I.

GENERAL CONSIDERATION
A. DEFINITION OF TERMS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
- study of the structure and powers of the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.
- Also deals with certain basic concepts of Political Law (nature of state, supremacy of
the constitution, separation of powers, rule of the majority).
2. PUBLIC LAW
- A general classification of law concerned with the political and sovereign capacity of
a state.
- Public law is that area of constitutional, administrative, criminal, and International
Law that focuses on the organization of the government, the relations between the
state and its citizens, the responsibilities of government officials, and the relations
between sister states.
- It is concerned with political matters, including the powers, rights, capacities, and
- duties of various levels of government and government officials.
- an act that applies to the public at large, as opposed to a private law that concerns
private individual rights, duties, and liabilities.
Additional:
POLITICAL LAW – branch of public law which deals with the organization and operations of the
governmental organs of the State and defines the relation of the State with the inhabitants of its
territory.
- Consti 1 & 2
- Administrative Law
- Law of Public Officers
- Election Law
- Law on Municipal Corporations

B. BASIS OF THE STUDY

- Principal basis of Consti 1 is the present constitution of the Philippines as adopted
on Feb. 2, 1987.
- Pertinent statutes, executive orders and decrees, judicial decisions, current political
events
- Provisions from Consti of 1935 and 1973 which served as the drafts
- Consti of the US, its Supreme Court such as the Bill of Rights incorporated in the
Philippine Consti. Imported provisions of law are interpreted in the light of their
understanding in the country of origin.
 II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
A. 1935 CONSTITUTION
1. IMBONG VS. COMELEC, GR NO. L-32432, SEPT 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,

vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as members
thereof, respondents.

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.

Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.

Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS

 Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, members of the Bar, taxpayers, and interested in running as
candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention filed two separate but related petitions for
declaratory relief pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132, both impugning this RA that it prejudices their
rights as such candidates.

 March 16, 1967 -- Congress passed Resolution No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to
propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district
who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be elected on the second Tuesday of
November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.

 November 1967 before elections -- Congress enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid
Resolution No. 2.

 June 17, 1969 – Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 that the
convention "shall be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts
according to the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be
entitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of
the House of Representatives.”

 August 24, 1970 – Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4,
repealing R.A. No.4914.

 Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a).

 Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132
 Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in accordance
with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of the law itself.

ISSUES

1. WON Sec 2 of RA 6132 is unconstitutional

2. WON Sec 4 of RA 6132 is unconstitutional
3. WON Sec 5 of RA 6132 is unconstitutional as deprivation of liberty without due process of law and
denies equal protection of the laws.
4. WON Sec 8 (a), paragraph 1 is violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
5. WON Sec 8 (a), paragraph 2 is unconstitutional.

RULING

1. The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned
among the existing representative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but
fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption is that the
factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such apportionment was presented to
Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the necessary computation to effect the desired
proportional representation.The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator
Pelaez which is now R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its
apportionment of the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a
reasonable apportionment of delegates. The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes,
may be over-represented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has
a population very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only
two delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the
apportionment as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not
required and is not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot
be accurate nor complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the
constant movement of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is
reasonable and the resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a
minimum of two delegates for a congressional district. The impossibility of absolute proportional
representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when it directs that the apportionment of
congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as nearly as may be according to their
respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const.,
emphasis supplied). Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not
expressly or impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of
population in each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy and to
avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the
apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each
representative district, they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the
apportionment of the representative districts.5 CONSTITUTIONAL.
 Court sustained the validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees,
elective or appointive, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, officers and employees of
corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the filing of their certificates
of candidacy on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with
the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due
process or of the equal protection of the law. CONSTITUTIONAL.

 Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or
from assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government until after the final
adjournment of the Constitutional Convention." The obvious reason for the questioned inhibition, is to
immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest, party interest or vested interest
and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the interest of the nation his high and
well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the land, which may endure for generations
and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute. It should be stressed that the disqualification
is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of the convention
which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present Constitution finished its
task in approximately seven months — from July 30, 1934 to February 8, 1935. The function of a delegate
is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public
officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the
government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other
laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. The
disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the second Tuesday
of November, 1970.- CONSTITUTIONAL.

 Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits “any candidate for delegate to the convention from
representing or allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other
organization; and any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or
other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from intervening in the nomination of any
such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material
or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election. The ban against all political parties or
organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization
support or assistance, whether material, moral, emotional or otherwise. This Court ruled last year that the
guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right
of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and
dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate and important
public interests. It permits the candidate to utilize in his campaign the help of the members of his family
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more
than one for every ten precincts in his district. It allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and
his right to peaceful assembly, because he cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the
pretext that the provision of said section may or will be violated. The right of a member of any political
party or association to support him or oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts
individually. The very party or organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his
cause or program of reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse
public interest in, or to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals
for amendments. According to Senate Majority Floor Leader Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the
Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates
equal protection of the laws by according them equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the
prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the
equal protection of the laws. The candidates must depend on their individual merits and not on the
support of political parties or organizations. Senator Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that
under this provision, the poor candidate has an even chance as against the rich candidate. The freedom
of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any existing organization.
A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to a political party or any
 other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose candidacy does not evoke
sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by
Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talent and imbued
with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilize their services if elected. –
CONSTITUTIONAL

 The constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was upheld which Congress acting as a
legislative body in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly,
because —

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution, has
full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or to call a convention for the
purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint session assembled but voting separately.
Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutional convention were passed by the required
three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call a

constitutional convention includes all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the
principal power granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the
election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as all
other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4
already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.

3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present Constitution
solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the power to enact the
implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No.
6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such
implementing details are matters within the competence of Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by
necessary implication withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative
action. And as lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide for such
implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, acting as a legislative
body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in the gaps, which authority is
expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.

5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the President is
no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative body nor present any
difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the Presidential veto or Congress can
reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.
 2. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC (GR NO. L-34150, OCT. 16, 1971) – 18 yrs old + other amendments

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER
OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA,
PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION
REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.

BARREDO, J.:

FACTS
 A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
The delegates were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the implementing legislation
Republic Act 6132.
 Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section 1 of article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower
the voting age to 18, was approved by the Convention.
 Organic Resolution No. 1 also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which refers only to the
age qualification for the exercise of suffrage, shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on
other portions of the entire Constitution.
 Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution - the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the
people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by
the Convention.

ISSUE
Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention constitutional?

HELD
 NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and
resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite are null and void.
 The Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the
same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite
for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose.
 We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding
that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately
from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
 Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no
fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that
will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be
able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment.
 The Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost
every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How
can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age
upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given
any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission.
 B. 1973 CONSTITUTION

3. PLANAS VS. COMELEC (GR NO. L-35925, JAN. 22, 1973)

FACTS

 16 March 1967 - Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2 which was amended by Resolution 4 of
said body, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.
 24 August 1970 - Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on pursuant to
the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970
 1 June 1971 - The1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions.
 21 September 1972 - the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial
Law.
 29 November 1972 - the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines.
 30 November 1972 - the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for
said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973.
 7 December 1972 - Charito Planas filed with the Supreme Court against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from
implementing Presidential Decree 73 upon the grounds that said Presidential Decree "has no force and
effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same,
the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress,"
and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof."
 17 December 1972 - the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
 December 23 - the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution.
 22 January 1973 - Congress, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, was scheduled to meet in regular session
on and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the
legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably
could do, the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.

Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the
validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court
has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of
Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the
Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.
Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution
proposed by the Convention.

Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino
people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time
being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any
event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the proper parties may then file such action
as the circumstances may justify.

Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific
proposals for amendment of the Constitution.

Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the
President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under
consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-
35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be
deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been
adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a
transcendental question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the
petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot
and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.

Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this:

(1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73.
(2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion,
or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree.
(3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate
therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra
opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention.
(4) Justice Fernando, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue in the
performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and
Antonio hold the same view.
(5) Whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a
plebiscite, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under
Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were
they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves
question of fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the
factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated.
(6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
 [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion
that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which,
accordingly, should not pass upon such question.
[b] Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted
to and should be determined by the Court
[c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance
with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever.
[d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed
Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact."
(7) Whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando,
Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to
the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to
contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the
petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and
decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

4. JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR NO. L-36142, MAR. 31, 1973

FACTS:

1. The Plebiscite Case

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The
next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to
the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential
Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the
conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and
the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and
“there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being
no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents
thereof.” Accordingly, a motion was filed for the Supreme Court’s speedy decision to the matter beforehand.

While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the
writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering
to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President ANNOUNCING
THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.
 1. The Ratification Case

Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the
proposed Constitutio. Javellana also alleged that theP resident had announced the immediate implementation of
the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which
have the same import and objective.

ISSUE/S NOTED:

1. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly
conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
2. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

HELD/DECISION:

1. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the
COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of
Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme
set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest” expression of the
people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same
are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution.
2. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in
force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third
question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted
the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

5. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, GR NO. L-44640, OCT. 12, 1976

SEPARATION OF POWERS SANIDAD V. COMELEC G.R. NO. L-44640. OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: Pablito Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of “Overview,” a weekly newspaper circulating in Baguio
and the Cordilleras, assailed the Constitutionality of Sec 19 of the Comelec Resolution 2167 which
provides that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time
to campaign for or against the plebiscite issue. Petitioner contends that it violates the freedom of
expression and of the press. Hence, constitutes as a prior restraint in his constitutional right. Solicitor
General contends that it does not violate the Constitution for it is a valid implementation of the power of
Comelec to supervise and regulate media during election or plebiscite period and can express his news
through the Comelec space & airtime.
 ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec is granted the power to regulate mass media during election or plebiscite
period under Article 9C of the 19987 Constitution.

HELD: It is given that what was granted to Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits, or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other
public utilities, media communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space,
and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaign and
forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented is the possibility that a franchise
holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate. Neither the Constitution nor RA 6646 can
be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Comelec Resolution
No 2167 has no statutory basis.

6. LAWYERS LEAGUE VS. AQUINO, GR. NO. 73748, MAY 22, 1986

Minute Resolutions

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET
AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.

In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972,
People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of President Aquino is questioned.
It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to be stated
below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the
petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extra-judicial methods. The withdrawal is
functus oficio.

The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and their
petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made
the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.

In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.------------------------------------------
DIGEST

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice
President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of
power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge.

 The Court further held that:

 The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
 It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
 The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

C. 1987 CONSTITUTION

7. DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA, GR. NO. 78059, AUG. 31, 1987

FACTS: In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, et al., as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal. On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987
designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The
designation made by the OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government." Also on
February 8, 1987, Esguerra signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986 designating respondents
Remigio M. Tigas, et al., as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners maintain that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, Esguerra no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate their successors. However, respondents rely on Section 2,
Article III of the Provisional Constitution, which provided: SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the
one-year period which ended on February 25, 1987.

HELD: NO. While February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one year deadline under the Provisional
Constitution, the same must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading: ―This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.‖ The
1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, Section 2, Article III
of the Provisional Constitution could not be relied on by the respondent OIC Governor. The memorandum
dated February 8, 1987 by the respondent OIC Governor could no longer have any legal force and effect.
The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. The canvass of the votes thereafter is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite, and the proclamation of
the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the
Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite.