BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF

MAIN PLANT
 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF
MAIN PLANT
1 GENERAL
The base & peak ratings of natural gas & Naptha are shown in table:
Natural Gas Naptha Fuel

Base Rating Peak Base Rating Peak

Rtg. Rtg.

Power output
At simple cycle 111,760 117,300 108,390 113,790
Operation (KW)

Power Output
At combined cycle 110,100 115,860 106,990 112,600
Operation (KW)

 Power output figures above are net output.

Note:
1. Above figures are based on the design conditions and actual performance
can be ascertained, based on the correction curves.
Major affecting conditions are as follows.
a) Ambient temperature (Compressor inlet air temperature)
b) Barometric pressure
c) Power Factor at generator terminals
AuGPP has two combined cycle module each consisting of two gas turbines,
two waste heat recovery boilers and one steam turbine. The capacity of each
gas turbine and steam turbine is:
Gas Turbine: 111.76MW (Each _Model MW. 701D
Steam Turbine: 110.00 MW (each Model – TC2F-28).
Total capacity of each Module: 326MW

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1.1 GAS FIRING OF GAS TURBINES
Manufacturer recommends lean gas of the following specification for the
AuGPP gas turbines.
CH4 (Methane)---84.5%
C2H6 (Ethane)---7.70%
C3H8 (Propane)---2.45%
C4H10 (Butane)---0.13%
CO2 (Carbon dioxide)-5.12%
N2 (nitrogen)--- 0.1%
The various units at Auraiya were synchronized as follows: -

SCHEDULED DATE ACTUAL DATE

GT1 03.09.89 29.03.89
GT2 03.11.89 21.07.89
CC1 03.09.90 29.12.89
GT3 03.01.90 09.08.89
GT4 03.03.90 29.09.89
CC#2 03.01.91 12.06.90

In the gas turbine unit, fine filtered air, is passed through 1008 No. of
cartridge type. Self cleaning filters provided in the filter house is compressed
in the 19 stage axial flow type compressor. This compressed air at a pressure
of around 14 Kg/cm2 and a temperature of 300C to 450C enters in the
combustor shell which encloses 18 No. of annular type combustor baskets
arranged cir-cumferential around the axis of gas turbine compressor rotor

3
shaft. On the downstream side there is 4 stage axial flow reaction turbine.
The machine has got the rated speed of 3000 rpm.
The exhaust gas at the outlet of the gas turbine has temperature of around
500C and can be allowed to pass through WHRB in combined cycle mode
or through bypass stack in open cycle mode with proper combination of
dampers i.e., bypass stack dampers and WHRB inlet dampers. In the bypass
stack, there are two layered multi louver dampers. On the top of dampers
there is paralleled plate silencer.
1.2 LIQUID FUEL FIRING (NAPTHA)
As per manufacturers recommendation, the specification of Naptha for trace
metals are as under:
Property Effect Maximum Limit
Sulphur causes corrosion 2% by wt. in
to boiler tubes combined cycle,
No restriction in
open cycle

Vanadium Cause severe corrosion after flux 0.5 ppm by wt.

formation at elevated temperature.

Sodium & Causes severe corrosion after flux 0.5 ppm by wt.
Potassium formation at elevated temperature.

Lead Causes corrosion 2 ppm by wt

Rainsbottom Forms carbonaceous material 0.15%

Carbon after combustion.
Residue
Calcium Causes hard border deposits 10 ppm by wt.

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Two number of storage tanks of 1500 kL capacity were installed, each
having a dead stock of 280 kL. So the maximum usable Naptha that can be
stored is approximately 2440 kL which is sufficient to run all the four gas
turbine units at base load for 15 hours. The Naptha transportation is done by
road tankers only and the unloading bay was initially having a capacity to
accommodate 8 tankers, which latter increased to 12 tankers.
Out of four Gas Turbines, Naptha firing commissioning had been carried out
only in GT#3 in open cycle mode. In other units and in combined cycle,
Naptha firing scheduled was carried out after completion of unit over
hauling.
Naptha firing in GT#3 was started on 7 th Nov. 1992 and completed on 21 st
November. 1992. Following activities were performed:
1. Fuel mix operation (50% ratio)
2. Unit start up with liquid fuel
3. Nox measurement (with and without water/steam injection).
4. Mix fuel operation at different ratios.
5. Fuel change-over at different load.
During fuel change over period, wide fluctuation of load was observed. To
reduce the fluctuation, the fuel change over period was adjusted from 400
sec. to finally 360 sec., and the slope of FRCSO against time was also
adjusted accordingly. Further one timer was added to fuel oil manifold purge
valve and logic modified. In addition, timer/speed settings of fuel gas sweep
air isolation valve (CV-184) and fuel oil manifold purge valve timer setting
were also changed. All this setting and adjustments were carried out in other
GTs viz GT#1 & GT#4.

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2 EMERGENCY GAS TURBINES
An emergency gas turbine of 2.86MW of m/s Ruston gas turbine, U.K is
also installed in the plant to meet power demand for critical auxiliaries of
GT & ST in the event of black out or grid failure. This is an skid mounted
open cycle gas turbine which can be operated on dual fuel viz, gas & liquid
fuel (HSD). This turbine was synchronized with liquid fuel on 23/12/88 &
with gas on 13/01/89.

3 CONSTRUCTIONAL FEATURES OF
MW 701D GAS TURBINE

3.1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The gas turbines at AuGPP are open cycle, single shaft, heavy duty,
industrial type consisting of 19 stage axial flow compressor. 4 stage axial
flow reaction type gas turbine (Model MW 701D) were manufactured by
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan.
Atmospheric air is drawn through the inlet manifold and inlet casing into the
compressor where it is pressurized and forced into combustion chamber.
Fuel delivered into the combustors, is burned which raises the temperature
of the mixture of air and combustion products to around 1150C. The
compressed and heated mixture (gas) flows through the turbine dropping in
pressure and converted into mechanical work of rotation.
The Gas is exhausted through the exhaust diffuser and axial exhaust
manifold into the atmosphere through exhaust stack silencer or WHRB. To
ensure good starting characteristics, bleeder valves were fitted in the 6 th and
11th stage of compressor. They are opened when starting cycle is on and
closed when turbine reaches near synchronization speed. Correct alignment

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of the turbine to the generator is maintained by the rigid compressor &
pedestals and, flexible turbine & supports. The flexible turbine support
allows for thermal expansion.
3.2 INLET CASING SECTION
This comprises of following:
A) Casing
B) Bearings
C) Seals.
A) Casing: The inlet casing is made of ductile cast iron and it acts as a
smooth bounding passage for the air flowing into the compressor, and
provides a housing for the journal bearing. Variable inlet guide vanes
were installed to modulate inlet flow of atmospheric air.
B) Bearings: A thrust bearing was installed in a housing secured to the
front end of the inlet casing. Inlet casing section also included journal
bearing housing.
C) Seals: Oil seals were installed in the front end of the thrust bearing to
prevent external leakage. To prevent oil from creeping along the rotor
shaft to the compressor suction, oil seals were installed in a seal
housing at the front end of the inlet casing.
3.3 COMPRESSOR AND COMBUSTOR
SECTION
The compressor cylinders and combustor cylinder were bolted together at a
vertical joint to form a compression chamber. This combined casing houses
the stationary diaphragms of the 18 stage compressor. It incorporates the 6 th
& 11th stage bleed air manifolds and also a manifold for air extracted at the
14th stage to supply cooling air to the second stage turbine vanes. The inlet

7
casing rests in pedestals, which form a rigid support for the turbine at the
compressor end.
3.3.1 COMPRESSOR DIAPHRAGM
Each compressor diaphragm consists of two piece fabrication. The air foil
shaped vanes, made of Cr. Steel are rolled, twisted and subsequently welded
to the inner & outer shroud rings to form diaphragms.
The leakage of air is minimized by seal strips welded to the inside diameter
wall of the inner shroud rings with matching seal lands machined on the
compressor discs.
3.3.2 COMBUSTION CHAMBER
This is enclosed by turbine cylinder to form a relatively low velocity plenum
into which compressor discharge air flows.
Combustion of the fuel takes place in 18 combustors arranged
circumferentially around the machine axis. These combustor baskets are
fabricated from cold rolled Nickel base Cr. alloy sheet. Fuel is forced into
the combustor baskets through dual fuel nozzle at the upstream of each
basket. These baskets are perforated and designed to induce turbulent mixing
of the fuel and air. Spark plug ignitors are located on the 11 th stage & 12th
combustor basket.
3.3.3 TORQUE TUBE SEALS
Filtered cooling air is supplied to this housing by means of four pipes
running through the combustion chamber. A part of it is utilized by the
torque tube sealing system which separates the compressor in turbine
environment while the rest is employed to cool the rotating blade roots.

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3.4 TURBINE CYLINDER SECTION
The Turbine cylinder section is fabricated from carbon steel plate. It
encloses the combustion chamber and provides a housing for the 4 stages of
the turbine stationary diaphragms also referred as blade ring assemblies.
Turbine vanes are cooled by air in order to protect them from excessive
temperature effects. Leakage of air is prevented or reduced to minimum by
seal support ring attached to vane segments.
The seal ring is maintained at an optimum operating temperature by cooling
air flow. The cooling air, after passing through the vanes, cools the seals,
enters the disc cavity area and flows into the main gas stream. The flow
prevents, gases to enter the disc cavity area and temperature of disc cavity is
continuously monitored by thermocouples.
3.5 EXHAUST CYLINDER SECTION
The exhaust cylinder fabrication comprises of the bearing housing, inner and
outer cones of exhaust diffuser and outer case, all jointed together by means
of a strut system.
3.6 EXHAUST MANIFOLD SECTION AND
EXHAUST TRANSITIONS
This serves as a sort of muffler in which the flow is slowed down without
becoming excessively turbulent. This flow stabilization further improves the
gas turbine performance and provides greater protection for silencer baffles
from material erosion.
3.7 COMPRESSOR AND TURBINE ROTOR
The turbine rotor consists of a bladed compressor spindle and blades of
turbine. It is supported on two pressure lubricant filling pad type journal
bearing.

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4 MAJOR GAS TURBINE FAILURES/
MODIFICATIONS

4.1 Failure of GT No.1 ON 22/5/1989

a) Operating conditions during failures
The machine was started on 22/5/1989 at 1.40 p.m. after a shutdown of 5
days due to non-availability of fuel gas. At 14.25 hours there was a loud
sound followed by surging like phenomenon, which continued for 20 to 25
seconds. Finally the machine automatically tripped due to “Exhaust over
Temperature”. Just after the circuit breaker of generator was disconnected,
heavy vibration around that time was observed from the stack.
b) Extend of Failure
In order to analyze the cause of tripping, detailed investigation was carried
out and the following observations were made.
i) All (nos 19) stage compressor blades were separated at rest section.
ii) Compressor 18th stage diaphragm was severely damaged. Seal box and
seal land had melted.
iii) Compressor 19th stage diaphragm and OGV was damaged by debris.
iv) Damage on no.18 disc of compressor and 17th stage seal box.
v) Heavy deposit on turbine first stage vanes.
vi) Feed back lever of IGV was found fallen down.
vii) Scratches on the gas & Naptha control valve sleeves.
c) CAUSE OF FAILURE
Final cause of failure as established by various measurement was inadequate
clearance between the seal ring and compressor disc particularly during cold
fast start causing 1.9 mm of diaphragm rubbing.

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d) REMEDIAL MEASURE
(i) Grinding of downstream side of the diaphragm seal box face of
13th, 15th stage by 1.0 mm and 16th-18th stage by 3.5mm.
(ii) Detuning of 19th stage compressor blades.
4.2 FAILURE OF GAS TURBINE NO#1 ON
07.03.90
(I) Operating Conditions
No.1 GT at Auraiya which was operating as a combined cycle suddenly
tripped at 3.42 a.m. on March 7, 1990. The indication of “reverse power”,
was shown as a cause of tripping on the control panel. Alarm indication for
high vibration was also recognized. The reading of recording chart showed
that the load was reduced from 50 MW to 40 MW due to high grid
frequency (beyond 51.5 HZ), 20 minutes before the tripping. A slight
increase of CSO (Control signal for fuel) from 38% to 41%, and a slight
increase of blade path temperature from 409 degree C to 442 degree C were
observed, 2 minutes before the tripping. The coasting down time to zero
speed was 18 minutes, which was shorter than the normal coasting down
time of 23 minutes. Those phenomena at tripping suggested that some heavy
damages took place in the unit.
(II) Inspection Results
The unit was opened and thoroughly inspected jointly with m/s NTPC
engineers. The summary of inspection results are as follows
A) All vanes of 14th stage compressor diaphragm were separated from the
tip and base sections. Approximately half of fracture surfaces were
old and appeared to have been cracked much earlier than the incident
occurred on March 7, 1990. The remaining half appeared new and
apparently separated just before the tripping.

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B) Four rotating blades of 13th stage were found to have been slided
toward downstream (same as those observed in No.4 GT). One slided
blade was heavily bent. Sign of trip rubbing was found on the
horizontal areas of casing surface at 13th stage.
C) Thirteen vanes (out of one hundred and sixty) of 13th stage compressor
diaphragm were found cracked and also two vanes were found
separated. Signs of rubbing were observed on the leading edge of 13 th
vanes. This rubbing was apparently caused by the 13th rotating blades
which slided downstream. Some deformations found on trailing edge
of 13th vanes are presumed to be caused by the subsequent rubbing by
separated parties.
D) Both 14th and 15th stage-rotating blades were heavily rubbed by the
fragments of separated 14th compressor vanes, but none of the
rotating blades were separated or cracked.
E) On the blade tips of 3rd to 6th stage rotating blades, signs of tip rubbing
were observed. signs of rubbing were also found on the surfaces of the
top portion of upper casing. Those are apparently caused by the
sudden high vibration of rotor when the gas turbine tripped.
F) The diaphragm of 15th stage, one vane was cracked and two vanes
were bent due to the influence of upstream damage.
G) On the surfaces of vanes and blades of 16 th to 19th stage, small dents
were observed.
H) Some overheated zones were observed on combustion baskets, and
small holes were found on three combustors. There were not any
significant dents on the combustor baskets.
I) In turbine section, small dents were observed on the surfaces of blades
and vanes for all stages. Small traces of impact were found on the tip

12
 sections of blades of Ist stage. Slights dents were observed on the
trailing edge of Ist and IInd vanes also.
(III) Cause of failure
Initiating cause of the failure was radial rubbing in 13 th& 14th stage of
compressor blade tip. One No. of 13th stage compressor blade moved down
stream and got deformed which made a big “wake” causing aero dynamic
disturbance at the downstream.
Harmonic excitation created by this, “wake” coincided with the third
harmonic natural frequency of # 14 stage diaphragm, causing high cycle
fatigue failure of # 14 stage vanes.
(IV) Remedial Measure
Increase of radial clearance for various compressor stages & 0.5 mm tip
grinding of 13th &14th stage of compressor rotor blades was carried out. In
addition to this blending of casing near the horizontal passing plane of
compressor was carried out.
In order to eliminate the chances of rubbing in 2nd & 12th stage, tip grinding
of compressor rotor blades by 0.2 mm was also carried out.
4.3 ADDITIONAL JOBS
In addition to above, following jobs were also carried out based on the
observation on other operating gas turbine units of AuGPP from 7.3.90 to
28.5.90.
1) Grinding of compressor rotating blade tip by 0.2 mm, from # 2S to # 12S.
2) Grinding of turbine blade by 0.5 mm from #2S to # 4S as tip rubbing was
found in the turbine blades, inspite of this modification tip rubbing was
found on turbine 3rd stage blade ring segments, as a counter measure
oval grinding (0.17 mm to 0.66mm) was carried out on 2 nd & 3rd stage
blades.

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4.4 FAILURE OF GAS TURBINE#4 ON 20.01.90
4.4.1 Operating conditions:
On 20.1.90 shutdown of GT#4 was taken in order to check any
abnormal condition in the machine due to which erratic vibration
pattern was shown by brg. No.2 (compressor end brg.)
4.4.2 Extent of Failure:
i) 13th stage rotor blades were damaged on the trailing edge (towards the
tip end). Radial rubbing on 13th and 14th stage tip was observed.
ii) 14th Stage rotor blades were also found damaged from the leading
edge as well as from the trailing edge.
iii) 13th stage diaphragm vanes got damaged on the trailing edge.
iv) 13th stage compressor diaphragm: there was extensive rubbing in the
leading edge of the diaphragm blades and the upper seal strip of the
seal box.
v) 14th stage compressor diaphragms rubbing was observed in the seal
box.
vi) 15th –19th stage compressor blades: there was minor damages on the
leading and trailing edges.
vii) Five No. of 13th stage compressor blades had walked down streamside
and had got badly damaged.
4.4.3 CAUSE OF FAILURE:
It is concluded that failure of 13 th stage blades was initiated by heavy blade
tip rubbing at # 13 and # 14 stages due to reduced radial clearances (at
Horizontal parting plane at 13th & 14th stage during hot restart cycle)
4.4.4 REMEDIAL MEASURE:
i) Tip grinding of 13th and 14th stage compressor blades by 0.5 mm.

14
ii) Grinding the casing near parting plane of stage 10th to 19th.
iii) Grinding of compressor blades tip by 0.2 mm in 2nd to 12th stage.
In order to establish the adequacy of modification compressor radial and
axial clearances were measured during hot condition by using touch type and
non contact type sensor. The machine was tested under most severe
condition of starting and loading pattern. Minimum radial clearance of 1.35
mm was measured when the gas turbine was restarted in hot condition, (40
minutes after the commencement of turning operation). Other conditions
such as a very hot condition or cold starting were less severe for the closure
of tip clearance.
The minimum axial clearance of 4 mm was measured at cold fast starting
condition when the machine was started after a shut down of approximately
24 hrs. Axial position meter which installed at thrust bearing indicated that
the direction of thrust shifted from compressor side to turbine side at rated
speed with no load condition.
In addition to this following jobs were also carried out based on the
observation on other operating gas turbine units of AuGPP. From 26.4.90 to
25.5.90
A: Grinding of turbine blade top from 2nd to 4th stage by 0.5 mm
B: Oval grinding of turbine blade ring segment by 0.17 mm to 0.6 mm
4.5 GAS TURBINE #2
Based on the modification carried out in GT#1 & GT#4 failures, following
jobs were carried out in GT#2.
From 30.9.1989 to 11.12.1989
a) Compressor diaphragm axial clearances were increased by 1 mm in
No.13 to No. 15 stages diaphragm & from 16 to 18 stage clearances
were increased by 3 mm.

15
b) In addition to this, detuned 19 stage compressor blades were filled in
compressor rotor.
From 7.3.90 to 18.4.90
a) Compressor 13th & 14th stage blade tip grinding by 0.5 mm.
b) Grinding of compressor casing near parting plane of stage 10 th 19th by
0.5 mm.
c) Compressor blades from 2nd to 12th stage were also grinded at the top
by 0.2 mm.
4.6 GAS TURBINE #3
Based on the modification carried out in GT#1 & GT#4 failures, following
jobs were carried out in GT#3 also.
From 20.12.89 to 7.1.1990
a) Compressor diaphragm axial clearances were increased by 1 mm in
No. 13 to No. 15 stages diaphragm & from 16 to 18 stage clearances
were increased by 3 mm.
b) In addition to this detuned 19 stage compressor blades were filled in
compressor rotor.
From 23.2.90 to 25.4.90
a) Compressor 13th & 14th stage blade tip grinding by 0.5 mm
b) Grinding of compressor casing near parting plane of stage 10 th to 19th
by 0.5 mm.
c) Compressor blades from 2nd to 12th stage were also grinded at the top
by 0.2 mm.

16
4.7 OTHER PROBLEMS CAUSES AND REMEDIAL
ACTION
In addition to the failure in main gas turbines, there were problem/failures in
associated system like exhaust duct, exhaust stack bypass duct dampers and
bypass duct expansion joints.
Following are the details of such failures:
1 BYPASS DAMPER FAILURE
Operating conditions at the time of failure:
On 30.9.94 GT#2 was operating in open cycle mode. Two damper blades
had fallen down and the unit was manually tripped. On Further inspection
cracks were found in all four units at the welding points between shaft sleeve
and damper blades.
1.1 CAUSE OF FAILURE:
1. The damper louvers were not strengthened in the middle, only side
strengthening was done.
2. Inadequate strength of joints against flow (VORTEX) induced
vibration causing fatigue failure.
3. Welding defects and improper electrodes were used for welding of
dissimilar metals.
1.2 REMEDIAL MEASURE:
(1) Joints between the damper blades and shaft sleeve were strengthened
at site for GT#1 & 2. For Unit GT#3 & #4 similar modified dampers were
manufactured and delivered at site.
2. Also to improve the weld quality, blade and shaft sleeve materials were
changed to SS 410 and Cr. Steel 73% respectively from SS430 & SS316.

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4.8 BYPASS STACK DAMPER SEAL FINS
FAILURE
Damage was found in the seal fins of bypass stack damper blades of al the
four gas turbine which were subsequently modified by M/s MHI.
CAUSE OF FAILURE
This was due to inadequate buckling strength and fragile configuration as
compared to the severe operating conditions.
REMEDIAL MEASURE
Following were the counter measures taken:
a) Reinforced configuration.
b) Short length seal plate to increase bulking load
c) Higher mechanical strength
d) Material of seal fin changed to INCONEL- 718 from INCONEL 625.
e) Installation of additional stiffener of SUS 410.
4.9 BYPASS DAMPER EXPANSION JOINT
FAILURE
During inspection on 18.12.89, cracks were found on the outer fabric of
expansion joint giving leakage passage to hot flue gas in GT#2.
Further similar cracks were observed in GT#3.
CAUSE OF FAILURE
Settlement of the insulation material gave passage to hot flue gas to reach
the outer fabric & causing the damage.
REMEDIAL MEASURE
1. Insulation was replaced to high density material.
2. Installation procedure was revised to prevent sagging of insulation as
well as restricted flow path of the hot flue gas.

18
For No.1 and No.3 by-pass stack expansion joints, failures were found at the
other surface on March 7, 1990. Both failures occurred at same location, just
lower fixed flange of expansion body, where some gap of inside insulation
material was observed.
Probable causes are presumed as follows:
a-1) Tightening and sinking of insulation material caused by vibration of
duct during GT operation.
a-2) Missing of insulation material through the failure portion of inner
seal.
It is presumed that the failure of inner seal occurred due to bending at sharp
edge of carrier fixing plate
b) Exposure of high temperature gas to outer surface of expansion joint.
d) Fracture of outer surface of expansion joint
3. Corrective actions
(i) Following corrective actions were adopted to avoid the exposure of
high temperature exhaust gas to WHRB outer surface of expansion
joints.
a) Installation of mat type insulation.
b) Application of fixing stud for mat type insulation
c) Installation of high density insulation
d) Exchange the fixing position of inner flow guide
e) Exchange the inner seal and its location.
(ii) For three sides of outer surface of expansion joint except WHRB
side, removal of insulation material was done for further
inspection.
(iii) If inner seal & inner flow guide are sound. Following corrective
actions can be adopted:

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a) Installation of mat type insulation
b) Application of fixing stud for mat type insulation
c) Installation of high density insulation
4.10 EXHAUST DUCT INNER INSULATION PLATE
FAILURE
In GT#2 exhaust duct bottom plates were found damaged. In GT#1 some
liner plates were missing and some were heavily damaged (warped).
4.10.1 CAUSE
Warping of blade GT#1 was due to occurrence of high exhaust gas temp.
during first failure. The dislodging of plates in other GTs was due to
inadequate clearance between the plate and plate retaining bolts provided to
take care of thermal expansion.
4.10.2 REMEDIAL MEASURE
All the steel bolts of the bottom plates were replaced with higher dimension
studs and larger diameter washers.
4.11 FAILURE IN COMBUSTOR BASKET
Burning of combustor baskets ring on the downstream of the scoop tube
along with erosion/ burning of scoop was found in the combustor baskets of
all the four gas turbines, during all the inspections.
In order to establish the design adequacy, temp. of the metal was measured
in GT#4 and at two places near the cross fire tube. Temperature was more
than 900C which is the maximum permissible limit.
4.11.1 CAUSE
Following are the causes of burning of compressor baskets near the scoop
tube.
i) Lower cooling effectiveness due to interruption of film cooling flow
by the scoop.

20
ii) Flame holding due to void in the down stream of scoop
iii) Extended tip metal at the root of the scoop on the down stream side
had increased the temp causing deformation outwardly so as to close
the cooling air passage causing starving of cooling air.
iv) Closure of cooling air passage made the combustor wall temperature
extremely high enough to burn out the combustor well on the down
stream scoops.
4.11.2 REMEDIAL MEASURES
In order to avoid the above phenomena more no. of cooling air holes were
drilled in order to improve cooling efficiency.
These modified combustor baskets were then installed in various GTs.
Inspection of these combustor baskets were carried out in Feb 1993 in GT#1
& it was found that there was burning on the down stream of the scoop tube
and burning below the cross flame tube (towards the downstream side).
After detailed study by m/s MHI experts, it was found that cooling air from
the opening around the scoop tube & cross flame tube (dia 3mm x 5 nos.
holes), were not sufficient for the cooling. An improved design of flow liner
on the down stream of the scoop tube, flow liner on the cross flame tube &
additional cooling holes of (dia 1.6mm x 16 nos.) were provided in GT-1, to
cool the tube wall in order to enhance the quantum of cooling air.
Subsequently same modification was provided in all other GTs
4.12 INLET AIR FILTER HOUSE SILENCER SUPPORT
FAILURE
On 24.6.91 gas turbine #3 was stopped due to abnormal noise from the inlet
air plenum chamber. Inspection was carried out and it was found that the
support which were welded to the inner perforated sheet for sound
absorbing, had broken in one of the silencer baffle.

21
4.12.1 CAUSE
Cause of this failure was the inadequate welding strength of the guide plate
to the sheet (which is not a rigid support).
4.12.2 REMEDIAL MEASURE
To increase the welding strength additional stiffeners were provided on the
down stream & upstream side of the baffle plates. Among the modified
support plates, the bottom plate is first welded to a rigid frame.

22
A CLOSER VIEW OF THE AURAIYA GAS POWER
STATION

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE POWER PLANT

23
A VIEW OF THE STEAM TURBINE HALL

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE STEAM TURBINE HALL

24
 A VIEW OF THE TWO NAPTHA TANKS
EACH HAVING A CAPACITY OF 1500 KL

A VIEW OF THE COOLING TOWERS

25

A VIEW OF THE COOLING TOWERS