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Adaptive co-management: Collaboration, learning and multi-level

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Edited b y Derek Armitage, Fikret Berkes, 8
and Nancy Doubleday Integrating Holism and Segmentalism:
Overcoming Barriers to Adaptive
Co-Management between Management
Agencies and Multi-Sector Bodies
Evelyn Pirzkerton

Adaptive Co-Management:
Collaboration, Learning, and In January 2005, I and another evaluation team member,' Anita Bedo, deliv-
ered an evaluation of a three-year pilot initiative in adaptive co-management
Multi-Level Governance to the co-managing body, the West Coast Vancouver lsland Aquatic Man-
agement Board (AMB).' This body is attempting to move towards integrated
ecosystem-based management of a coastal area covering some two-thirds of
the west coast of Vancouver Island in British Columbia. The evaluation was
intended to inform not only the co-management board itself but also the
four levels of government that fund and sponsor it, as the pilot project was
to end in March 2005 (and to be up for renewal). The sponsoring govern-
ments are the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), the Prov-
ince of British Columbia, the Regional Districts of Alberni-Clayoquot and
Comox-Strathcona, and the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council. By far the most
important funder (50 percent) and sponsor (because they have the legal
mandate to manage most aquatic resources) was the DFO.'
The DFO eventually opted to continue supporting the AMB, at least for
another two years beyond the three-year pilot, but their continued support
and vision for the future of the AMB is uncertain. The nature of these differ-
ences exemplifies the difficulties in coordinating the perspectives of govern-
ment bureaucracies and community-based (or regionally based) co-managers.
This discussion explores key dimensions of these difficulties and options
for overcoming them. After briefly noting how these difficulties surfaced in
our evaluation and the discussion surrounding it, I review some aspects of
what the literature on organizational behaviour contributes to the discus-
sion. This review is not comprehensive but is meant to highlight key as-
pects relevant to adaptive co-management.

Local and Non-Local Differences in Perspective on Appropriate

Scope and Scale of AM6 Issues
Among the challenges facing the Aquatic Management Board that the evalu-
ation team identified was the frequent insistence by DFO board members
 difficulties the board was experiencing in being able to significantly engage
with an issue of appropriate scope and scale. The broader question being
raised implicitly was: "How does a local body based on holistic principles
co-manage with a senior governing body based on segmental principles?"
Here, this question is considered in the context of a comanagement ar-
rangement at a formative stage (after the initial negotiation stage, but long
before the mature institutionalized stage). The discussion is relevant to theory
building because it involves an arrangement with an unusually broad vi-
sion and scope of objectives, operating at a regional scale and involving a
complex mix of parties (see Day 2003 for a discussion of the developmental
stages of the arrangement).

An Alternative Vision: Muiti-Sector Involvement at the Coastal

Management Area k a l e
Reflections on segmentalism versus holism in our draft evaluation report to
the AMB meeting (Pinkerton et al. 2005), and other comments by board
members, elicited an open and helpful response from a new DFO repre-
sentative on the AMB at one meetlng. He drew a chart to illustrate the DFO's
traditional consultative arrangements with stakeholder groups, and how
the AMB differed from other stakeholders in the scope of issues considered,
the geographic scale covered in planning, and the complexity of parties
involved. Figure 8.1, adapted from his drawing, ~llustratesthese contrasts.
It is meant to represent the more than fifty tradltional "stovepipe"' arrange-
ments whereby the DFO attempts to solve problems with (usually) single-
that the AMB not involve itself in coast-wide issues or migratory species. sector parties over single-species management for the entire coast. For
This prohibition was frustrating to most non-DFO board members, since example, the DFO works separately with the Hemng Industry Advisory Board,
the principles guiding their vision were to take steps towards integrated the Commercial Salmon Advisory Board, and the Sportfish Advisory Board,
management and ecosystem-based management, meaning that they would each of whlch is a body representing fishers in that sector coast-wide.
look broadly at connections among multiple species and their habitats. Box These traditional consultative arrangements are like stovepipes in several
8.1 summarizes the objectives of the AMB. ways. First, they separate one species from another, even though one spe-
Board members were mostly local residents of the WCVl from Aboriginal, cies (hemng) is the prey of another species (salmon), and their relationship
commercial, recreational, environmental, and local government sectors (First could affect management considerations. Second, they separate one sector
Nations, regional districts). A smaller number of non-local members were of fishers from another (commercial versus sport versus Aboriginal), although
from processing, aquaculture, labour, and senior governmental sectors, and these sectors all fish many of the same species. Third, they make decisions
some of them agreed with the local members on this issue. Local members on a coast-wide basis regarding situations that are complex and varied in
5
who had worked for some seven years to create the AMB were certain that different parts of the coast because of both societal and ecological variabil-
migratory species such as salmon, many of which spawned in their water- ity. Advisors elected to these sectoral processes represent sector-wide eco-
sheds, were part of the WCVl ecosystem. Furthermore, they felt that coast- nomic interests but not communities or geographical regions. At the opposite
wide decisions made in non-local forums regulating access to migratory end of the spectrum, occasional watershed-based pilot projects are not inte-
and non-migratory species such as halibut in their adjacent oceans also had
L
1 grated into larger regional processes, and represent small, geographically
an important effect on WCVl ecosystems. They repeatedly requksted inclu- isolated stovepipes. These stovepipe aspects of the consultations give the
sion in advisory processes dealing with these issues, but were denied.4 Our
1 decisions a narrowness and a top-down configuration, even though
evaluation reflected on this frustration and connected it to some of the j stakeholders are involved, because of what the decisions have to ignore.
Figure 8.1
Area (CMA; six on the BC coast), and (3) the large Ocean Management Area
(LOMA; two on the BC coast). 'The LIFO is already dealing with a BC North
The "stovepipe" consultative processes of the Department of Fisheries and Coast LOMA, attempting to reach agreement on a few major policy issues at
Oceans. There are approximately fifty stovepipe consultative processes of a large scale and to do coastal planning involving eight First Nations' tribal
the DFO functioning at different geographical scales. This figure illustrates
councils. 'The DFO member considered the AMB to be an example of the
how the WCVl AMB includes sectors and species at the Coastal Manage-
ment Area scale. second-order scale of management, a CMA, and spoke to the importance of
working on co-management at this scale.' The implication was that it might
Sporlflsh Commerc~al Salmon Herrlng Groundfish Nonh-
be possible to deal with more complex issues at the CMA scale, especially if
Advlsory Salmon Enhancement Industry Trawl Coa*
Board Adv~mv 8 Habng Advlsov Adv~sory Advlw only one tribal council were involved.
Board Adv~mv Board Committee Board
Board For the DFO to make management decisions with a co-managing partner
Whole
at a CMA scale would be a significant departure from the stovepipe model
BC Coa.1 in three ways. First, more decisions would be made at a much smaller geo-
graphical scale. A large co-management literature documents how a rela-
Large O u a n tively small geographical and human scale of interactions enables more
Managemwt A r u
(LOMA) meaningful and manageable dialogue across many sectors/stakeholder
groups (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). This possibility creates the second
Raglorul
DWrM
major difference from the stovepipe model: decisions at the CMA scale cut
across and include sectors usually operating in separate stovepipes. Deci-
C0art.l sions would thus be integrated, multi-sectoral decisions (instead of single-
Management
A r r (CMA)
sector), bringing together, in addition to the four levels of government,
commercial, sport, Aboriginal, processor, aquaculture, environmental, and
labour interests. Having these sectors reach agreement among themselves
at one table and plan jointly would mean that this particular CMA could
potentially have the sort of cross-seaoral management that is called for in
Canada's Oceans Act and Oceans Strategy (in language that is general and
vague, however). The DFO's 2004-05 Report o n Plans and Priorities (RPP) to
the Treasury Board of Canada clearly states the priority for the Aboriginal
The DFO representative explained that the DFO found its stovepipe con- fishery: "Assisting Aboriginal people to build the capacity to participate more
sultations frustrating, because they were costly (involving around fifty sepa- effectively in the multi-stakeholder processes used for aquatic resources and
rate processes) and often unproduc*ive. That is, even if they resolved conflict oceans management will help to avoid separate munugement solitudes" (10,
within one sector, the decisions of one sector were often in conflict with . emphasis added).
the decisions of another sector. For example, Aboriginal groups had consid- The AMB, then, is an example of a body at a second-order geographical
erable power t o question decisions made by the commercial and sport sec- scale (CMA) that cross-cuts many of the stakeholder sectors. It is an appro-
tor (because of constitutionally protected Aboriginal rights), sometimes priate vehicle for coordinating non-Aboriginal stakeholders with Aborig-
causing those sectors to have to rework their solutions to problems within inal governance processes in the same geographical area. It operates at a
their sectors (thus, making their first efforts a waste of time and resources). scale that is of great interest to government agencies because it is large enough
As discussed above, some of the dilemmas with stovepipe consultation that there would be only about six such areas on the whole west coast of
resulted from the scope at which a problem was defined - for example, how Canada. If the DFO could find stakeholders able to make agreements in
many species and how many sectors were really involved in and affected by areas this large, it would have a relatively efficient means of consulting that
a problem. Other stovepipe dilemmas resulted from the coast-wide geographi- would bypass a number of the stovepipe dilemmas and contribute to rnan-
cal scale of the consultations. The DFO member reminded tHe meeting agement solutions. Stovepipe processes that effectively solved other prob-
attendees that the DFO's Oceans Strategy called for management units at lems would' remain, but a different model for addressing the types of
several geographical scales: (1)the watershed, (2) the Coastal Management camplexity outlined above would emerge, including ways to link processes
156 Evelyn Pinkerton

operating at different scales (e.g., integrating watershed-scale processes with replace the stovepipe consultations (thus potentially altering long-standing
CMA-scale processes). power and client relationships)? re third-order aggregations of coast such
Third, and finally, the ClMA geographical scale would presumably be large as Large Ocean Management Areas (LOMAS),which are twice as large as
enough to include significant aspects of ocean and freshwater ecosystem CMAs, too large for reaching and implementing more than very general
structure and €unction. The DFO would then be responding to the call in agreements effectively? The North Coast LOMA appears to be driven mostly
the Oceans Act to do "integrated management," moving beyond the single- by government's desire to bring stakeholders to agreement o n possible oil,
species models in the stovepipe consultations to consider species interactions, gas, and aquaculture development, possibly the klnds of issues that could be
habitat linkages, and broader questions of coastal planning such as cumula- dealt with fruitfully at a LOMA scale. More complex issues, such as dealing
tive effects.' Some natural scientists have built ecosystem-based models at with species and habitattcpecies interactions, may be more effectively han-
the CMA scale, including a first-generation one for an area somewhat larger dled at a (:MA scale. In the discussion below, 1 show how some actions
than the WCVI (Pauly et al. 1996; Christensen and Walters 2004). Others undertaken by the AMB (or which the AMB aspired to undertake, but was
believe either that our knowledge of coastal ecosystems is not sufficient to prevented) either counteracted some of the problems In senior levels of
know at what scale we should be studying them (de la Mare 2005) or that governance or could have done so.
there are inherent difficulties in models at this scale but a better chance of
modelling them at a smaller scale (Cox et al. 2002a, 2002m. We do know Identifying Types of Banlen to Achieving Adaptive Co-Management
something about the scale at which multi-party boards can function, how- Here 1 conceptualize the types of barriers that the senior governing agency,
ever, so a reasonable approach is to be guided by this scale. This scale could a large federal bureaucracy, would have to overcome in order to move in
indicate what is politically and socially feasible, providing an opportunity the direction of greater use of multi-stakeholder boards at the CMA scale.
t o learn what we can about ecosystems in the process (de Young et al. 1999). The key barriers are a feature of the behavlour of complex organltat~ons,of
It should be noted that the level of power being exercised by all the afore- which government bureaucracies and dgencles are one class. Government
mentioned processes is officially only advisory, since the Minister of Fisher- agencies are predominantly hierarchical structures functloning according
ies and Oceans has the authority t o make all decisions. Decision making to instrumental values and technical considerations (Cyert and March 1963).
that results from agreement across sectors is inherently powerful, however, In order to deal with the complexity and dlverslty of an ecosystem, the
because senior governments are relieved of the burden of resolving conflict hierarchy would have to be able to delegate a great deal of control and
among those sectors and can bless as well as help craft their agreements. tnitiative to various local arms of the bureaucracy. These would need to
While a senior government may, in order to further an agenda, make a dif- have the capacity to be adaptive, learnlng bodles with considerable auto-
ferent decision than the one recommended, doing so would weaken the nomy, even while belng coordinated in thelr operational oblectlves at a
power of both government and the consultative body, because trust will policy level from the top (de la Mare 2005). Wllson (1989) has shown that
have been weakened and parties will become less willing to collaborate. A battles are won by armies that have the capacity for intelligent autonomous
major policy role of government is always t o broker agreements among con- actions at the lowest level, informed by an overall strategic plan coordl-
flicting users. As suggested by the discussion below, there can be more power nated at the highest level. Clarke and McCool (1996) have noted that the
for both stakeholders and government in such multl-party agreements." most successful federal resource management agencles have adopted these
key aspects of military structure. Yet, thls optimal practice may be more
How Can Shifts In Governance towards This VirIon Occur? r honoured in the breach than In the observance, if we conslder the usual
A number of questions arise from the project of co-managing at the CMA modus operandl of government dgencies. Wllson (1989) 5hows as many
scale. Some of them on the "community" side concern matters such as how failures as successes of government bureaucracies in achlevlng this type of
to have enough face-to-face encounters among stakeholders at the CMA structure and coordination.
geographical scale t o make and implement agreements effectively o n an I Some analysts focus o n how government agencies have moved from
ongoing basis. And what types of agreements? On the senior government failure to success in their attempt to cope with complexity in thelr policy
! environment. In hls analysis of the US Forest Service's transition to eco-
side, different questions arise, ones posed sincerely by the DFO representa- b
tive at the meeting. Can t h e agency actually shift to another rhly of work- cystem management, alternative dispute resolution planner and pollcy ana-
ing with stakeholders? What would be required to get beyond the stovepipe i. lyst Steven Yatfee (1997) identified five "behavloural biases" or tendencies
way of dealing with stakeholders? Would new models co-exist with or I (which d cociologist, following Max Weber, might call hrms of "bureaucratic
rationality") of government agencies: ( I ) preference for short-term rational- to institutional convenience, because the lessons that the agency needs t o
ity over long-term rationality; (2)preference for competition over cooperation; learn in order to solve a problem run counter to established institutional
(3) fragmentation of interests and values; (4) fragmentation of responsibili- modus operandi. The planning and reward structure of the agency is based
ties and authorities; and (5) fragmentation of information and knowledge. o n short-term considerations: rewards for immediate results are often en-
These behavioural biases inform the ways agencies tend to make decisions, hanced at the expense of rewards for long-term performance. Likewise, natu-
ways that unfortunately lead t o ineffective outcomes, and in this case make ral resource management agency decision makers often d o not face the
adaptive co-management impossible. consequences of poor decisions whose outcomes may not appear immedi-
In the discussion below, I conceptualize these five tendencies as barriers ately, such as the decline of fish populations.
to adaptive co-management, and include Yaffee's and others' ideas about
which practices show promise for overcoming these tendencies. Yaffee's ap- Hehnviouml Hius 2: Preterence ti)r Cornp~~tition
over G)opcration
proach is supplemented especially by the complementary approach of pol- Government agencies tend to protect their power preserves at all costs and
itical scientist William Ascher (2001),which examines policy failures through to perceive the sharing of power and resources as always a zero-sum game: if
"perverse learning." It is instructive to review how these two scholars, who some is shared with stakeholders, they believe they will enjoy exactly this
d o not cite each other's work and draw on different aspects of the literature, much less (Clarke and McCool 1996; Yaffee 1997; Songorwa et al. 2000).
have reached remarkably similar conclusions, based o n their experience with This mode of thinking inhibits the sharing of information and resources,
natural resource management agencies. The similarities make their findings promotes biasing or misrepresentation of information that is shared, and
more convincing, especially because Yaffee's experience is mostly in North perpetuates the protection of turf even within divisions of the agency, even
America while Ascher's is mostly in developing countries. Both authors have when there is a clear mutual benefit t o be derived from cooperation. Such
drawn upon at least some of the literature on the behaviour of complex competitive behaviour leads to stalemates, low morale, and low legitimacy
organizations, a literature that appears most frequently in the fields of pol- in the eyes of the public. 'Turf protection can also determine the models
itical science, sociology, and administrative science; relatively little of this that management agencies are willing to entertain. Insistence o n the use
literature has focused on how natural resource management agencies be- of conventional agency models limits the way partners can think of co-
have. Finally, 1 will note how various authors recommend dealing with these management, disallowing traditional forms of access or scales of knowledge
behavioural tendencies and how the AMB either responded or had the po- of community members. For example, many communities have tradition-
tential t o d o so. ally used regulation of gear and allocation of fishing space to limit fishing
effort. This approach is often based on detailed local knowledge of stocks and
Behavioural Bias I : Preference for Short-Term Rationality over Long-Term may be a highly effective regulatory approach in certain situations (Wilson
Rationality et al. 1994). Agencies' conventional regulatory tools, such as limited entry
Management agencies seek t o minimize the energy needed to respond to a and quantifiable stock models, provide predictability over large scales and
situation while maximizing control and predictability. These are reasonable are thus preferred (Degnbol 2003). Combinations of these approaches are
short-term responses but miss the long-term objective of solving the prob- seldom attempted because of a perceived competition between them.
lem at hand or creating the conditions to d o so. For example, agency lead- Ascher points out that the "bias in favour of government control" causes
ers often try t o force controversies into organizational procedures that are all negative outcomes to be attributed to the lack of government control and
not effective at dealing with these particular controversies. They tend to consequently leads to a felt need to increase regulatory stringency: the possi-
stifle productive dissension and protect ongoing organizational processes bility that poorly designed government policies could be the cause is not
from disruption, resulting in reduced creativity and effectiveness. 'They then entertained. The feedback loop that would enable the agency to adapt its
rationalize past behaviour and become entrapped in bad decisions. These policies and practices is often missing or obscured by competitive behaviour.
procedures reduce the agency's fitness over time by limiting innovation
and adaptation. This bias towards short-term rationality parallels the pris- Behaviorrrul Bias 3: Fragmentation oflriterests and Vulues
oner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons tendencies, in which indi- Interest groups lobby agencies for privileged access to the resource. 'The more
vidually rational choices. lead to socially undesirable outcomes? energetic, powerful, or privileged these interest groups are, the more influ-
Ascher calls this tendency "complexity reduction" or "oversimplification," ence they tend to have. Agencies may respond by institutionalizing their
leading to "perverse learning." He attributes oversimplificatlon especially response to the most powerful interest groups through formal consultative
 Holirrn and Sryrner~talistn 16 1
lritr~r[~tiiiy

mechanisms. In extreme cases, an agency may be "capturedV.bythe most goal of cooperative promotion of conservation goals. In addition, uncoor-
powerful interest group(s). In this case, the interests of the latter will have dinated decisions are likely to lead to piecemeal solutions that are not effec-
an influence o n policy that is disproportionate to the public benefit of the tive at addressing larger problems, and to diminished accountability in
latter's extraction activities (McFarland 1987). In cases where there are many dealing with overall issues. This tendency can be exacerbated by stovepipe
conflicting interests, stakeholders will engage in turf battles as energetic as sectoral processes, as discussed above. Conservation objectives, moreover,
those within the agency: positions will be exaggerated, and-non-productive are often neglected when other mandated objectives (such as exploitation)
conflict will predominate. Exaggerated positions make it impossible for gov- are more consistent with the organization's institutional interests or the
ernment decision makers not to be attacked by all sides. This manner of individual ambitions of leaders and staff (Ascher 2001). As March and Simon's
dealing with management and allocation decisions is inherently competi- classic analysis (1958) showed, there is a tendency to favour those aspects
tive and allows no means of inter-sectoral communication or cooperation, of their objectives that are most consistent with the agency's resource base.
especially not at the level of shared geographical territory. At this level, one Thus, exploitation interests are likely to have priority over conservation
would expect to find the greatest incentive to perceive a shared destiny and interests, and the sustainable extraction rules for one species will ignore the
t o recognize that the game may not be a zero-sum one - that there may be impact of that extraction o n other species and their habitats.
mutual benefits to joint problem solving. If fragmented interests are not
brought together and forced to identify and integrate their common interests Behavioural Bius 5: Frugmentatioti of Inturnration and Knowledge
in sustainable management and ecosystem health, the decision-making Information and analysis are fragmented among professional disciplines,
process will reflect fragmented values rather than shared or program objec- economic sectors, levels of government, and divisions of agencies. Because
tives, and conflict will be continually forced to higher and higher govern- information is collected in response to specific needs, it is generally biased
mental levels. If contlicts are resolved for political reasons at higher levels, towards past problems and retlects particular organizational contexts and
regional decision makers in the agency lose power, and decisions will be interests. It may not even be useful to other interests in its current forms.
more informed by politics than by program objectives. Furthermore, information as a form of power is hoarded by divisions and
agencies; it is seen as a possible weapon in contlicts and as property not to
Behavioural Bias 4: Fragmentation of Responsibilities and Authorities be shared until it can be claimed by an author through publication. Gov-
The structuring of agencies into divisions tends to divide up responsibilities ernment information-gathering resources will never be sufficient to obtain
but not to integrate them at a higher or lower level. Similarly, the legisla- the information needed to make fully scientifically informed harvesting
tion creating the mandates of an agency may be inherently contradictory decisions (Wilson et al. 1994). Although the literature shows many cases of
or incompatible. The Oceans Act and the Fisheries Act, implemented by sustainable community-based management or co-management based o n
two different branches of the DFO, have not been reconciled. Turf battles allocation of geographical space or other indirect means of keeping harvest
among agency divisions and among different agencies with jurisdiction over effort at sustainable levels (Schlager and Ostrom 1993; 'wilson et al. 1994))
different aspects of the resources and its habitat both create and reinforce it is very difficult for governments to trust these proxies or the knowledge
stovepipe management structures within the agency. Decisions are focused o n which they are based (Finlayson 1994; Holm 2003; Wilson 2003). Har-
o n various statutorily defined questions that are much narrower than re- vesters' knowledge may be tacit, eluding the discursive world of scientific
quired for an effective problem-solving process. For example, commercial experiment, and dismissed because of dissimilar cognitive cultures and the
fisheries are regulated by the federal agency, the DFO, while freshwater and use of alien rules, norms, and languages in the negotiation of validity (Palsson
anadromous sport fisheries and aquaculture are mostly regulated by the 1995; Neis and Felt 2000). Thus, government agencies often reject forms of
province. In addition, forest management and coastal development plan- knowledge that could help close the information gap, especially when com-
ning, two of the largest threats to fish habitat, are provincial jurisdictions. bined with agency knowledge.
While some level of division of responsibility and authority is obviously Ascher emphasizes the complexity of the classic "principal-agent prob-
necessary to develop expertise and accomplish specific tasks, it comes at a lem" that arises when agency officials have both superior information and
cost if not institutionally counterbalanced. Yaffee (1997) emphasizes the some autonomy. How does the "principal" (supervisor, administrator) moni-
tendency for individuals in such situations to build niches fonthemselves tor the performance of the "agent" (a party who implements the directives
as they seek turf. The goal of protecting their turf may then override the of the principal)? In a situation in which competitive behaviour results in
 Ir~tegrutingHolism urltl Srpnrr~tcllirrn 1h j

less flow of information on individual activities and resources, individuals forum, and as a convenor of processes to explore options, the AMB exem-
within government have more opportunity to pursue their own individual plifies this process.
or institutional interests rather than the public interest. The problem is com- Ascher (2001) recommends tying government officials' long-term ben-
plex, because "agents" have multiple motives that differ from one agent to efits (such as pensions and professional recognition) to the continued and
the next, and the same incentives or monitoring strategy may not work for sustainable operation of resource extraction activities. He believes that re-
all. Ascher also notes that complexity, uncertainty, and limited resources ducing the rotation of officials to different.locations will increase their in-
will discourage analysis of new situations on their own terms, and promote volvement in long-term projects oriented towards sustainability goals.
their interpretation in terms of the most recent or familiar example at hand, Westley (2002) goes further by showing how a manager who "goes local"
often leading to inadequate analysis. can work effectively to change conflict with stakeholders into collabora-
tion. Long-term familiarity with the problem and the stakeholders enables
Dealing with the Behavioural Biases a manager to discover a way to engage stakeholders in scientific experi-
Yaffee (1997) notes that visioning future undesirable states and binding ments and to discover windows and moments of opportunity, as well as the
oneself to alternative policies for achieving different outcomes is a large appropriate scale at which to define and solve problems. Ascher's belief and
step towards long-term rationality (overcoming Behavioural Hias 1 towards Westley's conclusions are consistent with my own (as yet unpublished) find-
short-term rationality). Table 8.1 demonstrates how the AMB has bound ings on the successful strategies of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game,
itself to alternative policies by spelling out its objectives. Ideally, board in which area managers may have twenty years' service in the same area.
members are required to uphold the objectives as a condition of serving on This finding is also consistent with the human resources strategy of firms
the board, although in practice this has not always been the case with all that invest in hiring the right people, rewarding them well, training and
non-local members. 'lb monitor how much and how well such a step is educating them, and sharing the rewards through means such as gain shar-
made means implementing performance measures, with monitored results ing, stock options, employee ownership, and so on. Some firms go further
reported to remind agencies of their commitments. Although not focused and tie top managers' bonuses to successful performance measured on an
on specific performance measures, the AMB has acted as a monitor of pro- index agreed to and rated by subordinates (Bolman and Deal 1997). In a
cesses or commitments of government, and the action or inaction of the similar use of visible sustainability indicators, agencies could explicitly plan
latter o n a particular issue. It has monitored government's lack of response for sustainability goals and evaluate for sustainability achievements, thus
to requests for stakeholder input in various fisheries and planning processes, improving and rewarding performance oriented towards longer-term ob-
and has determined which elements are missing from planning processes jectives. Many scholars have noted the influence of budgetary cycles on the
that leave key concerns unaddressed. time frame of government agency planning, and even the influence of an-
Another step towards long-term rationality is to reward risk taking and nual budgetary spending requirements on division or departmental perform-
experimentation with creative solutions, as is done routinely by successful ance. Rewards to agencies and even departments for budgetary carry-over
companies such as 3M, which encourages all employees to allocate up to 15 and allocation to long-term projects and planning would help combat short-
percent of their time to innovation (3M policy on its website, http://www. term rationality as it appears in spending patterns at the end of the fiscal
3M.com). Co-management arrangements themselves have often been docu- year, for example.
mented to serve the function of designing what the future commitments As a corrective for Behavioural Bias 2, preference for competition over
should be and then holding agencies accountable for these commitments cooperation, Yaffee (1997) recommends the use of alternative dispute reso-
(Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995). l'hus, they can be helpful in overcoming lution with professional facilitation. Such processes would be additionally
this dysfunctional tendency in management agencies and in steering man- helped by a focus on superordinate goals and shared objectives (such as
agement towards longer-term goals. Co-management could open the door the sustainable management of the resource, habitat protection, and in-
to "double-loop learning" (Argyris and Schon 1978): bureaucratic outsiders creased understanding of species interactions that affect the health of the
such as the AMB may redefine the problem or how to approach it, helping resource). With leadership from the agency concerning program objec-
insiders (the management agency) consider how they could rearrange their tives in the public interest, but flexibility about how to achieve these ob-
standard operating procedures so as to allow themselves to consider abroader jectives and help from facilitators in principled negotiation, competition
range of options or "to learn how to learn." As a discussion and learning could be reduced significantly. The AMB has played a significant role in
164 Evrlyn Pinkerton

the WCVI region in a number of ways that have tended to counteract Be- Yaffee (1997) suggests the creation of coordinating mechanisms such as
havioural Bias 2. In creating cooperation between government and local ecosystem-level multi-party policy councils, interagency management
groups, it has played several roles. As a two-way communication funnel teams, revitalized regional planning bodies, and information clearinghouses
between governments and local bodies, it has provided information both to build a shared understanding of what is at stake. He emphasizes that
ways to meet the needs of all parties; it has provided analysis of issues and such bodies would need some incentives, such as a substantive mandate
options that consolidate opinion in the region and explain government and/or new resources. They would also require clear and shared measures of
perspectives to locals; and it has acted as a clearinghouse to which issues are success and ways to monitor progress towards desired ends. They could
referred for resolution. overcome fragmentation of information through shared databases and in-
In a more proactive role, the AMB has acted as a mediator of everyday terpretations that integrate information and different forms of knowledge.
interactions among the DFO, local fishers, and Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Coun- The AMB provides an almost formulaic example of some of what Yaffee
cil biologists in developing a new fishery for gooseneck barnacles. The AMB recommends. To the extent allowed by its limited funding, the AMB plays
has also facilitated formal meetings among the DFO, the province, and other the role of a multi-party council, an interagency management team, a re-
actors by providing an educated balance through a neutral informed vi- gional planning body, and an information clearinghouse. Because it did
sion, conducting surveys in advance to identify the priority issues of not receive the funding originally budgeted for project management, the
attendees, and analyzing and framing issues in advance to promote prob- AMB has acted mostly to coordinate with and provide perspectives on
lem solving at meetings. In its relations with non-governmental bodies, the projects of other bodies. For example, it contributed to the Kyuquot Coastal
AMB has also acted as a facilitator for groups inside and outside the region, Zone Plan, where it observed and reviewed the Provincial Coastal Use Plan,
as a convenor of processes for exploring options, as an umbrella under which provided recommendations, and participated in follow-up activities. The
groups in the region could come together, and as a culture broker promot- AMB's participation in the plan was acknowledged as resulting in a more
ing communication among parties with different values, perspectives, and truly integrated plan than was initially envisioned.
worldviews. One unique AMB contribution to counteracting these three fragmenta-
My research on agencyltribal fisheries co-management in Washington tion behavioural tendencies is its production of an Internet-accessible, inte-
State provides another surprising finding: leaders in the state fisheries agency grated, geo-referenced database linked to a document database containing
believed that the agency was better off after co-management was established. the principal key writings about any resource on the WCVI. Furthermore, a
One dimension of the perceived improvement was increased resources for substantive mandate (to make progress towards ecosystem-based manage-
management. Cooperation between the tribes and the agency enabled them ment) allowed comprehensive actions. For example, the AMB can coordi-
to finally come together to negotiate a Pacific Salmon Treaty with Canada. nate habitat and stock status information in a comprehensive manner. It
The treaty produced new funds not previously available to the agency. In has recently been mapping the effects of activities in the uplands, such as
addition, the tribes were able to access funds from different sources and to agriculture and toxics; the effects of nearshore activities such as fish farms,
hire their own professional biological and management experts. The tribes sewage, and estuary drainage; and the effects of ocean cqnditions such as
and agency then began to allocate tasks among themselves more effectively, salinity and activities such as driftnetting to produce a map of the cumula-
spreading resources more efficiently. Finally, the entry into management of tive effects of upland, nearshore, and ocean conditions on salmon and other
new colleagues who reported to different authorities stimulated debate and aquatic species. Two separate maps - salmon stock status and cumulative
innovation (Pinkerton 2003). While a group such as the Aquatic Manage- effects -are being produced and will eventually be integrated into one map.
ment Board is dependent on governmental support in the first few years, Clarke and McCool (1996) found that the most successful agencies are
the charitable status it has obtained, the nature of its mission, and the record those best able to mobilize and infuse their staff with a sense of the mission
of other multi-party bodies suggests that it could eventually become self- of the agency and to tie the programmatic goals closely to the mission.
supporting and a net contributor of management resources. Such agencies were also able to deal with the principal-agent problem by
Possibilities for counteracting the last three behavioural biases, as variants identifying peer ptofessional performance with the standing of the agency
of the bias towards competition over cooperation, are best discussed to- and with programmatic goals, which are seen also as consistent with those
gether, as these biases and their resulting behaviours overlap consMerably of the public. This finding is consistent with Westley's conclusions (2002)
(fragmentation of interests and values, fragmentation of responsibilitiesand about the success of agencies that work closely with stakeholders and allow
authorities, fragmentation of information and knowledge). them to experiment and learn.
 It~tr~yrdtirr~
Holism llrrd Sc~mrirtulisin 167

An AMB project exemplifying these findings is the creation of a new goose- re-creation of the fishery and stated that he "would never have thought this
neck barnacle experimental fishery. Previously a "lost" fishery under con- possible" (since the DFO had closed the fishery as being impossible to man-
ventional management (closed because it could not be managed sustainably), age). The DFO was, of course, a partner in the creation of the new fishery
the gooseneck barnacle fishery was opened in late January 2004 and, by and still exercises oversight, but the innovations that made it possible were
April, showed substantial benefits in economic, ecological, and social terms. led by the AMB.
Economically, the fishery directly employs thirty-two harvesters and sup-
ports one full-time and eleven part-time additional jobs in monitoring, Conciuslon
management, purchasing, transportation, and processing. The development In considering selected literature o n five behavioural biases of resource
of the project involved extensive research integrating local knowledge and management agencies, this discussion has identified sixteen ways by which
natural science (a major AMB objective). Since the first three months of agencies can overcomes those biases. The first eleven of these relate directly
operations, the AMB has been able to introduce new buyers for gooseneck to the creation of multi-party co-management bodies, particularly ones that
barnacles and develop new protocols for the fishery, and is in the process of could operate at a regional scale and that would have characteristics similar
creating a product-tracking system for which the AMB has a five-year plan to those of the Aquatic Management Board. The biases may be overcome by
and fundraising proposal. The AMB predicts that this fishery will be self- the agency, in collaboration with a co-managing body, by:
sustaining by its fourth or fifth year.
Ecologically, the experimental fishery is being conducted in a sustain- visioning future undesirable states and binding itself to alternative poli-
able manner satisfactory to the DFO, the province, and the AMB, enabling cies for achieving different outcomes
effective monitoring of both the stock and its habitat. Detailed assessments designing what the future commitments should be, and then holding
o n control and index sites, an adaptive management plan, and a decision agencies responsible for these commitments
framework to verify the sustainability of the fishery under a precautionary monitoring how much and how well alternative activities are done by
approach have been established, and all parties are satisfied that the AMB implementing performance measures, with monitored results reported to
was able to revive a fishery that would otherwise be closed and probably remind agencies of their commitments
poached. rewarding risk taking and experimentation with creative solutions
Socially, the AMB worked closely with the DFO and the Nuu-chah-nuith practising "double-loop learning" (questioning standard operating pro-
Tribal Council and gained the confidence of the harvesters, who are now cedures so as to consider a broader range of options)
recommending a lower level of harvest on particular rocks that they feel are using alternative dispute resolution, with professional facilitation
not growing back fast enough. This is a positive sign that the AMB has been focusing on superordinate goals and shared objectives of multiple parties
able to develop a management regime that harvesters consider legitimate (such as the sustainable management of the resource, habitat protection,
and effective, and thus a regime that will be able to elicit not only high and increased understanding of species interactions that affect the health
levels of compliance but also intervention by harvesters to make the regime of the resource)
.~'
more precautionary in specific instances. This happened partially because leading by putting forth program objectives in the public interest, but
the AMB staff worked closely with the harvesters to record and include their being flexible about how to achieve these objectives
knowledge and gain their cooperation in the generation of harvest rules. reducing stereotypes and building concurrence across interest groups
The AMB has also developed a n efficient method of recording stock and creating ecosystem-level multi-party policy councils, interagency man-
habitat conditions through scanned photographs and data, which are in- agement teams, and revitalized regional planning bodies to build a shared
stantly recorded electronically and are easily viewed by managers, trigger- understanding of what is at stake
ing warning signals if precautionary thresholds are p a ~ s e d . ~ creating information clearinghouses to build a shared understanding of
This method of creating a new fishery blazes a path for innovative ways what is at stake and interpretations that integrate information and differ-
of rule making, monitoring, and enforcement, and demonstrates the poten- ent forms of knowledge.
tial of bodies like the AMB to contribute to management in ways unique to
their position as stakeholder representatives. It also demonstrate-he use of In addition to these eleven ciasses of activities related to working with co-
performance measures, adaptive management, and transparency. At an AMB managers, there are five types of actions that management agencies could
meeting, the DFO representative marvelled at the process surrounding the take internally to overcome the behavioural biases:
168 Evelyn Pinkerton b~tegratir~~g
Holism and Segmentnlism 1 6 9

creating incentives for agency staff to identify simultaneously with agency 2 A detailed description of the AMB is beyond the scope of this paper, as it is meant here to
serve as an example of the structural nature of problems with which government agencies
mission, program objectives, and professional peer expectations have to cope, and potential solutions t o these problems. Rriefly, the AMB was formed
tying govemment officials' long-term benefits (such as pensions and profes- following eight years of activism in the WCVI region by First Nations, commercial fishers,
sional recognition) to the continued and sustainable operation of resource recreational fishers, and environmental interests, plus two regional districts. These parties
had formed an organization to work together towards sustainable integrated aquatic man-
extraction activities agement. 'me terms of reference that were finally negotiated with federal and provincial
rewarding agencies and even departments for budgetary carry-over and governments called for the inclusion o n the AMB of members to broadly represent the
allocation to long-term projects and planning interests of processors, salmon farmers, the province, and the federal Department of Fish-
eries and Oceans (DFO). 1\11 members agreed t o support the principles and vision devel-
reducing the rotation of officials to different locations to increase their oped by the original WCVI members, consistent with the Nuuchah-nulth First Nation's
involvement in long-term projects oriented towards sustainability goals; principle of Hishukis '1S'awulk ("Everything is one"), ecosystem management, and the
"going local" over the long term by building relationships that engage Oceans Ac? principle of integrated management.
3 The Nuu-chah-nulth have been negotiating a treaty with Canada to clarify their own rights
stakeholders in scientific experiments, discovering windows and moments
to co-manage and access aquatic resources, a process recently interrupted by their 2004
of opportunity to create collaboration court proceedings against the DFO and the federal govemment for not allowing adequate
planning explicitly for sustainability goals and evaluation of sustainability commercial access to aquatic resources. Key Nuu-chah-nulth leaders consider the Aquatic
achievements, through the use of visible sustainability indicators. Management Board an lnterim Measures Agreement for their eventual treaty with Canada.
4 For example, the AMB requested inclusion in the three levels of salmon planning - the
Area Harvest Committees, the Commercial Salmon Advisory Board, and the Integrated
This discussion has identified the segmental tendencies of conventional Harvest Planning Committees - but was denied. AMB members pointed out that Stephen
resource management (as specified in the five behavioural biases) as a major Owen's Institute for Dispute Resolution, which had been commissioned to advise the DFO
on their advisory processes, had identified the AMB as a n important model for a new way
barrier t o achieving sustainable resource management and moving towards to d o policy work and had strongly recommended its connection to other advisory pro-
ecosystem-based management. I have considered how the conventional cesses (and specifically salmon) (see Institute for Dispute Resolution 2001).
stovepipe consultative mechanisms of agencies tend to be produced by and 5 The term "stovepipe" is wldespread in the organizational behaviour literature, and was
also used by the DFO representative o n the AMB.
t o reinforce this segmentalism. I have also considered the capacity of multi- 6 Since this presentation, it has become evident that the WCVI region offers opportunities
stakeholder boards such as the AMB to promote communication among to conduct management activltles far more complex and integrated that those envisaged
the warring stakeholder sectors and to integrate stakeholder's concerns by in the CMA scale in the Oceans Strategy. The term for that scale that has come into DFO
parlance is the "integrated management" scale. Management at this scale has elicited more
discussing problems holistically. Although we may not know the scale at interest from the province recently because of the opportunity It could offer the province
which we should be studying ecosystems, this discussion suggests that multi- to be involved as a partner with the federal government in integrated oceans planning,
party co-managing bodies such as the AMB operating at the Coastal Man- unllke the North Coast LOMA process, which does not include the province.
7 Although the DFO has gone through a second generation of strategies to achieve sustain-
agement Area (or what may be termed the "integrated management") scale able development, as required of all federal govemment agencies in Canada, there has
are a workable human scale at which t o take a productive first step in this been little implementation of these strategies so far.
direction. Such bodies can have the capacity t o be managers themselves in 8 'Ihe DFO was unwilling to abandon traditional stovepipe consultative processes, however,
innovative ways, as exemplified in the gooseneck barnacle fishery, and can and, during summer and fall 2005, began exploring how to combine these processes with
new Aboriginal co-managlng bodles that were to recelve slgnificant fundlng under a new
also be effective co-managers, as exemplified in the many other roles they Aboriglnal Aquatic Resource and Oceans Management (AAROM) Program (because of new
play both with government and within the region. court cases recognlzlng greater Aboriginal management rights). The West Coast of Vancou-
ver Island was the first area in BC to pilot the AAROM program, partly because of its experi-
ence with the AMB and partly because of the proactive stance of the Nuuchah-nulth. In
Acknowledgments this situation, the DFO saw the AMB in the llmlted role of an oceans planning body be-
1 warmly thank Tom Pater and Andrew Day for belng willing to serve as the AM8 reviewers tween the AAROM concept and the traditional stovepipe consultations, but with a project-
of this chapter, and 1 am equally grateful to three DFO reviewers who prefer to remain spcxific versus acontinuing mandate. At one polnt, the DFO decided to termlnate all funding,
anonymous. The internal workshops and review process organized by the editors were but intense pressure from AMB supporters at federal and provincial levels restored it. AMB
very provocative, stimulating, and helpful in herding us into a common corral. liveryone'$ members dld not agree with the proposed change to its mandate, and the nature of their
comments have Improved the chapter but only the author can be held responsible for any role is under negotiation at this writing. The AMB currently cooperates with the Nuu-
errors of judgment or fact. chah-nulth AAROM process o n the operational level in projects such as stock status map-
ping, c~eatinga stock assessment framework, and developing conservation units for the
Wild Salmon Policy initiatlve.
Notes * 9 'The fishery was not pursued in 2006 because of competition from Chile in the Spanish
1 The evaluation had three co-authors (Pinkerton, Redo, and Hanson 2005) and is posted at
http://www.westcoastaquatic.ca. market; the AMR hopes to identify other markets. The precautionary procedures adopted
d o not allow a fishery to occur at much lower prices for the product.
170 Evelyn Pirrkertorr Irrtexnztiny Holism utrci Sgrtlrr~tcrlisnr 17 1

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