
0504 Weapon Systems 5-3
0505 Surface Environment 5-3
0506 Sensors 5-3
0507 Contributing Systems 5-4
0508 Additional Assets 5-4
0509 Types of Active Air Defence Operations 5-4
0510 Self-defence 5-5
0511 Passive Air Defence Measures 5-5
0512 Employment of Air Defence Assets 5-6
0513 Two Mission Types of DCA 5-8
0514 AD Protection 5-8
0515 Control and Co-ordination 5-9
0516 Centralized or Decentralized Control 5-9
0517 Autonomous Operations 5-9
0518 Area Control of Weapons 5-9
0519 Control of Fighter Operations 5-10
0520 Control of Surface-to-Air Weapons Operations 5-11
0521 Integrated Air Defence Plan 5-13

CHAPTER 6 OPERATIONAL REPORTING AND COMBAT ASSESSMENT 6-1

0601 Operational Reporting 6-1

0602 Combat Assessment 6-1
0603 Security 6-1

LEXICON PART I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS Lex-1

LEXICON PART II - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS Lex-5

REFERENCES Ref-1

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

0101. Origin. Allied Joint Publication (AJP-3.3.1), Counter - Air (CA) Operations, is based on the
general doctrine and fundamental considerations contained in AJP-3.3, Joint Air and Space
Operations Doctrine.

0102. Aim. The aim of this publication is to provide a reference document covering operational and
tactical doctrine for CA operations. This publication will:

a. Provide guidance for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and national
commanders and staffs in order to promote the effective employment of allied forces in
CA operations.

b. Lead to a better understanding of CA operations within all national armed services and
allied forces.

c. Focus attention on all aspects of CA operations and thus lead to the identification of
unsatisfactory areas and the further development of doctrine and procedures.

0103. Scope

a. This publication considers the contribution to the CA operations of all elements of a

force whether they are in the air, in space, on land, or at sea.

b. This publication considers the full spectrum of CA operations, both defensive and
offensive, including the suppression of enemy air defences, to counter both air and
missile threats throughout the range of military operations.

c. In order to allow the widest possible circulation, this publication does not contain
classified information.

0104. Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations. See the Lexicon.

0105. Application. The employment of allied resources and of associated measures involved in CA
operations should be based on the principles contained in this document.

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CHAPTER 2

CONCEPT

0201. General. The purpose of counter-air operations is to achieve a desired, or necessary level of
control of the air, through the destruction, degradation or disruption of enemy aircraft and
missiles, in order to allow all friendly forces greater freedom of action, whilst minimizing their
vulnerability to detection and attack. Counter-air operations are those integrated operations by
all components to counter hostile and missile threats in order to attain and maintain a desired
degree of control of the air. Control of the air is achieved through the use of a variety of
integrated weapon systems and sensors to counter threats that include manned or unmanned
aircraft, ballistic missiles, and air, land or sea launched cruise missiles, both before and after
launch. There are three degrees of control of the air:

 A Favourable Air Situation is one in which the extent of air effort applied by enemy air
forces is insufficient to prejudice success of friendly sea, land or air operations.

 Air Superiority is defined as that degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over
another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea
and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing
force.

 Air Supremacy is defined as that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air
forces are incapable of effective interference.

It should be understood that neither air superiority nor air supremacy implies that losses will not
be inflicted by an enemy. It is the level of interference in relation to achieving the objective
caused by the enemy’s air operations that is the focus.

a. Offensive Counter - Air. Offensive Counter - Air (OCA) consists of offensive

operations to destroy, disrupt or degrade enemy air and missile threats. Ideally, most
OCA operations will prevent the launch of aircraft and missiles by destroying them and
their supporting systems on the ground, or failing that, as close to their source as
possible. Such operations may be pre-planned or immediate, and are conducted across
enemy territory at the initiative of friendly forces. Preplanned ops rely on continuous
and accurate intelligence for targets expected at particular locations and times, while
immediate ops are conducted against unexpected mobile and time sensitive targets
where minutes often define the timeline when these targets are vulnerable to attack.
OCA includes surface attack operations, air-to-air missions and Suppression of Enemy
Air Defenses (SEAD).

b. Defensive Counter - Air. Defensive Counter - Air (DCA) operations protect friendly
forces and vital interests from enemy air and missile attacks; as such it is synonymous
with Air Defense (AD). DCA consists of all active and passive air defense (AD)

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operations to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy air and missile
forces attempting to attack or penetrate friendly battlespace, or to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of such attacks should they escape destruction. The Air Defense
Commander (ADC) is responsible for the integration of all AD efforts, regardless of
system ownership.

(1) Active AD. Active AD involves any direct defensive action taken to destroy,
nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy air and missile attack against
friendly forces and critical elements. It is achieved through integrated detection,
identification, assessment, interception and engagement and usually
characterized by layered defense- in –depth allowing multiple engagement
opportunities, utilizing reactive air-to-air fighters, Surface-to-Air Missiles
(SAMs) and other assets in the air or on the ground.

(2) Passive AD. Passive AD includes all other measures taken to minimize the
effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks, through individual and collective
protection of friendly forces and critical assets. Elements of passive AD include
early warning; camouflage, concealment, and deception; hardening; dispersion;
reconstitution, and low observable or stealth technologies. Passive AD measures
do not involve the employment of lethal weapons, but do improve survivability.
These passive AD measures for survivability of the joint force are part of the
overall Force Protection (FP) doctrine.

0202. Aim of Counter - Air Operations. The aim of CA operations is to shape the joint battlespace, to
provide freedom of manoeuvre and action for friendly forces while ensuring that friendly
Centers of Gravity, key assets and military forces are safe from attack. CA operations are
coordinated and executed by all components, using a variety of integrated weapons systems and
sensors to counter threats, both before and after launch. They are conducted over enemy and
friendly territory exploiting the full benefit of both the offensive and defensive. They are both
proactive and reactive. They range from seeking out and destroying the enemy’s capabilities
prior to their employment, to taking reactive measures to minimize their effectiveness during
employment. Control of the air creates the conditions for the success of most operations. The
degree of control required may well vary over time and geography and depends on the overall
situation as well as the Joint Force Commander’s (JFC) concept of operations. Consequently,
surplus air power, when available, will be assigned to other lines of operation within the joint
campaign. There may be occasions when the required degree of control of the air cannot be
guaranteed throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA) or for the duration of the joint
campaign. Under these circumstances, the JFACC in consultation with the JFC will conduct a
risk assessment before deciding an appropriate course of action.

0203. Relationship between Offensive and Defensive Counter - Air Operations. In order to achieve
control of the air for the allied force, the OCA and DCA efforts must be integrated and
synchronized. Air operations are referred to as “offensive” when they are conducted to seek out
and engage an adversary at a time and place of friendly force choosing, or “defensive” when

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they are reactive to adversary initiatives. Because OCA and DCA operations may require the
same resources and may be conducted simultaneously in the same airspace, they cannot be
considered in isolation from each other.

0204. Relationship of Counter - Air Operations with other Component Operations. The air and
missile threat posed to friendly forces and operations is not bound by geography and is subject
to the adversary’s capabilities, priorities and objectives. CA operations may therefore impact
either the land or maritime operations, and frequently cross the boundaries between them.
Land, maritime, air, and special operations forces (SOFs) may all have a part in CA operations.
The degree of mutual support required for CA operations will depend on variables such as the
degree of adversary threat, the degree of control of the air required, friendly objectives, and the
disposition of allied forces.

0205. Interoperability. Operational effectiveness is enhanced by the ability of systems, units and
forces to provide services for, and to accept services from, other systems, units and forces.
Such interoperability includes the provision of cross servicing facilities and of compatible
doctrines, procedures, command and control (C2) systems, communications, information
exchange formats, combat identification systems, and navigational aids. Interoperability
enhances flexibility of response to changing requirements and may permit concentration of
effort to succeed in CA operations. This is especially true when the proliferation of advanced
adversary weapons and systems has reduced the time to react.

0206. Co-ordination of Effort. Integration of effort and unity of action that results from the efficient
blending of individual AD systems and the coordination between units tasked with CA, as well
as other friendly forces involves the assessment of capabilities of friendly resources and
adversary vulnerabilities. This results in the effective application of resources (aircraft,
weapons, control and support facilities, etc.) achieve the JFC’s desired objectives.

0207. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Effective CA operations require timely
collection, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of reliable and accurate
intelligence. Near-real-time and real-time information from air-, surface-, and space-based
sensors is used to provide warning, situational awareness (SA), targeting, and combat
assessment. ISR information is also needed to identify and either attack or exploit emerging
targets which pose a substantial threat to friendly operations. Timely target detection and geo-
location, target development, weapon selection, mission planning, and combat assessments
depend on integrated collection and analysis. Proper intelligence preparation of the battlespace
(IPB) is a crucial step in conducting CA operations. Without an accurate, well-defined
adversary air order of battle (AOB), friendly forces will operate under increased risk. Other
component intelligence resources provide valuable information concerning any air operations
within their area of operations (AOO). In addition to developing the AOB, IPB can enable a
predictive analysis to help determine likely adversary actions or reactions, thus optimizing ISR
effectiveness and combat air patrols.

0208. Readiness. The option of surprise often rests initially with a potential aggressor. Accordingly,

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allied CA resources should be held at appropriate readiness states to ensure that response time
to indications of an initial attack is commensurate with the warning that may be expected.

0209. Survivability. The survivability of CA assets is a vital factor in the conduct of the allied
operation and will be enhanced by a combination of active operations and passive measures.

0210. Sustained Operations. The possibility of a prolonged conflict requires that allied CA resources
are prepared to operate for extended periods, and economy of effort should therefore be sought
at all times. However, the effects of CA operations are cumulative in nature and should be
planned to allow the concentration of force when necessary to support allied objectives.

0211. All -Weather Day/Night Operations. Allied CA forces should be capable of continuous
operation by day and night under all environmental, weather and light conditions.

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CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL

0301. General. The growing capabilities of air and missile threats (speed, range, mobility, accuracy,
stealth, reduced radar cross section, lethality) require joint/allied forces to be more responsive,
flexible, and integrated in order to effectively counter them. The manner in which JFCs
organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations.
The first principle in joint force organization is to accomplish the mission based on the JFC’s
vision and concept of operations, which must be in accordance with overarching political
objectives, efforts and the desired end state. CA operations are part of the air component
commander’s (ACC’s) air operation plan as an integral part of the JFC’s campaign plan. Unity
of effort, centralized planning and decentralized execution are key considerations. Unity of
effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for
controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces, especially high demand, low
density assets. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required
and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat. The ability to task forces is
situational dependent and normally tailored by the JFC to enable effective spans of control,
responsiveness, tactical flexibility, and protection.

0302. Command Relationships. With the wide range of operational requirements to be covered with
minimal assets, the execution of NATO military operations will often be guided by
supported/supporting relationships when one organization should aid, protect, complement or
sustain another force. This key relationship provides the establishing authority with an effective
means of weighting the phases and sub phases of NATO operations with a subordinate
commander typically receiving support from, and providing support to, other commanders. The
supported commander has the primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks assigned
by the JFC. The JFC will designate a component commander, normally the ACC to integrate
the capabilities and C2 of allied air assets. The JFC also designates a component commander,
normally the ACC, to be the supported commander for CA operations. As such, the designated
CC plans, organizes, and executes CA operations JOA-wide. In accordance with JFC guidance
and priorities, the designate CC has the authority to determine the priority, timing, and effects
of CA operations throughout the JOA.

0303. Joint Force Commander. The JFC exercises the degree of command and control over assigned or
attached forces as delegated to ensure unity of effort in all air operations including countering
air and missile threats. The JFC provides authoritative direction to subordinate commanders on
objectives, priorities, missions, and apportionment of joint capabilities and forces. Primary
responsibilities of the JFC as they apply to CA include the following:

a. Develop and maintain a system to unify the employment of subordinate forces in

carrying out assigned CA missions.

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b. Develop and produce joint operation plans for joint CA and airspace control (ASC) or
delegate authority to subordinate commanders.

c. Establish appropriate command relationships for the component commanders.

d. Define and assign operational areas.

e. Establish targeting priorities and issue targeting decisions as approved by appropriate

higher authority.

f. Assign tasks, functions, and responsibilities to, and direct coordination among, the
subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in accomplishing joint CA missions.

g. After approval by the appropriate higher authority establish, coordinate, and disseminate
rules of engagement (ROE) to all subordinate commanders.

0304. Air Component Commander. Normally, the ACC is the component commander having the
preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control allied air operations.
The need for an ACC is based on the JFC’s overall mission, concept of operations, missions and
tasks assigned to subordinate commanders, forces available, duration and nature of allied air
operations desired, and the degree of unity of C2 of allied air operations required. The
functions and responsibilities of the ACC, air defence commander (ADC) and airspace control
authority (ACA) must be integrated to ensure that OCA and DCA operations and ASC are
synchronized. The responsibilities of the ACC, ADC and ACA are interrelated and are
normally assigned to one individual, but they may be assigned to two or more individuals when
the situation dictates. Based on the situation, if the JFC decides not to assign the ACC, ADC or
ACA as one individual, then close coordination among all three positions is essential. The
JFC assigns the ACC’s authority and responsibilities. These normally include, but are not
limited to, allied CA planning, coordinating, allocating and tasking based on the JFC’s concept
of operations and apportionment decision. Other responsibilities of the ACC relating to allied
CA operations include the following:

a. Develop the allied CA plan by coordinating and integrating it with operations of other
components.

b. Make an air apportionment recommendation to the JFC, after consulting with other
component commanders.

c. Provide centralized planning for allied CA capabilities and forces made available by the
JFC.

d. Provide information operations (Info Ops) strategies to neutralize adversary air and
missile threats while preserving friendly offensive and defensive capability.

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e. Perform the duties of the ADC when directed by the JFC.

f. Perform the duties of the ACA when directed by the JFC.

g. Conduct Air targeting when directed by the JFC.

h. Conduct “Combat Assessment”.

0305. Air Defense Commander. The JFC normally designates an ADC with the authority to plan,
coordinate, and integrate overall joint force DCA operations. Normally, the ADC is the
component commander with the preponderance of AD capability and the command, control,
communications and intelligence capability to plan, coordinate, and execute integrated AD
operations. Primary responsibilities of the ADC include the following:

a. Develop, integrate, and distribute a JFC-approved joint air defence plan (ADP).

b. Develop and execute, in coordination with the joint force staff, a detailed plan to
disseminate timely air and missile warning and cueing information to components,
forces, allies, coalition partners, and civil authorities, as appropriate.

c. Implement approved identification and ROE. Propose additional ROE to counter

changes to the air and missile threat.

d. Ensure timely and accurate track reporting among participating units to provide a
consistent common operational picture.

e. Establish sectors or regions, as appropriate, to enhance decentralized execution of DCA

operations.

0306. Airspace Control. ASC is a vital factor in CA operations and must include all necessary
airspace control means (ACM) to exercise effective control of friendly airspace and airspace
users. Standardized airspace control procedures and close co-ordination between component
commanders and appropriate national authorities reduce confusion and contribute to the overall
effectiveness of the CA mission. Coordination with AD systems is essential. The
establishment of identification and weapon engagement zones and the direction of non-combat
air traffic will be arranged so as to permit maximum use of DCA resources while offering the
least inhibition to OCA and other operations.

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0307. Airspace Control Authority. The ACA has overall responsibility for establishing and operating
the ASC system. The ACA also develops policies and procedures for ASC that are
incorporated into an airspace control plan (ACP). A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide
the flexibility needed within the ASC system to meet contingency situations that necessitate
rapid employment of forces. The ACA coordinates through the ACP the use of airspace,
including integration with the host nation and deconfliction of user requirements. The ACA
must be able to rapidly implement airspace control means (ACM) in the dynamic CA
environment to enhance freedom of action of components while preventing fratricide. The ACP
is co-ordinated with the ADP. The ACP is implemented through the airspace control order
(ACO). All forces affecting allied air operations are subject to the ACO.

0308. Command and Control System. A C2 system is required to direct all efforts toward the overall
objective. To interconnect the various decision and execution levels, an efficient, secure and
survivable C2 system is an essential prerequisite. For air operations, an Air Operations Center
(AOC) normally functions as the ACC’s principal operations centre that translates the Air
Operations Directive into an air tasking order (ATO). The AOC disseminates and executes the
ATO and monitors the resulting mission flow. The AOC links with all air C2 assets including
theatre sensors, intelligence sources, and airborne C2 assets. Co-ordination and liaison with
other component commands are provided by integrated land and maritime liaison elements to
the AOC and through the air operations co-ordination centre (AOCC (M) or (L)) collocated
with the respective Maritime/Army Corps headquarters (HQ).

0309. Rules of Engagement. NATO led forces generally operate under an established set of ROE.
The JFC must establish and implement the ROE approved by higher authority. These ROE
should be modified to meet the threat. The JFC will consider such factors as the mission, threat,
political constraints, presence of non-combatants, and the possible effect of collateral damage
when recommending modifications to ROE. Common ROE and standardized criteria used to
determine activities of a hostile nature, are defined for peacetime application, times of tension,
and crisis operations. Such ROE will include consideration of circumstances in which specific
weapon systems (such as beyond visual range) may be employed. ROE and precautionary
measures must be coordinated with all commanders to preclude anomalies and confusion in
interpretation.

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CHAPTER 4

OFFENSIVE COUNTER - AIR OPERATIONS

0401. Objectives. The objective of CA operations is to gain and maintain the desired degree of
control of the air. The purpose is to create a condition that gives friendly forces a freedom of
action throughout the area of conflict, while denying the adversary the same freedom. There
could be times when resources from all components are not adequate to ensure the required
degree of control of the air. Decisions will be based, therefore, on an assessment of the desired
degree of control needed to support allied objectives. Control of the air enhances an allied
force’s freedom of movement and creates a favourable environment for all operations. This
enables friendly use of otherwise contested airspace, enhances freedom of action, and reduces
the adversary’s air and missile threat to friendly forces. OCA comprises operations conducted
within enemy battlespace, at the initiative of friendly forces. They are aimed at destroying,
disrupting, or degrading enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms and the associated
supporting structures and systems as close to their source as possible. Control of the air is
achieved through both offensive and defensive CA operations from all components.

0402. The Relationship of OCA to the Allied Operation. Operations are enhanced by at least a
favourable air situation which is why attaining the desired degree of control of the air is
normally one of the highest priorities of the JFC. There may be instances when the adversary
does not have sufficient offensive air capability to affect the success of friendly land, maritime,
air and special operations. If there is any possibility of adversary’s offensive air and tactical
missiles being employed, possible CA action must be considered carefully in operational
planning. OCA must be directed at critical points of the adversary’s air and missile warfare
potential and targets, times of attack, and offensive force levels must be selected to optimize
allied capabilities. Thus, OCA will contribute considerably in the effective employment of
friendly air resources.

0403. Offensive Counter - Air Resources. The effectiveness of OCA operations depends on the
availability and the capabilities of systems. The choice of a particular system may depend on
target characteristics, threats, environmental conditions, fratricide and collateral damage
concerns and available intelligence. Resources include, but are not limited to the following:

a. Aircraft. Includes fixed and rotary wing systems.

b. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Aircraft. Specially equipped aircraft with
aircrews trained for tasks dealing with the suppression and destruction of enemy ground-
based, radar-directed, air defences including associated C2 resources. See paragraph
0414 for more detail.

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c. Attack Helicopter (AH). The ACC will normally task AH made available by the JFC
as a manoeuvre unit with mission type orders, when employing them to support OCA
attack operations.

d. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). When configured as a sensor platform, UAVs gather
information to support OCA operations. Additional roles include combat, deception,
electronic warfare (EW) and fire support.

e. Missiles. Includes surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, air-to-air, as well as air, land, and

sea launched cruise missiles. Cruise missiles may be employed against CA targets.
Factors such as damage per vehicle, vehicle cost, adversary AD capabilities, the
importance of the target and its relative vulnerability to other forms of attack must be
weighed against the benefits of using this weapon.

f. Special Operations Forces. Includes direct action and/or support functions. SOF can
conduct direct action (i.e. attack or provide terminal guidance for precision weapons)
and special reconnaissance (i.e. collect intelligence or locate and attack targets of
opportunity) against both fixed and mobile ground targets, maritime targets, and
aircraft/missiles prior to take off/launch.

g. Surface Fire Support. Should OCA targets be suitable for land forces, the land
component commander and maritime component commander may support the ACC in
OCA. This assistance can include the use of artillery, attack helicopter, air
assault/helicopter borne infantry attacks, or maritime fires. Surface-to-surface guided
missiles and long range unguided rockets may be used in OCA. Naval surface fire
support includes naval gunfire, missile and EW systems that can be employed against
suitable OCA targets.

h. Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence Systems. Includes

early warning and surveillance systems, satellites, radars, identification systems,
communication systems, and surface, air, and space-based sensors.

i. Information Operations Applications. Includes malicious codes, EW or electromagnetic

pulse (EMP) generators.

0404. Associated Resources

a. The Air Surveillance and Control System (ASACS). In general, the Surveillance and
Control System (ASACS) supports defensive and offensive missions as tasked by the
designated CC (normally the ACC). Control facilities, using their radar and
communication resources, give tactical assistance and control to aircraft tasked for AD
and aircraft engaged in OCA. The support and the subsequent tasking of ASACS will be
defined in the air operations directive and ATO.

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b. Tactical Air Control Systems at Sea. Ships equipped for tactical air control should
coordinate their activities closely with a shore tactical air control system when
necessary. Ships should also coordinate with airborne C2.

c. Jammers. Certain units are equipped with various electronic equipment that supports
OCA. Jamming platforms may be surface-based or airborne. If airborne, they may be
suited for stand-off or close-in jamming. Surface-based assets can either be requested
through joint procedures, or arranged at higher command levels. Aircraft self-protection
devices such as electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods, internal ECM equipment,
infrared (IR) flares and chaff dispensers are also included under this heading.

d. Intelligence. OCA depends on intelligence to provide threat warning and also to provide
a means of target development. Such intelligence is mainly generated within the
national structures and distributed at appropriate staff and HQ levels. Of particular
importance to OCA is the ability to intercept and identify adversary electronic emissions
and immediately pass derived location or threat warning to control agencies or aircrews
involved in operations. Furthermore, the ability to carry out combat assessment of OCA
operations will be a decisive factor in target development.

e. Space. Navigation systems, satellites and other technological devices may contribute to
OCA, both in the planning and execution phases (e.g. satellite photography evaluated for
weather data leading to a go/cancel decision). Space operations can enhance CA
operations in a variety of ways. Navigation and timing systems providing information
on precision, velocity, and time enhances accuracy for defining air corridors, precision
navigation, air refuelling tracks, and target location. Communication systems ensure
timing and assured voice and data transfer during combat operations. ISR assets help
inform on and shape the battlespace, and provide accurate target identification. Space
assets provide battle damage assessment to help determine if subsequent CA operations
are needed and where. Space capabilities provide detailed layout of airfields and
runways as well as locate ballistic missile systems for targeting. Warning systems can
detect, find, identify, fix, track, and target ballistic missile launch. Weather systems
provide timely and accurate information to aviators, air planners and
targeteers/weaponeers for the conduct of CA operations.

0405. Planning. General aspects governing the planning of OCA, especially political and military
considerations and restrictions, are contained in AJP-3.3. Three aspects of the planning process
of importance to OCA are setting the objectives, determining the targets against which OCA is
to be mounted, and unity of effort. Planning and tasking may occur at a high level of command,
but personnel at all levels should fully understand not only the purpose of their specific air task,
but also the commander’s intent, objective and concept of operations. Thus, part of the
planning process for all levels to execute operations is to understand how the specific mission
and tasks to be achieved relate to other activities.

0406. Offensive Counter- Air Tasks. Tasked units should be given as much latitude as possible in the

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detailed planning and tactical execution of tasks. The following are OCA missions:

a. Attack Operations. Attack operations are intended to inflict damage on or destroy soft
and hardened land targets, underground targets, and selected maritime units that
contribute to the adversary's air and missile capabilities. A wide choice of munitions
and air and surface platforms are available for this purpose and most combat aircraft
have some capability in this role.

b. Fighter Sweep. The fighter sweep is an offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out
and destroy adversary aircraft or targets of opportunity in an allotted AOO (AAP-6).
Traditionally, this mission has been directed against adversary aircraft in the air either in
a designated area or along a route in support of other air missions (e.g. a composite air
operation). Fighter sweep missions include attacks against adversary high value
airborne assets (HVAA), e.g. airborne early warning (AEW) or air-to-air refuelling
(AAR) aircraft, etc. In Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations fighter aircraft may be
tasked to police established no-fly areas.

c. Escort. Escort is an OCA mission, whereby aircraft are assigned to protect other aircraft
during a mission. When friendly aircraft enroute to an objective area may be subject to
adversary air attack, air-to-air fighter escort aircraft may accompany the force, flying
either directly with the force/package (close escort) or at a standoff position (detached
escort).

d. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. SEAD is that activity which neutralizes,

temporarily degrades or destroys adversary air defences by destructive and/or disruptive
means. SEAD tasks are mounted to protect friendly aircraft from the threat posed by
adversary ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems. These systems may be part of an
elaborate and well-integrated AD system designed to deny friendly forces freedom of
action. The types and degree of adversary air defences will influence the complexity
and magnitude of effort necessary to eliminate the threat. These tasks may often have to
be accomplished by specialized aircraft and aircrew and may include both lethal or non-
lethal defence suppression operations. If SEAD targets are within range of other
weapons (e.g. artillery) they should be targeted and attacked, if suitable.

0407. Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response
to them taking account of operational requirements, capabilities and desired effects.

0408. Information Operations. Information is essential in combat operations. The allied force is most
effective when they exploit the information continuum. In current and future conflicts and
operations, the allied force must ensure they understand the battlespace. Knowledge of the
battlespace is the result of converting ISR and the C2 systems that distribute ISR data into
meaningful intelligence information which is usable by the operational commander.
Knowledge of the battlespace involves everything from target recognition to knowledge of an
opponent’s operational scheme and the networks and systems relied on to pursue it. Together

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sensors, processors, and transmission media work to provide target selection for combat
operations. Information operations (Info Ops) comprise actions taken to gain, exploit, defend,
or attack information and information systems. Info Ops assists OCA to achieve desired
objectives by affecting the adversary’s perception of the battlespace. Here attack forces are
appropriately paired with targets to achieve mass. After the strike, combat assessment is used to
determine the results of the application of force and assess whether future strikes are needed.
Information technology provides the basis for continually improving precision strike,
communications, intelligence gathering and dissemination, and sensor data processing. Other
examples of Info Ops are any actions disrupting vital information transmissions that degrade the
adversary’s capability to recognize the situation until it is too late to take appropriate action.
Info Ops can be applied to many OCA targets. Targets such as C2 systems, theatre missiles and
support infrastructure, and airfields/operating bases can be affected by Info Ops applications,
including malicious codes, EW, or electromagnetic pulse generators. Some of these IO
applications afford access to a target that may be inaccessible by other means. The joint force
must limit its own potential vulnerabilities and exploit those of the adversary.

0409. Potential Offensive Counter - Air Targets

a. Weapon Systems and Combat Facilities

(1) Aircraft. This category includes adversary fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and
UAVs. All these vehicles represent a threat to friendly forces. Aircraft on the
ground might be lucrative targets if left unprotected due to movement and should
be attacked. Destruction of adversary aerial vehicles automatically reduces his
capability to bring airpower to bear, particularly in the short term. However, as
in all attrition exchanges, care must be taken not to become involved in a series
of unfavourable exchanges. Priorities will depend on the battle situation, and
engagement priorities will generally follow the degree of threat presented.

(2) Airfields, Operating Bases, infrastructure and Aircraft Carriers. Adversary

airfields, operating bases, infrastructure or aircraft carriers vary in vulnerability.
Passive defence measures should be expected and may complicate the targeting
process. Adversary airfields are invariably in the rear area, situated behind
layered defences and generally well defended. Due to hardening and other such
measures on airfields, the runways and support facilities may be more vulnerable
than the aircraft themselves, even to specialized weapons. Destruction of
command, control, and communications facilities, aircrew and key personnel
workspace, hangars, maintenance facilities, petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL)
and other storage areas will affect the adversary’s ability to generate aircraft
sorties. Runway or taxiway closures may prevent use of the airfield for an
extended period. This may depend on subsequent strikes and the adversary’s
repair capability.

(3) Tactical Ballistic and Cruise Missile as well as Combat Drone Launching

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Systems, Sites and Platforms. OCA operations are most effective when
conducted against theatre missiles before launch. The pre-emptive destruction of
missiles, launch facilities, storage facilities and other support infrastructure
greatly limits subsequent theatre missile strikes.

(4) Known GBAD sites or AD capable maritime platforms should be eliminated or

suppressed, if they affect other operations. It may be necessary to target all
known sites in a given area in order to clear corridors of approach for aircraft
involved in other air operations. Destruction of individual active sites may create
gaps in the adversary’s defensive shield, which could, in turn, allow relatively
safe penetration possibilities for allied air forces. The creation of such gaps
could force the adversary to rely on other defensive measures thereby diluting his
overall AD capability and reducing his flexibility. The destruction of active
GBAD system sites and maritime platforms may bring temporary relief in parts
of an AOO, but long term effects cannot be expected except as a result of
cumulative attrition. The target sites must be analyzed to ensure the attack is
directed against the critical component of the GBAD system.

(5) Electronic warfare Systems. This category includes adversary systems capable
of performing ECM that may be airborne or surface-based. Such systems are
generally difficult to detect, but once detected and located are usually vulnerable
and worthwhile targets.

b. Command, Control Facilities and Installations

(1) Command, control systems. While adversary C2 facilities may be hardened,

certain portions of them are vulnerable, not only to direct attack, but to the more
subtle forms of EW. In today’s combat environment, an adversary that closely
controls his forces is heavily dependent upon communications and other
electronic means or upon rigid procedures in order to exercise that control.
Denial of either the command function or the means of communication to
exercise control can greatly hamper operations. Repeated attacks leading to the
elimination of the means of command and control of forces can cause
disintegration of adversary efforts. However, the redundancy afforded by a
combination of multiple, hardened and mobile systems in large numbers creates
difficulties in locating key facilities. Attacks against known facilities may have
an immediate local beneficial effect upon an air battle occurring within the span
of control of those facilities particularly if sufficient backup sites are not
available. These attacks may also have a long-term cumulative effect as sites and
maritime platforms are destroyed.

(2) Air surveillance and control system (ASACS). The ASACS includes linked
ground-controlled intercept (GCI) and early warning radars and other sensors
together with control and communications amid other supporting facilities.

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These targets are important to the adversary’s situational awareness and his
ability to control his forces effectively. Although land-based radars may be
movable, the time required to redeploy them is lengthy compared with that of the
systems they control. Destruction of such sites in a confined geographic area
could, therefore, substantially reduce the adversary's capability to detect, react
and bring forces to bear against allied airpower elements and operations. While
these target sites can be hardened, certain components must be in the open during
operation. These targets should therefore be allocated a high priority in OCA
operations. Some of these considerations also apply to maritime platforms.

0410. Control and Coordination. OCA will often be performed beyond range of friendly ground-
based control systems. Nevertheless, such systems should contribute to the maximum extent
possible to the effective conduct of the mission by providing information and advice during
those portions of the operation within their range. This will contribute to the functions of ASC
and AD. AEW and airborne control systems may, within the limits of technical equipment, be
able to replace or complement ground systems and extend control into adversary territory.
When OCA missions are conducted short of the Fire Support Coordination Line, they require
close coordination between affected component commanders and must be under positive control
or procedural clearance.

0411. Communications. When operating over adversary territory, forces committed to OCA may
expect a degraded communications environment. Allied commanders are encouraged to
develop standard tactics, techniques and procedures to minimize the requirements for
communications without compromising mission effectiveness. This may be negated to a degree
by the use of secure, ECM resistant communications and tactical data links. Development and
use of standard tactics, techniques and procedures can further reduce the attempts at interference
by hostile forces.

0412. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Objectives. SEAD operations attack the adversary’s AD
posture to create favourable conditions for friendly operations to achieve their objectives with a
reduced risk of attrition.

0413. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Planning

a. As in the case with fighter sweep/escort missions, SEAD will not normally be pursued in
isolation but as an enhancing activity to other operations. SEAD therefore has to be an
integral part in the planning of other operations exposed to adversary ADs.

b. General guidance for SEAD planning is provided by the JFC. Component commanders
will take this guidance into account when developing their own plans and operations
orders.

c. Detailed SEAD planning will take place at that command level where the assets to
conduct SEAD are available. Where Joint SEAD is accomplished, close coordination

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between the respective commanders is necessary. SEAD operation planners have to take
into account all friendly emitters (refer to the Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL)) to
avoid limitations for and interference with those assets.

d. There are three primary objectives for SEAD planning as follows: 1. an accurate
continual assessment of the enemy’s air defences and their ability to influence the
outcome of overall air operations; 2. to decide the scope, magnitude and duration of
SEAD operations necessary to reduce the enemy’s air defence capabilities to acceptable
risk levels; and 3.to determine what SEAD assets, their capabilities and potential
competing requirements are both available and required to achieve the End State of the
SEAD mission/campaign.

e. Effective SEAD requires unity of effort to achieve a combined arms effect. The JFC
uses all assets to protect friendly forces and exploit threat weaknesses. SEAD is most
effective when the JFC integrates the combat power of all elements of the joint force.

0414. Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Resources. Each component has its own unique
capabilities to suppress adversary AD systems. Historically, the component directly affected by
the threat has assumed the immediate responsibility for suppressing enemy ADs. However, the
distinct capabilities provided by each component, the diverse combinations these capabilities
offer, and the aggregate of total SEAD capabilities allow allied forces to choose the best means
and ways to conduct particular SEAD operations from the array of available options. Some of
these options include aircraft with anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) and other air-to-surface
munitions, EW, AH, direct or indirect fires (including mortars, artillery, missiles, drones or
maritime fires), and direct action by SOF. SEAD operations can be accomplished through
destructive and disruptive means.

a. Destructive Means. Destructive means seek the destruction of the target system or
operating personnel. The effects are cumulative and increase aircraft survivability, but
destructive means may place large demands on the available combat capabilities/forces.
Examples of destructive SEAD capabilities are Anti-radiation missiles (ARMs),
Directed Energy (DE) and other munitions, e.g. bombs, air and surface-to-surface
missiles, drones and artillery.

b. Disruptive Means. Disruptive means temporarily deny, degrade, deceive, delay, or

neutralize adversary AD systems to increase aircraft survivability. Disruptive means
may be either active or passive. Active means include ARM, DE, electromagnetic
jamming and electromagnetic deception expendables (chaff, flares, and decoys), tactics
such as deception, avoidance, or evasive flight profiles. Passive means include emission
control, camouflage, IR shielding, warning receivers, and material design features.

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0415. Execution. SEAD operations can fall into three categories: JOA AD system suppression,
localized suppression, and opportune suppression. JOA AD system suppression creates
increasingly favourable conditions for allied operations by disabling adversary AD systems (or
major capabilities of those systems). Localized suppression operations normally have specified
time and space limitations because they support specific operations or missions. Opportune
suppression includes self-defence and offensive attacks against adversary AD targets of
opportunity. SEAD objectives are specified by the JFC, who will consider the unique
capabilities of each component to contribute to CA operations.

a. JOA Air Defence System Suppression. JOA AD system suppression efforts should
target high payoff AD assets that will result in the greatest degradation of the
adversary’s total system. These targets include adversary ground radars and associated
C4 for early warning, GCI, critical communications nodes, and long-range GBAD
systems. The objectives of JOA AD system suppression will depend upon the type of
air operations (interdiction, CA, maritime, and other types) planned to support the JFC
campaign plan. The immediate objective of JOA AD system suppression operations is
to permit effective allied air operations by protecting allied airborne systems, disrupting
the cohesion of adversary ADs, and establishing flexibility for allied operations.
Because the results of JOA AD system suppression can have a significant impact on
allied operations, they may have a higher priority for air capabilities/forces than
localized SEAD objectives. However, planners must consider the impact on the
manoeuvre force if strikes requiring localized SEAD are cancelled.

b. Localized Suppression. Localized suppression operations are normally confined to

geographical areas associated with specified ground targets or friendly transit routes.
These operations may occur throughout the JOA for all components and have time and
space limitations because they protect specific operations or missions. Based on the JFC
guidance, the land and maritime components’ fire support elements and fire support
coordination centres will determine the suppression systems available to conduct
localized suppression. Examples of these capabilities/forces include field artillery,
mortars, maritime surface fire, attack helicopters, EW, and surface-to-surface missiles.
Component liaison elements located with the ACC assist localized suppression
operations by providing the means to request surface fire support. The component
commanders continually update lists of potential SEAD targets in their areas of interest.
Tactical air control parties (TACPs), air and maritime gunfire liaison companies, and
fire support agencies identify potential local SEAD targets and request SEAD fire
support. A preplanned request for SEAD should also identify known or suspected
adversary AD locations enroute to and from and around the target area. The request for
air support contains the type of suppression desired by the requesting component.

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c. Immediate Missions. Threat assessment and suppression requirements must be made

quickly when processing a request for air support. Any friendly forces on the air request
net able to meet suppression requirements may enter the air request net by contacting the
TACPs or air and maritime gunfire liaison company to respond to the specific SEAD
request. If a surface force cannot support the SEAD requirement, the component passes
the request through the component senior air control agency to the ACC for immediate
SEAD support consideration. Execution timing is based on the requested time on target
and is relayed from the component to the suppressing unit. If a unit cannot fulfil a
prearranged localized suppression commitment, it must relay this information
immediately to the component through the appropriate command element. A requesting
echelon or component must first consider what organic SEAD systems are available.
When the requirements exceed the capability or availability of its systems, the
requesting component passes the requirements through its respective chain of command
to the ACC for resolution.

d. Opportune Suppression. Many AD threats are not identified in enough time for planned
suppression. Opportune suppression is usually unplanned and includes aircrew self-
defence and attack against targets of opportunity. The JFC or higher authority will
ensure ROE for opportune suppression (SEAD ROE) are part of the established ROE.

(1) Aircrew Self-defence. Unless otherwise dictated by the law of armed conflict,
restrictions ordinarily should be imposed only for the safety of friendly forces.

(2) Targets of Opportunity. SEAD targets of opportunity are those adversary AD

systems detected by surface or airborne sensors or observers within range of
available weapons and not yet targeted. Many SEAD efforts by surface forces
may be against targets of opportunity. Surface and air weapon systems may
suppress AD targets of opportunity whenever capabilities, mission priorities, and
ROE permit. Such suppression operations should be coordinated through the
AOC and/or fire support coordination centres unless autonomous action is
specifically permitted by ROE or other appropriate command. The purpose of
SEAD ROE is to enhance effective suppression of adversary ADs while
minimizing risks to friendly forces.

(3) Targets Acquired by Observers or Controllers. Many combat elements may

often be in good position to acquire SEAD targets of opportunity. Observers,
spotters, controllers, and liaison officers from the components have the authority
to request suppression for SEAD targets of opportunity. Such personnel include
forward air controllers (FAC), tactical air control parties (TACP), and component
surveillance and target acquisition elements and assets. The observers or
controllers will forward these requests through their respective fire support
channels. Requirements should first be passed to suppression systems that
belong to or support the unit acquiring the target because they can respond
immediately. If the suppression requirement exceeds the capabilities of the

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ground forces, an immediate air request for SEAD support will be sent to the air
component.

(4) Targets Acquired by Aircrews. When aircrews have acquired SEAD targets of
opportunity but have not engaged them because of mission priorities, system
capabilities, or SEAD ROE, they pass the information to the agency controlling
their mission. This agency immediately passes the targeting data through the
appropriate system or systems to coordinate with the force best suited for
targeting.

(5) Coordination. Opportune suppression is a continuous operation involving

immediate response to acquired AD targets of opportunity. In support of the
operation or campaign plan, the component commander may assign, for a
specific period of time, a higher priority of effort to those areas where the
campaign or operation plans call for air operations. In cases where air assets are
not available or not required, the component commander establishes priorities for
opportune suppression. These priorities are forwarded from the designated fire
support coordinator at component level HQ to the executing commands.

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CHAPTER 5

DEFENSIVE COUNTER - AIR OPERATIONS

0501. General. DCA operations are conducted primarily in reaction to adversary air and missile
offensive initiatives. DCA includes active and passive measures to protect forces and vital
interests from enemy air and missile attacks. DCA operations attempt interception of intruding
enemy aircraft and missiles as early as possible and should be conducted as far from the
friendly operations area as feasible. They aim to detect, identify, intercept, negate or preferably
destroy enemy air and missile forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air
environment. Effective employment of limited assets across a broad front can only be achieved
by prioritizing tasks and managing risks. Consequently, the ability to react effectively must be
premised on a comprehensive infrastructure facilitated by detailed planning.

a. Active Air Defence. Active AD is direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or
reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and
assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defence weapons, EW, and other available
weapons. Integration of these weapon systems will allow for a defence in depth, using
multiple engagements.

b. Passive Air Defence. Passive AD consists of all measures, other than active air
defence, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against
friendly forces and assets. These measures include camouflage, deception, dispersion,
and the use of protective construction. Passive air defence improves survivability by
reducing the likelihood of detection and targeting and also minimizing the potential
effects of surveillance and attack.

0502. Active Air Defense Functions. The resources made available for active AD must be organized
to carry out the following functions:

a. Detection;

b. Routing;

c. Identification;

d. Transmission of information;

e. Assignment of weapons;

f. Control of weapons;

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g. Engagement;

h. Combat assessment;

i. Recovery of aircraft.

0503. Active Air Defence Components. Components of the active AD system are as follows:

a. Weapon systems:

(1) Aircraft;

(2) GBAD;

(3) Ship AD weapons.

b. The surface environment, which comprises:

(1) Control and reporting agencies together with sensors which include:

(a) Early warning and surveillance systems;

(b) Other netted civilian and military sensors;

(c) Mobile radars;

(d) Identification systems;

(e) EW support measures;

(f) Maritime air search radars and EW systems;

(g) special operations forces surveillance and reconnaissance.

(2) Communications systems.

(3) Data processing facilities.

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c. Contributing systems, which include:

(1) AEW;

(2) Civilian and military air traffic control (ATC) agencies;

(3) Satellites;

(4) AAR aircraft;

(5) EW aircraft;

(6) Airborne lasers.

0504. Weapon Systems. Each system has different limitations and advantages such as range, reaction
time and flexibility of operation. Closer examination of individual systems shows that the
disadvantages of one are often balanced by the advantages of another; active AD requires a mix
of weapon types and systems. This balance is required not only between aircraft and surface-to-
air weapons, but also between specific types of aircraft, missiles and anti-aircraft artillery.

0505. Surface Environment. Where practical, all AD agencies and sensors should be integrated to
provide an effective surface environment system. Efficient control of AD resources relies on
the provision and exchange of essential near real time (NRT) information. This information
must include AD warnings that allow AD assets to be placed at appropriate readiness states and
permit timely target assignment. The exchange of NRT information requires the provision of
adequate track capacity within systems and the cross-telling of tracks utilizing data processing
systems. Secure, survivable communications systems to connect the control agencies are
essential. In addition, the surface environment system itself should be survivable and/or have
redundancy.

0506 Sensors. AD sensors are normally optimized to perform specific surveillance or control
functions. Individual surface-based systems, including ships, have limitations in range, low
level capability, vertical coverage, target discrimination and the provision of height data.
Airborne and space-based sensors have better range and vertical coverage capabilities than
surface-based systems but may have other limitations. Therefore the best results can be
achieved by a complementary sensor mix. Equipment operates on widely differing frequencies,
and as a consequence has different susceptibilities to ECM. Similarly, electronic protective
measures capability varies from system to system. To provide the spectrum of cover required
for DCA a number of complementary systems are therefore necessary. These are a mix of static
and mobile equipment. Systems should be netted to enable AD information to be gathered and
disseminated under all operational conditions and to provide mutual support.

0507. Contributing Systems

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a. Airborne Early Warning. Airborne sensors serve to overcome range and low-level
detection limitations inherent in a surface-based sensor system. The control function of
AEW aircraft and integration of the information by tactical data links provides for
increased flexibility and range.

b. Civilian and Military Air Traffic Control Facilities. ATC facilities may have
information or capabilities of value to the ADs. These assets should be explored and
exploited to the fullest and where possible connected into the surface environment.

c. AAR aircraft. Air refuelling makes CA operations possible without having to rely on
the use of forward bases. An air refuelling capability can extend the combat radius of
CA aircraft, lengthen their loiter time, or allow them to carry heavier payloads.

0508. Additional Assets. To increase further the effectiveness of ADs, all other sources or systems
available should be used to maximum advantage as they provide:

a. Indications of imminent hostile activity before it would be otherwise detected by the AD

system.

b. Host nation or national defence forces may provide ground-based site and force
protection to prevent the requirement for committing allied forces to that task.

c. Logistics and support agencies which provide the sustainability to enable the AD force
to accomplish its purpose. Adequate and timely support must be planned, coordinated
and executed so the AD mission does not falter under the stress of combat.

0509. Types of Active Air Defence Operations. Normally, an effective AD is layered in depth and
utilizes the following operational options:

a. Area defence is a posture designed for the defence of friendly assets in a broad area and
uses a combination of weapon systems.

b. Point defence is a posture designed for the protection of a more limited area normally in
defence of the vital elements or installations including vital civilian infrastructure.

c. HVAA protection defends airborne national assets, which are so important that the loss
of even one could seriously impact allied warfighting capabilities. Furthermore, the
political ramifications of destroying one of these assets could provide the enemy with a
tremendous propaganda victory. High value airborne asset protection is performed by
fighter aircraft using various combat air patrol (CAP) or escort techniques.

0510. Self-defence. It is universally recognized that individuals and units have the sovereign right to
defend themselves against attack or an imminent attack. ROE do not limit this right. In
exercising this right, individuals and units will act in accordance with national law. Self-

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defense is the use of such necessary and proportional force, including deadly force, by
NATO/NATO-led forces and personnel to defend themselves against attack or an imminent
attack. For further details see MC 362.

0511. Passive Air Defence measures. Passive AD measures are required to reduce the effects of
hostile aircraft and missile attack. They do not involve the employment of active weapons.
These measures are required for all critical military and civil assets and will involve the efforts
of both military and civil organizations. Reduction of the effectiveness of potential adversary
air and missile action requires extensive preparations in peacetime. The measures available
may include:

a. Mobility. Mobility reduces vulnerability and increases survivability by complicating

adversary surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting.

b. Hardening of assets. Valuable assets and their shelters are hardened to protect against
physical attack, electromagnetic pulse, and transient radiation. Hardening measures
should be accomplished during peacetime whenever possible.

c. Reconstitution. Reconstitution is the capability for rapid repair of damage resulting

from adversary attacks and the return of damaged units to combat readiness. Examples
of recuperation include the repair of airfield operating surfaces and aircraft, the removal
of mines and unexploded ordnance, provision of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
facilities and restoring essential services such as C2 systems, power and fuel.

d. Camouflage, Concealment and Deception (CCD). CCD denies accurate location and
targeting of friendly assets by misleading and presenting false information to the
adversary. These measures reduce vulnerability of friendly assets by limiting their
exposure to targeting. They may be conducted continuously or in response to warning.
Timely intelligence concerning the overflight of adversary satellite and aircraft
collection systems is important to the effort. CCD may cause the adversary to abort,
delay, or modify an attack, or deplete resources by attacking false targets.

e. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defensive Equipment and Facilities. NBC
defensive equipment and facilities protect against the effects of weapons of mass
destruction by providing contamination detection, shelter, and decontamination.
Individual protective equipment allows vital functions to continue in the NBC
environment.

f. Redundancy. Duplication of critical capabilities enables vital systems to continue

operating when critical nodes have been destroyed or damaged. Redundancy includes
dual, contingency or back up capabilities that can assume primary mission functions in
whole or in part upon failure or degradation of the primary system.

g. Provision of EOD facilities.

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h. Detection and Warning Systems. Timely detection and warning of air and missile
threats provide maximum reaction time for friendly forces to seek shelter or take
appropriate action. Connectivity for communications and sensor systems is vital for
accurate and timely warning. A combination of air-, space-, and surface-based detection
and communications assets should be established to maximize detection and warning.
“All clear” procedures should also be established to notify forces when a warning is
false or the threat no longer exists.

i. Dispersal. Dispersal of assets compounds the adversary's targeting and weapon

selection problems.

j Adoption of a comprehensive electromagnetic emission control policy.

0512. Employment of Air Defence Assets. Early warning of adversary attack is vital if defense in
depth is to be obtained. Continuous surveillance is crucial for early detection, identification, and
prediction of areas of attack by hostile aircraft and missiles. DCA operations are primarily
carried out over friendly territory. They comprise all measures designed to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy offensive air. Establishing the correct aim for the AD Plan and the
associated DCA operations is fundamental to their success. Essentially there are two choices:

a. To minimize the damage sustained by friendly forces and facilities.

b. To inflict the maximum attrition on the enemy.

To a certain extent these aims are interdependent: the more enemy aircraft that are shot down,
the fewer that are available to inflict damage in future raids. The less damage friendly forces
sustain, the more capable they are of defending themselves if the enemy continues with his
attacks. Deciding where the priority lies between these two aims has major implications for
operational deployment and force structuring, and thus for resource allocation. If the aim is to
minimize damage to friendly assets and population, then operational deployment considerations
will demand that all the resources need to be devoted to deterring or containing the incoming
raids, even if that means allowing vulnerable homebound enemy aircraft to escape. However,
in terms of force structuring, significant resources will need to be allocated to passive defense
and resilience measures. The operational deployment considerations for achieving maximum
attrition should support the interception of enemy aircraft wherever they can be found, before or
after they have attacked their targets. Force structuring will need to reflect that passive defense
measures will play a less important part, and the need to provide the strongest possible active
defense forces will dominate resource allocation. Deciding where the priority lies between the
‘minimum damage’ air and the ‘maximum attrition’ aim will depend partly on friendly
vulnerability and partly on the nature of the threat which is determined as part of the air
estimate process. Although the aim will shape the relative allocation of the resources between
active and passive defense systems, this will be a question of emphasis rather than of
alternative. An analysis of each vital asset in the JOA for criticality, vulnerability,

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recoverability and the ability of the enemy to attack it will influence the degree of emphasis.

The active AD assets should be positioned to provide adequate defence in accordance with
established AD priorities. The JFC will select and prioritize his AD priorities based on the
following considerations: political guidance, criticality of that asset/installation to the force,
vulnerability to air and missile attack, recuperation after attack and the assessed ability of the
threat to attack that asset.

0513. Two Mission Types of DCA. Although the AD plan seeks to construct a flexible posture,
individual missions react to the initiative of the enemy forces. DCA comprises two mission
types as follows:

a. Active defense missions use reactive air-to-air fighters or other assets placed on airborne
or ground alert. They employ a mix of weapon and sensor systems supported by secure
and highly responsive command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
systems to detect, identify, intercept or track enemy aircraft and missiles in flight. They
then attempt to destroy or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets.

b. Passive air defense includes all measures, other than active air defense, taken to
mimimize the effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks or measures used to
minimize the effectiveness of enemy attacks. Passive air defense measures include
camouflage, concealment, deception, dispersal, protective shelters (hardening), and low
observable or stealth technologies.

0514. AD Protection. The AD priorities should also specify the type of protection, i.e. protection
against TM or air- breathing threat (ABT). Hostile aircraft should also be engaged when
egressing if ROE permit. DCA weapons systems comprise two complementary elements:
surface-to-air defenses and fighter aircraft. Surface-to-air weapons offer high firepower and
rapid responsiveness and their effectiveness requires a reliable, interoperable interface with
aircraft operations. Successful integration of these capabilities strengthens mutual support and
provides the best overall defensive coverage. They are employed as follows:

a. Aircraft. Aircraft may perform DCA with the assistance of AD radars (i.e. GCI) and
could take the form of close, loose, or broadcast control (see STANAG 3993).
However, in the event that no form of control is available, fighters should be prepared to
operate autonomously. AD fighters may be employed on the following tasks:

(1) Alert. An alert mission normally involves aircrew and aircraft in a high state of
readiness for immediate start-up and takeoff for an intercept.

(2) Combat Air Patrol. CAP missions are mounted to enable rapid reaction to
adversary intrusion or otherwise unauthorized/unwanted entry into a designated
airspace. CAPs may be positioned well forward of or over specified areas to be

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defended, in support of friendly forces, over critical areas over air/land/sea

corridors, or along political borders. For deconfliction, or to enhance
autonomous operations, CAP missions may be assigned a Fighter Area of
Responsibility to operate in. In some cases CAP may provide the best utilization
of AD-fighter where there is little or no warning of intrusion, where short
reaction times are mandated, or for a show of intent.

b. Surface-to-Air Weapons. The employment of surface-to-air weapons will be to a large

extent dictated by their prior deployment into area or point defence positions. For some
systems, employment against theatre ballistic missiles or ABT must be pre-determined.
The combined effect of the separate systems will be at its greatest when they can be
integrated into the overall AD effort. The optimum capabilities of each different
weapon system occur at different ranges and heights, and only by coordination can they
be mutually supporting and provide the best overall cover. It is essential that co-
ordination ensures correct deconfliction between surface-to-air weapons and friendly
fighter aircraft.

0515. Control and Co-ordination . Effective DCA operations require optimum use of available assets
and airspace through an integrated C2 system. The variety of surveillance, tracking and weapon
systems of all the force components require detailed planning and coordination to allow rapid
AD warnings, effective C2 functions, and timely weapon employment, if required. If the area
to be defended is large and the intensity of operations is likely to be high, a number of defensive
sectors can be established, each under the control of a sector commander who reports to the
ADC. A maritime task group, aircraft carrier battle group or amphibious task force within the
JOA may require the establishment of a co-ordinated air defence area within which the anti-air
warfare commander or supporting arms co-ordination centre is responsible for the co-ordination
of AD operations.

0516. Centralized or Decentralized Control. Although centralized control is the desired standard, AD
weapon systems must be capable to execute decentralized operations if the saturation of the C2
system dictates so to maintain highest degree of reaction against an air threat.

0517. Autonomous Operations. Autonomous operations are conducted when centralized control fails
or is not possible due to the type of employment. All AD weapon systems must be capable of
autonomous operations when control fails or is not possible due to the type of employment.
Nevertheless, it is essential to co-ordinate the employment of these assets, at least by procedural
means, with the overall AD operations in order to permit the safe passage of
friendly/neutral/civilian aircraft without limiting the AD more than necessary.

0518. Area Control of Weapons. To capitalize on the complementary capabilities of the various
weapons systems and complete integration wherever possible, at least functional integration or
co-ordination, or at least co-ordination of the use of weapons, is necessary. In addition to the
ASC procedures detailed in AJP-3.3.5, various means are available to achieve this.

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a. Air Defence Operations Area. A geographical area within which procedures are
established to minimize interference between AD operations and other types of
operations (AAP-6). It may include one or more of the following (see lexicon for
description):

(1) Air defence action area;

(2) Air defence area;

(3) Air defence identification zone;

(4) Fire- power umbrella.

b. Weapon Engagement Zone (WEZ). Effective employment of AD weapons within the

airspace may be enhanced by the establishment of a WEZ. A WEZ is defined as: In
AD, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement
normally rests with a particular weapon system (AAP-6). Use of WEZs does not
preclude engagement of high priority targets by more than one type of weapon system if
close control is available. WEZs may be pre-planned and their possible locations co-
ordinated with the ACA, however, over land they are not ASC means (ACMs) and will
not be activated/de-activated through the ACO. Established zones may include:

(1) Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). FEZs will normally be established in those
areas where no effective surface- to-air capability is deployed.

(2) Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ). SAM units will operate in MEZ’s that should
normally cover the SAM engagement envelope.

(3) Short-Range Air Defence Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). A SHORADEZ

can be established to define the airspace within which these assets will operate.
Because centralized control over short-range AD weapons may not be possible,
these areas must be clearly defined and promulgated so that friendly aircraft can
avoid them. If friendly aircraft have to penetrate active SHORADEZs, special
co-ordination will have to be established.

0519. Control of Fighter Operations

a. Air Defence Aircraft. AD aircraft will be scrambled by the agency controlling the
specific AD area in response to the detection and assessment of a hostile, or potentially
hostile target, or one whose origin and purpose are unknown. Where possible, fighters
will remain under the control of an ASACS unit.

b. Combat Air Patrol. Where warning of adversary air activity may be inadequate for
fighters on ground alert to achieve an interception before adversary weapon release

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point (for instance, due to the electronic environment, poor low level radar coverage,
communications failure or need to intercept at long range), interceptors may be tasked
for CAP. Controlled interception may be provided by a controlling agency or fighters
may operate autonomously when targets are detected by on board sensors.

c. Routing. Management of airspace in an active AD environment can be extremely

difficult but is crucial to successful air operations. Positive control and/or procedural
measures must be implemented to ensure friendly aircraft can safely traverse the
airspace without inhibiting the ADs. (Also See AJP-3.3.5)

(1) Routing the aircraft is one method of providing control. Imposition of time and
space oriented controls over AD weapons defending a particular air route and
over transiting aircraft will serve to minimize the risks to these aircraft. Care
must be taken to avoid creation of time or space oriented patterns that may be
discernible by an adversary.

(2) Regardless of other controls and ASC measures imposed within a volume of
defended airspace, AD forces must be readily able to identify all aircraft in the
area. This may be accomplished by electronic, visual or procedural means. It is
critical to the survival of friendly aircraft, as well as to the effectiveness of AD,
that rapid, reliable and secure means of identification be defined and
implemented within AD areas.

0520. Control of Surface-to-Air Weapons Operations

a. Means of Control. The lethality of surface-to-air weapons demands a reliable and

responsible control architecture and compatible interfaces with the air C2 system.
Adequate identification features and procedures preclude engagement of friendly
aircraft and unnecessary expenditure of AD resources.

(1) Weapons Control Status. Weapons control of surface-to-air units is expressed as

a status, declared for a particular area and time. Weapons control statuses are:

(a) Weapons Free. In AD, a weapon control order imposing a status

whereby weapons systems may be fired at any target not positively
recognized as friendly. (AAP 6)

(b) Weapons Tight. In AD, a weapon control order imposing a status

whereby weapons systems may be fired only at targets recognized as
hostile.(AAP 6)

(c) Weapons Hold. In AD, a weapon control order imposing a status

whereby weapons systems may only be fired in self-defence or in
response to a formal order. (AAP 6)

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(2) Fire Control Orders. A fire control order is one given to direct or to inhibit firing
by surface-to-air weapons units based on rapidly changing battle situations. Fire
control orders may be issued regardless of the weapons control status at any
time. It normally addresses a specific unit. These orders are:

(a) Engage. In AD, a fire control order used to direct or authorize units
and/or weapons systems to fire on a designated target. (AAP-6)

(b) Cease Engagement. In AD, a fire control order used to direct units to stop
the firing sequence against a designated target. Guided missiles already in
flight will continue to intercept. (AAP-6)

(c) Hold Fire. In AD, an emergency order used to stop firing. Missiles already
in-flight must be prevented from intercepting if technically possible. (AAP-
6)

(d) Cover. An FCO used to direct a fire unit to acquire, track, and report speed,
altitude, heading and identification of a track.

b. Control of Medium and Long-Range SAM. Control of medium and long-range SAM is
achieved through data link or voice facilities of the SAM C2 system.

c. Control of Short-Range Air Defence (SHORAD). All AD assets in a given area should
be incorporated into an overall ADP. Autonomous control over the firing operation of
SHORAD weapons will be governed by the imposition of active ROE and rules and
procedures issued by the ADC. When not linked, control should be exercised through
weapons control orders to other procedural means.

(1) SHORAD units in defence of rear area critical assets such as airfields should be
integrated into the centralized AD C2 system. While technological limitations
may prevent the achievement of the same degree of control possible for the
interception of the target after launch than with medium and long-range SAM, an
adequate level of control is possible when SHORAD is employed for these tasks.

(2) SHORAD units organic to land manoeuvre forces will be positioned tactically by
the land force commander. These units must be responsive to the AD needs and
the manoeuvre scheme of the organic force; when possible they should also
contribute to the integrated AD of the area. Rules and procedures imposed by the
ADC are binding on these units. Liaison between these units and the central AD
C2 system is achieved through the functional integration with data links (e.g.
LINK 16 capability) and is the desired means for dissemination of weapon
control status, early warning information, and friendly air activity information to
AD units organic to the land manoeuvre forces.

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d. Self-Defense. All military units should be capable of self-defence against air attack by
using their organic weapons. This capability can only be attained by continuous training
in aircraft recognition and in the AD application of organic weapons. The manoeuvre
unit commander may direct his force to engage a threat.

0521. Integrated Air Defence Plan . Generally, the ADC will determine how integral the DCA
capability must be among the air, land, maritime and SOFs. Normally this means closest co-ordination
possible of all AD matters among the component commands involved and integration of available
assets into the overall ADP. As a minimum, the maritime AD resources must be integrated as far as
possible into the appropriate AD C2 network. Similarly, land-based AD resources employed in
maritime command areas must be integrated into the appropriate maritime AD organization. AD
operations conducted near the boundaries between land-based and maritime AOOs should be
coordinated by the ADC with the component commanders so as to ensure seamless to prevent
interference.

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CHAPTER 6

OPERATIONAL REPORTING AND COMBAT ASSESSMENT

0601. Operational Reporting . The function of operational reporting is to provide feedback within the
C2 structure. It is part of the vertical element of communication. Operational reporting
provides information on status of forces, mission results and observations by subordinates.
Concise, accurate and timely operational reporting is an essential element in the planning and
tasking processes. The tasks and responsibilities of the individual elements of the organization
determine the requirement for information. The information flow generally follows the
command structure. Tailoring information to specific needs requires selection from or
compression of the information available.

0602. Combat Assessment. CA missions must be analyzed to determine whether desired effects are
being achieved and if the original objectives have been achieved. The conclusions drawn from
this analysis will then be considered in planning the next stage of operations. To achieve this,
accurate and immediate reporting of all results is needed. A standard system of reporting
appropriate to each level of execution should be established (e.g. as per Mission Report in APP-
11).

0603. Security. Although security is essential in the protection of plans and capabilities, over
classification of operational reports may inhibit operations and should be avoided wherever and
whenever possible.

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LEXICON PART I ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP Allied Administrative Publication

AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling
ABT air-breathing threats
ACA airspace control authority
ACC Air Component Commander
ACM airspace control means
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
AD air defence
ADC air defense commander
ADP air defence plan
AEW airborne early warning
AH attack helicopter
AJP Allied Joint Publication
AOB air order of battle
AOC air operations centre
AOCC air operations co-ordination centre
AOO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
APP allied procedural publication
ARM anti-radiation missile
ASACS air surveillance and control system
ASC airspace control
ATC air traffic control
ATO air tasking order
ATP allied tactical publication

C2 command and control

CA counter air
CC component commander
CAP combat air patrol
CAS close air support
CCD camouflage concealment and deception

DCA defensive counter – air

DE directed energy

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ECM electronic countermeasures

EMP electromagnetic pulse
EOD Explosive ordnance disposal
EW electronic warfare

FAC forward air controller

FCO fire control order
FEZ fighter engagement zone
FP force protection

GBAD ground based air defense

GCI ground controlled intercept

HQ headquarters
HVAA high value airborne assets

Info Ops information operations

IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR infrared
ISR intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance

JFACC joint force air component commander

JFC joint force commander
JOA joint operations area
JRFL joint restricted frequency list

MEZ missile engagement zone

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear biological and chemical
NRT near real time
NSA NATO Standardization agency

OCA offensive counter - air operation

PFP Partnership for peace

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

ROE rules of engagement

SA situational awareness
SAM surface-to-air missile
SEAD suppression of enemy air defences
SHORAD short-range air defence
SHORADEZ short-range air defence engagement zone

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SOF special operations force

TACP tactical air control parties

TM theater missile

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

WEZ weapon engagement zone

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LEXICON PART II

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

active air defence

Active measures taken against attacking enemy forces to destroy or nullify any form of air or missile
threat or to reduce the effectiveness of any such attack. (AAP 6 2006)

air component commander

Within the NATO static command structure the ACC is the regional air commander (RAC) whilst for
the combined joint task force (CJTF) it will be the Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander
(CJFACC).

air defence
All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action. Related terms: active
air defence, passive air defence. (AAP-6(2005)).

air defence action area

An area and the airspace above it within which friendly aircraft or surface-to-air weapons are normally
given precedence in operations except under specified conditions. (AAP-6 (2005)).

air defence area

A specifically defined airspace for which air defence must be planned and provided. (AAP-6(2005)).

air defence identification zone

Airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft
is required. (AAP-6(2005)).

air defence operations area

A geographical area within which procedures are established to minimize interference between air
operations and other types of operations. It may include one or more of the following:

a. air defence action area;

b. air defence area;

c. air defence identification zone;

d. fire power umbrella. (AAP-6(2005))

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airspace control
A combination of airspace organization planning procedures, the resulting control structure and co-
ordination functions to minimize risks and to allow for efficient and flexible use of airspace by all
involved elements of joint air, land and sea operations. While airspace control is provided to promote
greater flexibility of operations, the authority to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations is
vested only in the operational commander. NOTE: This is the definition agreed upon for ATP-40/AJP-
3.3.5 at the 15th meeting of the Tactical Air Working Party.

air superiority
That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of
operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (AAP-6(2005))

air supremacy
That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference.
(AAP-6(2005))

apportionment
The quantification and distribution by percentage of the total expected effort,
in relation to the priorities which are to be given to the various air operations in geographic
areas for a given period of time. (AAP-6(2005))

attack
See strike. (Note: In ATP-42 “attack” and “strike” are used synonymously despite the fact that only
“strike” is defined in AAP-6. The term “seizure” does not apply to tactical air operations.)

broadcast control
A form of aircraft mission control used in the absence of full capability or if the tactical situation
precludes close or loose control, in which tactical/target information is passed to enable the aircraft to
accomplish the assigned task. The controlling unit, when possible, provides adequate warnings of
hazards, but the aircraft commander(s) is (are) responsible for aircraft navigation and collision
avoidance. Two-way communications are not a prerequisite for this type of control (STANAG 3993).
Broadcast control does not require controller qualification.

cease engagement
In air defence, a fire control order used to direct units to stop the firing sequence against a designated
target. Guided missiles already in flight will continue to intercept.
(AAP-6(2005))

close control
A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft is continuously controlled, for altitude, speed
and heading, to a position from which the mission can be accomplished (AAP-6).

combat air patrol

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An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a combat
zone, or in an air defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before
they reach their target (AAP-6(2005)).

counter - air operation

Those integrated operations by all components to counter hostile air and missile threats in order to
attain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air (This term is a new term and definition, is
being staffed for ratification within the context of AJP 3.3 (A) RD 3, and will be recommended for
inclusion in the NTDB and (AAP-6)

deception
Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, of falsification of evidence
to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (AAP-6(2005))

defensive counter - air

Active and passive defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or make
ineffective forces attempting to attack or penetrate friendly airspace (AAP-6 2006)

electronic protective measures

That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to ensure effective friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy’s use of electromagnetic energy. There are two
subdivisions of electronic protective measures: active electronic protective measures and passive
electronic protective measures. (AAP-6(2005))

electronic warfare
Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and
identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including
directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure
its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6(2005))

electronic warfare support measures

That division of electronic warfare involving action taken to search for, intercept and identify
electromagnetic emissions and to locate their sources for the purpose of immediate threat recognition.
It provides a source of information required for immediate decision involving electronic
countermeasures, electronic protective measures and other tactical actions. (AAP-6(2005))

engage
In air defence, a fire control order used to direct or authorize units and/or weapon systems to fire on a
designated target. (AAP-6(2005))

escort
Aircraft assigned to protect other aircraft during a mission. (AAP-6(2005)--Def 2)

favourable air situation

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A favourable air situation is one in which the extent of the air effort applied by the opposing forces is
insufficient to affect the success of allied operations.

fighter cover
The maintenance of a number of fighter aircraft over a specified area or force for the purpose of
repelling hostile air activities. (AAP-6(2005))

fighter sweep
An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity
in an allotted area of operations. (AAP-6(2005))

fire-power umbrella
An area of specified dimensions defining the boundaries of the airspace over a naval force at sea within
which the fire of ships anti-aircraft weapons can endanger aircraft, and within which special procedures
have been established for the identification and operation of friendly aircraft. (AAP-6(2005))

hold fire
In air defence, an emergency order to stop firing. Missiles already in flight must be prevented from
intercepting if technically possible. (AAP-6(2005))

identification
1. The indication by any act or means of one’s own friendly character or individuality.
2. The process of attaining an accurate characterization of a detected entity by any act or means so
that high confidence real-time decisions, including weapons engagement, can be made. Related
terms: detection; friend; hostile; identification friend or foe; neutral; recognition; unknown.
1/10/2003
3. In imagery interpretation, the discrimination between objects within a particular type or class.
Synonym: identity. 15/7/2000 (AAP-6(2005))

interoperability
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 22/6/2004 (AAP-6(2005))

loose control
A form of aircraft mission control in which the aircraft commander selects his own speed, altitude,
heading and the appropriate tactics required to accomplish the assigned task. The controlling unit will
advise the aircraft of the current tactical picture and will provide further advice if and when available
(STANAG 3993).

NATO assigned forces

Forces/HQs which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a
NATO commander in accordance with the NATO Crisis Response System, or as specified in special
agreements such as a MOU or when requested by a Strategic Commander through an Activation Order
on the basis of a North Atlantic Council-agreed OPLAN and Execution Directive. Related term:
force(s). (AAP-6(2009))

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NATO command forces

Forces in being which nations have placed under the operational command or operational control of a
NATO commander. Related term: force(s). (AAP-6(2009))

NATO earmarked forces

Forces and/or headquarters that nations agree to place under the operational command or the
operational control of a NATO commander at some future time. Related term: force(s). (AAP-
6(2009))

offensive counter - air operation

An operation mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy air power as close to its source as possible.
(AAP-6(2005))

operational command
The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to
deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the
commander deems necessary. Note: it does not include responsibility for administration. (AAP-
6(2005))

operational control
The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may
accomplish specific missions or tasks which are normally limited by function, time, or location; to
deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include
authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of
itself, include administrative or logistic control. (AAP-6(2005))

passive air defence

Passive measures taken for the physical defence and protection of personnel, essential installations and
equipment in order to minimize the effectiveness of air and/or missile attack. Related terms: active air
defence; air defence; air superiority; air supremacy; counter-air operation; defensive counter-air
operation; offensive counter-air operation.
(AAP-6 (2009)

recognition
The determination of the nature of a detected person, object or phenomenon, and possibly its class or
type. This may include the determination of an individual within a particular class or type. (AAP-
6(2005))

rules of engagement
Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations
under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.
(AAP-6(2005))

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strike
An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (AAP-6(2005))

suppression of enemy air defences

That activity which neutralizes, temporarily degrades or destroys enemy air defences by a destructive
and/or disruptive means. (AAP-6)

tactical air operation

The employment of air power in coordination with ground or maritime forces to:

a. attain and maintain air superiority;

b. prevent movement of enemy forces into and within the combat zone and to seek out and
destroy these forces and their supporting installations; and

c. assist ground or naval forces in achieving their objectives by combined and/or joint
operations. (AAP-6(2005))

tactical command
The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6(2005))

target development
The process of analyzing raw intelligence data to define, identify, locate and place in perspective a
potential target or target system.

theater missile
A missile employed to attack friendly assets within the theatre, regardless of the range of the system
considered or the method of launch. They are categorized as Theatre Aerodynamic Missiles (TAM) or
theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBM) depending on their flight path.

threat radar
Those fire control and acquisition radars connected with adversary weapon systems which can inflict
damage or destroy friendly airborne assets or friendly units.

unmanned aerial vehicle

A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can
carry a lethal and non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery
projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.

weapon engagement zone

In air defence, airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement normally

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rests with a particular weapon system. (AAP-6(2005))

weapons free
In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired at any
target not positively recognized as friendly. (AAP-6(2005))

weapons hold
In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may only be fired
in self-defence or in response to a formal order. (AAP-6(2005))

weapons tight
In air defence, a weapon control order imposing a status whereby weapons systems may be fired only
at targets recognized as hostile. (AAP-6(2005))

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REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS

Related publications concerning airpower and employment of air forces are:

AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)

AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine
AJP-3 Joint Operations
AJP-3.3 Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine
AJP-3.3.2 Air Interdiction and Close Air Support
AJP-3.3.3 Air Maritime Co-ordination (AMC)
AJP 3.3.5 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control
AJP-3.3.7 Combined Joint Force Air Component Command Doctrine
AJP-3.6 Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine
APP-11 NATO Message Catalogue (NMC)
ATP-3.2 Land Operations
ATP-44 Electronic Warfare (EW) in Air Operations
ATP-49 Use of Helicopters in Land Operations - Doctrine
ATP-56 Air-to-Air Refuelling
STANAG 3993 Air Control Terms and Definitions

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