1)Establishing a duty of care in a novel situation is a matter of policy rather than justice.

’ With
reference to case law, critically analyse this statement.

In order to achieve victory in a negligence lawsuit, the plaintiff must establish two key elements: firstly,
that the defendant's negligent behavior directly resulted in harm to the plaintiff, whether it be bodily or
financial; and secondly, that the defendant had a legal obligation to exercise reasonable care towards
the plaintiff in the first place.

Typically, this is a simple matter to contemplate, as negligence cases primarily focus on determining if
the defendant failed to fulfill their duty of care. However, in a minority of negligence claims, the court is
required to determine whether the defendant had a legal obligation to ensure the safety and well-being
of the claimant from the beginning. It is important to note that the courts are extremely cautious in
determining a duty of care in a new scenario, so as to avoid setting a precedent that could lead to an
overwhelming number of lawsuits. Before the case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, the concept
of "duty of care" was determined by examining specific connections between individuals and was
restricted to a few categories (such as occupier/visitor, doctor/patient, employer/employee). Over time,
the legal concept of negligence has experienced significant periods of transformation, and in numerous
cases, the importance of policy has become essential in determining when a legal obligation to exercise
care is required. The case of Donoghue v Stevenson established the legal idea that a defendant has a
responsibility to take care of a claimant if there is a close connection between them, such that it is
foreseeable that the claimant may be impacted by the defendant's actions or, in some cases, lack of
action. This test establishes the individual to whom a legal need to exercise care may be owed, but it
provides limited information regarding the specific timing or circumstances under which this obligation
arises. This is where policy concerns start to emerge. Regarding Donoghue v Stevenson, it is evident that
the judges prioritized fairness while deliberating on the issue. Following the landmark case of Donoghue
v Stevenson, the courts have applied Lord Atkin's 'neighbour' principle. This principle was initially
extended in the tort of negligence, as seen in the case of Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004.

Further expansion occurred in the case of Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, where
Lord Wilberforce introduced a 'two-stage' test to determine the existence of a duty of care. This test,
known as the proximity test, deviates from the Donoghue test. It states that a duty of care will be
established if there is a close relationship between the parties involved, such that the defendant's
negligence could potentially harm the claimant. Additionally, there should be no factors that would
negate or restrict the duty, such as policy reasons or limitations on potential damages. It is evident that
the House of Lords was striving to get justice for victims of carelessness.

Nevertheless, this test was deemed excessively costly. Viewed from this perspective, one could contend
that the Anns' expansive approach was unfair to defendants. The House of Lords in Caparo plc v
Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 promptly examined and questioned the liberal finding. The Caparo test, which
remains the standard for determining a duty of care in new circumstances, introduced a three-part
examination: the ability to reasonably anticipate harm, the closeness of the relationship, and the
fairness, justice, and reasonableness of holding the defendant responsible for the claimant's well-being
in the specific situation. Despite their apparent distinctiveness, Lord Oliver in Caparo argues that these
qualities are often really different aspects of the same phenomenon. What can be predicted or
anticipated relies on matters of policy, justice, and proximity. However, the definition of a proximate
relationship is contingent upon the other criteria and subsequent factors. Lord Wilberforce's two-stage
test in Anns v Merton LBC is now considered to have oversimplified the process of distinguishing
between the questions of foresight of injury and policy. This is the reason why. Significantly, the court's
determination of what is fair, just, and reasonable will be influenced by policy considerations,
particularly the impact on legal growth and the broader public interest. The primary policy matters are
presently under consideration.

Firstly, let's consider the floodgates argument: would the development of a duty situation potentially
lead to a significant number of claims, some of which may be unjustified? The matter in question was
likely addressed in the case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 and
represents the progression of legal principles, established through case law, regarding the negligent
infliction of psychiatric harm on "secondary" claimants. These claimants are individuals who were not
directly at risk of physical harm but are seeking compensation for psychiatric injury caused by negligence
towards a third party. It is not deemed just or rational for a defendant to bear responsibility in
negligence towards those who cannot be precisely identified. The concept was famously articulated by
Chief Justice Cardozo in the case of Ultramares Corporation v Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (1932), whereby he
argued that the law should not recognize an obligation that is uncertain in terms of size, duration, and
the affected group. Furthermore, in suitable instances, particularly those that fall within the general
scope of the rule in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 regarding economic
loss resulting from negligent advice, it has become evident that an additional factor to consider is
whether the defendant has willingly assumed a responsibility towards the claimant for the accuracy of
the advice provided (Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1994] 3 All ER 129; Henderson v Merrett
Syndicates Ltd [1994] 3 All ER 506; White v Jones [1995] 1 All ER 691). Policy reasons would deem it
unfair to hold someone accountable for their statements if they were unaware that their words will be
used to harm someone else.

When the courts evaluate the practical consequences of a judgment to impose an obligation, policy
becomes highly significant in the pursuit of justice. As an illustration, the decision in the case of Marc
Rich v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1995] 3 is noteworthy. The House of Lords expressed concern in All
ER 307 that the potential for civil liability could lead organizations, such as marine surveyors, whose
main responsibility is to promote the well-being of the public, to adopt defensive measures that could
result in the imposition of excessively burdensome safety standards. It could also discourage local
authorities from doing specific safety inspections entirely. This issue has now emerged in the realm of
law enforcement, following the recent rulings of the Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of
West Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4 and Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD & Anor [2018] UKSC
11. These decisions affirm that under specific conditions, the police can be held accountable not only for
civil wrongs (Robinson), but also for violations of the European Convention of Human Rights (MPP).
Furthermore, should Parliamentary intervention be considered in addressing this matter? If Parliament
has already taken action, the courts may be reluctant to enforce a common-law obligation that goes
beyond what has already been done. One significant component in the Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991]
1 AC 398 case appears to have been the consideration of the Defective Premises Act 1972 as the
acceptable legal recourse, despite its limited breadth rendering it practically ineffective.

Policy factors play a significant role in determining the existence of a duty of care, and the mere
existence of a specific form of relationship is not decisive. Similarly, the courts prioritize justice when
evaluating all parts of the case. Using only the criterion of reasonable foresight of harm can lead to
various issues, such as the risk of uncertain liability or an undesirable depletion of public funds. This can
occur either through compensating individual claimants or by promoting costly defensive measures.
Although courts may be reluctant to assume legislative responsibilities, the enactment of the Human
Rights Act in 1998 has influenced their approach. In cases where relevant, the courts can rely on the
intentions of Parliament to uphold Human Rights. The case is titled "Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis v DSD". In addition, it is necessary for them to implement measures to limit the tort of
carelessness and ensure the preservation of justice in the most optimal way. They are able to do so by
employing policy considerations.

2)Wilma, a student, invited a couple of friends from university, Chi and Astan, to stay at her family’s
farmhouse during the vacation. One evening, after drinking a bottle of wine, Wilma suggested taking
shotguns up into the fields to see what they could shoot. Neither Chi nor Astan had ever handled a
shotgun before, but Wilma announced that there were enough guns for all of them and that she
would show them what to do. When Wilma opened the gun cabinet she noticed that her shotgun
licence had expired the week before, but as she did not want to disappoint her friends she gave each
of them a gun and some pellets. Although they had been intending to shoot in a field across the road
from the farmhouse, the sight of a road sign proved too much temptation for them and all three fired
at it at once. Jatinder, a social worker, who had just cycled into range, was struck in the eye by a single
pellet, while Wilma suffered several injuries from pellets ricocheting off the sign. Both casualties were
rushed to hospital, where the shotgun pellets were removed but there was nothing to indicate from
whose gun any of the pellets had been fired. Consider the potential liability of the parties in
negligence. You may assume that issues relating to duty of care and breach have already been
resolved.

This is an intricate scenario involving two parties: Jatinder, the injured social worker, and Wilma, who,
together with her two companions, Chi and Astan, is a prospective defendant. Given that the facts
indicate the resolution of duty and breach problems, the initial focus lies on causation. Each claimant
will be evaluated sequentially.

Jatinder

The conventional method for determining causation involves the application of the but-for test, as
demonstrated in the case of Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee (1969)
1 QB 428. In this case, a doctor's failure to examine a patient was deemed not to be a factual cause of
harm because the patient was already beyond recovery before the negligence occurred. The but-for test
examines whether the injury would have been avoided if it were not for the defendant(s)' negligence.
This is a challenge as claimants are required to substantiate their claims against defendants on an
individual basis. Under some conditions, it is feasible to ascertain that multiple defendants have
contributed to the overall extent of harm. An analogous scenario arose in the case of Fitzgerald v Lane
[1989] AC 328, wherein an inattentive pedestrian sustained several injuries as a result of being hit by
two vehicles that were being operated recklessly. Based on the provided information, Jatinder has
sustained an injury from a solitary pellet, indicating that only one of the defendants can be held
accountable. The responsibility of proving this lies with Jatinder, who must demonstrate, with a higher
likelihood than not, who individual is responsible. Without additional evidence, this will be impossible to
achieve. There are three prospective tortfeasors, each with a probability of one-third or 33 percent of
being the liable party. Given the circumstances, it appears probable that Jatinder's assertion will not
succeed (Essex AHA [1988] AC 1074). Nevertheless, in specific conditions, the House of Lords has used a
revised method to determine causation, in order to achieve a sense of fairness in the given situation.
Most of these cases pertain to employees who have experienced injury or illness due to being exposed
to a particular substance. However, in situations where they are unable to definitively demonstrate that
their employer's exposure was negligent and caused the harm, or that a specific employer among
several equally negligent parties is responsible. In the cases of Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw [1956] 1
All ER 615 and McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008, the plaintiffs experienced
pneumoconiosis and dermatitis, respectively, as a result of their exposure to dust. In Wardlaw, the
plaintiff was employed in a setting where careless dust was combined with dust that could not have
been reasonably prevented, and was thus categorized as 'innocent'. McGhee toiled in a sweltering and
humid setting, where particles of brick dust adhered to his body unavoidably. However, because to his
employer's careless oversight in not providing showers, the duration of this contact was prolonged as he
was compelled to commute back home in the same state. Neither claimant could provide scientific
evidence to establish that the 'negligent' dust was the source of the damage. In the Wardlaw case, the
House of Lords determined that in situations like this, the claimant only needed to demonstrate, with a
reasonable degree of certainty, that the negligent dust had significantly contributed to the disease,
based on the balance of probabilities (as stated by Lord Reid). In McGhee, a similar method was used. It
was observed that while it was possible to demonstrate that fragments of brick dust had contributed to
McGhee's condition (unlike in Wardlaw's case, where every particle of dust was proven to have caused
the disease), Lord Reid stated that there was no significant distinction between stating that the
respondents' actions significantly increased the risk of harm to the appellant and stating that their
actions made a significant contribution to his injury. In the case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services
Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, the appeals involved individuals who had contracted mesothelioma, a type of
disease that can be caused by inhaling a single asbestos fiber, rather than by the buildup of asbestos
over time. Therefore, it is impossible for an individual who has been carelessly exposed to asbestos
while working for many employers to scientifically establish which specific employer caused the
sickness, or to prove that any particular employer significantly contributed to it.

This scenario presented a dilemma for the legal system, where it had to choose between two possible
injustices: (i) enforcing a stringent standard for proving causation, requiring evidence of direct causation
or significant contribution to the harm, which would result in the rights of severely injured employees
being left unprotected; or (ii) adopting a modified approach that considers the contribution to the risk of
harm, potentially holding a defendant liable even if they were not directly responsible. The House of
Lords unanimously agreed to adopt the revised approach, which was based on, among other things, the
rationale presented in the McGhee case. They argued that if the current limitations of medical
technology were to prevent wounded employees from making claims, it would essentially render the
employer's legal obligation meaningless. In the Fairchild case, Lord Hoffmann noted that the law should
acknowledge the need for distinct causal requirement principles in order to achieve a fair resolution for
different types of cases. In the Fairchild case, Lord Bingham examined various instances from different
legal systems where negligent shootings occurred. These cases included Litzinger v Kintzler Cass civ 2e, 5
June 1957, D 1957 Jur 493; Summers v Tice (1948) 199 P 2d 1; Oliver v Miles (1926) 50 ALR 357; Cook v
Lewis [1951] SCR 830.
In each of these cases, it was determined that all defendants who had fired the bullet responsible for
the claimant's injury were jointly and severally liable. In every instance, this result was considered more
desirable than the possibility of leaving a negligently harmed claimant without compensation. Returning
to the issue at hand, this line of reasoning would surely help Jatinder by relieving her from the
responsibility of showing causation on the but for test. Each of the three defendants, by firing their
firearm, significantly contributed to the likelihood of Jatinder's harm, therefore establishing causation.
The establishment of remoteness of damage is easily determined, and there are no relevant defenses.
Undoubtedly, Wilma would be delighted to embrace the same reasoning for causation. Despite
experiencing multiple injuries, there is still no evidence to determine the source of the pellets fired,
leaving open the possibility that they were all discharged from her own firearm. Her position, as one of
the defendants in the case, is similar to that of a mesothelioma victim in Barker v Corus [2006] UKHL 20,
who had similarly been exposed to asbestos while being self-employed. The House of Lords, in the
Barker case, implemented a novel method of determining the liability of each wrongdoer based on their
individual contribution to the overall risk, but this approach was quickly invalidated by Parliament
(particularly in cases involving asbestos) by the enactment of the Compensation Act 2006. In the more
recent case of Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10, the Supreme Court once again affirmed this
approach in mesothelioma cases. The Court stated that until medical science can establish a clearer link
between a specific exposure and the development of the disease, any negligent exposure that exceeds a
minimal level should be held fully liable, considering the current lack of knowledge.

Thus, Wilma has the potential to establish a causal relationship. However, what may appear equitable in
relation to Jatinder seems less permissible in relation to Wilma. If a court wants to avoid compensating
Wilma, it can choose between two options: (i) reevaluate the criteria for determining causality in her
case; or (ii) employ alternative principles to refuse her a remedy. Choosing option (i) could be
problematic since it may undermine the credibility of the Fairchild concept, which is built on
employment. Nevertheless, alternative ideas may indeed provide a fair and just resolution. The concept
of volenti might be invoked in this case, as Wilma was fully aware of the potential risk and willingly
chose to proceed, so incurring the risk that ultimately occurred. Alternatively, one could argue that the
concept of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (also known as the illegality defense) would prevent a legal
case from proceeding (Ashton v Turner [1980] 3 All ER 870; Pitts v Hunt [1990] 3 All ER 344). The
doctrine of ex turpi examines whether the claimant's conduct at the time of the negligent damage was
not only illegal but also morally reprehensible, to the extent that it would be morally unacceptable for
the court to aid her in seeking compensation. It is argued that the expiration of a shotgun license alone
is insufficient to activate the defense. However, actively promoting and engaging in the firing of
shotguns on public roads, particularly considering Jatinder's injury, may indeed be enough.
Consequently, it is improbable that Wilma will prevail in her assertion.

3. The law regarding duties of care for a negligently caused economic loss is based on suspect policy
considerations, and judicial approaches are inconsistent and rest on unsound principles.’ Evaluate
when a duty will be owed in relation to negligent misstatements and assess the overall merit of this
statement.
In certain circumstances, a legal obligation to exercise caution can exist for careless words that result in
harm to individuals or their belongings. However, this responsibility is limited to specific conditions that
are closely regulated. Previously, the denial of such an obligation was based on policy reasons, which,
notwithstanding the potential for a duty to now be due, nevertheless persist. This situation is
contentious because it implies that an individual who experiences harm to their financial well-being may
not receive compensation, even if all other elements of carelessness are met. The matter at hand
pertains to how the legal system guarantees impartiality to all parties involved in a conflict, while also
evolving in a manner that is equitable and grounded on solid principles. The courts have pursued this
objective in a somewhat uneven manner. However, it is contended that the assertion made in the
question lacks validity, and the law is not in the troublesome condition it implies. The obligation was
initially acknowledged in the legal case of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465.
Nevertheless, the House of Lords explicitly said that it would only allow such action in a limited manner
due to substantial policy justifications.

These reasons aim to ensure that the individual making the remark is not unfairly saddled with excessive
liability. The concern and importance of this issue stem from the fact that individuals often express firm
ideas in specific circumstances without fully contemplating the impact that their words, influenced by
the setting, may have. Furthermore, these comments have the potential to disseminate quickly by word-
of-mouth, resulting in the unintended victims being individuals who were not the intended recipients of
the statement and are unknown to the person who made the statement. This rationale is logical and
elucidates why the individual may have initially neglected to use caution while making the comment.
Based on this policy reasoning, Their Lordships determined that in order for a duty to be imposed, it is
necessary to prove that the defendant assumed responsibility towards the claimant, and that the
claimant reasonably relied on this assumption of responsibility. Furthermore, the defendant must have
been aware that the claimant was relying on their expertise and judgment. This is known as the
assumption of responsibility test. In the case of Hedley Byrne, the defendant bank was aware that the
credit worthiness assessment was intended to assist the claimant in making a business decision, even if
responsibility was ultimately dismissed.

Three The test has been formulated to encompass cases when services are negligently provided. It is
based on the premise that the claimant has entrusted the defendant with the management of their
affairs. The extension is valid because there is still a clear connection between both parties. However,
concerns arise over its suitability for more indirect service connections. The case of Henderson v Merrett
Syndicates [1995] 2 AC 145 is being referred to. A entered into a contractual agreement with B to
provide a service that would be advantageous to C, with full awareness that the service was intended for
C's benefit. Nevertheless, the test's implementation was justified due to A's awareness that C was
receiving benefits from the service. This created sufficient connection between the parties to support
the notion that A had taken on duty towards C. However, a notable contrast can be observed in the case
of White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207. In this instance, a negligent omission to revise a will resulted in the
intended beneficiaries, who were the claimants, receiving no inheritance. The claimants found it difficult
to ascertain their obligation for the claim, given the contract was only between the defendant and the
deceased, leaving the claims unaware of its existence.

Lord Browne-Wilkinson proposed that the term 'assumption of duty' refers specifically to the task being
carried out, rather than any legal obligation. Since the solicitor had taken part in the claimant's matters
by agreeing to prepare the will, there was a legitimate obligation, as seen in similar situations. Lord
Mustill expressed a strong disagreement, asserting that for an assumption of duty to exist, both parties
must actively participate in the transaction and demonstrate mutual involvement. In earlier instances,
His Lordship contended that this was indeed the situation, as, at the absolute minimum, B had entered
into a contract with A under the influence of C. This statement expands upon previous critiques of the
test presented in the case of Smith v Eric Bush [1990] 1 AC 831, made by Lord Griffiths. Lord Griffiths
argued that the phrase "assumption of responsibility" is only meaningful if it pertains to the point at
which the law determines that the person making the statement has taken on a legal obligation towards
the individual who acted upon the advice. Lord Griffiths favored the utilization of the Caparo test, which
was developed as a reaction to the perceived shortcomings of the assumption of responsibility test. This
test requires the claimant to prove that the defendant might have predicted their injury, that there was
a close enough relationship between them, and that it is reasonable and just to hold the defendant
responsible. This grants the courts a significant amount of discretion. The inherent flexibility of this
approach has value, but it clearly exposes claimants to the potential dangers of governmental decisions.
However, it is evident what requirements must be fulfilled, which may not always be true for the
alternative exam, as previously said.

The test serves solely as a practical tool and should not be regarded as anything more than a
straightforward means of assisting with the issue at hand (as seen in the case of Caparo itself and
Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc). Consequently, we possess two distinct tests,
one of which yields uncertain outcomes in specific cases, and another that lacks the necessary accuracy
to definitively determine when the obligation will be enforced. Therefore, it might be argued that the
statement has some validity regarding the inconsistency of the legislation. However, in summary, it may
be argued that although the presence of both tests may seem incongruous, this is partly mitigated by
the fact that the Caparo test was designed to address the apparent issue of applying the initial
assumption of responsibility test too broadly.

In light of the case Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc, any perceived inconsistency
is actually not significant. This is because when a party assumes responsibility, it establishes a close
enough relationship between the parties to justify imposing a duty. Therefore, this assumption of
responsibility serves as a way to meet the requirements set by the Caparo test, and the same outcomes
are generally reached regardless of which test is used. Indeed, as Lord Bingham pointed out, both tests
can be used together without conflict, albeit one test is more suitable for specific situations. Hence, the
method of examining the complete facts of the case in account of policy factors and thereafter
employing the assumption of responsibility test as a preliminary step, followed by the use of Caparo if
necessary, plausibly overcomes any challenges. However, it is necessary to provide justifications for the
policy considerations, making the worry expressed in the statement reasonable. Nevertheless, the
fundamental justification for the policy is valid, therefore rendering the remark ultimately insignificant.

4) One afternoon, Henry, a delivery driver for Agnew Petroleum plc was driving his petrol tanker in
rush hour traffic. Henry was tired and just wanting to get to his last stop and get home. Ignoring the
extreme weather conditions and a recommendation that high-sided vehicles not use the motorway,
Henry took the motorway as it was only one junction, driving over the speed limit to get off the
motorway quicker. However, a gust of wind blew the tanker over resulting in a multi-car pile-up, and
the petrol caused a massive fire. Geoffrey was watching the news at home. His nephew Monty, who
Geoffrey has raised from a young boy, uses that road to drive home. Geoffrey thought he saw a car
similar to Monty’s on the screen. After not hearing from Monty, Geoffrey rushed to the hospital to see
if Monty was there. Two hours after seeing the incident on TV, Geoffrey is informed that Monty has
been killed and is asked to identify the body. Owing to the number of patients, Monty’s body has not
been cleaned up. Upon seeing Monty, Geoffrey suffers a nervous breakdown. Agnew Petroleum Plc
has admitted liability to anyone that they owed a duty to. Sachin is a staff nurse at the hospital where
the victims of the crash were brought. Although having a history of work-related stress, he has never
been offered any counselling services since his return to work. On the day of the crash, having
complained of already being on duty for 20 hours due to a previous emergency, Sachin was told he
had to stay on shift and help with the accident victims. However, after working several more hours in
such difficult conditions, Sachin collapsed and has been signed off work since with a stress-related
mental illness. Advise Geoffrey and Sachin whether they could make a claim in these circumstances.

The matter at hand is to determine whether Geoffrey and Sachin have fulfilled the necessary
requirements mandated by the law to pursue a claim for negligently caused psychological injury. It is
important to inform them that this is an area governed by policies, and control mechanisms are typically
enforced to restrict when the defendant will be held responsible for a duty of care, particularly in
Geoffrey's case. Geoffrey, while being a secondary victim and encountering challenges in providing
evidence for his claim, may nevertheless prevail based on the factual circumstances. Given the
presented facts, it is quite probable that Sachin will succeed in his claim.

Regarding Geoffrey's assertion, it is necessary to inform him that he must demonstrate that he was
owed a legal obligation to be cautious. In accordance with the ruling in White v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police (1999), for an individual to be considered a primary victim of alleged negligence, they
must have been exposed to physical harm as a result of the defendant's negligent action, or at the very
least, have had reasonable grounds to fear for their physical well-being. Since Geoffrey was not directly
affected by the incident, he does not meet the criteria. Therefore, Geoffrey should be informed about
the specific legal restrictions for secondary victims outlined in the Alcock v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire (1992) case. Geoffrey must have experienced a medically acknowledged injury, even though
he was known for his calm and composed demeanor, as stated in the case of Bourhill v Young (1943). An
episode of acute psychological distress would fulfill this criterion, however it is uncertain whether he
possesses sufficient mental strength. Geoffrey needs guidance on the Alcock control systems.

Initially, the claimant must establish a strong emotional bond with Monty, who is the immediate victim
of the act. It is necessary for the claimant's injury to be reasonably foreseeable by the person
responsible for the initial occurrence in order for them to be held liable. The objective is to avoid an
excessive number of claims and legal responsibility that is disproportionate to the behavior in question.
Geoffrey should be informed that while a certain level of intimacy is expected between spouses and
parents/children, according to Alcock, other familial ties may not be immediately considered as
sufficiently close. Hence, Geoffrey will need to provide substantiation of his proximity to Monty, a task
that may prove challenging.

Nevertheless, Lord Ackner recognized that the degree of proximity would be assessed individually in
each case. Consequently, the mere fact that Geoffrey is Monty's uncle may not necessarily hinder
Geoffrey from making a successful claim. The fact that Geoffrey has nurtured Monty from a young age
implies the absence of Monty's biological parents and highlights Geoffrey's role as a parental figure in
Monty's life.

Given that Geoffrey has proven his connection to Monty, the next matter to consider is whether he has
adequate temporal and spatial proximity to the incident. Therefore, it might be inferred that Geoffrey
was present at the incident in person. This could potentially be a problem, as Geoffrey's initial exposure
to the incident is limited to television coverage, which is inadequate (Alcock). Nevertheless, it is
important to inform Geoffrey that personally witnessing the immediate consequences of the event is
satisfactory, as stated in the McLoughlin v O'Brien (1983) case. While the court in the case of Alcock
determined that the claimant who identified his brother-in-law at the mortuary some hours after the
tragedy did not witness the immediate aftermath, it is important to inform Geoffrey that his
circumstance is more similar to the true case of McLoughlin. Under those circumstances, the mother
was informed at her residence of a collision involving her family, two hours after its occurrence. Upon
her arrival at the hospital, she received the distressing news of her child's demise. Witnessing the
severity of injuries sustained by her other family members, this traumatic experience led to the
development of a psychiatric disorder. Thus, since Geoffrey witnessed Monty in the same condition he
would have been in at the roadside, similar to McLoughlin, and this occurred just two hours after the
incident, Geoffrey should possess the required immediacy to overcome this process.

Alcock's last stipulation pertains to the specific mechanisms that led to his collapse. Psychiatric harm
must result from directly seeing the incident or its immediate aftermath through one's own senses,
rather than simply being briefed about it by a bystander. Geoffrey received news of Monty's demise
from a third party, but the precise timing of the emotional collapse is not disclosed. The individual's
breakdown seems to have been triggered by the abrupt shock of witnessing Monty's lifeless body, as
indicated by the phrase 'upon seeing' the deceased. Thus, if Geoffrey can convincingly demonstrate to
the court that he had a strong emotional bond with Monty, he should be able to successfully assert his
claim.

The circumstances surrounding Sachin's predicament are distinct, as are the legal rules that govern it.
Sachin should be informed that occupational stress leading to psychiatric impairment is legally
actionable and falls within the employer's standard duty of care towards their employees, as established
in the case of Walker v Northumberland County Council (1995). Sachin, being an employee, is entitled to
this obligation. If the stress experienced by Sachin is a direct consequence of the job he is engaged to
do, and if this stress might have been predicted, and if there are no specific measures in place to
manage this stress, and if the resulting injury falls within the responsibilities of the job, then Sachin may
not be entitled to any unique control mechanisms.

The case of Hatton v Sutherland (2002) establishes the authoritative standards for this particular issue.
Firstly, as previously mentioned, it is crucial that the stress-related injury can be reasonably anticipated.
Crucially for Sachin, the damage does not have to be predictable in someone with average mental
strength, but it must be predictable within him. This indicates that the employer has a responsibility
towards the individual employee, and as a result, they should be aware of any specific susceptibility or
weakness (Paris v Stepney BC, 1951). Given Sachin's cognitively and emotionally taxing position, it is
imperative that the hospital be highly vigilant in recognizing signs of stress. Additionally, Sachin has
expressed dissatisfaction and has already taken a leave of absence due to stress. Hence, numerous
indications strongly suggest this result, and considering Sachin's past, this injury seems even more
predictable. Given the lack of support provided to Sachin upon his return from the initial injury, and
considering that the injury was caused by work-related stress, it appears that the requirements of
breach and causation have been met. Sachin's carrying on of his work cannot be considered as
contributory negligence, as established in the case of Young v Post Office (2002).

In conclusion, both parties seem to have valid claims based on the evidence, and a reasonable
probability of achieving success in their respective cases. However, additional evidence will likely be
necessary to definitively establish the existence of a duty of care in each specific case.

5) ’It would ...lead to a more coherent body of common law principles if the rule [in Rylands v
Fletcher] were to be regarded as essentially an extension of the law of nuisance to isolated escapes
from land. Lord Goff in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 1 All ER 53.
Discuss the interrelationship between the two torts in light of this statement. Should the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher remain an action in its own right?

The principle established in the case of Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 holds a defendant
responsible if they accumulate, on their land, anything that is likely to cause harm if it escapes during a
non-natural use of the land, and if it does escape and cause damage. In the case of Rylands, the
defendants enlisted the services of autonomous contractors to build a reservoir on their property for
their manufacturing facility. The contractors irresponsibly neglected to detect and obstruct a disused.
The mineshaft experienced a breach, causing water from the reservoir to forcefully flow through the
shafts and inundate the claimant's mine. The defendants were deemed personally responsible, even
though they were not at fault and there seemed to be no available legal recourse. Blackburn J's stance
at the time suggested that he did not perceive himself as establishing any novel legal theory.
Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, the rule appeared to gain autonomy until the case of Read
v Lyons [1947] AC 156 established that the rule could not be used as a determinant for strict
responsibility in extremely dangerous occupations. The House of Lords' more recent rulings in the case
of Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 1 The cases All ER 53 and Transco plc v
Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61 have provided clarity in the tort's development, resolving previous
misunderstanding. The case of Cambridge Water established that strict liability, as per the principle in
Rylands v Fletcher, only applies if the defendant had knowledge or should have reasonably anticipated
that the escape would result in damage.

According to the case of Cambridge Water, the defendant cannot be held responsible under the
principle established in Rylands v Fletcher since they could not have reasonably predicted that the
chemical seeping through the factory floor would lead to pollution in the claimants' borehole. Lord
Goff's argument was that Rylands v Fletcher and private nuisance are fundamentally connected, and
that since previous cases on private nuisance established that reasonable foreseeability of damage is a
crucial factor, it must also be a crucial factor in the rule of Rylands. In addition, Lord Bingham explicitly
noted in the Transco case that the 'ruling in Rylands v Fletcher' is a specific type of nuisance. This
perspective implies that Rylands is situated inside the realm of private nuisance. Private nuisance does
not encompass the ability to seek compensation for personal injury, as established in the cases of
Malone v Laskey and Hunter v Canary Wharf.

Additionally, it appears probable that personal injury damages will also not be recoverable under the
Rylands rule. Moreover, it is evident, especially in recent rulings leading up to the Cambridge Water
case, that the judges are gradually diminishing responsibility that is not based on negligence. In addition,
Lord Reid acknowledged the significance of fault-based liability in nuisance in the case of Wagon Mound
(No 2) [1967] 1 AC 617, stating that "some form of fault is typically required, and fault entails
foreseeability." Lord Goff, in the case of Cambridge Water, said that it would be more appropriate to
establish strict responsibility for high-risk enterprises through legislation rather than relying on the
Rylands rule. It is possible that the courts might support this approach. There are indeed multiple
similarities between Rylands and the tort of nuisance, suggesting that the rule could potentially be
eliminated without any negative impact on English law. Liability for annoyance occurs where there has
been an unjustifiable disruption of the claimant's ownership rights in land. In the case of Read v Lyons
[1947] AC 156, Lord Simonds stated that in the majority of situations, the law of annoyance and the
principle established in Rylands v Fletcher can be invoked interchangeably. The principle of reasonable
user in nuisance states that a defendant who acts in a reasonable manner will not be held responsible
for causing harm to their neighbor's enjoyment of their own property. This is closely related to the
principle of natural usage, which is also present in the rule established in the case of Rylands v Fletcher.
However, this idea was further discussed in the case of Transco plc v Stockport MBC [2003] UKHL 61.
Lord Bingham opined that it would be more accurate to characterize the principle as "ordinary" rather
than "natural," drawing upon the Privy Council's examination in the case of Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC
263. Lord Bingham reiterated the idea that Blackburn J had considered Rylands v Fletcher to be a
straightforward instance of nuisance. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the torts,
and thus, eliminating the rule could result in an unfair outcome. The principle of Rylands is based on the
defendant's non-natural accumulation of a substance on their land, which has the potential to do harm
if it is released. The 'anything' must inherently possess a level of risk. For instance, flammable material
alone is inadequate if a fire starts and spreads to someone else's property. The case of Stannard v Gore
[2012] EWCA Civ 1248. This explicitly excludes elements that are inherently present on the defendant's
property, such as trees. The act of cultivating a tree is considered a natural utilization of the soil, as
established in the case of Noble v Harrison [1926] 2 KB 332.

Nevertheless, in the legal case of Crowhurst v Amersham Burial Board (1878) 4 Ex D 5, there was a
situation where a yew tree located on the defendant's property extended across the land owned by the
claimant, where cattle were being grazed. Yew tree leaves possess toxicity, and the claimant's horse
perished as a result of consuming them. The defendant was found responsible under the principle
established in the legal case of Rylands v Fletcher due to the fact that planting a toxic tree on the land
was deemed an unnatural use of the property. An additional differentiation that can be seen between
the principle in Rylands v Fletcher and the tort of nuisance pertains to the legal right to bring a lawsuit.
In regards to the previous matter, Lawton J held in the case of British Celanese v A H Hunt [1969] 1 WLR
959 that once an escape is proven, anyone who has subsequent injury can make a claim, regardless of
whether or not they are occupants of neighboring land.

However, the concept of nuisance is based on the idea of safeguarding exclusive rights to property. In
order to bring a legal action for nuisance, the person making the claim must have a legal right to the
property affected. Therefore, family members who do not have this legal right will not be able to sue,
even if they have been affected by the nuisance caused by the defendant's actions, as seen in the case
of Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141. The House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 684
affirmed the validity of the decision in Malone by stating that a claim for annoyance can only be made
by someone who has 'exclusive possession' of the land in question, or by an owner who does not have
exclusive possession. Nevertheless, as highlighted by John Murphy in his work 'The Merits of Rylands v
Fletcher', there has never been a legal requirement for a claimant to possess a proprietary interest in
the case of Rylands. Additionally, the remarks made in Transco addressing this requirement were
incidental and not essential to the case. Murphy also highlights that Article 8 of the European
Convention of Human Rights ensures equal regard for the private life of all individuals. Consequently,
relying solely on proprietary interest appears to contradict the rights enshrined in the Convention. This
could be a crucial factor in upholding Rylands as a viable cause of action in tort law. The last point to be
addressed is whether Rylands v Fletcher possesses any inherent legal validity. Academic consensus over
the recent House of Lords cases is split. Donal Nolan contends in his work "The distinctiveness of Rylands
v Fletcher" that following the cases of Cambridge Water and Transco, the Rylands principle has
significantly diminished in importance and relevance, lacking both a clear justification and practical
value. In his article titled 'Deconstructing the Rule in Rylands v Fletcher', A. J. Waite contends that the
legal effectiveness of Rylands v Fletcher can only be achieved through the enactment of legislation.
Nevertheless, Murphy contends that the Rylands rule serves as a valuable remaining mechanism for
persons affected by detrimental releases from environmentally damaging heavyweight manufacturers
to ensure environmental protection. Róisín Áine Costello argues that Rylands could serve as an effective
deterrent against unsafe fracking techniques by imposing significant financial and reputational
consequences.

Given the recent emphasis on the protection of human rights and the controversial practice of fracking,
it is possible that Rylands v Fletcher, although currently inactive, may be invoked in future legal disputes.
Hence, it is imperative to uphold the regulation as an independent tort.

7)Clive has a part-time job in a petrol station. He was working one evening when three rockets, part of
an organised firework display, crashed into the garage forecourt. It was later discovered that the
rockets’ launch mechanisms had not been properly assembled by the event organiser. Alex was filling
his car with petrol when the rockets landed, causing a violent explosion. Miraculously Alex was not
badly hurt but was powerless to get to his wife Katie who was trapped in the burning car. Unable to
save her, he collapsed with shock. Dave, the station manager, watched the chaos unfold on CCTV in
the office behind the petrol station. Concerned for his own safety, and that of his lovingly restored
vintage Bentley, which was parked on the garage forecourt, he told Clive to ‘take the fire extinguisher,
get outside and save my car’. He then bolted the fire door and dialed the emergency services. Clive
attended to Alex, and also Jodie, who was walking her dog when the explosion happened. Jodie was
otherwise unhurt, but the Bentley was completely destroyed. Advise all of the parties as to their likely
success in claiming damages for the psychiatric harm each claims to have suffered.

The evaluation of the legal framework concerning the compensation for psychological injuries needs to
be conducted. The scope of liability is restricted to cases involving officially acknowledged psychological
harm, so excluding claims based on momentary feelings of sorrow or anxiety (Alcock; Brice v Brown
(1984); Vernon v Bosley (1997)). According to the existing legislation, the defendant's negligence must
lead to physical injury in order to establish personal harm (as established in the case of Bourhill v Young
(1943)). Additionally, as determined by the House of Lords in Grieves v F.T. Everard & Sons and others
(2007), a claim for personal harm must be grounded in an actual injury rather than a perceived one.
Alex, Clive, Dave, and Jodie would be responsible for demonstrating that they had the injuries in
question in order to establish the existence of PH.

The landmark case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire (1991) lays the foundation for creating
a legal need to take care. In the aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster, Lord Oliver made a distinction
between primary and secondary victims. Primary victims are those who can be identified as directly or
indirectly involved in the event, while secondary victims are those who were merely passive witnesses
to the harm inflicted upon others. In the case of Page v Smith (1996), successful claims were mostly
limited to individuals who were in the zone of anticipated bodily risk or those who had a genuine fear
for their safety. In the current circumstances, it is evident that Alex is the main target of harm: he was
personally implicated in a dreadful event, clearly within the area of bodily risk, and is highly likely to be
successful in a legal claim. Dave could argue that he was a direct victim, being in close proximity to the
danger, as the evidence suggests that his directions to Clive were driven by a desire to protect himself.
However, the chances of this endeavor being successful are slim, as indicated by the ruling in the case of
McFarlane v EE Caledonia (1994), which suggests that being indoors provided him with a secure position
away from danger.

The position becomes more ambiguous when providing guidance to secondary victims. Alcock identifies
three factors to be taken into account. Currently, a claimant must demonstrate that their connection
with a primary victim was sufficiently intimate, there was enough closeness to the incident or its
immediate aftermath in terms of time and location (as explained in the Bourhill case), and ultimately,
that the claimant experienced psychological harm by witnessing or hearing the accident or its immediate
aftermath firsthand, without any external assistance. Regarding the initial criterion, the Lords alluded to
a connection resembling 'an intimate bond of love and affection', however paradoxically proposed that
even a simple observer could make a claim if the incident was exceptionally dreadful. This has not
occurred, and legal cases such as McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd (1994) and Robertson v Forth Road
Bridge Joint Board (1995) indicate a disapproving stance towards such a standpoint. There has been
legal analysis on the length of the sudden event that caused the public health issue. It has been
established that a slow event lasting two weeks does not qualify as a sudden event (Sion v Hampstead
Health Authority, 1994). Nevertheless, judges increasingly tend to evaluate this obligation on an
individual basis, considering the categorization of the singular distressing incident and the claimant's
proximity to it. This approach was observed in the cases of North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters (2002)
and the more recent ruling of Taylor v A. Novo (UK) Ltd (2013).

he Taylor ruling differentiated previous instances by asserting that there must be close association with
the first distressing incident, rather than merely a subsequent death that resulted from it (in this case,
occurring three weeks later). Dave and Jodie are both considered secondary victims as witnesses,
although none of them would be able to achieve success. The reason for this is because, while both
individuals were in close proximity to the incident in terms of time and location, and it is highly probable
that they directly witnessed it, there is no evidence to demonstrate a strong emotional bond, such as
that of a sibling or spouse, between Alex or Katie. If it can be established, Jodie might have a valid claim
since she witnessed the incident firsthand without any assistance, whereas Dave, although he may have
heard it, does not seem to meet the criteria set by Lord Keith and Oliver in the Alcock case regarding the
possibility of bystanders seeking compensation for witnessing traumatic events, such as an oil tanker
colliding with a school. Dave observed the remainder on a closed-circuit television (CCTV) display and
chose to remain in a secure setting. Live and unedited TV has limited authority in conveying perception
through unassisted senses, as stated by Alcock. CCTV can fulfill this purpose. However, the main
constraint is the evident absence of a strong connection. Clive may be considered a primary victim due
to his justifiable concern for his own well-being.

Alternatively, he could be regarded as a rescuer, a role that traditionally entailed aiding in the recovery
of any form of injury, whether physical or psychiatric, for the purpose of promoting praiseworthy
conduct in society, as established in the case of Chadwick v British Transport Commission (1967).

However, this premise was somewhat obscured by the case of White v Chief Constable of South
Yorkshire Police (1998). It was determined that they did not have the right to make a claim as rescuers
based on the conventional stance. In a majority decision, the House of Lords ruled that only a rescuer
who was in actual danger or considered themselves to be in danger could make a claim, unless they met
the requirements outlined in the Alcock criteria. However, it is essential for a rescuer to actively
participate in a rescue, unlike McFarlane, who was positioned at a considerable distance. Clive willingly
put himself at risk to help Alex and Jodie in White. According to the case of Tolley v Carr (2010), Clive
would not have his damages reduced for contributory negligence because emergency situations and
actions driven by the intention to rescue are taken into account.

Another important factor to take into account is the innovative method of establishing personal harm
(PH) used in the case of Attia v British Gas (1988). In this case, the claimant was able to successfully sue
for PH by providing evidence that she had personally observed her house being destroyed by fire. Dave
may assert his claim for the damage to his automobile, but after the Alcock ruling, meeting the required
criteria may be challenging. Nevertheless, based on the rules of ordinary negligence, he would have the
right to seek compensation for the car damage, as harm to property would be a predictable outcome of
failing to fulfill the duty of care in guaranteeing the safety of a firework exhibition.

Ultimately, it may be inferred that the individuals with the highest probability of prevailing in a lawsuit
for psychological harm (PH) would be Alex, as a direct victim, and Clive, as a person who provided
assistance. The remaining claims are unlikely to meet the present criteria for secondary victims.