.

DEFENCE AND EX
TERNAL AFFA.llls.
THE defence of the
sta~ .is ~ as
.J- .l--·Tlie
( ua nu u , 5C two are among ~ . o~ th_~_~~- (dur a
the seven f i r a ~
t e· ~tate. Of thes
e. two, durga 1s an
co d th
. . •
more importaOt
earlier than in the list of prak nt . ns.,1tiien:i
fortified capital ~is (6.1.1) It :nd is
of the s_?te, wher: !~ ~'4
enemy_,_ e}rin_g,J~)1.l!:!~ pi'.§SCe
_h~~~.!!_~~~!~a! p r~ ~
duringJV.hl.~'1-. ld a siege_ ~er~ a s
.SlJ!El and a!:yt a a j~1!P!~~~v:e~-~~-~e to ~ M e
• Well 8\Sfo? defence ty . .. T~~_.army,, 1t 1s true, ~an be u ~ ~ Ji~ r\
;_ b1.
helpless and iS at the 1-t ~f 1t 1s defeated, the king beCO!:nes ; '
mere! of the enemy.
•·, · The text ;ecoU . a~
ltnends a series of po
charge of an antapiila sts alon g the· fronr
. .,In parti•c~1ar, th
four pnnc1pal, di~e_ct·
• • ~r e ar e to be four ier, Cac. h I\•
10 ~~ Vfh'~ch'
t ~r t
. . state (2.1.5) .. The te o s~
frontier po~ ~' 1 seem rve as· gates of. enPo trystsintl1lo \the
. • f~tnesse~•;Ilo s, ar e to be some kind of
t. re~r ,forts_ built bY
r:i::
/

. . _, _. ~ent1on~d~ wit~ pro~ man: Four types of

_·. - _, - .· .·fores~ (2_.8.1- ect~on, s~ cured by water,. mount
~). ~. The bord~,r b~~w ain, desert or
·.. _·,. _. -Sa~~ras, ~~11 een two ~ st s 1s to be
guarded~
: ', •. • . at th~ capita 1:~as an~ ~t~~rs (2.~.6}. The principa
l city and.1s a ma~-m l !o
• I •
• • • '

- •·.. .- ·_ : ·_·. Full deta

' '
a~-~!!}!~r~_(~.8.3). rt in the st\te~
-- . -- .; .
•
.
• 'I • •
ils, are. give~ about •

, •·. •.. .._. o~ th e~ ·cl the construction of

ear.:· But this fort, not all
,. . •-:· _-,:- ou u~ de /a ca n be no doubt about ~here ?e
nd -a~.- ing three moats
•. :. -: . <btl~ks. ·or sto ~a~part of .earth wi~h a parapet on top
nes. Wooden walls bu
, . ·.suscep~ble to ca are particul~rly forb ilt e~ther of
tching fire (2.3.4-9). iaden as being
,·.. •t·intervaJ.s an On the parap.et are to
d ·arrang be turrets
. in.g tbe'lllSelves· (2.3 ements enabling ar~hers to shoot without ex~-
.10-12
ltlewn •with various ki ). \The_ approaches to the ~ort are to~
·. 1 ~•
nds of traps intended
(2.S,lQ). _· _· • -
- for hindering .the P
~
..
~pital is to be garriso
ned by the usual four
,chario•ts, cava
• ~ypes 01
lry and· ~ Y · I • • 1d that
more than one chie t is, sae re~n
f (anekam ukhya). _f \t Jjkclv
under more .than on
e co mm andant is n ~-
tions of an. enemy to
i.&A--.'-d of ·one
turn trai·tor, as thenifi
co
ed
another (2.4.29-SO).
garrison Jirlght also ap A u ~ ,
pear to be unn;" uld
be there ·to be in ultim 0
ate charge.
 DEFE SCE AND EXTE RNAL AFFAIRS 2.1,5

g the
at the same time be able to hold ·in check any rivalr ies amon
entire garris on.
various comm andan ts and ensur e the Ioyalt y of the
n
Since the fort is a place of shelte r in which one may have to remai
opinio n
entrenched over a long period , it is s~ted as Kauti lya's own
there
that the fort shoul d have plenty of suppli es stored in it and that
it in case of need
should also be secre~ mean s of escap ing from
(7,15,11).
The army, it seems , could be recrui ted from all four varnas. The
from
earlier teacliers, in fact, had held the view that an army rec~i ied
from I ~
men of a highe r va~ is bE:tter for purpo ses of fightin g than one 1
s~tes that
those of a lower va~a . Disag reeing with this view, Kauti lya
enemy
Brahmin troops might at the last mome nt be won over by the
Ksatr iya
prostrating himse lf before them, and that, theref ore, w~ll-t rained
lS and
troo.ps ar~e st, or in~~h e_~l~ ~tive , a strong army of VaiSyj

- g forces
Sudras (9.2.21 -24). It may be assum ed that the core of the fightin
would
. would be forme d by ~atri yas,. and that, the stand ing army
same -time,
consist mainl y of well-t rained K~atr iya up.its. At the
ble in
it is possible that the numb er of ~atri yas so traine d and availa
that in practi ce
times of war may not have been quite adequ ate, so
sed to
the lower va~ , and in partic ular the Siidra s, .may be suppo
have forme d a very large part of the fightin g forces .
ted
Since fairly early times the army in india appea rs to have consis
ions
of four ~ s of fighti ng units- infrui try, cavalr y. chario t-divis
and elepha nt-div isions . Each of tbese u • its s cial fun t" s
i1; war, {10.4. 18-16) and 1 f.ferent modes of fig_ht_!ng (10.5.5 8-56). •
Each of unit is the_resp_Qnsibility of a special adhya k,a, who is
psa'Is o
concerned with the e ui m nt and trainf og of his unit_J perha
he text describes the dutie of the PJ!1tya -
for recrui ting m~n to it.
dhralc,a') the ratht idhj/l a, the __g.]ijj,ili:pa and the hastya,1;'1,galqa
k1as
(Chapters 2.80-8 8). In~~ _ ! h e s~ct,iQI!~.J>_n_tb~J~LtJ!q_!!!_hya
lay doWI], de~e d_ !uJ e~~ ~ care and traini ng of horses
phal}t ~_!:h~ ~- ch~rge_:/ . •
From anoth er point of view the troops are said to be of six kinds
and
ang.e

atavib
rle-

ala
:
mau~ la, bhrta,bala, .freti,ibala, mitrabal,a, amitrabal,a
(9.2.l) . The natur e of these is assum ed to be well-known,
since no
to the
description is given. Of these, the maula bala appea rs to refer
es of hered itary
stanging army of thJ state, recrui ted from famili
by the
sold!e~,J2_1-al to the ruling dynas ty. It is referr ed to as inspir ed
king himse lf (tadbhl ivabhd vin) and
same feelings and m terest s as the
The word maula is derive d
JlS one consta ntly honou red by him {9.2.1 4).
which
from mtlla, which often refers to tlie native land, the base from
of conqu est. Prima rily then the
the vijigt, u starts on an exped ition
expression means a native force. Howe ver, the bh,-tab gk:i is also rectui t-
 246 KAUTILlYA ARTHASASTRA
\

ed fro1n the natives of tp.e land. The difference appears to con8. .

st
this that they do not fonn a standing army, but are recruited ~ 1n
particular occ~sion. They are said to be quickly raised (k,iprotthaor=:-a
and dependable (9.2.15). The bhrtabala is naturally regarded as inte~:),
to the ,naula.bala. ~_,- r
A_s to t,-~ibala, it would. appear to _consist of_guilds, no'!'ln!.ll
fo1!_o'\\''1ng some ~~:,~l avoca~on, but ..takl'I!g~o arms in times of wa;
?~e the .fr~fs ~ferr~d to in 11.1.4. The sr~ti,ibala is 4eclared to
Janapada, that 1s native of the land, and having the same interests
the king (9.2.16). This_type of bala appears.to differ from the bhrtab~
in that it is organised in bands, each under its own BTt1}imukhya
whereas in the latter each soldier is recruited individually. It is possibl;
to understand sre'l),ibala to be something like bands of professional
s~ldiers, mer~enary bands, who lend their services to whosoever is willing
to pay them. But such bands would hardly be described as janapada.
It is also not very likely that sre'l),ibala refers to 'private armies main-
,
. I

tained by merchant guilds for the protection of their caravans and

tra4ing posts, which might be loaned to the king', as Basham suggests.1
Caravans appear to be given state protection in this text and charged
vartani road cess and iitivahika convoy charges for the sall.!e ; there
is no reference to their own troops .accompanying caravans.
The UQQP-s of ally wlygh come to join in ~~pedition OJ:. to
~lp in defence are~· the m~rabala, whi~ troops •belonging to some
enemy, either conquered, borrowed, .hired or purchased from him,
constitute tlie amitrabala. Tlie latter must be used with caution and
l
under proper s~perviJon. • Lastly, the atavibala refers to forest tribes
such as Sabaras, Pulindas and others~Tliese are under their_ own
chiefs. It seems that the enemy and forest troops are~ot to be paid
regular· wages, for it is stated that they should be maintained with
kupya, minor produce, or that, in the alterna.tive, they should be
allowed to keep what plunder they may get in the fighting. These
two kinds of troops, in fact, look forward to plun~er, and if there is
no plunder to be had, it is said, they may prove dangerous (9.2.19-20).
·The text frequently refers to fighters in water (nimnayodhin)
as distinguished from fighters· on dry land (2.88.8, 7. ~O 84•85, 10.4._2)·
But it does not refer to .a fleet of armed vessels, nor does it describe
the •mode of fighting in water or naval warfare. The navadhy~a
mentioned in the text is no admiral of the fleet with military duties ..
His principal duties are tocontrol ferrying across rivers, re~te
shipping at por~, collect ferry charges and port dues as well as hire for
the use of state boats. It is tru~ that he is required to destroy boats

1 TM Wonder ti.at ma, India, p. 118.

r
 DEFEN CE AND EXTER NAL AFFAIR S 247

that cause damage or harm (himsrikaJ.,,), those coming from \J.n enemy' s
territory and those viol~tin g port regulati ons (2.28.12 }. But these are
in the main police duties rather than military duties. And the equip-
l
2

ment of the boats in his charge, with.th eir crew of a captain , a pilot, a
manipu lator of the cutter and ropes and !J. bailer of water (2.28.18 )
hardly suggest s naval craft. V\.. 1J-....t fvvtvv.., .
As for ranks in the army, it is stated that an officer in char~ of
ten units is patika, one over ten patikas is senii12ati, and one over ten
8 -;;:ipatis is nii'Y_!!,ka
(10.6,:45). The position assigne d to senapati here
is at varianc e with that referred to elsewhe re. General ly, the senapat i
in the text is one of the highest state dignitar ies, equal in status to the wOvJ..QL
mantrin, purohit a and yuvariij a. He· is require ~ to be convers ant with
all military _mat.te rs, training , tactics in fighting and so on (2.38.9:-10).
The niiyaka appears to be-resp - - - onsible
---- _ seffing
- for
up-·fi);° skandhiiviira
_ _ _ ::.--____,1 _ _ _ __

qr camE (IO.I.I) . The niiyil?c !!_i~~~ rch at th~hea d of the army and
the seniipati in the rear (10.2.4) . This senapat i again seems to have a
different status altogeth er. It may be that a differen ce in sources is
responsible for this confusi on in the position of the seniipati .
. The importa nce of the training of the ar_med forces is natural ly
emphas ised. Th~~s ~~o !>~ practic~ ~f the fighting arts every day
exc~pt holiday s and the lgp.g is to carry _ou~ a!_l i!>:spe£!!.on of the various
u~n d their f!._ghting 4l:!~!~~~ at frequen t interva ls (5.8.35- 36}.
The l~al!y of ~he_tro op~ is of utmost importa nce and therefo re
it is recomm ended that they should be under the constan t surveill ance
of spies, prostitu tes, artisans , actors and singers in secret service,
besides being under the watchfu l eye of senior army officers ( 5.8.47}.
The arm01.~-~i~_!p_~~-in ch-~rge .of.~ ~e~~!J ,yak~a , who is obvious ly
subordi nate to the samnidh iitr. He is respons ible for getting weapon s
manufa ctured and fo_! §toring tl.:!.,em in such· a way tfiat':fl iey_do not
dete~a te thr_pug~ heat, moistur e 9r !n~~cts. He is to mainta in a full
record of the differen t types of weapon s (2.18.1- 4). He is respons ible
for any loss of weapon s, being require d to· make good the. loss twice
over (5.8.39} . Each weapon is to bear the king's emblem (5.3.37) .
- --- -
Weapon s may be useful for fighting on the battlefi eld (siimgriimika)
or for defendi ng a fort (daurgakar·mika) or for batterin g down an enemy' s
fortifications (parapu riibhigh atika). And these implem ents of war are
of four kinds-- yantra, machin es, iiyudha, weapon s prope,-, dvara~ ,
shields and upakararJ,O,, other accoutr ements of war (2.18.1) . A large
number of machin es are describ ed, the princip al purpose of which
appears to be to throw huge stones at enemy troops. The names of

2 Cf. 0. Botto, £11 Navadhy ak~a nel Kautilfty4 rtliaatJ3h 'a e Pattivita, marinura
Q
ne1l'India antica', RSO, XXXVI (1961),.p p. 128-124..

\ ~A OJ.+<> /l,~...;_,. f1L,J •• --,VJ W,\}.t'J-, CA.~,

\ ~ - 1,,-,
~1 J-t ft¼ ~,'r-..t.
I , .,_._ - f'-M..,.,..; - M,(

....... .___ ( ·l,\_,{

 2-18 KAUTIL IYA ARTHASASTRA

all these machines _reveal an_ indigenous origin, I. ~- _Baikov has

shown.3 Along with weapons and othe~ fig?:~ eqwprnent,· the
section on the armoury also refers to aindraJalika karma Dlagi
practices. and aup~n#adika kan~, se~ret practices (2.18.I~). Tb:
practices are described at length m the Fourtee nth Book. That th
practices are intended to be put to use in the course of hostilit~
wi~1 enemy states is quite clear. . es
The problem of the defence of a state is intimately bo!llld up with
the question of its foreign relations. It !s _f"!o~ hostile states that the
state needs to be defend~d. Foreign relations in this text .are mainly
discussed from the standpo int of the vijig~u. In other words, it seeks
to show how a state, desirous of extending its influence and expandi,ng
its territory, should conduct its relations with foreign states.
. : t i Foreign policy is stimme~ up in _the fo~ula of #iq.g~y a
or the
/ six'""measures. The formula IS associated with, though 1t does not
necessarily presuppose, the theory of r{!,jama1J,4,ala .or circle of kings.
•• This ma'IJ4,ala is said to consist of twelve kings or states. Two slightly
varying, views about the mem~r s of the circle are found in the text.
According to one view, the twelve kings are : ~jig ~, the would-be.
conquerory ~ i , the enemy~ whose territory is contiguous _tQ that of the
vijig~ ,~itra , the vijigi§-u's ally, with territory immediately beyond
that of the _ari, ~arimi tra., ene~y's~aliy~~=-wi~h·.~~toey-/~YC?Jl~-· .
that of th~ mitra, (5) mitramitrii, the: ally of tli~-_vijigi,nii ally/\rith~~- -
territory beyond that of the arimitra, {6)_ a!'imitramitra, the ally_.of the·
. . .. ~- . ...
.;

enemy~s.. ~y, beyond the m;itra mitra; ~~,jiii '_~. ·--~.

rear of the t,ijigifu,, (8) akranda, the tt-ijig~'s_ally.in the rear; ~th ter- •..
ritory behind that of the parr.i,ig raha~ii r,tl,igr. dhd,ara , the ally of ;
the piirroigniha, behind- the akranda,f}J}!-dkrandtuara, the_ ally of the
tikranda, behind the piirro, igriiha siir~ madhyama, the middle king
with territory adjoining those of the vijigilu and the an and stronger
~ha~ eit~er of these, ~4,,~" '1asina , "the king , lying o~de , or .
indifferent or ueutral ·mie powerful than t~e tnJtlilU,- the an
and the tnadhyama. (6.2.18-22,N • . •
~c~rdi ng to th~ other view there are four. principal states, those of
the viJigi§u, the ari, the madhyama and the uduina. Each of these ba.1
a m#r:~al ly and a mitramitra, ally's ~y, thus making a total of twelve •
kings. In this view, each of the four kings with his two allies constitutes
a sub~i iary tna'IJ,t/.ala or circle, of which there are four in all (8.2.t-&-2'1)•.
•
W. Ruben thinks that_ the passage implies the existence of forty-ei ;tt

3 'Arthashw ;tra-pam yatnik bolahol iatoricheskol taeanoatl • appended to

the Russian translatio n of the Artluuulr a, pp. 551•552.
 \

DEFENC E?AND. EX1.'ERNAL AFFAIR S

. . ,.

u,.teS, ·twelve to _each· of the four, ~ijigi.,.m, ari, ~nadhyama and uda8 ;na.' • •
;bis ·view is• obviously due m1s~nderstandmg of the text.
Of the two, the former scheme appears to be gene~ally implied in
.-.·th~ discussions in this text. The pdr,tt,igrdha and akranda, who do not
• in the other scheme a~ f~equently referred to. The former scheme
~ed on the assumption, well-supported by experien ce @verywhere,
JS6at~ne ighbou ring states te11:d to be hostile to each other
and
thtstates with a common enemy tend to be allies.regarde The vijigi,u,
d as the
!;-rscon te~plat iiig the expansi on of his dominio n, is
: e n ~ b e r of states which he has to overcom e in his quest for
~ n t . But though mf!,'TJ,<f,ala suggests the idea of states_ concen tr~
-k y situated roun:d ~he 'l!i}ig~u's stat~, the actual idea is· that of states
in a straig~t line lying one beyond the ot-!ier. Nei~her idea in its
entirety might conform with the actual state of ~hings prevailing. at any
tirne anywhere. • •
. .
• The par~•TJ,igraha and the iikranda are only the ari and the mitra
respectively, so called in a specific situatio n. When the vijig~ is
planning to _march in a particu lar directio n, the enemy in the, rear
becomes par~igr aha ' heel-cat cher ' and the ally _in the rear akranda
who' cries out' when going to )1elp. Similarly, the two iisdras are only
the ·arimitra and the m,itramitra in .the rear respectively. • All these
.' &re.a·elastic· terms. ,: The -S~~e. king µiay become a parrJ,igraha or an -"
-/a,ior"~-;nitra·or~even a·vijigi ~ 1~ changed-c1r~uim tances." •. :_/'._-·-.\.·_·- _: •.:
. .- .- - ,.;,. . - .. - .... . ... . • .. .' ... : .. . ..
n .
.,.
kings, with the exceptio
,;

. • :_·_. It ~~ears to be assum·ed that· all these

J\' . of~ i~kyam a _and ~he ~-i~ , are mo_re or le~s: equal in po~- in . ,
.\_- normal -cJ,rcumstances. -The ra;am,arJ,efa,la" _1s thus a conglom eration or: •
states loosely divided inter two ~ore or less hostile camps, with the leader -
of one group trying to establis h his he emon over the entire conalom er-
ation. e number twelve does not imply that' so n1any states are
·absolutely necessary for a marJ,4,a[,a •; it refer~ rather to the number of
-p6ss16le relationships· that may arise when a state tries to establis h its.
snp~y : over a number of, neighbo uring states. In practice ,. the
numhe-r of states involve d may· be smaller or larger accordi ng to the
~~~tion prevailing at ~he time. _It is quite possible that. the scheme •
. in·its origin had in view states of a compar atively small size.
But it can
lVell be understood as equally appli~able_ to a group of" la~ge-sized states.
.:ere is nothing in the discussi on on the ,nar_u/,ala or the 1at/.gur_,,ya
Th show that the idea of a large state is· inconce ivable to the author.
~ r y conce~tion of th~ ~jigi,u presupp oses the. ide~l, of_ "l_arge
.'
,. f
.,
I~~' Inter-state Relation s in Ancient lndiu a~ Kau!oly u's ~1rtluudiitra '- hi
ear-Book of lntemati onal Mairs, Vol. IV (Madras, 19455), p. 180.'
.
 l{A UTILIY A AH.'rIIASASTHA

Each of the twelve states has, beside the ruler, the ·oth
.
. ptakrtis, a,niitya, janapada, durga, kosa . and da·r;uJ,a, which· are er fiv
e
dravy~prllkrtis. The rtljamarp/.a_la thus has tWelve ki~gs, riijapr::1~~d,
and sixty dravyapralcrtis, .that 1s, seven ty-two prakrtis in all (a
Such is.the theory . . 2 r2 s,
,• • • 8). •·
Cyx_. Ruben thinks that the doctrine' of the rganrli,la was, in it.a.or; i
related to the growt h of the power 6f Ma adha. . " .g ~,
ur1ng t e per10 o t e andas, when the defeat ed one· after the oth1
1n o e anges va e , the olic of the circle must have ained er
impor tance " 6-- He adds that policy and d~c~rine may have gro
in
simultaneously. I~ is not possible to say if the policy of the Nan:
was influenced by· any theory of ma~u!,ala they might have kn.own.
Much lc!ss_ is it possible to s~y how far, if at all, ~he policy of the Nandas
affected the development of the theory . 'fhe theory of the man4al
a
• • app~ars to be unnecessary to explain the Nanda conquests.
O~ •the
t
other hand, the theory may well have been in exist~nce at the time with-
out the ·Nandas consciously following its pre_cepts in their program
me
' .of co~quest. . After all, the theory is, in _the last analysis, ~ased
on tbe
..
basic realities of inter- stat~rel~~ c:... · .. , . ..
•• The neighl?ouring princes, samantas, may normally be supposed
/
to
b~ hostile. But it is possible that some may have, a friendly feeling
.. \~war ds the vijigi~u, while others may e_ven be. subservient to
him.
Neighbouring states thus fall in three categories, aribhavin, mitrabhilvin
and bhrtyabluivin (7.18.29}. The last are, of course, the- vassals of
the
t·ijigi~u.
l •
. Relati ons with foreign states are to be established and negotiations
carrie d on with them throug h ..the duta, ambassador or env9y, of whom
there are three. types, nisr~tiirtha, the plenipotentiary, parimitcirtha,
I • )
• •

,,vith li~ite d powers of negotiating and sasanahara, who is little more

than a message-bearer. It is, no doubt , stated that dutas should
be
• station ed in the entire ·,ajama'TJ,4ala (7.13.43), implying the posting
of
perma nent ambassadors at foreign courts. But it seems that an en~~y
• I
is rather intend ed to _be sent to a foreign c·o~~~ only when an occ~io
n
arises' for doing so. That is tl)e impression created by Chapter 1·~ 6
,
which deals with the appoin tment of a duta. His' stay at the foreign
•
.. . . court may be prolonged, because the enemy Icing _detains him (1:16
• By_ common convention, the pers<;>n of the envoy 1s regarded as invio
:2::
hle (1.16,llS), . . :
•The duties of the envoy are· said to incl~(Je the following : sending
out jnfor~ tion to bis own king, securing the ob~ervance of the teftDS
<ioP-10lidatin1 an alliance, creating di1sensions among statel
 :.?al

th e foreign st at e
n, sm ug gl in g ~ op s secretly in to as ur y of th~
~ ti le to bis. ow !° re ig n pr ince, ge tti ng t.hc tre
of tJ1 e with th e
. kidnappi~ kmsmcn lp1 ng a ho st ag e ke pt by his king
bbed, l1e seduce
• foreign prmce ro ow in g va lo ur if need be-, try in g to
' foreign prince to
cscitpe, sh his king's side,
th ei r lo ):n lty an ~ ,vin tl1~n ov er to expected to
enCJllY officers from It de nr th at he 1s frcqucntlv
).
and so on (1.16.88-3.J. ified sp y nn d secret agent. ..
1s

ro le of a di gn d come
play th e to de se rt th ei r m as te r an
en em y of t1 ce rs n.
, • The instigation of im po rt an t ac tiv ity in th is connectio
an
0 ,·er to on
e,s side (t4pa}iipa) is om th ei r lo ya lty ar e ca
lled Jcrtyas
be se du ce d fr e . ar e th e
Those who ca n th us on , . ,v ra th , gr eed, fear an d prid it.
d up t nn d ,v an t to change
• who can be worke ie d ,,· ith on e's lo
t dissatisf ers of th e
feelings th at m ak e on ta ke n of su ch feE"Jings am 9n g offic
How a~vantage sh ou
ld be er to th e
to le ay e th ei r n1aster an d conie ov
em added
enemy to in st ig at e th ng th (I. 14 .1 -1 0) . It is, of course,
uijig;,u's side is de
scribed at le watch should
ke n in on e's service, a close
th at af te r th ey ha ve
be en ta rm' to th e
th ey ch an ge th ei r minds an d do ha
le st
be ke pt ov er th em 11 ).
\

new master. {1 .1 4. s of
wh icl 1 su m s up fo reign policy consist
<Jgutzya nditions or
•The formula of ~ti n1 ak in g a tr ea ty containing co
si~ guti,aS or policie
s: sa th dh i,
raha, th e policy
of hostility ;
y of £e ac e; vig on an
polic planning to m ar ch
terms, th at is, th e ng qu ie t ( an d no t • '
uana, th e policy of
~emaini eking sh el te r
g on an ex pe dition ; sa m ba ya , se
expedition)·; yanci,
m ar ch in le policy of
in a fo rt ; an d dv aidhiblzava, th e doub e tim e
with an ot he r ki ng
or
d vi gr ah a· w ith an ot he r· at th e sam
e ki ng a.p th e
_ 1amd/1,i w ith on te ac he rs , V at av ya dhi, ha d expressed
of th e earlier , an d th at th e
. -(7.1.6-12). O ne tw o po lic ies, peace an d war
view th at th er e ar
e on ly self, how-
pe ct s of ' th es e two. K au til ya him
ly as ations
ot h~ policies ar e on as sif ic at io n, . as th er e ar e different situ
-fold cl
ever, favours th e six .8-5) .
di fferent policies (7.1
which call for th e n one is weaker th an
th e. enemy,
le is th at w he v!'~aha.
. · · _The general ru fo llo w e~ , if st ~n ge r t~ an him, _then ry
),aamdhi" is th e -polliciny po to be
an a 1s th e ri gh t po licy, bu~ if one 1s ve
wer, as k sa m ha ya
• H bo th ar e eq ua so rte d to . W he n .one is ve ry wea
be re n w ith
strong, ya na sh ou ld iv a is th e po lic y recommended whe
dv ai dh ib hi •B ut
is necessary, while e ca n fig ht on e'$ · en em y (7.1.18-18).
source o~ ations m ak e it
help fr om an ot he r se t as id e if various consider
ay be licies is
th e general ru le m er en t co ur se . Th e purpose of all po one
ff
advisable to follow
a di
ru n th an th e en em y, th ou gh someiimes
to grow strongerleinrathtee telomngporarily th e gr ea te r st re ng th, -of th. · e -e ne1 ~y
m ay ha ve to to• • • • . .,
(7 .1 .2 0f f.) . ·, • because, of one's
sa m dh i is forc~d on one
Normally. th e· po lic y of_
ng •a tr ea ty one m
ay be required
es s. W he n ~a ki
• co m pa ra tiv ~ weakn
I
 252 l{AUTILIYA ARTHAS~STRA

surrender troops or treas~y or ~~tory. •. Such treati~ a.i:e called

dat:,,<!,opanata-aamdhi, kosopanata-samdhi and deAopanata-aamdhi respec..
tively. If forced to enter i~to any of these treaties, the king is advised
to thwart or outwit the strong enemy ·when fulfilling the terms of the
... treaty,._and, ·atter biding his time till_ he_ gets strong, to overthrow the
• • • strong· enemy·(7.8.22-85). ·: •
. • If when _making a treaty the enemy in~ists on a hostage (aamddhi),
•. the king is advised to offer the least serviceable person as a hostage.
The long ·discussion on the type of son, who should preferab~y be handed
over if there is a choice, ends with the assertion that the king should
rather hand himself.. over as a hostage than an only s01:1 (7.17.15..81),
• Ana it is also recommended that effqrts should be made to get the hostage
freed by helping him. to escape secretly. Many ways of escaping from
the enemy king's capitai are described (7.17.82-60). •
Every aamdhi is thus a tempora.ry measure to be abrog~ted when
one has grown in strength. The question is raised, what is then the
guarantee that the terms of a treaty would be observed ? The earlier
teachers thought that a surety or a hostage is the only guarantee,
aatya ' plighted word ' or Japatha ' oath ' being unreliable. Kautilya,
however, differs from them and as~erts that satya and Aapatha ensure
. •stabili~ in this world and in the next, while a surety or hostage gives
I
security only in this. world, being dependent on the relative strength of
t;Iie .two parties (7.17.8-5). What seems to be meant is that a king giving
a hostage may have no scruples in securing his escape by some ruse
when he gets stronger and thus violating the terms of the treaty,
where~ . i~ .he I had given his plighted word or taken an oath, bis
conscience may prick him if he were to think of breaking them. In
, ~pressing this opinion Kautilya is only recording a well-observe_d
fact that many persons do car~ for the consequences of breaking thell'
word ·or oath, consequences th~t would follow not only in this world,
but also in the next. Fear of these consequences is more likely to make
. them keep their promise. It is not possible to suppose that· Kautilya's
own lincerity or piety is in question here as W. Ruben does when be
~•n:• that theae words, ,atyam Bapatho va etc. are not to be taken
, Nl'JOUlly •Ince there is very little of inner piety in him.•
A pt.OUliar feature of the teachin1 of the ltJltra i• the way in which
hypotbetical J)ICta are oonteinplated between. the r,ijift,u and hi• ri~al,
the "an, Some of tbei4, like tho treaty with 1tipulation1 (poripa,UO·
~ ) • ODf witbout 1tlpulatio111 (apa"l"'tfU .,a,hdht) have_!
'./M the ob11ta, or outwlttln1 of the rival, 10 'that the""·-
..,,_,,.p n,IJ'M at l)luoat ('T,8,l•ll), Otberpac turt,illl

~•~·-~~,,,.
 . \

DE.FENCE AND EXTERNAL • \

AFFAIRS 258 •
' ·. •
• _ • byp<>thetical. 'rhey are appa rentl y mad b . se the two have u
JllOre n objective, but the real aim is to 8 e
ecau
. cOJ1j1llO ts· like ,nitra•aamdhi, bhumi-sam
dhi ;ore ~ver the rival. Such
12) S h pact s are ,in realiarmat-aam dhi and h.irar_,,-
are pac
- __.:..,lh.j (Chapte~s 7.9· • • uc n . ya.
'°"IP"'aiJy made. The purp ose of the·· discussion ;~• mer: y ot inten ded to be
one shou Y to show what
~tud f ally or land ol' unde1rtak ing . pre1e r ,when there is • •
kill o available. I. th e ong discu ssion on th•
• h •ce n ese points Kau fl
a c o1 • d" er teach er; . , ya
n. expresses. his isag reem ent with the· earli ' his own
0~ 1..4in g gene rally mor e reaso nabl
e. , •
. •
view s~
of vigraha wea n~ a state of host ility• It h as an• o f'1ens1vc
.
Th e palic y
•
• . one feels that any
well as defensive purp ose. for example, when
tack by the enem y can be succ essfully repe lled, one should r esort to
a t t h
.. h no to t at of samdhi. Similarly, when one~1ce1s
w palic
.1.1.e _ y of vigra
a, .. .
y's undertakings_
that fron1 _a sec~~e. posi tion one ,can r~in the, enem
because he is enagagcd in
·. or that one can sei~e the enem y s. terri tory
ated {7.l.3 3). If
a fl?· on anot her fron t, t'igralia is the policy indic
to the same result,
both samdhi and v-igraha are expe cted .to lead
y of samdhi should
namely~ one's own adva ncem ent in power, the polic
·be preferred, for in vigraha ther~ are losses, expe
nses and othe r troubles
,__
. (7.2.1-2)~- ·,
expect~tion that the
·, As to iisana, it is the polic y of wait ing in the
s or get involved
,

enemy would grqw •wea k or find himself in difficultie

'• <

that in the l~ean-

in_some· war. It ~lso inclu des wait ing 'in the hope
enemy (7.1.34).
wbiie "one -WOt.Jld- ones elf beco ~e,m ore powerful_-thari the
,the policy of samdhi
__Naturally,~ this. polic y is ofte n. a conc omit ant of
d ~_ven with vigrahti
,·(,a,iadluiya· tisana;- 'r.4.18). ·But' _it ·can .be combine
can seduce the
(¥.kga a,an a)~ as, for exam ple, wheJ?. one feels that one
one expects to
_en~y's. su_bjects from thei r loya lty to. him or when
futur e or when one
'detjve some benefit at the enem y's cost in the near
le by engag•
that the enem y may wea ken himself in the -meanwhi
• .
mg m some adve ntur e (7.4.5-12). ·
to be pursued
< The ·policy of...ydna, ~arc hing agai nst the en~my, i~ th
and yana g~ toge er
when one is defi nit~ y stron ger. Norm ally vigraha
y~na IS reco~;
-~ a 'yii:na, 7.4. H-i7 ). How ever , even satndhoya h
(7.4.18). • This it is obvi ous, involves- a· downright breac treat y
, , . • h . tered in to a
f111Bl1t.11 ~th • ..
• hbn.. ~1th who m one. is at peace, avin g en

··other·. kings· to mar ch with oneselffi is ed safhbku~atyat-,h~

a~m s
• is a . conf ~der a~y orm ma e. rornise a
•lillma ~~t her '. .This
1-enemy. .. In retu rn for the he!~ reee~ved, ~efixJ.!forehand
' 01the gain s .of the. join t expe ditio n,t· ei.th.or
er 8 •
effort in
the J·oint
.,_,., . . . .b.
~o~ ey with_ each· one' s cont ri u
10~ of kings whose help
~.1~ -22) . · Adv ice is give n on the .kind
•
 »56 KAUTILIYA ARTUASASTRA

muy be sought for the join t expedition, ns well

n.11 on how one ahou}
'-'omluct oncs df l\!i head of the confr<l<·rncy (7 .5.88
- ,1, in). 'rtie
bility thnt tho t•(jigJ,~"• after suc•ces~ of the expe
dition, might che: ;;•·
t•onfcdcrn.tcs of thdr due share i8 also visualised
nnd suitable ad . 1c
gin~n on whnt they should do in such nn eventuali
ty (7.5A5-48). vice
The policy of sa,i~rar a is for the wcnk king,
who is attacked or
threat('ncd with attac k y u. powerful enemy.
The text considers th
question of the type of kings with whom shelt
er should be sough~
7.2.0-25; also 7,15.1-Sj. It appears that sa,n,fraya
confers the status
of a protrgc. Ono's safety is assured thereby.
It is, of course, intend.
ed that the king would be making efforts to reco
up his strength nnd
regain his independent status.
Shelter mny also be found in one's own fort wher
e one can remain
entrenche~ (7.15.9-12). If neither kind of sari1,
.fraya can ensure safety,
the weak king is advised, ns a last resort, to surre
nder himself to the
powerful enemy. This is vussnlagc; the king
who submits is called ,
da~uJ.opanata, which means 'who has subm itted
with troo ps' as well
as 'sub dued by forc e, (7.2.9, 7.15.30). In
one place the text re-
('omn1ends thut the king who has thus subm itted
to the powerful enemy
m't1st ever remain watchful for an opportunity to
strike back and obtain
his independence (7.2.10-12). In another place, howe
ver, it recommends
thnt such a king should strictly obserye the rules
of behaviour proper
for a vassal towards h~s suzerain, and do ever
ything that would be
to the latte r's interest (7.15.21-30). The difference
is perhaps due to
a difference in sources. It is not clear which polic
y the author himself
prefers, though he is definitely in favour of acce
pting the position of
n Ynssal and rejt;cts the view of the· earlier teachers
that the weak king,
at the end of his resources, should throw hitns
elf in a last desperate
bnttle with the powerful enemy like a moth ente
ring fire (7.15.18-20).
The Inst poli<·y, dvaidhibl,civa, is no new policy.
It is sa,,;1,dhi wlth
one king and ut the snme time vigraha with anot
her. The purpose of
making the sa,iulhi is to ~ct t.he help of troops
or money from him for
the hostilities with the oth<'r king. This policy is
to he prt'f(.'rred to th~lt
of smnsraya, sin('e in the lnttc r one confers b~ne
fits on oth~'rs. while
in the former one looks to one's own interests
only (7.2.-1-5). This
text does not support the view thnt dv<iidhibli,lva
is duplicity, makin,~
1>e11.<·c t'or the timn hdn~ wit.h n. Yi\1W to prepi\rc
t'vr w~\l' ng~\in-;t th('
sainc king'.
'l'hc purpose of nll policy is to st•ru1·t.~ t,n in<'l'<-'lL'iC
in one's power,
prin<.'ipally at the cost of one's natura\l rnc-11\\', 1'hi~
inC'rcas~ in power
is intcndrd ns n preliminary to the renli"ntion •of the
a1nbition to ('Onquer
the worlll. 1'ht' adopt.ion of on~ or the othe r ot'
the ~ix po\i(•i<•s i, to l~,. .
soldy guided Ly this eoh"iidcrntion, 'l'hr inlt·rfst
ot' ,Hw' s own stntc 1'
 AFFAIRS 255
DE FE NC E AND EXTERNAL

y is to dec ide which pol icy

me cri ter ion , an d exp edi enc e app rop ria te
de r the cir cum sta nce s. Th
i,e the sup r:d va nta ge ou s un wi th thP.
rn~ ~t eas ure s, it is sta ted , ena ble s the vijigi~tt, to pla y
t~oold be by
51
as he ple ase s ; the y bec om e, as it were, tie d to him
,~ c of the ~ (
ther ktP ei f 1 is int ell ect ua l
115 • crs JUS po we rs 7.1 8.4 4).
1· • th ere 1s . me nt·1On of t h e ,ou r upiiya,'7 _
o cho.in.s o. 1 i the six po 1c1es, --, ..-- •-- --: --ing
the 1oe me ans of ov erc ?m
ngs Th ese fou r are
A1 dtina, bheda an d da1J,f/,a.
0

t the firs t tw o sho uld be use d to sub 1ug ate

It is sai d tha • k' (7.16.8). Th e
1t1. on.s the las t tw o .lOr ov erc om mg str on g • mg s Th
saf1ia,~,.
nos
opr~ b • sum up
alt kin g
f ' fou r up iiy as ap pe ars to e qm te anc ien t. • , . ey
the on e's
the sub mi ssi on of oth ers to
we • 0
t· are hel pfu l in sec uri ng
c0ncept 5 tha the fou r up<iyas an d the six
the me_~; There.. is som e ov er- lap pin g in dhi
ere is som eth i~g in com mo n bet we en siim an an d aam
o"\fll wi • Th e tw o con cep ts
twe en dalt.u/,a an d vig rah a com bin ed wi t'! yiina. Th
g«f ~~ cer ned
ha ve ari sen ind epe nd ent ly. Wh ile the gU1;ias aret·con b •
an ear· to 1· g
app i<:Y on Iy, t h e upr1yas 1iav•e a w1.der ap p 1ca 10n, em
wit h for eig n pol nt son ,
sec uri ng the sub mi ssi on of any on e, be he a rec alc itra
useful in or a nei gh-
a rebellious shb jec t or chief,
brother or oth er kin sm an, or le tha t the
pri nce or for eig n chi eft ain (9.7.68). It is pos sib
bou ring ma tte rs
of the upi iya s- in po liti cal the ory , par tic ula rly in
introduction
of foreign pol icy , is sec on
dar y.
to tha t of a
is gen era lly to be pre fer red
Th e use of an earlier. up iiy a a alo ne
. Ho we ver , it is rec ogn ise d •tha t a par ti? ula r up iiy
later one wo uld be be st
ma y be mo st ap pro pri ate
in a giv en sit uat ion . sam an
pec ts of tre aso n;
in the case of officers of the
ene my wh om the lat ter sus
n fro m the
uld be mo st ·us efu l in wi nn ing ov er sed itio us me
wo while
fed era cie s mo st eff ect ive ly,
dana
wo uld bre ak up con
enemy; bhe da str on g en em y
st effective in the cas e of a
the use of da1J,<!,a wo uld be mo ed for ov er-
9 Ho w the po lic y of' bhe da can be successfully pu rsu
2). len gth .
sho wn in Bo ok Ele ven at
( .7.7
ho sti lity of sai hgh as· is
c~ming the s is illu str ate d
for bre aki ng up . con fed era cie
~unilarly, the use of bheda • •
In 7.I. J..1 -11 .
ion .
set bef ore the rul er in for eign pol icy is tha t of exp ans
'fh Th e go al er ter rito rie s.
'de sir ou s of con qu eri ng ' oth
Tl c rul er sho uld be vijigi{,u vij ayi n, wh o
typ es of con qu ero rs are dis tin gu ish ed : dha nna
tn l;e me re
est s for the sak e of "lo ry an d wh o is sat isf ied wi th
ab es con
. qu o
~ ou t of
su rn·1 10 hav ijayin, wl w ma kes con q~ :st
~y oth er kin ?s ; lub
gi·ced : n_.
1~ ou t to ob tam la.nd or mo ney• or bo th ; asurm:zJaym, wh o
-..,ak~es 1.d • win•-;
sci:£cs lan d, mo ney , son'i and
of con qu est s lik e a dem on an d
life (12.1.10-16).
con qu ere d kin g an d tak es his
cr he is. rcq. uir nl
ure d the sub.mi ssi on of a. kin o•
t hen
to·, rca t I . the vij igi su ha s sec
.• • hos tile mt cn-
ess he con tm ues to har bo ur
tions. 1;1m wi th ho no ur, unl har shl y or unj u~ tly , he wo uld 11d t
lic we re to tre at the yns snl
 256 KAU TILIY .A ARTH ASAS TRA

only ha,-c to face the prosp ect of retal iatio n, but

also incur the
of the mand ala (7.16 .17-8 3). Rega rd for the feelino--,
• • of the th 'Vfath
; els~ they migh t join ter kin~
.
int.h e ma-,.ujala is a pract ical nece ssity o o
and frust rate his drea m of worl d-co nque st./
ogeth ,r
The 1,-i,jigi.yu is to plan his conq uests in diffe rent ways
. msta ac .
the circu nces prevaili. ng at t h e time.
.
(1) \Vhe n thecordin . g to
regul ar ,natz<jala, he shou ld first conq uer the ari
; with hisrestris the
augm ented there by, he shou ld overc ome the ,nadh
yama ; when h cngth
ceeds in doing that, he shou ld subd ue the udd.sina.
. Thus his su e ~uc.
would be estab lishe d over the whol e fm!,•rp!,ala. (2) 'Vhe zera1nty
n there is neith
a madh.yama nor an u.dasina, but only enem ies and
allies, he sho~ ;
fi~t try to subd ue the enem ies and then secur e
the allegiance of his
allies . (3) Whe n there are only two othe r state s,
one hosti le and ti
othe r frien dly to him, he shou ld try to sque eze and
crush one of the ie
~twe en hims elf and the other , it being imm ateri al whic
h state is crus h:
in the proce ss ; when that state is crush ed, the othe
r state should be
tadd ed. ( 4) ,vhe n there are a num ber of neigh
bouri ng ki~08, all
!1res umab ly hosti le, he shou ld tackl e them one after
the other , growing
1n stren gth as he proce eds with his conq uests (13.4 .54-6
1). It is interest-
ing to ·note that it is only in the first schem e that
the existence of a
nui~idala and that too of the secon d type is visua lised
. In the third case,
the. whol e of the field open for conq uest is supp
osed to conta in only'-
three state s. Thes e must be assum ed to be very
big indeed. For,
th~e ld of conq uest is the whol e of India .
~h en plann ing an expe ditio n of conq uest a numb
er of precautions
mus t be taken . First and forem ost it is neces sary
to see that none of
the seve n praic ttis (whic h inclu de the ally) suffers
from a vyasa1ia or
.._a calam ity. The vyasa na of a cons titue nt ma
rende r not onl that
cons 1 uen unser v1ce a e ut also ham er the effici
ency of the other
nsbt uen he whol e of the Eigh th Book is devo ted to_ a
discu ssion of the vyasa nas, calam ities or vices, by
whic h the vari~us
cons titue nts may be affec ted. That is done by consi
derin g the relative
serio usnes s of the calam ities of two prak rtis at a
time. In many 0 :
these cases , Kaut ilya expre sses view s that differ from
all or ~ome O•
the earli er teac h~h is own view s being gene rally
chara cteris ed b) '
reaso nable ness. . ' •s natur ally laid down that • on
befor e startm g t
an expe ditio n, the vijigf-lu must take steps to overc
ome a
any pr!!,_ rti an remo ve an cause that 1s hk 'I 0
ni;
-:::=;~ =-=-=-==-=-=-:.::.~=:-
lead to a vyaaana in :~
the futur e 8.5.2 1). f
• 'Befo re start ing on an expe ditio n, the vijig i~ must
satisf y h;: t
tha~ .he is •supe rior in all essen tial respe cts to
the e?e~ ~ :,,dha,
\ wha, n he proposes. marc h. Thes e inclu de the th~e aaktt:i~QbltllVO,
the energy, brav ery and perso nal drive of the king
himself, 1 ·
 .....
2 ,.., '
DEFE NCE AND EXT ERN AL AFFA IRS

and 11,antra, •
·aJ resources consisting of. the. treas ury and ar1ny,
earli er teach ers,
~r• unsel and diplomacy. •Disagreeing with the . The (9.1. 2-16)
gvv-tira regards mantraJakti as the mos t impo rtant
must also take into considertltion the desa or the terra in in whie h
n when fighting
vtJilfi ht is likely to. take place and kala, the seaso
the :e expected. Kaut ilya' s own opin ion is that sakti, ,desa
rtanc e
and _kci.l~
(~.1. 26-83 ).
:>:nutuallY ~elpful and are there fore of equ~ l i~po
an insur recti on
· A very im})?rtant cons idera tion is. the poss ibilit y ~f
ditio n.. It may be
. the kingdom while the king is away on the expe
raja, ,when it
~nee red by. the mantri"!- ?r puro hita or senapati or yuva
•s called abkyantarakopa, or by a palac e official,
when it is calle d antaram.d-
state , a rti#r amu-
;yakopa, or _by an ~fficial_ in t~e _outlying r~g~ons of the
In ge~eral, when a
khya or an antap~la, ·when 1t 1s calle d bal!,yakopa.
latent i~surr~ction ..s_uspected,.the vijigi~u is advi
sed to take the suspec-
to the inter ior and
ted party·~~r'the expe ditio n with him if he belongs
him if he belongs
take the wives and child ren of the susp ected part y with
to the outlying regions (9.3. 9-83. ). • The
vijigi~·u .is also io be on his guar d
capi tal . and· the
against_ the• possibility of two o~ce rs, one from t_he
in revo lt durin g the
other from the outly ing regions, cons pirin g to rise
it also gives advi ce
king's absence. And as is char acter istic of this te_xt,
lt, tellin g them with
to officers who may be think ing of risin g i_n revo
iled analy sis of the
.whom to conspire arid ~hen . We have a very deta
supp ort from othe r
ulterio~ motives that. gene rally impe l officers to seek
.86-4 1). • · •
ofli~ for an insur recti on agai nst the king :(9.3 '
gain expe cted
LA fac~ r that -~us t be weig hed b~f~re start ing is
. Norm ally t1ie
from .the expe 1bon an t. e osses 1 e y to e su ere
former must ~utwe1g man y time s over the losse
s in men and anitn als
s, princ ipall y thos e
and the expenses in cash· an~ grain s (9.4. 1-3). Gain
easy to seize and·
oflana, are classified in vario us ways , such as adeya '
akdla 'quic kly'
keep', prat.yadeya' easy for the enem y to reco ver', hrasv . \

.dha nnya ' right eous '

attai~ble ', tanu k,aya '. costi ng little ', kalya 'safe ', •
~d so on (9.4.5-23). • • . . . • _ ,. . .
When after a full cons idera ti~n of these facto rs, th~ vijig~u
decid es
mob ilise the
~rch , he must fix the date of the expe ditio n and
rded as suita ble for
:;ut r~ ~roops. Norm ally, three seaso ns are, rega
on a camp aign of
1o:P:gni~g. 'Mirgasi:r~a 1s the mon th for start ing
Jye~tha for a
•hort uratio_n, ~aitr a for one of med ium dura tion and ths and to get
.acbancampai~: The idea is to a~oi d the mon soon mon rv.es ted
t thece ~f se1z1ng the enem y's crop s likel y to be read y but unha with ~he
t,
~ - .time. How ever , the seas on. selec ted mus
Where the fight ing is expected. Even a camp
aign 1n the.,.;rainy
i1u, but not the
Jllay be.undertaken if the terra in suits the v·ljig
f( 9,1118'•52), • • The type of troops to be mob ilise d ·iB to depend
9!18 t(At rfll, IYA ARTHAS,\s·rnA

on the sen.son nnd the terra in. tts ,vcll ns on the type or troo ps
i~ like ly to en,ploy in tho figh t. Troo ps the cncrn.
to be n1obiliRcd mus t be sue~
n~ "'<>ulc\ ensily ovt'rrome the encn ,y's resis
tance.
Refore lca,ring, l\ A,1,iyap<Tlti, thnt is f\ t·cgcnt.,
sho 1.1ld be nppointc l
in chn.rge of t.hc kingdon1 duri ng the kini
f s nl>st'nC'c on Uw cxpcditio~
'fht' to..xt docs not say who should be so l\pp
oinl cd ; some metn bcr of
th~ ,~yn l fanlily or l\ tJ·ustcd tnin istcr n1ny be
thou ght. of u.s likely. lt is
stat ed t.hnt uornuilly one- third or nt lcnst
one- four th of the mobiliAcd •
troo ps should be kep t behi nd for the prot ceti
on of the kingdom nA W(•l\
ns fol.' gua rdin g the 1-ear, t.hc bord ers o.nd
the forest regions (9.1.34).
trhe troops are to consist of different unit s,
und er different commanders
so that no single po·werful co1n1nander prov ~,
es intr1ictnblc to the regent
(9.8 .10) .
T~e tc.xt describes
1:\t leng th the set.ling up of
the cam p afte r the
troops arc n\obilised (Ch apte r 10.1 ) and the mar
ch of the ar.my on the
~xpedition (Ch apte r 10.2 ). 'l'he taki ng of
n1easures for the safety of
the troops ,vhe ther in the cn.1np or on the mar
ch is natu rally cn1.pha.sised.
Figh ting , yud-dha. is said to be of thre e
kind s-pr a.lci isa- yudd ha
'ope n figh t• in the place and at the
time indicated, kufa-yuddha
' concenled figh ting ,, involving the use of tact
ics on the battlefield, and
tti,,.1tti}-yuddlu,. ' silen t fight', implying the
use of secret agents for entic-
ing enem y officers or killing them (7.6. 40-4 1).
It is stat ed that ,vhen the
uijigf~u is supe rior in stre ngth and the sens
on and terr ain are favourable
to him , he should reso rt to open ,va.rfarc
(10.8 .1). In fo.ct, a fight,
abo ut the plac e and time of which notice has
been given, is considered
righteous, <lha,r,ni~tha. (10.8.26).
If the vijig'i~u is not superior to the enem
y and the terr ain and
season are unfa vou rabl e to him, he may 1·eso
rt to ki"lfa-yuddha. An1ong
the vari ous for1us of ktlla-yt1,ddha described,
the follo,ving may be noted:
atta ckin g enem y troo ps ,vhen they are in
a. vulnerable position or on
unfa vou rabl e terr ain; feigning a retr eat and
thus drEnving the enemy
troo ps awa y to an unf'avoura,ble terr ain nnd
then turn ing rO'ttnd and
attacking them ther e ; usin g elep hant s
to brea k the closed rank s of
the enem y troo ps ; feigning a rout and man
agin g to get the enemy
rank s dhrided whe n they are in purs uit of his
own troo ps and then turn -
ing roun d to atta ck the divid'ed rank s ;
atta ckin g on one flank first
and when the enem y troo ps are pressed back
, atta ckin g them on the
othe r flank; using inferior troo ps first to
tire out the enemy troops
and then attacki11g with superior troo
ps; enticing enemy warriors
for a bun t or a catt le-ra id and killing them
in an amb ush ; keeping
enem y troo ps awake by an atta ck at nigh t
and then atta ckin g them the
n~ day whe n they are sleepy or fatigued
; mak ing a sudden at~ ck
at nigh t with elep hant s while the ei1emy troo
ps are asle ep; atta ckin g
 S
DE ~NC E 'AND EXT ERN AL AFFAIR 259
. .
I ..

•
I

n the sunhand wind are .directly in the1r •

•
•

. ~y t~p s whe .r.ace, and -

~ 1
It • c ear, t at kuto,-yuddha refe rs'to th
the ene 8.8-28). , is
• e commonly
on (lo • the batt lefie ld,, and con tain s nothing
so gnised tacti~s tha t are_ ~sed on poin t of View • .
reco hi' h objection can be take n from the militar . y
to_\\' c
in 'Vyuhas or battle-arrays,
. ·r~ ps are to ~e arra nge d for flghtin~ It seems tha t each of
bich have a centre, two fla~ks and two .wings. s from nine to
fl five sections are to con tain an equ al num ber of unit · ' ,
• •
the· ty-onc. It app ears tha t a u~ t 1or this purp ose 1s based eith er on
is atta che d, beside a cha riot
tlf~ariot or an elep han t. . To eac h uni t
en infa ntry men in fron t .and
.:rcan elephant, five ?.orsemen. ~d ~ft~
ther e would be forty-five
fiiteen ·behind. _Thus 1n the rune-urut array,_nty- five horseme~ and six
twe
. chariots or elep han ts, t~,o _hundre_~ and_
hundred and.· seventy-~v-~ infa ntry men
In fro~ t and an equ al. riumber
larg e number_ of batt le-a rray s,
behind (10.5.9~13};: .The t~~ t _describ~~ a
of which t~er.e are fou r bas ic typ~~, dar_
ufa-uyulia ' s_taff-array ~, bhoga-
ul~ arra y.' and asamhata-
vyuho, 'serpen~-~~ray \ mar;u/ala-pyu~ :' circ
is to dep end on the terrain
vyuho, loose arra y '.. The. choice of an arra y
M wel l~ the disp osit ion of _the
ene my. troo ps {I0.6.~-43). _ .. . •
• • It is ~nsisted tha~ a figh t mu st nev
er be beg un unless reserves are
e of· two · hun dred dhanuaes
stationed beh ind the arra y at ··a •dist anc
(about five hun dred yar ds )' ; the king
him self .is •app aren tly to stat ion
ed tha t a site .for .a. batt .le sho uld ·
himself there.(10.5.- 58). · It.i s also stat
. . .. , - .
rear
"
as a
be so chosen tha t ther e is a· mou ntai n
or a forest fort · in the
th~ fighti~g· fo~ces (1·0.2.20).
place of retr ~at ~n_d fo; hold ing reserve~ for
arm y a:rrang~d for a fight,
-·:·. Finally, it is add ed that . beh ind -the
d.w ith medicines, inst rum ~nts
physicians and surgeons sho uld be stat ione
·_ By thei r-si de sho ulq be
and ba~d~ges·.-for· trea ting · wou nde d ·soldiers~
the soldiers.· The women are
. ~omen in charge· of-foc,d ·and ·drink for
to encourage the sold iers to figh t (10.
3.47). These are· not quit e
•• ·· -
.· ••
·nurses in .the mod ern sens e· of the term
is adv ised to get his troo ps
,
• •

.• .- _Wh~~,a batt le.• is imm inen t, the viji g~~

how he himself is
together' and ~xlio~t them . • He ' sho uld po_int out time, the senapati
the sam e
only·a serv ant like the m (10.8.27). At'
-act s of brav ery dur ing the
shou1~ &lll)o~ce :rewards for out stan din g
,· 50,0 00 for killing the
.fight: 100,000 pa1),Q,s for kill ing the ·enemy- king
:a.Pati or a prin ce and so on dow ~ to. 20
patuJS for killing an ordinary
wo uld ~ allowed to keep
ldier.. ~;He sho uld also dec lare tha t eve ryo ne
would be given double ~e
:~t he is able to sejze dur ing ~e fight and
niake a note of the exploits
• I r grat uity at the end. Officers are to
und er.t hem (10,8.45".'.46). • •. • • •. . • : : • •.•
·.,~
~It ~:~ d•d ~w n iiia t·.~ ~~ atta ckin g th~
ene ~y i~ the open battle:
--. a
.•h ~ storming fo~ ; care 'sho uld ~ t~k
.
~n to see t~a t t~e
.
follo~

\
I
 260 I<AUTILIY A ARTHASAS TRA

ing categories of persons are not attacked by his troops : (1) patita th
_. kh
who have fallen down, {2) paranmu a, those who have turned, those.
back on the fight, (8) abhipanna , those who surrender, (4) ·muktake;ir
those whose hair are loose (as _a mark of sub1nission~, (5) mukta.foatr::
those who have abandoned their weapons, (6) bhayavirilpa, those whose
appearanc e is changed through fear, and (7) ayudhyami ina, those wh
at'e taking no part in the fight _(!3.4.52). I~ view_ of this, it is not quit:
correct to say that the Arthasa,stra knows nothing about fair play in
battle', as, Basham says.7 This text too knows a dharmit;tha yuddha
(10.3.26), but it recognises that on the battlefield tactics are essential
particular ly when one is at a disadvanta ge.. That is what its kilta-'
yudfU!,a means. 8
lwhen the fight ends in victory, the subsequen t conduct of the
vijigifu is to be determine d by the relative strength of the defeated
enemy. If he has defeated a king more powerful than himself, he may
offer ter1ns of peace and win him over to his side. If the defeated
king was his equal, he may accept the terms of peace offered by him,
as implying a friendly alliance, if not submission . But no peace should
be made with a weaker king, who is defeated ; he may be completely
destroyed, unless he becomes desperate fights for his life, when
peace may be made.with him {10.8.54-5 72.)
If the enemy, instead of giving an open fight, takes refuge in a fort,
siege should be laid to it by the vijigifu after satisfying himself that his
own troops ·are well-equip ped and properly supplied and conditions
are favourable to him. A suitable occasion for a siege would be when
the enemy is in difficulties on account of the depletion of his stores and
defences.t hrough fa1ninc, diseases etc. (13.4.8). On the way to the fort,
the- vijig~u should grant safety to the. people. Those who have to be
removed from the place where fighting ·n1ay take place should be settled
elsewhere and helped in every way. Destructio n of the people is a
ruinous policy. For, says Kautilya in his own words, a country without
people makes no sense, and there can be no kingdom without a c_ountry
(13.4.2-5). •
All sorts of tricks are described for the capture of a fort wit~out
a serious fight. Attempts should be made to seduce the principal
---oincef.lioftnc enemy from their lo alt to him so that they n1ay des~rt
hi • 18.l. -21). Or, advantage should be taken of the credulity
or _s~perstitious nature of the enemy· king to in~uce him to co~c-_out

7 'l.'he.. lVonder that wa,'l l11dia, p. 125. _

8 I. P. Raik<?v l~as made n detailed u11ulysis of the tcuching
of the Arth:S
laitra ?n the ~rganasataon of the army, its equipment, on fighting arri~ngern:
o~ flexible tactics, on battle-array s uncl so on. He concludes that all th1S sh0 •
h!gh level_ of knowl<>dgc of military seicnce nntl rev<'als grcnt militnry talent, (Op
Cll., pp. 5.J0-560).
I
 OEFENCB ANO EXT~~RNAL AFFAIRS 261

. trenched p0sition in the fort, when he can be ·done away with

of bJS en 18 _2). Other tricks include the smuggling of one's troops '
hapter d. • • d •
. the fort in' some isgu_is_e or in u~1~g a part of the garrison to come
(c
illto utting down dacoit1es or enticing the_ troops in the fort to come
out : :elp an ' ally ' supposed to be attacking the besieging vijigiiu,
out So on (Chapter 13.3).
and If these tactics • fai, • •• - may proceed to reduce the fort.
•1 thc VtJigi~u
lies must be prevented from going into the. fort•, crops and
~I suppmay be destroyed • Moats sh ould be emptied of water ; an
.
'°~und tunnel leading into the fort may be made, or a breach in
underall IJ18.Y be attempted {18.4.6-12) . It should be remember ed that
:::: ways are recommen ded in t~e Manusmrt i too (7.195-196 ). The
t describes various ways of se~tn1g fire to objects or places inside the
:~ from the outside and also mentions some incendiary preparatio ns
(JS.4'.14-21). The_ final ~ttempt to stor~ the fort. (avamarda) sh~uld be
ade _when there .1s a suitable opportuni ty, suc,h as a fire raging in the
:rt or a festival being celebrated or some show proving a great
attr~ion, or rain pouring down and so on {13.4.26).
(Conq~est of a territory inay mean ·its annexation . By successive
conquests an empire may be built up in which the vi 'i ·i • • the
sole ru er. n case of annexatio n of territory, the v#igi~u is advised to
win over the people in that territorY., and not to terrorize or exploit
them for self-aggran dizement. This policy is called lahdhaprasatnana
'pacification of what 1s conquered '. The· conqueror is to do what is
beneficial and a~eeable to his new subjects, showing fa.vour, granting
exemptions, showering honours and so on. He is to adopt the dress,
the language, the customs etc. of the new subjects and show reverence
for the deities and enthusiasm for the festivals and fairs in the land.
The_!lew territory is thus not to be treated as a colony to be ruled and
..
ex2_!oited from a distance. At the same tin1e, efforts must be made to
consolidate his rule in the new territor b his bona fid d
eliminating mischievo us and har f
However, instead of annexatio n of the conquered territ.ory, the
tjjjgrift--·rnay be satisfied with only 1·eceiviog the submission of' the
n uered kin . s the relationsh i that is• established
~ween the two :. that of a suzerain and a feudatory or vassa • ie
emp!.!! built· in this·· way differs from the one where territories are
~exed. ,.fhe text describes how the vassal king should conduct himself
1
his r ea
nr1'-'-· I t·10•ns · with the suzerain (7~15.21-30) . •It a 1so. re1ers. t 0 tl1e
nci les that should • . s , " ·n in his dealing~ ,v1th the
eudatorics so that the ma remain com letely loynl to him nnd 1is
succes=so =-r---.::.. ...::~~~.:. .i_~~~~~ ~~~~=L~ :...:::.::~- -------
• s over thc_g_enerations (7.16.17-88).
 I

262 KAu·r11.lYA ARTH ASAs TRA

.
<> In the latter kind of empir e we may u~der stand the creati on
ot soine
sort of feudal relationshi . But this feuda lism is not of the
same typ
as the feudalism that preva iled in Medieval Euro 9 The
surren e ,
of troop s by t e conquered king is conten1plated; but the
vassal kin
does not holq the territ ory _in fief with the oblig ation of
going to th!
suzer ain's help with troop s when he goes to war. His territ
ory is not
grant ed 'to him by his over- lord as a gift to a com rad
e-in -ar~
his own legiti mate ki • i h is for the time
c:being exting uishe d ,by the• conqu est. If circum stanc es
cba n~
_vassalage may be shake n off.· In· fact, it is possible to
conceive a
situat ion in which the tables are·\u rned, the· forme r vassa
l esta6Iish-
ing his suzer ainty over the former. suzerain. ·_;
---- ,
. 'the ideal of conqu est of the world ~rest ricted , of cours
e, to: the
India n ·wo!l d-ma y perhaps_ be found ·faul~ with on the gi-ou~
d ~hat-it
destro ys the right of small or weak states to lead an indep
enden t life
• of their ·own. But the idea of conqu est and empire-building
h~ al~ays -
exercised a fascin ation for rulers. What the text does is to
•
I • •

take notice
of such desires an4 proce.ed_to analyse th_e ~ays of three types
•
' J •• •

~f conquer-
ors. •It is not quite corre ~t to·say , as does B~sh am;'t hat the
. ,._. Artha.Aaatra
' evi,dently looks on conqu est. of the . demo . ... '' ..
niac vane ty as t~e most
' ;

pr~fit able and advis able' .1.0 ,The section on datµ/,opanti,yivrtt

am (Cha p~·
7.16) requi res -that the conquer~r- sh~ul d treat with d~e
co~d eratio n
the king subju gated by him. .: it- calls ,an. open fight. dha~
i#ha,-;. and
.its kuta-yuddha, consists mostl y of .unexc eption able milita
ry· tacti~
(10.8.1-26)." And the asura vijaya of this text consi sts
in this. that the
land and mone y are seize ~ the wi~es and childr en ·of the.co
nquei edkin g
taken:· possession of and the enein:y king· 1:tlmselt kill~~: ··Mor
eover, the
Q.ffiravijayi,,;, c~n be appe ~ed by the surren der· of the ~d
and: money
(12.1.15-16}. This is comp ~rativ ely a~ in~ocuous affair
-when one t);ijnks
of the num~rous conquests' in antiq uity, includ ing tliose of
Mex&lldt;r,
when whole cities were razed to the ··grou nd; th~ Jiuii~ •
•tion put
to the sword a~d wome n and childr en sold into ~y ~wr est• ,
ing to note in •this conne ction the opini on oA~lW D!
that '
when the ArthaAaatra teach es the la.yin, w
ol.'
the siege), the teach ing may have bee n~
he refers to Alexa nder who ¥
in the course of bis expedition,1•
I •

er.· L. Renou, La Cw tl~ ti,

10 TM Wonder that r.otU India,
11 Cf. ,v.
W. Tam, H , I ~
12 •J.legutb.enea iiber die t
n. T. •
 RN AL AF FA IR S 26 8
DE FE NC E AN D EX TE

, be
ac ~e s the ide al ?f co ~quest. It ma y, therefore
The tex t pre t the Ar tha -
reg ard ed as a ma nu al _of Imperial po lit y ,.is Bu din g,o f
r'<>'htlY als o a gu ide to the wi ths tan
t me rel y th at. It 1s
~t a is no t· • Seven, yiitavyavrttih
sas r iali•sm. B esI'de ma ny sec ions In Bo ok e~tir~
. per pte r 7.2) an d oth ers , the
),. sam sra yq, vrt tib , (C ha
;~hapter 7.8 ak kin g from the
ok IS d~ vo ted to the pro ble m of sav ing a we
tw elf th Bo es how the
im pe nd ing att ac k by a str on g king. It tea ch
actual or imperialistic
ou ld be fru str ate d an d his
tte r's att em pts to co nq ue• rhsh Bh ara d-
Ia
. To st. art wi t , Ka uti ly~ rej ec ts the advice of
designs foiled on g kin g as well
a tha t the we ak kin g mu st alw ay s su bm it to the str ve r the
vij
e of Vi sa. lak ~a th at he sh ou ld alw ay s ·fight wh ate
as the advic ou ld seek shelter,
ces . Hi s ow n ad vic e is th at the we ak kin g sh
con seq uen tex t the n
a mo re po we rfu l kin g or in a fo rt (12 .1. 1-9 ). Th e
either with ld be tri ed to ge t
s on to de scr ibe ho w the va rio us up ay as shou en em y's
goe sh ou ld be engineered in the
av ert ed . Ho w tro ub les
the attack sav e his own king-
gdo m so th at he is for ce d to go ba ck in ord er to att em pts
kin
ibe d at gr ea t len gth . Again, the tex t shows how
dom is descr en em y to de se rt
de to ge t th e ch ief arm y officers of the
sho uld be ma the en em y
ge t the m kil led (12 .2 an d 12 .3) . At tem pts to ge t If
him or to are als o described {12.5.1-~).
pe d an d kil led
king himself ·tr ap nc ing , the
se eff ort s su cc ee ds an d the en em y keeps ad ya
none of the is the n ad vis ed
h him sel f in the for t. He
weak king sh ou ld en tre nc rou nd the
fue l an d gr as s up to a: dis tan ce of on e yojana all
to burn down ble ob str uc tio ns in
wa ter an d to pu t all possi
fort, to spoil or dr ain aw ay me thi ng like-a scorched ea
rth po lic y•
the en em y's ma rch . So
the path of siege is lai d by the
cle arly rec om me nd ed he re (12 .5. 13 -15 ). W he n a example,
is
va rio us tac tic s· sh ou ld be tri ed to ou tw it him . Fo r
strong king, the en em y or the
un de rgr ou nd tun ne l ma y be bu ilt an d officers of all ow ed ·
an po iso ne d supplies ma y be
f ma y be kid na pp ed , or
enemy himsel res ult s to his arm y,
in the ·ha nd s' of th e en em y, wi th dis ast rou s fail, the
to' fall
efforts to sa ve the for t
5.1 6ff ). W he n all
and so on ( I2. secretly, tak ing
g ad vis ed to su rre nd er the ·fo rt an d lea ve it
Weak kin is sel f free
at he him sel f is no t ca ug ht. He mu st ke ep him
care to see th ing, thr ou gh
ba ck . Th at ma y be do ne by sec ret ly re-enter
to stri ke ma y
on ly to him sel f, th e ch am be r where the en em y
Passages known ng fire to the
epi ng an d kil lin g him wi th a we ap on •o r se tti
be sle
).
chamber an d so on (12 .5. 43 -48 foil an am bi-
thu s in thi s tex t as full an ad vic e on how to nd
• , We ha ve .up·
w to co nq ue r ~ , buil~
1

lis tic de sig ns as on ho

:ou s king's im pe ria the ide al of co nq ue , It
st t~kes int o
W hil e it set s fo rth nd
n empir e.
ich an y sta te ma y fin ~ its elf a
ns in wh
a~~Unt all possible sit ua tio •t and whic h course 1t wo
uld be
011
ers ad vic • e on wh at co urs es are op en to 1
191
"
18 R. A. Nilakanta Sastri, Ag e of the Na nd al
a,ad the Mauryaa, P·
 ~64 KAUT II,JYA ARTH ASAS TRA

prefe rable to follow in any ~iven ~itua tion. Its teach ing
is intended
for all kings , for the weak king being attack ed, the yiltavy
a, the hina
the abaliyas, the dar;uJ,opanata, as much as for the stron g, ambit
ious kin '
the jyayas; the balavat, the darJ,<!,opanayin. That is what
make s it;~
comp rehen sive.
It 'is becau se of the autho r's endea vour to imagi ne and
provide
for all possib le situat ions which a state may have to face
in its relations
with foreign. states that we some times find detail s that
migh t appear
to be of little significance. To regar d this as an indica
tion of his
pedan try is, howe ver, to misu nders tand the natur e and
scope of this
work. It is not a treati se on gener nl princi ples, but a work
concerned
vdth recom mend ing pract icable policies in any conce ivable
situation
that may arise in ·actua l politi cal life. And its vi~ua lisatio
n of such
situat ions and the cours es that are then open to a state is
characterised
by a realis m that is altog ether uniqu e. And its teach ing
has not lost
its releva nce in these matte rs even to-da y. C. W. Gurn er
has shown how
the' fortre ss polic y' recom mend ed in Chap ter 7.15 was actua
lly pursued
by Great Brita in durin g the Secon d Worl d War, when it
turne d itself
into an island fortre ss and successfully withs tood the onsla
ught of the
then more powe rful Germ ans, makin g effort s in the mean
while gain
stren gth and obtai n new allies. Refer ring ~o the surre
nder ·of one
Conti nenta l powe r after anoth er to the migh t of the Germ
an forces,
he point s out how this is wh~t Kaut ilya recom mend s when
a ' fortress
policy ' is not possible. He refers to the flash of insigh t and
vivid com-
press ion in the expre ssion ' enteri ng the flame like a moth
' descriptive of
a useless attack , as exemplified in a prem ature secon d front.
He speaks
of the great depth and penet ration of Kaut ilya's politi cal
teach ing and
show s that the princi ples he enum erates are as true to-da y
in their wiaer
appli cation as.the y were in his days. 14
The mean s recom mend ed in this text for avert ing dange
r to the
state and for achie ving success over hostil e eleme nts migh
t often appear
to be obnox ious from the mora l point of view. It shoul
d not be for-
gotte n, howe ver, that t~e use of such mean s is inten ded
again st in- '
tracta ble enem ies of the state. Its justif icatio n is that
it is necessary
in the intere sts of the ltate . One of the chara cteris tic featur
es of the
realis m of this text is that quest ions of mora lity are not
allowed to
intrud e when policies are consi dered that are to be pursu
ed towards
enem ies of the state, those who jeopa rdize its secur ity and
independence.
This is a positi on that is tacitl y recog nised as neces sary
when it is a
quest ion of pract ical politics. Even when certai n action
s. may be re-
garde d as moral ly unjus tifiab le, they are in actua l practi ce
resort ed to in
14 'The Fortre ss Policy in K~uti1 ya's ATthaa
dstra 'in IC, VIII (,1941-1942 ),
pp. 251-~5 2.

-
'
 RN AL
J
DE FE NC E AN D EX TE

the supren1e in ter es ts of th e sta

po
te. Objectio~1s th at some politi
lit ics are a fun cti on of ethics
cal
. Bu t
I
eth ica l as su me tn: at
actions are un ery sta te
po lit ics su ch a pr op os iti on is ne ve r acc ep ted . Ev
in pra cti cal d in the ir defence
s wh at it co ns ide rs its ow n int ere sts as su pre me an
reg ard
tio ns th at ap pe ar un eth ica l. Th e dre am tha t politics
often res ort s 'to ac ap s be rea lis ed at so me fqt ure da
te.
gh ly eth ica l ma y pe rh
must be th or ou r of over
ve r, un fa ir in th e me an wh ile to co nd em n an au tho
It is, ho we nk ly the most
tho us an d ye ar s ag o- an au tho r, moreover, fra -
two
ac tic al wh o ev er wr ote on thi s su bje ct- fo r no t recom
realist_ic an d pr pra cti ca ble in politics even to-
day.
me th in g th at is fo un d im
mending so