("The British Foreign Office and Macedonian National Identity - 1918-1941" by An drew Rossos ) Slavic Review, vol.

53, number 2, Summer 1994 The study of the Macedonian identity has given rise to far greater controversies and debates than that of most, if not all, other nationilisms in eastern Europe . This has been only in part due to the hazy past of the Slavic speaking populat ion of Macedonia and to the lack of a continuous and separate state tradition, a trait they had in common with other "small" and "young," or so-called "non-hist oric," peoples in the area. Controversy has been due above all to the fact that, although it began in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Macedonian n ationalism did not enjoy international acceptance or legitimacy until the Second World War, much later than was the case with other similar national movements i n eastern Europe.[1] Recent research has shown that Macedonian nationalism devel oped, generally speaking, similarly to that of neighboring Balkan peoples, and, in most respects, of other "small" and "young" peoples of eastern, as well as so me of western, Europe. But Macedonian nationalism was belated, grew slowly and, at times, manifested co nfusing tendencies and orientations that were, for the most part, consequences o f its protracted illegitimate status.[2] For a half century Macedonian nationalism existed illegally. It was recognized n either by the theocratic Ottoman state nor by the two established Orthodox churc hes in the empire: the Patriarchist (Greek) and, after its establishment in 1870 , the Exarchist (Bulgarian). Moreover neighboring Balkan nationalists-Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian-who had already achieved independence with the aid of one or mor e of the Great Powers, chose to deny the existence of a separate Macedonian iden tity; indeed they claimed Macedonia and the Macedonians as their own. They fough t for Macedonia with propaganda and force, against each other and the nascent Ma cedonian nationalists. A prolonged struggle culminated in 1913 with the forceful partition of Macedonia after the Second Balkan or Inter-Allied War between Bulg aria, on one side, and allied Greece and Serbia, on the other. [3] Each of these three states consolidated their control over their respective parts of Macedoni a, and throughout the inter-war years inaugurated and implemented policies inten ded to destroy any manifestations of Macedonian nationalism, patriotism or parti cularism- Consequently, until World War II, unlike the other nationalisms in the Balkans or in eastern Europe more generally, Macedonian nationalism developed w ith-out the aid of legal political, church, educational or cultural institutions . Macedonian movements not only lacked any legal infrastructure, they also were without the international sympathy, cultural aid and, most importantly, benefits of open and direct diplomatic and military support accorded other Balkan nation alisms. [4] Indeed, for an entire century Macedonian nationalism, illegal at hom e and illegitimate internationally, waged a precarious struggle for survival aga inst overwhelming odds: in appearance against the Turks and the Ottoman Empire b efore 1913 but in actual fact, both before and after that date, against the thre e expansionist Balkan states and their respective patrons among the Great Powers . [5] The denial of a Macedonian identity by the neighboring Balkan states, and their irreconcilably contradictory claims, motives, justifications and rationalization s, are mirrored by the largely polemical and tendentious Bulgarian, Greek and Se rbian literature on the Macedonian question. [6] But the attitudes of the indivi dual Great Powers and the thinking, motivations and internal foreign policy esta blishments have not yet been studied. In this article I will focus on the Britis h Foreign Office and its attitude toward the Macedonian question during the inte r-war years. The British Foreign Office provides a case study because Great Brit

ain played a leading role in the area after the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano; duri ng the inter-war years respect for national self-determination and for the right s of national minorities was, at least in theory and in official policy, the acc epted and prevailing norm. For the Macedonians the inter-war period was conditioned by the Balkan wars and the partition of their land. The peace conferences and treaties which ended the Great War, represented for many "small" and "young" nations of eastern Europe th e realization of dreams of self-determination. But with some minor territorial m odifications at the expense of Bulgaria, these treaties confirmed the partition of Macedonia agreed upon in the Treaty of Bucharest. For the victorious allies, especially Great Britain and France, this meant putting the Macedonian problem f inally to rest. It also meant that the allies could satisfy two of their clients which were pillars of the new order in south-eastern Europe: the Kingdom of Gre ece and the former Kingdom of Serbia, now the dominant component in the newly cr eated Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Yugoslavia. Even though their t erritorial acquisitions in Macedonia did not necessarily satisfy their maximal a spirations, official Athens and Belgrade also pretended that Macedonia and the M acedonian problem had ceased to exist. Belgrade proclaimed Vardar Macedonia to b e Old Serbia and the Macedonians Old Serbians; for Athens, Aegean Macedonia beca me simply northern Greece and the Slavic speaking Macedonians were considered Gr eeks or, at best, "Slavophone" Greeks. Although Bulgaria had enjoyed the greates t influence among the Macedonians, because of its defeat in the Inter-Allied and the Great Wars, it was accorded the smallest part, Pirin Macedonia, or the Petr ich district, as it became known during the inter-war years. Unlike official Ath ens and Belgrade, the ruling elite in Sofia did not consider the settlement perm anent; but without sympathy among the victorious Great Powers and threatened by revolutionary turmoil at home, they had to accept the settlement for the time be ing. In any event, the Macedonian question was not a priority for the Agrarian g overnment of A. Stamboliski. [7] Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria all sought to d estroy all signs of Macedonianism through forced deportation, so-called voluntar y exchanges of populations and internal transfers of the Macedonian populations. They also implemented policies of colonization, social and economic discriminat ion, and forced denationalization and assimilation based on total control of the educational systems and of cultural and intellectual life as a whole. These pol icies were particularly pursued with great determination in Yugoslavia and Greec e. Though he approved of these policies, C. L. Blakeney, British Vice-Consul at Belgrade, wrote in1930: It is very well for the outsider to say that the only way the Serb could achieve this [control of Vardar Macedonia] was by terrorism and the free and general us e of the big stick. This may be true, as a matter of fact one could say that it is true ...On the other hand, however, it must be admitted that the Serb had no other choice ... He had not only to deal with the brigands but also with a popul ation who regarded him as an invader and unwelcome foreigner and from whom he ha d and could expect no assistance. [8] Ten years later, on the eve of Yugoslavia' s collapse during the Second World War, it was obvious that the Serbian policies in Macedonia had failed. R.I. Campbell, British minister at Belgrade, now denou nced them to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary: Since the occupation by Serbia in 1913 of the Macedonian districts, the Governme nt has carried out in this area, with greater or lesser severity, a policy of su ppression and assimilation. In the years following the Great War land was taken away from the inhabitants and given to Serbian colonists. Macedonians were compe lled to change their names and the Government did little or nothing to assist th e economic development of the country... [9] Athens was even more extreme than B elgrade: under the guise of "voluntary" emigration they sought to expel the enti re Macedonian population. Colonel A.C. Corfe, chairman of the League of Nations Mixed Commission on Greco-Bulgarian Emigration, reported in 1923: "In the course of conversation, Mr. Lambros [Governor General of Macedonia], actually said tha

t the present was a good opportunity to get rid of the Bulgars [sic] who remaine d in this area and who had always been a source of trouble for Greece." [10][10] This could be achieved at least superficially: Athens made a concerted effort t o eradicate any reminders of the centuries old Slav presence in Aegean Macedonia by replacing Slav Macedonian personal names and surnames, as well as place name s, etc., by Greek. This policy reached its most extreme and tragic dimensions du ring the late 1930s under the dictatorship of General Metaxas when use of the Ma cedonian language was prohibited even in the privacy of the home to a people who knew Greek scarcely or not at all, and who in fact could not communicate proper ly in any other language but their own. [11] In 1944 Captain P.H. Evans, an agent of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) w ho spent eight months in western Aegean Macedonia as a British Liaison Officer ( BLO) and station commander, condemned the Greek policies in a lengthy report for the Foreign Office. He described the attitude "even of educated GREEKS towards the SLAV minority" as "usually stupid, uninformed and brutal to a degree that ma kes one despair of any understanding ever being created between the two people." However, he also left no doubt that the Greek government's policies had failed: It is predominantly a SLAV region not a GREEK one. The language of the home, and usually also of the fields, the village Street, and the market is MACEDONIAN, a SLAV language... The place names as given on the map are GREEK...; but the name s which are mostly used - - - are - - - all Slav names. The GREEK ones are merel y a bit of varnish put on by Metaxas... GREEK is regarded as almost a foreign la nguage and the GREEKS are distrusted as something alien, even if not, in the ful l sense of the word, as foreigners. The obvious fact, almost too obvious to be s tated, that the region is SLAV by nature and not GREEK cannot be overemphasized. [12] Revisionist Bulgaria, where major trends in Macedonian nationalism were well ent renched in Pirin Macedonia and among the large Macedonian emigration to its capi tal, assumed a more ambiguous position. Sofia continued its traditional attitude towards all Macedonians, acting as their patron but claiming them to be Bulgari ans. To a certain extent it left the Macedonians to do what they wanted; unlike Athens and Belgrade, it tolerated, or felt compelled to tolerate, the free use o f the name "Macedonia" and an active Macedonian political and cultural life.[13] In its annual report on Bulgaria for 1922, the British Legation at Sofia referr ed to the Pirin region as "the autonomous kingdom of Macedonia" and stressed tha t "Bulgarian sovereignty over the district - - - is purely nominal and, such as it is, is resented by the irredentist Macedonian element no less strongly than i s that of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government over the adjacent area within their frontier." [14] Indeed, it could be argued that, after the overthrow of the Stam boliski regime in June 1921, Sofia not only encouraged Macedonian discontent in all three countries but also sought to take advantage of it to further its own r evisionist aims.[15] Bulgaria's revisionism split the ranks of the partitioning powers and was of great significance for the future of Macedonian nationalism. F or no matter how much Greece and Yugoslavia, and their patrons among the Great P owers, especially Great Britain, pretended officially that the Macedonian questi on had been resolved, Bulgarian policies helped to keep it alive. [16] More importantly still, the Macedonians, both in the large emigration in Bulgari a and at home, rejected the partition of their land and the settlement based upo n it. As the British Legation at Sofia warned: "the Governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, if not that of Greece, are faced with practically an identical probl em in the pacification and control of a district overlapping both the frontiers inhabited by a population hostile to both Governments for different reasons and determined on strengthening the hands of the opposition parties in each country. " [17] Disturbing to London were calls for open resistance to foreign rule. Earl y in 1922 W.A.F. Erskine, the minister in Sofia, drew Lord Curzon's attention to an anonymous article in the newspaper Makedonija, purportedly from a Macedonian

professor at the University of Sofia, which exhorted the Macedonians to follow the example of the Irish, who after a bitter struggle lasting through centuries, have succeeded in gaining their autonomy. "Their country is today free. Ours, t oo, will be free if we remain faithful to our own traditions of struggle and if we take as our example the lives of people, who, like the Irish, have "never des paired of the force of right." [18] To be sure, organized Macedonian activity in Aegean and Vardar Macedonia, which had declined after the bloody suppression of the Ilinden uprising of 1903 and the repeated partitions of 1912-1918, came to a virtual standstill immediately after World War I. Virtually the entire Exarchi st educated elite, most Macedonian activists from Aegean Macedonia and large num bers from Vardar Macedonia had been forced to emigrate and now sought refuge in Bulgaria.[19] Furthermore, the remaining Macedonian population in Aegean Macedon ia, overwhelmingly rural and lacking an educated elite, found itself after the G reek-Turkish War (1919-1922) a minority in its own land as a result of the Greek government's settlement there of large numbers of Greek and other Christian ref ugees from Asia Minor.[20] The situation among the Macedonians in Bulgaria was o nly slightly more encouraging: while there were large concentrations of Exarchis t educated Macedonians and Macedonian activists both in the Pirin region and in Sofia, there were deep divisions within each group. Demoralization had set in an d a long process of regrouping ensued among the Macedonians there.[21] Nonetheless, opposition to foreign rule existed in all three parts of Macedonia from its imposition and systematic anti-Macedonian policies only intensified it. That this discontent was considerable was clearly evident in the support given to the terrorist activities of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organizatio n (IMRO) in the 1920s. A popular revolutionary movement in the early twentieth c entury, by the mid-1920s IMRO had emerged as a terrorist organization. It virtua lly ruled Pirin Macedonia and was a state within the state of Bulgaria, pursuing its own self-saving ends by relying on Bulgarian reaction and Italian fascism, and allowing itself to be used by both. However, officially and very conspicuous ly-it promulgated the aims and the slogans of the older movement: "united autono mous or independent Macedonia" and "Macedonia for the Macedonians." IMRO conduct ed repeated, so-called "Komitaji," armed raids and incursions into Vardar and, t o a lesser extent, into Aegean Macedonia until the military coup in Sofia of May 1934 when the new regime liquidated the organization. More than anything else, it succeeded in maintaining the Macedonian question on the international scene a nd, as champion of Macedonia and the Macedonians, it continued to enjoy consider able support throughout most of the 1920s.[22] Widespread opposition to foreign rule is also demonstrated by the results of the first post-war elections held in Greece, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the freest to be held during the inter-war years. Significant support in all three parts of Macedonia went to the newly formed com munist parties, which also rejected the status quo and declared themselves champ ions of Macedonia and the Macedonians.[23] As Erskine reported from Sofia: "The program of the Communists, therefore, at the instigation of Moscow, was modified to a form of cooperation with the Macedonian revolutionaries - - - to stir up t rouble generally - - - and to pave the way for a revolution by creating disorder ."[24] Commenting on the election in Yugoslavia, the British minister at Sofia, R. Peel, stressed that although Serbian troops had resorted to the worst excesse s in order to terrorize the inhabitants into voting for government lists, "...a large proportion of communist deputies were returned from Macedonia."[25] Clearl y, the communist vote was, in effect, a Macedonian protest against foreign rule. [26] This cooperation between communists and Macedonians, dating from the end of World War I, intensified in the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the Balkan com munist parties, after long and heated debates, officially recognized Macedonia a s a distinct Slav nation with its own language, history and territory. The Comin tern followed suit in 1934 and thus supplied the first formal international reco gnition of Macedonian nationalism.[27] Both rightist and leftist activities-the

renewal of terrorism by IMRO, led by I. Mihailov, and the association of Macedon ian nationalism with international communism-led to a revival of the Macedonian question as the central issue dividing the Balkan states and hence as the major cause of instability in southeastern Europe. These activities not only represent ed rejections of the territorial and political terms agreed to at the Paris Peac e Conference, but also were serious challenges to Great Britain, one of the arch itects of the treaty and its main defender throughout the inter-war years. For some time following World War I, London refused to consider the unrest in Ma cedonia and, hence, the revival of the Macedonian question. A lengthy memorandum , "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," prepared by the Central Depar tment of the Foreign Office in 1925, maintained that "While amongst the Slav int ellectuals there is violent partisanship, probably the majority of Slavs - - - d o not care to what nationality they belong."[28] DJ. Footman, the vice consul at Skopje, echoed a similar sentiment when he wrote, "I believe that 80 percent of the population merely desire a firm, just and enlightened Administration, and r egard Nationalism as of minor importance." [29] If there was a problem, the expl anation for it could be found in Bulgaria: London blamed Sofia not only for tole rating, but for encouraging and sponsoring an organized Macedonian movement, rev olutionary organizations and armed bands on its own territory.[30] A more sophis ticated explanation for the unrest could be based on a combination of social, ec onomic and especially administrative causes: reports from the Balkans pointed to the economic backwardness of Macedonia and to the exacerbation of its economic woes by the partition, which had destroyed traditional trade routes and markets. They further stressed the lack of government reforms and constructive policies to alleviate the prevailing condition: communications remained as primitive or n on-existent as they had been before the Great War, and towns such as Bitola, Sko pje and Ohrid were in a state of general decline. The peasantry appeared to be s lightly better off, but "this was less the result of agrarian reform or of the g overnment colonization policy than of the energy and initiative shown by the pea santry, who have, in many cases, bought land either individually or in corporati ons, from Turks or Albanians who have emigrated to Anatolia."[31] "Such disconte nt as exists springs from genuine economic distress," wrote O.C. Harvey of the F oreign Office after a visit to Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia in April 1926: "Alth ough the peasants are said to be doing well, the towns are dying from lack of tr ade. And wherever else the Serb is spending his money, he does not seem to be sp ending it in Macedonia. Yet this country is perhaps really the biggest problem f or the Serbs." [32] Or, as R.A. Gallop, third secretary in the legation in Belgr ade, put it: "What discontent there is comes from economic causes and the Govern ment must seek palliatives. This of course will take time and cost money, but to my mind the key to the Macedonian question is now this: a prosperous Macedonia will be a contented one." [33] But most reports to London singled out the administration as the root cause for discontent in Macedonia. The new rulers had forced on the Macedonians their own, that is foreign, administrative and legal codes without regard to local conditi ons or requirements." Their manner of administration was considered even worse:[ 34] it was described as invariably harsh, brutal, arbitrary and totally corrupt. As Colonel Corfe wrote: "One of the Macedonian's chief grievances is against th e Greek Gendarmerie and during our tour we saw many examples of the arrogant and unsatisfactory methods of the Gendarmerie, who comandeer from the peasants what ever food they want...One visits few villages where some of the inhabitants are not in Greek prisons, without trial..."[35] DJ. Footman described the Serbian of ficials in Vardar Macedonia as poorly qualified, underpaid, arbitrary and corrup t. "Officials depend for their promotions and appointment on the service they ca n render their political party... ," he wrote. "It is therefore only natural for them to make what they can while they are in office. I regard this as the facto r which will most militate against improvement in administration."[36] And, afte r a twelve-day motor tour in the same part of Macedonia, Major W.H. Oxley, the m ilitary attache at Belgrade, reported: To start with they [the Prefects] have pr

actically unlimited power over the local inhabitants and ... I gathered that the y must exercise a pretty firm control. Further, we were informed that on the who le they were corrupt and were liable to use their power either to blackmail thei r flock or to accept bribes from over the frontiers, in order to allow terrorist s to pass through their areas...[37] The Central Department of the Foreign Office admitted all this and more. Its len gthy review of 1930 of the Macedonian question stated: At present Jugoslavia lac ks the material out of which to create an efficient and honest civil service. Th is want is especially felt in the new and "foreign" provinces such as Serb-Maced onia. To make matters worse, the Jugoslav Government,... are compelled to pursue a policy of forcible assimilation, and, in order to "Serbise" the Slavs of Serb -Macedonia, must necessarily tend to disregard those grievances of the local inh abitants which spring from the violation of their local rights and customs.[38] Although this authoritative statement of the Foreign Office acknowledged the exi stence and the seriousness of the Macedonian problem, the underlying assumption was that, once the economic and administrative causes for grievance were allayed , it would be finally resolved. But while the Foreign Office endeavored to avoid dealing with the national dimension and implications of the problem until as la te as 1930, by the mid-1920s its position was already being questioned and chall enged by Foreign Office officials in the Balkans, and was becoming untenable. It was difficult to reconcile the use of three different terms-Slavophone Greeks, Old Serbians and Bulgarians-when referring to a people who called themselves Mak edonci and spoke Macedonian or dialects of it.[39] The British could maintain th eir position only as long as relations between Athens and Belgrade remained frie ndly; and a crisis in Greek-Yugoslav relations in the mid-1920s provoked a heate d debate over the national identity of the Macedonians -Although unwillingly, th e Foreign Office was also drawn into this debate and was forced to consider: "Wh o are the Macedonian Slavs?" Ironically, the crisis in Greek-Yugoslav relations was sparked by the conclusion of the abortive Greek-Bulgarian Minorities Protocol of 1924, which "connoted th e recognition on the part of Greece that the Slavophone inhabitants of Greek Mac edonia were of Bulgarian race."[40] This infuriated the Serbs and the Belgrade g overnment broke off its alliance with Greece on 7 November 1924; [41] it also la unched a press and a diplomatic campaign that Greece protect the rights of what it called the "Serbian minority" in Aegean Macedonia.[42] The Yugoslav governmen t clamored for a special agreement with Greece similar to the abortive protocol between Bulgaria and Greece. "The object of this move is quite patent," wrote C. H. Bateman of the Foreign Office. "All that the Serbs want is that the Greeks sh ould recognize a Serbian minority in Greek Macedonia in the same way as they rec ognized a Bulgarian minority in l924."[43] In the end, even though Greece did no t sign such an agreement with Yugoslavia, relations between these two countries returned to normal; but the debate concerning the national identity of the Maced onian Slavs that this crisis had instigated in the Foreign Office continued well into the 1930s. The debate was not entirely new or confined to Britain. The national identity of the Macedonians had sparked continuous and heated controversies before the Balk an Wars and the First World War. However, the debate assumed far greater relevan ce and urgency after the peace settlement because all democratic governments had embraced the principle of national self-determination. This principle was suppo sedly the basis for the entire settlement in east central Europe; and it suppose dly bound all overnments of the "New Europe" to respect the national rights of t hose national minorities who for one reason or another could not exercise their right to national self-determination. Hence, to a certain extent the fate of the peace settlement in this part of Europe hinged on this principle and it was thu s of particular interest to Great Britain, perhaps its chief architect and defen der. Even before the Greek-Serbian dispute London had received reports that the causes for the revival of the Macedonian problem were not solely economic or adm

inistrative, but rather that they were primarily ethnic or national. While notin g in its annual report on Bulgaria for 1922, that "the province known as Macedon ia has, of course, no integral existence," the Chancery of the British Legation at Sofia had emphasized that as an entity it still existed "in the aspirations o f men of Macedonian birth or origin scattered under the sovereignty of Yugoslavi a, Greece and Bulgaria." It also had added that Macedonia has "clearly defined g eographical boundaries."[44] Colonel Corfe had written in 1923 that the Macedoni ans of Aegean Macedonia, and incidentally in the other two parts, were fearful o f state officials and had nothing to say in their presence: But in the evenings in their own houses or when we had given the officials the s lip, we encouraged them to speak to us. Then we in-variably heard the same story as "Bad administration. They want to force us to become Greeks, in language, in religion, in sentiment, in every way. We have served in the Greek army and we h ave fought for them: now they insult us by calling us 'damned Bulgars"' ... To m y question "What do you want? An autonomous Macedonia or a Macedonia under Bulga ria?" the answer was generally the same: "We want good administration. We are Ma cedonians, not Greeks or Bulgars...We want to be left in peace."[45] The Greek-Serbian crisis, however, forced the Foreign Office to concentrate its attention, as never before, on the national identity of the Macedonian Slavs and , indeed, on the question: who are the Macedonians? On 30 June 1925, DJ. Footman , the British vice consul at Skopje, the administrative center of Vardar Macedon ia, addressed this issue in a lengthy report for the Foreign Office. He wrote th at "the majority of the inhabitants of Southern Serbia are Orthodox Christian Ma cedonians, ethnologically slightly nearer to the Bulgar than to the Serb.." He a cknowledged that the Macedonians were better disposed toward Bulgaria than Serbi a because, as he had pointed out: the Macedonians were "ethnologically" more aki n to the Bulgarians than to the Serbs; because Bulgarian propaganda in Macedonia in the time of the Turks, largely carried on through the schools, was widesprea d and effective; and because Macedonians at the time perceived Bulgarian culture and prestige to be higher than those of its neighbors. Moreover, large numbers of Macedonians educated in Bulgarian schools had sought refuge in Bulgaria befor e and especially after the partitions of 1913. "There is therefore now a large M acedonian element in Bulgaria," continued Footman, "represented in all Governmen t Departments and occupying high positions in the army and in the civil service. ..." He characterized this element as "Serbophobe, [it] mostly desires the incor poration of Macedonia in Bulgaria, and generally supports the Makedonska Revoluc ionara [sic] Organizacija [the IMRO]." However, he also pointed to the existence of the tendency to seek an independent Macedonia with Salonica as its capital. "This movement also had adherents among the Macedonian colony in Bulgaria. It is supported by the parties of the Left in Bulgaria, and, at least theoretically, by large numbers of Macedonians."[46] The Central Department of the Foreign Offi ce went even further in clarifying the separate identity of the Macedonians. In a confidential survey and analysis of the entire Macedonian problem it identifie d the Macedonians not as Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs, but rather as Macedonian S lavs, and, on the basis of "a fairly reliable estimate made in 1912," singled th em out as by far the largest single ethnic group in Macedonia.[47] It acknowledg ed, as did Footman, that these Slavs spoke a language "understood by both Serbs and Bulgars, but slightly more akin to the Bulgarian tongue than to the Serbian" ; and that after the 1870 establishment of the Exarchate, Bulgarian propaganda m ade greater inroads in Macedonia than the Serbian or Greek. However, it stressed that "While it is probable that the majority of these Slavs are, or were, pro-B ulgar, it is incorrect to refer to them as other than Macedo-Slavs. To this exte nt both the Serb claim that they are Southern Serbs and the Bulgarian claim that they are Bulgarians are unjustified."[48] By declaring that the Macedonian Slavs were neither Bulgarians nor Serbs, the su rvey acknowledged implicitly that they were different from both and hence that t hey constituted a separate south Slav element. However, it did not go so far as

to recognize them explicitly as a distinct nationality or nation. It sought to e xplain this omission by maintaining, without convincing evidence, that "while am ongst the Slav intellectuals there is violent partisanship, probably the majorit y of Slavs... do not care to what nationality they belong."[49] The real reason for the omission, however, lay elsewhere. In view of the prevailing acceptance o f the principle of national self-determination, the recognition of the Slav Mace donians as a distinct nationality would have legitimized the Macedonian claims f or autonomy or at least for national minority rights. This would have connoted t he tearing up or at least the revision of the peace treaties and of the frontier s, neither of which was acceptable to Britain's clients, Greece and Yugoslavia, or indeed, to Great Britain itself. "In all the circumstances the present partit ion of Macedonia is probably as good a practical arrangement as can be devised," declared the Central Department, "and there is no real reason or consideration of political expediency which could be quoted to necessitate a rearrangement of the present frontiers."[50] Indeed, the Foreign Office was contemplating a different and, as it turned out, an illusory solution to the Macedonian problem. It accepted as valid the officia l Greek determination of the low number of Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia and a ssumed that with time they would be assimilated.[51] It also assumed that with t ime the Yugoslav hold on Vardar Macedonia would become more secure, that this wo uld be followed "as a natural consequence" by the "rounding up of Macedonian age nts," and that the Macedonian organization operating from Bulgaria would "suffer correspondingly through the lack of funds and general support forthcoming from that district...." And, as organized Macedonian activity declined, the prospect of more cordiality between Bulgaria and the Serb-Slovene-Croat kingdom will beco me brighter, and pro tonto, the idea of Serb-Bulgar Slav confederacy will become more feasible. The formation of such a Slav State in the Balkans will settle th e Macedonian question once and for all. Other considerations arising out of the formation of such a confederacy must be reserved for the future. [52] A few months later, on 3 March 1926; C.H. Bateman, a second secretary in the For eign Office, issued the official position in a separate "Memorandum on 'Serbian Minorities' in Greek Macedonia." In this strong statement he reiterated the main points of the Central Department 's memorandum of 26 November 1925: "Most authorities are agreed that by all ethn ological and language tests the Macedonian Slav is more akin to the Bulgar than to the Serb." Again, without substantiation, he declared that the deciding facto r in the national allegiance of the Macedonian Slavs "is the national consciousn ess of the individual who changes his allegiance according to circumstances... H is national allegiance is largely a matter of the propaganda which is exercised upon him...,"[53] in effect, under the influence of propaganda, Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian, the Macedonian Slav would become a loyal Bulgarian, Greek or Serb. Bateman therefore sided with the Greeks in the Greek-Serbian dispute: "Taking th e broadest interpretation of the Macedonian Slavs, one thing is certain, namely, that the Serbs have only the flimsiest of rights to intervene at all on their b ehalf. The Greeks are correct in contesting this right and contending that it is a matter that touches the internal administration of Greece."[54] If, as it app ears, Bateman's aim was to put an end to the Foreign Office debate concerning th e Macedonian national question, he failed. Although the Greek-Serbian dispute ca me to nothing, this debate intensified. R.A. Gallop, third secretary of the Lega tion at Belgrade, spent a week in April 1926 in Vardar Macedonia; his report aft er the tour is most revealing: The most striking thing to one familiar with North Serbia [Serbia proper], who h as been accustomed to hear Macedonia described as Southern Serbia and its inhabi tants as Serbs, was the complete difference of atmosphere which was noticeable a lmost as soon as we had crossed the pre-1913 frontier some miles south of Vranje . One felt as though one had entered a foreign country. Officials and officers f

rom North Serbia seemed to feel this too, and I noticed especially in the cafes and hotels of Skopje that they formed groups by themselves and mixed little with the Macedo-Slavs. Those of the latter that I met were equally insistent on call ing themselves neither Serbs nor Bulgars, but Macedonians.... There seemed to be no love lost for the Bulgars in most places. Their brutality during the war had lost them the affection even of those who before the Balkan War had been their friends...[55] Moreover, in his response to Bateman's memorandum, Gallop defined more clearly t han ever before the central issue in the Greek-Serbian dispute. He reminded Bate man that the Serbian claim is founded not on the contention that among the Slavs of Greek Macedonia there are some that can be picked as Serbs, but on the conte ntion that the population is of exactly the same stock on both sides of the bord er. The Serbs see that to admit that the Macedonians in Greece are Bulgars weake ns their case that the Macedonians in South Serbia are Serbs. While he agreed wi th Bateman "that the Macedonian Slavs used, before the days of propaganda, to ca ll themselves 'Christians' rather than Serbs or Bulgars," Gallop did not agree " that the Macedonian Slavs are nearer akin to the Bulgar than to the Serb." In an y case, he questioned the impartiality of so-called "authorities" and emphasized the actual reality that "nowadays" the Macedonian Slavs considered and called t hemselves "Makedonci." [56] Oliver C. Harvey of the Foreign Office, who visited both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia, reinforced Gallop's views. Indeed, in his "Not es" on the fact-finding mission he left no doubt about the existence of a distin ct Macedonian consciousness and identity. In connection with Vardar Macedonia he reported that "The Slavophone population of Serb Macedonia definitely regard th emselves as distinct from the Serbs. If asked their nationality they say they ar e 'Macedonians,' and they speak the Macedonian dialect. Nor do they identify the mselves with the Bulgars, although the latter seem undoubtedly to be regarded as nearer relatives than the Serbs."[57] As far as Aegean Macedonia was concerned, Harvey noted that in its eastern and central part "the Slavophone population ha d 'voluntarily' emigrated and their place had been taken by 500,000 Greek refuge es" from Asia Minor. "'Voluntary' emigration," he observed, "is a euphemism; inc oming Greeks were planted on the Slavophone villagers to such an extent that lif e was made unbearable for them and they were forced to emigrate." Such upheaval did not take place in its western part and large numbers of Slavophones remained there, in the area around and south of Florina (Lerin). "These of course consti tute the much advertised "Serb minority," he continued. "But they are no more Se rb than the Macedonians of Serbia-they speak Macedonian, and call themselves Mac edonians and sentimentally look to Bulgaria rather than to Serbia."[58] Through this internal debate, the Foreign Office appeared to have reached a virtual cons ensus that the Macedonian Slavs were neither Serbs, nor Bulgarians nor Greeks, a de facto acknowledgment that they comprised a separate southern Slav national g roup. But they were not given official recognition as a distinct nationality or nation; as I have already shown, the Foreign Office hoped to see the Macedonian problem disappear by their eventual assimilation into the three nations that rul ed over them. In the meantime, during the second half of the 1920s and until its dissolution in 1934, the IMRO intensified its activities in Bulgaria and armed incursions into Vardar Macedonia, thereby reminding London of the Macedonian nat ional question. Unlike in Greece and Yugoslavia, in Bulgaria the various aspects of the Macedoni an problem were generally argued freely and publicly. This was only partly due t o the traditional Bulgarian paternalism toward the Macedonians; it also reflecte d the strength and influence of the organized Macedonian movement in the Pirin r egion, in Sofia and in other major urban centers. Consequently, British diplomat s there were more deeply and broadly versed in all the intricacies of the Macedo nian problem than their counterparts in Athens and Belgrade, and they were more apt to search for alternative solutions. Early in 1928 Charles ES. Dodd, the charge d'affaires at Sofia, assured the Fore

ign Office that the IMRO "would at once desist from its sinister activities" "if the Jugoslav Government would grant educational and religious autonomy to Maced onia." To DJ. Footman, whose reaction from Skopje had been sought by the Foreign Office, this read "like pious hope" rather than "a practical proposition." He d id not reject the idea in principle; indeed, he even used the terms "nationality " and "national minority" when referring to the Macedonians, and argued that if such autonomy had been introduced immediately after the war "the results would n o doubt have been beneficial." Now, however, "it would not suffice to wipe out t he bitterness felt against the Serbs"; it would no longer satisfy the entire Mac edonian movement. Instead, he warned, Macedonian activists would interpret it "a s a confession of failure and a sign of weakness on the part of Serbs, to be exp loited to the utmost possible extent." He considered (and the future proved him right) that "the best chance for real progress in Macedonia" was "the removal of the Serb predominance in the Jugoslav state."[59] The Foreign Office dismissed Dodd's suggestion and showed little appreciation of Footman's pessimistic, but r ather sensitive and measured analysis of the Macedonian problem in Yugoslavia. " It is quite clear, however," wrote Orme Sargent, a counselor and a future assist ant under secretary of state, "that it would be impossible to expect the Jugosla v Government to adopt measures which would recognize the population of Southern Serbia as a political minority." Inasmuch as he had convinced himself that the d iscontent in Macedonia was "due to economic and administrative conditions rather than psychological or racial issues," he endorsed instead a proposal made by H. W. Kennard, the minister at Belgrade, to grant financial loans to Yugoslavia to improve internal conditions "in Southern Serbia and thus help to lessen the pres ent sullen discontent of the population." Most important, such expenditure, Sarg ent concluded, would not have the appearance of being extorted from the Jugoslav Government at the point of the Macedonian bayonet, nor would it commit the Jugo slavs in any way to a recognition of the claim of a separate Macedonian national ity. Reforms on these lines could therefore be carried out at any time without l oss of face by the Jugoslav Government. [60] Obviously Sargent was concerned with the sensitivities and interests of the Yugo slav government and not with the demands of the Macedonians and consciously soug ht to minimize "the psychological and racial issues" as the basis of Macedonian discontent. This did not go unnoticed at the British Legation at Sofia: in a rat her blunt and less than diplomatic manner, R.A.C. Sperling, the new minister at Sofia, accused the "Powers," meaning, of course, primarily his own government an d that of France, of always unfairly taking the side of Yugoslavia against Bulga ria and the Macedonians. Or as he put it, "Jugoslavia continues flagrantly to vi olate the provisions of the Minorities Treaty of 1919. The Powers as well as the League of Nations accept any quibble advanced by the Jugoslav Government as a p retext for not raising the question of the Macedonian minority."[61] The exchang e of views provoked by Sperling's "outburst," as O. Sargent called it, is most r evealing about the Foreign Office's thinking on the Macedonian national question . Howard Kennard, Sperling's counterpart at Belgrade, was so taken aback by it t hat he did not wish to comment on it officially. In a letter to 0. Sargent, howe ver, he expressed his "private regrets that Sperling cannot understand that it i s not a question of taking sides one way or the other, but of assisting in prese rving the peace in the Balkans, which is, after all, our only political raison d 'etre here."[62] C.H. Bateman accused Sperling of holding general views "that ar e not only erroneous but certainly dangerous ...His Majesty's Government has lon g since decided that what are nebulously called Macedonian aspirations are impos sible of realization, and that to give way to Macedonian agitation would be the best way to create upheaval in the Balkans." [63] Sargent felt that Sperling's " outburst" ought not to go unnoticed; but instead of an official reprimand he pro posed to send him a private letter.[64] This was approved by R.G. Vansittart, pr ivate secretary to the Prime Minister and assistant under secretary of state in the Foreign Office, who added that "the next time this sort of thing happens, he [Sperling] should have it officially."[65] Sargent's lengthy private letter was polite, but direct. He pointed out that Serbia was the signatory "of one minori

ties treaty," that signed at St. Germain on 20 September 1919. "In your dispatch you make mention of a Macedonian minority. But what is this minority?" he asked . "You will find no mention of it in the Jugoslav Minorities Treaty... He also r eiterated the well known view of the Foreign Office that the grievances which "t he population of Southern Serbia complain of are common to all and are due to th e general low level of administrative ability among the local officials and not to the intentional ill treatment of any particular race, sect or language." Fina lly, he rejected Sperling's suggestion that some satisfaction of the "Macedonian national aspirations" might lead to a solution of the Macedonian problem. "What are we to understand by such aspirations?" asked Sargent. "If Macedonian autono my is what is aimed at it can be said at once that it is impossible of realisati on." To aim at it would be to play into the hands of Italy and other revisionist elements, and Britain was determined "to stick strenuously to the peace terms." [66] Sperling was not deterred by the hostile reaction of his superiors. He resp onded to Sargent with a lengthy letter of his own in which he reduced the Macedo nian problem to its bare essentials by asking bluntly two questions: "a, Is ther e such a thing as a Macedonian minority?" and "b, If there is, is it ill treated by the Serbs?" He then went on to answer them. "Sounds superfluous," he wrote, "but you ask 'What is the Macedonian minority?' I can hardly believe you want me to quote all the authorities from the year one to show you that there is such a thing as a Macedonian." He referred him specifically to the earlier reports by Gallop, Harvey and Footman, and stressed that the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia called themselves neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, but Macedonians. With regard to the second question, Sperling argued that it made no difference to the Macedonia ns "whether these things were due, as you say, to the general low level of Serbi an administrative ability or to the intentional ill treatment of a particular ra ce. ... The fact remains that their charges stand..."[67] London was not prepared to listen and, indeed, wished to put an end to the expre ssion of views that seemed to run counter to the main tenets of Britain's polici es in southeastern Europe. C.H. Bateman suggested to Sargent that "a short reply would be sufficient to point to the confusion of thought which appears to exist at our legation at Sofia on this Macedonian question."[68] Otherwise, his comme nts, which were drafted by Sargent into a letter to Sperling, reveal a character istic British slighting of nationalism and national movements among the so-calle d "small" and "young" peoples in eastern Europe. He argued that just because the Slavs of Macedonia called themselves Macedonians, "there was no reason why We o r you should consent to give them a name which coincides with a piece of territo ry... which has not for a thousand years been an autonomous entity in any sense. .."[69] However, he could not come up with another, more acceptable name for the m, except perhaps "Macedo-Slavs," which was in effect the same thing.[70] Such intervention and argumeilts do not seem to have been sufficient to silence the legation at Sofia. At any rate, R.A.C. Sperling left Sofia shortly after,[71 ] and his successor-, Sidney P.P. Waterlow, held views on the Macedonian problem that were, if anything, even more revisionist. He expressed them most cogently in a long, thoughtful and courteous letter to R.G. Vansittart,[72] who had in th e meantime become permanent under secretary of state for foreign affairs. He did not believe, as the Foreign Office did, that the Macedonian problem would simpl y disappear when the militant revolutionaries had been destroyed in Bulgaria and when Yugoslavia had provided the Macedonians with good administration and a civ ilized minority regime. Unlike Nevile Henderson, Kennard's successor as minister at Belgrade, he could not see how any amount of good administration, even if it would improve the atmosphere and facilitate the suppression of the IMRO, could be an ultimate solution. He argued that only genuine home rule-freedom to manage local affairs, churches, schools, etc.-could do that, but even here he had doub ts. In any case, he seemed convinced that Belgrade was not capable of giving its Macedonian subjects anything like real local autonomy or, at least, not so long as the Macedonians considered themselves Macedonian.

It is this that dictates the present policy of intense Serbification. But it is this that makes it impossible to introduce a genuine minority regime until there is no minority to give the regime to, and it is just this that Bulgaria, with h er Macedonian exiles (the most stubborn and intelligent people in the Balkans) a nd her indigenous Macedonian population, can never wholeheartedly accept ...[73] Thus, even if the revolutionaries were destroyed and Serbian Macedonia was ruled with "kindly wisdom," the Macedonian question would most likely remain unresolv ed, an apple of discord, a stumbling block to stability in the Balkans, etc. In Waterlow's search for a solution "that might bring real peace at long last," he seriously considered the idea, which seemed entirely logical to him but at the s ame time not altogether practical from the perspective of British foreign policy , of an autonomous united Macedonia. "I do not share the view of the department that Macedonia never having been a geographical or racial entity, the idea [an a utonomous united Macedonia] is inherently absurd;" he wrote, "that is an exagger ation, inherited, I fancy, from the predominance of Serb views at the Peace Conf erence." He believed that, united and independent, the Macedonians "might play t he part which God seems to have assigned to them in the Balkans, but which man h as thwarted-that, namely, of acting as a link between their Serb and Bulgar brot hers, instead of being a permanent cause of division." [74] He did not really ex pect a positive reaction to this idea from the Foreign Office; yet, as he conclu ded, "one's mind keeps flying back in this direction, as one goes over the probl em day after day, only to find Alps upon Alps of hopelessness arise."[75] But wh en John Balfour at the Foreign Office read Waterlow's report, he did not conside r this a logical idea and maintained that Britain "must continue to concentrate [on the peace treaties] in the forlorn hope that they will pierce a Simplon Tunn el through the Alps of despair."[76] On the basis of this lengthy debate, which involved those in the Foreign Office and service most concerned with the Macedonian question, the Central Department drafted a new, updated memorandum on the Macedonian question in 1929.[77] Parts of the first version were revised shortly thereafter as a result of last minute critical comments and objections voiced by Waterlow. The final draft of this lengthy and valuable document, dated 2 July 1930, presen ted the official British interpretation of the history of the Macedonian questio n since the 1860s, as well as an analysis of the contemporary political problem. [78] It acknowledged once again that the Slav inhabitants of Macedonia, the Macedo-Sl avs or Macedonians, were neither Serbs nor Bulgarians, and thus implicitly recog nized their separate and distinct identity. It also admitted the existence in Yugoslav Macedonia of "a uniquely dangerous mi nority problem, which is aggravated by the fact that the Macedonians are the mos t stubborn and hard-headed people in the Balkans." [79] It was therefore deeply concerned that the League of Nations could be dragged in to the Macedonian problem, first of all, because it was a threat to internationa l peace and, secondly and more importantly, because the Yugoslav minorities trea ty, concluded at St. Germain in 1919, applied "to all territories acquired by Se rbia as a result of the Balkan wars, and the enforcement of which is entrusted t o the League Council."[80] Great Britain, however, could not allow the considera tion of the Macedonian question in Yugoslavia by the League of Nations, the body that was specifically delegated to deal with and arbitrate national problems, c onflicts and grievances, for it would "inevitably involve the airing of the whol e Macedonian problem at Geneva and its discussion could hardly fail to precipita te a crisis which the League Council might find it very difficult to control."[8 1] London feared that League of Nations consideration of the Macedonian problem in Yugoslavia would amount to a de facto recognition of the Macedonian nationali

ty. This would in turn legitimize to a certain extent the Macedonian demands for a united and independent Macedonia, thus challenging the existing status quo in the Balkans. The Memorandum made this quite clear: "Indeed, once the existence of a Macedonian nationality is even allowed to be presumed there is a danger tha t the entire Peace Settlement will be jeopardized by the calling into question, not merely of the frontiers between Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, but also of those b etween Jugoslavia and Greece and between Jugoslavia and Albania" [82] It strongl y recommended that "this Balkan cancer" be treated "not by drastic surgical exci sion (e.g. plebiscite resulting in a change of frontiers....)" but rather "by th e use of the healing properties of time and by the use of radium treatment of pe rsuasive diplomacy, which while basing itself on the territorial status quo, sha ll endeavor gradually to eradicate the open sore that has for so long poisoned t he relations of the Balkan states."[83] The analysis and the recommendations of this memorandum remained the official British position on the Macedonian questio n virtually until the outbreak of World War II. The Foreign Office interpreted the subsequent "degeneration" of the IMRO of Ivan Mihailov and, after the military coup in Sofia in 1934, the decline and cessati on of its terrorist activities, as signs of the gradual eradication of "this Bal kan cancer." In actual fact, this view represented a serious misreading, indeed, a rather crude misunderstanding of the transformation of Macedonian nationalism at the time. The IMRO, which had been divided between a right and a left wing f rom its very inception, finally split in 1924-1925. The left formed its own sepa rate organization, the IMRO (United) and joined the Balkan Communist Federation and the Comintern. Unlike the right, it had a clearly defined social, economic a nd particularly national program; unlike the terrorist campaign of the right, it enhanced the cause of both nationalism and communism in Macedonia through under ground work. By the early 1930s it had attracted a large following and was chall enging Mihailov's IMRO for leadership. Waterlow informed the Foreign Office of t he split and the growing strength of the left in his report on the proceedings o f the Tenth Congress of the Macedonian Brotherhoods in Bulgaria, the legal organ ization of Mihailov's IMRO, held in Sofia on 24-27january 1932. The opposite view [the left], which has lately grown within the movement, which was suppressed at the congress, but which was clearly set out in the communist p ress, is that Mihailoff has forsaken the ideal of the Macedonian movement, that he does not fight for the liberation of Macedonia and that he has become the too l of the Fascist regime in Bulgaria, which uses the Macedonian organization for the sole purpose of maintaining its dictatorship ... The Macedonian movement sho uld again become national and independent, it should throw off the tutelage of t he Bulgarian Government, which supports it only for its own ends, and it should fight for a genuinely independent Macedonia as part of a Balkan Federation under Soviet protection.[84] The growth of the left undermined the support of the IMRO of Mihailov and forced the latter, for reasons of self-preservation, to free itself from the tutelage of the Bulgarian government and to identify itself with a Macedonian national pr ogram clearly calling for "the unification of Macedonian territories held by Yug oslavia, Greece and Bulgaria, into an independent political entity within its na tural geographical frontiers."[85] But it is safe to assume that this reorientat ion of the IMRO contributed to its suppression in 1934: by the second half of th e 1930s most Bulgarians had become convinced "that the Macedonians have been mor e trouble in Bulgaria than they were worth and merely gave the country a bad nam e abroad without helping the national [Bulgarian] cause...."[86] IMRO's suppression, in turn, helped to enhance the role of the Macedonian left, whose nationalist activities had previously been hampered by the IMRO and whose many activists had fallen victims of the mihailovist terror. As Bentinck, the ne w minister at Sofia, pointed out: Since the coup d'etat last year, however, the Macedonian communists became much more active, especially in Sofia and Bulgarian

Macedonia. I am told the intention was to detach the three portions of Macedoni a belonging to Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, and to unite them into a Soviet Repu blic - - - At the same time the communist parties in Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Gr eece were ordered by Moscow to support the Macedonian communists...[87] Thus, contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Foreign Office, neither the dissolution of the terrorist IMRO nor "the healing properties of time" resolved the Macedonian problem or caused it to disappear. Macedonian nationalism was for ced underground and into the embrace of international communism, where it contin ued to grow. As Simeon Radev, a prominent Bulgarophile Macedonian and a well kno wn retired Bulgarian diplomat, pointed out to Waterlow, "no solution of the [Mac edonian] problem could be expected by the mere aflux of time. There was no prosp ect whatever of the population acquiescing in the policy of Serbianisation pursu ed by Belgrade...." He also emphasized "that the Macedonian sense of nationality was not a sense of Bulgarian nationality. It took the shape, especially with th e younger generation, of an aspiration for autonomy." [88] On a private visit to Istanbul in September 1933, E. Venizelos, the great Greek statesman, expressed similar sentiments to Sir George Clerk, the British ambassador: Venizelos had al ways counselled that the Jugoslav Government should make a serious effort to con tent the Slav Macedonian minority... M. Venizelos maintained that these people, of which Greece has a small share...., are not pure Bulgarians, but something be tween Bulgarian and Serbian, and he had, he said, always been ready to give them Slav Macedonian schools and other reasonable privileges.[89] Furthermore, as Radev had also argued, a driving force behind the Macedonian mov ement at this time was the fundamental belief that anything, however improbable, might occur in a world of flux. And central to this belief was "a desire for a union of all Macedonians in an autonomous state..." [90] As the outbreak of the Second World War approached the growing challenges to the status quo in Europe i ntensified this belief and desire in the second half of the 1930s.[91] In additi on to the USSR or, rather, the communist movement, which already enjoyed widespr ead support among the Macedonians, by the end of the decade both Germany and Ita ly actively advocated schemes for "the liberation of Macedonia" with which "they are trying to attract Macedonians ..."[92] While the Foreign Office either minimized or was ignorant of the strength of Mac edonian nationalism on the left, it was not ready to overlook the spread of Germ an and Italian influence in the area. And it was this more than anything else, t hat brought about a renewed British interest in the Macedonians and the beginnin g of a British reappraisal of the Macedonian national problem. After the fall of France in summer 1940, G.W. Rendel, the minister at Sofia, warned of the increa sed Soviet, German and Italian activities in Macedonia and concluded that "Presu mably' however the Macedonians would accept any 'autonomous' Macedonian state wh ich a great power succeeds in establishing."[93] He analyzed the aims of the Mac edonians in greater detail in a private letter to P.B.B. Nichols of the Foreign Office written ten days later: My impression is that there is now a fairly large section of the Macedonians who look to Russia for their salvation. ... I think the pro -Russian groups probabl y hope for the eventual creation of an autonomous Macedonian Soviet Republic as one of a chain of South Slav Soviet states running from the Black Sea to the Adr iatic and to the German and Italian frontiers. On the other hand, there are cert ainly a number of Macedonians who are short sighted enough to be ready to intrig ue with Germany and Italy...The Macedonians are notoriously difficult, and have many of the characteristics of the Irish, and my impression is that they are hap piest in opposition to any existing regime...[94] Early in 1941 the vice consul at Skopje provided the Foreign Office with an even more extensive and perceptive analysis of the current state of the Macedonian p roblem. He claimed that the vast majority of the Macedonians belonged to the nat

ional movement; indeed, he estimated "that 90 percent of all Slav Macedonians we re autonomists in one sense or another...." Because the movement was wrapped in secrecy, however, it was extremely difficult to gauge the relative strength of i ts various currents, except that it could be assumed that IMRO had lost ground s ince it was banned in Bulgaria and its leaders exiled. While the vice consul ack nowledged the close relationship between communism and "autonomism" or nationali sm in Macedonia, he downplayed the frequently expressed contention that the comm unists used the Macedonian movement for their own ends. Instead, he argued that since virtually every Macedonian was an autonomist, it w as almost certain "that the Communists and autonomists are the same people..."; and, in any case, that Macedonian communists were not doctrinaire and were "rega rded by other Balkan communists as weaker brethren...." "My own opinion," wrote Thomas, "is that they are autonomists in the first place and Communists only in the second."[95] He concluded his lengthy report by stressing what by then shoul d have been obvious: the Macedonian problem was "a real one" and "an acute one" and that it "has in no way been artificially created by interested propaganda." He considered change unavoidable and felt that it was "in the interest of Jugosl avia to satisfy the aspirations of Macedonia." He was equally convinced, however, that it was highly improbable, "in view of th e instinctive dislike of the Serbs engendered by twenty years of Serbian rule, t hat anything short of autonomy would be acceptable. [96] Rendel's and Thomas's appraisals of the Macedonian situation were not radically different from many produced by their predecessors stationed in the Balkans. How ever, with the world once more at war, the Foreign Office now accorded them more serious consideration and appeared, although grudgingly, to accept them. It see med to accept the fact that Britain's hitherto refusal to officially recognize t he existence of a Macedonian nationality, a policy that it had shaped and defend ed for over twenty years, might no longer prove tenable and most likely would no t survive the war. In a highly revealing, indeed almost prophetic, comment on Th omas's report, Reginald J. Bowker of the Foreign Office conceded this when he wr ote: "To the layman the only possible solution of the Macedonian problem would s eem to be in giving the Macedonians some sort of autonomy within Jugoslavia. Pos sibly after the war the Jugoslavs may be willing to consider this. But such a me asure would, no doubt, incur the risk of whetting the appetite of the Macedonian s for complete independence."[97] The lack of official recognition or legitimacy internationally and in the three Balkan states obviously had hindered the normal and natural development of Maced onian identity. However, it could not destroy it. Macedonianism in its various m anifestations-particularism, patriotism, nationalism-was too deeply entrenched a mong the Macedonian people and among the small, but vibrant and dynamic intellig entsia, especially on the political left. During World War II, which began for t he Balkans in late 1940 and early 1941, Macedonians in all three parts of their divided land joined resistance movements in large numbers and fought for nationa l unification and liberation.[98] They did not achieve national unification; how ever, the Macedonians in Vardar or Yugoslav Macedonia won not only national reco gnition but also legal equality with the other nations of the new, communistled, federal Yugoslavia. 1. ^ For a discussion of the significance of international recognition or leg itimacy in the development of Balkan nationalisms, see especially John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), 10311, 115-16 and 373; and Alan Warwick Palmer, The Lands Between: A History of Eas t-Central Europe since the Congress of Vienna (London: Macmillan, 1970), 28-29. 2. ^ See especially Blaze Ristovski, Makedonskiot narod i makedonskata nacija (Skopje: Misla, 1983), 1: 75-86, 163-87, 263-80. Ristovski is the leading autho rity on Macedonian national thought and development. His two volumes contain pre

viously published studies on the subject. See also the following works published recently in the west: Fikret Adanir, Die Makedonische Frage. Ihre Entstchung un d Entwicklung bis 1908 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1979); Marco Dogo, Lingua e Nazional ita' in Macedonia: Vicende e pensieri di profeti disarmati, 1902-1903 (Milan: Ja ca Book, 1985); Jutta de Jong, Die nationale Kern des makedonisehen Problems: An satze und Grundlagen einer makedonischen Nationalbeweguag (1890-1903) (Frankfurt : Lang, 1982); Andrew Rossos, "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the L eft" to be published in Ivo Banac and Katherine Verderv. eds.. Nationa1 Characte r and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe. 3. ^ The literature on the struggles in Macedonia is vast but rather uneven a nd polemical in nature. A good documentary survey in English of the activities o f the neighboring Balkan states in Macedonia is to be found in George P. Gooch a nd Harold Temperley. eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-191 4 (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1926-1938), 5: 100-23. Among the more useful works in western languages are Duncan M. Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Mac edonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893-1903 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988) ; Henry N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (1906, reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1980); Elizabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (1950, reprint, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980); Jacques Ancel, La Ma cedoine (Paris, 1930); Gustav Weigand, Ethnographie von Makedonien (Leipzig, 192 4). For a representative sampling of the divergent points of view, see Jovan M. Jovanovic. Juzna Srbija od kraja XVIII veka do oslobodjenja (Belgrade. 1941) (Se rbian); G. Bazhdarov, Makedonskjat vapros vchera i dnes, (Sofia, 1925) (Bulgaria n); Georgios Modes, 0 makedonikos agon kai i neoteri makedoniki istoria (Salonic a: Etaireia Makedonikon Spoudon. 1967) (Greek). Macedonan historians have turned their attention to this problem more recently. See Kliment Dzambazovski, Kultur no-opstestvenite vrski na Makedoncite so Srbija vo tekot na XIX vek (Skopje: Ins titut za nacionalna istorija (Ini), 1960); Risto Poplazarov, Grckata politka spr ema Makedonija vo vtorata polovina na XIX i pocetokot na XX vek (Skopje: Ini, 19 73); Slavko Dimevski, Makedonskoto nacionalno osloboditelno dvizenie i egzarhija ta (1893-1912) (Skopje: Kultura, 1963); Krste Bitoski, Makedonija i Knezevstvo B ugarija (1893-1903) (Skopje: Ini, 1977). On the partition of Macedonia, see Andr ew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan Rivalries and Russian Foreign Po licy. 1908-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Petar Stojanov, Ma kedonija vo vremeto na balkanskite i prvata svetska vojna (1912-1918) (Skopje: I ni, 1969). 4. ^ Blaze Ristovski, Portreti i procesi od makedonskata literaturna i nacion alna istorija (Skopje: Kultura, 1990), 3: 34. 5. ^ Ristovski, op cit. and 2: 24-72; and my forthcoming study "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left." 6. ^ The Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian claims were extensively publicized. For a representative sampling of the divergent points of view, see Tihomir R. Georg evich, Macedonia (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1918) (Serbian); Iordan Ivanov, La q uestion macedoine (Paris, 1920) (Bulgarian); Cleanthes Nicolaides, La Macedoine (Berlin, 1899) (Greek). See also the works cited in note 3. 7. ^ See (London) Public Record Office, FO371/10667, Central Department, Memo randum, "The Macedonian Question and Komitaji Activity," 26 November 1925, 3-4. (All Foreign Office documents cited hereafter are found in the Public Record Off ice). See also Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, Velika Britania i makedonskoto prasnje na pariskata mirovna konferencija vo 19l9godina (Skopje: Arhiv na Makedonija, 19 73); Ivan Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje. Makedonskoto nacionalno prasanje megju d vete svetski vojni (1919-1930) (Skopje: Kultura, 1977), 1: chap. 1. Katardziev p rovides the most comprehensive, valuable and interesting treatment of the Macedo nian national question in the 1920s. 8. ^ FO371/14316, A. Henderson (Belgrade) to N. Henderson, 9 May 1930, Enclos ure 2, "Memorandum by Vice-Consul Blakeney." 9. ^ FO371/29785, Campbell (Belgrade) to Halifax, 6 January 1941. On developm ents in Vardar Macedonia during the interwar years, see also Katardziev, op.cit. , 1: 23-85; Institut za nacionalna istorija, Istorija na makedonskiot narod (Sko pje, 1969), 3: part 11; Aleksandar Apostolov, Kolonizacijata na Makedonija vo st

ara Jugoslavija (Skopje: Kultura, 1966), and "Specificnata polozba na makedonski ot narod vo kralstvoto Jugoslavija," Glasnik (Skopje) 16, no.1(1972): 39-62. 10. ^ FO 371/8566, Bentinck (Athens) to Curzon, 20 August 1923, Enclosure, Col onel A.C. Corfe, "Notes on a Tour Made by the Commission on Greco-Bulgarian Emig ration in Western and Central Macedonia," 5. By "Bulgars," Lambros meant Macedon ians. 11. ^ On the situation of the Macedonians in Aegean Macedonia, see Andrew Ross os, The Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia: A British Officer's Report, 1944," The Slavonic and East European Review (London) 69, no.2 (April 1991): 282-88. See al so Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: 85-106; Istorija na makedonskiot narod, 3: p art 13; Stojan Kiselinovski, Grckata kolonizacija vo Egeiska Makedonija (1913-19 40) (Skopje: Ini, 1981); Lazo Mojsov, Okolu prasanjeto na makedonskoto nacionaln o malcinstovo vo Grcija (Skopje: Ini, 1954), 207-87; Giorgi Abadziev, et al., Eg ejska Makedonija vo nasata nacionalna istorija (Skopje, 1951). 12. ^ Rossos, "Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia," 293-94. Captain P.H. Evans' " Report on the Free Macedonia Movement in Area Florina 1944" is given verbatim, 2 91-309. 13. ^ FO371/12856, Kennard (Belgrade) to Sargent, 16 February 1928 14. ^ FO371/8568, 22. A few years later, O. Sargent, a counselor in the Foreig n Office, complained that "the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation... defies o penly the Bulgarian Government and practically administers and governs part of t he Bulgarian territory" (FO371/12856, Sargent [London] to Sperling, 1 October 19 28). 15. ^ On Pirin Macedonia as well as the Macedonians in Bulgaria, see Katardzie v, Vreme na zreenje, 1: 107-19; Istorija na makedonskiot narod, 3: part 12; Dimi tar Mitrev, Pirinska Makedonija (Skopje: Nasa Kniga 1970), 126-202. 16. ^ See Stefan Troebst, Mussolini, Makedonien und die Machte, 1922-1930: Die "Innere Makeodnische Revolutionare Organisation" in der Sudosteuropapolitik der faschistischen Italien (Cologne: Bohlau, 1987); and Barker, Macedonia, chap. 2; Leften S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balka n Unity in Modern Times (1944, reprint, Hamden: Archon Books, 1964), chaps. 8 an d 9. 17. ^ FO371/8568, p.22. 18. ^ FO371/7375, Erskine (Sofia) to Curzon, 25 January 1922. Harold Nicolson commented: "There is less disparity between the Irish and Macedonian temperament than might be supposed" (Minute, 1 February 1922). 19. ^ Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: part 2, chap. 1. 20. ^ Kiselinovski, Grckata kolonizacija, chap. 4. 21. ^ Katardziev, op.cit.; Dino Kiosev, Istoria na makedonskoto natsionalno re voliutsionerno dvizhenie (Sofia: Otechestven front 1954) 493-99 22. ^ Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1:171-83 and part 2, chap. 2; Kiosev, ibid ., 512- 28. On the activities of the IMRO in all three parts of Macedonia, see a lso the memoirs of its leader after 1924: Ivan Mikhailov, Spomeni, 4 vols. (Selc i, Louvain, Indianapolis, 1952, 1965, 1967, 1973). 23. ^ Katardziev, Vreme na zreenje, 1: 375-76; Istorija na makedonshiot narod, 3: 20-23, 176-78; Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Salo nica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964), 69; Dimitrios G. Kousoulas, Revolutio n and Defeat: The Story of the Communist Party of Greece (London: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1965), 65. 24. ^ FO371/7377, Erskine (Sofia) to Curzon, 20 March 1922. 25. ^ FO371/6197, Peel (Sofia) to Curzon, 10 February 1921. 26. ^ See FO371/8568. 27. ^ On communism and Macedonian nationalism, see Katardziev, Vreme na zreenj e, 1: part 3, chaps. 1-4, 2: part 5, and ed., Predavnicite na makedonskoto delo (Skopje: Kultura, 1983), 5-56; Stojan Kiselinovski, KPG i makedonskoto nacionaln o prasanje, 1918-1940 (Skopje: Misla, 1985), chaps. 2-4; Kiril Miljovski, Makedo nskoto prasanje vo nacionalnata programa na KPJ (1919-1937) (Skopje: Kultura, 19 62), 24-140; Dimitar Mitrev, BKP i Pirinska Makedonija (Skopje: Kultura, 1960), 42-59; Kofos, op.cit., chap. 4; Darinka Pacemska, Vnatresnata makedonska revoluc ionerna organizacija (Obedineta) (Skopje: "Studentski zbor," 1985). I have dealt

with the subject in "Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left" to b e published in Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, eds., Nationa1 Character and Nat ional Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe. 28. ^ FO371/10667, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question an d Komitaji Activity," 26 November 1925, 4. 29. ^ FO371/10793, Kennard (Belgrade) to A. Chamberlain, 6July 1925, Enclosure , Footman (Skopje) to Kennard, 30 June 1925, 5. John David Footman was a fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford (1953-1963) and author of several books on moder n Russian history. 30. ^ See especially ibid., 14 and FO371/8568, 3 and FO371/10667, 6. 31. ^ FO371/11405, Kennard (Belgrade) to A. Chamberlain, 21 April 1926; Enclos ure R.A. Gallon. "Conditions in Macedonia," 19 April 1926, 4. 32. ^ F0371111245, O. Ch. Harvey, "Notes on a Visit to Jugoslavia and Greece," April 1926, 6 May 1926, 3. 33. ^ FO371/11405, 5. 34. ^ FO371/10793, 6. 35. ^ FO371/8566, 3. 36. ^ FO371/10793, 6. 37. ^ FO371/14316, N. Henderson (Belgrade) to A. Henderson, 13 May 1930, En-cl osures. 38. ^ FO371/14317, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Origins of the Macedon ian Revolutionary Organisation and Its History Since the Great War," 1 July 1930 , 12. 39. ^ See FO371/11337, Kennard (Belgrade) to H. Smith, Enclosure, R.A. Gallop "Notes," 23 April 1926. 40. ^ FO371/11337, C.H. Bateman, "Memorandum on "Serbian Minorities in Greek M acedonia," 3 March 1926, 2. 41. ^ Ibid. 42. ^ See FO371/10793 and FO371/11337. 43. ^ FO371/11337. 44. ^ See FO371/8568. 45. ^ FO371/8566. 46. ^ FO371/10793. Footman dismissed the Serbian claims to a "Serbian minority " in Aegean Macedonia and pointed to two other factors as the real causes of the Greek- -Serbian dispute: "a) Politically, the Serb displeasure at Slav inhabita nts of Greek Macedonia being recognized as Bulgars; and b) Economically, the los s suffered by Serbian Macedonia and the Kingdom as a whole by being separated by a frontier from Salonica" (6). 47. ^ FO371/10667, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question an d Komitaji Activity," 26 November 1925. It gave the following figures: Macedonia n Slavs 1,150,000; Turks 400,000; Greeks 300,000; Vlachs 200,000; Albanians 120, 000;Jews 100,000; Gypsies 10,000 (2). 48. ^ Ibid., 4. 49. ^ Ibid. 50. ^ Ibid. 51. ^ Ibid., 1, 4; See also Rossos, "Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia," 284-85, 290, 293-94. 52. ^ Ibid., 7. 53. ^ FO371/11337,1 54. ^ Ibid., 4. 55. ^ FO371/11405, Kennard (Belgrade) to A. Chamberlain, 21 April 1926, Enclos ure, R.A. Gallop, "Conditions in Macedonia," 19 April 1926,1. 56. ^ "I should like to know the names of any authorities who are impartial," wrote Gallop. "Certainly none of the Serbian, Bulgarian, Russian, British or Ger man ever are!" (FO371/11337, Enclosure, 23 April 1926). 57. ^ FO371/11245, 2. 58. ^ Ibid., p.3. 59. ^ Footman argued that "such local autonomy would have greater chance of su ccess were it to be introduced by some future government in which Croats and Slo venes held the preponderating position. There is throughout Macedonia a sullen b

itterness against the Serbs..." (FO371/12856, Footman [Skopje] to Kennard, 4 Feb ruary 1928 in Kennard [Belgrade] to Chamberlain, 18 February 1928). 60. ^ Ibid., Kennard (Belgrade) to Sargent, 16 February 1928, Minute, 24 Febru ary 1928; see also Sargent (London) to Kennard, 20 February 1928. 61. ^ Ibid., Sperling (Sofia) to Cushendun, 13 September 1928. 62. ^ Ibid., Kennard (Belgrade) to Sargent, 20 September 1928. 63. ^ Ibid., C.H. Bateman, Minute, 20 September 1928. 64. ^ Ibid., 0. Sargent, Minute, 28 September 1928. 65. ^ Ibid., R.G. Vansittart, Minute, 29 September 1928. Robert Gilbert Vansit tart was knighted in 1929 and created a baron in 1941 66. ^ Ibid., Sargent (London) to Sperling, 10 October 1928 67. ^ Ibid., Sperling (Sofia) to Sargent, 10 October 1928. 68. ^ Ibid., C.H. Bateman, Minute, 18 October 1928. 69. ^ Ibid., Sargent (London) to Sperling, 22 October 1928 70. ^ "The fact was of course that the framers of the Minorities Treaty hesita ted to mention them under any specific name," wrote Bateman. "The most they coul d be called is Macedo-Slavs" (ibid., C.H. Bateman, Minute, 18 October 1928). 71. ^ Great Britain, Foreign Office, The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic an d Consular Year Book for 1935 (London, 1935), 416. 72. ^ FO371/14316, Waterlow (Sofia) to Vansittart, 21 May 1930. 73. ^ Ibid., 7. 74. ^ Ibid., 8-9. 75. ^ Ibid., 9. 76. ^ Ibid., J. Balfour, Minute, 2 June 1930. 77. ^ FO371/13573, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Macedonian Question an d Komitaji Activity," 6 December 1929, 9 pp. 78. ^ FO371/14317, Central Department, Memorandum, "The Origins of the Macedon ian Revolutionary Organization and Its History Since the Great War," 1 July 1930 ,16 pp. 79. ^ Ibid., 9. 80. ^ Ibid., 14. 81. ^ Ibid., 15. 82. ^ Ibid. 83. ^ Ibid., 16. 84. ^ FO371/57473, Waterlow (Sofia) to Simon, 5 February 1932. According to th e assistant to the Bishop of Nevrokop, one of the major centers of Pirin Macedon ia, "The Revolutionary Organization itself was split by a growing Communist curr ent, ... aiming at the liberation of Macedonia by the bolshevisation of the Balk ans, while the local population was in its turn divided, about half being for th e organization and half against, and the hostile half being largely Communist in feeling (FO371/15896, Waterlow [Sofia] to Simon, 22 June 1932; see also FO371/1 9486, Bentinck [Sofia] to Hoare, 16 September 1935 and 26 September 1935). On th e left of the Macedonian movement see also the works cited in note 27. 85. ^ FO371/16650, Waterlow (Sofia) to Simon, 27 February 1933. 86. ^ FO371/24880, Rendel (Sofia) to Nichols, 25 August 1940. 87. ^ FO371/19486. Bentinck (Sofia) to Hoare, 26 September 1935. 88. ^ FO371/16651, Waterlow (Sofia) to Simon, 21 July 1933. 89. ^ FO371/16775, Clerk (Constaninople) to Simon, ^ October 1933. 90. ^ 90. FO371/16651 91. ^ On the aims of Macedonian nationalism on the left in the 1930s, see Bibl ioteka "Makedonsko zname," no.1, Ideite i zadachite na Makedonskoto progresivno dvizenje v Bulgaria (Sofia, 1933); Ristovski, Makedonskiot narod i Makedonskata Nacija, 2: 481-560; and my forthcoming study "Macedonianism and Macedonian Natio nalism on the Left." 92. ^ FO371/24880, Rendel (Sofia)to F.O., 15 August 1940. 93. ^ 93. Ibid. 94. ^ FO371/24880, Rendel (Sofia) to Nichols, 25 August 1940. George L. Clutto n of the Foreign Office described the Macedonians as "discontented peasants who are anti-Jugoslav, anti-Greek, anti-Bulgarian, anti-German, and anti everything except possibly anti-Russian" (FO371/24880, Campbell [Belgrade] to F.O., 4 Septe

mber 1940, G.L. Clutton, Minute, 10 September 1940). 95. ^ FO371/29785, Campbell (Belgrade) to Halifax, 6 January 1941, Enclosure, "Report on the General Situation in Southern Serbia by Mr. Thomas, British ViceConsul at Skoplje." 96. ^ Ibid.. 97. ^ Ibid., Reginald J. Bowker, Minute, l6 January 1941. 98. ^ On the aims of Macedonian nationalism during the Second World War, see t he informative and illuminating discussions by Kiril Miljovski, "Motivite na rev olucijata 1941-1944 godina vo Makedonija," Istorija (Skopje) 10, no.1 (1974): 19 ff; and by Cvetko Uzunovski, "Vostanieto vo 1941 vo Makedonija," Istorija, 10, n o.2 (1974): 103 if. http://mk.wikibooks.org/wiki/The_British_Foreign_Office_and_Macedonian_National_ Identity_-_1918-1941

The document given verbatim below entitled Report on the Free Macedonian Movement in Area Florina 1944?, was written by Captain P. H. Evans on 1 December 1944. I t was forwarded to London by the British Embassy in Athens on 12 December, reach ing the Foreign Office on 30 December.