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Harvard Divinity School

The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West


Author(s): Krister Stendahl
Source: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Jul., 1963), pp. 199-215
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity School
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508631
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THE APOSTLE PAUL AND THE INTROSPECTIVE
CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST *
KRISTER STENDAHL
HARVARD DIvINITY SCHOOL

To Henry J. Cadbury, octogenarian

IN the history of Western Christianity - and hence, to a large


extent, in the history of Western culture - the Apostle Paul has
been hailed as a hero of the introspective conscience. Here was
the man who grappled with the problem "I do not do the good I
want, but the evil I do not want to do is what I do . . ." (Rom.
7:19). His insights as to a solution of this dilemma have recently
been more or less identified, for example, with what Jung referred
to as the Individuation Process;' but this is only a contemporary
twist to the traditional Western way of reading the Pauline letters
as documents of human consciousness.
Twenty-five years ago Henry J. Cadbury wrote a stimulating
study, "The Peril of Modernizing Jesus" (I937). That book and
that very title is a good summary of one of the most important
insights of biblical studies in the 20oth century. It has ramifica-
tions far beyond the field of theology and biblical exegesis. It
questions the often tacit presupposition that man remains basical-
ly the same through the ages. There is little point in affirming or
denying such a presupposition in general terms --much would
depend on what the foggy word "basically" could mean. But both
* This paper was delivered as the invited Address at the Annual Meeting of the
American Psychological Association, September 3, I961; it is a revised and footnoted
edition of my article "Paulus och Samvetet," published in Sweden in Svensk
Exegetisk Arsbok 25 (1960), 62-77.
'D. Cox, Jung and St. Paul: A Study of the Doctrine of Justification by Faith
and Its Relation to the Concept of Individuation (I959).--Attention should also
be drawn to the discussion in The American Psychologist (i960), 301-4, 713-16,
initiated by O. H. Mowrer's article "'Sin,' the Lesser of Two Evils"; cf. also the
Symposium of W. H. Clark, O. H. Mowrer, A. Ellis, Ch. Curran and E. J. Shoben,
Jr., on "The Role of the Concept of Sin in Psychotherapy," Journal of Counseling
Psychology 7 (1960), 185-201.- For an unusually perceptive and careful attempt
to deal with historical material from a psychoanalytical point of view, see Erik H.
Erikson, Young Man Luther (1958). Not only the abundance but also the
"Western" nature of the Luther material makes such an attempt more reasonable
than when it is applied to Paul, who, as Erikson remarks, remains "in the twilight
of biblical psychology" (p. 94).

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200 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

the historian and the theologian, both the psychologist and the
average reader of the Bible, are well advised to assess how this
hypothesis of contemporaneity affects their thinking, and their
interpretation of ancient writings.
This problem becomes acute when one tries to picture the
function and the manifestation of introspection in the life and
writings of the Apostle Paul. It is the more acute since it is exactly
at this point that Western interpreters have found the common
denominator between Paul and the experiences of man, since
Paul's statements about "justification by faith" have been hailed
as the answer to the problem which faces the ruthlessly honest
man in his practice of introspection. Especially in Protestant
Christianity - which, however, at this point has its roots in
Augustine and in the piety of the Middle Ages - the Pauline
awareness of sin has been interpreted in the light of Luther's
struggle with his conscience. But it is exactly at that point that
we can discern the most drastic difference between Luther and

Paul, between the I6th and the Ist century, and, perhaps, between
Eastern and Western Christianity.
A fresh look at the Pauline writings themselves shows that Paul
was equipped with what in our eyes must be called a rather
"robust" conscience.2 In Phil. 3 Paul speaks most fully about
his life before his Christian calling, and there is no indication
that he had had any difficulty in fulfilling the Law. On the con-
trary, he can say that he had been "flawless" as to the righteous-
ness required by the Law (v.6). His encounter with Jesus Christ
- at Damascus, according to Acts 9: -9 - has not changed this
fact. It was not to him a restoration of a plagued conscience;
when he says that he now forgets what is behind him (Phil. 3:13),
he does not think about the shortcomings in his obedience to the
Law, but about his glorious achievements as a righteous Jew,

2The actual meaning of the Greek word syneidesis, usually translated "con-
science," is a complex linguistic problem, see C. A. Pierce, Conscience in The New
Testament (1955).- The more general problem dealt with in this lecture is closer
to the problem to which P. Althaus draws attention in his Paulus und Luther
iiber den Menschen (1951), cf. the critique by F. Biichsel, Theologische Bliitter I7
(1938), 3o6-II.-- B. Reicke, The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism (1946),
I74-82, gives the meaning "loyalty" in i Peter 3:21, cf. idem, "Syneidesis in R6m.
2:15," Theologische Zeitschrift 12 (1956), 157-6I.- See also C. Spicq, Revue
Biblique 47 (1938), 50-80, and J. Dupont, Studia Hellenistica 5 (1948), 119-53.

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 201

achievements which he nevertheless now has learned to consider


as "refuse" in the light of his faith in Jesus as the Messiah.
The impossibility of keeping the whole Law is a decisive point
in Paul's argumentation in Rom. 2:17-3:20 (cf. 2: Iff.); and also
in Gal. 3:10O-12 this impossibility is the background for Paul's
arguments in favor of a salvation which is open to both Jews and
Gentiles in Christ. These and similar Pauline statements have led
many interpreters to accuse Paul of misunderstanding or delib-
erately distorting the Jewish view of Law and Salvation.3 It is
pointed out that for the Jew the Law did not require a static or
pedantic perfectionism but supposed a covenant relationship in
which there was room for forgiveness and repentance and where
God applied the Measure of Grace. Hence Paul should have been
wrong in ruling out the Law on the basis that Israel could not
achieve the perfect obedience which the Law required. What is
forgotten in such a critique of Paul - which is conditioned by the
later Western problem of a conscience troubled by the demands
of the Law - is that these statements about the impossibility of
fulfilling the Law stand side by side with the one just mentioned:
"I was blameless as to righteousness - of the Law, that is" (Phil.
3:6). So Paul speaks about his subjective conscience - in full
accordance with his Jewish training. But Rom. 2-3 deals with
something very different. The actual transgressions in Israel--
as a people, not in each and every individual - show that the Jews
are not better than the Gentiles, in spite of circumcision and the
proud possession of the Law. The "advantage" of the Jews is
that they have been entrusted with the Words of God and this
advantage cannot be revoked by their disobedience (Rom. 3: iff.),
but for the rest they have no edge on salvation. The Law has not
helped. They stand before God as guilty as the Gentiles, and
even more so (2:9). All this is said in the light of the new avenue
of salvation, which has been opened in Christ, an avenue which
is equally open to Jews and Gentiles, since it is not based on the
Law, in which the very distinction between the two rests. In such
a situation, says Paul, the old covenant, even with its provision
'See esp. G. F. Moore, Judaism, vol. III (1930), 151.--H. J. Schoeps, Paul
(1961), 213-18, voices the same criticism from the anachronistic point of modern
Old Testament interpretation as carried out by M. Buber and others. Cf., however,
M. Buber, Two Types of Faith (1951), 46-50.

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202 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

for forgiveness and grace, is not a valid alternative any more. The
only metanoia (repentance/conversion) and the only grace which
counts is the one now available in Messiah Jesus. Once this has
been seen, it appears that Paul's references to the impossibility
of fulfilling the Law is part of a theological and theoretical
scriptural argument about the relation between Jews and Gentiles.
Judging from Paul's own writings, there is no indication that he
had "experienced it in his own conscience" during his time as a
Pharisee. It is also striking to note that Paul never urges Jews to
find in Christ the answer to the anguish of a plagued conscience.
If that is the case regarding Paul the Pharisee, it is, as we shall
see, even more important to note that we look in vain for any
evidence that Paul the Christian has suffered under the burden of
conscience concerning personal shortcomings which he would label
"sins." The famous formula "simul justus et peccator" - at the
same time righteous and sinner - as a description of the status
of the Christian may have some foundation in the Pauline writ-
ings, but this formula cannot be substantiated as the center of
Paul's conscious attitude toward his personal sins. Apparently,
Paul did not have the type of introspective conscience which such
a formula seems to presuppose.4 This is probably one of the
reasons why "forgiveness" is the term for salvation which is used
least of all in the Pauline writings."
It is most helpful to compare these observations concerning
Paul with the great hero of what has been called "Pauline Chris-
tianity," i.e., with Martin Luther. In him we find the problem of
late medieval piety and theology. Luther's inner struggles pre-
suppose the developed system of Penance and Indulgence, and it
'For a penetrating analysis of the original meaning of this formula in Luther's
theology, and its relation to the Pauline writings, see W. Joest, "Paulus und das
lutherische Simul Justus et Peccator," Kerygma und Dogma I (1956), 270-321.
- See also R. Bring, "Die paulinische Begriindung der lutherischen Theologie,"
Luthertum 17 (1955), 18-43; and idem, Commentary on Galatians (1961); H.
Pohlmann, "Hat Luther Paulus entdeckt?" Studien der Luther-Akademie N. F.
7 (I949).- For a perceptive view of the role of Luther's conscience, see A. Siirala,
Gottes Gebot bei Martin Luther (1956), 282 ff.
5There is actually no use of the term in the undisputed Pauline epistles; it is
found as an apposition in Eph. 1:7 and Col. 1:14; cf. the 0. T. quotation in Rom.
4:7, where Paul's own preference for "justification" is clear from the context, and
the similar term "remission" in Rom 3:25.- Cf. my articles "Siinde und Schuld"
and "Siindenvergebung," Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, vol. 6 (1962),
484-89, and 511-13, with a discussion of the absence of a common word for "guilt."

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 203

is significant that his famous 95 theses take their point of depar-


ture from the problem of forgiveness of sins as seen within the
framework of Penance: "When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ
said: 'Repent (penitentiam agite) . .. ,' he wanted the whole
life of the faithful to be a repentance (or: penance)."
When the period of the European mission had come to an end,
the theological and practical center of Penance shifted from
Baptism, administered once and for all, to the ever repeated Mass,
and already this subtle change in the architecture of the Christian
life contributed to a more acute introspection.' The manuals for
self-examination among the Irish monks and missionaries became
a treasured legacy in wide circles of Western Christianity. The
Black Death may have been significant in the development of the
climate of faith and life. Penetrating self-examination reached
a hitherto unknown intensity. For those who took this practice
seriously - and they were more numerous than many Protestants
are accustomed to think - the pressure was great. It is as one of
those - and for them - that Luther carries out his mission as a
great pioneer. It is in response to their question, "How can I find
a gracious God?" that Paul's words about a justification in Christ
by faith, and without the works of the Law, appears as the liberat-
ing and saving answer. Luther's unrelenting honesty, even to the
gates of hell (cf. especially his De servo arbitrio, "On the Bondage
of the Will"), his refusal to accept the wise and sound consolation
from his spiritual directors, these make him into a Christopher
Columbus in the world of faith, who finds new and good land on
the other side of what was thought to be the abyss.
In these matters Luther was a truly Augustinian monk, since
Augustine may well have been one of the first to express the
dilemma of the introspective conscience. It has always been a
puzzling fact that Paul meant so relatively little for the thinking
of the Church during the first 350 years of its history. To be sure,
he is honored and quoted but - in the theological perspective of
the West - it seems that Paul's great insight into justification
6 For this change and its effect on Christology, see G. H. Williams, "The Sacra-
mental Presuppositions of Anselm's Cur deus homo," Church History 26 (1957),
245-74.

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204 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

by faith was forgotten.' It is, however, with Augustine that we


find an interpretation of Paul which makes use of what to us is the
deeper layer in the thought of the great Apostle. A decisive reason
for this state of affairs may well have been that up to the time of
Augustine the Church was by and large under the impression that
Paul dealt with those issues with which he actually deals: i)
What happens to the Law (the Torah, the actual Law of Moses,
not the principle of legalism) when the Messiah has come? 8s
2) What are the ramifications of the Messiah's arrival for the rela-
tion between Jews and Gentiles? For Paul had not arrived at his
view of the Law by testing and pondering its effect upon his con-
science; it was his grappling with the question about the place of
the Gentiles in the Church and in the plan of God, with the prob-
lem Jew/Gentiles or Jewish Christians/Gentile Christians,9 which
had driven him to that interpretation of the Law which was to be-
come his in a unique way.'o These observations agree well with the
manner in which both Paul himself and the Acts of the Apostles
describe his "conversion" as a call to become the Apostle to and
of the Gentiles. This was the task for which he - in the manner
of the prophets of old - had been earmarked by God from his
mother's womb (Gal. 1:15, cf. Acts 9:15).11 There is not - as
'For early Pauline interpretation see K. Staab, Pauluskommentare aus der
griechischen Kirche (1933) ; V. E. Hasler, Gesetz und Evangelium in der alten Kirche
bis Origenes (1953); E. Aleith, Paulusverstiindnis in der alten Kirche (1937); P.
G. Verweijs, Evangelium und Gesetz in der iiltesten Christenheit bis auf Marcion
(1960); now also U. Wickert, "Die Pers6nlichkeit des Paulus in den Paulus kom-
mentaren Theodors von Mopsuestia," Zeitschrift fiir die neutestamentliche Wissen-
schaft 53 (1962), 51-66. For Paul and conscience in relation to Gnosticism, see F.
F. Sagnard, Clement d'Alexandrie, Extraits de Theodote (1948), 247-49, and R. M.
Grant's observations in Journal of Theological Studies 7 (1956), 310 f.
8 For the Jewish background to this problem as the one relevant to Paul, see
W. D. Davies, Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come (1952); also
H. J. Schoeps, op. cit., 174, with reference to the talmudic tractate Sanhedrin 98a.
9It is significant that the contrast in Paul is between Jews and Gentiles, or
Jewish Christians and Gentile Christians, but never between Jews and Gentile
Christians; see G. Bornkamm, "Gesetz und Natur: R6m 2:14-16," Studien zu Antike
und Urchristentum (I959), 93-118; cf. J. N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca (1961), 96.
1o A. Schweitzer was certainly right when he recognized that Paul's teaching about
justification by faith had such a limited function in Paul's theology and could not
be considered the center of his total view. "The doctrine of righteousness by faith
is therefore a subsidiary crater. .. ." The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (1931),
225.
1 J. Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind (1959), ch. i; see also H. G.
Wood, "The Conversion of St. Paul. Its Nature, Antecedents and Consequences,"
New Testament Studies I (1954/55), 276-82; and U. Wilckens, "Die Bekehrung

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 205

we usually think - first a conversion, and then a call to apostle-


ship; there is only the call to the work among the Gentiles.
Hence, it is quite natural that at least one of the centers of
gravity in Paul's thought should be how to define the place for
Gentiles in the Church, according to the plan of God. Rom. 9-11
is not an appendix to chs. 1-8, but the climax of the letter.
This problem was, however, not a live one after the end of the
first century, when Christianity for all practical purposes had a
non-Jewish constituency. Yet it was not until Augustine that the
Pauline thought about the Law and Justification was applied in a
consistent and grand style to a more general and timeless human
problem. In that connection we remember that Augustine has
often been called "the first modern man." While this is an obvious
generalization, it may contain a fair amount of truth. His Con-
fessiones are the first great document in the history of the intro-
spective conscience. The Augustinian line leads into the Middle
Ages and reaches its climax in the penitential struggle of an
Augustinian monk, Martin Luther, and in his interpretation of
Paul.12
Judging at least from a superficial survey of the preaching of
the Churches of the East from olden times to the present, it is
striking how their homiletical tradition is either one of doxology or
meditative mysticism or exhortation - but it does not deal with
the plagued conscience in the way in which one came to do so in
the Western Churches.
The problem we are trying to isolate could be expressed in
hermeneutical terms somewhat like this: The Reformers' inter-
pretation of Paul rests on an analogism when Pauline statements
about Faith and Works, Law and Gospel, Jews and Gentiles are
des Paulus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem," Zeitschrift fiir Theologie und
Kirche 56 (I959), 273-93.
12 For the Augustinian interpretation see A. F. W. Lekkerkerker, Rdmer 7 und
Riomer 9 bei Augustin (1942); cf. Ph. Platz, "Der R6merbrief in der Gnadenlehre
Augustins," Cassiciacum 5 (1938); also J. Stelzenberger, Conscientia bei Augustin
(1959); and idem, "Conscientia in der ost-westlichen Spannung der patristischen
Theologie," Tiibinger Theologische Quartalschrift 141 (I96I), 174-205.--For the
Greek background, see 0. Seel, "Zur Vorgeschichte des Gewissensbegriffes im
altgriechischen Denken," Festschrift F. Dornseiff (953), 291-319. For a broad
and instructive survey, which substantiates our view in many respects - but reads
the biblical material differently - see H. Jaeger, "L'examen de conscience dans les
religions non-chritiennes et avant le christianisme," Numen 6 (1959), 175-233.

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206 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

read in the framework of late medieval piety. The Law, the Torah,
with its specific requirements of circumcision and food restrictions
becomes a general principle of "legalism" in religious matters.
Where Paul was concerned about the possibility for Gentiles to be
included in the messianic community, his statements are now read
as answers to the quest for assurance about man's salvation out of
a common human predicament.
This shift in the frame of reference affects the interpretation at
many points. A good illustration can be seen in what Luther calls
the Second Use of the Law, i.e., its function as a Tutor or School-
master unto Christ. The crucial passage for this understanding
of the Law is Gal. 3:24, a passage which the King James Version
- in unconscious accord with Western tradition - renders:
"Wherefore the law was our schoolmaster (R.V. and A.S.V.:
tutor) to bring us unto Christ," but which the Revised Standard
Version translates more adequately: "So that the law was our
cutodian until Christ came." 12a In his extensive argument for the
possibility of Gentiles becoming Christians without circumcision
etc., Paul states that the Law had not come in until 430 years
after the promise to Abraham, and that it was meant to have
validity only up to the time of the Messiah (Gal. 3:15-22 ). Hence,
its function was to serve as a Custodian for the Jews until that
time. Once the Messiah had come, and once the faith in Him -
not "faith" as a general religious attitude - was available as the
decisive ground for salvation, the Law had done its duty as a cus-
todian for the Jews, or as a waiting room with strong locks (vv.
22f.) Hence, it is clear that Paul's problem is how to explain why
there is no reason to impose the Law on the Gentiles, who now, in
God's good Messianic time, have become partakers in the ful-
fillment of the promises to Abraham (v. 29).
In the common interpretation of Western Christianity, the
matter looks very different. One could even say that Paul's argu-
ment has been reversed into saying the opposite to his original
intention. Now the Law is the Tutor unto Christ. Nobody can
attain a true faith in Christ unless his self-righteousness has been
crushed by the Law. The function of the Second Use of the Law

12a Cf. my article on Gal. 3:24 in Svensk Exegetisk Arsbok 18-I9 (1953-54),
161-73.

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 207

is to make man see his desperate need for a Savior. In such an


interpretation, we note how Paul's distinction between Jews and
Gentiles is gone. "Our Tutor/Custodian" is now a statement
applied to man in general, not "our" in the sense of "I, Paul, and
my fellow Jews." Furthermore, the Law is not any more the Law
of Moses which requires circumcision etc., and which has become
obsolete when faith in the Messiah is a live option - it is the
moral imperative as such, in the form of the will of God. And
finally, Paul's argument that the Gentiles must not, and should
not come to Christ via the Law, i.e., via circumcision etc., has
turned into a statement according to which all men must come to
Christ with consciences properly convicted by the Law and its
insatiable requirements for righteousness. So drastic is the re-
interpretation once the original framework of "Jews and Gentiles"
is lost, and the Western problems of conscience become its un-
challenged and self-evident substitute.
Thus, the radical difference between a Paul and a Luther at this
one point has considerable ramification for the reading of the
actual texts. And the line of Luther appears to be the obvious
one. This is true not only among those who find themselves more
or less dogmatically bound by the confessions of the Reformation.
It is. equally true about the average student of "all the great
books" in a College course, or the agnostic Westerner in general.
It is also true in serious New Testament exegesis. Thus, R.
Bultmann - in spite of his great familiarity with the history of
religions in early Christian times - finds the nucleus of Pauline
thought in the problem of "boasting," 13 i.e., in man's need to be
utterly convicted in his conscience."4 Paul's self-understanding
in these matters is the existential, and hence, ever valid center of
Pauline theology. Such an interpretation is an even more drastic
translation and an even more far-reaching generalization of the
original Pauline material than that found in the Reformers. But it
is worth noting that it is achieved in the prolongation of the same
line. This is more obvious since Bultmann makes, candidly and
openly, the statement that his existential hermeneutic rests on
13SR. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. I. (1951), 242 f.
14C. H. Dodd feels the difficulty in such an interpretation, but ends up with
placing Paul's overcoming of his boasting somewhat later in his career, "The Mind
of Paul," New Testament Studies (1953), 67-128.

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208 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

the presupposition that man is essentially the same through the


ages, and that this continuity in the human self-consciousness is
the common denominator between the New Testament and any
age of human history. This presupposition is stated with the force
of an a priori truth."5
What in Bultmann rests on a clearly stated hermeneutic prin-
ciple plays, however, its subtle and distorting role in historians who
do not give account of their presuppositions but work within an
unquestioned Western framework. P. Volz, in his comprehensive
study of Jewish eschatology, uses man's knowledge of his indi-
vidual salvation in its relation to a troubled conscience as one of
the "trenches" in his reconstruction of the Jewish background to
the New Testament."' But when it comes to the crucial question
and he wants to find a passage which would substantiate that this
was a conscious problem in those generations of Judaism, he can
find only one example in the whole Rabbinic literature which
perhaps could illustrate an attitude of a troubled conscience
(bBer. 28b).17
To be sure, no one could ever deny that hamartia, "sin," is a
crucial word in Paul's terminology, especially in his epistle to the
Romans. Rom. 1-3 sets out to show that all- both Jews and
Gentiles--have sinned and fallen short of the Glory of God
(3:19, cf. v. 23). Rom. 3:21-8:39 demonstrates how and in what
sense this tragic fact is changed by the arrival of the Messiah.
It is much harder to gage how Paul subjectively experienced
the power of sin in his life and, more specifically, how and in what
sense he was conscious of actual sins. One point is clear. The
Sin with capital S in Paul's past was that he had persecuted the
Church of God. This climax of his dedicated obedience to his

15 Bultmann, ibm. vol. 2 (1955), 251; cf. idem, "The Problem of Hermeneutics,"
Essays Philosophical and Theological (1955), 234-61.
16Volz, Die Eschatologie der jiidischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen
Zeitalter (1934), 11 ff.
7 Cf. also how F. Biichsel, who repeats this view in highly biased language,
admits the lack of evidence for such an attitude: the Pharisee "vacillated between
an overbearing confidence in his good works, which made him blind to his sin-
fulness, and a desperate anxiety before the wrath of God, which, however, mani-
fests itself only seldom" (italics mine), Theologisches Wdrterbuch z. N. T. (ed. G.
Kittel), vol. 3 (1938), 935.- The examples, often quoted, from 4 Ezra 3-4 and
7-8 deal primarily with the historical theodicy and not with the individual
conscience.

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 209

Jewish faith (Gal. 1:13, Phil. 3:6) was the shameful deed which
made him the least worthy of apostleship (I Cor. 15:9). This
motif, which is elaborated dramatically by the author of the Acts
of the Apostles (chs. 9, 22 and 26), is well grounded in Paul's own
epistles. Similarly, when I Timothy states on Paul's account that
"Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am
number one" (1:I15), this is not an expression of contrition in the
present tense, but refers to how Paul in his ignorance had been
a blaspheming and violent persecutor, before God in his mercy
and grace had revealed to him his true Messiah and made Paul
an Apostle and a prototype of sinners' salvation (1:I2-16).18
Nevertheless, Paul knew that he had made up for this terrible
Sin of persecuting the Church, as he says in so many words in I
Cor. 15:10: ". . . his grace toward me was not in vain; on the
contrary, I worked harder than any of them - though it was not
I, but the grace of God which is with me."
This his call to Apostleship has the same pattern as the more
thematic statement that Christ died for us godless ones, while we
were yet sinners (Rom. 5:6-11). We note how that statement is
only the subsidiary conditional clause in an argument e majore ad
minus: If now God was so good and powerful that he could
justify weak and sinful and rebellious men, how much easier must
it not be for him to give in due time the ultimate salvation to
those whom he already has justified. Hence, the words about the
sinful, the weak and the rebellious have not present-tense meaning,
but refer to the past, which is gloriously and gracefully blotted
out, as was Paul's enmity to Jesus Christ and his Church.
What then about Paul's consciousness of sins after his con-
version? His letters indicate with great clarity that he did not
hold to the view that man was free from sin after baptism. His
pastoral admonitions show that he had much patience with the
sins and weaknesses of Christians. But does he ever intimate that
he is aware of any sins of his own which would trouble his con-
science? It is actually easier to find statements to the contrary.
The tone in Acts 23:I, "Brethren, I have lived before God in all
good conscience up to this day" (cf. 24:I6), prevails also through-
1s This theme is elaborated further in the Epistle of Barnabas 5:9, where all
the Apostles are called "iniquitous above all sin," with a reference to Mk. 2:I7.

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210 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

out his letters. Even if we take due note of the fact that the
major part of Paul's correspondence contains an apology for his
Apostolic ministry - hence it is the antipode to Augustine's Con-
fessions from the point of view of form - the conspicuous absence
of references to an actual consciousness of being a sinner is
surprising. To be sure, Paul is aware of a struggle with his "body"
(I Cor. 9:27), but we note that the tone is one of confidence,
not of a plagued conscience.
In Rom. 9:I and 2 Cor. I:I12 he witnesses to his good con-
science. This tone reaches its highest pitch in 2 Cor. 5:Iof.: "For
we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ so that each
one may receive the retribution for what he has done while in his
body, either good or evil. Aware, therefore, of the fear of the
Lord, we try to persuade men, but to God it is clear [what we
are]; and I hope that it is clear also to your conscience." Here,
with the day of reckoning before his eyes, Paul says that the Lord
has approved of him, and he hopes that the Corinthians shall have
an equally positive impression of him, and of his success in
pleasing the Lord (5:9). This robust conscience is not shaken
but strengthened by his awareness of a final judgment which has
not come yet. And when he writes about the tensions between
himself and Apollos and other teachers, he states that "I have
nothing on my conscience" (I Cor. 4:4; N.E.B.- literally "I
know nothing with me"; the verb is of the same stem as the word
for conscience); to be sure, he adds that this does not settle the
case, since "the Lord is my judge," but it is clear from the context
that Paul is in little doubt about the final verdict. His warning
against a premature verdict is not a plea out of humility or fear,
but a plea to the Corinthians not to be too rash in a negative
evaluation of Paul.
Thus, we look in vain for a statement in which Paul would
speak about himself as an actual sinner. When he speaks about
his conscience, he witnesses to his good conscience before men
and God. On the other hand, Paul often speaks about his weak-
ness, not only ironically as in 2 Cor. II:21f. In 2 Cor. 12 we find
the proudly humble words, "But He said to me: 'My grace is
sufficient to you, for the power is fulfilled in weakness.' I will the
more gladly boast of my weakness, that the power of Christ may

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 211

rest upon me. For the sake of Christ, then, I am content with
weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities; for
when I am weak, then I am strong" (vv. 9-io). The weakness
which Paul here refers to is clearly without any relation to his sin
or his conscience. The "thorn in the flesh" (v. 7) was presumably
some physical handicap - some have guessed at epilepsy -
which interfered with his effectiveness and, what was more
important, with his apostolic authority, as we can see from Gal.
4:13, cf. i. Cor. 11:30. Sickness was seen as a sign of insufficient
spiritual endowment. But there is no indication that Paul ever
thought of this and other "weaknesses" as sins for which he was
responsible. They were caused by the Enemy or the enemies. His
weakness became for him an important facet in his identification
with the work of Christ, who had been "crucified in weakness"
(2 Cor. 13:4; cf. also 4: io and Col. 1:24). - In the passage from
Rom. 5, mentioned above, we find the only use of the word "weak"
as a synonym to "sinner," but there these words helped to describe
primarily the power of justification as a past act (and the New
English Bible consequently renders it by "powerless"). This is
the more clear since the third synonym is "enemy" (v. io), and
points to Paul's past when he had been the enemy of Christ.
Yet there is one Pauline text which the reader must have
wondered why we have left unconsidered, especially since it is the
passage we mentioned in the beginning as the proof text for Paul's
deep insights into the human predicament: "I do not do the good
I want, but the evil I do not want to do is what I do" (Rom. 7:19).
What could witness more directly to a deep and sensitive intro-
spective conscience? While much attention has been given to the
question whether Paul here speaks about a pre-Christian or
Christian experience of his, or about man in general, little atten-
tion has been drawn to the fact that Paul here is involved in an
argument about the Law; he is not primarily concerned about
man's or his own cloven ego or predicament.'9 The diatribe style
of the chapter helps us to see what Paul is doing. In vv. 7-12 he
"1The confusion caused by psychological interpretations, and the centrality of
the Law in Rom. 7, was seen in the epoch-making study by W. G. Kiimmel,
Rdmer 7 und die Bekehrung des Paulus (1929); cf. C. L. Mitton, Expository Times
65 (1953/54), 78-81; 99-1o3; 132-135; and E. Ellwein, Kerygma und Dogma
1 (1955), 247-68.

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212 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

works out an answer to the semi-rhetorical question: "Is the Law


sin?" The answer reads: "Thus the Law is holy, just, and good."
This leads to the equally rhetorical question: "Is it then this good
(Law) which brought death to me?", and the answer is sum-
marized in v.25b: "So then, I myself serve the Law of God with
my mind, but with my flesh I serve the Law of Sin" (i.e., the Law
"weakened by sin" [8:31 leads to death, just as a medicine which
is good in itself can cause death to a patient whose organism
[flesh] cannot take it).
Such an analysis of the formal structure of Rom. 7 shows that
Paul is here involved in an interpretation of the Law, a defense
for the holiness and goodness of the Law. In vv. 13-2 5 he carries
out this defense by making a distinction between the Law as such
and the Sin (and the Flesh) which has to assume the whole re-
sponsibility for the fatal outcome. It is most striking that the "I",
the ego, is not simply identified with Sin and Flesh. The observa-
tion that "I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want
to do is what I do" does not lead directly over to the exclamation:
"Wretched man that I am . . .!", but, on the contrary, to the
statement, "Now if I do what I do not want, then it is not I who do
it, but the sin which dwells in me." The argument is one of acquit-
tal of the ego, not one of utter contrition. Such a line of thought
would be impossible if Paul's intention were to describe man's
predicament. In Rom. 1-3 the human impasse has been argued,
and here every possible excuse has been carefully ruled out. In
Rom. 7 the issue is rather to show how in some sense "I gladly
agree with the Law of God as far as my inner man is concerned"
(v. 22); or, as in v. 25, "I serve the Law of God."
All this makes sense only if the anthropological references in
Rom. 7 are seen as means for a very special argument about the
holiness and goodness of the Law. The possibility of a distinction
between the good Law and the bad Sin is based on the rather trivial
observation that every man knows that there is a difference be-
tween what he ought to do and what he does. This distinction
makes it possible for Paul to blame Sin and Flesh, and to rescue
the Law as a good gift of God. "If I now do what I do not want,
I agree with the Law [and recognize] that it is good" (v. 16).
That is all, but that is what should be proven.

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 213

Unfortunately --or fortunately --Paul happened to express


this supporting argument so well that what to him and his con-
temporaries was a common sense observation appeared to later
interpreters to be a most penetrating insight into the nature of man
and into the nature of sin. This could happen easily once the
problem about the nature and intention of God's Law was not any
more as relevant a problem in the sense in which Paul grappled
with it. The question about the Law became the incidental frame-
work around the golden truth of Pauline anthropology. This is
what happens when one approaches Paul with the Western ques-
tion of an introspective conscience. This Western interpretation
reaches its climax when it appears that even, or especially, the will
of man is the center of depravation. And yet, in Rom. 7 Paul had
said about that will: "The will (to do the good) is there . ."
(v. I8).
What we have called the Western interpretation has left its
mark even in the field of textual reconstruction in this chapter in
Romans. In Moffatt's translation of the New Testament the cli-
max of the whole argument about the Law (v. 2 5b, see above) is
placed before the words "wretched man that I am . . ." Such a
rearrangement - without any basis in the manuscripts 20
wants to make this exclamation the dramatic climax of the whole
chapter, so that it is quite clear to the reader that Paul here gives
the answer to the great problem of human existence. But by such
arrangements the structure of Paul's argumentation is destroyed.
What was a digression is elevated to the main factor. It should not
be denied that Paul is deeply aware of the precarious situation of
man in this world, where even the holy Law of God does not help
- it actually leads to death. Hence his outburst. But there is no
indication that this awareness is related to a subjective conscience
struggle. If that were the case, he would have spoken of the "body
of sin," but he says "body of death" (v. 25; cf. I Cor. 15:56).
What dominates this chapter is a theological concern and the
awareness that there is a positive solution available here and now
by the Holy Spirit about which he speaks in ch. 8. We should not
' In a similar fashion even the standard Greek text of the New Testament (the
Nestle edition) indicates that ch. 7 should end with the exclamation in v. 25a, and
ch. 8 begin already with v. 25b. But the New English Bible retains v. 25b as the
concluding sentence in ch. 7.

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214 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

read a trembling and introspective conscience into a text which is


so anxious to put the blame on Sin, and that in such a way that
not only the Law but the will and mind of man are declared good
and are found to be on the side of God.

We may have wasted too much time in trying to demonstrate a


fact well known in human history - and especially in the history
of religions: that sayings which originally meant one thing later
on were interpreted to mean something else, something which
was felt to be more relevant to human conditions of later times.
And yet, if our analysis is on the whole correct, it points to a
major question in the history of mankind. We should venture to
suggest that the West for centuries has wrongly surmised that the
biblical writers were grappling with problems which no doubt are
ours, but which never entered their consciousness.
For the historian this is of great significance. It could of course
always be argued that these ancients unconsciously were up
against the same problems as we are--man being the same
through the ages. But the historian is rightly anxious to stress the
value of having an adequate picture of what these people actually
thought that they were saying. He will always be suspicious of
any "modernizing," whether it be for apologetic, doctrinal, or
psychological purposes.
The theologian would be quite willing to accept and appreciate
the obvious deepening of religious and human insight which has
taken place in Western thought, and which reached a theological
climax with Luther - and a secular climax with Freud. He could
perhaps argue that this Western interpretation and transformation
of Pauline thought is a valid and glorious process of theological
development. He could even claim that such a development was
fostered by elements implicit in the New Testament, and especially
in Paul.
The framework of "Sacred History" which we have found to
be that of Pauline Theology (cf. our comments on Gal. 3:24
above) opens up a new perspective for systematic theology and
practical theology. The Pauline ephapax ("once for all", Rom.
6: Io) cannot be translated fully and only into something repeated
in the life of every individual believer. For Gentiles the Law is

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THE APOSTLE PAUL 215

not the Schoolmaster who leads to Christ; or it is that only by


analogy and a secondary one at that. We find ourselves in the new
situation where the faith in the Messiah Jesus gives us the right to
be called Children of God (I Jn. 3:I). By way of analogy, one
could of course say that in some sense every man has a "legalistic
Jew" in his heart. But that is an analogy, and should not be
smuggled into the texts as their primary or explicit meaning in
Paul. If that is done, something happens to the joy and humility
of Gentile Christianity.
Thus, the theologian would note that the Pauline original should
not be indentified with such interpretations. He would try to find
ways by which the church - also in the West - could do more
justice to other elements of the Pauline original than those cater-
ing to the problems raised by introspection. He would be sus-
picious of a teaching and a preaching which pretended that the
only door into the church was that of evermore introspective
awareness of sin and guilt. For it appears that the Apostle Paul
was a rather good Christian, and yet he seems to have had little
such awareness. We note how the biblical original functions as
a critique of inherited presuppositions and an incentive to new
thought.21 Few things are more liberating and creative in modern
theology than a clear distinction between the "original" and the
"translation" in any age, our own included.
SFor a fuller treatment of these issues, see my article "Biblical Theology" in
The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, vol. I (1962), 418-32.

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