[ G.R. No. 254484.

November 24, 2021 ]

IN RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE

WITH PRAYER TO CHANGE CIVIL STATUS OF JANEVIC ORTEZA ORDANEZA
FROM MARRIED TO SINGLE, JANEVIC ORTEZA ORDANEZA, REPRESENTED BY:
RICKY O. ORDANEZA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), assailing the Decision2 dated September 7, 2020 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05087-MIN filed by petitioner Janevic Orteza Ordaneza
(Janevic) through her representative, Ricky O. Ordaneza (Ricky).

Antecedents

Janevic, a Filipino citizen, and Masayoshi Imura (Masayoshi), a Japanese national,

were married on April 7, 2006 in Pasay City.3 On May 13, 2009, Janevic and Masayoshi
obtained a divorce decree by agreement/amicable divorce pursuant to the Civil Code of
Japan.4 The divorce notification5 was received and duly registered by the Mayor of
Karuya-shi, Aichi on May 15, 2009.

On December 8, 2016, Janevic, through her brother Ricky, filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and that her civil status be changed from "married" to
"single" in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kidapawan City docketed as SP Proc. No.
318-2016.6

During the trial, Ricky testified for Janevic and presented the following documents: (1)
Special Power of Attorney;7 (2) Certificate of Marriage between Janevic and
Masayoshi;8 (3) Japan Certification of All Information in Family Register with translation
in English language and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan;9 (4) Divorce Notification with translation in English language and authenticated
by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan;10 (5) Certificate of Publication
dated February 17, 2017; and (6) copy of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code of
Japan with its translation in English and authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in
Tokyo, Japan.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 28, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision,12 the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby granted.

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
divorce by agreement between JANEVIC O. ORDANEZA and her Japanese spouse
MASAYOSHI IMURA is hereby recognized.

Pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
JANEVIC O. ORDANEZA is declared single and capacitated to remarry under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Pursuant further to Article 407 of the Civil Code, Act No. 3753, NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982, the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City, the Civil Registrar General and the Philippine Statistic
Authority are directed to register or annotate the divorce by agreement of the petitioner
JANEVIC O. ORDANEZA with her Japanese spouse MASAYOSHI IMURA on their
marriage certificate under Registry No. 2006-2124.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphases in the original)

The RTC found that Janevic has proven her petition and compliance with the
requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules, as shown by the documents she submitted.
Although the petition failed to implead the Local Civil Registrar of Makilala, Cotabato
Province, and the Civil Registrar General, the RTC held that there was sufficient
compliance since the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified and the petition
was duly published.14

Citing the case of Fujiki v. Marinay,15 the RTC explained that the effects of the
recognition of foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is extended to the Filipino spouse to rectify an anomalous situation
wherein the Filipino spouse remains tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. The RTC added that notwithstanding
Article 26, the courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effects of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry.16

In a Resolution17 dated July 3, 2018, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
the OSG for lack of merit.18

The OSG appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) Janevic's petition did not comply with
Rule 108; and (2) the divorce decree failed to comply with the requirements under
Article 26 of the Family Code

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On September 7, 2020, the CA rendered its Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 December 2017 and
Resolution dated 3 July 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Kidapawan City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 318-2016, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.20

The CA ruled that Janevic failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 108. The
CA explained that since the end sought to be achieved in the petition was the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the Civil Registry (i.e., change of civil status
from "married" to "single"), Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 108 should strictly be
observed.21 The CA noted that the petition should have been filed in the RTC where
the Civil Registry in which the entry sought to be cancelled or corrected is located,
Pasay City, and not Kidapawan City. The Local Civil Registrar, the Civil Registrar
General, and other parties who would be affected by the grant of a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries were also not impleaded.22

The CA also held that there was no compliance with the requirements under Article 26
of the Family Code. The CA pointed out that while the Japanese law on divorce
provides that a husband and wife may divorce by agreement, the Japanese husband's
capacity to remarry was not sufficiently established. There was nothing in the copy of
the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan that Janevic submitted that states that the
Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry once the divorce decree is obtained. For the
CA, the party seeking recognition of the divorce bears the burden of proving that the
Japanese law allows her former spouse to remarry.23

In the present Petition,24 Janevic argues that the main action of her petition is the
recognition of the foreign judgment on divorce that she and her Japanese husband
validly obtained. While the Petition specifically prayed that her civil status be changed
from "married" to "single," she insists that this is merely incidental to her main prayer of
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce decree. She also claims that the Court's use of
the permissive word "may" in Republic v. Cote25 and Fujiki v. Marinay26 implies that
judicial recognition of divorce decree through a petition under Rule 108 is only directory
and not mandatory. To date, there is no categorical pronouncement to the effect that
Rule 108 shall be the proper proceeding to recognize foreign divorce decree and to
annotate the same in the civil registry.27

Following Janevic's position that compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 is not
necessary when it comes to recognition of foreign judgments on divorce, she maintains
that her petition need not be filed before the RTC where the Civil Registry in which the
entry sought to be cancelled or corrected is located. She insists that the general rule on
venue stated in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules should be observed. Being a resident of
Makilala, Cotabato, Janevic avers that her petition was filed in the proper
venue.28 Janevic contends that the requirement of impleading the Local Civil Registrar
and the Civil Registrar General finds no application in her petition since it was not filed
pursuant to Rule 108. She adds that the respective interests of the Local Civil Registrar
were protected since the Provincial Prosecutor of Cotabato, under the authority of the
Solicitor General, actively participated in the proceedings of the case.29 Janevic also
asserts that she had satisfactorily proved the foreign divorce she obtained and its
validity under the Japanese law pursuant to Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Rules.30

In its Comment,31 the OSG posits that since the Petition of Janevic includes a prayer
for the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registry, it must comply with the
requirements of Rule 108 on venue, and the parties to be impleaded.32 The OSG also
emphasizes that Janevic failed to comply with the requirements of Article 26 because
she failed to sufficiently establish that the divorce decree allows the alien spouse to
remarry.33 While Janevic cited Articles 732 and 733 of the Civil Code of Japan which
purportedly enumerated the restrictions imposed on "Japanese people [to]
remarry,"34 these provisions were not included in the authenticated documents she
submitted during trial. Therefore, the OSG maintains that the foreign spouse's capacity
to remarry under the Civil Code of Japan cannot be proven as a fact under the Rules.35

Issues

The core issues for the Court's resolution are:

1. Whether the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce should be treated
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108; and

2. Whether Janevic sufficiently established that her foreign divorce decree

complied with the requirements of Article 26.

Ruling of the Court

Janevic's petition for

judicial recognition of
foreign divorce decree
should not be treated as a
petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under
Rule 108 of the Rules.

In resolving the first issue, it is worthy to highlight A.M. No. 15-02-10-SC (Re: Report of
the Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns on the Budget Proposal for the
Formal Organization of Family Courts for 2016) wherein the Court adopted the following
guidelines:

I. CIVIL CASES

A. Recognition of Foreign Judgment Order or Decree of Divorce

Pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court on "Effect of foreign

judgments or final orders," the Regional Trial Courts shall hear and decide all
petitions for Recognition of Foreign Judgment, Order or Decree of Divorce,
regardless of any prayer by the petition for a court declaration of his/her capacity
to remarry under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

xxxx

C. Raffle of Cases and Rules of Procedure

The above-mentioned petitions shall be raffled to the regular Regional Trial

Courts and not to the designated or regular Family Courts.

The Regional Trial Courts shall be guided by the procedure provided in (a) Rule
108 of the Rules of Court on the "Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry" and (b) as to proof Rule 39, Section 48 (b) on "Effect of foreign
judgments or final orders" and Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 on "Proof of official
record" and "What attestation of copy must state," in accordance with Fujiki v.
Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013) and Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas (G.R. No.
186571, August 11, 2010). (Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing guidelines must be harmonized with the Court's pronouncements in

relation to recognition of foreign divorce decrees, especially the rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay36 and Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas.37

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,38 the Court categorically acknowledged that a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment in relation to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not the same as a petition for cancellation of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules. The Court explained that:

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a

civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
 proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
and that the time and place for hearing must be published
in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should

not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry - one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.39 (Citations
and emphasis omitted; underscoring supplied)

In Fujiki v. Marinay,40 the Court explicitly stated that:

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only

requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.41

More recently, in Republic v. Cote,42 the Court reiterated the differentiation made
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas43 between the nature of recognition proceedings under Rule
39 and cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.

The import of the recent rulings of the Court is that there is more than one remedy to
judicially recognize a foreign divorce decree in the Philippines and availing one remedy
does not automatically preclude the institution of another remedy.

Here, it is clear from the prayer that Janevic intended to cancel or correct her civil status
entry in the civil registry aside from the judicial recognition of the divorce decree. The
cancellation or correction of her civil status cannot be done through a petition for
recognition under Article 26 (2) without complying with the requirements of Rule 108.
In Fujiki v. Marinay,44 the Court stressed that:

Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]

special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
 establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest
in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."45 (Citation omitted; italics in the original;
underscoring supplied]

An individual seeking the change of his or her civil status must adhere to the
requirements governing a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108. There are underlying objectives and interests that the State
seeks to protect in imposing the requirements in Rule 108, including inter alia the
requirements on venue (Section 1 of Rule 108) and parties to implead (Section 3 of
Rule 108), that the Court cannot simply disregard in favor of expediency.

Section 1 of Rule 108 specifically states that the petition must be filed:

x x x with the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial

Court] of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, Section 3 of Rule 108 provides that:

Section 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of

an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)

Compliance with these requirements is necessary because inherent in the petition

under Rule 108 is a prayer that the trial court order the concerned local civil registrar to
make the necessary correction or cancellation in entries of documents in its custody.

Here, the interested parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108 include inter alia the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and Masayoshi. The RTC of Kidapawan City does
not possess any authority to instruct the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City to reflect the
change in civil status of Janevic considering that it was not impleaded in her petition.

While the change in Janevic's civil status is an expected consequence of the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce, it does not automatically follow that the Petition she
filed is the petition contemplated under Rule 108. Janevic herself acknowledged in her
Petition that "[t]he court does not altogether preclude the filing of the separate
proceedings to effect the same."46 Since Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, its
particular provisions on venue and the parties to implead must be observed to vest the
Court with jurisdiction.47 Therefore, the Court cannot take cognizance of Janevic's
prayer for the cancellation or correction of her civil status from "married" to "single" as
this may only be pursued and granted in the proper petition filed in compliance with the
specific requirements of Rule 108.

The foreign law

capacitating the foreign
spouse to remarry must be
proven as a fact during
trial and in accordance
with the Rules.

To date, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce.48 Nevertheless, jurisdiction
is conferred on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.49 Article 26 of the Family Code states:

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the second paragraph of the quoted provision and the seminal case of Republic
v. Manalo,50 twin elements must be established: (1) there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is
obtained capacitating the parties to remarry regardless of the spouse who initiated the
divorce proceedings.51 The Court has recognized the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as "a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
of his or her country."52

It is settled that the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
must be proven because courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments. This must be alleged and proven in accordance with the Rules.53 Here,
Janevic was able to prove the Japanese law permitting her and Masayoshi to obtain a
divorce by agreement. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code of Japan that was
properly presented during trial states: Article 763. A husband and wife may divorce by
agreement.54

While Janevic was able to allege and prove as a fact the divorce by agreement and the
Japanese law supporting its validity, the OSG insists that the provision of the Civil Code
of Japan capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry was not properly alleged and
proven in accordance with the Rules. The OSG contends that the relevant provisions of
the Civil Code of Japan duly proven during trial allegedly did not explicitly state that the
divorce obtained abroad permits the parties to remarry. Janevic alleged in her petition
Articles 732 and 733 of the Civil Code of Japan, to wit:

Japanese people can remarry, however there are restrictions, to wit:

(Period of Prohibition of Remarriage)

"Article 733. A woman may not remarry unless six months have elapsed from the
dissolution or annulment of her previous marriage.
2. In cases [sic] a woman is pregnant from before dissolution or annulment of her
previous marriage, the preceding paragraph shall cease to apply as from the day of her
delivery."

(Prohibition of Bigamous Marriage)

"Article 732. A person who has a spouse may not effect an additional marriage."55

The Court is mindful that it cannot simply take judicial notice of the foreign law
purportedly capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry without being properly presented
during trial.

In Racho v. Tanaka,56 the Court found that the national law of the foreign spouse
absolutely and completely terminated the spouses marital relationship, thereby
concluding that they are not restricted from remarrying. The Court explained that the
"Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation
than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely
terminates their marital tie."57

In the present case, Janevic alleged in her petition, though not properly presented and
proven during trial, that there are restrictions to remarrying in Japan but these
restrictions apply only to women, and not the male foreign spouse. Similar to the case
of Racho, the fact remains that the divorce by agreement severed the marital
relationship between the spouses and the Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry.
Moreover, the official document Janevic submitted to prove the fact of divorce, the
Divorce Notification,58 did not indicate any restriction on the capacity of either spouse
to remarry. Therefore, the Court deems it prudent to adopt its ruling in Racho, which
involved the same foreign law, in holding that the capacity to remarry of the foreign
spouse had been established.

Accordingly, the petition of Janevic is granted only insofar as her foreign divorce decree
by agreement is recognized. The other relief prayed for, that her civil status be changed
from "married" to "single" cannot be given due course and awarded in this petition. This
ruling is without prejudice to the filing of a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in compliance with the requirements outlined in Rule 108 where the appropriate
adversarial proceeding may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 7, 2020 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05087-MIN is SET ASIDE. The petition for review
on certiorari of Janevic Orteza Ordaneza is PARTIALLY GRANTED only insofar as her
foreign divorce decree by agreement is judicially recognized.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.

RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA RACHO TANAKA,"
PETITIONER, VS. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS
PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law
of the foreign spouse and the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as
a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may be
granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find that the foreign
divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to his or
her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law considers
the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] assailing the June 2, 2011
Decision[2] and October 3, 2011 Order[3] of Branch 254, Regional Trial
Court, Las Piñas City, which denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho's (Racho)
Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to
Marry.[4] The denial was on the ground that a Certificate of Divorce
issued by the Japanese Embassy was insufficient to prove the
existence of a divorce decree.

Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in
Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in
Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children. [5]

Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and
the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce Certificate [6] issued
by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated [7] by an
authentication officer of the Department of Foreign Affairs. [8]

She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General
in Tokyo, Japan, where she was informed that by reason of certain
administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines
to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate
case for judicial recognition of divorce. [9]

She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil
Registry of Manila but was refused by the City Registrar since there
was no court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department of
Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that she
needed the proper court order. She was also informed by the National
Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the
Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to
remarry.[10]

She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her lawyer, and

secured a Japanese Law English Version of the Civil Code of Japan,
2000 Edition.[11]

On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and
Declaration of Capacity to Marry[12] with the Regional Trial Court, Las
Piñas City.

On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City
rendered a Decision,[13] finding that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka
legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove
Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent
evidence since it was not the divorce decree itself. [14]

Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [15] arguing that under

Japanese law, a divorce by agreement becomes effective by oral
notification, or by a document signed by both parties and by two (2) or
more witnesses.[16]

In an Order[17] dated October 3, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied

the Motion, finding that Racho failed to present the notification of
divorce and its acceptance.[18]

On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition for Review on

Certiorari[19] with this Court. In its January 18, 2012 Resolution, this
Court deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly
authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce. [20]

Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation, [21] stating that a duly-

authenticated acceptance certificate was not among the documents
presented at the Regional Trial Court because of its unavailability to
petitioner during trial. She also pointed out that the Divorce Certificate
issued by ,the Consulate General of the Japanese Embassy was
sufficient proof of the fact of divorce.[22] She also manifested that
Tanaka had secured a marriage license on the basis of the same
Divorce Certificate and had already remarried another Filipino.
Nevertheless, she has endeavored to secure the document as directed
by this Court.[23]

On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance, [24] attaching

a duly authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce that she obtained in Japan. [25] The Office of the Solicitor
General thereafter submitted its Comment[26] on the Petition, to which
petitioner submitted her Reply.[27]

Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by

agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or
written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She
contends that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya
City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove
that she and her husband have divorced by agreement and have
already effected notification of the divorce. [28]

She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving a
divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and by the fact of
its acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate.
She maintains that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul
Takayama, whom the Department of Foreign Affairs certified as duly
appointed and qualified to sign the document. She also states that the
Divorce Certificate has already been filed and recorded with the Civil
Registry Office of Manila.[29]

She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article
728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce.[30]

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that the
Certificate of Divorce has no probative value since it was not properly
authenticated under Rule 132, Section 24[31] of the Rules of Court.
However, it states that it has no objection to the admission of the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce submitted by
petitioner in compliance with this Court's January 18, 2012 Resolution.
[32]

It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned that she and her
husband obtained a divorce by agreement and only mentioned it in her
motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. Thus,
petitioner failed to prove that she is now capacitated to marry since
her divorce was not obtained by the alien spouse. She also failed to
point to a specific provision in the Civil Code of Japan that allows
persons who obtained a divorce by agreement the capacity to remarry.
In any case, a divorce by agreement is not the divorce contemplated in
Article 26 of the Family Code.[33]

In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her evidence, including the

Divorce Certificate, was formally offered and held to be admissible as
evidence by the Regional Trial Court.[34] She also argues that the
Office of the Solicitor General should not have concluded that the law
does not contemplate divorce by agreement or consensual divorce
since a discriminatory situation will arise if this type of divorce is not
recognized.[35]

The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the Regional Trial
Court erred in dismissing the Petition for Declaration of Capacity to
Marry for insufficiency of evidence. After the submission of Comment,
however, the issue has evolved to whether or not the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that
a divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and respondent
Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his
national law.

Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and

a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly
obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. [36] (Emphasis
supplied)
The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation
where a Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even
after a validly obtained divorce abroad. [37] The addition of the second
paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the
marriage considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him or her
the capacity to remarry.[38]

Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the

validity of remarriage. It cannot be the basis for any other liability,
whether civil or criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur due to
remarriage.

Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is

insufficient.[39] In Garcia v. Recio,[40] this Court established the
principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this
jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for that purpose.
Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign
judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the
national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and proved like any
other fact before trial courts.[41] Hence, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas:[42]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule,
"no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.[43]
II

Respondent's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Trial

Court. Petitioner presented "a copy [of] the English Version of the Civil
Code of Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the
Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee." [44] Article
728(1) of the Civil Code of Japan reads:
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. [45]
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of Japan on January 18, 2010,
which stated in part:
This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis
of the Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the
Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009. [46]
This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the
Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce, exists. It is not the
divorce decree itself. The Regional Trial Court further clarified:
[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce, namely:
(1) judicial divorce and (2) divorce by agreement.

Under the same law, the divorce by agreement becomes effective by

notification, orally or in a document signed by both parties and two or
more witnesses of full age, in accordance with the provisions of Family
Registration Law of Japan.[47]
Thus, while respondent's national law was duly admitted, petitioner
failed to present sufficient evidence before the Regional Trial Court
that a divorce was validly obtained according to the national law of
her foreign spouse. The Regional Trial Court would not have erred in
dismissing her Petition.

III

Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate

of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, [48] certifying that the divorce
issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture,
has been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document
was authenticated by Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.[49]

The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of

Divorce is a question of fact that would not ordinarily be within this
Court's ambit to resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court[50] are limited to questions of law.

In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the cases to the Regional
Trial Courts for the reception of evidence and for further proceedings.
[51]
More recently in Medina v. Koike,[52] this Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals to determine the national law of the foreign
spouse:
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact
binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that
appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals
(CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as

above-adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under
paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - . . .

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional

Trial Court submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of
Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the
Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be
final.[53]
The court records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the
factual issues.[54] Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General
neither posed any objection to the admission of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce [55] nor argued that the Petition
presented questions of fact. In the interest of judicial economy and
efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.

IV

Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of

official records that are kept in a foreign country requires that it must
be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any
officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign
country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents
referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was
accompanied by an Authentication[56] issued by Consul Bryan Dexter
B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying
that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication
further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was
genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance
of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of
divorce between petitioner and respondent.

The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law
of Japan, a divorce by agreement "becomes effective by
notification."[57] Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between
petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to
respondent's national law.

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by

agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family
Code, which provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. [58] (Emphasis
supplied)
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse," the Office of the Solicitor
General posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce
proceedings.

In a study on foreign marriages in 2007 conducted by the Philippine

Statistics Authority, it was found that "marriages between Filipino
brides and foreign grooms comprised 5,537 or 66.7 percent while those
between Filipino grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8
percent of the total marriages outside the country." [59] It also found
that "[a]bout four in every ten interracial marriages (2,916 or 35.1%)
were between Filipino brides and Japanese grooms." Statistics for
foreign marriages in 2016 shows that there were 1,129 marriages
between Filipino men and foreign women but 8,314 marriages between
Filipina women and foreign men. [60] Thus, empirical data demonstrates
that Filipino women are more likely to enter into mixed marriages
than Filipino men. Under Philippine laws relating to mixed marriages,
Filipino women are twice marginalized.

In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the

burden of this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building,
and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.
This constitutional provision provides a more active application than
the passive orientation of Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article
III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is
given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the
State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the
patriarchy-that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors
that ensure women's disempowerment."[61]

In 1980, our country became a signatory to the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
[62]
Under Articles 2(f) and S(a) of the treaty, the Philippines as a state
party, is required:
Article 2

. . . .

(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or

abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;

. . . .

Article 5

. . . .

(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State has
committed to ensure and to promote gender equality.

In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta
for Women, which provides that the State "shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations." [63] This necessarily includes
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26
should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad.
Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes "validly
obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same
status should be given to the Filipino spouse.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from
initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow.
Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.

The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards

any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It presumes that the
Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the
marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are
protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and drama. Some
marriages can end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will
against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedings
and opt for, if the national law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more
convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity between
the former spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and
extended families, and less financial burden for the family.

Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only in the mid-

20th century. The Philippines had divorce laws in the past. In 1917, Act
No. 2710[64] was enacted which allowed a wife to file for divorce in
cases of concubinage or a husband to file in cases of adultery. [65]

Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was enacted
during the Japanese occupation, provided for 11 grounds for divorce,
including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least
one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent
as to make further living together impracticable." [66]

At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared void
and Act No. 2710 again took effect.[67] It was only until the enactment
of the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in our
jurisdiction.

It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more

progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be
intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the
Constitution guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not
tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation of laws. To rule that
the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only
contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal
partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate relationships. [68]
In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been
resolved in Republic v. Manalo,[69] where this Court held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of " a divorce . . . validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry ." Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word " obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes. As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC,
et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a
favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or
her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter's national law.[70] (Emphasis in the original)
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may be
recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly
obtained, regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce
proceedings.

The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses
initiated the proceedings but rather if the divorce obtained by
petitioner and respondent was valid.

The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of divorce
in Japan: judicial divorce and divorce by agreement. Petitioner and
respondent's divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement,
which is a valid divorce according to Japan's national law. [71]

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that while petitioner
was able to prove that the national law of Japan allows absolute
divorce, she was unable to "point to a specific provision of the
Japan[ese] Civil Code which states that both judicial divorce and
divorce by agreement will allow the spouses to remarry." [72]

To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor General

cites Republic v. Orbecido III,[73] where this Court stated:
[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is
capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of

Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No.
227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
[74]

The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly ignores that in Orbecido

III, the respondent in that case neither pleaded and proved that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, nor presented any
evidence of the national law of his alleged foreign spouse that would
allow absolute divorce.

In this case, respondent's nationality was not questioned. The

Regional Trial Court duly admitted petitioner's presentation of
respondent's national law. Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan as
quoted by the Office of the Solicitor General states:
Article 728 of the Japan Civil Code reads:

1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.

2. The same shall apply also if after the death of either husband or
wife, the surviving spouse declares his or her intention to terminate
the matrimonial relationship.[75]
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains no
other qualifications that could limit either spouse's capacity to
remarry.

In Garcia v. Recio,[76] this Court reversed the Regional Trial Court's

finding of the Filipino spouse's capacity to remarry since the national
law of the foreign spouse stated certain conditions before the divorce
could be considered absolute:
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful
union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a

conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction

that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we
find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. [77]
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications
that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be
no other interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner
and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital
tie.

Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the
marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to remarry. Thus,
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried, the National
Statistics Office having found no impediment to the registration of his
Marriage Certificate.[78] The validity of respondent's subsequent
marriage is irrelevant for the resolution of the issues in this case. The
existence of respondent's Marriage Certificate, however, only serves
to highlight the absurd situation sought to be prevented in the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:[79]
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. . . .

. . . .

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.[80]
The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code through the issuance of
Executive Order No. 227 in 1987. The grant of substantive equal rights
to the Filipino spouse was broad enough that this Court, in the 1985
case of Quita v. Court of Appeals,[81] "hinted, by way of obiter
dictum"[82] that it could be applied to Filipinos who have since been
naturalized as foreign citizens.

In Republic v. Orbecido III,[83] this Court noted the obiter in Quita and
stated outright that Filipino citizens who later become naturalized as
foreign citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino
spouses:
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.[84]
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our
laws, petitioner is still married to respondent despite the latter's
newfound companionship with another cannot be just. [85] Justice is
better served if she is not discriminated against in her own country.
[86]
As much as petitioner is free to seek fulfillment in the love and
devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment
within the institution of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June

2, 2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second
paragraph of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce dated December 16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin
Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires , and Gesmundo, JJ.,

concur.
[ G.R. No. 221029. April 24, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. MARELYN TANEDO
MANALO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014
Decision[1] and October 12, 2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision
states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15

October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial
Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo ( Manalo)

filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch
43 of the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for
initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial
hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel
for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial
court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and
issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February
28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance
with the jurisdictional requirements.
The Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG) entered its appearance for
petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption
of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the
proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the
court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that it is also a
petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment, alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a

Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their
Marriage Contract x x x;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and

her divorced Japanese husband are no longer living together and in
fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in the

Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the
petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is
still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her; furthermore, in the event that
petitioner decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by said entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the
cancellation of entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the
said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid
divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the

cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to
return and use. her maiden surname, MANALO.[4]
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to
leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that were
offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its
attachments to be sufficient in form and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February

28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese

husband;

5. Divorce Decree of the Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate

General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.[5]

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the
allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of
merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil
Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless
Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights
and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including
marriages."[6]
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines ( Family Code) is applicable even
if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband
because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married
to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro,
et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.[7] ruling that the meaning of the
law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of injustice
to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in
turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that
it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romillo, Jr. [8] where the
marriage between a foreigner and a Filipino was dissolved through a
divorce filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.[9] In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
courts cannot grant it.[10]
2. Consistent with Articles 15[11] and 17[12] of the New Civil Code, the
marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an
absolute divorce obtained abroad.[13]
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.[14]
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is
allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.[15]
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code
of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. [16] Shortly
thereafter, E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987. [17] Aside from
amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph
was added to Article 26.[18] This provision was originally deleted by
the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee), but it was presented
and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No.
209.[19] As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to

extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.[20] It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce.[21] Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. [22] Under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property
relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.[23]
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee,
the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino
as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a
divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her national law. [24] The
aim was that it would solve the problem of many Filipino women who,
under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien
husbands even after the latter have already validly divorced them
under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already
married again.[25]
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to
a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired
foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:[26]
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v.
Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the
rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd

situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a

Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.[27]
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision,
a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after
initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable
judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition and
enforcement of the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court
and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil
registry "in order that it would not appear anymore that [she] is still
married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or
is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of
marriage," and to return and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin[28] and Van Dorn[29] already recognized a

foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody
and property relation, respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement
for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband,
who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife to enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only, the latter who exercised sole custody of their
child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on
the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former
wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit but not to enforce the Agreement,
which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not
because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce
decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by
his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability. The
argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a
divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce
conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.[30]
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There,
a complaint was filed by the ex-husband, who is a US citizen, against
his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was
alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to
manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the
motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree
issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary
to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction. In dismissing the case filed by the alien
spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the
parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent
cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What
he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,

petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.[31]
In addition, the fact that a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by
the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the
Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.
[32]
and Medina v. Koike.[33]
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her first husband, who is a
Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court, which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In
resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in
the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse
not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that
arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the

Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x[34]
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese
husband jointly filed for divorce, which was granted. Subsequently, she
filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2
of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse
recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce decree must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas, et al.[35] and Garcia v. Recio,[36] the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of
dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action
including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the
pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned
rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal
effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should
not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and
necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry.
Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist,
the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle,
Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a
national not of Japan, but of the Philippines. It is said that a contrary
ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but
also that of the Filipino people, as expressed in the Constitution. The
Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the
legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained

abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry . " Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there
be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by
the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers.[37] "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure."[38]
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word " obtained" should
be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually
initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of
the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act.[39] Laws have ends to achieve, and
statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.[40] As held in League of Cities of the Phils., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al.:[41]
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba
legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle
that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be
to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly
where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
[42]
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond
and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in "like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such
principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to
certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by
law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written
by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.[43]
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice, such classification may be subjected
to judicial review.[44] The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.[45] When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations.[46] If a legislative classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that
the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest
and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.[47]
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.[48] It includes the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise free speech,
political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right to travel,
and the right to vote.[49] On the other hand, what constitutes
compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and
powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. [50] It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual
liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest,
public safety or the general welfare. [51] It essentially involves a public
right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual
rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter. [52]
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same
principle applies with respect to the acts of the President, which have
the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In
this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites[53] of the equal protection clause.[54] Particularly,
the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated
by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated
with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to
an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce
decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null
and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her
Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national
law of the foreigner.[55]
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a
Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings and a Filipino who
obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse.
In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as
Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2
of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are
no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they
initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the
treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against
the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary.

There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien
spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. [56] In filing for divorce
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of
invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she
should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The
dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not
lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her marital ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the
Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench
and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail
what these "mechanisms" are and how they specifically apply in
Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the
dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous,
costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data

whatsoever was shown to support what he intends to prove. Second,
We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under
the rules on evidence, it is disputably presumed ( i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,[57] that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary acts, [58] that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns,[59] that acquiescence resulted from a belief that
the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, [60] that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage, [61] and that the law has
been obeyed.[62] It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular
or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she
opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed
that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and
affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take
judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing
and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or
at the losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to
prejudge the motive behind a Filipino's decision to marry an alien
national. In one case, it was said:
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses
to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm
of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
[63]

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social

institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.[64] Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on
divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in
response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical
about this point.[65] Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas
be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is

recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been
categorically answered. I refer specifically to the proposal of
Commissioner Gascon. Is this to be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presiding Officer, that was not primarily my

intention. My intention was primarily to encourage the social
institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But
now that he mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
discourage it, Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No. my question is more categorical. Does this carry the
meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.[66]

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effective
March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce on
the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the
part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine
Legislature.[67] On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred
upon him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces
in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of
the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141
("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided
eleven grounds for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified
desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the
action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other
to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and
a spouse's incurable insanity.[68] When the Philippines was liberated
and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have
force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed. [69] From August 30,
1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 386 or the New Civil
Code, an absolute divorce obtained by Filipino citizens, whether here
or abroad, is no longer recognized.[70]
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various
sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a
matter of fact, in the current 17th Congress, House Bill ( H.B.) Nos. 116,
[71]
1062,[72] 2380[73] and 6027[74] were filed in the House of
Representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled
"An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by
the House Committee on Population and Family Relations on February
28, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with
134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 abstentions. Under the bill, the grounds
for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code, modified or amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or
connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism or chronic gambling of the
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person
other than one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the
mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being
a victim of rape;
i. Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a
common child or a child of the petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more
than two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper court
for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family

Code, restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled

was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twenty-one (21),
and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority
over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one (21), such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband or wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
d. The consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage
with the other and such incapacity continues or appears to be
incurable; and
f. Either party was afflicted with a sexually transmissible infection
found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the grounds mentioned in b, e and f existed either at
the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5)
years at the time the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and
reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article
36 of the Family Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at
the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery
or transitions from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled
to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual
as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted
in the total breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite
earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of the Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic
Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence, inviolability, and solidarity. However, none of
our laws should be based on any religious law, doctrine, or teaching;
otherwise, the separation of Church and State will be violated. [75]
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can
or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a
state religion.[76]
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes
that they are good for the country. [77] While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by
the Family Code.[78] It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized
with other constitutional provisions. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development. [79] It is also obligated to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.[80] To Our mind, the State cannot
effectively enforce these obligations if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 only to those foreign divorce initiated by the
alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are
almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and
violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to
minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 6955 (prohibiting
mail order bride and similar practices), R.A. No. 9262 (" Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 "), R.A. No. 9710 ("The
Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No. 10354 ("The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 "), and R.A. No. 9208
("Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 "), as amended by R.A. No.
10364 ("Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012 "). Moreover,
in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the
constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person,
guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.[81]
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm
than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained
a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 and
still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under
the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out of such "extra-marital" affair
has to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these
are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent
but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be
tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by
marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-
in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous
customs.[82]
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present
time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed
marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized
that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans
more often than not create imperfect unions.[83] Living in a flawed
world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the
individual's full human potential and self-fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus, it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time,
brush aside the truth that some of them are of rotten quality.
Going back, We hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it. [84] In reiterating that
the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, S an Luis v. San
Luis[85] quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead
is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be
done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly

apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.[86]
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law.[87] A statute may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.[88]
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the
divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry
of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Presentation solely of the
divorce decree will not suffice.[89] The fact of divorce must still first be
proven.[90] Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[91]
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value,
the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.[92]
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the
1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2)
the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance
of Certificate of Divorce by Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48
(b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to
recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce. [93]
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the
divorce decree is rendered admissible as a written act of the foreign
court.[94] As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not
denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground
of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.[95]
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of
an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.[96]
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the
pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges
are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The

September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 254484. November 24, 2021 ]

IN RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE

WITH PRAYER TO CHANGE CIVIL STATUS OF JANEVIC ORTEZA ORDANEZA
FROM MARRIED TO SINGLE, JANEVIC ORTEZA ORDANEZA, REPRESENTED BY:
RICKY O. ORDANEZA, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (Rules), assailing the Decision2 dated September 7, 2020 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05087-MIN filed by petitioner Janevic Orteza Ordaneza
(Janevic) through her representative, Ricky O. Ordaneza (Ricky).

Antecedents

Janevic, a Filipino citizen, and Masayoshi Imura (Masayoshi), a Japanese national,

were married on April 7, 2006 in Pasay City.3 On May 13, 2009, Janevic and Masayoshi
obtained a divorce decree by agreement/amicable divorce pursuant to the Civil Code of
Japan.4 The divorce notification5 was received and duly registered by the Mayor of
Karuya-shi, Aichi on May 15, 2009.

On December 8, 2016, Janevic, through her brother Ricky, filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and that her civil status be changed from "married" to
"single" in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kidapawan City docketed as SP Proc. No.
318-2016.6

During the trial, Ricky testified for Janevic and presented the following documents: (1)
Special Power of Attorney;7 (2) Certificate of Marriage between Janevic and
Masayoshi;8 (3) Japan Certification of All Information in Family Register with translation
in English language and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan;9 (4) Divorce Notification with translation in English language and authenticated
by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan;10 (5) Certificate of Publication
dated February 17, 2017; and (6) copy of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code of
Japan with its translation in English and authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in
Tokyo, Japan.11

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 28, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision,12 the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby granted.

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
divorce by agreement between JANEVIC O. ORDANEZA and her Japanese spouse
MASAYOSHI IMURA is hereby recognized.

Pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
JANEVIC O. ORDANEZA is declared single and capacitated to remarry under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

Pursuant further to Article 407 of the Civil Code, Act No. 3753, NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982, the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasay City, the Civil Registrar General and the Philippine Statistic
Authority are directed to register or annotate the divorce by agreement of the petitioner
JANEVIC O. ORDANEZA with her Japanese spouse MASAYOSHI IMURA on their
marriage certificate under Registry No. 2006-2124.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphases in the original)

The RTC found that Janevic has proven her petition and compliance with the
requirements under Rule 108 of the Rules, as shown by the documents she submitted.
Although the petition failed to implead the Local Civil Registrar of Makilala, Cotabato
Province, and the Civil Registrar General, the RTC held that there was sufficient
compliance since the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified and the petition
was duly published.14

Citing the case of Fujiki v. Marinay,15 the RTC explained that the effects of the
recognition of foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is extended to the Filipino spouse to rectify an anomalous situation
wherein the Filipino spouse remains tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. The RTC added that notwithstanding
Article 26, the courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effects of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry.16

In a Resolution17 dated July 3, 2018, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
the OSG for lack of merit.18

The OSG appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) Janevic's petition did not comply with
Rule 108; and (2) the divorce decree failed to comply with the requirements under
Article 26 of the Family Code

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On September 7, 2020, the CA rendered its Decision,19 the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 December 2017 and
Resolution dated 3 July 2018 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Kidapawan City, in
Special Proceedings Case No. 318-2016, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.20

The CA ruled that Janevic failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 108. The
CA explained that since the end sought to be achieved in the petition was the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the Civil Registry (i.e., change of civil status
from "married" to "single"), Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 108 should strictly be
observed.21 The CA noted that the petition should have been filed in the RTC where
the Civil Registry in which the entry sought to be cancelled or corrected is located,
Pasay City, and not Kidapawan City. The Local Civil Registrar, the Civil Registrar
General, and other parties who would be affected by the grant of a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries were also not impleaded.22

The CA also held that there was no compliance with the requirements under Article 26
of the Family Code. The CA pointed out that while the Japanese law on divorce
provides that a husband and wife may divorce by agreement, the Japanese husband's
capacity to remarry was not sufficiently established. There was nothing in the copy of
the provisions of the Civil Code of Japan that Janevic submitted that states that the
Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry once the divorce decree is obtained. For the
CA, the party seeking recognition of the divorce bears the burden of proving that the
Japanese law allows her former spouse to remarry.23

In the present Petition,24 Janevic argues that the main action of her petition is the
recognition of the foreign judgment on divorce that she and her Japanese husband
validly obtained. While the Petition specifically prayed that her civil status be changed
from "married" to "single," she insists that this is merely incidental to her main prayer of
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce decree. She also claims that the Court's use of
the permissive word "may" in Republic v. Cote25 and Fujiki v. Marinay26 implies that
judicial recognition of divorce decree through a petition under Rule 108 is only directory
and not mandatory. To date, there is no categorical pronouncement to the effect that
Rule 108 shall be the proper proceeding to recognize foreign divorce decree and to
annotate the same in the civil registry.27

Following Janevic's position that compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 is not
necessary when it comes to recognition of foreign judgments on divorce, she maintains
that her petition need not be filed before the RTC where the Civil Registry in which the
entry sought to be cancelled or corrected is located. She insists that the general rule on
venue stated in Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules should be observed. Being a resident of
Makilala, Cotabato, Janevic avers that her petition was filed in the proper
venue.28 Janevic contends that the requirement of impleading the Local Civil Registrar
and the Civil Registrar General finds no application in her petition since it was not filed
pursuant to Rule 108. She adds that the respective interests of the Local Civil Registrar
were protected since the Provincial Prosecutor of Cotabato, under the authority of the
Solicitor General, actively participated in the proceedings of the case.29 Janevic also
asserts that she had satisfactorily proved the foreign divorce she obtained and its
validity under the Japanese law pursuant to Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Rules.30

In its Comment,31 the OSG posits that since the Petition of Janevic includes a prayer
for the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil registry, it must comply with the
requirements of Rule 108 on venue, and the parties to be impleaded.32 The OSG also
emphasizes that Janevic failed to comply with the requirements of Article 26 because
she failed to sufficiently establish that the divorce decree allows the alien spouse to
remarry.33 While Janevic cited Articles 732 and 733 of the Civil Code of Japan which
purportedly enumerated the restrictions imposed on "Japanese people [to]
remarry,"34 these provisions were not included in the authenticated documents she
submitted during trial. Therefore, the OSG maintains that the foreign spouse's capacity
to remarry under the Civil Code of Japan cannot be proven as a fact under the Rules.35

Issues

The core issues for the Court's resolution are:

1. Whether the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce should be treated
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108; and

2. Whether Janevic sufficiently established that her foreign divorce decree

complied with the requirements of Article 26.

Ruling of the Court

Janevic's petition for
judicial recognition of
foreign divorce decree
should not be treated as a
petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under
Rule 108 of the Rules.

In resolving the first issue, it is worthy to highlight A.M. No. 15-02-10-SC (Re: Report of
the Committee on Family Courts and Juvenile Concerns on the Budget Proposal for the
Formal Organization of Family Courts for 2016) wherein the Court adopted the following
guidelines:

I. CIVIL CASES

A. Recognition of Foreign Judgment Order or Decree of Divorce

Pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court on "Effect of foreign

judgments or final orders," the Regional Trial Courts shall hear and decide
all petitions for Recognition of Foreign Judgment, Order or Decree of
Divorce, regardless of any prayer by the petition for a court declaration of
his/her capacity to remarry under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.

xxxx

C. Raffle of Cases and Rules of Procedure

The above-mentioned petitions shall be raffled to the regular Regional

Trial Courts and not to the designated or regular Family Courts.

The Regional Trial Courts shall be guided by the procedure provided in (a)
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the "Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry" and (b) as to proof Rule 39, Section 48 (b) on
"Effect of foreign judgments or final orders" and Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25 on "Proof of official record" and "What attestation of copy must state,"
in accordance with Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
and Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas (G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010).
(Emphases, italics, and underscoring supplied)

The foregoing guidelines must be harmonized with the Court's pronouncements in

relation to recognition of foreign divorce decrees, especially the rulings in Fujiki v.
Marinay36 and Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas.37

In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,38 the Court categorically acknowledged that a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment in relation to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not the same as a petition for cancellation of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules. The Court explained that:

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the

recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
 Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among
others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;
and that the time and place for hearing must be published
in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should

not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for
the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registry - one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.39 (Citations
and emphasis omitted; underscoring supplied)

In Fujiki v. Marinay,40 the Court explicitly stated that:

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only

requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.41

More recently, in Republic v. Cote,42 the Court reiterated the differentiation made
in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas43 between the nature of recognition proceedings under Rule
39 and cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.

The import of the recent rulings of the Court is that there is more than one remedy to
judicially recognize a foreign divorce decree in the Philippines and availing one remedy
does not automatically preclude the institution of another remedy.

Here, it is clear from the prayer that Janevic intended to cancel or correct her civil status
entry in the civil registry aside from the judicial recognition of the divorce decree. The
cancellation or correction of her civil status cannot be done through a petition for
recognition under Article 26 (2) without complying with the requirements of Rule 108.
In Fujiki v. Marinay,44 the Court stressed that:

Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]

special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest
in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."45 (Citation omitted; italics in the original;
underscoring supplied]

An individual seeking the change of his or her civil status must adhere to the
requirements governing a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108. There are underlying objectives and interests that the State
seeks to protect in imposing the requirements in Rule 108, including inter alia the
requirements on venue (Section 1 of Rule 108) and parties to implead (Section 3 of
Rule 108), that the Court cannot simply disregard in favor of expediency.

Section 1 of Rule 108 specifically states that the petition must be filed:

x x x with the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial

Court] of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Meanwhile, Section 3 of Rule 108 provides that:

Section 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of

an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied)

Compliance with these requirements is necessary because inherent in the petition

under Rule 108 is a prayer that the trial court order the concerned local civil registrar to
make the necessary correction or cancellation in entries of documents in its custody.

Here, the interested parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108 include inter alia the
Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and Masayoshi. The RTC of Kidapawan City does
not possess any authority to instruct the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City to reflect the
change in civil status of Janevic considering that it was not impleaded in her petition.

While the change in Janevic's civil status is an expected consequence of the judicial
recognition of her foreign divorce, it does not automatically follow that the Petition she
filed is the petition contemplated under Rule 108. Janevic herself acknowledged in her
Petition that "[t]he court does not altogether preclude the filing of the separate
proceedings to effect the same."46 Since Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, its
particular provisions on venue and the parties to implead must be observed to vest the
Court with jurisdiction.47 Therefore, the Court cannot take cognizance of Janevic's
prayer for the cancellation or correction of her civil status from "married" to "single" as
this may only be pursued and granted in the proper petition filed in compliance with the
specific requirements of Rule 108.

The foreign law

capacitating the foreign
spouse to remarry must be
proven as a fact during
trial and in accordance
with the Rules.

To date, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute divorce.48 Nevertheless, jurisdiction
is conferred on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.49 Article 26 of the Family Code states:

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the

Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the second paragraph of the quoted provision and the seminal case of Republic
v. Manalo,50 twin elements must be established: (1) there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) A valid divorce is
obtained capacitating the parties to remarry regardless of the spouse who initiated the
divorce proceedings.51 The Court has recognized the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code as "a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino
spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
of his or her country."52

It is settled that the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse
must be proven because courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments. This must be alleged and proven in accordance with the Rules.53 Here,
Janevic was able to prove the Japanese law permitting her and Masayoshi to obtain a
divorce by agreement. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code of Japan that was
properly presented during trial states: Article 763. A husband and wife may divorce by
agreement.54

While Janevic was able to allege and prove as a fact the divorce by agreement and the
Japanese law supporting its validity, the OSG insists that the provision of the Civil Code
of Japan capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry was not properly alleged and
proven in accordance with the Rules. The OSG contends that the relevant provisions of
the Civil Code of Japan duly proven during trial allegedly did not explicitly state that the
divorce obtained abroad permits the parties to remarry. Janevic alleged in her petition
Articles 732 and 733 of the Civil Code of Japan, to wit:

Japanese people can remarry, however there are restrictions, to wit:

(Period of Prohibition of Remarriage)

"Article 733. A woman may not remarry unless six months have elapsed from the
dissolution or annulment of her previous marriage.

2. In cases [sic] a woman is pregnant from before dissolution or annulment of her

previous marriage, the preceding paragraph shall cease to apply as from the day of her
delivery."

(Prohibition of Bigamous Marriage)

"Article 732. A person who has a spouse may not effect an additional marriage."55

The Court is mindful that it cannot simply take judicial notice of the foreign law
purportedly capacitating the foreign spouse to remarry without being properly presented
during trial.

In Racho v. Tanaka,56 the Court found that the national law of the foreign spouse
absolutely and completely terminated the spouses marital relationship, thereby
concluding that they are not restricted from remarrying. The Court explained that the
"Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation
than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely
terminates their marital tie."57

In the present case, Janevic alleged in her petition, though not properly presented and
proven during trial, that there are restrictions to remarrying in Japan but these
restrictions apply only to women, and not the male foreign spouse. Similar to the case
of Racho, the fact remains that the divorce by agreement severed the marital
relationship between the spouses and the Japanese spouse is capacitated to remarry.
Moreover, the official document Janevic submitted to prove the fact of divorce, the
Divorce Notification,58 did not indicate any restriction on the capacity of either spouse
to remarry. Therefore, the Court deems it prudent to adopt its ruling in Racho, which
involved the same foreign law, in holding that the capacity to remarry of the foreign
spouse had been established.

Accordingly, the petition of Janevic is granted only insofar as her foreign divorce decree
by agreement is recognized. The other relief prayed for, that her civil status be changed
from "married" to "single" cannot be given due course and awarded in this petition. This
ruling is without prejudice to the filing of a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in compliance with the requirements outlined in Rule 108 where the appropriate
adversarial proceeding may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 7, 2020 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05087-MIN is SET ASIDE. The petition for review
on certiorari of Janevic Orteza Ordaneza is PARTIALLY GRANTED only insofar as her
foreign divorce decree by agreement is judicially recognized.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.