2023, New Look

U.S.
Army in the Cold War
From New Look to

Flexible Response
The U.S. Army in National Security, 1953–1963
by
Donald A. Carter
Center of Military History

United States Army
Washington, D.C., 2023
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Carter, Donald A., 1955- author. | Center of Military History, issuing body.
Title: From new look to flexible response : the U.S. Army in national security, 1953-
1963 / by Donald A. Carter.
Other titles: U.S. Army in national security, 1953-1963 | U.S. Army in the Cold
War series.
Description: Washington, D.C. : Center of Military History, United States Army, 2023.
| Series: U.S. Army in the Cold War | In scope of the U.S. Government Publishing
Office Cataloging and Indexing Program (C&I); Federal Depository Library
Program (FDLP) distribution status to be determined upon publication. | Includes
bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2023018433 (print) | LCCN 2023018434 (ebook) | ISBN
9781959302032 (cloth) | ISBN 9781959302049 (paperback) | ISBN 9781959302049
(Adobe pdf)
Subjects: LCSH: United States. Army--20th century--History. | United States. Army--
Weapons systems--Research--History. | Organizational change--United States--
History. | National security--United States--History. | Counterinsurgency--United
States--History. | Cold War. | United States--History, Military--20th century.
Classification: LCC UA25 .C29 2023 (print) | LCC UA25 (ebook) | DDC
355.00973/0904--dc23/eng/20230503 | SUDOC D 114.7/8:SE 2
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023018433
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023018434
First Printing
CMH Pub 45–6–1
ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES
Jon T. Hoffman, General Editor
U.S. Army in the Cold War

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991
Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction in the
Mediterranean and Middle East, 1947–1991
Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962
The City Becomes a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin,
1945–1949
Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949
U.S. Army Center of Military History

Charles R. Bowery Jr., Executive Director
Chief Historian Jon T. Hoffman

Chief, General Histories Division Dr. W. Shane Story
Chief, Multimedia and Publications Division Cheryl L. Bratten
iii
CONTENTS
Foreword........................................................................... xiii
Preface................................................................................ xv
Introduction.................................................................... 1
1 Out of Korea and Into the New Look..................... 5

The Army in 1953........................................................................... 5
Eisenhower Takes Over.................................................................. 13
The Army Takes Stock.................................................................... 24
Korea: Sorting Through the Rubble.............................................. 30
Morale and Recruitment................................................................ 35
Personnel Strength and Reserve Issues........................................ 39
Year in Review................................................................................. 43
2 Coming to Grips with the New Look....................... 45

Funding the New Look Army....................................................... 46
Fighting the Battle for Public Relations....................................... 51
Building an Atomic Army.............................................................. 58
Exploring Other New Forms of Warfare...................................... 70
Reorganization................................................................................ 79
Personnel Issues.............................................................................. 83
Peering Into the Future.................................................................. 88
The Year Ends.................................................................................. 92
3 Year of “Stabilization”................................................. 93
Changing of the Guard.................................................................. 93
Army Organization Continues to Evolve.................................... 101
Building an Atomic Army............................................................. 106
Army Versus Air Force.................................................................. 116
Adapting to the New Look............................................................ 122
The Reserve Forces Act of 1955.................................................... 128
The Army and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.......... 133
Coming to Terms with the Legacy of Korea............................... 139
Moving Toward Stability?.............................................................. 142
v
4 The U.S. Army: Proud of Its Past, In Search of
a Future?......................................................................... 143
Ike’s Challenge................................................................................ 144
Army Versus Air Force................................................................. 147
Research and Development: Thinking Inside and Outside
the Box......................................................................................... 155
Building an Atomic Army............................................................ 163
Making the Army Relevant Again............................................... 175
The Army Gets a “Swagger Stick”................................................ 180
Owning Vietnam........................................................................... 184
The Army in 1956: True to its Motto.......................................... 187
5 1957: The Year of the Missile...................................... 189

The New Look Enters a Second Term......................................... 190
Implementing the Pentomic Army............................................. 196
The Army Embraces the Missile Age.......................................... 204
Selling Limited War....................................................................... 210
Forward Deployments.................................................................. 216
Recruiting and Training Atomic Soldiers................................... 222
Coping With the Missile............................................................... 228
6 Evolution.......................................................................... 231
Reorganizing the Defense Department....................................... 231
An Army in Transition................................................................... 236
Revising the Pentomic Structure.................................................. 244
Second Thoughts on Atomic War................................................. 248
The Evolution of the Strategic Army Corps................................ 253
Missiles and More Missiles............................................................ 258
The Special Warfare Debate........................................................... 265
Military Assistance Advisory Groups and Southeast Asia........ 267
Continuing the Search for an Identity......................................... 271
7 Moving Forward............................................................. 273

Reshuffling the Deck...................................................................... 274
Manpower for the Army of the Future........................................ 283
Redefining Ground Combat and Limited Warfare.................... 289
Army Versus Air Force.................................................................. 296
Managing the Bureaucracy............................................................ 301
A Ticking Bomb.............................................................................. 304
Saying Farewell to the New Look................................................. 308
vi
8 Turning the Page............................................................ 309
Twilight of the New Look.............................................................. 309
Building an Army for the 1960s................................................... 317
Keeping Busy................................................................................... 322
Project MAN................................................................................... 330
Retention Issues: Keeping the Right People In........................... 334
The Lure and the Danger............................................................... 337
Sizing Up the New President........................................................ 342
Looking Forward............................................................................ 347
9 Playing a Part in McNamara’s Band....................... 349

Introducing a New Team............................................................... 350
A Troubling War............................................................................. 358
The Army Moves from Pentomic to ROAD............................... 364
Expansion and Response to the Berlin Crisis............................. 368
Maintaining Readiness.................................................................. 374
Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the Army’s Embrace
of Sub-limited Warfare............................................................... 382
From Famine to Feast.................................................................... 387
10 Embracing a New Future........................................... 389

Presenting a New Army................................................................. 390
Reorganization................................................................................ 400
Keeping an Eye on Europe............................................................ 405
Resetting the Force......................................................................... 410
Army Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis.............................. 417
Mainstreaming Counterinsurgency............................................. 423
Drawing the Line in Vietnam....................................................... 428
Conclusion...................................................................................... 431
11 Entering the Morass.................................................. 433

Moving the Army Forward........................................................... 434
A New Look for the Army............................................................. 445
Reflecting Social Change............................................................... 451
Deeper Into Vietnam..................................................................... 456
Passing the Torch............................................................................ 461
Conclusion..........................................................................................465
Further Readings.............................................................................471
vii
Abbreviations.....................................................................................481
Chart Abbreviations.......................................................................483
Map Symbols.......................................................................................485
Index......................................................................................................487
The Author..........................................................................................521
CHARTS
1. Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950............... 16

2. Atomic Field Army Infantry Division, 30 September 1954................... 67
3. Atomic Field Army Armored Division, 30 September 1954................. 68
4. Secretary of the Army’s (The Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954....................... 82
5. Airborne Division (ROTAD), 10 August 1956........................................ 166
6. Infantry Division (ROCID), 21 December 1956..................................... 169
7. Armored Division (ROCAD), 1956 ......................................................... 171
8. Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960......................................................... 291
9. Heavy Division (MOMAR), 1960............................................................. 292
10. ROAD Division Base, 1961...................................................................... 365
11. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Reorganization of
Department of the Army Headquarters, October 1961..................... 402
12. Hoelscher Committee Proposal for a Logistics Command,
October 1961............................................................................................ 403
13. Howze Board—Air Assault Division, 1963........................................... 442
MAPS
1. Line of Demarcation, 27 July 1953.......................................................... 6

2. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, United States, December 1953........ 10
3. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, Germany, December 1953............... 11
5. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, Germany, December 1957............... 198
6. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, South Korea, December 1957......... 200
7. Eastern Mediterranean Area, 1958......................................................... 257
8. Southeast Asia, 1959................................................................................. 305
viii
10. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, South Korea, December 1960....... 324
11. U.S. Army Corps and Divisions, Germany, December 1960............. 325
12. Vietnam, 1960.......................................................................................... 341
13. Cuban Invasion Plan, 1962.................................................................... 419
ILLUSTRATIONS
1. General Clark signs the Korean armistice agreement..........................2

2. A former prisoner of war arrives at “Freedom Village”........................8
3. Sergeant Archibald elevates a Nike Ajax missile to
firing position.........................................................................................12
4. President Eisenhower visits troops in Korea.........................................13
5. Secretary Wilson at a press conference, 16 June 1953..........................15
6. Admiral Radford is sworn in as the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff................................................................................17
7. Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens...............................................19
8. Former and new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.........................21
9. General Matthew B. Ridgway..................................................................24
10. Members of the 39th Field Artillery Battalion calibrate and sight
in a 280-mm. cannon............................................................................25
11. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy..................................................................53
12. New summer uniforms...........................................................................55
13. Boy Scouts visit a retired cavalry horse at Fort Riley, Kansas...........57
14. Members of Company E, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, after a
training mission.....................................................................................61
15. A 5-ton truck pulls a 155-mm. gun out of a C–124 aircraft during
Exercise Flashburn.............................................................................63
16. General John E. Dahlquist.....................................................................64
17. Col. Aaron Bank, 31 March 1953..........................................................74
18. A 75-mm. Skysweeper radar-guided antiaircraft gun........................77
19. A Corporal missile is elevated in firing position,
15 September 1961................................................................................78
20. Secretary Stevens congratulates General Taylor.................................97
21. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker...........................................99
22. Sergeant Stover gives the signal to advance and attack......................107
23. General Dahlquist questions a soldier participating in
Exercise Follow Me............................................................................108
ix
24. A mannequin intentionally exposed to an atomic blast to
demonstrate damage............................................................................112
25. Phil Silvers and Paul Ford on the set of what would become
Sergeant Bilko........................................................................................124
26. Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris.....................................................................157
27. H–19 Chickasaw carrying an external load.........................................159
28. Troops deploy from an H–34 helicopter in a battle exercise.............161
29. The Army’s “flying platform”.................................................................162
30. Harold Graham demonstrates a new twin-jet rocket-propulsion
system.....................................................................................................163
31. The new U.S. Army flag, 1956................................................................178
32. Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams..................................................................185
33. General Nathan F. Twining....................................................................193
34. Hercules missiles in Homestead, Florida.............................................206
35. A Nike Zeus launches successfully in New Mexico............................207
36. A Hawk missile and launcher in Key West, Florida...........................208
37. Generals Eddleman, Boland, and Breckinridge..................................212
38. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke......................................................................233
39. Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin.........................................................................237
40. General Gavin confers with General Hodes........................................239
41. Colonel Milligan is sworn in as the director of the Women’s
Army Corps...........................................................................................242
42. General Bruce C. Clarke.........................................................................246
43. A 68th Armored tank guards a bridge near
Wertheim, Germany............................................................................250
44. Explorer 1 nears launching time at the Florida
Missile Test Range................................................................................262
45. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles....................................................275
46. Thomas S. Gates Jr. is sworn in as secretary of defense......................276
47. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer takes the oath of office.........................277
48. The Bell XH–40 Iroquois helicopter, later known
as the “Huey”..........................................................................................299
49. An HU–1 helicopter firing an SS11 missile.........................................300
50. A Chinook helicopter stops at Davidson Army Airfield en route
to the Pentagon......................................................................................301
51. General Decker with Secretary Brucker...............................................312
52. Soldiers read magazines during a lull in
Exercise Little Bear...........................................................................328
53. The presidential party arrives at Fort Benning, Georgia....................332
x
54. Director Dulles, Colonel Lansdale, General Twining, and General
Cabell at the Pentagon..........................................................................337
55. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in the inaugural parade............350
56. President Kennedy at the Army’s combat-readiness
demonstration........................................................................................353
57. Secretary McNamara, General Freeman, and General Taylor..........354
58. Secretary Stahr climbs into an Army helicopter ................................355
59. General Adams inspects an aircraft before Exercise
Deep Furrow .......................................................................................376
60. Testing the M60A1 tank.........................................................................379
61. Maintenance personnel assemble a UH–1B helicopter.....................385
62. Generals Howze and Critz troop the line............................................396
63. An AC–1 Caribou plane taking off.......................................................398
64. Secretary of the Army Stahr and future Secretary of the Army
Vance.......................................................................................................399
65. General Earle G. Wheeler......................................................................400
66. Special forces soldiers learn to make booby traps..............................426
67. Special forces soldiers learn about insurgent assistance....................427
68. Soldiers arrive in Frankfurt, Germany, for
Operation Big Lift...............................................................................438
69. Tanks and ammunition pre-positioned for
Operation Big Lift...............................................................................439
70. Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard............................................................440
71. 101st Airborne Division paratroopers in
Exercise Swift Strike III....................................................................444
72. Helicopters take off from Butts Army Airfield....................................445
73. Specialist White takes position with a new M16 rifle.........................448
74. A soldier prepares to fire a light antitank weapon
during training.......................................................................................449
75. A soldier demonstrates the new 40-mm. grenade launcher..............450
76. President Diệm arrives for the National Day parade.........................457
77. General York, Colonel Vann, and Captain Johnston during an
inspection tour.......................................................................................459
78. Private Rehkamp of the 57th Helicopter Company............................461
79. A special forces beret at the grave of President Kennedy..................462
Cover images, top to bottom, left to right: Chinook helicopter at Davidson

Field; Nike Ajax missile in firing position; Corporal missile in firing position;
Skysweeper antiaircraft weapon system (Stadtarchiv Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein,
Germany); Hawk missile and launcher. (Unless otherwise noted, all images
are from the U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch.)
xi
FOREWORD
The decade after the Korean War was a relatively peaceful one for the
United States despite the ongoing Cold War with the Soviet Union and its
Communist allies. It was nevertheless a turbulent time for the U.S. Army
as it dealt with innumerable challenges. It faced a burgeoning struggle
for primacy with the Air Force and Navy, which seemed to fit better
into President Eisenhower’s New Look strategy and its focus on nuclear
weapons. The personnel-intensive nature of ground warfare also put the
Army in the crosshairs of the administration’s efforts to rein in defense
spending during a time of rapid and expensive technological change that
took primacy in the budget. Army leaders sought to leverage their own
research and development efforts to make their service a bigger player in
the nuclear arena and to demonstrate their own forward-looking approach
to future conflict. Many of those programs did not pan out because of the
limits of scientific innovation or the weakness of the concepts themselves.
As the largest and seemingly least glamorous of the military services, the
Army had difficulty attracting enough quality personnel and continued to
rely heavily on the draft. Although the service largely had completed racial
integration, the Army’s high proportion of major bases in southern states
and its involvement in civilian desegregation struggles there kept it in the
forefront of the ongoing national problem of racial discord.
Notwithstanding those troubles, the U.S. Army not only formed a credible
deterrent force against a potential major conventional conflict in Europe with
the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, but it also made significant and enduring
changes that prepared it better for the war it would fight in Vietnam. The
service quickly and wisely cast aside the failed pentomic structure and
replaced it with a much more flexible system that could adapt to a mix of
capabilities and a wider array of missions. It developed better, more capable
helicopters and, equally significant, acquired them in substantial numbers
and created an innovative, workable air mobile doctrine and a divisional
organization to execute such operations. While the Army, not surprisingly,
took the lead in advising and assisting the fledgling army of South Vietnam,
it also devoted considerable attention to the question of fighting a guerrilla
war. Via doctrine, plans, formal schools, and training evolutions, it thus had
more than a passing familiarity with that growing realm of conflict. Special
forces, originally designed to carry the war behind enemy lines in Europe
by working with partisans, looked increasingly at counterinsurgency as a
xiii
new and important mission and grew accordingly in size and significance.
The Army also developed and fielded a wide array of basic weapons and
equipment that would prove their worth in the jungles, mountains, and rice
paddies of Southeast Asia, from the Claymore mine and the M79 grenade
launcher to the M113 armored personnel carrier, the M60 tank, and a range
of more powerful, more mobile artillery pieces.
From New Look to Flexible Response explains how the Army and its
leaders maneuvered at the institutional level through this tumultuous
period. It fills an important gap in official history, which frequently focuses
on wars to the detriment of the often-critical periods of peace when military
organizations must predict the nature of the next conflict and do their best
to prepare for it. How well they accomplish those tasks does not necessarily
determine victory or defeat, but it certainly contributes in large measure
to the ultimate outcome. This important volume in the Center of Military
History’s U.S. Army in the Cold War series provides the context for all that
the service did around the world in those early years of superpower rivalry,
from the Fulda Gap in Germany to the Taiwan Strait in the far Pacific, the
burgeoning battlegrounds in Southeast Asia, and the strategic backwater of
Latin America. It provides soldiers and scholars with a ready resource for
understanding how well the Army navigated these troubled waters.
Washington, D.C. JON T. HOFFMAN

14 August 2023 Chief Historian
xiv
PREFACE
The end of World War II began a period of transition for the United States
Army that would prove to be both expansive and turbulent. It began slowly.
The force that entered Korea almost five years later still closely resembled
the victorious commands from Europe and the Pacific. Beginning in
1953, however, spurred on by the strategic policies of the Eisenhower
administration, the Army reexamined almost every aspect of its organization.
As the nation accelerated its involvement into another conflict—this time
in Southeast Asia—its Army bore scant resemblance to the one that had
departed Korea ten years earlier.
This book examines, year by year, this remarkable reconstruction. Within
a national security environment captivated by the power and potential
of atomic weapons, the Army experimented with developments in its
organization, weapons, equipment, and doctrine, as it struggled to define its
place on an atomic battlefield. At the same time, the service’s leaders slowly
embraced concepts of limited warfare and counterinsurgency that seemed to
offer new opportunities to expand the Army’s relevance. New technologies,
particularly the helicopter, also offered avenues for exploitation. As a result,
the Army that emerged in the early 1960s was designed less for atomic
combat and more for the flexible role that its chief of staff had championed.
This book chronicles the period of transition between the New Look and
Flexible Response. For a thesis, it poses the question, “How did the Army
that left Korea in 1953 become the force that began moving into Vietnam ten
years later?” It addresses the key leaders and the decisions that they made to
place the service on its new course. To some extent, it also illuminates how
the war in Vietnam became an almost inevitable conflict.
As always, many individuals and organizations have helped to bring this
book to publication. During the research phase, the archivists and librarians
at the National Archives and the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center
provided invaluable help in locating and making available the documents
required. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Holly
Reed at the National Archives Still Picture Branch. She was able to identify
and provide numerous images that bring the Cold War Army to life.
My colleagues at the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) also
made innumerable contributions. The chief historian, Jon Hoffman; the
former director of the Histories Directorate, Dave Hogan; and the chief of
the General Histories Division, Shane Story, composed the editorial review
xv
panel that oversaw this work from start to finish. Their advice and support
throughout the process has been essential to the book’s completion. My
friend Mark Bradley took the time to review each chapter and to identify
most of my more egregious grammatical errors. Special thanks go to
Kendall Cosley, who spent days at the National Archives at the height of
the COVID–19 pandemic gathering the photographs I needed for the book.
In the library, James Tobias and Dennis Wilson met all of my requests for
assistance quickly and with a smile.
The external review panel was chaired by Jon Hoffman and included the
former director of the Joint History Office in the Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John Shortal, John Bonin from
the Army Heritage and Education Center, Chris DeRosa from Monmouth
University, Adam Seipp from Texas A&M University, and Michael Doidge
from the United States Vietnam War Commemoration. These gentlemen
generously donated their time to review the manuscript and provided
thoughtful and articulate feedback. This is a far better book for their efforts.
The Multimedia and Publications Division at CMH did its usual fine
job in preparing the manuscript. Editor Margaret McGarry, assisted by
Debbie Stultz, transformed my often meandering prose into a story well
worth reading. Matt Boan created all of the maps, and Kristina Hernandez
completed the final layout for publication. Throughout my career at CMH, I
have been consistently amazed at the magic they perform on each manuscript
that comes through their office.
This book is the product of the efforts, guidance, and advice of all those
noted above. As always, I alone am responsible for whatever errors or
inadequacies remain.
7 August 2023 DONALD A. CARTER
Note: Chapter 2 of this book is based, in part, upon my article “Eisenhower

Versus the Generals,” which appeared in the October 2007 issue of the
Journal of Military History (vol. 71, no. 4).
xvi
INTRODUCTION
On 27 July 1953, representatives of the United Nations Command, the

Korean People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army met at
Panmunjom, a small village situated along the demarcation line separating
the military forces of the United Nations from those of North Korea and
Communist China, to sign the armistice that would effectively end hostilities
on the Korean Peninsula. For the U.S. Army, the agreement meant the end
of a conflict that had lasted for a little more than three years and had cost
nearly 35,000 battle dead. At the end of the Korean War, the U.S. Army was
not too different from the force that had concluded World War II just eight
years earlier. Its organization, equipment, and doctrine had undergone few
changes, and most of its senior personnel were the same individuals who
had fought in Europe and the Pacific during the previous war.
Following World War II, the Army entered a period of rapid demobiliza-
tion, just as it had after every other major American conflict. By June 1950,
as the Korean War began, the force of more than 8 million soldiers that had
existed at the end of World War II had shrunk to fewer than 600,000 officers
and enlisted personnel. Of the twenty-three corps and ninety divisions that
had deployed during World War II, only one corps and ten regular army
divisions remained on active duty: the 1st Infantry Division on occupation
duty in Germany; the 1st Cavalry, 7th Infantry, 24th Infantry, and 25th
Infantry Divisions in Japan; and the V Corps, 2d Infantry, 2d Armored, 3d
Infantry, 11th Airborne, and 82d Airborne Divisions in the United States.
All were understrength, and most had dispersed across a variety of installa-
tions. An additional six divisions in the United States existed as cadre only,
serving as training center headquarters.1
Nonetheless, the world was still a dangerous place. American political
and military leaders recognized the potential threat of Soviet expansionism
to Western Europe and had risen to the challenge. The National Security Act
of 1947 provided for a unified command structure and created the National
1. John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate
Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History,
1998), 232. The Allies split the occupation of Germany four ways, whereas the United States
provided the occupation forces for all of Japan, which is slightly larger than Germany.
2 FROM NEW LOOK TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
General Mark W. Clark signs the Korean armistice agreement, 27 July

1953. (U.S. Navy)
Military Establishment, which would eventually become the Department

of Defense. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949, committed the
United States to the defense of its European allies. The beginning of the
war in Korea temporarily suspended the precipitous demobilization that
had begun following World War II. Then, in September 1950, President
Harry S. Truman approved substantial increases in the strength of U.S.
forces in Europe. In November, the Army reactivated the Seventh Army in
Germany and placed all remaining elements of the 1st Infantry Division and
the U.S. Constabulary under its command. Beginning in 1951, the United
States deployed an additional two corps and four divisions to Germany to
serve as part of Seventh Army’s deterrent force.
Much of the rhetoric during the 1952 presidential campaign dealt with
finding a way to bring the war in Korea to a close. Republicans blamed the
Democrats for being unprepared for the conflict. In an October campaign
speech, Republican candidate General of the Army (Ret.) Dwight D.
Eisenhower famously announced that he would go to Korea to determine
the best way to end the war. Aside from the conduct of the ongoing war,
military policy did not play a major role in the campaign. Foreign policy
and economic issues figured more prominently. A substantive discussion
INTRODUCTION 3
of Eisenhower’s views on defense policy would have to wait until after his
election in November 1952.
When the Korean War ended, most of the senior officers within the Army
were loath to reduce, once again, the standing force to a hollow shell. In the
strategic environment of the Cold War, they believed that the nation could
not afford unilateral disarmament. For them, the only real question was how
large an Army would be necessary to achieve security and to accomplish
the numerous missions they envisioned. Maintaining a large standing force
was expensive, and troops required new weapons, equipment, and facilities
on which to train and retain any level of combat proficiency. Army leaders
understood that the post–World War II, post–Korean War Army would
have to evolve to handle the new issues that the Cold War would present.
The most obvious challenge all of the military services would face in the
coming decade would be the integration of new and emerging weapons and
technology into their doctrine and force structure. Although the atomic bomb
had helped to bring about the end of World War II, no one had employed
it in Korea. Nonetheless, most military leaders expected such weapons to
be a decisive component of modern warfare. German World War II rocket
programs had sparked research and development in that area, too. Already
by 1953, scientists in the United States and the Soviet Union were improving
on the German V–1 and V–2 weapons. In Korea, U.S. military units were
also beginning to exploit the capabilities of another new technology, the
helicopter. As the war came to a close, the Army would have to address the
need to develop and field these and other new weapons within the construct
of the service’s traditional roles and missions.
By 1953, the United States Air Force was barely five years old. Almost all
of its officers had begun their careers as part of the U.S. Army Air Corps,
and many of them still bore the animus of the long struggle to create an
independent air force. In the years since 1947, Air Force officers had
fought bitter battles against their Army and Navy counterparts to secure
funding for advanced aircraft and to promote their vision of victory and
security through airpower. Early agreements between Army Secretary
Frank C. Pace Jr. and Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, attempting
to coordinate the roles and missions of each service, were proving to be
unsatisfactory to all involved. Both services claimed primacy over many of
the emerging technologies and demanded the lion’s share of the research and
development funding.
The end of the Korean War also prompted both the Army’s civilian and
military leadership to reassess many aspects of the service’s personnel system.
Although many Army National Guard and Army Reserve units had served
admirably in Korea, most had consisted primarily of veterans from World

War II. The reserve system did not seem up to the task of preparing civilian-
soldiers to become the backbone of national defense. With the concept of
universal military training all but abandoned, the Army investigated new
ways of organizing and training a general reserve. The service also faced
challenges in filling the active force. Army recruiters struggled to compete
with their counterparts in the other, more glamorous, services. They would
have to find new ways to sell the Army, both as a service and as a mission,
to an evolving American public. All the while, alone among the services, the
Army would have to rely upon the draft to maintain its personnel strength.
By the end of 1953, the racial integration of the American military
was well underway. The Army had disbanded almost all of its all-Black
units. Nevertheless, service leaders at all levels struggled to provide equal
opportunities for minority soldiers. Significant problems would remain for
local commanders, particularly those serving at Army posts in the South,
where civilian populations remained more hostile toward integration. The
1950s also would produce an increase in the number of women serving in
the armed forces. The Women’s Army Corps would come to play a more
active role in the administration of the force, and female soldiers would
question limitations placed upon the roles and positions that they could fill.
Perhaps the greatest challenge the Army would face after Korea would
be determining the nature of future conflict and designing a force prepared
to deal with it. Atomic weapons had obviously changed many aspects of
modern warfare, and the Air Force had already seized upon its monopoly
on atomic weapon delivery systems to proclaim preeminence in American
defense posture. The Army would have to learn how to define itself as a force
on the atomic battlefield. But might other contingencies appear as well?
Not all potential battlefields seemed destined for a nuclear exchange. Even
conflict in Western Europe, some believed, might be limited to conventional
combat. Post–World War II insurgencies in Malaysia and Indochina alerted
others to the prospect of more unconventional conflicts.
The ten-year period following the end of the Korean War would thus
become a period of remarkable transformation for the United States Army.
The many challenges the service faced as it emerged from the conflict would
force its leaders to reexamine nearly all aspects of its organization, equipment,
and doctrine. As a result, the force that found itself entering a deepening
conflict in Vietnam in 1963 bore scant resemblance to the organization that
had ended hostilities in Korea ten years earlier.
1
Out of Korea and Into the
New Look
The U.S. Army began its ten-year transition in 1953 still deeply mired
in the conflict in Korea. As a new administration under President
Dwight D. Eisenhower moved into office, it began to exert its influence over
U.S. defense policy almost immediately. Eisenhower held deep convictions
about how he wanted to approach national security. Once elected, he moved
into position an almost completely new slate of advisers, military and
civilian, to bring about the changes he desired. As a result, as the Korean
War ended, the Army soon found itself responding to challenges from many
different directions as it began to withdraw and redeploy its forces.
THE ARMY IN 1953
By the time the new president took office in January 1953, the U.S. Army
was well into its third year of combat in Korea. U.S. Army Forces, Far East,
consisted of more than 200,000 soldiers serving in the Eighth Army in Korea
and another 100,000 support troops stationed throughout Korea and Japan.
By this time, the opposing forces had halted most offensive operations and
had settled into parallel lines of outposts and trenches that ran the width of
SEA
Kosŏng O F
JAPAN
I m j in R
Pyonggang Kumsong
Kansong
Yongmi
Mundung-ni
Kumhwa XX
XX XX
2 45 XX
3
Ch’orwon 40
XX HWACH’ON
7 RESERVOIR XXX
ROK I
XXX
XXX
XXX
XXX
Panmunjom 38°
ROK II
XXX
XXX
XX XXX
1 Mar (+) IX X
XXX Ch’unch’on
I
Uijongbu L I N E O F D E M A R C AT I O N
Ha
nR 27 July 1953
Demarcation Line
SEOUL
Ha
n 0 40 Miles
R
Inch’on
0 40 Kilometers
Map 1
the peninsula. The Eighth Army line ran from Munsan-ni and the western
coast to the northeast, passing across Bunker Hill, Little Gibraltar, and
Old Baldy, outposts whose names had become famous in the newspapers
and the newsreels. From the Ch'ŏrwŏn Valley and the Iron Triangle in the
center of the peninsula, the line ran further to the east before ending on the
coast near the village of Kosŏng and the aptly named Anchor Hill. Major
U.S. Army units in Korea included the I, IX, and X Corps; and the 2d, 3d,
7th, 25th, 40th, and 45th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Cavalry Division and
the 24th Infantry Division had rotated to Japan late in 1951 and remained
there under the XVI Corps on occupation duty and, later, as the theater
reserve (Map 1).1
The Army had fought the Korean War very much as it had World
War II. Little had changed during the short interval between the two
1. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the Korean War
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), 370–76; Brochure, G–3,
Dept. of the Army, 12 Oct 1953, sub: How the Army Uses its Manpower, File Unit: Entry A1
OUT OF KOREA AND INTO THE NEW LOOK 7
conflicts. Although the nature of the terrain, climate, and enemy dictated
some changes in tactics and unit composition, the organization, equipment,
and doctrine remained much as they had been in 1945. By the third year of
the war, the stalemate resembled—as much as anything else—the Western
Front in Europe during World War I.
Negotiations to bring the war to a close began in mid-1951 but foundered
for months as the combatants jockeyed for position. By the end of the year,
however, they had agreed upon the existing line of contact as a basis for
an armistice, and they moved on to discuss other issues. Ultimately, the
repatriation of prisoners of war became a point of contention that bedeviled
negotiators for months. The United States supported the principle of voluntary
repatriation whereby prisoners could decide for themselves whether or not
they wanted to be returned to their native countries. This had been the
U.S. practice in postwar Europe. The Communists, however, vigorously
demanded a policy of mandatory repatriation, a position that delegates had
incorporated into the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and then strengthened
in the 1949 conventions. After another extended period of squabbling, both
sides agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, culminating in
Operation Little Switch in April 1953. More negotiations ensued, and,
on 27 July, envoys from the United States (representing the United Nations
Command), North Korea, and China signed an armistice that brought to an
end the active hostilities on the Korean peninsula.2
At the same time as it had been fighting in Korea, the Army had been
engaged in a major reinforcement of its forces in Europe. After reactivating
the Seventh Army in Europe in December 1950, the Army had sent two
corps headquarters, one armored division, and three infantry divisions
to Germany to augment forces already reconsolidating from occupation
duties. By 1953, the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), numbered more than
250,000 soldiers. In addition to the combat forces of the Seventh Army,
USAREUR had begun construction of a massive infrastructure, known as a
support base, across France and western Germany. This command, dubbed
the USAREUR Communications Zone, provided the logistical support for
137C, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, 1953 (hereinafter SCC 1953), Subgroup:
Records of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations (hereinafter G–3 Ops),
Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).
2. It is not my purpose to retell the story of the Korean War or the negotiations leading
to the armistice. There are numerous, well-written, commercial histories on the war. The
previously cited volume, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, is as good as any in describing the
end of the war.
The G–3 Section, Eighth Army, welcomes a former prisoner of war

(POW) at “Freedom Village” in Munsan-ni, Korea. The initial POW
exchange program was known as Operation Little Switch. (U.S. Army,
National Archives Still Picture Branch)
almost all of the western forces in Europe as part of NATO (North Atlantic
Treaty Organization) Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe.3
Although the Army had deployed the vast majority of its overseas forces
to Europe and Korea, smaller units carried out missions in dozens of other
locations. Regimental combat teams and supporting elements served in U.S.
Army, Pacific; U.S. Army, Alaska; and U.S. Army, Caribbean. The service
staffed military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and military missions
in thirty-six countries, providing training to allied military forces and
assisting with the disbursement of U.S. military aid and equipment under
the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Mobile
training teams and technical advisers also provided assistance to allied
nations learning to use American weapons and equipment. Army service
3. Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in
the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015).
schools in the United States hosted more than 2,600 foreign students from
forty-six nations.4
In 1953, U.S. Army forces in the continental United States, collectively
referred to as the General Reserve and serving at the direction of the chief of
Army Field Forces, existed almost exclusively to train and prepare soldiers for
service in Europe and Korea. Six continental U.S. Army headquarters, from
the First through the Sixth Armies, supervised eleven division headquarters
that ran basic training centers, which, along with several technical service
centers, provided cadres of new recruits for the active divisions. At the end
of the year, these training divisions included the 3d, 5th, and 6th Armored
Divisions; the 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Infantry Divisions; and the 31st, 37th,
44th, and 47th Infantry Divisions (National Guard), which had been brought
into federal service for the Korean War. Each division received new recruits at
regular intervals and incorporated them into unit training. As soon as these
divisions began to reach minimum levels of training effectiveness, soldiers
moved on to Europe and Korea as part of replacement packages. In the
continental United States, only three divisions—the 11th and 82d Airborne
Divisions and the newly reactivated 1st Armored Division—retained any
responsibility for combat readiness. Of those, only the 82d received a passing
grade for operational readiness in spring evaluations. Evaluators deemed the
others ineffective owing to a lack of trained personnel.5 (See Maps 2 and 3.)
The first Soviet atomic test in 1949 and the recognition that its long-range
bombers could reach the United States prompted the Army to reactivate
many of its World War II–era antiaircraft and coast artillery units. In June
1950, the service established the last major component of the General
Reserve, the U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Command. Antiaircraft battalions
defended twenty-six urban areas and military installations with a mix of
40-mm., 90-mm., and 120-mm. guns. Throughout 1953, many battalions
transitioned to new 75-mm. Skysweeper radar-controlled guns. The Army
4. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S. Dept.
of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1953 (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 10 Dec 1953), 144–48; Brochure, G–3, Dept.
of the Army, 12 Oct 1953, sub: How the Army Uses its Manpower.
5. Memo, Lt. Col. Ziegler, Ops Div, G–3, for Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Asst Ch Staff,
G–3, 7 Mar 1953, sub: Operational Readiness of Major Units in the U.S.; Memo, Col.
J. L. Wilken Jr., Asst Executive Ofcr, G–3, for Lt. Col. D. R. Pierce, Ofc Sec Gen Staff,
20 Jul 1953, sub: Major Army Units Located Within the Continental United States; both
in File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP;
Jean R. Moenk, A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental United
States, 1919–1971 (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1972); John B. Wilson,
Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage
Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 242–47.
CANADA
44 TH INFANTRY DIVISION (NG)
FORT LEWIS
9 TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FROM NEW LOOK TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
FORT DIX
31 ST INFANTRY DIVISION (NG)
CAMP ATTERBURY
6 TH INFANTRY DIVISION 10 TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT ORD FORT RILEY 6 TH ARMORED DIVISION 3 D ARMORED DIVISION
FORT LEONARD WOOD FORT KNOX
XVIII CORPS
III CORPS 11 TH AIRBORNE DIVISION 82 D AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT MACARTHUR FORT CAMPBELL FORT BRAGG
5 TH ARMORED DIVISION 8 TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT CHAFFEE FORT JACKSON
CAMP RUCKER
1 ST ARMORED DIVISION FORT POLK
FORT HOOD
HAWAII
1:20,000,000
UNION OF
U.S. ARMY CORPS AND DIVISIONS
SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
U NITE D S TATE S
December 1953
C
MEXICO
A
Unit Location
N
A
0 100 200 300 400 500
D
ALASKA
A
Miles
1:45,300,000
10 Map 2

G E R MANY
DENMARK
December 1953
Unit Location
0 150 Miles
NORTH
0 150 Kilometers
SEA
POLAND
DS
AN
RL
BERLIN
HE
ET
N
BELGIUM
V CORPS
4 TH INFANTRY DIVISION PRAGUE
FRANKFURT
LUXEMBOURG 1 ST INFANTRY DIVISION

2 D ARMORED DIVISION WÜRZBURG
BAD KREUZNACH C Z E C H O S LO VA K I A
GÖPPINGEN
VII CORPS 43 D INFANTRY DIVISION

MÖHRINGEN AUGSBURG
FRANCE
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
Map 3
also had begun site surveys throughout the nation for the installation of
new Nike guided-missile battalions, which it expected to deploy in the
near future.6
The Army’s Reserve and National Guard organizations reflected a force
that had been at war for three years. The Army had activated eight national
guard divisions for service during the Korean conflict. Two, the 28th and
6. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun
1953, 140–41.
Sgt. Gene L. Archibald, Battery D, 1st Missile Battalion (Ajax), 202d

Artillery, elevates a Nike Ajax missile to firing position. (U.S. Army,
43d Infantry Divisions, had deployed to Europe for service in the newly
activated Seventh Army. The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions had deployed
to Korea and were actively engaged in combat. The remaining four—the
31st, 37th, 44th, and 47th Infantry Divisions—had stayed in the United
States, where they served as training divisions preparing replacements for
overseas service. Because of the tremendous demand for replacements as
the war dragged on, the Army Reserve struggled to maintain anything close
to full unit strength. By the end of the war, it seemed clear to many Army
leaders that the existing reserve structure was not capable of fulfilling the
service’s personnel needs in the event of a full mobilization.7
In summary, by mid-1953, a total of 1,533,815 Army troops were dispersed
widely around the globe with a multitude of missions and responsibilities.8
Three years of war had strained the service’s resources to the breaking point,
and the support base struggled to provide a steady stream of reinforcements.
Leftover stocks of World War II ammunition and equipment had long since
7. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 244–55.

8. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 99.
President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower walks across a snow-

covered footbridge in Korea, December 1952. (U.S. Army,
been exhausted. Although most of the Army’s soldiers possessed a wealth of

combat experience from World War II and the Korean War, many observers
questioned whether that experience would be relevant in the new atomic
age. The remainder of the year found the service taking stock of its condition
and preparing to move forward under the strategic policies and constraints
of a new presidential administration.
EISENHOWER TAKES OVER
As he had promised during the 1952 presidential campaign, Dwight D.

Eisenhower traveled to Korea shortly after the election to assess, for himself,
the military situation there. What he observed confirmed his belief, developed
in Europe during World War II, that conventional warfare was becoming
obsolete. In his mind, the prolonged stalemate in Korea demonstrated the
futility of trying to match foreign armies on a one-for-one basis. More than
anything else, the conflict convinced him that such “small wars” wasted
personnel and placed an unacceptable burden on the economic resources

of the nation.9
The new president came into office convinced that a strong economy was
the true source of national security. He believed that the Soviet Union and
its satellites could never defeat the United States as long as the latter retained
its superiority in productive capacity. Eisenhower disparaged the idea that
military planners could identify a fixed time of crisis, that is, that they could
accurately predict when the next war might start or when the United States
might need to employ its military strength. He encouraged planners to
design a security policy and a military force that the nation could support
over the long haul. The policy would need to include enough military
strength to provide adequate security, but not so much as to damage the
growth and stability of the economy. With these goals in mind, the president
viewed a balanced budget as a necessary component to a sound security
policy. To that end, he appointed George M. Humphrey as his secretary of
the treasury and Joseph M. Dodge as his budget director. At Eisenhower’s
direction, both men became regular participants in meetings of the National
Security Council and urged steady reductions in both the amount of money
allocated to the defense budget and the authorized personnel strength of the
armed forces.10
The president believed that he could reduce military spending, at least
in part, by eliminating the waste and duplication that seemed endemic
throughout the Pentagon. Considering the Department of Defense the
equivalent of a big corporation, he recruited the head of General Motors,
Charles E. Wilson, to be his secretary of defense. Eisenhower instructed
Wilson to tighten controls over the department’s procurement, storage,
transportation, distribution, and other administrative functions. The new
9. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 454; Don-
ald A. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” Journal of Military History 71, no. 4 (Oct
2007): 1169–99.
10. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Charles E. Wilson, 5 Jan 1955, in The Papers of Dwight
David Eisenhower, ed. Louis Galambos, 21 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1970–1996), vol. 16, 1488–91; Memo of Discussion at the 160th Meeting of the Na-
tional Security Council, 27 Aug 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954
(hereinafter cited as FRUS 1952–1954), vol. 2, pt. 1, National Security Affairs (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), 443–57; Memo of Discussion at the 166th
Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 Oct 1953, in FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 1,
534–49.
Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson at a press conference,

16 June 1953 (Department of Defense, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
secretary enthusiastically pursued the president’s goals of reducing waste

and duplication and reining in Defense Department spending.11
From the beginning of his presidency, Eisenhower and his administration
had expressed their ideas regarding national defense as part of their
commitment to a complete reexamination of American security policy. The
president and his supporters had frequently referred to this process as a
“new look.” Inevitably, media reports of their pronouncements began to use
the phrase as a collective description of Eisenhower’s approach to national
security. Ironically, the president himself claimed not to care much for the
phrase. In a news conference in March 1954, he told reporters that the New
Look (as it had become known) was simply an attempt to keep abreast of
the times. He said that the organization and type of military that he took
across the channel in 1944 would have little usefulness in an era in which
two atomic bombs could destroy the entire force. If reporters wanted to call
the policy a New Look, that was fine with him, but, he said, “I don’t like this
expression because it doesn’t mean much to me.”12 Nevertheless, it served
11. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 86; E. Bruce Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Contro-
versy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1979).
12. Robert J. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Chart 1—Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950
Administrative SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Assistant ASA UNDER SECRETARY ASA
(General (Materiel)
Management) OF THE ARMY
Department
CHIEF OF STAFF
Counselor
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Comptroller of DCS for

DCS for Plans
the Army Administration
Chief of Chief of
Legislative
Information Liaison
GENERAL STAFF
Assistant Chief of Assistant Chief of Assistant Chief of Assistant Chief of

Staff, G–1 Staff, G–2 Staff, G–3 Staff, G–4
(Personnel) (Intelligence) (Operations) (Logistics)
SPECIAL STAFF
Chief of Judge Chief, Executive for

Chief of Inspector
Military Advocate National Reserve & ROTC
Finance General
History General Guard Bureau Affairs
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS AND SERVICES

TECHNICAL STAFFS AND SERVICES
The Provost
Chief of
Adjutant Marshal Surgeon Chief of Chief of
Chaplains
General General General Ordnance Engineers
Quarter- Chief of
Chief
master Transporta-
Signal Officer
General tion
Continental Chief of Army

Army Army Field Overseas Chief,
Commands Forces Commands Chemical
Corps
Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.
Source: James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration,
1900–1963, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 207.
Admiral Arthur W. Radford (left) is sworn in as the chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley (right),
while Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson looks on. (Department
of Defense, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
as a convenient shorthand for Eisenhower’s sense that a new age of warfare

could not be fought with old ideas and practices (Chart 1).
On 11 February 1953, shortly after taking office, Secretary Wilson
appointed a committee to study Department of Defense reorganization. The
committee, headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, made several recommendations
that Congress approved on 30 June 1953 as Reorganization Plan No. 6. The
act abolished several research and logistics agencies and transferred their
functions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It increased the number
of assistant secretaries of defense from three to nine and granted to the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the authority to manage the Joint Staff
and approve the selection of its members. The effect of the legislation and
the studies leading up to it was an increase in the authority of the secretary
of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs over the individual services.
In a message to Congress on 30 April 1953, President Eisenhower confirmed
the authority of the secretary by firmly stating that “no function in any part
Policy, 1953–1954, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 369;
News Conf, 17 Mar 1954, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 330.
of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, should

be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the
Secretary of Defense.”13
In May, the president and Secretary Wilson selected Navy Admiral
Arthur W. Radford to replace Army General Omar N. Bradley as the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Radford had commanded a carrier
division during World War II and had served most recently as the
commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command. An advocate for naval
aviation, he had been a key figure in the “Revolt of the Admirals” that had
opposed defense unification in the late 1940s. Radford perceived Secretary
of Defense Louis A. Johnson’s abrupt cancellation of the construction of the
Navy’s supercarrier, USS United States, in 1949, to be a direct threat to the
future of naval aviation and he played an active role in the congressional
hearings that followed. Despite his partisan record, the naval officer had
impressed Eisenhower and Wilson during their tour of Korea in December
1952. As chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he became the principal military
adviser to both the president and the secretary of defense and attended all
meetings of the National Security Council. Whereas the service secretaries
had an open invitation to attend any meeting of the council, service chiefs
only sat in on matters directly related to their services and usually only by
specific invitation. Before Radford’s confirmation as chairman, the president
asked him to acknowledge publicly before Congress that his new position
divorced him from exclusive identification with the U.S. Navy and that he
now would become a champion for all services, governed by what was best
for the nation as a whole.14
As if to reinforce the concept of a New Look for the nation’s defense,
Eisenhower and Wilson replaced three of the four sitting Joint Chiefs of
Staff. General Matthew B. Ridgway took over as Army chief of staff from
General J. Lawton Collins as part of the normal rotation of that position.
After a distinguished combat record in World War II and Korea, Ridgway
13. Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, in The Department of Defense: Documents on Estab-
lishment and Organization, 1944–1978, eds. Alice C. Cole et al. (Washington, DC: Office of
the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 1978), 151–57; Memo, Gen. J. Lawton Collins,
Army Ch Staff, for Sec Def, 10 Jul 1953, sub: President’s Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953,
File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
14. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Radford’s Strategy Views,” New York Times, 4 Jun 1953;
Stephen J. Jurika Jr., ed., From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W.
Radford (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1980), 174–95; Rpt, [Robert] Cutler, Special
Asst to the President for National Security Affairs, 16 Mar 1953, in FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 2,
pt. 1, 246–57; Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Arthur R. Radford, 18 May 1953, in Galambos,
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 14, 234–36.
Robert T. Stevens, the secretary of the Army during the Eisenhower

administration, 1953–1955. Oil on canvas by Thomas Edgar Stephens,
ca. 1955. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
had served most recently as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
General Alfred M. Gruenther, one of Eisenhower’s closest friends and his
frequent bridge partner, replaced Ridgway in Europe. Air Force General
Nathan F. Twining replaced General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who retired
because of declining health. Twining had been serving as vice chief of staff
of the Air Force since 1950. Admiral Robert B. Carney followed Admiral
William M. Fechteler as the chief of naval operations, even though Fechteler
had served less than two years of what had been expected to be a four-year
tour. Perhaps because he had served in the position for little more than one
year and sat with the Joint Chiefs only when they considered matters of
interest to the Marine Corps, Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C.
Shepherd Jr. remained in his position. Eisenhower explained the wholesale
shift in military leadership by saying that Secretary Wilson deserved an

“entirely new team” with which to begin his tenure.15
The changes in the administration also brought with them changes in
the senior leadership of the Army. Robert T. Stevens had replaced Frank C.
Pace Jr. as the secretary of the Army on 4 February 1953. Like Secretary
Wilson, Stevens had built a solid reputation as an industrial leader. A veteran
of World War I and World War II, he had served since 1929 as president of
J. P. Stevens Company, a well-respected textiles firm. He also had served
as the chair of the Business Advisory Council of the U.S. Department of
Commerce from 1951 to 1952. Soon after his own appointment, the new
Army chief of staff, General Ridgway, recalled General Charles L. Bolte from
his position as Commanding General, USAREUR, to be the new vice chief
of staff. Bolte, a veteran of both world wars, had established an admirable
combat record as the commander of the 34th Infantry Division in Italy. The
most significant holdover on the Army Staff was Assistant Chief of Staff,
G–3 (Operations), Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman. Before becoming the G–3,
Eddleman had served as General Walter Krueger’s assistant chief of staff
with the Sixth Army during World War II in the Pacific and as the Army’s
chief of Plans Division.16
Before they assumed their duties, the president sent the new chiefs on
a tour of U.S. military installations. He asked them to submit an analysis
reflecting “a fresh view as to the best balance and most effective use of our
armed forces.”17 Through this exercise, the president hoped to instill in his
new military advisers a sense of duty to the nation as a whole that would
take precedence over personal allegiance to their services. He repeatedly
exhorted them to be ruthless in eradicating duplication and unneeded
programs from their annual budget proposals. In their initial report to
the president concerning the nation’s military posture, the chiefs had
recommended no sweeping changes. They concluded that the balanced
forces, as they existed, were adequate to ensure the nation’s defense.18 The
president rejected those conclusions almost immediately and sent the chiefs
15. Anthony Leviero, “Radford is Named Joint Chiefs’ Head; Ridgway for Army,” New York
Times, 13 May 1953; Hanson W. Baldwin, “New Team at Pentagon to Review U. S. Strategy,”
New York Times, 17 May 1953; Harold B. Hinton, “Senate Unit Backs New Joint Chiefs,”
New York Times, 29 May 1953.
16. In describing the composition and nomenclature of the Army Staff positions, the G
represented the General Staff, with the numbers 1 through 4 corresponding to personnel,
intelligence, operations, and logistics, respectively.
17. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Charles E. Wilson, 1 Jul 1953, in Galambos, Papers of
Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 14, 355.
18. New York Times, 9 Oct 1953.
Former and new members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Left to right:
General Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., General of the Army Omar N.
Bradley, General Nathan F. Twining, Admiral William M. Fechteler,
General Matthew B. Ridgway, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, General J.
Lawton Collins, and Admiral Robert B. Carney (Defense Department,
back to work, accusing them of being overly parochial. He reminded them

at almost every opportunity that their primary responsibilities were to the
secretary of defense and himself. They had to put this corporate sense ahead
of their natural inclination to support their individual services.19 Spurred on
by Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, Eisenhower told the assembled
National Security Council, “What I’d like to see is a complete and thorough
reexamination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of this whole problem, in which
they would really take a corporate view and see how far we could get.”20
Generally, when the president spoke of getting the chiefs to take a corporate
19. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edward Everett Hazlett Jr., 20 Aug 1956, in Galambos,
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, vol. 17, 2255; “Military Is Told to End Rivalries,” New
York Times, 3 Feb 1953.
20. Memo of Discussion at the 166th Meeting of the National Security Council, 13 Oct
1953.
approach, what he really meant was for them to follow his instructions and
cut defense expenditures.
With his new national security team in place, President Eisenhower set
out to restructure the nation’s armed forces in accordance with his own
priorities. He intended to emphasize strategic atomic forces at the expense
of conventional ground troops. “Our first objective must . . . be,” he stated in
a letter to Secretary Wilson, “to maintain the capability to deter an enemy
from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes by a combination of effective
retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing
effectiveness.”21 At the start of his administration, that retaliatory strength
meant the long-range bombers of the Strategic Air Command. Only they
had the capability to reach targets deep within the Soviet Union. The Navy
fought a rear-guard action to preserve its status, arguing that carrier-based
aircraft offered a more flexible means of delivering atomic weapons to
most strategic targets. As the administration progressed, all three services
competed to develop long-range and intermediate-range missiles that could
deliver the appropriate nuclear response. In the environment that developed,
with purse strings tightening, the administration had few funds available to
support the Army’s conventional land forces once it had paid all the bills for
strategic weaponry.
Throughout these early discussions, Army Chief of Staff General
Matthew Ridgway struggled to get his service’s position recognized within
the framework of the New Look. During a thirty-six-year career, Ridgway
had forged an impressive reputation as a forceful combat leader and an
uncompromising advocate for the foot soldier. His tours in Korea and his
most recent assignment as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe had
provided him with a well-rounded appreciation for the nation’s security
requirements around the world. In that light, he disagreed completely with
one of the central premises of the president’s vision—that atomic weapons
had made ground forces obsolete. On the contrary, he believed that atomic
warfare, with its increased casualties and greatly expanded battlefield, would
increase ground force requirements.22 He saw no justification for the cuts the
president and Secretary Wilson wanted to make within the Army because
none of the Army’s commitments had been reduced accordingly.23
As a professional soldier, Ridgway was also uncomfortable with the
introduction of economic considerations into a discussion of military
21. Ltr, Eisenhower to Wilson, 5 Jan 1955, 1488–91.
22. Interv, Maurice Matloff with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 19 Apr 1984, Senior Ofcr De-
briefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter
MHI); Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 33–34.
23. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Pamphlet 21–70, The Role of the Army (Washington, DC:
security. He held to the more traditional view that the chiefs should
make recommendations for force structure based upon their assessment
of the military situation. Economic factors, he believed, should be left to
the consideration of the civilian leaders, who would have much more
expertise in that area.24 In a message to the Army Staff upon his taking
over as chief of staff, Ridgway wrote that it was not the responsibility of
a “military man” to decide whether the nation could afford the military
means they felt it required. Rather, he said, “his over-riding responsibility is
to give his honest, objective, professional military advice to those civilians
who, by our Constitution, are his Commanders.”25 His remarks echoed
those of the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley, who, less than a month earlier, had noted that the role
of the Joint Chiefs was to advise the president and the secretary of defense
on the nation’s military capabilities based upon the resources at hand.
Economic and political factors, he concluded, “should not be the basis of our
military recommendations.”26
Nonetheless, with the Korean War over, Secretary Wilson concluded that
he could make substantial reductions in both the defense budget and in
overall military personnel strength. After minor reductions in February, the
administration initiated discussions for more drastic cuts by the end of the
year. The budget for fiscal year 1955, for the period beginning 1 July 1954,
would be the first post-Korea budget to be negotiated between the services
and the Eisenhower administration.
On 23 October, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Personnel John A. Hannah met with representatives of the three services to
issue planning guidance for the upcoming budget negotiations. He told all
services to plan for a 10 percent reduction in military strength, at the least,
for fiscal year 1955. For the Army, this meant a decrease to 1.281 million
personnel, far less than the 1.5 million that Army Secretary Robert Stevens
had requested a week earlier as the minimum necessary to accomplish
all assigned missions. Additional discussions and negotiations further
reduced the Army end-strength for fiscal year 1955 to 1.162 million people.
Department of the Army, 29 Jun 1955).

24. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper
Brothers, 1956), 269–73; Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
11 May 1955, Box 78, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Memo, [Unnamed] for Sec Army, 21 Jun 1955,
Box 78, Ridgway Papers, MHI.
25. Memo, Col. F. W. Moorman, Asst Sec Gen Staff, for Army Staff, 27 Aug 1953, sub: Re-
marks by the Chief of Staff to the Army Staff, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953,
Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
26. Omar N. Bradley (remarks, Quantico, VA, 24 July 1953), Box 16, Ridgway Papers, MHI.
Accordingly, Ridgway proposed

reductions in the number of
Army divisions from twenty to
seventeen. Although the general
pointed out that the Army would
lose some combat force strength
and materiel readiness, he did
not formally protest the final
budget. In his memoirs, Ridgway
wrote that the implications that
dawned on him were stark: “This
military budget was not based so
much on military requirements,
or on what the economy of
General Matthew B. Ridgway the country could stand, as on
(U.S. Army) political considerations.”27
THE ARMY TAKES STOCK
The manner in which the president and Secretary Wilson had pushed through
Congress the reductions in the defense budget and military personnel
rankled the Army chief of staff and eliminated any chance of rapport
developing between the Army and the Department of Defense. When, in
January 1954, the president asserted in his State of the Union message that
the Joint Chiefs had unanimously endorsed his New Look military strategy,
Ridgway felt betrayed. Likewise, the relationship between the general and
Secretary Wilson continued to deteriorate. Ridgway later reflected in his
memoir that Wilson had come into office with a preconceived dislike for the
Army. Other officers on the Army Staff also described their perception that
the defense secretary was “out to get” the Army chief of staff.28 Wilson would
peremptorily dismiss Ridgway’s opinions, saying, “Well, Eisenhower is the
27. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 61–69; MFR, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young,
Asst Ch Staff, G–1, 23 Oct 1953, sub: Personnel Planning for 1955; Memo, Sec Army Rob-
ert T. Stevens for Sec Def, 14 Oct 1953, sub: Justification of Army Strength; Memo, Gen.
Matthew B. Ridgway for Sec Army, 9 Dec 1953, sub: Military Strategy and Posture; all in
File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified Correspondence, 1948–1954 (hereinaf-
ter SCC 1948–1954), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), RG 319, NACP. Quote is
from Ridgway, Soldier, 272.
28. Interv, Col. John J. Ridgway and Lt. Col. Paul B. Walter with Gen. Barksdale Hamlett,
9 Mar 1976, 66, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.
After setting up the 280-mm. cannon in firing position, members of

the 39th Field Artillery Battalion calibrate and sight in the weapon,
Grafenwoehr Training Area, 28 September 1958. (U.S. Army, National
Archives Still Picture Branch)
premier military man. What do you give me these views for? He knows far
more about it than you do.”29 Wilson also questioned the Army’s efforts to
refurbish its obsolescent conventional weapons and equipment, telling them
that they should focus their efforts on more modern purchases. Ridgway
would also get little support from Admiral Radford who, as chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had thoroughly embraced almost all aspects of the
New Look.
The Army had already begun research and development that would help
bring its arsenal into the atomic age. The service had tested the 280-mm.
cannon in May, firing the first artillery-launched atomic projectile. It was
also well along in the development of the Honest John, a surface-to-surface
nuclear-capable rocket with a range of about 15 miles, and the Corporal, a
guided missile with a range of about 75 miles. The former entered service late
in 1953 and the latter early in 1954. The first Nike Ajax antiaircraft missile
batteries also deployed in December 1953. Helicopters already had proven
29. Ridgway, Soldier, 288; Interv, Col. John M. McNair with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway,
24 Mar 1972, 31; Interv, Ridgway and Walter with Hamlett, 9 Mar 1976, 66; Interv,
Arthur J. Zoebelein with Gen. Charles L. Bolte, 1 Feb 1972, 54; all in Senior Ofcr Debriefing
Program, MHI.
useful in several roles in Korea. Units throughout the Army, particularly

those in Europe, experimented with new ways to employ them.30
Despite this progress, service leaders recognized that the Army had to
do more to demonstrate that it belonged on the atomic battlefield if it was
to retain a significant role in the nation’s defense policy. Project Vista, a
Defense Department–sponsored study on potential warfare in Europe,
had recommended the establishment of a combat developments group
within the Army to consider new weapons and tactics, with an emphasis
on the potential use of atomic weapons. In response, the Army established
a committee under the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces to study
how best to utilize the potential of new weapons under development and
to determine what changes in organization and doctrine the force required.
Specific projects included doctrine for the employment of atomic weapons,
tables of organization and equipment for atomic units, tactical testing of
the 280-mm. cannon, and special forces’ employment of atomic demolition
munitions.31 The Army’s chief of information, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, went
so far as to urge that the service rename its installation at Fort Bliss, Texas,
the Army Atomic Weapons Center. He described this as a “bit of semantics”
to inform the public that the Army was looking ahead and thinking
ahead.32 He argued that the “well fostered impression in the public’s mind
of the Navy’s and Air Force’s lead in guided missiles and atomic weapons
is either consciously or unconsciously reflected in Congress with regard to
supporting our programs.”33 Surely, he believed, the Army could capitalize
on a more forward-looking image.
This effort to portray the Army as a player on the atomic stage did not
escape the attention of some members of the news media. On 16 May,
columnist Drew Pearson wrote in the Washington Post that “some atomic
experts” believed that the only reason for atomic artillery was so the Army
could get in on the atomic act.34 Although the article was long on hyperbole
30. Elliott V. Converse III, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960, vol. 1, History of Acqui-
sition in the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Historical Office, 2012), 596–98.
31. Memo, Brig. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Asst for Planning Coordination, for Col. [F. W.]
Moorman, 16 Dec 1953, sub: OCAFF Combat Development Group Activities, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
32. Memo, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 21 Jan 1953, sub: Army Atomic
Weapons Center, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
33. Memo, Parks for Ch Staff, 21 Jan 1953, sub: Army Atomic Weapons Center.
34. Memo, [Unnamed] for Lt. Col. Baker, G–3 Plans Div, 26 May 1953, sub: The Washing-
ton Merry-Go-Round, May 16, 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Sub-
group: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
and short on facts, it did raise a valid point and caught the Army’s attention.
The Army would have to fight its battle to retain relevance in the New Look
in the various news media just as much as in the hallways of the Capitol
Building and the Pentagon.
Public relations were not a new concern for the Army in 1953, but with
the competition for a share of a decreasing defense budget growing more
intense, public affairs and the Office of the Chief of Information became
even more critical interests for the Army Staff. The Army television series,
The Big Picture, debuting in 1951, became one of the service’s most effective
tools for placing its message before the American public. Its goal, one
reviewer noted, was to “emphasize change, and show how the contemporary
Army’s embrace of technology constituted a break with the past and that this
was not your father’s or grandfather’s Army.”35 Motion pictures also offered
a venue to popularize the Army with its public. The Office of the Chief of
Information sponsored documentaries and cooperated with the makers of
more commercial films to ensure that they presented the service in the most
favorable light.36
Although publicity before the general public was important, presenting a
positive message to members of Congress was critical. Members of the Army
Staff took great pains to cultivate good relationships with congressional
representatives and senators alike. Early in 1953, Chief of Legislative Liaison
Maj. Gen. Miles Reber forwarded to the chief of staff a loose-leaf book
containing the military biographies of members of Congress. The book was
labeled “Confidential,” and Reber advised the staff that some members were
inclined to be a bit sensitive about their service records. Later, Reber sent
recommendations to the chief of staff for a series of briefings for members
of Congress. “Our objective,” he said, “must be to please, to entertain, and
to inform.”37 He suggested combined intelligence and operations briefings
35. Jeffrey Crean, “Something to Compete with ‘Gunsmoke’: ‘The Big Picture’ Television
Series and Selling a ‘Modern, Progressive and Forward Thinking’ Army to Cold War Amer-
ica,” War and Society 35, no. 3 (Aug 2016): 204–18.
36. Memo, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, for the Under
Sec of the Army, 27 Nov 1953, sub: Showing of Film, “This is the Army”; MFR, Maj. Gen.
Clark L. Ruffner, Acting Ch Info, 3 Nov 1953, sub: Exploitation of Motion Picture “Cease
Fire”; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP. See also Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military
Image in Film (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002).
37. Memo, Maj. Gen. Miles Reber, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Ch
Staff, 2 Jan 1953, sub: Military Biographies of Members of Congress; Memo, John G. Adams,
Dept. Counselor, for Sec Army, 19 Nov 1953, sub: Program for Congressional Briefings;
both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence,
1948–1954 (hereinafter SCGC 1948–1954), Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
with colorful maps and charts to convey the Army’s message. He warned
that lengthy personnel and logistics discussions of force strength revisions,
troop rotations, and maintenance costs would force staff officers to awaken
their audience before transporting them back to the Hill.38
The Army Staff also now took the time to examine some of the post–
World War II studies that had evaluated staff organization and performance
during that conflict. Those critiques rejected the traditional notion that
the staff should limit its considerations to broad policy and planning. They
also viewed with distaste the establishment of an Operations Division–type
war headquarters such as that which General George C. Marshall Jr. had
employed throughout World War II. Rather, one analysis observed, the
Department of the Army and the Army Staff must be so organized as to
provide a smooth and seamless transition to a wartime footing without
reorganization or disruption of its existing agencies. In September, Secretary
Stevens appointed the Advisory Committee on Army Organization, chaired
by Paul L. Davies, vice president of the Food Machinery and Chemical
Corporation and a director of the American Ordnance Association. Stevens
instructed the Davies Committee, as it became known, to examine the
Army’s top management in light of President Eisenhower’s Reorganization
Plan No. 6. Stevens also asked for recommendations for coordinating the
technical services, proper locations for the department’s legal and legislative
liaison functions, changes required for the Army’s research and development
program, and the organization and function of the Office of the Chief of
Army Field Forces.39
The Davies Committee launched a reorganization process that would play
out over the next ten years. The analysis of Army Staff operations in World
War II and Korea identified numerous flaws in the organization that would
have to evolve as the service prepared for its future. The post–World War II
abolition of the Army Service Forces had left the technical services without
a workable organizational structure. Both the Davies Committee and the
Operations Division recommended the formation of some type of logistics
command to coordinate support. That transition, however, would be a
lengthy process. The structure of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, had
38. Memo, Reber for Collins, 2 Jan 1953, sub: Military Biographies; Memo, Adams for Sec
Army, 19 Nov 1953, sub: Program for Congressional Briefings.
39. Memo, Col. John G. Hill, Asst Ch Organization and Training Div, for Asst Ch Staff,
G–3, 26 Aug 1953, sub: Reorganization of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: Dec-
imal Files 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to
McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963, Special Studies (Washing-
ton, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 223–24; Watson, History of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 16.
also outlived its usefulness. The committee recommended the creation of a

continental Army command to oversee combat forces in the United States,
as well as a training command to supervise the various training centers.
Those transitions would also take some time to come to fruition. Finally, the
various studies also identified new functions that should be represented at
the department level. Civil affairs, psychological warfare, and research and
development all required focused and independent representation on the
Army Staff. None of this would be resolved in 1953, but by the end of the
year, General Ridgway and his senior advisers recognized that they needed
to address these and other issues.40
The end of the war in Korea also initiated a period of reflection
and reappraisal for the Army. The brief interlude between the end of
World War II and the beginning of the conflict in Korea had not allowed
for any serious reconsideration of the service’s role in the nation’s military
policy. The Army had barely completed its postwar demobilization before it
began combat operations in Korea. Now, with an armistice in Korea, would
the inevitable drawdown and public demand to bring the soldiers home
once again emasculate the force? Facing an administration whose military
policies were not exactly hospitable to the Army’s interests, General Ridgway,
Secretary Stevens, and other leaders grappled with how to keep the force
relevant in the emerging nuclear age. Although it was clear that the Army
should not return to the minimally staffed organization and structure of the
pre–World War II force, military and civilian leaders reached no consensus
on what the size of the Army should be nor on what its proper role might
be in facing the Cold War. Nevertheless, the Army began the serious task of
preparing for the future.
In a long-range strategic estimate released in May 1953, the Army’s
planning and operations staff noted that “the conflict of interests between
the Soviet Bloc and the Free World is now and must for at least the next
decade be considered as a global conflict.”41 Communist China had also
demonstrated its ability to threaten the stability of its neighbors in the Far
East. Facing those two major threats and protecting the free world from the
40. Memo, Brig. Gen. J. A. Elmore, Ch Ops Div, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 27 Aug 1953, sub:
Army Organization for War, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: Decimal Files 1953, Sub-
group: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 224–27.
41. Strategic Estimate, Dep Ch Staff for Plans and Research, 27 May 1953, “Army Long
Range Strategic Estimate, FY 1959 to 1963, Inclusive,” File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series:
Decimal Files 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
threat of Communist expansionist policies defined the Army’s perception of

its role in American security policy.42
In describing the Army’s long-range strategy and objectives, the paper
forecast policies and initiatives that would shape the Cold War Army.
It identified deterring armed conflict with the Soviet Union as a primary
objective. In keeping with the Eisenhower conception of a “Long Haul”
defense policy, the planners noted that the Army had to develop a level of
readiness that could be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to
Soviet aggression. American security would also require reliance upon the
armed forces of friendly allied nations to assist in the effort. Planners noted
that U.S. MAAGs had made great strides in cultivating relationships with
armed forces in Europe, Asia, and South America. Advancing another theme
promoted by the new administration, the strategic estimate also endorsed
the use of propaganda and psychological warfare to advance U.S. interests
without involving unacceptable risk. In moving toward the future, the Army
had to prepare to fight an atomic war, while still developing the weapons,
organization, and tactics appropriate for general war. At the same time,
it had to retain the flexibility to operate in lower-intensity environments
against less-sophisticated foes. In April 1953, the chief of psychological
warfare for the assistant chief of staff, G–3, noted that the Army needed to
integrate provisions for psychological warfare units and special forces into its
training program.43
KOREA: SORTING THROUGH THE RUBBLE
For many officers and senior enlisted personnel, another issue troubled
their conscience. The Army expended a great deal of time and effort over
the next several years trying to identify and distill the lessons it could take
from its experiences during the Korean War. In the immediate aftermath
of the war, however, a few important considerations came to the forefront.
The most important was largely unspoken, but it seemed to weigh on the
minds of most. No triumphant parades had marched down the streets of
Seoul or Pyongyang, such as those that had ended the two great world wars.
Range Strategic Estimate, FY 1959 to 1963, Inclusive.”
Range Strategic Estimate, FY 1959 to 1963, Inclusive”; Memo, Col. William J. Blythe, Acting
Ch Psy Warfare, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 12 May 1953, sub: Review of Army Training Pro-
gram, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Chief of Special Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319,
NACP.
Although it would take some time for service members to sort out all of
the implications of the armistice that had ended the fighting, one thing was
clear. They had not won.
Even before the armistice had been signed, the Department of Defense
Office of Armed Forces Information and Education had prepared a pamphlet
entitled “What Next in Korea” for distribution to troops there. Its purpose
was to explain that a truce in Korea did not mean that they would be heading
home immediately. With the pamphlet as their primary resource, unit
commanders reminded their soldiers that the Communists had consistently
violated truces and agreements, and the nations of the West could not trust
them to honor the armistice. The war in Korea was only one part of the
worldwide conflict between the free world and Communist expansion.
The pamphlet concluded that troops would have to remain in Korea for
six months or more before they could begin returning home. Political and
military leaders alike hoped to avoid the wholesale demobilization and
gutting of the postwar force that had marked the end of World War II.44
The Army leadership attempted to place Korea into the context of a
larger confrontation. In June, then Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins
presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a paper on postarmistice deployment.
“Our position must be that the conflict in Korea is but a single engagement
in a global struggle which cannot be won or even kept from American shores
without constant vigilance on our part,” stated Collins.45 A month after the
agreement was signed, General Ridgway pointedly asked the secretary of
defense for guidance on future U.S. policy in Korea. He asked whether the
Army would be expected to fight if hostilities resumed or would it be asked
to evacuate. If the decision was to fight, would the nation seek a military
victory? Many of the Army’s looming decisions on force structure, budget
allocation, and personnel requirements depended on how the Eisenhower
administration perceived the stalemate in Korea.46
The effort to collect and digest tactical and operational lessons from Korea
had begun early in the war and would continue for the foreseeable future.
44. Memo, Brig. Gen. Frank Dorn, Dep Ch Info for Distribution, 27 Jul 1953, sub: Orien-
tation of Troops Going to Korea, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Sub-
group: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
45. Memo, Col. John W. Browning, Asst Sec Gen Staff, for Sec Joint Chs Staff, 24 Jun 1953,
sub: Information Plan: Post Armistice Troop Deployment, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series:
SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
46. Memo, Browning for Sec Joint Chs Staff, 24 Jun 1953, sub: Information Plan: Post Ar-
mistice Troop Deployment; Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Sec Army, 22 Aug 1953,
sub: U.S. Policy on Korea, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
The X Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins, offered one of the first
postwar appraisals in a 6 October letter to the Eighth Army commander,
General Maxwell D. Taylor. Jenkins stressed that, though Korea might be
considered a special case, the Army had faced many examples of Soviet-
based tactics and doctrine during its three years there. The extreme distance
between the front lines and the supporting Zone of the Interior made
logistical support challenging and allowed replacements to arrive in theater
unready mentally and physically for combat. He cited familiar complaints
about air support and recognized that the infantry had grown far too reliant
upon artillery support in lieu of their own weapons. Nonetheless, he believed
that still more artillery would be required in future combat.47
More ominous were concerns that emerged over the conduct of American
prisoners of war while in the custody of the Chinese and North Koreans.
In March 1953, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin, the adjutant general, sent
a memorandum to all of the major Army commands warning them that
Communist efforts at indoctrination had attained some degree of success and
that the Army would have to screen returning prisoners carefully. Without
citing any specific evidence, Bergin wrote that they must assume that some
prisoners had accepted Communist ideology to the extent that they would
constitute security risks. These prisoners could embarrass the Army and the
United States by a public embrace of Communist policies and war aims. He
recommended that commanders set up a program to interrogate returnees
before integrating them back into Army commands. In the cases of returnees
who would soon retire or be released from the service, Bergin asserted
that local branches of the Federal Bureau of Investigation should receive
information covering their name, grade, service number, and home address,
as well as information concerning any potential Communist indoctrination.
Reassuringly, the memo concluded that it was not the intent to prejudice the
careers or future assignments of returnees, but only to monitor their actions
until such time as they demonstrated that their loyalty was not affected by
Communist influence.48
Bergin’s concerns were borne out as numerous statements and stories of
released prisoners confirmed the brutal nature of their captivity and the level
of their exposure to indoctrination. Evidence mounted that some prisoners
had broken under torture or the duress of captivity and had committed
various acts of collaboration, including recording statements on the radio
47. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 6 Oct 1953, File Unit: Entry
A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
48. Memo, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin for Cmdg Gens, 13 Mar 1953, sub: Intelligence Pro-
cessing of Returned or Exchanged Captured American Personnel-Korea, File Unit: Entry
A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
or signing statements contrary to positions of the U.S. government. Most

disturbing was the revelation that some American prisoners had refused
repatriation and chose to remain in North Korea after the armistice was
signed. As the stories continued to circulate in the media, the level of concern,
particularly in Congress, escalated. In September, Senator Richard B. Russell,
a prominent member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote a
letter to Secretary Wilson decrying the conduct of “so-called progressives
who cooperated with the Communist enemy.”49 Russell expressed his belief
that these soldiers should be discharged dishonorably from the service
and he asked Wilson whether the Department of Defense would take
any disciplinary action against those identified as progressives and false
confessors.50 Indeed, as more information came to light about conditions in
the prisoner of war (POW) camps and the misconduct of a small number
of U.S. prisoners, this issue would become even more problematic for
the Army.51
General Ridgway recognized the potential threats that the POW issue
posed to the Army, but he also perceived an opportunity to exploit the
situation to the service’s benefit. He directed the chief of psychological
warfare, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, to collect and release as much factual
data as possible in the belief that accurate information, and not propaganda,
would reinforce in the public’s mind the brutal, cold-blooded nature of the
enemy they were fighting. Through a series of radio and television interviews,
magazine and newspapers articles, and public appearances by selected POW
returnees, the Army could fortify the will of Americans to fight communism
while simultaneously minimizing the significance of the few U.S. prisoners
who had refused repatriation or had returned as Communist sympathizers.
By Ridgway’s direction, Army press releases were to include and emphasize
the number of Americans who had died in captivity or who remained
missing. Sensing an opportunity to turn a potential negative into inspiration
for public support, Ridgway wrote that the exploitation of Communist
49. Ltr, Richard B. Russell to Charles E. Wilson, 18 Sep 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
50. Memo, Brig. Gen. John C. Oakes, Sec Gen Staff, for Ch Psy Warfare, 21 Aug 1953, sub:
Communist Treatment of United Nations Prisoners of War, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Sub-
group: Chief of Special Warfare, RG 319, NACP; Interv, Lt. Col. James W. Wurman with
Gen. John E. Hull, 1974, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI; Ltr, Russell to Wilson,
18 Sep 1953.
51. Interv, Wurman with Hull, 1974.
mistreatment of POWs was a positive and dynamic project that could

achieve psychological gains beneficial to the Army.52
Despite the opportunities for propaganda presented by the POW issue,
General Ridgway and others recognized that they also had education and
training challenges to address. Before teaching young soldiers how to
stand up to Communist ideology and propaganda techniques, it was first
necessary, they believed, to ground these soldiers in an American “way
of life.”53 The chief of staff instructed the chief of information to prepare
troop-level information and education programs that promoted popular
American values such as the dignity of the individual, respect for the rule of
law, and respect for spiritual values. He expressed the view that the failure
of American prisoners had been, in part, the fault of American society,
which had failed to inculcate in its youth the proper appreciation for the
aforementioned principles. Ridgway instructed unit commanders to stress,
in all phases of training, pride in the history of their unit, knowledge of its
mission, and the understanding of how those two things fit into the overall
goals of the nation and the United States Army.54
General Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, believed that the POW
issue was also a matter of preparation. He expressed the belief that proper
training and improved unit confidence would make it less likely that troops
would be captured in the first place. He noted that the Army had expanded
and improved its escape and evasion training and that the subject was now
receiving adequate attention. Resistance to interrogation and indoctrination,
and survival as a POW, Eddleman observed, were not simple problems
with obvious solutions. He did note that Army research organizations were
studying interrogation data from the Korean War prisoner exchanges and
believed that new ideas and information might be forthcoming.55
The reports of brainwashing and incidents of collaboration eventually
caused some in the United States to question the loyalty of soldiers returning
52. Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, Ch Psy Warfare, for Ch Staff, 26 Aug 1953, sub:
Plan for Exploiting Communist Mistreatment of U.S. Prisoners of War; Memo, Brig. Gen.
William C. Bullock, for Army Staff, 1 Sep 1953, sub: Implementation of Plan for Exploiting
Communist Mistreatment of U.S. Prisoners of War; both in File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Sub-
group: Office of the Chief, Special Warfare, RG 319, NACP.
53. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Ch Info, 30 Sep 1953, sub: Education Phase of our
Troop I&E Program, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG
319, NACP.
54. Memo, Ridgway for Ch Info, 30 Sep 1953, sub: Education Phase of our Troop I&E Pro-
gram. The Army’s efforts to indoctrinate its young soldiers reflected a Pentagon-wide effort.
See Lori Lyn Bogle, The Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War (Col-
lege Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).
55. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman for Ch Staff, 25 Nov 1953, sub: Worldwide Com-
from Korea. The more general anti-Communist paranoia that characterized

the early Cold War period caused this suspicion to extend to the Army’s
civilian workforce as well. With Senator Joseph R. McCarthy looking for
Communists throughout the government, the Army’s leaders themselves
grew concerned about sympathizers in their midst. Near the end of 1953,
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Brig. Gen. Mark McClure
reported to Ridgway that the Army had 452 active loyalty investigations
among thirteen major commands. He reminded Ridgway that Senator
McCarthy was closely monitoring Army procedures for granting security
clearances. When several civilian workers at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey,
came under investigation for various real and imagined violations of
security regulations, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 (Intelligence), Maj. Gen.
Richard C. Partridge complained to General Ridgway that too many
investigations of subversives were being overturned by appeals boards who
were placing the rights of the individual above national security. He suggested
that the Army consider requiring all civilian workers who participated in
classified military contracts to take the same loyalty oath taken by uniformed
military personnel. This suggestion was quickly endorsed by Secretary of the
Army Robert T. Stevens.56
MORALE AND RECRUITMENT
Publicity and public support were important to the Army to secure not just
its share of the defense budget but also the personnel needed to maintain its
force structure. In 1953, almost 60 percent of the service’s enlisted personnel
had come through the draft. Even though the Army still received the
majority of its enlistees through conscription, it counted on recruiting and
reenlistment to obtain volunteers capable of learning the highly technical
skills required in a modern army. More important, the Army also relied on
retaining a high proportion of those soldiers it had already trained through
reenlistment. By the end of hostilities in Korea, however, the American
munist Treatment of United States Hostages and Prisoners of War, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A,
Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
56. Memo, Maj. Gen. Richard C. Partridge for Ch Staff, 14 Oct 1953, sub: Department of
the Army Civilian Security Program; Memo, Brig. Gen. Mark McClure for Ch Staff, 1 Dec
1953, sub: Mr. Paul Chadwell and Mr. Henry Forbes; Memo, Brig. Gen. Mark McClure for
Ch Staff, 9 Nov 1953, sub: Complaint Type Investigations; Memo, Robert T. Stevens for Asst
Sec [Hugh M.] Milton, 15 Feb 1954, sub: Requirements for Loyalty Oaths in the Industrial
Security Program; all four in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
public had grown weary of shouldering wartime burdens. American youth

were less interested in military careers than in finding other opportunities in
a booming economy. Soldiers who had served their time in Korea or during
World War II saw little attraction to continued military service. All of the
branches of the armed forces, but particularly the Army, were forced to find
ways to make military service more attractive.57
By early 1953, observers would see plenty of evidence that recruiting and
retention were becoming a problem. In February, the Army Times reported
that reenlistments of regulars had fallen off drastically and that many of
the Army’s experienced noncommissioned officers were electing to leave
the service. In the past year, reenlistments had dropped by two-thirds. In
addition to the obvious conclusion that few wanted to fight the war in Korea,
the report identified many other sources of dissatisfaction, including long
overseas tours, infrequent promotions, and erosion of benefits such as the
post exchange, the commissary, and dependents’ medical care.58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the secretary of
defense saying that they had become increasingly concerned that armed
forces personnel had a growing lack of confidence in military service as a
worthwhile and respected career. After some consideration, the Armed Forces
Policy Council appointed an ad hoc committee, chaired by R. Adm. John P.
Womble and staffed by senior personnel officers from all four services, to
identify those causes that had reduced the attractiveness of military service.
In an interim report released in July, the Womble Committee identified
three contributing factors. First was the unstable international situation,
particularly the conflict in Korea and the military standoff in Europe.
Next was the inability of the military to compete with industry for capable
personnel. Finally, the committee cited an adverse national attitude toward
the military in general.59
The final report of the Womble Committee, released on 30 October 1953,
provided few new answers, but confirmed most of the suspicions concerning
the decline of the military’s popularity in American society. The continuing
practice, it said, of stationing large forces overseas without family living
accommodations had created lengthy family separations. The recent conflict
in Korea had contributed to a decline in support from the public, with the
57. Donald A. Carter, The U.S. Army Before Vietnam, 1953–1965, The U.S. Army Campaigns
of the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 11.
58. “Re-Up Drop Is Big Jolt,” Army Times, 28 Feb 1953.
59. Rpt, Army Staff, 16 Jul 1953, sub: Background and Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on the Future of the Military Services as a Career that will Attract and Retain Capa-
ble Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
continuation of selective service particularly distasteful. The committee

commented at length on the decline in military authority and leadership,
saying, “Service leaders must accept full responsibility for yielding to
popular and political pressure to adopt policies which served to further
diminish the distinction between ranks.”60 This was a thinly veiled refutation
of the post–World War II Doolittle Board, which had tried to create a more
egalitarian Army.61 Those reforms, the report continued, lessened esprit
de corps throughout the organization and impeded the ability of officers
and noncommissioned officers to lead their units. The overall effect was
a decline in military standards that made the service less prestigious and
less attractive.
The Womble Committee’s report also included other, more specific
recommendations. The full range of military benefits that had been under
the knife since the Truman administration demanded restoration. Congress
needed to increase military pay and make retirement more attractive.
The report pointed out the counterintuitive effect of veterans’ loans and
the G.I. Bill of Rights, which tended to make getting out of the service more
attractive than staying in it. In a direct shot across the bow of the Eisenhower
administration, the report concluded that “in the furtherance of cost
consciousness there exists positive danger that budgetary considerations
will be permitted to transcend the attainment of combat effectiveness.”62
After reviewing the final report of the Womble Committee, Secretary
of the Army Robert T. Stevens formed a separate committee within the
Army to coordinate actions that the Army could take on its own to increase
the attractiveness of military service as a career. Assistant Chief of Staff,
60. Memo, R. Adm. John P. Womble for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 30 Oct
1953, sub: Final Report-Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service as a Career
that Will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
61. In March 1946, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson directed the establishment of a
group, chaired by retired Army Air Forces Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, to study the relation-
ships between officers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Army. The report of the Doolittle
Board recommended better living and working conditions for enlisted personnel and the
elimination of the wide official and social gaps between commissioned and enlisted person-
nel. Although most of the recommendations were aimed at raising the standard of living
for enlisted personnel, some, like proposing the elimination of the requirement for enlisted
soldiers to salute commissioned officers off of military installations, were not well received.
During the next several years, many senior officers blamed the Doolittle Board and its rec-
ommendations for what they perceived to be a dramatic decline in discipline and military
standards throughout the Army.
62. Memo, Womble for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 30 Oct 1953, sub: Final
Report-Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service.
G–1 (Personnel), Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, a member of the Womble

Committee, submitted to the chief of staff a plan detailing options along
those lines. Young acknowledged that the Army could do little in the area of
pay and promotions, two of the major complaints. He noted that the service
had recently instituted an eighteen-month stabilized tour in the United
States for Regular Army enlisted soldiers returning from overseas duty, but
he suggested that the best remedy for complaints about the length of foreign
deployments would be concurrent travel for dependents of officers and
senior noncommissioned officers. He encouraged the secretary and the chief
of staff to join the other services in taking a firm stand against any further
deterioration of fringe benefits such as the post exchange, the commissary,
and leave accumulation. In support of this position, the president himself
wrote to the secretary of defense, saying that although soldiers cared little
about cost-of-living increases, their fringe benefits such as medical care
for dependents “have been very dear to them.”63 He encouraged Secretary
Wilson to support what he called the military’s “so-called perquisites.”64
Many of the Army’s leaders believed that the Army’s prestige also
could be enhanced if the service restored some of the discipline and
high standards that had eroded since the end of World War II. General
Young’s report recommended increasing the authority and responsibility
of noncommissioned officers, addressing one of the most frequently cited
complaints of departing soldiers. He suggested that more emphasis on
discipline and professionalism would benefit the Army. A similar report
submitted by the chief of the Organization and Training Division decried
the lost traditions and heritage of regimental affiliations, something that the
U.S. Marine Corps had been emphasizing throughout its existence. Even
though the Army had regiments with splendid traditions, the Army system
had failed to capitalize on their potential for morale and unit cohesion. As
an important example, the Organization and Training report lamented the
loss of regimental bands and the unit pride they helped to instill.65
Improving public relations and increasing the prestige of military service
thus became perhaps the most important military concerns in the period
63. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Sec Def, 23 Nov 1953, Ann Whitman Files (microfilm),
Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
64. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff, G–1, for Ch Staff, 9 Sep 1953, sub:
Plan to Improve Attractiveness of Military Service as a Career, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Eisenhower to Sec Def,
23 Nov 1953.
65. Memo, Young for Ch Staff, 9 Sep 1953, sub: Plan to Improve Attractiveness of Military
Service as a Career; Memo, Brig. Gen. Carl H. Jark, Ch Organization and Training Div, for
Committee to Improve the Service as a Career, 15 Oct 1953, sub: Improvement of the Mil-
immediately following the Korean armistice. The Army’s leaders pledged to

address, internally, any issues that they already had the means to support.
To affect changes that only increased funding could bring about, they vowed
to lobby Congress and the president. On 16 November, Army Chief of Staff
General Matthew Ridgway, also a strong supporter of regimental bands,
announced an “all-out campaign” to raise the morale and prestige of the
Army.66 He directed his deputy chief of staff for operations, Lt. Gen. Walter L.
Weible, to study the issue further and to work out the details of the program.
Beyond the effort to make military service more attractive, personnel
officers on the Army Staff explored options that would make the pool of
potential recruits even larger. In October 1951, the Defense Advisory
Committee on Women in the Services had established the goal of having
72,000 women in all services by 1952. Although the services did not meet that
goal, primarily due to an increased emphasis on higher quality recruits, the
Army, in particular, remained committed to growing the number of women
in its ranks and improving the public perception of women in uniform. In
November 1953, General Ridgway expressed his concern that the Women’s
Army Corps no longer had an officer serving on the advisory committee.
After some investigation, the assistant chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Robert N.
Young, informed the Army chief of staff that Army women were represented
by an enlisted member, who would soon be replaced by an officer as part of
a normal rotation.67
PERSONNEL STRENGTH AND RESERVE ISSUES
The Korean War had interrupted the dramatic post–World War II

demobilization over which President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of
Defense Louis A. Johnson had presided. The intensifying conflict with the
Soviet Union and the active hostilities in Korea seemed to prove to Army
leadership that the rapid reduction in force had been a mistake and that
the service could not return to the prewar peacetime levels of personnel
and readiness. Despite President Eisenhower’s desire to shrink the defense
itary Service as a Career, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops,
RG 319, NACP.
66. MFR, Col. F. W. Moorman, Sec Gen Staff, 16 Nov 1953, sub: Morale and Prestige of the
U.S. Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP
67. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, for Director, Women’s Army Corps, 10 Nov 1953,
sub: The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
budget and to rely on atomic weapons to guarantee the peace, even he and
his administration recognized that the Cold War presented new challenges
and requirements that could not be addressed with the nation’s traditional
peacetime force.
In Eisenhower’s view, the most obvious challenge was to find an equitable
method of securing the necessary force strength in the reserves for the
nation to mobilize in the event of war. Combat in Korea had demonstrated
that even a limited conflict required the commitment of greater numbers
of troops than could be supported comfortably by a peacetime economy.
This meant that the active force had to be backed up by reserves sufficient
in size and training to provide the numbers required. The president had
been particularly troubled that so many veterans of World War II had
been recalled, once again, to active duty in Korea. Although he remained
a firm believer in universal military training, which would require a one-
year training commitment from all young men in order to provide a reserve
pool of potential service members in wartime, Eisenhower recognized the
political liabilities of supporting such a program. In August, he appointed
retired Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs Adler, general manager of the New York
Times and former commander of the Senior Army Reserve Commanders
Association, to chair a committee that would study and recommend plans
for reserve forces recruitment and training.68
While the National Security Training Commission, also known as the
Adler Committee, went about its business, the Army worked within the
parameters of the recently passed Reserve Forces Act of 1952 to reform its
reserve component programs. The act identified the primary purpose of the
reserve force to be the provision of trained units and individuals for the
armed forces during time of war or national emergency. The legislation also
established three levels of liability for service during a national emergency.
The first level, the Ready Reserve, consisted of those units and individuals
liable for initial call-up to active duty and included almost all of the National
Guard as well as some selected Army Reserve units. The second level, the
Standby Reserve, consisted of units of the Army Reserve held at a lower
level of readiness and liable for call-up only in the event that the secretary of
the Army determined that the Ready Reserve could not meet all of the force
requirements. The third level, the Retired Reserve, included those members
of the reserve components placed on the reserves’ retired list. They could
be called up to active duty only by special legislation enacted by Congress.
The legislation had little effect on the day-to-day operations of the National
68. Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Julius Ochs Adler, 1 Aug 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A,
Guard, but it necessitated major revisions in most regulations pertaining to

Army Reserve affairs. Nonetheless, Army leaders regarded the codification
of reserve policies across all services and the efforts to prioritize categories
for recall as positive developments.69
Despite these advances, Army leaders expressed numerous concerns
about the ability of the reserves to reinforce the active force in a time of
national emergency. In general terms, both the National Guard and the
Army Reserve had grown, primarily because of the large number of soldiers
released from active duty who retained reserve obligations. Although
operating at a somewhat reduced strength, national guard units maintained
high levels of participation in required training and drill periods. The
number of Army Reserve units, however, and the assigned strength of those
units showed an alarming decrease. Although regulations required many
personnel leaving active service to spend time in the reserves, no statutory
requirement existed for them to actually join units or participate in training
activities. Skills gained during the course of a two-year active duty service
obligation would diminish quickly and would seriously limit the value of
such reserves if recalled in an emergency.70
A study conducted by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3,
in July and updated in October 1953 reported a serious imbalance in the
organization of forces assigned to the General Reserve. The study found that
more than 90,000 troops would be required during the first four months
of war to bring active duty formations up to strength, expand overseas
support operations, expand the mobilization base, and offset early losses.
This requirement, it concluded, was of greater urgency than procuring
and preparing additional divisions for deployment. As organized, the
General Reserve consisted of twenty-seven national guard divisions and
twenty-five Army Reserve divisions. Because current mobilization plans
envisioned a force of thirty-two divisions to be prepared for deployment,
the report recommended using twenty Army Reserve divisions to provide
the initial troop requirements and to alleviate shortages in other, support-
type units. The study acknowledged the political complications that would
accompany a similar conversion of national guard divisions, particularly
69. Franklin L. Orth, Special Asst to Sec Army (remarks, Army War College, Carlisle Bar-
racks, PA, 7 Dec 1953); Memo, James P. Mitchell, Asst Sec Army, for Chairman, Reserve
Forces Policy Board, 15 May 1953, sub: Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense to
the Congress; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG
319, NACP.
70. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun
1953, 102–5.
for state governors faced with losing the prestige of sponsoring a national
guard division.71
To address the requirement to expand the training base in the event
of full mobilization, the report suggested converting seven of the surplus
reserve divisions into replacement training centers, or training divisions.
To promote flexibility, the five remaining combat divisions and the seven
training divisions would be considered together as twelve divisions that
could be used interchangeably, with selection of roles determined upon the
initiation of full mobilization. All twelve divisions would spend the 1954
summer camp—the National Guard’s primary field training—with active
Army training divisions. During full mobilization, once all national guard
divisions had deployed, the Army could convert training divisions back to
combat divisions as required. The report also noted that only two armored
divisions existed in the reserve program and recommended converting four
national guard infantry divisions into armored divisions.72
Most senior officers agreed that increasing the number of trained reservists
was the most important aspect of the program, regardless of whether
they served as members of reserve units or as individual replacements.
Attempts to increase the numbers of reservists participating in organized
training had not proven successful. Recruiting efforts on the part of military
district personnel and reserve unit commanders also had failed to increase
participation. General Ridgway blamed the underperformance on a lack of
public understanding of the Army Reserve program, and he directed the
six continental Army commanders to initiate an “energetic informational
and procurement campaign to impel interest and active participation.”73 As
the Army waited on the final report of the Adler Committee, however, it
retained an assumption that only some form of universal military training
could provide the kind of numbers required to adequately fill the General
Reserve.74
That belief found some support in the National Security Training
Commission report, which Adler’s committee released in December.
71. Staff Study, Ofc Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 1 Jul 1953, sub: Reserve Components Mobilization
Preparedness Objectives Plan I, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Sub-
group: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
72. Staff Study, Ofc Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 1 Jul 1953, sub: Reserve Components Mobilization.
73. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 8 Dec 1953, sub:
Actions Required in Connection with NSTC Report, File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC
1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
74. Staff Study, Ofc Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 1 Jul 1953, sub: Reserve Components Mobiliza-
tion; Memo, Eddleman for Ch Staff, 8 Dec 1953, sub: Actions Required in Connection with
NSTC Report.
Although the report acknowledged the political infeasibility of a universal

military training initiative, its recommendations differed only slightly. It
urged for a six-month training program, proposed in earlier legislation, to
be put into effect, with an initial increment of 100,000 trainees chosen by
lot through selective service. That program could be expanded gradually
until virtually all American males incurred a service obligation. Lastly, the
commission recommended that the program be taken out of the hands of
the services and assigned to the Selective Service System. Both the Office of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Defense Mobilization embraced
portions of the report and designated it for further study. President
Eisenhower also approved the findings and directed the Department of
Defense to consider the recommendations as part of a new reorganization
plan for reserve forces.75
YEAR IN REVIEW
For the Army, 1953 marked the termination of combat operations in Korea,
although significant levels of forces would remain there for many years
to come. The end of the war enabled the service to examine much of its
organization, equipment, and doctrine, in depth, for the first time since the
beginning of World War II. Leaders began with a suspicion that what had
worked in World War II and Korea might no longer apply to the atomic-age
force. The year also saw the beginning of the Eisenhower presidency. For the
Army, this would be a period of scarce resources as it would compete for its
share of a diminishing defense budget. By the end of the year, the service had
begun a battle for survival as it struggled to carve out a meaningful role in
the president’s New Look defense policy. The next year would find Chief of
Staff Matthew Ridgway committed to reshaping the force to meet what he
perceived to be the requirements of the modern battlefield.
75. Statement, National Security Training Commission to Joint Chs Staff, 20 Nov 1953,
File Unit: Entry A1 137C, Series: SCC 1953, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Watson,
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 165–67.
2
Coming to Grips with the

New Look
As he summarized the progress his service had made during the first
half of 1954, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens wrote that no
generation of Americans had faced the assortment of complexities and
worldwide responsibilities such as those now confronted by the current
U.S. Army. Acknowledging the philosophies of the New Look, he reported
an Army that was adjusting itself to the prospect of a continuing period
of uneasy peace. Despite those concerns, he noted that the Army’s force
strength was scheduled to be reduced by one-quarter of a million in the
coming year. It was, he said, the tendency of Americans to shrug off the
need for an Army or military training once wars had concluded; he
reminded readers that at the end of the Revolutionary War, Congress had
slashed the Regular Army to eighty troops and two officers. Historically,
the United States had frequently maintained the peacetime Army of
a third-rate power. This should not, he warned, ever happen again.1
of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1954
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 Mar 1955), 69–71; Robert J. Watson,
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953–1954,
vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 35–37.
FUNDING THE NEW LOOK ARMY
The bruising battle to develop the military budget for 1955 proved to be only
a prelude to conflicts between the Army and the Eisenhower administration
as the latter began to implement a defense policy more reliant on the threat
of atomic retaliation than on the presence of a large standing army. The
president’s conviction that economic prosperity was the most important
aspect of national security resonated in his selection of the individuals he
had chosen to run the Defense Department.
In a 14 February feature article for the New York Times, Hanson W.
Baldwin highlighted the business approach the administration was taking
in shaping the Pentagon. Where predecessors like Louis A. Johnson,
George C. Marshall, and Robert A. Lovett had come from political, military,
and legal backgrounds, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and his deputy,
Roger M. Kyes, were both formerly of General Motors. The Defense
Department, Baldwin noted, spent annually as much as the sales of the
twenty-two largest industrial corporations in the country. Wilson and his
associates had come to Washington, D.C., to apply their business acumen
to the task of getting that spending under control. Wilson and Kyes arrived
at the Pentagon with barely concealed skepticism, if not also some degree
of contempt for the military brass. In their first year, they presided over a
more or less clean sweep of senior military leadership. Of the thirty-four top
civilian and military jobs in the Pentagon, only three were occupied by the
same people who had held them a year earlier. The previous year, Wilson
had enthusiastically supported President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s calls for
reductions while preparing the 1955 defense budget. Now, in 1954, he was
encouraging further cuts as the military services continued planning for
outlying years.2
The president and the secretary of defense found a willing and
vocal disciple in the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
Arthur W. Radford. The admiral embraced all of the tenants of the New
Look and had testified forcefully before the Senate Appropriations
Committee in favor of the president’s 1955 budget. He emphasized that,
in addition to military factors, the chiefs had to include economic and
political considerations as they made their recommendations. His emphatic
description of the unanimous nature of their recommendations belied the
strong reservations held by some of the other chiefs, most noteworthy,
2. Hanson W. Baldwin, “The Men Who Run the Pentagon,” New York Times, 14 Feb 1954;
“Army Mere Support Force for Air Under ’55 Budget,” Army Times, 23 Jan 1954; Interv,
Maurice Matloff with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 1 Aug 1984, Senior Ofcr Debriefing
Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI).
COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW LOOK 47
General Matthew B. Ridgway. Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Assistant Chief

of Staff, G–3 (Operations), noted that Radford had formed a habit of
speaking for the Joint Chiefs as a corporate body when it was clear that the
opinions he was expressing were solely his own. Although General Ridgway
clearly was irritated that his objections to the budget had been so blatantly
misrepresented, he told his subordinates that the time was not right to
challenge the chairman.3
For his part, Admiral Radford grew increasingly frustrated and irritated
by what he considered to be Ridgway’s intransigence. Not only did Radford
completely embrace almost all of the tenets of Eisenhower’s emerging defense
policies, but he also seems to have forged a close personal relationship with
the president. As such, Radford regarded the Army’s refusal to fall in line
with the New Look to be disloyal and disrespectful. He made it a point in
his published memoirs to mock Ridgway’s reluctant acceptance of proposed
budget allocations as a concession made simply to get home to his “young
bride” for the weekend.4 Radford particularly railed against the Army’s
refusal to acknowledge that future wars would inevitably involve atomic
weapons. With both Radford and Secretary of Defense Wilson so closely
allied with the president’s intentions and beliefs, Ridgway and his successors
would find little sympathy for their contrarian views.5
Eisenhower himself did create something of a back door in October
when he named Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster as his staff secretary and
defense liaison officer. Goodpaster had commanded a combat engineer
battalion during World War II and had later joined the War Planning Office
under General George C. Marshall. He had received a PhD in politics from
Princeton University in 1950 and had begun to develop a reputation as a
3. Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1984), 90; Statement, Adm. Arthur Radford, U.S. Navy, Ch Joint Chs Staff, Hearing Before
the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 83d Cong.
(15 Mar 1954), Series: Chairman’s Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of
the Chairman, Record Group (RG) 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff; Memo,
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 24 Jul 1954, sub: Unilateral
Action by Admiral Radford, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified General
Correspondence, 1948–1954 (hereinafter SCGC 1948–1954), Subgroup: Office of the Chief
of Staff (OCS), RG 319: Records of the Army Staff; both in National Archives at College
Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP). General Ridgway described his fury at both
Radford and President Eisenhower for their description of the unanimous nature of the
chief ’s budget recommendations in his memoir. Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs
of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper Brothers, 1956).
4. Stephen J. Jurika Jr., ed., From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral
Arthur W. Radford (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 1980), 321.
5. Jurika, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 321; Notes and Questionnaire, “Ridgway,”
26 Feb 1955, Series: Chairman’s Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the
Chairman, RG 218, NACP.
scholar-soldier. Although Goodpaster was solidly an Eisenhower loyalist

throughout his tenure, he did provide a sympathetic ear to senior Army
officials and sometimes a way to bypass the secretary of defense and the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs in order to present Army concerns to the
president.6
The Army chief of staff took the time to register formally with the
secretary of defense his concerns over the manner in which the budget was
announced. In his memo to Wilson, Ridgway noted that the impression of
unanimity was misleading. He affirmed that the Joint Chiefs had been given
budgetary and force strength ceilings by “competent authority” before they
began their discussions.7 The recommendations that the chiefs developed,
while unanimous within those limitations, were further qualified by several
assumptions regarding the international situation. Ridgway expressed his
opinion to Secretary Wilson that the interests of the Department of Defense
would be served better by openly acknowledging the limitations Wilson had
placed upon the chiefs’ deliberations.8
By March 1954, with the 1955 budget approved, the services turned
their attention to planning for the ensuing years. Events in Europe and the
Far East already had raised doubts among some over the wisdom of the
previous year’s force reductions. A deterioration of the French position in
Indochina and the uncertain prospects for the French ratification of the
European Defense Community caused even Secretary Wilson to take a
second look at proposed force levels. The Force Plan for 1957, published
as JCS 2101/113, established an Army force strength of one million service
members, comprising fourteen divisions. General Ridgway and the Army
Staff countered that the service’s worldwide responsibilities required a force
of at least seventeen divisions, a goal it could not meet at that personnel
level. Because the troop strength in Europe was controlled by the American
commitment to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), most of
the personnel cuts overseas would fall upon Army forces in the Far East.
Ridgway argued that the reduction in combat readiness would reduce the
U.S. contribution to collective security and might be interpreted by allies as
further evidence of the administration’s reliance upon massive retaliation
as the primary instrument of national policy. Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Materiel) John Slezak told Ridgway that if the Army could not get
6. Robert S. Jordan, An Unsung Soldier: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).
7. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, for Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, 11 Mar 1954,
Ridgway Papers, MHI.
8. Memo, Ridgway for Wilson, 11 Mar 1954.
Secretary Wilson to reconsider the force strength target, it had to get him to
understand and accept the serious results of that target.9
The other service chiefs appeared to share some of the Army’s concerns
and made similar appeals to the secretary of defense. Based upon these
apprehensions, in July, Secretary Wilson tentatively confirmed a force level
of 1.173 million for the Army with “as near a twenty division structure as
feasible.”10 The other services received similar augmentations. The president,
however, had not abandoned his desire for major reductions in the defense
budget. In a meeting with Wilson on 8 December, Eisenhower rejected
the idea of any increases for the Army and Navy and reaffirmed the force
strength objectives established in JCS 2101/113. Not only did the president
turn down the requested increases, but he also insisted that the reduced
strengths be reached by the end of fiscal year 1956—a year earlier than
planned—with part of the reduction in 1955. Although he did not couch it
as an order, the president expressed the opinion that he saw no reason that
the Army divisions in Korea could not be maintained at reduced strength.11
General Ridgway met with his primary staff the next evening to begin
planning a way forward. He was particularly anxious to avoid a morale and
public relations calamity that news of the force reductions might provoke. He
directed his staff to handle the required opening and closing of installations
in a methodical and orderly manner so that those affected might receive the
maximum possible notice. He also instructed that the divisions in Korea and
Europe be maintained, for the time being, at 100 percent strength. Maj. Gen.
George H. Decker, Comptroller of the Army, concluded the meeting with
the observation that the president’s decision would cause him to throw out
months of work and to start over on the budget process.12
Later in December, Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens wrote a detailed
memorandum for Secretary Wilson describing the impact the accelerated
force reduction would have on Army readiness. Given a troop ceiling of
one million, Stevens informed Wilson that the maximum supportable troop
strength for overseas forces was approximately 375,000. The remaining
9. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 70–72; MFR, Lt. Col. Alfred J. F. Moody, Gen.
Staff, 1 Mar 1954, sub: Briefing of Chief of Staff on Mid-Range Estimate (MRE) Committee
Report for FY 1957; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 19 Jul 1954, sub:
Army Program for FY 1955; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
10. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 72.
11. Staff Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 8 Dec 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series:
12. MFR, Brig. Gen. Frank W. Moorman, Sec Gen Staff, 9 Dec 1954, sub: Staff Conference
Reference Staff Memorandum dated 8 December 1954 signed by General Ridgway, File
Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
soldiers were required in the continental United States to constitute the

training base, provide logistical support, assist with Army Reserve and Army
National Guard functions, and maintain a small strategic reserve. Given the
numbers, he continued, the Army would consist of thirteen mobile, one
static, and three training divisions, for a total of seventeen divisions. The
thirteen mobile divisions included five in Europe, two in Korea, and four in
the United States, prepared for prompt shipment overseas. The remaining
two divisions would be maintained in a reduced state of readiness and only
be deployable after six months of training. The static division consisted of
scattered elements in Alaska and the Caribbean. The three training divisions,
also in the United States, provided only cadre for the training of new recruits
and inductees. Given that status, Stevens wrote, the United States was eight
divisions short of meeting its commitment to NATO of seventeen divisions
by D+6 months. The Army secretary also reminded Wilson that further
redeployments from Korea would interfere with the recovery of supplies and
materiel there and require a disproportionate number of service troops to
remain in the Far East to support allied forces and U.S. Air Force units that
remained. Finally, Stevens concluded, the reductions would render several
installations superfluous, and he warned that Camp Kilmer, New Jersey;
Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, would have to
be closed.13
Throughout the budget process, General Ridgway had premised his
defense of Army troop strength requirements on the belief that a battlefield
dominated by atomic weapons would require a greater number of soldiers,
not fewer as the New Look advocates had proposed. Early experiments with
integrating atomic weapons into military war games had indicated that the
high number of casualties anticipated in such a conflict would require greater
numbers of replacements and additional resources to evacuate the dead and
wounded. He also frequently had warned members of the administration
that local wars, and even global war, conceivably might be fought without
resort to nuclear weapons. In his testimony before Congress regarding the
budget, Ridgway had warned that a situation might well occur wherein no
nation would use atomic weapons for fear of retaliation. The considerations
and decisions in preparing the budget for fiscal year 1955 provided a clear
indication that the Army chief of staff ’s arguments had fallen on deaf ears.
In decrying the force reductions, an editorial in the Army Times noted that
the cuts were “a fair indication that General Matt Ridgway’s single-handed
13. Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, 22 Dec 1954, sub:
Impact of Reduction in the Authorized Military Strength of the Army for FYs 1955 and
1956 on the Capabilities of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954,
and valiant effort to prove the value of landpower in the atomic age has not
gained full recognition in the Pentagon or the White House.”14
FIGHTING THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS
For the Army, 1954 became a period of almost unrelenting bad news and
negative publicity. The conflict in Korea had ended without a clearly successful
resolution, and evidence was mounting that some Army prisoners of war
(POWs) had not conducted themselves honorably while in captivity. By
now, the implications of Eisenhower’s New Look defense policy had become
clear. Not only would the Army absorb the greatest share of reductions in
both force strength and budget, but the administration’s statements about
its reliance upon atomic weapons and the United States Air Force indicated
that service’s ascendency. On the domestic front, an expanding economy and
plentiful employment opportunities made military service and particularly
the draft increasingly unpopular. Despite the end of the war in Korea, 1954
saw 253,230 draftees enter the United States armed forces, most of them
joining the Army. Less than ten years after the Army’s success in World
War II, the public’s perception seemed to lack the favorable, nostalgic glow
that it seemed to have for the other services.
In a further indignity, the Army found itself enmeshed in another
controversy in 1954, when it ran afoul of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy and
his bombastic quest to eliminate communism from all aspects of American
life. McCarthy had seized upon the security-related investigations of some
federal workers at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to open up a widespread
investigation of alleged Communists in the Army. When Army officials
accused McCarthy’s chief counsel, Roy M. Cohn, of seeking preferential
treatment for his aide, Pvt. G. David Schine, who had been drafted into the
Army, McCarthy accused the service of retaliating against his aggressive
investigations. Secretary Stevens, in an attempt to mollify the senator,
met with McCarthy, Cohn, and Private Schine, and allowed himself to be
photographed with the young soldier. This apparent show of support for
the private, along with Stevens’s reluctance to speak out against McCarthy’s
wild accusations, earned him a lecture on service loyalty from General
Ridgway and condemnation throughout much of the news media. The
14. Testimony, Hearing Before the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee, 83d Cong. (4 Feb 1954); Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, for Special
Asst to the President for National Security Affairs, 22 Nov 1954, sub: Review of Basic
National Security Policy (NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2); both in Ridgway Papers, MHI;
“Butchery,” Army Times, 25 Dec 1954.
Army eventually recovered from its black eye, largely through a series of
nationally televised Senate hearings that systematically destroyed McCarthy’s
arguments. Stevens, however, was devastated by the beating he had taken in
the press, and even more so by the perceived lack of support he had received
from anyone in the Eisenhower administration. Although Secretary Wilson
and Vice President Richard M. Nixon would talk the Army secretary out of
resigning, Stevens remained bitter about the treatment he had received. For
the Army, the McCarthy hearings were still more bad publicity the service
did not need, and the intense congressional and popular scrutiny of its
leadership contributed to its perception that the American public neither
understood nor appreciated the service’s role in national defense.15
In May, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, prepared
a memo for distribution to the General Staff titled, “A Program to Improve
the Public Attitude Toward the United States Army.” Gavin’s main point
was that despite the real accomplishments of the United States Army in the
past twenty-five years, the American public tended to take its soldiers for
granted. The unpleasant aspects of its role, including disproportionate battle
casualties, relatively poor pay, extremely unpleasant battle environment,
and the traditional American aversion to militarism all worked to limit
any significant public affection for the Army. As a result, Gavin affirmed,
the Army must no longer take itself for granted and must sell itself. He
suggested that the service call upon some of the “many expert writers of
national repute” with demonstrated affection for the Army (based on their
own prior service) to explain at Army schools the requirements for public
relations.16 Commanders should encourage soldiers to join civic groups
such as Kiwanis, Lions Clubs, and Rotary to promote Army interests. The
15. Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Ch Staff, 26 Feb 1954, sub: Recent Developments
Regarding Senator McCarthy, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Robert Shogan, No Sense of Decency:
The Army-McCarthy Hearings: A Demagogue Falls and Television Takes Charge of American
Politics (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2009), 148–54; “Stevens in Attack,” New York Times,
14 Mar 1954; Telecon, Sec Def, 6 May 1954, “Telephone Calls,” Ann Whitman Files
(microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center,
Carlisle, PA (hereinafter AHEC); Ltr, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens to Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy, 3 Nov 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
16. Memo, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin for Distribution, 17 May 1954, sub: A Program to
Improve Public Attitude Toward the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security
Classified Correspondence, 1948–1954, (hereinafter SCC 1948–1954), Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (U.S. Senate

Historical Office)
general concluded his piece with a peroration urging the Army to hustle and
sell itself from every rooftop and crossroads.17
The Army’s chief of information, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, seized
upon the memo to promote his own efforts and to recommend that General
Gavin’s ideas represented a sound strategy for promotion of the Army. He
noted that the sister services placed a higher priority on public information
and public relations activities than did the Army. The Army might better
campaign for its long-term policies, he said, by reorganizing its public-
facing informational activities under a deputy chief of staff for public affairs.
That decision, however, and a more fundamental public relations policy for
the Army as a whole were outside the control of the Army Staff and would
have to await consideration by the executive branch and the Department
of Defense.18
Two weeks later, on 4 June, General Ridgway prepared a memorandum for
primary members of the staff and a personal letter to all commanding generals
of major continental and overseas commands. He directed commanders at
17. Memo, Gavin for Distribution, 17 May 1954, sub: A Program to Improve Public Attitude
Toward the Army.
18. Memo, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, Ch Info, for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration,
17 May 1954, sub: General Gavin’s Memorandum on a Program to Improve Public Attitude
all levels to consult with troop and public information officers as an integral
part of the planning process. He stressed the importance of community
relations, particularly to those commanders of installations in the United
States. He reminded officers of the public’s antipathy to the continuation
of selective service and its desire to reduce defense expenditures. The
chief of staff was confident that the public would continue to support the
Army as long as it understood the service’s problems, accomplishments,
and potentialities.19
Army Vice Chief of Staff General Charles L. Bolte followed up on Ridgway’s
memo with his own letter to the six continental Army commanders. In the
correspondence, Bolte expressed his opinion that the best way to keep the
American public informed about the actions of the Army was to let members
of Congress visit military installations to see Army activities for themselves.
That way, he said, when deliberating legislation and appropriations of
critical importance to the Army, members would have first-hand knowledge
of what was going on in the field. Bolte directed Chief of Legislative Liaison
Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Hauck Jr. to send representatives from his office to
visit Army Headquarters to discuss the program in more detail.20
The Army’s campaign to improve its public image thus moved forward on
several fronts. Movietone News produced a 55-minute color documentary
entitled This Is Your Army, illustrating the activities of U.S. soldiers around
the world. The film showed the service’s new weapons and missiles in
breathtaking action, and demonstrated to American taxpayers what their
money was buying. Army spokesmen took great pains to show to the
public that theirs was a modern, forward-looking service. The film received
endorsements from the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars,
and both organizations pledged to assist in generating public interest in
its release. When the weekly news magazine Newsweek published a cover
story about the Army’s atomic artillery, the former chief information officer
and Second Army commander, Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, complained that
the cover photo had not identified the guns as belonging to the Army. The
Toward the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
19. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Ch Staff, for Primary Staff, 4 Jun 1954, sub: Army
Troop, Public and Congressional Relations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–
1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
20. Ltr, Gen. Charles L. Bolte to Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, Cmdg Gen, Second Army, 18 Aug
1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
An army officer models the new summer cotton khaki shirt and short
trousers for male officers, 17 December 1956. (U.S. Army, National
letters USA were not enough for the hasty reader, he argued. All vehicles and
equipment should be stenciled “U.S. ARMY.”21
Army leaders enthusiastically released public notices highlighting the
Army’s support for the Boy Scouts and other youth activities. The chief of
information labeled service assistance in overseas disaster relief efforts as
targets of opportunity to be exploited in the public relations campaign. In
Europe, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
21. Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Council of Motion Picture Organizations, Inc., 29 Sep
1954, Ridgway Papers, MHI; “Civilian Audiences to See ‘This is Your Army’ Movie,” Army
Times, 4 Dec 1954; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Floyd L. Parks to Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Dep Ch Staff
Ops and Administration, 30 Dec 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “The Army Is Still in Business,” United States Army Combat
Forces Journal 4 (May 1954): 11–14.
reminded General Ridgway of the upcoming ten-year memorial services for

the Normandy landings. He noted that U.S. military participation in the
ceremonies, and those for subsequent observances, would also be useful in
bringing to the public eye the service and sacrifice of Army veterans. On a
less somber note, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1 (Personnel), Maj.
Gen. Herbert B. Powell, announced in August that the Army soon would
begin testing a new summer uniform of shorts and short-sleeved shirts, sure
to keep the service in the public’s eye.22
For an Army that was desperately trying to improve its public image, the
conduct of its POWs during the Korean conflict was an issue that would
not go away. By the spring of 1954, Army officials were still debating
the appropriate level of disciplinary action for suspected collaborators
or traitors. In a memorandum to major commanders dated 15 March,
Adjutant General Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin argued that the Army should
take vigorous action to bring those individuals to justice. Annexes to the
same document, however, pointed out the percentage of prisoners who
had suffered from disease, malnutrition, and mistreatment at the hands of
the enemy. One attachment noted that although soldiers participated in
intensive and detailed combat training, they received only minimal, broadly
generalized information regarding their deportment in the event of capture
by the enemy. Given the enemy’s success in breaking down the resistance of
so many prisoners, the analysis concluded that the armed forces required
a code of conduct clearly stating the military duties and responsibilities of
those taken prisoner.23
A general court-martial sitting at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.,
reinforced the point two months later when it convicted Cpl. Edward S.
Dickenson of collaborating with the enemy while held as a POW in North
Korea. His was the first trial for misconduct as a POW to come out of the
Korean War. Dickenson received a sentence of ten years’ confinement
at hard labor, total forfeiture of all pay, and a dishonorable discharge.
Exploiting extensive media coverage, the defense had based most of its case
on the harsh treatment Dickenson had received while in captivity and his
22. Memo, Gen. Charles L. Bolte for Asst Sec Army (Manpower and Reserve Forces),
19 Aug 1954, sub: Cooperation with the Boy Scouts of America; Memo, Maj. Gen.
Gilman C. Mudgett for Distribution, 29 Dec 1954, sub: News Coverage of Overseas Disaster
Relief; Ltr, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 20 Apr 1954; MFR, Col.
Alexander D. Surles Jr., Asst Sec Gen Staff, 19 Aug 1954, sub: Army Staff Meeting, 1130
hours, 18 August 1954; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
23. Memo, Maj. Gen. William E. Bergin for Cmdg Gens, 15 Mar 1954, sub: RECAP-K (Part
II) Policy, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
Boy Scouts John Murray and Stephen Worden visit Chief, a 32-year-
old retired cavalry horse, held by Sgt. Ben Parker at Fort Riley, Kansas.
(U.S. Army, National Archive Still Picture Branch)
lack of preparation for such an ordeal.24 Despite General Ridgway’s written

objections to what he considered to be an excessively harsh punishment,
Secretary Wilson also ordered Army Secretary Stevens to issue dishonorable
discharges to the twenty-one POWs who had refused repatriation.25
In August, the secretary of defense established an ad hoc committee,
chaired by the assistant secretary of defense for manpower and personnel, to
study the problems surrounding the conduct of American POWs. He directed
the committee to delineate the scope of the problem; to isolate its military,
medical, civil, and judicial aspects; and to begin moving toward a program
of indoctrination and training for the entire U.S. military organization. The
committee returned its report to the assistant secretary on 3 November.
Its primary conclusion was that the services required a determination of
the standards of conduct that were applicable to all military personnel. It
noted that each service had already undertaken intensive studies on the
subject based upon their experiences in Korea. Although they agreed on
24. “The Trial of a Korean War Turncoat: The Court Martial of Corporal Edward S.
Dickenson,” in Lore of the Corps: Compilation from The Army Lawyer 2010–2017, ed.
Fred Borch (Washington, DC: Judge Advocate General’s Corps, 2018).
25. MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 22 Jan 1954, Ridgway Papers, MHI.
most aspects of the duties required of prisoners, the services differed on the
types and amount of information prisoners might reveal when interrogated.
The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps clung to the traditional approach of
the Geneva Conventions that prisoners must provide only their name, rank,
serial number, and date of birth. The Air Force, however, advocated a policy
allowing prisoners to reveal any information that “reasonably cannot be used
to the injury of the United States or its Allies.”26 This discrepancy was a major
sticking point. The committee prepared a draft uniform policy on prisoner
conduct containing options for either interpretation. It then referred the
policy back to the services for comment. Army internal discussions on the
proposal flatly rejected the Air Force interpretation, and, by the end of the
year, the services achieved no further progress on the issue.27
Meanwhile, the Army began to work its way through the investigations
related to reports of collaboration and misconduct. Of the roughly 3,200
soldiers repatriated at the end of the war, the service determined that 225
required further investigation concerning their conduct while in captivity.
By October 1954, one officer, two corporals, and one private already had been
tried by court-martial. The cases of thirty-six others remained in pretrial
investigation, determining whether or not court-martial was appropriate.
Fifteen others had received general or undesirable discharges. The fate of the
remaining 170 service members remained uncertain, except that they did
not warrant trial by court-martial. In contrast to those statistics, the Army
also announced that it had recognized and decorated fifty-seven soldiers for
withstanding enemy coercion and attempts at indoctrination.28
BUILDING AN ATOMIC ARMY
With the war over in Korea, and with demobilization in high gear, the Army
began resetting its corps and divisional forces to account for the new peacetime
26. Memo, Brig. Gen. John H. Ives for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 3 Nov 1954,
sub: Indoctrination and Training of Military Personnel Concerning Conduct While in a
Prisoner of War Status, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Special
Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP.
27. Memo, Charles E. Wilson for Service Secs, 7 Aug 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training
of Military Personnel Concerning Conduct While in a Prisoner of War Status; Memo, Ives
for Asst Sec Def (Manpower and Personnel), 3 Nov 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training
of Military Personnel; both in File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of
Special Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch
Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1954, sub: Indoctrination and Training of Military Personnel
Concerning Conduct While in a Prisoner of War Status, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series:
SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, NACP.
28. “PW Record is Defended,” Army Times, 30 Oct 1954.
realities. Based upon guidance from President Eisenhower, the Army began
to send units home from Korea in the spring of 1954, commencing with
the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, two national guard formations that
returned to state control. Later in June, Secretary Wilson decided to release
the 28th, 31st, 37th, 43d, 44th, and 47th Infantry Divisions, also national
guard units, back to state control as well. In Europe, the 5th and 9th Infantry
Divisions replaced the 28th and 43d. The Army reactivated the 69th Infantry
Division and the 101st Airborne Division to fill the gaps in the training base
left by the departures of the 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions. To help balance
the service’s combat strength, General Ridgway directed the activation of a
new armored division, the 4th, at Fort Hood, Texas. Later in the year, in an
effort to give the Army more divisions without any corresponding increase
in force strength, Secretary Wilson authorized the activation of the 23d and
71st Infantry Divisions. These two units, dubbed “Wilson Divisions,” made
use of existing regimental combat teams and smaller units, with the 23d
stationed in the Panama Canal Zone and Puerto Rico, and the 71st stationed
primarily in Alaska. Because both divisions were severely understrength
and widely scattered, the Army Staff labeled them as “static units,” meaning
they were not capable of early deployment.29
By the end of 1954, when the dust had settled, the Army had six corps,
and nineteen active and six training divisions. In Europe, the Seventh
Army controlled the V and VII Corps, the 2d Armored Division, and the
1st, 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions. While the XVI Corps had been
inactivated in Japan, and the X Corps returned to the United States to be
inactivated in 1955, the I and IX Corps—with the 1st Cavalry Division and
the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions—remained as part of U.S. Army Forces,
Far East, in Korea and Japan. The 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions returned to
the continental United States and the 25th Infantry Division had moved to
Schofield Barracks in Hawai‘i assigned to U.S. Army, Pacific. In the United
States, the III and XVIII Corps with the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis,
Washington; the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia; the 8th
Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado; the 10th Infantry Division at Fort
Riley, Kansas; the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions at Fort Hood, Texas; the
11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and the 82d Airborne
Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, made up the General Reserve. The
two static divisions brought the total to nineteen. Also in the United States,
the 6th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California; the 69th Infantry Division
at Fort Dix, New Jersey; the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Jackson, South
1998), 244–53; “Two Wilson Divisions Formed,” Army Times, 20 Nov 1954.
Carolina; the 3d Armored Division at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the 5th Armored
Division at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; and the 6th Armored Division at Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri, operated as training divisions.30
As the post-Korea demobilization began in earnest, the Army’s leaders
began to reevaluate the service’s mission and how it could best fit into the
defense of the United States. In a February Army Times editorial that expressed
what many Army officers believed, military analyst and columnist George
Fielding Eliot wrote that the service needed to develop a concept of land
power that could compete with the ardent Navy and Air Force proponents of
sea power and air power. Any ensign, he wrote, could explain the importance
of sea power to the United States. The Air Force, he continued, was always
ready with a new scheme to “bomb something from somewhere.”31 Those
organizations had grabbed most of the glamor of military service, which was
why they received the lion’s share of the military budget and had no problem
maintaining their numbers by voluntary enlistment rather than by selective
service. If the Army was to compete with the other services, Eliot concluded,
it had to present the case for its readiness for the modern atomic battlefield.
If the Army was developing mobile tactics and modern weapons of great
striking power, it must show not only the ways in which those elements
applied to the battlefield but also the strategic conditions under which the
service could employ them.32
The theoretical underpinning for such a philosophy was already
underway. While serving as commandant of the Army’s Command and
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy
had appointed a small group of officers to study the role of the Army in
modern warfare, with a special focus on the employment of atomic weapons.
The study group formed a partnership with the Operations Research Office
of Johns Hopkins University and ultimately produced a text for officer
students on the divisional aspects of atomic warfare. Two of the officers, Col.
George C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, published the text in
1953 as Atomic Weapons in Land Combat. Although he was disturbed by
some of the book’s conclusions regarding the inevitability of atomic combat,
Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin wrote in a review that its publication was proof
that atomic weapons were here to stay and that the Army had to learn to
deal with them. A short time later, Lt. Col. Ferdinand O. Miksche, a Czech
30. “Two Wilson Divisions Formed”; Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff,
G–1, for Staff Coordination, 23 Jun 1954, sub: First Cavalry Division Designation, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
31. George Fielding Eliot, “Army Can’t Afford Policy of Silence,” Army Times, 13 Feb 1954.
32. Eliot, “Army Can’t Afford Policy of Silence.”
The tank-infantry team of Company E, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment,

on the road to the rendezvous area after a training mission at the
Grafenwoehr Training Area in the Southern Area Command, 28 July
1955. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
officer who had served in the British and French Armies, published another
book entitled Atomic Weapons and Armies. Miksche’s book made many of
the same points, but applied them to the armies of the world, not just the
United States. Atomic war would be, most assuredly, a two-way affair.33
Other Army officers expressed and exchanged ideas regarding atomic
warfare through the professional military journals. The Army Combat
Forces Journal, published by the Association of the United States Army,
and Military Review, published by the Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, both printed numerous articles
concerning tactical and operational concepts for an atomic battlefield.34
33. Study, James Johnson, “Tactical Organization for Atomic Warfare,” (Chevy Chase, MD:
Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 16 Apr 1954), Historians Files, U.S.
Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC; Col. George C. Reinhardt and
Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat (Harrisburg, PA: Military
Service Publishing Company, 1953); Lt. Col. Ferdinand O. Miksche, Atomic Weapons and
Armies (New York: Praeger, 1955); James M. Gavin, “First Book on Atomic Tactics Lists
Problems Facing American Planners,” Army Times, 9 Jan 1954.
34. Col. E. L. Rowny, “Ground Tactics in an Atomic War,” United States Army Combat Forces
Journal 5 (Aug 1954): 18–22; Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch, “Reserves in Atomic Warfare,”
On 27 September 1954, the Army released Field Manual 100–5, Field

Service Regulations, Operations, to replace the pre–Korean War 1949
version. This manual, prepared by the Command and General Staff College,
provided new doctrine for the post-Korea Army with a hybrid of previous
operational and tactical thought and new atomic considerations. The manual
addressed recent Korean experience by calling for the Army to prepare for
both general war and “wars of limited objective.”35 However, it maintained
the Army’s fundamental belief in an infantry-based war of movement with
atomic weapons simply as another means of fire support.36
Although the Army had experimented with atomic weapons employment
to a limited extent in Exercise Snowfall in 1952, it had not yet made them
the centerpiece of a major maneuver. The service took another step in that
direction in 1954 with Exercise Flashburn. Scheduled 23 April to 5 May in
the Carolina Maneuver Area stretching between Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
to the north and Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in the south, the exercise
featured expanded training objectives, including the coordinated tactical
use of all available types of atomic weapons and a defense against their use
by enemy forces. Although the maneuver elements, consisting primarily of
the 82d Airborne Division, the 37th Infantry Division, and the 3d Armored
Cavalry Regiment, seemed to validate most of the Army’s emerging doctrine
of dispersion and maneuver, the exercise exposed conflicts between the Army
and the Air Force over command and control of the weapons themselves.37
Army leaders believed that the ground commander should have the
authority to select the delivery system and retain operational control
over the attack of a selected target. The Air Force, however, clung to its
position that once the ground commander had requested a strike, only the
air commander had the authority to designate the delivery means and to
coordinate and control the attack. In his critique of the exercise, Army Field
Forces Commander Lt. Gen. John E. Dahlquist concluded that an urgent
need existed for a joint doctrine approved by both services. Army officials
came away from the exercise even more convinced of their requirement for
a wider range of ground-launched atomic munitions over which they could
United States Army Combat Forces Journal 4 (May 1954): 15–19; “Streamlining the Infantry
Division,” Military Review 34 (May 1954): 89–94.
35. Field Manual 100–5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Washington, DC:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 27 Sep 1954).
36. Field Manual 100–5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, 27 Sep 1954; Walter E.
Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2011), 168–71.
37. Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935–1964 (Fort
Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1969), 195–200; “Flashburn Lessons: Disperse,
Dig In,” Army Times, 1 May 1954.
A 5-ton truck pulls a 155-mm. gun out of a C–124 aircraft during the
airlift of Battery C, 540th Field Artillery Battalion, at Camp Mackall,
North Carolina, during Exercise Flashburn. (U.S. Army, National
retain full control. The postexercise critique also commented on the Air
Force’s inability, or unwillingness, to support extensive air movement, air
assault, or aerial resupply missions, a concern frequently addressed by the
Army chief of staff as well.38
General Ridgway thus had two motivations in his desire to reorganize
the Army’s combat divisions. Secretary Wilson’s Department of Defense
pressed the chief of staff to reduce the size of the Army’s divisions while not
reducing the number of divisions. At the same time, Ridgway believed that
the division structure that had served through World War II and the Korean
War was poorly prepared and equipped to survive and win on a modern
battlefield. In April 1954, he directed General Dahlquist to prepare a plan for
38. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 12 Apr 1954, sub:
Policy for the Tactical Employment of Atomic Weapons During Exercise Flashburn, File
Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Paul C.
Jussel, “Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army, 1956–1960” (PhD diss.,
Ohio State University, 2004), Historians Files, CMH.
General John E. Dahlquist (U.S. Army)
developing a new organization and the accompanying table of organization

and equipment for the service’s atomic-age battlefield divisions.39
Ridgway’s directive noted that, although current division organizations
provided increased firepower and capabilities as compared to their World
War II counterparts, they were also larger and less mobile. He wanted Army
Field Forces to explore what he called more favorable combat-potential-
to-manpower ratios, making combat units more mobile, flexible, and
less vulnerable to atomic attack. This could be done, he believed, without
sacrificing support capabilities. He encouraged Dahlquist to explore
new technologies that would improve the Army’s capacity for sustained
operations in an atomic environment. He requested a study of both infantry
39. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 264–65; Jussel, “Intimidating the World”; Memo, Lt.
Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Dep Ch Staff Plans and Research, for Ch Army Field Forces,
19 Apr 1954, sub: Organization Studies to Improve the Army Combat Potential-to-
Manpower Ratio, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
and armored divisions, with the understanding that the airborne divisions
would be similar enough to the infantry in most respects. The directive
authorized Army Field Forces to reorganize one armored and one infantry
division into provisional organizations for the purpose of testing new
concepts. The final plan and new tables of organization and equipment were
due to the assistant chief of staff by 1 November 1955.40
In July, the Army announced that it was establishing two experimental
divisions, for the purpose of testing the prototype organizations under
simulated conditions of atomic combat. The two guinea-pig divisions,
the press release claimed, would have more mobility, flexibility, and self-
sufficiency in combat than ever before. Officially titled Atomic Field Army,
or ATFA–1, the infantry and armored divisions were as similar as possible.
The infantry division consisted of a separate headquarters battalion; signal,
engineer, and tank battalions; seven infantry battalions; division artillery;
and a support command. One 4.2-inch mortar battalion and two 105-mm.
howitzer battalions made up the division artillery. The support command,
a new organization, included medical, maintenance, supply and transport,
and personnel service companies. The headquarters battalion included
three separate command headquarters to serve as the command and control
elements for the battalions, which could be organized into task forces as the
situation warranted. Total strength of the division was about 13,500, a cut of
almost 4,000 from the previous infantry division structure.41
The new armored division organization looked similar. It included
headquarters, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance battalions; three medium
and three heavy tank battalions; three armored infantry battalions; division
artillery; and a support command. The division artillery was the same as
the infantry division, except that the 105-mm. howitzers were self-propelled
rather than towed. Like the infantry division, the headquarters element
included three separate combat command headquarters. The strength of
the division was approximately 12,000, a drop of almost 2,700 from the
previous organization.42
Both divisions introduced some significant changes to traditional models.
Each consolidated all aircraft into an aviation company of some fifty aircraft
in the headquarters battalion. The new organization placed antiaircraft
guns within the field artillery battalions. Separate antiaircraft battalions and
military police companies disappeared from both divisions. Neither division
fielded atomic weapons, which the new organizations moved to the field
40. Memo, Lemnitzer for Ch Army Field Forces, 19 Apr 1954, sub: Organization Studies.
41. “Army to Organize Two Experimental A-War Divisions,” Army Times, 17 Jul 1954;
Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 265–67.
army level. The newly devised division support commands also introduced
drastic changes that were discomforting to many senior officers. Unlike in
the old regiment, which was nearly self-contained, combat commanders
had to turn to the division support commander for maintenance, supply, or
administration needs that exceeded the capability within their battalions.
The change created a unit with an extended span of control and additional
responsibilities that were new to many service support officers.43 (See Charts
2 and 3.)
Headquarters, Army Field Forces, quickly made plans to test the new
concepts. On 8 September 1954, it issued two almost identical sets of guidance
for creating prototypes of the new divisions and preparing for evaluations. It
addressed each letter to commandants of Army branch schools and technical
service chiefs. Exercise Follow Me would evaluate the new infantry
division. Army Field Forces tasked the commandant of the Infantry School
to prepare a detailed plan for a field test of the provisional organization.
The Third Army’s commanding general received the responsibility for
providing troops and logistical and administrative support. Exercise Blue
Bolt would assess the new armored division structure. The commandant
of the Armored School had the responsibility of preparing the field test, and
the commanding general of the Fourth Army provided required support.44
The assumptions contained in the guidance gave clear indication of the
intent behind the new organizations. The scenario would depict a conflict
with atomic weapons available and prevalent on both sides. Corps and
higher headquarters would provide atomic delivery means— including guns,
guided missiles, rockets, and tactical air—down to the division level. Both
sides also would prepare for chemical and biological weapons. All aspects of
the exercise would emphasize the conditions of a battlefield dominated by
atomic weapons. The first ten days of the maneuver would examine battalion
and combat command-level operations; the final eighteen days would look
at the division as a whole.45
The guidance also provided periods before the formal testing to organize
and prepare the provisional divisions and to conduct tactical and command
post exercises at all levels within the force. The tasking did not identify
a specific date for the tests to occur, but it requested a submission of the
43. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 267–69; Jussel, “Intimidating the World.”
44. Memo, Col. H. M. Rund, Adjutant Gen, for Ch Engs et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance
for Plan of Field Test, Exercise Blue Bolt; Memo, Col. H. M. Rund, Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg
Gen, Third U.S. Army, et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan of Field Test, Exercise
Follow Me; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
45. Memo, Rund for Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan
of Field Test.
Chart 2—Atomic Field Army Infantry Division, 30 September 1954
INFANTRY DIVISION
13,542
DIV HQ BN SIG BN TANK BN (90-mm.) ENG BN

670 627 611 639
INF BN DIV ARTY SPT BN

1,019 each 2,539 1,323
HHB HHC
128
HH & SV CO
363 MED CO
FA BN (105-mm.)
819 each
COMBAT MAINT CO
CMD
MORTAR BN
(4.2-inch) SUPPLY &
RECON CO 740 TRANS CO
151
MED DET
33 PERS SV CO
AVN CO
140
MED DET
16
Source: John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and
Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1998), 266.
Chart 3—Atomic Field Army Armored Division, 30 September 1954
ARMORED DIVISION
11,938
DIV HQ BN RECON BN TANK BN (120-mm.) ARMD

515 808 672 ENG BN
741
ARMD INF BN SIG BN SPT CMD

876 each 477 1,859
MAINT BN
TANK BN (90-mm.) DIV ARTY
599 each
2,433 SUPPLY &
TRANS BN
HH & SV CO HHB SPT BN

131
PERS SV CO
COMBAT
CMD FA BN (105-mm.)
762 each HH & SV CO
AVN CO MORTAR BN MED CO

(4.2-inch)
745
MED DET MED DET

33
History, 1998), 268.
detailed plan to Headquarters, Army Field Forces, by 15 November, roughly

two months from the date of receipt.46
Although the plans for the new divisions assumed that both sides
would employ atomic weapons from the onset of any future conflict, some
officers were not at all certain that would be the case. General Ridgway, in
particular, feared that the new structures placed too much emphasis on
atomic warfare and not enough on the ability to wage a conventional war.
He directed General Dahlquist to have another look at his study with the
idea of stressing a dual capability. Explaining the task to Dahlquist, General
Gavin, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, wrote that previous studies had focused
only on preparing for a two-sided atomic war. The chief of staff wanted a
new study on the future organization of the Army for the period of 1960 to
1970. In that study, as well, he wanted to develop an organization capable of
waging both an atomic and conventional war.47
Although the goal was to provide a dual-capable force, the list of
assumptions attached to Gavin’s letter indicated a continued concern for the
Army’s role on an atomic battlefield. The object of the study was to develop
doctrinal and organizational concepts applicable to sustained land combat
on the Eurasian land mass for the foreseeable future. Clear, but unspoken,
was the conviction that the Soviet Union and China remained the principal
subjects of American military preparations. National survival depended
upon the development and retention of both a nuclear and a nonnuclear
military establishment. Ridgway assumed that both the United States and
“the enemy” would operate in an era of nuclear plenty.48 The Army would
have available a new family of weapons, including surface-to-surface
guided missiles with a nuclear capability; long-range rockets, also with a
dual capability; and nuclear projectiles available for larger calibers of field
artillery. Smaller calibers would employ high-fragmentation ammunition.49
The rest of the G–3’s concept guidance portrayed an evolving vision of the
Army’s future requirements. Because war involving atomic weapons could
46. Memo, Rund for Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, et al., 8 Sep 1954, sub: Guidance for Plan
of Field Test.
47. “Army to Organize Two Experimental A-War Divisions”; Ltr, Gen. John E. Dahlquist,
Ch Army Field Forces, to Lt. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, Cdr, Seventh Army, 14 Feb 1955,
File Unit: Entry 2000, Series: USAREUR General Correspondence, 1953–1955, RG 549:
Records of U.S. Army, Europe, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff,
G–3, for Staff, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army During the Period 1960–1970,
File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
48. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov
1954, sub: Organization of the Army During the Period FY 1960–1970, File Unit: Entry A1
2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
49. Memo, Gavin for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army.
be over shortly after hostilities began, the nation must place its reliance on
forces in being rather than those to be mobilized. Once the conflict began,
mobility in an atomic environment would be virtually impossible without
air superiority. Thus, the Army needed some form of aerial capability,
both for tactical reconnaissance and for movement over the expanded area
required by dispersed forces. For economy and flexibility, the organization
should centralize all assets not habitually required by a unit at a higher level.
The reorganization should eliminate all unnecessary “frills” (although it
was unclear who would determine what constituted a frill).50 Conversely,
the greater dispersion of units would aggravate the problem of logistical
support. Efforts to create more favorable combat-to-support ratios must not
disregard essential service support requirements. Ultimately, in addition to
expanded requirements for individual replacements, atomic warfare would
demand the frequent replacement of entire units up to battalion size. By the
end of the year, special study groups at the Army War College at Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the Combat Developments Section at Army
Field Forces headquarters in Fort Monroe, Virginia, were hard at work on
the continued study.51
EXPLORING OTHER NEW FORMS OF WARFARE
General Ridgway believed that creating an organization capable of fighting

on an atomic battlefield would enable the Army to remain relevant within
the framework of the New Look defense policies, but neither he nor many of
his officers accepted the idea that the bomb had rendered more traditional
combat obsolete. General Gavin emerged as one of the primary skeptics
who believed that the Army could not abandon its embrace of basic military
principles. In his analysis of Army operations in Korea, Gavin observed that
mechanization had eliminated what he called the “mobility differential”
between ground forces and those specialized units that performed the
traditional missions of cavalry.52 This change, in turn, robbed ground
commanders of the ability to gather intelligence, screen movements,
50. Memo, Gavin for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army.
51. Memo, Gavin for Ch Army Field Forces, 12 Nov 1954, sub: Organization of the Army;
Ltr, Dahlquist to McAuliffe, 14 Feb 1955.
52. Christopher C. S. Cheng, Air Mobility: The Development of a Doctrine (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1994), 70.
provide advance scouting and security, or strike out quickly in advance of a

main body.53
In April, Gavin expounded on this observation in an article for Harper’s
magazine entitled “Cavalry, and I Don’t Mean Horses.” In the piece, he
highlighted the role of cavalry throughout history and, particularly, its lack
of impact in Korea. Because of the extreme terrain in Korea and the rapid
evolution of antitank weapons, the tank was no longer the dominant weapon
on the battlefield. Gavin expressed his view that the Army must recover the
lost mobility differential between cavalry and the supported ground force
to be successful in future battle. An atomic battlefield, he believed, only
accentuated the requirement because of the extended dispersion of units and
the greater need for scouting and advanced warning. Although agreements
with the Air Force prevented the Army from developing fixed-wing aircraft
larger than basic observation and liaison models, fewer restrictions existed
on rotary aircraft. The article only mentioned the helicopter in passing, but
it seemed clear that helicopters possessed the potential to provide the speed
and mobility that the general was seeking.54
Gavin’s article was, in fact, an unofficial summary of several staff studies
the office of the G–3 had prepared under his guidance. Gavin’s deputy, Maj.
Gen. Paul D. Adams, and the director of doctrine and combat development,
Col. John J. Tolson, had already begun work on potential designs for cavalry-
type organizations designed around the helicopter. In a short time, the
Army was moving away from its visualization of the helicopter as a flying
truck to a more flexible and tactical aircraft that might be used in a variety
of roles. In a letter to the chief of Army Field Forces, Gavin urged him to
pursue uses for the helicopter in the combat arms rather than relegating it to
logistical support.55
The increased interest in helicopters also propagated the demand for pilots
to fly them and mechanics to maintain them. In a briefing for the deputy
chief of staff for operations and administration, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible,
Lt. Col. Robert R. Williams of the G–3 staff noted that since 1951, the Army
had faced a shortage of aviators, caused by the increased demand for and
53. T. Michael Booth and Duncan Spencer, Paratrooper: The Life of Gen. James M. Gavin
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 349–51; Cheng, Air Mobility, 68–70.
54. James M. Gavin, “Cavalry, and I Don’t Mean Horses,” Harper’s Magazine, Apr 1954,
54–60; “General Gavin, and We Don’t Mean Slim Jim,” United States Army Combat Forces
Journal 5 (Aug 1954): 13–15.
55. John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961–71 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973),
4–5; Interv, Col. Irving Monclova and Lt. Col. Marlin Lang with Gen. Paul D. Adams,
7 May 1975; Interv, Col. Glenn A. Smith and Lt. Col. August M. Ciancolo with Lt. Gen.
John J. Tolson III, 1977; both in Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI; Cheng, Air Mobility,
96–97.
greater use of helicopters. The Army had doubled the number of students
in training, but that had not yet satisfied all of the requirements. Also, the
turnover of officer pilots had been greater than the Army expected following
the end of hostilities in Korea. The presence of a disproportionately large
number of field grade pilots meant that senior officers had to fill assignments
that normally would have gone to more junior grades. Finally, the shortages
in pilots forced many aviators trained in branches such as field artillery to
fill positions in other branches such as signal corps, engineers, or medical
service corps.56
The Army’s need for aviation personnel had clearly outgrown the ad hoc
training establishment that had developed during the Korean War. At the
start of 1954, the U.S. Air Force conducted fixed-wing training, the initial
stages of rotary training, and part of the maintenance training at Camp Gary
in San Marcos, Texas. The Army conducted the remainder of the training
for pilots and mechanics, as well as follow-on tactical training, at Fort Sill,
Oklahoma. By this time, however, Army leaders believed that they could
train more efficiently if the entire package was under their control. Fort Sill,
however, did not possess sufficient facilities to support any expansion of the
existing program.57
In February 1954, Maj. Gen. Charles E. Hart, commanding general of the
Artillery Center at Fort Sill, reported to Army Field Forces that the division
of training responsibilities between the Army and the Air Force had grown
unwieldly and had outlived its usefulness. He recommended consolidation
of Army Aviation training to provide a more effective program. General
Dahlquist supported the request and forwarded the recommendation to the
secretary of the Army and the chief of staff. By the end of 1954, however, the
Army and the Air Force had not yet resolved this issue.58
The Army had more success in consolidating its own portions of the
training program. After a broad search for more suitable facilities, leaders
settled on Camp Rucker, Alabama, as the place best suited to host the Army
Aviation School. The airfield there had three 5,000-foot runways, suitable
office and classroom space that the post had recently renovated, and larger
buildings suitable for heliports and maintenance hangars. General Ridgway
approved the transfer of the training program from Fort Sill to Camp Rucker
56. MFR, Lt. Col. Robert R. Williams, Gen Staff, 7 Dec 1953, sub: Briefing of Deputy Chief
of Staff (O and A) on Army Aviation Personnel, 4 Dec 1953, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series:
57. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, Sec Army, 8 Jul 1954,
sub: Army Aviation Training, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
58. Richard P. Weinert Jr., A History of Army Aviation, 1950–1962 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), 98.
on 20 July 1954, with Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton as commandant. The first
class began training there in October, and 120 officers graduated from the
program in January 1955.59
General Gavin reported in July 1954 that the Army had 3,243 aircraft
in operation, but it anticipated an increase to nearly 4,000 by the end of
1956. These included a roughly equal mix of small, fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters. Almost all Army helicopter pilots in 1954 flew one of two aircraft,
either the H–13 Sioux, a light helicopter used for observation or medical
evacuation, or the H–19 Chickasaw, a heavier model used for transport
and light cargo hauls. Neither aircraft was particularly satisfactory, and the
service greatly desired more dependable replacements. Based in part on
limitations imposed by the 1952 agreements between the Army and the Air
Force, the Army diverted a portion of its research and development funds
to the Air Force or Navy so that their aeronautical experts could develop
aircraft to meet Army specifications. Although Army researchers could work
on separate components, such as communications or navigation systems,
the other services coordinated the development of the aircraft as a whole.
For 1954, aviation research for the Army focused upon development of an
improved medium-sized helicopter, for medical evacuation and general
utility, and a heavier model intended to carry five to seven tons of cargo, or
roughly fifty combat-loaded troops. Contractors, working under Air Force
direction, tested a few models, but, by the end of the year, none appeared
particularly promising.60
The Army’s experiences in Korea had reaffirmed another form of warfare
that would gain adherents during the Cold War. At the urging of then
Secretary of the Army Frank C. Pace Jr., the Army had established the Office
of the Chief of Psychological Warfare in 1951, with Brig. Gen. Robert A.
McClure as its first chief. A year later, the service established the U.S. Army
Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The mission of
the center, identified in the initial orders, was to conduct individual and unit
training in psychological warfare and special forces operations; to develop
and test doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; and to test and
evaluate equipment employed in psychological warfare and special forces
operations. At the same time, the Army activated its initial special forces
group, the 10th Special Forces Group, under Col. Aaron Bank. Expanding
59. Weinert, History of Army Aviation, 100.

60. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, Sec Army, 8 Jul 1954, sub: Army Aviation Training; U.S.
Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun 1954,
122; Joseph Bykofsky, “The Support of Army Aviation, 1950–1954,” in “Transportation
Corps in the Current National Emergency,” Historical Report No. 4, Office of the Chief of
Transportation, 1955, Historians Files, CMH.
Col. Aaron Bank, 31 March 1953 (U.S. Army, National Archive Still
Picture Branch)
on lessons learned by the Office of Strategic Services and Jedburgh units
of World War II, the Army intended the new special forces units to act as
infiltration or stay-behind elements to train, organize, and lead indigenous
resistance movements. The 10th Group spent a year in development and
training at Fort Bragg before deploying to Bad Tölz, Germany, late in 1953.
A portion of the unit, however, remained behind at Fort Bragg to form the
nucleus of a second group, the 77th Special Forces Group.61
Despite the deployment of the 10th Group, however, the Army’s interest
in 1954 was less on the special forces component of the center and more
on the production of psychological warfare specialists. During World
War II, President Eisenhower had become a firm believer in the usefulness
of information and propaganda as weapons of war. Working with Special
Advisor Charles D. Jackson, the former chief of psychological warfare
at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force headquarters, the
61. Col. Alfred H. Paddock, “Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941–1952:
Origins of a Special Warfare Capability for the U.S. Army,” (Military Studies Program paper,
U.S. Army War College, Nov 1979), Carlisle Barracks, PA; Col. Aaron Bank, From OSS to
Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 168–89.
president made such operations an integral part of his national security and
foreign relations programs.62 In July, the Office of the Chief of Psychological
Warfare prepared guidance for research and planning at the Fort Bragg
center. In broad terms, it defined psychological warfare as the planned use of
propaganda and other actions for the purpose of influencing the opinions,
emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral, or friendly groups
in support of national aims and objectives. More specifically, it said that
military psychological warfare was concerned directly with enemy military
formations and the reduction of their will to resist efforts against them.63
By mid-1954, the Army Troop Program authorized 1,083 spaces for
psychological warfare activities, of which 924 were in operational units.
The balance of 159 spaces were in staff and training agencies. The Far East
Command maintained one loudspeaker and leaflet company in Korea and
one radio broadcasting and leaflet group in Japan. Because of the ongoing
personnel reductions, the U.S. European Command had inactivated
its assigned radio broadcasting and leaflet group and had reduced the
loudspeaker and leaflet company assigned to the Seventh Army to
approximately 70 percent of its authorized strength. In the United States, one
radio group and one loudspeaker company served at Fort Bragg, assisting
with training there, testing new equipment and techniques, and providing
replacements for the overseas units.64
Officers assigned to psychological warfare units received eight weeks of
individual training at Fort Bragg, whereas enlisted personnel went through a
two-week indoctrination course. Selected officers also attended international
relations and psychology courses at five major American universities. Some
officers received additional on-the-job instruction with the United States
Information Agency, a government unit that had been established in 1953
to promote national interests abroad. Within their units, enlisted personnel
completed instruction in their individual military occupational specialties.
During 1954, the Army sent 117 officers through the eight-week course at
Fort Bragg, with 29 going on to civil school classes. Newly commissioned
officers participated in two hours of indoctrination training as part of their
62. For an in-depth study of Eisenhower’s use of psychological warfare and propaganda,
see Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and
Abroad (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006).
63. Ofc Ch Psy Warfare, “Guidance for Military Psychological Warfare Research and
Planning,” 1 Jul 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 158, Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Special
Warfare, Classified Correspondence, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP.
64. Memo, Col. Joseph R. Groves, Ch Organization and Training Div, for Ch Training Br,
5 Mar 1954, sub: Information on the Army Psychological Warfare Program Requested by
the Appropriations Committee of Congress, File Unit: Entry A1 153B, Subgroup: Office of
the Chief of Special Warfare, 1950–1954, RG 319, NACP.
branch school training. Operational units throughout the Army conducted

troop information classes exposing troops to the basic principles of
psychological warfare.65
The Army also maintained another 1,292 troop spaces for psychological
warfare specialists in its reserve ranks. Units active in the reserve program
included two radio broadcasting and leaflet groups, three loudspeaker
and leaflet companies, and two mobilization designation detachments.
These units constituted a base from which the Army could draw qualified
individuals to reinforce active staff agencies, training installations, or
operational units.66
One aspect of President Eisenhower’s New Look that did play to an
Army strength was continental air defense. By 1954, the Army maintained
seventy-nine antiaircraft battalions in the continental United States, Alaska,
and Greenland. In July of that year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended
to Secretary Wilson the creation of a joint services air defense command
to coordinate both planning and execution of continental air defense.
Wilson approved the recommendation and, on 1 September, authorized the
Continental Air Defense Command, with the Air Force as its executive agent
and Air Force General Benjamin W. Chidlaw as its commanding general. The
new organization, consisting of the U.S. Air Force Air Defense Command,
the Army Anti-Aircraft Command, and a yet-to-be-established naval
component composed of radar picket ships, established its headquarters at
Ent Air Force Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado.67
General Ridgway and his senior staff recognized that continental air
defense was a high visibility mission within the administration’s defense
policy, and they took great pains to point out the personnel shortages
among the air defense battalions as the result of the budgetary cutbacks.
Most units in the Anti-Aircraft Command operated at a reduced strength
of 70 percent or less of the allocation authorized in the table of organization
and equipment. National guard officers and troops filled seven of the older
90-mm. gun battalions on a full-time basis. As the command continued to
transition to 75-mm. Skysweeper radar-directed guns and the Nike missile
system, Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis, the commanding general, pressed the
65. Memo, Groves for Ch Training Br, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Information on the Army
Psychological Warfare Program.
66. Memo, Groves for Ch Training Br, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Information on the Army
Psychological Warfare Program.
67. Notes, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Legislative Meeting, 13 Dec 1954, Ann Whitman Files
(microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, AHEC; Bolling W. Smith and William C.
Gaines, “Coast Artillery Organization A Brief View,” in American Seacoast Defenses: A
Reference Guide, ed. Mark A. Berhow (McLean, VA: Coast Defense Study Group Press,
2015), 430; Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 113, 138.
A radar-guided 75-mm. antiaircraft gun, the U.S. Army’s Skysweeper

(Stadtarchiv Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein, Germany)
Army Staff to increase the personnel strength of his battalions. Without an
increase of troops, trained on the new systems, he said, he would be unable
to maintain operational readiness throughout his command.68
In addition to its interest in helicopters, the Army focused its research
and development efforts upon several technologies aimed at adapting the
force to its vision of atomic warfare. The service had just begun fielding
the Corporal missile, the Honest John rocket, and the Nike antiaircraft
missile. Researchers continued to develop new missiles with greater range
and payload. The other services, however, began to criticize the Army’s
plans to increase the range of its weapons. Citing the Key West Agreement
of 1948, the Air Force complained that the Army was encroaching on the
Air Force’s responsibility to engage targets beyond the immediate depth of
the battlefield. The Corporal missile, with a 75-mile range, and the Nike
antiaircraft missile, with a horizontal range of 25 miles, already seemed to
exceed those boundaries. Many Air Force officers challenged the Army’s
interest in continental air defense, believing that also to be an exclusive Air
68. Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 113; Memo, Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis for Asst
Ch Staff, G–1, 16 Mar 1954, sub: Personnel Actions Required to Maintain Operational
Effectiveness; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 14 Oct
1954, sub: Increase in Strength of the Antiaircraft Command; both in File Unit: Entry A1
2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
A Corporal missile is elevated in firing position, 15 September 1961.

(U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
Force interest. The Army’s continued research and development efforts in
these areas soon reignited bitter rivalries that had existed between the two
services since their separation in 1947.69
Other Army research efforts dealt with more traditional weapons
and equipment. The recently fielded M47 and M48 Patton tanks had
experienced numerous mechanical failures, and service efforts to provide
product improvements were well underway. Likewise, development of the
M59, a new armored personnel carrier designed to provide mobility and
overhead cover for advancing infantry, was also in progress. Project Vista,
an analysis of combat requirements for a land war in Europe conducted by
prominent physicists, researchers, and military officers at the California
Institute of Technology in 1951, had emphasized a requirement for more
cost-effective antitank weapons to offset the Soviet numerical advantage.
To that end, Army researchers continued the ongoing development of
69. MFR, Col. Roy E. Moore, Gen Staff, 5 Mar 1954, sub: Status of Corporal and Honest
John Programs; Memo, Maj. Gen. J. D. O’Donnell, Chair, Army Electronic Warfare Policy
Council, 17 May 1954, sub: The Role of Land-Based Electronic Countermeasures in Air
Defense and Its Employment; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 4 Jun 1954, sub: Briefing
for Acting Secretary Milton, Ridgway Papers, MHI; Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 179–82.
two interdependent systems, the battalion antitank weapon—a 106-mm.

recoilless rifle—and the Ontos, a relatively lightweight tracked vehicle
mounting six of the weapons. Although initial testing revealed flaws in both
components, General Ridgway and other supporters urged continued efforts
to get the system into the field.70
Emerging from the stalemate in Korea, Army leaders recognized
that the nature of war was changing. Their experiments with doctrine
and organization recognized the possibilities of atomic conflict. Their
focus on peripheral missions and new approaches to combat reflected an
understanding that, if it were to remain an integral component of national
strategy and defense policy, the Army not only had to modernize but also to
diversify. With the competition for a diminishing defense budget becoming
a zero-sum game, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of
defense openly questioning the relevance of conventional ground combat,
many senior officers within the Army began to feel that their service was
fighting for its very existence.
REORGANIZATION
The end of the war in Korea allowed the Army to resume the reorganization
and downsizing efforts it had begun after World War II. In May 1954,
the chief of staff approved a plan for the consolidation and elimination
of excess depot and storage facilities throughout the continental United
States. Of its existing seventy-three supply sites, the Army announced
that it would close seventeen. The U.S. Air Force assumed ownership
of seven of the depots, reducing their requirement to construct
new warehouses. The General Services Administration and other
government agencies assumed responsibility for several other sites.71
Meanwhile, proposals for Army Staff reorganization that had originated
in the recommendations of the Davies Committee in 1953 had continued
70. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 27 Dec 1954,
sub: Review of Requirements for m59 Type Vehicle, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series:
SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway,
21 Dec 1953, sub: Memo of Conversation with Dr. Vannevar Bush, Ridgway Papers, MHI;
Elliot V. Converse III, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960, vol. 1, History of Acquisition
in the Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense
71. Memo, Maj. Gen. Edward J. O’Neill, Director of Supply Ops, for Ch Staff, 14 Sep 1954,
sub: Improvements in Combat Potential of the Army Within Limited Resources, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Supply Shake-up
Expected to Hit 17 Army Depots,” Army Times, 14 Aug 1954.
to percolate. Progress had stalled, largely owing to disagreements between

Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, and Assistant Chief
of Staff, G–4 (Logistics), Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, over supervision and
control of technical services personnel. On 14 June, the Army announced
the “Secretary of the Army’s Plan for Army Organization,” known as the
Slezak Plan after the new undersecretary of the Army, John Slezak. In
general, the plan followed many of the recommendations of the Davies Plan,
but it reflected General Palmer’s views by rejecting the concept of a supply
command and creating a more powerful deputy chief of staff for logistics
with command authority over the technical services.72
Three days later, on 17 June, the secretary of defense approved the
reorganization plan. Wilson viewed the proposal as a positive effort to
clarify lines of authority and accountability within the Department of the
Army and allow the service secretary to delegate authority to principal
civilian and military subordinates. At the secretarial level, the plan freed the
undersecretary of the Army from logistics functions in order to serve solely
as the alter ego and deputy to the secretary of the army. Consequently, the
Army would create two new positions: an assistant secretary for logistics and
an assistant secretary for civil-military affairs. These two positions combined
with the existing assistant secretary for manpower and reserve forces and
assistant secretary for financial management for a total of four assistant
secretaries. The plan further visualized that each major function assigned to
an assistant secretary of defense, an assistant to the secretary of defense, or
the general counsel would find a specific corresponding executive within the
Department of the Army.73
The plan incorporated most of General Palmer’s concerns regarding
the consolidation of the technical services—including chemical, medical,
engineers, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and transportation—under the
direction of a newly created deputy chief of staff for logistics. The deputy
chief would have command responsibility over the technical services
along with staff supervision over logistical activities overseas. The logistics
staff would be expanded to provide the career management, personnel
administration, budgeting, allocation of funds, material research and
development, procurement, supply, and legal functions of the technical
services. The responsibility for the training activities and functions of the
technical services would also shift to the deputy chief of staff for logistics, but
72. James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration,
1900–1963, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975),
228–32.
73. Rpt, 14 Jun 1954, “Secretary of the Army’s Plan for Army Organization,” File Unit: Entry
it would be subject to further study. Perhaps not completely coincidentally,

General Palmer became the first deputy chief of staff for logistics on
13 September 1954.74
The most sweeping change recommended by the plan and approved
by Secretary Wilson was the establishment of the U.S. Continental Army
Command (CONARC). Under the existing organization, the commanders of
the six continental armies and the Military District of Washington reported
directly to the chief of staff, bypassing Army Field Forces, the headquarters
overseeing all active Army units in the continental United States. This former
structure kept the chief involved in too many matters that could be dealt with
better at a lower level. The new command would inherit all of the functions
assigned to the Army Field Forces, but additionally, would exert command
authority over all of the continental armies, developing and approving plans
and budgets, supervising and evaluating training, and maintaining testing
boards for the development of materiel. Finally, the reorganization delegated
direction and control of Army service schools to CONARC.75 (See Chart 4.)
Reaction to the approved plan across the Army was immediate and vocal.
On 3 July, the Army Times published a front-page story entitled “Slezak
Plan Shocks Army.” The article suggested that someone had imposed the
plan upon the Army without consultation with the service’s own leaders. It
quoted unnamed general officers predicting that the Army would fall flat
on its face in the event of war, with one stating that the “plan could only
mean the needless killing of thousands of young men.”76 General Ridgway
and Vice Chief of Staff General Charles L. Bolte fired back the next week.
In separate interviews with the same reporters, both men expressed their
complete and enthusiastic support for the reorganization. Both admitted
that the plan presented some challenges for personnel management, but
they asserted that the service’s senior leadership had already begun sorting
out the issues. Both generals also made a point to endorse the new logistical
setup that would, they believed, provide all necessary support should the
nation once again find itself at war. Ridgway informed the Army Staff in no
uncertain terms that they had had the opportunity to submit their comments
and recommendations and that the committee had considered them. The
74. Rpt, 14 Jun 1954, “Secretary of the Army’s Plan for Army Organization.”
75. Rpt, 14 Jun 1954, “Secretary of the Army’s Plan for Army Organization”; Hewes, From
Root to McNamara, 266–67.
76. John Gerrity, “Slezak Plan Shocks Army,” Army Times, 3 Jul 1954.
Chart 4—Secretary of the Army’s (The Slezak) Plan, 14 June 1954
Administrative SECRETARY OF THE ARMY Chief of Public

Assistant Information
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY1
General Chief of
Counsel Legislative
Liaison
ASA ASA CHIEF OF ASA ASA

(Financial (Manpower &
3
STAFF (Civil-Military (Logistics)
2
Management) Reserve Forces) Vice Chief of Staff Affairs)
Inspector
General
Comptroller DCS DCS DCS

Deputy Comptroller (Operations & (Plans & (Logistics)
(Civilian) Administration) Research)
Other Logistics
Finance General
Staff Staff
Staff
Sections
Chemical
Medical
Army Continental Army Engineers 4

Antiaircraft Army Overseas
Command Command Commands Ordnance
Quarter-
master
First Second Third Fourth
Army Army Army Army
Signal
Fifth Sixth Military District Transportation

Army Army of Washington
Notes
1. General Management, Analysis, and Review
2. Panama, Alaska, Civil Functions, Politico-Military-Economic Affairs
3. Direct working relationships with civilian and military personnel elements of Army Staff
4. Additional direct responsibilities to Assistant Secretary (Civil-Military Affairs)
administration and the secretary of defense had approved the plan, and the
Army Staff would carry it out enthusiastically.77
The issue that seemed to generate the most questions and concern was
the establishment of CONARC. General Weible, the deputy chief of staff
for operations and administration, explained that the purpose of the
reorganization was to remove operating functions from the Army Staff as
much as possible. The staff could then focus on its primary responsibilities
of policymaking, general supervision, and coordination. The CONARC
headquarters would function in a manner corresponding to an Army
group headquarters, with fewer administrative duties, as these still would
be handled at the Army area or installation level. Weible asserted that the
implementation would be an evolutionary process and that various actions
would be phased in over the next year.78
In the months that followed, numerous general officers continued
to vent their apprehensions over the proposed changes. The leaders of
the technical services, in particular, expressed serious concern over the
delegation of direction and control of Army service schools to CONARC.
In October, General Ridgway sent a personal letter to each chief of a
technical service emphasizing the benefits of consolidating direction of the
schools. He reassured the officers that the changes would not impair their
ability to influence the instruction within their own branches. Moreover, he
instructed each chief to nominate a branch representative to serve on the
CONARC staff. He concluded each letter with a peroration commending
the addressees for displaying their personal leadership so conspicuously in
the past. Perhaps with the understanding that this was the last polite request
for their cooperation that they would receive, most of the Army’s senior
officers fell in line and went to work on the reorganization.79
PERSONNEL ISSUES
The budget and personnel reductions imposed by the Eisenhower

administration presented a paradox to leaders throughout the Army. On
77. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Ridgway, Bolte Back Reorganization Plan,” Army Times, 10 Jul
1954; Memo, Col. George P. Welch, Acting Ch Info, for Sec Gen Staff, 29 Jun 1954, sub:
Army Times Critique of the Army Reorganization Plan; MFR, Col. K. L. Davis, Asst Sec
Gen Staff, 7 Jul 1954, sub: General Council Meeting, 1130 hours, 7 July 1954; both in File
Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
78. MFR, Davis, 7 Jul 1954, sub: General Council Meeting, 1130 hours, 7 July 1954.
79. Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway to Maj. Gen. George E. Armstrong, Surgeon Gen, et al.,
25 Oct 1954, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
the one hand, the mandated personnel cuts enabled them to reduce the
numbers of soldiers and officers recruited into the service by a substantial
amount. The Army would take advantage of the opportunity to remove from
active duty thousands of soldiers who could not meet the sterner standards
of a modern technological force. On the other hand, even with lower force
strength levels, recruiters faced increasing difficulty in bringing enough new
blood into the Army. Military service remained unpopular with many in the
civilian community, because the Army could not provide the pay, benefits,
and stability that the flourishing economy offered.
For some time, Army leaders had expressed concerns about the problem
of illiterate and semi-illiterate soldiers throughout the ranks. A growing
number of soldiers who passed through basic and initial training eventually
failed higher-level training because they could not master the increasingly
complex weapons, vehicles, and equipment of the modern Army. Through
its military occupational classification project in 1949, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense had established intellectual requirements for military
service. This action created four separate mental groups based on tests
and evaluations of inprocessing recruits. It also mandated that the services
could not reject induction of any individual who met the minimum mental
acuity standards. In 1953 and again in 1954, the services recommended
raising the minimum intellectual standards for acceptance into the military
and reducing the number of recruits coming in from the lowest of the
four groups.80
With the newly assigned personnel ceilings, in 1954, the Army announced
programs for separating some officers and enlisted personnel from active
service. It accelerated the release of about 4,000 officers, moving their
discharge dates from 30 June or after to February through May, thus getting
them off the books before the end of the fiscal year. In the enlisted area,
the Army released about 20,000 soldiers whose mental qualification score
was at the lower end of the minimally acceptable group. At the same time,
several commanders expressed their concerns to the chief of staff over the
large number of field grade officers who remained on active service despite
a lack of advanced civilian and military education. The personnel cutbacks
and the decrease in available funds had made it difficult for those officers to
receive the education and training they needed to remain qualified for their
80. Memo, Sec Def George C. Marshall for Service Secs, 2 Apr 1951, sub: Qualitative
Distribution of Military Manpower; Memo, Asst Sec Army Fred Korth for Ch Staff, 8 Jan
1953, sub: Basic Education of Troops; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–
1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the
Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun 1954, 83–84.
positions. The implied message to the chief of staff was that the Army could
not use any minimally acceptable officers either.81
In April 1954, however, General Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1,
reported that he had instituted an intensive recruiting campaign to offset the
sharp decline in reenlistment rates. Factors adversely affecting reenlistment
included negative publicity regarding military life; lack of command emphasis
on retaining good soldiers, particularly among officers who themselves
desired to return to civilian status; and the ready availability of civilian
employment. He also noted that the Army’s decision in 1953 to require
higher mental scores for reenlistment had reduced the number of soldiers
eligible to reenlist. General Young observed that passage of legislation before
Congress to improve military housing, increase reenlistment bonuses,
improve dependent health care, and provide concurrent travel for families
of troops going overseas would go a long way toward improving the rates of
both recruitment and reenlistment.82
By the end of the year, efforts toward improving military benefits achieved
only mixed success. Under pressure from officials in the Departments of
Defense and the Treasury, Congress tabled discussions of a military pay
raise for at least another year. However, it did agree to set up a committee to
discuss a new survivor benefits plan that would equalize benefits provided
to families of regular and reserve soldiers. The Department of Defense also
approved funding of several thousand new housing units at Army bases across
the United States. General Ridgway announced plans for a program to rotate
troops overseas as part of entire divisions. Dubbed Operation Gyroscope,
the exercise would exchange entire divisions between the United States and
Europe, keeping those units together for extended periods and allowing
families to accompany their soldiers as they moved overseas. The chief of
staff hoped that the scheme would alleviate many of the morale issues that
had developed from soldiers spending long tours away from their families.
Planners expected that by rotating entire units, personnel turbulence
would be less of a problem. Soldiers could remain with their same unit
for longer periods, helping to build greater cohesion and esprit de corps.83
81. Memo, Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 16 Mar 1954,
sub: Military Education of Officers, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: Security Classified
Correspondence, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. See also Brian M. Linn, Elvis’s Army:
Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
82. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert N. Young, Asst Ch Staff, G–1, for Ch Staff, 30 Apr 1954, sub:
Re-enlistment Rates, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
83. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Pay Raise Dead,” Army Times, 26 Jun 1954; “New Survivor Benefits
Plan Under Study in Pentagon,” Army Times, 11 Sep 1954; “7000 Housing Units Planned,”
Army Times, 11 Dec 1954; Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def, 10 Sep 1954,
One personnel action that the service pointed to with a measure of pride
was the elimination of racially segregated units throughout the Army. In
November 1953, Assistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah had forecast
that Army integration virtually would be completed by the end of June
1954. On 10 July, the service announced that 98 percent of Black soldiers
in the Army were now serving in integrated units that previously had been
regarded as “White” units. Only fifteen small, company-sized units were still
segregated, and these units would be integrated through normal personnel
rotation by the end of the year. In November, the Army announced that,
because of integration, the number of Black officers and enlisted soldiers
attending service schools had more than doubled. Personnel officers cited
tangible increases in Black officer promotions and an increasing supply
of technically trained Black specialists. The service’s public information
office promoted reports that the Justice Department, in prosecuting cases
before the Supreme Court to end racial segregation in public schools, relied
heavily on Army experiences to prove that integration could occur without
provoking needless tensions.84
Far less successful were Army efforts to improve the readiness of the
reserve forces on which it depended in the case of a national emergency.
The end of the Korean War had prompted numerous studies of reserve
issues, and many of these continued into 1954. In January, the Senate Armed
Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Preparedness, chaired by Senator
Leverett M. Saltonstall of Massachusetts, released a report identifying many
of the problems limiting reserve participation, but offering few solutions.
The report asserted that the budgeted strength figure of 835,000 for June
1954 was completely unrealistic and “utterly incapable of being reached.”85
The national guard units were able to maintain something close to their
sub: Measures to Improve Combat Effectiveness and Career Attractiveness of the Army,
File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For
further information on Operation Gyroscope, see Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield:
The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S.
Army Center of Military History, 2015), 222–30.
84. “Army Reports Integration Program is 98% Complete,” Army Times, 10 Jul 1954;
“Services Abolish All Negro Units,” Army Times, 6 Nov 1954; Memo, Maj. Gen. William E.
Bergin, Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gens, Continental Armies, 4 Feb 1954, sub: Elimination of
Segregation in On-Post Public Schools, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For more information on the integration of the U.S. Army,
see Morris J. MacGregor Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965, Defense Studies
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981) and Bernard C. Nalty and
Morris J. MacGregor Jr., eds., Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981).
85. Memo, Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, Special Asst for Reserve Components, for Ch Staff,
30 Jan 1954, sub: Report of the Interim Subcommittee on Preparedness (Saltonstall), File
Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP
authorized strength, largely because of the draft deferment allocated to

certain individuals who joined Guard units, but Army Reserve participation
offered no such inducement, and its enrollment continued to suffer. The
committee also noted that much of the reserve training involved classroom
lectures and films. With so many units well understrength, the Army could
not justify the issue of major items of equipment to support more substantial
training. When the committee observed that reserve commanders spent
a large portion of their time recruiting, Army witnesses responded that,
because participation in the program was purely voluntary, unit commanders
would not have units to command if they did not recruit.86
The only major step the Army was able to take toward reforming its reserve
component was to focus more of its recruiting efforts on individuals who had
no prior service. In a change to its established procedures, the Army agreed
to provide recruits who had no prior service with the same initial training
provided to recruits for the active force. Department of Defense regulations
stipulated, however, that only those individuals who enlisted to serve for four
years on active duty would receive veterans’ benefits. Although the Army
attempted to reduce that requirement to three years, it was unsuccessful.87
More serious reform would have to wait for further legislation. Most
reserve units continued to lack full complements of personnel, equipment,
and facilities to conduct realistic training. Nor did they have dedicated time
for training that unit commanders could enforce. As the number of combat
veterans began to decline, the problem of maintaining an experienced reserve
force would only get worse. Even as the service debated the preparation,
training, roles, and missions to be assigned to its reserve forces, it continued
to struggle to recruit a force anywhere near adequate for the task.88
86. Memo, Milburn for Ch Staff, 30 Jan 1954, sub: Report of the Interim Subcommittee on
Preparedness (Saltonstall).
87. Memo, Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, Special Asst for Reserve Components, for Ch Staff,
18 May 1954, sub: Reserve Mobilization Requirements, File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series:
88. Col. (Ret.) Jon T. Hoffman and Col. (Ret.) Forrest L. Marion, Forging a Total Force:
The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve (Washington. DC: Historical Office, Office of
the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 47; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the
Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983 (Washington, DC: Office of
the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), 115–20.
PEERING INTO THE FUTURE
In September 1950, the first contingent of officers and enlisted soldiers

making up the newly authorized U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
(MAAG), Indochina, had arrived in Saigon. U.S. observers in Vietnam had
grown concerned with French efforts to subdue the independence movement
spearheaded by the anticolonialist Viet Minh and had recommended that
the United States establish a military group to monitor the situation in
Vietnam and to assist with the requisitioning, procurement, and receipt of
U.S. equipment and weapons. By the end of 1950, the group had grown to
about seventy, but even this number proved completely unable to monitor
the distribution and use of U.S. equipment throughout Vietnam. As a result,
inspection teams frequently had to rely on French reports of field operations
rather than their own direct observation. For the moment, however, U.S.
involvement in Korea prevented any expansion of efforts in Vietnam.89
By late 1953, the French situation in Vietnam had deteriorated even
further. Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, a member of the Joint Staff who
accompanied Vice President Richard M. Nixon on a fact-finding mission
to Southeast Asia, reported that French efforts to disperse the Viet Minh
and to create a national Vietnamese army had failed completely. The Viet
Minh, he reported, controlled 60 percent of the Red River Delta, and the
French were struggling to maintain communications with their outlying
forces. At night, the French held only Hanoi and Hải Phòng in the north.
French-Vietnamese relations were strained, and rumors were spreading that
the French had already proposed terms to the Viet Minh for a conference to
negotiate the ending of the war.90
In May 1953, French Lt. Gen. Henri E. Navarre assumed command of
French forces in Vietnam. Navarre pledged to initiate aggressive operations
against the Viet Minh to regain the initiative, highlighted by a major offensive
to begin that autumn. True to his word, on 20 November, Navarre launched
3,000 French paratroopers into a broad valley close to the Laotian border
near a small village called Điện Biên Phủ. Whether to serve as the base of
operations for smaller thrusts against the enemy or, as some believed, an
attempt to lure the Viet Minh into a decisive battle, the enterprise was doomed
to failure. The Communists soon captured the high ground surrounding the
small French garrison and brought more than 200 artillery pieces and heavy
89. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960, United States Army
in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 111–16.
90. Spector, Advice and Support, 181; MS, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “U.S. Army Policy
Towards Vietnam, 1945–1954,” Historians Files, CMH.
mortars to bear on the troops below. The battle for Điện Biên Phủ became a
siege that would last for almost six months.91
In March, with the battle raging, the chief of the French armed forces’
general staff, General Paul H. R. Ély, arrived in Washington, D.C., to consult
with the American leadership and to request that U.S. air support intervene
to break the siege. Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
strongly supported such intervention and took up the cause with President
Eisenhower and the other Joint Chiefs. For perhaps the first time, American
military and political leaders began a serious consideration of what it might
mean to intervene in Vietnam.92
Eisenhower himself was not particularly inclined to intervene. He was
willing to provide some additional aircraft for French use in the conflict, but
he was loath to consider any option that involved the introduction of any
additional U.S. troops into the theater. In a letter to his close friend General
Alfred M. Gruenther, then serving as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,
the president wrote that no Western power could go into Asia militarily
except as part of a coalition, which must also include Asian nations. He
was particularly critical of the French effort in Vietnam, especially France’s
unwillingness to grant some degree of autonomy and independence to
the Vietnamese people. Eisenhower told General Ély that any American
intervention would be dependent upon the approval of the U.S. Congress,
full British participation in the effort, French recognition of Vietnamese
independence, and French recognition of American leadership in any
circumstance in which they intervened. As desperate as the French were for
assistance, this was a poison pill they could not swallow.93
On 2 April, apparently on his own authority, Admiral Radford called the
service chiefs together to collect their views regarding the desirability of
providing U.S. naval and air support to the French in their defense of Điện
Biên Phủ. General Ridgway was adamant and emphatic in his response. He
told Radford that unless the question originated with the president or the
secretary of defense, it was clearly outside the proper scope of authority of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This body, he said, was not charged with formulating
foreign policy nor advocating for it, unless its advice was sought by higher
authority. More specifically, he continued, whatever happened at Điện Biên
91. Spector, Advice and Support, 182–90. The single best work on the battle for Điện
Biên Phủ remains Bernard Fall’s Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu
(Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1967).
92. Spector, Advice and Support, 191–94; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 175–83; Jurika, From Pearl
Harbor to Vietnam, 400–5.
93.Ambrose, Eisenhower, 177; Ltr, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther,
26 Apr 1954; Diary, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 Feb 1954; both in Ann Whitman Files
(microfilm), Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries, AHEC.
Phủ would not itself decisively affect the military situation in Vietnam. If
the United States were to intervene, he concluded, it would greatly increase
the risk of general war, a war that the United States was, at this time, not
prepared to fight.94
As the battle for Điện Biên Phủ entered its final phase, French political
resolve began to crumble. In February, at a foreign ministers’ conference
in Berlin, French and American diplomats agreed to include the issue of
Indochina in a planned conference in Geneva, Switzerland, to open on
26 April. Emboldened by the prospect of a negotiated settlement, the Viet
Minh commander, Võ Nguyên Giáp, launched an all-out assault on the
French garrison. On 8 May, just as negotiations regarding Vietnam began
in Geneva, Điện Biên Phủ fell, yielding more than 10,000 French and
Vietnamese prisoners.95
While the negotiations in Geneva dragged on, military leaders and
politicians in the United States debated the nation’s response to the anticipated
French withdrawal from Southeast Asia. In the National Security Council,
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, among others, presented plans to
save Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff worked on various options for U.S.
military intervention. In the Congress, senators and representatives lined
up on both sides of the issue, debating whether they should save the French
and, separately, if they should intervene unilaterally and go it alone.96
General Ridgway continued to oppose American intervention. In addition
to his fears that the commitment of U.S. troops to Vietnam would spark
a greater war, he also pointed out the logistical difficulties of supporting a
major military effort in a country that lacked the most basic infrastructure
requirements. In a briefing the Army Staff had prepared for Secretary Wilson
and President Eisenhower, Ridgway pointed out that the two principal ports,
Saigon and Hải Phòng, constituted a combined daily capacity of just over
15,000 tons and required considerable dredging before they could reach full
capacity. Because of the inadequate road and rail system, almost no capacity
existed for moving supplies inland from the ports. Only three airfields in the
country could handle heavy bombers, and only eight could accommodate
C–119 supply aircraft. Almost all were unusable during the rainy season.
The climate itself would prove to be unhealthy for Western troops. The
adverse conditions, he said, combined all of those that confronted U.S.
94. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Adm. Radford et al., 2 Apr 1954, Ridgway Papers,
MHI; Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 252–54.
95. MS, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “U.S. Army Policy Towards Vietnam, 1945–1954”; Fall,
Hell in a Very Small Place, 420; Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the
French Defeat in Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004), 624.
96. Spector, Advice and Support, 198–208.
forces in the South Pacific and Eastern Asia during World War II and Korea,
with the additional complication of a large native population, in thousands
of villages, evenly divided between friendly and hostile. General Gavin,
the Army G–3, estimated that it would require the equivalent of seven U.S.
divisions to replace the French forces.97
On 21 July, in Geneva, representatives of France and the Viet Minh signed
a cease-fire ending hostilities in Vietnam. Under the terms of the agreement,
both sides agreed to partition Vietnam along the 17th Parallel. Armed forces
of the Viet Minh were to withdraw north of the parallel, French forces to
the south. Representatives from India, Canada, and Poland would form the
International Control Commission to monitor the terms of the cease-fire
and to supervise general elections throughout Vietnam to occur no later
than July 1956. Neither the United States nor representatives of what would
become South Vietnam signed the agreement, although the United States
pledged to refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements.
Somewhat paradoxically, President Eisenhower announced during a news
conference on the same day that the United States was not itself a party to
the agreement and was not bound by the decisions made in it.98
Later that month, in a paper discussing the military implications of the
cease-fire, General Gavin wrote that the armistice marked a failure of U.S.
efforts to support the French in Vietnam and required a reexamination of
American policy in Southeast Asia. Although French forces would remain
in Vietnam for the foreseeable future, their presence was problematic for the
South Vietnamese government, and intelligence suggested that ultimately
they would withdraw. Gavin believed that the treaty would be regarded by
many in the region as a military, political, and psychological victory for
communism and a blow to U.S. influence and prestige in the region. The Viet
Minh undoubtedly would use the cease-fire as an opportunity to replenish
their forces for future efforts. The Army G–3 warned that if the United States
was not prepared to “undertake a program of the scale required to produce
decisive results within a short period of time, then it should diminish its
efforts in Indochina.”99
97. Memo, Sec Army Robert T. Stevens for Sec Def, 19 May 1954, sub: Indo-China, File
Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Gen.
Matthew B. Ridgway, 17 May 1954; Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3,
for Ch Staff, Mar 1954, sub: Military Consequences of Various Courses of Action With
Respect to Application of U.S. Military Forces in Indochina; both in Ridgway Papers, MHI.
98. Spector, Advice and Support, 219; MS, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “U.S. Army Policy
Towards Vietnam, 1945–1954”; Ambrose, Eisenhower, 209.
99. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 22 Jul 1954, sub:
Military Implications of the Cease-fire Agreements in Indochina; Memo, Maj. Gen.
In November 1954, U.S. Senator Michael J. Mansfield led a group of poli-

ticians visiting Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. In his report to the president,
Mansfield wrote that the French had lost in Vietnam largely because they
had failed to grant sovereignty to the Vietnamese. The United States, he said,
shared some of the blame because it had misjudged the military and political
situation and had overestimated the effectiveness of material aid. He noted
that the political situation in Vietnam had not improved. Although the new
South Vietnamese president, Ngô Đình Diệm, was known for his national-
ism and integrity, he had little support from the various political factions
within his country. Mansfield warned there was every likelihood that the
Viet Minh would win the general election scheduled for 1956.100
THE YEAR ENDS
As 1954 came to a close, the failure of the French effort in Vietnam and the
unresolved question of American policy there loomed before U.S. military
and political leaders. Although President Eisenhower had just begun to
implement his defense policies based upon the deterrence of nuclear weapons,
the conflict in Indochina suggested that more conventional capabilities
might not yet be obsolete. Although the United States had avoided direct
involvement in Vietnam, Senate Republicans of the “Old Guard” whispered
in the president’s ear in support of intervention. In an April news conference,
Eisenhower had defined Communist expansion in Southeast Asia in
terms of falling dominoes, an image that would endure. For the Army’s
part, General Ridgway remained convinced that intervention in Vietnam
would mean provoking a war for which his service was not prepared. He
remained committed to holding the line against an administration that was
determined to starve the Army of the personnel and materiel it needed, and
he pushed his commanders and staff to reform and reorganize to meet the
requirements of modern warfare.
John M. Willems, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–2, 25 Jun 1954, sub: Indochina Situation Entering
New Phase; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-A, Series: SCGC 1948–1954, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
100. Memo, Maj. Gen. William F. Marquat, Ch Civil Affairs, for Asst Sec Army et al., 4 Nov
1954, sub: Report of Senator Mansfield on Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, File Unit: Entry
3
Year of “Stabilization”
In July 1955, the new secretary of the Army, Wilber M. Brucker, wrote that,
for the Army, 1955 was a year of stabilization and adjustment. It certainly
would prove to be a period of adjustment, and any suggestion of stabilization
came with a healthy dose of irony. Though the Army had begun to reallocate
its resources within the scope of current national military policy, in most
other respects, the service continued to respond to buffeting currents
produced both by its own leadership and by outside forces competing
for influence within American military policy. As a result, Army leaders
continued to develop technology, organizations, and doctrine to show that
their service could adapt to the requirements of the modern battlefield while
still meeting constraints imposed by the political and economic concerns of
the Eisenhower administration.1
CHANGING OF THE GUARD
In his memoirs and later interviews, General Matthew B. Ridgway

maintained that he had always planned to retire upon completion of his first
tour as chief of staff in June 1955. Nonetheless, it was clear throughout the
administration, the Department of Defense, and even the Army Staff that
President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not retain him for a second term.
The general announced his retirement early in June 1955. As if to reinforce
1. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S.
Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1955
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 79.
his point, the president also replaced the chief of naval operations, Admiral
Robert B. Carney, who had also clashed at times with the precepts of the New
Look. Hanson W. Baldwin, who regularly covered the Pentagon for the New
York Times, noted that the departures lent credence to the viewpoint that the
administration expected senior military officers to support the party line.
He predicted that many officers in the future would “govern their actions by
the code of required conformity.”2
Before his departure, Ridgway prepared papers for both the secretary of
the Army and the secretary of defense, describing his thoughts on national
security and the Army’s role in the country’s defense. To the secretary of the
Army, he emphasized the continued threat of the Soviet Union, a “secret,
murderous conspiracy,” which was “bent on our ultimate destruction.”3
He wrote that the United States government must arouse the spiritual
determination of the people to counter the threat, and that Americans would
support such a course only if the national leadership provided them with a
clear understanding of what the situation required and why. Any approach,
he continued, that had as its primary objective the reduction of dollar costs
of the nation’s military program was faulty and should be rejected. In a direct
jab at the president’s core philosophy, the general concluded that national
fiscal bankruptcy was far preferable to national spiritual bankruptcy.4
More infamous was a letter that General Ridgway presented to Secretary
of Defense Charles E. Wilson on 27 June. Prepared with the assistance of
Maj. Gen. Paul W. Caraway and Brig. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett of the G–3
(Operations) section, the memo spelled out most of Ridgway’s objections
to the New Look philosophy. He pointed out that the time was rapidly
approaching when neither side would have an advantage in nuclear weapons.
Under those conditions, he questioned whether the United States really had
the freedom to rely preponderantly on nuclear weapons to exert its military
power. Present U.S. military forces, he continued, were inadequate and
improperly proportioned to meet all of the nation’s overseas commitments.
An overemphasis on airpower had impaired the nation’s overall military
2. Interv, Col. John M. Blair with Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 24 Mar 1972; Interv, Col.
John J. Ridgway and Lt. Col. Paul B. Walter with Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Mar 1976;
both in Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI); Hanson W. Baldwin, “Changes in Joint Chiefs,” New York
Times, 1 Jun 1955.
3. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Sec Army, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Observations
on Basic National Policy, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: Security Classified General
Correspondence, 1947–1964 (hereinafter SCGC 1947–1964), Record Group (RG) 335:
Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, National Archives at College Park,
4. Memo, Ridgway for Sec Army, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Observations on Basic National Policy.
YEAR OF “STABILIZATION” 95
potential. The general concluded with his now familiar belief that it
had been his role as chief of staff to confine his advice and testimony to
military implications and capabilities, and to leave political and economic
considerations to elected leaders.5
Upon receiving and reading the letter, Wilson forwarded it to Secretary
Robert T. Stevens noting that Ridgway undoubtedly drew its “thought
content and philosophy” from classified planning papers and high policy
council deliberations.6 He directed Stevens to ensure that Ridgway’s letter be
given an appropriate classification and that the Army limit its distribution.
Although the Army G–2 (Intelligence) testified that the document as
submitted by General Ridgway was not classified, the Army acceded to
Secretary Wilson’s wishes and brought all copies of the letter under classified
control. Nonetheless, the documents leaked, and an almost verbatim
transcript of the letter appeared in the September issue of the U.S. Army
Combat Forces Journal, a monthly amalgamation of the Field Artillery Journal
and the Infantry Journal published by the Association of the U.S. Army.7
Ridgway had one more message to relay to his soldiers before his
departure. On 29 June, the Department of the Army published Army
Pamphlet 21–70, The Role of the Army. With a targeted distribution to
every serving officer, warrant officer, and advanced senior ROTC (Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps) cadet, the pamphlet was a distillation of all the
principles for which Ridgway had fought during his tour as chief of staff.
Although he acknowledged the power of atomic weapons, he warned that
“skilled and brave men are still the vital ingredient of military strength,
whether they fight in the air, in ships on and beneath the sea, or in the
vehicles of the land forces—including those old and tested vehicles called
combat boots.”8 In a message no doubt aimed at President Eisenhower,
former Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe,
the old paratrooper concluded, “The decisive element of victory in war is
5. Interv, Ridgway and Walter with Hamlett, Mar 1976; Ltr, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway
to Sec Def Charles E. Wilson, 27 Jun 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: Security
Classified Correspondence, 1955 (hereinafter SCC 1955), Subgroup: Records of the Office
of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations (hereinafter G–3 Ops), RG 319: Records
of the Army Staff, NACP.
6. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G–2, for Ch Staff, 23 Jul 1955,
sub: Interim Report on General Ridgway’s Letter to Mr. Wilson, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–
1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), RG 319, NACP.
7. Memo, Schow for Ch Staff, 23 Jul 1955, sub: Interim Report on General Ridgway’s
Letter to Mr. Wilson; “The Communist Threat and the Proper U.S. Strategy,” United States
Army Combat Forces Journal 6 (Sep 1955): 20–24.
8. Matthew B. Ridgway, Army Pamphlet 21–70, The Role of the Army (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 29 Jun 1955).
still the trained fighting man who, with his feet on the ground, defeats the
enemy’s ground fighters, seizes his land, and holds it.”9
Ridgway’s successor was General Maxwell D. Taylor, World War II
commander of the 101st Airborne Division and most recently commanding
general of the Eighth Army in Korea and the Far East Command. Described
in one news editorial as “linguist, diplomat, and tactician of a high order,”
Taylor had held several quasi-diplomatic positions that seemed to make him
a worthy heir apparent. He had served as U.S. Commander, Berlin, shortly
after the end of the blockade and, as the Eighth Army commander, had
supervised the initial stages of a recovery program that would help to launch
South Korea and its armed forces into the modern world. Many senior officers
harbored the hope that replacing the forthright-to-the-point-of-bluntness
Ridgway with the more diplomatic and politically savvy Taylor would help
to elevate the Army’s standing with the Eisenhower administration.10
Taylor himself frequently used two anecdotes to describe his reception
into his new role. Describing his initial interviews with Secretary Wilson
and the president, Taylor noted that questions posed to him had less to do
with his views on world strategy and more to do with his willingness to carry
out the orders of civilian leaders even when contrary to his own views. After
thirty-seven years of service, he observed, he had no “difficulty of conscience”
in reassuring them, but he expressed a bit of surprise at Eisenhower and
Wilson subjecting him to such a loyalty test.11 He also frequently had cause
to remember the words of departing Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Carney, who told him, “You’re one of the good new Chiefs now, but you’ll
be surprised how soon you will become one of the bad old Chiefs.”12 In
fact, Taylor would recall in his memoirs that although he never particularly
minded the conflicts with his Pentagon peers, he felt keenly the increasing
coolness in his relations with President Eisenhower and could not escape the
sense that he had let down his former commander.13
On 30 June, in his first meeting with key staff officers, Taylor reminded
them that he was aware of the battle that they had been waging for the past
two years and the reasons for it. Nonetheless, he continued, he was anxious
to get the Army out of the doghouse with the commander in chief and the
Department of Defense. He wanted to get rid of the reputation for always
9. Ridgway, Army Pamphlet 21–70, The Role of the Army.
10. “Soldier’s Soldiers,” Army Times, 21 May 1955. For the most recent biography of
Maxwell Taylor, see Ingo W. Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to
Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019).
11. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 170–71.
12. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 170–71.
13. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959), 28;
Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 170–71.
Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens (right) congratulates General

Maxwell D. Taylor (left) on being sworn in as the new chief of staff
of the U.S. Army. Taylor succeeded General Matthew B. Ridgway
(center) in this role. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
being out of step and to reassure the secretary of defense and the president
that the Army was a member of the team. Taylor would return to this theme
frequently throughout his tenure as the chief of staff. With teamwork in mind,
he emphasized the need for the best-qualified personnel the Army could
find to staff the Legislative Liaison and Public Information offices. That was
essential, he noted, to reforming and maintaining the reputation of the Army.14
The new chief of staff expanded upon his philosophy to his vice chief of
staff, Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer. The Army should establish in the minds
of the public, the Congress, and the Department of Defense that it was an
14. MFR, Col. Alexander D. Surles, Dep Sec Gen Staff, 1 Jul 1955, sub: General Taylor’s
Meeting with Key Staff Officers, 30 June 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
indispensable member of the first line defense team. Those institutions must
regard the Army, Taylor wrote, as open-minded and progressive, constantly
looking forward and not back. His most frequently repeated mantra was
that the Army is a loyal member of the defense team, quick to defend its own
legitimate interests, but scrupulous in not trespassing on those of the other
services. He expected Army leaders to express their honest opinions, but
once the proper superior authority had made a decision, they must accept it
without grumbling and make the best of it.15
At virtually the same time that General Ridgway was turning over the
reins to Taylor, Secretary of the Army Stevens decided to return to private
life. After several weeks of rumors following his experience during the
McCarthy hearings, Stevens announced his resignation on 22 June. He
returned to his position with his family textile company, saying only that
“compelling personal considerations” made it necessary for him to leave
the Eisenhower administration.16 On the same morning that he accepted
Stevens’s resignation, President Eisenhower announced his nomination
of Wilber M. Brucker, general counsel of the Department of Defense and
former governor of Michigan, to be the next secretary of the Army.17
Governor Brucker, a World War I veteran of the 42d Infantry Division
(also known as the Rainbow Division) with General Douglas MacArthur,
brought many of the same insights to his new position that General Taylor
had expressed to his fellow officers. In his initial briefings with the Army Staff,
Brucker stated that he considered his position to be that of a salesman, with
his main task being selling the Army to Congress. In talking to reporters,
the new Secretary said that he was most concerned with the apologetic and
defensive attitude taken by Army officers in their joint work with the other
services. The Army had a great future, he believed, and he was going to make
it his business to restore a positive approach in the ground service’s attitude.
After his retirement, General Taylor would remember Brucker as intensely
loyal to the Army, so much so, he said, that he became “more royalist
than the king.”18 The chief of staff would have to moderate the secretary’s
eloquence and enthusiasm as he used his platform to promote the Army.19
Shortly after assuming his position as chief of staff, Taylor began work on
15. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Vice Ch Staff, 25 Jul 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS RG 319, NACP.
16. Anthony Leviero, “Stevens Resigns; Brucker Named Army Secretary,” New York
Times, 23 Jun 1955.
17. Leviero, “Stevens Resigns; Brucker Named Army Secretary.”
18. Interv, Col. Richard Manion with Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 8 Dec 1972, Senior Ofcr
Debriefing Program, MHI.
19. Memo, Lt. Col. H. D. Thomte, Asst Sec Gen Staff, for Ch Staff, 9 Jul 1955, sub:
Highlights of Briefings for Governor Brucker, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (U.S. Army, National Archives

Still Picture Branch)
an intellectual framework that would support the Army’s renewed efforts

to expand its role within Eisenhower’s defense strategy. The document
summarized many of the ideas Taylor had developed over the course
of his military career. It emphasized that although the primary purpose
of the national military program was to deter general war, the program
also required the capability to prevent or defeat local aggression. Because
unchecked local aggressions could expand into general war, it was vital
for the United States to maintain the ability to prevent or quickly suppress
them. The hydrogen bomb, which played an essential role in general war
plans, was not an appropriate weapon to deal with border intrusions, jungle
and mountain operations, guerrilla warfare, or a coup d’état. Ironically,
although nuclear weapons had little role to play in such localized conflicts,
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Interv, Manion with Taylor, 8 Dec 1972;
“Army on the Defensive,” Army Times, 17 Sep 1955.
those forces designed for limited war could just as easily be deployed in a
larger war. Taylor acknowledged the requirement for air and naval forces
large enough to deter Communist aggression and to deliver a nuclear
riposte if so required. He stressed, however, that the air and sea services
needed to provide sufficient resources to transport the ground force to
whatever flash points might develop. In summary, the general concluded
that a politically acceptable military program might fall somewhat short of
meeting all his stated requirements, but it should meet the requirements of
deterring both general and local war and for winning the smaller conflicts.
Our national military program, he believed, must not be dependent on any
single weapon or strategy, but must be prepared for flexible application to
unforeseen situations.20
General Taylor then assembled a group of colonels from across the Army
Staff to review the outline and suggest how the Army could implement
its ideas across the force. In October, the ad hoc committee returned
its analysis, which included an examination of specific actions the Army
could take to increase its capabilities and an extensive list of organizations
and functions it could eliminate to make the service more efficient. The
examination supported the idea that the Army needed to embrace a new
philosophy of war. Although not yet sharply defined, Taylor’s concepts of a
more flexible response capability were acceptable enough, and he concluded
that, for public purposes, they need not be perfect. These ideas would form
the basis for the strategic policy of “Flexible Response,” which Taylor would
champion for the remainder of his career.21
Perhaps with an eye to the former automobile executive currently sitting
as secretary of defense, the committee recommended a campaign that
translated the chief of staff ’s ideas into simple, appealing terms that could
compete with Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps propaganda. “We need
slogans and catchwords that people will like,” it proclaimed.22 The committee
also urged the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff to meet with the
secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congressional
leaders, and the president to discuss the Army’s “new” outlook. The
committee also expressed the hope that the new Army leaders were in a
20. “Army on the Defensive”; Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff
21. Memo, Col. Donovan P. Yeuell Jr., Sec Ad Hoc Committee, for Dep Ch Staff Ops and
Administration, attention Col. George I. Forsythe, 11 Oct 1955, sub: Analysis by Ad Hoc
Committee of Chief of Staff’s Outline for a National Military Program, File Unit: Entry A1
2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
22. Memo, Yeuell for Dep Ch Staff Ops and Administration, 11 Oct 1955, sub: Analysis by
Ad Hoc Committee.
better position to undertake these heart-to-heart exchanges in view of

their relatively “less strained relationships with their superiors than those
enjoyed by their predecessors.”23 Most important, the officers noted, was
for the Army to speak as one voice in addressing its concerns. The service
needed to coordinate the substance of all public and private statements that
related to its positions within the national security structure. The committee
recommended a concerted effort to “colonize the Office of the Secretary
of Defense,” making a deliberate effort to select highly qualified officers
for assignments to that agency and other joint projects. Those candidates,
warned the committee members, should be instructed that their first duty
was to serve the Army.24
ARMY ORGANIZATION CONTINUES TO EVOLVE
Despite the secretary of the Army’s description of 1955 as a year of stabilization,

the service’s organization continued to evolve as leaders implemented
recommendations offered by the Davies and Slezak plans of the previous two
years. In the field of logistics, civilian scientists had complained repeatedly
about the subordination of research and development to procurement and
production. The vice chief of staff, General Palmer, warned that in order
to keep the Army current in the atomic age, research and development
needed rank and prestige commensurate with that accorded in the other
services. In September, Secretary Brucker created the position of Director of
Research and Development and made the post the organizational equivalent
to the four existing assistant secretaries. He appointed William H. Martin,
then the deputy assistant secretary of defense for applications engineering,
to be the first director. The same month, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, now
serving as the deputy chief of staff for plans and research, recommended
that the Army separate the position of chief of research and development
from his office and establish the position as equivalent to the three existing
deputy chiefs of staff. Secretary Brucker approved that change as well and,
in October, Gavin moved laterally into the new position on the Army
Staff, becoming the first independent chief of research and development.25
Ad Hoc Committee.
Ad Hoc Committee.
25. Memo, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, for Ch Staff, 13 Oct 1955, sub: Establishment
of the Position of Director of Research and Development, File Unit: Entry A1-2B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; James E. Hewes Jr., From
Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900–1963, Special Studies
In November, Secretary Brucker and General Taylor approved another

reorganization of the Army Staff. This change eliminated the existing
structure of five deputy chiefs of staff and three assistant chiefs of staff below
them and replaced them with three deputy chiefs of staff (for personnel,
operations, and logistics), a chief of research and development, a comptroller,
and the assistant chief of staff for intelligence. In addition to supervising the
G–1 (Personnel) section, the deputy chief of staff for personnel absorbed
the functions of the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration.
This position also inherited direct supervision and control over the adjutant
general’s office, the chief of chaplains, the provost marshal general, and the
chief of information and education. In addition to overseeing the G–3 section,
the deputy chief of staff for military operations assumed the functions of
the deputy chief of staff for plans. This position also controlled the chief of
civil affairs and military government, the chief of psychological warfare, and
the chief of military history. The deputy chief of staff for logistics retained
control over the technical service chiefs: the quartermaster general, the chief
of engineers, the chief of ordnance, the surgeon general, the chief signal
officer, the chief chemical officer, and the chief of transportation.26
The reorganization had the effect of removing the chief of staff from
many of the day-to-day functions of the Army. Instead, Taylor created two
new agencies to assist with long-range planning within the secretariat of
the General Staff. The Coordinating Group would assist the chief of staff
in the development and evaluation of long-range strategic plans and act
as a liaison with other Army and defense committees. The chief of staff
immediately put them to work on a pamphlet explicitly describing his
philosophy regarding the Army’s role in national defense. The new Programs
and Analysis Group coordinated the balancing of Army programs with
available money, personnel, and other resources. Most of the changes went
into effect the first week of January 1956, after which the staff organization
would remain intact for the remainder of the Eisenhower administration.27
On 1 February 1955, the Army redesignated the Office, Chief of Army
Field Forces, as Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command
(CONARC), with command over the six continental armies, the Military
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), 238–39; Elliott V.
Converse III, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960, vol. 1, History of Acquisition in the
Department of Defense (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical
Office, 2012), 606–7.
26. Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Nov
1955, sub: Organizational Changes, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Steve Tillman, “G–2 Will be Only ‘G’ Under Army
Headquarters Plan,” Army Times, 8 Dec 1955; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 238.
27. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 238–41.
District of Washington, the five service test boards, an arctic test branch,
and three human resources research units. The new command assumed the
responsibilities for plans and execution of operations for ground defense of
the United States as well as for assisting civil authorities in disaster relief and
control of domestic disturbances. The headquarters inherited final approval
authority for most tables of authorization and equipment for Army units
in the field. Although the CONARC commander was now responsible for
the administrative and logistical support of the continental armies, the
Department of the Army continued to provide guidance in the suballocation
of funds.28
General John E. Dahlquist, the new organization’s first commanding
general, soon found that the changes had not resolved completely the
complicated chains of command and responsibility. In July, Dahlquist wrote
to Vice Chief of Staff General Palmer that the Army Staff was interfering
in matters that were clearly within his power of decision. He cited a major
logistics exercise during which he had asked the assistant chief of staff, G–2,
for a security check and instead had been subjected to a review and critique
of the entire exercise scenario. Service leaders also continued a contentious
debate over whether CONARC should exercise jurisdiction over the Army’s
technical and administrative service schools. The secretary of the Army
tabled that discussion for six to twelve months of further study. General
Walter L. Weible, the deputy chief of staff for operations and administration,
tried to diffuse the conflicts, saying that a lot of the issues were the result
of petty troubles exaggerated at lower levels, both on the Army Staff and
at CONARC.29
Although the ongoing personnel and budget reductions and the
expectation of more cuts to come had rendered the Army in flux, for most
of 1955 the roster of posts, corps, and divisions remained remarkably stable.
At the start of the year, the force numbered six corps headquarters and
twenty-five active divisions of various types. These included five divisions
in Europe, three in the Far East, nine in the continental United States, and
28. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 267; Ofc Ch Mil History, “A Brief History of the
Evolution of the Missions of Army Ground Forces Command from 1942 through the
Present Continental Army Command,” 6 Jan 1966, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of
Military History (CMH), Washington, DC.
29. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 28 Feb 1955,
sub: Training Responsibilities of Continental Army Command; MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D.
Adams, 23 May 1955, sub: Training Responsibilities for Continental Army Command with
Respect to T&A Schools; Ltr, Gen. John E. Dahlquist to Gen. Williston B. Palmer, 8 Jul
1955; MFR, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 23 Jul 1955, sub: Meeting in
General Weible’s Office, 1030 Hours, 23 July 1955; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
three in Hawai‘i, Alaska, and the Caribbean. Overseas, the Army had V and
VII Corps in Europe and I and IX Corps in the Far East. Five additional
divisions served in the United States as training cadre only, used to prepare
new recruits for assignments to overseas or deployable units. By the end of
the year, all of the divisions remained at the same locations except for the 1st
and 10th Infantry Divisions, which had swapped places during the summer
as part of Operation Gyroscope.30
With the looming threat of continued budget cuts and force reductions,
Army planners began to question the utility of established division
definitions for the service’s force structure. To facilitate planning and
simplify understanding of its organization, the Army had employed three
distinct definitions to describe its divisions. It defined mobile divisions as
General Reserve or overseas units that were staffed, trained, and equipped
to a degree that would permit immediate conduct of land combat. Static
divisions, which also were organized and equipped as combat divisions, were
dispersed to widely separate stations and unable to train as a unit. They were
less likely candidates for assembly and deployment. The third classification,
the General Reserve training divisions, were organized as mobile divisions,
but lacked most of the associated weapons and equipment. They consisted
only of cadre assigned the mission of training new recruits and replacements.
The Army did not consider this third category as deployable for combat
without at least six months of preparation and training.31
The Army had adapted division designations for its replacement training
centers in 1947 as a way to recognize and maintain on the active rolls units
that had distinguished themselves in combat during World War II. By 1955,
however, the practice had become counterproductive. In a December study
for the chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Sherburne, the acting assistant
chief of staff, G–1, wrote that the unit designations had not instilled in
the trainees the high morale and unit esprit de corps that the service had
anticipated. More important, he continued, the designation of training
centers as divisions presented a false impression in Congress and among
the public as to the actual strength of the Army. Sherburne recommended
that the Army discontinue the use of division designations to identify
training centers and retire those designations not assigned to active forces.32
30. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin for Ch Staff, 24 Mar 1955, sub: Definition of
Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319,
NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Sherburne, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–1, for Ch Staff,
15 Dec 1955, sub: Training Center Designations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
31. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, 24 Mar 1955, sub: Definition of Divisions.
32. Memo, Sherburne for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1955, sub: Training Center Designations.
In December, acting on those recommendations, the Army presented

to President Eisenhower a plan for a nineteen-division force. The proposal
eliminated the five training divisions, returning to those posts the designation
of Army training centers. The reorganization thus eliminated the 6th and
the 69th Infantry Divisions and the 5th and 6th Armored Divisions from the
active rolls. The Army announced its intent to transfer the designation of the
101st Airborne Division to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, where it would become
a tactical division. At the same time, the Army announced the elimination
of the two static units, the 23d and 71st Infantry Divisions. The 4th Infantry
Division would replace the 71st in Alaska when it returned from Germany.
The Army would not replace the 23d Infantry Division in the Caribbean,
leaving only the 20th Infantry Regiment and some supporting elements in
the Panama Canal Zone. The president approved the Army proposal on
17 December.33
The personnel and budget reductions also had begun to have an impact on
U.S. plans to provide emergency reinforcements to Europe as part of NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) agreements. By early 1955, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recognized that the Army would be unable to meet its goal of
sending seventeen divisions to Europe within six months of the start of an
emergency. Given the current active force structure, the best Army planners
could foresee was the availability of thirteen divisions within the given time
constraints. In June, the G–3 plans staff presented a proposal to incorporate
four divisions from the Army Reserve or the Army National Guard. The plan
assumed that the Army could preselect obligated reservists for deployment
and prepare mobilization and replacement training stations at least thirty
days before the start of hostilities. Logistical appraisals had indicated that
sufficient equipment existed to provide initial issue from depot stocks with
some shortages in tanks, aircraft, and artillery ammunition. The active force
would have to provide cadre to fill out some reserve positions, including
more than 200 officers and 600 enlisted personnel per division. Obviously,
the plan observed, the combat effectiveness of those active divisions from
which the cadres came would decline accordingly. The analysis also noted
that most national guard and reserve divisions were at less than 50 percent
of authorized strength and would have to add personnel upon mobilization.
Despite the risks and shortcomings inherent in the proposal, General Taylor
presented the concept to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Army’s best option
for meeting U.S. commitments to NATO.34
33. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Centers Back in Army,” Army Times, 17 Dec 1955.
34. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 134–35; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams,
Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 21 Jun 1955, sub: Plan to Meet NATO Force
Although the NATO reinforcements remained high on the Army’s list

of strategic requirements, Taylor and the General Staff frequently found
themselves at odds. In September, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, chair
of a National Security Council working group considering options for
countering Communist expansion, recommended to the Army Staff that
the service develop an “initial action deterrent force” capable of deploying
to overseas trouble spots on short notice.35 Bonesteel’s recommendation
noted that such a force would require elements of all military services,
but if properly supported, the possibility that it would have to fight would
decrease. General Taylor enthusiastically supported the idea and presented it
to the Joint Chiefs as a formal proposal. Predictably, the Navy and Air Force
balked at the idea. Admiral Arthur W. Radford protested that it violated
the secretary of defense’s policies on simplifying subordinate commands.
Nonetheless, the chairman referred the concept to the Joint Staff for study.
The Army Staff moved forward with the concept and urged General Taylor
to designate the XVIII Airborne Corps and four deployable D-Day–ready
divisions as the Army Strategic Task Force. The public acknowledgment of
such a contingent, they noted, would serve as a deterrent to Communist
aggression overseas, allow for continued planning, and establish for
Congress and the other services the requirement for the necessary sea- and
airlift. Although the year ended without any firm commitment from the
Joint Chiefs, Taylor provided the new commander of the XVIII Airborne
Corps, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, an early warning order that he should
begin planning for the new tasking.36
By the end of 1954, the Army had selected two divisions, the 3d Infantry
Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 1st Armored Division at Fort
Hood, Texas, to participate in the testing of the Atomic Field Army, or
Goals by 1 July 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: Security Classified General
Correspondence, 1955 (hereinafter SCGC 1955), Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
35. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 30 Sep 1955, sub:
Implementation of Paragraph 32 of NSC 5501, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC
1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
36. Memo, Harkins for Ch Staff, 30 Sep 1955, sub: Implementation of Paragraph 32 of NSC
5501; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Plans, for Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams,
Cmdg Gen, XVIII Abn Corps, 18 Oct 1955; File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955,
Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins for Ch Staff,
29 Dec 1955, sub: Organization and Designation of the Army Strategic Task Force, File
Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
Sfc. Charles W. Stover, platoon sergeant of 3d Platoon, Company

A, 6th Battalion, from an unidentified regiment of the 3d Infantry
Division, giving the signal to advance and attack near Baker Hill,
Alabama, 15 February 1955. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
ATFA–1. At the direction of the Third and Fourth Army headquarters,

each division reorganized under the tentative ATFA–1 table of
organization and equipment, completed preliminary training, and field-
tested the new concept of doctrine and organization. By February 1955,
each division was ready to undergo initial testing of the new concept.37
Exercise Follow Me, the field test of the 3d Infantry Division, began
on 11 February in a maneuver area that extended 30 miles wide and 100
miles deep between Fort Benning and Camp Rucker, Alabama. For the next
sixteen days, the division executed a series of phased maneuvers that tested
all aspects of its potential mission during an atomic conflict. Beginning
37. MS, Ops Research Ofc, Johns Hopkins University, Oct 1956, “Evaluation of Procedures
Employed in Tests of the 1956 Field Army (ATFA–1),” Historians Files, CMH.
General John E. Dahlquist questions a field artillery private

participating in Exercise Follow Me. (U.S. Army, National Archives
from a division assembly area, troops conducted a reconnaissance and a

movement to contact. After a sustained attack on a fortified enemy position,
the division fell back into a defensive posture and prepared to emplace and
employ atomic weapons. Finally, it conducted a mobile defense across a front
measuring 32,000 yards, the equivalent of more than thirty grid squares on
a military map.38
At the same time, at Fort Hood, the elements of the 1st Armored Division
began Exercise Blue Bolt. Combat Command C began the evaluation
by itself, but most of the division joined them two days later. Evaluators
pushed the division through a series of maneuvers appropriate to its
organization, including attack, withdrawal, mobile defense, river crossing,
38. MS, Ops Research Ofc, Johns Hopkins University, Oct 1956, “Evaluation of Procedures
Employed in Tests of the 1956 Field Army (ATFA–1)”; “Atom-Div Size Unchanged,”
Army Times, 19 Feb 1955. For more details on the organization and scope of U.S. Army
maneuvers during this period, see Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the
United States, 1935–1964 (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1969).
and envelopments. The test concluded on 1 March as umpires and evaluators

immediately began to compile their notes and observations for CONARC
headquarters and the Army Staff.39
First impressions were not favorable. In one of his final memos before
retirement, General Ridgway wrote that he was aware of the great amount
of effort that staffs and leaders at all levels had put into solving the problems
of atomic warfare. However, he doubted that the solutions as proposed
gained any more flexibility than one could find under good leadership in the
existing infantry division. General Adams, the G–3 at the time, observed that
neither exercise had validated the new organizations that they had tested.
Although the combat command concept produced greater flexibility, the
reorganization had produced no appreciable gain in mobility. The support
units were smaller, but the basic infantry and armored battalions were no
smaller than their Korean War and World War II counterparts. The new
divisions required better combat potential-to-manpower ratios than those
displayed, and both combat and combat support units needed to be smaller
and more mobile than those tested. Adams conceded that much of the
improved transportation and communications equipment required to make
the doctrine work was not yet available, but he concluded that it warranted
further testing.40
The test director for Exercise Follow Me reported that the combat
potential-to-manpower ratio and the overall mobility of the infantry
division remained about the same as the present division. Although the
new organization was more flexible, it lacked the capability for sustained
combat. It was woefully inadequate in field artillery, antiaircraft defense,
and antitank defense capabilities. The reconnaissance capabilities were also
inadequate for the ground the dispersed division would have to cover and
control. The support command seemed to be viable, and the communications
and command control capability of the organization was adequate. The
evaluators recommended adding a third artillery battalion and an antiaircraft
battalion to the division artillery, increasing the reconnaissance company
to a battalion, and adding a second tank battalion and an eighth infantry
battalion to the overall division strength. They also suggested increasing the
infantry rifle squads from nine soldiers to ten with two automatic rifles.41
39. Moenk, History of Large Scale Maneuvers, 202–19.
40. MFR, CWO William McCleary, 21 Jun 1955; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Asst
Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 15 Jul 1955, sub: Experimental Combat Organization of the
Infantry and Armored Divisions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
41. Memo, Col. C. Z. Shugart, Adjutant Gen, Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), for Asst
Ch Staff, G–3, 13 May 1955, sub: Report of Field Test of the ATFA Infantry Division, File
Upon receiving the exercise report, CONARC headquarters made several

changes to the ATFA–1 Infantry Division. It concurred with many of the
test director’s recommendations, adding a tank battalion and an infantry
battalion and replacing the reconnaissance company with a battalion. It
made wholesale changes to the division artillery, eliminating the composite
battalions and including one 155-mm. and three 105-mm. howitzer battalions. It
chose not to include an antiaircraft battalion headquarters, but it attached
an antiaircraft battery to each field artillery battalion. Because it deemed
the range and characteristics of the 4.2-inch mortars to be only marginally
better than those of the 81-mm. mortars, CONARC eliminated the former
from the division’s table of organization and equipment. Moving a step
further from the evaluator’s recommendations, CONARC also eliminated
the division headquarters battalion and created separate combat command
headquarters with their own organic motor transport, security, mess, and
communications elements. Although it declined the recommendation to
expand the rifle squads to ten soldiers, CONARC did authorize a second
automatic rifle per squad. The command directed the 3d Infantry Division to
begin training and retesting under the revised organization by 1 September,
with the understanding that it would participate in the multidivision Exercise
Sage Brush soon after that date.42
The evaluators for Exercise Blue Bolt were noncommittal. In their
estimation, the new organization was not particularly better suited to
atomic combat than the existing model. Although the new organization
held some promise, the evaluators believed that it required large amounts of
new equipment—especially more powerful radios and armored personnel
carriers. They did note that the use of the same command posts for combat
commands and the tank battalions increased the division’s vulnerability to
air attack, as did the lack of an organic antiaircraft battalion.43
Both the incoming and outgoing chiefs of staff weighed in on the results
of the two tests. General Ridgway overruled the CONARC decision to
shelve the 4.2-inch mortar in both the armored and infantry divisions. He
cited requirements for perimeter defense and the need for supplementary
indirect fires and directed CONARC to reevaluate the use of the mortars
as part of upcoming exercises and to include at least one platoon of four
42. Memo, Shugart for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 13 May 1955, sub: Report of Field Test of
the ATFA Infantry Division; John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of
Divisions and Separate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center
of Military History, 1998), 265–67.
43. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 267; Paul C. Jussel, “Intimidating the World: The
United States Atomic Army, 1956–1960” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004), 57–64,
Historians Files, CMH.
mortars in each infantry battalion. Ridgway also expressed his support for
expanding the size of the rifle squad and directed the divisions to employ
twelve-man rifle squads in further testing. In his initial comments following
the ATFA–1 tests, General Taylor cited some of his experiences with new
division organizations in Korea. He believed that a division should have
no equipment that it did not require for use every day. He suggested
the pooling of trucks and personnel carriers into a general purpose
transportation battalion within the infantry division. With that in mind,
he also suggested further study regarding the required and anticipated
mobility of the infantry. How much of the infantry division, he wanted to
know, could be transported using only its organic vehicles? He suggested
that the mobility of the infantry division should be that of the foot soldier,
with a differential for those elements that must leapfrog or move forward to
support. In other words, the infantry should walk, supplemented by trucks
when necessary. In the interest of increasing available firepower, Taylor also
suggested that it might be time to consider adding an 8-inch piece to the
division artillery.44
As the Army took time to evaluate the performance of its atomic-age
divisions, it also escalated the tests and training on troop exposure to live
atomic blasts that it had been conducting since 1951. The force had established
Camp Desert Rock as an adjunct to the Atomic Energy Commission’s test
site in Nevada. Up until 1955, the Army had sent limited numbers of troops
to witness live atomic test shots from a safe distance and had evaluated their
psychological responses to the experience. In April, however, in Exercise
Desert Rock VI, Lt. Col. John C. Wheelock and the 723d Tank Battalion
experienced the blast from less than 2 miles away, before moving forward with
reinforcing infantry and combat support into the blast area in a simulated
attack. After the exercise, radiological teams tested the troops for exposure,
and ordnance crews examined vehicles and equipment to determine how
well they had stood up to the blast and subsequent maneuver. After the test,
observers expressed some level of surprise that most of the equipment had
44. Memo, Adams for Ch Staff, 15 Jul 1955, sub: Experimental Combat Organization of
the Infantry and Armored Divisions; MFR, initialed by Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Asst Ch
Staff, G–3, 29 Jun 1955, sub: General Taylor’s Briefing on the ATFA Tests, File Unit: Entry
A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D.
Harkins, 25 Jul 1955, sub: Visit to CONARC with General Taylor, Monday, 18 July 1955, File
A mannequin known as “Priscilla,” intentionally exposed to an atomic

blast during Exercise Desert Rock, shows troops the extent to which
their equipment would survive such blasts. (U.S. Army, National
come through relatively unscathed. Notably, the effects of radiation exposure
on the troops participating in the test had not yet become a major concern.45
Although none of the exercises the Army had held so far had been
entirely satisfactory, they served to maintain a momentum pointing to its
most significant effort of the year, Exercise Sage Brush. Blue Bolt and
Follow Me had been relatively small, single-division affairs that the Army
had not even scheduled as part of its formal exercise program for 1955. Sage
Brush, however, would be a major joint exercise with the Air Force and
would involve more than 140,000 soldiers and airmen. The expansive scale
45. “GIs to Test Armor as Atomic Protection,” Army Times, 26 Mar 1955; “Nevada Tests
Prove Army Tanks Can Take A-Blast Punishment,” Army Times, 16 Apr 1955; “Tank
Force Crosses Desert For Atomic Warfare Tests,” Army Times, 23 Apr 1955; “Troops and
the Bomb,” Army Times, 14 May 1955; Anthony Leviero, “Task Force Razor Shaves Big
Apple 2,” United States Army Combat Forces Journal 5 (Jun 1955): 38–43.
of the maneuver would allow the Army to test combat and service support
elements at the field-army and corps levels and would provide another look
at the organization and doctrine of the two ATFA–1 divisions. The joint
exercise also would allow the Army and the Air Force to examine air-ground
coordination and to develop further procedures for processing air support
missions in an atomic environment.46
Plans for the exercise hit a snag late in 1954 when ranchers and landowners
in the Fort Hood vicinity complained to the secretary of the Army and
demanded increased compensation for use of their land included in the
proposed maneuver area. Their complaints regarding Army payments for
damages done in previous maneuvers and the adverse attitudes among the
public—spurred by some unfavorable local news coverage—had prevented
full division maneuvers during Exercise Blue Bolt and had threatened to
curtail Sage Brush even further. In January 1955, after several nonproductive
meetings between Army officials and representatives of the landowners,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs Frederick A. Seaton
directed the Army to discontinue negotiations and consider acquiring
additional maneuver land surrounding the inactive Camp Polk, Louisiana.
Despite some serious backtracking by Texas politicians and officials, Army
officials reached an agreement with the governor and the state of Louisiana.
In exchange for maneuver rights to more than 5.5 million acres surrounding
Camp Polk, the Army agreed to reopen the post as a permanent installation
and, ultimately, stationed a division there.47
Exercise Sage Brush ran 31 October–4 December in the newly acquired
Louisiana Maneuver Area. U.S. forces included the 1st Armored Division,
the 3d Infantry Division, and the 77th Special Forces Group, operating
under the III Corps headquarters. Two Air Force fighter-bomber wings,
a bomb group, a tactical reconnaissance wing, and a tactical missile flight
provided support. The 4th Armored Division, the 82d Airborne Division,
and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment portrayed the aggressor forces,
operating under the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, XVIII
Airborne Corps. Similar Air Force units supported the aggressor side. After
moving into initial positions, U.S. forces responded to an enemy surprise
46. Jussell, “Intimidating the World,” 57–58; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland,
Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 3 Nov 1955, sub: Task Force to Accumulate
Information Concerning Decision to Activate Camp Polk as a Permanent Station and to
Deploy Troops From Fort Hood, Texas, to Camp Polk, Louisiana, File Unit: Entry A1
137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
47. Memo, Westmoreland for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 3 Nov 1955, sub: Task Force to
Accumulate Information Concerning Decision to Activate Camp Polk; Moenk, History of
Large Scale Maneuvers, 205–6; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “130,000-Man Maneuver is Set for
Polk,” Army Times, 18 Jun 1955.
attack before launching their own extensive counterattack. Throughout the

entire maneuver phase, both sides employed a total of 254 notional atomic
weapons, delivered by aircraft, missiles, and 280-mm. atomic artillery.48
For several reasons, the results of the exercise were less compelling than
the Army desired. Despite the fact that the Army had obtained extensive
maneuver area in Louisiana, much of the area consisted of heavy vegetation,
swamps, bayous, and quicksand. The region lacked sufficient roads capable
of handling heavy military equipment and even fewer bridges capable of
supporting armored vehicles. As a result, movement for such large military
formations was constrained to the relatively few trafficable routes. Unrealistic
safety and administrative requirements rendered the two airborne assaults
so predictable that defending forces were able to determine and reach
drop zones before the arrival of the attacking troops. Weather conditions
in the area also limited the availability of supporting aircraft, which was
particularly problematic for an exercise designed to evaluate Army–Air
Force coordination.49
The joint critique for the exercise, held on 10 December, identified
additional concerns that brought into question the validity of any lessons.
General Dahlquist, of CONARC, pointed out that the shortage in trained
soldiers and equipment had forced the Army to piece together units just
weeks before beginning the exercise. Many officers and personnel had little
if any experience in the positions they held during the training. In many
cases, troops did not have proficiency in basic military skills, let alone the
knowledge and training in the advanced concepts of organization and
doctrine that were the subject of the evaluation. Across the board, many
units also displayed a lack of discipline, as evidenced by bumper-to-
bumper congestion during road movement and a failure to carry out basic
instructions. Most participants seemed to feel that the Army was testing
units and commanders on their job performance, rather than evaluating the
effectiveness of a new concept and organization.50
Despite such shortcomings, some comments during the subsequent
critiques reflected thoughtful consideration of the implications of the new
organization and doctrine. Maj. Gen. Charles D. W. Canham, commander of
the friendly ground forces during the exercise, observed that the maneuver
48. Moenk, History of Large Scale Maneuvers, 211–12; “Sage Brush Opens,” Army Times,
5 Nov 1955; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Old, New Clash As Troops Meet in Sage Brush,” Army
Times, 19 Nov 1955.
50. Joint Critique, HQ, CONARC, 10 Dec 1955, sub: Exercise Sage Brush; Final Rpt of
Army Tests, HQ, CONARC, n.d., sub: Exercise Sage Brush, Annex CC, Factors Adversely
Affecting Tests; both in File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series: CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–
1962, RG 319, NACP.
demonstrated that frontline troops would need a smaller-yield close support

atomic weapon in combat. Existing weapons such as the Honest John rocket
and the 280-mm. gun were too big to follow immediately behind an assault
unit. Using the current weapons, he said, would end up killing as many of
our own troops as the enemy. Canham also noted that the jet aircraft used
by the Air Force were poorly suited for close air support because they could
only remain on station for a brief period, and their high speeds diminished
the accuracy of rockets, napalm, and other types of ordnance. The Army, he
believed, needed to develop its own organic close air support, which would be
under the control of the ground commander at all times. Predictably, Army
and Air Force participants bickered throughout the critique concerning
the necessity, effectiveness, and especially the overall control of close air
support. Many Air Force representatives contended that they should reserve
atomic weapons for strategic targets and that such munitions had no role in
close support for the Army in any case. General Dahlquist summed up his
observations by questioning whether the participants had grasped fully the
implications of an atomic war. “We have become too interested in how many
people we can kill,” he said, “but we still don’t understand how to integrate
the atomic fires into an overall scheme for the battle.”51
At the same time that the Army was examining the results of Sage Brush
and its implementation of ATFA–1 division concepts, the U.S. Army War
College completed its own study entitled “Doctrinal and Organizational
Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army during the Period 1960–1970.”
Given the short title PENTANA—a combined abbreviation of “pentagonal”
(because the units would have five basic tactical components) and
“atomic-nonatomic”—the study envisioned completely air-transportable
8,600-person divisions to replace current infantry, armored, and airborne
divisions. The Army would build the new divisions around five small self-
sufficient “battle groups” that would include their own artillery.52
In the initial CONARC briefing on the new division to General Taylor,
General Dahlquist highlighted the divergences of opinion that the PENTANA
concept had generated. He noted that many of the negative reactions to the
concept bore a direct relation to the impact of the new organization on the
division elements associated with their own branches. Those perceiving a
decline in strength and responsibility expressed violent opposition to the
concepts. The chief of engineers had gone so far as to say that he found
51. Joint Critique, HQ, CONARC, 10 Dec 1955, sub: Exercise Sage Brush; Memo, Maj.
Gen. Charles D. W. Canham for Maneuver Director, 16 Dec 1955, sub: Final report,
Ninth Field Army (Provisional), Exercise Sage Brush, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series:
CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG 319, NACP.
the entire concept “unacceptable intellectually and scientifically.”53 Taylor

expressed considerable interest in the concept, particularly in light of the
relatively disappointing results of Exercise Sage Brush, of which he noted,
“We in the Army have a long way to go before we understand the problems
of using these weapons.”54
Taylor might well have had in mind another exercise, in Europe, that
had raised similar questions for senior U.S. and NATO commanders.
Carte Blanche, an air defense and communications exercise held in June,
had dropped more than 350 notional atomic bombs in a mock defense of
Germany and Western Europe. Reports on the maneuver ignited a furious
response throughout Europe considering the consequences of an atomic
war on the continent. With their homeland exploited as the principal
battleground, many Europeans justly questioned what would be left
after such a defense. Even as the Army prepared to reorganize for atomic
combat, important voices were beginning to question the relevance of the
entire concept.55
ARMY VERSUS AIR FORCE
Exercise Sage Brush proved noteworthy in a different respect as it provided

still another demonstration of the sometimes bitter infighting between the
Army and the Air Force. Although the military described the maneuver
as a joint endeavor, and the exercise staff was a mix of officers from both
services, conflicts arose between the two from the very beginning. In
February, CONARC had issued a joint directive for the event, including
a series of tests that would be administered jointly to participating forces.
When the exercise headquarters requested information from Headquarters,
Tactical Air Command, on their participation in joint tests, that organization
responded that it had no interest in the joint tests proposed by CONARC
53. MFR, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC
Briefing for Chief of Staff on PENTANA Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
54. Memo, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway for Ch Army Field Forces, 28 Dec 1953, sub:
Organization of the Army During the Period FY 1960–1970, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; MFR, Upham, 14 Dec
1955, sub: CONARC Briefing for Chief of Staff on PENTANA Army; Ltr, Gen. John E.
Dahlquist to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 12 Dec1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
55. Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army
in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 240–41;
Drew Middleton, “Soviet Peace Drive: Impact on West Europe,” New York Times, 10 Jul
1955.
and that it could evaluate service missions better unilaterally. Although

the CONARC representatives disagreed with that position, they informed
General Taylor that they saw little to gain by pursuing the matter and that
the forced participation of Tactical Air Command would not yield good
test results.56
Of greater concern was Air Force reluctance to allow the Army to carry
on with one of its principal experiments during the exercise. In a test of
concept encouraged by General Gavin, the Army organized, within the 82d
Airborne Division, a provisional “sky cavalry” troop to employ during the
maneuver. The unit consisted of a mix of helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, a
platoon of light tanks, and a platoon of infantry. In addition to conducting
more traditional scouting and reconnaissance missions, the troop would
exploit the capabilities of the helicopter to seek out targets for special
weapons strikes and to obtain accurate damage assessment after the strikes
had been completed. However, when the Army’s plans came to the attention
of Air Force officers in the Tactical Air Command, they protested to their
commander, General Otto P. Weyand, who also happened to be the Exercise
Sage Brush maneuver director. In November, as units were beginning
to deploy to Louisiana for the training, General Weyand informed the
Army representatives that the sky cavalry tests violated Army–Air Force
agreements on roles and missions. He notified Lt. Gen. John H. Collier, the
deputy maneuver director and senior Army officer on the staff, that any lift
of Army troops into hostile territory came under the assault role that was
inherently an Air Force mission and would only be carried out by Air Force
rotary-wing aircraft.57
After a personal protest from Secretary Brucker, Secretary of the Air
Force Donald A. Quarles cabled General Weyand to direct him to allow
the Army exercises. He told Weyand that, although he fully agreed with his
interpretation of the situation, they should allow the Army to take advantage
of the opportunity to carry out their experiments. Once the exercise was
56. Memo, Col. L. H. Walker, Asst Adjutant Gen, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 12 Aug 1955, sub:
Joint Tests, Exercise Sage Brush; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G–3,
for Ch Staff, 10 Sep 1955, sub: Refusal of the Tactical Air Command to Participate in Joint
Tests on Exercise Sage Brush; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
57. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Cmdg Gen, CONARC,
9 Mar 1955, sub: Provisional Reconnaissance Troop, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series:
SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Gen. O. P. Weyand, U.S. Air
Force, for Dep Maneuver Director (Army), 11 Nov 1955, sub: Use of Army Helicopters
for “Sky Cav” and Patrols in Exercise Sage Brush, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series:
CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG 319, NACP. See also John Schlight, Help From
Above: Air Force Close Air Support of the Army, 1946–1973 (Washington, DC: Air Force
History and Museums Program, 2003), 208–10.
completed, Quarles assured Weyand, he would see that the Army brought
air assault and aerial reconnaissance missions back into accord with the
provisions of the Key West Agreement.58
Army supporters used the sky cavalry conflict to air grievances that
had been steadily building under the fiscal limits of the Eisenhower
administration. Editorials in the Army Times noted that the service had
learned that it would have to fight every inch of the way for any concession
it must obtain from the Air Force. Moreover, another noted, it had long been
apparent that the Air Force had little or no interest in helping the Army solve
any problems to its immediate front. The Air Force much preferred the deep
interdiction fight, miles beyond the front lines.59
The debate over air assault and sky cavalry was not the only point of
contention between the two services. For both Army chiefs of staff for this
period, but particularly for General Ridgway, strategic airlift was an even
greater concern. In January 1955, during a revision of the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan, Ridgway had proposed that the Air Force provide 350
C–124 aircraft for the movement of one infantry and one airborne division,
plus cargo and replacements for overseas units during the first thirty days after
D-Day. A G–3 estimate presented to the chief of staff in March established a
requirement for 348 heavy transport aircraft to move one complete division.
An even more fanciful request existed for 1,307 C–119 or C–123 aircraft to
support an airborne assault of two and one-third divisions.60
Behind the requests for quite extraordinary numbers of aircraft lay a
disquieting reality. Although large portions of the Army remained forward
deployed, in Korea and Europe, they remained vulnerable and would require
immediate reinforcement if attacked. The service was, by 1955, already
committed to reducing the size and weight of its vehicles and equipment
in an attempt to make its divisions more readily deployable. Although most
units regularly incorporated air transportability drills into their training
schedules, many of their vehicles were too large and heavy for air transport.61
For its part, the Air Force had included the modernization of its transport
fleet as part of its overall budget. At the end of June 1955, the secretary of
58. Msg, Sec Air Force Donald A. Quarles to Gen. Otto P. Weyand, 15 Nov 1955, File Unit:
Entry A1 95-A, CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG 319, NACP.
59. Tony March, “Skycav Hassle Highlights Final Week of Sage Brush,” Army Times,
10 Dec 1955; “The Army’s Month,” United States Army Combat Forces Journal 6 (Jan
1956): 8.
60. Memo, Brig. Gen. Louis V. Hightower, Ch Organization and Training Div, G–3, for Ch
Organization and Training, 13 Apr 1955, sub: Items for Army Commanders Conference,
File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
61. MFR, Col. Cecil H. Strong, Ch Doctrines Section, 5 Apr 1955, sub: Briefing for the
Chief of Staff, USA on Army Airlift Requirements; Memo, Brig. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, Ch
the Air Force announced that a new strategic transport, the turboprop
C–130, would begin replacing existing transport within the next year. He
also announced, however, that the Air Force had cut the number of air
transport squadrons from forty-seven to twenty-eight, and he conceded
that the service would be unable to produce the required increase in airlift
projected over the next five to ten years. Air Force leaders remained firmly
focused on expanding the force from 115 to 137 wings, but with an emphasis
on the strategic bomber force and the interceptors of the Continental Air
Defense Command.62
Army and Air Force officers also continued their long-running battle over
close air support and control of air defense assets over the primary battle
area. Because of its inherent capabilities, the Air Force considered air defense
its responsibility and felt that other participating service forces should place
their assets under its control. Army leaders were equally as adamant that
ground commanders must not lose overall control of their own air defense
means. The Army’s commanders also argued that the ground commander
should have some general control over the interdiction and close air support
operations in the immediate battlefield area. Staff analysis noted, however,
that the Air Force would never agree to any system that permitted ground
officers to control Air Force operations. They counseled that the Army would
have to rely upon its guided missiles and developments in Army aviation to
meet its close support needs.63
In a briefing for the chief of staff on the service’s fledgling aviation program,
Brig. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, the first Chief, Army Aviation Division,
G–3, highlighted the Army’s concerns. General Howze, commissioned in
the cavalry in 1930, served in the 1st Armored Division in North Africa
and Italy during World War II. Despite the fact that Howze was not a
pilot, General Gavin had selected him to be the Army’s proponent for its
growing aviation fleet, because of his reputation as an innovator in mobility
for ground warfare. As modern aircraft grew faster and more complex to
meet the requirements of their primary Air Force missions, and as control
over Air Force fighter and reconnaissance aircraft became more centralized,
Plans Div, for Ch Organization and Training Div, 28 Feb 1955, sub: Optimal Air Mobility
for the Army; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops,
RG 319, NACP.
62. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force,” in
U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to June 30,
1955 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 215–27.
63. MFR, Gen. Williston B. Palmer, Vice Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1955, sub: USAF-Army
Disagreements on (1) Control of Tactical Air Forces in Support of Ground Forces, and
(2) Control of the Air Space Over the Army Battle Zone, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
a sort of vacuum was forming in the area of close air support for ground
forces. No one would wonder, he said, at the Army’s growing concern for
such an imperative component of ground combat.64
The Air Force’s own official histories reflect its diminishing interest in
the concept of ground support. “The development of tactical air power
became keyed to the use of nuclear weapons as atomic thinking dominated
fighter design. Although some conventional air wings to support the Army
continued to exist during these years, after 1954 these wings were seen
only as subordinate to the primary strike force.”65 By the time of Exercise
Sage Brush, atomic delivery had become the primary mission for most
fighter-bomber units, with only “familiarization” with conventional
weapons required of aircrews. Although some senior Air Force officers,
General Weyand among them, remained proponents of tactical air support,
most embraced the tenants of air power expressed by the Italian theorist
Giulio Douhet and Eisenhower. Because air forces alone could secure
the victory, it no longer seemed appropriate to place them in support of
ground operations.66
Perhaps the conflict of greatest interest to senior Army officials was
the growing Air Force resistance to Army advances in surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air missiles. In the development of antiaircraft missiles,
the Army’s Nike missile was in direct competition with the Air Force’s
Bomarc B. In late 1954, under pressure from Donald A. Quarles, then the
assistant secretary of defense for research and development, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff had limited the range of Army air-defense missiles to 50 nautical
miles and specified them for point defense of cities and military facilities.
In an effort to forestall a decision by civilian authorities, whom few Army
officers expected to be in their favor, the Army accepted the limitation, but
grew even more apprehensive that the Air Force was grasping for complete
control of the continental air defense mission. They also feared growing Air
Force interference with surface-to-surface missile development. By the end
of 1955, however, neither the Defense Department nor the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had placed any range limitations on Army surface-to-surface missile
development. In a view shared by many Army officers, General Taylor
suggested that because Army Air Corps pilots had once provided tactical
64. MFR, Brig. Gen. Hamilton Howze, Ch Army Avn Div, G–3, 16 Jul 1955, sub: Briefing
for the Chief of Staff on Army Aviation, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955,
Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 72–75;
Hamilton H. Howze, A Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth Century Army General
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996), 179–181.
65. Schlight, Help From Above, 183. Weyand had made his name providing air cover for
General George S. Patton’s Third Army.
66. Schlight, Help From Above, 189.
air support for the ground forces in engaging targets beyond the reach of
conventional artillery, Air Force leaders would reason that all such targets
were properly theirs. Army commanders had grown increasingly skeptical
of the Air Force’s willingness to divert resources from strategic missions to
support ground operations.67
In January 1955, General Ridgway had warned officers on the Army
Staff against making statements, public or private, that might be regarded
as derogatory toward the other services. When appropriate, he said, they
should pay tribute to the gallant deeds, high standards, and traditions of their
sister services.68 By the end of the year, staff officers were finding it difficult
to remember that comradeship. In one memo, Col. Harold K. Johnson wrote
that the image of a vast inferiority in force strength on the part of the United
States had become “part and parcel of the Air Force propaganda.”69 The logical
conclusion became that the United States must employ atomic weapons to
win any war. In December, a study conducted by the G–3 plans and policy
branch concluded that the Air Force’s aggressive public information policy,
combined with the Army’s reluctance to dispute, publicly, the Air Force’s
claims concerning the dominant role of air power, had created the popular
belief that air power was omnipotent and had rendered the Army obsolete.
The study urged a more aggressive public information campaign to restore
the Army’s prestige and to encourage public acceptance of Army personnel
as respected and influential citizens in their civilian communities.70
Ultimately, much of the Army–Air Force conflict might be understood
as the newly created independent service exercising and expressing its
sovereignty in the face of its former parent organization. Certainly, this
could be seen in the words and actions of many Air Force officers who had
embraced the air power theories of Giulio Douhet and had chafed under the
67. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 31 Aug 1955,
sub: Inter-Service Divergencies for Discussion by the Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army and
U.S. Air Force, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP; Memo, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Ch Research and Development, for Gen.
Eddleman, 31 Oct 1955, sub: Record of Meeting, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC
1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Converse, Rearming for the Cold War, 599.
68. Ltr, Gen. Charles L. Bolte, Vice Ch Staff, to Maj. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3,
31 Jan 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319,
NACP.
69. Memo, Col. Harold K. Johnson, Asst Ch Plans Div, for Ch Organization and Training
Div, 4 Apr 1955, sub: Combat Developments Objectives, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series:
SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
70. Memo, Johnson for Ch Organization and Training Div, 4 Apr 1955, sub: Combat
Developments Objectives; Memo, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham Jr., Dep Asst Ch Staff, G–3,
for Ch Staff, 10 Dec 1955, sub: A More Aggressive Army Public Relations Policy, File
control of the “ground-pounders.” At the same time, one cannot escape the
impact of New Look budgetary constraints. All four services engaged in a
virtual zero-sum competition for a diminishing pool of resources. Air Force
leaders would have been foolish not to recognize the advantage they held
under a strategic doctrine that emphasized air power and atomic weapons.
They waged their bureaucratic battles accordingly.
ADAPTING TO THE NEW LOOK
The process of adapting the U.S. military posture to the requirements of

the New Look continued throughout 1955. Both President Eisenhower
and Secretary Wilson encouraged the services to accelerate reductions in
personnel levels and to limit their budget requests accordingly. Meanwhile,
Congress considered the Pentagon’s recommendations for personnel and
budget authorizations for fiscal years 1956 and 1957. Generals Ridgway
and Taylor appeared, in turn, before appropriations and armed services
committees to persuade members to resist more wholesale cuts in the Army’s
force structure.
Throughout their own testimony, Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford
adamantly supported their proposed contraction of Army personnel strength
from 1,173,000 to 1,027,000 by June of 1956. This loss of nearly 150,000,
they argued, would be more than offset by the tremendously increased
firepower provided by missiles and atomic weapons. Several legislators,
however, balked at the idea of continued reductions, especially with conflicts
unfolding in East Asia over control of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in
the Taiwan Strait.71 They questioned the force reductions, particularly those
of the Army and the Marine Corps, at a time when the military power of
Communist China seemed to be rising and other allied forces had not yet
developed as an effective counterweight.72
Sensing an opportunity to recoup some of their losses, on 6 October, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a memorandum to the secretary of defense
recommending increases to the tentatively approved personnel ceilings for
the upcoming years. They cited the Communist Chinese threat to Formosa
(present-day Taiwan) and the continuing tension in French Indochina as
justification for boosting the force totals. The Army requested an additional
71. Quemoy was the common English-language name for the group of islands known as
Kinmen.
72. “Wilson, Radford Adamant on Plan to Cut Manpower,” New York Times, 5 Apr 1955;
“Pentagon is Firm on Cutting Army,” New York Times, 3 May 1955; Condit, History of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 48.
20,000 troops, primarily for trainers for the reserves and for engineer and
logistical support in the construction of the Distant Early Warning Line
of advanced radar stations across northern Canada. The Navy and Marine
Corps asked for similar marginal increments, while the Air Force expressed
satisfaction with its approved force levels. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Radford, conceded the perilous nature of the world situation,
but recommended disapproval of the requested increases. He indicated that
such negligible additions would have little practical effect and were not
worth challenging the desires of the president.73
President Eisenhower made the final decision on force levels for 1957 on
5 December 1955. He approved the original force levels authorized earlier in
the year but added an additional 7,500 spaces to the Army authorization to
account for a shift back to Army control of airfield construction engineers
who previously had been carried under an Air Force authorization. Even
accounting for the additional spaces, the Army’s authorized personnel
ceiling would be reduced to 1,034,500 for the coming fiscal year.74
The continued reductions in both the Army’s personnel strength and
its share of the military budget forced its leadership into another round of
soul-searching. One common theme that emerged on several fronts was that
the Army was still losing badly to the other services in a battle for public
opinion. The Army Times noted in March that what the service lacked
was “advertiseability.”75 The Air Force, it said, could send a squadron of jet
bombers flashing over an American town. Representing the Navy, an aircraft
carrier or battleship visiting a foreign port made a lasting impression. For the
Army, showing off its paratroops only seemed to illustrate its dependence
upon the Air Force. Nor could the Army match the Marines, who had long
cultivated an image of toughness, special skill, and glamor. The Army’s chief
of information, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, expressed the same idea when
he told the secretary of the Army that the complexity of the Army and its
numerous missions made it difficult to express a clear and understandable
statement of purpose such as “Keep the sea lanes clear,” or “To gain and
maintain air supremacy.”76
Even popular culture seemed to work in the favor of the other services.
The 1949 motion picture Sands of Iwo Jima had helped to propel John
73. Memo, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker for Sec Def, 6 Oct 1955, sub: Force Levels and
Personnel Strengths for Fiscal Year 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955,
74. Memo, Brucker for Sec Def, 6 Oct 1955, sub: Force Levels and Personnel Strengths for
Fiscal Year 1957; Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 49.
75. “Advertiseability,” Army Times, 19 Mar 1955.
76. “Advertiseability”; Memo, Maj. Gen. Gilman C. Mudgett, Ch Information and
Education, for Sec Army, 4 Aug 1955, sub: The Army’s Troop and Public Information
Actor Phil Silvers (left) as “Sergeant Bilko” with Paul Ford (right) as
“Colonel Hall” on the set of the CBS television production The Phil
Silvers Show, later known as Sergeant Bilko (Wikimedia Commons)
Wayne to stardom and captured an image for the Marine Corps that they
took pains to embellish. In 1955, the motion picture Strategic Air Command
with Jimmy Stewart provided enormous positive publicity for the Air Force.
Army-oriented movies such as 1949’s Battleground and Audie L. Murphy’s
autobiographical To Hell and Back in 1955 were popular enough, but they
failed to capture the same level of public support for that service. In the
comic books and newspapers, Americans could follow the swashbuckling
Air Force exploits of Steve Canyon and Terry and the Pirates. In contrast,
Programs, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
they could also read The Sad Sack and Beetle Bailey, portraying a somewhat
less positive image of Army life. Perhaps the final indignity was the debut
in September 1955 on the CBS television network of the Phil Silvers Show,
starring the well-known comedian as Army master sergeant Ernie Bilko,
whose scheming and mischief routinely kept him one step ahead of his
hapless superiors. The fact that this was neither the most positive nor
accurate depiction of the Army did not prevent the series from winning
three consecutive Emmy Awards.77
Throughout the year, the Army toiled resolutely to improve the
public outreach programs it had initiated under General Ridgway. In
November, Secretary Brucker proclaimed that he accepted as one of his
major responsibilities an effort to bring proper recognition to the Army’s
achievements and to the capability and dedication of its personnel. At
CONARC’s direction, each of the six subordinate field army commanders
established public affairs indoctrination courses for reserve units in their
region. In a separate action, General Palmer recognized that the Army had
no mechanism for influence among the public to correspond to the Navy
League or the U.S. Air Force Association. He supported the idea of utilizing
the Association of the United States Army as a vehicle for mobilizing civilian
influence. To do so, however, he noted that officers such as himself, General
Weible, and General Gavin would have to withdraw from the association’s
executive committee. General Taylor drafted personal letters for dozens of
senior retired Army general officers, informing them of service positions on
a number of issues and encouraging them to become active spokesmen for
the Army in their communities, explaining the service’s roles and missions
to the public.78
An August briefing by the chief of information for General Taylor reflected
the scope of the effort the Army had undertaken to get out its message. In
fiscal year 1955 alone, the Army had produced almost 30,000 news releases
and 10,000 photo releases. Department of the Army representatives had
appeared at almost 250 speaking engagements, and officers and soldiers
in the field had appeared before the public 1,400 times. Most impressive
were the 15,700 television programs, commercials, and announcements that
had aired on both national and local networks. As further indication of the
77. Lawrence H. Suid, Guts and Glory: The Making of the American Military Image in Film
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002), 117–35, 220; “In New Comedy,” Army
Times, 20 Aug 1955.
78. Steve Tillman, “Dynamic Revamping of Army Public Relations Setup Seen,” Army
Times, 12 Nov 1955; Memo, Gen. Williston B. Palmer for Lt. Gen. Weible, 12 Jul 1955,
sub: Organizing the Army’s Friends; Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen. (Ret.) John L.
DeWitt et al., 28 Nov 1955; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Army’s extensive effort to present its message to the public, briefers noted
that the service had liaised with sixty-eight active division associations with
a potential strength of 300,000 members. Maintaining close relationships
with veterans in this way offered the Army another way to raise public
perception of the service.79
Improving the public image of the Army served goals beyond supporting
its battle for a larger share of the budget. One of those goals, maintaining
personnel strength, presented a complex equation. Even though force
strength authorizations had declined steadily, the Army still required a
reliable source of new recruits. Also, because it was more cost effective to
retain experienced soldiers than to train and develop new ones, reenlistment
was another top priority. Balanced against this was the reality that many
serving officers and senior enlisted soldiers lacked the education, skills, or
motivation to master increasingly complex military skills. Their elimination
from the service proved to be a sensitive and troublesome challenge. Finally,
leaders needed to find more efficient ways to match the skills of individual
soldiers with the wide range of technical and operational requirements of
the modern Army.80
As the total enlisted strength of the Army fell, the number of career
service personnel declined in roughly the same proportion. All of the
services looked to Congress to make military service more attractive, both
to existing personnel and to potential recruits. Increases in reenlistment
bonuses and the establishment of various incentive payments through the
Career Incentive Act helped to improve retention rates. An amendment to
the National Housing Act of 1955 extended loans insured by the Federal
Housing Administration to active duty personnel under terms comparable
to those available for veterans. Finally, Army leaders hoped that the prospect
of a new uniform would contribute to a more modern image for the service.
Although many of the efforts to make military service more attractive
showed promise, the Army in particular continued to rely upon the draft to
replace those departing from service.81
General Taylor faced pressure from Congress to stem the steady flow of
young officers leaving the service. In the same manner as with the enlisted
soldiers, the replacement of departing junior leaders was more expensive
79. Memo, Brig. Gen. Theodore S. Riggs, Dep Ch Information and Education, for Ch Staff,
23 Aug 1955, sub: Answers to Questions Asked at CINFOE Briefing, File Unit: Entry A1
80. See Brian M. Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).
81. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–
30 Jun 1955, 99–100.
and time consuming than the retention of those whom the Army already
had trained and developed. A study conducted by the Army Staff showed
that long overseas tours without dependents, poor promotion rates, and lack
of opportunities for civil and military schooling were frequently expressed
reasons for dissatisfaction. Surprisingly, only a few officers noted inadequate
compensation as a primary cause for concern.82
At the same time that the Army was looking to make the service more
attractive for new recruits and potential reenlistees, it also carried on with
efforts to eliminate both officers and enlisted personnel who it believed could
not adapt to the more advanced technical challenges of the modern military.
In November, the Department of Defense lowered the minimum percent of
recruits from the lower ranges of mental ability it required the services to
accept. Underlining its own determination to improve the mental acuity of
its force, the Army issued orders for the involuntary release of soldiers who
had scored in the lower percentiles on their Armed Forces Qualification
Tests. The guidance directed commanders of major installations to get rid
of “professional privates” after they had served their three-year enlistment.83
The Army also was revising its policies regarding the retention of officers
on active duty. The assistant chief of staff, G–1, Maj. Gen. Donald P. Booth,
sent out a confidential message to all senior commanders directing them to
develop and to supervise an effective continuing elimination program. The
retention of so many officers who either lacked the necessary education or
whom the Army had passed over for promotion blocked the path for the
advancement of more qualified and promising individuals. Although much
of the focus was upon reserve officers whom the Army had retained on
active duty, the service engaged in a heated debate over policies that allowed
the elimination of reserve officers while also allowing less competent active
duty counterparts to remain. Although the system for considering officer
eliminations remained a work in progress, the vice chief of staff, General
Palmer, and the assistant secretary of the Army for manpower and reserve
forces, Hugh M. Milton, directed the staff to begin planning for inevitable
reductions in force and to prepare a plausible approach that would be
acceptable to all, including the public.84
Some observers began to complain that the Army was going too far in its
attempts to sell itself to potential recruits. One national guard commander
wrote to the Army’s inspector general that part of the reason for the lack of
82. Ltr, Senator Richard B. Russell to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 28 Oct 1955, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
83. “IQ Sights are Raised,” Army Times, 26 Nov 1955.
84. SS, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Sherburne, Dep G–1, 2 Aug 1955, sub: Elimination of the
Substandard Officer; MFR, Lt. Col. James O. Jones, Personnel Actions Br, 23 Aug 1955,
interest in Army careers was the service’s misplaced emphasis on recruiting

soldiers to learn skills related to civilian trades. Such advertising, he said,
“practically invites young men to learn a civilian trade with the strongly
implied suggestion that they get out of the Army to enjoy the benefits of the
trade.”85 More important, he believed, was the basic fact that the Army existed
to fight or to deter aggressors from fighting. He strongly recommended that
the service reorient its recruiting campaigns in that direction.86
Despite the Army’s focus on the myriad of challenges that it was facing
on a daily basis, factions within the service were also looking forward,
sometimes with remarkable clarity. In January 1955, General Gavin
distributed throughout the senior Army Staff a study entitled “Volunteer
Peacetime Army.” Anticipating the time when the draft would no longer be
an acceptable means for filling the force, he explored the parameters of what
an all-volunteer Army might look like. The factors he believed would shape
volunteer enlistments included public attitudes toward the military, the
national economy, competition from other services, peacetime deployments,
compensation, and the increased participation of women. Under anticipated
conditions, in a period beyond 1960, he believed the pool of available
personnel would support a volunteer Army of 600,000. Interestingly,
although Gavin foresaw that the all-volunteer force would rely increasingly
on female soldiers to fill its ranks, he did not mention anywhere in the study
a corresponding need to increase the percentage of racial minorities serving
in such a military organization.87
THE RESERVE FORCES ACT OF 1955
On 13 January 1955, President Eisenhower presented to Congress his plan

for increasing participation in the reserve forces of the United States and
improving the force’s overall readiness. Despite the failure of Congress to
approve any measure of universal military training, the president clung
to the belief that a strong and well-maintained reserve force could offset
the cuts he continued to make, particularly in the active duty Army. To
sub: Officer Elimination Policies; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
85. Ltr, Brig. Gen. Richard J. Werner, Georgia Mil District, to Col. Maurice D. Stratta, Ofc
Inspector Gen, 9 Nov 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3
Ops, RG 319, NACP.
86. Ltr, Werner to Stratta, 9 Nov 1955.
87. Memo, Col. M. G. Pohl, Ch Mobilization Br, for Distribution, 17 Jan 1955, sub:
Volunteer Peacetime Army, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3
Ops, RG 319, NACP.
some extent, military and civilian leaders alike retained a perception of the
reserves as they had functioned in both world wars, that is, providing the
base for a full-scale mobilization and furnishing the bulk of the nation’s
deployed land force. The United States’ commitment to NATO also relied
on a full mobilization of the reserves to deploy the number of divisions the
nation had promised the alliance in the event of Soviet attack. Inspections of
reserve and national guard units had revealed, however, that most units were
woefully understrength, lacked essential equipment, and required extensive
training before they could deploy.88
The president’s proposal, which he had dubbed the National Reserve Plan,
was based largely upon a study conducted by Arthur S. Fleming, the director
of defense mobilization, a year earlier. In his plan, Eisenhower emphasized
the nation’s requirement to mobilize sufficient forces to reinforce forward-
deployed troops in Europe and the Far East in the event of hostilities there.
Such forces, he said, had to be trained and equipped sufficiently to be ready
for deployment within six months. He proposed that men between the ages
of seventeen and nineteen be permitted to volunteer for six months of basic
training, to be followed by nine-and-one-half years of service in the reserves.
He suggested that the nation might require a draft to fill up the reserves if
not enough volunteers signed up. Enlistees in the National Guard also would
have to undergo six months of basic training. Because no real sanctions for
enforcing reserve commitments existed, the president recommended that
those who failed to complete their reserve requirements receive less than
honorable discharges. Finally, he requested that states be allowed to organize
separate militia forces so that someone could assume local security missions
when the National Guard was federalized.89
Both the House and the Senate began extensive hearings on the
administration’s proposal. Secretary Wilson, Admiral Radford, and
representatives from all four services testified, mostly in favor of the
program. General Ridgway, in particular, spoke to the inadequacy and lack
of readiness in the existing reserves. He noted that, at present, most of the
reserves would be unable to reach combat readiness within any amount of
time likely to be useful to the United States. He reminded the politicians that
the early disasters in Korea had occurred because Army units at that time were
88. Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–3, “Plan to Meet NATO Force Goals
by 1 July 1955,” n.d., File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops,
RG 319, NACP.
89. U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to
June 30, 1955, 20–21; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A
History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908–1983 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief,
Army Reserve, 1984), 120–21.
understrength and spread too thin around the globe. The service’s inability
to provide timely reinforcements exacerbated the situation. This forced the
nation to recommit to battle reservists with recent combat experience while
leaving a vast number of those eligible for service, but untrained, at home.
Admiral Radford also warned that future conflicts likely would not allow
time to develop and train large reserves. National survival might depend, he
concluded, on ready and sufficient forces in being, prepared for deployment
on very short notice. Both Ridgway and Radford stressed that the greater
need was for trained units rather than mere pools of replacements.90
As the hearings and deliberations continued, General Ridgway grew
concerned that the discussions perhaps had placed too much emphasis
on reserve issues. In a statement prepared for the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the general reiterated his support for reserve reform and again
acknowledged the unacceptable level of readiness endemic throughout
the current reserve force. He forcefully returned, however, to his familiar
resistance to the continued diminution of the active force. Active Army
forces, he said, provided the only means with which to counter enemy
actions in the first critical stages of a war. “Reserve forces augment the active
forces; they cannot substitute for them.”91 It was a dangerous proposition,
he concluded, to believe that proportionately increasing the reserve could
reduce active forces safely.92
President Eisenhower signed the Reserve Forces Act on 9 August 1955.
The legislation had several key components that directly affected the Army.
It raised the ceiling on the Ready Reserve from 1.5 million to 2.9 million,
1,692,235 of which it allocated to the Army. The new law authorized the
president to mobilize up to one million reservists in a declared national
emergency without congressional action. All those who entered the armed
forces after 9 August 1955 would be required to participate in reserve
training following the completion of their active service. For those who
agreed to spend two years on active duty and four years in the reserves, the
act reduced the total military commitment from eight to six years. The law
also allowed direct enlistments into the reserve components for non–prior
service individuals as an alternative to the draft. Until 1 August 1959, recruits
90. Crossland and Currie, Twice the Citizen, 120–21; “Wilson Promotes U.S. Reserve
Plan,” New York Times, 9 Feb 1955; Anthony Leviero, “Four Arms Chiefs Ask Reserve
Build-Up,” New York Times, 20 Feb 1955.
91. Memo, Brig. Gen. Frank W. Moorman, Sec Gen Staff, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 11 May
1955, sub: Statement in Support of the National Reserve Plan by the Chief of Staff to
Senate Armed Services Committee, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
92. Memo, Moorman for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 11 May 1955, sub: Statement in Support of
the National Reserve Plan.
could enlist directly into a unit of the Ready Reserve. After a six-month
period of active duty for training, they would return to civilian status. As
long as they met all of their reserve obligations during their eight-year term,
they remained exempt from the draft.93
The inability of the armed forces to enforce compliance with reserve
obligations had long plagued the system. The new legislation attempted to
remedy this by clarifying sanctions available to military commanders. It
allowed them to order to active duty for a period of forty-five days those
reservists with obligations to the Ready Reserve who failed to take part
in required training. Failure to comply with that order risked disciplinary
action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Those who had enlisted
directly into the reserves and failed to take part in training risked immediate
induction into the active Army through their local draft boards.94 None of
these provisions applied to members of the National Guard who remained
under state authority.95
Perhaps most significant were the things that the new legislation did not
do. Despite the hopes of most senior Army leaders, the law did not authorize
universal military training, nor did it make participation in reserve activities
mandatory for all male citizens. It also did not mandate basic training for
national guard enlistees. The National Guard, in fact, had been excluded
from many of the act’s provisions, largely because of disputes over whether
to enforce racial desegregation of the state forces. Although the service
now could enforce sanctions once an individual had enlisted, it still bore
the responsibility for recruitment. As Secretary Brucker wrote to Secretary
Wilson, removal of those compulsory features that the services had
supported denied the Army a known source of trainees and had imposed
greater requirements upon recruiting and publicity to sell the program to
93. Memo, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, for Sec Def, 25 Oct 1955, sub: Implementation
of Reserve Forces Act of 1955; MFR, Lt. Col. Richard G. Ciccolella, Reserve Components
Br, G–3, 28 Jul 1955, sub: Chief of Staff Briefing on Reserve Forces; Memo, Lt. Col.
William A. McKee, Dep Ch Troop Information and Education Div, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3,
1 Nov 1955, sub: Review of Manuscript, “The Reserve Forces Act of 1955”; all in File
Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP; Condit,
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 48.
94. Memo, McKee for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 1 Nov 1955, sub: Review of Manuscript, “The
Reserve Forces Act of 1955.”
95. Many state national guard organizations, particularly those in the South, resisted closer
affiliation with the reserves and the active Army because of federal efforts to integrate the
armed forces. Closer cooperation between federal and state forces would require further
civil rights legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. See Morris J. MacGregor Jr., Integration
of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965, Defense Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 1981) and Bernard C. Nalty and Morris J. MacGregor Jr., eds., Blacks in
the Military: Essential Documents (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981).
the public. Early reports indicated that the number of new trainees was far
fewer than Brucker had hoped. He did acknowledge that the very smallness
of the number would permit an unusually high standard of instruction and
individual attention than would be possible normally.96
The service took a series of steps to align the readiness and availability
of reserve and national guard units more closely with the mobilization
requirements according to NATO planning documents and national strategic
plans. The Army Strategic Objectives Plan for 1957 required thirty-seven
divisions other than active Army to deploy within seventeen months after
hostilities beginning. Although the plan called for nine of those divisions to
be armored, only two existed at the time. After some detailed negotiations
between Army leaders and state governors, the National Guard agreed to
convert four of its divisions from infantry to armored. Those were the 27th
in New York, the 30th in Tennessee, the 40th in California, and the 48th
in Florida and Georgia. By late summer in 1955, the 27th, 30th, and 40th
had completed the required conversions, and the 48th was scheduled to
complete its transition in 1956. Because the logisticians did not believe they
could support more than six armored divisions in the reserves, the Army
revised the reserve troop basis to include thirty-one infantry divisions and
six armored divisions.97
Reinforcement plans for Europe also drove prioritization of support
for units in the Army Reserve. Reserve units that the Army designated
for deployment during the first thirty days of mobilization included four
antiaircraft battalions, three radar maintenance detachments, and four
ordnance detachments related to artillery fire control systems repair.
Units designated for overseas deployment within the first ninety days
of mobilization included four more antiaircraft battalions, four more fire
control repair detachments, and four signal detachments dealing with radar
repair. The Army required units scheduled for deployment after thirty days
to maintain at least 85 percent of authorized strength at all times. Units
scheduled to arrive overseas by water during the first ninety days had to
maintain 100 percent of authorized equipment.98
In August, the Army took further steps to prioritize deployment of its
reserve forces. With the Eisenhower administration emphasizing the Army’s
96. Memo, Brucker for Sec Def, 25 Oct 1955, sub: Implementation of Reserve Forces Act
of 1955; Col. (Ret.) Jon T. Hoffman and Col. (Ret.) Forrest L. Marion, Forging a Total
Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office
of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 49.
97. MFR, Ciccolella, 28 Jul 1955, sub: Chief of Staff Briefing on Reserve Forces.
98. Memo, Maj. Gen. John A. Klein, Adjutant Gen, for Cdrs and Staff, 7 Jul 1955, sub:
High Priority Units in the General Reserve, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955,
Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319. NACP.
civil defense responsibilities, General Ridgway felt it necessary to remind

the state governors that many of their national guard divisions retained the
mission to deploy overseas with the active Army in the event of mobilization.
To that end, the Army devised what it called the 6×6 Program in which it
designated six national guard divisions to deploy as NATO reinforcements
within six months of notification. The concept provided approximately two
weeks for assembly and movement to mobilization stations, up to thirteen
weeks for training, four weeks for preparation for overseas movement, and
six weeks for transport overseas. On 5 August, the secretary of the Army
approved the selection of six divisions to receive priority treatment as early
deployment units. They were the 51st Infantry Division (South Carolina and
Florida) with a mobilization station at Fort Jackson, South Carolina; the 30th
Infantry Division (North Carolina) with a mobilization station at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina; the 38th Infantry Division (Indiana) with a mobilization
station at Camp Atterbury, Indiana; the 39th Infantry Division (Arkansas
and Louisiana) with a mobilization station at Camp Polk, Louisiana; the 49th
Armored Division (Texas) with a mobilization station at Fort Hood, Texas;
and the 41st Infantry Division (Oregon and Washington) with a mobilization
station at Fort Lewis, Washington. As much as possible, planners selected
units from areas that did not contain primary targets for nuclear attack and
that were located near suitable mobilization stations, transportation, and
storage facilities.99
All together, the Army’s actions to reform its reserve force and to prioritize
units for support and deployment reflected a shift in the military’s concept
of mobilization. The potential use of atomic weapons seemed to imply a
short, violent conflict that would not allow time for the full mobilization
that the United States had relied upon during World War I and World
War II. Instead, Army leaders looked to provide critical elements as quickly
as possible, which they hoped would arrive overseas before hostilities
actually began.
THE ARMY AND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM
In October 1949, President Harry S. Truman had signed the Mutual Defense
Assistance Act, which authorized the allocation of $1 billion to NATO
members for the purchase of military equipment, materials, and services
99. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 13 Aug 1955,
sub: Designation of Priority Reserve Units for Early Deployment, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
to strengthen their capabilities for individual or collective defense. By 1955,

this program had expanded and had become an integral part of U.S. defense
policy. In a paper labeled “Basic National Security Policy, (NSC 5501),” U.S.
military and political leaders spelled out the implications for the program.
Its primary purpose was to support and to maintain the cooperation of
appropriate major allies and other free world countries, encouraging them
to furnish bases for U.S. military units and to provide their share of military
forces. In countries vulnerable to subversion, it said, the United States
should assist in the development of adequate internal security forces. An
Army analysis of its Mutual Defense Assistance Program responsibilities
also noted that the production of military goods for disbursement through
the program also helped the United States retain a larger production base
than it could have maintained through procurement for U.S. forces alone.100
In 1955, the United States provided assistance to thirty-three countries
around the world through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. In
addition to helping the member nations of NATO, the United States had
established military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) and had provided
aid to partners in the Middle East, the Far East, and Latin America. As part
of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, almost 4,200 foreign military
students attended formal instruction in Army service schools. During the
year, the number of Army mobile training teams, which conducted on-the-
job instruction in the use and maintenance of American military equipment,
increased from thirty-six to seventy-eight. Army materiel deliveries to
Mutual Defense Assistance Program countries reached almost $1.2 billion.101
The Mutual Defense Assistance Program had begun in Europe, and
that region remained the most visible recipient of American military aid.
Throughout the early 1950s, the United States had donated almost all of its
World War II surplus vehicles, equipment, and weapons to its allies in Europe.
The European Command’s training centers and mobile Army training
teams worked with foreign military students learning how to maintain
and operate the donated equipment. In 1955, the alliance welcomed the
Federal Republic of Germany as a full-fledged member. Soldiers from the
U.S. European Command, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the Seventh
Army worked with their German counterparts to rebuild West German
armed forces and to integrate them into NATO defense plans. In December,
after the new German government had ratified a formal military assistance
100. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 6 Apr 1955,
sub: Relationship of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program to the National Security, File
Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
30 Jun 1955, 92, 119.
agreement with the United States, U.S. military personnel established the
MAAG, Germany.102
Closer to home, the United States signed several mutual security pacts
with nations in South and Central America. MAAGs and Army training
teams deployed to many of those areas to assist those governments. Some
advisory group commanders considered the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program in Latin America to be based more upon political considerations
than military one, and they placed more emphasis on improving internal
security than on opposing foreign intervention. In many cases, the
commanders expressed concern over the perceived instability of the host
government. Typically, Latin American government leaders requested more
military aid than the United States was willing to provide, and U.S. military
attachés reported that many were beginning to look elsewhere for assistance.
They reported that many Latin American countries expressed concern over
the obsolescent equipment they had received. Military mission leaders
also noted that the inability of their training teams to communicate with
their counterparts hampered their efforts in many cases. Too much time
had been lost, they said, in training members who were not fluent in the
native language.103
The war in Korea had opened up the Far East as an important theater
in the U.S. effort to halt the spread of communism. Army teams worked
to develop the armed forces of Japan, South Korea, and Formosa as they
faced challenges from Communist China. In Japan, 308 officers, enlisted
personnel, and civilians of the MAAG had as their primary responsibility
the training and development of a six-division ground self-defense force
along with smaller air and maritime components. In Formosa, the departing
chief of the MAAG, Maj. Gen. William C. Chase, reported that his section
had completed the training of fourteen infantry divisions. Seven additional
divisions, located on offshore islands and under threat of Communist attack,
had not yet been able to conduct significant combat training. The general
noted that although large amounts of Mutual Defense Assistance Program
equipment had brought most units up to full allowance, the units would not
102. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G–3 for International Affairs,
for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 2 May 1955, sub: Visit to Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey,
Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops,
RG 319, NACP; Carter, Forging the Shield, 185–86. See also Andrew J. Birtle, Rearming
the Phoenix: U.S. Military Assistance to the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950–1960 (New
York: Garland, 1991).
103. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd, to Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor, Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1955; Memo, Col. Neil M. Wallace, Ch Latin America Br, for Ch
Ops Div, 14 Nov 1955, sub: Report of Visit to Certain Latin American Countries (6 Oct–
1 Nov 1955); both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops,
RG 319, NACP.
become fully combat effective until the government had properly distributed
the equipment and had overcome the propensity of local commanders to
hoard their largesse.104
The Republic of Korea, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1950, maintained
an army of eight understrength divisions and two separate regiments. As
the war progressed, the United States agreed to support twenty divisions.
Subsequent negotiations and agreements produced a force of 661,000,
organized into twenty divisions, making it, by 1955, the fourth largest army
in the world. By then, the Korean MAAG had completed most of its work
with the active combat divisions. Its mission continued, however, with much
of the logistical infrastructure and with the training and development of ten
reserve divisions.105
The fall of Điện Biên Phủ and the subsequent conference in Geneva had
raised the profile of the U.S. MAAG, Indochina, dramatically. In November
of 1954, General (Ret.) J. Lawton Collins had traveled to Vietnam as President
Eisenhower’s special representative, to determine what military steps the
United States might take to stabilize the situation in South Vietnam. After
lengthy discussions between Collins and General Paul Ély, the chief of the
French armed forces staff, the two men signed an agreement in December
turning over responsibility for the training and organization of the South
Vietnamese armed forces to Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, Chief, U.S. MAAG,
Indochina. Although Ély would retain nominal control over the operation,
and French instructors and advisers would continue their efforts under
O’Daniel’s direction, both sides understood that the French had already
begun a phased withdrawal from Indochina.106
O’Daniel’s first action was to create a new organization combining
the advisory efforts of both the French and the Americans. The Training
Relations and Instruction Mission integrated U.S. and French personnel at
the level of headquarters staff. Below that, French and U.S. advisers would
work independently of each other. The French assumed initial responsibility
104. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ops Div, G–3, 28 Oct
1955, sub: Information Book and Briefing for Major General Strickler, J5, FCS Designate;
Msg, Paul W. Meyer, First Sec American Embassy, Taipei, to State Dept., 16 Aug, 1955,
sub: Final report of Chief MAAG; both in File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955,
Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319. NACP.
105. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Dep Ch Staff for Plans and
Ops, 8 Feb 1955, sub: Development of Republic of Korea Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Bfg, HQ, Eighth Army, for
Sec Army Robert T. Stevens, 30 Mar 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955,
106. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960, United States
Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 232–40.
for schools at Đà Lạt, Thủ Đức, and Camp Chanson, plus territorial
headquarters and units. The Americans assumed responsibility for basic
training centers, schools other than those assigned to the French, field force
units—light divisions, airborne regimental combat teams, and General
Reserve—and logistical installations.107
Although O’Daniel preached cooperation and mutual respect between
the two factions of his organization, it was difficult to conceal a growing
American contempt for the French efforts. On an inspection tour, then-
Eighth Army Commander General Taylor commented that it was hard to see
how long it took French instructors to teach American tactics to Vietnamese
soldiers in French. A Defense Department position paper opined that the
French had demonstrated a lack of ability to develop indigenous forces
in Indochina. Administration, through the French, of a U.S. military aid
program would produce only negligible results. Another Army Staff paper
noted that an exclusive American responsibility for training the South
Vietnamese would be more effective because of the superiority of U.S.
methods and the differences between French and American doctrine.108
Perhaps further evidence of the American overconfidence was the slowly
dawning realization that the imminent withdrawal of French forces from
Vietnam left the responsibility for security solely with the United States.
In March, the Army Staff prepared an outline plan summarizing the forces
it would need to provide for the internal security of South Vietnam while
it developed its own indigenous armed forces. The analysis estimated that
a U.S. Army force of three armored cavalry regiments and one airborne
regimental combat team, plus engineer support stationed in South Vietnam,
could provide adequate internal security. A reinforcing corps of one airborne
division and three infantry divisions stationed in the Philippines and Korea
would provide the necessary reinforcing and deterrent capability, if sufficient
air- and sealift were available.109 The G–3, General Gavin, warned that there
107. HQ Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Indochina Dir, Lt. Gen. John W.
O’Daniel, Ch MAAG Indochina, 27 Feb 1955, Establishing the Training Relations and
Instruction Mission to the Armed Forces of Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series:
SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP.
108. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Cmdg Gen, Eighth Army, to Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway,
Ch Staff, 19 Mar 1955, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for G–3 Plans, 30 Mar
1955, sub: Defense Position Papers for Franco-US Bipartite Discussions with Respect to
Indochina, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops; both in RG
319, NACP; Spector, Advice and Support, 255.
109. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 23 Feb 1955, sub:
Outline Plan for Security of South Vietnam; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for
Dep Ch Staff, Logistics, 7 Sep 1955, sub: Cost of Small Wars; both in File Unit: Entry A1
were serious implications to this plan. Its implementation required an

immediate decision on mobilization, for any delay until after the outbreak of
hostilities would result in piecemeal commitment of forces. Also, he warned,
U.S. intervention on the scale envisioned carried with it the risk of initiating
World War III. The Army would need at least six months, Gavin said, before
it could replace deployed units through mobilization and buildup of the
General Reserve. More realistically, he suggested that in order for the Army
to maintain its other worldwide commitments, it must expand to twenty-six
divisions with an end strength of 1,572,000. The service must also recall six
national guard divisions and three armored cavalry regiments to active duty.
Given all of that, he concluded, once initiated, U.S. intervention in South
Vietnam must be successful, or the entire U.S. position in the Far East and
perhaps the rest of the world would suffer.110
Having inherited the challenges in Indochina, some in the Army looked
to a more unconventional approach toward building a South Vietnamese
army. Col. Edward G. Lansdale, the chief of the military mission in
Saigon, suggested parallels between the situation in Vietnam and the
recent completion of the Filipino campaign suppressing the Hukbalahap
insurgency. Lansdale’s experiences, first as an operative with the Office of
Strategic Services and later with the MAAG, Philippines, had given him
the opportunity to observe guerrilla operations as part of a successful
counterinsurgency campaign. The colonel believed that the Vietnamese had
much they could learn from the Filipino experience.111
Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, the chief of psychological warfare, also
made the case for the inclusion of special forces personnel within military
assistance groups of nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Indochina
was one of several locations, he believed, where the introduction of a
guerrilla warfare capability could serve as a deterrent to aggressive action on
the part of Communist countries. Bullock’s comments, however, envisioned
the training of indigenous forces in guerrilla activities, particularly as
part of a stay-behind force after a hostile occupation, and not necessarily
in developing the government armed forces themselves. Still, the idea of
including special forces personnel as part of the MAAG package appealed to
many on the Army Staff.112
110. Memo, Taylor for Dep Ch Staff, Logistics, 7 Sep 1955, sub: Cost of Small Wars.
111. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, Acting Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 9 Jun 1955,
sub: Comment on Mr. Allen Dulles’ Memorandum to Admiral Radford, File Unit: Entry A1
112. Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Bullock, Ch Psy Warfare, for Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 2 Sep
1955, sub: Employment of Special Forces Units During a Cold War, File Unit: Entry A1
The growing interest in special forces and unconventional warfare was

not universal. The USAREUR commander, General Anthony C. McAuliffe,
had recommended the elimination of the 10th Special Forces Group in favor
of another regular infantry battalion. Many of the senior officers in Europe
had long viewed the 10th Group with suspicion, largely because the group
reported directly to USAREUR and not to the Seventh Army commander.
The special forces leaders, for their part, were equally concerned that
conventional commanders would view their organization as a sort of
super-commando force, rather than as the organizers of a stay-behind
resistance operation.113
COMING TO TERMS WITH THE LEGACY OF KOREA
For several years, the Army had reexamined its policies related to the conduct
of prisoners of war (POWs) in the light of the perceived misconduct of Korean
War captives. In February 1955, the Department of the Army published a
draft regulation entitled “Standards of Conduct of Military Personnel Liable
to and After Capture.” The paper identified the responsibilities of soldiers
under circumstances of peril. If isolated from friendly lines and no longer
able to inflict casualties on the enemy, soldiers had a duty to evade capture
and return to their units. If captured, they were still members of the U.S.
Army. They could reveal only their name, rank, serial number, and date of
birth. Any more information could assist the enemy and risk the lives of
comrades. Soldiers who became prisoners were at no point relieved from
risking their lives to defend their fellow soldiers and their country. The
policy made no allowances for giving in to harsh interrogation methods. It
also remained the duty of all prisoners to try to escape. Even if the attempt
failed, the enemy still had to devote additional resources to recapturing and
detaining them. The proposed regulation emphasized the need for positive
indoctrination and training in resisting capture, escape and evasion, and
conduct if captured. It linked success in these efforts to strengthening the
will of “American fighting men” through the “thorough inculcation of
the principles of American democracy, as opposed to the false ideology
of Communism.”114
113. Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for G–3 Ops, 31 Dec 1955,
sub: 10th Special Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series: SCC 1955, Subgroup: G–3
Ops, RG 319, NACP; Col. Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special
Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 192–200.
114. Memo, Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Asst Ch Staff, G–3, for Ch Staff, 16 Feb 1955,
sub: Proposed AR on “Standards of Conduct of Military Personnel Liable to and After
In framing the regulation, Army leaders noted that all members of

the United States armed forces, regardless of service, must have the same
responsibilities and standards of conduct. They urged the Defense Department
to standardize requirements across the services. They commented that
members of the public would be justifiably critical of a military authority
that permitted variations in standards. Any policy more lenient on other
services would result in increased pressure on Army personnel.115
With this in mind, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson took the final
steps toward creating a unified code of conduct for the armed forces. On
17 May, he appointed a committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary of Defense
Carter L. Burgess, to study and to make recommendations toward a unified
code and a program of indoctrination and training to prepare military
personnel for future combat. Wilson asked the committee members to
consider appropriate disciplinary action for those repatriated POWs who
had collaborated with the enemy in Korea. The committee consisted of one
retired senior officer from each of the four services and one senior civilian
from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Department of Defense.
Retired Lt. Gen. Frank W. Milburn and Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Manpower and Reserve Forces) Hugh Milton represented the Army. Retired
Army General John E. Hull also served on the committee as its vice chair.116
Two months later, on 29 July, the committee presented its findings and
recommendations to Secretary Wilson. In doing so, it reminded Wilson that
out of 4,428 Americans who survived Communist imprisonment, at most
192 were chargeable with serious offenses against comrades or the United
States. In other words, only one out of twenty-three American POWs was
suspected of serious misconduct. The committee also concluded that, if
adopting this code of conduct, America must always stand behind every
soldier, sailor, airman, or marine who might become a prisoner, and spare
no reasonable effort to gain their earliest possible release.117
After President Eisenhower approved the Armed Forces Code of Conduct
on 17 August, Secretary Wilson ordered an extensive program of orientation
Capture,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
115. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, 16 Feb 1955, sub: Proposed AR on “Standards of Conduct
of Military Personnel Liable to and After Capture.”
116. Memo, Charles E. Wilson, Sec Def, for Chairman, Def Advisory Committee on
Prisoners of War, 17 May 1955, sub: Terms of Reference, File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series:
SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335, NACP.
117. Rpt, Def Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, to Sec Def, 29 Jul 1955, File Unit:
Entry A1 3-B, Series: SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335, NACP.
and discussion, to ensure that each member of the armed forces understood
and embraced its content. In its entirety, the Code read:
I. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces, which guard my

country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.
II. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never
surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.
III. If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will

make every effort to escape and aid others to escape. I will accept neither
parole nor special favors from the enemy.
IV. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners.
I will give no information or take part in any action which might be
harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will
obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up
in every way.
V. When questioned, should I become prisoner of war, I am bound to give

only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering
further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written
statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.
VI. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for
my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I
will trust in my God and in the United States of America.118
Amended in 1988 with gender-neutral language, the code remains the

standard for American soldiers to this day. Although the ideals the code
expressed were lofty, its framers believed that its success would depend upon
strengthening the will of each soldier with an inculcation of the principles
of American democracy. American service members were to be fortified
with the weapons of religious faith and courage in the struggle against
communism. Left unanswered was any question whether the nation had the
118. Memo, Charles E. Wilson, for Sec Army, 22 Aug 1955, sub: Code of Conduct for
Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, File Unit: Entry A1 137B, Series:
SCGC 1955, Subgroup: G–3 Ops, RG 319, NACP. The Code of Conduct, cited here as it
appeared in 1955, was amended in 1977 and 1988 to make it gender-neutral.
right to expect that level of devotion from a fighting force consisting largely
of draftees or recalled reservists.119
MOVING TOWARD STABILITY?
By the end of the year, the Army had made significant strides in its efforts to
conform to the parameters of the New Look. The service’s experiments with
an organization and doctrine designed for an atomic battlefield reflected
the administration’s firm conviction that the next war would be fought with
nuclear weapons.
Reorganization of the Army Staff and the creation of CONARC had
moved the service away from its World War II–era configuration and
toward a structure better suited to command and control a force deployed
across the globe. Still, interservice conflicts, particularly between the Army
and the Air Force, revealed the competitive dynamic between services
that prevented them from reaching a level of “jointness” the president so
desperately wanted. Throughout 1955, the Army had succeeded to a great
degree in portraying itself as a progressive, forward-looking force. To say it
had achieved stability in the sense that Secretary Brucker had described it,
however, seemed a bit premature.
119. Memo, Gavin for Ch Staff, 16 Feb 1955, sub: Proposed AR on “Standards of Conduct
of Military Personnel Liable to and After Capture.”
4
The U.S. Army: Proud of Its

Past, In Search of a Future?
On 1 July 1956, at the urging of his chief of information, Army Chief of Staff
General Maxwell D. Taylor signed a general order establishing the official
Army slogan. The phrase, “The U.S. Army—Proud of Its Past—Alert to
Its Future,” was intended to impress the public and soldiers alike with the
Army’s past accomplishments and, simultaneously, its readiness to meet the
challenges of the future. The Army’s public information staff compared the
slogan to the General Electric Company’s: “Progress is Our Most Important
Product.” The new slogan would convey to the public a sense of quality
and a portrayal of the Army as a forward-looking organization. The staff
recommended a comprehensive campaign through multiple media to stamp
the phrase into the public consciousness.1
A more apt conclusion to the motto might have been “In Search of a
Future,” for in 1956, the final year of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s first
term in office, the Army continued to grapple with its relevance within the
parameters of the New Look. Experiments with organization, doctrine, and
new technologies proliferated as service leaders renewed their efforts to
1. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Army
Slogan, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence,
1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS),
adapt the Army to the atomic age. Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker
attempted to identify the magnitude of challenges facing his service. In
his annual report to Congress he wrote, “In the long history of warfare
and armies, probably no period can reflect changes in combat concepts so
fundamental and significant as those brought into clear focus by the Army
in the past twelve months.”2
IKE’S CHALLENGES
At the New York Times, columnist James B. Reston summed up the changes
that had occurred in the world during the president’s first four years. At
the start of Eisenhower’s administration, two major wars were in progress,
one in Korea and one in Indochina. The administration claimed a victory
in each case by restoring the demarcation line in Korea and by forcing the
Communists to settle for half of Indochina instead of the entire peninsula.
Reston noted, however, that the military power and capital development
in the Communist world had increased far beyond the administration’s
expectations. At the same time, the power and influence of two of the United
States’ major allies, France and Britain, had declined. Among world leaders,
Joseph Stalin was dead, Winston Churchill had retired, and a revolution
in Egypt had brought to power a new nationalist firebrand, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, who aimed to lead the developing world in reordering global affairs.3
The president faced a number of mounting concerns. In Germany,
the training and rearmament of the new West German army raised
predictable responses from the Communist bloc. Although the Soviets
announced a force reduction of 1.2 million in their armed forces in May,
U.S. intelligence analysts warned that the move would not affect greatly
their offensive capabilities in the Western European theater. Of further
concern in Europe, a worsening insurrection in Algeria had begun to draw
French forces out of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). By the
end of the year, uprisings in Poland and Hungary had demonstrated both
an American inability to influence events in Eastern Europe and a Soviet
willingness to employ ruthless force to restore order in its satellite states.
An arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia seemed to open the door
to increased Communist influence in the Middle East. In the Far East,
although the possibility of conflict over the offshore islands of Quemoy and
3. James Reston, “Eisenhower’s Four Years,” New York Times, 22 Jul 1956.
THE U.S. ARMY: PROUD OF ITS PAST, IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE? 145
Matsu had declined, the armed forces of Communist China remained a

potential threat.4
A challenge to the administration’s military policies came from retired
Army General Matthew B. Ridgway. Ridgway’s memoirs, first serialized
in January issues of the Saturday Evening Post, were published in full by
Harper & Brothers in April. They laid out in detail the former chief of staff ’s
grievances with the New Look, especially the introduction of political and
economic considerations into the preparation of the military budget. Later
historians would describe Ridgway as naive and ill-suited to a job requiring
political skills, but his criticisms received considerable interest in Congress
and by the American public. Army leaders testifying before Congress
pressed Ridgway’s point that missions had been added to the service’s
responsibilities without corresponding increases in capabilities or funding.
Although he made no public comment on Ridgway’s statements, Eisenhower
never forgave his former wartime compatriot. Despite his outwardly affable
demeanor, the president nursed grudges with legendary skill. When the
subject of Ridgway came up in a 1959 meeting of the National Security
Council, Eisenhower feigned ignorance and asked the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Nathan F. Twining, if he could remember
the name of the officer who had caused so much trouble, “that general, that
Army fellow.”5
Ridgway’s articles and book raised the issue of whether the service
chiefs and other senior military leaders should be allowed to voice their
disagreements with the administration’s policy. The president expressed his
4. Memo, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, Dir Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff,
5 Jan 1956, sub: Chief of Staff Press Conferences; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, Seventh
Army Cmdg Gen, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Ch Staff, 20 Aug 1956; Memo, Brig.
Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Asst Ch Staff Intel, 25 May 1956, sub:
Announced Reduction in Soviet Armed Forces of 1,200,000; Staff Study, Ops Planning
Staff, 27 Feb 1956, sub: Plausibility of Large-Scale Conflict with Communist China
without USSR; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec
Army, 15 Nov 1956, sub: Interim US Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary,
File Unit: Entry A1 3-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1947–1964
(hereinafter SCGC 1947–1964), RG 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the
Army, NACP.
5. S. L. A. Marshall, “General Ridgway Speaks His Mind,” New York Times, 15 Apr 1956;
Memo, Brig. Gen. Lyal C. Metheny, Ch Coordination Gp, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor,
21 Jan 1956, sub: The Ridgway Articles, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Daun van Ee, “From New Look to Flexible Response,”
in Against All Enemies: Interpretations of American Military History from Colonial Times to
the Present, eds. Kenneth J. Hagan and William R. Roberts (New York: Greenwood Press,
1986), 329; “Random Notes in Washington: Eisenhower Forgets His Critic,” New York
Times, 14 Dec 1959.
displeasure to Admiral Arthur W. Radford, suggesting that perhaps they

could strengthen the positions of the secretary of defense and the chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reducing the service chiefs to more operational
roles. Eisenhower spoke of making the service chiefs subordinate to the
chairman, giving the latter the power to select and reassign them. The chiefs
would then have the duty of implementing policy within their own services—
not of developing overall policy. As he had four years earlier, Eisenhower
emphasized that the chiefs had to subordinate their positions as champions
of their individual services to their roles as overall military advisers.6
For his part, Admiral Radford remained the most stalwart disciple of
Eisenhower’s New Look military philosophy. In July 1956, he proposed a
plan to cut another 800,000 personnel from the U.S. armed forces. With the
president committed to the use of atomic weapons in the event of war with
the Soviet Union, Radford believed he could cut the Army by almost half,
from slightly more than one million troops to around 550,000. The Army’s
primary missions would be civil defense and maintaining order at home in
the event of a Soviet atomic strike. The service’s only contribution to combat
might be small mobile teams built around atomic rockets or missiles. When
New York Times reporter Anthony H. Leviero revealed the proposal, referred
to as the Radford Plan, the resultant publicity kept it from going farther.
The episode reminded Army leaders, nonetheless, that within the context
of the president’s New Look, they were still engaged in a struggle for their
service’s survival.7
Although he had returned to civilian life in 1954, former Deputy Secretary
of Defense Roger M. Kyes met with Army leaders in October 1956 to discuss
the Army’s role in national defense. Kyes told the assembled officers that
the Army had assumed a negative and defensive approach in presenting
its case to the public and to Congress. It had focused its efforts too much
on preparations for small wars. Even the Army’s efforts in Europe were
overrated, he believed. The service needed to develop a concept that it could
sell to the public in a positive, dynamic fashion. Kyes told the officers that
the Army had to stop contending that thermonuclear war was unlikely to
6. Edward L. Katzenbach Jr., “Should Our Military Leaders Speak Up?,” New York Times,
15 Apr 1956; Memo of Conf with President, 30 Mar 1956; Memo of Conf with President,
14 May 1956; both in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 (hereinafter cited
as FRUS 1955–1957), vol. 19, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1990), 280–83, 301–3.
7. Anthony Leviero, “Radford’s Views Pose Basic National Security Issue,” New York
Times, 15 Jul 1956; MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Jun 1956,
File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956–
1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962), RG 319, NACP; Memo of Conf with
President, 18 Apr 1956, in FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 19, 296–98.
occur and acknowledge that it could occur. It should then prepare itself and
sell itself accordingly.8
For his part, President Eisenhower continued to focus on those principles
that had formed the basis of the New Look four years earlier. He tasked
the service chiefs with producing another paper to recommend further cuts
to the defense budget. He questioned the number of flying hours allocated
to aircraft pilots and asked again, why it was not possible to cut personnel
strength further, particularly in the Army and the Marines. He expressed
his frustration with the U.S. Army divisions in Europe, noting that U.S.
leadership had considered their original deployment a temporary expedient
to be discontinued once the European nations could build up their own
strength. U.S. security, he summarized, depended upon the ability of aircraft
to deliver the atomic bomb. In all other areas, he believed that the United
States could reduce expenditures if the three services could get together and
determine to do so in a spirit of mutual understanding.9
Despite some superficial efforts to portray the United States’ defense

establishment as a unified team, the reality was quite the opposite. Although
each of the services often staked out competing positions on issues, the most
frequent confrontations occurred between the Army and the Air Force. By
1956, conflicts between the two services had reached the level of undeclared
war. This friction had its roots in the evolution of two defense policies. First,
many of the Air Force’s senior leaders had been activists in the campaign of
the U.S. Army Air Forces to gain independent status. Having achieved that
goal, they zealously guarded all perceived prerogatives and regarded any
encroachment by the Army as counterrevolutionary. Quite a few also were
committed disciples of strategic bombing and tended to regard as excessive
any expenditures on ground combat weapons beyond those required for air
base defense. The two services might have weathered the split with minimal
hard feelings had defense spending remained at the levels seen during
World War II and the Korean War. Postwar budgets, however, particularly as
8. MFR, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, 10 Oct 1956, sub: Conference
With Mr. Roger M. Kyes, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
9. Memo of Conf with President, 13 Mar 1956, in FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 19, 238–41;
Memo of Discussion at 280th Mtg of National Security Council, 22 Mar 1956, in FRUS
1955–1957, vol. 19, 268–74; Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The
Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1955–1956, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff
Historical Office 1992), 51–53.
enforced under President Eisenhower’s New Look, forced the armed services
into a zero-sum game where any gain in appropriations by one service was
linked directly to losses incurred by the others. With the Air Force as the
principal beneficiary in the Eisenhower budget, and the Army seeing its
share steadily decrease, cooperation between the two services disappeared.
An already contentious interservice relationship degenerated into
outright hostility.10
Conflict between the two services centered around four main issues. The
longest standing was strategic airlift. The Army depended upon Air Force
support to transport its forces based in the United States to potential trouble
spots overseas. Although the Air Force paid lip service to the mission, its
prestige, public support, and dominance within U.S. military policy resided
in its fighter-interceptor squadrons and the Strategic Air Command. The
second major issue involved support for Army Ground Forces. Although
Army and Air Force leaders had made significant strides in coordinating
close air support for troops on the ground, the Air Force remained reluctant
to develop and procure aircraft optimized for that mission. As the Army
began to experiment with rockets and missiles to provide its own fire
support for long-range targets, Air Force officers objected that such targeting
represented deep interdiction missions, which were their responsibility. The
two services also tangled over the continental air defense mission. The Army
viewed the protection of the American homeland from incoming aircraft
and missiles as an outgrowth of its traditional antiaircraft mission and an
opportunity to demonstrate its relevance as part of atomic-age warfare. The
Air Force considered continental air defense to be an integral part of its
overall air defense mission and viewed Army and Navy efforts to develop
surface-to-air missiles as unnecessary and a waste of defense dollars. Finally,
the Air Force looked askance at the growing inventory of Army aircraft,
both fixed-wing and rotary. Although it did not contest Army development
of helicopters for limited tactical use, it loudly contested Army proposals to
develop an organic air assault or aerial resupply capability.11
The development and acquisition of transport aircraft remained a
hotly contested issue between the two services. As former commanders of
airborne divisions during World War II, Generals Ridgway and Taylor both
had expressed concern over the availability of aircraft to deliver Army forces
into an overseas theater. Strategic movement of troops and the delivery
10. Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984); Richard M. Leighton, History
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy, Money, and the New Look (Washington,
DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2001).
11. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 61–76.
of paratroops as part of an airborne assault were two distinct missions

and required different types of aircraft. The Air Force acknowledged
its responsibility for strategic transport but contended that strategic
bombardment was in itself the decisive way to wage war. Air Force leaders
argued before Congress that increasing the number of bomber wings and
fighter squadrons was of far more value to the American public than the
procurement of additional transport aircraft. Although the Air Force began
to procure C–130 turboprop four-engine medium transport aircraft in 1956,
the overwhelming majority of its transport fleet consisted of two-engine,
propeller-driven aircraft, many of World War II vintage. Most of those did
not belong to the Air Force but operated as part of the Military Air Transport
Service, a joint agency of the Department of Defense and under Air Force
direction. Despite frequent Army protests, the Department of Defense
maintained that the nation possessed sufficient strategic airlift to meet that
service’s requirements.12
As the Army’s discontent over strategic airlift remained at a low simmer,
the Air Force’s concern over the Army’s expanding surface-to-surface
missile program was rapidly coming to a boil. Army leaders had traditionally
viewed rockets and missiles as extensions of traditional artillery. With
the assistance of a group of former German scientists led by Wernher
von Braun, they had moved forward rapidly with a family of long-range
weapons. By 1956, the service had deployed the Honest John rocket with
a range of approximately 15 miles and the Corporal missile with a range of
75–100 miles. The Redstone missile, with a range of 200 miles, was under
development. Air Force officers began to suspect an Army intent to use the
increased range of its missiles to attack strategic targets. Alarmed by what his
officers considered an encroachment on their mission, Secretary of the Air
Force Donald A. Quarles submitted a memorandum to Secretary of Defense
Charles E. Wilson identifying his service’s disagreements with the Army
missile program and recommending that further research and development
be limited to weapons with a range of no more than 200 miles. Even that
12. “Excerpts From Wilson’s Closing Testimony at Senate Hearing on Military Strength,”
New York Times, 4 Jul 1956; Memo, Col. Fred C. Weyand, Executive Ofcr Sec Army, for
Sec Gen Staff, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Adequacy of Airlift and Tactical Air Support for the
Army; Memo, Brig. Gen. C. J. Hauck Jr. for Ch Staff, 29 May 1956, sub: Congressional
Interest in Roles and Missions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, “Semiannual Report of the
Secretary of the Air Force,” in U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary
of Defense, January 1 to June 30, 1956 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1957), 266–69.
range allowance, he explained, was only to take into account requirements

to position missile launchers up to 100 miles behind front lines.13
A similar interservice rivalry and competition had arisen in the
development of antiaircraft missiles. In 1949, the Armed Forces Policy
Council had assigned specific surface-to-air missile responsibilities to each of
the services, all of which had extensive research and development programs.
The Army would develop missiles to replace traditional antiaircraft artillery;
the Air Force would produce missiles that could supplant interceptor
aircraft; and the Navy would design missiles to protect the fleet at sea. The
Air Force concentrated on the Bomarc, a long-range guided missile, which
was essentially a pilotless interceptor. The Navy produced a short-range
missile, the Terrier, for defense of ships at sea and was working on a longer-
range version called the Talos. The Army’s Nike Ajax missile had a range
of 25 miles and was the only air-defense missile actually deployed by the
beginning of 1956. At that time, the service was also working on an improved
version, the Nike Hercules, with a potential range of about 75 miles.14
In 1954, the Air Force chief of staff, General Twining, had proposed that
his service assume responsibility for all air-defense missiles. He argued
that the competition between the services to develop similar systems was
wasteful. Twining reiterated his service’s belief that airpower, including
continental air defense, was indivisible and must be under centralized
control. Secretary Wilson did not concede to the Air Force all of its claims.
In November 1954, he assigned the responsibility for point defense of cities
and vital installations to the Army, with a range limitation on its missiles
of 50 miles. The Air Force would assume the responsibility for intercepting
enemy aircraft beyond that range.15
With the Army’s development of its longer-range Nike Hercules well
underway, the Air Force reopened the debate over air defense responsibilities.
In 1955, the Air Force had assumed the responsibility for developing and
financing a land-based version of the Talos missile and, in March 1956,
13. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 65; Elliott V. Converse III, Rearming for
the Cold War, 1945–1960, vol. 1, History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense
(Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense Historical Office, 2012), 599; Memo,
Hauck for Ch Staff, 29 May 1956, sub: Congressional Interest in Roles and Missions; both
in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
14. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 61.
15. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 61; Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir
Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, 29 May 1956, sub:
Staff Study—Clarification of Service Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler,
Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Major Areas
of Divergence Among Military Services, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top
Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
announced its intention to deploy these missiles in the point defense of its
Strategic Air Command bases. A few months later, excerpts from a classified
Air Force study appeared in the press condemning the Army’s Nike missile
as inadequately tested and incapable of intercepting manned bombers or
missiles. Only the Air Force, the report concluded, could provide adequate
air defense through a system of early-warning radars, interceptor aircraft,
and Bomarc and Talos missiles.16
The final area of conflict between the Army and the Air Force involved the
Army’s rapidly expanding aviation program. In a review of the entire program
submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff late in 1955, General Taylor identified
the statutory authorities who would implement the program as well as the
functions and responsibilities he expected them to perform. Taylor’s paper
described six functions—observation, airlift for small unit movement in the
combat zone, airlift for small amounts of critical supplies within the combat
zone, aerial reconnaissance, command and liaison, and medical evacuation
from the battlefield. At the time of the general’s report, the Army maintained
3,931 aircraft, including 2,619 airplanes and 1,312 helicopters. By July 1958,
the Army planned to receive an additional 1,583 aircraft. Taylor insisted that
the aircraft would supplement, rather than replace, Air Force missions and
that they did not encroach upon Air Force prerogatives.17
With significant research, development, and procurement funding at
stake, the two services continued to debate respective roles and missions. In
1952, Secretary of the Army Frank C. Pace and Secretary of the Air Force
Thomas K. Finletter had agreed to a limitation of 5,000 pounds for the
empty weight of Army fixed-wing aircraft. However, by 1956, the weight
limit had become overly restrictive in the development of new prototypes. In
September, Secretary Brucker approached Secretary Wilson about removing
the restriction. General Twining objected to the proposal as well as to the
number of aircraft the Army had programmed for procurement. The Air
Force declared that, because the 1952 agreements had been bilateral between
the two services, they were subject to varying interpretations. The Air Force
requested a new directive from the secretary of defense clarifying the role of
16. Anthony Leviero, “Air Force Calls Army Nike Unfit To Guard Nation,” New York
Times, 21 May 1956; John G. Norris, “Army Fights Air Force Missile Base Plans,” New
York Times, 21 Mar 1956; Elie Abel, “Wilson Marshals Service’s Chiefs to Decry Rivalry,”
New York Times, 22 May 1956; Memo, Lt. Col. [no first name given] Mease, Missiles and
Air Defense Division, for Staff, 19 July 1956, sub: Public Release of Information on Nike,
File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
17. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 74.
the Army’s organic aviation and identifying specific Air Force functions that
would support the Army.18
As Wilson tried to sort out the conflicts between the two services, both
sides continued the battle in the court of public opinion. In addition to
leaking its evaluation of the Army’s Nike missile, the Air Force continued its
aggressive campaign to sell the nation on the concept of dominance through
airpower. In testimony before Congress and through various speeches and
publications, Air Force officers concentrated their efforts to reinforce the
image of their service as the cornerstone of national defense. Always, they
emphasized the requirement for additional air wings to maintain the peace.
Often, when the Army tried to counterattack, the press accused the service of
“sulking.”19 General Guy S. Meloy Jr., the chief of public information, urged
General Taylor to keep the Army’s communications positive. The Army
should continue to spread its message of finding ways to do its job better,
with better equipment and less money. Meloy wanted leaders within Army
Aviation, the Guided Missile Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, and the Ballistic
Missile Agency at Huntsville, Alabama, to speak out more frequently about
advances in their respective organizations.20
Secretary Wilson delivered his response to the members of the Armed
Forces Policy Council on 26 November. As a preface, he declared that earlier
allocations of roles and missions recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
at previous meetings in Key West, Florida, and Newport, Rhode Island, had
proven to be sound and had effectively implemented the intent of Congress.
He noted, however, that the development of new weapons and new strategic
concepts had created the need for clearer interpretation of the roles and
missions of the armed forces.21
Wilson attempted to resolve the major issues that had confounded leaders
of the Army and Air Force. He first addressed the Army Aviation program.
18. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 76; Richard P. Weinert Jr., A History of Army
Aviation, 1950–1962 (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
1991), 110; Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep
Ch Staff Ops, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Major Areas of Divergence Among Military Services, File
Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
19. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 1 Jun 1956, sub:
Assessment of Article in TIME, 4 June 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
20. Memo, Meloy for Ch Staff, 1 Jun 1956, sub: Assessment of Article in TIME; Memo,
Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy for Ch Staff, 6 Aug 1956, sub: Accenting the Positive, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Jay M. Parker,
“The Colonels’ Revolt: Eisenhower, the Army, and the Politics of National Security”
(Paper, Naval War College, 1994), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=447086.
21. Memo, Sec Def Charles E. Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council,
26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of
Wilson defined the combat zone in which he would allow Army aircraft
to operate as no more than 100 miles forward of the line of contact with
the enemy. The field commander would define its rearward extension, but it
normally would extend up to 100 miles to the rear as well. This was a significant
change from earlier agreements, which had not specifically defined the zone.
Wilson affirmed most of the traditional functions for Army Aviation. The
service could continue to perform command, liaison, and communications;
observation, fire adjustment, and photographic reconnaissance; airlift of
personnel and materiel; and aeromedical evacuation. Wilson specifically
prohibited the Army from providing aircraft for strategic and tactical airlift,
which he defined as movement from exterior points into the combat zone.
Although he had allowed medical evacuation by Army Aviation within the
combat zone, only the Air Force would perform evacuation outside of the
combat zone or from airheads or airborne objective areas where Air Force
aircraft had provided the primary support. The order also reserved for the
Air Force the missions of close combat air support, interdiction, and tactical
reconnaissance beyond the combat zone. In an important clarification,
Deputy Defense Secretary Reuben H. Robertson Jr. told reporters that
nothing in the ruling prevented the Army from continuing its development
of sky cavalry units nor from using its aircraft to acquire targets and direct
the fire of its short-range missiles.22
Moving on to specifications for the aircraft themselves, Wilson maintained
the established limit of 5,000 pounds for Army fixed-wing aircraft and added
a limitation of 20,000 pounds for helicopters. He said he would consider
exceptions to weight limitations for specific aircraft developed for particular
Army requirements. Noting the proposed increase in the number of aircraft
maintained by the Army, the secretary commented that he expected
corresponding declines in the numbers of trucks and other forms of
transportation requested by the service. As a final note on the subject, Wilson
forbade the Army from maintaining its own aviation research facilities, directing
the service to make maximum use of Air Force and Navy aircraft research.23
The secretary also expounded on his philosophy for continental air
defense. Area- and point-defense systems, he said, could not be defined
Operation of the Department of Defense, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
22. Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub:
Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the Effectiveness of Operation of the
Department of Defense; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Army Mission is Curbed,” Army Times,
1 Dec 1956.
Department of Defense.
with precision. Nonetheless, the defense of key installations, cities, and

specified geographic areas would remain primarily an Army mission. He
directed that no service could plan unilaterally for additional missile bases
of either type unless and until the commander in chief of the Continental Air
Defense Command recommended this action and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved it. To the Army, Wilson assigned responsibility for the continued
development of Nike and Talos missile systems. He limited the horizontal
range of the point-defense missiles to 100 nautical miles. He directed the
Air Force to continue its development of the Bomarc area-defense missile
system, and the Navy retained responsibility for the development of ship-
based air-defense weapons.24
The secretary also took steps to limit the Army’s surface-to-surface missile
program. The service could use such systems against tactical targets within
the zone of operations, defined as extending no more than 100 miles forward
of the front lines. Allowing for a deployment of up to 100 miles behind the
front lines placed a limitation of 200 miles on the development and fielding
of any future systems. The attack of targets beyond that range remained the
responsibility of the Air Force. With that in mind, the secretary continued,
the employment of land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
would be the sole responsibility of the Air Force. He stated that, beginning
in July 1958, he would transfer budget support for the development of the
Army’s Jupiter IRBM to the Air Force. At the same time, support for the Air
Force’s Talos antiaircraft missile would become an Army responsibility.25
Finally, on the adequacy of strategic airlift, Wilson was far more succinct.
In a brief paragraph he stated, “The current composition of the Air Force
structure has been carefully examined, and it appears that it presently
provides adequate airborne lift in the light of currently approved strategic
concepts.”26 He did not want to talk about it anymore.
For the most part, reaction in the news media to the defense secretary’s
announcement was positive. Most commenting on the subject agreed that
the competition with the Air Force had forced the secretary to make a
decision and that it was a realistic compromise. Some noted, however, that
this outcome was unlikely to resolve the interservice arguments that plagued
the defense establishment. An editorial in the Army Times opined that the
service had been overmatched by the “five-sided ring across the Potomac”
and should continue the fight on Capitol Hill.27
General Taylor and officers on the Army Staff were more circumspect in
their analysis of the memorandum. To Secretary Brucker, Taylor wrote that
the Army had not suffered any substantive loss of mission because of the
ruling. He believed that the Army should limit its response to “an expression
of loyal support.”28 Most officers on the Army Staff reacted similarly, feeling
that the memorandum had not altered substantially many of the provisions
of the earlier Pace-Finletter agreements. More important, they believed,
had been the expressed validation of the sky cavalry experiments. Also, the
defense secretary’s statements seemed to strengthen the Army position that
air defense was not the responsibility of a single service, but rather a joint
function. On the question of strategic airlift, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman
noted that the issue was not directly related to the question of roles and
missions, but rather whether “currently approved strategic concepts”
fully supported national security policy.29 General Taylor’s Coordinating
Group, an informal collection of colonels he had assembled to study and to
advise him on policy issues, recommended that the service emphasize its
requirement to move two divisions within thirty days of alert. They noted,
however, that only the Air Force could make a definitive estimate of its
own capabilities.30
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: THINKING INSIDE AND

OUTSIDE THE BOX
Perhaps in no other way was the Army as “alert to its future,” as in the context
of its research and development programs. The period after the Korean War
27. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 7 Dec 1956, sub: Analysis
of Press and Commentator’s Reaction to Secretary Wilson’s Missile Directive, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Settling for a
Sop,” Army Times, 8 Dec 1956.
28. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Sec Army, 14 Feb 1957, sub: Army
Position on the Secretary of Defense’s 26 November Memorandum on Roles and Missions,
29. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Army, 8 Dec
1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
30. Memo, Taylor for Sec Army, 14 Feb 1957, sub: Army Position on the Secretary of
Defense’s 26 November Memorandum; Memo, Eddleman for Sec Army, 8 Dec 1956,
sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions; Memo, Coordination Gp for Gen. [Maxwell D.]
Taylor, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Analysis by DCSOPS of Secretary of Defense Memorandum
was one of the most dynamic in the Army’s history, as leaders attempted to
harness rapidly evolving technology. Although President Eisenhower and
Secretary Wilson were reluctant to spend money on replacing aging stocks
of World War II and Korean War weapons and equipment, they encouraged
Army leaders to embrace new technology and, in particular, atomic
weapons as the means of modernizing the force. In his memoir, General
Taylor recalled how Secretary Wilson once kicked back an Army budget for
revision, instructing Taylor to substitute requests for “newfangled items with
public appeal,” instead of those more prosaic items needed by the everyday
foot soldier.31 With research funds relatively plentiful, Army leaders explored
the potential offered by science and technology. Ultimately, the results were
mixed. Some ideas evolved into equipment that would become the backbone
of the Army for the next twenty years. Others, thankfully, were discarded.
The crown jewel of the Army’s research and development program was
the Jupiter IRBM. In 1955, the Killian Committee—formally known as the
Technological Capabilities Panel and chaired by James R. Killian, president
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Eisenhower’s science and
technology adviser—had recommended a program that would lead to the
development of a small, artificial satellite and an IRBM with a range of
1,500 miles. Army leaders recognized that their Redstone missile program
already had achieved many of the milestones involved in the development
of an IRBM. The facilities at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, were
well-suited to take on the new project. Von Braun, the Army’s lead scientist,
met with Secretary Wilson and convinced him that the Jupiter project was a
logical extension of the Redstone program. Although Wilson had designated
the new missile as a joint Army-Navy venture, the Army took the lead in the
testing and development of the Jupiter missile. In February 1956, the service
activated the Army Ballistic Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal and
named Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris as its first commanding general. Although
the Navy would soon lose interest in the project as it pursued its submarine-
launched Polaris missile system, the Army and the Air Force would spar
over control of the Jupiter program for the next several years.32
General Medaris had urged other Army leaders to concentrate on more
advanced weapon systems. He had told the chief of ordnance in 1955 that
dated 26 November Clarifying Roles and Missions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
31. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 171.
32. James M. Grimwood and Frances Strowd, “History of the Jupiter Missile System”
(Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command, 1962), 11–13, U.S. Army Center
of Military History (CMH) Library, CMH, Washington, DC; John B. Medaris, Countdown
for Decision (New York: Putnam, 1961), 66–70.
the Army was fighting a

losing game. If it continued
to expend its energy fighting
for conventional weapons
and ammunition, even
though it needed them
urgently, the service would
get little money of any kind.
It would be far easier, he had
said, to justify a budget with
the more popular, modern
items. He recommended
that the Army increase the
amount in its budget for
guided missiles and limit
itself to modest quantities of
conventional items.33
In October 1956, the Joint
Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris (U.S. Army) Chiefs of Staff agreed to form
an ad hoc committee of
senior military representatives from each service to consider all aspects of
continental air defense. Increasing Soviet capabilities, along with innovations
and improvements in weapons and delivery systems, had raised dramatically
the importance of protecting North America from enemy air attack. The
secretary of defense appointed Air Force General Carl A. Spaatz, Army
General Thomas T. Handy, Admiral John J. Ballentine, and Albert C. Hill from
the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group to study the associated problems and
developments, and to recommend appropriate countermeasures.34
A great deal of the Army’s research and development budget was
already devoted to air-defense missiles. By 1956, the Nike I, or Ajax, was
the backbone of the Army’s continental air defense system. The Ajax greatly
extended the altitude and range of traditional air defense artillery and
carried a more lethal warhead. The Nike B, or Hercules, an improvement
on the original model, was just entering production. The Hercules extended
both the range and altitude of the Ajax and had the capability of mounting
an atomic warhead. With it, Army planners envisioned knocking out whole
33. Medaris, Countdown for Decision, 65.
34. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, to Ellis A. Johnson, Dir, Ops Research Ofc,
26 Oct 1956; Memo, Gen. (Ret.) Thomas T. Handy for Ch Staff, 5 Dec 1956, sub: Ad Hoc
Committee on the Air Defense of North America, both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
formations of enemy aircraft. Because of anticipated advances in technology,

the ultimate goal for continental air defense was to develop the ability to
intercept and destroy incoming enemy missiles. The Army had completed
initial studies on an antimissile missile and had begun development of the
Nike Zeus to meet that requirement. Also undergoing final testing was the
Army’s Hawk antiaircraft missile, designed for employment by troops in the
field against low-flying enemy aircraft.35
In recognition of the prominent role that guided missiles had come to
play in the Army’s research and development program, the vice chief of staff
ordered the creation of the Guided Missiles Directorate, appointing Brig.
Gen. Dwight E. Beach as its first director. The appointment made Beach a
member of the Joint Board on Future Storage of Atomic Weapons and on the
Coordinating Committee on Atomic Energy. In his position, he also became
the principal assistant to the deputy chief of staff for operations in all matters
related to rockets, missiles, and atomic warheads. Secretary Brucker, not to
be outdone, suggested to General Taylor that the Army create a separate
missiles branch within the Army. After due consideration, Taylor decided
against creating a separate branch, but he directed his staff to conduct a study
to consider amending the field artillery insignia to incorporate a reference to
the Army missile program.36
The Army also increasingly looked to helicopters as another way to adapt
to modern warfare. Because, in 1950, the Army had designated its initial
helicopter companies as transport, the Army Transportation Corps had
become the technical service with the primary interest in Army Aviation. By
1956, however, some farsighted officers began to question that affiliation. A
fact sheet prepared for the chief of staff noted that air activity in the combat
zone required an “intimate coordination of effort.”37 The paper noted that
the Army needed aircraft designed specifically for its needs and missions. In
May, the director of Army Aviation, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, expanded
on that idea before an audience of the American Helicopter Society. Howze
35. Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, “Missiles on the Firing Line,” Army Information Digest
11 (Dec 1956): 36; U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the
Army,” in U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1
to June 30, 1957 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 109–11.
36. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Vice Ch Staff, 5 Sep
1956, sub: Title and Responsibilities of Brigadier General Dwight E. Beach, ODCSOPS;
Memo, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker for Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1956, sub: Proposal to Create
Missiles Branch; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
37. 1956 Fact Sheet, n.d., sub: Army Aviation: Future Role, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
An H–19 Chickasaw carrying an external load, 19 July 1962 (U.S.

Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
told his listeners that the Army needed simpler, more reliable helicopters
that were versatile enough to perform a variety of missions. He insisted that
future prototypes must have guidance and instrument systems to facilitate
operations at night and in bad weather. He predicted that the speed and
mobility provided by helicopters would require the Army to rewrite its
tactical manuals.38
With helicopters becoming an important part of the modern Army, the
service devoted more resources toward the development of new prototypes.
Although they had performed serviceably, the Army’s two primary
helicopters, the H–19 Chickasaw and the H–34 Choctaw had been designed,
respectively, for the Air Force and the Navy. In the mid-1950s, the Army
submitted its requirements for a relatively small, high-performance utility
helicopter for a variety of roles in the combat zone. By 1956, it had accepted
a bid from Bell Helicopter to build prototypes for testing. The XH–40
Iroquois was an all-metal, closed-cabin design and the first to have a gas
turbine engine. As the year ended, the Army had three of these helicopters
38. 1956 Fact Sheet, n.d., sub: Army Aviation: Future Role; “Howze Asks for Improvement
in Copters,” Army Times, 12 May 1956.
undergoing tests, with another six ordered for further tests the following year.
Research and development also continued in 1956 on a larger helicopter,
dubbed the Flying Crane, which could carry loads up to 12 tons over short
distances under combat conditions. Although much work remained on the
project, the Army had received several contractor studies that appeared to
be promising.39
In addition to its encouraging research on helicopters, the Army
continued its development of fixed-wing aircraft. In his “roles and missions”
decree of 26 November, Secretary Wilson had approved an exception to the
5,000-pound weight limit to allow the Army to purchase five de Havilland
DHC–4 Caribou cargo aircraft for testing. With an empty weight of 12,500
pounds, the Caribou was designed to transport moderate to heavy payloads
of troops or equipment while using short or improvised landing strips. In a
slight headwind, the aircraft could become airborne with a takeoff run of less
than 350 feet. Fitted with troop seats, the Caribou could transport twenty-
eight soldiers. Alternatively, the units could modify it to accommodate
twenty-two wounded, stretcher-borne troops.40
In attempting to come to grips with a concept for atomic warfare, Army
leaders revisited some older technologies with an eye toward adopting them
to modern combat. A requirement to neutralize enemy troops that were
deeply entrenched to withstand atomic attacks seemed to some to call for a
new look at chemical weapons. Although the World War I experience had
attached some stigma to their use, such weapons, argued Chief Chemical
Officer Maj. Gen. William A. Creasy, were still useful for their ability to
inflict casualties with a minimum of damage to the surrounding area. Creasy
insisted that chemical weapons were not horror weapons. He noted that only
2 percent of those incapacitated by gas in World War I had died. Certainly,
the firebombing employed during World War II was more horrific than that.
Research and development for chemical weapons projects continued in 1956.
Although chemical warheads for the Honest John rocket and the Corporal
39. Marvin L. Worley Jr., New Developments in Army Weapons, Tactics, Organization, and
Equipment (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), 127–36; U.S.
Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jan–30 Jun 1957,
111.
40. Worley, New Developments, 125–27; Memo, Wilson for Members of the Armed Forces
Policy Council, 26 Nov 1956, sub: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve the
Effectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.
Troops deploy from an H–34 Choctaw helicopter in a simulated battle

exercise, 17 July 1962. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
missile were already under development, Creasy also recommended the
study of projectiles for smaller mortars, rockets, and artillery.41
Finally, the Army looked to improve upon the basic instruments of the
common infantryman. In 1956, the Army completed testing on two new
weapons and prepared to approve them as standard issue. A soldier could
fire the M14 rifle in either semi- or fully-automatic mode, and it weighed
8.7 pounds—less than the M1, which it replaced. When modified with a
bipod and heavier barrel, it became the M15 and replaced the venerable
Browning automatic rifle. The M60 general-purpose machine gun replaced
three different infantry weapons. It could be fired from a tripod, with
a bipod, or from the shoulder or hip. It came with a quick-change barrel
that a user could replace in a matter of seconds. All three weapons fired
the same 7.62 NATO cartridge, thus simplifying ammunition resupply.42
41. Memo, Maj. Gen. William M. Creasy, Ch Chem Ofcr, for Asst Sec Army (Logistics),
3 Jan 1956, sub: Information on Chemical Warfare and Discussion of the Minimum
Destruction Concept of Warfare; Fact Sheet, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 15 Nov 1956, sub:
Army Requirements for Continued Development of CW Munitions; both in File Unit:
Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
30 Jun 1957, 110.
The Army’s “flying platform,” developed by Hiller Helicopters Inc.,

1956 (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
Not all of the Army’s research and development programs bore fruit.
Some, in fact, seemed to come from the pages of the latest pulp science
fiction magazines. For several years, the service experimented with a flying
platform, or “aerocycle,” designed to lift individual soldiers into the air and
move them short distances. Engineers envisioned the device less as a means
of transport and more as a tool for reconnaissance, area surveillance, and
adjustment of artillery fires. During the year, engineers tested two prototypes,
but found that neither met all of their requirements.43
General Medaris described an even more fanciful project at the annual
meeting of the Association of the United States Army in November 1956.
In discussions concerning the Army’s modern logistics system, Medaris
introduced the concept of a troop- and supply-carrying rocket that would
move 500 miles in thirty-five minutes and, at the end of its trajectory,
gently float to the earth beneath a massive parachute. At that point, either
the soldiers would exit the transport rocket or troops on the receiving end
would unload needed supplies. Artists’ depictions of the concept published
43. Worley, New Developments, 144–46; “Infantry May Fly in Future,” Army Times, 7 Jan
1956; “Army Lets New Contract For Flying Platforms,” Army Times, 24 Nov 1956.
At Fort Eustis, Virginia, test engineer Harold M. Graham demon-

strates a new twin-jet rocket-propulsion system, developed by the Bell
Aerosystem Company. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
in Army magazines showed up to twenty soldiers exiting from the delivery

vehicle as it rested beneath a collapsed parachute.44
Despite these occasional misfires, by the end of the year, the Army’s
research and development programs seemed to be on track. Although
the Army continued to experience difficulties replenishing its stocks of
conventional vehicles, weapons, and equipment, it was moving forward in
its effort to present itself as a modern, atomic-age force.
The Army and the Air Force had conducted Exercise Sage Brush in the
Louisiana Maneuver Area between 31 October and 4 December 1955. The
critiques had revealed that both services had seen little to move them away
from the preconceived notions they held regarding proponency over air
defense, close air support, and control over atomic munitions. Moreover,
44. “Army Eyes Future,” Army Times, 3 Nov 1956; “Missiles—Troop Vehicles of the
Future,” Army Information Digest 11 (Dec 1956): 124.
Army observers had confirmed that their own units had shown little of the
discipline and training that would have generated useful feedback regarding
the organization and doctrine they were testing. Instead of identifying
solutions to problems of atomic warfare, reported General John E. Dahlquist,
the commanding general of U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC),
Sage Brush merely emphasized that the Army had many more problems
to consider.45
The commanders of the two Atomic Field Army (ATFA–1) prototype
divisions, Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch of the 3d Infantry Division and
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Howze of the 1st Armored Division, submitted
different conclusions regarding the performance of their units and their
recommendations for reorganization. Neither officer was completely
satisfied with the new organization, and each suggested adding additional
increments. The resulting modification recommendations for each division
would exceed the personnel strengths of those unit types, which still operated
according to their previous Korean War models. Clearly, General Ridgway’s
original goal to develop more austere divisions, which he felt would be better
suited to atomic-era warfare, had become lost in the effort.46
On 12 December, the CONARC Combat Developments Group briefed
General Maxwell Taylor on a potential alternative to the Atomic Field Army.
CONARC’s “Study on the 1960–1970 PENTANA Army” was a repackaging
of the Army War College’s PENTANA (pentagonal atomic-nonatomic), a
study that called for a completely air-transportable 8,600-person division to
replace all three existing divisions—infantry, armored, and airborne. At the
end of December, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3
(Operations), wrote to Dahlquist that CONARC’s PENTANA study reflected
a great amount of imaginative thought and would serve as the basis for
future study on mid- and long-range objectives for organization, doctrine,
and weapons development. He noted that the Army Staff would present its
own recommendations to the chief of staff by March 1956. In the meantime,
General Eddleman, the deputy chief of staff for plans, reminded General
Taylor that CONARC had already been working on a study for a modified
airborne division. A combination of this effort with the PENTANA study
45. Joint Critique, HQ Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), 10 Dec 1955, sub: Exercise
Sage Brush, File Unit: Entry A1 95-A, Series: CONARC Exercise Files, 1954–1962, RG
546: Records of the U.S. Army Continental Command, NACP.
1998), 269–70; John J. Midgely Jr., Deadly Illusions: Army Policy for the Nuclear Battlefield
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 51–57.
would provide an early opportunity to evaluate many of the organizational

concepts under consideration.47
The airborne division proposed by CONARC incorporated many
features of the ATFA–1 concept and the two PENTANA studies. It included
five battle groups, each consisting of four infantry companies, a 4.2-inch
mortar battery, and a headquarters and service company composed of
engineer, signal, maintenance, reconnaissance, heavy weapons, and medical
resources. A divisional support group included a maintenance battalion
and administrative, medical, supply, and transportation companies.
The divisional command and control battalion included the division
headquarters, a headquarters and service company, an aviation company,
and a reconnaissance troop. A signal battalion and a small engineer
battalion provided support across the division. The division artillery
included three 105-mm. howitzer batteries for direct support and a battery
of two Honest John rocket launchers for nuclear support to the division as a
whole (Chart 5).48
General Taylor approved the concept for testing in February, with a
few modifications. He added a fifth infantry company to each battle group
and increased the number of howitzer batteries to five, but he reduced the
artillery batteries from eight guns to five. He also ordered the inclusion of
a band. The resulting division numbered 11,486 troops, considerably larger
than the original PENTANA model, but still 6,000 less than the Korean
War–version of the airborne division. The 101st Airborne Division, newly
redesignated from a training division, reorganized under the experimental
concept, now known as ROTAD (Reorganization of the Airborne Division),
and began training and evaluations.49
In the meantime, Taylor directed CONARC to begin development of
an infantry division along similar lines and to work with the Army Staff
to develop future organizational and operational concepts based on the
PENTANA model. Along with that study, the chief of staff provided
additional guidance for charting the Army’s future course. Although he
47. MFR, Maj. Gen. John S. Upham, Dep Asst Ch Staff, G–3, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC
Briefing for Chief of Staff on PENTANA Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Ch
Staff, G–3, to Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 28 Dec 1955; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman,
Dep Ch Staff Plans, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 14 Dec 1955, sub: CONARC Study on
the 1960–1970 PENTANA Army; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Midgley, Deadly Illusions, 57–63.
49. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 273; “101st Fits for A-War,” Army Times, 31 Mar
1956; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “101st AB to be Battle-Ready in Six Months,” Army Times,
29 Sep 1956.
Chart 5—Airborne Division (ROTAD), 10 August 1956
AIRBORNE DIVISION
11,486
CMD & SPT GP ENG BN SIG BN

CONTROL BN 1,178 477 374
731
HH & SV CO
1291 BATTLE GP
HH & SV CO
1,584 each
228
QM PARACHUTE
ADMIN CO SPT CO
184 HH & SV CO
138
219
MAINT BN
AVN CO 456 MORTAR
150 BTRY
115
SUPPLY &
TRANS CO
RECON TRP
171 INF CO
215 242 each
MED CO
238
DIV ARTY
806
FA BTRY (105-mm.) HHB FA BTRY (762-mm.

100 each 166 ROCKET)
140
Note
1. Includes the division band.
Source: John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate
Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 275.
believed that it was increasingly difficult to visualize a general war without

the use of tactical atomic weapons, he also considered it likely that some form
of “ground rules” would evolve. Flexibility for the Army’s combat forces was
a must. Taylor suggested rigorous consideration of all elements included at
the division level and wondered what units could be pooled at higher levels
and attached as needed. He embraced the pentagonal structure, pointing
out that it was excellent for dispersion and for the conduct of all-around
defense. Although PENTANA applied best to infantry-based divisions, the
chief of staff suggested exploring the possibilities of mechanized divisions—
larger and more expensive than the others—employing lighter and smaller
versions of tanks and armored vehicles.50
On 23 August, Taylor sent General Dahlquist additional guidance on the
reorganization of the current infantry division. He again specified that the
new division should develop along pentagonal lines, and he set a deadline of
15 October for CONARC to submit manning charts and proposed tables of
organization and equipment. The new division, Taylor directed, must contain
only the minimum number of vehicles to accomplish its mission. A study
of how to pool vehicles within a divisional transportation battalion most
efficiently was a matter of deep concern to the chief of staff. He also directed
special focus upon the engineer and signal units of the new organization.
Atomic warfare, he noted, would generate greater requirements for combat
engineers, but the planners could not allow the proposed battalion to become
unnecessarily large. Likewise, the division signal units must emphasize
support of radio, as wire communications would have diminished utility on
the more mobile battlefield. General Taylor also requested a schedule for the
reorganization of the Army’s active divisions during the coming fiscal year.
He suggested beginning with one division each from the continental United
States, Europe, and the Far East, so that he could study the effects of the
reorganization across a wide range of environments.51
CONARC forwarded the requested manning charts and its vision for the
new infantry division to the Army Staff on 15 October. Although it followed
Taylor’s basic guidance, the proposal suggested a slightly larger organization
that included divisional tank and engineer battalions with five companies
each. The division artillery included two battalions, one with five batteries
of 105-mm. howitzers and one with two 155-mm. howitzer batteries, an
50. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 1 Jun 1956, sub:
Army Organization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
51. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 23 Aug 1956, sub:
Reorganization of Current Infantry Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
8-inch howitzer battery, and an Honest John battery. After examining the
plan, the Army Staff recommended its approval, but identified a few points
of concern. They noted that no intermediate point in the chain of command
existed between the company commander, a captain, and the regimental
commander, a colonel. That presented a serious problem in the development
of infantry field grade officers qualified to command at higher levels. The
designation of the basic tactical element also presented a problem. Although
many within the service wished to retain traditional regimental affiliations,
identifying the five basic combat components of each division as regiments
would require more than 350 official regimental designations in total. The
Army had only 250 currently on its rolls. Ultimately, the service decided to
retain the term battle group, which had been used in the field tests, using it
nominally and affiliating it with traditional regiments, as in 1st Battle Group,
18th Infantry (Chart 6).52
Nonetheless, the Army planned to implement the changes to the infantry
division. In moving the proposal forward, General Eddleman relied upon
reports from the Office of the Chief of Military History to study how the
service had gone about restructuring its divisions in the past. He warned
that field commanders typically had wanted all types of units, weapons, and
equipment available for use in any possible contingency. He then observed
that if all proposed changes submitted to Army Ground Forces for the
triangular divisions of World War II had been approved, those units would
have had an approximate strength of 30,000 soldiers. Such size would have
rendered those units completely unwieldly and prevented the United States
from mobilizing as many divisions as it had. To him, that indicated a need
for the Army Staff to screen any further proposals carefully for additions
to the table of organization and equipment. He noted, however, that
history had shown that the reorganizations could take place in a relatively
short time.53
As the Army’s chief of information, General Meloy also weighed in on
the pending reorganization. The conversion offered, he said, “excellent
opportunity to demonstrate to the American public the Army’s modern
long-range concept and potentials.”54 He proposed a broad and integrated
52. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 24 Nov
1956, sub: New Infantry Division Organization (Manning Charts), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
53. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec
1956, sub: Divisional Reorganization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
54. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Army Staff, 11 Dec 1956, sub:
Reorganization of Army Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Chart 6—Infantry Division (ROCID), 21 December 1956
INFANTRY DIVISION
13,748
TANK BN (90-mm.) HHC RECON SQDN SIG BN ENG BN

763 292 669 525 791
HH & SV CO HH & SV CO
248 251
TANK CO ENG CO
103 each 108 each
DIV ARTY DIV TRAINS

1,763 1,810
BATTLE GP
1,427 each
HHB
HHD & BAND QM CO
190
70 194
HH & SV CO
310 FA BN (105-mm.)
897 ORD BN AVN CO
327 223
MORTAR BTRY
145 HHB
111
ADMIN CO TRANS BN
RIFLE CO 162 532
243 each SV BTRY
71
MED BN
BTRY 302
FA BN 143 ea
676
HHB 8-inch SV BTRY 762-mm. 155-mm.

HOW BTRY 155-mm
111 83 ROCKET BTRY HOW BTRY
139 HOWITZER
93 125 each
125 ea
History, 1998), 278.
publicity campaign with an introductory press conference, feature stories in

various publications, and productions for the Army’s Big Picture television
show and The Army Hour radio broadcast that highlighted the new, modern
Army. Meloy urged consideration of a new, descriptive, sales-appealing title
to describe the new divisions. Potential designations included Pentana, Star,
Astral, Hurricane, and Mars. General Taylor wisely noted that he preferred
the newly coined term “Pentomic” as the designation.55
Army planners had generally avoided experimenting with the armored
division because they believed that it already was well-suited for the atomic
battlefield. Its structure, employing combat command headquarters, and the
protection and mobility offered by its tanks and other organic vehicles offset
its somewhat larger size. Nonetheless, General Eddleman directed CONARC
to modernize the armored division by adding atomic weapons, increasing
target acquisition capabilities, and reducing the number of overall vehicles.
In response, CONARC added a surveillance platoon to the reconnaissance
company, provided additional aircraft within the aviation company, and
replaced one battery in the 155-mm. howitzer general support battalion with
a battery of nuclear capable 8-inch howitzers. After some discussion, the
Army Staff added an Honest John battery to the general support battalion
and dispersed the resources of the command and control battalion to
other elements within the division. The resulting division, named ROCAD
(Reorganization of the Current Armored Division), included 14,617 soldiers,
360 tanks, and roughly the same number of vehicles as the original structure.
Acting as the chief of staff, Vice Chief of Staff General Williston B. Palmer
approved the new organization on 5 November, and in December, the Army
published the tables and manning charts reflecting the changes (Chart 7).56
In order to reinforce the narrative that this was a new Army for the atomic
age, the service planned programs for Congress to demonstrate materiel in
development, concepts under consideration, and newly accepted doctrine.
Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis, the chief of legislative liaison, recommended
two shows in early 1957, one at the Infantry Center at Fort Benning,
Georgia, and one at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky. In the Army’s
advertisements for the events, General Michaelis suggested a tagline that
55. Memo, Meloy for Army Staff, 11 Dec 1956, sub: Reorganization of Army Divisions;
Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 14 Dec 1956, sub: Various
Code Names Which Refer to New Organizations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
56. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 277; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch
Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 Oct 1956, sub: Future Armor Organizations; Memo, Gen.
Williston B. Palmer, Acting Ch Staff, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 5 Nov 1956, sub:
Revised Armored Division; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Chart 7—Armored Division (ROCAD), 1956
ARMORED DIVISION
14,617
MP CO HHC RECON BN SIG BN ENG BN TANK BN

166 174 987 502 1,018 719 each
HHC COMBAT ARMD AVN CO

CMD INF BN 240
124 each 1,022 each
DIV ARTY DIV TRAINS

2,546 1,648
HHB
182 HHD & BAND QM BN
70 429
FA BN
(105-mm. SP HOW)
582 each ORD BN MED BN
606 363
FA BN
GEN SPT ADMIN CO
618 180
HHB 8-inch SV BTRY 762-mm. 155-mm.

HOW BTRY 155-mm
120 73 ROCKET BTRY HOW BTRY
HOWITZER
117 94 107 each
125 ea
Source: John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Sepa-
rate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1998), 280.
would reinforce the service’s message—“Pentomic Organization, Weapons

and Equipment Review—POWER!”57
As the transformation began to take shape, General Taylor took the
opportunity to brief President Eisenhower on the pending changes to Army
organization. During a meeting with the president and Secretary Brucker,
Taylor identified the four principles that had guided the reorganizations:
adapt divisions for operations on an atomic battlefield; eliminate
nonessential vehicles and equipment or pool them at a higher level; improve
communications systems to allow expanded spans of control; and create
new organizations to take advantage of new technology, some of which
the service had not yet fully developed. Eisenhower embraced the concept
of smaller divisions, although he indicated a preference for units cut to a
strength of around 10,000. Eisenhower acknowledged the need to notify
NATO allies, but he discouraged the idea of a campaign publicly announcing
the transition. He also accepted the Army chief of staff ’s proposed schedule,
calling for the reorganizations to begin early in 1957 and proceed for the
next two years.58
Meanwhile, the kaleidoscope that had been the Army’s active force
structure had begun to stabilize. Now a nineteen-division force, the Army
retained two corps and five divisions in Europe, two corps and four divisions
in the Far East and Hawai‘i, and two corps and ten divisions in the continental
United States. During the year, the service conducted three Gyroscope
rotations, with the 8th Infantry, 3d Armored, and 11th Airborne Divisions
going to Germany, and the 4th, 5th, and 9th Infantry Divisions returning
to the United States. The Army gained control of two additional posts from
the Air Force in 1956 with the transfer of Wolters Air Force Base (which
became Camp Wolters) in Mineral Wells, Texas, in July and Camp Gary in
San Marcos, Texas, in December. Camp Wolters and Camp Gary became
primary training sites for Army helicopter and fixed-wing pilots.59
Despite his consistent opposition to most aspects of the New Look,
General Taylor was pragmatic enough to recognize an opening when he saw
one and to move the Army in a direction where it could expand its influence.
During the summer of 1956, the New York Times had reported on Admiral
Radford’s proposal to reduce the armed forces by another 800,000 troops. At
the same time, the most recent version of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan,
the outline war plan for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the president’s
57. Memo, Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Ch Staff, 21 Dec
1956, sub: Congressional Demonstrations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
58. Memo of Conf with President, 11 Oct 1956, in FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 19, 369–70.
59. Weinert, History of Army Aviation, 226–31.
guidance that the United States would use atomic weapons at the outset of
a general war, and would employ them as necessary in operations short of
general war to achieve military objectives. Taylor understood the implication
of those strategic concepts to be a requirement for small, self-contained,
atomic task forces that the Army could preposition in strategic locations
and that were mobile enough to deploy to trouble spots on short notice. The
reduction in Army divisions, he believed, could help fund the creation of
these units.60
In June 1956, Taylor tasked the deputy chief of staff for military
operations with developing a concept and organization for an atomic task
force. In its subsequent briefing, the Army Staff noted four major strategic
considerations. First, atomic weapons in the form of Little John rocket
battalions would be organic to all U.S. divisions. (The Little John was the
smaller, more portable version of the Honest John rocket.) Second, the
United States would provide the bulk of atomic fire support for all allied
ground forces. Third, higher headquarters normally would allocate air
defense for the atomic task forces. Finally, by the end of 1960, four Redstone
missile battalions, thirteen Corporal missile battalions, twenty-three Honest
John battalions, and thirty-eight Little John battalions would be available as
components of the task forces.61
In construction of the task force organization, the staff identified several
tactical considerations. The task force must contain a liaison element
capable of coordinating with the supported force. Target analysis and target
acquisition would be key elements in providing effective atomic fire support.
Taylor himself reemphasized that point, suggesting that the organization
might include both ground and air reconnaissance elements, making it,
perhaps, a suitable venue for further tests on the sky cavalry concept. Given
the anticipated dispersion between fire units and supported forces, signal
communications were another important concern. As they had with the
pentomic organization, the planners considered radio communications to
be the only practical means of overcoming dispersion and distance. Finally,
although the new organization would require some integral elements for
60. Anthony Leviero, “The Paradox That is Admiral Radford,” New York Times,
5 Aug 1956; Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army,
Europe, 5 Jul 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG
319, NACP.
61. MFR, Maj. Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 5 Jul 1956, sub: Atomic
Task Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
local defense and logistical support, the supported force would have to
supply almost all of those requirements.62
After the briefing, General Taylor directed CONARC to develop detailed
organization plans for three types of atomic task forces—an airborne version
to be built around an Honest John battalion with the launchers modified so
that the unit could be air-transported more easily, a medium version to be
built around a Corporal missile battalion, and a heavy version to be built
around a Redstone missile battalion. The general delayed further action on
the heavy version of the task force until the Redstone missiles, still under
development, were ready for deployment. Work went forward in both U.S.
Army, Europe (USAREUR), and the Far East Command, testing the airborne
version of the organization. Commanders noted that, despite the best efforts
of logistics and research and development staffs, they had not yet developed
acceptable modifications of the Honest John launchers that would enable
them to be fully air-transportable.63
Despite his well-documented efforts to adapt the Army to an atomic
warfare environment, Maxwell Taylor already had begun to fashion his
strategic philosophy of “Flexible Response” for which he would gain much
more notoriety later in his career. An outline plan for guiding the development
of the future Army noted that the United States should reevaluate the extent
to which atomic weapons played a role in its war planning. “As the U.S. and
the USSR arrive at a point of atomic stand-off and mutual atomic deterrence,
the possibility that war will be non-atomic will increase,” Taylor surmised,
and “as the possibility increases that war will be non-atomic, conventional
strength will have to be increased.”64 General Taylor presented his views
to President Eisenhower in a meeting with Admiral Radford at the White
House in May. All of the attention and resources the nation had devoted to
nuclear forces, Taylor argued, had frozen out all other types of military forces,
particularly those needed to handle a small war situation. Using atomic
weapons in a local conflict would make escalation to full nuclear war more
likely. Eisenhower countered that the use of tactical atomic weapons against
military targets would be no more likely to trigger a larger war than the use
of 20-ton Blockbuster bombs had been during World War II. The carnage of
62. MFR, Harkins, 5 Jul 1956, sub: Atomic Task Forces.
63. MFR, Harkins, 5 Jul 1956, sub: Atomic Task Forces; Ltr, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
Cdr in Ch, Far East Cmd, to Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Ch Research and Development,
17 Mar 1956, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
64. Memo, Col. P. R. Walters, Ch Plans and Programs Div, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 27 Jan
1956, sub: Coordination of Outline Concept for ARDP–68, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series:
DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP; Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain
Trumpet (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959).
that war and the seemingly futile bloodletting in Korea had convinced the
president that conventional ground forces could no longer play a decisive
role in warfare and might only prolong it. He concluded the meeting by
expressing his understanding of the Army’s position and assuring Taylor
that, in the event of conflict, his service would play an important role in
maintaining public order in the United States if it were bombed.65
MAKING THE ARMY RELEVANT AGAIN
Its ongoing conflict with the Air Force had placed the Army in a position
where many believed the service was fighting for its very existence, but the
proverbial “last straw” had been the leak, in July 1956, of Admiral Radford’s
proposal for the further reduction of U.S. conventional forces by some
800,000 military personnel. More than half of them would come from the
Army, and the admiral had recommended the return to the United States
of most overseas deployments, including the divisions in Europe. To Army
leaders, most of whom had served during World War II and the Korean
War, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ’s suggestion that the remnants
of the Army might serve best as some form of home guard to maintain
order in a postapocalyptic United States was more than ludicrous. It was
downright insulting.66
As a preemptive strike, the plans section of the Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations prepared a blueprint for the chief of staff,
illustrating what an Army operating under the constraints of the Radford
Plan might look like. Perhaps overly stark in an effort to make the Army’s
case before Congress, the paper pulled no punches when identifying the
implications of such a force reduction.67 The immediate impact of Radford’s
proposal would be an automatic reduction or elimination of most overseas
deployments. The paper warned of the political implications of the nation’s
inability to meet certain commitments specified in the Baghdad Pact and
in partnerships with NATO, Japan, and Korea. In Europe, withdrawal of
U.S. forces would remove the cement from the NATO alliance. Under such
65. Memo of Conf with President, 24 May 1956, in FRUS 1955–1957, vol. 19, 311–15.
66. Leviero, “Radford’s Views Pose Basic National Security Issue”; Interv, Lt. Col. James
Shelton and Lt. Col. Edward Smith with Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., 27 Jan 1976, 374, Senior
Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
67. Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff,
20 Jun 1956, sub: Minimum Reorganization of Army Based on Budgetary Limitations
Which May Require a Reduction in Personnel Strength, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series:
DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
personnel limitations, the only remaining forward deployments would be

one division in Hawai‘i and elements of another in Alaska.68
The study predicted a reduction in the number of divisions from
nineteen in 1956 to eight by the end of 1960. In addition to the two divisions
stationed in Hawai‘i and Alaska, the remaining six would be stationed in the
continental United States. In accordance with the administration’s strategic
vision, the Army’s predominant striking power would lie in the formation
of up to twenty atomic task forces. With an average strength of 6,000, these
units would be organized around combinations of Honest John rocket and
Corporal missile battalions. The service might station as many as ten of
these task forces overseas, replacing the withdrawn divisions. The number
of supporting engineer and artillery battalions throughout the Army would
decrease considerably, although air defense units might see some increase.69
The concluding paragraphs of the study brought home important
points for members of Congress, who were probably the target audience
for the effort. Obviously, such dramatic force reductions would result in a
considerable contraction in the Army’s base structure, both at home and
overseas. Also, the reductions would require a reexamination of the reserve
force structure, as the smaller size of the active Army would not justify the
maintenance of such a large reserve force. Lastly, ongoing research and
development efforts at military and scientific installations across the United
States would have to be reexamined.70
The Army got some sense of its potential future in July when it participated
in a government-wide exercise portraying a national response to an atomic
strike. Operation Alert involved approximately sixteen government
agencies in a test of emergency procedures in the event of an enemy
attack. Although Army participants indicated that they had the required
plans in place, they complained that most participants demonstrated little
cooperation or understanding of the requirements and implications of such
an attack. They reported that the number of requests they had received from
civil authorities was insignificant as compared with those the Army had
received for actual natural disasters of much smaller scale and intensity. As
a result, Army participants had few opportunities to test their plans and
emergency capabilities.71
As the Army grappled with its diminished national security role, not all of
its public relations efforts could be described as sober reflection. Although
68. Memo, Wheeler for Ch Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Minimum Reorganization of Army.
71. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Asst Sec Army,
19 Sep 1956, sub: Final Evaluation Report of Operation Alert 1956, File Unit: Entry A1
service leaders engaged in honest reappraisals of organization, doctrine,

and military technology, other attempts to bolster the image of the Army,
particularly in the eyes of the populace, seemed a little like grasping at straws.
Late in 1955, Army Staff officers visiting the National War College noticed
four flags displayed with the national colors. Alongside flags representing
the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, stood the CONARC flag.
The War College could not display a flag representing the entirety of the
U.S. Army because there was none. Throughout its long history, the U.S.
Army never had adopted a distinguishing flag. After that visit, at the
request of Secretary Brucker, the Heraldic Branch of the Office of the
Quartermaster General presented a design that featured the seal of the War
Department in blue on a white background, accompanied by a red scroll
bearing the inscription “U.S. Army.” Separate streamers, denoting the major
engagements of the U.S. Army, would be attached to the top of the flagstaff.
Most staff sections concurred with the basic design of the flag, although the
Office of the Chief of Military History opposed the use of streamers. Maj.
Gen. Donald P. Booth, the assistant chief of staff, G–1 (Personnel), agreed,
noting that the intent of the flag was to build esprit de corps in the Army
as a whole. Using streamers earned by individual units might prevent the
flag from representing the entire service. Booth also suggested that a flag
festooned by multiple streamers might seem ostentatious when displayed
with the flags of the other services. The entire matter of streamers, General
Booth concluded, would have to be settled after the flag had been approved.
President Eisenhower approved the Army flag, with its streamers, by
executive order on 12 June 1956. Then, on 14 June, an Army color guard
unfurled the flag for the first time at Independence Hall in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, commemorating the 181st anniversary of the establishment
of the Army by the Continental Congress.72
Perhaps not entirely by coincidence, 1956 also saw the culmination of
an effort of several years to designate an official song for the Army. The
service already had adopted the melody of “The Caisson Song,” composed
in 1908 by then Lt. Edmund L. Gruber, as the tune of its official song. Then,
after sifting through 140 contributions from various individuals and Army
commands, the Adjutant General’s Office selected the song’s official lyrics.
Secretary Brucker directed that the new, official Army song, now known
as “The Army Goes Rolling Along,” would be dedicated at all U.S. Army
72. MFR, Maj. W. J. Dwyer, 17 Nov 1955, sub: Distinguishing Flag for the U.S. Army;
Memo, Maj. Gen. John Michaelis, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Sec Army, 28 Dec 1956, sub:
Presentation of Army Flags to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees; both in
The new U.S. Army flag, bearing campaign streamers dating back to
1775, waves in the breeze in the Garden of the Gods recreation area
near Fort Carson, Colorado, 1956. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
installations around the world on 11 November—Veterans Day—and that

subsequently it would be featured at all appropriate occasions throughout
the service.73
The growing popularity of television had not escaped the Army’s attention.
The service continued to lean upon its own production, The Big Picture, to
highlight its importance as a member of the larger defense community. In
October, the chief of information notified General Taylor of an upcoming
Christmas special featuring both the Army Field Band and the Army
73. “The Army Keeps Rolling Along—New Official Army Song,” Army Information Digest
12 (Jan 1957): 13–14; “Army Announces Choice of Official Song,” Army Times, 15 Sep
1956.
Chorus. The chief of staff would use the opportunity to deliver a brief holiday
greeting to the nation and to the men and women of the Army. However, not
every television program was deemed suitable for the Army leadership. In
a synopsis of current program opportunities, the Army’s Radio-Television
Branch suggested that Meet the Press and College Press Conference were most
appropriate, especially because Lawrence Spivak, the host of Meet the Press
noted for his sharp and incisive questioning, appeared to be mellowing. Face
the Nation and Youth Wants to Know were deemed less appealing because
Taylor recently had made appearances there. The branch approved of Taylor
appearing on any of the major network morning talk shows, such as NBC’s
Today show with Dave Garroway, but strongly discouraged appearances
on quiz shows like The $64,000 Question and What’s My Line? or “surprise”
documentary shows like This Is Your Life.74
To an increasing extent throughout 1956, General Taylor and members
of the Army Staff emphasized to the field the importance of selling the
Army to the public and especially to Congress. In November, General
Eddleman directed the Operations and Training Branch to produce a series
of training films that the Army could show to members of Congress and at
meetings of various civic organizations. He asked that the films highlight
new developments in Army weapons, equipment, and doctrine. Helicopters
and sky cavalry were worthy subjects, he suggested, as were shots of new
weapons firing. Secretary Brucker made similar points at the 21 November
Army Commanders’ Conference. He expected all senior leaders to establish
a rapport between their commands and members of Congress representing
their state and local areas. He explained to the assembled general officers, “In
the Army we have a magnificent product, and it is our responsibility to sell
it.”75 Further, Brucker told the chief of legislative liaison that every member
of his team must be able to promote the Army—enthusiastically—as an
aggressive, visionary force. They also must be prepared to present succinct and
forceful explanations of Army issues to members of Congress at any time.76
74. Memo, Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Public Info, for Ch Staff, 22 Oct 1956, sub: Special
Big Picture Television Program; Memo, Capt. William T. Ellington, Radio-Television
Br, for Col. [no first name given] Clifton, 6 Dec 1956, sub: Radio-Television Programs
Suitable for Appearance by Chief of Staff; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
75. Memo, Brig. Gen. John H. Michaelis, Ch Legislative Liaison, for Sec Army, 16 Nov
1956, sub: Army Commanders’ Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
76. Memo, Michaelis for Sec Army, 16 Nov 1956, sub: Army Commanders’ Conference;
Memo, Maj. Gen. John E. Theimer, Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Dir Ops and Training,
1 Nov 1956, sub: Training Film on New Concepts of Weapons, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Since the start of the Eisenhower administration, Army leaders had come
to perceive much of the service’s struggle to remain relevant as a public
relations problem. If they just could get their message out to Congress and
to the greater American public, the Army might regain its rightful position
as the cornerstone of American military policy. By the end of 1956, however,
events around the world would begin to raise suspicions that the senior
service was not obsolete after all.
THE ARMY GETS A “SWAGGER STICK”
In his memoir, President Eisenhower described the period beginning

20 October 1956 as “the most crowded and demanding three weeks of
my entire presidency.”77 That day, political leaders in Poland forced a
showdown with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev over the retention of
Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky in the Polish government. Although the
Communists were able to resolve that crisis without coming to blows, Polish
defiance inspired a similar insurrection in Hungary. This time, the Soviets
responded with ruthless force, and on 4 November, 200,000 Soviet troops
moved on Budapest. Despite pleas for assistance from resistance leaders
within Hungary, Eisenhower chose not to intervene. Given Hungary’s
proximity to the Soviet Union and the inability of Western forces to intervene
without traversing neutral or Communist countries, the president believed
he had no military options.78
Amid the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the president received intelligence
that the armed forces of Israel were mobilizing. State Department reports
revealed difficulties between Britain, France, and Egypt concerning access
to the Suez Canal. Then, on 31 October, French and British military forces
began a joint operation to seize the canal and to cooperate with Israeli
military operations against Egypt. After rapid Israeli advances into the
Sinai and the rout of defending Egyptian military forces, a U.S. cease-fire
resolution, passed by the United Nations General Assembly, brought a
77. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961 (New York:
Doubleday, 1960), 58–87.
78. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 58–87; Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army
in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center
of Military History, 2015), 250. More detailed accounts of the Hungarian uprising can be
found in Noel Barber, Seven Days of Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising 1956 (New York:
Stein and Day, 1956).
halt to the hostilities on 7 November. United Nations peacekeeping troops

entered the area a day later.79
Although Eisenhower had not considered seriously intervention by
U.S. forces into either of these crises, the Army had begun developing a
package of contingency plans for such international situations. In January,
the deputy chief of staff for operations, General Eddleman, had assigned to
the newly established CONARC the responsibility of formulating a family
of emergency movement plans that would support contingencies short
of general war. The Army Strategic Capabilities Plan for 1956 designated
the XVIII Airborne Corps as the primary element of the Strategic Army
Force and named it as the principal planning and command headquarters
under the direction of the CONARC commanding general. Eddleman
directed CONARC to coordinate with the Navy’s Logistics Plans Division,
the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command, and the Defense Department’s
Military Air Transport Command to develop plans for air- and sealift of the
designated forces.80
Guidance attached to the directive identified two contingencies as the
subjects for initial plans. The first, to be submitted by 1 June 1956, included
one airborne division and one infantry division with appropriate combat
support to be delivered by sealift and airlift to the Middle East. The proposed
mission of that force was to stabilize a volatile situation anywhere in the
Middle East or to intervene in a conflict between Iran and Iraq. The second
mission proposed a force of one airborne and two infantry divisions as an
initial combat force to stabilize the situation in Vietnam or to enter combat
operations against the Viet Minh. An alternative to that plan proposed
the possible reinforcement of Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan.81
In March, General Taylor expressed his concerns over the potential for
conflict in the Middle East and directed CONARC to develop additional
plans for airlift of one airborne regimental combat team in minimum time,
with provisions for the remainder of the division to follow. One month later,
CONARC’s commander, General Willard G. Wyman, provided the chief of
79. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 78–84; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President,
vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 347–75. More detailed accounts of the Suez
Crisis and the response of the Eisenhower administration can be found in Hugh Thomas,
Suez (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) and Cole Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis
of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995).
80. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Cmdg Gen, CONARC,
25 Jan 1956, sub: Movement of a Strategic Army Force from CONUS in Implementation
of Paragraph 32 of NSC 5501, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–
1962, RG 319, NACP.
81. Memo, Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, CONARC, 25 Jan 1956, sub: Movement of a Strategic
Army Force from CONUS.
staff with the initial details of Operation Plan Swaggerstick along with the
initial problems associated with its development. The Air Force estimated
that it could begin airlifting the force from Pope Air Force Base, North
Carolina, three days after the initial alert, with all elements delivered to
Wheelus Air Base in Libya nine days after the alert. Navy planners estimated
that they could complete movement to the Middle East in approximately
thirty days. General Wyman indicated that the primary logistical concern
was the prestocking of deployable ammunition, food, and equipment at
home installations and ports of embarkation. Shortages in personnel for the
deployable divisions also concerned the general. None of the divisions of
the XVIII Airborne Corps was at full strength, and most contained sizable
numbers of troops who had not completed initial training or who had less
than ninety days of service remaining. Wyman recommended boosting
the 82d Airborne Division to 100 percent strength and giving it the same
priority for replacements as overseas commands.82
The deputy chief of staff for operations added a new variant to the operation
in April, when he tasked the U.S. European Command with preparing plans
for the airlift of one regimental combat team from USAREUR to the Middle
East. He informed General Alfred M. Gruenther, commanding general of
the U.S. European Command, that potential missions for the unit included
the evacuation of U.S. nationals, the protection of U.S. installations, and the
provision of an independent force to terminate hostilities between Arabs
and Israelis and to restore a United Nations demarcation line. Significant
components of the additional guidance incorporated a directive that the
force would include an Honest John rocket battery and that coordination
with France, Britain, or the United Nations might be required.83
At the same time that CONARC and the U.S. European Command were
drawing up plans to deploy units to the Middle East, the Army Staff began
developing its own analysis of what an international peacekeeping operation
there might entail. The assistant chief of staff for intelligence prepared an
estimate of potential military contributions from member states in the
event that the United Nations Security Council directed intervention in
Arab-Israeli hostilities. At best, he believed that contributions from Europe
82. Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman, Cmdg Gen, CONARC, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
23 Apr 1956; Memo, Brig. Gen. David W. Gray, Dir Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep
Ch Staff Ops, 7 May 1956, sub: CONARC Plan for Movement of an Airborne Division
Force to the Middle East; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret
1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
83. Msg, Dep Ch Staff Ops to U.S. Cdr in Ch, Europe, 13 Apr 1956; Memo, Brig. Gen.
David W. Gray, Dir Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, n.d., sub: Status of USAREUR
Planning for Deployment of an RCT to the Middle East; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68,
Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
and the Middle East would total approximately 12,000 troops. Also, he
warned that the Soviet Union would be likely to match or exceed Western
contributions. Such an act would give them a foothold in the region,
outflanking the Baghdad Pact; would give increased publicity to the Soviet
theme of peaceful coexistence; and would prevent a crushing defeat of the
Soviet-equipped Egyptian forces. Assuming that the United Nations’ action
led to the cessation of hostilities, the Soviet Union then would insist on
playing a leading role in subsequent negotiations. All of those outcomes, the
intelligence officer noted, were counter to the United States’ overall interest
of preventing the expansion of Communist influence in the Middle East.84
Although the president rejected the use of American military forces in
the Suez Crisis, behind the scenes U.S. military leaders ensured that those
options were available. On 30 October, the Joint Chiefs issued orders to
the U.S. European Command to alert USAREUR for possible movement
of a regimental task force to the Middle East. Additional orders went
to CONARC to prepare one regimental combat team for movement and
to alert key personnel required to assist in the effort. Two days later, on
1 November, the deputy chief of staff for logistics ordered CONARC to bring
two regimental combat teams to full strength, to reconcile all equipment
shortages, and to begin stockpiling at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and other
posts the supplies required for the execution of Swaggerstick.85
Preparations for Army deployments continued, even as it became
apparent that their actual execution was unlikely. Army and Air Force
teams at the departure airfields submitted requisitions for crating,
chocking, and blocking materials as they prepared to load equipment.
The Army carried on with its efforts to bring supporting elements up to
full personnel strength. The Army Staff dispatched liaison officers to
CONARC and to Fort Bragg to assist with ongoing planning for the
operation. Other representatives traveled to Europe to coordinate and
plan with the Seventh Army and the 11th Airborne Division there.86
As the Suez Crisis abated and United Nations peacekeeping forces began
moving into their designated buffer zones, Army leaders conducted a series
of reviews to examine how effectively Swaggerstick plans supported
potential American deployments to the Middle East. The assessments
84. Memo, Maj. Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Dir Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff
Mil Ops, 17 Apr 1956, sub: Outline Plan for Security of Arab-Israeli Frontiers, File Unit:
85. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 13 Nov 1956,
sub: Measures Taken by the Army to Meet a Middle East Situation, File Unit: Entry A1
3-B, Series: SCGC 1947–1964, RG 335, NACP.
86. Memo, Eddleman for Ch Staff, 13 Nov 1956, sub: Measures Taken by the Army to
Meet a Middle East Situation.
affirmed that the 82d Airborne Division was the logical choice to support
the emergency deployment mission. The operations staff noted that the early
deployment mission was feasible, but further planning and modifications to
the division’s strength were required. In order to send the division out at near
100 percent strength, they said, the Army must authorize an overstrength
to compensate for the approximately 15 percent of the division’s personnel
who would be ineligible for deployment for a variety of reasons. At the same
time, they noted that a shortage of airborne-qualified personnel throughout
the Army meant that additions to the 82d might adversely affect support for
the 11th Airborne Division in Europe. Another possibility, they offered, was
to fill one regiment of the 82d with nonairborne-qualified troops, who could
participate in air landings as opposed to parachute assaults.87
The staff analysis also concluded that the Army must transfer any mission
that did not assist the division materially in achieving and maintaining a
high degree of combat readiness to another unit or installation. Deviation
from that rule would reduce the effectiveness of the division as an emergency
striking force. With that in mind, the deputy chief of staff for operations
recommended that the Army relieve the division of its mission of airborne
replacement training and also its responsibility for preparing Gyroscope
packets for the 11th Airborne Division in Europe. He also suggested that the
division should be exempted from participation in major exercises. Finally,
the analysis recommended temporarily suspending the reorganization of
the 82d to the pentomic model until another division was prepared to take
over the mission of emergency strike force.88
OWNING VIETNAM
By 1956, French interest and influence in Vietnam had declined to virtu-

ally nothing. In February, fewer than 15,000 French soldiers remained in
country, and by March, not a single French officer participated in the joint
Training Relations and Instruction Mission established the previous year.
87. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1956,
sub: Emergency Deployment of Army Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
88. Memo, Eddleman for Ch Staff, 10 Nov 1956, sub: Emergency Deployment of Army
Divisions; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff,
21 Dec 1956, sub: Reorganization of the 82d Airborne Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
The eyes of the French gov-

ernment and the French mil-
itary were solely on North
Africa. Vietnam was now an
American problem.89
In late 1955, Lt. Gen.
Samuel T. Williams replaced
Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel as
head of the Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG),
Indochina. Because the
United States had established
a separate advisory group for
Cambodia, Williams’s group
dropped Indochina from
its name and became the
MAAG, Vietnam.90
Williams’s immediate task
upon taking over the MAAG
was to gain some level of
Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams (U.S. Army, accountability over the vast
National Archives Still Picture Branch) quantities of ammunition and
equipment that the United
States had supplied to the French over the previous ten years. Although the
French retained the best of the remaining equipment and proceeded to take
it with them as they departed, they dumped thousands of tons they did not
want, much of it unserviceable, on the primitive South Vietnamese logistical
system. The 342 soldiers that composed the MAAG at the start of 1956 were
unable to deal with the flood of material while also trying to maintain a
training and advisory program for the new South Vietnamese Army. To
assist in the identification and processing of the mountains of equipment,
the United States dispatched a team of 350 soldiers to form a Temporary
Equipment Recovery Mission. In addition, the Army added forty-eight
permanent spaces to the MAAG to assist with the increased workload. In
reality, the assistance group leaders diverted most of the arriving personnel to
assist with other training missions. More than anything else, the equipment
89. Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960, United States
Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 252–54.
90. Spector, Advice and Support, 256; Richard W. Stewart, Deepening Involvement, 1945–
1965, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center
of Military History, 2012), 19.
recovery mission served as a clandestine means of expanding the advisory

group without overtly violating terms of the Geneva Accords.91
For the remainder of 1956, the subject of Vietnam remained a topic of
conversation among the various sections of the Army Staff. It was never
the highest priority, but it was always there. In January, General Taylor sent
General O’Daniel a list of questions, developed by the Defense Department’s
Office of Foreign Military Affairs, relating to his experiences in South
Vietnam. In particular, the staff wanted to understand the stability of the
Diệm government and its relationship with the South Vietnamese armed
forces. They also desired a detailed report concerning the condition and
progress of the various branches of those forces. Specific questions also
addressed applications of psychological and guerrilla warfare tactics, both
by the South Vietnamese and the Viet Minh.92
Later that year, in a memo titled “Preparations for Small War,” Taylor
asked the deputy chief of staff for military operations to develop plans for
reinforcing those countries in which the United States had established a
military mission in the event of imminent foreign aggression. He suggested
that, following augmentation of the MAAG, the Army consider insertion of
one or more small atomic task forces. Subsequent correspondence specified
that detailed studies should be conducted for Vietnam, Taiwan, Pakistan,
Iran, and Turkey. The first study Taylor wanted, by 11 July, was an estimate
of reinforcements required for the MAAG, Vietnam.93
Many ensuing discussions dealt with the logistical infrastructure in
Vietnam and the ability of the country to support military operations.
In May, Maj. Gen. Edward J. O’Neill, the acting deputy chief of staff for
logistics, requested information regarding the availability of engineer
construction equipment that the Army could provide to Vietnam and the
Philippines through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. He anticipated
a requirement to construct extensive networks of gravel roads throughout
both countries over the course of the coming five years. He recommended
that equipment for ten heavy construction battalions be made available to
91. Stewart, Deepening Involvement, 19; Memo, Charles C. Finucane, Under Sec Army, for
Vice Ch Staff, 23 Feb 1956, sub: Additional U.S. Personnel for Military Aid Functions in
Viet Nam; Memo, Lt. Gen. Walter L. Weible, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 8 Mar
1956, sub: Additional U.S. Personnel for Military Aid Functions in Viet Nam; both in File
92. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel, 10 Jan 1956, File Unit:
93. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 17 May 1956, sub:
Preparations for Small War; Memo, Brig. Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff,
26 Jun 1956, sub: Reinforcement of MAAGS; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
each country as part of future aid packages. Taylor also tasked the deputy
chief of staff for logistics with preparing a study on the logistical support the
United States would have to provide to the South Vietnamese in the event of
renewed Communist aggression and the effect this would have on materiel
reserves in the United States. In October, the logistics deputy responded that
the South Vietnamese lacked the capability to support the level of logistical
buildup required to defend against a determined Viet Minh attack from the
north. In the event that the United States did attempt to provide logistical
support, such an effort would reduce substantially its already unsatisfactory
materiel readiness. The study concluded that, even with logistical assistance,
South Vietnamese forces lacked the capability to avert total collapse within
three months without substantial allied ground support.94
THE ARMY IN 1956: TRUE TO ITS MOTTO
For the year, at least, the Army seemed to remain true to its newly acquired
motto. The service showed that it was proud of its past as it tried to remain
relevant in the national security discussions. In its weekly television and
radio presentations, through public appearances of its leadership, and in
its recruiting, the Army impressed upon the public its longtime service to
the nation. At the same time, the Army clearly was focused on its future
as it worked to fashion a force and a doctrine appropriate for the modern
age. In many ways, those efforts transcended the idea of being alert to the
organization’s future and reflected an almost desperate search for a future
that was defined more clearly. Beyond the obsession with developing an
atomic Army, however, events in Southeast Asia already were conspiring to
pull the Army and the United States in that direction.
94. Memo, Maj. Gen. Edward J. O’Neill, Acting Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Vice Ch
Staff, 20 Jun 1956, sub: Engineer Construction Equipment for MDAP; Memo, Brig. Gen.
William C. Westmoreland, Sec Gen Staff, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 19 Oct 1956, sub:
Logistical Capability to Support Allies in Small Wars; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
5
1957: The Year of the Missile
In January 1957, the Army announced the pending court-martial investiga-

tion of Col. John C. Nickerson Jr., chief of the Field Coordination Office of the
Army Ballistic Missile Agency at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama.
The Army had accused Nickerson of passing to various media reporters three
classified documents describing the Army–Air Force conflict over control of
ballistic missiles. The colonel had been particularly incensed at Secretary of
Defense Charles E. Wilson’s decision to limit Army missiles to a range of
200 miles and to give operational control of the Jupiter missile to the Air
Force. Columnists dubbed the trial another Billy Mitchell case, accusing the
Army of scapegoating an officer for criticizing the administration’s military
policy. Despite the theatrics, the court found Nickerson guilty and sen-
tenced him to a one-year suspension in rank, a substantial fine, and an of-
ficial reprimand for mishandling classified information. Although the case
never caught the public’s eye as much as Mitchell’s case had, it did serve as a
reminder of the extent to which the technology of the missile age had come
to dominate military policy.1
Developments in the field of missile technology dominated 1957 more
than any other year during the Eisenhower administration. Despite Secretary
1. Jack Raymond, “Clash of Services on Missiles Looms,” New York Times, 24 Feb 1957; Ben
Isaacs, “Nickerson Suspended in Rank for Year, Fined,” Washington Post, 30 Jun 1957; Memo,
Maj. Gen. Guy S. Meloy, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 1 Jul 1957, sub: Press reaction to Nickerson
Case Verdict, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence,
Wilson’s efforts to settle interservice differences the previous year, the Army
and the Air Force maintained their competition to develop intermediate-
range ballistic missiles. The Army’s Jupiter program and the Air Force’s Thor
program both moved toward operational status by the end of the decade. In
addition, Air Force scientists had begun work on Atlas, an intercontinental
ballistic missile, and the Navy’s Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile
program also was well underway. In the field of surface-to-air missiles, the
Army’s Nike Hercules neared deployment as the service continued work
on its antimissile version, the Nike Zeus. Air Force efforts to develop and
deploy their Bomarc air interceptor missile also moved forward.2
On 4 October, the Soviets provided a stark reminder that they, too, were
participants in the missile race when they launched the first artificial satellite
into orbit. The successful deployment of Sputnik also demonstrated the
Soviets’ clear capability to produce a ballistic missile with intercontinental
range. Although the Eisenhower administration tried to play down the
significance of the launch, its implications were clear. The news media and
the American public soon seized upon the perception of a “missile gap”
between the two superpowers. The launch of Sputnik and the public outcry
it raised helped to initiate a reappraisal of many of the assumptions upon
which New Look had been based. While 1957 was truly a year of the missile,
events would suggest that it also was time to consider strategic alternatives.3
THE NEW LOOK ENTERS A SECOND TERM
As he began his second term as president, Dwight D. Eisenhower remained

firmly committed to the principles for national defense that he had established
during his first term. In a 1 January 1957 diary entry, he noted, “Unless there
is some technical or political development that I do not foresee—or a marked
inflationary trend in the economy (which I will battle to the death)—I will
not approve any obligational or expenditure authorities for the Defense
Department that exceed something on the order of the $38.5 billion mark.”4
2. Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs
of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960, vol. 7 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History,
2000), 43.
3. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 43; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging
Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 205–7.
4. Diary, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1 Jan 1957, in The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed.
Louis Galambos, 21 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001),
vol. 17, 2471.
1957: THE YEAR OF THE MISSILE 191
The administration rallied around that figure as the services began budget
estimates for the upcoming three years. Initially, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, had each service chief list the
minimum forces he considered necessary to perform essential tasks. This
resulted in a projected budget of $52–55 billion per year, clearly unacceptable
to the president. Radford then had each service prepare an estimate based
upon Eisenhower’s stated ceiling and an assumption that each service would
receive the same percentage of the total that it had received in the previous
budget. That effort also failed because, in Radford’s opinion, it did not
support the strategic goals of the administration.5
In his comments to the secretary of defense, Radford complained that the
Army had persisted in basing its estimates upon the large-scale use of U.S.
ground forces in peripheral wars. He asked Wilson to reassert to the chiefs
that the United States would employ atomic weapons at the outset of any
general war and would use them as necessary in peripheral wars to achieve
military objectives. Radford also reaffirmed his understanding that it was
U.S. national policy to reduce U.S. overseas deployments, particularly those
in Europe, as soon as possible. In April, the admiral recommended to the
secretary a reduction of Army personnel from just under one million troops
in 1957 to 700,000 by 1961. Its eighteen divisions could be reduced to eleven,
and its air defense battalions from one hundred to eighty. He suggested
reductions in the other services as well, but on a smaller scale.6
In July, Radford presented his recommendations again to the secretary.
Although his proposed personnel numbers remained virtually the same as
those he had presented in April, he expounded at length on his interpretations
of the administration’s defense policies. Given the fixed ceiling Eisenhower
had approved for future budgets, the admiral believed that it was more
important to modernize forces than to maintain high levels of personnel.
He pointed out that the use of atomic weapons in the initial stages of general
war negated the need for a large strategic reserve of ground forces in the
United States. He also questioned the reliance on continental air defense
against atomic attacks. He suggested instead that the money should be spent
on early-warning and retaliatory forces. Although the reductions in Army
strength were not quite as stark as the proposed cut to 550,000 that the
5. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31–33.

6. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31–33; Memo, Chairman’s Study
Gp for Adm. [Arthur W.] Radford, 23 Apr 1957, sub: JSOP–61; Memo, Adm. [Arthur W.]
Radford for Sec Def, 25 Apr 1957, sub: Formulation of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan; both
in File Unit: Entry UD 50, Series: Chairman’s Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup:
Records of the Chairman, RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP.
media had reported the previous year, Radford’s proposals mirrored quite
closely the major points of the Radford Plan of 1956.7
Later that month, Secretary Wilson presented the president and the
National Security Council with his recommendations for the defense
program for the next three fiscal years. He adopted most of Radford’s
proposals, and his personnel numbers closely resembled those of the
chairman’s earlier submission. The total defense budget came in under the
president’s $38 billion ceiling. Eisenhower approved the budget proposals
for both 1958 and 1959 and warned that Congress and the American public
might require even greater reductions in the future.8
It did not take long for all three services to begin protesting what they
considered draconian defense cuts. Each service had friendly media contacts
who were only too happy to help air grievances. In August, the New York
Times reported that military leaders had grown particularly incensed at the
administration’s assertions that the economy measures had not adversely
affected the country’s military power. Initial Army reductions would
include an infantry division, eighteen antiaircraft battalions, sixteen depots,
and 15,000 civilian jobs. One unnamed Army official indicated that talks
were underway to close posts such as Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort
Gordon, Georgia; Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; and Fort Carson, Colorado. Army
Secretary Wilber M. Brucker gave Secretary Wilson a list of the actions the
Army would have to take to meet the 1958 expenditure limits. This included
eliminating one division, two out of six missile commands, and thirty-six
air defense battalions, along with cutbacks in two divisions. In order to
preserve combat units, the Army would have to make sharp reductions in
administrative, logistical, and other special activities.9
President Eisenhower’s second term of office brought on some significant
turnover in the leadership of the American military establishment. In
March, the president had nominated Air Force Chief of Staff General
Nathan F. Twining to replace Admiral Radford as the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs. Radford had announced his retirement upon the expiration
of his second term in August 1957. When he was sworn in on 15 August,
General Twining brought a thoroughly Air Force interpretation to most
7. Memo, Adm. [Arthur W.] Radford for Sec Def, 16 Jul 1957, sub: Force Tabs for JSOP
61, File Unit: Entry UD 50, Series: Chairman’s Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup:
Records of the Chairman, RG 218, NACP.
9. Jack Raymond, “Defense Cuts Stir Service Protests,” New York Times, 25 Aug 1957;
Memo, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker for Sec Def, 23 Sep 1957, sub: Actions Necessary to
Remain Within an Expenditure Level of $8.95 Billion for FY 1958 and Military Personnel
Reductions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
of the issues facing the Joint

Chiefs, but he proved to be
less confrontational and more
collegial than his predecessor
in his dealings with his fellow
chiefs. Far more than Radford,
Twining was willing to
include dissenting arguments
and discussions as part of
deliberations and papers the
Joint Chiefs sent forward to the
secretary of defense. General
Thomas D. White replaced
Twining as Air Force Chief of
Staff. White had served in the
Pacific theater during World
War II and had been the Air
Force Vice Chief of Staff
since 1953.10
General Nathan F. Twining (U.S. Air The biggest change in the
Force, National Archives Still Picture defense establishment came
Branch) in August when Secretary
Wilson submitted his letter
of resignation to the president. Almost immediately, Eisenhower nominated
Neil H. McElroy to be the next secretary of defense. The president of the Procter
& Gamble Company, McElroy had earned praise while serving as chairman of
the White House Conference on Education in 1956. Although he briefly faced
questions regarding a financial portfolio heavy in defense industry stocks, the
nominee had little difficulty obtaining congressional confirmation. He proved to
be a quick study, particularly in the intricate details of the various missile
programs under development. Although he had little patience for General
Maxwell D. Taylor’s ideas regarding limited war, the new secretary did agree
to reassess limitations put on the Army’s missile program by his predecessor.11
10. Jack Raymond, “Twining to Replace Radford as Chairman of Joint Chiefs,” New York
Times, 27 Mar 1957; “Twining Becomes First Airman to Head Joint Chiefs,” New York
Times, 16 Aug 1957; Donald A. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” Journal of
Military History 71, no. 4 (Oct 2007): 1192.
11. Jack Raymond, “McElroy is Named to Wilson’s Post,” New York Times, 8 Aug 1957;
James Reston, “McElroy: The Man Who . . . ,” New York Times, 21 Nov 1957; Jack Raymond,
“U.S. Reconsiders its 200-Mile Limit on Army Missiles,” New York Times, 1 Dec 1957.
The Soviet launch of Sputnik 1 on 4 October, followed by the launch of

a second satellite on 3 November, prompted second thoughts about the
administration’s New Look defense policies and, in particular, the doctrine
of massive retaliation. The launch of the first satellite raised an immediate
uproar in the media and in Congress. California Senator William F.
Knowland appeared on the CBS television program Face the Nation, where
he called for a bipartisan defense review that would assess responsibility
for the American failure and begin plans for the future. Representative Earl
Wilson from Indiana renewed an earlier proposal to establish a “West Point
of the sciences,” to develop scientists and engineers.12 An editorial in the
Army Times blamed outgoing Secretary Wilson for years of underfunded
military budgets and suggested he had left town just in the nick of time to
avoid having to answer to his critics.13
The second Sputnik launch deepened public concern. Secretary McElroy
met with senior members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to
reassure them that U.S. missile programs were moving forward as rapidly
as possible. Eisenhower himself sent a note to McElroy suggesting that
he would rescind an earlier ban on overtime work in missile production
if that might help speed up production of an American satellite. Defense
Department officials accelerated both the Navy’s Vanguard and the Army’s
Jupiter missile programs in hopes of matching the Soviet feat before the end
of the year.14
Others considered the implications of the Soviet missile launches from
a different perspective. The ability to place a satellite into orbit clearly
demonstrated that the Soviets could deliver a warhead to any target in the
continental United States. The publication of Henry A. Kissinger’s book
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in the autumn of 1957 suggested that
the rise of nuclear parity between the two superpowers would degrade
the effectiveness of massive retaliation as a deterrent to lesser aggressions
and provocations by the Soviet Union. An article by Edward Teller in an
October edition of This Week magazine, though intended to support
reliance upon atomic weapons, proposed a system of underground shelters
so that an atomic exchange would not kill everyone. The discussion of
mitigating casualties—later satirized in Stanley Kubrick’s motion picture Dr.
12. Allen Drury, “President Calls McElroy for Talk on Missiles Lag,” New York Times,
14 Oct 1957.
13. Drury, “President Calls McElroy for Talk”; “Sign in the Sky,” Army Times, 12 Oct 1957.
14. John W. Finney, “It’s No Surprise,” New York Times, 4 Nov 1957; Ltr, President [Dwight
D.] Eisenhower to Sec Def Neil H. McElroy, 17 Oct 1957, in Galambos, Papers of Dwight
David Eisenhower, vol. 18, 496.
Strangelove (1964)—raised uncomfortable questions about military strategy

dependent upon atomic weapons.15
The stark analysis of atomic war once more raised discussions regarding
the concept of limited war. In July 1956, Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, General Alfred M. Gruenther had briefed Secretary Wilson and
Admiral Radford that a successful defense of Western Europe had come
to depend “irreversibly” on the use of atomic weapons.16 Without them, he
advised, Soviet forces might advance to the English Channel in a matter of
weeks. He added a warning, however, that U.S. allies in Europe had been
slow to accept the “atomic concept.”17 In September 1957, a detailed study
prepared by the Plans Division of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations noted that atomic weapons had not prevented brutal Soviet
suppression of uprisings in Hungary and would be unlikely to deter similar
interventions in East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Only a strong American
military presence, they concluded, might prevent the Soviets from such
interventions. They also suggested that U.S. covert operations might be
useful in aiding Eastern European uprisings, although that would make
a decision to intervene easier for the Soviets. The publication of another
seminal work from the academic community, Limited War: The Challenge to
American Strategy by Robert E. Osgood, contributed to a resurgence in the
debate. In his book, Osgood asked how a nation could employ military force
in the pursuit of its national goals when the price of nuclear conflict was so
high. The answer, he believed, lay in the development of a strategic policy of
limited war.18
The turnover in the leadership within the Defense Department and the
launch of the Soviet satellites helped to perpetuate challenges to Eisenhower’s
New Look. Although still staunch supporters of the president’s policies,
15. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17–18; Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear
Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957); Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman,
Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 6 Jun 1957, sub: Army Position on the “Force Concept”
of Organization; Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff,
21 Oct 1957, sub: Article by Dr. Edward Teller, This Week Magazine, 13 October 1957; both
in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
16. Msg, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther to Sec Def, 2 Jul 1956, File Unit: Entry UD 50, Series,
Chairman’s Files, Admiral Arthur Radford, Subgroup: Records of the Chairman, RG 218,
NACP.
17. Memo, Director, Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 23 Sep 1957, sub: Implications
of Military Operations in Germany and Czechoslovakia, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series:
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956–1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top
Secret 1956–1962), RG 319, NACP.
18. “U.S. Strategy Cited,” New York Times, 13 Nov 1957; Msg, Gruenther to Sec Def, 2 Jul
1956; Memo, Director, Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 23 Sep 1957, sub: Implications of
Military Operations in Germany and Czechoslovakia; Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The
Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
both General Twining and Secretary McElroy proved to be less dogmatic

than their predecessors and without their apparent dislike for the Army
leadership. The satellites dispelled notions of American technical superiority
and initiated animated discussions on the perceived missile gap. In the wake
of Sputnik, President Eisenhower agreed to support some limited budget
increases. The possibility of an approaching nuclear parity between the
superpowers prompted more serious consideration of conflict below the
level of general war. As one historian noted, 1957 marked the apogee of the
New Look.19
IMPLEMENTING THE PENTOMIC ARMY
In accordance with the president’s mandated force reductions, the Army had
planned to cut its total strength to 950,000 by the end of 1957 and to 900,000
by the middle of 1958. Under pressure for even deeper cuts before the end
of the year, the service lowered the manpower ceiling to 929,000 by the end
of December 1957. Because of the early release of many enlisted soldiers
before the Christmas holidays, the service reached a total of 918,000 by
December 31. The reduced personnel levels allowed the Army to discharge
44,200 low aptitude soldiers, but also required the involuntary separation of
2,130 officers.20
Inevitably, the drastic cuts in personnel required the Army to realign
its force structure. In the Far East, the United States agreed to withdraw
all ground combat troops from Japan. While the Army reassigned most of
the troops in Japan, the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division moved to Korea,
where they replaced those of the 24th Infantry Division. Rather than being
inactivated, the flag of the 24th Infantry moved to Germany, where that
organization would replace the 11th Airborne Division later in the following
year. In the United States, the Army inactivated the 5th Infantry Division at
Fort Ord, California, and reduced the 1st Armored Division to one combat
command at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the 2d Infantry Division to two battle
groups in Alaska. The Army conducted only one Gyroscope rotation in
1957, with the 4th Armored Division moving from Fort Hood, Texas, to
Germany and exchanging places with the 2d Armored Division. By the end
of the year, the Army was left with fifteen divisions: V and VII Corps with
the 3d and 4th Armored, the 8th and 10th Infantry, and the 11th Airborne
of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1 to December 31, 1957
CANADA
FORT LEWIS
FORT CARSON 101 ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT CAMPBELL
XVIII CORPS
82 D AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT BRAGG
3 D INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT BENNING
25 TH INFANTRY DIVISION 1 ST ARMORED DIVISION

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS III CORPS
4 TH ARMORED DIVISION FORT POLK
FORT HOOD
HAWAII
1:20,000,000
UNION OF U.S. ARMY CORPS AND DIVISIONS

SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS UN ITED S TATES
C
December 1957
A
2 D INFANTRY DIVISION MEXICO
N
Unit Location
1957: THE YEAR OF THE MISSILE
FORT RICHARDSON
A
0 100 200 300 400 500
D
ALASKA
A
Miles
1:45,300,000
197
Map 4

G E R MA NY
DENMARK
December 1957
Unit Location
0 150 Miles
N O R T H
0 150 Kilometers
S E A
POLAND
DS
AN
RL
BERLIN
HE
ET
N
BELGIUM
V CORPS
3 D ARMORED DIVISION PRAGUE
FRANKFURT
LUXEMBOURG 10 TH INFANTRY DIVISION

8 TH INFANTRY DIVISION WÜRZBURG
BAD KREUZNACH C Z E C H O S LO VA K I A
4 TH ARMORED DIVISION
GÖPPINGEN
VII CORPS 11 TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

MÖHRINGEN AUGSBURG
FRANCE
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
Map 5
Divisions in Germany; I Corps with the 1st Cavalry and the 7th Infantry
Divisions in Korea and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i; and the III
and XVIII Corps with the 2d Armored, the 1st, 3d, 4th, and 9th Infantry,
and the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions in the continental United States.21
(See Maps 4, 5, and 6.)
In addition to reducing the number of active divisions, the Army also
took a hard look at its infrastructure, considering what installations it
could most readily afford to close down. Director of Installations Maj. Gen.
Keith R. Barney recommended that the service inactivate the major troop
posts of Forts Chaffee, Jackson, and Gordon, as well as Camp Wolters in
Texas. He also suggested phasing down Fort Carson to provide support for
only one battle group. Both General Taylor and Secretary Brucker balked
at closing so many of the Army’s major training facilities. After some
consideration, they agreed to limit operations at each of those locations
as well as at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Although that would generate
an estimated annual savings of $18 million, it also would retain all of
those installations in the active inventory and available when the need for
mobilization arose. At the same time, the secretary agreed to a program that
would inactivate sixteen separate depots, storage activities, arsenals, plants,
and hospitals.22
After the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) completed the
tables of organization for the new pentomic infantry and armored divisions,
the Army announced, in January 1957, that it would begin reorganization
within the next three months and complete the process for all of its divisions
within the next eighteen months. On 28 February, General Taylor met
with Army school commandants to sell them on the new organization and
doctrine. He observed that the modern Army had to be prepared to fight
both a conventional and a nuclear war and expressed his belief that the new
divisions could meet both challenges.23
Despite some objections from unit commanders, the conversion
proceeded quickly. Although the president and the Department of Defense
had prohibited the Army from publicly identifying which units would be
the first to transform, news reports correctly speculated that the 1st Infantry
Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i
would be the most likely candidates. In Europe, the 11th Airborne was the
21. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jul–31 Dec
1957, 23; John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate
1998), 279; “Indianhead to Drop From Rolls November 8,” Army Times, 5 Oct 1957; Memo,
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Under Sec Army, 20 Aug 1957, sub: U.S. Army Forces
in Alaska, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
22. Memo, Maj. Gen. Keith R. Barney, Director of Installations, for Sec Gen Staff, 20 Aug
1957, sub: Information for Report to General Taylor, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
UC. SH. I A
N RAM Y C O R P S A N D D I V I S I O N S
S O U T H KO R E A
December 1957
Unit Location SEA OF JAPAN
0 120 Miles
KOREA BAY
0 120 Kilomaters
ARMISTICE LINE
NORTH KOREA
TONGDUCHON
I CORPS
UIJONBU
SEOUL
1 ST CAVALRY DIVISION
TONGU
SOUTH KOREA
YELLOW SEA
Koje-do
T
I
A
R
T
S
A
E
R
O
K
Cheju-do
J A PA N
Map 6
first to convert, followed by the 8th and 10th Infantry Divisions and the
3d Armored Division. The 2d and 4th Armored Divisions had completed
most of their transformation before they began their Gyroscope rotation
in November. In the United States, the 1st Armored Division and the 4th
Infantry Division were next to reorganize, followed by the 3d and 9th
Infantry and the 82d Airborne Divisions. In Korea, the 7th Infantry Division
and the 1st Cavalry Division completed their transformation as part of the
unit transfer with the 24th Infantry Division. By the end of 1957, all of the
Army’s fifteen divisions had completed or were in the final stages of the
conversion to the pentomic model.24
As the Army reorganized, it adopted the Combat Arms Regimental
System for the infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery branches’ unit lineages.
Regiments with long histories of battles and campaigns traditionally had
been the basic elements of the branches and essential to unit esprit de
corps. The new pentomic structure with battle groups in place of regiments
and battalions threatened to destroy these traditions. Secretary Brucker
solved this issue on 24 January 1957 when he approved the Combat Arms
Regimental System. Under this system, most regiments would no longer
exist as tactical units but only as tradition-maintaining “parent” elements
of battle groups, battalions, or company-sized units that shared the parent
regiment’s honored past.25
The Army had begun testing the pentomic organization as soon as the
prototype unit, the 101st Airborne Division, had completed its activation
late in 1956. Exercise Jump Light, which had begun in October 1956 and
ran through March 1957, provided commanders with the opportunity to
evaluate company-sized elements and then battle groups, before conducting
field training with the entire division. Then, beginning in late March, the
101st, along with the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions, participated
in Exercise King Cole, a command post exercise intended to test the ability
of commanders and staffs to control and coordinate actions of the widely
dispersed elements of a pentomic organization. Almost one third of the
troops participating in the exercise were signal troops, as testing the complex
communications network was another important goal of the maneuver. The
participants experimented with ultrahigh frequency and microwave radio-
telephone networks because the dispersion and wide-ranging maneuvers of
the pentomic units made conventional wire communications obsolete. Staff
sections also employed closed-circuit television to broadcast activities in the
operations room of the exercise headquarters to other commanders and staff
sections participating in the exercise. From King Cole, the 1st Armored
Division swung right into Exercise Sledge Hammer, where it continued
24. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Three Divisions to Re-Form,” Army Times, 5 Jan 1957;
Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the
Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 271–73; Ingo W.
Trauschweizer, The Cold War U.S. Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2008), 92; “Additional Divisions Reorganized for Atomic
Capability,” Army Information Digest 12 (Jun 1957): 10.
combat-readiness evaluations as well as additional tests of the sky cavalry

concept and tactical resupply.26
In Europe, the divisions of the Seventh Army also took to the field to
experiment with the new organization and the tactics and doctrine that went
along with it. Right away, commanders noted the lack of support elements
that they had always associated with the division level. Armor officers in the
separate tank battalions of the infantry divisions reported that the division
lacked the ammunition and fuel-hauling capacity that their units required.
Unit commanders also complained that much of the communications
equipment and improved personnel carriers necessary to coordinate the
dispersed battle groups in an atomic environment were not yet available.
From their point of view, the pentomic reorganization appeared to present
more problems than it solved.27
Many of the concerns Army leaders had regarding the new concepts
and organizations seemed apparent during the early tests. In response to
General Taylor’s worries about the advanced communications equipment
necessary to link the dispersed battle groups and divisions, Deputy Chief
of Research and Development Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood reported that new
transistorized vehicular and portable equipment would soon be available
for command net radios. He noted, however, that transistors currently in
production were still of relatively low power. Although the development
of newer equipment was ahead of schedule, he did not expect test models
until 1958 and the capacity for troop issue until 1960. On a trip to Europe
in September, General Taylor observed that the infantry divisions seemed
to lack personnel with some of the special skills the new equipment and
division structures would require. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations reported that the pentomic infantry division required forty-
six military occupational specialties that had not appeared in the older
formation. Of these, nineteen required school training, including instruction
for helicopter pilots, aviation mechanics, radar and infrared equipment
operators, and Honest John personnel. The remaining twenty-seven
specialties, although new to the infantry division, could be learned on the job.28
26. Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Sherburne, “Reorganizing the 101st Airborne,” Army Information
Digest 12 (Jun 1957): 13–23; Screaming Eagles: 101st Airborne (Nashville, TN: Benson
Printing Company, 1957), 140–41; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Atom War Games End 2d Phase;
New Concepts are Being Tested,” New York Times, 4 Apr 1957; “Exercise King Cole to
Test Latest Communications Gear,” Army Times, 28 Mar 1957; “Mobile TV to Speed King
Cole Map Play,” Army Times, 23 Mar 1957; “1st Armored Division Starts Exercise Sledge
Hammer,” Army Times, 27 Apr 1957.
27. Carter, Forging the Shield, 271–74; Trauschweizer, Cold War U.S. Army, 89–96.
28. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert J. Wood, Dep Ch Research and Development, for Sec Gen
Staff, 20 Nov 1957, sub: Development of Tactical Communications Equipment; Memo, Col.
Even while staffing the original concepts for the pentomic divisions,
many officers had noted the lack of balance in the rank structure. In the
infantry and airborne divisions, company commanders, normally captains,
reported directly to battle group commanders, who were full colonels.
This created a sizable gap between the two command levels, eliminated a
significant amount of experience and expertise from the leadership chain,
and left no command opportunities for infantry lieutenant colonels. In
considering the problem, CONARC recommended that majors command
infantry rifle companies and eight-piece artillery batteries, with captains
serving as executives. Infantry lieutenant colonels would serve as battle
group executives and, in that position, would receive many opportunities to
exercise command. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lt. Gen. Donald P.
Booth suggested offering command positions in noninfantry combat arms
battalions to infantry lieutenant colonels, but that possibility was contested
strongly by both CONARC and the deputy chief of staff for operations. All
involved agreed that the issue required further study and, in the meantime,
division reorganizations should proceed on schedule.29
Although almost all of the attention regarding the transition to the
pentomic organization had focused on the active force, some Army leaders
addressed the issue of keeping reserve component units up to date. In
October, CONARC directed commanders of reserve component units to
initiate training in pentomic doctrine and concepts, based upon the most
recent releases of the Army Training Plan. Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve
Components Maj. Gen. Phillip D. Ginder responded that reserve component
units would begin training to the extent that their facilities, personnel, and
equipment would permit. Although armored units would be able to comply
with the new guidance to a great extent, training within infantry units would
be limited until they could reorganize and receive equipment necessary for
the pentomic conversion. Ginder noted that reserve service schools and
ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps) instruction also would incorporate
the doctrines and techniques of the pentomic concept.30
With the effort to implement the pentomic concept barely underway, the
Army also initiated a program to conceptualize a force of a more distant
Stephen O. Fuqua Jr., Dep Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for
Ch Staff, 20 Sep 1957, sub: New Specialists for the Pentomic Infantry Division; both in File
29. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 27 Feb 1957,
sub: Rank Structure in New Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
30. Training Memo 17, Maj. Gen. Stanhope B. Mason, Ch Staff, Continental Army Cmd,
7 Oct 1957, sub: Reserve Component Training—Pentomic Doctrine and Concepts; Memo,
Maj. Gen. Phillip D. Ginder, Asst Ch Staff Reserve Components, for Vice Ch Staff, 5 Dec
future. At the end of 1956, CONARC established the U.S. Army Combat
Development Experimentation Center at Fort Ord with a staff of forty-four
officers, ten enlisted soldiers, and fifteen civilian scientists. The center had the
run of a quarter of a million acres, spanning the Fort Ord–Camp Roberts–
Fort Hunter Liggett military reservation, to test and evaluate concepts,
organizations, and doctrine for future combat. The 10th Infantry, of the 5th
Infantry Division, served as experimental troops for a wide range of tests.
General Willard G. Wyman, the CONARC commander, enthusiastically
proclaimed to General Taylor that experiments there would build upon the
pentomic organization to produce a rapid deployment and quick reaction
force for the 1960s. Central to the center’s mission would be the continued
reduction of personnel and expansion of weaponry. A pet project was the
“Mobile Forces” concept, a 190-soldier mini–battle group that included a
tank platoon, a rifle platoon, a weapons platoon, a mortar platoon, and a
reconnaissance platoon. Leading this organization was a group of ten officers,
all lieutenants, with the rifle platoon leader acting as the force commander.31
THE ARMY EMBRACES THE MISSILE AGE
Throughout the first half of 1957, the Army and the Air Force continued
their parallel development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles as if
Secretary Wilson had never intervened. Although Army leaders acquiesced
to Wilson’s redefinition of service roles and missions, they continued to chafe
over range limitations the secretary had placed upon missiles he allowed
them to develop and employ. In testimony before a House Appropriations
subcommittee in May, the Army’s chief of research and development, Lt.
Gen. James M. Gavin, called the limitations inhibitory and unrealistic.
Wilson responded in August by directing the two services to merge the
competing Thor and Jupiter missile programs into a single weapon system.
He appointed a panel of three, including Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris from
the Army, Maj. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever from the Air Force, and William
H. Holaday from his own office, to combine the best features of each system.
The announcement from the secretary’s office gave no indication of a name
1957, sub: Modernization of Reserve Component Training Programs; both in File Unit:
31. Ltrs, Gen. Willard G. Wyman, to Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 1 May 1957 and 18 Jul 1957,
File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Brig.
Gen. Frederick W. Gibb, “Developing Tomorrow’s Army Today,” Army Information Digest
12 (Jun 1957): 24–33.
for the composite missile-to-be, but many in the Pentagon had already
dubbed the project the “Thupiter.”32
After two months of testing, the committee was no closer to selecting a
prototype than it had been at the start. Although both missiles had flown
at least one successful test launch, civilian defense officials opted for the
Army approach of testing each component individually, rather than basing a
contract upon test flight results only. In October, Holaday recommended to
new Defense Secretary McElroy that he delay a decision until further testing
established “a better technical basis.”33
The successful launch of two Soviet satellites in October and November
settled the debate. Immediately following a closed-door session with the
Senate Preparedness Committee in which Central Intelligence Agency
Director Allen W. Dulles had proclaimed the Soviet lead over the Americans
in missile technology a “sad and shocking story,” McElroy authorized
production of both missiles. Although neither was fully developed, the
authorization would permit installing the systems in Britain by the end
of 1958 and elsewhere in Europe soon afterward. In December, General
Medaris informed General Taylor that the Army Ballistic Missile Command
had received firm orders to launch American satellites using modified
Redstone missiles in 1958.34
Throughout 1957, the Army and Air Force also continued their
competition over the development of surface-to-air missiles for the defense
of the continental United States. At that time, only the Army had deployed its
Nike Ajax missile system, defending cities, Strategic Air Command airbases,
and Atomic Energy Commission sites from twenty-four separate locations.
The Ajax system was limited in range, however, and lacked the capability
to defend against missiles or supersonic bombers. All three services had
more advanced systems under development, most notably the Army Nike
Hercules, scheduled for deployment in 1958, and the Air Force’s Bomarc,
scheduled for deployment in 1960. Both offered full coverage against
subsonic bombers and limited coverage against supersonic aircraft, although
the Bomarc possessed a slightly greater range. The two services continued
to snipe at each other throughout the year, before Congress and in the press.
32. “Army Complains on Limited Role,” New York Times, 3 May 1957; John G. Norris,
“Wilson Orders Quick Merger of Jupiter and Thor Missiles,” Washington Post, 14 Aug 1957.
33. “McElroy Puts Off Missiles Choice,” New York Times, 11 Oct 1957; “Jupiter vs. Thor Tests
to Continue,” Army Times, 19 Oct 1957.
34. Jack Raymond, “McElroy Orders Thor and Jupiter Into Production,” New York Times,
28 Nov 1957; Memo, Col. Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Dec
1957, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff ’s Trip, 5–10 December 1957; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Hercules missiles in Homestead, Florida, belonging to Battery D,

2d Missile Battalion, 52d Artillery (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
Development continued on both systems, however, as they came closer
to deployment.35
The looming threat of Soviet intercontinental missiles provided General
Taylor with the opportunity to publicize the Army’s work on an antimissile
missile, the Nike Zeus. With a projected speed twice that of the existing
surface-to-air missiles and a capability to mount a thermonuclear warhead,
the Zeus seemed to offer a realistic possibility for countering the enemy
missile threat. Taylor urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of defense,
and President Eisenhower to make an all-out effort to expedite this developing
system. He asked for a three-year commitment of $6–7 billion. Predictably,
the Air Force quickly mounted a counter campaign, questioning not only
the cost of the program, but also its susceptibility to countermeasures such
as jamming or spoofing. Conflicts over the missile’s development raised
35. MFR, Lt. Col. Richard Irvin Jr., Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops Surface-to-Air Missile Div, 6 Nov
1957, sub: Briefing for Chief of Staff on Effectiveness of BOMARC and Air Force Reclama
for a BOMARC Site at Fort Dix; Memo, Maj. [no first name given] Everett, Ofc Sec Gen
Staff, for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 8 Nov 1957, sub: BOMARC Fact Sheet; both in File
Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept.
of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jul–31 Dec 1957, 92.
The Army’s newest test model, the Nike Zeus, launches successfully
at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. (U.S. Army, National
anew all of the old arguments regarding roles and missions that Defense
Department officials thought they had resolved the previous year.36
Other Army research and development projects continued with varying
degrees of success. The Hawk surface-to-air missile, which the Army had
designed to supplement the Nike system with coverage against low-flying
aircraft, neared completion of its testing and seemed to be on track to be ready
for deployment sometime within 1958. Once deployed, Hawk battalions
would also serve as field army assets, providing air defense coverage in the
battle area. The development of surface-to-surface rockets was proving to be
somewhat less successful. The Honest John, which the Army had deployed
36. James Reston, “Army Plan Seeks 6 Billion to Make A Missile Killer,” New York Times,
20 Nov 1957.
Soldiers of Battery C, 6th Missile Battalion, 65th Artillery, work on a

Hawk missile and launcher in Key West, Florida. (U.S. Army, National
to the field since 1954, had proven to be highly inaccurate, particularly with
regard to height of burst. It was bulky and had limited air transportability.
The Army was close to deploying a successor, the Little John, which was
smaller and more transportable, but it, too, was wildly inaccurate in
testing. More accurate was the Lacrosse, but it was still a year or two away
from deployment.37
Perhaps the Army’s least productive efforts were those devoted to
developing an effective antitank weapon for use by the infantry. The service
had spent several years on a wire-guided missile labeled the Dart. Even
though its warhead could penetrate almost all known armor plating, it was
inaccurate and difficult to control. The assistant commandant of the Infantry
School, Brig. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen, told General Taylor that the Dart was
simply no good. As an alternative, the Army had begun to consider purchase
of a French missile, the SS10, as an interim replacement.38
37. “Mobile Hawk to Give Army New Low Altitude AA Weapon,” Army Times, 15 Jun 1957;
Memo, Palmer for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Dec 1957, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff ’s Trip;
National Military Program Fact Book, Surface-to-Surface Missiles, n.d., File Unit: Entry A1
38. Memo, Palmer for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Dec 1957, sub: Report of the Chief of Staff ’s Trip;
National Military Program Fact Book, Surface-to-Surface Missiles, n.d.
Even as the Army continued with plans to develop and field its
intermediate-range ballistic missiles, it had already begun deploying new
formations featuring some of its existing atomic inventory. General Taylor
had embraced the president’s and Admiral Radford’s concept of atomic
“fire brigades” to support allied or indigenous forces in the field. By law, the
United States could not furnish foreign powers with atomic weapons, but
the deployed missile commands assured allies of timely atomic support even
though the weapons remained under U.S. control. In the Southern European
Task Force, organized in Italy in 1955, the Army established a prototype for
its new formation. In 1957, the disparate elements of the Southern European
Task Force came together as the 1st U.S. Army Missile Command. The
new organization included two Honest John battalions and two Corporal
missile battalions, along with some infantry, engineer, and signal elements
to provide security and a target-acquisition capability. Later that year, the
service activated the 2d U.S. Army Missile Command, organized in much
the same manner, at Fort Hood, Texas.39
The Army’s growing dependence upon rockets and missiles soon raised
concerns about the manner in which it trained and prepared its officers to
lead the new units. Army Vice Chief of Staff General Lyman L. Lemnitzer
met with select members of the Army Staff, the chief of the Artillery Section
at CONARC, and artillery officers on duty at West Point to determine better
ways to prepare young officers for such assignments. Lemnitzer concluded
that the current approach of splitting incoming classes of lieutenants in
two, to attend either the field artillery course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or the
missiles course at Fort Bliss, Texas, was unsatisfactory. He directed that all
new officers commissioned into the artillery would attend both courses
before reporting to their initial duty stations. Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen,
the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Defense Command, raised a
related issue when he complained that officers were arriving at units under
his command without an adequate understanding of the weapons and
equipment under their direct control. He suggested to General Taylor that
the artillery could not continue as it currently existed. The Army needed
to integrate the artillery from top to bottom or establish a separate guided
39. Carter, Forging the Shield, 232–33; Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of
Field Artillery 1775–2003, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 2007), 220–21; Memo, Brig. Gen. Theodore F. Bogart for Ch Staff, 14 Feb
1957, sub: Address for School Commandants, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Ops,
to Gen. Courtland V. R. Schuyler, Supreme HQ, Allied Powers, Europe, Ch Staff, 10 May
1957, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
missile branch, with the current arm retaining conventional artillery

and rockets.40
SELLING LIMITED WAR
In an address on 14 June, General Taylor presented his Blueprint of the Army

in the Period 1958–1961. In essence, he said, the justification for the Army, as
well as any armed force, was its ability to contribute to the deterrence of war,
especially general atomic war. One way to deter the big war, he concluded,
was to deter or quickly win any little war. That statement encapsulated
Taylor’s strategic vision and served as his guiding principle for the future.41
An Army presentation before the Army Policy Council in October dealt
at length with General Taylor’s limited war philosophy. The briefing officer
described the recent books by Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood as having
“a profound influence” at the State Department and within the Department
of Defense. He presented Kissinger’s book as posing a single dilemma: was
there a middle ground between inaction on one hand and total war on the
other? Taylor asserted it was wrong to assume that all wars would be total
wars with the complete destruction of the enemy as the objective of the
armed forces. Even the goal of unconditional surrender was, he believed,
incompatible with the concept of limited war. The nation’s fundamental
interest was to prevent the balance of power from swinging against the
United States to the point at which war became a matter of national survival.
Paraphrasing military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, the briefer concluded
that America’s overall strategy must be shaped to prepare the nation to fight
the kinds of war most likely to occur.42
Taylor recognized that the Army was poorly prepared to engage in the
kind of limited conflict he anticipated. After the Suez Crisis the previous
year, he had noted that the two divisions scheduled to carry out Army
contingency plans in that area, the 82d Airborne and the 1st Infantry, only
could deploy with less than two-thirds of their authorized strength. The
40. MFR, Lt. Col. Richard P. Scott, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 3 Dec 1957, sub: Training and
Assignment of Artillery Officers; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Mickelsen, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Army
Air Def Cmd, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 5 Jun 1957; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
41. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 20 Aug 1957,
sub: Unclassified Version of the Chief of Staff ’s Address at the 1957 Secretaries Conference,
42. Bfg, Lt. Col. D. S. Bussey to the Army Policy Council, 9 Oct 1957, sub: The Philosophy
of Limited War,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
general warned his primary staff, “We must never again find the Army in a
situation wherein we cannot deploy at least a division at full strength within
the time that the necessary lift can be made available.”43
At the same time, the Army began to reduce some of the diverse and
overlapping categories it had used to classify the elements of the strategic
reserve. The variety of titles—the 30-Day Ready Force, the Western
Hemisphere Reserve, the European Reinforcement Troop List—hindered
the development of a satisfactory priority system under which the Army
could allocate personnel and equipment. What the Army needed, Taylor
believed, was a versatile force that could deploy rapidly to meet a wide
range of contingencies. In March 1957, the term “Strategic Army Forces”
(STRAF) replaced the various terms for the strategic reserve and was
defined as “that part of the Army normally located in the continental
United States which is trained, equipped, and maintained for employment
at national level in accordance with current Army plans or approved
emergency deployment schedules.”44 The part of the force that had been
known as the Strategic Army Force now became known as the Strategic
Army Corps (STRAC) to avoid confusion with the newly named STRAF.
Planners envisioned a balanced four-division force that would include those
additional units needed to meet thirty-day NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization) requirements.45
With these definitions clarified, Taylor directed that one division be
prepared to move at any time at 100 percent strength. In recognition of
the difficulties involved in overcoming normal personnel turbulence, he
suggested the automatic discharge or reassignment of individuals having
less than three months to serve. He also recommended that the division
maintain whatever overstrength it required to guarantee its deployment
at 100 percent. A second division, he continued, would be prepared to
move, along with requisite corps support units, no later than thirty days
after notification. The general conceded that this division could deploy at
less than 100 percent strength as long as the Army could make available
replacements in the objective area within a reasonable amount of time.46
43. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “The Development of the STRAF,” Historians Files,
U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, DC; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 30 Apr 1957, sub: Readiness of the Strategic Army Corps,
44. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “Development of the STRAF.”
46. Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 30 Apr 1957, sub: Readiness
of the Strategic Army Corps; MFR, Maj. Thomas J. MacDonald, Gen Staff, 29 Apr 1957,
sub: Briefing for Chief of Staff—Readiness of the Strategic Army Corps; both in File Unit:
Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman (left) and Brig. Gen. Francis H.

Boland Jr. (right) visit with Maj. Gen. William M. Breckinridge at Fort
Ord, California, on 29 August 1957. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
In September, the chief of staff approved the designation of the 101st
Airborne Division and the 4th Infantry Division as the initial STRAC
divisions. He advised the Army planning staffs to begin revisions of existing
contingency plans accordingly. By December, it was evident that the directed
reductions in the strength of the Army over the next several years precluded
the maintenance of an eight-division STRAF or a four-division STRAC.
With an anticipated strength of 870,000 by the end of 1959, the Army would
retain a force of fourteen divisions, only six of which would be stationed
in the continental United States. Subsequent guidance from the Army Staff
identified the 1st Infantry Division and the 82d Airborne Division as the
third and fourth division forces in the STRAC. The adjutant general directed
the service to maintain the 1st Infantry Division at 90 percent of authorized
strength, with the expectation that it would be able to deploy with a minimum
of 80 percent. The 82d’s strength would depend on overall Army strength

and would include, of necessity, a substantial number of trainees.47
With the basic concept in place and the initial divisions identified, Lt.
Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, the deputy chief of staff for military operations,
prepared a plan to exercise and test the ability of the STRAC units to respond
rapidly to an overseas crisis. He recommended an airlift of a reinforced
company-sized force to Germany sometime in 1957 as a test of the concept.
Larger deployments would follow if the Air Force and Navy could provide
the required aircraft and sealift. He also proposed a series of alerts, rehearsals,
and command post exercises for STRAC units under the control of
CONARC or the chiefs of appropriate administrative and technical services.
General Eddleman noted that the Army could accomplish the proposed
program by obtaining approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an annual
strategic mobility exercise, thus ensuring Air Force and Navy participation.
He recommended to General Taylor, however, that the Army delay such a
request until discussions regarding the formation of a unified command or
joint task force to oversee STRAC deployments had concluded.48
The first opportunity to test the Army’s ability to deploy part of its
STRAC division arose from an unexpected source. Violence erupted on
23 September in Little Rock, Arkansas, when nine Black students attempted
to attend Central High School in accordance with a district court order. A
crowd of around 1,000 had gathered and threatened to storm the school and
attack the Black students. After negotiations between President Eisenhower
and Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus broke down, the president ordered
General Taylor and the Army to intervene. After receiving the order just after
noon on 24 September, 500 paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division
arrived in Little Rock that afternoon. Another 500 moved in later that day.49
Active Army forces deployed to Little Rock included the 1st Airborne
Battle Group, 327th Infantry, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the 720th
Military Police Battalion from Fort Hood, Texas; the 53d and 54th Signal
47. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “Development of the STRAF”; MFR, Lt. Col.
George A. Clayton, Dep Ch Staff Ops Bfg Ofcr, 24 Sep 1957, sub: Consolidation of Ready
Force A with STRAC and Readiness of STRAC; Memo, Maj Gen. Herbert M. Jones, Adjutant
Gen, for Distribution, 31 Dec 1957, sub: Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) Readiness Policies;
both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
48. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 7 Jun 1957, sub:
Joint Mobility Exercise Program; Memo, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Ch Staff, for Sec Army,
20 Jun 1957, sub: Joint Mobility Exercise Program; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
49. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 170; Robert W. Coakley, Paul J. Scheips, and Vincent H.
Demma, Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances Since World War II, 1945–1965 (Washington,
DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1971), 52–54.
Battalions from Fort Hood; and the 163d Transportation Company from
Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The president also federalized a number of Arkansas
National Guard units. Governor Faubus had used some of the units from
around Little Rock to prevent entry of the Black students, but Eisenhower
ordered those units to stand down. He ordered units from elsewhere around
the state to back up the federal troops. The Air Force’s 314th Troop Carrier
Wing transported the contingent from Fort Campbell to Little Rock.50
Upon their arrival, the Army troops set up a cordon around the high
school. They transported the nine students to and from school for the next
several weeks, dispersing crowds as they arose, controlling traffic along the
streets around the school, and maintaining surveillance throughout the
immediate area. Gradually, as a sense of calm returned to the surrounding
area, the Army began recalling active elements and replacing them with
national guard troops. By 27 November, the Army had withdrawn all of its
forces with the exception of a small, eighteen-man detachment to assist with
communications and liaison duties.51
By the end of the operation, interested observers had formed two different
impressions from the Army’s performance. General Taylor and Secretary
Brucker could take some satisfaction in the outcome of the first exercise
involving their rapid-response STRAC. Limited in scope and duration as
it was, the event proved that the system worked; the Army’s emergency
deployment plans were feasible. Meanwhile, the president and his staff—
still thinking of the Army as a civil-defense force—could derive some
comfort from the Army’s demonstrated ability to handle crowd control and
civil unrest.52
The Army’s interest in limited war did not preclude its cooperation
with the other services. Although the Army had continued its fierce
competition with the Air Force in the areas of the budget, procurement,
and missile development, the two services were able to come to some
agreement over battle management issues that had plagued them both for
years. In September, CONARC and the Air Force Tactical Air Command
published the Joint Air-Ground Operations Manual, which attempted to
resolve longstanding issues regarding air-ground support doctrine. General
Eddleman noted that, although many differences remained, particularly in
airspace management, the agreement had resolved many conflicts such as
the allocation of tactical air assets and a relaxation of restrictions on the
50. Coakley, Scheips, and Demma, Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances, 58–59.
51. Coakley, Scheips, and Demma, Use of Troops in Civil Disturbances, 58–59.
52. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 175–76; Ltr, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, to Senator Richard
B. Russell, 3 Oct 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
Army’s employment of its own atomic weapons. Significantly, the agreement

acknowledged the right of the ground commander to defend the airspace
above his position. The ground commander could consider all aircraft not
positively identified as friendly to be hostile. The responsibility for adhering
to air traffic control and aircraft identification rules rested with the pilots.
Nonadherence would result in identification as hostile. In perhaps not too
great a concession, commanders could automatically consider all incoming
missiles and artillery projectiles to be hostile.53
The Army’s focus on limited war prompted some leaders to consider
other contingencies. To many, the idea of limited warfare seemed to suggest
counterinsurgencies and unconventional warfare. This was precisely the
domain of the special operations organizations the Army had begun to
develop. In June, it had activated the 1st Special Forces Group in Japan,
joining the 10th Special Forces Group at Bad Tölz, Germany, and the
77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. To some extent,
however, leaders within the special operations community were still looking
to justify their existence.54
In an appendix to the 1959 Army Strategic Objectives Plan, published
in 1957, the deputy chief of staff for military operations described the
Army’s unconventional warfare objectives. Foremost was the establishment
of an unconventional warfare force of sufficient magnitude to become
a substantial deterrent to limited or general war. Many regular officers
envisioned using special forces units in a role similar to that of the British
commandos of World War II. However, the plan specified their mission
to be the infiltration by air, sea, or land of areas within an enemy’s sphere
of influence, and the organization and training of the local population in
unconventional warfare techniques for tactical and strategic exploitation
in support of conventional warfare. In the event of general war, the
Army expected special warfare teams to perform subsidiary activities
such as reconnaissance, target acquisition, and surveillance behind
enemy lines. The paper noted that, as the war progressed, the political
significance of unconventional warfare might well surpass its military
significance, and that national policy would dictate its ultimate objectives.55
53. Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 30 Jul 1957; Memo, Gen.
Maxwell D. Taylor for Ch Staff U.S. Air Force, 27 Dec 1957, sub: USCONARC–TAC Joint
Air-Ground Operations Manual; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
54. Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, “Unconventional Warfare,” app. 11 to an. A, in Army Strategic
Objectives Plan, FY 1959 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army, n.d.), 1–8, File Unit: Entry A1 68,
Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
55. Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, “Unconventional Warfare,” 1–8.
The strategic objectives plan also described a civil affairs component of

the special warfare mission. As hostilities ended, the task confronting the
United States would be the establishment or restoration of a government
friendly to the United States. Because unconventional warfare forces would
have intimate and influential contact with the local population during
the conflict, those forces would be in an excellent position to assist in
accomplishing that goal.56
Despite the Army’s preoccupation with a few of the more esoteric aspects
of its limited war agenda, some remained concerned with the service’s
traditional functions. In February, Secretary Brucker announced that the
Army had placed an order for 800 M48A3 90-mm. gun medium tanks for the
coming year. When questioned by senators of the Preparedness Committee
about the usefulness of such weapons in an atomic war, Brucker replied that
the tanks would be of great value in either atomic or nonatomic conflict.
Perhaps more to the point, he continued, the order would continue the
development and improvement of the Army’s equipment and would keep
open at least one production line during the coming fiscal year.57
Finally, a focus upon limited war inevitably meant improving the training
of the basic infantry soldier as well. In June, the Army marked the passing of
another of its venerable institutions when it announced that an automated
popup target system known as Trainfire would replace the known-distance
ranges traditionally used for marksmanship training. The idea, one observer
said, was to “teach men to shoot by letting them shoot.”58 Instead of directing
their fire against targets at one known distance, the new system presented
random targets that popped up at distances between 50 and 300 meters. Army
leaders hoped that the training would replicate field conditions better by
forcing the shooters to identify and engage each target during the short time
in which it was exposed. Service leaders hoped to have Trainfire installed at
all Army training centers and the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia,
by the end of 1959.59
FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS
By 1957, the Seventh Army was well established as the nation’s most potent
forward-deployed force in the path of potential Soviet aggression. With
almost one fourth of the Army’s total personnel stationed in Europe, in
56. Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, “Unconventional Warfare,” 1–8.
57. “Army to Order 900 Tanks,” Washington Post, 28 Feb 1957.
58. “Hope Trainfire Makes GI’s Shoot,” New York Times, 8 Jun 1957.
59. “Hope Trainfire Makes GI’s Shoot.”
many ways the troops there had become the public face of the United States
Army. Almost all of the Army’s organizational, doctrinal, and technological
development during this period involved preparing to fight the Soviet Union
in Western Europe.60
In particular, much of the Army’s missile development had taken place
with an eye toward engaging the Soviets in Europe. In 1957, briefing officers
from U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), tried to make the case that limiting
the range of Army missiles would put U.S. forces there at a tremendous
disadvantage. Their analysis of Soviet capabilities and doctrine indicated a
rapid advance toward the English Channel. U.S. forces, particularly airfields
and supporting atomic artillery positions, faced the possibility of quickly
being overrun. The Army required longer-range missiles, they argued, to
be able to deliver continuous support fires from secure rearward positions,
despite such fast-moving Soviet offensives. Officers within the Army Staff
circulated a proposed plan to begin an early counteroffensive within thirty
days of initial hostilities. Although it was unclear what resources might be
available for an offensive at that point, they argued that a counterattack was
imperative to exploit the potential for unrest in the satellite nations and
to assist any emerging resistance movements. The newly designed Army
divisions were not equipped well for prolonged defensive operations, and,
perhaps most important, a counteroffensive offered the possibility of moving
the atomic battlefield away from Western Europe.61
USAREUR commanders questioned their ability to carry out their
defensive mission given the personnel on hand and the requirements to assist
allied nations. The Army Strategic Capabilities Plan envisioned supplying
ground atomic artillery systems to NATO allies, the Southern European
Task Force, and the Turkey-Greece area. With so many of his atomic-capable
units earmarked for other missions, the USAREUR commander, General
Henry I. Hodes, expressed concerns over the relatively small number of
weapons remaining for his own support. He also noted the existing shortage,
throughout his command, of critical personnel trained in atomic weapons
specialties. Further, he suggested that the personnel turbulence inherent in
the Gyroscope rotation plan had exacerbated that situation.62
60. See Carter, Forging the Shield.

61. Staff Study, Dep Ch Staff Ops, n.d., “The Army’s Concept of Employment of a 200 to
500 Nautical Mile Missile System in Europe”; Memo, Col. Samuel M. Goodwin, Army War
Plans Div, for Director of Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 1 Apr 1957, sub: Outline Plan–
Central Europe; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG
319, NACP.
62. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 7 Jan 1957,
sub: Annual Training Inspection of USAREUR; Memo, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. H. Trapnell,
The integration of West German forces into NATO’s defensive planning

also introduced complications into the Army’s emerging atomic doctrine.
After Exercise Lion Noir, held in March 1957, the Germans complained
bitterly about what they considered an excessive use of atomic weapons
throughout the scenario. They asked why the Americans were planning to
use so many throughout West German territory when they had encouraged
the local populations to remain in their homes. For their part, American
officers sometimes expressed a certain callous disregard for the destruction
that might result from defensive efforts in West Germany. However, with
German armed forces preparing to take over a considerable portion of
NATO’s positions, the American and allied leaders could no longer afford
to ignore the question. The extent to which atomic weapons played a part
in the defensive effort would continue to provoke debate in several NATO
capital cities.63
The rotation of personnel between the United States and Europe also
had become problematic. As General Hodes had indicated, the rotation
of complete divisions created far more turbulence in both locations than
planners had considered. A unit in the United States preparing to move
overseas had to attain much more than 100 percent of its authorized
personnel strength to ensure that it would retain sufficient personnel strength
throughout the movement process. Units in Europe had to exchange large
numbers of troops with other units to make sure that troops returning to the
United States had served a complete tour in Europe. More than two years
into the experiment, some locations still lacked family housing facilities to
accommodate the large number of families to whom the Army had promised
the opportunity to accompany their soldiers. Officials on both sides of the
Atlantic had begun to consider reasonable alternatives.64
The impending Gyroscope move of the 2d Armored Division from
Europe to Fort Hood, Texas, highlighted another potential personnel
crisis. By 1957, the Army had completed the process of racial integration
first ordered by President Harry S. Truman in 1948. Most Black troops in
Europe had enjoyed an environment relatively free of the segregation and
Jim Crow legislation still common in the American South. Enough of them
had married German women while overseas to raise a particularly thorny
problem regarding their rotation. Texas law forbade interracial marriage
Asst Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 9 Jul 1957, sub: Briefing Team Visit to Europe; both in File Unit:
63. Annual Historical Rpt, HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, 1 Jul 1956–30 Jun 1957, n.d., 195,
Historians Files, CMH; Carter, Forging the Shield, 270–71.
64. M. Sgt. William J. Keegan, “Let’s Stabilize Gyro,” Army Times, 2 Nov 1957; Carter,
Forging the Shield, 327–29.
and refused to recognize such marriages performed elsewhere. With racial

tensions in the United States on the rise and the service already involved in
enforcing school integrations, Army officials feared that they had “a political
tiger by the tail.”65 Officials within the 2d Armored Division encouraged all
of their personnel affected by the law to transfer to other units in Germany
or the northern United States before the upcoming move. Ultimately, the
Army reassigned thirty-one Black soldiers to military bases in the North in
order to ensure their physical safety.66
Despite these challenges, the United States’ commitment to NATO and
the forward deployment of the Seventh Army remained firm. Meanwhile,
U.S. Army forces on the other side of the world were experiencing their
own turbulence. In 1957, the Department of Defense inactivated the
Far East Command, with U.S. Forces in Korea becoming a subordinate
unified command of the Navy-led Pacific Command. The four-star former
commander of U.S. Forces, Korea, remained commander of the United
Nations Command and became the commander of the Eighth Army,
its Army component. At the same time, the Army inactivated U.S. Army
Forces, Far East, leaving U.S. Army, Japan, to become part of U.S. Forces,
Japan, a subordinate unified command under Pacific Command with an Air
Force officer as commander. Additionally, the IX Corps moved to Japan and
merged with the U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Command, with the former IX
Corps commander becoming the high commissioner.67
Amidst all of these changes, Secretary Wilson had directed a 60 percent
reduction in the U.S. military population in Japan, and he expected most
of the reductions to come from the Army. The math, unfortunately, did not
support the secretary’s goals; out of slightly more than 100,000 American
personnel stationed in Japan, only 28,300 were soldiers. Even if all Army
personnel withdrew from Japan, most of the military personnel reductions
would have to come from the other services. Nonetheless, removing the
1st Cavalry Division and most of the logistical support elements from
Japan reduced the Army presence in country to roughly 10,000 troops. By
65. Maria Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West
Germany (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 106.
66. Harry S. Truman, EO 9981, “Establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,” 26 Jul 1948, in Bernard C. Nalty and
Morris J. MacGregor Jr., eds., Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents (Wilmington, DE:
Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), 239–40; “Army Wary on Advice Given Married Negroes,”
Army Times, 14 Sep 1957; Höhn, GIs and Fräuleins, 106. For more on the subject of Black
soldiers in Europe, see Maria Höhn and Martin Klimke, A Breath of Freedom: The Civil
Rights Struggle, African American GIs, and Germany (New York: MacMillan, 2010).
67. James C. McNaughton, The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement (Washington,
DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012), 58–60.
mid-1958, all that remained was a military intelligence group, two military
police companies, some ordnance disposal detachments, petroleum service
detachments, and assorted headquarters elements.68
General Isaac D. White, the first four-star commander in chief of U.S.
Army, Pacific, warned the vice chief of staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
about the consequences of these reductions. Withdrawing Army units from
Japan required the other services remaining there to provide their own
logistical support. In addition, the phasedown in Japan left the Army with no
logistical base in the Pacific Command capable of supporting contingency
operations beyond the initial days of combat. Although the forces in Korea
retained a substantial logistics capability, they consisted largely of Korean
augmentees to the U.S. Army, who could not readily transfer to another
theater. General White also reminded Lemnitzer that plans for the defense
of Vietnam, by both the commander in chief of the Pacific Command and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, relied upon withdrawing troops from Korea, even
though tensions remained high in that area. Finally, White noted that the
25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i was the strategic reserve for the Pacific
Command; and, he warned, designating the division as a STRAC unit for
possible diversion to other missions would send mixed signals to Pacific
allies about the American commitment to their support.69
Despite General White’s concerns, the further reduction of the Army’s
deployment in Korea was already under consideration. In anticipation of
additional personnel cuts, the Plans Section of the Army Staff proposed
withdrawing two battle groups in 1959 and one division in 1960, leaving
only one battle group of infantry. In place of the two infantry divisions, the
staff proposed to deploy two missile commands, one medium command
based around a Corporal battalion and one air-transportable command
based around a Little John battalion. In addition, the Army would send
two Lacrosse battalions and a battalion of 280-mm. atomic-capable guns to
provide additional atomic fire support. Planners hoped that the provision
of such a robust atomic capability would placate South Korean President
Syngman Rhee enough to prevent him from pulling his armed forces out
of the United Nations Command. Recognizing the political implications of
68. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 Jun 1957,
sub: Reduction of U.S. Forces in Japan; Memo, Lt. Gen. [Clyde D.] Eddleman for Vice Ch
Staff, 25 Nov 1957, sub: Draft of Personal Letter from Vice Chief of Staff to General I. D.
White; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, DCSOPS Top Secret, 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
69. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White, Pacific Cmd Cdr, to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice Ch Staff,
1 Nov 1957, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
such a proposal, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, General
Eddleman, approved it only as a basis for continued study.70
According to the inspector general of the Army, things in Vietnam were
going well. After a special inspection in June 1957, Lt. Gen. David A. D.
Ogden reported that the chief and members of the U.S. Army element of the
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, were performing
their assigned missions in a manner deserving special commendation.
Privately to General Taylor he noted that the Vietnamese army, unlike
other American allies, was likely to face combat on a moment’s notice. He
believed that U.S. assistance had pulled the South Vietnamese back from the
brink of disaster, but that the advisory team was working at a disadvantage.
The Geneva Accords had limited, artificially, the size of the U.S. military
mission in Vietnam and had authorized so-called neutral nations to inspect
U.S. training efforts and report to their Communist masters. Based upon
his observations in Vietnam, Ogden expressed his opinion that the U.S.
Army had not yet placed enough emphasis upon unconventional warfare.
“We seem to have staked everything,” he said, “upon our ability to defeat the
enemy in the field of conventional warfare.”71 The Army needed to make the
necessary changes in its service schools and in its training to call attention
to the unconventional warfare threat.72
Other than a few small MAAGs, the Army had no forward deployments
in the Middle East. Nevertheless, on 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower
announced his intention to employ the armed forces of the United States
to protect the independence and territorial integrity of any nation in the
Middle East requesting aid against Communist-inspired aggression. This
formed the basis of what would become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.
The president also affirmed his authority to establish a military assistance
program for any country in the area that requested one. He cited the
region’s wealth in petroleum resources and the geopolitical significance of
the Suez Canal. He argued that Russia’s rulers had long sought dominance
in the region, not for economic gain but solely for political exploitation.73
70. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 27 Sep 1957, sub:
Objectives Plan for the Phased Reduction of US Army Forces in Korea, File Unit: Entry A1
68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret, 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
71. Ltr, Lt. Gen. [David A. D.] Ogden to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 25 Oct 1957, File Unit: Entry
A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
72. Memo, Lt. Gen. David A. D. Ogden, Inspector Gen, for Ch Staff, 5 Jul 1957, sub: Special
Inspection of the United States Army Element, MAAG, Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Ltr, Ogden to Taylor, 25 Oct
1957.
73. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle
East,” 5 Jan 1957, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower,
In studying the announced policy, the Army Staff prepared a strategic

appraisal of the Middle East and the implications for the U. S. Army. They
acknowledged the president’s recognition of the importance of the Middle
East as a communications hub. They pointed out, however, that the Egyptians
already had demonstrated how easily and relatively quickly they could block
access to the Suez Canal. Of far more importance for the West were the
area’s petroleum reserves. For at least the next several years, the economies
of Western Europe would require access to the oil of the Middle East. That
plus the geographic location made this a major area of potential Cold War
conflict. The staff identified three possible confrontations that easily could
draw in the larger powers. These were Israel versus neighboring Arab
states; Syria and/or Egypt versus neighboring Arab states; and Afghanistan
versus Pakistan. The Eisenhower Doctrine implied the possibility of U.S.
intervention into any of these limited war scenarios. The staff recommended
to General Taylor that the Army develop new contingency plans for these
and other potential flashpoints in the region. Without a realistic approach
to limited war planning in the area, it concluded, promises made under the
Eisenhower Doctrine, as well as guarantees made to support the nations of
the Baghdad Pact, were a sham.74
RECRUITING AND TRAINING ATOMIC SOLDIERS
An article in the 13 April issue of the Army Times argued that the Army was
not training soldiers fit for modern atomic warfare. It suggested that, on an
atomic battlefield, soldiers would face a greater strain and mental shock than
ever before. Coping with that stress required a mental flexibility and toughness
and, above all, better training. The article reported that, with training centers
run by overworked junior officers and acting noncommissioned officers, the
Army’s best intentions were failing in execution.75
Secretary Brucker summarized the problem in his semiannual report
to the secretary of defense. He began by noting that the complexity of
modern weapons and electronic equipment was greater than at any time
in the service’s history. The modern Army required personnel proficient
1957 (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Service, 1957), 6–16; Fairchild and
Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 136–41.
74. Staff Study, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, n.d., “A Strategic Appraisal of the Middle East
Problem,” 1–8, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319,
NACP.
75. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “We’re Not Training Soldiers Fit for Atomic Battle,” Army Times,
13 Apr 1957.
in communications, aviation maintenance, guided missiles, radar, infrared

technology, surveillance equipment, television, and new fire control systems.
Challenges facing service leaders included a shortage of personnel with
technical aptitude, a need for expanded technical training facilities, the long
lead times needed to train soldiers in many skills, and the fact that relatively
few people remained in the Army once their enlistments were up. The Army
needed more personnel, it needed smarter personnel, and it needed to retain
them once it had invested so much time and money in training them.76
The service had already taken steps to eliminate some of its lowest quality
recruits. Having determined that it had accepted too many enlistees who had
scored in the lowest quarter (Mental Group IV) on the entrance intelligence
tests, the Army had raised its requirements from a score of ten on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test to a score of twenty-one. Although it still accepted
draftees with the lower score, the Department of the Army had proposed
higher requirements to the Department of Defense. More recently, the
service had raised the level of aptitude scores required for soldiers to be
considered for reenlistment. The deputy chief of staff for personnel, Lt. Gen.
Donald P. Booth, announced in April that the Army would apply higher
physical standards as well. He observed that the Army was still using the
same physical standards it had been using in 1945 when it was scraping the
bottom of the personnel barrel. As part of this effort, the service published a
revised Field Manual 21–20, Physical Training, and included a new Physical
Achievement Test designed to assess combat-related skills.77
Under the direction of Vice Chief of Staff General Williston B. Palmer,
the Army also began to eliminate loopholes that allowed the enlistment of
soldiers with inadequate or insufficient civilian schooling. In March, Palmer
noted that, during the previous year, 874 candidates for enlistment had failed
to achieve fourth-grade scores on entry tests but only 231 had been prevented
from enlisting. Existing policy did not require elimination unless they also
failed in the military portion of the training. Palmer pointed out that such
loopholes allowed unqualified personnel to hang around the service and
77. Memo, Col. [no first name given] Corbett, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff,
16 Apr 1957, sub: Fitting Soldiers for Atomic Warfare, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Elite Army Planned,” Army Times,
6 Apr 1957; Whitfield B. East, A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness
Training and Assessment (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013),
123–24.
remain a constant source of trouble. He directed General Booth to establish

tougher standards throughout the Army’s recruiting and training centers.78
General Taylor weighed in on similar issues in June when he directed
Booth to develop additional screening methods to identify Mental Group IV
personnel before their induction. He also told the personnel chief to work
with the major commanders to identify problems with the Mental Group IV
soldiers, which would demonstrate to the Department of Defense that the
Army was overloaded with illiterate soldiers that it could not accommodate.79
The Army also carried on with efforts to cut the size of the officer corps,
although this was less a matter of eliminating unsatisfactory performers
and more a matter of trimming the leadership to meet the needs of a
reduced force structure. The service had lowered the number of officers by
6,250 the previous year through a combination of attrition, elimination,
and a decrease in commissions. It projected slightly larger losses for 1957,
based on the continued personnel limits imposed by the Eisenhower
administration. Assistant Secretary of the Army Hugh M. Milton warned,
however, that reductions in officer strength already had undone years
of work in developing career incentives and increasing the attractiveness
of military service. Continuing them would do long-term damage to
national defense by undermining service morale, public relations, and
Congressional support.80
The involuntary elimination of so many officers, almost all of them
reserves serving on active duty status, soon attracted the attention of
congressional leaders. Both Senator John C. Stennis and Congressman Carl
Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, complained
to General Taylor and Secretary Brucker that the Army was discharging
qualified reserve officers while retaining incompetent regular officers in
uniform. Senator Stennis threatened to open an investigation into the Army’s
conduct of the reduction in force. Secretary Brucker responded to both
men, explaining that, by law, reductions in force required elimination of the
reservists. He pointed out that regular officers whom the Army eliminated
in such a manner lost all military status and that, under the wording of the
78. MFR, Col. John T. English, Ch Organization and Services Div, 8 Mar 1957, sub:
Transitional Training Policy; Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for
Vice Ch Staff, 3 May 1957, sub: Transitional Training Policy; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
79. MFR, Lt. Col. C. P. Keiser, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 1 Jul 1957, sub: Conference Between Chief
of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 1655 Hours, 28 June 1957, File Unit:
80. Memo, Asst Sec Army Hugh M. Milton for Asst Sec Def (Manpower, Personnel, and
Reserve), 22 Oct 1957, sub: Analysis of Officer Reductions-in-Force Actions, File Unit:
elimination provisions, the stigma of incompetence was inherent. Retirement

and postretirement benefits favored reservists, and the law assured their
tenure as part of the reserve component. Nevertheless, Brucker agreed that
the reductions had eliminated many fine reserve officers and had caused
well-founded resentment. He informed the lawmakers that he had directed
the deputy chief of staff for personnel to convene a board of general officers
to examine regular officers’ records to ensure the elimination of those who
had not met the expected standards of efficiency and effectiveness.81
At the same time as the reductions in force attempted to resolve an
overstrength of field grade officers in the Army, commanders experienced a
different problem involving the retention of junior grade officers. Growing
numbers of senior lieutenants and captains were leaving the service as
soon as they had completed their initial service obligations. Attributing the
attrition to a morale problem, General Taylor assumed at least part of it was
because of oversupervision and overcontrol of junior leaders by their chains
of command. He canvassed all of his senior leaders to determine the extent
of the problem. Few of the respondents took the bait, with most of them
claiming that oversupervision was not a problem within their commands.
Nonetheless, they acknowledged that the problem might exist in other units
because of excessive requirements from higher-level staffs and commands.
Most claimed that mission-type orders and the delegation of authority
down to the lowest possible echelon were the key to developing successful
junior leaders.82
In September, after several junior officers from Fort Polk, Louisiana,
had written letters to President Eisenhower expressing their dissatisfaction
with military service, Taylor sent a delegation to that facility to take a
sample of responses from young officers to current Army policies. They
discovered that the ongoing reductions in force and the lack of overall
information regarding the process had created a great sense of insecurity
and had discouraged several younger officers from pursuing their military
careers. Although oversupervision was a concern, a greater irritant was the
weight of administrative requirements and regulations that started at the
81. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Sec Army, 3 Oct 1957,
sub: Letter to Senator Stennis; Ltr, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker to the Honorable Carl
Vinson, House of Representatives, 26 Oct 1957; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
82. Ltr, Lt. Gen. W. H. Arnold, Cmdg Gen, Fifth Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 6 Dec
1957; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey, Cmdg Gen, Third Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
9 Nov 1957; Ltr, Lt. Gen. J. H. Collier, Cmdg Gen, Fourth Army, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor,
5 Nov 1957; Ltr, Lt. Gen. Lemuel Mathewson, Cmdg Gen, Sixth Army, to Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor, 12 Nov 1957; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
top. All officers interviewed indicated that reports and other administrative
requirements burdened them so much that they could not devote the proper
amount of time to command, training, maintenance, and other important
unit activities. Extended family separation and the poor quality of military
housing—when it was available—constituted the third consistent gripe.
Booth reminded Taylor that Fort Polk was a special case and that it already
was scheduled for extensive building projects, but both men recognized
that the conditions sparking the complaints at Fort Polk existed throughout
the Army.83
In March 1956, the Department of Defense had commissioned a study to
examine the retention problem across all of the armed services. Chaired by
Ralph J. Cordiner, the president of General Electric, the panel spent most of
the next year examining the pay structures of both officer and enlisted ranks,
and the relationship between pay and retention. In its preliminary report,
issued in February 1957, the panel identified a set of basic conclusions that
would guide its analysis of the problem. The strategy, tactics, and machinery
of modern war had become ever more complex, the committee stated, but
the practices and principles that guided military recruitment, motivation,
and compensation had not changed appreciably. The services needed to
modify compensation packages to retain personnel in those skills and those
levels that were most critical for their success. The committee asserted that
the military’s antiquated longevity-based pay system was the primary cause
of its poor personnel retention.84
As the year progressed, the committee released some detailed proposals.
At the enlisted level, a primary concern was the elimination of the longevity-
based pay scale. Cordiner noted that under the current system, 18,000
corporals or their equivalent received more pay than 122,000 sergeants. His
new pay scale introduced pay-grade steps, in which the highest step in each
pay grade remained less than the lowest step of the next higher grade. He
also proposed adding two new pay grades at the top of the enlisted scale.
Pay grades for E–8 and E–9 relieved some of the compression at the top
of the scale and offered higher pay for the achievement of higher rank and
responsibility. More controversial was the committee’s recommendation of
“proficiency pay,” or bonus payments, to be granted to individuals in critical
skilled positions who demonstrated particular skill or achievement. The
83. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth for Ch Staff, 24 Sep 1957, sub: Junior Officers Reaction
to Current Department of the Army Personnel Policies, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
84. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. [Maxwell D.] Taylor, 6 Feb 1957, sub: Preliminary
Report of Cordiner Committee Studies, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Pentagon Pushes Pay Studies,” Army Times, 25 Aug 1957.
intent was to award these bonuses to about 15 percent of the total enlisted
strength, with the eligibility and qualifications set by each service.85
The committee made similar recommendations regarding the officers’ pay
scale. In addition to creating steps within pay grades, they proposed adding
increased pay at higher levels, under the impression that a higher standard
of living offered to senior officers would provide junior personnel greater
incentive to succeed and move up in the ranks. Additionally, the revised pay
scale separated the pay rates for lieutenant generals and generals.86
Although the Department of Defense embraced most of the committee’s
recommendations, the Army objected that it could not implement the
Cordiner proposals without additional funding. Congress, the services,
and the White House debated potential legislation for the rest of 1957.
The discussions crystalized some of the basic issues of the New Look. The
security and flexibility provided by maintaining a substantial peacetime
military force had to be weighed against the costs of doing so. With military
technology becoming more complex, attracting and retaining soldiers with
the skills modern warfare demanded had become more expensive. Although
the president eliminated some of the pay increases attached to the legislation,
the bill that passed in May 1958 included many of the proposed changes to
the officer and enlisted pay structures, as well as the addition of the two
senior enlisted ranks and the separation of the general officer pay scales.87
Despite the Army’s serious concerns about maintaining its most
experienced and professional soldiers, sometimes its efforts seemed a little
hard to explain. In an attempt to improve the morale and prestige of his
leaders, Maj. Gen. Herbert B. Powell, commander at the Army Infantry
Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, announced that he had approved the
carrying of swagger sticks by officers and noncommissioned officers of the
top three grades. The announcement noted that, when carried under the
left arm, the “jaunty appendage” complemented the “serviceman’s military
appearance.”88 The standard model was made of pliable wood and bound
with hand-stitched English cowhide. More deluxe models were made of
hickory, walnut, or rosewood with a metal cap, and could be engraved, at an
85. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Taylor, 6 Feb 1957, sub: Preliminary Report of Cordiner
Committee Studies.
86. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Taylor, 6 Feb 1957, sub: Preliminary Report of Cordiner
Committee Studies.
87. Memo, Lt. Gen. Donald P. Booth for Ch Staff, 23 Oct 1957, sub: Review of D/A Position
on Cordiner Proposals, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense,
July 1 to December 31, 1957, 7.
88. “Swagger Sticks Come Back to Benning Infantry Center,” Army Times, 2 Mar 1957.
additional charge, with name, rank, and insignia such as the Ranger tab or
airborne wings.89
COPING WITH THE MISSILE
The Soviet launch of Sputnik had brought home to the American public,
more than anything else up until that time, the precarious nature of the Cold
War. Although Soviet bombers had presented a sort of vague, hypothetical
threat for which the United States already possessed countermeasures,
intercontinental ballistic missiles presented a new challenge. No longer
protected by the vast ocean expanses, Americans experienced a sense
of vulnerability.90
The president’s belief that atomic weapons offered a way to preserve
national security without expanding the national budget caused all of
the services to reassess their roles in America’s defense policy. The rapid
evolution of atomic weapons technology had forced the Army to incorporate
new weapons into its organization and doctrine. However, even as Army
units adapted to the new pentomic organization and began to explore its
possibilities and limitations, some were already beginning to question the
wisdom of such a complete reliance upon an atomic response.
In the 1950s, the threat of spreading communism, though sometimes
vague, seemed real to most Americans, and this threat instilled real fear.
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy had capitalized on those fears during his rise
in the early 1950s, and now Soviet successes in the budding space race had
raised them to a new level. Upon leaving his position as chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, Admiral Radford passed along to the secretary of defense his
recommendation that the armed services embrace a program for national
education developed by John C. Broger, the president of the Far East
Broadcasting Company, and a consultant to the Joint Staff. Dubbed Militant
Liberty, the program assumed that members of the United States military,
and, indeed, the citizens of the nation at large, required education and
motivation on the benefits and responsibilities of capitalism and democracy
if they were to withstand the attacks of Communist ideology. Although
the military services generally rejected the program in favor of their own
troop information and education efforts, it did reflect the deep concerns
89. “Swagger Sticks Come Back to Benning Infantry Center.”
90. Memo, Brig. Gen. Richard Collins, Dep Director Intel, Joint Staff, for Chairman, Joint
Chs Staff, 30 Oct 1957, sub: Memorandum on Soviet Capabilities, File Unit: Entry UD
53, Series: Chairman’s Files, Twining, 1957–1960, Subgroup: Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218,
NACP.
of a nation engaged in a protracted struggle. Atomic weapons and ballistic

missiles had forced warfare into a new dimension, and the U.S. Army, along
with the other services was just beginning to explore the consequences.91
91. Memo, Adm. Arthur W. Radford for Sec Defense, 14 Aug 1957, sub: Cold War Planning,
File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For
more information on the Pentagon’s embrace of Militant Liberty, see Lori Lyn Bogle, The
Pentagon’s Battle for the American Mind: The Early Cold War (College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2004).
6
Evolution
By 1958, it was clear that the United States Army was in the process of a
dramatic transition. It had been less than five years since the end of the
Korean War. Now, almost every aspect of the force that had served in Korea
was obsolete, and Army leaders struggled to shape the evolution of the
Army’s organization, weapons, equipment, training, doctrine, and personnel
for the future. Around them, the political environment also was changing as
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the rest of the defense establishment
continued to remake American security policy. What role the Army was to
play in national security remained uncertain, and it was not yet clear how
the Army would contribute to the nation’s next conflict.
REORGANIZING THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
By the end of his first term in office, President Eisenhower had grown weary
of his efforts to tame the unruly defense establishment. He had expected
former Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to take charge of the vast
defense enterprise as he had at General Motors, but Eisenhower had become
frustrated at how often he had to intervene personally in enforcing his
vision upon the military services. With his new secretary of defense, Neil H.
McElroy, experiencing the same difficulties in getting service leaders to toe
the administration line, the president resolved to reshape the department to
streamline the chain of command and to give the secretary of defense even
greater control over the military services.1
As 1958 began, Eisenhower spoke with congressional leaders about his
desire to reorganize the defense establishment. Revolutionary advances
in military technology, he said, had underscored the need for a more
direct and responsive chain of command. The recent reaction to Sputnik
and the continued interservice feuding had, in his mind, undermined
public confidence in military leadership. He proposed an authority more
centralized in the secretary of defense with an enhanced planning staff at
the Defense Department level. He would make the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff the senior military adviser to the secretary of defense and
would assign to the secretary more complete control over the allocation of
the military budget.2
On 25 January, the president traveled to the Pentagon to meet with
senior military and civilian officials. Many of the assembled leaders, led by
the recently retired Admiral Arthur W. Radford, argued that the existing
structure of joint committees was too cumbersome to deal with more
complicated issues. They favored replacing the committee system with
an integrated staff. Eisenhower expressed his belief that the service chiefs
should be removed from their roles as executive agents for strategic control,
that is, they should be taken out of the direct chain of command. The Joint
Chiefs must be supreme, he said, if the United States was to respond quickly
to foreign aggression before its own forces were destroyed.3
On 3 April, Eisenhower formally presented his proposal to Congress.
In summarizing the underlying principle of his plan, he stated, “Separate
ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be
involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single
concentrated effort.”4
The president intended to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff clear-cut planning
and operational control over global military forces. Likewise, he would give
the secretary of defense full authority over the spending of appropriations by
Congress, including the right to transfer funds from one service to another.
1. Donald A. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” Journal of Military History 71, no.
4 (Oct 2007): 1169–99.
2000), 5; Jack Raymond, “President to Take Charge in Defense Reorganization,” New York
Times, 10 Jan 1958.
3. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5; Jack Raymond, “Eisenhower
Visits Pentagon to Aid in Reorganizing,” New York Times, 26 Jan 1958.
4. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Service Fight Looms on New Ike Changes,” Army Times, 12 Apr
1958.
EVOLUTION 233
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke (U.S. Navy, National Archives Still Picture

Branch)
He proposed to relieve the service secretaries of operational responsibilities

and to downgrade the traditional military departments to administrative
agencies of a centralized and fortified Department of Defense.5
In support of these goals, Eisenhower made other specific proposals. He
wanted to organize all operational forces into unified commands, separate
from the service departments, with each commander exercising complete
authority during peace and war. To strengthen the role of the Joint Chiefs,
he would create a larger, integrated Joint Staff, replacing the existing joint
service planning committees. As further reinforcement of the preeminence
of the secretary of defense, he would assign to the secretary the authority
5. Jack Raymond, “Eisenhower Asks Drastic Revision of Defense Set-up,” New York Times,
4 Apr 1958; Memo, President Eisenhower for Andrew J. Goodpaster Jr., 30 Mar 1958, in The
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. Louis Galambos, 21 vols. (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1970–2001), vol. 19, 807.
for promotion of all service officers to the rank of major general and above.
Reflecting his frustration with the ongoing interservice rivalries, he directed
drastic reductions in service publicity offices and the transfer of many of
their responsibilities to the Department of Defense.6
Congressional hearings on the proposed reorganization began almost
immediately. All four service chiefs supported the legislation, although
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke expressed concerns
that the enlarged Joint Staff might grow into a national general staff,
leading to a merger of the services. Marine Corps Commandant General
Randolph M. Pate opposed those parts of the proposals leading to unified
commands, fearing a possible rationalization for the elimination of the
Marine Corps.7
Burke’s testimony provided the only real controversy throughout the
hearings. In April, Secretary McElroy pointedly had warned military officers
in general, and the Navy in particular, that, if they could not support the
president’s own requests for reorganization, they ought to retire. He could
see no reason for military or civilian members of the defense organization
to make, in their official capacities, public speeches in opposition to
the programs their commander in chief desired. When Admiral Burke
expressed his concerns before Congress regarding the reorganization bill,
McElroy made a point of expressing his regret and disappointment. He
noted in an interview that although he had no plans to discipline Admiral
Burke, he was not the only one responsible for the admiral’s future. Senator
Richard B. Russell, the head of the Armed Services Committee, pushed back
hard. Because it seemed obvious to him that the senior officers only could
appear before him under duress, he suspended scheduled appearances for
the rest of the day and threatened to delay them indefinitely until he could be
assured that the service chiefs could testify without being threatened overtly
or covertly. McElroy met with the senator to assure him of the admiral’s
security. Russell noted, however, that the incident was proof enough that
the language the president wanted in the bill—repealing an officer’s right to
appear before Congress on his or her own initiative—could not, and would
not, be approved.8
After some debate, both houses passed the legislation, and President
Eisenhower signed it into law on 6 August 1958. Observers noted that
the bill’s passage continued a trend toward limiting the range of advice
6. Memo, Eisenhower for Goodpaster, 30 Mar 1958; Bourjaily, “Service Fight Looms on
New Ike Changes.”
7. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6.
8. John W. Finney, “McElroy Advises Military to Back Revisions or Quit,” New York Times,
11 Apr 1958; Jack Raymond, “McElroy Rebukes Burke for Stand on Pentagon Bill,” New
EVOLUTION 235
available to the president, rather than a strategy based upon the canvassing
of all available sources. Somewhat ominously, New York Times columnist
Hanson W. Baldwin observed that the president’s decision, in July, to send
troops into Lebanon to quell political unrest had been based upon the advice
of the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He had not
consulted with the Joint Chiefs, either individually or as a body.9
Most within the Army viewed the reorganization as a victory and as
acceptance of many of the views they had championed. The increased size
and influence of the Joint Staff was a necessary development, but wording in
the legislation specifically precluded its operation as an overall armed forces
general staff and granted it no executive authority. Military departments
remained under the control of their secretaries, although the secretaries and
the service chiefs now were removed from the direct chain of command.
Service component commands would henceforth come under the full
operational control of the senior officer of the unified combatant command.
The unified commands would receive their orders from the secretary
of defense, passed through the Joint Chiefs. Army leaders particularly
applauded this as a move toward increased unity of command and efficiency
in strategic planning. Perhaps believing in the promise of their own
developing missile systems, they also approved of the increased ability of the
secretary of defense to reassign weapons development and operational use
of new weapons to a particular service.10
One month later, in September, the Department of Defense announced
the eight unified commands to be established worldwide. Only one, the
U.S. Caribbean Command, would be under the command of an Army
general, Lt. Gen. Ridgely Gaither. Four organizations—U.S. European
Command, Continental Air Defense Command, Strategic Air Command,
and Alaskan Command—would be under the command of Air Force
generals. The remaining three—Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Command—would be commanded
by Navy admirals. Other than components of the Continental Air Defense
Command, no Army units based in the United States were included in
unified commands. However, any units stationed there, such as elements of
York Times, 22 Jun 1958; “Russell Demands McElroy Bar Reprisals for Officers,” New York
Times, 24 Jun 1958.
9. Hanson W. Baldwin, “The New Pentagon Bill,” New York Times, 24 Jul 1958.
10. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 May
1958, sub: House Armed Services Committee Bill on Reorganization of the Department
of Defense, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence,
the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), could be assigned to a unified command

where they might be needed.11
AN ARMY IN TRANSITION
Although the Senate approved a $1.4 billion emergency appropriations

bill for the armed services in February 1958, the Army’s battle with the
administration over the military budget continued throughout the year.
Of the supplemental funding, the Army received $40 million for research
and development, $10 million of which was designated for outer-space
research. Meanwhile, the four services sparred over the president’s fiscal
year 1959 defense budget, which was more than $40 billion. Even though
they reluctantly had endorsed the president’s numbers in January, by March
all four service chiefs were expressing their reservations before Congress.
General Maxwell D. Taylor was most vehement in his comments, expressing
his view that personnel resources were inadequate to meet in full the
requirements of their assigned missions. Personnel cuts concurrent with
the president’s budget would reduce the Army from 918,111 in December
1957 to 870,000 by the middle of 1959. Taylor particularly noted his service’s
recruiting of foreign nationals in Korea and Europe to fill out combat
and support units. Such dependence, he believed, could have serious
consequences in an emergency.12
Placing an exclamation point on the Army’s dissatisfaction with its share
of the military budget was General James M. Gavin’s sudden announcement
in January of his intent to retire. Gavin had told a Senate subcommittee on
military preparedness that he saw his Army deteriorating while the Soviet
Army grew stronger. He told reporters that he felt he could contribute more to
national defense from the outside than from within. Gavin’s announcement
prompted Democratic senators to threaten investigations to determine if the
administration’s “rubber hose tactics” in silencing the general’s criticisms
had figured into his retirement.13 Gavin would publish his own critique of
11. “Army Gets 1 of 8 Unified Commands,” Army Times, 6 Sep 1958.

12. Allen Drury, “Senate Approves 1.4 Billion to Aid Defense Program,” New York Times,
4 Feb 1958; Jack Raymond, “4 Military Chiefs List Objections to Budget Limits,” New York
Times, 9 Mar 1958; U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Semiannual Report of the Secretary of the
Army,” in U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1 to
June 30, 1958 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959) 146–48.
13. Jack Bell, “Senate to Air Gavin Retiring,” New York Times, 6 Jan 1958.
EVOLUTION 237
Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
administration defense policies, War and Peace in the Space Age, shortly
after his retirement in March.14
Readiness reports from around the force began to give some indication
of the toll the steady budget and personnel cuts had taken on the Army.
Although Army leaders continued to declare that all commands were in
a satisfactory state of operational readiness, individual command reports
revealed some concerns. The U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) commander,
General Henry I. Hodes, stated in September that requirements to divert
two battalions each of Honest John rockets, Corporal missiles, and 280-
mm. artillery to support NATO’s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s)
14. Rpt, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen. Taylor, n.d., sub: Gavin’s Resignation, Box 15,
Messages Sent by General Lemnitzer, 1958, Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University,
Washington, DC; Bell, “Senate to Air Gavin Retiring”; James M. Gavin, War and Peace in
the Space Age (New York: Harper, 1958).
Army Group North seriously depleted atomic fire support assets available
to his command. Outmoded equipment, particularly communications and
target acquisition sets, was also a major concern. Hodes’s most significant
qualms lay in the area of personnel. The USAREUR Communications Zone,
the command’s logistical lifeline, was composed of 52 percent indigenous
personnel. The reliability of those individuals after the outbreak of hostilities,
he reported, was a major problem. Under the Army’s 1959 troop ceiling, he
could see no way to alleviate the problem. In a top secret message to the
chief of staff, Hodes wrote that, despite his assertion of mission readiness,
“We have reached a point of calculated risk, one beyond which I do not
recommend proceeding without complete reevaluation of the mission and
purpose of the command.”15
From the headquarters of the U.S. Army, Pacific, General Isaac D. White
reported that his command, which he rated as only marginally satisfactory,
was short more than 10,000 personnel. Combat units in Korea contained
up to 25 percent Korean soldiers, who were participants in the Korean
Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program. Service units in
Korea were diluted by up to 50 percent. Unit organizations in Korea had
begun to resemble those in the area before the Korean War had broken out.
Rifle companies maintained only two of four platoons. Tank companies
maintained only two of three platoons. Mortar and artillery batteries
operated at reduced strength as well, with up to half of their assigned tubes
remaining unmanned. The Army virtually had eliminated the logistical base
in Japan, and the support base in Korea was no longer adequate to sustain
combat operations. Training throughout the command had been hampered
by the requirement to divert more than 3,000 soldiers to administrative and
security tasks as well as by the language problems caused by the integration
of so many KATUSA soldiers.16
Units in the United States were in little better shape. Of the four STRAC
divisions, only one, the 82d Airborne Division, was at authorized strength
and fully deployable. The second priority division, the 4th Infantry Division,
reported 87 percent authorized strength, with only 76 percent deployable.
The other two STRAC divisions, the 101st Airborne and the 1st Infantry,
reported 106 percent and 95 percent authorized strength, respectively. The
15. Memo, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Gen.
Moore, 6 Nov 1958, sub: Presentations for the Secretary of the Army and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret,
1956–1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962), RG 319, NACP.
16. Memo, Pachler for Moore, 6 Nov 1958, sub: Presentations for the Secretary of the Army
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
EVOLUTION 239
Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin (right) confers with General Henry I. Hodes
(left). (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
Army considered neither to be fully deployable because many troops had

joined recently and required additional training.17
The readiness of the three Strategic Army Forces (STRAF) divisions
was significantly lower than their STRAC counterparts. The 2d Armored
Division had recently returned to Fort Hood, Texas, from Germany as part
of a Gyroscope rotation. The 2d Infantry Division had reconstituted as a
full division at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the 9th Infantry Division at Fort
Carson, Colorado, was preparing to inactivate later in the year. Although
the Army assessed that each of the units had sufficient equipment on hand
to enable them to become combat ready within the time limits assigned
by mobilization plans, each lacked some important equipment, was

understrength, and required a great deal of training.18
Some of the Army’s most senior officers weighed in with the Army Staff,
expressing their concern over the deteriorating status of the Army. Lt. Gen.
Thomas F. Hickey, Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army, wrote
that inadequate supporting forces and personnel shortages had made the
Army a hollow shell, not capable of the performance that would normally be
attributed to its number of active divisions. The Army’s goal of maintaining a
stated number of divisions without full supporting forces risked misleading
Congress regarding the force’s full capability and might cause future funding
requests to be denied as unnecessary. He suggested that the service present
its Troop Program on the basis of a “world-wide division slice,” in which
the full complement of supporting forces would be submitted as part of
a division package.19 General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the vice chief of staff,
responded that, although the idea was sound, it would not be acceptable
to Congress or to the Department of Defense, and it would cause the
Army to suffer in comparison to the leaner (though less self-sufficient)
Marine Corps.20
As he prepared for his upcoming retirement, General Willard G. Wyman
presented General Taylor with his own parting impressions of the military
organization he had served for more than forty years. Repeated compromise,
he said, had diminished the Army in stature as compared to the other
services. He believed that there had been a steady reduction in the emphasis
placed upon the combat arms, yet requirements for combat support and
administrative troops had increased steadily. Sadly, he noted that the entire
U.S. Infantry could now sit comfortably in the Rose Bowl.21
The composition of the Army continued to evolve, even as the reductions
continued. Although the service had reported racial integration to be
complete several years earlier, indications remained that this was not
necessarily the case. In October, Senator Paul H. Douglas complained to
Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker that an overseas levy, specifying
“Caucasian Only,” had been posted on a bulletin board at Fitzsimons Army
Hospital in Colorado. Brucker rejected a reply drafted by the Army Staff
19. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Thomas F. Hickey to Gen. Willard G. Wyman, 30 Apr 1958; File Unit: Entry
20. Ltr, Hickey to Wyman, 30 Apr 1958; Ltr, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen. Willard G.
Wyman, 21 Jul 1958; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
21. Ltr, Gen. Willard G. Wyman to Gen. Taylor, 26 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
EVOLUTION 241
which tried to explain the faux pas as a by-product of the Army’s need to
balance the racial makeup of units across several commands. He directed the
Army Staff to conduct a “quiet, open-minded, creative” study to determine
whether there remained any need for racial identification in any Army
personnel actions.22
The study, completed early in January 1959, provided a clear indication
that racial integration throughout the Army remained a work in progress.
Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, reported
that it had been the unanimous opinion of the major commanders that the
present system of racial identification and proportionate distribution should
continue. Experience gained in Korea, he wrote, indicated that although
small units such as squads could contain up to 33 percent Black soldiers
without any adverse effect on combat operations, they should limit the
number of Black soldiers in larger units such as battle groups and combat
commands to approximately 12 percent. There was still a need, he concluded,
for a system of distributing personnel proportionately by race. Elimination
of the existing system would generate an equal, or even greater number of
complaints of segregation.23
Not surprisingly for a force in transition, the role of women in the Army
was also coming under scrutiny. Late in 1957, the director of the Women’s
Army Corps, Col. Mary L. Milligan, asked the deputy chief of staff for
personnel to identify additional military jobs that women could perform
in peacetime and during periods of mobilization. Up until that time, few
women in the Army operated anything heavier than a light truck. The
resultant study, completed in August 1958, identified 116 out of 400 military
occupational specialties that women could not perform because the jobs
involved combat, isolated duty posts, or extraordinary physical strength or
stamina. The research team concluded that women could realistically fill
25 percent of military enlisted positions in a 700,000-person Army. With
that in mind, it recommended that regulations limiting the strength of the
Women’s Army Corps to 2 percent of the Regular Army’s strength should
be lifted.24
Despite the turmoil created by the recurring budget debates and
personnel reductions, efforts to improve the image of the Army and the
22. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 15 Dec 1958, sub:
Designation of Negro Personnel in Reports and Directives, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
23. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Under Sec Army, 22 Jan
1959, sub: Staff study on Racial Identification in Army Reports, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
24. Bettie J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 1945–1978, Army Historical Series
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990), 166.
Col. Mary L. Milligan (center) is sworn in as the director of the Women’s

Army Corps by Maj. Gen. Herbert M. Jones (right) on 3 January 1957.
Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (left) looks on. (U.S. Army,
conditions of military service seemed to be bearing fruit. In May, President

Eisenhower signed a bill that substantially increased military pay rates for
all active, reserve, and retired personnel. The legislation also included many
of the previous year’s Cordiner committee proposals, including provisions
for two new pay grades for senior enlisted (E–8 and E–9) and authorization
to provide for proficiency pay for certain technical military specialties.
The Army tried to address complaints raised by many of its junior officers
and noncommissioned officers regarding oversupervision by higher
headquarters. The Office of the Inspector General made the issue a subject
for special attention during its 1958 inspection. Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson, the
inspector general, reported to General Taylor that, in the combat arms, more
EVOLUTION 243
than 50 percent of the company or battery commander’s time was taken up

by administrative duties. The largest contributing factor to this was excessive
reporting requirements placed upon company-sized units by higher staffs
and headquarters. In response, Taylor ordered senior commanders and staff
to reassess their reporting requirements and to accept verbal reports from
lower headquarters wherever possible.25
Reports released toward the end of 1958 seemed to indicate that the Army’s
efforts to recruit and retain more qualified soldiers seemed to be paying
off. Statistics in August indicated that more nonprior-service members
were enlisting for three or more years of service than at any time since
the Korean War. Reenlistment rates were up, and resignation rates among
regular officers were dropping. Recruiting offices had begun to exceed their
quotas regularly. Although the number of draftees inducted into the Army
in 1958 had increased slightly, from 138,504 to 142,246, the overall trend
had been in decline for the previous four years. Even the rush of West Point
graduates to resign upon completion of their five-year commitment had
begun to drop off. A higher rate of resignation by ROTC (Reserve Officers’
Training Corps) distinguished military graduates who had been appointed
to the Regular Army remained a singular dark spot amid otherwise positive
personnel news.26
By the end of the year, the strength of the U.S. Army was below 900,000
and on its way to 870,000 by the middle of 1959. This was lower than at
any time since before the start of the Korean War. Coping with postwar
demobilization, the president’s strategic policies, and the integration of
atomic weapons into its organization and doctrine had begun to turn the
Army in several different directions. It remained to be seen how the service’s
recent embrace of an organization based upon atomic weapons would stand
up under the stress of the Cold War environment.
25. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Supergrade Opens Soon,” Army Times, 17 May 1958; “Pro Pay
Next Month,” Army Times, 11 Oct 1958; Rpt, Maj. Gen. Albert Pierson, 4 Aug 1958, sub:
Report on Special Subjects for Inspection, Fiscal Year 1958; Draft Cir No. 20, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, n.d., sub: Elimination of Unessential Requirements Imposed on Company-Sized
Unit Commanders; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
26. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “More Men Are Staying in Army,” Army Times, 27 Sep 1958. Draft
statistics are from the Ofc of Selective Service, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military
History (CMH), Washington, DC.
REVISING THE PENTOMIC STRUCTURE
By the end of June 1958, all of the Army’s fifteen combat divisions had
completed their reorganization. Meanwhile, the U.S. Continental Army
Command (CONARC) continued tests and evaluations of the new
organizations. The command issued guidance to field commanders
concerning procedures to use in evaluating the effectiveness of the new
infantry divisions, both overseas and in the continental United States. Specific
objectives of the evaluation program included an appraisal of pentomic
doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization, suitability of equipment, capacity
of personnel and units to accomplish assigned duties and missions, and
the adequacy of communications. CONARC tasked the field commands
to identify major strengths and weaknesses in the new organization and to
recommend where further evaluation might be required.27
The command received reports from commanders of all active Army
divisions and two separate battle groups in Alaska. In summarizing
the responses, CONARC announced that, with certain exceptions, the
Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division (ROCID) organization and
equipment appeared adequate to accomplish missions under conditions
of atomic or nonatomic warfare. The general structure was sound and
possessed the flexibility, unity of command, and decisive combat power to
succeed in both environments.28
Despite this seemingly glowing review, field commanders had
recommended numerous significant changes before the organization could
be considered ready for combat. They strongly suggested that the number
of rifle companies in the battle group be increased from four to five. The
additional company would allow for greater dispersion in the battle area.
It also would provide greater flexibility and staying power, better capacity
for all-around security, and an increased capacity for an adequate reserve.
Unit commanders had also noted that the organization lacked an adequate
surveillance and target acquisition capability. They recommended the
addition to each battle group of an organic eighteen-man radar section
1998), 281–83; Memo, Col. T. J. Marnane, Adjutant Gen, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958,
sub: Evaluation of ROCID, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
28. Memo, Marnane for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID.
EVOLUTION 245
composed of one AN/TPS21 medium-range radar and five AN/PPS4 short-

range radars.29
The most significant and consistent criticism of the new organization
from almost all the commanders was the inadequacy of the indirect fire
support available to the ROCID division. In place of one 105-mm. howitzer
battalion with five batteries, one of which provided direct support to each of
the battle groups, commanders asked for five direct-support battalions, each
composed of one 105-mm. howitzer battery and one 155-mm. howitzer
battery. Additionally, the composite general-support battalion would be
changed from one Honest John battery, one 155-mm. howitzer battery, and
one 8-inch howitzer battery to one Honest John battery and two 8-inch
howitzer batteries. The commanders also requested that at least two of the
direct-support battalions be equipped with self-propelled howitzers, with the
rest to be converted once sufficient self-propelled weapons were available.30
No organization in the U.S. Army was better prepared to test the new
organization and doctrine than the Seventh Army in Europe. Under the
command of Lt. Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, the Seventh Army was positioned in
Europe precisely to fight the kind of war that the new division was designed
to facilitate. In February, General Clarke sent his divisions to the field for ten
days as part of Exercise Sabre Hawk. Including both the V and VII Corps
and approximately 125,000 soldiers, the maneuver was the largest ever held
by the Seventh Army. In addition to the critiques already noted, Clarke and
his staff identified a number of important flaws in the new organization.
Although the division theoretically relied upon its atomic weapons for its
most significant striking power, its transportation and support elements
lacked sufficient personnel, vehicles, and equipment to ensure timely
delivery of atomic weapons to forward artillery units. Additionally, combat
units had to divert troops that already were engaged to protect atomic
weapons support and delivery operations. Clarke’s analysis also noted that
his corps were not prepared to evacuate the 2,000 or more casualties per day
that CONARC had included as part of the scenario.31
At Fort Ord, California, the Combat Development Experimentation
Center also was taking a look at the functionality of the pentomic organization.
The center ran a series of exercises at the company level, posing completely
mechanized forces against one another and allowing for the free use of
31. Annual Historical Rpt, HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, 1 Jul 1957–30 Jun 1958, n.d., 171,
Historians Files, CMH; Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe,
1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 2015) 301–3.
General Bruce C. Clarke (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
tactical atomic weapons. Their initial conclusions established 6,000 to 8,000

yards as the proper frontage for a company-sized unit, which was roughly
ten times the frontage similarly sized units had covered during World War II.
They noted that, because of the distance and dispersion, the effects of small
arms, mortars, and conventional artillery were practically negligible. Atomic
weapons and tank-antitank weapons caused, by far, the most casualties on
the battlefield. When General Taylor visited the center in July, he posed a few
questions on which to base future experiments. He told the assembled staff
that he expected them to develop insight regarding the Army of the next two
decades. He wanted more feedback on the adequacy and effectiveness of the
pentomic division. He also wanted more information on the survivability
of the helicopter on the atomic battlefield. Most important, he wanted
the center to focus more on weapons development. What was the proper
role for the Davy Crockett weapon system, a small-yield nuclear projectile
launched from a tube similar to a recoilless rifle, then under development?
How could the Army justify the high costs of its various missile programs?
EVOLUTION 247
Finally, he wanted to know the proper rate at which the Army should phase
out conventional weapons, considering the availability of more modern
weapons and the trend toward further personnel reduction.32
Meanwhile, some of the deficiencies of the new organization had become
fodder for public comment. As early as January, an unattributed letter in the
Army Times had warned readers that the Army was no longer as powerful as
it had been even a few years ago. Most of the new weapons that the service
had been boasting about really did not exist yet. There was a big difference,
the writer complained, between a plan for a 200-mile field artillery rocket
and actually having them in the hands of the troops. A few months later,
an article in the New York World Telegram and Sun proclaimed that the
Army had rushed into the reorganization with unacceptable deficiencies
in communications, weapons, and mobility. The pentomic structure lacked
sufficient antitank weapons and artillery to support the frontline troops
effectively. It also lacked adequate means of spotting enemy troop targets.
There was growing evidence, the article announced, that the Army had
reorganized itself into a state of dangerous weakness.33
Although General Taylor recognized the need to modify some of the
original pentomic organization, he soon grew impatient with the torrent of
requests to increase the number of units, personnel, or equipment within
the division. The question remained, he said, of “how to combine our net
resources in personnel and equipment in order to produce the greatest
aggregate of combat effectiveness.”34 This had to be done, he continued, while
remaining within a fixed ceiling of dollars and personnel. Speaking directly
to requests for increases in artillery, he told the CONARC commander that
he could not consider any increases in the artillery component of the division
without some indication of where, within the current force structure, the
required personnel could be found.35
By the end of the year, the new deputy chief of staff for military operations,
Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, approved many of the recommendations for
modifying the new pentomic infantry division. For the most part, he held
to the chief of staff ’s guidance. Additions to the division organization were
32. MFR, Col. John V. Roddy, Ch Ops Research Div, 16 Jul 1958, sub: Visit of the Chief
of Staff to Combat Development Experimentation Center, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
33. R. A. Field, “The Great Charade,” Army Times, 25 Jan 1958; Msg, Col. Stephen O. Fuqua
Jr., Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, to Cmdg Gen, Continental
Army Cmd, 10 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
34. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell Taylor to Gen. Willard G. Wyman, 24 Feb 1958, File Unit: Entry A1
35. Ltr, Taylor to Wyman, 24 Feb 1958.
offset by reductions in other parts of the unit. The inclusion of another rifle
company to each battle group was accomplished by deleting one rifle platoon
from each company, removing one 3.5-inch rocket-launcher team from
the rifle platoon weapons squad, and eliminating one rifleman per squad.
Reorganizing the division artillery into one composite Honest John/8-inch
howitzer battalion and five 105-mm./155-mm. howitzer battalions required
the removal of separate 4.2-inch mortar batteries from each battle group.
Ultimately, the addition of 2,109 spaces to the infantry division was offset by
the elimination of a matching number.36
Even as the revision of the pentomic structure was underway, some
officers warned that it was not evolving fast enough. As he prepared to
retire, General Wyman noted that organizational change lagged seriously
behind technological progress. The division, he believed, needed a greater
integration of “aero-vehicles,” and more emphasis on armor and armored
vehicles. Battle groups should become even smaller and wield even more
firepower.37 At the same time, the Army Staff reminded General Taylor that
the division had to be prepared to fight both general and limited conflicts. A
force that had been optimized for conduct of a general war in Eurasia might
not be the best construct for a limited conventional fight in the Far East.38
SECOND THOUGHTS ON ATOMIC WAR
As the Army was revising the design of the division it had developed
specifically for the purpose of fighting an atomic war, the architects of
massive retaliation and the New Look had begun to rethink many of their
basic assumptions. In a meeting with Secretary McElroy in April, Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles reflected that the conditions under which he had
supported the concept of massive retaliation had changed. The expansive
development of the Soviet nuclear weapons program meant that the capacity
for a large-scale nuclear response was no longer a deterrent which the
United States alone possessed. The prospect was now one of mutual suicide
if these weapons were used. In another meeting with McElroy a few months
later, Dulles wondered whether the United States might be putting too much
emphasis on the nuclear deterrent. Anything beyond the capacity to destroy
36. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 281–82; Memo, Marnane for Dep Ch Staff Ops,
28 Aug 1958, sub: Evaluation of ROCID.
37. Ltr, Wyman to Taylor, 26 Jul 1958.
38. Memo, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 30 Jul 1958,
sub: Gyroscope, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
EVOLUTION 249
the enemy was excessive and unnecessary. Although McElroy and others
in the room demurred that there had not been too much emphasis on the
nuclear deterrent, they acknowledged that more emphasis should be placed
on limited war capabilities. Dulles concluded with his opinion that ground
forces had an important role to play in limited operations and that the Army
should not be reduced any further. Belatedly—and perhaps too late, as he
would die of cancer in less than six months—John Foster Dulles had become
an advocate for the U.S. Army.39
Meanwhile, advocates for the Army continued to hammer at some of what
they considered to be misperceptions regarding atomic warfare. General
Matthew B. Ridgway had been one of the first to argue that fighting a war with
atomic weapons would require more soldiers on the battlefield, not fewer as
the air power advocates had proclaimed. Now the Army published some of
the results from Exercise Sabre Hawk, which showed that neither side in
the mock war had been prepared for the enormous number of casualties
inflicted nor the requirements not only to replace them but also to recover
them and remove them from the battlefield. In October, the service released
to the public portions of a study summarizing the results of combat exercises
in the United States and overseas. The report indicated that the range of
modern atomic weapons had made even the rear echelons of deployed
forces vulnerable to devastating attack. Moreover, the dispersal inherent in
modern organization and doctrine required increased transportation and
logistical support. Units had to deploy far enough apart to avoid presenting
a lucrative atomic target, but mobile enough to mass quickly to conduct an
attack. The complexity of modern weapons and equipment also implied a
need for increases in training time and additional personnel to conduct the
instruction. In light of these findings, the chief of staff and others argued
that further cuts to the force were shortsighted and dangerous.40
General Taylor also noted that the development of a rough nuclear parity
between the United States and the Soviet Union had raised a level of concern
among the NATO allies. The situation had caused some allies to question
whether the United States would risk the use of nuclear weapons for
anything other than its own survival. Taylor mused that other nations might
consider the question from a different point of view, wondering whether
39. MFR, Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 7 Apr 1958, sub: Meeting in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; MFR, Sec State John Foster Dulles, 8 Nov 1958, sub: Memorandum of
Meeting; both in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, vol. 3, National Security
Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1996), 62–65, 145–47.
40. “Battle Lesson,” Army Times, 22 Mar 1958; Jack Raymond, “Army Study Cites Manpower
Needs,” New York Times, 27 Oct 1958.
A 68th Armored tank guards the Main River bridge near Wertheim,
Germany, during Exercise Sabre Hawk, 15 February 1958. (U.S. Army,
a trigger-happy United States might launch its nuclear weapons without
regard to the concerns of its allies. The West Germans, in particular, already
had raised concerns over the excessive use of such weapons in various
NATO exercises. Taylor pointed out that even the so-called tactical weapons
were small only in comparison to the megaton yields of the larger strategic
weapons. Clearly, any level of atomic warfare would be devastating. In
considering the evolving impasse created by two sides armed with ultimate
weapons, one officer observed hopefully that the two nations might choose
not to destroy each other. “History shows,” he observed, “that the duel at two
paces was never a very popular pastime.”41
41. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor (speech, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 3 July 1958);
Memo, Gen. Maxwell Taylor for Sec Gen Staff, 7 Apr 1958, sub: Review of U.S. Strategy;
Memo, Col. Cyril A. Millson, Ch War Plans Br, Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for
Dep Ch Staff Ops, 10 Feb 1958, sub: Logistics Briefing-Army Strategic Capabilities Plan
EVOLUTION 251
Even within the Army’s research and developments, attempts to come

to grips with atomic warfare had begun to take on an almost whimsical
appearance. Speakers at the annual Armor Conference at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, predicted that the service was only a small step from developing
helicopter-launched guided missiles with atomic capability. Funds for the
fiscal year 1959 research and development budget included money for a
feasibility study on the application of nuclear power to combat vehicles.
Although not necessarily in favor of the development of a nuclear-powered
main battle tank, the Army Staff supported investigation into the concept of
an atomic power plant for a 150-ton cross-country logistical carrier.42
Despite growing concerns regarding the nuclear balance, or perhaps
because of them, the Army’s efforts to legitimize the concept of limited
war as a national strategic priority began to bear fruit. In April, Maj. Gen.
Lionel C. McGarr, the commandant of the Command and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, told Taylor that the service’s emphasis
on limited war in its public statements appeared to be increasingly effective.
He identified news reports that challenged both Air Force doctrine and
that service’s perception as the dominant player in American defense
policy. McGarr stated that there was growing public understanding that
national security could not rest on a single service or single concept of
operations. In September, the Defense Science Board, under the direction
of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics,
published a report on limited war in which it stated that the United States
could not hope to deal with important limited-area situations if it only had
forces designed for big war situations. In certain cases, such as guerrilla-
type conflicts, there was almost no basis for expecting atomic weapons to
be effective. More important, the study concluded, a requirement for the
United States to employ nuclear weapons in response to lesser challenges
would reduce the deterrent value of those forces to an entirely unacceptable
status. Maxwell Taylor was beginning to win his argument.43
Obscured by the loud and lengthy debates regarding atomic weapons
and limited war, the United States quietly changed its policy regarding other
FY 1959; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
42. “Tanks to Team with A-Armed Copters,” Army Times, 10 May 1958; Memo, Bonesteel
for Dep Chs Staff, 30 July 1958, sub: Gyroscope; Rpt, Def Science Board, Ofc of Under Sec
Def for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Sep 1958, Report on Limited War Volume
3, Historians Files, CMH.
43. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, to General Maxwell D. Taylor, 21 April 1958, File Unit:
Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Rpt, Def Science
Board, Ofc of Under Sec Def for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Sep 1958, Report
on Limited War Volume 1, Historians Files, CMH.
aspects of general combat. In May 1958, the president announced that the
United States would be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons
to the extent that the military effectiveness of its armed forces would be
enhanced by their use. This use would not be restricted to limited or general
war, nor dependent upon first use by an enemy combatant.44
The announcement prompted considerable discussion throughout
the Army, as service leaders tried to match procedures, doctrine, and
capabilities with the adjustment in national policy. Their studies noted that,
during World War I, mustard gas had proven to be five times more efficient
than high explosive shells as a casualty producer. They warned, however,
that the effectiveness of chemical weapons varied considerably depending
on weather, terrain, and other target conditions. Still, they concluded that
the inclusion of toxic chemical ammunition as a standard type for Army
weapons would result in a substantial increase in military effectiveness,
firepower, and flexibility at a comparatively small cost.45
More complicated were discussions concerning the political implications
of using chemical and biological weapons. Officers on the Army Staff opined
that the nature of warfare had changed markedly since the first quarter of the
twentieth century when toxic warfare had been condemned as inhumane.
Given the effects of nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the repercussions
for using chemical weapons seemed inconsequential. Nonetheless, they
continued, many nations, both allied and opposition, would not approve
of the use of chemical and biological weapons. In a conclusion both ironic
and cynical, they proposed that the United States might lose more friends
by failing to take a strong and positive stand than by moralizing some of the
segments of the world population against the use of toxic agents.46
The discussion of biological weapons proved to be even less optimistic.
Scientists working for the Army’s Weapons Systems Evaluation Group and
the Operations Research Center at the Army Chemical Center concluded
that biological weapons offered a relatively low potential for success so long
as a nuclear capability existed. Even more so than with chemical weapons, the
weight of world opinion would be against their use. Further, the effectiveness
of such weapons was limited because of the degrading effects of weather
and personal protective measures. They did note that against agricultural
44. Info Book Item, Ofc Ch Chem Ofcr, 9 Dec 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS
Top Secret 1955–1962, RG 319, NACP.
45. Study, Atomic-CBR [Chemical Biological Radiological] Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops,
1 Nov 1958, The Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents in Limited War, File Unit:
46. Study, Atomic-CBR Div, 1 Nov 1958, Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents
in Limited War.
EVOLUTION 253
countries, anticrop warfare would provide a temporary dislocation, but that

success depended upon so many factors that it was difficult to assess what
the value of such an attack might be.47
In summarizing its position, the Army Staff concluded that the use of
chemical and biological weapons had the potential to increase the Army’s
firepower and flexibility. Moreover, an increased stockpile of such weapons
would help to deter an enemy from initiating their employment. However,
the Army Staff also suggested that the loss of public support because of
an unprovoked first use of chemical weapons would be at least as great as
that which would result from a U.S. initiation of atomic warfare. The staff
recommended an extensive public information program to explain the
characteristics of toxic warfare and the results to be expected if such weapons
were to be used against the United States. Lastly, the staff encouraged a more
robust research and development program aimed toward the creation of a
quick-acting, nonlethal, incapacitating agent that the Army could employ at
all levels of warfare.48
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMY CORPS
By the end of 1957, it was evident that the directed reductions in the strength
of the Army over the next several years would not permit the maintenance
of an eight-division STRAF or a four-division STRAC. The cutback, from
approximately one million personnel in 1957 to 900,000 in 1958, was to be
followed by a further drop to 870,000 by the end of 1959. The entire Army
force structure for 1959, approved by the chief of staff on 28 December 1957,
reflected the decline in manpower by providing for only fourteen active
divisions, six of which remained in the United States.49
The reduction in the number of divisions available to the active Army
placed additional requirements on those remaining to assume training
responsibilities and other administrative burdens. In March, the deputy
chief of staff for operations informed General Taylor that the 1st Infantry
Division, because of its increased responsibility for preparing recruits and
47. MFR, George H. Milly, Ops Research Gp, Army Chem Center, 24 Jul 1958, File Unit:
48. Study, Atomic-CBR Div, 1 Nov 1958, Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents
in Limited War.
49. Draft Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, n.d., “The Development of the STRAF,” Historians
Files, CMH.
cadres for future assignments, could no longer meet the requirement for
deployment overseas within thirty days.50
In October, Taylor directed the Army Staff to conduct a conference to
determine the best use of available resources for support of the STRAC
concept. The conference, held 12–14 November, included representatives of
the deputy chief of staff for logistics, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, the
deputy chief of staff for operations, the assistant chief of staff for intelligence,
the assistant chief of staff for reserve components, the comptroller of the
Army, the chief of information, CONARC, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the
1st Logistical Command. With an assumed end strength of 870,000, the
conferees agreed that three divisions (the 82d and 101st Airborne and the
4th Infantry) were the maximum that the Army could sustain in a ready
status. Attendees also considered, but ultimately failed to reach agreement
on, the provision of a battle group on the West Coast to be earmarked for
the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i in lieu of providing reinforcements
directly from STRAC.51
Attendees at the conference also devoted considerable discussion to the
implications of deploying STRAC forces in a conflict short of general war.
They concluded that there was no sense in including an armored division
in the STRAC force because it was too heavy for rapid deployment and
too large for sustained aerial resupply. All the old issues regarding strategic
transport came up, with no firm resolution as usual. The discussions noted
that all planning for deployment of the STRAC was on a unilateral Army
basis. Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor any of the other services had yet
committed to formal plans for its employment.52
Independent of the conference, other senior officers already had begun to
consider establishing STRAC within a more formal structure in the national
defense chain of command. Maj. Gen. Robert F. Sink, the XVIII Airborne
Corps commanding general, proposed to General Taylor the establishment
of a Joint Ready Force, for which the STRAC would provide the ground
component. Uniting the STRAC with ground and air components under a
single commander and identifying it as a unified command would place the
force on a more secure footing within the defense establishment, provide
various forms of strategic transport as an organic part of the command,
50. Memo, Col. Stephen O. Fuqua Jr., Dep Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep
Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 14 Mar 1958, sub: Assignment of High Priority
Missions to STRAF Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955–
1962, RG 319, NACP.
51. Memo, Brig. Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 20 Oct 1958,
sub: Problem Areas of the STRAC, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
52. Memo, Palmer for Dep Chs Staff, 20 Oct 1958, sub: Problem Areas of the STRAC.
EVOLUTION 255
and facilitate planning up to the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such a
command would have as its primary mission preparing for limited war and
would be the nation’s first response to challenges short of atomic warfare.53
General Sink routed his letter through Lt. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, the Third
U.S. Army commander, and General Willard G. Wyman, commanding
general of CONARC. Both men strongly endorsed the concept, although
both also pointed out issues that had to be resolved before the concept could
become a reality. They considered the formation of the new command to
be a commendable effort along lines proposed by President Eisenhower as
part of his recent action reorganizing the Defense Department. Although
Taylor’s response was not immediately forthcoming, the suggestion for a
Joint Ready Force devoted to limited war challenges did start the ball rolling
toward further adaptations within the Department of Defense.54
Meanwhile, the Army made its own efforts to reform the command and
control over the STRAC. During periods of alert, the commanding general of
CONARC exercised operational control over the STRAC divisions. The chiefs
of the technical and administrative services were equally responsible for the
development of doctrine, standards, and procedures of those units under
their command that were also part of STRAC. Although the Department
of the Army would not take the technical service chiefs completely out
of the chain of command, it did pass to the CONARC commander both
the authority to test readiness within the STRAC support units and the
operational control over them in the event of a real-world deployment.55
Despite the many competing priorities, the Army tried to provide the
three remaining STRAC divisions with as many training opportunities as
possible. In July, the 101st Airborne Division sent a task force of 1,200 soldiers
to Eglin Air Force Base in Florida to give the unit practice in conducting a
strategic airlift. In November, the 101st conducted Exercise White Cloud,
a maneuver of several days, which culminated in an airdrop of 3,000 troops
and almost 200 vehicles along several Fort Bragg, North Carolina, drop
zones. Also in November, the 4th Infantry Division participated in Exercise
Rocky Shoals, a ten-day maneuver that featured an amphibious landing of
two battle groups along the California coast.56
53. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Robert F. Sink to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 15 May 1958, File Unit: Entry
54. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 28 May 1958; Ltr, Gen.
Willard G. Wyman to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 10 Jun 1958; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
56. “Eagle Goes to Florida: Airborne Troops Practice Quick Overseas Movements,” Army
Times, 19 Jul 1958; “Paratroopers Attack Bragg” and “Rocky Shoals: Troops Hit California
as Exercise Begins,” Army Times, 1 Nov 1958.
Realizing that more extensive training was necessary, Deputy Chief

of Staff for Military Operations Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman proposed to
General Taylor a full-scale deployment exercise for both the 101st and 4th
Divisions for the coming fiscal year. Eddleman wished to test the existing
Swaggerstick contingency plans by moving both divisions to deployment
airfields and load points and having designated units conduct a complete
load-out of their troops, equipment, and vehicles. Representative elements
of both divisions and the XVIII Airborne Corps would then deploy to
Germany to participate in a field exercise there. An analysis of funds
available, however, reduced the number of units who could participate in
the load-out and limited the amount of equipment that they actually could
pack. Limitations on air transport restricted the movement group to less
than 250 soldiers and three C–124 aircraft.57
In July, political unrest in Lebanon provided an opportunity to exercise
exactly the type of limited force contingency operation envisioned for the
Army’s STRAC. The previous year, President Eisenhower had declared
his intention to intervene in the Middle East if he believed Communist-
inspired insurgencies threatened Middle Eastern nations aligned with the
West. When rebel leaders seemed likely to overthrow the pro-Western
government in Lebanon, Eisenhower directed U.S. forces to deploy there to
provide stability and a peaceful government transition. The Army had not
coordinated its STRAC force planning with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,
nor did it have approval for the use of strategic lift provided by the other
services. In contrast, the commander in chief of U.S. European Command,
at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had developed a joint operations
plan for intervention in the Middle East. As a result, USAREUR deployed a
battle group from the 24th Infantry Division, along with other supporting
elements, to Lebanon on 19 July, where they remained until the end of
October. Another battle group remained on standby in Europe throughout
the deployment. Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Adams, commanding general of
the Northern Area Command in Germany, served as the joint ground force
commander for more than 10,000 soldiers and marines involved in the
operation (Map 7).58
Although the overall operation was a success, subsequent review and
analysis indicated that many portions of the contingency and deployment
57. Memo, Lt. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman for Ch Staff, 19 Feb 1958, sub: FY 1959 STRAC
Mobility Exercise, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
58. Roger J. Spiller, “Not War But Like War”: The American Intervention in Lebanon,
Leavenworth Papers, no. 3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1981); Carter, Forging the Shield, 341–58.
EVOLUTION 257
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AREA TURKEY INCIRLIK

1958
Adana
Air Base
Iskenderun
0 100 Miles
0 100 Kilometers
SYRIA
CYPRUS
A
SE
Tripolis
N
EA LEBANON
N
A
BEIRUT
R
R
E
IT
DAMASCUS
D
E
M
Haifa
YEL LOW
XX B EAC H
AMLANFOR
B LUE
B EAC H
JERUSALEM AMMAN
B EI RU T
GREEN Gaza
BEAC H
Olive Groves
Borj el Brajni JORDAN
ISRAEL
TF 201 El Hadeth
RED AIR PORT Ouadi Chahrour

BEAC H
Olive Groves
Kafer Chima
Ech Choueifate
EGYPT
Map 7
plans needed to be revised. Both General Eddleman, the new Seventh
Army commander, and the USAREUR commander, General Henry I.
Hodes, complained that the commitment of two battle groups from the
24th Infantry Division had deprived that unit of almost half of its infantry
strength and a large portion of its support force. Additionally, the remaining
three battle groups had to be stripped of airborne-qualified personnel to
provide fillers for the deploying elements. The U.S. European Command and
NATO commander, U.S. Air Force General Lauris Norstad, complained to
the Department of the Army and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that one of only
five American divisions under his command had been rendered combat
ineffective for the duration of the deployment. All three senior officers
questioned the wisdom of committing USAREUR forces to a Middle Eastern
deployment when that was exactly the mission of STRAC.59
Despite the apparent success of the ad hoc headquarters and staff
established under General Adams, an analysis of the operation by the
deputy chief of staff for operations concluded that the contingency plan
needed a predetermined, existing ground force headquarters. Further, the
headquarters already provided for in current plans, the XVIII Airborne
Corps headquarters, should be utilized for this purpose. Other observations
included the by-now obligatory requirement for sufficient airlift to ensure
mission success. To facilitate coordination with the Air Force, the deputy
chief of staff for operations recommended establishing a joint command
post at the departure airfields, particularly to clear load plans and avoid
confusion before departure. On the positive side, observers had hailed the
value of the USNS Comet, a roll-on/roll-off cargo ship that had transported
seventy tanks along with other vehicles from Bremerhaven, Germany, to
Beirut, Lebanon. The staff analysis strongly encouraged the acquisition of
five more vessels of exactly that type.60
MISSILES AND MORE MISSILES
The successful Soviet satellite launch in 1957 continued to influence

U.S. military policy in 1958. In January, the president requested, and the
Congress approved, a $1.2 billion emergency appropriation to accelerate
work on missiles and to otherwise strengthen the nation’s retaliatory power.
The House Appropriations Committee earmarked a large portion of the
additional funding for advancing the development of second-generation
versions of the Army’s Lacrosse, Little John, and Sergeant missiles. As part of
the discussion regarding the new money, Secretary McElroy announced that
he had lifted the 200-mile limitation on Army missiles. With that in mind,
59. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles K. Gailey, Ch Civil Affairs, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Os, 19 Dec
1958, sub: Lessons Learned in Lebanon Operation; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch
Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Oct 1958, sub: Lessons Learned From Lebanon Operations;
both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP;
Carter, Forging the Shield, 356–58.
60. Carter, Forging the Shield, 356–58; Memo, Maj. Gen. C. K. Gailey, Ch Civil Affairs, for
Vice Ch Staff, 19 Dec 1958, sub: Lessons Learned in Lebanon Operation, File Unit: Entry
EVOLUTION 259
he then directed the Army to hasten the development of its new Pershing,
solid-fuel ballistic missile, designated to replace the older Redstone.61
In an operation designated Project Ammo, the Army staged a massive
two-day field demonstration of its missile firepower from 30 June to 1 July at
Fort Bliss, Texas. Before a gallery of 500 military, government, and industrial
observers, and with news stations broadcasting from coast to coast, the
service hosted a program of lectures, maneuvers, and live firings, showcasing
its full repertoire of missiles. The launches included the Hawk and Nike
Hercules air-defense missiles, the Honest John rocket, and the Corporal
missile. In addition to the missile shots, the program also demonstrated the
Army’s various helicopters, most armed with machine guns and rockets,
illustrating the new air cavalry tactics under development at the aviation
school. Media accounts speculated about whom the Army show had been
designed to impress, with most assuming that the Army was directing the
display at potential allies and enemies. One “informed source,” however,
reported that the demonstration intended to counter the recent blitz of
publicity surrounding the Air Force’s development of intercontinental
ballistic missiles.62
That view received further support toward the end of the year as officials
rushed to declassify and release a film highlighting the service’s commitment
to modern weapons and tactics. In The Sharper Sword and the Stronger
Shield, the Army’s Public Information Office again highlighted the various
Army missiles, but also introduced weapons still on the drawing board,
such as the Davy Crockett atomic projectile and the Redeye low-level air
defense weapon. The Army vice chief of staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer,
cautioned the filmmakers to eliminate any unduly pessimistic views or
statements that reflected a “can’t-do” attitude.63 Any focus or overemphasis
on the Army’s shortcomings, he said, would have an adverse effect on the
morale and confidence within the service.64
Throughout the year, the Army and the Air Force continued their ongoing
blood feud over the continental air defense mission. After Sputnik, the
61. John D. Morris, “House Unit Votes 1.2 Billion Fund to Speed Missiles,” New York Times,
22 Jan1958; “200-Mile Limit Off Tactical Missiles, Army Times, 15 Feb 1958.
62. Monte Bourjaily Jr. “Army Kicks Off Project Ammo,” Army Times, 28 Jun 1958; Gladwin
Hill, “Army Shows Off Its Rocket Might,” New York Times, 1 Jul 1958; “Army Missiles Awe
Crowd at Big Shoot,” Army Times, 12 Jul 1958; Capt. Charles G. Wellborn Jr., “Project
AMMO,” Army Information Digest 13 (Sep 1958): 32–43.
63. MFR, Maj. Gen. Harry P. Storke, Ch Info, 10 Dec 1958, sub: Meeting With the Vice
Chief of Staff on The Sharper Sword and the Stronger Shield; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
64. Memo, Brig. Gen. Richard Collins, Director of Plans and Programs, for Sec Gen Staff,
4 Dec 1958; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
competition had shifted from defending against oncoming enemy aircraft to

deciding which service was best positioned to develop a system capable of
shooting down incoming missiles. On 13 January, the secretary of defense
outlined before Congress plans for the creation of the Advanced Research
Projects Agency within the Department of Defense. To that agency, he would
assign the responsibility for the direction of space projects and antimissile
missile programs. Three days later, on 16 January, McElroy assigned to
the Army the authority to proceed with the development of its Nike Zeus
antimissile program. To the Air Force, he assigned the responsibility for the
development of long-range radar detection in this field.65
The Air Force responded with its usual vehemence. Testifying before
a closed session of the House Armed Services Committee, Air Force Lt.
Gen. Donald L. Pruitt accused the secretary of being premature in his
decision. Pruitt expressed his “grave” concerns over the costs involved in
the Army’s project and stated that the Air Force was not convinced that the
Army’s approach was the best.66 Instead, the Air Force general touted the
potential of its own Wizard antimissile project, which the secretary had
ordered shelved.67
In June, Secretary of the Army Brucker fired back in testimony before
the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Brucker described the
intense effort his service had devoted to development of the antimissile
system. He noted that the project was being administered by the same Army-
Industry team that had produced both the Nike Ajax and the Nike Hercules
air-defense missiles. Under the supervision of the Army Ordnance Missile
Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, the Western Electric Company
acted as the single systems manager with the Bell Telephone Laboratories as
the research and development agency and the Douglas Aircraft Company
as the principal subcontractor. Other supporting industry leaders included
RCA (Radio Corporation of America), Goodyear Aircraft Company, Sperry
Gyroscope Company, and the Stanford Research Institute. Brucker offered
his opinion that this was the best qualified team in the western world for
the development of surface-to-air missiles. Left unmentioned, but obvious
NACP; MFR, Storke, 10 Dec 1958, sub: Meeting With the Vice Chief of Staff on The Sharper
Sword and the Stronger Shield.
65. Exec Sess., Review of National Defense Before the House Armed Services Committee, 85th
Cong. (21 Jan 1958), File Unit: Entry A1 1709, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958–1962,
Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP; Fairchild and Poole,
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 48–49.
66. Jack Raymond, “Air Force Scores McElroy Over Army’s Missile Role,” New York Times,
22 Feb 1958.
67. Raymond, “Air Force Scores McElroy Over Army’s Missile Role.”
EVOLUTION 261
to his congressional audience, were the large number and wide range of
constituencies involved in supporting the effort.68
Research and development continued through the end of the year, but the
interservice sniping did not seem to have abated. In a discussion with the
secretary of defense over the Office of the Secretary of Defense markup of
the Army budget for fiscal year 1960, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A.
Quarles pointed out that, although the Army had been given the green light
to develop the Nike Zeus, it had no priority for production, employment,
or fielding. When General Taylor expressed his belief in the importance of
fielding the system as soon as possible, Quarles, who had served as secretary
of the Air Force until 1957, repeated his assertion that the project had no
national priority when it came to production. Secretary McElroy intervened
and agreed with Taylor, saying that the Defense Department should establish
a priority for the system’s production as soon as all the components had
been approved. General Taylor predicted that, with full support, the Army
could begin operational deployment by 1963.69
The Army missile program’s finest hour came late one evening in January
1958. On 8 November 1957, the Department of Defense had directed
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, under Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, to
prepare a Jupiter-C missile for a satellite launch. Medaris and his director of
operations, Wernher von Braun, promised to have a missile ready for launch
in ninety days. Then, in early December, the Navy’s Vanguard satellite failed
to leave the launch pad, and all eyes turned to Medaris and his team. Their
modified Jupiter-C missile rose off the launch pad at Cape Canaveral and
boosted the Explorer 1 satellite into orbit on 31 January 1958, six days ahead
of their ninety-day promise.70
In recognition of this success—and to shorten the chain of command be-
tween the general’s headquarters and the service leadership—in March, the
Army established the Ordnance Missile Command and named Medaris as its
first commander. In that position, he exercised direct control over the Army
Ballistic Missile Agency, his old command; the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at
68. Statement, Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Department
of Defense Appropriations, 85th Cong. (9 Jun 1958), File Unit: Entry A1 87, Series: Security
Classified Records Regarding Congressional Bills, 1955–1964, Subgroup: Chief, Legislative
Liaison, RG 335: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, NACP.
69. MFR, Col. Willis D. Crittenberger Jr., Sec, Program Advisory Committee, 2 Dec 1958,
sub: 24 November Discussion with the Secretary of Defense on the OSD Markup of the
Army Budget, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
70. “Explorer in Orbit,” Army Information Digest 13 (Apr 1958): 5–7; Maj. Gen. John B.
Medaris, “The Explorer Satellites and How We Launched Them,” Army Information Digest
13 (Oct 1958): 4–16.
Explorer 1, boosted by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency’s

Jupiter-C missile, nears launching time from the agency’s
firing laboratory, located at the Florida Missile Test Range
in Cape Canaveral, Florida. (U.S. Army, National Archives
Pasadena, California; the proving ground at White Sands, New Mexico; and
the Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama. Redstone would then be des-
ignated as the Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency. The new alignment
gave Medaris direct access to the Army secretary and the chief of staff. The
Army Ballistic Missile Agency would continue to be responsible for weapons
development of the Jupiter, Redstone, and Pershing missiles as well as any space
projects assigned to the Army using components of those systems.71
71. “Medaris Heads New Unit as Army Cuts Red Tape,” Washington Post, 21 Mar 1958; “U.S.
Army Ordnance Missile Command Established,” Army Information Digest 13 (Jul 1958):
41–43.
EVOLUTION 263
Based upon the successful launch of Explorer 1 in January and a sec-

ond satellite, Explorer 3, in March, President Eisenhower directed the
Department of Defense to begin preparing missiles for exploratory probes to
the moon as well as for additional Earth satellites. To that end, the Advanced
Research Projects Agency allocated $8 million to the Army, Air Force, and
Navy. Guidance from the secretary of defense and the director of Advanced
Research Projects Agency, Roy W. Johnson, authorized the Air Force to
launch up to three lunar probes using the first stage of its Thor missile, the
second stage of the Navy’s Vanguard, and a third stage yet to be developed.
The two men directed the Army to prepare for two possible lunar launches
using its existing Jupiter-C missile. They also expected the Army to pro-
vide the launch platform for up to three additional Earth satellites. Navy
research would focus on ground scanning systems for future use in lunar
exploration vehicles.72
Army exuberance over its preeminent role in space exploration proved
to be short-lived. At the same time that the president had directed and
authorized service missions to probe the lunar surface, he was reconsidering
the proper role for the military in the exploration of outer space. He held
the opinion that information acquired by scientific exploration should be
made freely available throughout the world. By its very nature, however,
military research would require secrecy. Because national morale and
prestige could be boosted by a successful space program, he concluded that
it should be administered by a civilian agency. On 2 April, he asked Congress
to establish NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration).
The new agency began operations on 1 October under the direction of
Thomas Keith Glennan.73
Almost immediately, the new agency and the Army came to loggerheads.
By executive order, President Eisenhower transferred all functions of the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology from
Army direction to NASA. Only work specifically related to the development
of the Army’s Sergeant missile would remain under service control. NASA
presented a plan to the Department of Defense in which the space agency
would take over large segments of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency and the
facilities at Redstone Arsenal.74
72. Edward Gamarekian, “Ike Orders Moon Area Exploration,” Washington Post, 28 Mar
1958; “New Moon Missions Cheer Technicians,” Army Times, 5 Apr 1958.
Doubleday, 1960), 256–59.
74. Draft EO, U.S. Dept. of Def, 24 Nov 1958, Transferring Certain Functions from the
Department of Defense to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Memo, Dep
Sec Def Donald A. Quarles for Sec Brucker, 20 Nov 1958; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Two of the Army’s leading authorities on the service’s missile program

wasted no time in contesting the proposed action. At the 1958 Association
of the United States Army conference in October, General Medaris told
reporters that such a move would be disastrous and perhaps even fatal to
the nation’s missile progress. Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, the Army’s chief
of research and development, added that he could not believe that anyone
would do away with the capability of the most experienced element in the
nation to explore space. Both generals strongly suggested that Air Force
infighting had more than a little to do with the proposed breakup of the
Army program.75
Despite this opposition, the Army and the Department of Defense agreed
to transfer to NASA the facilities at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory along with
Army research and development funds, amounting to slightly more than
$4 million, for support of planned research at the lab in the coming year.
They also agreed to phase out Army military projects at the lab gradually,
with the exception of continued development of the Sergeant missile. The
Department of Defense, however, supported Army objections to the transfer
of any part of the Ballistic Missile Agency. Deputy Secretary of Defense
Quarles informed NASA that the Army team was essential to high-priority
defense programs and could not be spared. He did allow that portions of the
agency could be made available for the space agency’s use and that a NASA
technical operations group could be located at the Ballistic Missile Agency
headquarters to maintain direct communication with personnel working on
NASA projects.76
By the end of the year, it was clear that the Army was on the losing end of
this proposition. The president firmly believed in having a civilian agency in
charge of the nation’s space exploration program. It was equally clear that the
nation’s brightest and most experienced scientists and researchers in the field
were currently employed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. Eisenhower
had worked closely with Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson to
shepherd the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 through Congress
in accordance with his vision. It was only a matter of time before both the
Army and the Defense Department would have to cede proponency in this
area to NASA.77
75. Albon B. Hailey, “Army Fights Proposal to Transfer Its Space Experts to Civilian Agency,”
Washington Post, 23 Oct 1958; Jack Raymond, “2 Generals Fight Move to Break Up Army
Space Team,” New York Times, 23 Oct 1958.
76. Memo, Wilber M. Brucker, Sec Army, for Dep Sec Def, 24 Nov 1958, sub: Transfer of
Army Facilities to NASA, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Quarles for Brucker, 20 Nov 1958.
77. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 257.
EVOLUTION 265
By the end of 1958, the Army again seemed to be a service in search of a

mission. It had staked its claim to the atomic battlefield with the pentomic
division, but leaders throughout the service already were calling that
reorganization into question. The Army had invested considerable effort
and funding into expanding its role in continental air defense, but seemingly
endless bureaucratic battles with the other services had blunted its successes
in this area, and its most ambitious project, the Nike Zeus antimissile
missile, had encountered technical obstacles that now threatened its path
forward. Before the service could even savor its successful contributions to
the space effort, that mission was also in peril. Once again, Army leaders
felt compelled to seek a more substantial role in Eisenhower’s concept for
national defense.
THE SPECIAL WARFARE DEBATE
In January 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested a new direction when
they asked each of the services to review their worldwide unconventional
warfare capabilities to determine whether adequate emphasis had been
placed on that type of warfare. In developing a response, the chief of Army
special warfare, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr., observed that nuclear parity
had reduced the deterrent value of strategic air power. The United States
could offset some of that loss by maintaining a capability to exploit internal
instabilities and resistance within the states of the Soviet Bloc. The existence
of a large-scale U.S. unconventional warfare capability would undoubtedly
be known to the Soviets through their intelligence system and would act as
a deterrent to their aggression. It would create in the Soviets a continuing
concern over the reliability of satellite support and their armed forces. Units
left in place to operate behind an advancing Soviet front posed an additional
threat. U.S. Army Special Forces, he concluded, were the most appropriate
instrument for exploiting potential resistance in the Soviet satellites
and periphery.78
The Joint Services Capabilities Plan had defined unconventional warfare
as being composed of three interrelated activities: guerrilla warfare, escape
and evasion, and subversion against hostile states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
had assigned to the Army the primary responsibility for guerrilla warfare.
This responsibility included the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques,
procedures, and equipment, and the training of U.S. personnel in guerrilla
78. Memo, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel, Ch Special Warfare, for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops,
5 Feb 1958, sub: Review of World-wide U.S. Army Unconventional Warfare Capabilities,
File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955– 1962, RG 319, NACP.
warfare. The Joint Chiefs’ guidance had not directed the Army to provide a
specific number of special forces billets but left it to subordinate commanders
to establish these numbers based upon their perceived unconventional
warfare requirements.79
The number of appropriate units and personnel available to the Army
in 1958 did not match anticipated requirements. Some senior commanders
could not justify retaining large numbers of troops for a mission they
did not fully understand or support when they were already taking such
drastic cuts in the number of combat troops at their disposal. In 1956, at
the recommendation of the USAREUR commander, General Anthony C.
McAuliffe, the Army had reduced the 10th Special Forces Group in Germany
from 872 to an authorized strength of 279. A year later, it had reduced the
strength of the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg from 1,404 to 969.
In Okinawa, Japan, the recently activated 1st Special Forces Group was the
smallest of all with a strength of 115. In his report to the chief of staff, General
Troxel recommended that allocation of Army personnel spaces designated
for special forces should be more than doubled, from 1,363 to 3,545 for the
coming fiscal year.80
Other leaders throughout the Army already had begun to grasp the
potential for expanding the Army’s special forces. While serving as
the deputy commander in chief of U.S. European Command, General
George H. Decker had written to the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointing out the
need for an increase in unconventional warfare capabilities in Europe. He
asked the chiefs to reassess the usefulness of those forces as both a cold
war and hot war weapon. The deputy chief of staff for operations, General
Eddleman, also directed his staff to develop a program that would provide
a capability for guerrilla warfare in the event of a limited conflict in the
Middle East.81
At the highest level, however, the Army’s senior leadership could not
endorse the campaign to bolster unconventional warfare capabilities.
When staff officers briefed the deputy chief of staff for operations, General
Lemnitzer, on their recommendation to increase the number of special
forces personnel by more than 2,000, the general indicated that the request
was just another requirement that could not be filled. He also intimated
79. Memo, Troxel for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Feb 1958, sub: Review of World-wide U.S.
Army Unconventional Warfare Capabilities.
80. Memo, Troxel for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 5 Feb 1958, sub: Review of World-wide U.S.
Army Unconventional Warfare Capabilities.
81. MFR, Col. Page E. Smith, Ch United Nations Plans and Policy Br, 9 Jan 1958, sub:
Development of Requirements and a Capability to Meet These Requirements in a Limited
War Situation in the Middle East, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955–
1962, RG 319, NACP.
EVOLUTION 267
that requirements such as this came at the expense of the fighting forces
and would lead to the deterioration of the Army’s overall combat strength.
Lemnitzer suggested that requirements for additional special forces would
have to be met with reserve elements, or possibly even indigenous troops.
General Taylor also questioned the rationale for increasing special forces
units. He supported conclusions from the deputy chief of staff for operations
that the Army’s doctrine, tactics, and preparations for guerrilla warfare were
adequate and that the scope of training programs throughout the Army was
in balance with other training objectives. He suggested that the concept of
special forces had been extended beyond its original intent. At any rate, he
concluded, he could not spare any additional spaces at this time.82
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS AND

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Notwithstanding Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s brinksmanship

over continued Allied occupation in Berlin, by 1958 much of the Army’s
attention overseas had begun to shift toward Southeast Asia.83 The increasing
commitment to South Vietnam, obligations incurred through the 1954
Manila Pact (which established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), and
the simmering conflict with China over the offshore islands of Quemoy and
Matsu had dramatically raised the importance of military assistance efforts
throughout the region. In each of these, the Army played a major role.
On 23 August, without warning, Chinese Communists initiated an
artillery bombardment of more than 55,000 rounds, lasting more than two
hours, against the Chinese Nationalist–controlled islands in the Taiwan
Strait. Although President Eisenhower was loathe to intervene directly,
various agencies within the U.S. Department of Defense took steps to
reinforce Chinese Nationalist forces and to persuade the Communists
that the costs of attacking Nationalist-controlled territory would be
prohibitively high.84
On 3 September, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt,
announced new command relationships in Taiwan that would enable
82. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Lemnitzer, 9 Sep 1958; sub: U.S. Army Guerilla [sic]
Warfare Activities; Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Taylor, 10 Sep 1958, sub: U.S. Army
Guerilla [sic] Warfare Activities; MFR, Brig Gen S. E. Gee, 6 Oct 1958, sub: U.S. Army
Guerilla [sic] Warfare Activities; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
83. This topic is covered in much greater detail in Carter, Forging the Shield.
84. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 292–304.
U.S. military headquarters there to transition from a primary function

of coordination to that of conducting military operations. A week later,
Admiral Felt established the Taiwan Defense Command with three
subordinate service elements. The chief of the military assistance advisory
group (MAAG) on Taiwan, Brig. Gen. Lester S. Bork, was designated as
the commanding general of U.S. Army Forces, Taiwan. In addition to the
Army advisory personnel already on Taiwan, Bork’s command included
the 2d Missile Battalion, 71st Artillery (Nike Hercules), which decamped
to the island as part of the fiscal year 1959 military assistance program, as
well as various signal and engineer units that accompanied it. By October,
the organization had grown from its normal complement of roughly 135
advisory personnel to more than 1,800. The Army also began actions to
bring the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i to its full authorized strength
and reviewed plans to augment the division with one or more battle groups
from the continental United States.85
Although the Army forces saw no combat action, the advisory personnel
worked around the clock to familiarize Nationalist troops with U.S. equipment
and doctrine. The Army shipped sixty-six M41 light tanks with 76-mm.
guns from the United States to replace outdated M5 Stuart light tanks that
mounted 37-mm. guns. To provide counterbattery fire against the incoming
Communist artillery barrages, the United States also shipped thirty-six
155-mm. guns, twelve 8-inch howitzers, and twelve 240-mm. howitzers from
various stocks around the world to Taiwan. Artillery advisory teams provided
additional training on current counterbattery techniques and accompanied
Nationalist gun crews to the embattled islands to observe operations on-site.
As the crisis abated, an analysis from the deputy chief of staff for operations
indicated that, although the military assistance programming for Taiwan
had been adequate for peacetime operations, it was neither adequate nor
adaptable to support a tactical or combat operation logistically.86
Across the rest of Southeast Asia, U.S. Army military advisers experienced
various degrees of success as they attempted to spread the gospel of collective
defense. In September 1954, after the French disaster at Điện Biên Phủ and
the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, the United States had entered
into another collective defense treaty. Along with Britain, France, Australia,
85. Memo, Gen. I. D. White, Cdr, U.S. Army, Pacific, for Ch Staff, 20 Nov 1958, sub: Special
Report-Taiwan Emergency, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
86. Memo, White for Ch Staff, 20 Nov 1958, sub: Special Report-Taiwan Emergency; Memo,
Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 30 Oct 1958, sub: Lessons
Learned from Quemoy (Chinmen) Operations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
EVOLUTION 269
New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, the United States
had signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Unlike NATO’s
treaty, this treaty called for no standing military forces and entailed no firm
obligations on the part of the signatories. It did, however, open the door for
increased U.S. military aid to member nations. At the same time, a separate
protocol extended the treaty’s security provisions to Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam if those countries requested assistance.87
Early in 1958, a visit by U.S. Army, Pacific, commander, General Isaac D.
White, provided some indication of the progress of U.S. military assistance
programs in countries throughout Southeast Asia. White noted, primarily, the
excellent relationships between the various assistance groups and their host
countries, with the exception of Cambodia. There, he observed that French
military personnel retained an active role in military assistance and training
and seemed particularly interested in perpetuating a colonial administration
over the country. Across most of the other locations, he reported that more
emphasis seemed to be placed on rebuilding military equipment instead
of training operators to maintain it properly. He expressed doubts over the
advisability of providing more modern equipment to most of the supported
nations, suggesting instead that a better course would be to standardize a
minimum number of models of the simplest types of equipment. Although
the U.S. Army’s ultimate goal was to develop trained ground combat forces,
primarily infantry, it had to take into account the inherent capabilities and
limitations of the nations concerned. U.S. advisers, he concluded, should not
necessarily attempt to pattern indigenous forces too closely on U.S. models.88
In Laos, a guerrilla insurgency threatened to overthrow the monarchy
there and to tip another domino toward the region’s fall to communism. In
November, the U.S. Department of Defense decided to upgrade an existing
covert Programs Evaluation Office there to a full-scale MAAG-type of
organization. The U.S. Army, Pacific, sent an initial group of seven officers
in November to begin planning and observing operator use of American-
supplied equipment. A larger group, under the direction of Brig. Gen.
John A. Heintges, prepared to deploy to the capitol city of Vientiane in
January 1959 to establish the new headquarters.89
in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 229.
88. Memo, Gen. I. D. White, Cdr, U.S. Army, Pacific, for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 18 Mar
1958, sub: Report of Visit by CINCUSARPAC to Southeast Asian Countries, File Unit:
89. Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Acting Ch Staff, for Gen. C. B. Erskine, 20 Oct 1958,
sub: Proposed Cold War Planning Team for Laos; Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Vice
Ch Staff, for Adm. Burke, 19 Dec 1958, sub: The Establishment of a MAAG in Vientianne,
The linchpin for Army planning in Southeast Asia, however, remained

South Vietnam. In addition to the ongoing activities of the MAAG, the Army
spent much of 1958 developing contingency plans for the introduction of
U.S. combat troops there. Following Pacific Command’s requests for Army
calculations regarding the airlift of troops from Korea to Vietnam, General
White exchanged a series of letters with General Taylor discussing the ability
of his command to support such contingencies. He reminded the chief of
staff that, because of continued troop reductions, U.S. divisions in Korea
consisted of up to 25 percent KATUSA soldiers. The percentage of KATUSA
soldiers in service units was considerably higher. White believed that those
divisions could not be deployed elsewhere without a significant number of
U.S. replacements.90
Later discussions identified the 25th Infantry Division, stationed in
Hawai‘i, to be the initial source for U.S. Army combat troops to deploy to
Vietnam. When the Department of the Army tasked U.S. Army, Pacific, to
establish a forward depot in the Philippines to support potential operations
in Southeast Asia, White again had to remind Taylor that the force
reductions had eliminated almost all of the stockage in Japan to the point
that any further reduction threatened his own mission in Korea. Support for
contingency operations in Vietnam, he said, would have to come from the
25th Division, or from STRAC forces based in the United States.91
General White had taken care to maintain the 4th U.S. Army Missile
Command and two helicopter companies at full strength, with the expecta-
tion that they deploy where needed and provide atomic firepower to other
Army combat units. Taylor informed him, however, that the missile com-
mand had been stationed in Korea to support United Nations Command
forces, and that any movement away from Korea would require approval
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nonetheless, Taylor told White, that restric-
tion should not preclude him from planning for its later deployment.92
Meanwhile, Army advisers as well as American political and diplomatic
representatives were learning to deal with South Vietnam’s president, Ngô
Đình Diệm. After four years in office, Diệm enjoyed support in the United
States, being hailed as the potential savior of Southeast Asia. Members of the
Laos; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
90. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 19 Feb 1958; Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to
Adm. Felix B. Stump, Cdr in Ch, Pacific Cmd, 12 Mar 1958; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68,
Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1955– 1962, RG 319, NACP.
91. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 15 Jul 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68,
92. Ltr, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to Gen. I. D. White, 2 Sep 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 68,
EVOLUTION 271
U.S. country team in Saigon, however, were beginning to paint a different

picture. The Vietnamese president’s obsession with security, coupled with
his neglect for many of the economic and agrarian reforms U.S. advisers
believed necessary, seemed to provide fertile ground for continued social
and political unrest. In October, General Taylor and General Samuel T.
Williams, commander of the MAAG in Vietnam, met with President Diệm.
Diệm maintained that even though the South Vietnamese Army was making
great strides, the Viet Minh were also redoubling their efforts. He asked the
U.S. military representatives to provide him with all the help they could, for,
in his words, Vietnam was the bastion of Southeast Asia.93
CONTINUING THE SEARCH FOR AN IDENTITY
By the end of 1958, the Army seemed no closer to identifying its path forward
than it had been at the beginning of the year. Its enthusiastic embrace of
atomic weapons and the pentomic organization had raised more questions
than the changes had answered. The service’s success in the field of ballistic
missiles had won it some acclaim in the dawning exploration of outer space,
but even that had been overcome quickly by the impending loss of those
assets to the newly founded national space administration. Research and
development of other missiles, particularly in the field of air defense, seemed
promising, but were also prohibitively expensive and came at the cost of
investment in more basic military technology. Now, only unconventional
warfare and counterinsurgency, esoteric as they were, offered hope as causes
the Army could champion as part of the modern defense establishment.
93. Spector, Advice and Support, 304–5; Memo of Conversation, President Diệm, Gen.
Maxwell D. Taylor, Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, Howard
Elting Jr., 29 Oct 1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
7
Moving Forward
The year 1959 promised to be a very busy one for President Dwight D.
Eisenhower. Political events in the penultimate year of his second
administration presented challenges and possibilities with respect to
his New Look strategic policy. In November 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev had notified the Western Allies of his intent to sign a peace
treaty with East Germany, thereby terminating their rights in West Berlin.
Alarmed by the implications of the announcement, U.S. and Allied military
and political leaders began examining their options in the event the East
Germans challenged their access to the city. Both sides seemed to look for
ways to step back when, in July 1959, Vice President Richard M. Nixon
traveled to Moscow to help open a U.S. trade and cultural exhibition there.
At the same time, Khrushchev began dropping hints that he might like to
travel to the United States. The Soviet leader’s subsequent visit in September
included a state dinner at the White House and two days of meetings with
President Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland. The exchange of visits
seemed to generate a sense of good will and, for the moment, overshadowed
the imminent threats surrounding Berlin. It was against this political
backdrop that the United States Army continued to reassess its organization,
technology, and doctrine as it prepared for a new decade.1
Doubleday, 1960), 434–49; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for
Ch Staff, 15 Jan 1959, sub: Status of Actions Relating to the Berlin Crisis, File Unit: Entry
A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter SCGC
RESHUFFLING THE DECK
As had been the case for several previous years, 1959 brought with it
extensive turnover in many of the key leadership positions in the American
national security establishment. None of these was more significant than
the passing of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Eisenhower’s close
friend and confidant died of colon cancer in May. Although Dulles had
been staunchly anti-Communist and one of the earliest apostles of massive
retaliation, he had, near the end of his life, begun to question the utility of
the nation’s nuclear stockpile. He had come to support forward-deployed
conventional forces in what he considered to be important overseas areas and
had even proposed a national sales tax to help pay for additional funding for
limited warfare capabilities. The new secretary of state, Christian A. Herter,
brought solid credentials to the position. Like Dulles, he was ardently anti-
Communist, but he lacked the close personal connection with Eisenhower
that Dulles had enjoyed.2
Toward the end of the year, Eisenhower would also lose his secretary of
defense, Neil H. McElroy. McElroy had announced his intention to retire
early in the year, but he stayed on for several months in light of Dulles’s
imminent death. The sudden heart attack and death in May of Deputy
Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles further complicated the transition.
Quarles had been the logical successor to McElroy, and his loss, coupled
with that of Dulles, left gaping holes in the national security establishment
that took time to repair. McElroy eventually retired at the end of November,
to be replaced by the new deputy secretary, Thomas S. Gates Jr. Gates had
served as a naval officer in the Mediterranean and the Pacific during World
War II and had held the positions of undersecretary and, later, secretary of
the Navy throughout the Eisenhower administration.3
Gates took office amid renewed budget debates and with a divided Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who still were unable to reach consensus on roles, missions,
1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records
of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP);
Memo, Foy D. Kohler for the Sec [unspecified], 29 Oct 1959, sub: Report on Khrushchev’s
Visit to the United States, File Unit: Entry UD 53, Series: Chairman’s Files, Twining, 1957–
1960, RG 218: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP.
2. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 361–69; Memo of Conversation, President Eisenhower and
Sec State John Foster Dulles, 30 Nov 1958; Memo of Discussion at the 384th Meeting of
the National Security Council, 30 Oct 1958; both in Foreign Relations of the United States,
1958–1960 (hereinafter FRUS 1958–1960), vol. 3, National Security Policy; Arms Control
and Disarmament (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 139–45, 153.
3. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Now Pentagon Faces a Crisis of Leadership,” New York Times,
17 May 1959; Jack Raymond, “New Chief of Defense Faces Large Problems,” New York
Times, 6 Dec 1959.
MOVING FORWARD 275
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (U.S. Army, National Archives

and an equitable division of available defense funds. Although Gates was a

firm supporter of most naval programs, particularly the service’s emerging
Polaris missile program, he made a stronger effort than his predecessors to
resolve differences between the services and reach some sort of agreement.
He frequently would insert himself into the service chiefs’ discussions and,
when necessary, make timely decisions to resolve split positions. Although
Gates was never completely successful, his presence would go a long way
toward easing some of the tension that existed between the service chiefs.4
For the Army, the most significant change occurred at the end of July when
General Maxwell D. Taylor retired after completing his second two-year term
as chief of staff. Replacing Taylor was General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, who had
4. Donald A. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” Journal of Military History 71, no.
4 (Oct 2007): 1196.
Thomas S. Gates Jr. (second from left) is sworn in as secretary of

defense by Frank K. Sanderson (right) as President Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Millicent A. Gates look on. (U.S. Army, National
been the vice chief of staff for the previous two years. Lemnitzer had served
as an antiaircraft brigade commander early in World War II before becoming
the assistant chief of staff for Allied Forces headquarters and, later, the deputy
chief of staff for Fifth Army in Italy. He was most noted for accompanying
General Mark W. Clark on a secret submarine mission to North Africa in
1942 to coordinate with French leaders before the North Africa invasion. He
also had been active in negotiations with Italian representatives before their
surrender in 1943. He had managed Allied discussions with the German
High Command in Switzerland in 1945, resulting in the surrender of Axis
forces in northern Italy and Austria at the end of the war. Although noted
as a diplomat and administrator, Lemnitzer also had commanded the
11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 7th Infantry
Division in Korea during the peak years of fighting there. After serving as
the vice chief of staff for two years, Lemnitzer was well acquainted with
Defense Department staff machinery and, to a greater extent than his two
MOVING FORWARD 277
Maj. Gen. Robert V. Lee (right) administers the oath of office to

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (left), the new chief of staff, as Secretary
Wilber M. Brucker (center) looks on. (U.S. Army, National Archives
predecessors, was firm in his belief that dissent should be registered only
through proper channels and terminated once a decision had been made.5
General George H. Decker replaced Lemnitzer as vice chief of staff.
Decker had served under General Walter Krueger as chief of staff of the Sixth
Army in the Pacific during World War II. He had been the comptroller of
the Army from 1952 to 1955 before moving first to Europe to command VII
Corps and then to Korea to command the Eighth Army. Like Lemnitzer’s,
Decker’s experience with the Army Staff and particularly as the comptroller
had given him a first-hand look at the Army’s struggle for relevance under
President Eisenhower. Now, although the service’s senior officers lacked the
renown for combat leadership of their predecessors, they perhaps possessed
5. Carter, “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” 1196; “New Chief is a Diplomat,” Army Times,
28 Mar 1959; Hanson W. Baldwin, “Three of Joint Chiefs Will Be Renamed,” New York
Times, 13 Mar 1959; Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Joint
Chiefs of Staff Nominations, 86th Cong. (23 Apr 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 1704, Series:
Congressional Hearings, 1958–1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG
319, NACP.
a greater understanding of the bureaucratic infighting required to move the

Army forward in the missile age.6
In pursuing that end, one of the principal tasks for 1959 was coming
to terms with organizational and operational changes required as part of
the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The establishment of a new chain
of command running from the president to the secretary of defense and
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commanders of unified and specified
combatant commands had altered many traditional Army methods and
procedures. The expanded Joint Staff had taken on additional operational
tasks and had assumed greater planning responsibilities. The Army Staff
had to adjust its planning scope and responsibilities accordingly. Although
Army leaders saw no need for major organizational changes within the
Department of the Army Staff, they continued to review the current
structure so that it would remain fully responsive to the demands of higher
authorities and staffs.7
Despite the flurry of memos and directives that had disseminated the
details of the legislation, some officers remained confused regarding how
their status might have changed under the new organization. General
Isaac D. White, the U.S. Army, Pacific, commander, expressed his concerns
to General Taylor early in the year. As commander of the Army component
serving in the Pacific Command, a unified command under a Navy admiral,
White requested clarification of the role he and his staff were to play in
the service of the unified commander. He considered his position to be
an essential adviser to the unified commander, but he wondered whether
the admiral ever would seek his advice. Taylor wrote back to White that
although the Joint Chiefs had not expected the act to produce any significant
changes in the internal procedures of the commands, the legislation already
was producing unintended consequences, which remained to be addressed.
Taylor promised to keep the U.S. Army, Pacific, commander informed. A
later clarification to the legislation directed unified commanders to exercise
command through the service component commanders, thus making them
also part of the chain.8
With an election year in sight, both Congress and the news media
renewed their discussion and analysis of the defense budget and the
6. MFR, Lt. Col. Ace L. Waters Jr., Gen Ops Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 11 Aug 1959, sub:
Orientation Briefings for General Decker, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
7. Memo, Col. H. A. Twitchell, Ch Coordination Gp, for Ch Legislative Liaison, 2 Dec 1959,
sub: Army Organizational Changes Made Pursuant to the DOD Reorganization Act of
1958, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
8. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White, Cdr, U.S. Army, Pacific, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 9 Jan 1959; Ltr,
Taylor to White, 5 Feb 1959; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
MOVING FORWARD 279
administration’s defense policies. Ever since the launch of Sputnik in 1957,

politicians, correspondents, and political commentators had played up the
notion of a growing missile gap between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Congress had entered the fray with Senators Lyndon B. Johnson
of Texas and William S. “Stuart” Symington of Missouri, both Democrats
and potential presidential candidates, publicly challenging administration
defense policies and demanding an “honest count” of U.S. missile capabilities
versus the Soviets.9 Early releases of the 1961 defense budget prompted
several statements by senators and representatives that the administration
was overly concerned with thrift. As campaigns began to ramp up for the
1960 presidential election, the military budget and the missile gap received
even greater levels of publicity.10
The Army benefited from the increased scrutiny as more news stories
echoed some of the complaints that Army leaders had been making for
years. In an editorial broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System,
correspondent A. Eric Sevareid noted that members of Congress were “tired
of forwarding General Taylor’s requests to the Pentagon and then receiving
word that the Joint Chiefs of Staff disapprove.”11 The pattern of the other
services padding their budgets at the expense of the Army had become all
too familiar, he said. Sevareid closed by reminding his listeners that if the
nation’s conventional forces proved to be inadequate, then the country may
have no choice but to resort to nuclear weapons.12
Budget negotiations during 1959 covered appropriations and expenditures
for the 1961 fiscal year and followed a predictable pattern. As always, the
president implored the Joint Chiefs to take a truly corporate approach
and to eliminate wasteful and duplicative spending. Each service prepared
estimates that emphasized its own capabilities and resource requirements
and minimized the percentage of defense funds that should be devoted to
its competitors. At the end of the year, Congress approved a defense budget
of just over $40.5 billion. Of that, the Army received a little less than $10
billion, roughly the same amount it had received the previous two years. In a
statement prepared for a House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations,
Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker declared that the budget provided

9. Jack Raymond, “Johnson to Open a Broad Inquiry on Arms Dispute,” New York Times,
18 Jan 1959.
10. Raymond, “Johnson to Open a Broad Inquiry on Arms Dispute.”
11. Eric Sevareid, “Army at Low Point,” reprinted from CBS broadcast in Army Times, 4 Apr
1959.
12. Sevareid, “Army at Low Point.”
for an active Army of 870,000, a reserve component paid drill strength of

630,000, and the necessary support for those forces.13
As the negotiations over the budget ended, General Lemnitzer directed
the Army Staff to prepare a study for Congress breaking down the allocation
of military personnel throughout the Army. He wanted to explain in detail
how the Army used its assigned strength to meet its responsibilities. More
to the point, he wanted to emphasize the large number of soldiers assigned
to tasks that were not directly combat related. Some 69,000 soldiers worked
for allies or other U.S. government agencies that did not support the Army’s
combat mission directly. These included those working for military assistance
advisory groups (MAAGs), those supporting joint headquarters such as
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and those directly supporting
the Department of Defense or other U.S. government departments or
services. Nearly 150,000 personnel at any given time were involved directly
in the Army training program, as students and instructors at Army schools
and training centers and as advisers in reserve component units. Subtracting
another 36,000 troops assigned to the Continental Air Defense Command
left the Army with around 615,000 soldiers to fill out the combat divisions
and support units deployed around the world.14
In March, the Army released its Manpower Program for the coming fiscal
year and the projected strengths of its deployed units. It would maintain
the five divisions in Europe at full strength. However, the service would be
unable to keep combat support and combat service support forces at the level
required for combat. Early reinforcement of troops in Europe in the event
of an emergency would be essential if the Army was to conduct sustained
combat there. The two divisions in Korea also would remain at reduced
strength, and they would be diluted with indigenous personnel. Support units
there would be austere and consist of more than 50 percent South Korean
augmentees. In the United States, the Army would retain three divisions
with minimum essential combat support and combat service support forces
to form the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). The III Corps headquarters at
Fort Hood, Texas, would be inactivated, and the four remaining divisions
2000), 40; Draft Statement for the Secretary of the Army, Hearing Before the Department
of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th
Cong. (23 Dec 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
14. Memo, Col. H. A. Twitchell, Ch Coordination Gp, for Army Staff Action Ofcrs, 12 Nov
1959, sub: Formulation of a Presentation to Explain Relation Between Number of U.S.
Army Divisions and Total Army Strength, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
MOVING FORWARD 281
in the continental United States would remain at minimal strength and be

engaged heavily in replacement training. One division minus a battle group
would stay in Hawai‘i, two battle groups in Alaska, and one battle group in
the Caribbean.15
As the Army prepared to reach its mandated personnel limit of 870,000,
its leaders debated over the number of divisions and major installations the
force could afford to maintain. Few on the Army Staff believed the service
could deploy more than fourteen divisions without hollowing out support
elements to a dangerous degree. With fewer major units to maintain, there
seemed to be less of a requirement for large-scale military installations
as well. When political leaders from the states of Louisiana and Arkansas
learned that the Army had proposed closing Fort Polk, Louisiana, and
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, they arranged a meeting with General Lemnitzer.
Senator Russell B. Long of Louisiana warned Lemnitzer that if the Army
closed Fort Polk, it also would lose access to the entire Louisiana Maneuver
Area. Certainly, the Louisiana political representation would not look kindly
upon any future Army attempts to regain access to the land. Perhaps in a bit
of overkill, Senator Allen J. Ellender, also of Louisiana, added that if the
Army was so concerned about saving money, then the Senate could easily
accommodate that concern by cutting its funding in other areas.16
After General Lemnitzer met with Secretary Brucker to discuss the
political implications of the base closings, the Army announced that it would
take no position with respect to the closing of specific installations based
upon future changes in force levels. Instead, the announcement concluded,
the service would attempt to maintain the best, most efficient, and most
economical force and installation structure under the authorized personnel
strength of the time.17
The Army Staff had conducted similar debates about closing Fort
Carson, Colorado, and inactivating the 9th Infantry Division, which was
stationed there. Fearing similar political repercussions, Secretary Brucker
recommended delaying or canceling the proposed inactivation. Instead,
the staff elected to reduce the division to less than half of its authorized
15. HQ, Dept. of the Army, FY 1960 Manpower Program, 6 Mar 1959, File Unit: Entry A1
16. Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 3 Jun 1959, sub:
Army Position on Fort Polk, Louisiana and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; MFR, Brig. Gen.
Charles G. Dodge, Dep Ch Legislative Liaison, 21 May 1959, sub: Meeting of the Louisiana
Delegation with the Acting Chief of Staff; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
17. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 18 Jun
1959, sub: Army Position on Fort Polk, Louisiana and Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, File Unit:
strength. The reduced-strength division would continue its assigned mission

of receiving packets of soldiers who had completed advanced individual
training and preparing them for deployment. As a result of this decision,
for the first time in several years, the number of active divisions and their
locations remained the same throughout the entire year.18
The steady reduction in Army force strength had other implications that
began to raise concerns in public forums in 1959. Editorials and features in
daily newspapers around the country began to question the Army’s reliance
upon foreign nationals to fill the ranks of its units deployed overseas. One
editorial in the Louisville Courier Journal likened the practice to the French
Foreign Legion or, even worse, the British use of Hessian mercenaries
during the American Revolution. In its response to the allegations, the
Army acknowledged that more than 15,000 soldiers of the Korean Army
were integrated as combatants into American Army units as of January 1959.
Almost 8,000 more Korean nationals served as noncombatant labor forces
on contract hire from the Korean government. In Germany and France,
the Army employed more than 15,000 individuals encompassing almost all
European nationalities to provide internal security and to augment Army
service troops performing noncombatant technical duties. The response
also mentioned the almost 2,000 foreign nationals who, having enlisted in
the Army under the Lodge Act, intended to become U.S. citizens. Many of
those had been refugees from Eastern Europe who now served in the 10th
Special Forces Group in Germany.19
The requirement for increasing numbers of technical support contractors
highlighted another challenge that the atomic-age Army now faced. Army
Staff papers noted that although modernization was essential, it increased
requirements for materiel, personnel, and logistical support. More
mechanics were needed for helicopters and other aircraft than for trucks,
and they took longer to train. Three battalions of helicopters could substitute
for four transportation truck battalions, but they required 800 maintenance
personnel instead of 108. In addition to the growing complexity of the
equipment, the dispersion of units inherent in the Army’s modern battle
18. Memo, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr., Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep
Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 22 Jun 1959, sub: Issues Unresolved by Secretary of the
Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP;
“Army to Cut 16 Units,” Army Times, 11 Apr 1959.
19. Fact Sheet, Col. E. N. Rowell, Ch Procurement Div, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 27 Mar
1959, sub: Use of Foreign Manpower by the United States Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
MOVING FORWARD 283
doctrine added to support requirements because of increased ammunition

and fuel consumption.20
MANPOWER FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE
One positive aspect of the reduced personnel authorizations for the Army was
its increased success in meeting recruiting and reenlistment goals. Because
the service required fewer soldiers, it could be more selective in considering
whom it recruited as well as whom it accepted into the ranks. Although the
peacetime draft continued and was supported strongly by service leadership
as a critical tool for filling the force, in 1959, the number of draftees inducted
into the Army dropped below 100,000 for the first time since before the
Korean War. The Army was creeping closer and closer toward becoming an
all-professional force.
At the beginning of the year, 537,728 soldiers, more than two-thirds of
the Army’s enlisted personnel, were regulars. The remaining 230,000 were
either draftees or reservists on active duty. Positive trends in recruiting and
reenlistment rates indicated that within a year or two, three-quarters of
the enlisted force would consist of regulars. In January, the Army reported
that more individuals had signed up for initial enlistments in the previous
six months than at any time since the early months of the Korean War.
Reenlistments also had steadily increased during the same period. Along
with the Army’s increased emphasis on recruiting and retention, Army
officials attributed this success to better career and training opportunities
throughout the service, public acceptance of the Army as technologically
advanced, and a general belief in a positive future in the military.21
The improved reenlistment rates, however, brought with them unintended
consequences. In April, the Department of the Army reported that, because
so many more soldiers were staying in the service, they could expect fewer
promotions in the coming year. Promotion quotas for fiscal year 1959 in the
top five enlisted ranks declined in every grade but the highest level, E–9 or
sergeant major. Well aware that their positive trends could spiral downward
quickly, Army officials announced that they would reexamine strength
20. Memo, Twitchell for Army Staff Action Ofcrs, 12 Nov 1959, sub: Formulation of a
Presentation to Explain Relation Between Number of U.S. Army Divisions and Total Army
Strength.
21. “First Enlistment Rate is Running High,” Army Times, 24 Jan 1959; “Army Nearing Goal
of All-Pro Force,” Army Times, 18 Apr 1959.
and grade figures in the coming months with the possibility of expanding
promotion quotas for the year.22
Despite the Army’s success in recruiting and reenlistment, service leaders
argued strongly in favor of extension of the Selective Service Act. Speaking
before the House Armed Services Committee in January, General Taylor
testified that experience gained before the Korean War, as well as current
studies on the subject, had convinced him that it would be impossible
to support the Army’s required strength without the draft. Although
recent legislation such as the new pay bill had proven beneficial, it was no
replacement for selective service. The chief of staff added that the draft
provided the Army with additional supplementary benefits. Practically all
of the service’s officer procurement programs benefited from the stimulus
of induction. Many college students who enrolled in ROTC (Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps) had been prompted by their draft status to seek the
opportunity to discharge their military obligation as officers. Taylor added
that the draft law also stimulated enlistments in the reserve components.
Without the draft, he concluded, the mobilization readiness of the reserves
could be seriously impaired.23
Despite the progress the service had made selling itself to the public,
General Taylor and others worried constantly about how they could improve
the image that the Army and its soldiers projected. At the Fort Jackson
Training Center in South Carolina, Maj. Gen. Christian H. Clarke Jr., the
commanding general, instituted a family-friendly program to help the new
recruits adjust to their transition to military life. To offset the “exaggerations
and distortions” frequently contained in letters home, General Clarke had
his regimental and company commanders send letters home to families
advising them of their trainee’s arrival and informing them of opportunities
to visit the post and its guest facilities.24 Leaders regularly advised trainees
that they could invite their families to Fort Jackson. Unit commanders
invited all trainees’ families to attend graduation ceremonies and the open
house sponsored by unit members afterward. The command provided a
“handsome album, commercially produced,” to the high schools or colleges
that outstanding trainees had attended.25 General Clarke concluded that his
22. “Stripes Drought Looms,” Army Times, 18 Apr 1959.

23. Testimony, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Hearing Before the House Armed Services Committee,
86th Cong. (27 Jan 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 1709, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958–
1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP.
24. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Christian H. Clarke to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 3 Apr 1959, File Unit:
25. Ltr, Clarke to Taylor, 3 Apr 1959.
MOVING FORWARD 285
system reached important objectives over a wide geographic area and was
effective at selling the Army to the public.26
In the U.S. Army, Pacific, General White took a somewhat different
approach. He believed that the Army needed to place more emphasis on
convincing soldiers of the important roles they had to play in the defense
of their country. His command promoted the theme “A Tough Job—A
Man to Do a Man’s Work.” Leaders would provide positive direction and
firm but just treatment. The Army could not match the glamor of flying
jet aircraft or furnish the relative comfort normally found aboard ships. It
should not try to hide the fact that soldiers would have to live in the mud
and, at times, perform many dangerous and unpleasant duties. It was up to
commanders, White concluded, to make each soldier feel that his service
had been appreciated and that he had made a worthwhile contribution to
his country.27
With recruiting and retention holding relatively stable, General Taylor
and Secretary Brucker devoted considerable attention to what had become
one of their most passionate interests, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps.
In guidance prepared for the major commanders, the Army’s leaders noted
that the dispersion, mobility, and lethality of the atomic battlefield required
a greater reliance upon the leadership of the service’s noncommissioned
officers. The primary task of commanders in peacetime, they said, was to
train their subordinate leaders to make decisions. Through this freedom of
action, subordinate leaders would develop initiative and gain experience.
Commanders need not lower standards in any way, but they had to expect
and even tolerate honest errors. Most important, senior personnel must
not usurp the responsibilities so sorely needed in the development of
junior leaders.28
Taylor pointed to several recent personnel actions related to the
Noncommissioned Officer Corps that would assist in their development
and to promote their prestige within the service. During the previous year,
the Army had initiated both an enlisted evaluation system, upon which to
base promotion qualification, and proficiency pay bonuses, which rewarded
enlisted soldiers rated highest in their field. The recent establishment of the
enlisted grades E–8 and E–9 for those noncommissioned officers holding
positions of the greatest responsibility already was helping to relieve the
rank compression that had existed in grade E–7. Other senior officers had
26. Ltr, Clarke to Taylor, 3 Apr 1959.
27. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, 19 Jan 1959, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
28. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert V. Lee, Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gens, 16 Apr 1959, sub: NCO
Corps, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
suggested utilization of some senior enlisted personnel in positions formerly

filled by warrant officers. This action, they said, would provide positions of
increased authority and responsibility for the noncommissioned officers
while also helping to alleviate existing warrant officer shortages in some
critical areas.29
The service’s interest in developing its junior leaders was not limited to
the Noncommissioned Officer Corps. Perhaps a greater personnel challenge
facing the Army leadership during this period was the retention of junior
officers. The unexpected rigor of military life coupled with the attraction of
flourishing job markets in the civilian world caused many to leave the Army
as soon as their service commitment had expired. General Taylor canvassed
his senior commanders requesting comments and recommendations
for increasing the attractiveness of military service. Most respondents
commented on the length of the training week, with one senior officer opining
that the Army must accept the five-day work week as an established concept
if the organization were to compete with civilian industry. Others frequently
mentioned unrealistic administrative requirements and insufficient numbers
of officers in training centers to permit rotation of duties. In reviewing the
recommendations, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Lt. Gen. James F.
Collins observed that a more realistic balance between training time and
other unit functions was a reasonable goal. However, given the constraints
on personnel and the amount of work to be accomplished, reductions in
requirements might not be feasible.30
Of all the personnel concerns facing the service, none troubled the
secretary of the Army more than the friction that had developed between
the active force and the reserves. In October, Secretary Brucker called for a
conference to which he invited senior officers and noncommissioned officers
from the Active Army, the Ready Reserve, and the National Guard. Calling
his concept “One Army,” the secretary aimed to resolve some of the mistrust
that had grown between the components. In an interview discussing his
goals, he said, “Previous assumptions that the Army, National Guard, and
Reserves were separate and apart should be analyzed and faced frankly.
29. Memo, Lee for Cmdg Gens, 16 Apr 1959, sub: NCO Corps; Memo, Col. Thomas W.
Otto, Adjutant Gen, for Adjutant Gen, 7 Oct 1959, sub: NCO Corps, File Unit: Entry A1
2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; U.S. Dept. of the Army,
“Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S. Dept. of Defense, Annual Report of
the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1960 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1961), 149–50.
30. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff, 20 Feb 1959, sub:
Increasing Army Attractiveness for Young Career Officers, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
MOVING FORWARD 287
The time has come for all elements to recognize and practice the concept of
One Army.”31
Brucker convened the conference for three days beginning on 19 October.
Perhaps its most memorable moments occurred on the second day, when
Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Milton A. Reckord addressed the attendees. Born in 1879
and the current adjutant general of Maryland, Reckord had enlisted in the
National Guard in 1901 and had been mobilized during both World War I
and World War II. He had begun the latter as the commander of the 29th
Infantry Division before assuming command of the III Corps area in the
United States. He later served as the theater provost marshal in the European
Theater of Operations. Reckord wasted no time before lighting into the Army
Staff for what he considered to be its deliberate actions to denigrate or even
destroy the National Guard. Despite federal laws, which placed national
guard divisions in higher priority for mobilization, Reckord accused the
Army Staff of a deliberate campaign to replace them with elements of the
Army Reserve. He directly addressed General Lemnitzer, suggesting that
Lemnitzer had to reorient the thinking toward the National Guard and its
dual status. If nothing else, Reckord’s address provided clear evidence that
Secretary Brucker was on to something.32
When the conference ended, the Adjutant General’s Office submitted to
the deputy chief of staff for personnel a list of recommendations to heal the
rift between the components and to reinforce the concept that they were
all on the same team. The first prerequisite, it said, was to ensure that all
career officers recognize that in any war or national emergency, the officers
and enlisted personnel of the reserve components would compose the bulk
of the Army. After some discussion, other recommendations included
selecting higher quality officers to serve in reserve and national guard
advisory positions; selecting a greater number of other-than-Regular-Army
officers for attendance at the Command and General Staff College and the
Army War College; and developing universal criteria for the procurement,
training, utilization, promotion, relief from active duty, and retirement of
all officers regardless of component. As the year ended, reserve component
officers felt that they had won at least some small victories while Secretary
31. Jack Vincent, “Brucker Will Call Conference to Push One Army Concept,” Army Times,
25 Jul 1959; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “One Army Concept,” Army Times, 25 Jul 1959.
32. Memo, Maj. Gen. Phillip D. Ginder for Sec Army, 22 Oct 1959, sub: Report on the One
Army Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
Brucker, General Lemnitzer, and the Army Staff worked through how much
change they actually could implement.33
Secretary Brucker expressed his satisfaction in several developments
that reflected a rise in the quality of soldiers that the Army was recruiting.
Although he acknowledged that combat readiness was the ultimate test
of quality, he pointed to the general reduction in disciplinary problems as
another mark of progress. He pointed out that, in the previous seven years,
the Army had closed four of its five disciplinary barracks. The ratio of
prisoners in confinement had dropped from 11.1 per 1,000 in 1953 to 4.5
in the current year. Absences without leave also had dropped considerably.34
Brucker attributed much of this success to his decision to raise the
minimum scores acceptable on the armed forces aptitude qualification test.
The service had accepted fewer people who could not meet the standards.
That particular issue remained a sore point, however, as the Army still had to
accept a higher percentage of personnel from Mental Group IV (the lowest
intelligence rating) than the other services as part of their annual accession.
Because it was the only service receiving recruits through the draft, the Army
received a higher percentage of lower quality inductees. Raising standards to
keep out the influx of Mental Group IV personnel would result in a higher
rejection rate for selective service, which would subject the service to public
and congressional criticism.35
The Army secretary also pushed the senior Army leadership to continue
with its programs to eliminate officers whose performance was subpar or
who were guilty of misconduct. After revising its criteria for promotion
and adopting a policy of “best qualified,” the service had initiated another
reduction in force in 1958, reviewing the records of 283 regular officers.
Of these, it ordered fifty-nine to show cause for retention and eventually
eliminated thirty.36
33. Memo, Col. N. A. Skinrood, Executive Ofcr, Adjutant Gen Ofc, for Dep Ch Staff
Personnel, 9 Dec 1959, sub: Recommendation of One Army Conference, File Unit: Entry
A1 1839, Series: MILPERCEN Subject Files, 1959–1962, RG 319, NACP.
34. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jul 1959–30 Jun
1960, 145.
35. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jul 1959–30
Jun 1960, 145; Fact Sheet, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 5 Oct 1959, sub: Recent Enlistment
Personnel Trends, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
36. MFR, Maj. Gen. James L. Richardson, Asst Ch Staff Personnel, 17 Nov 1959, sub:
Elimination Actions on Officers; Fact Sheet, Col. Walter F. Winton Jr., Ch Promotion and
Retention Div, 28 Jul 1959, sub: Progress in the Elimination of Substandard Officers; both in
File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Army
Plan to Oust Dullards Approved,” Army Times, 2 Aug 1959.
MOVING FORWARD 289
REDEFINING GROUND COMBAT AND LIMITED WARFARE
By 1959, any enthusiasm that remained for the pentomic division was
beginning to subside. In his final days as Army chief of staff, General Taylor
seemed to be the concept’s sole remaining cheerleader. While visiting the
Seventh Army in Europe, Taylor urged General Frank W. Farrell, the Seventh
Army commanding general, to continue his evaluation of the five-sided
divisional organization and the techniques and doctrine associated with
it. Farrell noted that the new five-company battle group, and other recent
modifications, had provided the organization with additional flexibility
and versatility. He added, however, that his units still lacked adequate
acquisition assets to identify long-range targets and that they experienced
excessive delays in bringing atomic fires to bear on anything other than
preplanned targets.37
War games conducted by the U.S. Continental Army Command
(CONARC) seemed to bear out the experiences units had encountered in
the field. Its evaluation concluded that the organization was not suitable
for combat in a situation involving a high level of atomic use. Under those
conditions, atomic weapons were decisive to such a degree that elements
that did not support the atomic delivery systems or target acquisition
were relatively unimportant and “their presence on the battlefield merely
invite[d] increased casualties without a corresponding increase in combat
effectiveness.”38 Further, the study concluded that atomic weapons used in
sufficient quantities in any given area made the conduct of ground operations
impracticable. Another study, this one from the Army War College,
concluded that troop organizations could not survive as effective fighting
forces on a nuclear battlefield subjected to uninhibited nuclear fires.39
In January 1959, the new CONARC commanding general, General
Bruce C. Clarke, put his staff to work in preparing the blueprint for a new
divisional organization. Clarke recently had arrived from his tour as Seventh
Army commander in Europe and had his own definitive ideas about how
to organize the modern Army. Like most of the Army’s senior officers, he
believed that the force of the future had to be capable of operating effectively
on both nuclear and nonnuclear battlefields. Units had to be prepared to
take independent action or to combine with others to form more powerful
37. Memo, Col. Bruce Palmer Jr., Dep Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 28 May 1959, sub:
Report of the Chief of Staff ’s Trip to Europe, 24 April-14 May, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
38. Memo, Lt. Gen. Gordon B. Rogers for Gen. [Bruce C.] Clarke, 24 Nov 1959, File Unit:
39. Memo, Rogers for Clarke, 24 Nov 1959.
combat teams. His experience with the pentomic model had convinced him
that the new divisions needed additional conventional firepower as well as
greater tactical mobility. Both would come, he decided, through increased
reliance upon armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.40 (See Charts 8 and 9.)
The division structure that the CONARC staff conceived closely resembled
General Clarke’s vision for war on an atomic battlefield. To streamline
the chain of command, it had eliminated the corps headquarters and had
divisions reporting directly to a field army headquarters. The study produced
models for two types of divisions: the first heavy with a preponderance of
tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, and the second a medium
division with fewer heavy assets and more emphasis on motorized infantry.
Like pentomic divisions, each division consisted of five battle groups, but
unlike its predecessor, the battle groups each contained three task force
headquarters, so that commanders could group tank, infantry, and support
companies according to mission requirements. Perhaps the key attribute of
the new organizations, which Clarke dubbed the Modern Mobile Army, was
their mobility. Every soldier and each piece of equipment in both types of
divisions would ride in or on a vehicle.41
As the Army Staff and CONARC struggled to reshape the atomic Army,
the rest of the force went on with its assigned missions. General Clarke
reported in July that the XVIII Airborne Corps and the three STRAC
divisions had made considerable progress in the area of joint planning. In
coordination with the Military Air Transport Service, STRAC had produced
working-level plans to provide airlift for one high priority division. Although
the plans had no official status, they provided a basis for rapid movement
once the Joint Chiefs had assigned the appropriate priorities. Likewise, the
Joint Chiefs also had conducted a detailed analysis of U.S. ocean shipping
requirements versus controlled shipping availability. The study concluded
that U.S.-controlled shipping was adequate to meet military requirements
during a six-month mobilization period leading up to a general war. The
1998), 291–92; Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962,
U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015),
440–41; Maj. Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76,
Leavenworth Papers, no. 1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1979), 19–20.
41. Doughty, Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 19–20; Glen R. Hawkins and James
Jay Carafano, Prelude to Army XXI: U.S. Army Division Design Initiatives and Experiments,
1917–1995 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1997).
MOVING FORWARD 291
Chart 8—Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960
MEDIUM DIVISION
13,957
AVN CO HQ RECON SQDN SIG BN ENG BN

186 210 722 360 688
COMBAT CMD DIV ARTY COMBAT CMD SV CMD

(MECH) 647 (MTR) 1,382
1,962 each 1,946 each
MED BN
HQ 307
COMBAT
144
SPT CO
COMBAT 195
MP CO
SPT CO
199 FA BN (155-mm.) 120
MORTIZER BTRY
310 139
MORTIZER BTRY
139 TRANS BN
FA BN (MISSILE) TRAINS CO 244
193 175
TRAINS CO
175 TASK FORCE HQ HQ
23 each 30
TASK FORCE HQ
27 each
INF CO ORD BN
152 each 543
INF CO
152 each
ADMIN CO
138
Note: The medium division chart referenced here appears under the title “Heavy Division
(MOMAR), 1960.”
Chart 9—Heavy Division (MOMAR),1960
HEAVY DIVISION
12,643
AVN CO HHC RECON SQDN SIG BN ENG BN

186 210 722 360 688
COMBAT CMD DIV ARTY SV CMD

1,680 each 647 1,430
HQ
HQ MED BN
144
30 307
COMBAT
SPT CO
201 FA BN (155-mm.)
310 ORD BN MP CO
591 120
MORTIZER BTRY
139 FA BN (MISSILE)
193 ADMIN CO TRAINS BN
TRAINS 138 244
183
TASK FORCE HQ
29 each
TANK CO
77 each
INF CO
152 each
Source: John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Sepa-
rate Brigades, Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1998), 294. Note: The heavy division chart referenced here appears under the
title “Medium Division (MOMAR), 1960.”
MOVING FORWARD 293
United States required an additional 480 ships, possibly from NATO allies,
however, if a general war broke out without sufficient lead time to mobilize.42
The STRAC divisions had every opportunity to show what they could do in
1959 as they conducted several well-publicized exercises. Exercise Caribou
Creek had begun late in 1958, when 128 officers and noncommissioned
officers from the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, of the 82d
Airborne Division, traveled to Fort Greely, Alaska, where they received
three weeks of indoctrination and training in Arctic operations. They then
returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where they passed on the cold
weather instruction to the rest of the unit. The entire battle group traveled to
Fort Richardson, Alaska, early in January, where it underwent another four
weeks of intensive training. On 9 February, the unit began a ten-day free
maneuver with the 1st Battle Group, 23d Infantry, acting as the opposition.
In his evaluation, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze,
asserted that the maneuver demonstrated that well-trained troops could
make the adjustment to hostile terrain and environment with only a minimal
amount of indoctrination.43
On 15 and 16 February, fifty C–123 transport aircraft departed Fort
Bragg loaded with nearly 1,500 personnel of the 2d Airborne Battle Group,
501st Infantry. After a brief stop at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, the
group conducted a combined parachute assault and air landing at Río Hato,
Panama. Code-named Exercise Banyan Tree, the maneuver demonstrated
the division’s ability to deploy rapidly over a great distance and to conduct
an airborne assault against a hostile landing zone. Although planners had
incorporated atomic weapons into the scenarios of both exercises, they
played little part in the maneuver. Helicopters, on the other hand, proved
decisive in their capability to transport small groups of troops around the
battlefield and to provide rapid logistic or reconnaissance support. General
Howze made particular note of the vital role the helicopter had played when
he prepared his report.44
Over in the 101st Airborne Division, Maj. Gen. William C. Westmoreland
had focused much of his training upon developing his unit’s junior leaders.
42. Ltr, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 23 Jul 1959; Memo, Col.
D. F. Slaughter, Acting Ch Plans Div, for Vice Ch Staff, 20 Apr 1959, sub: Deployment of
Army Troops in a General War; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
43. “4th Infantry Division to Fight in Eight Maneuvers,” Army Times, 5 Sep 1959; U.S. Dept.
of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S. Dept. of Defense, Annual
Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1959), 128; Maj. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, “STRAC Flexes Its
Muscles,” Army Information Digest 14 (Jul 1959): 14–23.
44. Howze, “STRAC Flexes Its Muscles,” 14–23.
He noted that the dispersion and isolation of the atomic battlefield had placed
a premium on small-unit leadership. With that in mind, Westmoreland had
created the division-wide Recondo School to improve the quality of small-
unit tactics and the proficiency of small-unit leaders. Modeled loosely on
training conducted at the U.S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, Georgia,
the two-week Recondo (reconnaissance and commando) course emphasized
scouting and patrolling at the fire-team and squad levels. The school director,
Maj. Lewis H. Millett, was a veteran of the British Commando and U.S. Army
Ranger schools and had received the Medal of Honor for leading a bayonet
charge against a fortified enemy position in Korea. In its first eight months,
the school had graduated nearly 500 junior leaders.45
The STRAC divisions were beginning to achieve some level of proficiency,
but that progress did not go unchallenged. In November, a Marine Corps
demonstration team presented a program on vertical envelopment for
assembled journalists in the Pentagon. The team presented the concept as
“Marine Doctrine,” and highlighted its Spartan approach. Although the
presenter refused to say that it was cheaper than STRAC, as one observer
noted, “We all know who we are talking about, don’t we?”46 Army observers
interpreted the briefing’s message to be an assertion that the Marine Corps,
with its 225,000 marines, supported by the Navy, could perform all of the
Army’s contingency missions.47
The challenge to the Army’s role in contingency operations reflected
an evolving perception of limited warfare throughout the U.S. defense
establishment. Even in the White House, some of the president’s senior
advisers urged reconsideration of New Look policies. Secretary Gates told
Eisenhower that the increase in nuclear capability on the part of the Soviet
Union and the United States made conflicts limited to the use of conventional
forces more likely. Secretary of State Christian Herter added that many U.S.
allies were beginning to question whether the United States actually would
risk all out general war by employing nuclear weapons in their defense. In
order to rebuild the free world’s confidence that it could deter or defeat local
Communists, the United States needed an evident, adequate, and flexible
military capability for operations short of general war.48
45. “Meet the Eagle leader: A Great Believer in Challenges”; “Recondo Training Rugged”;
both in Army Times, 3 Oct 1959.
46. Memo, Brig. Gen. Chester V. Clifton, Acting Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 17 Nov 1959, sub:
Presentation by Marine Corps Re “Vertical Envelopment,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
47. Memo, Clifton for Ch Staff, 17 Nov 1959, sub: Presentation by Marine Corps Re “Vertical
Envelopment.”
48. Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23; Memo of Conf with President,
2 Jul 1959, in FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 3, 228–35.
MOVING FORWARD 295
Some of the secretary of state’s fears were reflected in a conversation

between General Lemnitzer and General Adolf Heusinger, Chief of German
Armed Forces, in December. Heusinger stressed to the U.S. Army chief of
staff his belief that NATO forces must be prepared to fight a limited war.
He thanked Lemnitzer for the American assistance in rebuilding German
armed forces but urged the Americans not to cut their strength in Europe.
Heusinger noted that the United States had had time to prepare before the
last two world wars. That would not be the case, he warned, if the Soviets
chose to attack. Both generals discussed requirements for new and improved
conventional weapons, but also agreed that smaller, tactical atomic weapons
could play a role in both fighting a limited war and preventing it from
escalating to a larger general conflict.49
Perhaps understanding that some of the underpinnings of the New
Look defense policies were beginning to weaken, the Army Staff attempted
to provide some structure in support of General Taylor’s belief in Flexible
Response. In a paper labeled “Background Studies on Army Objectives,”
the staff traced the evolution of the doctrine of massive retaliation and, in
particular, the influence of the Air Force upon the preparation of defense
policy. Overlooked, they said, were the political disadvantages of nuclear
weapons and the obvious fact that they were inappropriate in lesser conflicts.
A philosophy of limited war, originating in the Army, offered an alternative.
Because the concept offered no quick, easy, or cheap solution to problems
facing the United States, the administration and the other services had, for
the most part, rejected it as an attempt by the Army to justify its existence.
That the idea survived and gained acceptance outside strictly Army circles
seemed proof of its basic soundness.50
The launch of Sputnik had demonstrated the Soviet capability to target
the continental United States with nuclear weapons. The study cited one
foreign affairs analysis in saying that Sputnik had made it certain that no
U.S. president was going to risk the wholesale destruction of U.S. cities
except as a last resort. The United States required a wider range of options to
respond to Soviet provocations. The philosophy of limited warfare, analysts
believed, was a misnomer, and might be labeled more correctly as “fully
ready,” or “ready for anything.”51 Moreover, they concluded, the two concepts
49. MFR, Col. E. T. Ashworth, 17 Dec 1959, sub: Protocol Call on General Lemnitzer by
General Heusinger, Chief of German Armed Forces, at 1500 Hours, 3 Nov 1959, File Unit:
50. Ofc Ch Staff, “Background Studies on Army Objectives: Volume 1,” 1959, File Unit: Entry
A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Top Secret, 1956–1962 (hereinafter
DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962), RG 319, NACP.
51. Ofc Ch Staff, “Background Studies on Army Objectives: Volume 1,” 1959.
were not incompatible. Massive retaliation simply stood at the far end of a
spectrum that began with more limited military responses. Recognition of
that relationship would provide the United States with greater flexibility in
the formulation and execution of foreign policy.52
In support of that assessment, the operations staff prepared an analysis
of potential conventional war between the United States and the Soviet
Union. In Europe, in particular, the United States and the West were in a
favorable position. Even the most feasible avenue for a Soviet attack, across
the North German Plain, was cut by a “most excellent obstacle,” the Rhine
River.53 Because the Soviet forces lacked superior mobility, their potential
advantage of interior lines was merely a euphemism for “surrounded.”
Analysts also noted that, in a conventional conflict, the United States stood
a better chance of retaining its allies than the Soviet Union. If the West could
blunt an initial Communist surge, they doubted that the Soviets would
be willing to escalate to the point of risking a nuclear exchange. By their
most recent actions in Korea and Eastern Europe and around Taiwan, both
the Soviet Union and China had indicated a willingness to accept tactical
setbacks rather than risk expanding a conflict “illogically and unprofitably.”54
By the end of 1959, even though General Taylor, the apostle of limited
warfare and Flexible Response, had departed, the Army finally was beginning
to chip away at the dominance of massive retaliation and atomic weapons.
Increasingly, policymakers looked for a wider range of military options to
facilitate a more flexible approach to diplomacy and strategic policy.
In many ways, the bureaucratic infighting between the Army and the Air
Force constituted some of the most bitter conflicts of the Cold War. Twelve
years after the designation of the Air Force as an independent service, the
strained and often contentious relationship between the two branches
remained as heated as ever.
In the U.S. Senate, one of the Air Force’s most ardent supporters continued
his part of the fight. In June, Senator Symington delivered a withering and
highly partisan critique against the Army. He suggested that the Army’s
52. Ofc Ch Staff, “Background Studies on Army Objectives: Volume 1,” 1959.
53. Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 30 May 1959, sub: Study
on Conventional War Between the U.S. and USSR, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
54. Memo, Moore for Ch Staff, 30 May 1959, sub: Study on Conventional War Between the
U.S. and USSR.
MOVING FORWARD 297
inferiority in troop numbers as compared to the Soviets was matched by

an inferiority of mobility and firepower. Its tanks, guns, and rifles were
obsolete. The reason for this, he said, was the service’s insistence on funding
programs that were not part of its primary mission. All the money that
the Army was devoting to continental air defense, he concluded, rightfully
should be spent on modernizing its inventory of conventional weapons. The
Army’s combat readiness was being hamstrung by service rivalry and poor
decisions. Left unsaid, but clearly understood by all in attendance, was the
senator’s conviction that the responsibility for air defense, and the portion of
the budget allocated to it, properly belonged to the United States Air Force.55
Symington’s mischief was not limited to his jabs at the Army. He also
led the Democratic attack against the Eisenhower administration’s defense
policies. In January, he accused Secretary McElroy of adjusting intelligence
estimates to support the administration’s budget reductions. Symington
suggested that the defense secretary was ignoring evidence that the Soviet
Union had intercontinental missiles ready for launch. Despite repeated
assertions by the president and his representatives that no missile gap
existed, the issue would come to plague the Republican Party throughout
the coming presidential campaign and elections. Although the missile gap
would prove illusory, it would open a door to national military policies that
relied less on the concept of massive retaliation.56
Despite Symington’s attempted intercession, the Army–Air Force
competition over continental air defense continued to rage. Air Force
officials sent numerous communications to Congress and the secretary of
defense denigrating the capabilities of the Nike Hercules and touting the
potential of their service’s Bomarc system. Army officials retorted that
they, at least, had a system in service and that, to date, the Air Force had
yet to deploy the Bomarc. In May, the Senate Armed Services Committee
expressed its own irritation over the competition when it cut funding for
both programs. Committee members told the Defense Department that
they would appropriate no more money for either system until it completed
testing on both systems and indicated which it preferred. Some senators
expressed greater concerns that neither system provided any real defense
against incoming ballistic missiles, which they regarded as a more relevant
threat. In a related news story, the U.S. Army commander of Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Maryland, Maj. Gen. Holger N. Toftoy, announced during
55. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Lemnitzer, 27 Jul 1959, sub: Observations of Senator
Symington, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
56. Jack Raymond, “Symington Chides McElroy on ICBM: Sees U.S. Lagging,” New York
Times, 24 Jan 1959; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 389–90.
a May press conference that the Army would test launch a Nike Zeus missile
sometime during the next calendar year.57
As 1959 progressed, the Air Force did give ground in one important area
of contention. In December, officers from the Army’s CONARC and the Air
Force’s Tactical Air Command held a conference at Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia, to discuss measures for improving Air Force support for Army
ground operations. Air Force briefers expressed their support for investment
in high-performance aircraft capable of air defense, interdiction, and close
air support. They suggested that rather than developing aircraft specifically
for close air support, the Army should have its own aerial weapons for
covering the areas within the limits of its own target acquisition capability.
Army leaders quickly picked up on the hint that the Air Force no longer
would object to the Army moving into the gap being created by the current
stress on the Air Force’s high-performance aircraft.58
The Army, in fact, had been moving steadily in that direction. In May,
a new Training Circular 20–1 announced the concept of airmobility.
According to this new doctrine, Army forces would use Army aircraft to
move troops, equipment, and supplies into, around, and out of the combat
zone. The circular directed that all combat elements would be trained in
airmobile operations. It also called for armed helicopters—mounted with
machine guns, rockets, and missiles—to provide aerial fire support for
troops conducting helicopter-mounted assaults. The service also announced
in December that it was testing helicopters mounting the French SS11 wire-
guided antitank missile. Putting the whole concept together, the Army’s
Combat Developments Office indicated that two commands, the 2d Infantry
Division at Fort Benning and the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood would
activate aerial combat reconnaissance companies in the coming year. The
new units would consist of about thirty helicopters, including a weapons
platoon of six helicopters armed with rockets and machine guns.59
At the 1959 Army Commanders’ Conference, the director of Army
Aviation, Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, presented a briefing on the growing
57. Memo, Maj. Gen. Dwight E. Beach, Director of Air Def and Special Weapons, Ofc Dep
Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 5 Jun 1959, sub: Air Force Attacks on the Army’s Air Defense
Program, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP; “Nike Site Funds Wiped Out,” Army Times, 23 May 1959; Jack Raymond, “Pentagon
Drafts a Master Plan for Air Defense,” New York Times, 24 May 1959; “Toftoy Says Zeus Will
Be Fired in 1960,” Army Times, 30 May 1959.
58. MFR, Lt. Col. George C. Viney, 29 Dec 1959, sub: CONARC-TAC and DAF-DA
Planning Conference, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
59. Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Training to Stress Airmobility,” Army Times, 23 May 1959; “Army
Testing Copter that Can Kill Tank,” Army Times, 28 Nov 1959; Gene Famiglietti, “Two
MOVING FORWARD 299
Designed exclusively for the U.S. Army, the Bell XH–40 Iroquois
helicopter, later redesignated the HU–1, became better known
to U.S. troops as the “Huey.” (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
family of Army air assets. In addition to the by-now familiar AO–1 Mohawk
and AC–1 Caribou airplanes, he showed off photos of the HU–1 Iroquois
utility helicopter that had recently entered production. In discussing the
requirements for battlefield transport, he mentioned the HC–1B Chinook
helicopter and also described work underway to develop a new aircraft,
a flying crane, for moving heavy items across relatively short distances.
This, he concluded, was the fleet of aircraft that would carry the Army into
the 1970s.60
Even as the Army was beginning to make some headway in placing its
aviation program on a path toward sustained growth, its pioneering space
and satellite program continued to flounder. Having ceded the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory to NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
the previous year and dedicating most of its missile development team to
supporting the space agency, the service fared poorly in the bureaucratic
Divisions to Get Air Recon Units,” Army Times, 24 Oct 1959.
60. Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops (presentation, Army Commanders
Conf, 2 Dec 1959), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP. The Army later revised the nomenclatures to UH–1 and CH–47.
An HU–1 helicopter firing an SS11 missile (U.S. Army, National

battles surrounding missile development. The director of NASA, Thomas K.

Glennan, lobbied Congress effectively in his efforts to increase his agency’s
control over the Army’s missile development team. Glennan told a Senate
committee investigating missile and space activities that the nation’s space
effort would work better only if the entire team were united under NASA’s
leadership. By the end of the year, both the Army and NASA had developed
a plan, which would transfer the Army’s missile development team, a major
component of its Ballistic Missile Command, to NASA.61
In losing its highly successful ballistic missile program, the Army fell victim
to the same missile race propaganda that was beginning to fuel the 1960
presidential election. Both NASA scientists and Air Force generals persisted
in arguments that the Soviet Union had forged ahead in the development
of long-range missile technology. Collectively, they pushed for increased
investment in technologies that would promote both intercontinental
ballistic missiles and more powerful booster rockets to launch satellites and
61. Memo, Col. Roland P. Carlson for Sec Gen Staff, 2 Feb 1959, sub: Senate Preparedness
Sub-Committee and Aeronautics and Space Committee Hearings; Memo, Lt. Gen. John H.
Hinrichs, Ch Ordnance, for Dep Ch Staff Logistics, 22 Dec 1959, sub: Long Range plan for
Reorganization of USAOMC; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Where We Stand in Missile Race: Administration and
Critics Debate,” New York Times, 8 Feb 1959.
MOVING FORWARD 301
During its initial demonstration, this Chinook helicopter transport

stops off at Davidson Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, en route
to the heliport at the Pentagon. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
eventually people into space. Even the Army’s foremost missile scientist,
Wernher von Braun, contributed to the campaign when, while lobbying for
additional funding, he told reporters that if the United States did not hurry
up, it would have to pass Soviet customs when it finally reached the moon.62
MANAGING THE BUREAUCRACY
In 1958, the service had initiated the Army Management Improvement Plan
with the intent of developing better, faster, and more economical ways of
doing its daily business. Although the roots of this effort were clearly in coping
with the drastic budget reductions the service faced during the Eisenhower
administration, leaders also got caught up in some of the fascination with
management efficiency that had permeated American industry after World
War II. Some of this emphasis originated in the Office of the Comptroller of
62. Jerry Landauer, “Ike Acts in Missiles Dispute,” Washington Post, 21 Oct 1959.
the Army, and the spirit of economy and efficiency inspired numerous new
programs throughout the Army during this period.63
The dramatic reductions in personnel strength over the decade and the
postwar spirit of efficiency led Army leaders to eliminate offices and positions
they deemed redundant or unnecessary. In one example, the Army Staff
eliminated the Special Warfare Office in June 1958, moving its functions to
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and doing
away with nineteen military and twenty-four civilian positions.
Such initiatives lacked consistency, however, as at virtually the same time,
the staff created the Army Research Office as a component of the Office of
the Chief of Research and Development. The purpose of this new office was
to manage research activities and to provide a link between scientists of the
Army and those of the civilian community. Elements of the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency that remained after its key components moved to NASA
reorganized into the new Army Ordnance Missile Command. Finally,
in the operational units, divisions continued to refine their organizations
under various versions of the pentomic concept, seeking to make the best
use of the human resources allocated to their units. Many of these actions
originated in 1958 or earlier, but most were not completed until the following
year when they were then recognized as part of the Army’s Management
Improvement Program.64
The service designed other reforms to improve recordkeeping and
communications. Based upon a 1955 report that had indicated that
government letters were unduly long and hard to understand, the Department
of the Army, in 1957, had inaugurated a training program on plain letter
writing. After a positive response from all commands, the Adjutant General’s
School prepared a special text, Effective Army Writing, for all the school’s
resident and nonresident training courses to use. The chief of staff directed
all service schools to teach effective writing skills, and the staff subsequently
published Department of the Army Pamphlet 1–10, Improve Your Writing.65
The service also took steps to make its records administration more
efficient. The Adjutant General’s Office noted that it had destroyed almost
one million linear feet of its administrative and historical documents that
had been housed in Federal Records Centers or contracted holding areas.
This action, it proudly declared, made available 122,885 four-drawer file
cabinets, and opened up more than one million square feet of floor space.
63. Memo, Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, Comptroller of the Army, for Ch Staff, 2 Mar 1959,
sub: Army Management Improvements, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
64. Memo, Lawton for Ch Staff, 2 Mar 1959, sub: Army Management Improvements.
MOVING FORWARD 303
Finally, after several years of testing, the Army announced in December

1958 the adoption of the Army Functional Files System. The new system
replaced the old War Department Decimal File System, which many clerks
and records personnel had found difficult to learn and to retain. Presumably,
the new system would simplify the recordkeeping process and help clerks
and unit commanders identify which of their files required permanent
retention by the Army.66
The Department of the Army attempted to apply scientific management
tools toward the development of the service’s civilian work force as well.
During fiscal year 1960, more than 10,000 supervisors attended instruction
on the preparation of work distribution charts, flow process charts, motion
economy, and layout studies. The secretary of the Army’s annual report
noted these new management processes had saved the service more than $5
million. This would not be the last time that the military looked to business
for managerial techniques. Already, however, some wondered whether that
approach would be appropriate in combat.67
The Army also looked to its lower ranks for help in improving efficiency
and cost-savings. In September, General Lemnitzer directed an Army-wide
campaign, dubbed Operation Searchlight, to encourage suggestions from
civilian and military personnel. The objective, the chief of staff said, was to
encourage ideas for improving efficiency or equipment. He directed a major
effort to publicize the campaign and to provide awards for noteworthy
contributions to management efficiency. All publicity in connection with
the program, he said, should emphasize the idea that “the Army is modern”
and that it was making the most economical use of available resources.68
In an administration that proclaimed that its foremost goal was to
promote the American economy, the Comptroller General’s Office raised
some troubling issues in 1959. It noted that during the previous fiscal year,
the deficit in the national balance of international payments amounted to
approximately $4 billion. For a nation that, in 1959, remained on a gold
standard—meaning the value of its currency was tied to actual specie in
its vaults—this flow of payments overseas was particularly troubling. The
Army’s share of those overseas expenditures amounted to $1.5 billion.
The comptroller calculated that the U.S. Army in Germany expended
1960, 214–15.
68. Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer for Cdrs in Ch, 15 Oct 1959, sub: Operation
Searchlight; Memo, Maj. Gen. William W. Quinn, Ch Info, for Distribution, 29 Sep 1959,
sub: Information Plan for Operation Searchlight; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
approximately $3,600 per person per year. A reduction of one division in

Europe, the office estimated, would decrease the payments deficit by some
$50 million per year.69
The Army responded with its own calculations showing that the additional
expenditures of bringing home and repositioning troops would overshadow
any savings. Neither would reductions in troops in Korea provide significant
savings. Despite this proactive response, the gold-flow issue remained a
particular concern for President Eisenhower, one that he was still pondering
as 1959 came to a close.70
A TICKING BOMB
On 8 July 1959, a squad of National Liberation Front fighters, known to

the Republic of Vietnam’s government and its American allies as the Viet
Cong, attacked the quarters of an American detachment advising the South
Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division at Biên Hòa, just north of Saigon. Three
men with automatic weapons sprayed a dining hall where members of the
detachment sat watching a movie. Two men, Maj. Dale R. Buis and M. Sgt.
Chester M. Ovnand, died in the attack, becoming the first American advisers
to die by enemy action in Vietnam.71
Throughout 1959, Viet Cong strategy became more aggressive.
Kidnappings and assassinations increased to all-time highs and Communist-
staged uprisings broke out at various points throughout South Vietnam.
A series of disappointing performances by South Vietnamese Army
units convinced General Samuel T. Williams, commander of the MAAG,
Vietnam, to revoke the long-standing practice of forbidding American
advisers from accompanying their South Vietnamese units into combat.
On 25 May, the commander in chief of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral
69. Fact Sheet, E. K. Shultz, Asst Comptroller, Foreign Financial Affairs, 23 Oct 1959, sub:
Dollar Outflow Overseas, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
70. Fact Sheet, Col. [no first name given] Kennedy, 23 Oct 1959, sub: Limited Reductions
in the Budget Which Would Accrue from the Inactivation or Movement to CONUS of
Army Units, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP; Interv, Col. Francis B. Kish with Gen. Bruce C. Clarke, 1982, Senior Ofcr Debriefing
Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI). The
details of the gold-flow issue are exceedingly technical, but the essential concern was that
U.S. personnel were spending too much money overseas. Placing that much U.S. currency
into the hands of foreign governments gave them too much claim to the gold bullion, stored
at Fort Knox, that the specie represented.
in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), 329.
MOVING FORWARD 305
Matsu Island
CHINA CHINA
Lao Cai
CHINA
Lang Son Quemoy Island
TA I WA N
BURMA Vinh Yen
Điện Biên Phủ
HANOI
Hải Phòng
Luang Prabang
NORTH
LAOS VIETNAM
HAINAN
GULF
Vinh OF
VIENTIANE
TONKIN
Dong Hoi
Udon Thani
(Udorn) D EM ARC AT IO N LI N E
Quang Tri
Savannakhet Hue
THAILAND
Da Nang
Paksé
Quang Ngai
Nakhon Ratchasima
(Korat)
Kontum
BANGKOK Pleiku
Qui Nhon
CAMBODIA
SOUTH
Tonle Sap VIETNAM
Kratie
Nha Trang
GULF Đà Lạt
Loc Ninh
OF PHNOM PENH Tay Ninh
SIAM
Biên Hòa
SAIGON
Sihanoukville
Phu
SOUTHEAST ASIA Quoc
Can Tho
1959 SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
0 150
Con Son
Miles
Map 8
Harry D. Felt, approved General Williams’s request, authorizing American

advisers assigned to regiments and separate battalions to accompany those
units on operational missions as long as they did not become involved in
actual combat.72 (See Map 8.)
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the political situation was growing
more unstable. In Laos, Pathet Lao Communists, backed by the North
Vietnamese, worked to undermine a centrist and western leaning govern-
ment under the prime minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma. Viewing the sit-
uation with increasing alarm, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Army, Pacific,
warned the Army Staff that the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan,
lacked the resources to support contingency plans programmed in its area
of responsibility.73
That warning was reinforced by a report from Brig. Gen. John A. Heintges,
the newly appointed chief of the Programs Evaluation Office in Laos. Acting
as a de facto military assistance advisory team, the Programs Evaluation
Office helped to coordinate U.S. military assistance to the embattled Laotian
government. Because the operation was attached to the U.S. embassy and
theoretically not connected to the military, Heintges went as a civilian. After
a brief period to survey the situation, he reported back to the Army Staff.
Although the French sustained a minimal military assistance program in the
country, Heintges warned his superiors that the existing government would
fall without additional U.S. military support.74
In response to the looming crisis and in conjunction with the Central
Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army initiated Project Molecular, also
referred to as Project Hotfoot. In July, the United States sent twelve special
forces mobile training teams, along with one control team, to Laos to
assist with training the Laotian national army. These service members also
traveled as civilians and, by agreement with the French, could conduct only
training related to the weapons and equipment supplied by the Americans.
An additional 17 U.S. military personnel—7 Army and 10 Air Force—joined
103 Filipino contractor technicians at the end of the year to furnish advice
to the Laotian logistical system. General Heintges made several urgent
requests to the secretary of defense and to the Army for immediate delivery
72. Spector, Advice and Support, 329–32.

73. Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 293–94; Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil
Ops, for Ch Staff, 19 Jan 1959, sub: Personnel Increase of 1st Special Forces Group, File
Unit: Entry A1 68, DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
74. Jared M. Tracy, “Shoot and Salute: U.S. Army Special Warfare in Laos,” Veritas 14 (Spring
2018): 42–49; Interv, Maj. Jack A Pellicci with Lt. Gen. John A. Heintges, 1974, Senior Ofcr
MOVING FORWARD 307
of programmed aircraft, military equipment, and weapons to support an

additional 8,000 Laotian “volunteers.”75
In response to these concerns, the Department of the Army authorized
an increase of 133 spaces for the 1st Special Forces Group and an increase of
310 spaces for the 77th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg. The authorization
would also move the 107 spaces allocated for Project Molecular from the
77th Group to the 1st once the service and the Central Intelligence Agency
discontinued that program.76
Despite the developments in Laos, most of the Army’s focus in Southeast
Asia remained on Vietnam. In May, responding to a request from General
White at U.S. Army, Pacific, the Army Staff prepared an analysis of deployment
options for a limited war in Vietnam. This analysis lacked the rigor of the
study General Matthew B. Ridgway had prepared five years earlier. It did,
however, compare available air- and sealift resources to the forces that might
be available for a deployment to Saigon or to Bangkok, Thailand. The study
concluded that one STRAC airborne division could close on one of those
two ports of entry by air movement within sixteen days of notification. A
second STRAC division, presumably the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i,
would complete its movement by a combination of sea- and airlift no sooner
than sixty days after notification.77
Beyond identifying deployable divisions, however, the contingency plan
became a bit problematic. The units on the deployment list included most of
the logistical support elements normally associated with the division slice.
Not included on the list were elements of a field army headquarters that
might normally be associated with such an expeditionary force. The Army
Staff indicated that the earliest such a unit might arrive would be between 90
and 120 days. In lieu of that option, the staff suggested that General White
employ an advanced echelon of his own headquarters or an augmented
XVIII Airborne Corps staff. The Department of the Army also advised
White that no surface-to-air missile units were available for inclusion in
the initial deployment. The message suggested that the Army Staff would
75. Fact Sheet, Brig. Gen. James K. Woolnough, Director of Plans, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops,
19 Jun 1959, sub: Project Molecular; Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, Director of
Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 27 Aug 1959, sub: Extraordinary Military Aid for Laos; Fact
Sheet, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, 25 Aug 1959, sub: Improvement of Laos Armed Forces;
all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
76. Memo, Lt. Gen. James E. Moore, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 29 Jul 1959, sub:
Strengths of Special Forces Groups, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
77. Memo, Maj. Gen. Francis T. Pachler, Director of Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Cdr in
Ch, U.S. Army, Pacific, 7 May 1959, sub: USARPAC Limited War Planning for Southeast
Asia, File Unit: Entry A1 68, DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
consider one of a few Nike or Hawk battalions currently engaged in stateside

school support, but it failed to address exactly what targets such units might
be employed to defend against.78
SAYING FAREWELL TO THE NEW LOOK
The year 1960 would be the final year of Dwight Eisenhower’s presidency.
Although his emphasis on nuclear weapons and the threat of massive
retaliation had allowed him to maintain national security while keeping
the economy strong, it had not prevented the instabilities and small wars
that plagued allies and potential allies around the peripheries. Nor had
Eisenhower’s policies prevented his political opponents from using his
attempts to hold the line on defense expenditures to support their accusations
that the United States was falling behind its Soviet adversaries in strategic
missile technology.
Meanwhile, the Army’s experiments with an organization and a doctrine
based upon nuclear weapons had, so far, proven unwieldly. Exercises
involving the pentomic organization and extensive employment of atomic
weapons led many observers to question the validity of the entire concept.
Particularly in Europe, allies wondered what the point was of blowing up
everything they were intending to defend. Army leaders at CONARC and
on the Army Staff were already at work on still more revisions.
All of these uncertainties set the stage for some serious discussions that
would be held during the coming year. An election year, 1960 would see both
major political parties debate the utility of atomic weapons as a means of
achieving national security and supporting foreign policy goals. In politics,
in public discussions, and throughout the Pentagon, military and civilian
leaders considered alternatives to strategies based on atomic weapons. As
many sought to develop a military policy that would provide enough options
to respond to the full range of impending strategic challenges, they honed in
on the idea of a flexible response, words which soon would come to define
the new military doctrine.
78. Memo, Pachler for Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army, Pacific, 7 May 1959, sub: USARPAC Limited
War Planning for Southeast Asia.
8
Turning the Page
In November 1960, Americans went to the polls to elect a new president. The
Republicans had nominated the former vice president, Richard M. Nixon.
Throughout the presidential campaign, Nixon staunchly had supported the
strategic views and policies of his mentor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
To oppose him, the Democrats had nominated Massachusetts’ Senator John
F. Kennedy. Kennedy’s views on national defense stood in stark contrast
to those of the Eisenhower administration. He had embraced the concept
of Flexible Response that General Maxwell D. Taylor had featured in his
speeches and written critiques of the New Look. To a great extent, therefore,
the 1960 presidential election became a referendum on the national security
structure as it had evolved over eight years of Republican control. While
minor conflicts around the globe threatened to disturb the fragile Cold War
balance, the political debate in the United States challenged many of the
strategic concepts that had shaped American defense policy for the previous
eight years. Whoever won the election would determine the path forward
for the U.S. Army as well as the other military services.
TWILIGHT OF THE NEW LOOK
President Eisenhower remained true to his convictions right through to the

end of his term. In February, the consideration of force levels and of the
defense budget for 1963 remained every bit as contentious as it had been at
the start of his presidency. He continued to rail at the parochial viewpoints
expressed by his military leaders. He told reporters that what he wanted was
a deterrent that was adequate. “A deterrent has no added power,” he said,
“once it has become completely adequate.”1
Two Army chiefs of staff, General Taylor and General Matthew B.
Ridgway, had faced a solid block of opposition from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff for years, but this was beginning to break down. Now, Navy leaders
joined their Army counterparts in opposing the president’s overemphasis on
missiles and atomic weapons. Secretary of the Navy William B. Franke told
the Senate Armed Services Committee that the nation had to guard against
an overabundance of deterrent forces if that prevented it from maintaining
sufficient forces for other tasks. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
Arleigh A. Burke added that “limited war, rather than general war, [was] the
most likely future combat condition.”2
The Air Force joined in with vocal attacks against the president, but
from the opposite perspective. Senator W. Stuart Symington continued his
campaign railing against the perceived missile gap between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Despite growing evidence that the gap was narrowing,
if not completely illusory, Symington used the issue as a club with which to
beat administration officials throughout the election year. He charged the
administration with misleading the American public on the relative missile
strength of the United States and the Soviet Union. Senior Air Force officers
joined the offensive. General Thomas S. Power, head of the Strategic Air
Command, estimated that with a force of only 300 missiles, the Soviets
could knock out the U.S. deterrent force completely in thirty minutes. Lt.
Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, Director of the U.S. Air Force Research and
Development Command, testified that, although the two nations were about
even in missile strength, in the next few years, the Soviet Union would open
up a commanding lead that the United States would be unable to match.3
The president drew additional fire from Democrats and numerous
veterans associations when he declined to support an extension of the
benefits of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, commonly known as the
G.I. Bill, to veterans who had served during the Cold War. “Those who serve
in peacetime,” he said, “undergo fewer rigors and hazards than their combat
comrades.” He maintained that the peacetime veterans had received superior
pay and benefits compared to their World War II and Korea counterparts
and returned to civilian life under more favorable conditions after receiving
valuable training in the military service. To many in the military, the
1. “The Great Debate Over the Adequacy of Our Defense,” New York Times, 7 Feb 1960.
2. Jack Raymond, “Navy Chiefs Voice Defense Warning,” New York Times, 23 Jan 1960.
3. “President Holds Secret Parley,” New York Times, 6 Feb 1960; John W. Finney, “Defense
Critics Assailed by G.O.P.,” New York Times, 24 Feb 1960.
TURNING THE PAGE 311
president’s words indicated an unwillingness to recognize the variety and

severity of the threats facing service members in the Cold War environment.
Although most of the members of the House Veterans Affairs Committee
supported extending education benefits to post-Korea veterans, Congress
was unable to overcome the president’s opposition.4
Even as the rest of the United States military establishment ratcheted
up its confrontation with the administration, the Army appeared to move
in the opposite direction. With Generals Ridgway and Taylor now long
retired, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer burnished his reputation as a soldier-
diplomat. In June, he sent a personal letter to each of his senior commanders
and staff in which he admonished them to stop complaining about the
shortage of resources available to the Army. Such comments, he said,
created the erroneous impression that the Army lacked the capability and
confidence to accomplish its missions. He encouraged them to project the
impression of a can-do service, which maintained the ability to execute all
of its missions in the most effective manner possible commensurate with the
available resources.5
In August, the president and Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr.
nominated Lemnitzer to be the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs, replacing
retiring Air Force General Nathan F. Twining. To replace Lemnitzer as Army
chief of staff, they nominated General George H. Decker, then serving as
the vice chief of staff. Almost every news item on the nomination noted
that Decker would be the first non–West Point graduate to hold the position
since General George C. Marshall had retired in 1945. Most stories also
included Decker’s background in finance and his service as comptroller of
the Army. More astute accounts remembered that Decker also had served
ably as General Walter Kreuger’s chief of staff in New Guinea during World
War II. There, Decker had won grudging praise from his commander for
being imperturbable under pressure and quietly able to get the job done.6
The comparatively low profile that General Lemnitzer chose to adopt
during the final year of the New Look only served to accentuate the
outsized role that General Taylor was continuing to play, even in retirement.
4. Larry Carney, “Ike on GI Bill Draws Fire,” Army Times, 23 Jan 1960; Larry Carney,
“Majority of House Group Seen Favoring New GI Bill,” Army Times, 19 Mar 1960.
5. Ltr, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer to Gen. Eddleman et al., 3 Jun 1960, File Unit: Entry
A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence, 1955–1962 (hereinafter
SCGC 1955–1962), Subgroup: Office of the Chief of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG)
319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD
(hereinafter NACP).
6. “Top Military Planner: Lyman Louis Lemnitzer,” New York Times, 16 Aug 1960; “Low
Pressure Soldier: George Henry Decker,” New York Times, 19 Aug 1960; “Non-West
Pointer Named Army Chief,” Army Times, 27 Aug 1960.
U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker (left) with Secretary
of the Army Wilber M. Brucker (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
Taylor’s book, The Uncertain Trumpet, captured all of his disagreement and
frustration with Eisenhower’s defense policies in one convenient volume.
Instead of relying singularly upon nuclear weapons to keep the peace, Taylor
emphasized his now familiar alternative of a flexible military policy, with the
United States maintaining a range of military capabilities allowing a broader
spectrum of responses. That the book became widely read and publicized
surely vexed Eisenhower, who only commented that the retired general was
entitled to his opinion.7
The book and Taylor’s familiar criticisms of Republican military policy also
caught the attention of the Democratic presidential candidate. Kennedy and
the Democrats adopted many of the recommendations proposed by Taylor
as part of their foreign policy and national security platform throughout
the campaign. In Congress, General Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
7. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper Brothers, 1959); Maxwell
Taylor, “We Must Dispose of the Great Atomic Fallacy,” Army Times, 27 Feb 1960; Ltr,
James C. Oliver, Member of Congress, to Sec Army Wilber M. Brucker, 30 Jan 1960,
File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP;
Hanson W. Baldwin, “Lemnitzer Stands Firm,” New York Times, 15 Jan 1960.
of Staff, found himself responding to a barrage of questions from mostly

Democratic representatives regarding passages in Taylor’s book.8
Together, General Taylor and Senator Symington supported a radical
reorganization of the Defense Department that essentially merged the
separate branches of military service into one. Symington headed a
committee tasked by Kennedy with developing an alternative defense
establishment. In December, the committee presented the president-elect
a plan for centralization of defense powers under a single civilian secretary
aided by a single military chief of staff. The plan abolished the Army, Navy,
and Air Force Departments and eliminated all service secretaries and their
assistants. It retained the military service chiefs who would report directly
to the secretary of defense. The current structure of unified and specified
commands would be replaced by four major components. The Strategic
Command would encompass all forces designed for all-out nuclear war.
Tactical Command would include forces specifically designed for limited
war. Defense Command would have all of those forces required for the
defense of the continental United States, and the National Guard–Reserve
Command would be in charge of all reserve forces and responsible for civil
defense. Symington believed that his reorganization streamlined the chain of
command, strengthened the role and authorities of the secretary of defense,
and eliminated much of the interservice rivalry that had come to plague
military planning and budgeting.9
Taylor’s successors in the Army leadership had taken a less confrontational
approach toward the administration’s defense policy and organization. The
chief of staff, General Lemnitzer, favored the continuation of the current system
and did not believe that a single chief of staff for all of the armed services was
a necessary step. The chairman of the joint chiefs, he felt, had all the authority
he required. The Army followed Lemnitzer’s lead, and when he moved on to
be the chairman, his successor as chief of staff, General Decker, expressed
similar thoughts. Through the end of the year, Army leaders contended that
any radical reorganization of the defense establishment should wait until
the new administration was in place and had a chance to express its views.10
8. Memo, Capt. L. P. Gray, U.S. Navy, Mil Asst to the Chairman of the Joint Chs, for Asst
Sec Def (Comptroller), 28 Jan 1960, sub: Questions from the Mahon Subcommittee, File
Unit: Entry UD 53, Series: Chairman’s Files, Twining, 1957–1960, RG 218: Records of the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP.
9. Jack Raymond, “Symington Defense Plan Stirs Opposition by Army and Navy,” New
York Times, 7 Dec 1960; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Top-Level Remake in Plan,” Army Times,
10 Dec 1960.
10. Baldwin, “Lemnitzer Stands Firm”; MFR, Col. Lloyd B. Ramsey, Ofc Ch Legislative
Liaison, 7 Dec 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP; Memo, Brig. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs
The various oppositions to Eisenhower’s defense policies, coupled with

the heat of the political campaign, produced a number of thoughtful and
articulate discussions regarding nuclear weapons and the concepts of general
and limited war. In testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee,
General Lemnitzer described how both the United States and the Soviet
Union had acquired a virtually indestructible nuclear capability. Although
he did not use the specific terminology, he depicted an emerging condition
of mutual assured destruction. Beneath that balance, he continued, existed
a spectrum of conflict that could be labeled limited war. Although those
sorts of wars would not be fought with intercontinental ballistic missiles,
they might, at some level, include smaller-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
The general expanded on those thoughts in comments prepared for a variety
of newspapers and periodicals. There, he stressed the importance of the foot
soldier in an environment of strategic nuclear stalemate.11
A study conducted by the National Security Council in September
1960 examined U.S. limited warfare capabilities in several scenarios. It
concluded that U.S. capabilities, in conjunction with those of its allies,
would be adequate as long as the nation took prompt action to initiate
partial mobilization, augmented existing military airlift, expanded the war
production base, and waived financial limitations on military spending as
it prepared to engage in such a conflict. In some of its detailed comments
linked to specific scenarios, the study noted that neither the United States
nor its allies possessed adequate capability for counterguerrilla-type limited
military operations. More ominously, the analysis concluded that existing
communications and logistical support facilities in Southeast Asia would be
unable to support any sustained U.S. or allied military operation.12
For the Army Staff, however, the vision of future land combat remained
focused upon a conflict against the Soviet Union on a European battleground.
In a series of briefings prepared for public dissemination, the Doctrine and
Concepts Division of the Operations Staff described potential enemies
Staff et al., 22 Dec 1960, sub: Development of Army Views on Defense Reorganization,
11. Selected Extracts of Testimony, Hearing Before the Senate Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, 86th Cong. (4 Feb 1960); Memo, Maj. Gen. William W. Quinn, Ch Info, for
Ch Staff, 8 Nov 1960, sub: Interview with U.S. News and World Report; Memo, Maj. Gen.
William W. Quinn, for Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 13 May 1960, sub: Request for Magazine
Interview; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
12. Interagency Study, National Security Council, 28 Sep 1960, “United States and Allied
Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to 1 July 1962,” in Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1958–1960 (hereinafter cited as FRUS 1958–1960), vol. 3, National Security
Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1996), 474–76.
ranging from highly trained mechanized forces, such as the Soviet Army, to
lightly armed guerrilla forces. Army forces, they continued, must be capable
of fighting in either a nuclear or nonnuclear war. From that point, however, the
discussion returned to the Army’s vision of a war in Europe against a highly
mechanized, nuclear-capable enemy. It stressed the mobility, dispersion,
and firepower already inherent in the service’s pentomic organization and
doctrine. It proclaimed the potential firepower advantage provided by the
Davy Crockett atomic projectile and the versatility of the helicopter. The
study concluded that the tempo of future wars would far exceed what the
Army had experienced in previous conflicts. Beyond brief lip service, the
analysis omitted any serious consideration of conflict outside of or beneath
the level of full-scale combat in Europe.13
Because its budget was now sufficient, the Army finally began making
some headway in its program to modernize the weapons, vehicles, and
equipment required to fight both limited and general war. In February, the
director of the Army budget, Maj. Gen. David W. Traub, sent to the House
Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations a detailed and prioritized list of
those major items his service required. The list included everything from
new small arms and the appropriate ammunition to major-end items like
new helicopters, armored personnel carriers, long-range artillery, and main
battle tanks. Altogether, the cost for the items on the list came to $928
million. At the end of the year, when the Defense Department announced
the budget for fiscal year 1962, it included an increase of a billion dollars over
the previous year’s budget, most of which was earmarked for the Army.14
President Eisenhower, however, had one more concern to present to the
Army before he ended his term of office. The balance-of-payments issue
that had begun to trouble him the previous year had worsened. Despite a
continuing export surplus, the net outflow of capital payments was increasing.
In the president’s words, American dollars were cascading overseas. Despite
government efforts to stem the tide, by the third quarter of 1960, the deficit
of payments reached an annual rate of more than $4 billion. The developing
13. Memo, Brig. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff et al.,
29 Nov 1960, sub: Basic Army Briefings: #5 Nature of Future Land Warfare, File Unit:
14. Ltr, Maj. Gen. David W. Traub, Director of Army Budget, to Honorable George H.
Mahon, Chairman, Subcommittee on Dept. of Def Appropriations, 9 Feb1960, File Unit:
Entry A1 1709, Series: Congressional Hearings, 1958–1962, Subgroup: Deputy Secretary
of the General Staff, RG 319, NACP; “Budget Up Billion for Army,” Army Times, 17 Dec
1960.
possibility that the United States might have to devalue its currency spurred
investors to cash in their dollars for gold, further exacerbating the crisis.15
Convinced that he had to act, Eisenhower announced in mid-November
drastic steps to reduce military expenditures overseas. The most significant
aspect of this reduction was an order to cut the number of military
dependents outside of the United States to less than half their current
number. Additionally, he directed the Defense Department to eliminate all
nonessential foreign purchases. With more than 250,000 family members
accompanying deployed soldiers, the Army had by far the most dependents
affected by the order. The actual number probably was increased significantly
by an unknown number of individuals who had joined their service members
overseas without official military sponsorship.16
As Secretary Gates had warned the president, the response throughout
the military community was immediate and vocal. As one unnamed soldier
expressed in his outrage, “We in the military service have pledged our
lives for the preservation of the security of our country. . . . We have not,
however, pledged our lives for the security of gold reserves.”17 Dependents
throughout Europe and other U.S. military outposts wondered how soon
the presidential order would require them to come home. Army officials
expressed their concerns that the president’s announcement would cripple
both recruiting and reenlistment rates. The commanding general of U.S.
Army, Europe (USAREUR), General Bruce C. Clarke, telephoned Secretary
of the Army Wilber M. Brucker to express his outrage that he had not been
consulted about the decision. As a fitting postscript to the year’s end, the
Army Times noted that shortly after the edict was scheduled to go into effect
on 1 January, Eisenhower no longer would be president. His successor would
have to make the final determination on its implementation.18
Doubleday, 1960), 604.
16. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 604; Memo, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Dep Ch Staff
Logistics, 13 Nov 1960, sub: Special Staff Studies, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Rash Move,” Editorial, Army Times,
26 Nov 1960.
17. Jack Vincent, “Order to Return Dependents Stirs Bitter Replies,” Army Times, 26 Nov
1960.
18. Jack Vincent, “Oversea Moves Stay Normal,” Army Times, 26 Nov 1960; Vincent,
“Order to Return Dependents Stirs Bitter Replies.”
BUILDING AN ARMY FOR THE 1960s
For the Army, the new decade brought with it the hope of more generous
budgets and perhaps a greater voice in the formation of national defense
policy. It seemed that the service would finally begin to receive some of the
funding it had long sought to modernize its aging equipment. At the same
time, advancing technology had created even more interesting possibilities
on which it could spend its money.
After the bitter infighting between the Army and Air Force over long-
range missiles, strategic airlift, and antiaircraft responsibilities, the two
services had reached an almost peaceful coexistence regarding the continued
advancement of the Army’s helicopter program. Army experiments at Fort
Stewart, Georgia, testing an aerial reconnaissance troop, proceeded early in
1960 with minimal protest or resistance from the junior service. After fifteen
weeks of training, the 150-man unit had participated in a series of exercises,
acting first under direct control of the infantry division headquarters
and later as a component of a division cavalry squadron. The aerial troop
extended the range of division reconnaissance assets and acted as a covering
force for movements of other maneuver elements. Upon completion of the
testing, Third U.S. Army headquarters authorized the 2d Infantry Division
to retain the provisional troop within its organization until the Department
of the Army and the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) made a
final determination on whether to accept the unit as a permanent part of the
division’s structure.19
The Air Force also seemed to acquiesce a little in the issue of close air
support. In defending his service’s approach to acquiring and producing
aircraft capable of performing a wide range of air combat missions, Chief
of Staff General Thomas D. White appeared to yield some ground to the
Army in its development of armed helicopters. Although General White
maintained that the Air Force’s high-speed fighters could perform all of the
close support missions carried out by their World War II counterparts, he
offered no resistance to General Decker’s response that Army requirements
might exceed the capabilities of aircraft not specifically designed for
that mission. By the end of 1960, the Army had moved well along on its
development of machines and doctrine utilizing armed helicopters in a
ground support role.20
19. “2d Division Recon Unit Finishing Stewart Test,” Army Times, 30 Jan 1960; “2d
Division to Keep Provisional ARS Unit,” Army Times, 20 Feb 1960.
20. Ltr, Gen. Thomas D. White, Ch Staff, U.S. Air Force, to Gen. George H. Decker, Ch
Staff, U.S. Army, 21 Dec 1960; Ltr, Decker to White, 30 Dec 1960; both in File Unit: Entry
By 1960, the Army also had begun to explore the use of data processing
equipment in a wider range of roles. The service already had employed
computers to manage some logistical and personnel functions. Now,
CONARC began to explore how the service could use the machines to
support tactical commanders. Earlier studies had suggested that automatic
data processing systems could assist field commanders in handling and
processing tactical information in a more efficient and nonredundant
manner. Although the deputy chief of staff for operations maintained
overall control of the project, he delegated the responsibility for specific
tasks to those staff agencies with the appropriate interests while retaining
responsibilities for developments concerning fire support and operations
centers. The assistant chief of staff for intelligence, the deputy chief of staff
for personnel, and the deputy chief of staff for logistics retained oversight for
projects in their respective areas.21
Many of the experiments involved improving the flow of tactical
information within the operations centers at field army, corps, and division
levels. At those locations, commanders needed to be able to consolidate
incoming information to make timely decisions and recommendations.
Data systems and computers needed to be able to display such elements
as friendly and enemy situations, fire support, air traffic, communications,
terrain effects, and chemical and biological activity in a manner to facilitate
quick recognition and transfer. Additionally, machines required for the
fire support system had to process data collected by target acquisition and
intelligence gathering assets and forward that information to other machines
that would prepare targeting instructions for planned artillery or air attacks.
Ultimately, the flow of information throughout the entire command and
control system would be integrated and available to users at all levels.22
Automation of the Army’s logistical and personnel systems already
was well underway. The Seventh Army in Europe had employed a
communications and automated data processing network to support the
experimental Modern Army Supply System, known as Project MASS. The
program allowed forward units to stock minimum levels of supplies locally
while relying upon the automated network to forward additional resources
as they were needed. Computers employed in the personnel systems
had begun tracking the movement of soldiers, identifying where to send
replacements and calculating how many troops were already in the pipeline.
That program remained in its early stages, however, as the Army required
newer and more complex machines to update worldwide rosters and to
21. Staff Paper, n.d., sub: USACGSC Project: Command Control Information Systems,
1970, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
22. Staff Paper, n.d., sub: USACGSC Project.
predict in advance where shortages would occur. Additionally, the service

needed to automate casualty reporting systems and integrate them into the
command information networks as well as personnel functions.23
The rapid pace of technological growth in so many diverse areas prompted
the secretary of the Army to examine the service’s organization and
approach to basic research and development. In December 1959, Secretary
Brucker established the Army Research and Development Board, chaired
by George H. Roderick, the assistant secretary of the Army for finance and
comptroller, to study and to propose a realignment of the Army’s research
and development structure. The board met throughout early 1960 and, in
March, submitted a proposal to Secretary Brucker and the chief of staff
recommending the creation of the Research and Development Command.
Current Army organization, the report said, had divided the authority and
responsibility for research and development between the assistant secretary
of the Army for logistics and the director of research and development on
the civilian side and between the chief of research and development and
the deputy chief of staff for logistics on the Army Staff. The single, unified
Research and Development Command, the study concluded, would
improve the overall effectiveness of the Army program, shorten lead times,
improve long-range planning, and increase the prestige of the Army’s
research effort, enabling the service to attract and retain key scientific and
military personnel.24
The proposal prompted immediate conflict within the Army Staff. The
most vocal opposition came from the Army’s chiefs of technical services,
who stood to lose authority over resources, personnel, and funding for the
research and development process. Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, the Army’s
chief of research and development, countered that the technical service chiefs
seldom had cooperated with his office and that he must have a key voice in
the selection, assignment, relief, and replacement of military and civilian
personnel playing important roles in research and development. Although
Trudeau regarded the creation of a separate command to be too drastic a
response to the problem, he lobbied extensively for additional control over
the Army’s research and development effort.25
23. Staff Paper, n.d., sub: USACGSC Project; Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The
U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 2015), 282–84.
24. Dept. Army, Ofc Research and Development, 23 Mar 1960, “A Proposed Organization
for Army Research and Development”; Ltr, Clifford C. Furnas to Sec Brucker, 15 Apr
1960; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
25. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. Lemnitzer, 13 May 1960, sub: Proposed Organization
for Army R&D, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
Secretary Brucker endorsed Trudeau’s approach. In July, he directed the

chief of staff to establish a line of authority from the chief of research and
development to the chiefs of the technical services similar to that which
already existed between the deputy chief of staff for logistics and the technical
services. Brucker laid out in extensive detail the specific responsibilities and
authorities assigned to the chief of research and development. In a subsequent
meeting with all of the technical service chiefs, General Lemnitzer made
clear his personal interest in the reform. He informed the chiefs that they
would provide their “whole-hearted support” for the decision and that he
would tolerate no bickering, foot-dragging, or prolonged argument over
its implementation.26
The prospect of additional funding also prompted Army leaders to consider
reorganization of the service’s operational forces. After several years of tests
and experimentation, they began to consider seriously a replacement for the
pentomic division. Efforts to tinker around the edges of the organization,
expanding its artillery support and providing an additional rifle company
to the battle groups, had not improved significantly the division’s staying
power and survivability on the battlefield. At CONARC, General Clarke’s
proposals for a modern mobile Army (MOMAR) had initiated a new wave
of suggestions for discarding pentomic models and coming up with an
entirely new division structure.27
After Clarke moved to Europe to take over as the commanding general of
USAREUR, his replacement at CONARC, General Herbert B. Powell, again
brought the issue of division restructuring to the attention of the Army Staff.
He noted that the Army Command and General Staff College and various
CONARC agencies had conducted more than 300 separate studies related to
the MOMAR concept. Those studies and related commentaries had identified
numerous controversies connected with the concept. The proposed divisions
lacked adequate artillery and logistical support, possessed inadequate staff
support, and had eliminated much of the command and control elements
required at multiple levels throughout the organization. In light of these
concerns, along with reservations expressed by the new chief of staff, Powell
proposed that the Army Staff view MOMAR not as an ultimate solution
319, NACP.
26. Memo, Sec Brucker for Ch Staff, 30 Jul 1960, sub: Army R&D Organization and
Procedures; MFR, Lt. Col. Louis F. Felder, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 9 Aug 1960, sub: Army
Organization for Research and Development, both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
27. Ken Thompson, “New Light Army on the Way,” Army Times, 13 Aug 1960; Carter,
Forging the Shield, 440–41; Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Ch Staff, 10 Feb 1960, sub:
Concept, Modern Mobile Army 1965–70, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
but as a point of departure in the Army’s long-term search for a successor

organization to the pentomic division.28
General Clyde D. Eddleman, now the vice chief of staff, ordered Powell
and CONARC to reexamine the entire concept. The MOMAR proposal,
he wrote, “does not provide the simplicity, homogeneity, versatility, and
flexibility required by the Army for its diverse, world-wide tasks in the
coming decade.”29 The Army would pursue it no further. Eddleman directed
Powell to determine the optimum infantry, armored, and mechanized
division organizations for the 1961–1965 period. His proposals would
include details for all organizational elements, operational implications, and
major equipment requirements.30
Eddleman’s guidance for the reorganization seemed directed toward
avoiding some of the shortcomings observed in both the pentomic and
MOMAR experiments. The new divisions, he advised, must be capable of
adapting to the full range of nuclear and nonnuclear environments that
the Army might encounter in the coming decade. Planners also should
consider the development of a mechanized infantry division, particularly
for deployment to Europe. Although corps and field army organizations
would remain, the study would carefully compare the retention of the
battle group formation as opposed to a reversion to the traditional battalion
structure. Eddleman also directed CONARC to consider the desirability
of interchangeable battalion-size infantry, armor, and artillery elements
between the mechanized, infantry, and armored divisions. The new
organizations had to be adaptable by tailoring to varying environments,
degrees of mechanization, and mobility characteristics. Additional guidance
specified that planners should design the organizations with an eye toward
air-transportability and with some consideration of officer and senior
enlisted career patterns.31
Meanwhile, senior officers in Europe were attempting to mitigate
some of the perceived shortcomings of the pentomic division. In October
1959, USAREUR forwarded a proposal to the deputy chief of staff for
operations requesting approval of a plan to mechanize two battle groups
28. Memo, Gen. Herbert B. Powell for Vice Ch Staff, 22 Nov 1960, sub: MOMAR, File
29. Memo, Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 16 Dec
1960, sub: Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized
Division, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
30. Memo, Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 16 Dec 1960, sub:
Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division.
31. Memo, Eddleman for Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 16 Dec 1960, sub:
Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division.
in each of the command’s infantry divisions. If the chief of staff approved

the plan, USAREUR would assign the armored personnel carriers directly
to squads and platoons, rather than pooling them at the division level in
accordance with pentomic doctrine. The USAREUR staff estimated that the
reorganization would require 876 new tracked vehicles. It also called for 242
new wheeled vehicles to replace smaller vehicles turned in by the mechanized
units and to satisfy additional logistical requirements imposed by the new
organization. To implement these changes, USAREUR requested an addition
of 1,571 personnel to provide drivers, assistant drivers, and necessary
maintenance personnel.32
The Army Staff considered the USAREUR request, routing it through
the various staff sections during early March 1960. All sections concurred
in the proposal. The deputy chief of staff for military operations, Lt. Gen.
John C. Oakes, wrote that the proposal was in consonance with organizational
studies currently underway and that increasing the mobility of infantry
units was a vital step in the modernization of the Army. He pointed out that
the program had favorable public relations implications, which the service
could exploit upon its implementation.33
For the moment, however, neither the money nor the support was available
at the highest levels. Ironically, Vice Chief of Staff General Eddleman, who
had authorized the initial proposal while still the USAREUR commander,
initialed the document sent back to the Army Staff indicating that the chief
of staff had disapproved the measure. Despite this disappointment, the issue
remained in circulation, waiting for the arrival of the new administration.34
KEEPING BUSY
After nearly a decade of the Army shuffling a diminishing number of

active divisions around, by 1960, its organization and disposition began
to stabilize. For the second consecutive year, the number of divisions and
the locations of their headquarters remained the same as they had been the
previous year. In Europe, the V and VII Corps with the 3d, 8th, and 24th
Infantry Divisions and the 3d and 4th Armored Divisions remained the
32. Memo, Gen. Eddleman, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Army, Europe, for Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops,
29 Oct 1959, sub: Mechanization of Two Battle Groups in Each Division, File Unit: Entry
33. Memo, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 16 Mar 1960, sub:
Mechanization of USAREUR Infantry Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
34. Memo, Oakes for Ch Staff, 16 Mar 1960, sub: Mechanization of USAREUR Infantry
Divisions.
CANADA
FORT LEWIS
FORT CARSON
1 ST INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT RILEY 101 ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT CAMPBELL
XVIII CORPS
82 D AIRBORNE DIVISION
FORT BRAGG
2 D INFANTRY DIVISION
FORT BENNING
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
2 D ARMORED DIVISION
FORT HOOD
HAWAII
1:20,000,000
UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST UNI TED STATES
REPUBLICS
December 1960
MEXICO
CA
TURNING THE PAGE
Unit Location
N
A
0 100 200 300 400 500
D
ALASKA
A
Miles
1:45,300,000
323
Map 9
UC. SH. I A
N RAM Y C O R P S A N D D I V I S I O N S
S OU TH KOR E A
December 1960
Unit Location SEA OF JAPAN
0 120 Miles
KOREA BAY
0 120 Kilometers
ARMISTICE LINE
NORTH KOREA
DOPSUDONG
I CORPS
UIJONBU
SEOUL
1 ST CAVALRY DIVISION
TONGU
SOUTH KOREA
YELLOW SEA
Koje-do
T
I
A
R
T
S
A
E
R
O J A PA N
Cheju-do K
Map 10
core of the Seventh Army. Although understrength, the 7th Infantry and
the 1st Cavalry Divisions of I Corps continued their forward deployment
missions in Korea, backstopped by the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i.
In the continental United States, the 4th Infantry Division and the 82d and
101st Airborne Divisions made up the XVIII Airborne Corps, the nation’s
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) reaction force. The 1st and 2d Infantry
Divisions and the 2d Armored Division stood at a lower level of readiness,
served as training cadres for new recruits, and supported the rotation of
personnel overseas. Two battle groups in Alaska and one in the Caribbean

SWEDEN
G E R MA NY
DENMARK
December 1960
Unit Location
0 150 Miles
NORTH
0 150 Kilometers
SEA
POLAND
DS
AN
RL
BERLIN
HE
ET
N
BELGIUM
3 D ARMORED DIVISION
FRIEDBERG
V CORPS PRAGUE
FRANKFURT
LUXEMBOURG 3 D INFANTRY DIVISION

BAD KREUZNACH
WÜRZBURG C Z E C H O S LO VA K I A
4 TH ARMORED DIVISION
GÖPPINGEN
VII CORPS 24 TH INFANTRY DIVISION

MÖHRINGEN AUGSBURG
FRANCE
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
Map 11
rounded out the combat elements of the active Army.35 (See Maps 9, 10,
and 11.)
The pause in the steady reduction of Army units and personnel gave
the service’s leaders an opportunity to reconsider base requirements for
the now diminished force of just more than 870,000. In a study conducted
35. Memo, Dewey Short, Asst Sec Army Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces, for
Asst Sec Def (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces), 25 Feb 1960, sub: Request
of Chairman Price, House Armed Services Subcommittee for Unclassified Document
Outlining Allocation of Military Personnel; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
early in January 1960, the deputy chief of staff for logistics reported that the
Army currently maintained fifty-four active Class I installations within the
continental United States. Of these, he considered eleven to be the hard core
of the Army’s requirements and of too high a priority to consider closing.
Another twenty-nine he thought too small in acreage, assigned personnel,
and operating cost to justify the costs of shutdown. The remaining fourteen
merited additional study as potential candidates for closure.36
The fourteen installations under consideration included some of the
service’s oldest and most prestigious locations. The Army Staff narrowed
down the list according to the needs of the service. Fort Dix, New Jersey,
would remain because it housed a major reception and training area in
the most populous region of the United States. Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
provided the only location other than Fort Bragg, North Carolina, capable
of supporting the training and operational facilities required by an airborne
division. Fort Stewart, Georgia, supported the only tank-firing ranges on the
east coast capable of accommodating both active and reserve force training
exercises. Ultimately, the staff recommended three primary installations
for closure—Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Fort Gordon, Georgia; and
Fort Carson, Colorado. The recommendation also included several smaller
depots and installations as candidates for closure.37
General Decker, the vice chief of staff, agreed with most of the study’s
recommendations, but objected strenuously to the listing of Fort Jackson
as a higher priority for closure than Fort Gordon. He pointed out that the
former was the only major Army installation in South Carolina, while
Georgia retained Forts Benning, Stewart, and Gordon, as well as the Atlanta
General Depot. Closing one of a state’s five locations certainly would have
less of an impact on public relations than closing a state’s sole facility. In his
opinion, that was the most important consideration.38
Army air defense sites in the United States also were coming under fire.
In May, the commanding general of NORAD (North American Air Defense
Command), Air Force General Laurence S. Kuter, recommended to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the Nike Hercules bases located near seven Strategic Air
Command bases and one Atomic Energy Commission site be relocated to
support the air defenses surrounding several major metropolitan areas. He
based his recommendation upon anticipated reductions in NORAD forces
36. Memo, Maj. Gen. George O. N. Lodoen, Acting Dep Ch Staff Logistics, for Ch Staff,
18 Jan 1960, sub: Priority of Closure of Installations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
37. Memo, Lodoen for Ch Staff, 18 Jan 1960, sub: Priority of Closure of Installations.
38. Memo, Gen. Decker for Ch Staff, 22 Jan 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
in coming years. The Joint Chiefs approved the general’s recommendations,

which resulted in the cancellation of construction at the eight locations,
several of which already were nearing completion. Following that decision,
Army leaders prepared to redeploy Nike Hercules batteries intended for
those sites to areas around New York; the Washington, D.C.–Baltimore,
Maryland area; Los Angeles, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and
other cities, where they would replace aging Nike Ajax units.39
At the same time that the Army Staff wrestled with matching the service’s
facilities and infrastructure with its evolving strength and mission, the
units in the active force carried on with training exercises designed to
highlight their evolving capabilities. In Europe and Korea, the forward-
deployed divisions continued preparations to meet potential Communist
threats in those locations. In the United States, divisions assigned to STRAC
participated in a series of training events intended to test their response to
different situations and environments and their ability to move quickly to
far-flung trouble spots.40
In Little Bear, the first exercise in 1960, the 1st Battle Group, 12th
Infantry, led by Col. George C. Fogle, flew from Fort Lewis, Washington,
to team up with elements of U.S. Army, Alaska. After arriving in Alaska,
the unit prepared to move out with supplies and heavy equipment already
stockpiled in depots there. According to Maj. Gen. John H. Michaelis, the
U.S. Army, Alaska, commander, the participating units were able to test
various weapons and items of equipment under harsh arctic conditions.
Michaelis noted that the intense training developed “men with the tough
hide and cold nerve essential for combat readiness, especially in a climate of
this kind where we may someday have to fight.”41
In March, the Army participated in two major exercises in the Caribbean
to test strategic airlift coordination between the Army and the Air Force,
to assess the ability of U.S. Army units to cooperate in joint exercises with
military units from Latin American nations, and, perhaps, to send a message
to the revolutionary leaders in Cuba. Exercise Banyan Tree II began late
in December 1959, when representatives from the U.S. Army Caribbean
Command and CONARC visited Colombia, Peru, and Brazil to meet with
military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) there and to discuss the
39. MFR, Col. Phillip R. Smith, Asst Ch Air Def Plans Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops,
26 May 1960, sub: Discussion of JCS 1899/577 with ADDR&E (Air Defense); Fact Sheet,
Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes, Dep Ch Staff Ops, 2 Jun 1960, sub: Change in Deployment of
Nike Hercules in CONUS; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
40. For information about U.S. Army, Europe, training events, see Carter, Forging the Shield.
41. “2 Battle Groups End Little Bear,” Army Times, 27 Feb 1960.
Soldiers participating in Exercise Little Bear read magazines during a

lull in the training. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
participation of military units from those nations in a joint exercise. The

operations plan called for the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 325th Infantry, of
the 82d Airborne Division, to make an airborne assault into Panama, where
it would join an airborne infantry company from Brazil, one company from
the Panamanian National Guard, and an advanced planning detachment
provided by Colombia. The allied forces would then unite to combat
aggressors provided by the 1st Battle Group, 20th Infantry, from Fort Kobbe,
Panama Canal Zone. The Air Force provided twenty-five C–130 and fifty
C–123 aircraft to move the troops from Fort Bragg to the Canal Zone and to
conduct the airborne assault. The maneuver continued from 8 to 16 March
and involved a variety of missions against the aggressor force. Observers of
the maneuver were satisfied with the cooperation between the allied forces
and observed that further such training would be beneficial to all concerned.
For once, Army observers even expressed satisfaction with the level of Air
Force support and voiced their appreciation for the close teamwork between
Army and Air Force elements throughout the exercise.42
That cooperation and teamwork met an even bigger test almost
immediately on the heels of the Banyan Tree II deployment. Between
42. Final Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Caribbean, 8–16 Mar 1960, sub: Exercise Banyan
Tree II, Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History. Washington, DC; Karl
Sprinkle, “82d Jumps in Panama War” Army Times, 12 Mar 1960.
14 and 28 March, CONARC and the U.S. Air Force Military Air Transport
Service conducted Joint Exercise Big Slam/Puerto Pine, the largest test yet
conducted of the surge capability of U.S. strategic airlift. During Big Slam,
the Air Force component of the exercise, 447 aircraft from the Military
Air Transport Service, transported some 21,000 troops and 11,000 tons of
supplies from the United States to Puerto Rico. The aircraft, a mix of C–118,
C–121, C–133, and C–124 transport planes, flew from nineteen separate air
bases in the United States.43
The Army designated its part of the exercise as Puerto Pine. Seventy-eight
separate units participated in the training, which included the marshalling
at home stations, the movement to airfield staging areas, and the loading of
troops and equipment onto aircraft. Most of the participating units came
from the XVIII Airborne Corps, with six battle groups from the 82d and
101st Airborne Divisions. Although the lift included few heavy vehicles, the
exercise did involve two field artillery battalions: the 2d Battalion, 222d Field
Artillery, from the Utah National Guard and the 3d Battalion, 15th Field
Artillery, of the 79th Infantry Division, U.S. Army Reserve. The exercise
concluded without any further tactical operations once the units had landed
in Puerto Rico, but they received excellent training in movement, air loading,
and transport procedures.44
Although the exercise proved successful, it also identified the limits
of the nation’s current strategic airlift capability. Observers noted that all
aircraft except the C–133s rapidly were becoming obsolete. The operation
demonstrated the need for further tests and exercises of this type. Others
reviewing the maneuver suggested that contrary to current policy, civilian
aircraft were not appropriate for the movement of STRAC or other combat
forces. Instead, military officials should consider increased use of civilian
aircraft for routine peacetime missions, allowing the Military Air Transport
Command to focus exclusively on its wartime mission.45
In April, the services delivered a full report on the airlift exercises to a
subgroup of the House Armed Services Committee that Congress had
established to study the nation’s strategic airlift requirements. Army leaders
43. Joint Rpt, Headquarters, Continental Army Command and Military Air Transport
Service, 14-28 March 1960, Joint Report on the Operational and Internal Aspects With
Lessons Learned and Conclusions; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Test of Airlift Capabilities,” Army Information Digest
15 (Oct 1960): 39–43.
44. “Test of Airlift Capabilities,” 39–43.
45. “Test of Airlift Capabilities,” 39–43; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Airlift Iffy, Chiefs Admit,”
Army Times, 12 Mar 1960; Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. James K. Woolnough, 3 Feb 1960, sub:
The Role of MATS in Peace and War, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
appeared before the assembled group, hopeful that they might be able to
provide new impetus to the service’s efforts to increase acquisition of long-
range military transport aircraft. Defense Department officials maintained
their position that, in asking for sufficient aircraft to move a division
anywhere in the world within seven days, the Army was asking for too much.
General Lemnitzer argued that, to the contrary, the lift of a two-division
force anywhere in the world within a period of four weeks was a necessary,
reasonable, and attainable goal.46
In making his case, the Army chief of staff noted that he had selected
Southeast Asia as the most realistic scenario on which to base the Army’s
strategic airlift requirements. He noted that Vietnam represented a typical
destination, which might require a sustained movement over a long line of
communications into an area that would not have the logistic and command
facilities that were available in Korea. He concluded that a deployment into
Southeast Asia should remain the standard for measuring the adequacy of
airlift to meet the Army’s needs.47
PROJECT MAN
In March, Secretary Brucker approved plans for a troop and equipment

demonstration to take place at Fort Benning during the first week in May.
Army leadership intended the demonstration, dubbed Project MAN (for
Modern Army Needs), to reflect the service’s concentration on its most
important role, sustained land combat. The chief of staff assigned primary
responsibility for the project to the deputy chief of staff for logistics and
directed all other staff and field agencies to provide any requested assistance
and to consider the project one of his highest priorities.48
In a detailed description of the project’s purpose and goals, the Army
Staff referred to General Twining’s complaint that the service had become
too “missile happy” and had lost sight of its primary mission.49 In language
that resounded with the philosophies and verbiage of Maxwell Taylor, the
paper declared an intent to convince the American people that the Army
46. “Airlift Report,” Army Times, 16 Apr1960.
47. Statement, Army Ch Staff Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Before the Special Subcommittee
on Airlift Requirements, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 86th Cong.
(22 Apr 1960), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
48. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 9 Mar
1960, sub: Project MAN Demonstration at Fort Benning, Georgia, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
49. Memo, Bonesteel for Dep Chs Staff, 9 Mar 1960, sub: Project MAN Demonstration.
had its mind on its mission of sustained land combat in general or limited
war. The demonstration also would provide the media with an opportunity
to “fill their files” with photographs and written materials supporting the
Army’s objectives.50 Additionally, it would orient senior officers within the
Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve and bring
them up to date so that they would speak as one voice regarding the Army’s
role in national security.51
A series of articles in Army publications identified a second theme the
service intended to emphasize. Under Secretary of the Army Hugh M.
Milton III wrote in Army Information Digest that the service was returning
to a focus upon the individual soldier as the ultimate weapon in land combat.
No computer could match the wizardry of a soldier’s brain for judgment,
discernment, and decision. Milton referred to General Lemnitzer’s statement
that “man is and will remain the essential element in war,” but it must have
been difficult for readers not to hear the voice of Matthew Ridgway praising
“the trained fighting man” as the “decisive element of victory in war” as
they read Lemnitzer’s words. Articles in subsequent publications referred to
similar themes, praising the contributions of soldiers and identifying them
as the real source of the Army’s and the nation’s strength.52
The guest list for Project MAN was impressive. In addition to almost
all of the Army’s most senior officers and civilian leaders, attendees
included retired chiefs of staff Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, and
Matthew B. Ridgway. Other senior military representatives in attendance
were the secretary of defense, Thomas Gates, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Nathan Twining, and the director of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group,
V. Adm. John H. Sides. Other attendees included members of Congress
and representatives from Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe,
and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) headquarters as well as
delegates from many of the member nations making up those organizations.
Both President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon attended the opening
ceremonies, with the president delivering a few remarks at the initial
press conference.53
52. Hugh M. Milton III, “Modern Army Needs MAN, MAN Needs Modern Army,” Army
Information Digest 15 (May 1960): 2–3; “Soldier, American, Model 1960: The Ultimate
and Indispensable Weapon,” Army Information Digest 15 (Aug 1960): 2–15; Lt. Col.
John E. Lance, “Man: The Essential Element,” Army Information Digest 15 (May 1960):
5–13.
53. “Soldier, American, Model 1960: The Ultimate and Indispensable Weapon,” 2–15;
“Department of the Army: Project MAN,” Army Times, 30 Apr 1960.
The presidential party arrives at Fort Benning, Georgia. On the

ground, from left to right: Thomas S. Gates Jr., President Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Maj. Gen. Hugh P. Harris, Wilber M. Brucker, General
of the Army Omar N. Bradley, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General
Bruce C. Clarke, and Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Powell (U.S. Army, National
Also named as special attendees on the guest list were representatives

from thirty-two commercial companies that acted as sponsors, helping the
Army make Project MAN possible. The list included some of the biggest
names in American industry, among them Chrysler, General Electric,
Grumman Aircraft Engineering, U.S. Steel, and RCA (Radio Corporation
of America). Secretary Brucker highlighted the cooperation between the
Army and its industrial partners, pointing out that without the full support
of industry and the American public, the Army would find it even more
difficult to fulfill its missions.54
All of the attendees were in place on 2 May. Project MAN lasted for three
days, during which the Army treated its audience to a tremendous show. The
first demonstration featured a night attack against a reinforced infantry rifle
company, highlighting the variety of supporting weapons and Army aircraft
available to the ground commander. Subsequent demonstrations spotlighted
the service’s vehicles and equipment and its arsenal of nuclear-capable
54. “Department of the Army: Project MAN.”
artillery. Demonstrations and discussions also featured the Army’s evolving

aviation assets and their capabilities. Additional conferences and displays
provided information on airborne operations, river crossings, and Army
Rangers. Each branch within the Army had its opportunity to trumpet its
accomplishments and to justify its role as part of a modern, ground-combat
force. Despite the service’s stated goal of returning its focus to the individual
soldier, it was hard for observers not to notice the spotlights placed upon
new technologies.55
In his remarks, President Eisenhower had praised the cooperation
between industry and the armed forces, describing the pleasure he felt as
American businesses produced such tremendous weapons and then turned
them over to soldiers who learned to use them so expertly. The sight of such
close cooperation between the Army and national industry had a powerful
effect on the president, however. Less than a year later, in his farewell speech
to the country delivered over a national television broadcast, Eisenhower
warned the nation of the upcoming undue influence that would be exerted
by the military-industrial complex, an influence he must have observed as
an integral component of Project MAN.56
General Isaac D. White, commander of the U.S. Army, Pacific, tried
to summarize the Army’s fortunes in a letter to the Army’s chief of staff.
He told his friend, General Lemnitzer, that he sensed a certain amount of
public astonishment in the new and advanced concepts that the Army had
demonstrated. He only hoped that no one got the impression that the Army
actually had all of the marvelous weapons and equipment that were part of
the splendid demonstration the Army had held at Fort Benning.57
For some Army officials and for Secretary Brucker in particular, the
Project MAN demonstrations had another purpose. They hoped to use
the event to reinforce the secretary’s message that the active force, the
reserves, and the National Guard should speak with one voice, as one
Army. Various committees formed during a conference convened by the
secretary in October the previous year had generated forty-nine separate
recommendations for changes to policy. Many of these were more cosmetic
or symbolic than substantive. However, a few seemed to make a genuine
attempt to raise the status of the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard
within the overall hierarchy of the Army. One required the Department of
55. “Department of the Army: Project MAN.”

56. “Soldier, American, Model 1960: The Ultimate and Indispensable Weapon,” 2–15;
James Ledbetter, Unwarranted Influence: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial
Complex (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).
57. Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, 14 May 1960, File Unit: Entry A1
the Army to include appropriate reserve and national guard representatives

in presenting the objectives of the Army before Congress. Another directed
the Army Staff to establish the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and
Reserve Officers’ Training Corps Affairs on the same organizational level
as the National Guard Bureau, with direct access to the chief of staff and
the secretary of the Army. In February, the deputy chief of staff for military
operations, General Oakes, informed the undersecretary of the Army that
the staff had forwarded thirty-eight of the recommendations to the chief of
staff, with eleven remaining at the staff level for further consideration.58
RETENTION ISSUES: KEEPING THE RIGHT PEOPLE IN
Despite some successes, many of the Army’s perennial personnel issues

continued to bedevil its leaders. On the bright side, the outlook for retaining
junior officers appeared to be improving, with the retention rate in the
second half of 1960 showing a growth of 8.5 percent over the previous year.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter Jr., the Army’s director of military personnel
management, reported that retention rates were rising simply because
the service was doing a better job of selling the Army’s appeal than it had
done in the past. Others in the personnel business gave the lion’s share of
the credit to unit commanders. Brig. Gen. Reuben H. Tucker III, the chief
of the Infantry Officers Division in the Personnel Assignment Directorate,
also noted that assignment officers were doing a better job matching up
the needs of the service with the strengths and career requirements of
individual officers.59
The retention of more senior officers, however, seemed to be trending in a
different direction. Anecdotal evidence, at least, indicated that an increasing
number of field grade officers, particularly senior colonels, were leaving the
service. Army leaders attributed this, to some extent, to financial pressures.
Despite recent pay increases, many officers believed that retirement after
thirty years would leave them unable to take proper care of their families,
particularly with children entering the college-age years. Many believed that
58. Memo, Lt. Gen. John C. Oakes for Under Sec Army, 2 Mar 1960, sub: One Army
Conference Committees’ Recommendations; Ltr, Under Sec Army Hugh M. Milton III to
Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 12 Feb 1960; both in File Unit: Entry
59. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S.
Dept. of Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 100; Ken Thompson, “Officer
Retention Outlook Improving,” Army Times, 14 May 1960; “Unit Commanders Get Credit
for Officer Retention Rise,” Army Times, 15 Oct 1960.
by leaving the service earlier, they would stand a better chance of finding
good jobs in the civilian sector than they would if they remained in the
Army until full retirement.60
Others, however, pointed out a rising level of dissatisfaction among senior
officers over other issues within the Army. They noted that most of the Army’s
officers now spent a great deal of time within civilian communities, exposed
to a wider range of attitudes toward the military than they traditionally
had experienced. The perception that other services, particularly the Air
Force, enjoyed greater public and political support than the Army rankled
many. Additional issues that troubled Army leaders included the over-
centralization of authority that hindered the development of junior officers
and restrictions within the Uniform Code of Military Justice that limited
the authority of unit commanders to discipline their subordinates. Finally,
both Congress and the secretary of defense noted that disparities had
arisen in the way the military services administered their officer personnel
programs. The secretary called for the establishment of an ad hoc committee
to study the laws and regulations that applied to personnel management and
to recommend new legislation to bring the basic policies of each service
into alignment.61
When the Army’s leadership turned its attention to the attitudes, morale,
and physical condition of its soldiers, the news was somewhat better.
In response to queries from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, major commanders
reported that the general attitude of recruits toward military service was
positive and that disciplinary problems were not a major concern. Draftees
and volunteers were willing to accept the hardships of military service when
they viewed them as necessary and when they applied to the whole unit.
Leaders pointed toward the revised military pay bill, increased survivors’
benefits, improved medical care for dependents, and other recent beneficial
legislation as contributing to the more positive outlook. They also noted
that the elimination of many lower-aptitude soldiers from the service and
the imposition of higher admission and reenlistment standards had had a
positive effect.62
Senior commanders took special note of the physical fitness of their
soldiers. For the most part, they agreed that the medical condition of new
60. “Officer Shortage Looks Hopeless,” Army Times, 20 Aug 1960; Ltr, Gen. I. D. White to
Gen. Decker, 16 Nov 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
61. Ltr, White to Decker, 16 Nov 1960; Memo, James H. Douglas, Dep Sec Def, for Sec
Army et al., 23 May 1960, sub: Study and Revision of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947,
62. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Gen. Lemnitzer,
28 Mar 1960, sub: Morale and Physical Fitness of U.S. Military Personnel; Ltr,
recruits was excellent, but that in many cases their physical fitness and stamina
left something to be desired. The physical demands of basic training and
subsequent unit fitness programs were sufficient to correct these deficiencies.
Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, the deputy chief of staff for personnel, added his
belief that a more significant problem was the deterioration of fitness with
older, upper-grade soldiers. Although their condition usually did not merit
elimination or discharge, it was of concern for promotions and potential
overseas assignments. Collins suggested reorienting the Army’s physical
training test toward such combat skills as jumping, climbing, crawling, and
throwing as a way to identify soldiers who might no longer be deployable.63
By the end of 1960 and the end of the Eisenhower administration, the
Army was quite different from what it had been during World War II and the
Korean conflict. The men and women who now made up the Army took on
a new image. Although the service still relied upon the draft to maintain its
numbers, recent legislation had improved the quality of both enlistees and
draftees that it had to induct. Troops had to have the intellectual capacity
to absorb the more complex technologies associated with their weapons,
vehicles, and equipment. Efforts to improve the public image of military
service in general and the Army in particular also had proven effective. A
poll conducted within the Army’s Pacific Command showed that 58 percent
of inductees indicated a genuine desire to serve while only 5 percent resented
military service. Morale within the Army had improved, reflecting this
more positive perception. Although World War II and Korean War veterans
still pervaded the senior levels of both the enlisted and officer corps, few
in the junior ranks could boast of combat experience. After eight years of
struggling to survive the fiscal constraints and philosophical strait jacket
of the New Look, the force was beginning to look toward the future with a
rising air of confidence.64
Charles C. Finucane, Asst Sec Def, to Gordon Gray, Special Asst to the President for
National Security Affairs, 3 Jun 1960; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
63. Ltr, Finucane to Gray, 3 Jun 1960; Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff
Personnel, for Vice Ch Staff, 16 Jun 1960, sub: Distribution of Personnel Based on Physical
Capabilities, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
64. Memo, Lt. Gen. James F. Collins, Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Gen. Lemnitzer, 28 Mar
1960, sub: Morale and Physical Condition of U.S. Military Personnel, File Unit: Entry
A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. A more detailed
description of the mostly positive results of Army efforts to improve the quality of both
recruits and reenlistees can be found in Brian M. Linn, Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the
Atomic Battlefield (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 132–64.
Col. Edward G. Lansdale at the Pentagon in 1955. Left to right:

Allen W. Dulles, Colonel Lansdale, General Nathan F. Twining, and
Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell (U.S. Air Force Archive)
THE LURE AND THE DANGER
In March 1960, U.S. Air Force Col. Edward G. Lansdale, deputy assistant to
the secretary of defense for special operations, prepared an assessment of the
security situation in Vietnam. Lansdale had served in the Office of Strategic
Services during World War II and had gained a reputation for expertise in
the areas of special warfare and counterinsurgency from his experiences in
the Philippines and Southeast Asia. Lansdale reported that the Communist
Viet Cong had been strengthening their guerrilla efforts in South Vietnam
for some time. Larger bands were now operating throughout the country
despite the efforts of the South Vietnamese Army and local home-guard
units to contain them. Lansdale claimed that almost half of the Vietnamese
infantry regiments the government used against the insurgents lacked
fundamental individual and small-unit training. Yet, Lansdale concluded,
the United States needed to construct a sound political basis in Vietnam
before any military solution could take hold. He warned that this would take
a special effort, by both South Vietnam and the United States.65
Lansdale prepared another assessment in August, this time for Lt. Gen.
Lionel C. McGarr, who just had been designated the successor to General
Samuel T. Williams as the commander of the U.S. MAAG, Vietnam. In
answer to questions that the general had posed, Lansdale asserted that one
of the primary problems he would face in Vietnam was the ability of the
guerrillas to seek refuge across the border in Cambodia. He warned of a
growing influence of Soviet and Chinese elements in Cambodia who were
actively supporting guerrilla activities in Vietnam. Lansdale was a supporter
of President Ngô Đình Diệm, and he told McGarr that reports of popular
dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese leader were based largely upon the
wishful thinking of certain groups with particular reasons for advancing
those views. He also warned the incoming MAAG commander that many
of the top officers in the Vietnamese Army previously had been agents “in
the pay and control of the French intelligence and clandestine services.”66
Many U.S. officials remained naive, he concluded, regarding alliances that
had formed between those agencies and the security services of the Viet
Minh and Communist China.67
On the ground in Vietnam, the U.S. Army presence continued to
expand. In May, a contingent of thirty special forces personnel arrived in
Vietnam to increase and improve counterguerrilla training for the South
Vietnamese Army. They were accompanied by three intelligence officers,
two civil affairs officers, and three psychological warfare specialists
tasked to assist with the instruction. In supporting the deployment,
General Oakes, the deputy chief of staff for military operations, noted
the growing importance of antiguerrilla activities in the Cold War
environment. He wondered whether the Army was devoting enough of
its resources to meet possible requirements of that type in the future.68
65. Memo, Col. Edward G. Lansdale, U.S. Air Force, for Dep Sec Douglas, 17 Mar 1960,
sub: Security Situation in Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP. For more on Lansdale, see Max Boot, The Road Not
Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (New York: Liveright,
2018) and Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1988).
66. Memo, Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale for Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, 11 Aug 1960, sub:
Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
67. Memo, Lansdale for McGarr, 11 Aug 1960, sub: Vietnam.
68. Fact Sheet, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops,
22 Jul 1960, sub: Special U.S. Army Assistance to South Vietnam; Memo, Lt. Gen. John C.
Oakes, Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 19 May 1960, sub: Counter-Insurgency Operations
Equally troubling was the situation in Laos, where a series of coups and
countercoups had left the nation reeling. A Western-leaning government
there remained in control of the capital, Vientiane. An opposition party,
however, had aligned with the insurrectionist Pathet Lao and received
backing from the Soviet Union, China, and India. By the end of 1960, Laos
appeared to be teetering on the brink of Communist takeover. Primarily
because of State Department objections to its expansion, the U.S. Army
representation in Laos had been relatively small. Although the country
remained an important consideration for President Eisenhower, he feared
the consequences of a unilateral American intervention. He had hoped
that the British and French would bring their influence to bear through
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. As a result, Army planning for
operations in Laos lagged behind similar preparations for potential activity
in Vietnam.69
The situation in Southeast Asia was troublesome enough to drive much of
the conversation as Army leaders discussed the operational readiness of their
forces throughout 1960. In November, the U.S. Army, Pacific, commander,
General White, reported on the condition of the various elements under
his command. In Korea, the personnel posture of the two divisions in the
Eighth Army had improved considerably. Increased authorizations had
allowed commanders there to reduce the number of Korean augmentees.
The 25th Infantry Division had been improved materially by the deployment
of the 2d Airborne Battle Group, 503d Infantry, to Okinawa, Japan, although
the rest of the division in Hawai‘i remained at reduced strength. General
White observed that the activation of the 9th Logistical Command, also in
Okinawa, had improved his ability to support contingency operations in
the region.70
White’s command continued to deal with deficiencies in many other
areas. He had reported monthly to the Department of the Army a lack of
critical personnel in areas of electronics, maintenance, intelligence, and
some combat specialties. In the Eighth Army, where most of the shortages
occurred, attempts to reduce them through on-the-job training and unit
schools had been ineffective because of the brief tour of duty in Korea. White’s
report also noted that the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) on Okinawa
in South Vietnam and Laos; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Oxford University Press, 2000), 294–95; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days:
John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 162–63.
70. Memo, Gen. I. D. White for Adjutant Gen, 16 Nov 1960, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army
Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
did not have many of the skilled linguists it would require to perform its
missions. His command lacked adequate training areas in some cases
and had insufficient ammunition reserves to support some field artillery
training. Although the establishment of the 9th Logistical Command was
significant, White noted that it was only a nucleus around which he might
be able to build an adequate support force for the region. His reserve stocks,
scattered in depots in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, and the Philippines, remained
inadequate to support a major operation, and he lacked sufficient air and
sea transport to deploy them expeditiously. He concluded with an overall
assessment that, while his command was prepared to engage successfully
in the initial stages of a major combat operation, its readiness to conduct
sustained combat was less than satisfactory.71
Through other channels, General White reminded Vice Chief of Staff
General Decker that any widening conflict in Southeast Asia carried
important logistical implications for the United States. Much like the case
had been in Korea, indigenous forces in Laos and Vietnam would be almost
totally dependent upon the United States for support because the Americans
had supplied them exclusively with U.S. equipment. Those countries could
not turn anywhere else for maintenance support or for resupply of parts
and ammunition. Additionally, other members of the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization would look to the United States to provide port facilities and
the logistical infrastructure needed to support any participation of their
forces in a local conflict (Map 12).72
Earlier in the year, the Army Logistics Staff had provided the secretary
of the Army with an updated assessment of the facilities in Vietnam
necessary to support military operations. It noted that, while port facilities
were adequate to support the force envisioned for intervention in Vietnam,
the limited capacities of most ports would funnel incoming shipping into
Saigon. Only two airfields, those in Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang, were
capable of receiving large, cargo-type aircraft, and neither was suited for
sustained operations. Existing airfields in Laos and Thailand, however, could
help to offset these limitations. A national highway improvement program
had developed the coastal highway into an all-weather road stretching the
length of the eastern coastline and had completed another six-lane paved
road between Saigon and Biên Hòa. In summary, although there had been
several superficial improvements in the transportation infrastructure since
71. Memo, White for Adjutant Gen, 16 Nov 1960, sub: Readiness of U.S. Army Forces.
72. Msg, USARPAC to Department of the Army, 30 March 1960, sub: For Gen Decker
From Gen White, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG
319, NACP.
CHINA
Lao Cai
CHINA
d
Re
R
B la
ck Lang Son
R
BURMA Vinh Yen
Điện Biên Phủ
HANOI
Hải Phòng
M ekong R
Luang Prabang
NORTH
LAOS VIETNAM
HAINAN
GULF
Vinh OF
TONKIN
VIENTIANE
Dong Hoi
Udon Thani
(Udorn) DEMARC ATION LINE
Quang Tri
Savannakhet Hue
THAILAND
Da Nang
Paksé
Quang Ngai
Nakhon Ratchasima
(Korat)
Kontum
BANGKOK Pleiku
Qui Nhon
CAMBODIA
Tonle Sap SOUTH
VIETNAM
Kratie
R
g
on Đà Lạt Nha Trang
ek
GULF M
Cam Ranh Bay
Loc Ninh
OF PHNOM PENH Tay Ninh
SIAM
Biên Hòa
SAIGON
Sihanoukville Tan Son Nhut
Phu
VIETNAM Quoc
Can Tho
1960 SOUTH
Unit Location
CHINA
SEA
0 150
Con Son
Miles
Map 12
the analysis conducted by General Ridgway five years earlier, many of the
shortcomings, particularly in the country’s interior, remained.73
For the Army, then, Southeast Asia, and particularly Vietnam, had created
a strange mix of apprehension and anticipation. The escalating conflict
between the South Vietnamese government and the Viet Cong guerrillas
seemed to offer a tailor-made testing ground for the service to deploy and
exploit the resources and expertise it had begun to develop in the areas of
counterinsurgency, guerrilla warfare, and counterguerrilla warfare. The
growing number of U.S. observers in the region later would cause General
Taylor to refer to Vietnam as a laboratory for the study of insurgency. He
ultimately would become one of the greatest advocates for U.S. military
intervention there. As national leaders expressed their concern and interest
in the region, the Army could flex its muscle as the military service most
prepared to intervene. At the same time, many Army officers expressed the
same concerns that General Ridgway, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, and others
had raised over the previous several years. Vietnam was still a primitive
environment in which to fight a war, especially against an enemy they had
not yet defined clearly and behind a South Vietnamese government that
enjoyed dubious political support at home.74
SIZING UP THE NEW PRESIDENT
On 8 November 1960, in one of the closest presidential races on record,

Americans elected John F. Kennedy to be their new president. It was the
first national election to include fifty states, after the addition of Hawai‘i
and Alaska in 1959. It was also the first in which the limit established by the
Twenty-Second Amendment prevented the reelection of a sitting president
to a third term.
Even before the results were recorded, the Army Staff had been at work
preparing an analysis of the president-elect’s views on defense issues. In
doing so, they synopsized thoughts he had expressed in his latest book,
Strategy of Peace, in his most recent speeches before Congress and on the
73. Fact Sheet, Col. M. L. DeGuire, Asst Director of Plans and Material, Ofc Dep Ch Staff
Logistics, 21 Jan 1960, sub: Facilities in Vietnam for Support of Military Operations, File
74. Ingo W. Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam (Lexington,
University Press of Kentucky), 110–12.
campaign trail, and within many of the newspaper and periodical stories
treating the subject.75
The analysis began with a general assessment underlining the image
of youthful vigor that the new administration intended to portray. It
noted Kennedy’s professed belief that Americans must awaken from
their acquiescence and complacency to a new national mood in which
tough thinking and a sense of resolute action were the keys to solving the
nation’s problems.76
Kennedy already had directed some of his closest allies within the defense
establishment to begin studies of what he considered to be the most difficult
issues facing the United States. Senator Henry M. Jackson and Adlai E.
Stevenson II—the former Illinois governor who had lost the presidential
election to Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956—chaired one group
investigating the most pressing foreign policy problems. Paul H. Nitze, a
diplomat and scholar who had helped shape U.S. defense policy during the
Truman administration, headed a second group studying foreign policy
and defense matters. A third group, headed by Senator Symington, was
concerned with defense organization. Kennedy and his staff had directed
the leaders of each group to present him with their findings no later than the
end of the year.77
The paper also noted that Kennedy appeared to be more than familiar
with the views of both General Taylor and General Gavin, having cited their
opinions on missiles and limited war frequently. Although he supported
increased strategic missile development and particularly a hardening of
missile sites, he had reserved much of his criticism of his predecessor’s
defense policies for their lack of attention to limited warfare. He supported
General Taylor’s vision of Flexible Response and called for an increase in
strength for all conventional ground forces, including the Marines. He
wished to continue modernization programs for the Army’s and Navy’s
limited war forces and questioned the adequacy of strategic airlift available
to support overseas deployment. The analysis concluded with Kennedy’s
belief that he could streamline the Defense Department, but it expressed
75. Staff Reading Paper, Ofc Ch Staff, 30 Nov 1960, sub: President-Elect Kennedy’s Views
on Defense, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
on Defense.
on Defense.
some doubt that he would accept some of the more extreme proposals being
considered by the Symington Committee.78
That prediction seemed to be borne out when, at the end of the year,
Kennedy announced that he would nominate Robert S. McNamara,
president of the Ford Motor Company, to be the next secretary of defense.
McNamara also declared an intention to forego the dramatic reforms of the
Defense Department being recommended by the Symington committee.
After listening to advice by his predecessor, Secretary Gates, and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs General Lemnitzer, McNamara indicated that he would
give the changes effected by the 1958 Pentagon reorganization a chance to
take hold.79
Both Kennedy and McNamara would face a wide range of national
security issues once they took office. As it had been for the United States
since the end of World War II, most concerns began with its relationship
with the Soviet Union. To an enormous extent, the U.S. interaction with
the Soviets revolved around Berlin. In January 1960, Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev had repeated his intention to sign a separate peace treaty with
East Germany. He had used this threat for the previous few years to goad
the West into concessions he desired in other areas. With a summit meeting
scheduled in May with President Eisenhower and other Western leaders in
Paris, the Soviet leader no doubt intended the renewed threat over Berlin to
strengthen his hand. That advantage proved to be unnecessary. On 1 May,
the Soviets shot down an American U–2 surveillance aircraft following a
flight plan deep inside Soviet territory. Although the Americans initially
claimed the aircraft had been on a routine weather mission, their arguments
evaporated when Khrushchev produced both the pilot, who had survived
the crash, and telltale evidence the Soviets had found in the wreckage. After
opening statements in which he raged against American espionage, the
Soviet leader walked out of the Paris summit. U.S.-Soviet relations would
remain at a low ebb throughout the election.80
Closer to home were developments in Cuba, where Fidel Castro’s
Communist-supported insurgency had overthrown the government of
President Fulgencio Batista and had begun to consolidate its power. During
the summer of 1960, Castro nationalized all U.S.-owned businesses and
property in Cuba. President Eisenhower retaliated by freezing all Cuban
on Defense.
79. Jack Raymond, “McNamara is Cool to Pentagon Shift,” New York Times, 28 Dec 1960.
80. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 543–60; Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, History
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1957–1960, vol. 7
(Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 2000), 70–71.
assets in the United States and tightening embargoes on Cuban exports.

Prompted primarily by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A.
Burke, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the secretary of defense as early
as 1959 that the emerging Communist-dominated state in Cuba posed a
direct threat to the security of the United States. Throughout the spring of
1960, the State Department and the National Security Council discussed
plans for multilateral or unilateral intervention in Cuba. Emerging from
those discussions was a tentative plan for training a paramilitary group of
Cuban exiles to reenter that country and lead resistance forces. Although
President Eisenhower had endorsed the project, it would remain for the new
Kennedy administration to bring it to execution.81
Another potential trouble spot had flared in July when the Republic
of Congo gained independence from Belgium. Subsequent rioting and
a mutiny among some of the Congolese military prompted an exodus of
Europeans and other Westerners from the region. Although a member of
the new government requested U.S. assistance and approximately 2,000 U.S.
nationals resided in the area, President Eisenhower elected to limit U.S.
involvement in the region. He dispatched the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS
Wasp to waters off the East African coast, and the Army initially provided
a few helicopters and light aircraft to assist the U.S. ambassador. The Air
Force deployed more than one hundred aircraft of varying sizes to help
with evacuation efforts and to bring in humanitarian supplies. Failing to
acquire substantial American support, Congolese Prime Minister Patrice É.
Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union for military aid. The region quickly
descended into political chaos with Soviet and Western blocs aligning with
various competing African factions.82
The proxy conflicts between East and West continued to brew in Southeast
Asia as well. Pathet Lao insurrectionists remained a constant threat to the
Laotian government. Despite recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to establish a MAAG there, objections from the State Department and
President Eisenhower’s own reluctance to increase American involvement
forced Army advisers in Laos to operate under the covert guise of a Programs
Evaluation Office. However, early in 1961, President Eisenhower would
warn his incoming successor that the loss of Laos would be the beginning of
the loss of most of the Far East.83
82. Sitreps, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 30 Jun–30 Jul 1960, File Unit: Entry A1 94, Series:
Studies and Reports, 1958–1965, Subgroup: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations,
RG 319, NACP; Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 187–93.
83. Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. F. T. Pachler, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 21 Jan 1960,
sub: Situation in Laos, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
Although the situation in Laos garnered more headlines in 1960, the U.S.
position in Vietnam also raised concerns for U.S. policymakers. In March,
Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow reported to the State Department that recent
Viet Cong activity had become more aggressive and that the government
of South Vietnam was having difficulty controlling its internal security
situation. Assassination and kidnap rates had risen in recent months, and
military ambushes and attacks on South Vietnamese military positions had
increased in size and intensity. Durbrow suggested that the security situation
was unlikely to improve until the South Vietnamese government could gain
greater support and cooperation from the rural population.84
Army leaders pushed to increase the size of the MAAG in South Vietnam.
The Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, a contingent of 350 personnel
who had been in-country since the French withdrawal in 1956, was scheduled
to conclude its activities at the end of 1960. The United States and Vietnam
notified the International Control Commission, which was responsible
for enforcing the provisions of the Geneva Treaty, that they would allocate
those spaces to the MAAG. This was primarily a paper exercise, however,
because the temporary mission personnel had long since abandoned their
recovery efforts and had operated as de facto members of the MAAG for
many months.85
General Lemnitzer attributed the deterioration in the situation in South
Vietnam to the inability of that nation to engage in the protracted, guerrilla-
style struggle, which the conflict had become. He called for increased U.S.
support in the areas of psychological warfare, civil affairs, intelligence,
counterintelligence, and counterguerrilla military operations. Based upon
those recommendations, the Joint Chiefs agreed to send three more special
forces training teams of ten men each, along with several intelligence and
psychological warfare officers, to Vietnam to supplement the efforts of the
MAAG there. During the period of June to September, the training teams,
which had deployed from the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina, conducted classes in counterguerrilla operations and activities for
selected members of the Vietnamese Army.86
OCS, RG 319, NACP; Fairchild and Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 223–24.
84. Dispatch, Ambassador Durbrow, Vietnam, to Dept. of State, 7 Mar 1960, in FRUS
1958–1960, vol. 1, Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986),
300–11.
85. Fact Sheet, Maj. Gen. F. T. Pachler, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 20 Jan 1960,
sub: Increased Strength in MAAG Vietnam, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
86. Memo, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer for Joint Chs Staff, 24 Mar 1960, sub: Anti-Guerrilla
Training for Vietnam, in FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 1, 345–48; Fact Sheet, Brig. Gen. George
T. Duncan, Director Ops and Training, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, 23 Nov 1960, sub:
Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,

sent similar communications to the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning them of
the deteriorating situation in Vietnam. Neither the United States nor the
governments of Vietnam and Laos, he said, could afford to support both
large defense forces and large internal security forces in those countries. The
task in Laos and Vietnam, he continued, would be more difficult and time-
consuming than operations in the Philippines and Malaysia because of the
enemy’s contiguous secure rear base in North Vietnam. Gaining control over
the local populace on a continuing basis would be the primary objective of
both sides in this protracted struggle. Any successful program would have
to provide rural populations with the means, the training, and the will to
defend themselves. Felt recommended that the U.S. government increase
its efforts to develop civil affairs and counterguerrilla capabilities in both
Laos and Vietnam. He concluded that no quick, easy, inexpensive solution
existed for the Communist insurgency problem in Southeast Asia. The
Communists would continue to wage protracted war, in the Maoist sense,
for the foreseeable future.87
As the year ended and the president-elect prepared for the inauguration,
he reflected upon these and other national security challenges he would
face. He planned to work to minimize the threats connected with atomic
weapons, but he found special forces and counterinsurgency fascinating
and believed that they represented the future way of war. One of the first
questions he was reported to have asked as he prepared his new team was,
“What are we doing about guerrilla warfare?”88
LOOKING FORWARD
In many ways, the Army viewed the passing of the Eisenhower administration
with a sense of relief. Many service leaders envisioned an end to the
budgetary and personnel restrictions of the New Look and a military policy
that would embrace many of the capabilities the Army could provide. At the
same time, no one could define clearly what policies the new administration
would promote. The military’s traditional responsibilities in Europe and
Korea remained as important as ever. However, the success of Communist
insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Cuba posed additional challenges for the
Counter-Guerrilla Training, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
87. Ltr, Adm. Harry D. Felt, Cdr in Ch, U.S. Pacific Cmd, to Joint Chs Staff, 27 Apr 1960,
88. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 297.
Army as well as for the incoming Kennedy administration. For the first time
in eight years, the service prepared to welcome a new administration and to
secure its position within a new national security policy.
9
Playing a Part in
McNamara’s Band
The year 1961 would prove to be the watershed in the Army’s transition
between Korea and Vietnam. The new administration under President
John F. Kennedy would move American defense policy rapidly in a different
direction. Throughout the presidential campaign, Kennedy had expressed
his admiration for many of the concepts incorporated in Maxwell D.
Taylor’s Flexible Response theories. Once in office, he began reshaping
the U.S. military establishment toward that end. After so many years of
languishing under Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New Look, in 1961, the Army
began to reemerge as a more consequential element of America’s national
defense policy.
At the same time, Kennedy’s selection for secretary of defense,
Robert S. McNamara, brought business acumen and a belief in systems
analysis to his position, along with a cadre of young, like-minded acolytes
who became known as the Whiz Kids. The new administration’s style and
infrastructure for dealing with defense issues soon reflected enormous
changes from the way things had been done under President Eisenhower.
A series of crises would highlight Kennedy’s first year in office. They would
shape his approach to defense policy and would move the Army further
along in its transition to the force that would ultimately fight in Vietnam.
The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment rolls along in the inaugural

parade. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
INTRODUCING A NEW TEAM
To many observers, the 1961 presidential inauguration parade appeared

to be one of the grandest ever, with the U.S. Army playing a stellar role.
Accompanying the presidential party was the United States Army Band
and an honor escort provided by the 1st Battle Group, 3d Infantry—the
famed “Old Guard.” A contingent from the U.S. Military Academy Corps
of Cadets also played a prominent role, marching in their traditional full-
dress uniforms. Also participating were elements from the 2d Battle Group,
504th Airborne Infantry, and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Artillery
detachments placed on public display some of the service’s latest hardware,
including the Little John rocket and the Hawk, Lacrosse, and Pershing
missiles, as well as both versions of the Nike missile, the Hercules and
the Zeus.1
The new president wasted little time before moving to put his own stamp
on American military policy. Just one week after his inauguration, Kennedy
1. “The Army Goes to an Inaugural,” Army Information Digest 16 (Mar 1961): 32–35.
PLAYING A PART IN MCNAMARA’S BAND 351
met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss his thoughts on the relationship
between his office and the military leadership of the nation. He expressed a
firm desire to maintain close contact with the chiefs and to meet regularly
with the chairman, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer. The men discussed a wide
range of topics, including the nation’s capability for conducting a limited
war, the emerging situations in Laos and Vietnam, and the ongoing gold-
flow problem in Europe. At the end of the meeting, Kennedy thanked and
praised Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, President Eisenhower’s personal
liaison with the military community, for his work and assistance during the
presidential transition. He introduced Brig. Gen. Chester V. “Ted” Clifton
who would serve in that capacity in the new administration.2
During the early months of his administration, Kennedy honored his
pledge to meet regularly with his military leaders. He met with the assembled
chiefs at least once and sometimes twice a month. He spoke frequently
with General Lemnitzer as part of National Security Council meetings as
well as on an individual basis. Discussions focused on the many potential
flash points around the world that could threaten American interests. As
a group, the officers made their case for increasing the defense budget and
broadening the nation’s military capabilities.3
Despite his support for a more balanced national military strategy,
President Kennedy had used the perceived missile gap between the United
States and the Soviet Union as a valuable weapon against his political
opponent. Soon after he entered the White House, another study sponsored
by his administration confirmed that, in fact, no missile gap existed in favor
of the Soviets. In its place, the president’s Democratic supporters soon
posited a “guerrilla gap,” arguing the Army’s neglect in that area had allowed
the Communists to outpace U.S. efforts dramatically.4 In July, Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota declared that, while the U.S. Army
possessed only 1,500 troops trained in guerrilla warfare, the Reds had been
training hundreds of thousands in such tactics over the past twenty years.5
The president also had grown an appreciation for the potential political
power of the nationalism emerging in various developing countries around
the globe that were throwing off colonial shackles. As a senator, Kennedy
had espoused a foreign policy aimed not necessarily at lining up those
2. Memo of Conf with President Kennedy, 25 Jan 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1961–1963 (hereinafter cited as FRUS 1961–1963), vol. 8, National Security Policy
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 11–14.
3. Memo of Confs with President Kennedy, 25 Jan, 6 Feb, and 23 Feb 1961, in FRUS 1961–
1963, vol. 8, 11–14, 27–30, 48–54.
4. “US Guerrilla Gap Scored as a Result of Bad Planning,” Army Times, 8 Jul 1961.
5. Jack Raymond, “Kennedy Defense Study Finds No Evidence of a Missile Gap,” New York
Times, 7 Feb 1961; “US Guerrilla Gap Scored as a Result of Bad Planning.”
countries behind an American banner, but rather at ensuring that they did
not align with the Communists. He expressed more concern for countering
Soviet political overtures and sponsorship of brushfire wars than he did
for matching their buildup of strategic arms. With that interest in mind, in
February, he directed the Army to expand substantially its capability to deal
with “unconventional war by unconventional means.”6
The U.S. Army’s special forces units possessed exactly the types of
capabilities that Kennedy sought. The increased publicity these units now
received caused one Army Times columnist to observe that in their case “a
glamor outfit was at hand.”7 That prediction soon came to fruition when, after
viewing demonstrations at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, President Kennedy
overruled many senior Army leaders—who long had opposed adopting
distinguishing headgear for the special forces—by formally authorizing the
wearing of the green beret as a symbol of their expertise and excellence.8
The president’s appointees to the Defense Department reflected both
his youth and his educational background. Robert S. McNamara, the new
secretary of defense, had graduated from the University of California,
Berkeley, and Harvard Business School before serving in the Army Air
Corps during World War II. During that time, he had developed efficiency
and statistical analysis methods that would become his trademark during
his tenure at the Ford Motor Company, where he rose from the position
of comptroller in 1949 to president in 1960. Now 45 years old, McNamara
brought to the Pentagon a wealth of business and leadership experience and
at least a passing knowledge of the U.S. military. Perhaps in recognition of
his relative youth, he emphasized to his new subordinates that although he
welcomed honest differences of opinion, he expected swift and unquestioning
execution of his orders once he had made his decision. Other new members
of the Defense Department included Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric,
who was 54 years old and a Yale University graduate; Paul H. Nitze, also 54
and a Harvard University graduate; and General Counsel Cyrus R. Vance, 44,
another Yale graduate. The youngest member of the new team, at age 33, was
6. Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000), 32–41.
7. Max A. Schaible, “Nine-Year-Old Special Warfare Center Grows in Importance,” Army
Times, 22 Apr 1961; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Glamor Outfit is at Hand,” Army Times, 11 Mar
1961.
8. Interv, Col. John R. Meese and Lt. Col. Parks Houser with Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough,
21 Apr 1975, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI).
President John F. Kennedy (center) is accompanied by Lt. Gen.

Hamilton H. Howze (left) and Capt. Kaplan (first name unknown) at the
Ranger and special warfare portion of the Army’s combat-readiness
demonstration. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
Harold Brown, who had graduated from Columbia University and would
serve as the Defense Department’s director of research and engineering.9
The new members of the Army leadership team also reflected
the president’s youth, if not his Ivy League roots. In January, Elvis J.
Stahr Jr., president of West Virginia University, replaced Wilber M. Brucker
as secretary of the Army. Like McNamara, Stahr had reached the rank of
lieutenant colonel during World War II. As an infantryman, he had earned
two Bronze Stars in the China-Burma-India theater. Stephen Ailes took over
as the undersecretary of the Army. Color blindness had prevented Ailes from
serving in the military during World War II, but he had worked in the War
Department’s Office of Price Administration during that time. Altogether,
the average age of the Army’s new leadership team was 50, while that of
9. “The President’s Defense Team,” Army Times, 22 Apr 1961; Lawrence S. Kaplan,
Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea, The McNamara Ascendancy, 1961–1965, History of
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense Historical Office, 2006), 4–6.
Left to right: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Gen. Paul L.

Freeman Jr., and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor in Stuttgart, Germany (U.S.
their Defense Department counterparts was 47.10 Although other defense

secretaries and their staffs had attended Ivy League colleges and similarly
renowned institutions, McNamara and his Whiz Kids brought an academic
tilt to defense policymaking. They created a sort of military-academic
complex, which stood as a counterpoint to the previous administration’s
military-industrial complex.
Within the Army’s senior military leadership, many officers greeted
McNamara and his assistants with a mixture of curiosity and bemusement.
Although the term Whiz Kids had first gained traction describing the
secretary’s associates at Ford Motor Company, the press soon revived the
term to describe the incoming defense executives and their rather brash and
self-assured approach to dealing with senior military officers. The Army chief
of staff, General George H. Decker, ruefully remembered his first encounter
with one individual whom McNamara had sent over to analyze the utility
and structure of the Army division: “The gentleman he designated came
down to see me to talk about this analysis, and his first question to me was,
what is a division?”11 The vice chief of staff, General Clyde D. Eddleman, had
10. Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4–6.
11. Henry L. Trewhitt, McNamara: His Ordeal in the Pentagon (New York: Harper & Row,
1971), 12–13; H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara,
During an inspection trip of Army facilities in the Washington area,

Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. prepares to climb into an Army
helicopter at the Pentagon heliport. (U.S. Army, National Archives
a more positive impression. He told a friend that he had been quite impressed
with the new secretary of defense, and that, as a whole, the administration
was a pleasant change from the previous one, whose executives had come in
with the belief that they knew how to run the place and the officers did not.
Eddleman said that the group seemed receptive to new ideas and the whole
atmosphere in the Pentagon was more businesslike. He hoped that things
would remain that way.12
McNamara, however, soon began to reshape Pentagon operations and
procedures in a manner more to his liking. Although he tolerated internal
discussions of policies, he detested any leak of those discussions to the public.
His attempts to clamp down on the release of information to the press,
particularly before his office had approved it, soon raised a chorus of protest
from reporters as well as from the public affairs and information officers of
the various services. Additionally, McNamara interposed himself between
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),
19; Interv, Lt. Col. Dan H. Rawls with Gen. George H. Decker, 18 Dec 1972, Senior Ofcr
12. Ltr, Gen. [Clyde D.] Eddleman to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 25 Jan 1961,
Harold K. Johnson Papers, Personal Correspondence 1961, U.S. Army Heritage and
Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the president. Kennedy’s regular meetings with
the officers grew more infrequent and almost all communications between
them moved through the Office of the Secretary of Defense.13
Soon after taking office, the new secretary and some of his deputies
initiated discussions regarding a significant departure from the traditional
thinking about nuclear war. Up to this point, most consideration of strategic
nuclear weapons had focused on their role as a deterrent to their use by the
Soviets. The belief was that the Soviets, or any other potential enemy, would
be unwilling to risk the devastation of their cities by attacking the United
States with nuclear weapons. For that reason, America aimed a large portion
of its strategic arsenal at Soviet cities. McNamara and his associates, however,
began to think in terms of winning a nuclear war. Much like the Army had
considered its atomic-based strategy in Europe during the previous decade,
strategists in the Defense Department began to calculate how best to target
Soviet nuclear facilities and war-making capabilities for destruction before
they could bring them into play. These discussions included consideration of
a first-strike option as well as calculations of how much American capability
would survive to retaliate after an initial enemy strike. These discussions
evolved into a philosophy that strategists called “counterforce” as opposed
to the traditional view of deterrence, referred to as “countervalue.” The
growing potential of U.S. Army theater-level nuclear weapons, including the
new Pershing missile, that could hit Soviet military targets ensured that the
service would be able to participate in such strategic discussions to a far
greater degree than it had been under previous philosophies.14
The new defense secretary’s highest priority, however, was an examination
of his own department with an eye toward increased efficiency as well as
effectiveness. He quickly lost patience with the parochialism and squabbling
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His solution to both the inefficiency and
13. “The Right to Know,” Army Times, 29 Apr 1961; “The Soft Sell in Press Control,” Army
Times, 3 Jun 1961; Memo, Sec Defense McNamara for President Kennedy, 10 May 1961, in
FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 8, 79–81.
14. Memo, President’s Special Asst for National Security Affairs (Bundy) for President
Kennedy, 30 Jan 1961, in FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 8, 18–19; Memo, Maj. Gen. Barksdale
Hamlett, Acting Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 17 Jan 1961, sub: “100 Million
Lives” by Richard Fryklund, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General
of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP); Memo, Maj. Gen B. F. Evans, Ofc
Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, 24 May 1961, sub: General War
Strategy and Posture, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations,
Top Secret, 1956–1962 (hereinafter DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962), RG 319, NACP. See
also Trewhitt, McNamara, 122–23, and Kaplan, Landa, and Drea, History of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 13.
disagreements was an increased centralization of responsibilities within the

Office of the Secretary of Defense.15
Senator W. Stuart Symington’s committee on the defense establishment
had released its report in November of the previous year. Deputy Secretary
Gilpatric had been a prominent member of that committee, and McNamara
now took the time to examine carefully its findings. The committee had
recommended the elimination of the civilian service secretaries and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs elevated to the position
of principal military adviser to the secretary of defense and the president.
Additionally, the committee had recommended the reorganization of the
defense establishment into four primary unified commands, representing
strategic, tactical, continental air defense, and reserve responsibilities.16
McNamara rejected most of the Symington committee recommendations
as unworkable. He believed that the 1958 reorganization of the Defense
Department had given the office all the authority and power it required.
Pressure from congressional leaders reluctant to support any further
unification of the armed services prevented any serious consideration.
He worked instead to eliminate some of the defense bureaucracy’s lower-
level committees, which he blamed for the excessive time required to make
decisions and to move projects forward. He began to centralize authority,
particularly regarding budgetary issues, in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. As part of this overall review, he directed the Army to conduct its
own internal study to streamline functions, organization, and procedures
within its department.17
Early in February, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric provided the Army
leadership with detailed guidelines for a thorough reexamination of the
structure of the Department of the Army. He observed the absence of any
significant study of the overall configuration of the Army since the Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958. Gilpatric believed that it was important to
analyze the major components of the Department of the Army, particularly
the Office of the Secretary of the Army, the Army General Staff, the U.S.
Continental Army Command (CONARC), and the technical services on a
more frequent basis. General Decker and Secretary Stahr selected the Army’s
15. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, 18.
16. Memo, L. W. Hoelscher, Dep Comptroller Army, for Gen. [George H.] Decker, 1 Feb
1961, sub: Report to Senator Kennedy from the Committee on the defense Establishment
(Symington Report), File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
17. John F. Loosbrock, “United States Armed Forces: Why Not?,” Air Force Magazine 44,
no. 2 (1 Feb 1961); James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and
Administration, 1900–1963, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 1975), 304–5.
deputy comptroller, Leonard W. Hoelscher as director of the study, which

the Army designated as Project 80. For the remainder of 1961, Hoelscher,
the Army Staff, the technical service chiefs, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense would pose, debate, and reject a wide range of proposals to
reform the organization of the Department of the Army and particularly the
Army logistics system. The discussions ultimately would result in dramatic
changes, but not until the following year.18
The new administration attempted in all ways to portray an image
of vigor and vitality, emphasizing a contrast between it and the previous
presidency. Under Robert McNamara, the Department of Defense took the
lead as it embarked upon innovations and renovations aimed at curbing the
defense bureaucracy. Its goals would have been ambitious under the calmest
of conditions. Unfortunately, the year 1961 would prove to be anything
but calm.
A TROUBLING YEAR
John F. Kennedy probably deserved better. Few presidents in American

history, during their initial year in office, have experienced the variety
and depth of foreign policy challenges that he encountered in 1961. The
Eisenhower administration had bequeathed to him potential trouble spots
in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean. Unfortunately, for a new
president who had promised during his inauguration speech to pay any price
and to bear any burden, these areas and others seemed ready to explode.
The first trouble spot to erupt was Cuba. The Eisenhower administration
had made no secret of its disdain for the new government that emerged
after Fidel Castro had overthrown Fulgencio Batista’s regime. Early in
1960, the Central Intelligence Agency had begun assembling and training
a paramilitary force, made up largely of Cuban exiles, first with an eye
toward conducting guerrilla operations in Cuba, but ultimately evolving
into a full-scale amphibious assault against the island. Although military
leaders expressed some skepticism of the chances for success, Eisenhower
had thrown his support behind the plan, and it moved forward. Central
Intelligence Agency director Allen W. Dulles had briefed then candidate
Kennedy in July 1960, and by the time the new administration came into
18. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Dep Chs Staff, 17 Feb 1961, sub: Study of Organization
of the Department of the Army, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 344–53.
office, the Cuba operation had achieved such momentum that it had become
almost too powerful to dismiss.19
On the night of 17–18 April, a force of about 1,400 paramilitary troops
landed at the head of a deepwater estuary on the southern coast of Cuba, an
area known locally as the Bay of Pigs. Although the original plan had called
for U.S. air support of some forty sorties over the assault area, only eight flew
in an attack against Cuban airfields two days earlier. The attack had raised
such an international uproar that leaders within the Kennedy administration,
particularly Secretary of State D. Dean Rusk and Ambassador to the United
Nations Adlai E. Stevenson II, persuaded the president to cancel any
further air support. The assault force foundered on the beach with many of
its troops run aground on offshore reefs and most of its ammunition and
supplies destroyed by Cuban air attacks. The operation lasted less than three
days. Ultimately, Cuban government forces captured more than 1,100 of the
original assault force. Another 140 died during the fight. The rest melted
into the surrounding mountains and swamps.20
Public response to the aborted invasion was mixed. Predictably, the
United Nations and most world capitals condemned the operation.
Governments in Latin America and those allied with the Communist bloc
howled against what they called Yankee imperialism. Some friendly nations
quietly questioned American resolve in light of Kennedy’s failure to reinforce
the beleaguered attackers. The failure had little effect on Kennedy’s popular
support, however. Most found nothing intrinsically wrong with an attempt
to overthrow the Cuban dictator. In fact, the president’s approval rating rose
ten points to 83 percent. It seemed, Kennedy observed, that “the worse you
do, the better they like you.”21
Some leaders in Congress, looking to assign blame, settled upon the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and, particularly, the chairman, General Lemnitzer.
Senators Russell B. Long of Louisiana and Albert A. Gore of Tennessee, both
Democrats, publicly called for the relief of Lemnitzer and an overall shakeup
of the Joint Chiefs. Long suggested that the housecleaning should include
the head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles. Publicly, both
the president and Secretary McNamara stood by their military advisers.
McNamara affirmed to the press that any Pentagon role in the operation
was his responsibility and that, if any errors had been committed, they were
his alone. In a gesture clearly interpreted as a public expression of support
19. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 124–28.

20. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 140–45. For a detailed discussion of the operation, see
Howard Jones, The Bay of Pigs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
for the Joint Chiefs, Kennedy invited news photographers into his office to
record his meeting with them.22
With somewhat less fanfare, Kennedy turned to the military officer he
most trusted to try to make some sense of the failed operation in Cuba.
That officer was Maxwell Taylor. The president appointed Taylor to chair
a committee named the Cuba Study Group, the purpose of which was to
identify lessons from the Bay of Pigs fiasco. To the task force, Kennedy
named his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles, and
Admiral Arleigh A. Burke. The president instructed Taylor to take a close
look at all aspects of U.S. programs for military, paramilitary, guerrilla, and
antiguerrilla activity, which fell short of general war. Kennedy concluded
that he wanted Taylor, in his report, to chart a path toward the future.23
In this report, submitted to President Kennedy on 13 June, the Cuba Study
Group identified four primary issues that had led directly to the failure of the
operation. The first two, inadequacy of air support and the inability of the
attacking forces to break out into separate guerrilla bands, the committee
attributed to the poor execution of the operation. The latter two points,
dealing with the planning phase, were more distressing: The Joint Chiefs
had failed to point out military deficiencies, and there was a systemic lack
of communication at all levels—between the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Joint Chiefs, between the outgoing and incoming presidential
administrations, and between the Joint Chiefs and the president himself.24
The Bay of Pigs had consequences beyond the mere failure of a military
operation. Despite his public display of support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Kennedy never again truly trusted them for important military counsel.
Moreover, the postmortem of the Bay of Pigs affair marked the introduction
of General Taylor into the president’s inner circle. The retired general and
Robert Kennedy soon became close friends. In May, the president appointed
Taylor to a new position in the White House, that of military representative of
the president. Although Taylor would retain a generally cordial relationship
with General Lemnitzer, as a group the Joint Chiefs resented what they
22. Jack Raymond, “Gore Would Oust the Joint Chiefs,” New York Times, 20 May 1961;
“Would Oust Lemnitzer,” New York Times, 5 Jun 1961; Jack Raymond, “McNamara Backs
the Joint Chiefs,” New York Times, 27 May 1961; “President Poses with Joint Chiefs,” New
York Times, 28 May 1961.
23. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 145–46; Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 184–85.
24. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 184–85.
regarded as Taylor’s usurpation of their role as the primary military advisers

to the White House.25
Taylor’s appointment to a position specially created for him by the
president raised new questions regarding the proper role for military
officers in politics. To many observers, the president’s action reflected his
growing tendency to surround himself with only a few trusted advisers—
at the expense of relying on the broader expertise and experience of the
larger bureaucracy. The obvious effort by the president to circumvent at least
some of the influence of the Joint Chiefs and other traditional sources of
military expertise raised eyebrows among members of Congress as well as
experienced members of the media.26
At the same time, the Army had been dealing with the political fallout
created by the commander of the 24th Infantry Division in Germany, Maj.
Gen. Edwin A. Walker. Walker’s extreme anti-Communist views had led
him to make derogatory statements about several prominent politicians,
and service leaders had accused him of attempting to influence the votes of
his troops. When the Army relieved Walker of his command and brought
him back to the United States in disgrace, several leaders in Congress
complained that the Army’s most senior leadership was attempting to limit
the rights of its officers to speak openly. During a series of hearings on
the Walker case before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary
McNamara defended the Army’s position and denied any attempt to
muzzle military leaders. Ultimately, however, neither Taylor’s rise in status
nor Walker’s relief placed the Army in a comfortable position within the
Kennedy administration.27
Recriminations over the Bay of Pigs fiasco still were resounding as
President Kennedy prepared for his first major conference with his
25. Ingo W. Trauschweizer, Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 2019), 100–103; Jones, Bay of Pigs, 135–39; Taylor, Swords
and Plowshares, 195–98; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in
the White House (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 296–67; James Reston, “Kennedy
Weighs Choice of Taylor as Military Aide,” New York Times, 20 Jun 1961.
26. Hanson W. Baldwin, “Kennedy Shapes Pentagon Ties,” New York Times, 2 Jul 1961;
Waldemar N. Nielsen, “Soldier in Politics: A Growing Issue,” New York Times, 22 Oct
1961. Taylor’s rise in status within the Kennedy administration is covered in depth in
David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 162–
63. Halberstam wrote that Taylor, cool, correct, handsome, and athletic, seemed almost
invented for the Kennedy years.
27. Staff Study, U.S. Army War College (Carlisle Barracks, PA), 19 Sep 1961, “To Determine
the Responsibilities and Capabilities of the Military to Speak and Write Concerning the
Nature of the Current Threat to National Security,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: 1955–
1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Baldwin, “Kennedy Shapes Pentagon Ties”; Nielsen,
“Soldier in Politics: A Growing Issue.” For more on the Edwin Walker case, see Donald A.
Soviet counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, in Vienna, Austria, in early June.

Khrushchev had walked out of the summit in Paris a year earlier, largely in
response to the U–2 spy plane incident. After the Kennedy inauguration,
however, Khrushchev had released two U.S. airmen whose reconnaissance
aircraft the Soviets had shot down the previous summer after it had strayed
into Soviet airspace. Both leaders came to the conference hoping for some
progress on sticking points between the two nations. Kennedy wanted to
move forward with discussions about arms control and nuclear disarmament.
Khrushchev wanted to resolve what he referred to as the “bone in the throat”
of Soviet-American relations—Berlin.28
During the first meeting between the two on 4 June, the Soviet leader
presented Kennedy with an aide-mémoire accusing the United States and its
allies of saber-rattling over their continued presence in Berlin. The Soviets
resolved to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and thus
terminate Western occupation rights in the city. Khrushchev told Kennedy
that if the United States wished to wage war over Berlin, it should do so now,
before both sides developed even more terrible weapons. As he departed the
conference, Kennedy concluded the conversation by observing that it would
be a cold winter.29
Khrushchev waited only a short time before raising the stakes in the East-
West tug-of-war over Berlin. The rising exodus of refugees from Eastern
Europe to the West through the porous borders of the city had become too
much for the Soviets and the East Germans to bear. In the early morning
hours of 13 August, East German police began closing all access points to
the western portion of the city as workers began construction of a physical
barrier to separate the two enclaves. Following so closely on the heels of
Khrushchev’s threats to Kennedy at the Vienna Conference, the erection of
the Berlin Wall compounded the serious challenges to an administration
still learning the ropes of foreign policy and national defense.30
Although Berlin and the confrontation with the Soviets remained
Kennedy’s primary concerns in Europe, the old problem with U.S. balance
Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 459–61.
28. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 51; Telg, U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union to Dept. of State,
10 Mar 1961, in FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 14, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1993), 18–20.
29. Carter, Forging the Shield, 407–8; William R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold
War Struggle Over Germany (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 153; Hope M. Harrison,
Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961 (New York:
Princeton University Press, 2005), 176–77.
30. Carter, Forging the Shield, 410–26; Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961 (New York: Berkley
Books, 2011), 323–62; Memo, President’s Special Asst for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
of payments remained a thorn in the side of the American economy. Army

efforts to limit spending by its overseas troops and their dependents had
proven successful but had not eliminated the deficit. The U.S. Army, Europe
(USAREUR), commander, General Bruce C. Clarke, had discontinued large-
scale unit maneuvers in Germany to reduce the dollar outflow arising from
payment of maneuver damages. Army leaders in Europe also contemplated
further restricting the number of dependents allowed in the theater and began
working on another plan for the rotation of battalion-sized units between
the United States and Europe—Rotaplan. Unlike in the earlier Operation
Gyroscope exercises, rotating units would move without dependents.31
By September, the situation in Southeast Asia also had reached the point
at which the president believed he had to consider some new approach.
Viet Cong advances during the year had led Kennedy to question whether
Vietnamese nationalism had turned irrevocably against the United States, or
whether the nation might still serve as a base for the fight against commu-
nism. Early in October, Kennedy tasked General Taylor and Walt W. Rostow,
formerly the deputy national security advisor and recently appointed to the
State Department Policy Planning Staff, to lead a fact-finding mission to
South Vietnam. He asked Taylor to appraise not only the military and in-
ternal security situation there, but also the political, economic, and social
elements, which would help determine its fate.32
By the end of 1961, the United States thus faced potential threats from
several different trouble spots. None of these—the abortive invasion of
Cuba, the rising tension in Berlin leading to the construction of the Berlin
Wall, or the burgeoning crises in Southeast Asia—lent itself to a quick or
straightforward remedy. Each of these events would have an immediate effect
on the growth and further development of the organization and doctrine of
the United States Army. The Kennedy administration would prove itself far
more willing than its predecessor to include the Army in its plans to meet
expanding foreign policy and national security challenges.33
for President Kennedy, 14 August 1961, in FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 14, 330–31; “Berlin Threat
Sparks Buildup,” Army Times, 30 Dec 1961.
31. Memo, Elvis J. Stahr Jr., Sec Army, for Sec Def, 1 Dec 1961, sub: Balance of Payments;
MFR, Lt. Col. G. R. Allen, Asst Sec Gen Staff, 7 Dec1961, sub: VCofS Instructions with
Respect to Balance of Payments Actions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Carter, Forging the Shield, 463.
32. Study, Ofc Ch Mil History, 14 Aug 1964, “Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964,” Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History
(CMH), Washington, DC; Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 225–26; Schlesinger, A Thousand
Days, 544–45.
33. A summary of national security challenges facing President Kennedy during his first
year can be found in Robert W. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, 1961–
1962 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1963), I-1–I-6.
THE ARMY MOVES FROM PENTOMIC TO ROAD
The Army was already well on its way toward shedding some of the trappings of
its atomic battlefield orientation. Following the guidance he had received the
previous December, General Herbert B. Powell, the CONARC commander,
presented to General Decker a study entitled Reorganization Objective Army
Division (1961–1965). Unlike the pentomic model or the modern mobile
Army proposals, ROAD (the Army’s shorthand for Powell’s study) did not
address a general reorganization of the Army. Instead, it focused on the
three common division structures—infantry, mechanized infantry, and
armored. Each division would include a common base and three brigade
headquarters to which commanders could assign from an independent pool
of units varying numbers of maneuver battalions—infantry, mechanized
infantry, and tank. The predominant maneuver element would determine
the division’s classification as infantry, mechanized infantry, or armored. The
airborne divisions also would reorganize with a three-brigade structure but
would be filled with specialized parachute and airborne infantry battalions.34
Each division base would start with a headquarters element that included
a division commander and two assistant division commanders, one for
maneuver elements and one for administration and support. Support units
in the base would include a military police company; aviation, engineer, and
signal battalions; a reconnaissance squadron with one air and three ground
troops; division artillery; and a support command. In the initial concept,
the division artillery included three 105-mm. howitzer battalions, an Honest
John rocket battalion, and a composite battalion of one 8-inch and three
155-mm. howitzer batteries. All of the artillery in the mechanized and
armored divisions would be self-propelled. The support command consisted
of a headquarters and headquarters company, an administrative company,
a band, and medical, supply and transport, and maintenance battalions.
In addition, ROAD called for organizing several separate brigades under
the command of a brigadier general. These would be units composed of
two to five maneuver battalions with a corresponding slice of supporting
units similar to World War II and Korean War regimental combat teams
(Chart 10).35
General Decker approved the overall concept but supported several
modifications. He believed that the divisions themselves should remain
1998), 296; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Division Revamp Planned,” Army Times, 27 May 1961.
35. Bourjaily Jr., “Division Revamp Planned.”
Chart 10—ROAD Division Base, 1961
ROAD1
AVN BN HHC RECON SQDN SIG BN ENG BN

290 286 788 517 970
INF, MECH, OR DIV ARTY MP CO SPT CMD

ARMD BDE HQ 2,394 178 1,693 (INF)
140 each 1,835 (MECH)
1,879 (ARMD)
HHB
216
MED BN
390
MISSILE BN
231
ADMIN CO
164
FA BN
(155-mm. SP HOW)
455 HHC & BAND
110
FA BN
(155-mm. SP HOW) SUPPLY & TRANS BN
(COMP)2 385 (INF)
401 (MECH)
582 405 (ARMD)
MAINT BN
PLUS VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF 644 (INF)
770 (MECH)
810 (ARMD)
INF MECH INF TANK
842 868 574
Notes
1. Strength will vary depending on the combination of maneuver elements assigned.
2. Includes one 8-inch HOW BTRY
relatively stable. The Army lacked sufficient resources to maintain a

separate reserve pool of unattached battalions. The divisions would each
have enough flexibility for tailoring assigned battalions without having to
resort to an external source of maneuver elements. The chief of staff also
believed that the infantry divisions contained excessive amounts of vehicles
and equipment. Much of the heavier equipment might not be suitable for
such likely environments as Southeast Asia. In addition, he asked CONARC
to reexamine the types and amount of artillery assigned to the divisions.
Decker concluded his comments by prioritizing the development of doctrine
and training literature to support the new organization.36
By the end of April, the Army Staff briefed Secretary McNamara on the
proposed reorganization. During the presentation, the deputy chief of staff
for military operations, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett Jr., argued that the ability
to tailor the make-up of divisions allowed the Army to match mobility with
the requirements of the operational environment. Units in Germany required
mechanized, armored mobility and extreme concentrations of firepower.
By contrast, formations going to areas such as Southeast Asia could deploy
with vehicles and equipment more appropriate to that environment. The
changing world situation, they continued, required improved conventional
firepower. The new division designs offered more artillery, machine guns,
and antitank weapons than the pentomic model.37
The service proposed beginning the transition during fiscal year 1963, un-
less the Defense Department could find supplemental funding sooner. The
Army presentation emphasized that the service had considered the pentomic
organization to be only an interim solution and that the ROAD concept was a
positive step forward in an ongoing process. Aware that General Taylor, the pri-
mary advocate of the pentomic concept, was now serving on the White House
staff, General Decker and the Army Staff recognized that the new plan might
require an extensive publicity and public information component. General
Powell also acknowledged that the reserve community was likely to object
to renewed turbulence so soon after completing the most recent transition.38
36. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 13 Apr 1961, sub:
Reorganization of Army Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
37. Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett for Ch Staff, 10 May 1961, sub: Appraisal of
Improvements in ROAD–65 Mobility and Firepower, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
38. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 303; Ltr, Elvis J. Stahr to Sec Def, 28 Apr 1961; Memo,
Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Vice Ch Staff, 28 Apr 1961, sub:
Memorandum for Secretary of Defense on ROAD–65; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
The proposed reorganization received a variety of responses in Europe.

The commander of the Seventh Army in Germany, Lt. Gen. Garrison H.
Davidson, welcomed the upgrade, noting in his April readiness report that
the infantry divisions under his command were not organized to permit their
most effective employment on a European battlefield. They badly needed, he
said, more mechanization in the form of armored personnel carriers. Any
delays in modernization of Seventh Army’s equipment, he concluded, would
be an embarrassment to his command. In contrast to General Davidson’s
enthusiasm for the new organization, West German Defense Minister
Franz Josef Strauss expressed some misgivings over the potential changes.
Along with many other German politicians, Strauss questioned whether
the improved conventional capabilities indicated a movement away from a
reliance upon nuclear weapons. Although they loathed the prospect of their
homeland as an atomic battlefield, most Germans recognized that NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) could not defend Western Europe
against Soviet assault without nuclear weapons. More to the point, they
were suspicious of any change in policy that might indicate an uncoupling
of Europe from the American strategic umbrella.39
In August, General Decker approved a schedule for reorganizing the active
divisions in the Army. Conversions would start early in 1962, beginning
with units in U.S. Army, Pacific, and separate brigades in U.S. Army, Alaska,
and U.S. Army, Caribbean. Selected units in the United States also would
begin their transition in 1962, with the remainder following in 1963. Units
in Europe would begin conversion in 1963 or as soon as the international
situation would permit. In response to queries from the president, Decker
noted that under the ROAD concept, at the Army’s current strength, it
could maintain only two of the reconstituted divisions at optimal maneuver
battalion strength. With an increase of some 50,000 in personnel strength,
he continued, almost all of the Army’s fourteen divisions could have the best
possible balance of infantry and armored battalions.40
39. Memo, Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson for Adjutant Gen, Dept. Army, 29 Apr 1961, sub:
Operational Readiness Report; File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–
1962, RG 319, NACP; Memo, Paul R. Ignatius, Asst Sec Army Installations and Logistics,
for Asst Sec Def, 3 Jul 1961, sub: Alleged Superiority of West German Over United States
Conventional Equipment, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
40. Memo, Brig. Gen. John A Heintges, Director of Organization and Training, Ofc Dep Ch
Staff Ops, for Under Sec Army, 18 Aug 1961, sub: Progress Report: Reorganization of the
Army’s Divisions; Memo, Maj. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Ch Staff
Mil Ops, 9 Oct 1961, sub: Reorganization of Army Divisions; both in File Unit: Entry A1
EXPANSION AND RESPONSE TO THE BERLIN CRISIS
Amid Army efforts to gain presidential approval for their new concepts, the
administration was at work recasting its approach to national security. Late
in March, President Kennedy had submitted a special message to Congress
requesting an increase of $2.274 billion over the original Eisenhower
defense budget. In May, he made another request, this time for an additional
$237 million. Although the Defense Department had earmarked much of
the additional funding for improvements to strategic weaponry, it also had
aimed a significant portion at increasing the pace of modernization for
conventional forces and increasing strategic sea- and airlift. It devoted very
little funding to personnel increases, but it did allow for a small increment
in Army strength from 870,000 to 875,000. This addition would allow spaces
for 3,000 more special forces troops and would fill some of the obvious gaps
in the U.S. Army, Pacific, and U.S. Army, Caribbean, commands.41
By late June, pressure was mounting in the United States and Europe for
further improvements in both U.S. and NATO conventional forces. While
they continued to acknowledge that nuclear weapons would remain the
backbone of western military strategy in Europe, senior military and political
leaders embraced the notion that improved conventional capabilities could
raise the threshold at which a nuclear response might be necessary. To
that end, Secretary McNamara requested a study from the Joint Chiefs to
determine what improvements to force structure would be best to increase
the flexibility of the nation’s military response and, at the same time,
reestablish the credibility of its nuclear deterrent.42
The ongoing stalemate over Berlin provided additional justification for the
administration’s desire to upgrade its military capabilities. The conference in
Vienna with Khrushchev early in June presented the new president with
further evidence of Soviet intransigence. The Soviet premier had used the
opportunity to harangue Kennedy with the full force of Communist dogma.
At the same time, he had presented the American delegation with the aide-
mémoire, which had threatened to create a separate peace deal with East
Germany and which would deny Western access to the city of Berlin. By
his tone and by his actions, the Soviet leader virtually dared the Americans
to oppose Soviet intentions. A month later, Khrushchev announced that he
41. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, I-13–I-14.

42. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-1; Ltr, Ellis A. Johnson, Director,
Ops Research Ofc, to Gen. Decker, 1 Apr 1961; Ltr. Gen. Decker to Ellis Johnson, 12 Apr
1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
was suspending a previously planned reduction in Soviet armed forces and

instead proclaimed a 33 percent increase in the Soviet military budget.43
On 25 July, in a speech broadcast on television and radio from the
Oval Office, President Kennedy announced a series of steps he was taking
to increase military readiness. First, he would request from Congress an
immediate defense appropriation of $3.2 billion, about half of which would
go to the modernization and procurement of conventional ammunition,
weapons, and equipment. Next, he requested across-the-board increases in
the total authorized strengths of the armed services, with the Army growing
from 875,000 to 1 million personnel. To support the increases, the president
asked to double and triple the draft calls in the coming months, activating
certain Ready Reserve units and some individual reservists, and extending
the tours of duty for soldiers, sailors, and airmen scheduled to leave the service
in the near future. Additionally, he announced delays in the retirement and
mothballing of older ships and aircraft and in the inactivation of the B–47
bomber and aerial refueling wings.44
Congress quickly approved the president’s requests for the additional
funding, including that required to finance mobilization of selected reserves.
In so doing, however, it expressed a preference for expansion of the regular
forces rather than extensive reserve mobilization. In expanding each of the
services, Secretary McNamara promised that the priority of sources would
be volunteer enlistment, recruitment, draft, and reserve call-up.45
The president’s message and subsequent legislation provided the Army
with an additional 133,000 spaces to allocate across the force. By the end
of July, the service developed an initial plan that devoted 52,247 of these
slots to expanding the strategic reserve to a six-division, combat-ready force.
Included in this were sufficient troops to relieve the three Strategic Army
Forces (STRAF) divisions of their training mission and to bring them to full
strength, to fill the STRAF and Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) nondivisional
units to full strength, and to create minimum essential nondivisional units
to support a six-division continental United States reserve. The Army
plan allocated an additional 38,063 spaces to strengthen USAREUR by
bringing its units to full authorized strength and by developing additional
43. Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army
Build-Up, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 374; Carter, Forging the Shield, 407.
44. John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin
Crisis” (speech, White House, 25 Jul 1961), in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962); Carter,
Forging the Shield, 409; Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of
the 1961 Army Build-Up.
45. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-15.
nondivisional support units. The plan applied the final 42,690 personnel
spaces toward supporting the training base by providing cadre for training
centers and establishing additional spaces for trainees. On 2 August,
Secretary McNamara approved most of the allocations for the STRAF and
STRAC units and for increases in the training base.46
The secretary expressed some skepticism however, over USAREUR
requirements based upon additional requests he had received from
USAREUR Commander General Clarke and Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe, General Lauris Norstad. Both had stressed the need for an advance
shipment of service and support organizations for port operations totaling
5,656 personnel, to arrive well before the arrival of any other additional
forces. McNamara also used the opportunity to add 3,000 spaces to the
USAREUR allocation for the purpose of mechanizing the three infantry
divisions in Europe as soon as the Army had received sufficient armored
personnel carriers to carry out the transition. On 7 August, he approved the
allocations for USAREUR, including the additions of the port package and
the troops supporting mechanization.47
The defense secretary directed the appropriate support units from the
reserve component to mobilize to fill USAREUR requirements. As further
guidance, he instructed the Army to bring those units to full strength and
accelerate their training immediately. McNamara wanted them available
for deployment no later than 15 December, but he also wanted to defer the
actual call-up as long as possible and to occur no earlier than 1 October.
In approving the allocations, the secretary noted that even though he
regarded the additions to STRAC and STRAF to be permanent increases in
Army strength, the USAREUR increases should be considered a temporary
measure. That distinction explained the priority given to reserve units as
reinforcements to Europe.48
In the early morning hours of 13 August 1961, East German military and
government personnel began construction of a barrier sealing the border
between East and West Berlin. That action accelerated rearmament efforts in
the United States, most notably by prompting Secretary McNamara to accept
a larger proportion of Ready Reserve elements and to move up mobilization
dates for selected units. On 16 August, he announced the designation of
113 reserve component combat, combat support, and port units with an
authorized strength of 23,626 as priority units for recall to active duty. The
Army alerted those units the same day and authorized increased training
46. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-19; Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec
Army, 25 Jun 1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up.
47. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-21–II-22.
48. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-23.
periods to prepare them for deployment. In a 25 August press release,

McNamara announced the additional mobilization of individual reservists
to fill out STRAF nondivisional units and to support an Army training
center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The Army designated reporting dates of
25 September for the Fort Polk reservists and 1 October for all of the others.49
The construction of the Berlin Wall prompted a variety of responses as the
Kennedy administration worked to project an image of strength and resolve.
On 18 September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Army should
prepare additional divisions to send to Europe should General Norstad
request them. After a series of discussions, the Army vice chief of staff
recommended the mobilization of the 32d Infantry Division from Wisconsin
and Michigan to Fort Lewis, Washington; and the 49th Armored Division
from Texas to Fort Polk. The two call-ups amounted to a total mobilization
of 75,000 additional reservists. On 11 October, Secretary McNamara also
approved the deployment of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment from Fort
Meade, Maryland, to Germany. General Clarke had requested the regiment’s
deployment to provide rear-area security in the Seventh Army area and an
additional reserve of tanks for his combat forces.50
The Berlin emergency highlighted for most planners the difficulties the
United States would face in attempting to provide reinforcements, particularly
heavy armored units, to Europe. With that in mind, in October, Secretary
McNamara ordered the Army to pre-position all of the vehicles and heavy
equipment in Europe to support one armored and one infantry division. A
few days later, he added a requirement to pre-position additional vehicles
and equipment to outfit ten selected combat support units, mostly artillery
battalions, to support the two-division force. Headquarters, USAREUR,
established storage sites at selected cities throughout West Germany, and
McNamara allotted another 400 personnel slots for the Army to provide
caretaker and maintenance personnel and to provide security. Also, as a
result of the crisis, on 1 December 1961, General Clarke reorganized U.S.
Army units in Berlin, creating the Berlin Brigade around the 2d and 3d
Battle Groups, 6th Infantry, already present there.51
At the start of 1961, the Army had planned to conduct Exercise Long
Thrust from 1–15 May. A strategic mobility exercise, Long Thrust would
involve transporting three battle groups of the 101st Airborne Division to
Build-Up; “Army Will Need 110,000,” Army Times, 26 Aug 1961.
Build-Up; Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-39.
51. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, II-39; Carter, Forging the Shield,
427–29.
Germany, where they would participate in a series of major field exercises.

However, the Army canceled the exercise because of the tense political
situation in Europe and possible requirements for the United States to
provide Army forces to support Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
interests in Laos. General Norstad nevertheless recommended to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the United States needed to demonstrate its ability to
reinforce rapidly its deployed forces overseas. He urged the chiefs not to let
the planning that had gone into preparing Long Thrust go to waste. After
some deliberation, Secretary McNamara in October directed a renewal of
planning for the deployment exercise. To preserve the airborne capability
of the strategic reserve, he asked that units of the 4th Infantry Division be
substituted for those of the 101st Airborne Division. He also noted that
the infantry battle groups would be more appropriate for the operational
requirements of the force in Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army
leaders revised the existing Long Thrust plan toward an execution date
sometime early the following year.52
By the end of 1961, most of the actions to provide additional strength to
the Army, both at home and overseas, were well underway. Not all operations
went smoothly. In particular, the mobilization of reserve units presented
numerous challenges to the Army’s logistical system. Lt. Gen. Hamilton H.
Howze, commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, reported that
many of the units reporting to Fort Bragg for mobilization lacked much of the
critical equipment required for their training and deployment. Some units
reported losing many of their trucks and heavy equipment to the levy for
overseas pre-position sites before they themselves had begun training. One
unit, the 3d Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, reported shortages of seventeen
of eighteen authorized 10-ton trucks and seven of seventeen authorized
8-inch howitzers. General Howze noted that shortages had forced units
training at Fort Bragg to share equipment, leading to decreased training
effectiveness. Additionally, a lack of authorized tools and spare parts had
complicated efforts to maintain vehicles and equipment and to bring them
up to deployable standards. Filling those shortages had depleted stockpiles
reserved for STRAC units.53
The activation and mobilization of the two reserve divisions had
presented even more of a challenge. General Powell, commanding general
52. Memo, Roswell L. Gilpatric, Dep Sec Def, for Joint Chs Staff, 29 May 1961, sub:
Temporary Reinforcement as a Berlin Deterrent, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Encl. to Ch Staff Memo for Sec Army, 25 Jun
1962, sub: Appraisal of the 1961 Army Build-Up.
53. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze to Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, 6 Nov 1961; Ltr,
Thomas J. H. Trapnell, Cmdg Gen, Third U.S. Army, to Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental Army
of CONARC, informed the vice chief of staff that both the 32d Infantry
Division and the 49th Armored Division had reported to mobilization
stations without sufficient equipment to accomplish the required training
programs. Like General Howze, he reminded the Army leaders that his
command already had furnished much of the stockage the Army had sent
to Europe for pre-positioning. The most serious shortages included trucks,
tool sets, communications equipment, self-propelled weapons, and mortars.
Powell also reported that the recall of individual reservists to provide
filler personnel had been slower and more cumbersome than anyone had
anticipated. Some 400 recalled soldiers needed to attend Army service
schools to bring their specialty training up to date while another 900 had
reported without any prior training and had to be sent off to complete their
basic and advanced individual training.54
To complicate matters, more than 1,000 of the mobilized reservists had
complained in writing to their congressional leaders or to the secretary
of the Army, reporting shortages of clothing and equipment, poor living
conditions, idleness, and an inequity in the manner in which the Army
had recalled individual replacements. Inspector General teams from the
Fourth and Sixth U.S. Armies, accompanied by members of the CONARC
staff, visited both mobilization sites at the end of November to investigate
the complaints. The teams found that, although many of the complaints
were valid in isolated cases, leadership had addressed the most critical
shortcomings at the mobilization stations and within the units themselves.
Equipment shortages initially had hampered extensive field training, but
the Army resolved most of those by the time of the inspection. Enough
problems remained, however, for General Powell to inform the chief of staff
that the two divisions would not meet their projected training readiness date
of 15 February. Both needed additional weeks of unit training that would
push their deployment date to the end of March at the earliest. Even then, he
conceded, they would lack the desired combat posture.55
Throughout 1961, Secretary McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Army leadership had debated over the appropriate end strength of the Army
and the number of divisions that a reasonable personnel strength could
support. Although the Army continued to argue for a final strength in excess
Cmd, 13 Nov 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
54. Ltr, Gen. Herbert B. Powell to Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, 16 Nov 1961; Ltr, Gen. Powell
to Gen. George H. Decker, 19 Dec 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
55. Ltr, Powell to Decker, 19 Dec 1961; Statement, Sec Army, 4 Dec 1961, sub: Letters of
Complaint, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
of one million, McNamara informed Secretary Stahr in November that the

authorized strength for the service in the 1963 budget would increase to
960,000. At the same time, he acknowledged that, even if they deployed, the
two reserve divisions could remain on active duty for only a limited time.
With that in mind, he announced that he would include sufficient funding
in the budget to permit activation as rapidly as possible of two additional
Regular Army divisions.56
The Army Staff ’s rapid preparation of plans for the activation of the III
Corps headquarters and two additional regular divisions indicates that the
decision did not come as a surprise. On 2 December, the deputy chief of staff
for military operations submitted a concept of operations to the secretary
of the Army, who forwarded it to Secretary McNamara a week later. The
Army planned to reconstitute the 1st Armored Division and the 5th Infantry
Division. The 1st Armored Division would reform around the nucleus of its
Combat Command A, which had served as a training cadre at Fort Hood,
Texas. At Fort Carson, Colorado, the 5th Infantry Division would assemble
around the nucleus of the 2d Infantry Brigade, then a separate unit stationed
at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Both divisions would implement ROAD
organization. Replacements assigned to the two new divisions would begin
training as soon as possible, with the 1st Armored Division beginning in
January 1962 and the 5th Infantry Division beginning in April. Both divisions
would complete advanced unit training by the end of October 1962. Hidden
in a small subsection of the plan were instructions for the Army to begin
to release reservists who had been called up for the 32d Infantry and 49th
Armored Divisions in March and May, respectively.57
MAINTAINING READINESS
Buoyed by the news that reinforcements were on the way, the Army in the
field kept up a steady regimen of training and deployment exercises. In mid-
August, in the largest peacetime military exercise since the 1941 Louisiana
Maneuvers, 25,000 soldiers from the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions
joined 10,000 airmen from the U.S. Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air
National Guard for Exercise Swift Strike in North and South Carolina.
56. Coakley et al., U.S. Army Expansion and Readiness, VIII-25.

57. Memo, Under Sec Army Stephen Ailes for Sec Defense, 8 Dec 1961, sub: Plan for
Reactivating Two Additional Active Army Divisions; Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett,
Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Distribution, 2 Dec 1961, sub: Activation of Two Additional Active
Army Divisions; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
Over the course of fifteen days, almost 12,000 paratroopers dropped in four
separate aerial assaults, nearing the total number of Allied soldiers who had
parachuted into Operation Market Garden in World War II. In addition to
ferrying the paratroopers, aircraft from the 19th Air Force and the Military
Air Transport Service dropped 826 tons of supplies and equipment and air-
landed another 3,462 tons.58
Although Swift Strike demonstrated the ability of the United States
to deploy large numbers of soldiers on relatively short notice, Secretary
McNamara already had been working to streamline command channels.
Earlier reforms in the Department of Defense had created unified commands,
placing units from different services under the direction of one commander
in chief. The commander of the U.S. European Command, for example,
had control over USAREUR; the U.S. Navy, Europe; and the U.S. Air Force,
Europe. Oddly, none of the earlier reforms had addressed a unified command
over units deploying directly from the continental United States.59
In March, McNamara had instructed General Lemnitzer to begin
preparing a plan to merge the Army’s STRAC with the Air Force’s Tactical
Air Command. Placed under the command of an Army general, the
unit would restore to the Army combat forces a measure of control over
their strategic deployment as well as the control and direction of close air
support for ground operations. In September, the Department of Defense
announced the creation of U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM), formally
combining the two organizations. McNamara selected Army General
Paul D. Adams to command the new unit. Adams had served with distinction
in both World War II and Korea and had commanded U.S. land forces in the
Middle East during the 1958 intervention in Lebanon. Most recently, he had
served as commanding general of the Third U.S. Army in the United States.
The new command set up a temporary headquarters at MacDill Air Force
Base in Florida, but because that location was scheduled to close, the search
continued for a permanent home.60
The secretary assigned to the new command the primary mission
of providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces for U.S. overseas
commands. STRICOM would conduct planning for and supervise execution
of contingency operations. Its leadership would develop doctrine and
58. “Exercise Swift Strike Sets Record for Airborne Training,” Army Times, 26 Aug 1961;
“STRAC Demonstrates Readiness in Far-Ranging Exercises,” Army Information Digest 16
(Nov 1961): 23.
59. Trewhitt, McNamara, 85.
60. Trewhitt, McNamara, 85; Jack Raymond, “Pentagon Plans Joint Unit to Use in Limited
War,” New York Times, 27 Mar 1961; “Strike Command Set Up at McDill,” Army Times,
21 Oct 1961.
Gen. Paul D. Adams (center) inspects a loaded aircraft before its

departure for Deep Furrow, a recurring NATO exercise. (U.S. Army,
conduct training for joint force operations. The commanding general of

CONARC also would serve as Army component commander of STRICOM.
Army forces available to the STRICOM commander included the III Corps
and XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters; the 1st, 2d, and 4th Infantry
Divisions; the 2d Armored Division; and the 82d and 101st Airborne
Divisions. Air units committed to the new command included tactical
fighter, reconnaissance, troop carrier, and refueling wings from the active
Air Force as well as the Air National Guard.61
To minimize interservice friction, Adams organized his staff so that
whatever the branch of a staff section’s senior officer, the most immediate
subordinate had to be of another service. As his own chief of staff and deputy
commander, Adams selected U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Bruce K. Holloway.
Other key officers on the joint command staff included Army Brig. Gen.
Clifton F. von Kann as the assistant chief of staff for operations, Army Brig.
Gen. Robert B. Neely as the assistant chief of staff for logistics, and Air
Force Brig. Gen. Clyde Box as the assistant chief of staff for plans. U.S. Navy
leaders fiercely resisted participation in STRICOM on the grounds that their
61. Fact Sheet, 1 Mar 1962, sub: HQs, United States Strike Command, Historians Files,
CMH; Jean R. Moenk, A History of Command and Control of Army Forces in the Continental
United States, 1919–1971 (Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1972), 38.
service, with the Marines, was better qualified to plan and execute strike
operations on its own. However, to the extent that the Department of the
Navy made U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers available, Adams went out
of his way to include them in prominent positions on his staff.62
Meanwhile, in Europe, Army leaders had begun to incorporate the
reinforcements and modernizations launched by the Kennedy administration
while attempting to minimize disruptions to combat readiness. As
USAREUR prepared to implement the mechanization of its infantry
divisions, General Clarke reminded Department of Defense officials that
shortages of equipment, trained personnel, and adequate facilities would
extend the length of time required to reorganize or reequip. In particular,
he noted that the Seventh Army would require an additional 2,700 tracked
vehicle mechanics and drivers to accommodate the addition of armored
personnel carriers. Clarke also sent the chief of staff his recommendation
that the Seventh Army not begin its conversion to a ROAD organization
until the infantry divisions had completed their mechanization. By the end
of the year, USAREUR had received 3,000 filler personnel to support the
new personnel carriers. The command had received sufficient carriers to
complete the conversion of the 3d Infantry Division and two battle groups
of the 8th Infantry Division.63
Throughout the Army, an influx of new equipment prompted new ways
of thinking about how the service would fight in future wars, particularly
in discussions of the future of aviation. Secretary Stahr proved to be an
effective advocate for the potential employment of helicopters. In response
to a proposed reduction in aircraft procurement, he pointed out the
restrictions under which the Army had labored during the previous ten
years. The service’s current inventory of 5,500 aircraft included seventeen
separate fixed- and rotary-wing models. He pressed for a modernized
fleet of only eight aircraft types, designed to accomplish specific organic
service missions, including observation, troop movement, resupply,
reconnaissance, command and control, and medical evacuation. Stahr was
careful to promote the use of helicopters not only in a European battlefield,
but also as an essential element in combat against guerrilla fighters in more
austere environments.64
62. “Strike Command Set Up at MacDill”; Interv, Col. Irving Monclova and Lt. Col. Marlin
Lang with Gen. Paul D. Adams, 8 May 1975, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.
63. Msg, Cdr in Ch, U.S. Army, Europe, for U.S. Cdr in Ch, European Cmd, 24 Jul 1961;
Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Ch Staff, 22 Aug 1961, sub: Implementation of ROAD–65
by USAREUR; Ltr, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke to Gen. George H. Decker, 7 Nov 1961; all in File
64. Memo, Sec Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. for Sec Def, 1 Nov 1961, sub: Army Aircraft
Requirements, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
In his pitch to the defense secretary, Stahr also described the ongoing
studies and development of various weapon systems for use by helicopters.
By the end of the year, Army experiments with mounting the SS11 wire-
guided missile or twin .30-caliber machine guns had seemed promising.
The General Electric Company had developed a rapid-firing “minigun,”
patterned after a similar Air Force design but adapted for helicopters. At
Fort Lewis, elements of the 4th Infantry Division conducted tests of the air
cavalry concept, using helicopters mounted with some of the experimental
weapons. Pilots practiced flying just above treetop level, looking for ways to
make their aircraft more survivable on a mid- to high-intensity battlefield.65
Another branch that seemed to be in the midst of a technological
revolution was the field artillery. Throughout 1961, artillery units began
to receive new weapons and equipment that would change the manner in
which they provided their support to the maneuver units. In July, the service
demonstrated a new self-propelled 8-inch howitzer, the M110. With the
ability to travel at speeds up to 34 miles an hour and possessing twice the
cruising range of earlier models, the new weapon was better suited to serving
with mobile armored units. At twenty-six tons, it could be transported
anywhere in the world by larger cargo aircraft. Also on the drawing board
was a much lighter towed 105-mm. howitzer, the M102, which could be
sling-loaded under the service’s more modern helicopters. Perhaps most
revolutionary was the field testing of the new field artillery data computer.
The digital computer greatly increased the speeds at which artillerymen
could generate firing data or resolve complicated meteorological problems.
A solid-state electronic device without vacuum tubes, the field artillery data
computer would propel the artillery into the computer age.66
Other new weapons were also in various stages of development, testing,
and fielding. The M14 rifle, the M60 machine gun, and the M79 grenade
launcher were all in production and slowly working their way into the field
army. The service also had introduced its new M60 tank to units throughout
Europe. Unfortunately, adequate supplies of 105-mm. tank ammunition had
not yet reached the command, nor had the Seventh Army yet developed
the maintenance and logistical infrastructure to support large numbers of
the new tank. Still a bit further back in the production pipeline were the
NACP.
65. “Armed Copters Undergoing Test in 4th Div. Recon Squadron,” Army Times, 6 May
1961; Tom Scanlon, “Group Promotes Copter as Weapon,” Army Times, 13 May 1961; “New
Weapons Considered for Use on Copters,” Army Times, 18 Nov 1961.
66. “Army Demonstrates Eight Inch Howitzer,” Army Times, 22 Jul 1961; Gene Famiglietti,
“Army Developing 2 New Light 105s,” Army Times, 21 Oct 1961; “Computer Increases
Artillery Accuracy,” Army Times, 21 Oct 1961.
The M60A1 tank is tested on the dry-wash course at Yuma Proving

Ground, Arizona. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
Pershing missile, a replacement for the antiquated Redstone, and the Redeye
shoulder-launched air defense weapon.67
The increases in range, lethality, and mobility of the Army’s new weapons
and equipment prompted other concerns among the service’s senior leaders.
General Powell warned General Decker that the growing urbanization of the
United States posed limitations for future military training. Various outside
interests had begun clamoring for the release of much of the land controlled
by the federal government. The availability of open land on which to hold
large-scale maneuvers, long an issue in Europe, was becoming a concern at
home as well. Increased congestion of air space posed additional concerns
for Army Aviation. Powell suggested that future success in preparing
military units for battle might lie in the miniaturization of training—using
terrain boards, equipment simulators, and subcaliber weapon simulators.
The Army, he said, needed to foster new approaches to training.68
67. Tom Scanlon, “New Weapons on the Way, But Delivery is Slow,” Army Times, 25 Feb
1961; “Pershing, Redeye Production Seen,” Army Times, 30 Dec 1961; Memo, Gen. Bruce C.
Clarke for Adjutant Gen, 19 May 1961, sub: Operational Readiness Report, File Unit: Entry
A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
68. Ltr, Gen. Herbert B. Powell to Gen. George H. Decker, 18 Dec 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen.
Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 28 Dec 1961, sub: Problem Areas
for Future Training; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
None of the innovations in weapons, equipment, or training methods

would make a difference, however, if the Army failed to recruit and retain
sufficient soldiers to fill the force. For the most part, reports throughout
1961 indicated that efforts to improve personnel statistics were paying off. In
March, service leaders announced that reenlistments for the fiscal year ending
31 July would total between 76,000 and 78,000, establishing a new record.
Although personnel increases to support the Berlin response expanded the
number of inducted draftees from just more than 86,000 to almost 119,000,
the number would drop back to around 82,000 the following year. Of note
was an increase of more than 50 percent in the enlistment of Women’s Army
Corps recruits. In August, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup, the deputy chief of staff
for personnel, announced that President Kennedy’s televised message to the
nation on 25 July had boosted enlistments and reenlistments by 20 percent
above the Army’s most optimistic estimates. Vittrup warned, however,
that the extensions in overseas tours and the terms of enlistment that the
president had approved in conjunction with his rearmament package could
have a less favorable effect on recruiting and retention in the long term.69
One area in which personnel specialists began to look with alarm was the
ballooning surplus of senior noncommissioned officers in several branches
and career fields. Large numbers of promotions during the Korean War,
followed by the inactivation of units but the retention of personnel, created
long delays for promotions and fewer opportunities to attend required
service schools. In many cases, senior noncommissioned officers faced a
choice of reclassification into a completely alien skill field or an early release
from the service. An increasing resignation rate among senior enlisted ranks
caused some to recognize that, within a few years, most of those soldiers
with World War II or Korean War combat experience would be gone. With
leaders devoting so much attention to recruitment and initial reenlistment
rates, the Army had no immediate remedy for this looming concern.70
The new administration soon began poking at another personnel
issue that had simmered beneath the surface for several years. Secretary
McNamara approached the issue of racial integration less from a pursuit of
social justice than from a desire to increase military efficiency. Soon after
taking over the position, McNamara asked his staff to gather information
regarding the status of Black personnel within the Department of Defense.
Although he initially addressed his concerns toward civilians serving
69. “Regular Army Reenlistment Rate Points to New Record,” Army Times, 11 Mar 1961;
Memo, Lt. Gen. Russell L. Vittrup for Under Sec Army, 22 Aug 1961, sub: Significant
Developments in Personnel Procurement, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
70. Sfc. Frank B. Hastie Jr., “The Surplus Nightmare,” Army Times, 13 May 1961.
within the department, they soon spread to the availability of opportunities

throughout the military ranks. The president himself intervened when
he observed few if any Black service members participating in military
ceremonial units around the White House.71
In direct response to prodding from the assistant secretary of defense
(manpower), the Army directed commanders at all levels to increase their
emphasis on the participation of qualified Black personnel in existing officer
procurement and training programs. Unit commanders were to encourage,
counsel, and assist talented Black personnel to apply for appointment to
the U.S. Military Academy or officer candidate school. In 1961, the Army
drew the majority of its Black officers from a small number of historically
Black colleges and universities. The guidance tasked professors of military
science in all educational institutions to assist qualified Black students and
to encourage them to participate in the ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps) program. It also directed that a prominent Black educator be
appointed to the ROTC Advisory Panel within the Department of the Army.
The adjutant general ordered updates to assignment policies to ensure that
Black officers would serve in positions worthy of their capabilities.72
Although the active services had made considerable progress in the
integration of their organizations since President Harry S. Truman’s original
desegregation order in 1948, the same could not be said for their reserve
counterparts. The successful integration of some state national guard units
had set a positive example for the integration of other military units and
civilian agencies, but other state national guard units remained starkly racist.
By 1961, ten states with large Black populations and understaffed guard units
steadfastly resisted integration. Numerous civil rights organizations and
veterans groups urged the administration to withdraw federal recognition of
these states’ National Guards as a means of forcing those states to integrate,
but President Kennedy demurred. For the time being, he chose to pursue
persuasion and diplomacy over a more coercive approach.73
71. Morris J. MacGregor Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965, Defense Studies
72. Memo, Dep Under Sec (Manpower) Alfred B. Pitt for Asst Sec Defense (Manpower),
5 Dec 1961, sub: Minority Representation in Officer Procurement and Training; Memo,
Maj. Gen. Joe C. Lambert, Adjutant Gen, for Major ZI [Zone of the Interior] and Overseas
Cdrs, n.d., sub: Minority Representation in Officer Procurement and Training; both in File
73. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 518–19.
VIETNAM, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AND THE ARMY’S EMBRACE

OF SUB-LIMITED WARFARE
General Taylor and Walt Rostow returned from their fact-finding tour of
Vietnam at the end of October and submitted a report to the president on
3 November. The Taylor-Rostow Mission, as it came to be called, marked
an important turning point in the way the United States approached the
advancing Communist insurgency in Vietnam. Although they had different
sources of information and had developed their views individually, almost
all of the members of the mission had reached a similar conclusion. The
situation in Southeast Asia had become serious, but no one believed that it
was lost. In the final report to President Kennedy, the team recommended
the insertion of American administrators into all aspects of the South
Vietnamese government that President Ngô Đình Diệm was willing to
accept. Although only the Vietnamese could beat the Viet Cong finally, one
adviser argued, Americans at all levels could show them how to do the job.
The report urged a renewed effort to train and develop local self-defense
forces to aid in the effort against the Communist guerrillas. It suggested
that the United States deploy specialized forces to assist in such efforts as
aerial reconnaissance and photography, airlift, intelligence, and air support.
Taylor also recommended the insertion of a logistical task force to provide
an American military presence on the ground and to prepare to receive any
additional U.S. or Southeast Asia Treaty Organization forces that might
follow. At the end of the report, Taylor expressed his view that the time
might come when the United States would have to attack the source of the
guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam.74
Even before the Taylor-Rostow Mission to Southeast Asia, the Army
had begun preparations to increase its presence in Vietnam. At the end of
May, General Decker sent a letter to Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, Chief of
the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam, asking what
his firm requirements were to guarantee the security of South Vietnam. In
response, McGarr recommended U.S. approval of President Diệm’s request
for a Republic of Vietnam force of 280,000, of which 257,000 would be
Army. To develop such a force, McGarr requested an additional 10,000 U.S.
trainers for the MAAG. In addition, he asked for the deployment of a 6,000-
man U.S. brigade task force to provide additional security and to assist with
the development of a logistical support base. President Kennedy directed
General Taylor to review the request, and Secretary McNamara forwarded
the issue to the Joint Chiefs for their views on the subject. McNamara gave
74. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, 240–44; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 545–46.
initial approval for a phased increase of South Vietnamese forces from

150,000 to 170,000 but deferred further authorizations until he received
more guidance regarding how they would be funded.75
In the meantime, somewhat under the radar, the U.S. Army commitment
to South Vietnam continued to expand. In actions approved by the president
in April and May, the service provided an additional eighty-eight personnel
to the MAAG, two senior colonels to assist in the development of a combat
development and test center, a civil affairs mobile training team, and ninety-
three Army Security Agency personnel to assist Vietnamese Army units in
communications intercept and direction finding. The Department of the
Army also approved the deployment of an additional 400 special forces or
Ranger-trained personnel to assist in the training of Vietnamese military
and paramilitary forces.76
Other developments in Southeast Asia pointed toward an ever-increasing
level of U.S. involvement in the area. In September, senior Army commanders
in the Pacific presented to the chief of staff a plan for the pre-positioning of
584 tons of ammunition in Thailand for use by U.S. Army troops in support
of contingency plans in Southeast Asia. The proposal identified the prestock
as part of a military assistance program for Thailand in order to avoid the
appearance of providing additional support for South Vietnam. Items selected
for the stockpile would provide adequate ammunition for up to fifteen days
of operations for the air echelons of six airborne battle groups. The planners
noted that the pre-positioning would make a significant reduction in the
airlift requirement to support the initial phase of deployment to an objective
area in Southeast Asia.77
In Laos, however, prospects for increased Army involvement were
beginning to fade. Although the president initially had directed planning
for U.S. intervention there, the potential for escalation and reinforcement
by either the Chinese or North Vietnamese appeared ominous. General
Lemnitzer warned Kennedy that the United States would be unlikely to
match the numbers of troops those nations could insert into the theater.
Even though bringing American soldiers into the fight in Laos presented
few problems, Lemnitzer worried about his nation’s ability to get them out if
75. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr to Gen. George H. Decker, 15 Jun 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen.
Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, 11 Jul 1961, sub: Letter from General McGarr;
both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
76. Memo, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff,
12 Jun 1961, sub: South Vietnam Fact Sheet, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top
Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
77. Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch Staff, 12 Sep 1961, sub:
Prepositioning Army Ammunition-Thailand, File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top
Secret 1956–1962, RG 319, NACP.
the situation exploded. Ultimately, Kennedy decided that the risks involved
in intervention in Laos were too great, and he turned his attention back
to Vietnam.78
In December, the Army announced that it was sending two aviation
units, the 8th Transportation Company from Fort Bragg and the 57th
Transportation Company from Fort Lewis, to Vietnam. Each company
included 200 soldiers and eighteen H–21 Shawnee helicopters. Officials
indicated that the units had deployed to prepare and to operate U.S. Army
helicopters for supply and reconnaissance missions against the Communists.
U.S. aircrews also would transport Vietnamese ground troops into combat.
The Army chief of staff then approved a request from the chief of the Vietnam
MAAG to send a fixed-wing aircraft company (U–1A Otter) for use by
the group. At the same time, General Decker began making an argument
to the undersecretary of the Army that the service also should deploy
armed helicopters to the theater. Such a deployment, he argued, would
provide the Army of the Republic of Vietnam with a marked advantage
in mobility and firepower over the Communists. Decker recognized that
his position went against the current national policy and suggested further
consideration within the Joint Chiefs of Staff before bringing the matter up in
secretarial channels.79
Within the Kennedy administration, senior officials discussed new
ways in which military forces could be employed to support the struggling
government in Vietnam. The president himself addressed his belief to the
secretaries of state and defense that U.S. troops also could assist in the
economic and social development in Vietnam and other less developed
countries. He endorsed the phrase “civic action” to describe the use of
military forces to help out in such fields as training, public works, agriculture,
transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and other areas helpful
to economic development. Through National Security Advisor McGeorge
Bundy, Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of
State Rusk to notify him by the end of March 1962 of specific civic action
projects they had integrated into their respective departments.80

79. “U.S. Copter Unit Arrives in Saigon,” Army Times, 16 Dec 1961; Memo, Lt. Gen.
Barksdale Hamlett for Ch Staff, 8 Dec 1961, sub: U.S. Army Aircraft for MAAG Vietnam;
Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Under Sec Army, 8 Nov 1961, sub: Armed Helicopters
for Vietnam; both in File Unit: Entry A1 68, Series: DCSOPS Top Secret 1956–1962, RG
319, NACP.
80. National Security Memo No. 119, McGeorge Bundy for Sec State and Sec Def, 18 Dec
1961, sub: Civic Action, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
Maintenance personnel of the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter

Company assemble one of the newly arrived UH–1B helicopters at
Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
For its part, the Army embraced its role in what its leadership had termed
“sub-limited warfare.”81 In response to the president’s interest in civic action,
Secretary of the Army Stahr suggested to McNamara that Army elements
were available to help stem the growing insurgency and political instability
in Latin America. He mentioned Colombia, in particular, as a worthwhile
target for American intervention. The U.S. Army, he said, could participate
in the broad fields of Western Hemisphere defense, nation building, internal
security, counterinsurgency, and civic action.82
Officials within the Department of Defense countered with other
proposals. Deputy Secretary Roswell Gilpatric argued that the tense political
situation in Colombia made it unwise to send in a large sub-limited warfare
activities group at that time. Although he saw no immediate opportunities
for employing such organizations in Latin America, he suggested that the
Army could tailor the concept to meet challenges in the Near East, South
Asia, and Africa. South Vietnam, he said, had a civic action program just
getting underway, which needed support in every way possible. He suggested
that it might be desirable for small civic action teams to train the civil guard
and self-defense forces. General Decker and Secretary Stahr interpreted that
81. Memo, Sec Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. for Sec Def, 15 Dec 1961, sub: Sublimited Warfare
Activities for Colombia, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
82. Memo, Stahr for Sec Def, 15 Dec 1961, sub: Sublimited Warfare Activities for Colombia.
message as support for Army intervention in any of those areas and reiterated
the secretary’s earlier position that the Army “stands ready to make specific
proposals whenever you advise that there is a requirement.”83
In preparation for this increased emphasis on civic action and nation
building, the Army had focused more attention on low-intensity conflict
training and had begun tailoring part of its organization to deal with
such contingencies. In June, the service proposed a structure of four basic
counterinsurgency forces designed to operate, respectively, in Southeast
Asia; Latin America; Africa, south of the Sahara; and Europe and the Middle
East. Each task force would include a special forces group, a psychological
warfare company, an Army Security Agency detachment, a civil affairs
detachment, an engineer detachment, a military intelligence detachment,
and a medical detachment, for a total of just more than 1,500 personnel.
Although the concept was still under consideration by the end of the year,
the service had initiated development of the Latin America task force with
the expectation that it would move in 1962 to Fort Gulick in the Panama
Canal Zone.84
Central to the Army’s plans for exploiting its sub-limited warfare and
counterinsurgency capabilities was an expansion of its special forces. In his
provision to the 1962 defense budget, President Kennedy had recommended
an additional 3,000 spaces for counterinsurgency forces, 2,000 of which
would go to Army special forces. In July, Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for
Personnel Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter Jr. reported that increased recruiting
efforts successfully had procured almost 1,700 enlisted volunteers for special
forces training. Vice Chief of Staff Eddleman reported that the Army would
have no problem meeting the need for additional qualified officers. Near
the end of the year, the total strength assigned to the four active special
forces groups had nearly doubled from 1,800 in January to slightly more
than 3,500, with an additional 500 assigned to the Special Warfare Training
Center at Fort Bragg.85
83. Memo, Roswell Gilpatric, Dep Sec Def, for Sec Army, 15 Dec 1961, sub: Sub-Limited
Warfare Activities in Colombia; Memo, Howard E. Haugerud, Dep Under Sec Army, for Ch
Staff, 18 Dec 1961, sub: Sub-Limited Warfare Activities; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
84. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Sec Army, 8 Dec 1961, sub: Army Activities in
Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War, Dated 13 October 1961, File Unit: Entry A1
85. Memo, Maj. Gen. Robert W. Porter Jr. for Vice Ch Staff, 27 Jul 1961, sub: Special Forces
Recruiting; Ltr, Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman to Gen. Herbert B. Powell, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Army
Continental Army Cmd, 31 Jul 1961; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–
Despite the variety of potential trouble spots around the world and,
especially, the continued turmoil surrounding Berlin, the growing conflict
in Vietnam appeared to garner most of the attention of the American media.
In a luncheon with reporters from the Baltimore Sun and the Wall Street
Journal, General Decker answered questions regarding possible courses of
action for the United States in Vietnam. He responded that he could see
only two choices. The United States could continue along its current path,
providing political, economic, and military advisory support, or it could
intervene with the direct involvement of American combat troops. The
latter, he said, would require a political decision at the highest level to take
fully into account the possibility of escalation and direct involvement of
the forces of North Vietnam and Communist China. He expressed his view
that the United States should not undertake that course of action unless
the people were prepared to “go all the way,” if necessary, to hold Southeast
Asia.86 That being said, he saw no reason to question the ability of the Army
to win any war, any time, any place.
FROM FAMINE TO FEAST
The year 1961 ended with the Army in a vastly different place than it had
been in just a few years earlier. The Kennedy administration had come
into office already prepared to shift American defense policy in a new
direction, putting a greater emphasis on conventional forces and the wider
range of options they could provide. Now, after a year of foreign policy and
national security challenges, the Army found itself at the center of a massive
rearmament program. No longer the odd man out in a defense establishment
reliant upon nuclear weapons and a retaliation-based deterrent, the service
had reestablished itself as an essential element in the president’s portfolio of
military options.
However, the Army’s transition was still underway. The service had yet to
complete shifting its force structure away from the pentomic division model
to the more flexible ROAD concept. Although many new weapons, vehicles,
and items of equipment were already entering the system, important
innovations were still on the way. Finally, while commitment to a new
conflict in Southeast Asia seemed imminent, uncertainty lingered as to how
the Army would have to fight that war. A bit of tinkering remained before
the service would be ready to engage in its next great struggle.
86. Memo, Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, Ch Info, for Ch Staff, 16 Nov 1961, sub: Luncheon
with Press Representatives, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
10
Embracing a New Future
By the start of 1962, the Kennedy administration was well entrenched, and
the Army’s leadership was learning how to navigate the idiosyncrasies of
Robert S. McNamara’s Defense Department. The previous year’s most
significant challenges—Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia—remained at the
forefront of concerns for the country’s national security apparatus. President
John F. Kennedy retained his conviction that soft power, civic action, and
counterinsurgency represented America’s most effective tools in dealing
with the worldwide spread of communism.
For the Army, the president’s expressed interests accelerated a shift in
focus that already was well underway. Although the service’s traditional role
as the backbone of a Western European defense would remain constant,
other concerns were becoming more pressing. After the failed Bay of Pigs
expedition, the proximity of Communist Cuba to American soil posed a
consistent irritant if not an existential threat. Likewise, civil unrest and
unpopular rulers threatened to destabilize various locations throughout
Central and South America.
To an ever-increasing extent, however, the Army’s attention was turning
toward the expanding insurgency in Vietnam. A frequently expressed belief
that the United States could not allow this domino to fall to Communist
expansion seemed to make this a fight worth engaging. More to the point,
this appeared to Army leaders to be exactly the type of conflict suited to an
application of the counterinsurgency infrastructure and doctrine they had
been developing and in which the president had expressed his most ardent
interest. After years of settling for scraps in a defense policy infatuated with
atomic weapons, this was a challenge that would move the Army to the head
of the line in the competition for defense funding and for influence within
the national security structure.
PRESENTING A NEW ARMY
On 20 January 1962, Brig. Gen. Chester V. “Ted” Clifton, the military aide to
the president, forwarded to Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker a
request from the president for a brief report on changes in the Army during
1961 and those projected for 1962. General Decker established a program
advisory committee consisting of representatives of all the major staff offices.
After several weeks of consultation and staff work, Secretary of the Army
Elvis J. Stahr Jr. forwarded the requested information to the president on
29 March.1
The report noted the Army’s expansion over the course of the previous
year. Its active strength had increased from eleven combat and three training
divisions to sixteen combat-ready divisions. This growth was accompanied by
substantial increases in other combat units of less-than-division size as well as
supporting elements. Additionally, the report highlighted the augmentation
of the Army’s special forces from three groups to four. Significant deliveries
of new weapons and equipment for the two years included 500,000 modern
rifles and 1,800 main battle tanks by the end of 1962.2
The report summarized in some detail the effects upon the Army of
the 1961 rearmament and mobilization initiatives that the president had
instituted. Increases to the Army’s personnel ceiling, coupled with the
mobilization of various reserve and national guard units for the Berlin
challenge, had boosted the service’s authorized strength to 1,081,000.
Already at the start of 1962, many of the reserve and national guard units
were returning to civilian status. Nonetheless, analysts projected that, by the
end of the year, Army strength would remain near 960,000. The additions and
1. Memo, Gen. George H. Decker for Sec Army, 17 Feb 1962, sub: Changes in the Army—
1961 and 1962; Memo, Col. Charles L. Jackson, Director, Progress and Statistical Reporting,
for Dep Chs Staff, 2 Feb 1962, sub: Presidential Request for Brief Report on Changes in the
Army; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General Correspondence,
2. Ltr, Sec Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. to President John F. Kennedy, 29 Mar 1962, File Unit: Entry
EMBRACING A NEW FUTURE 391
improvements to the force, the report concluded, had added to the nation’s
ability to deter a conventional war through the creation of larger and more
modern ground forces. Simultaneously, the Army had made progress in
developing unconventional forces to meet the threat of Soviet-inspired wars
of liberation. The addition of a fourth special forces group along with more
psychological warfare and civil affairs units seemed to add considerably to
the Army’s counterinsurgency capabilities.3
The most visible sign of the Army’s evolution was its progress in
reorganizing its divisions. In January, President Kennedy approved a
program for the activation of two new divisions, the 5th Infantry and the 1st
Armored. On 3 February, the Army reactivated the 1st Armored Division
at Fort Hood, Texas, using elements of Combat Command A, the training
cadre already stationed there. Two weeks later, the service activated the 5th
Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, absorbing the personnel of the
training center there as well as elements of the 2d Infantry Brigade then
stationed at Fort Devens, Massachusetts. Although Secretary McNamara
approved the formation of the two new divisions under the Army’s new
Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) organization, he decided
to delay the adaptation of the rest of the Army until fiscal year 1964 because
of the ongoing crisis in Berlin.4
McNamara emphasized to Army leadership the importance of the
two divisions achieving an early operational readiness. He established
25 August and 8 September as the dates on which the 1st Armored Division
and the 5th Infantry Division, respectively, should be combat-ready. On
11 September, the commander of the 1st Armored Division reported that all
units of his division had achieved a state of combat readiness commensurate
with equipment available. He acknowledged that he had not yet evaluated
his unit’s nuclear weapons capability because of shortages of equipment and
technically qualified personnel. On 23 November, the 5th Infantry Division
reported to the Army Staff that it had completed its Army Training Test under
the ROAD concept and that most of its units had reached a satisfactory level
of combat readiness. The division report noted that its aviation battalion,
air cavalry troop, and brigade aviation platoons were not yet operationally
3. Ltr, Stahr to Kennedy, 29 Mar 1962; Memo, Jackson for Dep Chs Staff, 2 Feb 1962, sub:
Presidential Request for Brief Report on Changes in the Army.
4. Monte Bourjaily Jr. “Two New Divisions First in ROAD,” Army Times, 13 Jan 1962;
John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades,
Army Lineage Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), 305–6.
ready because of shortages of personnel and aircraft. The report noted that
the Army had diverted aircraft and personnel to higher priority missions.5
In light of Secretary McNamara’s decision to postpone further ROAD
reorganization, the Army published a new schedule in November 1962. It
called for the five divisions in Europe to begin conversion in January 1963,
with all modifications completed by the end of the year. In the Pacific,
the divisions in Korea and Hawai‘i would start their realignments in July
with the goal of regaining combat readiness by the end of the year. Among
the divisions stationed in the continental United States, the 2d Armored
Division would begin its conversion in December 1962. The 1st, 2d, and
4th Infantry Divisions would begin their efforts in March, July, and October
1963, respectively. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions would be the last
to convert, not beginning until early 1964.6
Even as the first two ROAD divisions, the 1st Armored and 5th Infantry,
began their initial field training, the new organization came under fire from
several observers. General Paul D. Adams, the commander of U.S. Strike
Command (STRICOM), complained that the new divisions contained too
much excess equipment. As an example, he noted that the new infantry
division contained 3,318 radios, or a radio for every 4.7 soldiers in the
organization. From Korea, the I Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Harvey H.
Fischer, echoed the complaints about excessive radios and observed that
the Army had become too concerned about “nice-to-have” elements rather
than focusing on what units required to perform their missions.7 General
Maxwell D. Taylor, serving as the military representative of the president,
also expressed his concerns, wondering why the Army could not have
augmented his pentomic concept rather than throwing it out in favor of
a completely new design. He did not believe that the service had allowed
enough time to fully test and adjust to his pentomic concept.8
Along with the reorganization of its divisions, the Army also realigned the
overall structure of the force in the continental United States. In March, the
5. Memo, Col. Francis J. Roberts, Mil Asst, for Sec Stahr, 26 Jan 1962, sub: Readiness Dates
for New Army Divisions; Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Ch
Staff, 25 Oct 1962, sub: Status Report of Actions of 1st Armored Division; Memo, Lt. Gen.
Theodore W. Parker for Sec Army, 26 Nov 1962, sub: 5th Infantry Division; all in File Unit:
6. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 306; Memo, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Ch Staff, for Sec
Def, 30 Nov 1962, sub: Schedule for Conversion of Army Divisions to ROAD, File Unit:
7. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Harvey H. Fischer to Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Vice Ch Staff, 10 Jan 1963, File
8. “Divisions Too Heavy, Adams Tells AUSA,” Army Times, 15 Oct 1962; Ltr, Fischer to
Hamlett, 10 Jan 1963; MFR, Lt. Col. John H. Murphy, Organization Div, Ofc Dep Ch Staff
service announced the activation of the III Corps at Fort Hood, joining the
XVIII Airborne Corps stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The service
assigned the 4th and 32d Infantry Divisions and the 2d and 49th Armored
Divisions to the III Corps, with the understanding that once it had returned
the two mobilized divisions to reserve status, they would be replaced by
the newly activated 1st Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions. The III Corps
would constitute the heavily armored Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) force
prepared for movement overseas to Europe or to the Middle East. The XVIII
Airborne Corps, which included the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions and the
82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, remained the air transportable element
of the Army designed to deploy to any potential trouble spots overseas on a
moment’s notice.9
Also evolving was STRICOM, under the leadership of General Adams. In
May, Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs attempted to clarify the role
of the command and its relationship with the combatant forces assigned to
it. McNamara told members of Congress that the STRICOM commander
retained operational control of those elements rather than having them
assigned as organic to the organization. This interpretation attempted to
mollify Air Force officers who rebelled against the concept of Air Force
assets under the command of an Army general. Adams explained that his
headquarters would plan for contingency operations and command and
control emergency deployments. Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army
Command (CONARC) would provide the commander and staff for the
Army component of STRICOM. If STRICOM elements, either land or air,
deployed as a reinforcement to an existing unified command, control would
pass to the unified commander once the units were in place.10
Throughout 1962, as the Army’s divisions in the United States realigned,
evidence mounted that their readiness posture was not up to the standards
the Army expected. In an investigation requested by the deputy chief of
staff for military operations and conducted by the U.S. Army Audit Agency,
inspectors reported that combat readiness in many of the STRAC divisions
had declined to the extent that positive command action was required
to maintain satisfactory ratings. Inspectors noted that readiness reports
emanating from STRAC units and continental U.S. Army headquarters did
Ops, 2 Jan 1962, sub: Meeting With General Taylor on ROAD; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
9. “Army Realigns STRAC Force,” Army Times, 3 Mar 1962.
10. “STRICOM’s Role Told” and “Lean, Mean, Ready to Go,” Army Times, 19 May 1962;
“Continental Army is Reorganized,” Army Times, 30 Jun 1962; Memo, Brig. Gen. John W.
Keating, Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 1 May 1962, sub: U.S. Strike
Command, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319,
NACP.
not reflect the posture of those units accurately. At many locations, STRAC-
unit personnel performed post support functions instead of serving in
their assigned operational positions. A shortage of trained maintenance
personnel and the extreme age of some vehicles and equipment had
contributed to an overall decline in maintenance programs across the force.
Significant shortages in supplies and repair parts compounded the problem.
Most concerning was the news that many unit commanders expressed a
reluctance to report unfavorable data because doing so might diminish their
performance ratings. The investigation concluded with recommendations
across the Army Staff for increased scrutiny of personnel and logistics
concerns that inspectors had identified at so many continental U.S. facilities
and for the commanding general of CONARC to monitor the readiness
reports coming out of STRAC units personally.11
Meanwhile, another of the service’s continental defense organizations,
Army Air Defense Command, was beginning to feel the strain of maintaining
a high state of readiness in the face of numerous Cold War challenges.
Potential flash points in Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia, coupled with
high-tension relationships with both the Soviet Union and Communist
China, had forced the commander, Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, to maintain
75 percent of his firing units on advanced levels of alert. With all of his units
at reduced strength, General Dick appealed to the chief of staff to restore his
units to full strength and to increase Air Defense Command’s priority for
new accessions and replacements.12
As it was, 1962 seemed to mark a high tide in the status and influence of
Army Air Defense Command. By then, the command included more than
200 Nike batteries committed to continental air defense. These included
sixty-nine older model Nike Ajax batteries manned by Army national
guard units, with the remainder consisting of newer Nike Hercules batteries
manned by active Army units. Altogether, these defenses covered more than
thirty vital areas encompassing 300 communities in thirty states.13
As a component that had embraced President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
devotion to strategic missiles to expand the service’s influence, Army Air
Defense Command now faced greater technological challenges. Despite the
significant funding and support the Army had received for the development
11. Audit Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army Audit Agency, 1 Nov 1962, “Operational Readiness
of Strategic Army Corps,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
12. Ltr, Lt. Gen. William W. Dick to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Ch Staff, 1 Oct 1962, File Unit:
13. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S. Dept. of
Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 136.
of its Nike Zeus antimissile missile, testing during 1962 indicated that the
system was not yet capable of fulfilling its mission. To compound the technical
failures, Air Force officials were careful to make sure that the national media
fully documented each shortcoming. President Kennedy had become highly
interested in the program, but both he and Secretary McNamara were
growing impatient with the overall lack of progress. Although McNamara
approved funding for further testing and development, he canceled plans
for initial deployments until the Army could demonstrate more consistent
success with the system.14
The defense secretary brought his interest in modern technology to bear
in an even more dynamic manner when, in April, he sent a pair of memos
to Secretary Stahr indicating his concerns for the future of Army Aviation.
In his communications—largely the product of Col. Robert R. Williams, an
Army aviator currently on his staff—McNamara directed the Army to take a
bold new look at the possibilities for expanding its mobility. He emphasized
that he wanted an atmosphere divorced from traditional viewpoints and
that he was willing to consider new concepts and unorthodox ideas. In
response, on 3 May, the Army established a board that included a virtual
all-star team of Army advocates for its aviation branch. In addition to
Williams, by that time a brigadier general, the board included Maj. Gen.
Ben Harrell, Commanding General of the Army Infantry Center; Maj. Gen.
Clifton F. von Kann, Assistant Chief of Staff and J–3 (Joint Staff Operations)
for STRICOM; Maj. Gen. William B. Rosson, Special Assistant to the Chief
of Staff for Special Warfare; and Brig. Gen. Delk M. Oden, Director of Army
Aviation. Overall, the board included 199 officers, 41 enlisted personnel,
and 53 civilians. At McNamara’s suggestion, the Army designated Lt. Gen.
Hamilton H. Howze as its president. Then serving as the commanding
general of the XVIII Airborne Corps, General Howze, a qualified light
aircraft and helicopter pilot, had served as the first chief of Army Aviation
in 1955.15
Officially designated the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board,
the group soon became more commonly known as the Howze Board.
Most of its work was carried out by seven committees—Reconnaissance,
Security, and Target Acquisition; Tactical Mobility; Firepower; Logistical
Operations and Support; Operations Research; Field Tests; and Programs,
Policy, and Budget. A newly completed primary school at Fort Bragg
14. “Zeus Flops; Pershing Hits,” Army Times, 24 Nov 1962.
15. J. A. Stockfisch, The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 1994); Hamilton H. Howze, A Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a
Twentieth Century Army General (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996),
182–88, 236–37.
Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze (right) and Maj. Gen. Harry H. Critz troop
the line during farewell ceremonies honoring General Howze. (U.S.
served as the group’s headquarters, but most of the committee’s work took
place at whatever location the section’s leader was assigned. Much of the
consideration included the field-testing of concepts using elements of the
82d Airborne Division and an extended visit to Southeast Asia by a seven-
person team to observe the employment of helicopters and small, fixed-
wing aircraft.16
The Howze Board submitted its findings to the secretary of the Army
on 20 August and then to the secretary of defense on 15 September. It
recommended sweeping changes in the Army’s use of aircraft, the types of
aircraft it employed, and the organization and types of units it would deploy.
Most significant was the proposal for an air assault division. Similar in
structure to the ROAD organizations, the new units would have three brigade
headquarters, eight airmobile infantry battalions, five artillery battalions,
and one air cavalry squadron. The new division would reduce the number
of ground vehicles from 3,452 to 1,113, replacing them with 459 aircraft.
Supporting the air assault effort would be two other new organizations,
the air cavalry combat brigade and the air transport brigade. The former
would be a force of 316 aircraft, including 144 attack helicopters armed with
antitank missiles. Its mix of aerial firepower and air-transportable infantry
16. Stockfisch, 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments.
made it a flexible complement to the air assault division, but suitable for
independent action in other fields. The air transport brigade included a
mix of fixed-wing cargo aircraft and medium- and heavy-lift helicopters.
In theory, one air transport brigade would provide limited logistical
support for an air assault division out to a distance of 175 miles. The board
recommended the inclusion of five air assault divisions, supported by three
air cavalry combat brigades and five air transport brigades in the Army’s
overall sixteen-division force.17
Most of the aircraft included in the tables of organization for the new
units were either recently deployed or under development. The fixed-
wing AO–1 Mohawk (later designated OV–1) and the AC–1 Caribou were
already in the field and suitable for the tasks required. Although the general
utility helicopter UH–1—a light transport armed gunship—was already in
production, anticipated light observation and heavy lift aircraft remained
under development. The OH–6 Cayuse observation helicopter and the heavy
lift CH–54 Sky Crane would not reach the field until 1966. Another heavy
lift craft, the CH–1 (later CH–47) Chinook, although early in production,
had been plagued with problems and the Howze Board did not yet regard it
as suitable for deployment.18
The board’s report prompted immediate reactions in several quarters.
The Air Force responded by designating its own board, under Lt. Gen.
Gabriel P. Disoway, to contest the Howze Board’s recommendations on
technical and doctrinal grounds. The Air Force group argued that its fighter-
bombers were superior platforms for providing fire support to ground
troops. It also contested the Army’s usurpation of the close air support role,
traditionally an Air Force mission. Army leaders, however, embraced the
findings and initiated plans to introduce an air assault division into the
Army structure by the end of 1964. Also pleased with the board’s work was
Secretary McNamara, who approved an increase of the Army’s troop strength
from 960,000 to 975,000 to accommodate the creation of a provisional air
assault division and an air transport brigade for further testing.19
17. Stockfisch, 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments; Interv, Lt. Col. Robert
Reed with Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, n.d., Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereinafter MHI); Christopher C. H.
Cheng, Airmobility: The Development of a Doctrine (London: Praeger, 1994), 179–80;
Howze, Cavalryman’s Story, 233–57.
18. Stockfisch, 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments; Howze, Cavalryman’s
Story, 245–50.
19. Stockfisch, 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments; Howze, Cavalryman’s
Story, 254–57; Memo, Maj. Gen. Vernon P. Mock, Sec Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 18 Oct
1962, sub: Alternatives for Providing an Air Assault Division in the Active Army Prior to
An AC–1 Caribou plane taking off (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
Even as General Howze himself acknowledged the significance of

the board’s findings, he ruefully conceded that they had, perhaps, gone
overboard in the documentation. In subsequent interviews, he noted that
the entire final report filled a regulation-sized Army footlocker. Because the
Army ultimately had generated more than 600 copies of the report, Howze
suggested that the service might win the next war by dropping them on
the Kremlin.20
Secretary McNamara’s enthusiastic support of the Howze Board’s
recommendations sounded the death knell for the decade-old Pace-
Finletter accords. Despite numerous Air Force efforts to refute the board’s
findings, the Army had made its case successfully for the increased mobility
and firepower that its embrace of helicopters could bring. Although the Air
Force’s primacy over jet aircraft would remain sacrosanct, any restrictions on
arming the helicopters and limiting their use on the battlefield had ended.21
the End of FY 1964, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
20. Interv, Reed with Howze, n.d.
21. Jack Vincent, “Army Air Limits Near End,” Army Times, 18 Aug 1962; “Army Air
Expansion Expected in Howze Board Proposals,” Army Times, 1 Sep 1962.
Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr Jr. (left) points out the worldwide
commitments of the Army to his successor, Cyrus R. Vance. (U.S.
This success served as a fitting sendoff to the Army’s senior leadership.

On 5 July, Elvis J. Stahr left his position as secretary of the Army to return
to civilian life. He was replaced by Cyrus R. Vance, who was serving as
general counsel for the Department of Defense. Vance had deployed as a
gunnery officer on a destroyer in the Pacific during World War II and had
served the nation in several military and civilian positions before assuming
this new role. Early in October, General Decker also retired, with General
Earle G. “Bus” Wheeler succeeding him as chief of staff. General Wheeler
had served in numerous line and staff positions in the United States during
World War II before deploying to Europe in November 1944 as chief of staff
for the newly formed 63d Infantry Division. In recent years, Wheeler had
served as the commanding general of the 2d Armored Division, the secretary
of the general staff, and the deputy commanding general of U.S. Army,
Europe (USAREUR).
Shortly after returning to the Pentagon, Wheeler sent a letter to his
senior commanders, noting the emergence of the new Army. Absorbing
the newly authorized personnel and developing the new airmobile division
would be his highest priorities. Accordingly, he directed the Army Staff to
reexamine the ongoing division reorganization to ensure that the service
retained only those units, activities,

and installations essential to the
Army’s combat posture. Although
the words were not explicit, the new
chief of staff ’s message appeared to
resonate. He was telling his senior
leaders to get ready to go to war.22
REORGANIZATION
After more than seventy-five for-

mal briefings for administration
officials, members of Congress, and
senior military officers, the Army
finally began to move forward
General Earle G. Wheeler with Project 80, the reorganization
(U.S. Army) of the Department of the Army’s
headquarters, secretariat, and staff
that it had been studying for more than a year and a half. Impatient with
the foot-dragging he perceived on the part of the Army Staff, Secretary
McNamara issued an executive order on 10 January, abolishing the statu-
tory positions of the technical service chiefs and transferring them to the
secretary of the Army. At the same time, the Army logistical staff released
to the public a formal summary of the Project 80 reorganization plan.23
(See Chart 11.)
Central to the plan was the formation of a 200,000-person organization
with “authoritative control” over Army development, testing, production, and
supply of equipment.24 Established as the Army Materiel Development and
Logistic Command (MDLC), the new organization would assume control over
all Army laboratories, arsenals, proving grounds, test stations, depots, supply
22. Ltr, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler to Gen. Herbert B. Powell, Cmdg Gen, U.S. Continental
Army Cmd, 26 Dec 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP. Wheeler sent similar letters to almost all of his three and four-star
generals.
23. James E. Hewes Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration,
1900–1963, Special Studies (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975),
353–54; MFR, Col. Edward W. McGregor, Asst Project Director, Reorganization of the
Dept. of the Army, 20 Feb 1962, sub: Weekly Meeting of Secretary of Defense on Significant
Defense Projects, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
24. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 354.
control points, purchasing officers, and transportation terminals. The new

organization provided an overall headquarters for several existing logistical
commands, and the MDLC would now control the Missile Command,
Munitions Command, Weapons and Mobility Command, Communications
and Electronics Command, General Equipment Command, Supply and
Maintenance Command, and the Test and Evaluation Agency. After some
pushback from Michigan’s political leaders over a proposed transfer of
functions from Detroit, Michigan’s Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command,
Army leaders agreed to create separate Weapons and Mobility Commands.
When many Pentagon officials began pronouncing the abbreviation MDLC
as “Muddle,” the Army quickly redesignated the new organization as Army
Materiel Command.25 (See Chart 12.)
The Army originally had named Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, the chief
of ordnance, to be the first commander of the Army Materiel Command.
However, General Hinrichs staunchly opposed the reorganization and
accused the Army Staff of allowing the project to be steamrolled by the
secretary of defense. He also earned the secretary’s wrath by testifying
before Congress regarding the overpayment of contractors involved in the
Nike Zeus project. To virtually no one’s surprise, Hinrichs announced his
retirement in April, never having taken the command. Almost immediately,
the Army promoted Chief of Transportation Maj. Gen. Frank S. Besson Jr.
to lieutenant general and assigned him as the first commanding general of
the Army Materiel Command. General Besson had served on the committee
planning and overseeing the transformation and strongly endorsed the basic
management concepts advanced by the reorganization.26
Secretary McNamara continued to express dissatisfaction at the pace of
the reforms. At the end of March, he directed Secretary Stahr to accelerate
the reorganization so that the Army Materiel Command would become
fully operational by July 1962, nine months ahead of the projected schedule.
The secretary of the Army and the Army Staff objected, arguing that they
had not yet selected any of the principal subordinate commanders, nor had
the service selected sites for major headquarters. McNamara’s continued
impatience contributed to Stahr’s decision to return to civilian life. General
Besson, however, accepted the accelerated plan and, on 1 August 1962, the
25. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 354; “How MDLC Will Be Organized,” Army Times,
27 Jan 1962; Gene Famiglietti, “HQ Command in New Moves,” Army Times, 12 May 1962.
26. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 350–52; Interv, Col. Raymond L. Toole with Gen.
Frank S. Besson Jr., 1973, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.
Chart 11—Hoelscher Committee Proposal for Reorganization of

Department of the Army Headquarters, October 1961
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Administrative General Chief of Chief of

Assistant Counsel Public Information1 Legislative
Liaison
ASA ASA CHIEF OF STAFF ASA
(Research & (Installations & (Financial
Development) Logistics) VICE CHIEF OF Management)
STAFF
- DIRECTOR OF THE
The Inspector The Judge THE ARMY STAFF
General Advocate
General SECRETARY OF
THE GENERAL
STAFF
GENERAL STAFF
DCS DCS DCS Assistant Chief

(Research & (Plans, Programs, of Staff for
(Strategy &
International Development) and Systems) Intelligence
Affairs)
Deputy Chief Assistant Chief of Deputy Chief of Comptroller

of Staff for Staff for Reserve Staff for Logistics of the Army2
Personnel Components
SPECIAL STAFF
Chief of Chief of Provost Chief of Army Chief of

Civil Chaplains Support
Marshal Reserve & ROTC
Affairs1 Services
Chief of Chief, National Chief of Director,

Chief of Personnel
Information1 Guard Bureau Administrative Engineer
Operations Services
Services
Director, Director, Transportation Chief of

Communication Medical Office Finance
Services
Services

Notes
1. Chief of Public Information also serves as Chief of Information
2. No change contemplated in status of Army Audit Agency
3. General Staff Agency
Army Materiel Command assumed responsibility for the service’s wholesale

logistics system.27
Simultaneously with the activation of Army Materiel Command, albeit
with somewhat less fanfare, the service established the Army Combat
Developments Command at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The idea for an
organization devoted to the development of future organization and doctrine
had its roots in the Project Vista study of 1952, addressing the future of land
combat in Europe. That paper had recommended that the Army establish
a combat developments group to study the newest tactics, ideas, and
inventions. After further consideration, the Army established the Combat
Development Experimentation Center at Fort Ord, California, in 1956. As
part of the 1962 reorganization, the Army replaced that organization with
the Combat Developments Command. The new headquarters, directed by Lt.
Gen. John P. Daley, included directorates devoted to concepts and doctrine
development, operations research, materiel requirements, and doctrinal and
organizational media. The latter branch caused some consternation among
the leadership at CONARC, where its commander, General Powell, claimed
service prerogative for preparation and distribution of current doctrine. The
two commanders would have to iron out the distinctions between current
and future concepts.28
Although the Army Staff escaped further changes, concurrent studies
as part of the 1962 reorganization set into motion proposals to divide the
responsibilities of the deputy chief of staff for military operations between
those related to force development and those related to force utilization. In
September, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, the deputy chief of staff for military
operations, suggested creating two separate offices, one beneath a deputy
chief of staff for plans and operations, and the other under a deputy chief of
staff for forces. He forwarded this concept to General Wheeler, the new chief
27. Hewes, From Root to McNamara, 358–59; Gene Famiglietti, “Materiel Command Begins
Operations,” Army Times, 4 Aug 1962.
28. Maj. Hassan M. Kamara, Army Combat Developments Command: A Way to Modernize
Better and Faster than the Competition, Land Warfare Paper No. 119 (Arlington, VA:
Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, 2018); Annual History,
U.S. Army Combat Developments Cmd, Aug 1963, sub: First Year: June 1962–July 1963,
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, VA; Memo, Gen. Herbert B.
Powell for Ch Staff, 26 Oct 1962, sub: Responsibility for Current Army Doctrine in the New
Army Organization, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
of staff, who set the issue aside for further discussion. The Army leadership
made no additional decisions regarding the issue before the end of the year.29
Significant in the evolution of the Army in 1962, although not part of the
Project 80 reorganization, was the establishment of an intelligence branch in
the active Army. In June, General Decker warned the secretary of the Army
that existing intelligence and Army Security Agency specialization programs
had failed to attract Regular Army officers in the numbers and grades
required. Many of those officers, he explained, were reluctant to place their
military careers in jeopardy by specializing in functions that were outside
the responsibility of their basic branch. The Army Staff recommended
the establishment of the Army Intelligence and Security branch, and the
secretary approved it on 2 July. The new component included some 5,000
officers serving in the Army Security Agency, in the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and in various combat intelligence positions
around the service. As a symbol for the new branch, the service authorized
an emblem featuring a dagger superimposed on a blazing sun; the sun
represented the Greek god Helios who could see and hear everything, and
the dagger signified the branch’s clandestine capabilities. The new emblem
replaced a sphinx insignia that had been in place since 1923.30
KEEPING AN EYE ON EUROPE
By the end of 1961, the confrontation over the Berlin Wall had subsided
somewhat, as the United States and the Soviet Union moderated their
military activities near the border. The momentary faceoff between opposing
platoons of main battle tanks at Checkpoint Charlie had brought both sides
close enough to the abyss to recognize that war was in neither of their
interests. Nonetheless, Berlin and Germany remained the central theater
in the Cold War conflict. Although distractions in other worldwide trouble
spots competed for the service’s attention, it remained, to a great degree,
focused upon Western Europe.31
29. Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Ch Staff, 20 Sep 1962, sub: Reorganization of
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hewes, From Root to McNamara,
364–65.
30. Memo, Maj. Gen. Phillip F. Lindeman, Acting Dep Ch Staff Personnel, for Ch Staff,
14 Jun 1962, sub: Establishment of an Intelligence Branch in the Active Army, File Unit:
31. A more detailed description of events surrounding the construction of the Berlin Wall
and the confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie can be found in Donald A. Carter, Forging the
Despite the deprivations it suffered throughout the Eisenhower

administration, the Army’s force in Europe had remained relatively
stable. In 1962, the two corps and five divisions of the Seventh Army still
represented the bulwark of NATO’s (North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s)
defenses. Although the American infatuation with tactical atomic warfare
had subsided to some degree, Soviet and Warsaw Pact numerical advantages
required the Western nations to rely upon the threat of a nuclear response
to backstop their conventional defenses. President Kennedy’s actions in
the face of the Soviet challenge in Berlin had strengthened the American
position in Germany, but the reliance upon a mobilization of reserve units to
supplement many of the reinforcements meant that the additional strength
could only be temporary.32
On 30 March, Secretary McNamara recommended to the president that
the nation should release all reservists involuntarily recalled to active duty
no later than August 1962. Regular personnel whose tours of duty the Army
had involuntarily extended should be released by June. McNamara noted that
the military posture of the United States had improved significantly because
of increased personnel authorizations and equipment modernization.
Additionally, McNamara worried that it was impractical to activate reserves
to meet repeated Cold War crises. The nation should refrain from such
mobilization, he concluded, until armed conflict was imminent.33
The defense secretary noted that few, if any, of the recalled reservists had
gone to Europe. Rather, they had backfilled regular units that had deployed
there in response to the Berlin Crisis. Without those reservists, many Army
units based in the United States now suffered critical shortages that limited
their abilities to respond to other possible crises. Overriding protests from
USAREUR leaders and some Allied nations, McNamara recommended that
many of the support units that had reinforced USAREUR and the Seventh
Army return to the United States beginning in October 1962. Although he
did not set a specific date, he also suggested that the 3d Armored Cavalry
Regiment and several tank and artillery battalions that had recently arrived
in Germany return to the United States when the Berlin Crisis clearly had
Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army in the Cold War (Washington, DC:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 403–30.
32. Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, n.d., sub: USAREUR Force Structure Analysis
as of 31 January 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
33. Memo, Paul H. Nitze, Asst Sec Def, for Service Secs, 30 Mar 1962, sub: Release of
Reservists Involuntarily Recalled to Active Duty, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319 NACP; Col. (Ret.) Jon T. Hoffman and Col. (Ret.)
Forrest L. Marion, Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and Reserve (Washington,
DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 53.
moderated. Once completed, the moves would reduce USAREUR personnel

strength from its authorized level of 272,296 to 210,803.34
To some extent, Army leaders in Europe still hoped to offset the drop in
personnel strength with the introduction of new, more powerful weapon. In
January, the Army Times reported that Seventh Army units were beginning
to train using the new Davy Crockett atomic projectile. Special training
personnel had arrived to begin instruction for every battle group equipped
with the weapon. Unfortunately, as training got underway, it became
apparent to local commanders that many of the trainers lacked expertise in
several subjects that were critical to the successful operation of the weapon
system. They reported that training regarding safety procedures, squad
and section tactics, and nuclear weapons effects seemed to be substandard.
Commanders emphatically concluded that course graduates did not receive
sufficient tactical training to advise their leaders on the tactical employment
of the section and its weapons.35
Another scheme that had originated during the Berlin Crisis proved to
be more successful. Early in October 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U.S.
commanders in Europe had proposed the pre-positioning of equipment to
outfit up to four divisions, which the Army could transport to the continent
on relatively short notice. Later that month, Secretary McNamara directed
the Army to pre-position sufficient materiel to equip one infantry division,
one armored division, and ten combat and service support units, mostly
artillery and engineer battalions. Throughout the latter part of 1962, the
Army gathered most of the required battle gear in Europe. Although a great
deal of the supplies came from USAREUR theater stocks, the equipment
for one infantry brigade and the support battalions came from units in the
continental United States. Generally, USAREUR selected pre-position sites
west of the Rhine River, far enough so that troops could receive and activate
the equipment during the first fourteen days of a conflict without the sites
being overrun by advancing Soviet columns. By the end of the year, most
of the required equipment was in place, although USAREUR headquarters
notified the Department of the Army that serious shortages of maintenance
34. Memo, Stephen Ailes, Under Sec Army, for Ch Staff, 26 Apr 1962, sub: Report of the
Under Secretary of the Army’s Study Group on Army Strength in Europe, File Unit: Entry
35. “Davy’s in Europe,” Army Times, 20 Jan 1962; Memo, CWO Willis J. Coates, Asst
Adjutant Gen, for Cmdg Gen, Continental Army Cmd, 14 May 1962, sub: Evaluation
of Davy Crockett School-Trained Personnel, File Unit: Entry A1 92G, Series: Adjutant
General Security Classified General Correspondence, 1956–1962 (hereinafter AG SCGC
1956–1962), RG 546: Records of the United States Continental Army Command, NACP.
tools and radio equipment continued to hamper full deployment of the pre-
positioned sets.36
The Army wasted little time before initiating its first test of the rapid
deployment plan in January 1962. Although the service had canceled an
earlier effort in 1961 because of a potential crisis in Laos, on 16 January it
launched Operation Long Thrust II, sending three infantry battle groups
from the 4th Infantry Division in the United States to Europe. The three
units, the 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry; the 2d Battle Group, 47th Infantry;
and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, flew from Fort Lewis, Washington, to
Germany, where they received pre-positioned equipment at the Mannheim
storage site. After an extended field training exercise, the 1st Battle Group,
22d Infantry, turned in its equipment and returned to home station. The 2d
Battle Group, 47th Infantry, moved to Berlin to support the brigade-sized
garrison there, and the 2d Battle Group, 39th Infantry, remained in Germany
as a temporary reinforcement for the Seventh Army. The Army would
conduct several Long Thrust exercises over the next three years, each time
exchanging U.S.-based units with those that previously had deployed. The
rotations proved the viability of the pre-positioned equipment and rapid
reinforcement, if only on a modest scale.37
Even though the Long Thrust exercises were valuable, by 1962,
USAREUR commander General Bruce C. Clarke and Seventh Army
commander Lt. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson had begun to question the
utility of larger training events. After observing Exercise Wintershield II
the previous year, both officers objected to the tremendous logistical and
financial burden the exercises imposed on units in exchange for training
experience that might be achieved in smaller tests. Allies in Germany and
France also had begun to question the benefit of the larger maneuvers that
ran roughshod over local terrain and road networks. The economic recovery
and expansion of West Germany had made maneuver space harder and
harder to come by.38
Although the pre-positioned equipment and the Long Thrust exercises
appeared to resolve some of the Army’s challenge of reinforcing its forces in
36. Memo, Brig. Gen. Leonidas G. Gavalas, U.S. Army, Europe, Adjutant Gen, for
Distribution, 2 Apr1962, sub: After-Action Report on Prepositioning of Equipment for
a Two Division Force; Memo, Col. Ray M. Bagley, Ch, Storage and Distribution Div, for
Ch Staff, 25 Apr 1962, sub: Prepositioning of Equipment; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
37. Memo, Brig. Gen. John W. Keating, Director of Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff,
1 May 1962, sub: Exercise Long Thrust, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Two Ivy Units Will Aid Europe Force,” Army Times, 6 Jan
1962; Carter, Forging the Shield, 428.
38. Carter, Forging the Shield, 454.
Europe, another long-term issue continued to plague service officials. The

United States still struggled with its international balance of payments, an
issue that many leaders attributed to the large military presence in Western
Europe. Military and civilian officials blamed this gold-flow issue on large
U.S. payments to foreign firms for the purchase of goods and services in
support of the troops. Also to blame were the purchases made on the local
economies by deployed soldiers and their dependents. Although the Army
cut the deficit sharply in 1961, Secretary McNamara urged the services to
continue to limit overseas spending.39
In Europe, General Clarke had taken several steps to reduce the amount
of money his troops spent on the economy. He initiated programs to
encourage personal savings and promoted the use of on-base service clubs
and recreation centers. He restricted the access of solicitors of non-U.S.
goods in housing areas, post exchanges, and commissaries. He staunchly
had resisted, however, President Eisenhower’s restrictions on dependents
accompanying soldiers overseas and pointed out the disastrous effects such
a policy would have on his soldiers.40
Early in the year, Secretary McNamara had directed the Army to develop
a plan for the rotation of units to Germany without dependents. However,
when the Army announced plans to reintroduce a limited unit-rotation plan
in which battalion-sized elements would deploy to Europe for six months
without dependents, General Clarke resisted, reminding the Army Staff
that Operation Gyroscope had featured many of the same characteristics
and had been unworkable. Nevertheless, in June, McNamara approved the
service’s concept, dubbed Rotaplan, to send three battle groups without
dependents from the United States to Germany, exchanging them for three
battle groups currently in Europe. Each overseas tour would last for six
months, followed by a U.S. tour that would last a minimum of eighteen
months. On 15 October, elements of the 1st Battle Group, 38th Infantry, part
of the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia, began their movement
to Germany as part of the initial rotation. Troops from the 8th Infantry
39. Memo, Gen. [Clyde D.] Eddleman, Acting Ch Staff, for Asst Sec Army, 4 Jan 1962,
sub: Balance of Payments; Memo, Roderick M. Gillies, Asst Comptroller, for Ch Staff,
2 May 1962, sub: Gold Outflow Problems; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
40. Memo, Gen. Bruce C. Clarke for Selected Cdrs and Chs, U.S. Army, Europe, Staff Divs,
14 Mar 1962, sub: Reduction in the Outflow of Gold; Ltr, Gen. [Bruce C.] Clarke to Gen.
George H. Decker, Ch Staff, 15 Jan 1962; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
Division’s 1st Battle Group, 26th Infantry, used the same aircraft for their
flights back to the United States.41
As General Clarke had predicted, the concept was unpopular with the
troops and ineffective almost from the start. Army officials had suggested
that the initial rotation would return approximately 4,250 dependents
from Europe to the United States. However, because the waiting time for
overseas accommodations was more than nine months, the number of
U.S. dependents in Europe was already curtailed. General Wheeler, then
deputy commander of the U.S. European Command, suggested that rather
than American dependents, who largely had observed limitations on
expenditures, it was primarily U.S. tourists in Europe who were driving up
the deficit in balance of payments through their extravagant travel spending.
Given Rotaplan’s unpopularity and its apparent lack of effectiveness, few
Army leaders expected the program to survive for long.42
RESETTING THE FORCE
By 1962, it was becoming clear that the United States Army was no longer
the same post-World War II force that had deployed to Korea twelve years
earlier. Eight years of deprivation under President Eisenhower, followed
by a renaissance under President Kennedy, had moved the service in a few
different directions. As American society had changed, so too had the Army,
reflecting the individuals who made up the nation. As a result, some of the
institution’s basic structures were evolving in accommodation.
Unexpected challenges in the 1961 call-up of two national guard divisions
prompted Army officials to reexamine the process and to reevaluate the
efficiency of the entire reserve structure. In a February 1962 study of the
mobilization, the Army Audit Agency noted that shortages in supplies and
equipment constituted the major difficulty in preparing the divisions for
deployment. Both divisions had reported to their respective mobilization
sites with less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment. Erroneous or
poorly maintained records also made it difficult to identify and recall the
personnel required to fill out the divisions and supporting units. The large
number of untrained or inexperienced personnel in the units increased the
need for fillers. Of the 30,000 drilling reservists mobilized in 1961, one third
41. Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Army, 19 Jul 1962,
sub: Unit Rotation, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP; “ROTAPLAN Group Exchanges Begin,” Army Times, 20 Oct 1962.
42. Ltr, Gen. [Earle G.] Wheeler to Gen. Barksdale Hamlett Jr., 25 Jul 1962, File Unit: Entry
occupied spaces for which they were not fully qualified. Finally, auditors
noted that breakdowns in communication and failure to follow established
procedures often had prevented timely funding throughout the operation.43
This report, along with others generated during the 1961 mobilizations,
reinforced Secretary McNamara’s belief that the Army’s reserve structure
was unwieldly and in need of reorganization. He agreed with those service
leaders who believed that the current structure was more oriented toward
general mobilization than it was toward rapid reinforcement of the Army. In
January, he established an ad hoc committee under the leadership of Utah’s
adjutant general, Maj. Gen. Maxwell E. Rich, to study plans for a proposed
realignment of reserve units. Some of McNamara’s guidance echoed previous
efforts, including maintaining six divisions and supporting units ready to
deploy in eight weeks. He suggested a reduction in paid drill strength from
700,000 to 670,000 and the elimination of eight reserve component divisions,
from which the Army would form six ROAD brigades. As developed, the
plan would cut roughly 650 company-sized units and more than 1,000
reserve personnel in twenty-one states.44
The Army proposed to eliminate four infantry divisions from each of
the two components. The reserve structure in 1962 included twenty-seven
national guard divisions and ten reserve divisions. The national guard
divisions selected for realignment included the 34th Infantry Division from
Nebraska and Iowa; the 35th Infantry Division from Kansas and Missouri,
the 43d Infantry Division from Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont;
and the 51st Infantry Division from Florida and South Carolina. Reserve
divisions selected for realignment included the 79th Infantry Division from
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland; the 94th Infantry Division from
Massachusetts; the 96th Infantry Division from Arizona, Utah, Nevada,
Washington, Idaho, and Montana; and the 103d Infantry Division from
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. In making its decisions, the study group
elected to prioritize the retention of those divisions designated for early
deployment, armored divisions, and those originating from a single state.
The realignment program envisioned the retention of the eight division
headquarters with their existing personnel strength and grade structure,
43. Audit Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Army Audit Agency, 26 Feb 1962, “Circumstances Related
to Call to Active Duty 32d Infantry Division and 49th Armored Division, Army National
Guard, and Supporting Units,” File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP; Hoffman and Marion, Forging a Total Force, 53.
44. Memo, Brig. Gen. Carl Darnell Jr., Asst Ch Staff Reserve Components, for Under Sec
Army, 9 Jan 1962; Rpt, Ad Hoc Committee Appointed to Study the Reorganization of the
Reserve Components of the Army, 15 Feb 1962; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Army Reorganization Effect on Guard,
Reserve Studied,” Army Times, 10 Feb 1962.
giving them the mission of training the six new brigades and other
nondivisional units.45
The proposal, endorsed by the Army and by Secretary McNamara,
received some resistance from reserve and national guard leaders, state
governors, and veterans of those divisions slated for elimination. Reserve
leaders protested the projected cuts in both personnel and units, arguing
that the nation needed more reserve strength, not less. Political leaders from
states losing national guard units pointed out that the losses limited their
ability to mobilize those forces to deal with local emergencies. The veterans
submitted the most emotional protests, decrying the elimination of so many
proud military organizations.46
After considerable wrangling with Congress, Secretary McNamara
was able to enact almost all of the changes that he had requested. On
4 December, he announced he was putting the reorganization of the reserves
into immediate effect. As a result of these actions, the National Guard and
Army Reserve eliminated 1,800 units that the Army had deemed no longer
essential. At the same time, the service activated roughly 1,000 new units
to absorb the excess personnel and to realign capabilities where they were
most needed. The realignment included the elimination of the eight named
divisions, but instead of six new separate brigades, the Army announced
that it would form eight, all under the new ROAD organization. The eight
realigned division headquarters would retain their unit designations,
colors, and histories, and would assume responsibility for the training and
administration of selected nondivisional units.47
Along with the reorganization of the reserves, McNamara requested a
reevaluation of the service’s requirement for major troop installations. In
April, his office identified forty-nine such locations in the United States,
asking that the Army review its requirements for each and the capabilities
and functions it provided. He wanted to know such details as the total acreage
of each site, the amount of available barracks space, peak training loads, and
the types of ranges available, particularly for larger artillery weapons. The
projected reductions in reserve personnel implied similar reductions the
Army could make in the number of spaces required at its training centers.
Perhaps, thought the defense secretary, the military could use some of those
45. Memo, Col. George C. Fairbanks, Ch, Organization and Training Div, for Distribution,
5 Apr 1962, sub: Reorganization of the Reserve Components, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
46. “State AGs Protest Reserve Cut, Say More Guard Needed,” Army Times, 19 May 1962;
Ltr, Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Robert W. Wilson to Sec Army, 5 Apr 1962; Ltr, Sec Army Cyrus R.
Vance to F. Edward Hebert, 23 Nov 1962; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
47. Larry Carney, “Eight Reserve Division Equal Eight Brigades,” Army Times, 8 Dec 1962.
troop spaces for other purposes. It might even be possible to close some of
the Army’s smaller facilities.48
Three months later, in July 1962, the Defense Department announced
that it was closing as surplus a total of eighty posts, bases, and installations
in twenty-nine states. Although the order had not named any of the Army’s
major installations, some consolidation of functions had allowed the service
to part with many smaller and outdated locations. Included in the list were
World War II mobilization sites, such as Camp Kilmer, New Jersey; Camp
Bowie, Texas; and Fort Douglas, Utah. The announcement also designated
many smaller arsenals and ordnance facilities for closing or repurposing.49
The consolidation of functions among the larger Army installations led
the service to reconsider how it administered initial induction and training
for its incoming soldiers. In September, General Decker directed the Army
Staff to initiate a study to determine the feasibility of centralizing the in-
processing of new recruits, basic combat training, and advanced individual
training at one of the several Army training centers. Under the existing
system, incoming personnel proceeded from a recruiting main station upon
completion of processing, to a reception station for extensive aptitude testing,
and then to an Army training center for basic combat training. Almost 20
percent then proceeded to a different training center for advanced individual
training. The study concluded that the Army would incur substantial savings
by eliminating one or more of these individual stages and conducting all
initial processing and training at a single site. It noted, however, that such
modifications would require a more advanced data-tracking system than
the Army currently possessed to monitor each individual’s progress as well
as the allocation of trainees against unit personnel requirements. General
Barksdale Hamlett Jr., the vice chief of staff, approved the recommendations
of the study and directed the deputy chief of staff for personnel to further
develop the concept.50
More effective initial training also required improvements in the quality
of the junior leaders administering that training. Maj. Gen. Orlando C.
Troxel Jr., the commanding general of the U.S. Army training center at Fort
Ord, noted that higher recruiting standards had produced recruits with
48. Memo, Sec Def Robert S. McNamara for Sec Army, 3 Apr 1962, sub: Plan for Use of
Major Active Army Troop Installations; Memo, Maj. Gen. John L. Throckmorton, Sec
Gen Staff, for Dep Chs Staff, 13 Apr 1962, sub: Plan for Use of Major Active Army Troop
Installations; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
49. “80 Military Bases Declared Surplus,” Army Times, 21 Jul 1962.
50. Memo, Sec Gen Staff for Gen. [Barksdale] Hamlett, 18 Oct 1962, sub: A Concept and
Study for Management of Replacement Training in 1965–1970 Time Frame, File Unit:
higher test scores and better physical development. He complained, however,

that his young lieutenants and noncommissioned officers struggled to apply
appropriate discipline without resorting to unauthorized punishment. It
required several cycles of training, he said, before they gained the experience
they needed to deal with their new soldiers.51
Legislation passed by Congress in September promised to give the Army’s
unit leaders additional tools for the administration of discipline within
their units. After lengthy consideration, Congress passed a bill amending
Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, giving battalion-level
commanders the authority to punish military infractions to the same degree
that previously had required a summary court-martial. The so-called field
grade Article 15 allowed a commanding officer in the grade of major or
higher to confine a soldier for up to thirty days in correctional custody,
impose fines of one-half pay for up to two months, assign extra duties for up
to forty-five days, restrict a soldier to limits for up to sixty days, and reduce
an E–5 or higher by one grade and an E–4 or lower to the lowest grade.
Unit commanders retained the authority to suspend punishments pending
corrective action on the part of the soldier. Army leaders hoped that the
measure would help to improve unit discipline by giving commanders
more discretion regarding punishment without resorting to a lengthy court
procedure or placing the stigma of a criminal conviction on the record of an
inexperienced soldier.52
Another factor that affected both discipline and morale within the Army
was the continuing process of racial integration. The service had made
considerable progress toward the integration of the active force, but by 1962,
it had made little headway in the reserves. That year, more than 40 percent of
all reserve units in the United States were exclusively White, and the Army
retained six all-Black units as well. Also, 75 percent of the Black reservists
in the Army were unassigned to specific units and did not participate in
active duty training. Additionally, serving in a nonpay status denied them
opportunities for credit toward promotion or retirement.53
In April, Deputy Secretary Roswell L. Gilpatric directed all of the services
to reexamine their policies and to take positive steps to assure the equity of
treatment for all service members. The Defense Department directed the
Army to complete the integration of any remaining all-White or all-Black
51. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel Jr. to Gen. Herbert B. Powell, 31 Jan 1962, File Unit:
Entry A1 92G, Series: AG SCGC 1956–1962, RG 546, NACP.
52. Ed Gates, “Article 15 Gives CO the Law,” Army Times, 25 Aug 1962; Jack Vincent, “COs
Given More Power,” Army Times, 15 Sep 1962.
reserve units as soon as possible. Shortly thereafter, in June, President

Kennedy announced the formation of the Committee on Equal Opportunity
in the Armed Forces, chaired by Gerhard A. Gesell, a prominent Washington,
D.C., attorney. Kennedy directed the committee to examine all aspects of
treatment afforded to minority groups within the United States’ armed forces,
as well as the treatment of minorities off-base within local communities.54
In a response to the committee, Under Secretary of the Army Stephen
Ailes summarized the Army’s approach to problems involving minority
groups. He suggested that, to date, the Army had handled most cases on an
individual basis. Most of these appeared to involve discrimination regarding
off-post housing, restrictions in public or commercial establishments, or
in public conveyance such as taxis or buses. He noted several instances in
which individual soldiers, both Black and White, had participated in racial
protests such as picketing or sit-ins. He found no evidence, however, that
these had evolved into massed protests by organized minority groups within
the military. He pointed out that no military personnel had participated in
the Freedom Ride demonstrations in Mississippi and Alabama during the
previous year.55
Meanwhile, in October, when riots broke out on the campus of the
University of Mississippi over the enrollment of a Black student, elements of
the Army once again received the call to restore the peace. Brig. Gen. Charles
Billingslea, the commanding general of the 2d Infantry Division, led an initial
intervention force composed of the 2d Battle Group, 23d Infantry; the 503d,
716th, and 720th Military Police Battalions; the 31st Helicopter Company;
and federalized Mississippi National Guard elements, which deployed to
the university campus. As the situation escalated, General Howze, then the
commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, replaced General Billingslea.
Ultimately, the Army’s buildup around Oxford, Mississippi, numbered more
than 30,000, including, at various times, elements of fourteen infantry and
airborne battle groups. Mostly by its mere presence, the force gradually
restored order, and after a few weeks, almost all troops redeployed to home
stations. Some military police and national guard units remained behind,
54. Randall Shoemaker, “Racial Guard End Sought,” Army Times, 21 Apr 1962; Randall
Shoemaker, “Order Out to Blend Units,” Army Times, 28 Apr 1962; MacGregor, Integration
of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965, 518–19; Memo, Norman S. Paul, Asst Sec Def Legislative
Affairs, for Under Sec Army, 13 Aug 1962, sub: President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity
in the Armed Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP.
55. Memo, Under Sec Stephen Ailes for Asst Sec Def (Manpower), 30 Aug 1962, sub:
President’s Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
however, to maintain order and to conduct periodic patrols through

nearby neighborhoods.56
Even as the Army played a role in improving opportunities for minorities,
the service also redoubled its efforts to promote its image as an integral part
of American life. The Army Corps of Engineers provided frequent and
timely examples of the service’s accomplishments in the civilian community.
In October, the chief of engineers summarized the assistance the corps was
providing in construction of launch facilities for the Gemini and Apollo
programs at the NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
facility at Cape Canaveral, Florida. Later, in December, the corps participated
in the retrieval of four large tanks of liquid chlorine from the bottom of the
Mississippi River after a transport barge had sunk a few miles below Natchez,
Mississippi. The Army’s director of military personnel also was pleased to
share the news that two Army test pilots had met all of NASA’s requirements
and had volunteered for astronaut training.57
Sometimes, however, concern for the service’s image might have gone
too far. In March, retired Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis wrote to Maj. Gen.
Charles G. Dodge, the Army’s public information officer, to complain about
the “derogatory and despicable light” in which television programs depicted
U.S. Cavalry officers on the western frontier.58 Surely, he suggested, Secretary
Stahr should be more interested in obtaining fair and honest portrayals for
the Army. General Dodge replied to his old friend that because most of the
television programs he mentioned were produced without Army assistance,
the service had no control or veto power over their content. At any rate, he
assured General Sturgis that, considering all types of programming currently
being broadcast, he was quite satisfied with the overall image of the service.59
Despite the good fortune and positive public support that the Army was
beginning to enjoy under the new administration, some shadows hinted
56. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992,
Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012),
101–25; Interv, Reed with Howze, n.d.
57. Memo, Lt. Gen.Walter K. Wilson Jr. for Ch Staff, 31 Oct 1962, sub: Corps of Engineers
Participation in Programs at the Atlantic Missile Range, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “Big Disaster Averted By Army
Engineers,” Army Times, 8 Dec 1962; Memo, Maj. Gen. Harvey J. Jablonsky, Director of
Ofcrs Assignments, for Dep Ch Staff Personnel, 29 May 1962, sub: U.S. Army Participation
in the NASA Astronaut Program, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
58. Ltr, Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis Jr. to Maj. Gen. Charles G. Dodge, 22 Mar 1962, File Unit:
59. Ltr, Sturgis to Dodge, 22 Mar 1962; Ltr, Gen. [Charles G.] Dodge to Gen. [Samuel D.]
Sturgis, 7 Jul 1962; File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP.
at darker days ahead. In July, Maj. Gen. Alvah R. Fitch, the assistant chief
of staff for intelligence, warned the chief of staff about a series of pending
demonstrations expected in the vicinity of the Pentagon. A group calling
itself the Committee for Non-Violent Action had scheduled vigils and
protests near the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence
Agency. Even more concerning was a declaration by Chief Information
Officer Arthur Sylvester that the Defense Department was using the
dissemination of information about its activities as a weapon and, further,
that the Cold War fully justified its continuing manipulation. His statement
raised eyebrows throughout the journalistic world, where one editorial
declared that the manipulation of the news was the first weapon of a dictator.
Sylvester’s statement, coupled with increasing pressure from the Department
of Defense to reduce contact between senior military leaders and members
of the press, troubled many who saw in those actions a growing distrust of
the uniformed leadership by the Defense Department’s civilian hierarchy.60
ARMY RESPONSE TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
On the evening of 22 October 1962, President Kennedy alerted the nation

to an ominous buildup of Russian missiles in Cuba. Kennedy announced
the establishment of a naval quarantine of the island nation to be effective
on 24 October and added that the United States would take whatever steps
were necessary to neutralize this Soviet threat so close to American shores.
Along with the rest of the United States military, the Army began to prepare
its forces for possible conflict, including the potential invasion of Cuba.61
Contingency planning for an operation in Cuba had begun in 1959 under
the direction of Admiral Robert L. Dennison, the commander in chief of
Atlantic Command. Dennison was joined in the initial planning by the
XVIII Airborne Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Robert F. Sink, acting in his
role as planning agent for the commanding general of CONARC. From the
outset, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated the commanding general of the
XVIII Airborne Corps to be the Army ground force commander operating
60. Memo, Maj. Gen. Alvah R. Fitch for Ch Staff, 18 Jun 1962, sub: Scheduled Demonstrations
at the Pentagon by Members of the Committee for Non-Violent Action, File Unit: Entry A1
2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; “The Dictat,” Army Times,
10 Nov 1962; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “The Military Downgraded,” Army Times, 10 Nov 1962.
61. Jean R. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962 (Fort Monroe, VA:
Continental Army Command, 1964), i.
under the commander of the U.S. Navy Second Fleet, whom Dennison had
designated as the joint force commander.62
At the beginning of October 1962, the commander in chief of Atlantic
Command directed his subordinate commands to begin pre-positioning
troops, aircraft, ships, equipment, and supplies in anticipation of executing
one or more of his contingency plans for Cuba. At that point, General
Powell, the commanding general of CONARC, directed the new XVIII
Airborne Corps commander, General Howze, to make recommendations
for increasing the readiness posture of his corps. Powell also ordered the
Third U.S. Army to prepare to support the staging and emergency resupply
operations for the Army Task Force (Map 13).63
As planning continued for a potential invasion of Cuba, the Army Task
Force began to take shape. The headquarters of the XVIII Airborne Corps
would direct the operations of four separate elements. An air echelon would
consist of the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions, three battle group task forces
from the 1st Infantry Division, one company of light tanks, and elements
of two separate artillery battalions. A surface echelon, to be delivered by
amphibious assault, included two battle group task forces from the 2d
Infantry Division, one armored battalion, the remainder of the two artillery
battalions contained in the air echelon, plus the 54th Artillery Group. A
floating reserve offshore consisted of one brigade from the 1st Armored
Division and two battle group task forces from the 2d Infantry Division. The
remainder of the 1st Armored Division and the 2d Infantry Division, plus
the 52d Artillery Group, remained in the United States as oncall reserves.64
To carry out his mission to provide administrative support of Army
forces in the pending operation, General Powell established the Peninsula
Base Command in Florida. Its major responsibilities would be to operate
the Army staging area and terminal commands, to provide medical support,
and to coordinate with other Army and Department of Defense logistical
agencies in the forward zone. On 23 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
authorized General Powell to move support units into the recently activated
Air Force base in Opa-locka, Florida. That same day, the Army alerted the
2d Logistical Command at Fort Lee, Virginia, which began its movement
62. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 1.

63. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 8–9.
64. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 13; Memo, Col. John W.
Paddock, Acting Director Ops, Ofc Dep Ch Staff Ops, for Ch Staff, 15 Nov 1962, sub: Status
of STRAF Divisions, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG
319, NACP; “New Command Set to Meet Cuba Crisis,” Army Times, 1 Dec 1962.
XX XX
HQ 1 2
X
1 1
XX XX
82 101 Floating Reserve XX X
1 1 2
XX X
1 1 1 III II
54 1 92
II II
1(-) 92 2(-) 11 II
2 11
I
D 66
Amphibious Echelon
Air Echelon
Tarará
HAVANA
José Martí
Bauta International
Airport
Rancho San José de Las Lajas
Boyeros
San Antonio
San Antonio de Los Baños
de Los Baños Airport
Gulf
of
Mexico Miami, Fl.
HAVANA
C U B A N I N VA S I O N P L A N
1962
CUBA 0 10 Miles
0 10 Kilometers
Map 13
on 25 October and officially established the Peninsula Base Command on

30 October.65
On 23 October, General Powell directed the commanding general of
Fourth Army to begin moving those elements of the 1st Armored Division
assigned to the amphibious assault echelon from Fort Hood to Fort Stewart,
Georgia. Division components assigned to the floating reserve would follow.
Preparations for rail movement began immediately. The first increments
of the division arrived at Fort Stewart on 26 October with all elements
assigned to the amphibious task force having completed their movement by
30 October. Those units designated for the floating reserve closed on Fort
Stewart by 2 November.66
All other units assigned to the proposed assault force remained at their
home stations. Troops of the two airborne divisions, along with those
elements of the 1st Infantry Division assigned to the air echelon, would
deploy directly from airfields at their locations. The 2d Infantry Division,
located at Fort Benning, was close enough to designated staging areas and
departure points to remain in place. Troops at all locations engaged in
intensive training to prepare for the anticipated assault. After their arrival in
Georgia, 1st Armored Division units continued their programs of small unit
exercises, in addition to practicing amphibious assaults along the Florida
coast. Because of their alert status and extremely short response time, the
airborne troops were limited in the amount of training they could conduct.
By the end of October, General Howze notified General Powell that he was
having a hard time keeping “the lid on the pot” while the airborne troops
waited for the go sign.67 Powell recommended that the division commanders
initiate local training exercises, as long as they could return to full alert status
within six hours.68
As the assault troops prepared for an impending invasion, Army officials
considered the implications of a Cuban, or even Soviet, response. Early in
October, White House officials requested information regarding Army air
defense capabilities in the Florida area. On 19 October, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff directed the Army to expedite preparations to deploy the 6th Battalion
(Hawk Missile), 65th Artillery, then in training at Fort Meade, Maryland. The
unit began arriving at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, on 24 October.
Because it was still in training status, the unit did not yet possess its basic
65. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 73–74.

66. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 81–82; “Armor Moved
Fast,” Army Times, 1 Dec 1962.
67. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 154.
68. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 154; “1st Armored Ends
Florida Training,” Army Times, 15 Dec 1962.
load of missiles, which officials had to ship from Letterkenney Army Depot
in Pennsylvania some days later. Also on 24 October, the commanding
general of Continental Air Defense Command requested the deployment
of two additional air defense units to the Florida area. The 2d Battalion
(Nike Hercules), 52d Artillery, and the 8th Battalion (Hawk), 15th Artillery,
arrived to provide coverage at Patrick, MacDill, and Homestead Air Force
Bases in Florida. With three of its battalions plus supporting elements now
in Florida on 28 October, CONARC sent Headquarters and Headquarters
Battery, 13th Artillery Group (Air Defense), to Homestead Air Force Base
to provide overall command and control for the Army air defense units.69
Throughout the mobilization, General Howze and his staff continued
to develop the ground plan for a possible invasion of Cuba. They planned
to seize airfields southwest of Havana with an airborne assault and then
move on toward the capital city. The airborne forces would link up with
the amphibious components, including one division of U.S. Marines, before
the final assault. Although Howze expected to suffer as many as 10,000
casualties, he had a great deal of faith in the readiness of his forces. Despite
the presence of some Soviet tank and artillery units in country, the general
expected much of the Cuban population to welcome the Americans once
they appreciated the scope of the operation. In subsequent interviews,
Howze seemed to invoke some of the same overconfidence and assumptions
that had doomed the Bay of Pigs fiasco two years earlier. He expressed his
belief that the readiness of his assembled force “equaled that of the cross-
channel forces in Overlord” during World War II.70
Despite the impressive military buildup in the southeastern United
States, the Kennedy administration searched for alternatives to an invasion
of Cuba. The president had overruled military plans for air strikes against
the suspected missile sites in favor of a shipping quarantine enforced by the
U.S. Navy. The naval blockade gave both sides time and space to reconsider
before initiating more dramatic military alternatives. Back-channel
diplomacy allowed the president and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev
to reach an agreement and avoid a military conflict. By the end of October,
69. MFR, Maj. William L. Lemnitzer, War Plans Div, 12 Oct 1962, sub: Army Air Defense
Capabilities in Florida, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS,
RG 319, NACP; Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, 98–101.
70. Interv, Reed with Howze, n.d.
the crisis began to subside, and on 19 November, the Soviets announced that
they were withdrawing their missiles from Cuba.71
Even though its units never entered battle, the Army and its leadership
learned a great deal about the service’s ability to mobilize in preparation for a
major conflict. After two world wars and the conflict in Korea, the dynamic
between the active force and the vast system of reserves had changed.
Coming so soon after it had released those reservists activated for the Berlin
mobilization, the Kennedy administration found it politically impossible to
recall large numbers of reserves to active duty. This left the Army unable to
employ many of the specialized units that existed only in the Army Reserve
and National Guard. This reluctance to mobilize the nation’s reserves
established a precedent that would be difficult to break in later years.72
Preparations for an invasion of Cuba laid bare how badly the Eisenhower
years had hollowed out the U.S. Army. The priority for personnel and
equipment afforded to overseas deployed forces had limited the service’s
ability to maintain a strong strategic reserve. Preparing just four divisions
for combat in Cuba had stripped remaining stateside units of much of their
equipment and personnel, and the demand for filler personnel had stripped
most of the Army school system. Unlike the other services, the Army never
received authority from the secretary of defense to extend enlistments.73
The actual mobilization and planning for the operation exposed flaws in
the way the services approached the massive undertaking. When equipment
from the 1st Armored Division reached Fort Stewart, officials decided to leave
most of it on the flatbed railcars, ready for transport to ports of embarkation.
They quickly realized that the post lacked sufficient marshalling space to
accommodate more than 660 loaded flatbed cars. Once deployed to Florida,
CONARC leaders found that their two headquarters, one for operations and
the other for logistics, strained the makeshift communications networks
the Army had established there. After action reviews also indicated that
the failure to name an overall joint task force commander for the invasion
Oxford University Press, 2000), 191–208; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days:
John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 820–30. There
are many fine books that tell the complete story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Elie Abel,
The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1966) and Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen
Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Norton, 1969).
72. Jonathan R. House, “Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Parameters
(Spring 1991): 92–102.
73. House, “Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 92–102.
ground forces would have led to chaos as the Army and Marines attempted
to reconcile airspace management and fire support doctrines.74
Perhaps the most disturbing lesson to come out of the Cuban experience
was the indication that the Army in particular, and the U.S. military in
general, was less than receptive to lessons learned from previous experiences.
During the Lebanon deployment in 1958, the Army’s chief of transportation
identified a major flaw in the roll-on, roll-off naval transport the service
had used during the deployment. Its lower decks lacked the headway to
store many of the tanks and trucks the Army needed to transport. Units had
to load tanks on the main deck, causing the ship to become so top-heavy
that shipmasters considered them to be unseaworthy. Yet, during planning
for the Cuban operation, logistical planners for CONARC did not become
aware of the shortcomings until after loading operations already had begun.
The fact that this lapse did not cause greater concern should have been more
troubling to military leaders. General Powell, however, expressed his belief
that the overall plan had been sound and that the crisis had provided an
excellent opportunity for its rehearsal.75
MAINSTREAMING COUNTERINSURGENCY
Despite the many military and diplomatic challenges facing the Kennedy
administration in 1962, no subjects captured the attention and the
imagination of the young president as much as the concepts of
counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Early in January, General Taylor
passed to Secretary McNamara a lengthy list of the president’s concerns
in those areas. Kennedy asked that the Army expand the Special Warfare
School at Fort Bragg, not only for training additional American instructors,
but also to accept more foreign students. He suggested that the school
should include courses about the political implications of guerrilla warfare,
counterinsurgency, and wars of liberation in its curriculum. At a meeting
with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kennedy suggested to the Army vice chief of staff,
General Clyde D. Eddleman, that the Army use South Vietnam as a training
ground for officers whom it expected to groom for future leadership. As
an active theater, Southeast Asia seemed to be an ideal place for rising
military leaders to appreciate the president’s focus upon unconventional
warfare. Specifically, he wanted the service to send colonels who were apt
74. House, “Joint Operational Problems in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 92–102.
75. Moenk, USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, iii–iv.
to be selected for brigadier general to Vietnam for appropriate training and

orientation.76
At the same time, Kennedy expressed some of his concerns directly to
McNamara, telling the defense secretary that he was not satisfied with the
amount of attention the military had paid to the threat of Communist-
directed subversive insurgency and guerrilla warfare. As an immediate step,
he requested that the Army designate a general officer, reporting directly to
the chief of staff, to serve as the focal point for Army activities in this area.
He also directed all services to provide additional training and orientation
on guerrilla warfare and its political implications for those officers assigned
to military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) in countries threatened by
Communist subversion.77
The Army responded quickly to the president’s request, and on
26 January, appointed William B. Rosson, soon to be a major general, to the
position of special assistant to the chief of staff for special warfare activities.
Rosson had served as a battalion commander with the 3d Infantry Division
during World War II and as a member of the U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group, Indochina, from 1954 to 1955. The chief of staff directed
General Rosson to take a broad view of special warfare as part of the Army’s
overall Cold War mission. In his new position, Rosson was to review the
adequacy of Army doctrine and training literature, as well as the curricula
of all U.S. Army schools with regard to all Cold War activities, placing
particular emphasis on counterinsurgency operations.78
Notwithstanding the president’s concerns, the Army already had begun
serious consideration of its role against Communist-inspired insurgencies
and guerrilla warfare. In January, the Army Staff released a study titled
Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces in Paramilitary Operations, in
which it described how the service intended to support the administration’s
program. The staff expressed the Army view that its primary role in
a counterinsurgency effort would be to optimize the capabilities of
indigenous military forces to ensure the internal security of the afflicted
nation. Army support to a threatened region would begin with a MAAG,
possibly supplemented by “specialized counterinsurgency forces” to provide
76. Memo, Gen. (Ret.) Maxwell D. Taylor for Sec McNamara, 11 Jan 1962, sub: Progress
Report on Guerrilla Warfare Matters Raised by the President, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
77. Memo, President John F. Kennedy for Sec Def, 11 Jan 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
78. Memo, Maj. Gen. John L. Throckmorton for Gen. [George H.] Decker, 26 Jan 1962, sub:
Terms of Reference for Brigadier General Rosson, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
training advice and assistance.79 Only in the direst of circumstances would

U.S. combat units intervene in the contest. In fact, Army leaders warned,
in a counterinsurgency situation where the support of the populace for its
government might be wavering, the introduction of major U.S. forces may
well be “the kiss of death.”80 More to the point, the paper warned that positive
action by the host government to publicize and implement its political and
socioeconomic reforms was essential to a successful counterinsurgency
operation. A military operation alone could not extinguish an insurgency.81
In February 1962, the Army published the new Field Manual
100–5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. In addition to recognizing
the importance of post-Korean airmobile operations, this publication
discussed unconventional warfare and operations against irregular forces.
As a product of the Army Staff and its educational system, it explained the
service’s strategic, operational, and tactical roles in atomic, conventional,
and unconventional warfare.82
In addition to its MAAG elements, by mid-1962, the Army had established
the nuclei of four special operations support forces, which were nearing full
strength. The Army concept highlighted the nation-building mission assigned
to the support forces. Construction and civic improvements benefited both
the military infrastructure and the relationship with the local population.
From successful nation-building operations came success in psychological
warfare, improved intelligence, and eventual military victory.83
CONARC also weighed in on the Army’s role in unconventional warfare
operations. In January, the command appointed a board to study all aspects
of special warfare operations. This group, also chaired by General Howze,
noted the previously published Army Staff paper on U.S. Army forces in
paramilitary operations, but proposed that the study did not go far enough.
The Howze Board held that the Army could not rely solely upon special
operations forces and indigenous military operations. Additionally, it
79. Study, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, “Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces
in Paramilitary Operations,” 2 Jan 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
in Paramilitary Operations,” 2 Jan 1962.
in Paramilitary Operations,” 2 Jan 1962.
82. Dept. of the Army Field Manual 100–5, Field Service Regulations: Operations
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Feb 1962); Walter E. Kretchik, U.S. Army
Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 2011), 180–87.
83. Kretchik, U.S. Army Doctrine, 180–87; Memo, Col. S. J. Mancuso, Acting Director of
Special Forces, for Ch Staff, 30 Aug 1962, sub: Personnel Status of Special Forces Warfare
Units, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP.
Everyday objects become booby traps during a cross-training class

conducted by members of a special forces team. (U.S. Army, National
concluded, regular Army units must prepare to intervene not only in

counterinsurgency operations or to assist in the training effort, but also to
conduct independent combat operations against the insurgents.84
The Howze Board opined that the special forces groups had too many
missions and that their counterinsurgency capabilities were inadequate. As
a supplement, it proposed that the Army assign specific counterinsurgency
missions to three divisions, the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i and
the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions in the continental United States; and to
three battle groups, one in Okinawa, Japan, and two in Panama. The Army
also could give a lower priority counterinsurgency mission to the 82d and
101st Airborne Divisions and the 4th Infantry Division, as well as to the
two airborne battle groups in Europe, which were part of the 24th Infantry
Division. Each division with a counterinsurgency mission would screen its
own resources for required language, area, and other skills. It would then
84. Final Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 9 Feb 1962, sub: Special Warfare
Board, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle, PA.
Special forces soldiers learn about insurgent assistance during a

demonstration of special warfare techniques at Fort Bragg, North
Carolina. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
organize, train, and maintain appropriately sized adviser teams or packets

prepared to deploy into designated trouble spots.85
By the end of the year, General Rosson reported to the chief of staff on
the continued expansion of the special warfare program within the Army.
Additional personnel allocations had raised the authorized special forces
strength to 9,060. Those increases, he said, provided a reasonable capability
for operations in Asia as well as an expanded training base. At the same time,
Rosson noted deployments of special warfare teams to Latin America and to
the Middle East. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, he
added, was preparing a request for an additional 2,784 special forces spaces
to help meet expanding requirements.86
Not all senior Army leaders were as sanguine as Rosson regarding
the progress of the Army’s special warfare programs. In 1962, Brig. Gen.
William P. Yarborough was the commander of the U.S. Army Special Warfare
Center and School at Fort Bragg. General Yarborough, who previously had
85. Final Rpt, Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Cmd, 9 Feb 1962, sub: Special Warfare
Board.
86. Memo, Maj. Gen. William B. Rosson for Gen. [Earle G.] Wheeler, 19 Dec 1962, sub:
Periodic Report on Items of Special Warfare Interest, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
served as the deputy commander of the MAAG in Cambodia, believed that

the Army had oversimplified the concept of counterinsurgency. He argued
that the process of changing the political and economic environment
of a beleaguered nation was far more complicated and time-consuming
than simply combatting guerrilla forces. Further, he said that civic action
programs, which had the military building roads and infrastructure within
that nation, led the natives to believe that such work was the normal job
of the military. Counterinsurgency, he concluded, was not something the
Army could define for its soldiers in a thirty-minute troop information
film. Even though, institutionally, the Army had welcomed unconventional
warfare as a means to restore its position within the defense establishment,
many officers and soldiers within its ranks still struggled to understand its
nuance.87
Whether or not it had completely grasped the concept, by the end of
1962, the Army had embraced counterinsurgency and the broader idea
of unconventional warfare as core components of its mission. Training
and doctrinal literature included those as part of the overall spectrum
of potential conflict associated with the Cold War. More important, they
represented critical components of the Kennedy administration’s national
security program that the Army was uniquely qualified to address.88
DRAWING THE LINE IN VIETNAM
By the end of 1961, Secretary McNamara and other Defense Department

officials had digested the Taylor-Rostow report and had decided to deepen
American engagement in Vietnam. On 17 February 1962, although they
reiterated that the United States had not yet committed combat troops to the
fight, department representatives announced that the administration had
decided that the conflict in Vietnam was one that the United States could
not afford to lose. On the same day, news reports related the downing of two
American helicopters in action against the Viet Cong. American advisers
had been demonstrating to South Vietnamese troops how to conduct a
vertical envelopment. Although the Department of Defense confirmed no
casualties from the action, a spokesperson from the Pentagon reminded
87. Interv, Col. John R. Meese and Lt. Col. Parks Houser with Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough,
21 Apr 1975, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI.
88. Memo, Lt. Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, Dep Ch Staff Mil Ops, for Sec Gen Staff, 12 Jan 1962,
sub: Cold War Activities, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup:
OCS, RG 319, NACP.
reporters that “when you are training people down at the company level,
you may lose some people.”89
The U.S. Army had begun a dramatic expansion of its presence in South
Vietnam. As of 31 December 1961, the chief of the MAAG in Vietnam
had reported a strength of 989 personnel. Other Army units in country
included two helicopter companies with supporting detachments, radio
and signal units, contract technicians, and mobile training teams, yielding
a total Army strength of nearly 2,100. In January 1962, three additional
aviation units and a counterintelligence detachment added another 500
troops. That same month, the commander in chief of Pacific Command,
Admiral Harry D. Felt, forwarded a request to the Army chief of staff from
MAAG, Vietnam, for 600 additional advisers to assist in training the South
Vietnamese Army and the Civil Guard/Self Defense Corps. Felt had also
approved and passed forward MAAG requests for support units, including
water purification teams, radio repair teams, and a large contingent of
field medical support units. In light of the volume of calls for additional
support elements, the deputy chief of staff for logistics recommended the
deployment to Vietnam of a logistics support force of some 400 personnel
to provide assistance for the increasing number of Army personnel not
specifically part of the MAAG. By the end of 1962, U.S. military personnel
strength in Vietnam had risen to more than 11,000, almost all of them
U.S. Army.90
On 8 February 1962, to deal with the expanding numbers and the growing
complexity of the situation in Vietnam, the United States established the U.S.
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), under the U.S. Army’s
General Paul D. Harkins. General Harkins had served during World War II as
the deputy chief of staff under General George S. Patton, first with the Seventh
Army in Sicily, Italy, and later with the Third Army in Europe. A joint service
subordinate unified command that reported directly to Admiral Felt and the
U.S. Pacific Command, MACV became the headquarters responsible for U.S.
military policy, operations, and assistance in Vietnam, with Harkins as the
primary military adviser to the South Vietnamese government. Because U.S.
leaders intended the new command to be a temporary headquarters lasting
89. “New U.S. Moves in Vietnam Draw Line on Red Expansion” and “2 Army Copters
Down in Vietnam,” Army Times, 17 Feb 1962.
90. Bfg, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, Dep Ch Staff Ops, 15 Jan 1962, sub: Area Brief:
Southeast Asia; Memo, Col. Walter E. Brinker for Ch Staff, 4 May 1962, sub: Monthly
Report, Personnel Support of Vietnam; MFR, Col. Walton O. Threadgill, Ofc Dep Ch Staff
Logistics, 5 Apr 1962, sub: Support Organization, Vietnam; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B,
Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Study, Ofc Ch Mil History,
14 Aug 1964, “Review of U.S. Efforts to Stabilize the Situation in Southeast Asia, 1961–
1964,” Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
only until it could subdue the Communist insurrection, they retained the
MAAG as a separate headquarters.91
The creation of MACV presaged further evolution in the U.S. command
structure in Southeast Asia. President Kennedy soon ordered the activation
of a new headquarters in Thailand—the U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Thailand—and appointed General Harkins as its commander, a role he
would fulfill in addition to his duties as the commander of MACV. By mid-
1962, however, the president had come to view the insurgency in Laos as
beyond the stage where the United States could effectively intervene. In
April, he authorized the secretary of defense to begin withdrawing U.S.
military assistance teams from forward positions there. This action drew
little opposition from Army leaders, who never had invested the same level
of interest in Laos as they had in neighboring Vietnam. Lacking access to
the sea and without any developed airfields, Laos was even less hospitable
than Vietnam for military operations. For the remainder of his presidency,
Kennedy would rely upon diplomatic, rather than military, means to deal
with the situation in Laos.92
For the Army elements in Vietnam, that nation had become a laboratory
in which the service could test and evaluate its evolving doctrine, weapons,
and equipment. In October, the Joint Chiefs and Secretary McNamara
approved the dispatch to Vietnam of a utility tactical transport company
equipped with fifteen new UH–1 helicopters armed with machine guns
and rockets to provide escort for troop-carrying helicopters. In November,
U.S. Army, Pacific, noted that its forces were receiving realistic, on-the-job
training in both hot and cold aspects of counterinsurgency operations. Also
in November, the Office of the Adjutant General published procedures for
administering Army troop tests in Vietnam. The objective of this program,
the guidance stated, would be to evaluate new or improved operational
concepts, doctrine, tactics, training, and procedures related to both U.S.
forces operating in Vietnam and the Vietnamese units they were advising
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964”; Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr., The 25-Year War: America’s Military
Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 11; Interv, Maj. Jacob B. Couch Jr.
with Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Apr 1979, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, MHI. A complete
description of the formation and activities of the U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam, can be found in Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of
Escalation, 1962–1967, The United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 2006).
92. Cosmas, MACV 1962–1967, 39; Memo, McGeorge Bundy for Sec Def, 19 Apr 1962, sub:
Withdrawal of Certain Military Units from Forward Positions in Laos, File Unit: Entry A1
2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars,
340–50.
and training. At the next higher level, the commander in chief of U.S. Pacific
Command informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that his office was prepared
to take maximum advantage of the present conflict in Vietnam toward
increasing U.S. capabilities for that type of warfare. To that end, he endorsed
programs that had begun sending copies of pertinent MAAG training
materials to various Army schools and installations in the United States.
Additionally, he said that the advisory group had sent two senior officers to
Fort Bragg to help establish the curriculum and assist in conducting a four-
week course for battalion-level advisers en route to Vietnam.93
CONCLUSION
By the end of 1962, the Army was well on its way toward recovery from
the deprivations of the New Look and restoration of what it regarded as its
rightful place at the head of the national security establishment. Although
the service stayed true to its commitment to remain on guard in Western
Europe, it also embraced President Kennedy’s vision of counterinsurgency
and unconventional warfare to combat the spread of Communist-inspired
insurrection. While many of the Army’s senior officers enthusiastically
endorsed the change in focus, some, like General Yarborough, openly
questioned the approach. New equipment, techniques, and doctrine
required testing and verification. The president had not yet committed
American combat troops to Vietnam, but Army leaders understood that the
option was no longer off the table. To an increasing extent, active American
participation in the Vietnam War no longer seemed to be a matter of if,
but when.
93. Memo, Col. Robert H. Shell, U.S. Army, Pacific, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 2 Nov
1962, sub: USARPAC Counterinsurgency Summary Number 1; Memo, Maj. Gen. Joe C.
Lambert, Adjutant Gen, for Distribution, 6 Nov 1962, sub: Army Troop Test Program in
Vietnam; Memo, Cdr in Ch, Pacific Cmd, for Joint Chs, 20 Mar 1962, sub: Report on Value
and Means for Taking Maximum Advantage of Present Conflict in South Vietnam Toward
Increasing U.S. Capabilities for this Type of Warfare; all in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series:
SCGC 1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; John J. Tolson, Airmobility, 1961–71
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), 27–30.
11
Entering the Morass
By 1963, the budget battles and flirtation with nuclear weapons and doctrine
that had dominated the service’s concerns during the previous decade had
helped to eliminate the remnants of the World War II force that had entered
the Korean conflict in 1950. The Army was well on its way toward replacing
its pentomic organization with the new, more flexible ROAD configuration,
named after General Herbert B. Powell’s 1961 study, Reorganization Objective
Army Division (1961–1965). Increased funding allowed a modernization
effort, which already had replaced almost all of the vehicles, weapons, and
equipment that had seen service during those earlier wars. To an increasing
extent, Army doctrine was beginning to rely upon new technology, like the
helicopter, that had been in its infancy during World War II and the Korean
War. Most importantly, although many senior officers and noncommissioned
officers who had fought in those earlier conflicts remained on active duty,
the vast majority of the Army’s younger officers and soldiers had never
seen combat.
In 1963, the Army remained significantly engaged in South Korea.
On 30 January 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated,
“The principal U.S. military effort in the Far East is still Korea, where we
maintain two divisions and are helping to support a large Korean military
establishment.”1 General Guy S. Meloy, as the commander in chief of United
Nations Command, retained operational control of the military forces of the
1. Guy S. Meloy, “The Eighth Army Story,” Army Information Digest 18 (Jun 1963): 2–13.
Republic of Korea (ROK). Simultaneously, he served as joint commander of

U.S. Forces, Korea, and commanding general of the Eighth Army. In addition
to the First ROK Army, which had some fourteen divisions to the east, Meloy
had on the western approaches the largest deployed corps in the free world
and one of the largest corps in U.S. history, I Corps (Group). Its combat
forces included the 1st Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions, along with four
ROK divisions, a marine brigade of the ROK VI Corps, and companies from
the two United Nations countries still providing troops to Korea, Thailand,
and Turkey.2
For the Army, though, a new war was on the horizon. The Communist
insurgency that had ejected the French from Vietnam in 1954 never really
had ended. From its inception as a military assistance advisory group
(MAAG) shortly before the French departure, the American presence in
South Vietnam would expand to more than 16,000 soldiers by the end of
1963. Many Americans perceived Vietnam as the place to stop the spread of
communism in the Far East. With skeptics like Matthew B. Ridgway no longer
in a position of influence, many senior Army leaders also looked to Vietnam
as an opportunity both to advance service influence throughout national
defense policy and to experiment with new organizations, equipment, and
doctrine. Consequently, as political developments in the United States and
Vietnam drew the United States deeper into the conflict, few voices in the
Department of the Army questioned the road to war.
MOVING THE ARMY FORWARD
Three years after the end of the Eisenhower administration, the Army had
begun to free itself from the trappings of the New Look. Its new combat
organization laid to rest the service’s obsession with atomic weapons and
warfare. Leaders paid new attention to maintaining its commitment in
Europe and stabilizing the forward-deployed troops there. They also pointed
the service toward preparing for different kinds of combat and responding
to crises in other parts of the world.
Following the activation and initial testing of the two prototype divisions,
the 1st Armored and the 5th Infantry, under the ROAD organization in
1962, the Army moved forward with ROAD’s implementation throughout
the force. With Secretary McNamara’s attention still focused on Berlin, the
divisions in Europe were the next to reorganize. By the end of September 1963,
both the 8th Infantry and 24th Infantry Divisions had not only converted
2. Meloy, “The Eighth Army Story,” 2–13.
ENTERING THE MORASS 435
to ROAD, but also had received the personnel, vehicles, and equipment
required for their transformation to mechanized divisions. The 3d Infantry
Division also would complete its reorganization before the end of the year.
In the United States, both the 2d Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia,
and the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, implemented the
new unit structure by the end of 1963. The service scheduled reorganizations
for the remaining nine divisions in the active force before the end of
September 1964.3
Additionally, during 1962–1963, the Army activated several separate
brigades under the ROAD structure for unique missions not requiring a
division. These included the 171st and 172d Infantry Brigades in Alaska,
the 173d Airborne Brigade in Okinawa, Japan, the 193d Infantry Brigade
in Panama, the 194th Armored Brigade to test new material at Fort Ord,
California, and the 197th Infantry Brigade for school support at Fort
Benning. The service retained the Berlin Brigade, a unique structure formed
in 1961 to continue the occupation of West Berlin.4
Even with the conversion well underway, some senior officers continued
to second guess the new organization. General Bruce C. Clarke, now retired,
continued to press for the adoption of his modern mobile Army brainchild.
He complained to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, his former chief of staff in
Seventh Army and the current commandant of the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that the Army’s
leadership had ignored his views regarding the new organization. General
Clarke particularly expressed his belief, as he had in his modern mobile Army
concept, that the corps echelon had outlived its usefulness. General Johnson
thanked Clarke for his ideas and expressed interest in further discussion. To
other officers, however, Johnson noted that the time for reconsideration on
ROAD had passed and that the Army was moving forward. In Europe, the
commander of U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), General Paul L. Freeman Jr.,
pointed out that the reorganization within the Seventh Army eliminated the
4th Armored Group, merging its assets within the newly reorganized ROAD
divisions. The result, he noted, would reduce the number of line companies
available to the Army commander from 182 to 156. He questioned whether
3. U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” in U.S. Dept. of
Defense, Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 122; “4th Infantry Division Units Renamed in
ROAD,” Army Times, 16 Oct 1963.
1998), 309–12.
the improved mobility and firepower of the ROAD division would offset the
decline in the number of maneuver elements.5
However, the continued excessive spending of American dollars in
Europe threatened any increased stability for the Army. The gold-flow issue
continued to plague U.S. defense policy and the national economy. By the
beginning of 1963, President John F. Kennedy and Secretary McNamara had
begun to consider seriously a reduction in U.S. forces stationed overseas.
McNamara acknowledged that strenuous military efforts had helped to level
off the international balance of payments, but he indicated that that was not
good enough.6
The Army’s attempt to mitigate gold-flow problems by rotating battle-
group-sized formations between the United States and Europe as part of
Rotaplan had not gone well. In a preliminary report issued in January 1963,
the deputy chief of staff for military operations, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker,
noted that all of the disadvantages the Army had foreseen with the program
had come to pass. Savings in expenditures made by dependents nearly
matched the additional costs incurred by the more frequent unit rotations.
Reports from the first unit exchange in October 1962 indicated that high
personnel turbulence and lowered morale because of family separations
remained significant problems. Even with the exchange of like units, some
difference in vehicles and equipment necessitated additional training and
the complicated coordination of ammunition and repair parts turnover.
Given these issues and the overall disruption of unit readiness for both units
involved, General Parker recommended suspending the program.7
The failure of Rotaplan prompted the president and the secretary of
defense to consider more drastic approaches to shoring up the international
balance of payments. In March, Army Chief of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler
5. Ltr, Lt. Gen. John P. Daley, Cdr, U.S. Army Combat Developments Cmd, to Maj. Gen.
Harold K. Johnson, 22 Jan 1963; Ltr, Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson to Gen. Bruce C. Clarke,
31 Jan 1963; Ltr, Gen. (Ret.) Bruce C. Clarke to Maj. Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 5 Feb 1963; all
in Personal Correspondence, Harold K. Johnson Papers, U.S. Army Heritage and Education
Center, Carlisle, PA (hereinafter AHEC); Ltr, Gen. Paul L. Freeman to Gen. Earle G.
Wheeler, Ch Staff, 30 Dec 1962, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: Security Classified General
of Staff (OCS), Record Group (RG) 319: Records of the Army Staff, National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD (hereinafter NACP).
6. MFR, Col. Warren K. Bennett, Ch, Staff Action Control Ofc, 2 Mar 1963, sub: CofS
Guidance on Gold Flow and Related Matters, Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K.
Johnson Papers, AHEC.
7. Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, 3 Jan 1963, sub: Initial
Evaluation Report on ROTAPLAN; Memo, Lt. Gen. Theodore W. Parker for Sec Def,
27 Oct 1962, sub: Suspension of ROTAPLAN; both in File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC
1955–1962, Subgroup: OCS, RG 319, NACP; Monte Bourjaily Jr. “Army Drops Rotaplan,”
Army Times, 14 Aug 1963.
noted that the subject had arisen in conversations with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and President Kennedy. The president was seriously considering a
reduction in U.S. military forces in Europe as a means of reducing the gold-
flow deficit. General Wheeler directed the Army Staff to study the possibility
of pulling one division out of Korea and leaving its equipment behind in a pre-
positioned mode. He also asserted that the Army had too many headquarters
in Europe and recommended that the service eliminate at least one. He
asked General Freeman to prepare a plan for shutting down Seventh Army
headquarters. General Johnson, at this time serving as the assistant deputy
chief of staff for military operations, suggested inactivating the V and VII
Corps headquarters instead. The deputy chief of staff for logistics, Lt. Gen.
Robert W. Colglazier, recommended that Wheeler also consider closing
portions of the Communications Zone and USAREUR headquarters.
Wheeler directed the staff to begin all of the appropriate studies at once,
concluding that it would be better for the Army’s leaders to make the decision
rather than have the president and Secretary McNamara make it for them.8
In addition to considering reducing overseas deployments, McNamara
told service leaders to place more emphasis on strategic mobility exercises
as a means of returning withdrawn units in the event of a crisis. In June,
he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin work on a major deployment
exercise, either to Europe or to Korea, within the next few months. He also
asked the chiefs to consider incorporating the mobility tests into upcoming
maneuvers, such as the Exercise Swift Strike III event scheduled for later
that year.9
For several years, Army leaders had been considering a strategic mobility
exercise testing their ability to deploy an entire division to Europe, where
it would use the vehicles and heavy equipment pre-positioned there. In
response to prodding from the secretary of defense, the Army submitted to
the Joint Chiefs an outline for such an exercise. Although Wheeler suggested
that the 4th Infantry Division might be a candidate for the operation, he
concluded that a movement of the 2d Armored Division would be in the
best interests of the Army.10
Operation Big Lift began on 21 October when 200 Air Force transport
planes airlifted 14,500 Army troops of the 2d Armored Division, with some
supporting elements, from airfields in Texas to Germany. There, the soldiers
8. MFR, Col. Warren K. Bennett, Ch, Staff Action Control Ofc, 5 Mar 1963, sub: CofS
Guidance on Gold Flow and Related Matters, Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K.
9. Msg, General Barksdale Hamlett to Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, 22 Jun 1963, Official
Correspondence 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.
10. Msg, Hamlett to Wheeler, 22 Jun 1963.
As part of Operation Big Lift, soldiers of the 502d Military Police

Company of the 2d Armored Division from Fort Hood, Texas,
disembark from a C–124 in Frankfurt, Germany. (U.S. Army, National
moved to storage facilities along the French–West German border, where

they received and put into operation the tanks, trucks, and heavy equipment
that the Army had been storing to equip units sent to Europe to reinforce
the Seventh Army. In many ways, the exercise mirrored the Long Thrust
exercise, which had taken place a year earlier, but this time, the maneuver
involved a complete armored division.11
Once deployed, the 2d Armored Division troops joined elements from
the 3d Armored Division, the 8th Infantry Division, and the 3d Armored
Cavalry Regiment for a two-week field-training exercise. The drill concluded
on 5 November, and critiques and after action reviews took place the
following two days. Most soldiers of the 2d Armored Division returned
to the United States before Thanksgiving, with a few remaining behind to
return the pre-positioned equipment to storage sites and to perform required
maintenance checks.12
11. Bob Horowitz, “2d Armored ‘Big Lifts’ to Europe FTX Site,” Army Times, 23 Oct 1963;
Bob Horowitz, “Big Lift Has Lots of Zip,” Army Times, 30 Oct 1963.
12. Horowitz, “Big Lift Has Lots of Zip”; Bob Horowitz, “Big Lift Exceeds Hopes,” Army
Times, 6 Nov 1963.
Pre-positioned tanks and ammunition await the arrival of the 2d

Armored Division for Operation Big Lift near Spesbach, Germany.
On its surface, the exercise seemed to be a great success. Many Pentagon

officials expressed satisfaction that the services had demonstrated the
ability to reinforce units in Europe rapidly and efficiently. The Air Force had
delivered the entire division to Germany in less than three days and boasted
that they could probably do it again in a day and a half. Army officials
praised the condition of the pre-positioned equipment, reporting fewer
serious maintenance problems than they normally experienced during
similar stateside maneuvers. Army leaders praised the morale of the soldiers
participating in the exercise, expressing their belief that reenlistment rates
would go up as a result of the excellent training.13
Other senior officials, however, expressed some reservations about the
implications of the maneuver. It would be unlikely, they said, for European
airfields to remain clear once any hostilities had begun. They also pointed
out that the pre-positioned equipment, although only in place for a few years,
was already dated. The Army had not yet replaced the equipment originally
positioned there with newer models of tanks and armored personnel
carriers. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, by then serving as Supreme Allied
13. Bob Horowitz, “Big Lift Men Win Plaudits,” Army Times, 18 Nov 1963.
Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard (U.S. Army, National Archives Still

Picture Branch)
Commander in Europe, noted that as successful as it was, the maneuver was
no substitute for a strong and well-armed frontline defense.14
Despite the attention that it received, Big Lift was not the Army’s most
consequential training event in 1963. In March, General Wheeler announced
the formation of a provisional division, the 11th Air Assault, at Fort Benning
to test airmobility and air assault concepts that had emerged during the
Howze Board studies. The division had an initial cadre of 291 officers, 187
warrant officers, and 3,114 enlisted soldiers, and it employed equipment
and aircraft the Army had stripped from units across the country. Wheeler
instructed the newly designated division commander, Maj. Gen. Harry
W. O. Kinnard, to “find out how far and fast the Army can go, and should
go, in the direction of airmobility.”15 The chief of staff further indicated his
intent to request congressional authorization for a seventeenth division if
the experiment proved to be worthwhile. Secretary McNamara voiced his
support for the testing and said that he was convinced that these new types
of units would significantly increase the Army’s capabilities.16
14. Horowitz, “Big Lift Men Win Plaudits.”

15. “New Air Assault Mission Defined,” Army Times, 16 Feb 1963.
16. “First Air Assault Division Units Arriving at Benning,” Army Times, 27 Mar 1963; “New
Air Assault Mission Defined”; J. A. Stockfisch, The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat
Developments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994).
Early in 1963, the U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC) laid out
the tables of organization and equipment for a ROAD-type air assault division.
In theory, the organization would include three task force headquarters,
eight infantry battalions, an air cavalry squadron, a division artillery, and
an aviation group. The latter would include maintenance, surveillance, and
assault support battalions, as well as sufficient assault helicopter battalions to
lift one third of the division’s infantry at one time. As proposed by the Howze
Board, the Army also activated the 10th Air Transport Brigade, not organic
to the division but providing direct support to transport troops, equipment,
and supplies on the battlefield. Throughout the early testing period, the
Army never completely filled out the division organization, limiting most
tests to company, battalion, and brigade-sized maneuvers (Chart 13).17
The service conducted additional tests related to the air assault division
at other locations. In April, the Army announced the activation of the 1st
Aerial Artillery Battery (Provisional) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The test battery
consisted of a headquarters element and three platoons of four helicopters
each. The CH–34 Choctaw helicopters carried 4.5-inch rocket pods on
both sides of the aircraft. The Field Artillery School at Fort Sill formed an
aerial artillery test and evaluation committee to oversee the training and
evaluation of the new battery.18
Even before the most strenuous portions of the testing of the air assault
concept had started, support began to build within the service for full
integration of the concept into the force structure. General Johnson, the
deputy chief of staff for military operations, cautioned that even though the
concept had much promise, it required more complete and comprehensive
testing. However, many of the helicopters that would turn the concept into
a viable doctrine were still under development. The Army required faster
and better-armed platforms to increase the speed of maneuver and provide
overwatch for the ground force. The service would need more time, Johnson
concluded, to convince skeptics that the air assault division could continue
fighting despite the losses it would absorb in personnel and equipment.19
By the end of the year, discussions throughout the Army Staff regarding
the integration of an air assault organization into the force structure had
begun in earnest. General Johnson thought that the Army’s sixteen-division
force structure could not support three special purpose divisions. Instead, he
17. “New Air Assault Mission Defined”; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 314–16.
18. “Aerial Artillery Battery Organized,” Army Times, 17 Apr 1963; “Air Artillery Activated,”
Army Times, 3 May 1963.
19. Memo, Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson for Director Ops, 22 Nov 1963, sub: Air Assault
Division; Memo, Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson for Ch Staff, 11 Nov 1963, sub: Air Assault
Division; both in Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.
Chart 13—Howze Board—Air Assault Division, 1963
AIR ASSAULT
DIVISION
AIR CAV INF BN TASK FORCE

BN HQ
DIV DIV
ARTY AVN
LITTLE JOHN SURVEILLANCE ASSAULT

BN ATTACK BN SPT BN
AERIAL ROCKET ASSAULT MAINT

BN HELICOPTER BN SPT BN
HOW
BN (105-mm.)
suggested two alternatives for integrating an air assault organization into the
force. The first was to substitute an air assault division for an existing infantry
division. It made sense, he offered, to replace the 2d Infantry Division,
because a substantial part of that unit already had been incorporated into
the 11th Air Assault Division to test the concept. A second alternative was
to substitute an air assault brigade for an existing brigade within an airborne
division. He could not support replacing a complete airborne division
because that would require throwing away an existing unit with a high state
of readiness and replacing it with one requiring substantial training and
reequipping to reach similar levels of readiness.20
As the testing of the air assault concept continued, most of the scenarios
committed the unit to a mid-intensity conflict. Although the Howze Board
had based its study and recommendations on a conventional conflict in
Europe, the report had included a section on counterinsurgency operations.
Most of the senior officers involved in the testing claimed to have given little
thought to the use of an air assault division in Vietnam. If anything, many
believed that it might be too ponderous for such an environment. More
than one observer noted, however, that many of the tactics and techniques
involved in the air assault tests were being employed already by helicopter
units in Vietnam.21
Even as the testing of the airmobility and air assault concepts went on,
the rest of the service continued its own training, in many cases attempting
to integrate aspects of counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare into its more
traditional operational doctrine. Many of these efforts came together in
Exercise Swift Strike III, which the Army conducted across an expanded
maneuver area of approximately 6 million acres in North and South Carolina
from 21 July to 16 August. General Paul D. Adams, the commander in
chief of U.S. Strike Command, served as the director for a maneuver that
pitted the 2d and 5th Infantry Divisions against the 82d and 101st Airborne
Divisions. The U.S. 9th and 12th Air Forces provided tactical air support and
air transport for each side. Units from the Army’s Special Warfare Center,
controlled by Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough, acted as guerrilla forces
supporting the airborne divisions.22
20. Memo, Johnson for Ch Staff, 11 Nov 1963, sub: Air Assault Division.
21. Interv, Col. Ralph J. Powell and Lt. Col. Phillip E. Courts with Lt. Gen. Robert R.
Williams, 29 Mar 1978, Senior Ofcr Debriefing Program, U.S. Army Military History
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; Monte Bourjaily Jr., “Too Hasty on Air Assault,” Army
Times, 9 Feb 1963.
22. Jean R. Moenk, A History of Large Scale Maneuvers in the United States, 1935–1964
(Fort Monroe, VA: Continental Army Command, 1969), 292–93; “Swift Strike III,” Army
Information Digest 18 (Dec 1963): 5–7; “75,000 Set for Swift Strike; Air Battle to Begin
July 21,” Army Times, 16 Jul 1963.
A wave of paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division drop behind

“enemy” lines to capture Red Team territory in Exercise Swift Strike
III. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
The massive maneuver was unique in several respects. It marked the

first time since Operation Market Garden during World War II that the
82d and 101st Airborne Divisions had worked together as a team. It was
also the first time since World War II that a complete airborne corps had
operated against a comparable ground force of straight infantry. Because
the 5th Infantry Division had only just completed its ROAD conversion, the
exercise was also an opportunity to test the new divisional structure. The
Military Air Transport Service had transported the division to the test site.
As a result, the division had left behind its organic tank elements, its heavy
engineer construction equipment, and its heavy artillery. Nonetheless, the
test validated the building block concept of the new organization, allowing
the commander to tailor available components of the division to best
accomplish its assigned missions.23
Although Swift Strike III accomplished most of its anticipated training
objectives, its exorbitant costs once again raised questions regarding
the value provided by large-scale maneuvers. The price tag of more than
U.S. Army helicopters take off from Butts Army Airfield, Fort Carson,
Colorado, to participate in Exercise Swift Strike III. (U.S. Army,
$11.5 million was double that of the previous year’s Swift Strike II. Reviews
of the exercise concluded that the Army was receiving a poor return for its
training dollars and that smaller unit training and command post exercises
would provide results equivalent to or better than the larger exercises.24
A NEW LOOK FOR THE ARMY
Perhaps the most obvious aspect of the Army’s transition in the ten years
since the Korean War armistice was its physical appearance. Although the
service’s fascination with rockets, missiles, and atomic weapons had begun
to wane, many of the byproducts of that interest remained in the Army
inventory. More apparent, however, was the evolution of the vehicles,
artillery, heavy weapons, and small arms borne by the soldiers. By 1963, the
Army had replaced almost all of the standard-issue items of World War II
and the Korean War with more modern gear.
24. Moenk, History of Large Scale Maneuvers, 308.
At the forefront of this evolution was the helicopter. Although the test of
the air assault division concept continued throughout the year, the service
already had embraced the helicopter as an integral part of its organization
and doctrine. Each new ROAD division contained a total of 103 organic
aircraft, approximately twice the number in pentomic divisions. This included
one full aviation battalion along with an air troop in the reconnaissance
squadron. During fiscal year 1963, the number of U.S. Army aircraft rose
from 5,700 to 6,000, almost entirely from the addition of helicopters. This
rise foreshadowed further helicopter additions that would be prompted
by the recommendations of the Howze Board. Already, helicopter units
were proving their worth in a variety of roles in Vietnam. Throughout the
Army, both the Bell UH–1 Iroquois and the Boeing CH–47 Chinook had
performed well during the early stages of their deployment.25
Vehicles and equipment on the ground also had evolved. By 1963, the
Army had equipped all of its active duty armored units with the M60 tank.
A second generation, designated the M60A1, with increased frontal armor,
an improved electronics package, and a larger basic load of main gun
ammunition was in production. As an improved version of the M48 Patton
tank, the M60 was not an original design, but it was a far cry from the M4
Sherman tank that the service had fielded throughout World War II and into
the Korea conflict.
In place of the World War II half-tracks that had carried infantry into
battle, the modern Army now employed the M113 armored personnel
carrier. The new vehicle, a lighter version of the M59 and M75 carriers
developed during the late 1950s, had begun entering the Army inventory
in 1960. Of all the Army’s primary vehicles, only two were recognizable to
old-timers—the venerable “Deuce and a Half ” M35 2½-ton truck and the
M151 ¼-ton jeep. Both were relatively new variants on traditional models
from World War II.
Another significant transition was occurring in the field artillery. Many
division artilleries still featured towed versions of the 105-mm. and 155-
mm. howitzers that had served the Army since World War II. The move
toward mechanization of many of the infantry divisions, however, supported
a complementary shift to tracked artillery weapons. The transition began
with heavier weapons, as the M110 self-propelled 8-inch howitzer and
the M107 175-mm. self-propelled gun entered the Army inventory in
1963. Limited numbers of the M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer
also reached Army units in Germany near the end of the year. Some of the
1963, 126; Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 299.
corps artillery battalions in Europe still fielded the Sergeant missile and
Honest John rockets, but newer replacements for those weapons were also
under development.26
Ironically, the new artillery sounded the death knell for the weapon that
had come to symbolize the Army of the early 1960s, the Davy Crockett
atomic projectile. Assigned to infantry battalions and reconnaissance
squadrons, the weapon never had been particularly popular. Its short range
exposed the firing crew to the blast and fallout effects of the explosion,
and its deployment on the front line made atomic release procedures and
command and control difficult. As the Army developed atomic projectiles
for its 155-mm. and 8-inch artillery pieces, the controversial Davy Crockett
became expendable.27
In 1963, the basic weapon of the American infantry, the rifle, had become
a raging point of contention. The Army had adopted the M14 as its standard-
issue rifle in 1957, but the decision did not put to rest the many criticisms
that weapon had engendered. Although it was sturdy and reliable, critics
countered that it was simply an improved version of the M1 Garand that the
Army had used in World War II and the Korean War. The M14 was heavy
and required a bipod to deliver accurate automatic fire. It also had a rather
dubious production record. Cost overruns had caused Senator Margaret
Chase Smith to ask, in 1961, why it took the Army more time to produce
a rifle than the Air Force needed to develop and deploy the B–52 bomber.28
Secretary McNamara directed the Army to assess the overall effectiveness
of the M14, the AK47, and the AR15, a more lightweight competitor
produced by Armalite, a division of the Fairchild Engine and Airplane
Corporation. Tests conducted throughout the Army, but particularly by
Combat Developments Command and Army Materiel Command, rated the
M14 most acceptable for general use. Civilian officials, however, questioned
the Army’s objectivity in the effort. An investigation by the service’s inspector
general documented a significant bias on the part of many testers within
the Army Materiel Command. As a rifle, the M14 was best suited for the
service’s traditional regard for long-range, single-shot marksmanship, and
many Army ordnance personnel favored the heavier weapon for its accuracy
at extended ranges. However, further investigation revealed that many of the
Army’s officers preferred the lighter weight of the AR15. The smaller caliber
26. “Big Guns Boom at Fort Sill,” Army Times, 22 May 1963; “New Howitzer Coming,” Army
Times, 9 Oct 1963.
27. Donald A. Carter, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, U.S. Army
in the Cold War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2015), 342, 349.
28. Walter S. Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960–1968 (Washington, DC: Historical
Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 133–35.
Sp4c. Harry L. White of the 82d Airborne Division’s military police

takes position with a new M16 rifle at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
ammunition made the AR15 much easier to control when employed in a

fully automatic mode and lightened the load of infantry soldiers. General
Wheeler and Army Secretary Cyrus R. Vance made a provisional decision to
procure AR15s for airborne, air assault, and special forces, but to retain the
M14 with its standard NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) caliber
for Army troops in Europe.29
By the end of the year, McNamara had grown tired of the Army’s
procrastination. He wanted to establish one rifle as the standard for all
the military services. Finally, after agreeing to a series of improvements to
make the AR15 more reliable in damp and cold climates, the Department of
Defense awarded a contract to Colt Firearms Company for 85,000 rifles—
now designated the M16—for the Army and Marine Corps and an additional
19,000 for the Air Force. Although some within the Army continued their
support for the M14, McNamara’s decision ensured that Army would
adopt the M16 as its primary infantry weapon in Vietnam. Despite further
29. Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response, 136–39; Thomas L. McNaugher, The M16
Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition (New York: Praeger, 1984),
88–105. For further information on the controversy, see Edward C. Ezell, The Great Rifle
Controversy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1984).
An infantry soldier prepares to fire a light antitank weapon (LAW)

during training at the U.S. Army Infantry Center. (U.S. Army, National
modifications, the redesignated M16A1 remained controversial throughout

its service.30
The Army had fielded other infantry weapons as standard-issue since the
end of the Korean War. Chinese mass wave attacks in Korea had prompted
several nations to develop antipersonnel mines to help protect infantry
positions. During the early 1960s, the U.S. Army deployed the M18 Claymore
antipersonnel mine. Once emplaced, the device could be detonated remotely
by defending troops and was labeled conveniently to ensure that a soldier
aimed the proper side toward the enemy. The M79 grenade launcher also
had entered the inventory during the early 1960s. Resembling a sawed-off
shotgun, the launcher allowed soldiers to project explosive grenades farther
than they could throw them. In 1963, the Army was well underway in its
development of a light antitank weapon (LAW) to supplement the larger,
heavier recoilless rifles. The M72 LAW weighed less than five pounds and
had proved promising against most types of armored vehicles.31
Perhaps the clearest sign of the Army’s reorientation under the Kennedy
administration was the fate of its Nike Zeus antimissile missile system.
30. Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response, 140.

31. “Every Soldier a Tank-Killer,” Army Information Digest 18 (Jun 1963): 23.
A soldier from the U.S. Army Ordnance Corps demonstrates the

new 40-mm. grenade launcher, a larger weapon to supplement the
infantry’s handgun arsenal by filling the gap in range between the
hand grenade and the mortar. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still
Picture Branch)
Throughout the Eisenhower years, the Army had pointed to that project as
a symbol of its forward thinking and consistently had received funding to
continue research and development on it. The new president, however, had
grown skeptical of the antimissile concept and had become less willing to
continue funding without quantifiable results. In 1963, the Army announced
a reorientation of the project toward a new and improved version of the
weapon dubbed Nike X. Although testing continued, many of the project’s
supporters had begun to lose interest in continued Army participation in
long-range strategic air defense.32
Finally, the look of the soldiers had changed since the end of the war
in Korea. During the 1950s, the Army had replaced the familiar olive drab
uniform (which was really a medium shade of brown) with a new, olive-
green utility uniform known as fatigues. Also gone were the brown boots
and gaiters familiar to World War II infantry. By the mid-1960s, troops wore
a standard-issue, full-laced, black leather boot. Airborne and special forces
1963, 160.
soldiers often wore specially designed jump boots, which had reinforced
seams and slightly higher tops. Although the design of the combat helmet
had changed little since World War II, the Ridgway-model utility cap, with
its stiffly molded sides, had given way, in 1963, to the hot weather field
cap, which closely resembled an olive-green baseball cap. Uniforms and
equipment would undergo even more dramatic changes once the Army
began its deeper involvement in Vietnam.33
REFLECTING SOCIAL CHANGE
History remembers the 1960s as a period of dramatic social upheaval in the

United States. In several ways, the United States Army played a vital role
in provoking that unrest during its prolonged participation in the Vietnam
War. However, it also recognized the need for change and acted as an early
agent of those advancements. As the decade began, the military moved
ahead of society by promoting racial integration as well as improving some
opportunities for women. Also, the Department of Defense and the Army
had learned important lessons during the mobilization of reserve forces for
the Berlin Crisis of 1961. As a result, the relationship between the active
and reserve components faced impending changes. Finally, even as the war
in Vietnam was beginning to heat up, several military and political leaders
questioned both the efficiency of the draft in providing a source of military
personnel and also the equity of a system that seemed to draw unevenly
from the nation’s minorities.
In June 1962, President Kennedy had announced the formation of the
Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, popularly referred
to as the Gesell Committee after its chair, Gerhard A. Gesell, a Washington,
D.C., attorney who had served as assistant general counsel for the Democrats
during the Pearl Harbor hearings. Although announced by Kennedy, the
committee was primarily the brainchild of Secretary McNamara, who desired
more detailed information regarding the treatment of racial minorities in
the military. McNamara remained aloof from the investigation to avoid
influencing its findings, but his special assistant, Adam Yarmolinsky, was
instrumental in guiding the committee through its investigation. Gesell
33. General information on the changes in the U.S. Army uniforms during this period can
be found in Antonio Arques, Grunt: A Pictorial Report on the US Infantry’s Gear and Life
During the Vietnam War, 1965–1975 (Madrid: Andrea Press, 2014); Martin Windrow and
Gerry Embleton, Military Dress of North America, 1665–1970 (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1973); and John R. Elting and Michael McAfee, eds., Military Uniforms in America,
vol. 4, The Modern Era: From 1868 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988).
acknowledged Yarmolinsky’s influence, noting that it was clear the defense

aide was most interested in investigating off-base discrimination against
minorities and wanted the committee to advance a solution.34
The committee delivered an initial report to the White House on 13 June
1963. It concluded from its investigations that serious discrimination against
Black service members and their families existed, both in the United States
and overseas. It noted the disproportionately small number of Black officers
and noncommissioned officers among the ranks. Gesell himself called the
dearth of Black officers a “shocking condition” and expressed concern over
the absence of Black officers on promotion boards.35 Additionally, Black
enlisted soldiers were overrepresented in certain supply and food service
specialties. Most significant, however, were the committee’s observations
regarding conditions encountered by Black service members when they were
off the military bases. The report found service efforts to relieve segregated
housing, schooling, and public accommodations in local communities
insufficient and ineffective.36
In response to the recommendations of the Gesell Committee, Secretary
McNamara on 26 July published a directive outlining new measures his
department would take toward combatting racial discrimination. The
secretary’s order established the new deputy assistant secretary of defense
(civil rights) to handle race problems in the military. He also delegated to
the service secretaries the authority to declare “off limits” those off-base
businesses and establishments that discriminated against Black soldiers.
Although it was not supported specifically in the directive, McNamara
reserved the right to consider closing military facilities near communities
that continued to practice discrimination.37
Public response to the directive was predictably mixed. Many critics
complained that the secretary was assuming dictatorial powers and
attempting to reinstate to communities in the South what they characterized
as nonproductive policies of post–Civil War Reconstruction. Less strident
analysts questioned the legal standing of McNamara’s implied threats. In
Congress, Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee, introduced a bill making it a court-martial offense for
unit or post commanders to place off-post establishments off limits for racial
35. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 341.
36. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 338–41.
37. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 348–49; Bob Schweitz, “Services Get Off-
Limit Right,” Army Times, 7 Aug 1963.
discrimination. McNamara also had to acknowledge that the order did not
apply to national guard units while they remained under state control.38
In the wake of McNamara’s announcement, the Army initiated its own
changes. The service established its own Equal Rights section as a separate
contingent reporting to the deputy chief of staff for personnel, Lt. Gen.
James L. Richardson Jr. The new section had as its areas of interest civil
rights, racial policies, personnel surveys, and legislative matters of interest.
The Army Materiel Command also established the Office of the Special
Assistant for Intergroup Relations to investigate and enforce fair employment
practices in contract work.39
Some on the Army Staff wondered, however, if the service was moving
too fast in its pursuit of civil rights. As the debate over the implications of
McNamara’s directive continued for the remainder of the year, the Army
took another look at the impact of discrimination within the ranks. It
acknowledged that, intuitively, discrimination appeared to have a harmful
effect on the morale of Black soldiers, but it remained difficult to find a
reliable and valid means of measuring that effect. One study suggested that
the very act of collecting data to measure levels of discrimination would be
discriminating in and of itself. It concluded that even though “the goal of
equality of treatment and opportunity is meritorious, the Army must not
be pressured into overzealous means of attaining it.”40 The Army must live
and work in a real-world environment. It had devoted considerable effort to
developing the best possible relations with the local communities in which
it served. Aggressive actions on the part of local commanders could threaten
the whole structure of established relationships. “In short, excessive efforts
to achieve an unquestionably lofty goal could be interpreted as unwarranted
and unwanted pressures for the benefit of a minority.”41
At the same time, Army units deployed to various locations during
periods of civil disturbance brought on by racial tensions. In the summer
of 1963, the Army sent troops to Birmingham, Alabama, and Washington,
D.C., to maintain order during demonstrations in those cities. As it had
in previous years in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Oxford, Mississippi, the
presence of the soldiers helped to relieve tensions during a time when rising
emotions could have led to violence. Although some in the South resented
38. Tom Wuriu, “Vinson Asks Trial of CO’s in Racial Off-Limits Cases,” Army Times, 25 Sep
1963; “Race Order Clarified by Pentagon,” Army Times, 2 Oct 1963.
39. “Equal Rights Section Established by Army,” Army Times, 18 Sep 1963.
40. Memo, Col. James I. Muir Jr., Acting Director of Strategic Plans and Policies, Ofc Dep
Ch Staff Ops, for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 26 Aug 1963, sub: Impact of Discrimination on Military
Effectiveness, Official Correspondence 1963, Harold K. Johnson Papers, AHEC.
41. Memo, Muir for Dep Ch Staff Ops, 26 Aug 1963, sub: Impact of Discrimination on
Military Effectiveness.
federal intrusion into what they regarded as a local affair, for the most part
the public continued to view the military as a neutral intermediary. It would
not be until later in the Vietnam War that violent events—both antiwar
and civil rights demonstrations—would shift public opinion to a more
antimilitary stance.42
The social dynamics of the period also focused attention on the role of
women in the armed forces. By many accounts, the Army had made substantial
progress in this area. Between January 1957 and July 1962, the strength of
the Women’s Army Corps had risen from 8,300 to 11,100. The Berlin Crisis
of 1961—and, to a lesser extent, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963—had
inspired increased enlistments of women. To generate further interest in
military careers for women, newly appointed director of the Women’s Army
Corps, Col. Emily C. Gorman, allowed the corps to participate in a series of
public relations programs about the service coordinated by the Army’s chief
of information. These mobile exhibits highlighted the service of women
in the Army and the variety of jobs they performed. Colonel Gorman also
made it a priority of her administration to improve housing conditions for
female soldiers, particularly by providing increased privacy and security for
women living in Army barracks.43
Reserve mobilizations in response to the construction of the Berlin
Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis had indicated to Army leaders a need
to realign the reserve structure as a base for rapid mobilization in an
emergency. After the Army had agreed to convert national guard divisions
to the ROAD organization, it received state-level support for the elimination
of nearly 1,850 company- or detachment-sized units, with the activation of
approximately 1,000 new ones. These actions left the National Guard with
a drill strength of 400,000 while the Army Reserve retained 300,000. The
reorganization eliminated four divisions each from the National Guard and
the Army Reserve, replacing them with separate brigades. The service also
revised the nomenclature referring to mobilization status. It designated those
units needed most quickly for reinforcement of active units as the Immediate
Reserve and it identified those of a lower priority as the Reinforcing Reserve.
Both national guard and reserve organizations tried to channel personnel
42. Paul J. Scheips, The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945–1992,
Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2012),
145–57.
43. Bettie J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 1945–1978, Army Historical Series
into the higher priority units so that those units most likely to deploy would
be less likely to require large numbers of filler personnel.44
On 2 January 1963, the Army created the Office of Reserve Components,
bringing the responsibility for policy, direction, and control over the Army
Reserve and the National Guard under a single three-star officer. This
eliminated the situation in which the chief of the National Guard Bureau was
essentially independent while the chief of the Army Reserve was a relatively
minor official on the Army Staff. In February, the Army also transferred
the ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps) program to the Office of
Reserve Components.45
By 1963, the manner in which the Army obtained its soldiers was
beginning to attract attention. The military draft, reinstated to support the
Cold War armed forces by President Harry S. Truman in 1948, remained in
effect. As requirements for military personnel declined, so did draft calls.
At the same time, an increasing number of draft-eligible males received
deferments for educational or occupational priorities. In 1962, President
Kennedy had extended draft deferments to married men, even those who
were not fathers. In the words of one critic, selective service had become
more about deferring than drafting. The generous level of deferments began
to raise politically sensitive questions regarding the pool of individuals left
eligible for selection, most of whom were poor or minorities. In November
1963, even as American involvement in Vietnam began to loom larger, the
director of selective service, General Lewis B. Hershey, answered questions
before Congress, where interest was growing to study the feasibility of
abolishing the draft in favor of an all-volunteer force. General Hershey
maintained that an all-volunteer force would never work as long as the
military needed more than one million personnel.46
Finally, in the spirit of the 1960s, Army leaders began to notice some
pushback on perceived levels of overmanagement and oversupervision by
senior leaders and staffs within the Army. To a great extent, junior officers
and noncommissioned officers had begun to chafe under the zero-defects
and checklist-oriented leadership philosophies that had been personified
44. Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United
States Army Reserve, 1908–1983 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve,
1984), 160–61; Memo, Sec General Staff for Gen. Barksdale Hamlett, 9 Jan 1963, sub: ROAD
Reorganization of Reserve Components, File Unit: Entry A1 2-B, Series: SCGC 1955–1962,
45. Memo, Sec General Staff for Hamlett, 9 Jan 1963, sub: ROAD Reorganization of Reserve
Components; U.S. Dept. of the Army, “Annual Report of the Secretary of the Army,” 1 Jul
1962–30 Jun 1963, 120.
46. Bernard Rostker, I Want You!: The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 3, 28.
by the former USAREUR and CONARC commander, General Clarke. In

October 1963, General Johnson, and Vice Chief of Staff General Barksdale
Hamlett Jr. warned members of the Army Staff and senior commanders that
excessive management and supervision were hampering the development of
junior leaders throughout the Army. Johnson suggested a series of formal
staff visits to investigate the seriousness of the problem and to assist in the
development of a solution.47
DEEPER INTO VIETNAM
By the end of 1962, the Army measured its success in Vietnam by what it
termed “certain indicators,” none of which, it said, were precise or wholly
trustworthy.48 The South Vietnamese government claimed control of
51 percent of the people, and its armed forces had launched more than 5,314
operations, of which 900 were battalion-sized or larger. During the second
half of 1962, Viet Cong insurgents had suffered roughly four times the usual
number of casualties, and the general trend of their attacks had decreased
from 118 per week to 92. Some U.S. observers noted with concern, however,
that only a very small percentage of South Vietnamese military operations
actually made contact with the enemy, and that as many as 40 percent of the
Viet Cong reported killed were not Viet Cong at all. Moreover, the hardcore
Viet Cong seemed to maintain their strength of almost 25,000 despite their
reported losses.49
Nonetheless, the Army’s chief of staff, General Wheeler, was optimistic
when he reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding an investigative visit
he had made to Vietnam during January 1963. He noted that the number
of U.S. advisers serving with the Vietnamese military had risen from 900
to more than 3,000 during the previous year. More than 400 of those were
serving at the battalion level or lower. Also, nearly 300 U.S. military aircraft
had deployed to Vietnam, including 148 transport helicopters, 11 armed
helicopters, 81 fixed-wing transport aircraft, 13 fighter-bombers, 9 light
bombers, and 4 reconnaissance aircraft. The Army had developed an austere
but effective logistic base in South Vietnam and installed an electronic
47. Memo, Lt. Gen. Harold K. Johnson for Vice Ch Staff, 3 Oct 1963, sub: Overmanagement
and Overcontrol of Subordinate Commands, Official Correspondence, 1963, Harold K.
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964,” Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History
(CMH), Washington, DC.
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1964.”
President Ngô Đình Diêm of South Vietnam arrives for the beginning
of the National Day parade in Saigon. (U.S. Army, National Archives
detection system capable of locating and following Viet Cong radio

transmitters. The “first team” he concluded, was in the game in Vietnam.50
General Wheeler noted several encouraging developments. First, the
South Vietnamese had completed more than 4,000 strategic hamlets and
had brought an additional 500,000 people under government control.
Additionally, more than 145,000 Montagnards had left their homelands
in the hills to seek training and government support. They could be
particularly helpful in the government’s efforts to gain and hold the plateau
and mountain areas that controlled much of the South Vietnamese border.
Wheeler described a positive relationship between the key leaders in South
Vietnam and General Paul D. Harkins, the commander of the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam.51
Wheeler decried the mutual distrust and dislike that had arisen between
the Diệm government and the foreign press, particularly American
50. Rpt, Investigative Team Headed by Ch Staff (Wheeler) to Joint Chs Staff, Jan 1963, sub:
JCS Team Report on South Vietnam, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
(hereinafter cited as FRUS 1961–1963), vol. 3, Vietnam, January–August 1963 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 71–95.
JCS Team Report on South Vietnam.
journalists. Reporters had accused the regime of being unduly secretive,

issuing deliberately false news bulletins, and attempting to use the press
as involuntary propaganda tools. The Vietnamese government accused
the press of reporting only the failures of its policies and armed forces and
never their successes. Trần Lệ Xuân, commonly known as Madame Nhu,
the wife of President Diệm’s brother and principal adviser, led a campaign
of resentment against the U.S. press. General Wheeler noted that, although
the truth of the charges and countercharges certainly lay somewhere in
the middle, the unfavorable press reports had undoubtedly influenced
U.S. public and congressional opinion toward thinking that the war effort
was misguided.52
The Army chief of staff ’s conclusions were mixed. He noted that, in
the space of the previous year, the situation in Vietnam had turned from
desperation to a position where victory was now a hopeful prospect.
American involvement, he recommended, should fall somewhere between
complete disengagement and the overt commitment of U.S. forces with
the United States directing the war effort. The current support effort, he
concluded, was adequate and sustainable and fell within this spectrum.
Wheeler objected, however, to the near invulnerability of Hồ Chí Minh and
the opposing forces in North Vietnam. He recommended a full spectrum
of actions, including covert operations and open attacks by U.S. air forces,
against targets in North Vietnam. It would be necessary to make North
Vietnam bleed, he said, before it would end the insurgency.53
Many administration officials did not share the general’s optimism. Some
of the president’s advisers had grown wary of what they considered to be the
military’s overly positive reports. When Michael V. Forrestal, an assistant to
National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, arranged the meeting between
Kennedy and General Wheeler, he apologized to the president for wasting
his time. Many on the presidential staff leaned more toward an estimate by
the Central Intelligence Agency describing the situation in Vietnam as a
“slowly escalating stalemate.”54 Victory, although still possible, would take
longer than previously predicted.
Other military officials had begun to show skepticism toward the
multiplicity of testing agencies the Army employed to evaluate equipment
and doctrinal concepts in Vietnam. The commander in chief of the U.S.
Oxford University Press, 2000), 358.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. York (left), Lt. Col. John P. Vann (center), and
Capt. William R. Johnston during an inspection tour of the South
Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division area near Duc Hoa (U.S. Army,
Pacific Command, Admiral Harry D. Felt, told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the
Army’s desire to use South Vietnam as a test bed was hampering the primary
objective of advising the South Vietnamese government and assisting them
in winning the war. The Combat Development Test Center and the Advanced
Research Projects Agency alone had some fifty projects underway, including
the chemical defoliation of suspected Viet Cong hideouts, the employment
of patrol dogs and ground surveillance radar, and the use of special grenades
to splash fluorescent paint on guerrillas during engagements. Admiral Felt
and General Harkins both lobbied the Joint Chiefs to unite all test efforts
under the supervision of the Military Assistance Command to eliminate
competing test efforts and to bring them under some type of local control.55
Doubts about the capabilities of the South Vietnamese military had begun
to spread among some American military advisers. Early in January, elements
of an Army of Vietnam division had cornered a battalion-sized, main-force
Viet Cong unit near the village of Ấp Bắc in the Mekong Delta. Despite
their advantages in size, firepower, and position, the South Vietnamese had
55. Graham A. Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967,
The United States Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military
History, 2005), 50–51.
suffered a significant defeat and allowed the enemy to slip away. Although
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, attempted to put a positive spin on
the operation, the Army could not contain pessimistic analysis coming from
many of the unit advisers. At the forefront of these critics was Col. John Paul
Vann, an experienced and charismatic senior adviser who had witnessed
the battle. He was deeply critical of the corruption and ineptitude displayed
by senior Vietnamese leaders at Ấp Bắc and elsewhere. As 1963 progressed,
many U.S. advisers assigned directly to South Vietnamese units began to
share some of Vann’s misgivings.56
Meanwhile, the U.S. Army presence in South Vietnam continued to
expand. Between January and October 1963, U.S. military strength in
country jumped from 11,325 to 16,916. The number of Army Aviation units
doubled from twelve to twenty-four, and the number of aircraft increased to
369. Sorties and flying hours tripled. In September, the service announced
that it would reequip three helicopter companies currently operating in
Vietnam with the new UH–1 Iroquois aircraft. In April 1963, approximately
one hundred volunteers from the 25th Infantry Division in Hawai‘i arrived
in South Vietnam to serve as door gunners on U.S. aircraft supporting South
Vietnamese military operations.57
The increased activity came at a cost, however, and inevitably brought
American soldiers into harm’s way. Between January 1962 and October
1963, the Army lost forty-seven aircraft to enemy ground fire. The Army
reported that eighteen U.S. service members had lost their lives in October
and listed another four as missing. U.S. service deaths since the beginning
of 1961 now numbered 132. Of those, seventy-three were the direct result of
enemy action. During that same period, 380 soldiers had been wounded.58
The United States Army, which gradually had edged deeper and deeper
into the morass that was the Vietnam War, found itself even further mired
on 2 November 1963 when a cabal of South Vietnamese military leaders
launched a coup, arresting President Diệm and his brother, Ngô Đình Nhu,
and later executing them. Although U.S. military and political leaders had
grown weary of Diệm, they had, for the most part, stayed out of the political
manipulations. However, by not expressly forbidding action against the
South Vietnamese president, they inevitably contributed to his downfall.
56. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars, 358; Cosmas, MACV 1962–1967, 86–87. Neil Sheehan, in
A Bright Shining Lie (New York: Random House, 1988), describes the Battle of Ấp Bắc and
John Paul Vann’s influence on the U.S. Army.
in Southeast Asia, 1961-1964”; “Army Units in Vietnam to Get Newer Copters,” Army Times,
4 Sep 1963; “100 Machine Gunners Volunteer in Vietnam,” Army Times, 24 Apr 1963.
58. “18 US Advisors Lost Lives During October in Vietnam,” Army Times, 20 Nov 1963.
Pfc. Glenn W. Rehkamp, the .30-caliber machine gunner for a CH–21

helicopter of the 57th Helicopter Company in Tan Son Nhut, on a
routine flight over Vietnam (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture
Branch)
General Harkins quickly tried to establish a working relationship with the

new regime, and the ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge,
expressed optimism regarding the prospects of the new government.
American news reporters in Saigon, however, interpreted the coup as a
defeat for American policy in Vietnam, and publicity continued to turn
against the American effort there.59
PASSING THE TORCH
On 22 November 1963, exactly three weeks after the assassination of

President Diệm, Lee Harvey Oswald shot and killed President Kennedy in
Dallas, Texas. Two days later, the nation buried the late president at Arlington
National Cemetery with full military honors. During the lighting of an
eternal flame, a contingent of U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers stood watch
at the four corners of the gravesite. At the conclusion of the ceremony, one
of the special forces troops, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Francis J. Ruddy, removed the
59. Cosmas, MACV 1962–1967, 104–6.
A special forces beret is illuminated by the flame of the eternal light

at the grave of President John F. Kennedy in Arlington National
Cemetery. (U.S. Army, National Archives Still Picture Branch)
green beret from his head and placed it on the grave. The former president
had done much to restore the stature and prestige of the entire U.S. Army,
but the Green Berets would remember him with special affection because he
had been particularly supportive of them.60
As the Army mourned the loss of its commander in chief, it also moved
forward quickly to assist his successor in taking up the reins. As service
reporters noted, the new president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, was no novice.
He had served in both houses of Congress and had been well-regarded as
a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. More recently, he had
acted as the Senate majority leader and as chair of the Senate Democratic
Caucus. As vice president, Johnson had attended all of Kennedy’s cabinet
meetings and had served as his personal emissary in meetings with foreign
leaders around the world.61
Two weeks later, Secretary McNamara briefed the new president on his
recommendations for the structure of U.S. Army and Marine Corps general
purpose forces for the second half of the 1960s. Over the Army’s objections,
60. “JFK and the Green Berets,” Soldier of Fortune, 5 Oct 2021, https://sofmag.com/happy-
34th-anniversary-to-the-usarmy-special-forces-the-green-berets-jfk-and-the-green-
berets/, Historians Files, CMH.
61. “The Command Passes,” Army Times, 4 Dec 1963.
the secretary of defense supported retaining the service’s current structure

of sixteen active divisions, seven separate brigades, and four armored
cavalry regiments. McNamara approved continued testing of the air assault
concept, but he described any proposal to deploy such a division actively as
premature. He recommended the disapproval of Army proposals to increase
the number of maneuver battalions within existing divisions, to add combat
and support units to the Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), and to activate two
additional Hawk antiaircraft missile battalions.62
As part of his briefing, McNamara provided President Johnson with his
department’s latest assessment of the risk in Southeast Asia. The United
States and its Southeast Asia Treaty Organization allies, he said, could
successfully defend the region against a twenty-one-division Communist
attack. The thirteen Thai and South Vietnamese divisions, reinforced by
five U.S. divisions and one Commonwealth division, along with allied air
superiority, could halt an advance along the general line of the 15th parallel
and north of the Mekong River. It would require an additional four U.S.
divisions, he concluded, to restore the situation. Although the purpose of the
secretary’s assessment had been to review conventional force requirements,
he nonetheless concluded that the United States would continue to face local
confrontations and guerrilla conflicts and that it should continue with its
counterinsurgency programs.63
The end of 1963 thus left the United States Army—and the nation—slowly
moving deeper into the conflict in Southeast Asia. At the service’s senior
levels, most of those reluctant to fight a war in Vietnam had been replaced
by leaders who, if not eager for a new conflict, at least possessed a greater
sense of optimism about the capabilities of the reinvigorated force, some
curiosity regarding the potential of its new equipment, and confidence in
the revised doctrine against an enemy they did not regard highly. Although
some frontline observers had begun to question the reliability of their
chosen allies and the wisdom of the fight in general, their concerns had yet
to hit home.
62. Draft Memo, Sec Robert S. McNamara for President Lyndon B. Johnson, 19 Dec 1963,
in FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 8, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1996), 565–87.
63. Draft Memo, McNamara for Johnson, 19 Dec 1963, 578, 586.
CONCLUSION
According to an old adage tossed around by historians and social scientists,

military organizations spend a great deal of their time preparing to fight the
previous war. This maxim contains some truth. Tradition is a powerful force,
one that helps to bind together members of a dangerous profession. Military
leaders can be reluctant to abandon methods and resources that have proven
to be successful in the past. Defeats often lead to efforts to fix what went
wrong in that war rather than anticipating the challenges of the next war.
Although wartime requirements usually accelerate change and drive new
developments in organization, doctrine, and equipment, peacetime armies,
at least through the mid-twentieth century, have tended to cling tenaciously
to established norms.
Between 1953 and 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower attempted
to base American national security on two primary components: a strong
economy and atomic weapons. He believed that large, standing, conventional
forces were too expensive and, for the most part, obsolete. The stalemate in
Korea had convinced him that conventional warfare between major powers
no longer could be decisive. The New Look posed a direct challenge to
the Army, as the service struggled to establish a viable role and maintain
sufficient budget and manpower resources to survive as an organization.
As a result, the ten-year period between the armistice in Korea and the
early stages of commitment in Vietnam was an era of rapid change for
the United States Army and was, perhaps, the most dynamic peacetime
interval in its history. Service leaders devoted almost all of the organization’s
research and development funding to rockets, missiles, and other systems
capable of delivering an atomic warhead, as they attempted to demonstrate
the Army’s ability to compete on a nuclear battlefield. At the same time, they
experimented with a variety of organizational and doctrinal changes that
might better satisfy the president’s vision. By the late 1950s, however, the
Army’s brief flirtation with the pentomic division structure convinced most
of its senior leaders that an organization and doctrine based primarily on
atomic warfare would be a dead end.
The Army’s research and development of rockets and guided missiles
soon brought the service into direct conflict with the other services.
Successful development of long-range surface-to-surface missiles provoked
confrontations with Air Force officers who viewed Army efforts as a challenge
to their traditional role of air support. Army efforts to assume responsibility

for continental air defense drew protests from both the Navy and the Air
Force, whose leaders claimed primacy in that mission. By 1963, enthusiasm
for the continental air defense mission had faded, and the Army abandoned
its most ambitious experiment, the Nike Zeus.
Research and development for long-range missiles produced notable
success in another area, however. On 31 January 1958, the United States’ first
successful satellite reached orbit atop a modified Jupiter-C missile launched
by the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency. The service’s prosperity in this
area was short-lived. After a series of successful launches in 1958 and 1959,
President Eisenhower consolidated much of the nation’s emerging space
exploration infrastructure into a single civilian agency, the newly formed
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Despite these advances, the technology that probably had the greatest
long-range impact on the Army was the helicopter. Service interest in
rotary aircraft exploded after the Korean War, prompted by the Air Force’s
consistent opposition to any expansion of the Army’s fixed-wing capabilities
and by its perceived lack of interest in providing the Army with close air
support. Throughout the 1950s, U.S. Army units operated a growing number
of helicopters and employed them in a wide variety of roles. In 1962, the
Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, or the Howze Board, formalized
the Army’s approach to the use of helicopters in its future organization
and doctrine. By 1963, aircraft in Vietnam featured mounted rockets and
machine guns for use in ground support, foreshadowing a new kind of
warfare. In the United States, the Army continued field-testing an airmobile
division that emphasized the mobility and flexibility of the helicopter, which
could function as troop transport, logistical support, command and control,
and a weapons platform.
In their efforts to maintain their share of a diminishing defense budget,
the services competed in the court of public opinion. The Army waged a
considerable campaign to confirm its place as an important component of
national defense. In both its national television production, The Big Picture,
and its weekly radio show, The Army Hour, the service portrayed its historical
legacy as the nation’s defender as well as its contemporary efforts to succeed
on a modern battlefield. The Army’s recruiting efforts and advertisements
also emphasized its new technology and forward thinking.
An up-to-date Army required soldiers who were capable of understanding
and employing the new technology that the service had embraced. Like the
other armed services, the Army began to raise the intelligence and literacy
standards required for enlistment. By the 1960s, only the Army still relied
CONCLUSION 467
upon the draft to meet its personnel needs. As a result, it had accepted some
less qualified individuals whom the other services could afford to reject. The
Army worked to recruit better educated and more qualified soldiers and, at
the same time, initiated programs to eliminate substandard performers and
those who could not grasp or adapt to the new technology. As the conflict
in Vietnam exposed inequities in the way the nation conducted its military
conscription, an end to the draft emerged as a likely consequence.
Mobilization for the Korean War and later for the Berlin Crisis raised
concerns among many military and political leaders that the traditional
reserve structure no longer was capable of supporting the active force in
wartime. Although many factors were beyond the Army’s control, the service
took what actions it could to improve reserve readiness. In responding
to the Berlin Crisis, many smaller, specialized units had accomplished
their assigned missions successfully, but combat divisions designated
for deployment to Europe had been unprepared to do so. Spurred on by
Secretary Robert S. McNamara, senior Army leaders took steps to streamline
reserve organizations and to provide a more effective training program for
those soldiers and units that were likely to deploy in the future. The most
significant outcome of the Berlin experience, however, may have been a
growing reluctance on the part of senior defense leaders to rely upon any
large-scale mobilization of the reserve force.
Also, a rising level of social unrest throughout the country exposed the
Army to the public in more challenging ways. Both President Eisenhower
and President John F. Kennedy deployed soldiers to southern American
cities to help control crowds protesting school integration. Although political
leaders had sent the troops to help maintain order, some in the South began
to perceive the soldiers as an unwarranted impediment to their freedoms.
This sense of resentment would spread to other regions of the country as the
soldiers themselves became a symbol for an unpopular war.
Throughout the turbulent ten years following the Korean War, the Army
attempted to keep its focus on future combat operations. Initially, that meant
preparing troops, weapons, and equipment to fight on an atomic battlefield.
Service leaders designed and implemented a new organization, the pentomic
division, specifically tailored for an atomic environment. However, by the
end of the 1950s, apocalyptic combat in Europe appeared less likely. Instead,
smaller, lower-intensity conflicts seemed to characterize modern warfare.
U.S. service leaders began to study Communist-inspired insurrections in
Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia as they thought about what
their forces should look like in the future. As the Army moved to develop a
more flexible posture, the Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD)

units replaced pentomic units.
The Army began to embrace counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare in
its doctrine long before President Kennedy took office. The service’s growing
involvement in the protracted war in Vietnam provided ample motivation
for increasing capabilities in those areas. By the early 1960s, the strength of
U.S. Army Special Forces had expanded from a single group activated in
1952 to four groups totaling almost 10,000 soldiers. The Army incorporated
instruction in unconventional warfare and guerrilla tactics into all of
its service schools and into the yearly training programs of most of its
operational units. Even large-scale maneuvers that involved two or more
divisions included significant partisan and guerrilla activity as part of the
exercise scenario.
The new president’s interest in a more flexible approach to military
capabilities thus reinforced a message the Army had tried to deliver
throughout the Eisenhower administration. President Kennedy had adopted
many of General Maxwell D. Taylor’s beliefs regarding a wider range of
military options. Army leaders were able to emphasize the steps they already
had taken to develop their service’s capabilities for lower-intensity conflicts.
This, along with a decreased emphasis on strategic nuclear retaliation as
a component of defense policy, allowed the Army to reemerge as a more
relevant member of the national military team.
Following the Geneva Accords, the Army’s involvement in the conflict in
Vietnam grew slowly but steadily. The departure of French military forces left
U.S. military leaders virtually alone to determine a western response to the
Communist insurgency. As potential flashpoints in Europe and Korea began
to stabilize, Army leaders devoted more attention to the deepening crisis
in Southeast Asia. Rather than coming as a surprise, war in Vietnam had
loomed as an ever-growing possibility. Although the ultimate nature of the
American commitment would remain in doubt for a while longer, the Army
already had given considerable thought to developing the organization,
doctrine, and equipment it would need to engage in combat there. Although
some aspects of the Vietnam War would expose shortcomings in the Army’s
understanding of the conflict, the service had anticipated that it would be a
different kind of war and had undertaken significant change in an effort to
prepare for it.
Contemporary military leaders might take some comfort in the Army’s
demonstrated ability to adapt to the evolutions and revolutions within the
society it serves. In many ways, the circumstances facing the U.S. armed
forces in the post–Korean War period mirror those faced by the Army in
CONCLUSION 469
the early twenty-first century. In both periods, emerging technologies and a

wide range of potential contingencies challenged military leaders to prepare
their organizations for a different type of conflict, one that they were unable
to predict with any degree of certainty. Although contemporary political
leaders have proven to be far more willing to support defense spending than
those in the Eisenhower administration, hefty increases in costs for both
personnel and technology ensure that the services cannot receive all that
they desire.
The U.S. Army of the 1950s and early 1960s coped with a period of
extraordinary challenge for many reasons, but two stand out as particularly
important. First, its senior leadership proved to be equal to the challenge.
Matthew B. Ridgway, James M. Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Hamilton H. Howze,
and Lyman L. Lemnitzer demonstrated a stewardship of service throughout
the decade every bit as effective as the combat leadership they had provided
during World War II and the Korean War. In doing so, they ably represented
the Army in testimony before Congress and throughout adversarial
relationships with the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A second important factor was the service’s embrace of emerging
technologies. Contrary to the aforementioned aphorism, the Army seized
upon each advance as a means to reinforce its position within the defense
establishment. Even though the emphasis upon rockets, missiles, atomic
weapons, and the helicopter in the Army’s research and development efforts
often precluded the replenishment and improvement of more traditional
hardware, such focus forced Army leaders to contemplate future warfare
rather than dwell on past success. They recognized that new technology was
changing the nature of warfare and welcomed opportunities to incorporate
it into the service’s organization and doctrine.
The social, political, and economic upheavals of the early 1960s
reinforced the notion that military conflict was evolving. When the Kennedy
administration entered office prepared to push the armed services toward an
emphasis on counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, the Army was
well positioned to move in that direction. It most definitely had not spent
the past decade preparing to fight the previous war.
FURTHER READINGS
BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS
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Vietnam. Washington, DC: Defense University Press, 1986.
Bank, Col. Aaron. From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces.
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986.
Bergerson, Frederic A. The Army Gets an Air Force: Tactics of Insurgent
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Harrison, Hope M. Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German
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Howze, Hamilton H. A Cavalryman’s Story: Memoirs of a Twentieth Century
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JOURNAL AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES
Brown, Maj. Gen. Frederic J. “Modern Army Supply System.” Army

Information Digest 12 (Apr 1957): 24–31.
Carter, Donald A. “Eisenhower Versus the Generals.” Journal of Military
History 71, no. 4 (Oct 2007): 1169–99.
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“Explorer in Orbit.” Army Information Digest 13 (Apr 1958): 5–7.
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1997): 93–120.
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Glasser, Capt. Anthony P. “The Reserve Forces Act of 1955.” Army
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Gundling, Lt. Col. David L. “The Flying Bulldozer.” Army Information Digest
15 (Feb 1960): 46–52.
Howze, Maj. Gen. Hamilton H., “STRAC Flexes Its Muscles.” Army
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Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L. “Army Airlift Requirements.” Army Information

Digest 15 (Oct 1960): 32–38.
———. “Army Plans and Programs.” Army Information Digest 15 (Apr 1960):
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Army Combat Forces Journal 4 (May 1964): 15–19.
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Them,” Army Information Digest 13 (Oct 1958): 4–16.
Milton, Hugh M., III. “Modern Army Needs MAN, MAN Needs Modern
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———. “Strengthening Our Reserve Force.” Army Information Digest 12
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Veritas 14 (Spring 2018): 42–49.
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Review 35 (May 1955): 3–6.
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ARCHIVAL MATERIALS
Bonin, John A. “Combat Copter Cavalry: A Study in Conceptual Confusion

and Inter-Service Misunderstanding in the Exploitation of Armed
Helicopters as Cavalry in the U.S. Army, 1950–1965.” Master’s thesis,
Duke University, 1982. Historians Files, U.S. Army Center of Military
History (CMH), Washington, DC.
Gavin, Maj. Edward P. “LTG James M. Gavin: Theory and Influence.”
Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, 2012. https://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/
api/collection/p4013coll3/id/2953/download.
Grimwood, James M., and Frances Strowd. “History of the Jupiter Missile
System.” Huntsville, AL: U.S. Army Ordnance Missile Command, 1962.
CMH Library, CMH, Washington, DC.
Johnson, James. “Tactical Organization for Atomic Warfare.” Study. Chevy
Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University,
16 Apr 1954. Historians Files, CMH.
Jussel, Paul C. “Intimidating the World: The United States Atomic Army,
1956–1960.” PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2004. Historians Files,
CMH.
Parker, Jay M. “The Colonels’ Revolt: Eisenhower, the Army, and the Politics
of National Security.” Paper, Naval War College, 1994. https://www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=447086.
ABBREVIATIONS
ATFA–1 Atomic Field Army

CONARC U.S. Continental Army Command
G–1 Army personnel
G–2 Army intelligence
G–3 Army operations
G–4 Army logistics
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
KATUSA Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
LAW light antitank weapon
MAAG military assistance advisory group
MACV U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAN Modern Army Needs
MOMAR modern mobile Army
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD North American Air Defense Command
PENTANA pentagonal atomic-nonatomic
POW prisoner of war
RCA Radio Corporation of America
Recondo reconnaissance and commando
ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Division
ROCAD Reorganization of the Current Armored Division
ROCID Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division
ROK Republic of Korea
ROTAD Reorganization of the Airborne Division
ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
STRAC Strategic Army Corps
STRAF Strategic Army Forces
STRICOM U.S. Strike Command
USAREUR U.S. Army, Europe
CHART ABBREVIATIONS
ADMIN administration
ARMD armored
ARTY artillery
ASA assistant secretary of the Army
AVN aviation
BDE brigade
BN battalion
BTRY battery
CAV cavalry
CMD command
CO company
COMP composite
DCS deputy chief of staff
DET detachment
DIV division
ENG engineer
FA field artillery
GEN general
GP group
HH & SV CO headquarters, headquarters and service company
HHB headquarters and headquarters battery
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHD headquarters and headquarters detachment
HOW howitzer
HQ headquarters
INF infantry
MAINT maintenance
MECH mechanized
MED medical
MOMAR modern mobile Army
MP military police
MTR motorized
ORD ordnance
PERS personnel
QM quartermaster
RECON reconnaissance
ROAD Reorganization Objective Army Division

ROCAD Reorganization of the Current Armored
Division
ROCID Reorganization of Combat Infantry Division
ROTAD Reorganization of the Airborne Division
ROTC Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
SIG signal
SP self-propelled
SPT support
SQDN squadron
SV service
TRANS transportation
TRP troop
GENERAL MAP SYMBOLS
GENERAL MAP SYMBOLS
Forest
Sand
Swamp/Marsh
Inundation/Flooding
Country Capitol
Provincial/State Capitol
City/Town
Built up Area
Airport/Airbase
Oil Well
River
Primary Road
Secondary Road
Tertiary Road
Trail
Railroad (single track)
Railroad (multi-track)
International Boundary
Provincial/State Boundary
District/County Boundary
INDEX
Note: Page numbers in italics refer to graphics and captions.
$64,000 Question, The, 179 Ent, 76

Gary. See camps, Gary.
Aberdeen Proving Ground, 297 Homestead, 421
Active Army, 42, 81, 130–33, 131n95, Langley, 298
176, 213, 244, 253, 280, 286, 325, 331, MacDill, 375, 421
374n57, 394, 397, 405, 405n30, 413n48 Opa-locka, 418
ACS. See assistant chief of staff. Patrick, 421
Adams, General Paul D., 71, 106, 109, Pope, 182
256, 258, 375–77, 376, 392–93, 443. Wolters. See camps, Wolters.
See also assistant chief of staff, G–3 Air Force chief of staff, 150, 192–93, 317.
(operations). See also Air Force vice chief of staff;
Adjutant General’s Office, 16, 32, 56, 102, service chiefs; Twining, General
177, 212, 287, 302, 381, 411, 430. See Nathan F.; Vandenberg, General Hoyt
also Bergin, Maj. Gen. William E.; S.; White, General Thomas D.
Reckord, Maj. Gen. Milton A.; Rich, Air Force Tactical Air Command. See Air
Maj. Gen. Maxwell E. Force units, Tactical Air Cmd.
Adjutant General’s School, 302 Air Force units. See also U.S. Air Force.
Adler, Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs, 40, 42 9th Air Force, 443
Adler Committee. See National Security 12th Air Force, 443
Training Commission. 19th Air Force, 375
advanced individual training, 282, 373, 413 314th Troop Carrier Wing, 214
Advanced Research Projects Agency, 260, Air Def Cmd, 76
263, 459 Tactical Air Cmd, 116–17, 181, 214, 298,
Advisory Committee on Army 375
Organization, 28 Research and Development Cmd, 310,
aerial artillery battery, 1st. See artillery 319
units. Air Force vice chief of staff, 19, 193. See
aerial refueling wings, 369 also Air Force chief of staff.
aerocycle, 162 air interceptor missiles. See missiles.
Afghanistan, 222 Air National Guard, 374, 376. See also
Africa, 119, 144, 180, 182–83, 185, 210, National Guard.
221–22, 276, 345, 385–86, 467 air transport, 115, 118–19, 164, 174, 208,
Ailes, Stephen, 353, 415. See also 220, 256, 321, 393, 396, 397, 443.
undersecretary of the Army. See also commands, U.S. Army, Mil
air assault, 63, 118, 148, 396–97, 440–41, Air Transport Cmd; Military Air
442, 443, 446, 448, 463 Transport Service; U.S. Air Force, Mil
air assault divisions. See divisions. Air Transport Service.
air bases, 147, 182, 257, 329 Air Transport Brigade, 10th, 441
air cavalry, 259, 378, 391, 396–97, 441. See airborne battle groups. See infantry
also cavalry regiments and companies; regiments and battle groups.
divisions; sky cavalry; U.S. Cavalry. Airborne Brigade, 173d, 435
Air Corps. See U.S. Army Air Corps. airborne divisions. See divisions.
Air Defense Command. See Air Force airborne infantry regiments. See infantry
units, Air Def Cmd; commands, regiments and battle groups.
U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Def Cmd; aircraft. See also aerial refueling wings;
commands, unified, Continental aerocycle; fixed-wing aircraft; rotary-
Air Def Cmd; North American Air wing aircraft.
Defense Command (NORAD). AC–1 Caribou, 299, 397, 398
air defense units. See artillery units. AO–1 Mohawk, 299, 397
Air Force bases B–47 bomber, 369
Eglin, 255 B–52 bomber, 447
aircraft—Continued antimissile missiles. See missiles.

C–118, 329 antipersonnel mine. See mine, M18
C–119, 90, 118 Claymore antipersonnel.
C–121, 329 antitank missiles. See missiles.
C–123, 118, 293, 328 Ấp Bắc, 459–60, 460n56
C–124, 63, 118, 256, 329, 438 Apollo program, 416
C–130, 119, 149, 328 AR15. See rifles, AR15.
C–133, 329 Archibald, Sgt. Gene L., 12
CH–1 Chinook. See CH–47 Chinook. area-defense missiles. See missiles.
CH–21, 461 Arizona, 379, 411
CH–34 Choctaw, 441 Arkansas, 10, 50, 60, 133, 192, 199, 213–14,
CH–47 Chinook, 299, 301, 397, 446 281, 453
CH–54 Sky Crane, 160, 299, 397 Arkansas National Guard, 214
DHC–4 Caribou, 160 Arlington National Cemetery, 461, 462
Flying Crane. See CH–54 Sky Crane. Armalite, 447
H–13 Sioux, 73 Armed Forces Code of Conduct, 56, 140
H–19 Chickasaw, 73, 159, 159 Armed Forces Information and Education.
H–21 Shawnee, 384 See Office of Armed Forces
H–34 Choctaw, 159, 161 Information and Education.
H–40 Iroquois. See UH–1 Iroquois. Armed Forces Policy Council, 36, 150, 152
HC–1B Chinook. See CH–47 Chinook. Armed Forces Qualification Test, 127, 223
HU–1. See UH–1 Iroquois. Armed Services Committee. See House
OH–6 Cayuse, 397 Armed Services Committee; Senate
OV–1, 397 Armed Services Committee.
U–1A Otter, 384 armies
U–2, 362 First Army, 9, 82
UH–1 Iroquois, 159, 299, 299, 299n60, Second Army, 9, 54, 82
300, 385, 397, 430, 446, 460 Third U.S. Army, 9, 82, 107, 120n65, 240,
UH–1B. See UH–1 Iroquois. 255, 317, 375, 418, 429
XH–40 Iroquois. See UH–1 Iroquois. Fourth Army, 9, 66, 82, 107, 420
air-defense missiles. See missiles. Fifth Army, 9, 82, 276
airmobility, 298, 396, 399, 425, 440, 443, Sixth U.S. Army, 9, 20, 82, 277, 373
466 Seventh Army, 2, 7, 12, 59, 75, 134, 139,
airplanes. See aircraft. 183, 202, 216, 219, 245, 257, 289, 318,
Ajax missile. See artillery units, 202d Arty, 324, 367, 371, 377–78, 406–8, 429, 435,
1st Missile Bn (Ajax); missiles, Ajax. 437–38
AK47. See rifles, AK47. Eighth Army, 5–6, 8, 32, 96, 137, 219,
Alabama, 10, 72–73, 106–7, 107, 152, 156, 277, 339, 434
189, 260, 262–63, 415, 453 Armor Center, 170
Alaska, 8, 50, 59, 76, 82, 104–5, 176, 196, Armor Conference, 251
235, 244, 281, 293, 324, 327, 342, 367, armored cavalry units. See cavalry
435 regiments and companies. See also
Alaskan Command. See commands, divisions; U.S. Cavalry.
unified, Alaskan Cmd. armored divisions. See divisions.
Algeria, 144 armored personnel carriers. See personnel
Allied Expeditionary Force, 75, 95 carriers.
Allied Forces, 1n1, 58, 267, 273, 276, 375 Armored School, 66
American Helicopter Society, 158 armored units. See also divisions.
American Legion, 54 4th Armd Gp, 435
American Ordnance Association, 28 68th Armd, 250
American Revolution. See Revolutionary 194th Armd Bde, 435
War. Army Air Corps. See U.S. Army Air Corps.
ammunition. See also artillery pieces. Army Atomic Weapons Center, 26
7.62-mm. NATO cartridge, 161 Army Audit Agency. See U.S. Army Audit
105-mm. tank ammunition, 378 Agency.
Anchor Hill, 6
antiaircraft missiles. See missiles.
INDEX 489
Army Aviation, 72, 119, 152–53, 158, 298, Army Personnel Staff. See assistant chief of
379, 395, 460 staff, G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of
School, 72–73, 259 staff (personnel).
Army Ballistic Missile Agency, 189, 261– Army Policy Council, 210
64, 302, 466. See also commands, U.S. Army Ranger School. See U.S. Army
Army, Army Ballistic Missile Cmd. Ranger School.
Army Ballistic Missile Command. See Army Rangers. See U.S. Army Rangers.
commands, U.S. Army, Army Ballistic Army Research and Development Board,
Missile Cmd. 319
Army Band. See United States Army Band. Army Research Office, 302
See also bands. Army Reserve, 3, 12, 40–42, 50, 87, 105,
Army Chemical Center, 252 132, 287, 329, 331, 333, 334, 412, 422,
Army chief of staff. See chief of staff of the 454–55. See also General Reserve;
Army. Immediate Reserve; Ready Reserve;
Army Chorus, 178–79 Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve;
Army Command and General Staff Standby Reserve
College. See U.S. Army Command and Army Rocket and Guided Missile Agency,
General Staff College. 262
Army Commanders’ Conference, 179, 298 Army Security Agency, 383, 386, 405
Army commands. See commands, U.S. Army Service Forces, 28
Army. Army Special Warfare Center and School.
Army Corps of Engineers, 416 See U.S. Army Special Warfare Center
Army Department. See Department of the and School.
Army. Army Staff, 20, 23–24, 27–29, 39, 48, 53,
Army Field Band, 178. See also bands. 59, 77, 80–81, 82, 83, 90, 93, 98, 100–3,
Army Field Forces, 9, 26, 28, 62, 64–66, 106, 109, 121, 127–28, 137–38, 142,
69–72, 81, 102 155, 164–65, 167–68, 170, 173, 177,
Combat Developments Section, 70 179, 182–83, 186, 209, 212, 217, 220,
HQ, 66, 69 222, 240–41, 248, 251–54, 274, 277–78,
Army Functional Files System, 303 280–82, 287–88, 290, 295, 302, 306–8,
Army General Staff. See General Staff. 314, 319–20, 322, 326–27, 330, 334,
“Army Goes Rolling Along, The,” 177 342, 358, 366, 374, 391, 394, 399–401,
Army Ground Forces, 148, 168 402, 404–5, 409, 413, 424–25, 437, 441,
HQ, 29 453, 455–56
Army Group North, 237–38 Army Strategic Capabilities Plan, 181, 217
Army Hour, The, 170, 466 Army Strategic Objectives Plan
Army Infantry Center. See U.S. Army 1957, 132
Infantry Center. 1959, 215
Army Information Digest, 331 Army Strategic Task Force, 106
Army Intelligence and Security branch, 405 Army Tactical Mobility Requirements
Army Intelligence Staff. See assistant chief Board (Howze Board), 395–98,
of staff, G–2 (intelligence). 425–26, 440–41, 442, 443, 446, 466
Army Logistics Staff. See assistant chief of Army Task Force, 418
staff, G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of Army Test and Evaluation Agency, 401
staff (logistics). Army Times, 36, 50, 60, 81, 118, 123, 155,
Army Management Improvement Plan, 301 194, 222, 247, 316, 352, 407
Army Materiel Command. See commands, Army Training Plan, 203
U.S. Army, Army Materiel Cmd. Army Training Test, 391
Army National Guard, 3, 50, 105, 286, 331, Army Transportation Corps, 158
333, 394 Army Troop Program. See Troop Program.
Army Operations Staff. See assistant chief Army War College. See National War
of staff, G–3 (operations). College; U.S. Army War College.
Army Ordnance Corps. See U.S. Army Article 15. See Uniform Code of Military
Ordnance Corps. Justice.
Army Ordnance Missile Command. See
commands, U.S. Army, Army Ord
Missile Cmd.
artillery groups. See artillery units. Maj. Gen. Thomas L.; Young, Maj.
artillery pieces Gen. Robert N.
155-mm., 63, 110, 167, 169, 170, 171, assistant chief of staff, G–2 (intelligence),
245, 248, 268, 291–92, 364, 365, 16, 20n16, 35, 95, 102–3, 182, 254, 318,
446–47 402, 405, 417. See also deputy assistant
240-mm., 268 chief of staff (intelligence); Fitch, Maj.
280-mm., 25, 25–26, 114–15, 220, 237 Gen. Alvah R.; Partridge, Maj. Gen.
8-inch, 111, 168–70, 171, 245, 248, 268, Richard C.
364, 365, 372, 378, 446–47 assistant chief of staff, G–3 (operations),
M102, 378 16, 20, 20n16, 30, 34, 41, 47, 52, 69–72,
M109, 446 91, 94, 102, 105, 109, 118–19, 121,
M110, 378, 446 137, 164, 376. See also Adams, General
artillery units Paul D; Box, Brig. Gen Clyde; deputy
1st Aerial Arty Btry (Provisional), 441 chief of staff (military operations);
13th Arty Gp (Air Def) deputy chief of staff (operations);
HQ and HQ Btry, 421 deputy chief of staff (operations and
15th Arty administration); deputy chief of staff
8th Bn (Hawk), 421 (plans); deputy chief of staff (plans
15th Field Arty and operations); deputy chief of staff
3d Bn, 329 (plans and research); deputy chief of
39th Field Arty Bn, 25 staff (plans, programs, and systems);
41st Field Arty deputy chief of staff (research and
3d Bn, 372 development); Eddleman, General
52d Arty Clyde D.; Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M.;
2d Bn (Nike Hercules), 421 Hamlett, General Barksdale, Jr.;
2d Missile Bn, 206 Harkins, General Paul D.; von Kann,
52d Arty Gp, 418 Maj. Gen. Clifton F.
54th Arty Gp, 418 assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics), 16,
65th Arty 20n16, 80–81, 376. See also deputy
6th Bn (Hawk Missile), 420 chief of staff (logistics); Neely, Brig.
6th Missile Bn, 208 Gen. Robert B.; Palmer, General
71st Arty (Nike Hercules) Williston B.
2d Missile Bn, 268 assistant chief of staff and J–3 (Joint Staff
202d Arty operations) for STRICOM, 395. See
1st Missile Bn (Ajax), 12 also von Kann, Maj. Gen. Clifton F.
222d Field Arty assistant chief of staff for plans, 376.
2d Bn, 329 See also assistant chief of staff, G–3
540th Field Arty Bn, 63 (operations).
ASA. See assistant secretary of the Army. assistant secretary of the Army. See also
assistant chief of staff. See assistant chief of Milton, Hugh M., III; Roderick,
staff, G–1 (personnel); assistant chief George H.; secretary of the Army;
of staff, G–2 (intelligence); assistant Slezak, John; undersecretary of the
chief of staff, G–3 (operations); Army.
assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics); finance and comptroller, 319
assistant chief of staff (reserve logistics, 319
components); assistant chief of staff materiel, 48
and J–3 (Joint Staff operations) for manpower and reserve forces, 80, 127,
STRICOM; assistant chief of staff 140, 224
for plans. See also chief of staff of the assistant secretary of defense, 140. See also
Army; deputy chief of staff. deputy assistant secretary of defense;
assistant chief of staff (reserve deputy secretary of defense; secretary
components), 203, 254, 402 of defense; undersecretary of defense;
assistant chief of staff, G–1 (personnel), 16, U.S. Department of Defense.
20n16, 37–39, 56, 80, 85, 102, 104, 127, legislative affairs, 113
177. See also Booth, Lt. Gen. Donald manpower and personnel, 23, 57, 86,
P.; deputy chief of staff (personnel); 101, 381
Powell, General Herbert B.; Sherburne,
INDEX 491
research and development, 120. See also Bergin, Maj. Gen. William E., 32, 56. See
chief of research and development. also Adjutant General’s Office.
Association of the United States Army, 61, Berlin, 90, 96, 267, 273, 344, 362–63, 368,
125, 162, 264 371, 380, 389–91, 394, 405–6, 408, 422,
ATFA–1. See Atomic Field Army (ATFA– 434, 467. See also Berlin Brigade; East
1). Berlin; West Berlin.
ATFA–1 divisions. See divisions, ATFA–1 Brigade, 371, 435
Inf Div. Crisis, 368–74, 387, 391, 406–7, 451, 454,
Atlanta General Depot, 326 467
Atlantic Command. See commands, Wall, 362–63, 371, 405, 454
unified, Atlantic Cmd. Besson, Maj. Gen. Frank S., Jr., 401
Atlas missile. See missiles, Atlas. Biên Hòa, 304, 340
Atomic Energy Commission, 111, 205, 326, Big Picture, The, 27, 170, 178, 466
417 Billingslea, Brig. Gen. Charles, 415
Atomic Field Army (ATFA–1), 65, 67, 68, Birmingham, 453
106–7, 110–11, 113, 115, 164–65. See Blueprint of the Army in the Period 1958–
also divisions, ATFA–1 Inf Div. 1961, 210
atomic projectile. See Davy Crockett Boeing helicopters. See aircraft.
weapon system. Boland, Brig. Gen. Francis H., Jr., 212
AUSA. See Association of the United States Bolte, General Charles L., 20, 54, 81. See
Army. also vice chief of staff of the Army.
Australia, 268 Bomarc missile. See missiles, Bomarc.
Austria, 276, 362, 368 bombers. See aircraft.
automatic rifles. See rifles. Bonesteel, Maj. Gen. Charles H., III, 106
Axis forces, 276 Booth, Lt. Gen. Donald P., 127, 177, 203,
223–24, 226. See also assistant chief of
Bad Tölz, 74, 215 staff, G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of
Baghdad Pact, 175, 183, 222 staff (personnel)
Baker Hill, 106 Bork, Brig. Gen. Lester S., 268
Baldwin, Hanson W., 46, 94, 235 Box, Brig. Gen. Clyde, 376. See also
Ballentine, Admiral John J., 157 assistant chief of staff, G–3
ballistic missiles. See missiles. (operations).
Baltimore, 327 Boy Scouts, 55, 57
Baltimore Sun, 387 Bradley, General Omar N., 17, 18, 21, 23,
bands, 165, 166, 169, 171, 364, 365 331, 332. See also chairman of the Joint
Army Field Band, 178 Chiefs of Staff; chief of staff of the
regimental bands, 38–39 Army; general of the Army.
United States Army Band, 350 Brazil, 327–28
Bangkok, 307 Breckinridge, Maj. Gen. William M., 212
Bank, Col. Aaron, 74, 74 Bremerhaven, 258
Barney, Maj. Gen. Keith R., 199 Brigade, Berlin. See Berlin, Brigade.
basic combat training, 413 Britain, 144, 180, 182, 205, 268
Batista, Fulgencio, 344, 358 British Commando School, 294
battalions. See artillery units; military Broger, John C., 228
police (MP) units; signal battalions; Bronze Star, 353
Tank Battalion, 723d. Brown, Harold, 352–53
battle groups. See infantry regiments and Browning automatic rifle. See rifles,
battle groups. Browning automatic.
Bay of Pigs, 359–61, 389, 421 Brucker, Wilber M., 93, 98, 99, 101–2, 117,
Beach, Brig. Gen. Dwight E., 158 125, 131–32, 142, 144, 151, 155, 158,
Beirut, 258 172, 177, 179, 192, 199, 201, 214, 216,
Belgium, 345 222, 224–25, 240, 242, 260, 277, 279,
Bell. See also aircraft. 281, 285–88, 312, 316, 319–20, 330,
Aerosystem Company, 163 332, 332–33, 353. See also general
Helicopter, 159 counsel; secretary of the Army.
Telephone Laboratories, 260 Buis, Maj. Dale R., 304
Bell helicopters. See aircraft. Bullock, Brig. Gen. William C., 33, 138
Bundy, McGeorge, 384, 458. See also Central Intelligence Agency, 205, 306–7,
national security adviser. 358–60, 417, 458
Bunker Hill, 6 chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17,
Burgess, Carter L., 140. See also assistant 17–18, 23, 25, 46–48, 89, 100, 106, 123,
secretary of defense. 145–46, 175, 191–92, 228, 232, 235,
Burke, Admiral Arleigh A., 233, 234, 310, 311–13, 331, 344, 351, 357, 359. See
345, 360 also Bradley, General Omar N.; Joint
Burma, 353 Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff; Lemnitzer,
Business Advisory Council, 20 General Lyman L.; Radford, Admiral
Butts Army Airfield, 445 Arthur W.; Twining, General Nathan F.
Chase, Maj. Gen. William C., 135
“Caisson Song, The,” 177 Checkpoint Charlie, 405, 405n31
California, 59, 132, 194, 196, 204, 212, 245, Chickasaw. See aircraft, H–19 Chickasaw.
255, 262–63, 327, 352, 404, 413, 435 Chidlaw, General Benjamin W., 76
Institute of Technology, 79, 263 Chief (cavalry horse), 57
Cambodia, 92, 185, 269, 338, 428 chief of Army Field Forces, 9, 16, 26, 28, 71,
camps 102. See also Army Field Forces.
Atterbury, 10, 133 chief of the Army Reserve, 334, 455
Bowie, 413 chief of information, 16, 26–27, 34, 53,
Chaffee, 50, 60. See also forts, Chaffee. 55, 102, 123, 125, 143, 168, 178, 254,
Chanson, 137 402, 454. See also chief of public
David, 273 information; Meloy, General Guy S.;
Desert Rock, 111 Mudgett, Maj. Gen. Gilman C.; Parks,
Gary, 72, 172 Maj. Gen. Floyd L.; public information.
Kilmer, 50, 413 chief of legislative liaison, 16, 27, 54, 82,
Mackall, 63 170, 179, 402. See also Hauck, Brig.
Polk, 113, 133. See also forts, Polk. Gen. Clarence J., Jr.; legislative liaison;
Roberts, 204 Michaelis, Maj. Gen. John H.; Reber,
Rucker, 10, 72–73, 107 Maj. Gen. Miles.
Wolters, 172, 199 chief of military history, 16, 102, 168, 177
Canal Zone. See Panama Canal Zone. chief of naval operations, 19, 94, 96, 234,
Canham, Maj. Gen. Charles D. W., 114–15 310, 345. See also Burke, Admiral
cannons. See artillery pieces. Arleigh A.; Carney, Admiral Robert B.;
Cape Canaveral, 261, 262, 416 Fechteler, Admiral William M.; service
Caraway, Maj. Gen. Paul W., 88, 94 chiefs.
Career Incentive Act, 126 chief of public information, 82, 152, 402.
Caribbean, 50, 104–5, 281, 324, 327, 358 See also chief of information; public
Caribbean Command. See commands, information.
unified, U.S. Caribbean Cmd. chief of psychological warfare, 30, 33,
Caribou. See aircraft, AC–1 Caribou; 73–75, 102, 138. See also psychological
aircraft, DHC–4 Caribou. warfare.
Carney, Admiral Robert B., 19, 21, 94, 96 chief of research and development,
Carolina Maneuver Area, 62 101–2, 202, 204, 264, 302, 319–20.
cartridges. See ammunition. See also Air Force units, Research and
Castro, Fidel, 344, 358 Development Cmd; Army Research
cavalry divisions. See divisions. See also and Development Board; assistant
U.S. Cavalry. secretary of defense, research and
cavalry regiments and companies. See also development; deputy chief of staff
air cavalry; divisions; sky cavalry; U.S. (research and development); Research
Cavalry. and Development Command.
3d Armd Cav Rgt, 62, 350, 350, 371, 406, chief of staff of the Air Force. See Air Force
438 chief of staff.
6th Armd Cav Rgt chief of staff of the Army, 16, 18, 20, 22–24,
Co E, 61 27, 31, 34, 38–39, 43, 48, 50, 54, 63,
11th Armd Cav Rgt, 113 69, 72, 79, 81, 82, 84–85, 93, 95, 97,
Cayuse. See aircraft, OH–6 Cayuse. 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 118–19, 143,
Central America, 135, 389, 467 145, 158, 164–65, 167, 170, 172, 175,
INDEX 493
179, 212, 238, 247, 249, 253, 262, Collins, General J. Lawton, 18, 21, 31, 136,
266, 270, 275–76, 277, 284, 289, 295, 331. See also chief of staff of the Army.
302–3, 310–11, 312, 313, 317, 319–20, Colombia, 327–28, 385
322, 330, 333–34, 354, 366, 373, 377, Colorado, 59, 76, 178, 192, 199, 239–40,
383–84, 390, 394, 399–400, 402, 403, 281, 326, 374, 391, 445
417, 424, 427, 429, 436, 440, 456, 458. Colorado Springs, 76
See also assistant chief of staff; Bradley, Colt Firearms Company, 448
General Omar N.; Collins, General Columbia Broadcasting System, 279
J. Lawton; Decker, General George Columbia University, 353
H.; deputy chief of staff; Lemnitzer, Combat Arms Regimental System, 201
General Lyman L.; Ridgway, General combat commands
Matthew B.; service chiefs; Taylor, Combat Cmd A, 374, 391
General Maxwell D.; vice chief of staff Combat Cmd C, 108
of the Army; Wheeler, General Earle Combat Development Experimentation
G. Center, 204, 245, 404
China, 1, 7, 29, 69, 122, 135, 145, 267, 296, Combat Development Test Center, 383, 459
338–39, 353, 387, 394 Combat Developments Command, 404,
Chinese Nationalist forces, 181, 267–68 447
Chinook. See aircraft, CH–47 Chinook. Combat Developments Group, 614. See
Choctaw. See aircraft, CH–34 Choctaw; also commands, U.S. Army, U.S.
aircraft, H–34 Choctaw. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC),
Ch'ŏrwŏn Valley, 6 CONARC Combat Developments
Chrysler, 332 Group.
Churchill, Winston, 144 combat developments groups, 26, 404.
CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency. See also commands, U.S. Army, U.S.
civil guard and self-defense forces, 385, 429 Continental Army Cmd (CONARC),
civil rights, 121n95, 381, 452–54 CONARC Combat Developments
civil rights, deputy assistant secretary Group.
of defense for. See deputy assistant Combat Developments Office, 298
secretary of defense, civil rights. Combat Developments Section. See Army
Civil War, 452 Field Forces, Combat Developments
CJCS. See chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Section.
Staff. Command and General Staff College. See
Clark, General Mark W., 2, 276 U.S. Army Command and General
Clarke, General Bruce C., 245, 246, 289–90, Staff College.
316, 320, 332, 363, 370–71, 377, 408–9, Commanders’ Conference. See Army
435, 456. See also commands, U.S. Commanders’ Conference.
Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd commands, U.S. Army
(CONARC), commanding general; 1st Logistical Cmd, 254
U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), 1st U.S. Army Missile Cmd, 209
commanding general. 2d Logistical Cmd, 418
Clarke, Maj. Gen. Christian H., Jr., 284 2d U.S. Army Missile Cmd, 209
Clausewitz, Carl von, 210 4th U.S. Army Missile Cmd, 270
Clifton, Brig. Gen. Chester V., 351, 390 9th Logistical Cmd, 339–40
Code of Conduct. See Armed Forces Code Army Ballistic Missile Cmd, 156, 205,
of Conduct. 300. See also Army Ballistic Missile
Cohn, Roy M., 51 Agency.
Cold War, 3, 29–30, 35, 40, 73, 222, 228, Army Materiel Cmd, 401, 403, 404, 447,
243, 266, 296, 309–11, 338, 394, 405–6, 453
417, 424, 428, 455 Army Ord Missile Cmd, 260–61, 302
Colglazier, Lt. Gen. Robert W., 437. See also Combat Developments Cmd. See
deputy chief of staff (logistics). Combat Developments Command.
College Press Conference, 179 Communications and Electronics Cmd,
Collier, Lt. Gen. John H., 117 401
Collins, Lt. Gen. James F., 241, 286, 336. See Far East Cmd, 75, 96, 174, 219
also deputy chief of staff (personnel). General Equipment Cmd, 401
commands, U.S. Army—Continued U.S. European Cmd, 75, 134, 182–83,

Material Development and Logistic Cmd 235, 256–57, 266, 375, 410
(MDLC), 400–1 U.S. Pacific Cmd, 18, 219–20, 235, 270,
Mil Air Transport Cmd, 181, 329 278, 304, 306, 347, 429, 431
Missile Cmd, 401 U.S. Strike Cmd (STRICOM), 375–76,
Munitions Cmd, 401 392–93, 395, 443
Northern Area Cmd, 256 Committee on Equal Opportunity in the
Ord Tank-Automotive Cmd, 401 Armed Forces, 415, 451
Peninsula Base Cmd, 418, 420 Committee for Non-Violent Action, 417
Southern Area Cmd, 61 Communications and Electronics
Supply and Maintenance Cmd, 401 Command. See commands, U.S. Army,
Taiwan Def Cmd, 268 Communications and Electronics
U.S. Army Air Def Cmd, 209, 313, Cmd.
394. See also commands, unified, Communications Zone. See U.S.
Continental Air Def Cmd. Army, Europe (USAREUR),
U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Cmd, 9, 76 Communications Zone.
U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd, 8, 327, communism, 1, 7, 29–35, 51, 88, 91–92,
367–68 100, 106, 122, 135, 138–41, 144–45,
U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Cmd, 219 180, 183, 187, 221, 228, 256, 267–69,
U.S. Continental Army Cmd 274, 294, 296, 304, 306, 327, 337–39,
(CONARC), 16, 29, 81, 82, 83, 103, 344–45, 347, 351–52, 359, 361, 363,
110, 114–17, 125, 142, 164–65, 167, 368, 382, 384, 387, 389, 394, 424,
170, 174, 177, 181–83, 199, 203–4, 209, 430–31, 434, 463, 467–68
213–14, 244–45, 247, 254–55, 289–90, comptroller of the Army, 16, 49, 82, 254,
298, 317–18, 320–21, 327, 329, 357, 277, 301–2, 311, 402. See also assistant
364, 366, 373, 376, 394, 404, 417–18, secretary of the Army, finance and
421–23, 425, 441, 456 comptroller; comptroller general;
Arty Section, 209 Decker, George H.
commanding general, 103, 181, 204, comptroller general, 82, 303. See also
247, 255, 289, 364, 376, 394, 417–18, comptroller of the Army.
456. See also Clarke, General Bruce CONARC. See commands, U.S. Army, U.S.
C.; Dahlquist, General John E.; Continental Army Cmd (CONARC).
Powell, General Herbert B.; Wyman, CONARC Combat Developments Group.
General Willard G. See commands, U.S. Army, U.S.
CONARC Combat Developments Continental Army Cmd (CONARC),
Group, 164. See also Combat CONARC Combat Developments
Developments Group; combat Group.
developments groups. CONARC Commanding General.
HQ, 83, 102, 109–10, 393 See commands, U.S. Army, U.S.
U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Thailand, 430 Continental Army Cmd (CONARC),
U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Vietnam commanding general.
(MACV), 429–30, 430n91, 457, Concept of Employment of U.S. Army Forces
459–60 in Paramilitary Operations, 424
Weapons and Mobility Cmd, 401 Congress. See U.S. Congress.
commands, unified Connecticut, 411
Alaskan Cmd, 235 Continental Air Defense Command. See
Atlantic Cmd, 235, 417–18 commands, unified, Continental Air
Continental Air Def Cmd, 76, 119, Def Cmd.
154, 225, 235, 280, 313, 421. See also Continental Army Command (CONARC).
commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air See commands, U.S. Army, U.S.
Def Cmd. Continental Army Cmd (CONARC).
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Continental Army Command Combat
Cmd, 235 Developments Group. See commands,
Strategic Air Cmd, 22, 148, 151, 205, 235, U.S. Army, U.S. Continental Army
310, 326 Cmd (CONARC), CONARC Combat
U.S. Caribbean Cmd, 235 Developments Group.
INDEX 495
Coordinating Committee on Atomic Davidson Army Airfield, 301

Energy, 158 Davies, Paul L., 28
Coordinating Group. See Taylor, General Davies Committee, 28, 80
Maxwell D. Davies Plan, 80, 101
Cordiner, Ralph J., 226–27, 242 Davy Crockett weapon system, 246, 259,
Corporal missile. See missiles, Corporal. 315, 407, 447. See also weapon systems.
corps DCS. See deputy chief of staff.
I Corps, 6, 59, 104, 198, 324, 392, 434 de Havilland DHC–4. See aircraft.
III Corps, 59, 113, 198, 280, 287, 374, Decker, General George H., 49, 266, 277,
376, 393 311, 312, 313, 317, 326, 340, 354, 357,
V Corps, 1, 59, 104, 196, 245, 322, 437 364, 366–67, 379, 382, 384–85, 387,
VII Corps, 59, 104, 196, 245, 277, 322, 390, 399, 405, 413. See also chief of
437 staff of the Army; comptroller of the
IX Corps, 6, 59, 104, 219 Army; vice chief of staff of the Army.
X Corps, 6, 32, 59 Defense Advisory Committee on Women
XVI Corps, 6, 59 in the Services, 39
XVIII Abn Corps, 59, 106, 113, 181–82, Defense Department. See U.S. Department
198, 254, 256, 258, 290, 307, 324, 329, of Defense.
372, 376, 393, 395, 415, 417–18 Defense Mobilization. See Office of Defense
Corps of Cadets. See U.S. Military Mobilization.
Academy, Corps of Cadets. Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 278,
counterforce, 356 357
counterguerrilla operations, 314, 338, 342, Defense Science Board, 251
346–47. See also counterinsurgency defense secretary. See secretary of defense.
operations; guerrilla warfare; Delaware, 411
insurgency. Dennison, Admiral Robert L., 417–18
counterinsurgency operations, 138, 215, Department of the Army, 16, 28, 80, 95,
271, 337, 342, 347, 385–86, 389, 391, 103, 125, 139, 223, 255, 258, 270, 278,
423–28, 430–31, 443, 463, 468–69. 283, 302–3, 307, 317, 339, 357–58, 381,
See also counterguerrilla operations; 383, 400, 402, 403, 407, 434
guerrilla warfare; insurgency. Department of the Army Pamphlet 1–10,
counterintelligence, 346, 429 Improve Your Writing, 302
countervalue, 356 Department of Commerce. See U.S.
Creasy, Maj. Gen. William A., 160–61 Department of Commerce.
Crisis, Berlin. See Berlin, Crisis. Department of Defense. See U.S.
Critz, Maj. Gen. Harry H., 396 Department of Defense.
cross-country logistical carrier, 150-ton, Department of the Navy, 313, 377
251 Department of State. See State Department.
CSA. See chief of staff of the Army. Department of the Treasury, 85. See also
Cuba, 327, 344–45, 348, 358–61, 363, 389, secretary of the Treasury.
394, 417–23, 454 deputy assistant secretary of defense. See
Cuba Study Group, 360 also assistant secretary of defense;
Cuban Missile Crisis, 417–23, 454 deputy secretary of defense; secretary
Czechoslovakia, 60–61, 144, 195 of defense; undersecretary of defense;
U.S. Department of Defense.
Đà Lạt, 137 applications engineering, 101. See also
Da Nang, 305, 340, 341 Martin, William H.
DACOWITS. See Defense Advisory civil rights, 452
Committee on Women in the Services. special operations, 337
Dahlquist, General John E., 62–64, 64, deputy assistant chief of staff (intelligence),
69, 72, 103, 108, 114–15, 164, 167. 35
See also commands, U.S. Army, U.S. deputy chief of staff. See deputy assistant
Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), chief of staff (intelligence); deputy
commanding general. chief of staff (administration); deputy
Daley, Lt. Gen. John P., 404 chief of staff (forces); deputy chief of
Dallas, 461 staff (logistics); deputy chief of staff
Dart missile. See missiles, Dart. (military operations); deputy chief of
Davidson, Lt. Gen. Garrison H., 367, 408 staff (operations and administration);
deputy chief of staff—Continued deputy chief of staff (operations and

deputy chief of staff (operations); administration),71, 82, 83, 102, 103.
deputy chief of staff (personnel); See also assistant chief of staff, G–3
deputy chief of staff (plans and (operations); deputy chief of staff
operations); deputy chief of staff (plans (military operations); deputy chief
and research); deputy chief of staff of staff (operations); Weible, General
(plans); deputy chief of staff (plans, Walter L.
programs, and systems); deputy chief deputy chief of staff (personnel), 102,
of staff (public affairs); deputy chief 203, 223, 225, 241, 254, 286–87,
of staff (research and development); 318, 336, 380, 386, 402, 413, 453.
deputy chief of staff (strategy and See also assistant chief of staff, G–1
international affairs); See also assistant (personnel); Booth, Lt. Gen. Donald P.;
chief of staff; chief of staff of the Army. chief of staff of the Army; Collins, Lt.
deputy chief of staff (administration), 16 Gen. James F.; Porter, Maj. Gen. Robert
deputy chief of staff (forces), 404 W., Jr.; Richardson, Lt. Gen. James L.,
deputy chief of staff (logistics), 80–81, Jr.; Vittrup, Lt. Gen. Russell L.
82, 102, 183, 186–87, 254, 318–20, deputy chief of staff (plans), 16, 102, 164.
326, 330, 402, 429, 437. See also See also assistant chief of staff, G–3
assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics); (operations); deputy chief of staff
Colglazier; Lt. Gen. Robert W.; O’Neill, (military operations); deputy chief of
Maj. Gen. Edward J. staff (operations); Eddleman, General
deputy chief of staff (military operations), Clyde D.; deputy chief of staff (plans
102, 173, 186–87, 213, 215, 221, 247, and operations), 404. See also assistant
256, 302, 322, 334, 338, 366, 374, 393, chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy
404, 436–37, 441. See also assistant chief of staff (military operations);
chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff (operations).
deputy chief of staff (operations); deputy chief of staff (plans and research),
deputy chief of staff (operations and 82, 101. See also assistant chief of staff,
administration); deputy chief of staff G–3 (operations); chief of research
(plans); deputy chief of staff (plans and development; deputy chief of staff
and operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief
(plans and research); deputy chief of of staff (operations); Gavin, Lt. Gen.
staff (plans, programs, and systems); James M.
deputy chief of staff (research and deputy chief of staff (plans, programs, and
development); Eddleman, General systems), 402. See also assistant chief of
Clyde D.; Hamlett, General Barksdale, staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of
Jr.; Johnson, Maj. Gen. Harold K.; staff (military operations); deputy chief
Moore, Lt. Gen. James E.; Oakes, of staff (operations).
Lt. Gen. John C.; Parker, Lt. Gen. deputy chief of staff (public affairs), 53
Theodore W. deputy chief of staff (research and
deputy chief of staff (operations), 39, 102, development), 202, 402. See
158, 175, 181–82, 184, 195, 202–3, also assistant chief of staff, G–3
253–54, 258, 266–68, 318, 321, 427. (operations); chief of research and
See also assistant chief of staff, G–3 development; deputy chief of staff
(operations); deputy chief of staff (military operations); deputy chief of
(military operations); deputy chief of staff (operations); Wood, Maj. Gen.
staff (operations and administration); Robert J.
deputy chief of staff (plans); deputy deputy chief of staff (strategy and
chief of staff (plans and operations); international affairs), 402
deputy chief of staff (plans and deputy defense secretary. See deputy
research); deputy chief of staff (plans, secretary of defense.
programs, and systems); deputy chief deputy secretary of defense, 146, 153, 261,
of staff (research and development); 264, 274, 352, 357, 385, 414. See also
Eddleman, General Clyde D.; assistant secretary of defense; deputy
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L.; Weible, assistant secretary of defense; Gates,
General Walter L. Thomas S., Jr.; Gilpatric, Roswell L.;
Kyes, Roger M.; Quarles, Donald A.;
INDEX 497
Robertson, Reuben H., Jr.; secretary 11th Air Assault Div, 440, 443
of defense; undersecretary of defense; 11th Abn Div, 1, 9, 10, 59, 172, 183–84,
U.S. Department of Defense. 196, 198, 198–99, 276
Detroit, 401 23d Inf Div, 59, 105
Deuce and a Half. See trucks, M35 2½-ton. 24th Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 196, 200, 256–57,
DEW. See Distant Early Warning Line. 322, 325, 361, 426, 434
Dick, Lt. Gen. William W., 394 25th Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 198–99, 220, 254,
Dickenson, Cpl. Edward S., 56 268, 270, 307, 323, 324, 339, 426, 460
Diệm, Ngô Đình. See Ngô Đình Diệm. 27th Inf Div, 132
Điện Biên Phủ, 88–90, 136, 268 28th Inf Div, 11, 11, 59
director of installations. See Barney, Maj. 29th Inf Div, 287
Gen. Keith R. 30th Armd Div, 132
Disoway, Lt. Gen. Gabriel P., 397 30th Inf Div, 132–33
Distant Early Warning Line, 123 31st Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59
divisions. See also Air Transport Brigade, 32d Inf Div, 371, 373–74, 393
10th; Airborne Brigade, 173d; 34th Inf Div, 20, 411
armored units, 194th Armd Bde; 35th Inf Div, 411
infantry brigades (nondivisional); 37th Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59, 62
Reorganization of Combat Infantry 38th Inf Div, 133
Division (ROCID). 39th Inf Div, 133
1st Armd Div, 9, 10, 59, 106, 108, 113, 40th Armd Div, 132
119, 164, 196, 197, 200–1, 374, 391–93, 40th Inf Div, 6, 12, 59, 132
418, 420, 422, 434 41st Inf Div, 133
1st Cav Div, 1, 6, 59, 196, 198, 200, 200, 42d Inf Div, 98
219, 324, 324, 434 43d Inf Div, 11, 12, 59, 411
1st Inf Div, 1–2, 11, 59, 104, 198–99, 44th Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59
201, 210, 212, 236, 253, 323, 324, 376, 45th Inf Div, 6, 12, 59
392–93, 418, 420, 426 47th Inf Div, 9, 10, 12, 59
2d Armd Div, 1, 11, 59, 196, 198, 200, 48th Armd Div, 132
218–19, 239, 298, 323, 324, 376, 48th Inf Div, 132
392–93, 399, 437, 438, 438, 439 49th Armd Div, 133, 371, 373–74, 393
2d Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 196, 197, 239, 298, 51st Inf Div, 133, 411
317, 323, 324, 374, 376, 392–93, 409, 63d Inf Div, 399
415, 418, 420, 426, 435, 443 69th Inf Div, 59, 105
3d Armd Div, 9, 10, 60, 172, 196, 198, 71st Inf Div, 59, 105
200, 322, 325, 438 79th Inf Div, 329, 411
3d Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 106, 107, 107, 110, 82d Abn Div, 1, 9, 10, 59, 62, 113, 117,
113, 164, 197, 198, 200, 322, 325, 350, 182, 184, 197, 199–200, 210, 212–13,
377, 424, 435 238, 254, 293, 323, 324, 328–29, 374,
4th Armd Div, 59, 113, 196, 197, 198, 376, 392–93, 396, 418, 426, 443–44,
200, 322, 325 448
4th Inf Div, 10, 11, 59, 105, 172, 197, 198, 94th Inf Div, 411
200, 212, 238, 254–56, 323, 324, 372, 96th Inf Div, 411
376, 378, 392–93, 408, 426, 435, 437 101st Abn Div, 59, 96, 105, 165, 197, 199,
5th Armd Div, 9, 10, 60, 105 201, 212–13, 238, 254–56, 293, 323,
5th Inf Div, 59, 172, 196, 204, 374, 324, 329, 371–72, 374, 376, 392–93,
391–93, 434, 443–44 418, 426, 443, 444, 444
6th Armd Div, 9, 10, 60, 105 103d Inf Div, 411
6th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 105, 371 ATFA–1 Inf Div, 110. See also Atomic
7th Inf Div, 1, 6, 59, 198, 200, 200, 276, Field Army (ATFA–1).
324, 324, 434 Operations Div, 28
8th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 172, 196, 198, 200, Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for
322, 325, 377, 409–10, 434, 438 Atomic Nonatomic Army during the
9th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 172, 197, 198–200, Period 1960–1970. See PENTANA.
239, 281, 323 Doctrine and Concepts Division, 314
10th Inf Div, 9, 10, 59, 104, 196, 198, 200, Dodge, Maj. Gen. Charles G., 416. See also
204 chief of public information; public
information.
Dodge, Joseph M., 14 295, 297, 301, 309–11, 313, 336, 347,
Doolittle, Gen. James H., 37n61 358, 406, 434, 468–69
Doolittle Board, 37 Eisenhower Doctrine, 221–22
Douglas, Paul H., 240 Eliot, George Fielding, 60
Douglas Aircraft Company, 260 Ellender, Allen J., 281
Douhet, Giulio, 120–21 Ély, General Paul H. R., 89, 136
draft, the, 4, 35, 51, 87, 126, 128, 130–31, English Channel, 195, 217
284, 288, 336, 369, 451, 455, 467 Ent Air Force Base. See Air Force bases,
Duc Hoa, 459 Ent.
Dulles, Allen W., 205, 337, 358–60 Equal Rights section, 453
Dulles, John Foster, 90, 248–49, 274, 275. European Command. See commands,
See also secretary of state. unified, U.S. European Cmd.
Durbrow, Elbridge, 346 European Defense Community, 48
European Reinforcement Troop List, 211
East Africa. See Africa. European Theater of Operations, 144, 287
East Berlin, 370. See also Berlin. exercises. See also Operation Plan
East Germany, 195, 273, 344, 362, 368. See Swaggerstick; operations; projects;
also Germany. Rotaplan.
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Banyan Tree, 293
Command. See commands, unified, Banyan Tree II, 327–28
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Big Slam/Puerto Pine (joint exercise),
Cmd. 329
Eastern Europe, 144, 180, 195, 282, 296, Blue Bolt, 66, 108, 110, 112–13
362 Caribou Creek, 293
Eddleman, General Clyde D., 20, 34, 155, Carte Blanche, 116
164, 168, 170, 179, 181, 212, 213–14, Deep Furrow, 376
221, 256–57, 266, 321–22, 354–55, 386, Desert Rock VI, 111, 112
423. See also assistant chief of staff, Flashburn, 62, 63
G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff Follow Me, 66, 107, 108, 109, 112
(military operations); deputy chief of Jump Light, 201
staff (operations); deputy chief of staff King Cole, 201
(plans); vice chief of staff of the Army. Lion Noir, 218
Eddy, Lt. Gen. Manton S., 60 Little Bear, 327, 328
Effective Army Writing, 302 Long Thrust, 371–72, 408, 438. See also
Eglin Air Force Base. See Air Force bases, operations, Long Thrust II.
Eglin. Rocky Shoals, 255
Egypt, 144, 180, 183, 222 Sabre Hawk, 245, 249, 250
Eighth Army. See armies, Eighth Army. Sage Brush (joint exercise), 110,
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2–3, 5, 13, 13–15, 112–13, 115–17, 120, 163–64
17–25, 28, 30–31, 37–40, 43, 46–49, Sledge Hammer, 201
51–52, 59, 75–76, 83, 89–100, 102, Snowfall, 62
105, 118, 120, 122–23, 128–30, 132, Swift Strike, 374–75
136, 140, 142–48, 156, 172, 174–75, Swift Strike II, 445
177, 180–81, 183, 189–96, 199, 206, Swift Strike III, 437, 443, 444–45, 444
209, 213–14, 221–22, 224–28, 231–36, White Cloud, 255
242–43, 252, 255–56, 258, 263–65, 267, Wintershield II, 408
273–74, 276, 277–79, 294, 297, 301, Explorer satellites. See satellites, Explorer
304, 308–16, 331, 332, 333, 336, 339, 1; satellites, Explorer 3.
342–45, 347, 349–53, 356–58, 368, 394,
406, 409–10, 422, 434, 450, 465–69. See Face the Nation, 179, 194
also general of the Army; president of Fairchild Engine and Airplane
the United States. Corporation, 447
administration, 19, 20, 22–23, 31, 37, 46, Far East, 29, 48, 50, 103–4, 129, 134–35,
48, 50–52, 76, 83, 93–94, 96, 98, 102, 138, 144, 167, 172, 196, 248, 345, 433–
118, 129, 132, 142, 144–45, 176, 180, 34. See also commands, U.S. Army, Far
189–92, 194, 224, 231, 236, 274, 279, East Cmd; U.S. Army Forces, Far East.
Far East Broadcasting Company, 228
INDEX 499
Far East Command. See commands, U.S. Benning, 59, 106–7, 170, 216, 227, 239,
Army, Far East Cmd. 294, 298, 326, 330, 332, 333, 409, 420,
Farrell, General Frank W., 289 435, 440
Faubus, Orval E., 213–14 Bliss, 26, 152, 209, 259
FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation. Bragg, 59, 62, 73–75, 133, 183, 215, 255,
Fechteler, Admiral William M., 19, 21 266, 293, 307, 326, 328, 346, 352, 372,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 32 384, 386, 393, 395, 423, 427, 427, 431,
Federal Housing Administration, 126 448
Federal Records Centers, 302 Campbell, 59, 105, 213–14, 276, 326
Federal Republic of Germany, 134. See also Carson, 59, 178, 192, 199, 239, 281, 326,
Germany. 374, 391, 445
Felt, Admiral Harry D., 267–68, 305–6, Chaffee, 10, 192, 199, 281. See also
347, 429, 459 camps, Chaffee.
Field Artillery School, 441 Devens, 374, 391
field artillery units. See artillery units. Dix, 59, 326
Field Coordination Office, 189 Douglas, 413
field manuals Eustis, 163
100–5, Field Service Regulations, Gordon, 192, 199, 326
Operations, 62, 425 Greely, 293
21–20, Physical Training, 223 Gulick, 386
Fifth Army. See armies, Fifth Army. Hood, 59, 106, 108, 113, 133, 196, 209,
finance, 16, 82, 311, 319, 369, 402 213–14, 218, 239, 280, 298, 374, 391,
finance and comptroller, assistant secretary 393, 420, 438
of the Army for. See assistant secretary Hunter Liggett, 204
of the Army, finance and comptroller. Jackson, 59, 62, 133, 192, 199, 326
Finletter, Thomas K., 3, 151, 155, 398. See Training Center, 284
also secretary of the Air Force. Knox, 60, 170, 251, 304n70
First Army. See armies, First Army. Kobbe, 328
Fischer, Lt. Gen. Harvey H., 392 Leavenworth, 60–61, 251, 435
Fitch, Maj. Gen. Alvah R., 417. See Lee, 418
also assistant chief of staff, G–2 Leonard Wood, 50, 60, 199
(intelligence). Lewis, 59, 133, 327, 371, 378, 384, 408,
Fitzsimons Army Hospital, 240 435
fixed-wing aircraft, 71–73, 117, 148, 151, McNair, 56
153, 160, 172, 377, 384, 396–97, 456, Meade, 371, 420
466. See also aircraft; rotary-wing Monmouth, 35, 51
aircraft. Ord, 59, 196, 204, 212, 245, 404, 413, 435
Fleming, Arthur S., 129 Polk, 10, 196, 197, 225–26, 281, 371. See
Florida, 77, 118, 132–33, 152, 206, 208, 208, also camps, Polk.
255, 261, 262, 293, 375, 411, 416, 418, Richardson, 293
420–22 Riley, 57, 59, 199
Florida Missile Test Range, 262 Rucker. See camps, Rucker.
Flying Crane. See aircraft, CH–54 Sky Sill, 72, 209, 214, 441
Crane. Stewart, 317, 326, 420, 422
flying platform, 162, 162 Fourth Army. See armies, Fourth Army.
Fogle, Col. George C., 327 France, 7, 89, 91, 144, 180, 182, 268, 282,
Food Machinery and Chemical 344, 362, 408
Corporation, 28 Franke, William B., 310. See also secretary
Force Plan for 1957. See JCS 2101/113. of the Navy.
Ford, Paul, 124 Frankfurt, 438
Ford Motor Company, 344, 352, 354 Freedom Ride demonstrations, 415
Foreign Military Affairs. See Office of Freedom Village, 8
Foreign Military Affairs. Freeman, General Paul L., Jr., 354, 435,
Formosa, 122, 135. See also Taiwan. 437. See also U.S. Army, Europe
Forrestal, Michael V., 458 (USAREUR), commanding general.
forts French Foreign Legion, 282
Belvoir, 301, 404
G–1 (Personnel). See assistant chief of staff, Georgia, 59, 106–7, 132, 170, 192, 199, 216,
G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff 227, 239, 294, 298, 317, 326, 330, 332,
(personnel). 332–33, 409, 420, 422, 435, 440
G–2 (Intelligence). See assistant chief German High Command, 276
of staff, G–2 (intelligence); deputy Germany, 1–2, 7, 74, 77, 90, 96, 105, 116,
assistant chief of staff (intelligence). 134–35, 144, 172, 195–96, 198, 213–15,
G–3 (Operations). See assistant chief of 218–19, 239, 250, 256, 258, 266, 273,
staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of 282, 296, 303, 344, 354, 361–63,
staff (operations). 366–74, 380, 387, 389–91, 394, 405–9,
G–4 (Logistics). See assistant chief of staff, 422, 434–35, 437, 438, 439, 439, 446,
G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff 451, 454, 467
(logistics). Gesell, Gerhard A., 415, 451–52
G. I. Bill of Rights. See Servicemen’s Gesell Committee. See Committee on
Readjustment Act. Equality of Opportunity in the Armed
Gaither, Lt. Gen. Ridgely, 235 Forces.
Garden of the Gods, 178 Giáp, Võ Nguyên, 90
Garroway, Dave, 179 Gilpatric, Roswell L., 352, 357, 385, 414. See
Gary Air Force Base. See camps, Gary. also deputy secretary of defense.
Gates, Millicent A., 276 Ginder, Maj. Gen. Phillip D., 203. See
Gates, Thomas S., Jr., 274–75, 276, 294, also assistant chief of staff (reserve
311, 316, 331, 332, 344. See also deputy components).
secretary of defense; secretary of Glennan, Thomas Keith, 263, 300
defense; secretary of the Navy. gold-flow issue, 304, 304n70, 409, 436
Gavin, Lt. Gen. James M., 47, 52–53, 60, Goodpaster, Brig. Gen. Andrew J., 47–48,
69–71, 73, 91, 101, 117, 119, 125, 128, 351
137–38, 204, 236, 237, 239, 342–43, Goodyear Aircraft Company, 260
469. See also assistant chief of staff, Gore, Albert A., 359
G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff Gorman, Col. Emily C., 454
(plans and research). Grafenwoehr Training Area, 25, 61
Gemini program, 416 Graham, Harold M., 163
general of the Army, 2, 17, 21, 23, 221, 332. Great Britain. See Britain.
See also Bradley, General Omar N.; Green Berets, 352, 462
Eisenhower, Dwight D. grenade launcher, M79 40-mm., 378, 449,
general counsel, 80, 82, 98, 352, 399, 402, 450
451. See also Brucker, Wilber M.; Ground Forces. See Army Ground Forces.
Vance, Cyrus R. Gruber, Lt. Edmund L., 177
General Electric Company, 143, 226, 332, Gruenther, General Alfred M., 19, 55, 89,
378 182, 195
General Equipment Command. See Grumman Aircraft Engineering, 332
commands, U.S. Army, General guerrilla warfare, 99, 138, 186, 251, 265–67,
Equipment Cmd. 269, 315, 337–38, 342, 346–47, 358,
General Motors, 14, 46, 231 360, 377, 382, 423–24, 428, 443, 459,
General Reserve, 4, 9, 41–42, 59, 104, 137, 463, 468. See also counterguerrilla
375. See also Army Reserve; Immediate operations; counterinsurgency
Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing operations; insurgency.
Reserve; Retired Reserve; Standby guerrilla gap, 351
Reserve. Guided Missile Center, 152. See also forts,
General Services Administration, 79 Bliss.
General Staff, 20n16, 52, 102, 106, 357, 399. guided missiles. See missiles.
See also assistant chief of staff, G–1 Guided Missiles Directorate, 158
(personnel); assistant chief of staff, gunships. See aircraft.
G–2 (intelligence); assistant chief of
staff, G–3 (operations); assistant chief Hải Phòng, 88, 90
of staff, G–4 (logistics). Hamlett, General Barksdale, Jr., 94. 366,
general utility helicopter. See aircraft. 413, 456. See also assistant chief of
Geneva, 90–91, 136 staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of
Accords (Treaty), 186, 221, 346, 468 staff (military operations); vice chief of
Conference (Conventions), 7, 58, 268 staff of the Army.
INDEX 501
Handy, General Thomas T., 157 on Defense Appropriations; Senate

Hannah, John A., 23, 86. See also assistant Appropriations Committee;
secretary of defense. Senate Defense Appropriations
Hanoi, 88 Subcommittee.
Harkins, General Paul D., 164, 429–30, House Appropriations Subcommittee. See
457, 459, 461. See also assistant chief of House Appropriations Committee;
staff, G–3 (operations). House Subcommittee on Defense
Harrell, Maj. Gen. Ben, 395 Appropriations; Senate Appropriations
Harris, Maj. Gen. Hugh P., 332 Committee; Senate Defense
Hart, Maj. Gen. Charles E., 72 Appropriations Subcommittee.
Harvard Business School, 352 House Armed Services Committee, 224,
Harvard University, 352 234, 260, 284, 329, 452. See also Senate
Hauck, Brig. Gen. Clarence J., Jr., 54. See Armed Services Committee.
also chief of legislative liaison. House Subcommittee on Defense
Havana, 421 Appropriations, 279, 315. See also
Hawai‘i, 59, 104, 172, 176, 198–99, 220, House Appropriations Committee;
254, 268, 270, 281, 307, 324, 339, 342, Senate Appropriations Committee;
392, 426, 460 Senate Defense Appropriations
Hawk missile. See missiles, Hawk. Subcommittee.
Headquarters, Department of the Army. House Veterans Affairs Committee, 211
See Department of the Army. howitzers. See artillery pieces.
heavy lift aircraft. See aircraft. Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton H., 119, 158,
Heintges, Brig. Gen. John A., 269, 306 293, 353, 372–73, 395, 396, 398, 415,
helicopter companies, 158, 270, 429, 460 418, 420–21, 425, 441, 469. See also
31st Helicopter Co, 415 Army Tactical Mobility Requirements
57th Helicopter Co, 461 Board (Howze Board).
Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Co, Howze, Maj. Gen. Robert L., 164
385 Howze Board. See Army Tactical Mobility
helicopters. See aircraft. Requirements Board (Howze Board).
Helios, 405 HQDA. See Department of the Army.
Hercules missile. See missiles, Hercules. Huey. See aircraft, UH–1 Iroquois.
Hershey, General Lewis B., 455 Hukbalahap insurgency, 128
Herter, Christian A., 274, 294–95. See also Hull, General John E., 140
secretary of state. Humphrey, George M., 14, 21
Heusinger, General Adolf, 295 Humphrey, Hubert H., 351
Hickey, Lt. Gen. Thomas F., 240 Hungary, 144, 180, 195
Hill, Albert C., 157 Huntsville, 152, 156, 189, 262
Hiller Helicopters, Inc., 162 Hutton, Brig. Gen. Carl I., 73
Hinrichs, Lt. Gen. John H., 401
Hồ Chí Minh, 458 I Corps. See corps, I Corps.
Hodes, General Henry I., 217–18, 237–38, Idaho, 411
239, 257. See also U.S. Army, Europe III Corps. See corps, III Corps.
(USAREUR), commanding general. Immediate Reserve, 454. See also Army
Hoelscher, Leonard W., 358, 402–3 Reserve; General Reserve; Ready
Holaday, William H., 204–5 Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve; Retired
Holloway, Lt. Gen. Bruce K., 376 Reserve; Standby Reserve.
Homestead, 206 Independence Hall, 177
Homestead Air Force Base. See Air Force India, 91, 339, 353
bases, Homestead. Indiana, 10, 133, 194
Honest John rocket. See rockets, Honest Indochina, 4, 48, 88, 90–92, 122, 136–38,
John. 144, 185, 424. See also Cambodia;
Honest John units, 165, 168, 170, 173–74, France; Laos; Vietnam.
176, 182, 202, 209, 237, 245, 248, 364, infantry battle groups. See infantry
447. See also rockets, Honest John. regiments and battle groups.
hot weather field cap, 451 infantry brigades (nondivisional). See also
House Appropriations Committee, 122, divisions.
204, 258. See also House Subcommittee 2d Inf Bde, 374, 391
infantry brigades (nondivisional). Intelligence and Security. See Army

Continued Intelligence and Security branch.
171st Inf Bde, 435 Intelligence Staff. See assistant chief of staff,
172d Inf Bde, 435 G–2 (intelligence).
193d Inf Bde, 435 intercontinental ballistic missiles. See
197th Inf Bde, 435 missiles.
Infantry Center. See U.S. Army Infantry intermediate-range ballistic missiles. See
Center. missiles.
infantry divisions. See divisions. International Control Commission, 91, 346
Infantry Officers Division, 334 Iowa, 411
infantry regiments and battle groups IRBM. See intermediate-range ballistic
3d Inf missile.
1st Battle Gp, 350 Iron Triangle, 6
6th Inf Iroquois. See aircraft, UH–1 Iroquois.
2d Battle Gp, 371 Israel, 180, 182, 222
3d Battle Gp, 371 Italy, 20, 119, 209, 276, 429.
10th Inf, 204 IX Corps. See corps, IX Corps.
12th Inf
1st Battle Gp, 327 Jackson, Charles D., 74
18th Inf Jackson, Henry M., 343
1st Battle Gp, 168 Japan, 1, 5, 6, 59, 75, 135, 175, 196, 215,
20th Inf, 105 219–20, 238, 266, 270, 306, 329,
1st Battle Gp, 328 339–40, 426, 435. See also Okinawa;
22d Inf U.S. Army, Japan; U.S. Forces, Japan.
1st Battle Gp, 408 JCS 2101/113, 48–49
23d Inf Jedburgh units, 74
1st Battle Gp, 293 jeep, M151 ¼-ton, 446
2d Battle Gp, 415 Jenkins, Lt. Gen. Reuben E., 32
26th Inf Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 261, 263–64, 299
1st Battle Gp, 410 Jim Crow legislation, 218
38th Inf Johnson, Maj. Gen. Harold K., 121, 435,
1st Battle Gp, 409 437, 441, 456. See also deputy chief of
39th Inf staff (military operations).
2d Battle Gp, 408 Johnson, Louis A., 18, 39, 46. See also
47th Inf secretary of defense.
2d Battle Gp, 408 Johnson, Lyndon B., 264, 279, 462–63. See
325th Inf also president of the United States; vice
1st Abn Battle Gp, 328 president of the United States.
327th Inf Johnson, Roy W., 263
1st Abn Battle Gp, 213 Johnston, Capt. William R., 459
501st Inf Joint Air-Ground Operations Manual, 214
2d Abn Battle Gp, 293 Joint Board on Future Storage of Atomic
503d Inf Weapons, 158
2d Abn Battle Gp, 293, 339 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18–19, 21, 21, 23–24,
504th Abn Inf 31, 36, 43, 47–48, 76, 79, 89–90, 105–6,
2d Battle Gp, 350 120, 122, 151–52, 154, 157, 172, 183,
Infantry School, 66, 208 193, 206, 213, 220, 232–33, 235, 254–
Information and Education Office. See 56, 258, 265–66, 270, 274, 278–79, 290,
Office of Armed Forces Information 310, 326–27, 331, 335, 345–47, 351,
and Education. 356–57, 359–61, 368, 371–73, 382, 384,
inspector general, 16, 82, 127, 221, 242, 393, 407, 418, 420, 423, 430–31, 437,
373, 402, 447 456, 459, 469. See also chairman of the
insurgency, 342, 344, 347, 382, 385, 389, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Staff; service
424–25, 430, 434, 458, 468. See chiefs; technical service chiefs.
also counterguerrilla operations; joint exercises. See exercises.
counterinsurgency operations; Joint Ready Force, 254–55
guerrilla warfare; Hukbalahap Joint Services Capabilities Plan, 265. See
insurgency. also Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan;
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.
INDEX 503
Joint Staff, 17, 88, 106, 228, 233–35, 278, Korean armistice agreement, 2, 39
395. See also chairman of the Joint Korean Army, 282. See also Korea; ROK
Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Republic of Korea) units.
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 118. See Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army
also Joint Services Capabilities Plan; (KATUSA), 220, 238, 270, 280, 339.
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. See also Korea; Korean Army; ROK
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, 172. See also (Republic of Korea) units.
Joint Services Capabilities Plan; Joint Korean War, 1–6, 9, 12–13, 23, 29–31, 34,
Strategic Capabilities Plan. 36, 39, 51, 56, 62–63, 72, 79, 86, 109,
Jones, Maj. Gen. Herbert M., 242 135, 139, 147, 155–56, 164–65, 175,
Jupiter missile. See missiles, Jupiter. 231, 238, 243, 283–84, 336, 364, 380,
422, 433, 445–47, 449–50, 466–69. See
Kansas, 57, 59–61, 199, 251, 411, 435 also Korea.
Kaplan, Capt., 353 Kosŏng, 6
KATUSA. See Korean Augmentation to the Kremlin, 398
U.S. Army (KATUSA). Krueger, General Walter, 20, 277
Kennedy, John F., 309, 312–13, 342–45, Kubrick, Stanley, 194
348–52, 353, 356–63, 367–69, 371, 377, Kuter, General Laurence S., 326
380–87, 389–92, 395, 406, 410, 415, Kyes, Roger M., 46, 146. See also deputy
417, 421–24, 428, 430–31, 436–37, secretary of defense.
449, 451, 455, 458, 461, 462, 462,
465, 467–69. See also president of the Lacrosse missile. See missiles, Lacrosse.
United States. Langley Air Force Base. See Air Force
administration, 345, 348, 355, 359, 361, bases, Langley.
361n26, 363, 368, 371, 377, 381, 384, Lansdale, Maj. Gen. Edward G., 138, 337,
387, 389, 414, 421–24, 428, 449, 469 337–38
Kennedy, Robert F., 360 Laos, 92, 269, 306–7, 339–40, 345–47, 351,
Kentucky, 59–60, 105, 170, 213–14, 251, 372, 383–84, 408, 430
276, 304n70, 326 Larsen, Brig. Gen. Stanley R., 208
Key West, 77, 118, 152, 208, 293, 420 Latin America, 134–35, 327, 359, 385–86,
Key West Agreement, 77, 118 427
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 180, 267, 273, 344, LAW. See rockets, M72 LAW (light antitank
362, 368, 421 weapon).
Killian, James R., 156 Lebanon, 235, 256, 258, 375, 423
Killian Committee, 156 Lee, Maj. Gen. Robert V., 277
Kinmen. See Quemoy. legislative affairs, assistant secretary of
Kinnard, Maj. Gen. Harry W. O., 440, 440 defense for. See assistant secretary of
Kintner, Lt. Col. William R., 60 defense, legislative affairs.
Kissinger, Henry A., 194, 210 legislative liaison, 16, 27–28, 54, 82, 97, 170,
Kiwanis, 52 179, 402. See also chief of legislative
Knowland, William F., 194 liaison; public information.
Korea, 1, 2, 2–7, 8, 8–9, 12–13, 13, 18, legislative liaison and public information.
22–23, 26, 28–32, 35–36, 39–40, 43, See legislative liaison; public
49–51, 56–60, 70–73, 75, 79, 88, 91, information.
96, 111, 118, 129, 135–37, 140, 144, Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 209, 220,
175, 196, 198, 200, 219–20, 231, 236, 240, 259, 266–67, 275–77, 277, 280–81,
238, 241, 270, 276–77, 280, 282, 294, 287–88, 295, 303, 311, 313–14, 320,
296, 304, 310, 324, 327, 330, 339–40, 331, 332, 333, 344, 346, 351, 359–60,
347, 349, 375, 392, 410, 422, 433–34, 375, 383, 439, 469. See also chairman
437, 449–50, 465, 468. See also Korean of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; chief of
armistice agreement; Korean Army; staff of the Army; deputy chief of staff
Korean Augmentation to the U.S. (operations); vice chief of staff of the
Army (KATUSA); Korean War; Army.
military assistance advisory groups Letterkenney Army Depot, 421
(MAAGs), MAAG, Korea; North Leviero, Anthony H., 146
Korea; Republic of Korea (ROK); Lewis, Lt. Gen. John T., 76
ROK (Republic of Korea) units; South Libya, 182
Korea; U.S. Forces, Korea.
light antitank weapon. See rockets, M72 M60 tank. See tanks, M60.
LAW (light antitank weapon). M60A1 tank. See tanks, M60A1.
Lions, 52 M72 LAW (light antitank weapon). See
Little Gibraltar rockets, M72 LAW (light antitank
Little John rocket. See rockets, Little John. weapon).
Little John units, 173, 220, 442. See also M75 carrier. See personnel carriers, M75.
rockets, Little John. M79 40-mm. grenade launcher. See
Little Rock, 213–14, 453 grenade launcher, M79 40-mm.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 461 M102 105-mm. howitzer. See artillery
Lodge Act, 282 pieces.
logistical carrier, 150-ton cross-country. M107 self-propelled 175-mm. gun, 446
See cross-country logistical carrier, M109 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer. See
150-ton. artillery pieces.
logistical commands. See commands, U.S. M110 self-propelled 8-inch howitzer. See
Army. artillery pieces.
logistics, assistant secretary of the Army M113 armored personnel carrier. See
for. See assistant secretary of the Army, personnel carriers, M113.
logistics. M151 ¼-ton jeep. See jeep, M151 ¼-ton.
Logistics Staff. See assistant chief of staff, MAAGs. See military assistance advisory
G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff group (MAAGs).
(logistics). MacArthur, General Douglas, 98
Long Haul defense policy, 30 MacDill Air Force Base. See Air Force
Long, Russell B., 281, 359 bases, MacDill.
long-range guided missiles. See missiles. machine guns, 259, 298, 366, 430, 466
longer-range missiles. See missiles. .30-caliber, 378, 461
Los Angeles, 327 M60 general purpose 7.62-mm., 161, 378
Louisiana, 10, 113–14, 117, 133, 163, 196, rapid-firing minigun, 378
197, 225–26, 281, 359, 371, 374 MACV. See commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Mil
Louisiana Maneuver Area, 113, 163, 281 Assistance Cmd, Vietnam (MACV).
Louisiana Maneuvers (1941), 374 Madame Nhu. See Trần Lệ Xuân.
Louisville Courier Journal, 282 Main River, 250
Lovett, Robert A., 46. See also secretary of Malaysia, 4, 347
defense. MAN. See Modern Army Needs.
Lumumba, Patrice É., 345 Management Improvement Program,
Lynch, Maj. Gen. George E., 164 301–2
Manila Pact, 267
M1 rifle. See rifles, M1. Mannheim, 408
M4 Sherman tank. See tanks, M4. manpower and personnel, assistant
M5 Stuart light tank. See tanks, M5. secretary of defense for. See assistant
M14 rifle. See rifles, M14. secretary of defense, manpower and
M15 rifle. See rifles, M15. personnel.
M16 rifle. See rifles, M16. manpower and reserve forces, assistant
M16A1 rifle. See rifles, M16A1. secretary of the Army for. See assistant
M18 Claymore antipersonnel mine. See secretary of the Army, manpower and
mine, M18Claymore antipersonnel. reserve forces.
M35 2½-ton truck. See trucks, M35 2½- Mansfield, Michael J., 92
ton. Marine Corps. See U.S. Marine Corps.
M41 light tank. See tanks, M41. Marshall, General George C., Jr., 28, 46–47,
M47 Patton tank. See tanks, M47. 311. See also secretary of defense.
M48 Patton tank. See tanks, M48. Martin, William H., 101. See also deputy
M48A3 90-mm. gun medium tank. See assistant secretary of defense.
tanks, M48A3. Maryland, 273, 287, 297, 327, 371, 411, 420
M59 armored personnel carrier. See Massachusetts, 86, 156, 309, 374, 391, 411
personnel carriers, M59. Material Development and Logistic
M60 general purpose 7.62-mm. machine Command (MDLC). See commands,
gun. See machine guns, M60 general U.S. Army, Material Development and
purpose 7.62-mm. Logistic Cmd (MDLC).
INDEX 505
materiel, assistant secretary of the Army MAAG, Germany, 135

for. See assistant secretary of the Army, MAAG, Indochina, 88, 136, 185, 424
materiel. MAAG, Korea, 136
Materiel Command. See commands, U.S. MAAG, Philippines, 138
Army, Army Materiel Cmd. MAAG, Taiwan, 268
Matsu, 122, 145, 267 MAAG, Vietnam, 185–86, 221, 271, 304,
McAuliffe, General Anthony C., 139, 338, 346, 382–84, 424–25, 428–31, 434
266. See also U.S. Army, Europe military assistance advisory teams. See
(USAREUR), commanding general. military assistance advisory groups
McCarthy, Joseph R., 35, 51–52, 53, 98, 228 (MAAGs).
McClure, Brig. Gen. Mark, 35. See Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
also assistant chief of staff, G–2 (MACV). See commands, U.S. Army,
(intelligence). U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Vietnam
McClure, Brig. Gen. Robert A., 73 (MACV).
McElroy, Neil H., 193–94, 196, 205, 231, Military District of Washington, 81, 82
234, 248–49, 258, 260, 261, 274, 297. military occupational classification project
See also secretary of defense. (1949), 84
McGarr, Lt. Gen. Lionel C., 251, 338, 382 military occupational specialties, 75, 202,
McNamara, Robert S., 344, 349, 352–53, 241
354, 354–59, 361, 366, 368–75, 380, Military Operations Staff. See assistant
382, 384–85, 389, 391–93, 395, 397–98, chief of staff, G–3 (operations); deputy
400–1, 406–7, 409, 411–12, 423–24, chief of staff (military operations);
428, 430, 433–34, 436–37, 440, 447–48, deputy chief of staff (operations).
451–53, 462–63, 467. See also secretary military police (MP) units, 65, 171, 220,
of defense. 291–2, 364, 365, 415, 448
MDLC. See commands, U.S. Army, 502d MP Co, 438
Material Development and Logistic 503d MP Bn, 415
Cmd (MDLC). 716th MP Bn, 415
Medal of Honor, 294 720th MP Bn, 213, 415
Medaris, Maj. Gen. John B., 156, 157, 162, military-industrial complex, 333, 354
204–5, 261–62, 264 Millett, Maj. Lewis H., 294
Meet the Press, 179 Milligan, Col. Mary L., 241, 242
Mekong Delta, 459 Milton, Hugh M., III, 127, 140, 224, 331.
Mekong River, 463 See also assistant secretary of the
Meloy, General Guy S., Jr., 152, 168, 170, Army, manpower and reserve forces;
433–34. See also chief of information; undersecretary of the Army.
chief of public information. mine, M18 Claymore antipersonnel, 449
mental groups, 84, 223–24, 288 Mineral Wells, 172
Michaelis, Maj. Gen. John H., 170, 327. See Minnesota, 351, 411
also chief of legislative liaison. missile battalions. See artillery units.
Michigan, 98, 371, 401 Missile Command. See commands, U.S.
Mickelsen, Lt. Gen. Stanley R., 209 Army, Missile Cmd.
Middle East, 134, 144, 181–83, 221–22, missile commands. See commands, U.S.
256, 258, 266, 375, 386, 393, 427 Army.
Miksche, Lt. Col. Ferdinand O., 60–61 missile gap, 190, 196, 279, 297, 310, 351
Milburn, Lt. Gen. Frank W., 140 missile systems. See missiles.
Militant Liberty, 228 missiles. See also rockets; satellites; weapon
Military Air Transport Command. See systems; Wizard antimissile project.
commands, U.S. Army, Mil Air Ajax, 12, 25, 150, 157, 205, 260, 327, 394.
Transport Cmd. See also missiles, Nike.
Military Air Transport Service, 149, 290, Atlas, 190
329, 375, 444. See also U.S. Air Force, Bomarc, 120, 150–51, 154, 190, 205, 297
Mil Air Transport Service. Corporal, 25, 77, 78, 149, 160–61,
military assistance advisory groups 173–74, 176, 209, 237, 259
(MAAGs), 8, 30, 134–35, 138, 185, Dart, 208
221, 267–71, 280, 306, 327, 345, 424, Hawk, 158, 207, 208, 259, 308, 350,
434 420–21, 463
missiles—Continued Mudgett, Maj. Gen. Gilman C., 53, 123. See

Hercules, 150, 157, 190, 205, 206, 259– also chief of information.
60, 268, 297, 326–27, 350, 394, 421. See Munitions Command. See commands, U.S.
also missiles, Nike. Army, Munitions Cmd.
Jupiter, 154, 156, 189–90, 194, 204, Munsan-ni, 6, 8
261–62, 262, 263, 466 Murphy, Audie L., 124
Lacrosse, 208, 220, 258, 350 Mutual Defense Assistance Act, 133. See
Nike, 11, 12, 25, 76–77, 120, 150–52, 154, also U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance
157–58, 190, 205–6, 207, 207, 259–61, Program.
265, 268, 297–98, 308, 326–27, 350, Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
394–95, 401, 421, 449–50, 466. See See U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance
also missiles, Ajax; missiles, Hercules; Program.
missiles, Zeus.
Pershing, 259, 262, 350, 356, 379 NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space
Polaris, 156, 190, 275 Administration (NASA).
Redeye, 259, 379 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 144
Redstone, 149, 156, 173–74, 205, 259, Natchez, 416
262, 379 National Aeronautics and Space Act of
Sergeant, 258, 263–64, 447 1958, 264
SS10, 208 National Aeronautics and Space
SS11, 298, 300, 378 Administration (NASA), 263–64,
Talos, 150–51, 154 299–300, 302, 416, 466
Terrier, 150 National Day, 457
Thor, 190, 204, 263 National Guard, 3, 9, 11, 40–42, 50, 59,
Vanguard, 194, 263. See also satellites, 76, 86, 105, 127, 129, 131, 131n95,
Vanguard. 132–33, 138, 214, 286–87, 313, 328–29,
Zeus, 158, 190, 206, 207, 260–61, 265, 331, 333–34, 374, 376, 381, 390, 394,
298, 350, 395, 401, 449, 466. See also 410–12, 415, 422, 453–55. For specific
missiles, Nike. units, see artillery units; divisions. See
Mississippi, 415–16, 453 also National Guard Bureau.
Mississippi National Guard, 415 National Guard Bureau, 16, 334, 402, 455.
Mississippi River, 416 See also National Guard.
Missouri, 50, 60, 199, 279, 411 National Guard–Reserve Command, 313
Mitchell, Billy, 189 National Housing Act of 1955, 126
Mobile Forces concept, 204 National Liberation Front, 304
Modern Army Needs. See projects, MAN national military policy (program,
(Modern Army Needs). strategy), 93, 99–100, 297, 351
Modern Army Supply System. See projects, National Reserve Plan, 129
MASS (Modern Army Supply System). National Security Act of 1947, 1
modern mobile Army (MOMAR), 290, national security adviser, 363, 384, 458
291–92, 320–21, 364, 435 National Security Council, 14, 18, 21, 90,
Mohawk. See aircraft, AO–1 Mohawk. 106, 145, 192, 314, 345, 351
MOMAR. See modern mobile Army National Security Training Commission,
(MOMAR). 40, 42
Montagnards, 457 National War College, 177. See also U.S.
Montana, 411 Army War College.
Moore, Lt. Gen. James E., 247. See Nationalist Chinese forces. See Chinese
also deputy chief of staff (military Nationalist forces.
operations). NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
mortars, 89, 110–11, 161, 166, 169, 204, Organization (NATO).
238, 246, 373, 450 Naval Air Station Key West, 293, 420
81-mm., 110 Navarre, Lt. Gen. Henri E., 88
4.2-inch, 65, 67–68, 110, 165, 248 Navy Department. See Department of the
MOSs. See military occupational Navy.
specialties. Navy, U.S. See chief of naval operations;
Department of the Navy; Naval Air
Station Key West; secretary of the
Navy; U.S. Navy; U.S. Navy Second
Fleet; U.S. Navy, Europe.
INDEX 507
Near East, 385 Office of the Adjutant General. See

Nebraska, 411 Adjutant General’s Office.
Neely, Brig. Gen. Robert B., 376. See also Office of Armed Forces Information and
assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics). Education, 31
Nevada, 111, 411 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1
New Guinea, 311 (Personnel). See assistant chief of staff,
New Jersey, 35, 50–51, 59, 326, 413 G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff
New Mexico, 207, 262 (personnel).
New York, 132, 327 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2
New York Times, 40, 46, 94, 144, 146, 172, (Intelligence). See assistant chief of
192, 235 staff, G–2 (intelligence).
New York World Telegram and Sun, 247 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3
New Zealand, 269 (Operations). See assistant chief of
Newport, 152 staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of
Ngô Đình Diệm, 92, 186, 270–71, 338, 382, staff (military operations); deputy chief
457, 457–58, 460–61 of staff (operations).
Ngô Đình Nhu, 460 Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4
Nhu, Madame. See Trần Lệ Xuân. (Logistics). See assistant chief of staff,
Nhu, Ngô Đình. See Ngô Đình Nhu. G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff
Nickerson, Col. John C., Jr., 189 (logistics).
Nike missile. See missiles, Nike. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the
Nitze, Paul H., 343, 352 Army. See assistant secretary of the
Nixon, Richard M., 52, 88, 273, 309, 331. Army.
See also vice president of the United Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces.
States. See Army Field Forces; chief of Army
Noncommissioned Officer Corps, 285–86 Field Forces.
NORAD. See North American Air Defense Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve
Command (NORAD). and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps
Norstad, General Lauris, 257, 370–72 Affairs. See chief of the Army Reserve.
North Africa. See Africa. Office of the Chief of Information. See chief
North American Air Defense Command of information.
(NORAD), 236 Office of the Chief of Military History. See
North Atlantic Treaty (1949), 2 chief of military history.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Office of the Chief of Psychological
(NATO), 8, 48, 50, 105–6, 116, 129, Warfare. See chief of psychological
132–34, 144, 161, 172, 175, 211, warfare.
217–19, 237, 249–50, 257, 269, 280, Office of the Chief of Research and
293, 295, 331, 367–68, 376, 406, 448 Development. See chief of research and
North Carolina, 59, 62, 63, 73–75, 133, development.
182–83, 215, 255, 266, 293, 326, 328, Office of the Comptroller of the Army. See
346, 352, 372, 384, 386, 393, 395, 423, comptroller of the Army.
427, 427, 431, 448 Office of Defense Mobilization, 43, 129
North German Plain, 296 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
North Korea, 1, 7, 32–33, 56. See also (Logistics). See assistant chief of staff,
Korea; South Korea. G–4 (logistics); deputy chief of staff
North Vietnam, 306, 347, 382–83, 387, 458. (logistics).
See also Vietnam. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Military
Northern Area Command. See commands, Operations). See assistant chief of staff,
U.S. Army, Northern Area Cmd. G–3 (operations); deputy chief of staff
nuclear projectile. See Davy Crockett (military operations); deputy chief of
weapon system. staff (operations).
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
Oakes, Lt. Gen. John C., 322, 334, 338. (Operations). See assistant chief of
See also deputy chief of staff (military staff, G–3 (operations); deputy chief of
operations). staff (military operations); deputy chief
O’Daniel, Lt. Gen. John W., 136–37, 185–86 of staff (operations).
Oden, Brig. Gen. Delk M., 395
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff Operations Research Office (Johns Hopkins
(Personnel). See assistant chief of staff, University), 60
G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff Operations Staff, 29, 184, 296, 314. See
(personnel). also assistant chief of staff, G–3
Office of Foreign Military Affairs, 186 (operations).
Office of the Inspector General. See Operations and Training Branch, 179
inspector general. Ordnance Corps. See U.S. Army Ordnance
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See Joint Corps.
Chiefs of Staff. Ordnance Tank-Automotive Command.
Office of Legislative Liaison and Public See commands, U.S. Army, Ord Tank-
Information, 97. See also legislative Automotive Cmd.
liaison; public information. Organization and Training Division, 38
Office of Price Administration, 353 Osgood, Robert E., 195, 210
Office of Public Information. See chief of Oswald, Lee Harvey, 461
information; public information. Otter. See aircraft, U–1A Otter.
Office of the Quartermaster General, 16, Ovnand, M. Sgt. Chester M., 304
82, 102 Oxford, 415, 453
Heraldic Br, 177
Office of Reserve Components, 455. See Pace, Frank C., Jr., 3, 20, 73, 151, 155, 398.
also assistant chief of staff (reserve See also secretary of the Army.
components). Pace-Finletter agreements (accords), 155,
Office of the Secretary of the Army. See 398. See also Finletter, Thomas K.;
secretary of the Army. Pace, Frank C., Jr.
Office of the Secretary of Defense. See Pacific Command. See commands, unified,
secretary of defense. U.S. Pacific Cmd.
Office of the Special Assistant for Pakistan, 186, 222, 269
Intergroup Relations, 453 Palmer, General Williston B., 80–81, 97,
Office of Strategic Services, 74, 138, 337 101, 103, 125, 127, 170, 223. See also
Ogden, Lt. Gen. David A. D., 221 assistant chief of staff, G–4 (logistics);
Okinawa, 266, 306, 339–40, 426, 435. See vice chief of staff of the Army.
also Japan. Panama, 293, 328, 386, 426, 435
Oklahoma, 72, 209, 214, 441 Canal Zone, 59, 105, 328, 386
Old Baldy, 6 Panamanian National Guard, 328
Old Guard. See infantry regiments and Panmunjom, 1
battle groups, 3d Inf, 1st Battle Gp. parallels
One Army, 286–87 15th, 463
O’Neill, Maj. Gen. Edward J., 186. See also 17th, 91
deputy chief of staff (logistics). Paris, 344, 362
Ontos, 79 Parker, Sgt. Ben, 57
Opa-locka, 418 Parker, Lt. Gen. Theodore W., 404, 436.
OPD. See divisions, Operations Div. See also deputy chief of staff (military
Operation Plan Swaggerstick, 182–83, operations).
256 Parks, Lt. Gen. Floyd L., 26, 54. See also
operations. See also exercises; Operation chief of information.
Plan Swaggerstick; projects; Partridge, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 35.
Rotaplan. See also assistant chief of staff, G–2
Alert, 176 (intelligence).
Big Lift, 437, 438–39, 440 Pasadena, 262
Gyroscope, 85, 86n83, 104, 172, 184, Pate, General Randolph M., 234
196, 200, 217–18, 239, 363, 409 Pathet Lao, 306, 339, 345
Little Switch, 7, 8 Patrick Air Force Base. See Air Force bases,
Long Thrust II, 408. See also exercises, Patrick.
Long Thrust. Patton, General George S., 429
Market Garden, 375, 444 Patton tanks. See tanks, M47; tanks, M48.
Searchlight, 303 Pearson, Drew, 26
Operations Division. See divisions, Peninsula Base Command. See commands,
Operations Div. U.S. Army, Peninsula Base Cmd.
Operations Research Center, 252
INDEX 509
Pennsylvania, 70, 177, 327, 411, 421 Preparedness Committee. See Senate
pentagonal atomic-nonatomic. See Armed Services Committee’s
PENTANA. Subcommittee on Preparedness.
PENTANA, 115, 164–65, 167, 170 president of the United States. See
pentomic divisions, 170, 196–204, 246–47, Eisenhower, Dwight D; Johnson,
265, 271, 289–90, 320–21, 387, 446, Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Truman,
465, 467–68 Harry S. See also White House.
pentomic model (organization, structure), Price Administration Office. See Office of
172–73, 194, 201–4, 228, 244–48, 290, Price Administration.
302, 308, 315, 320, 322, 364, 366, 392, prisoners of war (POWs), 7, 8, 32–34, 51,
433 56–57, 139–41
People’s Army, 1 Procter & Gamble Company, 193
People’s Volunteer Army, 1 Programs and Analysis Group, 102
Pershing missile. See missiles, Pershing. Programs Evaluation Office, 269, 306, 345
Personnel Assignment Directorate, 334 projects. See also exercises; Operation
personnel carriers, 110–11, 202, 290, 315, Plan Swaggerstick; operations;
322, 367, 370, 377, 439 Rotaplan.
M59, 78, 446 80, 358, 400, 405
M75, 446 Ammo, 259
M113, 446 Hotfoot, 306
Personnel Staff. See assistant chief of staff, MAN (Modern Army Needs), 330–34
G–1 (personnel); deputy chief of staff Mass (Modern Army Supply System),
(personnel). 318
Peru, 327 Molecular, 306–7
Philadelphia, 177, 327 Vista, 26, 78, 404
Philippines, 137–38, 186, 269–70, 337, 340, Pruitt, Lt. Gen. Donald L., 260
347 psychological warfare, 29–30, 73–76, 338,
Phouma, Prince Souvanna, 306 346, 386, 391, 425. See also chief of
Physical Achievement Test, 223 psychological warfare.
Pierson, Maj. Gen. Albert, 242 U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center,
Plans Division, 20, 195 73
Plans Staff. See assistant chief of staff, public information, 53–54, 82, 86, 97, 121,
G–3 (Operations); assistant chief of 143, 152, 253, 259, 366, 402, 416. See
staff for plans; deputy chief of staff also chief of information; legislative
(military operations); deputy chief of liaison.
staff (operations); deputy chief of staff Puerto Rico, 59, 329
(plans); deputy chief of staff (plans and Pyongyang, 30
operations); deputy chief of staff (plans
and research); deputy chief of staff Quarles, Donald A., 117–18, 120, 149, 261,
(plans, programs, and systems). 264, 274. See also assistant secretary of
Poland, 91, 144, 180 defense; deputy secretary of defense;
Polaris missile. See missiles, Polaris. secretary of the Air Force.
Pope Air Force Base. See Air Force bases, Quartermaster General. See Office of the
Pope. Quartermaster General.
Porter, Maj. Gen. Robert W., Jr., 334, Quemoy, 122, 144, 267
386. See also deputy chief of staff
(personnel). radars
Powell, General Herbert B., 56, 227, 320– AN/PPS4 short-range, 245
21, 332, 364, 366, 372–73, 379, 404, AN/TPS21 medium-range, 245
418, 420, 423, 433. See also assistant Radford, Admiral Arthur W., 17, 18, 21,
chief of staff, G–1 (personnel); 25, 46–47, 89, 106, 122–23, 129–30,
commands, U.S. Army, U.S. 146, 172, 174–75, 191–93, 195, 209,
Continental Army Cmd (CONARC), 228, 232. See also chairman of the Joint
commanding general. Chiefs of Staff.
Power, General Thomas S., 310 Radford Plan, 146, 175, 192
POWs. See prisoners of war (POWs). Radio Corporation of America (RCA), 260,
332
Radio-Television Branch, 179 development; deputy chief of staff

Rainbow Division. See divisions, 42d Inf (research and development); Research
Div. and Development Command.
Ranger School. See U.S. Army Ranger research and development, assistant
School. secretary of defense for. See assistant
Rangers. See U.S. Army Rangers. secretary of defense, research and
RCA. See Radio Corporation of America development.
(RCA). Research and Development Command,
Ready Force, 211. See also Joint Ready 310, 319
Force. Reserve Forces Act
Ready Reserve, 40, 130–31, 286, 369–70. of 1952, 40
See also Army Reserve; General of 1955, 128–33
Reserve; Immediate Reserve; Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC),
Reinforcing Reserve; Retired Reserve; 16, 95, 203, 243, 284, 334, 381, 402, 455
Standby Reserve. Reston, James B., 144
Reber, Maj. Gen. Miles, 27. See also chief of Retired Reserve, 40. See also Army Reserve;
legislative liaison. General Reserve; Immediate Reserve;
Reckord, Maj. Gen. Milton A., 287. See also Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Reserve;
Adjutant General’s Office. Standby Reserve.
recoilless rifle, 106-mm., 79 Revolt of the Admirals, 18
Recondo School, 294 Revolutionary War, 45
reconnaissance and commando, 294 Rhee, Syngman, 220
Red River Delta, 88 Rhine River, 296, 407
Redeye weapon. See missiles, Redeye. Rhode Island, 152, 411
Reds, the, 351 Rich, Maj. Gen. Maxwell E., 411. See also
Redstone Arsenal, 156, 189, 260, 262–63 Adjutant General’s Office.
Redstone missile. See missiles, Redstone. Richardson, Lt. Gen. James L., Jr., 453. See
regimental bands. See bands. also deputy chief of staff (personnel).
Regular Army, 1, 38, 45, 241, 243, 287, 374, Ridgway, General Matthew B., 18–20, 21,
405, 426 22–25, 24, 29, 31, 33–35, 39, 42–43,
Rehkamp, Pfc. Glenn W., 461 47–51, 53–54, 56–57, 59, 63–64,
Reinforcing Reserve, 454. See also Army 69–70, 72, 76, 79, 81, 83, 85, 89–90,
Reserve; General Reserve; Immediate 92–96, 97, 98, 109–11, 118, 121–22,
Reserve; Ready Reserve; Retired 125, 129–30, 133, 145, 148, 164, 249,
Reserve; Standby Reserve. 307, 310–11, 331, 342, 434, 451, 469.
Reinhardt, Col. George C., 60 See also chief of staff of the Army.
Reorganization of the Airborne Division Ridgway-model utility cap, 451
(ROTAD), 165, 166 rifles
Reorganization of Combat Infantry AK47, 447
Division (ROCID), 169, 244–45 AR15, 447–48
Reorganization of the Current Armored Browning automatic, 161
Division (ROCAD), 170, 171 M1, 161, 447
Reorganization Objective Army Division M14, 161, 378, 447–48
(ROAD), 364, 365, 366–67, 374, 377, M15, 161
387, 391–92, 396, 411–12, 433–36, 441, M16, 448, 448
444, 446, 454, 468 M16A1, 449
Reorganization Plan No. 6, 17, 28 Río Hato, 293
Republic of Congo, 345 ROAD. See Reorganization Objective Army
Republic of Korea (ROK), 136, 434. See also Division.
Korea; ROK (Republic of Korea) units. Robertson, Reuben H., Jr., 153. See also
Republic of Vietnam. See Vietnam. deputy secretary of defense.
research and development. See ROCAD. See Reorganization of the Current
Air Force units, Research and Armored Division (ROCAD).
Development Cmd; Army Research ROCID. See Reorganization of Combat
and Development Board; assistant Infantry Division (ROCID).
secretary of defense, research and Rockefeller, Nelson A., 17
development; chief of research and rocket launchers, 165, 248. See also rockets.
INDEX 511
rocket pods. See rockets. Seaton, Frederick A, 113. See also assistant
rockets. See also missiles; satellites; weapon secretary of defense.
systems. Second Army. See armies, Second Army.
4.5-inch rocket pods, 441 secretary of the Air Force, 117, 149, 151,
Honest John, 25, 77, 115, 149, 160, 165, 261. See also Finletter, Thomas K.;
168, 170, 173–74, 176, 182, 202, 207, Quarles, Donald A.
209, 237, 245, 248, 259, 364, 447 secretary of the Army, 16, 19, 20, 35, 37,
Little John, 173, 208, 220, 258, 350, 442 40, 45, 49, 72–73, 80, 82, 92, 94, 97, 98,
M72 LAW (light antitank weapon), 449, 100–1, 113, 123, 133, 144, 151, 240,
449 242, 260, 279, 286, 303, 312, 316, 319,
Roderick, George H., 319. See also assistant 334, 340, 353, 355, 357, 373, 385, 396,
secretary of the Army. 399, 400–1, 402, 405. See also assistant
ROK (Republic of Korea) units. See also secretary of the Army; Brucker, Wilber
Korea; Republic of Korea (ROK). M.; Pace, Frank C., Jr.; Stahr, Elvis J.,
First ROK Army, 434 Jr.; Stevens, Robert T.; undersecretary
ROK VI Corps, 434 of the Army; Vance, Cyrus R.
Rokossovsky, Konstantin, 180 secretary of defense, 14, 15, 17–18, 21,
Rose Bowl, 240 23–24, 31, 36, 38–39, 46–49, 57,
Rosson, Maj. Gen. William B., 395, 424, 79–80, 83–84, 89, 94, 97, 100–1,
427 106, 122, 140, 146, 149, 151, 154–55,
Rostow, Walt W., 363, 382, 428 157, 189, 191, 193, 205–6, 222, 228,
ROTAD. See Reorganization of the 231–33, 235, 260–61, 263, 274, 276,
Airborne Division (ROTAD). 278, 297, 306, 311, 313, 331, 335, 337,
Rotaplan, 363, 409–10, 436 344–45, 349, 352, 354, 354–58, 370,
Rotary, 52 378, 384, 395–96, 401, 406, 412, 422,
rotary-wing aircraft, 71–72, 117, 148, 424, 430, 433, 436–37, 463. See also
377, 466. See also aircraft; fixed-wing assistant secretary of defense; deputy
aircraft. assistant secretary of defense; deputy
ROTC. See Reserve Officers’ Training secretary of defense; Gates, Thomas
Corps (ROTC). S., Jr.; Johnson, Louis A.; Lovett,
Ruddy, Cmd. Sgt. Maj. Francis J., 461 Robert A.; Marshall, General George
Ruffner, Lt. Gen. Clark L., 255 C., Jr.; McElroy, Neil H.; McNamara,
Rusk, D. Dean, 359, 384. See also secretary Robert S.; undersecretary of defense;
of state. U.S. Department of Defense; Wilson,
Russell, Richard B., 33, 234 Charles E.
Ryukyu Islands Command. See commands, secretary of the Navy, 274, 310. See also
U.S. Army, U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Franke, William B.; Gates, Thomas S.,
Cmd. Jr.
secretary of state. See Dulles, John Foster;
Sahara, 386 Herter, Christian A.; Rusk, D. Dean.
Saigon, 88, 90, 138, 271, 304, 307, 340, 457, See also State Department.
461 secretary of the treasury, 14, 21. See also
Saltonstall, Leverett M., 86 Department of the Treasury.
San Marcos, 72, 172 selective service, 37, 43, 54, 60, 284, 288,
Sanderson, Frank K., 276 455
satellites, 14, 156, 190, 194–96, 205, 217, Selective Service Act, 284
258, 261, 263, 265, 299, 300, 466. See Selective Service System, 43
also missiles; rockets; weapon systems. self-propelled howitzers. See artillery
Explorer 1, 261, 262, 263 pieces.
Explorer 3, 263 semiautomatic rifles. See rifles.
Sputnik, 190, 194, 196, 228, 232, 259, Senate Appropriations Committee, 46,
279, 295 122. See also House Appropriations
Vanguard, 261. See also missiles, Committee; House Subcommittee
Vanguard. on Defense Appropriations;
Schine, Pvt. G. David, 51 Senate Defense Appropriations
Schofield Barracks, 59 Subcommittee.
Schriever, Lt. Gen. Bernard A., 204, 310
Senate Armed Services Committee, 33, 130, Sky Crane. See aircraft, CH–54 Sky Crane.
194, 234, 297, 310, 361, 462. See also Skysweeper antiaircraft weapon system, 9,
House Armed Services Committee. 76, 77
Senate Armed Services Committee’s Slezak, John, 48, 80. See also assistant
Subcommittee on Preparedness, 86, secretary of the Army; Slezak Plan;
205, 216, 314 undersecretary of the Army.
Senate Defense Appropriations Slezak Plan, 80–81, 82, 101. See also Slezak,
Subcommittee, 260. See also John.
House Appropriations Committee; Smith, Margaret Chase, 447
House Subcommittee on Defense solid-fuel ballistic missiles. See missiles.
Appropriations; Senate Appropriations South America, 30, 135, 389
Committee. South Asia, 385
Senate Democratic Caucus, 462 South Carolina, 59, 62, 133, 192, 199, 284,
Senate Preparedness Committee. See 326, 374, 411, 443
Senate Armed Services Committee’s South Korea, 96, 135, 220, 433. See also
Subcommittee on Preparedness. Korea; North Korea.
Senate Preparedness Subcommittee. See South Vietnam, 91–92, 136–38, 185–87,
Senate Armed Services Committee’s 221, 267, 269–71, 304, 337–38, 342,
Subcommittee on Preparedness. 346, 363, 382–83, 385, 423, 428–29,
Senior Army Reserve Commanders 434, 456–57, 457, 459–61, 463. See also
Association, 40 Vietnam.
Seoul, 30 South Vietnamese Army, xiii, 271, 304,
Sergeant Bilko, 124, 124–25 337–38, 384, 459
Sergeant missile. See missiles, Sergeant. 7th Inf Div, 304, 459
service chiefs, 18, 49, 66, 89, 102, 145–47, Southeast Asia, 88, 90–92, 187, 267–71,
191, 232, 234–36, 255, 275, 313, 306–7, 314, 330, 337, 339–40, 342, 345,
319–20, 358, 400. See also Air Force 347–48, 358, 363, 366, 372, 382–87,
chief of staff; chief of naval operations; 389, 394, 396, 423, 430, 463, 467–68
chief of staff of the Army; Joint Chiefs Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
of Staff; technical service chiefs. 269
service schools, 81, 83, 86, 103, 134, 203, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, 267,
221, 302, 373, 380, 468 339–40, 372, 382, 463
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, 37, 310 Southern Area Command. See commands,
Sevareid, A. Eric, 279 U.S. Army, Southern Area Cmd.
Seventh Army. See armies, Seventh Army. Southern European Task Force, 209, 217
Shawnee. See aircraft, H–21 Shawnee. Soviet Army, 236, 315
Shepherd, General Lemuel C., Jr., 19, 21 Soviet Bloc, 29, 265
Sherburne, Maj. Gen. Thomas L., 104. Soviet Union, 3, 14, 22, 30, 39, 69, 94, 138,
See also assistant chief of staff, G–1 146, 180, 183, 194, 217, 249, 279, 294,
(personnel). 296–97, 300, 310, 314, 339, 344–45,
Sherman tanks. See tanks, M4. 351, 394, 405
short-range missiles. See missiles. Spaatz, General Carl A., 157
Sicily, 429 special forces, 26, 30, 73–74, 138–39, 215,
Sides, V. Adm. John H., 331 265–67, 306, 338, 346–47, 352, 368,
signal units, 65, 67–68, 132, 165, 166, 167, 383, 386, 390–91, 426–27, 426–27, 448,
169, 171, 201, 209, 268, 292, 364, 365, 450, 461, 462, 468
429 special forces (SF) groups
53d Sig Bn, 213 1st SF Gp, 215, 266, 306–7, 339
54th Sig Bn, 213–14 7th SF Gp, 346
Silvers, Phil, 124, 125 10th SF Gp, 73, 139, 215, 282
Sink, Lt. Gen. Robert F., 254–55, 417 77th SF Gp, 74, 113, 215, 266, 307
Sioux. See aircraft, H–13 Sioux. special warfare, 215–16, 265–67, 302, 337,
Sixth U.S. Army. See armies, Sixth U.S. 353, 386, 395, 423–25, 427, 427, 443
Army. Special Warfare Center. See U.S. Army
sky cavalry, 117–18, 153, 155, 173, 179, 202. Special Warfare Center and School.
See also air cavalry; cavalry regiments Special Warfare School. See U.S. Army
and companies; divisions; U.S. Cavalry. Special Warfare Center and School.
INDEX 513
Special Warfare Training Center. See U.S. Stuttgart, 354

Army Special Warfare Center and sub-limited warfare, 382–87
School. submarine-launched missile systems. See
Sperry Gyroscope Company, 260 missiles.
Spesbach, 439 submarines, 156, 190, 276
Spivak, Lawrence, 179 Suez Canal, 180, 221–22
Sputnik. See satellites, Sputnik. Suez Crisis, 183, 210
spy planes. See aircraft. supply aircraft. See aircraft.
SS10 missile. See missiles, SS10. Supply and Maintenance Command. See
SS11 missile. See missiles, SS11. commands, U.S. Army, Supply and
Stahr, Elvis J., Jr., 353, 355, 357, 374, Maintenance Cmd.
377–78, 385, 390, 395, 399, 399, 401, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 19,
416. See also secretary of the Army. 22, 55, 89, 195, 370, 439–40
Stalin, Joseph, 144 Supreme Commander, Allied
Standby Reserve, 40. See also Army Expeditionary Forces, Europe, 95
Reserve; General Reserve; Immediate Supreme Court, 86
Reserve; Ready Reserve; Reinforcing Supreme Headquarters Allied
Reserve; Retired Reserve. Expeditionary Force headquarters, 74
Stanford Research Institute, 260 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers,
State Department, 180, 210, 339, 345–46. Europe, 8, 331
See also secretary of state. surface-to-air missiles. See missiles.
Policy Planning Staff, 363 surface-to-surface nuclear rockets. See
Stennis, John C., 224 rockets.
Stevens, Robert T., 19, 20, 23, 28–29, 35, surveillance aircraft. See aircraft.
37, 45, 49–52, 57, 95, 97, 98. See also survivor benefits plan, 85
secretary of the Army. swagger sticks, 180, 227
Stevenson, Adlai E., II, 343, 359 Swaggerstick. See Operation Plan
Stewart, Jimmy, 124 Swaggerstick
Stover, Sfc. Charles W., 107 Switzerland, 90–91, 136, 276
STRAC. See Strategic Army Corps Sylvester, Arthur, 417
(STRAC). Symington, William S., 279, 296–97, 310,
STRAF. See Strategic Army Forces 313, 343
(STRAF). Symington Committee, 344, 357
Strategic Air Command. See commands, Syria, 222
unified, Strategic Air Cmd.
Strategic Air Command (motion picture), tables of organization and equipment, 26,
124 64–65, 76, 107, 110, 167–68, 199, 397,
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), 211–14, 441
220, 236, 238–39, 253–58, 270, 280, Tactical Air Command, U.S. Air Force. See
290, 293–94, 307, 324, 327, 329, 369– Air Force units, Tactical Air Cmd.
70, 372, 375, 393–94. See also Strategic Tactical Command, 313
Army Forces (STRAF). Tactical Mobility Requirements Board. See
Strategic Army Force, 181, 211. See also Army Tactical Mobility Requirements
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC); Board (Howze Board).
Strategic Army Forces (STRAF). Taiwan, 122, 135, 144–45, 181, 186,
Strategic Army Forces (STRAF), 211–12, 267–68, 296
239, 253, 369–71, 463. See also Strait, 122, 267
Strategic Army Corps (STRAC). Taiwan Defense Command. See
Strategic Command, 313 commands, U.S. Army, Taiwan Def
Strategy of Peace, 342 Cmd.
Strauss, Franz Josef, 367 Talos missile. See missiles, Talos.
STRICOM. See commands, unified, U.S. Tan Son Nhut, 340, 385, 461
Strike Cmd (STRICOM). Tank Battalion, 723d, 111
Strike Command. See commands, unified, tanks
U.S. Strike Cmd (STRICOM). M4, 446
Stuart light tanks. See tanks, M5. M5, 268
Sturgis, Lt. Gen. Samuel D., 416 M41, 268
tanks—Continued transportation companies, 165

M47, 78 8th Trans Co, 384
M48, 78, 446 57th Trans Co, 384
M48A3, 216 163d Trans Co, 214
M60, 161, 378, 446 Transportation Corps. See Army
M60A1, 379, 446 Transportation Corps.
Taylor, General Maxwell D., 32, 96–100, Traub, Maj. Gen. David W., 315
97, 105–6, 111, 115–17, 120, 122, Treasury Department. See Department of
125–26, 137, 143, 148, 151–52, 156, the Treasury.
158, 164–65, 167, 170, 172–75, 178–79, treasury secretary. See secretary of the
181, 186–87, 193, 199, 202, 204–6, treasury.
208–11, 213–14, 221–22, 224–26, 236, Troop Program, 75, 240
240, 242–43, 246–51, 253–56, 261, 267, Troxel, Maj. Gen. Orlando C., Jr., 265–66,
270–71, 275, 278–79, 284–86, 289, 413
295–96, 309–13, 330, 342–43, 349, 354, trucks, 111, 153, 241, 282, 372–73, 423, 438
360–61, 361n63, 363, 366, 382, 392, M35 2½-ton, 446
423, 428, 468–69. See also chief of staff 5-ton, 63
of the Army. 10-ton, 372
Coordinating Group, 102, 155 Trudeau, Lt. Gen. Arthur G., 264, 319–20
Taylor-Rostow Mission, 382 Truman, Harry S., 2, 39, 133, 218, 381, 455.
report, 428 See also president of the United States.
Technological Capabilities Panel. See administration, 37, 343
Killian Committee. Tucker, Brig. Gen. Reuben H., III, 334
technical service chiefs, 66, 102, 255, 319– Turkey, 186, 217, 434
20, 358, 400. See also service chiefs. Twenty-Second Amendment, 342
technical services, 28, 80, 83, 213, 319–20, Twining, General Nathan F., 19, 21, 145,
357 150–51, 192–93, 193, 196, 311–12,
Teller, Edward, 194 330–31, 337. See also Air Force chief
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, of staff; chairman of the Joint Chiefs
185, 346 of Staff.
Tennessee, 132, 359
Terrier missile. See missiles, Terrier. Uncertain Trumpet, The, 312
Test and Evaluation Agency, 401 undersecretary of the Army, 16, 80, 82, 331,
Texas, 26, 59, 72, 106, 108, 113, 133, 152, 334, 353, 384, 402, 415. See also Ailes,
172, 196, 199, 209, 213–14, 218, 239, Stephen; assistant secretary of the
259, 279–80, 298, 371, 374, 391, 393, Army; Milton, Hugh M. III; secretary
413, 420, 437, 438, 461 of the Army; Slezak, John.
Thailand, 269, 307, 340, 383, 430, 434 undersecretary of defense. See also assistant
Third U.S. Army. See armies, Third U.S. secretary of defense; deputy assistant
Army. secretary of defense; deputy secretary
This Is Your Life, 179 of defense; secretary of defense; U.S.
Thor program. See missiles, Thor. Department of Defense.
Thủ Đức, 137 acquisition, technology, and logistics,
Today show, 179 251
Toftoy, Maj. Gen. Holger N., 297 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 131, 335,
Tolson, Col. John J., 71 414
Trainfire target system, 216 United Nations, 1, 181–83, 359, 434
training centers, 1, 98, 29, 42, 104–5, 134, Command, 1, 7, 219–20, 270, 433
137, 216, 222, 224, 280, 284, 286, General Assembly, 180
370–71, 386, 391, 412–13 Security Council, 182
Training Circular 20–1, 298 United States Army Band, 350. See also
Training Relations and Instruction bands.
Mission, 136, 184 universal military training, 4, 40, 42–43,
Trần Lệ Xuân, 458 128, 131
transport aircraft. See aircraft. University of California, Berkeley, 352
transport planes. See aircraft. University of Mississippi, 415
INDEX 515
U.S. Air Force, 3–4, 19, 26, 37n61, 50–51, U.S. Army commands. See commands, U.S.
58, 60, 62–63, 71–73, 76–77, 79, 100, Army.
106, 112–24, 140, 142, 145, 147–57, U.S. Army Europe Communications Zone.
159, 163, 172, 175, 177, 181–83, See U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR),
189–90, 192–93, 204–6, 213–14, Communications Zone.
219, 235, 251, 255, 257–61, 263–64, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, 5, 48, 59, 219
295–301, 306, 310–11, 313, 317, 326– U.S. Army Forces, Taiwan, 268
28, 335, 337, 345, 374–76, 378, 393, U.S. Army Infantry Center, 170, 216, 227,
395, 397–98, 418, 421, 437, 439, 443, 395, 449
447–48, 458, 465–66, 469. See also Air U.S. Army Ordnance Corps, 450
Force bases; Air Force chief of staff; U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center.
Air Force units; Air Force vice chief of See psychological warfare, U.S. Army
staff; secretary of the Air Force; service Psychological Warfare Center.
chiefs. U.S. Army Ranger School, 294
Association, 125 U.S. Army Rangers, 228, 333, 353, 383
Europe, 375 U.S. Army Special Forces. See special
Mil Air Transport Service, 329. See also forces; special forces (SF) groups.
Military Air Transport Service. U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and
U.S. Army, Alaska, 8, 327, 367 School, 386, 423, 427, 443. See also
U.S. Army, Caribbean. See commands, U.S. special warfare.
Army, U.S. Army Caribbean Cmd. U.S. Army War College, 70, 115, 164, 287.
U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), 7, 20, 134, See also National War College.
139, 174, 182–83, 217, 237–38, 256–58, U.S. Caribbean Command. See commands,
266, 316, 320–22, 363, 369–71, 375, unified, U.S. Caribbean Cmd.
377, 399, 406–8, 435, 437, 456 U.S. Cavalry, 70–71, 119, 201, 416. See also
commanding general, 139, 217, 237, air cavalry; cavalry regiments and
257, 266, 316, 320, 322, 363, 370, 408, companies; divisions; sky cavalry.
435. See also Clarke, General Bruce C.; U.S. Congress, 17–18, 24, 26–27, 33, 37,
Freeman, General Paul L., Jr.; Hodes, 39–40, 45, 50, 52, 54, 85, 89–90, 97–98,
General Henry I.; McAuliffe, General 100, 104, 106, 122, 126, 128, 130,
Anthony C. 144–46, 149, 152, 170, 175–77, 179–80,
Communications Zone, 7, 238, 437 192–94, 205, 224, 227, 232, 234, 236,
U.S. Army, Japan, 219 240, 258, 260–61, 263–64, 278–80, 288,
U.S. Army, Pacific, 8, 59, 220, 238, 269–70, 297, 300, 311–12, 329, 331, 334–35,
278, 285, 306–7, 333, 339, 367–68, 430 342, 357, 359, 361, 368–69, 373, 393,
U.S. Army, Ryukyu Islands Command. See 400–1, 412, 414, 440, 452, 455, 458,
commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army, 462, 469
Ryukyu Islands Cmd. U.S. Constabulary, 2
U.S. Army Air Corps, 3, 120, 352 U.S. Continental Army Command
U.S. Army Air Defense Command. See (CONARC). See commands, U.S.
commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army Air Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd
Def Cmd. (CONARC).
U.S. Army Anti-Aircraft Command. See U.S. Department of Commerce, 20
commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army U.S. Department of Defense, 2, 14–15, 17–
Anti-Aircraft Cmd. 18, 24, 26, 31, 33, 43, 46, 48, 53, 63, 85,
U.S. Army Audit Agency, 393, 410 87, 93, 96–98, 120, 127, 137, 140, 149,
U.S. Army Band. See United States Army 181, 186, 190, 194–95, 199, 207, 210,
Band. 219, 223–24, 226–27, 231–36, 240, 255,
U.S. Army Caribbean Command. See 260–61, 263–64, 267, 269, 276, 280,
commands, U.S. Army, U.S. Army 297, 313, 315–16, 330, 343–44, 352–54,
Caribbean Cmd. 356–58, 366, 368, 375, 377, 380, 385,
U.S. Army Combat Development 389, 399, 413–14, 417–18, 428, 448,
Experimentation Center. See Combat 451, 469. See also assistant secretary of
Development Experimentation Center. defense; deputy assistant secretary of
U.S. Army Command and General Staff defense; deputy secretary of defense;
College, 60–62, 251, 287, 320, 435 secretary of defense; undersecretary of
defense.
U.S. Department of State. See State V Corps. See corps, V Corps.

Department. Vance, Cyrus R., 352, 399, 399, 448. See
U.S. European Command. See commands, also general counsel; secretary of the
unified, U.S. European Cmd. Army.
U.S. Forces, Japan, 219 Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., 19. See also
U.S. Forces, Korea, 219, 434 Air Force chief of staff.
U.S. Information Agency, 75 Vanguard missile. See missiles, Vanguard.
U.S. MAAGs. See military assistance Vanguard satellite. See satellites, Vanguard.
advisory groups (MAAGs). Vann, Col. John P., 459, 460
U.S. Marine Corps, 19, 38, 58, 100, 122–24, Vermont, 411
140, 147, 177, 234, 240, 256, 294, 343, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 54
377, 421, 423, 434, 448, 462 vice chief of staff, Air Force. See Air Force
U.S. Military Academy, 209, 243, 311, 350, vice chief of staff.
381 vice chief of staff of the Army, 16, 19–20,
Corps of Cadets, 350 54, 81, 82, 97, 101, 103, 127, 158, 170,
U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups. 209, 212, 220, 223, 240, 259, 276–77,
See military assistance advisory groups 311, 321–22, 326, 340, 354, 371, 373,
(MAAGs). 386, 402, 413, 423, 456. See also Bolte;
U.S. Military Assistance Command, General Charles L.; chief of staff of the
Thailand. See commands, U.S. Army, Army; Decker, General George H.;
U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Thailand. Eddleman, General Clyde D.; Hamlett,
U.S. Military Assistance Command, General Barksdale, Jr.; Lemnitzer,
Vietnam (MACV). See commands, General Lyman L.; Palmer, Lt. Gen.
U.S. Army, U.S. Mil Assistance Cmd, Williston B.
Vietnam (MACV). vice president of the United States. See
U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Nixon,
8, 133–39, 186 Richard M.
U.S. Navy, 3, 18, 22, 26, 49, 58, 60, 73, 100, Vienna Conference, 362, 368
106, 123, 140, 148, 150, 153–54, 156, Viet Cong, 304, 337, 342, 346, 363, 382,
159, 177, 182, 190, 194, 213, 219, 234– 428, 456–57, 459
35, 261, 263, 274, 278, 294, 310, 313, Viet Minh, 88, 90–92, 181, 186–87, 271,
343, 345, 375–77, 421, 466. See also 338
chief of naval operations; Department Vietnam, 89–92, 136–37, 181, 184, 186–87,
of the Navy; missiles; Naval Air Station 220, 267–70, 305, 306, 330, 339–40,
Key West; satellites; secretary of the 341, 342, 347, 349, 351, 363, 382, 384,
Navy; U.S. Navy Second Fleet; U.S. 385, 385–86, 389, 423–24, 430, 434,
Navy, Europe. 443, 446, 448, 455–59, 457, 460n56,
Logistics Plans Division, 181 461, 461, 465–66
Navy League, 125 Vietnam War, 4, 307, 387, 428, 431, 451,
U.S. Navy, Europe, 375 454, 460, 463, 467–68
U.S. Navy Second Fleet, 418 Vietnamese Army, 88, 138, 185, 221, 271,
U.S. Pacific Command. See commands, 304, 337–38, 346, 383, 429
unified, U.S. Pacific Cmd. VII Corps. See corps, VII Corps.
U.S. Steel, 332 Vinson, Carl, 224, 452
U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM). See Virginia, 70, 163, 298, 301, 353, 404, 418,
commands, unified, U.S. Strike Cmd 461, 462
(STRICOM). Vittrup, Lt. Gen. Russell L., 380. See also
USAREUR. See U.S. Army, Europe deputy chief of staff (personnel).
(USAREUR). von Braun, Wernher, 149, 156, 261, 301
USAREUR Commanding General. See von Kann, Maj. Gen. Clifton F., 298, 376,
U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), 395. See also assistant chief of staff,
commanding general. G–3 (operations); assistant chief of
USNS Comet, 258 staff and J–3 (Joint Staff operations)
USS United States, 18 for STRICOM.
USS Wasp, 345
Utah, 329, 411, 413 Walker, Maj. Gen. Edwin A., 361
Utah National Guard, 329 Wall, Berlin. See Berlin, Wall.
INDEX 517
Wall Street Journal, 387 White Sands, 262

War College. See National War College; Missile Range, 207
U.S. Army War College. Whiz Kids, 349, 354
War Department, 177, 353 Williams, Col. Robert R., 71, 395
Decimal File System, 303 Williams, General Samuel T., 185, 185, 271,
War Planning Office, 47 304, 306, 338
Warsaw Pact, 406 Wilson, Charles E., 14, 15, 17, 17–18, 20,
Washington (state), 59–60, 133, 327, 355, 22–25, 33, 38, 46–50, 52, 57, 59, 63, 76,
371, 384, 408, 411, 435 80–81, 90, 94–96, 122, 129, 131, 140,
Washington, D.C., 46, 56, 81, 82, 89, 103, 149–54, 156, 160, 189–95, 204, 219,
327, 415, 451, 453 231. See also secretary of defense.
Washington Post, 26 Wilson, Earl, 194
Wayne, John, 123–24 wire-guided missiles. See missiles.
weapon systems, 156, 204, 246, 378, 407. Wisconsin, 371, 411
See also Davy Crockett weapon system; Wizard antimissile project, 260
missiles; rockets; satellites; Skysweeper Wolters Air Force Base. See camps, Wolters.
antiaircraft weapon system; Trainfire Womble, R. Adm. John P., 36
target system. Womble Committee, 36–38
Weapons and Mobility Command. See Women’s Army Corps, 4, 39, 241, 242, 380,
commands, U.S. Army, Weapons and 454
Mobility Cmd. Wood, Maj. Gen. Robert J., 202. See also
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, 157, deputy chief of staff (research and
252, 331 development).
Weible, General Walter L., 39, 71, 83, 103, World War I, 7, 20, 30, 98, 129, 133, 160,
125. See also deputy chief of staff 252, 287, 295, 422
(operations); deputy chief of staff World War II, 1–4, 6, 9, 12–13, 18, 20,
(operations and administration). 28–31, 36–40, 43, 47, 51, 63–64, 74, 79,
Wertheim, 250 91, 96, 104, 109, 119, 129, 133–34, 142,
West Berlin, 273, 370, 435. See also Berlin. 147, 149, 156, 160, 168, 174–75, 193,
West Germany, 218, 371, 408. See also 215, 246, 274, 276–77, 287, 295, 301,
Germany. 310–11, 317, 336–37, 344, 352–53, 364,
West Point. See U.S. Military Academy. 375, 380, 399–400, 410, 413, 421–22,
West Virginia University, 353 424, 429, 433, 444–47, 450–51, 469
Western Electric Company, 260 Wyman, General Willard G., 181–82, 204,
Western Europe, 1, 4, 116, 144, 195, 217, 240, 248, 255. See also commands, U.S.
222, 367, 389, 405, 409, 431 Army, U.S. Continental Army Cmd
Western Hemisphere, 385 (CONARC), commanding general.
Reserve, 211
Westmoreland, Maj. Gen. William C., X Corps. See corps, X Corps.
293–94 XVI Corps. See corps, XVI Corps.
Weyand, General Otto P., 117–18, 120 XVIII Abn Corps. See corps, XVIII Abn
What’s My Line?, 179 Corps.
Wheeler, General Earle G., 399, 400, 404,
410, 436–37, 440, 448, 457–58. See also Yale University, 352
chief of staff of the Army. Yarborough, Maj. Gen. William P., 427,
Wheelock, Lt. Col. John C., 111 431, 443
Wheelus Air Base, 182. See also air bases; Yarmolinsky, Adam, 451–52
Africa. York, Brig. Gen. Robert H., 459
White, Sp4c. Harry L., 448 Young, Maj. Gen. Robert N., 37–39, 80, 85.
White, General Isaac D., 220, 238, 269–70, See also assistant chief of staff, G–1
278, 285, 307, 333, 339–40 (personnel).
White, General Thomas D., 193, 317. See Youth Wants to Know, 179
also Air Force chief of staff. Yuma Proving Ground, 379
White House, 51, 174, 227, 273, 294, 351,
360–61, 366, 381, 420, 452. See also Zeus missile. See missiles, Zeus.
Eisenhower, Dwight D; Johnson, Zone of the Interior, 32
Lyndon B.; Kennedy, John F.; Truman,
Harry S.
Conference on Education, 193
THE AUTHOR
Donald A. Carter was born in Albany, New York, and grew up in Oneida,
New York. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1977
and served as a field artillery officer until 1992. During that time, he received
a PhD in history from the Ohio State University in 1985 and served as a
military history instructor at West Point and at the U.S. Army Field Artillery
School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. After leaving the Army, he joined the U.S.
Army Center of Military History (CMH) as an archivist. In 1995, he left
CMH to serve with the Gulf War Declassification Project and the U.S. Army
Declassification Activity. He returned to CMH in 2003 as a historian. His
publications include “Eisenhower Versus the Generals,” in Journal of Military
History (October 2007); “The U.S. Military Response to the 1960–1962
Berlin Crisis,” for a National Archives pamphlet commemorating the release
of Cold War records; “Wargames in Europe: The U.S. Army Experiments
with Atomic Doctrine,” in Blueprints for Battle (University Press of Kentucky,
2012); Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962 (U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 2015); and, with William Stivers, The City Becomes
a Symbol: The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Berlin, 1945–1949 (U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 2017). He is married with two children and lives
in Dale City, Virginia.

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Army in the Cold War

From New Look to

Center of Military History

U.S. Army in the Cold War

Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962

Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Chief Historian Jon T. Hoffman

1 Out of Korea and Into the New Look..................... 5

2 Coming to Grips with the New Look....................... 45

5 1957: The Year of the Missile...................................... 189

7 Moving Forward............................................................. 273

9 Playing a Part in McNamara’s Band....................... 349

10 Embracing a New Future........................................... 389

11 Entering the Morass.................................................. 433

1. Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950............... 16

1. Line of Demarcation, 27 July 1953.......................................................... 6

1. General Clark signs the Korean armistice agreement..........................2

Cover images, top to bottom, left to right: Chinook helicopter at Davidson

Washington, D.C. JON T. HOFFMAN

7 August 2023 DONALD A. CARTER

Note: Chapter 2 of this book is based, in part, upon my article “Eisenhower

On 27 July 1953, representatives of the United Nations Command, the

General Mark W. Clark signs the Korean armistice agreement, 27 July

Military Establishment, which would eventually become the Department

admirably in Korea, most had consisted primarily of veterans from World

THE ARMY IN 1953

The G–3 Section, Eighth Army, welcomes a former prisoner of war

U.S. ARMY CORPS AND DIVISIONS

LUXEMBOURG 1 ST INFANTRY DIVISION

VII CORPS 43 D INFANTRY DIVISION

Sgt. Gene L. Archibald, Battery D, 1st Missile Battalion (Ajax), 202d

7. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 244–55.

President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower walks across a snow-

been exhausted. Although most of the Army’s soldiers possessed a wealth of

EISENHOWER TAKES OVER

As he had promised during the 1952 presidential campaign, Dwight D.

personnel and placed an unacceptable burden on the economic resources

Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson at a press conference,

secretary enthusiastically pursued the president’s goals of reducing waste

Chart 1—Organization of the Department of the Army, 11 April 1950

Administrative SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Comptroller of DCS for

Assistant Chief of Assistant Chief of Assistant Chief of Assistant Chief of

Chief of Judge Chief, Executive for

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS AND SERVICES

Continental Chief of Army

Key: See Chart Abbreviations, page 483.

Admiral Arthur W. Radford (left) is sworn in as the chairman of the

as a convenient shorthand for Eisenhower’s sense that a new age of warfare

of the Department of Defense, or in any of its component agencies, should

Robert T. Stevens, the secretary of the Army during the Eisenhower

shift in military leadership by saying that Secretary Wilson deserved an

back to work, accusing them of being overly parochial. He reminded them

Department of the Army, 29 Jun 1955).

Accordingly, Ridgway proposed

THE ARMY TAKES STOCK

After setting up the 280-mm. cannon in firing position, members of

useful in several roles in Korea. Units throughout the Army, particularly