IS 15036:2001

Indian Standard
DEPENDABILITY MANAGEMENT —
APPLICATION GUIDE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR
DEPENDABILITY — GUIDE ON METHODOLOGY

ICS 03.100.40; 03.120.01

0 BIS 2001

BUREAU OF INDIAN STANDARDS

MANAK BHAVAN, 9 BAHADUR SHAH ZAFAR MARG
NEW DELHI 110002

December 2001 Price Group 5

Reliability of Electronic and Electrical Components and Equipment Sectional Committee, LTD 3

FOREWORD
This Indian Standard was adopted by the Bureau of Indian Standards, after the draft finalized by the Reliability
of Electronic and Electrical Components and Equipment Sectional Committee had been approved by the Electronic
and Telecommunication Division Council.
Dependability analysis techniques are used for the review and prediction of the reliability, availability,
maintainability and safety measures of a system. Dependability analyses are conducted mainly during the concept
and definition phase, the design and development phase and the operation and maintenance phase at various
system levels and degrees of detail to order to evaluate and determine the dependability measures of a system or
an installation. They are also used to compare the results of the analysis with specified requirements.
While preparing this standard, assistance has been derived from IEC 60300-3-1 (1991) ‘Dependability
management – Part 3: Application guide – Section 1: Analysis techniques for dependability: Guide on
methodology’, published by International Electrotechnical Commission.
The technical Committee responsible for preparation of this standard has reviewed the provisions of following
IEC publication and decided that it may be used in conjunction with this standard till Indian Standard on this
subject is published:
lEC 1025(1990) Fault tree analysis (FTA)
The composition of the Committee responsible for formulation of this standard is given in Annex B.
In reporting the results of a test or analysis made in accordance with this standard, if the final value, observed
or calculated, is to be rounded off, it shall be done in accordance with IS 2 : 1960 ‘Rules for rounding off
numerical values (revised)’.
 lS 15036:2001

Indian Standard
DEPENDABILITY MANAGEMENT —
APPLICATION GUIDE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR
DEPENDABILITY — GUIDE ON METHODOLOGY
1 SCOPE all the possible model complexities required to evaluate
the features of practical systems (hardware and
l%is standard gives a general overview of commonly
software, complex fictional structures, etc). It may
used dependability analysis procedures. It describes
be necessary to consider several additional analysis
the usual methodologies, the advantages and
methods to ensure proper treatment of complex or
disadvantages, data input and other requirements for
multi-functional systems.
the various techniques.
This guide is an introduction to the available 5 BASIC APPROACH TO SYSTEM
methodology and is intended to provide the analyst DEPENDABILITY ANALYSIS
with the necessary information in order to choose the Specific procedures for analysis are contained in the
analysis method most appropriate to the system. standards describing each analysis method. General
procedures, approaches and requirements are
2 REFERENCES
described hereinafter.
The Indian Standards listed in Annex A are necessary
adjuncts to this standard. 5.1 General Procedure
The procedure consists of the following steps (as
3 DEFINITIONS
applicable):
For the purpose of this standard, the terms and defin-
Step 1
itions given in IS 1885 (Part 39) shall apply in addi-
tion to the following. List all system reliability and availability requirements,
characteristics and features, together with environ-
3.1 System mental and operating conditions, and maintenance .- -
requirements. Define the system to be analyzed, its .
Item on the highest level considered in the analysis. <
-,
modes of operation, the functional relationships to
!-
3.2 Component higher levels and to interfacing systems of processes. .

Item on the lowest level considered in the analysis. Step 2

3.3 Allocation Define system fault, fault criteria and conditions based
on system tlmction”alrequirements, expected operation
A procedure applied during the design of an item and operating environment. Software performance
intended to apportion the requirements for should also be considered.
performance measures for an item to its sub items
according to given criteria. Step 3

NOTE — ‘System’maybe replacedby ‘sub-system’,

etc,as When numerical results are required, it is
applicable. recommended to carry out an allocation based on a
preliminary design (assignment of a portion of the
4 GENERAL
total permitted system failure rate or unavailability to
The analysis methods allow the evaluation of each sub-system).
qualitative characteristics and estimation of measures
Step 4
(for example, failure rate, MTTF, MTBF, reliability,
steady state availability) which describe the predicated Analysis of the system as follows:
long-term operating behaviour of a system. In order
4.1 Qualitative analysis (deductive/inductive
to perform a systematic and reproducible system
methodology)
analysis, use of a consistent procedure is essential.
Analyze, the functional system structure,
However, no single dependability analysis method is determine system/component fault modes,
sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to deal with failure mechanisms, effects and consequences

1
IS 15036:2001

of failures, consider item maintainability, b) inductive methodology (bottom-up), for

construct reliability and/or availability example fault mode and effects analysis.
models, determine possible maintenance and However, in practice, an iterative approach is more
repair strategies, etc. usual with deductive and inductive analysis
4.2 Quantitative analysis (analytical or event complementing one another.
simulation methods)
5.3 Deductive Analysis
Obtain or identify item reliability data (for
example, failure rates), construct mathe- The essence of the deductive approach is to proceed
matical reliability and/or availability model, from the highest level of interest, that is, the system
perform numerical evaluations of mathe- or sub-system level, to successively lower levels in
matical model, perform component criticality order to identify undesirable system operation.
and sensitivity analyses, evaluate improv-
ement of system performance due to The analysis is performed at the next lower system
redundant substructures and maintenance level to identify, any fault and its associated fault mode
strategies, etc. which could result in the fault effect as originally
identified. For each of these second level faults, the
Step 5
analysis is repeated by tracing back along the
Evaluation of results, comparison with requirements functional paths and relationships to the next lower
andlor alternative designs. Additional activities may level using logical gates. This process is continued as
include: far as the lowest level desired.
5.1 Reviewing system design, determining The deductive method is an event-oriented method
weaknesses, unbalances, critical/high risk which is useful during the early conceptual phase of
fault modes and items, considering system system design when the details of the system are not
interface problems, fail-safe features and yet fully defined. It is also used for evaluating multiple
mechanisms, etc. failures including sequentially related failures, the
5.2 Developing alternative ways for improving existence of faults due to a common-cause, or wherever
dependability (for example redundancy system complexity makes it more convenient to begin
allocation, performance monitoring, fault by listing system faults or system success.
detection, system reconfiguration procedures,
In all cases the undesirable single event or system
maintainability, component replaceability,
and repair procedures).
success at the highest level of interest (the top event), .-, ...
should be given. The contributory causes of that event
5.3 Performing trade-off studies and evaluating at all levels are then identified and analyzed.
the cost of alternative designs.
The relationships between the general analysis proce- 5.4 Inductive Analysis
dure and the specific methods and procedures are given The essence of the inductive method is to identi& fault
in Table 1 (note that Table 1 is not exhaustive). The modes at the component level. For each fault mode
methods are explained further in 5.2 to 5.5. the corresponding effect on performance is deduced
5.2 Analysis of Functional Structure for the next higher system level. The resulting fault
effect becomes the fault mode at the next higher system
In order to analyze the long-term operating behaviour level, and the fault effects of each fault mode are
of a system with confidence, the precise way a system analyzed at this level. Successive iterations result in
is required to function, as well as its operational and the eventual identification of the fault effects at all
environmental conditions should be determined and fi.mctional levels up to the system level. This ‘bottom-
described in detail. A separate analysis of the up’ method is rigorous in identifying all single fault
functional system structure may be necessary to modes. Because component fault modes must be
identify and departure from the required function. identified. This method is normally used during the
The system function may be represented by functional later stages of design where equipment has become
block diagrams, signal flow diagrams, state-transition mature.
diagrams, event sequences, tables, etc.
5.5 Maintenance and Repair Analysis and
Finally, the qualitative failure or success analysis may Considerations
be conducted in accordance with either of the following
The long-term operating behaviour of a repairable
two formal methods:
system is greatly influenced by the system
a) deductive methodology (top-down), for maintainability as well as the repair or maintenance
example fault tree analysis; and strategies employed. An availability performance
2
 IS 15036:2001 . ..
--4

measure is the appropriate measure for evaluating the redundant components. If so, then repair or
influence of maintenance and repair on system replacement increase system reliability performance . ..
dependability. and availability performance.
--l
Repair of a system during operation without It is usually necessary to perform a separate analysis ,.
interruption of its function is normally possible only to evaluate repair and maintenance aspects of a system
;““i.,,
for a redundant system structure with accessible (see IS 9692 series). t ‘J
~

7
Table 1 Correspondence of Methods to General Analysis Procedure
(Clause 5.1)

Steps of General Analysis Methods

Procedure

No. Activity FMEAIFWECA FTA RBD MA Pc

Fault mode and Fault tree Reliability block Markov analysis Parts count
effectdcritically analysis diagram reliability
analysis
.+
I
1 Requirements Component Functional System and sub- Component Component I
and system specification and system structure system operation function, timctional specification and
definitions operation system structure failure data

2 Definition of Failure of first Undesired (top) Criteria of system Criteria of system Failure of first
system fault order functional event success (failure) success and failure order functional
level level

3 Reliability If applicable
to If applicable
to If applicable
to If applicableto sub- lf applicable to
apportionment components sub-systems sub-systems systems components
4.1 Qualitative Inductive (table) Deductive (fault Deductive (block Inductive/deductive Assume series
analysis, tree) diagram) (state transition system structure,
maintenance diagram) list and evaluate
strategy components
4.2 Quantitative Fault Calculation of Calculation of Crdculation of Calculation of
~
analysis critically/probabi1- system reliability system reliability system reliability components and ‘;
(numerical ity analysis and availtillity and availahlity and availability system failure .
evaluation) measures measures measures rates
5 Requirements Criticality of Probability of Reliability/availati Reliability/availaM1 Does estimated
met (terminate failures and fiilu~ undesired even Iity requirement ity requirements system failure rate
procedure) probabilities within met? met? meet
withhr limits requirement requirements?
5.1 Review Component failure Sub-system/ Sub-system Componenthrb- Determine highest
design, modes, failure component reliability/ system/system component failure
determine rates, etc failure modes, availability, sub- reliability and rates
weaknesses failure rates, system/ component availability,
system structure, failure rates, maintenance and
etc system stmctrrre, repair policy,
etc system structure
5.2 Develop Component System structure, System structure, System structure, Re-evrduate choke
alternative selection and redundancy redundancy redundancy of weakest
designs maintenance, etc allocation, fault allocation, allocation, components
detection, component component
maintenance, etc selection, selection, repair
maintenance, etc policy, system
reconfiguration, etc
5.3 Perform trade- Determine most Determine most Determine most Determine most Estimate cost
off studies and economical economical economical economical
cost evaluation solution solution solution solution

3
IS 15036:2001

6 CHARACTERISTICS OF VARIOUS the occurrence of a defined undesirable event and

DEPENDABILITY ANALYSIS METHODS which significantly affect system performance, safety,
economy or other specified characteristics.
6.1 Selecting the Appropriate Analysis Method
Starting with the top event, the possible causes or fault
In order to enable a system dependability evaluation modes on the next lowest functional system level are
to be economically performed, an analysis method identified using logical gates. Following stepwise
should be chosen which: identification of undesirable system operation to
a) models and evaluates a wide range of successively lower system level will lead to the desired
dependability problems; lowest system level. Causes at this level are usually
b) the component fault modes. The results of the analysis
allows a straightforward, systematic,
qualitative and quantitative analysis to be are portrayed as a fault tree.
performed by trained design and The quantitative analysis is performed on the basis of
dependability engineers; and the fault tree. In order to estimate system reliability
c) predicts measures of the dependability char- and availability, methods such as Boolean reduction
acteristics numerically, if data are available. and cut set analysis are employed. The basic data
required are component failure rates, repair rates,
A dependability analysis method should be selected
probability of occurrence of fault modes, etc.
which will give the desired results and encompass all
relevant attributes. 6.2.3 Reliability Block Diagram Analysis
Table 2 gives an overview of various dependability Reliability block diagram (RBD) analysis is a
analysis methods and their characteristics and features. deductive (top-down) system dependability analysis
More than one method may be required to provide a method. An RBD is the graphical representation of a
complete analysis of the system. system’s logical structure in terms of sub-systems and/
or components. This allows the system success paths
6.2 Short Descriptions of Analysis Methods to be represented by the way in which the blocks (sub-
6.2.1 Failure Mode and Efects Analysis systems/components) are logically connected.

Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an Various qualitative analysis techniques may be
inductive (bottom-up), qualitative dependability employed to construct an RBD. The first step is to
analysis method, which is particularly suited to the establish the definition of system success. The next
study of material, component and equipment faults step is to divide the system in functional blocks
and their effects and mechanisms on the next higher appropriate to the purpose of the reliability analysis.
functional system level. Iterations of the step Some blocks may represent system substructures,
(identification of single fault modes and the evaluation which in turn may be represented by other RBDs
of their effects on the next higher system level) result (system reduction).
in the eventual identification of all the system single For the quantitative evaluation of an RBD, various
fault modes. FMEA lends itself to the analysis of methods are available. Depending on the type of
systems of different technologies (electrical, structure (reducible or irreducible) simple Boolean
mechanical, hydraulic, software, etc) with simple techniques, truth tables and/or path and cut set analysis
functional structures. may be employed for the prediction of system reliability
FMECA extends the FMEA to include criticality and availability values calculated from basic
analysis by quantifying fault effects in terms of component data.
probability of occurrence and the severity of any 6.2.4 Markov Analysis
effects. Estimates of the probability of failure are
calculated directly from a reliability prediction using Markov analysis is mainly an inductive (bottom-up)
the data assessed by the FMEA (probability of analysis method suitable for the evaluation of
occurrence of a fault mode, failure rates, etc). The functionally complex system structures and complex
severity of effects is assessed by reference to a specified repair and maintenance strategies.
scale. The method is based on the theory of Markov chains.
6.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis In principle the probabilities of system elements
(components, sub-systems) being in a particular
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive (top-down) (functional) state, or events to occur, at specific points
method for analyzing system dependability. It is or intervals of time are evaluated by mathematical
concerned with the identification and analysis of models.
conditions and factors which cause, or contribute to,

4
 \

Table 2 Characteristics of AnaIysis Methods

(Clause 6.1)

Analysis I Characteristics
.Ivletnuu
...--> I

I Ability of method to handle model characteristics as: Attributes Indian

Standard

Number of Redu- Irredu- Faihrre/ Time I Complex I Simulati Symbolic Approach

T
components ndmrt cible event varying mainte- on represen-
Stroct struc- combin- narrce of tation
failurel
Ures tures ations strategies functio-
event quao- quail-
and nal dedu- induc- quail- quan-
rates titative
depend- process tive tive tative tative titative
encies 1 1

I T
=FFF
FMEA Up to several (no) no (no) yes no no List Is 11137
thousands (Part 2)
FMECA

Fault
Up to several
thousands
tree Up to several
I (no)

yes
no
I (no)

yes no no
List

Fault tree
T c
#
c
1

high
1

medium
Is 11137
(Part 2)
IEC 1025
analysis thousands I I I
Clnc (1990)

T
Reliability Up to several yes (yes) no no Reliability c nc (c) I c I medium I medium Is 15037
block thousands I block
diagram diagram
Markov
1

2to 100$
I

yes
w System state (nc) c —

w=
+-=--t= diagram +
+
Parts count 1 to thousands (no) List —

=FFF
nclc

Cause/conse-
quence
Up to several
hundreds
yes Cause/conse
quenti chart T —

yes yes yes Any

T —

E
Event Up to several
simulation hundreds 8)

Y
System Up to several yes no (yes) Reliability nc c (nc) Clo)
medium medium —
reduction

Event tree
Truth table 3)
thousands 9)

2t050
2 to 505)
yes
yes
yes
yes
(yes)
yes 6)
block -
diagram
Event tree
Table
--1--
c
nclc
c
10)
I I I
—
—

NOTE — Forabbreviations
andremarkssee6.3.3.
IS 15036:2001

Initially all the states of interest shall be defined All these methods are capable of analyzing:
together with the probabilities of transition from one
a) series structures;
state to another (component failure or repair rates,
event rates, etc). Transition rates (failure rates, event b) reducible structures if redundant structures
rates) are normally assumed to be constant, that is are applicable;
independent of time or previous history. c) independent components (two-state model);
d) single faults;
The qualitative anaIysis requires the determination of
all the possible system states, preferably shown e) exponential distribution of times to failure;
diagrammatical Iy in a state-transition diagram. A 0 constant repair or event rates; and
major supporting analysis technique is the truth table. g) independent component repair.
The transition probabilities and the way in which the 6.3,2 Table 2 Headings
states are related, represented by the state-transition
6.3.2.1 Number of components
diagram, allow the construction of the desired
transition matrix (mathematical model) for the purpose The number of components of the system which can
of system reliability/availability calculations. The be handled by a particular analysis method is basically
evaluation of other measures of interest may also be limited by the number of combinations (system states)
accomplished. which arise from the possible component states or fault
modes considered. The number of combinations is also
6.2.5 Parts Count Reliability Prediction
heavily dependent on the specific system structure and
Parts count reliability prediction is basically an maintenance considerations.
inductive (bottom-up) method applicable mostly
6.3.2.2 Redundant structures
during the proposal and early design phases, to
estimate an approximate system failure rate. The basis capability to handling redundant system
structures.
The components of the system need to be listed and
the appropriate failure rates determined according to 6.3.2.3 Irreducible structures
their stress levels.
A structure is called irreducible if straight forward
The method is based upon the assumption that the reduction techniques are not possible.
components are logically connected in series. This is
6.3.2.4 Failure/event combinations and dependencies
often a worst case estimate. Where redundancies at
the higher levels of assembly are known, their effects The capability of the method to handle failure or event
may be taken into account. combinations. These include common cause br
A parts count reliability prediction of a system with a common mode failures, multiple failure effects and
series type of structure will yield predictions at an statistically dependent fault modes or sequential failure
acceptable precision level, provided a thorough ‘Parts effects and mechanisms, or events caused by adverse
environmental effects.
Stress Analysis’ is carried out. Use of the parts stress
analysis gives more realistic component failure rates. 6.3.2.5 Time vatying failure/event rates

6.3 Explanations to Table 2 Non-constant failure and event rates (or non-
exponential distribution of times to failure).
6.3.1 General
6.3.2.6 Complex maintenance strategies
On the left hand side of Table 2, the analysis methods
The capability of the method to handle statistically
are listed. In order to facilitate evaluation and
dependent repair and maintenance situations. These
comparison, their characteristics, attributes, flexibility, include cases where renewal processes (repair queues)
etc, are stated.
should be considered, as compared to the assumption
For each analysis method the matrix thus gives an that, for each component failure, repair begins
indication as to which additional characteristics each immediately after failure, independent of whether a
method can handle as indicated by ‘yes’ and ‘no’ component is accessible or not (independent repair).
entries, Further, the analysis methods are distinguished
by particular attributes or techniques. These are listed 6.3.2.7 Simulation of functional process
and rated on the right hand side of Table 2.
The capability of a method to simulate discrete events;
Table 2 indicates that there is no single, comprehensive that is, the failure and renewal processes are simulated
dependability analysis method. The analyst should and the particular system states evaluated according
choose the method which best fits the particular system to the influence which they exert on any higher-level
or analysis objective. system or on the total environment (interrelation).

6
 ,,
.—. &

-, -..
IS 15036:2001
‘,

Therefore, it is also necessary to simulate the dependability analysis method may be

fictional behaviour of the higher-level system along employed for the evaluation of the relevant .

.
..—

.-

with processes within the total environment while components.

analyzing the operating and failure processes of the 10) Mainly calculation of system dependability
system itself. measures by the reduction (substitution) I!k.,
>,,,,
6.3.2.8 Deductive/inductive approach
method of a given reliability block diagram. ,.
See 5.3 and 5.4. 6.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Methods

6.3.2.9 Qualitative/quantitative analysis A comparison of some of the commonly used methods

follows. {
The capability of a method to handle qualitative and/
or quantitative analysis. 6.4.1 Failure Mode and Eflects Analysis

6.3.2.10 Qualitative/qtiantitative analysis eflort (cost) 6.4.1.1 Advantages

The entries give relative estimates of the cost of a) identifies systematically the cause and effect
applying a particular analysis method to a particular relationships;
problem. The effective analysis effort is dependent on b) gives an initial indication of those fault modes
the system complexity, the depth of analysis, the skill which are likely to be critical, especially
of the analyst, the availability of basic system and single faults which may propagate;
component data, and the availability of suitable c) searches for possible outcomes not previously
computing resources. or precisely known;
6.3.3 Remarks with reference to Table 2 d) identifies outcomes arising from specific
causes or initiating events which are believed
c Capable. to be important;
Nc Not capable, or not applicable e) highlights spurious outcomes as well as
() With restrictions/exceptions deviations from normal functional
performance; and
1) With cut sets or logical reduction.
2) By event simulation, numerical integration f) useful in the preliminary analysis of new or
untried systems or components.
or renewal theory.
3) A basic, systematic method (combinatorics) 6.4.1.2 Disadvantages ..
to support qualitative system analysis, in a) the output data may be large even for -,,
particular for Markov and event simulation relatively simple systems;
to determine the possible system states. Low .
b) may become complicated and unmanageable
for event rate, high for unavailability
unless there is a fairly direct (of ‘single-
(diagrams with loops).
chain’) relationship between cause and effect,
4) Low for event rate, high for unavailability that is, cannot conveniently deal with parallel
(diagrams with loops).
or complex relationship;
5) Depends on system complexity (stochastic c) may not easily deal with time sequences,
process to be simulated) and possible restoration processes, environmental
approximations (truncation of event
conditions, maintenance aspects, etc;
sequences).
d) does not, in itself, directly produce a model
6) Especially dependent events, for example,
for quantitative evaluation; and
parallel structures with passive (standby)
e) may not easily portray multiple dependen-
components.
cies or complex interactions between faults
7) Special Erlang distribution (introduction of in different parts of the system.
virtual – ‘dummy’ states) or semi-Markov
process. 6.4.2 Fault Tree Analysis
8) System size and complexity which can be 6.4.2.1 Advantages
handled are mainly dependent on available
computing means, efficiency of event (Monte a) identifies and records systematically the
Carlo) simulation procedure and required logical fault paths from a specific effect, back
accuracy of measures to be estimated. to the prime causes;
9) Independent components at each reduction b) deals with parallel, redundant or alternative
level are assumed. Therefore, any fault paths;

7
IS 15036:2001

c) deals with most forms of combinatorial events .!9 capable of setting up models for the
and some forms of dependencies as well; evaluation of overall system reliability and
d) deals with systems which have several cross- availability in probabilistic terms; and
Iinked sub-systems; h) results in compact and concise diagrams for
e) provide for fairly easy manipulation of the a total system.
fault paths to give minimal logical models 6.4.3.2 Disadvantages
(for example by using Boolean algebra);
capable of sensitivity analysis to indicate the a) does not, in inself, provide for a specific fault
f)
items dominantly contributing to overall analysis – that is the cause-effect(s) paths or
system reliability; the effect-cause(s) paths are not specifically
highlighted;
g) capable of setting up models for the
evaluation of overall system reliability and b) requires a probabilistic model of performance
availability in probabilistic terms; and for each element in the diagram;
h) results in compact and concise diagrams for c) will not show spurious or unintended outputs
a total system. unless the analyst takes deliberate steps to
this end; and
6.4.2.2 Disadvantages d) is primarily directed towards success analy-
a) does not, in itself, provide for a specific fault sis and does not deal effectively with com-
analysis – that is the cause-effect(s) paths or plex repair and maintenance strategies or
the effect-cause(s) paths are not specifically general availability analysis.
highlighted; 6.4.4 A4arkov Analysis
b) requires a probabilistic model of performance
for each element in the diagram; 6.4.4.1 Advantages

c) wi 11not show spurious or unintended outputs a) provides a direct probabilistic model for
unless the analyst takes deliberate steps to system state behaviour based on the system
this end; and logic;
d) is primarily directed towards success analy- b) provides the probabilistic solutions for sub-
sis and does not deal effectively with com- sets of other models such as logic diagrams
plex repair and maintenance strategies or and fault trees;
general availability analysis. c) deals readily with multi-state situations and
6.4.3 Reliability Block Diagram outcomes, right down to the component level;
d) represents event sequences with a specific
6.4.3.1 Advantages pattern or order of occurrence;
a) Often constructed almost directly from the e) valuable in computing availability
system functional diagram; this has the performance measures of the system; and
further advantages of reducing constructional o deals with complex, dependent repair situa-
errors and/or systematic depiction of tions.
functional paths relevant to system reliability;
b) deals with most types of system configuration 6.4.4.2 Disadvantages
including parallel, redundant, standby and a) may become very complex for models
alternative functional paths; involving a large number of system states;
c) deals with most forms of combinational b) may not help in the logical solution of a
events and some forms of dependencies; problem;
d) capable of complete analysis of variations and c) depends normally upon the assumption that
trade-offs with regard to changes in system transition rates are constant; and
performance parameters;
d) can only represent combinatorial events
e) provide (in the two-state application) for
by creating a new state for each combi-
fairly easy manipulation of functional or non-
nation.
functional paths to give minimal logical
models (for example, by using Boolean 6.4.5 Parts Count Reliability Prediction
algebra);
6.4.5.1 Advantages
o capable of sensitivity analysis to indicate the
items dominantly contributing to over-all a) time and cost of analysis are very low;
system reliability;

8
 .——
IS 15036:2001

>
b) the necessary input information and data are considered, and therefore only simple
small and suiting to the situation in the early structures lend themselves to parts count ,.
design and development phase; analysis; ,-
c) basic information on component reliability b) the precision level of the predictions is
is gained in the early design and development normally low, especially for small sub-
phase; systems, due to the wide spread in values of
d) adapted to computerized calculations; most published data;
e) little training is necessary; c) repair and maintenance cannot be considered;
f) applied to parts of any complexity, provided d) the evaluation of fault modes and
reliability data are available. mechanisms and their effects is not possible;
and
6.4.5.2 Disadvantages !
e) time-sequential failure and event behaviour
a) the functional structure (for example lower cannot be considered.
level redundancies) of a system cannot be

ANNEX A

(Clause 2)
LIST OF REFERRED INDIAN STANDARDS

IS No. Title IS No. Title

1885 (Part 39) : Electrotechnical vocabulary: Part 39 (Part 8/See 2): Maintenance and maintenance
1999 Reliability of electronic and 1988 support planning, Section 2 Main- ., ..
electrical items (second revision) tenance support analysis
9692 Guide on maintainability of (Part 8/See 3): Maintenance — maintenance support
equipment 1988 support planning, Section 3
(Part 1) :1980 Introduction to maintainability Maintenance planning analysis
(Part 2) :1980 Maintainability requirements in (Part 8/See 4): Maintenance and maintenance
specifications and contracts 1988 supporting planning, Section 4
(Part 3) :1981 Maintainability programme Maintenance support resources
(Part 4) :1987 Test and diagnostic procedures requirements
(Part 5) :1985 Maintainability studies during the ll137(Part2): Analysis techniques for system
design phase 1984 reliability: Part 2 Procedure for
(Part 6) :1983 Maintainability verification failure mode and effects analysis
(Part 7) :1984 Collection, analysis and presentation (FMEA) and failure modes, effects
of data related to maintainability and criticality analysis (FMECA)
(Part 8/See 1) : Maintenance and maintenance 15037:2001 Analysis techniques for
1988 support planning, Section 1 General dependability — Reliability block
diagram method

9
IS 15036:2001

,.
i
ANNEX B

(f’oreword)
COMMITTEE COMPOSITION

Reliability of Electronic and Electrical Components and Equipment Sectional Committee, LTD 3
(’2
Organization Representative(s)
i
Indian Institute ofTechnology, Khamgpur PROFK. B. MISW(Chairman)
All India Radio, New Delhi SrrsuA.B. MAWR !,,
SsrroJ. P. Tsr.wm(Alternate)
,!

Bhabha Atomic Research Cerrtre,Mumbai SrmuD. tiO

Smr R.K.SARAF(Alternate)
Bharat Electronics Ltd, Bangalore Sara RUDRA
MANUEL
SHRrMATJ
MEENAPmmm mv,mm (Alternate)
Central Electricity Authority, New Delhi DrREaOR(TUCCMWNJCATJOt$
DEPUTY (Tele) PTCC(Alternate)
DJRSeTGR
Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), New Delhi SmuY. K. Pmmsv
Smr A. K. AHUJA
(Alternate)
Consumer Electronics &TV Manufacturers Association,New Delhi !%roN. G. NANOA
Department of Electronics (STQC), New Delhi SrrwA. K. SW
(Ar’rernafe)
!%rraS. K. KrMo_mr
Department of Telecommunication (TEC), New Delhi %mlv. A.RAMA~0
DIRECTOR
(Alternate)
ElectronicComponents IndustriesAssociation,New Delhi SW V.K.Smm[
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd, Hyderabad SmuR.11.mmv
SmrB.Bmsw MO(Alternate)
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, Hyderabad Sm V.M Mowl&+o
SsuoS.C.H.JAGNANAWIho (Alternate)
lETE, New Delhi MAJOR
GrmYmmv.mr DEVA
MAJORGENK. B. JwrvM (Alternute)
Instrumentation [.td, Ko@ Swu A. P. PAOmrm
SaruILwv SRIVASTAVA
(Alternate)
ISRO (Department of Space), Bangalore Swo S. SATJSH
SmuG. L.UCWMWATHI
(Alternate)
lTILtd,Bangalore SmV.Murww
Mhsistry
otDefence(DGQA)(L),
Bangalore SmiK.L.CtruG
Smr KALYAN ROY(Alternate)
ONIDA,Mumbai Swu T.C.GOSALJA
SsiruP.D. SHASTJU
(Alternate)
Philips India Ltd, Loni-Kalbhor Snm R.A.Wkmrvrs
SsrwB. DEVJCHARAN
(Alternde)
Research, Design and Standards Organization,Lucknow JOJNrDIRECTOR
S~ANDARDS
(Ltms)
Jorm DIRECTOR
STANDARDS
(Alternate)
Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, Kolkata Starr R.DE
Sm D. Wumr (Akernde)
BIS Directorate General Smu VIJ.wDhector& Head (Electronics and
Telecommunication)
~epresenting DirectorGeneral (Er-oflcio)]

Member-Secretary
Smu I%vrmKw
Assistant Dhector (Electronicsand Telecommunication),BIS

10
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Amendments Issued Since Publication

Amend No. Date of Issue Text Affected

... ..>

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