Leonid R.

Sykiainen

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF

CALIPHATE:
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND A
CONTEMPORARY
INTERPRETATION

BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM

WORKING PAPERS

SERIES: LAW
WP BRP 72/LAW/2017

This Working Paper is an output of a research project implemented at the National Research University Higher
School of Economics (HSE). Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the
views of HSE
 Leonid R. Sykiainen1

THE ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF CALIPHATE:

BASIC PRINCIPLES AND A CONTEMPORARY
INTERPRETATION

This article studies the approach of Islamic legal thought to the idea of Caliphate. The author
explains the fundamental principles of the Islamic concept of the state as an instrument for
defending and maintaining religion and dealing with worldly affairs. Modern Islamic thought,
taking into consideration the historical evolution of Islamic statehood under the influence of
objective political circumstances, came to the key conclusion that an Islamic state is not
restricted to a unified Caliphate (the Caliphate on the way of the prophecy). Other models of
power are quite admissible if they are meeting the aims of the Caliphate.

JEL Classification: K 10; K 40

Keywords: Caliphate, Sharia, Islamic state, fiqh, caliph, Islamic legal thought.

1
National Research University Higher School of Economics. Law Faculty. Department of
Theory and History of Law. Professor; E-mail: Lsukiyainen@hse.ru

The article was prepared within the framework of the Academic Fund Program at the National Research University Higher
School of Economics (HSE) in 2016- 2017 (grant № 16-01-0017 “Islamic State: Legal Fundamentals and Modern Practice”) and
supported within the framework of a subsidy granted to the HSE by the Government of the Russian Federation for the
implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program.
Fundamentals of Islamic conception of Caliphate
The Islamic Sunni concept of power (the state) was basically formed in the 11-14th centuries.
Sharia does not know enough number of the norms of the Quran and the Sunnah of Muhammad
which regulate the vertical relations of power. These sources do not contain concrete precepts
settling the organization and activity of the Islamic state or determining its content and essence.
Moreover, the Arabic term dawlah which in the modern sense is translated as “state” is rarely
used there. The Quran mentions it just once (59:7) in the meaning of “property”, “fortune”,
“domain”. Instead, the hadiths contain such notions as imamate (which initially denoted leading
the course of prayer in the mosque) and Caliphate (“succession”), which are both used in
traditional Sunni thought to denote the Islamic state. The restriction of certain precepts of
the Quran and Sunnah in terms of the structure and activity of power made the role of the fiqh
doctrine crucial in forming the concept of this phenomenon. In this respect Islamic science faced
a complicated task: a coherent concept of Islamic governance and a system of concrete legal
norms regulating the structure of the power and activity of its institutions were to be elaborated
on the basis of just a few quite abstract Sharia precepts.

Islamic thought emphasizes that, not by coincidence did the Prophet leave behind only
the basic idea of the Caliphate which does not significantly restrict Muslims, allowing them to
flexibly select different forms of government in different historical circumstances. Thus, the
major task of fiqh is to settle the general principles of state building and the activity of that state
using insight from Sharia and only then recommending options for organising an Islamic state to
meet the conditions of Muslim community. Hundreds of years after Prophet Muhammad, by the
virtue of the broad interpretation of the few provisions of the Quran and Sunnah in terms of the
Caliphate and by comparison of the Prophet’s actions and “the righteous” caliphs of the highest-
level leaders of the community, the faqihs (scholars entitled to elaborate fiqh) codified the initial
principles for the organization and functioning of state power.
The key category of classical Sunni political theory is the Caliphate which is viewed in
two interrelated ways: the essence of Islamic state power, and a specific form of government.
The fundamental understanding of the Caliphate still comes from the approach introduced by the
prominent Islamic scholar and jurist al-Mawardi (974-1058) who in his outstanding work
“Norms of Power and Religious Authorities” provided the following definition: “the essence of
imamate is the succession of the oracular mission in support of the faith and control of mundane
affairs” [See (al-Mawardi. 1973:5)]. This treatise introduces the terms “Caliphate” and
“imamate” as synonyms though thereafter Sunni legal thought adopted the term “Caliphate” as
the normative model of the Islamic state.
3
 When analysing this definition, it is not difficult to notice that in al-Mawardi’s
understanding the Caliphate introduces the function of the supreme mundane (political) power
and support of the faith for the Muslim community. In other words, the major feature of the
Caliphate is the role of the power and its orientation to solve certain tasks of religious and
political nature but the form and structure of the state are not rigorously defined.
Islamic politics deals a lot with the derivation of the Caliphate. According to Sunni
thinkers, following al-Mawardi’s views, the establishment of the Caliphate is essential and
represents a duty imposed both on the leader of the Islamic state and all Muslim people.
Religious doctrines and pure logical arguments support the duty to the Caliphate. One
of the most important reasons is the control on the part of the Caliphate of the performance of all
the religious duties and Sharia norms on the whole by Muslims. Among the rational arguments
in favour of the Caliphate is the necessity to avoid chaos and anarchy in state and public affairs
[See (al-Mawardi. 1973:5)]. Insisting on the idea that even an unjust and wrongful power is
preferable to anarchy, Islamic jurists do not miss the chance to quote the Prophet’s words: “A
despotic imam is better than turmoil”.
A peculiar kind of solution to the issue of who the supreme power in the Caliphate
belongs to is introduced in Sunni political science. The most popular modern concept is that the
supreme holder of sovereignty in the Caliphate is Allah and the Islamic state is totally built on
the basis of the delegation imposed by Him on the community. Power on earth is considered to
be exercised by the community on behalf of Allah and that community holds sovereignty which
is nothing but “the reflection” of the supreme sovereignty of Allah. Developing this approach
some contemporary thinkers emphasize that sovereignty in the Islamic state is essentially shared
between Sharia representing the will of Allah and the community whose will is not absolute and
is restricted by Sharia [See (Muhammad ‘Ammara)].
The sovereign rights of the community materialize, first and foremost, in their authority
to choose the caliph (governor, ruler) who is to manage affairs on behalf of the community. In
the meantime, the community do not concede their exclusive rights to the caliph—they only
delegate and entrust him with power. Both in the execution of this authority and in policy-
making the sovereignty of the community is only related to the will of Allah expressed in Sharia.
For instance, the community is entitled to legislate only in matters which are not settled by the
Quran and Sunnah and the community’s subordination to the caliph’s power is stipulated by his
compliance with Sharia precepts.
In respect of the organisational frameworks of Islamic state power, the parameters of the
Caliphate are not fixed according to Sunni legal science, rather they can be put into practice in
different ways. Along with this, some key parameters of the Caliphate’s structure are viewed as
4
pillars of Islamic power in Sunni thought, grounded upon just a few provisions in the Quran:
requiring consultations and taking decisions based on the common opinion as well as the
community’s duty to obey the ruler, Sunni legal scientists considered the Caliphate as a form of
the state which includes the procedure of endowing the caliph with authority and regulating his
interrelations with other state institutions.
Sunni political theory does not have a strictly defined procedure for the succession of
Islamic state leadership. However, according to the most widespread concept, the caliph does not
derive supreme secular and religious power and is not appointed by his predecessor but gets
appointed in pursuance of the special agreement—Bay’ah—concluded between the community
and the candidate. This form is thought to best fit the spirit of Islam. Here the community is
represented in the agreement by a group of outstanding Muslim scholars —mujtahids—endowed
with justice, wisdom and the ability to independently solve matters not settled by the Quran or
Sunnah.
The caliph is personally responsible for exercising power in the community and is
entitled to take any measures to serve the interests of the community providing that he follows
Sharia. As long as the caliph’s policy lies within this framework, he is empowered to demand
absolute obedience and subordination from Muslims. That is why the Caliphate agreement is
unlimited and valid as long as the caliph strictly follows the Sharia norms. If it is proved without
any doubt that the caliph breaches the terms of the agreement, he is to be ousted from power and
the Muslim community is no longer obliged to obey him. Here, theoretically the community is
entitled to demand from the caliph to perform his duties possessing the right to control his
actions. However, common Muslims cannot interfere with state affairs or evaluate the caliph’s
policy—mujtahids are in charge of this. Islamic thought proceeds from the fact that they
represent the community in relations with the caliph and protect the community’s interests. If
Sharia was considered to be “the law” for the elite, the opinion of mujtahids is “the law” for
common Muslims.
The unique merit of the Caliphate form of rule is the obligation of the head of the state
to follow Sharia norms in all his actions, and act with “the interests and common use” of his
subjects and to consult when taking important decisions. Theoretically the caliph is entitled to
consult any of his subjects. However, in practice the opinion of common Muslims is not taken
into account as they do not possess sufficient knowledge to give advice to the ruler. It is deemed
that the matters of state policy are not to be solved by the whole community since this is the
prerogative of the caliph and the advisory board including mujtahids. This body, whose opinion
is equated with the opinion of the community, is supposed to control the caliph’s activity
preventing despotism and tyranny.
5
 Sunni political legal theory emphasizes the fact that the power of the caliph is not
absolute, he has no privileges or immunity and, like all Muslims, he must follow Sharia norms
and can be punished for any evil deed. Even though he exercises supreme religious power in the
state, his power is not deprived from the will of Allah. Being the head of the state, the caliph
does not take advantage of the legislative power in the strict sense and is entitled to introduce
new legal norms only because he is a mujtahid2.
This understanding of the Caliphate, generally based on al-Mawardi, demonstrates an
ideal model of the state leaning to the past. To a certain extent it reflects the practice of the initial
period of the rise of the Islamic power after Muhammad’s death when the so called righteous
caliphs (632-661) headed the Muslim community. But already the state of the Umayyads (661-
750) was significantly different from the model of the Caliphate which was later theoretically
analysed and interpreted by al-Mawardi. It is no coincidence that Islamic legal thought marks the
prophecy of Muhammad who said: “The Caliphate following the way of the Prophet will last for
thirty years and then Allah will give the power to someone He will wish”. The Arabic term
mulk used in this statement specifically denotes the rule of the absolute monarchy.
This interpretation was substantially grounded by the outstanding Muslim scientist Ibn
Khaldun, who writes that the Caliphate is the administration of people in accordance with Sharia
in their celestial and mundane affairs since Allah refers everything mundane to the interests of
the next world. The Caliphate actually means the succession from the Master of Sharia (i.e.
Allah) in protection of the religion and in the administration of mundane affairs. In contrast to
the Caliphate, absolute monarchy (mulk), whether it is natural or political, rules in accordance
with the ruler’s pragmatic purposes, his passions, his practical understanding and insight to
protect interests and prevent damage [See (Ibn Khaldun. undated:191)].
Until the middle of the 13th century the direct successor to the righteous caliphs was the
Caliphate of the Umayyad and the Abbasid Caliphate which retained at least some external
characteristics of the ideal Islamic state. Nevertheless, over time the mechanism of power in the
Islamic world deviated more and more from the classical concept of the Caliphate, though
formally the Caliphate still existed. In the middle Ages the mission to represent it was obtained
by the Ottoman Empire. Arab rulers in a losing rivalry with the Empire had to renounce claims
over the Caliphate and, as a result, the Ottoman sultan acquired the title of the caliph. In the 16th
century most Arab countries became part of the Empire and acknowledged the sultan’s power.
As an institution, on religious grounds and formally uniting all Muslims, the Caliphate
existed up to the beginning of the 20th century. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the

2
Further details of the classical Sunni theory of the Caliphate see: Sykiainen. 2008. P 239-254; Sykiainen. 2003. P. 134-166.
6
end of the First World War it turned into a mere decorative institution and in March 1924 was
officially abolished. Ever since the Caliphate stopped existing as a political reality.

The modern interpretation of Caliphate

Islamic political and legal thought reacted to the liquidation of the Caliphate although in very
different ways. For instance, a major liberal Islamic scholar and theologian Rashid Rida (1865-
1935) shortly before the abolishment of the Caliphate published “The Caliphate or the Great
Imamate” which is a concise theory of the Caliphate as an ideal model of power compared to the
state institutions that had already been established in the Islamic world by that time [See
(Muhammad Rashid Rida.1994)].
This work demonstrated the superiority of the Caliphate over other forms of
government. This nostalgia for the Caliphate was opposed by Abdel Raziq (1888-1966). In his
“Islam and the Basics of the Power” he tried to prove that Islam had no certain models of power.
In his view, Islamic principles can be practically implemented within any form of government
since the essential in them is the content not the form [See (Ali Abd ar-Razik. 1972)].
Rashid Rida and Ali Abdel Raziq to a greater extent predetermined mainstream Islamic
political thought up to the present day. However, over recent decades the discussion of the
problems of power from an Islamic standpoint has reached a qualitatively new phase, which is
directly related to “the Arab Spring” and the appearance of the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL).
These factors force us to return to the issue of the Islamic state and its nature. The
conspicuous activation of the Islamic powers has posed a question on the perspectives of
establishing an Islamic state as a concrete practical project. Against this background all
traditional Islamic concepts of power and state have been given renewed momentum. The topic
of the Caliphate which might seem to have stayed in the past has arisen again.
Apparently taking into consideration the practical significance of this idea, the
Department of Fatwas in Egypt in May 2011 published a special Fatwa No. 3759 “Caliphate and
Islamic states”. The document touches upon the issue of whether there any state after the
Ottoman Caliphate could be called Islamic and how nowadays to estimate the Sharia duty to
obey the governors in terms of the after-world and worldly life3.
The official centre of Sharia thought in Egypt reproduces in its fatwa the well-known
definition of the Caliphate as the power, to a certain extent, replacing the Master of Sharia (i.e.
Allah) in meeting the interests of the religion and worldly life. With reference to Ibn Khaldun the
document interprets the Caliphate in the following way: in terms of the next world and this
3
Text of the Fatwa see: http://www.dar-alifta.org/AR/ViewFatwa.aspx?ID=3759&LangID=1&MuftiType
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world, it is to set everyone on the right path specified in Sharia since even worldly problems are
to be solved based on the will of Allah. The Caliphate is an institution on which Allah imposes
the functions of preserving the religion and administrating worldly affairs in accordance with His
commandments.
It is emphasized that the establishment of this power is a duty imposed on the Muslim
community who need someone to solve these two groups of issues for them. Through that person
Allah guards the people against tyranny, chaos and evil, and meets their interests. In the Sunni
Islamic tradition, as said in the fatwa, there is a unanimous opinion that the establishment of the
power of the caliph (Islamic ruler) is obligatory. However, eventually in Islamic political and
legal thought there is an explanatory conception of the Caliphate as the administration of the
Muslim community by a ruler who ensures the triumph of the religion, meets the requirements of
the Prophet’s Sunnah, administrates justice in respect of the oppressed, and safeguards the rights
of all. Such responsibilities are imposed on those Muslims who are able to cope with them. The
absence of this power casts the community into chaos when no right can be guarded and nobody
restrains people from malice. In this situation servants of God are governed by moral decay and
corruption and they start acting against one another. In order to prevent total chaos, an Islamic
governor is required and the community of all Muslims must obey him.
The fatwa contains a synopsis of the history of the evolution of the Caliphate. It is
marked, particularly, that Muslims remain committed to the idea of the Caliphate even in the
Middle Ages and other periods of weakness including the epoch of the formation of states such
as sultanates and emirates. Many of those quasi-states recognized the governance of the caliph.
However, some of those states were actually independent. For a while they retained some
religious liaison with the Caliphate but later in some states even those formal relations with the
caliph were cut. As a result, certain states appeared having absolutely nothing to do with the
caliph and were called emirates or even independent caliphates. They actually edged out the
Caliphate in its main role including the execution of all its religious and political functions. In
spite of this superficial resemblance, as Ibn Khaldun noted, according to their form those states
represented monarchies and due to that withdrew from the principles of the authentic Caliphate
depicted in Islamic legal thought. The major difference was that their power was already
grounded not on the religion but on the military force and the clan system.
The formal abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 and formation of many new states
with their constitutions and legal systems instead, led to a situation compared with the period of
the Middle Ages both in a political sense and in the nature of their power. According to Sharia
any of those states could be considered an emirate subordination to which is the duty of citizens
since the power does not impose anything sinful from the standpoints of Islam.
8
 The Department of Fatwas emphasizes that the aim of the Imamate (Islamic state
power) is actually the execution of everything that includes the duties and responsibilities of the
head of a modern state. Moreover, those functions are very similar to the authorities of the rulers
of the numerous previous emirates, sultanates and even some caliphates separated from the
initial Caliphate.
As a matter of principle, according to Sharia it is better when the rulers of different
regions act under the supreme authority of one head—the caliph. But if the Caliphate in this
sense is impossible, it does not deny the necessity and legitimacy of rulers of different existing
states. The heads of the modern Islamic states do act as such leaders. To deny this will lead to a
situation when people will lose their leader and chaos will reign in the state, which brings the
country to total decay. This would contradict the purposes of the Law-Giver (i.e. Allah). In that
case damage, corruption and harm will prevail over the goals and values which Islam aims to
protect from encroachment and which include the support and preservation of the religion, life,
sense, honour, dignity and property.
In other words, Islamic experts in the field of law set the basic principles of Islamic
state power in the form of the Caliphate and simultaneously drew borders not to be crossed. But
if in practice there are government institutions which by themselves do not fit the original
framework of Sharia but are essential in order to support Islamic values and reach the aims of
Sharia, that power is considered to be Sharia power in virtue of its existence and its fulfilment of
the specified functions. This order is viewed in Sharia as initially unacceptable but acceptable as
the result of the historical development of Islamic power. This assessment takes into account the
principle of fiqh: what is forbidden as an institution introduced first time ever is acceptable as
something already really formed and which continues to exist.
In fact, any states where all citizens or the majority of those living under their reign are
Muslims and they, without any obstruction, can perform religious rituals, openly follow the
precepts of their faith and are not exposed to restrictions, are Islamic by their nature. In this
respect Islamic territory comprises all states where Muslims live even with non-Muslims
(“people of the treaty”) if those regions were previously conquered (opened) by Muslims. The
allocation of those countries to the territory of Islam does not change the fact that Muslims who
discovered those territories were later pushed out by non-Muslims (kafirs).
As a result, the Department of Fatwas concludes that those states meeting these criteria
are at present Islamic states. Their leaders, in terms of Sharia, are legitimate and worthy of
subordination to as long as nothing sinful is imposed on the citizens
According to this fatwa modern Islamic thought, taking into consideration the historical
evolution of Islamic statehood or sovereignty under the influence of objective political
9
circumstances and supported by the findings of the outstanding representatives of the medieval
fiqh, came to the key conclusion that Islamic power can be performed not only in the form of the
unified Caliphate as the example of the righteous caliphs (the Caliphate on the way of the
prophecy). Other models of power are quite admissible and under certain political circumstances
even necessary if they are capable of meeting the aims of the Caliphate—protecting the religion
and administrating worldly affairs. The idea that Islam cannot find its place without the
Caliphate is undoubtedly false [See (Proclamation)].
Moreover, all major Muslim thinkers and scientific centres do not doubt that Caliphate
represents the ideal of power. For instance, the International Council of Muslim Scholars in its
special declaration4 made a few days after the announcement of the Islamic State caliphate noted
that the Caliphate on the way of the prophecy was still the dream of all Muslims who aimed for
its rebirth as the guarantee of real Muslim unity and of the consistent enforcement of Sharia. But
Islam teaches that any ambitious projects require serious intellectual efforts, complex
preparation, a community of power, and overcoming the resistance of enemies. First and
foremost, all modern Islamic states must exercise power according to Sharia and be united by
sacred ties. They are to possess sufficient material, human and moral power to protect
themselves.
It is worth creating the conditions for the revival of the Caliphate by clarifying the goals
of this project to the citizens and the whole world demonstrating the attitude of the Caliphate to
its allies and opponents. One of the main conditions is gaining consent and peace in the Muslim
community in terms of the common parameters of the recreated Caliphate, its form and content.
As many major Muslim legal scholars think, this might require overcoming some intermediate
stages and making transitional steps, for example, creating a federation or confederation of
Islamic states [See, for example (Yusuf al-Qaradawi)].
The modern interpretation of the Caliphate upheld by Sunni legal thought proceeds
from the fact that Islamic power prioritizes the content of the activity not its form. Muslim legal
scholars pay special attention to the fact that Sharia does not require the establishment of power
necessarily in the form of Caliphate. Fiqh does not view the Caliphate as the chief goal and does
not mention it among the religious cult precepts Allah rewards for.
Sharia requires something else—providing the values of the religion, life, sense, dignity
and property. These are the five goals that form the stem of the policy and the just administration
within the Sharia framework. Their performance may really be considered the duty to the faith
and the genuine requirement of Sharia [See (The Islamic Caliphate)]. Caliphate as any other

4
See: URL: http://iumsonline.org/ar/aboutar/newsar/829/
10
form of the Islamic power is needed not per se but because by means of it Allah guards and
preserves people from chaos, meeting their interests and pushing aside the evil.
“Sharia, which imposed an obligation on us to follow certain principles and goals,”
writes the outstanding contemporary Muslim scholar (faqih) Ahmad ar-Raisuni, “does not
oblige us to establish something called Caliphate, the Islamic Caliphate or the state of the
Caliphate. It contains no word obliging us to call the ruler caliph or call the government form the
Caliphate. One can assert with confidence that if such words as “Caliphate” and “caliph” once
and forever disappear from the life of Muslims, their religion is not in the least going to be
somehow damaged. But if, at least for a day, justice, the principle of consultation and the
legitimacy of power are going to leave them, that will be a calamity” [Ahmad ar-Raisuni. 2014)].
Within the framework of this logic Islamic political and legal thought eventually
specified the classic definition of Caliphate and started interpreting it in more detail as the
administration of the Muslim community by the ruler who is to ensure the triumph of the
religion, meet the requirement of the Sunnah of the Prophet, administrate justice, and secure the
rights of the people.
Understanding the idea of Islamic power accentuating its form not its content dominates
modern Sunni legal thought5. In order to confirm this conclusion, it is quite appropriate to refer
to the major medieval Islamic legal scholar Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah (1292-1350). He wrote:
“Sharia is completely founded on wisdom and consideration for others in their mortal life and in
the life to come; it is the embodiment of absolute justice, mercy, compassion and ultimate
wisdom; if any decision deviates from justice and turns to tyranny and chaos, turns its back to
mercy and stops meeting the interests of the people, becomes damaging, denies wisdom and
gravitates toward corruption, then it no way belongs to Sharia” [Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah.
undated: 3].
According to the image-bearing note by Ahmad ar-Raisuni, if these interests are met
and Sharia goals are attained under the auspices of any structure called Caliphate, then let the
Caliphate prosper. But when in the shade of Caliphate, these specified values are infringed upon
and get buried in oblivion, such a Caliphate is a disaster. But if they get fulfilled even not under
the auspices of the Caliphate, the desired goal is completely achieved [See (Ahmad ar-Raisuni
2014)].

5
Details regarding understanding of the caliphate in the modern Sunni legal thought see: Sykiainen. 2016-1; Sykiainen. 2016-2.
11
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Sykiainen.2008. Sykiainen, Leonid R. Legal and Political Thought // Outline of the History of
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Contact details and disclaimer:

Leonid R. Sykiainen
Professor, Department of Theory and History of Law of Law Faculty, National Research
University Higher School of Economics, Doctor of Juridical Sciences. Address: 20 Myasnitskaya
Str., Moscow, 101000, Russian Federation. Email: Lsukiyainen@hse.ru

Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the
views of HSE.

© Sykiainen 2017.

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